


# Local Peacebuilding: Unmanageable or unavoidable?

Interaction between MONUSCO and local human rights NGOs  
in South Kivu, DRC



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*“Congo is like a nightmare in heaven... it’s a heaven because Congo is the heart of Africa, so much natural resources, the people, the animals, the flowers, everything; Congo is a heaven.*


*But the thing is that people are living like in hell, people are dying. At first, we used to hear one million people died, two, three, four, five! And the situation is getting worse, worse and worse... because the money is there, the resources are there in Congo.*

*And everybody wants a piece of Congo. Everybody wants a piece of Congo...”*

***Mbepongo Bilamba, in the film:  
‘Crisis in the Congo: Uncovering the Truth’***

## Cover photos

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South Kivu, DRC  
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## Preface

While I am writing this, I am listening to Congolese music, singing the Swahili song text softly and catch myself that I cannot stop moving my feet. Congo, a country you will love and hate if you have been there. My fieldwork in eastern Congo was a fascinating experience; both personally as scientifically.

I will never forget the day I arrived in Bukavu. Or, especially, the bus trip from Kampala to Bukavu. Still tired of my flight, my days in Kampala and the nerves and tension what Congo would be like, I thought: where will I end up? I stepped into the bus, a little late because of the traffic jam in Kampala, and I came in a bus full of screaming Congolese people, everybody with at least five bags so there was only little place for me, the only *mzungu* (the Swahili word for white). And while people were laughing at me, the rich *mzungu* in this cheap but dangerous bus, I only thought: please let me arrive Bukavu safely! And, fortunately, 17 hours later I did so.

Anyway, it was an experience full of nerves, tension, fear and shocks in this instable and war-torn country, but also full of making friends, interesting conversations, surprising election campaigns and the memorable day of the proclamation. I will never forget the people of the Congo, who never lose faith and spirit of life.

For this impressive fieldwork I want to thank all my colleagues of the field office of ICCO in Bukavu, without whom I could not do this research. Special thanks for Christian, friend and colleague who often shared his interesting vision on world politics, the DRC and my research with me. I also want to thank Gonda de Haan and Chantal Daniels for bringing me in contact with them and giving me the opportunity to carry out my research in Bukavu. I also want to thank everybody who made time to do an interview with me; without them this research would not exist.

Furthermore, thanks to my friends in Bukavu: Patrick, Valery, Patient, Welmoet, Chiara, Balemba and Jean Babtist. You made my stay in Bukavu pleasant and joyful.

But then I came back to Holland, facing the differences of the third contra last country on the Human Development Index, dealing with daily life and writing this thesis. I want to thank my family, all my friends and especially Bas for all support in that.

Last but not least I want to thank my supervisor Jaïr van der Lijn, for the trust he had in me, for his suggestions and support, and for the enthusiasm he has for my work. I hope you will be that enthusiastic as well while reading this thesis.

Eline Pereboom  
Nijmegen, August 2012

## English Summary

When the United Nations (UN) deploys a peace mission, like MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), it does not operate in a vacuum, but in an environment in which international, national and local actors as well as civil society are present. The UN becomes increasingly aware of the importance of the context in which peace missions operate, as well as local needs and initiatives. This thesis describes the roles of local human rights NGOs and the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) in the peacebuilding process, and their relationship to each other within this process.

This thesis is a case study of South Kivu in the DRC. Since the UN knows a long history of involvement in the DRC, the amount of local human rights NGOs is very high, and human rights violations are still a significant problem in this area, the case of South Kivu is appropriate for this research. By way of a literature review, some statements are formulated and tested in this specific case. Besides the literature and policies, there is not much known about the roles and relationships in practice. Regarding local perceptions there is a gap in the existing theories. Also UN peacekeeping is constantly changing due to many critics and changes in the world of today.

After this literature review and describing the history of the DRC, the statements are tested with empirical data. This data is obtained by way of a four months during fieldwork. During this fieldwork, interviews with local human rights NGOs and MONUSCO officers are held, and several meetings between those actors have been observed. By analyzing the results, the expectations of the literature have been reflected and some gaps are filled.

International UN peacekeepers view their role in peacebuilding as macro-level as well as micro-level, contradictory with the literature. Some theories claim that international peacekeepers are too much focused at top-level with a top-down strategy, but the respondents of MONUSCO in this research stated that their role is also at a local level, to coordinate, share information and build capacity. Although they are limited in some aspects, they see enough possibilities to improve their roles and activities.

In addition, results show some corresponding between the perception of roles of local human rights NGOs and MONUSCO, as well as some contradiction. MONUSCO interviewees see local NGOs as limited in their roles, only approaching the population and replacing the government are essential roles of the local NGOs. The NGOs themselves see their roles more elaborated, in different sectors and at different levels. Moreover, MONUSCO's roles are seen equally by NGOs and MONUSCO, but the implementation is perceived differently.

Concerning the relationship between local human rights NGOs and MONUSCO, the literature can be verified by the interview results. Communication contributes to the intensity of the relationship. Essential is to share information and values among different actors of different levels, to increase comprehension and therefore the relationship. In addition, the integration of international UN peacekeepers in the Congolese context also contributes to the strength of the relation between them and local NGOs. Expanding informal contacts and having dialogues with locals bring them together.

Furthermore, the mentality of the Congolese NGOs is being named as problematic by MONUSCO officers. They state that Congolese NGOs are merely looking for money; there is no will to change or they want to compete with other NGOs. On the other hand, NGOs state that MONUSCO does not show willingness to build peace but only work for their own big salaries. All these accusations lead to distrust and difficult relationships.

As a result, recommendations are made to MONUSCO in particular and to UN peacekeeping missions in general, to increase communication, transparency and integration in the field. For local human rights NGOs, the recommendations are made to change mentality and to increase specialization of the activities within the peacebuilding process.

## Résumé Français

L'Organisation des Nations Unies (ONU) est employée dans plusieurs missions de la paix, comme la Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en République Démocratique du Congo (MONUSCO). Mais l'ONU n'opère pas seul, car l'environnement dans lequel ils sont opérationnels se partage avec d'autres acteurs internationaux, nationaux et locaux chargés processus de paix. L'ONU est consciente qu'elle a de plus en plus d'importance dans l'environnement local où la mission s'opère, ainsi que les besoins et les initiatives locaux. Ce mémoire consiste à décrire les rôles des Organisations Non-Gouvernemental (ONG) locaux des droits de l'homme et les rôles de la MONUSCO dans le processus de paix, puis leurs relations avec les autres dans ce processus.

Ce mémoire est un l'étude de cas au Sud Kivu de la République Démocratique du Congo (RDC). Puisque l'ONU est concernée depuis longtemps dans la RDC et un grand nombre des ONG locaux des droits de l'homme et les violations de droits de l'homme sont toujours un grand problème au Sud Kivu, ce cas est approprié pour cette recherche. Au moyen de la révision littéraire, quelques prévisions sont formulées qui ont été examinées dans ce cas. En plus de la littérature et la politique stratégie, il n'y a pas beaucoup d'information sur les rôles et les relations en pratique. Concerner les perceptions locaux, il y a un manque de théories existantes. Aussi, la stratégie des missions de maintien de la paix d'ONU change constamment à cause de nombreux critiques et les changements dans le monde d'aujourd'hui.

Après cette révision littéraire et description de l'histoire de la RDC, les prévisions sont testées avec des données empiriques. Ces données ont été obtenues au moyen de faire une recherche sur le terrain pendant quatre mois au Bukavu, RDC. Pendant cette recherche, les interviews sont fait subir avec les ONG des droits de l'homme et avec les fonctionnaires de la MONUSCO, ainsi que quelques réunions sont observées parmi ces acteurs. En analysant les résultats, les prévisions de la littérature sont réfléchies et quelques manquements sont bouchés.

Les membres du personnel civil international des Nations Unies perçoivent leur rôle dans le processus de paix qu'au niveau macroscopique autant qu'au niveau microscopique, contrairement à la littérature. Certaines théories évoquent que les membres du personnel civil international des Nations Unies sont trop focalisées au niveau supérieur, mais les répondants de la MONUSCO dans cette recherche affirment que leur rôle est au niveau local aussi, de coordonner, partager d'information et renforcer les capacités. Pourtant ils sont limités dans certains aspects, ils perçoivent suffisant de possibilités pour améliorer leurs rôles et activités.

De plus, les résultats montrent certaines ressemblances entre les perceptions de rôles du ONG locaux de droits de l'homme et la MONUSCO, ainsi que certaines contradictions. Les répondants de la MONUSCO envisagent des ONG locaux comme limité dans leurs rôles. Seulement approcher de la population et replacer le gouvernement Congolais sont les rôles essentiels des ONG locaux. Les ONG eux-mêmes envisagent leurs rôles plus extensifs, dans les secteurs différents et dans les niveaux différents. Ensuite, les rôles de la MONUSCO perçoivent également par les ONG et la MONUSCO, mais l'implémentation est perçu différemment.

Concernant la relation entre les ONG locaux et la MONUSCO, la littérature peut être vérifiée par les résultats des interviews. La communication contribue à l'intensité de la relation. C'est important de partager d'information et des valeurs parmi les acteurs différents ou les niveaux différents, pour agrandir la compréhension et en conséquence la relation.

En plus, l'intégration des membres du personnel civil international des Nations Unies dans la société Congolais contribue à la force de la relation entre eux et ONG locaux. Elargir les contacts informels et avoir des dialogues avec les indigènes de les rassemblent.

Ensuite, la mentalité des ONG Congolaises est nommée comme problématique par les fonctionnaires de la MONUSCO. Ils trouvent que les ONG Congolaises sont surtout en train de chercher l'argent, il n'y a pas de motivation pour changer ou il y a la compétition parmi les ONG. D'autre part, les ONG trouvent que la MONUSCO ne montre pas de motivation pour créer la paix et ils travaillent seulement pour toucher un bon salaire. Toutes ces insinuations résultent à la défiance et compliquer la relation.

En conséquence, les recommandations sont fait pour la MONUSCO particulièrement et les missions de maintien de la paix des Nations Unies généralement, de renforcer la communication, la transparence et l'intégration dans le terrain. Pour les ONG locaux de droits de l'homme, les recommandations sont fait pour changer la mentalité et renforcer la spécialisation des activités dans le processus de paix.

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## List of Acronyms

AFDL	Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre
CAS	Civil Affairs Section of MONUSCO
CLA	Community Liaison Assistants
CNDP	Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple
COB	Company Operating Base
DDR	Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FARDC	Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo
FDLR	Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
IO	International Organizations
JPT	Joint Protection Team
MLC	Mouvement de Libération du Congo
MLT	Mission Leadership Team
MOB	Mobile Operating Base
MONUC	Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo
MONUSCO	Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en République Démocratique du Congo
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ONUC	l'Opération des Nations Unies au Congo
PAD	Political Affairs Department
PBC	Peacebuilding Commission
QIP	Quick Impact Project
RCD	Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TOB	Temporary Operating Base
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDSS	United Nations Department of Safety and Security
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNJHRO	United Nations Joint Human Rights Office
US	United States (of America)
WHO	World Health Organization

# 1 Introduction

In a peace mission there are many actors involved. When the United Nations (UN) deploys a peace mission, like MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), it does not operate in a vacuum, but in an environment in which international, national and local actors, as well as civil society are present. The UN becomes increasingly aware of the importance of the context in which peace missions operate, as well as local needs and initiatives. Peace is not something one can create as an outsider, or just as a local actor, but there is a need for interaction, coherence and dialogues between the different actors.<sup>1</sup>

This thesis describes the role of local human rights Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) within the peacebuilding process and their relation with MONUSCO. Human rights are essential in conflicts, since there are many initiatives, local, national and international, to stop violations and to promote human rights.<sup>2</sup> Many reviews on UN peacekeeping operations and the effects of international NGOs have been done, but only a few of them include the perception of civil society organizations and the consequences of the presence or absence of a relationship with local NGOs. Consequently, there is a gap in knowledge about the effects and problems local NGOs encounter in UN peace keeping operations.<sup>3</sup>

Since the 1990s, the international community has become more aware of the contribution of civil society in peacebuilding. “[Civil society organizations] can build intercommunal links that are critical to reconciliation, have comparative advantages of local knowledge and contextual understanding of barriers and opportunities to make peace at local level, and in contrast to international organizations, have inherent understanding of the postconflict situation”.<sup>4</sup> Thus, civil society is an important factor in peacebuilding because it is close to the local population and is embedded in historical context. However, awareness of the low intensity and possible partiality of civil society is required. On the other hand, the UN as a powerful international actor, has a completely different cultural background with other norms and organizational structures.

This chapter starts with an introduction to peacebuilding, after which it explains the research objectives and research questions. Furthermore it contains the relevance of the case study of South Kivu in eastern DRC, the methodology and research process. It finishes with an overview of the structure of this thesis.

## 1.1 Introduction to UN peacebuilding

The United Nations started peacekeeping in 1948 with a mission in the Middle East. The first nation-building mission began in the DRC in 1960, with the ONUC mission that lasted four years. A couple of short-term missions, mainly observatory, followed in the 60s and 70s. Since the end of the Cold War, a lot has changed.<sup>5</sup> International relations became more complex with strong political ideologies and world-wide economic networks. In addition, the UN has developed and carried out more complex missions. Different forms of missions and how this is related to the UN Charter will be explained in chapter 2. However, for the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), three basic principles have always served as a tool to maintain international peace and security; consent of the parties, impartiality and non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate.<sup>6</sup> Currently, the peacekeeping operations are more focused on sustainability by concentrating on state building, long-term peacebuilding and reinforcement of state and local actors. There are more and more actors involved in these missions, and more attempts to coordination between actors.

The objectives of each peacekeeping mission are given in the mandate of the mission. The political goals, duration, mission, functions and rights, amongst others, are also documented in the mandate of the mission. This mandate is the result of political negotiations and therefore usually vague in practice.<sup>7</sup> However, a mandate always falls within the ambition of the bigger objective of the comprehensive strategy of peacekeeping operations:

“To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and

in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.”<sup>8</sup>

Therefore, the main objective of peacekeeping is not just to make peace in case of conflicts, but also to prevent conflicts. In 1992, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali defined peacekeeping in ‘An Agenda for Peace’ as:

“the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peacekeeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace.”<sup>9</sup>

Since the end of the Cold War, the world has significantly changed in many aspects. Political and military strategies transformed, as well as policies with regard to UN peacekeeping. Currently the UN is deployed mainly in unstable post-conflict situations in which there is a high risk of relapse into conflict. Moreover, peacekeeping missions are mainly deployed in what Mary Kaldor calls ‘new wars’.<sup>10</sup> New wars are intrastate conflicts, asymmetric, characterized by guerilla warfare, human rights violations and primarily civilian victims. In such conflicts military observations are not sufficient any more. Comprehensive and integrative operations are required with complex tasks such as changing political, institutional and social structures, building sustainable institutions as well as human rights monitoring and returning and integrating ex-combatants and refugees.

Consequently, traditional missions concerning mainly military observations have been replaced by multidimensional missions. These multidimensional missions are based on comprehensive peace agreements and they aspire toward sustainable peace by joined components of military, police and civilian personnel.<sup>11</sup> Such missions include peacebuilding; they form a process of societal transformation. Multidimensional peacekeeping missions are more integrated in the social and cultural context through coordination between all actors; international, national as well as local. ‘An Agenda for Peace’ by the Secretary-General of the UN defines peacebuilding as “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.”<sup>12</sup> Promotion of national and local ownership is fundamental, since the UN wants to build trust and create effective cooperation between national actors to ensure stability when the UN withdraws. In order to ensure this trust and cooperation, understanding of the national and regional context is essential.<sup>13</sup>

In her book “The trouble with the Congo”, Autesserre explains the international peacebuilding culture and its failures. She states her book is not written to condemn the UN mission in DRC, because the UN strives to build peace, it also has good effects and the UN is not monolithic. But MONUSCO tend to ignore local peacebuilding; it neglect local visions and international peacebuilders are too much surrounded by international structures and environment. “United Nations staff and diplomats viewed intervention at the macro levels as their only legitimate responsibility. Local peacebuilding was such an unimportant, unfamiliar, and unmanageable task that even the magnitude of the disaster could not impel international peacebuilders to augment their efforts at the local level.”<sup>14</sup> She states that the common top-down strategy of the UN has to be complemented by a bottom-up strategy. But UN peacekeepers in the Congo see themselves as limited and Autesserre claims that international interveners are too much guided by their perceptions of their roles. Besides this, they see Congolese people as inherently violent. Her theory was the main inspiration for this research to look more closely at the situation of peacebuilding in the DRC.

## **1.2 Research objective and research questions**

Integrated multi-dimensional UN peacekeeping operations aim to coordinate the many diverse actors in a peacebuilding process. International NGOs are included in the policy of the UN and UN has set up different civil components like the Civil Affairs Section (CAS), UN Joint Human Rights Office (UNJHRO), and Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The difficulty for a relative short-term peacekeeping operation is to get deeply into the society, understanding local values and structures while jointly building peace and promoting human rights. The UN says it wants

to listen to locals, and it wants to hold meetings and debates with NGOs, but there is little information about whether these views are translated into practice and whether locals feel any support of the UN. Another problem is that local NGOs and international NGOs compete for the same symbolic space in the peacebuilding process. “Hundreds of international organizations are present in the capital, occupying a space no longer available to local actors, ... which impede local organizations from functioning properly.”<sup>15</sup> To find effective solutions to these difficulties, in order to ensure that peacebuilding is reinforced by both the UN and local actors, there is need for more research. This research wishes to gain more insights in the perceptions of local peacebuilding of different actors in the DRC.

Therefore, the research objective is to describe the relation between MONUSCO and local human rights NGOs, and to fill the gap between theoretical debates about the UN and perspectives of local human rights NGOs in practice. By doing so, this research has an explanative character with additional exploration, building on critical theories from international actors but with a new insight in local perceptions. Hence, this research aims to give insight in relations within the peacebuilding process in the DRC. It leads to the following research question:

*How do MONUSCO and the local human rights NGOs perceive their role in the peacebuilding process in the DRC and their relationship to each other within this process?*

To be able to answer the main research question, the following sub questions need to be answered:

1. What is, according to literature, the role of peacekeeping operations and local NGOs in peacebuilding processes and their relationship to each other?
2. What is the context of the relationship between MONUSCO and the local NGOs in the DRC?
3. What are the perceptions of local human right NGOs with regard to MONUSCO?
  - a. How do the local human rights NGOs perceive the role of MONUSCO and that of themselves in the peacebuilding process in the DRC?
  - b. Which aspects are obstacles in their relationship with MONUSCO, according to local human rights NGOs?
  - c. Which aspects are strengthening their relationship with MONUSCO, according to local human rights NGOs?
4. What are the perceptions of MONUSCO with regard to local human rights NGOs?
  - a. How does MONUSCO perceive the role of the local human rights NGOs and that of itself in the peacebuilding process in the DRC?
  - b. Which aspects are obstacles in its relationship with the local human rights NGOs, according to MONUSCO?
  - c. Which aspects are strengthening its relationship with the local human rights NGOs, according to MONUSCO?

The theoretical framework will help this research to form a basis for the research and the interviews. By knowing what is written and what common critique on peacebuilding processes is, valuable interviews can be held to fill the gap in existing theories. Qualitative data is obtained in South Kivu, located in the east of the DRC. More details on the research methods, the process and methodology will be expounded upon further on in this chapter.

### **1.3 Relevance of this case study**

#### **1.3.1 Case study**

The DRC has a long history of conflict and atrocities: slavery, colonialism, assassinations, dictatorship, invasion of foreign refugees and many economic interests in the Congo. The involvement of the UN in the DRC started in 1960 with the mission ONUC. The second mission, the United Nation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) started in 1999. Again, a war was threatening in the DRC, after two wars in 1996 and 1998. Originally, the mission was observational in character, but in 2008 civilian protection became priority, because of the massive human rights violations in the DRC.

However, MONUC failed to protect civilians to a large extent, and the UN mission faced severe criticism.<sup>16</sup> Given the criticism, MONUC was replaced with the United Nation Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO), in May 2010. MONUSCO concentrates on stabilization and peace consolidation; therefore protection of civilians remains a big issue. It has concentrated its military forces in eastern DRC where rebellion threats and violence are most common. With its military forces the UN aims to protect civilians, humanitarian personnel, UN personnel, facilities, equipment and human rights. Important issues are Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) and Security Sector Reform (SSR), as well as fair elections and gender equality.<sup>17</sup> Additionally, MONUSCO supports government efforts to ensure protection of civilians and to end impunity and human rights violations. On the other hand, the component Civil Affairs strives for more coordination and facilitating dialogues with different sectors of the population and local mission actors. The UN agency OCHA is also active in the DRC; they are the link between MONUSCO and the humanitarian community, both at the national as local levels.<sup>18</sup>

MONUSCO is appropriate for this research because it is an integrated mission with many efforts concerning human rights. In the renewed mission the emphasis is on the protection of civilians and creating stability, as well as the organization of fair elections in collaboration with the government. Since unrest is concentrated in the east of the DRC, MONUSCO is mainly operating in that part of the country. This research is a case study in the province South Kivu in eastern DRC. Due to lack of time and capacity, this research focuses only on this province, one of the most violent provinces in the DRC.

Since this conflict is a long lasting conflict which is currently relatively stable but far from ending, it is a region that is perfectly appropriate for research. In fact, research is required to find out what the best way to end conflict is in South Kivu. Although a cease-fire has been achieved, there are profound political, social and economical problems faced by the society. Corruption, personal enrichment and human rights violations by the government as well as revolts of rebellions are still present.

In spite of the poor operative institutions and the continuing violence, civil society in eastern DRC is extensive and relatively strong. There are many local Congolese organizations operating in peacebuilding activities on local, national and regional levels. To make a selection within all these local NGOs, this research focuses on NGOs active in human rights issues. More on this selection and the research process will be explained further in this chapter.

### **1.3.2 Societal relevance**

Although the UN is constantly improving their policy towards and knowledge about international peace and security, a conflict often relapses after a period of stability. Since merely putting a stop to violence is not enough to reach durable peace and stability, peacekeeping missions are deployed in the aftermath of a violent conflict. These multi-dimensional UN peacekeeping operations are different from other operations before the Cold War, in number, size, strategy and function. Most peacekeeping operations before the Cold War were for observing and monitoring, but the function of ONUC in the Congo was as yet more than an observing mission, because ONUC aimed to maintain territorial integrity and preventing a civil war.<sup>19</sup> The multi-dimensionality is not only visible in the various aspects and sectors where these operations are employed, but also in the multi-dimensional actors of different levels that are integrated in these operations. Activities of these actors may be more effective by having a common strategic vision; since they are all operating in the same peacebuilding process and in the same context. According to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO):

“It is incumbent upon the peacekeeping operation to meet regularly and share information with all actors, and to harmonize activities, to the extent possible, by seeking their input into the mission’s planning process and to respond actively and substantively to requests for cooperation. [Different international and national actors, including NGOs] normally pursue independent agendas, which may or may not coincide with the strategic priorities identified by the peacekeeping operation. Some may be operating according to widely different timelines and work methods, or they may simply not be capable of engaging in intensive

cooperation due to the periodic nature of their engagement in the country. In these circumstances, proactive sharing of information by the mission is still important, even if the intensity of cooperation is limited.”<sup>20</sup>

So the UN aims for integration of NGOs into its peacekeeping operations. The Mission Leadership Team (MLT) is founded to establish these coordinating activities in order to ensure coherence in the peacekeeping operation, not only with activities of NGOs, but also coherence of different components within the UN. In addition, the UN has to prevent adverse outcomes of activities of humanitarian or development actors. Nevertheless, this only holds for international NGOs and some of the national NGOs. The Civil Affairs Section of the mission aims for liaison with local actors and communication of the perceptions and priorities of different actors in different sectors.<sup>21</sup> Facilitating dialogues is a crucial aspect in this. Regarding civil society, capacity building activities are an important part of the tasks of the Civil Affairs Section of MONUSCO. Capacity building needs to contribute to long-term stability and local empowerment. However, the needs and perceptions of the local NGOs are unclear so far.

This research hopes to contribute to closing the gap between the UN policy and difficulties in the local civil society and to highlight UN perspectives and local perspectives. For the UN it is hard to coordinate all actors, including NGOs, at the local, national and international level. There are many diverse actors in peacekeeping operations, so a limit has to be set. According to the Security Council, the main task of MONUSCO is to create calmness and order, so that structural building processes can begin.<sup>22</sup> On the other hand, local NGOs may have a need for support, resources and creating political spaces. They are nearest to the population, embedded in the society and thus most involved in the conflict too, but their capacity is low. Local NGOs may have valuable knowledge on a different level than international actors. They can be a crucial factor in the peacebuilding process, be it on a smaller scale and with less power and capabilities than other national or international actors. By mapping the perceptions of the roles and relations there will be more clarity of the local peacebuilding process and local needs in the east of the DRC.

The results of this research will provide greater insight into both the relationship between local human rights NGOs and MONUSCO, and in the problems in civil society concerning the peacebuilding process. Hence, it improves the peacebuilding process in the DRC for both local human rights NGOs and MONUSCO, in order for empathy, adjustment, and understanding to grow. According to Autesserre the UN is not involved enough in this bottom-up approach and UN officers do not see the essence of conflict transformation with a bottom-up strategy.<sup>23</sup> MONUSCO has too much top-down focus; knowledge about the role and impact of local actors is lacking. By improving effective interaction in the peacekeeping mission in the DRC, this interaction will contribute to reinforcement of local structures and better achievement of MONUSCO objectives to create durable peace.

However, with the results of this research we can draw broader lessons for peacekeeping operations and local peacebuilding outside the DRC. It can be a contribution and a step to further research. Therefore, this research wishes to indirectly result in better political decision making of the UN and better guidelines for local human rights NGOs, which in its turn will result in more coherence and better interaction between the UN and local human rights NGOs.

### **1.3.3 Scientific relevance**

There is still much unknown about conflicts and the peacebuilding process. One of the unknown issues is the role of local civil society within peacekeeping operations. Local parties are the main actors to improve conflict transformation, “a process of engaging with and transforming the relationships, interests, discourses and, if necessary, the very constitution of society that support the continuation of violent conflict.”<sup>24</sup> It is a long-term process that requires a comprehensive approach where inside actors and outside actors have to cooperate. A bottom-up approach to conflict transformation is fundamental to alter and accomplish possibilities at the local level. Then transformation will function at the basis of the conflict. The base of the society needs to be changed by peaceful principles for sustainable peace. However, the context in each country is different. Even per region the context and conflict can differ, so it may be impossible to generalize theories on the role of locals. However, it is very important to understand the local context and perceptions.<sup>25</sup>



This research is an examination of several hypotheses resulting from critical theories, which will be further explained in chapter 2. Moreover, it adds local perceptions which have not been included in existing theories. By including local perceptions, not only will the results and consequences of relations be studied, but also the motives for the presence or absence of relations. It fills the gap in the theories of relations within the peacebuilding process, as well as examining theories about cooperation and relations. Relations are crucial but not clear in the DRC, as seen in most other peacebuilding processes. That is why case studies are required to expand existing knowledge on conflicts with all actors involved. However, the response is person and region specific; therefore it is primarily applicable for analyses of the peacebuilding process and local context in South Kivu. Nevertheless, the results of this research can be a contribution to further research and can draw broader lessons for the knowledge of the relation of the UN and local human rights NGOs in peacebuilding.

## **1.4 Methodology and research process**

### **1.4.1 Methodology**

There are a number of strategies and methodological approaches used throughout this study, emphasizing that a stay in the DRC was valuable in the research process. The basic principle for this research is an interpretative and holistic approach to understand the structures of relations and networks. The fieldwork is based on an ethnographic tradition, which prefers a holistic view. Context is essential; people in society are related to each other, to institutions, bound to places and spaces and they talk, interact and collaborate. Ethnography is mainly about connections, inter-dependency, relationships and processes.<sup>26</sup> This ethnographical research uses the strategy of a case study, with multiple methods like document reviews, interviews and participant observations during workshops, which are further explained below. A case study is appropriate “to understand complex social phenomena [because] the case study method allows investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events.”<sup>27</sup>

Within this ethnographic tradition, the interpretative approach is essential. This approach takes totality into account, but with the notion that it is subjective. Each actor has its own reality and position in the community. It can be seen as a mirror, taking your own position into account and make the participants aware of their own position and certainties.<sup>28</sup> By doing so, conceptions and relations will be reinterpreted. Through interviews, the positions and perceptions of each actor have been studied, with the idea that it is very important for the actors to give their own opinion; there are no right or wrong answers. By emphasizing that, the interpretative approach will be valuable.

In an interpretative approach, meanings, beliefs and philosophy behind actions and practices are the most important matters.<sup>29</sup> This means that concrete and visible issues will be observed and studied, plus the meaning and perceptions behind those issues. The researcher has to try to look through the eyes of the participants. That is why this research contains in-depth interviews, because structured questionnaires will not take in feelings and beliefs.

Since the researcher lived in the particular society for four months and was involved in the community, local philosophy and attitudes may be better understood. To live within the research society has some strengths and weaknesses. A weakness can be the influence of the researcher as an outsider; it can influence the results in a disadvantageous way. People may not be completely open or may restrain things because of the different cultural background. Ethics is an aspect the researcher has to be aware of. There can be a bias because the researcher is a European and not an African. People may think she supports the UN and they may give socially desirable answers but not their real vision. However, because the researcher lived in the community and has also observed people and had informal conversations as well, this bias will decline.

An advantage is that respondents are being observed in their own environment. By studying personal stories and situations, the views, relations and networks will be understood better, and the reality will be described in the way locals feel and practice this reality. It is hard for an outsider to understand the context in a completely different society with a dynamic history. Some workshops have been attended by way of participant observations, to supplement and better understand the interviews. It makes it a little easier to see what occupies people in mind, the way of communicating

and the contact between UN and NGOs has been observed. The results of these workshops are also used in the analysis.

Finally, this research is primarily applicable in this specific case, the province South Kivu in the DRC. Because the qualitative data of concerning subjects is very context specific, it cannot be generalized, although it can draw broader lessons for UN peacekeeping missions and contact with local human rights NGOs.

#### **1.4.2 Data collection**

This study of peacebuilding in the DRC is a qualitative case study by which data is obtained from several views. First, data collection started with sources such as academic literature and policy papers, which forms the basis of the theoretical framework. The collection began with the United Nations policy papers, and some criticism on its effectivity. Policy papers are important to make the guiding principles and strategy of the UN explicit. It is also important to understand the structure of this international organization. However, there is a lot of critique against the strategy of the UN in practice. Furthermore, theories on local peacebuilding and involvement of international organizations in local structures are part of the theoretical framework. One of these criticisms was the work of Autesserre, which became the basis of the theoretical framework. There is little research on the current situation in the DRC with regard to local peacebuilding, so it is an important contribution with recent empirical data of the DRC. Chapter 2 has been written on the basis of these theoretical sources, from general policy papers and academic theories towards more practical and specific assumptions. It gives a good insight on the situation described on paper, which may be different than the situation in the field and the perceptions of the actors involved in the field.

However, this is a qualitative research that is based on empirical data. To obtain the qualitative data the researcher did fieldwork during four months in South Kivu in the DRC. She experienced the cultural, economical, geographical and personal context of the participants and was involved in the society. It was partly an observing participant role, because she observed behavior and discussions in some workshops. And there was a lot of interaction with local people and with expats in South Kivu; going out, learning the language and experiencing the life of people living in the east of the DRC, so you can put it into perspective and you can write about it emphatically.<sup>30</sup> The diverse perceptions and stories with regard to relations within the peacebuilding process will be better understood through this involvement.

The second way of data collection in this research is obtaining empirical data via interviews. Experiences in practice and perceptions of different actors have been investigated through in-depth interviews. The fieldwork mainly exists of interviews with local NGO representatives working in the field of human rights, and interviews with MONUSCO officers working in Bukavu, the principal town of South Kivu, complemented by international NGOs and academics. Bukavu was chosen as the main fieldwork area, because there is a lot of local and UN peacebuilding activity. Due to lack of capacity and security it was not possible to acquire data in other towns or villages in South Kivu. Nevertheless, all actors in Bukavu are also operating throughout the province in numerous towns and villages.

The selection of local NGOs is first made by geographical criteria. Then, the selection goes further by theme, only local NGOs active in human rights activities were part of this research. This theme is important because it is one of the main tasks of MONUSCO to improve human rights situations and fight against impunity. It is also one of the core issues of security, which is still inadequate in eastern DRC. As local NGOs in Bukavu operating in the field of human rights still abound, further selection was randomly made. The interviews started with local human rights NGOs which were listed by OCHA. The list of NGOs included some large local human rights NGOs who have a lot of local contacts. Sampling was carried out by snowball-effect, one interviewee would bring the researcher in contact with other NGOs. By using key documents and informants, it is easier to reach the right persons within the population and the sampling frame grows with every interview. By doing this, it is an effective way to extend the sampling frame.<sup>31</sup>

The selection of MONUSCO officers was made by component; officers of the civil components who have contact with local human rights NGOs and who promote human rights were interviewed. Sometimes it was hard to get permission to contact somebody, although all the interviews were reported anonymously. This was an obstacle which restricted the amount of interviews. Another

disadvantageous aspect was that the elections were held in the DRC on November 28, 2011. Due to the unstable security situation, many expats left the country, some even up and until to the holidays.

To implement data triangulation - mapping out different point of views to reinforce the validity of the data<sup>32</sup> - some international human rights NGOs were interviewed for their vision as expats without connections with MONUSCO but working in the DRC with local NGOs. These international human rights NGOs were randomly selected. Additionally, some interviews with academics in Bukavu were added for a more critical view, as well as some interviews of intellectuals in the Netherlands.

The in-depth interviews were semi-structured, directed by an interviewguide with the main topics. By using an interview guide, the researcher uses well-considered paths to obtain the real feelings and visions of the respondent, without too much control of the direction of the answers.<sup>33</sup> The research questions were the basis of the interview topics: 1) context of the NGO activities or MONUSCO activities; 2) perceptions of roles of each other; 3) view of relations; 4) strengths and obstacles in these relations and perceptions. The topics are the same in every interview as much as possible, in order to obtain the same data be able to compare the answers. These interviews gave a very good insight in the practice of international and local peacebuilding strategies in the eastern DRC.

Third, a participant observation method is applied to supplement the received information to get the most valid qualitative empirical data, during discussion workshops. Different workshops were attended, mostly meetings with different local NGOs, some also with MONUSCO officers. The issues discussed were amongst others sharing cultures, youth, sexual violence and elections. In the workshops there was a lot of discussion and response from the public, which brought forward interesting information. Participant observations were part of these workshops; the researcher took part in the discussion but with the concentration on the reaction of the people who joined in. In so doing, there is complementary and undifferentiated information obtained which can give additional information and may give other results than formal interviews because of the casual settings.

The last phase of this research is analyzing the data by labeling and coding. First, results are coded by the interview topics and subtopics to conceptual categories. Then, these categories were labeled by the most important and most mentioned answers and gathered in a schedule. The data of the discussion workshops is coded by theme and also gathered in a database, so analyzing in comparison with the other databases is feasible.<sup>34</sup> This way, the qualitative data can be easily scanned and the answers can be compared to each other. To be able to draw conclusions, the results and analyses are placed in the theoretical framework which resulted in the conclusion chapter of this thesis.

### **1.4.3 Structure**

The most relevant theories are outlined in Chapter 2. As mentioned above, first policy papers and the structure of the United Nations and their peacekeeping operations are explained. Next, more general theories on peacebuilding and involvement of the UN in local structures in (post-)conflict situations are highlighted. In addition, the concepts conflict transformation and civil society are clarified. Furthermore, the theory of Autesserre is explained, as well as other UN critics, relation theories and human rights activities. The last part of the chapter describes the theoretical framework of this thesis, with hypotheses and explanation of the interview questions.

Chapter 3 contains the context of the DRC. To understand the current situation and strategies in the DRC, it is essential to know the history of the conflict in the DRC. Although it is a brief history despite the complexity of it, the most important matters and developments are explained, with emphasis on the Kivu provinces. The international commitment is crucial in these developments, as well as in the peacebuilding process. Finally, the current and former UN peacekeeping missions are explained, after which civil society and human rights activities in the DRC are also described.

Chapter 4 and 5 describe the determination of the findings of the empirical data, with its conceptual categories central. The perceptions of local NGOs on their own role, on the role of MONUSCO, the effectivity of MONUSCO and all strengths and obstacles in the relationship and realized roles are described. Chapter 5 holds the same questions as chapter 4, but with the perceptions of MONUSCO. The data obtained by the interviews is fundamental in these two chapters and is compared to each other and to the literature.

The conclusion will be specified in chapter 6. The findings of the fieldwork in South Kivu in the DRC are placed in the theoretical framework which is expounded in chapter 2. In the last chapter, the central research question will be answered. Also, looking back at the research objectives and, based on this, recommendations are given for the peacebuilding process in the east of the DRC as well as other (post-)conflict situations, with regard to UN peacekeeping missions and local human rights NGOs.

<sup>1</sup> Autessere, S. 2010. *The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding*. Cambridge University Press: New York; Barber, M. 2009. Humanitarian crises and peace operations: a personal view of UN reforms during Kofi Annan's first term, *Conflict, Security and Development*, 9, p. 387-409; Lijn, van der, J. 2006. *Walking the Tightrope: Do UN Peacekeeping Operations actually contribute to Durable Peace?* Dutch University Press: Amsterdam.

<sup>2</sup> Barber, M. 2009. Humanitarian crises and peace operations: a personal view of UN reforms during Kofi Annan's first term, *Conflict, Security and Development*, 9, p. 387-409; Parlevliet, M. (2010). *Rethinking Conflict Transformation from a Human Rights Perspective*. In: Dudouet, V., Schmelzle, B. 2010. *Human Rights and Conflict Transformation: the Challenges of Just Peace*. The Berghof Handbook, Berlin, Germany, p. 15-46.

<sup>3</sup> Zanotti, L. 2010. UN Integrated Peacekeeping Operations and NGO's: Reflections on Governmental Rationalities and Contestation in the Age of Risk. *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 17, No 1, p. 17-31; Barber, M. 2009. Humanitarian crises and peace operations: a personal view of UN reforms during Kofi Annan's first term, *Conflict, Security and Development*, 9, p. 402; Pouligny, B. 2005. Building 'new' societies. *Security Dialogue*, 36 (4), p.503.

<sup>4</sup> Prendergast, J., Plumb, E. 2002. Building local capacity; From implementation to peacebuilding, in: Leeuwen, M. van. 2006. *Partners in Peace, discourses and practices of civil-society peacebuilding*. Thesis Wageningen University: Wageningen.

<sup>5</sup> Kaldor, M. 2001. Chapter 1, 'Introduction'. In: M. Kaldor, *New & old wars; organized violence in a global era*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

<sup>6</sup> United Nations. 2008. *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations; Principles and Guidelines*.

[http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/Library/Capstone\\_Doctrine\\_ENG.pdf](http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf)

<sup>7</sup> Lijn, van der, J. 2006. *Walking the Tightrope: Do UN Peacekeeping Operations actually contribute to Durable Peace?* Dutch University Press: Amsterdam, p.2.

<sup>8</sup> United Nations. 1945. *Charter of the United Nations*, Chapter 1. <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml>

<sup>9</sup> United Nations. 1992. *An Agenda for Peace*. <http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html>

<sup>10</sup> Kaldor, M. 2001. Chapter 1, 'Introduction'. In: M. Kaldor, *New & old wars; organized violence in a global era*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

<sup>11</sup> United Nations. 2008. *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*. <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/surge.shtml>

<sup>12</sup> United Nations. 1992. *An Agenda for Peace*. <http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html>

<sup>13</sup> United Nations. 2008. *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations; Principles and Guidelines*.

[http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/Library/Capstone\\_Doctrine\\_ENG.pdf](http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf)

<sup>14</sup> Ibid. p.231.

<sup>15</sup> Pouligny, B. 2005. Building 'new' societies. *Security Dialogue*, 36 (4), p.501.

<sup>16</sup> Autessere, S. 2010. *The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding*. Cambridge University Press: New York; and Reynaert, J. 2010. MONUC/MONUSCO and civilian protection in the Kivus. *International Peace Information Service*. [http://www.ipisresearch.be/publications\\_detail.php?id=327](http://www.ipisresearch.be/publications_detail.php?id=327)

<sup>17</sup> United Nations Security Council. 2010. Resolution 1925. [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1925\(2010\)](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1925(2010))

<sup>18</sup> OCHA. 2011. Democratic Republic of the Congo. <http://www.unocha.org/where-we-work/democratic-republic-congo-drc>

<sup>19</sup> United Nations. 2001. Republic of the Congo, ONUC mandate. <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onucM.htm>

<sup>20</sup> United Nations. 2008. *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations; Principles and Guidelines*, p.73-74.

[http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/Library/Capstone\\_Doctrine\\_ENG.pdf](http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf)

<sup>21</sup> United Nations. 2011. MONUSCO. <http://monusco.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=4951>

<sup>22</sup> United Nations Security Council. 2010. Resolution 1925. [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1925\(2010\)](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1925(2010))

<sup>23</sup> Autessere, S. 2010. *The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding*. Cambridge University Press: New York.

<sup>24</sup> Miall, H. 2001. *Conflict Transformation: A Multi-dimensional Task*. In: Austin, A. and Fischer, M. and Ropers, N., eds. 2004. *Transforming Ethnopolitical Conflict*. The Berghof Handbook, Berlin, Germany, p. 67-90.

<sup>25</sup> Autessere, S. 2010. *The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding*. Cambridge University Press: New York.

<sup>26</sup> Bernard, H.R. 2002. *Research Methods in Anthropology*, AltaMira Press: Walnut Creek.

<sup>27</sup> Yin, R. K. (2002). *Case study research, design and methods*. Thousand Oaks: Sage, p.2.

<sup>28</sup> Bernard, H.R. 2002. *Research Methods in Anthropology*, AltaMira Press: Walnut Creek.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid, p. 344.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid, p. 192-193.

<sup>32</sup> Hart, H., Boeije, H., Hox, J. 2005. *Onderzoeksmethoden*. Uitgeverij Boom: Amsterdam.

<sup>33</sup> Gordon, R. 1992. *Basic Interviewing skills*. F.E. Peacock Publishers: Illinois.

<sup>34</sup> Mikkelsen, B. 2005. *Methods for Development Work and Research: a new guide for practitioners*, Sage Publications: London.

## 2 Theoretical Framework

This chapter explains the different existing theories in the theme of peacebuilding, civil society and multi-level relations. At the end of the chapter the framework of this thesis will be given with an overview of the existing knowledge and hypotheses resulting from these theories, to describe the background of the empirical research in South Kivu in the DRC.

### 2.1 United Nations and peacekeeping

United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping has taken many different forms and developments over time, but the UN Charter is always been the basis for all their activities. Traditional peacekeeping had the objective of reaching and maintaining a cease-fire and stabilizing the situation. This was realized by neutral and impartial assistance and observations.<sup>1</sup> Since the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping operations are more complex, with broader mandates, more use of force and other different tasks. Moreover since 2003, UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding strongly increased. There is more and more awareness of the long-term consequences and the UN is taking more responsibility for sustainability. So the UN interventions and roles are changing in time.

#### 2.1.1 UN Charter

The UN is founded in 1945 by 51 countries, as an international organization which has to maintain international peace and security. After the Second World War there was an increasing awareness of consequences of violence and political international relations. The UN has the purposes “to keep peace throughout the world, to develop friendly relations among nations, [and] to improve the lives of poor people, conquer hunger, disease and illiteracy, and to encourage respect for each other’s rights and freedoms.”<sup>2</sup>

The UN Charter is the constitution of the UN. It is comprehensive, so the UN can take action on a wide range and in every place of the world. Since the independency of South-Sudan, the UN has 193 Member States.<sup>3</sup> The UN consists of six main bodies: the General Assembly, Economic and Social Council, International Court of Justice, Secretariat, Trusteeship Council and the well known Security Council. In addition, there are many different specialized agencies like WHO, FAO, IMF, UNDP etc. The Secretary General is the head of the Secretariat, the component which deals with all diverse objectives, programs and policies of the UN. Amongst others, there is a department of political affairs, legal affairs, economic and social affairs, public information, peacekeeping, coordination of humanitarian affairs etc. The Secretary General – Ban Ki-moon since 2007 – is in fact the leader of the UN. In the Charter the Secretary General is portrayed as the “chief administrative officer of the Organization”.<sup>4</sup> In addition it is written in the Charter that the Secretary General is able to “bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.”<sup>5</sup>

There is not an explicit chapter in the UN Charter for peacekeeping. The Security Council operates with regard to the whole Charter; however, Chapters V, VI and VII of the Charter contain principles of peacekeeping, conflict prevention and humanitarian assistance. It describes the Security Council’s power and capabilities for regional arrangements. In fact, the Security Council is the major component of the UN which is able to make imperative decisions.<sup>6</sup> When the members of the Security Council agree that the international community has to intervene in a conflict situation, they will write a mandate for a peace operation.

Chapter V of the Charter explains the responsibility of the Security Council “for the maintenance of international peace and security” and in order to realize that “with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources”.<sup>7</sup> The Security Council functions continuously and implements its own procedures of acting. Chapter VI consists of 6 articles which explain the settlement of disputes and the duty for every party to seek a solution by mediation, negotiation, judicial settlement or other peaceful means.<sup>8</sup> The Security Council may also investigate a dispute or make recommendations to a peaceful solution for the parties. Chapter VII explains the right to intervene in a situation when international peace and security is being threaten, in the first instance without using force, but if necessary they have the right to use force and take urgent

military measures, whether it is a prevention or an enforcement intervention.<sup>9</sup> The Chapter concludes that the Security Council may take action at any time to restore the international peace and security.

Written in the “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Principles and Guidelines” the three basic principles of keeping international peace and security are still served, even though all transformations in time. The principles are consent of the parties, impartiality and non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate.<sup>10</sup> Consent of the main parties is necessary for the legitimacy of a UN peacekeeping operation. There is a need for commitment for a political process and the acceptance to support the mission. Without this consent of the main parties the mission is an enforcement of peace instead of peacekeeping. It is important to keep this consent during the whole process. To realize this, trust and understanding of history, customs and culture are required, plus the estimation of development of interests and motivations of the main parties.

To maintain the consent of the main parties, the second principle is essential; impartiality. Be aware of the fact that impartiality is not the same as neutrality, the peacekeepers should be impartial in their contact with the concerning parties in the conflict, but they should not be neutral in the implementation of their activities and the mandate. According to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO):

“Notwithstanding the need to establish and maintain good relations with the parties, a peacekeeping operation must scrupulously avoid activities that might compromise its image of impartiality. ... Failure to do so may undermine the peacekeeping operation’s credibility and legitimacy, and may lead to a withdrawal of consent for its presence by one or more of the parties. Where the peacekeeping operation is required to counter such breaches, it must do so with transparency, openness and effective communication as to the rationale and appropriate nature of its response. This will help to minimize opportunities to manipulate the perceptions against the mission, and help to mitigate the potential backlash from the parties and their supporters.”<sup>11</sup>

The third principle adds to the first two principles. With only use of force in self-defense or defense of the mandate, the consent of the parties will have a positive effect on the consent of the parties as well as the neutrality. If force is used with malice, impartiality is hard to maintain.

### **2.1.2 Peacekeeping missions**

The UN knows a long history of peacekeeping. With its first mission in 1948, this part of the UN has been in existence for more than 60 years. Obviously, there have been a lot of transformations within the strategies. Traditional UN peacekeeping missions were characterized by observation, monitoring, supervision of the cease-fire and interposition as buffer and confidence building between parties.<sup>12</sup> ONUC, the UN mission in the Congo in 1960-1964, was already an exception on these traditional missions, because it aimed to prevent civil war, assisted the Congolese government in restoring law and order and gave technical assistance. Not only military personnel was part of ONUC, but also civilian, police and advisory personnel.<sup>13</sup>

Often, the end of the Cold War is seen as a turning point in history of conflicts. Kaldor explains the rise of new wars: intrastate conflicts, guerrilla warfare with asymmetric parties, heavily fighting with the consequence of many civilian victims. Spread of fear by horrible human rights violations is one of the goals, but also political violence and ordinary crime is part of those ‘new wars’.<sup>14</sup> Because rebel movements are frequently involved, which are close to or part of the population, the difference between civilians and rebels is hard to indicate. Besides, there is often an economic motive in these wars, so civilians can join the rebels for economic gains easily. This makes the conflict complex, with indefinable parties. Also, new wars mostly take place within weak or failed states. Problems such as lack of infrastructure, lack of state capacity, ongoing violence and human rights abuses, as well as a displaced and divided population are common in new wars.<sup>15</sup>

Kaldor states:

“The blurring of the distinction between external and internal, state and non-state, combatant and non-combatant implies the blurring of the distinction between war and peace. ‘New wars’ do not have decisive beginnings or endings... The principles of legitimacy derive from individual rights rather than the rights of states.”<sup>16</sup>

Without a decisive beginning or ending, it is hard to find an appropriate way to intervene. Kaldor puts forward a new approach to these new wars. She states that not warfare with aims to overcome the victory is the core of the new wars, nor traditional peacekeeping with observations and cease-fire agreements, but civil “freedom from fear and freedom from want”.<sup>17</sup> According to this theory, human security is a precondition to build a democracy; there is a need for a combination of human rights and human development. A human security force needs to protect civilians via a mixture of military, civilian and police personnel, with international pressure as well as a bottom-up approach. In this situation, there is a need for creating space for a legitimate political process by stabilization, so that local and national political authority can be rebuilt. An intensive dialogue and reconciliation that bring local security are required, even in the rule of law and legitimate local governance.<sup>18</sup>

The international pressure can provide a human security force. This can be accomplished by a UN peacekeeping mission. Hence, in these complex new wars a tradition peacekeeping mission with its main task to observe is less adequate now. There is a need for more structural reforms to strive towards sustainable peaceful transformation of the society which is deeply ingrained by violence and conflicts. Institution building and creating conditions for sustainable peace are inevitable in these war-torn societies.<sup>19</sup> More comprehensive approaches with having an eye for long-term peacebuilding by way of multi-dimensional interventions are more effective in current conflicts.

Because of changing politics and conflicts and repeated failures, the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations has created the so called ‘Brahimi report’ in 2000. There is a need for more effective results of peace operations and better management of personnel in the field. Recommendations for operational, organizational, politics and strategy are made to be better able to adjust at new wars and the current global order. The most important recommendations are to make clearer, more achievable and credible mandates with distinct objectives, improving consultation between troop contributors and the Security Council, better protection of civilians and strengthening sustainable rule of law institutions and human rights respects, strengthening capacity of peace operations personnel and recruiting based on expertise, clear mission leadership and more effective strategies by doing more strategic analyses.<sup>20</sup>

Subsequently, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations has written in its new ‘Principles and Guidelines’ that “all United Nations entities have a responsibility to ensure that human rights are promoted and protected by and within their field operations. Most United Nations multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations are therefore mandated to promote and protect human rights by monitoring and helping to investigate human rights violations and/or developing the capacity of national actors and institutions to do so on their own.”<sup>21</sup> The integration of human rights activities is important to protect civilians and by building institutions to monitor violations and advocacy, the UN operations need to be more effective and sustainable.




Figure 1. The Core Business of Multi-dimensional United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

With the multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations the line between peacekeeping and peacebuilding is blurred, but it is fundamental to understand the differences. Peacekeeping is the presence of the United Nation in the field in the form of a temporary mission, with its main objective to create peace and prevent a new conflict.<sup>22</sup> The mission exists of military and police personnel, often in cooperation with civilian personnel. According to the UN Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines, the essential functions of UN multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations are to:

- a) "Create a secure and stable environment while strengthening the State's ability to provide security, with full respect for the rule of law and human rights;
- b) Facilitate the political process by promoting dialogue and reconciliation and supporting the establishment of legitimate and effective institutions of governance;
- c) Provide a framework to ensure that all United Nations and other international actors pursue their activities at the country-level in a coherent and coordinated manner."<sup>23</sup>

Peacebuilding is to recognize and support national, regional and local structures which will contribute to strengthen peace and maintain this so that a new conflict will be prevented.<sup>24</sup> The 'UN 2006 Peacebuilding Capacity Inventory' distinguishes measures according to 4 peacebuilding sectors:

- "Security and public order (e.g. security sector governance, law enforcement, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants, mine action)
- Justice and reconciliation (e.g. transitional justice, judicial and legal reform, human rights)
- Governance and participation (e.g. good offices, constitution-making, local governance, political parties, civil society, media)
- Social and economic well-being (e.g. protection of vulnerable groups, basic needs, gender, physical infrastructure, employment, economic development)."<sup>25</sup>




Figure 2. Linkages and Grey Areas

Although there are several differences between peacekeeping and peacebuilding, in practice these two areas often overlap. For a multi-dimensional peacekeeping mission it is its objective to contribute to sustainable peacebuilding including bringing about the transition of peacekeeping to post-conflict peacebuilding. In figure 1 this distinction is visible.

### 2.1.3 UN Agencies

There are many UN agencies of the General Assembly working on peace, development, humanitarian aid and security, like United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS), World Health Organization (WHO) etcetera. All these agencies have their own policy and programs to contribute to peacebuilding, while having broad international responsibilities. The specialized agencies and the General Assembly of the UN coordinate through consultation and sharing recommendations.<sup>26</sup>

The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) is part of the Secretariat of the UN, and is primarily involved in peace operations. They mobilize and coordinate partnerships between humanitarian actors, bring them together and advocate rights and protection of people in need.<sup>27</sup> OCHA has a strategic framework with three pillars: Partnership, coordination, and management and professionalism.

Through partnership, OCHA wants to build an appropriate environment for an effective humanitarian system that can respond adequately to crises. This partnership will be with members of the UN, regional organizations, NGOs and also with the private sector.<sup>28</sup> By doing this, they want to increase multilateral humanitarian action. But in addition to building partnership, there is a need for a coordination system with strong leadership and well-built coordination mechanisms. Third aspect



of this framework is to develop efficient management and administration, by means of well educated staff and with the capacity to respond rapidly to humanitarian crises situations.<sup>29</sup>

## **2.2 Conflict transformation**

In continuation of the changing type of conflicts and more complex and comprehensive peace operations there is more attention to conflict transformation and bottom-up approaches. This paragraph explains the theories of Miall and Fischer.

### **2.2.1 What is conflict transformation?**

Because 'just' ending a war is impossible and is not the solution for conflicts present nowadays, the society has to be transformed into a peaceful society.<sup>30</sup> In asymmetric new wars, there is a lot of contrariety and inequality, and those aspects result in a protracted negative circle of conflict and deformation.<sup>31</sup> According to Miall, conflict transformation is the process of addressing the root causes of a conflict and seeking for a bottom-up approach to make a change in the causes of the conflict. Disordered relations, interests, discourses and the constitution of the society support continuation of the conflict in war-torn societies. There are many actors involved; not only the warring parties but also state-actors, non-state actors and outsiders with human and material resources contribute to the peacebuilding process.<sup>32</sup> Because local structures and systems have to be changed, support of the groups and people within the society is fundamental in the peacebuilding process. To rebuild devastated relationships there has to be a focus on reconciliation, and for third party interveners, it is inevitable to ignore internal actors. Sensitivity to local culture and structures, as well as a long-term vision, are required to reach transformation in a war-torn society.<sup>33</sup>

To be able to understand the conflict and the sequence of the peacebuilding process in time and action, Miall distinguishes 5 types of transformation. The first type, context transformation, addresses the international and regional environment that can influence the perceptions and motives of the parties. The paths of development and culture are also part of the context. Secondly, structural transformation concerns changes in power structures, economy, the set of actors with their goals and relations. Asymmetric conflicts could transform by balancing relationships with support of internal and external actors. Thirdly, actor transformation means that leadership, goals or approaches change in the conflict area. Support for political leaders or for the public constituencies can change, actors can leave or new actors might engage in the conflict. Fourthly, issue transformation includes reformulation of positions of the parties with regard to key issues of the conflict, construction of compromises or de-linking or re-linking issues. The fifth transformation is that of personal changes, change in perspectives, heart, will for conciliation of individual leaders or small groups which are involved in decision-making. This transformation can be part of policy of external interveners.<sup>34</sup>

The diversity of conflict transformations interact over time, transformations can cause a chain reaction or can influence another changing aspect. These transformations are all about attitudes, behavior and circumstances.<sup>35</sup> Often, traditional attitudes and behavior have to change because of deeply ingrained conflict and hostility within the society. According to Fischer, a crucial role lies here for civil society: educating peace, raising awareness and aiming for social consensus whereupon democratic values and politics can be based.<sup>36</sup> For this purpose, partnership is required in all levels of society, civil society has to be acknowledged and strengthened by better mechanisms for interaction between international organizations, NGOs and governments. The next paragraph explains the different levels and actors in conflict transformation.

### **2.2.2 Actors and levels**

To distinguish the different actors at different levels, Lederach made a "peacebuilding pyramid" of the actors involved in peacebuilding, with three different levels of leadership and approaches. Figure 2.1 shows the actors in order of their distance to the population and with the different approaches to build peace. It is a pyramid because of the differences in the affected population and the amount of actors involved in each level.<sup>37</sup>

Top-level leadership includes key military, political and religious leaders. They are primary representatives and thus highly visible. It is difficult to change statements because of their position

and publicly stated goals. State actors as political leaders are part of level one, as well as UN peace interveners working at negotiations and trying to reach a cease-fire. The first level represents a few key actors who usually have to maintain their policy and image.

Level two refers to middle-range leadership. Leaders in certain sectors, ethnic leaders, academics and big national NGOs and INGOs are usually not connected with formal leaders of the government or opposition. Their influence and status can differ from their relationships with other actors like leaders in education, business, health or the first level. Generally middle-range leaders have more freedom but less visibility than top leaders.<sup>38</sup> However, it is essential, according to Lederach, that the second level functions as an important connection between the first and third level.




Figure 3. Actors in Peacebuilding

Level three includes local NGOs, local leaders and community developers. Grassroots leaders represent the population and are numerous. Local training, prejudice reduction and psycho-social activities take part in this level approach.<sup>39</sup> These leaders often operate in the core of the conflict and face a lot of animosity. Lederach states that these three levels together with their related approaches lines out a comprehensive framework of peacebuilding. It shows that it is not possible to operate only in the top-level track, nor only at grassroots level.

This pyramid concept is based on actors; activities and approaches of different actors are central, and can be matching in a certain way concerning objectives.<sup>40</sup> Different actors have different goals, frequently regarded to the level of the pyramid wherein they belong. Approaches in track one correspond to conflict management: mediation of diplomats with an outcome-oriented approach, often with the objective to reach a peace agreement. Approaches in track two correspond to conflict resolution with unofficial interveners and non-state actors who are resolution-oriented, such as peace commissions, mainly focused on external actors. The significance of the third track in peacebuilding is admitted more and more. They are also resolution-oriented, with local dialogues and commissions, mainly focused on local actors.<sup>41</sup> A lot has been written on the relationship between the second and third track, but the relation between the first and third track is still unknown.

## 2.3 Civil society

To understand the role of NGOs and what kind of activities and projects local organizations undertake in peacebuilding, it is important to first look at the concept of civil society in general. There are many theories about this concept, but a universal definition has never been made.

### **2.3.1 What is civil society?**

Fukuyama states that civil society is the sphere between state and individuals. It is the social space for individuals in which they can organize aspiring political and social objectives.<sup>42</sup> Because collective action in civil society is voluntary, there is a great will to achieve goals and create networks. Newton defines civil society as “a broad, deep and dense network of voluntary associations and intermediary organizations”.<sup>43</sup>

Nevertheless, civil society never has a common vision, neither is it a homogeneous entity. Likewise, the role is not that clear. Politicians and academics often see civil society as an answer to social, political and economic problems.<sup>44</sup> Despite its heterogeneity and the debate about the role of civil society, there are some common aspects. Salamon and Anheier list these characteristics of civil society:

- “Organizations, they have an institutional presence and structure;
- Private, they are institutionally separate from the state;
- Not profit distributing, they do not return profits to their managers or to a set of “owners”;
- Self-governing, they are fundamentally in control of their own affairs;
- Voluntary, membership in them is not legally required and they attract some level of voluntary contribution of time or money.”<sup>45</sup>

Civil society is often been solely referred to non-governmental organizations (NGOs), but civil society is more than that. Unions, alliances and associations are also part of it, if they convene with the criteria mentioned above. Putnam draws it even broader; he emphasizes social capital within civil society; that is the networks and relations that strengthen individuals in its social, political and economic activities. At the same time, individuals unfold attitudes like trust, civility and loyalty.<sup>46</sup> This is civil society in the broadest sense.

Hence, in civil society both social ties and social networks are constructed, by which solidarity as well as social diversity come into existence. Civilians are going to organize themselves by which formal institutions and procedures come into being to control the state. The political system has to be more open and participant, as a result of which the system will be more democratic. Therefore, according to Fukuyama, civil society is a basis for democracy.<sup>47</sup> A civil society with strong structures can bring a sense of security and social intercourse; it can “balance the power of the state and to protect individuals from the state’s power”.<sup>48</sup>

According to Paffenholz, civil society in Africa is something different than a Western-type of civil society. Because of the colonial history and the suppression of the opposition by the ruling elite, there is no space for participatory governance and impact on democratization.<sup>49</sup> Moreover, organizations like labor unions and alliances are less common in African societies. So it is less feasible to create a balance of state’s power and protection of the population, or to participate in politics by organizing civilians.

### **2.3.2 The role of NGOs in peacebuilding**

There are many theories on the effectivity and requirement of NGOs in peacebuilding. In traditional peacekeeping operations and before the rise of conflict transformation, peacebuilding was mainly the task of diplomats.<sup>50</sup> But nowadays NGOs are numerous and impossible to ignore, although there is still division of the roles of NGOs. According to Chigas:

“NGOs are said to offer flexibility, expertise, rapid responses, and commitment to local environments to meet the challenges of the new generation of peace operations and to make connections to civil society and the grassroots, now seen as essential components of democracy and peacebuilding. Others warn of the dangers inherent in multiple agendas, the lack of accountability of NGOs, and their potential for diverting needed funds from the United Nations and other responsible intergovernmental organizations.”<sup>51</sup>

In addition, a lack of capacity, skills and failure in strategic thinking, as well as problems with program design limit NGOs in what they can realize in peacebuilding. NGOs are frequently said to be contrary

of official peacebuilding in the top-level track in their way of acting, since they are more flexible and locally oriented. But it can also be said that NGOs are complementary to the top-level, just for having opposite ways of operating.<sup>52</sup>

The Worldbank Civil Society Report describes seven functions of civil society in peacebuilding.<sup>53</sup> Protection of civilians and autonomy, monitoring of activities of state, as well as non-state actors, and advocacy are the foremost important functions for human rights NGOs in conflict situations. Creating peaceful attitudes and values and establishing social cohesion among citizens are functions which are important in every society, with or without conflict. Facilitating dialogue and collaboration between institutions, interests groups and state is an important function after a conflict but hard to realize because institutions and state are often weak during and after a conflict. Furthermore, service provision for citizens to participate in the peacebuilding process is the seventh function of civil society.

However, it is not always easy to realize these functions. Frerks states that civil society can be seen as a bridge between the elite level and grassroots level. He describes eight challenges of civil society in peacebuilding: neutrality, representation, differences in quality, space for spoilers, transparency and accountability, impact and effectivity, sustainability and security.<sup>54</sup> Some NGOs tend to be neutral, apolitical and impartial, while others attempt to increase justice by aiming at the accusation of perpetrators and violations. In a conflict situation, it might be difficult to keep propaganda out and to deal with every ethnic group. Relating to this challenge is the representation of NGOs; who or what do they really represent, what are the constituencies and target group(s) without being partial. There are a lot of differences between NGOs with regard to expertise, capacity, financial management, operational competence et cetera. So it is a heterogeneous sector with diverse projects and outcome, often hard to measure.

Frerks also says that discourses are various and highly sensitive. Projects consist of a compromise between interests and different goals, which can lead making space for spoilers. To minimize this space and restrain corruption, transparency and accountability are important to realize. Then there is a challenge of impact and measurement. "Conflict and peace are multi-level, multi-actor, multi-causal and multi-faceted phenomena."<sup>55</sup> It is hard to see or measure the impact of one project of one NGO, especially the small grassroots NGOs. But when impact and effectivity is hard to measure, it is the question whether a project is unsuccessful, or it is overruled by power-elites at the macro level of the society, which are on a larger scale and more effectual. Sustainability is another point of discussion. As well as in development projects as in peacebuilding, the question of sustainability and the degree of capacity remains essential. It is important to look at the short-term but also the long-term outcome of a project or intervention, while the capacity to be effective in the long term in (post-) conflict situations is usually low. Finally, there is always the issue of security, and how to relate to the military presence. Nowadays debates on the civil-military cooperation versus neutrality are often taking place in civil society.

The OCHA brochure "Principles relating to emergency humanitarian action" is handed out to every local organization, to increase effectiveness and maximize the humanitarian space.<sup>56</sup> There are two kinds of principles: fundamental principles and necessary conditions. The fundamental principles contain rules of humanity that says that every human being has the right to help, dignity and respect. Another rule is impartiality; aid must be distributed without ethnic, religious or political distinction. They also have to be neutral and strive towards an apolitical character of the actions. Humanitarian assistance is independent of political, economical or military considerations, and promotes human rights. Besides these rules, there are necessary conditions for humanitarian action. To ensure long-term impact of the actions, actions should involve beneficiaries, local partners and local structures. Secondly, "agencies implicated in humanitarian aid commit to working in a coordinated manner using existing coordination mechanisms." Thirdly, organizations should be transparent in their programs and contacts by sharing information with donors, beneficiaries and authorities (if security is not endangered). Fourthly, there has to be freedom of access. The fifth rule is the rule of safety. "Local authorities are responsible for the safety and the protection of the civilian population in conflict zones. These authorities have the duty to create suitable conditions for the implementation

of the humanitarian aid programs... security for both the staff and assets of the organizations.” Armed escort is always the last resort.

### **2.3.3 Human Rights NGOs**

In this research, the emphasis is on human rights NGOs. Weiss and Gordenker state that “national human rights organizations often address volatile issues that directly attack fundamental power relationships in their own societies.”<sup>57</sup> Sometimes these are physical injuries like political killings, torture, kidnapping, and other physical human rights violations, in other cases the issues are about societal distribution of power, services and wealth. Also, participation in decision-making and involvement in politics are addressed by human rights NGOs. So human rights issues are multifarious; political, social, ethnic, economic, cultural, collective and self-determination rights are part of the programs of these NGOs.

Weiss and Gordenker outline three activities of human rights NGOs: 1) revealing abuses and mobilizing ignominy and disgrace through public advocacy, and gathering information of human rights violations; 2) delivering services like legal aid, training to develop advocacy and expanding skills of local actors and creating awareness of rights by educational activities for local civilians; 3) communication with decision-makers to establish the norms of human rights and set national as well as international agendas.<sup>58</sup> Therefore, local and national NGOs often cooperate with international NGOs, diplomats and UN personnel. To increase access and effectiveness, it is important to have informal relationships with UN personnel and to generate new UN mechanisms to respond to local human rights issues.<sup>59</sup>

## **2.4 Interaction in peacebuilding**

After describing the role of NGOs in peacebuilding, this paragraph will focus on the role of international interventions and its civil tasks, as well as the relationship between the UN peacekeeping missions and local NGOs. Many authors, such as Duffield and Pearce, describe the role of interventions by way of relating it to development, since peace goes hand in hand with development. Furthermore, creating local ownership in peacebuilding is explained, and the extent of bottom-up approaches in international peacekeeping.

### **2.4.1 The role of international peacekeeping missions**

After the Cold War, the role of peacekeeping missions has changed, since the types of conflict and the international vision on peace and development have changed. Duffield states: “The current concern of global governance is to establish a liberal peace...: to resolve conflicts, reconstruct societies and establish functioning market economies as a way to avoid future wars. The ultimate goal of liberal peace is stability.”<sup>60</sup> Peace and development go hand in hand. On the one hand, to reach security in instable communities, the community has to develop itself with sustainable changes which cannot be imposed from outside. On the other hand, to reach more development within poor communities, changing societies by altering traditional behavior and values into more liberal visions have been advocated in the international literature.<sup>61</sup> Participation and cooperative partnerships are essential to reach both development and security.<sup>62</sup>

The role of an international intervention is, amongst others, to change the system of institutions and local attitudes, Duffield claims.<sup>63</sup> With strong institutions in which people can participate and incentives for conflict resolution and development are evolving, behavior can change and ownership of the population has to increase.<sup>64</sup> This is a sustainable way of raising security and due to the globalization the whole world will profit from security and development of the failed states, according to Duffield.<sup>65</sup>

Pearce agrees the convergence of peace and development. The role of international peacekeeping missions is to develop a model fitting in the concerning society, bear upon economic, political and social processes, by way of critical reflection of field activities and adjust to ingrained approaches.<sup>66</sup> More listening to local actors is required, she states. Understanding local cultures and structures can be important for international interveners but is not realized in current missions. To encourage the local population in participating in the peacebuilding process and to build local capacity, listening and empathy can be useful.<sup>67</sup>

According to Pearce, the international community has to create a safe space for locals to participate in peace processes. In this safe space, ownership can be developed. By way of capacity development in civil society, as well as consolidation of the rule of law, the peacebuilding process can be increasingly sustainable. Pearce wants to see more investment in the determination of local actors for sustainable change and more reflection on relationships between internal and external actors.<sup>68</sup>

Van der Lijn also states that UN peacekeeping operations only partly contribute to durable peace, since these UN operations still need to improve. He states that there has to be more involvement and more listening to local parties and the population. It is important to create ownership during and after the peace operation for the local actors to contribute in the peace process and ensure sustainability. That is why local involvement should start as soon as possible in peace operations. "Although through the integration of the UN country team into peacekeeping operations a better link with local civil society has been established, local NGOs need to be further incorporated into peace processes. One of the main problems is, however, that not only the parties but most often also civil society is highly polarized during and immediately after a conflict and that local civil society is often not representative."<sup>69</sup>

Since there is no response to local needs and sustainable peace has not been realized frequently, Chesterman states that ownership is low in transitional societies.<sup>70</sup> Having dialogues with local actors is time-consuming, he argues. Furthermore, to reach ownership for local and national actors during and after the peacekeeping operation, there is a need to decide together what they consider to be right. In so doing, the motivation and capacity of the local actors will increase. For this joint decision-making, interaction is required for sharing needs and visions to address the operation.<sup>71</sup> In addition, local laws are often contradicting with international laws and human rights. That is why international visions and interests of the donors and interventions are more central in the peacebuilding process than the local needs. In such cases, it is hard to create local ownership in the peacebuilding process.<sup>72</sup>

The role of the internationals, according to Chesterman, is to manage expectations and tensions between conflict resolution and local values and traditions.<sup>73</sup> Expectations do not always face the reality, due to a lack of information of objectives and projects. In addition, if justice has high priority in (post)-conflict societies, with fighting against impunity and generating respect of the law, reconciliation amongst the population increases, claims Chesterman. Maintain security and build sustainable institutions can raise the involvement of local ownership with participation of civilians. Blueprints seem to be ineffective in practice; there is a need for more flexible management with local involvement, according to Chesterman and Pearce.<sup>74</sup>

Justice and human rights are fundamental in peacebuilding, and also important to avoid renewed conflict in the long term. O'Flaherty states that raising awareness of human rights and rights education is important, but it is not possible for internationals to reach everybody in a post-conflict area.<sup>75</sup> So they need to train local civil society to develop local capacity of human rights and to improve raising awareness. This is the first responsibility of the state and national civil society, but the UN can play a role in assistance and support in rights education, resulting in sustainable human rights programs.

Another theory of the international peacebuilding culture with its roles and failures comes from Autesserre. Peace operations neglect local visions and peacebuilders are too much surrounded by international structures and environment, whereby they do not operate very effectively. "United Nations staff and diplomats viewed intervention at the macro levels as their only legitimate responsibility. Local peacebuilding was such an unimportant, unfamiliar, and unmanageable task that even the magnitude of the disaster could not impel international peacebuilders to augment their efforts at the local level."<sup>76</sup> UN peacekeepers regularly see themselves as limited and Autesserre claims that international interveners are too much guided by their international perceptions of their own roles.

#### **2.4.2 Relationship UN and NGOs**

Many theories are about the role of the UN or NGOs in peacebuilding, or about the relationship between the UN and international NGOs, which have a different position than local NGOs. There is

not much written about the specific relation between the UN peacekeeping operations and local grassroots NGOs. Many authors of peacebuilding literature conclude that there is a need for more interaction and a better relationship between the UN and local NGOs to fulfill sustainability and bottom-up capacity building, but they do not specify this statement with details or the pros and cons of it.<sup>77</sup>

Autesserre states that the international peacebuilding culture is dominated by a top-down strategy. International interveners focus at macro-level measurements, because, according to them, violence is caused nationally and will be solved by reconstruction. The priority lies at the macro level, though it is an “impossible mission”; it costs a lot of money, infrastructure is destroyed and there is a long and complex history of conflict.<sup>78</sup> However, local needs are internal matters and will solve themselves in time; this is, according to the interviews of Autesserre, the vision of the international interveners in the field. Generally, “violence is inherent to Africa (and to the Congo), and the continent is a hopeless place where nothing can be done to improve the situation.”<sup>79</sup>

Within this top-down strategy, priority is the holding of fair and democratic elections. All tasks of the intervention have to contribute to the success of elections. Many conflict areas are labeled as post-conflict, when a peacebuilding mission is implemented in the area. This implies that the conflict is ended and stability increases. For example, eastern Congo was labeled as a post-conflict area although fighting still occurred daily during the transition in 2003-2006. The situation was even framed as a humanitarian crisis, which led to increasing humanitarian aid. The UN financed some humanitarian NGOs which were working at a sub-national or local level, but the UN’s main priority was to operate at the macro level with regard to holding elections, as well as the security and political crisis.<sup>80</sup>

According to Autesserre, in the international peacebuilding culture the top-down strategy has to be complemented with a bottom-up strategy. There has to be a shift in focus; less attention for holding elections, more attention to SSR, local conflicts and land resolutions, and creating a legitimate justice system at all levels. Local grassroots organizations are raising awareness, but local projects are often limited, small scale or they have a lack of diplomatic influence on local military and political leaders. There is a need for a local network of peacebuilders, consisting of international, local and diplomatic peacebuilders.<sup>81</sup> Autesserre states that the UN has enough financial, human and logistical resources to support local peacebuilding initiatives, especially if they redistribute their budget and complement the top-down strategy with a bottom-up strategy. But one of the main problems is the mentality and willingness of international UN staff. They see the limitations they have with regard to the mandate, sovereignty, financial and human capacity as “absolute constraints instead of manageable problems”.<sup>82</sup>

Pouligny’s theory of building new societies describes the international peacebuilding program with regard to civil society and local actors. Often local NGOs and international NGOs are seen as a single category, working with intergovernmental organizations, but frequently there is more proximity between the international actors, which are collaborating and taking space in the public sphere with less availability for local NGOs. Pouligny states that outsiders need to better understand local structures and local context.<sup>83</sup> Intervenors over-systemize their policy, based on blue prints and ignoring local processes and local needs. There are often different objectives between local and international actors. In an international intervention usually stability is the main objective, while there is more need for change within the society. “War does not only destroy a society, it also deeply transforms it.”<sup>84</sup> So sharing needs and objectives within the peacebuilding process contributes to the effectivity of this process. Peacekeepers – mainly the civilian staff – need to be better trained to be able to cooperate with the local population. Moreover, outsiders need to see local actors as the “major motors for change”.<sup>85</sup>

Pearce states that it is essential to build trust and empathy among extern and intern actors. Internationals have to work *with* “local change agents” and create a model adjusted at the local situation, instead of using a blueprint or western model in a post-conflict situation.<sup>86</sup> There is a need for better understanding of the complexity of the society and attach importance to local civil society. More adjustment among the different parties with a more local integration of the UN peace missions will contribute to an effective process of peacebuilding.<sup>87</sup>

In addition, Van Leeuwen argues that international organizations often have too high expectations of the intervention and the local civil organizations. International actors compare the local organizations to their idealistic notion of civil society. This will never be realistic, there has to be more awareness of the structures, history and developments of local civil society.<sup>88</sup> International interveners have to integrate to a certain degree in a new society where they have to deal with other local values and visions, to understand these societies more profound.

Weiss and Gordenker describe the phenomena of scaling up of local NGOs, and scaling down of the summit. The summit consists of the UN, international NGOs (INGOs) and international organizations (IOs) such as the Worldbank, IMF and WHO. Peacebuilding is a process including a lot of actors; nowadays more actors are knocking at the UN's door, international as well as local.<sup>89</sup> Weiss and Gordenker describe grassroots NGOs as millions of organizations which are small, underfunded with extremely limited budgets, localized and often inefficient, voluntary and elite-based.<sup>90</sup> With 'scaling up' they mean that grassroots organizations build a relationship with the summit, to increase their impact and move beyond being local and small. Having a strong relationship with the summit means that the organizational strength increases, since they expand activities and efficiency through external links and increasing political involvement. Another reason to work with the UN and INGOs is the availability of funds, because local NGOs have limited resources since they are small and localized in a poor and violent society. In addition, this is a motive to build relations with international actors, to increase influence in international politics and programs to unite the local needs.<sup>91</sup>

A problem of scaling up is to find the balance between international funds versus local needs. The more time, energy and personnel are put into international policy and the requirements of the international funds, the less alignment to local needs will be realized. If local NGOs are participating in international debates and interfering in international politics, they can lose their views of empowerment and structural change in local communities and adjust more and more to the summit. Then their strengths of their connection with the local population and participatory methods can decline.<sup>92</sup>

On the other hand, the summit also has advantages by having relations with grassroots organizations. Because NGOs are working in remote areas, have community trust and are more flexible than big international organizations, projects of the summit which cooperate with local NGOs can be more sustainable and effective. Another advantage is that they can adjust to local needs and recent ideologies of the private sector. And, as mentioned above, they can help each other to build local constituencies for international policies and programs.<sup>93</sup>

Hence, to make the process of scaling up useful, the summit has to scale down as well: "It should adopt structures and modes of operation that allow local communities and NGOs to build their conceptual, operational and institutional capacities... This implies a coherent and shared vision of the goal in terms of grassroots development and empowerment."<sup>94</sup> Weiss and Gordenker stress that scaling down is mostly done by INGOs, while the UN and other international organizations pay less attention to it. Through scaling down, the participation level, accountability and decentralization of international actors may increase in relation to local NGOs. Many critics say that international organizations have to act faster, with more long-term vision and less rigid and large project cycles.<sup>95</sup> There is no blueprint for each actor and each operation, since it is a learning process where a learning attitude is necessarily for actors to come closer and to be effective.

Another aspect of scaling down is information sharing and the availability of public information of international policies and projects. However, the process of scaling down is not moving forward as much as the process of scaling up. Scaling down is often resulting from the pressure of local organizations pursued to IOs, since those two processes are mutual.<sup>96</sup> Through a process of both scaling up and scaling down, accountability grows, as well as sustainability. However, all those issues apply to development projects; for peacebuilding this strategy is even harder to realize because of the strained relations with different parties and the complexity of the situation.

### **2.4.3 Contradictions and dilemmas**

Paris and Sisk have a different point of view, concerning peace- and statebuilding and contradictions in it. The main contradiction in the theories mentioned above is that "international control is required to establish local ownership".<sup>97</sup> Ownership is an aspect that needs to grow, and it has to be



developed by the local population. However, peacekeeping operations want to assist in this, because in a conflict situation locals are not able to establish ownership by themselves. Legitimacy issues do play a role in this process. It is hard for outsiders to identify local actions and local owners since they are not completely integrated in society. They can say that the actors and processes should be allocated by local actors, or by themselves as outsiders but with more expertise and knowledge.

This contradiction leads to a participation dilemma in the policy of the peace interventions. The population and authorities need to participate in peacebuilding, because in the end, they need to control the situation themselves. International actors need to be clear on what the role of the international community is and how they approach the local structures, norms and habits. They cannot take over decision-making, but neither can locals do it on their own. Consequently, they both have to participate in the peacebuilding process.

Second contradiction is that “universal values are promoted as a remedy for local problems”.<sup>98</sup> Local phenomena with their own history and the interpretation and value of the local population can be contradictory to universal, international values brought from outside into a society. What is ‘good’? What is the best for this society and who has the ‘right’ answers? Besides, in war-torn societies there are often deep-seated patterns of social, political and economic life. Outsiders may want to change these patterns, but if they modify traditional practices it can cause conflicts with local actors. Ignoring the past is impossible, as is continuing the same way.<sup>99</sup>

The level of intrusiveness is part of the footprint dilemma. On the one hand, an obvious international presence may be necessary to achieve or maintain security and stability; on the other hand, a light footprint of the international community will create a more independent situation and will be more sustainable in longer terms.<sup>100</sup> The effects of external powers can be visible in military issues, but also in non-military matters, economic or political life. The footprint will be determined by the size of the intervention, the extent of the tasks of the international mission, and the consistency of the interveners. Duration will also influence the footprint. While statebuilding is a long-term process where institutions need to be built and democratic values and awareness need to be realized before holding elections, a long-term mission can also create passivity, lack of interest or hostility of local actors against the international presence.<sup>101</sup>

## **2.5 Theoretical framework**

This chapter has specified the theories, which have been used in this research. Because there are no specific theories about the relationship between UN peacekeeping missions and local NGOs in peacebuilding, this research builds upon several authors who describe parts of this research, like roles in the peacebuilding or local involvement of UN peacekeeping.

Now these theories will be made ready for use to be able to find an answer at the research question: *“How do MONUSCO and the local human rights NGOs perceive their role in the peacebuilding process in the DRC and their relationship to each other within this process?”* This research is going to examine some hypotheses from the existing theories. Because most theories do not include personal perceptions and attitudes towards other actors from other levels, this empirical fieldwork will also reduce this gap in knowledge about peacebuilding operations.

### **2.5.1 Roles of UN peacekeeping missions and local NGOs**

In recent years, international visions are evolving and strategies are changing; liberal peace ideas increase. Also, the UN evolves his strategy into more liberal and multi-dimensional. Peace operations policy nowadays is focused on political processes, protection of civilians, promotion of human rights and aims at reaching stability of whole societies.<sup>102</sup> However, stability is not always being reached.

Since the UN has been criticized a lot, effectivity of the peace operations is a big issue. Not only reports like the Brahimi report states that the UN missions need to be more effective, authors like Autesserre and Van der Lijn also made this conclusion in their researches.<sup>103</sup> Autesserre states that the UN’s ineffectiveness is the result of the international peacebuilding culture that excludes local visions and integration of local actors.

As described by, amongst others Duffield and Pearce, security and peace are related to development.<sup>104</sup> It is more than to stop violence; traditions and behavior need to transform into other structures and sometimes also the mentality of the local population, besides political and

economic development. Pearce states that local actors are the agents to change in collaboration with the UN, while Duffield put more emphasis on the modifications of incentives and institutions by the internationals. Unclear is what is whose role and whether these roles overlap or not. None of the theories compares the two roles of local NGOs and UN peacekeeping missions.

Where the theories do focus on, is the role of internationals as well as the influence of the international peacebuilding culture. International needs and interests are more central in international interventions, because it is easier to use blueprints and it takes too much time to have dialogues with locals.<sup>105</sup> It is their path towards peace, with their – international – values. Some say a new phase is coming, with more emphasis on bottom-up approaches, local needs and capacity building.<sup>106</sup> Also, UN policy acknowledges this shift towards more local involvement. However, there are contradictions between the UN policy described in chapter 2.1, and the criticisms on the role the UN plays in current peacebuilding processes, described in chapter 2.4.

Autesserre includes in her research the personal perception of the role of interveners; many think that their role is at the macro level and is limited, in an almost “impossible mission”.<sup>107</sup> There is a tendency to show western models for peacebuilding and development, Pearce claims.<sup>108</sup> Participation of the local population or local NGOs is commonly not considered, because it takes too much time and local laws are frequently contradicting with international laws. As all authors state in this chapter, it is easier to look at your own international values and interests than the unfamiliar local ones.

However, none of the authors mentioned the perception of local actors and how they see the role of the UN, neither they describe a clear role of the local NGOs themselves. The theories imply that there is a difference between those perceptions, because interveners are too much led by the international culture and there is need for more emphasis on local needs and visions. However, this is only a presumption and not been examined.

This research will look at the vision of the role of interveners and it will test the statement of Autesserre: *International UN peacekeepers view their role in peacebuilding at the macro level and as limited*. To examine this hypothesis, there are several interview questions formulated. First of all there has been asked at UN officers for their role in the peacebuilding process. This question is as neutral as possible so the interviewee has to give its own perceptions, at a macro level or a micro level. Then there are questions about the effectiveness of the UN peacekeeping mission, weaknesses and positive points of the mission, to see what is in mind of the interviewee and if they see the mission as limited or with many strengths. Also, the causes of weaknesses have been asked, to clarify the visions of the international UN peacekeepers.

Another hypothesis is made, due to the implication that there is a difference between local and international perceptions: *The perceptions of locals and internationals with regard to the role of both actors in the peacebuilding process do not correspond with each other*. This statement will be examined by asking both local NGOs and UN officers for the vision of their own role in the peacebuilding process and the role of the other. Also at this point, the question about effectiveness, weaknesses and positive aspects is essential to make a complete picture of the vision of the interviewee. In the analysis, the two visions of local NGOs and international UN officers are compared to each other, to see whether there is some comprehension or disagreement in these roles. No theories are written about the consequences of a divergence between roles. It could be related to the interaction or relationship, which will be further illustrated in the next paragraph.

### **2.5.2 Relationship between UN peacekeeping missions and local NGOs**

Theories about peacebuilding processes describe roles of different actors and the change in visions in time, but they do not talk about relationships. Although, these theories push the international community into more interaction between locals and internationals and it is argued that further research is required about this interaction. Consequently, if there is interaction, there has to be a certain extent of relationship. Indirect derived from the theories, there are two central themes fundamental in the relationship in post-conflict areas: communication and integration.

#### 2.5.2.1 Communication

Pouligny states that sharing visions is necessary to understand local structures and context, so there has to be contact between internationals and locals to increase comprehension.<sup>109</sup> She claims that internationals need to be trained to adjust at locals and to share objectives among different actors. Nowadays there is too much focus on only international visions, according to Pouligny. Van Leeuwen also states that interveners need to know about local initiatives, and they have to release their expectations.<sup>110</sup> For this information and vision sharing there is a need for communication and interaction; issues that return in every theory described in this chapter.

According to the UN policy, more and more communication with local actors is taking place in peacebuilding.<sup>111</sup> But criticisms, described above, claim that there is not enough communication and understanding between international and local actors. Mainly scaling down needs to increase, according to Weiss and Gordenker.<sup>112</sup> The advantages and problems described by Weiss and Gordenker as a result of scaling down or scaling up is a theory in the context of development. Whether these aspects also occur in post-conflict situations is unclear. This research is going to apply the theory of Weiss and Gordenker in post-conflict situations, according to the UN officers and local actors in the field.

Paris and Sisk state that a balance has to be found between footprints of external actors with universal values and internal actors with traditional local values.<sup>113</sup> Internationals tend to work according to western models, while local traditions are often contradictory. Locals do not understand the strategy of the internationals, or they do not agree with new structures or institutions. In addition, international interveners may not understand local values or international models do not fit in local projects. Therefore, they have to make mutual concessions to find the best way to operate and to transform the conflict into a peaceful situation. Dialogues and communication are essential in this process.

Many authors, such as Duffield, Pearce, Van der Lijn and Chesterman argue that there is too much focus on the international visions and the demands of donors.<sup>114</sup> All these authors agree that there is a need for more local involvement to make the peacebuilding process more sustainable at long term, and for the UN peacekeeping missions to be more effective. This involvement can be increased by interaction and dialogues between the concerning actors. Remarkably, none of them write about relationships between the UN and local NGOs, while local involvement of international interveners demand for interaction and thus a certain degree of a relationship. Whether local and international actors in the field think there is enough interaction or there is a lot of misunderstanding between each other, is unclear in the existing theories.

Looking at the theories, the expectation is that there is not enough communication between the actors in the field. In this research is communication defined as: “the imparting or exchanging of information by speaking, writing, or using some other medium.”<sup>115</sup> A hypothesis is that a *lack of communication leads to a difficult relationship*. First, a question about the communication between the UN peacekeeping mission and local NGOs needs to clarify the interaction between them. Important is to know whether the contact is enough, according to the interviewees, or there is need for more contact. By way of asking both the UN, as well as local NGOs for their opinion about the relationship, with its strengths and obstacles, this relationship can be largely described with the extent of communication and information sharing.

#### 2.5.2.2 Integration

As described in the theories, relationships are related to the extent of interaction, to the balance between local and international visions and needs, but these aspects are also influenced by integration in the society. International actors should integrate more in the society if they want to understand the local structures better. Adjustment is essential in this and Pouligny and Pearce state that there is more training required for the interveners to be able to adapt to and interact with locals. Listening and sensitivity to traditions and local values are fundamental; “this will build trust and enable the international community to work with change agents rather than turn them into mirror images of western organizations.”<sup>116</sup>

Tamara Duffy explains in her article ‘Cultural issues in contemporary peacekeeping’<sup>117</sup> the importance of culture and understanding of differences. Nowadays culture is often not be recognized

as significant to peacekeepers, but it makes operating and cooperating much easier if local culture is being understood. Duffy states that there is a lack of understanding, due to the lack of sharing cultural views and information. With more training of intercultural communication skills and more integration in the society comprehension increases. Important is that not only formal contacts with locals to understand projects are essential, but just informal contacts create more understanding and trust among the different levels.<sup>118</sup>

The integration in the local culture and society contributes to comprehension and effectiveness of the UN mission, according to the existing theories. In this research, integration is defined as: “the intermixing of people who were previously segregated.”<sup>119</sup> However, it is unclear to what extent actors in the field invest in integration and comprehension. What actors know about each other, about their values, the differences between them and how they respond on each other in the field is necessary to know to describe the relationship.

The hypothesis is: *More integration of UN peacekeepers should relate to stronger relationships.* To find out the vision of field actors, they will be asked about the extent of integration of the international interveners of the UN peacekeeping mission in social life and the local culture. Questions about the differences between values, knowledge or other aspects are been asked, and whether this might cause problems in their relationship.

Related to the integration in the society, is the creation of local ownership by external actors for long-term processes. According to Chesterman, ownership is low because it costs too much time, but without participation of locals in the peacebuilding process, passivity and a lack of interest can be created.<sup>120</sup> A balance should be found between participation of locals and footprints of the internationals. The vision of the actors in the field will be mapped, with regard to sustainability of the peacebuilding in the long term.

After describing the history and context of the DRC in Chapter 3, this thesis will first describe the perceptions and results of the interviews with local human rights NGO representatives. Afterwards, the results of the interviews with the UN peacekeeping mission are given and compared with local perceptions. Then, the expectations expressed in this chapter will be reflected. As a result, the conclusion will verify whether the hypotheses came true that the perceptions differ, due to a lack of interaction, and that this will result in a difficult relationship between NGOs and the UN peacekeeping mission.

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### 3 The story of the DRC

It can be said that the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is a very complex and one of the most atrocious conflict in this time. It is complex because there are many issues and parties involved in this conflict and thereby the whole population in the DRC is involved, as well as organizations, authorities and other institutions. Important issues in the conflict include primacy of land, failed state and corruption, violence against women and other human rights violations, and a disorganized army. This chapter explains the context of the relationships of the UN and local human rights NGOs in the DRC. The history is fundamental to understand the current situation. Furthermore, the human rights situation and the civil society in the DRC are described, with its developments.

#### 3.1 History of the conflict in the DRC

The Congo was not a usual case in the colonization. It was the geographical centre of Africa and contained a lot of natural resources. Many neighboring countries, colonizers and armed groups wanted to benefit from these resources. “Everybody wanted to have a piece of Congo”, according to Maurice Carney, Executive Director at Friends of the Congo.<sup>1</sup> Congo has always been the middle of a geo-strategic battle.

In the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the Belgian King Leopold II claimed the Congo as his own property.<sup>2</sup> The boundaries were set on the Berlin conference in 1885, without involving the Congolese population. Slavery and personal rule became the norm; King Leopold wanted to profit from the rubber and other resources. But because of harsh treatment of the population, the Belgian parliament took over the Congo. In 1960 the Congo became independent, with the elected Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba and President Joseph Kasavubu. However, some regions wanted to secede. That is where the UN got involved; it deployed ‘*l’Opération des Nations Unies au Congo*’ (ONUC), to restore territorial integrity and maintain law and order. Then, Prime Minister Lumumba was assassinated. Chaos prevailed.<sup>3</sup>

In 1965 Mobutu Sese Seko committed a coup d’état. Although he succeeded to end most decentralized fighting, state violence continued during his dictatorship, for three decades. In 1971 he renamed the Congo into Zaire. He relied on clientelism and installed a corrupt authoritarian regime, which was notorious for its greed; exploitation of the natural resources, and maintaining wealth and power at the cost of the population’s wellbeing.<sup>4</sup>

In 1973 he introduced the General Property law, which nationalized all land and authorities. Local authorities and traditional chiefs lost power and peasants were deprived of their customary land. Consequently, tensions at local level increased and ethnic rivalries aggravated.<sup>5</sup> The resistance expanded, so Mobutu had to accede to elections in the early 90’s. In May 1990 a student protest for repression the political opposition turned into a massacre.<sup>6</sup> Security forces violently repressed the protests and many students were killed. The number of victims was unknown because the bodies disappeared. Consequently, the European Economic Commission, former colonizer Belgium, Canada and the United States broke off the humanitarian aid to Zaire.<sup>7</sup>

Instead of elections, a national conference was held for political reform. This conference established a new government with Etienne Tshisekedi as prime minister. But Mobutu did not accept this new government; as a result, two rival governments were controlling the Zaire since 1992.<sup>8</sup> Rather than political reform and stability, political chaos and instability exacerbated.

Then, regional instability rose due to the genocide in Rwanda. The conflict between Hutus and Tutsis reached an outburst when the Hutu president Habyarimana was killed on April 6<sup>th</sup> 1994. Hutu extremists – known as the Interahamwe – followed this assassination by killing more than 800.000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus. But when the Tutsi-led rebellion Kagame took power, about 2 million – mainly Hutu – Rwandan refugees fled into the Congo, both militants and civilians.<sup>9</sup> As Prunier states, “it was easy to predict the impact of one and a half million refugees with an extremist political leadership, plenty of weapons and a history of genocide when they suddenly burst upon this fragile human environment”.<sup>10</sup> Refugee camps in Nord Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri were overcrowded and were controlled by people who committed the genocide. They prepared attacks against the Rwandan



Tutsi-government and to Congolese Tutsis. Kagame responded to this threat with outrages in the Congo, because he stated that the international community did not do anything.<sup>11</sup>




Figure 4. Approximate Deployment of Armed Groups during the Second Congo War

Meanwhile, resistance against Mobutu in Zaire grew. Congolese rebellions in eastern Congo wanted to liberate the Congo, they formed the '*Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre*' (AFDL), with Laurent-Désiré Kabila as its leader. This rebel movement was backed by Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Angola and Sudan. In October 1996 the AFDL fought against Mobutu's troops, which resulted in the First Congo War. Nelson Mandela tried to negotiate between the fighting parties, but they both wanted victory and did not reach an agreement.<sup>12</sup> In May 1997, the AFDL reached Kinshasa, after crossing over the Congo with loads of *kadogo's* (child soldiers), and they took over the capital. Laurent-Désiré Kabila declared himself as president of the Congo. This resulted in the end of the First Congo War. Kabila renamed the country into the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), but the situation was far from peace and stability.

In August 1998 the Second Congo War started, after Kabila commanded the foreign troops, including his former Ugandan and Rwandan allies, to leave the country.<sup>13</sup> Disorder ruled, plundering of natural resources and massive atrocities committed by all parties continued. Because this war was highly internationalized in the region, it is also called the Great African War.<sup>14</sup> It was a confusing conflict with a lot of parties. Congolese rebels formed the '*Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie*' (RCD), backed by Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi. Kabila was supported by Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe. Rapidly a second rebel group was created, the '*Mouvement de Libération du Congo*' (MLC) with Jan-Pierre Bemba as leader and including mainly Mobutists. Afterwards, the RCD split into two groups; RCD-Goma backed by Rwanda, and RCD-Kisangani backed by Uganda.

In July 1999 the Lusaka Agreement was signed, a cease-fire among all regional and national conflicting parties except the RCD. The agreement included the accord for a national dialogue, a disarmament program, and the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force. As a result, in September 1999 the '*Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo*' (MONUC) was deployed. However, stability was still far out of reach.<sup>15</sup> Meanwhile 14 armed groups, under which the local militias Mai-Mai, Rwandan Hutu rebels and Burundian rebels, fought between 1999 and 2003 in the DRC, concentrated in the eastern provinces South Kivu, North Kivu and Ituri.<sup>16</sup>

Then, in January 2001, the president Laurent-Désiré Kabila was killed by his bodyguard. His son Joseph Kabila followed him as the president of the DRC. The perpetrators behind the assassination were never found, and it is still unclear who set up the liquidation of Kabila senior.<sup>17</sup>

Under international pressure, the Inter-Congolese Dialogue started in Sun City in 2002. The Global and All-Inclusive Peace agreement on the Transition in the DRC was one of the main results. A transitional government had to transform the DRC “from war to peace and democracy”.<sup>18</sup> A 1+4 model was created, with Joseph Kabila as the president, and 4 vice-presidents drawn from the main warring parties: Ruberwa of the RCD-Goma, Bemba of the MLC, Ndombasi of Kabila’s former government and Ngoma of the Political – unarmed – opposition.<sup>19</sup> Furthermore, 8 other political and military groups, including the Civil Society Movement, took place in the government as ministers and other administrators. In 2003 this transitional government with a new constitution was installed, and the final foreign troops withdrew.<sup>20</sup> Furthermore, the main results of the agreement were reconciliation, reunifying the DRC and organizing fair and free elections. The end of the Second Congo War was reached, and the agreement led to positive results.

However, there was still not a bit of stability in the DRC.<sup>21</sup> For example, in the spring of 2004, two groups of dissident soldiers – Nkunda and Mutebusi – seized Bukavu, in South Kivu. It came to violent clashes between these soldiers and the national army, ‘*Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo*’ (FARDC).<sup>22</sup> The army in the Congo has a long history of mutiny and disorder, as a consequent of which the FARDC is nowadays still far from being a unity.<sup>23</sup> Because of the international pressure of MONUC and other mediators the troops in Bukavu withdrew after several weeks of heavy fighting.

In 2006 presidential elections were held with Joseph Kabila as the winner. But after those elections there was again heavy fighting. Bemba and his followers did not agree with the results and fought against Kabila’s troops in Kinshasa. Other threats were the former followers of Laurent-Désiré Kabila, and Nkunda with his ‘*Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple*’ (CNDP), active in the east of the DRC. Also Mai-Mai rebels, the local militias in the east supporting Kabila, were committing atrocities. Besides these threats, the FARDC was still not a unity. A part of the army wanted to crush Nkunda; consequently they operated on their own. However, the economy and politics were a little more stable and were picking up, in comparison to the beginning of the war 1998.<sup>24</sup>

In addition, there were also many problems with the ‘*Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda*’ (FDLR). This was “a small, fully equipped conventional army”, consisting of Rwandese rebels and operating since the beginning of the century in the east of the DRC.<sup>25</sup> In 2008, a conference in Goma tried in vain to eliminate the domestic and foreign rebels, with emphasis on the withdrawal of the FDLR. To this day, even after the arrest of Nkunda in 2009, the threat of the CNDP and FDLR is still high in eastern DRC. In 2010 the government wanted MONUC to leave, since new elections were coming in 2011 and the war was over, according to the government. MONUC changed its mandate and created ‘*Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en République Démocratique du Congo*’ (MONUSCO), with more focus on stability and peace consolidation. In 2011 new democratic elections were held, which Joseph Kabila won again. Although there was a lot of criticism on the election process with many accusations of fraud and lack of transparency, the elections were passed off rather quietly.<sup>26</sup> According to Jason Stearns, elections in the Congo are “an imperfect but necessary step”:

“Elections are not a panacea for Congo. Given the current state of political parties and the corrosion of state institutions, it is unlikely that a change in leadership will prompt radical change. But, as flawed as the democratic process in the Congo may be, there is no alternative. If the ruling party squeezes out all opposition, the legislative audits and commissions of the past few years will stop; military abuses and repression of dissent will remain unchecked.”<sup>27</sup>

Although the situation nowadays is quite stable and the country is labeled as post-conflict, 125 years of conflict destroyed and eviscerated the Congolese institutes, so the DRC is still a - huge - country without functioning state, according to Maurice Carney.<sup>28</sup> He names the DRC a police state with no

freedom and without an army, since the FARDC is a group of undisciplined individuals while many armed groups are still frequently raping, murdering and plundering.

### **3.2 International commitment**

There is a long history of international involvement in the DRC. Due to its natural resources and strategic position, many interested parties were looking into the Congo. Since it was the property of King Leopold II after which the Berlin Conference drew the borders, international actors were always involved.<sup>29</sup> The UN deployed a peace mission in the DRC soon after the dependency. Additionally, many international NGOs took part in the humanitarian aid and the peace process.

But in 1994 the international community failed to stop the genocide in Rwanda. Many policy makers felt guilty about the Rwandan genocide, which resulted in an extremely pro-Rwanda policy.<sup>30</sup> Kagame appealed to the international community to stop the Hutus in the refugee camps in the Congo, because they were a threat to Rwanda and the entire Great Lakes region. But the United States (US) did not respond on that; hence he saw this as a green light. According to French and van Woudenberg, the UN knew about the atrocities in the Congo, but they did not make an effort to investigate and invade.<sup>31</sup>

Since the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, “media diplomacy [and] image juggling” became more and more important for the US and Europe, according to Prunier.<sup>32</sup> Africa was strategically not important, since there were not enough interests for the rest of the world to make Africa priority in policies. Prunier stated that diplomatic involvement in Africa was still too little to be pioneering.<sup>33</sup> However, in the end of the '00, the notion of a new kind of Africa-policy had risen. Obama, president of the US, said in his speech in Ghana in 2009:

“Yes, a colonial map that made little sense helped to breed conflict. The West has often approached Africa as a patron, or a source of resources, rather than a partner. But the West is not responsible for the destruction of the Zimbabwean economy over the last decade, or wars in which children are enlisted as combatants. [...] Make no mistake: history is on the side of these brave Africans, and not with those who use coups or change constitutions to stay in power. Africa doesn't need strong men, it needs strong institutions.”<sup>34</sup>

In the past, many leaders in the US and Europe were partners with Mobutu, his clientele network was spread all over the world.<sup>35</sup> But nowadays the consciousness is rising that institutions are more important and sustainable to create peace, development and democracy in Africa. Obama continued:

“As for America and the West, our commitment must be measured by more than just the dollars we spend. I have pledged substantial increases in our foreign assistance, which is in Africa's interest and America's interest. But the true sign of success is not whether we are a source of perpetual aid that helps people scrape by - it is whether we are partners in building the capacity for transformational change.”<sup>36</sup>

This line of thought contains not only the US policy, but also a general change of thinking in the international policy. In addition, the UN wants to attain transition by building partnerships and strengthening capacity for itself and of other partners in the field.<sup>37</sup> The next paragraph will further describe the developments of the UN peacekeeping missions in the DRC.

#### **3.2.1 MONUC**

As a result of the Lusaka agreement in 1999 the international community came to an agreement to intervene in the DRC. On 30 November 1999, Resolution 1279 established MONUC in the DRC. Its main tasks were to maintain contact and liaison with the parties of the Lusaka agreement, to observe the cease-fire and to provide information and technical assistance.<sup>38</sup> With 500 observers it was a traditional -observation- peacekeeping mission. However, this turned out to be insignificant. In February 2000, Resolution 1291 extended the operation MONUC with 5537 peacekeepers.

The new resolution added tasks to make an action plan for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and it requested foreign troops to leave the DRC.<sup>39</sup> The mission became more extended and more complex, falling within the scope of Chapter VI and VII. MONUC was authorized to use “all necessary means” to protect civilians, promote and protect human rights, to put an end to impunity, to facilitate and support the DDR process and to create a “secure environment for free, transparent and peaceful elections”.<sup>40</sup> But due to the large extent of the DRC and the complexity of the conflict and its parties, the mission continued to be an underequipped mission.

In 2002, after an attack of the RCD-Goma in Kisangani where more than 180 people were killed near a UN base, the first discussions of protection of civilians and failing of MONUC started.<sup>41</sup> Another crisis, the attack of Nkunda in Bukavu in 2004, was complicated for MONUC to respond to. The military wanted to go into defense, but the mission’s leadership stated that it was a matter of internal affairs of the DRC, and preferred to stay away because Nkunda was one of the government’s partners during the transition.<sup>42</sup> This again led to a new resolution in 2004, which extended the capacity and had a stronger mandate. With the elections in prospect, there was a more proactive attitude and forceful action, but that did not alter the fact that threats of rebels and attacks were stopped.<sup>43</sup>

After the elections in 2006, the transitional period came formally to an end and the DRC had a legitimate government. MONUC’s role was more limited now.<sup>44</sup> More emphasis came on Security Sector Reform (SSR), including training the FARDC and police. According to Clark, this was a contradiction in the mandate of MONUC, because cooperating with the FARDC, who violated human rights regularly, was contrary to protecting civilians and promoting human rights.<sup>45</sup> Still, troubles such as the Goma crisis in 2008 were taking place in the east of the DRC, where Nkunda and its CNDP were almost taking over the capital of North-Kivu.<sup>46</sup> MONUC did not have the capacity to protect all citizens against the CNDP, but it has also been said that impartiality played a part in not using force, since the CNDP was again one of the parties of the Goma Agreements signed in January 2008.<sup>47</sup>

### **3.2.2 MONUSCO**

In May 2010 MONUC changed into MONUSCO, mandated with Resolution 1925. It strives for stabilization and peace consolidation, with protection of civilians as the main focus.<sup>48</sup> Other important tasks are supporting the national government, developing a justice system and increasing the country’s capacity to be able to cope with the challenges the DRC faces. Nevertheless, atrocities still occur in eastern DRC, like the mass rapes in July and August 2010 in North-Kivu. The FDLR blocked the road and communication tools, so MONUSCO had a lack of information and did not intervene. Consequently, there was a lot of distrust between the population and the military of MONUSCO, due to failing in the protection of civilians.<sup>49</sup>

The mandate of MONUSCO states that it is necessary “to ensure regular interaction with the civilian population to raise awareness and understanding about its mandate and activities”.<sup>50</sup> Also, gathering information about violations and threats is part of the mandate, as is bringing them to the attention of Congolese authorities. In a seminar report of the International Peace Institute, it is stressed that the government needs to focus more on communication and civil education, and therefore dialogue between the Congolese government, civil society and the international community is needed.<sup>51</sup>

Although the peacekeepers of MONUSCO are 70% military personnel, civil personnel and their tasks are increasing, with departments like the Civil Affairs Section (CAS), Political Affairs and Human Rights.<sup>52</sup> According to the official website of MONUSCO, CAS “provides a channel for communicating the priorities and perceptions of different sectors of the population to the Mission, concerning both the mission itself and the peace process.”<sup>53</sup> CAS has four pillars of tasks, namely: 1) restoration of state authority, 2) support to civil society organizations, 3) protection of the civilian population, 4) conflict management and reconciliation.

Support of civil society organizations is mainly realized by capacity building activities and creating political spaces for dialogues, between the government and communities.<sup>54</sup> This is done by identifying the most representative networks within the civil society. Another task is to accomplish Quick Impact Projects (QIP), to demonstrate rapid activities and create trust and relations with the local population.

Besides CAS, the department of Political Affairs (PAD) supports democratization and institutional reform, as well as political institutions as civil society organizations. Their main objective is “to create conditions conducive to the establishment of democracy and the rule of law, [t]his also includes technical support to lawmaking and good governance.”<sup>55</sup> Activities of the PAD are providing risks assessments, preparing reviews and informative documents on conflicts and stakeholders, and advising and monitoring. Also supporting the government and analyzing the activities, and contributing to improving bilateral relations in the Great Lakes Region are part of the tasks of PAD. Furthermore, the department of Public Information provides information about MONUSCO for the local population and creating awareness about the current peace process in the DRC. They explain the mandate in local languages and make it public in an understandable manner.<sup>56</sup>

Thus, MONUSCO has more bottom-up activities than MONUC and it expands on the protection of civilians, as well as information sharing and communication with the local population in the field, amongst others through Joint Protection Teams (JPT) and Community Liaison Assistants (CLA).<sup>57</sup> JPTs are connecting military bases with civilian staff to share information, and communicating concerning protection efforts. CLAs enhance the JPT task, by communicating between communication and the peace mission. Although these teams have more contact with the local population, protection of civilians still fails because of a lack of capacity, according to a field report of the Refugees International. There are just a few JPTs and CLAs in an enormous region like South Kivu.

### **3.3 Civil Society and Human Rights in the DRC**

Civil society in the DRC started to develop in the early 90s.<sup>58</sup> There was a lack of basic needs and there was a lot of political suppression during the regime of Mobutu. As a result, people began to resist this suppression and they began to organize themselves. Although there are no official records, there are about 4000 civil society organizations in the Congo, in South Kivu are about 350.<sup>59</sup> Creating an NGO became a means of survival for Congolese citizens, since there are available funds of international donors and because of the high unemployment and limited economic opportunities.<sup>60</sup> It is a way to trying to change the situation, but also a way to have a job and earn some money. That is why the amount of local NGOs in the DRC is high.

Local peacebuilding programs are expanding and increasingly developed, although they are still minor with regard to international programs and they commonly have little capacity. However, “[NGO] peacebuilding projects made a crucial contribution to local stability in the parts of the eastern Congo where they were implemented,” according to Autesserre.<sup>61</sup> Van Leeuwen also states: “In DRC, in the absence of healthy state structures, civil society took far-reaching responsibilities for development and the provision of services, and became strong and well-organized.”<sup>62</sup> As a result, local NGOs in the DRC seem to be more quantitative and effective than international actors often claim.<sup>63</sup> There is high sensitivity of identity because of the various ethnicities in the DRC. The social constructions resulting from related identities make people feel connected with each other. Therefore, social networks are fundamental and people are aware of the benefits of social ties. Together they want to change the current situation in the east of the DRC.

A lot has been written about the DRC, but not much empirical research has been done with regard to civil society and MONUSCO in the Kivu provinces. In this research, the results are to some extent compared with the researches of Autesserre and Reynaert. Autesserre wrote a book about MONUSCO’s interaction with grassroots actors, mainly about local causes of conflict. She claims that there is a lack of local involvement of MONUSCO, and there is too much focus on the international visions within the peacebuilding process.<sup>64</sup> Reynaert’s research is about the protection of civilians by MONUSCO, and the views on the mandate and failures, according to Congolese civil society and MONUSCO. Protection still regularly fails, mainly by a lack of communication between actors, but MONUSCOs effectiveness improves little by little, according to Reynaert.<sup>65</sup> None of the researches is equally at this research, but aspects can be used to compare to each other.

Because there are still many human rights violations - not only abuse by armed groups, but also by the Congolese authorities and the national government - there is an increasing interest to improve the human rights situation in the DRC.<sup>66</sup> In addition to international programs, there are also many local initiatives. According to the International Alert Report, almost half of the civil society organizations are operative in human rights, although many organizations lack a specialization

because of opportunism; people want to increase their financing opportunities by operating in different sectors or themes.<sup>67</sup> However, raising awareness of human rights and breaking the silence of violations are important activities for NGOs.

Not only the human rights violations in eastern DRC need to stop, also the failed justice system and impunity have to be brought to an end. In April 2012, Human Rights Watch wrote: "Very few top-ranking officers or armed group leaders have been held to account for war crimes or crimes against humanity despite the numerous serious crimes committed during Congo's recent armed conflicts. Military courts have been starved of resources, often plagued with political interference and many procedures fall short of respecting international standards for a fair trial. A number of those who have been convicted have been able to escape from prison."<sup>68</sup> Human Rights Watch also reports that recruitment of child soldiers is still been done by Ntaganda, the successor of Nkunda of the CNDP. There is a high priority to protect children and others from the atrocities, and to prosecute offenders of these crimes. Without justice and protection, peace will not be realized.

Since the international intervention of MONUSCO and the high amount of local human rights NGOs are present in the DRC, these two actors both take part in the peacebuilding process. The next chapters describe the visions of roles and impact of each other and explore relationships between them.

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<sup>5</sup> Autesserre, S. 2010. The Trouble with the Congo. Local violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding, Cambridge University Press: New York.

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<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Prunier, G. 2009. From Genocide to Continental War: The "Congolese" Conflict and the Crisis of Contemporary Africa. Hurst & Company: London, p. 47.

<sup>11</sup> Dan Fahey in: Friends of the Congo. 2011. Crisis in the Congo: Uncovering the truth. <http://congojustice.org/>

<sup>12</sup> Autesserre, S. 2010. The Trouble with the Congo. Local violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding, Cambridge University Press: New York.

<sup>13</sup> Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. 2010. Tackling the Threat of Mass Atrocities in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Applying the Responsibility to Protect. Policy brief.

<sup>14</sup> Reynaert, J. 2010. MONUC/MONUSCO and civilian protection in the Kivu. International Peace Information Service.

[http://www.ipisresearch.be/publications\\_detail.php?id=327](http://www.ipisresearch.be/publications_detail.php?id=327)

<sup>15</sup> Ibid; Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. 2010. Tackling the Threat of Mass Atrocities in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Applying the Responsibility to Protect. Policy brief.

<sup>16</sup> Autesserre, S. 2010. The Trouble with the Congo. Local violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding, Cambridge University Press: New York.

<sup>17</sup> Aljazeera. 2011. Murder in Kinshasa. <http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/2011/10/20111027131838717148.html>

<sup>18</sup> Autesserre, S. 2010. The Trouble with the Congo. Local violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding, Cambridge University Press: New York.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> Reynaert, J. 2010. MONUC/MONUSCO and civilian protection in the Kivu. International Peace Information Service.

[http://www.ipisresearch.be/publications\\_detail.php?id=327](http://www.ipisresearch.be/publications_detail.php?id=327)

<sup>21</sup> Prunier, G. 2009. From Genocide to Continental War: The "Congolese" Conflict and the Crisis of Contemporary Africa. Hurst & Company: London.

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<sup>23</sup> Prunier, G. 2009. From Genocide to Continental War: The "Congolese" Conflict and the Crisis of Contemporary Africa. Hurst & Company: London; and Reybroeck, D. 2010. Congo, een Geschiedenis. De Bezige Bij: Amsterdam.

<sup>24</sup> Prunier, G. 2009. From Genocide to Continental War: The "Congolese" Conflict and the Crisis of Contemporary Africa. Hurst & Company: London.

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<sup>26</sup> Aljazeera. N.d. DRC Decides. <http://www.aljazeera.com/Services/Search/?q=drc%20elections>; The Guardian. N.d. Democratic Republic of the Congo. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/congo>

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- <sup>33</sup> Ibid.
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## 4. Perceptions local NGOs with regard to MONUSCO

After examining the theories and policies of the UN, local NGOs, the interaction between those actors and after describing the context of the actors in the DRC, the perceptions of local NGOs, as well as international MONUSCO officers in South Kivu, will be described in the next chapters. This chapter contains the perceptions of local NGOs, in chapter 5 the MONUSCO officers are placed centrally. Since the theory does not make a distinction between local perceptions and international ones and this research does, the hypotheses given in chapter 2.5 will be examined in chapter 5, when local perceptions are pointed out as well as the UN peacekeepers perceptions. Whereupon, these comparisons can be put in place of the literature and expectations can be assessed.

First, the perception of the role of local human rights NGOs themselves will be described according to the interviews held with local human rights NGO representatives in Bukavu, South Kivu. Furthermore, their perception of the role of MONUSCO in their region will be described. Next, difficulties in the relationship with MONUSCO are outlined in this chapter, as well as the strengthening in the relationship. The overview of results is attached in the appendix. When talking about NGOs is meant local human rights NGOs in South Kivu, DRC.

### 4.1 The role of local NGOs in peacebuilding

NGOs have been asked about their role in the peacebuilding process in South Kivu. There are four themes most mentioned in the interviewees which are also included in the theories, that is to say: 1) raising awareness of human rights, 2) being a bridge, 3) structural transformation, 4) information gathering. Each theme will be explained below, which are ranged in order of quantity of mentioning.

#### 4.1.1 *Raising awareness of human rights*

Explaining human rights to the population in the DRC is seen as a primary role for the NGOs. Raising awareness of human rights, with education and promotion of rights, is important because the population has a lack of knowledge concerning their rights, sometimes caused by a lack of understanding because many people are not educated or are even illiterate, but also traditions are sometimes contradictory with the law.<sup>1</sup> For example, women do not have many rights in the Congo because in their culture they are inferior to men. Also children born from rape are not accepted in their own family or community. But according to Universal Declaration of the Human Rights every person is equal, man or woman, any kind of birth and origin.<sup>2</sup>

The civil society has to play a role in these problems, because they are close to the population and they have more people with knowledge about human rights, according to the respondents.<sup>3</sup> This knowledge is also described in the theory of Weiss and Gordenker, as a function of human rights NGOs.<sup>4</sup> NGOs can educate local civilians and make them aware of their rights. And because of local projects there is more understanding, knowledge and sometimes changing of minds and traditions.<sup>5</sup>

Furthermore, advocacy and assistance in justice are important roles for NGOs to play in the peacebuilding process, the interviewees agree with the Worldbank.<sup>6</sup> Since there are still many human rights violations, and people are more aware of their rights, they have to keep up the struggle for justice.<sup>7</sup> However, advocates are too expensive for many civilians, so they need support of NGOs.<sup>8</sup> There is a corrupt and poor justice system in the Congo according to many respondents.<sup>9</sup> Besides raising awareness of human rights, NGOs can assist the people and support them to be able to do themselves justice.<sup>10</sup>

Most international NGOs also see the promoting of human rights as primarily role for local NGOs, because local NGOs are near to the population and part of culture, and they are building local human rights networks so that this aspect in the peacebuilding can be sustainable.<sup>11</sup>

#### 4.1.2 *Being a bridge*

Civil society can be seen as a bridge between two levels; between population and government, between the international community and the Congolese population, and a platform for civil society in South Kivu said they are a bridge between MONUSCO and local NGOs.<sup>12</sup> As mentioned before, civil society is near the population, but also has contacts with the government and international



community.<sup>13</sup> Besides, civil society is a counterpoint of the government, to observe and control the local and provincial authorities in taking responsibility in their leadership.<sup>14</sup> NGOs can help to start dialogues and change leadership, by communicating with decision-makers, as Weiss and Gordenker argue.<sup>15</sup> The NGOs say there is regular contact between the Congolese authorities and civil society, but most of the interviewees say that there is no support and lack of willingness and understanding.<sup>16</sup>

Another point of view, as well in the theory as in the interviews, is that civil society is close to the population.<sup>17</sup> NGO activities have local impact because they work at the base of the society and collaborate with traditional leaders. They know the local culture and traditions; there is often a lot of trust between local NGOs and local population, so the work of civil society is effective.<sup>18</sup> Many said that it is important to have a lot of contact with the population and to mediate between groups, to solve conflicts at local level and reinforce existing services.<sup>19</sup> Also, the international NGOs and academics mentioned the closeness to the population as one of the most important roles of Congolese civil society.<sup>20</sup>

#### **4.1.3 Structural transformation**

Another part of the role of NGOs in peacebuilding is the contribution to conflict transformation and structural change. NGOs try to create a basis for democracy and peace by developing capacity to participate in politics and create a critical view of the population.<sup>21</sup> As Miall also claims in his theory, attitudes and minds of locals have to change; there is a need for more understanding of rights and democracy among the population.<sup>22</sup> According to a local NGO representative, “power and traditions have to change to bring democracy”.<sup>23</sup> Education of human rights is part of the democratic principles, since some traditions are contradictory to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Many NGOs stand behind these human rights, more than the local traditions. And some say that the population understands the transformation and is ready to change their minds and culture.<sup>24</sup> According to the international NGOs this conflict transformation of NGOs contributes to the impact in long-term processes and sustainability.<sup>25</sup>

Another structural change is to reform the security sector and reconciliation, one of the main tasks of MONUSCO but also the role of civil society according to many NGOs. Main activities are reinsertion of child soldiers into society, acceptance of them in the communities and educating both children and ex-combatants. Civil society prepares the population for peace, by explaining how institutions work and what rights they have. “We reinforce the existing services because they don’t work well,” according to one NGO representative.<sup>26</sup> Because of the history – a dictatorship with a huge impact – and lack of functioning institutions, people need to be educated in their rights and available services.<sup>27</sup>

Empowerment of women is also part of strengthening the population in their rights and to realize structural transformation in the society at a local level. By this transformation, courage of the people has to be brought back, so that a peaceful situation and stabilization of communities can be hold.<sup>28</sup>

#### **4.1.4 Information gathering**

It has been argued that holding dialogues is an important part of the peace process for NGOs. The interviewees mentioned the same goals in these dialogues as Weiss and Gordenker did in their theory about human rights NGOs: 1) to signal problems and cases of violations, 2) acceptance of victims and to generate respect, 3) sharing information, 4) to identify and analyze conflicts.<sup>29</sup> There is a lack of information and documentation on current problems at grassroots level. This aspect is also acknowledged by the academics and an international NGO. To be able to defend the people, it is required to know the insecurity problems at the grassroots level.<sup>30</sup>

However, the dialogues need to be at different levels. When NGOs have dialogues with the local population problems can be observed and identified, so that NGOs can adjust their activities to local situations.<sup>31</sup> Also dialogues within communities are necessary to solve local conflicts and to help the acceptance of victims and ex-combatants.<sup>32</sup> In addition, dialogues with authorities can bring more legitimacy and control in the governmental activities.<sup>33</sup>

#### **4.1.5 Obstacles in their work to fulfill their role**

Many obstacles for NGOs to fulfill their role are mentioned in the interviews: 1) a lack of money, limitations in budget, 2) because of insecurity NGOs cannot always fulfill their tasks, 3) bad governance, including corruption in justice system, lack of leadership and lack of infrastructure - many areas are inaccessible because of insecurity and lack of infrastructure - 4) local culture, traditions, poverty and analphabetism obstruct NGOs activities. Traditions are contradictory with the law which causes problems. Besides, poor people are not committed to the NGO programs because they need to survive. They are looking for food and security instead of learning about human rights and reconciliation.<sup>34</sup>

Another obstacle in peacebuilding by NGOs is “the complexity of the problems here. Many national and international actors are operating here with different perspectives. That makes it difficult.”<sup>35</sup> There is a need for more information sharing and consensus. However, some of the actors do not want peace, because there is a lot of greed; business in arms, natural resources but also peacebuilding is sometimes commercialized, according to this representative.<sup>36</sup>

One respondent said that local NGOs are restricted by the donors in their activities.<sup>37</sup> They cannot look at their own needs but have to do what the donor has outlined for programs. Remarkably, two academic respondents confirm this statement; NGOs are too much concentrated on foreign actors and dependent of international objectives.<sup>38</sup>

The content of projects can be restrictive, but NGOs are also restricted by funding. As many interviewees said, they are limited in their budget and are in need of more money. Most of the international NGOs said that some local NGOs are looking for a way to earn money, because unemployment is high in the DRC.<sup>39</sup> As a result, some people just start an NGO to earn money, but with minimal willingness and without specialization. If they are operating in different sectors, they can find different financiers. A lot of interests and even jealousy between NGOs is a consequence of the mentality some local NGO representatives have. “Greed is all over”, according to one respondent.<sup>40</sup>

## **4.2 The role of MONUSCO**

Answers to the question of the role of MONUSCO in the peacebuilding process in the DRC were very diverse. The answers can be categorized into five themes: 1) Protection and security, 2) Support government, 3) Capacity building, 4) Transport and infrastructure, 5) Coordination and information. These themes are all found in the theory, except of transport and infrastructure. In chapter 5 these roles will be compared to the perception of the role of MONUSCO representatives themselves. First, this chapter describes the perception of local NGOs with motivations for their visions.

### **4.2.1 Security and justice**

MONUSCO is in the east of the DRC with a mission to maintain peace and security, according to the local NGOs. The presence of the UN chases away – partly – the FDLR and other rebels, whereby stabilization and security is realized.<sup>41</sup> It creates order and diminishes violence.<sup>42</sup> Protection of the population is essential in South Kivu, since rape, murders and pillages still occur. However, less than half of the respondents mentioned this as a role for MONUSCO; they named it security instead of protection more often.<sup>43</sup> Probably, it can signify that the Congolese do not feel protected by MONUSCO, they think MONUSCO is able to secure the situation little by little but without a feeling of protection among the population.

Justice, sanctions, advocacy, awareness and consolidation of human rights, are in the category of security included.<sup>44</sup> Impunity is a big issue in the DRC, it is seen as one of the essential causes of the conflict. These issues also take a big part of the mandate of MONUSCO.<sup>45</sup> To fight impunity, a legitimate justice system has to be developed, with sanctions for everybody who committed human rights violations or crimes, Chesterman claims.<sup>46</sup> No matter what the function, the origin or the wealth and power of the person. Notably, the interviewees are looking from the population’s perspective. To be able to realize a legitimate justice system, people need to know their rights and be aware of the possibilities concerning human rights and justice. Fighting against impunity is not mentioned as a role for MONUSCO. It seems to be a lack of understanding and knowledge about the mandate and activities of MONUSCO concerning protection and security.<sup>47</sup>

#### **4.2.2 Support government**

“First role is to support the government, although [MONUSCO is] limited and only can recommend the government. They cannot change really many things”.<sup>48</sup> The government is a legitimate power of a sovereign state, so MONUSCO is limited in their actions. Nevertheless, increasing the responsibility of the government and reinforcing the government is a role for MONUSCO.<sup>49</sup> These aspects are fundamental in the mandate,<sup>50</sup> but of all NGO representatives only three mentioned the reinforcement of the government.<sup>51</sup>

Support of the government is recognized more by NGOs concerning the elections. This can be accounted by the fact that the interviews were held in the period of the election campaign in the DRC. But respondents do see the importance of MONUSCO in the process and logistics of elections.<sup>52</sup> Transportation of the election forms, training of the international and local observers and reaching the remote areas is included in the capability within MONUSCO. Observers, civil society and the government cannot do this on their own. Besides, there is international pressure to control the elections to resist corruption and fraud in the electoral process. Control and pressure is important and MONUSCO contributes to that, by being in the field and by being actively concerned in the process.<sup>53</sup>

Part of support to the government is also technical assistance in Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR). This is also been seen as the role of MONUSCO in the DRC.<sup>54</sup> SSR primarily contains police training and reform of the Congolese army, while respondents see DDR as mainly having dialogue with the FDLR and reconciliation. It is important “to live in harmony together”, according to an interviewee.<sup>55</sup> He states that MONUSCO has to start this process and increase the responsibility for reconciliation of the government.

#### **4.2.3 Capacity building**

Several respondents indicate that MONUSCO’s role is to reinforce the capacity of civil society, as well as Congolese authorities. Strengthening civil society should be realized by workshops and trainings, exchanging ideas and information, several interviewees agree with Pearce and Pouligny.<sup>56</sup> Also Autesserre states that in the DRC there is barely capacity building by MONUSCO with regard to local civil organizations.<sup>57</sup> MONUSCO has more expertise to build capacity than the NGOs, and NGOs are in need of increasing expertise, according to representatives of NGOs.<sup>58</sup> Training and education can be a solution to the obstacle of NGOs. MONUSCO has to support the population and to create opportunities for justice and development, but MONUSCO does not provide enough support.<sup>59</sup>

Furthermore, construction of a system of good administration is important for prospect of the DRC.<sup>60</sup> Only two NGO representatives recognize this role of MONUSCO. MONUSCO can reinforce sustainable structures in administrations and institutions to prevent future conflicts and to improve the situation of the population.<sup>61</sup> In combination with the structural transformation of NGOs at a local level, as mentioned before, the capacity of people and institutions can grow in the DRC. As well as the reinforcement of the government, the role of construction of a good administration system is not often been recognized by NGOs, possibly because these activities are at another level as the projects of the NGOs.<sup>62</sup>

A positive side effect of the peacekeeping operation is that they create employment for local population.<sup>63</sup> It is not a durable solution to the unemployment, but it is seen as an opportunity for the population to develop themselves and to initiate skills and experiences.

#### **4.2.4 Transport and infrastructure**

Another role of MONUSCO is to assist in transport and logistics, according to the NGO respondents.<sup>64</sup> Although only logistics with regard to elections and military operations are mentioned in the mandate,<sup>65</sup> NGOs experience the logistical support as very useful.<sup>66</sup> Many areas are inaccessible because there are no roads. MONUSCO has the means to go there with helicopters and NGOs can apply to accompany them when necessary. They also provide protection for NGOs in these cases, since the military are part of those flights. Taking care of the logistics with regard to the elections in November 2011 was also an important task of MONUSCO. The DRC is such a huge country with many remote areas, so helicopters are essential to make the elections possible, and some roads are

restored by MONUSCO.<sup>67</sup> In addition, MONUSCO set up Radio Okapi, to provide information and starting dialogues in remote areas.<sup>68</sup> NGOs appreciate this role of MONUSCO and say that in this they are successful.

#### **4.2.5 Coordination and information**

Chesterman states that there has to be more information sharing in the field to create ownership and to be effective.<sup>69</sup> Also Reynaert acknowledges in her research the importance of information sharing in the DRC between MONUSCO and civil society, to increase comprehension in the field.<sup>70</sup> Some respondents explained the role of MONUSCO to facilitate meetings and information, within the Congolese civil society and with local and national authorities.<sup>71</sup> Cooperation with local NGOs by holding intercommunal dialogues and distributing tasks is seen as a function for MONUSCO, with mainly CAS being responsible for coordination. Workshops and trainings are part of this coordination.

To form a network with local NGOs and local population, the MONUSCO military communicate by way of Company Operating Bases, Temporary Operating Bases, and Mobile Operating Bases. Information can easily be shared and the effectivity of the peacekeeping mission will increase, according to an interviewee.<sup>72</sup> The information is primarily about the security situation, but also sharing ideas and making recommendations for building peace and (women) rights have to be done.<sup>73</sup>

Furthermore, MONUSCO's role to create networks is not only applicable at the local level but also at an international level. It can facilitate international contacts for Congolese NGOs. To provide diplomatic relations and raising international attention for the DRC is important.<sup>74</sup> Some locals get the chance to take part in international meetings. For NGOs, these networks are a positive aspect of the involvement of MONUSCO in the DRC. Besides, contact with the government and politicians need to improve, especially the willingness of the authorities, and MONUSCO can play a part in that according to one of the NGO representatives.<sup>75</sup>

#### **4.2.6 Failures of MONUSCO according to NGOs**

To be able to understand the role of MONUSCO and the perception of the NGOs, we also look at the failures of MONUSCO according to these NGOs. First, the population does not have confidence in MONUSCO. MONUSCO is not visible, does not have direct contact with the population and the military do not speak local languages, or even French. Often, they are not at the right places, or not active in the field. The population does not see any change in their situation.<sup>76</sup>

Secondly, neither the action plan nor the mandate is clear.<sup>77</sup> MONUSCO is not transparent in their policy and activities. "The population doesn't trust them because they see that MONUSCO doesn't react on attacks. But they don't have the right mandate for that. We don't know what they can do."<sup>78</sup> Some of the respondents recognize that MONUSCO is limited, by their means but also by their mandate and the Congolese government. But the majority of the population – and also some NGO representatives – do not understand the way of acting and the limitations of MONUSCO, according to the NGOs.<sup>79</sup> In addition, some people say the mandate has to change. It is not complete, justice requires a higher priority, actions are in contradiction with the mandate, or the tasks and responsibilities are unclear among the government and MONUSCO. During MONUSCO's presence in the DRC, the Congolese government will not take its responsibility, according to one of the respondents.<sup>80</sup>

Thirdly, some respondents say that UN officers are not open or integrated.<sup>81</sup> They only work in the cities, and are not present in the field at a local level. But even in the cities, the officers only stay in their office. They are not integrated and do not have informal contacts. As a result, "we don't know them", states one of the interviewees.<sup>82</sup> According to another person, MONUSCO wastes a lot of money. Many people are useless, and even willingness is sometimes not noticeable. "They don't have the will to reinforce situation, they don't want to leave because it is a big business here. Big business but not in our interest."<sup>83</sup> They are a "little mafia here"<sup>84</sup>, they want our resources and there are even spies within MONUSCO; some statements made by some people. Remarkably, academics and international NGOs agree with this statement. "It is a business for all actors, the international community benefits from instability with regard to resources."<sup>85</sup>

There are several explanations for this bad image of MONUSCO. A lack of integration can cause distrust between local and international actors, because internationals do not take part in the daily life of locals and they are seen as 'outsiders'. Consequently, and in combination with a lack of visible results, a deficient willingness of these outsiders is determined and the distrust increases. Besides, MONUSCO has been involved in several scandals such as rape and deprivation of resources.<sup>86</sup> On the top of the view the locals have about the lack of effectiveness and the little information, a bad image is created and MONUSCO has been accused of being a mafia and of working only for their own business.

Fourthly, the protection of civilians fails. There is still a lot of violence, they sometimes do not react on attacks and are not always on the right places.<sup>87</sup> If there is no impact of the UN mission visible for the Congolese people and the mandate is not accomplished, the bad image of this mission will persist. The fifth weakness, according to the respondents, is that there is no long-term plan.<sup>88</sup> They are not sustainable, not looking forward. Besides, nobody knows when the UN peacekeeping mission is leaving. Sixthly, two NGO representatives said that there is no good relation with Rwanda; MONUSCO has to start a dialogue with Rwanda to withdraw the Rwandese rebels in eastern DRC.<sup>89</sup>

The effectivity of the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC depends on the component and task. According to the interviewees, protection of civilians and capacity building is not effective, while elections, logistics and humanitarian aid are often mentioned as effective. Causes of the weaknesses are, according to the NGO representatives, a lack of information and comprehension, or that MONUSCO is too big.<sup>90</sup> Because of the UN system and the structure and the size of the peacekeeping mission, the officers in the field are restricted. "UN is a plump and huge organ", according to an academic.<sup>91</sup>

Remarkably, all international NGOs and academics say that MONUSCO is not effective. They are less positive than local NGOs are. MONUSCO is "living on an island", with big salaries, bad communication and a lack of motivation. Another international mentioned that the UN has a hidden agenda; they have been involved in scandals. He also agrees on the big business and lack of willingness within the UN peacekeeping operation.<sup>92</sup> This negativity can be explained by the fact that local NGOs feel more support of MONUSCO in their activities and capacity than international NGOs. International NGOs partly have the same expertise as the international peacekeeping mission.

In summary, the primary role of NGOs is raising awareness of human rights and making people able to defend their rights. This overlaps with the role of MONUSCO to improve security by creating a justice system and raising awareness. While NGOs control the government and give the population a voice, MONUSCO needs to support the government in elections and technical assistance. Then, for both the UN as well as NGOs, information gathering, sharing and holding dialogues is important. NGO's dialogues are primary with the population, and MONUSCO need to inform and educate authorities and civil society, according to the NGO representatives. Finally, the UN and NGOs both work towards structural transformation, although NGOs have the biggest part in this matter. Changing minds and traditions of the population, reconciliation, strengthening services and bringing courage back are issues that have been put forward. MONUSCO's role is more technical in DDR and SSR, with some contribution in capacity building and development.

#### **4.3 Difficulties relationship UN and NGOs**

The NGO representatives were divided concerning their relationship with MONUSCO. Some said the relation is good, some said it is not good, and others said that there is no relation. To be able to explain these differences the relationship is described in two different parts; difficulties and strengths within the relationship between MONUSCO and local NGOs. Interviewees have been asked about the communication with MONUSCO and the integration of MONUSCO officers, because these concepts are mostly pointed out in the theory. In addition, there has been asked about other difficulties seen by the interviewees.

##### **4.3.1 Communication**

Communication is essential to inform civilians about the mandate and activities of MONUSCO, and to create trust and realistic expectations in eastern DRC, so claims Reynaert.<sup>93</sup> Many respondents of the

civil society in South Kivu said that there is insignificant communication between them and MONUSCO, for most of them the communication is not enough nor efficient in their relationship. There are monthly meetings with the Human Rights Component of MONUSCO and some – the bigger local NGOs – have regular meetings with Civil Affairs of MONUSCO.<sup>94</sup> Half of the respondents stated there is no sufficient communication.<sup>95</sup> Many said that there is a need for more face to face contact, as current communication is mainly through reports and documents. Also, international NGOs state that there is no comprehension between MONUSCO and local NGOs due to a lack of communication and openness.<sup>96</sup> This has been put forward as a barrier in their relationship.

As noted by a number of meetings organized by NGOs, they have good motivation and they want to involve MONUSCO in those meetings, but the NGOs did not have the power and knowledge to organize an effective meeting. Invitations were extremely late, unclear and many subjects or speakers changed at the last moment. Furthermore, at the meetings they mostly share visions, without clear information or scientific knowledge.<sup>97</sup>

Another obstacle that is given is that MONUSCO is not transparent.<sup>98</sup> The local population does not know the mandate, but some local NGOs also stated they do not know the mandate, nor its actions, strategy, objectives or priorities. “The less info, the more critics,” stated an NGO representative.<sup>99</sup> Also, few people distinguish the civil component and the military of MONUSCO. There is a lot of vagueness according to the interviewees. Moreover, there is a lack of long-term strategy or planning; some respondents said they want to know when MONUSCO is leaving.<sup>100</sup> As a result of non-transparency and invisibility, there is no trust between the Congolese citizens and MONUSCO. Although some NGOs say that they do understand MONUSCO better than the local population, there is also a lot of distrust between NGOs and MONUSCO.<sup>101</sup> According to academics, the contacts and relation are a formality but not effective and useful in policies.<sup>102</sup>

#### **4.3.2 Integration**

Half of the respondents said that the international interveners of the UN are integrated; the other half said they are not. In the theory, integration of internationals in the local society is seen as essential to understand local structures and for more comprehension between actors.<sup>103</sup> The interviewees explained this further. The little integration of MONUSCO officers in the society is an obstacle for many NGOs in their relation with MONUSCO. According to those who think interveners are not integrated, there is a lack of local contacts. MONUSCO does not have dialogues with civilians or informal contacts.<sup>104</sup> MONUSCO officers do not socialize in the Congolese culture, they live in their own world and only stay at their offices. As a result, they do not know the culture and there is a lot of misunderstanding and dissimilarity between notions. International NGOs and academics agree with this vision.<sup>105</sup>

Some interviewees always feel a distance between them and the UN personnel. “They are reserved, not open. I have the feeling that they feel better than us because they know more.”<sup>106</sup> It is also noticeable that international NGO representatives and academics recognize this problem. There are unequal relations, “MONUSCO is looking for power and influence all over the DRC,”<sup>107</sup> and a “more open attitude is desired by locals.”<sup>108</sup> Locals see white people as all the same and all have money, while they are not committed to the society.

A lot of NGO representatives stated that the military are less integrated than the civilian personnel.<sup>109</sup> Many military do not speak the official language – French – nor local languages like Swahili. Communication with the local population is hard, which causes a lack of understanding. In addition, the population often thinks that international actors are rich, while the Congolese are poor.<sup>110</sup> This results in friction. Part of the UN personnel is not adapted to Congolese habitudes, which can lead to irritation and friction.

Furthermore, many said that MONUSCO officers have their own way of living. “Congolese people are very open and friendly, they often find solutions quickly. This does not match with MONUSCO, they are too closed and reserved. They have different values and the way of thinking because they are the international community and not Congolese. They are more globalized. They want to push us in a different way of living, but they do not realize that this is not always the best way.”<sup>111</sup>

All these issues can be diminished with communication and a little more integration into the Congolese society. When MONUSCO communicates more with NGOs and their rank and file, it can create more understanding and acceptance of each other.<sup>112</sup> NGOs can explain their vision about the distance they feel and interveners can react on that. However, there will always be a difference between the two levels because of different backgrounds and origins.

Not mentioned in the theory, but argued by the NGO respondents, is that locals have another mentality, which can hinder the UN. Some locals think that the UN will solve all the Congolese problems, since civilians do not participate or ignore their own problems.<sup>113</sup> Sometimes problems in methods or attitudes occur, like a representative stated: "Local NGOs are not very professional, while MONUSCO is. MONUSCO wants to see more quality, but this is not possible. There is concurrence and critique to each other."<sup>114</sup> This can make cooperation or a good relationship difficult. Another interviewee said that "[MONUSCO] has to know civil society better to work with them together, with more reflection and support."<sup>115</sup> Therefore, with knowledge and understanding of each other, a stronger relationship can be built.

#### **4.3.3 Need for support**

Significant for the relationship between MONUSCO and NGOs can be the issue whether NGOs are in need of support of MONUSCO or not. In the majority of the interviews, the NGOs said they would like to have more support of the UN peacekeeping mission. Some of the interviewees said that they only need money, but most of them are aware of the financial limits that a UN mission has. Some interviewees admit NGOs need more than just money; they are in need of more training and expertise.<sup>116</sup> "They have the expertise that we need," according to one of the NGO representatives.<sup>117</sup> Another one said that there is a need for more support in functioning and capacity, only sharing ideas is not enough.<sup>118</sup>

Thus, the DRC needs the international community, for diplomacy, supporting the government and building capacity, disregarding its ineffectiveness.<sup>119</sup> According to the respondents, this is the only way to contribute to creation of ownership and security. "If MONUSCO was not here, it would be a catastrophe."<sup>120</sup> Many interviewees agree with this statement. So despite the bad image, lack of integration and a lot of misunderstanding, NGOs acknowledge that MONUSCO is the best way to achieve and maintain security in the DRC. Due to the failures, MONUSCO is not able to change everything in a complex situation like the DRC, but it can contribute to improvement, especially when MONUSCO improves its own effectiveness of operation. One of the respondents said: "Defeats are in the government, we cannot blame MONUSCO for failing in security."<sup>121</sup> The first responsible party for security in the DRC is the government of the country. However, for Congolese people it is probably easier to hold the international interveners, being outsiders, responsible for failing in their protection, rather than its own government.

#### **4.4 Strengthening relationship UN and NGOs**

The strengths of the relationship between MONUSCO and local NGOs can also be described in the themes of communication and integration. Besides, there are some other strengths mentioned, which are more practical issues. The strengths are close to the difficulties, since there is no consensus about these aspects among the NGOs in relation with MONUSCO.

##### **4.4.1 Communication**

Although there are many respondents who said that there is not enough communication between NGOs and MONUSCO, at the same time there are several respondents who stress the opposite, contradictory with the results of Reynaert.<sup>122</sup> Primarily the contact with Human Rights component and the monthly meetings were highly esteemed. It has been argued that these meetings are useful and sufficient to share ideas and information, have discussions and ask questions.<sup>123</sup> Civil Affairs is often mentioned concerning the logistics and transport; only two NGOs said that they have substantive meetings to present the problems of the local population.<sup>124</sup> All respondents said it is easy to get in touch with MONUSCO if they want to. "MONUSCO have to know the needs of the population, but if the civil society needs MONUSCO they go to Civil Affairs for help."<sup>125</sup> Hence, many

NGOs see Civil Affairs as available for assistance, even as the Human Rights Office, though generally only if they ask for help.

#### **4.4.2 Integration**

A part of the interviewees mentioned that the UN officers are well integrated.<sup>126</sup> Obviously the civilian personnel, especially the Civil Affairs officers, are named as most integrated, in comparison with the military. Because the UN consists of many different nationalities, the UN itself is very diverse in origin. In addition, they work with Congolese colleagues and internationals share their principles with their Congolese colleagues, so there are no difficulties in dissimilarity of the principles or perspectives.<sup>127</sup> According to some respondents this contributes to the integration of the international UN officers as well as their knowledge of the culture and habitudes.

Others said that due to the openness and hospitality of the Congolese themselves, this does not cause any problems in case of differences.<sup>128</sup> Some NGO representatives even said there are no differences between them and international interveners of the UN. Because of the communication there is – according to some respondents – there is a good exchange of perspectives without any friction.<sup>129</sup> UN officers know our way of living. However, it is a minority who make this statement.

#### **4.4.3 Strengthening relation**

Remarkably, half of the respondents said that there is nothing strengthening their relation with MONUSCO. They have some contact with the UN, but they often do not see this as a relationship.<sup>130</sup>

However, others gave some positive aspects of their relation. There is some collaboration in the field, MONUSCO and NGOs go to the villages together or they use each other's presence in remote areas.<sup>131</sup> Transport is an important issue for the NGOs, because of the insecurity and inaccessibility in many areas. They help the NGOs with the means they need, so that MONUSCO makes work easier for NGOs.

But not only transport is seen as strength in having a good relation with the UN peacekeeping mission. MONUSCO also assists in claiming rights and doing advocacy for NGOs when needed.<sup>132</sup> Especially the *Société Civil* states that MONUSCO knows them very well and receives a lot of assistance from MONUSCO.<sup>133</sup> *Société Civil* is a platform of local NGOs that can bring NGOs together and train and inform them. This platform has a lot of contact with MONUSCO and is able to transfer the expertise and assistance to the NGOs.

Somebody else states that MONUSCO is multidimensional, in the sense that there are many specialized components with each their own expertise and different dimensions of the mission, but all are available to NGOs to contact them and to ask for assistance.<sup>134</sup> All these specialized components form a clear structure and makes MONUSCO more accessible for NGOs who are looking for substantive assistance.

Thus, there is no consensus between the interviewees what exactly strengthens or weakens their relationship with MONUSCO. Several issues have been put forward at both sides, like communication and integration. It is argued that communication can be more, although some say it should be more while others say the current meetings are regular and useful. However, most respondents agree that MONUSCO is not transparent in their action plan and strategy. Concerning integration, half of the respondents pointed out that international interveners are not open and living in their own world. This aspect hinders a good relationship, because of a lack of understanding. Notable is that all international NGO representatives and part of the academics state that MONUSCO is not embedded and not integrated in the social context. They also see this as a problem between NGOs and MONUSCO.

About how to reach the most effective peacebuilding process all respondents have different ideas, but it is mostly argued that there is a need for more information sharing and collaboration. Evaluation and reconstruction has also been put forward. "MONUSCO uses many means to do little, while local NGOs have little but do more."<sup>135</sup> Mostly respondents indicate that there is not just one best partner, there has to be cooperation between the international community, the Congolese government and civil society. However, "roles have to be divided."<sup>136</sup> Above all, the mentality of



these actors has to change according to the local NGOs; there is a need for more willingness to attain security and peace. Then capacity can be built and long-term visions can be developed.

Consensus about the need for more support is not found. Some see they do need support in way of funding, others see they need support in way of training and expertise, while some see they do not need support and want to act (more) on their own.

#### **4.5 Conclusion**

After the presentation of the results of the interviewees held with local NGOs, we are able to answer one of the sub questions of this research:

*What are the perceptions of local human right NGOs with regard to MONUSCO?*

##### **4.5.1 How do the NGOs perceive the role of MONUSCO and that of themselves?**

The empirical results show that, according to the local human rights NGOs, the role of themselves and the role of MONUSCO in the peacebuilding process are generally close to each other, like raising awareness about human rights, advocacy and assistance in the justice sector, information sharing and holding dialogues, and structural change in building institutions and services. These roles are in line with the roles being given in the theories. Because MONUSCO and local NGOs operate at another level and these issues need to be performed at different levels, it is possible to partially have the same roles.

A typical role for NGOs is to check the government for taking responsibility and increasing leadership. NGOs are able to give the population a voice and to build a bridge between the government and the population. Also, the international community can be closer to the population by way of interacting with NGOs, and then the NGOs are a bridge between the international community and Congolese civil society.

On the other hand, a typical role for MONUSCO is to provide protection and security. However, NGO respondents confirm the literature that MONUSCO fails in its task to protect the civilians and to create a secure situation without threats and attacks. However, ever since MONUSCO became present in the eastern Congo, violence diminished and rebels seem to be afraid of the international peacekeeping operation.

Furthermore, MONUSCO plays a role in the elections, which is valued a lot by NGOs. Other support of the government is scarcely seen by NGOs. Another role in the peacebuilding is the provision of logistics with protection for NGOs when going into remote areas. This technical assistance for NGOs is not mentioned in the mandate, but it is esteemed by the NGOs. The last aspect is the capacity building by MONUSCO. The expertise and knowledge MONUSCO has should be shared with the NGOs, since they need to develop their capacity, NGOs stated.

##### **4.5.2 Which aspects are obstacles in their relationship with MONUSCO, according to the NGOs?**

There are several obstacles in the relationship between MONUSCO and local human rights NGOs, according to those NGOs. First, MONUSCO is not transparent. The mandate is not clear for many Congolese, or even the action plan or strategy. There is a lack of understanding of the UN operation, due to a lack of communication. The results of this research confirm the finding of Reynaert in the DRC. International NGOs agree with this statement, and academics also state that there is no synergy. The contacts and relations are a formality and not effective.

For some NGOs, it is a problem that internationals of the UN mission are not integrated in the Congolese society. The peacekeepers are not open and do not have informal – Congolese – contacts. Although the civilian staff is more open and better trained in adjusting to the society, the attitude is generally not open. International NGOs and academics confirm this attitude and state that MONUSCO officers are often living on an island, stay at the office and in their own compounds without integrating in the Congolese society. MONUSCO creates a bad image, due to this, and to the scandals wherein MONUSCO has been involved. From the perception of the local NGOs, the hypothesis that the more integration is related to a stronger relationship is confirmed.

#### **4.5.3 Which aspects are strengthening their relationship with MONUSCO, according to the NGOs?**

The issue of a lack of contact and communication is arguable. Where some said that the communication is not enough for local human rights NGOs, others said that the contact is good and regular. There are regular meetings with security information, which are useful for NGOs. Those NGOs do not need more contact with MONUSCO. However, others say that these meetings are useful but not frequent enough, that there is a need for more contact with the emphasis on dialogues and sharing visions.

The multidimensionality of MONUSCO is valued by NGOs, like the many tasks and areas of operating they have. NGOs mentioned the logistics and cooperation in the field that are important for NGOs, as well as claiming rights and assistance in advocacy which is a contribution to the effectivity of NGOs.

Finally, some NGOs appreciate the openness and behavior of the civilian staff of MONUSCO. They think that the international interveners are integrated and there are no problems concerning differences of cultures because Congolese people are open and hospitable.

Thus, many things are valued, but there are also many gaps where improvement is required. NGOs do not come to one shared perception. However, over all there are a few big obstacles where MONUSCO can do something more according to the NGOs. The international NGOs and academics agree with that. The aspects that are strengthening the relationships are smaller and more practical than the obstacles. But first we need to look at the vision of MONUSCO to be able to say more about the relationship.

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<sup>1</sup> Interview LNGO 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 11, 13, 17, 18, 19, 20

<sup>2</sup> The Universal Declaration of Human Rights. United Nations. <http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml#a1>

<sup>3</sup> Interview LNGO 3, 5, 6, 8, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20

<sup>4</sup> Weiss, T., Gordenker, L. 1996. NGOs, the UN, and Global Governance. Emerging Global Issues. Lynne Rienner Publishers: London.

<sup>5</sup> Interview LNGO 13, 18, 19, 20

<sup>6</sup> Worldbank. 2006. Civil Society and Peacebuilding. Potential, Limitations and Critical Factors.

<sup>7</sup> Interview LNGO 4, 6, 9, 11, 13, 17, 18, 20

<sup>8</sup> Interview LNGO 17, INGO 1

<sup>9</sup> Interview LNGO 6, 8, 9, 15, 17, 19

<sup>10</sup> Interview LNGO 6, 8, 9, 15, 17, 19

<sup>11</sup> Interview INGO 1, 3, 4, 5

<sup>12</sup> Interview LNGO 4

<sup>13</sup> Interview LNGO 1, 4

<sup>14</sup> Interview LNGO 7, 14, 18, 19

<sup>15</sup> Weiss, T., Gordenker, L. 1996. NGOs, the UN, and Global Governance. Emerging Global Issues. Lynne Rienner Publishers: London.

<sup>16</sup> Interview LNGO 9, 16, 19

<sup>17</sup> Frerks, G. 2005. Symposium Report: The role of civil society in conflict prevention and peacebuilding; Chigas, D. 2007. Capacities and Limits of NGOs as Conflict Managers. In: Crocker, C.A., Hampson, F.O., Aall, P. 2007. Leashing the Dogs of War, Conflict Management in a Divided World. United States Institute of Peace, Washington D.C.

<sup>18</sup> Interview LNGO 4, 13

<sup>19</sup> Interview LNGO 7, 8, 9, 13, 16, 17

<sup>20</sup> Interview LNGO 1, 3, 5, Ac 2, 4

<sup>21</sup> Interview LNGO 4, 6, 20

<sup>22</sup> Miall, H. 2001. Conflict Transformation: A Multi-dimensional Task. In: Austin, A. and Fischer, M. and Ropers, N., eds. 2004. Transforming Ethnopolitical Conflict. The Berghof Handbook, Berlin, Germany, p. 67-90; Interview LNGO 13, 18, 19.

<sup>23</sup> Interview LNGO 18

<sup>24</sup> Interview LNGO 13, 19

<sup>25</sup> Interview INGOs 1, 2, 5

<sup>26</sup> Interview LNGO 8

<sup>27</sup> Interview LNGO 6

<sup>28</sup> Interview LNGO 1, 2, 5, 7, 9, 19, 20

<sup>29</sup> Interview LNGO 3, 9, 16, 18; Weiss, T., Gordenker, L. 1996. NGOs, the UN, and Global Governance. Emerging Global Issues. Lynne Rienner Publishers: London.

<sup>30</sup> Interview Ac 1,2, INGO 1

<sup>31</sup> Interview LNGO 16, 17

<sup>32</sup> Interview LNGO 13, 20, INGO 1

<sup>33</sup> Interview LNGO 15, 16, 18

<sup>34</sup> Interview LNGO 1, 19, 20

<sup>35</sup> Interview LNGO 14

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

<sup>37</sup> Interview LNGO 5

<sup>38</sup> Interview Ac 3, 4

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- <sup>39</sup> Interview INGO 3, 4, 5
- <sup>40</sup> Interview Ac 3
- <sup>41</sup> Interview LNGO 12
- <sup>42</sup> Interview LNGO 1, 14, 16, 19, 20
- <sup>43</sup> Interview LNGO 3, 4, 9, 10, 11, 12
- <sup>44</sup> Interview LNGO 6, 8, 9, 11, 15, 17, 18, 20
- <sup>45</sup> United Nations Security Council. 2010. Resolution 1925. [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1925\(2010\)](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1925(2010))
- <sup>46</sup> Chesterman, S. 2007. Ownership in Theory and Practice: Transfer of Authority in UN Statebuilding Operations. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, 1 (1), p. 3-26.
- <sup>47</sup> Interview LNGO 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 10, 12, 14, 20, M 1, 2, 3, 4, 6.
- <sup>48</sup> Interview LNGO 19
- <sup>49</sup> Interview LNGO 18, 19, 20
- <sup>50</sup> United Nations Security Council. 2010. Resolution 1925. [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1925\(2010\)](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1925(2010))
- <sup>51</sup> Interview LNGO 9, 18, 19
- <sup>52</sup> Interview LNGO 1, 4, 5, 6, 9, 12, 13, 16, 19, 20
- <sup>53</sup> Interview LNGO 6, 15
- <sup>54</sup> Interview LNGO 7, 11, 13, 14, 18, 19, 20
- <sup>55</sup> Interview LNGO 18
- <sup>56</sup> Interview LNGO 2, 11, 13, 15; Pearce, J. 2005. The International Community and Peacebuilding. *Development*, 48 (3), p. 41-49; Pouligny, B. 2005. Building 'new' societies. *Security Dialogue*, 36 (4), p.495-510; Autessere, S. 2010. *The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding*. Cambridge University Press: New York.
- <sup>57</sup> Autessere, S. 2010. *The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding*. Cambridge University Press: New York.
- <sup>58</sup> Interview LNGO 17, 19
- <sup>59</sup> Interview LNGO 20
- <sup>60</sup> United Nations Security Council. 2010. Resolution 1925. [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1925\(2010\)](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1925(2010))
- <sup>61</sup> Interview LNGO 5, 8
- <sup>62</sup> Interview LNGO 16
- <sup>63</sup> Interview LNGO 1, 3, 7, 9
- <sup>64</sup> Interview LNGO 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 19, 20
- <sup>65</sup> United Nations Security Council. 2010. Resolution 1925. [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1925\(2010\)](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1925(2010))
- <sup>66</sup> Interview LNGO 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 19, 20
- <sup>67</sup> Interview LNGO 5, 10
- <sup>68</sup> Interview LNGO 3, 5
- <sup>69</sup> Chesterman, S. 2007. Ownership in Theory and Practice: Transfer of Authority in UN Statebuilding Operations. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, 1 (1), p. 3-26
- <sup>70</sup> Reynaert, J. 2010. MONUC/MONUSCO and civilian protection in the Kivus. International Peace Information Service.
- <sup>71</sup> Interview LNGO 2, 4, 11, 13, 15, 18, 19
- <sup>72</sup> Interview LNGO 13
- <sup>73</sup> Interview LNGO 19
- <sup>74</sup> Interview LNGO 3, 4, 6, 8, 15, 16
- <sup>75</sup> Interview LNGO 6
- <sup>76</sup> Interview LNGO 3, 5, 9, 16, 17, 18, 20
- <sup>77</sup> Interview LNGO 4, 5, 6, 12, 14, 16, 17, 18, 20
- <sup>78</sup> Interview LNGO 17
- <sup>79</sup> Interview LNGO 1, 4, 9, 13, 16, 17, 18
- <sup>80</sup> Interview LNGO 2
- <sup>81</sup> Interview LNGO 1, 6, 3, 4, 17
- <sup>82</sup> Interview LNGO 6
- <sup>83</sup> Interview LNGO 14
- <sup>84</sup> Interview LNGO 15
- <sup>85</sup> Interview Ac 4
- <sup>86</sup> UN News Centre. 2004. Annan vows to end sex abuse committed by UN mission staff in DR of Congo. <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=12590&Cr=democratic&Cr1=congo>
- <sup>87</sup> Interview LNGO 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 13, 16, 19
- <sup>88</sup> Interview LNGO 1, 2, 12, 17, 18, 19
- <sup>89</sup> Interview LNGO 16, 19
- <sup>90</sup> Interview LNGO 4, 6, 12, 16, 17, 20
- <sup>91</sup> Interview Ac 4
- <sup>92</sup> Interview LNGO 22, Ac 1
- <sup>93</sup> Reynaert, J. 2010. MONUC/MONUSCO and civilian protection in the Kivus. International Peace Information Service.
- <sup>94</sup> Interview LNGO 1, 4, 6, 7, 8, 12, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19
- <sup>95</sup> Interview LNGO 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 12, 14, 20
- <sup>96</sup> Interview INGO 1, 2, 3, 4, 5
- <sup>97</sup> Meetings 10-10, 11-11, 12-11, 28-11-2011
- <sup>98</sup> Interview LNGO 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 10, 12, 14, 16, 17, 20
- <sup>99</sup> Interview LNGO 15
- <sup>100</sup> Interview LNGO 2, 16, 18, 19
- <sup>101</sup> Interview LNGO 5, 6, 17, 20
- <sup>102</sup> Interview Ac 1, 3, 4
- <sup>103</sup> Pouligny, B. 2005. Building 'new' societies. *Security Dialogue*, 36 (4), p.495-510; Autessere, S. 2010. *The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding*. Cambridge University Press: New York. See also chapter 2.4 for more theory.
- <sup>104</sup> Interview LNGO 3, 6, 10, 14, 17

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<sup>105</sup> Interview INGO 1, 2, 3, 4, Ac 4, 3  
<sup>106</sup> Interview LNGO 6  
<sup>107</sup> Interview Ac 3  
<sup>108</sup> Interview INGO 3  
<sup>109</sup> Interview LNGO 4, 18, 19  
<sup>110</sup> Interview LNGO 15  
<sup>111</sup> Interview LNGO 6  
<sup>112</sup> Reynaert, J. 2010. MONUC/MONUSCO and civilian protection in the Kivus. International Peace Information Service.  
<sup>113</sup> Interview LNGO 11, 19  
<sup>114</sup> Interview LNGO 15  
<sup>115</sup> Interview LNGO 1  
<sup>116</sup> Interview LNGO 3, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18, 20  
<sup>117</sup> Interview LNGO 11  
<sup>118</sup> Interview LNGO 6  
<sup>119</sup> Interview LNGO 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11-20  
<sup>120</sup> Interview LNGO 14 and 15  
<sup>121</sup> Interview LNGO 19  
<sup>122</sup> Interview LNGO 2, 4, 6, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19; Reynaert, J. 2010. MONUC/MONUSCO and civilian protection in the Kivus. International Peace Information Service.  
<sup>123</sup> Interview LNGO 1, 6, 9, 15, 18, 19  
<sup>124</sup> Interview LNGO 4, 18  
<sup>125</sup> Interview LNGO 19  
<sup>126</sup> Interview LNGO 1, 2, 4, 9, 11, 12, 13, 16, 18, 19  
<sup>127</sup> Interview LNGO 13, 14  
<sup>128</sup> Interview LNGO 2, 6, 18  
<sup>129</sup> Interview LNGO 6, 9, 13, 14, 19  
<sup>130</sup> Interview LNGO 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 14  
<sup>131</sup> Interview LNGO 5, 13, 15, 16, 20  
<sup>132</sup> Interview LNGO 2, 4, 17  
<sup>133</sup> Interview LNGO 4  
<sup>134</sup> Interview LNGO 15  
<sup>135</sup> Interview LNGO 3  
<sup>136</sup> Interview LNGO 1

## 5. Perceptions MONUSCO with regard to local NGOs

This chapter describes the perception of MONUSCO officers in Bukavu, South Kivu, regarding to the role of the UN peacekeeping mission, local human rights NGOs, and the relationship between these actors. These perceptions are compared with the visions of local NGOs described in chapter 4, and with the theory described in chapter 2. In this chapter, the local human rights NGOs are named shortly NGOs.

### 5.1 The role of MONUSCO in peacebuilding

MONUSCO officers have different perceptions of the role of the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC, although these perceptions are not very diverse. The roles can be placed in four categories, related with the theories of UN peacekeeping missions: 1) coordination, 2) security and justice, 3) support of government, 4) capacity building. These categories are not just at the macro level, as the hypothesis states, because coordination and capacity building focus also at the local level. But the literature criticizes the UN peacekeeping missions by neglecting the local roles. Moreover, these local roles are not being recognized by all actors in current missions. This paragraph examines the hypothesis that international UN peacekeepers view their role in peacebuilding only at the macro level and as limited.

The roles are largely corresponding with the roles mentioned by local NGOs. NGOs mentioned infrastructure as a role what has not been mentioned by MONUSCO, and NGOs declare information sharing as minor role, while MONUSCO expounds information sharing in combination with coordination as fundamental role.

#### 5.1.1 Coordination and information

While most theories state that the role of coordination has to be exaggerated because locals are not enough been involved in the process, the interviewees of MONUSCO disagree.<sup>1</sup> For MONUSCO's civil staff in the field, their main role in the peacebuilding process is coordination; bringing actors together, local NGOs, projects and information.<sup>2</sup> Investigation of human rights violations is being done by all actors together, according to an officer of MONUSCO.<sup>3</sup> Some see the role of MONUSCO as involving local NGOs in the peacebuilding process; moreover they facilitate contacts, assistance and activities for them. Supporting locals by way of transport and protection is often being argued, but also information, knowledge and financial assistance is mentioned.<sup>4</sup>

Providing information is not only a role for the component Public Information, which holds meetings with whole communities, including the population, authorities and local NGOs. Also the Human Rights Office, the Civil Affairs Section and the Sexual Violence Unit gather and provide information.<sup>5</sup> In the DRC there is a lack of data mapping and information, all MONUSCO officers argued. The Community Liaison Assistants (CLAs) are effective in the communication with the population, according to the Civil Affairs Section. Another one said that "we are able to facilitate dialogues", especially by new tools like radios, Joint Protection Teams (JPT) and CLAs.<sup>6</sup>

One Civil Affairs Section officer sees CAS as "the ear of MONUSCO; the bridge between MONUSCO and civil society".<sup>7</sup> They work by theme to support local NGOs as best as they can, and they try to reinforce capacity. He states it is not yet an optimally effective system, because the system has only been in existence for one year. But for CAS it is a better way to operate nowadays, according to the interviewee.<sup>8</sup>

Remarkably, not many NGOs confirm seeing CAS as the ear of MONUSCO. The platform of Civil Society in South Kivu is positive about the role and impact of CAS. They bring local support and reinforcement of the civil society and they work for capacity improvement. This makes CAS effective and transparent.<sup>9</sup> However, there are only two NGOs who value the component of CAS.<sup>10</sup> One of the international NGOs states that CAS coordinates very well, shows willingness and creates more trust between NGOs and MONUSCO. Also one of the academics states CAS contributes to coordination with NGOs.<sup>11</sup> CAS seems to have a good reputation, but the problem is many NGOs do not know them.<sup>12</sup>

Although this role of the UN peacekeepers is not perceived just at the macro level or as limited, since local NGOs are involved in coordination networks and information sharing, the local NGOs did minimally recognize this role of MONUSCO in the peacebuilding process. For many local NGOs it is inadequate or they are not part of the network.<sup>13</sup>

### **5.1.2 Security and justice**

Often described in the theory, relating to rebuilding, justice and development, security is essential in international interventions. Since security is also the main objective in the mandate, all levels – local NGOs, international NGOs, academics and MONUSCO officers – agree with this role with little divergence.<sup>14</sup> Security is an important role for MONUSCO, as many interviewees mentioned it as role for the UN mission, although they did not elaborate on security issues.<sup>15</sup> Security includes fighting against impunity, securing justices and promoting and protecting human rights are roles which MONUSCO has to play according to several components.<sup>16</sup> Stabilization in the eastern provinces and stabilizing the routes is part of the protection of civilians.<sup>17</sup> They all agree that protection of civilians is not completely successful, since there is still insecurity, although violence in the provinces decreases. Protection by way of fighting against impunity, assistance in justice and protecting people against militia coincides with the perception of international NGOs and academics.<sup>18</sup>

This role is one of the macro level roles for the peacekeepers. It is a central role in the mandate, and also NGO prioritize the role of maintaining security and creating justice. However, maintaining security is being seen as limited, by all actors, since the Kivu provinces are still instable.<sup>19</sup>

### **5.1.3 Support of government**

Supporting the government is a macro-role of MONUSCO recognized by both NGOs as well as MONUSCO officers.<sup>20</sup> Not only assistance for elections is mentioned by MONUSCO, but also supporting the government to creating good administration, to build institutions and create a basis for democracy. There is barely law and order in the DRC; “it’s a political game with just all influence of Kabila.”<sup>21</sup> This is only one statement, but many respondents agree that cooperation with the government is hard and that MONUSCO is being restricted a lot due to the Congolese government.<sup>22</sup> So this role is being seen as limited by the international peacekeepers. Some NGOs see this restriction as well, while others think it is a lack of willingness of MONUSCO to change the leadership of the DRC. Several NGOs do not know the activities of MONUSCO to reinforce governance and emphasized only the support with regard to the elections.<sup>23</sup>

Furthermore, contribution to a better and sustainable infrastructure is often mentioned. MONUSCO tries to provide transport because this public service is not being supplied by the government.<sup>24</sup> Besides, the UN set up a radio station, Radio Okapi, which provides a lot of information and tries to start dialogues, even within the remote areas.<sup>25</sup> Since there is no data of violence and human rights violations, MONUSCO is trying to gather this information and assist the authorities in prospective information services. All these issues were also mentioned by the local human rights NGOs.

### **5.1.4 Capacity building**

The statement of Autesserre that the top-down approach in eastern DRC needs to be completed with a bottom-up approach is verified by the interview results, looking at the four main categories of MONUSCO’s role.<sup>26</sup> Although the local NGOs mentioned training and capacity building as a deficiency instead of a current role that MONUSCO plays in the peacebuilding process, MONUSCO indicates capacity building as an important role for the UN mission at micro level.<sup>27</sup> NGOs say they are in need of training to develop the expertise and knowledge that MONUSCO has, while different components of the mission state that they contribute to reinforcement of local NGOs by providing knowledge, accomplishes training and coordination of local NGOs and local authorities. Probably it is explicable by the fact that trainings are only for a few big NGOs and just a few times a year. If MONUSCO would extend these trainings, creating local ownership will be expanded and MONUSCO can truly bring change.<sup>28</sup> To teach local NGOs, as well as authorities, in being accountable, the DRC is a little step closer to peace. The international NGOs emphasize the expansion of sustainability of the mission when MONUSCO is doing more capacity building and by doing this creating more local ownership.<sup>29</sup>

### **5.1.5 Weaknesses of MONUSCO**

Only two of its own officers think that MONUSCO is effective.<sup>30</sup> Most officers said that the UN mission is partly effective but that it has many gaps, as we also have seen with the local NGOs.

First of all, most weaknesses are concerning the organizational structure of the UN and the peacekeeping mission. There are restrictions of the UN due to the policy drawn up in New York.<sup>31</sup> Reynaert names the bureaucracy of the UN as one of the causes of failures in the field in eastern DRC. Due to complex procedures and the need for approvals for every action, MONUSCO cannot always react properly or quickly.<sup>32</sup> In addition, everybody agrees that MONUSCO does not receive enough budget and staff. Lack of coordination and failing in protection of civilians are consequences of under capacity in the field. There are too many political aspects within the implementation of the mandate, and MONUSCO is seen as unprogressive since MONUSCO is too big and has double tasks or useless actions.<sup>33</sup> On the one hand, lack of sustainability has been determined due to the way of acting of MONUSCO and its short-employed staff, on the other hand, it is argued that sustainability is hard to reach with a relatively small intervention in a huge country like the DRC with its complex conflicts.

All these aspects, recognized by international NGOs and academics, indicate a wrong mode of working. The direction of the highest level of the mission needs to be more practical.<sup>34</sup> Remarkably, NGOs did not name this problem, since they look at the more local weaknesses of MONUSCO and integration with the Congolese actors, than the higher political level and organizational structure of MONUSCO. Only one respondent states: "MONUSCO wants to have a solution at macro level but not local,"<sup>35</sup> what makes local peacebuilding more difficult. But regarding the roles MONUSCO mentioned, at the macro level security and support of the government and at the local level coordination and capacity building, they focus not just at the macro level.

Furthermore, it is argued that the difference between civil components of the mission and the military of MONUSCO is not clear for the population, but neither it is for some of MONUSCO.<sup>36</sup> There is a clear lack of information, even within MONUSCO itself. This seems to be an ever-recurring aspect.

Another limitation of MONUSCO is the local context. There is a lot of poverty, so people do not see the meaning to understand the efforts of MONUSCO, since they are trying to survive with their families.<sup>37</sup> Information is not significant, some local people think. Others think that MONUSCO is cooperating with the rebels of the FDLR, because MONUSCO has been involved in some scandals that have been made public.<sup>38</sup> So often there is no confidence or collaboration with locals.

Besides, some of the respondents said that a difficulty for them is that there are too many independent NGOs.<sup>39</sup> In the DRC, it is quite simple to start an NGO, and many see ruling an NGO as a job since there is high unemployment.<sup>40</sup> NGOs themselves recognize these problems and see many ineffective NGOs around them. But for MONUSCO, it is hard to distinguish between which NGO they are going to cooperate and which not, because it is not possible to support them all.<sup>41</sup>

Looking back at the hypothesis that the international UN peacekeepers view their own role mainly at the macro level and as limited, it can be concluded that there are several weaknesses and limitations of MONUSCO - mainly due to the Congolese government and the UN system - but there are still enough possibilities be seen by MONUSCO officers to reinforce the situation in South Kivu. They focus also on roles at the local level, by coordination and capacity building, besides the macro-level roles. But remarkably, NGOs do not value these local roles as much as MONUSCO does. Coordination is not transparent and information is not enough provided. Also, capacity building is not effective due to the minimal trainings and workshops given by MONUSCO. So the hypothesis can be rejected regarding the perceptions of MONUSCO, but is more likely to confirm concerning the implementation, based on the vision of NGOs and the literature.

### **5.2 The role of local NGOs in peacebuilding**

From the roles of local NGOs, mentioned in the theory and by the NGO respondents, there are only two main roles for local NGOs mentioned by MONUSCO officers: first, approaching population and second, the replacement of government. These two roles are also described by NGOs themselves as

being a bridge, although NGOs have a broader view and see more roles for itself in the peacebuilding process. Looking at the theory, replacement of the government is not being mentioned. Whether the perceptions of locals and internationals correspond with each other, with regard to the roles of both actors, is being clarified in this paragraph.

### **5.2.1 Approaching population**

Each theory of NGOs in peacebuilding, every representative of MONUSCO and the NGOs themselves values the position of local human rights NGOs.<sup>42</sup> NGOs are close to the population, they know the terrain and culture. They are in the middle of the context of the conflict and local peacebuilding, where they can help the population in their needs and help to organize them. In doing so, NGOs give the population a voice and make them participate in the process.<sup>43</sup> Those bottom-up initiatives are at the core of local civil society. What is missing is the position of NGOs as a bridge between the international community and the population, and a bridge between the government and the population.<sup>44</sup>

Furthermore, NGOs work in remote areas where they do dangerous work. They take risks and are able to find and mobilize victims.<sup>45</sup> It is important to break through the taboos of sexual violence and being a victim. Also, NGOs are able to monitor behavior and processes at a local level. They are the main source of information in the field.<sup>46</sup> MONUSCO appreciates the impact NGOs have at local level, but they do not mention it as an opportunity for MONUSCO to have a bigger influence or improve their image at local level by way of interacting with local NGOs.

It is argued that "local projects are the motor of peacebuilding.... they have impact, because everyone is part of the strategy in local projects."<sup>47</sup> The implementation of different activities of local NGOs reinforces the capacity at a local level and improves the impact of peacebuilding activities. Furthermore, it is a sustainable way of peacebuilding because the NGOs will continue their activities as long as necessary and they are able to change the way of acting when it is needed. Only one officer said that local civil society has the role to be the actor of development and sustainability.<sup>48</sup> By building local networks of human rights organizations and improving local initiatives, the peacebuilding process can be sustainable. It is remarkable that just one of the NGOs mentioned development as role for civil society, probably because the others see the many problems and complex history as obstacles to develop their precarious country.<sup>49</sup>

### **5.2.2 Replacement of government**

As NGOs mentioned its role as observing and checking the government, MONUSCO representatives indicate NGOs as a replacement of the government.<sup>50</sup> Because the lack of willingness and not-working authorities, the local NGOs take over the institutions and tasks of the government. Also, concerning the elections, the government takes no responsibility in creating awareness of the democratic principles and the right to vote.<sup>51</sup> Because of the closeness of local NGOs to the population, they are able to raise awareness concerning the elections. However, one interviewee said: "[NGOs] cannot bring change, because Kabila rules all in the DRC."<sup>52</sup>

It seems to be that NGOs see the Congolese government as working but need to be controlled,<sup>53</sup> while MONUSCO implies that there is no well-working government in the DRC because civil society replaces the government.<sup>54</sup> MONUSCO tries to support the government from the top-level, and NGOs are replacing services that the government should provide relating to the population, bottom-up.<sup>55</sup> The theory focuses at communication with state actors and monitoring of state activities as a role for NGOs, but the vision that NGOs carry out the tasks of the state has not been mentioned in the literature.<sup>56</sup> Whether it is a typical perception of the situation in the DRC or there is another explanation, cannot be concluded without further research.

### **5.2.3 Weaknesses of local NGOs**

To be able to better understand MONUSCO's way of thinking concerning NGOs, the weaknesses they mentioned are explained below. First, the mentality within the Congolese civil society is hard to work with.<sup>57</sup> Almost all MONUSCO representatives said that there are several NGOs who only want to have money. As mentioned before, people are creating NGOs to have a job and earn some money, instead



of changing the precarious situation. NGOs are “just as corrupt as the government.”<sup>58</sup> They are incredible and try to deceive. Obviously, these statements do not count for all NGOs.

Secondly, in the civil society there is competition between the NGOs, which does not lead to effectiveness.<sup>59</sup> Many NGOs are not specialized; they work arbitrarily in sectors where they can find money, preferably as much as possible. Consequently, there is a lack of expertise and a lack of a critical view within many NGOs.<sup>60</sup> As a result, it is hard to bring about change in a complex situation like the eastern part of the DRC. Also, information is remote from the NGOs; some do not see the importance of sharing information.<sup>61</sup>

Remarkably the interviewees agree that it is hard to find solutions for these weaknesses. Trying to create local capacity and development are the possible solutions, although it is still hard to realize change in these issues.<sup>62</sup>

In summary, the role of MONUSCO is seen as manifold by the interveners themselves. First, coordination between actors, projects and dialogues is an important role for MONUSCO officers. An essential aspect in this is to provide and share information. Secondly, security is fundamental, including creating justice and protecting civilians. Thirdly, MONUSCO is supporting the government by creating institutions, democracy principles and holding elections. Fourthly, MONUSCO's role is to strengthen the deficient infrastructure, not only by way of providing transport for NGOs, but also by sharing information and holding dialogues. Fifthly, capacity building by sharing the experiences and knowledge that MONUSCO has is of significance within the peacebuilding process.

According to the MONUSCO representatives there are only two important roles for local NGOs: approaching the population and replacement of the government. Since NGOs are part of the society, they know the culture, traditions, remote areas and the people, and it is important to be in the field. Because the NGOs are close to the population, they can raise awareness and share information, a fundamental aspect of their function. MONUSCO acknowledges that the work done by NGOs can be dangerous and they attach importance to the high risks that NGOs are taking. This contribution to the peacebuilding process is seen as valuable, having impact and being sustainable.

Secondly, civil society is replacing the government by developing institutions and democracy principles. Remarkably, MONUSCO mentioned this also as its own role. Obviously, the Congolese government has not been effective because the lack of willingness to change the precarious situation in the eastern part of the DRC.

Thus, the perceptions of NGOs and MONUSCO concerning the roles in the peacebuilding process are partial equal without distinct contradictions between these roles. However, the most important difference is that MONUSCO sees local NGOs as limited in their roles; there are only two essential roles for local civil society. Furthermore, the mentality of many NGOs is not supportive, according to the UN peacekeepers, what is being seen as a significant limitation in the civil society in the DRC.

### **5.3 Difficulties relationship UN and NGOs**

In the interviews, most MONUSCO representatives said that there is not a good relation between local NGOs and MONUSCO. They are a little more negative than the local human rights NGOs. The issues that have been put forward are out of the theory: communication and integration. Central in the difficulties of the relationship is the extent of sharing information and values, since the expectation is that a lack of communication leads to a difficult relationship.

#### **5.3.1 Communication**

The contact and meetings between MONUSCO and NGOs is not always effective, MONUSCO agrees with the local NGOs.<sup>63</sup> The NGOs that are represented in Bukavu have regular contact with the UN peacekeeping mission, but other local grassroots NGOs who do not have representatives in the principal town are hard to reach. There is no more need for support to MONUSCO, but more understanding and information for NGOs are required according to most interviewees.<sup>64</sup> People expect things that MONUSCO cannot realize because of a lack of knowledge and understanding of the international intervention and its policies.

Some officers mentioned that there is no training of NGOs while they need it.<sup>65</sup> The expertise and knowledge that MONUSCO has, need to be transferred to local NGOs by trainings. Some NGOs

have a lack of engagement and devotion to their work.<sup>66</sup> By training the NGOs, this attitude has to change. Only the Human Rights component said they do trainings, as being mentioned in their mandate; they train Congolese trainers to teach about human rights, advocacy and justice and increase the empowerment of local civil society.<sup>67</sup> Other workshops of CAS were held in 2010-2011 but not anymore nowadays, without a clear reason.<sup>68</sup>

Furthermore, communication with the military of the mission is very hard.<sup>69</sup> Most military are from Pakistan and India, and they do not speak French, local languages, and some of them do not even speak English.<sup>70</sup> They are not embedded at all, and this is one of the reasons that MONUSCO has a bad image among the Congolese population. For the civilian staff, it is hard to fight against this image.<sup>71</sup>

Hence, in the field in South Kivu the same results are found as described in the literature. The interviewees who state that the communication with NGOs is good and there is enough information sharing, are the same who state that their relationship with the NGOs is good.<sup>72</sup> Otherwise, if the communication is insignificant, the interviewees indicate a bad relationship with NGOs.<sup>73</sup> NGOs show the same results regarding their communication and relationship with the UN mission.

### **5.3.2 Integration**

Another aspect that makes the relationship more difficult for MONUSCO officers is the differences in culture. There are often opposing ideas between interveners and locals, mainly in the villages, because of traditional values.<sup>74</sup> Because of the differences and the Congolese mentality, it is hard to work with the Congolese people, according to several MONUSCO officers. Due to these aspects, embeddedness of the internationals is low. One interviewee said that internationals have few local informal contacts, in accordance with the vision of most international NGOs and local NGOs.<sup>75</sup>

Furthermore, the Congolese mentality is hard to work with. There is no will to change according to some respondents. They are impatient; they expect MONUSCO to bring peace while they do not see peacebuilding as a process that takes time.<sup>76</sup> "Dependency has been created by internationals. That is why some Congolese have the mentality to wait," agrees an academic with MONUSCO.<sup>77</sup> Consequently, they are dissatisfied with MONUSCO and the results in peacebuilding. "We have to push the Congolese to more effective peacebuilding, try to really change things, transform capacity."<sup>78</sup>

Again, this can be explained by the lack of information. The expectation of Congolese people does not fit with the reality according to MONUSCO, so possibly, when this problem is explained to the NGOs, it can clarify the process. Besides, if the roles – in which perceptions do not differ that much – are discussed including its activities, the mentality to wait should diminishes among the Congolese.<sup>79</sup> By doing this, it is required for MONUSCO to be more open to the Congolese, which the NGOs mentioned as an obstacle for them in their relationship with MONUSCO. However, the mentality to be dependent on the international community is hard to change, because of all international influence and donors in the DRC.<sup>80</sup>

## **5.4 Strengthening relationship UN and NGOs**

According to the interviewees of MONUSCO, there are fewer aspects which strengthen the relationship between them and NGOs than the NGOs mentioned. Nevertheless, some issues have been put forward which correspond with the positive aspects the NGOs mentioned. Looking again at the communication and integration, the hypothesis is tested whether more integration of UN peacekeepers should relate to stronger relationships, as the literature states.

### **5.4.1 Communication**

In Bukavu there are regular meetings with NGOs.<sup>81</sup> Forums and dialogues are held, even by way of Radio Okapi, where locals can contribute to dialogues with their visions. The Human Rights component said that there are regular brainstorm-meetings among them and NGOs to see what the best way is to intervene and operate. The Human Rights component also shares information with NGOs and NGOs help them to gather information on human rights issues or cases.<sup>82</sup> Main NGOs confirm this strength to meet regularly with the Human Rights component of MONUSCO. However, this is the only component of MONUSCO who organizes regular meetings with NGOs. All

international NGOs, academics, two officers of MONUSCO and one NGO representative state that the meetings are regular but not useful.<sup>83</sup> It is just a formality, but there is still no understanding or transparency.

Everybody agrees that there is a lack of knowledge and information about the work MONUSCO is doing in the DRC, due to the minimal communication.<sup>84</sup> Some officers say that if the UN explains their policy and activities people will understand,<sup>85</sup> others say that it is hard to make them understand the work done by the UN.<sup>86</sup>

In a meeting with NGOs and MONUSCO, the role of MONUSCO regarding the elections was explained clearly. Due to the current events and concrete subject it is easier to explain the activities to the people. According to the MONUSCO representative, there is more consciousness of the right to vote and the elections than in 2006.<sup>87</sup> However, this consciousness is improved primarily regarding the elections; concerning general human rights there is much unknown about the results of raising awareness and knowledge.

#### **5.4.2 Integration**

Integration is the most debatable aspect of the relationship between MONUSCO and NGOs. Half of the respondents from MONUSCO and half of the NGOs said that UN internationals are integrated in the Congolese society.<sup>88</sup> The civilian staff is open and trained, and they speak the language so they are able to make contact with locals. In addition, the international staff works with local staff of MONUSCO so this contributes to the integration. An academic said that MONUSCO has been in the DRC for many years, so they know the environment.<sup>89</sup> Others argued that UN peacekeepers, due to the short-term deployment, lack understanding of the culture and environment.<sup>90</sup>

The respondents who state that MONUSCO officers are integrated in the Congolese context, are the ones who also said they have a good relationship with NGOs.<sup>91</sup> Thus, the hypothesis that more integration leads to a stronger relationship seems to be confirmed for MONUSCO officers. Amongst the NGOs, the expectation is also mostly confirmed, although a few results are inconsistent.<sup>92</sup> An explanation for these inconsistencies is not found.

Possibly, the vision of the international representatives of international NGOs can be the same as the international officers of MONUSCO. However, this is not true. When asked about the integration of MONUSCO officers in the Congolese society, international NGOs put forward that the UN is arrogant. They think they are better than locals. MONUSCO is far from the base of the conflict, many persons are not embedded, not open and often there is no willingness to really improve the situation.<sup>93</sup>

However, it has also been argued that the DRC needs the international community to assist in reaching local ownership and, by doing so, contributing to local peacebuilding. But the international community is causing a problem according to international NGOs and academics: the dependency of Congo and its people on the international community. There is passivity among Congolese citizens because some people think that “we will fix it”.<sup>94</sup> This dependency has been created by internationals, stated an academic. The mentality to wait has been aroused because of all the international interference. According to an international NGO representative: “They cannot go with or without the international community.”<sup>95</sup>

“Congo deserves to be treated as a country, not as a mess. It is important to give them a change and look for sustainability... we should leave but with a smooth exit strategy to handle things to the Congolese themselves.” So there is a need for (local) capacity building. Remarkably none of the MONUSCO officers mentioned the departure of MONUSCO. Only one MONUSCO member said: “If MONUSCO leaves, everything will fall down in the DRC.”<sup>96</sup>

Thus, regarding to the relationship with NGOs, MONUSCO perceives more obstacles than strengths. They mentioned the mentality of the Congolese NGOs as an obstacle. The system of corruption did not only evolve within the government, but also in the mentality of the population, even in the civil society. Everybody only thinks about money, and that way it is hard to work with them. Idealism has disappeared, because of repeated history. It is a problem that NGOs are not specialized and only looking for ways to obtain money; it causes concurrence and lack of expertise.

Furthermore, there is a lack of information, because not every part of the society is within reach and training outside the principle town is hard to realize. In addition, the military cause a bad image

because they do not speak the languages and do not know the cultures. For the civil sections of MONUSCO, it is important to distinguish the civil staff from the military, but this has not been explained up to now, not even within MONUSCO itself.

The final obstacle is the many differences in cultures; traditional values are hard to understand for MONUSCO and difficult to change. Minds, traditions and even parts of cultures need to change to be able to transform the situation into peace and justice, according to MONUSCO.

Strengthening the relationship between MONUSCO and NGOs is the communication with larger NGOs and within the principle town Bukavu. Although there is still a lack of information as explained above, in Bukavu there are regular meetings and sometimes trainings for NGOs. Regarding the elections, there is more understanding and awareness of the right to vote. And MONUSCO representatives named Radio Okapi as a strength in their relationship, because locals can contribute to dialogues and provide information, even from remote areas and small villages.

Also, the civil staff of MONUSCO thinks that they are embedded in the society; they are open and trained and interact with their Congolese colleagues. They admit that the military are not embedded at all; this is an obstacle for the relationship between MONUSCO military and the local population.

## **5.5 Conclusion**

This chapter has described the perceptions of MONUSCO regarding its role in the peacebuilding process and its relationship with local human rights NGOs. Relating the roles in the peacebuilding process, the categories of roles are pointed out in the literature but the hypotheses of perceptions of roles are not found in the field-results. But the expectations concerning relationships are verified by empirical data. This enables us to answer one of the sub questions of this research:

*What are the perceptions of MONUSCO with regard to local human rights NGOs?*

### **5.5.1 How does MONUSCO perceive the role of the NGOs and that of itself?**

MONUSCO representatives see clear differences between their own role and the role of local human rights NGOs. Local NGOs are close to the population and thus more local oriented, while MONUSCO has both macro as local level roles. Their perception is not, as Autesserre states in her book, only focused at the macro level. Coordination, information sharing, and capacity building are local roles for MONUSCO's civil staff to realize in the field. MONUSCO itself sees improvements in these roles, while the literature criticizes these aspects as a deficiency.

Obviously, macro roles that are central in the mandate - maintaining security and supporting the government - are also of importance for MONUSCO officers. Furthermore, the main limitations of MONUSCO are in the bureaucracy of the UN system and the restrictions of the Congolese government. But again, it is not as Autesserre states, that MONUSCO officers see the mission as impossible and limited. There are possibilities be seen to improve activities in the field, mostly by way of increase comprehension, dialogues and local capacity.

The role of NGOs is seen by MONUSCO as narrow. Building principles for democracy and building or replacing missing institutions are equal roles for MONUSCO and NGOs, although this takes place at another level. Approaching the population is an important role for the NGOs, because MONUSCO itself is not close to the population and it may be difficult to understand local cultures.

The big difference between the perceptions of locals and international peacekeepers with regard to the role of both actors in the peacebuilding process lies mainly in the role of NGOs. NGOs themselves see their role as extensive, with raising awareness of rights and justice, building bridges, transforming communities and sharing information with the population, while MONUSCO officers see the roles of NGOs as more restricted. The implication of the literature that there is no correspondence between the perceptions of roles is only partly confirmed. The roles of MONUSCO are for both levels the same, except the implementation of it. Regarding NGOs, the amount of roles of NGOs in peacebuilding is perceived differently; for MONUSCO there are just two roles for NGOs, while NGOs see more different roles for themselves. Though, both actors state that being close to the population is a fundamental aspect of NGOs, this is being valued by both actors as well as the literature.

### ***5.5.2 Which aspects are obstacles in its relationship with the NGOs?***

According to the literature and to every level of actors, there is a lack of information and understanding of the activities of MONUSCO. For MONUSCO, capacity building is a significant role, but the local and international NGOs state that there is a lack in training expertise and sharing knowledge. Therefore, understanding of MONUSCO among Congolese is deficient. Subsequently, more training for NGOs is required to be able to build capacity. MONUSCO agrees with the local NGOs, as well as international NGOs and academics, that local capacity needs to be improved. In addition, the military need to communicate better to have more understanding about the population and, by doing that, improve the image of MONUSCO, since many Congolese do not know the difference between UN military and UN civil staff.

The expectation is confirmed that a lack of sharing information leads to problems in the relationship of NGOs and MONUSCO. The respondents who perceive a lack of communication between local NGOs and the UN mission, claimed to have a bad relationship with the other. Communication is the best way to increase understanding among each other, and share information about their way of thinking and way of acting. Otherwise is also proved, with good communication there is an effective relationship for most of the respondents.

Additional difficulty comes from the differences between the cultures. MONUSCO is not so integrated that they understand all aspects of the local culture, and values and traditions are misunderstood. Again this is a point of communication. Not only formal contacts and information sharing is of importance, but informal contact about cultures and the way of living is also essential. The other hypothesis is also verified in the field results; more integration leads to a stronger relationship. Every interviewee who stated that MONUSCO officers are integrated in the Congolese context, as well internationals themselves as NGOs, thinks more positive about their relationship than the ones who state that internationals are not integrated.

Furthermore, MONUSCO states that the mentality of Congolese NGOs is hard to work with; everybody is looking for money and they see civil society as a competition field for NGOs. There is no specialization among NGOs because they are looking for as much money as possible in different sectors, according the UN officers. That is why it is hard to build a relationship with NGOs, since there are so many unmotivated and ineffective NGOs. Besides, internationals state that there is a mentality to wait and be passive because they have a feeling of dependency on the international community, since there is much involvement and many international donors involved in the DRC. Whether this mentality could be changed with more information about MONUSCO and international donors, is questionable.

### ***5.5.3 Which aspects are strengthening its relationship with the NGOs?***

MONUSCO does not see much strength in its relationship with NGOs. The few strengths the respondents mentioned were the same as the strengths NGOs mentioned. The regular meetings are of positive influence for the contact and communication, although some persons of MONUSCO think it is not useful because there are no dialogues and discussions. However, most actors appreciate the meetings, as well as Radio Okapi as a communication tool by MONUSCO. Additionally, there is more understanding about the elections, which has a good impact on MONUSCO and its relationship with NGOs.

Integration is mentioned above as an obstacle in the relationship, although integration is sometimes also seen as a positive aspect. Some MONUSCO representatives think they are integrated, open minded and well trained to take part in the Congolese culture. They know the culture because of the contact and interaction with local colleagues. And some NGOs do not see problems in the degree of integration of MONUSCO officers and consequently they do not see many problems in their relationship.

So there is a clear need for more communication about the activities and means of MONUSCO, but also about the organizational structure. This communication is required to create more understanding. Furthermore, training and development of expertise and capacity is important for NGOs, and MONUSCO also concedes that training is important and needs to be achieved more. In

addition, MONUSCO realizes that their image needs to improve in order to be able to have a good relationship with NGOs. This counts mainly for the military, but if there is also more understanding, the difference between military and civil staff will be clearer and the image of the civilian staff will not be dependent on the behavior of the military any more.

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<sup>2</sup> Interview M 1, 2, 5, 6, 7

<sup>3</sup> Interview M 7

<sup>4</sup> Interview M 1-5, 7

<sup>5</sup> Interview M 1, 2, 5, 6, 7

<sup>6</sup> Interview M 4

<sup>7</sup> Interview M 2

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Meeting 11-11-2011

<sup>10</sup> Interview M 8, 19

<sup>11</sup> Interview Ac 2

<sup>12</sup> Interview Ac 3

<sup>13</sup> Interview LNGO 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 14, 16, 17, 20

<sup>14</sup> Interview M 3-7, INGO 1-4, 1-4, LNGO 3-15, 17,18

<sup>15</sup> Interview M 3, 4, 6, 7

<sup>16</sup> Interview M 3, 4, 6, 7

<sup>17</sup> Interview M 3, 6

<sup>18</sup> Interview INGO 1, 2, 3, Ac 2, 3

<sup>19</sup> Interview LNGO 3, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 15, 17, 18, 20; United Nations Security Council. 2010. Resolution 1925.

<sup>20</sup> Interview M 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, LNGO 4, 6, 9, 10, 13, 18, 19, 20

<sup>21</sup> Interview M 6

<sup>22</sup> Interview M 3, 5, 6

<sup>23</sup> Interview LNGO 1, 4, 5, 12, 13

<sup>24</sup> Interview M 2, 3, 4, 7

<sup>25</sup> Interview M 4, 5

<sup>26</sup> Autessere, S. 2010. *The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding*. Cambridge University Press: New York.

<sup>27</sup> Interview M 1, 2, 3, 4, 7

<sup>28</sup> Interview M 7

<sup>29</sup> Interview INGO 1, 2, 4, 5

<sup>30</sup> Interview M 4, 7

<sup>31</sup> Interview M 1, INGO 4, AC 3, 4

<sup>32</sup> Reynaert, J. 2010. MONUC/MONUSCO and civilian protection in the Kivu. International Peace Information Service.

<sup>33</sup> Interview M 1, 6

<sup>34</sup> Interview M 1, INGO 2, 4, AC 3, 4

<sup>35</sup> Interview M 9

<sup>36</sup> Interview M 5

<sup>37</sup> Interview M 5

<sup>38</sup> Interview M 4

<sup>39</sup> Interview M 2, 3

<sup>40</sup> Interview M 3, 4, 6, 7, INGO 1, 2, 3,

<sup>41</sup> Interview M 1-7, INGO 2, 3, 4

<sup>42</sup> Interview M 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, LNGO 1, 6, 8, 13-18, 20, INGO 1, 3, 5, Ac 4

<sup>43</sup> Interview LNGO LNGO 1, 6, 8, 13-18, 20; Chigas, D. 2007. Capacities and Limits of NGOs as Conflict Managers. In: Crocker, C.A., Hampson, F.O., Aall, P. 2007. *Leashing the Dogs of War, Conflict Management in a Divided World*. United States Institute of Peace, Washington D.C.

<sup>44</sup> Interview LNGO 1, 4; not in Interviews MONUSCO

<sup>45</sup> Interview M 7, INGO2, Ac 3

<sup>46</sup> Interview M 6; Weiss, T., Gordenker, L. 1996. *NGOs, the UN, and Global Governance*. Emerging Global Issues. Lynne Rienner Publishers: London.

<sup>47</sup> Interview M 1

<sup>48</sup> Interview M 2

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

<sup>50</sup> Interview M 3, 4, Ac 3

<sup>51</sup> Interview M 2, 3, 4

<sup>52</sup> Interview M 6

<sup>53</sup> Interview LNGO 7, 14, 18, 19

<sup>54</sup> Interview M 3, 4

<sup>55</sup> Interview M 1, 3, 4, 6

<sup>56</sup> Weiss, T., Gordenker, L. 1996. *NGOs, the UN, and Global Governance*. Emerging Global Issues. Lynne Rienner Publishers: London; Worldbank. 2006. *Civil Society and Peacebuilding*. Potential, Limitations and Critical Factors.

<sup>57</sup> Interview M 3, 4, 6, 7

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<sup>58</sup> Interview M 3  
<sup>59</sup> Interview M 2, 5, 6, 7  
<sup>60</sup> Interview M 1, 2, 6  
<sup>61</sup> Interview M 2, 5  
<sup>62</sup> Interview M 1, 5, 6  
<sup>63</sup> Interview M 1, 4, 6  
<sup>64</sup> Interview M 3, 4, 5, 6  
<sup>65</sup> Interview M 1, 2, 6, 7  
<sup>66</sup> Interview M 6  
<sup>67</sup> Interview M 7; Mandate UNJHRO <http://monusco.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=10766&language=en-US>  
<sup>68</sup> MONUSCO Civil Affairs <http://monusco.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=10708&language=en-US>  
<sup>69</sup> Interview M 1, 2, 6  
<sup>70</sup> Interview M 1  
<sup>71</sup> Interview INGO 2, 3  
<sup>72</sup> Interview M 2, 5, 7  
<sup>73</sup> Interview M 1, 3, 4, 5  
<sup>74</sup> Interview M 1, 4, 5, 7  
<sup>75</sup> Interview M 6, INGO 2, 3, 4, Ac 3, 4  
<sup>76</sup> Interview M 1, 2, 3, 4, 6  
<sup>77</sup> Interview Ac 3  
<sup>78</sup> Interview INGO 5  
<sup>79</sup> Interview M 1, 2, 4  
<sup>80</sup> Interview INGO 1, 4, Ac 1, 3  
<sup>81</sup> Interview M 2, 3, 6, 7  
<sup>82</sup> Interview M 7  
<sup>83</sup> Interview LNGO 1, M 4, 6, INGO 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, Ac 1, 2, 3, 4  
<sup>84</sup> Interview M 1-7  
<sup>85</sup> Interview M 1, 4  
<sup>86</sup> Interview M 2, 3  
<sup>87</sup> Meeting 28-11-2011  
<sup>88</sup> Interview M 1, 2, 5, 7, LNGO 1, 2, 4, 9, 11, 12, 13, 16, 18, 19  
<sup>89</sup> Interview Ac 2  
<sup>90</sup> Interview Ac 4, M 1, 3, 4, 5  
<sup>91</sup> Interview M 1, 2, 5, 7  
<sup>92</sup> Interview LNGO 6, 7, 8, 14, 15.  
<sup>93</sup> Interview INGO 1-5  
<sup>94</sup> Interview INGO 5  
<sup>95</sup> Interview INGO 5  
<sup>96</sup> Interview M 3

## 6. Conclusion and Recommendations

This thesis has described several theories about international peacebuilding, local peacebuilding and the relationship between the UN and local human rights NGOs. The importance of human rights in post-conflict situations has been outlined, as well as the history and situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Subsequently, the field results of the interviews are placed to the hypotheses from the literature. This final chapter will overview the results and answers the research question:

*How do MONUSCO and the local human rights NGOs perceive their role in the peacebuilding process in the DRC and their relationship to each other within this process?*

This answer is found by comparing the empirical data of the perceptions between local human rights NGOs and MONUSCO, and looking back at the theories and the theoretical framework supporting this research. Finally, recommendations are given to improve the relationship between local human rights NGOs and UN peacekeeping operations.

### 6.1 Roles of UN peacekeeping missions and local NGOs

The categories of roles described in the literature, such as raising awareness of human rights, being close to the population, information gathering and capacity building, are also found in the perceptions of roles in the DRC. The local human rights NGOs agree with the roles of NGOs in peacebuilding which are been stated in the literature. MONUSCO saw just two roles for local human rights NGOs, of which one is not mentioned in the theories; the replacement of the government. Whereas MONUSCO names the role of local NGOs 'replacement of the government', NGOs name their role as 'control of the government'. Monitoring activities and control of the state has been mentioned by the Worldbank, but to replace the government by building institutions and giving attention to democratic principles is not described. MONUSCO respondents state that in the DRC is a lack of willingness and well-working institutions, so this became a task of the local civil society, while NGOs see the Congolese government as an operating actor, which needs to be checked and observed in their activities and tasks. However, NGOs see their own role in peacebuilding as more extended, including structural transformation in services, holding more dialogues and education in human rights and justice.

Concerning the role of MONUSCO, local human rights NGOs and MONUSCO respondents largely have the same vision, corresponding with the literature. However, the implementation and effectiveness of the roles has been discussed. MONUSCO gives priority to coordination and supply of information, while the NGOs see protection and security as the primary role, as also stated in the mandate of MONUSCO. MONUSCO perceives its coordination and communication as adequate, but NGOs agree with the literature that it has to improve. The local roles are still minor and insignificant for the NGOs.

The different perceptions between NGOs, the literature and MONUSCO about the effectiveness of local implementations by MONUSCO, can be caused by other aspects than just a difference of opinion. A cause of the difference between the theory and empirical data can be the fact that the empirical data is of civil officers, active in components of the UN mission which have -more or less- contact with NGOs. NGOs barely see the difference between civil and military components, and even MONUSCO officers said that within MONUSCO the differentiation is not that clear. This needs to be better explained to be able to understand the tasks of MONUSCO and possibly also to create a better image of MONUSCO.

The expectation that international interveners think that their role is focused at the macro level and is seen as limited is not confirmed in the empirical data. The four themes this research described as main roles for MONUSCO are partly macro-level roles, but coordination, information sharing and capacity building are roles at different levels, as well at macro level as at micro level. In these roles, MONUSCO tries to educate the local NGOs, so that these NGOs can build capacity and transformation at a local level within the communities. MONUSCO is restricted by the government,



limited by their budget and the insecurity in the DRC, so MONUSCO is limited in their peacekeeping mission. However, it is not seen as an impossible mission by most of the MONUSCO officers; there are enough possibilities and improvements within the mission, according to the respondents.

Subsequently, the literature implies the expectation that there is a difference between the perceptions of roles by locals and by internationals within a peacebuilding process. This statement is partly confirmed by the results of this research. The role of MONUSCO is seen similar by MONUSCO and local human rights NGOs, except for the fact that NGOs see the protection as a primary role and MONUSCO sees coordination between actors and projects as a primary role. This difference can be explained by the fact that NGOs see MONUSCO primarily as a military mission while MONUSCOs respondents were mainly focusing on civil tasks. There is a need for locals to understand the differentiation between military and civil components, as argued by MONUSCO, the international NGOs and academics. This can be realized by better explanation of MONUSCO's different activities.

Furthermore, according to MONUSCO respondents, coordination and communication with NGOs is an adequate role for them. NGOs agree that it is an important role, but they do not see the effectiveness of the implementation of that role. So the categories of the roles are the same, but the perceptions of implementation are different according to the empirical research results.

But the role of NGOs is not seen as equal by MONUSCO and NGOs. As mentioned above, MONUSCO respondents describe the role of local NGOs in the peacebuilding process as limited, only approaching the population and replacing the government are roles of them. NGOs themselves see their roles as more elaborated, in different sectors and different levels. This can cause some friction in the relationship, although this is not being examined further.

## **6.2 Relationship between UN peacekeeping missions and local NGOs**

The hypothesis of the theory is that there is a need for communication between locals and internationals to share information and visions, which will lead to more understanding of the culture and context of the peacebuilding process. This study indicates that there is contact between local NGOs and MONUSCO, but the communication is insufficient and superficial. The meetings held for NGOs and the UN peacekeeping mission do not lead to a useful sharing of information and visions. NGOs perceive a lack of understanding of the mission, and a lack of transparency of the activities and strategy of MONUSCO, resulting in a feeling of distrust and suspicion of espionage or deprivation. In addition, the differentiation between military and civil components is not clear. Some NGOs state that the regular meetings of MONUSCO for local NGOs in Bukavu are strengthening the relationship, although many actors agree that these meetings can be improved so they might be more useful for NGOs.

A possible cause of this deficiency is that MONUSCO does not see the priority of making locals understand the mission, so that they do not make time or create a budget for this purpose. Or it cannot make time and budget for it, due to the organizational structure of the UN. MONUSCO claims to be limited due to the bureaucracy and structure of the mission; for every action permissions and reports are necessary, as well as many useless tasks or impractical policies make reacting at and assistance to locals difficult. Consequently, due to the lack of communication, the relationship is difficult and superficial. International NGOs, as well as the academics, state that there is a lack of understanding between those two levels, which can be diminished by communicating together, sharing perceptions and explaining your needs and activities.

Another cause that makes the relationship more difficult is the integration of international interveners in the Congolese society. The hypothesis that more integration of internationals should relate to a stronger relationship is confirmed with the empirical data. To be able to better understand the local structures and to adjust better to the local context, the literature and respondents state that training and integration is required. Half of the respondents think MONUSCO officers are integrated, especially the civil staff, and say they have a good relationship with MONUSCO. But others think there is a lack of integration and understanding of the internationals about the local culture, they claim to have an unsatisfactory relationship with the UN peacekeeping mission. MONUSCO's civil staff itself thinks to be integrated and be well trained to adjust in the local society.

International NGOs state that MONUSCO officers live on an island and stay in their own compounds. For the locals, this seems to be the result of unwillingness to adjust to and integrate in the society. Informal contacts can contribute to a closer contact together, which do not only improve understanding but also show willingness to understand each other. This might strengthen the relationship between them. However, one of the reasons that MONUSCO is not interfering in the local context might be the security restrictions of the UN. This can be an indirect obstacle for the UN officers.

On the other hand, Congolese mentality is seen as a large obstacle for MONUSCO while the NGOs commonly do not recognize this. The mentality of NGOs of looking for money without specialization and expertise has to reduce, according to MONUSCO. To see civil society as a competition between NGOs does not contribute to the effectivity of local NGOs. Then again, NGOs state that MONUSCO does not show willingness to build peace but only work for their own big salaries. All these accusations lead to distrust and difficult relationships. Remarkably, the literature concerning peacebuilding in the DRC does only point at the international failures and shortcomings, but they do not investigate local problems like the mentality of the Congolese NGOs.

Thus, the relationship between MONUSCO and local human rights NGOs in the DRC has two kinds of obstacles; organizational and cultural. At the organizational side of MONUSCO there has to be more awareness of the need for understanding amongst the locals, and more emphasis on capacity building with sharing knowledge and expertise by more and better communication. In addition, local human rights NGOs need to specialize more so they can develop their expertise. At the cultural side there has to be a shift for the Congolese NGOs from searching for money to improving capacities and looking for ways to develop themselves. Moreover, MONUSCO needs to increase integration in the Congolese society, in a formal as well as an informal way, to improve understanding and to build trust. With more communication and better integration, a stronger relationship can be built.

### **6.3 Recommendations**

To conclude this thesis, we will look ahead and make some recommendations for UN peacekeeping missions and local human rights NGOs in peacebuilding processes. As mentioned in the introduction of this research, it can draw broader lessons for UN peacekeeping missions and local peacebuilding, and hopes to result indirectly in better political decision-making by the UN and better guidelines for local human rights NGOs. Thus, although these recommendations are concentrated on the actors in the DRC, they might be applicable for more peacebuilding processes.

#### **6.3.1 Recommendations for UN peacekeeping missions**

- This research has shown that communication of the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC towards local human rights NGOs needs to improve. The existing regular meetings with NGOs should be extended with more dialogues, and more sharing of perceptions and visions. Additionally, it might be useful to expand the network of NGOs with smaller local NGOs. Although they are less effective, this is the category that needs more capacity building and wants to be heard, so local ownership can grow. By way of more communication with NGOs, the comprehension of the mission with its activities and strategy should increase and expectations are more realistic. In addition, the differentiation between military and civil components needs to be clarified, also within the mission itself.
- UN internationals need to be more open towards the local people. By making some local contacts and having more informal conversations with the Congolese civilians, sharing visions in all contexts can contribute to sharing and comprehension. It is also important to show more willingness towards NGOs, so UN peacekeeping missions can fight a bad image they might have. With a more open attitude, and acceptance of each other and the differences, the relationship can grow and might contribute to local effectiveness. Besides, by explaining the differentiation between military and civil components, the bad image can also be reduced, since the scandals in the past have been conducted by the military.

### **6.3.2 Recommendations for local human rights NGOs**

- The local human rights NGOs in the DRC need to change their mentality. They have to realize that money is not all that they need; instead, capacity needs to be built with knowledge and expertise. The UN peacekeeping mission has a limited budget, but it has the expertise and knowledge that NGOs need, so this can help NGOs to develop themselves and make them more effective. Building a relationship with the UN mission, sharing the needs of NGOs and being open to the international interveners to learn from them is crucial. NGOs need to look further than just money, and they need to understand that capacity and expertise are required to be effective and increase local ownership. So NGOs should ask for training and capacity building by the UN peacekeepers.
- Furthermore, NGOs need to specialize themselves to be more effective and be able to participate in the peacebuilding process. Civil society is not a competition to have the most money or the largest network. They need to be aware of the importance of effectiveness, although they have low capacity. If an NGO focuses on one sector and tries to expand its capacity and expertise within this sector, effectiveness will increase so that the local civil society can contribute more to a sustainable peacebuilding process.

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### Map 1: The Democratic Republic of the Congo



**Carte des Territoires du SUD KIVU**

**Zones de Santé / Health Zones**

**Légende**

- Chef-lieu de la Province
- Cité
- Village
- ▲ Volcan
- ✈ Aéroport
- ▬ Routes

Sources: DOW, Mol, IGC, OMS, BCD

The boundaries and names displayed on this map do not imply official recognition by the United Nations

OCHA DRC Geographic (WGS84)  
April 2002

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(Source: <http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/dpko/MONUSCO.pdf>)



## Appendix 2: Timeline

1885	Berlin Conference: boundaries Congo were set, and King Leopold II claims the Congo
1960	Independence of the Congo, Lumumba prime minister, Kasavubu elected president
1960-1965	ONUC
Jan 1961	Assassination of Lumumba
Nov 1965	Coup d'état by Mobutu
1965-1997	Mobutu regime
1971	Rename the Congo into Zaire
1973	General Property Law
May 1990	Massacre of student protests, cut off humanitarian aid to Zaire
1991	National Conference
Aug 1992	New government installed with prime minister Tshisekedi, but Mobutu don't accept
April 1994	Genocide in Rwanda, 800.000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed, 2 million Hutus flee into Congo
Oct 1996	First Congo War, AFDL wants to liberate Zaire of Mobutu.
May 1997	ADFL takes over Kinshasa, Laurent-Désirée Kabila declares himself as president. Zaire becomes the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). End of First Congo War.
Aug 1998	Second Congo War, or Great African War. RCD backed by Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi, Kabila backed by Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe. MLC created
July 1999	Lusaka Agreement, cease-fire among all regional and national conflicting parties, except RCD. Agreement for UN mission.
Febr 2000	MONUC installed
Jan 2001	Assassination of Laurent-Désirée Kabila, his son Joseph Kabila replaces him.
April 2002	Inter-Congolese Dialogue started in Sun City
Dec 2002	Global and All-Inclusive Agreement signed. End of Second Congo War.
June 2003	Transitional Government installed, 1+4 model.
May 2004	Bukavu crisis, Nkunda seized the capital of South-Kivu for several weeks.
Oct 2006	Democratic elections were held in July, now second round. Kabila wins of Bemba and Gizenga. Official end of the transition, but still many violence and threats.
Jan 2008	Goma Peace agreement
Jan 2009	Arrest of Nkunda
Nov 2011	Second democratic elections for the Congo. Kabila reelected.

## Appendix 3: MONUSCO Mandate Resolution 1925

**Resolution 1925 (2010)**  
**Adopted by the Security Council at its 6324th meeting, on**  
**28 May 2010**

*The Security Council,*

*Recalling* its previous resolutions and the statements of its President concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

*Reaffirming* its commitment to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

*Acknowledging* the progress made in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, considering the challenges it has had to overcome during the past 15 years,

*Stressing* the primary responsibility of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for ensuring security in its territory and protecting its civilians with respect for the rule of law, human rights and international humanitarian law, *stressing* the urgency of implementing comprehensive security sector reform and of achieving as appropriate the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration (DDR) of Congolese armed groups, and the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration (DDRRR) of foreign armed groups for the long-term stabilization of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, *considering* the need to create the security conditions for ensuring sustainable economic development, and *stressing* the importance of the contribution made by international partners in these fields,

*Stressing* the significant security challenges in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in particular in the Kivu and Orientale Provinces, posed by the continued presence of armed groups, the ongoing need to establish effective State authority, the possible resurgence of conflicts as internally displaced persons and refugees return and the continued illegal exploitation of natural resources, and *determined* to avoid a security vacuum that could trigger renewed instability in the country,

*Encouraging* the countries of the Great Lakes region to maintain a high level of commitment to jointly promote peace and stability in the region, including through existing regional mechanisms, and to intensify their efforts on regional economic development,

*Stressing* that the Goma and Nairobi processes as well as the 23 March 2009 Agreements have contributed to stabilize the situation in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and *urging* all parties to fully abide by these agreements,

*Recognizing* the importance of supporting peacebuilding efforts in order to consolidate and achieve further progress in the stabilization of the country, and *stressing* the need for sustained international support to ensure early recovery activities and lay the foundations for sustainable development,

*Emphasizing* that the linkage between the illicit exploitation and trade of natural resources and the proliferation and trafficking of arms is among the major factors fuelling and exacerbating conflicts in the Great Lakes region, *urging* all States, particularly those in the region, to implement fully the measures set out by its resolution 1896 (2009), *reiterating* its determination to continue to closely monitor the implementation and compliance with the measures set out by the resolution 1896 (2009), and *urging* all States to take legal action where appropriate in accordance with these measures against the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) leaders residing in their countries,

*Supporting* the efforts of the Government to finalize the electoral calendar for local, general and presidential elections within the constitutional framework, with a view to consolidate democracy and promote the rule of law,

*Remaining* greatly concerned by the humanitarian and human rights situation in areas affected by armed conflicts, *condemning* in particular the targeted attacks against the civilian population, widespread sexual violence, recruitment and use of child soldiers and extrajudicial executions, and *stressing the urgent need for*

the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in cooperation with the United Nations and other relevant actors, to end violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, fight impunity and bring the perpetrators to justice and provide medical, humanitarian and other assistance to victims,

*Welcoming* the commitments made by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to hold accountable those responsible for atrocities in the country, *noting* the cooperation of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo with the International Criminal Court, and *stressing* the importance of actively seeking to hold accountable those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity in the country and of regional cooperation to this end,

*Recalling* its resolutions 1325 (2000) and 1888 (2009) on women, peace and security, its resolution 1894 (2009) on the protection of civilians in armed conflicts, and its resolution 1882 (2009) on children and armed conflict, and *recalling* the conclusions of the Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict pertaining to parties in the armed conflict of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

*Condemning* all attacks against United Nations peacekeepers and humanitarian personnel, regardless of their perpetrators, and *emphasizing* that those responsible for such attacks must be brought to justice,

*Commending* the valuable contribution that the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) has made to the recovery of the Democratic Republic of the Congo from conflict and to the improvement of the country's peace and security,

*Emphasizing* the importance of the continued support of the United Nations and the international community for the long-term security and development of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

*Having considered* the report of the Secretary General of 1 April 2010, and *sharing* the view that the Democratic Republic of the Congo is now entering a new phase of its transition towards peace consolidation and that a strong partnership between the United Nations and the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to face these challenges is needed,

*Aware* of the persistent challenges to the stability of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and *determining* that the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to pose a threat to international peace and security in the region,

*Acting* under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Decides* to extend the mandate of MONUC until 30 June 2010 and further *decides* that, in view of the new phase that has been reached in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the United Nations mission in that country, MONUC, shall, as from 1 July 2010, bear the title of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO);
2. *Decides* that MONUSCO shall be deployed until 30 June 2011 and *authorizes* that MONUSCO shall comprise, in addition to the appropriate civilian, judiciary and correction components, a maximum of 19,815 military personnel, 760 military observers, 391 police personnel and 1,050 personnel of formed police units;
3. *Authorizes* the withdrawal of up to 2000 United Nations military personnel by 30 June 2010 from areas where the security situation permits;
4. *Authorizes* MONUSCO, while concentrating its military forces in the east of the country, to keep a reserve force capable of redeploying rapidly elsewhere in the country;
5. *Emphasizes* that the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo bears primary responsibility for security, peacebuilding and development in the country, and *encourages* the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to remain fully committed to protecting the population through the establishment of professional and sustainable security forces, to promote non-military solutions as an integral part of the overall solution for reducing the threat posed by Congolese and foreign armed groups and to restore full State authority in the areas freed from armed groups;

6. *Decides* that future reconfigurations of MONUSCO should be determined on the basis of the evolution of the situation on the ground and on the achievement of the following objectives to be pursued by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the United Nations mission:

(i) the completion of the ongoing military operations in the Kivus and Orientale Province, resulting in minimizing the threat of armed groups and restoring stability in sensitive areas,

(ii) an improved capacity of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to effectively protect the population through the establishment of sustainable security forces with a view to progressively take over MONUSCO's security role,

(iii) the consolidation of State authority throughout the territory, through the deployment of Congolese civil administration, in particular the police, territorial administration and rule of law institutions in areas freed from armed groups;

7. *Encourages* enhanced dialogue and partnership between the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the United Nations mission in this country, *decides* to keep under continuous review the strength of MONUSCO on the basis of assessments from the Secretary-General and the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo as provided to the Secretary-General on progress towards the implementation of the objectives presented in paragraph 6 above and to that end *requests* the Secretary-General to report on these assessments regularly to the Council, through the reports mentioned in paragraph 20 below, to enable the Council to make informed decisions and seize opportunities for reconfiguration;

8. *Commends* the improvements in the relationship between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the neighbouring countries since 2009, *calls upon* all countries, in particular those in the region, to join their efforts to ensure sustainable peace consolidation in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, notably with regard to paragraph 6 (i) above and the fight against illegal exploitation of natural resources, and *urges* the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda to continue to work together and to agree on a clear set of end-state objectives on the FDLR, in the framework of a multidimensional approach;

9. *Calls upon* the United Nations system, along with international partners, to focus its efforts on helping the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to consolidate the conditions to ensure effective protection of civilians and sustainable development in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, *requests* the Secretary-General to continue to coordinate all the activities of the United Nations system in this country through a continued cooperation between MONUSCO and the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) under the authority of his Special Representative for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and *encourages* the international and donor community to support the activities of the UNCT;

10. *Encourages* the UNCT, along with international partners, to support the efforts of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo on peace consolidation and development activities in order to provide long-term stability in the country;

11. *Emphasizes* that the protection of civilians must be given priority in decisions about the use of available capacity and resources and *authorizes* MONUSCO to use all necessary means, within the limits of its capacity and in the areas where its units are deployed, to carry out its protection mandate as set out in paragraphs 12 (a) to 12 (k) and 12 (t) below;

12. *Decides* that MONUSCO shall have the following mandate in this order of priority:

*Protection of civilians*

(a) Ensure the effective protection of civilians, including humanitarian personnel and human rights defenders, under imminent threat of physical violence, in particular violence emanating from any of the parties engaged in the conflict;

(b) Ensure the protection of United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment;

(c) Support the efforts of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to ensure the protection of civilians from violations of international humanitarian law and human rights abuses, including all forms of

sexual and gender-based violence, to promote and protect human rights and to fight impunity, including through the implementation of the Government's "zero-tolerance policy" with respect to discipline and human rights and humanitarian law violations, committed by elements of the security forces, in particular its newly integrated elements;

(d) Support national and international efforts to bring perpetrators to justice, including by establishing Prosecution Support Cells to assist the FARDC military justice authorities in prosecuting persons arrested by the FARDC;

(e) Work closely with the Government to ensure the implementation of its commitments to address serious violations against children, in particular the finalization of the Action Plan to release children present in the FARDC and to prevent further recruitment, with the support of the Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism;

(f) Implement the United Nations system-wide protection strategy in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, operationalizing it with MONUSCO's protection strategy built on best practices and extend useful protection measures, such as the Joint Protection Teams, Community Liaison Interpreters, Joint Investigation Teams, Surveillance Centres and Women's Protection Advisers;

(g) Support the Government's efforts, along with international partners and neighbouring countries, to create an environment conducive to the voluntary, safe and dignified return of internally displaced persons and refugees, or voluntary local integration or resettlement;

(h) Support the efforts of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to bring the ongoing military operations against the FDLR, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and other armed groups, to a completion, in compliance with international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law and the need to protect civilians, including through the support of the FARDC in jointly planned operations, as set out in paragraphs 21, 22, 23 and 32 of resolution 1906 (2009);

(i) Support, including through its political mediation efforts, the completion of activities of DDR of Congolese armed groups or their effective integration in the army, which would remain subject to prior adequate training and equipment;

(j) Support activities of DDRRR of foreign armed groups members, including the FDLR and the LRA, and support strategies towards a sustainable solution of the FDLR issue, including repatriation, reinsertion or resettlement in other areas, or judicial prosecution as appropriate, with the help of all countries, especially those in the region;

(k) Coordinate strategies with other United Nations missions in the region for enhanced information-sharing in light of the attacks by the LRA and, at the request of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, may provide logistical support for regional military operations conducted against the LRA in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in compliance with the international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law and the need to protect civilians;

#### *Stabilization and peace consolidation*

(l) Taking fully into account the leading role of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, support, in close cooperation with other international partners, the efforts of the Congolese authorities to strengthen and reform security and judicial institutions;

(m) In line with the relevant legislation on the reform of the FARDC and the Army Reform Plan presented in January 2010, assist the Government, along with international and bilateral partners, in strengthening its military capacity, including military justice and military police, in particular by harmonizing efforts and facilitating exchanges of information and lessons learned and, as the Government requests it, assist in the training of FARDC and military police battalions, support military justice institutions and mobilize donors to provide equipment and other required resources;

(n) Support the reform of the police led by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including by providing training to battalions of the Congolese National Police (PNC) and mobilizing donors to

provide basic supplies, recalling the urgent need for the Congolese authorities to adopt the appropriate legal framework;

(o) Develop and implement, in close consultation with the Congolese authorities and in accordance with the Congolese strategy for justice reform, a multi-year joint United Nations justice support programme in order to develop the criminal justice chain, the police, the judiciary and prisons in conflict-affected areas and a strategic programmatic support at the central level in Kinshasa;

(p) Support, in close cooperation with other international partners, the efforts by the Congolese Government to consolidate State authority in the territory freed from armed groups through the deployment of trained PNC, and to develop rule of law institutions and territorial administration, with respect to the Government's Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan (STAREC) and the International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (ISSSS);

(q) Provide technical and logistical support for the organization of national and local elections, upon explicit request from the Congolese authorities and within the limits of its capacities and resources;

(r) With respect to the urgent need to fight illegal exploitation and trade of, natural resources in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, support the Government's efforts and enhance its capabilities, along with international partners and neighbouring countries, to prevent the provision of support to armed groups, in particular support derived from illicit economic activities and illicit trade in natural resources, and consolidate and assess, jointly with the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the pilot project of bringing together all State services in five trading counters in North and South Kivu in order to improve the traceability of mineral products;

(s) Assist the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in enhancing its demining capacity;

(t) Monitor the implementation of the measures imposed by paragraph 1 of resolution 1896 (2009), in cooperation, as appropriate, with the Governments concerned and with the Group of Experts established by resolution 1533 (2004), seize or collect any arms or related materiel whose presence in Democratic Republic of the Congo violates the measures imposed by paragraph 1 of resolution 1896 (2009) and dispose of them as appropriate, and provide assistance to the competent customs authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in implementing the provisions of paragraph 9 of resolution 1896 (2009);

13. *Urges* the international community and donors to support MONUSCO in the DDRRR activities referred to in paragraph 12 (j) and *calls upon* the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and neighbouring States to remain engaged in the process;

14. *Calls upon* the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to build on its cooperation with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflicts and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict;

15. *Requests* the Secretary-General to take the necessary measures to ensure full compliance of MONUSCO with the United Nations zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuses and to keep the Council informed if cases of such conduct occur;

16. *Encourages* MONUSCO to ensure regular interaction with the civilian population to raise awareness and understanding about its mandate and activities;

17. *Calls upon* MONUSCO to collect information on potential threats against the civilian population as well as reliable information on violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, and bring them to the attention of the authorities as appropriate;

18. *Demands* that all armed groups, in particular FDLR and the LRA, immediately cease all forms of violence and human rights abuse against the civilian population in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in particular gender-based violence, including rape and other forms of sexual abuse;

19. *Commends* the contribution of troop- and police-contributing countries and donors to MONUC and *calls on* Member States to pledge and provide the remaining force enablers required for the mission;

20. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report by 11 October 2010, 21 January 2011 and 13 May 2011 on the progress on the ground, in particular in light of the assessment discussions with the Congolese authorities mentioned in paragraph 7 above, and on the implementation of this resolution with a view to progressively adapting the United Nations presence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and *recalling* the statement of its President of 5 August 2009 (PRST/2009/24), *requests* the Secretary-General to provide in these reports an indication of progress towards achieving a coordinated United Nations approach in-country, and in particular on critical gaps to achieving peacebuilding objectives alongside the mission;

21. *Demands* that all parties cooperate fully with the operations of MONUSCO and that they ensure the security of as well as unhindered and immediate access for the United Nations and associated personnel in carrying out their mandate, throughout the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and *requests* the Secretary-General to report without delay any failure to comply with these demands;

22. *Requests* the Secretary-General to elaborate the concept of operation and rules of engagement of MONUSCO in line with the provisions of this resolution and to report on this to the Security Council and troop-contributing countries;

23. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

(Source: United Nations Security Council. 2010. Resolution 1925.  
[http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1925\(2010\)](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1925(2010)))



## Appendix 4: List of interviews and meetings

Interview Action Aid, Bukavu  
Interview Afedem, Bukavu  
Interview Alphonse Muambi, Den Haag  
Interview APRODEPED, Bukavu  
Interview Arche d'Alliance  
Interview Avocats Sans Frontières, Bukavu  
Interview Caritas, Bukavu  
Interview Caucus des Femmes, Bukavu  
Interview CDDP, Bukavu  
Interview Christian Cito, Bukavu  
Interview Civil Affairs Section, Conflict Transformation, MONUSCO Bukavu (2x)  
Interview Civil Affairs Section, Focal Point, MONUSCO Bukavu  
Interview ECC, Bukavu  
Interview GAM, Bukavu  
Interview Groupe Jérémie, Bukavu  
Interview Heritiers de la Justice, Bukavu  
Interview Ilse van Velzen, Amsterdam  
Interview International Alert, Bukavu  
Interview Jean-Luc Malango, Bukavu  
Interview Life and Peace Institute, Bukavu  
Interview Maison de la Presse, Bukavu  
Interview MERU, Bukavu  
Interview OCET, Bukavu  
Interview Olame, Bukavu  
Interview PLD, Bukavu  
Interview Protection International, Bukavu  
Interview Public Information, MONUSCO Bukavu  
Interview Redhovic, Bukavu  
Interview RFDP, Bukavu  
Interview Sant'Egidio, Bukavu  
Interview Sarcaf, Bukavu  
Interview Sexual Violence Unit, MONUSCO Bukavu  
Interview Société Civil Platform Sud-Kivu, Bukavu  
Interview United Nations Joint Human Rights Office, MONUSCO Bukavu (2x)  
Meeting Arche Verte, 10-10-2011, Bukavu  
Meeting Sant'Egidio, 28-11-2011, Bukavu  
Meeting Saphir, 12-11-2011, Bukavu  
Meeting Société Civil and MONUSCO, 11-11-2011, Walungu

## Appendix 5: Interviews Bukavu – General interview guide

This research is about differences in perceptions and roles of MONUSCO and local human rights NGOs, and the relationship of each other. The bottom-up approach and grassroots activities are more and more important in peacebuilding, as well as interaction between different actors. This research wants to figure out whether different levels in peacebuilding (international and local) can come together and possibly work together. The research objective is to map the different roles and perceptions according to you and your opinion of interaction and relationships in South Kivu, DRC. You will stay anonymous.

Introductory question: What is your function at this moment and what is your history in peacebuilding? What do you understand by peace?

### Local NGO peacebuilding

1. What is the role of local human rights NGOs in the peacebuilding process?
2. What are positive effects of their work?
3. Are there any obstacles or negative effects in their work?
  - a. What are the causes of these obstacles?
  - b. What are the solutions to these obstacles?
  - c. How do you experience the organizational space NGOs have?
4. To what extent do NGOs have contact with the Congolese government, concerning content of your activities?

### MONUSCO peacebuilding

5. What is the role of MONUSCO in the peacebuilding process, according to you?
6. In general: Is MONUSCO effective or not? Why?
7. What are the (biggest) weaknesses of MONUSCO?
  - a. What are the causes of these weaknesses?
  - b. What are the solutions to these weaknesses?
8. What are the positive points of the mission?
9. How would you describe the developments made by MONUC transforming in MONUSCO?

### Relation local human rights NGOs versus MONUSCO

10. To what extent do you communicate with MONUSCO/NGOs? In what way(how), or why not?
  - a. Are there any problems to get in touch with MONUSCO/NGOs?
  - b. To what extent are you informed about activities and developments of MONUSCO/NGOs?
11. Are you in need of more contact or support with MONUSCO/NGOs?
12. In general: How do you perceive the relation with MONUSCO/NGOs?
  - c. Which aspects are strengthening your relation with MONUSCO/NGOs?
  - d. Which aspects are obstacles in your relation with MONUSCO/NGOs?
13. Your peacebuilding program is about human rights. Do you see more or less interference of MONUSCO/NGOs in this program than other programs, like elections, reconciliation or others?
  - a. What do you think about the priorities MONUSCO/NGOs makes?

### Culture

1. To what extent is MONUSCO integrated in the Congolese context, according to you?
  - a. To what extent can local ownership be created by external actors, like the UN? Why?
2. Do you perceive any differences between values of MONUSCO and NGOs?
  - a. How do you explain these differences?
  - b. To what extent does it influence your relationship with MONUSCO/NGOs or the way they operate?
14. Do you perceive any differences in education or knowledge?
  - a. Do you perceive this as an obstacle or as a challenge/benefit?
15. Concerning the needs of the local population, who is the best partner for them in peacebuilding? Why?
  - a. How to create the most effective peacebuilding process, according to you?

Do you have any questions or remarks left?