

# ***The European Union: bliss or burden to refuged people?***

**How EU policies affect refuged people's well-being and migrant trajectories in three  
different cities in Turkey: Kayseri, Istanbul and Edirne**

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## Preface

This thesis is carried out as the final research of the Bachelor Human Geography, Spatial Planning and Environment at the Faculty of Management of Radboud University in Nijmegen. The topic idea stems from my background, me being half-Turkish with family from Istanbul and the Kayseri provinces, and previous research I conducted while studying abroad in Istanbul, Turkey. When I started this thesis in the beginning of 2021, I wanted to use my time productively during the Corona pandemic by researching and gaining knowledge on a topic I read a lot about in the media.

I want to thank my parents for the support I received throughout the past few months as well as other family members, such as my uncle who helped me with translations of certain articles. Next to that, I want to thank my friends from university as they supported me during this last year and gave advice on what I should discuss in my thesis.

Lastly, I want to thank my supervisor, Cesar E. Merlín Escorza, who has provided guidance during my research, through the highs and lows, by giving solid advice, being critical by which he explored my potential and which improved the quality of this thesis, and showing patience and flexibility through these difficult times with the Corona pandemic. Besides, I want to thank the second supervisor for taking the time to read and grade this thesis.

I enjoyed researching this topic, which led me to gain knowledge and get an insight in processes that affect human beings, a field I have the ambition of pursuing my career in.

I wish you a pleasant reading!

Vince Yalçın,

Sint Hubert, August 13th, 2021

## Summary

This thesis discusses the topic of migrant trajectories theory, which can be described as being the route a migrant or refuged person follows from one place to another, which is a space of intersecting power relations, escaping possible threats to life and human rights violations. Important to this theory is the characteristic that these routes are not fixed, but instead are chains, global structures, that are affected as migrants and refuged people move through them, therefore being chains that are made anew. During these trajectories, in these spaces, people can be found who interact with each other, being migrants, refuged people, citizens and authorities, and are all affected by their daily encounters. As policies are implemented in these spaces, possibly to strain the influx of migrants and refuged people, power shifts occur, that affect the space's power relations. Important is to recognize the 'in-between phase', instead of only looking at the point of origin and destination, as conditions can have an impact on these human beings, we call refuged people.

The in-between phase this research focuses on the Turkish cities of Kayseri, Istanbul and Edirne, which all have seen an influx of Syrian refuged people since the beginning of the migrant crisis. Most refuged people travel from Syria through Turkey eastwards with the intention of crossing the border into the European Union. Some stay in the Turkish cities, while some hope to return to their homes when the war has ended and the situation can be deemed safe. In this research we want to know whether the European Union has intervened in Turkey with its policies to counteract the flow of refuged people to its territory. We then will have a look at whether these policies affect refuged people's human rights and their migrant trajectories.

To gain knowledge about the subject, at first I have conducted literature, media and policy research to create a context about the topic. This let me to better understand the background of in which Turkish provinces Syrian refuged people are located, how these provinces can be grouped together in phases, as their characteristics are similar, and how these phases would tell the story of what refuged people's migrant trajectories in Turkey looks like. I concluded by describing two different

found trajectories, one being the 'Greek Islands'-route, which runs from the Syrian border provinces, to the Anatolian provinces, to Izmir onto the Greek islands, territory of the European Union. The second trajectory entails a route from the same Syrian border provinces, to the Anatolian provinces, to Istanbul, to Edirne into Greece or Bulgaria, the territory of the European Union. The second chapter was an analysis on the discourse present in European society. This resulted in findings that reflected the hypothesis of that Europeans think of refuged people as a threat. Furthermore, we concluded that public discourse is constructed by media, who do not have the full picture of a phenomenon that occurs outside of European territory. Therefore, the public is misinformed. Public discourse then constructs political discourse, as politicians are influenced by their voters. Therefore, the European Union's member states reflect the public discourse of perceiving refuged people as a threat. The European Union follows its member states governments, thus resulting in 'anti-refugee' policy in Turkey through extraterritoriality. This led me to dissect the policies the European Union enforces in the Turkish cities of Kayseri, Istanbul and Edirne, by which they were responsible for human rights violations, as they funded projects that were aimed at transferring refuged people as far away from the border as possible. Therefore, we concluded that this can be seen as the third migrant trajectory we did not observe before. Therefore we answered our main research question, concluding that refuged people's migrant trajectory indeed changed because of the EU policies.

In further research, academics should try to create an even clearer view on how European policies affect refuged people's well-being in Turkey and if the EU is responsible for human rights violations committed by Turkish authorities. Besides, research on European policies focus can also be shifted towards the Turkish governments policies that can affect refuged people's livelihoods. Besides, I recommend future research to focus on the concept of phases in migrant trajectories, whether the concept matches with situations in other countries and whether these phases have the same characteristics as the phases in Turkey. This could add to the academic field, but also contribute to a better understanding in society of the concept of migration and refuged people's hardships.

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## 1. Introduction

Since the height of the so-called crisis in 2015, many refuged people from mainly Syria and Iraq, as well as other parts of Asia, the Middle East and Africa, left their homes to seek refuge in the European Union (European Council, 2021). This complex migration phenomenon created an influx of refuged people crossing the Mediterranean Sea from Africa, but also led to Turkey becoming a “well-known country of destination, transit and origin, in the irregular migratory movements in its neighbouring regions” (IOM, 1996; İçduygu, 2000; İçduygu & Keyman 2000; İçduygu, 2003). As Turkey is on the edge of Europe, cooperation with the European Union is necessary in order to reach a common ground and to tackle the problems that may arise in the process of dealing with this great influx of refuged people.

However, Turkey and the European Union have had a difficult relationship through this crisis, in which they sought closer ties with each other for economic, political and security reasons (Saatçioğlu, 2019, p.3), but also have remained at a distance from each other. Both actors have attacked each other politically on how the other fails in coming up with sufficient policies, on how aims are not reached and on how binding obligations from treaties and protocols are breached by the other party. One main cause of this is the (EU-)Turkey Agreement of 2016, in which Turkey promised to take back every migrant that crossed over illegally into the EU in exchange for the EU taking in one legal refuged person per illegal migrant, as well as a sum of money and possible EU-membership (Lempp et. al., 2016, p.22). Turkey’s president Recep Tayyip Erdogan said in a speech that “... Turkey’s expectations, including free movement, ... updating of the customs union and financial assistance are tangibly met, ...” and that Turkey would because of these shortcomings would open their borders for refuged people to cross-over into Greece (DW News, 2020). Next to that he stated that the Greek practices at the border were Nazi-alike (France24, 2020), because of the stripping of refuged people of their belongings and the tear-gas Greece uses. This led to the European leaders criticizing Turkey’s immigration policy with statements like that the “situation at the EU’s external borders is not



acceptable” and that they “strongly reject” the “use” of refuged people by Ankara (DW News, 2020); by which they mean that the Turkish government “uses migrants to get its way politically” (DW News, 2020) in the negotiation processes with the European Union, for example by not holding back refuged people at the border which increases pressure on Greece. The aforementioned case shows that the EU has policies with Turkey over the migrant crisis, but from other sources we know that the EU also makes use of a process called externalization and intervenes in Turkey’s domestic handling of the crisis (Erensu & Kaşlı, 2016, p.2-3). The EU-Turkey Agreement and other policies implemented directly on the border are well known (Carrera, 2007; Wolff, 2008; Baldaccini, 2010; Rijpma, 2010), but EU-countries tend to give less attention to the domestic projects and policies they implement in bordering countries as the focus is on “where Europe’s borders lie” (Light & Young, 2009). Furthermore, critical literature review shows that there are not many academic papers on this matter and that media articles also tend to highlight the worst cases, which mainly are at the Greek borders as those are more visible.

The question then arises why the European Union is that harsh with its critique on Turkey, while they are in need of cooperation. How come they criticize Turkey the Turkish government, while they themselves also partake in the causing of problems? Why is the EU not transparent about their policy in Turkey, rather than focussing on Erdogan’s governments wrongdoing? And what are the effects of these policies not only on refuged people, but also on the cities and the civilians within them? Furthermore, how do these policies affect the migrant trajectory from which we can get a better understanding about the concept of migration on a whole.

It is important to understand this complex case, consisting of multiple dimensions like the European Union’s policies, human rights violations, changing migrant trajectories and how the three cities adapt and also differ from each other, and to realise that domestic problems can differ from the well-portrayed, by the media, direct problems at the EU’s border. Since there is not much attention from

within the European Union on the domestic problems, which will be discussed in the next section, in Turkey that are caused by the EU's policies and could have consequences on the refuged people's human rights, this research will focus mainly on this area of field in which these policies are implemented in three different cities, with three different positions in the Theory of Migrant Trajectories; Edirne, Istanbul and Kayseri.

### **1.1. Research question and sub-questions**

This leads us to the research question: *"How does European migration policy differ between the three major Turkish cities of Edirne, Istanbul and Kayseri and in which way do such policies affect the refuged people's migrant trajectories?"*

In order to answer this question sufficiently, we will need to ask ourselves multiple questions, that can be seen as sub-questions. Firstly, we will discuss in detail the context regarding the paths of migration in Turkey. This will also explain why Edirne, Istanbul and Kayseri have different positions in the Theory of Migrant Trajectories. Secondly, we will discuss in depth what the discourse from Europe on the crisis resembles. This then will be followed by extensive qualitative analysis of data collected through ethnographic research contrasting media articles and academic literature, to create an overview of what the European Union's practices and policies in Turkey actually look like. Fourthly, there will be a discussion regarding the effects of these policies on migrants themselves and the human rights' dimension (approach, perspective, etc.) involved in this. Lastly, as all the aforementioned fields come together, we will look at the effects on the migrant trajectories in Turkey and with that answer the main research question. Question 4 and 5 are found in the chapter of question 3. To give a clear overview of the sub-questions, I will recount them shortly:

1. What is the context regarding the paths of migration in Turkey?
2. How is the discourse from Europe on the migrant crisis being shaped?
3. What are the European Union's practices and policies regarding refuged people in Turkey?

4. What are the effects of these policies on refuged people and the human rights' dimension?
5. How do the European Union's practices and policies influence or change the migrant trajectories?

## **1.2. Aim of research and societal relevance**

The aim of this research is to create a clear overview of the practices and policies implemented in Turkey by the European Union, since there is no real critical discourse about this within Europe. By this I mean that there have been few researches into this subject with the focus on the domestic policies and its consequences implemented in Turkey by the European Union. As stated in the Critical Literature Review, it is clear that there are policies that influence refuged people's lives, rights and their future, but what the exact consequences are remains unclear. Besides, I aim to contribute by introducing a new dimension into this discussion by involving the subject of migrant trajectories. This study could contribute to further research on such policies considering that human rights could be at stake and international rights could be violated. Taking in account the ethnographic approach of this study, people from these different places and positions in this crisis's voices will be heard. Hereby we could possibly uncover problems and contribute to improve the cooperation between the European Union and Turkey by denouncing, exposing, etc. the violation of human- and international rights. As a researcher it is important to help people's voices to be heard, but then the problem emerges of through which lens we look at the situation. This research aims to shine light on the perspective from Turkish citizens as we see that, because there has been few research into this topic, their voices have not been heard enough. Next to that, views from Turkish people in Turkey differ from the views of European citizens and leaders, since they live in the situation where they have to deal with a large group of refuged people. Furthermore, the European policies may look as if they do not create any problems to the European leaders that created them, but could be viewed as problem-creating by locals, political leaders and researchers in Turkey. Segregation, violation of human rights and other problems then could be tackled and thus benefit society, not only Turkish

citizens, but also the migrants and refuged people themselves. Problems like these are a burden on society and could lead to other problems in the future, thus making it important to shine light on them and to understand what is going on to prevent this in the future. In short, this sums up the societal relevance of this research.

### **1.3. Academic relevance**

Not much research has been done on the migration phenomenon in this so-called migration crisis from a Turkish perspective, which also includes European policy. Academics could use this research as a starting point and dataset to build upon in further research. We see furthermore that, when there has been research on the problems migrants and refuged people face in Turkey, only issues regarding their health and segregation are discussed, rather than giving the full array of problems. Besides, it is mostly shown how these are caused by the Turkish government, instead of also including the European Union's participation and policies implementation in the crisis. Likewise, the ethical position of researchers from the West towards lesser academical distinct countries (Euro/Western-centred), as they see it, plays a role in how the discourse is being shaped (Kremer, 1997). Kremer states that there is a discourse in which countries, apart from the so-called West, i.e. U.S.A., Canada, Europe, etc., are taken less seriously and besides that literature is often written in the native language instead of English (Kremer, 1997). With this research I aim to give a look inside the discourse from the Turkish perspective. To conclude, research on this topic has been scarce and thus makes it hard for academics to understand the full scope of the situation when researching a comparable topic. This makes this research a contribution to the academic field and makes it academically relevant.

## **2. Theoretical Framework**

### **2.1. Critical Literature Review**

Multiple academics have talked about European policies aimed at preventing migrants and refuged people from entering the European Union. Saatçioğlu (2019, p.3) explores “The EU’s asymmetric strategic dependence on Ankara to stop the flow of migrants to Europe ...”, with a further analysis on the political relations between the EU and Turkey, talking about possible admission to the union. Likewise, Hughes (2004) talks in her paper about the political and economic dynamics between the two actors, but does it before the so-called migration crisis of 2015. İçduygu (2011) states in his paper called ‘Europe, Turkey, and International Migration: an uneasy negotiation’ that “... rising numbers of irregular transit migrants through Turkey to Europe ...” (İçduygu, 2011, p.2) are the main concern for Europe, and that they thus need collaboration with the Turks to reach a sufficient solution. All of these papers talk extensively on how relations were between the European Union and Turkey in the past, but also in the current and how they might be in the future.

Furthermore, we see that many academics talk about how refuged people cross the border from either Syria into Turkey, or from Turkey into the European Union, either via Izmir to the Greek Islands or at the border crossing near Edirne (İçduygu, 2004; Tokuzlu, 2005; Baird, 2015; Kale et. al., 2018). They all elaborate on how border security should be strengthened and how Turkish as well as EU policy affects the crossing for refuged people into Europe, but they give no mention of the intervention and extraterritoriality by the European Union within Turkey.

Baird (2015, p.851-852) states that “The extraterritoriality of EU border controls has occurred ... with the formation of a “buffer zone” which restricts migrants from accessing EU territory” (Collinson, 1996). Likewise, Karadağ (2019) wrote a paper ‘Extraterritoriality of European Borders to Turkey’. These two papers go into the European Union’s policies that they impose within Turkey to keep migrants and refuged people away from their borders. Karadağ states that “... existing literature on

the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the EU draws significant attention to the asymmetrical and hierarchical relationship between the European 'center', and its 'periphery, ...' (Karadağ, 2019, p.2), with periphery meaning Turkey in this instance. This point touches the concept of Eurocentrism, which could be explained as a "intra-European phenomena as the starting point of modernity and explains its later development without making recourse to anything outside of Europe" (Dussel, Krauel & Tuma, 2000, p.469-470). By having a Eurocentric view, we cannot meet the expectations researchers have of being objective and fully inclusive. Therefore it is important that this research, like the literature tells us, needs to look beyond the common discourse of this centre-periphery divisions to get an understanding of the situation from a Turkish citizens and refuged people's view. We will do this by seeking respondents who operate on smaller scales, like charity workers in the three cities and local/regional governmental actors, instead of a national governmental representative. Furthermore, independent researchers from universities within Turkey will also be contacted, as they tend to strive for objectivity. Politically, the national government looks at its relations with the European Union and has other goals, like seeking further cooperation with the European Union, than a regional government, as they tend to focus on tackling problems and improving their subject area. The concept of Eurocentrism was also mentioned in the sections of 'societal and academic relevance'.

One of the few articles that shines light on the division between cities is the paper of Erensu and Kaşlı (2016), named 'A Tale of Two Cities: Multiple Practices of Bordering and Degrees of 'Transit' in and through Turkey'. This paper looks at the "nature of transit migration based on ethnographic research conducted in two cities of Turkey: Edirne and Kayseri" (Erensu & Kaşlı, 2016, p.1). I will be focussing on these two cities as well adding Istanbul, the cultural and economic capital of the country, to this research, as I find it a valuable contribution to the research of Erensu and Kaşlı. Istanbul lies on the route from Kayseri to Edirne and is a major stop-over point for people who are planning to migrate to the European Union. Besides, "Two other ... spaces in which Syrians as well as other irregular border-

crossers are seen transiting are the coach station, where they come from Istanbul ...” to go to their “... next destination ...” (Erensu & Kaşlı, 2016, p.541). The researchers thus saw that Istanbul had a significant role as a transit space, but did not do any further research on it.

Edirne’s importance has been clear because of its geographical location next to the EU’s border, and thus is seen as the last point, maybe even the point of no-return, for migrants and refuged people wanting to cross over into the EU. Kayseri however is a ‘rural’ city in the middle of the country, 900 kilometres away from the EU’s border, thus posing no direct threat to Europe’s security. This also becomes clear in the process of extraterritoriality, which we will talk about in this research to give a clear overview on the EU’s measures to keep migrants and refuged people away from their borders. Van Liempt et. al. (2017, p.21) make this clear as well in their research in which they talk about how illegal refuged people crossing over to the Greek Islands are send back to Turkey to cities far away from the border, where they name Kayseri as one of the places of destination.

The literature review thus makes clear that there has been no real in depth analysis with a comparison between places within Turkey, but instead researchers have focussed on the direct border problems. Therefore, my research on the three cities, in combination with having no Euro-centric view of ‘centre’ and ‘periphery’, could be of significant academic relevance.

## **2.2. Important theories and terms**

The research I will be conducting will make use of different terms and theories, which are important to get a clear view of the case and situation. I will be discussing the most important theories and terms shortly in this section, though I will elaborate on them in the final thesis.

- Migrant Trajectories: This term is the core of this research and will be discussed in further detail in the final research paper. In short migrant trajectories are described as “... the path of a migrant from one ‘place’ to another, through a certain space of intersecting power relations” (Vaattinen, 2014, p.6). Next to that, we have to take the lived migration into account as an

phenomenon, rather than just a physical journey (Kynsiletho, 2011, p.1547). This means that it is important for this research, that we do not just look at 'what is the easiest and fastest way to get to Europe', but that we look at the phenomenon with its context, thus for example how the European policies affect this trajectory. Researchers like Vaittinen, Schapendonk and Van Houtum have done extensive research on the topic of migrant trajectories. I will take their work into account in the final thesis when writing more on the subject of migrant trajectories.

- Extraterritoriality: this term could be used in different contexts, making it important that we describe it in the geographical context, while looking at the dimension of law. Next to that, we will elaborate on this term in the final research paper, to make clear the connection to the migrant trajectories and crisis. Extraterritoriality is defined as "The application of a measure triggered by something other than a territorial connection with the regulating state" (Scott, 2014, p.90), thus meaning in this instance that the European Union can impose measures in another country, because there is something occurring that does not directly in their own territory, but has a connection to it, i.e. the migrant crisis. This term is of importance to the European Union as it legitimizes partly their implementation of these measures.

Concepts like Eurocentrism, the Migrant Crisis and the distinction between migrants and refugees/refused people are important to further elaborate on in the thesis, as they will make the situation refused people in Turkey find themselves in clear. We will accompany this with literature by academics like Dussel, Van Houtum, Vaittinen, Schapendonk and possibly others who have written articles on these subjects. Other concepts may arise during the gathering of data, for example when conducting interviews, and thus will be discussed as well in the thesis. These remain unclear for now.




### 2.3. Conceptual Model

Showed on the next page is an early conceptual model based on the hypothesis which I aim to either verify or falsify with this research. It serves as a guide to be able to answer my research question:

*“How does European migration policy differ between the three major Turkish cities of Edirne, Istanbul and Kayseri and in which way do such policies affect the refuged people’s migrant trajectories?”*

Based on read literature and my hypothesis, I have made this conceptual model in which I assume that extraterritoriality of the EU’s refugee policies within Turkey has an effect on human rights and the conflict itself, in which in this case it both deteriorates. By this I mean that the policies implemented by the EU are aimed to stop migrants and refuged people reaching the European border and in the meantime does not do this sufficiently as many refugee camps are in a bad condition. We could thus assume that this touches upon the violation of human rights as they should be treated the same as other humans, like citizens of the European Union. Next to that, as these policies have bad consequences, the conflict worsens as the situation deteriorates. The location, i.e. either Edirne, Istanbul or Kayseri, where the policy is implemented makes a difference in the size of the impact of these measures. Therefore it is important to research what this difference exactly is, thus making this research a comparative study. It could be that each city has a different human rights violations and that the situation of the conflict differs to each city. In the conceptual model this ‘element of difference’ is highlighted in yellow.

Lastly, my hypothesis is that the worsening of the conflict leads to worse relations between the European Union and Turkey, as the EU’s migration policies deteriorate the conflict by having an impact on the human rights. Likewise the migrant trajectories are impacted and possibly changed by these policies, which in the future could also impact the conflict and thus worse relations between both actors.



### 3. Methods

Hammersley and Atkinson state that “research design should be a reflexive process operating through every stage of a project” (1995, p.24) in which you reflect back on your choices, but also are flexible in making changes when needed. As a researcher one can be prone to blind spots and can overlook questions that are important because the research field itself can be highly politicized, especially in border/migration studies (Aparna, Schapendonk & Merlín-Escorza, 2020). Therefore it is important to acknowledge that we need to shift “the gaze away from the spectacle” and adopt “reflexive methods to avoid reproducing the design principles of migration apparatuses and border regimes” (Aparna, Schapendonk & Merlín-Escorza, 2020, p.111) when constructing one’s own research design. A research comprises of “collecting and analysing data, developing and modifying theory, elaborating or refocussing the research questions, and identifying and dealing with validity threats” (Maxwell et. al., 2009, p.215) which happens simultaneously, while influencing each other. This means that I will be doing this as well throughout the research process and that the research question could change based upon found results or availability of data.

When comparing multiple research methods, this research will be conducted from a qualitative stance. In qualitative research consists of “detailed narrative descriptions, then constructing in-depth case studies of the phenomenon under study, and, finally, moving to comparisons and the interpretive search for patterns that cut across cases” (Patton, 2005, p.1633). The in-depth case study in this research are the three cities Edirne, Istanbul and Kayseri, which will in the end be compared on how the European Union’s policy differs and affects migrants and refuged

people. Because this research is focussed on humans, I will use three kinds of data gathering methods, in-depth open-ended interviews, direct observations and written documents (literature), which are also at the centre of good qualitative research (Patton, 2005). Furthermore, I will use the Grounded Theory method, which entails that descriptive information, in the shape of interviews, will be eventually transformed into a theory, particular to the case that has been studied (Creswell & Poth, 2017).

It is important that I first will conduct thorough literature research to understand the full context of the phenomenon and then conduct interviews to fully grasp the details. I intend to travel to Turkey, on my own costs, around the months of April/May 2021, taking the current Covid-19 situation into account, to conduct the interviews in person. While the pandemic brings a few challenges with it, I see the option of conducting the interviews online from the Netherlands as a worse option than to go there in person. Citizens in the Republic of Turkey tend to be closed when discussing matters like politics and the government's interference in society; therefore conducting interview online does not add to a secure feeling for the respondents and could thus thereby change their answers, that could have been important to the research and to understand the phenomenon. Furthermore, only when conducting observations in person, a researcher can grasp the full atmosphere of the object, for example in this case refugee camps or housing compounds. Since I have family and friends living in Turkey, I will have people to contact in case the Covid-19 situation changes. Next to that, to lessen the risks of contracting and/or spreading the virus to other people, possibly respondents, I will of course adhere to the measure imposed by the Turkish government and next to that will follow the international guidelines on how to take precautions.

As I will have to compare three cities, I will travel to them all and evenly divide the number of interviews, which I plan to be 15, to each of these cities. As I have studied at Sabancı University for my Erasmus Abroad, I will try to contact academics from this institution. Furthermore, I do plan to

find government officials that could give the Turkish government's viewpoint on this matter, as well as people from lesser institutions or NGO's, like the Red Cross or other charitable organizations. Next to that, I will try to reach out to refuged people, which can be a hard task, as many of them probably do not speak any English. Though, because I intend to interview all these kind of actors, I will get a full overview from every part of society, which thus makes the validity of this research higher.

I will be conducting semi-structured interviews, as it is important for me that the respondent does not stray from the focus point of the European Union's influence and instead focusses on Turkey's policy. In this way I as a researcher can steer the conversation, but leave room for input from the respondent and for going in-depth on a topic that is relevant. Afterwards, the interviews will be transcribed and analysed, in which codes will be added in the programme Atlas.TI, to filter out the most relevant information, that can be used to answer my sub-questions and main research question. By conducting the interviews in this way, I try to position myself as a researcher as close to objectivity as possible, thus not trying to influence the respondent and his or her answers. Unfortunately it is not possible to reach full objectivity as a researcher, as my presence already affects the respondents' views and positions and therefore their answers. Therefore, as I will reflect on in the coming section, how I position myself during an interview and observation is important to gain as much objectivity as is feasible.

As a plan B, in case it will be impossible to travel to Turkey due to the Covid-19 pandemic, I will organize for the interviews to be held online via services like Zoom, Skype or Teams. Therefore it is important to pay extra attention to aspects like context of the space the interviewee is in, because this will be lost because of the interview occurring online. Normally, when interviewing an actor like a spokesman from the Red Cross Organization at a refugee camp, contextual information could be of importance or use for the research.

Furthermore, I would like to gather ethnographic data at either a refugee housing compound or a refugee camp, to get a better understanding of the state refuged people live in today. If possible, I will try to do this in all of the three cities. This is the data collection type of direct observation, as Patton (2005) stated. Together with the interviews and literature review, this will eventually lead to a full scope of the phenomenon and in the end a more inclusive and relevant conclusion. Next to that, I will position myself in the role of 'Complete Observer/Observer as Participant'. This means that I will try to be not noticed by participants, as I could influence their behaviour, or when the situation does not give room for this, I will take on the role of 'Observer as Participant', meaning I will be recognized by the participants, there will be short interaction, but I will remain as neutral as possible in order to have as less of an influence as possible. Maps will be used to further clarify aspect of this research topic, some made by other authors, some made by myself using tools like ARCGIS, a mapping tool.

Lastly, as Helps states "Issues of transparency, choice, consent, confidentiality, the consequences of the research and the competency of the researcher are key to the ethical construction of research" (Helps, 2017, p.350). This means that I will be transparent towards respondents on what their information is used for, give them the right of anonymity when preferred, thus ask for consent and will use the results solely for the aim of conducting research and writing an academic paper, without intent to publish the confidential interviews online. Next to that, I will ask myself with every step in the process if the steps taken are ethical and morally well thought of.

Unfortunately, while my plan was to interview refuged people in Kayseri, Istanbul and Edirne for this thesis, the Corona pandemic made it impossible for me to travel safely to Turkey from the Netherlands. In the end I made the decision not to go there as it would be irresponsible and egoistic for me to do, as I could bring others in danger. While reaching out to possible respondents, it became clear that the objective of conducting the interviews online was nearly impossible. As refuged people are less likely to have access to working internet and can mostly not be reached through human rights organisations, I had to disregard the idea of interviewing them. Furthermore, institutions in

Turkey were sceptical of conducting an interview online and preferred to do it in person, which was impossible as I could not travel there. After discussing the situation with my supervisor, C.E. Merlín Escorza, we concluded that doing ethnographic research through literature, media and policy study would be sufficient as well. Therefore, instead of conducting research through interviews, I now am going to compare literature, media articles, humanitarian reports, governmental statements and the European Union's policies. This will give me an extensive base of data to base my conclusion on.

## **4. What is the context regarding the paths of migration in Turkey**

In this chapter I will address the situation Turkey finds itself in regarding the so-called migrant crisis and the routes, i.e. trajectories, migrants take within Turkey to cross-over towards the European Union. This chapter, together with the second, are explanatory chapters which pose as the basis to, thereafter, have a better understanding of how the European Union's policies and their consequences could be causally linked to the theory of migrant trajectories.

### **4.1. Migrants or Refugees?**

The distinction between migrants and refugees is a topic that has been studied extensively by academics in the past. In this research it is important to make it clear which term we will use as both terms have different connotations, could evoke emotions and lead to different reactions. Being called a migrant, means that you are characterized by other people, who have not experienced what you as a 'migrant' have, while it also means that this affects your rights. As we will elaborate on in a moment, it matters whether you are considered a migrant or refuged person, as according to international law you receive different rights and privileges. Objectifying a human into one of these categories leaves out the human dimension, therefore also losing the context, such as the emotions, hardships, violations, etc. these people have endured. Therefore calling these people by the wrong term could evoke emotions like sadness, but also anger, as they do not want to be mistaken for who they are. Next to that, in Europe, migrants and refugees are considered to be a 'threat', something I will elaborate on in chapter 5 about discourse. People characterized as one of these groups can be mistakenly considered threats, while they are not, just because they also have received these terms, while they did not ask for these themselves. These emotions also have an impact on the respondents, but furthermore lead to an unclear research objective. Next to that, what to call people is important to the European Union, since people referred to as migrants and refugees are treated differently international and European law, by this giving the EU the power to treat them differently

and to deny refuge in the EU to some of them. In order to make this distinction clear, I will discuss both terms in what they portray and then make a choice which one is of importance to our research.


“A basic and age-old characteristic” of humans is that they often move “from one place to another,” generally because they make this choice themselves, but sometimes because something forces them (Bernard, 1976, p.267) is the most simple definition which describes the difference between a migrant and a refugee, in which the first can be deemed voluntary and the latter involuntary, also refugee-, migration. A migrant can be seen as a person “moving within or between countries to improve their economic and social conditions” (Douglas, Cetron & Spiegel, 2019), a decision that is because of “...‘personal convenience’ and without intervention of an external compelling factor” (Douglas, Cetron & Spiegel, 2019).

The International Organization for Migration (2018) states that a migrant can be defined as someone who crosses an international border or who stays within their country away from their “habitual place of residence, regardless of the person’s legal status, whether the movement is voluntary or involuntary, what the causes for the movement are, or what is the length of the stay” (McAuliffe & Ruhs, 2018; Douglas et. al., 2019). This definition differs significantly to the aforementioned, in which a migrant can move either voluntarily or involuntarily. Therefore, we need to ask ourselves how refugees are described as and if they are a specific category of migrants or if they are fundamentally different to them.

The term refugee can be described as people who are afflicted by “fear of death and loss of freedom” and “have felt intellectually stifled, politically oppressed, economically or culturally regimented, ... to such an extent ... they were compelled to leave” (Bernard, 1976, p.268). Besides Bernard’s description, refugees are associated by the “absence of rights (of citizenship, to homeland) and with the access to rights (to relief, of recognition)” (Feldman, 2012, p.389), which entails that these people do not have access to basic human rights and therefore make the decision or are forced



to leave their homes. Therefore, not only the factors such as political, economic and cultural rights mentioned by Bernard (1976) are important to take into account, but also a factor lack of citizenship or right to homeland. This makes clear that these people do not always have a choice whether they would stay or leave their place of habitation and thus are different to people who move because they seek a better economic situation, but are not in danger per se. Though, if we follow the aforementioned definitions of migrants, we could argue that a refugee is still a migrant, as they move from one place to another even though it is involuntary, but that they are a sub-category of the term 'migrant'. This argument will be visually explained in the figure 3 below, of which the information is based on the research of Douglas et. al. (2019).



(Figure 3: Douglas et. al., 2019; Yalçın, 2021)

I will now elaborate on how the European Union looks at these terms, which will take into account international law on refugees and migrants, as described by the United Nations. The question whether refugees and migrants should be granted equal rights according to the 1951 New York Convention on Refugees and Migrants is a question that we will not be focussing on right now, but should be elaborated on further in academic research.

International law, i.e. the aforementioned 1951 Convention on Refugees and Migrants in combination with the United Nation's Geneva Convention on Human Rights, is important to set a legal framework in which countries can operate and implement their policies. The UN makes a distinction between migrants and refugees because, according to these conventions, their rights differ and these people could have different objectives and pose different threats.

Refugees' "situation is often so perilous and intolerable that they cross national borders to seek safety in nearby countries" and that they thus "become internationally recognized as refugees with access to assistance from States, UNHCR, and other organizations" (Edwards, 2016). According to the 1951 Convention, states are held responsible and are legally obliged to respect the following:

1. Refugees have the right to remain in a country and are not to be expelled because this would pose a threat to their life and freedom (Edwards, 2016).
2. "Should have access to asylum procedures that are fair and efficient" (Edwards, 2016).
3. States must take "measures to ensure that refugees' basic human rights are respected to allow them to live in dignity and safety while helping them to find a longer-term solution" (Edwards, 2016).

While the Geneva Convention was signed by the members of the United Nations, some of its key stances have not fared well, as for example aspect 3, which entails resettlement of refugees, only saw a success rate of not even 1% of the world's refugee population (Kirişci, 2021, p.253). This figure has risen through the years to 5%, but probably has fallen back due to the COVID pandemic, which affected countries that "are finding themselves in growing economic difficulties" (Kirişci, 2021, p.253). After the beginning of the migrant crisis in 2015, because of which the European Union found itself in a situation of a sudden influx of refugees, these countries urgently adopted the Global Compact on Refugees, an agreement signed in Marrakech in 2018. This compact "reiterates the importance of traditional durable solutions for achieving permanent protection for refugees" (Kirişci, 2021, p.254). In contrast to the 1951 Geneva Convention Agreement, it lied the focus on the "expansion of 'access to third country solutions', and 'support conditions in countries of origin for

return in safety and dignity” (Kirişci, 2021, p.254), which in the Geneva Convention was no mention of, as there the focus was mainly on the human perspective and the responsibility for countries to provide refugees with safety when they would be in need of it. Next to that, the 2018 Compact is not legally binding, while the Geneva Convention is, leading to criticism as it is considered “a ‘cop-out’ from state responsibilities under the terms of the Convention” (Hathaway, 2018). Therefore, the argument of considering this Compact as a leading document for international law, can be disregarded as it is not legally binding. However, while the United Nations is a construct made up by countries, which they agreed upon that would have legal binding legitimacy, we can argue that this Compact is still of importance, as it not only shows intentions of the European Union’s member states regarding the intake of refugees, but also is a self-made construct. Therefore, if these countries agreed on enforcing the Compact, it is still of importance to our discussion. However, we will not further elaborate on the consequences of this Compact or discuss the differences between the Geneva Convention and the Compact, as this is not of importance to this research.

Migrants, by which the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) means people who “choose to move not because of a direct threat of persecution or death, but mainly to improve their lives by finding work, or in some cases for education, family reunion, or other reasons” (Edwards, 2016), are not eligible for the mentioned rights of refugees. They are not, unlike some refugees, stateless and will continue to receive protection from their government when they return home. Stateless refugees are in a situation where they cannot cross borders as they do not have a legal document that gives them this right. However, some refugees do belong to a state, such as Palestinians, but their international travel documents are not always considered legitimate as some states do not recognize their country, therefore making them de facto stateless. “Countries deal with migrants under their own immigration laws and processes” (Edwards, 2016), which is an important distinction because they can decide who they take in and who they deny access and stay in their national territory. Because the European Union has to stay within the boundaries of the international

law framework, they have to implement policies that take these conventions into account without violating people's human rights. The European Union's Customs Union works as one territory with free-movement between the member states, which means that they will look at their external borders, i.e. member states bordering neighbouring non-EU countries, as the place where they have to take the decision of who they let in and who they deny entry. This is of importance because every member-state will face the consequences if a non-EU-bordering member-state implements its own policies. While the European Union can de facto deny refugees who do not meet qualifications, internationally they are still obliged to search for a solution on how protection and security will be provided to refugees who are in desperate need. As refugees mostly do not have another option than to seek refuge elsewhere than their country of origin, and as most of them qualify for refugee person, the European Union has to seek possible resolutions outside their territories, called extraterritoriality, as this could decrease the influx to Europe. Then the question arises whether the EU focussed on reducing the flow of refugees or do they seek better opportunities for them and are eager to take them in? This is a question we will be touching on in the next chapter under section 'European Union's perception'.

We can conclude that there has been no consensus on what the exact difference between these terms is, as definitions differ and some actors see refugees as a specific group of migrants, while others see and describe them as completely different and put them opposite to each other. This case is a delicate one that can be questioned further in future academic research. However, these terms overlap and as my arguments showed, we can see refugees as a kind of migrant. Thus for the sake of clarity in this research, I will use the term 'refugee' as this is the group which the European Union desires to minimize with their policies and tries to keep away as far as possible from their territory (Castles and Miller, 2009), which we will elaborate on in chapter 5. Migrants are the group they can deny and thus are irrelevant to a study about European policy aimed at refugees. Concepts like 'migrant trajectories' and 'migrant crisis' are still in accordance with the term 'refugee' we use,

because of the argument that we see refugees as a group within the construct of migrant. Therefore we do not need to substitute the word migrant for refugee when talking about these concepts.

Lastly I would like to mention the work of Janine Dahinden (2016), in which she argues that we have to 'de-migranticize' as we now use terms such as migrants and refugees as a "unit of analysis and investigation and instead direct the focus on parts of the whole population", therefore resulting in overcoming the "distinction between migrant and non-migrant populations" (Dahinden, 2016, p.11). She furthermore argues that because we use migrants and refugees as units of analytical measure, we lose sight of the human perspective and ethical positions we should preserve as researchers. We as individuals, institutions and politics create "ethnicized and 'migranticized' worldviews" that "interact with other perspectives of difference" (Dahinden, 2016, p.7), which lead to naturalized ideas, i.e. discourses, in society of "migration and ethnicity", which "might lead to negative stereotypes, discrimination and exclusion" (Dahinden, 2016, p.8). Thus, categorizing people into groups can have negative consequences on these people, while these categories are constructed through worldviews that may not be true. We lose the perspective of being human, as we only see this group of people we call migrants or refugees as a threat, as 'the other'. This argument will be elaborated further on in chapter 5, under the discourse that is present in society and the media. My aim in this research is to de-migranticize these categories, thus meaning I will try to keep these human being in value by looking from a human perspective to their situation. By this we see people as equal to each other, which will give us the possibility of perceiving human rights violations as more important than political gain. While I have chosen to use the term 'refugee' instead of 'migrant', I shall hereafter refer to these humans as refuged people instead of refugees, which takes into account the human perspective Dahinden (2016) also mentioned in her work.

## **4.2. The origin of the refuted people of the Migrant Crisis**

In order to have a clear view of the most common migrant trajectories within Turkey, we first have to understand from which bordering country refuted people enter Turkey. Therefore, we will first discuss information found in literature, the UN data and the media, in addition to maps that give these documents some clarification.

As stated in the introduction of this thesis, Turkey became a “well-known country of destination, transit and origin, in the irregular migratory movements in its neighbouring regions” (IOM, 1996; İçduygu & Keyman 2000, İçduygu, 2003). According to the IOM (2016), at the end of 2015 Turkey hosted a population of 2.7 million refuted people consisting of primarily people from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, seeking protection or temporary asylum within the country. Next to that, it also has seen a great influx of migrants from Sub-Saharan African nations (De Clerck, 2013), who tend to travel via Morocco into Spain or cross the Mediterranean from countries like Tunisia or Libya and enter the EU in Italy. These people are called migrants, according to the definition we described in the previous section, as they are mostly not escaping an unsafe situation, but are experiencing “persistent economic decline leading to severe poverty and human deprivation” (De Clerck, 2013, p.42), thus making them economic migrants seeking a better future. Because of “political and economic constraints [such as hardening of the border and economic depressions] on international migration in traditional – mostly European – receiving countries” (Adepoju, 2000), such as France, Spain and Italy (Adepoju, 2000), these migrants were forced to seek routes into Europe, different than the most used ones as mentioned before. However, we see that this group of refuted people mostly stay in Istanbul close to the European border awaiting the asylum-process and possible admittance to the European Union (Yükseker & Brewer, 2011). African migrants are less likely to cross-over into the European Union irregularly, according to the EU themselves, than Syrian refuted people who are escaping unsafety in their homeland; these migrants’ asylum application mostly gets rejected and when they cross-over illegally into the EU, they are deported back to Turkey as they are

not considered refuged people (Yükseker & Brewer, 2011, p.130). The argument is based on how the European Union views these crossings, as refuged people cross the border without approval by European border guards. However, most refuged people do not have documentation or are denied entry, therefore leading to them trying to crossing irregularly as this gives them the largest chance of reaching European territory, to the apply for asylum there.

Therefore, economic migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa are not the group that is important to this research as the European Union has measures in place to keep this group out of their territory. The second group of migrants are those who fled and were displaced by the civil war in Syria that started in 2011 and continues to this day with actors like the regime of Assad, IS/Daesh, the Kurdish troops and international states all intervening in the conflict. These migrants are internationally recognized as refuged people and over 2.7 million of them, of whom 2.5 million in major cities, reside in Turkey (Baban et. al., 2016, p.1). In the beginning, the Governments assumption was that these refuged people would return back to Syria once the civil war would end, but now it became clear that this is no longer the case, Syrian refuged people “can no longer be described as ‘guests’” (Baban et. al., 2016), but are either seeking to stay in Turkey or are interested in getting to Europe. This poses challenges for the Turkish government as they have to regulate their status, implementing measures aimed at creating a legal status for Syrians, though failing in doing so in such a short period of time. The refuged people are granted “some of the social rights available to Turkish citizens, thereby, incorporating Syrians within ... existing social welfare system,” though not granting them clear status that “would lead to longer term residency or full citizenship” (Baban et. al., 2016). From this it becomes clear that Turkey does not have the intention of providing them a place to live for the rest of their lives, but are eager for them to either move on into Europe or to go back to their homeland. Alongside Turkey’s response, the European Union is doing everything in their power, while staying within the framework of international rights that are granted to refuged people, to keep them away from their European border with Turkey and thus implements measures like the 2016 EU-Turkey

Agreement and others to ensure this goal (Erensu & Kaşlı, 2016). We will touch upon why the EU is having the response of not wanting to take in refuged people in chapter 5 and we will also be toughing upon these measures by explaining what these are in chapter 6.

To conclude, we thus have seen that this research is focussed on the group of Syrian refuged people that are residing in Turkey and came from its southern border. Other migrants like those from Sub-Saharan Africa will be disregarded. Now the question arises of where these refuged people reside in Turkey and if this can lead us to finding the overarching migrant trajectories within Turkey.

### **4.3. Trajectory Phases in Turkey**


In this section we will discuss the different regions, provinces and cities refuged people inhabit or stop at over on their way to the European Union. We have seen that they enter Turkey from the bordering country named Syria and that they tend to end up in big cities rather than rural areas, as mentioned before (Baban et. al., 2016). Now the question arises, what are these cities and where are they located in Turkey?

In 2016, just under 10% of the total number of refuged people in Turkey lived in “25 government-established refugee camps located in cities along the southern and south-eastern border of Turkey” (Yildiz, 2015, p.24). According to Kutlu (2015) and the United Nations (2014), the majority of refuged people resided in border towns, mainly the big cities like Gaziantep, Hatay, Kilis, Şanlıurfa and Mardin in the same regions, therefore confirming the previous statement. By 2018 the percentage of Syrian refuged people in government-run camps increased to 30%, with many of them subsequently flocking towards bigger cities either in the region, or towards Western Turkey, in the direction of the European Union (Salah et. al., 2018, p.1). The number of total refuged people in Turkey grew as well from 2.7 in 2016 to 4 million in 2018 of whom 3.5 million are registered under temporary protection (Ministry of Interior, 2018). The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has




produced maps that show in which Turkish provinces Syrian refugee people settle or are taken into refugee camps. These maps show the process of settlement through the years and are thus an important source of information to see which regions, provinces and cities are the most prominent and important in the trajectory the refugee people take towards the European Union. By this I mean that refugee people's place of habitation, and where they move next is represented through these maps. This leads to an overview of how they move through Turkey through the years, which ultimately is the path they take to end up at the European Union's border. If we would research a province that sees almost no refugee people, we can conclude that this is no major hub in the migrant trajectory of refugee people to the European Union. Therefore, we will only focus on the provinces that see the most refugee people living there.

I will now dissect the maps chronologically and make remarks on them. Though, the UNHCR did not produce any maps of the years 2011 till 2015 as then it was not yet clear what the situation was as Turkey's Ministry of Interior on Migration and Refugee Affairs could not handle the great influx of migrants and thus had no information to provide where all documented and undocumented refugee people were located within the country's cities and camps (Baban et. al., 2016).



(Figure 4: UNHCR, 2016)


This figure (4) shows the provincial breakdown, i.e. measured on a provincial level, of where Syrian people resided in Turkey. What stands out most is that the bordering provinces of Hatay, Gaziantep and Şanlıurfa, coastal provinces Adana and Mersin and Istanbul, which are highlighted in red, are where most refuged people can be found. Thereafter, the provinces Mardin, Bursa and Izmir, highlighted in orange, follow the aforementioned provinces and we see an equal distribution between the inland provinces of Ankara, Konya, Kayseri, Kilis and Kahraman-maraş (K.Maras), and to a lesser extent Malatya, Adıyaman, Diyarbakır, Batman and Şırnak, all highlighted in yellow.



(Figure 5: UNHCR, 2017)

The second figure shows the situation as of 2017 and talks about all kinds of refuged people and asylum seekers that are found in Turkey. However, the overarching picture still is the same, with the mentioned provinces, like Gaziantep, Istanbul, Kayseri, Izmir and Ankara, in the same situation as in 2016. This map also considers asylum seekers, people who, according to the United Nations' Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, are "persons petitioning for protection outside their country of origin because of a well-founded fear of being persecuted on account of their race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion" (Kalt et. al., 2013,

p.30). As we discussed in chapter 4, section 4.1, people who cannot return home as they deem his or her country too dangerous, in which returning would lead to persecution, can be considered refugee people (Habitat for Humanity, 2016). This means that every refugee person at first is an asylum seeker, but what about (economic) migrants? According to Habitat for Humanity, the grey area is that categorising humans into groups of migrants, refugee people and asylum seekers does not “always reflect the complex reality of people’s experience of migration and the situation they had to suffer at home” (Habitat for Humanity, 2016). Therefore, when an ‘economic’ migrant decides to travel to Europe as he or she is facing drought that possibly could lead to death, why are they then considered as migrants? Don’t they face a situation that threatens their security, which they try to escape? Is it solely because we see no armoured conflict in their region, thus consider it safe? In reality they are likely to experience life-threatening conditions because of economic deprivation. They apply for asylum in the European Union in order to make a living that supports their lives. Therefore, drawing an arbitrary boundary of who is an asylum seeker is not easy, refugee people being considered as one, however some migrants also can be seen as one.




(Figure 6: UNHCR, 2018)

The situation of 2018 (Figure 6) still portrays the same situation as in 2016 and 2017, with two major changes, one being that the refugee population dispersed to a slight extent to other provinces, like for example from Kayseri to Yozgat and Sivas, which are shown in blue in the figure above, or from Ankara and Konya to Afyon and Eskişehir, shown in green. The second change is that Istanbul's agglomeration, i.e. the provinces Tekirdağ, Kocaeli and Sakarya also sees an influx of refuged people, which is shown in purple. Therefore, we can conclude that from the major cities Kayseri, Ankara, Konya and Istanbul, refuged people disperse through the bordering provinces.

The next year, being 2019, saw no major changes compared to previous years, except that the number of refuged people in the Konya province became larger, and with that its importance in the network of routes the migrants take. The dispersal of refuged people over the country became larger as we now see provinces like Kastamonu, Çorum and Balıkesir, all quite rural provinces, hosting more refuged people. However, these provinces do not play a significant role in the migrant trajectory network of refuged people in Turkey. Other than that, there are no major comments for this year.

As for the year 2020, no real changes have been observed, except the fact that the Afyonkarahisar and Nevşehir provinces saw an influx of refuged people. However, as the Kastamonu, Çorum and Balıkesir provinces, these two provinces are not of importance to this research.

Lastly, the map of 2021, shown below, (Figure 7) until now has shown no major changes compared to its previous year except that the Ankara province has equalled the Konya province in the number of refuged people. Besides that, this year has seen no significant change. However, as we have seen in the first map (Figure 4), as well as in this map, is that the Edirne province, highlighted in green, has seen no major refugee communities in all the years we discussed. The situation of Edirne is contested, because in the media the city is portrayed as hosting a large community of refuged people who are trying to cross-over into Greece, while numbers show that there is no large host community of refuged people found in Edirne. This contrast will be discussed under this section, under phase 4.



(Figure 7: UNHCR, 2021)

For further consultation on the maps discussed, the website of the European Country of Origin Information Network (ECOI.NET) can be consulted (see references for the source).

Now we discussed these maps, I will now divide the provinces into different phases I found to be notable and dissect them to give context to their situation. During my research I found that the provinces discussed in the section before, all have distinct characteristics regarding settlement of refugee people, like economic opportunities, proximity to the European border, better housing, etc. However, some provinces' characteristics overlapped with each other, which resulted me in grouping them together into a phase. The reason for calling it a phase is due to the fact that each phase represents a step in the journey of a refugee person from entering Turkey from Syria, travelling eastward through different provinces, where they settle for a short or long period of time, before reaching the province where they try to cross-over into the European Union. Each phase tells a different story about the conditions refugee people find themselves in and eventually will show the bigger picture of which route the migrant trajectory through Turkey consists of. Hereby we move from a micro-level, being a province, towards a macro-level, through a phase into an overarching

trajectory. To validate my claim as to why I picked such provinces for the different phases, I substantiate this with academic literature and case descriptions. This concept of phases has not been researched yet, meaning we can not generalize this into a theory that would describe other countries' cases. Therefore, further research can be done to gain knowledge whether other countries have such phases and whether the phase's characteristics match Turkey's phases.

### **Phase 1:**

The first provinces refuged people enter when crossing the Syria-Turkey border are Hatay, Gaziantep, Kilis and Şanlıurfa, as we discussed before. The places they settle can be split into three major categories being that Syrian refuged people can be found in [1] government-run camps [2] cities like Gaziantep and Şanlıurfa [3] illegal self-made compounds scattered throughout the provinces (Turgut, 2015, p.695). These people either seek to travel further into Turkey, and ultimately to Europe, or to be admitted as citizens. Next to that, there is a group of people who choose to live in these provinces to be able to return to Syria easily, as it is in close proximity (Eraydin, 2017, p.11). The location and the bilateral cross-border policies allow refuged people to cross and visit their families, relatives and friends on a regular basis (Bircan & Sunata, 2015, p.232). This differs significantly from the other phases in which refuge people cannot travel back too easily because this demands much of their resources. From this phase we can therefore conclude that it is the first hurdle refuged people take in their journey to Europe and that it is the first place they make the decision whether to travel further inland or to stay and leave the option of re-migration open.

### **Phase 2:**

From the border onwards, many refuged people will try to abandon the government camps as they feel there are no opportunities for better life there, such as refuged people interviewed in Diyarbakır, who all saw this city as a short-term solution (Veul, 2015, p.25), and migrate to the inland provinces of Konya, Ankara and Kayseri. 70% of refuged people that inhabit Konya preferred this city since

“NGOs in Konya provide more help compared to other provinces” (Akgemci, Cicekdagi & Celik, 2016, p.178), while 28% preferred it because of “density in border provinces and shortage of places in camps” next to that it is easier “to find jobs compared to other provinces” (Akgemci, Cicekdagi & Celik, 2016, p.178). However, as most of them live in deserted and unhealthy houses or high-rent apartment flats, many of them are not satisfied and opt to move to camps if provided. Promises from the Turkish government, like that they would have jobs and houses, are not met, making living in these cities extremely difficult. Many feel they are not accepted as guests and feel disturbed by their existence in the city (Akgemci, Cicekdagi & Celik, 2016, p.178), which entails refuged people feel as if they are the ‘alien’ in society, because they are not accepted by Turkish citizens living in these cities.

The situation in provinces like Kayseri and Ankara is similar in which one of the key drive to migrate here is the high range of employment opportunities, besides these cities’ already existing heterogeneous social structure networks of internal migration caused in other eras and the social communities of Syrians existing in these cities (Eraydin, 2017, p.12). As for Kayseri, economic migration is one of the key factors refuged people choose this city next to the relative tolerance they experience in the field of religion and LGBTQ+ rights, declaring they do not feel burdened to express themselves (Cragnolini, 2013). Furthermore, refuged people have access to more humanitarian aid from NGOs and other aid providing organisations when compared to cities in the bordering provinces (Burcu, 2016). Kayseri’s provincial migration management directorate tries to ensure that refuged people are subjected to harmonization activities, such as providing guides on subjects like health care, finance, work life, accommodation, etc., on how to live in Turkey (Ministry of Interior, 2019), to encourage them to participate in all areas of social life to reach the goal of a more peaceful life and better communication in Turkey while they are staying there (Ministry of Interior, 2019). Therefore, according to the media, European Union and human rights organisations (UNFPA, 2018; Nielson, 2021; UNHCR, 2014), these provinces can be seen as safe havens for refuged people who fled prosecution in Syria and offer chances of a better life. However, this can be contrasted as many human rights violations occur (Kingsley, 2016), which will be discussed in chapter 6.

While the aforementioned positives seem to paint a picture of acceptance, as Eraydin points out correctly, “it is not possible to generalize all ... who have settled in every city” and that “each city has its dynamics, positive and negative sides and opportunities and challenges” (Eraydin, 2017). The lack of research regarding the lives of refuged people in the cities in Turkey makes it difficult to grasp the whole picture. The forced migration they endured plays a significant role and we will have to look further into the promises made. Next to that, knowing whether these are made by the European Union and if this correlates to the EU’s policy of extraterritoriality and their aim to keep refuged people as far away from its border as possible, can give us an answer to our sub-question on whether human rights are violated. Though, for now we can conclude that these provinces are more admissive to refuged people and that they have attractive features like the economic possibilities, chance of access to humanitarian aid and acceptance of identity. Many refuged people choose to migrate here, of whom some settle for a longer period of time, while some travel to phase 3 provinces. When leaving this phase, they have to choose which route they will take into the European Union. Some opt for the ‘Greek Islands’-route while some cross the land border at Edirne. As these two different borders are located far away from each other, refuged people must make this decision earlier in their journey, as the trajectory is different. Under the section in this chapter of the trajectories, a map can be seen displaying the two trajectories through Turkey and later a graph is shown that visualises it in a plain manner.

### **Phase 3:**

While travelling westward, refuged people make a choice in which direction they will migrate. Before ending up at the border of the European Union, like seen before many of them seek better economic opportunities to sustain either their crossing by boat or crossing at the land border and their further travels through the continent, which are both expensive undertakings. Destinations of interest are mostly “major metropolitan hubs – particularly Istanbul which is an attractive location for Syrians hoping to find employment” (Mackreath & Sağnıç, 2017, p.17). All the mentioned provinces we



discussed under phase 1 and 2 offer refuged people these chances of finding employment, but do significantly differ from mainly Istanbul and to a lesser extent to Bursa as they are located further away from the European border and these represent the next step in their migration trajectory. Furthermore, as Istanbul is Turkey's largest economic and cultural city, many migrants choose to go there as they feel their chances of finding a sufficient income and eventually the best chances in life are the most plausible here. As it was discussed in phase 2, we can see cities as "being the arenas of 'tolerant encounters' and 'incorporation,'" (Ruddick, 1996; Shiller and Çağlar, 2009), which Istanbul is a prime example of. We see many groups of refuged people living in neighbourhoods such as Şişli and Sultanbeyli, in which they adapt to their new surroundings but also create communities that seem to be self-sufficient and culturally Syrian while they live in Turkey. However, as discussed, "cities are also denoted by processes of exclusion, segregation, and repression" (Ruddick, 1996; Shiller and Çağlar, 2009). In many ways this happens culturally, as social segregation is likelier to happen when cultural differences are present in society (Musterd, 2005, p.342), but we also see the government stepping up to contain the strain of migrants coming to Istanbul. For example, Istanbul's Municipal Council voted on implementing measures to deport or relocate illegal Syrian refuged people in the city to other places in the county or even Syria if they would not move voluntary (BBC News, 2019). Many more news outlets reported on the matter for example saying that "'illegal migrants had been arrested [in Istanbul] and sent to repatriation [also 'removal'] centres, to be removed later from Turkey" (MacGregor, 2019). We thus can see that refuged people are not wanted in Istanbul or Bursa, which affects their decision whether to stay or not.

When refuged people stay in these cities and are eventually ejected to another city with lesser chances, or even back to Syria, from where you have to start your journey all over again, some take the gamble to stay in a city like Istanbul to have chances in the present. The other side is the gamble of travelling to Edirne and crossing the border into the European Union, with the possibility of ending up in a refugee camp with conditions unworthy to human, which could end up in removal back to

Istanbul or Syria anyways. The fact is that “After such a long journey, where every single city is a hurdle, refugees – swindled and sometimes ousted – often have no other choice but to return down south” (Guichard, 2016). While we now saw measures implemented by the Turkish government and municipality, the next question is if these said threats refuged people face in Istanbul (and Bursa) are also coming from the European Union. Since we now gave context to the phase of Istanbul, the question arises what happens if refuged people move to Edirne, in what situation would they find themselves in? Next to that, does the EU implement policies that affect refuged people living in Istanbul, like we are going to ask for Kayseri, and their choice whether to move further in their migrant trajectory to Edirne? Besides, does the European Union try to keep them by implementing policies as far away as possible from their border? The first question will be answered in the next section with the latter two being answered throughout this research in chapter 6.

#### **Phase 4:**

In this phase most refuged people have reached the end of their journeys within Turkey, as we can see the provinces of Izmir and Edirne as ports of embarkment to the European Union. Because refuged people have decided which route they will take already in phase 2, Izmir and Edirne see different groups and types of refuged people coming from different cities in Turkey. Therefore, situations in these border regions differ from each other and are not coherent. I will thus explain them shortly, with the focus being on the case of Edirne, as this is what this research aims to elaborate on.

The case of Izmir is being portrayed in Western media as being a ‘Greek Islands’-route, which refuged people take on boats trying to cross-over into the European Union. As Izmir is located in close proximity to the Greek Islands, it has seen a great influx of refuged people gathering all in the city before the sea crossing (Ogli, 2019). This sea crossing is not legal, thus resulting in refuged people being smuggled across the Aegean Sea to the islands. In the meantime Izmir became a city of transit,

a place where “thousands of migrants were stuck, unable to afford the escalating cost of being smuggled to Europe” (Ogli, 2019). There also have been promising signs of integration of refuged people in the city as they try to adapt to their surroundings and make a living in order to care for themselves. Izmir sees for example street signs in Arabic, Syrian bakeries and apartment buildings with combined Syrian and Turkish residents, which all are great examples of integration. However, the necessities of irregular migration can also be found within the city, as smugglers and money transfer vendors hold themselves there and shops sell goods like Turkish SIM cards and life vests all catered towards refuged people (Ogli, 2019). Also factors like “cash-based jobs with Turkish and Syrian businesses or NGOs, accessible healthcare and education services” and “affordable housing” (Ogli, 2019) are great examples of de facto integration into society, which are initiatives set up by the Turkish government, as discussed in the example of harmonization activities in the section, phase 2.

What also catches the eye is the cash assistance refuged people can receive from the Red Crescent (Kızılay in Turkish), which is managed by the Turkish Government but paid for by the European Union. This is one of the measures the EU imposed trying to lessen the flow of refuged people seeking safety within their borders. The crossing of the border via the ‘Greek Islands’-route plays a large roll in this as it is the last obstacle for refuged people to entering Europe and legally seeking asylum, something the European Union has to abide by according to international law. As “the President of the European Commission described Greece as Europe’s ‘shield’ in deterring people from entering” (Amnesty International, 2020), financial support was made available to hold up this shield and to keep refuged people away from the European Union’s border, but also led to the creation of the EU-Turkey Agreement in 2016, that was mentioned in the introduction of this Thesis. With this deal, the European Union has given Turkey financial support in the dealing with refuged people’s amenities, humanitarian aid (for example via the Red Crescent), economic subsidies, housing and others, while also promising to take one ‘legal’ refuged person from Turkey, i.e. referring to a selection procedure through which they will provide with asylum only to the people whom are

residing in Turkey. The flip side of the coin is that every 'illegal' refuged person that crosses via boat into the European Union onto the Greek Islands, has to be taken back by Turkey, resulting in the sending back of thousands of refuged people (and migrants) to Izmir province, the place where they were in some instances stuck for many months. These measures implemented by the European Union have been discussed many times in the Western media. However, as there are signs of measures being implemented by the European Union in other provinces further away from the direct border, the question arises which measures could these be and if they would have as much of an impact as those implemented in Izmir. This question will be answered in this thesis, but first we will have a look at what the situation for refuged people in Edirne looks like.

Edirne is a city located at a proximity of 7 km from Greece and 20 km from Bulgaria, both member states of the European Union, and has 165.000 inhabitants as of 2020. In 2019, there were 80.000 refuged people "attempting to cross the border via Edirne" (ANSA, 2020), that either resided in the city or in camps and self-made shacks outside of the city. The Turkish government released a statement in that year that a third of all the refuged people travelling through Turkey with the aim of reaching the European Union, tried to cross-over into the EU via the Edirne province (InfoMigrants, 2020). The two thirds that was left mainly tried to cross via the 'Greek Islands'-route we discussed before.

What catches the eye is that there are no major refugee camps in Edirne as many refuged people choose to live in Istanbul, work for an income to sustain their travels, and then take a bus to Edirne to cross the border illegally. Some refuged people succeed, but as measures have stricken them, many are forced to either return to Istanbul or to stay in Edirne. According to a research on the living conditions of Syrian refuged people in Edirne, there were three areas of interest where they would settle; being the Highway 'Camp', Otogar (bus station) and the Antik Park areas (Hayata Destek & Support To Life, 2015). These areas did not have camps that were set-up for long-term inhabitancy,

but were erected as a short-term solution in awaiting of borders to open up or opportunities to cross to arise. “Approximately half of the tents at all three sites were vinyl pop-up tents” (Hayata Destek & Support To Life, 2015) brought by the refuged people themselves, while the rest of the tents were tarps and blankets hung over tree branches or on ropes and were provided sometimes by humanitarian aid organisations or self-brought. Furthermore, these organisations also made food and washroom facilities available to the refuged people, but did not provide any other form of help to them, like clean drinking water, medication, health services and protection. What is important is that this research also mentions that the refuged people found in these ‘camps’ did not intend to stay in Turkey, but had travelled through Turkey as fast as they could and were now residing in Istanbul. They did not await procedures to register in the country to receive temporary protection, but wanted to reach the European Union’s territory as soon as possible (Hayata Destek & Support to Life, 2015). Syrian refuged people were not met with great acceptance in Edirne or at the border; many have experienced a stand-off with the Greek border guards as they were kept away from reaching Greece’s territory. When Turkey’s president Recep Tayyip Erdogan had a falling out with the European Union’s Commission, he threatened and eventually opened the border to Greece, producing a great influx of refuged people trying their luck to cross illegally. They were met with water cannons, sound bombs, tear gas shells and rubber bullets that were fired by the Greek border guards, while the country refused to let refuged people into the country, resulting in them being trapped in the buffer zone (Baran & Demirci, 2020). It was said that President Erdogan was using the refuged people as leverage to gain more political wins from the European Union, while there was also critique from human rights organisations on how the EU responded to the situation (Nasr, 2020).

Like in Izmir, Edirne has seen adaptation to the ever growing population of refuged people for example the change of signs from solely Turkish to a combination with Arabic, ‘Cash and Carry’ places. When documenting if the city receives help for the integration of refuged people, or just to improve their living conditions, there is no clear understanding of what is provided by who. Are


international humanitarian aid organisations the only ones that supply food, drinking, hygiene equipment, housing, etc. or does the European Union also play a role in this? And if so, does the EU do this from a point of view of striving for better human rights for these refuged people, like said humanitarian aid organisations, or is there another reason behind it? These questions can lead us to answering the main research question and thus will be discussed in chapter 6. For now, we have gained knowledge on what the four phases of transit look like in Turkey, thus making it possible for us to continue with creating the overarching paths of migration, i.e. migrant trajectories, in Turkey. This will be discussed in the coming section.

#### **4.4. Trajectory 1: Syria, Anatolia, Izmir, Greek Islands (European Union)**

As we have seen, refuged people take different paths to get to the European Union. Besides that, they may decide to stay at some places instead of travelling towards the west, but some also make the decision to migrate back to their homeland Syria. To understand what the concept of a trajectory entails, I will now elaborate on the theory of migrant trajectories and after that conclude on what the two main trajectories are.

According to the Concise English Dictionary (1999, p.1577), a trajectory can be defined as “the path described by an object moving in air or space, esp. the curved path of a projectile” which is affected by “the action of given forces” (Oxford English Dictionary, 2013). When looking at the term migrant trajectory in its whole, it can be used as “a shorthand to a customary understanding of migrants’ route from one social position to another, through a certain space of intersecting power relations” (Vaittinen, 2014, p.14). In addition, it is a “unique space of negotiations, where the global is recurrently made anew” (Vaittinen, 2014, p.5). Hereby Vaittinen means that this space, i.e. the places in which refuged people can be found, whether it being refugee camps, buildings in cities or others, in which different groups like refuged people and citizens of cities are affected by their daily encounters. Therefore, it is important that both groups give and receive and thus negotiate in these

spaces. Because these encounters happen on a daily basis, these spaces change over time and thus are made anew. Vaittinen (2014) adds that the trajectories are like chains, also global structures, that are affected as refuged people move through them resulting in a changing city that also sees new policies being implemented with power shifts that occur because of them. Schapendonk and Steel also refer to migrant trajectories being a space of trans-local engagements in which refuged people are “moving from one state of fixity (in the place of origin) to another (in the destination)” (Schapendonk & Steel, 2014 p.262) and thus corresponding to Vaittinen’s aforementioned definition. However, it is important that seeing migrant trajectories as being the movement between two fixed points, being the point of origin and the destination, can be argued to be insufficient. Recognizing the ‘in-between phase’, as Schapendonk calls it, opens up the discussion and leads to “an ontological shift from settlement and permanency to mobility and process” (Schapendonk, 2011, p.8/9). This research focusses as well on the process behind the movement of Syrian refuged people. We have seen that refuged people do not see a city as their permanent destination because some choose to move back to Syria or to take the step of migrating to the next hub on their journey to the European Union. These decisions are sometimes made beforehand, but can also occur when refuged people experience that promises of job access and housing are not met, humanitarian aid is non-existent or not sufficient, or that acceptance is less than expected making them feel disturbed (Akgemci, Cicekdagi & Celik, 2016). Therefore, the process, encounters, policies and power-shifts are important to be taken into account when talking about migrant trajectories. In our case, refuged people do not have a clear destination in mind, thus making the process key to understanding refuged people’s behaviour. This can be substantiated by the previous section (4.3), in which we discussed the phases of transit, in which we saw that refuged people are interested in going to different destinations, being back to Syria, staying in Turkey, and going to the European Union. Besides, this decision is subjected to change because of changing conditions during their journey. Therefore, we can argue refuged people have no clear plan they stick too at all times. This research will elaborate on how the migrant trajectories are affected by the EU’s policies, thus providing us with insight in the situation.



(Figure 8: Yalçın, 2021; see Appendix 3 for full version)


This map shows the two trajectories found within Turkey, which can be concluded from our previous literature study. The four explained phases of transit are made visible through different colour gradations. Between these phases arrows show the flow of refuged people through Turkey and between the provinces. The black, blue and green arrows show the path towards the European Union, while the grey arrows show the group of refuged people returning to Syria, as we talked about in phase 1 and 2. Firstly, when refuged people enter Turkey, no clear migrant trajectory is visible, therefore grouping them together with the black arrows. While migrating through the country they split into two different trajectories, being Trajectory 1, shown in blue, and Trajectory 2, shown with the green arrows. As the group of refuged people that crosses the border gets dispersed through the country, the arrows show the approximate percentage of refuged people choosing one path over another. For example, when looking at the transit between phase 1 (Hatay, Gaziantep, Kilis and Şanlıurfa) and phase 2 (either first Konya or Kayseri and then Ankara), we can see that most refuged people take the path of Konya and a smaller percentage chooses Kayseri as their first stop. This is why the black arrow of phase 1 to Konya is relatively larger than the one to Kayseri.



As we can see, there is no real difference between trajectory 1 and 2 when looking at phase 1 or 2; refuged people make a decision to either stay in phase 1, travel to phase 2, being it Konya or Kayseri, and then make a decision where to go, either to Ankara and then to Istanbul or Bursa and ultimately to Edirne, or take the 'Greek Islands'-route travelling to Izmir first and then crossing the Aegean Sea. One exception to this is that some refuged people cross the border from Syria into Turkey ending up in the phase 1 provinces. They then take a boat and cross the Mediterranean Sea to the coast provinces and also end up in Izmir, making this an alternative to travelling through the inland provinces. As this group is relatively small, it is of no purpose to go into depth on this in this research.

#### **4.5. Trajectory 2: Syria, Anatolia, Edirne, Greece / Bulgaria (European Union)**

Trajectory 2 differs from 1 as it has one more phase refuged people travel through and thus have one more decision to make for their future. When arriving in phase 2 we see that refuged people choosing to travel towards Istanbul and the European land border, are more likely to choose to travel to Kayseri compared to refuged people traveling to Izmir. This is because Kayseri is on route to Ankara, the capital of the Republic of Turkey and a major hub with many incentives that make it attractive to go to. When passing phase 2, refuged people thus choose to travel in one line to phase 4 when taking the 'Greek Islands'-route or go to phase 3, being Istanbul and to a lesser extent Bursa. Refuged people residing in Bursa either travel to Edirne and cross-over into the European Union, but many of them end up at last travelling to Istanbul and stay there for an unknown period of time, some planning to make a living there while some travel to Edirne and try to cross the Turkey-EU border. In short this trajectory consists of the full four phases, while trajectory 1 only consists of three. This difference also creates more possibilities for the Turkish government or the European Union to intervene in the lives of the refuged people and to limit their movement, because of more places they settle throughout their journey in Turkey.



(Figure 9: Yalçın, 2021)

As maps are a tool to create clarity by displaying the gathered data visually, the map on page 41 gives an overview of how refuged people travel. However, for the sake of clarity, I also will show a graph that depicts the same two trajectories, phases and provinces of importance. The graph can be interpreted as that refuged people enter from Syria and travel to the four named provinces in phase 1, then choose to go either to Konya or Kayseri. Here the choice has to be made which route a refuged person wants to take to the European Union, which results in two trajectories, the blue (1) being the ‘Greek Islands’-route at Izmir and the green (2) being the land border crossing route at Edirne. The grey arrow portrays the refuged people returning back to Syria, as was depicted on the map as well in grey.

#### 4.6. Conclusion

This explanatory chapter was aimed at describing the context regarding the paths of migration in Turkey. We discussed why it is important to make a distinction between which term we use when speaking of the group coming from Syria, residing in Turkey and going to the European Union, being either ‘migrant’ or ‘refugee’. Firstly we explained what these terms entail to have a better understanding of which term suits this research best. Thereafter, I argued that the use of the term ‘refugee’ fits this research, because of the reason that the European Union tries to minimize the influx of migrants and refugees to and in their territory, but that they have to make a distinction

between these two groups as they have different rights according to international law. In short this means that they can deny migrants, but cannot deny refugees, as these people need to (involuntary) seek security from violence they experienced in their home land, while migrants are seeking a better opportunity (voluntarily). Lastly, I elaborated on how literature research overlaps on these two terms and that some see them being alike. However, I concluded that when we have a better look at the different kinds of migrants, we see that there are sub-divisions and that refugee is distinct from the others. This was my second reason to speak of the term 'refugee' in this research instead of using it interchangeably with 'migrant'. Lastly I concluded that we can use terms like 'migrant trajectory' instead of changing it into 'refugee trajectory' as we still can see refugees of a kind of migrant. Lastly, I argued to use the term 'refuged people' instead of 'refugee' to keep a human perspective.

The second topic discussed in this chapter was the general overview of what situation of refuged people in Turkey looks like. I started by explaining how many refuged people there were and continued by elaborating where they came from. Thereafter it was important to explain why this research is going to be focussed on Syrian refuged people. I concluded that there were many groups entering Turkey, such as Sub-Saharan Africans and people from countries like Pakistan and Afghanistan seeking a better economic life, thus them being economic migrants. As we concluded in the previous section that we were going to focus on refuged people, I had to disregard this group as a research subject for this thesis. Thereafter we saw that Syrian refuged people fit the research objective, thus resulting in me choosing this group to as the subject of this research.

The next two sections were on what the different phases of trajectory were in Turkey and on how we then could conclude what the path was between these phases, i.e. the overarching migrant trajectory. I started by explaining where Syrian refuged people can be found the most in Turkey and then divided that into four phases, them being (1) Syrian border provinces (2) Anatolian inland provinces (3) Istanbul and Bursa & (4) provinces of Embarkment, i.e. Izmir and Edirne. I explained the situation in these provinces to gain more knowledge on what the conditions of living is, the reasons

refuged people come to these places, for example being economic or for better access to humanitarian aid, and how they would move within or between the phases, i.e. solely moving forward and staying for a while in one, or also moving back to a previous one and ultimately to Syria. This led to a better understanding and as we had analysed the different trajectory phases in Turkey, we could now make an assumption on what the different trajectories migrants take might be.

This resulted in sections 1.5 in which I discussed a map I made to visualise the different movements through the country. Firstly, I discussed what the term of 'migrant trajectory' entails to have a better understanding of what fall within this term and then I began explaining the different paths. In the process I came to the understanding that there were two main trajectories, being (1) the 'Greek Islands'-route and (2) the EU land border crossing-route. Trajectory 1 only had three phases, being phase 1,2 and 4, while trajectory 2 contained all four of them. Besides this difference, we also saw that refuged people chose this route early in their journey through Turkey as the route would often already differ in phase 2. I concluded this section by discussing that, because there has been a major focus on the 'Greek Islands'-route in Western media and the European Union's policies, I want to focus my research on Edirne, thus choosing trajectory 2 as my subject.

Ultimately, as we now have a clear understanding of the context regarding the paths of migration in Turkey, we can now focus on what the policies are that are implemented by the European Union and whether these aimed at preventing refuged people from getting closer to and entering the EU's territory. Firstly, we have to understand the discourse that is prominent in Europe's politics, media and society, which we will do in the coming chapter. Thereafter we can answer the aforementioned question and the question of whether the implemented measures by the European Union differ between the different phases in the migrant trajectory and whether this has an impact on the trajectory itself and the human rights involved with this. Because of that, we would ultimately answer our main research question: *"How does European migration policy differ between the three major Turkish cities of Edirne, Istanbul and Kayseri and in which way do such policies affect the refuged people's migrant trajectories?"*

## 5. How is the discourse on the migrant crisis being shaped?

This chapter will discuss the discourse on the so-called migrant crisis that is found within multiple layers of the European Union's society and governmental layers, being the perception from (1) human rights organisations (2) media coverage (3) governmental statements and ultimately how this all comes together in the (4) European Union's position. This chapter thus is a prelude to chapter 6, in which we will discuss what policies are the result of this discourse.

When looking at discourse, we first must understand what this term entails and create an overview of the key aspects that make up said term. A discourse can be described as "the examination of argumentative structure in documents and other written or spoken statements, as well as the practices through which these utterances were made" (Hajer, Howarth & Torfing, 2004, p.299).

Important is that the academics that made this statement spoke of utterances, thus meaning that a discourse cannot be considered factual, but may be seen as a structure that is build up from said documents, written or spoken statements and practices. Therefore, we can speak of an 'idea' or 'image' that someone has of a phenomenon, but also how this person perceives said phenomenon.

Habermas, a leading figure in discourse theory, points out that discourses can differ from each other as people have different views, access to information and are not interested in getting the same result. In our case, we see four different actors that all have come to a discourse on the migrant crisis, but who act out of different ethical and lawful positions. Human Rights Organisations act out of the value that everyone should have the same access to certain rights and that they aim to provide these to them, while the media covers citizens' views on a matter. Governments and in particular the European Union act out of what is best for their people and make laws and policies that relate to this aim. The discourse that they connect to are created from public and political discourses, that differ significantly but also have overarching characteristics that are alike.

Public discourse consists of “‘opinion- and will-formation’ in the public sphere” that can be considered to mobilize “reasons and arguments that draw on citizens’ interests, values, and identities” (Habermas & Rehg, 1996, p.28). This means that the public’s overarching discourse originates in their position towards a certain phenomenon, for example being a migrant crisis. This can lead to statements such as that refuged people can be bad for society because citizens have experienced cases in which a refuged person had earlier access to basic needs, while they value them being before refuged people. While individual views cannot be seen as discourse, we see that people with same views often unite and that they together create an overarching discourse on a matter. Habermas further elaborates on this concluding that a discourse thus is a group consensus that consists of social acceptance and idealized validity and that “such consensus must claim for itself if members are to accept it as reasonable” (Habermas & Rehg, 1996, p.15). From this we move onto political discourse, which is related to public discourse according to academics such as Luhmann and Habermas.

Luhmann (Habermas & Rehg, 1996) argues that political discourse cannot be seen independent from public discourse as it must be tied to public reason. It “brings in the citizens’ actual sources of motivation and volition” thereby generating “a ‘communicative power’ that has a real impact on the formal decision making and action” (Habermas & Rehg, 1996, p.28). In short, we thus can see political discourse as a result of public discourse, but being put into action by creating an institutional field of law-binding structures that one has to adhere to.

As people’s views change over time because they obtain more information on a topic or their set of norms and values changes, discourses are not fixed, but are everchanging phenomena. When looking at our four different actors, we can expect that human rights organisations and the media’s views and actions relate to public discourse, while a government and the European Union’s policies relate to political discourse, which comes from the said public discourse. As it is now clear how these

discourses were formed and which characteristics are specific to a discourse, we can now aim to observe the discourse of these four groups by analysing their statements.

### **5.1 Human Rights Organisations**

Organisations that advocate for equal human rights to everyone often act out of the view that every human individual should have access to rights such as freedom of speech, healthcare, safety, basic necessities and others. These organisations see refuged people as vulnerable people that can be trapped in the position they find themselves in as countries give little consideration to their status and do not give them prospect, but try to keep them away. According to Human Rights Watch, an organisation that focusses on refuged people, asylum seekers, migrants and displaced people, is the European Union actively engaging in other countries outside of the union trying to outsource its responsibility of providing access to people in need (Human Rights Watch, 2021). They state that the EU is cooperating with countries like Turkey, that uses refuged people and migrants as leverage as mentioned before, and Libya, where systematic abuse against refuged people and migrants is ongoing. They aim to improve “responsibility-sharing among members states” (Human Rights Watch, 2021), but for now try to create attention in Europe’s society for atrocities happening within and outside of the borders of the union. Amnesty International also paints a picture of what refuged people go through, in their home country but also while travelling and while arriving in a new country. Giving examples like that some “are forced to flee persecution or human rights violations such as torture” and that “millions flee from armed conflicts or other crises or violence” (Amnesty International, 2021), then leads to them addressing situations in which refuged people experience racism, discrimination and xenophobia. Like Human Rights Watch, Amnesty also aims to create a “world where human rights can be enjoyed by everyone, no matter what situation they are in” (Amnesty International, 2021). Next to that, they share the ideal of that governments should share responsibility to protect the rights of these people and they condemn policies that prohibit or prevent movement and ‘a better life’ of/for refuged people. UNICEF, an organisation that is focussed

on the wellbeing of children, also cares to shine light on the migrant crisis, addressing that with a slogan “Children on the move are children first” (UNICEF, 2021). What makes UNICEF differ from the two organisations discussed, is that they provide help while the Human Rights Watch and Amnesty are mainly aimed at bringing a topic to the attention of the larger public. Like UNICEF, organisations like UNHCR tries to create opportunities for refuged people by providing them with emergency shelter kits, core relief items, sanitary kits and others (UNHCR, 2021). The Red Cross, the biggest relief organisation in the world with around 12 million active volunteers, goes to a far extent to help people in need, going to war locations themselves and providing refuged people of every kind of relief they need, but also launching projects after settlement to boost integration (Red Cross, 2021). What is important to recognize is that all of these organisations are not acting out of the interest to generate profit from this migrant-crisis, but are mainly volunteers that try to have an impact on the world doing good to their fellow human beings. We can conclude from this section that the main discourse for these human rights organisations and anyone who affiliates to them, consists out of the view that every human being is equal and that they should have access to all basic human rights we enjoy ourselves as well in the European Union (and West). As we do not experience these atrocities, we are not knowing of what impact this kind of situation has on a human, thus making us not fully capable of understanding these concepts. However, we do have the basic responsibility of helping these people who are in desperate need of help. Refuged people thus are not seen as intruders or people who have bad intentions, but are rather seen as victims of situations they did not want to find themselves in.



## 5.2 Media Coverage

Many academic studies have been done on the content and tone of European and Western media coverage on the so-called migrant crisis, but also news outlets have picked up on this matter, both trying to open up the debate on how we see migrants and refuged people. In the Guardian, a critical newspaper, the author makes the point of how 'we' in Europe have debated who should be "regarded as a deserving candidate for European sympathy and protection" (Trilling, 2019). He argues that, because "the terms that surround migration are inextricably bound up with power" (Trilling, 2019), we have different outlooks on who should be treated fairly and who deserves said sympathy and protection; people who "fall foul of border control at the frontiers of the rich world", as Trilling (2019) puts it, are designated terms with a negative connotation. This stance is being supported by Georgiou and Zaborowski (2017, p.5), who point out that because of unequal social relations, power relations are different between the actors, with one group being able to refuse the other, i.e. refuged people, of entry. They state that the media has a crucial role in representation of these relations and that we as an audience are "invited to construct a sense of who 'we' are in relation to who 'we' are not" (Cottle, 2002, p.2). Hereby we start to think in brackets and put ourselves opposite to refuged people, what eventually can lead to a construct of 'the other', which can create an image of refuged people being a danger to our European norms, values and society. An example is the term migrant crisis, which hints at there being a negative situation that has consequences not only for refuged people but for our society as well. Trilling (2019) states that the term is accurate in one sense as it describes the sharp increase of people claiming asylum in the European Union, but also contests it as compared to global terms the number of people coming to the EU was relatively small. Next to that, institutional failure ensured that needs for basic rights and necessities were not met, were not accounted much for in the media, while they instead would give the "false impression that the crisis was a problem from elsewhere that landed unexpectedly on European shores" (Trilling, 2019).

This example of framing an event which in our eyes resembles a crisis, relates to the central role in providing information by the media in our societies. While media is fed by public opinion, it still constitutes “key and trusted resources for officials and publics to make sense and take action in the course of events” (Georgiou & Zaborowski, 2017, p.4), by this thus framing an event. Provision of information came mainly from the media, which the public but also officials were depended on as they could not keep up with events happening at a fast pace (Georgiou & Zaborowski, 2017). Therefore information was mediated and not fully factual, and had another aspect of the relative lack of familiarity with the topic. In short, the European societies depended fully on the media to understand the situation, which also was full of narratives, prejudices and images of ‘the other’.

Figures like that 65% of Dutch citizens is “apprehensive of the arrival of refuged people and sees immigration as a major social problem” (Evers, 2016, p.6), also confirms the views Europeans have of refuged people. Other countries’ citizens feel alike, which is part of the trend that the attitude towards refuged people has become more negative since 2015. Evers explains this change of trend as being fuelled by the “increasing number and visibility of asylum seekers, the economic crisis and citizens’ growing concerns about national security and cultural differences” (Evers, 2016, p.6). However, she also makes the point that the publics opinion is not independent, but is also impacted by media coverage. “The media provides information that citizens use to make sense of the world and their place within it” (Boomgaarden & Vliegenthart, 2009), which corresponds to the statements given by Cottle (2002) and the statement of ‘the other’. Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart concluded that media coverage “affects the process of forming attitudes towards immigration and immigrants” (2009), mainly resulting in false assumptions, as media coverage is not accurate all the time.

We can conclude from this section that the discourse Europe’s society has is shaped by prejudice, false assumptions, and anxiousness, which are sometimes independent to, but also affected by media coverage. Refuged people are seen as an alien, ‘the other’, people we do not, but more

importantly cannot, relate to. Because the media paints a picture that is not always accurate, the public is fed with misinformation and thus demands action by politicians to stop or decrease the flow of refuted people and to ensure that Europe's security is maintained. Important to note is that not every person in Europe's society feels like this, as some are welcoming and take their responsibility by volunteering for the aforementioned human rights organisations. However, the main picture in the European Union is the one we discussed and which is supported by academics and journalists like Trilling, Georgiou & Zaborowski, Cottle, Evers and others.

### **5.3 Member States' statements**

As talked about before, governments are the extension of the public opinion as political discourse is shaped by public discourse. Therefore, the discourse explained under the previous section is corresponding to the discourse we will discuss in this section. Like European citizens, politicians also use the media as a source of information, but also make use of research to underpin their stances. In the end, law cannot be implemented without a good argumentative structure, therefore politicians relying on academics or independent commissions that research the matter. Still, this does not lead to governments taking the exact same stance against phenomena like the migrant crisis.

Hungary has taken a clear stance towards the migrant crisis seeing it as a threat to its country. The government has sealed off the border with Croatia and Serbia completely by building a razor-wire coil wall to keep refuted people out of their territory (Amnesty International, 2015). "Hungary is effectively transforming into a refugee protection free zone, with blatant disregard for its human rights obligations and the ... need to ... find collective, humane solutions to the current crisis" (Dalhuisen & Amnesty International, 2015). It's prime minister Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz party made comments when addressing their citizens to "defend Hungary" and that the arrival of refuted people "was not a humanitarian issue but a Muslim invasion threatening the national security, social cohesion, and Christian identity of the Hungarian nation" (Goździak, 2019). This has resulted in a

strong anti-immigrant policy by the government to prevent said arrival, which is fuelled by the fear of 'the other', as we mentioned before, but is also mentioned by Goździak (2019).

Like Hungary, Italy's government has made comments on their ideals regarding the migrant crisis, reacting troublingly to the refugee situation. Salvini, deputy prime minister, is openly hostile to migrants and refuged people as he claimed that "Italy was in need of a 'mass cleaning' – invoking migration and related matters, which he said justify such action" (Snell, 2018). While his party is far-right on the political spectrum, leftist parties echoed these views in a less hostile manner, by exhibiting the "prejudices of a populism rooted in the sense that Italian voters are being taken for a ride" (Snell, 2018), by which is meant that European ideas of free movement and labour in the Schengen Area are to be dealt with by Italians, but have negative consequences them and their society. This ultimately results in the left aiming to implement policies to counter this. Literature studies complement these statements as in these we see arguments that Italy's "government had sought to distinguish itself ... through ... measures designed to frame migration as an existential threat" (Strazzari & Grandi, 2019), and that they aim to make it increasingly difficult for migrants and refuged people to reach Italy by boat by implementing measures and laws (Newell, 2019, p.355). Therefore, Italy's government goes from the "basic assumption that international migration is a phenomenon that needs to be resisted or at least governed" (Newell, 2019, p.355).

Sweden, Norway and Denmark also changed their policies becoming more restrictive towards immigration and refuged people. "This included stricter regulatory policies, but also restrictions in refugees' access to social rights" (Hagelund, 2020, p.2). Likewise, Greece imposed measures to help refuged people crossing into the country as they are obliged to by international law and were under immense pressure by the great influx they did not anticipate, but did not have the intend of welcoming them much (Velentza, 2018, p.5/6). Many abuses of refuged people's rights have been observed (Velentza, 2018), but prime minister Mitsotakis claimed Greece is doing Europe a great

service, while he still sees refuted people as a problem and because of this wants to protect the sovereignty of his country (Prime Minister's Office of Greece, 2020).

Countries like France and the Netherlands both take a negative stance towards refuted people and the migrant crisis, but also try to help their fellow EU-members in restraining the flow of refuted people to the continent. France's PM Macron and his government has called for a humane approach and greater solidarity in welcoming migrant and refuted people from Greece to its own territory (Moscovenko, 2020). While his government sees the influx of refuted people as a crisis and while they have been condemned by the European Court of Human Rights for its asylum policy (Moscovenko, 2020), they still aim to allocate refuted people fairly among Member States. They oppose the "introduction of quotas for migrant intake" (Government France, 2021), and want to work together with countries like Germany to create an equal Europe. The Dutch government's policy resembles France's in many ways trying to assure protection to those who flee war and oppression, and providing housing and asylum to refuted person who reach the Netherlands. However, at the same time the government and opposition actively and openly speak against immigration stating that "a collective EU approach should restrict and manage refugee flows to Europe" so that "fewer people come to Europe" (Government of the Netherlands, 2021). The Netherlands aims to enlarge reception in the region of origin, combat people smuggling, strengthen the Schengen Area's external borders and to send refuted people back if the government deems that they are not in danger (Government of the Netherlands, 2021). This corresponds to statements made by opposition leader Geert Wilders, who sees the wave of refuted people as an 'Islamic invasion' that threatens "our prosperity, our security, our culture and identity" (Wilders, in Bahceli, 2015). Because of the Netherlands' response and policies, and because of statements of the opposition, we can see that they also are negative about refuted people coming to Europe, and are quite contrary to France's statements, but alike with the aforementioned examples of Hungary, Italy, Sweden, etc.

One country that stands out in its reception of migrants and refuged people is Angela Merkel's Germany. Her country saw the greatest influx of refuged people compared to other member states, but was partially because of its open policy of welcoming refuged people. "Merkel let them enter Germany even though other EU member states were officially responsible for them" (Hasselbach, 2020), and did this under the motto of 'Wir Schaffen Das', 'we can do this'. Many experts stated that if it was not for Germany's open policy, Europe would have had a problem of harbouring refuged people and that it could have resulted in incalculable potential conflicts and chaotic conditions (Hasselbach, 2020). While some events occurred that were bad for the reputation of refuged people, like rape offences committed in Cologne, Germany's public opinion still closely resembles Merkel's policies. She stated that the migrant crisis is a major challenge but that there was no alternative and that she did not want to wait for people to die, thus that "that there was no other option" (Merkel, in Carrel & Barkin, 2015).

Germany and to a lesser extent France are thus outliers in an otherwise monogamous landscape in Europe. The overarching discourse we can observe is that many countries' governments and oppositions are in favour of restricting and lessening the flow of refuged people towards their countries and ultimately the European Union. Almost all of them are condemned on their policies that contribute to poor situation refuged people find themselves in and to the worsening state of human rights. Refuged people are seen as threats by governments and the migrant crisis is called a problem that must be resolved to protect their country's culture and identity, security, and prosperity. But how does this relate to the statements of the European Union? Do they resemble the ones we have seen in media coverage and the member states' policies? Or are they closer to the discourse that is present in human rights organisations?

#### **5.4 The European Union's position**

Now we have discussed what the public discourse of Europe's society and political discourse of its member states look like, we can now have a look at the overarching statements that come from the European Union's Commission, i.e. the overarching body that has ultimately has governance over its European subjects and governments. Important for this section is that we will solely look at statements the European governing bodies, like the EU Commission and Parliament, make, and not the member states' ones, as we want to compare whether these align or differ.

When the European Union's Council reached an agreement with Turkey, the statement uttered by the EU was that "all new irregular migrants and asylum seekers arriving from Turkey to the Greek islands and whose applications have been declared inadmissible should be returned to Turkey" (European Parliament, 2021), by this aiming to end migration flows from Turkey. In order for them to fall within international regulations, the European Union agreed to adopt one refuted person, not economic migrant, from Turkey if they could send irregular migrants and refuted people back to Turkey, in particular the Izmir province. This agreement solely already underlines what policy the European Union aims to implement. Next to that, we see that the EU does not hold up to its promise, as experts say that the intake of refuted people is not equal to the ones being send back (Zieck, 2016). Besides, according to the European Commission's President, the equal relocation of refuted people to its member states at its current pace, could only be realized at its earliest by the year 2101 (Juncker, 2015). These all point towards failure and unwillingness by the European Union to find a suitable solution for the human being rather than for the European Union itself. The assumption can be made that the focus is on what the EU can do to keep its security, cultural identity and prosperity intact without interference of another group they see as 'the other'. But now the question arises that if their actions point towards one direction, do their statements say otherwise, or are they in line with their focus on themselves instead of refuted people's well-being?

When we look at statements made by the European commission, they state to aim to “develop a common policy on asylum, subsidiary protection and temporary protection with a view to offering appropriate status to all ... who need international protection” (European Parliament, 2021:2). The policy they enforce must be consistent with the Geneva Convention, thus meaning respecting refuged people’s rights of being free to seek protection in another country, without the hazard of being send back to their country of origin, i.e. refoulement (European Parliament, 2021(2)). Furthermore, the passed legislature of 2019 by the Parliament and Council, set a set of measures to improve regulations. Examples of measures are “simplifying, clarifying and shortening of asylum procedures”, “achieving greater convergence of recognition rates and forms of protection”, “laying down criteria for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection”, etc. (European Parliament, 2021(2), p.4).

The European Union also made comments regarding the Coronavirus pandemic that started in 2020, by saying that it does “not discriminate between people and knows no borders” (European Commission, 2020). It said that “a fast and coordinated global response” was needed, that was based on international solidarity, by including refuged people, who are “at the heart of the EU’s Global response to the coronavirus crisis” (European Commission, 2020).

Comments like this and the aforementioned statements all point towards an inclusive European Union who’s borders are open and welcoming to every person in need of protection. This leads to a situation in which it is not clear what discourse can be observed in this scenario, as the statements made by the EU are inclusive while, as we discussed before, their actions contradict this.

Furthermore, as the European Union’s governing bodies are made up of representatives of its member states, and the discourse in that field as we discussed is clearly anti-refugee, inclusive statements by the EU are evermore conflicting. How is it possible that member states voice they want to stop the flow and see refuged people as a threat, while the European Union states they are



welcome in its territory? It seems the European Union portrays a picture of itself from the human rights organisations discourse, while in actuality they act according to the media coverage and member states discourses. Therefore, it is more important to analyse the European Union's policies to paint a picture of what their aim actually is, instead of believing politically correct statements. This means that the next chapter will dive into measures implemented by the European Union in Turkey. In order for us to work towards answering our main research question, I will specify this to the three cities Kayseri, Istanbul and Edirne. By doing this we can see what policies are implemented and if they affect the human rights of refuted people and ultimately have a look at whether this has an effect on the discussed migrant trajectories.

## **6. The European Union's policies on refuted people in Kayseri, Edirne and Istanbul and its effects on human rights and migrant trajectories**

As we have discussed why it is important to distinguish different phases within a refuted people's journey through Turkey and we have sketched what their migrant trajectory looks like, we now will have a look at the policies that are implemented by the European Union in the three different cities, being (1) Kayseri, (2) Istanbul and (3) Edirne. This means this chapter is solely focussed on trajectory 2, as we have argumentized before why these are chosen. Next to that, many policy reports from the European Union, academic papers and journalistic articles are considered when writing this chapter. These sources together will show which projects Europe's funding goes too, but also will uncover whether the drafted regulations are complied with, as academia and journalists have a critical outlook on the matter. After the discussion on the policies, an analysis will follow on whether these policies affect the human rights dimension and ultimately the journey refuted people take, i.e. their migrant trajectory.

### **6.1 Kayseri: the European Union's policies**

The European Union has launched different initiatives in the city of Kayseri that are not only aimed at refuted people, but also migrants. An example of combatting the flow of irregular migrants towards Turkey is the 'removal centre' instituted in the city, which houses detained migrants who crossed into Greece and were readmitted to Turkey. This is done "with the ... purpose of secondary deportation to respective countries of origin which makes it difficult ... to apply for asylum" (Van Liempt et. al., 2017, p.21). Instead of housing these migrants closer to the border with its territory, the European Union purposefully sends them, under the deal with Turkey, to detention centres located at "a four to ten hour bus ride away from Istanbul [and Edirne] and Izmir" (Van Liempt et. al., 2017). Originally the removal centre, in some ways also a prison, was only aimed to detain non-Syrian asylum seekers with a capacity of 750 people (Global Detention Project, 2019, p.40), however research shows that it also houses refuted people (GUE/NGL Delegation, 2016), like other camps

throughout Turkey. This is supported by a research conducted by OpenDemocracy, an independent global media organisation aimed at reporting on social and political issues, who stated that from 2014-15 onwards new centres had been built with the target of refoulement. “Refugees found to have broken the law, through petty crime, illegal working ... are being deported with little chance for appeal or concern for the dangers they may face in countries of origin” (Williams, 2016). This tells us that not only migrants were admitted to the removal centres, but refuged people as well and that this was done unlawfully under international law that protects refuged people from this, i.e. the Geneva Convention. While most refuged people are sent to the Syrian border cities, like the provinces Gaziantep, Hatay, Adana, etc. (Dm-Aegean, 2019), there are thus human rights violations going on by housing refuged people in these removal centres, which should be aimed at irregular migrants according to the EU-Turkey deal on this matter.

Human rights have been violated in removal centres, thus also in Kayseri, with examples emerging like that it is “practically impossible for a detainee to apply for any form of protection in Turkey from inside a Removal Centre” (Dm-Aegean, 2019), as they do not have access to lawyers, who can hardly be accessed by refuged people. Besides, some lawyers “who provide legal aid in Removal Prisons reported having to face a variety of bureaucratic and practical barriers” (Dm-Aegean, 2019), for example being denied access to the refuged person because of alleged non-public rules or mis-information, which cannot be checked whether correct or not. Next to that, lawyers have been arbitrarily detained by authorities within a removal centre for an unknown reason (Dm-Aegean, 2019). All of this makes the task more difficult for refuged people to seek solutions and to have access to their human rights. Many other violations have been observed, like violations to “access of health services, ill-treatment, defamation, assault, lack of access to personal hygiene and hot water, widespread infectious skin diseases, inadequate nutrition, deprivation of privacy and the inability to exercise the right to petition” (Dm-Aegean, 2019). These conditions have led to suicide attempts as many refuged people felt they had no outlook on a better future. While they are

detained against their will in these centres, they are expected to sign a declaration of ‘voluntary return’ to their country of origin, and when resisting are often pressed to do so (Dm-Aegean, 2019). Systematic human rights violations in Kayseri’s removal centre can be blamed on the Turkish government, as they implement the executive measures and set up the exact frameworks. However, the European Union also has responsibility for the violations happening. Important to this argument is the fact that the EU funded and helped to set up the removal centre of Kayseri, which took four years to complete with a budget of €55.325 million contribution from the EU and € 859 000 million from Turkey itself (Ministry of Interior, 2021; Global Detention Project, 2019; European Parliament, 2017, p.18). While multiple sources were given before about that this removal centre was aimed at illegal migrants and not refuged people, as this would be against international law, the European Union’s Committee on Budgetary Control contradicts this by giving a report on their “visit to Removal Centre for asylum seekers, refugees and illegal migrants” (European Parliament, 2017). This shows that the European Union tries to cover their wrongdoings by using politically correct statements like ‘irregular migrant removal centres’, while in actuality they are also aimed at refuged people and they do not seem to have no problem with it.

This all corresponds to the European Union’s policy of extraterritoriality, which can be defined as “the application of a measure triggered by something other than a territorial connection with the regulating state” (Scott, 2014, p.90). This means in this instance that the European Union can impose measures in another country, because there is something occurring that does not directly in their own territory, but has a connection to it, i.e. the migrant crisis. Because the European Union utilizes extraterritoriality to realize their own policy of keeping refuged people as far away as possible from its territory, and in doing so fund projects to help them reach this goal, they are also partly responsible for the consequences it causes. In the example with removal centres, it is clear that the European Union plays a role in the human rights violations; while they may not be enforced by themselves, they are funded by them. Lastly, they actively and knowingly created the removal centre

in Kayseri as it is a satellite city of the European Union (Asylum Information Database, 2018, p.62), which in traditional literature are often considered to be cities located at the edge of major metropolises from which people travel toward said major metropole as it is more abundant in “significant employment and educational opportunities” (Merrilees, Miller & Herington, 2013, p.37). In our example we can see cities in Turkey as satellite cities of ‘the metropole’ the European Union, where refuged people are aiming to go to, while residing in these cities for a shorter amount of time. The metropole has influence over its satellite cities and can implement measures that change these cities to its likings, which is exactly what happens with the European Union implementing measures to achieve their own goals. Kayseri acts as an satellite city in which they implement a measure like the removal centre, which acts according to Europe’s wills, but is also located at a distance from the European territory that does not encourage to travel there quickly.

Besides the example of a removal centre in Kayseri, the European Union enforces other policies in the city regarding refuged people. In 2017, Ambassador Berger from the EU visited Kayseri’s removal centre, but also went to the EU-funded Erciyes Technopark, which is known for “its support to the development of a technology-based industry in Turkey” (Delegation of the European Union to Turkey, 2017). Next to that, he visited civil society organisations that assist its members, mostly refuged people and migrants, if problems occur in Turkey. The ASAM, short for the Association for Solidarity with Asylum Seekers and Migrants, Field Office was set up in 2005 by the UNHCR and consisted out of two social workers and a psychologist who’s aim is “mainly providing social and legal counselling as well as psychological support” (European Parliament, 2017, p.19). Lately, the European Union has funded this organisation’s field office to enhance the protection of the Syrians and asylum seekers living in Kayseri. According to an UNHCR researcher, Nayana Bose, this field office, together with other in Turkey, played a “vital role in protecting refugees through counselling on legal and social issues, psycho social support and by building networks and links with the local authorities and other NGOs” (Bose, 2016, p.3). This would result in better opportunities to improved living in Turkey

as those who are in need would be assisted. However, because the EU started funding the ASAM Field Office, the UNHCR ended its “registration and processing of applications for international protection” (Leghtas & Thea, 2018, p.7), which now were the responsibility of Europe’s humanitarian aid committee. Because the European Union is bound to the EU-Turkey agreement, it meant that refuged people now had to apply for protection to the Turkish authorities, thus meaning that their way to the European Union was not accessible (Leghtas & Thea, 2018). From this the conclusion could be drawn that refuged people were no longer applying to the field office because the UNHCR had dissolved its contract. Besides, it is important to acknowledge that the ASAM Field Office in Kayseri does not receive enough funding and therefore cannot operate at a scale that is needed to equal the demand there is in the province (Delegation of the European Union to Turkey, 2017). If the European Union’s goal is to improve refuged people’s access to protection, legal counselling and psychological- and social support, it should scale up its funding, or the ASAM Field Office is of no use to refuged people.

A confusing aspect to the ASAM Field Office in Kayseri is the matter of who is eligible to apply for protection and care. While Syrian refuged people came to this field office to seek protection as they had limited options, they were sometimes rejected on the basis of that the office was mainly aimed at non-Syrians, which was enforced out of European policy (Leghtas & Thea, 2018). Multiple sources state though that these offices also were open to Syrian refuged people, such as the European Union’s Committee on Budgetary Control stating that they visited the ASAM Field Office for Syrians and non-Syrians (European Parliament, 2017), and the UNHCR report on Donor Impact (Bose, 2016) in which Syrian refuged people are interviewed on the help ASAM provided to them. Again, as we saw before with the example of the removal centre, the Committee on Budgetary Control contradicts statements made before by the European Union. This leads us to believe that there is no clear border to who can apply for protection to the ASAM Field Office in Kayseri, and would have us believing that Syrian refuged people can experience this confusion as well. If the European Union sets up a

boundary in its own proposals, for example on how they will fund such an office, in which they tell the office is mainly aimed at non-Syrian refuged people, why are there contrasting reports on Syrian refuged people being admitted to the ASAM Field Office in Kayseri? Ultimately, this could have the effect of less refuged people seeking the protection and care they need at a field office, which would deteriorate their well-being and human right to safety.

Besides the examples of the Kayseri Removal Centre and ASAM Field Office, The European Union carries out other projects in Kayseri, like industrial development and educational projects (CORDIS, 2016; ICMPD, 2021). Such projects try to “increase entrepreneurial activity of Syrians ... by providing an enabling environment and support in creation of new products and markets” (ICMPD, 2021). Besides this, the ICMPDs project is aimed at improving “policy making and the coordination of the policy implementation” and increasing “employment opportunities of the Syrians ... through strengthening the performance of the market operators” (ICMPD, 2021). The project is partially funded by the European Union, who act as a ‘donor’, but who did not set up the project. Important to note is that this example is aimed at Syrians who are under temporary protection, which according to the European Union is defined as “an exceptional measure to provide immediate and temporary protection to displaced persons from non-EU countries and those unable to return to their country of origin” (European Commission, 2021). Recipients of temporary protection have the right to have access to employment, housing, social welfare, medical treatment and education for minors, as well as opportunities for families to reunite and are guaranteed access to a normal asylum procedure (European Commission, 2021). However, Syrian refuged people have to apply for temporary protection, and as we saw in the example of the removal centre, this process can be painstakingly hard. When we look at the other policies implemented in Kayseri, we can conclude that the ASAM Field Office does not function properly, as refuged people no longer apply as they feel application for protection has been made impossible because of the change of funding organisation, first being the UNHCR and now the European Union. Like in the instance of the removal centre, we again see that

interference by the European Union leads to a worse situation, and that this is their responsibility as they have funded organisations that have committed violations. While the Kayseri Removal Centre that extracts refuged people from the EU's border does receive enough funding, a humanitarian aid organisation that safeguard the well-being of refuged people does not. This is a crooked fact of reality of how the European Union's policies are implemented in Kayseri. While the EU implements policies that are aimed at keeping refuged people away from their border, they also seem to have good will by funding projects that create opportunities for refuged people and builds their livelihoods. However, such projects have strict frameworks of who can apply to it, which contrasts this good will. Why would the European Union only provide to Syrian refuged people under temporary protection and not to refuged people who could not apply because the EU has made this difficult? The intentions of the European Union contradict, because they state one thing in official documents, while the execution tells another story. Next to that, we cannot make a generalization from a few examples on what the European Union's objectives with these policies really are. Notes from meetings of high governing bodies are not shared with the public, thus we cannot see what high level executives discuss and what their intentions are.

Further research into other policies launched by the European Union that are aimed at refuged people in Kayseri yielded sufficient results; the Facility for Refugees in Turkey, a six billion euro deal by the European Commission that dealt directly with the refuged people and their well-being on the ground (Kirişçi, 2021). From this Facility for Refugees in Turkey, the EU has implemented a total of 35 projects in the Kayseri province that consist out of humanitarian aid and development policies. Examples of such policies are "Education for All Project", "Formal Employment Creation Project", "Municipal Services Improvement Project", "Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) Assistance Project" and others (European Commission, 2021:2). These projects are all aimed at improving the situation refuged people find themselves in. Besides these projects, according to the European Commission's Facility for Refugees in Turkey (2021:2), the European Union also launched projects aimed at



improving the protection of refuged people. As we have seen, creating protection for refuged people worked contrary to the stated interest of the European Union, meaning the policy did not benefit the people who were in need of protection. While they have launched projects that have positive impacts on the lives of refuged people in Kayseri, these projects were not aimed at bringing refuged people closer to the European Union. Thus, when we take into consideration the discussed examples, we see that the European Union is more focussed on implementing measures that are aimed at keeping refuged people far away from their own border, like the removal centre, therefore expulsing them to a province like Kayseri, which is in far proximity to the EU's borders, and from Kayseri ultimately to provinces like Gaziantep and even back to the country of origin, Syria. Instead of showing priority lies with making sure these human being receive the protection and care they need, the European Union is more focussed on itself and in the process commits human rights violations.

## **6.2 Istanbul: the European Union's policies**

Like in Kayseri, Istanbul has a removal centre that operates in the same way, located in the Selimpaşa neighbourhood in Silivri in the European side of Istanbul, about 60 km away from the city centre, another one in Tuzla in the Asian side at a distance of 40 km to the city centre (Global Detention Project, 2019), and one located at 100 km in Binkılıç, with a capacity of 120 people (Ministry of Interior, 2019). The Silivri and Tuzla centres have capacities of 270 and 900 refuged people respectively and receive funding from the European Union and Turkish government, enabling them to operate. According to an independent researcher of the Asylum Information Database (AIDA), which is run by the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), refuged people in Istanbul are “generally not informed about their rights in removal centres” and many of them face the problem of being unable to access legal representation (Asylum Information Database, 2019). Silivri's removal centre houses mostly women, who currently receive better treatment as administrators are implementing better practices, while in other removal centres, this is lacking (Asylum Information Database, 2021:1). The Binkılıç Removal Centre houses mostly men, while the Tuzla centre sees both

men and women (Asylum Information Database, 2021:2). This raises the question of why women are treated differently than men in the removal centres, and why men are sent to centres located way further away from the city centre, at 100 km, than women, who are at a proximity of 60 km.

Unfortunately, other than to contact these removal centres directly and take the chance of asking them why men and women are segregated, no real evidence could be found as to why this is the case. Therefore, making a statement on the 'why' is not possible, but we can conclude that segregating men and women and treating them differently, is a kind of discriminatory issue.

Contrary to the removal centre of Kayseri, Istanbul's Silivri and Tuzla centres practice the policy of transferring refuged people "from Istanbul to other removal centres in different cities" in central-Turkey (Asylum Information Database, 2019). These 'different cities' in this case mean cities like Konya and Kayseri, that are located even further away from the European border. As discussed, we see that the centre in Kayseri also transfers refuged people to other cities, but does not do this to a city in central-Turkey, but to the ones located in close proximity to the Syrian border, like Gaziantep, Hatay, Adana, etc. (Dm-Aegean, 2019). This means that refuged people can be transferred from Istanbul to Kayseri, then to Gaziantep and ultimately be deported to Syria. By this, these removal centres operate as a 'chain' that moves refuged people across the whole of Turkey with the intention of keeping them as far away from the European border as possible. Now the question arises if Edirne also has a removal centre that fits into this 'chain' through Turkey, which will be discussed in the next section.

Firstly, we will have a look at whether at removal camps in Istanbul, like in Kayseri, systematic violations of human rights can be observed. Thereafter we will have a look at other practices and policies that are implemented by the European Union in Istanbul. The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) produced a report about its visit to Istanbul's removal camps in Turkey in which human rights violations were observed.

Turkey answered this report by implementing new regulations such as that “rooms of foreign nationals in the removal centres are not surveyed in accordance with the privacy principle” (Government Turkey, 2020, p.29), and that “all forms of ill-treatment of foreign national (including verbal abuse) are not acceptable and will be punished accordingly” (Government Turkey, 2020, p.18), and that physical facilities that will be realised that meet quality standards. Hereby, the European Union keeps an eye out on how refuged people are treated in the removal camps in Istanbul. However, Istanbul’s removal centres also see violations like inaccessibility to legal representation, as lawyers are not granted access to refuged people in removal centres (Amnesty International, 2015, p.6), like we saw in Kayseri. Next to that, “some people were kept in removal centres despite having cancer or being chronically ill, as well as persons undergoing intensive care treatment” (Asylum Information Database, 2021:3), meaning the basic human right to healthcare was violated in this instance. Furthermore, discrimination from police and removal centre guards towards refuged people groups like LGBTQ+ people and sex workers was observed, which for example consisted out of police raids that were carried out at midnight that resulted in arrests and had the consequence that refuged people were being deported on the grounds of being a danger to public order and public health (Asylum Information Database, 2021:3). Lastly, some refuged people were detained in unofficial holding facilities, like police stations before being transferred to a removal centre, and saw violations of power by officials in which they were kept prisoner for two to three, or sometimes even seven days, while they had no access to legal representation (Asylum Information Database, 2021:1). Legally being a police station, like those in the Istanbul neighbourhoods Beyoğlu, Beşiktaş, Kağıthane and Pendik, some acted as if they were removal centres, detaining and then transferring refuged people to removal centres in central-Turkey, for example those in Konya and Kayseri (Asylum Information Database, 2021:1). The European Union does not comment on this in its reports or other statements and seems to have no problem with the practice of illegal transfers by institutions that do not have the right on a legal basis to operate like a removal centre, and thus can be deemed unofficial holding facilities.

From this we can conclude that, however the European Union tries it best to reduce violations happening to refuged people living in removal centres, still many can be observed. In contrast to Istanbul's removal centres, the removal centre in Kayseri, while it does receive funding it does not receive the European Union's attention towards violations of human rights, as not many progress has been made on improving the situation. When we look at responsibility, we can conclude that the purpose of these camps remains to detain refuged people and transfer, and ultimately deport, them to locations far away from the European border. Since the EU funds these centres, like in Kayseri, they still can be held responsible for human rights violations, even when committed by Turkish officials.

Besides the example of the three Istanbul Removal Centres, we will now have a look at other policies that are implemented by the European Union on refuged people in Istanbul. The EU started funding a project that was launched by the UNHCR and Turkish Bar Associations with a budget of five million euro's, that was aimed at providing quality legal assistance free of charge to refuged people and asylum seekers in Istanbul (Asylum Information Database, 2019, p.44). This legal assistance could be used by refuged people who want to apply for protection to government offices, however the supply "remains limited mainly due to practical obstacles," such as "issues with the calculations for funding for different cities, the way the fees were paid, the costs covered and gaps in services due to the project-based approach" (Asylum Information Database, 2019, p.44). While increases in refuged people's access to legal representation have been observed, like discussed, violations in removal centres and unofficial holding facilities limit refuged people's access to legal aid in these places. The European Union invests in a project that has some benefits, but is counteracted by themselves by funding removal centres that commit violations. Therefore, this project shows goodwill, but could have had a better print on refuged people's situation in Turkey. For now, when refuged people mainly rely on civil society organisations for legal representation (Asylum Information Database, 2019, p.45), who operate out of their own budget and are not bound to political agreements with

Turkey, but act out of ethical views. Though, NGOs are not all accepted by the aforementioned Turkish government's bar associations, those who have launched the project, and even when a NGO is accepted, they cannot receive all cases but only partially as they are not deemed to be capable enough of providing good quality legal assistance (Asylum Information Database, 2019, p.45). This means that the European Union has created a system in which they provide legal assistance via an organisation that limits human rights organisations from helping refuted people, while at the same time it blocks these same organisations through removal centres in which violations occur. Refuted people are thus limited in their options and become stuck in a system from which there is no escape, as they can rely only on the European Union for help.

According to the European Commission's (2021:2) Facility for Refugees on its projects in cities in Turkey, like for Kayseri, we see that the European Union has launched a total of 70 projects in Istanbul. This is the double amount of projects in Kayseri, which was a total of 35. Istanbul, being the main metropolitan hub of Turkey, the city in which most refuted people reside, therefore sees the most projects and investment, which all consist out of humanitarian aid and development policies. Examples of projects the European Union has launched in Istanbul for Syrian refuted people are "Strengthening Economic Opportunities", "Improved Access to Health Services", "Integrating Syrians into Turkish Economy", "Increased Access to Protection and Basic Needs Support", improving of "Social Economic Cohesion", "Access to Sexual and Gender Based Violence Services", etc. (European Commission, 2021:2). All these projects have the aim of improving the living conditions and situation for Syrian refuted people in Istanbul, but in actuality do not all play out the way the European Union envisioned them to do. Like we saw with the matter of how protection cannot be guaranteed through the EU's policies, many of projects mentioned above are not realised, do not receive the full funding and see complications arising, as the European Commission's President called on exploring the "missing elements from the ... deal [Facility for Refugees in Turkey] ... and improving on them" (Kirişci, 2021).

From this section we can conclude that the European Union has launched many projects regarding refuged people in Istanbul. Removal centres are set up that transfer refuged people further away from the European border, in this instance from Istanbul to the Anatolian provinces like Konya and Kayseri. However, contrary to Kayseri's example, the removal centres of Istanbul are located at a large proximity from the city centre, meaning refuged people are less likely to travel into the city. Furthermore, the segregation of men and women is an issue that is different to Kayseri, as these two groups are not segregated in that city, but is one that raises the issue of discrimination. Why should people be characterised into groups and why should they receive different treatment? This question remains unanswered for now, but should be looked into in future research, to uncover whether discrimination by segregating refuged people in this manner has an effect on their livelihoods.

Like in Kayseri, the removal centre sees human rights violations happening like inaccessibility to legal representation, health care, privacy and ultimately protection and facing discrimination of identity. Like discussed in the previous section about Kayseri, the European Union has responsibility in this as they fund the project of removal centres. When we had a look at how NGOs, that can help refuged people receive said human rights, are counteracted against by the European Union, it becomes clear that the intention in Istanbul lies elsewhere. The EU launched projects like the discussed project with the UNHCR and Bar Organisations which was aimed at improving access to legal assistance for refuged people in removal centres. As told, the project counteracted NGOs by denying them access to refuged people and not assigning them to cases, claiming they lack capability. Next to this project, the European Union launched many more projects, totalling 70, in Istanbul according to the European Commission's Facility for Refugees in Turkey. While intention shows that the EU wants to improve the life of refuged people, we concluded that the outcome was not as expected by complexities that arose and thus projects not able to be funded. Therefore, refuged people who could have been helped, were not.

These projects could be generalized into a overarching policy the European carries out. To conclude this section, assuming the European Union has no intention of looking after refuged people's well-being cannot be said, as projects have been launched to improve their well-being. However, practically, Istanbul remains the biggest metropolitan hub in Turkey which is attractive due to its economic opportunities, as we discussed in chapter 3 under the section of Phase 3. The European Union's actions in funding and supporting the practice of removal centres in Istanbul shows that their target is to transfer refuged people as far away from the European border as possible, in this instance to the Anatolian provinces, like Konya and Kayseri. If it is not possible to detain a refuged person, the European Union makes sure with its practices that Istanbul remains attractive as far as economic opportunities goes and does this through its projects, because they would not want them to migrate to the cities closer to the European border, like Edirne.

In the next section we will elaborate on what policies the European Union implements in Edirne, and whether it shows that the EU does invest less in this city and if this supports the claim that by doing so the EU holds off refuged people from going to Edirne.

### **6.3 Edirne: the European Union's policies**

As we have discussed in chapter 3 under the section of phase 4 about Edirne, the city is no place where refuged people reside with the intention of staying. They come from Istanbul as this is only a two hour bus ride and try to cross the border into the European Union through Greece and to a lesser extent Bulgaria. In this section, we will discuss how the removal camp in Edirne differs from those in Istanbul and Kayseri and how other policies of the European Union can explain why the city is no place that attracts refuged people.

Unlike the removal centres in Istanbul, which are located at 40, 60 and 100 km from the city centre, and the one in Kayseri, which is located at 25 km from the city centre in Gömeç Village (Kayseri Eczacı Odası, 2021), Edirne's removal centre is located in the middle of the city and has a capacity of 750

people, being both men and women, and minors (Global Detention Project, 2021). This removal centre not only houses refuged people from Syria but also other countries and is funded by the European Commission's Facility for Refugees in Turkey, like in Kayseri and Istanbul. However, while the centre houses both men and women, gender segregation is practiced and mistreatment by staff has been observed, as reports on the conditions have shown. One refuged person, named Rahim, told his story to Amnesty International, stating "In Edirne camp, they told us that they would deport us. I showed them my UNHCR paper... But they still said they would deport us" (Amnesty International, 2014, p.7). He then continued by explaining that he and others tried to escape, but were caught and received punishment by being beaten and being held in a "small windowless cell alone for two weeks" (Amnesty International, 2014, p.7) and was not allowed to go out except to use the toilet. Later he was deported to another city's removal centre away from the border with Greece. Another example of ill-treatment of refuged people in the Edirne Removal Centre was discussed in the Global Detention Project's report we have used as a source before. The centre regularly received criticism for the poor conditions refuged people are held in, such as that 400 detainees were "held in a single room in 'abysmal' conditions that were completely unfit for human habitation, even for short duration" (Global Detention Project, 2019, p.35). Human Rights Watch accused the ministry of "intentionally keeping conditions degrading and inhumane as a means of coercing detainees to self deport" (Global Detention Project, 2019, p.35), meaning refuged people would rather be deported and would do this themselves to get out of these conditions. Since then the situation in the removal centre has improved, however reports of that detainees' mobiles were confiscated, which impacted their information resources, have emerged (Crépeau, 2013; Global Detention Project, 2019). This led to refuged people being forced to use the centres payphone, however since there was "no information available in the centre on how to contact lawyers, civil society organisations and UNHCR, or consular authorities" (Global Detention Project, 2019, p.36), they were left abandoned to their fate. Still ill-treatment by staff was observed as some detainees reported beatings from guards as well as that access to medical care had been blocked by staff (Crépeau, 2013). Like the removal



centres of Kayseri and Istanbul, the European Union can be held responsible for the human rights violations that were committed in Edirne's centre, as the EU funds all of these. Furthermore, all centres have experienced similar kinds of abuse and violations, meaning the overarching structure and institution is not operating as it should. If two of the centres would have seen no violations and one did, it could have pointed to staff operating insufficiently. However, because all centres have similar situations, we could conclude the structure and institutional directives are not up to par, which is the responsibility of the European Union, as they uttered the idea of implementing the policy of creating removal centres in Turkey's cities.

If we compare the operational process of Edirne's removal centre compared to the ones in Kayseri and Istanbul, we see one major difference, being the place where refuged people were detained. As discussed, in Kayseri and Istanbul people were apprehended in the cities by forces such as the police, because they committed petty crimes (Williams, 2016), which legitimized the arrest, and were then transferred to a removal centre in the city or even directly to another one further away from the European border. In Edirne however refuged people were mostly "apprehended while leaving Turkey" (Asylum Information Database, 2018), which is also supported by Rahim, who was "apprehended by the Turkish soldiers at the border, handed over to the Turkish gendarmerie and then taken to a removal centre in Edirne" (Amnesty International, 2014, p.7). Again, this is also confirmed by another report titled 'Europe's Gatekeeper' in which refuged people were interviewed, all of them stating they "had been apprehended in one of the western border provinces, such as Edirne" (Amnesty International, 2015, p.4). Many were detained by border guards as they "were attempting or intending to cross irregularly to the EU" (Amnesty International, 2015, p.4). Thereafter, refuged people were detained locally in removal centres, like the one in Edirne, before being transferred to another removal centre in provinces like Konya and Kayseri, at a great proximity to the European Union's border with Turkey. Some refuged people were taken back to Istanbul, but they were never informed beforehand where they would go, some even being promised they would be

taken to the European Union (Amnesty International, 2015). The comparison between Edirne, Kayseri and Istanbul's places of apprehension and the removal centre structure affect the refugees' migrant trajectory, as it are setbacks in the path they take to reach their destination, being in this case the European Union.

Besides the example of the Edirne Removal Centre, the European Commission's (2021:2) Facility for Refugees in Turkey also gives examples of European projects implemented in Edirne. While we have observed that Kayseri has a total of 35 projects being funded by the European Union, Istanbul has a total of 70, Edirne only has 16 projects (European Commission, 2021:2). All of these projects are aimed at humanitarian intervention, except for one, which is a development project funded by the European Union and implemented by UNICEF, called "Education and Protection Programme for vulnerable Syrian and host community children, in Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey" (European Commission, 2021:2). From this we can observe that this development project is only aimed at children who are in need of education and protection, but not at adults. Therefore, the European Union makes a distinction on who they want to provide with education and protection, two basic human rights, which can be considered discriminatory. The EU considers all human beings as equal, as stated in chapter 5, section 5.4, "develop a common policy on asylum, subsidiary protection and temporary protection with offering ... to all ... who need international protection" (European Parliament, 2021:2). So why does the European Union then make a distinction between on who receives this protection in Edirne when it 'wants' to offer protection to all who need it? This stems from the discourse on who is a threat and who is not, which is found within societies in Europe. Children cannot be considered dangers to society as they are still little, however adults, in particularly males can be, according to research conducted by Al Jazeera Newspaper (Strickland, 2016). Politicians in Europe are describing these males as an 'organised invasion' to Europe and as perpetrators of sexual assault, or as them being ISIS-affiliated (Strickland, 2016). As we already discussed, societal discourse is the predecessor of political discourse, meaning that politics are

affected by the discourse that is present in society. Therefore, seeing that policy of the European Union excludes these males that are considered dangerous through European societal discourse, can be considered logical from a political, but not from a human rights point of view.

Next to this project only being aimed at children, it is also implemented not only in Turkey, but also in Lebanon and Jordan. At first glance, this seems logical as refuged people are found in those countries as well. However, when we take into account that the distribution of funding is considered to not always go as planned, like we discussed under section 3.2 about Istanbul, we can conclude that funding hardly finds its way to Edirne. This is also supported by the outline on the location of implementation of this project, as the Delegation of the European Union to Turkey (2021) states it prioritizes “provinces from the Southeast of Turkey” and includes “new priority provinces from the western part of the country”, where Edirne is located, but then only states as them being “Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir” (Delegation of the European Union to Turkey, 2021). Important is that this delegation states it allocates money towards places refuged people are living in, however as we concluded from the phase analysis of Edirne (chapter 4, section 4.3, phase 4), refuged people do not live there as there is no sufficient housing or economic opportunities, and that there is no access to basic resources. Therefore the project intended to create improved livelihoods for Syrian children in Edirne has little effect on them.

The fact that the European Union stated in last example that it allocates money towards places refuged people live in, also contrasts their projects under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey. No other development projects have been found to be implemented in Edirne by the EU, therefore also no development of housing and other resources that would benefit these humans. Besides, creating economic opportunities for Syrians in Edirne is not an objective the EU strives to complete. Humanitarian projects implemented in Edirne contain “Supporting Adapted and Culturally Sensitive Healthcare Services”, “Emergency Social Safety Net Assistance”, “Access to Protection and Services” and “Providing Protection and Durable Solutions” (European Commission, 2021:2), the other projects

being similar and repetitions of the aforementioned ones. Firstly, it is important to discuss that these projects are ones that do not develop resources for refuged people to make Edirne more liveable, but are moreover aimed at providing humanitarian aid after atrocities already have happened, like we see at how refuged people live in home-made shacks along the highway or in parks in Edirne. Therefore, building a sustainable future can be ruled out as being the intention of the European Union. Secondly, we have discussed arguments that counter these projects, as we concluded that refuged people do not have access to protection as they are apprehended and detained illegally in a removal centre, a place where they are counteracted by officials when trying to reach out to lawyers, or are in danger because of the way they are treated by border guards and police, who commit human rights violations by trapping them in no-man's land and using military gear on them, as we have discussed in chapter 4 (section 4.3, phase 4). This leads to their security and protection being marginalized, while at the same time the European Union claims it creates protection for refuged people. Besides, as discussed, access to health care in home-made refugee camps or the removal centre in Edirne is not available, thus meaning that till this day the European Union's project on "Supporting Adapted and Culturally Sensitive Health Care" (European Commission, 2021:2) can be considered obsolete.

We can conclude that the European Union has no intention of creating economic opportunities for refuged people in Edirne, as there are no revelatory projects that match this. We may assume that, though no clear statement about this by the EU was found, economic opportunities may be an incentive for refuged people to move to Edirne, them seeing this city as a possible place of habitation in await of crossing the border. Therefore, they are moving closer to the European Union's border from Istanbul, something the EU does not want to see happening, as they consider refuged people as a threat to its security. Keeping them in Istanbul is considered a more suitable option, therefore not implementing policies that would enhance Edirne's attractiveness.

This section has shown that the European Union, through its removal centre initiative and projects, has no intention of improving conditions of refuged people in Edirne, as human rights violations are still happening, project yield no sufficient results and bureaucratic violations are silently agreed upon by the European Union. Therefore, we can conclude that it's policy in Edirne is similar to the ones in Kayseri and Istanbul, with the distinction of Edirne being the beginning of the chain in Turkey from which refuged people are deported back through the county until they possibly end up back in Syria.

#### **6.4 Effects of these policies on Human Rights**

In these next two sections I will address the effects the European Union's policies have on the human rights dimension and whether migrant trajectories change because of them. Firstly I will address the effect on human rights, which is a conclusion that follows previous sections about Kayseri, Istanbul and Edirne. Since many violations already have been discussed in depth, I will not address all of them. Therefore, the aim of this section is to give a clear overarching statement on what the effect is on the human rights of refuged people, but also what the effect is politically. Furthermore, I will give my opinion on whether the European Union has to lecture other countries on human rights violations or not and elaborate on what the EU can do that would be best for refuged people.

In all, we see that many human rights violations are committed against refuged people in Turkey. Many reside in bigger cities, without resources that would support their livelihoods as they fled places that were not safe and had to leave everything behind. As cities are places where equality is not always as common, meaning places in which poverty, social segregation and social inequality can be observed, where housing can be scarce, inaccessibility to health care and jobs, etc. human rights violations happening willingly and knowingly by institutions and officials is especially inhumane; humans that cannot support themselves in cities like Kayseri, Istanbul and Edirne already experience hardships and are extra vulnerable to more happening. When we take into account that the discussion is about basic human rights, one should not look to the other side and tolerate such atrocities.

Refuged people in Kayseri, Istanbul and Edirne all experienced similar violations, such as inaccessibility to legal representation, which was characterised by the inability to apply for any form of protection from within a removal centre as lawyers could not be accessed, even resulting in lawyers being detained illegally. In Kayseri, the ASAM Field Office could provide legal representation to refuged people, however, as discussed, as the funding-partnership changed from first being with the UNHCR, then to the European Union. Because of this new partnership, refuged people could not apply anymore to the UNHCR, but had to do so too the Turkish authorities, which was obligatory because of the EU-Turkey Agreement. Besides, funding was not sufficient, leading to less aid given, as well as that human rights organisations were counterworked to provide their resources to refuged people. Furthermore, proper health care is also inaccessible as instances can be observed in which some people even had illnesses in centres without receiving any form of care. This was similar in all three cities, like the violations concerning privacy, which was lacking in all removal centres we discussed, as well as the abundance of defamation, which resulted in refuged people not knowing who they could consult for help. Furthermore, refuged people in the removal centres in all cities also experienced some form of physical assault or deprivation, as some were detained in little holding cells without windows, some were beaten by guards, or inadequate nutrition.

Kayseri, Istanbul and Edirne differ in some ways, such as that the abundance of information of ill-treatment within Edirne's removal centre is better known than ill-treatment in Kayseri's, as less reports have been published about this one. Furthermore, Istanbul's removal centres experience gender segregation, which the other cities' centres do not. This can be considered discriminatory as male refuged people experienced less rights than women, something we cannot know the reasons of as not much information is accessible to the public.

When looking at the human rights violations that happen outside of detention facilities like removal centres, we see that especially Edirne's case stands out. Refuged people's actual direct contact with the European Union can only happen at its border, meaning these places are the most likely to see

conflicts arising. Greek and Turkish border guards both committed violations, such as illegal apprehension and detaining of refuged people, firing upon people who cannot defend themselves, beatings, and other atrocities. Next to that, since the European Union is not obliged to provide housing to refuged people in Turkey, we cannot hold the EU responsible for the lack thereof. However, since the EU has closed a deal with Turkey in which both countries actively engage in the detention and refoulement of people who under international law, like the Geneva convention, are protected from this, the European Union is to blame for the situation refuged people end up in. If one engages in an act that is illegal, one should accept consequences, something that is a fundamental principle to every countries' legal system. So should the European Union also accept the consequence of that they have failed in making sure the same people they illegally rejected are taken care off? Because the European Union funds projects like removal centres or others that fall under the European Commission's Facility for Refugees in Turkey, they can be held accountable for violations that are committed under their institutions. It seems however that the European Union is either not aware, or does not want to be aware off the human rights violations happening in Turkey. Many reports have been published by the organisations like Human Rights Watch, the Red Cross, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Amnesty International and others, that discuss such violations, including reports by the European Union's Commission, Council, Parliament and Delegates themselves. Therefore, we can conclude that the EU must be informed about the situation. So then the question arises why no action is taken in making sure human rights violations are reduced or stopped? This question will be answered in the conclusion of this thesis, chapter 7. If projects launched by the European Union do not improve the situation for refuged people as these projects do not operate sufficiently, the EU implements measures that keeps them away from their border, the EU implements policies that create inaccessibility to certain resources and does this knowingly, Next to the fact they fund all of this, they can be held responsible for human rights violations committed against Syrian refuged people in Kayseri, Istanbul and Edirne.

The European Union lectures Turkey on human rights as they state that the “deterioration of human and fundamental rights continued” in which there has been “lack of institutional independence, ... [removal of] crucial safeguards protecting detainees from abuse, ... lack of independent judiciary” (European Commission, 2020), lack of freedom of expression and less protection of minorities, such as Syrian refuted people. The EU criticises these multiple human rights violations and thereafter gives a statement on how Turkey should act to limit this happening. This is supported by the fact that the “EU seems to be asking Turkey to simultaneously be ‘nicer on asylum seekers’ and ‘tougher on irregular migrants’, when in reality the distinction between the two is very blurred” (Paçacı Elitok & Straubhaar, 2012 , p.53). Like we discussed in chapter 4, it is important also in this example that the usage of terms is clear, so that misunderstandings can be prevented. Which group are the asylum seekers in this example and who are irregular migrants? Asylum seekers can be irregular as well and migrants can be asylum seekers, as we have discussed in chapter 4. So we can conclude that the terms overlap and that what the European Union asks, cannot be carried out sufficiently as the objective is not clear. This leads to a situation in which Turkish officials are criticized on their practices by EU actors regardless of what they do, while the European Union takes no blame and responsibility for the caused situation. However, since we have seen that the European Union actually can be held responsible for certain human rights violations committed against refuted people, because of their funding and policies, these statements seem like a semblance. If the European Union is responsible for violations, they cannot lay the sole blame on Turkey, who carries out European policies. If the EU has the intention of improving the lives of Syrian refuted people and protect them according to international law, they should take responsibility for what they are doing and on what their intentions are. Transparency not only towards refuted people, but also towards officials and citizens benefits the situation as people do not get a wrong picture of the situation they find themselves in.

When the European Union lays blame to the Turkish government for the human rights violations committed against refuted people, Turkey could uphold the EU-Turkey Agreement, which



eventually could lead to a great influx of people crossing the border into the European Union and Schengen Area. Like we have seen before, refuged people are sometimes used as a means of pressure, as politically they could be used to gain certain goals. Turkey's president did so by threatening to open his land border close to Edirne to Greece if the European Union would not fulfil his wishes. Likewise, the European Union also request certain objectives to be reached from Turkey, like asking them to take back irregular migrants and refuged people, for which in return they would finance the Turkish government's expenses regarding taking refuged people in their country. Politics can be seen as a game in which interaction and interplay is important, as sometimes governments have to give to be able to receive. Therefore, political tension could lead to governments not wanting to cooperate. They would think their country loses out, however in the end, refuged people will be the biggest loser as they experience the hardships that come down onto them and which are happening because of governments' policies and political institutions. Refuged people also receive information about these violations happening, possibly affecting their choices of how they travel to the European Union, possibly resulting in taking the more dangerous route, like with an overcrowded rubber boat which has to cross a turbulent sea, to avoid being detained at the land border with Greece. Next to that, they may choose to travel as fast as possible through Turkey to avoid all of the trouble. Therefore, human rights violations thus could affect refuged people's migrant trajectories.

To conclude, refuged people suffer from human rights violations that are committed by Turkish officials and many more institutions. The Turkish government can be held responsible for violations happening on their territory, as they implement the operational aspect of policies, and the European Union can be held responsible as they fund the Turkish government and continue doing so while being informed human rights violations occur through projects they launched. The human aspect of the situation is lost as governments fight over the fact they want to receive as less as possible refuged people, who they think are threats to their country. These humans are then trapped in a no-man's land in which no one looks out for them and where they are left abandoned to their fate.

## **6.5 Effects of these policies on the Migrant Trajectory**

As we have now addressed the policies the European Union implements in Turkey, we can now elaborate on whether these policies had any effect on refuged people's migrant trajectory. In chapter 4, section 4.4, we discussed a map and graph that displayed two different trajectories, which we will now use to compare to the information we gathered through our research. Firstly, I will give my arguments as to why these trajectories have changed and how the policies of the European Union are causally linked to this. Then I will discuss what implementing of these policies could mean for the future change of refuged people's migrant trajectories in Turkey.

Besides affecting the human rights, the European Union's policies are clearly aimed at stopping, slowing down the influx of refuged people to Europe, which is done via the EU-Turkey Agreement, by sending back refuged people who already entered the EU, as well as the detention and transferring to cities further away from the border. Firstly, policy making [by the European Union] affects and shape "refugees and migrants' decision-making for when, where, and how to move" (Kuschminder et. al., 2019, p.31). Implementing measures directly at the border leads to refuged people choosing if they want to leave Turkey, where crossing is the easiest, taking a gamble and accepting the possibility of getting hurt or having to stay in inhumane conditions, such as the self-made camps in Edirne we discussed. When refuged people crossed the border from Syria into Turkey, the initial impetus for migration has abated as they left behind the greatest danger. "This means that if the initial trigger of the migration is no longer of concern individuals will be able to make decisions with more consideration than in a time of crisis" (Kuschminder et. al., 2019, p.30). Therefore, it is more likely to critically reflect on the decisions where to migrate to onwards, as refuged people also may access "new sources of information and social networks while in transit" (Kuschminder et. al., 2019, p.30). Where they first when newly arriving in Turkey had little knowledge "regarding policies shaping migration routes and destinations" (Gilbert & Koser, 2006; Havinga & Böcker, 1999), and

relied on smugglers as their main information source (Yildiz, 2017), the situation has now changed “with increasing technology use and information availability” (Kuschminder et. al., 2019, p.33).

Refuged people therefore may consider if they can build a life in Turkey as movement to the European Union becomes more difficult. This is supported by Kuchsminder et. al., who state that refuged people’s “intention to settle in the first country of asylum [Turkey] may be altered over time because of changing conditions in the context of reception as well as changes in one’s capabilities and aspirations” (Kuchsminder et. al., 2019, p.31). Hardening of the border at Edirne, where people live in inhuman conditions, without access to health care and housing, where human rights are violated and where people face violence from border guards when coming close to the border, means some refuged people will not take the gamble of going there as they estimate the chance they can cross-over into the European Union too little. This means that their trajectory gets affected as less people would for example travel from Istanbul to Edirne, rather staying in Istanbul as there they “may have greater access to resources, for example, employment opportunities may allow refugees and migrants to generate enough income to finance their onwards migration” (Hagen-Zanker & Mallett, 2016; Koser & Kuschminder, 2016). Next to that, in a city like Istanbul, refuged people are protected from the war they faced in Syria, which was their initial impetus for migration. In this example, cities across Turkey would see a great influx of refuged people as cities provide more opportunities compared to rural villages. 2015 saw many rush from Izmir to the “western frontier province of Edirne, where they hope to continue overland to Greece or Bulgaria” (Peker & Abdulrahim, 2015), as the EU-Turkey Agreement made it harder to cross the sea. However, currently the border at Edirne is also hardened, which makes crossing maybe as difficult as via the ‘Greek Islands’-route. Making a statement on which of these two trajectories remains at the moment the most favourable to refuged people, is not possible as we do not have any information on this.


However, making a prediction for the future migrant trajectories of these refuged people is possible, as we now have seen that which policies were implemented. Firstly, removal centres gave us an overview of how refuged people are sent back from being apprehended at the border, then

being detained at different removal centres going westwards through the country. Like we have discussed in chapter 4, section 4.4, some move back to Syria voluntary, however, we now have seen that European policies lead to forceable transferal and could conclude by naming this a new kind of migrant trajectory, one that does not go forwards, but backwards in the eyes of refuged people, as they become more distanced from their goal of reaching the European Union. In the eyes of the EU, this migrant trajectory goes forward as they realise their desire of moving refuged people as far away from their border as possible. Based on the conducted case study on Kayseri, Istanbul and Edirne, it became clear that these three cities all have removal centres that execute the policy of the European Union, from which we could draw the new trajectory. As we have not studied the rest of Turkey, I will leave these out of the new trajectory. Though, in future research possibly similar practices could be observed adding to this newly created trajectory, thus being of importance to society and the academic field. I already have encountered signs of such practices when conducting research on the 'Greek Islands'-route, in which Izmir's Işıkkent and Harmandalı Removal Centres were found to be executing similar practices (Global Detention Project, 2021). However, since my research was focussed on the cases of Kayseri, Istanbul and Edirne, I have not elaborated on them further in this thesis. Next to that, trajectory 3 has only been created for the case-cities and not for others in the same phases, for example Bursa, Ankara and Konya. These also could be researched in the future, adding to the academic field. In chapter 4, section 4.4, we have seen the following trajectories:

- *Trajectory 1: Syria – Phase 1 (Kilis, Gaziantep, Hatay, Şanlıurfa) – Phase 2 (Konya) – Phase 4 (Izmir) – European Union (Greek Islands)*
- *Trajectory 2: Syria – Phase 1 (Kilis, Gaziantep, Hatay, Şanlıurfa) – Phase 2A (Konya or Kayseri) – Phase 2B (Ankara) – Phase 3 (Istanbul or Bursa) – Phase 4 (Edirne) – European Union (Land Bordercrossing)*


To add to this, below I first will first give a short description of the new trajectory, before comparing the graphs and maps we discussed in chapter 4 with the new graphs and maps created after researching the cases of Kayseri, Istanbul and Edirne.

- *Trajectory 3: European Border – Phase 4 (Removal Centre in Edirne) – Phase 3 (Removal Centres in Istanbul) – Phase 2A (Removal Centre in Kayseri) – Phase 1 (Removal Centres in Kilis, Gaziantep, Hatay, Şanlıurfa) – Syria*




Like discussed in chapter 4, this graph shows Trajectory 1 and 2, which are at first similar as refuged people cross-over into Turkey from Syria to the Phase 1 provinces. Thereafter, we see some change in their behaviour as some go to Konya and some to Kayseri. From Konya, refuged people either choose to travel via Trajectory 1 directly to the Phase 4 province Izmir, or go via Trajectory 2 to the Phase 2B province of Ankara. These two different trajectories are highlighted in the colours blue for trajectory one and green for trajectory two. From Kayseri refuged people travel to Ankara and thus commence on their journey to the European Union via Trajectory 2, going through the Phase 3 provinces of Istanbul and to a lesser extent Bursa, and then on to the Phase 4 province Edirne, from where they try to cross-over into the European Union. Lastly, the grey arrow underneath Phase 1 and 2A shows the voluntary return of refuged people to Syria from these provinces.

Below, graph 2 shows the newly added Trajectory 3, which I will now discuss. Both graphs as well as the maps I will discuss in a while, can be consulted in the Appendices at the end of this thesis.




Graph 2 shows Trajectory 3 in purple which starts at the EU-Turkey border where refuged people are apprehended and detained in removal centres. From there they are transferred further away from the border first to Istanbul’s removal centres, then onto the Anatolian provinces, like Kayseri’s removal centre, and then to Phase 1’s removal centres. From there the European Union hopes to resettle refuged people in the region, like these Phase 1 provinces, or in the country of origin if safety can be guaranteed. Therefore, we see both the voluntary return arrow and Trajectory 3 arrow separately, as different motives play a role in the refoulement of refuged people to Syria.



The map on the previous page, which is the visual representation of graph 1 we discussed, displays the situation we described in chapter 4. Maps can be important as they give a visual representation that provides more information to the viewer, for example that the distance between Kayseri and Istanbul is far greater than between Edirne and Istanbul. This could have effect on how we research as we now understand that refuged people, who are transferred to the Anatolian Phase 2 provinces, have to travel this distance, thus possibly leading to research whether human rights violations are committed during these journeys. This ultimately is of societal and academic importance, as more information is published on the phenomenon we discuss in this thesis, and because this creation of information also draws attention to the public and to policy makers, pushing them to take their responsibility if violations are committed and to find a resolution on the matter.

To summarise map 1, we see that refuged people enter Turkey from Syria into Phase 1 and then travel onwards to Phase 2, which is visualised by the black arrows. Phase 2 is characterised by its lighter shade of red, and shows the two different trajectories arising, the blue arrow representing Trajectory 1, while the green arrows represent Trajectory 2. Each province in the discussed phases is highlighted in the shade of red that suits their phase. For information on how this map can be interpreted further, see chapter 4, section 4.4, or the previous section in which we discussed graph 1.



Map 2, shown on the previous page, shows the added Trajectory 3, which is highlighted in purple arrows. The first arrow starts from the European border, displayed at the left of the map, and then runs to Istanbul, from where it goes directly to Kayseri and passes Ankara and Konya, which we have not discussed in our case study. From Kayseri, the next arrow goes to the Phase 4 provinces of Kilis, Gaziantep, Hatay and Şanlıurfa and then back to Syria.

To summarise this section, we can conclude that not only refugee people's migrant trajectories have changed and will in the future because of the European Union's policies, as they face setbacks in their journeys to the European border by being detained and transferred to removal centres, but also that we can observe one more trajectory that runs in the opposite direction of Trajectory 1 and 2. When refugee people are transferred to the east of Turkey from provinces such as Edirne and Istanbul, there is no regard for the struggles they already have endured to reach these provinces, without even reaching the European Union. They will have to start this journey all over again, while facing more human rights violations, inhumane conditions, possible death and oppression by authorities. Therefore, it is important for people to realize the effect of the European Union's policies we encountered throughout this research, to minimize such violations happening in the future and to find a sustainable solution that suits all, and mainly takes into account the humane perspective on how our fellow-humans should be treated.



## 7. Conclusion

In this thesis the focus lay on the concept of Migrant Trajectories Theory, which tries to explain the complex structure of how migrants and refuged people travel to reach a certain destination and it's components that make up this journey, looking at where they settle temporarily, what their intentions are, what they experience throughout their trajectory, such as human rights violations, and other factors. As many articles have been published and many journals have been written about the so-called 'migrant crisis' from an European perspective, for example on how refuged people are treated, i.e. violations of human rights, in Turkey by the Turkish government, my focus was elsewhere. I intended on finding out whether European policy affects refuged people's possibility of reaching the European Union and whether migrant trajectories and their livelihoods, in the form of human rights, are affected. When discussing refuged people crossing-over into the European Union, media and academics have focussed on the 'Greek Islands'-route, which entails that refuged people cross the Aegean Sea from Izmir into the EU onto islands which are Greece's territory. In the past years, since the border hardened in this area, refuged people have sought another route, finding it at the border crossing near the city of Edirne. This meant the media and academics also now paid attention to this part of Turkey, however not much has been published yet on the conditions refuged people find themselves in. Furthermore, as articles on the effects of European policy in Turkey are scarce, I decided to focus my research on this matter. I chose three cities, all in different positions of the migration process, as they are located from east to west, being Kayseri, Istanbul and Edirne. This resulted in a main research question: *"How does European migration policy differ between the three major Turkish cities of Edirne, Istanbul and Kayseri and in which way do such policies affect the refuged people's migrant trajectories?"*

The first part of the analysis, chapter 4, contains a discussion on which term is best to use, being migrant or refugee. I decided to go with refugee as my hypothesis was that the European Union tries to stop the influx of refugees to the continent, who they cannot refuse entry legally under the

Geneva Convention, while migrants can be denied, thus resulting in the EU trying other means to meet their wishes. To keep a human perspective on these terms, the term *refuged people* was used instead of *refugee*, because said term does not categorizes people into groups and does not objectify them. Thereafter, I discussed the origin of these *refuged people*, concluding the greatest influx came from Syria, which was also the group of people the European Union targeted to decline.

This led me to discussing where *refuged people* can be found in Turkey, then constructing these findings into a 'Phase-concept', which can be considered a part of the bigger concept of 'Migrant Trajectories'. When researching the different provinces and discussing them in chapter 4, I found that some provinces experienced a similar situation and therefore could be grouped together into a phase, which contrasted other 'groups' of provinces. This lead to the creation of four phases that are distinct from each other, in ways such as the intention of *refuged people* to settle there, the access to resources they receive, the opportunities they can realise, the degree of protection they enjoy, etc. These phases then displayed the bigger picture of how *refuged people* migrated through Turkey as we saw them moving from one phase to another in the direction of the European Union. This resulted in two main paths, named Trajectory 1, being the 'Greek Islands'-route, and Trajectory 2, being the route that passed Kayseri, Istanbul and Edirne, where *refuged people* crossed-over into the European Union.

When discussing the discourses present in European society, we came to a conclusion that these were constructed by misinformation, which was shared by the media, such as in journals. Society relies on the media for their supply of information, and thus created a general discourse based on misinformation that was present in media articles. As politicians are the representatives of society, they too were affected by the public discourse. This leads to governments constructing a political discourse, based on public discourse, from which policies are made. Because the European Union consists out of representatives from its member states' politicians, their discourse is affected by the individual discourses of these member states. Therefore its policies resemble those of national

governments. In Europe we found the governments to be 'anti-refugee', who they saw as a threat to their cultural and historical identity, culture, security, economy and societal norms and values. Most member states shared these views except Germany and France, who are strong members in the Union, meaning they have great influence over its policies. Therefore, the European Union's policies regarding refuged people were harsh on the part of implementing policies that would see as less people as possible entering Europe, while being mild on the part of caring for refuged people's well-being by funding projects that would enhance their human rights in Turkey.

However, as chapter 6 showed, we can clearly conclude the European Union does its best to strain the influx of refuged people to its territory by creating and funding structures that transfer these people back through Turkey and keeps them in this way far from Europe's border. This mainly is done by removal centres, that are present in all the case-cities: Kayseri, Istanbul and Edirne. Paired with these removal centres is the fact human rights are violated, like access to legal representation, health care, privacy, security and others, to an extent human rights organisations call on the Turkish government and European Union to take action. Kayseri, Istanbul and Edirne did not differ much regarding the aspect of human rights violations, as we saw similar conditions in all cities. The European Union then launched multiple projects to improve conditions, however as we saw in chapter 6, these were gimmicks that did not help the situation for refuged people in its whole, but only tackled small issues. Furthermore, arguments were given as to why these projects contributed to the growth of inequality. We concluded by stating that the European Union is responsible for the human rights violations that were committed as they funded willingly and knowingly these projects that had a negative impact on the refuged people's well-being.

Thereafter, I analysed how refuged people's migrant trajectories changed because of the policies the European Union has implemented in Turkey, coming to the conclusion that apart from the observed Trajectory 1 and 2, we also now could see a Trajectory 3, in which refuged people are detained in removal centres and transferred back eastward through Turkey until they are deported

back to Syria. This is in line with the discourse found in Europe as seeing refugees people as a threat and therefore trying to keep as much of them away as possible. These removal centres thereof acted as our main source for the refolement that the EU practices, together with reports from human rights organisations like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, who interviewed refuged people, in which the same practices were explained on the basis of refuged people's experiences.

Therefore, we can conclude when answering our main research question that European migration policies do not significantly differ between Kayseri, Istanbul and Edirne, as the same practices and effects of these practices are observed. However, the policies do have an effect on the refuged people's migrant trajectories, as some will make the decision to stay in Turkey and build their future, while some may choose to take another route as they feel crossing via Edirne is not safe. Next to that, we have added a third trajectory that is enforced by the European Union and goes backwards in the eyes of refuged people, but goes forward in the eyes of the European Union. The conceptual model therefore is not accurate as differences between cities did not have an effect on human rights violations and the change of migrant trajectories. Though, European policies did have a direct effect.

Since we have looked at three cases, being Kayseri, Istanbul and Edirne, the question arises if similar practices can be observed in the other cities in Turkey. Therefore, future research could dive deeper into this concept, by doing so contributing to the academic field. Furthermore, while we now have discussed the European Union's policies in Turkey, in fact not much has been published about this topic. Therefore, I recommend future research to also delve deeper into this topic for us to gain more knowledge about the phenomenon. While the European Union can be deemed partially responsible for the atrocities committed, research could also focus on the Turkish government's policies regarding refuged people to see if they should be held responsible as well. As discussed, during my research I came up with the concept of phases under the broader concept of Migrant Trajectories. As no other article has been published in which this concept is mentioned, it is important that first

research is done that verifies this idea of phases during a migrant trajectory, before we accept it as a valid theory. Therefore, research could focus on different transit countries that see influxes of refuged people, like Colombia, Mexico, Morocco, Egypt and others, in which the focus could be on whether phases exist in these countries, whether these phases have the same characteristics and whether they link up to become a migrant trajectory. When true, this would ultimately be relevant to the academic field, as it adds an element to the theory of Migrant Trajectories, something about which more research should be published. This would help us better understand phenomena like migration, the incentives that lead people to migrate and the consequences migration has.

Because of extraterritorial European policy, refuged people are trapped in Turkey and may decide to settle long-term in the country, which ultimately would have an effect on Turkish society. Therefore, it is important for the European Union to recognize their wrong-doings and to take responsibility by taking in refuged people, as should be done when international law is followed, and should take the lengths to protect the human rights of these people, who ultimately should be looked upon as human beings and not chess pieces in a political game that does harm to them. In Europe we should consider the thought of welcoming these humans as they flee for safety from a place that is subjected to poverty, violence, human rights abuses, no opportunities, no resources and most importantly death, something every human should not be pushed to experience.

in the poem titled 'Home':

"No one leaves home unless home is the mouth of a shark" – Warsan Shire, 2015



(Figure 10:  
Selta/Shutterstock, w.d.)

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
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## Appendices:


All of the Appendices will be inserted into a zip file which will be send by email to supervisor.


**Appendix 1:** Figure 8: Yalçın, 2021:

1: Graph of Migrant Trajectories of Syrian Refugees in Turkey.




**Appendix 2:** Figure 11: Yalçın, 2021:  
2: Graph of Migrant Trajectories of Syrian Refugees in Turkey.





**Appendix 3: Figure 9:**  
Yalçın, 2021: 1: Migrant  
Trajectories of Syrian  
Refugees in Turkey:  
Paths refugees take  
passing through the 4  
phases of transit





**Appendix 3:** Figure 12:  
Yalçın, 2021: 1: Migrant  
Trajectories of Syrian  
Refugees in Turkey:  
Paths refugees take  
passing through the 4  
phases of transit

# Appendix 4: European Commission (2021:2): Facility for Refugees in Turkey – Kayseri project sheet

Type of intervention	Title of the project	EU Budget - Facility	Implementing Partner	Location
Development	Living and Working Together: Integrating Syrians to Turkish Economy <sup>7</sup>	15 000 000	Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği (TOBB)	Şanlıurfa, İstanbul, Hatay, Gaziantep, Adana, Mersin, Kilis, Mardin, Iznir, Bursa, Konya and Kayseri
Development	Addressing Vulnerabilities of Refugees and Host Communities in Five Countries Affected by the Syria Crisis	32 399 356	Danish Red Cross (DRC)	Ankara, İstanbul, Konya, Kayseri, Kilis, Şanlıurfa, Gaziantep, Mardin, Kahramanmaraş, Mersin, Hatay, Iznir, Adana, Kocaeli
Humanitarian	Increased access to non-formal education programmes for vulnerable refugee children in Turkey	12 500 000	United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)	Ankara, Gaziantep, Kilis, Iznir, İstanbul, Şanlıurfa, Adana, Mersin, Adıyaman, Batman, Bursa, Hatay, Kahramanmaraş, Mardin, Osmaniye, Konya, Kayseri
Development	Support to the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement of 18 March 2016	60 000 000	Directorate-General of Migration Management (DGMM)	Çankırı, Kırklareli, Iznir, Kayseri, Gaziantep, Erzurum
Development	Education infrastructure for Resilience Activities in Turkey	150 000 000	World Bank (WB)	Adana, Mersin, Hatay, Kilis, Kahramanmaraş, Osmaniye, İstanbul, Ankara, Bursa, Iznir, Konya, Kayseri
Development	Education for all in times of crisis II	255 000 000	Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW)	Adana, Adıyaman, Gaziantep, Hatay, İstanbul, Kahramanmaraş, Kayseri, Kilis, Konya, Mardin, Mersin, Osmaniye, Şanlıurfa, Diyarbakır, Ankara, Bursa, Iznir, Kocaeli, Malatya
Development	Improving the health status of the Syrian population under temporary protection and related services provided by Turkish authorities (SINHAAT I)	300 000 000	Ministry of Health (MoH)	Adana, Adıyaman, Ankara, Batman, Burdur, Bursa, Denizli, Diyarbakır, Eskişehir, Gaziantep, Hatay, İstanbul, Iznir, Kahramanmaraş, Kayseri, Kilis, Kocaeli, Konya, Malatya, Manisa, Mardin, Mersin, Muğla, Niğde, Osmaniye, Sakarya, Samsun, Şanlıurfa, Isparta
Development	Promoting integration of Syrian Children into Turkish Education System (PIKTES)	300 000 000	Ministry of National Education (MoNE)	İstanbul, Hatay, Kayseri, Osmaniye, Kilis, Şanlıurfa, Ankara, Batman, Konya, Kocaeli, Mersin, Mardin, Malatya, Bursa, Iznir, Antalya, Sırt, Diyarbakır, Gaziantep, Adana, Kahramanmaraş, Adıyaman, Sakarya
Humanitarian	Multisectoral Assistance to Syrian Refugees Displaced by the Conflict in Turkey and Provision of Humanitarian to Migrants Rescued at Sea	1 900 000	International Organization for Migration (IOM)	İstanbul, Çanakkale, Balıkesir, Iznir, Aydın, Muğla, Antalya, Mersin, Adana, Gaziantep, Batman, Kayseri, Adıyaman, Malatya, Hatay, Şanlıurfa
Humanitarian	Enhancing access to effective services and protection for people of concern in Turkey	3 834 288	DiaKonie Karazatrophienhilfe (DKH)	Diyarbakır, Mardin, İstanbul, Adana, Mersin, Kayseri, Hatay
Humanitarian	Responding to Protection Needs of Refugees in Turkey	6 330 289	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)	İstanbul, Şanlıurfa, Hatay, Gaziantep, Adana, Mersin, Kilis, Iznir, Bursa, Mardin, Kahramanmaraş, Konya, Ankara, Kayseri, Osmaniye
Humanitarian	Proactive Actions to reduce protection vulnerabilities among displaced populations in Turkey	8 000 000	Danish Refugee Council (DRC)	Şanlıurfa, Hatay, Kilis, Kahramanmaraş, Iznir, İstanbul, Kayseri, Adana, Mersin
Humanitarian	Enhancing protection in the humanitarian response in Turkey through better addressing basic needs, supporting access to education and integrated service provision	8 000 000	International Organization for Migration (IOM)	Ankara, İstanbul, Çanakkale, Balıkesir, Iznir, Aydın, Muğla, Antalya, Mersin, Adana, Gaziantep, Batman, Kayseri, Adıyaman, Malatya, Hatay, Şanlıurfa, Mardin
Development	Generation Fund: EU Syria Trust Fund - UNICEF Partnership	36 950 286	United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)	Adana, Adıyaman, Ankara, Batman, Diyarbakır, Gaziantep, Hatay, İstanbul, Kahramanmaraş, Kayseri, Kilis, Kocaeli, Konya, Malatya, Mardin, Mersin, Osmaniye, Şanlıurfa
Humanitarian	Supporting Adapted and Culturally Sensitive Healthcare Services to Syrian Refugees in Turkey	2 000 000	World Health Organisation (WHO)	Nationwide
Humanitarian	Turkey Population Movement	8 000 000	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)	Nationwide
Development	Education and protection programme for vulnerable Syrian and host community children, in Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey	31 382 891	United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)	Nationwide
Humanitarian	Increased access to education and protection for vulnerable Syrian and non-Syrian refugee children and families in Turkey	34 000 000	United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)	Nationwide
Humanitarian	Protection and improved access to services for refugees and asylum seekers in Turkey.	25 000 000	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)	Nationwide

Type of intervention	Title of the project	EU Budget - Facility	Implementing Partner	Location
Humanitarian	Providing protection and durable solutions to refugees and asylum seekers in Turkey	43 251 517	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)	Nationwide
Humanitarian	Increased access to education and protection for vulnerable Syrian and non-Syrian refugee children and families in Turkey (CCTE)	50 000 000	United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)	Nationwide
Humanitarian	Emergency Social Safety Net Assistance to refugees in Turkey	348 000 000	World Food Programme (WFP)	Nationwide
Humanitarian	Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) Assistance to refugees in Turkey	650 000 000	World Food Programme (WFP)	Nationwide
Humanitarian	Support for school enrolment for vulnerable refugee children in Turkey	10 000 000	United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)	Adana, Ankara, Bursa, Gaziantep, Hatay, İstanbul, İzmir, Kahramanmaraş, Kayseri, Kilis, Kocaeli, Konya, Mardin, Mersin, Osmaniye, Sakarya, Şanlıurfa
Development	Enhancement of Entrepreneurship Capacities for Sustainable Socio-Economic Integration" (ENHANCER)	26 358 336	International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD)	Istanbul, Ankara, İzmir, Bursa, Gaziantep, Adana, Mersin Konya, Şanlıurfa, Kayseri, Hatay
Development	Improving the Employment Prospects for the Syrian Refugees and host communities by high-quality VET and apprenticeship in Turkey	30 000 000	Expertise France	Adana, Ankara, Bursa, Gaziantep, Hatay, İstanbul, İzmir, Kahramanmaraş, Kayseri, Kilis, Kocaeli, Konya, Mardin, Mersin, Osmaniye, Şanlıurfa and Yozgat
Development	Education for All in Times of Crisis III	100 000 000	Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW)	Şanlıurfa, Gaziantep, Hatay, İstanbul, Adana, Kahramanmaraş, Mersin, Diyarbakır, Kilis, Mardin, Osmaniye, Ankara, Bursa, İzmir, Kayseri, Konya, Adıyaman, Kocaeli, Malatya
Development	Promoting integration of Syrian kids into Turkish Education System (PIRKES II)	400 000 000	Ministry of National Education (MONE)	İstanbul, Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa, Hatay, Ankara, Mersin, Adana, Bursa, Kahramanmaraş, Kilis, Konya, İzmir, Kayseri, Osmaniye, Mardin, Kocaeli, Malatya, Adıyaman, Diyarbakır, Samsun, Sakarya, Antalya, Çorum, Eskişehir, Yalova, Batman
Development	Municipal services improvement Project	140 178 320	World Bank (WB)	Adana, Kahramanmaraş, Osmaniye, Kayseri, Konya
Development	Formal Employment creation project	80 000 000	World Bank (WB)	İstanbul, Şanlıurfa, Hatay, Gaziantep, Adana, Mersin, Bursa, İzmir, Kilis, Konya, Mardin, Ankara, Kahramanmaraş, Kayseri, Kocaeli, Osmaniye, Diyarbakır, Malatya, Adıyaman, Batman, Manisa, Denizli, Tekirdağ, Sakarya
Humanitarian	Protection and improved access to services for refugees and asylum seekers in Turkey.	8 100 000	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)	Nationwide
Humanitarian	Access to protection and services for refugees and asylum seekers in Turkey	23 929 195	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)	Nationwide
Humanitarian	Increased access to education and protection for vulnerable Syrian and non-Syrian refugee children and families in Turkey (CCTE)	70 000 000	United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)	Nationwide
Humanitarian	Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) Assistance to refugees in Turkey	357 800 000	World Food Programme (WFP)	Nationwide
Humanitarian	Emergency Social Safety Net Assistance for Refugees in Turkey	500 000 000	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)	Nationwide

## Appendix 5: European Commission (2021:2): Facility for Refugees in Turkey – Istanbul project sheet

Type of intervention	Title of the Project	EU Budget - Facility	Implementing Partner	Location
Development	HOPES - Higher and Further Education Opportunities and Perspectives for Syrians	2 700 000	Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst (DAAD)	Istanbul, Karabük, Adana and Gaziantep
Development	Strengthening Economic Opportunities for Syrians Under Temporary Protection and Host Communities in Selected Provinces	5 000 000	World Bank (WB)	Adana, Hatay, Istanbul, Şanlıurfa, Gaziantep, Mersin, Ankara, Izmir
Development	Strengthening the Resilience of Syrian Women and Girls and Host Communities in Iraq, Jordan and Turkey	5 000 000	UN Women	Ankara, Gaziantep, Mardin, Kilis, Şanlıurfa and Istanbul
Development	Improved access to health services for Syrian refugees in Turkey	11 500 000	World Health Organisation (WHO)	Ankara, Gaziantep, Hatay, Istanbul, Izmir, Mersin, Şanlıurfa
Development	Job Creation and Entrepreneurship Opportunities for Syrians under Temporary Protection and Host Communities in Turkey	11 610 000	International Labour Organization (ILO)	Ankara, Istanbul, Bursa, Konya, Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa, Adana, Mersin, Hatay
Development	Living and Working Together: Integrating SuTRs to Turkish Economy"	15 000 000	Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği (TOBB)	Şanlıurfa, Istanbul, Hatay, Gaziantep, Adana, Mersin, Kilis, Mardin, Izmir, Bursa, Konya and Kayseri
Development	Qudra – Resilience for Syrian Refugees, IDPs and host communities in response to the Syrian and Iraq crises	18 207 812	Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)	Adana, Gaziantep, Hatay, Istanbul, Kilis, Mersin, Şanlıurfa
Development	Strengthening the Operational Capacities of the Turkish Coast Guard in Managing Migration Flows in the Mediterranean Sea	20 000 000	International Organization for Migration (IOM)	Antalya, Ankara, Antalya, Izmir, Çanakkale, Istanbul, Trabzon, Samsun, Adana, Hatay, Balıkesir, Muğla
Humanitarian	Increased access to protection and basic needs support for vulnerable refugee children and families	8 000 000	United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)	Ankara, Istanbul, Izmir, Gaziantep, Adana, Edirne, Izmir, Çanakkale, Balıkesir, Muğla, Aydın
Development	Addressing Vulnerabilities of Refugees and Host Communities in Five Countries Affected by the Syria Crisis	32 399 356	Danish Red Cross (DRC)	Ankara, Istanbul, Konya, Kayseri, Kilis, Şanlıurfa, Gaziantep, Mardin, Kahramanmaraş, Mersin, Hatay, Izmir, Adana, Kocaeli
Humanitarian	Increased access to non-formal education programmes for vulnerable refugee children in Turkey	12 500 000	United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)	Ankara, Gaziantep, Kilis, Izmir, Istanbul, Şanlıurfa, Adana, Mersin, Adıyaman, Batman, Bursa, Hatay, Kahramanmaraş, Mardin, Osmaniye, Konya, Kayseri
Development	Social and Economic Cohesion through Vocational Education	50 000 000	Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW)	Adana, Bursa, Gaziantep, Hatay, Istanbul, Kilis, Mersin, Şanlıurfa
Development	Employment Support for Syrians under Temporary Protection and Host Communities	50 000 000	World Bank (WB)	Adana, Şanlıurfa, Gaziantep, Istanbul
Development	UNDP Turkey Resilience Project in response to the Syria Crisis (TRP)	50 000 000	United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)	Gaziantep, Hatay, Şanlıurfa, Kilis, Izmir, Bursa, Adana, Konya, Mersin, Manisa, Istanbul
Development	Education Infrastructure for Resilience Activities in Turkey	150 000 000	World Bank (WB)	Adana, Mersin, Hatay, Kilis, Kahramanmaraş, Osmaniye, Istanbul, Ankara, Bursa, Izmir, Konya, Kayseri
Development	Education for all in times of crisis II	255 000 000	Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW)	Adana, Adıyaman, Gaziantep, Hatay, Istanbul, Kahramanmaraş, Kayseri, Kilis, Konya, Mardin, Mersin, Osmaniye, Şanlıurfa, Diyarbakır, Ankara, Bursa, Izmir, Kocaeli, Malatya
Development	Improving the health status of the Syrian population under temporary protection and related services provided by Turkish Authorities (SIHAT I)	300 000 000	Ministry of Health (MoH)	Adana, Adıyaman, Ankara, Batman, Burdur, Bursa, Denizli, Diyarbakır, Elazığ, Gaziantep, Hatay, Istanbul, Izmir, Kahramanmaraş, Kayseri, Kilis, Kocaeli, Konya, Malatya, Manisa, Mardin, Mersin, Muğla, Nevşehir, Osmaniye, Sakarya, Samsun, Şanlıurfa, Isparta
Development	Promoting Integration of Syrian Children into Turkish Education System (PIKTES)	300 000 000	Ministry of National Education (MoNE)	Istanbul, Hatay, Kayseri, Osmaniye, Kilis, Şanlıurfa, Ankara, Batman, Konya, Kocaeli, Mersin, Mardin, Malatya, Bursa, Izmir, Antalya, Sırt, Diyarbakır, Gaziantep, Adana, Kahramanmaraş, Adıyaman, Sakarya
Humanitarian	Refugee Protection Response in Turkey	680 071	Mercy Corps (MC)	Izmir, Manisa, Uşak, Denizli, Muğla, Istanbul and Kocaeli



Type of intervention	Title of the Project	EU Budget - Facility	Implementing Partner	Location
Humanitarian	Providing Life Improving Protection: Support to Vulnerable Refugees and Host Families in Turkey	1 758 531	World Vision (WV)	Ankara, Bursa, İstanbul, Mersin
Humanitarian	A multi-stakeholders and multi sectoral response mechanism improves the access to inclusive and quality services for the most vulnerable Syrian and non-Syrian refugees including people with disabilities in West Turkey (Izmir and Istanbul city)	1 810 936	Humanity and Inclusion (HI)	Izmir, İstanbul
Humanitarian	Multisectoral Assistance to Syrian Refugees Displaced by the Conflict in Turkey and Provision of Humanitarian to Migrants Rescued at Sea	1 900 000	International Organization for Migration (IOM)	İstanbul, Çanakkale, Balıkesir, İzmir, Aydın, Muğla, Antalya, Mersin, Adana, Gaziantep, Batman, Kayseri, Adıyaman, Malatya, Hatay, Şanlıurfa
Humanitarian	Provision of Medical Relief to Refugees and Migrants in Turkey through Direct Support to Health Facilities and Implementing Partners	2 977 918	Médecins du Monde (MDM)	Batman, Diyarbakır, İstanbul, İzmir, Hatay
Humanitarian	Contribute to sustainable integration of refugees into host population	3 000 000	Médecins du Monde (MDM)	İstanbul, Hatay, İzmir
Humanitarian	Strengthening Access to Specialized Health Services for Refugees in Turkey - Phase II (SASH II)	3 000 000	Relief International	Ankara, İstanbul, Kilis
Humanitarian	Providing information and protection assistance to vulnerable refugees in Turkey, and linking them to protection services.	3 192 000	World Vision (WV)	İstanbul, Bursa, Ankara, Konya, Mersin, İzmir
Humanitarian	Enhancing access to effective services and protection for people of concern in Turkey	3 834 288	Diakonie Katastrophenhilfe (DKH)	Diyarbakır, Mardin, İstanbul, Adana, Mersin, Kayseri, Hatay
Humanitarian	Unconditional Cash Assistance and Protection for Out-of-camp and Newcomer Syrian and Iraqi Refugees Settled in Southeast Turkey	5 500 000	Diakonie Katastrophenhilfe (DKH)	Diyarbakır, Batman, Hatay, Şanlıurfa, İstanbul
Humanitarian	Responding to Protection Needs of Refugees in Turkey	6 330 289	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)	İstanbul, Şanlıurfa, Hatay, Gaziantep, Adana, Mersin, Kilis, İzmir, Bursa, Mardin, Kahramanmaraş, Konya, Ankara, Kayseri, Osmaniye
Humanitarian	Improving access of most vulnerable refugees to Social Services in Turkey	7 000 000	United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)	Ankara, Adana, Adıyaman, Bursa, Batman, İstanbul, İzmir, Mersin, Hatay, Şanlıurfa, Gaziantep, Kahramanmaraş, Kilis, Osmaniye, Konya, Kocaeli, Diyarbakır, Malatya, Mardin
Humanitarian	Proactive Actions to reduce protection vulnerabilities among displaced populations in Turkey	8 000 000	Danish Refugee Council (DRC)	Şanlıurfa, Hatay, Kilis, Kahramanmaraş, İzmir, İstanbul, Kayseri, Adana, Mersin
Humanitarian	Enhancing Protection in the humanitarian response in Turkey through better addressing basic needs, supporting access to education and integrated service provision	8 000 000	International Organization for Migration (IOM)	Ankara, İstanbul, Çanakkale, Balıkesir, İzmir, Aydın, Muğla, Antalya, Mersin, Adana, Gaziantep, Batman, Kayseri, Adıyaman, Malatya, Hatay, Şanlıurfa, Mardin
Humanitarian	Strengthen the longer-term resilience of refugees and migrants by improving the level of their emotional, mental, and physical wellbeing.	9 000 000	Médecins du Monde (MDM)	İstanbul, İzmir, Hatay, Gaziantep, Kilis, Manisa
Humanitarian	Support to most vulnerable Refugee women and girls to access Sexual Reproductive health (SRH) and Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV) Services.	9 000 000	United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)	Adıyaman, Ankara, Bursa, Ekişehir, Gaziantep, İzmir, İstanbul, Kahramanmaraş, Mardin, Mersin, Şanlıurfa
Humanitarian	Supporting adapted and culturally sensitive healthcare services to refugees and migrants in Turkey	9 641 130	World Health Organization (WHO)	Ankara, İstanbul, Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa, Hatay, Mersin, İzmir
Humanitarian	Improving access of most vulnerable refugees, particularly women, girls and key refugee groups to Sexual Reproductive Health (SRH) and better protection services including Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV) in Turkey	15 166 870	United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)	Adana, Adıyaman, Ankara, Batman, Bursa, Denizli, Ekişehir, Gaziantep, Hatay, İstanbul, İzmir, Konya, Mardin, Mersin, Kahramanmaraş, Şanlıurfa, Yalova
Development	Generation Found: EU Syria Trust Fund - UNICEF Partnership	36 950 286	United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)	Adana, Adıyaman, Ankara, Batman, Diyarbakır, Gaziantep, Hatay, İstanbul, Kahramanmaraş, Kayseri, Kilis, Kocaeli, Konya, Malatya, Mardin, Mersin, Osmaniye, Şanlıurfa
Humanitarian	Food Assistance to Vulnerable Syrian Populations in Turkey Affected by Conflict in Syria	40 000 000	World Food Programme (WFP)	Ankara, Bursa, İstanbul, İzmir, Konya, Mardin, Şanlıurfa

Type of intervention	Title of the Project	EU Budget - Facility	Implementing Partner	Location
Humanitarian	Supporting Adapted and Culturally Sensitive Healthcare Services to Syrian Refugees in Turkey	2 000 000	World Health Organisation (WHO)	Nationwide
Humanitarian	Turkey Population Movement	8 000 000	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)	Nationwide
Development	Education and protection programme for vulnerable Syrian and host community children, in Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey	31 382 891	United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)	Nationwide
Humanitarian	Increased access to education and protection for vulnerable Syrian and non-Syrian refugee children and families in Turkey	34 000 000	United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)	Nationwide
Humanitarian	Protection and improved access to services for refugees and asylum seekers in Turkey.	25 000 000	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)	Nationwide
Humanitarian	Providing protection and durable solutions to refugees and asylum seekers in Turkey	43 251 517	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)	Nationwide
Humanitarian	Increased access to education and protection for vulnerable Syrian and non-Syrian refugee children and families in Turkey (CCTE)	50 000 000	United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)	Nationwide
Humanitarian	Emergency Social Safety Net Assistance to refugees in Turkey	348 000 000	World Food Programme (WFP)	Nationwide
Humanitarian	Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) Assistance to refugees in Turkey	650 000 000	World Food Programme (WFP)	Nationwide
Humanitarian	Improving access of most vulnerable refugees to Social Services in Turkey	234 322	United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)	Ankara, Adana, Adiyaman, Bursa, Batman, Istanbul, Izmir, Mersin, Hatay, Şanlıurfa, Gaziantep, Kahramanmaraş, Kilis, Osmaniye, Konya, Kocaeli, Diyarbakır, Malatya, Mardin
Humanitarian	Providing information and protection assistance to vulnerable refugees in Turkey and enhancing community-based protection	1 800 000	World Vision (WV)	Istanbul, Bursa, Ankara, Konya
Humanitarian	Better access to protection services for the most vulnerable refugee groups in Turkey	2 400 000	United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)	Ankara, Istanbul, Eskişehir, Mersin, Yalova, Denizli, Adana, Izmir
Humanitarian	Strengthened protection and wellbeing among refugee children, youth and adults in Istanbul and Ankara	2 500 000	Save The Children (SC)	Istanbul and Ankara
Humanitarian	Coordinated and integrated protection assistance for refugees living in Ankara, Bilecik, Eskişehir, Istanbul, Kütahya and Van	3 500 000	Deutsche Welthungerhilfe (WHH)	Istanbul, Bilecik, Eskişehir, Kütahya, Van, Ankara
Humanitarian	Addressing protection risks of displacement affected populations in Turkey through targeted initiatives	3 700 000	Danish Refugee Council (DRC)	Adana, Hatay, Kilis, Kahramanmaraş, Şanlıurfa, Istanbul
Humanitarian	Supporting Transition and Access in Turkey for Specialized Health Services (STAT)	4 765 678	Relief International (RI)	Gaziantep, Hatay, Istanbul, Izmir, Kilis, Manisa
Humanitarian	Improving the wellbeing of refugees and migrants in Turkey by empowering them and facilitating access to sustainable and quality health services tailored to their needs	5 000 000	Médecins du monde (MDM)	Istanbul, Izmir, Manisa, Hatay
Humanitarian	Enhancing protection of at-risk and marginalized refugees in Turkey through improved access to services	5 800 000	Diakonie Katastrophenhilfe (DKH)	Diyarbakır, Mardin, Batman, Mersin, Istanbul, Şanlıurfa
Humanitarian	Strengthening Access to Specialized Health Services for Refugees in Turkey - Phase III (SASH III)	7 900 000	Relief International (RI)	Gaziantep, Ankara, Istanbul, Kilis, Hatay, Izmir, Manisa

Type of intervention	Title of the Project	EU Budget - Facility	Implementing Partner	Location
Humanitarian	Support for school enrolment for vulnerable refugee children in Turkey	10 000 000	United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)	Adana, Ankara, Bursa, Gaziantep, Hatay, İstanbul, İzmir, Kahramanmaraş, Kayseri, Kilis, Kocaeli, Konya, Mardin, Mersin, Osmaniye, Sakarya, Şanlıurfa
Humanitarian	Leave No One Behind - Support to Localised Assistance Interventions	12 250 000	Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)	Adana, Ankara, Bursa, Çorum, Eskişehir, Gaziantep, Hatay, İstanbul, İzmir, Kilis, Konya, Mardin, Mersin, Şanlıurfa
Development	Enhancement of Entrepreneurship Capacities for Sustainable Socio-Economic Integration" (ENHANCE)	26 358 336	International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD)	İstanbul, Ankara, İzmir, Bursa, Gaziantep, Adana, Mersin Konya, Şanlıurfa, Kayseri, Hatay
Development	Improving the Employment Prospects for the Syrian Refugees and host communities by high-quality VET and apprenticeship in Turkey	30 000 000	Expertise France	Adana, Ankara, Bursa, Gaziantep, Hatay, İstanbul, İzmir, Kahramanmaraş, Kayseri, Kilis, Kocaeli, Konya, Mardin, Mersin, Osmaniye, Şanlıurfa and Yozgat
Development	Education for All in Times of Crisis III	100 000 000	Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW)	Şanlıurfa, Gaziantep, Hatay, İstanbul, Adana, Kahramanmaraş, Mersin, Diyarbakır, Kilis, Mardin, Osmaniye, Ankara, Bursa, İzmir, Kayseri, Konya, Adıyaman, Kocaeli, Malatya
Development	Promoting Integration of Syrian Kids into Turkish Education System (PITKES II)	400 000 000	Ministry of National Education (MoNE)	İstanbul, Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa, Hatay, Ankara, Mersin, Adana, Bursa, Kahramanmaraş, Kilis, Konya, İzmir, Kayseri, Osmaniye, Mardin, Kocaeli, Malatya, Adıyaman, Diyarbakır, Samsun, Sakarya, Antalya, Çorum, Eskişehir, Yalova, Batman
Development	Support to transition to labour market project	80 000 000	World Bank (WB)	Adana, İstanbul, Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa, Kocaeli, Bursa, İzmir, Konya
Development	Formal Employment creation project	80 000 000	World Bank (WB)	İstanbul, Şanlıurfa, Hatay, Gaziantep, Adana, Mersin, Bursa, İzmir, Kilis, Konya, Mardin, Ankara, Kahramanmaraş, Kayseri, Kocaeli, Osmaniye, Diyarbakır, Malatya, Adıyaman, Batman, Manisa, Denizli, Tekirdağ, Sakarya
Humanitarian	Protection and improved access to services for refugees and asylum seekers in Turkey.	8 100 000	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)	Nationwide
Humanitarian	Access to protection and services for refugees and asylum seekers in Turkey	23 929 195	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)	Nationwide
Humanitarian	Increased access to education and protection for vulnerable Syrian and non-Syrian refugee children and families in Turkey (CCTE)	70 000 000	United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)	Nationwide
Humanitarian	Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) Assistance to refugees in Turkey	357 800 000	World Food Programme (WFP)	Nationwide
Humanitarian	Emergency Social Safety Net Assistance for Refugees in Turkey	500 000 000	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)	Nationwide

## Appendix 6: European Commission (2021:2): Facility for Refugees in Turkey – Edirne project sheet

Type of intervention	Title of the Project	EU Budget - Facility	Implementing Partner	Location
Humanitarian	Increased access to protection and basic needs support for vulnerable refugee children and families	8 000 000	United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)	Ankara, İstanbul, İzmir, Gaziantep, Adana, Edirne, İzmir, Çanakkale, Balıkesir, Muğla, Aydın
Humanitarian	Humanitarian Response to Syrian Vulnerable Refugees in Southern Turkey	4 493 974	Danish Refugee Council (DRC)	Kilis, Hatay, Şanlıurfa, Gaziantep, Kahramanmaraş,, İzmir, Edirne, Muğla
Humanitarian	Supporting Adapted and Culturally Sensitive Healthcare Services to Syrian Refugees in Turkey	2 000 000	World Health Organisation (WHO)	Nationwide
Humanitarian	Turkey Population Movement	8 000 000	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)	Nationwide
Development	Education and protection programme for vulnerable Syrian and host community children, in Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey	31 382 891	United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)	Nationwide
Humanitarian	Increased access to education and protection for vulnerable Syrian and non-Syrian refugee children and families in Turkey	34 000 000	United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)	Nationwide
Humanitarian	Protection and improved access to services for refugees and asylum seekers in Turkey.	25 000 000	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)	Nationwide
Humanitarian	Providing protection and durable solutions to refugees and asylum seekers in Turkey	43 251 517	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)	Nationwide
Humanitarian	Increased access to education and protection for vulnerable Syrian and non-Syrian refugee children and families in Turkey (CCTE)	50 000 000	United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)	Nationwide
Humanitarian	Emergency Social Safety Net Assistance to refugees in Turkey	348 000 000	World Food Programme (WFP)	Nationwide
Humanitarian	Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) Assistance to refugees in Turkey	650 000 000	World Food Programme (WFP)	Nationwide
Humanitarian	Protection and improved access to services for refugees and asylum seekers in Turkey.	8 100 000	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)	Nationwide
Humanitarian	Access to protection and services for refugees and asylum seekers in Turkey	23 929 195	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)	Nationwide
Humanitarian	Increased access to education and protection for vulnerable Syrian and non-Syrian refugee children and families in Turkey (CCTE)	70 000 000	United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)	Nationwide
Humanitarian	Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) Assistance to refugees in Turkey	357 800 000	World Food Programme (WFP)	Nationwide
Humanitarian	Emergency Social Safety Net Assistance for Refugees in Turkey	500 000 000	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)	Nationwide



