



SCALING UP THE CITY

THE WAY TURKISH AND
(SURINAM-) HINDUSTAN
SELF-ORGANISATIONS EMBED
THE HAGUE IN AN ETHNIC NETWORK

BY RANESH BALLA

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ETHNIC NETWORK

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Den Haag

*'houses make a town,
but citizens make a city'*

- Rousseau

*'exclusion in one network,
means inclusion
in another network'*

Monder Ram -

PREFACE

It is a pleasure to present you my research: *Scaling up the city: the way Turkish and (Surinam-) Hindustan self-organisations embed The Hague in an ethnic network*. Reading this title you could take two positions. Is this a subject we (*the society*) should want to know or this is interesting! Speaking about ethnicities is always questionable. People are quickly biased and could have xenophobia sentiments towards the other. However, the opposite may also happen: getting to know what *ethnicity* means across the borders. *Ethnicity* can be served as a – very seriously taken – playground to explore connections, overlap and discrepancies between the applied, the creative and practical outcome on the one hand and the structured, analytical, thorough and theoretical approach of (social) sciences on the other hand. Both sides share a common space where *ethnicity* is an actor influenced into.

Inspired through my bachelor thesis (*Ethnic entrepreneurship in the Balti Triangle, Birmingham UK*) I elaborated on the transnational aspect of organised ethnic minorities. While the media and the current public discourse is negative among ethnic minorities – in particular when they are organised and celebrate their own cultural activities – it is a challenge to show the way this is benefitting for the majority. Ethnic entrepreneurs give a positive input regarding urban transformation, as shown for the case of Birmingham. Organised migrants have an interesting position in the field of transnationalism and have an outcome for cities.

With this research I hope to inspire everybody to get a positive perspective regarding migrant development. The master track *Globalisation, Migration and Development* at Radboud University Nijmegen gave me the opportunity to develop further in this field. Next to my basis – the bachelor Human Geography and Urban Planning at the University of Amsterdam – I am able to give an interesting perspective regarding the role of ethnic self-organisations in The Hague.

This thesis would never be made without the help of others. There are many people to whom I owe for their help. There are a few people who I would like to thank in particular. First I would like to thank my old colleagues at The Hague Municipality. They know a lot of what was happening in the city, helped me to give the first stones for this research and gave me the right direction to go on: Niermala Raghoobar and Latifa Bakrimi for the social aspects, Rob Gieb and Wim van Bogerijen for the methodological aspects. Last but definitely not the least from The Hague, I would like to thank my Hague colleagues/supervisors/roommates Rob Groeneweg and Ton van Gestel, with whom I drunk a lot of coffee. These gentlemen helped me with getting the right direction for my research, gave me feedback on particular issues, managed the necessary support and – also important – with whom I had relaxed hours in The Hague with refreshments.

I would like to thank the self-organisations which took the time to fill in my survey and especially them who agreed for an in-depth interview. Not to forget the self-organisations that also gave additional support, in order to help myself to develop further and make an interesting and inspiring research. Making time free in a full agenda for a short talk without getting something back is always the best sign that people would like to help you.

Other support was always available of my friends and family: living far away but supported me always when we visited each other.

I would like to thank my supervisor, Jackie van de Walle, who gave me support and was always available for helping with my thesis. Giving support and feedback on my research and helped – as you can expect of a good study advisor – on planning was definitely helpful.

Finally, there are two persons whom I will always take into memoir. The famous Hague Hindustan Tjandrika Rangoe, a respondent who gave a full history about and opened my view of the first generation (Surinam-)Hindustanis in The Hague. He died one month after taking a very useful interview. And someone who is my youth and has always a place in my heart, my grandfather, Roepchand Balla. Without him, I would have never learned speaking Sarnami, my mother tongue and therefore he has an important impact to this research. He died on the last day of my internship. *Aatma ko shanti mile.*

With their wisdom, motivational words and emotional support, they have helped me to bring this research to a successful final.

Happy reading and be inspired,

Ranesh Balla

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SUMMARY

Global cities are hosting a population originating from different parts of the world. Currently, the academic literature describes widely the concept of ethnic entrepreneurs. The debate related to this concept is disputable when speaking about integration and social mobility what develops the debate further to focus more on the social aspects of the migrant: the debate of migrant participation in the society.

This research focus more on the urban-sociological part of the debate; the way ethnic communities organise themselves and operate transnational. Putting the emphasize on *transnationalism* gives another understanding towards the global city and the ethnic world a city operates into. The city of The Hague is an interesting case to understand this relation. The Hague is embedded in diverse geographies like IGO's, law and diplomacy. However, the ethnic world where The Hague is embedded into is unacknowledged. Therefore shows this research a new understanding for being global due to the participation of an ethnic minority. The notion is that ethnic communities are organised in ethnic self-organisations and contributes to the being global of a city. This relates to the following main research question: *To what extent do ethnic self-organisations influence the global position of The Hague?*

The current Dutch society is under pressure: there are tensions between the mainstream society and citizens with a non-Dutch descendant. Citizens with a non-Dutch descendant do not feel themselves part of the society any more. People from different parts of the Netherlands are showing – mostly through social media – their aversion against *the other*. This brings up a division between citizens with and citizens without a Dutch descendant. Organised citizens with a non-Dutch descendant could be participate in an ethnic network. This understanding shows the existence of other – ethnic – worlds where a city is embedded into. This gives a new understanding towards the concept of a *global city*.

The concept of *global city* is derived from Friedman (1986), Sassen (2001) and Taylor (2001). The acknowledgement rests in what network a city is embedded. The current discourse is related mainly towards advanced producer services production node and economic giants. Migrants are seen as part of the low-wage occupations in manufacturing industries. However, migrants can also participate in higher sectors whereby they are using their access in the ethnic world. The relation between ethnic communities and their ethnic world – in broader terms called *transnationalism* – is not well developed in relation to urban governance, in particular the influences of this ethnic world in the local city governance.

This research is situated in-between the humanist and post-structuralism approach and has an after post-colonial perspective whereby the emphasis is on the role of ethnic self-organisations. These ethnic

self-organisations are seen as an actor for the city of The Hague: an actor in the city that is part of an ethnic network whereby the relations are fluid and not always clear. To understand ethnic self-organisations in The Hague a first analysis has been made in the subsidy register 2015 of The Hague Municipality. This provided 172 ethnic self-organisations. To discover the ethnic communities in The Hague, a GIS-analysis has been used to show where and to what extent citizens are populated together in The Hague. To understand the transnationalism actor for The Hague, with 12 (Surinam-) Hindustan self-organisations an in-depth interview has been taken.

This analysis has shown several important features for The Hague. Next to the 'known' geographies of The Hague like IGO's, law and diplomacy, The Hague is embedded in ethnic worlds like the Turkish and the (Surinam-) Hindustan. These ethnic communities are mainly located in one particular part: the South-East of The Hague. The ethnic self-organisations are participating for Hague citizens what offers them a position in the urban governance. The other actors in the urban governance are the local government (The Hague Municipality); the non-government (e.g. fundings) and the citizens. These actors have different perspectives among each other what results in an urban conflict. The question arises who or what the director is of The Hague. This urban conflict becomes more complex when taking the ethnic self-organisations more comprehensive – the foreign influxes – in the urban governance.

Two ethnic worlds has been described more widely. The Turkish and the (Surinam-) Hindustan self-organisations show two different perspectives of an ethnic world and the position of a city into. The Turkish self-organisations are mostly part of a larger movement. The variety of these organisations is based on their aim and the influence they have in and receive from Turkey. Various political tensions have led to a shift of these organisations towards West-Europe, whereby Germany focus as a main hub. These organisations have a local department what controls on local level in the view of the mother organisation. The example of the Alevi community shows how transnational they are structured. Therefore this ethnic world is top-down structured, in contrary to the (Surinam-) Hindustan self-organisations what is more bottom up orientated. The (Surinam-) Hindustan community is working to upscale their own culture. There is a process visible of losing the traditional ties and function more towards being part of the global Indian diaspora with regard to the *ethnification* as part of the Indian diaspora. The (Surinam-) Hindustan community is not primary related to Surinam, but is seeing itself as part of the larger global Hindustan(/Desi) community. Through the diverse type of organisations there are various variables what makes them global, like for the online self-organisations the migratory: the departure in the 19th and 20th century from India towards countries like South-Africa, Mauritius, Fiji and Surinam.

These findings and results show the importance the way migrants – with ethnicity as allocation – are organised by themselves and what position these ethnic self-organisations have in the city (governance). These ethnic self-organisations could be helpful to embed a city in an ethnic network: part of the Turkish network or participate in the Hindustan world. These ethnic global communities have their influence in the city governance through the ethnic self-organisations. Therefore ethnic self-organisations are helpful to embed the city of The Hague in these ethnic networks. There are social and organisational linkages with communities in other cities around the world. It would be wise to see the transnationalism character of the ethnic self-organisations and the communities as a new actor in the world system concept. Ethnic self-organisations are through their structure influencing the global city, on various ways as the Turkish and the (Surinam-) Hindustan self-organisation showed. This approach opens up an old concept – the global/world city – and takes the perspective of ethnicities into account.

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1. INTRODUCTION

The literature embodies widely the concept of ethnic entrepreneurs (e.g. Bonacich, 1993; Volery, 2007; Zhou, 2004). The way migrants experience the challenges in the place of destination make them often forced to start a business. In most cases, these businesses are low-skilled, informal and short-term (Volery, 2007). These ethnic bussinesses are opportunities for policy makers to sell their neighbourhoods as places of leisure and consumption (Aytar and Rath, 2012). The way ethnic entrepreneurs act is crucial in this case for neighbourhood development and the upward social mobility of the new generation. Ram and Jones (2008) call into question the second generation and note that the upward mobility is not that obvious as it sounds. This opens the debate to focus more on the social aspects of the migrant, the way migrants participate in the society.

In the Netherlands, the national government requires local government to put the emphasise more on citizen participation. Bottom-up development has received more attention due to savings of the national government. The local government gets the challenge to participate on local settings. According to De Gier (2007), the welfare state as known in the Netherlands since the 80s is under pressure. The welfare state has to, with a special place for citizen participation, result in better social services. Citizens in global cities are originating from different places of the world, with their own history, own movements, their own culture. These citizens feel themselves frequently marginalised through the mainstream society (Castles, 2010). Seeing these people as part of the city's population, requires the acknowledgement of diversity and their *ethnic social capital* within the main society. Migrants – as well the new generation, as well the older generation – are offering another perspective for the way of living, but also another perspective for the future in the place of destination.

Through the history, migrants are always known as a group of people who organise themself after arriving and setteling in the city (Parker, 2007). The mainstream society does not fullfill in the demand of the migrants, due to some cultural background. The missing gap can be remedied through some keypersons in the migrant society who are working in the field of self-organisation. They are like a contactperson who helps the marginalised migrants into the main society. The way they accomplish an ethnic self-organisation and satisfy the demand of migrants shows interesting feature for the city, but also offers some challenges, like for the *urban governance*. It seems like self-organisation could be a response. Therefore it would be wise the government should facilitate this proces and acknowledge the function of self-organisations.

The role of self-organisation in policy making offers some interesting space for research, in particular the ethnic self-organisations. Ethnic self-organisations are participating on the demand of a marginalised group of people in the society like ethnic minorities. This could be new migrants, but also migrants who already live some years in the society (Da Graça, 2010; Castles, 2010). On the other hand, it is likely that these ethnic self-organisations do have ties or relations with other ethnic self-organisations over the world. This recognition requires that self-organisations are important players in the urban governance and facilitate the proces of globalisation through their transnational ties for cities hosting high amount of ethnic groups.

There are three cities characterised with their high amount of ethnic groups, what makes them the largest ethnic cities in the Netherlands: The Hague with 45,1%; Amsterdam with 42,3% and Rotterdam with 38,5% of the population is a migrant¹ among 21,7% nationwide (CBS, 2015²). Government policies for The Hague are focused in the international relations on the higher classes, like the international institutions. The recognition of The Hague as a global city rests on this top down perspective (Holland.com, n.d.). However, the recognition of the lower classes (e.g. the migrants) who are able to sustain social transnational ties what makes The Hague *global* from another perspective, is not licensed. Local government policy was even against talking explicitly about ethnicities during the previous tenure (Gemeente Den Haag, 2010; 2014). Taking these ethnic self-organisations into account, the globalisation of The Hague is an interesting case. It suggests that The Hague is included in the global network due to the (transnational) orientation of the ethnic minorities.

1.1: RESEARCH QUESTIONS

As already suggested, migrants play an important role in the bottom-up development of cities to become more global. From all regions of the world migrants are opening stores and restaurants in many more neighbourhoods and they also start to organise themselves (Navitas, 2013). This 'self-organising' is gaining popularity in the literature but is in relation to the global city concept still undeveloped. However, there could be stated that migrants influence the global position of The Hague through their transnational network. This development can be positive as well negative. Being embedded into an ethnic network means opportunities for the development of ethnic neighbourhoods (Aytar and Rath, 2012) but means also *getting* or *being influenced* through external actors where the local government cannot succeed in controlling it. For city development, the cross-border activities of migrants who

¹ The Dutch government defines this as *allochtoon*. The word *migrant* used in this research will refer to people who are not born in the Netherlands, or one of the parents is not born in the Netherlands (CBS, 2016; Unesco, 2016).

² The largest municipal is Vaals (Limburg) with 51,1%. However, this border city contains a small population (± 3000 citizens) what indicates other reasons are more likely for the explanation of the high non-Dutch population instead the concept of *global city*.

participate in several ethnic self-organisations, the position into a geography can be enhanced. This is an important development for the city and at the same time a challenge for the city governance³. In this thesis, the following questions will be addressed:

1. To what extent is The Hague a global city?

The concept of a global city is widely described in academic literature. What position could The Hague take in these studies?

2. To what extent are ethnic self-organisations represented in neighbourhoods?

The city is formed by their neighbourhoods. Therefore the unit of analyses will rely on a neighbourhood level when looking to the ethnic self-organisations.

3. In what order can the ethnic self-organisation be linked to the global city?

The interest relies on what drives ethnic self-organisations as a force towards the global network where the city relies on.

4. How could ethnic self-organisation be seen as an effective way in the urban governance?

In order to create an effective way of urban governance, what position could ethnic self-organisations take?

These subquestions will bring to the following main research question:

To what extent do ethnic self-organisations influence the global position of The Hague?

Ethnic self-organisations could take an important role in the increasement of the global position of a city. These research questions are helpful in order to get more indepth insights of the meaning of ethnic self-organisations and their influence into a global city.

This research relies on the intersect of the humanist and post-structuralism approach what will open a new view regarding the experience and meaning from the side of the self-organisations as an actor for the (global) city. Going beyond the interrelation and the contested fluid structure of the self-organisations for the city, there seems a shifting power balance towards the ethnic minorities and their self-organisational structure. This entails an after post-colonialism perspective. This (new) perspective will be the main approach reading this thesis (see for full explanation section 3.2).

³ This research makes a distinction between urban governance and city governance. Urban relates to the urban area, usually in the academic context. City governance is limited to the borders of The Hague Municipality: therefore not including the suburbs like Rijswijk of Wassenaar.

1.2: SOCIETAL RELEVANCE

The current Dutch society is challenged by the refugee crises, terrorism and Islamophobia. People from different parts of the Netherlands are showing – mostly through social media – their aversion against *the other*. There is a large minority with a non-Dutch descendant that does not feel themselves part of the society any more. This makes it for people with a non-Dutch descendant harder to participate into the society. It is more likely they join a self-organisation of their own group instead they join a general organisation (Da Graça, 2010).

There are organisations of all origin. This research will show the ties for all ethnic self-organisations participating in The Hague. It will zoom into two cases: the Turkish self-organisations and the (Surinam-) Hindustan self-organisations. These two cases are different in the sense that the Turkish are influenced from above while the (Surinam-) Hindustan are global developed from bottom-up. The emphasis on transnational Turkish networks for the city of The Hague will be helpful to understand the diverse Turkish community, and how it is influenced from above. On the other hand, with showing the (Surinam-) Hindustan self-organisations, this thesis will give a perspective of a transnational network established from bottom-up. In comparison with the Turkish self-organisations, the (Surinam-) Hindustan organisations and community are quite invisible in the academic literature and media. The (Surinam-) Hindustan community is in the literature, the media and in the statistics visible by the alias of Surinam community but is ethnically and culturally different than the (Surinam-) Creole, (Surinam-) Javanese and so on. In The Hague, the (Surinam-) Hindustan community is the largest of all other Surinam communities (Oudhof *et al.*, 2011). Therefore is this research helpful to understand global ethnic communities: the relation between ethnic minorities and their ethnic world – in broader terms called *transnationalism* – is not well developed in relation to urban governance. For the local city governance this means taking the broader perspective into account; the influences from abroad. Urban planners can adjust policies that matches better with the preferences of the ethnic communities.

This research has been focused on The Hague. While cities in the Netherlands are not of that size like New York, Tokyo or London (Sassen, 2001), the relative big city that could be compared with is The Hague. The Hague has an importance on the high level as well on the lower level of the Dutch society. It is the political capital of the Netherlands and is hosting a large amount of migrants. This research focus on the second importance: the lower (migrant) level and relate it more towards the importance of ethnic self-organisations. Therefore this research will give the municipality of The Hague new insights in how they can see and/or make their city more a 'global city' from below. While the Turkish community is not of that large scale in comparison with Rotterdam and Amsterdam, the (Surinam-) Hindustan community is in The Hague the largest in the Netherlands (Oudhof *et al.*, 2011). This contradiction

makes The Hague an interesting case and helps to understand the Hague society; in particular the transnational part.

1.3: SCIENTIFIC RELEVANCE

The literature embodies widely the concept of global city. This research will redevelop the concept of global city and gives an understanding of transnationalism in the city, emphasising the notion of bottom up development through migrant activities and adding another perspective regarding migrant communities.

The concept of *global city* is derived from Friedman (1986), Sassen (2001) and Taylor (2001) whereby the acknowledgement rests in what network a city is embedded. In this concept, the actors for this network is related mainly towards advanced producer services production node and economic giants. Migrants are seen as part of the low-wage occupations in manufacturing industries. This research assumes the way migrants are active in higher sectors whereby they are using their access in the ethnic network. If migrants are organised and participate in the society, there seems a relation between the ethnic network and local ethnic communities. This notion can be elaborated in the concept of global city whereby cities can be understood as global from an ethnic perspective. This gives a new dimension towards the global city as known by Friedman (1986), Sassen (2001) and Taylor (2001).

The Turkish self-organisations and the (Surinam-)Hindustan self-organisations will be described more indepth. In particular the (Surinam-)Hindustan self-organisations will offer a new perspective of a local community what has become part of a global community. This will give new insights of local ethnic self-organisations that are embedding a city in an ethnic network through the local community and elaborates on the transnational debate in relation to global cities.

While most literature about ethnic minorities is based on a economic perspective – the ethnic economy (e.g. Flap *et al.*, 2000; Henry *et al.*, 2002; Porter, 2000) – or on a local urban perspective – integration into the mainstream society (e.g. Da Graça, 2010; Musterd, 2008) – this research is based on a (global) socio-urban perspective: the concept of organised ethnic communities through ethnic self-organisation in relation to the global city whereby the ethnic self-organisations are an important actor in the accomplishment of making the city more global. The global scale will show the ethnic network and their consequences on the local level; the local city government. This gives another perspective to organised ethnic minorities and will put the role of ethnic self-organisation in the academic debate of urban development.

This research will be examined in The Hague. As one of the largest cities of the Netherlands with a high level of migrants, The Hague shows a development whereby ethnic self-organisations are participating

on global level. As already stated, this participation is not always recognised. The Hague is important for the Netherlands from a political perspective but has a lower importance on economic perspective. Related to the understanding for global cities and its post-colonialism structure (see Lees, 2012), this research will show the importance of ethnic self-organisations in the migrant neighbourhoods of The Hague as part of a global network. As Schmal (1995; see section 4.3: The Hague: the arrival city for migrants) states, The Hague has always been divided into 'a rich and a poor' part. The 'poor' part can be seen as the arrival place of migrants what suggests that the ethnic communities are well developed in these neighbourhoods. That makes The Hague a representative case.

1.4: RESEARCH RATIONALE AND THESIS OUTLINE

This thesis emerged from academic literature and new data. As explained in the previous parts, the research will show the importance of ethnic self-organisations for the city of The Hague. The available scientific knowledge on these matters is developed but only on particular subjects. The aim of this thesis is to draw a clear link between ethnic self-organisations and the global city: how ethnic self-organisations influence the global city. In most literature the (ethnic) self-organisations are not taken into the concept of a global city. This thesis will show that there is part for the self-organisations into the concept of a global city. In other words, how self-organisations could make the city more global.

The next chapter will summarise the main issues and academic concepts regarding global cities and the role of migrants. It will discuss the academic debate of migrant participation in a city and this meaning for the world system. The third chapter is an overview of the used data and the methods applied for the data analysis of this research. The fourth chapter goes more in-depth to the City of The Hague, in what geographies The Hague rely and the meaning of the ethnic self-organisations for The Hague. This chapter will answer sub-question one, two and four. The following up chapter will go more beyond the ethnic self-organisations, in particular the Turkish and the (Surinam-) Hindustan self-organisations. This chapter will answer sub-question three whereby the transnational character will be shown. The sixth chapter is the conclusion where everything comes together and the research questions will be answered. The references are in the end.

2. THEORY: THE ETHNIC SELF-ORGANISATION IN THE GLOBAL CITY

2.1: INTRODUCTION

In the field of urban studies, Manuel Castell (1972) and David Harvey (1973) link the processes of city forming into the larger historical movement of industrial capitalism. Henceforth, the borders of the city are no longer limited. Nation-states become afraid to lose their distinction. Nation-state should therefore be different among other states. As Burgers and Van der Waal (2008) explain,

'that is why advanced nation-states in their spatial and urban policies currently focus on their strong, vital and prosperous cities and city regions, and make them as 'global' as possible, instead of compensating economically peripheral and relatively backward cities and regions...' (Burgers and Van der Waal, 2008: 79; based on Sassen, 2001).

The literature embodies widely the concept of global cities varied from the different meaning of a global city, position in the global world and their socio-spatial outcome (Burgers and Van der Waal, 2008; Friedmann, 1986; Sassen, 2001; Taylor, 2001). This socio-spatial outcome suggests a different understanding and is for policy makers a challenge: to handle on one side the influence of globalisation and to enjoy the benefits of globalisation on other side. Various academics (summarised in Pamuk, 2004) indicate the challenge of the attractive factor for migrants: what conditions in a global city makes it attractive for migrants? Within the process of globalisation, Winders (2014) highlights the New Immigrant Destinations (NIDs) and the importance for policy makers. In a research of Chinese labour migrants in their new destination Israel, Li (2012) shows that not the demographic threshold or a comparison with other destinations in the Middel East are pull factors, but the reason that Chinese immigrants had not gone to Israel in the history was the attractive force to go to Israel. This new development show the existence of new destinations for migrants what requires at the same new services adapted for the specific migrant group in the place of destination.

After arriving in the place of destination, Volery (2007) states that migrants are often forced into entrepreneurship. The challenges they face in the place of destination are often quite high to find an appropriate job due to difference in skill level (Chiswick and Miller, 2009). Nevertheless, these migrants remain good ties with the place of origin, what offers space to work on transnational entrepreneurship (Portes *et al.* 1999; Schiller *et al.*, 1992; Vertovec, 1999). The diaspora networks that are obtained from this entrepreneurial network are an outcome of transnationalism. The system of ties, interactions, exchange and mobility function is being spread throughout the world. This system has intensified through the advanced technology development.

Regarding the trajectory, Lie (1995) and Schapendonk (2012) argue that migrants do not go directly from their homelands to the place of destination; rather the sojourn is neither unidirectional nor final. Migrants are following on multifarious trajectories and on this way they sustain a variety of networks. These networks are suggesting another way of globalisation. Instead the networks that are established in the colonialism period, this after post-colonialism period is suggesting other network and new ties through diaspora networks.

In addition, Tölöyan (1996) highlights the importance of a diaspora in community building. According to her, diasporas embody a variety of historical and contemporary conditions, characteristics, trajectories and experiences that identified a meaning to a diaspora. This diaspora network rests on various countries. Within the border of the global city, the migrants are identified more as a group, as a migrant group or ethnic group. This group identification elaborates towards self-organisation. When a migrant has been succeeding in their primary requirements and has a workable livelihood, the next step is to search social contact (see also pyramid of Maslow, 1943). This social contact happens most likely with people of the own origin or common background (migratory). The outcome is frequently ethnic self-organisation with the transnational ties that are the same in the case of ethnic entrepreneurship. The structure of ethnic self-organisations gives a new dimension to the global city.

This theoretical chapter will spread out the academic debate of how a global city is defined and the way a global city is seen. The emphasise will be on the migrant communities and the way they influence the global city. The first part describes the phenomenon of a global city, starting with the key thinkers Friedman, Sassen and Taylor. The second part will stress the feature of migrants into this debate and the way they influence the concept of global city. Subsequently the debate of ethnic self-organisation will be put in the concept of global city.

2.2: THE GLOBAL CITY


There are various actors that make a city a *global* or a *world* city, depending on the conceptualisation of the ranking (Friedman, 1986; Sassen, 2001; Taylor, 2001). John Friedman introduced the concept of world cities in 1986 with adding the world economy approach, whereby he states that cities will become more integrated in the world economy what will lead to structural changes in the spatial division of labour. His approach sharpened insights into processes of urban change but also offered a spatial perspective of an economy which seems decreasing the national borders. Friedman links hereby the urbanisation processes into global economic forces, putting the emphasis on the new international division of labour leading to structural changes: '*the contradictory relations between production in the era of global management and the political determination of territorial interests*' (1986: 69). This will result into some key cities what are used as 'basing points' in the spatial organisation and articulation

of production and markets resulting into a complex spatial hierarchy. According to Friedman (1986: 73) these basing points are driven mainly by a small number of rapidly expanding sectors like corporate headquarters, international finance, global transport and communications and high level business services like advertising, accounting. This will result into concentrations and places of accumulation of international capital, what will attract domestic as well international migrants resulting in spatial and class polarisation. Friedman distinguishes a spatial polarisation on three main scales. The first is between countries (global); the second is regional (within a country) and the third one is metropolitan, in the city area. The class polarisation happen on three principal faces: huge income gaps, large-scale immigration and structural trends in the evolution of jobs. This spatial and class polarisation stating by Friedman (1986) is summarized in figure 1. It shows the polarisation reflecting in the world city. The world city is attracting migrants and exodus high wage manufacturing and routine information to low-wage areas. The role of migrants in this outflow is mainly as supplement of the management elites and upper classes. With his thesis, Friedman suggests that there is no space of the high level migrants and does not acknowledge the role regarding the migrant capabilities within the field of transnationalism. This perspective of transnationalism will be explained later.

Sassen elaborates on the concept of Friedman (1986) and introduced the concept of a *global city* in 2001; a higher level than the world city. She points out how several cities has been undergone parallel economic and social changes leading to a few capital cities in the concept of a world city: the *global city*. She argues that these cities now function in four new ways: highly concentrated command points in the organisation of the world economy; key locations for finance and specialised service firms as leading economic sectors; production and innovation and markets for the products (Sassen, 2001: 3). As Sassen focus on the city on the one hand, she focus on the global urban system on the other hand. Sassen states that the global city – whereby only London, Tokyo and New York can be seen as a global city – constitutes in a system. In this system, these cities do no compete with each other on the same business but these cities relate to each other and to the global market whereby the underlying notion are cross border financial networks (Sassen, 2001). Sassen explain the de-nationalisation as following:

‘the insertion of the global in an overwhelmingly nationalised institutional world engenders a partial unbundling of that national order. It is partial because the geography of economic globalisation is strategic; it is not diffuse nor is it an all-encompassing condition. Further, it is partial in the sense that national space was probably never a unitary condition, even though institutionally constructed as such. One way of conceptualising this insertion of the global in the national is as a partial and incipient “de-nationalisation”’ (Sassen, 1996; cited in Sassen, 2002: 18).

Figure 1: World city restructuring in core countries.



Source: Friedman, 1986: 78.

This de-nationalisation of the city has been stressed by recent scholars in relation to specific neighbourhoods. Beauregard (2015) explains the meaning of *obduracy* from a planning perspective, arguing that specific elements could intertwine from one network to another network. When something is not included in one network, it is included in another network depending on the perspective that is taken into account. The understanding of Beauregard in relation towards city networks emphasises the bottom up forces relating towards an embedding in a larger network. This approach has been confirmed by Uitermark. Uitermark (2015) adds, the relations in these networks are disproportionally formed around a professional setting and there are only few linkages among segregated groups. These linkages are weak and could easily be destroyed and not that strong as the linkages towards the global city suggested by Sassen (2001). However, these linkages are informal build and could become stronger. This aspect has opened a new debate of seeing the city from the perspective of marginalised groups.

2.2.1: GLOBAL CITY FROM ABOVE

In an article of *The Economist* (2013), Schumpeter revisited the concept of global cities of Sassen by arguing the (more than) doubling of headquarters in cities like Sao Paulo, Beijing and Istanbul claiming that the division between global city and world city is not that strict as suggested: there could be another understanding towards the distinction of global city and world city (*The Economist*, 2013). The core of this perspective is in agreement with the shifting ranking system of world cities of Taylor. Taylor (2001) states that world cities are deemed into an urban system or network. He highlights the importance of traditional facets like the advanced producer service firms through cities forming the prime actors in the world city network formation. Therefore there could be made a statically hierarchical level of cities, showing the level of *global* a certain city has. Taylor include several actors in the *Globalization and World Cities Research Network* (GaWC), an index for cities and highlights the importance of connectivities, what can be computed from the city-firm data on the basis where the service firms in a city have offices elsewhere in the world (Van Dijk, 2008: 2). Taylor (2001) shows here the varied importance of cities: there are cities with importance for financial flows like Frankfurt and Dublin while Scandinavian cities are more important in media connectivity. Taylor's argument relies in agreement with Friedman and Sassen whereby his main emphasis rely on the financial flows and to what extent they are connected in the global world and he adds other actors like media organisations and their position in the global world.

The top-down perspective of a global city can be summarised in the following five categories of actors (elaborated from Renn, 2012):

1. advanced producer services production node: e.g. clustering (see Porter, 2000);
2. economic giants: how big cities are, what services are there (e.g. central place theory, (Christaller, 1933; cited in Haggett, 1965));
3. international gateway: flows of people and goods (measure availability airport);
4. political hub: political institutions and political agreements;
5. cultural hub: place of art and the creative class (Florida, 2014).

These categories are elaborated from the key scholars like Friedmann, Sassen and Taylor. However they do not give attention to the importance of the transnational ethnic linkages. This last actor has an importance related to the migrant⁴ development that could have an important attribution for the concept of global city. This will be elaborated in the following sections.

⁴ Defined by Unesco (2016): "any person who lives temporarily or permanently in a country where he or she was not born, and has acquired some significant social ties to this country."

2.2.2: GLOBAL CITY VIEW FROM BOTTOM UP

Sassen (2001) puts the emphasis with the de-nationalisation on the functional and institutional realm. This set of institutions has locational patterns but is also reflecting and claiming their space in the world network. Within this understanding, the spatiality of economic globalisation only happens in terms of hypermobility and space/time compression is not sufficient. According to Sassen, there are concentrations of very material and not so mobile facilities and the necessary infrastructure and need to be managed – and serviced – through place-bound labour markets, as well the high educated and low-wage workers. Within this facet, Sassen puts the stress on PS/CS in figure 1. Sassen stress hereby the importance of a physical place in the dominant account of globalisation, information economy and telematics. However these accounts privilege the capability for global transmission and includes information outputs over the working producing outputs, *'it allows to examine the possibility of a new politics of traditionally disadvantaged actors operating in this new transnational economic geography'* according to Sassen (2002: 20). Sassen claims that these politics rest between the intersection of economic participation in the global economy and on the other side on the disadvantaged, specifically those who do 'the other jobs', like factory workers in export processing zones or city cleaners. The benefit all those workers do have is the centrality of *place* in the global network. This locality offers an infrastructure in the transnational economy and gives political possibilities towards the formation of new claims in the constitution of entitlements like their right to place and citizenship.

Sassen states that global capital and the new immigrant workforce are two major concepts that meet each other inside the global city. They have unifying properties and need to find themselves in contestation. However, Sassen also agree with the statement of Friedman of class polarisation and the lower level where migrants are participating on. The emphasis on migrant development for the meaning of the global city shows another perspective. Sassen indicates the urban politics what reflect into the global city. Her point offers challenges into the meaning towards a global city or world city. However, Friedman (1986), Sassen (2001, 2002) and Taylor (2001) do not look to the participation of migrants for the city. The way urban politics is happening into the global city give another dimension towards the understanding of the global city. There is on the one hand an enhanced role for local states in economic development while on the other hand there exist a kind of transnational linkages among the authoritative power. This new kind of transnational linkages with an authoritative power could be established through migrant development (Jessop, 1997). The next section will elaborate on the relation between global city and migration. Afterwards, the discussion will go further from the perspective of urban governance.

2.3: GLOBAL CITY – MIGRATION: CROSS-BORDER ACTIVITIES

Regarding the meaning for global cities such as New York in the perspective of massive influx of immigrant labour, responding towards the increasement of low-wage assembly jobs in new high-technology industries, Sassen (1988) charted the parrallel growth and restructuring of the production and service functions. These production and service functions are mainly based where migrants serve for the high wage services. This point of understanding is also the starting point of the thesis of Hu (2015). Indicating a global city-migration nexus, Hu focused on the case of Sydney, Australia. In a broader perspective, he states that *'the global city-migration framework focuses on the interrelationships between global services and migration within individual global cities, which are the strategic nodes of the global network'* (p. 40). He links three indexes, the global competitiveness index (GCI), global migration index (GMI), and global mobility index (GloMo) to statistically understand the relation between a global city and migration. According to Hu, the rise of a global city has been accompanied by multiple and profound changes in its migration patterns. Towards the foreign born population - their attendance - was none significant statistical evidence, while the relation between mobility and the global city was more significant (Hu, 2015). This suggest that the amount of foreign born population in a city does not have a significant influence on the city, but their activities and participation are more important on the city development. Hu's understanding for the position of a city includes the global activities of organisations of low-level migrants but stress the perspective of the more skilled and second generation migrants who are participating in the politics of the global city (Hu and McClure, 2014). Findlay *et al.* (1996) explore the in-between way and looked to the role of skilled migrants and their key mechanism to enhance the global control capability offered by world cities. The relationship between global city and migration is on the one hand based on low-skilled migrants serving the higher skilled as already stated. On the other hand, firms are locating in global cities due to the availability of high skilled employees. These high skilled employees are already established in the global city due to the amount of high educated institutions, but it is also likely that skilled migrants will migrate towards the global city in order to get a suitable job. In this perspective, Findlay *et al.* (1996) state that skilled international migration is contributing more to the production of the global city then unskilled migrants.

As Friedman (1986) and Sassen (2001; 2002) are stating that the new international division of labour helps to understand why companies need to transfer managerial and technical skills around the globe, Findlay *et al.* (1996) states *'that skilled migrant pools may be produced, not merely by the operation of the internal labour markets of transnational corporations but by the functions of world cities within an increasingly global labour market'* (p. 50). This perspective goes more beyond putting not the corporations central but the functions of the city in global network central.

The transnational workforce dimension is developed in the literature as *transnationalism* with a top down view as well as a bottom up view (Portes, 2003; Portes *et al.*, 1999; Schiller *et al.*, 1992; Vertovec, 1999). Gowricharan (2009) points out that the concept of *transnationalism* lacks a good definition but the social phenomenon is clear. Within the varied explanations of transnationalism, the terms *transnational networks* and *cross-border activities* are central. Portes (2003) summarises a few statements regarding transnationalism. He states that – regarding transnationalism – the perspective of migration and city development is not new, but the lens and recognition of this transnational life is upcoming in the debate of migration and therefore also in city development. There are typologies that referred to transnationalism ‘from above’ and ‘from below’, whereby the first referred to the activities of governments and multinational corporations. On the other side, there are grassroots non-governmental associations and activists for human rights e.g., which have contributed to proliferating cross-border networks. The types of network are different and not always transnational. Transnationalism regarding migrants from the bottom up view stresses the increased scale and complexity of enhanced migration flows between the place of origin and the place of destination and gives a new meaning for the city: the linkage of the city with the global network will increase when migrants organise themselves and participate across borders according to the transnationalism perspective. However, it should be noted that migrants are not always operating transnational.

Waldinger (2010) is critical towards the perspective of transnationalism. According to Waldinger connectivity is between the sending country and the receiving country a normal relation of international migration. Not everyone can easily go from one location to the other with equal ease; keeping the same ties and use the same advantages everywhere, what transnationalism suggest. Portes (2003) stresses therefore the differences of cross border activities on different levels (international, multinational and transnational) and by different areas (political, economic and socio-cultural). This perspective is shown in figure 2. Regarding the economic area the recent literature is expanding with a focus on ethnic transnationalism entrepreneurship (e.g. Portes and Yiu, 2013; Ram *et al.* 2002). Within ethnic entrepreneurship one of the resources of their strategies is the social network (Volery, 2007). This social network suggests the socio-cultural ties that ethnic entrepreneurs use. Within the studies of Ram *et al.* (2002) and more recently Portes and Yiu (2013), it confirms the *economic b section* in *transnational activities* (see figure 2). The low scale level of the entrepreneurial size – whereby there is a relation between the place of origin and destination – make them transnational. They use the old linkages due lack of knowledge or availability of new linkages. In agreement with Portes (2003), the multinational level is more for global corporations. Therefore the size of the business is important in ethnic entrepreneurship: most businesses are of small or medium size (Volery, 2007).

Figure 2: Cross-border activities by different types of actors.

Activities	Areas		
	Political	Economic	Socio-cultural
International	Establishment of embassies and organization of diplomatic missions abroad by national governments	Export drives by farming, ranch, and fishing organizations from a particular country	Travel and exchange programs organized by universities based on a specific country
Multinational	United Nations and other international agencies charged with monitoring and improving specialized areas of global life	Production and marketing activities of global corporations with profits dependent on multiple national markets	Schools and missions sponsored by the Catholic Church and other global religions in multiple countries
Transnational	a) Non-governmental associations established to monitor human rights globally b) Hometown civic associations established by immigrants to improve their sending communities	a) Boycotts organized by grassroots activists in First World countries to compel multinationals to improve their Third World labor practices b) Enterprises established by immigrants to export/import goods to and from their home countries	a) Grassroots charities promoting the protection and care of children in poorer nations b) Election of beauty queens and selection of performing groups in immigrant communities to take part in annual hometown festivals

Source: Portes, 2003: 877.

Portes (2003) gives therefore an interesting perspective in relation with migrants. The qualification of the activities of migrants could be put on different levels depending on what they do on what area. It is therefore likely that – if it is a cross-border activity of one migrant group – the migrant group is international only on the socio-cultural side, but is transnational on the economic side. In relation with the city development, these kind of activities shows an importance for the urban governance whereby the discussion started for the authoritative power. The following section will spread this importance of the migrants into the urban governance.

2.4: URBAN GOVERNANCE

As the above section describe the difference on scale level for cross-border activities, this section will go more in-depth to the meaning of migrant cross-border activities for the urban governance⁵. More important is the way regarding urban organised movements. Castells (1983) describes that the

⁵ This research makes a distinction between urban governance and city governance. Urban relates to the urban area, usually in the academic context. City governance is limited to the borders of The Hague Municipality: therefore not including the suburbs like Rijswijk of Wassenaar.

restructuring of the interrelations of the city begins with (1) the provision of housing and public services on the basis of need; (2) the regeneration of community on the basis of gender, racial, ethnic or any other socially defined equality: the (city) culture; and (3) the contesting of all means of domination by the state: the power. Urban movements and other organised forms of collective expression like political parties, have turned out to be unresponsive, limited in their effectiveness and domineering. This understanding will lead to underline the importance of governance instead of government (Jessop, 1997). In order to create the inclusiveness in the city back the urban governance should respect these urban movements.

Migrants who are part of the urban movement are most likely organised (see next section). Nevertheless, they are also part of the urban governance and have a meaningful role. The city is hosting people from several background with several identities who should get their place into the city. The recognition of these people is not always clear: government policy focusing on city development highlights the importance of the big businesses and tries to improve their competitive position regarding other cities or city-regions (AgendaStad, 2016; see also Burgers and Van der Waal, 2008) while there is no recognition of the importance of migrants. Regarding the urban governance migrants form an important actor in making the city more global. Therefore it is important to take also migrants into city governance and understand their importance for making the city more global.

According to Castells (1983: 326) people tend to think about alternatives territorially. He places the emphasis on urban movements. Migrants, in particular the second generation, tend to be more active on this kind of urban movements. This second generation is born in the place of destination and is benefitting the same development as a non-migrant. The following section will elaborate on organised migrants and seeing the relation between (migrant) urban movement and the global city.

2.5: SELF-ORGANISATION

Global cities are hosting large amount of migrants. Making the city more embedded in a global network, the transnational activities of the migrants are important. This could be established through the various organisations in the city focusing on the migrant group. As Da Graça (2010) suggests, this organisation of people seems to happen on a natural way: people find each other when they have something in common. This common sense could rely on the cultural or ethnic proliferation of people's attitudes or background. It is likely that people could have some preferences in a society where they are a minority. People would like to organise activities for their own people. A way to establish these activities could be through self-organisation, in addition the ethnically suggested division makes it *ethnic self-organisation* (Da Graça, 2010).

The addition of *ethnic* could have a misleading understanding. In the definition of self-organisation, ethnicity is defined as ‘*a set of connections and regular patterns of interaction among people sharing common national background or migration experiences*’ (Waldinger *et al.*, 1990: 3). Therefore, the distinction could be made with migrant, what is “*any person who lives temporarily or permanently in a country where he or she was not born, and has acquired some significant social ties to this country*” (Unesco, 2016). Using the term *migrant self-organisations* would be limited to organisations of people who did only the same migratory; using the term *ethnic* will give a broader understanding of specific groups, with the same origins. In addition, the word migrant would include more ethnic groups, whereby an ethnic group is limited to a certain specific group.

Most Western countries show a mixed profile about ethnic self-organisation. On the one hand it is perceived with a negative sense: ethnic self-organisation has a negative effect on the integration, the ties between migrants and their own ethnic group becomes stronger and the assimilation with the original habitants becomes weaker (see also WRR, 2007). On the other hand, local governments promote ethnic self-organisation with the recognition that ethnic self-organisation can be helpful for the integration and participation into the society (Da Graça, 2010).

The role of ethnic self-organisations is double in this sense. The approach taken in this research relates towards the concept of transnationalism. Ethnic self-organisations are driven by migrants whereby it is likely that these migrants do have ties with their place of origin or with their diaspora networks. In this understanding the meaning of transnationalism is visible on local level whereby the relation is made towards city governance making the city from inside more *global*. This opens up a new debate what will be explained in the next section.

2.6: THE NEW DEBATE

Ethnic self-organisations are an interesting feature for the city and offers several challenges for the urban governance as explained above. Claiming for the recognition of these marginalised groups in the urban governance is not new, but is still neglected. The importance of migrant neighbourhood – where it is likely that ethnic self-organisations are located – and migrant development is unknown for most policy makers. This opens as well the societal as the scientific debate of seeing the importance of ethnic populated areas in city development. The importance is more visible to the large second generation population, people whereby one of the parents are not born in the Netherlands. Opening up this debate shows new perspective regarding the global city, whereby people with non-Dutch descendants are not only seen in the low quality sectors or informal economy (Friedman, 1986; Sassen, 2001, 2002) but are seen as important actors when they participate in the urban governance or have an entrepreneurship (Ram and Jones, 2008). Getting a diverse community means the acknowledgement of all groups. Recent

developments in the Dutch society like the upcoming political party related to diversity, DENK⁶ (*Think*) suggests that the tensions are high on this issue. It seems that the educated first generation and the upcoming second generation of migrants are claiming their position in the mainstream society.

Figure 3 shows the relation between ethnic self-organisations and the global city. It clearly distinguishes two main concepts: the global city inside the world system approach and the ethnic self-organisations as part of transnationalism. The world system consists of world cities and a few global cities as described in section 2.2 (The Global City). The *old actors* what influences this world system and the distinguishment of world city and global city refer to the five categories of actors as described in section 2.2.1 (Global city from above). This perspective of seeing the city has a shortcoming: it excludes migrant participation as an actor in the meaning of a global/world city and sees migrants only as *influx of foreign workers and absorption into low-wage employment* (see figure 1).

The second part of this chapter discussed the urban governance and the role for migrant urban movements. A migrant finds himself back in an ethnic community because of self-identification. This ethnic community can organise themselves and participate in the urban governance. They will organise themselves: for example working towards the own cultural activities and on self-actualisation (Da Graça, 2010). In the conceptual model this is visualised below on the right side. This ethnic community in a city is therefore linked with the ethnic self-organisations in the same city; on local level. The transnational shift happens when this ethnic self-organisation effectuates good ties with other ethnic communities or self-organisations in other cities, which are in the same country or across countries. Not all ethnic self-organisations could succeed in this transnational shift. The ethnic self-organisations which succeed in participating on transnational level are at the same time participating in an ethnic network. With the consequence that the ethnic self-organisation is the link between the city and the ethnic network. This include cities in a global ethnic network, what has an important understanding in the world system approach as the link between *ethnic self-organisation in a city and world system* makes clear in figure 3.


To sum up, this chapter discussed the relation between the global city and the ethnic self-organisations and showed finally the conceptual model. The relation towards organised ethnic groups (e.g. ethnic self-organisations) and the city development is undervalued as described. The role of particular organisations and migrants for the city of The Hague offers challenges what can be used in city development. The upcoming importance in international diaspora networks as well the transnationalism debate helps to understand a city can upscale itself, using the power that is available in the city. This put the importance of people with a non-Dutch descendant in the society into question from traditional perspectives and opens the debate of the role of people with non-Dutch descendant in the

⁶ See <https://www.bewegingdenk.nl/> (retrieved on 1st of September 2016).

society. Therefore the role of ethnic communities in a city can be linked towards the global city perspective.

The following chapters will discuss this relation for The Hague. First, chapter 3 will describe the used data and methods to discover the relation between ethnic self-organisations and the world system for the city of The Hague. Chapter 4 will give a city profile of The Hague whereby the first part discuss the world system of The Hague: the diverse geographies The Hague is embedded into. The second part of chapter 4 will go more in depth towards the diverse population and the ethnic self-organisations in The Hague. Due to the variety in type ethnic self-organisation, the choice has been made to only discuss the Turkish and (Surinam-) Hindustan self-organisation in chapter 5. This will give a two-side story the way The Hague can be embed in an ethnic network. Finally, the concluding chapter will summarize this research and give answer of the research questions as described in section 1.1 (Research questions).

Figure 3: Conceptual model.



Source: made by author.

3. METHODS & DATA

In the academic literature there is a missing gap between the relation of ethnic data and urban studies with a geographical perspective for The Hague in particular. While the concept of global city is widely spoken and the concept of ethnic self-organisation is gaining their importance, the relation between these concepts is undeveloped. The missing academic literature about urban The Hague makes it necessary to complete this research with mainly primary data. The secondary data will be used to offer a broad description of the social setting. This chapter will offer an insight in the methodology used to research the relation between ethnic self-organisations and city of The Hague.

3.1: THE GLOBAL CITY

The location for discovering the link between ethnic self-organisation and their influence for the global city is The Hague. The Hague is known as a diverse city, where people of 175 different nationalities⁷ are living (CBS, 2012). These different nationalities are including the diplomacy and refugees. The importance of both sides are not always reflected: the City of The Hague promotes himself as the International City of Peace and Justice (Gemeente Den Haag, 2010; 2014). In addition, there are 172 ethnic self-organisations active in The Hague (Gemeente Den Haag, 2016) what was not stressed in the coalition agreement of the city council of 2010 – 2014 (Gemeente Den Haag, 2010). Different than other cities in the Netherlands, the separation of people with different origins is not that high as The Hague. This separation has been developed through the several years (Schmal, 1995). Therefore, the case The Hague is an excellent example to research the role of ethnic self-organisations for the global city.

3.2: ONTOLOGICAL MEANING: THE WAY OF SEEING THIS RESEARCH

This research is partly literature based. The used approach is partly deductive but mostly inductive. On the one hand the research will apply on recent literature regarding the global city and the way migrants establish this level; more detailed: how the Turkish self-organisations embed The Hague in an ethnic network. On the other hand, this research is inductive. As already mentioned in the introduction, the (Surinam-) Hindustan migrants are unknown in the academic literature and form an interesting case as 'non-state migrants' who brings the city to a higher level through their *ethnification*. This site of the research will bring new insights into the academic field. This research relies on the intersect of the humanist approach and post-structuralism theory (see section 3.2.2: The humanist and post-structuralism approach) with a postcolonial perspective. The postcolonial – or even after the

⁷ Including the nationalities of former Yugoslavia, Soviet-Union, Serbia and Montenegro, Czechoslovakia and Kosovo.

postcolonial – perspective is honourable in that sense the perspective of migrants are located central in the research.

3.2.1: THE AFTER POST-COLONIALISM PERSPECTIVE

The *after post-colonialism* perspective – as suggested by Dabashi (2012) – is crucial in understanding the global politics of the Middle East. Rethinking about this perspective will have an impact for the upcoming generations and is crucial in understanding sustainable ties regarding transnationalism and therefore the future world relations. New ideas and perspectives have not only an impact on geopolitics, but also on the meaning of global relations. Dabashi (2012) argues for a meaning that goes more beyond race and religion. According to him, geopolitical term ‘the West’ is meaningless than ever before:

‘It has lost its potency, and with it the notion, and the condition, we had code-named postcoloniality. The East, the West, the Oriental, the colonial, the postcolonial - they are no more’ (Dabashi, 2012).

Related to several revolutions in the world – from the occupy movement in Wall Street (New York) to Aung San Suu Kyi with her campaign for democracy in Myanmar – Dabashi argues that these revolutions are not driven by politics of representing ‘the West’, they are transcending ‘the West’. The politics are shifting under the feet of what superpowers thought they had the power and is shifting towards ideologies that are presented and exhausted in religious, nationalist or social grand narratives. Instead an Americanism or Eurocentric perspective, the beyond post-colonialism approach puts ethnic ideologies central and uses this perspective towards the world view. This processed another meaning towards the global networks.

3.2.2: THE HUMANIST AND POST-STRUCTURALISM APPROACH

The way of seeing this research or social reality is embedded on the intersect of the humanist approach and post-structuralism (Aitken and Valentine, 2014). In studying the experience and meaning from the side of the self-organisations as an actor of the city, this research will go beyond the interrelation and the contested fluid structure it has regarding the position of the self-organisations for the city: seeing an actor that is part of a network but the relations are fluid and not always clear. The relations could be strong or weak. This embeddedness is the perspective that will be used in order to understand the – Turkish and (Surinam-) Hindustan ethnic self-organisations as part of the city The Hague. The importance rests on what the cities governance is structured to give ethnic self-organisations to flourish as a transnational ethnic self-organisation. Therefore this ethnic self-organisations or community can embed their city into their ethnic network. This approach will be necessary to read this research further. To discover this link, this chapter will discuss further the epistemological perspective in line with Bryman (2008:13). Finally, section 3.9 (Critical reflection) will reflect on the epistemological part.

3.3: RESEARCH STRATEGY AND DESIGN

The board variety of topics to discuss in this research requires a mixed methods analysis. The quantitative part is based to analyse all ethnic self-organisations which are subsidized through the City of The Hague or Fonds1818⁸. The aim of this analysis is to get an overview of the self-organisations in the city and the way they are connected abroad. A quantitative analysis gives the overview and the meaning of self-organisation towards the city. All foundations and associations that have received a subsidy in 2015 by The Hague Municipality have been coded as ethnic self-organisation or not ethnic self-organisation, based on their activities, their goal or their name. The ethnicity of the self-organisations are coded as Surinam-Hindustan, Turkish, Moroccan or other (see also part 5.0 Data).

Communities differ highly into their connections and the way they are transnational (see also section 2.3: Global city – Migration: cross-border activities; Portes, 2003). A qualitative strategy is used to get more insight of the (Surinam-) Hindustan self-organisations: therefore interviews are coded and analysed together with the quantitative data that has been received through a survey. Going more in-depth towards the (Surinam-) Hindustan and Turkish self-organisations, it is not possible to do a comparative analysis. The (Surinam-) Hindustan self-organisations academic literature is not developed while the literature of the Turkish self-organisations is more varied. In addition, the Turkish self-organisations are more political influence compared to the (Surinam-) Hindustan self-organisations. This requires to interview the (Surinam-) Hindustan self-organisations and compare these to the literature and expert interviews of Turkish self-organisations. To compare these different settings, a cross-sectional design offers the best solution. The differences and the similarities regarding the transnational perspective for the city development is central.

3.4: RESEARCH METHODS

Different strategies are asking for different methods. The first analysis is a GIS-analysis to get a spatial overview of The Hague citizens with a non-Dutch background. To get a significant overview, the focus is rested on the four largest groups: citizens of The Hague with a Turkish, Moroccan, Surinam and Caribbean descendant. Through this analysis, it becomes clear that The Hague citizens with a Caribbean background are not clustered that much as the citizens with a Turkish, Moroccan or Surinam descendant. Ethnic clustering suggests the participation of an ethnic group in a particular neighbourhood; the level an ethnic group participates in city development. The assumption is that large ethnic communities will give a representative and broad perspective of the link between ethnic self-organisations and the global city.

⁸ A fund that support social projects, see also section 4.4.3: *The non-government*.

Secondly, a self-completion questionnaire has been taken through Survey Monkey. Survey Monkey is an online program to establish, send and follow a questionnaire. The response was 42 full filled surveys (see also 6.0 Survey). These data has been analyses through Excel for a descriptive analysis and through SPSS to research correlations. The SPSS analysis have not brought relevant significant relations due to the variety of the ethnic self-organisations: the different ethnic groups and their type of organisation, e.g. elderly organisation.

The third method is the usage of semi-structured interviews through 12 Surinam-Hindustan self-organisations (see 7.0 Interviews). The respondents are selected based on the reason why and on what amount they received subsidy through the City of The Hague. The selected policy goal is crucial in order to make a selection, based on their importance for and their size in the City of The Hague.

In addition, a significant part of the information has been received through own observation. The background of the researcher is also (Surinam-) Hindustan what received positive as well negative reactions and perceptions of the self-organisations. Visiting the activities of the ethnic self-organisations was kind of familiar in the sense the language was familiar to the researcher. However, he is not grown up in this community giving me a neutral perspective relating to this social setting (see also section 3.8: The role of the researcher). Further The Hague Municipality was accessible towards the ethnic self-organisations and receiving insights related to the city governance, the way the municipality is working and perceiving social urban challenges.

3.5: DATA

Registration on ethnicity is forbidden in the Netherlands after the Second World War due to the hunting of Jews. This makes it difficult getting relevant ethnic information. The data on the maps on page 36-39 has been received through the local government and the *Dutch Central Agency for Statistics* (CBS). The data set consists information of the ethnicity and their residence. This has been visualized on a vector maps and converted towards a raster maps. At the same time, the data has been up scaled to a level of 10x100 meters and offers only the descendant due to privacy reasons. The information on these maps could not be traced towards an individual. However, this still offers one complication. If only one citizen with a non-Dutch background is living in a 10x100 meter square, this becomes visible. Therefore the decision has been taken to start from 1,5 percent of the total population living in this 10x100 meter square area. The ethnicity of a citizen (e.g. Surinam, Moroccan) has been given based on the country where they are born and/or one of their parents is born. There could be stated that people with a Turkish, Moroccan or Caribbean descendent are also ethnically the same, but this does not mean that their experience of in-community is the same. As chapter 4 will show, these communities are quite diverse in the experience of people. For the people with a Surinamese descendent, generalisation is

more difficult. Citizens with a Surinamese descendant are ethnically from different origin. This could be people with a Creole, East-Indian, Javanese, other or even a mixed descendant (St-Hilaire, 1999). Citizens with a Surinamese descendant are not registered with their ethnicity in the Netherlands. Nevertheless, there could be stated that the South-Indian Surinamese people – in this research called as (Surinam-) Hindustan – are the largest group of people with a Surinamese descendant living in The Hague (Oudhof *et al.*, 2011).

The same challenge is experienced for the ethnic self-organisations. The subsidy register of the City of The Hague has listed a total of 3057 organisations that are subsidized in 2015 through the City of The Hague and include only foundations and unions. These organisations are coded through their name, e.g. *Alevi Bektasi Kultur ve Tanitma Dernegi* is coded as Turkish self-organisations: for the Turkish Alevi community or their primary goal like *Al manaar*, what is focussing on and supporting Moroccan young girls in their religious and cultural identity⁹. In addition, a few ethnic self-organisations are known by Fonds1818, an independent organisation that supports a numerous social initiatives focusing on care, welfare, art, culture etc. (Fonds1818, n.d.). This offered 172 different ethnic self-organisations. The next challenge was finding correct contact data. This has been received through the submission system of The Hague Municipality. Paper forms are scanned and collected as pdf-file in a system, called ABBA. This system collects all the forms of a submission of a specific organisation but does not collect the data. This has the disadvantage that data could not be analysed and has to be perceived manual. The question arise to get the right e-mail address or telephone number. In most cases the right e-mail/telephone number has been received, in some cases not: the contact person was not responsible any more for that particular organisation. This brought finally 168 ethnic self-organisations.

3.6: SURVEY

To 168 ethnic self-organisations a survey has been send at the end of May 2016. After sending several mails, making telephone calls and messaged them through Whatsapp, 42¹⁰ self-organisations completed a questionnaire at the start of July 2016. For the organisations which participate with an in-depth interview, the survey has been taken manually. The other received a survey through the web application Survey Monkey. An analysis of correlation offered not significant evidence due to the variety in ethnicity and the type organisation. Therefore the results are not used one its own, but offered some additional insights to categorise the self-organisations. The ethnic self-organisations are categorised into 12 categories, based on their activities (see section 4.4.1: The ethnic self-organisations: space for the own community).

⁹ See also their website: <http://www.al-manaar.nl/site/index.php> (retrieved May 20, 2016).

¹⁰ In total 54 questionnaires: 12 self-organisations filled in manually.

3.6.1: NON-RESPONS

After the second round sending the survey, still a few board members did not responded. They were called. The reactions through the telephone calls were quite diverse:

- Most of the respondents, who did not respond digital, mentioned they did not receive the survey properly. The survey was send to someone who is not active any more for the organisation or the e-mail address was not in use anymore. This suggests also that the information from The Hague Municipality is not present. The survey has been send again.
- The African self-organisations had problems with reading the survey in Dutch. They could understand Dutch, but had difficulties in responding in Dutch. Two surveys have been taken through telephone.
- With some Chinese self-organisation the researcher experienced communication problems. Through the telephone they spoke with a certain accent and the message was not received properly. Due to communication problems these organisations are not captured into the research.
- The Moroccan and Turkish self-organisations had several statements. Some of them had problems with understanding the Dutch language. They send the survey forward to their son or daughter, who filled the survey online (survey was send to private mail). Other board members responded that the concerning board member was not available this period. The concerning board member was often the secretary who has the exclusive right to respond on e-mails and to participate in surveys. At least, particular applicable for the Turkish self-organisations, they refused to participate in this research. They stated they had no time for participation and preferred not to call again. Sometimes this was quite aggressive.
- The response rate on the (Surinam-) Hindustan self-organisation is quite high. Most of them participate in the survey. After the first call they stated they were busy and apologised for the delay, and asked to send it again. Others were not traceable, perhaps due to old information.

Next to the challenge some board members denied to participate, for a large part it was not possible to find everyone. This shows the importance to get reliable contact details of the ethnic self-organisations.

3.7: INTERVIEWS

The three in-depth interviews are taken with civil servants of The Hague Municipality and with 12 (Surinam-) Hindustan self-organisations. These (Surinam-) Hindustan self-organisations are all physically located in The Hague or do their activities in The Hague. They are selected based on the amount and size of activities and based on what policy they received a subsidy. These (Surinam-) Hindustan self-organisations received an invitation by e-mail. By non-response they were called with the invitation for

an in-depth interview. Most respondents replied positive. Most of them asked, after the introduction, a few question regarding the interview: what is my name, what is my field of study, and or I have Surinam-Hindustan descendant. In particular the last question raised up some interesting points, what will be described in the next part. The interviews are all taken on the preferred location of the respondent. This was at their organisation, at home or at a café. All interviews are recorded and fully transcribed. The transcription has been send by e-mail to the respondent back, for some additional information and the ethical part of this research. Information what the respondent does not want to literally state in this research has been changed. The interviews have a duration around the 45-60 minutes with two exceptions of 30 minutes. The transcriptions are used as quotes to strengthen the findings.

3.8: THE ROLE OF THE RESEARCHER

During this research, I have experienced some interesting features, whereby my own position takes an interesting role, in particular interviewing the Surinam-Hindustan self-organisations. The board members of these organisations do have the same ethnic background as me. It is likely that this offered possibilities to get better access, better information than a non-(Surinam-)Hindustan researcher. During the in-depth interviews, the language we spoke was Dutch. For some statements the respondent decided to say it in another language, like Sranan-Tongo or in Sarnami because they feel comfortable in it. On the other hand, the interpretation of the statements has benefitted, because I share the same culture background and know e.g. the difference and the practical outcome between *Arya Samaj* and *Sanathan Dharma*. This offers to ask targeted information and receiving a broad knowledge for the benefit of this research.

3.9: CRITICAL REFLECTION

This chapter discussed the used data and methods for this research. After explaining the location choice, the ontological meaning and the epistemological description has been given. As section 3.2 (Ontological meaning: the way of seeing this research) makes clear, for this research an after post-colonial perspective (Dabashi, 2012) will be used. With this perspective the interest has shifted from Eurocentric/American centric world order towards the post-colonial centres. The way relations are seen in the intersect of the humanist approach and post-structuralism approach is crucial for further reading of this research. In addition, the epistemological choices and theoretical chapter is leading for good social research (Bryman, 2008: 24). Bryman (2008) appoints that the three most prominent criteria of social research are *reliability*, *replication* and *validity* (p. 31). These three criteria can be used on almost all social research regardless the complexity in methods. Reliability is concerned if the results are repeatable. The difficulty relies in the alacrity of the ethnic self-organisations regarding the qualitative part. The participants participate with the research voluntary. The (Surinam-)Hindustan self-organisations were positive and able to help in this research. There could be a link with the researcher

as section 3.8 (The role of the researcher) described. Regarding other types of ethnic self-organisations, participation was more hard, e.g. the Moroccan and the Turkish self-organisations as mentioned in section 3.6.1 (Non-respons). Therefore they are excluded for an in-depth analysis. For the quantitative part the difficulty rests in the coding of the ethnic self-organisations. Sometimes information is missing to confirm the ethnicity of a specific organisation. That is not equal to hard replication; the second criteria. The way data has gathered and this method has occurred could be replicated, even for other cities. It is likely that other – big – municipalities have certain data at their disposal. The question arises if the relationship also exist. The third criteria, validity, is the most important. The methods described in this chapter will give a specific causal relation (*internal validity*; see Bryman, 2008: 32). The way this relation has been established differs highly to the ethnic community. It is likely new diaspora communities like Afghan or Syrian refugees are establishing an ethnic network differs as the organised Turkish networks. Nevertheless, the aim of this research is to discover the forces and influences towards an ethnic network. It should be noted that a migrant is not always organised. Generalization between a citizen with a non-Dutch descendant and an ethnic network may not be called. This research limits therefore only the relation between organised ethnic communities and city governance whereby the city could be pushed into an ethnic network.

Nevertheless, with these difficulties and limitations, there is enough data to research the link between ethnic self-organisations and the global city. The response rate of the ethnic self-organisations is sufficient to make the relation visible between ethnic self-organisations and the global city as chapter 5 make clear. But first chapter 4 will give an overview of the city of The Hague and how its city governance is grounded.

4. CITY OF THE HAGUE

The Netherlands is known as a country with medium-sized cities in international perspective. There is no city with a population more than 1 million inhabitants inside its communal borders. Amsterdam is the largest city with some more than 800.000 inhabitants, followed by Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht (see also table 1). Louis Napoleon made Amsterdam the capital of the Netherlands during the French occupation and Amsterdam kept that status after the establishment of the new Kingdom in 1814, while the political and administrative centre of the Netherlands was and is – since the seceding from the Spanish Crown in 1585 – The Hague. The Hague has always been neutral in the sense that this location avoided a choice among one of the six powerful cities in Holland of the late Middle Ages: Amsterdam, Delft, Dordrecht, Gouda, Haarlem and Leyden (Meijers *et al.*, 2014). In addition, while the Dutch Republic had struggles to be recognised as a full European state member according to the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) – and the recognition of the capital Amsterdam during these periods – The Hague developed through establishments of residences and later with embassies as an important venue for multilateral treaty making (Van der Wusten *et al.*, 2011; Mamadouh *et al.*, 2015). Therefore the city strives to strengthen its image as the International City of Peace and Justice (Meijers *et al.*, 2014).

This chapter consists of two parts. The aim of the first part is to get an overview of The Hague and the different geographies The Hague is situated into. This part goes from an up to down level. It will start on the international level with the geography of IGO's and Law, followed by the geography of diplomacy. Subsequently the embeddedness of The Hague in the Netherlands will be shown. Thereafter, the local demographics will show in particular the position of the citizens with a non-Dutch descendant. The second part will go more in-depth of the urban politics and show how the city governance is localised approaching the ethnic population. This part will put the ethnic perspective central in the city governance.

Table 1: Population and surface of the four largest cities.¹¹

Region	Population	Surface in ha
Amsterdam	821752	14977
Rotterdam	623652	7999
The Hague	514861	6618
Utrecht (municipality)	334176	2298

Source: Based on CBS (2006; 2016).

¹¹ Population count on 1st of January 2015, surface is from 1930

4.1: THE HAGUE: WITHIN DIFFERENT GEOGRAPHIES

There are different perspectives to approach a city. The city of The Hague can be approached roughly into two main geographies what the municipality is promoting: The Hague, International City of Peace and Justice (Gemeente Den Haag, 2014). According to the municipality, there are 160 international institutions and organisations located in The Hague – with more than 14,000 people – working towards a safer and more justice world. Receiving this status implies a development and an embeddedness in a geography. This section will describe the development and the role of IGO's and law institutions for The Hague. The second section engages the geography of the diplomacy in The Hague.

4.1.1: IGO'S AND LAW

International lawyers have created and are continuing to create metaphysical geographies of international law. Koller (2012) states that the recent establishment of IGO's like the *International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia* (ICTY) and of the *International Criminal Court* (ICC) gives The Hague the opportunity to publish a numerous books and articles and give the opportunity to convince several conferences in The Hague. Recent developments in the field of criminal law lead to an increasement for a call of papers, what gives attendance to The Hague's position in the geographies of international law, as Koller (2012) tries to explain from the perspective of historical geography, philosophical history and the linear progressive development of international law. He states that '*patterns of history's linear progress and of its inevitable circularity have recurred throughout history and are likely to continue to appear*' (Koller, 2012: 117). For a site towards the future, it is not to advocate one particular geography related to an aspect of the international law but several. This gives the ability to demonstrate how maps of the dominant narrative distort reality and use the same tools to generate a plethora of maps. The Hague takes thereby a special position with hosting these institutions. Schlichtmann (2003) emphasizes the important conferences in The Hague (in 1899 and in 1907) with the shift of international law – *Völkerrecht* being transformed into World Law – what was crucial to present developments. According to Schlichtmann (2003),


'...in 1899 Japan, together with some two dozen mostly European nations, but among them the USA, China, Persia, Siam and Turkey, participated in the 'first truly international assembl[y] meeting in time of peace for the purpose of preserving peace, not of concluding a war then in progress...' (Hinsley, 1963: 139; cited in Schlichtmann, 2003: 381).

However the Japanese government was aware of the ambivalence and widespread scepticism in the European capitals, the general opinion was that the conference still should be held in Europe because Europe was the centre of military and naval activity in this period (1899). Next to the Russian proposal for a Permanent Court of Arbitration – a parent of today’s International Court of Justice – the choice for The Hague was primarily based on technical reasons e.g. the location: access to international water. So, this historical choice for The Hague has led to a development of law institutions in The Hague and started to put The Hague in this geography of IGO and law.

4.1.2: DIPLOMACY

Mamadouh *et al.* (2015) examined the micro geography of diplomacy for the case The Hague. Diplomacy is something what happens on many places like a corridor, a sidewalk, an airport or even in a hotel lobby. Traditional diplomacy happens across the state system but is also heavily clustered. In these clusters the political and diplomatic centres are connected. According to Mamadouh *et al.* (2015), treaty making and place-centred accounts of supranational bureaucracies indicate the roles and forms of spatial proximity and networks. Nearly all diplomatic agencies are clustered in the strip between the political centre of the Netherlands – *Binnenhof* – and the Dutch coast (see figure 4). These embassies have three main types of embassy buildings and are built for diplomatic functions in very different times: *the vintage diplomatic accommodations, conversions* and *purpose-built accommodations* (Mamadouh *et al.* 2015). The embassies represent symbolic state power and national identities for citizens and shows wider socio-spatial relations. Mamadouh *et al.* (2015) state that these transnational activities extent to agglomeration effects if embassies are thinkable in wider complex associations or as elements of ‘urban assemblages’ (Farias, 2011). The position these embassies takes – in particular the social part – in the diplomacy geography suggest a broad network for The Hague.

Figure 4: Embassies and intergovernmental organisations in The Hague.



Intergovernmental Organizations:

- | | |
|---|---|
| 1 Eurojust | 6 International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia |
| 2 Europol | 7 Iran-US Claims Tribunal |
| 3 Hague Conference on Private International Law | 8 NATO CI Agency |
| 4 International Court of Justice (Peace Palace) | 9 Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons |
| 5 International Criminal Court | 10 Permanent Court of Arbitration |



Source: Mamadouh et al., 2015: 567

4.2: THE HAGUE AS PART OF RANDSTAD HOLLAND

The above stated dominance of public institutions in The Hague gives the city a distinct profile that differs from other major cities in the Randstad. The Hague never obtained city rights as a neutral city since the late Middle Ages (Meijers *et al.* 2014). Meijers *et al.* (2014) give an overview how the population of The Hague has developed: from the shrinkages due to the Dutch 'new town policies' to the annexation of new housing area at the borders in the late 1990s. This made The Hague the centre of the former larger city-region 'Haaglanden'. Since 2014, The Hague has been participating as one of the cores of the MRDH: 'Metropolitan area Rotterdam Den Haag' (MRDH, 2016). Through this MRDH-project The Hague strengthens its relation with Rotterdam, what makes the division of the Randstad metropolitan area more visible into a South wing and a North Wing: The Hague/Rotterdam against Amsterdam/Utrecht (see figure 5). The international accessibility of The Hague is organised at the level of Randstad, with *Rotterdam The Hague Airport* for short flights and *Amsterdam Schiphol Airport* for long hauls. For rail access, The Hague has two main stations: *The Hague Central Station* and *The Hague Holland's Rail* (Holland's Spoor). However there is a connection with Antwerp and Brussels, for the high speed line or other international directions a stopover in Utrecht or Rotterdam is necessary (NSInternational, 2016). In comparison with other European cities like Geneva, Hamburg or Vienna, Meijer *et al.* (2014) state that if The Hague would like to support their international ambitions, it should make optimal use of its location within the Randstad and '*reaping the benefits of scale by 'borrowing size' from its neighbours*' (p. 99) like the use of Schiphol airport. However, this could also work in contrary whereby the southern wing (Rotterdam-The Hague) cannot compete with the northern wing (Amsterdam-Utrecht) what is according to Meijer *et al.* more attractive for – young – professionals.

Therefore, Meijer *et al.* (2014) suggest that The Hague is dependent of the other cities in the Randstad related to economic growth. Due to the financial crisis of 2014, the unemployment rate is increasing and is still high (AD.nl, 2016), in particular on the level of private companies. Meijer *et al.* argue that the focus of the municipality is to broaden the international security and other main intergovernmental and European organisations. This is something whereby The Hague can strengthen itself. However, these large international organisations recruit often their employees international so attracting these companies does not necessarily mean benefits for the local labour market. Perhaps it creates new job opportunities for migrants in the low-wage and informal labour market as Friedman states (1986: 78; see also figure 1) but it has no direct opportunities for the middle classes.

Figure 5: Location of The Hague and its position in the administrative division.



Source: E. Meijers et al., 2014: 94.


4.3: THE HAGUE: THE ARRIVAL CITY FOR MIGRANTS

In the 1960s, the Netherlands became an immigration country. The economy increased and migrants came to the Netherlands. These post-war-immigrants can be categorised into three groups: the guest workers, immigrants from the former colonies and – more recently – the refugees. In The Hague, there are four large populated ethnic groups. They have a Dutch Caribbean, Turkish, Moroccan or Surinam descendant (Zorlu and Hartog, 2002). Figure 6,7,8 and 9 show the segregation in The Hague related to these four ethnic groups, within the borders of the neighbourhood. To get a good overview on the most local scale, the territorial administrative number is included. The meaning of the territorial administrative numbers is included in attachment A.

As figure 6 for the Turkish community shows, there is a highly concentration visible in the area 15-16-17-32-33-34; respectively *Schildersbuurt*-West, -North and -East and *Transvaartkwartier*-North, -Middle and -South. In the area's 15-16-17 (*Schildersbuurt*), there is also a high concentration of citizens with a Moroccan descendant as shown in figure 8, but on a lower level than the citizens with a Turkish descendant. The citizens with a Turkish or Moroccan descendant are mainly entered into The Hague in the 1960s as guest worker for diverse Dutch companies (Zorlu and Hartog, 2002). The economic growth in the Netherlands demanded a high amount of workers during the 1960s. In the 1970s the economy stabilised and the demand decreased. Nevertheless, the amount of Turkish and Moroccan immigrants still grew due to family reunification and forming (Prins, 1996). These inflow of the immigrants demand affordable housing, what was mainly located in these areas (15-16-17-32-33-34). The previous occupants could afford a more expensive housing and moved to another place. This indicates that these neighbourhoods are starters neighbourhoods [D. van Wolferen, personal communication, May 4, 2016]. Nevertheless between the borders of the municipality of The Hague, the citizens with Moroccan or Turkish descendant are still concentrated in these areas.


The citizens from the Dutch overseas areas – Surinam and Dutch Caribbean – have experienced another development. Their places of origins have colonial ties with the place of destination for a long time. The Surinam immigrants came mostly around 1975, the Surinamese independence, while the Dutch Caribbean are still part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The citizens from the Dutch Caribbean descendant are not migrated on certain peak periods (Zorlu and Hartog, 2002). Interesting in figure 9 is the spatial sprawl in The Hague related to this group. The citizens with Dutch Caribbean descendant are not specifically located to a certain neighbourhood. They are in small amounts divided over the whole city. The citizens with a Surinam descendant are visible in figure 7. As Oudhof *et al.* (2011) state, it is likely that these people have mainly a (Surinam-) Hindustan descendant. The Surinam community is divided in the whole city.

Figure 6: Hague citizens with Turkish descendant.




Source: Dutch Central Agency for Statistics (CBS) and ESRI.

Figure 7: Hague citizens with Surinamese descendant.




Source: Dutch Central Agency for Statistics (CBS) and ESRI.

Figure 8: Hague citizens with Moroccan descendant.



Source: Dutch Central Agency for Statistics (CBS) and ESRI.

Figure 9: Hague citizens with Dutch-Caribbean descendant.



Source: Dutch Central Agency for Statistics (CBS) and ESRI.

Schmal (1995) makes a rough division between the poor part and the rich part. From a historical perspective, the most important element of the social division of The Hague is the soil. The Hague is traditionally divided into an "upper half" of the high and dry sandy soil where the elite reside and a 'lower half' on the low and wet peat soil where the poor live. This division is still visible, but should not be seen as something fixed: nevertheless it is in accordance with the mainstream literature of the global city; polarisation in the global city as described by Sassen (2001). High educated city dwellers are more likely to live in the rich part while the low educated city dwellers – mainly with a non-Dutch descendant – are living in the poor part. It is difficult to say whether it is still in use for The Hague: ethnicity on its own should not be a factor. Other factors should also be included to confirm Sassen's polarisation (2001).

The areas (15-16-17-32-33-34) are characterised with a relative young population (younger than 20 years), the population density is quite high and the amount of households are quite high; in particular one-parent household. The amount of households with children is above average but the amount of households without children is low in these areas. The dwellings are mostly medium sized (61 till 100 meters square) and most of them are built before the Second World War. In comparison with the other areas of The Hague, there is not a division visible as strong as the ethnicity (Gemeente Den Haag, 2010b).

While the Northern part contains the basic conditions of the *global* in The Hague, like the embassies and the IGOs, the Southern part is mainly hosting citizens with a non-Dutch descendant. This suggest a segregation and comes close to the polarised *global city* as Sassen (2001) states. This ethnic part is created of the citizens with a non-Dutch descendant. It is not necessarily a perspective of self-segregation: the dwellings were available in the same period as the migrants arrived in The Hague. This development shows that The Hague was an arrival city for migrants and the ethnic groups are still divided among the citizens with a Dutch descendant in The Hague.

The question that arises is to what extent The Hague citizens with a non-Dutch descendant participate organised with their own group in the urban setting. The role of ethnic self-organisations in the broader perspective of the city politics needs to take into account to understand the importance and the meaning of ethnic groups for the city. The way these citizens can make the city more global highlights an interesting perspective for planners and shows a new understanding towards the concepts of the *global* in the city. The following section will go more beyond this city politics and the role of ethnic groups in particular.

4.4: THE HAGUE: CITY POLITICS

Intra-urban issues are reflecting various social aspects that are gaining an importance. In the academic literature, there seems during the recent years an agreement that top-down and command-and-control models of governance are not the most effective way of governance (Healey *et al.* 1995; Dekker and Van Kempen, 2004). The new way is the city governance what differs from traditional forms of government by including actors that represent the private and the voluntary sectors. Dekker and Van Kempen (2004) state that these actors

'are engaged in partnerships and other kinds of networks that are fairly autonomous with respect to the state. Participation in such a network is usually based on mutual interests, exchange of resources and commitment; the relationships between the participants do not have to be balanced' (p. 110).

Dekker and Van Kempen (2004) distinguish three different kind of collaboration: (1) the central government, municipality, and sub-municipality whereby more and more responsibilities are transferred to the lower government; (2) the involvement of the private sector, that has resources for the projects; and (3) the involvement of voluntary and community sectors in decision-making. The underlying notion in this perspective is seeing the citizens not only as objects, but as actors. Andersen (2001) states that the citizens are supposed to be capable of managing their own lives and everything that is necessary for improvement of their lives and their environment. This set-up has increased the hierarchies and bureaucracies leading to a complex, dynamic and diverse urban environment. This way of city governance should engender city knowledge on the one hand; on the other hand it may generate tensions and conflicts regarding accountability, legitimacy and power. Dekker and Van Kempen (2004) mention the accountability as the main problem whereby it is not clear who is responsible when something goes wrong or as when something is wrong. The point of view towards the city of one actor can be different than another actor, e.g. private interests and public interests. Self-interests are often higher than the interest of the whole neighbourhood.

Van Marissing *et al.* (2006) try to link urban governance with social cohesion. They state that the negative side of social cohesion could lead into exclusion of people from the cohesive group. Nevertheless, trying to include the citizens into the urban governance also requires knowledge of the diversity of the population. Including everybody also means to know where people live, understand the communities and know the way they are organised and participate in the city governance. According to Van Marissing *et al.*, there are two elements that are important including the citizens in city governance: place attachment and social network. Place attachment rests on the opportunities to choose your dwelling self; in particular low-income households could have problems to get freedom of choice. The

social network is helpful for residents to maintain contact, formal as well informal with the neighbourhood. According to Van Marissing *et al.*, there are several insights for this approach in the academic debate: on the one hand the variety of contacts among urban residents shows that residents are no longer focused on the neighbourhood for social contacts while on the other hand low-income household are more likely be oriented in the neighbourhood because of their financial limitations travelling far afield for social contact. In addition to the social network, Blokland (2003) shows four types of relationships:

- interdependencies: you simply live next to each other so you might both affect each the quality of life, e.g. the smoke of a barbeque;
- transactions: where some kind of exchange takes place, e.g. saying good morning;
- neighbourhood attachments: through memberships of (sport-)organisations;
- bonds: relationships based on affection, like family etc.

Recent technological developments makes social contact possible through social media like Facebook or WhatsApp. Nevertheless, this could just be seen as a way to make social contact instead it replaces social contact. For neighbourhood cohesion it is important to afford space for social networks. In the most cases, this could be through formal participation, what policy makers also call *citizen participation* (Van Marissing *et al.*, 2006). This citizen participation could be established top down whereby the municipality has an active role in, but could also be established bottom up, whereby a particular social group have the need to organise themselves. This social group could be an ethnic minority. In most cases this is the start of an ethnic self-organisation. The following section describes more in-depth the role of the ethnic self-organisations.

4.4.1: THE ETHNIC SELF-ORGANISATIONS: SPACE FOR THE OWN COMMUNITY

The previous section points out the importance for citizen participation. In the urban politics it is important to include the citizens as they are part of the new city or urban governance (Dekker and Van Kempen, 2004). This formal inclusion of citizens happens through organised citizens. This could be mainstream organisations but could also be an organisation based for a particular ethnic minority. As section 2.5 (Self-organisation) highlights the importance of the ethnic self-organisation, this chapter will spread out the role of ethnic self-organisations for the urban politics in The Hague.

The importance of ethnic self-organisations rests on an ethnic community inside the city borders focussing on the own ethnic community and their challenges. Self-organisations could be established towards participation like *Stichting Kefeya* (Foundation Kefeya) what is focused on women from Arabic descendant who are living under the cultural pressure of their husband and could not participate in the free Dutch society [El Sayed, personal communication, June 20, 2016]. This organisation is active for a

particular group – Arabic women – and helps this group to participate in the urban setting. To accomplish this, this organisation is active in the city governance to stand up for their interests. The emphasis rely on the *ethnic* group. Moreover, as Irshad Gobind of *Stichting Hindustani* (Foundation Hindustani) makes clear about the role of self-organisations for the ethnic group:

“... *Self-organisations here are not indispensable, no matter how big or good a charity is, or a healthcare facility. You need an organisation that builds the bridge here. So someone who builds the bridge from rescuer to the client (migrant)...*” [Gobind, personal communication, June 13, 2016]¹²

Gobind stresses the role of an ethnic self-organisation has for the ethnic community. Functioning as the bridge between the ethnic community and the mainstream community helps to participate people with a non-Dutch descendant in the urban setting. As figure 6, 7, 8 and 9 show the segregated areas, it is likely that – without ethnic self-organisations – the participation level of citizens in the urban setting is low and therefore also low in the city governance. It is difficult to say if these citizens are forced to live here. The place attachment perspective of Van Marissing *et al.* (2006) suggests the exclusion of the low-income households into urban governance. People could live somewhere they do not like it, but are forced through high house prices. Applied to The Hague, there seems a difference. There seems a relationship between low-income households and people with non-Dutch descendant, in this research citizens with a Turkish, Moroccan or Surinamese descendant (see figure 6, 7, 8 and 9 and *Ruimtelijke kengetallen* of Gemeente Den Haag, 2010). Admittedly, there could be other reasons that result in this relationship like self-segregation (Phillips, 2006; Zorlu and Mulder, 2008).

However, the location of the self-organisations is important to understand citizens with a non-Dutch descendant and their participation in the society. Figure 10 and table 2 give a broad view of the location of ethnic self-organisations in the city. The categorisation has been made through their main focus, what the self-organisations mentioned by themselves or what could be made up through the name or goal of the self-organisations, e.g. *Stichting Hindustani* is likely that their primary focus is for citizens with a (Surinam-) Hindustan descendant and the same is the case for *Southern Sudanese Women association*; they are respectively a (Surinam-) Hindustan self-organisation and an African self-organisation. The latter is in a small amount and therefore coded as *others*. The other categories with a significant amount are: *Hindustan*, *Islamic*, *Moroccan*, *Surinamese* and *Turkish*. There should be noted that while the self-

¹² Original quote: ‘...zelforganisaties hierbij niet onmisbaar zijn, ongeacht hoe groot of goed een hulporganisatie ook is, een zorginstelling is. Je hebt toch een organisatie nodig die de brug bouwt hierin. Dus iemand die brug bouwt van hulpverlener, naar de cliënt (migrant)...’

organisations have got an ethnically suggested name, the activities of the self-organisations are open for everybody according to the self-organisations. The self-organisations are operating voluntarily and working on an ideological goal whereby they are not limited to one particular group. Nevertheless, this does not preclude that people do not feel confidential when there is an ethnically suggested name.

Figure 10 and table 2 are based on the data of all ethnic self-organisations that received a subsidy from the City of The Hague or are known by Fonds1818. According to their suggestive name and their goal there are 172 ethnic self-organisations, mostly Turkish and (Surinam-) Hindustan. Due to the lack of information of some organisations, information of 168 ethnic self-organisations can be used (see also chapter Methods & Data). These 168 organisations are coded in 12 categories.

According to Da Graca (2010), there is a strict distinction between the micro- and macro functions of a self-organisation. The micro functions of a self-organisation are inside the community based like to meet, social interaction etc. The macro functions of a self-organisation are more orientated towards building on social capital and the creation of public opinion. Based on these functions and the case study of Da Graca towards the Cape Verdian community in Rotterdam, Da Graca distinguishes 11 different types of an ethnic self-organisation. The *interest organisations* have put the emphasis on integration and are mainly focusing on the interests of the ethnic population. *Cultural organisations* have a cultural experience and practising their culture is their main task. The *media organisations* are mainly radio-stations and magazines. *Sport organisations* are in most cases clubs special for the ethnic group and *youth organisations* are mainly focused on the youth participation into the society e.g. re-entering low-skilled youngster into the labour market. They are distinguished with *educational organisations* that are offering courses for elder people. *Elderly organisations* are characterised as elderly participation into the society and are therefore more social clubs. Same for the *women organisations*, only the target audience is different. *Political organisations* are not that much ethnically, for the case of The Hague this is only the *Party for Unity (Partij voor de Eenheid)* what focus on the Islamic community in The Hague. *Religious organisations* have their primary task to operate on and distribute the religious believing and practices. *Health care organisations* focus more on health care whereby the mainstream network is not successful in.

Table 2 shows some interesting differences comparing the different ethnic groups. First, ethnic self-organisations are mainly broad organisations instead they have a specific task. Most ethnic self-organisations characterise themselves as interest or cultural organisation. Taking the program and activities of them into account, these ethnic self-organisations could be seen as quite broad. It is also the most general category to fit a self-organisation into. In the survey – filled by 54 organisations – most of the respondents answered to be quite broad and have a broad audience. The other organisations are

coded based on their goal and their activities. Another feature is that there is a relatively high amount of Turkish women organisations and Surinamese elderly organisations. This could be explained to the social challenges or preferences to be with the own ethnic group.

Looking to the location of these ethnic self-organisations, there could be stated that most ethnic self-organisations are located in the city centre formally. This map (figure 10) shows the formal location of an ethnic self-organisation. The ethnic self-organisations in The Hague are not clustered. It should be noted that there is looked to the formal address of an ethnic self-organisation. It is likewise that an ethnic self-organisation is located formally on the address of the president, but their activities are in a union building. Therefore table 3 gives more in-depth information of the intended purpose of the building on that address. This is registered in the *Basis registration addresses and buildings (BAG: Basisregistraties Adressen en Gebouwen)*. The BAG is part of the municipality administration that is responsible for the information and the justification of all buildings in a municipality. All municipalities should offer this information to the nationwide BAG (LV BAG). The BAG distinguishes 11 types, whereby only seven types are appeared on these address (Gemeente Amsterdam, n.d.):

- *meeting*: the congregation of people for art, culture, religion, communication etc. More concrete these buildings are e.g. churches or clubhouses;
- *industry*: the commercial processing or storage of materials and good or for agricultural purposes;
- *living*: family houses. It is likely that this suggest just a formal address location for correspondence and/or the living address of the president/secretary of the self-organisation. This limits figure 10 not offering a represented view of the ethnic self-organisations.
- *offices*: places for administration, same limitation as the goal *living*;
- *education*: in this case mainly old school buildings;
- *sport*: sport buildings;
- *shop*: places intended for trading materials, goods and services.

Table 2: Ethnic self-organisations in The Hague by type.¹³

Ethnicity	I	%	C	%	Y	%	M	%	E	%	F	%	P	%	R	%	S	%	W	%	HC	%	O	%	Total	%
Hindustani	8	23%	9	26%	-	0%	6	17%	3	9%	3	9%	-	0%	3	9%	1	3%	2	6%	-	0%	-	0%	35	100%
Islamic	3	30%	1	10%	-	0%	-	0%	2	20%	-	0%	1	10%	2	20%	-	0%	1	10%	-	0%	-	0%	10	100%
Moroccan	8	36%	5	23%	2	9%	-	0%	-	0%	-	0%	-	0%	-	0%	2	9%	2	9%	2	9%	1	5%	22	100%
Surinamese	3	27%	4	36%	-	0%	1	9%	-	0%	2	18%	-	0%	-	0%	-	0%	1	9%	-	0%	-	0%	11	100%
Turkish	16	41%	12	31%	1	3%	1	3%	2	5%	-	0%	-	0%	1	3%	-	0%	6	15%	-	0%	-	0%	39	100%
Others	25	49%	12	24%	1	2%	-	0%	4	8%	4	8%	-	0%	-	0%	1	2%	4	8%	-	0%	-	0%	51	100%
Total	63	38%	43	26%	4	2%	8	5%	11	7%	9	5%	1	1%	6	4%	4	2%	16	10%	2	1%	1	1%	168	100%

Made by author

Clarification for table 2 and figure 10.

I = Interest organisation
 C = Cultural organisation
 Y = Youth organisation
 M = Media organisation
 E = Educative organisation
 F = Elderly organisation

P = Political organisation
 R = Religious organisation
 S = Sport organisation
 W = Women organisation
 H = Health care organisation
 O = Other

Explanation colours in figure 10.

Blue = Hindustan self-organisation
 Brown = Islamic self-organisation
 Green = Moroccan self-organisation
 Red = Surinamese self-organisation
 Yellow = Turkish self-organisation
 Black = Other self-organisations

¹³ Note: This is a summary of all ethnic self-organisations who received a subsidy from The Hague Municipal or is known by Fonds1818. In addition, the ethnicity and the type organisation has been coded by the author. Therefore, it is likely that the numbers are biased. Nevertheless, it gives a good overview of what ethnicity the best is represented.

Table 3: The function of the buildings.

	Meeting	Industry	Offices	Combined offices/living	Education	Sport	Shop	Combined shop/offices	Living	Other	Unknown	Total
Amount	23	13	14	2	6	2	7	3	51	4	25	150 ¹⁵

Source: BAG.

Table 3 shows that most of the locations have the function of *meeting* or *industry*. The buildings are built around 1970s, a period when most people from Turkey, Morocco and Suriname moved to the Netherlands. It was not likely that ethnic communities received a building for their own community. Arriving in The Hague, the migrants were not supported through The Hague municipality for their inner-community activities: the ethnic communities claimed their own place where they could organise activities for their own community. This development was not that simply as it sounds. As Tjandrika Rangoe, the former president of *Federatie Eekta* (Federation Eekta), states [personal communication, June 14, 2016]:

'... Look it was not just assumed that you have got a building, there was a group that lobbied for this building, Eekta bhauwen, and who has to make a fight also, they have occupied the municipality... SER, and the municipality have been engaged, in order to enforce to get a building. Because they had noticed that there are some groups who came from the countryside, we came from Suriname, the countryside, and we noticed that the culture shock was quite high. We also noticed, within the family, families fall apart, children were running from house away, suicidal behaviour rose, and there happened a lot. And our goal was to try to keep families together...'¹⁶

¹⁵ The difference with table 2 is due to the lack of information of certain organisations.

¹⁶ Original quote: *'...kijk het was niet zomaar gegaan dat je een gebouw gekregen heb, er was een groep die hiervoor ging, een eigen gebouw, Eekta bhauwen, en die heeft ook een fight moeten leveren, ze hebben een bezettingsactie, ... SER bezet, en de gemeente is bezet geweest, om af te dwingen om een gebouw te krijgen. Want ze hadden gemerkt dat er een aantal groepen, die kwamen uit het platteland, wij kwamen uit Suriname, het platteland, en we merkten dat de cultuurschock vrij hoog was. Dat merkte je ook, zo merkte je het binnen het gezin, gezinnen vielen uit elkaar, kinderen liepen uit huis weg, suïcidaal gedrag nam toe, er gebeurde heel veel. En onze doel was probeer gezinnen bij elkaar te houden.'*

Rangoe stresses getting an own building for a community was hard, but is necessary. People need to find a place for themselves where they can live and feel comfortable. Thereafter most of these buildings have been transformed, e.g. an old school building that is transformed into a union building. It is likely that these buildings are located in this part of the city (see figure 10) simply through the reason here was accommodation available.

Rangoe indicates that the importance of an own building rests on the experience of life for people with a non-Dutch descendant. According to Aisha Mangre of *Stichting You Matter* (Foundation You Matter), people with non-Dutch descendants are living in a dual world. The cultural norms and values of the place of origin and at the home of a migrant are different than the cultural norms and values in the mainstream society. As Aisah Mangre expresses [personal communication, June 8, 2016]:

"... that nostalgia that you return to what is familiar, to your roots, which I find very important. (...) They get also along cultural codes, as they are in some kind of dual conflict of the society. That of you are Moroccan, Turkish, but in the first place you live here, you behave like a Dutch. And what are the cultural codes and groups of which you are supposed to behave, the framework. And you see also what the framework within you should behave is. They feel happy with that framework..."¹⁷

Rangoe and Mangre are suggesting the importance for a place in The Hague for people with a non-Dutch descendant: getting the feeling that they are also part of the society and have a place where they live into. A place outside their house where they feel comfortable to. The social problems what have come through the assimilation into the new society shows how high the threshold is, in particular for the first generation. Regarding the second generation, the dual living world forms a bigger problem because this generation is growing up in two worlds. The first generation in contrary has experienced another social setting. The second generation grows up and experiences a different setting at home than at school. Mangre [personal communication, June 8, 2016] highlights recent events where this challenge came into conflict: the Dutch-Moroccan youth who cared for unrest in a district in Ede (the Netherlands) because they were angry about the closure of their community centre (NOS.nl, 2016). Mangre stresses therefore the importance of people with a non-Dutch descendant to have a place in the urban setting or at least a feeling they are part of the city. This requires an important position for

¹⁷ Original quote: *...dat nostalgie, dat van je thuiskomst, wat vertrouwd is, waar je wortels liggen, dat vind ik ontzettend belangrijk. (...) Die krijgen ook de culturele codes mee, want zij zitten toch ook in een soort van tweestrijd in de samenleving. Die van je bent Marokkaan, je bent Turk, maar in de eerste plaatst je leef hier, je gedraagt je als een Nederlander. En wat zijn dan de culturele codes en groepen waarbinnen je je hoort te gedragen, de kaders. En je ziet dan ook wat de kaders zijn waarbinnen je je moet gedragen. Zij voelen zich daar ook happy bij...*

The Hague Municipality. According to Mangre should The Hague municipality include ethnic self-organisations in the city governance to get every citizen a right place in the city. She states that most ethnic self-organisations feel themselves marginalised in the city through the municipality, e.g. through their subsidy policy. The group of ethnic self-organisations that do not receive subsidy has not included in this research, but the group that received subsidy stated during the interviews that the application for a subsidy is hard and a long-term project.

This section started with the main function of ethnic self-organisations: building the bridge between ethnic cultural norms and values and the mainstream society. As Van Marissing *et al.* (2006) already suggested related to the urban governance in the previous section, the two actors – place attachment and social network – are important to get citizen participation. Most of the ethnic self-organisations are interest or cultural organisations or are participation for a specific audience like the Turkish women organisations. Nevertheless, they are all working for a specific ethnic group and are located in the area where most citizens with a non-Dutch background are living. The meeting place where people can feel comfortable with respect to their own ethnic/cultural background has been stressed through Tjandrika Rangoe and Aisah Mangre. This sounds desirable according the urban governance theory of Van Marissing *et al.* (2006). However The Hague Municipality has a large influence in this urban governance: most ethnic self-organisations are dependent of The Hague Municipality. Rangoe states already the challenge *Eekta Bhauwan* had to receive an own building (see quote). The second section will put the role of The Hague Municipality central in this urban setting.

4.4.2: THE ROLE OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF THE HAGUE

The citizens of The Hague are represented by the City Council. Together with the *College van Burgemeester en Wethouders* (College of Mayor and Councillors) is the City Council the board of The Hague Municipality. It is the highest representative of the municipality and consists of 45 members and 15 parties, which are elected each four years. The City Council has the responsibility to decide on large projects and the budget. The present coalition of the City Council (2014-2018) consists of five political parties: D66 (social-liberal); PvdA (labour party); Haagse Stadspartij (local party); VVD (liberal) and CDA (centre). The 26 positions are divided whereby D66 is the largest party (Gemeente Den Haag, 2016). After the election, these parties have drawn a coalition agreement, called *Vertrouwen op Haagse Kracht* (Trust on The Hague Power). In this coalition agreement, the focus is to make the city more attractive for international institutions and international sport events on the one hand, and to focus more on the participation of the citizens of The Hague and the bottom up development of the city on the other hand. The latter stress the position regarding volunteers (Gemeente Den Haag, 2014). In addition, in the annual working plan of team participation (*Jaarwerkplan 2016: productgroep Participatie*) the focus rely on inclusiveness, for all the citizens in The Hague; in particular the marginalised.

Most initiatives are taken through the self-organisations. Building employee¹⁸ of city district *Escamp*, Gaby de Vries, states in responding on the activities of self-organisations [personal communication, April 25, 2016]:

*'..It is their core business. In this district you see that they (the self-organisations) come together almost every weekend and that they discuss a theme, and once in a while there is a major activity...'*¹⁹

De Vries states the importance of the ethnic self-organisations in the urban setting. His work is to support the establishment of these activities. According to De Vries, the problem with most ethnic self-organisations is that they do not know how to apply.

*'What I saw, is that the level was really low when I came to work. We had much to reject. We have worked a few years and I have had a role into. How to find a funding, and to pay attention to here, and there. And I notice that I have now to do less. We see that they are making real steps. So, there is invested and we do not have to reject as much. I can imagine that it was really frustrating'*²⁰ [G. de Vries, personal communication, April 25, 2016].

An ethnic self-organisation has not always enough resources to establish an activity, like financial or an own building. Therefore (ethnic) self-organisations are dependent of the local government. To get support of the local government, the activities should be in accordance with the city ambitions, what is on their turn depending on the political landscape in the council. These ambitions could be in contradiction towards the societal problems of one marginalised group that are not represented in the urban politics. However it depends on what is desirable. In this perspective the city major and councillors have their say on what direction the city should develop. But more important is the support and the power self-organisations receive for what they would like to establish in the society. As Tjandrika Rangoe already stated, there are a lot of problems in the society whereby the cultural norms and values are in conflict with the mainstream society. Giving power towards these ethnic self-organisations has the

¹⁸ Official titel in Dutch: Opbouwmedewerker.

¹⁹ Original quote: *'...dat is wel een van de corebusiness van deze organisaties. Hier in de wijk zie je wel dat ze bijna elk weekend bij elkaar komen en dat er wel een thema aan bewoont is, en dat eens in de zoveel tijd een grote activiteit plaatsvindt...'*

²⁰ Original quote: *'Wat ik wel zag is dat het niveau echt laag was toen ik kwam werken. Dat we veel in moesten afwijzen. Daar hebben we een paar jaar aan gewerkt en daar heb ik een rol in gehad. Bij hoe je subsidie kan vinden, en let daar even op, en daar op. en ik merk dat ik nu ook minder hoeft te doen daarin. We zien wel dat ze echt stappen maken. Er is dus wel investeert en dat we dan niet meer zoveel hoeven te afwijzen. Ik kan me voorstellen dat dat wel frustrerend is.'*

consequence that particular societal issues are helped out. However, giving power away has the consequence that the local government is loosening their function into the society as director of the city. This issue will be elaborated after explaining the role of third parties: the non-government.

4.4.3: THE NON-GOVERNMENT

The local government helps the ethnic self-organisations towards funding and establishing an activity. In most cases these activities should be in accordance with what the city policies are. From this way it is thinkable that the local government is the director according what kind of activities there are in the city. They have the resources to support an activity like financial support. However, there are also other ways of funding. There are several funds active like the Orange Fund (*Oranje Fonds*) and Fonds1818. This section will discuss the role of Fonds1818 as an example of the non-government participating in the city governance (Fonds1818.nl, 2016).

Fonds1818 is an equity fund that supports community projects in the region Delft, Zoetermeer, The Hague, Leiden, Duin- and Bollenstreek and intermediate municipalities. The fund donates to foundations and associations what is in the benefit of the society. There are different themes where they focus on like health care, education and youth.


More interesting towards Fonds1818 is that they do not only support financially, but also accompany the self-organisations with other problems like tax problems and management challenges. For example they organise workshops to evolve collaboration and activities with and between ethnic self-organisations. As Gaby de Vries stated, the problem with ethnic self-organisations is often that they do not know how to apply for funding or support. Their way of communication and way of working is often different than the mainstream way of working. It is speaking with norms and values that are culturally different and in conflict with each other. Nevertheless Fonds1818 participates on this issue and offers possibilities and resources for (ethnic) self-organisations.

4.4.4: THE URBAN CONFLICT

The above sections discussed several actors that are participating in the city governance. In the discussion of the city governance, the emphasize was put on the link with social cohesion: the relation with place attachment and social network (Van Marissing *et al.*, 2005). Dekker and Van Kempen (2004) discussed three kind of actors good urban governance should include: the government, the private sector and the involvement of voluntary and community sectors in decision making. For the city of The Hague, these actors are related to The Hague Municipality as responsible government; the non-government actors like Fonds1818 and the (ethnic) self-organisations. They all have an influence on the citizens. As the previous sections make clear, it is likely that these actors have other priorities. This

difference in priorities could lead to an urban conflict. This urban conflict is schematic visible in figure 11 and will be discussed further in this section.

Figure 11: The urban governance in the city of The Hague (basic).



Source: Made by author.

The urban conflict consists of three different actors (Dekker and Van Kempen, 2004) and include the citizens. In the urban conflict the central question relies on what the relationship is between these actors. The scale used in this perspective is on local level. It is likely that all these actors are influenced from actors on a higher scale. This will be discussed later in the context of (Surinam-) Hindustan and Turkish self-organisations. Regarding The Hague Municipality, it is likely that they are influenced through the regional, national or supranational (EU) government e.g. through funding or policies. These influences are not included in figure 11. There should also be noted that the size of the arrows are not suggesting the insensitivity of the relation. The (basic) model shows what the relations are between the actors.

These actors could be distinguished in various ways. First there are formal and informal actors. The formal actor is the (non-)government and the informal actor consists of the ethnic self-organisations in this case. The ethnic self-organisations participate on diverse aspects: they function on cultural activities like music and dancing in the sphere of congregation or function with interest activities like debates and discussions to function as a bridge into the mainstream society. The formal actor includes the non-government and the government; Fonds1818 and The Hague Municipality in this case. In contrary to the informal actor, the formal actor are more professional, formal established and structured. The citizens are separable and are influenced and participate through these formal and informal actors. This underlines the relationship between these actors with the citizens.

Relation local government and citizens

The relation between the local government and the citizens is not always clear as it should be. The policy of The Hague Municipality is highly dependent towards the decisions of the councillors and their connected political party. The left wing politics could have other ideas on this relationship than the right wing politics. In contrary, the citizens have the decision towards the political direction. The citizens vote for their political preference in the hope they will come up for their interest. This suggests a two-way road of importance. However, it is likely that the citizens with a non-Dutch descendant or the citizens with a lower education are not that familiar with the politics. So, while this relationship should be a two-way road, or even a relationship whereby the citizens have more influence into, the role of the government towards the citizens are stronger.

Relation with the ethnic self-organisations

This relationship becomes more complex. The local government is more and more focussing on and supporting the citizens but takes not always the responsibilities. The societal responsibilities go towards the ethnic self-organisations. The ethnic self-organisations are focussing on societal issues that occurs particular to their ethnic group like family tensions. The local government focus and support these ethnic self-organisation through funding the activities if it is in accordance with the city' policies. This brings a few implications for the self-organisations. The self-organisations are dependent of city' policies and every time it is questionable if they will receive a subsidy: the local government does not support ethnic self-organisations structurally [A. Mangre, personal communication, June 8, 2016]. This makes the relationship short term and fragile.

The relationship between the citizens and the ethnic self-organisations is more structured. In most cases the ethnic self-organisations can find their network and participate on the issue that play in the specific ethnic group and regarding the citizens the threshold to step to an ethnic self-organisation is easier for

most citizens. It is likely that within the ethnic self-organisations, the language that is spoken is not always Dutch (section 5.2.2.4: The others: the inward organisations will give a more broad description of this relation).

Most ethnic self-organisations do not feel themselves supported by the local government. Ethnic self-organisations participate mainly on one or two specific ethnic groups. The policymakers have to listen to the counsellors and the way the counsellors would work towards participation in the society. The ethnic self-organisations work on particular societal issues, but the recognition of important social issues and its support is from The Hague Municipality. From this perspective there would be suggested the city power is by The Hague Municipality. It suggests that The Hague Municipality is the director of the city, knows what plays in the city and participates on those issues. However, this is not the case: the initiatives made by ethnic self-organisation are bottom up led. The Hague Municipality does not have a complete overview of all ethnic self-organisations and their activities. There seems like a conflict here. The other official actor – non-governmental parties – are participating on this conflict.

Relation with non-government parties

Social funds like Fonds1818 are participating on this conflict and support ethnic self-organisations. They focus on the challenges for foundations and associations. This shows the importance of third parties as Fonds1818. While there is a relation with The Hague Municipality and the citizens, the strongest role relation seems to happen with the (ethnic) self-organisations. It seems like that there is a strong position for the non-government party like Fonds1818. However, it is desirable that The Hague Municipality should get the overview of what is happening in the city. They are the democratic elected representatives of the city and participate on the challenges for the city. It could be assumed that an ethnic self-organisation, that has been rejected for their subsidy application by The Hague Municipality, could complete their budget through a third party fund, what is in opposition of the policy of The Hague Municipality. This will led to an on-going conflict for the urban politics in The Hague whereby The Hague Municipality cannot participate on certain issues in the city. In other words: The Hague municipality has not an overview of the city.

4.5: CONCLUSION: WHO IS THE BIG BOSS?

This chapter shows an interesting overview of The Hague. It started with an overview of the most important geographies where The Hague is embedded into and how The Hague is located in the Netherlands. Subsequently an overview is offered about the diversity in The Hague and the ethnic self-organisations which are located in the city. The last part looked more towards the meaning of these ethnic self-organisations for the city and the urban governance in the city of The Hague. More

interesting is the position how the urban conflict in The Hague is situated, in particular the different perspectives the different actors have.

The question for The Hague arises: who conducts the city and/or who should be (or what is the big boss?). Starting to answer the last question first, the role of the municipality depends on what political sphere will be used. The question on who directs, rests on the importance of the non-governmental actors, the official like funds and on non-official like the ethnic self-organisations. The ethnic self-organisations are participating on societal issues but more important, they are participating into the demand of the society, something what would be desirable if The Hague Municipality could do. In getting support of The Hague Municipality, the municipality works most of the time against the ethnic self-organisations what offers budgetary challenges. Therefore the ethnic self-organisations are forced to complete their budget and go to third parties like Fonds1818. While in this overview a strong role for the municipality is desirable, it is political influenced what the role of the municipality is. It is likely that the left-progressive parties have another opinion then the right-conservative parties. This could open up a discussion about what the desirable role of the government is in the urban government. This becomes more complex when taking the transnational character of ethnic self-organisations into account.

The role of the ethnic self-organisations could be stronger than have been suggested: they could be part of a larger ethnic network. Ethnic communities in a place of destination could have ties with ethnic communities in other places of destinations. They could relate to each other and have an established ethnic network. This *transnationalism* is getting more importance in the academic literature (see 2.3: Global city – Migration: cross-border activities) and has an interesting outcome for cities: the way ethnic communities put cities in an ethnic network. This aspect will be discussed in the following chapter. The Turkish self-organisations and (Surinam-) Hindustan self-organisations will be described as cases for the city of The Hague.

5. CASE: THE TURKISH AND SURINAM-HINDUSTAN

The previous sections – in particular section 4.4: The Hague: city politics – make clear that the urban governance consists of three main actors: the government, the private sector or non-government and the citizens. For citizens to accomplish their position in the urban governance, it is likely they are organised. As Da Graca (2010) points out, the organisation of citizens happens on a natural way whereby people with the same identity are orientated together. Within this understanding the ethnic self-organisations are important as a way of organisation in the city. However, their position in the urban governance and city politics stresses a complication in the desirable urban governance as shown in the previous chapter.

The urban governance as described in section 4.4 does not include external influences. While for the local government it is presumably it is influenced by the regional or national governance, external influences of the ethnic self-organisations are likewise but quite unknown. Recent academics stress the transnationalism in scientific debates (e.g. Portes, 2003; see also section 2.2.2: Global city view from bottom up). The practical outcome could be that these ethnic self-organisations are embedded in transnational worlds that have their outcomes even in the (local) city governance. While this aspect sounds negative – the big boss role of the municipality is affected – it shows also an interesting aspect of *scaling up* the city in this transnational network. This aspect, the way ethnic self-organisations are transnational organised will be discussed in this chapter.

This chapter will go more beyond the ethnic self-organisation, whereby the case of the Turkish and the (Surinam-) Hindustan self-organisations will be discussed. Turkish self-organisations are most known in the academic literature and are present-day an important topic in societal issues. The (Surinam-) Hindustan self-organisations are relatively highly visible in The Hague but unknown in the literature. These two ethnicities have a different organisational structure. The (Surinam-) Hindustan self-organisations have not a strong government policy from Surinam instead the Turkish what do have from Turkey. Therefore the (Surinam-) Hindustan self-organisation are a more bottom-up network instead the Turkish self-organisations that are affected through a top-down support from Turkey or another country what will be shown in this chapter.

The aim of this chapter is to give an understanding towards the ethnic network where cities could be located into and what are important players in this network. It is not relevant to show what this network is; therefore data is missing and requires putting the ethnic network central. More relevant is putting the city central related to ethnic structures towards the ethnic network. Taking this perspective central is helpful to understand city governance in its broader sense and to understand how a city can be embedded in an ethnic network. The first section will describe the Turkish self-organisations, followed

by the (Surinam-) Hindustan self-organisations. At the end, these two type of ethnic self-organisations will be compared.

5.1: THE POLARISED TURKISH SELF-ORGANISATIONS

The integration and inclusion of Turkish organisations in the mainstream society have widely been debated by academics and politicians. Several studies show a top-down perspective regarding the Turkish community. This section will discuss the position of the Turkish self-organisation in The Hague. In this social setting it is important to know some background information of the Turkish politics, what the first section will describe. The following section will describe briefly the Turkish organisations in Europe. The Alevi organisation will put more into detail as an example of a transnational organisational structure. In the last section the specific case of The Hague will be discussed: the foreign power through the ethnic self-organisations in The Hague.

5.1.1: TURKISH POLITICS

To understand the organisational base of Turkish organisations in the Netherlands and Europe, it is important to know how the diverse Turkish political landscape developed after the foundation of the Turkish state in 1923. This development has four stages according to Sunier and Landman (2015).

1. The first stage starts in 1923 – after the foundation of Turkey – with the CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi; *Republican People's Party*) as the only ruling party. According to the CHP organisation on basis of class, ethnicity or religion was forbidden. Other parties saw this as an obstruction to develop a multi-party setting, but came after the Second World War.
2. Hereby starts the second stage: after the Second World War (1945) with a multi-party setting. The DP (Demokrat Parti; *Democratic Party*) supported by the Kurdish Islamic scholar and preacher Said Nursi and the conservative-liberal AP (Adalet Partisi; *Justice Party*) led by Süleyman Demirel came up. These parties differ on the Islamic rhetoric and the meaning of *laiklik* (secularism) in Turkey. In this debate later on the Islamic movement *Milli Görüş* get their foundations, established through Necmettin Erbakan (1926-2011). The *Milli Görüş* was fierce opponent of the further internationalisation of the economy and the growing dependence of Turkey on the West. They claimed for a strong focus on Islamic foundations. In words of Erbakan, the political landscape of Turkey was now divided in three categories: a liberal vision (AP), a leftist vision (CHP) and a national vision (*Milli Görüş*) what has propagated by the MSP (*Milli Selamet Partisi*; National Salvation Party, established in 1970 by Erbakan; Sunier and Landman, 2015: 20). The most important development through these years is the role of Islam on the political agenda.

3. The third stage starts with the military coup in 1980 when the tensions between the parties was high about the role of Islam on the political agenda. Kenan Evran (1917 – 2015) changed the political landscape whereby Islamic values received a central place towards science and technological development. According to Yavuz (cited in Sunier and Landman, 2015: 22), the Diyanet, Directorate of Religious Affairs has the task of introducing the Turkish-Islam synthesis ideology in their material and to teach it both in Turkish mosques as well as among Turkish migrants in Europe. Directly after the military coup of 1980, all parties were banned.
4. In 2003 the AKP²¹ (*Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi*: Justice and Progress party) with Erdogan started a new stage with a new political wind whereby the underlying notion rests on the relation between state, society and religion, what is visible in the interpretation and application of secularism and the role of the state (and army) in.

This establishment and immense development of the Turkish state shows how divers the Turkish political landscape is. This political development is important to understand the polarised structure of the Turkish organisation in The Hague. The following section will describe a few organisations that are located in The Hague and have their origins in the development of Turkish politic. One of the organisations will be described more in-depth to visualise the transnational part of an organisation. The approach of Sunier and Landman (2015) of the Turkish movements and organisations will be used as a starting point. There should be note that these are state-led or community driven organisation from Turkey. Nevertheless, as section 5.1.4 makes clear, the local self-organisations of the Turkish community in The Hague are linked with one of these organisations. First, the next section will describe the development of these Turkish organisations in (West-) Europe.

5.1.2: THE EUROPEAN TURKISH LANDSCAPE

Zorlu and Hartog (2002) describe the influx Turkish migrants during the 1960s and the influx of their family during the 1980s. The attendance of Turkish migrants went along with Turkish self-organisations as described in section 4.4.1 (The ethnic self-organisation: space for the own community). The Netherlands and other arrival countries offered this space. According to Sunier and Landman (2015) a neutral state where religion is completely separated by the state and whereby the state only grants religious freedom without interference in religious affairs is a myth. Sunier and Landman stress that the pillarization structure of the Dutch society offers the possibility that Turkish migrants can start their own school. Most of the organisations are established through temporary policies with the thought that the Turkish will return (Zorlu and Hartog, 2002). In the end of the 1970s and in the 1980s – family reunification showed the contrary and the Turkish migrants started to settle definitely – frequently in

²¹ In 2001, the Milli Görüş went back to the political world and divided into two groups: the traditionalists, with Erbakan and the reformists, with Erdogan, who founded the AKP.

old quarters of main town centres. The recognition came that the Turkish migrants will stay in the Netherlands/West-Europe. The need for religious places and religious qualified personnel increased. On the other hand, Turkish organisations transferred their activities towards Europe, due to the political struggles in Turkey (e.g. the coup of 1980). Opposite's parties experienced state repressions and stricter rules on dissident religious activities in Turkey. The religious freedom of European countries was the main cause for the Turkish organisations to move and expand their activities in Europe. Sunier and Landman (2015) state that they could ensure on moral and material support and know-how from their counterparts in Turkey. Germany has focused as the main hub for the organisations and their structure what will be clear in section 5.1.3 (A small case: transnational Alevi).

The official Islam: Diyanet

There are different Turkish organisations that have a transnationalism aspect and are institutionalised in The Hague. The first one is the official Turkish state-led organisation. The Turkish state has its own department that regulates the practical aspects of religious life in Turkey: the *Diyanet Isleri Bakanligi* (Directorate of Religious Affairs; shortly Diyanet). Diyanet is the instrument to control Islam at home and abroad and 'to make the Islam Turkish' (Sunier and Landman, 2015). Other groups, the Christian and Jewish communities have their own official institution in Turkey. The Diyanet is established in 1924 and has three main tasks according to Sunier and Landman (2015: 48):

1. to administer the affairs of the Islamic faith and the principles of its worship and morality;
2. to illuminate the public about religion;
3. to administer places of worship.

The origin of Diyanet rests on the perspective of Turkish secularism: not a rigorous separation of religion and state but bringing the Islam under Turkish control. Since 1970s, imams are sent to Europe originating from and paid by Diyanet. Diyanet has therefore a huge influence in the religious life of Turkish mosques: it has the role as employer of all the imams and Friday preachers and is even entitled to prescribe what to preach. Diyanet positions himself in a complex situation, on the one hand balancing between religious traditions and on the other hand they are limited by the Turkish state. This last aspect led to a hierarchical organisational structure, whereby local organisations are part of the central organisation. The full-time salaried imam that Diyanet offers make them a strong player in the field. In the Netherlands, *Hollanda Diyanet Vakfi* (Diyanet Foundation Netherlands, Islamitische Stichting Nederland, ISN) is the largest mosque-organisation, controlling 143 of the 220 Turkish mosques (Sunier et al., 2011: 54f) and the headquarter is located in The Hague²². Important to take into account is that

²² See <http://www.diyamet.nl/contact/> (retrieved on September 18, 2016).

this transnational network predominantly concern activities in which the Turkish state plays a central and crucial role.

As already stated, the paid imams of Diyanet are an important factor for the popularity of the Diyanet and their influence. The symbolic and material resources are not limited by the borders of the Turkish state. Ögelman (2006) states that the Diyanet is well integrated into multiple transnational networks which are linked to their place of origin whereby *'a combination of circumstances, arrangements and interrelations transcending sovereign nation-states and their constituent sub-units, which enhances the ability of particular actors to exercise power over others'* (p. 170). Bruce (2013) puts this a step further and claims to understand this approach through Bourdieu's forms of cultural capital, what refers here to *'those customs (habitus), symbols and institutions which are specific to a given society, knowledge of which is acquired through processes of socialisation and education; it differs from religious capital in that it is not equally valued, known or even recognised by Muslims who come from different cultural backgrounds'* (p. 132). The notion rests hereby in the understanding that it is applicable for Turkish Muslims, and not to all Muslims. The way Diyanet has included the *Turkish* makes it clear what it means to belong to the Diyanet, instead of other organisations. The traditional form of authority still is the case, whereby the Turkish state has the influence and power to decide what Turkish citizens get in touch.

Islamic education: Süleymanlıs

The Süleymanlı are the first Turkish migrants who established a religious organisation in West-Europe (Shadid and Van Koningsveld, 1992; Sunier and Landman, 2015). They provide courses, education for children and student dormitories and create facilities for ritual prayer. This organisation has Islamic centres in various European countries, whereby the *Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren e.V.* (Federation of Islamic Cultural Centers; VIKZ) in Cologne is the centre (see table 4). The chief imam is also located in Cologne and counts as the highest authority of this movement in Europe. In the Netherlands there are 48 local organisations, whereby *Stichting Islamitische Centrum Nederland* (SICN) in Utrecht functions as the centre. This European brand operates apart from the federation in Istanbul because there is an agreement about the different circumstances and challenges in Europe compared with Turkey. Nevertheless, the organisational structure is hierarchical: as Yükleven (2012: 103) explain:

'local hoca²³ is bound to regional hoca in various European countries or districts, who in their turn report to Cologne. The hoca in Cologne works under the spiritual authority of the leader in Istanbul who is believed to be connected with Tunahan at

²³ For this movement translated as *teacher*.

a higher spiritual level. However, the highest level of hoca can only perceive in Istanbul.'

Into politics: Milli Görüş

As already stated in section 5.1.1 – the political development of Turkey – the Milli Görüş movement is the general denominator of an Islamic political movement founded in the 1970s. Linked to Necmettin Erbakan (1926 – 2011), this movement founded a number of parties (MNP, MSP, RP, FP and SP) in which Erbakan tried to re-Islamize Turkey with parliamentary means. However, it threatens the secular principle of the Turkish Republic and all parties are banned and closed down by the state, with the exception of the SP. However, the SP never received enough votes for the threshold and did not get into the parliament. Erbakan always tried to restructure the core values of the Turkish identity (Sunier and Landman, 2015). His period as prime minister of Turkey (1996-1997) with the WP (Welfare Party; *Refah Partisi*) ended amid accusations that Erbakan was attempting to undermine the Turkish secular state (Balci, 2011).

With regard to the political and religious freedom of Europe and to avoid prosecution, a large part of the party moved to Europe (see section 5.1.2: The European Turkish Landscape). The first destination was Germany, where the headquarter is located: in Kerpen, near Cologne. The Milli Görüş organisations in the neighbouring countries are statutory inked to the IGMG (*Islamische Gemeinde Milli Görüş*) in Kerpen. In the Netherlands there are two branches of Milli Görüş since 1998, one for the norther part (*Milli Görüş Noord Nederland*) and one for the southern part (*Milli Görüş Zuid Nederland*). The last is also known with its former name NIF (*Nederlandse Islamitische Federatie*). Together they run 36 local mosque associations (Sunier and Landman, 2015). These local branches have no say in the European federation and can practice relatively autonomous. They are able to develop their own policies depending on local circumstances.

Global doctrine: Gülen

The Gülen movement is founded in the 1960s by Fethullah Gülen (1941 -) and have established schools, educational institutions and business companies in more than hundred countries. In the changing political and economic environment of Turkey of the early 1980s the Gülen movement (also called *Hizmet*) became an important religious and social innovative force for the young and the relatively high educated population. Gülen was convinced that Islam was the first and foremost about spirituality and acquiring profound religious knowledge (Yavuz, 1999). Political power could never be a goal in itself and is counterproductive for spiritual self-improvement (Sunier and Landman, 2015). They are focussing on interfaith dialogue activities, to accommodate a secular liberal democracy. Therefore their goal is working towards a global Islamic doctrine: self-chosen side-line position is no doubt related to the specific goals of the movement. As Seufert (2014: 24) describe, Gülen aims to create a Muslim elite via

a self-organised system of secular education. In the Netherlands, the Gülen movement has been established in 1981 at Rotterdam with the *Akyazili Foundation*. In Rotterdam, students are taught mystical Islam and supported in their school homework, which is the only focus: education. This corresponds to the goal for the Gülen movement: *'to raise well-educated and observant Turkish Muslims who can reconcile their religious identity with their lives in Europe. And they aim to integrate their followers socially and economically while preserving Turkish cultural and religious differences'* (Yükleyen and Tunagür, 2013: 230).

According to Sunier and Landman (2015), there are two reasons why this Gülen movement is the most successful in establishing a genuine network of activities across borders:

1. Large proportion of highly educated people in the movement; most international conferences in English, national activities in local language;
2. Loose organisational structure – uprooted.

The uprooted organisational structure is due to the followers, who are volunteers without a formal engagement with members, boards, and umbrella organisations. Fethullah Gülen has even no formal statutory power of decision in matters concerning the movement at the local level. According to Sunier and Landman (2015) is the message of Gülen primarily spiritual with their keys points: *peaceful coexistence and – interfaith – dialogue*.

Other movements and organisations

Besides the above movements, Sunier and Landman (2015) describe two movements that are important to take into account:

- The Turkish nationalists are following the Kemalists ideology and are called ADUTDF: *Avrupa Demokratik Ulkucu Turk Dernekleri Federasyonu* (Federation of Democratic Idealist Turkish Associations). They are located in Frankfurt since 1978 with now 150 associated organisations in Germany and six national federations. The Dutch headquarter is in Amsterdam (Dutch Turkish Federation) which coordinate 21 organisations, whereby 16 of them are mosque associations.
- The Kaplan movement is a wing of Milli Görüş in Germany but more radical. Cemalettin Kaplan (1952 -) was a candidate of MSP for the Turkish parliament, but fled to Germany and became active in building the Milli Görüş network. Kaplan was inspired by the Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979) and convinced that an Islamic state could not be achieved through participation in the current political system but only by overthrowing the entire political order. It is a new organisation, called *Islami Cemiyet ve Cemaatlar Birligi* (ICCB; Union of Islamic Associations and Communities). A few Milli Görüş organisations in the Netherlands have joined them. Sunier and Landman (2015) states that there is a small minority of Muslims of Turkish background who

sympathise with radical ideologies such as those propagated by Kaplan and could seek connection towards northern Iraq and Syria. This statement is refuted through Sunier and Landman (2015) because the strong Arab influence in radical networks in combination with the strong organisational structures that characterise the Turkish-Islamic landscape make a growing support for radical alternatives less likely.

5.1.3: A SMALL CASE: TRANSNATIONAL ALEVI

The above section describes several Turkish organisations that operate transnational (see also section 2.3: Global city – Migration: cross-border activities). They all indicate being transnational but are in another way structured. This section will spread out one of the Turkish organisations that is also active in The Hague to understand and show the transnational structure of an organisation. The Alevi are therefore the best example because they are working in several countries and on several levels. First the Alevi community will be spread out, followed by their organisations and finally their transnational structure.

The Alevi

The Alevi are a Turkish heterodox religious minority whose identity is shaped by Shia Islam. Sunier and Landman (2015) show that there is some rivalry and debate about what an Alevi identity implies and how the organisations position themselves vis-à-vis the state and the Sunni majority in Europe and in Turkey. According to external observers, Alevism has been portrayed as a syncretic religion in which various religious traditions come together: Shamanism, Buddhism, Christianity and Islam. Alevism is considered as part of the Shia Islam. However, the Turkish administration does not recognise them as a separate entity and the Alevi are counted as Muslims (Sunier and Landman, 2015).

Sunier and Landman (2015: 97-98) state that Alevi are originated from two related groups of the Ottoman Empire:

- Kizilbas (red-heads): they are the followers of Shah Ismail (1487 – 1524). Shah Ismail was the leader of the Safawi Sufi order based in Ardabil (Azerbaijan) and made the order into a political and religious movement that sought to impose a form of Shia Islam in Azerbaijan, Eastern Anatolia and Persia. Where the Safawid Empire in Iran cultivated Shia Islam, the Ottomans made Sunni Islam state religion.
- Bektasi, named after the 13th century as the *Haci Bektas Veli*. The theological orientation of this origin is close to Shia Islam, but writings nowhere suggest Shia teachings. The order was sponsored by the Ottomans, to subdue the Kizilbas.

The relation between these two groups is complex. This complexity goes further whereby the Bektasi can be distinguished in two hierarchies that competes with each other: one line of *dedes* claiming to

descend from *Hace Biktas*, called *Celebis*; and a spiritual genealogy of celibatarian *Derviş* (*babas*) chosen by their fellows. The *Celebis* gained recognition mainly among the *Kizilbas*. As Sunier and Landman (2015: 98-99) states:

'In the Ottoman period both the Kizilbas village communities and the Bektasis tended to hide their religious belief and practices from the outside world. However, their traditions were transferred and reproduced in the form of oral conveyance through songs, poems and stories and some written documents. A central Alevi practice is the cem, a communitary gathering with religious teaching, singing hymns, a liturgical dance and a meal, all under the guidance of a dede.'

Organisations

Due to these differences, Alevis are not an unified movement: while they share some grievances, they are much divided with regard to their demands and identity claims. A variety of Alevi organisations emerged, representing the three directions within the movement:

1. *Haci Bektas Veli Kultur ve Turizm Dernegi* (HBVKTD) and *Haci Bektas Veli Anadolu Kultur Vakfi* (HBVAKV) are focussed on maintaining and reviving traditional culture and maintaining the former Bektasi lodges;
2. *Pir Sultan Abdal Kultur Dernegi* (PSAKD) is the strongest within the *Alevi Bektasi Federasyonu* movement and is stressing political and social issues. It demands a total separation of religion and state in Turkey;
3. CEM-foundation: This revives Alevism as a religious movement.

The difference between the Alevi organisations is their strongly disagreement on the future position of Diyanet. Only CEM would like to be recognised through the Diyanet. The other organisations demand a complete separation between state and religion (Sunier and Landman, 2015). The cause for this difference could be the division between the various origin of the Alevis. As there are different directions of the movement, therefore the organisational structure is also different and their position in the Diyanet.

Transnational structure

In The Hague the *Haci Bektas Foundations* is located as first organisation in Europe with 24 organisations in 2015. The supervision is under the centre in Cologne (Sunier and Landman, 2015). Alevis tend to become involved in social and political organisations such as trade unions, committees of Turkish workers and left-wing political parties. After the Turkish coup of 1980, Alevis moved to Europe and revived with regard to the European religious freedom. Europe has become the centre of Turkish and Kurdish political activism. In the start it was hard to get the younger generation, but it worked out: in


the Netherlands collaboration exceed with the University of Utrecht, where also the HAK-DER is located (*Hollanda Alevi Bektasi Kultur Dernekleri Federasyonu*; Federation of Social and Cultural Alevi and Bektasi Associations in the Netherlands).

Alevis are far from united, but the central organisation – AABF (Almanya Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu; *Alevitische Gemeinde Deutschland e.V.*) – helps to maintain social cohesion. They protest against their marginalised position in Turkey most of the time. In 2004 the *Dutch Council of Alevi Dedes* has been established and works together with *dedes* from Germany, Austria, France and Bulgaria with the consequent that the AABF is positioned into a transnational network. To understand the AABF's transnational behaviour the influence of the EU should be included what increase the pressure on the Turkish state. The primary goal of the AABF is to get recognition of the Alevi, both within and across the national borders. In this order, the AABF established and developed a network between the diaspora in Europe what is visible in figure 12. The importance in figure 12 rests on the interplay between the actors and shows clear signs of cross-border dynamics, such as the hierarchical level of an organisation and their transnational role in this network. To understand Alevis, a multi-level and multidimensional approach should be taken into account because this movement has never focused exclusively on only religious issues or political or welfare-related issues as Piers and Tuncer-Zengingül (2013) are stating. Therefore a 'boomerang pattern' and a 'ping-pong effect' is observed between the organisations in the countries of arrival and in the country of origin. In addition, the large size (250 organisations across Europe) '*and its policy of decentralised resource distribution enable the organisation to successfully mobilise resources in various locations, successfully legitimize itself in its multi-level transnational field, and effectively influence the various political systems*' (Piers and Tuncer-Zengingül, 2013: 162). This shows that the Alevis are a strong community that contribute to discourses and changes, like the recognition of AABF as a religious community in Germany or to include Alevis in Turkey's progress reports of EU since 2000.

Conclusion

The Turkish Alevi organisations are a good example of an ethnic organisation that operates transnational. The Alevi are a Turkish ethnic minority as described and are located on several places in Europe. These communities in several places are linked to each other with a mother organisation – the AABF – what is working on political and social issues on a high level. The ethnic self-organisations on local level are participating in this way on political and social issues through the mother organisation. It should be noted that this is just an example of a transnational structured organisation. The other transnational structured described in section 5.1.2 are probably on another way orientated but are likewise also transnational as suggested where the local ethnic self-organisation are part of. The next section will describe the way these organisations are institutionalised in The Hague.

Figure 12: Transnational dynamics of and between Alevi organisations.



Source: Halm et al., 2012: 82, cited in Piers and Tuncer-Zengingül, 2013: 161.

5.1.4: INSTUTIONALISED IN THE HAGUE

This chapter showed until now the embeddedness of the Turkish organisations in Europe (in particular section 5.1.3 (A small case: transnational Alevi)). This transnational organisational structure has a local outcome and is necessary in order to understand local city governance. Most local Turkish self-organisations are part of these large transnational organisations. According to an old member of the City Council of The Hague²⁴, the Turkish organisations in The Hague could be divided in three main categories [personal communication, June 6, 2016]:

1. organisations that are derived from a Kurdish identity;
2. organisations that are derived from a religious point of view: Alevism or Sunni;
3. organisations that are derived from a political point of view: Milli Görüş; Diyanet and the Gülen movement.

²⁴ This respondent preferred to be anonymous.

It is likely that a local organisation is part of a national organisation that is dependent of the vote of Turkey like Sunier and Landman (2015) stated. According to the old city council member, it is very likely that national organisations takeover a local organisation e.g. through financial support when the local organisation is operating independent and has got financial issues. This could be voluntary but also in case of necessity. The organisational structure of the Turkish organisations is highly polarised, depending on the origin. What is not well developed by Sunier and Landman (2015), but becomes more visible in The Hague, are the tensions between these groups. According to the old member of the city council, the organisations and their followers are not always in agreement with each other. This is visible in the collaboration between the groups, for example an organisation that is operating from the Kurdish identity could get in touch with an organisation that is operating from a religious point of view, but will never work together with an organisation that is operating from a political point of view. It is more likely that collaboration occur on particular subjects on national or European level. These organisations differ with their ideology.

Tietze (2000) states that interaction and participation do not occur between mosques. People could find it too soft or do not attend IGMG (*Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüş*) mosques because they find them too political for example. Sunier and Landman (2015) state that some Muslims go to the closest (or only) mosque and according to Bruce (2013) conflict can occur between individuals and different movements. Gibbon (2009: 26; cited in Bruce, 2013: 133) states that

'It's religious 'products' and social services may never appeal to those who have a taste for more demanding sectarian faith, but by seeking to provide lowest-common-denominator religious services it is possible to reach a wider swath of the market than 'niche' organisations like Milli Görüş or the Suleymancıs.'

This is in particular the field where the Diyanet plays into. The supply of the Diyanet is the result of the active participation of the official religious institutions in Turkey. According to Bruce (2013), the cause for the popularity relies in the way Diyanet is institutionally integrated in the life of Turkish citizens. Therefore it makes that easier to get in touch and become part of the Diyanet.

The other movements are institutionalised into the European field due to the freedom they experienced in Europe. They are seen as part of the society due to the pillarization structure of the Dutch (and German) society. The structure of the AABF (Alevi) shows how complex these organisations are embedded in a transnational network (see section 5.1.3: A small case: transnational Alevi). These movements have always stressed the importance of self-organisations and the perception of Turkish Muslims to see themselves as foreigners in Europe; they need a place to be with their own community what resulted in an increase of non-religious activities but with a religious principle.

5.1.5: CONCLUSION: TURKISH ETHNIC WORLD

Part one of this chapter has come to this end. This section discussed the role of transnational Turkish organisations and the way they are structured. The variety of these organisations is based on their aim and the influence they have in and receive from Turkey. However the state Turkey is relative new – founded in 1923 – the political development is quite dynamic. Various political tensions have led to a shift of these organisations towards West-Europe, whereby Germany focus as a main hub. These organisations have a local department that controls on local level in the view of the mother organisation. The organisational structure of the transnational Turkish organisations is summarized in table 4. According to an old member of the City Council of The Hague, the Turkish organisations in The Hague are belonging to one of these organisations [personal communication, June 6, 2016]. They are voluntary but most often in case of necessity linked to one organisation.

The role of the Turkish state in the transnational organisation structure is double. On the one hand the Diyanet is the official state department that regulates the practical aspects of religious life. The role of the Turkish state is therefore quite strong and is focussed to control Islam. On the other hand has restrictions the Turkish state imposed regarding opposite organisations led to a shift of the centre of gravity of these organisations: Germany - in particular Cologne - is the main hub of these organisations. In this aspect local organisations participate through their mother organisation in Germany to meet their demands as the case AABF of the Turkish Alevi shows. The reverse is also possible whereby the local *hoca* is getting influenced of the regional *hoca* (see 5.1.2: Islamic education: Suleymanlis). Nevertheless, all organisations are embedded in a transnational world but have strong different ideologies. After the foundation of the Turkish state (1923) these organisations are quite often in disagreement with each other and sometime even banned through the ruling party (see section 5.1.1: Turkish politics). As the old member of the City Council of The Hague predicts, these different organisations with their local influences could get in battle locally. This became visible during the 15th of July 2016, when there was a military coup in Turkey. After this coup, the tensions in the Netherlands raised up and people are sued due to hate crimes (Metronieuws.nl, 2016). According to the Turkish state, the Gülen movement is responsible for this coup, however this is not proven and Fethollah Gülen also state not to be in case with. At the moment of writing the perpetrator has not be designated (September 2016).

Table 4: Overview of main Turkish transnational organisations

	Diyanet	Suleymanlis	Milli Görüş	Gülen	Alevi	Turkish nationalist	Kaplan
<i>Established in</i>	1924	1970s	1970s	1960s	None	1969	1983
<i>Founder</i>	Turkish state	Suleyman Hilmi Tunahan	Necmettin Erbakan	Fethullah Gülen	None	Alparslan Türkeş	Cemalettin Kaplan
<i>Aim</i>	Control Islam for Turkish citizens	Religious education	Turkish Islamic vision	Global Islamic doctrine	No	Nation-building	Religious Islamic Turkey
<i>Controlled by Turkish state/organisations</i>	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Through the party MHP	No
<i>Religious</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Originally yes	No	Yes (even radical)
<i>Dutch organisation</i>	<i>Hollanda Diyanet Vakfi</i> (Islamitische stichting Nederland)	Stichting Islamtische Centrum Nederland	(1) Milli Görüş Noord Nederland (2) Milli Görüş Zuid Nederland	Platform INS (Akyazili Foundation)	Various: <i>Heci Bektas Foundations</i>	Federation of Democratic Idealistic Turkish Associations in the Netherlands	Some Milli Görüş organisation
<i>Location of headquarter in NL</i>	The Hague	Utrecht	Amsterdam and Rotterdam	Rotterdam/Amsterdam	The Hague	Amsterdam	-
<i>Size in NL</i>	143 mosques	48 organisations	36 mosque associations	Unknown	24 member organisations	21 organisations	-
<i>Location of headquarter in Europe</i>	Cologne	Cologne	Kerpen (near Cologne)	Rotterdam (Akyazili foundation)	Unknown	Frankfurt	-
<i>Size in Europe</i>	896 member organisations	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	Around 150 organisations	Unknown

Source: Made by author, based on Shadid and Van Koningsveld, 1992; Sunier & Landman, 2015.

5.2: THE ETHNICITY ABOVE: THE SURINAM-HINDUSTAN SELF-ORGANISATIONS

This part of chapter 5 will describe a transnational ethnic minority without the strong strength of a state: the (Surinam-) Hindustan. The way this ethnic group has established an ethnic world and participates into gives a new understanding towards transnational (self-) organisations. The case of the Turkish organisations shows a top-down perspective regarding transnationalism. This section will describe a bottom up transnational development of a statically invisible ethnic group. Therefore it is helpful in the understanding of transnational ethnic self-organisations and the way a city can or is positioned into.

To understand the Surinam-Hindustan self-organisation it is important to understand the Surinamese community first. In the Dutch statistics the Surinam-Hindustani community is not visible at all. The Dutch statistics track only people by their origin: so the Surinam-Hindustan community is visible under the denominator of Surinamese people (see also section 3.5: Data; 4.3: The Hague: the arrival city for migrants and Oudhof *et al.*, 2011). Before going more into these self-organisations, the question will be answered what the Hindustan community is, subsequently an overview of the Hindustan self-organisations will be given from a transnationalism perspective.

5.2.1: THE (IMAGINED) COMMUNITY

The (Surinam-) Hindustan community is one of the ethnic communities living in Surinam and they are the largest ethnic group from Surinam living in The Hague (Oudhof *et al.*, 2011). Between 1873 and 1916, they moved from present-day India to Surinam as contract workers. This was after the abolition of slavery: new labours were needed to work on the plantations (Gowricharn, 2008). It is hard to figure out what the (Surinam-) Hindustan community is according to Ruben Gowricharn (2008). At start of the first migratory (India – Surinam) there was not and could be not a Hindustan community in Surinam according to three main issues: (1) in the period of 1873 - 1916, around one third of the migrants decided to return to their place of origin in India, specific to the area consisting of Bihar, Bengal and Oudh; (2) the 43 years of migration suggests that there are different generations in combination with the lower life expectancy what cannot result in a social unity; and (3) people lived in small groups on a relatively large area in Surinam. These issues result in demographic, geographic, religious, linguistic and cultural differences what should affect the community building negatively; people lived on long distances. In the light of Van Lier (cited in Gowricharn, 2008), there are three main indicators for community building: race, religion and language. Gowricharn adds to this list also *group consciousness* whereby the main condition is cultural homogenisation of the group.

The same development could be applicable for the Surinam variant of the religion Hinduism. The equalisation of the migrants through the plantation authorities made it impossible to maintain the caste system. The religious leaders experienced a certain freedom because most people were in doubt how to behave and what was possible in this new destination, Surinam. A main factor hereby was that it is not possible to have a marriage in the same caste: the (Surinam-) Hindustan migrants consisted of 70% male and 30% female. Further, the rules relating to cleanliness, food and handling fell into disuse leading to more freedom in Hinduism. This religious downfall had a positive effect to cultural homogenisation of the Hindustan community in Surinam and made equal interaction easier according to Gowricharn (2008).

Next to these development, was the introduction of the *Arya Samaj* in Surinam, a monotheistic reform movement (Bissoondoyal, 1950), inspired through British colonialism whereby the characteristics are the rejection of caste system and the worship of statues of God. This is still applicable for the *Sanatan Dharm*, the other subdivision. Gowricharn (2008) estimates that around one fifth of the Hindu migrants believed into Arya Samaj. From a sociological perspective this should work towards consciousness of the group. Around 1930 the first religious associations were established in Surinam: Hinduism is nowadays instituted into schools, orphanages, radio stations and further more. in Surinam (Bloemberg, 1995).

According to Gowricharan (2008), the way this *imagined community* is established has an interesting mandatory force what relates towards the common interest. It has not been established only from the community itself but people associates also with what they are not, like the Creolian or Javanese community. In addition, this process has also increased through transnational developments and orientations. India was and is interesting: visible in the political ties till people movement. Gowricharan states that the most important factor rests in the recognition of being part of a larger (Indian) civilisation: India is the place of origin. After the Second World War the orientation towards India became more important for the Hindustan community in Surinam. It is likely that this orientation is still the case for the (Surinam-) Hindustan community in the Netherlands. In addition, the orientation of the (Surinam-) Hindustan community in the Netherlands goes further, what will be discussed in the next section with the self-organisations.

5.2.2: THE ORGANISATIONS

This section discusses the Surinam-Hindustan self-organisations. There could be made roughly a division between *religious*, *media* and *online organisations* in order to distinguish the transnational part. The other organisations which are working more towards community building will also be described.

5.2.2.1: Religious

The (Surinam-) Hindustan religious organisations are divided into the *Sanatan Dharm* or *Arya Samaj* movement. According to Bloemberg (1995), there are a lot of organisations that claim that they represent one of these movements in the Netherlands. Some of them are formally recognised through the umbrella organisation: the Dutch Hindu Council (*HindoeRaad*) situated in The Hague. Based on their own definition,

'the Hindoe Raad Nederland (HRN) is the highest representative organisation for Hindus in the Netherlands. It represents national, regional and local governments, businesses and societal organisations. The Hindu council is recognised through the national government for everything that consist of Hindu people, regardless religious tradition or descendant and dissociate every form of discrimination based on sex, race, skin colour, ethnic or social descendant or genetic feature' (Hindoeraad.nl, 2015)²⁵.

This description shows the way the (Surinam-) Hindustan community is divided, but also that the Hindu council is not only for the (Surinam-) Hindustan community, but for all Hindus in the Netherlands. However, according to Dharmasektra [personal communication, June 16, 2016], most people who participate with the activities of the Hindu council are people with a (Surinam-) Hindustan descendant. The structure of the Hindu Council is based of 12 seats divided through nine foundations and associations, summarised in attachment B. All these organisations have received a formal position in the Dutch Hindu Council, what results in one organisation representing the Dutch Hindus abroad. The Hindu Council is working on European scale in Brussels to get the recognition of Hindus in the European Union. Therefore the Hindu Council has good ties with the UK Hindu Council, the Swedish Hindu Council and the Hungarian Hindu Council. For Hindu education are ties through the Oxford Centrum for Hindu studies, but only with a focus on knowledge and collaboration. The Dutch Hindu Council is not affected through these organisations formally. There could be stated that this transnational connectivity is on a medium level. The collaboration is not that high as it suggests, but there is a network established on European scale. The transnational religious network does not go further. The religious Hindu leaders (*pandits*) are not international active in their workspace according to Dharmasektra [personal

²⁵ Original text: *'De Hindoe Raad Nederland (HRN) is de hoogste vertegenwoordigende organisatie van Hindoes in Nederland. HRN vertegenwoordigt Hindoes bij de landelijke, provinciale en gemeentelijke overheden, bedrijfsleven en maatschappelijke organisaties. De Hindoe Raad Nederland is door de overheid erkend als gesprekspartner voor alle zaken die de Hindoes in Nederland betreffen. HRN streeft ernaar dienstbaar te zijn voor alle Nederlandse Hindoes ongeacht hun religieuze tradities of hun afkomst en distantieert zich sterk van iedere vorm discriminatie op grond van geslacht, ras, huidskleur, etnische of sociale afkomst, en genetische kenmerken.'*

communication, June 16, 2016]. Informal there are connections and it is likely that there are conferences, but these connections are not formal linked.

In addition to these different religious organisations, there are also organisations that are working from a religious perspective. An example is *Seva Network Foundation* (SNF). SNF focuses on poverty reduction in the world whereby the starting point is derived from the Hinduism. The concept of *Seva*²⁶ in Hinduism involves in performing an act of kindness without the expectation of rewards. *Seva 'is performed selflessly and without ulterior motive. Embedded in Indian traditions the core is to sacrifice your time and resources for the benefit of others without the expectation of anything in return'* (nhsf.org.uk, 2016). The workplace of SNF is mostly located in third world countries: to invest there should be a relation with poverty reduction. Most activities are located in African countries, Bangladesh, Nepal, India and Surinam [Bondhoe, personal communication, June 21, 2016]. The core of this transnational organisation relies in the operating structure that is derived from a Hinduism concept: *Seva*. The link with poverty reduction on the one side and a location in a developing country makes a cross-border suggestion; a more cosmopolitan point of view what will be additive towards the understanding the Hindustan community. This approach will be elaborated later.

5.2.2.2: Media organisations

The (Surinam-) Hindustan community has relatively a high amount of media organisations (see table 2). Some are located in The Hague, but there are also media organisations based in other cities like Rotterdam or Amsterdam²⁷. These media organisation do have transnational ties however it depends on the way they participate transnational. The radio stations are the classic media organisations and are operating more in a traditional way; the events and other media organisation are operating more on new forms of communication.

I Radio stations

There are two radio stations in The Hague located for the (Surinam-) Hindustan community. The first one is national active on an AM-frequency, called VAHON FM. The divided community, as stated already and suggested by the religious organisations, is not visible hereby. According to Fred Kartaram [personal communication, July 6, 2016]:

'We are a national organisation. So here comes everybody. We are actually a living room, and everybody comes in here. And at the door, we do not ask if you are a Muslim, or you are a Sanatan, are you part of the Janmavedic or of the Arya Samaj,

²⁶ Sometimes written as *Sewa*.

²⁷ For example the largest (Surinam-) Hindustan radiostation AmorFM, based in Rotterdam (amorfm.eu)

*everyone is welcome. What I always say, you can do everything with us on the radio, there is only one condition. Whatever you do or say, do not offend another, and you cannot say to another that your apple is better than that of another. You should not say: I have the truth, I know the truth and what the truth is according someone else, that is what you dispute or put in a bad light.'*²⁸

Hereby Kartaram states that everybody is welcome, but the second quote states that this is only for the (Surinam-) Hindustan community:

*'We are expressed as a Hindustan radio. We are named as Hindustan VAHON radio. That name pictures where we stand. And you are a Hindustan and when you hear Hindustan radio, then you think that is something for us! It also brings a bit of identity awareness. If you hear VAHON Hindustan Radio, you can identify yourself with it, and you can feel it. And at the same time it confronts with your identity, and at the same time it also brings a piece of identity consciousness along with it.'*²⁹

The interesting feature Kartaram states is the belief in the own identity. The way people identify themselves as Hindustan is important to get in touch with this radio station. Otherwise people do not feel recognised in this radio station what is crucial in defining ethnic self-organisations. With this type of organisation the community building is stronger due to language. Discussions are held in Sarnami or Dutch what has likewise a beneficial effect (Gowricharn, 2008), but are working towards an international network: Surinam – the Netherlands. So there is no significant evidence of a transnational network through the traditional way of radio. However with a more modern way it is. In that case the group consciousness is not only limited to the Netherlands. Vikash Boejharat [personal communication June 29, 2016] works at the second Hindustani radio station located in The Hague: *Desi Jongeren Media* (Desi Youngster Media). He states that the youngsters of (Surinam-) Hindustan descendants identify themselves as *Desi people*. This group is not only limited to the (Surinam-) Hindustan community, but is

²⁸ Original quote: *'Wij zijn een nationale organisatie. Dus hier komt alles binnen. We zijn eigenlijk een huiskamer, en iedereen komt hier binnen. En aan de deur vragen we niet ben jij een moslim, ben jij een Sanatan, ben je van de Janmavadische of de Arya Samaj, iedereen is welkom. Wat ik zeg altijd, je mag bij ons alles op de radio doen, er is maar één voorwaarde. Wat je ook doet of zegt, je mag een ander niet beledigen, en je mag niet zeggen tegen een ander dat jouw appel lekkerder is dan die van een ander. Je gaat niet zeggen van ik heb de waarheid, ik ken de waarheid en de ander zijn waarheid, dat ga je betwisten, in een verkeerd daglicht plaatsen.'*

²⁹ Original quote: *'Wij zijn uitgesproken een Hindoestaanse radio. Wij heten Hindoestaanse VAHON radio. Die naam alleen al beeld uit waar we voor staan. En jij bent Hindoestaan en als je hoort Hindustani Radio, dan denk jij al van dat is iets van ons! Dat brengt ook een stukje identiteitsbewustzijn bij. Als jij hoort VAHON Hindustani Radio, dan kun je je daarmee identificeren, en jij kunt je daarin voelen. En tegelijkertijd confronteert dat met jouw identiteit, en tegelijkertijd brengt dat ook een stukje identiteitsbewustzijn met zich mee.'*

to all people with a South-Asian descendant. This point suggests that the Surinam-Hindustan community is orientated towards the Indian diaspora worldwide.

Boejaharat is one of the founders of *Desi Jongeren Media*, an online community with the main focus the internet radio station. With this online community experiment, he suggests the identity feeling is not primary towards (Surinam-) Hindustan community, but goes more beyond and focus on the Desi community: people with a South-Asian descendant. The interesting point on this approach is the missing link of 'Surinam'. It suggests that the Hindustans are not necessarily linked with Surinam but can stand on their own. According to Boejaharat, the focus rests on societal issues, lifestyle, cooking and culture of the Desi [personal communication, June 29, 2016].

The main benefit of working online is the broad target audience. Instead of being dependant of the AM-frequency, online has the opportunity to go worldwide. Therefore the people who participate in discussions of *VAHON Hindustan radio* are mainly living in the Netherlands and have a (Surinam-) Hindustan descendant. In contrary, *Desi Jongeren Media* focus on all people who identify themselves as Desi: Surinam-Hindustan community and the South-Asian community in other parts of the world. According to Boejaharat, the comments through radio or social media are originated from all over the world, like Brazil, Sweden, India or Pakistan, depending on the discussed topic [personal communication, June 29, 2016]. This confirms the suggestion of a Hindustan ethnic world where the Hindustan community in The Hague is participating into. The same could be stated with other media organisations, what will discuss next.

II Event- and other media organisations

For the radio stations there is a division between the focus on Surinam-Hindustan community one-side and the focus on people with a South Asian descendant on the other side. The same is with event- and other media organisations. An example is *Taj Events*, also called *UnitedDreamz*. Working on events like *Indian Fair*, *Miss India Holland* and *Bollywood Boulevard Festival*³⁰, it makes the suggestion that the (Surinam-) Hindustan community in the Netherlands are part of a larger Indian ethnic network. In addition, the events organised through *Taj Events* are in collaboration with official organisations in India relating the Indian diaspora. The focus therefore is not primarily on Surinam or cohesion within the (Surinam-) Hindustan community but is setting the set forward the Indian diaspora. However the relations are getting stronger with the South Asian countries, it is likely that this will be also the case with other diaspora countries. This suggests an interesting perspective of the (Surinam-) Hindustan community in the Netherlands getting into the worldwide Indian diaspora community through

³⁰ See their facebook page: <https://www.facebook.com/evenementenbureau.tajevents/>

media/radio organisations and events. The Hindustani community in the Netherlands and the organisations in The Hague are participating into. This participation embed The Hague in a global Desi or Hindustan network. It seems that the identity question is important for the global Hindustan network. This understanding will be discussed with the online organisation *Sarnamihuis* in the next section.

5.2.2.3: Online organisations

The previous categories revealed the importance of online communication: the transnationalism of the (Surinam-) Hindustan community express itself better online. There are also organisations that are solely active online e.g. through social media. One of them is *Stichting Sarnamihuis* (Foundation Sarnamihouse³¹). This foundation is focused on identity questions regarding the (Surinam-) Hindustan community in the Netherlands and whether the harmony should be found with Surinam or with India. *Sarnamihuis* is focused on what the Surinam-Hindustan community is and to what extent the two migratory trajectory (India – Surinam (1) and Surinam – Netherlands (2)) give meaning towards the community. Amar Soeklal, the president of the *Sarnamihuis* mentions that his organisation is working on two sides. One side regarding the community building of Surinam-Hindustan people and on the other side regarding the transnational ties that the *Sarnamihuis* is creating. These two aspects are important for the Hindustan community to see them as an ethnic group on its own and to reveal its ethnic world it belongs to.

The community building of the *Sarnamihuis* is mainly focused on identity issues and works towards benefitting the own community: seeing people as part of your group. As Soeklal [personal communication, June 22, 2016] states:

‘When I go to your home, for example, I know how to behave. When I go to a Nauta³², I know how to behave. I know that I have to give dhaan³³ that are very much taken for granted so I do not need to explain to you and you do not need me to explain. The Bhaitak Ghana³⁴ culture. So it's integral. ... And at a certain time, there still arises a band. If you say bara, roti, or Nauta or milan, or Kaise³⁵, you will see that pierce a smile, the ice melts in one way, and that there is recognition. And therefore there still creates a certain band. Because you just share a lot with each other. Unspoken. Whether you are 58 or 30 you are. The behaviour of your parents are not so different than our behaviour. Which you have inherited. Kaise, then you know exactly what

³¹ Sarnami is the mother language of the (Surinam-) Hindustan.

³² (Surinam-) Hindustan party, in this sentence referring to a marriage.

³³ An offer

³⁴ Traditional (Surinam-) Hindustan folkore music

³⁵ *Bara* and *Roti* are Surinam-Hindustan food examples, *nauta* is meaning a party, *milan* is an event once a year for the Surinam-Hindustan community, *Kaise* means ‘How are you’ in Sarnami.

*that means. Even if you cannot speak well [Sarnami], it will give them an immediate dimension with your fellow man.*³⁶

Soeklal stress hereby the feeling that Gowricharn (2008) named as *group consciousness*. Soeklal notes the way this is expressed: through the informal institutions of the group. He stresses the unspoken rules in the community like giving *dhaan* (an offer) at a marriage or the cultural food that is familiar in this community. These unspoken rules are transferred from parent to child. This makes the suggestion that these rules are the same for people who did one of the two migratory e.g. people who migrated not from India towards Surinam but towards Mauritius. This calls the idea of Surinam-Hindustan community into question, whereby there are interesting similarities with the Indian diaspora community in other places of destination, like South-Africa or Mauritius. This is also the case regarding Amar Soeklal. He states that most contact is

*'through the internet (social media), and of course via whatsapp and email. But those people, the Fijians living in Australia, have the same history, migration history as we have. Questions related to identity issues. Their history, the departure of their ancestors from India, who went to Fiji, Mauritius, which is identical (with our). They went also to work on the plantations. Many abuses on that plantations. So you have a shared history and that creates a bond. And related to identity issues. Those are the same everywhere (the collaboration) concerns the exchange of items. And if you go to our website or on the Facebook page, you see regularly articles that can be found from Australia. I forget her name, but there is someone who writes a lot about it and publishes articles, which is translated into Dutch, which is then translated to them. We have also a partnership, newly established, with South Africa, where we will link migration data with people here. If there are departed ancestors and ended up in South Africa. And that might establish a relationship. That is not yet completed.'*³⁷ [personal communication, June 22, 2016].

³⁶ Original quote: *'Als ik bijvoorbeeld bij jou thuiskom, dan weet ik hoe ik me moet gedragen. Als ik naar een nauta ga, weet ik hoe ik me moet gedragen. Dan weet ik dat ik dhaan moet geven, dat zijn heel veel vanzelfsprekendheden die ik jou niet hoeft uit te leggen en die je mij ook niet hoeft uit te leggen. De Bhaitak-Ghana cultuur. Dus het is integraal. ... op een gegeven moment ontstaat er toch een band. Als je zegt bara, roti, of nauta of milan, of kaise, dan zie je dat er de glimlach doordringt, het ijs smelt in één keer weg, en dat er herkenning is. En daardoor ontstaat er toch een bepaalde band. Omdat je gewoon heel veel met elkaar deelt. Onuitgesproken. Of je nu 58 bent of 30 bent. De omgangsvormen bij jouw ouders zijn niet zo anders dan bij mij. Die heb je meegekregen. Kaise, dan weet je meteen wat dat betekent. Al kan je het niet goed praten, het scheidt wel meteen een dimensie met je medemens.'*

³⁷ Original quote: *'via het internet (social media), en natuurlijk via de whatsapp en de mail. Maar ook die mensen, die Fijianen die in Australië wonen, die hebben dezelfde geschiedenis, de migratiegeschiedenis als dat wij hebben. Vragen met identiteitsvraagstukken. Hun geschiedenis, de vertrek van hun voorouders uit India, die naar Fiji*

Soeklal makes the suggestion that there is a widely collaboration possible with the communities in other countries than Surinam: sharing the same history and therefore could share the same identity. This last feature is hard to say. Gowricharn (2008) indicates that race, religion, language and group consciousness are important to see the (Surinam-) Hindustan community as one community. In the words of Soeklal the concept of (Surinam-) Hindustan community can be up scaled towards a global community, sharing the identity with other groups that share the same descendant: originated from Bihar, Bengal and Oudh end 19th start 20th century and moved towards another place of residence. It is questionable to what extent people feel recognised themselves towards each other and when a person with an Indian descendant sees someone as part of their society. Section 5.3 (Conclusion: Transnational communities in The Hague) will discuss this topic in particular but first the inward organisations will be discussed.

5.2.2.4: The others: the inward organisations

As the above organisations have a transnational or an international dimension, there are also organisations which are working more for the own community, the micro (Surinam-) Hindustan self-organisations as Da Graca (2010) explains with his micro/macro division. The micro (Surinam-) Hindustan organisations are active on diverse terrains in The Hague, where by the main core of the respondents rests on participation in the society, to discuss societal issues and elderly care. This sounds familiar because this is also one of the conditions of The Hague Municipality for subsidy application where most self-organisation are depending of. Next to these activities, the self-organisations are also celebrating the glory days of the Surinam-Hindustan community, like *Diwali*, *Holi Phagua*, *Idul-Fitr* and immigration day (India-Surinam migratory).

The organisations that are working on these aspects are for example *Stichting Hindustani*, *Federation Eekta*, *You Matter*³⁸, *Stichting Islamitische ouderen* (Foundation Islamic Elderly³⁹) and *Shanti Transvaal*. The starting point of these organisations is their focus on social cohesion in the neighbourhood however some of them have grown out to city level importance. With these organisations the cultural element of (Surinam-) Hindustan community is visible, like the unspoken rules. As Frank Nanhekhan, founder of

gingen, naar Mauritius, die is identiek. Zij gingen ook op de plantages werken. Heel veel misstanden op die plantages. Dus je hebt een gedeelde geschiedenis en dat scheidt toch wel een band. En vervolgens identiteitsvraagstukken. Die zijn overal hetzelfde. (de samenwerking) betreft het uitwisselen van artikelen. En als je naar onze website gaat, of op de facebookpagina, dan zie je regelmatig artikelen die te vinden zijn vanuit Australië. Ik ben heel even haar naam kwijt, maar er iemand die er heel veel over schrijft. Artikelen publiceren, die wordt naar het Nederlands vertaalt en die wordt dan daar vertaald. Wij hebben ook een samenwerkingsverband, pas opgericht, met Zuid-Afrika, waarin wij misschien, migratiegegevens gaan koppelen met mensen hier, databases willen gaan koppelen. Of er toch voorouders vertrokken zijn en weer in Zuid-Afrika terecht zijn gekomen. En wellicht een relatie kan leggen. Dat is nog niet voltooid.'

³⁸ Foundation *You Matter* is not located in The Hague, but their activities are in The Hague.

³⁹ This foundation is for all Muslim elderly, but the organisation and the network suggest the focus on Surinam-Hindustan Muslims.

the *Stichting Islamitische Ouderen* (Islamic Elderly foundation) explains in his practices [personal communication, June 29, 2016]:

*'I help Mrs Jalapsing, because she is 86, and she has problems with her PGB-affairs. And if there is a problem, then they would rather talk to me. And what do I, they tell me very confidentially their problem. Then I mail to a white institution, this is the problem, the lady lives over there, would you go and see what the problems are and solve it. And give me an answer if it works out. So that is the way I always work. And in a number of cases it works well. But you have a number of people, and in such cases it can happen that your own children abuse the situation, I mean with debit cards and stuff. And then they say to their children, bring me to Frank (...), and when they get here, I hear, 'son, he did it this way, took all my mails to his house, I have nothing'. And at that point, you should know what you are saying. Because that woman trusts me so much, like a son, and tells me all her affaires.'*⁴⁰

This shows two interesting features. First for the lady it is hard to find help. The *Stichting Islamitische Ouderen* tries to participate as a bridge function, helping the woman of (Surinam-) Hindustan descendant who could not find their way to the official institutions. The second feature is the confidence she finds by Frank Nanhekhan, instead trusting her own son. Nanhekhan states that the language they speak often is *Sarnami* (see original quote). In this case, the lady trusts more someone with the same descendant, around the same age and who also speaks well the same mother tongue than her own son. Nevertheless the lady can be helped with her problems. The way the (Surinam-) Hindustan community works out in this perspective shows feeling confident to another person but who is still in the same community. This stresses the importance of the foundation: an ethnic self-organisation that participates inside the community.

These organisations are also working together in the celebration of the glory days of the (Surinam-) Hindustan community. These glory days are related to the Surinam glory days, not specified for religion or a particular subdivision. *Diwali* and *Holi Phagua* are examples that are particularly celebrated through the Hindu community; *Idul-Fitr* is an example for the Muslim community. The immigration day is for all

⁴⁰ Original quote: *'Dat ik mevrouw Jalapsing help, omdat ze 86 is, met haar PGB zaken. En als er een probleem is, dan wilt ze liever met mij praten. En wat doe ik als ze mij heel vertrouwelijk vertellen. Dan mail ik naar een witte instelling, Magaret, dit is het probleem, daar woont die mevrouw, wil je langs haar gaan, en kijk wat de problemen zijn, en los het op. En geef me respons. Dus op die manier werk ik altijd. En in een aantal gevallen komt het zo ook voor. Maar dat heb je dan bij een aantal mensen, en in zulke gevallen komt het voor, dat je eigen kinderen misbruik maken van de situatie, ik bedoel pinpas enzo. En dan zeggen die kinderen, Hareld, breng me bij Frank, ik heet Frankmohamat, maar ze noemen me Frank, breng me mij Frank. (...) En als ze hier komen dan hoor ik, beta easa karriesh, hamaar sap post legah apan khare, kuch na he hame. Op dat moment moet je goed weten wat je zegt. Want die vrouw vertrouwt mij zo, net een zoon, en die verteld haar dingen.'*

(Surinam-) Hindustan people. Celebrating and participating in all these days shows that these organisations are focused on all (Surinam-) Hindustan people instead focused on a part of it. This section shows the importance of the inward self-organisations which are working more towards community building. This community building happens on a local level while other organisations are succeeding in strengthen the transnational ties. This last feature indicates a global Hindustan community what will be discussed in the next section.

5.2.3: CONCLUSION: THE GLOBAL HINDUSTAN COMMUNITY

In the above part the role of (Surinam-) Hindustan self-organisations has been discussed widely and the role they are working to upscale their own culture. There is a process visible of losing the traditional ties and function more towards part of the global Indian diaspora. This is in agreement with the findings of Gowricharn (2009), whereby he tries to understand the Hindustan community in the Netherlands – in particular the second generation – through the concept of transnationalism. The concept of transnationalism is varied, depending on the used definition and the point of view. The level of transnationalism of the Hindustan community is related to the *ethnification* as Indian diaspora, not primary related to Surinam, but seeing themselves part of the larger global Hindustan community. Gowricharn (2009) states therefore the growing participation in this global Hindustan community, like travelling towards diasporas in the UK, South-Africa, Mauritius but also the growing influence of Bollywood in the community. In these words, the word *(Surinam-) Hindustan* community is getting changed, whereby the additive *Surinam* is not that necessary any more. The additive *Surinam* would suggest that the Hindustan community is related to Surinam, without the additive, Hindustan would suggest being part of the larger global Hindustan community or global Desi community⁴¹.

This statement of being part of a global community is confirmed through the role of self-organisations. There could be roughly a distinction between religious, media, online and other organisations. The religious organisations show that they are part of a larger global Hindu community, whereby religion is the most important factor. The media organisations show the importance of the Indian or Desi culture: Bollywood music and the lifestyle. As a result, this limits the target audience not only to the (Surinam-) Hindustan community in The Hague but increase the scale towards a global community. There are people who listen to online radio station from other parts of the world. In addition, the third category, online organisations, shows strongly that they are part of a larger community. The approach of being part of a larger community that is not only limited to the (Surinam-) Hindustan community, but being part of a global Hindustan community admits the weaken ties with Surinam, but strengthen the ties with

⁴¹ Hindustan refers to the specific part of India while Desi refers to descendants of South-Asia in general and their specific (sub)culture (Diethrich, 1999).

Hindustan people in all places of arrival where the Indian migrants arrived in the 19th and 20th century, like South-Africa and Mauritius.

This understanding of seeing the (Surinam-) Hindustan community part of a global Hindustan community does not destroy the variety in the Surinam-Hindustan community as described earlier, but suggest the way of group consciousness of the community on a larger scale. The inward organisations are not focussing on the differences in the community, but are working on the (Surinam-) Hindustan community. They organise activities for the whole community, not limited to a particular subdivision. This strengthens the group consciousness as (Surinam-) Hindustan community, not as being part of a global Hindustan community. The 'Surinam' is visible in these activities. The religious, media and online organisations are participating in the global Hindustan community and show their part in this global community, whereby the religious are more orientated to *Hinduism* as the variable. Seeing them and participating actively in this global community give a new meaning to the global dimension of a city and the way The Hague is embedded in this transnational Hindustan world. The following section will discuss this aspect more broadly.

5.3: CONCLUSION: TRANSNATIONAL COMMUNITIES IN THE HAGUE

The previous sections have discussed respectively the Turkish and the (Surinam-) Hindustan self-organisations. The Turkish self-organisations are divided depending on what movement they belong to in Turkey. The developments in Turkey in the political landscape are an important actor in the development of the organisations in Europe. This has resulted in a divided Turkish community, belonging to one or more movements, that are active in several countries in Europe. As the example of the Alevi organisation AABF shows, the organisational structure could go to a high hierarchical and transnational level. The self-organisations for the (Surinam-) Hindustan community are much less (transnational) structured. They are starting to show a trend whereby they are more focussing towards a global community instead being orientated on the traditional ties with Surinam and India only. The main upcoming online development could be seen as an important actor in this relation. While the (Surinam-) Hindustan community is divided in several subdivisions, there is some feeling of *group consciousness* what is the main cause towards the global community.

The concept of group consciousness as shown for the (Surinam-) Hindustan community, shows a more interesting aspect to consider. The (Surinam-) Hindustan community is getting to weakner their ties locally but is getting more strenght with a global community. The (Surinam-) Hindustan self-organisations are not supported by the state of Surinam, even the organisations are not hierarchical structured. There is some support of the Indian state regarding the media organisations, mainly focused on the Indian diaspora and Indian culture in the activities. However, most organisations that participate

transnational are getting connection with a community what has experienced the same migratory and have the same descendant, offering a global community through the internet. This quite new development shows an interesting aspect on transnational interaction of some kind of mother community: the (Surinam-) Hindustan community in the Netherlands is part of the global Indian diaspora, related to the Desi community and culture. On the other side they are also a sub community whereby the inwards communities are strengthening this sub-community.

While the Turkish community does not know a large worldwide diaspora as large as the Indian – the Turkish state is ‘young’, established in 1923 by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk – the same development seems to happen with the Turkish organisations and their followers. However some organisations do have strong ties with the Turkish state, like Diyanet or the Turkish nationalists, there seems also a development where other organisations are loosening their geographical ties, like the Gülen-movement which is working towards a global Islamic doctrine. The limitations that Turkey has imposed are not that strict: an organisation that is banned through the Turkish state can simply developed outside Turkey, what has happened after the coup of 1980 in Turkey. This suggests a loosener role of the nation-state.


This development of being part of larger community that is across the national borders shows a new perspective of city planners and requires a new understanding of the urban governance. In the basic profile of urban governance in The Hague (figure 11 of page 53) are the influences from outside not pointed out. The self-organisations are influenced through external forces from other countries or could influence communities in other cities or countries. For the Turkish self-organisations the central organisations are in Germany or in Turkey. The (Surinam-) Hindustan self-organisations are not strictly influenced but are working more towards a global community whereby a more bottom-up structure is noticeable. Therefore the urban governance model has been extended and is visible in figure 13 (the size of the arrows suggests the intensity a relation is).

Figure 13 shows a more complex situation than the basic setting (figure 11). The complexity relies in the influences from outside. In this perspective a community is not just seen only on local level, but has a position on global level. While it is likely that the global community is not the same as the local community, there is to some extent overlap. The Hague Municipality is located in the centre where it is influencing their citizens. This is a oneway direction because the citizens can not influence the municipality on its own. Therefore these communities are organised in self-organisations. With these self-organisations interaction with the municipality has been established. The (Surinam-) Hindustan community is part of the global Hindustan community (see section 5.2.3: Conclusion: The global Hindustan community). The Turkish community is more complex: this community is divided in several subgroups what are linked to a local self-organisation with the own ideology. This local self-organisation

could be part of a larger transnational organisational structure as shown with the AABF (the Alevi community, see section 5.1.3 (A small case: transnational Alevi)).

This perspective of seeing a community part of a larger community changes the concept of a global city. It demands a new role and importance of diversity and ethnicity in the city. The communities located in the city are influencing the city governance. This relation could also be seen in reverse, whereby the city is part in one of the transnational ethnic networks. Positioning the city into these larger networks develops a new understanding of the *global city*. For city planners this understanding shows the importance of global communities, not just diaspora networks but the perspective a community is global and the city has a part in the ethnic network. As shown with the online (Surinam-) Hindustan self-organisations, the recent technological developments are an important factor in the establishment of a global community. The meaning of this global community for the global city rests therefore on the importance of ethnic self-organisations. The attendance of global orientated ethnic communities is an important actor for the world system (see figure 3). Ethnic self-organisations in a city that are operating transnational embed a city into a global ethnic network. The Hague operates in the transnational Turkish and Hindustan network as this chapter has shown. This *globality* of The Hague is not established through treaties or institutions (see chapter 4.1) but through their diverse population.

Figure 13: The urban governance for The Hague specific towards Turkish and Hindustan.



Source: Made by author.

6. CONCLUSION: GLOBAL CITY IN ETHNIC NETWORK

In most urban researches the emphasis regarding ethnic parts of the city rests on the position ethnic business takes. The way ethnic neighbourhoods could be sold and are visualised are mainly from an economic perspective. This research shows the importance of ethnic self-organisations and is derived from a more sociological perspective. Using the after post colonialism approach is helpful to understand the fluidity of the present-day world order and the importance of ethnic networks. The development happens whereby the influence of ethnic participation in the world order has increased and shows another understanding of the post-colonialism world order. The after post colonialism approach shows that the traditional linkage between the place of origin and the place of origin has not that importance anymore for ethnic self-organisations. More important is their global ethnic network.

6.1: THE HAGUE AND ITS DIFFERENT GEOGRAPHIES

The perspective of the current world order is conceptualised through financial flows. Using the benefits of globalisations, nation-states are engaged with putting the emphasis and importance on their cities instead of the nationwide. Cities become more important than the nation-state. Using the financial flows, the world (economic) order offers a distinguishment for cities, depending on the level they are engaged in a global system (Friedman, 1986; Sassen, 2001, 2002; Taylor, 2001). To specific actors like law, IGOs and diplomacy The Hague is good embedded into (Koller, 2012; Mamadouh *et al.*, 2015; Schlichtmann, 2003). Within these geographies, The Hague has a lead position and attributes towards the global in the(se) world system network(s).

The Hague was and is divided depending on the land use. As Schmal (1995) stated, the most important element of the social division of The Hague is the soil: an "upper half" of the high and dry sandy soil where the elite reside and a 'lower half' on the low and wet peat soil where the poor live. On the upper half the above stated geographies are located: law, IGOs and diplomacy. On the lower half The Hague is hosting citizens with a non-Dutch descendant. The citizens with a Turkish and Moroccan descendant are concentrated in these areas; the citizens with a Surinamese descendant are mainly located here but are not concentrated here. Nevertheless, the ethnic self-organisations are located in these areas: *Schildersbuurt*-West, -North and -East and *Transvaalkwartier*-North, -Middle and -South. The ethnic self-organisations are representing in the neighbourhoods where most people of their same ethnic background are living. It is therefore likely that the ethnic self-organisations are also participating in these neighbourhoods regarding the social development; as well on local level as on global level.

6.2: THE HAGUE AND ITS ETHNIC SELF-ORGANISATIONS

The ethnic self-organisations are on one side participating for their own ethnic group like cultural events or towards participation in the mainstream society. On the other hand, ethnic self-organisations are formal or informal linked with another organisation on a higher level. The linkage on a higher level also suggest a shift of the authoritative power towards a foreign power whereby other actors have more influence on the local city governance instead the (local) government. The ways other foreign authoritative powers influence the local community give understanding towards a global community and a global (ethnic) network. Seeing people from different local communities being part of one society gives for cities another ranking than is suggestive.

6.2.1: THEIR GLOBAL NETWORK

The multi layered organisational structure suggests a new understanding towards the global system of world cities and global cities. The role ethnicity is playing in the global system of city order shows the up scaling of the city into this perspective. As Portes (2003) states with transnationalism, in relation with the city this geography of ethnicities is not new but is unknown. The way cities are embedded in the global setting requires an acknowledgement on local level what shows the city on a higher level. Putting the city in this perspective gives not a new understanding, but a different understanding. The local community in The Hague can embed The Hague into these ethnic networks as the case with Turkish and (Surinam-) Hindustan self-organisations has shown.

The role of Turkish self-organisations as top down structured has putting the role of the authoritative power into question. Seeing these local communities part of the larger movement requires for city planners to acknowledge this influence and participate in accordance of this influence. Participating in contrast of this movement will lead towards the contrary effect (e.g. the banned Turkish organisations that moved to Europe after the Turkish coup of 1980). In contrary the (Surinam-) Hindustan self-organisations see themselves as part of a global Hindustan community whereby there is no large state influence. This has led to a bottom up developed global ethnic network and requires for city planners another perspective than for the Turkish self-organisations. Understanding the global ethnic networks is crucial in this perspective to make well applicable policy, e.g. for subsidy applications.

6.3: THE NEW CITY GOVERNANCE

Whereby the present-day discourse regarding the urban governance is limited to the three different kind of collaboration – government, private sector and the micro factors of self-organisations – the involvement and engagement of the macro factors of the ethnic self-organisations show a new understanding for urban planners and policy makers. Seeing these organisations not just on local level, but acknowledging their participation on global level shows a new understanding of the urban

governance. As figure 13 on page 85 shows, the role of the authoritative power has been shifted towards another field and this authoritative power can become in conflict for the local government. The local government can loosen their power in the city when they underestimate the influence from outside.

This perspective should not neglect the role of ethnic self-organisation for the city governance. The ethnic self-organisations participate the most in the city governance and take the responsibility of the city challenges. The city of The Hague has a varied population whereby a significant part of the population cannot always find their way in the mainstream society. Seeing ethnic self-organisation as building the bridge between the ethnic society and the mainstream society is the core approach. Nevertheless, there is also an ethnic global network whereby the local ethnic community is part of a global ethnic society. These communities influence each other. Neglecting ethnic self-organisation is not a possibility due to the importance for the ethnic minority. This could make the urban conflict larger as discussed in section 4.4.4.

The consequence of the enlargement of the urban conflict could result in societal tensions whereby there is a rival between communities. On the one hand local ethnic communities do not feel themselves recognised through the local government whereby the local government simply does not understand their local ethnic community. This becomes more complex when the communities are influenced through external organisations. On the other hand there is none community building. Citizens see themselves as part of their community e.g. Hindustan or Alevi but not as Hague citizens. Seeing themselves as part of the local community has the main advantage that the community feel themselves responsible of their own town. In this perspective citizens with a non-Dutch descendant and who succeed in using their (social) transnational ties will be successful in city development and make the ties stronger with other countries and cities. This result into a new perspective regarding the global city.

6.4: CONCLUSION

This research had looked up to the relation between ethnic self-organisations and the global city. The Hague is a global city based on various actors like IGO, law and diplomacy. However in the literature the position of migrants is neglected. Migrants are in relation with global city seen as an influx into low way employment (see figure 1). The way migrants are organised and the meaning of this organisation has received attention in the literature is not in relation with the global city. This research showed the importance the way migrants – with ethnicity as allocation – who are organised by themselves through ethnic self-organisations have in the city (governance). Ethnic self-organisations are important towards community building and to accomplish the bridge function between the own local community and the mainstream community. These ethnic self-organisations could also be embedded in an ethnic network: the Turkish self-organisations are transnational structured while the (Surinam-) Hindustan self-

organisations are working towards a global Hindustan community. While these ethnic networks are influencing the local city governance, they are also helpful to embed the city of The Hague in these ethnic networks. There are social and organisational linkages with communities in other cities around the world. This transnationalism of the ethnic self-organisations and the communities could be seen as a new actor in the world system theory what is influencing the city ranking. The Hindustan community showed the way social media is helpful to interact with other Hindustan/Desi⁴² communities in the world. This bottom up development is likely for other communities to create an ethnic global community. The participation of a transnational community in a city gives input towards the meaning of a global city. A city with the old actors could be a world or a global city according to Friedman (1986), Sassen (2001) and Taylor (2001) but this does not mean the attendance of a transnational community. The reverse is also possible whereby a transnational community upscale a city: a city becomes more global due to the ethnic transnational communities. The Hague is hosting these transnational communities: taking these transnational communities into count shows the importance of the city of The Hague in an ethnic world.

6.5: THE NEW DEBATE

The way the concept of *global city* develops show interesting points in the perspective of ethnicities. While the present underlying notion is putting the emphasis on the old actors like financial flows and the availability of advanced producer's services, ethnicities as a new actor can be used to appoint with a more inclusive approach. In this inclusive approach it should be wise the ethnic minorities have more influence in the global setting of cities and seeing cities as part of global ethnic system.

This requires not a new role but a stronger role for the local government, whereby the local government has not the monopoly of authoritative power in urban governance but is participating on the foreign influences and takes care of it. If the local government has the monopoly of the authoritative power in the urban governance, this will lead to concerns where the citizens have no influence in. This will lead in our open society to stronger influences from outside leading to a larger urban conflict as described in section 4.4.4: The urban conflict). This can even lead to a societal conflict where people with different ideologies are in disagreement. The debate goes further towards new ideas of an inclusive society (Etzioni 2016). In this inclusive society the ethnic self-organisations forms a crucial role: on the one hand towards community building, on the other hand towards their own ethnic world.

For the City of The Hague the ethnic worlds are not new but should be seen as part of the city, like the other geographies where The Hague is embedded into. For instance the embassies in The Hague

⁴² In this context the (Surinam-) Hindustan community are seen as part of the Desi community (see also 5.2.2.2: Media organisations).

represent symbolic state power and national identities for citizens and shows wider socio-spatial relations. These transactional activities are extending to agglomeration effects if embassies are thinkable in wider complex associations or as elements of 'urban assemblages' (Farias, 2011; Mamadouh *et al.*, 2015). The role that ethnic diaspora networks have on local governance needs to get their attention. Linkages between The Hague and Cologne are stronger due to the Turkish organisations. The same point can be made for the relation between The Hague and countries with Hindustan/Desi communities in like Mauritius, South-Africa and Fiji.

The position citizens take with a non-Dutch descendant as being part of the city is important to see what network this has established. The old Eurocentric or Americentrism world order is slightly changing whereby the new generation of migrants are focussing more on another world order whereby the after post-colonialism perspective of Dabashi (2012) is crucial in this understanding. The technological resources have increased what led towards new ways of communication and new ties. This gives the concept of transnationalism a new direction and position in the societal and scientific debate.

6.6: FURTHER RESEARCH & LIMITATIONS

This research shows an interesting perspective regarding ethnic communities in The Hague. As already stated, this research opens a new perspective in the debate of ethnic communities in global cities. The recent development in communication technology has made it possible to get in touch with other communities over the world and to establish a network. These networks are developed through various diaspora networks and are helpful in our global understanding of ethnicities. The case studies of Turkish self-organisations and (Surinam-) Hindustan self-organisations have shown important complexities regarding the transnational perspective of ethnic self-organisations.

This perspective could rely on a top down perspective or on a bottom up perspective. The Turkish self-organisations showed the influence of a state in the establishment of the organisations. The local self-organisations are part of these main organisations. The (Surinam-) Hindustan self-organisation are succeed in the establishment of a global network due to their culture whereby they have a connection towards the global Hindustan community. These perspectives show two extremely different approaches; a mix could be found for other communities. The Hague and other global cities are hosting citizens from all part of the whole world with their own cultural identity and level of group consciousness. This approach using for city development is crucial in the after post-colonialism world whereby the role of ethnic minorities qualitative is enhancing. Taking the perspective of all different ethnic minorities will be helpful for the understanding the city in global ethnic networks. However, this process can be hard and it is not applicable that all communities are transnational. It is possible that small communities can be transnational but larger communities not. The way communities are

practicing transnational is difficult to say. The same for their network: an ethnic network can be large on different scales. The Turkish organisations are large on European scale but not on global scale while the Hindustan organisations are more global active.

Important to note is that the data has been received through The Hague Municipality or are known by Fonds1818 (see section 3.5: Data). The self-organisations are therefore active on particular fields like social participation or elderly care. This is in agreement with the policy of The Hague Municipality. The main advantage is that the organisations are helpful towards the municipality; the main disadvantage is that a large category is unknown. For instance criminal transnational organisations are not visible in this research. The same for organisations that do not received a subsidy in 2015 but received structural support the years before.

This research has shown the Turkish self-organisations due to expert interviews and the already present literature of Turkish self-organisations. The (Surinam-) Hindustan self-organisations have been interviewed through a researcher who has also a (Surinam-) Hindustan descendant. This perspective is helpful in order to get the information what is preferable and where the respondent trust on; the researcher is seen as part of the same community. As shown for the Turkish case, this could work on the opposite. Belonging to a particular Turkish community means also not belonging to another community that could even dissociate you. This makes research in the field of ethnicity hard. It is even hard to find particular ethnic groups. It is necessary to make ethnicity visible if an ethnic group is the subject of research. In the Netherlands, registration based on ethnicity is not allowed. This makes it hard to see ethnicity in societal issues. This was visible with approaching the (Surinam-) Hindustan community, what is part of the Surinam descendants, but do not feel connected with the Creole community. Access, understanding and acceptance is necessary to research ethnic groups.

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ATTACHMENT A

Administrative list of neighbourhoods, the quarter, district and the population on 1st of January 2016

Neighborhood	Quarter	District	Population
01 Oud Scheveningen	07 Scheveningen	4 Scheveningen	2.883
02 Vissershaven	07 Scheveningen	4 Scheveningen	3.119
03 Scheveningen Badplaats	07 Scheveningen	4 Scheveningen	5.397
04 Visserijbuurt	07 Scheveningen	4 Scheveningen	3.736
05 v Stolkpark/Schev Bosjes	06 Van Stolkpark en Schev. Bos	4 Scheveningen	780
06 Waldeck-Zuid	18 Waldeck	1 Loosduinen	1.984
07 Statenkwartier	09 Geuzen- en Statenkwartier	4 Scheveningen	9.250
08 Geuzenkwartier	09 Geuzen- en Statenkwartier	4 Scheveningen	4.394
09 Vogelwijk	13 Vogelwijk	3 Segbroek	5.098
10 Rond de Energiecentrale	21 Regentessekwartier	3 Segbroek	5.688
11 Kortenbos	28 Centrum	5 Centrum	6.965
12 Voorhout	28 Centrum	5 Centrum	2.100
13 Uilebomen	28 Centrum	5 Centrum	2.594
14 Zuidwal	28 Centrum	5 Centrum	6.529
15 Schildersbuurt-West	29 Schildersbuurt	5 Centrum	14.291
16 Schildersbuurt-Noord	29 Schildersbuurt	5 Centrum	10.016
17 Schildersbuurt-Oost	29 Schildersbuurt	5 Centrum	7.332
18 Huygenspark	27 Stationsbuurt	5 Centrum	7.064
19 Laakhaven-Oost	38 Laakkwartier en Spoorwijk	6 Laak	4.012
20 Moerwijk-Oost	36 Moerwijk	2 Eskamp	3.110
21 Groente- en Fruitmarkt	37 Groente- en Fruitmarkt	5 Centrum	5.177
22 Laakhaven-West	38 Laakkwartier en Spoorwijk	6 Laak	4.593
23 Spoorwijk	38 Laakkwartier en Spoorwijk	6 Laak	4.206
24 Laakkwartier-West	38 Laakkwartier en Spoorwijk	6 Laak	7.975

25 Laakkwartier-Oost	38 Laakkwartier en Spoorwijk	6 Laak	11.023
26 Noordpolderbuurt	38 Laakkwartier en Spoorwijk	6 Laak	8.335
30 Rustenburg	31 Rustenburg en Oostbroek	2 Eskamp	6.053
31 Oostbroek-Noord	31 Rustenburg en Oostbroek	2 Eskamp	4.450
32 Transvaalkwartier-Noord	30 Transvaalkwartier	5 Centrum	3.918
33 Transvaalkwartier-Midden	30 Transvaalkwartier	5 Centrum	4.895
34 Transvaalkwartier-Zuid	30 Transvaalkwartier	5 Centrum	7.263
35 Oostbroek-Zuid	31 Rustenburg en Oostbroek	2 Eskamp	7.841
36 Zuiderpark	35 Zuiderpark	2 Eskamp	160
37 Moerwijk-West	36 Moerwijk	2 Eskamp	6.227
38 Moerwijk-Noord	36 Moerwijk	2 Eskamp	6.821
39 Moerwijk-Zuid	36 Moerwijk	2 Eskamp	3.951
40 Nieuw Waldeck	18 Waldeck	1 Loosduinen	7.258
41 Zorgvliet	10 Zorgvliet	4 Scheveningen	418
42 Stadhoudersplantsoen	11 Duinoord	4 Scheveningen	1.860
43 Sweelinckplein eo	11 Duinoord	4 Scheveningen	6.508
44 Koningsplein eo	21 Regentessekwartier	3 Segbroek	7.386
45 Zeeheldenkwartier	22 Zeeheldenkwartier	5 Centrum	11.192
46 Archipelbuurt	05 Archipelbuurt	5 Centrum	5.729
47 Willemspark	23 Willemspark	5 Centrum	1.478
48 Nassaubuurt	04 Benoordenhout	7 Haagse Hout	1.521
49 Haagse Bos	24 Haagse Bos	7 Haagse Hout	391
50 Bloemenbuurt-West	12 Bomen- en Bloemenbuurt	3 Segbroek	2.298
51 Bloemenbuurt-Oost	12 Bomen- en Bloemenbuurt	3 Segbroek	6.308
52 Bomenbuurt	12 Bomen- en Bloemenbuurt	3 Segbroek	5.793
53 Vruchtenbuurt	19 Vruchtenbuurt	3 Segbroek	7.009
54 Heesterbuurt	20 Valkenboskwartier	3 Segbroek	6.741
55 Valkenboskwartier	20 Valkenboskwartier	3 Segbroek	11.582
60 Binckhorst	39 Binckhorst	6 Laak	215
61 Landen	25 Mariahoeve en Marlot	7 Haagse Hout	4.915

62 Rivierenbuurt-Zuid	27 Stationsbuurt	5 Centrum	821
63 Rivierenbuurt-Noord	27 Stationsbuurt	5 Centrum	3.287
64 Bezuidenhout-West	26 Bezuidenhout	7 Haagse Hout	3.529
65 Bezuidenhout-Midden	26 Bezuidenhout	7 Haagse Hout	3.971
66 Bezuidenhout-Oost	26 Bezuidenhout	7 Haagse Hout	8.961
67 Kampen	25 Mariahoeve en Marlot	7 Haagse Hout	2.377
68 Marlot	25 Mariahoeve en Marlot	7 Haagse Hout	802
69 Burgen en Horsten	25 Mariahoeve en Marlot	7 Haagse Hout	5.960
70 Oostduinen	01 Oostduinen	4 Scheveningen	1
71 Belgisch Park	02 Belgisch Park	4 Scheveningen	7.970
72 Rijslag	07 Scheveningen	4 Scheveningen	1.612
73 Westbroekpark	03 Westbroekpark/Duttendel	4 Scheveningen	802
74 Duttendel	03 Westbroekpark/Duttendel	4 Scheveningen	1.050
75 Uilennest	04 Benoordenhout	7 Haagse Hout	2.038
76 Duinzigt	04 Benoordenhout	7 Haagse Hout	2.490
77 Waalsdorp	04 Benoordenhout	7 Haagse Hout	3.678
78 Arendsdorp	04 Benoordenhout	7 Haagse Hout	1.314
79 v Hoytemastraat eo	04 Benoordenhout	7 Haagse Hout	2.306
80 Morgenstond-Zuid	34 Morgenstond	2 Eskamp	6.028
81 Bosjes van Pex	14 Bohemen, Meer en Bos	1 Loosduinen	398
82 Rosenburg	18 Waldeck	1 Loosduinen	2.798
83 Eykenduynen	19 Vruchtenbuurt	3 Segbroek	2.690
84 Leyenburg	32 Leyenburg	2 Eskamp	14.800
85 Kerketuinen/Zichtenburg	17 Loosduinen	1 Loosduinen	58
86 Houtwijk	17 Loosduinen	1 Loosduinen	12.249
87 Venen/Oorden/Raden	33 Bouwlust/Vrederust	2 Eskamp	8.284
88 Morgenstond-West	34 Morgenstond	2 Eskamp	6.839
89 Morgenstond-Oost	34 Morgenstond	2 Eskamp	5.438
90 Ockenburgh	15 Kijkduin en Ockenburgh	1 Loosduinen	736
91 Kijkduin	15 Kijkduin en Ockenburgh	1 Loosduinen	1.457

92 Bohemen/Meer en Bos	14 Bohemen, Meer en Bos	1 Loosduinen	4.346
93 Componistenbuurt	18 Waldeck	1 Loosduinen	1.761
94 Waldeck-Noord	18 Waldeck	1 Loosduinen	3.022
95 Kom Loosduinen	17 Loosduinen	1 Loosduinen	4.943
96 Zijden/Steden/Zichten	33 Bouwlust/Vrederust	2 Eskamp	7.683
97 Kraayenstein	16 Kraayenstein	1 Loosduinen	4.855
98 Dreven en Gaarden	33 Bouwlust/Vrederust	2 Eskamp	10.523
99 De Uithof	33 Bouwlust/Vrederust	2 Eskamp	1.070
100 Duindorp	08 Duindorp	4 Scheveningen	5.937
101 Erasmus Veld	40 Wateringse Veld	2 Eskamp	2.038
102 Hoge Veld	40 Wateringse Veld	2 Eskamp	7.572
103 Parkbuurt Oosteinde	40 Wateringse Veld	2 Eskamp	3.476
104 Lage Veld	40 Wateringse Veld	2 Eskamp	4.285
105 Zonne Veld	40 Wateringse Veld	2 Eskamp	3.431
106 Vlietbuurt	41 Hoornwijck	8 Leidschenveen-Ypenburg	186
107 Vliegeniersbuurt	41 Hoornwijck	8 Leidschenveen-Ypenburg	-
108 Bosweide	42 Ypenburg	8 Leidschenveen-Ypenburg	2.079
109 Tedingebroek	42 Ypenburg	8 Leidschenveen-Ypenburg	-
110 De Reef	41 Hoornwijck	8 Leidschenveen-Ypenburg	3
111 De Venen	42 Ypenburg	8 Leidschenveen-Ypenburg	1.560
112 Morgenweide	42 Ypenburg	8 Leidschenveen-Ypenburg	7.131
113 Singels	42 Ypenburg	8 Leidschenveen-Ypenburg	5.656
114 Waterbuurt	42 Ypenburg	8 Leidschenveen-Ypenburg	4.797
115 De Bras	42 Ypenburg	8 Leidschenveen-Ypenburg	5.907
116 Westvliet	43 Forepark	8 Leidschenveen-Ypenburg	126
117 De Rivieren	43 Forepark	8 Leidschenveen-Ypenburg	28
118 De Lanen	44 Leidschenveen	8 Leidschenveen-Ypenburg	5.214
119 De Velden	44 Leidschenveen	8 Leidschenveen-Ypenburg	4.311
120 De Vissen	44 Leidschenveen	8 Leidschenveen-Ypenburg	8.574
121 Rietbuurt	44 Leidschenveen	8 Leidschenveen-Ypenburg	2.649

ATTACHMENT B

List of the official 9 foundations and associations that have a seat in the Dutch Hindu Council:

- *Stichting Federatie Arya Samadj Nederland (FAS-NED)*⁴³
- *Stichting Shri Sanatan Dharma Maha Sabha Nederland (S.S.D.M.N.)*
- *Vereniging Federatie Shri Sanatan Dharm Nederland (F.S.S.D.N.)*
- *Stichting Widwad Parisadh Sanatan Dharm Nederland (W.P.N.)*
- *Vereniging Sanatan Hindoe Parishad Nederland (S.H.P.N.)*
- *Stichting Shri Sanatan Dharm Sabha (S.S.S.D.S.)*
- *Stichting Karmavadische Sanatan Dharm Mahasabha Nederland (KSD)*
- *Stichting Karmavadische Federatie Hindoe Virat Sabha (K.F.H.V.S.)*
- *Stichting Federatie Samenwerkende Vaisnava Organisaties Nederland ISKCON, (FSVO ISKCON).*

⁴³ This foundation is the only Arya Samaj organisation and is a federation, consisting of four Arya Samaj organisations. Therefore this federation has also received four seats, all other organisations just one.