From a controlling relation to joint effort assistance. Can education and training solve the tensions between civil aid organizations and the military?

Victoria Smeets (s4181204)   
[smeetsvictoria@gmail.com](mailto:smeetsvictoria@gmail.com)

Radboud University Nijmegen - Political Science - Conflict, Power & Politics

Date: August 2019

Supervisor: Dr. François Lenfant

## **Abstract**

The aim of this thesis is to explore the relationship between civil aid organizations and the military in the Netherlands. This thesis sets out to investigate the possible tensions between civil aid organizations and the military and intends to determine the extent to which education and training could solve these possible tensions and to whether education and training have an influence on the cooperation between civil aid organizations and the military. Experts from the civil field, the military field and training institutes were interviewed to get a comprehensive understanding of the possible tensions between civil aid organizations and the military, the organization of education and training in the Netherlands (concerning the preparation of a foreign mission) and the influence of education and training on solving these possible tensions and on the cooperation between civil aid organizations and the military. Results show that the main tensions between civil aid organizations and the military are situated in the lack of knowledge and misunderstanding of each other, their differences in cultures and routines and the humanitarian principals under which civil aid organizations are able to do their work. However, these tensions do not necessarily have to have a negative influence on the cooperation between civil aid organizations and the military. Education and training can help to overcome these tensions by creating knowledge and understanding about each other.

Civil Aid Organizations - Military - Civil-Military Cooperation - Tensions -   
Education & Training – Netherlands

Table of Contents

[Abstract 2](#_Toc16326859)

[List of Tables and Figures 4](#_Toc16326860)

[List of Appendices 5](#_Toc16326861)

[List of Abbreviations and Acronyms 6](#_Toc16326862)

[Chapter 1: Introduction 7](#_Toc16326863)

[1.1 Background 7](#_Toc16326864)

[1.2 Scientific and Societal Relevance 9](#_Toc16326865)

[1.3 Methodology 10](#_Toc16326866)

[1.4 Outline 10](#_Toc16326867)

[Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework 11](#_Toc16326868)

[2.1 Civil-Military Relation 11](#_Toc16326869)

[2.2 Civil-Military Gap 13](#_Toc16326870)

[2.3 Civil-Military Cooperation 13](#_Toc16326871)

[2.4 Tensions between the Civil Aid Organizations & the Military 14](#_Toc16326872)

[2.5 Education & Training 18](#_Toc16326873)

[Chapter 3: Methodology 21](#_Toc16326874)

[3.1 Research Design 21](#_Toc16326875)

[3.2 Research Method 22](#_Toc16326876)

[3.3 Analyzing Data 24](#_Toc16326877)

[Chapter 4: Empirical results 25](#_Toc16326878)

[4.1 Tensions 26](#_Toc16326879)

[4.1.1 Tensions 26](#_Toc16326880)

[4.1.2 Influence of Tensions on Cooperation 29](#_Toc16326881)

[4.2 Organization of Education & Training 29](#_Toc16326882)

[4.2.1 Influence of Education & Training on solving the Tensions 29](#_Toc16326883)

[4.2.2 Organization of Education & Training 31](#_Toc16326884)

[4.3 Influence of Education & Training 34](#_Toc16326885)

[4.4 Other Strategies 34](#_Toc16326886)

[Chapter 5: Discussion & Conclusion 36](#_Toc16326887)

[5.1 Discussion 37](#_Toc16326888)

[5.2 Conclusion 40](#_Toc16326889)

[Bibliography 41](#_Toc16326890)

[Appendices 43](#_Toc16326891)

List of Tables and Figures

Table 1: Differences in Organizational Cultures ……………………………………………………….. 15

Figure 2: Tasks ………………………………………………………………………………………………..…. 17

Table 2: Differences in Cultures & Routines …………………………………………………………….. 27

# List of Appendices

Appendix 1: List of Interviewees ………………………………………………………………………….….43

Appendix 2: List of Documents ………………………………………………………………………………45

Appendix 3: Interview Guide ……………………………………………………………………………….…46

# List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

1CMI CO Civil and Military Interaction Command

1GNC 1(German/Netherlands)Corps

CCOE Civil-Military Cooperation - Centre of Excellence

CIMIC Civil-Military Cooperation

CMC Civil-Military Cooperation

CMG Civil-Military Gap

CMR Civil-Military Relation

E&T Education and Training

MSF Médicins Sans Frontières

# Chapter 1: Introduction

## Background

Huntington (1959) and Janowitz (1960) initiated the theoretical discussion regarding the relationship between the civil institution and the military institution. They argue that the civil authority must control the military and that the military must not overpower the civil authority of a state. The civil authority must be the institution in control of a nation. The focus of this relationship shifted over time, which was partly due to a changing crisis environment. The focus shifted towards civil aid organizations working with the military instead of the civil authority controlling the military. Nowadays, the relationship is more about an international joint effort involving the civil aid organizations and the military to assist each other in crisis situations.   
 This new crisis environment has developed new kinds of crises. Globalization has made these new kinds of crises intensified (Kaldor, 2006). There is a growing number of diverse international actors involved in new kind of crises. States are not the only actors involved in crisis situations anymore (ibid). This makes it more difficult to solve these crises, because a lot of different interests must be taken into consideration. Non-state actors, as for example civil aid organizations or the local populations, are more involved and/or affected by in contemporary crises. The local populations are already affected by the crises taking place in their country, but a changing mode of warfare made local populations even more vulnerable with irregular military actors deliberately aiming violence at them (Kaldor, 2006; Abiew, 2003). Civil aid organizations play an important role in crises by providing relief aid to the local population, but they cannot protect them from a next attack. These new kinds of crises have initiated an evolution of thinking on how to deal with such multifaceted situations. It is simply impossible for one institution to manage such a crisis by themselves. A joint effort involving civil aid organizations and the military is necessary to bring peace in contemporary crises (Abiew, 2003; Jenny, 2001; Gourlay, 2000; Spence, 2002; Rietjens, van Fenema & Essens, 2013). Contemporary crises are too much work and too diverse work for one institution to resolve it on their own (ibid). The military provides security and safety and the civil aid organizations assist in rebuilding the area (ibid). The joint effort of civil aid organizations and the military gets complicated by the extreme dissimilarity between the two institutions and their unfamiliarity with each other’s characteristics (ibid; Byman, 2001). The two institutions differ extremely from each other regarding cultures, procedures and tasks. The unfamiliarity with these differences ‘is a breeding ground for misunderstanding and poor coordination’ (Duffey, 2000, p. 148) and complicates a joint effort (Vogelaar & Kramer, 2004). This lack of familiarity with each other is a source of tensions between the civil aid organizations and the military. The main tensions relate to (1) differences in organizational culture, (2) danger, (3) ambiguity about tasks and (4) inadequate civil-civil coordination. Education and training (E&T) may increase the probability to overcome these tensions (Abiew, 2003; Jenny, 2001; Gourlay, 2000; Spence, 2002; Rietjens et al., 2013; Byman, 2001; Duffey; 2000). E&T help with expanding knowledge about each other and becoming more familiar with each other. E&T are crucial for understanding each other’s way of thinking. It helps with the recognition and understanding of differences before they result in misunderstanding (Duffey, 2000).

Civil-military relations (CMR) and civil-military cooperation (CMC) have been studied by many researchers, mainly by studying the consequences of a controlling relationship or joint effort and the subsequent tensions of it. One example is Jenny (2001) who warns for negative consequences (endangering the neutrality and independence of the civil aid organizations and with that their ability to provide relief aid) if there are indistinct boundaries between the civil aid organizations and the military. Another example is Abiew (2003) who argues that the unfamiliarity between the civil aid organizations and the military is a big barrier in a joint effort. There is less attention aimed at attempts to solve these tensions. Studies do show the importance of E&T, but they do not delve deeper into the specifics of (joint) E&T meant for the preparation of a foreign mission. There is a growing body of literature that acknowledges the importance of culture in E&T. However, Duffey (2000) argues that especially the cultural section of training remains considerably underdeveloped.

The aim of this thesis is to explore the relationship between civil aid organizations and the military in the Netherlands. This thesis sets out to investigate the possible tensions between the civil aid organizations and the military and intends to determine the extent to which E&T could solve these possible tensions and to whether E&T have an influence on the cooperation between the civil aid organizations and the military.

From this follows the following central research question:  *‘To what extent do education and training have the potential to solve the tensions between the civil aid organizations and the military in the Netherlands and how does education and training influence cooperation between the two?’* A first related sub-question reads: *‘What are the main tensions between the civil aid organizations and the military in the Netherlands?’*  
 A second related sub-question reads: *‘How is education and training organized in the Netherlands, regarding the preparation of a foreign mission?’* A third related sub-question reads: *‘Do education and training programs, as currently organized in the Netherlands, help solve the tensions? If yes, how? And if no, what could be done to solve the tensions effectively?’*

## Scientific and Societal Relevance

This study is of scientific relevance because it provides an opportunity to advance the understanding of civil-military cooperation by focusing on possible tensions and education and training. It contributes to the growing area of civil-military cooperation by exploring the education and training programs, specifically by looking at how education and training in the Netherlands prepares soldiers and civil aid personnel for a foreign mission. There has not been done much research on the influence of education and training on the tensions and cooperation between civil aid organizations and the military. This study provides new insights into the preparation and its influence on tensions and civil-military cooperation in a foreign mission.

Researching the preparation of a foreign mission is also of societal relevance because of the support (or not) from the general public regarding a foreign mission. A foreign mission is not without its risks thus winning the hearts and minds of the general public is challenging. The return of wounded participants or “body bags” has a negative effect on the general public support regarding a mission (Voogd & Vos, 2010). On the contrary, whether the general public thinks that a mission could be successful has a positive effect on their support for that mission (ibid). Reassuring the general public that foreign missions are supported by high quality E&T might take away some doubt they have about a foreign mission.

## Methodology

This thesis uses an in-depth qualitative case study design to investigate the E&T between the civil aid organizations and the military in the Netherlands.  
 The research methods selected for this thesis are a mixed methodology based on semi-structured interviews and document analysis. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with experts from within the civil field, the military field and with experts from training institutes. Documents related to E&T program descriptions, an E&T course agenda, guidelines and a speech were analyzed.   
 Thematic examining is used to analyze the data received from the expert interviews.

## Outline

The paper has been organized in the following way. Following this introduction, the thesis is composed of four more chapters.   
 Chapter two begins by laying out the theoretical framework of the research and looks at how the relation between the civil institution and the military institution has changed over time. It also discusses how this relation had led to tensions between the two institutions and the importance of E&T to solve these tensions.   
 Chapter three is concerned with the methodology used for this thesis. It discusses the research design, the research method and explains how the data was analyzed.   
 Chapter four presents the results of the expert interviews undertaken during this research and the complementary documents analysis.   
 Chapter five discusses the results, limitations and points of improvements of this research and finishes with a conclusion.

# Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework

In this chapter, the most important literature regarding CMR, CMC, civil-military tensions and E&T of the civil aid organizations and the military in preparation of a foreign mission is reviewed.   
 Much of the earlier literature on CMR focuses on the modalities through which the civil authority can keep control over the military. This literature regards the civil authority and the military as two different institutions, which should stay separate from each other (Huntington, 1959; Janowitz, 1960; Feaver, 1996). The people in a democracy choose a civil authority to govern the nation, while the military is there to protect the nation. A changing crisis environment shifted CMR towards CMC. The emphasis of more recent literature is not on controlling the military, but on the international joint effort involving civil aid organizations and the military to assist each other in crisis situations (Abiew, 2003; Jenny, 2001; Gourlay, 2000; Spence, 2002; Rietjens et al., 2013; Byman, 2001). The growing number of diverse international actors involved in a crisis situation makes it more difficult to solve these crises. A lot of different interests have to be taken into consideration. Crisis situations need a joint effort between civil aid organizations and the military to get solved. Crises are too much and too diverse work for one institution. However, this joint effort between the civil aid organization and the military comes with its own tensions, which could for a large part be overcome with suitable E&T (ibid; Duffey, 2000).

## 2.1 Civil-Military Relation

There is no agreement in the literature on CMR on how civilian control of the military should look like. Huntington (1959), Janowitz (1960) and Feaver (1996) concentrate on CMR and express different perspectives on how the civilian authority can keep control over the military in a nation. They agree with each other about keeping the civil authority and the military separate from each other. But, they disagree with each other about how to manage the differences between the two institutions.   
 Huntington argues for managing the differences between the civil authority and the military by ‘militarizing the military’ (Huntington, 1959, p. 83). He argues that civilian control of the military is guaranteed when the power of the military is reduced. He proposes an approach of objective civilian control, which means ‘maximizing military professionalism’ (ibid). An essential assumption with regard to objective civilian control is military professionalism of the modern officer corps and the modern military officer (ibid). Huntington argues that military officers motivated by the military ideals of loyalty and obedience will be respectful of the civil authority. This guarantees civilian control of the military.   
 As opposed to Huntington, Janowitz argues for managing the differences between the civil authority and the military by the ‘civilianization of the military’ (Janowitz, 1977, p. 53). He argues that the differences between the civil authority and the military are fading and that the two are converging (Janowitz, 1960). According to Janowitz, modern technology has changed the military profession by converging the skill differentiation between those in the civil institution and those in the military. The amount of military personnel with solely military skills as opposed to military personnel who also have civilian expertise, as for example about machine maintenance and health service, has been greatly reduced (ibid). Nonetheless, he also argues that the military profession must stay distinctive from the civil authority, because of the military being ‘an expert in war-making and in the organized use of violence’ (ibid, p.15). This recognition of the uniqueness of the military is essential for civilian control of the military.  
 Feaver disagrees with Huntington’s and Janowitz’s trust in professionalism and argues for managing the difference between the civil authority and the military with a rationalist strategic game. The challenge of his game is to keep the civil authority in control (Feaver, 1996), while establishing a military that is powerful enough to do whatever the civil authority ask to do while being subordinate enough to only do what is asked (Feaver 2003). The civil authority has control instruments, monitoring instruments and punishments available to them to ensure that the military officer chooses to submit to civilian control and work instead of evade (ibid).

## 2.2 Civil-Military Gap

The separation of the civil authority and the military contributes to a civil-military gap (CMG) between the two institutions. Huntington (1959) and Janowitz (1960) acknowledge that there is a CMG between the civil culture and the military culture. Each institution has its own culture with its own values, norms and attitudes which are of crucial importance to them. However, literature on CMG argues that this CMG cannot grow too wide. With regard to CMR, Volkman (2001) argues that the military might lose its support from the population if the CMG grows too wide. The military cannot become too different from the civil domain. Feaver & Kohn (2001) agree with Volkman’s concern but they connect it also to CMC. They argue that a too wide CMG ‘threatens the effectiveness of the military and civil-military cooperation’ (ibid, p. 1). Hence, with regard to the joint effort involving the civil aid organizations and the military, it is important that this CMG is kept tight and that differences in cultures are being managed. A too wide CMG will complicate the cooperation between civil aid organizations and the military, because it will be too difficult to overcome the differences.

## 2.3 Civil-Military Cooperation

A changing crisis environment shifted CMR towards CMC. This relationship puts emphasis on a different section of the civil world. CMC is about the joint effort between the civil aid organizations and the military in an international crisis situation, instead of on the civil authority controlling the military in a nation. There is agreement in the literature of CMC on how to address CMC. They argue that a coordinated joint effort between the civil aid organizations and the military has become indispensable because of the multifaceted nature of contemporary crises (Abiew, 2003; Jenny, 2001; Gourlay, 2000; Spence, 2002; Rietjens et al., 2013). These crises have become too much work and too much diverse work for one institution to resolve it (ibid). Both institutions are needed in their field of expertise.

An essential characteristic of CMC is the sharing of responsibility between the civil aid organizations and the military (Abiew, 2003; Jenny, 2001). Sharing the responsibility of working together to solve a conflict and building the area up again. Another important related characteristic is the making of an agreement between the civil aid organizations and the military on a clear division of tasks among them (Abiew 2003; Jenny, 2001; Gourlay, 2000; Spence, 2002). Civil aid organizations provide aid to and develop opportunities for the local populations, while the military provides security and might support civil aid organizations in providing aid (Abiew, 2003; Jenny, 2001; Gourlay, 2000; Duffey, 2000). A clear division of tasks clarifies who is responsible for which tasks and which expectations can be assumed from and by each institution (Gourlay, 2000). Nonetheless, the boundaries of the tasks should be flexible in the sense that the institutions can complement each other where necessary (Spence, 2002). Except, the military is most often tasked with civil tasks with for example helping the victims of a crisis (Jenny, 2001). Both institutions need to agree with each other when and under what circumstances they support each other in performing their tasks (ibid). The involvement of the military in civil tasks should always happen with advice and guidance from the civil aid organizations (Spence, 2002). The different qualities of each institution should be used in their advantage (Gourlay, 2000) when determining the spheres of responsibility and division of tasks. The sharing of responsibility and a division on tasks is only possible when everyone involved in the crisis communicates with each other and shares information and knowledge with each other (Spence, 2002). Everyone involved must have a common understanding of the situation and the agreed upon clear agreements. It is of crucial importance that the puzzle of who, what, why, where, when and how is well-defined, clear and agreed upon by everyone involved (ibid).

These characteristics are of crucial important for the functioning of cooperation between the civil aid organizations and the military. Blurring spheres of responsibility, blurring divisions of tasks and weak communication result in chaos between the civil aid organizations and the military. Chaos and indistinctness result in detrimental consequences for the mission and the local population of the country wherein the mission takes place. The crisis is not getting solved and the local population does not get there highly hoped peace.

## 2.4 Tensions between the Civil Aid Organizations & the Military

There is a general agreement across the literature of CMC that the lack of familiarity between the civil aid organizations and the military has revealed tensions between the two institutions. These tensions are differences that could cause difficulties. The main tensions relate to (1) differences in organizational culture, (2) danger, (3) ambiguity about the division of tasks and (4) inadequate civil-civil coordination.

1. The greatest tension between the civil aid organization and the military is found in their differences in organizational culture (Abiew, 2003; Jenny, 2001; Gourlay, 2000; Byman, 2001; Vogelaar & Kramer, 2004). ‘An organizational culture is the way a group is organized and how its functions’ (Duffey, 2000, p. 148) and it is expressed in shared values, norms and attitudes. The individuals of an organization learn shared patterns of behaving and thinking and these shared patterns provide stability and meaning to their organization (Shein, 1990).

Table 1 shows the differences between the organizational cultures of civil aid organizations and the military regarding their organization structure, their orientation and their purpose.

Table 1: Differences in Organizational Cultures

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Civil Aid Organizations | Military |
| Organization Structure | * Participatory structure * Independent decision-making power | * Top-down hierarchical structure * Clear lines of authority |
| Orientation | * Long-term rebuilding | * Short-term security |
| Purpose | * Relieve of suffering | * Pursuing of political interests |

Note: Jenny, 2001; Gourlay, 2000.

Related to this tension is the uniqueness of the local culture from the local population of the country wherein the mission takes place. The local population has its own unique culture with its own set of values, norms and attitudes. The local population identify themselves with their own culture in the same way as the civil aid organizations and the military do with their culture. The dissimilarity and unfamiliarity with the differences may lead to misunderstanding between the civil aid organizations, the military and the local population (Vogelaar & Kramer, 2004). Jenny (2001) and Byman (2001) argue that, because civil aid organizations are inside a crisis situation for a longer period of time, they are able to bond with the local population and recognize and understand their feelings better (as opposed to the military, which are only inside a crisis situation for a short period of time).Others argue that civil aid organizations carry out the interests of the western world and lack knowledge about local cultures. Managing the tension between the different cultures is of essential importance, because cultural factors play important roles in CMR and CMC (Duffey, 2000).

1. A second kind of tension concerns the danger related to joint effort between the civil aid organizations and the military. Working together with the military jeopardizes the humanitarian principles of neutrality and independence under which the civil aid organizations operate (Abiew, 2003; Jenny, 2001; Byman, 2001 Harris & Dombrowski, 2002). Aid personnel and aid goods may become targets of attack as working together with the military is being perceived as supporting one side (ibid). This will endanger their ability to provide aid. Increasing threats made towards the civil aid organizations makes them requests military protection (Harris & Dombrowski, 2002), which will in turn increase further threats and the likelihood of attacks. The civil aid organizations protect themselves by presenting themselves as impartial and stay safe by presenting themselves as non-threatening to others (Byman, 2001). Because of this presentation of impartiality, local people are more likely to talk to the civil aid organizations and not the military (ibid). The military, on the contrary, is often perceived as being partial. Working together with them might mean losing the close contact with the local people. This close contact with the local people is essential for a successful mission (Duffey, 2000).

A foreign mission is dangerous for every actor involved. Whether a crisis situation is safe is highly changeable (Vogelaar & Kramer, 2004). Danger is always around the corner. A high quality preparation is of essential importance to prepare for a dangerous situation.

1. Another tension emerges in the ambiguity about the division of tasks (Abiew, 2003; Jenny, 2001; Vogelaar & Kramer, 2004). The military might perform tasks that are actually the tasks of the civil aid organizations, for example by helping the victims of a crisis (Jenny, 2001). The military needs to be educated and trained for situations like these. Clarifying who does what tasks or when to support each other in performing their tasks is important in order to have the most successful joint effort (ibid). Figure 1 shows a summary of (traditional) tasks related to the civil aid organizations and the military in crisis situations. Civil aid organizations focus on wide-ranging humanitarian assistance by providing aid in food, medical care and more, by providing opportunities in support of economic development and by providing education to empower the local population (Abiew, 2003; Jenny, 2001). Civil aid organizations also provide a cultural context of the crisis situation, because they tend to be more familiar with the local background (Duffey, 2000). Another task that civil aid organizations undertake is the recruitment of international support for action in the crisis situation (Abiew, 2003). The military focuses on security by providing a secure environment by controlling the violence with defending, disarmament, demobilization, monitoring and more (Abiew, 2003; Jenny, 2001; Gourlay, 2000). The military supports the civil aid organizations by protecting their personnel and aid supplies, by providing technical, material and logistical support and by assisting in providing aid (ibid). The ambiguity about tasks emerges with the military assisting the civil aid organizations in providing aid. There needs to be a clear picture of who is responsible for what specific task. It is of crucial importance that both institutions work together in complementing each other and do not get in the way of each other. They could, for example, provide information to each other about a certain context and their activities.

Note: Abiew, 2003; Jenny, 2001; Gourlay, 2000; Duffey, 2000.

Figure 2: Tasks

1. The last kind of tension concerns the inadequate civil-civil coordination and how it affects the joint effort between the civil aid organizations and the military. The large number of civil aid organizations and their diverse interests makes it difficult to get an overview of all their activities (Abiew, 2003; Jenny, 2001). Each civil aid organization has their own area and sets of interests which guide their activities (Abiew, 2003). This leads to competition between the civil aid organizations, rather than coordination between them (Abiew, 2003; Jenny, 2001). They compete primarily for visibility, fundraising and media coverage (ibid). It is frustrating for the military that the civil aid organizations put much effort in this competition, but that they cannot agree on a clear action plan, which outlines the base for the joint effort (ibid).

## 2.5 Education & Training

The above mentioned tensions derive from the lack of mutual understanding and unfamiliarity between the civil aid organizations and the military (Abiew, 2003; Jenny, 2001; Gourlay, 2000; Spence, 2002; Byman, 2001; Rietjens et al., 2013; Thornberry in Duffey, 2000). The civil aid organizations and the military do not know enough about each other’s who, what, why, where, when and how. Not knowing enough about each other often leads to mistrust between the two institutions (Jenny, 2001; Duffey, 2000).  
 Managing the tensions and bridging the CMG improves the situation for a joint effort between the two institutions. To overcome the CMG and the tensions, it is of crucial importance that the civil aid organizations and the military become familiar with and learn about each other (Abiew, 2003; Jenny, 2001; Byman, 2001). Both institutions need to understand why they are both involved in a particular crisis situation (Abiew, 2003). The process of understanding each other is influenced by the different conflicting cultures of each institution. Recognizing and understanding where the two cultures clash with each other helps to build trust and respect between the civil aid organizations and the military (Abiew, 2003; Gourlay, 2000; Spence, 2002).

The CMG can be bridged and the tensions can be managed with E&T (Abiew, 2003; Jenny, 2001; Gourlay, 2000; Spence, 2002; Byman, 2001; Duffey, 2000; Rietjens et al., 2013). Huntington (1959) and Janowitz (1960) have already recognized the importance of E&T. They argue that military officers learn and develop their skills of managing violence, cultural awareness and managing morale, among others, (Huntington, 1959; Janowitz, 29160) from books, practice and experience (Huntington 1959). Jenny (2001) agrees with the importance of E&T. She argues that E&T are the best way to improve the understanding between the civil institution and the military institution. Rietjens et al. (2013) recommend an interactive relationship between civil aid organizations and the military which increases an open orientation towards the other actor and an understanding of each other. They propose to extend the “train as you fight” to “train as you interact”. An example of this proposal is a joint exercise named Common Effort executed by the 1(German/Netherlands)Corps (ibid). Participating in joint trainings in which each actor plays themselves provides both institutions with opportunities to adjust their means to the other institution (ibid). Interaction education helps in understanding the civil aid organizations and military ways of working and thinking, understanding their differences and creating trust between them.   
 An essential part of training should be about improving the communication between the civil aid organizations and the military (Byman 2001; Rietjens, Verlaan, Brocades Zaalberg & de Boer, 2009). Both institutions can benefit from information exchange, but this does not happen consistently (ibid). Military information is often labelled classified for the civil aid organizations and the civil aid organizations are selective in which information they share with the military (Byman, 2001). Improving communication and increasing contact moments should result in greater trust in and better understanding of each other and initiate possibilities for coordination of activities (Rietjens et al., 2009).   
 Duffey (2000) emphasizes the importance of culture in training. She argues that cultural training is essential for anyone involved in a civil-military mission. A crisis situation could be affected by local cultural perceptions and they provide a framework for understanding the crisis situation (ibid). Kaldor (2006) argues that an important characteristic of new crisis situations are conflicting identities. These conflicting identities disagree with each other about their cultural beliefs. It is of essential importance that these cultural beliefs are known and understood by the civil aid organizations and the military. The cultural training should consist of two parts: culture-general training and culture-specific training (Duffey, 2000). Culture-general training should be about understanding the cultural differences between the military and civil aid organizations cultural frameworks and constructing an understanding about each other cultures (ibid). Culture-specific training should be about understanding the local culture (cultural dynamics and local customs) in which the mission will take place and about the history of a conflict (ibid). Duffey (2000) argues that the cultural training should, preferably, be conducted before deployment to the crisis situation.

Learning and training together is of crucial importance for future success of foreign civil-military mission by reducing the suspicion, understanding the challenges and improve the joint effort between the civil aid organizations and the military (Abiew, 2003; Jenny, 2001; Rietjens et al., 2013; Shein, 1990). E&T could be conducted through joint participatory exercises, conferences, briefings, courses, lectures, workshops, role-plays, real-time simulations, trainings and more (Jenny, 2001; Byman, 2001; Gourlay, 2000; Feaver & Kohn, 2001; Duffey, 2000).  
 Desch (1999) proposes that E&T for a crisis situation is an evolving process because crisis situations are never the same. What has been learned and trained for a particular crisis situation is often not applicable to another crisis situation. Every crisis situation has its own unique circumstances who need their own unique E&T. Rietjens et al. (2013, p. 21) agree with Desch about the uniqueness of a crisis situation, but they suggest ‘two reasons to search for constant: (1) to build on experiences and become more effective and (2) to train and prepare to become more skilled’.

# Chapter 3: Methodology

In this chapter, the methodology will be reviewed. It discusses the research design of an in-depth qualitative case study design, the research methods of interview guide approach and document analysis and the thematic technique used to analyze the data.

## 3.1 Research Design

This thesis uses an in-depth qualitative case study research design in order to gain insights into the E&T programs of civil aid organizations and the military in the Netherlands regarding their respective preparation for a foreign mission. A case study analyses a small number of cases with the intention of shedding light on similar cases in a broader spectrum (Gerring, 2012). Case studies can be beneficial when a phenomenon is studied for the first time or studied in a new way, because of the attention to detail (ibid). The reviewed case study can be used as a starting point or as a comparison case for future research. Case studies are suitable for exploration (ibid). Analyzing a small number of cases offers room for intensive analyses. The researcher decides to learn more about fewer cases instead of learning less about more cases (ibid). There is a focus on the depth and details of a small number of cases and not on a small amount of information of a bigger number of cases (ibid). The focus on a small number of cases present an opportunity to discover a specific pattern, and not just a relation, between the variables (ibid). A disadvantage about the case study design is the external validity. Analyzing a small number of cases will harm the representativeness of a phenomenon with the broader spectrum (Verschuren & Doorewaard, 2010).

Case selection in case study research is based on ‘purposive (nonrandom) selection procedures’ (Gerring, 2008, p. 646). Cases must be selected for a reason. Cases must, in some way, be representative of the broader spectrum of a phenomenon (ibid). Otherwise, the research is of little or no value (ibid). As we concentrate on the E&T programs in the Netherlands, conclusions are only being drawn about this specific case. These conclusions cannot be stretched to other cases. They are specifically for the situation in the Netherlands. The concentration on the Netherlands was chosen because of the expected accessibility to data. With regard to the military, the focus is on the ground forces who are concerned with land operations in foreign countries. The ground forces are the unit closes to the situation. With regard to the civil aid organizations, the focus is on (humanitarian) aid organizations. These organizations are often the first one there or are already there and will be there for some time.

## 3.2 Research Method

This thesis makes use of triangulation. Denzin (1989) argues that triangulation aims at the combination of multiple theoretical perspectives, research methods and/or data sources. He differentiates between four types of triangulation: (1) data triangulation, (2) investigator triangulation, (3) theory triangulation and (4) methodological triangulation. This thesis applies data triangulation and methodological triangulation. Data triangulation means having different kinds of data sources (ibid). Denzin (1989) differentiates between three subtypes of data triangulation: (1) time, (2) space and (3) person. This thesis makes use of data triangulation related to the subtype of person. Different kinds of persons are being interviewed. Persons related to civil aid organizations and persons related to the military. These two kinds of persons are different data sources. These interviews are primary data sources. They provide ‘first-hand evidence’ because of minimal intervention between the data source, the interviewee and the researcher (Halperin & Heath, 2012, p. 329). Another completely different data source used in this thesis are documents. These documents are complementary to the expert interviews. Methodological triangulation means having different approaches of generating data (Denzin, 1989). A disadvantage could be the linking of different data methods (ibid), but this will not be a problem in this thesis because the documents are complementary to the interviews (not oppose to them). Denzin (1989) differentiates between two types of methodological triangulation: (1) within-method triangulation and (2) between-method triangulation. This thesis makes use of between-method triangulation. Between-method triangulation means using different kinds of methods to study a phenomenon (ibid). An advantage of this is being able to balance the strength and weaknesses of other methods (ibid). The research methods selected in this thesis are semi-structured interviews and document analysis.

Patton (2015) argues that an interview is an interaction between the interviewer and the interviewee. The interviewer wants to discover certain things that she cannot directly observe by the interviewee (ibid). The interviewer intends, by asking questions, to understand the interviewee’s perspective (ibid). He differentiates between four types of interviews: (1) informal conversational interview, (2) interview guide approach, (3) standardized open-ended interview and (4) closed, fixed-response interview.

1. The informal conversational interview is completely unstructured in the sense that there is no specific phrasing and order of questions. The interviewer has flexibility in asking questions.
2. The interview guide approach is semi-structured in the sense that the questions-topics are predetermined in an interview guide, but the phrasing and order of questions are adaptable to the situation of each interview. The interview guide provides a baseline for the interviewer.
3. The standardized open-ended interview is more structured in the sense that the phrasing and order of questions are fixed, but the responses are left open-ended. The interviewer has no flexibility in asking questions.
4. The closed, fixed-response interview is completely structured in the sense that the phrasing, order and possible responses of questions are fixed for every interview.

The interview guide approach is used to interview experts. These experts are being interviewed because they have ‘specific insights and knowledge because of their professional position and expertise’ (Flick, 2014, p. 227). A disadvantage of interviewing experts is the identification of the expert (ibid). Civil aid organizations and training institutes themselves were very helpful with pointing in the direction of an expert. The situation was very different with the military. At the beginning of conducting interviews, it was very difficult to get inside the military structure. Once I got an interview with a former CIMIC-officer (Civil-Military Cooperation), whom is nowadays working for a civil aid organization, the ball started rolling and I was inside. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with experts from within the civil field (six respondents), the military field (nine respondents) and training institutes (four respondents). Several other organizations and people were asked to contribute with an interview, but they could not contribute because of conflicting schedules and/or lack of time or capacity. Names of respondents along with their organization and function can be found in the list of interviewees which is included in Appendix 1. Respondents answered the questions based on their knowledge and own experiences. Experiences from their current function and/or previous ones.   
 Another method applied in this thesis is document analysis. When analyzing documents, it is of crucial importance that the intention and purpose of producing that document are considered (Flick, 2014). The documents were used to strengthen the interviews. They did not contain new information. These were documents of E&T program descriptions, E&T course agenda, guidelines and a speech. An overview of the documents is included in Appendix 2.

## 3.3 Analyzing Data

This thesis uses thematic examining to analyze the data received from the expert interviews. Braun and Clarke (in Flick, 2014, p. 421) define thematic analysis as follows: ‘a method for identifying, analyzing and reporting patterns (themes) within data’. A theme is an aspect that is relevant for answering the research questions. The research questions of this thesis were reflected in the set of questions used in the expert interviews. These set of questions represented a specific theme, which made analyzing and later also comparison between respondent easier. The themes of comparison were known in advance. They did not develop during the research. They were developed out of the theoretical framework. The different themes that were used to compare the data are: (1) tensions, (2) organization of E&T, (3) influence of E&T and (4) other strategies. With regard to tensions, analyzing was focused on different kinds of tensions and whether they had an influence on the cooperation between civil aid organizations and the military. The organization of E&T was focused on different kinds of E&T programs in the Netherlands. A distinction was made between separate and joint E&T programs. With regard to the influence of E&T, analyzing was focused on whether E&T had an influence on resolving the tensions between the two institutions and whether E&T had an influence on the cooperation between them. Other strategies were focused on different approaches of solving the tensions.

# Chapter 4: Empirical results

In this chapter, the results of the interviews and documents analysis will be presented.  
 Respondents were interviewed with the aim of getting a comprehensive understanding of the tensions between civil aid organizations and the military in the Netherlands and an overview of the organization of E&T(regarding the preparation of a foreign mission) in the Netherlands and the influence of E&T on solving the tensions and cooperation between civil aid organizations and the military. The interview questions can be found in the interview guide which is included in Appendix 3.

There are a lot of different perspectives with regard to CMC. Some groups are open to and/or see a need for cooperation with each other, while other groups are against and/or see no need for cooperation with each other and some are changeable in their opinion of cooperating with each other. Almost 90% of the respondents is open and/or see a need for some form of cooperation between civil aid organizations and the military. An exception is one civil aid organization, Médicins Sans Frontières (MSF), which is unconditionally against the cooperation with any military actor. As their respondent (W. Kok, personal communication, June 26, 2019) stated: ‘MSF is cautious and suspicious and we have an active resistance against cooperation with any military actor. We do not trust them! We do not want to be associated in any way with them, because it will undermine our credibility as a neutral actor in the conflict. Being a neutral actor and communicating this to everyone in the conflict is our life line. We do not have an opinion on the conflict. MSF’s raison d’être is saving lives, alleviating suffer and assuring access to medical care to those in need of such’. Nevertheless, this resistance against cooperation does not mean that there is no contact at all between MSF and the military. There is some contact in the field and in the Netherlands, but this limits to communicating where oneself is in the field and in expressing MSF’s view on CMC. MSF’s view on CMC centers around independence. ‘MSF wants to be politically independent and the military executes a political order. Another importance independence is financial independence from politics and being able to decide ourselves where to spend the money’ (ibid).   
 These different perspectives regarding CMC create a split between different kinds of organizations, but also within an organization with a dual mandate. As one respondent argued: ‘Colleagues from the emergency assistance branch might be more principled against cooperation with the military then colleagues from the sustainable development branch. Emergency assistance personnel work according to the humanitarian principles of neutrality and impartiality. These principles are core conditions and association and/or cooperation with the military makes it more complicated to uphold these principles’ (P. van den Berg, personal communication, June 18, 2019).

## 4.1 Tensions

The first set of questions aimed at the tensions and their influence on the cooperation between civil aid organizations and the military.

### 4.1.1 Tensions

Some tensions are mentioned by every group of respondents (civil aid organizations, the military and training institutes), while others are not. Not every tension is mentioned by every respondent in a group.

* All respondents mention tensions that arise because the two institutions do not know each other and do not understand each other. A couple of respondents of each group talk about various clichés and assumptions that emerge from unknowingness and misunderstanding. There are these images that civil aid personnel wear goat wool socks and are tree huggers and that military personnel are loud screaming rambo’s that love to shoot.
* All respondents mention tensions that arise because the two institutions are two different worlds with differences in their cultures and routines.

Table 2 shows the differences between the organizational cultures of civil aid organizations and the military regarding their organizational structure, their orientation and their purpose, according to the respondents.

Table 2: Differences in Cultures & Routines

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Civil Aid Organizations | Military |
| Organizational Structure | * Participatory vs. hierarchical decision-making * Slower vs. faster working * Fluid vs. manageable world * Flexible (adaptability) vs. strict * Soft vs. hard * People- vs. task-oriented * Thinkers vs. doers | |
| Orientation | * Long-term | * Short-term |
| Purpose | * Humanitarian | * Political * Use of force |

* About 50% of the respondents of each group mention the different ways of approaching in the organizational structure that could lead to tensions. Each institution has their own way of thinking and doing. As one civil aid organization respondent describes: ‘When my boss says something, you just see everyone thinking about whether they agree with it and whether they are going to do something with it. By the military, when the boss says something, you do not think, you do. The military is fast and efficient, while civil aid organizations are slower’ (anonymous civil aid organization respondent, personal communication, June 13, 2019).
* About 50% of civil aid organizations and 30% of military respondents talked specifically about the differences in the time-frame orientation of each institution. A CIMIC officer explains this tension as follows: ‘Civil aid organizations have more time to do their activities, while the military has a time-bounded mandate. The politics can decide to not extend a military mission, thus the military wants to see results quickly’ (M. Vaanhold, personal communication, July 26, 2019).
* About 50% of the respondents of each group mention the differences in the mandate of each institution’s purpose being there.
* All civil aid organization respondents and a little over 50% of military respondents named the humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence that outline the base for civil aid organizations a sensitive tension between the two institutions. An association with the military will harm these principles and the work civil aid organizations are able to do because of them. Four civil aid organizations and one military respondent argue that the humanitarian principles are the root causes for tensions between civil aid organizations and the military.
* 50% of the civil aid organizations respondents said that an association of civil aid organizations with the military or a wrong perception could result in a dangerous situation for civil aid organizations. One civil aid organization respondent talked about an experience during a field visit in a previous function of him. He said that ‘proposals were being made about painting our vehicles pink, because it would avoid association with white military vehicles’ (M. van Boekel, personal communication, June 19, 2019).

A former CIMIC officer illustrates, with a field example, how mismatched interests can lead to tensions: ‘My team was building a cool storage for local farmers. They could store their products there and sell them for a better price later. The local population was struggling with each other about the use of the cool storage. The civil aid organizations felt this struggling, because they were working with the local population by introducing certain crops on the local market. We were merely focusing on building this project’ (A. Ham, personal communication, June 26, 2019). The military built the cool storage without taking the whole local context into account. The civil aid organizations had to deal with the struggling that arose from this, because they were dealing with the local context. The alignment of activities between both institutions could have been better to avoid this tension.

### 4.1.2 Influence of Tensions on Cooperation

In general, the response to the influence of tensions on the cooperation between civil aid organizations and the military is that it needs to be a tactful process. Whether tensions have an influence on the cooperation or not depends primarily on whether the two institutions want to cooperate or not. Assuming that the institutions want to cooperate with each other, how they let these tensions influence their cooperation depends on their approach regarding the process. One third of civil aid organization respondents, one third of training institutes respondents and two-third of military respondents said that tensions do not have to be a barrier in cooperation. But that if you do not communicate, listen and respect each other, cooperation will not go well, because you maintain the tensions as a barrier between each other. They argued that the institutions need to empathize with each other and each other’s work culture by communicating with, listening to and respecting each other. They need to build relationships with each other. One respondent of each group argued that tensions could have a negative influence on cooperation between civil aid organizations and the military, because it complicates the cooperation.   
 A recurring matter among each group of respondents, with two civil aid organization respondents, two military respondents and one training institute respondent, is the difference in influence on cooperation on different levels. Some argue that there is less negative influence of tensions on cooperation on the field level and more on the executive level. The individuals in the field know that they need each other to achieve their purposes, but that they have different means. The people on the executive level may have a more principled position related to cooperation.

## 4.2 Organization of Education & Training

The second set of questions aimed at the influence of E&T on solving the tensions and the organization of E&T.

### 4.2.1 Influence of Education & Training on solving the Tensions

With the exception of one civil aid organization respondent and one training institute respondents, all other respondents are in agreement with each other regarding the need of E&T to solve tensions. The two exceptions argue that E&T will not solve the tensions between the civil aid organizations and the military, because the two institutions and the people are too different from each other and E&T will not change that.  
 All other respondents suggest E&T to develop a better understanding of each other. Having knowledge of each other is of crucial importance. They argue that having knowledge about each other gives you handles to work around the tensions. You can never know enough of each other. You need to be aware of each other differences and how to act upon this. You need to be aware of what is going on in the field (which organization are there, how do they work and think, what to expect from them). One civil aid organization respondent talks about ‘having a continuous dialogue with your own staff and others’ (M. van Boekel, personal communication, June 19, 2019). He gives an example that it is important for your own staff to know how to deal with different actors: ‘During a field visit in Nigeria, our car was stopped at a checkpoint. A young lady on her first mission was sitting in the passenger seat. She got pissed off to the checkpoint guard about why our car stopped and others not. This was not an appropriate reaction in this context. Such a reaction can get you in a lot of trouble in that kind of context. You can overcome this with simple education’ (ibid). Some respondents also argue that it would be beneficial to have this E&T in the Netherlands, before going abroad. Getting to know each other in a complex situation abroad will be more difficult because of the influence of the local context. As a respondent states: ‘Letting people get to know each other in advance provides them with a basis for in the field. You do not want to do this in the field, because you already have to adjust to a lot then’ (E. Brons, personal communication, July 5, 2019).

When asked about which skills could alleviate the tensions between civil aid organizations and the military, only a few respondents answered with specific skills. Depending on the specific skills, but never more than three respondents per group talked about specific skills. They mentioned specific skills that civil aid organizations and the military can learn from each other. Civil aid organizations can learn planning and efficiency from the military, while the military can consult the civil aid organizations on how to get in touch with the local population. They also stated that having the skills of communication, listening and being cultural sensitive would be of general importance to both institutions. However, the more general response to asking about skills were not skills itself. More than 50% of the respondents responded that it is about having knowledge of each other and making each other’s perspective clear to one another. As one respondent puts it: ‘It is not necessarily about learning skills, but about learning to understand each other’ (M. Vaanhold, personal communication, July 26, 2019).

### 4.2.2 Organization of Education & Training

The overall result of the organization of E&T is that there are separate E&T programs, but that there are joint exchanges and inputs in the Netherlands and in the field between civil aid organizations and the military. There are some exceptions to the separate E&T programs with joint exercises between civil aid organizations and the military.

Within the civil aid organizations, there are similarities regarding E&T programs.

* None of them have specific trainings regarding CMC.
* All of the organizations work together with local partners. Some more than others. But none of the respondents knew to what extent these local partners get trained.
* All civil aid organizations provide security and safety trainings for their personnel that goes abroad. They either provide this training themselves or outsource it to a training institute. The number of personnel that goes abroad differs per civil aid organizations. Respondents explain that these trainings are mostly about creating context awareness and about dealing with different actors that you can encounter in the field, including military actors. Some organizations go a step further in their preparation. For example, Oxfam Novib has context-specific training when someone arrives in the field and E&T on specific themes, for example about military engagement (M. van Boekel, personal communication, June 16, 2019).

An exception within the civil aid organizations is PAX For Peace. They provide E&T programs to the military (not per se Dutch military), but they are very clear about not being an E&T institute (S. van Oostwaard, personal communication, June 20, 2019). ‘PAX For Peace is a civil organization that finds having contact and/or cooperation with the military meaningful’ (ibid). For cooperation to be successful, the military needs to know what civil organizations do, how they do and why they do it. PAX For peace tries to communicate a civil organization’s perspective to the military.

Just like the civil aid organizations, none of the training institutes have specific trainings regarding CMC. Two training institutes provide security and safety trainings. They use simulations and role-plays to make their trainings more realistic. One respondent explains how they use simulations and role-plays to educate and train someone’s behavior in a certain situation (anonymous training institute respondent, personal communication, June 28, 2019). The Clingendael Institute is an exception in that they do not provide security and safety training, but they do provide separate pre-deployment training to government personnel and military personnel about how to deal with different situations abroad (B. van den Berg, personal communication, July 11, 2019). This is a preparation program consisting of a mixture of lectures (for example about mission context or conflict mapping), skills training (for example about intercultural communication) and interactive dialogues. The discussed subjects in the program can vary from time to time. There is input from the military in the civilian course and vice versa. They try to get them out of their comfort zone, because that is what will happen in the field.

Respondents explained how a lot of military E&T about CMC can be found at the Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence (CCOE). They ‘train military personnel for a specific NATO CIMIC related function’ (J. Brouwer, personal communication, July 10, 2019). They provide several CIMIC courses by focusing on different aspects of CIMIC: (1) online awareness course, (2) field worker course, (3) staff workers course, (4) liaison course, (5) higher command course and (6) functional specialist course. They also invite civil aid organizations to explain their perspective on CMC. ‘This counterbalances military thinking by providing the military with more input from and knowledge about civil aid organizations’ (ibid). Military respondents also explained how other military E&T is given by the Civil and Military Interaction Command (1CMI CO). They ‘provide, among other courses, a few short courses about communication’ (J. de Weert, personal communication, August 1, 2019). A more general military E&T is provided by the School for Peace Operations. Before any Dutch military personnel can be sent abroad, he or she has to go by the School for Peace Operations. Their ‘main task is mission-oriented education’ (P. van Sambeeck, personal communication, July 8, 2019). This mission-oriented education is mainly about creating awareness and a little bit of knowledge exchange. They try to create awareness through interactive discussions with each other. There is no specific CIMIC course, but there is one hour about civil aid organizations and how they are organized.   
 Respondents mentioned that a larger part of CIMIC personnel within the Dutch military are reservists. Some of these respondents argue that the reservists need to be military trained. They need to get a better understanding of the military organizations and how to handle within a military team in a dangerous situation. They argue that they already have the knowledge to connect with the civil field. As one reservist illustrates with an example: ‘The military encountered a farmer during a patrol in the fields. At about 100 meters from this farmer, the military makes a big turn around the farmer. I am thinking that the farmer does not like what the military is doing. I expressed this to the commander, who said to me to go talk to the farmer, because the farmer could blow himself up if we go talk to him. The commander joined me soon after I approached the farmer and talked to him. The commander agrees with my thinking, but he does not come up with it by himself. The military is constantly thinking about safety and what could happen‘ (J. Batenburg, personal communication, July 11, 2019).

Respondents also explain that there are some joint exercises in addition to these individual E&T programs. In these joint exercises, civil aid organizations and the military train together to get to know and create an understanding of each other. Exercises as for example Common Ground, Joint Cooperation, Trident Juncture and Common Effort. Two respondents are part of the Common Effort, which is an example of a yearly joint exercise. Civil aid organizations, the military and government personnel are brought together before they go on a mission. As one of these respondents puts it: ‘meet each other, before you need each other’ (M. Vaanhold, personal communication, July 26, 2019). It is about getting to know each other, knowing what to expect from each other and learning to cooperate with each other. The other respondent explains that the exercise lasts a week and consists of three blocks: the exercise, a high level event and expert meetings (M van den Bosch, personal communication, July 12, 2019). During the exercise, little groups look at a conflict area and try to come up with recommendations. These recommendations are presented at the high level event. The week is an opportunity ‘to exchange knowledge on a specific area and to build on a network that could be useful when you have to go to this specific area’ (M. Vaanhold, personal communication, July 26, 2019). You get to know people within the other institution, instead of just knowing about other actors in the field.

## 4.3 Influence of Education & Training

The third set of questions aimed at the influence of E&T on a mission and on cooperation between the civil aid organizations and the military.  
 80% of the civil aid organization respondents, 90% of the military respondents and 100% of the training institutes respondents argue that E&T has a positive influence on the mission and on the cooperation between civil aid organizations and the military. Having contact moments and exchanging knowledge with each other is beneficial for everyone’s mission and for cooperation. One respondent explains that ‘the benefit of E&T is in a better understanding of each other which continues in better cooperation’ (G. Hofstee, personal communication, July 10, 2019). The respondents agree with each other that the mission and the cooperation between civil aid organizations and the military would definitely be different if there was no E&T. People would stay unknown without E&T and would not know how to act upon each other.   
 Some respondents argue that E&T brings the cooperation to another level. E&T helps in deciding which level of cooperation fits a certain situation. Perhaps even to a level where both institutions conclude that cooperation is not beneficial for them.

Two civil aid organization respondents pointed out that they prepare for civil activities in a civil mission. For them, it is never the case of a civil-military mission. They argue that you can encounter military actors during your civil mission and that is why you need to take them into account when preparing.

## 4.4 Other Strategies

The final set of questions aimed at other strategies than E&T, whether there are other approaches to minimize and/or solve the tensions. This was a challenging question for some respondents. Not all respondents had an immediate answer or one at all. The two respondents critical of cooperation between the two institutions were also critical of other strategies. Other strategies are not going to solve the tensions either.  
 An overarching response to other strategies was continuity. Continuity in contact moments, meetings and consultation with each other. Knowledge exchange is important, but this needs to happen on a regular basis. One military respondent talked about personnel continuity. Personnel from both institutions get rotated after a certain amount of time. One former CIMIC officer had a positive experience with personnel continuity in the field: ‘A military unit is there for a certain amount of months. Each unit planned their activities for the months they were there and one month more. This kept continuity in the activities in the field and there was no interruption in activities when a new unit came. A new unit could execute the plan already in place’ (P. van Ingen, personal communication, July 4, 2019).   
 Besides the overarching continuity, respondents came up with lots of other strategies. One respondent argued for an exchange project. Getting to know the other institution by experiencing it. One other respondent talked about a rewarding and punishing system. Other respondents argued for E&T in the field. Other respondents argued for a top-down approach of directing towards cooperation. They argue for the alignment of activities on a higher level.

# Chapter 5: Discussion & Conclusion

This chapter discusses the results presented in the previous chapter and finishes with a conclusion. This thesis explored the relationship between civil aid organizations and the military in the Netherlands by focusing on the tensions between them and by focusing on the potential of E&T programs to solve tensions. The following central research question was investigated:

*‘To what extent do education and training have the potential to solve the tensions between the civil aid organizations and the military in the Netherlands and how does education and training influence cooperation between the two?’*

This central research question was investigated with the help of three sub-questions:

(1) ‘*What are the main tensions between the civil aid organizations and the military in the Netherlands?’* and

(2) *‘How is education and training organized in the Netherlands, regarding the preparation of a foreign mission?’*

*(3) ‘Do education and training programs, as currently organized in the Netherlands, help solve the tensions? If yes, how? And if no, what could be done to solve the tensions effectively?’*

As mentioned in the theoretical framework, there is a lot of literature to be found on the relationship between civil aid organizations and the military. Literature about how this relationship evolved over time to a joint effort assistance and how this joint effort assistance leads to tensions between civil aid organizations and the military. Also literature about how E&T could resolve the tensions. However, very little was found on whether E&T prepare both institutions to work in the field, as well as to collaborate while in the field. This lack of knowledge motivated the writing of my thesis.

## 5.1 Discussion

The first sub-question (*‘What are the main tensions between civil aid organizations and the military in the Netherlands?’*) focused on the specific tensions between the two institutions. With respect to the first sub-question, it was found that the main tensions are situated in:

* The lack of knowledge of each other and misunderstanding between civil aid organizations and the military.
* The differences in cultures and routines between civil aid organizations and the military. Both institutions have different ways and orientations of approaching and executing their activities.
* The danger for civil aid organizations to be associated with the military, which harm the humanitarian principles under which civil aid organizations are able do their work.

The influence of these tensions on the cooperation between civil aid organizations and the military does not seem to be as negative as the undertone of the word tensions would suggest. The majority of the results suggest that the tensions do not have to have a negative influence on the cooperation between civil aid organizations and the military, especially in the field. There seems to be a difference in how civil aid organizations and the military perceive these tensions. When civil aid organization respondents were asked which tensions there were between civil aid organizations and the military, they were quick in mentioning multiple specific tensions. Military respondents were more talking about tensions being something natural when two different institutions cooperate with each other. Some even spoke of healthy tensions.  
 These results are partly in line with those found in the literature. Respondents mentioned the tensions in differences in organizational culture and of danger. They did not mention the tensions of inadequate civil-civil coordination and only a few mentioned the tensions of ambiguity about the division of tasks. It is somewhat surprising that only a few respondents mentioned the tension about the division of tasks with it being a frequently mentioned tension in the literature. A possible explanation for this might be that whether an institution comes in contact with overlapping tasks depends on the area the institution is working in (J. de Weert, personal communication, August 1, 2019). J. de Weert, who worked as a CIMIC-officer on the military headquarter of United Nations Mission In South Sudan, stated that there were a lot of civil aid organizations in South Sudan and that they received complaints about military units doing humanitarian activities (ibid). Civil aid organizations got frustrated with the military because the military was doing the work they were supposed to do (ibid). Other areas might got fewer complaints or never dealt with it because of fewer civil aid organizations being there, for example in Uruzgan, Afghanistan. Another possible explanation for this might be in the perspective someone has regarding the relationship between civil aid organizations and the military. Former CIMIC-officers and reservists argued that the military does civil activities where it is too dangerous for civil aid organizations to do them themselves. That it is only a temporary situation. A respondent illustrates this with an example of cooperation: ‘This market was situated in a dangerous area. This civil aid organization wanted to support the market people with financial loans. They needed information from these people, but it was too dangerous for them to go there. So, we went there and got the information. Once the area was less dangerous, the civil aid organization could go there with the information we got for them and they could get started right away’ (J. Batenburg, personal communication, July 11, 2019).

The second sub-question *(‘How is E&T organized in the Netherlands, regarding the preparation of a foreign mission?’*) focused on the organization of E&T in the Netherlands. With respect to the second sub-question, it was found that the organization of E&T in the Netherlands is diverse. The results show that the majority of E&T programs are separate programs. These programs differ between civil aid organization and the military. Civil aid organizations and the military educate and train almost never together. An exception to this is joint information exchanges and joint exercises. These exercises are every year or every few years. There is a general recognition that civil aid organization and the military need each other and that there is a need to know about each other, but there are only a small number of joint E&T. Some respondents argue that it might has to do with money. It might be something interesting to look at in future research.  
 The results show that the E&T of civil aid organizations and most training institutes concentrates on establishing safety and security for their personnel or the people they train. Civil aid organizations and training institutes have attention for the different actors in the field (which could be military actors), but not specifically on CMC. The results show that there is a large amount of military E&T. Several respondents expressed that E&T is at the heart of the military. The military prepares non-stop for possible deployment abroad. The results present some bigger military E&T programs focused on mission preparation and CMC. But there are a lot more smaller E&T programs within the Dutch military.  
 Respondents reacted different in sharing information about the content of E&T programs. Some respondents were reluctant to share content, while others gave more details.

The third sub question (*‘Do E&T programs, as currently organized in the Netherlands, help solve the tensions? If yes, how? If no, what could be done to solve the tensions effectively?*) focused on the influence of current E&T programs in the Netherlands on solving the tensions. The majority of the individuals E&T programs focuses on preparation for a foreign mission. They do not specifically focus on getting to know the other institution with the intention of solving the tensions between them. The joint information exchanges and joint exercises between civil aid organizations and the military focus on getting to know each other and trying to understand each other. They create knowledge and understanding that could have a beneficial influence on solving the tensions between the two institutions. The results show that to effectively solve the tensions between civil aid organizations and the military continuity is needed. Continuity in exchanging information and contact moments with each other.

The central research question (*To what extent do E&T have the potential to solve the tensions between the civil aid organizations and the military in the Netherlands and how does E&T influence cooperation between the two?’*) focused on the influence of E&T to solve the tensions and on cooperation. With respect to the central research question, it was found that the majority of results, with an average of 90% among the group of respondents, suggest a positive influence of E&T on the tensions and on cooperation between civil aid organizations and the military.  
 The results show a beneficial influence of E&T on tensions. Joint E&T provides knowledge of the other institution and creates an understanding between the two institutions. Having the knowledge and understanding gives you handles to work around the tensions. The results also show a beneficial influence of joint E&T on the cooperation between civil aid organization and the military. Just as with the tensions, the results show that having the knowledge of each other and understanding each other helps in cooperating with each other. The results do show some exceptions of those that do not see the benefit of E&T with regard to solving tensions and being able to cooperate easier. These two respondents regard civil aid organizations and the military to be too different to overcome these differences with E&T or at all.   
 These results are in line with the suggestions made in the literature. The literature suggests that improving the understanding of each other, knowing the who, what, why and where and being aware of the cultural differences through information exchanges are important for CMC.

## 5.2 Conclusion

This thesis has identified several tensions between civil aid organizations and the military. Many of these tensions have to do with the differences between the two institutions and the two institutions not knowing (why) about each other and misunderstanding each other. But these tensions do not need to have a negative influence on the mission and on the cooperation between civil aid organizations and the military. The research in E&T has shown that E&T can be of beneficial influence for solving the tensions between civil aid organizations and the military and for making cooperation easier. Some kind of E&T (be it official courses, informal meeting, exercises or else) can solve some hurdles for better cooperation. It is about providing knowledge of each other to each other to create and have a better understanding of each other. But whether a mission and cooperation goes well or not depends on a lot of different factors and E&T might remove some of them, but not all. After all, CMC is carried out by people. Overall, this thesis strengthens the idea that E&T is of importance for better CMC. This complements earlier research about the importance of E&T.

This thesis adds to the growing body of research of CMC by providing a deeper and valuable insight into the tensions and E&T programs regarding CMC in the Netherland. This limit the generalizability of these results as mentioned in the methodology. It also raises questions regarding the nature and extent of E&T in the Netherlands. The organization of E&T in the Netherlands could change for the better regarding the solving of tensions between civil aid organizations and the military. Another interesting point for future research is the scope of the civil field and the military field. The scope of this thesis was limited in terms of focusing on civil aid organizations and (legitimate) military. However, the civil field and the military field are much larger than those two actors. To develop a full picture of the larger playing field of CMC, additional research will be needed by focusing on the other actors concerned with CMC.

# Bibliography

* Abiew, F. K. (2003). NGO-Military Relations in Peace Operations. *International Peacekeeping*, 10(1), 24-39.
* Byman, D. (2001). Uncertain Partners: NGOs and the Military. *Survival*, 43(2), 97-114.
* Denzin, N. K. (1989). *The Research Act. A Theoretical Introduction to Sociological Methods* (3rd ed.). Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
* Desch, M. C. (1999). *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment*. Baltimore, Maryland: John Hopkins University Press.
* Duffey, T. (2000). Cultural Issues in Contemporary Peacekeeping. *International Peacekeeping*, 7(1), 142-168.
* Feaver, P. D. (1996). The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz and the Question of Civilian Control. *Armed Forces & Society*, 23(2), 149-178.
* Feaver, P. & Kohn, R. H. (2001). *Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
* Flick, U. (2014). *An Introduction to Qualitative Research* (5th ed.). City Road, London: SAGE Publications Ltd.
* Gerring, J. (2008). Case Selection for Case-Study Analysis: Qualitative and Quantitative Techniques. In J. M. Box-Steffensmeier, H. E. Brady & D. Collier (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology* (646-685). Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.
* Gerring, J. (2012). *Case Study Research. Principles and Practices (14th ed.)*. New York, New York: Cambridge University Press.
* Gourlay, C. (2000). Partners Apart: Managing Civil-Military Co-operation in Humanitarian Interventions. *Forum Disarmament*, 3, 33-44.
* Halperin, S. & Heath, O. (2012). *Political Research. Methods and Practical Skills.* Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.
* Harris, A. & Dombrowski, P. (2002). Military Collaboration with Humanitarian Organizations in Complex Emergencies. *Global Governance*, 8(2), 155-178.
* Huntington, S. P. (1959). *The Soldier and The State. The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (2nd ed.). Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
* Janowitz, M. (1960). *The Professional Soldier. A Social and Political Portrait.* New York, New York: The Free Press.
* Janowitz, M. (1977). From Institutional to Occupational. The Need for Conceptual Continuity. *Armed Forces & Society*, 4(1), 51-54.
* Jenny, J. (2001). Civil-Military Cooperation in Complex Emergencies: Findings Ways to Make it Work. *European Security*, 10(2), 23-33.
* Kaldor, M. (2006). *New & Old Wars. Organized Violence in a Global Era* (2nd ed.). Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
* Patton, M. Q. (2015). *Qualitative Research & Evaluation Methods* (4th ed.). Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications, Inc.
* Rietjens, S., Van Fenema, P. C., & Essens, P. (2013). “Train as You Fight” Revisited: Preparing for a Comprehensive Approach. *PRISM*, 4(2), 17-30.
* Rietjens, S. J. H., Verlaan, K., Brocades Zaalberg, T. W., & De Boer, S. J. (2009). Inter-organisational Communication in Civil-Military Cooperation during Complex Emergencies: A Case Study in Afghanistan. *Disasters*, 33(3), 412-435.
* Schiff, R. L. (1995). Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance. *Armed Forces & Society*, 22(1), 7-24.
* Spence, N. (2002). EYEWITNESS – Civil-Military Cooperation in Complex Emergencies: More than a Field Application. *International Peacekeeping*, 9(1), 165-171.
* Shein, E. H. (1990). Organizational Culture. *American Psychologist*, 45(2), 109-119.
* Verschuren, P. & Doorewaard, H. (2010). *Designing a Research Project*. (2nd ed.). Eleven International Publishing, The Hague: The Netherlands.
* Vogelaar, A. L. W. & Kramer, E. (2004). Mission Command in Dutch Peace Support Missions. *Armed Forces & Society*, 30(3), 409-431.
* Volkman, S. D. (2001). *Understanding the Dynamics of the Civil-Military Gap* [PDF]. Retrieved from <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a390597.pdf>.
* Voogd, R. & Vos, A. J. V. M. V. (2010). Publieke Steun voor de Missie in Uruzgan. Welke Factoren bepalen het Draagvlak? *Militaire Spectator*, 179(9), 440-453.

Appendices  
Appendix 1: List of interviewees

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Interviews with civil (aid) organization respondents (in alphabetical order) | | |
| Name | **Organization** | **Function** |
| Anonymous respondent | -- | -- |
| P. van den Berg | Cordaid | Political Advisor |
| M. van Boekel | Oxfam Novib | Global Security Advisor |
| A. Ham | Plan International NL | Operational Program Manager |
| W. Kok | MSF | Security Advisor |
| S. van Oostwaard | PAX For Peace | Senior Project Officer Protection of Civilians |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Interviews with military respondents (in alphabetical order) | | |
| Name | **Organization** | **Function** |
| Anonymous respondent | 1CMI CO | Reservist Specific Expertise |
| J. Batenburg | 1CMI CO | Reservist Specific Expertise |
| M. van den Bosch | 1GNC | Civilian & Political Advisor |
| J. Brouwer | CCOE | Branch Chief Training & Education |
| A. Ham | CIMIC Battalion | Former CIMIC Officer |
| P. van Ingen | CIMIC Battalion | Former CIMIC Officer |
| P. van Sambeeck | School for Peace Operations | Commander |
| M. Vaanhold | 1GNC | CIMIC Officer |
| J. de Weert | 1CMI CO | CIMIC Officer |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Interviews with training institutes respondents (in alphabetical order) | | |
| Name | **Organization** | **Function** |
| Anonymous respondent | -- | Director |
| B. Van den Berg | The Clingendael Institute | Training Fellow International Security |
| E. Brons | Centre for Safety and Development | Director |
| G. Hofstee | The Clingendael Institute | Research Fellow International Security/ Strategic Foresight |

# Appendix 2: List of Documents

* Agenda of a safety and security training course of the anonymous training institute.
* Course descriptions of E&T programs at trainings institutes (anonymous training institute, Centre for Safety and Development and The Clingendael Institute).
* Course descriptions of E&T programs at military institutions (School for Peace Operations and CCOE).
* Guidelines from Oxfam Novib on Operating in Conflict-Affected Contexts.
* MSF Speech.

# Appendix 3: Interview Guide

Date: Interviewee:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Introduction | |
| * Introducing * Purpose * Topics * Confidentiality (& anonymity) * Duration * Recording | I want to thank you for taking the time to meet with me today. My name is Victoria Smeets and to complete my Master, I am writing a thesis about civil-military cooperation. More specifically, I would like to talk to you about your knowledge regarding the E&T (of personnel) in the Netherlands relating to the preparation of a civil-military foreign mission. I am interviewing multiple people in the civil and military field with the intention of getting a comprehensive overview and understanding.  Topics that will be covered today are the (possible) tensions between civil aid organizations and the military and the organization and influence of E&T.  All responses will be kept confidential. This means that you interview responses will only be used for my master thesis. If you would like to stay anonymous, I will ensure that any information I include in my master thesis does not identify you as the respondent.  The interview should take about half an hour. You do not have to talk about anything you do not want to talk about and you may end the interview at any time. |
|  | If it is okay with you, I will be recording the session because I do not want to miss any of your comments.  Are there any questions as of now? |
| Questions | |
| * General introduction * Tensions   + Organizational structure   + Danger   + Division of tasks   + Civil-civil coordination   + Other * Education & Training   + Organization   + Influence | * Can you tell me anything about your position and work within the organization?   + And about your experiences with civil-military cooperation? * Do you think that there are tensions between civil aid organizations and the military?   + If yes, which ones?   + How do these tensions manifest (express) themselves?   + Could you give an example of your own experiences with a tension?   + How do these tensions influence the cooperation between the civil aid organizations and the military? * Is education or training needed to solve the tensions?   + If yes, what kind of education or training?   + To what extent is separate or joint (or both) E&T between the civil aid organizations and the military needed?   + Could you give an example of separate/joint education and/or training program?   + What kind of skills need to be transferred to alleviate the tensions? * To what extent do E&T prepare for a civil-military foreign mission? * How do E&T influence the cooperation between civil aid organizations and the military?   + And during a civil-military mission? * Are other strategies required or needed to solve the tensions between civil aid organizations and the military?   + If yes, which ones?   + How can these strategies solve the tensions? |
| Closing | |
| * Additional comments * Next steps   Thanking | Is there anything more you would like to add?  I will be analyzing the information you and others gave me and themes will be compared with each other to reach a conclusion. I will be happy to send you a copy of my master thesis, if you are interested.  Thank you, again, for you time. |