
Political Polarization measured by actual behaviour of Parties'

Measuring political polarization in the Dutch *Tweede Kamer*
through parliamentary resolutions and party manifestos

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Summary

Polarization is used as a key word to describe the conflicting positions of political parties in the political system and in society. An increase of polarization is an important indicator for social and political unrest (Frye, 2002; Esteban & Ray, 2008; Oosterwaal, 2009; Rovers, 2019;). The negative impact of polarization on the democratic functionality of the state is visible in the literature. An example is the legislative gridlock in the United States, where especially high impact policies are encountering difficult passage, causing a governmental shutdown (Jones, 2001; McCarthy, ND.). Therefore, studying the polarization level in democracies is important.

However, contemporary research struggled with a missing link (Curino & Hino, 2012) in researching political polarization, which is built on the foundations of Downs (1957) and Sartori (1976), and is focused on the number of parties in a political system and the dynamics of parties. In particular, simply measuring the number of parties, has a big limitation in analyzing polarization. This study introduces a new method, one that covers three processes deemed important in measuring polarization: the actual voting behavior of parties (seen in parliamentary resolutions); coalition building; and responses to changing social attitudes. Introducing the indicator 'parliamentary resolution' enables comprehensive measurement of political polarization during governmental incumbency, covering all three processes. Using the new method, this study tries to answer the following question:

To what extent does the new method, including parliamentary resolutions, offer a different view on the political polarization level and what new insight does it provide for the research of polarization?

This question is applied in a case-study of the Netherlands, a country with a proportional electoral system, a low electoral threshold and one which frequently uses parliamentary resolutions as a well-documented political instrument.

Analysis of parliamentary resolutions provided convincing and corroborating evidence of the in-government party dynamics. The most noticeable and important process was that of coalition building,

which significantly influenced the grades of the political parties. The actual voting of parties gave rise to related data, where parties could not be individually identified and the behaviour of the party was influenced accordingly. It can, therefore, be seen that the governing party's grade was influenced by the parties in coalition or opposition, but also by the initiator of the parliamentary resolution. This study gives an insight into the way parties can structure collaborative work outside their political families, regardless of their coalition/opposition role.

Analysis of actual voting data in parliamentary resolutions is only pertinent in its chronological context and does not reflect the 'normalised' grade of the parties. However, this contextual dependency does not undermine, but strengthen the fundamental importance of actual voting in measuring political polarization because the rating of individual parties is considered less important than the overarching political landscape. Furthermore, there is less evidence of political polarization using a static indicator of party manifestos, whereas the data from the parliamentary resolutions indicated a small decrease of the polarization level during the years included in this study.

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1. Introduction

Nowadays, is there more polarization between political parties? This question sparked the start of this thesis. It originates from the widely held view of the media that the political landscape is more polarized than ever (Pennings & Keman, 2008; Oosterwaal, 2009; Curino & Hino, 2012; Testa, 2012; Rovers, 2019; SCP 2019). Polarization is a key word, used to illustrate the conflicting position of political parties. Recently, political events have been so fast moving that commentary is out of date within a month. However, polarization is a constant theme and is often said to indicate or cause a crisis in the social or political landscape. Polarization is also obstructive in the political process.

An increase in polarization is an important indicator of social and political unrest. The negative impact of polarization on the democratic functionality of the state is visible in the literature (Jones, 2001; Frye, 2002; Esteban & Ray, 2008; McCarthy, ND). An example is the legislative gridlock in the United States, where especially high impact policies are encountering difficult passage, causing a governmental shutdown (Jones, 2001; Esteban & Ray, 2008; Testa, 2012; McCarthy, ND.). In post-communist countries, polarization led to a war of attrition, incoherent policy and slower growth (Frye, 2002). In these cases, increasing polarization is not a beneficial phenomenon in the continuation of a functional democracy. Therefore, studying the polarization level in democracies is important.

Research measuring polarization does not appear as progressive as one would expect, with due regard to the importance of the phenomenon. Most existent research is still done following the foundation laid down by Downs (1957) and Sartori (1976). Although both authors give a firm theoretical basis for the dynamics of political parties in a political system, their research was limited by the measurement tools they used. Most research measured polarization by the static indicators of the electoral system and counting the number of political parties in the system (Dalton, 2008; Aarts, Macdonald & Rabinowitz, 1999; Andrews & Money, 2009; Budge & Macdonald, 2006). Examples of these static indicators are a grade of the party manifesto on a certain policy domain or the perceived place of political parties on a left/right continuum by questionnaire. There is a big limitation in measuring polarization by these static indicators, because the electoral system and the political parties are subject to the flexibility of party dynamics. Static indicators do not cover any effect of the in-government period of parties, where three

processes are present: the actual voting behavior of parties; coalition building; and responses to changing social attitudes. To measure polarization, an indicator should evidence the presence of these three processes so this study introduces a new, dynamic indicator: the parliamentary resolution. This indicator enables comprehensive measurement of political polarization in the in-government period, covering all three processes.

Parliamentary resolutions are part of everyday politics. Members of parliament make thousands of resolutions a year (*Tweede Kamer*, 2020; GOVinfo.gov, n.d.). These resolutions diverge from a proclamation of loss of trust in a minister to the everyday reaction on new developments. Therefore, resolutions are an excellent indicator of all the three processes during the in-government period, and this inclusion gives a more accurate measurement of polarization: every resolution is subject to a voting round so the actual behavior of parties can be measured, instead of measuring their promises; the influence of coalition building can be measured, because parties inside a coalition should vote accordingly; and voting behavior can be measured over a longer time frame; and a change of voting behavior, in response to events or crisis during the in-government period can be evaluated. These characteristics make the parliamentary resolution an ideal candidate for polarization measurement.

To measure the added value of the new method of measuring political polarization, a case study will be conducted to test and evaluate the method. Furthermore, the case study will look for evidence of the three processes during the in-government period, because it is the inclusion of resolutions, which this thesis proclaims to be important for polarization research. In order to evaluate them correctly, a detailed study is required and a case study was deemed the most valuable but the research on the parliamentary resolutions indicator is very time intensive. A high number of documents have to be manually scrutinized, scored and saved, so it is important to first test this new method on a smaller and more detailed scale, before a broader, comparative study.

Having more than two parties in the system is a preferable condition for measuring polarization by parliamentary resolution, because it provides a more dynamic view of actual voting behavior> Parties in a two party system would, most commonly, vote in opposition to one another, whereas, in a multi-party system, parties work in opposition, in a coalition or in other formations. In a multi-party system, this study

expects the polarization level to be low because parties have to work together for an agreement, they need to compromise more, and, therefore, their voting behavior should be more aligned. Downs (1957) and Sartori (1976), however, do not concur; according to them, a multi-party system is more polarized than a two-party system.

The political system of the Netherlands meets all the requirements of the case study (Pennings & Keman, 2008). The Netherlands is a country with a proportional electoral system, a low electoral rate and is characterized by a high number of relevant parties (Pennings & Keman, 2008). Every Member of Parliament is free to hand in proposed resolutions. Members can vote on every resolution individually. Thousands of resolutions are documented, every year, including the number and designation of votes, resulting in a large database of voting behaviour.

When measuring polarization using parliamentary resolutions, this study had three expectations. The first is inherent to its goal to give a better image of the real polarization level during the decision-making process, including responses to changes in social attitudes, and facing nationwide crises. By measuring polarization in the in-government period this study expects a more nuanced image of political polarization, resulting in a lower level of polarization measured by parliamentary resolutions than by party manifestos. The second expectation is a juxtaposition of the theory of Downs and Sartori and this study, where the former expect a higher polarization level with more parties in a party system, whereas this study pays more attention to the relationship between parties instead of just the number of them. The third and last expectation is on the difference between the pre-government period and the in-government period, where the expectation is that the dynamic of the coalition building process creates a different outcome in actual voting behavior. Sartori describes this phenomenon as a limited influence on the polarization level, because parties with different ideologies will not work together. This study expects this influence to be much greater, because in the Netherlands there are examples of ideologically opposed parties in coalition.

In conclusion, polarization is an important phenomenon of the political landscape and any increase could have a negative influence on the functionality of the state. Moreover, preexistent research only includes static indicators and, therefore, is not as progressive as it should be. This study introduces a

new, more dynamic indicator for polarization measurement, the parliamentary resolution and its aim is to evaluate and validate polarization measurement through parliamentary resolutions, in comparison to the party manifestos method. that objective gave rise to the main question of this thesis:

To what extent does the new method, including parliamentary resolutions, offer a different view on the political polarization level and what new insight does it provide for the research of polarization?

In addition, subsidiary questions were formulated:

1. What is polarization?
2. What are the dynamics of political polarization?
3. To what extent did the political polarization level in the case study change, measured by party manifestos?
4. To what extent did the political polarization level in the case study change, measured by parliamentary resolutions?
5. To what extent can the three processes of the in-government period be measured by parliamentary resolutions?

The first and the second question will be answered in the second chapter of the theoretical framework.

The last three questions will be answered in the fourth chapter of the analysis.

1.1 Scientific relevance

Measuring polarization should have a more profound research basis, because of its potential consequences. The lack of measurement tools and indicators of political polarization is, therefore, surprising. This study aims to provide more, and better, understanding of political polarization by using an indicator that introduces the measurement of three features so inherent to politics. With the introduction of the parliamentary resolution this study gives insight into political polarization by actual voting behavior of parties, an indicator not like any of the existing indicators of contemporary research. One of the most interesting features this indicator uncovers is the consequence of the coalition building process. This turns the fundamental expectation, that a multi-party system should be more polarized

than a two-party system, upside down. In a political system where more parties are introduced the effect of compromise is never measured. This study tries to take one step forward in the political polarization research, for it is of the utmost importance to give a just assessment of a powerful connotation, polarization, to a political system.

1.2 Social relevance

Polarization is a phenomenon that is inherent in politics. It can result in more extreme policies and policy gridlock, in which case the political debate is extended, picked up by the media and seen by society as an unanswerable problem. An increase in political polarization can, therefore, influence social polarization too. Conversely, society can influence policy making and the political landscape. Therefore polarization is a political and societal parameter. This study tries to breach this phenomenon by evaluating the processes inherent in politics. Measuring by parliamentary resolutions not only reveals increases and/or decreases in polarization, it also sheds light on the political system. It highlights the need of parties to compromise in order to legislate because a multi-party system only exert real political pressure by collaboration. Understanding this process makes compromise a necessity for the common good, not necessarily for the individual party.

1.3 Reading guide

In chapter 2 the theoretical framework will define polarization, introduce political polarization, describe the indicators used in this thesis and the conceptual model of this thesis will be explained. In chapter 3 the methodology of this thesis will be explained, with extra attention to the coding and measuring of parliamentary resolutions. The analysis part is separated into three chapters. chapter 4 will measure polarization by using the indicator of party manifestos, chapter 5 will measure polarization by parliamentary resolutions, and chapter 6 will evaluate the three processes of the political system seen in the data by parliamentary resolutions. Chapter 7 is the final chapter with the conclusion of this study.

2. Theoretical Framework

Introduction

In this chapter the foundation of this thesis will be formed. It will describe the intriguing path political polarization research has gone down, from the spatial modeling of party competition towards contemporary research. In this reconstruction the flaws of measuring political polarization will become clear and the need for a different measurement of political polarization will be greater.

Reading Guide

The theoretical framework is defined in two parts. In general the first part is on polarization and political polarization. In the second part the indicators of polarization will be explained. The subjects both parts covers are, in consecutive order: the concept of polarization; secondly the adjective of “political” polarization and its research will be described; thirdly, contemporary research on political polarization and its closely related areas will be demonstrated; fourthly political parties will be demarcated and be put in a spatial dimension; lastly, the party manifestos will be described; sixthly the new indicator resolutions are defined.


2.1 What is polarization?

Polarization is about the distance between two positions or more. This general assumption makes polarization easy to explain, but difficult to demarcate from other terms that indicate distance. When using such a marginal definition polarization is not more or less that inequality or dispersion. But this is a mistake, and unfortunately more often made, because inequality and polarization are closely related (Keefer & Knack, 2002; Poole & Rosenthal, 2003; Esteban & Ray, 2011, McCarty). Still these terms are, according to Esteban & Ray (1994; 2008; 2011), fundamentally different from each other. In short, the difference between inequality and polarization is that with inequality the power is in the individual and with polarization the power is in the group. Thus inequality adds a quantity (money, rights) towards each individual that increases the gap between the groups, where polarization gives to each individual one identity that adds more power to the size of the group and the difference across the groups (Esteban & Ray, 1994).

This difference is demarcated in three different features which polarization inhibits. These three features are, homogeneity within clusters, heterogeneity across clusters and the relative size of the cluster. These will form the basis of the definition of polarization used in this thesis. Because of this, the features will be explained by three examples. The first example will explain the homogeneity within clusters, the second example will explain heterogeneity across clusters, and the last example will explain the relative size of the cluster. All three examples are set in a spatial dimension of one dimension of 1 to 9 and the line of argumentation is along the lines of Esteban & Ray (1994). The following rules will be applied on all the examples. The clusters are for the simplicity just named cluster A, cluster B and so on. The assumption is that these clusters are composed of the same attributes and on these attributes internally homogeneous and across each other heterogeneous. The attributes can change, therefore clusters can change from composition and position. The attributes used in the examples are attributes A, Attributes B and so on.


The rules above are set out, for the purpose of clarity, in this example. Explanatory example as seen in Figure 1.01: On Attributes A (migration policy) the opinions are grouped in five clusters, cluster A (extremely negative towards migration), cluster B (negative towards migration), cluster C (indifferent towards migration), cluster D (positive towards migration) and cluster E (extremely positive towards migration). These are placed on the spatial dimension on point 1, 3, 5, 7, 9.

Figure 1.01 Diagram illustrating a normal distribution



We start the examples with two distributions on attribute A and attribute B, where attribute A is composed of nine different clusters and attribute B is composed of two different clusters.

Figure 1.02 **Diagrams illustrating Example 1**



The distribution of Figure X seen in Figure 1.02 is perfectly divided in nine clusters equally spaced apart at the points 1,2,...,9. It is assumed that two members of each cluster are 'similar' on attribute A and members from different clusters are 'dissimilar' across each cluster on attribute A. In Figure Y the uniform distribution is collapsed into a two-spike configuration concentrated on points 3 and 7 and the same assumption is in force. This example focused on the importance of homogeneity within each cluster. The distribution of clusters in both figures can be compared on their polarization level without calculation. The cluster distribution on attribute B in Figure Y looks more conflictual where two clusters with a clear identity are opposite of each other than the cluster distribution on attribute A in Figure X, where a sense of cluster identity becomes less visible. If you admit the possibility that Figure Y exhibits a greater polarization, you are forced to depart from the domain of inequality measurement. For under any inequality measure, inequality has come down in Figure Y relative to X (Esteban & Ray, 1994).

Example 2 will illustrate the importance of heterogeneity across the clusters. This example is illustrated in Figure 1.03. On Figure X the cluster distribution is centered on points 3 and 7. The clusters in Figure Y are also distributed along two spikes, but on point 1 and 9 on the dimension. Even though the position of the clusters is different on both attributes the intra-cluster homogeneity is the same. The difference in this example lies in the inter-group heterogeneity between the clusters on the two different attributes. In this example Figure Y exhibits greater polarization, because the two spikes are more apart from each other than the ones of Figure X, and therefore give greater probability of conflict. Where the difference in the polarization level of Figure X and Y are quite clear. The difference between both figures and Figure Z is more ambiguous. This Figure consists of four clusters that are positioned on point 1, 3, 7 and 9.

While Figure Y shows ample evidence of greater polarization than X, Figure Z as transition in-between these figures is less clear. All four clusters indicate less cluster homogeneity than example X and Y, but the cluster heterogeneity has increased. The fact that polarization is not just the mathematics of adding the clusters of point 1 and 3 and point 7 and 9 in such a way a large cluster on point 2 and point 8 is created. Of course the clusters on each side of the dimension will be seen as dissimilar and the cluster in the close vicinity similar. But the sum of point 1 and 3 in Figure Z is not equal to cluster 3 in Figure X or cluster 1 in Figure Y. Therefore it depends in this case on which feature is seen as more important by the assessor.

Figure 1.03 Diagrams illustrating Example 2




Figure X

Figure Y





Figure Z

The last example will explain the importance of the relative size of clusters. In Figure 1.04 the example is illustrated. In Figure X the clusters are centered on points 2 and 9 with smaller clusters on points 1 and 3. When assessing the polarization level in this example, point 1, 2 and 3 would see themselves as similar where the cluster on point 9 is very dissimilar. The clusters on point 1 and 3 do not have much weight for the polarization level, because the heterogeneity between the clusters on point 1, 2 and 3 is

not large and the homogeneity on point 1 and 3 is smaller than point 2 and 9. The smaller the clusters on point 1 and 3 will become, the less significant they will be to the point that the cluster does not have any real weight in influencing the polarization level. In Figure Y this is exemplified, where the clusters on point 1, 2 and 3 all increased and the cluster on point 9 decreased. The previous “little” clusters on point 1 and 3 were seen as part of point 2 against their common enemy, the cluster on point 9, but both clusters increased and the cluster on point 9 decreased to an “insignificant” size. The clusters on point 1 and 3 are now the cause of polarization. Still the polarization on this attribute decreased from Figure X to Figure Y. When assessing the polarization level of Figure Y the level will be low because the common conception on attribute B makes the cluster on point 9 insignificant.

Figure 1.04 Diagrams illustrating Example 3



The previous three examples amplified the basic features of polarization, homogeneity, heterogeneity and relative size of clusters. What has emerged from the examples is that polarization is indeed different from inequality, because inequality assumes according to the Lorenz ordering that any distribution of income, any transfer of income from an individual to one richer than him must increase inequality. To apply it, it is unnecessary to take account of the original distribution (Esteban & Ray, 1994). Another point that has risen in the examples is the ambiguity of assessing polarization. If there is a change in one of the features of homogeneity or heterogeneity (what can result in feature three, an insignificant size cluster), the change in the level of polarization is not hard to assess, but if there is a change in both features, the assessor can only determine whether the intra-cluster homogeneity is more important than

the inter-group heterogeneity. This difficulty of assessing will be neutralized by the measurement method, explained in the methodology chapter.

To make a comprehensive definition of polarization, the article of Esteban & Ray (1994) is supplemented by the article of DiMaggio, Evans & Bryson (1996). Esteban & Ray (1994) define polarization as a population of individuals grouped according to some vector of characteristics into clusters. Each cluster should be very “similar” in terms of the attributes of its members, and each cluster has members with very “dissimilar” attributes (Esteban & Ray, 1994). DiMaggio, Evans & Bryson (1996) define polarization by explaining what polarization is not. According to them it is not noisy incivility in political exchange, polarization refers to the extent of disagreement, not to the ways in which disagreement is expressed. DiMaggio, Evans & Bryson (1996) also distinguish two different forms of polarization, namely as a state and as a process. The first refers to the extent to which opinions on an issue are opposed in relation to some theoretical maximum. The latter refers to the increase in such opposition over time. In this study polarization will be seen as a process to analyze the change of the degree in polarization over time. When combining Esteban & Ray (1994), and DiMaggio, Evans & Bryson (1996) a definition of polarization is constructed and composed of seven basic features of polarization: 1) distance between two or more clusters on any given attributes; 2) attributes are composed of a common conception; 3) spatial dimension; 4) relative and significant size of a cluster; 5) homogeneous of cluster on attributes; 6) heterogeneous across clusters on attributes; 7) it is a process over a longer time period.

When taken these seven features into account this study constructs the following definition:

‘Polarization is the gap of position between clusters and the relative size of clusters, over a longer time frame, in a spatial dimension, where every cluster is homogeneous in terms of attributes given, and is heterogeneous across clusters.’

2.2 Literature on political polarization

The origins of the research on political polarization can be found in the works of Downs (1957) and Sartori (1976). Both works laid down the foundation of the spatial modelling of party systems and party competition. They did not inherently want to lay a basis for researching political polarization as such, but afterwards political research on this form of polarization is mainly focused on the essentials put forward by them. This is because their assumption on the behavior of parties and voters leads directly towards the assumption of the level of polarization in a political system. Thus the foundation of the spatial modelling of party systems and party competition are described here.

The contribution of Downs's concept of the spatial modelling of party systems is applying economic theory on democracy. His economic rationality means being efficient, i.e., maximizing output for a given input or minimizing input for a given output. In his eyes, a rational person is "[one] who moves towards its goals in a way which, to the best of his knowledge, uses the least possible input of scarce resources per unit of valued output" (Downs, 1957, p. 5). This rationality is corresponding with the idea of the "rational consumer" or the *homo economicus*. For our purpose this consumer is transformed to the "rational citizen" or *homo politicus*. In addition to this, Downs' model assumes that every individual, although rational, is also selfish. This creates the self-interest axiom, which assumes that rational behavior always directs primarily towards selfish ends (Downs, 1957, p. 27). This rationality can also be found in other actors as decision-makers, including political parties, interest groups, and governments (Downs, 1957, p. 6). This rationality is in the nature of political parties. Their sole reason for existing is trying to seek control of the governing apparatus. Therefore these parties are vote-maximizers. These assumptions affect polarization directly as we shortly will see.

Downs (1957) assumes two things, firstly that parties place themselves as vote-maximizers on the best spot on a one-dimensional physical space. And secondly that there is an ideological consensus among the citizens that they are normally distributed along the continuum. When this consensus is stable, he speaks about an ideological equilibrium. Consequently within a two-party system parties deliberately change their platforms so that they resemble one another. And this is according to Downs in the middle of the one-dimensional space. If the ideological consensus is absent and citizens are distributed on the

extremes, the polarization would be too large and the consequence will be chaos and potentially result in revolution. Downs therefore hypothesizes the following for polarization research: either there is a normally distributed electorate, and resulting in parties ending up in the middle of this distribution, or the distribution is on the extremes and therefore chaos and conflict as a result. In the first option parties create less polarized political systems, because the heterogeneity across the parties has decreased. In the second option the heterogeneity across the parties increased, and with it the polarization level.

In a multi-party system parties Down's assumes that parties try to be as ideologically distinct from each other as possible. However Downs sees the space of the electoral system as small and definite. Therefore the electoral system constructed as the one-dimensional line has only place for a certain number of parties. A limited number of parties thus compete for power with chances of success. Therefore, a definite number of parties will spring up along the normally distributed continuum and maneuver until the distance between each party and its immediately adjacent neighbors is the same for all parties. Consequently, for parties there's no ideological incentive to move towards each other, because there are no more votes to win on the left that will not be lost on the right (Downs, 1957). The assumption for polarization research in multi-party systems is that the size of the parties is the most important gauge to measure polarization in these systems. Because there is not much ideological competition the heterogeneity across parties stay the same. The same can be said about the homogeneity across parties, because if not, then the assumption of no ideological competition is false. A last remark, Downs is highly critical about the stability of multi-party systems. Therefore the small and definite space he constructs where they can compete. A multi-party system with more than four or five parties results, according to Downs, is chaos. Therefore a higher number of parties should result in a higher polarization level, an assumption made by most studies on "just" the number of parties.

The cooperation between parties in a multi-party system is often characterized by a coalition. In this study the presumption is that the coalition building has a decreasing effect on the polarization level. Downs uses (1957), a definition of a coalition that is inherent to the nature of political parties. Namely: "a political party is a team of people seeking to control the governing apparatus by gaining office in a duly constituted election" (Downs, 1957, p. 28). This nature of political parties continued in his definition of a coalition. According to Downs a coalition consist of people seeking to control the governing

apparatus by legal means. In other words a coalition is a group of individuals who have certain ends in common and cooperate with each other to achieve them. The governing apparatus is the physical, legal and institutional equipment which the government uses to carry out its specialized role. This loosely formed group of people who cooperate chiefly in an effort to get some of their number elected to office. However, they may strongly disagree with each other about the policies which those elected should put into practice.

Sartori (1976) borrows much from the Downsian model of party competition. The emphasis in this part will be on the critical aspects laid out by Sartori of Downs' work. However it should be made clear that in most part Sartori faced the same difficulties in creating an applicable measurement tool as did Downs. Therefore the contribution of Sartori is unfortunately less in practical measurement tools and more in points of attention. These points are on two-party systems, multi-party systems, political parties and coalitions.

The first and most significant point of attention is places on the Downsian theory of party competition of multi-party systems. Sartori (1976) thinks it is highly implausible that in a multi-party system, parties slide among a fixed competitive space. The perspective that the overall space of competition is fixed or inelastic, and that two parties slide among the same linear size of competitive space than say six parties is wrong. Therefore the presumption that Downs suggests that there is an optimal position along the spectrum for parties resulting in an equilibrium is also wrong.

That is to say, various systems display different overall linear distances (Sartori, 1976, P. 343). If the continuum becomes larger when more parties are introduced in a system the dynamics change too. According to Sartori, two to four parties can still be centripetal, but with five or more the competition forces become centrifugal. The crucial element of this change is that when the extreme ends of the spectrum are so far removed as to be two poles apart, then the center becomes not only a highly visible point, but also a pole endowed with strong leverage. Now a center positioning is perceived by the non-extremist electorate as the safe position, the position that best secures the survival of the existing democracy. We may equally say that the center position now incarnates a center logic of defense against the extremes. Hence the system is now tripolar or eventually multipolar (Sartori, 1976, p. 349). The basic

idea of multipolar systems is in his model of polarized pluralism (a system with more than 5/6 established parties) is that the leverage acquired by a center pole discourages and actually impedes centrality and that the extreme parties of such systems prosper on more, not on less polarization (Sartori, 1976, p. 350).

A second point of attention is the dynamics of coalition building. Sartori, connects this with vote transferability. This is the willingness of each voter to move along the spectrum. According to Sartori there is a clear point of no-transfer. Moreover, this principle is the same with legislators and politicians. They do not simply abide into their coalition maneuverings, in what Sartori calls, the contiguity principle: parties too encounter a no-coalition point (Sartori, 1976). In other words, Sartori acknowledges a maximum movability of voters, politicians and parties and their tolerance to cooperate.

The last point is very important for the substantiation of this study. Downs' assumption that the spatial modelling of party systems is based on economic rationality and selfish means, results in vote-maximalization of parties. He describes it as follows: "parties formulate policies in order to win elections, rather than win elections in order to formulate policies" (Downs, 1957, p. 28). Sartori (1976) however thinks that defining parties as "vote-maximizers" is largely untrue. His definition is: "A party is any political group that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections, candidates for public office." (Sartori, 1976,p.64). In this definition, it does not mean that parties are only vote-maximizers, but use votes as a means to stay in the market and enact policy. However parties still have to compete for votes, or they cease to exist. Nevertheless Sartori admits that in election time parties are these "vote-maximizers". Therefore Downs as Sartori admits that in election time parties do have an attitude to maximize their vote-base. Making the election time period, and the party manifesto indicator an highly influenced. For this reason the parliamentary resolutions are an interesting indicator to see behind the highly influenced period of election time, by analyzing the real voting behavior of parties.

The contribution of Downs and Sartori on polarization research is as follows. Downs and Sartori lay the basis of party competition and the dynamics of parties in party systems. The assumption that their models could understand the behavior of political parties in a party system, and with it predicting their movability, results in the possibility to model the polarization level too. The dynamic of parties on account of Downs, polarization in two-party systems, where parties end up in the middle of a uni-dimensional

space, create less polarization in the sense of heterogeneity across parties, but more on homogeneity in parties. His presumption on multi-party systems is that the overall polarization is higher than in a two-party system. Still because of the inflexible one-dimension there is a small definite number of parties competing in the political system. Therefore polarization is thus higher because of the increase in heterogeneity across clusters, but decreased by the homogeneity in parties. And all up to a definite maximum. Satori agrees with the centripetal effect of a two or more party system. Parties tend to move to the center. This changed however when more parties enter the political system. Where it then becomes centrifugal. But even so Satori argues that the dimensional space is flexible and changes with the adding of more parties. There is still an end to this increase. Therefore parties that end up on the extremes leave a vacuum in the middle, and therefore change the process to centripetal again. On the grounds of the coalition building process, Downs is more open minded about coalitions with people who are just seeking government control. Therefore every party can work together to create a coalition. Satori is more strict in this coalition process. He argues that there is a definite point of no transfer. Therefore making the statement that parties that are too far apart can't create coalitions. One last remark is on the nature of political parties and their vote-maximizer quality, where e both agree that parties especially in election time are vote-maximizers. Making the statement that assessing polarization in the election period is a highly influential period (Sartori, 1976). For this reason the election period does not seem to do justice to, at least the behavior of parties in the in-government period.

2.3 Contemporary research on political polarization

In this part the research that helped strengthen the base of this study will be described. The allocation of contemporary research received a less important place in this study, for the first and foremost reason that most research uses the basis of Downs (1956) and Satori (1976). Another reason is that existing research on polarization is using indicators that are too static. Therefore the key to the missing link in existing polarization research is not found in these studies. However a brief summary of existing contemporary research will be given, because their influence is in the foundation of this research.

Most contemporary research is based on indirect indicators, like the number of parties in a party system. With the assumption that the number of parties affect the representation of social cleavages in voting

behavior, election turnout, patterns of political conflict and thus also on political polarization (Baldassarri & Bearman, 2007; Dalton, 2008;). According to these researches there is still a strong relational indicator between the number of parties in a political system and political polarization (Andrews & Money, 2009). Another reason the number of parties as an indicator is still used is the feasibility of research. The amount of political parties and their ideological position is relatively easy to measure. Researchers only need to know the factual grade of the vote share and measure the ideological position. In addition, a lot of political science research is comparative. The number of political parties is an excellent indicator to use in these researches.

Other studies look to the relationship and effect of polarization and the electoral systems. Examples of these studies are Dow (2001) where he studies the effect of the majoritarian system of France and Canada on the spatial dispersion of the parties, and compares this with the proportional system of the Netherlands and Israel. His conclusion is that the majoritarian system is located significantly closer to the center than proportional systems are (Dow, 2001, p. 122). Other studies look for the relationship between party systems size and polarization (Ezrow, 2008; Andrews & Money, 2009; Dow, 2011; Curino & Hino, 2012). However there are also criticism of the use of this relational indicator. Dalton (2008) is one of the critical researchers, he does give weight to the relationship between electoral systems on two-party and multi-party systems. However he argues that measuring just the number of parties can miss in many cases the property of party systems. Still he concludes that counting the number of parties can be of prime interest in studying the increase in coalition negotiation costs. Where he attest to the increase of these costs as the number of parties increase in a political system.

Another indicator that has been researched in relationship with political polarization is the party-system size. One of the interesting studies is the one from Curino & Hino (2012) who tries to find the missing link of researching political polarization to study the relationship between party systems and institutional and voter-related factors. Others that study the relationships of party-systems are Dalton (2008), Ezrow (2008), Andrews & Money (2009) and Dow (2011). Andrews & Money (2009) study the relationship between the number of parties in a party system and party dispersion. They conclude that when the number of parties in the system increases, the dispersion of parties also increases, but only up to a point. Therefore the spatial dimension is according to them, just like Sartori (1976) not an infinite one.

In addition, once the boundaries of the spatial dimensions were reached, the electoral rules did not have any direct effect on party dispersion. Dow (2011) tries to estimate the extent of party-system compactness or dispersion across polities and determine whether more proportional systems foster greater ideological divergence among parties. The relationship between proportional systems tends to support greater ideological dispersion than less proportional systems. Once again in the smaller party-size systems the parties tend to position themselves on the center.

This study will try to deliver a study that will build on the groundwork Downs (1957) and Sartori (1976) put down, like the above studies. It will try to use contemporary research of Dalton (2008) by adapting their measurement tool, Esteban & Ray (1994) by using part of their definition of polarization, Dow (2011) to put it in the same proportionalism system, Dalton (2008), Ezrow (2008), Andrews & Money (2009) and Dow (2011) to research one-sided the effect of real voting behavior in multi-party systems. As last it will use the proposition of Curino & Hino (2012) that finding a missing link is key, an endeavor this study sets out to be a part of.

2.4 Indicators of this study

The first indicator this study uses to measure polarization is the party manifestos. The first and foremost reason is the comparability of this indicator in polarization research. The party manifestos are an indicator that is throughout the democratic world a universal tool. The data of these party manifestos on a broad range of policy domains makes it one of the most documented and coded indicators on political issues. Therefore the first part will describe the use of the indicator in contemporary research.

The second part will describe the newly introduced indicator, the parliamentary resolution. This indicator should inhibit the process of the real voting behavior of parties. One of the main shortcomings of existing polarization research. Contemporary research is all about measuring polarization by indirect indicators. Parliamentary resolutions are the first indicator that can measure and attest for the real voting behavior of parties. With this quality it will uncover the way parties work together in their daily working process. Therefore the second part will describe the indicator parliamentary resolution.

2.4.1 Indicator: Party Manifestos

The first indicator used to measure political polarization are the party manifestos. This static indicator is in line with the contemporary research to measure on the basis of the amount of parties in a political system. To grade the ideological position of the party, one could use the party position on basis of the citizen placements of these parties (Dalton, 2008) or, one could grade the ideological position on the basis of party manifestos. Studies that made use of party manifestos are Budge & McDonald (2006), Ezrow (2008) and Andrews & Money (2009). They all use data of the Comparative Manifesto Project, a databank that not only provides party manifestos of many countries from all the years after World War II, it also provides coded data of all the party manifestos on different attributes.

Party manifestos are an important source of information that informs the public with the main priorities of the party in election time. The aim of the party manifestos is to distribute certain points in a clear and simple way to target a broad range of voters. Repetition of these points is their hallmark, highlighting their policy points and repeating them in slightly varied form and coming back to them in a variety of contexts. This characteristic gives an enormous set of results (Budge, et al., 2001). The fact that party manifestos are campaign programs is for some researchers the reason that they argue party manifestos are not usable for research (Dalton, 2008). Parties do not have to maintain their program after election and therefore they use party manifestos as a way to distinguish themselves from the other parties, increasing polarization. This study recognizes this feature, but party manifestos as an already established indicator make it an trusted adversary of the indicator of the new parliamentary resolution.

For the measurement of party manifestos this study will use the dataset given by the Comparative Manifesto Project. When using party manifestos, the CMP database is the largest databank and provides the most transparency on their coding methods. Their coding collaborates with the policy topics of this study. Their elaborated coding sheet is included as appendix 1. This coding sheet is based on 56 categories that are grouped into seven major polity areas. These polity areas are frequently updated (last update is in 2014). This provides a matching framework of coding with the changing preferences of policies.

Content of party manifestos in the case study

In the party manifesto the main policy issues are addressed, but are they elaborate enough for grading? They are written for the public to assess the parties attitude towards policy topics. To what extent party manifestos are really used by the electorate is not an issue for the grading of polarization of the political landscape. If this is their ideal of how the country should be run, then the score will be one of extremes. Therefore the polarization level of the party manifestos could be higher.

The party Manifesto is on average an elaborated campaign story of the party's view on the Netherlands and the position of the Netherlands in the world. There are some exceptions in content and format. The content of the party manifesto of the Party for the Animals (PVDD) who puts the animal welfare and environment central to their manifest. Or there is a difference in the elaboration of the content. The Freedom Party (PVV) handed in an election Pamphlet with bullet points. And there are also differences in format. An average party manifesto includes chapters on the main policy points, for example education, safety (law and order), environment and health care. But there are exceptions like the Pamphlet of the PVV or the People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) who uses a newspaper format for their 2006 manifest edition. This results in just 4 page edition of the highlights of their party. Needless to say that these exceptions deliver different levels of content. Additionally the grading of one party can be different over the years because of their use of content and format, not necessarily because they changed their views.

2.4.2 Indicator: Resolutions

The second indicator used in this study is the new introduced indicator: the parliamentary resolution. This indicator is the missing link in measuring real voting behavior in parliament. Therefore this study will give an unique view of daily working behavior of parties. Therefore this indicator should give an answer to the indirect indicator of contemporary polarization research, never done before. This study came to the conclusion of using the parliamentary resolutions because it inhibits the quality of three political processes, namely: real voting behavior of parties; coalition building; and responses to changing social attitudes. In order to measure all three processes the voting of a large quantity will be researched. An useful addition to the quantity is the measurement over a longer time frame.

Resolutions are an easy way for a parliamentary member to express their own or their parties' opinion, because all members of parliament are equally able to submit resolutions. Even though opposition parties have more incentives to propose resolutions, because a part of the resolutions are responses to policies brought forward by the government, still the voting on them is not always an opposition versus coalition enterprise. Therefore it is an opportunity to look into the real voting behavior of political parties.

Content of Parliamentary Resolutions

Parliamentary motions are a part of everyday politics in the Dutch *Tweede Kamer*. On average the members of parliament produce more than three thousand motions a year. These motions diverge from a proclamation of loss of trust in a minister to the everyday reaction on new developments. Because all motions should be handed in to the chairman of the *Tweede Kamer*, all motions are filed. Starting from 2009 this archive is modernized into a digital archive. Therefore access to the motions from 2009 to the present day is fairly easy. Access to earlier years is unfortunately more difficult. The Government does have an archive of all Parliamentary Papers, except the archive method of filing, makes it excruciatingly difficult to assess such a large portion of data.

The Dutch Government provides the vote count on every motion. This gives us crucial information on the attitude of political parties towards the addressed topics. Only with access to the vote count can an objective measurement of the attitude be made. Even though the Dutch political system is based on individual membership, and members of parliament are free to vote without the parties consent, the possibility to do so is not often used. In the almost thousand parliamentary motions included in this research only on three motions, there was one member that voted out of the party line. Therefore the attitude on the motion can be subscribed to the attitude of the party instead of the individual member.

Parliamentary motions give a different timeframe of research. Where the party manifestos grade on one moment in time, motions gives on average two assessments a day. Even though the content of the motions are little, they give repeatedly detailed information on the standpoints of political parties. The important difference of the motion to the party manifesto is that the grades on the motions are based on the actions of the party, instead of their standpoints. Coalition negotiations weaken the standpoints of

parties dramatically. Thus where the party manifesto's are based on the individual party's standpoints, the parliamentary motion is subjected to the interaction between the parties. The biggest collusion is seen with the coalition, and the opposition in lesser degree.

Content of parliamentary motions

A parliamentary motion is the tool of members of parliament in the *Tweede Kamer* to voice their opinion. Therefore the content of the motions are different from other data, they are not all strategically issued points, or party manifesto headlines, but are mostly comments on policy. But because of the platform it gives, members of parliament use motions to voice their general concern, to express their vision, or to submit a message to their voters.

The content of the parliamentary motions has different forms. They can contain encouragement for ministers to do further research on the effects of policies. They can contain a plea for the postponement of future policies, or current policies. They can contain small adjustments to current policies. They can contain proposals for new policies. They can contain statements, this can be in different forms. The statement can be made on current policies or ministers. Mostly to express their concern or outrage. And they can contain a declaration of loss of trust in the minister, or council of ministers.

Thus the unique newly introduced parliamentary resolutions should go further where existing research stopped. That is the addition of a direct indicator of real voting behavior of parties, instead of indirect quantities of the political system. Because whatever good does it do to polarization research to measure parties that differ significantly on the left, right continuum, to see them in both in government and there real voting behavior is the same. With indirect measurement these parties will cause high polarization, however with direct indicators as the parliamentary resolution uncovers that their real voting behavior is the same. This study will uncover this unique view of measuring political polarization.

3. Methodology

The methodology chapter is extra important for the coding and operationalization of the newly introduced indicator of parliamentary resolutions. For the validity of this study the coding of the parliamentary resolutions are explained in as much detail as could be provided. Apart from this, the indicator of party manifestos will shortly be described. Then the part of parliamentary resolutions will follow. After that the operationalization of both indicators will be explained. This is followed by the description of the one-dimensional continuum that is used.

3.1 Policy domains

This study is using four policy domains in order to construct a balanced analysis of the polarization level. The policy domains used in this study are: military, law and order, European union and multiculturalism. The policy domains are knowingly selected from other studies, in order to enable a methodological comparison with other studies. Before we look into this variety of studies, this study tried to make a balanced choice of policy domains from these studies. Therefore it included two policy domains: military and law and order, that are perceived to be ideology right (Budge & Macdonald, 2006) and one policy domain that is ideology left: Multiculturalism. And one policy that is ideology undefined: European Union. Another balance this study wanted to make is to include two policy domains that are perceived to be more polarized, namely law and order and Multiculturalism. And two policy domains that are perceived to be less polarized, namely the European Union and military.

In studies on political polarization there are often more than less policy domains included. As a result the policy domains are more narrowly defined. These policy domains are therefore mostly policy issues, and based on one question, or a set of questions for larger studies. These issues are on for instance on freedom, human rights, national way of life, economic incentives, democracy, nationalization, education and labor groups (Budge & Macdonald, 2006). However there are some geographical differences. In the study of Aarts, Macdonald & Rabinowitz (1999) in a case study of the Netherlands, all four policy domains of military, law and order, European Union and multiculturalism are used. In this study these issues are named: military strength, crime, European Union and minorities. In studies focused on the

United States the issues are: aid to blacks, abortion, gay marriage, death penalty and health insurance (Abramowitz & Saunders 2008). Thus resulting in totally different policy issues.

The more specific definition of the four policy domains will be followed in the individual indicators of party manifestos and parliamentary resolutions. Where the party manifestos definition is from their own code book, the parliamentary resolution needed a more detailed selection. That is to say, it excluded and included more specific subjects inside the policy domain in order to give the parliamentary resolution the right coding.

3.2 Indicator: Party Manifestos

The indicator used to give a clear insight in the pre-government time period is the party manifesto. This is the indicator that is used in a majority of research to place the attitude of the parties on a continuum. In this study the party manifesto indicated parties attitudes on the four policy domains. The party manifestos used in this study are the official party manifestos indicated by the term “*verkiezingsprogramma*” (election program). The organisation that collects and grades these party manifestos is the comparative manifesto project (CMP). The CMP has the largest databank for party manifestos and grades the party manifestos with their own comparative codebook. These coded data are used in this study.

There are 56 categories the CMP defines in their codebook, four of these categories will be used in this study. More information over the four chosen domains will follow later in this chapter. To grade the party manifestos on these categories, the party manifestos are dissected sentence for sentence and then added as a score to the category the sentence best suits. When there is no connection with any category, the sentence is left out of grading. The result of the coding of a party manifesto is a certain score on every category that the party manifesto includes.

An important note is that the scores are one sided, on the majority of the categories. In other words, there are two categories that describe the same policy domain. For instance, military positive is one category, and military negative another. For this reason a low score on military positive, does not imply

a high score on military negative. A low score on military positive only implies that the amount of positive sentences on military positive is low. This study has chosen to use only the positive categories on all the four categories. In the first place, because the positive side of the policy domains gets more attention in the party manifestos and parliamentary resolutions. Parties tend to address a broad vote share. Parliamentary resolutions do see the same pattern. Parties which do not persist to this pattern are the extremist parties. They do address budget cuts, abolishment of institutions and exclude professional and social groups from their party manifestos as in their parliamentary resolutions. For this reason the negative side of the policy domain gets less attention in the data, especially with the party manifestos, resulting in a lot of no data fields. Therefore this study uses the positive side of the policy domain.

The selected years:

The party manifestos are made before every election period. Every party has an own time-frame of introducing their party manifesto. One thing they have in common is that before every election a party manifesto is made without exceptions. Thus the designation of the party manifestos is on the first year of government. In other words, the party manifestos for the election period of 2007-2010 are for example designated by the year 2007.

The government years included in this research are on the three election periods from 2007 until 2017. The CMP has also data on the period before 2007, however the data from the indicator of parliamentary resolutions don't go back until 2008. There are the following election periods:

2007-2010 designated as 2007

2010-2012 designated as 2010

2012-2017 designated as 2012

3.3 Indicator: Parliamentary resolutions

The indicator is used to give an insight in the in-government time period is the parliamentary resolution. This indicator is the contribution of this study to the research of political polarization and thus needs more attention. First the parliamentary resolution will be introduced more. Secondly the selected years

will be answered for. And thirdly the coding of the parliamentary resolutions will be described. The operationalization of the indicator of parliamentary resolution will be introduced together with the indicator of party manifestos in 3.5.

All the data of the parliamentary resolutions are from the official website of the *Tweede Kamer*. The parliamentary resolutions are filed by datum. In the databank of the *Tweede Kamer* are 36,704 parliamentary resolutions (*Tweede Kamer*, 2016). In the three time periods this study covers there are 8,847 parliamentary resolutions in total, where 742 are included in this study.

The selected years:

For the 2007 election: 02-09-2008 until 02-09-2009

For the 2010 election: 14-10-2010 until 14-10-2011

For the 2012 election: 05-11-2012 until 05-11-2013

This study tried to select the same years of the in-government period. Because there can be an assumption that the first year of a government period will be different than for instance the last year. However there were two reasons why this was impossible. The first problem was the databank of the *Tweede Kamer*. There is only digital data from around October 2008 and only full information from September that same year. Therefore the first year of government was not possible for the 2007 election year. The second, third or fourth year of the government period was not possible because of the election year of 2010. This government year only lasted 18 months. Therefore this study compromised by including the data from the first day of the government period in the election year of 2010 and 2012. And started including data from 02-09-2008 in the election year of 2007 that started on the 22th of February.

3.3.1 Coding of parliamentary resolutions

The resolutions are all manually selected by viewing every day of the week in the selected years. All resolutions used are filed by the day of vote and their policy domain. Here is a more detailed way of selecting and coding of the parliamentary resolutions described.

- 1) Every day is viewed, parliamentary resolutions with the following qualities are viewed:
 - a. All the parliamentary resolutions with sub-titles that include the policy topics.

- b. All the parliamentary resolutions with sub-titles that can be linked to the policy topics.
- 2) The parliamentary resolutions are viewed one by one and assessed on their relation with the policy topic. They are included in the study when:
 - a. The content of the parliamentary resolution is on one of the policy topics.
 - i. *Militarism*
 - 1. All the statements about military missions.
 - 2. All the statements about military spending.
 - 3. All the statements about military equipment, training and personnel.
 - 4. All the statements about military veterans
 - ii. *Law and order*
 - 1. All the statements about home security, i.e. security systems, police department, criminal investigation department and prisons.
 - 2. All the statements about the police force.
 - 3. All the statements about sentences and punishments of delinquents.
 - iii. *European Union*
 - 1. All the statements about the power of the European Union
 - 2. All the statements about the rights and obligations of the European Union
 - iv. *Multiculturalism*
 - 1. All the statements about the migrants and asylum seekers in the Netherlands.
 - 2. All the statements about the integration of migrants and asylum seekers.
 - 3. All the statements about the rights and obligations of migrants and asylum seekers.
 - b. Content that is not included
 - i. *In general*
 - 1. Resolutions without a vote
 - a. Because the vote is the objectively parameter for the parties attitude.
 - 2. Resolutions that could not be opened (N=2 in all the selected years)
 - a. Because an assessment could not be made.
 - 3. Resolutions that could not be graded as positive/neutral or negative towards policy topics (N=9 in all the selected years)
 - a. Because the resolutions were too technical to rightfully judge the resolution as a negative-positive/neutral selection.
 - 4. The parliamentary resolutions on the annual budget debate
 - a. Because the budget debate is all about the allocation of money towards the different ministries. Where the dichotomy of opposition and coalitions is imminent. Therefore it would be an

interesting feature. Unfortunately it is highly subjective to grade these resolutions as negative-positive/neutral, for the mere reason that from 2008 on, the economic crisis leaves the government with budget cuts all along the policy fields. The opposition from the right to the left of the ideology spectrum is for more spending, without contributing to where the money should come from. Therefore making the annual budget debate resolutions highly difficult to assess.

5. Laws

- a. Because with the making of new law parliamentary reaction comes more in the form of amendments to the law instead of resolutions.

6. Letters from the presidium

- a. Because there are no resolutions attached to these letters.

7. Letters from the European Commission

- a. Because there are no resolutions attached to these letters.

8. Amendments

- a. Because these are very detailed and technical comments on laws that are difficult to code.

ii. Military

1. Inquiry about the invasion of Iraq (mission in 2003)

- a. Because this is about the responsibility for a mission in a period before this government.

2. Inquiry about Srebrenica (mission in 1991)

- a. Because this is about the responsibility for a mission in a period before this government.

3. The subject of weapons exports

- a. Because this is closely linked towards trade and trade gives a different dynamic to the subject treated.

iii. Law and order

1. All the resolutions that combine law and order and multiculturalism.

- a. These subjects were too closely related to more than one policy domain.

2. The subject of the sex branch

- a. Because this discussion was conducted between the safety of the women involved and the repression of the trade.

3. The subject of tax evasion

- a. Because there were only highly technical resolutions.

4. Emergency debate on the TBS

- a. Because this was a highly technical debate and therefore resulted in technical resolutions.

iv. European Union

1. The subject of the European Monetary Union
 - a. Because the monetary union is in the first place a different union, and secondly the resolutions on the European Monetary Union were only on the policy of the ECB.
2. Parliamentary resolutions that ask the European Union to take a certain point of view.
 - a. Because these issues were often very broad and not specific on one policy domain.

v. Multiculturalism

1. All the resolutions that combine law and order and multiculturalism.
 - a. These subjects were too closely related to more than one policy domain.
2. No parliamentary resolutions on labor migration from within the European Union.
 - a. Because these resolutions were closely related to more than one policy domain.
3. The subject of ritual slaughter
 - a. Because this was not a religious point, but a point from an animal welfare standpoint.
4. Did not include the subject of youth, underprivilege and women's emancipation if there was not a clear connection to multiculturalism.
 - a. Because then it did not touch the outline of multiculturalism.
5. Did not include the subject of development aid
 - a. Because this is a subject external to the Netherlands instead of internal.

3.3.2 Selecting and filing parliamentary resolutions

In order to enhance reliability the filing method of the selected parliamentary resolutions is given. In the reference section the list of all included parliamentary resolutions used in this study can be found. They are structured as follow:

- a. 1 military
- b. 3 Law and order
- c. 5 European Union
- d. 9 Multiculturalism

- a. The resolution will receive a number as follows:
 - vi. Subject, Year, Month, Day, number of resolution given by this study
S.YY.MM.DD.NNN
- c. The resolution will be graded on the contents. It will receive either a positive/neutral or negative notation towards the policy topic.
 - i. *Positive/neutral*
 1. The parliamentary resolution has a positive attitude about the policy domain when the resolutions described one of the following:
 - a. A budget increase of the policy
 - b. A change in policy to improve already positive policy (for example, a stricter visitors policy in prisons would be a positive improvement on law and order)
 - c. An inquiry in the policy for the better of the group the policy concerns
 - d. Ask for a positive political standpoint of the government on the policy, people or institutions
 2. The parliamentary resolution has a neutral attitude about the policy domain when the resolutions described one of the following:
 - a. Questions on policies that's ask for the usability or workings of a policy
 - b. Technical issues of policies that imply a an improvement of the policy
 - c. Stating the status quo, when the policy is positive towards the policy domain.
 3. The parliamentary resolution has a negative attitude about the policy domain when the resolutions described one of the following:
 - a. A budget cut
 - b. A change in policy to improve an already negative policy (for example prohibiting hijabs in public buildings would be an improvement in a negative perspective for the policy domain of multiculturalism)
 - c. Any obstruction for positive policy or the implementation of positive policies
 - d. The votes of the parties are counted (only on two of the 742 resolutions included in this study party members voted out of the party line)

Table 3.1 shows all the abbreviations of the political parties included in this study.

Table 3.1 **Political parties and abbreviations**

| | |
|---------|--|
| CDA | Christian Democratic Appeal |
| PVDA | Labour Party |
| SP | Socialist party |
| VVD | People's Party for Freedom and Democracy |
| PVV | Party of Freedom |
| GL | Green Left |
| CU | Christian Union |
| D66 | Democrats'66 |
| PVDD | Party for the Animals |
| SGP | Reformed Political Party |
| VERDONK | - |
| 50Plus | - |

Two examples are given to further explain the grading of parliamentary resolutions on the policy domain and on the positive/neutral and negative indicator.

Example 1:

Resolution: 3.12.12.04.001 Resolution of the member Helder

"In protection of society.....calls on the government to include in the Code of Criminal Procedure that suspects of violent and criminal offenses are obligated to appear in court for their trial".

Resolution is filed under Law and Order as positive/neutral

Voting is as follows: Rejected (All those in favor)

Table 3.2 **Voting result on resolution 3.12.12.04.001**

| <i>Law and Order: positive/neutral</i> | <i>Rejected</i> |
|---|------------------------|
| CDA | 0 |
| PVDA | 0 |
| SP | 0 |
| VVD | 0 |

| | |
|--------|----|
| PVV | 15 |
| GL | 0 |
| CU | 0 |
| D66 | 0 |
| PVDD | 0 |
| SGP | 0 |
| 50PLUS | 0 |

Example 2:

Resolution: 9.11.03.15.036 resolution of the member van Dam.

“Observing that the segregation in residential areas and in schools has increased, concluding that this has a negative impact on the integration. Asking the government for an integration plan; request in their integration plan to indicate how they are going to oppose segregation in society, especially in the residential areas and in schools.”

Resolution is filed under multiculturalism positive/neutral

Voting is as follows: Adopted (All those in favor)

Table 3.3 Voting results on resolution 9.11.03.15.036

| <i>Multiculturalism: positive/neutral</i> | <i>Adopted</i> |
|--|-----------------------|
| CDA | 0 |
| PVDA | 30 |
| SP | 15 |
| VVD | 0 |
| PVV | 0 |
| GL | 10 |
| CU | 0 |
| D66 | 10 |
| PVDD | 2 |
| SGP | 1 |

The result is a datasheet of policy topics and that are graded for positive/neutral or negative for each political party. For every year the resolutions can be added up to give a total grade of positive/neutral

(and negative) votes for every political party on all of the four policy domains. The grade every political party receives on a policy topic is the total number of positive/neutral votes divided by the total amount of resolutions on the policy topic. This results in a grade from 0 to 10, where the 0 means that a political party never voted in favor of a resolution with a positive/neutral attitude towards the policy topic. And a 10 means that the political party never voted in favor of a resolution with a negative attitude towards the policy topic. Because the datasheet is a full grid, the positive/neutral grade is always the opposite of the negative grade.

3.4 One-dimension continuum

The coding results in a grade on a policy domain. This grade is placed on a left/right continuum. This study used a one-dimensional continuum, ranging from 0 to 10. How this study derived to this one-dimensional finite continuum will be explained here.

The ideological continuum Downs uses, is derived from the spatial analogy of Harold Hotelling. The vision of Hotelling's spatial market consists of a linear scale running from zero to 100 from the left to the right. Downs assumes that political preferences can be ordered from left to right in a manner agreed upon by voters. In his example he presents a horizontal scale that represents the political orientation of citizens on minimal or maximal state influence (Downs, 1957, pp.113-116) The geographic or physical space Downs took from Hotelling, is according to Sartori (1976), not fit as a symbolic and figurative space. In addition, Sartori questioned the correctness of the transition from a spatial configuration of politics to an ideological type of space. In his rendering he argues eventually that the ideological space can be conceptualized as an imaginary space. Sartori identifies four different cleavage dimensions that fill in the imagery space of party competition: secular-denominational; democratic-authoritarian, left-right; integration-ethnicity (Sartori, 1976).

The fact remains that Sartori does not make the dimensions applicable for measurement. As a matter of fact, he comes to the conclusion that his four dimensions are too complex to measure. While a unidimensional simplification may oversimplify the case, yet it forms a more realistic representation the more complex the case becomes (Sartori, 1976). Two reasons why Sartori does legitimize the use of the

one-dimensional continuum; first that the perception of party position becomes more useful and, at the limit, unavoidable the more the number of parties increases; second, that a left-right space is all the more likely the more we pass from pragmatic to ideological politics (Sartori, 1976). And while more than one dimension generally allows a better fit of the data, the evidence that dimension x, y, and z are needed to account for all voter preferences does not assure that any of the actors are seeing the space in more than one dimension. Therefore a unidimensional dimension could be used as a simplification (Sartori, 1976).

In contemporary research the use of an unidimensional continuum is continued to be used. Studies based on one dimensional space are even still in the majority (Dow, 2001; Budge & Macdonald, 2006; Dalton, 2008; Ezrow, 2008; Dow, 2011; Curino & Hino, 2012). Nevertheless there are also studies with a two-dimensional space Dow (2001) and Schofield et al. (2006). In his study Dow (2001) is doubtful that a single axis adequately represents electoral competition in any country. Schofield et al. (2006) argues that in the case of the Netherlands or Germany a two dimensional space represents at best the electoral competition. Still the majority pleads on the fact that major political issues are constructed on the left-right unidimensional line (Budge & Macdonald, 2006; Dalton, 2008). Another issue is the feasibility of measuring polarization. A unidimensional is easier to measure with the existing measuring tools.

This study will use the one-dimensional line as described by Sartori (1976) and used by others after him. The continuum is from left to right and starts with a 0 and ends with a 10, thus it is a finite space. The left and right is in a way not just the left and right ideology continuum used in many other studies. Parties are placed on their attitude towards a policy domain. The policy domain can be perceived as ideology right of ideology left. As described by Budge & Macdonald (2006) the military and Law and Order domains are perceived right and the European Union and Multiculturalism are perceived left. Thus a positive score on these subjects can therefore be seen in the first two policy domains as right ideology parties and a positive score on the last two subjects can therefore be seen as left ideology parties.

3.5 Operationalization of party manifestos and parliamentary resolutions

The indicators of party manifestos and parliamentary resolutions provide a grade on the policy domain, a polarization index and finally the political system as a whole receives a polarization level. The policy domain grade, as explained above, for the party manifestos and for the parliamentary resolutions describe the attitude of the party on the policy domain. The polarization index is the first step to measure the influence of the party and its party grade. In other words, it measured the influence of the party with the amount of seats and the deviation of the party grade from the average. This will be further explained below. Finally all these polarization indexes on a single policy domain for the polarization level for that year on one policy domain.

For the measurement of the polarization level of the indicators the measurement of Dalton (2008) is used. This measurement is comparable to a measure of the standard deviation of a distribution and it will give a polarization index of one party on one policy on a certain year. The second measurement calculates the polarization level of the polarization indexes of all parties on one policy on a certain year.

The polarization index is measured as follows:

$$PI = \sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^n \left((party_vote_share_i * \left(\frac{party_l/r_score - party_system_average_l/r_score}{ap} \right)^2 \right)}$$

Where PI is the polarization index, i represents the individual parties, ap represents is the amount of political parties in a party system.

The polarization level is measured as follows:

$$PL = \sqrt{(party_polarization_index_A + Party_polarization_index_B + party_polarization_index_C)}$$

Example:

The polarization index of GL on the domain military in the election year of 2012 will be calculated, using the sum above (Table 3.4). The party vote share of GL is 2.67 (this is the percentage of their seats) and

the party grade is 0.13. The party system average grade is 0.54, measured by the sum of all the grade scores divided by the number of parties present in the party system. In this case there are 11 parties present. The answer to the question “*What is the polarization index of GL on military in the election of 2012?*” is 0.06. This polarization index therefore is the influence of the size of the party and the deviation of the attitude (grade) on the polarization level of military. See below for an example of the formula:

$$\sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^n \left((2.67 * \left(\frac{0.13 - 0.54}{11} \right)^2 \right)} = 0.06$$

The measurement of the polarization level of policy domain of military in the election year of 2012 is done by taking the square root of the polarization indexes (PI), as shown in Table 3.4. This makes the following formula:

$$\sqrt{(0.06 + 0.13 + 0.11 + 0.03 + 0.12 + 0.06 + 0.14 + 0.01 + 0.03 + 0.05 + 0.05)} = 0.88$$

This results in a polarization level for military positive on the year 2012 of 0.88. This means that the *Tweede Kamer* is polarized on the subject of military for a score of 0.88.

Table 3.4 **Measurement of the polarization level on military**

Military - 2012

| <i>Political party</i> | <i>Score</i> | <i>Share of seats</i> | <i>PI</i> |
|---------------------------|--------------|-----------------------|-------------|
| CDA | 0.67 | 27.33 | 0.06 |
| PVDA | 0.80 | 25.33 | 0.11 |
| SP | 0.07 | 10.00 | 0.13 |
| VVD | 1.05 | 8.67 | 0.12 |
| PVV | 0.65 | 10.00 | 0.03 |
| GL | 0.13 | 2.67 | 0.06 |
| CU | 0.48 | 3.33 | 0.01 |
| D66 | 0.42 | 8.00 | 0.03 |
| PVDD | 0.00 | 1.33 | 0.05 |
| SGP | 1.71 | 2.00 | 0.14 |
| 50Plus | 0.00 | 1.33 | 0.05 |
| <i>Average</i> | <i>0.54</i> | | |
| <i>Polarization level</i> | | | <i>0.88</i> |

3.6 Validity and reliability

Validity and reliability are the foundation of scientific research. Especially when introducing a new method of research the concerns about reliability and validity are substantial. Moreover, this study operationalized a new indicator into the research of political polarization, the parliamentary resolution. Therefore it is imperative to account for the reliability and validity of this study. This chapter will discuss first reliability and secondly validity.

Reliability

Reliability revolves around the replicability of the case study. Another study should produce similar results under the same circumstances and the same measurement instruments (Babbie, 2012; Van Thiel, 2014). This study tries to increase the reliability by including an extensive and detailed methodology section. Where especially the measurement of the indicator parliamentary resolutions is explained. This study ensures in three ways the reliability of the study.

Firstly the study is not hampered by the small-N problem (Van Thiel, 2014). By including almost eight hundred resolutions in this study the reliability of the data is increased. Even the separate years and policy domains have on their individual merits enough N-cases.

Secondly the study is subjected to the inclusion or exclusion of a parliamentary resolution by the framework of this study. However 67 of the excluded parliamentary resolutions are measured as well. These 67 resolutions show the same trend as the other four policy domains. The data of these resolutions are included in the appendix 2.

Thirdly this study gives a neutral/positive and negative connotation to the parliamentary resolution. However this process is not the first and foremost indicator of the final result, because the objectivity of the voting cast of parties, including a voting fingerprint, transcends the subjective filing of this study. In other words, without the subjective filing, the connection between the parties that vote together will be exactly the same. Thus the indicator of parliamentary resolutions, because of its objective real voting behavior quantity, makes it a very reliable indicator. This study however uses the neutral/positive and negative connotation because of its counterpart the party manifesto is coded that way. The parliamentary resolutions could be researched without this connotation and the results of the behavior of parties should be similar to this study.

Validity

The validity of the study reflects the degree to which the indicators have been adequately operationalized. Even though many forms of validity can be distinguished, therefore two basic types: internal and external validity (Babbie, 2012; Van Thiel, 2014). In this study both types will be discussed and assessed, but because this study uses a new indicator not used by other research, the external validity will receive more attention. But first the internal validity will be described.

The internal validity refers to the correctness of the study design and the operationalization of the indicators in relation with the objectives of this study. The most important aspects is the assessment if the study does measure its objective. Two elements that will be discussed here, are the theoretical construct and the relationship between the indicators and the objective of political polarization. The first

element of a sufficient theoretical construct is safeguarded by an elaborated operationalization of the concept of parliamentary resolutions. Furthermore, the coding of this indicator is step for step brought forward in this method section. As last regarding the indicator of parliamentary resolution, also brought forward in the reliability part, the data is subjected to subjectivity, although the data is the real voting data from the *Tweede Kamer*. Therefore the data should give the same result even without the coding. As regarded for the indicator of party manifestos, the coded data is used from an external trusted party. The use of this data is validated by contemporary research Budge & Macdonald (2006).

The second element of internal validity, if the indicators can indeed give insight into the political polarization level. This study tried to validate this claim by using one of the existing indicators of polarization measurement. Also this study uses the same mathematical framework of Dalton (2008) and Esteban & Ray (1994). With party manifestos as a proven pendant the outcome of parliamentary resolutions should give the same basic insight, and extend this insight in the three processes.

The external validity is in this research very important because it claims to cover new research ground. Therefore checking the external validity with the result of this study to similar studies is difficult. Especially therefore this study will restrain from large generalizations, because the case study done in this study is very specific. It is based in a multi-party, proportionalism political system, with a long heritage of a large body of parties, and a rich tradition of coalition building. Qualities that are especially good to measure with the indicator of parliamentary resolutions, but hard to compare with other systems, especially two-party systems. However this study should contribute to the concept of real voting behavior of parties. A feature Aarts, Macdonald & Rabinowitz (1999) attest its value to measure the vote-policy link. As regards for the use of party manifestos. The studies on this indicator are plenty, and thus good to validate (Budge & McDonald, 2006; Dalton, 2008; Ezrow, 2008; Andrews & Money, 2009)

4. Political polarization measured by party manifestos

To what extent did the political polarization level in the case study increase, measured by party manifestos?

This study uses party manifestos as an indicator for the attitude of parties, in order to calculate the overall polarization level in the political system. A part of this study follows Budge & Macdonald (2006) in their choice of CMP data and some of their policy topics. Here, the CMP data provides the grade of the attitude of the parties on the policy domains. Using this grade, the polarization index and the polarization level is measured by the method of Dalton (2008). This results in a two-step approach to the polarization level, chiefly for the purpose of validity as well as clarity. To be more precise, the influence of every party on the final polarization level can be traced back to the polarization index and attitude grades of the parties.

The party manifesto is part of the Dutch political tradition. Albeit not a mandatory document, still it is made by every party on every election. Their content: plans for the upcoming government period. Therefore, it covers all the main point of a party on the majority of political issues, naturally elaborating the policy domains designated important by the party. Surely, every election period, the main body of a party manifesto remains in line with the general statutes of that party. Therefore the underlying message is one of the same, even so the party manifesto is updated every election period by the party. In addition, for the majority of parties, the format of party manifestos remains unchanged over time. Yet there have been three exceptions. The VVD once used a newspaper format, the PVV used mere bullet points in one of their party manifestos, and the conservative Christian Party (SGP) used exactly the same Party Manifesto in 2010 as in 2012.

The analysis of the indicator, party manifestos is structured as follows: first the grades on the party manifestos are given and analyzed. Because this grade is the basis of the final polarization level, the correctness is of utmost importance. In the second part of this chapter, the polarization index and the polarization level on the four policy domains are calculated. The polarization index shows the influence of the party in the polarization level, based on the grade and relative size of the party. In the third part, the polarization level will be further analyzed. And finally the chapter will be closed by the answer to the

question “*To what extent did the political polarization level in the case study increase, measured by party manifestos?*”.

4.1 Grades on party manifestos

In this part, grades of party manifestos are given and described by the individual party grades and the overall remarkable features. On the whole, the party manifestos do seem similar by their layout, and in some cases they are very similar on their content as well. However for most cases the content is very dissimilar. Therefore, the grades have no genuine relation with each other even though it is sometimes visible. Thus this part enables to visualize the attitude grades of the parties that form the basis of the polarization index.

Military

In Table 4.1 the grades of the parties attitude on the policy domain of military are presented. The most noteworthy remark on the policy domain of military is the low overall scores on all three years. The reason for these low scores can only be partly given by analyzing the party manifestos. In most manifestos, the policy domain of military (defence) is not mentioned in a separate chapter. On average, the word military (*militair(e)*) is not used more than 10 times by the parties.

In 2007, the average of the party manifesto grades is 0.70. In the consecutive years, this number remains incredibly stable, with only a slight decrease in 2012. This decrease can be explained by the fact that the individual parties do change. Therefore, their grades fluctuate over time. For example, the grade of the VVD in 2007 is 0.92, in 2010 2.10, and in 2012 a 1.05. This large fluctuation oddly enough did not influence the average number. This can be explained by the fact that the other parties were showing the opposite fluctuation.

In 2007, the conservative Christian party (SGP) receives the highest score (2.38) of all the parties on all the years. In fact, it is almost four times higher than the average (0.70) in that year. In that same year, the lowest scores are from the socialistic party of SP (0.11) and the liberal party of D66 (0.07), two

parties that are expected to be at the bottom. However, comparable parties (GL and the PVDD) score higher on this policy domain.

As described above, in 2010 the score of the VVD doubled and is thereby the highest score given. The grade of the SGP and GL declined from 2.38 to 1.51 and 0.00 to 0.53 respectively.

Despite a temporary increase in 2010, the grades of CDA and PVDA in 2012 are comparable to their grades in 2007. To a lesser extent a similar trend is seen in the grades of VVD, PVV, and SP. Despite a higher grade in 2007, the grades of GL and CU remain low in both 2010 and 2012. D66 is the only party showing an steady increase in grades from 2007 to 2012.

Table 4.1 **Party manifesto grades on military – CMP**

| Military | | | |
|------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| <i>Political party</i> | <i>2007</i> | <i>2010</i> | <i>2012</i> |
| CDA | 0.63 | 0.93 | 0.67 |
| PVDA | 0.84 | 1.13 | 0.80 |
| SP | 0.11 * | 0.00 | 0.07 |
| VVD | 0.92 | 2.10 * | 1.05 |
| PVV | 0.73 | 0.15 | 0.65 |
| GL | 0.53 | 0.06 * | 0.13 * |
| CU | 0.84 | 0.44 | 0.48 * |
| D66 | 0.07 * | 0.28 | 0.42 * |
| PVDD | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| SGP | 2.38 * | 1.51 * | 1.71 |
| 50Plus | NC | NC | 0.00 |
| <i>Average</i> | <i>0.70</i> | <i>0.66</i> | <i>0.54</i> |

* *Mentioned in text*

Law and Order

The policy field of law and order has three noteworthy features, as shown in Table 4.2. For instance, the average grade of all years is very high, especially compared to the other policy domains. Another remarkable feature is the outlying grades of individual parties, especially the PVV and the VVD. Despite

abovementioned features and the change in individual party grades over the years, the average grade is fairly stable.

It is not surprising that the PVV receives a high grade on law and order. However, the extremely high grade in 2007 cannot be explained by analyzing and comparing the manifestos. On the other hand, the influence of this grade is constrained since grades of all parties on law and order are fairly high. Moreover, the sharp decline from 2007 towards 2012 is arguable, because their party manifesto did not change significantly.

In the government year of 2007 the (abovementioned) grade of the PVV is an all-time high (19.71), a score that is almost three times the average. The VVD comes in second, also with a remarkable 12.71, almost double the average. The lowest score is received by D66 (3.38).

In 2010, the grade of the PVV is, despite a decrease of 4.22 points, once again the highest grade (15.49). The rest of the parties show grades deviating largely from their grades in 2007. However, only the grade of the D66 is fairly stable, with just an increase from 3.38 to 3.69.

CDA is the only party showing an increase in grades from 2007 to 2012. In 2007, the CDA grade was still below average (-5.66 points). In 2010, this grade was above the average level, and in 2012 the CDA grade even exceeded this level with 4.62 points. Two parties following the complete opposite trend are the VVD and the PVV. In 2007, the VVD grade is 5.30 points and the PVV grade 12.30 points above average. In 2012, the grades of VVD and PVV declined to 5.37 and 10.68 (average 5.97), respectively. Once again in 2012, the grade of PVV was the highest.

Table 4.2 **Party manifesto grades on law and order - CMP**

| Law and order | | | |
|------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| <i>Political party</i> | <i>2007</i> | <i>2010</i> | <i>2012</i> |
| CDA | 5.66 | 7.30 | 10.59 * |
| PVDA | 7.63 | 4.94 | 5.04 |
| SP | 5.02 | 5.98 | 6.71 |
| VVD | 12.71 * | 8.87 | 5.37 * |
| PVV | 19.71 * | 15.49 * | 10.68 * |
| GL | 3.50 | 2.31 | 3.04 |
| CU | 4.12 | 5.87 | 5.10 |
| D66 | 3.38 * | 3.69 * | 2.90 |
| PVDD | 5.75 | 4.21 | 2.69 |
| SGP | 6.60 | 8.95 | 7.29 |
| 50Plus | NC | NC | 6.31 |
| <i>Average</i> | <i>7.41</i> | <i>6.76</i> | <i>5.97</i> |

* *Mentioned in text*

European Union

Table 4.3 shows the grades of all political parties on the European Union domain. The average of the grades are in 2007 and 2010 stable and relatively low. In 2012 there was a remarkable increase in the average of the received grades. Oddly enough the individual parties do not show a lot of obvious increases. However the details show that eight out of ten political parties tend to receive a somewhat higher grade. As one might expect this should apply too for the pro-European parties D66 and the VVD. However they are still receiving surprisingly low grades. For instance, the 6.58 score of D66 in 2012 should be expected on all the years for D66. Moreover the decrease of the grade of the VVD in 2010 towards an 1.38 cannot be explained.

The 2007 government period is characterized by lower grades. The D66 party comes in first with a score of 3.98. The other parties receive grades more than a full point apart from D66. At the bottom of the lower received grades is the PVDD with an 0.12. This is closely followed by the CU with an 0.25. Three other parties that do not come off the 1.0 point are the SP, the PVV and the SGP.

In the year of 2010 a lot of political parties see their received grade changed from 2007. The SP receives a grade double that of 2007, and the PVDA and VVD receive a grade that decreased with almost one point. The CU went from the bottom in 2007 with a received grade of 0.25 to the middle with a grade of 1.61 in 2010. The CDA and the SGP receive stable grades. The CDA went from a 2.88 in 2007 to a 2.90 in 2010. And the SGP went from a 0.83 in 2007 to a 0.78 in 2010.

The government year of 2012 is distinguished by an increased grade on the attitude towards the European Union by eight of the ten parties. The two parties that receive a decreasing grade are the CDA and the CU. The latter one received in 2010 a 1.61 and in 2012 a 0.15, a grade similar to 2007. The VVD receives the grade that increased the most, it went from 1.38 to 3.69 a doubling of two and a half. There are two parties that received, not surprisingly, a zero in 2010, however, both parties do receive grades on the other years. Strangely enough the SP received a grade in 2012 of 1.18.

Table 4.3 *Party manifesto grades on European Union - CMP*

| European Union | | | |
|------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| <i>Political party</i> | <i>2007</i> | <i>2010</i> | <i>2012</i> |
| CDA | 2.88 | 2.90 * | 2.73 |
| PVDA | 2.47 | 1.72 | 2.36 |
| SP | 0.46 | 0.83 | 1.30 |
| VVD | 2.21 | 1.38 | 3.69 * |
| PVV | 0.73 | 0.00 | 0.65 |
| GL | 2.71 | 2.57 | 3.97 |
| CU | 0.25 * | 1.61 * | 0.15 * |
| D66 | 3.98 * | 3.59 | 6.58 |
| PVDD | 0.12 * | 0.00 | 1.18 * |
| SGP | 0.83 | 0.78 | 0.94 |
| 50Plus | NC | NC | 0.49 |
| <i>Average</i> | <i>1.66</i> | <i>1.54</i> | <i>2.18</i> |

* *Mentioned in text*

Multiculturalism

It can be seen from the data in Table 4.4 that the average on the policy domain of multiculturalism 2007 and 2010 was stable. However it dropped in 2012 with a 0.28 point. Despite the stable average, the

individual parties did change over all of the three government years. One of the most remarkable features is the grade of the CU in 2010. With an received grade 3.92 higher than the average, its 5.35 grade is the highest of all the years. In addition, all the Christian parties (CU, CDA, SGP) received a higher grade than other parties. Apart from this, the more multiculturalism open-minded parties of the PVDA, D66 and GL received lower grades than expected.

The 2007 government period is the first year where the Christian Parties of the CDA, CU and SGP received the highest scores. With an 2.83 the CU lead the score, and the CDA close behind them with an 2.70, followed already further away by the SGP with an 2.11.

In the same way as the 2007 government year, the effect of the Christian Parties is repeated in the 2010 period. The CU remarkably surged from 2.83 to 5.35 in 2010. The CDA decreases a little where the SGP increases a bit. With the exception of the PVDA and the PVDD, the rest of the parties see their received grades decreased in 2010. Where the VVD lost 1.40 points from 1.66 in 2007 to a 0.26 in 2010. And the GL party received a grade that decreased a full point from 2007 to 2010, resulting in a 0.58.

The average grade in the government year of 2012 on multiculturalism dropped to 1.15. This is mostly due to a decreased grade of the CU. Their grade went from 5.35 in 2010 to 2.99 in 2012, and ended up in a similar grade to 2007. There are five other parties that received a decreased grade. One of the examples of parties that received an increased grade is the GL party. Their grade of 0.58 in 2010 increased to 1.65 in 2012. Another example is the SGP, they received an increased grade of 3.42 and ended up being the highest ranked party in 2012.

Table 4.4 **Party manifesto grades on multiculturalism - CMP**

| Multiculturalism | | | |
|-------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| <i>Political party</i> | <i>2007</i> | <i>2010</i> | <i>2012</i> |
| CDA | 2.70 * | 2.33 | 1.93 |
| PVDA | 1.41 | 1.55 | 0.83 |
| SP | 1.20 | 0.41 | 0.91 |
| VVD | 1.66 | 0.26 * | 0.29 |
| PVV | 0.73 | 0.59 | 0.22 |
| GL | 1.58 | 0.58 | 1.65 * |
| CU | 2.83 * | 5.35 * | 2.99 * |
| D66 | 0.93 | 0.59 | 0.36 |
| PVDD | 0.23 | 0.52 | 0.08 |
| SGP | 2.11 * | 2.14 | 3.42 * |
| VERDONK | 0.00 | NC | NC |
| 50Plus | NC | NC | 0.00 |
| <i>Average</i> | <i>1.54</i> | <i>1.43</i> | <i>1.15</i> |

* *Mentioned in text*

4.2 Polarization level measured by party manifestos

The grades of the political parties on the above policy domains are operationalized in two steps to the final polarization level of the political system on each particular policy domain. The first step is the measurement of the polarization index of one party by the measurement tool of Dalton (2008). In short, this is the sum of the received grade and the relative size of the party. To give an accurate image of the influence of the relative size of the party, the total seats of each party is included in Table 4.6. Thus the polarization index is the power one political party had on the polarization level. With these indexes, the second step in the measurement of the polarization level can be taken. The polarization level is measured by the square root of the polarization indexes. Therefore, the polarization level is the result of the calculation of the deviation of the parties indexes. A low polarization level indicates less polarization in the system and a high polarization level indicates more polarization in the system.

Military

In Table 4.5 the polarization indexes and the polarization level of military positive are presented. The lowest deviant effect of all the parties in all the years starts with the grade of the PVV in 2007 with a 0.01. In the example of the PVV, the low polarization index can indicate two things. Firstly the grade on military is close to the average of military, or/and the party is small in size in the case of the PVV and does not extend the 0.66 of the VVD in 2010. Overall the polarization indexes have a very low score, meaning that there are no parties that deviate from the average or the ones that do, do not have a significant size.

The low score on the polarization indexes is indicating a low polarization level of 0.93 in 2007. Chiefly depending on the low grades of the PVV, the CU and GL, with polarization indexes of , 0.01, 0.03, and a 0.04. One of the reasons that the polarization level is still 0.93 in 2007 is probably the amount of parties in the party system, and another reason could be the higher polarization indexes of the SP and the SGP with an 0.24 and an 0.19.

The polarization level of 2010 increases relative to the polarization level of 2007 to 1.36. With this number 2010 is the most polarized government year on military positive. The reason for this high polarization level is the combination of the high grade of 0.66 of the VVD, the 0.21 of the PVDA and the 0.21 of the SP and the PVV, and the low scores of the CDA, CU, D66, PVDD and the SGP.

In 2012 the polarization level is declining again to around the same level as 2007 with an 0.96. This year the PVDA, SP, VVD and the SGP have the highest polarization indexes. Compared to the 2007 year, the polarization indexes are very similar. Therefore this year received somewhat the same polarization level.

Table 4.5 *Polarization indexes and level on Military*

| Military | | | |
|---------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| <i>Political party</i> | <i>2007</i> | <i>2010</i> | <i>2012</i> |
| CDA | 0.04 | 0.10 | 0.03 |
| PVDA | 0.06 | 0.21 | 0.12 |
| SP | 0.24 | 0.21 | 0.14 |
| VVD | 0.08 | 0.66 | 0.24 |
| PVV | 0.01 | 0.21 | 0.03 |
| GL | 0.04 | 0.15 | 0.06 |
| CU | 0.03 | 0.04 | 0.01 |
| D66 | 0.09 | 0.10 | 0.03 |
| PVDD | 0.08 | 0.08 | 0.06 |
| SGP | 0.19 | 0.10 | 0.15 |
| 50Plus | NC | NC | 0.06 |
| <i>Polarization level</i> | <i>0.93</i> | <i>1.36</i> | <i>0.96</i> |

Table 4.6 *Amount of absolute seats in the Tweede Kamer*

| <i>Political party</i> | <i>2007</i> | <i>2010</i> | <i>2012</i> |
|------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| CDA | 41 | 21 | 13 |
| PVDA | 33 | 30 | 38 |
| SP | 25 | 15 | 15 |
| VVD | 22 | 31 | 41 |
| PVV | 9 | 24 | 15 |
| GL | 7 | 10 | 4 |
| CU | 6 | 5 | 5 |
| D66 | 3 | 10 | 12 |
| PVDD | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| SGP | 2 | 2 | 3 |
| 50Plus | NC | NC | 2 |

Law and Order

As is seen in Table 4.7, the polarization indexes on law and order have some real outlying polarization indexes. For this reason the final polarization levels are high. Especially the polarization index of the PVV influences the polarization level on every separate year. Started with the polarization level of 2.92 in 2007 and ended with 2.33 in 2012. The decrease in 2012 is partly due to that seven out of eleven parties had declining polarization indexes.

In the government year of 2007 the PVV and the VVD had the highest polarization index with respectively 2.74 and 1.85. This influence is traced back to their policy domain grade. Still the other parties also influence the polarization level with their indexes. The SP is the third in line with an 0.89, next to the CDA with an 0.83 and GL with an 0.77. From the parties that have a low score there are three examples. The PVDA received an 0.09, the SGP an 0.08 the PVDD with an 0.17. Resulting in the highest polarization level of all the policy domains of 2.91.

The polarization level in 2010 declined to 2.89. This is in spite of the all-time high polarization index of 3.49 off the PVV. Five other parties see their polarization index also increased this year. The parties that see their polarization index at the same time declined are the CDA from a 0.83 to a 0.20, the SP from a 0.89 to a 0.25, the VVD from a 1.85 to a 0.96 and the CU from a 0.60 to a 0.16.

In 2012 the polarization level decreased again, it went from 2.89 to 2.33. In this year the polarization indexes have two clear outlying indexes. The PVV with an 1.35 and the CDA with an 1.23. The PVV saw its grade on the policy topic declining every year. Where the CDA saw its received grade increasing every year. This preluded the CDA as one of the top influencers on the polarization level in 2012. Other than the CDA, only one party saw their polarization index increase. This happened to the PVDD with a marginal increase from 0.29 to 0.35. The rest of the parties saw a declined polarization index.

Table 4.7 ***Polarization indexes and level on law and order***

| <i>Law and order</i> | | | |
|-----------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| <i>Political party</i> | <i>2007</i> | <i>2010</i> | <i>2012</i> |
| CDA | 0.83 | 0.20 | 1.23 |
| PVDA | 0.09 | 0.82 | 0.43 |
| SP | 0.89 | 0.25 | 0.21 |
| VVD | 1.85 | 0.96 | 0.29 |
| PVV | 2.74 | 3.49 | 1.35 |
| GL | 0.77 | 1.15 | 0.44 |
| CU | 0.60 | 0.16 | 0.14 |
| D66 | 0.52 | 0.79 | 0.79 |
| PVDD | 0.17 | 0.29 | 0.35 |
| SGP | 0.08 | 0.25 | 0.17 |
| 50Plus | NC | NC | 0.04 |
| <i>Polarization level</i> | <i>2.92</i> | <i>2.89</i> | <i>2.33</i> |

European Union

The polarization indexes and polarization level of European Union are presented in Table 4.8. On this policy domain one third of the polarization indexes is in the range of 0.00 to 0.20, half of the numbers is in the range of 0.20 to 0.60. With the majority of indexes in this these ranges influenced the polarization level to the range of 1.61 to 1.95. The only actual high index is the one of D66 in 2012 (1.13) which is the highest polarization level of all the years on this policy domain.

In the government year of 2007, the polarization level is 1.75. This is for a large part influenced by the polarization index of the CDA (0.63) and the SP (0.49). The remaining indexes ranged from 0.10 to 0.40.

The index of the CDA and the SP, which were still the highest in 2007, declined to 0.51 and 0.23. As a result, the PVV and D66 took over there high position, with an increase of their own polarization index. In spite of this, the 2010 polarization level decreased to 1.61. This is partly due to the decreased polarization indexes of the PVDA from 0.38 to 0.08, the VVD from 0.21 to 0.07 and the CU from 0.28 to 0.01.

The government year of 2012 sees a peak of 1.95 in the polarization level on the policy domain of European Union, even despite the high polarization index of D66. Furthermore, the VVD increased their polarization index from 0.07 to 0.72.

Table 4.8 *Polarization indexes and level on European Union*

| European Union | | | |
|---------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| <i>Political party</i> | <i>2007</i> | <i>2010</i> | <i>2012</i> |
| CDA | 0.63 | 0.51 | 0.15 |
| PVDA | 0.38 | 0.08 | 0.08 |
| SP | 0.49 | 0.23 | 0.25 |
| VVD | 0.21 | 0.07 | 0.72 |
| PVV | 0.23 | 0.62 | 0.44 |
| GL | 0.23 | 0.27 | 0.26 |
| CU | 0.28 | 0.01 | 0.34 |
| D66 | 0.33 | 0.53 | 1.13 |
| PVDD | 0.18 | 0.18 | 0.11 |
| SGP | 0.10 | 0.09 | 0.16 |
| 50Plus | NC | NC | 0.18 |
| <i>Polarization level</i> | <i>1.75</i> | <i>1.61</i> | <i>1.95</i> |

Multiculturalism

In Table 4.9 the polarization indexes and polarization level on multiculturalism are shown. The lowest polarized year is 2007, with a polarization level of 1.21. The polarization level increased with 0.50 point to 1.71 in 2010. In 2012 it decreased towards 1.49. These are still considerably high polarization levels, especially since the highest polarization index on this policy domain is just 0.72, followed by 0.55. Consequently, the rest of the polarization indexes on this policy domain are low. Almost half of the indexes did not exceed 0.10 and almost a quarter of all indexes ranged between 0.10 to 0.20.

The government period of 2007 received the lowest polarization level of 1.21. This resembles the polarization indexes received by the parties. To be more precise, the CDA received the highest polarization index (0.55), followed by the CU with an index of 0.23.

The government year of 2010 shows the highest polarization level (1.71), mostly due to the increased polarization indexes of the CU and the VVD. The polarization index of the CDA decreased from 0.51 to 0.28, and the indexes of the SP and the PVV increased from 0.13 to 0.32 and 0.18 to 0.34, respectively.

In 2012, the polarization level in multiculturalism declined again, partially due to the decrease in polarization indexes of the CU, VVD, SP, and PVV. Despite this, the 2012 polarization level still exceeded the level of 2007, due to the fact that only two parties had an index ranging from 0.00 to 0.10 and four parties indexes ranging from 0.10 to 0.20.

Table 4.9 *Polarization indexes and level on multiculturalism*

| <i>Multiculturalism</i> | | | |
|--------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| <i>Political party</i> | <i>2007</i> | <i>2010</i> | <i>2012</i> |
| CDA | 0.55 | 0.34 | 0.21 |
| PVDA | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.15 |
| SP | 0.13 | 0.32 | 0.07 |
| VVD | 0.04 | 0.53 | 0.41 |
| PVV | 0.18 | 0.34 | 0.27 |
| GL | 0.01 | 0.22 | 0.07 |
| CU | 0.23 | 0.72 | 0.31 |
| D66 | 0.08 | 0.22 | 0.20 |
| PVDD | 0.14 | 0.11 | 0.11 |
| SGP | 0.06 | 0.08 | 0.29 |
| 50Plus | NC | NC | 0.12 |
| <i>Polarization level</i> | <i>1.21</i> | <i>1.71</i> | <i>1.49</i> |

4.3 Summary of polarization levels measured by party manifestos

In order to observe any structural changes in the polarization level, polarization levels on all domains are shown in Table 4.10.

On average, the polarization level increased in 2010 and decreased again in 2012. At first sight, the overall polarization levels appears stable, with only a small margin (0.21) between the highest average

polarization level in 2010 (1.89) and the lowest in 2012 (1.68). However, the polarization levels on the individual policies do not show the same stable trend. The polarization level on military has a margin of 0.43 between the highest and the lowest polarization level, law and order a margin of 0.59, European Union of 0.34, and multiculturalism of 0.50. Though polarization levels on all policy domains did fluctuate from 2007 to 2012, polarization level on the military, European Union, and multiculturalism domain eventually increased and the polarization level on law and order declined.

Table 4.10 ***Polarization levels on all domains***

| Polarization level | <i>2007</i> | <i>2010</i> | <i>2012</i> |
|---------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Military | 0.93 | 1.36 | 0.96 |
| Law and Order | 2.92 | 2.89 | 2.33 |
| European Union | 1.75 | 1.61 | 1.95 |
| Multiculturalism | 1.21 | 1.71 | 1.49 |
| <i>Average</i> | <i>1.70</i> | <i>1.89</i> | <i>1.68</i> |

4.4 Conclusion of polarization measured by party manifestos

This study aimed to find a new, more significant method to study political polarization. The method of measuring political polarization by party manifestos was described in chapter 4.1. Here the evaluation of the indicator was just as important as the answer and this conclusion will give attention to some surprising features of measuring polarization by party manifestos. First, these surprises will be discussed. Second, the interesting characterizations of party manifestos and its polarization levels will be discussed. At last, the question “*to what extent did the political polarization level in the case study of the Netherlands increased, measured by the manifestos of the parties*” will be answered.

Overall, grades of parties on policy domains, using the data of CMP, were low even on domains where more outspoken attitudes would be expected, for example on European Union and multiculturalism. As a consequence, both polarization indexes and levels were low, even though, throughout the years, grades of individual parties fluctuated on all policy domains. In addition, the share of seats of parties did

fluctuate, resulting in wide margins between polarization levels, especially for the lower polarization levels.

For this analysis of measuring polarization, two remarkable results are worth mentioning. The first result was the corrective effect of the relative size of the party on the policy grade. For example, polarization indexes of the smaller parties were very low, even though their grades on the policy domains were among the highest. As a consequence, the polarization level was less influenced by the small parties with more extreme attitudes. A feature inherent to measuring polarization and thus an expected result. The second result was the low overall polarization grade. The polarization level on all policy domains did not exceed the expectations. A very high polarization level could only be obtained if parties with a larger relative size and with more deviant attitudes to other parties would be present. In the Netherlands, relative sizes of parties are (too) small. Therefore, even on the law and order domain, where most deviant attitudes were present, high polarization grades could not be measured by this method.

As a result, the political polarization level in the case study of the Netherlands during the government period of 2007 towards 2012 is increased, measured by party manifestos. In three of the policy domains (military, European Union, and multiculturalism), the polarization level increased. However the margin of this increase is very small. Law and order was the only domain showing a decrease in polarization level in three consecutive years. This was also the only domain that did not follow the same fluctuated trend as the other three. Both polarization levels of the policy domains military and multiculturalism increased in 2010 and decreased again in 2012. The levels of European Union decreased in 2010. However, this is the only domain showing an increase in polarization levels from 2010 to 2012.

5. Political polarization measured by parliamentary resolutions

To what extent did the political polarization level in the case study increase, measured by parliamentary resolutions?

This study uses parliamentary resolutions as an indicator for the attitude of parties in order to calculate the overall polarization level in the political system. This indicator is a new method of political polarization research. This method tries to be an addition by using an indicator that gives evidence of the in-government processes. To be more precise, the parliamentary resolution should give more detailed information about the real voting behaviour of parties. Apart from this, parliamentary resolutions should give more understanding of the functioning of the coalition-in building process, and the influence of crises and other external influences. This is set out in two questions, the first, practical question on the polarization level will follow in this part. The more evaluating question follows in the next part.

Parliamentary resolutions are a part of everyday politics in the Dutch *Tweede Kamer*. On average the members of parliament produce more than three thousand resolutions a year (*Tweede kamer, 2020*). These resolutions diverge from a proclamation of loss of trust in a minister to the everyday reaction on new developments. Because all resolutions should be handed in to the chairman of the *Tweede Kamer*, all resolutions are filed. Resolutions that are dealt with in the *Tweede Kamer* receive a vote count. Only with access to the vote count can an objective measurement of the attitude be made. Because the real voting behaviour gives crucial information on parties' attitudes on policy topics. In this study the attention will be on the party as a whole, not on the individual Members of Parliament. First of all because there is no individual evidence of voting by Members of Parliament. Secondly there are only three resolutions where a member of a party votes in another direction of the party. Therefore the voting behaviour on the resolution can be subscribed to the attitude of the party instead of the individual members.

5.1 Grades on parliamentary resolutions

In this part the grades the parties received by measuring the parliamentary resolutions are presented. The most remarkable grades are denoted and described. Before reading this analysis this study makes four noteworthy comments that are different from the party manifestos analysis. Firstly the grades range

from 0 to 10. To be precise, the grades are the percentage of positive votes on the policy domain. Thus where a grade is for example 8.49 as it is for the CDA in 2008 on military, it means that on the 53 parliamentary resolutions the CDA votes in 84,9 percent of the cases in favour of the positive side of the parliamentary resolution. The second comment is that the amount of parliamentary resolutions found in one year on a particular policy domain fluctuated. This is one more influential variable on the grades of the parties. Another comment is the inclusion of the VERDONK party. A more extreme-right splinter party of the VVD. In the part of party manifestos this party is excluded, because there was no data of this party. On the parliamentary resolutions however, this party voted and therefore received a grade. For this reason the party is included in the part of parliamentary resolutions. The influence of this party consisting of one member is however insignificant on the polarization level. The last comment is on the most significant relational factor on the grade of parties that is found by this indicator, the coalition factor. This relational factor will not be described in this part of the analysis, because of its importance it received most part of chapter 6. This part will first start with the general focus on the grades of the real voting behaviour of political parties. The next part will be on the polarization index the parties receive and the final polarization level.

Military

In Table 5.1 the grade parties receive on military are presented. There are two remarkable features on military. Firstly the overall high received grades, especially for the Netherlands this is unexpected. Even the government period with the lowest average still received a grade of 5.87. Another feature is the drop in the number of resolutions in 2012. Where there is a peak number in 2008 which continued in 2010, the 2012 year showed signs of the consequence of the economic crisis. In 2008 there still was a big debate about the purchase of the JSF (Joint Strike Fighter) or other planes as a replacement for the old F16 fighter planes. In 2010 this debate took a different turn to stop the whole acquisition project altogether. In 2012 this debate was subdued and budget cuts on military were already made in the previous years.

The grades of the VVD and the SGP in 2008 are exemplary for the score on military. With and respectively 8.87 and 8.57 they received the highest scores in this period. Closely followed by the CDA and CU. The parties that support less than half of the positive parliamentary resolutions are the PVDD,

the SP, the PVV and GL. These lower grades can be expected for these parties. However the grades are quite high for the pacifistic SP and PVDD. On the other side, the grade the PVDA received is in contrast higher than expected for the labour party.

In the government year of 2010 the most interesting feature is the loss of some of the higher scores that were seen in 2008. The CDA, PVDA, VVD and D66 give evidence of this decline in this year. As a consequence of the global economic crisis the whole playing field collapses to the middle. However the CU and the SGP stayed at the same level, but they are part of the four exceptions. The other two exceptions increased their score, the PVV from 4.15 in 2008 to 5.97 in 2010, and GL from 4.15 in 2008 to 4.84 in 2010.

The government year of 2012 has a remarkably low number of cases. Even though the low number of cases the average of this year is the same as previously. However the individual parties make some unexpected movements. The parties with a high policy grade on the years of 2008 and 2010 decreased in 2012. Where the parties with a low policy grade in 2008 increased their grade in 2012. As a result of a change in government with an attitude of not spending more on the Military budget. As a consequence the opposition showed their dissatisfaction by handing in more parliamentary resolutions with a positive attitude on military, and were rejected by the government parties.

Parties that are part of this decreased attitude on military are the two government parties of the PVDA and the VVD, and a third party the SGP. The PVDA decreased from 5.48 to 4.48. The VVD decreased from 6.77 to 4.14. And the SGP from 8.23 to 6.21. The parties in the opposition that see their grade increased, and are normally not favourable towards military, are the SP, GL and the PVDD.

Table 5.1 **Grades on Military measured by parliamentary resolutions**

| Military | 2008-2009 | | 2010-2011 | | 2012-2013 | |
|------------------------|------------------|-------------|------------------|-------------|------------------|-------------|
| <i>Political party</i> | <i>Points</i> | <i>N=52</i> | <i>Points</i> | <i>N=62</i> | <i>Points</i> | <i>N=29</i> |
| CDA | 8.49 | | 6.77 | | 6.21 | |
| PVDA | 7.92 | | 5.48 | | 4.48 * | |
| SP | 4.15 | | 3.55 | | 5.52 * | |
| VVD | 8.87 * | | 6.77 | | 4.14 * | |
| PVV | 4.15 | | 5.97 * | | 5.86 | |
| GL | 4.15 | | 4.84 * | | 5.86 | |
| CU | 8.49 | | 7.90 | | 7.93 | |
| D66 | 6.42 | | 5.81 | | 6.55 | |
| PVDD | 3.77 | | 3.39 | | 5.52 | |
| SGP | 8.65 * | | 8.23 | | 6.21 | |
| VERDONK | 7.55 | | NC | | NC | |
| 50Plus | NC | | NC | | 6.55 | |
| <i>Average</i> | <i>6.60</i> | | <i>5.87</i> | | <i>5.89</i> | |

N *Number of resolutions*

* *Mentioned in text*

Law and Order

Table 5.2 contains the received grades on law and order. The average grade increased from 5.52 in 2008 to 6.00 in 2010 and decreased again in 2012 with 1.24 point towards an 4.76. This is the result of the declined grades from seven out of the eleven parties, and a low grade for the new party of 50plus. As a consequence the 2012 government received not only the lowest average on this policy domain. It is even the lowest average on all the four policy domains included in this study.

The government year of 2008 presents a shift of parties in two ideology blocks of right and left/middle. Oddly enough this schism does not follow the coalition-opposition line. The first block consists of a part of the opposite parties that are ideology right wing parties, including the VVD, PVV, Verdonk party and the SGP. These parties received high grades ranging from 7.81 to 7.26. The other block consists of all the other parties, thus also all the coalition parties as the other opposition parties. Therefore consisting of a broader range of ideologies, namely the ideology left wing parties, the conservative parties and the parties in the middle of the continuum. These grades have a larger range than the other block. However

with the exclusion of the opposite party of the SP the range changed from 3.97 to 5.34 towards 3.97 to 4.52, the range became smaller than the one of the first block.

In 2010 there is no more evidence to be found of the scission above described. All the high grades in 2008 declined in 2010, with a remarkably declined grade from the VVD. This party went from the highest score in 2008 toward almost the lowest score in 2010. The party that followed an opposite trend is GL party. This party increased from a 3.19 to the highest grade in 2010 of a 7.71. Furthermore the other parties with a low grade in 2008 increased their score in 2010.

In the last government year a few of the shifts in grades the parties made from 2008 towards 2010 are reversed. The PVDA and the GL party that increased in the 2008-2010 period, declined, even to the bottom of the list, in 2012. The PVV increased in 2012 from a 5.43 to an 8.44 and received with it the highest grade. One of the exceptions of the reversion is the VVD, the received an 4.01 and with it stayed at the bottom of the field.

Table 5.2 ***Grades on Law and order measured by parliamentary resolutions***

| <i>Law and Order</i> | <i>2008-2009</i> | | <i>2010-2011</i> | | <i>2012-2013</i> | |
|-------------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------|-------------------------|--------------------|-------------------------|--------------------|
| <i>Political party</i> | <i>Points</i> | <i>N=73</i> | <i>Points</i> | <i>N=35</i> | <i>Points</i> | <i>N=91</i> |
| CDA | 4,25 | | 4,57 | | 5,31 | |
| PVDA | 3,97 * | | 6,86 | | 3,40 * | |
| SP | 5,34 | | 6,86 | | 4,08 | |
| VVD | 7,81 * | | 4,86 * | | 4,01 * | |
| PVV | 7,67 | | 5,43 | | 8,44 * | |
| GL | 4,52 * | | 7,71 * | | 3,67 * | |
| CU | 3,97 * | | 5,71 | | 4,97 | |
| D66 | 4,11 | | 5,43 | | 4,22 | |
| PVDD | 4,11 | | 6,57 | | 3,54 | |
| SGP | 7,26 * | | 6,00 | | 6,26 | |
| VERDONK | 7,67 | | NC | | NC | |
| 50Plus | NC | | NC | | 4,42 | |
| <i>Average</i> | <i>5.52</i> | | <i>6.00</i> | | <i>4.76</i> | |

N *Number of resolutions*

* *Mentioned in text*

European Union

In Table 5.3 the grades measured by parliamentary resolutions on the policy domain of the European Union are given. Most political parties received stable grades on most years. Despite this, there is a decline in 2010, but followed by an clearly visible increase in 2012. Parties that stay fairly positive over all three government years are the CDA, PVDA, VVD, GL and D66. Oddly enough both the CDA and VVD declined as part of the same coalition in 2010. Furthermore, their other coalition partner that year, the PVV, with a negative attitude towards the European Union, increased their grade.

The government period of 2008 is characterized by high grades of almost all the parties. Examples of parties with these higher received grades are D66 with an grade of 8.33, the GL party and the CU both with an grade of 7.78. The bulk of the parties with positive grades range from 6.67 and 7.22. One of the exceptions is the PVV, this party received a very low score of 0.56. The other party that had a negative attitude of the European Union was the animal Party of the PVDD with a 4.44.

In 2010 the government year received a more negative attitude towards the European Union, as a result the average declined to 5.33. This is mostly due to the declined grades of the coalition parties that year, namely the CDA and the VVD that declined both from a 6.67 to a 5.31. Three other parties that also declined in 2010 are the SP from 6.11 to 3.27, the CU from 7.78 to 4.08 and the SGP from 7.22 to 4.29. One of the examples of a party that increased their grade is oddly enough the PVV as one of three coalition partners.

In 2012 almost all parties increased their grades, because of this the period received the highest grade average. Two expected increased grades are from the VVD and the CU. Two parties that saw an unexpected decline in 2010. The VVD returned to a 6.75 and the CU to a 5.25. Two parties that expectantly see an increased grade are the parties of the SP and the PVDSS. Both ending in the middle of the spectrum.

Table 5.3 **Grades on European Union measured by parliamentary resolutions**

| European Union | 2008-2009 | | 2010-2011 | | 2012-2013 | |
|------------------------|------------------|-------------|------------------|-------------|------------------|-------------|
| <i>Political party</i> | <i>Points</i> | <i>N=18</i> | <i>Points</i> | <i>N=49</i> | <i>Points</i> | <i>N=80</i> |
| CDA | 6.67 | | 5.31 | | 6.63 | |
| PVDA | 6.67 | | 6.94 | | 7.75 | |
| SP | 6.11 | | 3.27 * | | 5.25 * | |
| VVD | 6.67 | | 5.31 | | 6.75 * | |
| PVV | 0.56 * | | 1.43 * | | 1.00 | |
| GL | 7.78 * | | 9.39 | | 9.25 | |
| CU | 7.78 * | | 4.08 * | | 5.25 * | |
| D66 | 8.33 * | | 9.59 | | 8.88 | |
| PVDD | 4.44 | | 3.67 | | 5.75 * | |
| SGP | 7.22 | | 4.29 * | | 4.75 | |
| VERDONK | 5.56 | | NC | | NC | |
| 50Plus | NC | | NC | | 7.50 | |
| <i>Average</i> | <i>6.16</i> | | <i>5.33</i> | | <i>6.25</i> | |

N *Number of resolutions*

* *Mentioned in text*

Multiculturalism

There were more parliamentary resolutions found on the policy domain of multiculturalism, than on any other policy domain. Clearly this policy domain is a more debated subject than the other policy domains included in this study. Still 67 parliamentary resolutions were excluded from this policy domain that combined the policy domain of law and order and multiculturalism and can be find in appendix 2.

In Table 5.4 the grades on the policy domain of multiculturalism are presented. The average of the received grades on Multiculturalism is the highest of all the policy domains. For the most part it's because there is large cleavage between a large group of parties with very high grades and a small group with very low grades. In the instance of the policy domain there are a lot of parliamentary resolutions introduced by the parties with a negative attitude towards multiculturalism. Therefore the parliamentary resolution gave evidence of the attitude of the large group of parties on the small group of parties. As a consequence the large group of other parties are forced to vote together in order to, mostly, reject the parliamentary resolution brought in by the "negative attitude" parties.

As a result the small group caused this cleavage in the party system, namely the VVD, PVV and the Verdonk party in 2008, the VVD and the PVV with an addition of their CDA coalition party, in 2010 and the PVV in 2012. Because this group stayed almost the size overtime, the average on multiculturalism stayed around the same grade from 2008 to 2012. As a matter of fact the cleavage between these groups made multiculturalism the most stable policy domain. Additionally this policy domain gave evidence to more stability on the level of the individual party too.

In 2008 there are three parties that vote positive on more than 90 percent of the cases. This is the PVDD with a 9.28, D66 with a 9.18 and GL party with a 9.07. The coalition parties in this year received grades almost just as high. On the bottom of the field, clearly the parties with a negative attitude towards multiculturalism, are the PVV with a received grade of 1.03, the Verdonk party with a 2.37 and the VVD with a 3.30.

The government year of 2010 even increased the amount of parties that scored above the 9.00. With the two additional parties of the PVDA and the SP this year has the most high grades of every year. As one might expect the grades of the PVV and the VVD are extremely low, with a 0.60 for the PVV and a 2.37 for the VVD the both received even decreased grades. Obviously these two parties influenced their coalition party. Because the grade of CDA decreased from 7.63 to 2.98 in 2010.

The SP, GL, CU and D66 received again very positive grades in 2012. Still the change of government also changed the grades of the new coalition partners and showed a lasting influence on the old ones. The new coalition of the VVD and the PVDA caused a centripetal force on both parties. The received grade of the VVD increased from 2.37 to 4.00, and the received grade of the PVDA decreased from 9.54 to 5.05. As part of the coalition in 2010 the CDA saw a declined grade in that year, however being in the opposition in 2012 saw their grade only increased toward a 4.62.

Table 5.4 **Grades on multiculturalism measured by parliamentary resolutions**

| Multiculturalism | 2008-2009 | | 2010-2011 | | 2012-2013 | |
|-------------------------|------------------|-------------|------------------|-------------|------------------|--------------|
| <i>Political party</i> | <i>Points</i> | <i>N=97</i> | <i>Points</i> | <i>N=50</i> | <i>Points</i> | <i>N=105</i> |
| CDA | 7.63 | | 2.98 * | | 4.62 | |
| PVDA | 8.45 | | 9.54 | | 5.05 | |
| SP | 8.35 | | 9.39 | | 9.62 | |
| VVD | 3.30 | | 2.37 * | | 4.00 | |
| PVV | 1.03 * | | 0.60 * | | 0.48 | |
| GL | 9.07 | | 9.60 | | 9.03 | |
| CU | 8.25 | | 8.60 | | 8.76 | |
| D66 | 9.18 | | 9.20 | | 8.38 | |
| PVDD | 9.28 * | | 9.20 | | 9.33 | |
| SGP | 5.77 | | 4.60 | | 4.41 | |
| VERDONK | 2.37 * | | NC | | NC | |
| 50Plus | NC | | NC | | 8.10 | |
| <i>Average</i> | <i>6.61</i> | | <i>6.61</i> | | <i>6.53</i> | |

N *Number of resolutions*

* *Mentioned in text*

5.2 Polarization level measured by parliamentary resolutions

In this part the polarization level is measured. The operationalization of the polarization level followed the same two steps as for the indicator party manifestos. Firstly the polarization index is measured by the measurement tool of Dalton (2008). This polarization index is the sum of the received grade and the relative size of the party. To give a clear insight in the relative size of the party the absolute seats of the parties in the *Tweede Kamer* can be found in Table 5.6 (similar to Table 4.6). The second step is the measurement of the square root of the polarization indexes. Thus calculating the deviation of the parties indexes. A low polarization level indicates less polarization in the system and a high level indicates more polarization in the system.

Military

As presented in Table 5.5, the polarization level on military received a high polarization level of 2.26 in the government year of 2008. The polarization level declined every year as a consequence of the

declined high number of political parties with a high polarization index. As a result the polarization level declined from 2.23 towards 1.53 in 2012.

The 2008 government year resulted in the highest polarization level of all the years on this domain. The CDA and the SP with an 0.90 and a 0.91 received the highest polarization index and therefore influenced the polarization level the most. Even so, this year is marked by the high amount of parties that contribute to the polarization level, by their higher received score. Only two parties received a low polarization index, D66 with an 0.02 and VERDONK party with an 0.07.

In the government year of 2010 the polarization level declined towards a 1.71. The parties with a high polarization index such as the CDA and the SP declined. The first from a 0.90 towards a 0.34 and the second from a 0.91 to a 0.73. All of the other parties followed the same declining trend or stabilized. With two exceptions, the CU and the SGP both received an increased polarization index.

The polarization level declined even further in the government year of 2012 towards an 1.53. In this year a lot of parties see their received polarization index further decline. The CDA, SP, PVDD and the SGP see a sharp drop of the polarization index. However the polarization index of the PVDA and the VVD increased greatly.

Table 5.5 *Polarization indexes and level on military*

| Military | | | |
|---------------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| <i>Political party</i> | <i>2008-2009</i> | <i>2010-2011</i> | <i>2012-2013</i> |
| CDA | 0.90 | 0.34 | 0.08 |
| PVDA | 0.56 | 0.17 | 0.65 |
| SP | 0.91 | 0.73 | 0.11 |
| VVD | 0.77 | 0.41 | 0.83 |
| PVV | 0.55 | 0.04 | 0.01 |
| GL | 0.48 | 0.27 | 0.00 |
| CU | 0.34 | 0.37 | 0.34 |
| D66 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.17 |
| PVDD | 0.30 | 0.29 | 0.04 |
| SGP | 0.22 | 0.27 | 0.04 |
| VERDONK | 0.07 | NC | NC |
| 50Plus | NC | NC | 0.07 |
| <i>Polarization Level</i> | <i>2.26</i> | <i>1.71</i> | <i>1.53</i> |

Table 5.6 *Amount of absolute seats in the Tweede Kamer*

| <i>Political party</i> | <i>2007</i> | <i>2010</i> | <i>2012</i> |
|------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| CDA | 41 | 21 | 13 |
| PVDA | 33 | 30 | 38 |
| SP | 25 | 15 | 15 |
| VVD | 22 | 31 | 41 |
| PVV | 9 | 24 | 15 |
| GL | 7 | 10 | 4 |
| CU | 6 | 5 | 5 |
| D66 | 3 | 10 | 12 |
| PVDD | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| SGP | 2 | 2 | 3 |
| 50Plus | NC | NC | 2 |

Law and Order

In Table 5.7 the polarization level on the policy field of law and order is presented. The polarization level of 2008 is characterized by the highest polarization level of all the years with a grade of 1.93. The

polarization level declined in 2010 towards an 1.63 and received almost the same polarization level in 2012 with an 1.64.

In the government year of 2008 four parties received high polarization indexes, thus resulting in a higher polarization level of 1.93. The VVD received the highest polarization level with an 0.78, then the PVDA with an 0.66 and then the CDA with an 0.60. The PVV as fourth party left a gap between the first three with an 0.48.

In 2010 the polarization level declined towards a 1.63. All of the four political parties just described declined in 2010. There are only two parties that increased their polarization index, the SP from a 0.06 in 2008 towards a 0.27 in 2010 and GL with an 0.20 in 2008 towards a 0.44 in 2010.

The polarization level of 2012 received a 1.64, a grade that is almost the same as the polarization level of 2010. The highest number this year is from the PVV with an 0.87. The PVDA followed with a 0.63. Most of the other parties declined again, resulting in five bottom parties with extremely low grades. Started with 50Plus with an 0.02, the CU with an 0.04, the CDA with an 0.07 and D66 and the PVDD both with an 0.10.

Table 5.7 Polarization indexes and level on Law and order

| Law and Order | | | |
|---------------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| <i>Political party</i> | <i>2008-2009</i> | <i>2010-2011</i> | <i>2012-2013</i> |
| CDA | 0.60 | 0.53 | 0.07 |
| PVDA | 0.66 | 0.38 | 0.63 |
| SP | 0.06 | 0.27 | 0.14 |
| VVD | 0.78 | 0.52 | 0.39 |
| PVV | 0.48 | 0.23 | 0.87 |
| GL | 0.20 | 0.44 | 0.12 |
| CU | 0.28 | 0.05 | 0.04 |
| D66 | 0.18 | 0.15 | 0.10 |
| PVDD | 0.15 | 0.07 | 0.10 |
| SGP | 0.18 | 0.00 | 0.19 |
| VERDONK | 0.16 | NC | NC |
| 50Plus | NC | NC | 0.02 |
| <i>Polarization Level</i> | <i>1.93</i> | <i>1.63</i> | <i>1.64</i> |

European Union

The polarization of the European Union saw an increased polarization level from 2008 toward 2010 and declined again in 2012 as seen in Table 5.8. However the polarization level of 2012 ended up higher than the starting polarization level of 2008. The high level is mostly due to the high polarization index of the PVV on all the years. In 2010 this is combined with the high polarization level of D66 and GL on the government year of 2010, resulting in the highest polarization level.

The government year of 2008 has a polarization level of 1.77, the lowest level of all the years. The polarization level is mostly influenced by the PVV with an 1.25. The other parties are all in the low range of 0.02 and 0.32.

In the government year of 2010 the polarization level is 2.37. Again the PVV caused the most polarization with their polarization index of 1.56. However this government year also saw a high polarization index from D66 with an 1.10 and GL with an 1.05. As a consequence the polarization level of 2010 is the highest of all the years on the policy domain of European Union.

The government year of 2012 received a declined polarization level. The PVV stayed stable on 1.51, but the polarization index of D66 and GL declined again towards 0.67 and 0.45. With higher polarization for almost all the parties compared to the government year of 2008 the overall polarization level of 2012 is 2.12 higher than that of 2008.

Table 5.8 ***Polarization indexes and level on European Union***

| <i>European Union</i> | | | |
|------------------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| <i>Political party</i> | <i>2008-2009</i> | <i>2010-2011</i> | <i>2012-2013</i> |
| CDA | 0.24 | 0.01 | 0.10 |
| PVDA | 0.22 | 0.72 | 0.69 |
| SP | 0.02 | 0.65 | 0.29 |
| VVD | 0.17 | 0.01 | 0.24 |
| PVV | 1.25 | 1.56 | 1.51 |
| GL | 0.32 | 1.05 | 0.45 |
| CU | 0.29 | 0.23 | 0.17 |
| D66 | 0.28 | 1.10 | 0.67 |
| PVDD | 0.18 | 0.19 | 0.05 |
| SGP | 0.11 | 0.12 | 0.19 |
| VERDONK | 0.04 | NC | NC |
| 50Plus | NC | NC | 0.13 |
| <i>Polarization Level</i> | <i>1.77</i> | <i>2.37</i> | <i>2.12</i> |

Multiculturalism

In Table 5.9 the polarization indexes and the associated polarization level measured by the parliamentary resolutions on multiculturalism is presented. The polarization level on this policy domain is from the start in the government year of 2008 already the highest of all the policy domains. It still increased in 2010, but declined in 2012 to a respectively 2.64. Just as in the policy domain of European Union, the PVV influenced the polarization level on multiculturalism the most. They received every year the highest polarization index of all the parties. However, with the difference that on this policy domain a lot more parties received higher polarization indexes.

The government year of 2008 has a polarization level of 2.47. The two parties with the highest polarization index are the PVV with an 1.24 and the VVD with an 1.13. All other parties ranged between the 0.30 and the 0.80. With a few exceptions, like the SGP with an 0.09. Resulting in a high polarization level.

In 2010 the polarization level rises to its peak with a level of 3.16. This grade is the highest polarization level measured on all the policy domains. Mostly caused by the amount of parties that received high polarization indexes. The PVV even doubles their polarization index from a 1.24 to a 2.40. followed again by an increased grade of the VVD, from a 1.13 to a 1.91. Other parties that flowed this flow are the CDA with an index of 1.27 and the PVDA with an index of 1.25. The lowest received grade from the SGP with a 0.23.

The polarization level declined again in 2012 towards 2.64. With this number it is still remarkably high, this grade thus became the second largest polarization level on all the years on all the policy domains. The PVV and the VVD, even though their polarization index declined, once again caused the highest influence on the polarization level with an 1.74 for the PVV and 1.20 for the VVD. There is only one party below the 0.20. The rest is all in between the 0.27 and 0.89, this all together resulted in a high polarization level.

Table 5.9 ***Polarization indexes and level on Multiculturalism***

| <i>Multiculturalism</i> | | | |
|--------------------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| <i>Political party</i> | <i>2008-2009</i> | <i>2010-2011</i> | <i>2012-2013</i> |
| CDA | 0.49 | 1.27 | 0.51 |
| PVDA | 0.79 | 1.25 | 0.68 |
| SP | 0.65 | 0.82 | 0.89 |
| VVD | 1.13 | 1.91 | 1.20 |
| PVV | 1.24 | 2.40 | 1.74 |
| GL | 0.48 | 0.77 | 0.37 |
| CU | 0.30 | 0.37 | 0.37 |
| D66 | 0.33 | 0.67 | 0.48 |
| PVDD | 0.28 | 0.30 | 0.29 |
| SGP | 0.09 | 0.23 | 0.27 |
| VERDONK | 0.31 | NC | NC |
| 50Plus | NC | NC | 0.16 |
| <i>Polarization Level</i> | <i>2.47</i> | <i>3.16</i> | <i>2.64</i> |

5.3 Summary of polarization measured by parliamentary resolutions

In Table 5.10 the polarization level on the policy fields on all the years are given. On average the polarization level increased in 2010 and decreased in 2012. Still the overall average is quite stable ranging from 1.98 to 2.22, a difference of 0.24 point. However the polarization level declined from 2008 towards 2012 with 0.13 point. Therefore the average of the polarization level declined in the period measured by this study.

The polarization level on the individual policy domain are not as stable as the average should presume. The polarization on military declined every government year from 2.26 in 2008 towards 1.53 in 2012. The policy domain of law and order declined from 2008 towards 2010, but stayed at the same level in 2012. The policy domains of European Union and multiculturalism followed both the same trend. They both sharply increased in 2010, but declined again in 2012 and therefore ended up on a higher level than in 2008.

Table 5.10 *Polarization levels on the policy fields*

| Polarization level | 2008-2009 | 2010-2011 | 2012-2013 |
|--------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| Military | 2.26 | 1.71 | 1.53 |
| Law and Order | 1.93 | 1.63 | 1.64 |
| European Union | 1.77 | 2.37 | 2.12 |
| Multiculturalism | 2.47 | 3.16 | 2.64 |
| Average | 2.11 | 2.22 | 1.98 |

5.4 Conclusion of polarization measured by parliamentary resolutions

This study set out to find a new, more significant indicator to study political polarization. The sub question to measure political polarization by parliamentary resolutions is the second path set out by this study. Along this path not only the question is found, but also some surprising features of measuring polarization by parliamentary resolutions. Moreover during the analysing there were some remarkable characteristics. This conclusion is structured as follows: firstly the surprises along the path are written, secondly the interesting characteristics of parliamentary resolutions and its polarization level are given.

Lastly the sub question “to what extent did the political polarization level in the case study of the Netherlands increased, measured by the parliamentary resolutions of the parties” is answered.

There was one surprising feature of parliamentary resolutions. Every year on all the domains there were some grades on political parties that could not be traced back towards the origins of the parties. When putting into account the coalition and opposition parties almost all of the out of line grades could be explained. Therefore the coalition building process is a very strong indicator of the voting behaviour of the individual political parties. More over the dynamics of coalition building can be found in the next chapter.

In analyzing the grades of the political parties on the parliamentary resolutions the resolutions show their validity by expected grades on the policy domains. The grades on the policy domains could be traced back towards the origins of the parties. Therefore their voting behaviour was as expected.

As a result of this analysis the polarization level in the case study of the Netherlands during the government period of 2008 towards 2012 is not increased when measured by parliamentary resolutions. In two of the four policy domains, military and law and order , the polarization level of 2012 is lower than that of 2008. The polarization level on the policy domains of European Union and multiculturalism are in 2012 higher than that of 2008.

6. In-government period measured by parliamentary resolutions

To what extent are the three processes of the in-government period being measured by parliamentary resolutions?

This chapter covers the added value parliamentary resolutions gives to researching polarization. It goes over the addition these parliamentary resolutions give in the three in-government processes; every resolution is subjected to a voting round; the coalition building process; and the voting behavior over a longer time frame. In the first and the last process more of an explanatory view is given on the data of part 6.1 and 6.2., where the coalition building process will give another descriptive view of the research data. Therefore the coalition building process will be the main body of the analysis.

6.1 Parliamentary resolution subjected to voting

In the Dutch parliament every resolution should be delivered on fore hand to the chairman. On Tuesday and Thursday there is the standard round for voting on resolutions. All the voting's are recorded and made publicly. Resulting in more than 3000 cases a year where each member of the *Tweede Kamer* is subjected to give their opinion. This is the core characteristic of the process, every member has to vote on every resolution. Resulting in a broad set of real voting data of parties, this gives us four clear structural insights. The first is the initial backing of the parliamentary resolution, the second the making of a statement, the third is the ostracization of parties, and the last is the coalition-opposition dichotomy. The first three will only be described in this part of the analysis, the last one will give more attention in 6.3

6.1.2 Structures of party voting

As described earlier, every member of parliament can hand in a parliamentary resolution. However there are a lot of different reasons why a member of parliament hands in a resolution. The reason often changes the process. The question is, does the initial initiator of the resolution want to make a change on legislative policies, change the standpoint of the government, or the country, or does the initiator want to make a standpoint for their own benefit? In the first instance an initiator needs to have support in order to get their resolution approved. In the latter the initiator just wants to share the standpoint of

the political party on a national podium. Therefore the resolution does not need to be approved, or sometimes it wants it to get rejected, to use it in a campaign strategy.

To make a change and get the parliamentary resolution approved a member can hand in their resolution and hope for approval. Another option is converting other members and parties for the resolution. This can be a process before or after the initial handing in of the resolution. However as seen in the data, a lot of resolutions that are handed in individually do not receive the backing of a majority of the votes and therefore fail in their process. Put in other words, a lot of resolutions that are handed in by an individual member are being at least for a quarter of the time being rejected by all other parties. Still there are some exceptions. For instance there is a difference between the resolutions of members of a coalition party relative to opposition parties, they have more chance of being approved, but definitely it's not a certainty for them either. Another difference seen in the data are the resolutions as a response of global and national events. Even with an individual initiator they see a lot of times the support from the whole *Tweede Kamer*.

Members of parliament can also initiate a resolution with other members of other parties. In this process the resolution already has the support of more than one party. This grouping of members is mostly seen in the opposition parties, where a single resolution can even contain members of all the opposition parties. When this happens it is the opposition making a clear standpoint to be against the current government line. Even though the message is a strong one and it happens infrequently, these resolutions are always rejected because the coalition has the majority of the vote.

Parliamentary resolution can also be used by members of parliament to make a clear standpoint with their initiated resolution to give a signal to their followers and the country. Parties that often do this are the PVV, SGP, and to a lesser extent the SP and the GL party. The data shows a lot of resolutions initiated by the PVV where they initiate more extreme rightwing legislation, stricter enforcement and asking for extreme rightwing standpoints of the government. The SGP, as a Christian party, sees a lot of initiated resolutions in the protection of Christians, not only in the Netherlands, but also in the rest of the world. The SP initiates resolutions for the poorer stratum of the Netherlands, the elderly, and the working people, even initiating and supporting military resolutions for the support of the military

personnel. The GL party initiates for a better climate and animal rights, often backed by the PVDD. Still all these parties have difficulty seeing their resolutions approved, as they are topics without support of the majority of the parties.

The odd one out is in this case is the PVV, as described above they initiate more extreme resolutions, but see their resolutions seldom being approved. Therefore this party sees itself ostracized, however this does not restrain them from initiating resolutions. In the government period of 2008 they see their resolutions being supported only by the other rightwing party the VVD. But in 2010 where the CDA, VVD and the PVV form a government the VVD and the CDA does not support their fellow coalition party as happens in the government years of 2008 and 2012 with the other coalition parties. In 2012 the PVV receives even less backing of their parliamentary resolutions, only sometimes supported by the small reformed Christian party of the SGP.

The last structure that is seen in the data of the resolutions is the coalition-opposition dichotomy. There is a significant amount of resolutions where the coalition parties at least vote in line with each other. Still there are the exceptions where resolutions can get approval without the backing of all the coalition parties. Another exception is the PVV in the government year of 2010 just spoken about. However the data shows that the coalition is more of a stable block than the opposition. Therefore this dichotomy is more of the coalition against other parties, than the coalition against the opposition. The dichotomy just gets weaker by the amount of parties that vote in line with the coalition. An example is the SGP, until 2012, a party that systematically votes with the coalition. Especially in the government period of 2008 and 2010. A fragmented opposition results in a stronger coalition and in the end, less polarization.

6.2 Coalition building

In the Dutch political landscape there are no parties that find themselves in the majority as to create a government on their own. Usually government is formed by two large parties or two large parties and one small party. In the formation of the coalition there is a coalition agreement with all the government parties to be. In the negotiations parties make concessions. These agreements are the real foundation

of the government for the four years of their government period, and are therefore an insight in the real voting behavior of parties on the policy domains of the political landscape.

Grades of the coalition parties

Once a coalition agreement is made, the parties of the coalition support each other on a broad set of policies set out for their government period. For the coalition parties this agreement is important, because without the consent of the other parties there is no majority possible. This is in most cases a fragile majority, where the coalition has a majority with only all the coalition parties. When one of the partners votes out of line, the majority will be lost. Therefore it is important for all the coalition parties to have a stable coalition. This results in an extension from the voting on legislation to the everyday life of politics. Once in office the previously taken position of parties on policy domains is subordinate to the coalition. This is clearly seen in the study on parliamentary resolutions. An overarching example for all policy domains will be given by the grades on European Union: positive.

In Table 6.1 the grades of the coalition parties are given on the policy domain of European Positive measured by parliamentary resolutions. The grades of the government year of 2008 are very positive, to decline in the government year of 2010 and increase again in 2012 to a higher point than the 2008 government year. When looking at the different coalitions this trend is changing as expected. The coalition parties of CDA, PVDA and CU are parties positive on the European Union. The decline is set in by the new coalition of the CDA, with the VVD and PVV. Especially the PVV is the probable cause of the decline of the CDA, but also of the VVD, that had the same grade of 6.67 as the CDA in the government year of 2008. In 2012 the coalition of the PVDA and the VVD the grade of the VVD increases again.

There are four interesting features looking at Table 6.1. The coalition parties have the same, or almost the same grades. That means that the parties vote positive on the same amount of parliamentary resolutions. Even though the parties, actually every single member of the parliament, have to vote individually. Therefore it is safe to say that parties in a coalition have the unspoken/spoken bond to vote the same way on the party resolutions, and in this bond concessions are made. This influences one or all the parties in the coalition to become something else than their pre-government position. Looking at

the grades especially at the percentage of deviation of the average of the coalition parties, the deviation is in the government year of 2008 and 2012 not more than 10.5%. The large parties of CDA and PVDA show in 2008 only a deviation of 5.3%. In 2012 it is only 6.9% for both coalition parties of PVDA and VVD. The odd one out is the government year of 2010 with a deviation of 32.2% of the large coalition parties of the CDA and the VVD. And the small coalition party has even a higher deviation of -64.4%. This deviation is the sole responsibility of the PVV, because the CDA and the VVD has the same score on this policy domain. This government year marks out the second interesting feature.

This second interesting feature is the difference of the PVV in the 2010 government period. This is the only coalition partner that does not vote in line with their coalition, and the coalition does not vote on the PVV resolutions. This has everything to do with their special relation towards the coalition already spoken of. This tolerated agreement with the coalition party does not extend towards the voting and applying of parliamentary resolution. For is it the PVV that contributes every year a high number of resolutions, where the CDA and the VVD also in the 2010 government year, predominantly vote against them. Still even though the government agreement seems not to extend towards parliamentary resolutions it seems that the tolerated agreement makes the coalition parties of the CDA and the VVD in the government period of 2010 more negative on European Union: positive, and the PVV seems to be more positive.

The third interesting feature is the behavior of the larger coalition parties relative to the small coalition parties. Or at least there is a stable block consisting of parties that have the agreement not to vote out of party line. In the government year of 2008 the CDA and the PVDA with respectively 41 and 33 seats and the CU with 6 seats show that the large parties tend to vote more in line, where it seems that the small third party has the freedom/leverage to vote out of party line. This is also seen in the government year of 2010, but this has less to do with the share of seats. Where the parties of the coalition agreement of the CDA and the VVD have respectively 21 and 31 seats, the third tolerated coalition partner the PVV has 24 seats. This construction sees the PVV even with more seats than the PVV as the party most out of line. In the government year of 2012 there are only two large parties, the VVD and the PVDA have 41 and 38 seats. These two parties vote more out of party line than the CDA and the PVDA in 2008 and the CDA and the CDA in 2010, still they consist of a stable block on a broad line of policy domains.

The last interesting feature is the ‘normalization’ grade of a party. What can the grades say about the difference from being a coalition party to becoming an opposition party and the other way around? This is interesting because it is explicitly inherent to the expectation of compromise. However what a ‘normalized’ grade of a party should be is difficult to say. The reason is as follows, being in the coalition is for many parties an influencing factor, still being a member of the opposition, this is to a lesser extent also an influencing factor. When looking at Table 6.1 the CU tends to be more negative in the opposition on European Union: positive, just like the PVV. Where the CDA, PVDA and the VVD see a more stable line overall three government years, the CDA and the VVD see however, both their grade drop in 2010 as coalition partners increasing again in 2012. The PVDA sees an increasing line, from 2008 towards 2012, even though they have two separated coalition periods.

Table 6.1 **Grades on European Union measured by parliamentary resolutions**

**European Union
Parliamentary resolutions**

| <i>Political party</i> | <i>2008-2009</i> | | | <i>2010-2011</i> | | | <i>2012-2013</i> | | |
|------------------------|------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|
| | <i>Points</i> | <i>deviaton of ACP</i> | <i>% of deviation</i> | <i>Points</i> | <i>deviaton of ACP</i> | <i>% of deviation</i> | <i>Points</i> | <i>deviaton of ACP</i> | <i>% of deviation</i> |
| CDA | 6.67 * | -0.37 | -5.3% | 5.31 * | 1.29 | 32.2% | 6.63 | -0.62 | -8.6% |
| PVDA | 6.67 * | -0.37 | -5.3% | 6.94 | 2.92 | 72.8% | 7.75 * | 0.50 | 6.9% |
| VVD | 6.67 | -0.37 | -5.2% | 5.31 * | 1.29 | 32.2% | 6.75 * | -0.50 | -6.9% |
| PVV | 0.56 | -6.48 | -92.0% | 1.43 * | -2.59 | -64.4% | 1.00 | -6.25 | -86.2% |
| CU | 7.78 * | 0.74 | 10.5% | 4.08 | 0.06 | 1.6% | 5.25 | -2.00 | -27.6% |
| <i>ACP</i> | <i>7.04</i> | | | <i>4.02</i> | | | <i>7.25</i> | | |

* Coalition parties of that year
ACP Average of coalition parties

Just as the grades of parliamentary resolutions, the overall grades on European Union: positive measured by party manifestos, as seen in Table 6.2, decrease from 2006 towards 2010 to double again in 2012. The reason for the decline in 2010 is the same as with the parliamentary resolutions, the influence of the PVV. They score an 0.00 on European Union: positive. But unlike the Parliamentary resolutions the VVD also contribute towards the more negative attitude. The increase again in the

government period of 2012 is solely because of the more positive attitude again from the VVD, with an average of 3.69, more than double their score from 2010. The same increase is somewhat seen in the parliamentary resolutions, but to this extent. The parties that tend to be more positive on European Union: positive are the CDA, in all three government periods, the PVDA, somewhat in the 2006 and 2012 government period, and the VVD, in the 2012 government period. The rest of the grades are fairly towards the negative. Conclusively the grades of party manifestos do not deviate in a broad sense from the grade from the Parliamentary resolutions. Does this also apply for the four features seen in the parliamentary resolutions?

The four features seen in the grades of parliamentary resolutions were: the coalition parties tend to have the same attitude; the tolerated agreement of the coalition with the PVV is the odd one out; The large coalition parties tend to vote more in line than the smaller coalition parties; The parties have a 'normalized' attitude towards a particularly policy domain. The first feature is not to be seen in the grades measured by the party manifestos, in the government year of 2006 the deviation is at least 32.4% and even as high as -86.7%. This could be a result of the third feature, that the CU as a small party could vote out of party line. A difference of -86.7% is albeit very high and can't be seen as an agreement at all. The government year of 2010 does show an even higher deviation from the coalition. Every party deviated at least 100% of the average from each other. The government year of 2012 shows grades that could be seen as coalition agreement, still a 22.1% deviation of the average is still a large difference.

The tolerated agreement with the PVV in the government year of 2010 is also a feature in the grades of party manifestos. With an -100% deviation of the average they are the odd one out. However, in the same year the coalition party of the CDA, shows an even more deviation from the average with an 103.3% deviation. Therefore the PVV is not the odd one out any more, just the same as the CDA in this picture.

The feature that is somewhat to be seen in the government year of 2006 is the stable coalition of large parties. The two large parties of the CDA and the PVDA do have somewhat the same grade. With the small party of the CU being nowhere near the average coalition party grade. The different grade of the CU shows not much of a possible agreement that year with the other coalition member. In the

government year of 2010 there is no stability at all in the coalition. The PVV as the odd one out as a feature is already spoken of. The CDA and the VVD do however also not contribute towards the large party stabilizer. And make the difference actually worse than better. The government year of 2012 shows the most stable coalition with a deviation of 22.1%. Still compared to the parliamentary resolutions this is a fairly high number.

The last feature, the 'normalization' of the parties is difficult to see in all parties, however the CDA shows a stable grade over all the government years in coalition as well as in the opposition. The PVDA declines a bit in the opposition year, but the coalition grades are stable, even though the coalitions are totally different. The VVD tends to be more negative about European Union: positive in a coalition with the PVV, but seems to be very positive in a coalition with the PVDA. The PVV is also a stable grade. They start off negative and stay negative, even more in the coalition than in the opposition. The CU goes from negative towards positive towards negative again. With only one year in the coalition it is difficult to say what their normal attitude is, regarding the two opposition years are so different in attitude.

Table 6.2 ***Grades on European Union measured by party manifestos***

***European Union
Party Manifestos***

| <i>Political party</i> | <i>2006</i> | | | <i>2010</i> | | | <i>2012</i> | | |
|----------------------------|---------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|---------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|---------------|---------------|--------------------------|
| | <i>Points</i> | <i>deviaton of ACP</i> | <i>% of deviation</i> | <i>Points</i> | <i>deviaton of ACP</i> | <i>% of deviation</i> | <i>Points</i> | <i>of ACP</i> | <i>%of deviation</i> |
| CDA | 2.88 * | 1.01 | 54.3% | 2.90 * | 1.47 | 103.3% | 2.73 | -0.29 | -9.7% |
| PVDA | 2.47 * | 0.60 | 32.4% | 1.72 | 0.29 | 20.6% | 2.36 * | -0.69 | -22.1% |
| VVD | 2.21 | 0.35 | 18.5% | 1.38 * | -0.05 | -3.3% | 3.69 * | 0.67 | 22.1% |
| PVV | 0.73 | -1.13 | -60.8% | 0.00 * | -1.43 | -100.0% | 0.65 | -2.37 | -78.5% |
| CU | 0.25 * | -1.62 | -86.7% | 1.61 | 0.18 | 12.9% | 0.15 | -2.87 | -95.0% |
| <i>ACP</i> | <i>1.86</i> | | | <i>1.43</i> | | | <i>3.02</i> | | |

* Coalition parties of that year
ACP Average of coalition parties

Differences between opposition and coalition

The coalition parties in the Dutch political landscape, as elsewhere are inherently different from the opposition parties. The Dutch political landscape is one of compromise, therefore political parties from different political families can work together in one coalition. Inherently changing the actual voting behavior of these parties and especially taking a different attitude from their pre-government standpoints. This even goes so far as that voters can feel alienated from their party in the long run. Two examples of voters becoming alienated from their parties are in the coalition agreement between the Cristian conservative party of the CDA and the extreme-right wing party of the PVV in the government year of 2010 and the coalition between the Labour party of the PVDA with the right wing Liberal party of the VVD in the government year of 2012. After these collaborations the CDA saw their seat share drop from 21 to 13 (a decline already started in 2006-2010 with a drop from 41 to 21 seats). And the PVDA with a drop from 38 seats in 2012 towards 9 seats in 2017.

Where political parties from different political families can be working together in a coalition, so can there be political parties from the same political family working against each other when they are part of the opposition. This makes being a part of the opposition just as an influential power as being in the coalition. Making the difference between coalition and opposition more a contradiction of legislation put forward by the government, than being a contradiction between attitudes on different policy domains. With regularity parliamentary resolutions are being used by opposition parties to give their opinion about certain legislation. Not resulting in any more changes, because of the compromising character already of the bill between the coalition parties. This already difficult constructive legislation is for the coalition parties difficult to alter any more, let alone from the parliamentary resolutions in the *Tweede Kamer*. Therefore making the *Tweede Kamer* on these issues a real coalition-opposition dichotomy.

In Table 6.3 the difference between the grades of the coalition and opposition on each year and each policy field are given, measured by parliamentary resolutions. What stands out is that in the 2008 government year the coalition was more positive on three of the four policy domains. In the government year of 2010 and 2012 it was the other way around, in these two government periods the opposition was more positive on three of the four domains.

An expectation is that there is a correlation between the difference of the opposition and the coalition and the amount of polarization. Where the expectation is that a smaller difference between these groups should mean less polarization. However the difference between them could never be small for many policy domains because then it is questionable if the grades can even differentiate between coalition and opposition. For a coalition and an opposition thinking, or voting the same, is no contradiction at all. And therefore the difference is obsolete. This fortunately is not seen in Table 6.2, the grades shows that the coalition and the opposition do differentiate.

The difference between the coalition and the opposition measured by parliamentary resolutions ranges in seven out of twelve domains, between the 25% and 50%, and two domains of with an even higher difference. This means that the coalition can clearly be differentiated. The three cases that have a lower difference should show a lower polarization level than the nine other cases. However this correlation is only for a part supported by the polarization level, as seen in Table 5.10. The polarization level in 2008 on the policy domain of the European Union: positive is 1.77. The polarization level on Military: positive in 2010 is 1.71 and the polarization level on European Union: positive in 2012 is 2.12. Making the last mentioned polarization level higher than expected. The nine cases of higher differences are however, with the exception of one, in line with this expectation. Leaving the cases in the 25% to 50% differences giving polarization levels between 1.63 and the 2.47. And the two cases with the highest differences giving polarization levels of 3.16 and 2.64, Clearly above the prior range. Correlation ten out of the twelve cases of difference and the polarization level.

Table 6.3 *Average of the coalition parties and the opposition parties measured by parliamentary resolution*

| <i>Parliamentary Resolutions</i> | <i>2008-2009</i> | | | | <i>2010-2011</i> | | | | <i>2012-2013</i> | | | |
|----------------------------------|------------------|------------|------------|-----------------|------------------|------------|------------|-----------------|------------------|------------|------------|------------------|
| <i>Policy Fields</i> | <i>Coa</i> | <i>Opp</i> | <i>Dif</i> | <i>Dif in %</i> | <i>Coa</i> | <i>Opp</i> | <i>Dif</i> | <i>Dif in %</i> | <i>Coa</i> | <i>Opp</i> | <i>Dif</i> | <i>Dif. in %</i> |
| Military | 8.30 | 5.96 | 2.34 | 28.2% | 6.50 | 5.60 | 0.90 | 13.9% | 4.31 | 6.25 | -1.94 | -44.9% |
| Law and Order | 4.06 | 6.06 | -2.00 | -49.2% | 4.95 | 6.45 | -1.50 | -30.2% | 3.71 | 4.99 | -1.29 | -34.7% |
| European Union | 7.04 | 5.83 | 1.20 | 17.1% | 4.02 | 5.89 | -1.87 | -46.6% | 7.25 | 6.03 | 1.22 | 16.8% |
| Multiculturalism | 8.11 | 6.04 | 2.07 | 25.5% | 1.98 | 8.59 | -6.61 | -333.1% | 4.53 | 6.97 | -2.45 | -54.0% |
| Average | 6.88 | 5.98 | 0.90 | 13.1% | 4.36 | 6.63 | -2.27 | -52.0% | 4.95 | 6.06 | -1.11 | -22.5% |

Coa, Coalition; Opp, Opposition; Dif, Difference between Coa and Opp

The difference between the coalition and the opposition measured by the party manifestos is given in Table 6.4. The first remarkable feature is that in the same government years the coalition is in the same way positive or negative as on the grades of parliamentary resolutions, with just two exceptions. These exceptions are on the policy domain of law and order in the government year of 2010, where the coalition is more positive when measured by party manifestos and more negative when measured by parliamentary resolutions. The other exception is the attitude on military: positive in the government year of 2012 where the coalition is more positive when measured by party manifestos and more negative when measured by parliamentary resolutions.

Furthermore when taking the same range of 25% to 50% difference, only four cases fall in between this range, however there are four cases with an even higher percentage of difference of 50%. Making it eight cases out of twelve with a high differentiate. Thus even the grades from a pre-government period can differentiate between the coalition and the opposition. In four cases the difference is between the - 22.1% and the 23.1% making them just fall out of range. However the expected correlation of a difference and the polarization level, is nowhere to be seen. The polarization levels on party manifesto's should be way higher than the polarization level of the policy domains measured on parliamentary resolutions when the correlation of difference and polarization is present. The fact that all the polarization

levels of party manifestos (Table 4.10) are lower than the polarization levels on parliamentary resolutions (Table 5.10), making measuring party manifesto lack the coalition building explanatory power.

Table 6.4 *Average of the coalition parties and opposition parties measured by party manifestos*

| Party | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-----------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-----------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|------------------|
| Manifestos | 2006 | | | | 2010 | | | | 2012 | | | |
| Policy Fields | <i>Coa</i> | <i>Opp</i> | <i>Dif</i> | <i>Dif in %</i> | <i>Coa</i> | <i>Opp</i> | <i>Dif</i> | <i>Dif in %</i> | <i>Coa</i> | <i>Opp</i> | <i>Dif</i> | <i>Dif. in %</i> |
| Military | 0.77 | 0.59 | 0.18 | 23.1% | 1.06 | 0.49 | 0.57 | 53.8% | 0.92 | 0.46 | 0.46 | 50% |
| Law and Order | 5.80 | 7.08 | -1.28 | -22.1% | 10.55 | 5.41 | 5.42 | 51.3% | 5.20 | 6.15 | -0.94 | -18.1% |
| European Union | 1.86 | 1.38 | 0.48 | 25.8% | 1.43 | 1.59 | -0.16 | -11.2% | 3.02 | 2.00 | 1.02 | 33.8% |
| Multiculturalism | 2.31 | 1.05 | 1.26 | 54.4% | 1.06 | 1.59 | -0.53 | -49.9% | 0.56 | 1.29 | -0.72 | -128.8% |
| Average | 2.69 | 2.53 | 0.16 | 5.9% | 3.53 | 2.20 | 1.32 | 37.6% | 2.43 | 2.47 | -0.05 | -1.9% |

Coa, Coalition; Opp, Opposition; Dif, Difference between Coa and Opp

6.3 Voting behavior over time

One of the expectations of this study was that polarization measurement by a static variable has a missing link of real voting behavior of parties, and with it, missing crucial information in polarization measurement. The static variable of party manifestos, where the standpoints and attitudes of the party are written down, could not do justice to the change due to the process of a changing society, learnings over time, or in reaction of other parties, but also by the simple fact that parties compromise to make policies. Becoming a coalition party, or being a member of the opposition, the real voting behavior can change. Another issue is the question if the parties can, even if they want to, live up to their party manifestos. Because the content of most party manifestos do not cover the content of the parliamentary resolutions. Besides that the parliamentary resolutions cover a broader ground of interest than the party manifestos, measuring them over time has seen two remarkable features of consistency and hot topics. These will be described below.

Consistency

One of the characteristics given by the data of the parliamentary resolutions is the consistency of voting behavior of the parties over time. The data shows that parties once established inside the coalition or opposition tend to vote the whole year in the same way. In all of the three government years there are no indications of sudden change of voting behavior. This consistency is remarkable. One could say that the data from the government year of 2010 and 2012 were from the first year of a government period. It seems logical that the start of a government period will be prior to a constructive period. However the data from the 2008 government year, as the third year, gives us the same consistency of the 2010 and 2012 government period.

What does change is the parties voting behavior seen over all three government periods. Being in a new government period, in a different role of coalition, or opposition and changing from size, thus power, and a changing society, thus a changing demand from followers, parties do change their voting behavior. For instance, the right-wing liberal party of the VVD tended to change from a more extreme right-wing party in 2008 (voting with the PVV as the only party), and becoming more central, or even more positive in 2010 and 2012. They even vote less with the PVV in 2010, in their coalition year, than in 2008. And in 2012 they get into a coalition with their counterparts of the left-wing labour party the PVDA. Another example is the SGP that votes more positive on multiculturalism in 2008, but starts to become more negative along the way to 2012. In that year, they vote more with the PVV than any other party.

Popular topic

One of the features a longer time frame includes are the hot topic events. These events in society can cause resolutions all year round, or just an increase in resolutions for a short period. These events are not always covert in the party manifesto's. Therefore the attitude of the party is not always established yet. These topics can cause very different grades of parties than expected.

In the government year of 2008 on the policy domain of military: positive out of the 53 resolutions included in this study, eleven were on the subject of the purchase of the Joint Strike Fighter. A topic still recurring in the government year of 2010, but then the economic crisis brought in a new topic of cuts in the defensive budgets. In 2012 the defence budget was at a low point, the purchase of the Joint Strike

Fighter was still not final and the policy domain of military: positive does not get interest in the political landscape anymore in that year.

The government year of 2008 and 2010 show resolutions on the policy domain of multiculturalism: positive on asylum seekers, integration and Islamic influences, these two government years (even though there is a decline in the number of resolutions), show a similar pattern of topics. The government year of 2012 characterizes from the start of the Syrian war. The number of resolutions on multiculturalism almost doubles again. Still way before the “wir schaffen das” momentum in Germany. The Dutch political parties tend to be fairly positive on this subject.

6.4 Conclusion of the evaluation of the three processes by parliamentary resolutions

In this part of the analysis the question “to what extent are the three processes of the in-government period measured by parliamentary resolutions?” is answered. This conclusion follows the three processes, first the process of voting, secondly the coalition building process and as last the voting over a longer time frame. The importance of this chapter is to distinguish the variable of parliamentary resolution as a unique variable of measuring polarization. This study sought out to find a variable with more explanatory power of polarization than the static variables in prior researches. The answer to this question is therefore, yes to an extent can the three processes of the in-government period can be measured by parliamentary resolutions. To what extent and what unique information is subtracted out of the variable will follow below.

In the gathering of the parliamentary resolutions the first process: every resolution should be subjected to a voting round, is adapted, because resolutions with no vote could not be measured. The amount of parliamentary resolutions, as also described in chapter 3 methodology, the amount of these kind of resolutions where rare. The process for the purpose of this research is put in a broader context. In this broader context four structures of voting could be distinguished. The first structure is the initiator and its backing of the parliamentary resolution, the second the making of a statement, the third is the ostracization of parties, and the last is the coalition-opposition dichotomy. These four structures show that in politics it is not all about your own attitude on a certain policy domain. Every member and every

party is subjected to a larger force, sometimes initiated by a party and sometimes initiated by more than one party. Being forced to be part of these dynamics, the attitudes of parties are changed by compromise or pressure. Therefore the parliamentary resolution does do justice towards the process if every resolution is subject to a voting round.

The most influential process of the three processes of the in-government period is the coalition building process. Becoming a part of the coalition is in the Netherlands only possible with an coalition agreement, that is in itself a compromise. A bargain of all the parties where each party has to give up on some of their standpoints. Of course one coalition is not the other and some parties make better deals than others. But what is seen in the measuring of parliamentary resolutions are four interesting features defining, and in this instance for a greater extent changing, the attitudes on policy domains of the participating parties. This is the most important aspect of measuring polarization that is inherently going wrong with other variables. The highly influential factor of coalition compromising is not included in any study. Even though the first important feature of coalition building is that the coalition parties tend to have the same attitude in their voting behavior. Thus causing for a stable base of politics. Measuring polarization with pre-government data does not do justice to this fact. The other three interesting features on coalition building were, the different relationship of the tolerated agreement of the coalition with the PVV, an experiment also not done before in Dutch politics, and only withstanding two years of the normally four years of government. The stable block of the coalition parties and their smaller partners. And the difficulty of assessing the 'normalized' attitude of parties, because of, to a lesser extent, the opposition also influences the attitude of the party. From these clearly assessable four features, the variable parliamentary resolutions derive their power. The process of coalition building can be measured to the full extent.

The last process, the voting behavior over a longer timeframe, was the first problem this study saw that was wrong with measuring polarization prior to this study. Measuring with a static variable does not do justice to the dynamics of the political landscape. Even though this still is a right presumption, and the two remarkable features that came out of the measurement over longer time will be given here, this study will state that there is more explanatory power to the coalition building process than to the process of voting behavior over a longer time frame. The first remarkable feature is namely consistency, the

remarkable founding of parties voting in a stable line on a broad set of policy domains show that even on a longer timeframe the dynamics of parties do not change much. Parties start their terms with agreements, and their probable side agreements made during the in-government time, still the parties vote really consistently. Looking at a broader timeframe of the three different government periods, then there is a change visible, but this is due to a the change in coalition, size of the parties and a different society mindset of the government period. The other remarkable feature was the change in popular topics. Certain topics could impel parties to become more positive or more negative on policy domains than in advance could be expected. This however did not let individual parties change radically, but merely changed a group of parties, making the individual change less clearly. These two features make measuring polarization by parliamentary resolutions fairly interesting and to the full extent this can also be done. However because of the outcome of consistency over a longer time frame of measuring, this is more of a validating process than an explanatory process.

Parliamentary resolutions can be used to the full extent to measure the three processes of the in-government period. Where the first process enables this research in the first place It gives more explanatory power to the variable. Where the second process is the most important in influencing the actual polarization level. The uncovering of the workings of the coalition building process is therefore the most important contribution of this study. The last process of the voting behavior over a longer time period validated this study enormously by increasing the number of cases included in this study.

7. Conclusion of political polarization measurement with parliamentary resolutions

To what extent does the new method, including parliamentary resolutions, offer a different view on the political polarization level and what new insight does it provide for the research of polarization?

The idea of an increase in polarization in the political landscape was the concept of this thesis. The significance of polarization was not hard to evidence, with consequences ranging from an overall negative impact on the democratic functionality of the state, to more detailed passage of legislative policies, especially high impact ones, with the potential of legislative gridlock.

When searching for an effective and valid method for measuring polarization, it became apparent that there was no preexisting comprehensive variable. Contemporary research is still done on the basis of the dynamics of the party systems laid down by Downs (1957) and Sartori (1976). However, their research did not include a dynamic measurement tool. Consequently, most subsequent research did not go further than measuring polarization by static variables of the electoral system or it simply graded and counted political parties in a system.

The flaw in polarization measurement is not exclusive to this thesis, because other contemporary researchers have noticed the same missing link. The biggest limitation of measuring polarization is the static characteristic and timeframe of most variables used to comprehend party dynamics. This thesis tries to validate the in-government variable of parliamentary resolutions to bridge the gap. To validate this new method, polarization measurement with parliamentary resolutions was compared with the more static indicator of party manifestos. The objective of this thesis is to proffer a different perspective of political polarization and, in so doing, provide new insight for the research of polarization. Hence the mission statement and leading question of this thesis, “ To what extent does the new method, including parliamentary resolutions, offer a different view on the political polarization level and what new insight does it provide for the research of polarization?”

To exceed the preexisting narrative of research into political polarization, this thesis adopts the contemporary definition, “*Polarization is the gap of position between clusters and the relative size of clusters, over a longer time frame, in a spatial dimension, where every cluster is homogeneous in terms of attributes given, and is heterogeneous across clusters*” which is a merger of the attributes of polarization by DiMaggio, Evans & Bryson and Esteban & Ray. This broader definition is constructed to transcend the research and measurement of political polarization.

In this thesis, the work of Downs and Sartori are deemed too narrow to reflect the political landscape, the dynamics of parties and coalitions and, therefore, the complexity of political polarization. To some extent the dynamics are as simple as they describe them, where political parties try to get in power by their own means or by the means of a coalition. A coalition needs to be stable to engender a long and effective period of governance.

A case-study of the Netherlands was conducted using parliamentary resolutions as an indicator of political polarization. The Netherlands is a country with a proportional electoral system and a low electoral threshold, resulting in a high number of relevant parties and a more compromising political landscape than a two-party dichotomy, such as the United States. Furthermore, in the Netherlands, parliamentary resolutions are frequently used and well documented political instruments.

Analysis of parliamentary resolutions provided convincing and corroborative evidence of the in-government party dynamics. A noticeable and important aspect found, as a result of using a dynamic measurement tool instead of a static variable, was the coalition building process, which influenced the grades of the political parties the most. Three interesting features are described here but, notably, the influence of the coalition building process was not identifiable when using the static party manifestos variable.

In the coalition building process, a compromising coalition agreement is made on a broad set of policies. This binds the parties for the forthcoming four years of government and commands cross-party allegiance instead of being loyal to different and conflicting parties’ attitude toward certain policies. This is seen in the grades of all the coalitions, except in part of the 2010 government year, which will

subsequently be described as an individual feature. The coalition building process is the most influential factor of the voting behavior of political parties and, therefore, the biggest driver of polarization. Therefore, the presumption that the level of polarization only increases in a multi-party system with majority rule, is, demonstrably wrong: once in government the majority obviates the minority and neutralizes the polarization level. Furthermore, the polarization level should also be evident in the pre-coalition building process, for the duration of the formation process.

A stable coalition neutralizes the polarization level, but an unstable coalition increases the polarization level accordingly. This was the case in 2010 where the government had a tolerance agreement with the PVV. The coalition existed that year out of a minority of the CDA and VVD, only having support on broader policies of the PVV. As a result, 2010 is marked with the highest polarization level. Therefore, stability is the most important factor of a coalition building process, to neutralize polarization. Where a coalition does not have cross-party support, demonstrated by voting on parliamentary resolutions, the polarization level will be higher.

One of the consequences of measuring polarization with a high coalition correlation is that the parties do not have a 'normalized' party grade, which makes it difficult to assess the actual influence of the coalition building process. This could have been done with the party manifestos grades, except that all these grades are very low, and, therefore, unreliable for the sake of comparison.

The polarization level of both variables suggests the same overall trend. The polarization in the year of 2010 increases on both variables, which is due to the unstable coalition demonstrated by voting on parliamentary resolutions. The polarization level decreases again on both variables in the year of 2012. Resulting in an increase of polarization in the timeframe of 2006 towards 2012 on two of the four policy domains measured by party manifestos and an increase of polarization in the timeframe of 2008 towards 2012 on one of the four policy domains measured by parliamentary resolutions.

The study and this thesis concludes four things:

- i) Polarization level can be measured by both variables, parliamentary resolutions and party manifestos.
- ii) Where the polarization level rises and falls, when measured by parliamentary resolutions it can at least be attributed to the process of coalition building and its qualities. Whereas the fluctuation, when measured by party manifestos can only be attributed to some individual scoring of one or more parties.

The data from both indicators are entirely different and incomparable. Party resolutions are at least an actual voting indicator of political parties and thus an actual indicator of political polarization instead of pre-governmental polarization.

- iii) This study finds, contrary to the prevailing image, that polarization level in the in-government period is not increased over the timeframe of 2008-2012, and that the polarization level in the pre-government period over the timeframe of 2006-2012 is increased on only half the policy domains.
- iv) Measuring polarization gave a clear insight into party dynamics, with stability as the most important factor of the coalition building process and thus to neutralize polarization. In other words where parties compromise individual ideologies for the greater good, instead of only for their own gains. There is a lower polarization level and government is less exposed to policy gridlock. However, at the time of building the coalition framework, parties don't know the consequence of being a compromising partner in a coalition. In two instances the party saw a decline of support by the electorate after forming a coalition. Even where coalition building process results in a better working government, it can be politically hazardous for individual parties.

7.1 Reflection

This study has been complicated by my own ambition which was inspired by the huge amount, and scope, of my research. The study started at the notion of an increase of polarization in news media, followed by world events, whose cause and effect were difficult to understand. The scope of the study

expanded and developed to include a means of objective measurement of polarization and the changing political landscape. Media coverage reflected nervousness within the establishment and provoked societal anxiety as the political landscape took shape in recent years. In pursuit of the original goal of the study I discovered that it was difficult to objectively differentiate between political polarization and the more subjective social polarization. I had to find an accurate measurement of actual political polarization and, by my assessment, the current method of measurement is not up to that job.

Initially, I thought that the complexity and dynamics of the political landscape was so large, that when there is evidence of a high level of polarization it will always result in political gridlock and, I suspected, progress could only be made where there is cooperation and understanding within government. Therefore, this study aspires to measure and evidence political polarization by means of actual voting behavior of the various parties. In the process a raft of parliamentary resolutions were manually scrutinized and coded.

The unique features of parliamentary resolutions are written down in chapter 6. However, in the course of my research I noticed some curious aspects of parliamentary resolutions which I have reflected on in this, the closing section of the thesis.

The most important point is the 'normalized' grade of a party on a policy domain. Measured by parliamentary resolutions the grades of a party are not an individual grade - all the figures are related to one another. Where one party votes against a particular resolution and another party votes in support of the same resolution, the data is correlated. This is not unique to resolutions but it is unique to variables where the actual voting behavior of parties is being measured. The related data demonstrates an interdependency and, therefore, the 'normalized' grade of a party is not visible. A party's grade is, therefore, only apparent when a coalition framework is established and the opposition is laid down. In the case of the Netherlands, and, doubtless, in other political systems, where a party is outcast it can become a target for all other parties to block, collectively. These dynamics are easy to spot by actual voting behaviour but the expected 'normalized' grade of individual parties is not measured. For this reason actual voting behaviour is more important than party manifestos, which clearly demonstrate the 'normalised' grade of individual parties, because the real power of parties is in voting, and not in writing

party manifestos, which invariably include false or undeliverable promises or is simply trying to appeal to the electorate.

At the outset of this thesis I wanted to lay a new foundation for research into political polarization but halfway through I thought it was going to be impossible: parliamentary resolutions, a statutory instrument of almost all democratic systems but (for the purpose of a measurement variable) one that needs more than two parties in the system, an extensive database and requires a comprehensive coding mechanism. However, in concluding the thesis I realized that the efficacy of measuring actual political polarization does not necessarily lie in the parliamentary resolution itself, but in the inference it uncovers. Therefore every variable that has been stored in a database of an actual vote count can be used to measure polarization. The whole coding chapter could be shortened because there is less coding needed when you accept that the variable is correlated. Making the indicator parliamentary resolutions useful for comparative research.

The method proposed in this thesis, is in line with contemporary research into political polarization but introduces a new, objective method of measuring political polarization. Other studies have broadened earlier research methods by considering, for instance, social media, and the public debate. Research that focused on the political consequences of polarization are for a large part centered in the United States, a country that is more likely to be affected by polarization because of their two-party system. It is, however, a deficiency of the polarization debate where contemporary research pays insufficient attention to the multi-party system - mainly because of the high concession of political ideology during the coalition building phase. This is an attribute that is not evident in two-party systems and is underexposed in contemporary research but remains essential for the efficacy of a coalition and/or government. This study adds new insight into polarization and concludes that, without the inclusion of the actual voting behaviour during governmental incumbency, political polarization cannot be constructed as a valid indicator.

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Reference of parliamentary resolutions

Parliamentary resolutions from 2008-2009 included in this study

1.08.11.18.001 e_Van_Velzen_c.s._over_het_nogmaals_laten_onderzoeken_van_de_beveiliging_van_militaire_terreinen

1.08.11.18.002 Motie_Diks_over_een_verhoogd_beveiligingsniveau_voor_de_categorieën_1_en_2_op_militaire_bases_

1.08.11.25.003 Van_Velzen_over_het_niet_nemen_van_het_besluit_tot_aanschaf_van_JSF-toestellen_in_februari_2009_

1.08.11.25.004 Gew_motie_Van_Velzen_over_het_geluidsniveau_als_criterium_(t.v.v._26_488,_nr._112)

1.08.11.25.005 t_over_aanschaf_van_de_JSF-toestellen_tot_het_besluit_over_de_vervanging_van_de_F-16_is_genomen_

1.08.11.25.006 Motie_Pechtold_over_extra_tijd_voor_kandidaat-producenten_voor_een_simulatie_

1.08.11.25.007 Motie_Pechtold_het_geluidsaspect_als_onderdeel_van_een_kwalitatieve_vergelijking_

1.08.12.02.008 Brinkman_over_uitstel_van_de_beslissing_over_aanschaf_tot_er_een_goede_kandidaat_beschikbaar_is_

1.08.12.02.009 Motie_Poppe_over_de_benodigde_bezettingsgraad_voor_uitvoering_van_het_ambitieniveau_

1.08.12.02.010 Poppe_over_herintroductie_van_het_gevechtsinsigne_met_terugwerkende_kracht_tot_27_december_1949_

1.08.12.02.011 Motie_Poppe_-_Van_Velzen_over_onderzoek_naar_de_kosten_van_de_Nederlandse_missie_in_Uruzgan

1.08.12.02.012 Motie_Poppe_c.s._over_onderzoek_naar_een_klachtencommissie_voor_veteranen_

1.08.12.02.013 Motie_Van_Velzen_over_afstand_nemen_van_de_uitspraken_van_kolonel_Van_Happen

1.08.12.02.014 Motie_Van_Velzen_over_extra_beveiligingsmaatregelen_

1.08.12.02.015 tie_Knops_-_Eijsink_over_een_bonus_voor_actief_dienende_militairen_die_driemaal_zijn_uitgezonden

1.08.12.02.016 Motie_Knops_c.s._over vereenvoudiging_van_regelgeving_

1.08.12.02.017 Motie_Knops_c.s._over_bescherming_van_de_Fennek-voertuigen_

1.08.12.02.018 _Voordewind_over_de_uitwerking_van_een_plan_voor_een_-internaat_voor_veiligheid_en_vakmanschap_

1.08.12.02.019 Nader_gew_motie_Boekstijn_c.s._over_verruiming_van_de_HGIS-afspraken_(t.v.v._31_700_X,_nr._64)

1.08.12.02.020 et_lid_Boekstijn_over_reductie_van_de_termijn_waarbinnen_innovatieve_projecten_tot_wasdom_komen

1.08.12.02.021 r_het_tegen_het_licht_houden_van_de_functie_IGK_en_andere_toezichthoudende_organen_bij_Defensie_

1.08.12.02.022 motie Eijsink c.s. over rapportage over de voortgang SPEER project

1.08.12.02.023 motie van het lid eijsink c.s.voorstel veteranen schadeloostelling

1.08.12.02.024 svesting_en_arbeidsomstandigheden_van_het_personeel_van_de_Koninklijke_Marechaussee_op_Schiphol_

1.08.12.02.025 r_onderhandelingen_gericht_op_terugtrekking_van_de_Nederlandse_troepen_uit_Uruzgan_volgend_jaar_

1.08.12.02.026 Motie_Voordewind_c.s._over_eigen_UAV-capaciteit_ter_vervanging_van_de_Sperwer_

1.08.12.02.027 Motie_Voordewind_c.s._over_het_Multinationaal_Heli_Initiative_Trustfund_

1.08.12.02.028 Motie_Diks_een_inventarisatie_van_de_Nederlandse_ambities_op_veiligheidsgebied

1.08.12.02.029 Motie_Van_der_Staaij_-_Boekstijn_over_de_budgettaire_consequenties_van_de_verkenningen (1)

1.09.01.27.030 Motie_Van_Bommel_-_Boekstijn_over_geen_grote_Nederlandse_missie_in_Afghanistan_na_2010_

1.09.03.03.031 Motie_De_Wit-Van_Gent_over_het_reduceren_van_het_aantal_AWACS-vluchten_tot_2340_

1.09.03.03.032 uchten_van_Geilenkirchen_te_verplaatsen_naar_een_Nederlands_vliegveld_(t.v.v._31_700_XI,_nr._77)

1.09.03.03.033 otie_Neppérus-Samsom_over_een_vermindering_van_de_geluidsoverlast_van_de_AWACS-vluchten_met_35%

1.09.03.03.034 over_het_afsluiten_van_het_Nederlandse_luchtruim_voor_opstijgende_en_landende_AWACS-vliegtuigen_

1.09.03.03.035 n_Velzen_c.s._over_advies_van_de_Raad_van_State_inzake_vertrouwelijke_informatie_van_de_regering

1.09.03.03.036 Motie_Van_Velzen_c.s._over_uitvoering_van_de_motie_op_stuk_26488,_nr._87_

1.09.03.03.037 Eijsink_c.s._over_de_ontwikkeling_van_het_aantal_geplande_en_het_aantal_gerealiseerde_vliegreun_

1.09.04.21.038 Motie_Brinkman_over_de_aanschaf_van_JSF-testtoestellen_

1.09.04.23.039 Motie-Kant_c.s._over_niet_instemmen_met_de_aanschaf_van_JSF-testtoestellen_

1.09.04.23.040 otie-Hamer_c.s._over_deelname_aan_de_operationele_testfase_is_geen_definitieve_keuze_voor_de_JSF

1.09.04.23.041 t_aangaan_van_verplichtingen_zonder_dat_in_een_nieuw_contract_een_terugneemgarantie_is_opgenomen

1.09.04.23.042 Motie-Pechtold_over_nieuwe_elementen_in_een_nieuwe_kandidatenvergelijking

1.09.06.02.043 Motie_Van_Bommel_over_een_afzonderlijke_artikel_100-procedure_per_afzonderlijke_operatie_

1.09.06.02.044 n_het_lid_Boekestijn_over_een_convenant_met_de_reservistenorganisaties_over_ondersteunende_taken

1.09.06.02.045 Motie_Knops_c.s._over_onderzoek_naar_de_inzet_van_reservisten_in_andere_landen_

1.09.06.23.046 Motie_Brinkman_c.s._over_de_aanwending_van_gelden_voor_de_regeling_Employer_support_krijgsmacht_

1.09.06.23.047 Motie_Boekestijn_over_afzetten_van_gerealiseerde_prestaties_tegen_voornemens_in_de_begroting_

1.09.06.23.048 kestijn_en_Eijsink_over_aangeven_van_de_begrenzungen_in_tijd,_geld_en_resultaat_per_deelproject_

1.09.06.23.049 ie_Boekestijn_over_een_tijdpad_voor_de_invoering_van_een_betrouwbaar_tracking- en_tracingsysteem

1.09.06.23.050 Motie_Brinkman_over_onmogelijk_maken_van_externer_inhuur_

1.09.06.23.051 Motie_Eijsink_over_de_wijze_van_aanbieden_van_informatie_over_de_inhuur_van_externen

1.09.06.30.052 Motie_Madlener_over_zwaarbewapende_mariniers_op_koopvaardischepen_

1.09.07.02.053 Motie_Pechtold_en_Haverkamp_over_voorstellen_voor_stemmen_vanuit_het_buitenland

3.08.09.18.001 het_toepassen_van_snelrecht_bij_geweldsmisdrijven_tegen_werknemers_in_de_dienstverlenende_sector

3.08.09.18.002 lijk_maken_van_het_opleggen_van_een_taastrap_voor_ernstige_geweldsmisdrijven_en_zedenmisdrijven

3.08.09.18.003 _over_het_duidelijk_communiceren_van_aansprekende_en_concrete_voorbeelden_van_lik-op-stukbeleid_

3.08.09.18.004 Motie-Kant_over_het_wegnemen_van_tekorten_aan_agenten_

3.08.09.18.005 Motie_van_het_lid_Griffith_over_een_landelijke_vliegende_brigade

3.08.09.18.006 Motie-Griffith_over_een_landelijke_aanpak_van_probleemjongeren_

3.08.10.09.007 Agema_en_Zijlstra_over_het_eerst_geven_van_een_waarschuwing_en_pas_in_tweede_instantie_een_boete

3.08.10.09.008 Motie_Agema_over_het_opheffen_van_het_rookverbod_in_de_horeca

3.08.10.09.009 Motie_Zijlstra_en_Agema_over_het_opschorten_van_de_aanscherping_van_het_handhavingsregime

3.08.11.04.010 _taaktrap_aan_een_persoon_die_in_de_voorafgaande_vijf_jaren_een_vrijheidsrap_ heeft_ondergaan_

3.08.11.04.011 Motie-De_Roon-Teeven_over_het_niet_vaker_dan_eenmaal_opleggen_van_een_taastrap

3.08.11.04.012 Motie-De_Roon-Teeven_over_het_beperken_van_de_maximale_duur_van_een_taastrap_tot_120_uur

3.08.11.04.013 n_van_een_taastrap_in_combinatie_met_straffen_voor_ernstige_gewelddelicten_en_zedenmisdrijven_

3.08.11.04.014 Motie_Kuiken_c.s._over_overnemen_van_de_aanbevelingen_van_de_werkgroep_

3.08.11.04.015 eringen_aan_de_opsporingsinstanties_die_het_wederrechtelijk_verkregen_vermogen_hebben_opgespoord

3.08.11.11.016 erplichting_om_vermogensbestanddelen_en_inkomsten_van_verdachten_vroegtijdig_in_beslag_te_nemen_

3.08.11.11.017 Motie_Van_Velzen_c.s._over_ondersteuning_van_het_project_huisbewaring_gedetineerden_

3.08.11.11.018 Motie_Van_Velzen_en_Azough_over_oormerking_van_het_budget_voor_nazorg_voor_ex-gedetineeren_

3.08.11.11.019 Motie_Jodersma_en_Teeven_over_het_weren_van_drugs_in_penitentiaire_inrichtingen_

3.08.11.11.020 Motie_Teeven_en_Azough_over_een_uitgewerkt_plan_tegen_illegale_vuurwapens_

3.08.11.11.021 Motie_Heerts_en_Teeven_over_een_landelijk_projectteam_lading- en_winkeldiefstal_bij_de_politie_

3.08.11.11.022 Motie_Heerts_c.s._over_arbeid_en_onderwijs_in_detentie_

3.08.11.11.023 Motie_Arib_c.s._over_het_vervolgen_van_Nederlanders_die_zich_schuldig_maken_aan_sekstoerisme

3.08.11.11.024 Motie_De_Roon_over_het_tegengaan_van_drugstoerisme_

3.08.11.11.025 Motie_Anker_c.s._over_uitbreiding_van_het_FF_Kappe-project_

3.08.11.11.026 Motie_Azough_over_staking_van_het_experiment_met_bodyscans_op_Schiphol_

3.08.11.11.027 Motie_Azough_c.s._over_het_uitbrengen_van_de_drugsnota_in_de_eerste_helft_van_2009_

3.08.11.11.028 e_Pechtold_over_een_onderzoek_naar_een_tussentijdse_toetsing_van_de_levenslange_gevangenisrap_

3.08.11.11.029 komen_van_concessies_aan_het_opleidingsniveau_bij_het_tegengaan_van_tekorten_in_de_togaberoepen_

3.08.11.11.030

Motie_Van_der_Staaij_en_Teeven_over_een_redelijke_termijn_voor_een_beslissing_op_beklag

3.08.12.02.031 Motie_Van_Raak_over_het_afzien_van_de_voorgenomen_bezuinigingen_op_de_politie_

3.08.12.02.032 Motie_Brinkman_over_10%_minder_politechefs_vanaf_de_rang_van_commissaris_

3.08.12.02.033 Motie_van_het_lid_Çörüz_c.s._over_het_terugbrengen_van_de_overhead_bij_de_politekorpren_

3.08.12.02.034 et_lid_Çörüz_c.s._over_de_effectiviteit_van_het_instrumentarium_voor_bestrijding_van_overlast

3.08.12.02.035 Motie_Van_der_Staaij_c.s._over_het_niet_ontmoedigen_van_het_gebruik_van_Mosquito's

3.08.12.02.036 ken_over_een_plan_van_aanpak_voor_de_bestrijding_van_homofoob_geweld_(t.v.v._31_700_VII,_nr._38)

3.08.12.18.037 De_Roon_over_verdubbelen_van_de_maximale_straf_voor_drugsbezit,_-vervoer,_-handel_en_-bewerking_

3.08.12.18.038 Motie_De_Roon_over_beloning_van_penitentiaire_inrichtingswerkers_voor_betrappen_van_drugsbezit_

3.08.12.18.039 Motie_De_Roon_over_implementeren_van_de_zogenaamde_slang_in_2009_

3.08.12.18.040 Motie_De_Roon_over_verbieden_van_bezoek_na_geconstateerde_aanwezigheid_van_drugs_

3.09.02.03.041 Motie-De_Roon_over_ongeeüniformeerde_beveiligingsmedewerkers_in_winkels

3.09.02.03.042 ie-De_Roon_over_strafvorderlijk_conservatoir_beslag_ten_behoeve_van_slachtoffers_van_misdrijven_

3.09.03.10.043 Smits_en_Kuiken_over_het_alleen_na_goedkeuring_van_het_lokale_bestuur_plaatsen_van_de_Mosquito_

3.09.03.10.044 Motie_van_het_lid_Çörüz_c.s._over_het_bij_wet_regelen_van_het_gebruik_van_de_Mosquito_

3.09.03.24.045 ma-De_Roon_over_conservatoire_beslaglegging_voor_het_schadeverhaal_ten_behoeve_van_slachtoffers_

3.09.03.24.046 ervatoire_beslaglegging_bij_verdenking_van_misdrijven_met_een_geldboete_van_de_vierde_categorie_

3.09.04.07.047 Motie_Agema_over_intrekken_van_het_rookverbod_in_de_horeca_

3.09.04.21.048 ver_onmogelijk_maken_dat_criminele_organisaties_vanuit_penitentiaire_inrichtingen_worden_geleid_

3.09.04.23.049 nalen_van_radicalisering_bij_weigering_van_een_wapenvergunning_op_grond_van_vrees_voor_misbruik_

3.09.04.23.050 Verdonk_over_direct_beboeten_van_ouders_als_hun_kind_door_een_politieagent_wordt_thuisgebracht_

3.09.04.23.051 van_plegers_van_geweldsdelicten_tegen_hulpverleners_met_een_administratieve_boete_van_€10.000_

3.09.04.23.052 Motie_Van_Toorenborg_en_De_Krom_over_een_analyse_van_de_knelpunten_in_de_schorsingsregeling

3.09.04.23.053 Motie_Van_Toorenborg_over_inzicht_in_de_precieze_bevoegdheden_van_toekomstige_gezinsmanagers_

3.09.05.26.054 Motie_De_Roon_over_afzien_van_het_voornemen_om_acht_gevangenen_te_sluiten

3.09.05.26.055 Motie_Teeven_c.s._over_niet_doorzetten_van_sluiting_van_gevangenen_

3.09.05.26.056 en_-
_Teeven_over_de_garantie_dat_gedwongen_ontslagen_onder_gevangenispersoneel_worden voorkomen_

3.09.05.26.057 Motie_Verdonk_over_onderzoek_naar_factoren_die_meewegen_bij_de_dalende_behoefte_aan_celruimte_

3.09.06.02.058 Motie_Kant_c.s._over_niet_minder_politieagenten_op_straat_

3.09.06.02.059 an_Geel_c.s._over_versneld_terugdringen_van_de_fysieke_verloedering_en_ernstige_sociale_overlast

3.09.06.02.060 te_over_niet_nemen_van_bezuinigingsmaatregelen_die_ten_koste_gaan_van_het_totale_aantal_agenten_

3.09.06.16.061 _Wit_c.s._over_het_verhoren_van_mensen_met_een_verstandelijke_handicap_door_externe_deskundigen_

3.09.06.16.062 _over_externe_deskundigen_uit_de_verhoorderspool_opleiden_tot_buitengewoon_opsporingsambtenaar_

3.09.06.16.063 Motie_Aasted-Madsen-van_Stiphout_en_Heerts_over_een_screeningsinstrument_voor_verhoorplannen

3.09.06.23.064 Motie-Teeven_over_onmiddellijk_stoppen_met_elektronische_detentie_op_het_huisadres_

3.09.06.23.065 Motie-De_Roon_over_het_afschaffen_van_alle_elektronische_enkelbandjes_

3.09.06.23.066 ellijk_ontslag_voor_managers_die_verantwoordelijk_zijn_voor_de_administratieve_chaos_bij_de_IND_

3.09.07.02.067 z_c.s._over_voorstellen_om_de_positie_van_de_voorzitter_van_de_raad_van_korpschefs_te_versterken

3.09.07.02.068 _specifieke_afspraken_over_kwaliteit_en_beschikbaarheid_van_politiezorg_in_het_landelijk_gebied_

3.09.07.02.069 Motie_van_het_lid_Van_Velzen_c.s._over_niet_laten_afvloeien_van_gevangenispersoneel

3.09.07.02.070 Motie_van_het_lid_Van_Velzen_c.s._over_niet_sluiten_van_BBI's_en_ZBBI's

3.09.07.02.071 Motie_van_de_leden_Van_Velzen_en_Azough_over_niet_sluiten_van_de_verslavingsbegeleidingsafdelingen

3.09.07.02.072 tuele)_sluiting_van_de_penitentiaire_inrichtingen_Bankenbos,_Noordsingel,_Maashegge_en_'t_Keern_

3.09.07.02.073 e_Teeven_over_een_eensluitende_landelijke_afspraak_over_informatie-uitwisseling_en_samenwerking_

5.08.09.18.001 van_Europese_verdragen_die_beletsels_opwerpen_bij_het_opzetten_en_uitvoeren_van_immigratiebeleid

5.08.10.07.002 Motie_Tang_c.s._over_een_Europese_toezichthouder_

5.08.11.06.003 alen_over_het_aan_de_orde_stellen_van_de_mogelijke_inzet_van_de_Europese_snelle_interventiemacht

5.08.11.11.004 mel_c.s._over_het_uitdragen_van_de_Europese_Unie_als_samenwerkingsverband_van_soevereine_staten_

5.08.11.11.005 Motie_Van_Bommel_over_een_verplicht_register_voor_lobbyisten_

5.08.11.11.006 _over_de_mogelijkheden_van_het_Verdrag_van_Nice_om_aan_bepaalde_uitdagingen_het_hoofd_te_bieden_

5.08.11.11.007 nemen_van_belemmeringen_voor_het_leveren_van_een_Nederlandse_operationele_bijdrage_aan_Frontex_

5.08.11.18.008 Motie_Tony_van_Dijck_over_afwijzing_van_het_Asiel-_en_Migratiepact_

5.08.11.25.009 Motie_Griffith_een_Europese_aanpak_van_ongewenste_inmenging_

5.08.12.16.010 Motie_Kamp_over_een_oplossing_voor_het_gebruik_van_de_Europa-route_

5.08.12.18.011 Motie_Ten_Broeke_over_het_meewegen_van_de_omvang_van_de_Commissie_in_de_beoordeling_

5.08.12.18.012 ich_onthouden_van_voorlichtingsactiviteiten_van_de_Europese_Commissie_tot_na_de_EU-verkiezingen_

5.08.12.18.013 Jonker_c.s._over_de_oprichting_van_een_Europees_equivalent_van_Actal_(t.v.v._21_501-20,_nr._407)_

5.09.02.19.014 Motie_Fritsma_over_het_niet_uit_handen_geven_van_het_asiel-_en_immigratiebeleid_aan_Europa_

5.09.03.03.015 e_Vendrik_over_de_financiële_bijdrage_aan_mitigatie-_en_adaptatiebeleid_in_ontwikkelingslanden_

5.09.03.31.016 Ten_Broeke_over_de_inzet_van_de_regering_bij_de_samenstelling_van_de_nieuwe_Europese_Commissie_

5.09.06.02.016 Motie_Fritsma_over_geen_gemeenschappelijk_Europees_toelatingsbeleid_

5.09.06.17.017 Motie_Peters_over_financieel_commitment_aan_mitigatie-_en_adaptatiebeleid_

9.08.09.18.001 Motie-Verdonk_over_een_eerlijk_en_open_overzicht_van_de_totale_kosten_van_het_generaal_pardon_

9.08.09.18.002 _over_het_binnen_twee_weken_volledig_duidelijkheid_geven_over_de_kosten_van_het_generaal_pardon_

9.08.10.09.003 Motie_Madlener-Fritsma_over_een_eind_maken_aan_gescheiden_inburgering_

9.08.10.09.004 Motie_Van_Toorenborg-_Kamp_over_het_in_stand_blijven_van_de_verplichte_eigen_bijdrage_

9.08.10.09.005 ver_het_voorzetten_van_het_bieden_van_categoriale_bescherming_aan_asielzoekers_uit_Centraal-Irak_

9.08.10.09.006 w_motie_Anker_over_het_ook_benoemen_van_joden_en_shabaks_als_specifieke_groep_(t.v.v._nr._1226)_

9.08.10.28.007 ederland_verblijvende_personen_van_door_de_overheid_(mede)_gefinancierde_onderwijsvoorzieningen_

9.08.10.28.008 p_over_het_binnen_vier_jaar_halveren_van_het_aantal_illegaal_in_Nederland_verblijvende_personen_

9.08.11.11.009 Motie_Van_Haersma_Buma_en_Arib_over_een_extra_inspanning_ten behoeve_van_terugkeer_naar_Irak_

9.08.11.11.010 Motie_Teeven_over_het_serieus_nemen_van_de_immigratieproblematiek_

9.08.11.11.011 a_over_melding_van_het_gebruik_van_de_discretionaire_bevoegdheid_bij_individuele_verblijfszaken_

9.08.11.11.012 ngaan_dat_partners_en_familieleden_van_EU-onderdanen_automatisch_meeliften_op_hun_verblijfsstatus_

9.08.11.11.013 Motie_Fritsma_over_een_onderzoek_naar_de_kosten_van_massa-immigratie_

9.08.11.11.014 er_verbetering_van_de_leef-_en_werksituatie_in_bronlanden_van_illegale_migratie_en_mensenhandel_

9.08.11.25.015 Motie_Griffith_over_migrantengroepen_die_kwetsbaar_zijn_voor_ongewenste_inmenging_

9.08.11.25.016 Motie_Karabulut_over_ongewenste_beïnvloeding_van_Nederlandse_imams_

9.08.11.25.017 Motie_Fritsma_over_het_onheffen_uit_hun_functie_van_9_imams_(1)_

9.08.12.02.018 Motie_Heijnen_over_aanvullende_maatregelen_om_meer_allochtonen_in_dienst_te_nemen_

9.08.12.02.019 Motie_Brinkman_over_onderzoek_naar_homogeweld_door_allochtonen_

9.08.12.02.020 Motie_Brinkman_over_een_verbod_op_het_dragen_van_hoofddoekjes_ook_binnen_een_politiebureau_

9.08.12.09.021 Motie_Karabulut_c.s._over_een_taalcursus_voor_werknemers_uit_MOE-landen_

9.08.12.09.022 Motie_Van_Toorenborg_en_Dijsselbloem_over_een_integraal_beleid_ten_aanzien_van_huwelijksmigratie_

9.08.12.09.023 Motie_Van_Toorenborg_over_heroverweging_van_de_remigratieregeling_

9.08.12.09.024 der_Burg_en_Kamp_over_het_handhaven_van_de_inkomens-_en_opleidingseisen_voor_huwelijksmigranten_

9.08.12.09.025 otie_Van_der_Burg_en_Van_Toorenborg_over_herijking_van_het_delictsbestanddeel_-in_het_openbaar-_

9.08.12.09.026 Dijsselbloem_en_Van_der_Staaij_over_concretisering_van_de_ambities_op_het_terrein_van_integratie_

9.08.12.09.027 Dijsselbloem_c.s._over_informatie_over_specifieke_problemen_binnen_specifieke_bevolkingsgroepen_

9.08.12.09.028 Motie_Dijsselbloem_c.s._over_van_taalcursussen_op_ETV_

9.08.12.09.029 ng_dat_de_migratieproblemen_niet_zijn_op_te_lossen_met_de_huidige_hoge_instroom_van_immigranten_

9.08.12.09.030 t_verlies_van_de_verblijfsvergunning_bij_het_verwijtbaar_niet_afmaken_van_de_inburgeringscursus_

9.08.12.09.031 Motie_Fritsma_over_het_niet_langer_financieren_van_inburgeringscursussen_met_belastinggeld_

9.08.12.09.032 ver_het_uitspreken_door_de_regering_dat_de_boerka_niet_in_de_Nederlandse_samenleving_thuishoort_

9.08.12.09.033 otie_Ortega-Martijn_c.s._over_een_tweejaarlijks_onderzoek_naar_de_participatie_van_inburgeraars_

9.08.12.09.034 n_der_Staaij - Ortega-Martijn over melding van geweld en intimidatie tegenover geloofsafvalligen

9.08.12.09.035 over_de_toezegging_dat_60.000_mensen_op_31_december_2009_het_inburgeringsexamen_hebben_afgelegd_

9.08.12.09.036 Motie_Verdonk_over_opheffing_van_de_ANBI-status_van_de_As-Soennah moskee_

9.08.12.16.037 Motie_Fritsma_over_toepassen_van_het_nationale_toelatingsbeleid_inzake_gezinsmigratie

9.08.12.16.038 Motie_Fritsma_over_niet_vrijstellen_van_het_mvv-vereiste_van_nieuwe_categorieën_vreemdelingen

9.08.12.16.039 sen_van_de_arbeidsmarkttoets_op_prioriteitgenietend_aanbod_bij_aanvragen_van_buitenlandse_imams_

9.08.12.16.040 jsselbloem_over_concretiseren_van_de_gedragscode_en_de_compensatieprojecten_voor_herkomstlanden_

9.08.12.16.041 it_over_toepassing_van_de_versnelde_procedure_voor_duurzaam_tot_het_gezin_behorende_gezinsleden_

9.08.12.16.042 Motie_Kamp_over_afzien_van_versoepeling_van_het_immigratiebeleid_voor_oudere_vreemdelingen

9.08.12.16.043 e_Van_de_Camp_over_afronding_van_het_overleg_over_de_zorgverzekeringsproblematiek_van_migranten_

9.08.12.16.044 Motie_Van_de_Camp_over_blijvende_garantstelling_door_de_kinderen_

9.08.12.18.045 Istra_c.s._over_het_niet_tijdig_informereren_van_de_Kamer_over_de_einddatum_van_de_pardonregeling_

9.08.12.18.046 ritsma_over_het_ongeldig_verklaren_van_de_na_1_januari_2008_afgegeven_burgemeestersverklaringen_

9.08.12.18.047 Motie-Fritsma_over_geen_vervolgprocedures_en_vovo-procedures_voor_afgevalen_pardonkandidaten_

9.08.12.18.048 Motie-Van_Gerven_over_uitstel_van_de_overgang_van_de_medische_opvang_asielzoekers (1)

9.09.02.03.049 er_het_niet_automatisch_toekennen_van_het_recht_op_vrij_verkeer_en_verblijf_in_de_Europese_Unie_

9.09.02.03.050 e_Fritsma_en_Verdonk_over_het_apart_registreren_en_op_fraude_controleren_van_verblijfsaanvragen_

9.09.02.03.051 Motie_De_Wit_over_de_regels_voor_toelating_als_ongehuwd_partner_van_een_EU-onderdaan

9.09.02.03.052 Motie-De_Roon_c.s._over_bevorderen_van_een_immigratiestop_voor_personen_uit_moslimlanden

9.09.02.19.053 t_opschorten_van_en_geen_onomkeerbare_stappen_zetten_in_zaken_waarin_artikel_15c_een_rol_speelt_

9.09.03.17.054 tie_Gill'ard_en_Ferrier_over_uitwerking_van_het_terugkeerbeleid_voor_tijdelijke_arbeidsmigranten

9.09.03.17.055 chrappen_van_de_pilot_ter_stimulering_van_tijdelijke_arbeidsmigratie_vanuit Ontwikkelingslanden_

9.09.04.07.056 Motie_De_Krom_over_stoppen_met_aanbieden_van_gescheiden_inburgeringscursussen_

9.09.04.07.057 ut_en_De_Krom_over_de_uitvoeringskosten_van_de_inburgeringsvoorzieningen_(t.v.v._31_143,_nr._44)

9.09.04.07.058 Motie_Karabulut_over_kwaliteitseisen_en_toezicht_voor_inburgeringsonderwijs_

9.09.04.07.059 Motie_Fritsma_over_beëindigen_van_gescheiden_inburgeren_

9.09.04.07.060 Motie_Fritsma_over_een_inburgeringscursus_voor_burgemeester_en_wethouders_van_Utrecht

9.09.04.07.061 Motie_Van_Toorenborg-De_Krom_over_de_eigen_bijdrage_van_verplichte_inburgeraars_

9.09.04.07.062 Motie_Van_Toorenborg_over_verplicht_aanbieden_van_een_taalcursus_

9.09.04.07.063 de_termijn_voor_de_ontheffing_van_de_inburgeringsplicht_(t.v.v._die_gedrukt_onder_31143,_nr._50)

9.09.04.09.064 Motie_Brinkman_over_het_ontslaan_van_een_Marokkaanse_imam_

9.09.04.09.065 Motie_Brinkman_over_het_ontslaan_van_een_Turkse_imam_

9.09.04.21.066 otie_Brinkman_en_Fritsma_over_uitvoeren_van_de_aangenomen_motie_van_de_toenmalige_Groep_Wilders

9.09.04.21.067 Motie_De_Krom_over_versnellen_van_het_project_capaciteitsuitbreiding_asiel_

9.09.04.21.068 n_geestelijk_verzorger_die_een_reeks_radicale_uitspraken_heeft_gedaan_(t.v.v._31_700_X,_nr._102)

9.09.04.23.069 Motie_Brinkman_over_moskeeën_niet_meer_aanmerken_als_algemeen_nut_beogende_instellingen_ (1)

9.09.04.23.070 _over_niet_meer_verstrekken_van_subsidies_aan_Forum_instituut_voor_multiculturele_ontwikkeling_

9.09.04.23.071 Motie_Van_Raak_over_een_nieuwe_versie_van_de_Wegwijzer_Façadepolitiek_

9.09.04.23.072 ak_over_aanpassen_van_de_Wegwijzer_Façadepolitiek_op_het_punt_van_medewerking_en_subsidieering_

9.09.04.23.074 e_Dibi_over_uitgeven_van_extra_financiële_middelen_aan_probleemgezinnen,_ongeacht_de_etniciteit

9.09.04.23.074 Motie_Fritsma_over_erkenning_dat_er_sprake_is_van_massa-immigratie_

9.09.05.10.075 Motie_De_Krom_en_Verdonk_over_aanscherpen_van_het_asiel- en_immigratiebeleid_

9.09.05.10.076 Motie_De_Krom_en_Verdonk_over_afwijzen_van_herhaalde_asielaanvragen_

9.09.05.10.077 Motie_Verdonk_en_De_Krom_over_terugbrengen_van_het_aantal_eerste_asielaanvragen

9.09.05.10.078 Motie_Verdonk_en_De_Krom_over_inwilligen_van_maximaal_15%_van_de_asielaanvragen

9.09.05.10.079 een jaarlijkse toets of asielzoekers aan alle voorwaarden voor een verblijfsvergunning voldoen_
 9.09.05.10.080 Motie Fritsma over tijdelijk verlenen van een verblijfsvergunning asiel_
 9.09.05.10.081 Motie Fritsma over uitvoering van de op 28 september 2006 aangenomen motie-Wilders
 9.09.05.10.082 aar over niet afschaffen van het categoriaal beschermingsbeleid voor Zuid- en Centraal-Somalië_
 9.09.06.02.083 Motie Wilders c.s. over onderzoek naar de hoogte van de kosten van de massa-immigratie
 9.09.06.23.084 Motie De Krom over een pakket maatregelen om de toestroom van importbruiden in te dammen
 9.09.06.23.085 Motie Fritsma over een deugdelijk administratie van historische verblijfsgegevens
 9.09.06.23.086 Motie Verdonk - De Krom over omkering van de bewijslast voor rechtmatig verblijf_
 9.09.06.30.087 otie Fritsma over volledig betalen van de kosten van inburgering door de inburgeringsplichtigen_
 9.09.06.30.088 Motie Fritsma over verzwaren van de inburgeringstoets in het buitenland_
 9.09.06.30.089 tie Ortega-Martijn c.s. over ontwikkelen van een inburgerprogramma voor blinden en slechtzienden
 9.09.07.02.090 t over niet langer subsidiëren van activiteiten die sekseongelijkheid en segregatie bevorderen_
 9.09.07.02.091 Motie Fritsma over beëindigen van de praktijk van gescheiden inburgeren_
 9.09.07.02.092 Motie Fritsma over sluiting van gescheiden loketten in een Utrechtse moskee_
 9.09.07.02.093 om over niet faciliteren c.q. subsidiëren van aparte behandeling en achterstelling van vrouwen_
 9.09.07.02.094 Motie Brinkman over een project voor hoogopgeleide allochtonen_
 9.09.07.02.095 n Velzen en Azough over voorlopig opschorten van het overdragen van asielzoekers aan Griekenland
 9.09.07.02.096 erdonk over de garantstelling door kinderen voor de volledige periode van verblijf van de ouder_
 9.09.07.02.097 pecifieke criteria voor een extra zorgvuldige toets van asielverzoeken van Tamils uit Sri Lanka_

Parliamentary resolutions from 2010-2011 included in this study

1.10.11.18.001 Motie Timmermans en Voordewind over niet instemmen met verhoging van het NAVO-budget 2011
 1.10.11.18.002 _El Fassed over opstellen van een plan voor terugtrekking van Amerikaanse kernwapens uit Europa_
 1.10.11.18.003 Motie Van Bommel over internationaalrechtelijke aspecten van cyberagressie_
 1.10.12.14.004 Motie Jasper van Dijk over verlagen van het ambitieniveau van de krijgsmacht_
 1.10.12.14.005 Motie Bruins Slot c.s. over vergroting van het reservistenbestand_
 1.10.12.14.006 Motie Hachchi c.s. over universitaire diploma's voor afgestudeerden aan de NLDA_
 1.10.12.14.007 chi over een extra kwaliteits- en integriteitstoets voor medewerkers van opleidingsinstellingen_
 1.10.12.14.008 ngen met het militaire personeelsbestand van het aantal hoge officieren (t.v.v. 32500_X, nr. 21)
 1.10.12.14.009 ritisch kijken naar nut en noodzaak van het aantal civiele dienstauto's (t.v.v. 32500_X, nr. 77)
 1.10.12.14.010 otie Hernandez over gewetensbezwaren van islamitische militairen bij de Nederlandse krijgsmacht_
 1.10.12.14.011 dez en Knops over een visie over de aanpak van cybercrime-cyberwarfare (t.v.v. 32500_X, nr. 24)_
 1.10.12.14.012 cheppink c.s. over geen prioriteit aan politietaken voor de krijgsmacht (t.v.v. 32500_X, nr. 25)
 1.10.12.14.0013 wenden van de middelen voor vervanging van de F-16 voor verbetering van de operationele sterkte (1)
 1.10.12.14.014 Motie Eijssink c.s. over aanpassing van het besturingsmodel_
 1.10.12.14.015 Motie Eijssink c.s. over uitbesteden van onderhoud_
 1.10.12.14.016 Motie Eijssink c.s. over intensivering van de structurele samenwerking met Europese partners
 1.10.12.14.017 Motie Ten Broeke c.s. over doelmatiger en goedkoper gebruik van het wagenpark_
 1.10.12.14.0018 Motie Ten Broeke c.s. over evaluatie van het project Onderhoud Bushmaster_
 1.10.12.14.019 Motie Knops c.s. over het wegwerken van achterstanden in het onderhoud_
 1.10.12.14.020 Motie Knops c.s. over reductie van ten minste 30% bij de staven en de bureaucratie_
 1.10.12.14.021 Motie Knops c.s. over internationale samenwerking bij aanschaf, onderhoud en instandhouding
 1.10.12.14.022 Motie Hachchi c.s. over uitbesteding van diensten die de primaire taken ondersteunen
 1.10.12.14.023 Motie Albayrak c.s. over schadeloosstelling van veteranen uit oude missies_
 1.10.12.14.024 ayrak c.s. over een parlementair onderzoek naar de administratieve beheerssystemen van Defensie_

1.10.12.14.025 Motie-Albayrak c.s. over een onafhankelijke inspectiefunctie_

1.10.12.14.026 over een kabinetsreactie op de Defensie Verkenningen en het rapport Internationale Veiligheid_

1.10.12.14.028 Motie-Ten Broeke over geen onevenredige bezuinigingen op innovatieprogramma's

1.10.12.14.029 andez en Bosman over een zakgeldvergoeding voor cadetten en adelborsten (t.v.v. 32500_X, nr. 64)

1.10.12.14.030 Motie-Grashoff-Albayrak over beleidsrijke afstoting van gronden en gebouwen_

1.10.12.14.031 Motie-Grashoff c.s. over uitstel van de aanschaf van het tweede JSF-testtoetsel_

1.10.12.14.032 Motie-Voordewind c.s. over onderzoek naar gewapende militairen op koopvaardischepen_

1.10.12.14.033 Motie-Van der Staaij c.s. over een financieel perspectief voor de lange termijn_

1.11.01.27.034 Motie Cohen-Roemer over niet akkoord gaan met de geïntegreerde politietrainingsmissie

1.11.02.15.035 Motie-Eijsink c.s. over de investeringen in de operationele testfase_

1.11.02.15.036 Motie Hachchi over ontwikkelingskosten van andere opvolgers van de F-16_

1.11.04.28.037 Motie-Jasper van Dijk c.s. over afzien van de aanschaf_

1.11.04.28.038 Motie-Jasper van Dijk c.s. over afzien van deelname aan de training_

1.11.04.28.039 Motie-Eijsink c.s. over afzien van de aanschaf_

1.11.04.28.040 Motie-El Fassed c.s. over staken van de investeringen

1.11.05.24.041 Motie Cohen c.s. over een deltaplan bedrijfsvoering defensie_

1.11.05.24.042 Motie Voordewind-Slob over bezuinigingen op Defensie_

1.11.06.07.043 Motie Brinkman en Jasper van Dijk over verlenging missie Unified Protector_

1.11.06.07.044 Motie Brinkman over een verlenging met drie maanden_

1.11.06.14.045 Motie-Eijsink c.s. over voorkomen van gedwongen ontslagen_

1.11.06.14.046 Motie-Eijsink c.s. over sociaal flankerend beleid_

1.11.06.14.047 Motie-Eijsink c.s. over gedegen personeelsbeleid_

1.11.06.14.048 Gew motie Ten Broeke c.s. over niet afstoten van OPV's (t.v.v. 32733, nr. 7)

1.11.06.14.049 Motie Knops-Ten Broeke over een moratorium op investeringen in nieuwe infrastructuur_

1.11.06.14.050 Motie Knops-Ten Broeke over verruimen van de HGIS-afspraken_

1.11.06.14.051 Motie Knops c.s. over vijf extra Cougar-helikopters_

1.11.06.14.052 Motie Hachchi over modernisering van het ambitieniveau van de krijgsmacht_

1.11.06.14.053 Motie Hachchi-El Fassed over toetsing op kwaliteit van individuen_

1.11.06.14.054 Motie Hernandez c.s. over de personele vulling van de Koninklijke Marechaussee_

1.11.06.14.055 Motie Hernandez c.s. over invoering van een numerus fixus_

1.11.06.14.056 Gew motie Hernandez c.s. over aanwending van het vrijgemaakte geld (t.v.v. 32733, nr. 19)

1.11.06.14.057 Motie El Fassed c.s. over terugdringen van de overhead_

1.11.06.14.058 Motie El Fassed c.s. over voorkomen dat de bezuinigingen ten koste gaan van de kwaliteit_

1.11.06.14.059 Motie El Fassed over vermindering van het aantal F-16's_

1.11.06.14.060 Motie El Fassed over behoud van de Cougar-helikopters_

1.11.06.14.061 Motie Voordewind c.s. over gebruik van UAV's boven Nederlands grondgebied_

1.11.06.14.062 Motie Voordewind c.s. over de uitbreiding van de sourcingagenda_

1.11.06.14.063 Motie Voordewind-Eijsink over geen onomkeerbare bezuinigingen op operationele capaciteit

1.11.06.14.064 Motie Voordewind over niet afstoten van alle tanks_

1.11.06.14.065 Motie Voordewind over operationeel houden van de DC-10_

1.11.06.14.066 Motie Van der Staaij over behoud van een beperkt aantal tanks_

3.10.11.30.001 over een gesprek met de ouder of voogd van wie het kind is aangehouden (t.v.v. 32500_VI, nr. 18)

3.10.11.30.002 uch c.s. over een -terbeschikkingstelling aan het onderwijs--maatregel (t.v.v. 32500_VI, nr. 19)

3.10.11.30.003 Motie Kuiken c.s. over meetbare doelstellingen van de politiesterke_

3.10.11.30.004 Motie Kuiken- Van Raak over salaris blijven betalen aan aspiranten voor de politie

3.10.11.30.005 Motie Van der Steur c.s. over herijking van het systeem van het beslagrecht_

3.10.11.30.006 Motie_Hennis-Plasschaert_c.s._over_regionalisering_van_de_brandweer_

3.10.11.30.007 Raak_over_aan_de_Kamer_sturen_van_alle_relevante_rapporten_over_de_invoering_van_handhaving_BVH_

3.10.11.30.008 Motie_Gesthuizen_c.s._over_gemeentelijke_vrijheid_bij_de_aanpak_van_de_softdrugsproblematiek

3.10.11.30.009 Motie_Gesthuizen_c.s._over_een_forse_verhoging_van_het_aantal_financieel_rechercheurs_

3.10.11.30.010 Motie_Gesthuizen_c.s._over_verhoging_van_het_ambitieniveau_voor_het_ontnemen_van_misdaadgeld_

3.10.11.30.011 loed_van_de_financieringssysteem_van_de_rechterlijke_macht_op_de_kwaliteit_van_de_vonnissen_

3.10.11.30.012 Motie_Çörüz_c.s._over_een_veteranenbeleid_voor_uitgezonden_politieambtenaren_

3.10.11.30.013 dsen_c.s._over_inzichtelijk_maken_van_de_administratieve_lasten_bij_extra_taken_voor_de_politie_

3.10.11.30.014 r_c.s._over_een_herdenkings-_en_bezinningsplaats_ter_ere_van_de_slachtoffers_van_zinloos_geweld_

3.10.11.30.015 Motie_Helder_over_een_nationale_herdenkingsdag_van_slachtoffers_van_ernstige_geweldsmisdrijven_

3.10.11.30.016 c.s._over_erkenning_van_de_Vakvereniging_Brandweer_Vrijwilligers_als_officiële_gesprekspartner_

3.10.11.30.017 teit_van_competenties,_taken,_bevoegdheden_en_zichtbaarheid_van_de_bestuurlijke_toezichhouders_

3.10.11.30.018 _over_een_uitvoeringstoets_door_onafhankelijke_experts_bij_de_vorming_van_de_nationale_politie_

3.10.11.30.019 Motie_Dibi_c.s._over_een_landelijke_wapeninleveractie_

3.10.11.30.020 s._over_uitbreiding_van_de_partiële_notificatieplicht_bij_de_bijzondere_aanwijzingsbevoegdheid_

3.10.11.30.021 ouvoet_c.s._over_het_voorkomen_van_wachtlijsten_voor_re-integratietrajecten_van_ex-gedetineerden_

3.10.11.30.022 otie_Rouvoet_c.s._over_handhaving_van_de_standardebetting_van_een_eerstelijnsbrandweereenheid_

3.10.11.30.023 Motie_Van_der_Staaij_c.s._over_een_gerichte_verhoging_van_de_tarieven_voor_verkeersboetes

3.10.12.14.024 tie_Van_Raak_over_de_mogelijkheid_om_de_teelt_van_wiet_en_levering_aan_coffeeshops_te_reguleren_

3.10.12.16.025 schikbare_financiën_voor_re-integratietrajecten_van_ex-gedetineerden_(t.v.v._32500_VI,_nr._39)_

3.10.12.16.026 Motie_Van_der_Staaij_c.s._over_een_gerichte_verhoging_van_de_tarieven_voor_verkeersboetes_(1)

3.11.02.01.027 Motie_Cörüz_c.s._over_de_verschijningsplicht_van_wettelijke_vertegenwoordigers_

3.11.02.17.028 Motie_Rik_Jansen_over_scholing_van_rechters_in_de_vreemdelingenketen_

3.11.03.15.029 Motie_Van_der_Burg_en_Bontes_over_verbreiding_van_de_meldplicht_

3.11.03.15.030 Motie_Arib_over_het_wetsvoorstel_over_de_meldcode_

3.11.03.15.031 Gew_motie_Van_Dam_over_terugdringen_van_antisemitische_incidenten_(t.v.v._30950,_nr._28)

3.11.03.29.032 Motie_Van_der_Steur-Van_der_Staaij_over_de_takstraf_als_corrigerend_middel_

3.11.03.29.033 otie_van_het_lid_Van_der_Steur_c.s._over_korte_tijd_tussen_vonnis_en_uitvoering_van_de_takstraf

3.11.03.29.034 Motie_Schouw-Recourt_over_ouderbouwing_van_de_noodzaak_van_het_wetsvoorstel

3.11.03.29.035 Motie_Helder_over_automatische_invrijheidstelling_

3.11.03.29.036 Motie_Helder_over_schrappen_van_de_takstraf_als_hoofdstaf_

3.11.04.28.037 Motie-Marcouch-Hennis-Plasschaert_over_een_samenhangend_juridisch_kader

3.11.04.28.038 Motie-Marcouch_over_de_strafeis_bij_geweld_tegen_medewerkers

3.11.04.28.039 Motie-Marcouch_over_beschermen_van_medewerkers

3.11.04.28.040 Motie-Hachchi-Schouw_over_de_veiligheid_in_het_openbaar_vervoer

3.11.05.24.041 Motie-Dibi_c.s._over_capaciteit_van_forensisch-pediatrisch_onderzoek_

3.11.10.04.042 Motie_Van_der_Steur_c.s._over_toetredingseisen_voor_de_cassatiebalie_

5.10.11.04.001 Omatische_sancties_voor_landen_die_de_afspraken_uit_het_Stabiliteits-_en_Groeipact_niet_nakomen_

5.10.11.04.002 n_Ten_Broeke_over_geen_verhoging_van_de_kosten_voor_ambtelijke_en_administratieve_ondersteuning_

5.10.11.04.003 Motie_Schouw_en_Braakhuis_over_een_gezamenlijk_EU-uitzettingbeleid_

5.10.11.04.004 Motie_Van_Bemmel_over_juridische_stappen_van_de_Europese_Commissie_tegen_Nederland_

5.10.11.16.005 _motie_Schouw_en_Braakhuis_over_een_gezamenlijk_EU-uitzettingbeleid_(t.v.v._21501-20,_nr._486)_ (1)

5.10.11.30.006 Motie_Çörüz_en_Omtzigt_over_een_ruimere_-margin_of_appreciation-_

5.10.12.07.007 s._over_optimaal_benutten_van_de_relatie_tussen_de_EU_en_het_Caribisch_deel_van_het_Koninkrijk_

5.10.12.14.008 Motie_Eijsink_c.s._over_intensivering_van_de_structurale_samenwerking_met_Europese_partners

5.10.12.14.009 Motie_Hachchi_over_gemeenschappelijke_Europese_defensiebudgetten_

5.10.12.14.010 Motie_Hachchi_en_Eijsink_over_grote_materieelprojecten_in_samenwerking_met_meerdere_EU-lidstaten

5.10.12.14.011 Motie-Hachchi_over_overgang_naar_het_principe_van_common_funding_

5.10.12.14.012 Motie-Grashoff-Hachchi_over_herdefiniëring_van_de_ambities_van_Defensie_

5.10.12.14.013 tie_Van_Veldhoven_en_Grashoff_over_in_Europees_verband_bundelen_van_toezichthouders_voor_energie

5.10.12.16.014 lijst_van_prioritaire_voorstellen_uit_het_wetgevings-_en_werkprogramma_van_de_Europese_Commissie

5.11.02.03.015 Motie_Van_den_Berge_en_Albayrak_over_het_Europese_Nabuurschapsbeleid_

5.11.02.03.016 Motie_Albayrak_c.s._over_actie_van_de_Europese_Unie_ten_aanzien_van_de_situatie_in_Egypte

5.11.02.03.017 Motie_Ten_Broeke_c.s._over_een_-Global_Online_Freedom_Act-

5.11.02.17.018 Motie_Slob_c.s._over_naleving_van_het_Stabiliteits-_en_Groeipact_

5.11.02.17.019 Motie_Slob_c.s._over_overeenstemming_in_de_Kamer_over_het_noodfonds

5.11.02.17.020 Motie_Blanksma-van_den_Heuvel_c.s._over_versterking_van_het_Groei-_en_Stabiliteitspact

5.11.02.17.021 Motie_Koolmees-Braakhuis_over_uitbreiding_van_het_noodfonds

5.11.02.17.022 Motie_Van_Nieuwenhuizen-Cörüz_over_inzetten_van_alle_middelen_voor_Frontex

5.11.03.08.023 Motie_Schouw_c.s._over_asielzoekers_uit_Libië_

5.11.03.24.024 Motie_Irrgang_en_Plasterk_over_nationale_zeggenschap_

5.11.03.24.025 Motie_Slob_c.s._over_aanvullende_Europese_afdwingbare_afspraken_

5.11.03.24.026 Motie_Plasterk_over_de_vennootschapsbelasting_

5.11.03.24.027 Motie_Tony_van_Dijck_over_Europese_belastingen_

5.11.04.28.028 Motie-Irrgang_over_multilaterale_instellingen

5.11.04.28.029 Gewijzigde_motie-Dijkhoff_over_verbetering_van_het_Europese_OS-beleid_(t.v.v._21501-04-129)

5.11.05.24.030 Motie_Wilders_over_probleemlanden_uit_de_eurozone_

5.11.05.31.031 Motie_Ten_Broeke-Ormel_over_bevriezen_van_de_Europese_begroting_

5.11.05.31.032 Motie_Ten_Broeke-Schouw_over_vergelijkingstabellen_

5.11.05.31.033Gew_motie_Plasterk_en_Voordewind_over_een_nominale_nullijn_(t.v.v._32502,_nr._6)

5.11.05.31.034 Motie_Plasterk-Ten_Broeke_over_doelstellingen_voor_een_Europese_inzet_

5.11.05.31.035 Motie_Ormel_c.s._over_efficiëntere_Europese_samenwerking_

5.11.05.31.036 Motie_Van_Bommel_over_toetreding_Servië_tot_de_EU_

5.11.05.31.037 Motie_Schouw-EI_Fassed_over_het_mensenrechtenbeleid_

5.11.05.31.038 Motie_Schouw-EI_Fassed_over_scenario's_voor_een_Europees_bestuur_

5.11.05.31.039 Motie_EI_Fassed-Schouw_over_naleving_van_de_Europese_grondrechten_

5.11.05.31.040 Motie_EI_Fassed-Schouw_over_vrije_en_pluriforme_media_

5.11.05.31.041 Motie_EI_Fassed_over_verdediging_besluit_Europees_Parlement_

5.11.05.31.042 Motie_Voordewind_c.s._over_het_MATRA-programma_

5.11.05.31.043 Motie_Voordewind_c.s._over_korting_op_het_pr-budget_

5.11.06.14.044 Motie_Hernandez_over_de_Nederlandse_soevereiniteit_

5.11.06.22.045 Motie_Van_Bommel_over_de_toetreding_van_Kroatië

5.11.06.22.046 Motie_Voordewind_c.s._over_een_moratorium_op_uitbreiding_van_de_eurozone_met_nieuw_lidstaten

5.11.06.22.047 f_en_Ormel_over_het_verzetten_tegen_het_invoeren_van_een_Europese_FTT_als_eigen_middel_van_de_EU

5.11.06.28.048 Motie_Elissen_over_de_Europese_vlag_

5.11.09.15.049 Motie_Bontes_c.s._over_het_realiseren_van_een_verdragswijziging

5.11.10.04.050 Motie_Tony_van_Dijck_over_ter_goedkeuring_voorleggen_van_besluiten_en_bestedingen_van_het_EFSF_

5.11.10.06.051 Motie_Tony_van_Dijck_over_niet_instemmen_met_de_gewijzigde_raamwerkovereenkomst_

9.10.10.27.001 MuP_an_immigratiemaatregelen_die_de_gelijkwaardigheid_van_partners_van_hetzelfde_geslacht_aantasten_

9.10.10.27.002 r_uitdragen_in_woord_en_daad_dat_het_tegengaan_van_islamisering_geen_doelstelling_van_beleid_is_

9.10.10.27.003 ders_over_het_opgeven_van_de_Zweedse_nationaliteit_door_staatssecretaris_Veldhuijzen_van_Zanten_

9.10.10.27.004 Motie_Cohen_c.s._over_de_dubbele_nationaliteit_

9.10.10.27.005 Motie_Cohen_c.s._over_niet_verlengen_van_de_termijn_voor_de_zelfstandige_verblijfsvergunning_

9.10.11.02.006 otie_Dibi_over_het_zwaarder_laten_meewegen_van_rapportages_van_non-gouvernementele_organisaties_

9.10.11.02.007 Motie_Voordewind_c.s._over_het_opschorten_van_alle_uitzettingen_naar_Irak

9.10.11.04.008 Motie_Voordewind-Gesthuizen_over_een_protocol_informatie-uitwisseling_

9.10.11.04.009 verruiming_van_de_mogelijkheden_voor_rechtshulpverleners_om_in_contact_te_komen_met_hun_cliënt_

9.10.11.04.010 Motie_Dibi_c.s._over_beschikbaar_stellen_van_informatie_uit_gemotiveerde_-interim_measures-_

9.10.11.04.011 Motie_Dibi_c.s._over_een_quicksan_van_mogelijke_incidenten_

9.10.11.04.012 ie_Schouw_en_Dibi_over_verschuiven_van_een_deel_de_capaciteit_voor_-animal_cops-_naar_de_politie (1)

9.10.11.04.013 ouw_c.s._over_eenvoudiger_maken_van_aangifte_van_gewelddelicten_tegen_moslims,_joden_en_LHBT's_

9.10.11.04.014 Motie_Arib_c.s._over_een_actieprogramma_bestrijding_geweld_tegen_religieuze_instellingen

9.10.11.11.015 n_Kooiman_over voortzetten_van_de_pilots_voor_opvang_van_slachtoffers_van_eergerelateerd_geweld_

9.10.11.16.016 brengen_van_cruciale_informatie_afkomstig_van_internationale_gerechten_(t.v.v._19637,_nr._1371)

9.10.12.07.017 jn_over_terugdringen_van_de_oververtegenwoordiging_van_niet-westerse_jongeren_in_de_criminaliteit_

9.10.12.07.018 Motie_Dibi_c.s._over_aanpassing_van_de_Remigratiewet_

9.10.12.07.019 Motie_Dibi_over_financiële_steun_voor_vrijwillige_inburgeraars_

9.10.12.07.020 ciefiek_beleid_voor_terugdringen_van_de_criminaliteit_onder_Marokkaanse_en_Antilliaanse_jongeren_

9.10.12.07.021 otie_Van_Dam-Dibi_over_niet_terugsturen_van_vluchtelingen_die_hun_inburgeringscursus_niet_halen_

9.10.12.07.022 Motie_Van_Dam-Dibi_over_ontzien_van_vluchtelingen_bij_het_zelf_betalen_van_de_inburgering

9.10.12.07.023 op_de_vrouwenemancipatie_van_verlengen_van_de_termijn_voor_een_zelfstandige_verblijfsvergunning_

9.10.12.07.024 Motie_Van_Klaveren_over_de_definitie_van_de_regering_van_het_begrip_-islamisering-

9.10.12.14.025 Motie-Albayrak-Eijsink_over_versterking_van_het_diversiteitsbeleid_voor_het_defensiepersoneel_

9.10.12.14.026 Motie_Van_Hijum_c.s._over_aanscherping_van_het_arbeidsmigratiebeleid_

9.11.02.17.027 Motie_Helder_over_bestrijden_van_geschildbemiddeling_op_grond_van_de_sharia_

9.11.02.17.028 _structurele_continuering_van_gespecialiseerde_opvangmogelijkheden_(t.v.v._30388,_nrs._43_en_45)

9.11.02.17.029 Motie_Arib_over_achterlaten_in_land_van_herkomst_en_gedwongen_uithuwelijken_

9.11.02.17.030 Motie_Van_Nieuwenhuizen_en_Straus_over_bieden_van_een_alternatief_voor_regulier_onderwijs_

9.11.03.08.031 Motie_Dibi_over_een_kwantificeerbare_doelstelling_

9.11.03.08.032 Motie_Voordewind_c.s._over_de_instroom_van_asielzoekers_

9.11.03.10.033 Motie-Schouw_c.s._over_hulp_bieden_aan_de_zuidelijke_lidstaten_

9.11.03.15.033 Motie_Van_Klaveren_en_Van_der_Staaij_over_de_beveiliging_van_joodse_instellingen_

9.11.03.15.034 Motie_Van_der_Staaij_c.s._over_de_ontwikkelingen_bij_de_bestrijding_van_antisemitisme

9.11.03.15.035 Gew_motie_Van_der_Staaij_c.s._over_bijzondere_aandacht_voor_de_Holocaust_(t.v.v._30950,_nr._26)

9.11.03.15.036 Motie_Van_Dam_over_een_visie_op_bestrijden_segregatie_

9.11.03.15.037 Motie_Van_Klaveren_over_indirect_gefinancierde_projecten_

9.11.03.15.038 Motie_Jasper_van_Dijk_over_conclusies_van_de_commissie-Blok_

9.11.04.26.039 Motie_Voortman_over_toegang_tot_huisartsen_

9.11.04.26.040 Motie_Arib_over_zorg_verlenen_aan_illegalen_

9.11.04.26.041 Motie_Arib_over_geestelijke_gezondheidszorg_aan_asielzoekers_

9.11.04.26.042 Motie_Van_Gerven_over_medische_opvang_van_asielzoekers_

9.11.04.26.043 Motie_Voordewind_c.s._over_de_toegankelijkheid_van_de_medische_behandeling_

9.11.04.26.044 Motie_Voordewind_c.s._over_breed_toegankelijke_reguliere_zorg_

9.11.04.26.045 Motie_Gerbrands_over_de_zorg_beperken_tot_spoedeisende_medisch_noodzakelijke_zorg_

9.11.04.28.046 Motie-Driessen_over_korten_op_de_afdracht_

9.11.04.28.047 Motie-Driessen_over_ontwikkelingshulp_aan_Turkije

9.11.05.31.048 Motie_Voordewind_c.s._over_terugkeer_van_Somalische_meisjes_

9.11.05.31.049 Motie_Voordewind_c.s._over_een_thematisch_amtsbericht_

9.11.05.31.050 Motie_Dibi_c.s._over_psychosociale_druk_bij_terugkeer_
 9.11.05.31.051 Motie_Sterk_over_individuele_toetsing_
 9.11.05.31.052 Motie_Spekman_c.s._over_Afghaanse_meisjes_tussen_18_en_21_jaar_
 9.11.05.31.053 Motie_Spekman_c.s._over_de_bewijslast_voor_het_verblijfsalternatief_
 9.11.06.30.054 Motie_Ortega-Martijn-Schouw_over_continuering_van_de_rijksbijdrage_en_het_Antillianenprogramma_
 9.11.06.30.055 Motie_Ortega-Martijn_over_evaluatie_van_de_Wet_Overleg_Minderhedenbeleid
 9.11.06.30.056 Motie_Karabulut_over_ongewenste_beïnvloeding_van_Nederlanders
 9.11.06.30.057 Motie_Karabulut_over_meer_gemengde_buurtten_en_scholen
 9.11.06.30.058 Motie_Dibi-Schouw_over_een_meervoudige_nationaliteit
 9.11.06.30.059 Motie_Sterk_over_een_Nederlandse_kijk_en_aanpak_op_het_concept_'Big_Society'
 9.11.09.13.060 Motie_Spekman_c.s._over_een_vergelijkend_onderzoek_
 9.11.09.13.061 Motie_Schouw_c.s._over_toezicht_op_de_opvang_van_asielkinderen_

Parliamentary resolutions from 2012-2013 included in this study

1.12.11.29.001 Motie_van_het_lid_Knops_over_opschorten_van_het_besluit_tot_sluiting_van_het_complex_Eygelshoven_
 1.12.11.29.002 Motie_van_het_lid_Knops_over_gestand_doen_van_de_eerdere_toezeggingen_uit_2011_over_behoud_van_defensiebanen_
 1.12.12.18.003 Motie_van_het_lid_Hachchi_c.s._over_de_civiele_erkenning_van_defensieopleidingen_op_mbo-niveau_
 1.12.12.18.004 Motie_van_het_lid_Knops_over_uitwisselingsprogramma's_voor_militairen_in_opleiding_
 1.12.12.18.005 Motie_van_het_lid_Jasper_Van_Dijk_over_regels_rond_de_inzet_van_bewapende_drones_
 1.12.12.18.006 Motie_van_het_lid_Knops_over_een_middelenafpraak_met_Financiën_
 1.12.12.18.007 Motie_van_het_lid_Hachchi_over_doodkapitaal_
 1.12.12.18.008 Motie_van_het_lid_De_Roon_over_aanpassen_van_het_Toetsingskader_2009_
 1.12.12.18.009 Motie_van_het_lid_Jasper_Van_Dijk_over_diverse_varianten_van_een_toekomstige_krijgsmacht_
 1.12.12.18.010 Motie_van_het_lid_Knops_over_het_ontzien_van_operationele_eeenheden_
 1.12.12.18.011 Motie_van_het_lid_Knops_over_het_afzien_van_verdere_bezuinigingen_op_Defensie_in_deze_kabinetsperiode_
 1.12.12.18.012 Motie_van_het_lid_Hachchi_en_Knops_over_de_Kamer_informereren_over_het_aantal_troepen_
 1.12.12.18.013 Motie_van_het_lid_Segers_en_Dijkgraaf_over_punten_voor_de_beleidsbrief_
 1.12.12.18.014 Motie_van_het_lid_Segers_over_de_gevolgen_van_de_stijging_van_materiaalkosten_
 1.12.12.18.015 Motie_van_het_lid_Segers_c.s._over_geestelijke_verzorging_ontzien_bij_bezuiniging_
 1.12.12.18.016 Motie_van_het_lid_Klaver_c.s._over_bescherming_van_burgers_in_de_nieuwe_visie_op_de_krijgsmacht_
 1.12.12.18.017 Motie_van_het_lid_Klaver_c.s._over_een_onafhankelijke_evaluatie_van_missies_
 1.12.12.20.018 Motie_van_het_lid_De_Roon_over_terugdraaien_van_het_besluit_om_Patriotkrakketten_en_troepen_naar_Turkije_uit_te_zenden_
 1.13.01.17.019 Motie_van_het_lid_Jasper_Van_Dijk_over_geen_steun_verlenen_aan_de_Franse_militaire_activiteiten_
 1.13.02.14.020 Motie_van_het_lid_Knops_en_Hachchi_over_een_renovatieplan_voor_de_Van_Horne_Kazerne_
 1.13.02.14.021 Motie_van_het_lid_Hachchi_over_een_vergelijking_tussen_locaties_voor_de_marinierskazerne_
 1.13.02.14.022 Motie_van_het_lid_Knops(t.v.v._32733,_nr._114)_over_de_DMP-procedure_bij_plannen_van_meer_dan_25_miljoen_euro_
 1.13.04.02.023 Motie_van_het_lid_Hachchi_c.s._over_actuele_informatie_over_kandidaatopvolgers_van_de_F-16_
 1.13.04.02.024 Motie_van_het_lid_Hachchi_c.s._over_de_mogelijke_scenario's_en_hun_gevolgen_
 1.13.04.09.025 Motie_van_het_lid_Van_Bommel_over_de_inzet_van_F-16's_tegelijkertijd_met_de_trainingsmissie_beëindigen_
 1.13.04.25.026 Motie_van_het_lid_Hachchi_c.s._over_een_nieuwe_kandidatenvergelijking_
 1.13.06.20.027 Motie_van_het_lid_De_Roon_over_een_open_debat_over_tactische_nucleaire_kernwapens_op_Europees_grondgebied_en_in_Nederland_
 1.13.06.25.028 Motie_van_het_lid_Hachchi_over_een_inschatting_van_de_uiterste_houdbaarheid_van_de_F-16_
 1.13.10.10.029 Motie_van_het_lid_Bontes_en_De_Roon_over_afzien_van_de_aanschaf_van_de_F-35_
 3.12.12.04.001 Motie_Helder_over_een_verschijningsplicht_ter_terechtzitting_
 3.12.12.04.002 Motie_Helder_over_het_verspreiden_van_foto's_en_videobeelden_door_politie_en_justitie_
 3.12.12.04.003 Motie_Helder_over_een_onderzoek_naar_herziening_van_de_Penitentiaire_beginselenwet_

3.12.12.04.004 Motie_Helder_over_de_mogelijkheid_voor_gedetineerden_om_geld_van_buitenaf_te_krijgen_

3.12.12.04.005 Motie_Helder_over_het_niet_doorzetten_van_het_sluiten_van_gevangenissen_

3.12.12.04.006 Motie_Bontes_over_geweld_tegen_agenten_en_andere_functionarissen_met_een_publieke_taak_

3.12.12.04.006 Motie_Bontes_over_geweld_tegen_agenten_en_andere_functionarissen_met_een_publieke_taak_

3.12.12.04.008 Motie_De_Wit_over_de_zaak-Lucia_de_Berk_

3.12.12.04.009 Motie_Kooiman_en_Berndsen-Jansen_over_lokaal_maatwerk_in_het_coffeeshop-en_veiligheidsbeleid_

3.12.12.04.010 Motie_Kooiman_en_Oskam_over_bezuinigingen_op_het_gevangeniswezen_

3.12.12.04.011 Motie_Kooiman_c.s._over_verbetering_van_de_basiszorg_in_penitentiaire_inrichtingen_

3.12.12.04.012 Motie_Kooiman_c.s._over_het_ontzien_van_het_gevangeniswezen_bij_de_bezuinigingstaakstelling_

3.12.12.04.013 Motie_Oskam_en_Berndsen-Jansen_over_het_naar_rato_verdelen_van_de_investering_van_105_miljoen_

3.12.12.04.014 Motie_Oskam_c.s._over_een_afstand_van_ten_minste_350_meter_tussen_scholen_en_coffeeshops_

3.12.12.04.015 Motie_Oskam_c.s._over_de_enkelband_als_sanctie_

3.12.12.04.016 Motie_Berndsen-Jansen_c.s._over_het_capaciteitsprobleem_bij_de_politie_

3.12.12.04.017 c.s._(t.v.v._33400-VI,_nr._48)_over_de_bezuinigingen_op_het_College_bescherming_persoonsgegevens_

3.12.12.04.018 Motie_Segers_en_Berndsen-Jansen_over_de_pilots_-snelle_sepots-_

3.12.12.04.019 Motie_Segers_en_Oskam_over_handhaven_van_het_ingezetencriterium_

3.12.12.04.020 Motie_Segers_c.s._over_gefinancierde_begeleiding_en_resocialisatie_

3.12.12.04.021 Motie_Segers_c.s._over_de_evenementenheffing_

3.12.12.04.022 Motie_Van_Tongeren_c.s._over_het_vaststellen_van_iemands_onschuld_in_hoger beroep_

3.12.12.04.023 Motie_Van_Tongeren_c.s._over_kindersekstoerisme_

3.12.12.18.024 Motie_Heerma_over_verruimen_van_de_mogelijkheden_voor_het_omdraaien_van_de_bewijslast_

3.13.02.05.025 an_het_lid_Kooiman_c.s._over_een_onderzoek_naar_het_takenpakket_en_de_capaciteit_van_de_politie_

3.13.02.05.026 Motie_van_het_lid_Kooiman_c.s._over_een_impactanalyse_van_de_verhoging_van_verkeersboetes_

3.13.02.05.027 Bontes_(29628,_nr._361)_over_het_hard_aanpakken_van_élke_vorm_van_geweld_in_de_publieke_ruimte_

3.13.02.05.028 Moties_van_het_lid_Bontes_over_de_selectieprocedure_van_politiemensen_

3.13.02.05.029 van_de_leden_Dijkhoff_en_Marcouch_over_een_richtlijn_over_lidmaatschap_van_een_outlawbikersbende_

3.13.02.26.030 Motie_van_het_lid_Bosma_over_altijd_aangifte_bij_geweld_tegen_ambtenaren_

3.13.03.05.031 Motie_van_het_lid_Helder_over_preventief_fouilleren_in_drugsoverlastgebieden_

3.13.03.05.032 an_de_leden_Helder_en_De_Graaf_over_aanwijzen_van_perrons_van_de_NS_als_veiligheidsrisicogebied_

3.13.03.05.033 Motie_van_het_lid_Kooiman_over_beschikbaar_komen_van_landelijke_cijfers_

3.13.03.05.034 Motie_van_het_lid_Schouw_over_de_bewaartermijnen_in_de_Eurodac-verordening_

3.13.03.05.035 Motie_van_het_lid_Gesthuizen_over_het_raadplegen_van_Eurodac_

3.13.03.05.036 _van_het_lid_Gesthuizen_over_de_voorwaarde_dat_Eurodac_geen_verkapt_opsporingssysteem_mag_worden_

3.13.04.09.037 Motie_van_het_lid_Bontes_over_beklagmogelijkheden_gedetineerden_nader_regelen_

3.13.04.09.038 _van_het_lid_van_Toorenborg_c.s._over_heroverweging_van_bredere_inzet_van_elektronische_detentie_

3.13.04.09.039 Motie_van_het_lid_van_Toorenborg_c.s._over_het_handhaven_van_arbeid_als_dagactiviteit_

3.13.04.16.040 Motie_van_het_lid_Van_Klaveren_over_het_seponeren_van_een_aangifte_tegen_een_klokkenluider_

3.13.04.16.041 Motie_van_het_lid_Karabulut_over_wettelijk_regelen_van_het_toezicht_op_moskee-internaten_

3.13.04.16.042 Motie_van_het_lid_Bisschop_over_handhaving_van_de_wettelijke_regels_door_gemeenten_

3.13.04.23.043 gde_motie_van_het_lid_Bontes_(t.v.v._29628,_nr._379)_over_inzetten_op_aanhoudingen_op_heterdaad_

3.13.04.23.044 Motie_van_het_lid_Van_Toorenborg_c.s._over_concrete_en_afrekenbare_doelstellingen_

3.13.04.23.045 e_van_het_lid_Berndsen-Jansen_c.s._over_onderzoek_naar_versterking_van_de_aanpak_van_recidive____

3.13.04.23.046 Motie_van_het_lid_Helder_over_geen_lagere_straffen_bij_verspreiden_video's_

3.13.04.23.047 Motie_van_de_leden_Helder_en_Oskam_over_verhalen_van_de_kosten_op_ouders_

3.13.04.25.048 Motie_van_het_lid_Van_der_Steur_c.s._over_het_ervaren_van_de_taastrap_als_straf_

3.13.04.25.049 otie_van_het_lid_Oskam_c.s._over_de_samenwerking_tussen_de_reclassering_en_de_veiligheidshuizen_

3.13.04.25.050 Motie van het lid Kooiman over de inschrijfmogelijkheden bij UWV voor gedetineerde jongeren

3.13.04.25.051 Motie van het lid Schouw over onderzoek welke taakstraffen als straf worden ervaren

3.13.04.25.052 Motie van het lid Schouw over de effecten van het Masterplan DJI op recidivebestrijding

3.13.04.25.053 Motie van het lid Helder over een eigen bijdrage voor reclasseringsbegeleiding

3.13.05.28.054 r.c.s. over disciplinaire maatregelen om het vertrouwen in het Openbaar Ministerie te herstellen

3.13.05.28.055 Motie van het lid Helder c.s. over het herstellen van het vertrouwen in het Openbaar Ministerie

3.13.05.28.056 Motie van het lid Van Der Steur c.s. over jaarlijks rapporteren over de gemaakte fouten

3.13.06.04.057 Motie Bontes en Wilders over afzien van bezuinigingen op de AIVD

3.13.06.04.058 Motie Bernds en Jansen en Schouw over het met een jaar opschorten van de bezuinigingen op de AIVD

3.13.06.04.059 Motie van het lid Bontes over toepassing van het volwassenenstrafrecht op minderjarigen (1)

3.13.06.11.060 Motie Kooiman c.s. over het intrekken van het Masterplan DJI 2013-2018

3.13.06.11.061 Motie Helder over het in stand houden van het oorlogsmonument Oranjestad

3.13.06.11.062 Motie Van der Steur en Marcouch over de nadere uitwerking van het Masterplan DJI

3.13.06.11.063 Motie Van der Steur en Marcouch over werk in detentie

3.13.06.11.064 over het heroverwegen van de voorgenomen sluiting van de inrichtingen Oldenkotte en Veldzicht

3.13.06.11.065 87, (nr. 519) over initiatieven voor een geregleerde productie en verkoop van softdrugsproducten

3.13.06.11.066 Motie Van Tongeren c.s. over een plan van aanpak voor de uitbreiding van elektronische detentie

3.13.06.11.067 87, (nr. 523) over de mogelijkheid van gedetineerde begeleiding in niet-zorggerelateerde concepten

3.13.06.11.068 gers c.s. (t.v.v. 24587, nr. 524) over het in stand houden van een categorale opvang voor meisjes

3.13.06.11.069 taaij c.s. (t.v.v. 24587, nr. 525) over waarborgen dat er geen heen-zendingen zullen plaatsvinden

3.13.06.11.070 Motie Van der Staaij c.s. over het maximaal ruimte bieden aan vrijwilligerswerk

3.13.06.11.071 Motie Marcouch en Van der Steur over het bieden van meer ruimte aan professionals

3.13.07.02.072 Motie Kooiman c.s. over handhaven van het aantal plaatsen in psychiatrische penitentiaire centra

3.13.07.02.073 Motie Kooiman c.s. over recidivebestrijding

3.13.07.02.074 Motie Kooiman over een variant op het masterplan

3.13.07.02.075 Motie Helder c.s. over het niet door laten gaan van sluiting van inrichtingen

3.13.07.02.076 Motie Schouw c.s. over ICT-voorzieningen in de gevangenis

3.13.07.02.077 Motie Schouw c.s. over regionale plaatsing van stelselmatige daders

3.13.07.02.078 Motie Schouw c.s. over onderbouwing van wijze waarop recidivevermindering wordt behaald

3.13.07.02.079 Motie Schouw c.s. over annuleren van de bouw van een megagevangenis

3.13.07.02.080 an Tongeren-Van Toorenborg over het separeren van gedetineerden wegens weigering meerpersoons

3.13.07.02.081 Motie Van Tongeren c.s. over de kosten die bij de gemeenten terechtkomen

3.13.07.02.082 Motie Van Toorenborg c.s. over opschorten van de sluiting van Veldzicht en Oldenkotte

3.13.07.02.083 Motie Segers c.s. over de gevolgen van de stapeling van maatregelen

3.13.07.02.084 Motie van het lid Helder over het opleggen van de ISD-maatregel aan jeugdigen vanaf 12 jaar

3.13.07.02.085 Motie van het lid Kooiman over gedetineerden e-mails laten ontvangen via de postkamer

3.13.09.10.086 het lid Oskam (t.v.v. 33400-VI, nr. 118) over de executie van nog niet ten uitvoer gelegde zaken

3.13.09.19.087 Motie van het lid Oskam c.s. over niet verder laten oplopen van de bezuinigingen op het OM

3.13.09.19.088 Motie van het lid Oskam c.s. over zo spoedig mogelijk verhelpen van de problemen bij het OM

3.13.09.19.089 et lid Helder c.s. (tvv Kamerstuknr. 33400-VI, nr. 125) over geen extra bezuinigingen op het OM

3.13.10.10.090 Motie van het lid Bernds en Jansen over geen uitbreiding van geweldsmiddelen van bo's

3.13.10.17.091 Motie van de leden Helder en Van der Steur over een verschijningsplicht ter terechtzitting (1)

5.12.11.15.001 Motie De Roon over afstand nemen van plannen die leiden tot de vorming van een Europees leger

5.12.11.21.002 mmel over een nettobetalingsspositie in lijn met lidstaten met een vergelijkbaar welvaartsniveau

5.12.11.21.003 d Van Bommel over een openbare en controleerbare verantwoording van de besteding van EU-middelen

5.12.11.21.004 Tony_Van_Dijck_over_inzetten_van_het_veto_om_ten_minste_2_miljard_jaarlijkse_korting_te_bedingen

5.12.11.21.005 en_Omtzigt_over_doelgerichte_investeringen_in_innovatie_en_duurzaamheid_van_agrarische_bedrijven

5.12.11.21.006 _cohesie-,_landbouw-en_structuurfondsen_naar_Europese_onderzoeks-onderwijs-en_innovatiebudgetten

5.12.11.21.007 et_lid_Klaver_over_het_op_peil_houden_van_het_Europese_ontwikkelingsfonds_voor_de_armste_landen_

5.12.11.21.008 er_niet_instemmen_met_conclusies_die_leiden_tot_het_invoeren_van_een_financiële_transactietaks_

5.12.11.21.009 e_van_het_lid_Omtzigt_(t.v.v._21501-20,_nr._699)_over_de_herverdeling_van_de_directe_betalingen_

5.12.11.21.010 Motie_van_het_lid_Omtzigt_over_geen_totale_nettoverslechtering_voor_Nederland

5.12.12.04.011 Motie_Fritsma_over_een_opt-out_op_het_gebied_van_immigratie_en_asiel_

5.12.12.12.012 Motie_van_het_lid_Madlener_over_een_bindend_referendum_

5.12.12.12.013 Motie_van_het_lid_Pechtold_over_overdracht_van_soevereiniteit_

5.12.12.12.014 Motie_van_het_lid_Pechtold_c.s._over_een_bankenunie_

5.12.12.12.015 t_lid_Van_Bommel_c.s._over_zich_uitspreken_over_de_toekomst_van_de_Economische_en_Monetaire_Unie

5.12.12.12.016 ver_niet_instemmen_met_afspraken_die_kunnen_leiden_tot_een_begrotingscapaciteit_voor_de_eurozone

5.12.12.12.017 Motie_van_de_leden_Slob_en_Van_Haersma_Buma_over_het_opstellen_van_exit-condities_

5.12.12.12.018 Motie_van_het_lid_Klaver_over_het_-common_deposit_guarantee_mechanism-_

5.12.12.12.019 s._over_concrete_voorstellen_ter_versterking_van_de_democratische_legitimering_en_verantwoording

5.12.12.12.020 Motie_van_de_leden_Verheijen_en_Servaes_over_het_oprichten_van_effectief_banktoezicht

5.12.12.12.021 Motie_van_het_lid_Merkies_over_versterking_van_de_positie_van_nationale_parlementen_

5.12.12.18.022 Motie_van_de_leden_Hachchi_en_Klaver_over_Europese_samenwerking_in_de_visie_op_de_krijgsmacht_

5.13.01.17.023 _Van_Dijck_over_niet_accepteren_van_de_functie_van_voorzitter_van_de_Eurogroep_door_de_minister_(1)

5.13.01.17.024 n_met_het_op_zich_nemen_van_het_voorzitterschap_van_de_Eurogroep_door_de_minister_van_Financiën

5.13.01.29.025 Motie_van_het_lid_Van_Weyenberg_c.s._over__versteviging_van_het_internationaal_toezicht_

5.13.02.05.026 Motie_van_het_lid_Van_Bommel_over_gebruik_maken_van_het_overgangsregime_

5.13.02.06.027 Motie_van_de_leden_Servaes_en_Verheijen_over_inzetten_op_een_aanpassing_in_de_-Berlijnformule-_

5.13.02.06.028 Motie_van_de_leden_Servaes_en_Verheijen_over_inzetten_op_een_-midterm_review-_

5.13.02.06.029 Motie_van_het_lid_Omtzigt_over_informerende_van_de_Kamer_na_een_akkoord_over_de_Meerjarenbegroting

5.13.02.06.030 eijen_c.s._over_blijven_wijzen_op_de_noodzaak_van_het_verplicht_stellen_van_lidstaatverklaringen

5.13.02.06.031 Motie_van_het_lid_Madlener_over_niet_instemmen_met_een_Europees_meerjarig_financieel_kader_

5.13.02.06.032 Motie_van_het_lid_Madlener_over_bedingen_van_een_miljard_extra_korting__

5.13.02.12.033 Motie_van_het_lid_Wilders_over_een_referendum_over_het_EU-lidmaatschap_van_Nederland_

5.13.02.12.034 Motie_van_het_lid_Wilders_over_het_terughalen_van_bevoegdheden

5.13.02.12.035 Motie_van_de_leden_Pechtold_en_Van_Haersma_Buma_over_een_herziening_van_bevoegdheden_

5.13.02.12.036 Motie_van_de_leden_Slob_en_Van_der_Staaij_over_het_belang_van_Europese_samenwerking_

5.13.02.12.037 ie_van_het_lid_Ouwehand_(t.v.v._21501-20,_nr._735)_Ouwehand_over_beïnvloeding_van_sociale_media

5.13.03.05.038 Motie_van_het_lid_Fritsma_over_geen_bemoeden_van_de_EU_met_landen_en_gebieden_overzee

5.13.03.05.039 an_het_lid_Omtzigt_c.s._over_geen_geheime_stemming_over_de_Europese_meerjarenbegroting_(Herdruk)

5.13.03.05.040 Motie_van_het_lid_Pechtold_over_investeren_van_onbested_geld_in_kennis_en_innovatie_

5.13.03.05.041 Motie_van_het_lid_Pechtold_c.s._over_verhoging_van_het_budget_voor_de_Digitale_Agenda_

5.13.03.05.042 Motie_van_het_het_lid_Schouw_over_adviezen_over_het_Eurodac-voorstel_

5.13.03.05.043 Motie_van_het_lid_Schouw_over_evaluatie_van_het_Eurodac-voorstel_

5.13.03.06.044 kheid_om_aan_niet_EU-ingezetene_investeerders_in_vastgoed_een_verblijfsvergunning_te_verstrekken_

5.13.03.12.045 Motie_Verheijen_over_een_periodieke_monitoring_

5.13.03.12.046 Motie_Servaes_c.s._over_de_versterking_van_de_sociale_dimensie_van_de_EMU_

5.13.03.12.047 Motie_Madlener_over_een_opt-out_op_het_immigratiedossier_

5.13.03.12.048 Motie_Madlener_over_toetreding_van_Roemenië_en_Bulgarije_tot_de_Schengenzone_

5.13.03.12.049 Motie_Madlener_over_openstelling_van_de_Nederlandse_arbeidsmarkt_voor_Roemenen_en_Bulgaren

5.13.03.12.050 Motie_Madlener_over_het_verlaten_van_de_Europese_Unie_en_de_eurozone_

5.13.03.12.051 Motie_Van_Bommel_over_een_sociale_vooruitgangsclausule_in_Europese_verdragen

5.13.03.12.052 Motie_Van_Bommel_over_een_behandelveerhoud_voor_Europese_besluiten_

5.13.03.12.053 Motie_Pechtold_over_de_EU_2020-agenda_

5.13.03.12.054 Motie_Klaver_over_herziening_van_de_EU-verdragen_

5.13.03.12.055 Motie_Thieme_en_Ouwehand_over_een_import-_en_handelsverbod_voor_producten_van_ijsberen_

5.13.03.12.056 Motie_van_de_leden_van_der_Staaij_en_Slob_over_de_uitleg_van_de_Nederlandse_Grondwet (1)

5.13.03.13.057 Motie_van_het_lid_Klaver_c.s._over_de_aanpakvan_jeugdwerkloosheid_als_een_aparte_prioriteit_

5.13.03.13.058 Motie_van_het_lid_Madlener_over_uit_de_eurozone_treden_

5.13.03.13.059 Motie_van_het_lid_Madlener_over_dwingende_aanbevelingen_aan_de_Europese_Unie_

5.13.03.19.060 Motie_van_het_lid_Helder_over_opzegging_van_het_EVRM_

5.13.03.26.061 n_Schouten_en_Dijkgraaf_over_aan_de_EU_kenbaar_maken_dat_Nederland_zelf_beslist_over_maatregelen

5.13.03.26.062 Motie_van_het_lid_Hachchi_over_het_actualiseren_van_de_Europese_veiligheidsstrategie_

5.13.03.26.063 Motie_van_het_lid_Hachchi_over_één_EU-onderzoeksbudget_voor_interne_en_externe_veiligheid_

5.13.04.09.064 Motie_van_het_lid_Sjoerdsma_over_een_leidend_Europees_amtsbericht_

5.13.04.16.065 Motie_Omtzigt_over_de_financiële_sector

5.13.04.23.066 Motie_van_de_leden_Bontes_en_Fritsma_over_een_opt-out_

5.13.05.21.067 otie_van_de_leden_Van_Bommel_en_Dijkgraaf_over_het_openbreken_van_het_bereikte_politiek_akkoord_

5.13.05.21.068 otie_van_het_lid_Klaver_over_een_snellere_en_ambitieuze_uitvoering_van_de_ecodesign_richtlijn_

5.13.05.21.069 _van_alle_Europese_voorstellen_totdat_de_extra_verhoging_voor_de_Europese_begroting_van_tafel_is

5.13.05.21.070de_orde_stellen_van_de_teleurstellende_uitkomst_van_de_procedure_over_de_Europese_begroting_2013

5.13.06.04.071 Motie_van_het_lid_Madlener_over_vermindering_van_het_aantal_EU-ambtenaren_met_100%_

5.13.06.11.072 Motie_Van_Toorenborg_c.s._over_het_in_acht_nemen_van_artikel_100_van_de_European_Prison_Rules

5.13.06.25.073 Motie_van_het_lid_Fritsma_over_uittreden_uit_de_Europese_Unie_dan_wel_een_opt-out_

5.13.06.26.074 Bisschop_over_een_meer_substantiële_inventarisatie_van_terreinen_die_weer_aan_lidstaten behoren

5.13.06.26.075 Motie_Van_Haersma_Buma_c.s._over_een_substantiële_verhoging_van_de_drempelwaarden_

5.13.09.24.076 Motie_van_het_lid_Bontes_over_onderhandelingen_om_de_EU_en_de_muntunie_te_verlaten_

5.13.09.24.077 _lid_Omtzigt_over_het_terughalen_van_bevoegdheden_en_wetgeving_naar_het_niveau_van_de_lidstaten_

5.13.10.03.079 s._over_niet_instemmen_met_de_instelling_danwel_oprichting_van_een_Europees_Openbaar_Ministerie_

5.13.10.03.080 anwel_oprichting_van_een_Europees_Openbaar_Ministerie_volgens_het_voorstel_zoals_dat_nu_voorligt

5.13.10.10.081 Motie_van_het_lid_Fritsma_c.s._over_een_opt-out_op_het_gebied_van_immigratie_en_asiel_(1)

9.12.11.21.001 thuisen_c.s._(t.v.v._29344,_nr._93)_over_menswaardige_opvang_voor_uitgeprocedeerde_vreemdelingen

9.12.11.21.002 Motie_van_het_lid_Voordewind_c.s._over_opvang_tot_en_met_de_uitspraak_in_hoger_beroep

9.12.11.21.003 Motie_van_het_lid_Fritsma_over_uitzetting_met_de_grootst_mogelijke_spoed

9.12.11.21.004 Motie_van_het_lid_Fritsma_over_geen_voorkeursbehandeling_voor_vreemdelingen_in_tentenkampen

9.12.11.21.005 Motie_van_het_lid_Fritsma_over_financieel_aanpakken_van_gemeenten_

9.12.11.21.006 het_lid_Van_Hijum_over_herbevestigen_van_de_afspraak_dat_gemeenten_geen_noodopvang_zullen_bieden

9.12.12.04.007 Motie_van_het_lid_Voordewind_c.s._over_tijdelijk_verblijf_voor_Iraakse_asielzoekers (1)

9.12.12.18.008 Motie_van_het_lid_De_Roon_over_het_niet_opnemen_van_streefcijfers_in_het_diversiteitsbeleid____

9.12.12.18.009 Motie_van_het_lid_Van_Klaveren_over_de_bouw_van_nieuwe_moskeeën_

9.12.12.18.010 Motie_van_het_lid_Karabulut_over_een_visie_op_integratie_en_het_bestrijden_van_segregatie_

9.12.12.18.011 Motie_van_het_lid_Voortman_over_de_participatie_van_migranten_

9.12.12.20.012 Gesthuizen_over_afkeuring_van_de_handelswijze_van_de_staatssecretaris_van_Veiligheid_en_Justitie

9.12.12.20.013 Motie_Voortman_c.s._over_opschorten_van_aanvragen_in_het_kader_van_het_buitenschuldbeleid

9.12.12.20.014 Motie_Voortman_c.s._over_voorzien_in_monitoring_door_de_Commissie_Integraal_Toezicht_Terugkeer_

9.13.01.29.015 van_het_lid_Heerma_c.s._over_stagemogelijkheden_voor_illegaal_in_Nederland_verblijvende_jongeren

9.13.03.05.015 Motie_van_het_lid_Gesthuizen_over_onderzoek_naar_de_dood_van_een_Servische_asielzoeker_

9.13.03.05.016 Motie_van_het_lid_Fritsma_over_fraude_in_de_vorm_van_schijnrelaties_

9.13.03.12.017 Motie_van_het_lid_Karabulut_over_een_samenhangend_plan_tegen_onder_meer_discriminatie_

9.13.03.12.018 Motie_van_het_lid_Karabulut_over_een_subsiestop_voor_organisaties_die_integratie_belemmeren_

9.13.03.12.019 Motie_van_het_lid_Karabulut_over_het_bestrijden_van_monoculturele_en_mono-etnische_scholen_

9.13.03.12.020 Motie_van_het_lid_Van_Klaveren_over_het_sluiten_van_alle_moskee-internaten_

9.13.03.12.021 ie_van_het_lid_Van_Klaveren_over_onderzoek_naar_antisemitisme_binnen_de_islamitische_gemeenschap_

9.13.03.12.022 Motie_van_het_lid_Heerma_over_een_aanvulling_op_de_Agenda_Integratie_

9.13.03.12.023 _nr._16)_over_toetsing_van_het_initiatiefwetsvoorstel-Dijsselbloem_c.s._over_burgerschapsvorming_

9.13.03.12.024 Motie_van_het_lid_Van_Klaveren_over_direct_stopzetten_van_de_subsidies_aan_het_LOM_

9.13.03.19.025 Motie_van_de_leden_Van_Hijum_en_Van_der_Staaij_over_afzien_van_de_definitieve_regeling_

9.13.03.19.026 Motie_van_het_lid_Fritsma_over_afzien_van_het_nieuwe_generaal_pardon_

9.13.03.19.027 _van_verblijfsvergunningen_aan_vreemdelingen_die_niet_hebben_meegewerkt_aan_het_terugkeerproces_

9.13.03.19.028 e_van_het_lid_Voortman_c.s._over_advies_vragen_aan_het_VN-Comité_inzake_de_Rechten_van_het_Kind_

9.13.03.19.029 Motie_van_het_lid_Voortman_c.s._over_de_groepjongeren_die_ouder_is_dan_21_jaar_

9.13.03.19.030 man_en_Gesthuizen_over_aanspraken_voor_kinderen_die_een_reguliere_vergunning_hebben_aangevraagd_

9.13.03.19.031 Motie_van_het_lid_Gesthuizen_c.s._over_een_reguliere_vergunning_voor_kinderen_van_1F'ers_

9.13.03.19.032 tie_van_het_lid_Voordewind_c.s._over_een_aanvulling_op_paragraaf_3.1.c_van_de_overgangsregeling_

9.13.03.19.033 Motie_van_het_lid_Voordewind_c.s._over_IND-registratie_van_vergunningaanvragen_en_toekenningen_

9.13.03.19.034 Motie_van_het_lid_Voordewind_over_bepaling_medewerking_

9.13.03.19.035 de_leden_Van_der_Staaij_en_Van_Hijum_over_verwijtbaarheid_van_de_overheid_bij_langdurig_verblijf_

9.13.03.19.036 Motie_Van_Klaveren_over_verbod_op_het_aanpassen_van_woningen_aan_islamitische_wooneisen_

9.13.04.09.037 Gewijzigde_motie_van_het_lid_Leijten_c.s.__(t.v.v._32439_nr.15)_over_een_integrale_aanpak_

9.13.04.09.038 tie_van_het_lid_Otwin_Van_Dijk_over_cumulatie_van_eigen_bijdragen_van_cliënten_in_instellingen_

9.13.04.09.039 Motie_van_het_lid_Voordewind_c.s._over_overleg_over_passende_noodopvang_

9.13.04.09.040 tie_van_het_lid_Voordewind_c.s._over_het_voorkomen_van_verhuizen_voor_kinderen_van_asielzoekers_

9.13.04.09.041 sma_over_kleinschalige_alternatieven_voor_de_opvang_van_alleenstaande_minderjarige_vreemdelingen_

9.13.04.09.042 Motie_van_het_lid_Voortman_over_de_opvang_van_uitgeprocedeerde_gezinnen_

9.13.04.09.043 Motie_van_het_lid_Sjoerdsma_over_openstelling_van_het_Country_of_Origin_Information_Portal_

9.13.04.09.044 Motie_van_het_lid_Maij_over_opvang_van_amv's_in_pleeggezinnen_

9.13.04.09.045 Motie_van_het_lid_Fritsma_over_het_korten_van_gemeenten_die_afspraken_schenden_

9.13.04.09.046 Motie_van_het_lid_Van_Ojik_c.s._over_een_EU-aanbod_voor_het_opnemen_van_Syrische_vluchtelingen_

9.13.04.09.047 Motie_Van_Klaveren_over_het_keihard_aanpakken_van_het_Marokkanenprobleem_

9.13.04.09.048 Motie_Dijkgraaf_over_het_formuleren_van_specifiek_beleid_

9.13.04.16.049 Motie_van_het_lid_Van_Klaveren_over_een_verband_tussen_eergerelateerd_geweld_en_de_islam_

9.13.04.16.050 van_het_lid_Van_Klaveren_over_intrekken_van_de_Wet_gemeentelijke_antidiscriminatievoorzieningen_

9.13.04.16.051 ie_van_het_lid_Van_Weyenberg_c.s._over_evaluatie_van_het_homo-acceptatieprogramma_voor_migranten_

9.13.04.16.052 Motie_van_het_lid_Van_Weyenberg_over_monitoring_van_discriminatie_op_de_arbeidsmarkt_

9.13.04.16.053 de_leden_Azmani_en_Yücel_over_geen_dubbele_kinderbijslag_voor_kinderen_op_een_moskee-internaat_

9.13.04.16.054 Motie_van_de_leden_Azmani_en_Yücel_over_een_afdwingbaar_kwaliteitskader_voor_moskee-internaten_

9.13.04.16.055 Motie_van_het_lid_Van_Klaveren_over_onderzoek_naar_mishandelingen_tijdens_Koranlessen_

9.13.04.16.056 Motie_van_het_lid_Van_Klaveren_over_sluiting_van_alle_moskee-internaten_

9.13.04.16.057 Motie_van_het_lid_Karabulut_over_de_financiering_van_moskee-internaten_

9.13.04.23.058 Motie_van_het_lid_Schouw_c.s._over_rekening_houden_met_psychische_gesteldheid_

9.13.04.23.059 Motie_van_het_lid_Gesthuizen_over_de_bewijslast_voor_zieke_vreemdelingen_

9.13.04.23.060 Motie_van_het_lid_Voortman_c.s._over_behoud_van_het_traumatabeleid_in_andere_vorm_

9.13.04.23.061 otie_van_het_lid_Voortman_c.s._over_internationale_bescherming_van_verwesterde_Afghaanse_meisjes

9.13.05.28.062 otie_van_het_lid_Fritsma_over_het_naast_zich_neerleggen_van_de_voorstellen_in_de_motie-Terphuis_

9.13.05.28.063 Motie_van_het_lid_Voortman_c.s._over_het_verruimen_van_het_buitenschuldbeleid_

9.13.06.04.064 Motie_Segers_c.s._over_een_onderzoek_naar_financiële_steun_vanuit_onvrije_landen_

9.13.06.04.066 Motie_van_het_lid_Schouw_c.s._over_gelijkstelling_van_leges_

9.13.06.25.067 _lid_Van_Klaveren_over_de_negatieve_invloed_van_de_islam_op_de_emancipatie_van_vrouwen_en_homo's

9.13.07.02.068 tie_van_de_leden_Van_Klaveren_en_Wilders_over_het_verwijderen_van_de_koran_uit_de_plenaire_zaal_

9.13.07.02.069 Motie_van_het_lid_Gesthuizen_over_een_reactie_op_de_serie_-Uitgezet-_

9.13.07.02.070 an_het_lid_Gesthuizen_over_controleren_van_de_geldigheid_van_laissez_passers_en_titres_de_voyage

9.13.07.02.071 huizen_over_de_aanwezigheid_van_een_derde_bij_een_gesprek_tussen_arts_en_ingesloten_vreemdeling_

9.13.07.02.072 t_lid_Voortman_(t.v.v._19637,_nr._1688)_Voortman_over_interpretatie_van_het_belang_van_het_kind

9.13.07.02.073 Motie_van_het_lid_Van_Hijum_over_regeling_gericht_op_aantoonbaar_vertrek_

9.13.07.02.074 Motie_van_het_lid_Van_Hijum_over_beperken_van_het_aantal_tweede_en_vervolgaanvragen_

9.13.07.02.075 Motie_van_de_leden_Schouw_en_Voordewind_over_de_kosten_van_INDiGO_

9.13.07.02.076 van_het_lid_Van_Klaveren_over_verkorten_van_de_termijn_voor_het_halen_van_het_inburgeringsexamen

9.13.07.02.077 Klaveren_over_intrekken_van_de_verblijfsvergunning_bij_het_niet_halen_van_het_inburgeringsexamen

9.13.07.02.078 et_lid_Van_Klaveren_over_schrappen_van_de_ontheffing_bij_het_leveren_van_voldoende_inspanningen

9.13.07.02.079 Gesthuizen_en_Schouw_(t.v.v._32317,_nr._176)_over_het_uitnodigen_van_250_Syrische_vluchtelingen (1)

9.13.09.10.080 Motie_van_het_lid_Van_Klaveren_over_een_onderzoek_naar_shariawijken_in_Nederland_

9.13.09.10.081 Motie_van_het_lid_Van_Klaveren_over_het_stoppen_van_de_immigratie_uit_islamitische_landen

9.13.09.19.082 aan_de_UNHCR_kenbaar_maken_dat_Nederland_bereid_is_5.000_Syrische_vluchtelingen_uit_te_nodigen_

9.13.09.19.083 tie_van_het_lid_Voortman_c.s._over_versoepeling_regels_voor_toelating_van_Syrische_vluchtelingen

9.13.09.19.084 Motie_van_het_lid_Voortman_c.s._over_ruimhartige_opvang_van_Syrische_vluchtelingen_in_Nederland_

9.13.09.19.085 ie_van_het_lid_Voordewind_c.s._over_participeren_in_het_tijdelijk_humanitair_toelatingsprogramma

9.13.09.19.086 id_Voordewind_c.s._over_het_loskoppelen_van_250_Syrische_vluchtelingen_van_het_bestaande_quotum_

9.13.09.19.087
den_Van_der_Staaij_en_Van_Hijum_over_vorrang_geven_aan_de_meest_kwetsbare_en_bedreigde_personen

9.13.09.19.088 Motie_van_het_lid_Schouw_c.s._over_het_verhogen_van_het_quotum_voor_hervestiging_van_2014

9.13.09.19.089 _c.s._over_een_meer_actieve_rol_van_de_regering_in_de_Europese_coördinatie_van_hulp_aan_Syrië_

9.13.09.19.090 otie_van_het_lid_Van_Klaveren_over_het_ontnemen_van_de_anbi-status_van_islamitische_organisaties

9.13.09.19.091 Motie_het_lid_Van_Klaveren_over_een_verbod_op_de_buitenlandse_financiering_van moskeeën

9.13.09.19.092 ie_van_het_lid_Beertema_over_het_intrekken_van_onderwijslicenties_van_alle_islamitische_scholen_ (1)

9.13.09.19.093 Motie_van_het_lid_Beertema_over_financiering_van_scholen_door_partijen_in_OIC-landen_

9.13.09.19.094 Motie_van_het_lid_Beertema_over_misbruik_van_artikel_23_van_de_Grondwet_

9.13.10.17.095 _loslaten_van_de_kwantitatieve_richtlijnen_voor_het_aanhouden_van_uitgeprocedeerde_vreemdelingen

9.13.10.17.096 _de_leden_Voordewind_en_Gesthuizen_over_aanvragers_die_zich_onttrokken_hebben_aan_rijkstoezicht_

9.13.10.17.097 n_de_leden_Voordewind_en_Gesthuizen_over_de_tijdelijke_Regeling_langdurig_verblijvende_kinderen_

9.13.10.17.098 Motie_van_het_lid_Voordewind_over_het_overnemen_van_de_aanbevelingen_van_de_ACVZ_

9.13.10.17.099 van_het_lid_Voortman_overjongeren_ouder_dan_21_jaar_die_voor_hun_13de_asiel_hebben_aangevraagd_

9.13.10.17.100 Motie_van_het_lid_Voortman_over_criteria_voor_kwetsbare_groepen_

9.13.10.17.101 n_het_lid_Voortman_over_opvangvoorzieningen_aanbieden_aan_voormalige_bewoners_van_de_Vluchtfat_

9.13.10.17.102 sthuizen_over_advies_vragen_aan_de_Raad_van_State_over_vreemdelingen_die_in_bewijsnood_verkeren_

9.13.10.17.103 Motie_van_het_lid_Fritsma_over_het_niet_beperken_van_vreemdelingendetentie_

9.13.10.17.104 _Gesthuizen_over_het_verlenen_van_een_buitenschuldvergunning_bij_gebrek_aan_reactie_na_een_jaar_

9.13.10.17.105 _Gesthuizen_over_een_gesprek_met_burgemeesters_over_de_opvang_van_uitgeprocedeerde_asielzoekers_

Appendix 1: Coding of the CMP on my policy domains

From: https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/coding_schemes/mp_v5 07-06-2020_15:42

104 Military: Positive

The importance of external security and defence. May include statements concerning:

- The need to maintain or increase military expenditure;
- The need to secure adequate manpower in the military;
- The need to modernise armed forces and improve military strength;
- The need for rearmament and self-defence;
- The need to keep military treaty obligations.

605.1 Law and Order General: Positive

Favourable mentions of strict law enforcement, and tougher actions against domestic crime. Only refers to the enforcement of the status quo of the manifesto country's law code. May include:

- Increasing support and resources for the police;
- Tougher attitudes in courts;
- Importance of internal security.

108 European Community/Union or Latin America Integration: Positive

Favourable mentions of European Community/Union in general. May include the:

- Desirability of the manifesto country joining (or remaining a member);
- Desirability of expanding the European Community/Union;
- Desirability of increasing the ECs/EUs competences;
- Desirability of expanding the competences of the European Parliament.

In Latin American countries: Favourable mentions of integration within Latin America, e.g CELAC, MERCOSUR, UNASUR. May include the:

- Desirability of the manifesto country joining (or remaining a member);
- Desirability of expanding or deepening the integration;

607 Multiculturalism: Positive - comprised of:

607.1 General

Favourable mentions of cultural diversity and cultural plurality within domestic societies. May include the preservation of autonomy of religious, linguistic heritages within the country including special educational provisions.

607.2 Immigrant Integration: Diversity

Statements favouring the idea that immigrants keep their cultural traits; voluntary integration; state providing opportunities to integrate.

Only concerned with immigrants already in the manifesto country. For positive statements regarding the possibility of new immigrants, please see 602.2

607.3 Indigenous rights: Positive

Calls for the protection of indigenous people, strengthening their rights, may include:

- Protection of their lands;
- Introduction of special provisions in the democratic or bureaucratic process;
- Compensation for past grief.

Appendix 2: Excluded data from multiculturalism and law and order

These are the 67 parliamentary resolutions that are excluded from the policy domain of multiculturalism and law and order.

2009-2010

10.08.09.25.001 Motie Brinkman over het verbieden van alle organisaties die op de terreurlijsten voorkomen
10.08.09.25.002 kman over het uitzetten van personen die mogelijk een gevaar vormen voor de nationale veiligheid
10.08.09.25.003 Motie-Brinkman over het onder curatele stellen van burgemeesters_
10.08.10.07.004 Motie Teeven over het ongewenst verklaren van vreemdelingen en illegalen
10.08.10.07.005 Motie Tony van Dijck en Brinkman over reductie van het aantal verkeersboetes_
10.08.10.28.006 Motie Fritsma over het strafbaar stellen van illegaal verblijf in Nederland_
10.08.11.04.007 De Roon over het niet opleggen van taakstraffen aan illegaal in Nederland verblijvende personen_
10.08.11.11.008 en onderzoek naar redenen voor een strafrechtelijk onderzoek tegen vier salafistische moskeeën_
10.08.11.25.009 Motie Fritsma c.s. over zwaardere straffen voor straatterroristen_
10.08.11.25.010 Motie van het lid Fritsma c.s. over het inzetten van het leger in probleemwijken
10.08.11.25.011 Motie Teeven en De Roon over het niet instellen van een reflectieperiode op Schiphol
10.08.12.02.012 Motie Brinkman over de aanpak van Marokkaans straattuig door de politie_
10.08.12.16.013 e Dibi over het niet verschillend straffen op basis van etniciteit (t.v.v. 31_700_XVIII, nr. 46)
10.09.04.23.014 itsma over intrekking van de verblijfsvergunning van iedere vreemdeling die een misdrijf pleegt_
10.09.04.23.015 Motie Verdonk over het verbieden van dragen van capuchons_
10.09.04.23.016 het ongewenst verklaren van alle criminele vreemdelingen die zijn veroordeeld voor een misdrijf_
10.09.05.10.017 Motie De Krom en Verdonk over blokkeren van de asielprocedure bij fraude of tegenwerking
10.09.05.10.018 _nooit meer in aanmerking komen voor verblijf in Nederland na fraude bij de toelatingsprocedure_
10.09.06.23.019 ma over intrekken van de verblijfsvergunning van vreemdelingen die een misdrijf hebben gepleegd_
10.09.06.23.020 Motie Verdonk - De Krom over onmiddellijke invoering van de verscherping van de glijdende schaal
10.09.06.30.021 n afhankelijke verblijfsvergunning wanneer de inburgeringscursus verwijtbaar niet wordt gestart_
10.09.07.02.022 Motie Verdonk over geen financiële vergoeding voor criminele vreemdelingen_

2010-2011

10.10.12.07.001 Motie Spekman c.s. over het toezenden van het kostprijsonderzoek COA aan de Kamer
10.10.12.07.002 c.s. over niet op straat zetten van uitgeprocedeerde vreemdelingen tijdens een koudweerregeling_
10.10.12.07.003 Motie Spekman c.s. over de bewijslast voor asielzoekers_
10.10.12.07.004 Motie Spekman c.s. over niet strafbaar stellen van hulp aan illegalen_
10.10.12.07.005 Motie Spekman c.s. over verbeteren van de situatie van asielzoekers in Griekenland_
10.10.12.07.006 Motie Spekman c.s. over een evenwichtiger immigratiebeleid_
10.10.12.07.007 ew motie Gesthuizen c.s. over alternatieven voor vreemdelingenbewaring (t.v.v. 32500_VI, nr. 49)
10.10.12.07.008 Staij over niet strafbaar stellen van hulpverlening aan illegalen uit humanitaire overwegingen_
10.10.12.07.009 Motie Schouw c.s. over het EVRM als uitgangspunt voor beleid_
10.10.12.07.010 chouw c.s. over een substantiële daling van de instroom van asielzoekers niet als doel op zich_

10.10.12.07.011 Motie_Schouw_c.s._over_niet_belemmeren_van_de_kenniseconomie_door_een_strenger_migratiebeleid_
 10.10.12.07.012 Motie_Fritsma_over_uitzetten_van_ongewenst_verklaarde_vreemdelingen_
 10.10.12.07.013 ge_verblijfsvergunning_voor_huwelijks-_en_gezinsmigranten_die_slachtoffer_zijn_van_mishandeling_
 10.10.12.07.014 ewind_c.s._over_onderzoek_naar_de_schaal_waarop_kwetsbare_asielzoekers_in_AZC's_worden_bedreigd_
 10.10.12.07.015 Motie_Voordewind_c.s._over_een_vertrouwenspersoon_voor_asielzoekers_
 10.10.12.07.016 c.s._over_eerbiedigen_van_het_recht_op_gezinshereniging_en_op_gezinsleven_op_basis_van_het_EVRM_
 10.10.12.07.017 _voorwaarden_voor_tot_het_christendom_bekeerde_Iraanse_moslims_als_Iraanse_christenasielzoekers_
 10.10.12.07.018 _brengen_van_cruciale_informatie_van_internationale_gerechten_aan_de_Nederlandse_rechtspraak_
 10.10.12.07.019 Motie_Van_der_Staaij_c.s._over_stoppen_van_immigratie_ten_behoeve_van_werk_in_de_prostitutie_
 10.11.04.05.020 Motie_De_Jong_over_het_maximaal_toegestane_eigen_vermogen_ (1)
 10.11.04.05.021 Motie_De_Jong_en_Azmani_over_terugvorderen_van_het_fraudebedrag_plus_boete_
 10.11.04.05.022 Motie_De_Jong_en_Azmani_over_beslagleggen_op_bezittingen_van_bijstandsfraudeurs_
 10.11.05.24.023 Gew._motie_Wilders_over_geleidelijk_toekennen_van_rechten_aan_migranten_(t.v.v._32710-13)_
 10.11.10.04.024 Motie_Van_Klaveren_over_de_uitbanning_van_de_sharia_uit_ons_rechtssysteem_

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10.12.12.04.001 Motie_Fritsma_over_een_nieuwe_pardonregeling_
 10.12.12.04.002 Motie_Van_Hijum_en_Van_der_Staaij_over_verhoging_van_het_asiel-afdoeningspercentage_
 10.12.12.04.003 tie_van_de_leden_Schouw_en_Voordewind_(t.v.v._33400-VI,_nr._47)_over_een_sanctie_op_illegaliteit
 10.12.12.04.004 wijzigde_motie_van_het_lid_Schouw_c.s._(t.v.v._33400-VI,_nr._49)_over_Ugandese_LHBT-asielzoekers
 10.12.12.04.005 Motie_Voordewind_c.s._over_de_overgangsregeling_voor_een_kinderpardon_
 10.12.12.04.006 Motie_Voordewind_c.s._over_meerderjarige_broers_en_zussen_
 10.12.12.04.007 Motie_Voordewind_c.s._over_het_niet_uitzetten_van_Somaliërs_
 10.12.12.04.008 Motie_Voordewind_c.s._over_niet_toepassen_van_de_leeftijdsverhoging_naar_24_jaar_
 10.12.12.04.009 Motie_Voordewind_c.s._over_de_wekelijkse_meldplicht_
 10.12.12.04.010 Motie_Van_Tongeren_c.s._over_Ranov-vergunninghouders_
 10.12.12.18.011 Motie_van_het_lid_Van_Klaveren_over_het_Marokkanenprobleem_
 10.12.12.18.012 ie_van_de_leden_Van_Klaveren_en_Helder_over_het_registreren_van_de_nationaliteit_van_gevangenen_
 10.12.12.20.013 Motie_Voordewind_c.s._over_wederom_aanmerken_van_Mogadishu_als_artikel_15c_gebied
 10.13.01.29.014 Motie_Gesthuizen_over_het_niet_invoeren_van_artikel_107,_lid_6,_sub_b_Vreemdelingenwet
 10.13.01.29.015 Motie_Fritsma_over_aangifte_van_fraude_inzake_verblijfsaanvragen_
 10.13.01.29.016 Motie_Fritsma_over_het_tegenwerpen_van_gepleegde_fraude_bij_reguliere_verblijfsaanvragen
 10.13.03.19.017 nimmer_verstrekken_van_verblijfsvergunningen_aan_vreemdelingen_die_een_misdrijf_hebben_gepleegd_
 10.13.05.28.018 Motie_van_het_lid_Voortman_c.s._over_het_versoepelen_van_het_detentieregime_
 10.13.05.28.019 Motie_van_het_lid_Voordewind_c.s._over_geen_kwantitatieve_resultaatafspraken_voor_vreemdelingen_
 10.13.06.04.020 Motie_Bontes_over_het_opsluiten_van_naar_Nederland_terugkerende_jihadisten_
 10.13.06.04.021 Jansen_over_het_in_kaart_brengen_van_best_practices_in_gemeentelijk_beleid_tegen_radicalisering
 10.13.06.04.022 Motie_Dijkhoff_c.s._over_wijziging_van_artikel_15_van_de_Wet_op_het_Nederlandschap_
 10.13.06.04.023 Motie_Dijkhoff_c.s._over_onderzoek_naar_een_stelsel_van_bestemmingsvisa_
 10.13.06.06.024 leden_Van_Hijum_en_Azmani_over_informereren_over_beperkingen_aan_binnenlands_vreemdelingentoezicht
 10.13.07.02.025 e_van_de_leden_Voordewind_en_Schouw_(t.v.v._19637,_nr._1682_)_over_alternatieven_voor_visaties
 10.13.07.02.026 Motie_van_het_lid_Fritsma_over_afzien_van_het_voornemen_om_geen_illegalen_meer_vast_te_zetten
 10.13.07.02.027 Motie_van_het_lid_Voortman_over_afschaffen_van_de_grensdetentie_voor_vluchtelingen_
 10.13.07.02.028 Motie_van_het_lid_Helder_over_denaturaliseren_en_terugsturen_van_criminelen