

The Determinants of Dutch Development Aid

Pursuit of 'principles' or profits?

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Abstract

For the first time since 1975, in 2013 the Netherlands dropped below the UN target of allocating 0.7% of one's GNP to aid. This, in addition to the fact that the policy would be too commercialized, led to the party resignation of the Dutch former Minister of Development Cooperation, Minister Pronk. His party, with Ploumen as the new Minister, was in fact responsible for this new policy which Pronk called 'a denial of a core principle'. This apparent change in Dutch aid policy was striking because with a government of similar political color and Ministers from the same political party one would expect some form of continuity. This was furthermore puzzling because the Dutch have always had the reputation of being a generous donor, with which they suddenly seemed to break. A comparison between Pronk's *1993-Agenda* and Ploumen's *2013-Agenda* is therefore an interesting one. The question this thesis aims to answer is the following: *How can the Dutch aid policy in the 1993-Agenda and the 2013-Agenda be explained, and is there a change in underlying interests and focus between them?* To answer this question, the three grand theories – realism, liberalism, and constructivism – are juxtaposed in order to find out if either provides an adequate explanation of the Dutch aid policy interests. This thesis argues that the explanation of Dutch foreign aid policy can be found in the liberalist theory. A Dutch economic self-interest, and enlightened self-interest were found in the *2013-Agenda*, and a Dutch enlightened self-interest dominated the *1993-Agenda*. The other two grand theories were refuted in this thesis.

Keywords: *Aid Allocation; Constructivism; Development Cooperation; Foreign Aid; Framing; Liberalism; Realism;*

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List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

AfT	Aid for Trade
CDA	Christian Democratic Appeal
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreements
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
IPGs	International Product Goods
LDCs	Least Developed Countries
LMICs	Low and Middle-income Countries
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDCs	Now-Developed Countries
ODA	Official Development Aid
OECD	The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
PvdA	The Labor Party (Partij van de Arbeid)
SRHR	Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
VVD	People's Party for Freedom and Democracy
WTO	World Trade Organization

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Chapter 1: Introduction

On May 28, 2013, Jan Pronk – the Dutch former Minister of Development Cooperation – terminates his membership to his Dutch social-democratic political party, the Labor Party (PvdA). In his farewell letter, Pronk states that the PvdA has moved away from the principles of social democracy, particularly in the area of development cooperation and immigration policy (Pronk, 2013). The former Minister finds it particularly embarrassing that the government has abandoned the internationally agreed norm for the development budget (0.7% of the national income). “With this, the soil has been swept away under international solidarity. I foresee that this will prove irreparable. This is not deficient policy, but a denial of a core principle.” (Pronk, 2013). Pronk argues that development cooperation should “mainly take place on the basis of solidarity, and especially with countries and populations that fall outside the scope of the process of capitalist and geopolitical globalization”. He states that the current Dutch policy, from his party colleague Minister Ploumen, is aimed at countries and populations that have already reached a reasonable standard of living. He calls this the ‘commercialization’ of aid, which pressurizes the worldwide lower class even more. Hence, there seems to have been a big change between Pronk’s aid policy and Ploumen’s. This is striking because both ministers are part of the same political party, with which you would expect some form of continuity. And in addition, the new policy seems to forsake the Dutch reputation of being a generous and humanitarian donor. This naturally leads to a number of questions. Has the policy really changed that much? Have the underlying principles changed? And if the two aid policies are really so different, can they then be explained by the same theory? In this introductory chapter these questions will first be embedded into the context of development aid and international relations theory, after which follows the illustration of the research question and my plan of action.

1.1 Portraying the context

The Dutch reputation

The Netherlands started providing development aid after the Second World War in 1949 in response to the call from United States President Wilson (Hoebink, Willems & Muskens, 2008). Since then, the Netherlands has become a respected actor regarding development policies and a front runner in international cooperation (OECD, 2006; OECD, 2011). Internationally, the Netherlands is seen as a generous and humanitarian aid donor (Hoebink, 1999). Since the international donors agreed in 1970 on a target of 0.7% of Gross National Product (GNP), the Netherlands adjusted its aid budget to 0.74% in 1975 and for many years they managed to spend even more than this United Nations (UN) target (Spitz, Muskens & Van Ewijk, 2013; OECD, 2016). Sustainable poverty reduction, a high humanitarian focus, and aiming at the poorest population in the world seem to be objectives that are highly valued by Dutch governments over the years (Hoebink, Willems & Muskens, 2008). The Dutch foreign aid policy is even said to be an example of the pursuit of ‘principles’ rather than profits (Hoebink, 1999). Because of their historical trade background, the Dutch have always been very internationally connected and they have the reputation of “being an early campaigner for international aid agreements and a country that advocates the need for coherent development policies and donor coordination” (Spitz, Muskens & Van Ewijk, 2013, p. 6). They are seen as a trendsetter for new approaches in development cooperation. The Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) also praised the Dutch performance:

“The Netherlands is viewed within the international donor community as a front runner with regard to its ability to adapt to new challenges and to test innovative operational approaches. Since the early 1990s, the Netherlands has been a leading player in consistently promoting poverty reduction, with a particular focus on the quality of aid and the international aid effectiveness agenda” (OECD, 2006, p. 11).

Pronk was an important actor in initiating this tradition during his first term in office in 1973. In this period as Minister of Development Cooperation he made poverty reduction the central objective (NCDO, 2012). This humanitarian focus seemed to continue till he became Minister of Development Cooperation once again in 1989. During this time, the Dutch government focused on large international issues such as war and peace, climate and energy, migration, religion, and culture (Tijkotte & Rijneveld, 2008). The aim was to improve the productive capacity of people, the provision of basic needs, and the participation of the poor in the process of political decision-making. Poverty reduction and international solidarity also continued to be pursued by the subsequent governments, and while other donor countries are still striving to achieve the UN target, the Netherlands has long since surpassed it (Tijkotte & Rijneveld, 2008; Spitz, Muskens & Van Ewijk, 2013).

The turning point?

“Dutch development cooperation is at a historical cross-roads.” (Spitz, Muskens & Van Ewijk, 2013)

However, for the first time since 1975, the Dutch development spending dropped below the internationally agreed UN target of 0.7% in 2013 during Minister Ploumen’s tenure (Spitz, Muskens & Van Ewijk, 2013). This seems unexpected from an international perspective, as the Dutch who have always been an advocate of the 0.7% target, are now abandoning it. The Dutch government breaks with the long tradition of being a generous donor. They still focus on four ‘traditional’ development themes (i.e. security and justice, water, food security, and sexual and reproductive health and rights), but the new main focus is combining aid with trade (Parliamentary Documents II, 2012/13, 33625, 1). With this change the Dutch seem to move away from their reputation of being a humanitarian frontrunner, and join the international trend of ‘Aid for Trade’ in which the coherence between trade and development is central. The idea here is that more developing countries are becoming trading partners in addition to recipients of aid, and that trade and development cooperation are interlinked and can strengthen each other (Parliamentary Documents II, 2012/13, 33625, 1). The Dutch government, however, still states to aim at eliminating extreme poverty in a single generation – next to establishing sustainable economic growth all over the world which should also benefit the poor, and success for Dutch companies abroad (Parliamentary Documents II, 2012/13, 33625, 1). The fact that Minister Ploumen still has the goal to eliminate extreme poverty, raises the question what then really angered Pronk so much that he terminated his membership. Ploumen seems to sell the new Dutch aid agenda as just another new frontrunner approach and nothing more (Parliamentary Documents II, 2012/13, 33625, 35). However, Pronk seems to think that the government does break with years of Dutch tradition. Has the pursuit of ‘principles’ in the end made way for the pursuit of profits? Pronk’s criticism is not entirely unfounded; Aid for Trade is mainly contested for the fact that it actually excludes the poor from its success.

Aid for Trade, a contested subject

Aid for Trade (AFT) originated during the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Doha Round process (Alonso, 2016). The goal of this Round was to lower trade barriers in the world and allow free

international trade. While according to the WTO the Doha Round is meant to improve the trading prospects of developing countries, adjustment to this post-Doha trading regime will be disproportionately costly and difficult for developing countries (Stiglitz & Charlton, 2006). Increased aid is needed for low and middle-income countries (LMICs) to meet these transition costs and to seize the opportunities provided through trade. This translated into the AfT initiative which was formalized at the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference in 2005 (Alonso, 2016). In the Ministerial Declaration (WTO, 2005) it states in Article 57 that: "Aid for Trade should aim to help developing countries, particularly LDCs, to build the supply-side capacity and trade-related infrastructure that they need to assist them to implement and benefit from WTO Agreements and more broadly to expand their trade." The aim of this AfT initiative is to help LMICs to develop their capacity to trade. LMICs have difficulty to integrate and compete in global markets because there is often a lack of good information, policies, procedures, institutions, and infrastructure (WTO Task Force AfT, 2006). By helping LMICs to benefit from open global markets, development should increase and poverty should be reduced. However, there is controversy surrounding the AfT initiative; linking free market and trade to development raises some questions.

For example, this discourse that promotes free trade to foster economic development is highly criticized. Chang (2002) states that the adoption of these policies and institutions are promoted by the now-developed countries (NDCs), the International Financial Institutions, and the WTO, while these might not be the best methods for the developing countries. His study showed that back in the day NDCs actually used protectionist policies themselves to accomplish economic growth. Chang (2002, p. 64) says about the NDCs: "once they fully joined the league of the most developed nations, they began to advocate free trade and prevent the outflow of skilled workers and technologies; they also became strong protectors of patents and trademarks. In this way the poachers appear to have turned gamekeepers". According to the opponents, the Doha Round is in line with this narrative that the West is 'kicking away the ladder' for LMICs and the Round is actually building a system of trade rules that would be detrimental to developing countries (Akyüz, Milberg & Wade, 2006). The Round actually should have started in 1999 but this was refused by some developing countries and eventually only in 2013 there was agreement from all member states. Critics say that the AfT initiative turned out to be more about mobilizing support for these stalled Doha Round negotiations (Melo & Wagner, 2016). Parts of these AfT funds have been used to help developing countries in their process to gain membership to the WTO and comply to these new agreements (Warner, 2013). However, this compliance obliges LMICs to build institutions that aren't their priority on which they have to spend large parts of their annual development budget. Imposing these institutions is sometimes still too demanding for the developing countries (Chang, 2002). Furthermore, promoting trade liberalization for LMICs while rich countries maintain trade-distorting subsidies in key areas of possible LMIC export undermines the AfT initiative and is further kicking away the ladder (Negin, 2014).

Another controversy surrounding AfT is the debate about its exact effect on development and poverty (Negin, 2014). It is difficult to determine a clear relationship between a type of aid and a specific outcome without making assumptions. There seems to be some agreement however, that in the long run trade liberalization and increased trade reduces poverty at the macro-level. A review of the Overseas Development Institute found that the "empirical literature tends to confirm that Aid for Trade has indeed been effective in raising exports and improving the investment climate" (Basnett et al., 2012, p. 9). However, the said positive effect of AfT is contested, because "the impact of Aid for Trade tends to vary considerably depending on the type of intervention, the income level and geographical region of the recipient country and the sector to which Aid for Trade flows are directed"

(Basnett et al., 2012). AfT is especially criticized for the latter, because it is said to only focus on the already economically active parts of societies (Flemming & Tilstam, 2016). Instead of targeting a sector in which a lot of the poor are economically active (Negin, 2014). AfT might have a positive effect on macro-level development and increase LMICs GNP, but its impact on poverty reduction in terms equality is highly debated. It is questioned whether AfT produces job creation of which the poor can benefit and increases wages or that it just creates overall wealth. The focus on trade also raises the problem that development projects often need to be cost-effective as well to create a win-win situation (De Weerd, 2014). This often fails to support the poorest, most vulnerable group that is already difficult to reach.

This all causes some stirring, as the Dutch still say to want to close this poverty gap but chose a method that is actually contested on this subject. It seems like the Netherlands completely switched direction, but is that really true? Both Minister Pronk and Minister Ploumen say to focus on poverty reduction. Which interests then underlie their aid policies and has there been a change between them? And which theory can then best explain Dutch development policy over time?

1.2 Theories

There has not been extended research into the reasons why donor countries change their aid to recipient countries at a specific point in time. However, Van der Veen (2011) tried to find an explanation by stating that 'frames' direct decisions on development aid and shape the role it plays in the broader foreign policy. Frames can specify goals and thereby determine interests. They can thus help us understand the Dutch motives for development aid donation. The way actors think about a certain issue has a major effect on policy formation and can reflect the underlying important principles (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001). However, the three major grand theories – realism, liberalism, constructivism – have a very different view on what is important. Following these different theories leads to a different use in frames.

The realist paradigm assumes that aid policies are primarily driven by the strategic interests of donor states (Schraeder, Hook & Taylor, 1998). Realist argue that perceptions of the political-military strategic importance of recipient states determines aid allocation. The liberalist paradigm, on the other hand, is based more on the importance of economic interests and global interdependence in the foreign aid allocation of donor states (Schraeder, Hook & Taylor, 1998). Capitalist exploitation of recipient countries can play a role here for example. The constructivist paradigm challenges these assumptions, advancing the possibility of a more positive vision regarding donor state motivations (Lumsdaine, 1993). According to constructivism the international system is a society, and the structure consists of social relationships and shared, collective meanings that direct actions. These different paradigms lead to different determinants of aid policy.

There have only been a few extensive studies into these underlying determinants of different aid policies. Alesina and Dollar (2000) carried out a quantitative research of the determinants of aid donation by looking at the different aid donors in the world. They looked at several variables – colonial past, UN friend (voting reasons), Egypt/Israel (security reasons), income of the recipient, openness, and democracy - to answer the question why donor countries provide foreign aid to recipient countries. Schraeder, Hook and Taylor (1998) researched the motives of France, Japan, Sweden, and the United States, looking at the following variables: humanitarian need, strategic importance, economic potential, cultural similarity, and ideological stance. Lastly, Van der Veen (2011) carried out a research looking at the role security, power, wealth, indirect self-interest, prestige, obligation and

humanitarianism played in the aid allocation of Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, and Norway. Most of the variables discussed here can be placed under one of the three grand theories. That's why this thesis will focus on which one of these grand theories can best explain foreign development cooperation policy.

1.3 Research Question

Sustainable poverty reduction has been the main objective of Dutch development aid since 1990, and their aim has always been to help the poorest population in the world. The Netherlands is a respected actor in the development playing field, and is often a front-runner regarding policies and cooperation. They have been a generous donor and have a humanitarian reputation. In the development community, Pronk symbolizes this Dutch reputation: "Who says development cooperation, says Pronk" reads an old newspaper headline (Nicolasen, 1998). These principles also seem to be illustrated in his 1993 agenda *A world in dispute* (Parliamentary Documents II, 1993/94, 23408, 2). However, in 2013 the Netherlands developed the contested aid agenda *A world to gain* which is in line with the WTO's Aid for Trade initiative. In this new policy the focus is on the coherence between trade and development. This government aims to help LMICs to increase their access to the international value chain and improve their business climate.

Hence, there seems to be a change in focus in the Dutch development policy, and between these two agendas. This is puzzling because both the 1993 and the 2013 agendas are presented by Ministers of the same political party, Pronk and Ploumen of the PvdA, and are formed under governments with both a center-coalition in terms of political color. With this, one would expect to see some continuity in policy. This apparent change is furthermore striking because until 2013 the somewhat the same principles and frames seemed to be dominant in the Dutch development aid. The new Dutch aid agenda seems to be at odds with their previous development policies and with their international aid reputation. It is also puzzling because the Netherlands adopted an AfT policy in their *2013-Agenda*, while saying that they are focused on eradicating poverty. AfT is mainly contested for the fact that it seems to exclude the poor from its success. It might have a positive macro-level effect, but it is said to increase inequality and fails to support the poorest, most vulnerable population. This seems to be in contrast to the Dutch reputation of having humanitarian motives, being a front-runner, and the aim of establishing sustainable poverty reduction and inclusive growth. However, both agendas do say to aim at reducing poverty and helping the poorest people. Thus to what extent is there really a change in the underlying principles; is it not just a change in approach? What are the actual determinants of Dutch aid policy? This leads to the question that this thesis will ultimately try to answer:

How can the Dutch aid policy in the 1993-Agenda and the 2013-Agenda be explained, and is there a change in underlying interests and focus between them?

Relevance of the Research

There has been written a lot about why countries give foreign aid, which kind of aid, how much they give, and to whom they give it (Alesina & Weder, 2002; Milner, 2006; Gilsing, 2007; Wagener & Kamminga, 2011; Groeneveld, 2016). However, there has not been enough theoretical research in these aspects regarding the three grand theories, which might eventually help to understand why donor countries change their aid policy at a specific point in time (Van der Veen, 2011; Taylor, Hook & Schraeder, 1998). This thesis will try to fill this gap in the literature and contribute to the understanding

of theoretical explanations regarding foreign aid programs. Development aid is scientifically an interesting subject, because there is a wide range of possible goals for aid what makes it a good case for testing these competing international relations theories (Van der Veen, 2011). This thesis will therefore juxtapose realism, liberalism, and constructivism, and elaborate on which grand theory can best explain foreign aid policy. Furthermore, recent literature on AfT have mostly focused on its effectiveness or critiques the policy (Melo & Wagner, 2016; Hynes & Holden, 2016; Hallaert, 2013). Some write about its origin and its goals (Stiglitz & Charlton, 2006; Alonso, 2016). However, it has not yet been researched why a specific country has adopted the initiative into their own aid policy. This thesis will not focus on the effect of AfT on factors like the GNP and the inequality of the recipient country, but instead will focus on the Dutch policy interests preceding the Dutch adoption.

The large volume of the Dutch development aid also makes it societally an important topic. There has been a lot of critique on the new agenda; there have been remarks like “Where are the poorest?” from former Minister Jan Pronk, and “We’re going back to tied aid” from Bram van Ojik who is part of one of the opposition parties (Zijlstra, 2017). Aid is always a subject that is highly discussed in society, and the new contested policy only heightens this effect. Insights into the motives that led to this policy adaption are therefore interesting to uncover. Knowing which factors influence development policy gives us a better understanding of how foreign politics works and which interests dominate the international playing field. A better understanding of these dynamics could help apprehend the whole picture of foreign politics. It also might provide an interesting view into a possible difference between the framing of the development aid to the outside world (humanitarian?) and the motives that played a role in accepting that aid policy (self-interest?).

1.4 Plan of action

Method

This thesis uses content analysis to study these different aid policies. This analysis is done by looking at the memoranda from both governments and the debates about these memoranda. Content analysis is a structured way of organizing and analyzing written, transcribed or pictured information. It is based on the general assumption that our beliefs are reflected in our statements and of causal importance to our actions (Van der Veen, 2011). This thesis will look at the different frames used in the aid policy to study the Dutch interests. Frames represent the way we think about relatively broad issues, such as development cooperation (Van der Veen, 2011). They form the context in which more specific policy questions can be interpreted, and “they indicate why a particular policy might be valuable or desirable – in other words, which interests are involved – and suggest which additional considerations might be relevant to that policy” (Van der Veen, 2011, p. 28). This thesis will focus on the explicit motivations the governments make in their aid policies and which frames were dominant in the debates about this policy. Furthermore, it will study certain elements of the policy: which recipients are chosen, which goals are being pursued, does the government focus on bilateral or multilateral aid, and what is their aid budget? These elements will be compared to the expectations from the different theories, formulated in the next chapters, in order to see which interest seems to dominate. This is verified by looking at the substantiations made by the policymakers for these choices.

Outline

In the next chapter the main assumptions of the three grand theories – realism, liberalism, and constructivism – will be presented. An overview of the literature will be given and the determinants that can explain development aid policy will be outlined. This will lead to a theoretical framework and

clear hypotheses in order to answer the research question. Chapter 3 will elaborate on the methods used and why these are the most effective in this research. Concepts will be clarified and defined, and operationalization of the different hypotheses will take place. The choices for the case and the data sources will be motivated there as well. Next, Chapter 4 will contain the background information on the Dutch aid policy in relation to the 2013 agenda, after which the data will be analyzed and the dominant interest will be determined. In Chapter 5 the Dutch aid policy in relation to the 1993 agenda will be reviewed in the same manner, and we will see if there was a change in the dominant interest. Lastly, Chapter 6 will provide the findings and the implications of these findings, and finally the conclusions and limitations of this research will be discussed.

Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework

Foreign aid “has, through its history, been driven by more than a concern for development and development strategy. It has also been driven by the political, economic, and institutional circumstances of both donors and recipients, which have led them to engage in development assistance” (Kanbur, Sandler & Morrison, 1999, p. 16).

The three grand theories – realism, liberalism, and constructivism – believe in different lenses through which policymakers see foreign policy that lead to competing paradigms on which factors motivate development aid. One would maybe expect aid to have mainly altruistic aims, but this does not always seem to be the case. A lot of factors can play a role in determining aid policy. However, the theories differ on which factors are decisive. In this chapter, the three grand theories will be juxtaposed. The theories all have different expectations on aid policy and a different way of explaining aid allocation. Depending on the explanatory power of the theory, different dominant interests can be expected in the aid policies. The paradigm that turns out to be dominant may be able to provide some insight into the motives preceding aid policy formation and adoption. First, realism will be explained, followed respectively by liberalism and constructivism.

2.1 Realism

Realism, traditionally the dominant paradigm in the International Relations literature, is based on the idea that we live in a Hobbesian state of nature, in which everyone pursues their own self-interest in order to survive (Waltz, 1979). Human nature is egocentric and competitive, and without an authority to regulate interactions we have a war of all against all. States are the highest authority which implies that the international system is anarchic and therefore sensitive to conflict (Mearsheimer, 2002). In this anarchy in which all states strive for their own interest, states try to acquire as much power as possible by any means and especially by competing with other states. This creates a competitive environment which leads to a constant struggle for survival, security, and power, in which states seek to maximize their own gains (Jackson & Sørensen, 2007). From this, the four premises of realist theories follow: (1) states are the most important actors in international politics, (2) we live in an anarchic system in which there is no supranational authority that can enforce rules, (3) states act rationally in their own self-interest, and (4) they search for power to ensure their own survival (Goodin, 2010). States try to maintain the balance of power and in order to do that seek for relative power, sometimes by forming alliances with other states. One way of forming such an alliance is by engaging in foreign aid. Realism assumes that the strategic interests of the donor state are the primary drivers behind aid policies (Schraeder, Hook & Taylor, 1998).

There has long been a debate in the international community about the proper relationship between morality and the national interest (Smith, 1989). In the realist paradigm morality does not play a big role in international relations. Rational, more hard-hearted considerations win over humanitarian ideals. According to realism, states have no grand aspiration to do right by all humanity if these aspirations are at odds with the national interest. The national interest is not moral but pragmatic and political, and aimed at preserving if not enhancing the power of a state. Regarding foreign aid, states thus pursue their own interests leaving little room for the distribution of aid based on universal moral principles (Donnelly, 2000). In realism, states see foreign policy through the lens of security and power. Potential actions are judged on their contribution to improving their international position in this sense. Not pursuing their own national interest would be even ineffective and probably costly, because of the fact that there is no international authority superior to the power of states which

can ensure that each state complies with international regulations and undertakes its fair share of the burden of the international development actions (Pratt, 1989). Policymakers think about their own national interest first and are therefore constrained to help other states in a purely idealist way. Realism thus sees foreign aid merely as another tool in the toolbox of statesmen. By giving aid states can increase their own security position and build their international influence.

Security

Within the realist paradigm the national interest is traditionally defined largely in terms of military security. In an anarchic system, a state tries to deploy substantial resources to increase its security (Taliaferro, 2006). This is because anarchy produces uncertainty which entails that states do not know the relative distribution of capabilities over time nor do they know the present or future intentions of other states. This leads to the realist lens of self-help behavior, and states thus react to reductions in their security by taking steps to increase their own security. States strive to maximize their military security relative to other states. Waltz (1979, p. 126) says: "In anarchy, security is the highest end. Only if survival is assured can states safely seek such other goals as tranquility, profit and power." However, security-seeking policies can also set in motion a process that reduces the state's own military capabilities and security (Taliaferro, 2006). This system of self-help where "one nation's search for security often leaves its current and potential adversaries insecure, any nation that strives for absolute security leaves all others in the system absolutely insecure, and it can provide a powerful incentive for arms races and other types of hostile interactions" (Holsti, 1985, p. 4). Rigorous measures, like military buildups and military alliances with specific states, can change the opponents' beliefs about the motives of that state, which can unwittingly persuade opponents to think that the state is more dangerous and is harboring greedy motives. It may make opponents believe that the state has a desire to expand for reasons other than security, which may lead to countermeasures. With the use of rigorous policies, a state can thus set in motion a chain of events that actually leaves it less secure (Taliaferro, 2006). States often can achieve security better by pursuing more moderate foreign policies, such as foreign aid.

Where traditionally the use of military means has long been the way to battle the world's problems, nowadays developmental assistance is becoming more and more relevant to achieving peace (Blencowe, 2009). For example, during the Cold War states started to use foreign aid already to influence the political ideologies of recipient nations and contain the spread of communism (Lancaster, 2007). Using gun barrel diplomacy has developed a negative implication in international politics, and states are thus favoring it less and less as an effective means to ensure one's interests. And a small country like the Netherlands cannot afford to face such reputational damage internationally. Instead foreign aid can be used as a tool to enhance the national security of aid donors (Schraeder, Hook & Taylor, 1998). Hayes (2012) says it as follows:

"In the game of world politics, the only player you worry about is yourself. From this perspective, foreign aid is not really about 'helping' the small nations around us so that they can someday play at our level. Foreign aid is used more as a bargaining chip to balance power. States will give what they can where *they* need it most. It is the principle of survival and self-help."

According to realism, foreign aid is thus not given to development countries out of altruistic beliefs but in line with their own strategic interests of survival. In realism, states search for aid alliances with recipients with strategic importance (Schraeder, Hook & Taylor, 1998). Alliances are especially important for small countries, like the Netherlands, who cannot guarantee their survival on their own.

Apodaca (2017, p. 6-7) describes that “foreign aid can be successfully used to buy strategic concessions, such as the building of military bases or consolidating military alliances from the recipient government. Foreign aid can be a large component of foreign capital flows for many low-income countries, thus increasing their dependence on donor governments”. Aid can thus be seen as a moderate foreign policy to secure one’s survival by for example tying friendly regimes to you to prevent them from supporting political enemies instead, and by forming alliances with states surrounding hostile nations that would be able to act as surrogates for the donor within their specific regions (Apodaca, 2017; Van der Veen, 2011). For a small country like the Netherlands, with relatively little military power, it is important to have many of friends and allies to enhance their military capabilities, and aid is an effective way to achieve this.

Power

Next to ensuring their current military security, states also strive for more power to influence their options for guaranteed survival. Definitions of security and power are intertwined in international relations literature. In this thesis security is seen in terms of manpower, military strength and international physical security, and power is seen in terms of international political influence and unilateral coercive diplomacy. Realists believe in the use of hard power, which is enforced by the use of inducements or threats (Nye, 2009). Morgenthau (1948, p. 27) states that “international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is the immediate aim”. The realist anarchic international system also plays a role here, because under anarchy there is always a threat that other states will try to harm you. This is why states strive to maximize their relative power “because only the most powerful states can guarantee their survival” (Taliaferro, 2006, p. 128). States pursue power and influence when and where the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs. For Morgenthau (1948, p. 5) “the main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest in terms of power”. This political realism does not believe in morality, but in self-help. This does not mean that states do not look for interactions and alliances with one another, but they only do so when it gives them higher benefits relative to the risks (Blencowe, 2009). An alliance needs to be in their relative self-interest. When a state for example has not enough power on its own, realists believe it is a logical step to try to align with other states in order to increase the chances of securing one’s interests. This is especially the case for small countries, such as the Netherlands who have little influence on their own but can enhance this by cooperation. A low-risks way to attain this, is by forming an alliance through foreign aid.

Development aid is a strategy for the pursuit of power that is open to the state (Van der Veen, 2011). When tangible power resources such as withholding economic means are at play, foreign aid can be used as a form of hard power (Gallarotti, 2011). “Hard power strategies focus on military intervention, coercive diplomacy, and economic sanctions to enforce national interest” (Wilson, 2008, p. 114). However, forcing political compliance through military means can count on a lot of international criticism nowadays, so strategic statecraft is used instead to try to force recipients into compliance (Wang, 1999). According to Morgenthau (1962) for example, much of foreign aid is ‘make believe’ to feign the goal of economic development, and is actually a form of bribe to try to buy political influence. Foreign aid is a tool of foreign policy and is aimed to influence recipient governments and shape international affairs to suit the donor state (Apodaca, 2017). This is an effective way for small developed countries to try to influence the international playing field. Because “foreign aid might be one of the few means available for a small state to increase its influence over another state, or to raise

its international influence in general. A major power, on the other hand, is likely to have several other instruments at its disposal.” (Van der Veen, 2011, p. 41). Foreign aid can either be used as a ‘carrot’ or as a ‘stick’ to change behavior. UN voting behavior is one way to attain this international influence. There has been evidence of a causal relationship between aid allocation and recipient voting behavior (Wang, 1999). Donors try to influence voting behavior on issues considered important to them. They force compliance by using aid allocation levels as reward or punishment for voting behavior. The receiving nation will then be more likely to ally with the donor nation. Foreign aid can help to attain a voice in the international environment and establish an international presence and power (Van de Veen, 2011). Furthermore, colonial powers also turn out to grant more aid to former colonies (Round & Odedokun, 2004). Alesina and Dollar (2000, p. 33) have concluded that “an inefficient, economically closed, mismanaged nondemocratic former colony politically friendly to its former colonizer receives more foreign aid than another country with similar levels of poverty, a superior policy stance but without a past as a colony”. This also strengthens the donor’s power position because this can help continue colonial spheres of influence and reinforce political alliances (Apodaca, 2017). By giving aid states can thus build their international influence. Helping underdeveloped states is ‘not only beneficial to the international security interests of a state but it is also essential for developing effective diplomatic ties’ (Blencowe, 2009). These ties are especially important for a small country as the Netherlands to claim their seat at international negotiation tables and increase their influence.

Hypotheses

In a purely realist perspective, there is no possibility of people in power striving for the ideal of development of underdeveloped states without it being beneficial to themselves (Zimmerman, 2007). Aid is a show of influence and a strategic mode of protection. In this perspective, foreign aid is for example aimed at ensuring access to strategically important regions, spreading the donors’ own ideological system in form of values or instruments, and obtaining influence in the international playing field (Stokke, 1989). As a result, aid does not always end up with the poorest which are in the greatest need of it. In the realist paradigm foreign aid is only minimally related to recipient economic development and the humanitarian needs of recipient countries are downplayed (Schraeder, Hook & Taylor, 1998). Foreign aid policies are based on strategic concerns as national security, and gaining power and influence. In foreign aid studies with realist paradigms, security and power frames have long been prominent (Van der Veen, 2011). States strive to maximize their chance for survival which leads to the following hypotheses:

Realism
H1a: If realism can explain aid policy, one would expect a security interest to be dominant in the development aid policy.
H1b: If realism can explain aid policy, one would expect a power interest to be dominant in the development aid policy.

If realism can explain aid policy, a donor is using aid donation to increase its security in terms of military and geopolitical interests and/or to gain influence by dealing in unilateral coercive diplomacy. What these concepts exactly imply, is explicated through the operationalization in Chapter 3. To measure these theoretical hypotheses, some operational hypotheses are drawn up in that next section.

2.2 Liberalism

Liberalism is a theory that claims that states are embedded in a domestic and transnational society, which creates incentives for economic, social and cultural interaction across borders (Moravcsik, 2010). State policy gives guidelines for such interactions, which might benefit some groups and harm others. These groups try to influence these policies by putting pressure on the governments. States are thus not the only relevant actor in international politics, but individuals and groups operating in both domestic and transnational civil society can influence policy as well (Slaughter, 1995). The preferences of the state are defined by these social pressures which motivates foreign policy. Moravcsik (2010, p. 1) says that: "State preferences give governments an underlying stake in the international issues they face". State preferences need to be strong enough to motivate any costly foreign policy action, like development cooperation. This behavior of the state is, according to liberalism, thus not determined by the international balance of power, 'but by the relationship between these social actors and the governments representing their interests' (Slaughter, 1995). Liberalism thus considers state and non-state actors to be partners in the development process and that this leads to more international cooperation (Aneek, 2010). Contrary to the realist anarchy assumptions, liberalist believe this international cooperation leads to international interdependence and thereby the need for international institutions, which are based on democratic principles of a peaceful international order. This interdependence is believed to reduce the risks of war and can lead to international peace; because all states involved benefit from this cooperation and would want to preserve it (Keohane & Martin, 1995). Regarding development aid, this makes room for other state interest than security and power. In liberalist theory international institutions play a big part in enabling this cooperation and peace among states. International institutions can provide valuable information, settle distributional conflict, and regulate compliance (Keohane & Martin, 1995). This can take away part of the state's insecurities which helps decision making about cooperation, and might for example reduce the need to use 'hard power' in aid relations (Jehangir, 2012). More international cooperation leads to more interdependence with the aim of achieving wealth and international security. With the proper institutions and diplomacy at play, states can thus work together in order to maximize prosperity and minimize conflict (Shiraev, 2014). One way to do this, is through development aid.

Because states are embedded in a transnational society, with an international order, this leads to different state interests in development aid as well. For one thing, liberalist assume that in an interdependent world states see the mutual benefit of trade (Moravcsik, 2010). When this trade prospers, states also become more economically dependent on each other. The prosperity these gains bring about, influences the government's foreign policy towards the other state, and might thus also influence their foreign aid policy. Economic self-interest of the donor state can thus be one of the determinants of development aid. The other interest that can play a part in a donor's aid policy is an enlightened self-interest. Where with an economic self-interest it is all about economic gains and the state's own interests that are paramount, with an enlightened frame that self-interest is more indirect as will be more elaborately explained later on. Out of an enlightened self-interest donor states help underdeveloped countries because in an interdependent world their problems can ultimately hit them as well. As liberalist argue that world politics is globalizing, which means interdependence is only rising, liberalists expect that this determinant only gets more important in development aid (Moravcsik, 2010). The increasingly global nature of challenges, such as climate change, peace and security, food security, migration and financial stability, gives donors an enlightened self-interest to provide global

solutions through development aid (Gavas, 2013). In liberalist theory states want to maintain the peaceful international order.

Economic self-interest

According to liberalism, welfare not warfare will shape the rules of international politics (Noël & Therien, 1995). Liberalism tries to address the problem of achieving lasting peace and cooperation in international relations. One of its aims is creating wealth and prosperity by economic international cooperation and interdependence (Shiraev, 2014). When states are economically interdependent, they will more likely resolve issues diplomatically. Liberalism thus promotes global free trade and investment. This is supposedly for all nations to prosper and develop fairly and equitably, however the aim of free trade is always to find cheaper resources, and to maximize profits and efficiency (Shah, 2010). A lot of the current liberal economic policies is thus seen by many as a continuation of those old policies of plunder. In foreign aid, a donor's own economic interest often plays a big part, such as developing or securing export markets, safeguarding the supply of valuable imports, and providing employment for donor state nationals (Van der Veen, 2011). It is thus mainly about developing opportunities for the own nation-state. Dixon (2013, p. 130) specifies that cooperative behavior, such as development aid, between states and institutions in international relations can be explained "as a series of 'iterated' interactions, reciprocated in a 'tit-for-tat' manner, potentially in the interests of each". However, in liberalist theory that cooperation does not happen out of idealistic motivations, but because it serves the donors own economic interest.

A large part of foreign aid serves donors' commercial goals (Lumsdaine, 1993). Foreign aid comes at a price, as donor countries tend to pursue their own interests under the guise of aid (Shah, 2014). Donor countries look for opportunities where they can get some economic gain, such as countries offering large export or investment markets, or with access to vital raw materials (Van der Veen, 2011; Apodaca, 2017). It is common in international development for donor countries to use economic statecraft to try to influence those states by using aid as leverage; they thus turn to the use of 'soft power' (Mingst, 2008). Wilson (2008, p. 114) defines soft power as "the capacity to persuade others to do what one wants". And Byers (2012, p. 128) adds that "overseas development assistance is not charity. It is the price we pay for 'soft power,' the ability to persuade rather than coerce. Soft power is the principle currency of diplomacy". A lot of Official Development Aid (ODA) is said to be tied in some fashion with the intent to increase market opportunities for the donor's business interests (Apodaca, 2017). Ensuring tangible economic returns and profitable outcomes for firms in the donor country, helps to build domestic support for foreign aid (Blencowe, 2009). Pursuing the state's economic interests is often done in the private sector's development activities, for example in the form of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), which is investment by foreign entities into domestic economies of states (Blencowe, 2009). These investments have a large effect on developing economies because of the desire by the developing states to attract foreign investors. These foreign investments bring wealth to recipient countries and ensures employment, stability, and prospective growth. This gives donors the power to influence the economic policies of the recipient states and ensure that these policies are favorable to them. However, this obliges recipient countries to build economic institutions and adopt policies that aren't their priority on which they have to spend large parts of their annual development budget (Chang, 2002). But divestment usually would have a crippling effect on the domestic economy and threaten any existing or prospective development (Blencowe, 2009).

That is why rich countries can use protectionism and deny market access for products from poor countries, while opening up recipients' markets for the donor's products by using aid as a leverage

(Shah, 2014). Donor countries have used a lot of protective policies, such as tariff protection and export subsidies, in order to achieve development (Chang, 2002). Even when their industries matured, they still used some kind of protectionism to pull ahead even further from competitors. However, nowadays the 'now-developed countries' promote free trade and the adoption of certain 'good policies' and 'good institutions' in development countries (Chang, 2002). Promoting trade liberalization by LMICs while rich countries maintain trade-distorting subsidies in key areas of possible LMIC export is in the donors own economic interest and it is kicking away the ladder for developing countries (Chang, 2002; Negin, 2014). Their own economic goals motivate their participation in the international aid regime (Noël & Therien, 1995). Focusing on trade leaves little room for the purely moral aspects of foreign aid. Trade related aid only targets the economically already active parts of societies instead of targeting a sector in which a lot of the poor are economically active (Flemming & Tilstam, 2016; Negin, 2014). With a focus on trade, development projects also need to be cost-effective which often fails to support the poorest, most vulnerable group that is already difficult to reach (De Weerd, 2014). Especially for a country as the Netherlands, liberalism might expect this determinant to be important. Seen as the Netherlands is a small country with a very international economic outlook, and has a long tradition of international trade. The Dutch are therefore, more than many other countries, dependent for their economic wellbeing on sustainable development in other countries (Spitz, Muskens & Van Ewijk, 2013). Economic growth in developing and emerging countries might lead to increasing demand for Dutch exports and might also benefit the Dutch society in terms of employment: "Development cooperation has helped to forge trade relations with former and current partner countries, thereby providing income to Dutch society" (Spitz, Muskens & Van Ewijk, 2013, p. 41).

Enlightened self-interest

"The traditional country-focused model of development assistance can no longer address the global challenges that arise from our ever more interconnected world" (Birdsall & Diofasi, 2016, p. 1).

Whereas with the economic self-interest the development of opportunities for the own nation-state is paramount, the enlightened self-interest is more about maintaining international security and preventing global problems – of which the economic conditions may be part. Under realism I have talked about security in terms of a state's relative manpower and military capabilities, but that is not the only important form of security. Liberals believe that states are embedded in a transnational society and that globalization is a universal condition of world politics (Moravcsik, 2010). The non-state specific security in the international environment thus also influences a state, especially such a small and open state as the Netherlands who is dependent on the stability in other countries. Liberals also believe that in a good society there is freedom for all, which sometimes leads to international interventions on the basis of a growing global consciousness and sense of global responsibility (Kaldor, 2006). While this is a 'good' believe, states don't pursue it only out of altruism. Individual freedom leads to prosperity and peace, which in turn leads to less international conflict in which the state operates. Liberal scholars such as Kant (1975) focused, for example, on harmony between people overseen by institutions such as judiciary and the representative democratic form of the government. Liberals thus promote democracies as they believe in 'freedom for the individual', but also because they argue that democracies rarely go to war with each other which leads to less international instability (Jehangir, 2012).

Furthermore, the increasingly global nature of challenges such as climate change, peace and security, food security, migration, and financial stability, indicate that these global problems require

global solutions and international cooperation (Gavas, 2013). This leads to a pursuit of International Public Goods (IPGs) which are goods that bring advantages to society as a whole, such as environment, health, knowledge, peace and security, and governance. Yet the distinction between the humanitarian pursuit of global public goods and strategic interest objectives is not that clear-cut. International cooperation in support of global public goods is often driven by 'enlightened self-interest' (Kaul & Gleicher, 2011). This entails that countries who act to further the interests of others, also ultimately serve their own self-interest (Ikerd, 1999). 'Enlightened states' try to expand their influence and gain a degree of soft power as well. That power can be used to favorably influence the international environment. One way to influence the international environment a state operates in is through foreign aid. Development cooperation can achieve this by building diplomatic credit and goodwill, through which they can influence recipients' policies (Blencowe, 2009). With that diplomatic credit donors can for example stimulate recipients to tackle environmental and energy challenges. Threats like climate change, pandemic diseases, population growth, non-state terrorism, cybercrime, microbial resistance to antibiotics, and more, have grown during recent years (Rübbelke, 2005; Birdsall & Diofasi, 2016). Liberalism would therefore expect development cooperation to emphasize global public goods.

Furthermore, there is a relationship between poverty and insecurity, and these transnational challenges. The causes of today's violence are often due to conditions like poverty, infectious disease, political turmoil and corruption (Atwood, McPherson & Natsios, 2008). Development aid can help address these problems (Blencowe, 2009). Reducing poverty and insecurity overseas is good for a nation's own security; countries with high poverty rates descend far more often into unstable or violent circumstances than more prosperous nations (Collier, 2007; Birdsall & Diofasi, 2016). Poor and fragile states are unpredictable and can spiral into conflict quickly killing thousands and destroying political and economic institutions, which can pose risks to entire regions leaving the international community to pick up the tab for reconstruction. The fight against poverty is therefore in a donor's own enlightened self-interest, especially for example if it, such as the Netherlands, is a popular destination for refugees (Van der Veen, 2011). Brown and Grävingholt (2016, p. 1) say about this enlightened self-interest "the emergence of 'failed and fragile states', such as Afghanistan and Somalia, and 'new wars' in the Balkans and elsewhere contributed to the blurring of lines between the 'neat' world of development and the 'murky' field of national and international security". With the emergence of these kind of states liberalism would expect enlightened self-interest to be a determinant of development aid as donors want to secure the international stability. Reducing poverty might also increase the demand for hygienic standards that lower the likelihood of the occurrence and pandemic spread of new illnesses, and raise the domestic demand for environmental protection (Rübbelke, 2005). Foreign aid can be used to reduce poverty and inequality, and promote good governance, and transparency in the recipient state that might be(come) a source of instability (Apodaca, 2017). According to liberalism, politicians see foreign aid as a way to combat these global threats.

Hypotheses

According to the liberalist theory, states invest in other states in order to reduce overall poverty, however always with a self-interest in mind. As Holmes (1991) says it "Liberals are intensely concerned about poverty and economic dependency, about absolute levels of well-being as well as economically entrenched relations of mastery and control". Economic and enlightened self-interest play a big part in this paradigm. For example, without development aid many vulnerable developing countries might not remain viable partners in trade and investment, and states use a tit-for-tat manner in these

investments (Buob, 2009). And reducing poverty and insecurity overseas is good for a nation's own security; cross-border risks can pose a common threat to donor countries (Birdsall & Diofasi, 2016). This leads to donor interference in these public goods in the form of development aid. In the liberalist perspective development aid is viewed as a way to pressure developing countries to go for mitigation (Buob, 2009). A donor state that is giving aid to pursue business endeavors or global public goods can give very useful aid, however always with its own economic and/or enlightened self-interest in mind, which leads to the following hypotheses:

Liberalism
H2a: If liberalism can explain aid policy, one would expect an economic self-interest to be dominant in the development aid policy.
H2b: If liberalism can explain aid policy, one would expect an enlightened self-interest to be dominant in the development aid policy.

If liberalism can explain aid policy, a donor is using aid donation to increase its own wealth and/or to pursue global stability. What these concepts exactly imply, is explicated through the operationalization in Chapter 3. To measure these theoretical hypotheses, some operational hypotheses are drawn up in that next section.

2.3 Constructivism

Constructivists believe the environment in which states act is social and ideational as well as material (Holsti, 1985). According to this theory human nature is not only aggressive, but actually highly varied and may produce principled and altruistic deeds (Lumsdaine, 1993). Constructivism states that identity is the basis of interest which shapes the behavior of states (Wendt, 1992). These identities are 'relatively stable, role-specific understandings and expectations about self' and are cultivated by interaction with the environment. Constructivists emphasize the mutual constitution of actors and structures, and the role ideas play in identity formation and subsequent behavior (Dixon, 2013). The behavior of states can shape the international system, and the international system also, in turn, shapes the behavior of states. The structure of the international system therefore consists of social relationships and shared, collective meanings. Wendt (1992, p. 402) states that "it is through reciprocal interaction that we create and instantiate the relatively enduring social structures in terms of which we define our identities and interests". As a consequence, constructivism emphasizes different determinants of aid than the aforementioned rational theories. They believe that the social environment and shared norms determine the interests and identity, which constitutes state behavior and motivates aid donation (Shannon, 2000). These norms change and evolve through interaction, and constructivism explores how they give meaning to and sanction action. Changes in domestic political systems and the 'waxing and waning' of ethical concerns can influence the international structure, and influence, for example, how development cooperation is valued (Lumsdaine, 1993). In contrast to realism and liberalism, "actors follow 'logic of appropriateness' over 'logic of consequences' where behavior is not strategically dictated by self-interest but rather by identities and norms" (Dixon, 2013, p. 135). Where the previous rational theories looked at material interests for giving meaning to the world, constructivism does not limit the understanding of the system in material terms but looks at the ideas shared between actors instead. Constructivism states that 'the values of the physical world are socially emergent, having no meaning beyond that which the actors develop within an intersubjective social context' (Dixon, 2013, p. 135). Material interests on their own do therefore not

explain foreign aid policy; constructivism believes we have to look at the ideas that give them relative importance (Wendt, 1999). As Boulding says it (1959, p. 120): “It is what we think the world is like, not what it is really like, that determines our behavior.”

For explaining development aid policy, constructivism then looks at the social interactions and dynamic cultural values that formed the donor’s interests (Harris, n.d.). Norms can explain why states do and do not give aid or why states act the way they do and how that changes over time. Constructivism believes that the relationship between actors and structure is not fixed, but rather a mutually constitutive and continuous process (Dixon, 2013). Actor agency can lead to new norms, like the norm that engaging in development aid is important. ‘Socialization’ plays an important role in this process and can lead to states following or setting certain norms. States can, along these lines, give aid because it has become an international norm to engage in aid in which they cannot lag behind, or because they actually want to build a reputation as a norm leader and want to be a front-runner instead. Constructivists, furthermore, believe in the power of moral vision (Lumsdaine, 1993). Lumsdaine (1993, p. 28) states that “the international system does not require prudent states to concentrate so exclusively on their own needs that no one can take care of system, or of weaker neighbors”. Moral factors can change the character of the international system. Lumsdaine (1993, p. 29): “Cooperation stems not just from incentives, but from underlying attitudes and values”. States can therefore also give aid out of moral humanitarian beliefs.

Duty

Constructivism believes that the social context gives meaning to the world. This context gives certain standards for what is considered as appropriate behavior: “We only know what is appropriate by reference to the judgments of a community or a society” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 891-892). If a state breaks the norm, the international community will express their disapproval which can hurt the state’s position. In this way norms regulate behavior. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p. 894) explain: “From a constructivist perspective, international structure is determined by the international distribution of ideas. Shared ideas, expectations, and beliefs about appropriate behavior are what give the world structure, order, and stability.” This cultural-institutional context within which states act, shape the state’s identity and that identity shapes state behavior. By way of socialization, states comply with norms because they have an identity as members of that international society, and as part of such a society they are expected to follow certain norms (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). Through peer pressure they feel obliged to conform to certain international norms, such as the norm of giving aid.

States thus may provide aid out of – socially constructed – feelings of duty or guilt. This obligation may derive from ‘a climate of opinion which accepts as universally valid the proposition that the highly developed industrial nations have an obligation to transfer money and services to underdeveloped nations for the purpose of economic development’ (Morgenthau, 1962, p. 302). The international society might see it as the responsibility of rich nations to help close the gap in living standards with poor countries (Van der Veen, 2011). Donors might also have feelings of guilt over former colonial exploitation, or feel obligated as repayment for own aid receipts. They feel pressure from their environment and want to be a good international citizen. Every country has an interest in being, and being seen as, a good international citizen (Evans, 2016). They might do this, for example, out of the idea of reciprocity; with other countries more likely to help them when they might ever need it. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p. 898) call this ‘empathetic interdependence’, “where actors are interested in the welfare of others for its own sake, even if this has no effect on their own material well-being or security”. They want to maintain their position in the international society and, given

their certain identity, they have to follow the standards of appropriate behavior and therefore feel that they have to share in the burden. They feel this duty because of the desire to enhance their international legitimation and the pressure for conformity (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). Legitimation is important for states, and they get their approval and disapproval from their international environment (Claude, 1966). Getting labeled as a rogue state has costs as this entails loss of reputation, trust, and credibility (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). States that do not reach the international aid threshold, suffer blemishes on their records of involvement which can be used against them in policy discussions or negotiations (Apodaca, 2017). As the Netherlands has the reputation to always reach that threshold, constructivism might expect them to continue this tradition. In addition, states strive for conformity as this involves 'social proof' that they 'belong'; states comply with norms to demonstrate that they are part of, and fit the social environment (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). "By conforming to the actions of those around us, we fulfill a psychological need to be part of a group." (Axelrod, 1986, p. 1105). Through the socialization process of legitimation and conformity, and mechanisms such as praise or censure, states thus comply with the international norm of giving aid (Shannon, 2000).

Reputation

States can also be norm leaders instead of just norm followers, and attempt to socialize other states to follow and embrace new norms (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). A state is then looking to gain a certain reputation. Reputation is a social concept that is defined as 'the generally shared opinion of a referent's character or nature, based on a wide range of information, associations and social cues' (Sharman, 2007, p. 20). When a state promotes certain norms and tries to establish a certain reputation, they have strong notions about appropriate or desirable behavior in their community and they call attention to certain issues. Ideational commitment is their main motivation and they promote norms or ideas 'because they believe in the ideals and values embodied in the norms, even though the pursuit of the norms may have no effect on their well-being' (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 898). They thus want to become a norm leader in certain areas, as 'compassionate behaviour born of idealism can be one of the ways in which a state enhances its international standing' (Nel, 1997, p. 100). One way of doing this is to assume a leadership position in the development community.

Donors with a leadership position benefit through reputational enhancement, which might also bring other indirect advantages (Evans, 2016). Development aid can, along these lines, be used in order to project an image of being a good global citizen (Van der Veen, 2011). Being active and having a strong reputation as a proponent of development aid is good for their public image, and helps to build credibility and influence in diplomatic circles (Blencowe, 2009). Having a good reputation can in this manner work in the states' favor, by for example giving the impression of having benevolent intentions: "By observing others' behaviour in the past, one can fairly confidently predict their behaviour in the future without incurring further costs" (von Weizsacker, 1980, p. 72). A donor tries to express a national identity as benevolent and trustworthy actor in order to increase its status and to build goodwill, by presenting an example for others to follow in the development community (Van der Veen, 2011). Again, states do this out of socialization as well. Next to conformity and legitimacy, esteem is another related socialization mechanism (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). Only, esteem goes deeper and entails that states follow norms because they want others to think well of them, and they want to think well of themselves. "Identity is based on those aspects of the self in which an individual has special pride or from which an individual gains self-esteem. Thus, the desire to gain or defend one's pride or esteem can explain norm following." (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 903-904). This has to do

with self-affirmation (Sherman & Cohen, 2006). States are motivated to maintain the integrity of the self and their identity; they want to be and be seen as good and appropriate. Affirmation happens by engaging in activities that remind them of 'who they are' (Sherman & Cohen, 2006). States that are giving aid might be looking for a way to affirm themselves as a good global citizen, but they also want to be seen as such and are therefore looking for emulation and praise. Every states has their own identity and role in the international community, and some states choose to be viewed as generous global citizens (Apodaca, 2017). The Netherlands might be seen as such a state, and constructivism would therefore expect reputation interests to influence their aid policy.

Humanitarianism

In the aforementioned possible determinants for aid, the incentives – although less material than in the other theories – are still formed by either feelings of fear or praise by the outside international community. However, as constructivists emphasize how ideational or normative structures constitute agents and their interests, and a norm such as 'solidarity' can therefore also have a great impact on policy making (Karacasulu, & Uzgören, 2007; Jileva, 2004). According to constructivism, states can comply with these norms not only out of feelings of duty or self-affirmation, but also for purely altruistic reasons (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). This altruism originates from what an actor believes is right, good, and humane. Lumsdaine (1993, p. 291) puts it like this: "International politics, like all politics, is a matter of moral choice and moral struggle. Whatever the immediate issues in international politics, the ultimate results depend in large part upon the fundamental moral vision by which states operate". This vision can be guided by norms as solidarity and humanitarianism, which can explain why donors might give aid when it is in conflict with their own national interest (Jileva, 2004).

Altruism and humanitarianism have been prominent concepts in the aid literature (Van der Veen, 2011). According to Lumsdaine (1993) foreign aid cannot be fully explained on the basis of donor state's material or strategic interests. He states that humanitarian and egalitarian concerns, such as 'compassion' and 'generosity', can motivate the donor's aid policy – as all states would want the chance to 'make progress towards a better life'. Along these lines, aid policy is aimed to help the poorest, neediest people in other countries (Stokke, 1989). The foreign aid policy of a humanitarian donor, as is the Dutch reputation, is expected to be determined by the ethical, moral and philosophical values – the altruistic identity – of the country. Monroe (1998) defines altruism as follows:

"Altruists have a particular perspective in which all mankind is connected through a common humanity, in which each individual is linked to all others and to a world in which all living beings are entitled to a certain humane treatment merely by the virtue of being alive. It is not any mystical blending of the self with another; rather, it is a very simple but deeply felt recognition that we all share certain characteristics and are entitled to certain rights, merely by virtue of our common humanity." (Monroe, 1998, p. 206).

Humanitarianism builds on the shared perception of common humanity and believes states give aid 'designed to benefit another even at the risk of significant harm to the actor's own well-being' (Monroe, 1998, p. 4). According to Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor (1998) foreign aid is most often rhetorically portrayed by policymakers in industrialized states as a humanitarian effort to alleviate the suffering of those in distress. However, to be truly humanitarian, aid should go to the neediest states with the poorest populations and that are suffering the most – self-interest being subordinate to this cause (Schraeder, Hook & Taylor, 1998). Foreign aid policy is aimed at eradicating poverty, and improving human welfare (Apodaca, 2017). Aid contributes to tackle threats such as human rights

violations, peacemaking, and the growing gap between the rich and the poor (Apodaca, 2017). In the humanitarian frame, support for aid is merely a moral response to world poverty, which arose out of ethical and humane concern (Nel, 1997). It emphasizes the importance of humanitarian need as the cornerstone of foreign aid programs and underlying interests play no role in this paradigm (Schraeder, Hook & Taylor, 1998).

Hypotheses

Unlike realism and liberalism, constructivism emphasizes the importance of the normative context in international relations (Dixon, 2013). It can explain why states do and do not give aid, even when it is not in their material interest to do so. Constructivists believe the environment in which states act is social and ideational. Foreign policy is formed by ongoing social interactions and dynamic cultural values. Dynamics such as persuasion, praise, and socialization affect the extent to which there is a norm of participating in foreign aid and how states behave relative to this norm (Dixon, 2013). Things like feelings of obligation, upholding an international reputation or feelings of solidarity can therefore shape aid policy. Norms can manifest with different actor in different ways, which leads to the following hypotheses:

Constructivism
H3a: If constructivism can explain aid policy, one would expect a duty interest to be dominant in the development aid policy.
H3b: If constructivism can explain aid policy, one would expect a reputation interest to be dominant in the development aid policy.
H3c: If constructivism can explain aid policy, one would expect a humanitarian interest to be dominant in the development aid policy.

If constructivism can explain aid policy, a donor is using aid donation to fulfil obligations, whether historical or associated with position in international system, to establish and express a certain identity as norm leader through engaging in development cooperation, and/or to improve the well-being of the poorest groups worldwide. What these concepts exactly imply, is explicated through the operationalization in Chapter 3. To measure these theoretical hypotheses, some operational hypotheses are drawn up in that next section.

Conclusion

In this thesis I will look at frames as they indicate why a particular policy might be valuable or desirable, and therefore indicate which interests are involved. All three theories have different assumptions, which lead to different explanations regarding foreign aid policy. The three theories expect donors to have different interests underlining their aid policies. These interests are reflected in the frames policymakers use. As realism is based on the idea that we live in an egocentric and competitive system, without an authority to regulate interactions in which everyone pursues their own self-interest in order to survive, they explain foreign aid policy in light of this struggle for survival. Donor states either use their aid donation to ensure their security or to gain power and influence over recipient states. When realism can explain aid policy, you would expect to see the donor's interest therefore framed in either terms of security or power. One or both of these frames would then be dominant in the policy and debate. Liberalism, on the other hand, does claim that there are international institutions to regulate behavior. States are embedded in a domestic and transnational society, which creates incentives for

economic, social and cultural interaction and cooperation across borders. This causes interdependence, and with this also follow other explanations for foreign aid policy. Donors would either want to grab these opportunities in the international society in terms of economic gains, or would want to make sure that this international society stays stable and global problems don't spread. The liberalist explanation therefore leads to a dominance of either the economic or the enlightened self-interest frame in the policy (debates). Constructivism has a more different approach and looks at norm, ideas and socialization instead. This socialization can lead to states to either follow or set certain norms, as the norm of participating development aid. The power of moral vision can also play a role here, and donors might also give aid out of altruistic beliefs. When this theory can explain foreign aid policy, you would then expect to see a dominance of the duty, reputation or humanitarian interest.

Ergo, these theories have competing explanations of why a donor participates in aid donation and what kind of aid they give. This thesis will look at which frames are dominant in the two Dutch aid policies, and will establish what kind of recipients are chosen, which goals are being pursued, whether the government focuses on bilateral or multilateral aid, and what their aid budget is. This tells us something about which interest is dominant and which theory can best explain the Dutch aid policy, and why the Netherlands gives aid, what kind of aid, and if there has been a change. What these different interests exactly entail, and what expectations their dominance brings for the composition of the aid policy, will be explained in the next chapter. That section will provide an operationalization of these interests which leads to operationalized hypotheses for this research. But first it will introduce and discuss the methods used to test these theoretical approaches.

Chapter 3: Methodology

This chapter will explain the procedures used in order to accept or reject the aforementioned hypotheses, and will explicate an operationalization of these hypotheses. The section will start off presenting the methodological substantiations. First I will explain my research design, and then elaborate on the case selection and the sources used to test the hypotheses. Hereafter, I will explain my motivations behind the research method, and will address how I will apply this in my study. The chapter will end with an operationalization of the theoretical hypotheses summed in Chapter 2, in order to make them applicable to analyze the data.

3.1 Research Design

This research uses a qualitative research method in the form of a single case study. According to Bromley (1990, p. 302) a case study is a “systematic inquiry into an event or a set of related events which aims to describe and explain the phenomenon of interest”. A case study can be useful because it gives the researcher more in-depth knowledge of the research subject which helps to build a better understanding of the whole by exploring a key part (Gerring, 2006). A lot of different types of cases can be selected for doing a single case study, but by focusing on the Dutch foreign aid policy a ‘deviant case’ is chosen here. A deviant case is case that deviates from an expected pattern, as suggested by scientific theories or common sense, which result in a surprising effect (Gerring, 2006). As the Dutch are seen as a front-runner in aid with a humanitarian reputation, one would expect their foreign aid to be focused on helping the poorest populations instead of focusing on trade. In addition, when we zoom in a bit and especially look at the 1993 agenda, you could also say that this is a ‘most-likely case’. A most-likely case is case in which the case is likely to be consistent with a theory’s predictions (Levy, 2008); in this case the constructivist theory. If the data confounds these expectations, that result can be quite damaging to the theory. The constructivist theory would expect the humanitarian or reputation frame to be dominant in a donor with such a generous reputation as the Netherlands. If the humanitarian frame then, is not even dominant in the Netherlands with its humanitarian reputation, it might be expected that one of the other theories have more explanatory power in every donor’s aid policy. It is therefore interesting to dig deeper into this case and research what motivates Dutch policymakers in forming aid policy.

This also explains why this research uses a single case study instead of a multiple comparative case study. It specifically wants to understand why the Netherlands, despite their reputation, behaves a certain way. A single case study further helps to create a deeper understanding of the exploring subject then when two cases have to be researched in the same time-frame (Gustafsson, 2017). Choosing only one case allows an in-depth research of the three possible theories that can explain the Dutch behavior. These different hypotheses belonging to these theories can be compared thoroughly, and can be tested to find the best suiting explanation for this particular case. Because this research is based upon a single case study it has to be careful about its generalizability (King, Keohane & Verba, 1994). However, the results of this research may give some insights about other cases in which states conduct foreign aid policies, even when these policies can for example seem to be unexpected.

3.2 Case Selection & Data sources

As explained above, the case of the Dutch foreign aid policy will be used to analyze which interests play a role the formation of foreign aid policies. The Netherlands is an interesting case because it is internationally seen as a front-runner (Hoebink, 1999). Traditionally, it has always spend more than

the UN target of 0.7% of GNP on foreign aid, and a large part of its aid budget has gone to the least developing countries and to the social sectors in term of basic human needs. The Netherlands is a large and visible player in the aid world, and a strong supporter of international and UN organizations. The Dutch have obtained this international influence by playing a leading role in international development fora, and by setting an example in introducing new humanitarian priorities into their aid program (Van der Veen, 2011). According to Voorhoeve (1979) the Dutch aid program has always been a clear example of the pursuit of 'principles' rather than profits. However, there has recently seemed to be a change in the Dutch aid program with its focus on Aid for Trade. The Netherlands dropped, for the first time since constituted, under the UN target of 0.7%, and the commercial interests seem to have the upper hand. It is therefore an interesting case to study more deeply and to see whether indeed such a change has taken place, and what interests played a role.

To study the Dutch aid policy, two tenures will be compared. The most recent *2013-Agenda: A world to gain*, with Lilianne Ploumen as the Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, will be compared to the *1993-Agenda: A world in dispute*, with Jan Pronk as the Minister for Development Cooperation. Both Ministers were members of the PvdA, and both agendas were formed under governments with a center-coalition in terms of political color. These two agendas are also particularly interesting to investigate because, as a result of *2013-Agenda*, Pronk has resigned from his political party, the PvdA. Is the difference really that big? To compare the policies of these two governments, the first letters from the Ministers to the Second Chamber, the memorandum in which they explain their aid policy, will be analyzed. Relevant discussions of these important policy initiatives then often occur in the Second Chamber. This has the form of an extended question-and-answer session with the Minister of Development Cooperation (Van der Veen, 2011). Every party can then express their basic position on the agenda, after which the Minister in charge makes a lengthy presentation. In this presentation (s)he discusses the policy initiatives and answers any specific questions the representatives may have asked, after which follows a second round of debate. For each memorandum, the debate(s) in which said policy document are discussed, will also be compared in order to investigate the justification of both governments for their aid policy (see List below). As the *2013-Agenda* caused a lot of discussion, a third round was necessary to finish the debate which took place at another time, explaining the second debate document in the list below. These sources can be found on the website Overheid.nl that is the guide to information of all government organizations in the Netherlands. One constraint of these documents is of course that policy documents and debates are not an exact representation for the actual thoughts that define interests of decision-makers, but it is a good proxy.

List of information & data sources	
<i>1993-Agenda</i>	
Government	Lubbers III: coalition of political parties the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) and the Labor Party (PvdA)
Minister in charge	Jan Pronk (PvdA): Minister for Development Cooperation
Memorandum	<i>A world in dispute; exploring the boundaries of development cooperation</i>

	Parliamentary Documents II (1993). Een wereld in geschil; de grenzen van de ontwikkelingssamenwerking verkend. <i>Parliamentary Documents II 1993/94</i> , 23408(2). ¹
Debate	Parliamentary Documents II (1993). 24ste vergadering. <i>Parliamentary Documents II 1993/94</i> , 23408(24).
2013-Agenda	
Government	Rutte II: coalition of political parties the People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) and the Labor Party (PvdA)
Minister in charge	Lilianne Ploumen: Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation
Memorandum	<i>A world to gain: A New Agenda for Aid, Trade and Investment</i> Parliamentary Documents II (2013). Wat de wereld verdient: Een nieuwe agenda voor hulp, handel en investeringen. <i>Parliamentary Documents II 2012/13</i> , 33625(1).
Debate 1	Parliamentary Documents II (2013). Verslag van een Algemeen Overleg. <i>Parliamentary Documents II 2012/13</i> , 33625(34).
Debate 2	Parliamentary Documents II (2013). Verslag van een Algemeen Overleg. <i>Parliamentary Documents II 2012/13</i> , 33625(35).

3.3 Research Method

This thesis uses content analysis to study these different aid policies. Content analysis is a structured way of organizing and analyzing written, transcribed or pictured information. It is based on the general assumption that our beliefs are reflected in our statements and of causal importance to our actions (Van der Veen, 2011). This thesis will look at the different frames used in the aid policy to study the Dutch interests. Frames represent the way we think about relatively broad issues, such as development cooperation (Van der Veen, 2011). They form the context in which more specific policy questions can be interpreted, and “they indicate why a particular policy might be valuable or desirable – in other words, which interests are involved – and suggest which additional considerations might be relevant to that policy” (Van der Veen, 2011, p. 28). While this thesis will look at frames, it will not focus on a discourse analysis. Discourse analysis focuses more on the conscious or unconscious use of particular words – ‘it is the study of the ways in which language is used in texts and contexts’ (Van der Veen, 2011). Discourse analysis looks at how these words not only affect action, but also construct perceptions of reality. This thesis however, will not look specifically at language or at specific choice of words or phrases the government is using in referring to issues of development assistance; it is not aimed and researching constructions of reality, but is rather focused on retrieving meaningful information about the motivations for a certain aid policy. This thesis will therefore only focus on content analysis instead, as this “analysis is more interested in specific policy related concepts and goals expressed in a discourse, such as roles, beliefs about other actors in international relations, and, of course, frames” (Van der Veen, 2011, p. 53). This thesis will concentrate on the explicit motivations the governments make in their aid policies and which frames were dominant in the debates about these policies. Furthermore, it will study certain elements of the policy: which recipients are chosen,

¹ I chose the second agenda issued by this government instead of the first, because the first agenda *A world of difference* was issued in 1990. In the previous year, the Berlin wall had just fallen, which could therefore have many implications on Dutch foreign policy. I wanted to choose two agendas that were similar to each other in political circumstances.

which goals are being pursued, does the government focus on bilateral or multilateral aid, and what is their aid budget? These elements will be compared to the expectations from the different theories, formulated in the next section, in order to see which interest seems to dominate. This is verified by looking at the substantiations made by the policymakers for these choices.

Framing

To study the Dutch aid policy interests, this research will investigate the frames used by policymakers. Different perceptions of the purpose of aid policy – i.e. aid ‘frames’ – have a big impact on the shape of a donor’s aid program (Van der Veen, 2011). Frames specify goals and suggest particular policy choices. Frames therewith reflect the underlying interests of the policymakers. These policymakers have a certain worldview which is expressed through how they frame the issue. Frames thus construct a shared understanding of the world, which in turn legitimizes the actions chosen (McAdam, McCarthy & Zald, 1996). A frame analysis is applied to investigate which interests and worldview – reflecting a certain theoretical lens – appear to be dominant in the Dutch aid policy. Traditional approaches often only focus on actors, their constraints and the actor’s ability to reach its goals. The method chosen here however, is interested in how this meaning is constructed and how and aid policy came to be; which interests underly a policy and how does that influences the shape of the policy. A frame will be understood as the way in which policy makers define a problem and offer a solution to that problem (Klotz & Lynch, 2007). The frames used by Dutch policymakers will be analyzed. With the dominance of a certain frame, expectations also arise regarding the specific policy features, such as the recipients or the total size of the aid budget. To study this, it is therefore necessary to first compile a method with which these elements can be organized, and give an overview of the different possible frames in which these are operationalized in order to be able to measure their presence. The dominance of these specific frames will be analyzed through different statements made by policymakers in the policy documents and debates.

Applied

In this content analysis, the two agendas and Second Chamber debates are analyzed qualitatively. These texts will be coded and interpreted. The goal of this thesis is to asses which interest(s) are dominant in the justification of the Dutch aid policies, and consequently asses which theory of international relations – realism, liberalism, or constructivism – has the most explanatory power. After this assessment, this thesis will look at if a change in interest took place between the two tenures. I therefore look at justifications that refer to specific reasons for giving aid. When a particular interest is dominant, certain aspects and arguments are bound to be present. I have compiled a method with which these elements can be organized. These are elements regarding:

- **Aid motivation;** *Why does the donor give aid? What are the arguments given in the policy documents and the justification in the debates?*
- **Recipients;** *To which states does the donor allocate its aid and how is this justified?*
- **Policy goals;** *What kind of aid does the donor give in terms of policy goals? Is aid seen as the primary goal or is it a supplement to other strategic policies?*
- **Bilateral or multilateral aid;** *Does the donor mainly focus on bilateral aid or multilateral aid, and what arguments are made for this?*
- **Volume of aid;** *What is the overall volume of aid and how is this volume allocated between different areas of interest?*

During the interpretation of the results, patterns will be identified, and an underlying motivation for aid and dominant paradigm will be established. To realize this, in the following section the hypotheses will be operationalized first. However, no explicit codebook is followed, because that would constrain the scope of possible interpretations of the texts. This thesis will study what the government's main rationale is and to which interest, and thus to which theory, that belongs.

3.4 Operationalization

In this chapter the theoretical hypotheses formulated in Chapter 2 will be operationalized in measurable hypotheses. I will look at what one would expect to see if a particular interest is dominant. If those indicators of that particular interest are dominant, then that corresponding theory has the most explanative power and might help us better understand what the Dutch policy motivations are and why the change in policy happened. Policy debates are of course suffused with a variety of competing frames, but the relative strength will be reflected in the arguments and problems most referred to by policymakers (Van der Veen, 2011). For example, if the survival of the state is emphasized as imperative, this puts certain limits on the frame that is likely to be dominant and how that shapes aid policy. Indicators of other frames can also play a part, but they may not be dominant. I will therefore look at what the general dominant view is in the government's arguments for their certain aid policy. To measure the theoretical hypotheses, for each hypothesis some operational hypotheses are drawn up regarding aid motivation, recipients, policy goals, levels of bilateral/multilateral aid, and aid volume (allocation). The complete, detailed operationalization can be found in Appendix A. Data to measure the recipient variables (the country indicators) are mostly retrieved from the World Bank. However, not all data could be found there, and sometimes other sources had to be cited. This overview could be found in Appendix A, where the detailed references are specified. The specific recipient expectations for the Dutch development aid are also given there. The rationale behind this operationalization will be given below.

Theoretical hypothesis 1a

Realism
H1a: If realism can explain aid policy, one would expect a security interest to be dominant in the development aid policy.

As explained in Chapter 2, under this paradigm a donor is trying to increase its security in terms of military and geopolitical interests. To measure this theoretical hypothesis, some operational hypotheses are drawn up (see Table A.1):

- i. **If a security interest is dominant in the aid policy, one would expect policymakers to use a 'security frame' to legitimize their aid policy; i.e. providing aid is motivated from the paradigm that the international environment is hostile and allocating aid can increase the donor's security.**

Realism assumes states engage in self-help behavior and respond to threats from their environment. In this paradigm, how policymakers perceive the international security environment, will therefore influence their aid policy. Looking at the arguments made and problems addressed by policymakers, one would expect to see the presence of a 'security aid frame'. Aid policy is framed in terms of security

if concerns like tension with other states, the struggle against different ideologies, and geopolitical concerns are emphasized by policymakers:

<i>Aid motivation</i>	- salience of security considerations - the focus on international tension (which directly hurts the donor's national security) - struggle against different ideologies - geopolitical threats - pursuit of military self-interest - the need increase donor's physical security
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ii. If a security interest is dominant in the aid policy, one would expect the recipients to be states whose allegiance can help secure the donor's international safety.

Realism expects recipients to be states whose allegiance is valued for security reasons, such as allied states or states neighboring enemy nations. Tying friendly regimes to you enhances your own security by preventing the recipient state to support political enemies. Aid can also help secure the donor's safety by forming alliances with states surrounding enemy nations that would be able to act as surrogates for the donor within their specific regions. Which recipients to expect along these lines for the Dutch allocation can be seen in Table A.1.

<i>Recipients</i>	- allied states	<i>Measured by: states that are either part of NATO or Europa with the lowest GDP/capita</i>
	- friendly regimes & states neighboring enemy nations	<i>Measured by: immediate threat of physical security/war from another states(s)</i>

iii. If a security interest is dominant in the aid policy, one would expect the donor to use the allocation of aid to enhance their position in the international security environment.

Realism sees aid as a tool which can be used as a relevant alternative to military spending. It can be used to help ensure strategic goals, for example by 'buying' strategic concessions. And as this theory revolves around self-help, humanitarian needs of recipients are downplayed.

<i>Policy goals</i>	- buying strategic concessions (such as the building of military bases or consolidating military alliances from the recipient government) - ensuring access to strategically important regions - spreading the donor's own ideological system in form of values or instruments - humanitarian needs of recipient countries are downplayed
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iv. If a security interest is dominant in the aid policy, one would expect aid to be mainly bilateral.

As realisms sees states as the central actor and since national security is a state-level goal, aid is more likely to be aimed at states and governments than at subgroups within those states or international groups. International institutions entail some loss of autonomy and complicate policy-making, so multilateral aid is likely to be less important.

<i>Bilateral/ Multilateral</i>	- aid is given to states, instead of subgroups within or above those states - aid is given directly from state to state instead of cooperation through international institutions - the role of international institutions is downplayed
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v. If a security interest is dominant in the aid policy, one would expect aid volume to be relatively low, to be correlated with international tension, and the budget to be aimed at ensuring national security.

As a donor motivated by a security interest, only thinks about their self-interest, development cooperation will not be their main focus. The total aid volume is therefore expected to be low.

However, such a donor will likely provide a relatively somewhat higher aid volume if they fear an international current threat from another state(s). The aid that they give will therefore also mainly be allocated to to ensure national security.

<i>Volume of aid</i>	- overall low volume - correlated with the level of international tension - large share of aid is used for projects that ensure national security
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Theoretical hypothesis 1b

Realism
H1b: If realism can explain aid policy, one would expect a power interest to be dominant in the development aid policy.

When a power interest is dominant in the aid policy, a donor is trying to gain influence and deals in unilateral coercive diplomacy. To measure this theoretical hypothesis, some operational hypotheses are drawn up (see Table A.2):

- i. **If a power interest is dominant in the aid policy, one would expect policymakers to use a ‘power frame’ to legitimize their aid policy; i.e. the imperative of political influence in the international system is highlighted.**

Realism believes that only the most powerful states can guarantee their survival, so states strive to maximize their relative power by gaining influence. Policymakers therefore ‘frame’ the issue in this way, and emphasize for example the need to obtain a voice in recipient countries and to maintain the balance of power:

<i>Aid motivation</i>	- the need to obtain a voice in recipient countries - obtaining influence in the international system - increase its leverage over others - maintaining the balance of power - pursuit power positions
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- ii. **If a power interest is dominant in the aid policy, one would expect the recipients to be states that have strategic value in some sense.**

As realism assumes donor’s to act out of self-interest, recipient states are likely to have some military, economic or political value; such as allied states, former colonies, or countries that have high international visibility. Allied states might be, for example, more easily influenced to act in the donor’s favor. Former colonial powers might also wish to maintain the special relationship with its ex-colonies. Furthermore, there will also be a payoff to obtaining the allegiance of countries that have high international visibility. Among others, such countries might offer a way to influence other, less important, LMICs indirectly.

<i>Recipients</i>	- former colonies (out of power reasons)	<i>Indonesia, Suriname, the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba</i>
	- allied states	<i>Measured by: states that are either part of NATO or Europa with the lowest GDP/capita</i>
	- recipients that have high international visibility	<i>Measured by: GDP, Population</i>

- iii. **If a power interest is dominant in the aid policy, one would expect aid policy to be used to enforce power over recipient states.**

Aid policy is then supplementary to the donor's other strategies for the pursuit of power. Aid is, for example, used as a bribe to try to buy political influence. And donors force compliance by using aid allocation levels as reward or punishment for voting behavior. Humanitarian needs of recipients are again of less importance.

<i>Policy goals</i>	- the use of hard power - buying political influence - win allies - aid as reward or punishment for voting behavior - humanitarian needs of recipient countries are downplayed
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iv. If a power interest is dominant in the aid policy, one would expect aid to be mainly bilateral. As realism sees states as the central actor, aid is likely to be mainly bilateral. When aid is given from state to state instead of cooperation through international institutions, donors can more easily extend their influence and execute hard power strategies.

<i>Bilateral/ Multilateral</i>	- aid is given to states, instead of subgroups within or above those states - aid is given directly from state to state instead of cooperation through international institutions - the role of international institutions is downplayed
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v. If a power interest is dominant in the aid policy, one would expect aid volume to be relatively low, correlated with the size of the donor state, and the budget to be aimed at gaining influence.

As a donor motivated by a power interest, only thinks about their self-interest, development cooperation will not be their main focus. The total aid volume is therefore expected to be low. However, such a donor will likely allocate a somewhat higher share of their GNP to aid donation if it's a small state. As explained in Chapter 2, a small state has fewer means available to raise their international influence, and often has a less strong position in the international environment. Therefore it is expected that smaller states will more often use aid as a means to gain power, while on the other hand a major power is likely to have several other instruments at its disposal. The aid that is allocated, will therefore also mainly go to projects that help the donor gain power, and make recipients dependent on their aid.

<i>Volume of aid</i>	- overall low volume - correlated with size of donor state - connections with the state's strategies for the pursuit of power - aid is used to make recipients dependent, and gain power
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Theoretical hypothesis 2a

Liberalism
H2a: If liberalism can explain aid policy, one would expect an economic self-interest to be dominant in the development aid policy.

When aid is given out of economic self-interest, the donor is trying to increase its own wealth. To measure this theoretical hypothesis, some operational hypotheses are drawn up (see Table A.3):

- i. If an economic self-interest is dominant in the aid policy, one would expect policymakers to use an 'economic frame' to legitimize their aid policy; i.e. the need for economic cooperation and the pursuit of commercial interests are accentuated.**

As explained in Chapter 2, in liberalism international economic cooperation is highly valued. In this paradigm, how policymakers perceive the international economic chances, will therefore influence their aid policy. Donors try to maximize their commercial gains. Aid policy is framed in terms of economic self-interest if considerations like securing export markets or safeguarding the supply of valuable imports are emphasized by policymakers:

<i>Aid motivation</i>	- response to changing economic conditions - pursuit of economic market share - promote exports - job creation for donor - secure valuable imports
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ii. If an economic self-interest is dominant in the aid policy, one would expect the recipients to be states that have economic value in some sense.

Such as those with access to vital raw materials, those offering large export or investment markets, as well as those that already are important trading partners. Donors interested in promoting their own economy would also favor recipients that represent the most powerful economies in their region. Distribution of foreign aid is then mostly directed toward emerging or middle-income economies at the expense of the poorest ones.

<i>Recipients</i>	- states offering large export or investment markets - states that represent the most powerful economies in their region	<i>Measured by: GDP</i>
	- states that already are important trading partners	<i>Measured by: Export & import flows</i>

iii. If an economic self-interest is dominant in the aid policy, one would expect the donor to use the allocation of aid to pursue profitable conditions and projects.

Aid is seen as a way to supplement the state's economic policy and will contain economic goals. Aid is for example used to influence recipients' policies, to subsidize domestic firms, or promote Foreign Direct Investment. To pursue their commercial motives donors often tie aid, and bind recipients to the procurement of certain goods and services.

<i>Policy goals</i>	- promotion of trade liberalization in LMICs - promoting private sector development - supporting domestic firms - influencing recipients' trade policies (soft power) - tying aid
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iv. If an economic self-interest is dominant in the aid policy, it is likely that levels of multilateral aid will be low.

Multilateral aid is expected to be low as it is less easily controlled by domestic economic interests. And the portion which is given multilaterally, is focused on enhancing the general business climate.

<i>Bilateral/ Multilateral</i>	- aid is mainly given from state to state instead of cooperation through international institutions - the multilateral aid that is given is focused on enhancing the business climate
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v. If an economic self-interest is dominant in the aid policy, one would expect aid volume to be relatively low, to be correlated with economic dependence, and the budget to be aimed at economic gains.

As a donor motivated by economic interest, predominantly thinks about their own self-interest, development cooperation will not be their main focus. The total aid volume is therefore expected to be low. However, such a donor will likely provide a somewhat higher aid volume if they have a high international trade volume and are thus dependent on international economic stability. The aid that they give will therefore also mainly be allocated to economic projects.

<i>Volume of aid</i>	- overall low volume - correlated with international economic dependence - large share for projects supporting economic growth - large share to enhance trade - low share/cut backs on projects without economic gains
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Theoretical hypothesis 2b

Liberalism
H2b: If liberalism can explain aid policy, one would expect an enlightened self-interest to be dominant in the development aid policy.

When an enlightened self-interest interest is dominant, a donor tries pursue global stability. To measure this theoretical hypothesis, some operational hypotheses are drawn up (see Table A.4):

- i. **If an enlightened self-interest is dominant in the aid policy, one would expect policymakers to use an 'enlightened frame' to legitimize their aid policy; i.e. providing aid is motivated through the lens of international dependency and threat of international instability.**

A donor gives aid because of mutual dependence; there are global problems originating in recipient countries that can eventually also affect the donor. In this paradigm, how policymakers perceive the international stability will therefore influence their aid policy. Looking at the arguments made and problems addressed by policymakers, one would expect to see the presence of an 'enlightened aid frame'. Aid policy is framed in terms of enlightened self-interest if concerns like global challenges, and international instability are emphasized by policymakers:

<i>Aid motivation</i>	- mutual dependence - globalization - responding to global challenges - pursuing stability - combination of self-interest and doing good
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- ii. **If an enlightened self-interest is dominant in the aid policy, one would expect prominent recipients to be states that are – or could evolve to be – a threat to the donor's security situation.**

Prominent recipients are likely to be states where the allocation of aid leads to a reduction in the level of global insecurity. Such as states that are unstable or appear likely to become so, states with large populations, and states with, for example, a climate or migration threat.

<i>Recipients</i>	- states that are unstable or appear likely to become so - states that have one or more of global challenges (like climate, migration, poverty etc.)	<i>Measured by: Collapsed states/failed states (index)</i>
	- states with large populations	<i>Measured by: Population (growth)</i>

- iii. **If an enlightened self-interest is dominant in the aid policy, one would expect aid to be used to pursue global stability.**

Enlightened states use aid to gain a degree of soft power and persuade recipients to pursue global goods. Development practices can achieve this by building goodwill and influencing recipients' policies. With that diplomatic credit donors can, for example, stimulate recipients to tackle environmental and energy challenges, and to promote good governance, and transparency in the recipient state. Further, donors often invest themselves as well in international public goods.

<i>Policy goals</i>	- investing in IPGs (climate, food, trade, poverty etc.) - combating conflict - promoting good governance - use of soft power to influence policies that are in everyone's interest
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iv. If an enlightened self-interest is dominant in the aid policy, one would expect high levels of multilateral aid.

Liberalism believes these global problems require global solutions and international cooperation. Since multilateral organizations tend to emphasize these types of projects, for example addressing population control and the environment, the levels of multilateral aid are expected to be high. Giving this kind of aid might also have the goal of strengthening international organization, like the United Nations, which in turn helps to reduce global threats.

<i>Bilateral/ Multilateral</i>	- aid is given through international institutions - giving aid to multilateral organizations to combat global problems - strengthening international organizations
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v. If an enlightened self-interest is dominant in the aid policy, one would expect aid volume to be relatively high, correlated with the donor's international exposure, and the budget to be aimed at pursuing international stability.

The liberalist paradigm would expect the level of international interdependency to effect the volume of the donor's aid program. And as they believe in the increase of globalization which leads to a high interdependence, the total aid volume is therefore expected to be relatively high. Especially when that international instability is likely to affect the donor, for example when it is a popular destination for refugees, or when there is a high level of trade with LMICs as it is then more vulnerable to international economic shocks. A large share will be allocated to the pursuit of global goods.

<i>Volume of aid</i>	- overall high volume - correlated with international exposure - large share for pursuing stability and IPGs
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Theoretical hypothesis 3a

Constructivism
H3a: If constructivism can explain aid policy, one would expect a duty interest to be dominant in the development aid policy.

When aid is given out of feelings of duty, the donor is trying to fulfil obligations, whether historical or associated with position in international system. To measure this theoretical hypothesis, some operational hypotheses are drawn up (see Table A.5):

i. If a duty interest is dominant in the aid policy, one would expect policymakers to use a 'duty frame' to legitimize their aid policy; i.e. the need to oblige to certain international norms is emphasized.

According to constructivism donors provide aid to fulfil their (feelings of) obligations. They might feel this pressure because aid is internationally seen as the responsibility of rich nation, and they want to

maintain their role in the international system. To do this they must adhere to international standards and keep up with their peers. They might also have internalized the feelings of guilt over colonial exploitation, and may give aid due to shared history with the recipients. Donors might furthermore feel obliged due to the norm of continuity, pressure from society, or as repayment for own aid receipts.

<i>Aid motivation</i>	- responsibility as rich nation - adhere to international standards - importance of continuity - guilt over (colonial) exploitation - repayment for own aid receipts - public pressure
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ii. If a duty interest is dominant in the aid policy, one would expect recipients to be visible recipients, ex-colonies, and trading partners.

In this paradigm donors would prefer visible recipients, namely states with high aid disbursements by peers, as this confirms their position in the international society. In addition, as donors see aid only as an obligation, constructivism would expect donors to want to get the maximum benefit out of fulfilling this obligation, and focus on trading partners.

<i>Recipients</i>	- states that are favored recipients of peer states	<i>Measured by: Net ODA recieved</i>
	- donor's ex-colonies	<i>Indonesia, Suriname, the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba</i>
	- trading partners	<i>Measured by: Export flows</i>

iii. If a duty interest is dominant in the aid policy, one would expect the donor to use aid as an instrument to preserve their position in the international system.

Aid is seen as a way to maintain a certain role in the international system, and not as goal in itself. Because of this we can expect governments to want to get the maximum benefit out of fulfilling their obligation, and therefore aim at projects that get a lot of recognition. Further, one may expect donors to merely match the average effort of their peers, or even just to stay above some minimal expected level of performance; they follow the international trend for example, but don't start new projects.

<i>Policy goals</i>	- investments in the kind of projects that are internationally recognized and popular - visible projects - follow the international trend
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iv. If a duty interest is dominant in the aid policy, one would expect the donor to make the mandatory contributions to international organizations.

Donors want to just fulfill their duty and follow the international norm. Their focus will therefore be on the mandatory contributions to international organizations, but this paradigm expects little more.

<i>Bilateral/ Multilateral</i>	- mandatory contributions to international organizations will be made faithfully - bilateral aid will be at the acceptable minimum
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v. If a duty interest is dominant in the aid policy, one would expect aid volume to match those of peers, and the budget to be aimed at popular projects.

Donors that are motivated by duty, merely match the average effort of their peers, or even perform just above some minimal expected level of performance.

<i>Volume of aid</i>	- match peer aid volume - aimed at mandatory, visible or popular projects
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Theoretical hypothesis 3b

Constructivism

H3b: If constructivism can explain aid policy, one would expect a reputation interest to be dominant in the development aid policy.

When a reputation interest is dominant, a donor tries establish and express an identity as norm leader in development cooperation; it tries to improve its international status and prestige. To measure this theoretical hypothesis, some operational hypotheses are drawn up (see Table A.6):

- i. **If a reputation interest is dominant in the aid policy, one would expect policymakers to use a 'reputation frame' to legitimize their aid policy; i.e. providing aid is motivated from the focus of establishing and expressing an identity as norm leader.**

The donor tries to express a national identity to the international society as generous state and promote the norm of giving aid to those in need. Donors assume a leadership position and want to present an example for others to follow. They see development cooperation as a noble and glorious task.

<i>Aid motivation</i>	- assuming a leadership position - improve international prestige and status - presenting an example for others to follow - a noble and glorious task
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- ii. **If a reputation interest is dominant in the aid policy, one would expect recipients to be states with high international visibility and friendly regimes.**

When donors generously provide aid towards recipients with high international visibility, they are likely to receive recognition, which is the aim they pursue with their aid policy. These may be internationally prominent states, or recipients favored by peer states. This is where the actions of the prestige oriented donor will be most easily noticed.

<i>Recipients</i>	- visible (popular) recipients - states that are favored recipients of peer states	<i>Measured by: Net ODA recieved</i>
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- iii. **If a reputation interest is dominant in the aid policy, one would expect the donor to use the symbolic significance of aid to enhance their reputation.**

Under this paradigm aid is not seen as a goal in itself, but the donor uses the symbolic significance to express their identity to the international society as a generous state. Donors interested in prestige are likely to favor large, high-profile aid projects. They want to exceed the international norms, and will attempt to stand out among their peer group.

<i>Policy goals</i>	- Symbolic significance of aid - favor large, high-profile aid projects - new, innovative projects - many leadership tasks in international fora
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- iv. **If a reputation interest is dominant in the aid policy, one would expect high levels of multilateral aid.**

As international cooperation is most visible in the international society, donors with a reputation interest are expected to focus on multilateral aid. Especially large UN projects with a lot of visibility are popular. Status within an international institutions is considered to be of value.

<i>Bilateral/</i>	- aid is given through international institutions
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<i>Multilateral</i>	- mainly large UN projects with a lot of visibility - status of international institutions is considered to be of value
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- v. If a reputation interest is dominant in the aid policy, one would expect the donor to meet or exceed international norms regarding aid volume, and the budget to be aimed at high-profile aid projects.**

Donor states where aid is seen in terms of self-affirmation and status will attempt to stand out among their peer group. Therefore one may expect them to meet or exceed international norms regarding aid volume.

<i>Volume of aid</i>	- higher than peer aid volume - attempt to stand out among their peer group
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Theoretical hypothesis 3c

Constructivism
H3c: If constructivism can explain aid policy, one would expect a humanitarian interest to be dominant in the development aid policy.

When aid is given out of humanitarian considerations, a donor tries to improve the well-being of the poorest groups worldwide. To measure this theoretical hypothesis, some operational hypotheses are drawn up (see Table A.7):

- i. If a humanitarian interest is dominant in the aid policy, one would expect policymakers to use a ‘humanitarian frame’ to legitimize their aid policy; i.e. the imperative of promoting the well-being of the neediest groups worldwide is demonstrated.**

Constructivism believes that donors can have altruistic reasons, and that they can think the gap between rich and poor is unfair and needs to be closed, even if that sometimes hurts their own interest. In this paradigm, how policymakers perceive this unfair gap will therefore influence their aid policy. Aid policy is framed in terms of a humanitarian interest if policymakers emphasize the importance of reducing suffering, international solidarity, and doing what is morally right:

<i>Aid motivation</i>	- the unfair gap between rich and poor - international solidarity - living beings are entitled to a humane treatment merely by the virtue of being alive - morally right - reducing suffering
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- ii. If a humanitarian interest is dominant in the aid policy, one would expect recipients to be the neediest states.**

A donor with a humanitarian interest allocates aid to the states who need it most, regardless of other characteristics or strategic concerns.

<i>Recipients</i>	- Poorest states	<i>Measured by: GDP/capita</i>
	- states with most basic human needs	<i>Measured by: Mortality rate, Life expectancy</i>

- iii. If a humanitarian interest is dominant in the aid policy, one would expect the donor to use aid to improve living conditions and human rights worldwide.**

In this paradigm aid is not seen as a strategic tool to help enhance their own self-interest. Aid has no other strategic concerns, but is a goal in itself. With this kind of aid the donor focusses on eradicating poverty, and advocates good governance and human rights.

<i>Policy goals</i>	- eradicate poverty - promote good governance - promote human rights - improve international justice - provide humanitarian relief
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iv. If a humanitarian interest is dominant in the aid policy, one would expect high levels of both bilateral and multilateral aid.

As a donor's self-interest plays no part at all, and both bilateral and multilateral aid can make good contributions to development, we expect to see high levels of both if a humanitarian interest is dominant. The substantiation here is interesting; policymakers should chose for the form that they believe can make the highest contribution to the issue area they focus on, which should lead to human development in general.

<i>Bilateral/ Multilateral</i>	- aid is given both bilaterally and multilaterally - highest focus for the one which can contribute the most on specific area
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v. If a humanitarian interest is dominant in the aid policy, one would expect an overall high aid volume which is correlated with the donor's level of achieved wealth, and the budget to be aimed at project for the neediest people.

As there is no self-interest involves, aid is given generously. Aid is also correlated with wealth, as richer countries have fewer humanitarian needs at home. It is also aimed at projects that specifically help the poorest and neediest people in the world.

<i>Volume of aid</i>	- overall volume is relatively high - correlated with donor's wealth - large share for neediest groups
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Conclusion

This operationalization overview given here provides an initial insight into how this thesis measures the dominance of different interests. The complete overview can be found in Appendix A. After specifying which methods to use and operationalizing the theoretical hypotheses, these operationalized hypotheses can now be tested in the next chapters. In Chapter 4 and 5 the presence of the different frames and elements are established, reflecting the Dutch policy interests. First an overview of the agendas will be given, after which a content analysis is applied to the memoranda and the debates about these memoranda. I have chosen to first look at the *2013-Agenda* before investigating the *1993-Agenda*. I chose to do the opposite chronological order because the motive for starting this research – Pronk's membership termination – actually took place in 2013. Since especially this *2013-Agenda* was highly contested and debated in society, it was interesting to investigate this thoroughly first; what does this policy what we are talking about here actually entail? Thereafter, it was interesting to see whether this is really so much different as the Dutch policies that came before. The aim of this thesis is to see if the 2013 policy changed with respect to 1993, so it is interesting to first determine what the general view is in 2013, and to then look at whether that is different than in 1993.

Chapter 4: 2013 - A world to gain

"You don't have to agree with me, but I know what I'm doing"

- Lilianne Ploumen (FD, 2017)

In this chapter I will first briefly explain the Dutch aid policy following the *2013-Agenda* during which Ploumen was the Minister in charge. I will give a brief summary of the policy and discuss some of the policy objectives of the government in place during 2013. Then, based on the memorandum and on the basis of the two debates about this memorandum, I will apply a content analysis, in which I look at the frames used by the Dutch government and establish the shape of the policy. The results of this analysis can be found in Table B.1 to B.5 in Appendix B. I have first looked at which frame was dominant in this development policy regarding the motivations used. Then I have checked to see whether the kind of recipients, the policy goals, the levels of both bilateral or multilateral aid, and the aid volume matched the hypotheses of the dominant interests. I have looked here both at the factual choices and the possible further substantiation of these choices. I have chosen to look at these both, because e.g. a certain type of recipient or goal can be expected by multiple theories/frames; the difference however, may lie in the motivation for and substantiation of these choices. Organizing this data made it possible to analyze the dominant interest and draw a conclusion about which theory therefore appears to have the most explanatory power.

4.1 Overview aid policy

During 2012 till 2017 cabinet-Rutte II was in charge in the Netherlands. This cabinet was a coalition of two different political parties, the People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) and the Labor Party (PvdA). This government was a center-coalition in terms of political color. During this time, Lilianne Ploumen occupied the function of Minister for Development Cooperation as well as Minister of Foreign Trade. In 2013, the government issued an agenda in which they elaborated on their aid policy objectives: *A world to gain: A New Agenda for Aid, Trade and Investment* (Parliamentary Documents II, 2012/13, 33625, 1). The focus of this government have been on the areas of trade and investment, poverty reduction, and the common ground between them. Four of the 'traditional' development themes – security and justice, water, food security, and sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) – remained policy objectives, but in this agenda a new core aim of the Dutch development aid policy surfaced, namely combining aid with trade (Parliamentary Documents II, 2012/13, 33625, 1). The government believed that trade and development cooperation are interlinked and can strengthen each other. They support developing countries in increasing their access to the international value chain and in improving their business climate. The main policy goals were aimed at eliminating extreme poverty in a single generation, establishing sustainable economic growth all over the world which should also benefit the poor, and success for Dutch companies abroad (Parliamentary Documents II, 2012/13, 33625, 1). This aid policy was quite contested in the media however. To the displeasure of the Dutch aid organizations, Ploumen was the first minister who combined aid and trade (Volkskrant, 2017). They called the cutbacks that the government carried through 'painful', and the halving of subsidies to aid organizations caused a lot of fury. Rutte II would have 'desecrated' the aid sector (Volkskrant, 2017). By contrast, there are also the ones that admire the combination of aid and trade. Ploumen fought hard for good international agreements, and she called the policy 'Development aid new style', and opponents 'old-fashioned' (Volkskrant, 2017). The OECD was predominantly positive in their review about the Dutch aid policy as well (Rijksoverheid, 2017). They spoke about an innovative approach, including the Dutch pioneering role in promoting corporate social

responsibility, supporting entrepreneurship in developing countries, and praising the good response to the challenges of the global goals. These, divergently assessed, policy plans were formed in the *2013-Agenda: A world to gain*. In the following section, the memorandum and the two debates about this memorandum will be analyzed, with the aim of establishing the Dutch dominant underlying interest during that time.

4.2 Analysis

When we look at the *2013-Agenda's* aid policy, one sees that trade plays more of a central role. The addition of the function of Minister of Foreign Trade under the umbrella of Minister for Development Cooperation already shows this change in focus. However, as one can see in the three main policy ambitions – the elimination of extreme poverty in one generation, sustainable and inclusive growth worldwide, and success for Dutch companies abroad – different underlying ideas might play a role, which can be placed under different theories and aid frames. Using aid to eliminate poverty can be argued from both the constructivist humanitarian interest, which is all about compassion for the poorest, and from the liberalist enlightened interest, which sees poverty as a global challenge that needs to be resolved. The same can be said for inclusive growth worldwide; the government might want to include LMICs out of a solidarity perspective, out of an enlightened interest, or even out of an economic motive with the idea that growth leads to more trade. The last goal, success for Dutch companies abroad, on the other hand clearly falls under the liberalist economic interest with the countries own commercial interest in mind. In this first example, the difficulty of assigning frames is immediately apparent. Often certain statements and considerations are ambiguous. To get a clear picture of the overall ideas and interests of this government, we therefore have to dig deeper into the documents. I structured this data in Appendix B. I have analyzed the memorandum and the two debates about this policy by comparing the operationalization in Chapter 3 and Appendix A to these documents. I looked at which frames and which further indicators were most prevalent in these pieces, and which interest dominated the conversation.

Aid motivation

The memorandum for the *2013-Agenda* starts off ambiguously with the sentence: “The Netherlands wants to move forward in the world and the Netherlands wants to move forward with the world.” (Parliamentary Documents II, 2012/13, 33625, 1:3). You could say that it is remarkable to start a policy document about development aid with noting the country’s own desire to get ahead in the world. The first paragraph continues in this view:

“We are involved in global problems. Our country is one of the most open countries in the world. We depend on the development of others for our own well-being and our own prosperity. Sustainable and inclusive growth is in our own interest and in the interests of others.”

The train of thought here is that the Netherlands is an open country with an open economy and that globalization leads to global problems, which especially hit the Netherlands. To maintain their own position they are therefore dependent on global development. These issues of openness, globalization, mutual dependence, and sustainability fit the liberalistic theory. The Dutch might give good helpful aid, but give it out of self-interest; out of fear for international instability or to further their own economy. The documents starts off by using a liberalist frame.

When we dig deeper in the different motivations used by policymakers, as is shown in Table B.1, you also notice immediately the dominance of the liberalist frames. Initially the focus is very much on the international interdependence: “Countries are increasingly interconnected. All countries have an interest in good agreements about international trade. And all countries have an interest in tackling cross-border problems.” (Parliamentary Documents II, 2012/13, 33625, 1:9). The new agenda is said to play out against a global context in which cross-border problems are becoming increasingly important. Goods such as food security, climate, and security – International Public Goods (IPGs) – are therefore of collective interest: “The pursuit, management and enforcement of a sensible management of IPGs is a collective interest and therefore a well-understood Dutch interest” (Parliamentary Documents II, 2012/13, 33625, 1:23). The pressure on the environment is also increasing what causes that: “The further sustainability of production chains is a necessity. Historically there is also a relationship between scarcity and the origin of conflicts. (Parliamentary Documents II, 2012/13, 33625, 1:11). As these conflicts can easily spread in a globalized world, the government calls the situation in fragile states and conflict countries worrying: “These countries threaten to lag far behind the rest of the world politically, socially and economically. They also pose a threat in terms of regional stability, radicalization and terrorism, cross-border crime, illegal migration and trade flows and raw material supply.” (Parliamentary Documents II, 2012/13, 33625, 1:2). The government wants to respond with its aid policies to these global challenges and is therefore pursuing international public goods. They also emphasize that low- and middle-income countries often have the most trouble and the least opportunities to resist global problems. Development aid is thus used by the Dutch to counteract this effect. In this motivation you see a dominance of a liberalist enlightened frame.

However, as trade is also seen as an IPG, the focus turns quickly towards the role of trade and investment. First still from an enlightened view – “Where aid and trade meet, we act both out of solidarity and from well-understood self-interest” (Parliamentary Documents II, 2012/13, 33625, 1:5) – but it soon tends more towards an economic frame. First, the changing economic conditions are described that would have led the government to, in addition to aid, also focus more on trade. For example, countries that were previously known as poor, such as Ghana, Vietnam and Ethiopia, developed faster than expected. These countries would no longer want an aid relationship: “They ask for an equal (trade) relationship” (Parliamentary Documents II, 2012/13, 33625, 1:8). A PvdA-member adds during the debate: “Countries which twenty years ago were penniless, are now our competitors on the world market. For development cooperation too, this means that not everything can stay as it usually was.” (Parliamentary Documents II, 2012/13, 33625, 34:30). The Dutch economy is in recession, and the government sees an opportunity in trade: “It is precisely external demand and trade that are resources to compensate for the drop in demand” (Parliamentary Documents II, 2012/13, 33625, 35:2). The Netherlands has too little connection with economic growth in Asia, Africa and South America: “Our trade is still very much focused on neighboring countries. While we have good contacts with emerging countries on these continents - partly due to long-term aid relations.” (Parliamentary Documents II, 2012/13, 33625, 1:4). These contacts offer opportunities for the Dutch commercial motives. The government says to want to build up a trade relationship with as many countries as possible, and wants to benefit from the economic growth in emerging countries in other parts of the world. As the policy states furthermore, these “emerging markets are an opportunity for our business, especially in sectors where the Netherlands is at the international top” (Parliamentary Documents II, 2012/13, 33625, 1:9). The government wants to help Dutch companies to gain these kind international projects. This focus on trade was however, widely criticized during the debates. A *world to gain* is being called a ‘trade-agenda’ that throws aid overboard. The opposition mainly sees “that the fight against

poverty must help trade”, instead of the other way around (Parliamentary Documents II, 2012/13, 33625, 35:5). There is much criticism on the focus on this self-interest: “Aid becomes trade. «Can I help you?»», but from behind the counter of BV (the Ltd.) Netherlands”, according to someone from the opposition (Parliamentary Documents II, 2012/13, 33625, 34:27). There is even satirical talk of a new name for the agenda (also known as *What the world deserves*): “«What the Netherlands deserves» thanks to all export support to our companies. Self-interest is certainly not trivialized in this memorandum.” (Parliamentary Documents II, 2012/13, 33625, 34:21). Minister Ploumen is said to have become the Minister of Export and to steal the bread from the mouths of the poorest people and put it towards the Dutch companies’ pockets. An economic self-interest thus seems to be underlying the Dutch aid policy.

The realist expectations about what motivations to see are almost non-existent in the framing of the Dutch policymakers. The Netherlands does seem to feel threatened to some extent by emerging economies such as China, India, Brazil, and South Africa that are manifesting not only in the economic field, but also in regional and international politics. As a result however, they seem not to be focused on gaining more political power, but focus more on the economy instead as the ‘aid frames’ indicate. The constructivist frames, on the contrary, are present to some lesser extent. For example, the importance of continuity, the front runner role, and international solidarity are occasionally emphasized. On the other hand, however, the opposition also emphasizes that the government is rapidly withdrawing from the agreements that the Netherlands has internationally committed to for such a long time, and thereby abandons the tradition of being one of the largest donors. Furthermore, there is a lot of criticism of the priorities and imbalances in the policy: “The focus on the poorest people is being abandoned in this memorandum ... The Minister seems to trust that what is good for BV Netherlands is also good for the poorest.” (Parliamentary Documents II, 2012/13, 33625, 35:4). The liberalist frames are thus by far the most dominant in these documents. With the dominance of these frames one would also expect to see certain recipients, policy goals, levels of bilateral or multilateral aid, and a certain amount of aid. So in this chapter we are going to see whether these are indeed in line with the expectations.

Recipients

When we look at the recipients, we see that this government focuses on three types of relationships: aid relationships, transitional relationships, and trade relationships. For the first type of relationship, the aid is allocated to Afghanistan, Burundi, Mali, Yemen, Rwanda, South Sudan, and the Palestinian Territories. The second type concerns Bangladesh, Benin, Ethiopia, Ghana, Indonesia, Kenya, Mozambique, and Uganda. And for the trade relationships the focus is on Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Germany, France, Gulf States, India, Iraq, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Ukraine, Poland, Romania, Russia, Singapore, Turkey, Vietnam, United Kingdom, United States of America, South Africa, and South Korea. In Table B.2 I compared these countries with the expectations regarding recipients derived from the different theories in Appendix A. As can be seen in Table B.2, for the security interest the chosen countries do not align with the expectations, and policymakers also do not use a line of argumentation regarding the fear of being attacked by other states. When we look at the power interest, we do see one former colony – Indonesia – and a few recipients with high international visibility. However, the substantiation of these recipient choices is more economic based, which brings us to the expectations from the economic interest. When we compare the chosen recipients to the expected recipients for this frame, we see that a lot of the expected countries are actually part of the Dutch trade relationships instead of one of the two development-based

relationships. This trade relationship however, only involves activities that contribute to the growth of the Dutch economy and employment. There is no ODA allocated to these countries, and these countries therefore do not belong to the focus of this thesis. However, it does explain why we do not see more of them in the transitional relationships. The Netherlands seems to think that these countries already have enough prosperity, and therefore the aid in these countries can be stopped altogether. While if you look at these trade relationships from a humanitarian perspective, there is also a country like Nigeria. As can be seen in my operationalization, this is a country with one of the lowest life expectancies (i.e. 52 years according to the World Bank). With a humanitarian donor you would not expect this country being part of only a trade relationships, but you would expect an aid relationship instead. If we then go back to the aid and transitional relationships, we see Bangladesh, Yemen, and Ethiopia which have a high GDP, and Indonesia which is a large trading partner of the Netherlands. These recipients are therefore interesting from an economic perspective. For the other recipients in the transitional relationship, the dominance of economic interest is particularly evident in the substantiation of the policymakers: “Here we focus mainly on middle-income countries and low-income countries with strong economic growth. In transition relationships, combining aid and trade can benefit both developing countries and the Netherlands.” (Parliamentary Documents II, 2012/13, 33625, 1:4). Combining aid and trade should thus also lead to a Dutch advantage. This relationship is aimed to guide the recipients from an aid relation to Dutch trading partners. It therefore aligns with the economic interest.

Regarding the other type of relationship, the aid relationships, the focus is on countries that cannot solve their problems themselves: “This category includes (after) conflict countries, fragile states and countries that do not have sufficient capacity to effectively combat poverty without assistance.” (Parliamentary Documents II, 2012/13, 33625, 1:4). This seems to suggest an enlightened interest, and Table B.2 shows us that Indonesia, Yemen, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, and South Sudan are indeed countries you would expect to see with a dominant enlightened self-interest in a donor’s aid policy. The substantiation shows that the other aid relationships also are also chosen from this narrative. The focus is on unstable states or ones that might face a global challenge. This focus on international stability can for example also be seen in the Dutch involvement in Mali. This globalization is also why sometimes a whole region is taken into account in this policy: “Because problems in areas such as safety and the environment do not stick to national borders, we increasingly use a regional approach. We do this, for example, in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa.” (Parliamentary Documents II, 2012/13, 33625, 1:21). If things evolve into chaos there, that would have a destabilizing effect. This line of reasoning further substantiates the enlightened interest. The Dutch aid allocation during this time therefore seems to align with expectations from the liberalist theory. The analysis of the constructivist expectations in Table B.2 supports this furthermore by shows the theories shortcomings; the recipients do not fit the constructivism predictions. If constructivism had the most explanatory power, where are the most visible recipients, like Myanmar and Tanzania? Or if the humanitarian frame is supposed to be dominant, where are the poorest states like Liberia, Belarus, Tajikistan, or Sudan? It is interesting to see in the next section whether the policy goals also mainly align with the liberalist expectations, or if there still might be some realist or constructivist goals at play in the Dutch aid policy.

Policy goals

The policy has a spearhead-program in which the focus is on four spearheads: women’s rights and sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR), water, food security, and security and the rule of

law. The policy notes that: “These spearheads are relevant for global poverty alleviation and for the (economic) interests of the Netherlands” (Parliamentary Documents II, 2012/13, 33625, 1:5). This immediately shows a dual focus again. These spearheads underlie all the specific policy goals of the *2013-Agenda*. In this agenda the policy goals are divided into four categories: the pursuit of IPGs, the goals for the aid relationships, for the transitional relationships, and for the trade relationships. These goals are reviewed in Table B.3 in light of the expectations of the different theories. Here, we will respectively discuss the goals of the different categories and discuss if these match the expectations of a certain interest(s). The first group of policy objectives discussed in the memorandum is the pursuit of IPGs. This seems to suit the earlier enlightened self-interest focus of the policy. The government aims to achieve clear results on the themes of trade, safety and the rule of law, food security, water, climate, and migration. The fact that these are collective goods is emphasized by the government: “A public good is something that we all have an interest in, can contribute to and benefit from, but which we can all be bothered by if it is not properly managed.” (Parliamentary Documents II, 2012/13, 33625, 34:53). For example, food security is increasingly becoming a global issue, and climate change is also affecting many other themes, such as water management due to floods, degradation of land and forest, and resource depletion which can eventually lead to conflicts. “Climate change and the depletion of natural resources (environment, soil, biodiversity) limit the social and economic development of both poor and rich countries.” (Parliamentary Documents II, 2012/13, 33625, 1:24). But not only combating climate change, and its associated problems, is an important goal of this government, also “problems such as radicalization, terrorism and cross-border crime, as well as illegal trade flows and the raw materials supply are an increasing threat to stability in fragile states, and also to the Netherlands and Europe” (Parliamentary Documents II, 2012/13, 33625, 1:27). In combating these threats lies thus clearly a self-interest as well, which corresponds to an enlightened interest. The Dutch even use a form of soft power regarding the migration flows: “We exert pressure on countries to take back their subjects to whom access to the Netherlands has been denied, and use the possibility of conditionality in our trade and development relations with these countries in order to assure return.” (Parliamentary Documents II, 2012/13, 33625, 1:27-28). Not all IPGs immediately fit so clearly with an enlightened self-interest, for example promoting the international legal order can also be pursued out of a humanitarian interest. However, the substantiation then often confirms the dominance of the enlightened frame: “We benefit from respecting core values of the constitutional state in other countries as well” (Parliamentary Documents II, 2012/13, 33625, 1:27).

We also see the enlightened interest reflected in the first type of relationships, the aid relationships. One of the objectives here, is investing in a new global development program as a successor to the Millennium Development Goals. This is a large, high-profile aid project and the memorandum also states that this is necessary to combat poverty, which could fit the constructivist expectations. However, the government’s emphasis on the environment and sustainable development, as well as the Dutch four spearheads which should also receive an important place on this new global agenda, suggest a more liberal view. Investing in basic needs is also one of the objectives in the aid relationships. Here, there is a presence of the constructivist frames as well (Parliamentary Documents II, 2012/13, 33625, 1:30): “The Netherlands wants to make a difference in the lives of women” and they make a strong commitment to combating forced marriage (child brides) and sexual violence. However, these basic needs are focused on the spearheads, in which the Dutch own (economic) interests are at play again. The Netherlands benefits from investing in water- and food security, halting HIV/AIDS, and managing human crises. For example, the “companies and knowledge institutions from the Dutch top sectors can make a very valuable contribution here”, and only if

everyone “has access to health care, can HIV / AIDS be stopped” (Parliamentary Documents II, 2012/13, 33625, 1:23&31). The final objective is the focus on emergency relief and resilience. Underlying this, of course, is also a humanitarian idea as suits the enlightened frame (‘doing well by doing good’). However, “the number of natural disasters has risen to an average of almost 400 per year over the past few decades” which also entails a collective danger (Parliamentary Documents II, 2012/13, 33625, 1:5). The focus on IPGs and goals mentioned for the aid relationships therefore mostly align with the expectations of a dominant enlightened interest.

For the transitional relationships, the government wants to combine aid and trade activities in such a way that they lead to mutual benefits. To do this, the Netherlands wants to use the expertise of Dutch companies and Foreign Direct Investment to contribute to private sector development. With this, however, they simultaneously create a market and demand for the Dutch businesses which suggest some kind of economic interest. That Dutch business community is actually getting a lot of attention in these transitional relationships in the *2013-Agenda*. First of all, the focus is on more accessible business tools that provide information and advice as well as the financing of these activities. In this set of instruments, however, the Dutch entrepreneurs indicate in which countries and sectors they want to trade or want to invest, which could count on criticism in the debate: “It must above all be demand-driven and not supply-driven, because then you get tied aid.” (Parliamentary Documents II, 2012/13, 33625, 34:21). Secondly, Ploumen started the Dutch Good Growth Fund. The Fund provides financing to entrepreneurs in the Netherlands and in low- and middle-income countries by financing activities in developing countries. This initiative was badly received by the opposition. It was being called an ‘old-fashioned form of tied aid that leads to dumping’, and they are afraid that it for example, will compete with the small farmers over there, and mainly serves to create a market for the multinationals: “The Minister now calls it the Dutch Good Growth Fund. That actually says enough right? It is an incomprehensible name for an incomprehensible fund. ... How does the Minister explain to a child in Somalia that she does not want to give money to send her to school, but does have the money to let Heineken invest in Georgia?” (Parliamentary Documents II, 2012/13, 33625, 34:22). Another goal that was not well received is Ploumen’s way of opening up of international and regional markets. The negotiations around the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) were not going smoothly – the LMICs already have full tariff-free and quota-free market access to the European Union (EU) and think little of the benefits of an EPA – and Ploumen wanted to play an ‘honest broker’ in this. Her aim was “that countries recognize that they benefit from it themselves. ... They have to get over those hiccups” (Parliamentary Documents II, 2012/13, 33625, 34:53). The opposition, however, calls this ‘free trade through coercion’ and believes that developing countries have the right to make their own assessments on this point and that Ploumen should defend them in this: “If you assume that the ones holding trade talks with each other are sovereign partners, you cannot say, certainly not if you want to be honest broker, that it is an awareness project and that you are there to convince those countries that their objections do not hold.” (Parliamentary Documents II, 2012/13, 33625, 34:54). In these transitional relationships the economic frame thus appears to be indeed quite dominant. Of course this interest is also dominant in the trade relationships, but since there is no ODA involved here, this does not belong to the focus of this thesis. However, the fact that these relationships are lumped together with the development relationships, might also suggest a certain interest. Economic diplomacy is becoming more and more important here: “Economic diplomacy can ensure that doors for companies are opened in sectors where the Netherlands is strong and foreign governments have major interference, such as energy and water.” (Parliamentary Documents II, 2012/13, 33625, 1:40). In conclusion, as can be seen in Table B.3, some of the *2013-Agenda* policy goals also fit the

expectations of the constructivist theory, however the liberalist interests seem to be more dominant which is clearly indicated by their abundance in the table.

Bilateral/Multilateral

When we move to the expectations regarding the levels of bilateral and multilateral aid, I chose to mainly focus on the substantiation for these choices in deciding whether they fit certain expectations or not. Because only looking at the levels, without looking at the framing of policymakers, does not give us that much information; different theories have same expectations on levels of aid. The difference lies however in the narrative used by policymakers, as is shown in Table B.4. When we then first establish whether the *2013-Agenda* mainly focuses on bilateral or multilateral aid, the government states that: “contributions to multilateral organizations and earmarked expenditures to civil society organizations are reduced” (Parliamentary Documents II, 2012/13, 33625, 1:6). There are substantial budget cuts in this area. If we compare this to the operationalized hypotheses, we see a match with the expectations from a security, power, and/or economic interest. However, if we then look at the frames present in the documents, we do not see any support for the realist theory. The economic interest on the other hand, is being emphasized by the policymakers: “Trade should play a greater role in bilateral (aid) relationships” (Parliamentary Documents II, 2012/13, 33625, 1:19). Ploumen also adds: “Of course, in the bilateral relationship, I also focus on strengthening the business climate and the economies, particularly through the private sector development budget.” (Parliamentary Documents II, 2012/13, 33625, 34:51). This economic dominance is further substantiated as part of the aid that is still multilaterally allocated, is focused on enhancing the business climate, and on seeking cooperation with international organizations that are active in areas in which the Dutch companies belong to the top. This clearly aligns with what you would expect to see with a dominant economic interest.

If we look to the substantiation for the other part of the multilaterally allocated aid, we see that next to the dominance of the economic interest, there is clearly a presence of an enlightened interest as well. A large part of the expenditures that do take place multilaterally are focused on combatting global problems which aligns with the enlightened frame. The memorandum states that: “International organizations are becoming increasingly important for solving cross-border problems, which can only be successfully tackled by countries together, such as climate change and financial instability.” (Parliamentary Documents II, 2012/13, 33625, 1:19). They state for example that the EU is active in many countries where Member States do have strategic interests, but no or only small bilateral programs. “With its development programs, special representatives and civilian missions in the field of security, police and justice, the EU makes an important contribution to stability in many countries.” (Parliamentary Documents II, 2012/13, 33625, 1:47). The Dutch government supports other international organizations that can contribute to stability as well, such as the UN, the World Bank, NATO, and the UNHCR (UN Refugee Organization). They want to strengthen these organizations to prevent destabilization of the world order which fits with an enlightened frame. This enlightened interest is however not dominant, because according to the hypothesis in Chapter 2 we would expect to see a main focus on multilateral aid, instead of the budget cuts we see here. The presence of both an economic and enlightened interest is however not that remarkable, because the Dutch seem to have a dual focus with both their aid relationships, as well as their transitional relationships.

Volume

With regard to volume, there are three variables that play part in this hypothesis: the overall volume, the correlation of the volume with environment expectations from the different interests, and to what kind of projects the volume is allocated. When we first look to the overall volume, one can see a substantial cut in the development cooperation budget: “Between 2014 and 2016 the ODA budget will be cut by €750 million a year and by €1 billion a year as from 2017.” (Parliamentary Documents II, 2012/13, 33625, 1:50). As can be seen in the figure below, with these new cuts the Netherlands annually allocate around 0,6% of their GNP to aid.

ODA budget in millions of euros					
	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Gross ODA draft budget 2013	4,340	4,701	4,912	4,950	5,142
Rutte II coalition agreement cuts		-750	-750	-750	-1,000
GNP adjustment since 2013 draft budget	-100	-135	-172	-225	-296
Gross ODA, Rutte II	4,240	3,816	3,990	3,975	3,846
less repayments/receipts	-85	-81	-77	-77	-77
Net ODA, Rutte II	4,154	3,735	3,913	3,898	3,769
Net ODA as a percentage of GNP	0.68	0.59	0.60	0.59	0.55

Figure 1: 2013-Agenda ODA budget in millions of euros

This means that for first time the Dutch drop below the UN norm of 0,7%. This goes against the expectations from a reputation and humanitarian frame. The Netherlands does not exceed the international norm anymore, and an opposition member adds: “I think that is a serious break with a tradition that the Netherlands was proud of.” (Parliamentary Documents II, 2012/13, 33625, 34:57). And the debate about this subject also makes it clear again that the opposition does not find this policy humanitarian in any case: “That specifically the Labor Party is responsible for the fact that our country is giving up the 0.7% standard unilaterally, is embarrassing. With this, the soil has been beaten away under international solidarity.” (Parliamentary Documents II, 2012/13, 33625, 34:6). However, the Dutch still allocate a higher % of their GNP than most peers. If we look to the expectations about correlation with the environment, one sees that this can be explained by either a power interest or an economic or enlightened interest. A power interest states that small countries have fewer means available to raise their international influence, and are therefore expected to more often use aid as a means to gain this. An economic or enlightened interest explains this along the lines that the Netherlands is a small country with a very international economic outlook, they are therefore, more than many other countries, dependent for their economic wellbeing on sustainable development in other countries. An enlightened interest, however, would not expect these budget cuts, but would expect a relatively high volume – we live in an interdependent world and therefore need one another. This paradigm can thus not explain why the budget is being cut.

As far as the kind of projects concerned, the aid goes to projects in the four spearheads, emergency relief, international security, private sector development, and annual obligations as can be seen in the figure below. This aligns with the expectations from an economic, enlightened, and duty frame.




Figure 2: 2013-Agenda expenditure

This government furthermore opts, in the budgetary sense as well, for strengthening cohesion between the policy areas of foreign trade and development cooperation. The Dutch Good Growth Fund receives 250 million annually, and they focus on private sector development, market access, and improving the business climate. The share of the four spearheads and private sector development/trade promotion will even increase from 51% to 57% in this period, while the expenditures on civil society, education, good governance, culture, and support will decrease from 16% to 11%. These objectives could count on a lot of criticism from the opposition. The cabinet was said to lose the balance between the aid objectives and the investment in economic growth: “The proportion of Dutch aid money that goes to the business tools in 2017 compared to, for example, civil society, is out of control” (Parliamentary Documents II, 2012/13, 33625, 34:17-18). In addition to the spearheads, The Budget for International Security also receives 250 million annually, and it is stipulated that international climate expenditure is financed from the ODA budget. The opposition says about the latter: “The fine print says that the private financing of the climate money is still not regulated. This could even amount to an additional tax of 1.2 billion. ... This is then called combating poverty.” (Parliamentary Documents II, 2012/13, 33625, 34:19). This clearly implies an enlightened interest in the Dutch allocation as well.

In conclusion, one can see some elements that can also be expected with the presence of an enlightened, duty or power frame. However, the only paradigm that matches to whole volume hypotheses is the economic interest. The economic interest can explain why there are budget cuts, but also why the % of the Dutch GNP is still higher than most peers. It also explains the cuts on civil society, education, good governance, culture, and support, and explains the increase in expenditures on the four spearheads and private sector development/trade promotion. An economic frame therefore seems to have the upper hand, which is further substantiated by the fact that Ploumen opts for the expansion of the ODA-definition. She wants innovative financing instruments, like the Dutch Good Growth Fund which also has an own economic interest underlying it, to be included into the ODA definition.

Conclusion

When looking at the policy of this government, the *2013-Agenda: A world to gain* shows us that the policy is mainly motivated out of the argument that we are all connected and we live in an interdependent world, and out argument that the Dutch are losing economic power and want to gain in that area again. The recipients are countries that cannot solve their problems themselves, and middle-income countries and low-income countries with strong economic growth. Their policy goals are inter alia, investing in IPGs, investing in basic needs, emergency relief and resilience, supporting entrepreneurs and governments, and improving access to international and regional markets. Aid is given both bilaterally, and multilaterally. However, there are large budget cuts regarding multilateral aid. Finally, aid volume is also being cut. The Netherlands still gives a higher share compared to peers, but breaks tradition by discarding the UN target of 0.7%. This suggest the dominance of the liberalist theory, which will be more thoroughly tested in the final chapter. But we will first take a look at the *1993-Agenda* in the next section.

Chapter 5: 1993 – A world in dispute

After analyzing the 2013 policy it is interesting to see whether this is actually so different from the 1993 policy. Are there other interests dominant in Pronk's policy and can the same theory also explain this policy? In this chapter I will first briefly explain again what the particular policy entails. I will give a brief summary of the policy and discuss some of its objectives. Then, based on the memorandum and on the basis of the debate about this memorandum, I will analyze the *1993-Agenda*. The results of this analysis can be found in Appendix C. I followed the same structure as with the *2013-Agenda*: I have first looked at which frame was dominant in this development policy regarding the motivations used, and then checked to see whether the kind of recipients, the policy goals, the levels of either bilateral or multilateral aid, and the aid volume matched the expectations for the dominant interest(s). Organizing this data made it possible to analyze the dominant frame and draw a conclusion about which theory therefore appears to have the most explanatory power.

5.1 Overview aid policy

During 1989 till 1994 cabinet-Lubbers III was in charge in the Netherlands. This cabinet was a coalition of two different political parties, the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) and the Labor Party (PvdA). This government was a center-coalition in terms of political color. Jan Pronk occupied the function of Minister for Development Cooperation in this government. In 1993, the government issued a second agenda in which they elaborated on their aid policy objectives: *A world in dispute; exploring the boundaries of development cooperation* (Parliamentary Documents II, 1993/94, 23408, 2). During this time, the Netherlands built their reputation of being generous donor, and they became a respected actor in the development playing field, and were seen as a front-runner regarding policies and cooperation. In the development community, Pronk symbolizes this Dutch reputation: "Who says development cooperation, says Pronk" reads an old newspaper headline (Nicolasen, 1998). Sustainable poverty reduction is therefore indicated as one of his main objectives for Dutch development aid. This particular government focused on large international issues, such as war and peace, climate and energy, migration, religion, and culture (Tijkotte & Rijnveld, 2008). The aim was to improve the productive capacity of people, the provision of basic needs, and the participation of the poor in the process of political decision-making. This policy was a reaction to a number of fundamental changes in the world, such as the increase in disputes, the emergence of a multipolar world, the increasing interdependence of states, and globalization due to e.g. advancing technological developments (Parliamentary Documents II, 1993/94, 23408, 2). These developments have led to some adjustments in relation to the government's former policy memorandum issued in 1990, *A world of difference*. With this new policy Minister Pronk "stroved to counter the disintegration and disorder in the world and saw this as a task for the entire international community: promoting the cohesion of the world" (Tijkotte & Rijnveld, 2008, p. 9). It is interesting to see what interest(s) underlies this policy, and if that is any different from the *2013-Agenda*. In the following section the *1993-Agenda* memorandum and the two debates about this memorandum will be analyzed, with the aim of establishing the Dutch dominant underlying interest.

5.2 Analysis

When looking at the *1993-Agenda*, one might expect to see a very humanitarian aid policy. Seeing as Pronk stated that Ploumen has 'swept away the soil under international solidarity'. In his termination letter, Pronk argued that development cooperation should "mainly take place on the basis of

solidarity". It is interesting to see whether this is indeed really the case here in the *1993-Agenda*. To get a clear picture of the government's overall ideas, I structured the data in Table C.1-C.5. I have analyzed the memorandum and the debate about this policy by comparing the operationalization in Chapter 3 and Appendix A to these documents. I looked at which indicators of which interests were most prevalent in these pieces, and which frame dominated the conversation.

Aid motivation

The memorandum starts off by giving an account of a number of developments in international relations. These developments have led to some adjustments in relation to Pronk's former policy memorandum issued in 1990 *A world of difference*. It starts with describing the changes in polarity in the world. It would have changed from bipolar to either unipolar with a role for the United States, or multipolar. This seems to point to a realistic frame to legitimize their aid policy, since: "In that perspective it is useful to analyze to which order the world now tends, and to see how these tendencies can be steered in a peace-enhancing way." (Parliamentary Documents II, 1993/94, 23408, 2:12). However, this line of thought does not seem to continue. This multipolarity would, according to the Dutch government, namely lead to regional or supranational cooperation. The policy also states that the position of governments has become weaker and that other parties need to be involved in this cooperation: "It is about involving all the major actors on the international scene in framing the new relationships and safeguarding their interests, so that all parties will also feel responsible." (Parliamentary Documents II, 1993/94, 23408, 2:68). This does not align with what you would expect to see with a dominant realist frame, as it only sees states as the main actor.

Then the memorandum quickly switches to a liberalistic train of thought as can be seen in Table C.1. Just like the *2013-Agenda*, the *1993-Agenda* is also motivated as being partly a response to changing economic conditions. The interconnectedness of economies is increasing and there is globalization of economic relations between countries. The Dutch emphasize that an increasing number of production processes are outsourced internationally and: "Gradually *the global factory* is coming to fruition." (Parliamentary Documents II, 1993/94, 23408, 2:56). Developing countries are said to become an increasingly important competitor for rich countries, and the government states that they need to further integrate into the world economy, and need to develop a balanced market economy adapted to the world market. At first sight this might suggest an economic frame, however, the Netherlands does not see this competition as a disadvantage: "It is clear that these developments must be valued positively for the world as a whole. ... Globally it promotes the growth of prosperity. It also increases the possibilities for poor countries to get out of their poverty." (Parliamentary Documents II, 1993/94, 23408, 2:57). The Dutch also believe that all developed countries should contribute to the aforementioned integration by taking the interests of economically weak developing countries into account in a consistent manner and as a priority. With this motivation behind the aid policy, helping developing countries integrate, the government seems to follow more of an enlightened frame than a purely economic frame. The world economy is being seen more as a public good of which stability is important for everyone, than as a system that can be exploited for personal gain. And although the economy is an important IPG, in the *1993-Agenda* the greatest focus seems to be on all kinds of global disputes.

The policy is therefore mostly motivated out of a response to changing global stability conditions. As can be seen in Table C.1 there is an overwhelming dominance of enlightened frames in this regard. The country borders are said to have faded, the risks of the disruption of the ecological balance would have increased, globalization would have taken place and as a consequence national

governments had less control over processes, and populations of the different continents are getting more and more connected:

“Goods, services and capital move faster and are rapidly growing in magnitude all over the world. Distances are rapidly becoming smaller, both physically and in people's minds. Traveling is much easier; migration has become a massive phenomenon. The world's problems are also becoming less isolated and hidden: poverty, hunger, conflict, environmental damage, contagious disease, drug addiction.” (Parliamentary Documents II, 1993/94, 23408, 2:8).

The number of difficult-to-solve problems has grown sharply and large-scale poverty, combined with scarcity of resources, provokes distribution conflicts. The problem of an expanding economic system that must function within a closed ecosystem is presented; “environmental space has borders, but these are often not national borders” (Parliamentary Documents II, 1993/94, 23408, 2:42). The economies are increasingly intertwined and problems of international migration and refugee flows have increased sharply. The government therefore sees the promotion of the cohesion of the world and alleviating the problems such as disorder, as a new urgent task for the international community. Using aid to combat this, is further substantiated by Pronk in the debate with the line of thought that: “as a result of international interdependence and globalization, a greater possibility has arisen that conflicts spread to other countries and also manifest in other societies where things were going well until then. The conflicts can therefore easily be introduced from outside. This could, for example, be related to drug trafficking, mafia or terrorism.” (Parliamentary Documents II, 1993/94, 23408, 24:4). Because these cross-border problems can sooner or later affect everyone, this government emphasizes the growing need for adaptation. This argumentation is in line with the expectations of a dominant enlightened interest. This dominance is confirmed by the policy's accentuating of the need for global cooperation in order to strengthen the practice of peaceful settlement of disputes:

“The international frameworks for development cooperation are thus being revived. Collective safety and conflict management are keywords here. ... These are developments whose meaning crosses national boundaries; they thus touch upon the question of order and disorder in the world.” (Parliamentary Documents II, 1993/94, 23408, 2: 12-13)

For example, especially in poor countries and territories, the chance of violent conflict over the seizure of the environmental space arises. Rich and poor countries should therefore cooperate, and use development aid to help reduce both environmental degradation and population growth, aim for more equal distribution of wealth, and shape a more sustainable development: “Ultimately, this benefits the safety of all.” (Parliamentary Documents II, 1993/94, 23408, 2:31). In addition, poverty is also highlighted by this government as a global challenge. They state that poverty is associated with war and violence, population growth and, for example, the spread of AIDS. The elimination of absolute poverty motivates the Dutch aid policy in order to realize sustainable development and prevent environmental degradation and conflict. This is not therefore entirely pursued out of altruism, but there is also an enlightened self-interest. The government adds that social integration is necessary as well for the stability of societies in the long run “and therefore also for the world community” (Parliamentary Documents II, 1993/94, 23408, 2:102). Furthermore, poverty reduction also saves the society some costs. The poverty-related crime, prostitution, etc. is reduced, the great waste of the human potential that is associated with poverty is nullified, and, for example, investment in education of girls leads to them later having fewer children; “Poverty reduction can therefore make an important contribution to the growth and development of the economy as a whole” (Parliamentary Documents

II, 1993/94, 23408, 2:93). These new international problems influence the Dutch aid policy, which is clearly motivated by an enlightened self-interest. Pronk says about this in the debate: “Previously, a problem that took place in a country was a problem for that country. It was isolated. It had no consequences. Now it has consequences for countless countries that have to deal with it” (Parliamentary Documents II, 1993/94, 23408, 24:1805). This also means that international frameworks for development cooperation are being redrawn, which fits in very strongly with an enlightened frame.

The constructivist frames are not predominantly present, contrary to what might be expected in advance. The government does speak out about matters they think international society should undertake, they do state that rich countries must make a contribution because they have the most resources, and the need for a less skewed distribution is emphasized. However, the reasoning of the policymakers more closely resemble an enlightened frame than one of the constructivist frames as can be seen in Table C.1. With the clear dominance of this frame, one would also expect to see certain recipients, policy goals, levels of bilateral or multilateral aid, and a certain amount of aid. So in this chapter we are going to see whether these are indeed in line with the expectations set by this frame.

Recipients

The *1993-Agenda* focuses on four type of countries: regular cooperation countries, countries with which a sustainable development treaty is concluded that not only concerns official development cooperation but also relations from other departments, countries in conflict or rehabilitation, and countries in transition. The nature of the cooperation with the countries in the first and second category is structural, long-term, and development-oriented. This concerns Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Laos, Egypt, Ethiopia, Yemen, Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, Suriname, Netherlands Antilles, and Aruba. With the countries in the third and fourth category, the cooperation is limited in time and in character focused on the problems of conflict, rehabilitation, or transformation. Countries from the third category include Angola, Occupied Territories, Eritrea, Cambodia, Sudan, and Somalia. The countries in the fourth category are Armenia, Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova, Romania, former Yugoslavia, Albania, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Namibia, Vietnam, and South Africa. In Table C.2 I compared these countries with the expectations regarding recipients derived from the different theories in Appendix A. As can be seen in Table C.2, for the security interest the chosen countries do not really align with the expectations; there are some allied states, but most recipients are states without a clear Dutch allegiance. When we look at the power interest, we do see three former colonies – Surinam, Netherlands Antilles, and Aruba – and a few recipients with high international visibility. Political considerations also seem to play a role to a certain extent. For example, the decision to keep giving aid to Pakistan instead of stopping it, is substantiated from the fact that: “it would not be wise because of geopolitical relations, the relationship with India, and the related political problems” (Parliamentary Documents II, 1993/94, 23408, 24:29). However, the sort of expected extensive substantiation with a dominance of this interest is lacking. In addition, there is an extended list of recipients that do not fit this frame and do not have a certain high international visibility. When we then move to the expectations from the economic interest, one can see that the Dutch recipients are not eminently Dutch trading partners or upcoming and powerful economies. It was actually decided to even terminate the aid relationship with a dozen countries, precisely because some of these countries have reached such a degree of economic development that “of a reallocation

to poorer countries is sensible" (Parliamentary Documents II, 1993/94, 23408, 2:123). If the government was mainly focused on trade, this would not be in line with expectations.

When we then take a closer look at the countries from the first two categories, Table C.2 shows us that they mostly align with the expectations from an enlightened or duty interest. For a humanitarian interest, for example, we miss too many of the poorest countries during that time. But especially the substantiations show the certain frames. A duty interest is present in the sense that continuity plays an important role for the Netherlands in choosing recipients. Furthermore, in these countries are problems at play like population growth, environmental degradation, and agricultural stagnation which "will lead to increasing, also international, labor migration." (Parliamentary Documents II, 1993/94, 23408, 2:52-53). With the choice of countries the government tries, among other thing, to prevent population growth. They state that the world's population has grown at an unprecedented rate and Africa is the continent with the fastest growing population. Since population growth is related to things like environmental degradation and labor migration, Pronk seems to be committed to this as can be seen in his prioritization of Africa. Focusing on countries with global challenges and large populations fits in with the enlightened frame. The government also focuses on countries where poverty reduction can take place to ultimately reduce the social costs of poverty: "Poverty alleviation is therefore an investment that bears fruit" (Parliamentary Documents II, 1993/94, 23408, 2:93). Here, there also seems to be an implicit own interest again.

With countries from the third category the effort is focused on contributing to conflict resolution. These countries are eligible for emergency aid and humanitarian aid; i.e. reconstruction support. It concerns states that are unstable and in need of rehabilitation, which matches the expectations from an enlightened interest. However, there also seems to be a duty interest in these relationships: "After all, it would not be understood by anyone if the Netherlands did not offer any assistance in the context of a conflict" (Parliamentary Documents II, 1993/94, 23408, 2:12). The countries in the fourth category are countries that are in a structural transformation to a market-oriented democratic society. They receive institutional support and macroeconomic assistance through joint international programs to stabilize and transform the economy (i.e. no development and investment programs). The government emphasizes that this transformation can encounter all kinds of obstacles of a political, institutional or socio-cultural nature. The result is often a system where the old one is already demolished without a new one being in place: "Such a half anarchy naturally offers fertile soil for the activities of black market traders and other profiteers of unrestrained early capitalism. It also proves to be a favorable context for the stimulation of ethnic differences." (Parliamentary Documents II, 1993/94, 23408, 2:26). This can lead to conflicts that can spread to the entire region. With the countries in the last two categories no long-term development relations are entered into, but the Dutch do invest in them to prevent international instability. This is in line with the expectation of a dominant enlightened frame.

Policy goals

When we test the policy goals for the different hypotheses in Table C.3, we see that they don't corroborate with the hypotheses from the realist theory. There is however some evidence for the presence of an economic interest. This government has a development fund for private investment (the FMO, Dutch development bank), they encourage Foreign Direct Investment, and they also support the liberalization and opening up of world trade. An open climate is said to be a requirement for international trade, and regarding the negotiations about this liberalization they state that "the success of the round is of great importance, because this will give an impetus to world trade" (Parliamentary

Documents II, 1993/94, 23408, 2:61). This view could count on some criticism in the debate. The opposition states that precisely as a result of this liberalization “especially the least developed countries can face major financial problems” (Parliamentary Documents II, 1993/94, 23408, 24:22). One member of the opposition states that he thinks that the developing countries therefore have to be compensated with part of “the hundreds of billions that are expected for us as positive consequences of the agreement” (Parliamentary Documents II, 1993/94, 23408, 24:22). This clearly shows an economic self-interest. Pronk responds by stating: “I think compensation of international trade policy through extra assistance is not justified.” He does add that he will do his utmost to maximize the access for developing countries to the European market. Above all however, he sees the stalemate in the negotiations as a danger to all world trade, which is not in the interests of developing countries, but of course not the Dutch interest as well. This can also indicate the presence of an enlightened interest instead. This dual focus is present as well in some of the other policy goals. This government sums up fourteen specific areas of attention in the memorandum. Four of them have an economic focus to some extent. The government aims at: the strengthening and reforming of the international economic order, the link between development aid on the one hand and international trade policy and financial policy on the other, the adaptations of the structure of the national economies of developing countries that are necessary in order to achieve a sustainable equilibrium in the various markets, and the transformation of some recipients into market-oriented and democratic processes. These goals could be pursued out of an economic as well as an enlightened interest. However, ‘the current interdependent international economic relations’ are emphasized.

Other policy goals include investing in global challenges and reforming the international order. In this the importance of ecologically sustainable development and redistribution of the limited international environmental usage space is noted, in which the government focuses on climate, conservation of biological diversity and forests, sustainable land use, and water. Priority is given to bringing peace and averting (preventing, controlling and resolving) violent conflicts. “The international coordination of peace policy, the international legal order policy, and international cooperation in development” is an important problem that needs to be bridged (Parliamentary Documents II, 1993/94, 23408, 24:9). Furthermore, this government focuses on the containment of large migration flows, as well as the reduction of population growth by implementing family planning services, in order to prevent, among other things, further labor migration and environmental degradation. These are goals that one would also expect to see if an enlightened interest is dominant, as these are all IPGs that are being pursued. The policy goals that are a little more ambiguous regarding the testing of the different hypotheses, are the ones about poverty reduction from the bottom up, and reducing the economic inequality and exclusion of people, in which priority is given within each sector to development activities that directly benefit weaker, marginalized populations. The areas of interest here are rural development and poverty reduction, urban poverty reduction, poverty and children, education, and health care and nutrition. These goals match the expectations from both a humanitarian interest, as well as an enlightened self-interest (‘doing well, by doing good’). The other constructivist interests are not predominantly present as can be seen in Table C.3. Both the humanitarian and the enlightened interest might play a role here. However, a member of the opposition does ask if the Netherlands shouldn’t do more: “Why is this poorest category of the poor, as we may call them, not helped with anything that is possible, while we do help those people who are suddenly in such dire circumstances due to hunger or natural disaster?” (Parliamentary Documents II, 1993/94, 23408, 24:23). And another adds in this debate: “These interests are increasingly related to our own interests in the areas of the environment, the economy, conflict management, refugees, etc.”

and he opts to increase the mandate of this minister to primarily promote the interests of the developing countries (Parliamentary Documents II, 1993/94, 23408, 24:22). The government thus seems to focus on things that actually benefit development, but where there is also some Dutch self-interest underlying it.

This enlightened line of thought also continues in Pronk's reasoning in the debate. He puts a number of terms and conditions on poverty reduction/development aid: "It must be clean. That is the environmental dimension. It must be safe. That is the political dimension. It must be healthy macro-economically." (Parliamentary Documents II, 1993/94, 23408, 24:3). To achieve socio-economic development – 'that benefits the entire population' – priority is given to freedom, democracy, and human rights. For many countries, this requires a transformation in which people's access to the market and their participation in the political system must come first, in addition to the promotion of reliable government and an effective legal system, because "People are more and more dependent on what is happening elsewhere, to which people must react and which often happens without much political decision-making. This also gives us problems in the western countries", Pronk states in the debate (Parliamentary Documents II, 1993/94, 23408, 24:4). The provision of regular development aid should therefore increasingly be placed within the framework of an assessment of the political and social situation in the recipient country, of the quality of its public administration, as well as of the degree of democracy and guaranteeing of human rights. Pronk even uses soft power to enforce this. He states it is justified to "cut back on aid to the country if there is a flagrant and systematic violation of human rights, a severe drop in democratization or persistently excessive military expenditure, or even to stop it completely" (Parliamentary Documents II, 1993/94, 23408, 2:24). He also sees the possibility of linking extra preferences to the willingness of developing countries to participate in international environmental agreements. This conditionality does not align with the expectations from a humanitarian interest. The memorandum confirms this by ending its policy with:

"Development cooperation is no longer the soft sector of foreign relations, a form of international welfare policy to correct or compensate for the harsh reality of international politics. The development cooperation itself will also increasingly become part of that reality. This has disadvantages, because a dimension of purity - the "real" development aid - is likely to be lost. But the advantage is the gain in relevance and effectiveness, because the balance of power can also be influenced through development cooperation." (Parliamentary Documents II, 1993/94, 23408, 2:105).

This decompartmentalization of development aid is done with the aim of broader international cooperation, which this government will focus on pursuing.

Bilateral/Multilateral aid

During this time, the government's main focus was on multilateral aid. As can be seen in Table C.4, a great deal of multilateral aid is being provided, and while the amount for this is not being reduced, those for bilateral aid are. This doesn't correspond with the expectations from the realist theory and the economic interest. Although regarding the latter, in the multilateral aid that is given, there is some focus on enhancing the business climate as there is a need for the "Strengthening and reform of the international economic order, including through the promotion of multilateral cooperation" (Parliamentary Documents II, 1993/94, 23408, 2:103). This substantiation could however, also fit in with an enlightened interest. The focus on multilateral aid does match the expectations from this interest, as well as the expectations from the duty and reputation interest. When we then look at the debate, Pronk shows us two of the reasons behind this focus: "First of all, I would like to point out that

the vast majority of multilateral aid processed on this budget is provided on demand by the World Bank, the regional development banks, and the European Development Fund. This aid is given on the basis of decisions taken years ago during negotiations. ... It involves honoring previously taken decisions.” (Parliamentary Documents II, 1993/94, 23408, 24:16). This does not apply to annual pledging for UN funds, such as UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF and so on. Pronk says about this: “If we were to lower our funds for the organizations mentioned, that would have a snowball effect. Others will then also adjust the levels of their contributions downwards.” (Parliamentary Documents II, 1993/94, 23408, 24:16). It legitimizes other to do less as well, which is what the Dutch want to prevent. These reasons show a reputation and duty frame.

The further substantiation focuses more on the need for international cooperation. This is on the one hand because “joint country-specific poverty strategies can make a very important contribution to the so urgent reduction of absolute poverty”, which suggest a humanitarian frame (Parliamentary Documents II, 1993/94, 23408, 2:89). But on the other hand, multilateral aid is said to be especially needed to support the efforts to strengthen international systems, and promote cohesion in the world, which might suggest more of an enlightened framing. For example, many of the former communist countries were in transition to democratization, to the building of a rule of law, and to the introduction of a market economy. The memorandum states that “in this fluid situation there is a need for new, integrating structures as anchors of stability. This is reflected in the rapidly growing intensity of multilateral relations” (Parliamentary Documents II, 1993/94, 23408, 2:14). The government therefore advocates for strong international cooperation. They furthermore focus on strengthening the international economic order by promoting multilateral cooperation, on multilateral environmental agreements to tackle cross-border and global environmental problems, and on placing the subject of migration on the international cooperation agenda. In addition, complex humanitarian emergencies also “call for an integrated deployment of foreign-political, defense-policy, and development-policy instruments” (Parliamentary Documents II, 1993/94, 23408, 2:31). Because of the loss of function of the state due to cross-border problems, international cooperation is seen as the remedy. This strengthens the practice of peaceful settlement of disputes. That’s why this government wants to strengthen international organizations such as the UN. “Unselfish states do not exist”, so in this new interdependent environment it is necessary to give content to “the idea of collective security” (Parliamentary Documents II, 1993/94, 23408, 2:34). This line of thought and this focus on the multilateral system corresponds to the expectations from an enlightened frame.

Volume

In analyzing the volume, we have to look at the three variables again: the overall volume, the correlation of the volume with environment expectations from the different interests, and to what kind of projects the volume is allocated. However, Pronk has chosen not to elaborate on the budgetary details, as the “relevant note comes shortly before the end of a cabinet period” (Parliamentary Documents II, 1993/94, 23408, 24:10). The memorandum does not provide any specifications on the volume and allocation of development aid in the coming years: “In that respect you cannot make any commitments that suggest something.” (Parliamentary Documents II, 1993/94, 23408, 24:10). But if we look at the entire budget of this tenure, one sees that the government allocated a budget of 0.8% of the GNP to aid. This is a relatively high volume, which with the Dutch outperform most other donors. If we then look at theories, this can be explained by an enlightened interest, or a reputation or humanitarian interest. As interdependence is high, and the Dutch are a very ‘open’ country, the enlightened paradigm expect a high volume of aid and even higher than that of peers. A reputation

interest expects the Dutch to be above the UN target of 0.7%, which they are. And lastly, a humanitarian view expects the Netherlands to outperform peers because it is a prosperous country compared to a lot of other donors, and therefore have the means to do so. However, over the years the Dutch allocation in % of GNP has shrunk a little, something you would not expect from a completely altruistic donor.

While the memorandum does not provide us with a table with budgetary specifics, it does offer an analysis on the basis of which political decisions can be made. One of those aspects regarding volume, tells us something about the government's underlying interests. Next to ODA, the Dutch spend a lot of non-ODA money as well. The memorandum tells us that the Netherlands have always had the objective of annually earmarking 1.5% of their Net National Income for development co-operation, "that is, for ODA plus for adjacent and supporting activities (non-ODA)" (Parliamentary Documents II, 1993/94, 23408, 24:10). However, the latter category is said to have increased as a result of, among other things, the changes due to new needs for international cooperation that could not be brought under the traditional ODA definition. This puts pressure on the level of ODA within the Dutch aid share. The government therefore advocates for a broader standard: in addition to development aid, also the inclusion of international environmental policy, peace operations in developing countries, the reception of asylum seekers, and assistance to Central and Eastern Europe. Wanting this broader definition suits somewhat with a reputation interest, however that this is needed due to the international changes that asks for more international cooperation and investment in stability, suits the enlightened frame as well. Specific shares or international norms would not influence a humanitarian donor that much; they would give aid where needed independent of societies expectations.

Conclusion

The *1993-Agenda* shows us that the government's aid policy during this time was largely motivated by international dependence. Aid is allocated to countries which deal with poverty problems or global challenges like population growth, countries in conflict or rehabilitation, and countries in transition. The policy is aimed at eradicating this poverty, investing in IPGs, and reforming the international economic order. Aid is mainly given multilaterally, and the Dutch have a relatively high aid budget during this time. At first glance, the *1993-Agenda* indeed seems to have a somewhat other focus than the *2013-Agenda*, but there also seem to be some similarities. How much, and in which areas they really differ will be discussed in the next Chapter. In that section, an overview of the results will be given and an answer to the research question will be produced.

Chapter 6: Conclusion and Discussion

In this final chapter, an answer will be constructed to the research question: *How can the Dutch aid policy in the 1993-Agenda and the 2013-Agenda be explained, and is there a change in underlying interests and focus between them?*

First, I will elaborate upon and test the hypotheses, predicted by the different theories, for what has been found in Chapter 4 and 5. Based on this, the hypotheses will be rejected or accepted. Second, the final conclusions will be given based on the theories and the analysis which will lead to answering the research question. Thirdly, I will introduce some recommendations for further research. And finally, some of the limitations of the research will be discussed.

6.1 Findings

In Chapter 2 a number of hypotheses were made on the basis of the three grand theories. If that particular theory had the most explanatory power, one would expect to see the dominance of a specific interest in the documents – i.e. a particular framing, and a certain kind of recipients and aid allocation. In order to be able to test these hypotheses, the interests were operationalized in Chapter 3. This led to operational hypotheses that could be tested; this is what one would expect to see if a particular interest is dominant in the policy. This operationalization was used to analyze the documents discussed in Chapter 4 and 5. In these chapters the different elements were discussed, wherein the presence of certain interests were established. In this section, I will first give an overview of the findings in the agendas and of the test of the operationalized hypotheses, after which I will return to my theoretical hypotheses and discuss the implications for the accepted and rejected theories.

The Aid Agendas

For the *2013-Agenda*, the government chose to focus on two type of development relationships with recipients, for which they had different motivations, policy goals and volume allocations. In the first type of relationships, the aid relationships, the government focused on conflict countries, fragile states, and countries that did not have sufficient capacity to effectively combat poverty without assistance; these states threaten the international stability. The focus lay on investments on the four spearheads in the area of basic needs, and on investing in IPGs to combat global threats. In the second type of relationships, the transition relationships, recipients were LMICs with strong economic growth, and countries with trade and investment opportunities, for example with the aim to conquer a market share. The government promoted trade liberalization and subsidized domestic firms to invest in LMICs, for example with the use of the Dutch Good Growth Fund. Regarding the levels of bilateral and multilateral aid, contributions to multilateral organizations and earmarked expenditures to civil society organizations were reduced. However, the Netherlands did see a significant value in the remaining part. Multilateral aid was for example used to both strengthen international organizations to solve cross-border problems, as well as to enhance their own business climate. Regarding volume, the share of private sector development and trade promotion grew, while the expenditures on things like civil society, education, and good governance decreased. Overall volume also dropped below the norm of 0.7% for first time since it was internationally agreed upon.

In 1993, the new agenda was legitimized as being a response to the changing international conditions. What motivated the aid policy was the development of things like the increase in disputes, the problems of a limited environmental use space, the interconnectedness of economies, the large migration flows, and the social costs of poverty. In an increasingly interconnected world these

problems could hit quite easily close to home. Aid was therefore allocated to countries which dealt with poverty problems or global challenges like population growth, countries in conflict or rehabilitation, and countries in transition. The government stated fourteen specific areas of attention which included things like strengthening and reforming the international economic order, ecologically sustainable development, bringing peace and averting violent conflicts, reduction in natural population growth in the world, and poverty reduction from the bottom up. Furthermore, the *1993-Agenda* had a high focus on the multilateral aid flows as these were internationally agreed upon, as well as they stimulated international cooperation. Regarding volume, the government allocated a relatively high overall aid volume; 0.8% of the Dutch GNP.

The Operationalized Hypotheses

As became apparent in Chapter 4, most of the above mentioned elements of the *2013-Agenda* seem to align with either the expectations from an economic or an enlightened interest, or both. However, in chapter 4 each dimension was viewed separately. In this section I try to capture the dominance of the certain interests that underlie the entire Dutch policy in 2013. I did this by making an overview in which the various dimensions from the different hypotheses are scored on the basis of the analysis in Chapter 4, founded on the data from Appendix B. I did the same with the *1993-Agenda* on the basis of the analysis in Chapter 5, founded on the data from Appendix C. By doing this, the dominance of a certain interest can be established by addressing them as a whole. This overview is shown in Figure 3 below. The overview clearly shows the dominance of an economic interest, as well as visible presence of an enlightened interest in the 2013-Agenda. These interests are clearly present in the Dutch development policy, as indicated through the complete analysis shown in Appendix B and the summary in Chapter 4. This Chapter showed us multiple times the presence of an enlightened self-interest, for example: “We are involved in global problems. Our country is one of the most open countries in the world. We depend on the development of others for our own well-being and our own prosperity. Sustainable and inclusive growth is in our own interest and in the interests of others.” As well as an economic interest, for example, in their choice of recipients in which the Dutch focus on middle-income countries and low-income countries with strong economic growth, because “emerging markets are an opportunity for our business, especially in sectors where the Netherlands is at the international top”. What this means for the theoretical hypotheses, the theoretical implications, and the research question, I will move towards in the next sections.

Subsequently, the analysis of the data in Chapter 5 strongly suggested the overall dominance of an enlightened interest in the policy of the *1993-Agenda*. If we look at the figure below, we see that this is confirmed. There are some elements of the constructivist expectations present in the policy, but they cannot explain the whole policy. Chapter 5 showed us that some of those expected elements were clearly missing, as shown by for example the question: “Why is this poorest category of the poor, as we may call them, not helped with anything that is possible?” In addition the analysis showed us many examples of the enlightened interest, which motivated the policy for instance because: “People are more and more dependent on what is happening elsewhere, to which people must react and which often happens without much political decision-making. This also gives us problems in the western countries”. As the figure shows us, this interest to maintain the international stability directs to whole Dutch policy. Because I already elaborated quite thoroughly on the separate dimensions in the previous chapter, I here focused on developing a clear overview of those analyses. With this overview we can move to the testing of the theoretical hypotheses. See Figure 3 below, for a comprehensive overview of the execution of the operationalized hypotheses-testing:

Theory	Dimension	Indicator	2013	1993
Realism				
Security	Motivation	fear for the international security environment	--	-
	Recipients	states with national security value	--	-
	Goal	enhance position in international security environment	-	-
	Bilateral/Multilateral	mainly bilateral	-/+	--
	Volume	Low, correlated with international tension & large share for security projects	-	--
Power	Motivation	pursuit of influence	-	-
	Recipients	states that have strategic value	-	-/+
	Goal	enforce power over recipient states	--	--
	Bilateral/Multilateral	mainly bilateral	-/+	--
	Volume	Low, correlated with donor size & large share for power projects	-/+	-
Liberalism				
Economic	Motivation	further the donor economy	++	-/+
	Recipients	states that have economic importance	+	-
	Goal	pursue profitable conditions and projects	++	+
	Bilateral/Multilateral	mainly bilateral	+	-
	Volume	Low, correlated with economic dependence & large share for economic projects	++	-
Enlightened	Motivation	international interdependency	+	++
	Recipients	states that threaten international stability	+	++
	Goal	pursue global stability and combat global threats	++	++
	Bilateral/Multilateral	mainly multilateral	-/+	+
	Volume	High, correlated with donor's international exposure & large share for IPG projects	-/+	+
Constructivism				
Duty	Motivation	feelings of obligation	-	-
	Recipients	visible states, ex-colonies, and trading partners	-	+
	Goal	maintain their position in international system	-	-
	Bilateral/Multilateral	mainly multilateral	--	+
	Volume	correlated with those of peer groups & large share for popular projects	-/+	-
Reputation	Motivation	pursuing an identity as norm entrepreneur	-/+	-
	Recipients	states with high international visibility	-	-/+
	Goal	enhance reputation	-/+	-/+
	Bilateral/Multilateral	mainly multilateral	-	+
	Volume	meets or exceeds international norms regarding aid volume & projects to stand out among their peer group	--	+
Humanitarian	Motivation	concern for the well-being of the neediest groups worldwide	-/+	-/+
	Recipients	neediest states	-	-/+
	Goal	improve living conditions and human rights worldwide	-/+	+
	Bilateral/Multilateral	high levels of both bilateral and multilateral donation	-	-/+
	Volume	High, correlated with donor's wealth & large share for neediest groups	-	-/+

-- = not present - = negligible -/+ = somewhat present + = present, not predominantly ++ = predominantly present

Figure 3: The operationalized hypotheses tested

Below these findings are summarized per theory, with feedback to the theoretical hypothesis, which leads to a result on which interest/theory is dominant, and therefore which hypotheses can be rejected and which can be accepted.

The Theories

Realism
H1a: If realism can explain aid policy, one would expect a security interest to be dominant in the development aid policy.
H1b: If realism can explain aid policy, one would expect a power interest to be dominant in the development aid policy.

Realism describes international politics as an environment controlled by the egocentric and competitive human nature of states and without a supranational government to regulate interactions. International relations is thus largely a realm of power and self-interest, and securing your safety in this is important. Aid is primarily used to achieve a state's own objectives. And aid policy is shaped by national interests; by security and power reasons.

When the first interest, the security frame, is dominant, one would expect to see aid motivations out of fear for the international security environment and because of certain geopolitical threats. Recipients would be states with some national security value, and aid is used, for example, to ensure access to strategically important regions or buy strategic concessions. Aid would be mainly bilateral because the role of international institutions is downplayed, and aid volume would be relatively low because a donor thinks primarily of its own interests. As can be seen in Figure 3, this interest is not predominantly reflected in either of the agendas of the Dutch government. The certain policy choices are not substantiated for the above reasons, and policy expectations were not corroborated. This interest is therefore not dominant and Hypothesis 1a can be rejected.

When the second interest, the power frame, is dominant, one would expect to see aid motivations out of pursuit of influence and to increase its leverage over others. Recipients would be states that have some kind of strategic value, and aid would be used to buy political influence and control recipients with rewards or punishments. As with the previous interest, aid would also be mainly bilateral because the role of international institutions is downplayed, and aid volume would be relatively low as a donor thinks primarily of its own interests. Like the other realist interest, the power interest is not dominantly present in both Dutch agendas. Hypothesis 1b can therefore be rejected as well.

Realist assumptions do not hold. The Dutch aid policy is not predominantly motivated out of security or power reasons. The traditionally dominant paradigm in the International Relations literature does not dominate this debate. Realism does therefore not have the most explanatory power and cannot be used to answer my research question.

Liberalism
H2a: If liberalism can explain aid policy, one would expect an economic self-interest to be dominant in the development aid policy.
H2b: If liberalism can explain aid policy, one would expect an enlightened self-interest to be dominant in the development aid policy.

Liberalism, on the other hand, believes that state and non-state actors are actually partners in the development process. Liberalist theory is based on (economic) interdependence and on the democratic principles of peaceful international order. A state still also has its own interest in mind, but liberalism is already more optimistic and there is more cooperation among nation-states. As politics is shaped by mutual dependency, while also having one's own interest in mind, aid policy is mainly

shaped by economic self-interest (investing in trade), and enlightened self-interest (investing in global stability).

When an economic interest is dominant, one would expect that aid is motivated by economic reasons, such as the pursuit of a market share or wanting to increase trade flows. One would expect aid to be given to states that have economic importance, such as states offering large export or investment markets or ones that are already important trading partners. Aid is used to supplement the donor's economic policy by, for example, promoting trade liberalization and subsidizing the donor's domestic firms to invest in LMICs. Aid is given mainly bilaterally as that is easier controlled by domestic economic interests, and aid volume would be relatively low and aimed at economic gains. As can be seen in Figure 3, this frame is predominantly present in the *2013-Agenda*, however it is not the dominant explanation for the *1993-Agenda*. To explain that agenda we have to move to the second part of the liberalist expectation.

Liberalism can also lead to another interest being dominant: the enlightened self-interest. When this is dominant, one would expect that aid is given because of the international interdependency. Aid would then be given to states that threaten international stability, and aid is used to combat global threats and invest in International Public Goods. In this case, aid is given mainly multilaterally because international cooperation is necessary to combat global problems, and aid volume will be relatively high as the donor is dependent of world situations. As can be seen in Figure 3, this frame is predominantly present in the *1993-Agenda*, while also playing a big role in the *2013-Agenda*.

When looking at the two agendas, a change can be observed from a 1993 policy that is motivated from an enlightened self-interest towards a 2013 policy in which both an economic and an enlightened self-interest play a role. The interest and principles underlying Dutch aid policy therefore seemed to have changed over the years. As Figure 3 shows us, the liberalist theory can best explain the two agendas. The liberalist theory therefore holds in this research; economic and enlightened motives seemed to have played a role in allocating Dutch development aid over the years. I will therefore use the liberalist theory for answering my research question in the next section: *How can the Dutch aid policy in the 1993-Agenda and the 2013-Agenda be explained, and is there a change in underlying interests and focus between them?* But first I will check the hypotheses predicted by the constructivist theory.

Constructivism
H3a: If constructivism can explain aid policy, one would expect a duty interest to be dominant in the development aid policy.
H3b: If constructivism can explain aid policy, one would expect a reputation interest to be dominant in the development aid policy.
H3c: If constructivism can explain aid policy, one would expect a humanitarian interest to be dominant in the development aid policy.

Constructivists believe the environment in which states act is social and ideational. According to this theory human nature is not only aggressive, but actually highly varied and may produce principled and altruistic deeds. Ongoing social interactions and dynamic cultural values shape state's identities, interests, and interactions in international society. Things like feelings of obligation, upholding an international reputation or feelings of solidarity can therefore shape aid policy.

When a duty interest is dominant, one would expect aid to be motivated out of feelings of obligation, for example because they feel the responsibility as a rich nation, because they feel guilty over previous colonial expectation, or out of public pressure. One would expect aid to be given to visible recipients, ex-colonies, and trading partners, and that aid is used as an instrument to maintain their position. Aid is focused on the mandatory multilateral contributions, and aid volume will match those of peer groups.

When the reputation interest is dominant, one would expect that aid is given because the donor wants an identity as a norm entrepreneur; they want to express their national identity and assume a leadership position. Aid is then given to states with high international visibility, and aid is used to enhance their reputation, for example by investing in large, high-profile aid projects. Aid could actually be both bilateral and multilateral depending on if status within an institution is considered to be of value, and aid volume exceeds those of peer groups.

When the last interest, the humanitarian frame, is dominant, one would expect aid to be motivated out of concern for the well-being of the poorest groups worldwide and feelings of international solidarity. Aid is then given to the neediest states, and aid is given independently of national strategic interests for supporting the poorest and weakest groups worldwide. Aid could again be both bilateral and multilateral depending on if the quality of aid in international institutions is considered to be high, and aid volume is relatively high as needs are great and self-interest is low.

As can be seen in Figure 3, some of the elements can also be assigned – or at least to a certain extent – to these theories, but none of the three hypotheses of these theories can explain the entire Dutch policy. These frames are not predominantly reflected in the *1993-Agenda* and the *2013-Agenda*, and certain policy choices are not substantiated for the above reasons. These interests are not dominant present in the Dutch aid policy, and Hypothesis 3a, 3b, and 3c can therefore be rejected. Constructivist assumptions do not hold; the theory does not have the most explanatory power and can therefore not be used to answer my research question.

6.2 Conclusion

To answer my research question, we thus have to look within liberalist theory. I will do this by first focusing on the first half of the question: *How can the Dutch aid policy in the 1993-Agenda and 2013-Agenda be explained?* I will firstly elaborate on the *2013-Agenda* aid policy and then continue to do the same for the *1993-Agenda*. Then, I will answer the second half of the question: *and is there a change in underlying interests and focus between them?* So we can finally see if there is really such a big change as there seemed to be beforehand in Chapter 1, or that it is mostly a change in approach but actually not that much a change in the underlying principles.

So for the first question – *How can the aid policy in the 2013-Agenda best be explained?* – the documents show the dominance of the economic interest, but also a clear presence of an enlightened frame. The presence of both can be explained by the fact that the Dutch government focused on two different kind of development relationships with recipients during this time: aid relationships and transitional relationships. Looking to the liberalist theory, the Dutch involvement in the aid relationships can be explained by the fact that we live in an interdependent world in which global problems increasingly cross borders. That is why the Dutch focus on conflict countries, fragile states, and countries that do not have sufficient capacity to effectively combat poverty without assistance. These states threaten the international stability, which also threaten the Dutch society. That is also the reason why the investment by the Dutch in IPGs is so paramount. Seen as the Netherlands is a small

country with a very international outlook, they are, even more than many other countries, dependent for their wellbeing on sustainable development and stability in other countries. They are also a popular destination for refugees, making their enlightened interest even greater. The other relationships, the transition relationships, is on the other hand explained by the liberalist theory out of an economic perspective. As the Dutch are losing their international economic position somewhat, they have an incentive to focus in their aid programs on their trade. The *2013-Agenda* focuses in these relationships on LMICs with strong economic growth, and other countries with trade and investment opportunities. In order to eventually gain more trading partner. To enhance this further the Dutch promote trade liberalization and subsidizes domestic firms to invest in LMICs. This economic focus also explains why multilateral expenditure is cut and the focus seems to be more on bilateral flows. Furthermore, it explains why the Dutch, while cutting their total aid volume, still increase the levels of aid for private sector development and trade promotion. While this means that the overall volume drops below the norm of 0.7%, the Netherlands still outperform most of their peers. This can be explained by the fact that the Netherlands is a small country with a very international economic outlook, they are therefore more dependent on global trade than their peers.

Subsequently, the second part of the first question *How can the aid policy in the 1993-Agenda best be explained?* Here the documents show a clear dominance of the enlightened frame. Enlightened motives are used to motivate the aid policy, such as the increase in disputes, the problems of a limited environmental use space, the interconnectedness of economies, the large migration flows, and the social costs of poverty. Liberalism explains this by emphasizing the role globalization plays. The non-state specific security in the international environment increasingly influences a state, especially such a small and open state as the Netherlands who is dependent on the stability in other countries. These were problems that came to light at the time and were very much emphasized in Dutch policy. That motivates the government's choice to focus on recipients with global challenges and large populations, or states in conflict, rehabilitation or transformation. Things like climate, conservation of biological diversity and forests, sustainable land use, and water, bringing peace and averting violent conflicts, strengthening and reforming the international economic order, and poverty reduction from the bottom up got a lot of attention. This also explains the high multilateral focus, since multilateral organizations tend to emphasize the these types of projects, for example addressing population control and the environment. As the Netherlands is a small country with a very international economic outlook, they provide a relatively high overall aid volume. They are, more than many other donors, dependent for their economic wellbeing on sustainable development in other countries.

Then to answer the second question *Is there a change in underlying interests and focus between these two Dutch agendas?* Yes, there has been a change, but this change can still be explained within the same theory. While Pronk's policy may be publicly portrayed as primarily humanitarian, it appears that in reality it is mainly in an enlightened self-interest. This brings Pronk's *1993-Agenda* in the underlying principles a lot closer to Ploumen's *2013-Agenda*. Although there is definitely a difference, that difference may be smaller than expected in advance. However, in the *2013-Agenda* there is clearly a presence of an economic interest as well. That interest is much less evident in the *1993-Agenda*. Pronk's policy therefore certainly seems to be a lot more solidary. However, this is rather a shadow solidarity, considering that this is also mainly based on an (indirect) self-interest. So yes: Pronk certainly does generous aid investments, but there is also a Dutch self-interest behind it. Either way, self-interest seems to play a role in allocating Dutch development aid, either to maintain international order, or because of economic dependence. Liberalist theory can therefore best explain both policies, and seems to have the most explanatory power regarding foreign aid policy.

6.3 Further Research

In this study I have paid attention to how the Dutch aid policy can be explained based on the documents of two different agendas; which interest(s) are dominant in the policies? I then analyzed whether a certain change took place regarding the dominant frame. This showed that the liberalist theory had the most explanatory power in this regard, and that indeed a change did happen, however maybe smaller than the Dutch traditional reputation suggested. This research was necessary to explore how this process worked, which interests and frames played a role in this, and which theory could say the most about this subject. It would also be very interesting however, to look at how and why the Dutch policy moves from a dominant enlightened self-interest interest to a heavy focus on the economic self-interest interest. Is this an incipient change which is expected to continue and will lead to an even lower aid volume with a higher commercial motive? We now know that we must look within the liberalist theory for answers, and it might be interesting to take a first look at this here.

If we look at the international system, liberalism emphasizes the interdependence of states. As explained earlier, economic or enlightened interests play a role in this. If one then looks at why there is a change from an enlightened interest to more of an economic interest, further research might start to look at changes in the international system that might have affected the Dutch interest. To what extent was the Netherlands in this period vulnerable to external influences? When we quickly take a first investigative look at what happened during this period, the policymakers stated that in the period of 2013, Asia, Latin America, and Africa have become the new drivers of the world economy, while the Netherlands have had a shrinking economy and rising unemployment since the financial crisis (Parliamentary Documents II, 2012/13, 33625, 1). In this thesis the emphasis has been more on how national economic interest influences foreign policy. However, there are also studies in which “external economic influences are considered so important that they dictate national positions (or more often the lack of them) on international political issues” (Julius, 1987). This might also be an explanation for the Dutch change in aid policy. Is this the reason the Dutch focus more on their own economic interest, and focus more on trade in their aid programs because they have good connections there they can exploit? Do, for example, countries with a reduced economic dominance gain a higher focus on their economic self-interest in their aid programs? In addition, we see that due to globalization of world trade more and more countries are connected to the global production chain. The share that LMICs have in the chain is growing. Is this the reason that the Dutch help LMICs integrate in the global production chain in the way they want them to, because this interconnectedness brings them more risks? Do countries with a more open economy then, for example, invest more in trade policies in LMICs? But all these statements and questions are not yet substantiated. This would be interesting to investigate further: which factors play a role in this and does this further underpin the explanatory power of liberalism?

In addition to the international factors, liberalism also looks at individuals and groups to explain foreign policy. Liberalism says actors in international politics are rational individuals and groups, that promote their interests and “States (or other political institutions) represent some subset of domestic society, on the basis of whose interests state officials define state preferences and act purposively in world politics.” (Moravcsik, 1997, p. 518). Domestic factors, such as pressure from the population at large, legislative and other governmental bodies, and elite or popular interest groups might therefore influence the Dutch aid policy. Party policy, for example, might also have played a role here. According to the party-difference theory, in democratic countries policy choices are highly influenced by the party composition of the government (Schmidt 1996). This theory might suggest that

the ideological preference of cabinet-Rutte II caused this change. Did the fact that the VVD (Dutch liberal party for freedom and democracy) gain more power lead to a promotion of this economic interest? Do, for example, countries with a liberal party in power have a higher focus on their economic self-interest in aid policies? These kind of questions would be interesting to have a closer look at and investigate further.

6.4 Limitations

In the course of this research, I also encountered some limitations. A methodological limitation was concerned with the single case study in which I only analyzed one case. With a low amount of cases it makes the results more difficult to generalize. That is the reason why I have chosen for a most-likely case. If a constructivist interest is not even dominant in the Netherlands with its humanitarian reputation, it might be expected to not play such a big a role in every donor's policy. Furthermore, if the liberalist frame is even dominant in specifically Pronk's policy and if the difference between Pronk and Ploumen turns out to be smaller than expected, liberalist theory can be expected to might have explanatory power in all aid policies. This is however the first study to juxtapose these theories like this regarding aid allocation. This study is thus explorative in nature, and because of the obvious dominance of the liberalistic theory, I do not think the fact this was a single case was too limited as a first exploration. But of course it would be interesting to see what one finds when putting other cases to the test.

Another limitation regards the fact that policy-making is rarely straightforward. Most of the time, multiple, different goals and motivations play a role in deciding upon an issue. So it is difficult to simply say that one policy is only 'economic' or only an 'enlightened self-interest'. However, I did aim to deduce a dominant frame. So how then to decide which one is dominant? I have tried to reduce the impact of this limitation by being as specific as possible in my operationalization, so that it can easily be deducted if a certain frame is at play. In addition, I have always looked closely at the substantiation of the certain choices, because the choice in itself may be divided into multiple frames.

A final, more practical limitation was concerned with the content of the available sources. Between Pronk's and Ploumen's tenure is a period of 20 years, so it make sense that their memoranda and the debates have a different structure and are somewhat different in content. Unfortunately, for example, Pronk's budget was not described as extensively as Ploumen's. As a result, I sometimes had to look at other substantiations, such as in this case his wish for the broadening of the ODA budget. However, there was always enough information regarding the choices and substantiation, which enabled me to draw the comparison to a certain extent. Furthermore, this content of course only provides a proxy for the true decision making processes. We cannot know which frames and motivations might have played a role in people's heads, or for example in discussions in the corridors. Measuring precise frames and goals is thus hampered with difficulties, however these document did give the best proxy available at this time.

6.5 Final remarks

"involvement in ODA is a bit like working in a restaurant: one realizes how unappealing reality often is once one scrapes away the veneer of official statements, glossy brochures and rigorously culled anecdotes." (Van der Veen, 2011, p. 231)

To conclude with going back to where it all started: Pronk's membership termination. If we, with the knowledge we have now, look at his critique: was this justified? When we read Ploumen's 2013-

Agenda, we have to establish that the Dutch government indeed has a high economic interest interwoven into their aid policy. They have definitely joined the international Aid for Trade trend. When we look at the critique formulated in Chapter 1, Pronk's criticism might be justified. AfT is especially criticized for the fact that it is said to only focus on the already economically active parts of societies. If we assess this in the *2013-Agenda*, one sees that the focus is indeed on the emergent economies and not on the poorest group. However, international solidarity also turned out to not be the main determinant in Pronk's *1993-Agenda* either. There the Dutch self-interest, although another kind of self-interest, was present as well. This makes me wonder: frames can also be used strategically by policymakers in order to reach their goals and mobilize public support (Barnett, 1999). Is this what was at play here? Was the framing to the outside world then indeed different from the motives that played a role in accepting the aid policy? Anyways, one thing is clear: self-interest, in whatever form, plays a role in the Dutch foreign aid policy.

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Appendix A: Operationalization

Table A.1: Security

Security		
Dimension	Indicator	Measurement
Aid motivation	Aid motivations out of fear for the international security environment	Look in policy document and in the debate for arguments regarding: - salience of security considerations - the focus on international tension (which directly hurts the donor's national security) - struggle against different ideologies - geopolitical threats - pursuit of military self-interest - the need to increase donor's physical security
Recipients	Aid given to states with national security value	Establish whether recipients are: - allied states - friendly regimes & states neighboring enemy nations
		Look in the substantiation for these choices for arguments regarding: - national security
	<i>This means specifically for the Netherlands as donor in 1993 & 2013:</i>	- <i>Allied states: would expect the Dutch to give aid to allies, so states that are either part of NATO or Europa with the lowest GDP/capita (same for both time periods): such as Turkey, Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, and Poland²</i> - <i>Friendly regimes & states neighboring enemy nations: not relevant, as the Netherlands was not at war during this time and their direct physical security wasn't in danger</i>
Policy goals	Aid as tool to enhance position in international security environment	Establish whether the policy focuses on: - buying strategic concessions (such as the building of military bases or consolidating military alliances from the recipient government) - ensuring access to strategically important regions - spreading the donor's own ideological system in form of values or instruments
		Look in the substantiation for these choices for arguments regarding: - aid as alternative to military expenditures - connections with the state's military/defense policy - humanitarian needs of recipient countries are downplayed
Bilateral/Multilateral	Aid is mainly bilateral	Establish whether: - aid is given to states, instead of subgroups within or above those states - aid is given directly from state to state instead of cooperation through international institutions
		Look in the substantiation for these choices for arguments regarding: - focusing on bilateral aid instead of multilateral aid - the role of international institutions is downplayed - state is central actor - international institutions entail some loss of autonomy and complicate policy-making
Volume of aid	Aid volume is low, correlated with international tension & large share for security projects	Establish: - overall low volume - the level of international tension*
		Look whether: - large share of aid is used for projects that ensure national security
	<i>This means specifically for the Netherlands as donor in 1993 & 2013:</i>	<i>*The Netherlands was not in war during this time and their direct physical security wasn't in danger, aid volume is therefore expected to be at a minimum level</i>

Table A.2: Power

Power		
Dimension	Indicator	Measurement
Aid motivation	Aid motivations out of pursuit of influence	Look in policy document and in the debate for arguments regarding: - the need to obtain a voice in recipient countries - obtaining influence in the international system - increasing its leverage over others - maintaining the balance of power - pursuit of power positions
Recipients		Establish whether recipients are:

² The World Bank: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?end=2013&locations=EU&start=1993>

	Aid given to states that have strategic value	- former colonies (out of power reasons) - allied states - recipients that have high international visibility
	<i>This means specifically for the Netherlands as donor in 1993 & 2013:</i>	Look in the substantiation for these choices for arguments regarding: - military, economic, political importance - <i>Dutch ex-colonies: Indonesia, Suriname, the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba³.</i> - <i>Allied states (same for both time periods): would expect the Dutch to give aid to allies, so states that are either part of NATO or Europa with the lowest GDP/capita: such as Turkey, Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, and Poland</i> - <i>Recipients that have high international visibility =></i> - <i>Through high GDP:⁴</i> 1993: LMICs: Mexico, Argentina, Turkey, Indonesia, South Africa, Thailand, Malaysia / least developed: Bangladesh, Congo, Sudan, Ethiopia, Angola, Senegal, Yemen 2013: LMICs: India, Turkey, Indonesia, Argentina, Nigeria, Iran, Thailand / least developed: Bangladesh, Angola, Sudan, Myanmar, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Yemen - <i>Through large population (same for both time periods): India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Nigeria, Bangladesh, Mexico⁵</i>
<i>Policy goals</i>	Aid as tool to enforce power over recipient states	Establish whether the policy focuses on: - the use of hard power - using aid as reward or punishment for voting behavior - buying political influence - winning allies
		Look in the substantiation for these choices for arguments regarding: - connections with the state's strategies for the pursuit of power - humanitarian needs of recipient countries are downplayed - state is central actor - bilaterally it is easier to extend influence and execute hard power strategies
<i>Bilateral/ Multilateral</i>	Aid is mainly bilateral	Establish whether: - aid is given to states, instead of subgroups within or above those states - aid is given directly from state to state instead of cooperation through international institutions
		Look in the substantiation for these choices for arguments regarding: - focusing on bilateral aid instead of multilateral aid - the role of international institutions is downplayed
<i>Volume of aid</i>	Aid volume is low, correlated with size of donor & large share for power projects	Establish: - overall low volume - size of donor state* Look whether: - aid is used to make recipients dependent, and gain power - connections with the state's strategies for the pursuit of power
	<i>This means specifically for the Netherlands as donor in 1993 & 2013:</i>	<i>*The Netherlands is a small state, aid volume is therefore expected to be at a higher level compared to bigger donor states</i>

Table A.3: Economic

Economic		
<i>Dimension</i>	<i>Indicator</i>	<i>Measurement</i>
<i>Aid motivation</i>	Aid motivations to further the donor economy	Look in policy document and in the debate for arguments regarding: - pursuit of economic market share - response to changing economic conditions - general commercial motives - promote exports - job creation for donor - secure valuable imports - access to vital raw materials
<i>Recipients</i>		Establish whether recipients are: - states offering large export or investment markets

³ Van der Veen, 2011

⁴ The World Bank: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?end=2013&locations=XO-XL&start=1993&year_low_desc=true

⁵ The World Bank: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?end=2013&start=1993&year_high_desc=true

	Aid given to states that have economic importance	- states that already are important trading partners - states that represent the most powerful economies in their region
		Look in the substantiation for these choices for arguments regarding: - economic importance - recipients with economic potential
	<i>This means specifically for the Netherlands as donor in 1993 & 2013:</i>	- <i>Through high GDP:</i> 1993: LMICs: Mexico, Argentina, Turkey, Indonesia, South Africa, Thailand, Malaysia / least developed: Bangladesh, Congo, Sudan, Ethiopia, Angola, Senegal, Yemen 2013: LMICs: India, Turkey, Indonesia, Argentina, Nigeria, Iran, Thailand / least developed: Bangladesh, Angola, Sudan, Myanmar, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Yemen - <i>Through Trade with LMICs:</i> - <i>High export flow:</i> 1993⁶: Turkey, Singapore, South Korea, Indonesia, Mexico, South-Africa, Nigeria, Egypt 2013⁷: Turkey, South Korea, Singapore, India, South-Africa, Egypt, Nigeria, Thailand, Indonesia - <i>High import flow:</i> 1993⁸: Kuwait, Thailand, Indonesia, Algeria, Malaysia, Singapore, Nigeria, South Africa, Philippines, Pakistan 2013⁹: Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, India, Kuwait, Vietnam, Nigeria, Algeria, Libya
<i>Policy goals</i>	Aid as tool to pursue profitable conditions and projects	Establish whether the policy focuses on: - promotion of trade liberalization in LDCs - promoting private sector development - opening up foreign markets to multinational corporations headquartered in donor countries - subsidize the donor's domestic firms - supporting domestic firms - use of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) - maintaining western quality standards - influencing recipients' trade policies (soft power) - tying aid (such as the requirement to purchase the equipment, arms, materials, supplies, parts and services, or other commodities made in the donor country or from the donor's corporations; use contractors or consultants from the donor country; or that the equipment be shipped via ships or airplanes flagged in the donor country)
		Look in the substantiation for these choices for arguments regarding: - connections with the donor's economic policy
<i>Bilateral/ Multilateral</i>	Aid is mainly bilateral	Establish whether: - aid is mainly given from state to state instead of cooperation through international institutions - the multilateral aid that is given, is focused on enhancing the business climate
		Look in the substantiation for these choices for arguments regarding: - focusing on bilateral aid instead of multilateral aid - multilateral aid is less easily controlled by domestic economic interests - emphasizing economic interest
<i>Volume of aid</i>	Aid volume is low, correlated with economic dependence & large share for economic projects	Establish: - overall low volume - economic dependence*
		Look whether there is: - large share to enhance trade - large share for projects supporting economic growth - low share/cut backs on projects without economic gains
	<i>This means specifically for the Netherlands as donor in 1993 & 2013:</i>	<i>*Seen as the Netherlands is a small country with a very international economic outlook, they are, more than many other countries, dependent for their economic wellbeing on sustainable development in other countries. Aid volume is therefore expected to be at a higher level compared to other donor states.</i>

⁶ The Observatory of Economic Complexity:

https://atlas.media.mit.edu/nl/visualize/tree_map/sitc/export/nld/show/all/1993/

⁷ The Observatory of Economic Complexity: https://atlas.media.mit.edu/nl/visualize/tree_map/sitc/export/nld/show/all/2013/

⁸ The Observatory of Economic Complexity: https://atlas.media.mit.edu/nl/visualize/tree_map/sitc/import/nld/show/all/1993/

⁹ The Observatory of Economic Complexity: https://atlas.media.mit.edu/nl/visualize/tree_map/sitc/import/nld/show/all/2013/

Table A.4: Enlightened

Enlightened		
Dimension	Indicator	Measurement
Aid motivation	Aid motivations out of international dependency	Look in policy document and in the debate for arguments regarding: - mutual dependence - globalization - responding to global challenges - pursuing international public goods - pursuing stability - combination of self-interest and doing good
Recipients	Aid given to states that threaten international stability	Establish whether recipients are: - states that are unstable or appear likely to become so - states that have one or more of the above global challenges - states with large populations (or growths) Look in the substantiation for these choices for arguments regarding: - the threat of instability
	<i>This means specifically for the Netherlands as donor in 1993 & 2013:</i>	- <i>Large populations:</i> - <i>Large Population(same for both time periods): India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Nigeria, Bangladesh, Mexico</i> - <i>High growth rate:¹⁰</i> <i>1993: e.g. Afghanistan, Aruba, Guinea, Jordan, Yemen</i> <i>2013: e.g. Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Jordan, Kuwait</i> - <i>Unstable:</i> <i>Failed state index 2013¹¹: Somalia, Congo, Sudan, South Sudan, Chad, Yemen, Afghanistan</i> <i>No index for 1993, but unrest Post-Soviet region & :</i> <i>Collapsed states around that time: Somalia, Afghanistan¹²</i> <i>Armed conflict during 1993: e.g. Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Cambodia, India, Sri Lanka, Angola, Somalia, Sudan¹³</i>
Policy goals	Aid as tool to pursue global stability and combat global threats	Establish whether the policy focuses on: - investing in trade as IPG - investing in climate as IPG - investing in food security as IPG - investing in water as IPG - investing in security & legal order as IPG - investing in migration as IPG - investing in poverty as IPG - combating conflict - promoting good governance - promoting democracies - use of soft power to influence policies that are in everyone's interest - attention to population growth
		Look in the substantiation for these choices for arguments regarding: - investing in IPGs - the danger of global instability
Bilateral/ Multilateral	Aid is mainly multilateral	Establish whether: - aid is given through international institutions - giving aid to multilateral organizations to combat global problems
		Look in the substantiation for these choices for arguments regarding: - focusing on multilateral aid instead of bilateral aid - strengthening international organizations
Volume of aid	Aid volume is high, correlated with donor's international exposure & large share for IPG projects	Establish: - overall high volume - the level of international exposure*
		Look whether there is: - large share for pursuing stability and IPGs

¹⁰ The World Bank: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW?end=2013&name_desc=false&start=1993

¹¹ The Failed States Index 2013: <http://library.fundforpeace.org/library/cfsir1306-failedstatesindex2013-06l.pdf>

¹² Rotberg, R. I. (2005). Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators" dalam Robert I. Rotberg. State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror.

¹³ Wallensteen, P., & Sollenberg, M. (1999). Armed Conflict, 1989-98. Journal of Peace Research, 36(5), 593-606.

	<i>This means specifically for the Netherlands as donor in 1993 & 2013:</i>	<i>*Seen as the Netherlands is a small country with a very international economic outlook, they are, more than many other countries, dependent for their economic wellbeing on sustainable development in other countries. They are also a popular destination for refugees. Aid volume is therefore expected to be at a higher level compared to other donor states.</i>
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Table A.5: Duty

Duty		
<i>Dimension</i>	<i>Indicator</i>	<i>Measurement</i>
<i>Aid motivation</i>	Aid motivations out of feelings of obligation	Look in policy document and in the debate for arguments regarding: - responsibility as rich nation - role in international system - adhere to international standards - importance of continuity - guilt over (colonial) exploitation - shared history with recipients - repayment for own aid receipts - public pressure - others do more - burden-sharing
<i>Recipients</i>	Aid given to visible recipients, ex-colonies, and trading partners	Establish whether recipients are: - states that are favored recipients of peer states - donor's ex-colonies - trading partners Look in the substantiation for these choices for arguments regarding: - internationally prominent states - own international position interests
	<i>This means specifically for the Netherlands as donor in 1993 & 2013:</i>	- <i>Dutch ex-colonies: Indonesia, Suriname, the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba</i> - <i>High export flow:</i> 1993: Turkey, Singapore, South Korea, Indonesia, Mexico, South-Africa, Nigeria, Egypt 2013: Turkey, South Korea, Singapore, India, South-Africa, Egypt, Nigeria, Thailand, Indonesia - <i>Net ODA recieved:¹⁴</i> 1993: e.g. Egypt, Indonesia, Philippines, India, Bangladesh, Mozambique, Ethiopia 2013: e.g. Egypt, Afghanistan, Vietnam, Myanmar, Ethiopia, Syria, Tanzania
	<i>Policy goals</i>	Aid as tool to maintain their position in international system
<i>Bilateral/Multilateral</i>	Aid is mainly multilateral	Establish whether the policy focuses on: - investments in the kind of projects that are internationally recognized and popular - visible projects - follow the international trend Look in the substantiation for these choices for arguments regarding: - connection with strategies for international position - references to international norms or agreements - comparison with other countries (others do more)
		Establish whether: - mandatory contributions to international organizations will be made faithfully - bilateral aid will be at the acceptable minimum Look in the substantiation for these choices for arguments regarding: - international duty to contribute to international organizations
		Establish the correlation with: - peer aid volume* Look whether there is: - aimed at mandatory, visible or popular projects
<i>Volume of aid</i>	Aid volume is correlated with those of peer groups & large share for popular projects	- peer aid volume* Look whether there is: - aimed at mandatory, visible or popular projects
	<i>This means specifically for the Netherlands as donor in 1993 & 2013:</i>	*1993: average of 0.29% of GNI 2013: average of 0.30% of GNI¹⁵ - Aid volume is expected to be similar to these %.

¹⁴ The World Bank: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ODAT.CD?end=2013&start=1993&year_high_desc=true

¹⁵ OECD average DAC countries: <https://data.oecd.org/oda/net-oda.htm>

Table A.6: Reputation

Reputation		
Dimension	Indicator	Measurement
Aid motivation	Aid motivations out of pursuing an identity as norm entrepreneur	Look in policy document and in the debate for arguments regarding: - expressing national identity - assuming a leadership position - establishing an international moral presence - improving international prestige and status - presenting an example for others to follow - a noble and glorious task - being a generous donor
Recipients	Aid given to states with high international visibility	Establish whether recipients are: - visible (popular) recipients - states that are favored recipients of peer states Look in the substantiation for these choices for arguments regarding: - own international visibility interests
	<i>This means specifically for the Netherlands as donor in 1993 & 2013:</i>	- Net ODA received: 1993: e.g. Egypt, Indonesia, Philippines, India, Bangladesh, Mozambique, Ethiopia 2013: e.g. Egypt, Afghanistan, Vietnam, Myanmar, Ethiopia, Syria, Tanzania
	Policy goals	Aid as tool to enhance reputation
Bilateral/ Multilateral	Aid is mainly multilateral	Establish whether the policy focuses on: - large, high-profile aid projects - new, innovative projects - many leadership tasks in international fora
		Look in the substantiation for these choices for arguments regarding: - connections to reputation strategies - symbolic significance of aid - comparison with other countries (others do less) - references to upholding reputation
		Look in the substantiation for these choices for arguments regarding: - focusing on multilateral aid instead of bilateral aid - status of international institutions is considered to be of value
Volume of aid	Aid volume meets or exceeds international norms regarding aid volume	Establish the correlation with: - peer aid volume*
		Look whether there is: - attempt to stand out among their peer group
		<i>*As the UN target for aid is 0.7% of GNI, under this interest the Netherlands is expected to meet or exceed this.</i>

Table A.7: Humanitarian

Humanitarian		
Dimension	Indicator	Measurement
Aid motivation	Aid motivations out of concern for the well-being of the neediest groups worldwide	Look in policy document and in the debate for arguments regarding: - the unfair gap between rich and poor - international solidarity - living beings are entitled to a humane treatment merely by the virtue of being alive - morally right - reducing suffering - Christian charity
Recipients	Aid given to the neediest states	Establish whether recipients are: - Poorest states - states with most basic human needs
		Look in the substantiation for these choices for arguments regarding: - the moral to giving aid to those who need it

	<i>This means specifically for the Netherlands as donor in 1993 & 2013:</i>	- GDP/capita:¹⁶ 1993: Liberia, Belarus, Sudan, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Ghana, Georgia, Jordan 2013: Liberia, Belarus, Tajikistan, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Ghana, Jordan, Haiti - Mortality¹⁷ 1993: Rwanda, Zambia, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Sierra Leone, Malawi 2013: Lesotho, Swaziland, Central African Republic, Sierra Leone, Zimbabwe, Cote d'Ivoire - Life expectancy¹⁸ 1993: Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Angola, Zambia, Mozambique, Uganda 2013: Central African Republic, Sierra Leone, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria, Lesotho
<i>Policy goals</i>	Aid as tool improve living conditions and human rights worldwide	Establish whether the policy focuses on: - eradicate poverty - supporting poorest and weakest groups - promote good governance - promote human rights - support democratization and democracy - international justice - international distributive justice - provide humanitarian relief Look in the substantiation for these choices for arguments regarding: - aid is seen as its own policy independently of national strategic interests
<i>Bilateral/ Multilateral</i>	Aid has high levels of both bilateral and multilateral donation	Establish whether: - aid is given both bilaterally and multilaterally - highest focus for the one which can contribute the most on specific area Look in the substantiation for these choices for arguments regarding: - human development is always end goal
<i>Volume of aid</i>	Aid volume is high, correlated with donor's wealth & large share for neediest groups	Establish the correlation with: - overall volume is relatively high - donor's wealth* Look whether there is: - large share for neediest groups
	<i>This means specifically for the Netherlands as donor in 1993 & 2013:</i>	<i>*As the Netherlands is a prosperous country compared to a lot of other donors, they are expected to allocate a larger share to aid.</i>

¹⁶ The World Bank: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KN?end=2013&start=1993&year_high_desc=false

¹⁷ The World Bank: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.AMRT.MA?end=2013&start=1993&year_low_desc=true & https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.AMRT.FE?end=2013&start=1993&year_low_desc=true

¹⁸ The World Bank: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN?end=2013&start=1993&year_low_desc=false

Appendix B: 2013

The tables analyzing the 2013's aid policy.

Black= the frame is found here / or criticism at the policy has been found, which implies the certain frame

Red= this statement falsifies the dominance of the particular frame (one would not expect to see this if that frame/interest would actually be dominant)

References:

1= document: Parliamentary Documents II, 2012/13, 33625, 1

34= document: Parliamentary Documents II, 2012/13, 33625, 34

35= document: Parliamentary Documents II, 2012/13, 33625, 35

Table B.1 Motivation

2013 Motivation			
Theory	Frame	Measurement	
Realism	Security Aid motivations out of fear for the international security environment	- struggle against different ideologies	<i>Alleen De heer Van Klaveren (PVV) zegt hier iets over: "Nederland moet stoppen, geld te pompen in dit soort verwerpelijke pseudostaten en islamofascistische regimes, niet alleen bilateraal, maar ook via de EU en de Wereldbank." (35:9) Hier wordt echter verder niet op ingegaan.</i>
		- the focus on international tension (which directly hurts the donor's national security) - geopolitical threats - pursuit of self-interest in terms of military security - salience of security considerations - the need to increase donor's physical security	-
Realism	Power Aid motivations out of pursuit of influence	- maintaining the balance of power - pursuit power positions - obtaining influence in the international system	"De oude wereldorde met twee politieke en economische machtsblokken is vervangen door een multipolaire wereldorde met nieuwe machtsblokken. Opkomende economieën als China, India, Brazilië en Zuid-Afrika manifesteren zich niet alleen op economisch terrein, maar ook in de regionale en internationale politiek." (1:8) "De economische macht van Azië en Zuid-Amerika is ook zichtbaar in de politieke verhoudingen. China en India hebben hun plek aan de internationale onderhandelingstafels opgeëist. En landen als Indonesië en Zuid-Afrika zijn vertegenwoordigd in de G20, terwijl Nederland geen uitnodiging meer ontvangt. De nieuwe machtsverhoudingen in de wereld hebben vanzelfsprekend gevolgen voor de manier waarop internationale instituties en fora functioneren. En voor hoe Nederland binnen deze instituties opereert." (1:10-11) "Onze invloed als land neemt af door de opkomst van nieuwe spelers op het wereldtoneel." (1:13)
		- obtaining a voice in recipient countries - increase its leverage over others	-
Liberalism	Economic self-interest Aid motivations to further the donor economy	- response to changing economic conditions	"En landen die wij nog niet zo lang geleden arm noemden, ontwikkelen zich sneller dan verwacht. Ghana, Vietnam en Ethiopië – om drie voorbeelden te noemen – willen niet langer een hulprelatie met Nederland. Zij vragen om een gelijkwaardige (handels)relatie." (1:8) "Mevrouw Maij (PvdA): Landen die nog geen twintig jaar geleden straatarm waren, zijn nu onze concurrenten op de wereldmarkt. Ook voor ontwikkelingssamenwerking betekent dit dat niet alles bij het oude kan blijven." (34:30) "De heer Jan Vos (PvdA): Nederland moet constateren dat de wereld sterk is veranderd. Dat betekent dat je je economische macht, je investeringsmacht, moet inzetten." (34:38) "De heer Leegte (VVD): De Nederlandse economie draait slecht, net zoals de Europese economie. ... Juist externe vraag en handel zijn middelen om de vraaguitval te kunnen compenseren" (35:2)
		- pursuit of economic market share	"Nederland heeft te weinig aansluiting op de economische groei in Azië, Afrika en Zuid-Amerika. Onze handel is nog veel gericht op omringende landen. Terwijl wij – mede door langdurige

		hulprelaties – vaak goede contacten hebben met groeilanden op deze continenten. Deze contacten bieden kansen, juist omdat die landen steeds vaker een gelijkwaardige relatie met ons willen.”(1:4) Kritiek: “Mevrouw Thieme (PvdD): De Minister zou het jammer vinden als Nederland niet profiteert van de economische groei in opkomende landen in andere delen van de wereld. ... Wij moeten af van de illusie dat wij de koek groter kunnen maken, we moeten de koek eerlijker gaan verdelen. ... Bij het uitblijven van concrete acties voor het verminderen van onze eigen voetafdruk op de wereld, bij het uitblijven van de erkenning dat onze exportdrift ten koste gaat van de mogelijkheden voor ontwikkelingslanden om zichzelf te ontplooiën, blijven mooie woorden symboolpolitiek.” (34:27)
	- general commercial motives	“Handel en investeringen stimuleren we vooral uit eigenbelang.” (1:5) “Onze doelstelling is om op langere termijn met zoveel mogelijk landen een handelsrelatie op te bouwen.” (1:5) “De relatie die we met die landen hebben opgebouwd vanuit onze hulprelatie kunnen we gebruiken voor het versterken van onze handels- en investeringsrelaties.” (1:22) “De heer Leegte (VVD): dat Nederland een handelsland is, is geen vanzelfsprekendheid maar iets waar hard aan gewerkt moet worden. Dat is een belangrijke prioriteit.” (34:11) Kritiek: “De heer Sjoerdsma (D66): Ook de visie van de Minister hinkt te veel op twee gedachten. Het toont het ongemakkelijke compromis tussen de VVD en de PvdA. Twee werelden worden bij elkaar gebracht: hulp en handel.” (34:17) Kritiek: “De heer Sjoerdsma (D66): Een handelsagenda die hulp overboord gooit, bedrijven die niet gepaaid worden door ambitie, een koekoeksjong op klimaat dat het OS-nest vervuult en een fonds waarop niemand zit te wachten. Dat kan en moet beter” (34:19) Kritiek: “De heer Van Ojik (GroenLinks): Soms wordt wel gekozen, maar dan is het vaak weer voor het eigen belang, bijvoorbeeld bij het associatieakkoord met Midden-Amerika. Daar kon een deal worden gesloten: wij mogen daar baggeren en zij mogen naar ons land vlees en suiker exporteren. Wij kiezen in dat soort gevallen voor de oplossing die voor de Nederlandse economie het beste resultaat oplevert, zo schrijft de Minister op pagina 16 van de nota.” (34:26) Kritiek: “Mevrouw Thieme (PvdD): Ons buitenlandbeleid lijkt vooral symboolpolitiek en dit is een van de voorbeelden daarvan. Door ontwikkelingssamenwerking weg te zetten als hulp en daarmee als niet meer van deze tijd, wil de Minister de bezuinigingen op de allerarmsten in de wereld legitimeren. Hulp wordt handel. «Kan ik u helpen?», maar wel vanachter de toonbank van BV Nederland.” (34:27) Kritiek: “De heer Voordewind (ChristenUnie): De inzet van de Minister is duidelijk. Handel moet een bijdrage leveren aan de armoedebestrijding. Vooralsnog zien wij echter vooral dat de armoedebestrijding de handel moet helpen, door middel van fondsen die beschikbaar worden gesteld aan het bedrijfsfonds en de verschuiving van het maatschappelijk middenveld naar de private sectorontwikkeling.” (35:5)
	- promote exports	“Tegelijkertijd zijn opkomende markten een kans voor ons bedrijfsleven, vooral in sectoren waarin Nederland aan de internationale top staat. De combinatie van hulp en handel kan wederzijds voordeel bieden.” (1:9) “De combinatie van hulp en handel kan wederzijds voordeel opleveren. Grotere handelsvolumes tussen Nederland en lage- en middeninkomenslanden zijn goed voor ons én goed voor hen.”(1:16) “Mevrouw De Caluwé (VVD): De nota Wat de wereld verdient geeft invulling aan een meer zakelijke aanpak van de Nederlandse inzet in zich ontwikkelende landen. ... er ligt veel meer nadruk op economische ontwikkeling met een grote rol voor het Nederlands bedrijfsleven” (34:2) Kritiek: “De heer Jasper van Dijk (SP): We spreken over de nota Wat de wereld verdient, maar misschien was beter «Wat het kabinet verdient». Dat is 1 miljard euro. Wat ook had gekund was: «Wat Nederland verdient» dankzij alle exportsteun aan onze bedrijven. Het eigenbelang wordt beslist niet gebagatelliseerd in deze nota. Terwijl nog altijd bijna 1 miljard mensen moet rondkomen van minder dan 1 dollar per dag, kiest het kabinet voor een immense korting op het hulpbudget en een investering in handel. Daarmee stoot de Minister het brood uit de monden van de allerarmsten en stopt het in de zakken van Nederlandse bedrijven.” (34:21) Kritiek: “De heer Jasper van Dijk (SP): Het mag duidelijk zijn dat ik vind dat deze nota helemaal geen mooi compromis is, maar vreselijk doorslaat naar de handelskant. Ik mag Minister Ploumen graag, maar ik vrees dat zij de Minister van export is geworden” (34:23)

		- access to vital raw materials	“Mevrouw Mulder (CDA): De groei van onze economie moet de komende jaren komen uit het verre buitenland en dat betekent dat wij steeds meer moeten kijken naar een agenda waarin idealisme en geopolitieke belangen met name in onze grondstoffenvoorziening hand in hand gaan. Wij moeten ons grondstoffenbeleid in Nederland en in het buitenland slim op elkaar laten aansluiten en profiteren van onze voorsprong op het gebied van afval en grondstoffen.” (34:42)
		- job creation	“En we gaan Nederlandse bedrijven helpen ondersteunen bij het binnenhalen van opdrachten uit aanbestedingsprocedures bij internationale instellingen.” (1:6) “Ten slotte ondersteunen we Nederlandse bedrijven om opdrachten van grote internationale instellingen binnen te halen. Jaarlijks besteden deze instellingen miljarden aan projecten in sectoren waarin Nederlandse bedrijven internationaal aan de top staan. De Nederlandse inzet is gericht op het vereenvoudigen en verkorten van de aanbestedingsprocedures, en het aanpassen van de beoordelingssystematiek, die nog onvoldoende oog heeft voor belangrijke kwaliteitseisen waarin Nederland goed is.” (1:42)
		- secure valuable imports	-
Liberalism	Enlightened self-interest <i>Aid motivations out of international dependency</i>	- mutual dependence - globalization	“Nederland wil vooruit in de wereld en Nederland wil vooruit met de wereld. We zijn betrokken bij mondiale problemen. Ons land is een van de meest open landen ter wereld. We zijn afhankelijk van de ontwikkeling van anderen voor ons eigen welzijn en onze eigen welvaart. Duurzame en inclusieve groei is in ons eigen belang en in het belang van anderen.” (1:2) “Nergens is mondialisering zo goed zichtbaar als in de wereldhandel. ... Maar internationale verwevenheid heeft ook een keerzijde. De kredietcrisis en de Europese schuldencrisis laten zien hoe problemen in één land kunnen overslaan naar de rest van de wereld. Bovendien is de vraag naar energie, voedsel, water en grondstoffen sterk toegenomen door groei van de wereldbevolking en het wereldwijde BBP. Dat leidt tot schaarste, een opwaartse druk op prijzen en grote prijsschommelingen.” (1:2) “Landen zijn steeds sterker met elkaar verbonden. Alle landen hebben belang bij goede afspraken over internationale handel. En alle landen hebben er belang bij dat grensoverschrijdende problemen worden aangepakt.” (1:9) “De nieuwe agenda speelt zich af tegen een mondiale context waarin grensoverschrijdende problemen steeds belangrijker worden. Alle landen hebben baat bij het waarborgen van Internationale Publieke Goederen (IPG's), zoals voedselzekerheid, klimaat en veiligheid. Onze nieuwe agenda kan niet zonder goede afspraken tussen landen over zulke goederen. Het nastreven, beheren en afdwingen van een verstandig beheer van IPG's is een collectief belang dus ook een welbegrepen Nederlands belang.” (1:23) “Mevrouw Maij (PvdA): Nederland zal zijn buitenlandbeleid echter moeten aanpassen aan de nieuwe mondiale politieke en economische verhoudingen. De druk op strategische grondstoffen, conventionele energiebronnen en publieke mondiale rijkdom als zoet water, schone lucht en klimaat neemt toe, terwijl politieke macht en economische kracht zich steeds verder verspreiden.” (34:30)
		- responding to global challenges - pursuing international public goods - pursuing stability	“De situatie in fragiele staten en conflictlanden is zorgwekkend. Deze landen dreigen op politiek, sociaal en economisch gebied ver achter te blijven bij de rest van de wereld. Ook vormen zij een bedreiging in termen van regionale stabiliteit, radicalisering en terrorisme, grensoverschrijdende criminaliteit, illegale migratie- en handelsstromen en grondstoffenaanvoer.” (1:2) “Denk aan conflicten, migratie, waterschaarste, klimaatverandering en gebrek aan (goed) voedsel. Een mondiale en regionale aanpak voor deze Internationale Publieke Goederen (IPG's) is een vereiste.” (1:9) “Tegelijkertijd neemt ook de druk op onze leefwereld toe. Met klimaatverandering, milieuvervuiling en verlies aan biodiversiteit als gevolg. Het verder verduurzamen van productieketens is noodzaak. Historisch is er ook een relatie tussen schaarste en het ontstaan van conflicten. Handel en het financiële systeem, klimaat, voedsel en water, maar ook bepaalde aspecten van migratie, veiligheid en stabiliteit noemen we daarom ook wel Internationale Publieke Goederen, omdat ze ons allemaal raken. Vaak hebben lage- en middeninkomenslanden het meeste last en de minste mogelijkheden zich te weren tegen mondiale problemen.” (1:11)
		- combination of self-interest and doing good	“Waar hulp en handel elkaar raken, handelen we zowel uit solidariteit als uit welbegrepen eigenbelang.” (1:5)
Constructivism	Duty <i>Aid motivations out of</i>	- importance of continuity	“Daarnaast is een aantal andere principes van belang gebleken, zoals voorspelbaarheid: meerjarige afspraken over samenwerking met zicht op voldoende continuïteit en heldere afbouwclausules.” (1:14)

	<i>feelings of obligation</i>	- guilt over (colonial) exploitation	Over het textielschandaal in Bangladesh: “De heer Sjoerdsma (D66): De Minister heeft samen met bedrijven een plan gemaakt om de keten te verstevigen, heeft geïnvesteerd om inspecties mogelijk te maken en werkt samen met de overheid van Bangladesh om de keten duurzamer en ontvankelijker te maken. Uw collega zegt dat dit het afkopen van schuldgevoel is.” (34:7) “De heer Voordewind (ChristenUnie): De VVD heeft vorige week laten weten dat zij het onzin vindt dat de Minister dit doet omdat het het afkopen van een schuldgevoel is, terwijl het bedrijfsleven het zelf prima af kan.” (34:8)
		- responsibility as rich nation	“Minister Ploumen : Wij zijn allemaal met elkaar verbonden. Ieder heeft daarin zijn eigen verantwoordelijkheid, maar samen hebben wij een gedeelde verantwoordelijkheid. Die wil ik op deze manier graag invullen.” (34:47) (ook enlightened interest) “De heer Van der Staaij (SGP): Als er een handelsrelatie of een handelsbelang is, is het dan niet logisch dat de overheid een zekere medeverantwoordelijkheid ziet in het verbeteren van de arbeidsomstandigheden van een land als Bangladesh?” (34:15)
		- role in international system - adhere to international standards - shared history with recipients - repayment for own aid receipts - public pressure - others do more - burden-sharing	-
		NOT duty:	“De heer Van Ojik (GroenLinks): We onttrekken ons de komende jaren in rap tempo aan de afspraken waar we ons internationaal zo lang aan verbonden hebben.” (35:6)
Construc-tivism	Reputation <i>Aid motivations out of pursuing an identity as norm entrepreneur</i>	- assuming a leadership position - presenting an example for others to follow - being a generous donor	“Nederland blijft één van de belangrijkste donoren op het gebied van humanitaire hulp.” (1:5) “Nederland is wereldwijd één van de grootste donoren op het gebied van humanitaire hulp en heeft daardoor een belangrijke stem in de internationale discussies over noodhulp. In internationale organisaties maken wij ons sterk voor humanitaire hulp die zo effectief mogelijk is georganiseerd.” (1:33) “Minister Ploumen : Nederland heeft zich altijd een voorloper betoond. Het gaat juist om de combinatie van hulp en handel. Ik heb eerder gezegd dat trickle-downeffecten niet vanzelf optreden, daar moet je wat voor doen. ... Juist dat type voorloper moeten wij willen zijn. Nogmaals, als ik kijk naar de bijval die ik in Europa en op andere continenten krijg voor de combinatie hulp en handel, laat ik dan zeggen dat ik bij de collega-Ministers een gevoelige snaar heb geraakt. ... Het moet mogelijk zijn om extreme armoede uit te bannen in één generatie. Dat wij dit niet meer langs de klassieke weg doen, alleen maar via ontwikkelingssamenwerking, maar ook via andere financieringsstromen, vind ik alleen maar toe te juichen.” (35:22) Over Bangladesh: “Minister Ploumen : De overheid moet ervoor zorgen dat duidelijk is wat onze normen zijn, ze moet ervoor zorgen dat partijen bij elkaar gebracht kunnen worden, ze moet de agenda zetten en ze moet aanmoedigend zijn, maar ook de scherpste zoeken. ... Wij zijn wellicht de eerste overheid, het eerste kabinet dat zich zo scherp heeft uitgesproken rondom de textielindustrie, maar er gaan zich een aantal overheden bij ons aansluiten. Dat is alleen maar heel erg goed en daarom voel mij ook zeer gesteund door een aantal collega's binnen de EU.” (35:15-16)
		- expressing national identity - establishing an international moral presence - prestige and status - a noble and glorious task	-
		NOT reputation:	Mevrouw De Caluwé (VVD): Waarom moeten wij overal een van de grootste donoren zijn?” (34:10) “De heer Sjoerdsma (D66): Even inzoomend op de doelstelling voor de allerarmsten: het uitbannen van extreme armoede raakt mij toch wel een beetje. Ik hoopte graag op het pad te blijven dat Nederland traditioneel heeft bewandeld, als een voorloper op het gebied van ontwikkelingssamenwerking voor de allerarmsten en de stemlozen. Ik zie dat de Minister daar gaandeweg met de kaasschaaf wat dingetjes vanaf schaaft.” (35:22)
Construc-tivism	Humanitaria-nism <i>Aid motivations out of</i>	- international solidarity	“Nederland blijft solidair met de allerarmsten. De armoede in de wereld neemt af, maar lang niet iedereen profiteert daarvan. ... Daarom blijven we strijden voor een eerlijke wereld.” (1:4) “Extreme armoede bestrijden we uit solidariteit met mensen.” (1:5)

	concern for the well-being of the poorest groups worldwide		“Mevrouw Maij (PvdA): Vanuit internationale solidariteit met mensen die het moeilijk hebben en arm en kwetsbaar zijn, vind ik dat de Nederlandse samenleving ook arme landen en arme mensen buiten onze landgrenzen moet blijven steunen.” (34:30) “Mevrouw Maij (PvdA): Wij moeten internationale solidariteit betrachten met de allerarmsten en de nieuwe rijkdommen en de nieuwe welvaart eerlijk verdelen.” (34:31) “De heer Jan Vos (PvdA): Voorzitter. De PvdA heeft een heel lange traditie als het gaat om internationale solidariteit. ... Het is geen compromis of uitruil tussen VVD en PvdA. Ik geloof oprecht dat dit een modernisering en een nieuwe slag in het denken van de PvdA is.” (34:38)
	- the unfair gap between rich and poor		“Minister Ploemen: Juist omdat het niet vanzelf goed komt en omdat economische groei niet vanzelf doorsijpelt, is het belangrijk om te investeren in voorwaarden om de economische groei duurzaam en inclusief te laten zijn. Dat draagt bij aan de vermindering van de extreme armoede.” (34:58) “Minister Ploemen: Het trickledowneffect gaat niet vanzelf goed en treedt niet vanzelf op. Daar moet je interventies op plegen. Dat doe ik via de private sector development.” (34:59)
	- morally right - reducing suffering - Christian charity - living beings are entitled to a humane treatment merely by the virtue of being alive	-	
	NOT humanitarianism:		De heer Van Ojik (GroenLinks): De tweede doelstelling is inclusieve groei en de derde de belangen van het Nederlandse bedrijfsleven. Het gaat om de balans in de bezuinigingen. Wij halen bijna een miljard weg bij armoedebestrijding en voegen geld toe aan de doelstelling om inclusieve groei te bereiken met een Dutch Good Growth Fund waar wij de komende jaren elk jaar 250 miljoen in stoppen. Het gaat om de balans tussen de doelstellingen en de manier waarop de Minister de bezuinigingen invult. (34:58) “De heer Voordewind (ChristenUnie): Het gaat om de prioritering en die komt tot uiting in de financiering van de middelen. Ik zeg het de heer Van Ojik na dat wij daar nog steeds een disbalans zien als het gaat om grass root levels en het stimuleren van de onderlaag, de meest kwetsbaren, om aan te sluiten bij de economische groei.” (34:59) “De heer Sjoerdsma (D66): Doelstelling één: het uitbannen van extreme armoede in één generatie. Hoe wil de Minister deze ambitie nu eigenlijk verwezenlijken, met 1 miljard minder voor het koekoeksjong van klimaat dat het nest van OS bevuult? De focus op de allerarmsten wordt in deze nota juist losgelaten. Doelstelling twee: duurzame en inclusieve groei overal ter wereld. Hoe wil de Minister deze ambitie verwezenlijken, zonder versnelling van de uitvoering van de schijnbaar vergeten millenniumdoelstellingen en zonder het maatschappelijk middenveld? De Minister lijkt erop te vertrouwen dat wat goed is voor de BV Nederland, ook goed is voor de allerarmsten.” (35:4) “De heer Sjoerdsma (D66): Wat ik daarin zie, zijn drie lovenswaardige ambities, maar ik zie niet hoe de acties die de Minister kiest, aansluiten bij die ambities. Dat vind ik wel de kern van het beleid. Wat het uitbannen van extreme armoede in één generatie betreft: er is minder geld en er gaat meer geld naar klimaat. Maar de focus in de nota ligt volgens mij ook niet bij de allerarmsten. Ik heb de Minister dat ook niet horen bewijzen in haar betoog. Duurzame en inclusieve groei? In de nota staat eigenlijk niet hoe het bereiken van de millenniumdoelstellingen tot 2015 kan worden versneld. Daarbij gaat het juist om duurzame en inclusieve groei.” (35:20)

Table B.2 Recipients

2013 Recipients			
Theory	Frame	Measurement	
Realism	Security Aid given to states with national security value	- Allied states: would expect the Dutch to give aid to allies, so states that are either part of NATO or Europa with the lowest GDP/capita:	Roemenië en Polen zitten wel in de handelsrelaties maar ik richt me hier op de hulp- en overgangsrelaties.
		- Friendly regimes & states neighboring enemy nations:	-
		Substantiation regarding: - national security	-
Realism	Power	- Dutch ex-colonies:	Indonesia

	<i>Aid given to states that have strategic value</i>	- Allied states:	<i>Roemenië en Polen zitten wel in de handelsrelaties maar ik richt me hier op de hulp- en overgangsrelaties.</i>
		- Recipients that have high international visibility through high GDP in 2013:	Bangladesh, Yemen, Ethiopia <i>India, Turkije, Nigeria zitten wel in de handelsrelaties maar ik richt me hier op de hulp- en overgangsrelaties.</i>
		- Recipients that have high international visibility through large population:	Indonesia, Bangladesh <i>India, Nigeria, Mexico zitten wel in de handelsrelaties maar ik richt me hier op de hulp- en overgangsrelaties.</i>
		Substantiation regarding: - military, economic, political importance	Voornamelijk economisch belang wordt aangedragen, en die past beter bij economic self-interest.
Liberalism	Economic self-interest <i>Aid given to states that have economic importance</i>	- states offering large export or investment markets - states that represent the most powerful economies in their region (Through high GDP in 2013):	Bangladesh, Yemen, Ethiopia <i>India, Turkije, Nigeria zitten wel in de handelsrelaties maar ik richt me hier op de hulp- en overgangsrelaties.</i>
		- states that already are important trading partners (high export flows in 2013):	Indonesië <i>Zuid-Korea, Turkije, Singapore, India, Zuid-Afrika, Nigeria zitten wel in de handelsrelaties maar ik richt me hier op de hulp- en overgangsrelaties.</i>
		- states that already are important trading partners (high import flows in 2013):	Indonesië <i>Maleisië, Singapore, India, Vietnam, Nigeria zitten wel in de handelsrelaties maar ik richt me hier op de hulp- en overgangsrelaties.</i>
		Substantiation regarding: - economic importance - recipients with economic potential	"2. Overgangsrelaties Hier richten we ons vooral op middeninkomenslanden en lage-inkomenslanden met een forse economische groei. In overgangsrelaties kan het combineren van hulp en handel tot voordeel leiden voor zowel ontwikkelingslanden als voor Nederland. Naast programma's gericht op armoedebestrijding op de vier speerpunten (zie onder), steunen we deze landen bij het vergroten van hun markttoegang en het verbeteren van hun ondernemingsklimaat. Dit doen we in Bangladesh, Benin, Ethiopië, Ghana, Indonesië, Kenia, Mozambique en Uganda." (1:4-5) "3. Handelsrelaties <i>Hier richten we ons vooral op handel- en investeringspromotie. Het gaat om activiteiten die vooral bijdragen aan de groei van onze economie en werkgelegenheid. De focus ligt op Australië, België, Brazilië, Canada, China, Colombia, Duitsland, Frankrijk, Golfstaten, India, Irak, Japan, Maleisië, Mexico, Nigeria, Oekraïne, Polen, Roemenië, Rusland, Singapore, Turkije, Vietnam, VK, VS, Zuid-Afrika en Zuid-Korea."</i> (1:5) "Het gaat hier om activiteiten die tot doel hebben om Nederlandse bedrijven succesvol te laten zijn in het buitenland. Zo wordt hard gewerkt aan een internationaliseringsoffensief voor onze topsectoren. Er ligt voor Nederland een enorm potentieel in sectoren als energie, agro-food en water, waar onze bedrijven en kennisinstellingen aan de internationale top staan. Daarnaast richten we ons vooral landen die zich snel ontwikkelen en waar het belangrijk is dat Nederland marktaandeel verovert, zeker nu de groei in Europa tegenvalt." (1:22)
Liberalism	Enlightened self-interest <i>Aid given to states that threaten international stability</i>	- states with large populations (or growths)	Indonesië, Bangladesh <i>Nog overige landen in de handelsrelatie, maar focust deze thesis zich niet op.</i>
		- states that are unstable or appear likely to become so - states that have one or more of the above global challenges	Afghanistan, Jemen, Zuid-Sudan
		Substantiation regarding: - the threat of instability	"1. Hulprelaties Hier richten we ons vooral op landen die hun armoedeproblemen niet zelf kunnen oplossen. In deze categorie vallen (post-) conflictlanden, fragiele staten en landen die onvoldoende capaciteit hebben om zonder hulp effectief aan armoedebestrijding te doen. Het gaat om Afghanistan, Burundi, Mali, Jemen, Rwanda, Zuid-Sudan en de Palestijnse Gebieden. In het Grote Merengebied en in de Hoorn van Afrika wordt zoveel mogelijk vanuit een regionaal perspectief gewerkt." (1:4)

			“Omdat problemen op het gebied van onder andere veiligheid en milieu zich niet houden aan landsgrenzen, hanteren we steeds vaker een regionale benadering. Dat doen we bijvoorbeeld in de Grote Merenregio en de Hoorn van Afrika.” (1:21) Mevrouw Maij (PvdA): Kan de Minister, als zij eind dit jaar kritisch kijkt naar haar lijstje partnerlanden, wellicht een land uit de set middeninkomenslanden laten vallen en ruimte maken voor een land als Somalië? Somalië is bij uitstek een land dat belangrijk is voor Nederland om de piraterijbestrijding en de veiligheid van onze vrachtschepen, maar het is ook een land dat destabiliserend werkt in de Hoorn van Afrika en een land waar het conflict altijd op de loer ligt. (34:34) “Minister Ploumen: Mocht een land van een hulp- naar een meer hybride relatie gaan, dan valt er een plekje vrij. Ik stel mij voor dat Somalië dan een van de landen is waarnaar wij kijken. Het land is opgenomen in de regionale benadering omdat het zo’n belangrijk land is. Als het daar niet goed gaat, heeft dit een destabiliserend effect.” (34:67)
Construc-tivism	Duty <i>Aid given to visible recipients, ex-colonies, and trading partners</i>	- states that are favored recipients of peer states	Afghanistan, Ethiopia
		- donor’s ex-colonies	Indonesië
		- trading partners	Indonesië
		Substantiation regarding: - own international position interests	<i>Nog overige landen in de handelsrelatie, maar focust deze thesis zich niet op.</i>
Construc-tivism	Reputation <i>Aid given to states with high international visibility</i>	- visible (popular) recipients - states that are favored recipients of peer states	Afghanistan, Ethiopia
		Substantiation regarding: - own international visibility interests	-
Construc-tivism	Humanitaria-nism <i>Aid given to the neediest states</i>	- Poorest states	Ghana
		- states with most basic human needs by mortality rate:	-
		- states with most basic human needs by life expectancy:	<i>Alleen Nigeria, maar die zit echter alleen in de handelsrelatie en ontvangt geen ODA-hulp.</i>
		Substantiation regarding: - the moral to giving aid to those who need it	-

Table B.3 Policy goals

2013 Policy goals			
Theory	Frame	Measurement	
Realism	Security <i>Aid as tool to enhance position in international security environment</i>	- aid as alternative to military expenditures - connections with the state’s military/defense policy	“De heer Sjoerdsma (D66): Met betrekking tot het BIV is het de vraag of dit een buitenboordbegroting is van Minister Hennes. Als dit fonds wordt gebruikt om bezuinigings-kappen op Defensie op te vangen, schiet de ontwikkeling daar niets mee op.” (34:18) “De heer Jasper van Dijk (SP): Het budget van 250 miljoen voor internationale veiligheid, of te wel het defensiefonds, is een mooi voorbeeld van vervuiling van het budget, want blijkaar wordt oorlog voeren vanaf 2014 ontwikkelingshulp.” (34:24)
		- buying strategic concessions (such as the building of military bases or consolidating military alliances from the recipient government) - ensuring access to strategically important regions - spreading the donor’s own ideological system in form of values or instruments - humanitarian needs of recipient countries are downplayed	-
Realism	Power	- the use of hard power	-

	<i>Aid as tool to enforce power over recipient states</i>	- using aid as reward or punishment for voting behavior - buying political influence - winning allies - connections with the state's strategies for the pursuit of power - humanitarian needs of recipient countries are downplayed	
Liberalism	Economic self-interest <i>Aid as tool to pursue profitable conditions and projects</i>	- promotion of trade liberalization in LDCs - opening up foreign markets to multinational corporations headquartered in donor countries	2. Overgangsrelaties -“Het opbouwen van een handelsrelatie begint met het openstellen van markten en het stimuleren van private sectorontwikkeling.” (1:34) <u>Het verbeteren van de toegang tot internationale en regionale markten</u> -Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA's): “De EPA's bieden verregaande markttoegang tot de Europese markt en vragen van de ACS-landen een geleidelijke openstelling van hun markt.” (1:34) -“De onderhandelingen over de EPA's verlopen stroef. ... Deze MOL's hebben al volledig tariefvrije en quotavrije markttoegang tot de EU en denken weinig voordeel te halen uit een EPA. Anderzijds heeft dit te maken met het feit dat veel landen zich zorgen maken over de gevolgen van de EPA's. Bijvoorbeeld of hun bedrijfsleven de concurrentie aan kan met bedrijven uit de EU.”(1:35) -“De heer Leegte (VVD): De Minister geeft zelf aan dat het bewijs geleverd is: EPA's leveren handel en dus welvaart op. Het is ook in ons eigen belang als er meer handel komt. Het is goed voor hen, maar ook goed voor ons en dat is de reden dat ik er zo op hamer.” (34:53) Kritiek: -“De heer Sjoerdsma (D66): en dan noemt de Minister zich nog «honest broker» voor de EPA's, of zoals de VVD dat noemt: vrijhandel via dwang? Over een contradictio in terminis gesproken.” (35:4) -“De heer Van Ojik (GroenLinks): Maar daadkracht vraagt soms meer dan alleen maar een honest broker te zijn. Soms betekent dit ook dat je positie kiest en bijvoorbeeld in de EPA-onderhandelingen zegt dat je vindt dat de ontwikkelingslanden gelijk hebben en dat je je voor hun belang inzet.” (34:42) -“Minister Ploumen: Het belangrijkste is ... dat landen inzien dat ze er zelf baat bij hebben. Een aantal landen ziet dat en een aantal landen wil dat zien, maar heeft nog een aantal hiccups. Met de rol van honest broker wil ik dit scherp in kaart brengen. Ze moeten over die hiccups heen.” (34:53) -“De heer Van Ojik (GroenLinks): Stel nu dat die landen gelijk hebben als zij tot de conclusie komen dat zij er geen belang bij hebben? De Minister noemt zelf in haar brief van 16 mei jongstleden negen punten van zorg van de ontwikkelingslanden. Ik vind heel veel van die punten zeer valide. Als je uitgaat van soevereine partners die met elkaar een handelsoverleg voeren, kun je niet zeggen, zeker niet als je honest broker wilt zijn, dat het een bewustwordingsproject is en dat je er zit om die landen ervan te overtuigen dat hun bezwaren geen hout snijden. Dat is voor een honest broker, die ik toch al een bescheiden ambitie vind, een vreemde opstelling. Misschien hebben die ontwikkelingslanden namelijk wel gelijk. De EPA's zijn niet door de ACS-landen bedacht, maar door Europa. En waarom zijn die bedacht? Omdat wij de handelspreferenties die wij in de WTO aan die landen verleenden niet meer wilden handhaven. Ik begrijp het wantrouwen van de ontwikkelingslanden wel.” (34:54) -“Minister Ploumen: Eerlijke handel is uiteindelijk goed voor iedereen. De heer Van Ojik (GroenLinks): Eerlijke handel wel, maar daar gaat het precies om. Wanneer is handel eerlijk? De ontwikkelingslanden hebben het recht om op dat punt hun eigen afwegingen te maken.” (34:55) 3. Handelsrelaties -“De ambitie is om het aantal bedrijven dat internationaal actief is te vergroten – vooral het MKB – evenals de export en investeringen naar opkomende markten. Ook liggen er grote kansen op buitenlandse markten op het gebied van duurzaam en maatschappelijk ondernemen, waarin het Nederlandse bedrijfsleven voorop loopt.” (1:40) <u>Het afsluiten van vrijhandelsakkoorden</u> <u>Het bevorderen van de internationalisering van het Nederlandse bedrijfsleven</u> -“Het belang van economische diplomatie neemt toe om Nederlandse bedrijven toegang te verschaffen tot vaak door overheden gedomineerde markten (zoals water en energie) en verder gelegen markten in lage- en middeninkomenslanden.” (1:41)
		- promoting private sector development - use of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)	-“We ondersteunen landen bij de ontwikkeling van hun private sector” (1:35) -“Onze opdracht is om hulp- en handelsactiviteiten zodanig te combineren dat zij leiden tot wederzijds voordeel. De expertise van Nederlandse bedrijven kunnen we inschakelen bij de ontwikkeling van havens en de aanleg van wegen. Omgekeerd kan het Nederlandse bedrijfsleven zo

			voet aan de grond krijgen in nieuwe groeimarkten. Private sectorontwikkeling zal steeds vaker lopen via kennisoverdracht en het bedrijfsleven.” (1:34)
	- subsidize the donor's domestic firms - supporting domestic firms - tying aid - connections with the donor's economic policy	2. Overgangsrelaties <u>Het ondersteunen van ondernemers en overheden</u> -Een toegankelijker bedrijfsleveninstrumentarium: “Nederlandse ondernemers kunnen voor internationale en ontwikkelingsre-levante activiteiten een beroep doen op diverse instrumenten. Het bedrijfsleveninstrumentarium voorziet zowel in het verstrekken van informatie en advies als in de financiering van activiteiten.” (1:36) “De toegankelijkheid wordt vergroot door vraaggestuurd te werken en maatwerk te leveren. De ondernemer staat centraal. Ondernemers geven aan in welk landen en sectoren zij handel willen drijven of willen investeren.” (1:37) Kritiek: “De heer Voordewind (ChristenUnie): Het kan zo zijn dat het mkb in Afrika technische ondersteuning kan gebruiken van het mkb in Nederland. Die moet vooral vraaggestuurd en niet aanbodgestuurd zijn, want dan krijg je gebonden hulp.” (34:21) -Dutch Good Growth Fund: “Het rondkrijgen van de financiering van activiteiten in opkomende markten en ontwikkelingslanden is voor ondernemers lastig, omdat er vaak relatief hoge risico's aan kleven. Financiers willen zekerheden en die kunnen (nog) niet altijd geboden worden. Er is sprake van marktfalen. Het Fonds springt hierop in. Het Fonds verstrekt financiering aan ondernemers in Nederland en in de lage- en middeninkomenslanden, vooral het midden-en kleinbedrijf, door activiteiten in ontwikkelingslanden te financieren.” (1:38) -“Mevrouw De Caluwé (VVD): De VVD heeft de laatste jaren aangegeven dat zij toe wil naar meer handel en minder klassieke ontwikkelingshulp. Daar is het Dutch Good Growth Fund een uitwerking van: meer handel, meer investeringen, ook in ontwikkelingslanden, en veel minder focus op hulp. Wij willen vooral bezuinigen op de donaties aan multilaterale organisaties en op bijdragen aan de ngo's.” (34:3) Kritiek: -“De heer Sjoerdsma (D66): Ik geef een voorbeeld: de manier waarop het Dutch Good Growth Fund nu is ingericht, betekent dat een groot bedrijf aanspraak kan maken op het geld om export te bevorderen. Dat vinden wij een zeer ouderwetse vorm van gebonden hulp.” (34:17) - Over het fonds: “De heer Voordewind (ChristenUnie): Ik ben bang dat ... we naar het grote bedrijfsleven en naar exportsubsidies gaan kijken en dat met name de kleinere boeren weggeconcentreerd worden door de bedrijven uit het westen van Nederland.” (34:20) “De heer Voordewind (ChristenUnie): Voor ons blijft wel degelijk de kern staan dat het ontwikkelingsrelevant moet zijn, ... en dat het bedoeld is voor armoedebestrijding en niet om een afzetgebied voor de multinationals te creëren.” (34:21) - De heer Jasper van Dijk (SP): De Minister noemt het nu het Dutch Good Growth Fund. Dat zegt toch eigenlijk genoeg? Het is een onbegrijpelijke naam voor een onbegrijpelijk fonds. Het wordt nota bene opengesteld voor exportfinanciering van Nederlandse bedrijven. De Minister weet toch dat dit niets met ontwikkelingssamenwerking te maken heeft en dat het gebonden hulp is die tot dumping leidt? Dit is een fonds van de VVD, de partij die nota bene altijd afgeeft op subsidies. Hoe gaat de Minister aan een kind in Somalië uitleggen dat zij geen geld wil geven om haar naar school te sturen, maar wel geld heeft om Heineken in Georgië te laten investeren?” (34:22) 3. Handelsrelaties <u>Het aantrekken van buitenlandse investeerders</u> <u>Het beschermen van Nederlandse investeerders in het buitenland</u>	
	- influencing recipients' trade policies (soft power)	-“Economische diplomatie wordt steeds belangrijker, zowel in het bedrijfsleven internationaliseringsbeleid als in het werk van het postennet. Markten buiten Europa worden veelal gekenmerkt door een prominente(re) rol van de overheid in de economie. Economische diplomatie kan er voor zorgen dat bedrijven geopend worden in sectoren waarin Nederland sterk is en buitenlandse overheden grote inmenging hebben zoals energie en water.” (1:40)	
	- maintaining western quality standards	2. Overgangsrelaties <u>Het stimuleren internationaal maatschappelijk verantwoord ondernemen</u> -“Internationaal Maatschappelijk Verantwoord Ondernemen (IMVO) is een voorwaarde voor duurzame en inclusieve groei.” (1:39) -bv: “Daarnaast hebben we MVO Nederland een subsidie gegeven voor een ambitieus project om het Nederlands MKB te steunen in het verduurzamen van hun bedrijfsvoering in ontwikkelingslanden.” (1:39) “Wij hanteren hoge standaarden voor de producten die worden verhandeld op de Europese markt. Denk aan veiligheid, duurzaamheidseisen en verpakkingsmaterialen. Deze standaarden zijn een barrière voor producenten uit lage- en middeninkomenslanden. Dit is belangrijk om onze consumenten te beschermen, maar betekent – indirect – ook een concurrentievoordeel voor onze producenten. Toch verlagen wij deze standaarden niet, maar steunen producenten uit deze landen	

			om aan de standaarden te voldoen, bijvoorbeeld via het Centrum tot Bevordering van Import uit Ontwikkelingslanden (CBI).” (1:16)
Liberalism	Enlightened self-interest <i>Aid as tool to pursue global stability and combat global threats</i>	- investing in IPGs (general) - investing in poverty as IPG - use of soft power to influence policies that are in everyone's interest - attention to population growth	IPG's: “We richten ons vooral op het bereiken van concrete resultaten op de thema's handel, veiligheid en rechtsorde, voedselzekerheid, water, klimaat en migratie. Op deze onderwerpen kan Nederland verschil maken. Ook omdat bedrijven en kennisinstellingen uit de Nederlandse topsectoren hier een zeer waardevolle bijdrage kunnen leveren.” (1:23) 1. Hulpverleningsrelaties: <u>Investeren in een mondiale ontwikkelingsagenda</u> -“Een nieuwe internationale agenda voor armoedebestrijding, die de plek inneemt van de Millenniumdoelen na 2015, is van groot belang om ook in de toekomst concrete doelen te stellen voor de bestrijding van armoede en ongelijkheid.” (1:28) -“In het belang van de landen waarmee we een hulpverlening onderhouden, investeren we in een mondiale ontwikkelingsagenda als opvolger van de Millenniumdoelen. Naast de vier speerpunten van het Nederlands beleid, vrouwenrechten en seksuele en reproductieve gezondheid en rechten (SRGR), water, voedselzekerheid en veiligheid en rechtsorde, wil Nederland dat duurzaamheid en een minimumniveau van sociale rechten een plaats krijgen in deze nieuwe agenda. De vier speerpunten blijven actueel en krijgen meer aandacht in het beleid van Nederland. Deze speerpunten zijn relevant voor mondiale armoedebestrijding en voor de (economische) belangen van Nederland.” (1:5) -“Van bijzonder belang voor de post-2015-agenda zijn de Duurzame Ontwikkelingsdoelen (<i>Sustainable Development Goals</i>, SDG's). Op de Rio+20-conferentie over duurzame ontwikkeling in 2012 is afgesproken dat deze nieuwe doelen, die voornamelijk betrekking hebben op milieu en duurzame ontwikkeling, verder worden uitgewerkt.” (1:29) <u>Investeren in basisvoorzieningen</u> -Investeren in water: “Water is onlosmakelijk verbonden met de beschikbaarheid en productie van voedsel en energie. Dit betekent dat een integrale, duurzame aanpak nodig is om toekomstige beschikbaarheid van water, voedsel en energie zeker te stellen. Waterveiligheid is belangrijk voor armoedebestrijding en voor economische groei.” (1:29) -Investeren in voedselzekerheid: “Om te zorgen voor (kwalitatief) voldoende voedsel voor iedereen moeten we rekening houden met bevolkingsgroei, klimaatverandering, veranderende consumptiepatronen, verstedelijking, prijspeculatie en de vraag naar biobrandstoffen.” (1:30) -Investeren in gelijke rechten voor vrouwen en seksuele en reproductieve gezondheid en rechten: “Twee miljard vrouwen zijn niet werkzaam in een productieve sector, terwijl een groot deel van hen wel een betaalde baan wil hebben. ...<i>wat kan leiden tot sociale uitsluiting en instabiliteit</i>. Door de snelle bevolkingsgroei wordt het tekort aan werk alleen maar nijpender.” (2:12) “Alleen als iedereen – ook jonge mensen, homo's, prostituees en drugsgebruikers – toegang heeft tot gezondheidszorg, kan hiv/aids een halt worden toegevoerd.” (1:31) -Investeren in veiligheid en rechtsorde in fragiele staten: “Het nieuwe Budget Internationale Veiligheid richt zich onder andere op de bescherming van de burgerbevolking, het voorkomen of beheersen van menselijke crises en het bevorderen van duurzame veiligheid en stabiliteit in arme landen.” (1:5) “In dit verband wordt in landen die te kampen hebben met conflictsituaties een scala van instrumenten ingezet op het terrein van ontwikkelingssamenwerking, defensie en diplomatie (zogenaamde 3D-benadering: <i>Development, Defence, Diplomacy</i>).” (1:14) <u>Aandacht voor noodhulp en weerbaarheid</u> -“Het aantal natuurrampen is afgelopen decennia gestegen tot gemiddeld bijna 400 per jaar. Door verstedelijking, klimaatverandering, uitputting van natuurlijke hulpbronnen en de groeiende complexiteit van conflicten is de impact van rampen ook nog eens flink toegenomen. Vooral mensen in arme landen hebben hieronder te lijden.” (1:33)
		- investing in trade as IPG	IPG's: - NL zet zich in voor liberaliseren van de wereldhandel & handelsfacilitatie (1:24) -“De heer Sjoerdsma (D66): De Minister beschouwt handel als een global public good. Waarom precies? Minister Ploumen: Waarom zie ik de handel als een internationaal publiek goed? Een publiek goed is iets van ons allemaal, waar wij allemaal belang bij hebben, aan bij kunnen dragen en van kunnen profiteren, maar waar wij ook allemaal hinder van kunnen hebben als het niet goed geregeld is. Ik vind dat het in de agenda van hulp, handel en investeringen het best tot zijn recht komt. Wij hebben een collectief belang in Nederland en Europa met de rest van de wereld en daarom vond ik het op deze manier een goede ordening.” (34:53) 2. Overgangsrelaties <u>Het bevorderen van gelijke kansen</u> -“Een eerlijke verdeling van inkomens is belangrijk voor de ontwikkeling van landen, vanuit sociaal en economisch perspectief. Een economie heeft er baat bij als iedereen volwaardig kan participeren

			op de arbeidsmarkt en niet wordt gehinderd door tradities, sociale taboes of wet- en regelgeving.” (1:39)
		- investing in climate as IPG	IPG’s: - “Klimaatverandering en uitputting van natuurlijke hulpbronnen (milieu, bodem, biodiversiteit) begrenzen de sociale en economische ontwikkeling van zowel arme als rijke landen.” (1:24) - “Klimaatverandering raakt aan vele andere thema’s: voedselzekerheid staat onder druk door droogte, watermanagement wordt belangrijker door overstromingen, degradatie van land en bos treft vrouwen het eerst en uitputting van hulpbronnen kan leiden tot conflicten.” (1:25)
		- investing in food security as IPG	IPG’s: - “Voedselzekerheid is in toenemende mate een mondiaal vraagstuk.” (1:25)
		- investing in water as IPG	IPG’s: - “Waar waterbestuur faalt en waterproblemen niet adequaat worden aangepakt, komen belangrijke ecosystemen, cruciale voorzieningen en economische belangen in de knel. ... Zo kan water een belangrijke bron van regionaal conflict worden. We dragen daarom bij aan grensoverschrijdend waterbeheer in zeven internationale stroomgebieden.” (1:26)
		- investing in security & legal order - combating conflict - promoting good governance - the danger of global instability	IPG’s: - “Problemen als radicalisering, terrorisme en grensoverschrijdende criminaliteit, maar ook illegale handelsstromen en grondstoffentoevoer zijn een steeds grotere bedreiging voor de stabiliteit in fragiele staten, en ook voor Nederland en Europa.” (1:27) - “We maken ons daarom sterk voor een betere mondiale aanpak van vrede en veiligheid.” (1:27) - “Deze regering zet zich eveneens in voor de bevordering van de internationale rechtsorde. Een sterke internationale rechtsorde is essentieel voor een rechtvaardige, vreedzame en welvarende wereld. ... We hebben er baat bij dat ook in andere landen kernwaarden van de rechtsstaat worden gerespecteerd.” (1:27)
		- investing in migration as IPG	IPG’s: - “Migratie vraagt om een grensoverschrijdende samenwerking tussen overheden van herkomst-, transit- en bestemmingslanden.” (1:27) - “We oefenen druk uit op landen om hun onderdanen terug te nemen aan wie de toegang tot Nederland is ontzegd en hanteren de mogelijkheid tot conditionaliteit in onze handels- en ontwikkelingsrelaties met landen om terugkeer te helpen realiseren.” (1:27-28)
		- promoting democracies	“De ontwikkeling van een middenklasse is hier belangrijk om druk te zetten op de eigen regeringen en zo de democratie, de rechtsstaat en de emancipatie van vrouwen te bevorderen.” (1:3)
Construc- tivism	Duty <i>Aid as tool to maintain their position in international system</i>	- investments in the kind of projects that are internationally recognized and popular - visible projects - follow the international trend	“Daarmee is het Millenniumdoel om extreme armoede te halveren in 2015 bereikt. Ook andere Millenniumdoelen – bijvoorbeeld toegang tot water, sanitatie en basisonderwijs – zijn in zicht. Maar dit geldt niet voor alle Millenniumdoelen. We lopen nog ver achter bij het terugbrengen van zuigelingen-, kind- en moedersterfte, en het vergroten van de toegang tot reproductieve gezondheidszorg.” (1:3) “Minister Ploumen: De EPA’s zijn een agreement met de Europese Unie waarvan Nederland een van de lidstaten is. Wij zetten ons met de Commissie actief in.” (34:53)
		- references to international norms or agreements	“Nederland heeft bij de internationale onderhandelingen toegezegd bij te dragen aan de extra kosten voor vergroening van de economie (mitigatie) en het aanpassen aan klimaatverandering in ontwikkelingslanden (adaptatie).” (1:25)
		- connection with strategies for international position - comparison with other countries (others do more)	-
Construc- tivism	Reputation <i>Aid as tool to enhance reputation</i>	- large, high-profile aid projects - many leadership tasks in international fora - references to upholding reputation	1. Hulprelaties: <u>Investeren in een mondiale ontwikkelingsagenda</u> “Van bijzonder belang voor de post-2015-agenda zijn de Duurzame Ontwikkelingsdoelen (Sustainable Development Goals, SDG’s). Op de Rio+20-conferentie over duurzame ontwikkeling in 2012 is afgesproken dat deze nieuwe doelen, die voornamelijk betrekking hebben op milieu en duurzame ontwikkeling, verder worden uitgewerkt. Nederland is lid van de werkgroep die zich buigt over de vormgeving van de SDG’s. We vinden het belangrijk dat de SDG’s een plek krijgen in de mondiale ontwikkelingsagenda. Zo kunnen we na 2015 met één set aan doelen aan de slag, die zowel de vernieuwde ontwikkelingsagenda als de SDG’s omvat.” (1:29) (maar hierin blijkt ook enigzins een enlightened interest) <u>Investeren in basisvoorzieningen</u> “Bovendien staat de internationale consensus over gendergelijkheid en seksuele gezondheid en rechten onder zware druk. Daarom investeert Nederland in bondgenootschappen met progressieve

			landen. Thema's als gelijkheid voor mannen en vrouwen en seksuele rechten moeten een plek krijgen in de nieuwe armoedeagenda die de Millenniumdoelen na 2015 vervangt." (1:30) "Nederland vindt het belangrijk om de impasse met de andere regio's te doorbreken. In onze rol als <i>honest broker</i> willen wij de wensen van de EU en de ACS-landen dichterbij elkaar brengen." (1:35) "Nederland vervult een internationale voortrekkersrol bij het verbeteren van de financiële infrastructuur voor de armen" (1:36) "Nederland heeft een reputatie op het gebied van water en watermanagement." (1:46) "Minister Ploumen: Defense, diplomacy en development lopen echt gelijk op. Nederland heeft daarin een naam hoog te houden en dat doen wij graag." (34:57)
		- new, innovative projects	"Minister Ploumen: Deze nota is naar mijn volle overtuiging anno 2013 de manier om armoede te bestrijden." (35:25)
		- comparison with other countries (others do less)	"Daarbij kijken wij of de verdragen die deze landen met Nederland hebben afgesloten onbedoelde effecten hebben. Dat zou het geval kunnen zijn wanneer het verdrag met Nederland, meer dan de verdragen met andere landen, ongewenste mogelijkheden biedt de belastinggrondslag in ontwikkelingslanden te verlagen." (1:16) "De heer Jasper van Dijk (SP): De Minister gaat mede vanwege deze ongelijkheid belastingverdragen met ontwikkelingslanden bekijken. Dat is goed; de SP heeft daarop aangedrongen. Wij moeten wel scherp blijven. De Minister schrijft dat zij gaat kijken naar onbedoelde effecten van de verdragen. Ik citeer: «Dat zou het geval kunnen zijn wanneer het verdrag met Nederland meer dan de verdragen met andere landen ongewenste mogelijkheden biedt om de belastinggrondslag in ontwikkelingslanden te verlagen.» Dat klinkt goed, maar het maakt toch niet uit wat andere landen doen? Het gaat erom dat de Minister onze belastingverdragen met ontwikkelingslanden eerlijker maakt." (34:22) → Dit laatse duidt op de afwezigheid van een humanitaire motivatie "De heer Van Ojik (GroenLinks): Het mag daarbij uiteraard niet alleen gaan om de vergelijking met andere landen. Immers, als we net zo slecht zijn als de anderen, helpt dat de ontwikkelingslanden niet" (35:7) "De EU geeft, in vergelijking met andere OESO-landen, al ruim toegang voor agrarische producten uit lage inkomenslanden." (1:17)
		- symbolic significance of aid	"Mevrouw Thieme (PvdD): Ons buitenlandbeleid lijkt vooral symboolpolitiek en dit is een van de voorbeelden daarvan. ... Bij het uitblijven van concrete acties voor het verminderen van onze eigen voetafdruk op de wereld, bij het uitblijven van de erkenning dat onze exportdrift ten koste gaat van de mogelijkheden voor ontwikkelingslanden om zichzelf te ontplooien, blijven mooie woorden symboolpolitiek." (34:27)
		- connections to reputation strategies	-
Constructivism	Humanitarianism <i>Aid as tool improve living conditions and human rights worldwide</i>	- eradicate poverty	1. Hulprelaties: <u>Investeren in een mondiale ontwikkelingsagenda</u> - "Een nieuwe internationale agenda voor armoedebestrijding, die de plek inneemt van de Millenniumdoelen na 2015, is van groot belang om ook in de toekomst concrete doelen te stellen voor de bestrijding van armoede en ongelijkheid." (1:28)
		- supporting poorest and weakest groups	1. Hulprelaties: <u>Investeren in basisvoorzieningen</u> - Investeren in gelijke rechten voor vrouwen en seksuele en reproductieve gezondheid en rechten: "Nederland wil verschil maken in het leven van vrouwen." (1:30) "Nederland maakt zich sterk voor het tegengaan van huwelijksdwang (kindbruiden) en seksueel geweld, onder meer door deelname aan de internationale campagne «Girls not Brides»." (1:30)
		- provide humanitarian relief	1. Hulprelaties: <u>Aandacht voor noodhulp en weerbaarheid</u> - "Bij noodhulp staan voor ons de humanitaire principes onafhankelijkheid, neutraliteit en onpartijdigheid voorop. Daarnaast vinden wij dat hulpverleners met aandacht voor de lokale situatie te werk moeten gaan, om ervoor te zorgen dat hulp daar aankomt waar de nood het hoogst is." (1:33)
		- support democratization and democracy	"De ontwikkeling van een middenklasse is hier belangrijk om druk te zetten op de eigen regeringen en zo de democratie, de rechtsstaat en de emancipatie van vrouwen te bevorderen." (1:3)
		- promote good governance - promote human rights	IPG's:

		- international justice - international distributive justice	- “Deze regering zet zich eveneens in voor de bevordering van de internationale rechtsorde. Een sterke internationale rechtsorde is essentieel voor een rechtvaardige, vreedzame en welvarende wereld. - Maar let op toevoeging, niet humanitair, maar enlightened: - ... We hebben er baat bij dat ook in andere landen kernwaarden van de rechtsstaat worden gerespecteerd.” (1:27)
		- aid is seen as its own policy independently of national strategic interests	-

Table B.4 Bilateral/Multilateral aid

2013 Bilateral/Multilateral aid			
Theory	Frame	Measurement	
Realism	Security <i>Aid is mainly bilateral</i>	- aid is given to states, instead of subgroups within or above those states - aid is given directly from state to state instead of cooperation through international institutions - focusing on bilateral aid instead of multilateral aid	“de bijdragen aan multilaterale organisaties worden verminderd en de geoormerkte uitgaven aan maatschappelijke organisaties worden verlaagd” (1:6) “Invulling van de bezuinigingen bereiken we vooral door de bestedingen voor de doorsnijdende thema’s goed bestuur, milieu en onderwijs in lage- en middeninkomenslanden versneld af te bouwen en waar relevant te integreren in de speerpunten; door het verminderen van bijdragen aan multilaterale organisaties; en door een verlaging van de geoormerkte uitgaven aan maatschappelijke organisaties” (1:20) “Algemene bijdragen aan multilaterale organisaties worden verlaagd. Thematische activiteiten van multilaterale organisaties komen in aanmerking voor financiering uit de budgetten voor de speerpunten.” (1:51)
		- the role of international institutions is downplayed - state is central actor - international institutions entail some loss of autonomy and complicate policy-making	-
Realism	Power <i>Aid is mainly bilateral</i>	- aid is given to states, instead of subgroups within or above those states - aid is given directly from state to state instead of cooperation through international institutions - focusing on bilateral aid instead of multilateral aid	“de bijdragen aan multilaterale organisaties worden verminderd en de geoormerkte uitgaven aan maatschappelijke organisaties worden verlaagd” (1:6) “Invulling van de bezuinigingen bereiken we vooral door de bestedingen voor de doorsnijdende thema’s goed bestuur, milieu en onderwijs in lage- en middeninkomenslanden versneld af te bouwen en waar relevant te integreren in de speerpunten; door het verminderen van bijdragen aan multilaterale organisaties; en door een verlaging van de geoormerkte uitgaven aan maatschappelijke organisaties” (1:20) “Algemene bijdragen aan multilaterale organisaties worden verlaagd. Thematische activiteiten van multilaterale organisaties komen in aanmerking voor financiering uit de budgetten voor de speerpunten.” (1:51)
		- the role of international institutions is downplayed - state is central actor - bilaterally it is easier to extend influence and execute hard power strategies	-
Liberalism	Economic self-interest <i>Aid is mainly bilateral</i>	- focusing on bilateral aid instead of multilateral aid - aid is given from state to state instead of cooperation through international institutions	“de bijdragen aan multilaterale organisaties worden verminderd en de geoormerkte uitgaven aan maatschappelijke organisaties worden verlaagd” (1:6) “Invulling van de bezuinigingen bereiken we vooral door de bestedingen voor de doorsnijdende thema’s goed bestuur, milieu en onderwijs in lage- en middeninkomenslanden versneld af te bouwen en waar relevant te integreren in de speerpunten; door het verminderen van bijdragen aan multilaterale organisaties; en door een verlaging van de geoormerkte uitgaven aan maatschappelijke organisaties” (1:20)

			“Algemene bijdragen aan multilaterale organisaties worden verlaagd. Thematische activiteiten van multilaterale organisaties komen in aanmerking voor financiering uit de budgetten voor de speerpunten.” (1:51)
		- emphasizing economic interest	“We hebben op het terrein van handel en hulp drie soorten bilaterale relaties met landen. We richten ons daarbij vooral op de huidige partnerlanden (hulp) en de focuslanden (handel).” (1:4) “Zo moet handel een grotere rol gaan spelen in de bilaterale (hulp)relaties.” (1:19) “Minister Ploumen: Natuurlijk geef ik in de bilaterale relatie ook aandacht aan het versterken van het ondernemingsklimaat en de economieën, met name via het budget voor private sectorontwikkeling.” (34:51) “Mevrouw De Caluwé (VVD): Wij willen vooral bezuinigen op de donaties aan multilaterale organisaties en op bijdragen aan de ngo’s. Daarnaast willen wij meer handel creëren.” (34:3)
		- the multilateral aid that is given is focused on enhancing the business climate	“Minister Ploumen: Ik wil graag regionale bijeenkomsten tot stand brengen en op basis van die bijeenkomsten bekijken waar de ruimte zit, zowel in de onderhandelingen tussen de EU en die landen, als in de internationale handelsarchitectuur zoals die bij de WTO belegd is.” (34:51) “Minister Ploumen: Handelsverdragen worden gesloten tussen de Europese Unie en een derde land of een andere samenstelling van landen, en niet bilateraal.” (35:13) “De EU is de natuurlijke <i>multiplier</i> van Nederlandse ideeën en belangen.” (1:47) “Nederland zoekt graag samenwerking met internationale organisaties die actief zijn op terreinen waarop ook Nederlandse bedrijven, instellingen en maatschappelijke organisaties tot de top behoren.” (1:48)
		- multilateral aid is less easily controlled by domestic economic interests	-
Liberalism	Enlightened self-interest <i>Aid is mainly multilateral</i>	- focusing on multilateral aid instead of bilateral aid - aid is given through international institutions	Flinke bezuinigingen op multilateral aid, maar: “Dit wil niet zeggen dat er in andere landen geen Nederlands ontwikkelingsgeld meer wordt geïnvesteerd. De EU, de multilaterale instellingen en maatschappelijke organisaties zijn in een groot aantal lage- en middeninkomenslanden actief.” (1:21)
		- giving aid to multilateral organizations to combat global problems	“Internationale organisaties worden steeds belangrijker voor het oplossen van grensoverschrijdende problemen, die alleen door landen gezamenlijk met succes kunnen worden aangepakt, zoals klimaatverandering en financiële instabiliteit.” (1:48) “De EU is actief in veel landen waar lidstaten wél strategische belangen hebben (bijvoorbeeld vanwege de geografische ligging), maar geen of slechts kleine bilaterale programma’s. ... De EU is in fragiele staten zoals de Centraal-Afrikaanse Republiek goed vertegenwoordigd en heeft daar een breed instrumentarium. De EU levert met haar ontwikkelingsprogramma’s, speciale vertegenwoordigers en civiele missies op het gebied van veiligheid, politie en justitie in veel landen een belangrijke bijdrage aan stabiliteit.” (1:47) “We steunen gericht de capaciteit van leidende organisaties op vrede en veiligheid, zoals de VN, de Wereldbank, de NAVO en regionale organisaties.” (1:27) “Nederland blijft allereerst inzetten op bescherming en opvang van vluchtelingen in de regio. Daarom steunen we de UNHCR.” (1:27) “We kiezen steeds vaker een regionale benadering omdat problemen als instabiliteit en voedselonzeekerheid daar ook om vragen.” (1:18) “Een nieuwe internationale agenda voor armoedebestrijding, die de plek inneemt van de Millenniumdoelen na 2015, is van groot belang om ook in de toekomst concrete doelen te stellen voor de bestrijding van armoede en ongelijkheid.” (1:28) “Minister Ploumen: De toegevoegde waarde van maatschappelijke organisaties en van het multilaterale kanaal is juist dat zij via andere wegen bijdragen aan het uitbannen van die extreme

			armoede, of dat nu in extreem arme landen is of in middeninkomenslanden. Migrantenorganisaties en diasporaorganisaties spelen een belangrijke rol, zowel met hun politieke inbreng als in de relaties die zij hebben met de landen van herkomst." (35:23)
		- strengthening international organizations	"Een goed functionerend netwerk van internationale organisaties is cruciaal. ... UNDP, UNICEF en Wereldbank moeten een sterke coördinerende rol spelen. Nederland hecht grote waarde aan het multilaterale systeem en zet zich ervoor in om dit netwerk efficiënter en effectiever te laten functioneren. Daarnaast moeten internationale organisaties meerwaarde hebben voor het Nederlands beleid." (1:48) "In internationale organisaties maken wij ons sterk voor humanitaire hulp die zo effectief mogelijk is georganiseerd. Coördinatie, vooral in de EU en VN-verband, vinden wij hiervan een belangrijk aspect." (1:33) "We zetten ons in voor de versterking en modernisering van multilaterale fora. De EU wordt een steeds belangrijker gremium voor de behartiging van Nederlandse belangen, ook op het gebied van hulp en handel." (1:44)
Construc-tivism	Duty <i>Aid is mainly multilateral</i>	- mandatory contributions to international organizations will be made faithfully	Flinke bezuinigingen op multilateral aid, maar: "Dit wil niet zeggen dat er in andere landen geen Nederlands ontwikkelingsgeld meer wordt geïnvesteerd. De EU, de multilaterale instellingen en maatschappelijke organisaties zijn in een groot aantal lage- en middeninkomenslanden actief." (1:21)
		- bilateral aid will be at the acceptable minimum - international duty to contribute to international organizations	-
Construc-tivism	Reputation <i>Aid is mainly multilateral</i>	- focusing on multilateral aid instead of bilateral aid - aid is given through international institutions	Flinke bezuinigingen op multilateral aid, maar: "Dit wil niet zeggen dat er in andere landen geen Nederlands ontwikkelingsgeld meer wordt geïnvesteerd. De EU, de multilaterale instellingen en maatschappelijke organisaties zijn in een groot aantal lage- en middeninkomenslanden actief." (1:21)
		- mainly large UN projects with a lot of visibility - status of international institutions is considered to be of value	"Een goed functionerend netwerk van internationale organisaties is cruciaal. ... UNDP, UNICEF en Wereldbank moeten een sterke coördinerende rol spelen. Nederland hecht grote waarde aan het multilaterale systeem en zet zich ervoor in om dit netwerk efficiënter en effectiever te laten functioneren. Daarnaast moeten internationale organisaties meerwaarde hebben voor het Nederlands beleid." (1:48) "In internationale organisaties maken wij ons sterk voor humanitaire hulp die zo effectief mogelijk is georganiseerd. Coördinatie, vooral in de EU en VN-verband, vinden wij hiervan een belangrijk aspect." (1:33)
Construc-tivism	Humanitaria-nism <i>Aid has high levels of both bilateral and multilateral donation</i>	- aid is given both bilaterally and multilaterally	Flinke bezuinigingen op multilateral aid, dat zou je niet verwachten bij een donor die onbaatzuchtig is.
		- highest focus for the one which can contribute the most on specific area - human development is always end goal	-

Table B.5 Volume

2013 Volume			
Theory	Frame	Measurement	
Realism	Security <i>Aid volume is low, correlated with international tension & large share for security projects</i>	- overall low volume	Nederland met 0.6% nog steeds vrij hoog volume, echter zijn er wel flinke budget cuts "In de periode 2014 tot en met 2016 wordt de ODA-begroting met jaarlijks EUR 750 miljoen verlaagd en vanaf 2017 met jaarlijks EUR 1 miljard. Daarbovenop moet een aanzienlijke neerwaartse bijstelling van het budget als gevolg van tegenvallende BNP-ramingen worden opgevangen, die oploopt tot bijna EUR 300 mln in 2017." (1:50) Netto ODA als % van het BNP: 0.68 (2013), 0.59 (2014), 0.60 (2015), 0.59 (2016), 0.55 (2017) Kritiek: "De heer Jasper van Dijk (SP): Voorzitter. Dat juist de Partij van de Arbeid ervoor verantwoordelijk is dat ons land de norm van 0,7% eenzijdig opgeeft, is beschamend. Hiermee is de

			bodem onder de internationale solidariteit weggeslagen. Ik voorzie dat dit onherstelbaar zal blijken." (2:6)
		- the level of international tension	<i>The Netherlands was not in war during this time and their direct physical security wasn't in danger, aid volume is therefore expected to be at a minimum level. Dus je zou nog lager volume verwachten, voorspelling klopt niet.</i>
		- large share of aid is used for projects that ensure national security	-
Realism	Power <i>Aid volume is low, correlated with size of donor & large share for power projects</i>	- overall low volume	Nederland met 0.6% nog steeds vrij hoog volume, echter zijn er wel flinke budget cuts "In de periode 2014 tot en met 2016 wordt de ODA-begroting met jaarlijks EUR 750 miljoen verlaagd en vanaf 2017 met jaarlijks EUR 1 miljard. Daarbovenop moet een aanzienlijke neerwaartse bijstelling van het budget als gevolg van tegenvallende BNP-ramingen worden opgevangen, die oploopt tot bijna EUR 300 mln in 2017." (1:50) Netto ODA als % van het BNP: 0.68 (2013), 0.59 (2014), 0.60 (2015), 0.59 (2016), 0.55 (2017) Kritiek: "De heer Jasper van Dijk (SP): Voorzitter. Dat juist de Partij van de Arbeid ervoor verantwoordelijk is dat ons land de norm van 0,7% eenzijdig opgeeft, is beschamend. Hiermee is de bodem onder de internationale solidariteit weggeslagen. Ik voorzie dat dit onherstelbaar zal blijken." (2:6)
		- size of donor state	<i>The Netherlands is a small state, aid volume is therefore expected to be at a higher level compared to bigger donor states: Dit klopt</i>
		- aid is used to make recipients dependent, and gain power	<i>No hard power, only soft power</i>
		- connections with the state's strategies for the pursuit of power	-
Liberalism	Economic self-interest <i>Aid volume is low, correlated with economic dependence & large share for economic projects</i>	- overall volume is relatively low	Nederland met 0.6% nog steeds vrij hoog volume, echter zijn er wel flinke budget cuts "In de periode 2014 tot en met 2016 wordt de ODA-begroting met jaarlijks EUR 750 miljoen verlaagd en vanaf 2017 met jaarlijks EUR 1 miljard. Daarbovenop moet een aanzienlijke neerwaartse bijstelling van het budget als gevolg van tegenvallende BNP-ramingen worden opgevangen, die oploopt tot bijna EUR 300 mln in 2017." (1:50) Netto ODA als % van het BNP: 0.68 (2013), 0.59 (2014), 0.60 (2015), 0.59 (2016), 0.55 (2017) Kritiek: "De heer Jasper van Dijk (SP): Voorzitter. Dat juist de Partij van de Arbeid ervoor verantwoordelijk is dat ons land de norm van 0,7% eenzijdig opgeeft, is beschamend. Hiermee is de bodem onder de internationale solidariteit weggeslagen. Ik voorzie dat dit onherstelbaar zal blijken." (2:6)
		- economic dependence	<i>Seen as the Netherlands is a small country with a very international economic outlook, they are, more than many other countries, dependent for their economic wellbeing on sustainable development in other countries. Aid volume is therefore expected to be at a higher level compared to other donor states.: Dit klopt nog steeds</i>
		- large share for projects supporting economic growth - large share to enhance trade	"Dit kabinet kiest voor een versterking van de samenhang tussen de beleidsterreinen buitenlandse handel en ontwikkelingssamenwerking, zowel in beleidsinhoudelijke als begrotingstechnische zin." (1:50) "Daarnaast is in het Regeerakkoord besloten tot oprichting van het <i>Dutch Good Growth Fund</i> . Dit revolverende fonds wordt in de periode 2014 tot en met 2016 gevoed met jaarlijks EUR 250 mln." (1:50) "Door onze bestedingen op private sectorontwikkeling ondersteunen we landen bij het verkrijgen van markttoegang en bij het verbeteren van het ondernemersklimaat." (1:51) "Het aandeel van de vier speerpunten (incl. Budget Internationale Veiligheid) en private sectorontwikkeling/handelsbevordering neemt in deze periode toe van 51% naar 57%. Het aandeel van uitgaven aan het maatschappelijk middenveld in Nederland, onderwijs in lage- en middeninkomenslanden, goed bestuur, cultuur en draagvlak daalt van 16% naar 11%." (1:52) Kritiek: "De heer Sjoerdsma (D66): De proportie van het Nederlandse hulpgeld dat in 2017 naar het bedrijfsleveninstrumentarium gaat ten opzichte van bijvoorbeeld het maatschappelijk middenveld, loopt uit de klauwen." (34:17-18)

			“De heer Voordewind (ChristenUnie): Hoe ziet de Minister het evenwicht tussen de grote bezuiniging, van zelfs 50% als wij doorredeneren naar 2017, op het maatschappelijk middenveld en het grote belang van het middenveld in het licht van de stijging van de uitgaven voor het bedrijfsleven van 380 naar 500 miljoen? Dan heb ik het nog niet gehad over het bedrijfslevenfonds van 750 miljoen.” (34:19-20) “De heer Van Ojik (GroenLinks): Behalve op vrouwenrechten en SRGR – waarvoor hulde – wordt overal op bezuinigd, ook op de speerpunten. Daarop is maar één uitzondering: de private sectorontwikkeling. Die sector krijgt er geld bij.” (34:25) “De heer Van Ojik (GroenLinks): De tweede doelstelling is inclusieve groei en de derde de belangen van het Nederlandse bedrijfsleven. Het gaat om de balans in de bezuinigingen. Wij halen bijna een miljard weg bij armoedebestrijding en voegen geld toe aan de doelstelling om inclusieve groei te bereiken met een Dutch Good Growth Fund waar wij de komende jaren elk jaar 250 miljoen in stoppen. Het gaat om de balans tussen de doelstellingen en de manier waarop de Minister de bezuinigingen invult.” (34:58) Over ODA definitie: NL maakt zich hard voor bredere ODA-definitie waar ook meer handelsmechanismen (zoals de DDGF) onder kunnen vallen: “Innovatieve financieringsinstrumenten voldoen niet altijd aan de officiële definitie van ODA. Dit geldt overigens ook voor andere – vaak omvangrijke – inspanningen die ontwikkelingsrelevant zijn, en die bijdragen aan meer welzijn en meer economische groei. Dat is onwenselijk. In de internationale discussie over de toekomst van ODA die de komende jaren onder andere in de OESO wordt gevoerd, maken we ons daarom sterk voor een bredere definitie die ook innovatieve financieringsmechanismen en andere ontwikkelingsrelevante uitgaven omarmt.” (1:19-20)
		- low share/cut backs on projects without economic gains	“De budgetten op de doorsnijdende thema’s goed bestuur, milieu en onderwijs in lage- en middeninkomenslanden worden versneld afgebouwd.” (1:51) “Algemene bijdragen aan multilaterale organisaties worden verlaagd. Thematische activiteiten van multilaterale organisaties komen in aanmerking voor financiering uit de budgetten voor de speerpunten.” (1:51) “Er komt geen vervolg op MFS-II. Maatschappelijke organisaties kunnen in aanmerking komen voor financiering uit de programmabudgetten voor de speerpunten.” (1:51)
Liberalism	Enlightened self-interest <i>Aid volume is high, correlated with donor’s international exposure & large share for IPG projects</i>	- overall volume is relatively high	The international interdependence is high, so you would expect a high volume of aid if this frame is dominant. However, for the first time the Dutch drop below the norm of 0,7%.
		- the level of international exposure	<i>Seen as the Netherlands is a small country with a very international economic outlook, they are, more than many other countries, dependent for their economic wellbeing on sustainable development in other countries. They are also a popular destination for refugees. Aid volume is therefore expected to be at a higher level compared to other donor states.: Dit klopt nog steeds</i>
		- large share for pursuing stability and IPGs	“Het Budget voor Internationale Veiligheid (BIV) bedraagt structureel EUR 250 mln. vanaf 2014.” (1:50) “We concentreren onze inspanningen voor hulp, handel en investeringen op de speerpunten voedselzekerheid, vrouwenrechten en SRGR, water, veiligheid en rechtsorde. Met uitzondering van vrouwenrechten en SRGR worden ook de speerpunten onvermijdelijk getroffen door bezuinigingen.” (1:51) “Op noodhulp wordt niet bezuinigd.” (1:51) “In het Regeerakkoord is bovendien vastgelegd dat internationale klimaatuitgaven worden gefinancierd uit de ODA-begroting.” (1:51) Kritiek: “De heer Voordewind (ChristenUnie): Op pagina 50 van de nota word je echt wakker, want daar staat die enorme bezuiniging van 1 miljard. Ik zou bijna zeggen: was het maar 1 miljard, maar er komt het een en ander bij. In de kleine lettertjes staat dat de private financiering van het klimaatgeld nog steeds niet geregeld is. Die zou zelfs kunnen oplopen tot een extra belasting van 1,2 miljard. ... Dat noemt men dan armoedebestrijding.” (34:19)
Constructivism	Duty <i>Aid volume is correlated with those of peer groups & large share for popular projects</i>	- peer aid volume	Aid volume is expected to be similar to 0.3%. Er zijn wel bezuinigingen, maar het % is 2x zo hoog. Duty kan dit niet verklaren
		- aimed at mandatory, visible or popular projects	“Vanwege het belang om als een betrouwbare donor te blijven opereren worden doorlopende contracten en toezeggingen zoveel mogelijk gerespecteerd.” (1:51) “Bij de invulling van de bezuinigingen moet worden bedacht dat een aanzienlijk deel van het ODA-budget vastligt. In de eerste plaats gaat het hierbij om de zgn. toerekeningen (eerstejaarsopvang van asielzoekers uit DAC-landen, de EU-toerekening, schuldkwijtschelding (EKI) en apparaatskosten). Deze toerekeningen bedragen samen jaarlijks ca. EUR 1 miljard. Daarnaast ligt een belangrijk deel van het budget vast in verplichtingen die al zijn aangegaan.” (1:51)

Construc- tivism	Reputation <i>Aid volume meets or exceeds international norms regarding aid volume</i>	- peer aid volume	<i>As the UN target for aid is 0.7% of GNI, under this interest the Netherlands is expected to meet or exceed this. Klopt niet, Nederland zit eronder.</i>
		- attempt to stand out among their peer group	<i>"De heer Van Ojik (GroenLinks): Ten eerste kijk ik naar het totale bedrag dat tussen nu en 2017 bezuinigd wordt. Dan voldoen wij voor het eerst in 40 jaar niet meer aan wat internationaal is afgesproken. Ik vind dat een ernstige breuk met een traditie waar Nederland trots op was." (2:57)</i>
Construc- tivism	Humanitaria- nism <i>Aid volume is high, correlated with donor's wealth & large share for neediest groups</i>	- overall volume is relatively high	<i>Nederland geeft nog steeds hoger dan gemiddeld, maar zou nog veel meer kunnen missen vanuit een altruïstisch perspectief. Je zou ook zeker niet zulke bezuinigingen verwachten met humanitair frame</i>
		- donor's wealth	<i>As the Netherlands is a prosperous country compared to a lot of other donors, they are expected to allocate a larger share to aid. Ja, Nederland geeft nog steeds relatief veel.</i>
		- large share for neediest groups	<i>"Op noodhulp wordt niet bezuinigd." (1:51)</i> <i>"De budgetten op de doorsnijdende thema's goed bestuur, milieu en onderwijs in lage- en middeninkomenslanden worden versneld afgebouwd." (1:51)</i> <i>"De heer Jasper van Dijk (SP): Voorzitter. Dat juist de Partij van de Arbeid ervoor verantwoordelijk is dat ons land de norm van 0,7% eenzijdig opgeeft, is beschamend. Hiermee is de bodem onder de internationale solidariteit weggeslagen. Ik voorzie dat dit onherstelbaar zal blijken. Dit is geen foutief beleid, maar een verloochening van een kernbeginsel, aldus Jan Pronk, die zijn lidmaatschap van de Partij van de Arbeid gisteren heeft opgezegd." (2:6)</i>

Appendix C: 1993

The tables analyzing 1993's aid policy.

Black= the frame is found here / or criticism at the policy has been found, which implies the certain frame

Red= this statement falsifies the dominance of the particular frame (one would not expect to see this if that frame/interest would actually be dominant)

References:

2= document: Parliamentary Documents II, 1993/94, 23408, 2

24= document: Parliamentary Documents II, 1993/94, 23408, 24

Table C.1 Motivation

1993 Motivation			
Theory	Frame	Measurement	
Realism	Security <i>Aid motivations out of fear for the international security environment</i>	- international tension (which directly hurts the donor's national security) - geopolitical threats	Over de nieuwe polariteit in de wereld: "In het nieuwe wereldpatroon is bovendien door de proliferatie van massavernietigingswapens de dreiging van grootscheepse vernietiging geenszins verdwenen, integendeel wellicht zelfs acuter geworden. In dat perspectief is het dienstig te analyseren naar welke orde de wereld nu tendeert, en te bezien hoe deze tendensen in vredebevorderende zin zijn bij te sturen." (2:12)
		- struggle against different ideologies - pursuit of self-interest in terms of military security - salience of security considerations - the need to increase donor's physical security	-
		NOT security:	"Zeker nu zoveel conflicten zich afspelen binnen staten, in plaats ervan ertussen, of onderdeel vormen van een proces van het uiteenvallen van staten" (2:33)
Realism	Power <i>Aid motivations out of pursuit of influence</i>	- pursuit power positions - obtaining influence in the international system - obtaining a voice in recipient countries - increase its leverage over others - win allies	-
		- maintaining the balance of power	"Als in de internationale verhoudingen het heersende patroon niet meer bipolair is, wat is het dan wel? ... Met «unipolariteit» wordt dit patroon van de internationale verhoudingen sinds 1989 wel omschreven, zij het weinig precies. Door een combinatie van politieke, economische, militaire en culturele factoren zijn de Verenigde Staten inderdaad de enige mogendheid die in staat is een mondiaal leidende rol te spelen. Tegelijk spreekt het niet langer vanzelf dat de Verenigde Staten deze rol op zich nemen. ... Omdat anderen die leidersrol ook niet op zich kunnen nemen, zou dan echt van een multipolaire wereld sprake zijn, met het risico van verbrokkeling als perspectief." (2:10-11) Maar volgens Pronk leidt dit tot: "Regionale samenwerking, of regionalisme, is in dit verband een ontwikkeling van belang. ... Afgezet tegen tendensen van fragmentatie en beschouwd als opmaat voor mondiale samenwerking is regionalisme alleen maar positief te waarderen. Het bevordert immers de transparantie van nationale grenzen, stimuleert de interdependentie en concrete samenwerking tussen buurlanden en versterkt de praktijk van vreedzame regeling van geschillen." (2:12)
		NOT power:	"Ter ondervanging van het functieverlies van de staat door grensoverschrijdende problemen wordt algemeen internationale en zelfs bovennationale organisatie als remedie gezien." (2:13) "De positie van overheden is zwakker geworden. Die van andere partijen, zoals het bedrijfsleven, sterker. Het gaat erom alle belangrijke actoren op het internationale toneel te betrekken bij het inkaderen van de nieuwe verhoudingen en hun belangen daarbij te waarborgen, zodat alle partijen zich er ook verantwoordelijk voor zullen voelen." (2:68)
Liberalism	Economic self-interest	- general commercial motives	-

	<i>Aid motivations to further the donor economy</i>	- promote exports - access to vital raw materials - job creation - secure valuable imports	
		- response to changing economic conditions	“De steeds grotere onderlinge verwevenheid van economieën ... is een gevolg van zowel technologische als economische ontwikkelingen en geldt op tal van terreinen: handel, investeringen, telecommunicatie, technologie en tegenwoordig ook milieu en migratie. Ook is er veelal een samenhang tussen vraagstukken die op verschillende terreinen spelen: handel, kapitaalstromen en wisselkoersen; handel en milieu; protectionisme en migratie.” (2:55) “Mondialisering van de economische relaties tussen landen is een proces dat al lange tijd gaande is. ... Technologische ontwikkelingen maken het via informatisering en computerisering steeds meer mogelijk om productieprocessen te splitsen. Delen van productieprocessen kunnen internationaal uitbesteed worden. ... Er vindt als het ware transnationalisering van de economische besluitvorming, ten aanzien van productie, investeringen, handel en daarmee samenhangende geldstromen, plaats. Zo is langzamerhand de <i>global factory</i> tot stand aan het komen.” (2:56) “De belangrijkste beleidsconclusies voor ontwikkelingslanden, gegeven de doelstelling van duurzame economische groei, betroffen de noodzaak van verdere integratie in de wereldeconomie door middel van een evenwichtig, op de wereldmarkt afgestemd, macro-economisch en wisselkoersbeleid, voorziening in basisbehoeften met een investeringskarakter (scholing, gezondheid), en diversificatie van de economie.” (2:55) Maar: “Ontwikkelde landen zouden aan deze integratie moeten bijdragen door met de belangen van economisch zwakke ontwikkelingslanden op consistente wijze en bij voorrang rekening te houden, en door hun markten verder open te stellen en te zorgen voor adequate financiële middelenstromen naar ontwikkelingslanden.” (2:55)
		- pursuit of economic market share	“Ontwikkelingslanden nemen in dit proces een bijzondere plaats in. Ze richten zich steeds meer op de wereldmarkt. ... Hun kracht is goedkope arbeid ... Om hun positie te versterken in dit proces van mondialisering stellen ze zich ook opener op ten aanzien van buitenlandse investeringen, die niet alleen kapitaal met zich meebrengen maar, belangrijker, ook kennis en techniek. In de traditionele industrieën worden zij een steeds grotere concurrent voor de rijke landen. ... De concurrentie op de wereldmarkt, en dus op ieders binnenlandse markt, wordt completer en intenser. Intensier, omdat meer landen daar op het scherp van de snede aan mee doen. Completer in de zin dat steeds meer sectoren, grotere delen van nationale economieën, en daarmee steeds meer mensen, in een internationale concurrentiestrijd verwikkeld zijn.” (2:56-57) Maar: “Het is duidelijk dat deze ontwikkelingen voor de wereld als geheel positief gewaardeerd moeten worden. Technologische ontwikkeling is de motor van economische groei en internationale handel is de smeeroil voor die motor. Grotere toegankelijkheid voor buitenlandse investeringen in veel landen maakt wereldwijde toepassing van moderne technologie, ook in combinatie met goedkope arbeid, gemakkelijker. Mondiaal bevordert het de groei van de welvaart. Het vergroot ook de mogelijkheden voor arme landen om zich te onttrekken aan hun armoede.” (2:57)
Liberalism	Enlightened self-interest <i>Aid motivations out of international dependency</i>	- mutual dependence - globalization	“Ten gevolge van de nieuwe Oost-West verhouding waren grenzen vervaagd; ten gevolge van de aantasting van de basis van de economische groei door de verstoring van het ecologisch evenwicht waren de risico's voor de komende generaties groter geworden; ten gevolge van de mondialisering van economie en technologie waren de marges versmald waarbinnen nationale overheden processen kunnen sturen.” (2:5) “De bevolkingen van de verschillende continenten krijgen steeds meer met elkaar te maken. Goederen, diensten en kapitaal gaan sneller en in sterk groeiende omvang de wereld over. Afstanden worden in rap tempo kleiner, zowel fysiek als in 's mensen geest. Reizen gaat veel gemakkelijker; migratie is een massaal verschijnsel geworden. 's Werelds problemen doen zich ook steeds minder geïsoleerd en verborgen voor: armoede, honger, conflict, milieuschade, besmettelijke ziekte, drugsverslaving.” (2:8) “Afgezet tegen tendensen van fragmentatie en beschouwd als opmaat voor mondiale samenwerking is regionalisme alleen maar positief te waarderen. Het bevordert immers de transparantie van nationale grenzen, stimuleert de interdependentie en concrete samenwerking tussen buurlanden en versterkt de praktijk van vreedzame regeling van geschillen.” (2:12) “de materiële aantasting van de nationale soevereiniteit door transnationale processen. Dit betreft enerzijds de werkingssfeer van de wereldeconomie en anderzijds de uitwerking van grensoverschrijdende problemen. Bij het eerste moet gedacht worden aan de afgenomen mogelijkheden voor nationale staten om geheel zelfstandig binnenlandse economische processen te beïnvloeden of internationale bewegingen van goederen, diensten en kapitaal te sturen. Bij het tweede, de uitwerking op de materiële soevereiniteit van grensoverschrijdende problemen, valt te denken aan de mondiale milieudegradatie, de steeds massalere vluchtelingen- en migrantenstromen en epidemieën als aids. ... Hetzelfde geldt in feite ook voor een ander

		verschijnsel dat in toenemende mate transnationaal van karakter wordt, te weten de georganiseerde misdaad" (2:16) "De mondialisering van de economie en de toenemende interdependentie tussen landen en volken brengen een groeiende noodzaak tot aanpassing met zich mee. Dit geldt voor de wetmatigheden van de wereldeconomie, waaraan landen zich vaak alleen tegen sterk oplopende kosten kunnen onttrekken. Dit geldt ook voor de uitdaging van grensoverschrijdende problemen, zoals milieu-degradatie, die vroeg of laat iedereen raken." (2:24) "Het is een uitdaging voor de jaren negentig om de ordening weer te versterken - de oude orde is niet geheel en al versleten - of aan te passen dan wel nieuwe ordening aan te brengen in de vele transnationale processen. Dat is een uitdaging omdat het gaat om een nieuwe context van mondialisering en internationale interdependentie, met problemen die nieuw zijn of een nieuw gezicht hebben gekregen." (2:68) "Ze heeft door de ontwikkelingen van de laatste jaren nog meer betekenis gekregen omdat het ontwikkelingsproces zich in toenemende mate wereldwijd aandient en niet meer louter betrekking heeft op een geografisch beperkt gebied in het Zuiden van de wereld. ... de steeds snellere technologische ontwikkeling, over de grenzen heen, heeft de economische en culturele interdependentie via de handel, de migratie, de massamedia en andere vormen van communicatie zo intensief gemaakt dat grenzen irrelevant zijn geworden. Dit alles kan niet zonder gevolgen zijn voor de ontwikkelingssamenwerking." (2:104) "Minister Pronk: Vroeger was een probleem dat in een land speelde, een probleem van dat land. Dat was geïsoleerd. Het had geen consequenties. Nu heeft het consequenties voor talloze landen die ermee te maken hebben, al was het alleen maar via internationale communicatie, als iets totaal nieuws." (24:5)
	- pursuing stability	<u>Geschillen</u> "Veel van de toen geanalyseerde ontwikkelingen droegen de kiemen van conflict reeds in zich en zijn inderdaad tot geschillen uitgegroeid. Geschillen tussen staten maar vooral erbinen, geschillen tussen volken en tussen etnische en religieuze groepen, geschillen over de verdeling van de schaarste en van de beperkte milieugebruiksruimte, geschillen over mensenrechten en over de ordening van de betrekkingen in de wereld." (2:6) "Het internationale politieke vermogen problemen op te lossen is weliswaar toegenomen, maar het aantal moeilijk oplosbare problemen is nog veel sterker gegroeid." (2:8) "De bevordering van de samenhang van de wereld, althans het helpen tegengaan van verbroekeling en wanorde, is een nieuwe, dringende opdracht voor de internationale gemeenschap" (2:9) "Aldus worden de internationale kaders voor de ontwikkelingssamenwerking opnieuw getrokken. Collectieve veiligheid en conflictbeheersing zijn daarbij sleutelwoorden. ... Het zijn ontwikkelingen waarvan de betekenis nationale grenzen overschrijdt; zij raken dus aan het vraagstuk van orde en wanorde in de wereld." (2:12-13) "De internationale gemeenschap kan bijdragen aan het beheersbaar houden van het desintegratieverschijnsel en het tegengaan van extremistische ontwikkelingen." (2:16) "het ontwikkelingsproces gaat gepaard met conflicten. Grootschalige armoede, in combinatie met schaarste aan hulpbronnen, lokt verdelingsconflicten uit, vooral over het bezit en gebruik van land en water." (2:28) "Door de nauwe relatie van de nieuwe conflicten met het gewijzigde karakter van het nationale en internationale ontwikkelingsproces heeft het veiligheidsvraagstuk meer dan ooit niet alleen politieke of militaire aspecten. Veiligheid heeft ook economische, sociale, humanitaire, ecologische en zelfs religieus-culturele kanten. Dat maakt het onderwerp des te meer relevant uit een oogpunt van ontwikkelingssamenwerking." (2:29) "Een type conflict dat in de nabije toekomst vaker zal voorkomen en dat tot geweld - kleinschalig, maar eventueel ook op grotere schaal - aanleiding kan geven, betreft de afbraak van het natuurlijk milieu en de schaarste aan vernieuwbare hulpbronnen." (2:30) "Vooral in arme landen en gebieden, waar de bevolkingsgroei het grootst en de mogelijkheid uit te wijken naar technische vernieuwing het kleinst is, dient de kans op gewelddadig conflict over het beslag op de milieugebruiksruimte zich aan." (2:30) "Ook om deze reden is er dus veel aan gelegen dat rijke en arme landen samenwerken bij het terugdringen van zowel milieudegradatie als bevolkingsgroei, bij het bewerkstelligen van een veel minder ongelijke welvaartsverdeling en bij het vormgeven aan een veel duurzamere ontwikkeling. Uiteindelijk is daar de veiligheid van allen mee gemoeid." (2:31)

		“Minister Pronk: In de derde plaats is er tengevolge van de internationale interdependentie, de globalisering, een grotere mogelijkheid ontstaan dat conflicten overwaaen en doorwerken in andere samenlevingen waar het tot dan goed gaat. De conflicten kunnen dus makkelijker van buitenaf worden ingebracht. Dat kan bijvoorbeeld met drugshandel, maffia of terrorisme te maken hebben.” (24:4) “Mevrouw Terpstra (VVD): Kan de minister een paar concrete voorbeelden geven van het "overwaaibaar" waar hij zo'n nadruk op legt?” “Minister Pronk: de hele problematiek van de internationale migratie– en vluchtelingenstromen die zeer sterk toenemen. Ik geef nog een totaal ander voorbeeld. De wijze waarop een etnisch, een religieus, een taalkundig of anderszins niet– economisch conflict al of niet wordt aangepakt in een bepaald deel van de wereld, kan op zichzelf leiden tot de volgende politieke constatering elders: "Het legitimeert de wijze waarop wij met ditzelfde of een ander conflict omgaan in onze eigen samenleving".” (24:5) “Minister Pronk: Het huidige conflict in Algerije tussen islamitische fundamentalisten en anderen heeft niet alleen consequenties voor de mensen in dat land, maar voor heel Noord-Afrika en het heeft in belangrijke mate ook effecten in Europa. ... Het vraagstuk van de inheemse groepen is door hun globale organisatie wereldwijd van belang. ... Dit heeft niet te maken met maakbaarheid, maar met het opbouwen van een gezamenlijke, internationale capaciteit van conflictbeheersing.” (24:5)
	- responding to global challenges - pursuing international public goods - combination of self-interest and doing good	<u>Milieu</u> “De problematiek van een expanderend economisch systeem dat moet functioneren binnen een gesloten ecosysteem” (2:37) “Duurzame mondiale ontwikkeling vereist dat de grenzen van de milieu–gebruiksruimte, nu en in de toekomst, niet overschreden worden” (2:39) “Dat is niet alleen het belang van ontwikkelingslanden, maar ook van rijke landen. De milieugebruiksruimte kent wel grenzen, maar dat zijn veelal geen landsgrenzen.” (2:42) <u>Economie</u> “De steeds grotere onderlinge verwevenheid van economieën ... is een gevolg van zowel technologische als economische ontwikkelingen en geldt op tal van terreinen: handel, investeringen, telecommunicatie, technologie en tegenwoordig ook milieu en migratie. Ook is er veelal een samenhang tussen vraagstukken die op verschillende terreinen spelen: handel, kapitaalstromen en wisselkoersen; handel en milieu; protectionisme en migratie.” (2:55) “Het goed functioneren van het financieel-monetair systeem is van groot belang voor de wereldeconomie. Belangrijke elementen daarin betreffen stabiliteit en toegang tot de wereldkapitaalmarkt.” (2:62) “Wat de externe context betreft is ook meer aandacht nodig voor de rol die uitbreiding van de handel, ondermeer door het slechten van handelsbarrières, kan spelen in de terugdringing van de absolute armoede in ontwikkelingslanden. Het gaat daarbij om de toegang van ontwikkelingslanden tot niet alleen de markten van de rijke landen, maar ook tot elkaars markten.” (2:81) Veel landen zijn in economische transformatie: “Ofschoon in het communisme de economie geheel aan de politiek ondergeschikt was, gaat het bij de systeemtransformatie in voormalige communistische landen, net als bij de structurele aanpassing in ontwikkelingslanden, in belangrijke mate om de economische orde. De overgang naar een op particulier bezit en vrij ondernemerschap gebaseerde, open markteconomie vergt globaal een drietal stappen.” (2:25) “In de praktijk blijkt dan ook dat de transformatie op allerlei hindernissen van politieke, institutionele of sociaal-culturele aard kan stuiten. Het resultaat is niet zelden een schemertoestand, waarin het oude systeem al goeddeels is afgebroken zonder dat het nieuwe systeem voldoende is opgebouwd en vormgegeven. Zo'n halve anarchie biedt uiteraard een vruchtbare bodem voor de activiteiten van zwarte-markthandelaren en andere profiteurs van een onbeteugeld vroegkapitalisme. Het blijkt ook bij uitstek een gunstige context voor het aanwakken van etnische tegenstellingen.” (2:26) <u>Migratie</u> “Wel lijkt er een stijging op te treden. Zo nam het aantal asielaanvragen in West-Europa toe van 146000 in 1980 tot 540000 in 1991.” (2:66-67) “Deze grote aantallen hangen samen met de hoge bevolkingsgroei in ontwikkelingslanden, de veelheid van actuele conflictgebieden die niet beperkt zijn tot ontwikkelingslanden, de gemakkelijke verbindings, de situatie op de arbeidsmarkt - ondanks de hoge werkloosheid - in veel rijke landen met een verouderende bevolking, en het semi-doorlaatbare karakter van de meeste grenzen.” (2:67) “Op langere termijn zullen migratiestromen pas stabiliseren, en misschien zelfs afnemen, als

			de economische vooruitzichten in de landen van oorsprong voldoende verbeteren, niet alleen in absolute zin, maar ook relatief d.w.z. ten opzichte van de rijke landen.” (2:67) <u>Armoede</u> “Dat blijkt bijvoorbeeld ook uit gegevens met betrekking tot de honger in ontwikke– lingslanden. Hongersnoden waarin zeer grote aantallen mensen sterven komen minder voor. Daarbij doet zich wel de zorgelijke ontwikkeling voor dat de hongersnoden die zich nog voordoen in steeds belangrijker mate door oorlog en geweld veroorzaakt worden. Het lijkt er op dat geweld een belangrijker rol is gaan spelen als oorzaak van armoede, zowel door de desorganisatie van het economisch leven, en met name ook van de landbouw, als door de vluchtelingenstromen die er het gevolg van zijn.” (2:79) “De ervaring heeft bovendien geleerd dat de spiraal tussen armoede en bevolkingsgroei moeilijk te doorbreken is. Armoede draagt ertoe bij dat geboortecijfers relatief hoog blijven en de snelle bevolkingsgroei draagt op allerlei manieren bij aan het in stand houden van absolute armoede. Armoedebestrijding en reductie van de bevolkingsgroei dienen dus beide integraal onderdeel te zijn van het ontwikkelingsbeleid.” (2:80) “De verspreiding van AIDS wordt vaak in verband gebracht met armoede, en inderdaad is AIDS geleidelijk aan óók een ziekte van de armen geworden.³⁰ Andersom moet evenwel verwacht worden dat AIDS ook een steeds belangrijker oorzaak van verarming zal worden. AIDS treft immers vooral mensen in de produktieve leeftijd, en dus kostwinners.” (2:80) “Armoedebestrijding is dan ook een investering die vruchten afwerpt, direct door produktiviteitsverhoging en indirect door het terugdringen van de maatschappelijke kosten van armoede. Armoedebestrijding kan dan ook een belangrijke bijdrage leveren aan de groei en de ontwikkeling van de economie als geheel.” (2:93) “Armoedebestrijding bespaart de samenleving ook kosten. In de eerste plaats door de terugdringing van onnodig menselijk lijden. Die besparing is niet in geld uit te drukken. In de tweede plaats wordt daardoor de met armoede geassocieerde criminaliteit, prostitutie, e.d. teruggedrongen, waarvan overigens armen zelf veelal, en met name de vrouwen onder hen, onevenredig vaak het slachtoffer zijn. Daarnaast wordt door volwaardige inschakeling van armen in het productieproces en in de samenleving de grote verspilling van het menselijk potentieel die armoede in de praktijk betekent tenietgedaan. Er zijn ook minder hoogdravende, doch zeer concrete kostenbesparingen. Dat geldt, bijvoorbeeld, voor een voorziening als het basisonderwijs. Niet alleen heeft deze voorziening een directe economische betekenis door de produktiviteitsverhoging die zij bewerkstelligt, maar ze kan ook indirect belangrijke financiële gevolgen hebben. ... Investeren in onderwijs van meisjes leidt er dus toe dat zij later minder kinderen zullen krijgen en tot terugdringing van de moeder– en kindersterfte.” (2:93-94) “Duidelijk is dat op lange termijn armoedebestrijding noodzakelijk is voor milieubehoud. Andersom is milieubehoud - ook dat is evident – op den duur voor armoedebestrijding en (het behoud van) ontwikkeling in het algemeen een onmisbare voorwaarde.” (2:96) “Door de tijd heen is migratie steeds een belangrijke gedragsreactie op schaarste en armoede geweest” (2:96) “Sociale integratie, het doorbreken van uitsluiting en het scheppen van gelijke kansen zijn voorwaarden voor de stabiliteit van samenlevingen op langere termijn en dus ook voor de werldsamenleving.” (2:102) “Ter afsluiting van dit hoofdstuk kan gesteld worden dat de uitbanning van absolute armoede nog veel inspanning zal vergen. Het is echter een noodzakelijke voorwaarde voor het verwezenlijken van werkelijk duurzame ontwikkeling en het tegengaan van milieuverval en conflict.” (2:102)
Construc- tivism	Duty Aid motivations out of feelings of obligation	- responsibility as rich nation	“Maar rijke landen zullen ook een bijdrage moeten leveren. Immers, zij leggen voor een onevenredig deel beslag op de wereldwijde milieugebruiksruimte. Bovendien hebben zij financieel en technisch de grootste mogelijkheden.” (2:43)
		- importance of continuity - guilt over (colonial) exploitation - role in international system - adhere to international standards - shared history with recipients - repayment for own aid receipts - public pressure - others do more	-

		- burden-sharing	
Constructivism	Reputation <i>Aid motivations out of pursuing an identity as norm entrepreneur</i>	- assuming a leadership position - presenting an example for others to follow - expressing national identity - establishing an international moral presence - prestige and status - a noble and glorious task	Door Pronk's hele stuk zitten normen en waarden verweven over wat de internationale gemeenschap zou moeten doen m.b.t. ontwikkelingshulp. Dit impliceert een voortrekkersrol, echt worden hier nooit expliciete uitspraken over gedaan.
Constructivism	Humanitarianism <i>Aid motivations out of concern for the well-being of the poorest groups worldwide</i>	- the unfair gap between rich and poor	"Duurzame mondiale ontwikkeling is niet te rijmen met de bestaande ongelijkheden. De noodzaak van een minder scheve verdeling in de toekomst impliceert dat bij een begrensde milieugebruiksruimte de rijke landen een stap terug zullen moeten doen." (2:41) "Dat is armoedebestrijding van onderop, niet van buitenaf. Hulp kan daarbij wel een rol spelen. Zij kan gebruikt worden om de sociaal-economische verschillen die (kunnen) ontstaan in het proces van economische verzelfstandiging te reduceren" (2:91)
		- reducing suffering	"Armoedebestrijding bespaart de samenleving ook kosten. In de eerste plaats door de terugdringing van onnodig menselijk lijden. Die besparing is niet in geld uit te drukken." (2:93) "Er moet echter voorkomen worden dat armen door de aanpassingsmaatregelen onnodig geschaad worden en dat investeringen in voorzieningen en capaciteiten die aan toekomstige groei kunnen bijdragen tenietgedaan worden." (2:87)
		- morally right - international solidarity - Christian charity	-

Table C.2 Recipients

1993 Recipients			
Theory	Frame	Measurement	
Realism	Security <i>Aid given to states with national security value</i>	- Allied states: would expect the Dutch to give aid to allies, so states that are either part of NATO or Europa with the lowest GDP/capita:	Albanië Armenië Bulgarije Georgië Moldavië Roemenië voormalig Joegoslavië
		- Friendly regimes & states neighboring enemy nations:	-
		Substantiation regarding: - national security	-
Realism	Power <i>Aid given to states that have strategic value</i>	- Dutch ex-colonies:	Suriname Nederlandse Antillen en Aruba
		- Allied states:	Albanië Armenië Bulgarije Georgië Moldavië Roemenië voormalig Joegoslavië
		- Recipients that have high international visibility through high GDP in 1993:	Zuid-Afrika Bangladesh Ethiopië Senegal Jemen
		- Recipients that have high international visibility through large population:	Bangladesh India Pakistan Niger
		Substantiation regarding: - military, economic, political importance	"De minister zal zich herinne- ren dat de VVD vorig jaar samen met het CDA heeft voorgesteld om de hulp aan Pakistan helemaal te schrappen. De minister heeft dat toen met kracht van argumenten tegengehouden. Hij heeft gezegd dat het ook vanwege de geopolitieke verhoudingen, de verhouding met India en de daarmee samenhan- gende politieke problemen niet verstandig zou zijn." (24:29)
Liberalism	Economic self-interest <i>Aid given to states that have economic importance</i>	- states offering large export or investment markets - states that represent the most powerful economies in their region (Through high GDP in 1993):	Zuid-Afrika Bangladesh Ethiopië Senegal Jemen

		- states that already are important trading partners (high export flows in 1993):	Zuid-Afrika Niger Egypte
		- states that already are important trading partners (high import flows in 1993):	Zuid-Afrika Niger Pakistan
		Substantiation regarding: - economic importance - recipients with economic potential	“Daarbij is besloten de hulprelatie met een twaalfal landen te beëindigen: Burma, Botswana, Chili, China, Colombia, Filipijnen, Gambia, Kameroen, Malawi, Swaziland, Thailand, Tsjaad. Sommige van deze landen hebben een zodanige graad van economische ontwikkeling bereikt dat deze minder afhankelijk zijn van hulp dan van handel en particuliere buitenlandse investeringen. Zeker nu de Nederlandse officiële ontwikkelingshulp weinig stijgt ligt een herschikking ten behoeve van armere landen in de rede.” (2:123)
Liberalism	Enlightened self-interest <i>Aid given to states that threaten international stability</i>	- states with large populations (or growths)	Bangladesh India Pakistan Niger Jemen Aruba
		- states that are unstable or appear likely to become so - states that have one or more of the above global challenges	Moldavië Armenië Georgië Kyrgyzstan Azerbeidzjan voormalig Joegoslavië India Sri Lanka
		Substantiation regarding: - the threat of instability	Pronk richt zich op 34 landen: “Een viertal categorieën onderscheidt zich in de nieuwe situatie: i. reguliere samenwerkingslanden; ii. landen waarmee een duurzaam ontwikkelingsverdrag wordt gesloten dat niet alleen de officiële ontwikkelingssamenwerking betreft doch ook relaties vanuit andere departementen; iii. landen waar de inspanning zich richt op het bijdragen aan conflictoplossing en rehabilitatie; iv. landen in transitie (structurele transformatie naar een marktgeoriënteerde democratische samenleving). De aard van de samenwerking met de landen uit de eerste en tweede categorie zal in de regel structureel, langdurig en ontwikkelingsgericht zijn; met de landen in de derde en vierde categorie zal deze in de tijd begrensd zijn en qua karakter toegespitst op de problematiek van conflict, rehabilitatie of transformatie. De landen in de derde categorie komen alleen in aanmerking voor noodhulp en humanitaire hulp c.q. herstel- en wederopbouwsteun. De landen uit de vierde categorie ontvangen institutionele steun alsmede macro-economische bijstand via gezamenlijke internationale programma's ter stabilisatie en transformatie van de economie (dat wil zeggen geen ontwikkelings- en investeringsprogramma's). Met de landen in de laatste twee categorieën worden dus geen langdurige ontwikkelingsrelaties aangegaan.” (2:123) 1. Reguliere Samenwerkingslanden <u>Azië:</u> Bangladesh India Pakistan Nepal Sri Lanka Laos <u>Afrika:</u> (Regio Nijl en Rode Zee) Egypte Ethiopië Jemen, (Regio Zuidelijk Afrika) Mozambique Zambia Zimbabwe, (Regio Sahel en overig West-Afrika) Burkina Faso Ghana Guinee Bissau Kaapverdië Mali Niger Senegal, (Regio Oost-Afrika) Kenya Rwanda Tanzania Uganda <u>Latijns- en Centraal-Amerika:</u> (Regio Midden-Amerika) El Salvador Guatemala Haïti Honduras Jamaica Nicaragua, (Andes Regio) Bolivia Ecuador Peru Suriname Nederlandse Antillen en Aruba 2. Landen waarmee een duurzaam ontwikkelingsverdrag zal worden gesloten Benin, Bhutan, Costa Rica 3. Landen in conflict of rehabilitatie Angola, Bezette Gebieden, Eritrea, Cambodja, Soedan, Somalië 4. Landen in transitie <u>Kiesgroeplanden:</u> Armenië Bulgarije Georgië Moldavië Roemenië voormalig Joegoslavië <u>Overige:</u> Albanië Azerbeidzjan Kyrgyzstan Mongolië Namibië Vietnam Zuid-Afrika “In de tweede helft van deze eeuw groeit de wereldbevolking ongekend snel: van drie miljard mensen in 1960 tot bijna zes miljard nu en naar verwachting tot acht miljard in 2020.” (2:51) “Afrika is het continent met de snelst groeiende bevolking (3,0 procent), van 220 miljoen mensen in 1950 tot vermoedelijk 1,5 miljard in 2030.” (2:52) “Volgens een recente studie van de Wereldbank hebben met name in Sub-Sahara Afrika snelle bevolkingsgroei, stagnatie van de landbouwprodukt, en milieudegradatie elkaar de afgelopen decennia in toenemende mate versterkt in een neerwaartse spiraal.” (2:52) “Het is niet te verwachten dat zij allen in hun eigen regio of land werk zullen kunnen vinden. Dit zal leiden tot toenemende, ook internationale, arbeidsmigratie.” (2:52-53) “Armoedebestrijding is dan ook een investering die vruchten afwerpt, direct door produktiviteitsverhoging en indirect door het terugdringen van de maatschappelijke kosten van armoede. Armoedebestrijding kan dan ook een belangrijke bijdrage leveren aan de groei en de ontwikkeling van de economie als geheel.” (2:93)

			<u>Keuze landen 1&2</u> “Minister Pronk: De eerste randvoorwaarde is een goede regionale spreiding over de verschillende continenten ... Dat is een politieke en een ontwikkelingspolitieke overweging. Dat heeft ook te maken met het feit dat je met al die landen juist ook spreekt over de structurele dimensie van handelspolitiek, investerings- beleid, milieubeleid en dergelijke. ... De tweede randvow- waarde is prioriteit voor Afrika.” (24:12) Over Kenia: “Tegelijkertijd zijn wij heel streng geworden en wij komen er nog over te spreken naar aanleiding van het verslag. Dat is nu typisch zo'n land waar het probleem dat ik zoëven noemde - de niet- economische conflicten - onbeheers- baar dreigt te worden. ... Voor mij is het ook een reden om de komende jaren Kenia geen macro-hulp, geen betalingsbalanshulp te geven. Dat zou namelijk kunnen worden beschouwd als een legitimering van het interne beleid.” (24:15) <u>Keuze landen 4:</u> “In de praktijk blijkt dan ook dat de transformatie op allerlei hindernissen van politieke, institutionele of sociaal-culturele aard kan stuiten. Het resultaat is niet zelden een schemertoestand, waarin het oude systeem al goeddeels is afgebroken zonder dat het nieuwe systeem voldoende is opgebouwd en vormgegeven. Zo'n halve anarchie biedt uiteraard een vruchtbare bodem voor de activiteiten van zwarte-markthandelaren en andere profiteurs van een onbeteugeld vroegkapitalisme. Het blijkt ook bij uitstek een gunstige context voor het aanwakken van etnische tegenstellingen.” (2:26) Over de Balkan: “Tegelijk zijn hier meerderheden en minderheden zozeer over nationale grenzen heen met elkaar verweven dat een conflict hierover de vlam in de pan in gehele regio kan doen slaan.” (2:14) “Ze heeft door de ontwikkelingen van de laatste jaren nog meer betekenis gekregen omdat het ontwikkelingsproces zich in toenemende mate wereldwijd aandient en niet meer louter betrekking heeft op een geografisch beperkt gebied in het Zuiden van de wereld. ... Ten eerste is het transformatieproces in Midden- en Oost-Europa en de andere voorheen centraal geleide landen onverbrekkelijk verbonden geraakt met het ontwikkelingsproces. Dit geldt niet alleen voor die landen van dat deel van de wereld die op basis van traditionele maatstaven alsnog tot de categorie der ontwikkelingslanden zou kunnen worden gerekend («Zuid in Oost»), maar ook voor andere landen wier economische en politieke orde een grondige transformatie ondergaan.” (2:104) “Minister Pronk: Ook transitiebeleid houdt geen langdurige relatie in. Het strekt zich ook niet uit over alle mogelijke terreinen. Nee, het gaat om macro-economische stabilisatiehulp, waarbij wij participeren in een internationaal consortium.”
Construc- tivism	Duty <i>Aid given to visible recipients, ex-colonies, and trading partners</i>	- states that are favored recipients of peer states	Egypte India Bangladesh Ethiopië Mozambique (ja dat zijn er best veel, ik mis alleen Indonesië en Filipijnen)
		- donor's ex-colonies	Suriname Nederlandse Antillen en Aruba (ja, mis alleen Indonesië)
		- trading partners	Zuid-Afrika Niger Egypte
		Substantiation regarding: - own international position interests	<u>Keuze landen 1&2</u> “Minister Pronk: Een derde randvoorwaarde is dat het van groot belang is om met name met de landen waarmee in de afgelopen periode - wij beginnen niet opnieuw, "from scratch", wij gaan niet wat verzinnen; er is continuïteit - langdurige, reguliere en brede relaties” (24:12) <u>Keuze landen 3:</u> “Minister Pronk: Ik kom dus te spreken over de conflictlanden. Welke landen kiest men? Men kiest die landen die - voor een deel natuurlijk deel uitmakend van het beleid dat in het verleden is gevoerd in het kader van de langdurige reguliere samenwerking - in conflict zijn gekomen en waarvoor er een grote, gezamenlijke en internationale aanpak bestaat en waarvan het totaal onmogelijk zou zijn als Nederland zich daaraan zou onttrekken, zeker omdat Nederland zich in het verleden in het kader van de genoemde langdurige, brede en reguliere samenwerkingsrelatie heeft bewogen. Het zou immers door niemand begrepen worden wanneer juist Nederland geen hulp zou bieden in het kader van een conflict: humanitaire hulp of rehabilitatiehulp, hulp aan de bezette gebieden, aan Somalië, aan Cambodja, aan Soedan of aan Angola. Daarvoor bestaat een grote, internationale aanpak en daar doen wij aan mee.” (24:12)
Construc- tivism	Reputation <i>Aid given to states with high international visibility</i>	- visible (popular) recipients - states that are favored recipients of peer states	Egypte India Bangladesh Ethiopië Mozambique (ja dat zijn er best veel, ik mis alleen Indonesië en Filipijnen)
		Substantiation regarding: - own international visibility interests	-
Construc- tivism	Humanitaria- -nism	- Poorest states	Azerbeidzjan Ghana Georgië, mis er veel

	<i>Aid given to the neediest states</i>	- states with most basic human needs by mortality rate:	Zambia Zimbabwe Rwanda Uganda (ja, wel redelijk wat)
		- states with most basic human needs by life expectancy:	Zambia Rwanda Uganda Mozambique (ja, wel redelijk wat) Mis wel echt Sierra Leone in dit frame
		Substantiation regarding: - the moral to giving aid to those who need it	“Volgens een recente studie van de Wereldbank hebben met name in Sub-Sahara Afrika snelle bevolkingsgroei, stagnatie van de landbouwproduct, en milieudegradatie elkaar de afgelopen decennia in toenemende mate versterkt in een neerwaartse spiraal.” (2:52)

Table C.3 Policy goals

1993 Policy goals			
Theory	Frame	Measurement	
Realism	Security <i>Aid as tool to enhance position in international security environment</i>	- aid as alternative to military expenditures - connections with the state's military/defense policy	“Een niet gering aantal ontwikkelingslanden houdt er een omvangrijke militaire machinerie op na en vele zijn betrokken in grootscheepse wapenaankopen. ... Door in juni 1992 een internationaal seminar over dit onderwerp te organiseren, heeft Nederland actief aan dit debat bijgedragen. Voor Nederland vormt het onderwerp «militaire uitgaven» inmiddels ook integraal onderdeel van de beleidsdialoog met zijn partners in ontwikkelingssamenwerking, waarbij in uiterste consequentie negatieve maatregelen niet zijn uitgesloten.” (2:29)
		- buying strategic concessions (such as the building of military bases or consolidating military alliances from the recipient government) - ensuring access to strategically important regions - spreading the donor's own ideological system in form of values or instruments - humanitarian needs of recipient countries are downplayed	-
Realism	Power <i>Aid as tool to enforce power over recipient states</i>	- the use of hard power - using aid as reward or punishment for voting behavior - buying political influence - winning allies - connections with the state's strategies for the pursuit of power - humanitarian needs of recipient countries are downplayed	-
Liberalism	Economic self-interest <i>Aid as tool to pursue profitable conditions and projects</i>	- promotion of trade liberalization in LDCs - opening up foreign markets to multinational corporations headquartered in donor countries - influencing recipients' trade policies (soft power)	“Dit proces van arbeidsdeling vindt plaats in een nog steeds relatief open economisch klimaat. Het investeringsklimaat is in veel landen liberaler geworden. De invoertarieven in de meeste industrielanden zijn via GATT-onderhandelingen in de afgelopen decennia teruggebracht tot gemiddeld 3 a 5 procent, met overigens forse uitschieters naar boven. De non-tarifaire bescherming is echter, vooral in de jaren tachtig, toegenomen. De Uruguay ronde biedt de mogelijkheid om de internationale handel in industrieproducten verder te liberaliseren en tevens in een aantal andere sectoren - bv. internationale handel in landbouwproducten en diensten - meer openheid en concurrentie te bereiken. Een open klimaat is een vereiste voor deze internationale arbeidsdeling.” (2:57) “De in 1986 begonnen Uruguay ronde is nog steeds niet afgerond. ... Voor ontwikkelingslanden lijkt dit document in principe acceptabel als resultaat van de ronde, o.a. vanwege de mogelijke liberalisatie in textiel en landbouw, hoewel er ook minder aantrekkelijke kanten aan zijn. ... Het moge duidelijk zijn dat het welslagen van de ronde van groot belang is, omdat dit een stimulans zal geven aan de wereldhandel.” (2:61) “Minister Pronk: van het allergrootste belang is dat in de komende maanden de onderhandelingsronde in het kader van de GATT tot een einde wordt gebracht. Op dat punt verschil ik van mening met de heer Van Ojik, die zich afvroeg of het niet veel verstandiger zou zijn om die onderhandelingen uit te stellen. De armste landen worden er eerder het slachtoffer van dan dat zij kansen krijgen, zei de heer Van Ojik. ... Ik zie het proces van internationale handelsliberalisatie als

			een proces waarvan je de effecten niet op een statische wijze kunt meten. Handelsliberalisatie zal niet alleen leiden tot handelsverlegging, maar ook tot handelsverruiming en economische groei.” “Minister Pronk: Compensatie van internationaal handelsbeleid door middel van extra hulpverlening vind ik onjuist.” “Minister Pronk: de tekortkomingen die zich nu in de uitkomsten van de GATT-onderhandelingen lijken voor te doen, ook voor ontwikkelingslanden, zijn niet het gevolg van het slagen van de liberalisatie in de GATT-onderhandelingen, maar van afscherming, het niet volledig liberaliseren, het nog steeds zichzelf beschermen, ook door de Europese Gemeenschap” (24:6) “De heer Van Ojik (Groen Links): Ik wil echter niet verhehlen dat ik zeer teleurgesteld ben over zijn reactie op de interventies over de Uruguay–ronde. Hij zei dat ik blijk gaf van een statische analyse. Ik heb mij gebaseerd op rapporten van de Wereldbank, de OESO en het GATT-secretariaat zelf die in ieder geval op de middellange termijn gericht zijn. Ze tonen aan dat juist als gevolg van liberalisering, en niet als gevolg van onvolledige liberalisering, zoals de minister zei, met name de minst ontwikkelde landen op de middellange termijn in grote financiële problemen komen. Ik heb hem niet gevraagd, met OS-geld bij te betalen als de ontwikkelingslanden te kort komen, ik heb er juist de nadruk op gelegd dat het naar mijn smaak in overeenstemming zou zijn met het mandaat van de onderhandelaars, in 1986 vastgelegd in Punta del Este, om in het kader van het akkoord voor de minst ontwikkelde landen die nadelige gevolgen van het akkoord ondervinden, een regeling te treffen. ... Nee, ik had het oog op de honderden miljarden die ons als positieve gevolgen van het akkoord worden voorgespiegeld. Daarmee moet het gemakkelijk op te hoesten zijn.” (24:22) “Minister Pronk: dat ik mijn uiterste best zal doen om de toegang van ontwikkelingslanden tot de Europese markt in het kader van handels– besprekingen (niet alleen de Uruguay-ronde, maar ook anders– zins) maximaal te doen zijn. ... Uiteraard moet dan uiteindelijk worden gemikt op een zo laag mogelijk niveau van alle handels– belemmeringen, maar er zal altijd een uitruil plaatsvinden. Het enige waarvoor je dan kunt pleiten, is een tegemoetkomende houding van de machtiger handelspartners ten opzichte van de zwakkere handels– partners bij een dergelijke uitruil. Mijn eigen ervaring in al deze handelspolitieke onderhandelingen, die ik soms heb meegemaakt of soms goed heb bekeken, is dat de desbetreffende groep van ontwikkelingslanden ook steeds minder zwak is. Zij kan behoorlijk optreden.” “Het is op de langere termijn, en dan kom ik op de opmerking van de heer Van Ojik ter zake, echt in ieders belang en zeker in dat van de ontwikkelingslanden als de Uruguay ronde zo gauw mogelijk achter ons wordt gelaten. Niet dat dit zulke ideale oplossingen biedt aan tal van ontwikkelingslanden, maar wel omdat de ontstane patstelling tengevolge van het niet verder komen in handelspolitieke onderhandelingen tot een gebrek aan vertrouwen, tot minder investeringen en een lagere groei leidt. Dat is dus ook niet in het belang van de desbetreffende ontwikkelingslanden zelf.” (24:25)
		- connections with the donor's economic policy	<u>Beleidsdoelstellingen</u> - “Versterking en hervorming van de internationale economische orde, onder meer door bevordering van de multilaterale samenwerking.” (2:103) - “Samenhang tussen ontwikkelingshulp enerzijds en het internationale handelsbeleid en financiële beleid anderzijds, gericht op economische verzelfstandiging van landen” (2:103) - “Aanpassing van de structuur van de nationale economie van ontwikkelingslanden teneinde op de diverse markten duurzaam evenwicht tot stand te brengen. Dit evenwicht is noodzakelijk om effectieve investeringen in economische groei mogelijk te maken.” (2:103) - “Het bevorderen van een evenwichtige transformatie van de economische en politieke orde van samenlevingen, na een periode van aanpassing. In deze transformatie naar marktgeoriënteerde en democratische processen zal de toegang van mensen tot de markt en hun participatie in het politieke systeem voorop moeten staan, naast de bevordering van betrouwbaar overheidsbestuur en een effectief rechtssysteem (tezamen <i>good governance</i>).” (2:104)
		- use of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)	“Aan de andere kant is het van groot belang directe buitenlandse investeringen, een ander onderdeel van de particuliere stromen, aan te moedigen.” (2:64)
		- subsidize the donor's domestic firms - supporting domestic firms - promoting private sector development	“In de redevoering wordt ingegaan op de rol van de particuliere sector in de ontwikkelingssamenwerking. Gewezen wordt op het nieuwe beleid dat inhoudt dat de FMO een aantal taken van de overheid overneemt. Gezien het grote belang van het kleinschalig ondernemerschap in ontwikkelingslanden wordt aangekondigd dat de FMO hiervoor een apart budget ter beschikking krijgt.” (2:115)
		- tying aid - maintaining western quality standards	-
Liberalism	Enlightened self-interest <i>Aid as tool to pursue global stability and combat</i>	- investing in IPGs (general) - the danger of global instability	“Een tweede gevolg is de groeiende noodzaak van afstemming en integratie van beleid, niet slechts tussen ontwikkelingssamenwerking en internationaal economisch beleid, maar vooral tussen ontwikkelingssamenwerking en buitenlands beleid. Naast de hervorming van de internationale economische orde, die inmiddels aarzeland in gang is gezet, moet de internationale rechtsorde worden hervormd en worden aangepast aan nieuwe verhoudingen.” (2:105)

<i>global threats</i>		“Minister Pronk: Armoedebestrijding is pas duurzaam, zo voeg ik daaraan toe, in een redelijk veilige en schone omgeving, met een gezonde economische ontwikkeling. Dan is armoedebestrijding pas werkelijk effectief. Dat is het beleid in een notedop. Het moet schoon zijn. Dat is de milieudimensie. Het moet veilig zijn. Dat is de politieke dimensie. Het moet macro-economisch gezond zijn. Die voorwaarden zijn noodzakelijk om het armoedebestrijdingsbeleid duurzaam en effectief te laten zijn. Het is mijn stelling dat die voorwaarden eigenlijk in de afgelopen jaren minder vanzelfsprekend vervuld zijn dan wij wellicht hadden gehoopt. Daar gaat eigenlijk deze nota over. Het hoofdaandachtspunt is de armoedebestrijding, maar laten wij op de voorwaarden ingaan.” (24:3) “Minister Pronk: Dan gaat het om zowel de voorwaarden met betrekking tot het milieu - de ecologische bedreiging is in een groot aantal delen van de wereld groot geworden - als de voorwaarden met betrekking tot de in hoofdstuk 3 geanalyseerde transnationalisering en globalisering van economische activiteiten, die de marges eigenlijk steeds smaller lijken te maken voor afzonderlijk beleid binnen afzonderlijke landen. Men is steeds afhankelijker van hetgeen elders gebeurt, waarop men moet reageren en dat vaak gebeurt zonder dat er veel politieke besluitvorming aan te pas komt. Daarmee krijgen wij ook in de westelijke landen problemen” (24:4) “Minister Pronk: Het gaat mij erom dat wij met z'n allen proberen, in de vorm van internationale samenwerking capaciteit op te bouwen om deze ecologische voorwaarden, globaliseringsvoorwaarden en conflictmatige voorwaarden te vervullen.” (24:5-6) Kritiek: “De heer Van Ojik (Groen Links): Ten slotte wil ik toch nog een pleidooi houden voor het voortbestaan van de post van minister voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking. Er is één minister in het Nederlandse kabinet die primair de belangen van de ontwikkelingslanden behartigt. Die belangen hangen steeds meer samen met onze eigen belangen op het gebied van het milieu, de economie, conflictbeheersing, vluchtelingen enz. Dit is een reden te meer om zelfs aan verzwaring van het mandaat van deze minister te denken.” (24:22) Kritiek: “De heer Leerling (RPF): dat wereldwijd toch miljoenen mensen in erbarmelijke omstandigheden verkeren. ... Kan en moet er voor die mensen, die medemensen, niet meer worden gedaan, als de eigen overheid te kort schiet of niet genoeg kan doen? Waarom wordt deze categorie armsten der armen, zoals wij ze wel mogen noemen, niet geholpen met alles wat mogelijk is, terwijl wij wel mensen helpen die door honger of door een natuurramp plotseling in zulke kommervolle omstandigheden komen te verkeren?” (24:23)
	- investing in poverty as IPG	<u>Beleidsdoelstellingen</u> - “Armoedebestrijding van onderop, gebaseerd op het concept van «human development» - ontwikkeling van, voor en door mensen zelf - met nadruk op de economische verzelfstandiging van mensen.” (2:103) - “Het verbinden van gerichte armoedebestrijding met het verkleinen van de economische ongelijkheid die, niet geheel samenhangend met het welvaartsniveau, veelal het gevolg is van de uitsluiting van mensen in het bijzonder in economieën met een dualistisch karakter.” (2:104) - “Autonomie van vrouwen.” (2:103) - “Binnen iedere afzonderlijke sector prioriteit voor die ontwikkelings-activiteiten die zo direct mogelijk ten goede komen aan zwakkere, gemarginaliseerde bevolkingsgroepen: basisonderwijs, primaire gezondheidszorg, moeder- en kindzorg, kleinschalige autochtone industriële bedrijvigheid, stedelijke armoedebestrijding, geïntegreerde plattelandsontwikkeling en voedselzekerheid hebben een hogere prioriteit dan universitair onderwijs, curatieve zorg in ziekenhuizen, grootschalige industriële investeringen van buitenlandse ondernemingen, kapitaalintensive stedelijke en rurale infrastructuur en agrarische exportproductie. Uiteraard zijn de laatste categorieën voor ontwikkeling van groot belang, doch zij kunnen ook uit andere bron worden gefinancierd dan louter met behulp van giften in het kader van intergouvernementele hulpverlening.” (2:103) “armoede kan alleen effectief bestreden worden als de armen volwaardig in de economie geïntegreerd worden” (2:102) <i>Plattelandsontwikkeling en armoedebestrijding</i> - “Het merendeel van de absoluut armen woont nog immer op het platteland. Het streven is jaarlijks gemiddeld een derde van de totale bilaterale hulp aan plattelandsontwikkeling te besteden.” (2:97) - “Voor effectieve armoedebestrijding zijn echter wel bepaalde accenten nodig in het beleid met betrekking tot plattelandsontwikkeling: produktiviteits-groei in de kleinschalige, arbeidsintensieve, agrarische activiteiten, verhoging van de effectieve vraag naar voedsel en landbouwprodukten en stimulering van kleinschalige, arbeidsintensieve, niet-agrarische werkgelegenheid.” (2:97) <i>Stedelijke armoedebestrijding</i> - “De bevolkingsgroei, zowel in de steden als op het platteland, heeft in combinatie met de bevolkingsdruk en de stagnatie in de landbouw geleid tot omvangrijke migratie naar steden. ... De stedelijke problematiek in ontwikkelingslanden is daarmee eigenlijk in essentie gekenmerkt: snelle bevolkingsgroei, achterblijvende produktieve werkgelegenheid, tekortschietende infrastructuur, verslechtering van het milieu en ontoereikend stedelijk bestuur.” (2:98) <i>Armoede en kinderen</i>

		-“Minder dan wie dan ook zijn kinderen, en zeker arme kinderen in staat voor hun rechten op te komen. Armoede van kinderen is schrijnend vanwege de zwakte van kinderen, maar ook omdat een zware hypotheek gelegd wordt op hun toekomst en ook op die van de maatschappij waarin zij leven.” (2:98) <i>Onderwijs</i> -“Investerings in onderwijs, en met name in basisonderwijs, beroepson- derwijs en volwasseneneducatie zijn essentiële componenten in een beleid dat gericht is op de uitbanning van absolute armoede, door mensen in staat te stellen hun eigen capaciteit en sociaal-economische produktiviteit te verhogen.” (2:98) <i>Gezondheidszorg en voeding</i> -“nadruk op primaire gezondheidszorg (<i>primary health care</i>) voor armoedebestrijding. Dat betekent vooral aandacht voor eenvoudige curatieve zorg, preventie, moeder- en kindzorg, bevolkingsparticipatie en aandacht voor de fysiek-sociaal-economische context.” (2:100) -“Bijzondere aandacht wordt in de Nederlandse ontwikkelingssamen-werking gegeven aan AIDS en malaria. Ook tuberculose zal in de komende tijd meer aandacht krijgen.” (2:101)
	- investing in trade as IPG	<u>Beleidsdoelstellingen</u> - “Versterking en hervorming van de internationale economische orde, onder meer door bevordering van de multilaterale samenwerking.” (2:103) - “Samenhang tussen ontwikkelingshulp enerzijds en het internationale handelsbeleid en financiële beleid anderzijds, gericht op economische verzelfstandiging van landen” (2:103) - “Aanpassing van de structuur van de nationale economie van ontwikkelingslanden teneinde op de diverse markten duurzaam evenwicht tot stand te brengen. Dit evenwicht is noodzakelijk om effectieve investeringen in economische groei mogelijk te maken.” (2:103) - “Het bevorderen van een evenwichtige transformatie van de economische en politieke orde van samenlevingen, na een periode van aanpassing. In deze transformatie naar marktgeoriënteerde en democratische processen zal de toegang van mensen tot de markt en hun participatie in het politieke systeem voorop moeten staan, naast de bevordering van betrouwbaar overheidsbestuur en een effectief rechtsstelsel (tezamen <i>good governance</i>).” (2:104) “De overgang naar een op particulier bezit en vrij ondernemerschap gebaseerde, open markteconomie vergt globaal een drietal stappen. Allereerst: de invoering van prijzen en markten, van prijsvorming op basis van vraag en aanbod van goederen en diensten alsmede van de produktiefactoren kapitaal en arbeid. Ten tweede: de invoering van een particuliere sector, door particuliere eigendom te legaliseren en staatsbedrijven te privatiseren. Ten derde moet de rol van de staat in de economie opnieuw worden gedefinieerd, weg van directe eigendom en beheer van alle productie en distributie naar een veel beperkter beheer - alleen voor essentiële taken die door de markt niet worden vervuld - en naar een meer indirecte, regulerende rol die particuliere economische activiteit bevordert en vergemakkelijkt.” (2:25) “Voor een belangrijk deel was dit nodig om de integratie in de wereldmarkt te bewerkstelligen. Voor een land dat in de huidige interdependente internationale economische verhoudingen ontwikkeling nastreeft bestaat eigenlijk geen andere keus. Het alternatief - gescheiden ontwikkeling of <i>disengagement</i>- leidt tot stagnatie en wellicht zelfs teruggang.” (2:25)
	- investing in climate as IPG - investing in water as IPG	Nederland richt zich op: Klimaat “Terugdringing van het commerciële energiegebruik is niet alleen een zaak van de industrielanden. De grootste toename in dit gebruik tussen 1970 en 1990 is te vinden in ontwikkelingslanden” (2:46) Biologische diversiteit en bossen “Het Nederlandse beleid is er op gericht verlies van biologische diversiteit tegen te gaan” (2:48) Duurzaam landgebruik “Om deze problemen het hoofd te bieden is er thans veel aandacht voor de ontwikkeling van geïntegreerde produktiesystemen. Overname op grote schaal van westerse, intensieve landbouw-methoden door ontwikkelingslanden is ondenkbaar vanwege het hoge verbruik van niet-vernieuwbare hulpbronnen dat dat vereist” (2:49) Water “Rendementen van waterprojecten zijn matig, water is niet onuitputtelijk, verontreiniging van water wordt in toenemende mate een probleem, grootschalige onttrekking van water bedreigt natuurlijke evenwichten. Water is schaars, heeft een economische waarde en moet dan ook als een economisch goed worden beschouwd, ook in het ontwikkelingssamenwerkingsbeleid.” (2:51) <u>Beleidsdoelstellingen</u> -“(Ecologisch) duurzame ontwikkeling, ook in het belang van toekomstige generaties.” (2:103) - “Herverdeling van de beperkte internationale milieugebruiksruimte door in de Westelijke geïndustrialiseerde wereld zodanige produktie- en consumptiepatronen tot stand te brengen dat deze landen in hun beslag op schaarse hulpbronnen een stap terug doen.” (2:104)
	- investing in food security as IPG	“geïntegreerde plattelandsontwikkeling en voedselzekerheid hebben een hogere prioriteit” (2:103)

	- investing in security & legal order - combating conflict	<u>Beleidsdoelstellingen</u> - "Prioriteit voor het bewerkstelligen van vrede en het tegengaan (voorkomen, beheersen en oplossen) van gewelddadige conflicten, ook van een niet-economisch (religieus, nationalistisch, cultureel, etnisch) karakter, zowel tussen als binnen samenlevingen." (2:103-104) "Minister Pronk: Voor de komende jaren is het probleem de internationale afstemming van de vredespolitiek, het internationale rechtsordebeleid en de ontwikkelingssamenwerking een groter probleem om te overbruggen dan het probleem waarmee wij jaren bezig zijn geweest." (24:9)
	- investing in migration as IPG	"Pogingen om de potentieel grote migratiestromen in te dammen moeten de fundamentele oorzaken aanpakken: economische ongelijkheden, politieke instabiliteit, schendingen van de mensenrechten. Ontwikkelingssamenwerking in diverse vormen kan een rol spelen bij de aanpak van de problemen aan de bron. Voor acute conflictsituaties kan daarbij gedacht worden aan de activiteiten van de VN Hoge Commissaris voor vluchtelingen (UNHCR), maar ook aan noodhulp, vredesoperaties en rehabilitatie-activiteiten. In meer structurele zin moet dan ook gedacht worden aan al die vormen van beleid (handelsbeleid, schuldenbeleid e.d.) die van invloed zijn op het vermogen van landen, en daarmee van mensen, om hun positie in de wereld te verbeteren." (2:68) <u>Beleidsdoelstellingen</u> - Het wegnemen van ecologische, politieke en sociaal-economische redenen waardoor mensen zich gedwongen voelen tot migratie, alsmede het goed begeleiden en opvangen van migratiestromen." (2:104)
	- promoting democracies - promoting good governance	<u>Beleidsdoelstellingen</u> - "Prioriteit voor vrijheid, democratie en mensenrechten als voorwaarde voor een sociaal-economische ontwikkeling die aan de gehele bevolking ten goede komt." (2:103) - "Het bevorderen van een evenwichtige transformatie van de economische en politieke orde van samenlevingen, na een periode van aanpassing. In deze transformatie naar marktgeoriënteerde en democratische processen zal de toegang van mensen tot de markt en hun participatie in het politieke systeem voorop moeten staan, naast de bevordering van betrouwbaar overheidsbestuur en een effectief rechtssstelsel (tezamen <i>good governance</i>)." (2:104) "Het verstrekken van reguliere ontwikkelingshulp wordt ook steeds meer in het kader geplaatst van een beoordeling van de politieke en maatschappelijke situatie in het ontvangende land, van de kwaliteit van diens openbaar bestuur, alsmede van de machtsverhoudingen en de mate van democratie en waarborging van mensenrechten." (2:105) "Onzerzijds blijven in dit debat het wezen van de vertegenwoordigende democratie, de universaliteit van de mensenrechten en het beginsel van de rechtsstaat onverminderd het uitgangspunt." (2:17) "Om het vermogen tot participeren van armen te vergroten is het ook van belang dat sociale handicaps worden weggenomen zoals een kennisachterstand door analfabetisme en achterstelling op grond van sexe, religie, ras of kaste. Dit onderstreept het belang, ook uit een oogpunt van armoedebestrijding, van aandacht voor <i>good governance</i>." (2:83)
	- use of soft power to influence policies that are in everyone's interest	"Bovendien is het op ontwikkelingspolitieke gronden gerechtvaardigd bij flagrante en systematische schending van de mensenrechten, bij een ernstige terugval in de democratisering of bij aanhoudend buitensporige militaire uitgaven te korten op de hulp aan het land in kwestie dan wel deze geheel stop te zetten." (2:24) "Een geheel andere mogelijkheid is om extra preferenties te koppelen aan de bereidheid van ontwikkelingslanden om deel te nemen aan internationale milieuverdragen." (2:45) Over Kenia: "Minister Pronk: Tegelijkertijd zijn wij heel streng geworden en wij komen er nog over te spreken naar aanleiding van het verslag. Dat is nu typisch zo'n land waar het probleem dat ik zoëven noemde - de niet-economische conflicten - onbeheersbaar dreigt te worden. ... Voor mij is het ook een reden om de komende jaren Kenia geen macro-hulp, geen betalingsbalanshulp te geven. Dat zou namelijk kunnen worden beschouwd als een legitimering van het interne beleid." (24:15) "Mevrouw Terpstra (VVD): "als je werkelijk effectieve ontwikkelingssamenwerking wilt bedrijven, dan moet je bij voorkeur bij de selectie van de landen kijken naar die landen die in ieder geval op de goede weg zijn om die voorwaarden te vervullen, die althans bereid zijn om die weg in te slaan." (24:3) "Minister Pronk: Dat kan alleen maar gebeuren door een integraal economisch beleid, waarin bijvoorbeeld zeer veel nadruk ligt op handelsbeleid en alles wat daarmee in verband wordt gebracht. Ik noem investeringsbeleid en dergelijke. Als dat niet gebeurt, is hulpverlening niet effectief. Dat is dus een onderdeel van die voorwaarden a contrario. Als aan die voorwaarden niet wordt voldaan, is hulpverlening eigenlijk alleen maar een soort van legitimatie van niet structureel bezig zijn. ... Ik vind het ook niet een liberale of een niet-liberale stelling; het is een analytisch juiste constatering" (24:3)

			“De huidige wereld in geschil vraagt om een «ontschotting» van de ontwikkelingssamenwerking, net zoals dat ook voor andere delen van het Nederlands externe beleid opgaat. De ontwikkelingssamenwerking is niet langer de zachte sector van de buitenlandse betrekkingen, een vorm van internationaal welzijnsbeleid ter correctie of compensatie van de harde realiteit van de internationale politiek. De ontwikkelingssamenwerking zal ook zelf steeds meer onderdeel gaan uitmaken van die realiteit. Dat heeft nadelen, omdat een dimensie van zuiverheid - de «echte» ontwikkelingshulp - verloren dreigt te gaan. Maar het voordeel is de winst aan relevantie en effectiviteit, omdat de machtsverhoudingen ook door middel van ontwikkelingssamenwerking kunnen worden beïnvloed. Deze ontschotting van de ontwikkelingssamenwerking, leidend tot een bredere internationale samenwerking, zal in de rest van dit decennium nader gestalte moeten krijgen” (2:105)
		- attention to population growth	Bevolking “De bevolkingsproblematiek kan geplaatst worden binnen een conceptuele driehoek van bevolking, milieu, en ontwikkeling.” (2:52) “Het is niet te verwachten dat zij allen in hun eigen regio of land werk zullen kunnen vinden. Dit zal leiden tot toenemende, ook internationale, arbeidsmigratie.” (2:52-53) “Naast overwegingen die zijn gebaseerd op de wenselijkheid van het terugdringen van bevolkingsgroei, zijn er andere argumenten om ontwikkelingslanden te steunen bij het opzetten en implementeren van family planning dienstverlening die beantwoordt aan individuele behoeften.” (2:53) <u>Beleidsdoelstellingen</u> - “Verlaging van de natuurlijke bevolkingsgroei in de wereld.” (2:104)
Construc- tivism	Duty <i>Aid as tool to maintain their position in international system</i>	- investments in the kind of projects that are internationally recognized and popular - visible projects - follow the international trend	“Nationale programma's voor onderzoek naar klimaatverandering worden in toenemende mate gecoördineerd in een aantal samenhangende internationale programma's betreffende wereldwijde waarneming en onderzoek van het klimaatstelsel en de menselijke invloeden daarop. Nederland participeert in deze programma's.” (2:46)
		- connection with strategies for international position - comparison with other countries (others do more) - references to international norms or agreements	-
Construc- tivism	Reputation <i>Aid as tool to enhance reputation</i>	- large, high-profile aid projects - many leadership tasks in international fora - references to upholding reputation - new, innovative projects	Over stedelijke problematiek: “Nederland heeft de afgelopen jaren een actieve rol gespeeld in de dialoog tussen de verschillende donoren op dit beleidsterrein ... Vanuit Nederland wordt daarbij het accent gelegd op armoedebestrijding.” (2:98) De komende jaren wil Nederland allerlei activiteiten op het gebied van bestrijding van geweld ondersteunen (onderzoek, bewustmaking, kennisverspreiding, steun aan opvanghuizen, NGO's, rechtspraak en overheden). Daarnaast zal Nederland geweld tegen vrouwen op de agenda van internationale fora en beleidsdialogen met gastlanden plaatsen. (2:86) “Nederland is ook partij bij het CITES-verdrag. Dit is het internationale verdrag dat tot doel heeft bij te dragen aan het behoud van bedreigde plant- en diersoorten door middel van handelsbeperkingen.” (2:49)
		- connections to reputation strategies - symbolic significance of aid - comparison with other countries (others do less)	-
Construc- tivism	Humanitarianism <i>Aid as tool to improve living conditions and human</i>	- eradicate poverty	<u>Beleidsdoelstellingen</u> - “Armoedebestrijding van onderop, gebaseerd op het concept van «human development» - ontwikkeling van, voor en door mensen zelf - met nadruk op de economische verzelfstandiging van mensen.” (2:103) - “Het verbinden van gerichte armoedebestrijding met het verkleinen van de economische ongelijkheid die, niet geheel samenhangend met het welvaartsniveau, veelal het gevolg is van de uitsluiting van mensen in het bijzonder in economieën met een dualistisch karakter.” (2:104)

rights worldwide		“armoede kan alleen effectief bestreden worden als de armen volwaardig in de economie geïntegreerd worden” (2:102) <i>Plattelandsontwikkeling en armoedebestrijding</i> -“Het merendeel van de absoluut armen woont nog immer op het platteland. Het streven is jaarlijks gemiddeld een derde van de totale bilaterale hulp aan plattelandsontwikkeling te besteden.” (2:97) -“Voor effectieve armoedebestrijding zijn echter wel bepaalde accenten nodig in het beleid met betrekking tot plattelandsontwikkeling: produktiviteits-groei in de kleinschalige, arbeidsintensieve, agrarische activiteiten, verhoging van de effectieve vraag naar voedsel en landbouwprodukten en stimulering van kleinschalige, arbeidsintensieve, niet-agrarische werkgelegenheid.” (2:97) <i>Armoede en kinderen</i> -“Minder dan wie dan ook zijn kinderen, en zeker arme kinderen in staat voor hun rechten op te komen.” (2:98) <i>Onderwijs</i> -“Investerings in onderwijs, en met name in basisonderwijs, beroepson- derwijs en volwasseneneducatie zijn essentiële componenten in een beleid dat gericht is op de uitbanning van absolute armoede, door mensen in staat te stellen hun eigen capaciteit en sociaal-economische produktiviteit te verhogen.” (2:98) <i>Gezondheidszorg en voeding</i> -“nadruk op primaire gezondheidszorg (<i>primary health care</i>) voor armoedebestrijding. Dat betekent vooral aandacht voor eenvoudige curatieve zorg, preventie, moeder- en kindzorg, bevolkingsparticipatie en aandacht voor de fysiek-sociaal-economische context.” (2:100) -“Bijzondere aandacht wordt in de Nederlandse ontwikkelingssamen-werking gegeven aan AIDS en malaria. Ook tuberculose zal in de komende tijd meer aandacht krijgen.” (2:101) “Minister Pronk: Wat wij dus hebben toegevoegd, is de noodzaak van een goed macro-beleid om een behoorlijk armoedebestrijdingsbeleid te laten beklijven. Dat is een gezond macro-economische beleid, dat is investeren in sociale sectoren, dat zijn social safety nets, dat is investeren in werkgelegenheid.” (2:3) “De heer Leerling (RPF): dat wereldwijd toch miljoenen mensen in erbarmelijke omstandig- heden verkeren. ... Kan en moet er voor die mensen, die medemensen, niet meer worden gedaan, als de eigen overheid te kort schiet of niet genoeg kan doen? Waarom wordt deze categorie armsten der armen, zoals wij ze wel mogen noemen, niet geholpen met alles wat mogelijk is, terwijl wij wel mensen helpen die door honger of door een natuurramp plotseling in zulke kommervolle omstandigheden komen te verkeren?” (24:23)
	- supporting poorest and weakest groups	<u>Beleidsdoelstellingen</u> - “Autonomie van vrouwen.” (2:103) - “Binnen iedere afzonderlijke sector prioriteit voor die ontwikkelings-activiteiten die zo direct mogelijk ten goede komen aan zwakkere, gemarginaliseerde bevolkingsgroepen: basisonderwijs, primaire gezondheidszorg, moeder- en kindzorg, kleinschalige autochtone industriële bedrijvigheid, stedelijke armoedebestrijding, geïnte-greerde plattelandsontwikkeling en voedselzekerheid hebben een hogere prioriteit dan universitair onderwijs, curatieve zorg in zieken- huizen, grootschalige industriële investeringen van buitenlandse ondernemingen, kapitaalintensieve stedelijke en rurale infrastructuur en agrarische exportproductie. Uiteraard zijn de laatste categorieën voor ontwikkeling van groot belang, doch zij kunnen ook uit andere bron worden gefinancierd dan louter met behulp van giften in het kader van intergouvernementele hulpverlening.” (2:103)
	- provide humanitarian relief	<u>Beleidsdoelstellingen</u> - “Prioriteit voor het bewerkstelligen van vrede en het tegengaan (voorkomen, beheersen en oplossen) van gewelddadige conflicten, ook van een niet-economisch (religieus, nationalistisch, cultureel, etnisch) karakter, zowel tussen als binnen samenlevingen.” (2:103-104)
	- support democratization and democracy - promote good governance - promote human rights - international justice - international distributive justice	<u>Beleidsdoelstellingen</u> - “Prioriteit voor vrijheid, democratie en mensenrechten als voorwaarde voor een sociaal-economische ontwikkeling die aan de gehele bevolking ten goede komt.” (2:103) “Onzerzijds blijven in dit debat het wezen van de vertegenwoordigende democratie, de universaliteit van de mensenrechten en het beginsel van de rechtsstaat onverminderd het uitgangspunt.” (2:17) “Om het vermogen tot participeren van armen te vergroten is het ook van belang dat sociale handicaps worden weggenomen zoals een kennisachterstand door analfabetisme en achter- stelling op grond van sexe, religie, ras of kaste. Dit onderstreept het belang, ook uit een oogpunt van armoedebestrijding, van aandacht voor <i>good governance</i>.” (2:83)
	- aid is seen as its own policy independently of national strategic interests	-

Table C.4 Bilateral/Multilateral aid

1993 Bilateral/Multilateral aid			
Theory	Frame	Measurement	
Realism	Security <i>Aid is mainly bilateral</i>	- aid is given to states, instead of subgroups within or above those states - aid is given directly from state to state instead of cooperation through international institutions - focusing on bilateral aid instead of multilateral aid	The focus is on multilateral aid, there are cut backs on bilateral aid.
		- the role of international institutions is downplayed - state is central actor - international institutions entail some loss of autonomy and complicate policy-making	-
Realism	Power <i>Aid is mainly bilateral</i>	- aid is given to states, instead of subgroups within or above those states - aid is given directly from state to state instead of cooperation through international institutions - focusing on bilateral aid instead of multilateral aid	The focus is on multilateral aid, there are cut backs on bilateral aid.
		- the role of international institutions is downplayed - state is central actor - bilaterally it is easier to extend influence and execute hard power strategies	-
Liberalism	Economic self-interest <i>Aid is mainly bilateral</i>	- focusing on bilateral aid instead of multilateral aid - aid is given from state to state instead of cooperation through international institutions	The focus is on multilateral aid, there are cut backs on bilateral aid.
		- the multilateral aid that is given is focused on enhancing the business climate	“Versterking en hervorming van de internationale economische orde, onder meer door bevordering van de multilaterale samenwerking.” (2:103) “Mondialisering, liberalisering en gebrekkige coördinatie van nationaal-economisch beleid, zijn de hoofdkenmerken geweest van het systeem van flexibele wisselkoersen, ontstaan na het einde van het Bretton-Woods regime. Stabiliteit van wisselkoersen als doelstelling van beleid kwam in de loop van de jaren tachtig weer meer in zwang. Multilaterale afstemming van monetair en fiscaal beleid werd daarvoor als vereiste gezien.” (2:63) De focus op de stabiliteit en de afhankelijkheid van het systeem past echter weer meer bij het enlightened frame.
		- emphasizing economic interest - multilateral aid is less easily controlled by domestic economic interests	-
Liberalism	Enlightened self-interest <i>Aid is mainly multilateral</i>	- focusing on multilateral aid instead of bilateral aid - aid is given through international institutions	The focus is on multilateral aid, there are cut backs on bilateral aid.

		- giving aid to multilateral organizations to combat global problems	“Een veel minder overheersende rol van de overheid in de voormalig communistische landen is immers ook een onmisbaar aspect van de democratisering, de opbouw van een rechts– staat en de invoering van een markteconomie, zoals die worden nagestreefd. Niettemin bestaat in deze fluïde situatie behoefte aan nieuwe, integrerende structuren als ankers van stabiliteit. Dit vindt dan ook uitdrukking in de hier snel groeiende intensiteit van multilaterale betrekkingen in het kader van onder meer de Europese Gemeenschap (speciale associatieakkoorden die eventueel uitzicht bieden op toetreding), de NAVO en de WEU (beide doende de praktische samen– werking met deze landen aan te halen, eventueel ook met het oog op verdere integratie), de Raad van Europa (waarvan het lidmaatschap een toetssteen vormt voor een effectieve aansluiting bij het democratische Europa) en de CVSE (mede gericht op conflictvoorkoming en crisisbeheersing in het «Europa» van Vancouver tot Wladiwostok).” (2:14) “Versterking en hervorming van de internationale economische orde, onder meer door bevordering van de multilaterale samenwerking.” (2:103) Over humanitaire noodhulp (landen type 3): “Het kan alleen worden opgelost wanneer ontwikkelingssamenwerking, inclusief humanitaire hulpverlening, goed wordt afgestemd op een internationaal vredes– en veiligheidsbeleid en vice versa. Complexe humanitaire noodsituaties vragen mede daarom om een geïntegreerde inzet van buitenlands– politieke, defensiepolitieke en ontwikkelingspolitieke instrumenten.” (2:31) “Waar het gaat om de aanpak van grensoverschrijdende en mondiale milieuproblemen, moet gestreefd worden naar multilaterale milieuovereenkomsten, waarin zo nodig handelsmaatregelen kunnen worden opgenomen.” (2:44) “Het zou bovendien aanbeveling verdienen wanneer het onderwerp migratie ook op de agenda werd geplaatst van de brede dialoog over internationale samenwerking in het kader van de Verenigde Naties.” (2:68)
		- strengthening international organizations	“Alle welgemeende formules aangaande een internationale gemeenschap ten spijt, bestaan de Verenigde Naties de eerste plaats uit nationale lidstaten die primair hun als vitaal ervaren belangen voor ogen houden. ... Onzelfzuchtige staten bestaan niet, en het is dus niet verwonderlijk dat ook de permanente Vijf voortdurend hun verantwoordelijkheden tegen hun belangen afwegen. ... De oplossing voor deze problematiek ligt niet in een terugkeer naar machtspolitiek - zoals in het interbellum - want ook die kan de vrede niet verzekeren, maar in het verder inhoud geven aan de gedachte van collectieve veiligheid. ...Langs verschillende weg kan gepoogd worden het vredebewarende en vredebevorderende vermogen van de Verenigde Naties te versterken.” (2:34) “Wel is mede uit een oogpunt van de relatie tussen ontwikkeling en conflict er veel aan gelegen dat het VN-systeem van collectieve veiligheid alsmede de Verenigde Naties Organisatie zelf krachtig worden versterkt. ... hen juist in staat te stellen te kunnen besluiten tot een gemeenschappelijk aanpak van grensoverschrijdende conflicten en andere grote problemen die hun soevereiniteit nu feitelijk zo in het gedrang brengen.” (2:35) “Om fragmentatie of regionalisering van de wereldeconomie te voorkomen is versterking van de internationale economische en sociale organisaties van de VN de aangewezen weg.” (2:69) “multilaterale hulp (mede noodzakelijk ter ondersteuning van het streven naar versterking van internationale systemen)” (2:106)
Construc- tivism	Duty <i>Aid is mainly multilateral</i>	- mandatory contributions to international organizations will be made faithfully - international duty to contribute to international organizations	The focus is on multilateral aid, there are cut backs on bilateral aid. “Minister Pronk: Er is geconstateerd, dat zeer veel multilaterale hulp wordt gegeven. Waarom worden de bedragen daarvoor niet verlaagd en die voor de bilaterale hulp wel? Daarop heb ik twee antwoorden. Allereerst wijs ik erop, dat het overgrote deel van de multilaterale hulp die op deze begroting wordt verwerkt, wordt gegeven op afroep door de Wereldbank, de regionale ontwikke- lingsbanken en het Europees ontwikkelingsfonds. Die hulp wordt gegeven op grond van beslissingen die jaren geleden tijdens onderhan- delingen zijn genomen. ... Over de bedragen die nu in het kader van de multilaterale hulp aan de orde zijn, beslissen wij dus niet zelf. Het gaat daarbij om het honoreren van eerder genomen besluiten.” (24:16)
		- bilateral aid will be at the acceptable minimum	-
Construc- tivism	Reputation <i>Aid is mainly multilateral</i>	- focusing on multilateral aid instead of bilateral aid - aid is given through international institutions - mainly large UN projects with a lot of visibility	The focus is on multilateral aid, there are cut backs on bilateral aid. “Minister Pronk: Er is geconstateerd, dat zeer veel multilaterale hulp wordt gegeven. Waarom worden de bedragen daarvoor niet verlaagd en die voor de bilaterale hulp wel? Daarop heb ik twee antwoorden. Allereerst wijs ik erop, ... Dat geldt niet voor de jaarlijkse pledging voor VN-fondsen, zoals die van UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF enzovoorts. ... Politiek heb ik het beleid voor de Verenigde Naties proberen te voeren aan de hand van de pledging– conferenties. Als wij met onze gelden voor de genoemde organisaties omlaag zouden gaan, zou dat een sneeuwbal effect hebben. Anderen zullen dan de hoogte van hun bedragen ook naar beneden bijstellen. Daarom hebben wij altijd op

			onze positie in dezen gelet, welke samenstelling de Nederlandse regering ook had. Als Nederland minder gaat geven aan UNDP, zal in het algemeen een bijstelling naar beneden door anderen het gevolg zijn. ... Dan vinden anderen daarin namelijk een legitimatie om ook minder te doen." (24:16)
		- status of international institutions is considered to be of value	-
Constructivism	Humanitarianism <i>Aid has high levels of both bilateral and multilateral donation</i>	- aid is given both bilaterally and multilaterally	The focus is on multilateral aid, there are cut backs on bilateral aid. Dat zou je niet verwachten bij een donor die onbaatzuchtig is.
		- highest focus for the one which can contribute the most on specific area	"Ontwikkelingslanden zien steeds meer in dat zij baat hebben bij een sterk multilateraal stelsel van regels en disciplines, omdat zij anders zijn overgeleverd aan de eigen spelregels van de grootste partijen in de wereldeconomie." (2:61) Over humanitaire noodhulp (landen type 3): "Het kan alleen worden opgelost wanneer ontwikkelingssamenwerking, inclusief humanitaire hulpverlening, goed wordt afgestemd op een internationaal vredes- en veiligheidsbeleid en vice versa. Complexe humanitaire noodsituaties vragen mede daarom om een geïntegreerde inzet van buitenlands- politieke, defensiepolitieke en ontwikkelingspolitieke instrumenten." (2:31)
		- human development is always end goal	"Het is van groot belang dat de multi- en bilaterale donoren onderling en met de desbetreffende ontwikkelingslanden hun activiteiten op de terreinen van informatieverzameling, beleidsvoorbereiding en strategie-ontwikkeling op elkaar afstemmen. Gezamenlijke landenspecifieke armoedestrategieën kunnen een zeer belangrijke bijdrage leveren in de zo urgente vermindering van absolute armoede." (2:89)

Table C.5 Volume

1993 Volume			
Theory	Frame	Measurement	
Realism	Security <i>Aid volume is low, correlated with international tension & large share for security projects</i>	- overall low volume	Nee relatief hoog (0.8%)
		- the level of international tension	<i>The Netherlands was not in war during this time and their direct physical security wasn't in danger, aid volume is therefore expected to be at a minimum level. Dus je zou nog lager volume verwachten, voorspelling klopt niet.</i>
		- large share of aid is used for projects that ensure national security	-
Realism	Power <i>Aid volume is low, correlated with size of donor & large share for power projects</i>	- overall low volume	Nee relatief hoog (0.8%)
		- size of donor state	<i>The Netherlands is a small state, aid volume is therefore expected to be at a higher level compared to bigger donor states: Dit klopt</i>
		- aid is used to make recipients dependent, and gain power	No hard power, only soft power
Liberalism	Economic self-interest <i>Aid volume is low, correlated with economic dependence & large share for economic projects</i>	- connections with the state's strategies for the pursuit of power	-
		- overall volume is relatively low	Nee relatief hoog (0.8%)
		- economic dependence	<i>Seen as the Netherlands is a small country with a very international economic outlook, they are, more than many other countries, dependent for their economic wellbeing on sustainable development in other countries. Aid volume is therefore expected to be at a higher level compared to other donor states.: Dit klopt nog steeds</i>
Liberalism	Enlightened self-interest <i>Aid volume is high, correlated with donor's international exposure & large share</i>	- large share for projects supporting economic growth	0,8% van BNP "Een en ander heeft ook financieringsconsequenties. Er is terecht geconstateerd, dat in de nota geen consequentie is getrokken inzake de omvang van de ontwikkelingssamenwerking in de komende jaren. Dat ligt ook zeer voor de hand als een desbetreffende nota kort voor het einde van een kabinetsperiode uitkomt. Wat dat betreft kun je dan geen afspraken maken die iets voorstellen. Je kunt hoogstens een analyse aanbieden op grond waarvan politieke beslissingen kunnen worden genomen na een verkiezingscampagne op basis van verkiezingsprogramma's en regeerakkoorden." (24:10)
		- large share to enhance trade	
		- low share/cut backs on projects without economic gains	
Liberalism	Enlightened self-interest <i>Aid volume is high, correlated with donor's international exposure & large share</i>	- overall volume is relatively high	

	for IPG projects	- the level of international exposure	<i>Seen as the Netherlands is a small country with a very international economic outlook, they are, more than many other countries, dependent for their economic wellbeing on sustainable development in other countries. They are also a popular destination for refugees. Aid volume is therefore expected to be at a higher level compared to other donor states.</i> Dit klopt nog steeds
		- large share for pursuing stability and IPGs	“Bij de financiering in deze jaren kennen wij in feite op drie manieren een overgangperiode. ... De tweede dimensie in die overgangperiode wordt gevormd door het feit dat wij er internationaal nog niet helemaal uit zijn. Wat is ontwikkelingshulp nu echt? Welke definitie wordt gehanteerd? Ik doel hierbij op de ODA-definitie. Welke landen kunnen in aanmerking komen voor het ontvangen van officiële ontwikkelingshulp, de DAC-landen?” (24:10) “In Nederland is een politieke discussie op gang gekomen over de wenselijkheid van een bredere financiële doelstelling voor internationale ontwikkelingssamenwerking dan een doelstelling voor de zogenaamde Official Development Assistance (ODA). Dit was een onderdeel van de jarenlang in ons land algemeen geaccepteerde doelstelling om van ons Netto Nationale Inkomen 1,5% te bestemmen voor ontwikkelingssamenwerking, dat wil zeggen voor ODA plus voor belendende en ondersteunende activiteiten (non-ODA). Die laatste categorie nam toe ten gevolge van de toenemende rentesubsidies op de leningen aan ontwikkelingslanden en doordat steeds meer non-ODA-activiteiten onder de 1,5% doelstelling werden gebracht. Bovendien kwamen er, omdat de wereld nu eenmaal veranderde, nieuwe behoeften aan internationale samenwerking op die niet onder de traditionale ODA-definitie konden worden gebracht. Daardoor daalde de Nederlandse ODA tot beneden het bovengenoemde niveau van 0,9% van het BNP. In discussie is thans de mogelijkheid om een brede norm te kiezen voor de jaarlijkse Nederlandse uitgaven ten behoeve van internationale samenwerking: ontwikkelingshulp plus internationaal milieubeleid plus vredesoperaties in ontwikkelingslanden plus de opvang van asiel- zoekers plus hulp aan Midden- en Oost Europa plus de traditionele non-ODA-activiteiten.” (2:105-106) Minister Pronk: Wij hebben gezegd dat wat ons betreft dat deel van de financiering dat deel uitmaakt van de contributie aan de Verenigde Naties en dat op conflictbeheersings- beleid is gericht in de toekomst als official development assistance kan worden beschouwd. (24:10) Minister Pronk: Wij vinden dat alle milieu-activiteiten die echt aan ontwikkelingslanden ten goede komen, onder de official development assistance zouden moeten kunnen vallen. Dat geldt echter niet voor die milieu- activiteiten die vooral in ons eigen belang zijn. Het is te definiëren welke activiteiten daar wel en niet onder vallen. (24:11)
Construc-tivism	Duty Aid volume is correlated with those of peer groups & large share for popular projects	- peer aid volume	<i>Aid volume is expected to be similar to 0.29%. Het Nederlandse % is bijna 3x zo hoog. Duty kan dit niet verklaren</i>
		- aimed at mandatory, visible or popular projects	“Over de bedragen die nu in het kader van de multilaterale hulp aan de orde zijn, beslissen wij dus niet zelf. Het gaat daarbij om het honoreren van eerder genomen besluiten.” (24:16)
Construc-tivism	Reputation Aid volume meets or exceeds international norms regarding aid volume	- peer aid volume	<i>As the UN target for aid is 0.7% of GNI, under this interest the Netherlands is expected to meet or exceed this.</i> Dit klopt.
		- attempt to stand out among their peer group	“Politiek heb ik het beleid voor de Verenigde Naties proberen te voeren aan de hand van de pledging- conferenties. Als wij met onze gelden voor de genoemde organisaties omlaag zouden gaan, zou dat een sneeuwbal effect hebben. Anderen zullen dan de hoogte van hun bedragen ook naar beneden bijstellen.” (24:16) “De internationaal overeenge- komen norm dienaangaande bedraagt 0,7% van het Bruto Nationaal Produkt (tegen marktprijzen). Hoewel de hulpgevende landen gezamenlijk deze norm nooit hebben bereikt - de fetelijke hoogte van de ontwikkelingshulp bedroeg jaarlijks nooit meer dan de helft: 0,35% van het gezamenlijke BNP - heeft Nederland, na de norm van 0,7% voor het eerst in 1975 te hebben gehaald, in de jaren tachtig steeds meer dan 0,9% van haar BNP voor ODA-doeleinden kunnen bestemmen. Dit was een onderdeel van de jarenlang in ons land algemeen geaccepteerde doelstelling om van ons Netto Nationale Inkomen 1,5% te bestemmen voor ontwikkelingssamenwerking, dat wil zeggen voor ODA plus voor belendende en ondersteunende activiteiten (non-ODA).” (2:105)
Construc-tivism	Humanitaria-nism Aid volume is high, correlated with donor's wealth & large share for neediest groups	- overall volume is relatively high	0,8% van BNP, echter gaat % wel naar beneden over de jaren. Is niet wat je zou verwachten bij een humanitaire donor
		- donor's wealth	<i>As the Netherlands is a prosperous country compared to a lot of other donors, they are expected to allocate a larger share to aid.</i> Ja, Nederland geeft relatief veel.
		- large share for neediest groups	“Binnen iedere afzonderlijke sector prioriteit voor die ontwikkelings-activiteiten die zo direct mogelijk ten goede komen aan zwakkere, gemarginaliseerde bevolkingsgroepen.” (2:103)

