The attribution of product failures in an online platform context

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A research study on the attribution process of product failures and how this process mediates the effects of platform and manufacturer reputation on customer satisfaction with the platform in an online platform context.

Name:	Lina van Loon
Student number:	s1009684
University:	Radboud University
Master:	Business administration- Marketing
Course:	Master's Thesis in Marketing (MAN-MMATHA)
Supervisor:	Drs. M. Börsig
Second examiner:	Dr. C. Horváth
Place and date	Nijmegen, June 12, 2021

Preface

In front of you lies the thesis *'The attribution of product failures in an online platform context',* which investigates how the attribution process of product failures mediates the effects of platform and manufacturer reputation on customer satisfaction with the platform. This thesis was the final piece of my master degree in marketing at Radboud University. From December 2020 until June 2021, I have put time and effort into writing my master thesis. Writing this thesis was challenging, especially while everything had to be done virtually. However, during the process of writing my master thesis, I have learned a lot.

During this process, my supervisor Drs. M. Börsig provided professional guidance and critical feedback. Therefore, I would like to thank him for his helpful insights and expertise. I would also like to thank Dr. C. Horváth for being my second supervisor. Primarily for providing critical feedback on my proposal. Furthermore, I would like to thank all individuals who participated in this study. Without their participation, this research would not have been completed. Finally, I would like to thank my fellow students, family, and friends who supported me during the process.

I hope you enjoy reading this thesis.

Lina van Loon

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Abstract

Fairly recent, the online platform economy has emerged, and the number of online platforms is still growing. As in any other context, in this online platform context failures are inevitable. When failures occur, most likely, a causal reasoning process will follow where responsibility will be attributed. The attribution process of product failures in an online platform context remains underexplored, indicating a gap in the literature. Therefore, the purpose of this research is to gain insight into the attribution process of product failures in online platforms by examining how the effect of platform and manufacturer reputation on customer satisfaction with the platform is mediated by platform locus and platform controllability. To gain insight in this process, an online survey was conducted amongst Dutch respondents. First, an introductory text was shown to respondents, thereafter respondents filled in the questionnaire, including questions about the key constructs. After that, the data was analyzed using the PROCESS 3.5 tool. The results showed that platform reputation has a negative effect on platform controllability. Subsequently, platform controllability has a negative effect on customer satisfaction with the platform. Furthermore, a positive effect was found from platform reputation on manufacturer reputation. There were no significant effects from manufacturer reputation on any of the constructs. Furthermore, platform reputation does not significantly affect platform locus or customer satisfaction with the platform. Also, no significant effect was found from platform locus on customer satisfaction with the platform. Finally, the results of this research, theoretical and managerial implications, limitations of this research, and suggestions for further research are discussed.

Keywords: online platform, product failure, platform reputation, manufacturer reputation, platform locus, platform controllability, customer satisfaction with the platform.

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1. Introduction

Fairly recent, a platform economy emerged (Kenny & Zysman, 2016). Back in the late 90s, some well-known platforms, such as Amazon and eBay, were established. These companies were at the forefront of the new platform economy and changed the way participants interact with one another (Kenney & Zysman, 2016). T). This platform economy is still emerging and is expected to grow even faster due to new innovative technologies (Ketron & Mai, 2020). The function of these platforms is to connect sellers with customers and allow them to transact with each other (Chakravarty, Kumar, & Grewal, 2014, p. 1). These platforms mainly do not own the products that are sold. For example, Amazon only directly sells 7% of its products in the electronic department. Third-party sellers sell the remaining 93% on the platform of Amazon. In this situation, Amazon allows sellers to get in touch with customers. In exchange, the seller pays a specific fee for each unit sold. These third-party sellers could be well-known brands such as Philips and Samsung, but also small independent companies (Jiang et al., 2011). Specifically, in this research, we assume that the seller company is the same as the brand that offers and manufactures the product. So, for example, we assume that Philips sells its shaver through Bol.com. In this case, Philips is the manufacturer that sells its product on Bol.com and Bol.com is the platform that connects Philips with several customers. To avoid confusion, in this research, there are two parties involved: the platform and the manufacturer who sells through the platform. Together, these two parties are responsible for the overall transaction (Suri, Huang, & Sénécal, 2019). There must be a certain level of trust between the platform, the buyer, and the manufacturer who sells through the platform to let these platforms flourish. While an honest manufacturer will always deliver its promises, an opportunistic firm will take advantage of the situation. Especially in online environments, trust is crucial because it is harder for customers to identify the identity of the manufacturer who sells through the platform and the identity of the platform (Tadelis, 2016, pp. 1-2).

When a transaction takes place in these platforms, even as in any other situation, failures and negative experiences are inevitable, and recovering from these failures is often challenging (Sengupta, Balaji, & Krishnan, 2015). The three most common e-failures are slow or unavailable service, packaging error, and product defects (Forbes, Kelley, & Hoffman, 2005). The first two failures could be characterized as service failure, while the last failure is a product failure. Where multiple studies investigated the impact of service failure, little research is done on product failure (Choi & Mattila, 2008; Hess, 2008; Munyon, Jenkins, Crook, Edwards, & Harvey, 2019; Suri et al., 2019; Tam, Kim, & Sharma, 2016; Vázquez-

Casielles, del Río-Lanza, & Díaz-Martín, 2007). Therefore, this research is focused on product defects and thereby closes this gap in literature.

When a failure occurs that was not expected, a customer will end up in a state of psychological disequilibrium. This state will most likely elicit a causal reasoning process. Customers engage in these causal reasoning processes to better understand the causes of the failure (Munyon et al., 2019; Tam et al., 2016). This causal reasoning process is based on the information the customers possess and is therefore subjective. The information customers possess will be limited in online platforms since the product cannot be seen or tested physically. Furthermore, there is less support from sales employees. This lack of physical interaction distinguishes the online platform environment from a traditional brick-and-mortar store and will impact the causal reasoning process of customers (Forbes et al., 2005; Schilirò, 2018).

The process of causal reasoning will elicit an attribution process. This attribution process is based on the attribution theory, which is one of the foundational theories in customer complaining behavior. The attribution process consists of three causal dimensions: locus of causality (who caused the failure), controllability (the degree to which the actor could have prevented the failure), and stability (whether the failure is temporary or permanent) (Folkes, 1984; Munyon et al. 2019; Tsiros, Mittal, &Ross, 2004). Based on the theory of social conduct, the attribution of responsibility is determined by its dimensions: locus of causality and controllability (Munyon et al., 2019; Tsiros et al., 2004). Responsibility is about "the belief that an actor possessed the power to change concrete or moral consequences" (Munyon et al., 2019, p. 588). Within the platform context, the attribution process will be different from the attribution process in traditional firms since a platform is an online triadic exchange system (Chakravarty et al., 2014, p. 2). Therefore, customers could attribute the failure to at least two potential entities: the platform or the manufacturer that sells through the platform (Ketron & Mai, 2020).

Multiple researchers found that reputation influences the attribution of failures (Hess, 2008; Jin, Park, & Kim, 2008; Sengupta et al., 2015). Reputation is a collective measure of the trustworthiness of an actor, in this context, the platform, and manufacturer (Fan et al., 2012). Researchers found a direct effect from firm reputation on satisfaction and a "buffering effect" of firm reputation on the attribution of failures (Hess, 2008; Jin et al., 2008; Sengupta et al., 2015; Yu, Liu, Lee, & Soutar, 2018). An excellent firm reputation will lower the attribution process of controllability and stability and diminish the impact of failures on firm outcomes (Hess, 2008, p. 391). Contrasting, other researchers found that customers were more

disappointed when a failure was caused by excellent firms (Korkofingas & Ang, 2011; Niedrich, Kiryanova, & Black, 2005). These contrasting findings are exciting opportunities to generate new insights and find consensus. Specifically, it is worth exploring this buffering effect due to its potential positive impact on the attribution of failures and the overall customer satisfaction.

The attribution of failures can cause customer complaining behavior, customer anger, and even a desire to hurt the firm, in this context, the platform (Folkes, 1984). Eventually, the process negatively influences several outcome variables, for example, customer satisfaction (Choi & Mattila, 2008; Hess, 2008; Sengupta et al., 2015; Tsiros et al., 2004; Vázquez-Casielles et al., 2007), customer loyalty (Y.-S. Wang, Wu, Lin, & Wang, 2011), word of mouth (Chang, Tsai, Wong, Wang, & Cho, 2015; Hess, 2008) and purchase intentions (Hess, 2008; Munyon et al., 2019). In the context of online platforms, where the platform and manufacturer who sells through the platform are interwoven and together responsible for the overall transaction, these negative outcomes could impact both platform and manufacturer (Suri et al., 2019). These insights emphasize the impact of failures on firm outcomes. Therefore, to minimize this impact, it is relevant to investigate the attribution process of failures in online platforms to understand customers' internal reasoning process. Furthermore, the effect of both platform and manufacturer reputation on the attribution process is investigated to gain insight into the buffering effect of these reputations. At the moment, the platform economy is still emerging and therefore gaining insights in these online platforms is even more relevant (Kenney & Zysman, 2016; Ketron & Mai, 2020).

1.1 Research objective and question

The overarching purpose of this research is to gain insight into the attribution process of product failures in online platforms by examining how the effects of platform and manufacturer reputation on customer satisfaction with the platform is mediated by platform locus and platform controllability. To achieve this objective, this research aims to answer the following research question: '*Following a product failure in an online platform, how are the effects of platform and manufacturer reputation on customer satisfaction with the platform mediated by platform locus and platform controllability?'*

1.2 Relevance

1.2.1 Theoretical relevance

To this day, the extant amount of literature on platforms is limited and primarily focused on the economic part of business, with some exceptions related to, for example, customer orientation (Chakravarty et al., 2014, p. 3). Therefore, several researchers stress the importance of conducting more research in the context of online platforms (Chakravarty et al., 2014; Krafft, Goetz, Mantrala, Sotgiu, & Tillmanns, 2015). Overall, multiple types of research investigated the attribution of failures and their effects in a traditional retail context. However, the attribution of product failures in the online platform context has remained unexplored. Just like any other industry, platform industries are not failproof. Online platforms are even more complex due to the triadic exchange system, resulting in even more failures (Chakravarty et al., 2014). Due to the triadic structure of online platforms, it is expected that the purchase funnel looks different. Furthermore, the attribution process of responsibility will be more complex due to the increase in the number of actors involved (Ketron & Mai, 2020; Reinartz, Wiegand, & Imschloss, 2019). Due to these differences between traditional firms and online platforms, it remains unclear how responsibility will be attributed in an online platform context (Ketron & Mai, 2020). To overcome this gap in literature, the attribution process of product failures in online platforms should be researched. Wirtz, So, Mody, Liu, and Chun (2019) also highlighted the importance of gaining these insights. Filling this gap in literature is even more important because the digital platform economy is currently emerging (Kenney & Zysman, 2016). Besides gaining insight into the attribution process, it is essential to investigate relevant factors that could influence this process. Several researchers discovered a buffering effect of reputation (Hess, 2008; Jin et al., 2008; Sengupta et al., 2015). On the other side, some researchers found an opposite negative effect of reputation on the attribution process (Huang, 2011; Korkofingas & Ang, 2011). This controversy supports debate and stresses the importance of researching the effect of reputation in this product failure context. Furthermore, little is known about the effects of reputation in the complex context of an online platform, where both the platform and manufacturer reputation are of relevance. This research will overcome several gaps in literature by gaining insight into the attribution process in an online platform context. Furthermore, this research examines the effects of reputation on the attribution process of responsibility and customer satisfaction with the platform. Based on these new insights, this research will contribute to the literature on the attribution of product failures in online platforms.

1.2.2 Managerial relevance

From a managerial perspective, it is important to gain insight into customers attribution process of product failures and how this process is affected by platform and manufacturer reputation. Overall, previous research was first and foremost focused on investigating responses towards failures. However, these researches overlooked the internal process of customers in case a product failure did occur. Investigating this internal process may even be more important because most customers find it tough to voice their dissatisfaction with the firm (Choi & Mattila, 2008). Furthermore, it is important to gain these insights to keep current customers satisfied because the costs of acquiring new customers are five times higher than the costs to retain current customers and keep them satisfied (Hart, Heskett, & Sasser Jr, 1990). Therefore, it is important to get insight into this attribution process and customers' feelings to overcome negative word of mouth, dissatisfaction, and switching behavior (Chang et al., 2015; Folkes, 1984; Sengupta et al., 2015). This study will be relevant for the platform and for the manufacturer who sells through the platform and is therefore dependent on the platform (Chakravarty et al., 2014). This dependency relation is based on the spillover effect (Klein & Dawar, 2004; Zavyalova, Pfarrer, Reger, and Shapiro, 2012). Furthermore, this research gives insight into the importance of both platform and manufacturer reputation and provides managers with opportunities to diminish the negative effect of product failures.

1.3 Outline of thesis

This master thesis is structured the following way: in chapter 2, the theoretical framework will be presented. Based on the theory, the central constructs are explained, and the conceptual model is discussed. Chapter 3 starts with describing the research strategy and sample method. After that, the constructs are operationalized, and the data analysis method is described. In chapter 4, the analysis and the results of this study are presented. Finally, in chapter 5, the conclusion is drawn, the theoretical and practical implications are described, and the limitations, and recommendations for further research are being discussed.

2. Literature review

In this paragraph, the key constructs are discussed based on current literature. The key constructs are online platforms, product failure, reputation, attribution theory, and customer satisfaction. Furthermore, the conceptual model is presented, and hypotheses are formulated.

2.1 Online platforms

In the digital world, a platform economy emerged, which changed the way people interact with one another (Kenney & Zysman, 2016). Online platforms differ from traditional retailers and brands that sell their products online (Reinartz et al., 2019). This difference might impact the attribution of product failures and their effects on overall customer reactions. Multi-sided markets use these online platforms as intermediaries to connect manufacturers with customers (Trabucchi & Buganza, 2020). For example, Amazon and eBay are acting as an intermediary between buyers and manufacturer. Therefore, the fundamental value proposition in a platform is to reduce market friction and act as a matchmaker between two different groups with distinct roles to ensure transactions can occur and economic value is generated. There are two groups in an online platform context where one group consists of the customers, and the other group consists of the manufacturers who sell through the platform (Chakravarty et al., 2014; Trabucchi & Buganza, 2020). The manufacturer who sells through the platform could be a well-known brand such as Samsung or Philips, but also a small independent company (Jiang et al., 2011). As mentioned before, in this research, we assume that the company that sells through the platform is the same as the brand that offers and manufactures the product. In this research, the two parties are termed the platform and the manufacturer.

Another characteristic of a platform is that no interaction between these different groups is required. The manufacturer retains sovereignty over the products, which is different from traditional brick and mortar stores (Chakravarty et al., 2014; Reinartz et al., 2019; Trabucchi & Buganza, 2020). Managing these different groups with distinct demands is challenging. This results in a complex situation where the platform should get both sides on board and satisfy the needs of both (Chakravarty et al., 2014; Frishammar, Cenamor, Cavalli-Björkman, Hernell, & Carlsson, 2018).

Furthermore, an online platform distinguishes itself through individualization and transparency of product information. Online platforms can offer a wide variety of offerings due to their endless shelf space and advanced search algorithms. Therefore, platforms can

possess a superior assortment of products and better match manufacturers and customers. This fosters convenience through the decrease in product and transaction costs.

Also, platforms empower customers to make better choices by delivering transparency and comparing information from different sources (Reinartz et al., 2019). This transparency can facilitate customer trust (Tadelis, 2016). However, there are also some disadvantages of an online platform context. A disadvantage of online platforms is the lack of sensory experiences and personal interaction. By adding customer and expert reviews, some experiential information is provided. However, this falls short of personal interactions and first-hand experiences provided by service personnel or experts in a traditional brick and mortar store (Reinartz et al., 2019). Adding reviews reduces information asymmetry by providing more first-hand information about the product (Lawani, Reed, Mark, & Zheng, 2019, p. 23). Subsequently, these reviews impact customer purchase decisions and serve as a proxy of a product or service quality and thereby determine reputation (Lawani et al., 2019, p. 32). Along these lines, adding reviews is beneficial to provide some experiential experience. Especially in an online platform context because experiential experiences are minimal (Reinartz et al., 2019). Reviews determine reputation, and therefore reputation is also an essential factor to overcome the disadvantages of online platforms (Lawani et al., 2019). Therefore, this research includes reputation. The role of reputation in this research will be discussed further in the preceding of this chapter.

2.2 Product failure

After a purchase or during a purchase, failures could occur, which causes customer dissatisfaction (Kincade, Giddings, & Chen-Yu, 1998; Sengupta et al., 2015). Something is called a failure when a specific performance of a product or service does not reach a given reference point. Therefore, a failure can be defined as failing to reach the desired end-state and landing in an undesired end-state (Ewe, Lee, & Watabe, 2020, p. 2). In literature, there is a distinction between product failure and service failure. Product failure is defined as "the failure of the product to maintain the desired quality after purchase" (Kincade et al., 1998, p. 84). Service failure is defined as "a service performance that falls to meet a customer's expectations" (Sands, Campbell, Shedd, Ferraro, & Mavrommatis, 2020, p. 2). Recently, the focus of research has been on the attribution process in traditional firms, where most studies investigated the service context (Choi & Mattila, 2008; Hess, 2008; Tam et al., 2016; Vázquez-Casielles et al., 2007), less were performed in a product context (Folkes, 1984; Munyon et al., 2019). This research fills the gap in the literature and increases knowledge

about the attribution process of a product failure in an online platform context. Munyon et al. (2019) did already investigate the attribution of a product recall. However, this research was conducted in a traditional firm context. Overall, the online platform context and especially the attribution process of product failures within this context is barely researched. Forbes et al. (2005) investigated the most common failures in an e-tailing context. The three most common e-failures are slow or unavailable service, packaging error, and product defects. Slow and unavailable service and packaging errors could be characterized as service failures, while product defects are product failures. Based on these insights, this research will investigate the attribution effect of a product failure, a product defect, in an online platform context.

2.3 Reputation

As mentioned before, online platforms are triadic exchange systems. Therefore, a customer's purchase decision is not only dependent on the platform but also on the manufacturer who sells through the platform (Chakravarty et al., 2014). So, both the platform and the manufacturer could influence the purchase decisions of customers. At the same time, it is also expected that both could influence the attribution process of customers when a product failure occurs. The platform is, in this situation, the transaction party, and the manufacturer is the firm that manufactures and sells the product. In the online platform context, there is information asymmetry and less direct contact. Therefore, it is harder for customers to identify the identity of the platform and manufacturer. However, before a market can flourish and transactions can occur, a certain level of trust is necessary (Tadelis, 2016; Zloteanu, Harvey, Tuckett, & Livan, 2018). A central factor that affects trust is reputation, where a positive reputation increases trust (Ert, Fleischer, & Magen, 2016, p. 64). Reputation is a combined representation of trust towards a certain entity (Fan et al., 2012; Zloteanu et al., 2018, p. 2). Furthermore, reputation is a signal of quality and can simplify the decision process of a customer. This quality signal is even more critical in the online environment due to the inherent uncertainty associated with this environment (Jin et al., 2008). In this context, reputation builds trust and influences customer satisfaction, determining repurchase intentions (Abbes, Hallem, & Taga, 2020).

Reputation is a social process based on past transactions (Abbes et al., 2020). The construct is defined as "a public opinion that represents a collective evaluation of a group regarding the characteristic of an entity or a person" (Ert et al., 2016, p. 64, Wang & Vassileva, 2007). It is thus about the perception of the characteristics of an entity. For

example, the perception about how genuinely concerned a firm is about the welfare of their customers and the degree of firm's honesty (Hess, 2008, p. 386).

The trust transfer theory could explain the relationship between platform reputation and manufacturer reputation. This theory assumes that the trust in one party can be transferred to another party. Specifically, trust in the platform can be transferred to trust in the selling firm. In this research, the manufacturer is the selling firm. When a customer trusts the platform, and this platform is related to the manufacturing firm, the trustee, the customer trust in the platform will be transferred to the manufacturing firm. (Chen, Huang, Davison & Hua, 2015, p. 264). These intermediary platforms reduce uncertainty by providing regulations that provide clear guidelines for acceptable behavior (Pavlou & Gefen, 2004). Therefore, when a platform is trusted, customers will view the platform as a safe place to do business (Chen et al., 2015). Based on the perceived associations between manufacturer and platform, manufacturers will be more trustworthy when selling through a trusted platform. So, by selling through a trusted platform, the manufacturer demonstrates its trustworthiness (Chen et al., 2015, p. 266; Pavlou & Gefen, 2004). Also, the opposite holds, trust in the manufacturer decreases when platform trust erodes (Pavlou & Gefen, 2004). Multiple studies found support for this relationship. For example, Verhagen, Meents, and Tan (2006) found a direct relationship between intermediary trust and seller trust in the context of eBay. Also, this relationship is found in the context of Airbnb (Möhlmann, 2016). Furthermore, Hong and Cho (2011) found the critical role of an intermediary in determining customer trust in the seller in the e-marketplace.

An important concept that is strongly correlated with trust is reputation. An actor's reputation is an essential factor to create trust (Ert et al., 2016; Jin et al., 2008; Johnson & Grayson, 2005; Teubner, Adam & Hawlitschek, 2019). This is based on signaling theory, which states that one actors' uncertainty can be reduced by providing a signal. Therefore, reputation serves as a signal of quality and thereby affects trust (Jin et al., 2008; Teubner et al., 2019). Also, the opposite relationship between trust and reputation is found in the literature (Khan & Anwar, 2017; Kim, Hur & Yeo, 2015). Trust affects the perceived quality of an actor. Subsequently, perceived quality infers with objective quality. Therefore, a trustworthy brand is perceived as more reputable (Kim et al., 2015). Based on the solid interconnectedness between trust and reputation, we expect that the trust transfer theory can be translated to reputation transfer. Where platform reputation affects platform trust, which affects manufacturer trust and thereby manufacturer reputation, this reasoning leads to the following hypothesis.

H1: Following a product failure, platform reputation has a positive effect on manufacturer reputation.

2.4 Attribution theory

Causal reasoning plays a vital role in people's interpretations of their experiences (Mroz & Allen, 2017). People make causal attributions to understand the situation better and gain more control over the behavior or event (Tam et al., 2016). These causal reasonings result from a motivating stimulus. Therefore, it is most likely that a causal reasoning process will follow when performances exceed or fall short of expectations, resulting in a state of psychological disequilibrium (Mroz & Allen, 2017; Tam et al., 2016). The theory found three possible situations that may result in a process of causal reasoning. First, expectancy disconfirmation, which occurs when an outcome or event is unexpected. Second, outcome valence is about the fact that people are more likely to search for causes when an outcome or event is negative than positive. Third, outcome dependency is about the causal search intensity where customers make more extreme attributions when they are highly dependent on the results of their assessments (Mroz & Allen, 2017). From these three determinants, product failures may initiate causal reasoning primarily through expectancy disconfirmation and outcome valence. Product failure is usually not expected and will most likely elicit negative outcomes, such as customer complaining behavior, customer anger, and even a desire to hurt the firm (Folkes, 1984; Munyon et al., 2019).

Theory regarding causal reasoning is the attribution theory. Well-known research in this field is the research of Folkes (1984) (Chang et al., 2015; Hess, 2008; Munyon et al., 2019; Tsiros et al., 2004). He stated that people are rational information processors who assign causes to negative experiences. Subsequently, these causal inferences influence the actions people take. The causal inferences, for example, determines the degree of anger the customer experiences and whether the customer will complain and asks for refunds. Along these lines, the attribution theory states that causal inferences determine customer responses (Chang et al., 2015; Hess, 2008; Munyon et al., 2019; Tsiros et al., 2004). However, the statement that people are rational information processors is questioned. The bounded rationality theory assumes that customers are not able to be entirely rational. The customer cannot process all information due to limited cognitive capacity and the environment's complexity. Therefore, it is not possible to oversee all options. As a result, customers will make decisions that are satisfactory but not always optimal (Schilirò, 2018). Therefore, the

attribution process is subjective and is dependent on the knowledge a specific customer possesses. For example, when a customer attributes the failure to the platform, this does not necessarily imply that the platform caused the failure. So, an actor could be perceived as responsible, while this actor, in reality, did not cause the failure.

The attribution theory consists of three causal dimensions: locus, controllability, and stability (Folkes, 1984). The two dimensions of locus and controllability are the most important causal dimensions and collectively give insight into the judgment of responsibility (Munyon et al., 2019; Tsiros et al., 2004; Weiner, 2000). Responsibility is defined as "the belief that an actor possesses the power to change concrete moral consequences" (Munyon et al., 2019, p. 588). Munyon et al. (2019) researched the effect of locus and controllability on responsibility in a product recall context. They found that when the locus and controllability of a firm were high, this firm was perceived as highly responsible. Thereby they support the notion that locus and controllability are dimensions of responsibility.

This research focuses on gaining insight into the attribution of responsibility in an online platform context, and therefore the dimensions of responsibility: locus and controllability, are included in this research. Where stability attribution is not significantly related to responsibility, the dimension of stability is excluded (Huang, 2008). In this research, we talk about the perceived locus and perceived controllability. There is chosen to focus on customer perceptions because the end consumer has no overview of the entire value chain and therefore cannot see who really caused the failure. Therefore, who really caused and is responsible for the failure is not relevant. It is about whom the customer perceived responsible.

2.4.1 Locus

The first dimension of responsibility is the perceived locus. This dimension is about in whom the cause is located, in the firm or the customer. When the cause is located in the firm, the customers expect compensation and apology (Folkes, 1984, p. 399). There are two types of attribution: internal or external attribution. When a person attributes the failure internally, they attribute the cause of the failure to the personal self or others. When a person attributes the failure externally, they attribute the cause of the failure to external or situational conditions (Tam et al., 2016, p. 645). In this research attributing locus is more complex due to the structure of these online platforms. Until now, most research on the dimension of locus included attribution to customer or to the firm, but little research is done regarding a platform context. As a result of the triadic structure, multiple actors are involved in the transaction: the

manufacturer who sells the product through the platform, the platform, and the customer selves (Chakravarty et al., 2014). Literature demonstrated that Customers are likely to protect their ego and do not perceive themselves as responsible (Vázquez-Casielles et al., 2007). Therefore, this research excluded the attribution of failures to customers' self. So, the responsibility of a product failure could be attributed to the platform or to the manufacturer who sells through the platform (Ketron & Mai, 2020). These attributions mentioned above are all internal attributions. However, it is also possible that the cause of the failure is attributed to external conditions (Tam et al., 2016). In this research, the platform is central, and therefore the locus of the platform is measured. When the locus of the platform is low, this will indicate that in all probability the locus will be attributed to the manufacturer or external conditions.

2.4.2 Controllability

The second dimension of responsibility is the perceived controllability and indicates whether the actor could have prevented the failure. Failures can occur due to external constraints or due to choices the actor makes. When the customer perceives the failure as under control by the firm, the customers may become angry and want to hurt the firm (Folkes, 1984, p. 399). Sometimes, the constructs of responsibility and controllability are confused and used interchangeably. Therefore, it is necessary to make a clear distinction between these constructs. Controllability is the perceived degree of control an actor has over the cause of a failure. In contrast, responsibility is more a moral judgment and is the degree that an actor can be held accountable for a failure (Armstrong & Dagnan, 2011, p. 460). An increase in the perceived controllability of a firm will increase the perceived responsibility of this firm (Munyon et al., 2019). In this research, the platform is central, and therefore the perceived controllability of the platform is investigated.

2.4.3 Reputation and the attribution process

Multiple pieces of research examined the relationship between reputation and the attribution of responsibility in the context of failures. Currently, there is a debate in the literature about the relationship between reputation and responsibility attribution. Several researchers argue that there is a positive relationship between reputation and the attribution of failures (Huang, 2011; Korkonfingas & Ang, 2011; Niedrich et al., 2005). This relationship indicates that an excellent reputation will increase the attribution of responsibility. The reasoning behind this logic is that customers expect that reputable brands should perform consistently, and any product failure will lead to erosion of the brands' trust. In contrast, customers do not have

these high expectations towards weak brands, and therefore, these brands are less likely to be penalized during product failures than strong brands (Korkonfingas & Ang, 2011). The expectancy-disconfirmation theory supports this reasoning and predicts that customers will be more disappointed with a high equity brand failure than a low equity brand (Niedrich et al., 2005).

In contrast, many researchers argue that there is a negative relationship between reputation and the attribution of responsibility (Coombs & Holladay, 2006; Hess, 2008; Jin et al., 2008; Klein & Dawar, 2004; Sengupta et al., 2015; Vázquez-Casielles et al., 2007). This indicates that an excellent reputation will lower the attribution of responsibility. Reputation could serve as a signal of quality and creates a halo effect (Jin et al., 2008). The halo effect is defined as "the bias due to a measure that spills over to another measure" (Klein & Dawar, 2004, p. 204). For example, a customer's overall attitude towards a brand might spill over to some specific elements of that brand because the brand and these specific elements are interrelated with each other (Klein & Dawar, 2004). Research suggests two possible explanations for this halo effect: halo as benefit of doubt and halo as shield (Coombs & Holladay, 2006, p. 125; Grunwald & Hempelmann, 2011). Halo as benefit of the doubt assumes that a holistic evaluation of an organization affects specific judgments about the organization. Organizations with an excellent reputation get the benefit of the doubt when assigning responsibility compared to organizations with an unknown or unfavorable reputation (Coombs & Holladay, 2006, p.125). This could be explained by the fact that a reputable organization is viewed as more competent and therefore is viewed less responsible (Vázquez-Casielles et al., 2007). So, the halo as benefit of doubt effect is "the consequence that the general impression has on specific impressions" (Kim, 2017, p. 279). Several pieces of research found support for the halo as benefit of the doubt effect (Kim, 2017; Klein & Dawar, 2004). Furthermore, Jin et al. (2008) found that this effect also holds for less satisfactory performances and thereby could diminish the negative effects of failures. Second, reputation can function as a shield because people are reluctant to reexamine its initial expectations even in a situation where they are confronted with contrasting evidence (Coombs & Holladay, 2006, p. 125; Kim, 2017). So, any information that does not 'fit' in the existing beliefs tends to be ignored (Grunwald & Hempelmann, 2011, p. 267). Coombs and Holladay (2006) researched the halo as benefit of the doubt and the halo as a shield. In their research, no support was found for the halo as benefit of the doubt effect. However, the halo as a shield was supported for organizations with very favorable reputations. Furthermore, Grunwald and Hempelmann (2011) found support for the halo as a shield effect in a product recall situation.

They found that consumers' perception of company responsibility is higher when the company is less reputable than highly reputable.

Besides the halo effect of reputation, the buffering effect of reputation is also well known in the literature (Hess, 2008; Sengupta et al., 2015; Vázquez-Casielles et al., 2007). This effect implies that reputation can function as a buffer in a situation where a failure occurs. This buffer could ensure that a firm is perceived as more favorable and less responsible (Hess, 2008). An organization or brand with an excellent reputation will be viewed as highly competent. Based on their reputation, people assume that these organizations are functioning well and provide good quality. Therefore, people perceive excellent organizations/brands as less responsible (Vázquez-Casielles et al., 2007). Both the halo and buffering effect show that reputation could serve as a signal of quality and positively impact the attribution of responsibility when failures happen (Hess, 2008; Jin et al., 2008; Sengupta et al., 2015; Vázquez-Casielles et al., 2007). The halo and buffering effects are similar to each other.

Hess (2008) researched the buffering effect and found that an excellent reputation lowers the attribution of controllability and stability in a service failure context. In support of the findings, Vázquez-Casielles et al. (2007) found that an excellent brand is perceived as less controllable. Also, Yu et al. (2018) found this buffering effect in the context of negative publicity. They found that a brand that is involved in a negative publicity incident is blamed less when the brand is well-established compared to not well-established (Yu et al., 2018, p. 442). Lastly, Brady, Cronin Jr, Fox, and Roehm (2008) found that high brand equity leads to more favorable satisfaction than low brand equity. They further found that this advantage spans the entire failure and recovery process. This implies that the positive effect of high brand equity applies to all failures, even when recovery is not attempted. Based on this buffering effect, a firm with an excellent reputation suffers less from product failures than firms with inferior reputations.

Based on the halo and buffering effect of reputation, it is expected that an excellent reputation will lead to the attribution of lower responsibility. This reasoning leads to the following hypothesis:

H2: Following a product failure, platform reputation has a negative effect on the degree of platform locus.

H3: Following a product failure, platform reputation has a negative effect on platform controllability.

Considering the triadic exchange system of online platforms, both platform and manufacturer reputation are relevant when attributing responsibility (Chakravarty et al., 2014; Ketron & Mai, 2020). Therefore, this research included both platform and manufacturer reputation. Based on the halo and buffering effects discussed before, it is expected that manufacturer reputation affects manufacturer locus and manufacturer controllability. When the manufacturer is perceived as highly reputable, manufacturer locus and controllability will be lower than when the manufacturer is perceived as less reputable (Hess, 2008; Jin et al., 2008; Klein & Dawar, 2004; Sengupta et al., 2015; Vázquez-Casielles et al., 2007). In the context of this research, the manufacturer sells through the platform, and therefore these two actors are interwoven (Suri et al., 2019). Therefore, it is expected that the reputation of one actor can influence the responsibility of the other actor. Along this line, it is expected that when manufacturer locus and controllability decreases, the locus and controllability of the platform increases. This is in line with the insourced and outsourced categories in the research of Munyon et al. (2019). They distinguish between two opposites, an insourced and outsourced product defect. Translating this to the context of this research, insourced refers to the platform, where outsourced refers to the manufacturer. Along these lines, we expect that manufacturer reputation positively affects platform locus and controllability. An excellent manufacturer reputation will lower the degree of manufacturer responsibility. Subsequently, it is expected that the platform is perceived as more responsible. This reasoning leads to the following hypothesis.

H4: Following a product failure, manufacturer reputation has a positive effect on the degree of platform locus.

H5: Following a product failure, manufacturer reputation has a positive effect on platform controllability.

When platform reputation and manufacturer reputation are similar, the attribution of responsibility is no longer dependent on reputation. The attribution of responsibility will be based on other things than reputation. Therefore, we expect that in situations of similar

reputations, the attribution of responsibility will be random, and no clear pattern will be found based on reputation.

2.5 Customer satisfaction

The dependent variable of this research is customer satisfaction with the platform. Customer satisfaction is "a person's feelings of pleasure or disappointment that results from comparing a product's perceived performance or outcome with his/her expectations" (Kasiri, Guan Cheng, Sambasivan, & Sidin, 2017, p. 92; Kotler & Keller, 2009). In this context, it is a post-choice evaluation of a specific decision, a product failure (Thakur, 2019, p. 1279). When measuring customer satisfaction, there are two conceptualizations to choose from: transactional satisfaction and cumulative satisfaction. Transactional satisfaction is the evaluation of a specific transaction, whereas cumulative satisfaction is the overall evaluation of a product or firm. Cumulative satisfaction is influenced by transaction-specific satisfaction (Jiang & Rosenbloom, 2005). Due to the design of this study, transactional satisfaction is examined to measure the impact of platform locus and controllability on customer satisfaction with the platform, which is the central actor in this research. In this study, a fictitious platform is used. Therefore, this research measures transactional satisfaction with the platform.

Customer satisfaction is a well-known construct and is included in multiple pieces of research about failures. Literature shows a well-founded direct positive effect from reputation on customer satisfaction (Abbes et al., 2020; Curras-Perez, Ruiz, Sanchez-Garcia, & Sanz, 2017; Jin et al., 2008; Sengupta et al., 2015; Su, Swanson, Chinchanachokchai, Hsu, & Chen, 2016). For example, Brady, Cronin Jr, Fox, and Roehm (2008) found that high brand equity leads to more favorable satisfaction than low brand equity. Specifically, the halo and buffering effect are well established (Hess, 2008; Jin et al., 2008; Sengupta et al., 2015; Vázquez-Casielles et al., 2007; Yu et al., 2018). This halo effect also holds for less satisfactory performances and thereby could diminish the effect of a failure on customer satisfaction (Jin et al., 2008). Therefore, it is expected that even in case of a product failure, a highly reputable platform is evaluated more favorably than a less reputable platform. In this research, we investigate customer satisfaction with the platform, and therefore we expect a direct relationship between platform reputation and customer satisfaction. This reasoning leads to the following hypothesis.

H6: Following a product failure, platform reputation has a positive effect on customer satisfaction with the platform.

Furthermore, due to the spillover effect, it is expected that manufacturer reputation positively influences customer satisfaction with the platform (Klein & Dawar, 2004; Zavyalova et al., 2012). This relationship is expected due to the halo-effect discussed before, which is about the consequences of a general impression on a specific impression (Kim, 2017; Klein & Dawar, 2004). So, the general impression of a firm can spill over to other events related to this firm. Zavyalova et al. (2012) found that this spillover effect holds within firms and between different firms in the same industry since these firms are closely related. In an online platform context, the platform and manufacturer are closely related and together responsible for the overall transaction. Therefore, it is expected that the general impression of the manufacturer can influence the impression of the platform (Suri et al., 2019). While this halo effect also holds for less satisfactory situations, it is expected that when a product failure occurs, an excellent manufacturer reputation spills over to the platform and increases customer satisfaction with the platform (Klein & Dawar, 2004; Zavyalova et al. 2012). This reasoning leads to the following hypothesis.

H7: Following a product failure, manufacturer reputation has a positive effect on customer satisfaction with the platform.

The platform acts as a matchmaker between manufacturer and customer and determines how the transaction takes place (Reinartz et al., 2019). Therefore, it is expected that the effect of platform reputation on customer satisfaction with the platform will be stronger than the effect of manufacturer reputation on customer satisfaction with the platform (Zavyalova et al., 2012). This reasoning leads to the following hypothesis.

H8: Following a product failure, platform reputation has a significantly stronger positive effect on customer satisfaction with the platform than manufacturer reputation.

Besides the direct effect of reputation on customer satisfaction with the platform, the relationship between attribution of responsibility and customer satisfaction with the platform has been examined in previous studies and is well established (Hess, 2008; Iglesias, 2009). These studies show that the attribution of responsibility can affect satisfaction in several ways. There may be a direct negative effect, but also indirect effects through, for example, perceived justice or recovery expectations (Iglesias, 2009).

Prior studies found that customer attribution is strongly related to customer satisfaction (Wirtz & Mattila, 2004, p. 154). Tsiros et al. (2004) identified a valence-expectancy framework. The valence component constitutes of responsibility and disconfirmation, where responsibility consists of locus and controllability. The expectancy component consists of stability attribution and moderates the relationship from the valence component on satisfaction. Along these lines, the valence component of responsibility and disconfirmation affects customer satisfaction. An increase in responsibility of the firm increases the amount of regret experienced by the customer. Subsequently, when the amount of regret increases, the customer will be less satisfied with the transaction. This effect is stronger for more stable failures (Tsiros et al., 2004). In the research of Huang (2008), they also found the negative direct effect of firm responsibility on customer satisfaction. Also, Munyon et al. (2019) found that judgment of responsibility affects firm reputation change, purchase intentions, and legal damage recommendations. Literature shows that purchase intention is a key dimension of loyalty (Thakur, 2019; Xie, Kwok, & Wu, 2019). Subsequently, it is well established that satisfaction predicts loyalty and, subsequently, purchase intentions (Thakur, 2019). Along these lines, satisfaction significantly and positively influences purchase intentions (Gan & Wang, 2017; Thakur, 2019). Therefore, it is expected that responsibility and its dimensions affect customer satisfaction with the platform negatively. This reasoning leads to the following hypothesis.

H9: Following a product failure, platform locus has a negative effect on customer satisfaction with the platform.

H10: Following a product failure, platform controllability has a negative effect on customer satisfaction with the platform.

2.6 Conceptual model

This research is focused on product failures in online platforms. The independent variables are platform reputation and manufacturer reputation. Both the platform and manufacturer could be highly reputable or less reputable. The dependent variable is customer satisfaction with the platform. This relationship is mediated by the attribution of locus and controllability of the platform. The conceptual model is shown in Figure 1: Conceptual model.



Figure 1: Conceptual model

3. Methodology

In this paragraph, the research strategy and sampling method are discussed. Furthermore, the operationalization and procedure of this research are discussed. Lastly, the data analysis method will be described, and an ethical reflection is provided.

3.1 Research Strategy

Previous research showed that a process of causal reasoning occurs when people experience a state of psychological disequilibrium. This state could be the result of a product failure (Tam et al., 2016). Furthermore, the research found that reputation could influence this process, and eventually, reputation influences customer satisfaction (Hess, 2008; Jin et al., 2008; Sengupta et al., 2015; Vázquez-Casielles et al., 2007; Yu et al., 2018). This research builds on these researches, is theoretical in nature, and is approached in a deductive manner. A quantitative research methodology was used to investigate the hypotheses and to answer the research question. Through an online survey, data were collected from respondents. According to Vennix (2016), this data collection method is suitable to measure the feelings and perceptions of respondents. Furthermore, this method is appropriate in this research due to the limited availability of time and money. In limited time, many data could be collected. Besides, financial costs are low, and a wider audience is accessible (Ilieva, Baron, & Healey, 2002; Wright, 2005). Also, the use of an online survey ensures the anonymity of respondents and thereby limits the social desirability bias (Larson, 2019). Compared to these advantages, a disadvantage of an online survey is the low response rate. Therefore, multiple people need to be reached to obtain a sufficient number of respondents (Ilieva et al., 2002). Considering the advantages and disadvantages, using an online survey was an appropriate method for the current study.

This study adopted a 2 (platform reputation: high- less) x 2 (manufacturer reputation: high-less) design. “Less” reputation was chosen rather than “low/poor” reputation because there is a low incidence of organizations who have a “poor” reputation (Hess, 2008). Furthermore, organizations with a poor reputation are bought less frequently, and therefore the scenario will be perceived more realistic. Also, a less/ average reputation ensures that the manipulation is less biased. The scenarios in this research are based on two important studies from Hess (2009) and Sengupta et al. (2015), who also researched high/ less or average reputations. Therefore, there were four plausible scenarios (Table 1: Experimental design, p. 25). This study used a between-subject design, which implies that each respondent was

assigned to one scenario. Respondents were allocated to the different scenarios in a random order to increase external validity. This between-subject design is beneficial due to the relatively short length of the questionnaire compared to a within-subject design. Furthermore, a within-subject design can be confusing because respondents are exposed to multiple scenarios. Despite these advantages, this method also has some disadvantages. A between-subject design requires more respondents than a within-subject design. Furthermore, while every respondent is only exposed to one scenario, the differences between respondents could cause errors (Charness, Gneezy, & Kuhn, 2012). Despite these disadvantages a between-subject design is most appropriate.

The four scenarios describe a situation wherein the respondents were asked to picture themselves as a customer who had bought a defective product on a fictitious platform. The reputation of the platform and manufacturer were manipulated as high or less. There is chosen to include a fictitious platform and manufacturer to establish internal validity. Through this method, the impact of previous experiences with a platform and manufacturer is eliminated, which could impact the results of this research (Boush, 1993). While causal reasonings result from a motivating stimulus, it is assumed that a greater attribution process will follow when a high involvement product fails compared to a low involvement product (Mroz & Allen, 2017; Tam et al., 2016). Therefore, this research focused on a high involvement product, a digital camera. The manipulation of reputation was based on the scenarios developed by Hess (2009) and Sengupta et al. (2015). Sengupta et al. (2015) researched the coping process of customers when a service failure occurs. Furthermore, they examined the moderating effect of brand reputation. Therefore, they created a high and less brand reputation condition of an airline company. The manipulation checks showed that the manipulations were perceived as intended and were perceived as realistic. Also, the scenarios developed by Hess (2008) were used. They researched the impact of firm reputation and failure severity on customer responses to service failures. They created a high and average brand reputation condition for a particular restaurant. The manipulation checks showed that the manipulation of brand reputation was successful. Respondents exposed to the average firm reputation condition rated the firm reputation lower than the respondents exposed to the excellent firm reputation condition. The scenarios developed by Hess (2008) and Sengupta et al. (2015) were slightly adapted to the context of this research. The scenarios can be found in Appendix I (p. 62). After a scenario was presented, each respondent was asked the same questions.

	Manufacturer Reputation: High	**Manufacturer Reputation: Less**

Platform Reputation: High	Scenario 1	Scenario 3
Platform Reputation: Less	Scenario 2	Scenario 4

Table 1: Experimental design

3.2 Sample

The sample of this research is taken in the Netherlands to reduce the impact of cultural differences. Therefore, this survey is directed towards people who live in the Netherlands and have Dutch nationality. For selecting respondents, the method of convenience sampling was used. This sampling method is a non-probable random sample method that is very practical. It targets people that are easily accessible and available. Advantages of this method are that it is easy, affordable and respondents are relatively readily available. However, this method is likely to be biased and may not represent the population (Etikan, Musa, & Alkassim, 2016, p. 2). Due to this method, respondents will be mainly family, friends, and acquaintances because the survey is spread through the social media channels of the researcher (e.g., Facebook, LinkedIn, Whatsapp). Despite these possible disadvantages, this research uses convenience sampling to collect as many respondents as possible within the limited time frame set by Radboud University. Additionally, a snowball sampling method was used. This will accelerate the speed of data collection and will contribute to the variety of people. Because convenience sampling mainly targets people who are close to the research, this method could reduce this negative effect and allows reaching people outside of the network of the researcher (Dudovskiy, n.d.).

The preferred sample size is 384 respondents. This number is based on the generalizability of the results to the population of this research. The population of this research is the Dutch population between 18 and 75 years old. People older than 75 are excluded because they buy to a lesser extent online (CBS, 2020). The Dutch population between 18 and 75 years old consists of 12.681 million people (CBS, 2021). Based on this population, 5% margin of error, and a 95% reliability level, the preferred sample size is 384 (Cochran, 1977). To analyze the data, this research uses the PROCESS tool, which is based on regression analyses. For multiple regression analyses, a minimum of 50 to 100 respondents is preferred. Overall, at least five responses need to be generated for each independent variable. This research includes four independent variables and four control variables who also belong to the group of independent variables. Hence, the minimum required sample size is 40 (8 x 5) (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2019). However, it is preferred to generate approximately 15 to 20 responses for each independent variable, and therefore, it is most desirable to generate 160 responses (8 x 20) (Hair, Black, Babin & Anderson, 2019).

3.3 Construct measurements

This research manipulates the two independent variables of platform and manufacturer reputation. The survey's introduction describes a high involvement product failure in a fictitious platform made by a fictitious manufacturer. These introductions differentiate between a highly or less reputable platform and a highly or less reputable manufacturer. This results in four different introduction texts (Appendix I, p. 62). However, before these scenarios were shown to the respondents, a few questions were asked about the effect of platform reputation on manufacturer reputation. These questions are based on the reputation scale developed by Sengupta et al. (2015). After these questions, the scenario is showed, and the respondents are asked to answer several questions about platform locus, platform controllability, and customer satisfaction with the platform. These constructs are measured using a seven-point Likert scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).

The first construct is platform responsibility. Responsibility is defined as "the belief that an actor possessed the power to change concrete moral consequences" (Munyon et al., 2019, p. 588). Responsibility is measured by its dimensions of locus and controllability (Munyon et al., 2019; Tsiros et al., 2004; Weiner, 2000). The scales of Chang et al. (2015) and Poon, Hui, and Au (2004) are used in this research to measure locus. The scale used by Chang et al. (2015) has an alfa of 0,695 and an AVE of 0,533. This alfa is just below the desirable level of 0,7 (Taber, 2018). Therefore, to increase alfa, this scale is extended by the research of Poon et al. (2004) (Taber, 2018). The final questions are slightly adapted to the context of this research. Also, the research of Chang et al. (2015) is used to measure the attribution of controllability. The items of the attribution of controllability of Chang et al. (2015) are based on the research of Hess Jr, Ganesan, and Klein (2007). The alfa of this scale is 0,892, and its AVE is 0,638; therefore, this scale is adequate to use in this research. The questions of Chang et al. (2015) are slightly adapted to the context of this research.

Lastly, the scale of Huang (2008) is adopted to measure customer satisfaction with the platform. In this research transactional satisfaction with the platform is measured. This is a post-choice evaluation of a specific transaction (Jiang & Rosenbloom, 2005). The scale of Huang (2008) has an alfa of 0.87 and is validated. The questions are slightly adapted to the contexts of this research. The final set of questions is presented in Table 2: Scale items (p. 28)

Construct	*Questions*
Responsibility of the platform	
Platform Locus (Chang et al., 2015; Poon et al., 2004)	I think the platform caused the product failure I think the platform did contribute to the product failure I think the platform should be blamed for the product failure
Platform Controllability (Chang et al., 2015; Hess Jr et al., 2007)	I think the platform was controllable for the product failure I think the platform could have prevented the product failure I think the platform could have avoided the product failure
Customer Satisfaction with the platform (Huang, 2008)	I am pleased with the platform on this particular occasion I am unhappy with the platform on this particular occasion I am content with the platform on this particular occasion

Table 2: Scale items

3.4 Control variables

Besides these key constructs, this research also included some control variables to increase accuracy and to decrease the effect of variables that are not the focus of this research (Field, 2018). The first control variable in this research is gender. This control variable is included while males and females differ in their behavior. For example, females are more aware of other's feelings and therefore are more socially focused. Furthermore, females attempt to obtain all information before they make a judgment, while men often rely their judgment on the highly available information (Sanchez-Franco, 2006). These differences may indicate that their behaviors in attributing responsibility may also differ. Several studies found that in a product harm crisis, female customers blame the firm more than male customers (Laufer & Gillespie, 2004; Lee & Cranage, 2017; Tam et al., 2016). Furthermore, literature found gender differences in the perception of web-based shopping (Cao Ajjan, & Hong, 2018). Therefore, gender is included as a control variable. Second, while age may impact online shopping behavior, this research controls for age. Studies found that different age groups attribute

responsibility differently (Lee & Cranage, 2017). Furthermore, older customers have a limited information processing capacity, which may influence their cognitive processes. Also, they have greater life experience and are more open-minded. Therefore, they may assess less blame to the firm (Laufer, Silver & Meyer, 2005; Tam et al., 2016). Additionally, Cao et al. (2018) found that age directly affects customer satisfaction negatively. Third, the level of education was included as a control variable. This variable was included since several studies found a significant effect of education on satisfaction (Mburu, 2014; Odia & Dakare, 2019). Fourth, this research controls for the frequency of transactions on online platforms in the past year. This control variable is included because frequent customers may have a different perception of online shopping. Cao et al. (2018) found a direct effect of online shopping frequency on customer satisfaction. Lastly, this research included nationality to ensure only Dutch people participated in this research, to minimize cultural differences.

3.5 Procedure

Before the survey was distributed, the survey was translated to Dutch to ensure accessibility for the entire Dutch population, which is the target group of this research. Considerable effort is required to provide the respondents with good quality translations (W. L. Wang, Lee, & Fetzer, 2006). A recommended method for translating scales is the back-translation method developed by Brislin (1970) (Cha, Kim, & Erlen, 2007). This translation is done by two master students who fluently speak English and Dutch. First, one student translated the English survey items to Dutch. Second, the other student translated the survey items back to English. After that, the two English versions are compared, and differences are discussed. After adjustments, the translation was perceived as identical to the original version (Brislin, 1970; Cha et al., 2007). Subsequently, the survey and scenarios were pretested. The scenarios were pretested to examine whether the manipulation of the platform and manufacturer reputation was successful. The manipulation of both reputations was checked with three statements about reputation adopted from Han, Nguyen, and Lee (2015). Furthermore, the survey items were pretested to examine the clarity and interpretability of each item (Dishman & Calof, 2008). Five master students were asked to read the four scenarios and provide in-depth feedback. Second, they were asked to fill in the survey and provide feedback based on the plus-minus method (Sienot, 1997). After some alterations, the survey was pretested by 25 respondents. These respondents were asked to fill out the survey and rate the clarity of the scenarios and questions on a seven-point Likert scale. Furthermore, there was room to provide feedback. Overall, the respondents perceived the scenarios as realistic (M= 6,08). Also, they

indicate that they could easily put themselves in the position of the customer in the scenario (M= 6,08). Furthermore, the questions (M= 5,44) and scenarios (M= 5,8) were perceived as clear. However, the manipulation was not entirely successful. By adding the option that respondents can go back to the scenario, the survey was pretested again with 25 respondents. In pretest 2, the manipulation was more successful. However, the outcomes were not completely satisfying. Especially, the answers to the third question about reputation deviated. Therefore, the scale of reputation was revised, and eventually, the scale from Sengupta et al. (2015) to measure reputation was adopted. Furthermore, the scenario was repeated during the survey. Finally, the third pretest was conducted with 29 respondents. The outcomes showed that the manipulation was successful (Appendix III, p. 76).

On April 27th, the survey was distributed in Dutch through the social media channels of the researcher (Facebook, Linkedin, and Whatsapp). The English and Dutch surveys can be found in Appendix II (p. 67). The survey started with a short introduction and three statements about the impact of platform reputation on manufacturer reputation. After that, the respondents were randomly assigned to one scenario (Appendix I, p. 62). Following, questions were asked about locus, controllability, and customer satisfaction with the platform. These questions could be answered with a seven-point Likert scale. Subsequently, some questions were asked about the reputation of both the platform and the manufacturer to check whether these were manipulated correctly. Finally, some general questions were asked, and the respondents were thanked for participating in this survey. Also, respondents could leave their email addresses to participate in drawing a Bol.com gift card worth 25 euros. After a while, on April 30th, the survey was conducted by 198 respondents. On April 30th, the survey was published again on some social media channels. Furthermore, the survey was distributed through survey circle and MTurk. On May 3rd, the number of respondents was 286. On this day, some extra reminders were sent, and the survey was again published through the social media channels of the researcher. On May 6th, the number of respondents was 409, and the survey was closed.

3.6 Data analysis procedure

In this section, the data analysis method will be described. To analyze the data, the statistical program IBM SPSS Statistics 27.0 is used. Before the analyses were conducted, the data is cleaned, useless data was deleted, and assumptions were tested. After that, the hypotheses were tested with the use of regression analysis. Regression analyses are appropriate because the independent variables are categorical, including two categories and the dependent

variables are continuous. According to Field (2018), the best way to analyze a mediation effect is using the PROCESS tool. This is an ordinary least-squared method developed by Hayes (2013). This tool is specially designed to analyze mediating relationships and uses bootstrapping for estimating the direct, indirect, and total effects. This bootstrap re-sampling method is very popular and superior to other methods to analyze mediation effects (Al-Sa'di, Abdallah, & Dahiyat, 2017). Other methods, such as the normal theory approach from Baron and Kenny (1986), consider the indirect effects normally distributed. Furthermore, this method is considered superior in terms of power and type 1 error rate (Al-Sa'di et al., 2017, p. 359).

3.7 Research ethics

In this research, the five ethical principles of research must be addressed (American psychological association, 2017). First, the researcher should benefit those who are involved in the research and be cautious to do no harm. Therefore, respondents are continually made aware of their rights. When conflicts occur, respondents can contact the researcher, where after the researcher attempts to solve these conflicts to minimize harm. Second, a relationship of trust is developed. This is done by guaranteeing privacy. Participation in this research was completely anonymous and voluntary, and leaving the survey was possible at any time. Third, integrity is guaranteed by handling the obtained data confidentially and responsibly, only used for this master thesis. Furthermore, the APA guidelines are used to refer to other research in an honorable way. Fourth, fairness and justice are perceived as important. Every respondent was handled equally and with respect. Fifth, people's rights and dignity are respected. No discrimination based on age, gender, gender identity, ethnicity, race, national origin, culture, religion, sexual orientation, language, disability, and socioeconomic status was presented (American psychological association, 2017). Furthermore, this study also discussed the shortcomings and negative findings because the goal was to determine what was going on rather than support hypotheses in favor of this research.

4. Results

In this paragraph, the results of the analysis are discussed. The sample descriptive will be described, followed by a factor analysis and reliability analysis. After that, the manipulation and assumptions for multiple regression are checked. Finally, the hypotheses are tested.

4.1 Sample

By means of convenience sampling, 409 respondents participated in the survey. Of those respondents, 173 completed less than 90% of the survey and were deleted. After this deletion, there were 236 responses left. From these respondents, there were two Germans, two Belgians, and one Frenchmen. Also, there was one respondent below 18. After removing these six respondents, 230 usable respondents remained. This sample size is below the preferred sample size for generalizability, and therefore the margin of error increases from 5% to 6.5% (Cochran, 1977). Furthermore, concerning the sample's descriptive statistics, 127 (55.2%) women and 103 (44.8%) men participated in the survey. The average age of the respondents was 37 years (*SD*= 14.33). The youngest respondent was 18 years old, and the oldest was 73. Especially many young people completed the survey since 37.8% of the respondents were 25 years or younger. Overall, most respondents are highly educated since 74.3% of the respondents completed University or University of applied sciences. The average number of purchases on online platforms in the past years is 20 (*SD*=38.35). However, this mean is strongly affected by some outliers. There was one respondent who answered this question with 500, one with 200, one with 150, two with 100, and one with 80. When these were excluded, the average number of purchases on an online platform in the past year is 16 (*SD*= 12.00). Furthermore, some respondents answered “no idea” or “very often” these answers could not be interpreted. Based on multiple outliers and some missing values the purchase scale should be interpreted with caution. The 230 respondents were allocated to one of the four different scenarios. Scenario 1 constitutes of 59 respondents, scenario 2 constitutes of 52 respondents, scenario 3 constitutes of 58 respondents, and scenario 4 constitutes of 61 respondents.

4.2 Factor analysis

An exploratory factor analysis was conducted to validate the survey and understand the variables' underlying structure (Field, 2019). More specifically, principal component analysis was chosen because the main goal was to find the minimum number of factors to account for

the maximum portion of total variance and to have the largest explanatory power (Hair et al., 2019, p.139). Conducting a factor analysis requires constructs with multiple items. In this research, there are five constructs with three items each. These 15 items are included in the factor analyses. The rotation method that was chosen was oblique rotation (Direct Oblimin). This method is more realistic and was chosen because factors were allowed to be correlated (Hair et al., 2019).

The results of this factor analysis can be found in Appendix IV (p. 77). Before interpreting the results, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure must exceed the value of 0.50, and Bartlett's Test of Sphericity must be significant. KMO was 0.79, which indicates that the sample adequacy of the analysis is verified. Furthermore, Bartlett's Test of Sphericity was significant, which indicates that conducting a factor analysis is appropriate (χ^2 (105) = 2286.43, $p < 0.01$) (Field, 2018; Kaiser & Rice, 1974). Looking at the correlation matrix, some correlations are 0.30 or higher. Therefore, an oblique rotation method was appropriate in this research (Hair et al., 2019).

The factor analysis extracted four different factors with an eigenvalue above 1 and a cumulative explained variance of 76.79%. Looking at the pattern matrix, the loadings should be above 0.50 to be significant. All loadings are above 0.70, which is a desirable outcome (Hair et al., 2019). The results of the factor analysis are shown in Table 3: Factor analysis 1.

	FACTOR			
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**
Platform_locus1	0.86			
Platform_locus2	0.82			
Platform_locus3	0.73			
Platform_controllability1	0.81			
Platform_controllability2	0.79			
Platform_controllability3	0.76			
Platform_satisfaction1				0.91
Platform_satisfaction2				0.81
Platform_satisfaction3				0.89
Platform_reputation1			0.87	
Platform_reputation2			0.93	
Platform_reputation3			0.93	
Manufacturer_reputation1		0.92		
Manufacturer_reputation2		0.94		
Manufacturer_reputation3		0.95		

Note: Factor loadings below 0.30 were suppressed

Table 3: Factor analysis 1

The number of factors extracted is not completely in accordance with the initial intended scale adopted from Chang et al. (2015). Platform locus and platform controllability load on the same factor, which results in four factors instead of five. The literature assumes that locus and controllability together determine responsibility, and therefore it was expected that they would strongly correlate (Munyon, 2019). This factor analysis was conducted to gain insight into the scale's dimensionality; however, it is not conclusive. Therefore, it was decided to focus on the number of factors determined in theory. A new factor analysis was conducted where the number of factors was predetermined to 5. The results of this factor analysis can also be found in Appendix IV (p. 77). There were five factors extracted whit a cumulative explained variance of 81.39%. KMO is 0.79 and Bartlett's Test of Sphericity is significant, and therefore factor analysis is appropriate. Again, the oblique rotation method is appropriate, while the correlations in the correlation matrix are above 0.30 (Hair et al., 2019). The pattern matrix discriminates between five factors that are in line with the initial intended measurement scale. Unfortunately, the eigenvalue of the fifth factor is below one. In this research, the focus is on theory, and therefore the decision was made to extract five factors besides the low eigenvalue of platform controllability. The results of this factor analysis are shown in Table 4: Factor analysis 2.

	FACTOR				
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
Platform_locus1	0.91				
Platform_locus2	0.88				
Platform_locus3	0.75				
Platform_controllability1	0.31				0.61
Platform_controllability2					0.90
Platform_controllability3					0.94
Platform_satisfaction1				0.93	
Platform_satisfaction2				0.80	
Platform_satisfaction3				0.90	
Platform_reputation1			0.86		
Platform_reputation2			0.95		
Platform_reputation3			0.93		
Manufacturer_reputation1		0.93			
Manufacturer_reputation2		0.94			
Manufacturer_reputation3		0.95			

Note: Factor loadings below 0.30 were suppressed

Table 4: Factor analysis 2.

The first factor analysis only extracted four factors, and when the number of factors to extract was fixed to five the eigenvalue of the fifth factor is below one. Therefore, the correlation matrix of platform locus and controllability is investigated. The correlation matrix showed that the correlation is significantly different from zero (r (228) =0.34, p=<0.01). The Pearson correlation is 0.63, and therefore, it can be assumed that platform locus and controllability are moderately correlated (Field, 2018) (Appendix IV, p. 77).

4.3 Common method bias

After the factor analysis was conducted, Harman's single factor test was executed. This test was executed since common method variance can impact this analysis. For common method variance not to be an issue, when only one factor was extracted the explained variance of this factor should not exceed 50% (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). Results show that this factor explained 30.99% of the variance. This indicates no threat of common method bias since 30.99% Is below 50% (Appendix V, p. 81).

4.4 Reliability analysis

Subsequently, a reliability analysis was conducted to measure whether the items together reflect the construct that they are measuring. Reliability was checked by analyzing Cronbach's alpha. Cronbach's alpha must be 0.70 higher to be acceptable, lower values indicate an unreliable scale (Field, 2018). All scales have a Cronbach's alpha of 0.70 or higher, which indicates that the scales are reliable (Table 5: Cronbach's alpha). The Cronbach's alpha of platform locus, platform controllability, and platform reputation could be improved by deleting some items. However, these increases are only 0.02, 0.02, 0.01, respectively. Deleting an item will decrease the number of items from one construct from three to two, which is less desirable. Furthermore, the increase of each item's Cronbach's alpha is limited. Therefore, no items are deleted (Hair et al., 2019) (Appendix VI, p. 82).

CONSTRUCT	N	CRONBACH'S ALPHA
Platform Locus	3	0.83
Platform Controllability	3	0.86
Platform Satisfaction	3	0.86
Platform Reputation	3	0.90
Manufacturer Reputation	3	0.93

Table 5: Cronbach's alpha

4.5 Relation between platform reputation and manufacturer reputation

Three items investigated the relation between platform reputation and manufacturer reputation. Before we could analyze these items, we have to check whether these questions reflect the construct they are measuring. This is done through a reliability analysis. The Cronbach's alpha is 0.94, which indicates that the scale is reliable (Appendix VII, p. 83). Subsequently, the three items are transformed into one variable. This variable represents the mean of the three items measuring the relation between platform reputation and manufacturer reputation. The items were measured on a 7-point Likert scale where 4 was neutral. When there was no preference in the data, the general mean should be 4. The mean of this variable is 4.44 (SD= 0.11). This mean does indicate a positive relation between platform reputation and manufacturer reputation. To measure whether this mean is significantly different from the general mean, a one-sample t-test was conducted. Results show that the mean of 4.44 was significantly different from the general mean of 4 (Appendix VII, p. 83). These findings support hypothesis 1 and show that platform reputation has a positive effect on manufacturer reputation.

4.6 Manipulation check

To assess the manipulation of stimuli, a one-way ANOVA was performed. The platform reputation condition (0 = less platform reputation, 1= high platform reputation) was the fixed factor on the means of the platform reputation evaluation factor. Results showed a significant main effect of the platform reputation condition on the platform reputation evaluation factor ($F (1, 228) = 207.63$, $p<0.01$). This significant main effect indicates that the mean of the low platform reputation condition (M=-0.70) was significantly lower than the mean of the high platform reputation condition (M=0.68). Subsequently, the manufacturer reputation condition (0 = less manufacturer reputation, 1= high manufacturer reputation) was the fixed factor on the means of the manufacturer reputation evaluation factor. There was a significant main effect of the manufacturer reputation condition on the manufacturer reputation evaluation factor ($F (1, 228) = 159.36$, $p<0.01$). This significant main effect indicates that the mean of the low manufacturer reputation condition (M=-0.62) was significantly lower than the mean of the high manufacturer reputation condition (M=0.66) (Appendix VIII, p. 84). These results show that the manipulations were perceived as intended.

4.7 Assumptions

Before running the analysis, the assumptions concerning multiple regression analysis had to be checked (Appendix IX, p. 86). Before checking these assumptions, the normality of the dependent variables is investigated. The normality is checked by assessing the values for skewness and kurtosis. The variables are normally distributed when Skewness/ Standard Error for Skewness and Kurtosis/Standard Error for Kurtosis are < |2| (Hair et al., 2019). The values of all variables are below this threshold.

Furthermore, the assumption of linearity should be checked. This assumption is the most critical assumption in multiple regression analysis (Hair et al., 2019). Linearity was assessed with the scatterplot for customer satisfaction with the platform, platform locus, and platform controllability. The scatterplots of all variables showed a linear relationship, and therefore the assumption of linearity is met (Hair et al. 2019). In addition, linearity is checked by examining the curve fit. The independent variable of platform locus is plotted against the dependent variable of customer satisfaction with the platform. The linear and quadratic slope is presented. The quadratic slope does not show a better fit, so the assumption of linearity is met. Subsequently, platform controllability is plotted against the dependent variable of customer satisfaction with the platform. Also, in this case, the quadratic slope does not show a better fit (Appendix IX, p. 86). As a result, the assumption of linearity is met.

The assumptions of independence of residuals, homoscedasticity, and multicollinearity are tested for three different models. There are three models because there are three possible dependent variables: platform locus, platform controllability, and customer satisfaction with the platform. In these models, there are three control variables: age, gender and education. The control variable of purchase intention was not included due to the high number of outliers and missing values. Furthermore, including this variable in the analysis does not significantly improve model fit. The first assumption, independence of residuals, is tested to see if there are correlated residuals. To test this assumption, Durban Watson should be around 2 (Field, 2018). The second assumption, homoscedasticity, investigates the constant variance of residuals. This assumption is tested by the Breusch-Pagan test, which is a test for heteroscedasticity in a linear regression model. The assumption is met when the Anova is significant (Breusch & Pagan, 1979). The last assumption, multicollinearity, is tested by the tolerance and VIF values. The tolerance value should be above 0.20, and the VIF value should be below 5 (Field, 2018).

The first model includes platform locus as the dependent variable. In this model, Durban Watson is 1.89, which is close to 2. The highest VIF value is 1.05, which is below the threshold of 5. Furthermore, the lowest tolerance value is 0.96, which is above the threshold of 0.20. Lastly, based on the scatterplot and the Anova testing for homoscedasticity, it can be concluded that the data is homoscedastic ($F(5, 224) = 1.24$, $p=0.29$). As a result, in model 1, all assumptions are met.

In the second model, the dependent variable is platform controllability. The Durban Watson is 2.11, which is close to 2. The VIF and tolerance values are the same for model 2 as for model 1 and indicates no multicollinearity. The scatterplot and the Anova show that the data is homoscedastic ($F(5, 224) = 0.16$, $p= 0.18$). Also, for model 2, all assumptions are met.

In the last model, the dependent variable is customer satisfaction with the platform. In this model, the Durban Watson is 1.93, which is close to 2. The highest VIF value is 1.74, which is below the threshold of 5. The lowest tolerance value is 0.58, which is above the threshold of 0.20. Furthermore, the scatterplot and Anova show that the data is homoscedastic ($F(7, 222) = 1.41$, $p=0.20$). Therefore, in model 3, all assumptions are met.

Overall, the assumptions for multiple regression analysis are met.

4.8 Analysis: Process

In this study, a multiple regression analysis was conducted. The PROCESS 3.5 tool, model 4 (5000 bootstrapping), developed by Hayes (2013), was used. This tool is an ordinary least-squared method specially designed to analyze mediating relationships (Al-Sa'di, Abdallah, & Dahiyat, 2017). The PROCESS tool is able to analyze one independent and one dependent variable at a time. This research includes two independent variables, and therefore the analysis is conducted two times. In the first analysis, the dummy variable platform reputation is the independent variable, platform locus and platform controllability are the mediators, and the dependent variable is customer satisfaction with the platform. In the second analysis, the independent variable is manufacturer reputation. The mediators and dependent variable in this analysis stay the same. Furthermore, both analyses controlled for age, gender, and education. To include age, the variable was transformed to a logarithmic variable to fit the normal distribution better. The results of the final analysis are shown in Appendix X (p. 90). In the next part, the results of both analyses are interpreted and described for hypothesis 2 till 10, where hypothesis 1 is already discussed.

In contrast to hypothesis 2, there is no significant effect of platform reputation on the degree of platform locus ($b=-0.21$, 95% CI [-0.46, 0.04], $t=-1.69$, $p=0.09$). This effect

indicates that a highly reputable platform does not significantly lower the platform locus. The effect is in line with the expected negative direction. However, the effect is not significant; therefore, hypothesis 2 is not supported.

In line with hypothesis 3, there is a significant effect of platform reputation on platform controllability (b=-0.34, 95% CI [-0.60, -0.09], t=-2.65, p<0.01). Platform controllability is lower for a highly reputable platform compared to a less reputable platform. Therefore, hypothesis 3 is supported.

In contrast to hypothesis 4, there is no significant effect of manufacturer reputation on platform locus (b=0.12, 95% CI [-0.13, 0.37], t=0.98, p= 0.33). This indicates that a highly reputable manufacturer does not significantly increase platform locus. The effect is in line with the expected positive direction. However, the effect is not significant; therefore, hypothesis 4 is not supported.

In contrast to hypothesis 5, there is no significant effect of manufacturer reputation on platform controllability (b=-0.06, 95% CI [-0.31, 0.20], t=-0.45, p=0.66). This indicates that a highly reputable manufacturer does not significantly increase platform controllability. The effect is not in line with the expected positive direction. Furthermore, the effect is not significant. Therefore, hypothesis 5 is not supported.

In contrast to hypothesis 6, there is no significant effect of platform reputation on customer satisfaction with the platform (b=0.09, 95% CI [-0.16, 0.34], t=0.72, p=0.47). This indicates that a highly reputable platform does not significantly increase customer satisfaction with the platform. The effect is in line with the expected positive direction. However, the effect is not significant. Therefore, hypothesis 6 is not supported.

In contrast to hypothesis 7, there is no significant effect of manufacturer reputation on customer satisfaction with the platform (b=-0.17, 95% CI [-0.41, 0.08], t=-1.36, p=0.18). This indicates that a highly reputable manufacturer does not significantly increase customer satisfaction with the platform. The effect is not in line with the expected positive direction. Furthermore, the effect is not significant; therefore, hypothesis 7 is not supported.

In contrast to hypothesis 8, there is no significant stronger positive effect of platform reputation on customer satisfaction with the platform than manufacturer reputation. As described above, both reputations do not significantly affect customer satisfaction with the platform. The coefficient of platform reputation is positive, while the coefficient of manufacturer reputation is negative. Therefore, we could assume that the positive effect of platform reputation is stronger, while manufacturer reputation has a negative effect. However,

both effects are not significant and therefore the effects are based on coincidence. Therefore, no powerful conclusion could be drawn. Hence, hypothesis 8 is not supported.

In contrast to hypothesis 9, there is no significant effect from platform locus on customer satisfaction with the platform (analysis 1: (b=-0.09, 95% CI [-0.25, 0.07], t=-1.12, p=0.27) analysis 2: (b=-0.08, 95% CI [-0.24, 0.08], t=-0.98, p=0.33)). This indicates that an increase in the degree of platform locus does not significantly decrease customer satisfaction with the platform. The effect is in line with the expected negative direction. However, the effect is not significant; therefore, the direction could change. These results show that hypothesis 9 is not supported.

In line with hypothesis 10, there is a significant effect of platform controllability on customer satisfaction with the platform (analysis 1: (b=-0.31, 95% CI [-0.47, -0.16], t=-3.93, p<0.01) analysis 2: (b=-0.33, 95% CI [-0.49, -0.17], t=-4.17, p<0.01)). This indicates that an increase in platform controllability significantly decrease customer satisfaction with the platform. Therefore, hypothesis 10 is supported.

Overall, besides hypotheses 1,3 and 10, the majority of the hypotheses are not supported. However, the results showed that the indirect effect of platform reputation through platform controllability on customer satisfaction with the platform is significant (b=0.11, 95% BCa CI [0.03, 0.21]). However, the direct effect of platform reputation on customer satisfaction with the platform is not significant (b=0.09, 95% CI [-.0.16, 0.34], t=0.72, p=0.47). This indicates that there is an indirect only mediation effect of platform controllability (Zhao, Lynch, & Chen, 2010). The partially standardized indirect effect of platform controllability showed the same results as the non-standardized outcomes. Therefore, we can conclude that the mediation effect of platform controllability is relatively small. An overview of the results of the two analyses can be found in Figure 2: Results analysis 1 and Figure 3: Results analysis 2. Also, an overview of the supported hypotheses is presented in Table 6: Overview of hypotheses and results (p. 41).



Figure 2: Results analysis 1



Figure 3: Results analysis 2

	HYPOTHESES	RESULTS
H1	Following a product failure, platform reputation has a positive effect on manufacturer reputation.	Supported
H2	Following a product failure, platform reputation has a negative effect on the degree of platform locus.	Rejected
H3	Following a product failure, platform reputation has a negative effect on platform controllability.	Supported
H4	Following a product failure, manufacturer reputation has a positive effect on the degree of platform locus.	Rejected
H5	Following a product failure, manufacturer reputation has a positive effect on platform controllability.	Rejected
H6	Following a product failure, platform reputation has a positive effect on customer satisfaction with the platform.	Rejected
H7	Following a product failure, manufacturer reputation has a positive effect on customer satisfaction with the platform.	Rejected
H8	Following a product failure, platform reputation has a significantly stronger positive effect on customer satisfaction with the platform than manufacturer reputation.	Rejected
H9	Following a product failure, platform locus has a negative effect on customer satisfaction with the platform.	Rejected
H10	Following a product failure, platform controllability has a negative effect on customer satisfaction with the platform.	Supported

Table 6: Overview of hypotheses and results

Besides these hypothesized effects, the effects of the control variables are analyzed. Since, several control variables had significant effects on the constructs in the model. Platform locus is significantly influenced by age (analysis 1 (b=-0.50, 95% CI [-0.82, -0.18] t=-3.04, p<0.01), analysis 2 (b=-0.49, 95% CI [-0.82, -0.17] t=-3.02, p<0.01)) and education (analysis 1 (b=-

0.22, 95% CI [-0.36, -0.08] t=-3.02, p<0.01), analysis 2 (b=-0.22, 95% CI [-0.37, -0.08] t=-3.07, p<0.01)). This indicates that older and highly educated customers attribute less locus to the platform. Also, platform controllability is significantly influenced by age (analysis 1 (b=-0.35, 95% CI [-0.67, -0.02] t=-2.11, p=0.04), analysis 2 (b=-0.35, 95% CI [-0.68, -0.02] t=-2.10, p=.04)) and education (analysis 1 (b=-0.16, 95% CI [-0.30, -0.01] t= -2.14, p=0.03), analysis 2 (b=-0.16, 95% CI [-0.21, -0.01] t=-2.15, p=0.03)). Age and education negatively influence platform controllability. This indicates that older and highly educated customers perceive the platform as less controllable. Lastly, results show that education has a significant effect on customer satisfaction with the platform (analysis 1 (b=-0.20, 95% CI [-0.34, -0.06] t= -2,76, p=<0.01), analysis 2 (b=-0.20, 95% CI [-0.34, -0.05] t=-2.72, p=<0.01)). This indicates that customer satisfaction with the platform is lower for highly educated customers.

5. Discussion

In this last paragraph, the research question is answered. Furthermore, theoretical and academic implications are discussed. Finally, the limitations are discussed, and suggestions for further research are provided.

5.1 Conclusion

While the platform economy has emerged and is still growing (Kenney & Zysman, 2016; Ketron & Mai; 2020), literature about these online platforms is limited (Chakravarty et al., 2014; Krafft, Goetz, Mantrala, Sotgiu, & Tillmanns, 2015). Also, the attribution process in this context is still underexplored. This process affects the behavior of individuals, and therefore it is crucial to understand this process in an online platform context (Folkes, 1984). While this process is researched in multiple contexts, this process will be different in an online platform, while a platform is a triadic exchange system (Reinartz et al., 2019). Therefore, the responsibility of a product failure could be attributed to the platform or to the manufacturer who sells through the platform (Ketron & Mai, 2020). Further research is necessary to get insight into this process in an online platform context. Therefore, this research extends the literature by gaining insight into the attribution process of product failures in online platforms and the role of reputation in this process. This is done by investigating how the effect of platform and manufacturer reputation on customer satisfaction with the platform is mediated by platform locus and platform controllability. To achieve this objective, this research aims to answer the following research question: '*Following a product failure in an online platform, how are the effects of platform and manufacturer reputation on*

customer satisfaction with the platform mediated by platform locus and platform controllability?' This question is tested empirically with the use of the PROCESS tool of Hayes (2013). Below a detailed discussion of the outcomes is presented.

First, results from a one-sample t-test showed a positive relationship between platform reputation and manufacturer reputation. This finding aligns with the literature, indicating that the trust transfer theory applies to reputation transfer. (Chen et al., 2015; Hong & Cho, Möhlmann, 2016; 2011; Pavlou & Gefen, 2004; Verhagen et al., 2006).

Second, the direct effects of platform and manufacturer reputation on customer satisfaction with the platform will be discussed. Comparing the findings with existing literature, the findings seem to question the direct relationship between platform reputation and customer satisfaction with the platform. Initially, it was expected that a highly reputable platform would obtain a higher level of customer satisfaction than a less reputable platform (Abbes et al., 2020; Curras-Perez, Ruiz, Sanchez-Garcia, & Sanz, 2017; Jin et al., 2008; Sengupta et al., 2015; Su et al., 2016). Based on previous research, it was expected that this relation also holds for less satisfactory performances (Jin et al., 2008). While this relationship was well-founded in literature, this research does not find a significant effect. This could be explained by a design flaw or some methodological issues. Hence, it is important to speculate about some possible explanations for this insignificant effect to contribute to the theoretical insights. It seems that following a product failure, a good reputation does not necessarily induce an increase in customer satisfaction. This contradicts the argumentation of Jin et al. (2008) that this relationship holds regardless of the performances. Jin et al. (2008) did investigate the impact of firm reputation on customer's evaluations of e-tailers' market response outcomes in two different cultures. They found a significant effect of firm reputation on customer satisfaction where this effect was stronger in Korea than in the USA. While this study was conducted in the Netherlands, cultural differences could cause the contradicting findings of this research. Where this research found no significant effect this research emphasizes that further research is necessary to further research the effect of reputation on satisfaction Also, the effect of manufacturer reputation on customer satisfaction with the platform was not supported. Initially, it was expected that due to spillover effects, manufacturer reputation positively affects customer satisfaction with the platform (Klein & Dawar, 2004; Suri et al., 2019; Zavyalova et al., 2012). However, the findings showed that this relationship was not significant. Furthermore, the coefficient showed that the relationship was in the opposite direction. However, the confidence interval includes the value of zero, so this direction is based on coincidence. Based on these results, it can be concluded that

manufacturer reputation does not significantly influence customer satisfaction with the platform. Therefore, this research did not support the spillover effect. Hence, these results are somewhat surprising. An explanation for this could be that customers perceive the platform and the manufacturer as two separate actors who are not connected. Accordingly, manufacturer reputation has no significant effect on customer satisfaction with the platform. Furthermore, this research expected a stronger effect of platform reputation on customer satisfaction with the platform compared to manufacturer reputation. Looking at the coefficients, platform reputation positively affects customer satisfaction with the platform while manufacturer reputation has a negative effect. Therefore, it could be assumed that platform reputation has a stronger positive effect on customer satisfaction with the platform than manufacturer reputation. However, no conclusions could be drawn while these effects are not significant and are based on coincidence.

Third, the direct effects of platform and manufacturer reputation on platform locus and platform controllability will be discussed. Based on the buffering effect of reputation, it was expected that there was a negative effect of platform reputation on platform locus and controllability (Coombs & Holladay, 2006; Hess, 2008; Jin et al., 2008; Klein & Dawar, 2004; Sengupta et al., 2015; Vázquez-Casielles et al., 2007; Yu et al., 2018). In line with these studies, the negative relationship between platform reputation and platform controllability was significant. This indicates that a highly reputable platform was perceived as less controllable compared to a less reputable platform. However, the findings seem to question the negative effect of platform reputation on platform locus. It was expected that the platform had a lower degree of platform locus when the platform was highly reputable compared to less reputable. The findings show a negative effect; however, the effect was just not significant. Therefore, the direction of this effect is based on coincidence. Furthermore, results show that there was a strong correlation between platform locus and platform controllability. This may suggest that respondents find it difficult to distinguish between these two constructs. Therefore, the effect of platform reputation on platform controllability is significant, while the effect of platform reputation on platform locus was almost significant. The fact that the constructs are highly correlated may also have to do with the formulation of the questions. However, Chang et al. (2015) validated these constructs' measurements, and the current study also showed that the constructs show no problems with multicollinearity. This suggests that these theoretical constructs are difficult to measure in practice. Therefore, it is questionable whether it makes sense to distinguish between those constructs. Additionally, the findings show that the effect of manufacturer reputation on platform locus and platform controllability was not supported.

Initially, it was expected that manufacturer reputation positively affects platform locus and controllability. An increase in manufacturer reputation should decrease manufacturer locus and controllability and subsequently increase platform locus and controllability (Hess, 2008; Jin et al., 2008; Klein & Dawar, 2004; Munyon et al.,2019; Reinartz et al., 2019; Sengupta et al., 2015; Vázquez-Casielles et al., 2007). This study indicates that manufacturer reputation has no impact on the perceived controllability and locus of the platform. Accordingly, manufacturer reputation has a limited role in attributing responsibility to the platform. This supports the argumentation of before that maybe customers perceive the platform and the manufacturer as two separate actors who are not connected.

Fourth, the direct effects of platform locus and controllability on customer satisfaction with the platform will be discussed. This research shows partial support for the effect of platform locus and controllability on customer satisfaction with the platform. Platform controllability significantly affects customer satisfaction with the platform. However, the effect of platform locus on customer satisfaction with the platform is not significant. It was expected that there would be a significant negative effect of both platform locus and platform controllability on customer satisfaction with the platform (Huang, 2008; Munyon et al., 2019; Tsiros et al., 2004). This negative effect was expected because prior studies show that customer attributions are strongly related to customer satisfaction (Wirtz & Mattila, 2004). Tsiros et al. (2004) found that an increase in responsibility of the firm will increase the amount of regret the customer experiences, which subsequently decreases the customer satisfaction with the platform. Locus and controllability are two important determinants for responsibility, so this effect was also expected for these constructs. The coefficient of the effect from platform locus on customer satisfaction was in the right direction. However, the effect was not significant and was based on coincidence. This contradicts previous findings. This non-significant finding could be due to the fact that this research is focused on an online platform context instead of a traditional store. Furthermore, lately, the internet has evolved, where nowadays there are good regulations about selling online, and maybe therefore customers are less concerned with attributing responsibility and blaming the firm.

Besides these hypothesized effects, there were multiple significant effects from age and education on the central constructs in the model. As initially expected, age significantly affects platform locus and platform controllability negatively (Laufer et al., 2005; Tam et al., 2016). Also, it was expected that age affects customer satisfaction with the platform. However, this research did not find any significant effect on this relationship. Furthermore, education significantly affects platform locus, platform controllability, and customer

satisfaction with the platform. These relationships are negative, which indicates that highly educated customers attribute less locus and controllability to the platform and are less satisfied with the platform. Contrary to the theory, gender has no significant relationships with any of the constructs (Cao Ajjan, & Hong, 2018; Laufer & Gillespie, 2004; Lee & Cranage, 2017; Tam et al. 2016).

To conclude, not all hypotheses are supported, but still, some valuable insights are generated. To answer the research question, platform reputation only has a significant negative effect on platform controllability. Also, the effect of platform controllability on customer satisfaction with the platform was negatively significant. Thereby, platform controllability significantly mediates the effect of platform reputation on customer satisfaction with the platform. The direct effect of platform reputation on customer satisfaction with the platform is not significant. Based on these results, there is an indirect only mediation effect of platform controllability (Zhao, Lynch, & Chen, 2010). No significant effects were found of manufacturer reputation on platform locus, platform controllability, or customer satisfaction with the platform. Also, platform locus has no significant effect on customer satisfaction with the platform. Furthermore, the results from a one-sample t-test showed that there is a positive relationship between platform reputation on manufacturer reputation. This supports the first hypothesis about the effect of platform reputation on manufacturer reputation.

5.2 Theoretical implications

As mentioned before, the extant amount of literature on online platforms is limited (Chakravarty et al., 2014). However, failures and negative experiences are also in an online platform context inevitable and recovering from these negative experiences is challenging (Sengupta et al., 2015). While most customers fail to voice their dissatisfaction, it is important to gain insight into the internal process where customers attribute responsibility (Choi & Mattila, 2008). By gaining insight into customers' attribution process, negative consequences of failures such as negative word of mouth and dissatisfaction could be prevented (Chang et al., 2015; Folkes, 1984; Sengupta et al., 2015). Previous research on attribution theory showed the importance of the attribution of locus and controllability (Folkes, 1984; Munyon et al., 2019; Tam et al., 2016; Vázquez-Casielles et al., 2007). Furthermore, several studies found the buffering effect of reputation (Hess, 2008; Jin et al., 2008; Sengupta et al., 2015). However, previous research mainly focused on traditional service firms (Choi & Mattila, 2008; Hess, 2008; Tam et al., 2016; Vázquez-Casielles et al., 2007). Only a few researched the attribution in a product context (Folkes, 1984; Munyon et al., 2019). No research has been

conducted on attribution theory in an online platform context to the researcher's knowledge. The findings of this study were somewhat surprising and show that the online platform context is different from the attribution process in traditional firms. Therefore, this research's most important theoretical contribution is the further investigation of the attribution process of a product failure and the role of reputation in this process in an online platform context.

Furthermore, this research contributes to the knowledge about the trust transfer theory. The findings align with the literature and support the positive effect of platform reputation on manufacturer reputation. This effect indicates that the trust transfer theory applies to reputation transfer. (Chen et al., 2015; Hong & Cho, Möhlmann, 2016; 2011; Pavlou & Gefen, 2004; Verhagen et al., 2006).

Comparing the findings to the literature, the findings seem to question the direct effect of platform reputation on customer satisfaction with the platform. This finding was surprising while literature showed a well-founded direct positive effect from reputation on customer satisfaction (Abbes et al., 2020; Curras-Perez, Ruiz, Sanchez-Garcia, & Sanz, 2017; Jin et al., 2008; Sengupta et al., 2015; Su, Swanson, Chinchanachokchai, Hsu, & Chen, 2016). Also, the spillover effect of manufacturer reputation is questioned (Klein & Dawar, 2004; Zavyalova et al., 2012). The results showed that the effect of manufacturer reputation on customer satisfaction with the platform was not significant. These contrasting findings may be due to a design flaw or because there is no effect. Maybe the effects of reputation on satisfaction only hold for satisfactory performances, which contradicts the argumentation of Jin et al. (2008) that this relationship also holds for less satisfactory performances.

By including two mediators, platform locus and platform controllability, some significant effects were found. Platform controllability significantly mediates the relationship between platform reputation and customer satisfaction with the platform. This research found a negative effect from platform reputation on platform controllability. This result contributes to the current debate in literature by finding additional support for the buffering effect of platform reputation (Hess, 2008; Jin et al., 2008; Sengupta et al., 2015). Furthermore, this research confirms the negative effect of platform controllability on customer satisfaction with the platform. The second mediator, platform locus, does not align with the literature. These two mediators were highly correlated, and initially, when the number of factors was not predetermined, they loaded on the same factor. This indicates that practically respondents find it difficult to distinguish between these theoretical constructs. This contradicts the argumentation of Folkes (1984), who clearly distinguishes between three causal dimensions: locus, controllability, and stability. However, this supports the findings of several studies that

locus and controllability move in the same direction and together measure responsibility (Munyon et al., 2019; Tsiros et al., 2004; Weiner, 2000).

Furthermore, this research found some significant effects of age and education. These findings are exciting and extents current literature about the attribution process in online platforms.

5.3 Managerial implications

As mentioned before, in online platforms, failures are inevitable and could result in negative word of mouth, switching behavior, etc. (Chang et al., 2015; Folkes, 1984; Sengupta et al., 2015). Firms need to overcome these negative outcomes because the costs of acquiring new customers are five times higher than keeping current customers satisfied (Hart et al., 1990). However, it is difficult for most firms to detect customers who are not satisfied as most customers find it difficult to voice their dissatisfaction to the firm (Choi & Mattila, 2008). Therefore, more insights into customers' internal attribution process could help practitioners better understand customer behaviors. Hence, the findings of this study are relevant for managers working for an online platform, and several implications can be subtracted from the findings of this study.

Following a product failure, outcomes showed that platform controllability is a predictor of customer satisfaction with the platform. This indicates that customer satisfaction with the platform is lower when the platform is perceived as highly controllable. Therefore, managers working for an online platform are advised to minimize platform controllability to increase customer satisfaction with the platform. Subsequently, the results of this study show that platform reputation is an important predictor for platform controllability. A highly reputable platform is perceived as less controllable following a product failure than a less reputable platform. Thus, platform controllability could be lowered by a good reputation (Coombs & Holladay, 2006; Hess, 2008; Jin et al., 2008; Klein & Dawar, 2004; Sengupta et al., 2015; Vázquez-Casielles et al., 2007; Yu et al., 2018). While there is no significant direct effect of platform reputation on customer satisfaction with the platform in this research, it is still very important to build a good reputation since a good reputation will lower the perceived controllability of the platform. Subsequently, following a product failure, a decrease in perceived controllability of the platform will increase customer satisfaction with the platform.

In contrast to platform reputation, manufacturer reputation has no significant effect on platform locus, platform controllability, or customer satisfaction with the platform. Therefore, when a product failure occurs, managers working for online platforms do not necessarily have

to worry about the manufacturer's reputation since manufacturer reputation does not affect platform locus, platform controllability, or customer satisfaction with the platform. However, while some studies show that manufacturer and platform are interwoven, it is not advisable to completely ignore manufacturer reputation (Chakravarty et al., 2014; Klein & Dawar, 2004; Reinartz et al., 2019; Suri et al., 2019; Zavyalova et al., 2012).

Moreover, managers of online platforms should try to minimize the number of failures to prevent negative customer evaluations. Managers can prevent failures from happening by optimizing their internal processes and setting strict quality requirements for the manufacturer selling through the platform. Also, strict measures need to be taken against manufacturers selling through the platform when they deliver poor quality.

To conclude, managers of online platforms should try to prevent failures from happening. However, when a failure occurs, they can minimize the impact by minimizing platform controllability. Platform controllability could be minimized by a platform having an excellent reputation. Therefore, building an excellent reputation is advisable.

5.4 Limitations and further research

In this study, there are several shortcomings. Those limitations are outlined in this section. Subsequently, the limitations provide several avenues for further research.

First, in this study, an online survey was used to gather data. The use of an online survey has several drawbacks. The first drawback is sample validity. For an unbiased sample, every member of a population must have a chance to participate in this study. However, only online users could participate with the use of an online survey (Duda & Nobile, 2010, p. 56). Second, the researcher has no control over the sample selection. Third, the researcher does not know whether each submission is unique, while anonymity is assured (Duda & Nobile, 2010). For further research, it can be helpful to take these drawbacks into account. Furthermore, it would be appropriate to conduct qualitative research to gain a deeper understanding of the attribution process and the role of reputation in this process (Vennix, 2016). While most research in this field conducted quantitative research (Hess, 2008; Munyon et al., 2019; Sengupta et al. 2015; Suri et al., 2019), conducting qualitative research could generate findings from another point of view.

Second, the sample size can influence finding significant effects. The sample size of 230 respondents exceeds the threshold of 160 which indicates that the sample should be sufficiently large to find significant effects, according to Hair et al. (2019). However, regarding generalizability, it was preferred to collect 384 respondents (Cochran, 1977). The

sample size of this study was below this threshold, and therefore the margin of error increases from 5% to 6,5%. Furthermore, the sample is not homogenous; young and highly educated individuals overrepresent the sample. The convenience sampling method could be an explanation for this. For further research, it can be helpful to generate a larger and more diverse sample to generalize the findings to the Dutch population and lower the margin of error. Also, this research should be replicated in different countries to find out whether results differ regarding different countries and cultures. Differences are expected, while other studies, for example, found that cultural backgrounds affect the attribution process (Tsiros et al., 2004). Furthermore, several studies found some differences between individualistic and collectivist cultures regarding their responses towards service failures (Matilla & Patterson, 2004; Lee & Sparks, 2007). Also, Jin et al. (2008) found a difference between South Korea and the USA regarding the effect of firm reputation on customer satisfaction. This indicates that customers from different cultures evaluate market response outcomes differently. Also, different countries have different laws and regulations regarding selling products online. In line with the recommendation of Swanson & Hsu (2011), the attribution process should be researched in different cultures.

Third, this study uses a between-subject design. This design ensures that respondents are not able to compare between the different scenarios. A within-subject design could make the comparison between different reputations more obvious. This comparison could influence the respondent's opinion and thereby could impact the results. However, a within-subject design could increase confusion and thereby influences the result negatively. For further research, it can be helpful to conduct this same research with a within-subject design to investigate whether this method will generate other results and minimize the error caused by differences in respondents (Charness, Gneezy, & Kuhn, 2012).

Fourth, the use of short written scenarios of a fictitious platform and manufacturer could result in difficulty for the respondent to imagine themselves in the scenario. Subsequently, some participants' responses could not indicate their real-life responses (Green, 2004). For further research, it can be helpful to collect data from respondents using a self-report questionnaire, which is based on real-life situations.

Fifth, the experimental design only incorporates highly and less reputable platforms and manufacturers. This study does not discriminate between low and average reputations. Further research should investigate whether results differ when reputation distinguishes between high, average, and low reputations.

Sixth, in this study, discriminant validity is lacking. Factor analysis showed that the questions about platform locus and controllability load on the same factor. However, there is chosen to focus on the predetermined number of factors. Results showed that platform locus and platform are highly correlated. However, they meet the assumption of multicollinearity. Further research should investigate the constructs of platform locus and platform controllability to ensure discriminant validity and contribute to validating the results. Based on the high correlation between these constructs, it may be advisable for further research to measure responsibility, while responsibility constitutes of locus and controllability.

Seventh, the current study could not include the control variable of purchase intentions in the final model. Respondents did not always answer the question of purchase intention appropriately. Some respondents indicated that they had no idea or bought very often at online platforms, but no concrete numbers were answered. For further research, only numbers should be entered in the answer option, or a scale should be used.

In addition, further research should investigate the attribution of low involvement products. Also, an exciting opportunity for further research is to research the attribution process when a product breaks down several months or years after the purchase. Lastly, further research should consider service recovery attempts because these actions can reduce the negative consequences of a failure (Hess et al., 2003). However, it is expected that the positive effect of a highly reputable brand applies to all failures, even when recovery is not attempted (Brady et al.,2008)

To conclude, this research only examines some possible drivers of platform locus, platform controllability, and customer satisfaction with the platform; many possible drivers remain unexamined. Further research should focus on measuring responsibility and the possible drivers of responsibility to minimize the negative consequences of a product failure. Accordingly, the researcher sincerely hopes that the current study will be extended to further improve the theoretical knowledge concerning the attributional process in online platforms, an underexplored topic in literature.

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Appendices

Appendix I: Scenarios

Introduction text (used in every scenario)

Imagine that you have bought a digital camera on an online platform. You have purchased the SSR system camera A500 on the online platform FLIXX. The listing of this camera on the platform is shown below

Dutch version: Beeld u in dat u een digitale camera heeft gekocht op een online platform. U heeft de SSR-systeemcamera A500 gekocht op het online platform FLIXX. De aanbieding van deze camera op het platform ziet u hier onder



Subsequently, one of the four scenarios is showed to the respondents. Which respondent get which scenario is randomly determined.

FLIXX

- High: ***** FLIXX was recently awarded 5-Star ranking by Trustpilot. Trustpilot recognizes the platform for its product and service quality achievement. FLIXX has a reputation for being highly committed to providing high quality products and services to its customers
- Less: *** FLIXX was recently awarded 3-Star ranking by Trustpilot. Trustpilot recognizes the platform for its product and service quality achievement. FLIXX does

not have a reputation of being highly committed to providing high quality products and services to its customers.

SSR

- High: ***** SSR was recently awarded 5-Star ranking by Trustpilot. Trustpilot recognizes the manufacturer for its product and service quality achievement. SSR has a reputation for being highly committed to providing high quality products and services to its customers.
- Less: *** SSR was recently awarded 3-Star ranking by Trustpilot. Trustpilot recognizes the manufacturer for its product and service quality achievement. SSR does not have a reputation of being highly committed to providing high quality products and services to its customers.

Dutch version:

FLIXX

- *Hoog: *****. FLIXX is met 5 sterren beoordeeld op Trustpilot. Trustpilot erkent het platform voor zijn prestaties op het gebied van product- en servicekwaliteit. FLIXX heeft de reputatie zeer toegewijd te zijn aan het leveren van hoogwaardige producten en diensten.*
- *Less: *** FLIXX is met 3 sterren beoordeeld op Trustpilot. Trustpilot erkent het platform voor zijn prestaties op het gebied van product- en servicekwaliteit. FLIXX heeft niet de reputatie zeer toegewijd te zijn aan het leveren van hoogwaardige producten en diensten.*

SSR

- *Hoog: *****. SSR is met 5 sterren beoordeeld op Trustpilot. Trustpilot erkent de fabrikant voor zijn prestaties op het gebied van product- en servicekwaliteit. SSR heeft de reputatie zeer toegewijd te zijn aan het leveren van hoogwaardige producten en diensten.*
- *Less: *** SSR is met 3 sterren beoordeeld op Trustpilot. Trustpilot erkent de fabrikant voor zijn prestaties op het gebied van product- en servicekwaliteit. SSR heeft niet de reputatie zeer toegewijd te zijn aan het leveren van hoogwaardige producten en diensten.*

Scenario 1:

Scenario 2:

Scenario 3:

Scenario 4:

Imagine that the camera you bought from SSR, on FLIXX, was defect.
When you received the camera, you directly charged the camera to make sure you could use it immediately. After the camera was charged, you turned on the camera to make a picture. Unfortunately, the picture appears to be blurry. Quickly you find out that it's not your fault, but that the product is defect.

Dutch version:
Beeld u in dat de camera van SSR, gekocht op FLIXX, defect is.
Wanneer u de camera heeft onvangen besluit u de camera direct op te laden zodat u de camera meteen kunt gebruiken. Nadat de camera is opgeladen, zet u de camera aan om een foto te maken. Helaas blijkt de foto wazig te zijn. U komt er achter dat dit niet uw schuld is, maar dat het een product fout is.

Appendix II: Survey

English Version

INTRODUCTION

Dear Madam, Sir,

Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire! My name is Lina van Loon, and I am currently finishing my master's degree in Marketing at the Radboud University in Nijmegen. This questionnaire will contribute to the completion of my master thesis. My master thesis is about defective products that you have bought online.

The questionnaire will approximately take 10 minutes and is completely anonymous. The results will not be traceable to you and will only be used for this research. Your opinion will be asked and for this reason there are no wrong or right answers. Furthermore, completing the questionnaire is completely voluntary and the questionnaire can be terminated at any time.

By participating in this survey you can win a Bol.com gift card worth 25 euros. To participate in this drawing of lots, you can enter your e-mail address at the end of this questionnaire.

Sincerely,
Lina van Loon

REPUTATION

Imagine that you have purchased a product on an online platform and this product is not functioning properly.
Please indicate to which extent you agree with the following statements.

If the platform has an excellent reputation,

- Then the manufacturers selling on this platform will increase in popularity.
- Then the manufactures selling on this platform will be appreciated higher.
- Then the manufactures selling on this platform will increase in status.

(These questions are derived from the scale of Sengupta et al. (2015) measuring reputation)

SCENARIOS

Imagine that you have bought a digital camera on an online platform. You have purchased the SSR system camera A500 on the online platform FLIXX. The listing of this camera on the platform is shown below

FLIXX



SSR
System camera A500- black

Thereafter one of the four scenarios described in Appendix I is presented.
Imagine that the camera you bought from SSR on FLIXX was defect.
When you received the camera, you directly charged the camera to make sure you could use it immediately. After the camera was charged, you turned on the camera to make a picture. Unfortunately, the picture appears to be blurry. Quickly you find out that it's not your fault, but that the product is defect.

Based on this situation, some questions will be asked. Therefore, I want to ask you to read the texts and images above carefully and completely

KEY VARIABLES

Questions for each Scenario
The following statements relate to the platform FLIXX.
Please indicate to what extent you agree with the following statements
(1 = totally disagree - 7 = totally agree)

- I think the platform FLIXX caused the product failure

- I think the platform FLIXX did contribute to the product failure
- I think the platform FLIXX should be blamed for the product failure
- I think the platform FLIXX was controllable for the product failure
- I think the platform FLIXX could have prevented the product failure
- I think the platform FLIXX could have avoided the product failure

The following statements relate to the manufacturer SSR who sells through the platform FLIXX.
(These questions are included in the survey as a backup. To reduce complexity these are not used in the analyses. It was decided to exclude these variables since this research focuses on the platform and therefore manufacturer locus and controllability are less of relevance.)
Please indicate to what extent you agree with the following statements
(1 = totally disagree - 7 = totally agree)

- I think the manufacturer SSR caused the product failure
- I think the manufacturer SSR did contribute to the product failure
- I think the manufacturer SSR should be blamed for the product failure
- I think the manufacturer SSR was controllable for the product failure
- I think the manufacturer SSR could have prevented the product failure
- I think the manufacturer SSR could have avoided the product failure

U almost finished this survey. Three more statements are questioned, whereafter some general questions follow.
The following statements relate to the platform FLIXX.
Please indicate to what extent you agree with the following statements
(1 = totally disagree - 7 = totally agree)

- I am pleased with the platform FLIXX on this particular occasion
- I am unhappy with the platform FLIXX on this particular occasion
- I am content with the platform FLIXX on this particular occasion

MANIPULATION CHECK

Platform reputation

- The platform is a popular brand
- The platform has high esteem
- The platform has status

Manufacturer reputation

- The manufacturer is a popular brand
- The manufacturer has high esteem
- The manufacturer has status

CONTROL VARIABLES

How many times did you approximately made a purchase on an online platform in the past year?

- Open question

What is your age?

- Open question

What is your gender?

- Man
- Women
- Gender neutral
- I prefer no to say

What is your highest level of education?

- Primary education
- Secondary education
- Secondary vocational education
- Higher professional eduaction
- Scientific education

What is your nationality?

- Dutch
- Non Dutch, namely..

Thank you for your time! Your answers have been registered and will contribute to the completion of my master thesis. Your response will help to gain insight into the attribution process of people when they received an broken product, which is purchased through an online platform, and more importantly the role of reputation in this process.

Would you like to win a Bol.com gift voucher worth 25 euros? Enter your e-mail address here.

If you have any questions or are interested in viewing the results of my research, please contact me at l2.vanloon@student.ru.nl.

Dutch version
INLEIDING

Beste meneer, mevrouw,

Bedankt dat u de tijd wilt nemen om deze vragenlijst in te vullen! Mijn naam is Lina van Loon, en ben momenteel bezig met het afronden van de master Marketing aan de Radboud Universiteit te Nijmegen. Deze vragenlijst zal bijdragen aan de afronding van mijn master thesis. Mijn master thesis gaat over defecte producten die op een online platform zijn gekocht.

De vragenlijst zal ongeveer 10 minuten duren en is volledig anoniem. De resultaten zullen niet naar u herleidbaar zijn en zullen uitsluitend gebruikt worden voor dit onderzoek. U mening zal worden gevraagd en om deze reden zijn er geen foute of goede antwoorden. Verder is het invullen van de vragenlijst geheel vrijwillig en kan de vragenlijst ten alle tijden beëindigd worden.

Door deel te nemen aan dit onderzoek kunt u kans maken op een Bol.com cadeaukaart ter waarde van 25 euro. Om kans te maken op deze cadeaukaart kunt u aan het eind van de vragenlijst uw e-mailadres achterlaten.

Met vriendelijke groet,

Lina van Loon

REPUTATIE

Beeld u in dat u een product heeft gekocht op een online platform en dit product niet goed functioneert.

Geef aan in welke mate u het eens bent met de volgende stellingen (1= helemaal niet mee eens- 7= helemaal mee eens)

Als het platform een goede reputatie heeft

- Dan zullen de fabrikanten die verkopen op dit platform in populariteit stijgen.
- Dan zullen de fabrikanten die verkopen op dit platform hoger worden gewaardeerd.
- Dan zullen de fabrikanten die verkopen op dit platform een hogere status genieten.

(Bovenstaande vragen zijn afgeleid van de schaal waarop reputatie in dit onderzoek wordt gemeten. Deze schaal is gebaseerd op het onderzoek van Sengupta et al. (2015).

SCENARIO

Beeld u in dat u een digitale camera heeft gekocht op een online platform. U heeft de SSR systeemcamera A500 gekocht op het online platform FLIXX. De aanbieding van deze camera op het platform ziet u hier onder

FLIXX



SSR

Systeemcamera A500- zwart

In onderstaande afbeelding ziet u de beoordelingen die SSR en FLIXX hebben ontvangen op Trustpilot. Trustpilot is een bekend en betrouwbaar review platform.

Vervolgens wordt 1 van de 4 scenario's beschreven in Appendix I getoond aan de respondent.

Beeld u in dat de camera van SSR, gekocht op FLIXX, defect is.
Wanneer u de camera heeft onvangen besluit u de camera direct op te laden zodat u de camera meteen kunt gebruiken. Nadat de camera is opgeladen, zet u de camera aan om een foto te maken. Helaas blijkt de foto wazig te zijn. U komt er achter dat dit niet uw schuld is, maar dat het een product fout is.

Nu volgen er enkele vragen met betrekking tot bovenstaande situatie. Daarom wil ik u vragen bovenstaande tekst en afbeeldingen goed en volledig te lezen.

KEY VARIABELE

De volgende vragen worden getoond bij elk scenario.

De volgende stellingen hebben betrekking op het platform Flixx.
Geef aan in welke mate u het eens bent met de volgende stellingen
(1= helemaal niet mee eens – 7= helemaal mee eens)

- Ik denk dat het platform Flixx het product falen heeft veroorzaakt
- Ik denk dat het platform Flixx heeft bijgedragen aan het product falen
- Ik denk dat het platform Flixx de schuld moet krijgen van het product falen
- Ik denk dat het platform Flixx controle had over het product falen
- Ik denk dat het platform Flixx het product falen had kunnen voorkomen
- Ik denk dat het platform Flixx het product falen had kunnen vermijden

De volgende stellingen hebben betrekking op SSR. Dit is de fabrikant die het product aan u heeft verkocht op het online platform Flixx.
(Deze vragen zijn meegenomen in deze vragenlijst als een back-up. Om de complexiteit van het model te verminderen zijn deze niet meegenomen in de analyse. Er is gekozen om deze variabele niet mee te nemen in de analyse omdat dit onderzoek gefocust is op het platform en daarom manufacturer locus en controllability minder relevant zijn.)
Geef aan in welke mate u het eens bent met de volgende stellingen
(1= helemaal niet mee eens- 7= helemaal mee eens)

- Ik denk dat de fabrikant SSR het product falen heeft veroorzaakt
- Ik denk dat de fabrikant SSR heeft bijgedragen aan het product falen
- Ik denk dat de fabrikant SSR de schuld moet krijgen van het product falen
- Ik denk dat de fabrikant SSR controle had over het product falen
- Ik denk dat de fabrikant SSR het product falen had kunnen voorkomen
- Ik denk dat de fabrikant SSR het product falen had kunnen vermijden

U bent bijna aan het eind van deze vragenlijst. Er volgen nog drie stellingen en enkele algemene vragen.
Geef aan in welke mate u het eens bent met de volgende stellingen
(1= helemaal niet mee eens – 7= helemaal mee eens)

- Ik ben tevreden met het platform Flixx in deze specifieke transactie
- Ik ben niet blij met het platform Flixx in deze specifieke transactie
- Ik ben content met het platform Flixx in deze specifieke transactie

MANIPULATIE CHECK

Platform reputation

- Het platform Flixx is een populair merk
- Het platform Flixx heeft een hoge waardering
- Het platform Flixx heeft status

Manufacturer reputation

- De fabrikant SSR is een populair merk
- De fabrikant SSR heeft een hoge waardering
- De fabrikant SSR heeft status

CONTROLE VRAGEN

Hoe vaak heeft u het afgelopen jaar ongeveer een aankoop gedaan op een online platform?

- Open vraag

Wat is uw leeftijd?

- Open vraag

Wat is uw geslacht?

- Man
- -Vrouw
- Gender neutral
- Wil ik niet zeggen

Wat is uw hoogst genoten opleiding?

- Basisonderwijs
- Middelbaar onderwijs
- Middelbaar beroepsonderwijs (mbo)
- Hoger beroepsonderwijs (hbo)
- Wetenschappelijk onderwijs (wo)

Wat is uw nationaliteit?

- Nederlandse
- Niet Nederlandse, namelijk….

Bedankt voor uw tijd! Uw antwoorden zijn geregistreerd en zullen bijdragen aan de afronding van mijn master thesis. Uw respons zal helpen inzicht te verkrijgen in het attributie proces van mensen bij het ontvangen van een kapot product gekocht via een online platform, en nog belangrijker de rol van reputatie in dit proces.

Wilt u kans maken op een Bol.com cadeaubon ter waarde van 25 euro? Vul dan hier uw e-mailadres in.

Mocht u nog vragen hebben of interesse hebben de resultaten van mijn onderzoek in te zien kan u contact met mij opnemen via l2.vanloon@student.ru.nl.

Appendix III: Pretest results

Pretest 1

N=25

	N	Cronbach's alpha
Platform reputation (Han, Nguyen, Lee, 2015)	3	0.810
Manufacturer reputation (Han, Nguyen, Lee, 2015)	3	0.780

The mean for each scenario (measured on a 7 point Likert scale).

	Scenario 1 (high, high)	Scenario 2 (less, high)	Scenario 3 (high, less)	Scenario 4 (less, less)
Platform reputation	4.333	3.857	4.583	4.905
Manufacturer reputation	4.191	4.619	3.750	3.952

Pretest 2

N=25

	N	Cronbach's alpha
Platform reputation (Han, Nguyen, Lee, 2015)	3	0.924
Manufacturer reputation (Han, Nguyen, Lee, 2015)	3	0.841

The mean of s for each scenario (measured on a 7 point Likert scale).

	Scenario 1 (high, high)	Scenario 2 (less, high)	Scenario 3 (high, less)	Scenario 4 (less, less)
Platform reputation	4.778	3.476	5.778	3.389
Manufacturer reputation	4.278	4.000	2.389	3.111

Pretest 3

N=29

	N	Cronbach's alpha
Platform reputation (Sengupta et al., 2015)	3	0.897
Manufacturer reputation (Sengupta et al., 2015)	3	0.937

The mean of above questions for each scenario.

	Scenario 1 (high, high)	Scenario 2 (less, high)	Scenario 3 (high, less)	Scenario 4 (less, less)
Platform reputation	5.375	2.778	5.619	3.042
Manufacturer reputation	5.250	5.722	3.238	2.792

Appendix IV: Factor analysis

Factor analysis 1 : number of factors extracted based on eigenvalues

KMO and Bartlett's Test		
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy		0.786
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	2286.429
	Df	105
	Sig.	<0.001

Component correlation matrix

Component	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**
1	1.000	0.046	-0.148	-0.307
2	0.046	1.000	0.082	-0.038
3	-0.148	0.082	1.000	0.136
4	-0.307	-0.038	0.136	1.000

Pattern matrix

	Factor			
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**
Platform_Locus1	0.856			
Platform_Locus2	0.822			
Platform_Locus3	0.734			
Platform_Controllability1	0.808			
Platform_Controllability2	0.785			
Platform_Controllability3	0.763			
Platform_Satisfaction1				0.902
Platform_Satisfaction2				0.807
Platform_Satisfaction3				0.894
Platform_Reputation1			0.872	
Platform_Reputation2			0.925	
Platform_Reputation3			0.926	
Manufacturer_Reputation1		0.923		
Manufacturer_Reputation2		0.940		
Manufacturer_Reputation3		0.946		

Extraction method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization
Rotation converged in 4 iterations

Total variance explained							
	Initial eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings			Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings
Component	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total
1	4.648	30.985	30.985	4.648	30.985	30.985	4.212
2	2.871	19.139	50.124	2.871	19.139	50.124	2.735
3	2.214	14.760	64.885	2.214	14.760	64.885	2.698
4	1.786	11.909	76.794	1.786	11.909	76.794	2.882
5	0.689	4.596	81.390				
6	0.503	3.351	84.741				
7	0.489	3.263	88.004				
8	0.343	2.290	90.293				
9	0.315	2.102	92.395				
10	0.258	1.723	94.118				
11	0.232	1.544	95.662				
12	0.210	1.397	97.059				
13	0.185	1.232	98.291				
14	0.153	1.019	99.311				
15	0.103	0.689	100.000				

Extraction method: Principal Component Analysis

Factor analysis 2: Number of factors predetermined based on literature

KMO and Bartlett's Test		
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy		0.786
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	2286.429
	Df	105
	Sig.	<0.001

Component correlation matrix

Component	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
1	1.000	0.096	-0.168	-0.234	0.627
2	0.096	1.000	0.106	-0.078	-0.012
3	-0.168	0.106	1.000	0.169	-0.097
4	-0.234	-0.078	0.169	1.000	-0.335
5	0.627	-0.012	-0.097	-0.335	1.000

Pattern matrix

	Factor				
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
Platform_Locus1	0.908				
Platform_Locus2	0.877				
Platform_Locus3	0.753				
Platform_Controllability1	0.305				0.606
Platform_Controllability2					0.898
Platform_Controllability3					0.944
Platform_Satisfaction1				0.925	
Platform_Satisfaction2				0.796	
Platform_Satisfaction3				0.896	
Platform_Reputation1			0.861		
Platform_Reputation2			0.945		
Platform_Reputation3			0.931		
Manufacturer_Reputation1		0.925			
Manufacturer_Reputation2		0.942			
Manufacturer_Reputation3		0.954			

6Extraction method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization
Rotation converged in 6 iterations

Total variance explained							
	Initial eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings			Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings
Component	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total
1	4.648	30.985	30.985	4.648	30.985	30.985	4.212
2	2.871	19.139	50.124	2.871	19.139	50.124	2.735
3	2.214	14.760	64.885	2.214	14.760	64.885	2.698
4	1.786	11.909	76.794	1.786	11.909	76.794	2.882
5	0.689	4.596	81.390	0.698	4.596	81.390	3.590
6	0.503	3.351	84.741				
7	0.489	3.263	88.004				
8	0.343	2.290	90.293				
9	0.315	2.102	92.395				
10	0.258	1.723	94.118				
11	0.232	1.544	95.662				
12	0.210	1.397	97.059				
13	0.185	1.232	98.291				
14	0.153	1.019	99.311				
15	0.103	0.689	100.000				

Extraction method: Principal Component Analysis

Correlation matrix (platform locus – platform controllability)

		Fac_Platform_Controllability
Fac_Platform_ Locus	Pearson Correlation	0.627**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	<0.001
	N	230

***. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)*

Appendix V: Common method bias

	Initial eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings		
Component	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	4.648	30.985	30.985	4.648	30.985	30.985
2	2.871	19.139	50.124			
3	2.214	14.760	64.885			
4	1.786	11.909	76.794			
5	0.689	4.596	81.390			
6	0.503	3.351	84.741			
7	0.489	3.263	88.004			
8	0.343	2.290	90.293			
9	0.315	2.102	92.395			
10	0.258	1.723	94.118			
11	0.232	1.544	95.662			
12	0.210	1.397	97.059			
13	0.185	1.232	98.291			
14	0.153	1.019	99.311			
15	0.103	0.689	100.000			

Appendix VI: Reliability analysis

Platform locus	0.826
	Cronbach's alpha if item deleted
Platform_locus1	0.707
Platform_locus2	0.726
Platform_locus3	0.845

Platform controllability	0.858
	Cronbach's alpha if item deleted
Platform_controllability1	0.875
Platform_controllability2	0.763
Platform_controllability3	0.755

Platform satisfaction	0.860
	Cronbach's alpha if item deleted
Platform_satisfaction1	0.765
Platform_satisfaction2	0.841
Platform_satisfaction3	0.805

Platform reputation	0.902
	Cronbach's alpha if item deleted
Platform_reputation1	0.911
Platform_reputation2	0.832
Platform_reputation3	0.829

Manufacturer reputation	0.934
	Cronbach's alpha if item deleted
Manufacturer_reputation1	0.918
Manufacturer_reputation2	0.906
Manufacturer_reputation3	0.887

Appendix VII: Relation from platform reputation on manufacturer reputation

Reliability analysis

Platform reputation → manufacturer reputation	0.939
	Cronbach's alpha if item deleted
Platform reputation → manufacturer reputation1	0.913
Platform reputation → manufacturer reputation2	0.905
Platform reputation → manufacturer reputation3	0.917

Explore

Descriptives				
			Statistic	Std. Error
Pl_rep → Man_rep	Mean		4.436	0.113
	95% Confidence interval for mean	Lower bound	4.213	
		Upper bound	4.659	
	Median		5.000	
	Std. deviation		1.718	
	Skewness		-0.609	0.160
	Kurtosis		-0.909	0.320

T-test

One-sample Test						
Test value= 4.000						
					95% Confidence interval of the difference	
	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Lower	Upper
PL-rep →M-rep	3.851	229	<0.001	.436	.213	.659

Appendix VIII: Manipulation check

One way anova

- Fixed factor: platform reputation dummy
- Dependent variable: platform reputation evaluation factor

Descriptives: Plaform reputation					
				95% confidence interval for mean	
	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Lower bound	Upper bound
Low platform reputation	113	-0.701	0.809	-0.852	-0.550
High platform reputation	117	0.677	0.634	0.561	0.793
Total	230	0.000	1.000	-0.130	0.130

Anova					
	Sum of squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	109.146	1	109.146	207.630	<0.001
Within Groups	119.854	228	0.526		
Total	229.000	229			

One way anova

- Fixed factor: Manufacturer reputation dummy
- Dependent variable: manufacturer reputation evaluation factor

Descriptives: Manufacturer reputation					
				95% confidence interval for mean	
	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Lower bound	Upper bound
Low platform reputation	119	-0.618	0.794	-0.762	-0.474
High platform reputation	111	0.663	0.741	0.523	0.802
Total	230	0.000	1.000	-0.130	0.130

Anova					
	Sum of squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	94.210	1	94.210	159.359	<0.001
Within Groups	134.790	228	0.591		
Total	229.000	229			

Appendix IX: Assumptions

Normality check

Descriptives			
		Statistic	Std. Error
Platform Satisfaction	Skewness	0.177	0.160
	Kurtosis	-0.468	0.320
Platform Locus	Skewness	0.810	0.160
	Kurtosis	0.045	0.320
Platform Controllability	Skewness	0.277	0.160
	Kurtosis	-1.037	0.320

Assumption: Linearity






Scatterplot
Dependent Variable: FAC_Platform_Controllability
Regression Standardized Residual
Regression Standardized Predicted Value
3
2
1
0
−1
−2
−3


FAC_Platform_Satisfaction
Observed
Linear
Quadratic
3.00000
2.00000
1.00000
.00000
−1.00000
−2.00000
−3.00000
−2.00000
−1.00000
.00000
1.00000
2.00000
3.00000
FAC_Platform_Controllability


FAC_Platform_Satisfaction
Observed
Linear
Quadratic
3.00000
2.00000
1.00000
.00000
−1.00000
−2.00000
−3.00000
−2.00000
−1.00000
.00000
1.00000
2.00000
3.00000
FAC_Platform_Locus

Assumption: independence of residuals.

Model	Durban Watson
1 (DV: Platform Locus)	1.892
2 (DV: Platform Controllability)	2.113
3 (DV: Platform Satisfaction)	1.930

Assumption: multicollinearity

Collinearity Statistics model 1 (DV: Platform Locus)		
	Tolerance	VIF
REPSSR	0.997	1.003
REPFLIXX	0.989	1.011
MAN	0.957	1.045
AGE_SCALE_LN	0.960	1.042
EDUCATION	0.979	1.021

Collinearity Statistics model 2 (DV: Platform Controllability)		
	Tolerance	VIF
REPFLIXX	0.989	1.011
REPSSR	0.997	1.003
MAN	0.957	1.045
AGE_SCALE_LN	0.960	1.042
EDUCATION	0.979	1.021

Collinearity Statistics model 3 (DV: Platform Satisfaction)		
	Tolerance	VIF
REPFLIXX	0.959	1.043
REPSSR	0.985	1.015
Platform Controllability	0.590	1.696
Platform Locus	0.576	1.737
Age_Scale_LN	0.922	1.085
MAN	0.941	1.063
EDUCATION	0.940	1.064

Assumption: Homoscedasticity

Model 1

Anova[a]					
	Sum of squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Regression	13.510	5	2.702	1.244	0.290[b]
Residual	486.603	224	2.172		
Total	500.113	229			

a. DV: RES_LOC_2
b. Predictors: Age_Scale_LN, REPFLIXX, REPSSR, MAN, EDUCATION

Model 2

Anova[a]					
	Sum of squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Regression	7.681	5	1.536	1.551	0.175[b]
Residual	221.863	224	0.990		
Total	229.543	229			

a. DV: RES_CON_2
b. Predictors: Age_Scale_LN, MAN, REPFLIXX, REPSSR, EDUCATION

Model 3

Anova[a]					
	Sum of squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Regression	10.027	7	1.432	1.410	0.202[b]
Residual	225.485	222	1.016		
Total	235.512	229			

a. DV: RES_SAT_2
b. Predictors: Age_Scale_LN, MAN, REPSSR, REPFLIXX, Fac_Platform_Locus, Fac_Platform_Controllability

Appendix X: PROCESS 3.5.3 output

Analysis 1 (IV: platform reputation)

Model : 4
Y: F_PL_SAT
X: REPFLIXX
M1: Platform Locus
M2: Platform Controllability

Covariates:
AGE_LN, MAN, EDU

Sample
Size: 230

Outcome Variable: Platform Locus

Model Summary

R	R-sq	MSE	F	df1	df2	p
.3137	0.098	0.918	6.139	4.000	225.000	<0.001

	coeff	se	t	p
Constant	2.858	0.677	4.222	<0.001
Rep Flixx	-0.214	0.127	-1.688	0.093
Age (ln)	-0.497	0.163	-3.044	0.003
Man	-0.213	0.130	-1.636	0.103
Edu	-0.220	0.073	-3.019	0.003

Outcome Variable: Platform Controllability

Model Summary

R	R-sq	MSE	F	df1	df2	P
0.284	0.081	0.936	4.946	4.000	225.000	<0.001

	coeff	se	t	p
Constant	2.148	0.683	3.143	0.002
Rep Flixx	-0.340	0.128	-2.654	0.009
Age (ln)	-0.347	0.165	-2.107	0.036
Man	-0.237	0.131	-1.804	0.073
Edu	-0.157	0.073	-2.138	0.034

Outcome Variable: Platform Satisfaction

Model Summary

R	R-sq	MSE	F	df1	df2	P
0.393	0.154	0.868	6.787	6.000	223.000	<0.001

	coeff	se	t	p
Constant	1.854	0.685	2.707	0.007
Rep Flixx	0.091	0.125	0.723	0.471
Pl Locus	-0.090	0.081	-1.117	0.265
Pl Control	-0.314	0.080	-3.925	<0.001
Age (ln)	-0.302	0.162	-1.865	0.064
Man	-0.040	0.127	-0.311	0.756
Edu	-0.199	0.072	-2.756	0.006

TOTAL EFFECT MODEL
Outcome Variable: Platform Satisfaction

Model Summary

R	R-sq	MSE	F	df1	df2	P
0.161	0.026	0.991	1.497	4.000	225.000	0.204

	coeff	se	t	p
Constant	0.922	0.704	1.311	0.191
Rep Flixx	0.217	0.132	1.642	0.102
Age (ln)	-0.149	0.170	-0.876	0.382
Man	0.054	0.135	0.399	0.691
Edu	-0.130	0.076	-1.719	0.087

Total effect of X on Y

Effect	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
0.217	0.132	1.642	0.102	-0.043	0.477

Direct effect of X on Y

Effect	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
0.091	0.125	0.723	0.471	-0.157	0.338

Indirect effect(s) of X on Y:

	Effect	BootSE	BootLLCI	BootULCI
Total	0.126	0.054	0.033	0.241
Pl Locus	0.019	0.022	-0.012	0.075
Pl Contol	0.107	0.047	0.027	0.209

Analysis 2 (IV: manufacturer reputation)

Model: 4
Y: F_PL_SAT
X: REPSSR
M1: Platform Locus
M2: Platform Controllability

Covariates:
AGE_LN, MAN, EDU

Sample
Size: 230

Outcome Variable: Platform Locus

Model Summary

R	R-sq	MSE	F	df1	df2	P
0.301	0.091	0.925	5.620	4.000	225.000	<0.001

	coeff	se	t	p
Constant	2.690	0.680	3.954	<0.001
Rep SSR	0.124	0.127	0.976	0.330
Age (ln)	-0.494	0.164	-3.016	0.003
Man	-0.193	0.130	-1.483	0.139
Edu	-0.224	0.073	-3.066	0.002

Outcome Variable: Platform Controllability

Model Summary

R	R-sq	MSE	F	df1	df2	P
0.230	0.053	0.964	3.141	4.000	225.000	.015

	coeff	se	t	p
Constant	2.016	0.694	2.904	.004
Rep SSR	-0.058	0.130	-0.446	.656
Age (ln)	-0.351	0.167	-2.100	.037
Man	-0.203	0.133	-1.532	.127
Edu	-0.160	0.075	-2.150	.033

Outcome Variable: Platform Satisfaction

Model Summary

R	R-sq	MSE	F	df1	df2	P
0.399	0.159	0.863	7.046	6.000	223.000	<0.001

	coeff	se	t	p
Constant	1.990	0.680	2.926	0.004
Rep SSR	-0.168	0.123	-1.357	0.176
Pl Locus	-0.079	0.081	-0.979	0.328
Pl Control	-0.331	0.079	-4.174	0.000
Age (ln)	-0.307	0.162	-1.903	0.058
Man	-0.049	0.126	-0.385	0.700
Edu	-0.196	0.072	-2.719	0.007

TOTAL EFFECT MODEL
Outcome Variable: Platform Satisfaction

Model Summary

R	R-sq	MSE	F	df1	df2	P
0.143	0.021	0.997	1.1779	4.000	225.000	0.321

	coeff	se	t	p
Constant	1.110	0.706	1.571	0.118
Rep SSR	-0.158	0.132	-1.200	0.231
Age (ln)	-0.152	0.170	-0.893	0.373
Man	0.034	0.135	0.251	0.802
Edu	-0.125	0.076	-1.649	0.101

Total effect of X on Y

Effect	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
-0.158	0.132	-1.200	0.231	-0.418	0.102

Direct effect of X on Y

Effect	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
-0.168	0.123	-1.357	0.176	-0.411	0.076

Indirect effect(s) of X on Y:

	Effect	BootSE	BootLLCI	BootULCI
Total	0.009	0.054	-0.096	0.119
Pl Locus	-0.010	0.017	-0.053	0.016
Pl Contol	0.019	0.045	-0.065	0.115