IN PURSUIT OF A GOOD LIFE

UNDERSTANDING SPATIAL MOBILITY AFTER BORDER CHANGES IN SENSITIVE SPACES THROUGH GEOGRAPHICAL IMAGINATION



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In Pursuit of a Good Life:

Understanding Spatial Mobility After Border Changes in Sensitive Spaces Through Geographical Imagination

Master Thesis

Human Geography

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ABSTRACT

The false predictions of spatial mobility after border changes in sensitive spaces misguide the understanding of the geographic movements. The aim of this research is to theorize about the geographic movements after border changes in sensitive spaces. This research casts sensitive spaces and boils the purposes of spatial mobility down to a good life that necessitates geographical imagination. The prevailing idea about geographical imagination depicts a mental-material binary. This research challenges the conventional wisdom and offers the geographical imagination ternary theory, arguing geographical imagination is a social-mental-material nexus. The geographical imagination ternary theory projects individuals' knowledge about the good life. This research states that following border changes in sensitive spaces, spatial mobility and immobility should be understood through the geographical imagination ternary theory: to go and to stay are local people's workable choices for the purpose of a good life. A careful cross-case analysis of Crimea and India-Bangladesh enclaves buttresses the validity of the geographical imagination ternary theory.

Keywords: geographic movements, spatial mobility, border changes, sensitive space, geographical imagination, good life

SUMMARY

The present research aims to understand spatial mobility after border changes in sensitive spaces. The false predictions of the geographic movements after border changes in sensitive spaces misguide the understanding of the geographic movements. This research suggests establishing a single explanatory system to make sense of these geographic movements to support societies of origin and destination and people that move away and stay where they were. This research formulates the research question: "*How can the geographic movements from sensitive spaces to relevant neighboring territorial states be understood after border changes in those spaces*?"

This research revolves around two lines of relevant concepts—spatial mobility and sensitive space. This research combines ontology and ideology to investigate spatial mobility, i.e., from an individualist-structuralist stance and *a good life* perspective. This research contends that individuals make their decision on spatial mobility for the purpose of a good life.

Based on the ontological and epistemological inquiries, this research argues that there is no objective truth about the good life. Individuals' knowledge about the good life can be mastered through the geographical imagination ternary theory. This research contests the binary thinking of geographical imagination. This research lays out the geographical imagination ternary theory and argues geographical imagination is a social-mental-material nexus.

Based on sensitivity and spatiality, this research theorizes about another key concept—sensitive space. This research characterizes sensitive space by territorial incoherence, national security concerns, and anxiety. Following a structuralist-constructivist approach, three stakeholders of sensitive space are visualized: territorial states, social groups, and individuals. This research argues that border changes might put the agendas of these stakeholders at odds.

After exercising the geographical imagination ternary theory in a hypothetical case—sensitive space, this research presents a conceptual model. This research states that geographical imagination ternary theory projects individuals' knowledge about the good life; the pursuit of a good life mandates decision-making; decision-making enables or dismisses spatial mobility. This research identifies the powerful variables in the context of border changes in sensitive spaces: the social part of geographical imagination—borders and social justice; mental—identity and othering; material—capabilities and livelihoods.

This research designs a multi-layered methodological framework to test the geographical imagination ternary theory. This research approaches geographical imagination through phenomenology, individualism, and post-positivism. Based on the ontological and epistemological stances, CDA and survey research are applied. Based on the mixed methodology, cross-case analysis and qualitative research are adopted. Based on the methodological choices, this research employs the written narrative theme identification as the principal tool and the semi-structured interview with experts as the minor tool.

This research specifies the criteria for data collection and analysis— *sensitive space*, *spatial mobility*, social (*borders*, *social justice*), mental (*identity*, *othering*), material parts (*capabilities, livelihoods*), and stakeholders (*territorial states, social groups, and individuals*). This research references policy reports, news articles, and interview data. In the analytical part, this research applies CDA and software ATLAS.ti.

This research tests the geographical imagination ternary theory in the practical cases—Crimea and India-Bangladesh enclaves. Through the empirical investigation, this research affirms that these two cases premise the precondition—sensitive space, border changes, and spatial mobility.

After a careful review of social (*borders*, *social justice*), mental (*identity*, *othering*), and material parts (*capabilities, livelihoods*) of geographical imagination, this research

states that the local people's migratory decisions "to go" or "to stay" were made based on geographical imagination: for the Crimean non-migrants, their geographical imagination about the good life was not severely disrupted; or their geographical imagination about the good life was disrupted, but they were restrained by wherewithal; for the overwhelming majority of the India-Bangladesh non-migrants, their geographical imagination about the good life was not upset.

According to the findings of the cross-case analysis and ATLAS.ti, this research asserts that the explanatory power of the geographical imagination ternary theory is valid. After revisiting the theory and its conceptual model, this research concludes that in the wake of border changes, the geographic movements from sensitive spaces to relevant neighboring territorial states can be understood from the geographical imagination ternary theory about the good life. Border changes alter local people's social, mental, and material parts of their geographical imagination in the phase of migratory decision-making. The geographic movements highlight people's pursuit of a good life.

This research acknowledges that the research limitation lies in the individuals' narratives about the good life and people's unmeasurable beliefs and feelings. This research points out the research directions: individuals' stories about the good life, herd behavior, and the sensitivity of sensitive spaces.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Writing this master thesis was a painful but enjoyable march. I attempted to find out the answers to the questions raised myself; I contested and refined my own arguments time after time. As Charles Dickens said in *A Tale of Two Cities*, *…it was the season of Light, it was the season of Darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair*. I groped in the dark in the hope of witnessing a glimmer of light. What buttressed me to the end of this march, was not only my perseverance but also many people's irreplaceable company. Of course, I am responsible for all the arguments, mistakes, and critiques in this master thesis. But I owe a great deal of debt to others for whatever insights this master thesis contains.

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They[1] went away because for Russians there could be no question as to whether things would go well or ill under French rule in Moscow. It was out of the question to be under French rule, it would be the worst thing that could happen.

—Leo Tolstoy, War and Peace

Man is nothing else than his plan; he exists only to the extent that he fulfills himself; he is therefore nothing else than the ensemble of his acts, nothing else than his life.

— Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism is a Humanism

[1] It refers to Russians during the French invasion of Moscow in 1812—Author.

1. INTRODUCTION

We happen to live in a world with borders. Throughout history, borders are constantly modified by territorial states. There is no guarantee that every territorial state, social group, and individuals would be cool with that. Rebordering practices occasionally leave the clash of territorial imaginations—territorial incoherence, security concerns, and tangled emotions to territorial states, social groups, and individuals. Owing to those reasons, a sensitive space is born. To put it differently, sensitive space is the result of territorial incoherence (i.e., more than two territorial states or authorities). On that ground, sensitive space maintains an unstable equilibrium that is disquieted by national security concerns and cartographic anxiety.

For sure, I will conceptualize and exemplify sensitive spaces at length in the ensuing chapters. It is sufficient to exhibit that for the scope of this research, Catalonia, Nicosia, East Jerusalem, Crimea, Kashmir, India-Bangladesh enclaves, Hong Kong, North and South Korea, and Ukraine are compelling examples of sensitive spaces. Albeit the term "sensitive space" is not widely used, sensitive space itself is not such an unusual geopolitical occurrence.

In any event, the advent of sensitive space is not the end of the border-changing story. De Certeau (1984, p. 84) puts that point well, "*what the map cuts up, the story cuts across*". Borders keep getting rectified by territorial states. Social groups and individuals have to face their new perceived reality. It goes without saying that border changes have an impact on geographic movements. Sensitive spaces are no different when it comes to geographic movements in the wake of border changes. The border changes in different sensitive spaces appear to be alike notwithstanding, the outcomes—geographic movements sometimes contradict each other as well as our predictions.

I shall usher into some illustrative instances on the subject of spatial mobility after border changes in sensitive spaces—Crimea (2014) and India-Bangladesh

enclaves (2015). Since 2014, Crimea has been rebordered as a *de facto* part of Russia. From 2014 to 2022 (before the Russo-Ukrainian War erupted), a great deal of Crimean people[2] moved from Crimea to the Ukrainian mainland (Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine , 2021).

Under the land swap agreement between the Indian and Bangladeshi governments, the India-Bangladesh enclave dwellers were free to choose their citizenship. Since 2015, when the agreement came into effect, only less than 1,000 Bangladeshi citizens moved to India (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 2015). Facing border changes, the two cases show divergent geographic movements—*to go* and *to stay*.

Furthermore, people failed to predict the outcomes of the geographic movements. In each case, it was largely believed that following border changes, there were good reasons for projecting local people's choice— "to go" or "to stay". So the stories go, suggesting that the Crimean people would stay because of their identical cultural identity (Putin, 2014); the Bangladeshi citizens would go due to India's comparative advantage in economic opportunities (Mohan, 2015; Nayar, 2020).

Alas, needless to say, the geographic movements ran against people's anticipations. Miscellaneous politicized framing aside, it is natural to ask whether it is possible to employ a single explanatory system to make sense of these geographic movements after border changes in sensitive spaces.

1.1. Societal Relevance

This research is about geographic movements. It is also about the trail—the society of origin (*sensitive space in the relevant neighboring territorial state*) and the society of

[2] Due to data pollution produced by the methodology of the Ukrainian authority, it is hard to filter and give the pure number of Crimean migrants that moved to the Ukrainian mainland. Blair (2016) estimates that approximately 100,000 Crimean people emigrated from Crimea. The statistics computed by the Russian authority also hint at a decline in the Crimean population—42, 124 (see Appendix 1). However, it fails to capture Crimean people that did not register themselves when emigrating from Crimea—Author.

destination (*relevant neighboring territorial state*); and people that move away and stay where they were—*migrants and non-migrants*.

The first implication is linked to the society of origin—sensitive space and relevant territorial states. On the one hand, as mentioned earlier, sensitive space endures an unstable equilibrium, national security concerns, and cartographic anxiety. On the other hand, the relevant territorial states that are entitled to sensitive space would face challenges in mediating societal issues and social construct. This research aims to raise general awareness of sensitive spaces among international institutions, relevant territorial states, local authorities, NGOs, policymakers, etc. in the hope of alleviating the symptoms and risks of sensitive spaces.

The second implication is attached to the society of destination—relevant neighboring territorial states. The receiving society might undergo an influx of migrants from sensitive spaces. Border changes in sensitive spaces throw challenges to both societies of destination and migrants. For instance, housing issues, social resources redistribution, unemployment, integration, etc. would pop up in the society of destination. A key ambition of this research lies in facilitating the municipalities of the society of destination formulating a planned and well-managed strategy to reduce the potential issues for the society of destination as well as migrants.

Last but not least, I view people as the protagonists of this research. The wellbeing and rights of both migrants and non-migrants that inhabit sensitive spaces are the primary interests of this research. The political unease of relevant neighboring territorial states has profound implications on the wellbeing, rights, and spatial mobility of certain social groups, and individuals (migrants and non-migrants). What is more, this research makes sense of geographic movements through the lens of a "good life". In view of that, this research will provide policy support to governments, NGOs, and civil societies in the protection of the rights of migrants and non-migrants in sensitive spaces.

1.2. Scientific Relevance

This research is about geographic movements, trail, and people. It is also about the pursuit of a good life and geographical imagination. This master thesis comes up with the geographical imagination ternary theory to explain the good life for migrants and non-migrants and their geographic movements. My enterprise involves five concerns.

For starters, my theory refines Van der Velde and Van Naerssen's (2016) threshold approach to migratory decision-making by highlighting the purpose of geographic movements—a good life. Nonetheless, the early study has shed light on individuals who make their ultimate migratory decision, which comprises people's mindset, migratory destination, and trajectory (Van der Velde & Van Naerssen, 2016). These dimensions are essential but not sufficient. With the emphasis on the purpose of the geographic movements, my theory promotes thorough comprehension of mobility choices.

Secondly, my theory challenges the prevailing wisdom about geographical imagination that tells a mental-and-material binary story (Gregory, 1994; Daniels, 2011). My geographical imagination ternary theory encircles social, mental, and material spheres. By underlining the social sphere, my theory challenges the conventional wisdom and projects individuals' knowledge about the good life. The geographical imagination ternary theory affords fresh thinking to geographical imagination and the good life.

Thirdly, I conceptualized "sensitive space". I must spell out that I was inspired by the concept of "sensitive space" used by Cons (2016). But our ideas are fundamentally different. Cons' (2016) concept focuses on the enclaves in South Asia. My concept includes multifaceted dimensions: the level of sensitivity, the scale of spatiality, the type of demarcation lines, and stakeholder mapping. I propose a broad perspective to grasp and discern this geopolitical phenomenon.

Fourthly, I delved into what individuals' geographical imagination contains in the event of border changes in sensitive spaces. This research offers a conceptual

model for understanding spatial mobility after border changes in sensitive spaces through geographical imagination. A great deal of relevant concepts are projected in a single explanatory system. That is to say my research provides not only insights into spatial mobility but also with an illustrative paradigm on how to cope with a variety of concepts under one explanatory framework.

Lastly, my methodological framework delivers a new approach to theory testing. The quantitative method is a common way to examine newborn theories (Creswell & Poth, 2018, p. 75). However, as Mearsheimer and Walt (2013) pointed out, scholars sometimes encounter poor data in theory testing. On top of poor data, a limited budget is another issue researchers often confront. For that reason, I designed a mixed methodology—cross-case analysis and interviews with experts to get around poor data and a limited budget for researchers.

1.3. Research Goal

In the light of my geographical imagination ternary theory about the good life, I aim to unfold the geographic movements of migrants and non-migrants in the wake of border changes in sensitive spaces. To achieve this ambition, I formulated the following research question:

How can the geographic movements from sensitive spaces to relevant neighboring territorial states be understood after border changes in those spaces?

The research question is supported by three sub-questions:

1) How do border changes in sensitive spaces affect local people's social part of their geographical imagination in the phase of migratory decision-making?
2) How do border changes in sensitive spaces affect local people's mental part of their geographical imagination in the phase of migratory decision-making?
3) How do border changes in sensitive spaces affect local people's material part of their geographical imagination in the phase of migratory decision-making?

1.4. Research Objectives

Based on the identified research goal, the research objectives are eight-fold. First, I will address the nature and ideology of spatial mobility. Second, I will put emphasis on the decision-making of spatial mobility. Third, I will outline the purpose of decision-making—a good life. Fourth, I will assess and underscore the concept of the good life. Fifth, I will establish the theory of geographical imagination about the good life, which is probably the most important research objective.

Sixth, I will switch over to conceptualizing sensitive spaces. Seventh, I will sketch out and analyze the powerful variables of geographical imagination about the good life in the event of border changes in sensitive spaces in a hypothetical case. Eighth, I will assess the powerful variables of geographical imagination about the good life in sensitive spaces in practical cases.

1.5. Reading Guide

I would like to illustrate the plan for the rest chapters. Chapter 2, which is probably the most important chapter of this research, lays out my initiative geographical imagination ternary theory about the good life and its conceptual model. Notably, I will take up all relevant concepts around two lines—spatial mobility and sensitive space at length. Thereafter, the two lines will meet each other in a hypothetical case—border changes in sensitive spaces.

Chapter 3 designs a multi-layered mixed methodology to test my theory and its conceptual model. In Chapter 4, I will follow the same line of arguments as in Chapter 2 and the prior methodology to examine the explanatory power of my theory and its conceptual model against practical cases—Crimea (2014) and India-Bangladesh enclaves (2015). In Chapter 5, I will take my findings to revisit my theory and conceptual model. Thereafter, I will wrap up this research by answering my research questions.

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Before turning into spatial mobility after border changes in sensitive spaces, it is necessary to clarify several important concepts. My discussion will be divided into eight sections. In Section 2.1, I will begin with the key concept of this research—spatial mobility by asking *what the nature of spatial mobility is, and what the purpose of spatial mobility is*. I will endeavor to answer these two questions based on my ontological and ideological assumptions. In Section 2.2, I will move on to investigate the linkage between spatial mobility and decision-making. In Section 2.3, I will highlight my assumption: the purpose of spatial mobility is a good life. The pursuit of a good life enables or dismisses migratory decision-making.

In Section 2.4, I will inquire into the good life by asking *what the good life is, and how knowledge about the good life can be acquired*. I will try to answer these two questions based on my ontological and epistemological assumptions. In Section 2.5, I will spell out my tentative viewpoint—geographical imagination ternary theory about the good life: the knowledge of the good life is mastered through an individual's geographical imagination, which is a social-mental-material nexus.

In Section 2.6, I will shift gears to another key concept—sensitive space. I will answer *what sensitive space is, who makes sensitive space sensitive, and who lives in sensitive space*. In Section 2.7, I will apply the geographical imagination ternary theory about the good life to sensitive space. Specifically, what the social, mental, and material spheres entail respectively in relation to a good life in the wake of border changes in sensitive spaces. In Section 2.8, I will present my conceptual model and theoretical statement, concluding with an overall critical reflection on my theory and conceptual model.

2.1. Spatial Mobility: Ontological and Ideological Assumptions

Spatial mobility, arguably, is the first parameter one observes in geographic movements. Its meaning is as straightforward as the word itself suggests. Spatial mobility refers to the migratory mobility of human spatial movement, that involves

the change of residence across administrative borders (De Haas, Castles, & Miller, 2020, p. 23). I will carefully review theories on spatial mobility. But before I do so, it is essential to address two fundamental questions: *what the nature of spatial mobility is*, *and what the purpose of spatial mobility is*. Answering these two questions is crucial not only for understanding spatial mobility but also for evaluating the assumptions of various relevant theories. I aim to begin with my ontological and ideological assumptions that sit at the core of this social phenomenon.

Van Willard (1951) denotes that ontology and ideology are intertwined in semantics. Ontology, as a theory of reference, deals with truth; ideology, as a theory of meaning, deals with implication and intention. The theory of meaning (ideology) is contained within the theory of reference (ontology) itself.

Van Willard's statement points to two other concepts—ontology and ideology. Ontology refers to claims or assumptions that a particular social enquire makes about the nature of social reality—what units make it up and how these units interact with each other (Blaikie, 1993; Guarino, Oberle, & Staab, 2009). There are two distinct ontological views: structuralism holds a view that social structures and systems determine individual behavior and social life; while individualism holds a view that the world is an improvisation theater, guided by actors who act, react, and organize themselves to achieve their aims (Moses & Knutsen, 2012).

Ideology holds one's deep-seated beliefs and values. From a Marxist perspective, ideology primarily refers to the view of a particular social class (Marx & Engels, 1970). Gerring (1997) advocates analyzing ideology in a comprehensive way—location, function, etc. The location of ideology could be people's thoughts or behavior. The function could be explaining or motivating. The motivation could be interest-based etc. Ideology is of utmost importance for understanding one's view, behavior, and beliefs.

A glance at ideology makes it possible to grasp one's purpose. For starters, purpose stems from a person's long-term values and beliefs that are deeply rooted in

their ideology. Furthermore, purpose holds reasons and goals for what a person strives for. One's purpose reflects the reason something is done or for which something exists. One's purpose is fulfilled through the achievement of goals only. In short, purpose is rooted in one's ideology and contains reasons and goals. Purpose guides behavior and shapes reasons and goals (Parks, 2011). It is fair to say that purpose is central to human beings' life (Akande & Odewale, 1994).

Figure 2.1. Venn diagram of ideology, purpose, and reasons & goals

Source: the author.

I must spell out my ontological and ideological views on spatial mobility. This ultimately means that I will explain how relevant factors interact and operate together to affect spatial mobility. My ontological assumption is that spatial mobility should be understood from the individual's agency and structural forces. I view individual agents as actors with feelings and critical faculty. They make their ultimate migratory decision. In migratory decision-making, individuals take structural factors into account.

My ideological assumption is that the purpose of spatial im/mobility lies in living a good life. A *good life* perspective provides us insights into an individual's thoughts and behaviors, their incentives, and the purpose behind spatial mobility. A good life can be here or there. To that end, people have to decide to go or to stay within their affordable range (essential capabilities and livelihoods). Decision-making

sets up a transitive nexus between the outcome—*spatial mobility* and the purpose—a *good life*.

A careful literature review would help us screen various ontological stances. The early debate around spatial mobility places emphasis on structural forces and downplayed the individual's agency. The reason for spatial mobility is related to the individual's development and the development of societies of origin and destination. Functionalist migration theories view migrants as rational actors (Passaris, 1989; Todaro, 1969). The reason for spatial mobility (*migration*) is derived from distance, population size, and people's economic interests in destination areas. Historical-structural theories view migrants as exploited actors in the capitalist system, in which migrants are free to make limited choices (Massey, et al., 1998; Cohen, 1987). The reason for spatial mobility (*migration*) is derived from employment agencies and transnational cooperation in mobilizing cheap labor for capital. Both approaches, to a certain extent, are engaged in the mobility—development debate.

Some scholars have poked out of structural containers and zoomed in on the individual's agency. Spatial mobility is driven by social transformation. The purpose of spatial mobility is aligned with individuals' feelings and agendas. Migration transition theories defy the linear relation between development and spatial mobility (Polanyi, 1944; Zelinsky, 1971). What is more important, migration transition theories shed light on the individual's feelings. The new economics of labor migration (NELM), for instance, considers that relative deprivation (or poverty), rather than absolute poverty, within origin communities, are important mobility-motivating factors. *The feeling of being less well-off than other community members can be a powerful incentive to migrate in order to attain a similar or higher socioeconomic status* (De Haas, Castles, & Miller, 2020, p. 55). As it might be seen, individuals' agency in this spatial mobility debate was conceptualized.

The early debate on spatial mobility portrays individuals as rational as well as nonrational actors. In the rational sense, individuals' calculation and comparison of

their job opportunities in the societies of origin and destination boost spatial mobility (Passaris, 1989; Todaro, 1969). In the nonrational sense, individuals' feelings of relative deprivation or aspirations drive spatial mobility (De Haas, Castles, & Miller, 2020, p. 55; Carling, 2002; De Haas, 2003).

However, the problem with the early debate is that it gave little attention to people who do not migrate. De Haas et al. (2020, p. 4) articulate that from 1960 to 2017 the share of international migrants has remained stable, fluctuating at around 3 percent of the world population. It indicates that most people do not migrate internationally. Their spatial mobility is not less important than migrants'. Objectively speaking, individuals are the ones who made their decision: to go or to stay. Yet, individuals' decision-making regarding their spatial mobility in the early debate is ambiguous.

2.2. Spatial Mobility and Decision-making

I shall usher into my first assumption—individuals make their ultimate decision on their spatial mobility. Simply put, decision-making activates or discards people's behavior, including spatial mobility. However, it is fair to say that people's decision-making regarding spatial mobility is more than spatial mobility itself. The decision to migrate is never easy to make. People have to flee from their homes to seek other places. Most people opt to stay. The decision on spatial mobility, therefore, is critical for us to understand why people decide to go or to stay.

Decision-making is a vital component of human behavior. When people make a decision, usually they have to take various factors into account. March and Heath (1994) assert that any specific decision in a specific situation requires a great deal of concrete contextual knowledge about the historical, social, political, and economic worlds surrounding the decision and about the individuals, organizations, and institutions involved. Van der Velde and Van Naerssen (2016) further state that understanding the decision-making process in all its dimensions (people's mindset,

migratory destination, and trajectory) will lead to a better understanding of the ways that migrants conceive, perceive, and undertake their transnational journeys.

Decision-making can be rational and nonrational because the decision-maker—individual actors are rational and nonrational. Van der Velde and Van Naerssen (2016, p. 3) reject taking individuals as pure rational actors driven by structural economic unevenness between areas. They advocate the threshold approach that views migrants as actors with feelings and senses of belonging.

In terms of spatial mobility, Van der Velde and Van Naerssen in their book did not bring their ontological orientation to light. In essence, they embrace both individualist and structuralist stances. Departing from people's decision-making, the threshold approach discerns structural forces and individual's agency.

In terms of the purpose of spatial mobility and immobility, through case studies, Van der Velde and Van Naerssen's (2016) book drops rather diverse hints. The purposes could be shopping for differences in the case of the German-Polish borderlands (Szytniewski, 2016); young adults' aspirations of migration in the case of Ghana (Smith, 2016); the "imagined" job opportunities and onward migration in the society of destination in the case of Somalia (Jinnah, 2016); economic accumulation and familial responsibilities in the case of Chinese students and scholars (Leung, 2016); reducing household pressure in the case of gender study in Asia (Van Naerssen & Asis, 2016), etc.

Nevertheless, Van der Velde and Van Naerssen reiterate that the threshold approach facilitates a comprehensive way of understanding migratory decision-making in all its dimensions. One problem with this approach is that the purposes of spatial mobility are too fragmented to boil down to something that can be consistently understood. To say the least, it is hard to understand people's decision-making by and large without theorizing their purpose.

Van der Velde and Van Naerssen (2016, p. 4) acknowledge that decision-making is an entire mental process. On this account, what do neuroscientists say about purposes? Cuijpers et al. (2006) affirm that many of our day-to-day activities, psychologically speaking, are supported by purpose (*behavioral goals*) that guide the selection of actions, which allow us to reach these goals effectively. Furthermore, goals are essential for action observation since they allow the observer to copy the purpose (*goal*) of the action without the need to use the exact same means (Cuijpers, Van Schie, Koppen, Erlhagen, & Bekkering, 2006). Given this, it is pivotal to explicate and theorize the purpose of decision-making.

To be crystal clear, this is not to deny that other dimensions are trivial matters. People's mindset, migratory destination, and trajectory are still important for understanding decision-making. However, it has to be acknowledged that none of them can be a substitute for the purpose of decision-making.

2.3. Decision-making and Good Life

I shall get down to my second assumption—a *good life* as the purpose of spatial im/mobility. That is to say that spatial im/mobility is the means of striving for the purpose—a good life. A good life is of great meaning to everyone. It haunts us. The pursuit of a good life shines throughout the decision-making on spatial mobility of migrants and non-migrants.

The purpose of spatial mobility offers an ideological prism to explain personal meanings—what motivates and dismisses people's decisions upon spatial mobility. Tuan (1986, pp. 10,11) contends that a good life implies a habit of reflection and choice. Different people make their own choice: to go or not to go. Yet, the purpose of their spatial im/mobility remains the same—a desire for a good life.

One might argue that after the decision-making—*to go (*migrants*)* or *to stay (*non-migrants*)*, the decision-maker still might not live a good life. For instance, Bloomfield (2016, p. 7) reiterates that…*there is no guarantee of the Good Life for any human being facing all the manifold vicissitudes of reality.* The skeptic defies the good life perspective

by pointing to the outcomes of decision-making. For sure, migrants might face housing issues, dietary, job haunting, or fit-in in the society of destination. Non-migrants might confront the vexing trends in the place they were.

The main problem with this perspective is that it mistakenly equates the good life itself with the pursuit of a good life. The fact that individuals face difficulties in the society of origin or destination does not necessarily mean that the migratory decision was not made for a good life. The appropriate way for us to understand spatial mobility is to pay attention to the purpose rather than the outcome of spatial mobility.

Up to this point, I must respond to the daunting but inevitable calls: *what the good life is*, *how the knowledge about the good life can be acquired*. Answering these two questions is not only important for looking through the good life but also for reasoning the decision-making of migrants and non-migrants. I will begin with my ontological and epistemological assumptions that sit at the core of this notion.

2.4. Good Life: Ontological and Epistemological Assumptions

We are curious about the truth of various matters. Our interests in truth eventually lead us to propositional knowledge (Fumerton, 2006, p. 2). Epistemology copes with knowledge, for instance, *what knowledge is*, *and how knowledge of this world can be acquired* (Moses & Knutsen, 2012). In other words, a true belief counts as knowledge only if it is produced by a reliable belief-forming process, that includes the concepts of knowledge, evidence, reasons for believing, and justification (Fumerton, 2006, p. 1; Goldman, 2012). Moreover, epistemology and ontology are always pursued in tandem, each discussed with an eye on the other (McGinn, 1999, p. 2). Ontological and epistemological investigations facilitate figuring out the nature of the good life and knowledge reproducing in knowledge systems.

I will outline how scholars from different disciplines built their knowledge on the good life. Before that, I will disclose my ontological and epistemological assumptions. My ontological assumption is that there is no objective truth about the

good life. My epistemological assumption is that we can know about the good life through my geographical imagination ternary theory.

Scholars from different disciplines attempted to reveal the good life from different approaches. Philosophers discern the good life from human nature. They ask what distinguishes human beings from other animals (Tuan, 1986). Philosophers appeal to contemplation, morality, and virtuous action for a good life (Tuan, 1986; Korsgaard, 1998; Bloomfield, 2016). Value orientation aside, it is implausible that people short of contemplation, morality, or virtues, cannot live a good life.

Social scientists have taken up this topic by conducting questionnaires and surveys. King and Napa (1998), for instance, believe that the Western notion of the good life involves happiness, meaning in life, and money. They quantify the good life and claim that compared with wealth, meaning and happiness are overwhelmingly more powerful predictors of the value of life.

One doubt on this research is whether our happiness can be calculated. Another pitfall is that the respondents (students and other adults) were only recruited from the Southern Methodist University campus (Texas, the US). It is rather a conception of the good life within that college.

Most economists assume that individuals are capable of using their critical faculty to maximize their utility (Mearsheimer, 2018). As Robins remarked, economics is *unconcerned with norms and ends; it is concerned strictly with constructing patterns for the appropriation of scarce means to given purposes* (Amadae, 2003, p. 91). A good life cannot be reduced to scarce means or individuals' utility. Economy, therefore, has not much to tell about the good life (Mearsheimer, 2018).

Neuroscientists approach the good life through experiments on our brains. For instance, based on the analysis of the structural magnetic resonance images of the insular cortex volume, Lewis et al. (2014) articulate that the traits of the good life are positively related to personal growth, self-acceptance, purpose in life, and autonomy.

Some political scientists have explored the good life by adopting the constructivist approach. Mearsheimer (2018) takes a negative attitude toward the possibility of approaching the good life. He argues that due to socialization, our moral thinking, and our limited knowledge about how the human brain works, there are significant limits to disclosing the good life.

Some anthropologists have delved into the good life through cross-cultural fieldwork. Fischer (2020, p. 2) considers the good life encompasses aspiration, opportunity, dignity and fairness, and commitment to a larger purpose. People's visions of the good life cannot be reduced to material conditions alone. To put it in more concrete terms, a good life encompasses not only material conditions but also nonmaterial conditions.

Finally, what do geographers say about the good life? By and large, human geographers have been quite silent on this key topic. Tuan (1986, p. 11) argues that the good life cannot be confined to direct experiences, which is too limiting. Besides the *good life* mindset, instrumental thought enables individuals to incorporate other people's experiences and worlds.

My idea about the good life is straightforward. Ontologically speaking, individuals hold the truth of a good life. A farmer in Friesland (the Netherlands) and a software developer in Bangalore (India) would hold different views on the good life. Every individual defines the good life in their own fashion. A good life, therefore, cannot be measured and uniformed.

It seems to be naive to excavate the objective truth of the good life. To be sure, I do not seek to define *what a good life is*. I would rather characterize a good life. A good life cannot be reduced to a luxury life. What is more, we wonder when a good life occurs. A good life can be in the past, present, or future tense. Thirdly, we might never achieve the good life we desire. However, the pursuit of a good life is deemed as every individual's life-long purpose and process. Everyone strives for a good life.

This research is about people's geographic movements after border changes in sensitive spaces. A similar question "*what a good life should be like in relation to sensitive space*" to the foregoing question "*what a good life is*" deserves to be inquired into. Following the same line of argument, I would demarcate what a good life should not entail in sensitive space. I will talk about sensitive space and the good life at length in Section 2.7 but suffice it to say that a good life in sensitive space should not involve uncertainty, risks, or even threats to survival.

Instead of defining the good life, I aim to master the individuals' knowledge about their good life in the hope of grasping personal beliefs and experiences. Human geography, the field which I know the best, offers "geographical imagination" to shed light on the knowledge about the good life.

2.5. Good life and Geographical Imagination

We have been told what a good life would look like. But we dream about it in our own way. It may refer to something social—being in an intimate relationship. It may suggest something mental—going to church every Sunday. It may denote something material—having a successful career with a decent income. In this regard, I will disclose the social, mental, and material parts of geographical imagination in the hope to grasp the knowledge about the good life.

My epistemological assumption is that the knowledge of the good life lies in individuals' geographical imagination, which is a ternary nexus. Firstly, I will assess the literature on geographical imagination. Secondly, I will lay out my geographical imagination ternary theory.

Simply stated, the conventional wisdom about geographical imagination discusses how we perceive and conceive the world; how our knowledge of reality is mastered. Warf (2010) defines geographical imagination as a way of viewing the world and considering the relative nature of places and the relationship between "our" places and "other" places. Harvey (2019) contends that geographical imagination functions as a "spatial consciousness". Geographical imagination recognizes reality

and goes beyond it. To sum up, geography appears to focus on the material, the imagination revolves around the mental.

The conventional wisdom around geographical imagination tells us a binary story that divides geographical imagination into mental and material parts. Mental refers to our mental world and conceived objects. Material refers to the objects in our milieus. Gregory (1994) describes that geographical imagination is a feeling beyond our own world that enables us to reach beyond our reality and connect to universalism to recognize intertwined existences. Daniels (2011) claims that geographical imagination has the metaphorical capacity to refigure a larger conceptual field, to bring material and mental worlds into closer conjunction, and to connect the perceived and conceived.



Figure 2.2. Mental-and-Material dichotomy

Source: the author.

The downside of this mental-and-material dichotomy is that it does not tell us much about the social context or interactions within an individual's geographical imagination. We perceive and conceive the world. Yet besides "perceiving subject" and "conceived object", there is the social context.

We are individual souls. Meanwhile, we are social beings. We were born and raised in society. We socialize and interact with other people, our environment, community, and society. Warf (2010) denotes that geographical imagination separates *Us* and *Them*. However, if our social contexts are not recognizably similar to each other, if our geographical imagination is detached from society, we could never construct a common knowledge of our milieus. As such, our conventional wisdom of geographical imagination is essential but not sufficient.

The historical record also shows the empirical evidence that supports and illustrates the magnitude of social contexts in geographical imagination. For instance, in 1783, Crimea became a part of the Russian Empire. Most local notables turned down the noble status offered by Russians and emigrated to the Ottoman Empire following the Russian takeover (Figes, 2012).

The power of these notables had never been derived from civil service but from their ownership of land and clan-based politics: as long as they were allowed to keep their land, most of them preferred to keep their standing in the local community rather than serve their new imperial masters. The majority had ties through kin or trade or religion to the Ottoman Empire. (Figes, 2012).

Complicated in political and religious shifts notwithstanding, the social ties, in essence, were at play in the geographical imagination of the Crimean local notables.

In this research, I would like to employ social constructivism to underpin and expand geographical imagination. Social constructivism is a worldview that recognizes background as shaping interpretation (Creswell & Poth, 2018, p. 73). The creation of knowledge cannot be separated from the social environment in which it is formed (Woolfolf, 2013). The goal is to achieve an understanding of the shared meanings within a social group.

On this account, it seems to be essential to embrace the social part of geographical imagination. The social part of geographical imagination refers to social structure, historical context, relations, social dynamics, etc. It is an integral part of geographical imagination. The mental and material parts are no substitutes for this.

In contrast to the social part, the mental part of geographical imagination refers to people's feelings, conceived objects, and emotions. The material part of geographical imagination indicates objects and material means in our milieus. The social, mental, and material parts of geographical imagination interact with each

other. I would like to borrow the Ghana case study on climate change and spatial mobility, conducted by Jarawura and Smith to illustrate the interactions.

For starters, in Ghana, for instance, the impacts of climate change are already being felt by smallholder farmers, whose livelihoods are affected by rain-fed systems (Jarawura & Smith, 2015). In the Ghana case, the social context has an impact on one's perception and sustainability in livelihood.

Some of our young people rather return home when many people join them during years of bad rain … Those from rich households where food is not a problem usually quickly come back home. And these wise boys know when to migrate and when not. When there is a bad harvest and everyone else is going, they just sit back home" (Yussif, 85, focus group at Tunaayili).

On the other hand, social relations might be modified by one's mental and material parts of geographical imagination. In Ghana, people take seasonal migration as an adaptation to the decline of crops. The social relations might be reproduced by increasing livelihood security and mental health.

.. during drought some married women migrate to find jobs that allow for time to heal wounds between them and their rivals, and their husbands. This may be a happy moment for both the women migrating and the others at home." (Jarawura & Smith, 2015, p. 129).

As we can learn from the Ghana case, the social part holds interactions with both mental and material parts of geographical imagination. All the compounded parts make up the individual geographical imagination about our milieus. Grounded in its underlying ternary dynamic, geographical imagination serves as an analytical tool for us to know about the world.



Figure 2.3. Social-Mental-Material ternary

Source: the author.

Geographical imagination allows us to pull on a deductive thread to discover the individuals' beliefs, feelings, milieus, and social contexts. This ultimately would facilitate our understanding of decision-making and the knowledge of the good life. In the upcoming sections, I will zoom in on the social, mental, and material parts of geographical imagination regarding the good life after border changes in sensitive spaces. Before I do so, I want to lay out another key concept of this research—sensitive space, which is inextricably bound up with spatial mobility, decision-making, the good life, and geographical imagination.

2.6. Sensitive Space

This section is divided into three segments. In Section 2.6.1, I will carefully review the literature on the concepts of place and space. In Section 2.6.2, I will move toward Thirdspace which provides an analytical lens to look at sensitive space. In Section 2.6.3, I will conceptualize sensitive space.

2.6.1. Place and space

Sensitive space, in lexical terms, is space. Before I literally lead you to the sensitive space, it is better to get familiar with the definitions of place and space first. To start with, space and place require each other for definition (Cresswell, 2015). Agnew (1987) outlines three fundamental aspects of place as a "meaningful location", namely,

location (subjective coordinates), locale (material settings for social relations), and sense of place (people's subjective and emotional attachment to place).

Space is more abstract than place. Compared to place, it is considered a realm without meaning—as a "fact of life" (Cresswell, 2015). Tuan (1977, p. 6) links space to movement and place to pause. *When human beings invest meaning in a portion of space and then become attached to it, space becomes a place* (Cresswell, 2015). Nonetheless, the ideas of space and place differ from each other. When it comes to social space, there are not many differences between space and place (Lefebvre, 1991).

Secondly, social space or place exists on many scales (Tuan, 1977, p. 176). It could be your boss's office or a shopping mall. Social space or place pops up everywhere in our day-to-day life. They have various areas and volumes. What is more, the borders of social space or place can be material or nonmaterial. Wiles (2007), for instance, exemplifies that border can be cartographic, social, cultural, etc.

2.6.2. Thirdspace

After figuring out space and place, the next concern is how we look at them. In this research, I employ the concept of Thirdspace to understand sensitive spaces. To be clear, this concept does not attempt to discard your familiar ways of thinking about space and place. Based on philosopher Henri Lefebvre's profound work "The production of space" (1991), Soja (1996) created the Thirdspace theory.

Thirdspace is a flexible term that attempts to expand the scope of spatial and geographical imagination (Soja, 1996, pp. 1,3). Soja rejects the dual-mode of thinking of space: real-and-imagined places. Thirdspace is a lived space that breaks down the distinction between Firstspace—perceived and Secondspace—conceived. Soja defines Thirdspace as follows:

"*A knowable and unknowable, real and imagined lifeworld of experiences, emotional events, and political choices that are existentially shaped by the generative and problematic interplay between centers and peripheries, the abstract and concrete, the impassioned spaces*

of the conceptual and the lived, marked out materially and metaphorically in spatial praxis, the transformation of (spatial) knowledge into (spatial) action in the field of unevenly developed (spatial) power" (Soja, 1996, p. 31)



Figure 2.4. Trialectics of Spatiality

Source: (Soja, 1996, p. 74).

Soja (1996, p. 3) captures that there is a growing awareness of the simultaneity and interwoven complexity of the social, the historical, and the spatial. The three-sided complexity leads to major revisions in how we study space, history, and society. Thereby, in virtue of Thirdspace, it is possible to incorporate social, historical, and spatial aspects of sensitive spaces, and explore what these aspects mean to migrants and non-migrants.

Figure 2.5. Trialectics of Being

Source: (Soja, 1996, p. 71).

In this research, sensitive space will be approached from a Thirdspace perspective. The significance of Thirdspace lies in engaging with contemporary politics, along with its radical openness, and strategic flexibility in coping with multiple forms of oppression and inequality (Soja, 1996, p. 13). A Thirdspace perspective allows us to excavate social, and historical contexts, lived experiences, emotions, and beliefs that are embedded in sensitive spaces.

2.6.3. Theorizing sensitive space

After the inquiry into place and space, and Thirdspace, it is time to construct sensitive space. This section is three-fold. First, I will endeavor to characterize and conceptualize sensitive space. Second, I will reveal my ontological and epistemological assumptions about sensitive space. Third, I will identify inhabitants in sensitive spaces by mapping stakeholders.

Sensitive space *per se* contains sensitivity and spatiality. I want to briefly talk about "sensitivity" and "spatiality" through the lens of Thirdspace. For starters, sensitivity is linked to emotions, political, and security connotations. Cataldi (1993, p. 44) from a philosophical perspective, aligns sensitive space with the individual's emotional depth. She argues that a sensitive space is a space of personal outlook in which people orient themselves situationally. Cons (2016) widens the connotation of "sensitive" that as follows:

It means, variously, having perception or being perceivable; causing irritation, arousal, or intense emotion or feeling; being receptive to external influences; being involved with national security; and something likely to give offense if mishandled. It conjures feelings of urgency, pain, and danger without defining them. Evoked in political contexts, it summons concerns over security without specifying the nature of the threats (Cons, 2016, p. 7).

Secondly, spatiality refers to how space is represented as having effects (Agnew, 1994). Cons (2016, p. 21) posits that the ambiguity of sensitive space might be the best vector of territorial incoherence and anxiety that disturb territorial imaginations, the classically defined territory, nation, and state. I will exemplify the clash of territorial

imaginations shortly after defining sensitive space but suffice it to say that geopolitics is at play.

In sum, sensitive space comes from territorial incoherence (i.e., more than two territorial states or authorities). For that reason, sensitive space maintains an unstable equilibrium which is disturbed by potential national security concerns and cartographic anxiety.

Following the definition of sensitive space, I will clear this concept up by probing into the dimensions of sensitive space.

Dimension	**Sensitivity**	**Spatiality**
Parameter	Sensitivity level (high, low)	Scale (subject to arbitrary)
		Border (material, nonmaterial)

Table 2.1. The dimensions of sensitive space

Source: the author.

Firstly, the sensitivity of sensitive space sits on different levels. In a way, any social space with territorial incoherence can be sensitive. For instance, the exclaves of *Baarle-Hertog* and *Baarle-Nassau* scattered in the Dutch and Belgian territories are archetypical low-level sensitive spaces (see Map 2.1). Of course, during the early days of COVID-19, the Netherlands and Belgium adopted different corona measures. Due to this reason, the loose Dutch corona measures and the strict Belgian corona policy clashed and posed border control (Sadée, 2020; France 24, 2020). Belgian people residing along the Belgian-Dutch border were concerned that they could contract COVID-19 from their laissez-faire Dutch neighbors (Sadée, 2020). This somewhat sparked local security concerns and anxiety in *Baarle-Hertog* and *Baarle-Nassau* (Sadée, 2020). But compared to Catalonia, Nicosia, East Jerusalem, Kashmir, and Hong Kong, *Baarle-Hertog* and *Baarle-Nassau* are sensitive spaces on a notably low level. All of this is to say the sensitivity of sensitive space can be high or low.



Map 2.1.The borders between the Netherlands and Belgium at Baarle-Hertog & Baarle-Nassau

Source: (Tos, 2008).

Secondly, the discussion so far has put emphasis on the scale of the region with physical lines. In essence, like any social space, the spatiality (scale and border) of sensitive space is subject to arbitrary. A sensitive space could be a country or a room. A border can be material or nonmaterial. Material lines demarcate territorial incoherence. From a geopolitical angle, the West and Russia contend for Ukraine (Mearsheimer, 2018, p. 252; Putin, 2021). In light of geopolitics, Ukraine is a sensitive space. So are East and West Germany, and North and South Korea.

Nonmaterial lines highlight territorial incoherence. It could be the lines between victory and defeat, joy and sorrow, life and death, religious and atheistic. For instance, there is a dynamic line of victory and defeat for any football team in any football stadium. The players and fans aspire for their triumph in that space. This is also the case for their counterpart. Two groups of people endure strong emotions aimed at

winning in that space. In the same vein, it is possible to mark an intensive care unit (ICU) or a chapel by territorial incoherence with nonmaterial lines.

It appears necessary to confine this concept to a practical range. In this research, I only focus on high-level sensitive spaces with physical boundaries on the scale of a region or territorial state.

Sensitive space: ontological and epistemological assumptions

Up to this point, I am ready to lay out my ontological and epistemological views on sensitive space. My ontological assumption is that sensitive space should be followed from a structuralist approach. I view sensitive space as a social space with its structures and systems. Sensitive space is the source of action. My epistemological assumption is that constructivism is capable of uncovering sensitive spaces. The constructivist approach addresses the "process" of interaction among actors and zooms in on the specific context in which people live in the hope of understanding the historical and cultural settings of sensitive spaces (Creswell & Poth, 2018, p. 25).

Sensitive space: stakeholder mapping

Stakeholder mapping would nurture our awareness of their agendas and conflicting interests[3]. In this regard, it is natural to ask *what makes sensitive space "sensitive"*, and *who inhabits sensitive space?*



Figure 2.6. Stakeholder mapping

Source: the author.

First and foremost, territorial states mediate and create sensitive space. Territorial states are vehicles that engage in cartographical politics and nation-

[3] See (Murdoch & Marsden, 1995).

building. Nonetheless, the merging of the state with a clearly delineated territory is the geographical essence of international relations (Agnew, 1994). Bordering territorial states co-exist along the cartographic lines. The cartographic lines, however, do not always follow the historical context. Samaddar (1999, p. 108) argues that the enterprise of nation-building is accompanied by psychological and epistemic violence.

The second group of actors that inhabit sensitive spaces is social groups. Social groups are engaged in drawing and propagating social values and norms (Lapinski & Rimal, 2005). Social groups can be separated along the ethnic line, economic line, or political line (e.g., political orientation, elites, and civilians). Mearsheimer (2018) affirms that within social groups, the members share similar day-to-day lives and have a common history and culture. Paradoxically, the identical culture, history, memory, economy, and politics can be separated into pieces scattered among different spaces by cartographic lines. In this context, social groups would confront different social norms and socialization.

Lastly, individuals are the inhabitants of sensitive space as well as the protagonists of this research. Facing border changes in sensitive spaces, individuals with certain identities, beliefs, and political orientations may become more sensitive to their interactions with social groups and territorial states. In that event, individuals have to make their decision on spatial im/mobility for a good life.

In a nutshell, territorial states, social groups, and individuals fuel sensitivity to sensitive spaces on different levels—macro, meso, and micro. I discussed territorial states, social groups, and individuals. This template reflects the three levels of analysis—system, unit, and individual[4].

Sensitive space is at play in spatial mobility. Firstly, we cannot deny the fact that geographic movements take place in sensitive spaces. Furthermore, due to territorial

[4] See (Waltz, 1959).

incoherence and deep emotions, border changes in sensitive spaces might trigger territorial states, social groups, and individuals to pursue their agendas.

It would be wrong to think that territorial states, social groups, and individuals always share the same agenda. When it comes to border changes in sensitive spaces, there is no reason to believe that these stakeholders would stand hand in hand. Especially when the individuals and their social groups are marginalized objects in their country. Individuals and their social groups cannot determine their business through institutions. In that event, the agendas of territorial states, social groups, and individuals are at odds.

Given the emphasis individuals place on the good life, following border changes, individuals have to make a decision—to go or to stay based on their geographical imagination. Sensitive space is of great importance to understanding spatial mobility, decision-making, and geographical imagination.

To drive home the point that geographical imagination consists of social, mental, and material parts, I will take up the geographical imagination ternary theory about the good life to sensitive space in the wake of border changes.

2.7. Sensitive Space, Geographical Imagination, and Good Life

It is important to specify the particular circumstance in which people pursue a good life. On this account, sensitive space works as a hypothetical case. Ashley (2007) maintains that a hypothetical case helps the reasoner draw out the consequences.

According to the foregoing discussion, I draw two assumptions. First, following border changes in sensitive spaces, local residents make their migratory decision aiming at a good life. The decision can be *to go* or *to stay*. Second, we can know about the good life through local residents' geographical imagination. Based on my assumptions, the central mission of this section is to inquire into the social-mental-material nexus of geographical imagination about the good life after border changes in sensitive spaces.

In this regard, it is necessary to identify concrete concepts and their links to respective parts of geographical imagination. This does not equate with creating a rigid universal conceptual model. Instead, the social-mental-material nexus of geographical imagination is a flexible approach. Due to specific settings, the variables in social, mental, and material parts of geographical imagination are subject to change.

2.7.1. Social part

The social part of geographical imagination refers to social structure, historical context, socialization, social dynamics, etc. It involves borders and social justice. Border changes pose new spatial forms and social relations that resonate with social justice. The possible changes in social justice upset spatial forms and social relations on three levels—territorial states, social groups, and individuals. All of these changes have significant impacts on one's geographical imagination about the good life.

Borders

Geographical imagination acknowledges the borders and reaches beyond borders. In other words, borders are more than physical demarcations. Borders afford ways of revealing the individuals' geographical imagination about sensitive space. This section is two-fold. First, I will refine the literature on borders. Second, I will consider the meanings of border changes.

It might be useful to review the literature on borders. There are three paradigms in the study of geopolitical borders: classic, modern, and postmodern geopolitics of borders (Tuathail, 2002, pp. 26, 28). In classic geopolitics, borders are understood as frontiers—a physical demarcation of the territoriality of sovereign nation-states (Parker & Adler-Nissen, 2012). In modern geopolitics, borders study has been expanded to boundaries: identities, battles for power, and territory (Tuathail, 2002). In both tendencies, borders are attributed as natural, static, and objective lines. Both describe a relation: who governs where.

Later in the 90s, postmodern geopolitics of borders turned to the social constructs process of borders, comprising values, power, presentation, narratives, etc.

Compared to classic and modern geopolitics, postmodern geopolitics consider borders meaningful, dynamic practices with values. It describes the process of becoming. Postmodern politics advocates a shift from the "physical line in the sand" to the bordering practices and performances (Parker & Vaughan-Williams, 2012; Tuathail, 2002).

In line with postmodern geopolitics, Rumford (2006) posits that the spatial turn may work to subordinate borders to spaces. On top of that, borders function as networks, that renewed the importance of land borders. Each act of debordering and rebordering is constitutive of social relations, access to networks, and people's orientation to the world (Rumford, 2006).

Given the multifaceted meanings of borders, border changes suggest two main implications for different stakeholders. To start with, for territorial states, border changes indicate the changes to cartographic lines on the map. Second, the rebordering practices overthrow and reshape the spatial form, existing relations, networks, power, and identities among territorial states, social groups, and individuals.

There are good reasons for individuals to worry about the formidable social reconstruct dictated by the new master of the sensitive space. What is more important, the shifts in spatial forms and existing relations bring social justice, identity, othering, capabilities, and livelihoods to the fore.

Social justice

Geographical imagination appreciates social justice as a spatial form and social relations in sensitive space. People need justice. Social justice is a matter of eternal justice and morality that views it as something contingent upon the social process operating in society as a whole (Harvey, 2009, p. 15). This section is two-fold. First, I will refine the literature on social justice. To be specific, the reasons why social justice matters. Second, I will link social justice to sensitive spaces after border changes.

Early literature on social justice indicates that it associates with individual development, liberty, institutional conditions, and positive peace. Firstly, social justice is associated with individual development. Harvey (2009, p. 97) asserts that social justice is an application of the just principle to mediate a conflict that arises out of the necessity for social cooperation in seeking individual advancement, i.e., social justice enables individual development.

Secondly, social justice encompasses liberty. Rawls (1999) opines that everyone has an equal right to a fully adequate set of equal basic liberties which is compatible with a similar set of liberties for everyone. Likewise, Harvey (2009, p. 15) remarks, that social justice allows people to fashion and use space creatively and to appreciate the meaning of the spatial forms created by others.

Thirdly, social justice is not only associated with the right to space (individual development, liberty, etc.) but necessitates institutional conditions. Rawls (1999, p. 9) adopts a conception of social justice as a standard whereby the distributive aspects of the basic structure of society are to be assessed. Tyler (2010) maintains that people evaluate fairness mostly based on criteria that can be offered to all the parties to a conflict: whether there are opportunities to engage, and whether the authorities are neutral.

Young (1990) from an institutional perspective, rejects simply reducing social justice to individual development and distribution. Young (1990, p. 39) argues that social justice should zoom in on *institutional conditions necessary for the development and exercise of individual capacities and collective communication and cooperation.* By contrast, injustice refers to oppression and domination. The institutional conditions perspective facilitates examining people's lived experiences in sensitive spaces, and whether they have experienced oppression or inequality.

Lastly, social justice underpins positive peace. Both positive peace and negative peace are associated with violence. Negative peace is merely linked to the absence of war or personal violence (Galtung, 1969). In contrast to negative peace, positive peace

sets a higher bar. Positive peace includes harmony, just social order, and the absence of both structural and personal violence (Barash & Webel, 2018, p. 9; Galtung, 1969). In this sense, positive peace necessitates social justice to create a just spatial form that every social member would appreciate and enjoy (Barash & Webel, 2018, p. 9). On balance, understanding social justice is vital to revealing the complexity of individual development, liberty, and structural order, and identifying positive/negative peace in sensitive spaces.

In the preceding section, I illustrated that border changes evoke the underlying dynamics of spatial form and social relations. The shift of spatial forms and social relations resonates with social justice. It is, therefore, natural to align border changes with social justice.

The changes in social justice suggest changes in spatial forms and social relations alert potential changes on three levels. On a macro level, the changes in social justice might shift institutional conditions and positive/negative peace of territorial states. On a meso level, these changes might affect equal access to social resources and liberty for certain social groups. On a micro level, these changes might affect individual opportunities, liberty, etc. All these changes together reshape spatial form and social relations among territorial states, social groups, and individuals.

The sense of justice is deeply held in our minds. There is no reason to think that a society without the opportunities for individual development, liberty, just institutional conditions, and harmony can bring a good life to individuals. All of these parameters are inherently attached to social justice. As such, the variation of social justice brings uncertainty about the future. This ultimately might severely alter local residents' geographical imagination. Local people have good reasons to worry about their good life.

2.7.2. Mental part

The mental part of geographical imagination refers to people's feelings, conceived objects, and emotions. It contains identity and othering. Identity and othering

highlight social reconstructs in sensitive spaces in the wake of border changes. They pervade local people's day-to-day life with various emotions attached to places, belonging, etc. What is more important, identity and othering pose a thought-provoking question: *social justice for whom*? They disturb local people's geographical imagination about the good life.

Identity

Identity and geographical imagination are inextricably connected. Fukuyama (2018, p. v) reiterates that the demand for recognition of one's identity is a master concept to facilitate understanding of world politics nowadays. This section is two-fold. First, I will refine the literature on identity. Namely, why identity bothers. Second, I will link identity to sensitive space after border changes.

Simply put, identity functions as answers to the questions "*Who I am*" and "*What binds us together*". People's identity is aligned with "the groups to which I belong". Belonging to a particular ethnic group socializes individuals into particular expectations and life chances (Flint, 2006, p. 63). As Sen (2006, p. 19) noted, identifying with others, in various ways, can be extremely important for living in a society. Flint (2006, p. 191) argues that the sense of identity is focused on the nation rather than the (territorial) state.

Secondly, identity is bound up with emotions. Fukuyama (2018) claims that *identity is rooted in thymos, which is experienced emotionally through feelings of pride, shame, and anger*. Likewise, Sen (2006, p. 19) claims that belonging to a certain identity group in a particular context has significant meanings. Belonging is deemed as a resource for a community or a source of pride and joy.

Thirdly, identity is tied to a particular place (Flint, 2006, p. 62). Given the fact that the territorial entailment throughout history of a place varies, identity is continuously rewritten on the basis of external events (Flint, 2006, p. 69). On this account, Mann (2012) articulates that (territorial) states within their borders use their

despotic power to create a sense of national identity for the whole population so that region and ethnic identities are subsumed within an overarching allegiance.

However, the regional identity does not always integrate into the identity of the territorial state. In the incident of a US military helicopter crash in Okinawa (Japan), Japanese police were not allowed to get involved in the investigation (Brooke, 2004). Flint (2006, p. 69) opines that the contestation on *who controls Okinawa* led to local protests and expressions of self-identity. As a local high school teacher said, "*At that time I felt Okinawa is really occupied by the US, that it is not part of Japan*." Another local claim points toward Tokyo," *Tokyo doesn't care … I feel a gap between Tokyo and here*" (Flint, 2006, p. 69).

Social groups may construct a regional identity as they settle in particular areas of a territorial state (Flint, 2006, p. 69). Through the example of the US military presence in Okinawa, as we might see, to the local people, the regional identity does not always rally around the identity of the territorial state.

In the wake of border changes, local residents have to deal with social changes. As Taylor (2009, p. 3) asserted, identity is about the interface between what might variously be characterized as the macro and the micro, the exterior and interior, the people's social world and the individuals within it.

For starters, individuals must process multiple collective identities. That is often affiliated with the incoherence of memberships—ethnicity and citizenship due to territorial incoherence. When the memberships are from different groups, a person opts for the identities of relative importance (Sen, 2006).

Changes in social relations might arouse changes in liberty and equal access to social resources for certain social groups. This eventually will affect the right to space of individuals from the same social group.

Another pertinent point is that one's identity is connected with their emotions. Border changes in sensitive spaces, first and foremost, bring uncertainty and anxiety.

Local people endure emotions. Objectively speaking, emotions cannot be reduced to identity. However, identity is likely highlighted when the emotions are linked to the shift to their territorial states, social groups, individual rights, places, or identity.

Finally, one's identity is inextricably bound up with the place. In this research, it is considered to be a sensitive space. The changes in spatial forms, social relations, and territorial entailment of sensitive space resemble a coin flip. You never know for sure which side you will get—in the place you live, everything remains the same or radical changes. This is especially true when it comes to underrepresented social groups or individuals. "Heads or tails" of sensitive space lead to identity choice, emotional impact, and the anxious outlook for the good life for individuals.

Othering

Geographical imagination affords ways of thinking about *Us* and *Them*. Othering is closely intertwined with identity construct. If identity is constructed based on sameness, othering is a process of differentiation between Us and Them. They are two sides of one coin. Following the same logic with identity, othering is affiliated with *not* belonging, emotions, and places.

After border changes in sensitive spaces, othering might occur. Van Houtum and Van Naerssen (2002) claim that others, based on our present image of borders, are needed, and constantly produced and reproduced to maintain cohesion in the formatted order of a territorially demarcated society. It has to be acknowledged that this process makes no guarantees of social justice.

Othering highlights social injustice. When you start to separate people, the next scenario would be differential treatment. Like Lister (2004, p. 101) remarks, othering is "*a process of differentiation and demarcation, by which the line is drawn between 'us' and 'them'—between the more and the less powerful*". In line with Lister, Young (1990, p. 56) points out powerlessness as one of the faces of oppression that is aligned with social injustice.

In the wake of border changes in sensitive spaces, othering feeds into a notion that enables us to trace the identity construct and power relations of different identity groups. For instance, othering might bring inequality and political oppression onto the table. This undoubtedly keels over oppressed people's geographical imagination in many ways: a sense of alienation from places, resentment, etc. In that event, it prompts local people to review their outlook on the good life.

2.7.3. Material part

The material part of geographical imagination indicates objects and material means in our milieus. It entails capabilities and livelihoods. Border changes reconnect networks, which resonate with the individual's capabilities and livelihoods. Apart from that, border changes in sensitive spaces might severely affect local people's livelihoods on account of identity, political orientation, etc. Capabilities and livelihoods prop up people's geographical imagination about the good life.

Capabilities

Capabilities highlight the un/favorable resources that prop up people's geographical imagination. First, I will denote the meanings of capabilities. Second, I will discuss capabilities in sensitive spaces after border changes.

It might be useful to clarify what capabilities refer to. Capabilities denote access to resources, particularly (1) *social capital* (useful networks); (2) *cultural or human capital* (ideas, knowledge, and skills); and (3) *economic capital* (money and assets) (De Haas, Castles, & Miller, 2020, p. 332).

Furthermore, capabilities make much of the freedom of choice. Sen (2009) describes human capability as the ability of human beings to lead lives they have reason to value and to enhance the freedom they have. In accord with Sen, De Haas et al. (2020, p. 348) denote that increased capabilities increase the freedom of migrants to choose.

It would be fair to say the term "freedom of choice" directs to viable options that allow individuals to go or to stay as they wish. Border changes in sensitive spaces might disrupt local people's geographical imagination about the good life. In that context, local people have to decide to go or to stay.

Spatial mobility demands social networks, skills, money, etc. Van der Velde and Van Naerssen (2016, p. 4) underline that to make spatial mobility happen, the thresholds of acknowledging and accepting one's diplomas, skills, and competences must be passed. As such, local people would have little freedom to go away if they were not equipped with sufficient capabilities. Without a doubt, local people can enjoy spatial immobility. Yet, it has to be admitted that by having essential capabilities, one would feel free to actualize their willingness to go or to stay for their desirable good life. Capabilities, therefore, underpin one's geographical imagination about the good life.

Livelihoods

People's livelihood conditions are crucial to their geographical imagination. De Haan (2012) advocates a livelihood approach for an actor-oriented perspective for development and geography studies. First, I will delve into why livelihoods matter. Second, I will discuss livelihoods in sensitive spaces after border changes.

Simply stated, a livelihood comprises income and property rights required to support and sustain a given standard of living (Ellis, 1998). In sensitive spaces, people's livelihoods support their sustainable living and household based on their income, pension, financial support from the authorities, etc.

Livelihoods are pivotal to pursuing a good life. Spatial mobility (migration) involves significant costs and risks that the poorest population generally cannot afford. De Haas et al. (2020) reiterate that the poorest people do not migrate. Objectively speaking, livelihoods are not the sole fact of a good life. However, without wherewithal maintained by livelihoods, one hardly can move to another place for a good life.

Border changes in sensitive spaces might significantly influence access to resources, social wealth (re)distribution, and networks. Precisely speaking, social in/justice sits behind access to resources and social wealth (re)distribution. Rebordering sits behind shifts of networks.

To certain social groups and individuals, these potential changes would severely affect their livelihoods. Presuming that one's sustainable livelihoods are positively or negatively affected following border changes, one must review their life. Objectively speaking, livelihoods are the necessary material means of local people's geographical imagination about the good life.

One might concede that people make their decisions based on their geographical imagination with the hypothetical examples mentioned earlier but still argue that spatial mobility cannot be explained from a good life perspective. The purpose of "*to go*" or "*to stay*" lies in "*safety and avoid loss*". The argument runs because people are bent on avoiding having a bad life.

To argue spatial mobility is guided by "*safety and avoid loss*" after border changes in sensitive spaces implies that our feelings (senses of belonging and alienation, joy and sorrow), relations we cherish, etc. do not really matter over spatial mobility. In other words, regarding spatial mobility, only the individual's safety and material interests will be seriously considered. Ultimately, it recognizes individuals as rational actors without feelings or belongings. This is an implausible argument in all its appearances.

2.8. Conceptual Model and Theoretical Statement



Figure 2.7. Conceptual model

Source: the author.

It is time to present the conceptual model of spatial mobility in the wake of border changes in sensitive spaces. This conceptual model is interpreted in four parts. First and foremost, it illustrates my empirical statement that spatial mobility is discerned in people's decision-making for the purpose of a good life.

The pursuit of a good life is a lifelong process and a meaningful purpose for every individual. Everyone strives to achieve a good life in their own way. A good life can be here or there. To that end, people opt to go or to stay at a reasonable cost (essential capabilities and livelihoods). The pursuit of a good life is not equated with a good life. A good life is not equated with a luxury life. By and large, a good life should not involve uncertainty, risks, or even threats to survival.

Geographical imagination underpinned by social constructivism is capable of discovering individuals' vision of the good life. My theory suggests that geographical imagination is made up of its social, mental, and material parts (see Figure 2.3).

To put it differently, we can know about the good life through geographical imagination. The pursuit of a good life mandates decision-making. Decision-making enables or dismisses spatial mobility.

Second, I theorized about sensitive space. Sensitive spaces, characterized by national security and cartographic anxiety, are raised by territorial incoherence. Moreover, I visualized three stakeholders in sensitive spaces—territorial states, social groups, and individuals. They fueled sensitivity to sensitive space in their own fashion. Border changes in sensitive spaces might pose conflicting agendas to stakeholders.

Third, I applied my theory of geographical imagination about the good life in the context of border changes in sensitive spaces. According to the context and actors, the powerful variables were identified. Borders and social justice afford ways of revealing the social part of geographical imagination. Identity and othering buttress the mental part of geographical imagination. Capabilities and livelihoods highlight the material part of geographical imagination.

To put it in more concrete terms, border changes in sensitive spaces serve as a hypothetical case to apply my geographical imagination ternary theory about the good life. In the social part, border changes in sensitive spaces pose not only new cartographic lines but new spatial forms and social reconstructs. The shuffle is at play on many levels between territorial states, social groups, and individuals. On top of that, it brings social justice, identity, othering, capabilities, and livelihoods to the fore.

Last but not least, the social-mental-material nexus formulates local people's geographical imagination in the wake of border changes in sensitive spaces. The mental part is intertwined with the social part. The shift in social relations within the sensitive space leads to new identification and othering. The uncertainty, anxiety, belonging to sensitive space, and potential political oppression haunt local people.

The material part is bound up with the social part. Social justice might severely disturb local people's capabilities and livelihoods. Without their support, one barely can move to their desired place. In addition, the material part is associated with the mental part. The limits to resources for certain social groups and individuals might be based on identity and othering.

To sum up, border changes in sensitive spaces alert the social, mental, and material parts of local people's geographical imagination about the good life. For this reason, local people, based on their outlook of the good life and wherewithal, have to decide *to go* or *to stay*, which ultimately highlights their spatial mobility. The geographical imagination ternary theory about the good life and its conceptual model facilitate explaining the geographic movements of migrants and non-migrants after border changes in sensitive spaces.

2.8.1. Reflection

Looking at the conceptual model makes it possible to visualize and test my assumptions in the phase of people's decision-making in one explanatory system. My discussion is two-fold. In the first half, I will carefully assess the concerns and virtues of my theory and model. In the second half, I will critically reflect on their limits.

My theory and the conceptual model refine the threshold approach of Van der Velde and Van Naerssen by incorporating purpose. The wherewithal (essential capabilities and livelihoods) allies with the mental threshold (Van der Velde & Van Naerssen, 2016, p. 4). Meanwhile, trajectories and locations are not missing: these dimensions are mapped in the societies of origin—sensitive space and destination within the relevant territorial states.

My theory and model suggest that the ultimate decision on spatial mobility (migration) is made by individuals. This is not to deny that individuals' pursuit of a good life, geographical imagination, and decision-making are not influenced by their sensitive spaces, social-historical contexts, or even international relations. Nor is it to deny the impacts from other stakeholders.

The conceptual model is built based on the open social-mental-material nexus of geographical imagination. Due to specific cases, the variables within the model are subject to change. For instance, in climate change studies, environment, and food security can be engaged in geographical imagination. That is to say that the conceptual model is not a closed, rigid explanatory system. Its radical openness affords a comprehensive way of understanding the good life in various contexts.

My geographical imagination ternary theory about the good life and its model endeavor to interpret spatial mobility, the pursuit of a good life, and people's decision-making after border changes in sensitive spaces. However, it is difficult to say that my theory and model are not flawless.

To begin with, the conceptual model might fail to capture some latent variables in the context of sensitive space after border changes. When simplifying reality by merely amplifying certain variables, theorists could overlook others (Mearsheimer, 2014, p. 25). Hence, it is necessary to test the geographical imagination ternary theory about the good life and the model in practical cases.

Secondly, the conceptual model draws the map in a linear fashion. The conceptual model does not illustrate every cross-cutting interaction of different variables within one explanatory system. It is necessary to check whether exists potential cross-cutting interactions of different variables through practical case studies.

You might have doubts about my assumptions. I urge you to stay tuned for more detailed examples. In Chapter 4, I will apply a cross-case study to test my theory and conceptual model. Thereafter, I will revise my theory and model to meet your skeptical eye.

3. METHODOLOGY

In this research, I delved into the geographic movements from sensitive spaces to relevant neighboring territorial states after border changes in those spaces. In the preceding chapter, I have come up with my *geographical imagination ternary theory about the good life* and a conceptual model based on empirical evidence—an intensive literature review and inference. My central mission in this chapter is to explore adequate approaches to ascertain my theory and its conceptual model—border changes in sensitive spaces alert the social (*borders, social justice*), mental (*identity, othering*), and material parts (*capabilities*, *livelihoods*) of local people's geographical imagination. I will speak of the research scope of this master thesis in Section 3.5 but suffice it to say that the individuals' decision-making and their views on the good life are not on the agenda of this chapter.

This chapter is divided into seven sections. In Section 3.1, I will start with my philosophical assumptions. Specifically, regarding geographical imagination, I will come up with my philosophical perspective, ontological, and epistemological assumptions. In Section 3.2, I will hold on to a mixed methodology, namely, critical discourse analysis and survey research.

In Section 3.3, I will move on to methodological choices—cross-case analysis and qualitative research. In Section 3.4, I will amplify specific methods— the written narrative theme identification and the semi-structured interview with experts. In addition, I will illustrate data collection and data analysis of the combined methods respectively.

In Section 3.5, I will identify the methodological limitations of this research. In Section 3.6, I will respond to ethical considerations. In Section 3.7, I will provide an overall reflection on my positionality.

3.1. Philosophical Assumptions

My philosophical assumptions are three-fold. First and foremost, I endeavor to recognize geographical imagination through a proper philosophical lens. Second, in response to the philosophical interpretation of geographical imagination, I will take an adequate ontological stance. Third, I will come up with a decent epistemological stance. My philosophical assumptions are as follows:

Philosophical perspective	*Ontological*	*Epistemological*
Phenomenology	Individualist	Post-positivist

Table 3.1. Methodological framework (Philosophical assumptions)

Source: the author.

The philosophical perspective aims to inform the beliefs that I bring to this research. To begin with, I view geographical imagination as feelings and common meaning. Van Manen (1990) contends that phenomenology is oriented to interpreting the "texts" of life and lived experiences. It centers the lived experiences of individuals, and how they have both subjective experiences of the phenomenon and objective experiences of something in common with others (Creswell & Poth, 2018, p. 124). Phenomenology, therefore, is able to address the lived experiences and common meanings of people residing in sensitive spaces after border changes.

The next point is the ontological choice for geographical imagination. Ontology is the study of the nature of reality and the nature of the human being in the world (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005, p. 183). The individualist approach in the belief that individual actors are the source of action and initiate change, will be adopted in this research.

To begin with, people's capability, or ability, to act on their will is aligned with their agency. Individualism singles out that individual agency is the starting point of any analysis (Moses & Knutsen, 2012). As such, it is essential to appreciate the

individual agency of people residing in sensitive spaces to follow the geographic movements.

Furthermore, an individualist stance accords with the empirical evidence in Chapter 2. Simply put, spatial mobility is discerned in people's decision-making. A good life is deemed as the purpose for migratory decision-making. Geographical imagination is capable of unfolding individuals' vision of the good life. Ontologically speaking, decision-making, good life, and geographical imagination are all bound up with the individual agency.

The last point is the epistemological choice for geographical imagination. Simply stated, epistemology is a way of understanding and explaining *how I know what I know* (Crotty, 2020). A post-positivist stance will be employed in the epistemological investigation.

For starters, post-positivist researchers do not believe in strict cause and effect but rather recognize that all-cause and effect is a probability that may or may not occur (Creswell & Poth, 2018, p. 59). Due to contextual influences, post-positivist scholars accept that our perception and observation are fallible, but an objective investigation will bring us to the truth as close as possible (McEvoy & Richards, 2003; Levers, 2013).

Secondly, post-positivism shares common ground with constructivism—the philosophical foundation of the social-mental-material nexus of geographical imagination. In Section 2.5, I assigned social constructivism to geographical imagination. Myers (2002) aligns most post-positivists with constructivists who believe that we each construct our view of the world through our perceptions of it. Given this, a post-positivist stance is able to test my geographical imagination ternary theory about the good life established in Chapter 2.

To sum up, I attribute the geographical imagination of migrants and non-migrants residing in sensitive spaces after border changes as *feelings and common meanings*. I use phenomenology as my philosophical perspective. I take on individualist and post-positivist stances for this research.

3.2. Mixed Methodology

Based on my ontological and epistemological stances on this research, the methodology involves critical discourse analysis (CDA) and survey research.

Ontological-Epistemological stance	***Methodology***
Individualist-postpositivist	CDA; Survey research

Table 3.2. Methodological framework (Mixed methodology)

Source: the author.

It seems to be necessary to clarify the reason why I decide to use a mixed methodology for this research. One challenge for this research lies in the difficulty of determining when categories are saturated, and on what condition my theory is sufficiently detailed. For that reason, I decided to adopt a mixed methodology to saturate the database and ensure the robustness of my theory.

CDA is described as "*a type of discourse analysis research that primarily studies the way social power abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in social and political contexts*" (Van Dijk, 1994). The goal of CDA is to examine the structural environment, relations, and processes within sensitive spaces (Amoussou & Allagbe, 2018).

Survey research denotes "*the collection of information from a sample of individuals through their responses to questions*" (Check & Schutt, 2011, p. 160). It comprises quantitative and qualitative research (Hines, 1993; Römkens, 1997). The goal of survey research is to collect information testing characteristics of a sample of individuals and structural environments in sensitive spaces after border changes (Ponto, 2015).

3.3. Methodological Choices

Based on the methodological framework (mix methodology), my methodological choices incorporate cross-case analysis and qualitative research.

Methodology	*Methodological choice*
1) CDA	1) Cross-case analysis
2) Survey research	2) Qualitative research

Table 3.3. Methodological framework (Methodological choices)

Source: the author.

CDA can make a significant contribution to critical social or political analysis when having access to an account of discourse (Van Dijk, 1993). In virtue of various texts, the case study presents a detailed account for CDA to scrutinize (Henry & Tator, 2016).

The case study is applicable for theory testing. Iacono et al. (2011) demonstrate that it is feasible to examine the theory by employing the case study in a rigorous qualitative fashion. Founded on the case study, the cross-case study aims to verify the geographical imagination ternary theory about the good life. There are three merits of the cross-case analysis. First, it enlarges and diversifies the database. Second, it enables comparing variables from individual case studies. Third, it facilitates testing and generalizing the theory in different cases.

Qualitative research as a component to survey research, informs the research objectives concerning the meaning ascribed to a social problem for individuals or groups (Creswell & Poth, 2018, p. 84; Hutton, 1990). People's feelings and experiences can hardly be simply quantified. We need a complex, detailed understanding of geographical imagination about the good life. Plus, qualitative research is capable of developing existing theories (Creswell & Poth, 2018, p. 84). Qualitative research, therefore, enables verifying the geographical imagination ternary theory about the good life.

3.4. Combined Methods

Based on the methodological framework (Methodological choices), the combined methods zoom in on the written narrative theme identification and the semi-structured interview with experts. In the operational phase, I will move on to the more detailed methodological settings—data collection and data analysis.

Methodological choice	*Methods*
1) Cross-case analysis	1) Written narrative theme identification
2) Qualitative research	2) Semi-structured interview with experts

Table 3.4. Methodological framework (Combined Methods)

Source: the author.

The written narrative theme identification was chosen to search relevant written content for cross-case analysis. Firstly, the theme as the central meaning of a narrative would be approached from the geographical imagination ternary theory about the good life. Specifically speaking, themes around sensitive space, mobility, the social (*borders, social justice*), mental (*identity, othering*), and material parts (*capabilities, livelihoods*) of local people's geographical imagination about the good life would be approached.

Furthermore, to ensure the comparability of particular variables, I selected specific modules for different variables based on the discussion in Section 2.7. For instance, regarding social justice, institutional conditions were singled out to compare. By this means, the two cases were entitled sound comparability.

Thirdly, written contents were suitable for CDA to review. Research materials related to the structural environments and power relations were in written form, such as policy reports and news articles.

As one of the means of qualitative methods, semi-structured interviews with experts were used for theory testing. The goal of semi-structured interviews was to verify local people's geographical imagination after border changes in sensitive

spaces through experts' knowledge stock. Another merit of this approach lies in its openness. Although a list of predetermined questions has been prepared, semi-structured interviews would unfold a chance for the informants to feel free to share issues that are important to them (Longhurst, 2010).

To be crystal clear, interviewing experts was not to gain a short-cut answer for my research question, but rather to reconstruct explainable knowledge stocks (Pfadenhauer, 2009). In this regard, the geographical imagination ternary theory about the good life could be tested. Plus, expert interviews accord with the post-positivist approach, which believes the validity of reality comes from peers, not participants, e.g., local people (Creswell & Poth, 2018, pp. 74, 75).

The last thing I shall set out is how the two combined methods in this research were prioritized. The written narrative theme for the cross-case analysis was used as the principal tool. The semi-structured interviews with experts were applied as the secondary tool. On the one hand, the written narrative theme for the cross-case analysis was able to demonstrate and test all variables in respective cases. On the other hand, the right experts could be identified to fit in with the interviews through the selected cases. Both combined methods contain data collection and data analysis respectively.

3.4.1. Data collection

Based on the combined methods, essential data were accordingly divided into two parts. First, the prime data were sorted from the policy reports and news articles. Second, the secondary data were gathered from the interviews. Each part of data collection had the same guideline for data selection—relevance and source evaluation.

Cross-case analysis

I must elucidate the guideline for data collection. Data collection for cross-case analysis involves relevance and source evaluation. In respect of relevance, the topics should address spatial mobility in sensitive spaces after border changes. Next, it

should touch upon stakeholders of sensitive spaces and the social-mental-material nexus. In this regard, the written narrative theme of the two cases will be categorized into *sensitive space*, *spatial mobility*, social (*borders*, *social justice*), mental (*identity*, *othering*), material parts (*capabilities, livelihoods*), and stakeholders (*territorial states, social groups, and individuals*) to compare.

Proceeding from the chosen categories, two cases were selected for this research—the Crimea (2014) and the India-Bangladesh enclaves (2015). I will dwell on the two cases in Section 4.1 but suffice it to say that based on the commonalities in the category of "sensitive space", the two cases displayed divergent outcomes—spatial mobility. In short, in the case of Crimea, many people moved away to the Ukrainian mainland in the wake of border changes (before the Russo-Ukrainian War broke out in February 2022). While in the case of the India-Bangladesh enclaves, most people stayed where they were after border changes. Thus, the two cases could test the geographical imagination ternary theory about the good life from different perspectives—to go and to stay.

In respect of source evaluation, data were collected based on motivation, age, reliability, and accuracy. To exemplify this, the motivation behind the sources should not be commercial or propagandist. The source should not present a conflict of interest. The date of publications for current events should not be outdated. Or old materials should contribute to the historical dimension of the theme. The policy reports or news articles should come from reputable organizations or websites. The source should not exhibit bias. The facts should be compared from different sources, etc.

Under the guideline for data collection—relevance and source evaluation, the policy reports and news articles were referenced from the sites: Russian legal system (http://www.consultant.ru/), UNHCR Ukraine (https://www.unhcr.org/ua/), Department of the Federal State Statistics Service for the Republic of Crimea and the

city of Sevastopol (Krymstat) (https://crimea.gks.ru/), Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine (https://www.msp.gov.ua/en/), Crimean local news portal Kryminform (https://www.c-inform.info/); Office on Drugs and Crime, United Nations (UNODC) (https://www.unodc.org/), Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India (https://mea.gov.in/), Observer Research Foundation (https://www.orfonline.org/), etc.

The cited policy reports assessed the outcomes of territorial states' related policies. For instance, the UNHCR's report "*UNHCR 25 years in Ukraine*" informs that from December 2014, the Ukrainian government stopped social service delivery and payments in areas not under its control, including Crimea (UNHCR, 2021b). Another Observer Research Foundation's policy report "*The 2015 India-Bangladesh land boundary agreement: Identifying constraints and exploring possibilities in Cooch Behar*" provides an assessment of the territory exchanged between India and Bangladesh.

The cited news articles reported the dynamics in sensitive spaces. According to the source on *Izvestia*, the Ukrainian government has dammed the North Crimean Canal, cutting off 90% of the water supply to Crimea. *BBC News* provides insights that after the India-Bangladesh land swap agreement, the former enclave dwellers believed that they *got the benefits that the people of Bangladesh get.*

Interview with experts

I invited experts in the selected cases as the focus group to gather interview data. The semi-structured interview with experts just as its name implies, recruited experts in the selected cases. The goal of data collection for semi-structured interviews with experts was to gather a diverse range of knowledge and various perspectives from experts of the selected cases.

Informant	Gender	Title	Relevant Publications	Citizenship	Date
Ranabir Samaddar	Male	Prof. of political science	The Marginal Nation; Transborder Migration from Bangladesh to West Bengal (1999)	Indian	13/04/2022
Evert van der Zweerde	Male	Prof. of political philosophy	Russian Political Philosophy: Anarchy, Authority, Autocracy (2022)	Dutch	18/05/2022
Dhananjay Tripathi	Male	Assoc. prof. of international relations	South Asia: boundaries, borders and beyond (2019)	Indian	25/05/2022
Wim P. van Meurs	Male	Prof. of European political history	Majdan. Presence and Representation in post-communist Ukraine (2019)	Dutch	31/052022

Table 3.5. List of expert-interviewees

Source: the author.

Furthermore, following the same guideline for data collection as cross-case analysis, experts were selected by their relevant publications. The experts were approached through my social network and the social network of the experts. In addition, I reached the experts through social media, for instance, LinkedIn, in the hope to recruit more experts through their social network. Regarding the experts' age, gender, profession, and ethnicity, I made no judgments.

Thirdly, the interviews covered the relevant topics in the data collection guideline. Moreover, the interview guide was adjusted for every semi-structured interview based on experts' knowledge stock. The interview questions were designed as open as possible in the hope that experts could elaborate on the topics in their own fashion. Experts' identities were disclosed with their permission.

Last but not least, the fieldwork—semi-structured interviews with experts were organized in the form of on-site or online meetings. Due to the geographical distance

with some experts, it was convenient to conduct interviews online. With the technological support of the online meeting software ZOOM, the goal of semi-structured interviews with experts was fulfilled.

3.4.2. Data analysis

In the analytical phase, data were analyzed by two means. First, the data from policy reports and news articles were disposed of by CDA. Second, the data from the semi-structured interviews with experts were processed with the help of ATLAS.ti (Version 22.0.11). The guidelines for data analysis and data collection are identical. Albeit applying mixed methods, the consistent criteria enabled examining the geographical imagination theory and its model on the same principle.

Following the guideline, CDA analyzed the relevant topics through policy reports and news articles. Besides, in light of the criteria for cross-case analysis, CDA was employed to analyze the interview transcripts and the quotations.

Before running the software ATLAS.ti, it was necessary to develop solid criteria for coding. The criteria were designed based on the guideline for data collection. According to the central mission of this chapter, geographical imagination ternary theory was the primary assignment for coding. While spatial mobility, sensitive space, and stakeholders were more empirical and functioned as the minor assignment for coding. The topics around decision-making and the good life were not screened or coded.



Figure 3.1. Criteria for code groups of Cluster-1,2,3

Source: the author.

ATLAS.ti made it possible to reorganize the dataset. The interview data were analyzed in four steps. First, the interview transcripts were uploaded to ATLAS.ti as sources. Second, the interview transcripts were coded in the context at length. Third, based on the connotations of codes and subcodes, they were categorized into code groups. Thereafter, these code groups were further categorized into higher levels of code groups. In this way, all relevant code groups were synthesized into four different clusters of code groups.

To exemplify this, Cluster-1 represented geographical imagination ternary theory. The first level of Cluster-1 incorporated the variables in the conceptual model. The second level of Cluster-1 showed the social, mental, and material parts of geographical imagination. The third level indicated geographical imagination. Cluster-2 represented spatial mobility. Cluster-3—sensitive space. Cluster-4

illustrated the stakeholders of sensitive spaces (same as Figure 2.6. Stakeholder mapping).

Four, thereafter, all findings were logged to examine and revise my theory and model. For instance, interviewee Van Meurs used the term "*perceived reality*" (W.P. van Meurs, personal communication, May 31, 2022). It was coded in ATLAS.ti. Apparently, this term did not fit in the first or the second level of Cluster-1. Nor did in Cluster-2,3,4. Yet, it was linked to the term geographical imagination, which is the knowledge of our milieus. On this account, this code was placed on the third level of Cluster-1—*Geographical imagination*. Thus, it was viable to identify the similarities and differences between my theoretical statement and the statements of experts by rolling out these criteria.

3.5. Methodological Limitations

The methodological framework provides adequate mixed approaches to test and ensure the robustness of my theory. However, it is humbling to admit that the methodological framework has its limitations. The methodological limitations encompass data pollution and the confined research scope.

For starters, post-positivism normally requires quantitative research as its methodological choice (Creswell & Poth, 2018, p. 75). As such, in addition to cross-case analysis and qualitative research, the geographical imagination ternary theory ideally needs to be ascertained in a quantitative manner. In other words, the data of people "to go" or "to stay" should be run in the statistical software IBM SPSS to test the outcome of my theory—spatial mobility.

Data pollution, however, was an obstacle to statistical analysis. It was hard to chase down the pure official data on geographic cross-border movements. For instance, due to the methodology of the Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine, the numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs) are only counted under the category "non-government-controlled areas". The data of the Crimean migrants that moved to the Ukraine mainland (from March 2014 till the war in Ukraine broke out in 2022)

were mingled with the data of the migrants from the Donetsk and Luhansk regions that moved to the Ukrainian mainland. It was impossible to filter the target data and get the firm numbers.

In the case of India-Bangladesh enclaves, data collection was not flawless either. *The Washington Post* reveals that some enclave residents were left out of the government survey of citizenship choice (Taylor A. , 2015). Given the inaccuracy of data in both cases, it would not be a wise choice to carry out quantitative research.

Secondly, I strived to confine my research to a master-thesis scope. Thus, the methodology only addressed my geographical imagination ternary theory rather than the whole theoretical statement (see Section 2.8). In the future, the link between the good life and migratory decision-making should be further examined through an individualist-positivist approach, for instance, interviews with local people.

3.6. Ethical Considerations

I took research ethics seriously. In this research, ethical considerations concern voluntary participation, informed consent, autonym, confidentiality, access to data, and do-no-harm.

All respondents participated in the interview voluntarily of their own accord. Before each interview, the recording of the interview was explicitly permitted by the participants. In addition, the identity of respondents was permitted to be disclosed. Respondents were informed about the topic and the structure of the interview beforehand. The respondents were clearly informed that they could speak out freely. Some topics that were discussed during the interviews could be considered politically sensitive. The confidentiality and the access to the data are protected and limited. The respondents were told that, for whatever reason, they have the right to turn down any question or shut down the interview.

3.7. Reflection

I was aware of my positionality. I was born in China. I have been a migrant for more than ten years. Most of the time I lived in Russia. At the moment of writing this master thesis, I resided in the Netherlands. I was aware that my migratory experiences and social contexts might influence my knowledge of spatial mobility, decision-making, and good life. I strived to control the impact of my positionality in various phases of the research.

To begin with, I endeavored to minimize researcher bias and put my personal emotions aside[5]. To achieve this goal, the written content for the cross-case analysis was sorted and compared from different sources in the hope to get close to objectivity.

Secondly, during the interviews with experts, I put myself in the position of interviewer and quasi-expert. Experts' words did not have to fit in my theory. Instead, they were encouraged to interpret the research topic in their own way. As such, the interview questions were designed as open as possible.

[5] See (Cresswell, 2015, p. 75).

4. CROSS-CASE ANALYSIS

It is time to shift gears and link the geographical imagination ternary theory about the good life and the conceptual model to praxes. Crimea (2014) and India-Bangladesh enclaves (2015) are two quintessential cases in point. The primary mission of this chapter is to examine whether my geographical imagination ternary theory about the good life and its model have explanatory power i.e., whether it is capable of making sense of spatial mobility after border changes in Crimea (2014) and India-Bangladesh enclaves (2015).

This chapter is divided into two sections. In Section 4.1, I will begin with the criteria by which the two cases were selected. In Section 4.2, I will test my geographical imagination ternary theory about the good life and the conceptual model against the selected two cases. Namely, I will put the two cases in comparison of their respective social, mental, and material parts of geographical imagination. To be crystal clear, owing to the circumscribed research scope, I will not probe into individuals' decision-making or their views on the good life.

4.1. Sensitive Space and Spatial Mobility

I must roll out my criteria for my choice: the two cases should premise the precondition "spatial mobility after border changes in sensitive spaces". That is to say, sensitive space applies to Crimea and India-Bangladesh enclaves. In addition to sensitive space, the geographic movements, i.e., local people's spatial mobility since the changes in the Crimea border and the India-Bangladesh borders occurred, should be manifest. First, I will verify the "sensitive space" situation of the two cases. Second, I will search for spatial mobility concerned in sensitive spaces after border changes.

	Sensitive space	**Border changes**	**Spatial mobility**
Crimea	Yes	Yes, 2014	To go and to stay
India-Bangladesh enclaves	Yes	Yes, 2015	To stay

Table 4.1. Crimea and India-Bangladesh enclaves in comparison

Source: the author.

In Table 4.1, *To go* and *to stay* are misnomers. Precisely speaking, after border changes in sensitive spaces, a large number of Crimean residents have moved to the Ukrainian mainland. However, the majority of the Crimean and the India-Bangladesh enclave residents have decided to stay where they were.

4.1.1. Sensitive space

Sensitive space, as discussed in Section 2.6.3, stems from territorial incoherence. Sensitive space pervades potential national security concerns and anxiety. This section, therefore, is three-fold. First, I will delve into the border history of the two cases. Second, I will take up the security concerns for the contemporary territorial states. Third, I will inquire into the emotions related to Crimea and India-Bangladesh enclaves.

The complex strands of histories of both cases left territorial incoherence, security concerns, and tangled emotions on both sides. Before turning into territorial incoherence, it is necessary to briefly recap on rebordering in history. Crimea has been rebordered by different powers. In the 15th century, the first state formation—Crimean Khanate was established in Crimea. The Ottoman Empire immediately imposed its control over the peninsula and made the Crimean Khan its vassal (Buchanan, 2014). In 1783, Crimea was incorporated by the Russian Empire (Figes, 2012) (see Map 4.1). In 1954, Crimea was transferred within the USSR: from the Russian Soviet Federation of Socialist Republic to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (Calamur, 2014). In 1991, after Ukraine declared its independence, Ukraine inherited Crimea from the USSR (Figes, 2012; Kubicek, 2008).

Indian history left convoluted borders. Popular folklore tells a story that enclaves were created centuries ago by the regional kings. The Maharaja of Cooch Behar and the Faujdar of Rangpur wagered each other's villages in their chess games. In 1947, in the background of the partition of India, Sir Radcliffe drew solid but messy

boundaries to those enclaves, based on some loose maps (Whyte, 2002). This resulted in 111 Indian enclaves in Bangladesh[6]; 55 Bangladeshi enclaves in India (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 2011) (see Map 4.4).

For starters, troublesome borders evinced territorial incoherence. Irrespective of the territorial status *quo* between 1991-2014, the Kremlin motivated by its historical memory, viewed Crimea as an indispensable part of Russia (Putin, 2014). In view of that delusion, Crimea, which was not bordered by Russia, was deemed as Russia's cherished domain. Needless to say, the India-Bangladesh exclaves were located in each other's pockets.

In Crimea and India-Bangladesh enclaves, history and rebordering produced territorial incoherence. I am not arguing which country is entitled to which piece of land. I am arguing that territorial incoherence dictated unstable equilibrium generating security concerns, tangled emotions, and anxiety among different stakeholders—territorial states, social groups, and individuals.

Secondly, for the contemporary territorial states, history left not only territorial incoherence but also considerable security concerns. Biersack and O'Lear (2014) affirm that the Kremlin views its presence in Crimea as its security assurance. Not surprisingly, after the 2008 Bucharest Summit, at which NATO agreed that Ukraine would become a member of NATO (NATO, 2021), the Kremlin immediately warned that it views this as a security threat (Dawar, 2008).

The Kremlin had its geography calculations. If Ukraine entirely fell into NATO's arms, Russia would be at stake: it would lose its navy base in Sevastopol and access to the Mediterranean Sea and world ocean[7] (Lewis D. , 2019) (see Map 4.2). I make no judgment on Russia's doctrine or involvement in the Crimea Crisis. My goal is to

[6] Before 1971 when Bangladesh declared its independence, it was East Pakistan—Author.
[7] Before 2014, Crimea was leased by Ukraine as Russia's Black Sea Fleet base (Greene, 2012, p. 2).

portray Russia's strategic security perspective—Crimea is of magnitude to Russia's security.

By contrast, the territorial incoherence of the India-Bangladesh fuzzy enclaves encountered security issues in a different fashion. The security concerns consisted of undocumented migration, cross-border trafficking in persons, fake currency, and smuggling of goods, drugs, and arms (UNODC, 2017, p. 2). On top of that, due to the absence of law and order, the enclaves became a hideout for criminals (Banerjee, Chaudhury, & Guha, 2017). In large part due to security, India is obsessed with fencing its borders with Bangladesh (Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, 2021, p. 26). As Tripathi and Chaturvedi (2020) noted, in South Asia, borders are overwhelmingly viewed as a matter of national security.

Lastly, territorial incoherence also highlighted tangled emotions that perturbed territorial states, social groups, and individuals. The Kremlin reiterates that "*The collapse of the Soviet Union was the biggest geopolitical catastrophe of the century*" (BBC News, 2005). After the change in the geopolitical landscape, Crimea did not share a border with Russia anymore. Yet, Crimea, with a dominant ethnic Russian population, was still on intimate terms with Russia. In the ensuing year of the Soviet collapse—1992, the Crimean parliament declared the region independent and proposed a referendum to vote on the matter (Kubicek, 2008, p. 153). When the territorial state—the Soviet Union collapsed, no one seemed to bother asking what the local social groups and people wanted.

In South Asia, borders as cartographic representation archives cartographic anxiety (Samaddar, 1999, p. 107; Tripathi & Chaturvedi, 2020). The anxiety originated from national security and identity (Samaddar, 1999, p. 108; Tripathi & Chaturvedi, 2020).

...the old India was the land where borders have now cut between two or three or several parts between India and Burma (see Map 4.3). *There are people who had regional kinship,*

religious village historical ties. And suddenly you say, we are separate, and you think that they are the enemy (R. Samaddar, personal communication, April 13, 2022).

In both cases, rebordering represents different connotations to different stakeholders. It seemed to be a workable choice for territorial states to split the territories between themselves. However, in the same event, the choices of local social groups and individuals were scarcely cared for. Alas, rebordering put different stakeholders' agendas at odds.

As we might see, Crimea (2014) and India-Bangladesh enclaves (2015), characterized by territorial incoherence, security concerns, and tangled emotions, were persuasive examples of sensitive space in point.

Map 4.1. Crimea as a part of the Russian Empire, 19th century

Source: Genealogia.ru (http://maps.genealogia.ru/maps/map_tavr_jpg.htm)

Map 4.2. The Crimean Peninsula between Ukraine and Russia, 2014

Source: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc (https://www.britannica.com/place/Crimea#/media/1/143010/187391)



Map 4.3. British India, 1909

Source: Edinburgh Geographical Institute; J. G. Bartholomew and Sons. Oxford University Press, 1909



Map 4.4. India-Bangladesh enclaves, 2011

Source: Annexure-II, India & Bangladesh Land Boundary Agreement (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 2011)

4.1.2. Spatial mobility

I shall set about the second part of the criteria—spatial mobility. I will carefully check two cases' geographic movement performances related to sensitive spaces after border changes.

Crimea culminated in the Russian annexation and a disputed referendum. On 18th March 2014, Crimea was proclaimed a *de facto* part of the Russian Federation (BBC News, 2014; TASS, 2021; Harding, 2014). From 2014 to 2022 (before the Russo-Ukrainian War broke out), approximately 40,000 to 100,000[8] Crimean people moved from Crimea to the Ukrainian mainland. It is of note that over 2, 000, 000 people inhabited the peninsula (see Appendix 1). The majority of the Crimean people did not leave.

India-Bangladesh enclaves ended their history in a peaceful manner. In 2015, India-Bangladesh Land Boundary Agreement (LBA) came into force. Under the

[8] See Footnote 2.

agreement, India handed over 51 enclaves to Bangladesh and received 111 enclaves from Bangladesh. The total number of people affected by this agreement was about 51, 000 (Library of Congress, 2015). The enclave residents were free to choose their citizenship. The majority decided to stay where they were. Merely 989 persons from the Indian enclaves in Bangladesh opted for keeping their Indian citizenship (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 2015).

It is evident that the two cases performed their spatial mobility and immobility respectively following border changes in sensitive spaces. Putting two sensitive spaces with different outcomes in comparison is of meaning to test the explanatory power of my theory and conceptual model.

In the context of border changes in sensitive spaces, my geographical imagination theory encircles social (*borders, social justice*), mental (*identity, othering*), and material (*capabilities, livelihoods*) parts. I will test these variables in the upcoming section.

4.2. Sensitive Spaces, Geographical Imagination, and Good Life

It may come to your attention that the title of this section shares the same name as Section 2.7. My intention is to follow the same line of argumentation. Section 2.7 provides a hypothetical case—sensitive space, while this section aims to test my theory against practical cases—Crimea (2014) and India-Bangladesh enclaves (2015). Following the same structure as Section 2.7, this section is split into three parts: social, mental, and material.

To be sure, it is ineluctable for me to argue that the pursuit of the good life is bound up with geographical imagination. However, due to the methodological limitations (see Section 3.5), I will not examine individuals' narratives about the pursuit of a good life but approach this from my inference.

4.2.1. Social part

In the social part of geographical imagination, I will test borders and social justice. Precisely, I will check the networks, choices of citizenship, and institutional conditions of the two cases. After the border changes in Crimea and India-Bangladesh enclaves, the two sensitive spaces entered new networks. The choice for citizenship illuminated the social relations in the wake of border changes. Crimean people, in effect, could have their ties with Russia and Ukraine. The citizenship choice for India-Bangladesh enclave people was liberal but exclusive.

In Crimea and India-Bangladesh enclaves, social justice for a large share was bound up with institutional conditions. The case study shows that following the border changes, the institutional conditions in Crimea were degraded to a certain degree. While in the India-Bangladesh enclaves, they were enhanced.

		Crimea	**India-Bangladesh enclaves**
	Module		
Borders	Social relations (citizenship)	A compulsory but inclusive choice	A liberal but exclusive choice
Social justice	Institutional conditions	Decline	Increase

Table 4.2. The social part of the geographical imagination of people from Crimea and India-Bangladesh enclaves in comparison

Source: the author.

Borders

Little needs to be said about the change in the cartographical lines of the two cases, as it was noticed internationally as well as in Section 4.1.2. I want to put emphasis on the changes in networks and social relations in the wake of border changes.

Networking was a stunning point after border changes. Crimea was forced to switch its networks. Since March 2014, the Ukrainian government has dammed the North Crimean Canal, cutting off 90% of the water supply to Crimea (Marques, 2021;

Izvestia, 2021). Later in 2015, the agreement on local border traffic between Ukraine and Russia was abolished by the Ukrainian side (Unian, 2015). In 2018, Russia completed the Crimean Bridge, connecting the Crimean Peninsula with Russia (Ministry of Transport, Russia, n.d.).

After the territory swap, India-Bangladesh enclaves were officially switched into their host countries' networks. India, for instance, arranged currency exchange, bank account opening, and biometric enrolment for the former enclave residents (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 2015).

In both cases, the new cartographical lines reshaped the networks. This is not to deny that Crimea had connections with Russia before 2014. Nor is it to deny the existing ties before the LBA. My point is that border changes prompted the rebordered sensitive spaces to enter the networks of their new masters which were in favor of the territorial states. Yet, it is natural to ask: *are the new networks in favor of individuals or social groups?* I will feed this discussion into Sections ***Capabilities*** and ***Livelihoods***.

The choice of citizenship was a prominent feature in the shuffle of social relations. Border changes force local people to choose citizenship. From the Russian side, inhabitants of the Crimean Peninsula, as of March 18, 2014, were recognized as citizens of Russia (State Duma, 2014). However, Ukraine refused to disqualify Crimean people's Ukrainian citizenship (RIA News, 2021). In effect, Crimean people could have two passports. Ukraine left a door open for the Crimean people to reconnect with Ukraine.

The LBA offered a free choice of citizenship to the India-Bangladesh enclaves' residents. Because India does not grant its overseas citizenship to citizens from Pakistan or Bangladesh (Verma, 2013, p. 12), the enclave residents had to opt for either Indian or Bangladeshi citizenship (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 2011). Once local people made their choices, all their return routes will be under strict

surveillance in case of undocumented immigration (Banerjee, Chaudhury, & Guha, 2017). The choice offered by India and Bangladesh was liberal but one-way.

Border changes launched by territorial states, altered spatial forms, networks, and social relations in both cases. On balance, behind closed doors, the Crimean people could keep their Ukraine passports. The India-Bangladesh residents were offered a liberal but exclusive choice. The shift in networks and social relations sounded the alarm to the Crimean and India-Bangladesh enclave residents' geographical imagination about the good life.

Social justice

In both cases, social justice in large part was attached to institutional conditions. They did, however, have opposite outcomes.

Since Crimea became the *de facto* part of Russia, the institutional conditions have been converted. In Crimea, restrictive laws were enacted to limit the freedoms of expression, association, and assembly. According to the annual report of Amnesty International, the representative organ of the Crimean Tatar community—Mejlis, recognized by the Ukrainian authorities was closed by the *de facto* Crimean authorities. To make matters worse, Crimean people with different political orientations from the Russian authorities were charged with extremism (Amnesty International, 2015). To some extent, the institutional conditions in Crimea have been degraded.

Before the LBA, the inhabitants of the India-Bangladesh enclaves were left without government bodies to take care of their rights (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 2011, p. 65). This is not to say that after the territorial swap, social justice in the former enclaves has been significantly improved. Nor is it to say that after the enclaves were merged with their host countries, there were no complaints from the former enclave residents[9]. Yet, it has to be acknowledged that after the LBA, there were nominated bodies (educational, medical, economic facilities,

[9] See (Banerjee, Chaudhury, & Guha, 2017).

etc.) to work on the development of the former enclaves (Banerjee, Chaudhury, & Guha, 2017). On balance, in the former enclaves, the course of the institutional conditions got reversed towards a positive direction[10].

In both cases, after border changes, the institutional conditions were rectified by the territorial states in different ways. The institutional conditions in Crimea declined in a way. While in the India-Bangladesh enclaves, they were at least consolidated. The changes in the institutional conditions shed light on social justice for individuals and social groups, e.g., Crimean Tatars.

Social justice concerns everyone. The ups and downs of institutional conditions alter not only social justice but also the geographical imagination of the Crimean people and the India-Bangladesh enclave residents. With an eye to the good life, some Crimean people had good reasons to decide to go when they encountered social injustice and vice versa. For the same reason, India-Bangladesh enclave people had no strong motive to pursue a good life in their former home country.

4.2.2. Mental part

In the mental part of geographical imagination, I will put identity and othering to test. Specifically, I will examine the dynamics between the regional and national identities, and how *others* were produced and reproduced in the two cases.

In terms of identity, a considerable amount of the Crimean and the overwhelming majority of India-Bangladesh enclave residents linked their regional identity to the national identity of the country which controls their regions in essence. In terms of othering, in Crimea, others were produced following the border changes and the decline of social justice. In the India-Bangladesh enclaves, others were produced along with the identity construct of the host country.

[10] See (Parveen, 2018).

		Crimea	India-Bangladesh enclaves
	Module		
Identity	Regional and national identities	The Ukrainian identity was shaped in Crimea; The Russian identity coexisted with other identities	The regional identity was bound with its home country
Othering	Others	Projected by Russia along the ethnic or political lines	Produced through identity construct of host countries

Table 4.3. The mental part of the geographical imagination of people from Crimea and India-Bangladesh enclaves in comparison

Source: the author.

Identity

I will zoom in on the underlying dynamics between the regional and national identities. In the two cases, the regional and national identity are attached to the host country or home country in the adjacent territorial states.

Before the Crimea Crisis, Crimea had been a part of Ukraine for 60 years. The Ukrainian national identity had been shaped in Crimea (Sasse, 2007). Irrespective of the close historical and economic ties with Russia, the opinion poll on Crimean residents' identity choices reveals the dynamic of regional and national identities on the peninsula. From 2011 to 2013, Crimean residents who considered themselves Russian dropped by 5 percent, while Crimean residents who viewed themselves as Ukrainians raised 4 percent (IRI, 2013, p. 8). Interviewee Van der Zweerde puts that point well, "*…on the Ukrainian side [in Crimea], something like [Ukrainian] national consciousness has been developing"* (E. van der Zweerde, personal communication, May 18, 2022) [Explanations added].



Figure 4.1. The opinion poll on Crimean residents' identity choices

Source: (IRI, 2013, p. 8).

In the India-Bangladesh enclaves, the regional identity discourse remained in the orbit of their host countries—the neighboring territorial states. Enclave residents for years had been left out of the nation-building process of their home country (Van Schendel, 2002). The Indian enclave students, for instance, received their education in Bangladesh. Immersed in the Bangladeshi national discourse, they shared traditions and collective identities with Bangladeshi people (Ferdoush, 2019). As a result, they aligned their regional identity with the Bangladeshi national identity instead of their home country.

Identity is never a fixed discourse. Local people from both cases encountered national discourse. In Crimea, regardless of historical memory, a considerable part of the Crimean people considered themselves Ukrainians. In the India-Bangladesh enclaves, local people bound their regional identity to the identity of their host country. I am not arguing that people from both places did not have plural identities. I am arguing that facing border changes, the Crimean and India-Bangladesh enclave people already weighed the identity they cared about the most.

Othering

This section will focus on how identity construct and othering are connected, and how territorial states were engaged in producing and reproducing others in both cases.

In the case of Crimea, in the wake of border changes, othering was projected along the ethnic and political lines by the territorial state—Russia. Regarding the ethnic line, the disciplines taught in schools have been converted to Russian language. Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar languages were oppressed (Dorosh, 2017; The Crimean Human Rights Group, 2019). Regarding the political line, the *de facto* Crimean authorities targeted pro-Ukraine activists for their vocal opposition into Russia's legitimacy in Crimea (Human Rights Watch, 2018). It is apparent that the agendas of territorial states, certain social groups, and individuals were at odds.

In the case of the India-Bangladesh enclaves, before the territorial exchange, othering in the former enclaves was already intertwined with the identity construct. For instance, the Indian enclave students at school in Bangladesh were told that India is *them*, Bangladesh is *us*. The Indian enclave residents eagerly wanted to be recognized by their host country (Ferdoush, 2019). As we might see, local people's awareness of identity and otherness affords a way of supporting geographical imagination.

The border changes and the shuffle in social relations projected the geographical imagination, which concerns identity and othering. Firstly, identity can be aligned with the region people live, the host or home country. In Crimea, a considerable part of local people linked their regional identity to the Ukrainian one. In the India-Bangladesh enclaves, local people's regional identity was incorporated in their host country's national identity due to its formidable social construct.

Secondly, territorial states were actively engaged in producing "others" among certain social groups in both cases. Russia was engaged in producing "others" along the ethnic or political lines. The enclave people perceived their home country as "other" because of their host country's identity construct.

In the wake of border changes, the Crimean and the India-Bangladesh enclave people had to review their visions of the good life. Specifically, for the Crimean people firmly convinced that their identity had nothing to do with the new master of Crimea, *to go* would be an understandable option for their good life. By contrast, the Crimean people who aligned their identity with Russia, and the former enclave residents who affiliated themselves with one of their host countries, had no such reason to move to their former home country.

4.2.3. Material part

My final test of the geographical imagination ternary theory about the good life is its material part—capabilities and livelihoods. In particular, I will evaluate local people's social networks, territorial states' commitment to local people's livelihoods, and local people's response to the impacts on their livelihoods.

		Crimea	**India-Bangladesh enclaves**
	Module		
Capabilities	Networks	Crimean people's networks on the Ukrainian mainland assisted their willingness to go	Enclave people's local networks conditioned their willingness to go
		Crimean people's local networks could impede their willingness to go	
Livelihoods	Territorial states' commitment	Not priority	Compared to the past, territorial states bare full responsibility
	Individual's adaption	Hard for vulnerable people	Not hard to adapt

Table 4.4. The material part of geographical imagination of people from Crimea and India-Bangladesh enclaves in comparison

Source: the author.

Capabilities

I will center on local people's social networks in both cases. Networks contain the societies of origin and destination.

Useful social networks can be a catalyst as well as an obstacle for spatial mobility. After the Crimea Crisis, kinship or family ties on the Ukrainian mainland eased the problems the Crimean migrants faced (Aden, 2015). In addition to personal networks, the Crimean migrants still could receive support from the Ukrainian authorities and civil societies on the Ukrainian mainland. They received aid in housing, searching for jobs, settlements, etc. (Jaroszewicz, 2019). This would facilitate the Crimean migrants settling down on the Ukrainian mainland in many ways.

I am not arguing that the useful network on the Ukrainian mainland took over all the problems the Crimean migrants faced. I am also not denying that the Crimean people's local networks could impede their willingness to go. My point is that social networks in the society of destination would make a positive difference in spatial mobility.

Before the LBA, in the India-Bangladesh enclaves, local people's social networks were already forged. *You know, there are marriages or relatives on that side of the border* (D. Tripathi, personal communication, May 25, 2022). Likewise, Ferdoush (2019) contends that the enclave college students opt to maintain their achievements by staying in their Bangladeshi college (Ferdoush, 2019). Therefore, they were loath to move away from their networks. It can be said that social networks, to some degree, confined the majority of the enclave people to move away from where they were.

Livelihoods

Livelihoods entail two layers. First, I will probe into the impacts of border changes on the territorial states' commitments to local people's livelihoods. Second, I will illustrate the individual's networks and adaptation to the impacts on their livelihoods.

The border changes in Crimea severely struck the Crimean people's livelihoods. Crimea's economy was deeply dependent on the Ukrainian mainland. As discussed, Crimea was switched into different networks. After the crisis, Crimea suffered the prohibition of trade by the Ukrainian authorities. To make matters worse, sanctions imposed by Western countries directly affected Crimea. This resulted in the rising cost of household (Charron, 2020).

Alas, it seemed that none of the territorial states prioritized the Crimean people's livelihoods. On the one hand, Russia showed no interest in taking responsibility for guaranteeing livelihoods to the Crimean people. When asked by a Crimean protester about the government's failure to index pensions in Crimea, the then Russian prime minister replied, "*There is no money. But be strong*" (BBC News, 2016). On the other hand, since December 2014, the Ukrainian government has stopped social service delivery and payments in Crimea (UNHCR, 2021b).

It would be tough for certain vulnerable Crimean individuals to adapt to the adverse impact on their livelihoods. In that event, those Crimean people had no choice but to move to the Ukrainian mainland to register themselves as IDPs to restore access to their bank accounts, social entitlements, or registration documents (UNHCR, 2018; Jaroszewicz, 2019).

Before the LBA, the enclave people were left out of the social care systems of their home or host countries. After the enclaves were merged with their host countries, the new home countries undertook the due obligations of addressing local people's livelihoods. For instance, the Indian authorities provided children under the age of five with milk powder, biscuits, and fruits. Plus, the former enclave residents were issued job cards, which aimed to offer a source of income for the former enclave residents for the time being (Banerjee, Chaudhury, & Guha, 2017).

This is not to say that the LBA promoted the living standard of the enclave people onto the same level as people from the Indian or Bangladeshi mainland. Nor is it to say that the outcome of the LBA satisfied enclave residents in all aspects. For

sure, lots of things in the former enclaves still need to be addressed, for instance, proper job opportunities, job training, etc. (Banerjee, Chaudhury, & Guha, 2017). My point is that after the enclaves were merged with their host countries, their institutional conditions were improved to a point. The new home country—either India or Bangladesh, bears full responsibility for the livelihoods of the former enclave dwellers.

In terms of individual networks and adaptation, former enclave people's livelihood activities were already bound up with their host countries. Before the LBA, enclave dwellers had to cross the fence to their host countries to commute, for instance, to work in agrarian fields (OHCHR). To a point, for the enclave dwellers, the land swap facilitates them crossing the fence and post to reach their workplace. On this account, the local people could maintain their networks, and adapt to the border changes in the enclaves to maintain their livelihoods the same way before the LBA came into force.

In the wake of border changes, the dynamics of local people's capabilities and livelihoods portrays their geographical imagination about the good life. For starters, local people were connected to new networks. Crimean migrants' social networks on the Ukrainian mainland facilitated them settling down there. The enclave dwellers were so restrained by their local networks that they were loath to leave.

Secondly, the border changes took a toll on the Crimean people's livelihoods. It triggered local people's geographical imagination about the good life. Thus, there was a good reason for the Crimean migrants to move away to pursue a good life. To be sure, there could be certain affected Crimean people who could not move away due to their financial disadvantage.

While in the India-Bangladesh enclaves, as mentioned early, the institutional conditions were promoted in a way—the new home country had to undertake the former enclave people's livelihood. Plus, the border changes did not radically reverse local people's livelihood patterns. In that event, the former enclave people's

geographical imagination about the good life were not strained. For that reason, they were not driven to leave where they were.

To bring things together, the Crimean and India-Bangladesh enclave people in divergent contexts have been operating the same handbook—the pursuit of a good life through geographical imagination. The Crimean migrants, on the unfavorable side, following border changes, were concerned about the potential unjust institutional conditions. Or their regional identity was bound up with the Ukrainian national identity; they were the potential target of the othering process projected by Russia. Or the vulnerable group of Crimean people felt strain due to the changes to their livelihoods. On the plus side, Crimean migrants' Ukrainian passports and networks facilitated their settle-down on the Ukrainian mainland.

In sum, border changes not only put these people in a precarious position but also disquiet these people's geographical imagination about the good life. To go would be a reasonable choice for them as a means to a good life.

For the Crimean non-migrants, there are two aspects to infer why they stayed on the peninsula. First, their geographical imagination about the good life was not severely disrupted. They might not have suffered from unjust institutional conditions. Or they might not have considered themselves Ukrainians. Or they might have not been the subject of the othering process. Or they might have been restrained by their local networks. Or their livelihoods might not have gone through destructive impacts following border changes. In that sense, it makes good sense that those Crimean people would be loath to leave.

Second, their geographical imagination about the good life was disrupted, but they were restrained by wherewithal. To pursue a good life, one should have the wherewithal (essential capabilities and livelihoods) for them to migrate. Therefore, it would be difficult for those Crimean people short of essential social networks or financial means to leave.

For the overwhelming majority of the India-Bangladesh non-migrants, the institutional conditions were reversed in a positive direction. Prior to border changes, their regional identity was incorporated into the national identity discourse of their host country; under the identity construct of their host country, they defined their home country as *other*. The local networks of the India-Bangladesh dwellers conditioned their willingness to leave; they were capable of adapting the changes to their livelihoods. On the unfavorable side, their choice of citizenship and spatial mobility were rather constrained by the territorial state. As such, there was no convincing reason to believe that their geographical imagination about the good life in the place they lived, would be upset by the border changes.

5. CONCLUSION

A careful cross-case analysis of Crimea and India-Bangladesh enclaves not only reveals the reasons for "to go" and "to stay" after border changes but also facilitates reviewing my theory and model. This chapter, therefore, is divided into three sections. In Section 5.1, I will report the findings of the cross-case analysis and ATLAS.ti. In Section 5.2, I will revisit my geographical imagination ternary theory about the good life and conceptual model. Thereafter, I will answer my sub-questions and research questions. In Section 5.3, I will provide an overall reflection with limitations and recommendations.

5.1. Reporting Findings

The present research was designed to study the geographic movements from sensitive spaces to relevant neighboring territorial states in the wake of border changes in those spaces. Based on my claim and model, this study has detected findings from the cross-case analysis and software ATLAS.ti.

The cross-case analysis backs up the explanatory power and validity of the geographical imagination ternary theory—in the wake of border changes in sensitive spaces, people opt to go or to stay based on their geographical imagination.

In addition to the cross-case analysis, the results from ATLAS.ti buttress the explanatory power of my theory and model (see Appendix 2). All codes fitted the previously set criteria (codes, code groups, clusters). However, it is of note that not every code from ATLAS.ti uses the same term as in my conceptual model. One compelling example is the code "security". Due to its connotations, this code refers to 1) security for territorial states; and 2) security for individuals and social groups. In the first case, security was categorized into the code group sensitive space, which entails security concerns. In the second case, security was categorized into the code group social justice, which denotes positive peace—harmony and the absence of

structural and physical violence. Albeit different lexicons from the experts, they ended up at the same point. The robustness of my claim and model withstood the test.

5.2. Revisiting My Theory and Conceptual Model

Following the careful tests, the explanatory power of my theory and model was not only substantiated but also rendered an analytical lens for understanding the geographic movements from sensitive spaces to relevant neighboring territorial states after border changes in those spaces.

Border changes alter local people's social, mental, and material parts of their geographical imagination respectively in the phase of migratory decision-making. To begin with, border changes in sensitive spaces pose new spatial forms and social reconstructs. The shuffle in social relations, networks, and social justice has an impact on the individual's social part of geographical imagination. The individual is forced to review their visions of the good life.

Secondly, border changes in sensitive spaces bring identity and othering to the fore. The changes might trigger the individual's feelings and senses of belonging in relation to sensitive space, new home country, etc. Any of these factors bother the mental part of the individual's geographical imagination about the good life.

Thirdly, border changes in sensitive spaces sound the alarm of capabilities and livelihoods, which are the wherewithal for spatial mobility. Border changes prompt individuals to shift their networks. For that reason, sustainable livelihoods could be disturbed. This perturbs the material part of the individual's geographical imagination about the good life.

Overall, in the wake of border changes, the geographic movements from sensitive spaces to relevant neighboring territorial states can be understood from the geographical imagination ternary theory about the good life. Border changes alter local people's social, mental, and material parts of their geographical imagination respectively in the phase of migratory decision-making. There would be good reasons

for individuals to go to the relevant neighboring territorial states or stay where they were for the same purpose—a good life. Yet, it is also crucial to understand that the lack of the wherewithal for spatial mobility turns people's desires *to go* into wishful thinking. On balance, in the wake of border changes in sensitive spaces, to go and to stay are local people's workable responses for the purpose of a good life that originates from their geographical imagination. The geographic movements highlight people's pursuit of a good life.

5.3. Reflection

The geographical imagination ternary theory about the good life provides insights into spatial mobility after border changes in sensitive spaces. Furthermore, my claim and model made it possible to understand spatial mobility, decision-making, and the underlying dynamics in sensitive spaces. Yet, it has to be acknowledged that this master thesis has its limitations. It should be viewed as an opening gambit for further research. The discussion about this research will be approached in two sections. In Section 5.3.1, I will address the limitations of this research. In Section 5.3.2, I will come up with recommendations for further research.

5.3.1. Limitations

In this research, in particular, my theory and model withstood a careful cross-case analysis. Yet, I must point out that this research could not get around its limitations. The first restriction, as I claimed in the methodology, is that I did not examine the individual's narrative about the good life.

The next limit lies in the recruitment of experts. Due to the tight research schedule, I invited experts only from academic circles. Experts not only refers to scholars but also professionals and skilled people from governments, media, NGOs, civil societies, etc. The research fails to diversify experts from different circles.

The third pertinent question is whether our decision-making is interdependent with others' decision-making. Nevertheless, my theory and conceptual model acknowledge that migratory decision-making is personal. People are social beings.

One's migratory decision may have an impact on other people. Given this, this research fails to examine herd behavior[11].

The last relevant point is that decision-making is an entire mental process. As Luhmann and Bednarz (1995) remarked, social systems can observe ascriptions of meaning to psychic systems, but what was truly meant can never be known. Likewise, Mearsheimer (2018) underlines that we have very limited knowledge about how the human brain works. Migrants and non-migrants were raised in similar ways in the same sensitive space. Yet, they have different values and different visions of a good life. This is not to undermine the significance of the social part of geographical imagination. But it is to say that it is hard for us to measure innate feelings and beliefs.

5.3.2. Recommendations

This master thesis comes to its end. But this research does not. My geographical imagination ternary theory about the good life and conceptual model should be seen as a starting point for further research on spatial mobility, migratory decision-making, good life, geographical imagination, and sensitive spaces.

My geographical imagination ternary theory about the good life, conceptual model, and its radical openness can be deemed as an invitation for other similar case studies. This research, therefore, invites border, migration, development, and conflict study scholars, and policymakers to take a crack at employing a new way of thinking.

Following my claim and model, new research directions can be identified. Regarding decision-making, the individual's narrative about the good life and herd behavior deserves to be examined. Regarding sensitive space, more research needs to be done. For instance, "*how do border changes affect the sensitivity of sensitive spaces?"*, or "*when does sensitive space stop being sensitive?*" etc. Hopefully, my theory and model will be conducive to the new research directions as well as praxis.

[11] Herd behavior refers to the behavior of individuals in a group acting collectively without centralized direction (Banerjee A. V., 1992).

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APPENDIX

Appendix 1. The Demographic Change in Crimea, 2014-2019

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Total
To RoC	24161	42883	42032	43418	44872	49291	246657
From RoC	7772	26586	30941	35142	40091	40807	181339
Increase + Decrease -	16389	16297	11091	8276	4781	8484	65318

Table 0.1. The migration records in the Republic of Crimea (RoC)

Source: Department of the Federal State Statistics Service for the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Krymstat)

https://crimea.gks.ru/storage/mediabank/%D0%9C%D0%9D%202002-2020.pdf

This table is made by the author.

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Total
To Sevastopol	14402	24865	22633	20205	21126	n.d.	103231
From Sevastopol	837	6982	9613	11472	13387	n.d.	42291
Increase + Decrease -	13565	17883	13020	8733	7739		60940

Table 0.2. The migration records in the Federal city of Sevastopol

Source: Krymstat

http://crimea.old.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_ts/crimea/resources/a88f380043aa2966922fb3fa17e1e317/%D0%9C%D0%B8%D0%B3%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%86%D0%B8%D1%8F.pdf

http://crimea.old.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_ts/crimea/resources/3f0f298043aa29669226b3fa17e1e317/%D1%87%D0%B8%D1%81%D0%BB%D0%BE+%D0%B2%D1%8B%D0%B1%D1%8B%D0%B2%D1%88%D0%B8%D1%85.pdf

This table is made by the author.

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Total
To Crimea	38563	67748	64665	63623	65998	n.d.	300597
From Crimea	8609	33568	40554	46614	53478	n.d.	182823
Increase + Decrease -	29954	34180	24111	17009	12520	n.d.	117774

Table 0.3. The migration records in Crimea (including the Republic of Crimea and the Federal City Sevastopol)[12]

This table is made by the author[13].

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Population	2274769	2294888	2323369	2340921	2350401	2355030

Table 0.4. The population in Crimea (including the Republic of Crimea and the Federal City Sevastopol)

This table is made by the author.

[12] Crimea consists of the Republic of Crimea and the Federal City Sevastopol—Author.

[13] Considering the mortality caused by COVID-19, I took the period from 2014-2019 as the objective (similarly hereafter)—Author.

Appendix 2. The ATLAS.ti Output



Figure 0.1. The network of geographical imagination

Source: the author.