Understanding the European-Libyan relation

The changing geopolitical relation between Libya and the European Union through the cosmopolitical and economic globalist lens.

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Photo cover: G-20 Summit, July 2009. From left to right: Nicolas Sarkozy, Silvio Berlusconi, Dimitri Medvedev, Muammar Gadaffi and Hosni Mubarak (Associated Press, 2009)

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Preface

Before you lies my master thesis for the master Conflicts, Territories and Identities. Around June of 2011 I started on the first pages of this thesis and it took me over six months to come to this moment. Writing this preface marks the end of my research as well as the finalization of my thesis about Libya and the EU. I hope this thesis will inspire more people to take a critical look at the geopolitical behavior of the EU, as well as gain a better understanding of the complexity and duality of economic and humanitarian interests.

By writing this thesis, I have learned a great deal about analyzing texts, finding and interpreting sources as well as defining and applying a discourse. For helping me with this, I wish to thank my supervisor Henk van Houtum, for helping me to ask the right questions and to stay on course despite many distractions. I would also like to thank my girlfriend Jikke for putting up with my stressful behavior in the past half year.

Last but not least I would like to thank the class of 2010-2011 for all the good times and the inspiring discussions of which I had the privilege to experience.

I hope you will enjoy reading this thesis.

Nijmegen, 2012

Jos Kuiper

Summary

In the first months of 2011, Libya was at the center of attention by the international community when the Libyan leader Muammar Gadaffi used his military forces to strike down the demonstrations by Libyan civilians against his regime. The demonstrations took place during the *Arab spring*, a revolutionary momentum that had already led to the end of Egyptian president Mubarak his 30-year-old regime. Fearing the same outcome in Libya, Muammar Gadaffi did everything in his power to end the growing number of demonstrations by ordering his military forces to strike down hard on Libyan civilians. In response, the United States, Great Britain and France urged the international community to stop these violent acts against the Libyan people. Due to international military involvement through heavy bombardments and political pressure the Libyan rebel forces were -after a conflict that lasted for more than six months - capable of overthrowing the regime and eventually killing Muammar Gadaffi.

By deconstructing the binary oppositions (such as good versus evil), applying a critical discourse analysis and looking at the power relation between the EU and Libya, this thesis sets out to answer the question of how the geopolitical behavior of the EU in Libya can be explained. This geographical relation is approached through the lenses of two theorists. Both theorists, David Held and Martin Wolf formulate their theories on the notion that the processes of globalization should be approached in a particular manner.

Martin Wolf argues that globalization allows every nation to become connected through the global market. Consequently, Wolf suggests that through economic globalization, every nation should be integrated into one world economy. A system that focuses on economic trade, and only cooperates politically on those aspects that cannot be resolved by the market alone, such as counter-terrorism as well as health and environmental issues. By focusing primarily on liberalizing the economies, each and every state will slowly move towards a liberal democracy. For as Wolf argues, a liberal economy predates and correlates with a liberal democracy. It is within a liberal democracy that any economy can thrive even further, thus improving the welfare of the individual. In terms of geopolitical behavior, Wolf thus argues that we should focus on opening our markets and allowing every economy to participate in one economy, in which every nation can benefit and ultimately gain the benefits of a liberal democracy through perpetual change.

David Held argues that because of the increasing globalization, the political space changes. Where in history nations and their state apparatus were limited mainly to their own state boundaries, today's problems pass these borders and create overlapping communities. As a result of this overlap, different point of views, cultures and values are connected through different political spheres. According to Held, all these differences need to respected and safeguarded through a global cosmopolitical order. This global cosmopolitical order must prevent any political organ from denying individuals the right of freedom and equal treatment. Consequently, Held argues that the focus of the international community should be about

preventing any harm done. Crimes against humanity, environmental issues and the like constitute these types of harm which no longer should be resolved at a nation-level, but much rather through a cosmopolitical framework that ensures an impartial treatment of all claims. In terms of geopolitical behavior, this would mean that every state gains his sovereignty and legitimacy through respecting and participating in this cosmopolitical order.

Libya and the EU have had a controversial history in which they were both friends and foes. Throughout the 42 year long dictatorial regime of Gadaffi, the EU has enforced sanctions and embargos in order to punish the regime for crimes against humanity and disregarding Western principles. In the past decade, Gadaffi has changed its foreign policy from an isolationist anti-Western to a more open pro-Western stance, resulting in more cooperation between the EU and Libya. As a result, the EU has used their European Neighborhood Policy to establish common ground between the both nations. The focus of this cooperation revolved primarily around the establishment of migration policies, which resulted in a steep decline of the influx of migrants to the European main lands. The EU also prioritized the cooperation in the field of securing its ever-increasing demand for energy.

Prior to the conflict, the EU and Libya have thus been cooperating more intensively on economic matters, but Gadaffi had denied any attempts to change the political landscape in Libya. When the Libyan rebel forces started to fight against the Gadaffi regime, the EU however intervened on both a military and political level. By aiding the rebel forces with heavy bombardments and the freezing of Libyan assets, the rebel forces were able to overthrow the Gadaffi regime, which eventually led to the death of Muammar Gadaffi. This successful campaign, initially led by EU and US forces and later on by the NATO forces offered the Libyan people an opportunity to redefine their political landscape and potentially create a society based up the principles of a liberal democracy.

This thesis has looked at these developments through the lenses of both Held and Wolf, in order to comprehend the change of policy as well as geopolitical discourse of the EU. This has resulted in an analysis which shows that the EU initially has cooperated with Libya in order to serve their economic interests, and during the conflict has intervened based upon their moral principles of protecting civilians from their government when the government fails to do so itself. As Wolf argues, the increase in economic cooperation was a much needed development. By intervening in the failed state, which Wolf considers to be the duty of the international community, the Libyan people now have the opportunity to improve their economic situation and allow for more competitiveness and an eventual shift towards a liberal democracy that will improve the economic situation even further. David Wolf however offers strong critique on those policies that counter any form of economic integration. The migration policies of the EU, as well as the corruptive nature of natural resources will require a different policy by both the EU and Libya, and should be the priority in future cooperation.

David Held argues that although it is favorable that the international community intervenes in cases of crimes against humanity, he has reservations about the intervention of only a small

part of the international community, namely the EU. As Held argues, it may be the established and institutionalized cosmopolitan principles that have helped the Libyan people as both civilians of a nation and a people of the world, it is still intermingled with serving the geopolitical interests of the EU. As a result, Held argues that although the EU intervened in a successful manner, its successes should be incorporated on a world-scale level, in the form of a cosmopolitical order that ensures that in any case of political intervention the different values, principles and geopolitical interests of all nation-states and individuals will be respected.

Figure 1: Libyan rebels flash victory signs during the battle to liberate the city of Sirte (ANP, 2011)

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Chapter I: Introducing and structuring the thesis

In the first months of 2011, Libya was at the center of attention by the international community when the Libyan leader Muammar Gadaffi used his military forces to strike down the demonstrations by Libyan civilians against his regime. The demonstrations took place during the *Arab spring*, a revolutionary momentum that had already led to the end of Egyptian president Mubarak his 30-year-old regime. Fearing the same outcome as Egypt, Muammar Gadaffi did everything in his power to end the growing number of demonstrations by ordering his military forces to strike down hard on Libyan civilians.

As the success in Egypt had already generated enormous international media attention, many eyes were pointed towards the developments in Libya and with the use of social media and new technologies, Libyan demonstrators were able to communicate with the world and consequently managed to raise awareness of the use of violence against Libyan people by the Gadaffi regime. With the international community aware of the alleged atrocities in Libya, it seemed to be just a matter of time before someone from the international community would react.

It were the United States', British and French leaders who took the lead and sought approval by the UN, as well as the NATO to intervene in the situation. I became interested in the case during the early stages of this conflict when all possible outcomes were still on the table. At the time, I was following a course about the European Union (EU) and its cross-border governance. The course discussed the multitude of policy options that the EU had when dealing with its neighbors, and in my eyes the situation in Libya proved to a highly interesting and current case to write my - mandatory - paper about. I was intrigued by a statement of François Baroin, a French government spokesman who said that the NATO should intervene in order to *protect the Libyan people* and *allow them to go all the way in their drive, which means bringing down the Gadaffi regime'* (NY Times, 2011) .

What was intriguing about this statement was that on the one hand it tried to stop violence, whilst also clearing the path for the rebel movement to pursue their goals, which, as we now know, resulted in a large scale conflict. At the time that I was looking for an interesting topic for my thesis, there had already been some very significant developments, such as the enforcement of a no-fly-zone and the eventual bombing campaign that targeted military objects in Libya. At the time, the EU had already started to play a significant role in the conflict and proved how crucial it was in deciding the outcome of the conflict.

There are several unique features to this conflict that make it so interesting to research. For instance the significance of the role the EU has played, in relation to the geopolitical interests it had established with Gadaffi, as well as the language used by Western leaders when Libya was the topic of debate. During the course of cross-border governance I became acquainted with the concept of cosmopolitanism, a theoretical concept that in essence promotes the idea that every individual is of equal moral worth that should be entitled to the same rights and

freedoms as any other. With the rationalization of international intervention being focused on the moral obligation to protect the Libyan civilians, the cosmopolitan ideas may prove to be helpful in understanding why and how the EU has played such a significant role in eventually overthrowing the Gadaffi regime. As a result, I had decided to write my master thesis about the conflict in Libya, with the historical, current and future political, military and economic relation between Libya and the EU as my main research focus. Because the conflict had only just begun and was still ongoing, little research had been done about the conflict itself. However, during my orientation I did find many articles that described, clarified and underpinned the geopolitical relation between Libya and the EU prior to the conflict.

As has been argued many times in the case of the US military invasion of Iraq in 2003, there may have been geopolitical interests serving the agenda of the political leaders which were not clearly visible to the public. The political leaders however, again, claim to act upon their moral obligation to protect their fellow – universal – citizen. Could it be that this altruistic point of reasoning was the actual cause of intervention in Libya, the outcome of a new narrative? Or are the events in Libya a reproduction of an already existing narrative?

1.1 Research goal and questions

Faced with these questions and numerous possibilities to look into the conflict and hopefully add to an understanding of the relationship between the EU and Libya, this thesis has narrowed down its research by formulating the following research goal:

Provide the reader with an understanding of the geopolitical behavior of the EU and Libya in the course of, as well as before and after this conflict by looking at the perceived reality of the conflict through the lens of cosmopolitan and economic globalist thinkers.

In order to gain an understanding of the geopolitical behavior of the EU and Libya, a set of questions arise that require answering in a structured manner. This in turn has resulted in the following main research question and sub-questions.

To what extend can both theoretical lenses explain and account for the geopolitical behavior of the European Union in the case of Libya?

- *On what grounds has the relation between Libya and Europe (later EU) been established during the colonial rule up till November of 2011?*

- *What geopolitical interests does the EU have in Libya?*

- *How has the European geopolitical discourse evolved in the Libyan conflict?*

- *How do the actions undertaken by the EU relate to the geopolitical interests it has in Libya?*

Before this chapter will describe the applied methodology of this thesis, the societal and scientific relevance of this thesis will be provided first.

1.2 Social/Societal relevance

With an increased interconnectedness as a result of globalization, technological advances and modern age twenty-four-seven media there is an ever-growing increased awareness of what goes on in the world. The acts of violence committed by Gadaffi's regime on its own people may even have gone unnoticed to the citizens in the rest of the world, had it for instance occurred two decades ago. So people become aware of events that take place far away from their homes as these events are being distilled by the news media and broadcasted into the living rooms throughout the world. As a result, it influences people consciously and unconsciously, which may or may not influence the political leaders of the nation states as well.

One could argue that the awareness of the international community, by which this thesis means the political organs as well as the civilians throughout the world on Libya has increased and maybe altered as a result of recent events. Gadaffi however, has been in power for 42 years, during which he had played a role in many controversial events such as terrorist attacks and dubious convictions. Although sanctioned by the international community, the stability of his power seemed nearly uncontested. The latest developments in the relation between the EU and Libya as a result also embody a different type of geopolitical behavior, one of coercion and military dominance over the multilateral use of 'soft power' by the EU. Also the EU has increased their political and economic cooperation with Gadaffi significantly over the last years, serving the interests of the EU member states in more than one way.

With the current financial crisis affecting the EU member-states with Greece in particular, it becomes clear that on certain topics the EU is far from an Union and the focus may shift from European to national interests. In the light of the conflict in Libya, an understanding of the EU may be expanded by looking into its geopolitical behavior abroad. The cosmopolitan outlook and its economic globalist counterweight contribute in a way that helps the reader understand what the perceived goals of the EU are and which interests are – both intentionally and unintentionally – being served. Consequently, this thesis hopes to provide a contribution to the reader's understanding of the EU and help evaluate its behavior in the Libyan conflict by looking at it through the lenses of morality and economy.

1.3 Scientific relevance

The goal of this thesis is to provide the reader with an understanding of the geopolitical behavior of the EU in Libya. This thesis attempts to do so by looking at the relation between the EU and Libya through two specific lenses. The case presented here is that of the Libyan

revolution, its aftermath and the events prior to the conflict, dating back to the Italian colonial period. What makes this case interesting for research, is the ambiguous relation that the EU and Libya have, as well as the relatively small amount of publications and researches about this relation. Certainly, there have been many publications about the relation between Libya and the EU on a particular topic such as energy, migration or the cold war era. However, because this thesis has been written during the time the conflict had only just started and was still ongoing, scientific publications about this topic that accounted for the latest events were still scarce. This thesis will add to the debate on a topic that in time will see a large amount of scientific publications. As a result, this thesis will add existing theories about the potential role that the EU –or Western hegemony- can play with the current events in Libya: cosmopolitanism and economic globalism. A particularly interesting relation between the two can be made; There is an underlying agreement behind the clash of views between cosmopolitical and economic globalist thinkers; that globalization exists. The debate as a result, is about the role and the consequences of this globalization.

A selection of authors has been made based upon their relevance to the research goal and questions and the availability of their publications. This thesis follows the main line of argumentation of David Held (cosmopolitan outlook) and Martin Wolf (Economic globalization). In addition, several authors who add to the theoretical debate, such as Beck and Pugh will be discussed as well. Both theoretical departures will provide this thesis with lenses that will be used to look at the perceived reality of the relation between the EU and Libya. In order to surface the different type of realities, the concept of deconstruction by Jacques Derrida and power-relations and *governmentality* by Michael Foucault will be used. By doing so, this thesis hopes to add to the scientific debate about the EU's foreign policy and identity.

1.4 Methodology

In order to come to an in- and conclusive thesis, the scope of the research needs to be defined and structured. As described in paragraph 1.1, the scope of this research is the geopolitical relation between the EU and Libya. The timeframe of this relation is the end of the Italian colonial rule and the start of the Libyan monarchy in 1951 up till November 2011. The focus will be on the 42 years of dictatorial rule by Muammar Gadaffi, the conflict that erupted early in 2011, the aftermath and the significant developments of the EU's foreign policy in relation to Libya. Most notable for this thesis is the establishment of a common (European) foreign policy and the formulation of European neighborhood policies in a period when Gadaffi was still in power. In this thesis the EU refers primarily to the instruments of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In those cases where the EU is being used to define something else, this will be mentioned. With the term Libyan government, this thesis primarily means the Gadaffi-regime. During and after the conflict, the National Transition Council (NTC) is being used to describe the interim government. Because no officially elected government has yet been installed, using the term of Libyan government would be highly ambiguous. As a result, this thesis will refer to the

NTC instead of a Libyan government. As well as for the term EU this thesis will give a description of those cases in which one the definitions of these terms differs from what has been described here.

In this paragraph a description will be given of why, within this timeframe, this thesis will deconstruct the geopolitical relation and how. For structuring purposes, this paragraph has been divided into several subparagraphs. First the use of deconstruction as a methodology will be discussed. Then Foucault's notions about power will be outlined as well.

1.4.1 Deconstructing as a methodology

Deconstruction as a methodology is about challenging the perception that the universe is binary and composed out of fundamental things (such as reality and truth) on the one hand and the textual or sign systems that convey these on the other (Burman & Maclure, 2005, p. 284). Deconstruction implies that everything is textual and, as Jacques Derrida says, therefore there is no outside text (p. 284). In terms of methodology this means a research is not capable of stepping outside the 'text' and look at the 'truth' that is unmediated. Instead, the research should acknowledge that the world is always being mediated, is always already textualized (p. 284). As Burman and Maclure point out, it is difficult to further define deconstruction as it presupposes some kind of contract between words and meaning. In attempt to do so however, the authors derive from the works of Derrida that deconstruction is a *sustained, philosophical interrogation of this and other binary oppositions that have underpinned Western thought* (p.285). Examples of binary oppositions are truth versus error, reality versus representation, cause versus effect and good versus evil.

These oppositions themselves are hierarchical. This means that in the case of truth versus error, one of the two always represents some higher principle, ideal or *presence*, and the other is always the *supplement*, subordinate (p.285). As Derrida shows, the binary law of presence contains the seed of its own undoing; it will always break down under pressure. As a methodology, this means that the researcher should bring pressure on the cherished oppositions that are woven into texts, forcing or allowing it to reveal their blind spots or *aporias*, meaning points of impasse where contradictory meanings and resonances are released (p.286).

Derrida argues in his study of the binary opposition of speech versus writing that the Western philosophy is geared towards logocentrism, meaning that it beliefs in orders of meaning, reason or logic that exists independently of language or text. By creating this division, a hierarchy is born, one that presupposes a presence over a supplement (p.285). Derrida and Michael Foucault argue that one should not just look at the creation of binary oppositions, but instead look at the differences, the paradoxical logics of binary oppositions and the violent role it plays. Because as Derrida argues, the stability that is achieved by creating a binary opposition is always at the cost of suppressing some 'other' of whatever is banished to the 'wrong side' of the binary (p.286). So, consequently there is always power, authority and

violence at play in the creation of *presence*. This provides this thesis with two significant types of research, one is that of challenging the binary oppositions and the other is that of challenging the power, authority and violence of the creator of the binary oppositions. The latter will be discussed in next subparagraph, but first some importance notions about using deconstruction as a methodology will be pointed out.

First of all, Derrida would probably say that deconstruction is no research methodology, because it cannot separate itself from whatever it seeks to research. However, this thesis will make an attempt at using deconstruction as a methodology, by acknowledging and working with this challenge. Fortunately, Burman and Maclure (p.286) have provided some key notions that when acknowledged and addressed, makes it possible to work with this methodology. These key notions are:

- Everything is textual, everything has context. This means that there is no direct access to reality, nothing is natural, self-evident or innocent. Therefore, this thesis will provide the reader with context of the researcher in paragraph 1.5.2.
- Binary oppositions should be looked for and pressurized. The binary oppositions will be provided throughout the thesis. In order to locate the binary oppositions, a discourse analysis will be used (see 1.7).

Because everything is textual and thus everything applies, it becomes highly complex to decide which oppositions this thesis will need to look into, pressurize and relate to the power relations. This is why this thesis will look into a pre-existing debate, which in this case is that of cosmopolitanism and economic globalism and derive the binary oppositions from this debate and put them under pressure by applying it to the case of Libya and EU. Consequently, the theory will first be discussed in chapter two, before providing the data in chapter three and four. Although the oppositions will not yet be formulated, the role of the researcher and the methodological implications of deconstruction in terms of data, analysis and scope already can and will be discussed in more detail in the paragraphs below.

First the importance of the relation between subject and power as described by Michael Foucault will be described. As has been mentioned earlier in this paragraph, not only the binary oppositions require attention, also the power, authority and violence of the one that creates the (relevant) oppositions should be taken into account. As a result, the following paragraph will provide this thesis with five points of analyses in order to describe the power relation.

1.4.2 The subject and power

As discussed above, this thesis will deconstruct the relation between the European Union and Libya. The binary oppositions that are being created are the result of power, authority and violence, as Derrida argues. This thesis sets out to not only look at the binary oppositions provided the data, but also at the power relations that create the relation between the EU and Libya. Before describing how this will be implemented in the methodology, Foucault's concept of subject and power will be described.

Much like the people, which Foucault calls subjects, its inherent institutions and such are placed within complex power relations (Foucault, 1983, p. 209). As Foucault argues, we perhaps can best understand what power relations are about by investigating the forms of resistance and attempts made to disassociate these relations (Foucault, p. 211). Foucault sums up five types of these kind of anti-authority struggles, being transversal struggles, the power effects as such, immediate struggles, struggle for the status of the individual and the opposition to the effects of power which are linked to knowledge, competence and qualification (Foucault, pp. 211-212). What is important about these five types of struggles, is that they all revolve around the question of 'who are we?' The answer to this may challenge the economic and ideological state violence or refuse to acknowledge what a administrative or scientific inquisition tells you that you are. This relates to the argument that Derrida makes about the violence of the creation of binary oppositions. For example, George W. Bush said that Iran, North-Korea , Iraq constitute the *axis of evil* that need to be stopped (Bush, 2002). He then called upon every nation to either be with *us* – nations that embrace freedom - or against us – with the enemy (CNN, 2001) . President Bush purposely created a binary opposition of good versus evil and refused to acknowledge neutrality. This forced division created a lot of controversy (Habermas & Derrida, 2003, p. 291).

These struggles according to Foucault do not challenge the power itself directly, but the *form of power*. People struggle against the forms of subjection, which in the case of this thesis poses an interesting point of view towards the economic, military, diplomatic and political relation between EU and Libya. The Arab spring is a revolution against a dictatorial regime, which subjected its people to their ruling. Would the Libyan people thus be in favor of incorporating Western models which subject them to a new system which may or may not define themselves as individuals?

Foucault makes several interesting points about the relation between subject and power, the focus will remain on the question of how this thesis should analyze the relation between Libya and the EU. Who exercises power over another and how? In this sense, exercising power is a way through which certain actions may structure the field for other possible actions. For example, the military intervention of the Western nations can only – in theory at least - be successful if the military power of the Western nations is greater than that of the Gadaffi regime. As Foucault states, there are five points that need to be established in order to analyze the power relation sufficiently (Foucault, pp. 222-224):

1.   The system of differentiation which permits one to act upon the actions of others. For instance economic or technological differences or (dis)advantages.

2. The types of objectives pursued by those who act upon the actions of others. For instance the accumulation of profits, establishing statutory authority or trade.

3. The means of bringing power relations into being. For instance the use of military, diplomatic or economic instruments.

4. Forms of institutionalization. For instance, traditional and/or legal structure or fashionable phenomena with either one or multiple apparatuses in order to regulate and distribute power.

5. The degrees of rationalization. By which Foucault means that the bringing into play of power as an action may be elaborate in relation to the (perceived) effectiveness and the certainty of the results, as well as the economic costs. As Foucault argues, power is not a naked fact, but rather a rationalized concept which can transform, organize and elaborate in such a way that it often adepts to the situation at hand.

The conflict in Libya, as well as the post-conflict situation, share a significant relation with the Western military involvement: Their military and economic power. These five points that Foucault mentions, are an useful tool for helping to describe the relation between EU and Libya. These five points all influence, or are influenced by, power, which in turn is part of a strategy. The strategy, as Foucault argues, can be threefold. First is the designation of means employed to attain a certain end. Second is the manner in which a   partner   in   a certain *game* acts with regard to what he thinks should be the action, it is the way in which one seeks to have an advantage over others. Third is the designation of procedures used in a situation of confrontation to deprive the opponent of his means of combat and to persuade or force him to give up the struggle (Foucault, pp. 224-225).

By analyzing the type of actions which were undertaken by the EU and the international community, the five types of actions can provide key insights in the role that power plays in the relation before, during and after the conflict. All this then may be applied to a strategy which in turn can describe which goals the EU has, or claims to have, and which of these goals they actively pursue, which in turn may be understood by either the lens of cosmopolitism or economic globalization. In order to analyze the actions and its relation to the power-relation, the right type of data needs to be collected. What type of data has been collected, how and why will be described in paragraph 1.6. First the key notions mentioned in subparagraph 1.4.1 will be discussed below.

1.5 Working with deconstruction

As has been mentioned earlier, deconstruction as a method becomes complicated as the very concept of deconstruction considers there to be no outside from which one can look at a case and conduct research objectively. Acknowledging the bias of the context and research thus becomes a prerequisite for using deconstruction properly. This paragraph therefore will outline the context of the researcher and the case in order to provide insight in how this affects the research and the thesis as a whole.

1.5.1 The research case

As has been described earlier, the case is the geopolitical relation between EU and Libya from 1951 till November 2011, with specific attention to the last years of the Gadaffi regime and the recently ended conflict that overthrew his regime. In order to comprehend and ultimately describe and analyse the case, it is important to recognize the importance of the role that dominant discourses play. As Burman points out, what we often take for granted is that the stories that we hear or read about are the dominant stories that have been (re)produced by those who have won progress' competition. Consequently, Burman argues that history is the story of the winners (Burman & Maclure, 2005, p. 287). In order to attempt to find the whole story, one must not only look at the dominant discourse or narrative, but try to approach it from multiple perspectives and take into account the story of the 'losers'. This affects the way the case needs to approached in more than one way.

Because this thesis focuses on the case of Libya and its relation to the EU, the scope of the research can be bordered by looking at what does and what doesn't apply to this case study. As described by Flyvbjerg, a case study is more about choosing and setting boundaries to your case then a methodology (Flyvbjerg, 2011, p. 301). The paradox presented here, is that when working with deconstruction everything applies, and thus setting boundaries may prove difficult. However, as has been described before, the *boundaries* will be set by the authors that will be discussed in chapter three. The boundaries will be the combination of cosmopolitanism and economic globalism. They will then be used to pressurize the binary oppositions by looking at the perceived reality of the authors in relation to the case of Libya and the EU.

What thus is required for this research is a set of data that relates to the theory and looks at the discourse, or language (Gee, 2011, p. 30), that is being used within the case. How the required data will be collected, will be described in detail in paragraph 1.6.

1.5.2 Role of researcher

Another important aspect of working with deconstruction, is acknowledging that as a researcher, you are intertwined with the research object as well. Burman (Burman & Maclure, pp. 287-289) addresses several issues that a researcher should address in order to provide

the reader with the context of the researcher himself. The context and socio-political stance of the researcher will be provided in paragraph 1.7.

1.6 Data collection

The goal of data gathering in qualitative research is to provide evidence for the experience it is investigating (Polkinghorne, 2005, p. 138). One of the main arguments of deconstruction is that we cannot find 'truth' because it cannot be isolated from text, therefore how do we define what counts as evidence? Although one cannot find truth, one can try to glimpse at the world behind the stability, at that what has remained silent, unthought or *untruthed* so that presence can come into being (Burman & Maclure, 2005, p. 286).

This thesis will look at the EU-Libyan relation through two different theoretical lenses, which will require relevant data. This thesis will provide the data in two ways: surfacing the discourse of the political leaders as well as the geopolitical relation (e.g. migration, energy supply). In order to provide data that will help surface the (dominant) discourse, this thesis has gathered data that entailed both 'language' and 'practice' (Gee, 2011, pp. 5-8). The language has been derived from press releases, statements, reports, citations from news articles and video messages. The practice has been derived from assessment reports, news articles, policy plans, and EU documents from the European Neighborhood Policy, Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Commission.

This thesis has made no use of the option of interviews. Although this may have added to the amount of expert background information, for this thesis there has been decided to use publications of interviews that had been conducted by the media. This method provided in depth knowledge about the situation as it derived key information that has been inquired in interviews conducted by others. In addition, scientific and news articles have been used as well in order to provide key insights to the practice of the geopolitical relation.

The second type of data that has been provided is about the geopolitical relation. This data has been gathered in order to give answer to the question what interests the EU and Libya have in working together or not. This data is a collection of assessment reports, scientific and news articles, publications by NGO's and institutions that are related to the EU-Libyan relation as well as video messages, policy documents and such. These types of data proved to provide a vast amount of data that not only offered a structured division of the different fields of interest, but also provided interesting use of language, which will be used for the first type of data: language and practice.

It also requires mentioning that while writing this thesis, the conflict was still ongoing and thus not all the data could be conclusive. Also, the newsfeeds and input of data from other sources were not always yet verified or responded upon by the politicians. How these limitations have been taken into account, will be described in the paragraph below, which will lay out the way this data has been analyzed.

1.7 Data analysis

In order to establish a thorough analysis of the data, certain choices in methodology have to be made. In this thesis, the data will be analyzed through the methodology of discourse analysis. This type of analysis is particularly interesting when it comes to understanding geopolitical behavior (Müller, 2010, p. 1). Discourse means *a system of ideas or knowledge, inscribed in a specific vocabulary which are used to legitimate the exercise of power over certain persons by categorizing them as particular 'types' (*Foucault in Stav 2008). Through language, one can convey meaning through representation (Hall, 1997, p. 41). This meaning is often constituted by a larger unit of analysis, such as narratives and statements (p. 43). This thesis focuses primarily on the EU-Libyan narrative and its inherent statements provided by political leaders and policy makers. A more comprehensive understanding of the representation of the EU, albeit economic or moral validation, can be provided by looking at how meaning is being conveyed. In order to so, one must first take into account the particular political and social context in which geopolitical power is embedded (Müller, p. 2). As Müller argues, there is no one-size-fits-all type of discourse analysis, as the context and contingency of empirical objects require a tailor-made approach (p.6). As a result, the type of discourse used may differ significantly from one research to another. In order to validate the use of discourse analysis, the researcher should thus aim at providing full transparency of the way this type of analysis is being done (pp. 6-7). This paragraph will outline how the methodology of discourse has been used, as well as in which context. One way of doing so, is by describing the three core dimensions of discourse analysis in geopolitical studies, which will be provided below.

The first dimension is the context of analysis (p. 8). As has been described in 1.4.1, everything is contextual, which means that providing a context is a daunting task, yet achievable nonetheless. In the case provided in this thesis, being the geopolitical relation between Libya and the EU, there are three types of historical context, which are the periods prior, during and after the 2011 conflict. Because this thesis sets out to understand the geopolitical behavior through the economic globalist and cosmopolitical lens, these two types of meaning determine which data is relevant to the context. It is the geopolitical behavior of Libya and the EU, translated through policy reports, statements, interviews and the like that give meaning to the context. In order to determine whether or not there has been a shift in geopolitical behavior, and more importantly in meaning, these three types of context provides a valid set of data. As a result, the data used in this thesis focuses on these three contexts, by looking at how language is being used to create meaning and how this can be understood through both theoretical lenses.

The second dimension is that of the analytical form of analysis. This thesis makes use of the interpretative-explanatory form of analysis (p. 16). This type of analysis is used to critically interrogate the formation of geopolitical identities, in this case that of economics and morality. In this thesis, the data is first provided before offering a concise analysis through both theoretical lenses. The reason for this type of structuring is that in this way the political

statements, policies and use of instruments such as the ENP and CFSP can be placed within their original context. Rather than looking solely at the interpretation of the content of discourses or their intentionality, this thesis will also look at the processes and mechanisms of the construction of meaning and its social effects (pp.17-18). By doing both, this thesis is not only capable of looking at how discourses are being used to accomplish certain political ends (p.17), but also at how they are being articulated in order to constantly reproduce, challenge and transform discourses. By applying both theoretical lenses at the described geopolitical narrative of the EU and Libya, this thesis can both interpret which types of meaning are being used to accomplish geopolitical ends (for instance economic gain) and how the narrative is being told (for instance moral claims).

The third dimension is the political stance of analysis. As Müller describes, it is imperative, when using discourse analysis, to acknowledge that the analyst himself is an active force within the research (p.21). As Van Dijk describes in his publication about the principles of critical discourse analysis, the analyst should take an explicit sociopolitical stance, in which the analyst spells out his point of view, perspective, principle and aims (Van Dijk, 1993, p. 252). The socio-politically stance of the analyst can be regarded to constitute an analytical bias and compromise the autonomy of the data as it is being analyzed from the viewpoint of the analyst's concern (Müller, p.24). Although in this thesis, the focus will be on how Martin Wolf and David Held will interpret the data, it remains important to provide the reader with an understanding of my role and positioning within this thesis.

Much like Van Dijk his description of the assumed role of the analyst, I too wish to gain a critical understanding of the geopolitical behavior of the EU as a result of the pressing social issue that has been the conflict in Libya. My main drive has been to gain an understanding of why and how the EU attempts to legitimize its geopolitical behavior in Libya by taking the moral high ground, whilst at the same time having worked together with the very same dictator it now had condemned to die. I wish to find out, by gaining a critical understanding of the geopolitical behavior the EU, whether the EU has changed it geopolitical behavior from prioritizing economic benefits to prioritizing moral values and human rights. In other words, to gain an understanding, through the eyes of Martin Wolf and David Held of the discourse and the reproduction of dominance and inequality (Van Dijk, 1993, p. 253)

Discourse analyst *are primarily interested and motivated by pressing social issues, which [they hope] to better understand through discourse analysis. ... [C]ritical discourse analysts (should) take an explicit sociopolitical stance; they spell out their point of view, perspective, principles and aims. ... Their hope ... is change through critical understanding. ... Their critical targets are the power elites that enact, sustain, legitimate, condone or ignore social inequality and injustice. ... Their critique of discourse implies a political critique of those responsible for its perversion in the reproduction of dominance and inequality* (Van Dijk, 1993, pp. 252-253). My basic principle is that enhancing welfare implies an attempt to offer equal opportunities to every individual in the world. This basic principle should not be confined to nation borders. I believe that in order to do so, there are several options

available. By describing and applying the options provided by Martin Wolf and Held, who both underpin my basic principle and are show much overlap with the policy goals of the EU (see chapter 2), there is an opportunity to take a critical look at how the EU, as both a supranational state and a member of the international community, behaves and how perhaps, it should behave.

In this thesis, the methodology of discourse analysis is being used because it offers a suitable tool for gaining a better understanding of the geopolitical behavior of the EU and Libya. Because this thesis focuses more on the EU than one Libya, and in particular on the instruments that the EU has at its disposal, the type of language that is being used within this context is the main focus. As a result, a conscious choice about the structure of this thesis has been made.

In the following chapter, the policy goals and desired outcome of the instruments of the EU will be described. By doing so, it will become able to compare the geopolitical behavior to the language being used by EU officials. Secondly, the theoretical outline for this thesis will be provided. By offering the argumentation of both Martin Wolf and David Held, accompanied by several contributions of other authors, the points on which the case will be analyzed are provided. Both authors offer a set of detailed arguments for what they believe should be the outcome of globalization. At the end of chapter two there will be a detailed description on what basis both theoretical lenses will look at the data provided. It are these arguments that will be used to interpret the data which will be provided in chapter three and four.

In chapter three and four, the events in Libya leading up to the conflict, as well as during and after will be provided. Also, a more detailed look at the geopolitical relation between the EU and Libya will be offered in chapter four. These two chapters will thus offer the reader both an understanding of the type of events and relations, as well as the language that is being used in relation to these events and relations. Because the type of analysis used in this thesis is interpretative-explanatory, the decision has been made to place the interpretation and explanation of this data in a separate chapter, being chapter five. In that chapter, both Martin Wolf and Held their different binary oppositions (for instance in the case of Martin Wolf this would be free market versus government involvement) and the desired outcome of globalization, which will be linked to the data in order to gain a critical understanding of the geopolitical behavior of the EU by approaching it from two contrasting angles. The analysis in chapter six will focus on the different and changing types of actions we have seen in the geopolitical relation between Libya and the EU in the past sixty years, as well as the type of language that has been used to validate these actions

By looking at the language of the EU and Libya, and analyzing this through the economic globalist and cosmopolitical lens, this thesis will be able to offer a valuable contribution to a more broader understanding of geopolitical behavior. Both theoretical lenses will thus be used to analyze the way language relates to context, how it creates relationships and

communities. By taking the two theoretical lenses as point of departure, an interesting analysis of the connection between language and the use of power can be made.

Consequently, this means that from the next chapter on forward, I will play the role of chairman of the discussion between two schools of thought and provide the data for them to formulate their argumentations on. It is the presumed binary opposition of *language* and *practice* that will be pressurized by both schools of thought in relation to the case. In other words, the geopolitical interests, the historical relation, the current events and the response of the leaders of the respective nations about these topics will be analyzed based upon the points provided in chapter two.

1.8 Readers guide

The first chapter of this thesis has provided the basis upon which this thesis will be structured. In this paragraph this structure will be explained by shortly describing the content of each chapter and its relation to the research goal.

Chapter 2: Theoretical framework
In this chapter the theoretical framework of both the economic globalist and cosmopolitan views have been outlined. Also attention has been given to the desired foreign policy by the EU and a deconstruction of Western interventionism.

Chapter 3: The EU-Libyan narrative
This chapter offers a chronological overview of Libya since the end of colonial rule up till November 2011.

Chapter 4: Cooperation between Libya and the EU
This chapter shows the different type of geopolitical interests the EU has in Libya, as well as the policies that have already been enforced or were in development.

Chapter 5: Analysis of the EU-Libyan narrative
In this chapter you will find the analysis of the data through the lenses of the economic globalist and cosmopolitan authors. Also Foucault's notions about power as well as a deconstruction of the geopolitical discourse has been provided.

Chapter 6: Conclusion and reflection
In this last chapter of the thesis, you will find the conclusive remarks of this thesis as well as a reflection and suggestions for further research.

Chapter 2: An economic globalist or cosmopolitan Europe?

There is an underlying agreement behind the clash of views between cosmopolitical and economic globalist thinkers: that globalization exists. Cosmopolitanism and economic (liberal) globalization both meet at this point of departure but head off to different directions. As a result, the debate is about the role and the consequences of this globalization. David Held for instance argues that there is a need for a reformed social democratic political covenant at an international level that properly establishes and codifies a legally based cosmopolitan order. Martin Wolf, a key economic globalist thinker, on the other hand argues that globalization should continue along the existing trends of liberalization, privatization and the free market (Thompson, 2005, p. 53). The different desired outcomes of globalization will provide two different views on the case of Libya and the EU, offering two perspectives that will be applied in order to provide a critical view towards the geopolitical relationship between Libya and the EU. What will be provided are their main arguments, accompanied by several other authors in the field of the respective schools of thought. The aim of this chapter is to provide a partial answer to the main research question, by outlining what both theoretical lenses imply.

The primary focus will thus be on the argumentation of Held his cosmopolitical, and Wolf his globalist economic view. However, some space has been reserved to provide the reader with an introduction to the European geopolitical aspirations and potential. As a result, this chapter will start with an appeal by Habermas and Derrida about the European foreign policy, as well as a brief outline of the main goals of this foreign policy. In the next paragraph the role of the EU in the international community will be described. As will be shown, the EU wants to implement a mix of economic, political and humanitarian policies in their neighboring states. It describes the – desired – discourse of the EU, which will provide a sufficient starting point to describe the arguments for economic globalization and a cosmopolitan world order, which will be described in paragraph 2.4 and 2.5. This chapter will end with a conclusion that summarizes the main arguments of both sides, which will be used to analyze the geopolitical relationship which has been described in chapter three and four.

In 2005, the former EU Commissioner for external relations, Chris Patten said that '*The US and the EU have two decades left to "shape the world" in the way we deem best. After that, economic and demographic trends will force us to share that power with the two emerging Asian giants*' (Patten (2005) in Jorgensen, 2009, p. 1)*.* This means that these are crucial times for the future of the EU, as well as position of the Western hegemony as a whole. This makes it particularly interesting to look at the challenges, difficulties and possibilities that lie ahead of the nation states as well the supranational EU, the international community as a whole and if and how this affects or affected the EU-Libya relation with regard to the current events.

2.1 An appeal for (Common) European foreign and security policy

As a collective supranational organ consisting out of twenty-seven member states, each with their own ministries of foreign affairs, achieving a common European foreign and security policy has been, and still is, a difficult challenge. Whether or not such a consensual policy will be achieved depends on the member-states and to some degree on the existence or creation of a European public sphere. Arguably, a major contribution to this public sphere has been George W. Bush his call to join his 'coalition of the willing' and support the Iraq war. The Spanish prime minister as a result had invited other European nations to swear an oath of loyalty to the president of the United States of America (USA). As a result, demonstrations took place in Rome, London, Madrid, Barcelona, Berlin and Paris, condemning this 'sneak attack' that bypassed international regulations (Habermas & Derrida, 2003, p. 291).

The invasion of Iraq has made Europeans (more) conscious about the failure, or non-existence, of their common foreign policy. Consequently, the breaking with international law resulted in a debate over the future of the role the Western hegemony, the USA in particular, a future world order and the relevance of international law and the United Nations (UN). This momentum was accompanied by the contradiction between West, central- and East Europe, the latter only recently having regained sovereignty and being less willing to delegate more of their sovereign power than strictly required. This contrast between those member-states that desire a stronger EU, and those who desire to maintain the current status quo makes the establishment of a common foreign policy more difficult. This contrast can have a negative impact on the effectiveness and commonality of European foreign and security policy: the risk that agreement can only be reached on the definition of self-interest (Habermas & Derrida, p. 292).

The EU considers itself to be a key player in international issues ranging from global warming to the conflicts in the Middle East. Its success relies on the use of 'soft' power - the use of diplomacy, trade, aid and peacekeepers - in order to resolve conflicts and achieve international understanding (European Union, 2011). Their multilateral approach could be used to counterbalance the hegemonic unilateralist approach of the US (referring to the G.W. Bush administration) (Habermas & Derrida, p. 293).

The EU is a constellation of treaties, defining its legal, political and monetary rights and obligations. In article 11 of the treaty on European Union, the European Union has set out to define and implement a common foreign and security policy (CFSP), covering all areas of foreign and security policy (European Union, 2006, p. 14). The objectives of the CFSP are:

- To safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter.

- To strengthen the security of the Union in all ways.

- To preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter…including those on external borders.

- To promote international cooperation

- To develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms

What is interesting about the treaty, is the assumption that there are common values that are being shared by the member-states. What these values are however, has not yet been defined. By contrast, one could argue that the EU is a 'unity in diversity' (Euractiv, 2006). As Habermas and Derrida point out, politics in its essence require the approval of the (European) citizens in order to be effective, or at least legitimate, in the long run. In order to establish and identify common values, an European consciousness needs to be created. A consciousness where citizens of one nation regards the citizens of another nation as fundamentally "one of us". (Habermas & Derrida, p. 293). Commonalities will call for historical experiences, traditions and achievements that offer European citizens the consciousness of a political fate that they share(d), or could share together, for instance the welfare state principle (Habermas & Derrida, pp. 293-294).

Perhaps, as Habermas and Derrida argue, the EU could try to defend and promote a cosmopolitan order on the premise of international law against competing visions. Certain basic moral rights are shared and promoted throughout the EU, yet not in every nation-state in the world. The Europeans have, since the end of World War II, worked hard to establish, uphold and promote their concept of social justice. However, as the authors argue, there are two contradictions that the EU faces (Habermas & Derrida, p. 294):

1. Haven't the most significant historical achievements of Europe[1] forfeited their identity-forming power precisely through the fact of their worldwide success?

2. What could hold together a region characterized more than any other by the ongoing rivalries between self-conscious nations?

What Habermas and Derrida point out, is that European common foreign and security policy has to deal with three, potentially contrasting, identities: The National, European and Universal identity. The European identity of common values would be the accumulation of values derived from national identities which consist out of national consciousnesses, national languages, national literatures and national histories. The universal identity would offer the same challenge, only on a broader scale and would, due to different socio-economic and political ideologies, be even more contrasting. (Habermas & Derrida, p. 294).

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[1] For instance, Christianity, Capitalism, Natural Science and technology, Roman Law and the Code Napoleon, the bourgeois-urban form of life, democracy and human rights (Habermas & Derrida, p. 294).

In this chapter the argument will be made by Wolf that Europe's economic, social and political success is a result of market liberalization and economic globalization. The question however, is if the EU can give other nations, like Libya, political, economic and social success by prioritizing market reforms, or perhaps social justice and democratic reform should be prioritized, which is what Held argues. Before this chapter will provide a comprehensive description of both sides of the argument, the goals as described by the EU itself will be provided first. This will give some much needed insight into the geopolitical agenda of the EU and which type of policies are being prioritized. Because all the sources used in the next chapter predate the Libyan conflict, it becomes interesting to see how the geopolitical discourse described below relates to the geopolitical discourse of the past year described in chapter three.

2.2 The European Union in the international community

Looking back at the quote of Chris Patten in the introduction of this chapter, it becomes evident that the EU has multiple interests in participating actively within the international community, and may very well explain why some of the largest EU member states played such a decisive role in the Libyan conflict. There are many ways and multiple arenas to shape the world, which consequently lead to policies of the EU towards the international organizations that constitute a form of global governance (Jorgensen, 2009, p. 1). As Jorgensen points out, there is still much unclear about the intentions of the EU in terms of shaping the world (of international organizations) in ways 'we deem best'. A key trademark of the EU however, is their multilateral approach, identity and interests.

As pointed out by the EU High representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana, increased globalization does not change the importance of geography. It is in the interest of the EU that neighboring states, with Libya being one of them, should be well-governed (European Council, 2003, pp. 6-7). The title of his report is '*A secure Europe in a better World',* which shows a duality in the goals of the EU. On one side there is the interest of securing the European Union, by combating threats and integrating the upcoming Asian economies into the Western-oriented international organizations, whilst on the other side there is the interest of improving the World in a way that is beneficial for all, assuming that both goals can be combined.

The EU believes that the UN holds in its hands a fundamental framework for international relations; the United Nations Charter. The EU thus sets out to strengthen the UN by equipping it to fulfill its responsibilities and to act effectively (European Council, pp. 8-9). There is a logic to the EU's desire to make the UN more effective, as it is an effective instrument for pluralism and multilateralism on a global scale, bypassing the constrictions of the European borders, yet still serving EU's core political interests. However, this could also imply that the EU relies strongly on the international organizations in terms of their success and legitimacy and vice versa (Jorgensen, 2009, pp. 1-2).

Problematic is the position of the EU within the international community, shifting from being an international organization to becoming a player within international organizations. The EU itself however, has a split identity; being a Union as well as being a group of small or medium-sized countries. Consequently the approach from the international organizations tend to aim at the nation-state level of the member states, rather than at a supranational level (Jorgensen, 2009, p. 5). In addition, it is not the EU that has a seat in the UN security council. Instead, the United Kingdom and France hold a permanent seat whilst other EU member states often gain a seat as a non-permanent member (United Nations, 2011).

2.2.1 Serving Europe's interests

In 2004 the European Commission published a manuscript that described the desired course of the European Union: one of a 'world player'. Referred to as 'the Union', the EU sets out to *work with other countries and international organizations to bring everyone the benefits of open markets, economic growth and stability in an increasingly interdependent world. At the same time, the EU defends its legitimate economic and commercial interests in the international arena* (European Commission, 2004, p. 5).

The EU also works together with the WTO to allow everyone to participate in open trade, while being supervised, and protected, by the referee: the WTO (European Commission, 2004, p. 14). With the EU being the world's biggest trader, the EU has a keen interest in opening up the world trade for the benefit of the rich and the poor. The EU believes that globalization brings economic benefits to all, including the developed countries, provided appropriate rules are adopted at the multilateral level and efforts are made to integrate developing countries in world trade (European Commission, 2004, p. 13).

So far, the EU focuses their role as world player on the economic globalization, attempting to have each and every nation-state participate in the world trade that is being dominated (at least in numbers) by the EU itself. The EU however focuses on the development side as well, giving economic benefits such as removing trade tariffs and quotas for developing countries (European Commission, 2004, p. 15). The focus however, is not only on the output (products), the EU also invests in the infrastructure, local government, education and other basic requirements for a functional economy (European Commission, 2004, p. 16).

The EU policy towards the Mediterranean neighbors is one of offering them the benefits of their (the EU's) internal market, providing them with additional trade concessions and financial assistance. This however, occurs only on the condition that the receiving country will make greater commitments to democratic reform and the market economy, as well as pay greater respect to human rights. It is within the interest of the EU to promote prosperity and stability in their neighboring countries, as it consolidates its own security. The EU also helps transit countries, Libya being one of the largest, for illegal immigrants and traffickers in

drugs and human beings to strengthen their borders and immigration policies (European Commission, 2004, p. 20).

2.2.2 The challenge of the EU paradox

When looking at the European Commission's statements, it seems that both cosmopolitical and economic globalist influences take part within the approach of the EU towards other countries, including Libya. Globalization and cosmopolitanism both entail transnational behavior, regardless of the question if the actions serve their national goals only.

A paradox can be found in the conflicting goals of the EU: Their perceived wish to integrate each and everyone in an economic system that allows for open trade, as well as using the same economic system to improve the humanitarian and political situation in less-developed countries, whilst at the same time ensuring and promoting their own economic and commercial interests in the international arena. The paradox presented here, is that the EU whishes to remove economic borders in the world and create a global sphere of free economic trade, whilst at the same time reinforcing the European economic stronghold and thus reinforcing borders and more specifically an economic order.

Beck and Grande provide an explanation for this paradox: '*Acting on purely realistic motives, though in the knowledge that they (in this case the EU) can only (continue to) realize their interests in a particular way, namely, by recognizing the legitimate interests of others and integrating them into their own rational calculations*' (Beck & Grande, 2007, pp. 20-21). This proved to be a successful formula for the EU, which could achieve both national and European goals at the same time. The member states renounced power not out of idealistic reasons but for reasons of their own national interests, i.e. their purely realistic motives.

2.3 The diversity of globalization

'*Globalization has become the new grand narrative of the social sciences..we feel the concept offers more than it can deliver*' (Hirst and Thompson in Wolf, 2005, p. 13). Because globalization is studied from multiple disciplines, such as cultural studies and sociology, Mooney and Evans add up over 100 different concepts of globalization, ranging from the abstract systems of Anthony Giddens (Mooney & Evans, 2007, p. 3) to the World Systems Theory of Immanuel Wallerstein (p. 252). Globalization is most often linked to economic issues such as capitalism, corporatism and libertarianism. Globalization can be regarded as being an important element in explaining the rise of the West, meaning the US and Western-Europe in the 21th century (Spybey, 1996). Even prior to the 21st century, the objectification, measuring and owning of the Earth by the colonial rulers, oceanic explorations and the inherent global influences have set in motion the 'modernization' in Western society.

This modernization is characterized by a lifestyle of consumption and material emancipation, which in turn influenced the cultural and the political institution as well as the continuous reproduction of the globalized social institutions. This reproduction of global culture by people everywhere can be seen as the reflexive effect of global cultural flow, a flow that is significantly influenced by the Western society, resulting in global aspirations to reach standards of living and lifestyles that have roots in the Western culture (Spybey, pp. 4-5). Achieving the standards to obtain a Western lifestyle requires sufficient means, which the majority of the people over the world do not have, partly because of that very same globalization and the exploitation of labor (Spybey, p. 75).

Although globalization has had an enormous impact on the lives of the individuals in the last century, the concept itself is much older. The concept has been linked to as early as the aftermath of the voyages by Columbus and Da Gamma in 1497-8. At the time, Europe started to influence and control the rest of the world as well as establishing and promoting their cultural institutions. The European worldview produced the first world's truly global culture (Spybey, p. 1). Globalization however, has evolved more rapidly during the 21th century, with improved means of travelling, media, the internet and so forth. Nowadays it is virtually impossible to avoid the influences of the nation-state system, the global economy, the global communication system and the world military order. Even though states remained independent on the political level, they became interdependent on an economic level. The whole concept in its essence seems to evolve around trade, mass production and mass consumption, increasing the need for resources and labor power by the day (Spybey, pp. 2-5). Although there is a myriad of approaches to globalization, this thesis will focus on the approaches provided by Martin Wolf and David Held. Before describing their views, a brief description of why these two authors are relevant contributors to their respective schools of thought will be provided below.

2.3.1 Portraying the authors

When it comes to finding suitable theories to apply to the case of this thesis, the amount of options to choose from is numerous. Because geopolitical behavior is such a broad term, many different authors and their respective theories proof to be relevant to the scope of this research. This also means that this thesis has had the luxury of looking at many different aspects that surround the geopolitical behavior of states, before deciding upon a strict selection of authors. For this thesis, the choice has been made to focus mainly on the argumentation of both Martin Wolf and David Held. In this chapter, it will become clear why their theoretical lenses provide a highly relevant and interesting understanding of the geopolitical behavior of the EU and Libya. Aside from their theoretical argumentation however, it is also worth describing why these two authors in particular play such a significant role within their schools of thought.

Ranking 55th place in the top 100 Global Thinkers of 2011, Martin Wolf can be considered to be an authority in the field of economics (Foreign Policy, 2011). Wolf attended Oxford

University, where he acquired a Master of philosophy degree in economy in 1971. That same year he started to work for the World Bank, where he, as Wolf stated, experienced firsthand how misjudged interventions by the international community were bankrupting recipient states. After Wolf left the World Bank in 1981, he became Director of the Studies at the Trade Policy Research Centre in London (The New Republic, 2009). He also became chief economics commentator for the Financial times, for which he was awarded the Commander of the British Empire for his achievements in the field of financial journalism. As columnist for the Financial Times, Wolf manages to reach many influential people in both the public and private sector. Wolf himself states that he is *writing for the people who are doing these things, who are running these things, both governmental and politicians and financiers* (The New Republic). Wolf his core beliefs and values, which play an important factor in his publications show an interesting desired outcome of globalization, in which the economy itself levels out the playing field, instead of government regulation and interventionism. In his book Why globalization Works, Martin Wolf makes a clear and concise argument on why government regulation and interventionism are counterproductive. Because Wolf is such an authority in the field of economics, and is capable of reaching many high-ranking officials, politicians and private firm holders, applying his theoretical lens can offer a better understanding of how economic principles influence geopolitical behavior and why.

Although not mentioned in the top 100 of Global Thinkers, Held holds a significant position within the field of foreign policy. Having been educated in Britain, France, Germany and the United States, it may become clear why David Held has become interested in the concept of cosmopolitanism. As a co-founder of Polity, a leading international publisher in the field of social sciences and humanities, Held has established an influential position within the academic world, specifically in the field of cosmopolitanism (Polity Books). Within this field, Held has many publications behind his name. Up till recently, Held also had been professor of political science at the London School of Economics (LSE), but left voluntarily because of the controversial relation between the Gadaffi family and the LSE, specifically the relation between David Held and Saif Al-Islam Gadaffi, son of Muammar Gadaffi. David Held had been an academic advisor for Saif, and later on became board-member of the Gadaffi foundation, a charity organization of the Gadaffi family. According to Held, he worked with Saif because he believed that he was a potential reformer for Libya which could implement cosmopolitical values within the Libyan government (The Guardian, 2011). Because Held is a large contributor in the cosmopolitical school of thought, and his interest in Libyan politics and morality, he can be considered a valuable and interesting contributor for this thesis.

On the website OpenDemocracy.net both Martin Wolf and David Held contribute to several geopolitical discussions based upon each other's opinions and beliefs, on such topics as the dangers of globalization and the impact of the international community (OpenDemocracy, 2004). Their columns show in interesting connection between both their schools of thought and consequently underpins the significance of their theoretical notions that have been used in this thesis.

2.4 Economic globalization

In his book, Martin Wolf narrows down his focus to the economic globalization, for, as he argues, it is the driving force for almost everything else (Wolf, 2005, p. 14); economic agents in any given part of the world are affected by events elsewhere in the world, which consequently influences culture and politics. The economic globalization implies free movement of goods, services, labor and capital, thereby creating a single market of inputs and outputs: and full national treatment for foreign investors so that, economically speaking, there are no foreigners (Henderson in Wolf, 2005, p. 14). If economic globalization as a goal was to be achieved, every individual over the world would no longer be affected by borders in his/her search for work. This paragraph will outline the argumentation of Wolf on why the focus of states should be on economic freedom, and as a result why economic globalization works. In addition, some comments from critics about the concept of economic globalization will be provided.

2.4.1 The economic globalist argument

Wolf argues that economic globalization, or *liberal* globalization promotes economic integration, thus removing natural and manmade barriers, consequently increasing the impact of economic changes in one part of the world on the other (Wolf, 2005, p. 15). Because economic globalization revolves around trade in any form or kind, distance will always matter, and so does space. As a result, territorial control will always matters and so do states. As a result, economic borders may fade, state borders will not (Wolf, p. 16). Although Wolf acknowledges the cultural, social and political consequences of economic globalization, it as he argues is not the focus of economic globalization. Wolf argues in chapter three that actively pursuing economic integration of all nation-states into one collective will bring peace, democracy and welfare and as a consequence will improve international relations. Much like in Wolf his book, his arguments will be described separately.

Freedom of the individual is a core value of a free society, most importantly the freedom of choice and property. A distinct culture is a prerequisite for such a society. A culture that places intrinsic value on all individuals, equally, and moulds them to accept personal responsibility and fate (Wolf, p. 24). Combining the freedom of choice with the freedom of property, Wolf concludes that a liberal society is a commercial society. In such a society, the modern science of practicality, rationalism and freedom of inquiry can flourish. His main argument here, is that as long as the state welcomes perpetual change (novelties), it requires itself to protect its citizens from both themselves and the state. In a liberal society, the state needs to ensure its citizens that their long-term investments will be protected and that the state itself will not seize its profits (Wolf, pp. 24-26). It is according to Wolf the reason why the Western societies have been so successful, and societies in – for instance- the Middle-East have not.

The second argument is the success of regulatory competition, by which is meant that law makers compete with another in order to attract capital into their jurisdiction. With a continuous competition between political units for political and economic hegemony, combined with regulatory competition the economy will flourish. It however requires a wise and beneficent government to prevent the flight of capital or emigration of labor. Wolf argues that because of the regulatory competition, states were bound by commitments that it would not seize assets or use coercive powers to increase uncertainty in exchange. This has been the reason why financial institutions and the creation of capital markets could evolve (Wolf pp. 26-28).

The third argument is the long-term security of one's freedom, which requires a constitutional democracy that protects you from the tyranny of one and the tyranny of the majority. Wolf argues also that a constitutional democracy needs to ensure that there are limits to the extent of (economic) inequality. If not, there is a risk that the democratic electorate will become populist. Also, private property is a necessary condition for political pluralism. If all economic decisions were to become political, loss of power threatens the loss of livelihood and consequently the democracy's stability. As Wolf argues, there is a strong correlation between economic freedom and political freedom: If the individual's autonomy is respected in one sphere, it will be respected in the other. According to Wolf, economic freedom and a degree of political representation predate mass democracy (Wolf pp. 28-31).

The fourth argument is the element called moral values. As Jane Jacobs argued, there is a symbiosis between the commercial culture and the guardian culture. In others words, a relation of mutual benefit between capital accumulation of the civilians (servants of the markets) and the protection of wealth by civil servants (servants of the state). As Wolf argues, the establishment of morals that make a liberal democracy successful rely on economic freedom which –presumably - generates more wealth. Wealth allows the merchants of the market to pay the merchants of the state a decent salary. Over time, this will harmonize through a moral understanding that civilians cannot use force but are allowed to sell to the highest bidder and vice versa (Wolf, pp. 31-32).

The overall argument by Wolf is that economic freedom has improved the state in many ways and vice versa. Liberal democracy is the only political and economic system that, according to Wolf, is capable of generating sustained prosperity and political stability. It are those countries that through economic freedom have established constitutional democracies that embody the rare features of human societies such as rational bureaucracies, independent judiciaries and such (Wolf, pp. 24-33).

2.4.2 Economic freedom and international relations

Wolf his argumentation in favor of economic freedom also has implications for the nation in relation to the international community. In a globalized world, economic freedom and its inherent liberal democracies are no longer focused on territory, because a nation's prosperity

is derived from the combination of internal economic developments with international exchange. In addition, Wolf argues that liberal democracies may fight with other states, but have no reason to fight with one another (Wolf, p. 33). Trade is far cheaper than empire, just as internal development is a less costly route to prosperity than plunder (Wolf, p. 34). However, this does not mean that the political or military power do not desire to plunder or exploit its nation. In order to prevent these people from serving their interests, democratic peace eventually will have to be established (Wolf, p. 35). The basis for peaceful relations is not merely the internal political structure of a liberal democracy, it is also its nature as a law-governed state. It, according to Wolf, is the only sort of state that can be securely bound by international treaties. Also, the peaceful relations are caused by associations that are being formed across borders among private citizens and organizations of private citizens: the NGO's, which are a key characteristic of liberal democracies (Wolf, pp. 35-36).

As Wolf argues, since the Second World War, all advanced economies have transformed into liberal democracies. Although these democracies are interventionist, they all represent the core values of liberal democracy. They however, all differ from another. According to Wolf, there is no overwhelming force inherent in globalization that will oblige them to all become identical: there is still room for difference (Wolf, p.38). Implementing liberal democracies and its inherent economic freedom in the developing world will prove challenging. Especially impoverished majorities will pose a threat to the stability of liberal democracies. Economic globalization can only work if every single state is included, each of which slowly transforming to a liberal democracy. If globalization is halted, then prosperity falls, a corrupting web of controls on economic transactions grows, resentments over barriers to commerce increase and international ill will expand. As a result, Wolf argues that instead of halting global economic integration, it should be made available to all (Wolf, pp. 38-39).

2.4.3 The effects of economic globalization

Liberalism has had a large influence in the increase of economic interdependence. It has influenced the decision of political leaders in a way that allowed more openness of international trade, under the assumption that it would improve the overall national welfare. In light of this thesis, it is important to ask the question how the globalization and its economic interdependence influence government policymaking. Layna Mosley argues that the assumed economic growth has significantly influenced the decisions of the politicians. Removing protectionist trade barriers would jeopardize the firms and sectors that do not have a comparative advantage. These losses however, were compensated by the firms that did have such an advantage (Mosley, 2007, pp. 106-108). By allowing foreign investors into the nation-state, the government will have a larger access to capital. It however also means that the government becomes subject of the market, or external, discipline. Their legitimacy and effectiveness as a government no longer is decided only by their voters. The government also needs to convince international investors (Mosley, 2007, p. 114).

2.4.4 Economic globalization as new imperialism

A much argued downside of the economic globalization is that it imposes a new form of imperialism without colonies (Held & McGrew, 2007, pp. 7-8). By allowing all economies to become interdependent, chances are that there will be dominant and humble economies. After all, it has been the pressure from the US government, private financial markets, IMF and World Bank that promoted neoliberal ideas and consequently motivated governments to completely transform their economies to allow for greater economic openness (Mosley, 2007, p. 106). Highly advanced and developed, being predominantly Western, countries have 'strong but narrow' financial market constraints. The capital market only pressures these governments on policy subjects such as the overall budget, deficits and rates of inflation. These governments however have an almost continuous ability to borrow at a low rate. For instance, the USA recently has increased their debt ceiling, which already is at 14.3 trillion dollars (Bloomberg, 2011) and the public deficit of Greece may need to be refinanced by European member-states who can loan money at relatively low interest-rates (Der Spiegel, 2011) .

Developing and transitioning countries however can provide less security for foreign investors. The investors thus demand more security in terms of government policy. In order to gain foreign capital, these countries are required to change their policies in order to attract foreign investors, at the cost of the social wellbeing of their citizens (Mosley, 2007, pp. 115-116). The status quo also refutes the notion that, economically speaking, nobody is a foreigner. It are the low wages and low government involvement that attract foreign investors to a developing country. The cheap labor this country provides in turn creates cheap products, which can be sold for (large) profits to consumers throughout the world. Even though these investors can often provide labor which otherwise may not have existed, the wages are in no comparison to Western countries (Spybey, 1996, p. 89). Workers from developing countries have little choice but to accept the wages they are given. Their attempts to find work abroad for better wages often means illegal migration as the Western countries deny foreigners from certain parts of the world legal access, in order to protect their own economy, thus maintaining the status quo.

In addition, with a more rapid, and less constrained accumulation of capital within the Western states it increasingly dominated the economic markets. This process could be regarded as *'the outcome of a consciously pursued strategy, the political project of a transnational capitalist class, and formed on the basis of an institutional structure set up to serve and advance the interests of this class'* (Petras & Veltmeyer, 2001, p. 11). From the Marxist perspective, this implies a form of imperialism, which is the product of a combination of both economic struggle and geopolitical rivalries between states (Callinicos, 2007, p. 70). This may imply that the competition among the nation states becomes the economic struggle for markets, investment sites and resources, as well as military and diplomatic conflicts between states, i.e. states become subject to the capitalist firms (Callinicos, 2007, p. 71). This form of capitalist imperialism has seen some changes in its, relatively, modern history.

2.4.5 The oil-dependency

There has been rivalry over economic resources in World War I and II and over political ideology in the Cold War (Callinicos, 2007, p. 71). When the Cold War came to an end, the East and West intensified their economic ties, increasing the interdependencies. The more advanced an economy gets, the more it depends on oil and gas resources. As a result, every advanced industrial nation relies strongly on a consistent supply of natural resources in order to maintain production and thus a competitive advantage.

Where economic interdependencies reduce the likelihood of conflict, the dependency on oil, its geographical positioning, increased consumption and scarcity of these resources actually provide a new source for geopolitical conflict. The argument can be made, and has been made on several occasions, that for instance the war in Iraq was not merely about the military and ideological threat Saddam Hussein posed to the international community. It also has been an example of how geopolitical and economical considerations are in play; Overthrowing Saddam Hussein's regime not only demonstrated US's military supremacy, it also allowed the US to establish a permanent military presence in the Middle East, making it more easier for the US government, and its allies, to secure their growing dependence on imported oil (Callinicos, 2007, pp. 72-73, Harvey, 2003, pp. 1-25).

However, it is not merely the demanding side that may be the cause of future tensions and/or conflict, one must also look at the side of the supplier (Wolf, p. 147). Natural resources tend to corrupt politics, create unstable terms of trade and produce a high real exchange that hinders the development of internationally competitive manufacturing. Although the presence of oil may provide large amounts of income, it can have a negative effect on the labor force as little industry can prove competitive enough to compete in the international market (Wolf, pp. 147-148).

2.4.6 Too little economic globalization

In chapter seven and eight of his book, Wolf acknowledges the role that the Western hegemony plays in the status quo. This according to Wolf however, is not a result of economic globalization, but the lack of it. The degree of international economic integration remains limited, as high income countries protect their labour-intensive, resource-processing and agricultural activities. They do so by enforcing tight controls on the influx of immigrants. Many developing countries still remain closed to trade, capital and the movement of people (Wolf, pp. 133-134).

Also, economic globalization, according to Wolf, does not have such a large impact on income inequality as people suggest. According to Wolf, it is globalization that removes income inequality, whilst it is non-globalization that causes it. It is the refusal (or inability) of some countries to participate. According to Wolf, the critics all focus on the *commentary* of economic globalization, stating that full privatization of public goods for instance is no

requirement. However, Wolf never said that it is. Instead, in his book Wolf argues that it is the heart of the matter that counts: Economic liberalization and international integration, all else is commentary. What all successful countries share, is that they all changed their goals in accordance with the heart of the matter. By liberalizing internal market structures, they liberalized the people and opened up to rapid development, as was the case in China when it liberalized agriculture (Wolf, pp. 143-144).

Following Wolf his line of argumentation, economic liberalization has brought prosperity, wealth and given individuals the freedom to pursue their own life goals. The fact that it are mostly the dominant Western countries that enjoy these virtues is a result of their willingness to trade internationally and open up their markets, to some extend however. Liberal globalization as a process has far from reached its goal. Wolf fears that with the post 9/11 sentiment of fear for the other, globalization will risk to lose its momentum and the halting of economic integration will cause friction among the nations in the world (Wolf, p.308).

In the last chapter of his book, Wolf addresses four challenges that pose a threat to economic globalization, being international rivalry, instabilities, interests and ideas. All four will be outlined in the following subparagraph.

2.4.7 Threats to economic globalization

The Western hegemony is increasingly being pressured by the upcoming economies in Asia. If the West refuses to acknowledge the inevitable, and integrates these new world economies into the global order, mutual hostility, protectionist behavior and the potential of conflict will increase. There however, according to Wolf, is an ever larger threat, that of (mega-)terrorism. The events that unfolded after the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York have caused global outrage and increased the fear among people. What one can already see at European airports and state borders, is that borders are getting more and more closed (Wolf, pp. 308-310).

Also, the financial crises in the US and the EU show the effects that instabilities can have on integrated economies. Sound financial policy and a more sustainable form of foreign direct investment will reduce this threat. Also, the interests of companies nowadays are no longer strongly linked to a nation. For instance General Motors has parts of its manufacturing in China, and Toyota in the US, yet it says little about their identity. Companies become cosmopolitan entities that consider themselves to be part of the world. Although this trend may be objectified to by nation-states and low-waged unions, they lack the electoral power nor autonomy as a result of the multilateral institutions and a web of strong international commitments (Wolf, pp. 310-312). The potential danger of fear of terrorism, economic instability, protectionist reactions and the rise of new competitors in Asia however, should not be ignored. It may not cause a collapse of the global economic integration, it could do severe damage (Wolf, p.313).

In order to combat the threats and improve global economic integration, instead of halting it, Wolf suggested his so-called *Ten commandments of globalization* (Wolf, pp. 319-320). This paragraph will end with a brief outline of these ten commandments.

2.4.8 The ten commandments of economic globalization

1. The market economy is the only arrangement capable of generating sustained increases in prosperity, providing the underpinnings of stable liberal democracies and giving individual human beings the opportunity to seek what they desire in life;
2. Individual states remain the locus of political debate and legitimacy. Supranational institutions gain their legitimacy and authority from the states that belong to them;
3. States and their citizens should participate in international treaty-based regimes and institutions that deliver global public goods, including open markets, environmental protection, health and international security;
4. Such regimes need to be specific, focused and enforceable;
5. The WTO has already strayed too far from its primary function of promoting trade liberalization. What is required is a single undertaking that binds all members;
6. Regimes should be created that include fewer countries, but contain higher standards;
7. It is in the long-run interest of countries to integrate into global financial markets;
8. In the absence of a global lender of last resort, it is necessary to accept standstill and renegotiation of sovereign debt;
9. (Foreign) aid should never be so large that it frees a government from the need to raise most of its money from its people;
10. Countries should learn from their own mistakes. But the global community also needs the capacity and will to intervene in failed states.

The ten commandments of liberal globalization (Wolf, pp.319-320)

As Wolf concludes his book, the first two commandments are the most significant. The world needs more economic globalization, not less. How this differs from the view of cosmopolitanism will now be shown. In the following paragraph, the view of cosmopolitanism will be provided. David Held his argumentation, with additions by other authors will provide a different perspective on what role international institutions and states should play. After the following paragraph, both lines of argumentation will be mirrored, by which the argumentation of Martin Wolf will be used to criticize the view of David Held and vice versa. Both their views will eventually be brought down to key characteristics of their view, which then will be applied to case.

2.5 Cosmopolitanism

In the chapter Cosmopolitanism: Ideas, Realities and Visions, David Held argues that cosmopolitanism is increasingly important to politics and human welfare and that it ought to be embraced further in thinking about the proper form of globalization and global governance

(Held, 2002, p. 305). In contrast to the view of Wolf, Held argues that the world of globalization is not a singular, linear narrative that is merely about economics. It is also cultural, commercial and legal, about power and the lack of it. From the UN to the EU, new political narratives are being told. Narratives that seek to redefine human activity and anchor it in law, rights and responsibilities that are worldwide in their reach and universal in their principles (Held, 2004).

This paragraph will outline the argumentation in favor of a global cosmopolitan order by Held and add some significant contributions by Ulrich Beck, Edgar Grande and other authors that relate more specifically to the EU. Before the argumentation will be offered, a brief introduction into the concept of cosmopolitanism will be provided.

2.5.1 The idea of cosmopolitanism

Socrates is regarded to be one of the first references of the Cosmopolitan movement in 412 B.C., with his famous quote: *'I am not an Athenian or a Greek; I am a citizen of the world'* (Laertius, 1925). In its essence, cosmopolitanism can be seen as a rearticulation of the boundaries of regional and national consciousness and local ethnicities. The past and present globalizing processes objectively embody different forms of normative, nonethnocentric cosmopolitanism (Cheah, 1998, p. 21). Historically speaking, cosmopolitanism was considered to be about international commerce, which crossed nation states as international commerce was incompatible with war and the self-interests of states[2] (Kant (1795) in Cheah, p. 23). International commerce as the standard for cosmopolitanism could be regarded as establishing a global mode of production, which is a reflection of traditional cosmopolitanism of Karl Marx (Cheah, p. 26). The foreign is not experienced and assessed as dangerous, disintegrating and fragmenting but as enriching. One's curiosity about him or herself and about difference makes others irreplaceable to him or her. Consequently, those who integrate the interests of others into their own lives learn more about themselves as well as about others (Beck & Grande, 2007, p. 14).

In order to understand cosmopolitanization, it is important to distinguish it from the political term of globalization. Globalization is primarily understood as economic globalization, which has been discussed in the previous paragraph. According to Beck, even the opposition to globalization remains fixated on the view that presupposes and defends the power of the autonomous nation-state (Beck, 2006, p. 9).

By contrast, cosmopolitanization is a multidimensional process which has irreversibly changed the historical nature of social worlds and the standing of states in these worlds. It comprises the development of multiple loyalties as well as the increase in diverse transnational forms of life, non-state political actors such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and Human Rights Watch (HRW), the development of global protest movements

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[2] As Cheah explains the Kant's idea of the cosmopolitical was written too early to take into account the role of nationalism and liberalism.

against liberal globalism and in support for different kinds of globalization. These type of developments have marked the beginnings of institutionalized cosmopolitanism. When for instance the Security Council makes a resolution, it is received as if it applies to all of mankind (Beck, p. 9).

Cosmopolitanism also embodies upholding equal moral rights that apply to all citizens of every nation, such as basic human rights that binds every citizen in the world, thus superseding state borders (Held, p. 311; Cheah, p. 24). Cosmopolitanism from this perspective cannot undisputedly be regarded as a necessary instrument to obtain desired normative outcomes of globalizing processes. What is considered a desired normative outcome of the globalizing processes we see today, may differ significantly between states. This is why the argument is made that it is humankind that belongs to a single moral realm in which everyone is regarded as equally worthy of respect and consideration, and not the state (Beitz, 1994, in Held, p. 310). A cosmopolitical order, according to Held, thus is needed because as citizens of the world it is important that their status of equality should entitle them to enjoy the impartial treatment of their claims, rejecting all practices, rules and institutions that not everyone can (Held, 2002, p. 311).

The principle of regarding others both equal and different implies the use of multiple interpretations: recognizing distinctions of others may refer to collectives or to individuals. Instead of referring to collective categories of difference alone, as would be the case in multiculturalism which places one within a culture and/or nation-state framework, the cosmopolitan principle does the opposite. From the principle of cosmopolitanism, the awareness of differences is focused on the concept that ethnic and territorial boundaries are blurred and intermingling at multiple levels (Beck & Grande, p. 14). This is why, in his book, Beck argues that the process of cosmopolitanism – cosmopolitanization - means the disappearance of the closed society for good (Beck, 2006, p. 109).

2.5.2 The need for a cosmopolitical order

The process of economic globalization as argued by Wolf, has not occurred in an empty political space. The impact of the economic globalization and its consequential development of international regimes and organizations that regulate and control the areas of transactional activity is not merely economical. With economic globalization came transnational issues and problems which have caused layers of governance both within and across political boundaries to spawn. This has resulted in a transformation of territorially based political decision making, the increased influence of regional and global organizations, institutions and the emergence of regional and global law (Held, p. 206). In addition, there is also a denser pattern of interconnectedness, as a result of for example migration patterns, technological advances and environmental changes.

The world, as a result, is no longer a constellation of discrete civilizations or discrete political communities. Instead, as Held argues, the world exists out of overlapping communities of

fate. However, it was the historical assumption that democracy, geography and political power all were limited by territorial space. These links remained unchallenged for a long time, yet as Held argues, the increased globalization challenges the proper scope of democracy, or democratic jurisdiction, because the relation between decision-makers and decision-takers is not always symmetrical nor similar in terms of territory (Held, p. 307).

Held provides five casing points that show a disjuncture between globalization and democracy. The first is that many of the fundamental economic, social, cultural and environmental processes that determine the nature of the political good as well as its outcomes are not longer within the reach of individual polities. Secondly, effective political power no longer is synonymous with national governments and the nation-state. Instead, the political power is shared and negotiated among a vast amount of different forces and agencies. Thirdly, the concentration of power can more frequently be found in new regimes of government and governance that displaces traditional conceptions of state power as an indivisible, territorially exclusive form of public power. The fourth disjuncture is that providing and securing public good increasingly requires a coordinated multilateral approach, a more recent example is the appeal of the EU that all member states will provide funds in order to prevent a bankruptcy in Greece, which would damage the EU as a whole. The context of national politics has been transformed by the diffusion of political authority and the growth of multilayered governance. As fifth and last disjuncture, Held mentions that a clear distinction between domestic and foreign affairs can no longer be made. Governmental issues such as international drug trade, AIDS, the scarcity of non-renewable resources and the war on terror cannot be resolved through central instruments of national economic policy (Held, pp. 307-308).

It are these type of problems and dilemmas that national governments face, which inform and motivate the case for a cosmopolitan framework of accountability and regulation. However, how will the principles of moral worth, democracy and justice be decided which can overcome the deficiencies of the global economy and the global political order, and by who? Held states that a theoretical dialogue with reasonable rejectability fresh challenges and new questions, with a fundamental understanding that it can never be complete, will offer proof of the best or only moral principles that should guide institutional formation (Held, p.312). In the meantime, the avoidance of serious harm and providing aid in dire situations should be prioritized.

As Held argues, providing aid an preventing harm is not yet available to all the people in the world, and as such, not everyone has adequate access to resources which they may need in circumstances that qualify as dire or harmful. As long as not everyone has adequate access, the social provision falls short and thus causes a situation of *manifest harm* (Held, p.312). Political policy should thus prioritize the needs such as health, education and welfare with the 'highest standard' currently achieved in a political community as their goal. Held states that cosmopolitanism is the ultimate requirement in order to create an ethical and political space

which sets out to terms of reference for the recognition of people's equal moral worth (Held, p. 313).

In his book, Beck challenges the notion that cosmopolitanism means something active, like Held argues, a task of imposing an order on the world. By contrast, cosmopolitanization looks at the world and focuses on uncontrollable events that merely befall us (Beck, p. 20). By doing so, one is more prone to cast itself in the role of a victim: the victim of the US, Europe, neoliberalism, communism etcetera. Consequently, everybody in one way or another is suffering the fate of minorities, of species threatened with extinction, including majorities.

Real cosmopolitanism can best be grasped by characterizing it by what it seeks to avoid at all costs, namely fascistic conformism, systematic violation of human dignity, genocide and crimes against humanity. Cosmopolitanism is about respecting diversity. The question arises what kind of connection can be made between the recognition of diversity and the compulsion to act. Beck's answer to this question is that real cosmopolitanism is the common defense against evils (Beck, p. 59). One way this translates itself, is through institutionalized cosmopolitanism. In the following subparagraph, Held will argue that to some extend one can already speak of institutionalized cosmopolitanism.

2.5.3 The cosmopolitical reality

Within the international *realm*, as Held calls it, there already are characteristics of cosmopolitanism embedded into rule systems and institutions. There is an emerging regional and universal regulatory order that takes the commonality of human beings, such as human rights and the ecosystem as a starting point. One can become member of both national communities and of a wider cosmopolitan order, that embodies unrestricted use of public reason and universal hospitality, which can be found in for instance the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Held, pp. 313-314).

A major contribution to providing people with adequate access to the political community, is liberal democracy. Wolf argues that liberal democracies are a key characteristic for overall welfare, and correlate with liberal globalization. Held however argues that many democracies in the world are still best described as partial, because they have curtailed and limited election procedures, rights and associational autonomy (Held, p.314). And even if they could be considered full liberal democracies, with all its inherent rights and freedoms, it still would not be enough to qualify as a cosmopolitical society. Held provides three arguments why that is.

His first argument is that allowing each person to become part of a cosmopolitan society does not take account of the complex power relations and inequality that turns this society into a market-driven sphere marked by massive inequalities of access, distributions and outcomes (Held, 2000 in Held 2004, p.314). Technological advances such as communication

systems may establish a globally linked communication system, it also creates new divisions between those who are connected, and those who are not (e.g. Those who have access to internet and those who have not).

His second argument is that the participants in the cosmopolitan society can become subject to a discourse that is shaped through territorial interests, private properties or particular commitments. The current forms of international law do not address the difficulty people have to participate in deliberate international forums such as the WTO, which as a result often marginalize the concerns and interests of the least powerful (See paragraph 2.6).His third argument is that in this world goods and services have greater opportunity for mobility than people. As a result, even those most in need of protection such as refugees and asylum seekers are limited in their movement. Although there is universal hospitality, it still is too limited to address for all dilemmas and account for a proper treatment of people (Held, pp. 314-315).

There has been a significant shift in emphasis in the character and goals of international society, away from the goal of co-existence towards the creation of rules and institutions that embody shared responsibilities towards the *planetary goods* (Hurrell, 1995, p. 139 in Held, p. 316). However, as argued before by Held, it is not the heart of the politics of sovereign states or corporate colossi. Instead*, the principle of impartial moral reasoning might be appealed to justify limits on reasons of state and the actions of International Governmental Organizations (IGO), but it is, at best, only an incidental part of the institutional dynamics that have created such chronic political problems as the externalities* (spillover effects such as excessive sea-fishing) *generated by many national economic and energy policies, overlapping communities of fate in areas as diverse as security and the environment, and the global polarization of power, wealth and income* (Held, p. 316)*.*

Where in the history cosmopolitan was about international commerce, and thus solely about the production and distribution of 'goods', nowadays the focus has turned towards the production and distribution of 'bads' (Beck, pp. 21-22). By this, Beck means that international focus nowadays includes climate change, global poverty, terrorism, AIDS, epidemics etcetera: all of which deriving around a risk-assessment and the, perceived, need to control those risks. These risks can be divided into a spatial and a social dimension.

The spatial dimension refers to those risks that are not bound by nation-state borders; climate change, pollution and such. The social dimension on the other hand refers to the question who may be (legally) liable for causing or being involved in said risks. Matters such as pollution or financial crises are the result of interactions among many individuals that again may disregard nation-state borders, pinpointing who is to blame thus may prove to be a difficult task. This over time has increased awareness about the deterritorialization of global risks. In turn, it has sharpened global normative consciousness (Cheah, 1998, p. 26), generated global publics and promoted a cosmopolitan outlook. Political conflicts about these risks have the consequence that they promote institutionalized cosmopolitanism that deals with definitions and jurisdictions (Beck, pp. 22-23).

Beck makes an important notion about the coming about of institutionalized cosmopolitanism: It is the result of '*involuntary politicization of world risk society. The everyday experience of cosmopolitan interdependence is not a love affair of everyone with everyone. It arises in climate of heightened global threats, which create an unavoidable pressure to cooperate … this is the case when recognition of the scale of the common threats leads to cosmopolitan norms and agreements, and hence to an institutionalized cosmopolitanism'* (Beck, p. 23)*.*

What is interesting about this citation is the question that can be derived from it. As cooperation sometimes is involuntary and cosmopolitan norms and agreements become institutionalized, on what principles are these norms and agreements based? Can Western countries demand other countries to actively engage in combating terrorism, whilst at the same time maintaining the status quo, which may, or may not, fuel terrorist tendencies? Does this mean that institutionalized cosmopolitanism is incapable of challenging the dualism of national and international?

According to Held, this duality has an effect on the way institutions are being shaped. International treaties and other legal or political initiatives not only curtail sovereignty, they also underpin it. Geopolitical interests of powerful nation-states are often embedded into articles and statutes of IGOs. Although the international community may lean on cosmopolitan principles, they hardly ever provide enough resources and *clout* to make declared cosmopolitan intentions and goals effective. Instead, organizations such as the United Nations are depending heavily on the financial support of a few major states (Held, pp. 316-317).

Another important issue Held raises, is the fact that cosmopolitan political initiatives (since the end of World War II) have focused on the political domain, not the economic; these initiatives have focused on checking the abuse of political, and not economic power. Held argues, that the issues of economic domination, corporate power, corporate governance and flourishing economic inequalities have to be brought back into the centre of cosmopolitan practice. In the following subparagraph, Held his vision on how the cosmopolitan theory should be brought back to the international community and its institutions will be provided.

2.5.4 The cosmopolitan vision and implications

An important dilemma is that the current institutionalization of cosmopolitan standards is not only unable to reach the entire world, its impact also differentiates across the world. As a result, upholding cosmopolitan standards may have severe effects for economic agents and institutions of economic governance. It may negatively affect the economic practice and damage the interests of corporate, on which they rely as well (Held, p.317). Arguably, for the EU there may be a discrepancy between the cosmopolitan vision, which is promoted by social scientists, and the cosmopolitical reality of the European Union. The EU does not

position itself, its projects of integration nor its citizens as cosmopolitan. Instead, as Rumford argues, that although the EU may seem cosmopolitan, it is not the interpretation or designation favored by EU institutions, which may prefer the terms 'humanitarian' or 'globally aware'. Within this lies the possibility that the EU is well aware that they may become less legitimate if they work on behalf of all humanity rather than promoting the interests of Europeans (Rumford, 2008, pp. 4-5).

It thus may be the corporations that are the primary agents of justice. According to O'Neill both the state and transnational corporations and companies (TNC) should be judged by the principles and standards that they claim to uphold . According to O'Neill, TNC's can and should use their power to support and strengthen the reasonably just states (Bernstein, 2005, pp. 17-18). The downside however, is that companies, specifically those who need a competitive edge, that reside in a state with high labor standards and freedom see their profits go to rogue states were companies are les constrained, and their rational economic view would result in focusing on the economic benefits, instead of the humanitarian (Held, p.318).

And thus, as Held argues, should the global world order be redefined. Global institutions like the WTO, and large political organs such as the EU will need to re-establish a set of mechanisms and procedures that allow markets to flourish within the framework of cosmopolitan principles and processes. A bridge will thus need to be built between the international economic law and the human rights law (Held 2004, p.318). Held also makes the same argument about the legal and political institutions and IGO's (Held, 2002).

The crux however, is that most institutions, such as the WTO and IMF are based upon Western principles of freedoms and rights. Redefining the *rules of the game* into standards and values that are of Western descent, may give rise to the idea that it promotes Western interests and may ignore that of others. In addition, terms like liberty and democracy are often related to, and used by the discourse of Western dominance. Held acknowledges that skepticism towards this is natural, however the focus should be on the validity of the principles, not the origin. In terms of defining the success of the cosmopolitanization of institutions, a clear divide between political discourses that serve particular interests and power systems on the one hand and those that serve the claims and interests of the world community and is willing to share power should be made (Held, p.319-320).

Much like the ten commandments of economic globalization by Wolf, Held use a set of principles that should guide the creation of a cosmopolitan order. In the global transformations reader, seven cosmopolitan principles which can be universally shared and should form the basis for protection, nurturing and the establishment of institutions that govern his or her life:

1. Equal worth and dignity
2. Active agency
3. Personal responsibility and accountability
4. Consent
5. Reflexive deliberation and collective decision-making through voting procedures:
6. Inclusiveness and subsidiarity
7. Avoidance of serious harm and the amelioration of urgent need.

The seven cosmopolitan principles (Held & MacGrew, 2003, p. 515)

2.6 Western intervention and Liberal peace

Implementing market reforms and moving towards a world-wide market through liberalization is, according to Wolf, a prerequisite for a flourishing liberal democracy. David Held, argues that instead of following that path, international organizations needs to reestablish a cosmopolitan world order that protects and promotes individual rights and freedoms. Before this chapter will end by describing where Wolf and Held agree, and where they disagree and how they believe the relation between the EU and Libya should be understood, attention will be given to an important essay written by Michael Pugh about Western intervention.

Because this thesis not only looks at the geopolitical relation before, but also during and after the conflict in Libya, it is important to shed some light on the way Western nations proceed with their interventions and peacekeeping and -building operations. A much referred term when it comes to Western intervention is Liberal peace, which implies the Western philosophy of democracy, free markets, economic liberalization and deregulation (Heleta, 2011). Adding insights from previous interventions can help this thesis to define key characteristics of how the Western discourse is being used or abused to serve national or global interests. Later on, this can be used to add to the list of topics that will be analyzed and discussed by Wolf and Held.

2.6.1 Deconstructing Liberal peace

Pugh argues that liberal peace has no clear neutrality, but that certain state interventions may only occur to serve state interests (Pugh, 2004, pp. 39-40). Interventions, he argues, should be deconstructed from a critical theory view of world order politics. Much of the research on conflict is determined by problem-solving imperatives (Pugh, p. 39), and concentrates on 'what we've got'. This then results in the situation where the wisdom, as well as the dissent of the issue of peacekeeping does not interrogate the order itself, but rather accepts it as a reality. The order Pugh refers to, is that of neo-liberal market economics, statism and political plurality (Pugh, p. 41). In practice, the order reflects the hegemonic power (the West) and its allies as the chief determinants of how a regime will function in each case of intervention (Pugh, p. 44). An order which at times is reluctant to institutionalize

experiences of other peacekeeping countries. Promoting 'liberal peace' occurs through the discourse of morals: Peace and humanitarianism (Pugh, pp. 47-48).

By deconstructing this discourse, Pugh show how the discourse of humanitarianism promotes moral values and responses that demonstrate and reinforce the 'superiority' of liberal ideology, without having to deal with the structural injustices that foster instabilities within that same system (Pugh, p. 49). Also, these morals are used by this order to capture the moral high ground, or it's used as wrapping paper to cover more base interests which are less popular. Yet most importantly, this new form of military humanism has been a key element in the Western script for reconstituting security in order to maintain a 'Selves and Others' duality (Pugh, p. 49).

What it boils down to, is the lack of critical view towards the institutions that foster peace and stability, as it generates dependency on the wealthy parts of the world and thus subjects them to their demands of economic globalization which undermines the very self-sufficiency of these states (Pugh, p. 54). The framework that can be derived from his article, is that of a critical view towards the international institutions, their interventions and more importantly their state-centric control system (Pugh, p. 53).

In addition to Pugh's description of the discourse, the article of David Chandler shares equal significance for a critical view towards intervention. Chandler argues that the discourse did not shift, but merely gained a new form of representation (Chandler, 2009, p. 244), as he states that in essence global war is understood as the struggle for securing the reproduction of power, but also that of global social and economic order (Chandler, p. 246). Chandler uses the War on Terror to surface the discourse in practice, showing how a deterritorialized type of war results in a war that is disassociated from any clear strategic grounding (Chandler, p. 255), bypassing or dismantling the framework of international order as it wages on (Chandler, p. 259). Chandler tries to show why it is important to apply a critical view towards the hegemonic power(s) that are involved in global interventions. Their goal is to preserve the hegemony by controlling and policing the world. And without anyone challenging this hegemony, this global war could create one large concentration camp in which all are subject to the hegemonic power(s) (Chandler, p. 248).

2.7 Conclusion

The impact and potential of globalization is well understood by the EU. Through globalization, nation-states that once seemed far away now come closer to the ever-expanding EU. The EU and its CFSP desire a well-governed ring in the periphery of Europe. It serves Europe's interest to have stability and peace in the region. The EU seems to promote the concept of economic globalization, by desiring that everyone should enjoy benefits of open markets and stability. At the same time, the EU also defends its legitimate economic and commercial interests in the international arena.

However, the EU does not only promote liberal economic values. There is also a level of conditionality to their offered economic integration, demanding political and social reforms of the recipient state. By doing so, it seems that the EU manages to rationally calculate universal interests (human rights and freedoms) into their own interests (increased trade-relations, alliances). These goals however, have been formulated prior to the conflict in Libya, in a period where the relation between the Gadaffi-regime and the EU improved, as will be described in the following two chapters.

Before describing the case however, Wolf and Held their arguments will have to be linked together in order to provide a clear and concise overview of where both authors agree and disagree upon. In the methodological section of chapter one, deconstruction as a methodology has been described. One of the key aspects of deconstruction is understanding that binary oppositions are hierarchical, in which one always represents some higher principle or ideal or presence (1.4.1). By bringing pressure on the cherished oppositions, this thesis will then reveal blind spots or aporias.

Both authors would argue that their idea of how globalization should take place is the ideal or presence. Although both authors have opposite views, their ideas may not present a *perfect* binary opposition on every argument. However, by applying the opposing views to the case of Libya and the EU, which will provide the *text* that will be used to pressurize both views, this thesis can add to an understanding of why the EU intervenes in Libya and why particular language is being used.

2.7.1 Wolf and Held on globalization

As has been described earlier, the focus of both authors differ significantly when it comes to question of what should be the focus of globalization. Wolf argues that the focus should be on economic freedom, whilst Held focuses on the (re)establishment of a framework of cosmopolitan processes and principles that also involves the issues of economic domination and its inherent inequalities.

Wolf argues that states will always matter, because everything revolves around trade and territorial control. Held on the other hand argues that due to increased economic development, many issues were put on the agenda that caused layers of governance to spawn within and across political boundaries, which causes states to operate on a regional (state) as well as global level.

Wolf thus argues that the geopolitical agenda should be to actively pursue economic integration of all nation-states into one collective, as this will bring peace, democracy and welfare. Applied to the EU market, economically integrating its neighboring states into their market system would be favored by Wolf. Held would criticize this move by stating that integrating nation-states into the EU economic market would not take account of the complex

power relations and inequalities that would turn the receiving nation-state into a market-driven sphere. Also, the neighboring states that are allowed to enter the EU market may become subject to a discourse that is shaped through the EU's territorial interests, private properties and particular commitments.

According to Wolf, offering economic freedom to a neighboring state, for instance Libya, will eventually bring political freedom. However, Wolf would also acknowledge that the dictatorial regime of Gadaffi would not provide for a degree of political representation required to predate mass democracy, yet the current removal of this regime may prove to be sufficient for Wolf his argument. Held may agree on this, but would argue that the events that took place between the EU and Libya should not only be seen from the perspective of the political domain, but also from the economic domain. Stating that providing democratic values and entrance to the Western markets still does not account for issues of economic domination. Instead, Held might argue that the current events will foster more inequality and unrest.

Transforming Libya into a liberal democracy would favor peace, as Wolf argues, as no liberal democracy has ever fought with another. Also, by connecting the individuals within different nation-states through economic integration will cause associations between private citizens and organizations and result in peaceful relations. Wolf makes the connection through private property, whilst Held makes the connection through the moral equality that binds citizens across and within borders. Much like the critique provided in 2.4.4., Held argues that the current status quo does not provide an impartial treatment of every individual's claims, and consequently Held claims that economic integration alone is not enough.

2.7.2 Wolf, Held and the case of the EU and Libya.

The first two paragraphs of this chapter have provided an interesting perspective on the EU and its foreign policy. The EU is more than capable of promoting (Western) values such as democracy and freedom, they way to do so however is still up to debate. Documentation provided by the EU shows that economic globalization, and their neoliberal doctrine dominates the discourse of the EU. However, cosmopolitan values such as equality and morality are increasingly embedded into EU's foreign policies, specifically when it comes to cooperating with their neighboring states.

Much like the debate between Wolf and Held about the desired course towards globalization, the same debate can be applied towards the desired course of Europe's foreign policy. Clearly, as a neighboring state the EU has key interests in Libya for providing stability and an economic partner. However, in light of the more recent events in Libya, and as the following chapters will show, the claims on morality to justify the recent events may show a different type of approach. It also may be exactly what Pugh argues, the claim on morality to justify the EU's involvement to secure economic interests, or as Beck and Grande put it: *Acting on purely realistic motives, though in the knowledge that they (for instance the EU) can only (continue to) realize their interests in a particular way, namely, by recognizing the legitimate*

interests of others and integrating them into their own rational calculations' (Beck & Grande, 2007, pp. 20-21)*.*

Because Wolf and Held both have such different views on how to react to the effects of globalization, it becomes particularly interesting to approach their views on the case of Libya, by applying both the views on economic globalization and cosmopolitanism onto the geopolitical behavior of the EU in Libya. It is challenging to provide a binary opposition between both schools of thoughts, as doing so implies a hierarchical order. Both Wolf and Held would claim their logic to be better than the other. By applying it to the case of Libya their argumentation can be pressurized and tested. Both authors will perceive the *reality* of the case through their own lenses and offer and interesting view on the geopolitical relation, and more importantly the geopolitical *reality* of this relation.

In the following chapter, a chronological description of the events in Libya will be provided, with specific attention to the EU. In chapter four, the level of, as well as the different fields of cooperation between the EU and Libya prior to the conflict will be described. The decision has been made to apply the Wolf and Held their arguments in chapter five. By doing so, a more comprehensive and concise debate can be provided which can link arguments based up chapter three and four together.

Chapter 3: The EU-Libyan narrative

Although Libya is a relatively young state, the revolution in 2011 has not been its first. This chapter will outline significant events, interpretations and factors of Libya as a nation-state, with specific attention to how it relates to the EU. Starting with a profile of Libya, this chapter will furthermore outline key events in post-colonial Libya as well as the conflict and the days after the death of Gadaffi. The major changes in Libya's history have been given separate paragraphs. Those events that are considered significant within these specific timeframes, have been placed under separate subparagraphs. The aim of this chapter is to provide the reader with a thorough outlining of contemporary and post-colonial Libya as well as the reactions of the international community, specifically the EU towards the behavior of Libya as a state as well as its people. This chapter will end with a contemplation about contemporary Libya and the challenges it faces in the near future.

3.1 The origin of Libya (up till 1951)

It is considered highly complex and difficult to offer a complete overview of the Libyan history, as it is rich and highly diverse (Szabó, 2006, p. 6). Prior to its achieved independence in 1951, Libya could be considered a state of little political unity. The region's history has been one of tribes, regions, cities and the empires of which it was a part of. The name Libya is derived from one of the Berber tribes, which was called as such by the Greeks. Libyan as a term was used to describe all Berbers in North-Africa. Libya and Libyan consequently were terms that, prior to independence, had not been used to geographically position the territory of Libya as a political state. Being a relatively new state, Libya has been working towards the development of national consciousness and institutions (Federal Research Division, 2005, pp. 1-2).

Geographically speaking, Libya can be divided into three major regions, each of which with separate historical events that shaped and defined their region. The three major regions are Tripolitania, Fezzan and Cyrenaica (See figure I). It is the Saharan climate that has played a significant role in the historical development of these three regions, as they were cut off from one another by the vast desserts, and no viable infrastructure, that separated the regions (Federal Research Division, p. 2). Consequently,

Figure 2: Three major regions of Libya

the political, economical and cultural orientation of the regions was different as well.

Tripolitania's orientation was towards western Africa, also called the Maghrib (Mahreb). The region's political consciousness developed as a reaction to foreign domination. This orientation has been one of the major factors in the desire for the unification of modern Libya. The region of Cyrenaica was oriented towards the Eastern Islamic world; the Mashriq (Machrek) or Middle East. Because the occupying regimes were unable to assert autonomy

of the region, specifically the hinterlands, Cyrenaica has retained much of the authority throughout the period prior to Libyan independence. Fezzan has had little orientation towards the Maghrib or Mashriq. Consisting predominantly out of nomads, the region main focus had been the desert trade routes towards the sub-Saharan region of Africa (Federal Research Division, p. 2).

Although the three regions could be considered separate territories throughout the history of Libya, the region as a whole had been subject to many different empires and regions. The regions have been subject to the ruling of the Phoenicians, Carthaginians, Greeks, Persians, Romans, Spaniards, Vandals, Byzantines in the first seven centuries B.C. (Congress Country Studies, 1987). In the centuries 700-1951, the chronological order of rulers have been the Muslim Arabs, Ottoman Turks and the Italians.

Italy invaded the regions of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica in 1911, and was given Fezzan the year after by the Ottoman sultan as a result of the Treaty of Lausanne (Szabó, p. 8). The Italian government applied separate colonial organizations to the regions up till 1929, when Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were united into one colonial province. In 1934, this colony was given the name of Libya, which was divided by four provinces: Tripoli, Misurata, Bengasi and Derna. The colonial ruling of Italy had been contested greatly in Cyrenaica and Fezzan, and led to several bloody battles between Italian forces and tribal lead rebel forces. During the time of World War II, Libya was still an Italian colony, and its territory was used as a battleground between the Axis and Allied forces. After the war had ended, it were the allied British and French forces who occupied the region until Libya was given independence by the United Nations in 1951 (Federal Research Division, p. 2). During the Italian occupation, which lasted nearly three decades, twenty-five percent of Libya's population had died (Szabó, p. 8)

This key moment in Libya's history was not only the first time the UN had given a country independence. It also meant a new era of post-colonial Libya, which originally was founded as a constitutional, hereditary monarchy under the Sanusi leader Said Muhammed Idris (Federal Research Division, p. 2). What followed was a highly interesting era of key events in Libya's post-colonial history which not only greatly affected the people of Libya, but also the international community as a whole. The following paragraphs will elaborate on this further.

3.2 The Libyan monarchy (1951-1969)

With the proclamation of independence, Libya had managed to shake off their foreign rulers. With independence came the idea of a unified state. In reality, the three major regions were all still relying on the local ruling of the tribes and lacked any political will towards a unified Libya. Unification as a result, became the political construct of foreign powers (Szabó, p. 9). The political construct, with King Idris as ruler, thus had to take drastic measures in order to stretch his reach of power over the three regions; He ordered almost immediately the disbandment of all political parties throughout the kingdom. In order to remain seated, the

king also invested in the relations towards the Western world. The United States and Great Britain were even allowed to place military bases on Libyan territory (Szabó, p. 9).

A very important event during the early years of Libyan independence, was the discovery of oil in 1959. Prior to the discovery of oil, Libya was a poor state that relied heavily on their agricultural production. After the discovery of oil, large revenues poured into the state as petroleum became one of the major resources needed for the new forms of international industry. Libya as a result transformed from a poor to a wealthy state with the means to change their economic situation drastically (Hamood, 2006, p. 17). Although this key-moment in the history of Libya established close links to the international economy (Szabó, p. 9), it also marked the beginning of an anti-Western sentiment (Federal Research Division, p. 2)

The discovery of oil also meant a change in the administrative structure, as the revenues had to be distributed equally over the regions (Szabó, 2006, p. 9), which required a more unitary administrative organization. With an assured income on a vast scale, Libya was able to launch several ambitious programmes for economic and social development, such as the Great Man-Made River project that transferred water from deep under desert areas to the coastal areas, which increased the agricultural means significantly and also meant a self-sufficient food production for Libya (Hamood, p. 17). These ambitious programmes required a large workforce, one that Libya itself could not provide. Consequently, migrant workers entered the state, predominantly from the neighboring countries of Egypt en Tunisia (Hamood, p. 17).

Despite the economic uprising of Libya, the state failed to maintain stability and order. On the first of September 1969, the Libyan monarchy was overthrown by a bloodless military coup d'état. The leader of this coup was colonel Muammar al Gadaffi. Born in 1942 and descendant of a small tribe of mixed Berber and Arab ancestry. As head of state and commander in chief of the armed forces, he, together with the Revolutionary Command Council, created the Libyan Arab Republic (Federal Research Division, pp. 2-3).

3.3 The Libyan Arab Republic (1969-2011)

Gadaffi can be regarded as an Arab populist that combined Arab nationalism with socialism. One of his first actions as chief of state was demanding the withdrawal of all foreign military troops and the removal of their military bases. All foreign military presence left the country in 1970 (Szabó, p. 10). Secondly, Gadaffi focused his energy on reforming the Libyan society, leading to the 1973 revolution which, among many things, tried to put an end to bureaucratic inefficiency. The political representation within Libya was reshaped through the system of people's committees, which Gadaffi considered to be the embodiment of direct democracy (Szabó, pp. 10-11).

The Gadaffi-regime is regarded to be the first real effort to unify Libya and its diverse people, as well as creating a Libyan state and identity (Federal Research Division, p. 3).

Nationalization of foreign banks, hospitals and the creating of laws that nationalized the oil industry (Szabó, p. 11), all added to the plan of a strong and unified Libya in the eyes of Gadaffi and his followers. As a result of Gadaffi's view on nationalism and socialism, the economy of Libya had become one of highly centralized and public-property based during the period of 1969-1980.

3.3.1 The isolation of Libya

Alongside its economic poilcies, Libya's foreign policy changed radically as well. The domestic laws that nationalized foreign companies was accompanied by foreign skepticism. It was Gadaffi's goal to create a state of uncompromising endorsement of their own interests and independence against the outside world. Gadaffi believed that, specifically the Western powers and Israel will always pursue their own interests and undermine Arab, Muslim and African' freedoms and interests. The implications of Gadaffi's view on the foreign world also meant an increased isolation of Libya. Although European states still tried to tie economic and strategic links with Libya, these attempts were hardly ever fruitful (Szabó, p. 12). Despite the efforts, from the period of 1973 and onwards, the relation between Libya and the outside world destabilized even further.

One of the main reasons for the increased isolation of Libya had been its support of radical organizations that used violence as opposed to the US's determination to end radicalism in the beginning of 1981 (Szabó, 2006, p. 12). During this time, which was also the period of the Cold War, Gadaffi developed relations with the Soviet Union that involved arms trade, this alongside Libya's involvement in terrorism increased the antagonism between the Western states and Libya, as well as Libyan's neighboring states who tried to keep good relations with the US (Federal Research Division, p. 3). Another significant reason has been Gadaffi's desire to acquire Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), which he had said should be '*sufficient enough to match Israel's capabilities*' (Szabó, p. 12).

The isolation intensified when Gadaffi's regime was linked to several terrorist attacks, the first of which being the bombing of a discotheque in West Berlin in 1986 that was popular amongst the American military personnel. The United States responded by imposing economic sanctions, which had severe consequences because the United States was the largest customer of Libyan oil. The United Nations imposed sanctions as well as a result of the implication of Libyan involvement in the Pan Am flight bombing over Lockerbie (1988), as well as the bombing of a French flight over Niger (1989) (Federal Research Division, p. 3). There has also been fierce debate over Libya's treatment of hospital personnel in Benghazi, who allegedly were responsible for the death of several infants. The debate focused mainly on the maltreatment of the Bulgarian health professionals, as well as the death-sentence for five of the Bulgarian medics who supposedly had infected 426 Libyan children with aids (Szabó, p. 14).

The sanctions imposed on Libya had large consequences for the domestic economy. The rise of inflation and import costs meant a decline of the living standards of the Libyan people. This led to people questioning Gadaffi as the legitimate ruler of Libya. This proved to be a window of opportunity for militant Islam opposition groups, who undertook several attempts to overthrow or even assassinate Gadaffi and his regime. Gadaffi struck hard in the several regions of Cyrenaica, the center of most opposition and managed to maintain control over Libya (Federal Research Division, p. 3).

With the decline of Libya, Gadaffi changed his behavior in order to seek common ground with sub-Saharan Africa as well as the international community. This change in behavior meant the beginning of a new era, specifically between the Libya and the Western states. The EU granted Libya the 'observer status' in the European Mediterranean Partnership. Gadaffi fulfilled all the terms of the UN security council and accepted responsibility for the terrorist attack of the flight over Lockerbie. As a result, the sanctions were suspended, not lifted. The relations did struck a blow during the period of the Benghazi Hospital trial, but managed to withstand this trial. As a result of political pressure, the supreme court overturned the death sentences in 2005. When Libya paid damages to the victims of the Lockerbie attack, the sanctions were eventually lifted (Federal Research Division, p. 3, Szabó, pp. 14-15).

Additionally, Gadaffi announced in 2003 that Libya was removing all its programs of acquiring Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). He then welcomed the United States, United Kingdom and the International Atomic Energy Agency by cooperating with them and meeting their demands about WMD's. This change of paste by Gadaffi meant that Libya was allowed back into the international community. The political relations between Libya and the EU intensified and many leaders of EU member states visited Libya. The victims of the Berlin bombing eventually received financial compensation as well. In reaction to this, the Secretary of State of the United State, Condoleezza Rice announced in 2006 that Libya will be removed from their list of states that support terrorism. Consequently this meant that U.S. could resume their normal diplomatic and economic relations with Libya (ABC News, 2006).

From this point onwards till the uprising in 2011, Libya and the EU have intensified their cooperation as well as their economic and political relations. In 2008, negotiations of an EU-Libya framework Agreement started but were suspended in February 2011. The negotiations were suspended as a result of the conflict in Libya. In 2010 however, the European Commission (EC) and Libya had agreed upon a program of financial and technical cooperation under the banner of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). For this purpose, the EC had prepared a Country Strategy and National Indicative Programme, which will be discussed in chapter four (European Commission, 2011).

3.4 The Libyan conflict

Early on in 2011, Egypt (as well as Tunesia) became the scene of a revolution, with large demonstrations against the seated president Mubarak. The Egyptians wanted democracy

and its inherent freedoms, and eventually made a step towards achieving this goal by having Mubarak removed from power. The success of the demonstrations in Egypt soon sprung to Libya, inspiring those who desired the removal of Gadaffi (BBC, 2011). The 'day of rage' on February the 17th had one objective: challenging Gadaffi's 42 years of iron rule. Large protests in the larger cities across the state were the result. Because of the censoring of the media by the Libyan government, the magnitude remained unclear in the early days after the uprising (NY Times, 2011).

This situation opened up opportunities for the opposition to overthrow Gadaffi. However, due to Gadaffi's deliberate tactics to keep the Libyan military too weak to and divided to rebel against him, there had been insufficient support within the military ranks of Libya. Gadaffi also ensured that the battalions are organized along tribal lines. Due to the culture of Libya, the battalions are loyal to their tribe prior to being loyal to their military commanders (NY Times, 2011). Before the uprising in 2011, this concept would ensure that top commanders were unable to mobilize large numbers of troops in order to stage a coup. However, the unreliable loyalty also meant that during the latest conflict battalions refused to attack members of their own tribe, resulting in desertion and military revolt .The air force of Libya is dominated by Gadaffi's clan, as well as most of the top officer positions, who, as they stand to lose as well if Gadaffi would be overthrown, remained loyal to Gadaffi (NY Times, 2011).

Gadaffi's refusal to meet the demands of the demonstrators eventually led to a bloodbath, as military forces started shooting at demonstrators. There have been reports of snipers, artillery and helicopters shooting at crowds of demonstrators (The Telegraph, 2011). These reports however, have also been claimed false by non-Western media such as Russia today (Russia Today, 2011). Although there was little contact with the Libyan demonstrators, the alleged horrific actions by the Libyan military forces, as well as hired mercenaries (NY Times, 2011), reached the international media relatively quick and created large commotion throughout the international community. Gadaffi made no secret about his desired outcome of the demonstrations, as he vowed to turn Libya into *a hell* (NY times, 2011). Over the course of the events, demonstrators started joining the armed rebel forces, under the command of Abdel-Hakim al-Hasidi (The Telegraph, 2011), that took over cities throughout Eastern Libya, generating a war between the Libyan military and the rebel forces. Soon afterwards, the rebel forces moved towards Tripoli. Although the rebel forces advanced quickly, the war would be far from over, as Gadaffi managed to concentrate its forces around Tripoli (NY Times, 2011).

3.4.1 International political involvement

As the fights continued throughout March 2011, more and more innocent civilians lost their lives. As the rebel forces lacked the skill to fly helicopters and fighter jets, air superiority soon become a large advantage for Gadaffi. While the importance of air support grew larger, the United Nations Security Council, on February the 26th, voted unanimously to impose

sanctions[3] and called for a war crimes inquiry in Libya, as a response to the 'widespread and systemic attacks' against Libyan citizens over the last two weeks (NY Times, 2011). During that time, the option for a no-fly zone in Libya had been discussed but had not included the sanctions.

In early March, nation-state leaders Sarkozy (France) and Cameron (UK), as well as the EU foreign policy chief Lady Ashton did urge the need for a no-fly-zone as Gadaffi had used air strikes against civilians (Guardian, 2011). Intervention, according to Sarkozy '*would be solely of a defensive nature if Mr Gadaffi makes use of chemical weapons or air strikes against non-violent protesters'* (Guardian, 2011). Sarkozy did add that he had reservations about military intervention because '*Arab revolutions belong to Arabs'* (Guardian, 2011).

Figure 3: The UN security council votes for a no-fly-zone above Libya (CNN, 2011)

Over the following days Gadaffi's forces moved towards the oil towns in the east. With air superiority, Gadaffi's forces could easily be resupplied and thus advance faster than the rebel forces. In the meantime, the Western states continued debating on which measures needed to be taken. As the situation became more dire by the day, Gadaffi's forces were within a hundred miles of the rebel capital Benghazi, the Western states felt pressured by time to take action against the situation in Libya. On March 17th, the United Nations Security Council voted to authorize military actions, including airstrikes against Libyan tanks and artillery, as well as imposing a no-fly zone over Libya (NY Times, 2011). The no-fly-zone was also supported by the Arab League (BBC, 2011). Officially, the UN authorized its members to take all necessary measures to protect civilians. Although the vote legitimized military action, not all UN members wanted to get involved, as Russia, China, Germany, Brazil and India abstained (UN SC, 2011). Russia for instance abstained from voting because it felt that the resolution did not answer the questions of how and by whom the measures would be enforced, and what the limitations of the engagements would be. Germany abstained as well. Although Germany agreed that the violence had to stop, it feared that military intervention

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[3] These sanctions also involved an arms embargo, travel ban for the 16 Libyan leaders, freezing the assets of Qhadaffi and his family (NY Times, 2011).

would cause more bloodshed than needed and urged for an increased set of sanctions instead (UN SC, 2011).

The UN resolution showed a split in Europe, as European countries were divided over whether to support the no-flight zone. Germany, which abstained during the vote for the resolution officially *broke ranks* with France and the UK over a crisis in Europe's Neighborhood (Simon, 2011). The foreign minister of Germany, in response to their decision to abstain told that *'Germany is not prepared to be dragged into a civil war'* (NY times, 2011). Gadaffi praised Germany's decision, saying that *'Germany was the only one with a chance of doing business in Libyan oil in the future'* (NY times, 2011).

There were still many questions surrounding the vote, such as the question who would take charge and if the UN was too late to stop Gadaffi from recapturing the rebel areas. In a reaction to the vote, the deputy foreign minister of Libya, Khalid Kaim, said that the Gadaffi government welcomed the resolution's call for the protection of civilians, as he claimed the government has been trying to do the same. Kaim also warned that external involvement in the shape of mobilizing and arming the rebel forces would mean 'inviting Libyans to kill each other' (NY Times, 2011). It requires mentioning that the Gadaffi government, on several occasions, had said to be prepared for a cease-fire on both sides (De Volkskrant, 2011, Sky News, 2011). However, no cease-fire agreement had been established. Former minister of Justice Abdul Jalil, at that time, said about the cease-fire that it is not possible with the current situation of Gadaffi controlling the West and the rebels controlling the East (NY Times, 2011).

3.4.2 Western Military involvement

No more than 48 hours later, on march 19th, under British and French leadership, their - as well as the American - military forces used their military missiles and planes to bombard strategic and military objects of Gadaffi's regime. These military interventions were said to serve one goal: *To protect the civilian population in Libya and allow Libyans to pursue their legitimate aspirations for more open and democratic government* (Ministry of Defence, 2011)*.* The French government spoke about the protection of *the Libyan people* (The London Times, 2011)*.* The American president Obama said that America '*can't stand idly by when a tyrant tells his people that there will be no mercy.'* (NY Times, 2011)

It requires mentioning that the international involvement in Libya is part of an UN 2005 World Summit agreement that committed the members to assist states in their primary responsibility to protect their population from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. If a state fails to do so, as is the case in Libya, then the international community has the possibility to use measures deemed necessary to protect the population from these crimes. This commitment has been named the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP or R2P) (ICRtoP, 2011). Gelijn Molier, a Dutch professor at the University of Leiden, who had been speaking at multiple seminars about Libya said that the R2P had been a gift to the

Rebel forces (Molier, 2011). However, Molier noted that the international community would widely underestimate the will and perseverance of the Gadaffi-regime. Intensified air-bombardments could even result in more support for Gadaffi (Molier,p.6). Molier also adds that the international community, specifically those who supported the bombardments could lose their moral legitimacy. The Western use of military strength to obtain their humanitarian goals could, if Gadaffi does not respond as anticipated, result in an increase of bombardments and thus pressurize the moral legitimacy of the campaign (Molier, pp. 6-7).

Figure 4: A British tornado jetfighter is being loaded with bombs in preparation for the UK air combat mission in Libya (ANP, 2011)

Because, with the military involvement also came the risk of collateral damage in the form of innocent civilians, which would jeopardize the mission of protecting the civilians. This, alongside with the fact the mission was restricted to long range bombarding and enforcing the no-fly-zone reduced the changes of a quick victory significantly. This also had its effect for the legitimacy required within international community, as more and more states demanded that North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would take over the command. This eventually happened on March 30th. Rasmussen, the secretary general of NATO, stated that *'NATO's focus is on protecting civilians and civilian-populated areas against the threat of attack'* (Financial Times, 2011, NATO, 2011).

With NATO in command, some significant changes occurred. The United States military began using close range planes in order to support rebel ground forces. Additionally, more and more voices raised demanding arms supplies for the rebel forces, which proved to be a controversial subject for both the UN and NATO (Financial Times, 2011). Supplying the rebels with arms could pose a risk as it would deepen the states' involvement in the civil war, consequently some rebels may have potential links to the terrorist organization Al-Qaeda (NY Times, 2011). Aside from the UN and NATO, over 40 nation-states and civil society organizations pressured Gadaffi to relinquish his power over Libya. This demand supersedes the goal of the UN and NAVO, which is set to protect the civilians. Additionally, the UN had sent a mediator to Libya, with little success so far (NY Times, 2011). In the meantime, the use of NATO air strikes grew larger and larger. In the initial two months of the NATO taking over command, there had been over 2.500 NATO-led airstrikes (NY Times, 2011).

During a visit to Denmark, the Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin criticized the NATO-led airstrikes on Libyan soil, questioning the mandate of the NATO to target Gadaffi (Russia Today, 2011). A month earlier, in an address to the nation, Obama had declared that it is not the goal of the coalition to kill Gadaffi, but to enforce the no-fly zone and the protection of civilians (Fox News, 2011). However, Putin questioned why the *so called civilized world uses all its military power against a small nation, destroying what has been created by generations*. Putin accused the west of having *double standards*, as their amount of military presence in Libya was in no relation to their presence in or attention to any similar civil-war type situation in the region (Russia Today, 2011).

An interesting development is the occupation of oil rich regions by either the rebel forces or Gadaffi's forces. In March, many oil resources in the east were under the control of the rebel forces. Qatar, an Arab nation as well, had announced that they were willing to facilitate the sale of Libyan oil in exchange for relief goods. Although the UN resolution may allow rebels to be armed, no such action had been taken so far (Financial Times, 2011). During that time it appeared that the international community was willing to intervene to the point where the rebel forces and Gadaffi's forces becomes stalemates by destroying Gadaffi's aerial, armored and naval forces. In the meantime there had been an increase in political, diplomatic, economic and military pressure on Gadaffi and his followers, such as the proposal of an arrest warrant by the International Criminal Court (ICC, 2011).

3.4.3 Deadlock situation

During the month of April the situation was still at a deadlock. There were some significant developments however. The rebel groups became coordinated under the National Transitional Council (NTC). The NTC was officially recognized as the legitimate government of Libya by Italy, Kuwait, France and Qatar, on June 13 Germany also officially recognized NTC (NY Times, 2011), and on July 16 more than 30 countries have recognized that Gadaffi no longer has legitimate authority in Libya (Belfast Telegraph, 2011) . The foreign minister of Italy went on to say that *'we have decided to recognize the council as the only political,*

legitimate interlocutor to represent Libya' (NY Times, 2011) A senior Libyan rebel leader of NTC, Ali Al-Essawi, criticized NATO's bureaucratic delays as they were putting the lives of many civilians at risk. The air coverage by NATO planes started to play a smaller role, resulting in more losses for the rebel forces. Al-Essawi stated that it was the change of command to the NATO that has caused the recent setbacks.

The African Union (AU) also tried to reach a cease-fire agreement by sending negotiators to Benghazi. The agreement as proposed by the AU was wavered off by the NTC, as their basic demands of having Gadaffi and his sons and inner circle leave immediately have not been met (NY Times, 2011). Over the period of April, the UK, France and Italy had sent military officers to support the rebel forces, Gadaffi's forces were accused of shooting at residential houses and using cluster-bombs. Also, a NATO airstrike on a house owned by the family of Gadaffi resulted in the death of several of his family members, including one of his sons (NY Times, 2011).

Turkey, with historic and business ties to Libya has tried to mediate in the conflict as well, resulting in both Gadaffi and the rebel side to accuse Turkey of favoring one over another. As the mediation efforts proved unsuccessful, prime minister of Turkey Erdogan told on the 3th of May that *'Muammar Gadaffi is to immediately step down from power that he holds in Libya',* as he has chosen '*blood, tears and oppression'* (NY Times, 2011)*.*

Despite these efforts, fighting continued between the Gadaffi forces and the NATO-backed rebel forces, resulting in both minor and major victories on both sides with still no end in sight. There were little to no developments in the changes of policies by the international community in the first weeks of May, aside from shifting Gadaffi's funds to the rebel forces and expelling Libyan diplomats out of the UK and France   (NY Times, 2011). On may 22, Catherine Ashton, the foreign policy chief of the EU visited Benghazi, providing support for the rebel forces by officially opening an European Union diplomatic office, yet emphasized that the European Union was not able to officially recognize the NTC. During her visit, Ashton said that '*These* (NTC) *are the people with whom we have a strong dialogue. It's for the people of Libya to determine the future of the country*' (NY Times, 2011).   Russia also entered the negotiating table by the end of May, offering to use their relationship with Libya as a leverage to persuade Gadaffi to leave power (NY Times, 2011). Gadaffi however emphasized that he is not willing to leave (NY Times, 2011)

The international community seems confident that the rebel forces will prevail, as more support is being given by the end of May up till today. Senior British and American officials requested more details on a post-Gadaffi government. Their plans should also include a power-sharing agreement with some of Gadaffi's loyalists. Despite the urge for more detailed plans, the British foreign secretary William Hague said that '*we're not going to set a deadline, could be days or weeks or months'* (NY Times, 2011) The rebel forces were also given additional funds by the UK, Qatar, Kuwait, Italy, France, Turkey, Australia, partly financed from seized assets of Gadaffi, reaching a total sum of $ 1 billion (NY Times, 2011)

June 28th, the ICC issued an official arrest warrant for Gadaffi, his oldest son and the security chief of Libya. The warrant was immediately dismissed by the minister of Justice in Libya, stating that '*Libya does not accept the decisions of the ICC which is a tool of the Western World to prosecute leaders in the Third World.* (The Independent, 2011). In the same article the potential risk is mentioned of Gadaffi and his followers as they will face prosecution in exile and thus may cling on to their power as they having nothing to lose. Only four days later, the African Union declared that they will not cooperate in the execution of the arrest warrant as it '*seriously complicates the effort aimed at finding a negotiated political settlement to the crisis in Libya, which will also address, in a mutually reinforcing way, issues related to impunity and reconciliation'* (India Times, 2011) .

During the conflict, Gadaffi has held numerous broadcasts in which he blamed nation-states, politicians and the like for the chaos in Libya. On July 1st, Gadaffi went on to threaten the European Union with attacks on their soil. Gadaffi said that Libya would be able to take the battle '*Europe, to target your homes, offices, families, which have become legitimate military targets, like you have targeted our homes.* Gadaffi also said he was willing to negotiate, if the US and Europe were willing as well (NY times, 2011).

3.4.4 The end of Gadaffi's regime

As the fights continued, Gadaffi's loyalists lost more and more terrain to the rebels. On the 21th of August, the rebel forces managed to take control of the capital of Libya: Tripoli. Although this had been a major victory for the rebel forces, the war still wasn't over, as Gadaffi and his close relatives and loyalists were still on the run (NY Times, 2011). With the rebels forces gaining hold of more and more of the Libyan territory, it became clear that the Gadaffi regime would not survive the revolution. Despite several attempts to reach a peace agreement, both sides refused to lay down their arms and thus fights continued, concentrating on the cities of Bani Walid and Surt (or Sirtre), the birthplace and one of the last strongholds of Gadaffi and his loyalist forces (NY Times, 2011).

On the 15th of September, both Prime minister of Britain David Cameron and President Nicolas Sarkozy were the first two world leaders to go to the Libyan capital, pledging to keep up the NATO bombing until the last of the Gadaffi forces surrendered. Prime minister Cameron said to the Libyans that *this was your revolution, not our revolution* (NY Times, 2011). President Sarkozy urged the NTC to refrain from acts such as vengeance and score-setting once the conflict was over, and also said that France expected no favorable treatment in exchange for pressing the NATO campaign, saying that *What we did we did without a hidden agenda, but because we wanted to help Libya* (NY Times, 2011). The same article however also points out that with the conflict to a near end, the time closes where the lucrative oil contracts made under the Gadaffi government might become topic of discussion, whilst both the British and French government would have an interest in preserving these

contracts, as well as compete for the contracts as part of the reconstruction and restoration of Libya's battered infrastructure.

The commander of the NATO forces, general Jodice, had said that he was surprised by the *resilient and fierce* threat that the remainder of the Gadaffi forces posed during the last weeks of the conflict. Because the loyalist forces were hiding in or on top of resident buildings, the NATO could not intervene during the fights between the rebel forces and Gadaffi loyalists; The NATO mandate prohibits any action that would endanger the lives of civilians (NY Times, 2011).

I'm proud to stand here on the soil of a free Libya, Secretary of State of the US Mrs. Clinton said during her visit to Libya on October the 18th, two days prior to Gadaffi's death. Mrs. Clinton pledged to aid the new Libyan government with economic and political aid, most of which specifically targeted at reacquiring weaponry in an attempt to keep it out of the hands of terrorist organizations (NY Times, 2011).

On October the 20th, Gadaffi's 42 years of ruling came to end as he was captured while trying to flee Surt (Sirtre) and later killed by, supposedly, rebel forces (Ny Times, 2011). The fact that Gadaffi had captured and killed resulted in official statements throughout the international community.

President Sarkozy said that now was the time for *'reconciliation in unity and freedom'* (MSNBC, 2011). Prime minister Cameron welcomed the news of the death of Gadaffi, but said '*it is the day that people should remember all of his victims, particularly those of the Lockerbie plane bomb, IRA deaths connected to Libyan Semtex, as well as those in Libya itself'* (The Guardian, 2011). Prime Minister of Italy, Silvio Berlusconi said '*Sic transit Gloria mundi'*, which is Latin for '*So the glory of this world passes away'* (India Vision, 2011). German Chancellor Merkel said that Germany is '*relieved and very happy about this'*, but emphasizes that Libya should now carry out political reforms to '*ensure the achievements of the Arab spring cannot be undone'* (Reuters, 2011). In a joint statement by President Herman van Rompuy and President José Manuel Barroso of the EU, they stated that *the reported death of Gadaffi marks the end of an era of despotism and repression from which the Libyan people have suffered for too long. Today Libya can turn a page in its history and embrace a new democratic future* (Van Rompuy & Barroso, 2011, p. 1).

Although the initial reactions were of a jubilant nature, the news that Gadaffi had first been captured and then killed did caused commotion and controversy in the media as well as among the world leaders. As a result, the NTC has promised to start an investigation into the death of Gadaffi (Time, 2011). On the 23th of October, the Libyan Interim's rulers declared Libya officially freed and marked the beginning of a transition towards democracy that would take up to two-years. The rulers also said that the rule of law will be based upon the Islamic law of Sharia (Associated Press, 2011).

Figure 5: A selection of British newspapers featuring pictures and headlines of former Libyan leader Muammar Gadaffi (ANP, 2011)

3.4.5 Humanitarian costs

The conflict itself has had a severe impact on the civilian lives of those living in Libya. By the time the first demonstrators went into the streets of Libyan cities, the Libyan government already had made plans to kill civilians in an attempt to crush the uprising (BBC, 2011). During the conflict, there have been reports of hundreds of enforced disappearances, people who have been taken to undisclosed locations where they might have been submitted to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatments or even executed (UNHRC, 2011). Also, there have been allegations of systematic rape of Libyan females by Gadaffi's forces and militiamen (CNN, 2011). The rebel forces on the other hand have been accused of human right violations as well as violation of the Geneva convention of 1929 as captured Libyan soldiers were supposedly executed (The Globe and Mail, 2011). Chad has requested the coalition forces' assistance in the protection of its citizens in rebel held areas, as a spokesperson of Chad claimed that they were being executed for allegedly being mercenaries in the pay of Gadaffi (Reuters, 2011).

During the conflict there have been numerous reports of Libyan forces using human shields by hiding their armored vehicles in civilian areas as well as using civilian vehicles for transport. Every time the forces are fighting over a city, the people living in that city are deprived of basic supplies and are in risk of standing between the crossfire (BBC, 2011). Although the United Nations has increased its efforts to help wounded civilians. Of an estimated population of 6.420.000 (UN, 2009), 530.000 people have received food assistance from the UN and 20 non-governmental organizations in the course of the conflict. Over 650.000 people have fled the country since the start of the conflict, the majority of which being non-Libyan, more than 250.000 of which still haven't returned to their country of origin. A overcrowded ship packed with African migrants, supposedly forced on deck by armed Libyan soldiers sank on its way to Italy, resulting in over 600 casualties. It is believed to be a deliberate tactic by Libyan officials to let the EU pay the price for supporting the rebel forces (Global News, 2011). In addition, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that about 243.000 Libyans are internally displaced as a result of the violence (UN, 2011).

Because NATO is not willing to release official casualty figures, nor are Gadaffi and his loyalists willing to verify any estimations, there is no clear insight in death-toll of the conflict so far. Al-jazeera estimated the death-toll to be around 13.000 Libyans in the first four months of the conflict (Al Jazeera, 2011), which includes military personnel, rebel forces and civilians. These casualties were the result of attacks by Gadaffi's forces, rebel forces and NATO forces. Human rights watch has reported war crimes against Gadaffi loyalist by the Rebel forces, who supposedly executed 53 people during the last days of the conflict. "This latest massacre seems part of killings, looting and other abuses committed by armed anti-Gadaffi fighters who consider themselves above the law, emergencies director Peter Bouckeart of Human Rights ways says (Human Rights Watch, 2011).

An estimation by the Libyan government states that the conflict has cost the Libyan national economy around $ 50 billion, most of which can be accounted for by the stoppage of the export of oil and gas exports. There is also the political costs as well, as Libya has seen increased economic development and political progress in the past number of years. Policies, agreements and diplomatic relations with other countries will have to be rebuilt if not preserved. This consequently also effects the European Union. In the next paragraph the relation between the EU and Libya will be described to describe which types of relations the EU and its respective member states has had with Libya and how they can be linked to the more recent military and political support of the anti-Gadaffi movement during the conflict.

3.5 The transition of Libya

Although the Gadaffi regime officially ended when he was killed, the NTC still fears that Gadaffi loyalist in the border regions of Libya will continue to fight. Because the NTC lacks sufficient technical knowhow and equipment, it has requested the NATO to prolong their mission in Libya till the end of 2011. With the end to a dictatorial regime, and with a state that

exists out of a myriad of clans and tribes, there will continue to be tensions. One of the biggest challenges for the NTC in the near future will be appointing an interim head of state that has the backing of the majority of the Libyan people, as well as maintaining peace and order. Consequently, the transition to a democratic state, which is the desired outcome of the Western nations that intervened, may prove to be a road full of challenges yet to come (NY Times, 2011).

Now that the revolution is regarded victorious, the international community is looking at the new Libyan officials and their future aspirations. The same day that the leader of the NTC said that the revolution had ended, he also vowed that the new government would be based on Islamic principles. After 42 years of rain, the new leaders of Libya will not only have to build a new transparent state apparatus from scratch, it will also have to rebuild the infrastructure of Libya. The ceremony also showed how, even though the Western nations had made the revolution possible due to financial and military aid, it was Allah who was thanked for the victory. It shows the increased surfacing of Islamic elements in the rebel movement. It is a process which is contested by fractions within the rebel movement itself, stating that the Islamists have successfully exploited the country's power vacuum and infused the conflict with religion. In addition, the current composition of the NTC is not favored by all the Libyans. Many anti-Gadaffi leaders complain about the heavy orientation towards Eastern-Libya (NY Times, 2011).

Evidently, with the end of a dictator, a new era can begin, its outcome however is still very ambiguous. Each clan and tribe in Libya will have specific stakes and interests in seeing a particular outcome play out, as does the international community. This ambiguity may very well become a source for new tensions or even lead to violence, and consequently makes it difficult to decide the future of Libya. It is thus important to look at the agenda of the EU in order to describe which role the EU can, or wishes to play in the future of Libya. In the following chapter the relation prior, as well as during the conflict will be discussed. By doing so, this thesis hopes to provide with insights in often paradoxical relation between EU and Libya (be it the Libyan government or the Libyan people).

Figure 6: Nicolas Sarkozy and senior member of the NTC Mahmoud Jabril (Reuters, 2011)

Chapter 4: Cooperation between Libya and the EU

Aside from the geographical connection between the EU and Libya, they also share a diverse and controversial political history. From colonial rule to partnership with, and the overthrowing of the Gadaffi regime. With the EU setting out to not only become an economic partner of its neighbors, but also a multilateral guide towards achieving western standards such as democracy and market reforms as well as basic humanitarian principles, it becomes interesting to look at where, how and why the EU and Libya cooperate. Particularly interesting about the cooperation is the fact that in the 42 years of rule by Gadaffi, the EU and Libya have only just started to increase their cooperation. In this light, one can wonder why the EU risked losing all the progress made by overthrowing the very same regime it has set out to seek common grounds with.

This chapter looks at the types of agreements that have been made between the EU and Libya, as well as how the current events affected these agreements. In addition, citations from key persons within the EU as well as Libya will be added in order to better understand the discourse at hand. By doing so, the geopolitical, economical, cosmopolitical interests and advantages can be distilled more easily, thus providing this thesis with data that can be used to link with the theory and consequently add to a better understanding of the relation.

4.1 Political cooperation

The desire to play a more capable, more coherent and more active role as a global player is just one of the factors that has shaped EU's ever growing influence that exceeds the state borders of the member-states. The aim of the EU is to promote their concept of values, peace and security, in accordance with the Charter of the UN, as well as to promote international cooperation. The EU also intends to develop and consolidate democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, 2011, p. 4). In order to promote the political values and ideals, the EU has several instruments at its disposal. One of them is the European Security Strategy

(ESS), originating from 2003. The ESS prioritizes a *'ring of well-governed countries to the East of the EU and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations'*. The ESS furthermore sets out to secure the energy supply of the EU (European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, p. 4).

In 2004 the aspirations of the EU to improve their relations with neighboring countries was given shape in the form of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). The ENP allows the EU to strengthen its relations with individual countries, whilst also spreading peace and prosperity to prevent artificial divisions and creating benefits for the ENP partners and the EU alike (European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, p. 4). Although Libya is no official participant of the ENP, there still is a bilateral cooperation between the EU and Libya. One example is Libya's, until recently, chairmanship together with Spain on the Africa-EU Migration, Mobility and Employment Partnership. As will be described in paragraph 3.8, the migration issues are a high priority when it comes to cooperation. Also, achieving the Millennium Development Goals and the topic of Climate Change are considered important reasons for increased cooperation (European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, pp. 4-5).

Figure 7: Muammar Gadaffi shaking hands with Nicolas Sarkozy (2007), Herman van Rompuy (2010) and Tony Blair (2010) (Associated Press, 2011)

Gadaffi had made efforts to improve its relations with the EU as well. The end of the international sanctions in 2003 meant that Gadaffi moved towards reintegration into the international community. Prior to the conflict, the foreign policy of Gadaffi aimed at stabilizing the relations with the Western nations. He has paid compensation for the victims of the terrorist attacks, and in 2009 Italy officially apologized for their wrongful behavior during the colonial period. In 2009, Libya held the Presidency of the African Union. During that same year, Libya became member of the UN security council and held the annual Chairmanship of the UN General Assembly (European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, pp. 6-7).

The strategy of the European Commission is to consolidate Libya's integration in the rule-based international political and economic system. In order to conform Libya to the international standards it needs to ensure the successful implementation of the Framework Agreement, which will place relations with Libya within a clear and comprehensive legal framework (European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, 2011, p. 5). Negotiations on this matter have started in 2008 but have come to a standstill due to the recent events.

The European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument presented their strategy paper in 2011 to describe and evaluate the possibilities for increased cooperation in the near future (2011-2013). Although officially the idea behind the ENP programmes is one of mutual benefit, in the case of Libya the EU seems primarily concerned about migration issues and energy security (European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, p. 15). The potential risk of a change in administration of Libya, as well as long lasted isolation could endanger the progress between the EU and Libya. If that would be the case, the EU would focus more precisely on sectors where there is a clear and urgent EU interest, by which the example of energy is given (European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, p. 20). Although the EU intents to develop and consolidate democracy, it refrained from dealing with governance issues as there was insufficient mutual knowledge and trust. Instead, it has been the intention of the EU to cooperate primarily on the sectors in which they already had experience of technical cooperation with Libya (European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, p. 15).

As mentioned in paragraph 2.2, the EU sets out to achieve economic cooperation and from that point on forward work towards improving the cosmopolitical values. During the third European-African summit, Gadaffi had criticized the agenda of the EU, stating that the EU has diverted its attention from cooperation in economic matters to matters that were political, which led to the failure of agreements of cooperation since 1960; "*When the focus became centered on internal systems, on lack of respect of people's cultures and on these people's own particularities, economies failed*" (The Tripoli Post, 2010) *.* During the same summit, Gadaffi went on to call the UN corrupt and the WTO a tool of neocolonialism (The Tripoli Post). Gadaffi also pointed out a level of interdependency between the African countries and the EU, urging the EU to enhance energy cooperation to benefit the energy-strapped Europe and investment-thirsty Africa.

So evidently there has been tension between the wishes of the EU and that of the Gadaffi regime. Although the regime has been overthrown, it is important to look at the agreements made prior to the conflict and how the change of regime affects the previously made agreements. In 2008, the EU has declared *a new era* in its relations with Libya, focusing specifically on counter-terrorism, energy and migration. In 2011, the EU, in response to the conflict, said *now is the time for a qualitative step forward in the relations between the EU and its Southern Neighbors* (European Commission, 2011, p. 2). In both situations the EU applauded the possibility to cooperate with Libya, which makes it interesting and paradoxical at the same time. In addition to these three topics, paragraphs have been added on trade relations, arms trade and humanitarianism

4.2 Trade relations

As described in the previous paragraph, the EU emphasized the importance of cooperation with Libya to secure and further develop Libya's energy sources in hydrocarbons and renewable energies. For Libya, energy export is by far the largest source of national income. In 2008, 49.6% of the Libyan import is accounted for by the EU as well as 78,4% of the Libyan export. Of the imports, 78.1% are manufactured goods. Of the export, 98.3% are fuel and mining products. Almost the entire export of Libyan trade relies on the energy and mining sector (European Commission, 2010, p. 4). The EU imports about 50% of its energy needs (Belkin, 2008, p. 1). Libya is the third largest supplier of energy to the EU, accounting for 9,51% at a total value of $ 8.593.414.000 in the first three months of 2011 alone (European Commission, 2011, p. 3) . With the dependency on foreign oil also comes the risk of outside influences on the European foreign and economic policy.

With Russia accounting for over 30% of the imported energy (European Commission, 2011, p. 3), the EU wanted to diversify their energy supplies and decrease dependence on Russia. As a result, more voices were raised within Europe to increase their political and economic engagement in the Middle East and North-Africa (Belkin, 2008, p. 17). Even though the EU is one of the world's largest importers of oil, gas and coal, and consequently a major player on the energy market, it also makes the EU vulnerable due to their dependency. If nothing is done about this, 65% of the EU energy consumption has to be imported by the year 2030 (Commission of European Communities, 2007, p. 3).

And not only the EU will see an increase in demand for energy, but the overall demand for oil will also have grown by 41% by the year 2030. A strong rise in demand that cannot be compensated by an equal rise in supply (Commission of European Communities, p. 4). This poses major geopolitical challenges for the EU. One of the three ways[4] the EU intends to react on these development is the limitation of EU's external vulnerability to imported energy. In 2008, Gadaffi visited Moscow and said he hoped to increase the energy ties with Russia. The latter wanted a cartel of gas-producing nations[5] and in addition the two countries have been negotiating a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement (BBC, 2008). Also, there had been negotiations about arms trade between Russia and Libya as well as opening a naval base in Benghazi, which would be open for the Russian navy. Interesting about this, is that the EU and Libya had been making progress towards working together, while at the same time Libya has been making attempts to strengthen its grip on the European oil dependency.

4.2.1 Greenstream

Sustainable diplomatic and political relations with the energy suppliers, as well as a diversification of the supply are tools that can provide a more secure energy supply to the

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[4] The other two are combating climate change and promoting growth and jobs, thereby providing secure and affordable energy to consumers (Commission of European Communities, p.5).
[5] Alongside with Algeria, Iran, Qatar and several Central Asian nations.

EU. With Libya being a large suppliers of energy, as well as a neighboring country, meaning that pipelines do not cross other state lines and thereby making the supply less vulnerable. In 2004, a pipeline under the name of *Greenstream* connected Libya with Italy. The pipeline was constructed after the lift of international embargo's, one of which being the arms embargo in 2004 (see paragraph 3.7). Gadaffi called it an era of 'friendship and cooperation' across the Mediterranean and was said to supply Italy with 10% of its energy needs (Gas and Oil, 2004).

On February 22, the Greenstream gas export to Italy came to a halt as a result of the political turmoil in Libya. Because the European Union, Italy in particular, have several energy suppliers, as well as several gas reserves, there were no severe consequences as a result of the halted energy supply (Lochner & Dieckhöner, 2011, p. 143). However, as the authors argue there could be severe consequences for the EU if other North-African countries, for instance Algeria, would get in a situation of conflict and close their gas lines (Lochner & Dieckhöner, p. 144). Consequently, stability within the region would arguable be of great interest to the EU.

<u>4.2.2 Free trade agreement</u>

Commissioned and financed by the European Commission, a Sustainability Impact Assessment (SIA) has been published that provided an *independent* assessment of the likely economic, social and environmental impacts of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the EU and Libya (European Commission, 2009, p. 3).

The Libyan im- and export figures show a high dependency on the EU. In 2010, Libya was the 11th largest import partner (1.9%), and 33th largest export partner (0.5%) of the EU. Combined, Libya is the 19th largest trade partner of the EU. The EU on the other hand, is the number one import partner of Libya (42,5%), as well as number one export partner (77,2%). Unsurprisingly, the EU is the largest trade partner of Libya with a total 65,5% of all trade going in and out of the EU (EC: DG Trade, 2010, pp. 5-6).

Prior to the free trade agreement, there already was high economic activity between the two. However, the SIA argues that in case a FTA would have been created, the EU would gain increased economic opportunities as well as a greater energy security. For Libya, the FTA could have potentially severe side-effects; First there would be the risk of an increased pressure on Libya's environment, as the oil and gas extractive industries would increase. Secondly, there could be an increased risk in social tension due to an increase in migrant workers and an increase in market competition from foreign firms. Thirdly, there is the risk of imported foods from the EU leading to a contraction of the agricultural sector, resulting in the decrease of employment of women and household incomes in the rural areas. There is also a fourth risk, which is the accelerated rate of depletion of Libya's natural resources, consequently increasing Libya's need for diversification (European Commission, 2009, pp. 2-3).

4.3 Environment

Eighty-five percent of the Libyan population lives near the Mediterranean coast, which consequently is also the region of major industrial, agricultural and tourist activity (European Commission, 2009, p. 10). Libya's major environmental issue is stabilizing their supply of water as a result of overuse by the agricultural sector. In addition, the water supplies are also affected by the climate change.

Also, the waste management, lack of environmental regulations and a high dependency of the nation's economy on non-renewable energy poses significant challenges for the Libyan government (European Commission, p. 11). On the topic of environmental issues, it has not been the EU but the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) that plays a significant role as the main active donor, even though most of the funding is provided by the Libyan authorities. Their goals are – among many others – the diversification of the Libyan economy in order to improve the use and reusability of energy, as well as the launching several programmes with the Libyan Environmental General Authority in order to increase the Libyan know-how about the environment and improve the sustainability (European Commission, p. 14). Although it is one of the key points of interest for the EU and its ENP, there are few cases about the EU cooperating with Libya in order to increase the environment. Consequently, this subparagraph is of little significance for this thesis and its analysis and will not be elaborated any further.

4.4 Humanitarianism

Before discussing the type of humanitarian aid, cooperation and/or intervention between the EU and Libya, it should be mentioned that there are several ways to describe the relation. Humanitarianism in this case means the level of concern for human welfare, and the moral obligation of the respective government to improve this welfare. For instance one can look at the treatment of Libyan people by the Libyan government, the treatment of migrants in Libya that are heading for the European main lands and the treatment of Libyans during the conflict and during its aftermath. Making this division has the potential to visualize if, and how, the EU has integrated its humanitarian goals into their actions.

4.4.1 Humanitarian principles and Gadaffi's regime

There are several ways to define the level of human welfare. One of the more popular instruments, is that of the United Nations Development Programme: The Human Development Index (HDI). The HDI consists out of three dimensions: Health, education and income (UNDP, 2011). In addition, components such as poverty, human security and sustainability can be added in order to provide for a more comprehensive view of the situation in a country. The UNDP has only provided the HDI of Libya in the years 2005 until 2010. During this time, it has shown a growth of 4% in 5 years, with a HDI of 0.755 in 2010.

In appendix I the HDI has been calculated for the four major states who had a major share in the NATO-led mission in Libya, being the US, the UK, France and Italy. In addition Egypt has been added, as this state also underwent a revolution which led to the removal of the regime, as well as Syria where, as a result of the Arab Spring, there have been attempts to get a regime change as well. What is interesting to see, is that Libya not only has shown steady growth, but is also rated as a country with a high HDI ((UNDP, 2010). In terms of health, economy and education Libya scores relatively well. In terms of political freedom or civil liberties however, Libya is considered 'not free' (Freedom House, 2010). Under Gadaffi's ruling, political parties have been banned for over 35 years, independent press and demonstrations are prohibited and there were strict policies against Libyan dissidents (Freedom House, 2010). Consequently, from a Western perspective, with relatively high economic prosperity came little political prosperity.

In terms of political freedom, Libya did underwent some form of 'liberalization' in the last two years of Gadaffi's regime, by allowing foreign newspapers and asking the help of foreign experts to work on a draft constitution (European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, pp. 10-11). Specifically during the last years of the Gadaffi regime, when the international sanctions were lifted, EU increased their cooperation with Libya, including the terrain of humanitarian aid. The European Commission had launched a HIV action plan for Benghazi in 2004, the EU member states granted scholarships for Libyan students. However, most of the financial aid provided by the European member-states goes to the topic of migration (pp. 12-13), which are discussed in 4.4.3. As described in the previous paragraph, the UNDP had been the main donor in Libya, even though the Libyan government paid for nearly the entire UNDP budget. In addition, Libya has received technical aid from the World Bank and the African Development Bank in order to increase its water and public-sector capacity building (pp. 13-14).

In the report of the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument, the positioning of the Libyan government towards foreign aid, as well as the limited timeframe in which Gadaffi has allowed foreign influences within Libyan stateliness have been used to explain why so far little has been done about improving the quality of human capital. The amount of attention that is being given to energy, migration and the improvement of the HDI indicators contrasts highly with how little attention had been given to the political situation in Libya (pp. 14-18). Or as the report itself clarifies: *While Libya is a high-income country, the EU has strong political interests in providing assistance to Libya, in particular in areas where there is need for a joint action (in particular migration and energy sector)* (p. 15). However, the multilateral approach of the EU may be one build on patience, as the report elaborates that *the political dialogue and engagement of the EU with Libya is very recent and remains fragile…. Mutual knowledge and trust need to be strengthened before …. dealing with very sensitive issues, in particular the governance area* (p. 15).

4.4.2 Humanitarian principles and the treatment of migrants

Another aspect, which is being discussed in paragraph 4.7 as well, is the relation Libya and the EU have in terms of migration. This subparagraph will focus on the aspect of the treatment of these migrants who depart from Libya in search for the European main lands. The same moment the EU lifted its sanctions and embargos, it embarked upon a cooperation with Libya in order to combat the influx of illegal migration to the EU. In 2007, the EU commissioner of External relations and European neighborhood Policy, Benita Ferrero-Waldnder, and the Libyan minister for European Affairs, Adbuletti Elobeidi, both signed a *Memorandum of Understanding*, in which both agreed that migration was to be considered a point of mutual interest (Human Rights Watch, 2009, p. 32). Much of the financial aid that was given to Libya, was destined for the construction of *accommodation centers* for asylum seekers as well as migration management on the southern frontier of Libya (Human Rights Watch, p. 32).

The aim of the EU's Global Approach to Migration is *to address migration in a balanced matter, by taking into account all aspects of this phenomena on the basis of dialogue and cooperation between all destination, origin and transit countries. This approach underpins the cooperation with Libya* (European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, p. 15). The reality however, as described by the Human Rights Watch in 2009, is that Gadaffi refused to recognize the problem of migrants, saying that African migrants are *living in the desert, in the forests, having no identity at all. Let alone a political identity. They feel that the North has all the wealth, the money, and so they try to reach it* (Human Rights Watch, p. 47). Alongside with the mentioned cases in the report by the Human Rights Watch about the treatment of Migrants in the Asylums by both Libyan and European authorities, one can question how this relates to the humanitarian principles of allowing people welfare and improving this principle. The European member-states relocate the illegal migrants who reach the shores of Europe back to Libya, who in turn refuses to provide asylum. There have also been reports of migrants who, after a period of detention ,were dropped in the desserts of Southern Libya (Human Rights Watch, p. 74), or in some cases even risk the chance of being executed by Libyan forces (Freedom House, 2010).

4.4.3 Humanitarian principles and the conflict

During the conflict, member-states of the European Nation started to choose the side of the rebel movement that later became the NTC. Originally, the mission was *to protect the civilian population in Libya and allow Libyans to pursue their legitimate aspirations for more open and democratic government* (Ministry of Defence, 2011).

Aside from the military assistance the NATO-members have provided, the European Commission responded early in March with a joint communication on the partnership for democracy and shared prosperity with the southern Mediterranean (European Commission, 2011). The events are of historic proportions the report says, and the changes *carry the*

hope of a better life ..with.. greater respect for human rights, pluralism, rule of law and social justice (p. 2)*. The EU felt that it needed to play a significant role in *supporting wholeheartedly the wish of the people in our neighborhood to enjoy the same freedoms that we take as our right (p. 2)*. In a direct response to the conflict, the EU has pledged to give 30 million Euro in humanitarian aid and an additional 25 million Euro from the EU external borders fund will be used in the North-African region (p. 3).

Although the EU considers the establishment of a state based on the Western values to be one of *shared interests*, the EU does acknowledge that the revolution in Libya is primarily an *internal transformation process,* for which the EU can offer expertise. The report also not only emphasized that now is the time to move forward and improve the relations with the EU and their southern neighbors, but also that the EU should apply a *new approach* (p. 2).

The difficulty during, and after the conflict, is how the relation between the EU and the NTC, and its consequential democratic reform, will be affected by the accusations of human rights violations by rebel forces against Gadaffi loyalists, as well as the suspicious conditions under which Gadaffi was reported killed (NY Times, 2011). EU Council President Herman Van Rompuy said that the EU should take credit for preventing a *bloodbath* in Libya. When asked about EU's close relations with the Libyan dictator before the conflict, he replied: *Did we always have good policies in the past? No. Have we corrected this? Yes.* (Eurobserver, 2011).

In light of the moral implications of humanitarianism, there is interesting difference in the claim for morality in this conflict. One of Gadaffi's sons, Saif al Gadaffi says that *The West has no morals, only interests* (The Independent, 2011). The head of the European Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso said that the West has a *moral duty to step in* because *Libya is very close to Europe and when the leader is going to massacre his people, it created indignation* (EU business, 2011).

4.5 Counter-terrorism

As described in the previous chapter, Gadaffi's support for international terrorism and his interest in the acquiring of WMD's had resulted in an international isolation. Only when he changed his position towards terrorism radically, Would he gain more access and approval in the international community.

With George W. Bush his 'war on terror', which, as chapter two shows, also influenced political decisions made in Europe, the US has had major geopolitical interests in Libya when it comes to counterterrorism. The fear that Gadaffi once again would resort to, or support terrorist activities as a result of international isolation grew larger in the early months of the conflict. With Gadaffi killed, there is a chance that a political vacuum will be created, which Al-Qaida will try to exploit (NPR, 2011). The EU counter-terrorism coordinator Gilles de Kerchove said that a branch of the North-African Al-Qaida has acquired weapons in Libya

during the turmoil, including surface to air missiles, which could be used against EU flights. In order to take away much of the breeding ground for new terrorists, Kerchove argued that the EU will have to help the African countries to reintegrate the hundreds of thousands of migrants workers who have fled home from Libya in the past months (The Telegraph, 2011).

4.6 Arms trade

One of the striking aspects of the EU-Libya relation is the arms trade between European countries and the Gadaffi regime. Weapons that now are being used in the Libyan conflict. Jamming equipment was also part of the arms export license. The very same jamming equipment that was used by Gadaffi's forces to block mobile phone, internet and GPS services, hampering the attempts by the EU to evacuate around 5.000 EU citizens that were still in Libya by the time the conflict erupted (EU observer, 2011).

In 2004, the European Union decided to lift an 18-year-old arms embargo imposed on Libya. Italy urged to remove the ban, so it could supply Libya with hi-tech equipment intended to curb illegal migration (BBC, 2004). The British foreign secretary explained that the decision followed Libya's decision to halt their weapons of mass destruction programme, as well as the compensation payments of the victims of the terrorist attacks. British foreign secretary said that *'This is a very good day… for peace and security across the world'* (BBC, 2004). One can wonder how selling arms would help improve peace and security across the world.

In 2009, 13 European member-states exported a total of € 343 million worth of Military technology and equipment (See table 1) (European Union, 2009, pp. 160-161).

Country	Export in Euros
Austria	**2.476**
Belgium	22.320.773
Bulgaria	**3.730.000**
France	30.542.753
Germany	**53.154.423**
Greece	33.555
Italy	**111.796.655**
Latvia	254.539
Malta	**79.689.691**
Poland	2.025.846
Portugal	**14.519.355**
Slovenia	112.251
Spain	**-**
United Kingdom	25.552.315
Total	**343.734.632**

Table 1: Military exports to Libya per EU member state in 2009

The decision not only generated large amounts of income for the European member states, it presumably brought the EU and Libya closer together, opening possibilities for Italy to patrol its coastlines more effectively if it can provide Libya with boats and additional equipment (NY times, 2004). As table one shows, Italy is by far the largest supplier of military equipment to Libya, more than € 100.000.000 of which is earned on the export of military planes and € 468.197 in surveillance tools[6] (European Union, 2009, pp. 160-161).

The day the EU made the decision to lift the arms embargo, the arms embargo on China was also up for debate. The EU however decided not to remove the embargo on China, as it had not done enough to improve its human rights record since the 1989 crackdown in Tiananmen Square. An interesting type of reasoning, as the same logic could be applied to the case of Libya. As of today, this embargo still has not been lifted although the EU is considering doing so (China Daily, 2011). .

4.7 Migration

Migration plays a significant role with Libya being a transit country for illegal migration to the coasts of Europe. Libya was not always a transit country; it has served as a destination for migrants for many years. As described in chapter 4, the discovery of oil has played a significant role in the migration flows towards Libya. As Libya became more and more isolated from, in particular, the Western world and its Arab neighbors, Gadaffi shifted his orientation towards sub-Saharan Africa (Hamood, 2006, p. 17).

With the foundation of the Community of Sahel-Saharan States in 1998 (CEN-SAD) - in which Libya played an integral role - 21 African countries were linked together. The aim of CEN-SAD was to create a unified regional bloc that promoted free movement of persons, capital and the interests of nationals. Libya even went on to advertise in the daily Newspapers of some of these countries, encouraging Africans to come work in Libya. At the early stages of the migration influx, Libyan border police had sufficient capacity to direct the migrants to the locations within Libya where work was needed. Gadaffi's relationship with the country of origin of the migrants determined in a large way how the migrants were treated. For instance, the Tunisians were expulsed eight times only to return later in the period of 1966 and 1985. Gadaffi's nationalist ideals also meant that in times of economic downfall Libyans were first in line in terms of employment whilst tens of thousands of migrants were expelled or left voluntarily (Hamood, p. 18).

With a relatively pro-migrant status by the Libyan government, eventually migrants also became attracted by the possibility to travel beyond Libya, to the continent of Europe. It transformed Libya from a country that was the destination of migrants to a country that served as a point of departure to the European continent. A total of 80.000 migrants a year would leave shore in Libya and travel by boat to Italy's southern Islands and Malta (Hamood,

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[6] The € 468.197 also accounts for training tools and software (European Union, 2009, pp 160-161).

pp. 18-19). On an estimated 100.000 to 120.000 migrants crossing the Mediterranean each year (Sørensen, 2006, p. 7), and with the European Union having made successful arrangements with Morocco and Tunisia about border patrols in an attempt to prevent the high influx of illegal migrants, Libya soon became one of the hot spots for those who would risk the dangerous crossing of the Mediterranean sea. More recent data shows that in the period of august 2008 until July 2009 there had been 29.076 disembarkations from Libya towards the shores of Europe, in particular those of Italy (Paoletti & Ferruccio, 2010, p. 4).


Figure 8: Migration routes to Europe (BBC, 2009)

4.7.1 Italy

With most migrants landing ashore in Italy, it had become a raising concern for the Italian government to prevent the influx of illegal immigration since the end of the 90's. It became a key item on the agenda of high-level meetings between Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi and Gadaffi. In 2000, both countries signed an agreement to fight terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking and illegal immigration (European Commission, 2005, p. 58). The first High Level Security Libyan-Italian Committee extended this cooperation in September 2002. Both Ministries of Interior established a permanent liaison in the fields of organized crime and illegal immigration between Italian police officers collaborating with their Libyan colleagues (European Commission, p. 59). The Italian government agreed upon providing special training, devices and equipments to the Libyan authorities in order to improve their ability to prevent illegal immigration. The cooperation between Italy and Libya also implied significant financial consequences. Charter flights had to be paid for in order to

send the illegal immigrants back to their country of origin, sea rescues needed to be conducted as well as building camps for immigrants (European Commission, p. 59).

The last agreement was signed on December 9, 2010. This agreement between Italy and Libya entailed a technical and operational protocol to fight illegal immigration by sea. Both the Ministers that signed the agreement also urged the European Union to increase the funding and to show more political commitment to countries that suffer from the influx of illegal immigration (Times of Malta, 2010). The efforts made by Italy and Libya did result in a steep decline of illegal immigrants with only 3.185 migrants landing on the Italian coast in 2009, compared with the 31.281 over the same period in 2008 (Paoletti & Ferruccio, 2010, p. 4).

4.7.2 Malta

The influx of illegal immigrants into Malta has risen since Malta joined the European Union in 2004. The Minister of Interior of Malta initially had difficulties establishing talks with Libya on illegal immigration because of '*too many pre-conditions based on democracy and human rights'* (Citation in (Hamood, p. 66)). In July 2005, Malta drafted a 17-point document to the EU describing the concern it felt as a result of the influx of illegal immigrants. Although Malta has made several attempts to reach an agreement with Libya on the return of illegal immigrants, Libyan authorities seemed reluctant to cooperate (Hamood, p. 66).

4.7.3 Migration / refugee policies

Although the illegal immigrants seems to depart largely from Libya, the EU has been cooperating with all southern Mediterranean countries on the issue of migration, and it has played a core part of all relations between the EU and its neighbors across the Mediterranean. The approach towards migration has changed over the last years, from the Amsterdam treaty in 1999, which emphasized the fundamental importance of the management of migration (Cassarino, 2005, p. 3). This Treaty was expanded during a summit of the European Council of Tampere in 1999, which added the need to establish partnerships with third countries, a common European asylum system, fair treatment of third-country nationals and the management of migration flows (Cassarino, p. 7)

In 2002, a Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers made significant progress in realizing EU's aim to externalize questions of migration and asylum management. The link between migration issues and development became a key way of looking at migration issues in recognition of the need to address root causes of migratory flows, consequently linking development assistance and financial aid to migration (Cassarino, p. 70). With the start of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), aimed at intensifying existing cooperation between EU and its neighbors (Hamood, p. 71). This more comprehensive policy integrated the migration issues with development issues as well as financial aid. Although Europe has

proposed negotiations for a framework agreement, Libya as of yet is no participator in the ENP (European Commission, 2011).

The Council of the European states that the EU should support those third world countries with capacity building in national asylum systems, border control and wider cooperation on migration issues if they demonstrate a genuine commitment to fulfill their obligations under the Geneva Convention on Refugees (Council of the European Union, November, 2004, p. 22). Hamood's study on the African transit migration through Libya to Europe shows that Libya is far from meeting all the conditions of the Geneva Convention on Refugees (Hamood, 2006, pp. 29-43). The EU ambassador in Libya said in 2010 that *'Libya has a different view on the status of refugees….Tripoli has a problem with the status of this organization* (UN High commissioner for refugees) *as well as with the concept of what a refugee is, as defined at an international level'* (EU Business, 2010). Looking at the statement made by the Council of the European Union, which seemingly commits the EU to cooperate with third world countries on the condition that they do acknowledge the Geneva Convention on Refugees, the latest agreements made between Libya and Italy could be open for debate.

Here, an interesting dilemma surfaces where not the EU but states at a bilateral level initiate agreements on migration policies (Paoletti & Ferruccio, 2010, p. 5). The difficulty lies with the inhumane situations by which the illegal migrants come ashore in Italy and trying to combat this by working together with a rogue state. On many occasions the EU as a supranational organ had imposed embargos upon Libya, constraining economic and political cooperation, whilst at the same time on nation-level there was a level of cooperation in order to tackle the issue of illegal migrants (Paoletti & Ferruccio, pp. 11-12). Italy went forward and initiated projects such as joint patrolling, arguing that their actions were based on absolute legality and were necessary because '*until then the EU had not directly committed to support activities to reduce illegal immigration*' (Paoletti & Ferruccio, p. 13).

While lacking a formal, unified migration policy, the EU did respond on numerous occasions to the cooperation between Libya and Italy about the migration issues. Different European institutes with different standpoints, ranging from condemning the actions undertaken by the Italian government by the European Court of Human Rights to appraisal by the Director General for Migration, Stefano Manservisi of the efficiency of the Italian government's bilateral agreement, which led to a stop of illegal migrants (Paoletti & Ferruccio, pp. 15-18).

4.8 Friends & Foes

What this chapter has shown is that there is a large amount of paradoxical policies of the EU and Libya when we look at the events described in this chapter. In the last years, the EU has sought to improve their relation with Libya, and Libya has done so too. The relation however, has focused primarily on economic interests. Although attention has been given to the socio-economic and humanitarian aspect, little had yet been done. With the conflict, the EU has set a course to a different destination. Where it originally sought to work with the Gadaffi regime,

thus steering for more stability with the regime, it has sought to intervene in the conflict and choose the side of the NTC. As has been described in this, as well as the previous chapter, the EU made several moral claims in order to legitimize their strategy. The next chapter will provide an analysis of chapter four and five, describing the geopolitical relation and unfolded events through the lenses of Held and Wolf.

Figure 9: Muammar Gadaffi posing for a photograph with Silvio Berlusconi, Nicolas Sarkozy, Dmitri Medvedev, Barack Obama and Ban Ki Moon on the third day of the G8 summit on July 2009 (Getty Images. 2009)

Chapter 5: Analysis of the EU-Libyan narrative

In the previous chapters, the methodology, theoretical notions, geopolitical interests as well as the contemporary trends and events have been described. In this chapter, the theoretical notions provided in chapter two will be applied to the data from chapter three and four by using the interpretative-explanatory analysis, as described in chapter one. David Held and Martin Wolf both favor a different outcome of globalization, and both will argue that their view represents the *presence* (see 1.4). Their ideas pose an opposition of views (see 1.4.1). By applying their views on chapter three and four, the opposition is pressurized, the geopolitical relation and its inherent claims are being deconstructed and in addition, the discourse in play between EU and Libya will be added. This chapter will also offer a more comprehensive look at the power relation and Foucault's notions about subject and power (see 1.4.2).

This chapter offers an integral debate between Held and Wolf. Consequently, both their views will be discussed per topic. For the analysis, a different structure compared to the previous two chapters has been used. First, both their views on the EU-Libyan relation during the time of Gadaffi prior to the increased economic and political cooperation will be discussed. Then the period of increased cooperation and finally the recent conflict and post-conflict situation will be discussed. These paragraphs will then be combined in the paragraph which provides the discourse analysis.

5.1 Wolf, Held and the Libyan Arab Republic

Although the focus of this thesis lies on the type of relation in more recent years, it remains important to look at the relation between EU and Libya over a longer period. By doing so, one can look which trends and discourses have dominated over the years. It also helps to add perspective to certain claims and remarks. This paragraph will focus on the debate about the 42 years of dictatorial rule by Gadaffi and his regime, which has been described in detail in chapter three.

One of the interesting characteristics of Libya is that it consists out of a myriad of clans and tribes, all with their own cultural footprints and orientations, making Libya a constellation of geographical and cultural fault lines. Libya is considered to be a relatively 'new' state as it was granted independence by the United Nations in 1951. The first efforts of governing this constellation of difference by the Libyan Monarchy were not aimed towards respecting and acknowledging difference, but rather ignoring and keeping it away from the legal and political discourse. In addition, the Libyan orientation was geared heavily towards the military and political presence by the US and Great Britain. These are signs of the political space, which also includes Libya. The same political space that offered Libya independence, yet also maintained foreign military presence within Libyan borders. As has been mentioned in 2.5.3, Held would consider the declaration of independence of Libya by the UN as one of the first characteristics of embedded cosmopolitanism in the international community, as (the Libyan) people were given the right of a having a state for their own. By offering Libya independence,

it also had been granted their own national economy and state apparatus. Wolf too would see this move by the international community as a positive effect of globalization, provided the Libyan economy would have been fully integrated into the world economy. However, at the time of the Cold War the chosen alliance also influenced one's access to certain economies. Libya, at the time being a constellation of nationalism and socialism under Gadaffi had little regard for the Western Capitalist principles, and more for the dominant Communist principles of the Soviet Union.

In terms of government and the role that Libya plays in the international economy and community, it was the discovery of oil that changed Libya's position within the international community drastically. Wolf warns that the existence of natural resources in a state can result in corrupt politics; unstable terms of trade and the high real exchange rates which negatively influences the competiveness of Libya in other sector. The early efforts by the Libyan government to use this additional source of income, however, would suit the argument made by Wolf, as the oil revenues were used to diversify and improve the production in other sectors. In addition, Libya offered many migrants to come work in their country, which Wolf says is why border restrictions should become a thing of the past. For the international community, the discovery of oil meant that promoting cosmopolitical principles and values towards Libya became intermingled with economic interests. Economically speaking, Libya became connected to the international community; politically it would still be bound to their own territory and that of the divided space because of the Cold War. This according to Held however, does not mean that the economical and the political can be viewed separately; The Cold-War era was a political narrative being told by two superpowers that had severe consequences for the economic market systems, which was about capitalism versus communism. The same happened in Libya, where political doctrine of socialist nationalism influenced the economy significantly.

Although the discovery of oil meant that Libya gained a stronger position in the international economy, it also marked the beginning of an anti-Western sentiment. Gadaffi exploited this sentiment successfully when he came to power. He nationalized the economy and banned any Western presence and influence within Libya. A political decision that both Wolf and Held would criticize, and to some extent would also be related to the vast amount of natural resources that so rigorously influenced the political landscape. Although Gadaffi managed to uphold the appearance of offering Libya a democracy in the early years, the nationalization of the economy showed how little economic freedom the Libyan people would have. As Wolf argues, economic freedom and political freedom correlate strongly, and are, together with regulatory competition, a prerequisite for a peaceful and prosperous society.

Aside from the oil-export, Libya isolated its economy and prevented economic integration, the most important requirement according to Wolf for achieving welfare and democracy. Gadaffi believed that the West was only interested in serving its own interests, and as a result started to destabilize the relation with the outside world. The international community responded to Gadaffi his increased radicalization and isolation by imposing economic

sanctions. As mentioned in the Ten Commandments by Wolf, the international community should have the capacity and will to intervene in failed states. From an economic globalist perspective, Wolf would argue that Gadaffi indeed was leading a failed state. The efforts of economic sanctions at the time resulted in a steep decline of the Libyan economy and the overall welfare, increased inflation and ultimately to several attempts to overthrow Gadaffi. Economic isolation brings the opposite of peace, democracy and welfare, as Wolf argues. It is when one looks beyond his own borders and opens up his economy, that an incremental change towards improved international relations and ultimately peace, democracy and welfare can be established. So far, Held would agree as he too states that because of globalization one cannot simply remain isolated within its own borders. Domestic and foreign affairs cannot be separated, and partaking in the international political community, according to Held, requires not only a liberal democracy, as Wolf would argue, but also the addressing of the massive inequalities, the dominant discourse and the mobility of people that are the result of the (dominant) political community and economic hegemony.

5.1.1 Towards cooperation

As Gadaffi lacked the means to survive the economic sanctioning by the dominant economies, he was forced to change its policies. Slowly, Gadaffi started to seek connection with the international community, improved relations and removed programs such as the acquiring of WMD's. Ultimately, it were the Western states who forced Gadaffi to change his political rhetoric. It is also part of the critique on Wolf's theory on economic globalization, namely that the status quo of Western economic dominance allows the West to impose their will and systems upon other nations by in- and/or excluding them to their markets. However, as Wolf would argue, it is through economic integration of all nation-states that the unequal status-quo eventually levels out, as a result of economic and political competition for investments. This would require a change of policy by both the European economic strongholds and Libya.

The EU has sought to cooperate with Libya in more recent years, resulting in several policy programmes and a change of discourse. Prior to discussing this, it is important to look back at the fundamental disagreement between Held and Wolf. Both their views require political action. The privatization, liberalization and the free market system of Western Nations evidently have been the result of political change. Neither Wolf nor Held would disagree on that. It however is the political influence within these systems or the sheer lack of it that after they have been implemented are cause for debate. With the Cold War era at an end, the supranational EU was no longer entangled by the artificial divide between the East and the West.

What has been described as well in chapter two, is that the EU tells its own narrative of political and economic cooperation and reproduces this narrative through its policies such as the ENP and FTA, which have been described in the previous chapter. In the following

paragraph, the narrative of the EU provided in the past chapter will be combined with the narrative of Wolf and Held and their consequential critique and argumentation.

5.2 Wolf, Held and the EU-Libyan cooperation

An interesting starting point for looking at the developments at the level of interstate cooperation is the paradox that is presented through the geopolitical behavior of the EU towards Libya. Through economic sanctions and isolation from the international community, Gadaffi had to change its policies towards a more pro-European stance. As a result, the EU has allowed economic and political cooperation with the regime in an attempt to establish a ring of well-governed countries surrounding the European borders. In 2008, the EU stated that it has started a new era in its relations with Libya, referring to certain European Neighborhood policies. Only 3 years later, the EU again says that there is a momentum for qualitative step forward in the relation between EU and its Southern Neighbors (see 4.1). The EU condemned a highly controversial regime with which it has sought increased cooperation over the past few years. The question arises how this shift in geopolitical behavior can be explained, as well as to what extend the cooperation has contributed to an improved relation and more importantly which interests are being served? A similar question has been asked in the previous chapter: Why would the EU risk losing all their progress made by overthrowing the very same regime it has set out to seek common grounds with? This subparagraph will attempt to answer this question through the theoretical lenses.

Agenda-wise, the EU has on more than one occasion expressed its desire to promote and establish their policy-narrative. The narrative, which has been described in 4.1, is that of the EU trying to promote their concept of values, peace and security, which is based upon the UN charter. As Pugh argues, the dominant position of the western nations in the UN makes both supranational organs intertwined. It are not necessarily the values of the UN that the EU bases its own values upon, as they already were the values of the EU. The foreign policy of the EU however, at least in terms of its desired goals, would be considered to be a cosmopolitical shift by Held.

The desired outcome of Europe's foreign policies is the outcome of the instruments it has at its disposal, which in the case of Libya had been the ESS, ENP and FTA. These instruments, according to Held, should go beyond sharing economic interests and values, as cultural, commercial and legal values should also be implemented in the narrative. According to Held, an important distinction needs to be made between the agenda and the instruments at one's disposal, as well as the interests of states and the interests of the people. In addition, an important notion of Wolf is that by cooperating economically with a dictatorial regime, it becomes difficult to determine if the benefits for Libya eventually will serve the interest of the civilians, rather than that of the Gadaffi regime.

As been described in the previous chapter, the EU has implemented instruments in multiple fields of interest. In terms of political cooperation, Libya has been offered membership to the

UN Security Council, a result of Gadaffi's efforts to improve its relation with the EU. In addition, the EC had set out a strategy to integrate Libya into the rule-based international political and economic system, provided Libya would implement the Framework Agreement successfully. According to Gadaffi, it was the focus on internal systems and the lack of respect for people's culture and their inherent particularities, the has caused economies to fail. As Held would confirm, there is not only a difference between the states in terms of their political views, there is also a cultural difference. Held would argue that economic cooperation can occur between Libya and the EU, but any form of cosmopolitical improvement should be the result of the efforts made by a cosmopolitan order. However, Gadaffi accused the UN of being corrupt and the WTO of being a tool for neocolonialists. Where the EU may set out to establish a common ground for implementing cosmopolitical values, Gadaffi was only willing to focus on the economic interdependencies. As described in 2.3, the EU will first increase economic cooperation before promoting cosmopolitical values. As Wolf would argue, economic cooperation increases interstate dependency, which will also make it more likely to influence and improve the society as a whole. However, the extensive supply of natural resources in Libya will also make it more likely for the energy-strapped EU to refrain from interfering in state-affairs in fear of negatively influencing the energy-supply, which is the number one priority for the EU according to its own policy documents. As Pugh would argue, this offers a clear geopolitical interest in creating a well-governed ring surrounding the EU, as states with likeminded philosophies on the society and the international community will be less likely to disrupt the respective economies.

Pursuing economic integration of both the EU and Libya, according to Wolf, is a key condition for bringing peace, democracy and welfare. In addition, it consequentially will improve international relations. A favorable development according to Wolf, who argues that allowing economic integration, and its inherent (perpetual) change, will eventually improve the freedom of the individuals and gear the state towards a free society. Although, Libya was gradually allowing political change; it however cannot be considered perpetual due to its brief nature of economic and political cooperation. Under Gadaffi's rule, people and corporations would not yet be sure that their long-term investments in the Libyan economy would be protected by the state, because Gadaffi had nationalized private property before. In addition, there is the risk of damaging the Libyan internal market due to unequal distribution of knowledge, products and extensive foreign competition. In the long run, Libya will see its natural resource deplete and will thus be forced to diversify its means of production in order to maintain their standards of living. Complete integration into the European market may provide long-term investments that would offer such diversification, which Wolf considers a key requirement for prosperity and eventual democratic reform.

In order to stop the negative impacts of climate change, the international community has composed the Millennium Developments Goals. The EU considers these goals to be an important reason for increased cooperation. As Held argues, environmental issues are no longer within the reach of individual political actors. Especially with a topic as delicate as environment and accountability, Held would applaud the fact that not the EU, but the UN had

been cooperating on this topic with the Libyan government. One of the goals of the UNDP is to diversify the Libyan economy in order to improve the reusability of energy. Wolf would also underpin this programme because the diversification of the Libyan economy eventually will improve its position in the world economy, as well as decrease the dependency on oil revenues. In addition, Wolf too believes that states and their citizens should commit themselves to international treaties in order to protect shared concerns such as environmental issues and counter-terrorism.

5.2.3 Migration

A very important issue for the EU and Libya, as well as a casing point for both Wolf and Held their argument, revolves around the issue of migration policies. A fundamental argument made by Wolf is that economic integration eventually will have to imply free movement of goods, services, labor and capital. Economically speaking, Wolf states, there are no foreigners. Everyone should be able to go where work can be found, regardless of borders. In addition, as Held would argue, the root causes for migration do not fade away by stopping people at the border. The current migration policies are a political and economical answer that relates to a specific territory, namely that of the EU. It does not offer an equal entitlement to the same treatment, and as chapter four has shown, it is a systematic violation of human dignity. Both Held and Wolf criticize the fact that goods and services have more rights than human beings when it comes to crossing borders.

A paradox presents itself when looking at the geopolitical behavior of the EU. The moment embargos and sanctions were lifted, thus removing economic barriers, the EU has cooperated with Libya to create improved barriers to stop the high influx of migrants. The ENP instrument has played a significant role in the establishment of new border and migration policies. Although the ENP documents state that the EU approaches migration in a balanced matter, the reality is that most of the migrants who reach the shores of European member-states are being send back to Libya, where they are brought back to their country of origin, or at times even executed. Neither Wolf nor Held would favor these type of policies. However, Wolf would see a much different desired outcome than Held. By integrating the nation's economies into one global economy and thereby removing any economic barriers, illegal migration would become a thing of the past. This however, presupposes that migrants travel based upon economic motives. Held would argue that not by removing all border regulations and interventionism the migration issue should be resolved, but rather by implementing a worldwide cosmopolitical order that holds accountable those who create inequalities and change the policies that create inequalities and refuse equal access to all in a way that treats every individual equally.

In order to enforce migration policies and border patrols near the coastal lines of Libya, arms trade had been re-established by the EU. Great Britain even called the renewed installment of arms trade a good day for peace and security across the world. As Wolf argues in his book, only democratic peace can offer protection against a political or military power and its

desire to plunder and exploit the nation. As is well known, Libya had been subject to dictatorial rule for a very long time. Wolf would thus argue that selling arms to a dictatorial regime goes against his principle of establishing democratic peace. For Held and his appeal for real cosmopolitanism, selling arms achieves the very opposite of avoiding systematic violation of human dignity and crimes against humanity. The common defense against evils is what the ultimate goal of cosmopolitan policy should be. As democracies themselves lack the reach and potential to achieve this, an international cosmopolitan order needs to be established. One however, based upon the principles derived from a democratic state. The evil in this, would be the dictatorial regime, which should mean that selling weapons, which ultimately serve only one purpose, undermines the cosmopolitan principles. In addition, weapons sold to the Libyan regime in order to enforce migration policies now risk getting into the hands of terrorist organizations. This in turn poses a threat to the global safety and may even be used as an argument for enforcing even tighter border controls.

In chapter two, the interests of the EU as well as their desired policy outcomes have been described. As Jorgensen pointed out, there is still much not known about the intentions of the EU to shape the world. As described in 2.2.1 the EU's foreign policy shows overlap with the theory of economic globalization. In addition to offering economic integration through the EU and the WTO to the recipient state, the EU also helps them pay more attention to human rights and democratic reform. As described in this paragraph, there is some overlap with both theoretical notions, yet EU's foreign policy in Libya does not lean heavily towards a particular one. Also, what will be described in the following paragraph are actions, trends and statements that are legitimized through values of peace, safety and holding accountable those who commit crimes against humanity. This paragraph will first be discussed before deconstructing the discourse presented through EU's official documents by linking it to practice.

5.3 Wolf, Held and the (post-)Libyan conflict

As described in detail in chapter three, the EU has played a significant role in the removal of the Gadaffi regime. The Arab Spring that started in Egypt provided the momentum. Eager to reform Libya in order to gain more political freedom, demonstrators went to the streets. What originally appeared to be an intrastate conflict, soon sprung to a war that involved US and European military forces. Arguably, it started as a non-violent movement. However, it soon had become a very violent conflict that led to the deaths of thousands of civilians, rebel forces and Libyan military personnel. Both Held and Wolf would argue that international involvement is required. Wolf would argue that because Libya itself was not yet a democracy, it would be legitimate to overthrow the regime because the Libyan people needed to be protected by the tyranny of one. Wolf would note however, that the ultimate goal for intervention should be to establish and uphold the core values of liberal democracy and its inherent economic freedoms. This would mean that a liberal democracy should be the outcome of the intervention as well as integration into the international community, all of which bound within the framework of international treaties.

Held would consider it a moral obligation for the international community to resolve the crimes committed by Gadaffi against peaceful demonstrators. This because every participant in a cosmopolitan society should not have their moral obligations bound to their own state territory. Held however, focuses more significantly on the argument that the intervention should result in preventing any harm done; it should not entail establishing a situation that would suit the interests of the EU and the US, rather than that of the Libyan people. What binds every citizen worldwide is the entitlement to fundamental moral and rights and values, not necessarily the very same state apparatus and economic system, although Held his argument is that liberal democracy is a key requirement for obtaining equal moral rights to all.

So far, both Held and Wolf would favor the fact that the international community showed concern for the situation and took action to prevent any more bloodshed. There was no consensus within the international community about the course of action that should be taken. Instead, there was debate about the effectiveness of military involvement as it might lead to more bloodshed and a full-scale civil war. Here is where Wolf and Held would disagree to some extent. Wolf argues that it is at first an intra-state conflict and thus one that should be resolved within the state. Yet, because Libya is far from a democratic state, intervention should be geared towards ending Libya as a failed state. Stopping Gadaffi and allowing more political freedom within Libya would thus be a legitimate reason for international intervention. Held however, would argue that first and foremost preventing any form of harm being done to civilians should be the top priority. Risking more bloodshed and a full-scale civil war thus be prevented at all times. For Held it would be top priority that the international community as a whole, and its inherent cosmopolitical organs such as the UN should reach consensus about the desired course of action. It shows, as Held argues, that organs such as the UN may pursue cosmopolitan values, such as the UN 2005 summit agreement of the Responsibility to Protect, the reality is very ambiguous. One can raise questions about the will to protect the Libyan people, which would also include Gadaffi-loyalists and the large bombing campaign of the Western nations.

Protecting civilians would favor non-violent action, as Held argues. If the international community as a whole was to demand Gadaffi to step down and offered a deal, it might have offered Gadaffi a reasonable option to end the civil war, as he still would have had something to lose. Based upon the economic argument by Wolf, there is another argument to be made that would favor a non-violent course of action. Due to the heavy bombardments, the Libyan (economic) infrastructure has sustained significant damage. As a result, the Libyan economy will have an even worse starting point for economic growth, which is required to establish an effective liberal democracy.

In 2.5.3, Beck states that the involuntary politicization of a world risk society creates an unavoidable pressure to cooperate. This cooperation will lead to the establishment of cosmopolitan norms and agreements. However, given the situation in Libya, Held may see the cosmopolitan argumentation of protecting the civilian people and allowing them the right

to pursue peace and democracy to be a precedent for taking action without the blessing of a cosmopolitical order. Libya is not the only *rogue state* left in the world. By resolving the conflict in this particular way, with a civil war and the execution of Gadaffi, other dictatorial rulers may resolve to even more extreme measures to present any expression of political outrage. On the other hand, the red tape and polarity that hinders effective and swift interventions as well as the difficulty to reach consensus due to the political indifference and apathy for Western intervention may ultimately cause more bloodshed as well.

British Prime Minister David Cameron said that the Libyan revolution was the revolution of the Libyan people, not of the intervening states. French President Nicolas Sarkozy said that the Western nations were not serving a hidden agenda, but merely wanted to help the Libyan people. The chief of foreign policy for the EU said that it is for the people of Libya to decide their future. As mentioned in 3.4.4, oil contracts and construction contracts for restoring the destroyed infrastructure might be more likely to go to those countries that were responsible for overthrowing the Gadaffi regime and supporting the rebel movement. It also will become interesting to see how the EU will respond if the statement of the leader of the NTC that he wishes to establish a new government, based upon Islamic principles will become reality.

5.4 The geopolitical discourse

One of the questions that this thesis has set out to answer is how the European geopolitical discourse has evolved in the Libyan conflict. In order to do so, this thesis has looked at the language of policies, politicians and the like. Language, as described in 1.7, has multiple purposes: to communicate, to perform actions, to create social identities, establish relationships and to create communities (Stav, 2008). It is used to spread such practices as liberal economics and democracy (Jorgensen & Philips, 2002, p. 61). By analyzing the language used, this thesis can determine which type of actions relate to which identity.

By answering the questions of what is being communicated and which actions are performed as well as which communities and identities are established, this thesis will offer a concise analysis of the EU-Libyan discourse. Deconstructing the discourse will then take place by pressurizing the language used within the EU-Libyan relation.

5.4.1 The geopolitical discourse

Throughout the thesis, numerous citations of politicians, documents and policy programmes have been mentioned. The geopolitical discourse of the EU has been mentioned in, for instance, the foreign policy of the EU. As Chris Patten said in 2005, '*The US and the EU have two decades left to "shape the world" in the way we deem best. After that, economic and demographic trends will force us to share that power with the two emerging Asian giants'* (Patten (2005) in Jorgensen, 2009, p. 1). Within the past years and the upcoming two decades, the EU sets out - according to EU high representative Javier Solana points out – to create a '*A secure Europe in a better World'* (European Council, 2003, pp. 6-7). The future

role of the EU, at least in terms of desired goals is one of a world player, as the EC describes it: W*ork with other countries and international organizations to bring everyone the benefits of open markets, economic growth and stability in an increasingly interdependent world. At the same time, the EU defends its legitimate economic and commercial interests in the international arena* (European Commission, 2004, p. 5)*.* The foreign policies of the EU focus more notably on the periphery of the European border, which also includes Libya. As described in the ESS, the EU wants to establish a *ring of well-governed countries to the East of the EU and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations'* (European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, p. 4).

The EU thus desires to cooperate with Libya in order to serve their, as well as Libyan interests. In the case of Libya, these economic and commercial interests are dominated by the energy and migration policies. As described by Beck and Grande, the language used by the EU is formulated in such a way that the interest of the EU and the recipient state can be combined: *Acting on purely realistic motives, though in the knowledge that they (for instance the EU) can only (continue to) realize their interests in a particular way, namely, by recognizing the legitimate interests of others and integrating them into their own rational calculations'* (Beck & Grande, 2007, pp. 20-21)*.* For instance, both Libya and the EU benefit from a steady and secure energy supply.

In terms of economic cooperation, the EU and Libya have been successful with regard to developing more secure energy supply lines as well as decreasing the amount of illegal migrants. The change in discourse of the EU to also intervene in political matters of the recipient state has, in the case of Libya proved little successful. As Gadaffi stated: "*When the focus became centered on internal systems, on lack of respect of people's cultures and on these people's own particularities, economies failed"* (The Tripoli Post, 2010)*.* In here, one can argue that the legitimate interest of establishing a ring of well-governed states does not reflect the interest of the Gadaffi regime. As a result, perhaps the EU has calculated the interests of the Gadaffi regime into their rational calculations, which meant that EU had more focus on economic policies and less on the political. In 2008, the EU has declared *a new era* in its relations with Libya, focusing specifically on counter-terrorism, energy and migration.

This new era was one of 'friendship and cooperation' across the Mediterranean and as a result Gadaffi was said to supply Italy with 10% of its energy needs (Gas and Oil, 2004). The language used is one of establishing common grounds. With the EU consisting out of democratic states and the Libyan government being a dictatorial regime, the common grounds were limited to economic interests. In addition, the increase in cooperation between the EU and Libya was only short-lived, and incremental changes such as political freedoms may have been a desired outcome on the long run, but could not yet be implemented. The ENP underpinned the fragility of the newfound friendship with Libya: p*olitical dialogue and engagement of the EU with Libya is very recent and remains fragile…. Mutual knowledge and trust need to be strengthened before …. dealing with very sensitive issues, in particular the governance area* (European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, 2011, p. 15)*.*

Although the geopolitical discourse of the EU may set out to promote and establish both economic, commercial, political and humanitarian principles, it has not been able to do so in Libya within the limited timeframe of the renewed cooperation. Economically beneficial cooperation seems to be the established relatively quickly. The geopolitical interest again is underpinned in the ENP when it said that W*hile Libya is a high-income country, the EU has strong political interests in providing assistance to Libya, in particular in areas where there is need for a joint action (in particular migration and energy sector)* (p. 15)*.*

The morality of cooperating with a dictatorial regime that offers little political freedom to its people however is highly debatable. For instance the topic of migration, which Held and Wolf argue is both economically and morally a highly complex and contradictory point of interest. The aim of the EU's Global Approach to Migration is *to address migration in a balanced matter, by taking into account all aspects of these phenomena on the basis of dialogue and cooperation between all destination, origin and transit countries. This approach underpins the cooperation with Libya* (p. 15). Although the discussion about the morality of migration itself should be granted a thesis on its own, its relevance to this thesis lies within the fact that the EU promotes a set of values and principles that is derived from their political view of democracy and peace. Their political views on for instance the status of migrants and the consequential treatment of said people differs greatly from that of the Libyan government. As the EU ambassador in Libya said: *'Libya has a different view on the status of refugees….Tripoli has a problem with the status of this organization* (UN High commissioner for refugees) *as well as with the concept of what a refugee is, as defined at an international level'* (EU Business, 2010). In addition, in order to establish a common migration policy, the EU was forced to re-establish arms trade with a regime that may have changed its language, it has not changed it political systems. The British foreign secretary even said about the arms trade contracts with Libya that *'This is a very good day… for peace and security across the world'* (BBC, 2004).

Here is where an important crux in the geopolitical discourse of the EU presents itself. Although the EU instruments acknowledges in its language that the legitimacy of cooperation should be derived from the different fields of cooperation that still underpin values of the EU, whilst respecting the values of the recipient state, its actions on migration issues show how these geopolitical interests can become more important than upholding the values and principles of the EU. In order to suit the interest of the EU in terms of preventing illegal migration, it had to set aside their values in order to establish a cooperative relation with Libya. Not alone did the EU have to re-establish arms trade with a country that has been subject of many sanctions and embargos because of the very same desire to acquire arms, it also had to establish a migration policy that to some extend disregarded the democratic values of the EU. As the Minister of Interior of Malta said, establishing migration policies with Libya based upon the principles of the EU entailed *too many pre-conditions based on democracy and human rights'* (Citation in (Hamood, p. 66). Italy went forward and initiated projects such as joint patrolling, arguing that their actions were based on absolute legality

and were necessary because '*until then the EU had not directly committed to support activities to reduce illegal immigration*' (Paoletti & Ferruccio, p. 13).

The topic of migration show the difficulty of establishing a relationship with a recipient state that does not underpin the same political views, values or principles. The EU however did manage to establish common grounds with the Gadaffi regime by focusing on the economic interests that suited both the EU and Libya, which have been primarily the energy supplies and migration issues. These topics are of such geopolitical significance to the EU, that to some extend it has been willing to ignore the very set of rules and principles it has agreed upon in their CFSP treaty in order to:

- safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter.
- preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter…including those on external borders.
- develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms

5.4.2 The opportunity of conflict

As a result, the EU arguably has keen geopolitical interests in seeing a change of the political landscape of Libya, preferably to a situation which underpins the same values and principles of the EU and the UN. The conflict in Libya and the rebel uprising in the East may have offered a policy window for the EU in order to do so. When the international community was debating about how to proceed after the initial UN mandate of a no-fly-zone, the EC said that the events are of historic proportions, and the changes *carry the hope of a better life ..with.. greater respect for human rights, pluralism, rule of law and social justice* (European Commission, 2011, p. 2)*.* The EU felt that it needed to play a significant role in *supporting wholeheartedly the wish of the people in our neighborhood to enjoy the same freedoms that we take as our right (p. 2)*. Although the EU considers the establishment of a state based on the Western values to be one of *shared interests*, the EU did acknowledge that the revolution in Libya is primarily an *internal transformation process*. The report also emphasized that EU should apply a *new approach* (p. 2).

This new approach could be the result of a change in the course of action by the EU, which is to not only focus on the economic interests when there are no common grounds for political cooperation. If this indeed is the case, then the EU may reshape the international landscape by becoming an interventionist union that should also intervene when similar events take place in other states, such as Syria. As Putin pointed out: *the so-called civilized world uses all its military power against a small nation, destroying what has been created by generations*. Putin accused the west of having *double standards*, as their amount of military presence in Libya was in no relation to their presence in or attention to any similar civil-war type situation in the region (Russia Today, 2011). EU Council President Herman van

Rompuy said that the EU should take credit for preventing a *bloodbath* in Libya. When asked about EU's close relations with the Libyan dictator before the conflict, he replied: *Did we always have good policies in the past? No. Have we corrected this? Yes.* (Eurobserver, 2011). The EC, in response to the conflict, said that *now is the time for a qualitative step forward in the relations between the EU and its Southern Neighbors* (European Commission, 2011, p. 2).

It is interesting to combine these statements by Van Rompuy and Barroso with one of their joint statements in which they stated that *the reported death of Gadaffi marks the end of an era of despotism and repression from which the Libyan people have suffered for too long. Today Libya can turn a page in its history and embrace a new democratic future* (Van Rompuy & Barroso, 2011, p. 1). Primarily, the acknowledgment that the Libyan people have suffered for far too long is interesting, as the economic cooperation with Libya has , at least to some extent, contributed to Gadaffi his power grip on the Libyan people. These statements also acknowledge that the EU has been well aware of the situation in Libya, yet consciously has allowed economic cooperation between the two to take place.

With Gadaffi out of the picture, it remains a question what will become of the advances made throughout the European instruments such as the ENP, and the future role of cooperation between the EU and Libya. Looking back at the desired strategy of the EU, the geopolitical discourse remains one of pursuing economic interests, integrating countries into the world economy and promoting Western values. Several European leaders had said their intervention was not part of a geopolitical agenda to reshape the political agenda.

For instance, the British Ministry of Defense legitimized the intervention because it wanted *to protect the civilian population in Libya and allow Libyans to pursue their legitimate aspirations for more open and democratic government* (Ministry of Defence, 2011)*.* The French government spoke about the protection of *the Libyan people* (The London Times, 2011)*.* Prime Minister Cameron said to the Libyans that *this was your revolution, not our revolution* (NY Times, 2011). President Sarkozy stated *what we did we did without a hidden agenda, but because we wanted to help Libya* (NY Times, 2011). President Sarkozy said that now was the time for *'reconciliation in unity and freedom'* (MSNBC, 2011). German Chancellor Merkel said that Germany is '*relieved and very happy about this'*, but emphasizes that Libya should now carry out political reforms to '*ensure the achievements of the Arab spring cannot be undone'* (Reuters, 2011). Catherine Ashton, the foreign policy chief of the EU said that '*These* (NTC) *are the people with whom we have a strong dialogue. It's for the people of Libya to determine the future of the country*' (NY Times, 2011).

Looking at these statements however, it becomes evident that the legitimacy of intervening is because the people of Libya should be allowed to pursue their political aspirations, preferably by establishing a more open democratic government of unity and freedom. All of which are principles that the Western nations try to uphold and promote. Because of the removal of the Gadaffi regime, the EU now has the policy window to improve the economic cooperation,

which to some extend has already been established in the previous years. Due to the large role that the EU has played in the removal of the Gadaffi regime, chances are it has created a sufficient amount of goodwill amongst the Libyan people, which enables more opportunities to implement the ENP and other policies that are no longer limited to a commonality of economic interests.

So far, it seems that the aspired geopolitical discourse does not always reflect the actions of the EU. Although it wishes to establish a ring of well-governed states, it seems to desire their instrument of soft power over hard power. Consequently, it can be explained why the EU has prioritized the economic cooperation with Libya because not only does it suit both interests, it may also have served as a platform for further cooperation on different fronts. The conflict in Libya however, makes it possible for the Libyan people as well as the EU to advance further into political cooperation and potentially achieve the geopolitical goals of the EU of democracy, peace, regards for human rights and economic integration into the world community. It does however depend for a great deal on how the future of Libya will take shape. As has been said, there is a desire to create a state based upon Islamic principles, which conflicts with the values and principles of many European states. It may be well possible that again the EU will have to focus primarily on the commonalities first and any desired changes in actions on the long run.

Before using Held and Wolf their view on the geopolitical discourse, as well as the events and developments to explain the geopolitical behavior, a brief look at the power relation between EU and Libya will be given, which is presented in the paragraph below.

5.5 The power relation

As has been described throughout the thesis, the geographical connection, as well as sound geopolitical interests lay at the core of the EU-Libyan cooperation. This thesis has looked at the geopolitical relation with most attention given to the side of the EU. In this thesis, the EU represents the *power,* whilst Libya represents the *subject*. Its inherent institutions and such are placed within complex power relations (Foucault, 1983, p. 209). As Foucault argues, perhaps we can best understand what power relations are about by investigating the forms of resistance and attempts made to disassociate these relations through the five points mentioned in 1.4.2 (Foucault, p. 211).

As has been described in the previous paragraph, the level of cooperation on economic policies is higher than on the political policies. This because economic cooperation has met much less resistance by the Libyan authorities. For the EU, there may be a sound logic behind advancing economic cooperation without too much conditionality on the political atrocities of the recipient state. For as Foucault argues: exercising power is a way through which certain actions may structure the field for other possible actions. By establishing economic interdependencies, the EU can create more power within the Libyan state, consequently resulting in more leverage to change the political landscape. This logic

however, in this case, works two ways. Gadaffi has been able to buy arms and disregard human rights in order to decrease the amount of illegal immigrants that cross the Mediterranean.

The EU believes in the effectiveness of soft power, which looks at mutual beneficial arrangements and interests to act upon. Because of the Western economic hegemony, the EU possesses a large economic and technological advantage, which in general would allow the EU to implement their policies more easily in the recipient state. However, Libya has a vast amount of energy resources, which are vital to the European economies, consequently increasing the geopolitical influence of the Libyan government. This in turn influences the type of objectives pursued by one's actions. For the EU, the priority during the Gadaffi regime was to establish a secure and stable energy supply and migration policies as well as advance the economic integration. During the conflict, the objective was to remove the regime and to allow the Libyan people to pursue their political aspirations. For Libya, the objective had remained solely economic, and Libya desired to have no outside influence into their political practices. Initially, the use of soft power through instruments such as the ENP embodied the means of bringing power relations into being. By looking at common grounds, diplomacy and economic instruments which formed the basis for establishing relationships. It was only when the conflict erupted that military power was used to influence the course of actions in Libya to the liking of the EU.

What this thesis has shown as well, is the different forms of institutionalization. The EU itself and its inherent instruments played a significant role in establishing common policies as well as opening the doors for migration policies. However, because the institutes of the EU and the UN have strict rules about the treatment of migrants, the individual member states of Malta and Italy were required to implement these migration policies. In addition, in order to gain international legitimacy, the initial US, French and British led military intervention was transferred to NATO-command. Because the EU its economic and (geo)political views to some extend overlap with the UN, the WTO and NATO, these institutions are more likely to increase the power of the EU than that of Libya.

Another notion of Foucault is the type of rationalization. The EU rationalized cooperating with Libya in order to establish their foreign policy goals of stability and peace, as well as economic interests such as energy supplies and migration issues. These are all rationalized policy goals that legitimate the EU to work with a dictatorial regime. The military intervention was rationalized through claims of morality and the duty to stop crimes against humanity. The geopolitical discourse and its inherent rationalizations were visibly influenced by the course of events in Libya, and changed from economic rationalization to moral rationalization.

The strategy used by the EU has changed from soft power to hard power. Initially the EU has secured its own geopolitical interests by securing energy supplies as well as decreasing the influx of illegal immigrants. By applying hard power the EU has also managed to establish a

situation in which the rebel forces were capable of defeating the Gadaffi regime. Consequently, the initial power balance of Gadaffi versus the EU no longer exists. A new situation has been created in which the geopolitical discourse of the EU may hold more power than before. The conflict in Libya, as well as the post-conflict situation, share a significant relation with the Western military involvement: Their military and economic power. As Foucault argues, the type of strategy in play reveals the type of power between the EU and Libya. During the Gadaffi regime, there was little room to maneuver in terms of political changes. Economically however, a change in behavior of Gadaffi towards a more pro-Western stance has resulted in establishing common grounds for economic cooperation. Now that the Gadaffi regime has come to an end, the EU and Libya both have the potential to achieve the goals set out in the foreign policy of the EU and thus to establish common ground between both the economical and political domain.

5.6 How Held and Wolf understand the geopolitical behavior

The goal of this thesis is to explain the geopolitical behavior of the EU in Libya through the theoretical lenses of Held and Wolf. In order to do so, this thesis has provided the different types of geopolitical interests, the discourse as well as the actions and events that unfolded under Gadaffi's regime, during the conflict as well as contemporary Libya. This chapter has analyzed this information in order to formulate an understanding of this behavior by both Held and Wolf. This paragraph will provide both authors their understanding, based upon their theoretical views described in chapter two and the analysis in this chapter.

5.6.1 Wolf his understanding of the European geopolitical behavior

Looking at the policy documents of the EU, the foreign policy is designed, or at least articulated in a way, to not only serve the interests of the EU, but also that of the entire world community. Chris Patten said that in the future the EU would have to share its political and economic power with the two emerging Asian giants. As an economic globalist, this would mean that in order to maintain a competitive advantage over the upcoming Asian economies, the EU would have to improve their economic situation. From the EU perspective, this is perfectly rational. As Wolf argues as well, because of the increased economic interdependencies and the move towards a single world economy, events that unfold in other states have an increasing influence on the (supra-)nation's economy. This development is inevitable, and the only way as a state to stay ahead is to change their economic policies in a way that attracts foreign investors, i.e. to maintain a competitive advantage.

This would also mean that the EU will have to ensure a stable economy, which ensures long-term investors that their investments are solid and safe. Formulating a common foreign policy to establish a ring of well-governed states around the EU, would not only allow for more economic trade, the economic stability that the EU brings also attracts more investments to the region. For Wolf, instruments like the ENP and CFSP should be interpreted and used as tools for improving the economy of both the providing and recipient state. The EU should

promote their liberal economic values because it would benefit the world economy as a whole, specifically in the long run as Wolf argues. However, these liberal economic values only thrive in a situation where peace and democracy are established. As a result, the geopolitical behavior of the EU could be understood as promoting peace and stability in order to advance their core economic interests and maintain a competitive edge.

The geopolitical policies however seem to favor European interests more than those of a singular world economy due to protectionist measures such as the migration and energy policies. From Wolf his perspective, such behavior should be disregarded, as Libya as well as other nations that are integrated into the world economy should not be limited in their abilities to participate in said world economy and to pursue their own life goals. The EU should refrain from formulating such policies and focus on international cooperation on fields such as the environmental issues, counter-terrorism, health and international security. The Western involvement in the conflict has provided a momentum that allows for the Libyan economy to be integrated into the world economy and to establish a situation of democracy with its inherent values and principles that will improve the nation's economy as well as its international competitive advantage. If indeed the EU allows the Libyan people to pursue their own desires and to create a nation to their own liking, it will follow Wolf his line of argumentation that each nation should be entitled to learn from its own mistakes and create their own destiny through democratic and liberal economic participation.

If indeed the desire of the EU is to improve the economic, humanitarian and political situation of the world community, it will have to focus on the market economy and should only intervene if a state is incapable of doing so itself and focus on economic integration of every nation.

5.6.2 Held his understanding of the European geopolitical behavior

Due to globalization, the political space of each nation has increased. With the EU being one of the largest political collective spaces, it may come as no surprise that they develop and integrate programmes and treaties into their own political domain. The instruments of the EU such as the ENP and CSFP are the result of the EU in order to interact with overlapping communities and territories. Although Libya is no part of the European continent, Held states that the proper scope of organs such as the EU, as well as their jurisdiction has expanded. With this development, consequently, also comes responsibility.

Cooperation with Libya thus suits the argument of Held that political and economic cooperation on a multilateral level is the effect of increased globalization. As the political domain grows, so does the challenge of incorporating all the different interests and cultures. Problems that go beyond the borders of the nation states, such as migration, counter-terrorism, environment and energy thus have to be integrated into a cosmopolitan framework in order to ensure that every individual is entitled to the same rights and freedoms. Consequently, Held would view the geopolitical behavior of the EU as being part of the ever-

changing political community that tries to promote certain moral principles and institutionalize these throughout their respective instruments and internationals organs such as the UN. Just as Wolf argues, Held underpins the importance of liberal democracies to shape the international community. What the reality of the EU-Libyan narrative shows however, is what Held describes as the complex power relation between the dominant economic and political EU versus Libya. The cosmopolitan features such as establishing and maintaining liberal democracies become subject of a geopolitical agenda that is shaped through territorial interests, such as migration, private properties such as the FTA and insufficient attention to the fact that people have fewer opportunities than goods and services. This is why, as has been mentioned earlier in this chapter, Held believes that it should be the international community as a whole, rather than the EU that intervenes in Libya in order to reshape its political landscape.

Although the EU in its policy goals underpins the importance of cosmopolitan values such as respecting human rights and political freedom, their economic agenda makes the EU partial in their approach to Libya. To Held it is important that any international involvement should not negate the sovereignty of the recipient state, it should underpin it.

The recent events in Libya however, have shown a Europe that is willing to intervene based upon a set of cosmopolitan principles. This type of geopolitical behavior should form the basis of any intervention on a global scale. With a change of government a policy window arises where the EU can uphold these cosmopolitan principles and ensure the policies of such instruments as the ENP, CFSP are redefined within this cosmopolitan framework. This argument lies at the core of Held's understanding of the world society: One that collectively establishes and codifies a set of cosmopolitan principles that serves the claims and interests of the world community that determines the legitimacy and legality of any future geopolitical behavior.

Chapter 6: Conclusion and reflection

In this last chapter of the thesis, the overall conclusion of and reflection upon the main goal of this thesis will be provided. In addition, this chapter will reflect upon the process as well as the results, accompanied with a brief evaluation of the methodology and data. This thesis will end by offering suggestions for further research, suggestions that are derived from questions that arose during the writing of this thesis that could not be answered within the framework of this thesis.

6.1 What has been done

Before this thesis will end with an answer to the main research question, a brief contemplation about what has been done will be provided first. It is important to understand that it has been a conscious decision to have this thesis structured in the way it is presented. In order to guide the reader through the process of gaining a better understanding of the geopolitical behavior, this thesis has started with outlining the research case as well as the applied methodology. By showing how power plays a significant role in discourses, binary oppositions and geopolitical behavior, the reader is offered the concept that everything is connected. One cannot isolate the geopolitical behavior of the EU during the conflict, as the geopolitical relation between EU and Libya is part of a larger context. A context that, until recently, has been dominated by economic concerns such as energy supply and migration.

From a poststructuralist perspective it is not possible to offer a neutral perspective at the geopolitical relation. Instead, one must acknowledge the role he or she plays within the research and thus offer transparency. As has been described in chapter two, both Wolf and Held have their own agendas which have been shaped through their own sociopolitical stance and historical background. How this affects them and their concepts and ideas has been described, as well as why they consider it so important that their ideas about globalization should be regarded as the *presence*, as the true way to achieving democratic peace throughout the world. Both their theoretical notions have not only been useful to understand the geopolitical behavior of the EU and Libya, the geopolitical behavior itself has also been very helpful for understanding the authors' concepts and ideas. Although it may not be explicitly implied, both Held and Wolf acknowledge that there is an interconnectedness between economic and moral values. Much like the geopolitical discourse of the EU also acknowledge that economic interests are better served when moral interests are taken into account and vice versa.

What this thesis has shown, is how delicate geopolitics is, and how vague the divide between economic and moral interests actually is. It has shown how the EU serves core economic interests, whilst at the same time underpinning the importance of human rights principles. The geopolitical agenda however, prioritizes the advancement of economic cooperation, as if it predates more core moral values. However, when human rights are being violated on a large scale and for the whole world to see, the EU has taken its responsibility as a neighbor,

with keen geopolitical interests in Libya, to intervene. This thesis shows how relevant the debate between economic and moral interests and values has become, and how difficult it is to separate one from another. It has also shown how authors like Held and Wolf may agree upon the ineffectiveness of current significant issues such as migration and counter-terrorism, even though they both would offer different solutions to these problems. From this point of view, this thesis can be seen as a interesting contribution to a more global debate about the role the international community claims, pretends and ought to play.

6.2 Concluding the EU-Libyan narrative

This thesis has set out to answer a set of questions in order to help understand and explain the geopolitical behavior of the European Union in the case of Libya. Before answering the main question, a brief contemplation about the sub questions will be addressed.

The relation between the EU and Libya has changed significantly because of an increase in energy demands, influx of illegal immigrants and the desire of the EU to become a world player as well its desire to establish a ring of well-governed state around the EU. The relationship always has had a political background, which resulted in economic sanctions and embargos as well as the desire to cooperate with and influence the Libyan government. Until recently, the EU has focused on the common grounds between Libya and the EU, which are the economic interests of both nations. The rebel uprising however has also showed how the EU wishes to protect people from crimes against humanity and the willingness to intervene in order to ensure a successful revolution that increases the chances of allowing the political aspirations of the Libyan people to gain new common grounds between Libya and the EU on which to cooperate in the future.

The events that unfolded in Libya has shown both an economic and cosmopolitical commitment of the EU. Their geopolitical interests however, form the basis for the initial cooperation between Libya and the EU, focusing primarily on those issues that relate to the interests of the EU, namely energy supply and migration. Although the EU sets out to not only establish economic relations but also political commitments in order to establish moral values and political principles that are important to the EU, the main priority of the EU, as described in their policy documents has been to secure the core interests of the EU first. As a result, prior to the conflict the EU has stayed away from delicate topics such as state reform and focused primarily on the common grounds that are derived from economic interests.

Although Libya was far from a democratic state, the EU was willing to cooperate with Gadaffi up until the moment Gadaffi started to commit crimes against humanity on a large scale for all the international community to see. As a result, the EU considered it their responsibility to intervene. This intervention however did not lead to the end of violence, as heavy bombardments and support for the Rebel forces lead to even more bloodshed and the end of the Gadaffi regime. As a result, the responsibility to protect, signed by many countries in the

international community remains a debatable issue. Nonetheless, the rebel forces, together with the EU and the US, managed to put an end to a dictatorial regime and paved the way for a brighter, more open future, which allows for the creation of nation-state based upon the principles of a liberal democracy. If and how this will be achieved however, is up to the Libyan people, more specifically the efforts by the NTC.

Both Held and Wolf approach the geopolitical behavior of the EU as the result of the effects of globalization. The economic cooperation and the potential integration of the Libyan economy into the international community is highly favored by Wolf. The reality of the efforts by the EU however, is overshadowed by the way the EU tries to preserve its economic hegemony by enforcing border policies and focusing on securing the energy supplies. Wolf criticizes these types of policies, as they do not follow the line of argumentation that every single individual should be allowed to pursue a good life. Nonetheless, the efforts of the EU to improve its relations with Libya and to improve the economic situation in the region is a step in the right direction. Now that the regime has been overthrown, the Libyan people have the possibility to benefit from an open market to attract investors and to improve their economic competitiveness.

However, because it was more specifically the EU and not the international community as a whole that has protected the cosmopolitan principles, Held fears that in such cases core economic interests become intermingled with the types of intervention. In this case, as Held shows, the cosmopolitan legitimization of the intervention should not lead to the legitimization of Europe's foreign economic policies that do not lead to an international world order that provides every individual equal rights and entitlements. So how would both Held and Wolf explain the geographical behavior of the EU in Libya?

Wolf would state that the importance of economic globalization is underpinned by the influence that any economic system has to the political spectrum. As economies become intertwined, interdependencies are being created. By allowing every economy into the world economy, every single state is given the opportunity to, albeit slowly, transform into a liberal democracy, as it is the only successful way of benefiting from the liberal economic situation, as well as the only way to maintain a competitive advantage and to pursue welfare and happiness. Because both Libya and the EU have intermingled economic interests, there is a desire to cooperate. Now that a dictatorial regime has been removed, Libya has been granted the opportunity to establish an economic system that is supported by a liberal democracy. As a result, the geopolitical behavior of the EU should underpin a successful integration of the Libyan economy into the world economy and refrain from those policies that decrease the mobility of people, goods and services. In addition, the EU must participate in the international community only on those topics that cannot be resolved through economic cooperation.

Held would state that the importance of upholding and respecting cosmopolitan principles is showcased in the case of Libya. By allowing the Libyan people to have their own revolution

and by protecting the civilians from harm done by their government, the EU has committed itself to upholding the principles that every person should be saved from evildoers. The fact however that it was the EU and the US, and not the entire international community that played such a significant role in the outcome of the Libyan government, the cosmopolitan principles are at risk of being used to serve economic interests that increase tensions as well as prevent a specific group of people their entitlement for the pursuit of happiness and equal moral worth.

6.3 Reflection and evaluation

For this thesis, extensive research has been done in order to supply data that proved sufficient for answering the main and sub questions. Because the conflict was still ongoing during the time that the data was collected, there were some limitations to the availability of information as well as its validity. As a result, some sources could not be used. Regardless of the limitations, a sufficient amount of data could be found in news articles, policy documents and press releases, which offered this thesis with useful data that helped surface the discourse, strategies as well as the trends and developments within the EU and Libya, as well as between them.

The applied methodology of deconstruction and discourse analysis have been used to understand the acquired data as well as offer an answer to the main and sub questions. It is important to end with a contemplation of why the decision has been made to use discourse analysis and the notions of deconstruction as the premise for data collection and interpretation, as well as which difficulties this thesis has encountered as a result of this selection.

Using deconstruction as a starting point for this thesis has proven useful for showing how on the topic of globalization two key theoretical thinkers both offer argumentation why they offer the best desired outcome or presence. As a result, this thesis has been able to offer the reader with an answer how both Wolf and Held would argue that, in the case of the EU and Libya it is important to incorporate the fundamental principles of either economic liberalization or morality. In order to comprehend to which extend the EU and Libya are leaning towards both theoretical notions, the use of discourse analysis has been a very important contributor. Not only was the conflict still ongoing, there has also been a gap between the desired policy outcomes of the EU and Libya and the events that unfolded during the conflict. By using the methodology of discourse analysis, this thesis has been able to better understand how words and actions relate and how they should be interpreted through the eyes of both Wolf and Held. By doing so, this thesis has been able to not only surface the desired outcome described in policy documents and statements by political leaders, but also surface how more core beliefs and principles relate to those type of actions that conflict with these beliefs and principles. Nonetheless, there are some limitations to the used methodology.

One limitation comes from the key assumption of deconstruction that everything is textual. Defining the scope of research and isolating the data within this scope has been a daunting task because, in essence, everything applies and thus could prove relevant to the case. Although both Held and Wolf their argumentation offer several points of interests, which this thesis has been able to focus on, it remained difficult to determine when data is relevant and when it is not. More importantly, it has been a difficult task to respect and describe the context in which data presents itself. This is also the key reason why the decision has been made to structure this thesis in a chronological manner. By doing so, the events that unfolded in Libya as well as in the international community, with the EU in particular, and the political, military and societal reactions to these events have, in most cases, remained within its original context.

Another limitation is the fact that both Wolf and Held their argumentation are generalizations which are not directly applicable to a specific case. Although both Wolf and Held may argue that in any case their desired outcome should be the focus of actions and policy, there are many events which have not been described in detail by both authors and consequently require a very delicate approach. As a result, some findings and conclusions are generalizations which in turn limits the significance of both Held and Wolf their argument in some cases. Regardless of these limitations however, the use of discourse analysis have made it possible to better understand the behavior of the EU and Libya in a way that both Held and Wolf can argue why these types of actions are a result of their desired outcome or why certain actions are wrong because they do not follow their line of argumentation.

The limitations of the acquired data also offers an important notion for future research. Should a similar research be conducted, this thesis would then suggest giving more attention to the opinions of professionals, by conducting interviews and looking at blogs of renowned authors and diplomats. In addition, more attention to contemporary Libya could be offered. For this thesis, it has been decided to limit the data up until November of 2011. In the meantime, there have been several developments that would be interesting to look at, as well as to analyze in detail. Despite the limitations however, the data that has been found and used not only offered a very interesting look at the geopolitical discourse of the EU, it also showed the discrepancy between the desired and actual reality of the EU-Libyan policies.

However, because the focus of this thesis has been towards the relation between EU and Libya, using its conclusions for a more broader understanding of the geopolitical behavior of the EU should not be done without caution. What applies to Libya may not necessarily apply to other countries or policies. This limits the findings of this thesis to the EU and Libya alone, which means that in order to formulate an opinion or conclusion about the geopolitical behavior of the EU as a whole, a more concise and inclusive research will be required. Nonetheless, this thesis does offer key insights about the different point of views on how the EU should act on a global scale as well as which role it should play depending on which path of globalization the EU wishes to follow.

6.4 Suggestions for further research

The topic of research for this thesis could very well be applicable to similar situations in the world. Although this thesis has set out to answer a very specific set of questions that relate to the EU and Libya alone, certain questions arose which could prove to be interesting for further research. As a result, this paragraph describes a few suggestions for further research, as these questions could not have been answered within the scope of this research.

As has been mentioned in the theoretical framework of this thesis, there is an interesting aspect of multiple identities within the EU, being national, European or universal. The legitimacy of the actions of politicians and policies relate to the constituency they represent. To determine if and how legitimate the actions of the EU have been and will be, a detailed look into the development of the identity of the 'European' people could prove some interesting insights. Are these actions of the EU in Libya for instance the result of a change in the identity of the constituency from a national towards an European or Universal identity that may cause these types of interventions based upon morality to become (more) legitimate? Can one even speak of an European or Universal identity that reflects the moral beliefs and interests of the individual, or are they merely a social construct created to validate and legitimize actions that would conflict with national identity?

Now that the dictatorial regime in Libya has come to an end, the question arises of what is to become of Libya. Characterized by a strong geographical and ethnic divide, it will be difficult task for the Libyan people to come together and feel (equally) represented by a democratically elected government. More notable, with the expressed aspirations of NTC rebel leaders to establish a nation based upon Islamic principles, it would be an interesting topic of research to look if and to which extend democracy and its inherent principles will actually be established. More notable, with the moral claims of the EU, it would be interesting to look if and to which extend the EU tries to prevent any type of score-settling among the Libyan people, as well as how the EU will ensure there will be new rule of tyranny.

The situation in Syria, which shows many similarities to that of Libya in the early months of 2011 would also be an interesting case for further research. As in Libya, the Syrian leader had, and still is, ordering his military personnel to open fire on the Syrian demonstrators. Contrary to Libya however, no military intervention has yet been initiated. As the European leaders called it their moral obligation to help in Libya, one could wonder why no similar action has been undertaken in Syria as well. Drawing upon the findings in this thesis, such as research could offer an even more extensive understanding of the geopolitical behavior of the EU as well as the validity of their morality.

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Appendix 1: