The Disappearance of Lake Chad
A Humanitarian and Natural Disaster

Examining the Securitization of Environmental issues

Dirk van de Wetering – S1010650 – h.vandewetering@student.ru.nl

MA Political Science – Conflict, Power & Politics – Radboud University – Nijmegen

Supervisor – Jutta Joachim

29-06-2018

Abstract

The humanitarian crisis in the Lake Chad region is one of world's largest and most complex humanitarian disasters. The prevailing view has been that this crisis is a security problem, particularly emanating from the Boko Haram insurgency. However, more recently, environmental problems are increasingly being recognized as drivers of the violent conflicts and humanitarian crisis. This indicates a securitization of environmental issues. Therefore, this thesis set out to explore how environmental issues in the Lake Chad region are being securitized with the specific purpose to identify the role of the United Nations in this process. In doing this, it drew on the securitization approach and used content analysis and process tracing to determine how environmental issues in the Lake Chad region are being securitized. Speech acts by the United Nations provided evidence that it securitizes the shrinking of Lake Chad, which subsequently legitimizes the employment of emergency measures. Besides, it established that the securitization of environmental issues is ongoing and future academic research is to determine its success and effects. Finally, the findings point towards the potential risks and opportunities of the securitization approach and identify new avenues for future research.

Key words: Lake Chad, Environmental Degradation, Humanitarian Crisis, Securitization, United Nations.

Table of Contents

List of Figures

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

AFD	French Development Agency
AFDB	African Development Bank
AU	African Union
BIOPALT	BIOsphere and Heritage of Lake Chad
CAR	Central African Republic
CS	Copenhagen School
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FYIP	Five Year Investment Plan
GEF	Global Environment Facility
IBWT	Inter-Basin Water Transfer
ICLC	International Conference on Lake Chad
IGO	Intergovernmental Organization
ILO	International Labour Organization
LCBC	Lake Chad Basin Commission
MNJTF	Multinational Joint Task Force
NAP	National Action Plan
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PRESIBALT	Programme to Rehabilitate and Strengthen the Resilience of Lake Chad Basin Systems
PRODEBALT	Lake Chad Basin Sustainable Development Programme
UN	United Nations
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDP Nigeria	United Nations Development Programme Nigeria

UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UN OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNOCT	United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism
UNOWAS	United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
SDC	Swiss Development Agency
SAP	Strategic Action Programme
WFP	World Food Programme

"Lake Chad: The World's most complex humanitarian disaster" (Taub, 2017).

"Lake Chad: The faces of the world's 'silent emergency'" (BBC, 2017).

"Lake Chad Basin is world's most neglected humanitarian crisis: U.N. aid chief" (Whiting, 2016).

"Lake Chad Basin: World's most neglected crisis rages on" (Byanyima & Egeland, 2017).

Neglected crisis: Poverty, terror and the threat of famine in the Lake Chad Basin" (Theirworld, 2016).

"Lake Chad crisis: 'If Nigeria fails, Africa fails'" (Drummond, 2017).

1. Introduction

Lake Chad is a lake situated on the borders between Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger and Chad (see Figure 1.1). In 2014, its banks and islands were populated by approximately 2 million people and roughly 13 million people are highly dependent on this region in terms of food and water security. The whole Lake Chad Basin is home to just about 47 million people. Until recently, the biodiversity of the region has always allowed for productive fishing, livestock farming and agricultural practices (LCBC, 2016, iv).

Figure 1.1. **Lake Chad.** Retrieved from *"Lake Chad: Better late than never…"* from U.Y. Kirawa, 2018 (https://www.dailytrust.com.ng/lake-chad-better-late-than-never--250586.html) Copyright 2018, U.Y. Kirawa.

However, today, the Lake Chad Basin is facing one of the most severe humanitarian crises in the world. Because of deteriorating violent conflicts in the region, with the Boko Haram insurgency being the most violent and grave one, tens of thousands of people have been killed and millions are driven from their homes, families and way of subsistence. Moreover, as a result of the insurgency, millions of people are excluded from access to basic and vital human needs and services (United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), 2017, p.16-20; U.N. Environment; 2018). It has become one of the poorest regions in the world and food insecurity and malnutrition have reached sky-high levels and are significantly worsening every year (Lanzer, Tatay, Dewar, 2016, p.3; OCHA, 2018). More precisely, 17,4 million people are living in affected areas, 2.3 million people have been displaced, 10.7 million are in immediate need for help, 488.000 children are suffering from extreme malnutrition and 5.8 million people are coping with food insecurity (U.N. OCHA, 2018; U.N. Environment, 2018). The population living in the area is expected to increase with about 20 million people in the next 20 years, which will significantly worsen the humanitarian situation if not more is being done to counter the crisis (Lanzer, Tatay, Dewar, 2016, p.2; Torbjörnsson & Jonsson, 2017).

In addressing the causes of this humanitarian crisis, policy makers, the international media and many academics have predominantly pointed at the violent conflicts raging through the region. The prevailing view has therefore been that this crisis is a security problem, particularly emanating from the Boko Haram insurgency and the military operations combatting the terrorist group. This reflects a 'traditionalist' understanding of security, focusing on military or otherwise armed threats. That is, they argue that the threat to the survival and well-being of the people living in the Lake Chad region, and the humanitarian crisis subsequently, emanates from the violence of the Boko Haram insurgency (UNFPA, 2017, p.6/15-16; Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), 2018).

However, more recently, scholars who conducted research on the region suggested that it is an environmental problem as well. They pointed to environmental issues as the root causes of the conflict and therefore crucial in explaining the humanitarian crisis. This group of scholars considers environmental degradation to be the underlying issue that instigates and fuels violent conflicts. Moreover, besides an indirect environmental cause of the humanitarian crisis, they argue that environmental problems themselves constitute a source of insecurity, malnutrition and displacement (Nett & Rüttinger, 2016, p.10-19; Okpara et al., 2015; Freeman, 2017, p. 351-374). Thus, they broaden the security agenda and recognize that the humanitarian crisis is, next to military and otherwise violent threats, also very much caused by environmental threats. These scholars are called the 'wideners' and include, among others,

environmental dimensions into the concept of security. While until recently environmental issues were not, at least not to the same extent, recognized as security problems and potential drivers of humanitarian crises and violent conflicts, now they increasingly are. This implies a securitization of environmental issues, a process which will be elaborated on in the theoretical chapter of this research (Šulovic, 2010, p.1-3; Charrett, 2009, p.9).

This thesis wants to explore the extent to which the humanitarian crisis in the Lake Chad region can indeed be viewed as an environmental problem based on the arguments advanced in the existing literature. More specifically, it aims to examine and determine to what extent environmental issues are recognized, by the United Nations (UN), as factors that urgently need to be addressed in order to deal with the Boko Haram insurgency and humanitarian crisis. Hence, the purpose of this research is to trace the process of the securitization of environmental issues by the UN. The UN is chosen as the unit of analysis since it is not only the biggest international governmental organization involved, but also the most influential actor active in the region. The main research question derived from this and guiding the thesis reads as follows:

> *'How are environmental issues in the Lake Chad region being securitized, and what role does the United Nations play in this process?'*

To answer the research question, this thesis draws on the securitization literature. As indicated before, the securitization approach has predominantly been applied with more traditional notions of security in mind, focusing on the military sector. However, more recently, it has also been used to illustrate how also other problems can be subject to securitization, including environmental matters, which is what I try to show in my thesis as well. After having explained the different steps and features of a securitization process, a theoretical framework is constructed based upon which the UN's role in the securitization of environmental issues in the Lake Chad region is examined. To trace this process, I draw on reports of the UN, particularly meeting coverages and press releases from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and other relevant documents concerning the crisis in the Lake Chad region. An in-depth qualitative case study of UN speech-acts follows. Therefore, process-tracing and content-analysis constitute the methods by which this research is conducted. A deductive approach is applied based on the theoretical framework constructed.

Analysing the extent to which environmental issues are being recognized and addressed by the UN as security problems is of great societal importance because it offers insights as to how violent conflicts in the Lake Chad region might be deterred and long-term

suffering diminished. Tackling underlying environmental issues could provide long-term solutions to the humanitarian crisis instead of only alleviating immediate human suffering and providing short-term help to the people in need, which is also of crucial importance. Furthermore, addressing the root causes of the crisis by recognizing environmental threats not only counteracts the deterioration of the contemporary humanitarian situation, but may also prevent the outbreak of future conflicts and restore stability in the region. Moreover, considering the many global environmental challenges the world is facing today, the rapidly growing and demanding population in Africa and the persistent shrinking of Lake Chad, long-term sustainable solutions are urgently needed. Therefore, it is necessary to examine to what extent environmental issues are recognized and addressed as drivers of the humanitarian crisis.

In addition to the societal relevance of this study, it also has important scientific relevance. Analysing the securitization process in the Lake Chad region and determining its effects provides insights into the opportunities and risks of the securitization approach in general. It indicates whether the securitization of issues can offer a valuable way to address a wide range of problems urgently and sufficiently, which could provide grounds for a critical reassessment or extension of the approach. Moreover, many attempts to securitize are not (entirely) successful and Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde (1998) note that "unsuccessful or partially successful securitizations are interesting primarily for the insights they offer into the stability of social attitudes toward security legitimacy, the process by which those attitudes are maintained or changed, and the possible future direction of security politics" (p.39). Examining securitization attempts by the UN uncovers features of the social attitudes towards security dynamics in the Lake Chad region. Besides, this research adds to the broader domain of security studies and identifies avenues for future scientific research.

The structure of this thesis is as follows. The second chapter delineates the theoretical approach of this research. It first explains the general process and steps of securitization after which environmental securitization is discussed in particular. Following from this, a theoretical framework is developed based upon which the securitization of environmental issues in the Lake Chad region is examined. The framework delineates both criteria as well as different phases of securitization. In Chapter 3, I will elaborate on the specific methods used to conduct the main analysis. After that, the case selection process is described in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 covers the empirical analysis starting with a more extensive discussion of the humanitarian crisis and the Boko Haram insurgency. Facts and figures about the severity and different dimensions of the crisis are presented. After that, a comprehensive in-depth case

study follows detailing the UN's role in the securitization of environmental problems through speech acts. The theoretical framework composed in the second chapter will be applied and guide the analysis. The final chapter answers the research question and identifies the societal and scientific implications of the findings. Furthermore, it draws out limitations and weaknesses of this study and provides suggestions for future scholarly research.

2. Theoretical Framework

This chapter presents the theoretical approach of this research. First, it introduces the concept of security and discusses how it has been expanded to also include environment problems. Subsequently, the securitization process is explained. It outlines the steps by which an issue becomes securitized. Besides, it indicates some of the criticism of the securitization approach. After that, environmental securitization is discussed in more detail, using examples from previous studies. Following from this, a set of criteria is formulated based upon which the securitization of environmental issues in the Lake Chad region is analysed. Finally, this chapter discusses the concepts of existential threats and environmental threats.

2.1. Security

Security is a highly complex and debated concept in the academic literature. The traditional approach to security defines it as "a freedom from any objective military threat to the state survival in an anarchic international system" (Šulovic, 2010 p.2). However, more recently, particularly since the end of the Cold War, security became a contested concept (Šulovic, 2010, p.3; Charett, 2009, p.9). That is, a new group of scholars called the 'wideners' emerged in the midst of newly recognized threats, other than military, and an increasing complexity in international relations involving state and non-state actors. The wideners, among them Barry Buzan, Mohammed Ayoob, Ole Wæver, Michael Klare and Daniel Thomas, argue that the traditionalist understanding of security has become too limited by only recognizing the military sector (Tarry, 1999, p.3-7). Subsequently, they broadened the security agenda and added political, societal, economic and environmental dimensions to the concept. Additionally, they extended the security agenda vertically and included referent objects other than the state, such as particular social groups, individual people, ecologically important areas, or even the society as a whole (Šulovic, 2010, p.1-3; Charrett, 2009; Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998).

2.2. Securitization & the Copenhagen School

The Copenhagen School (CS), which includes scholars such as Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap De Wilde, is representative of the wideners' side. This was one of the first leading schools to expand the definition of security from the military sector to the environmental, the social, the political and the economic sector. The scholars belonging to this school emphasize that all of these sectors are intertwined and inseparable elements of wider security complexes (Buzan, 1983, p.368). They define a security complex as "as a set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their national security problems

cannot reasonable be analyzed or resolved apart from one another" (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.12; Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998; Charrett, 2009, p.9).

Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde (1998) are considered to be among the most influential and prominent scholars of the Copenhagen School and their notion of securitization is still widely used in the academic world. Therefore, the definition of securitization used throughout this research, and the composed set of criteria, are derived from their work. The authors adopt a social constructivist approach in understanding and determining the process of securitization (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.19). They indicate that for a threat or vulnerability to be considered a security issue, it must approximate strictly denoted criteria. More specifically, they argue that security issues "have to be staged as existential threats to a referent object by a securitizing actor who thereby generates endorsement of emergency measures beyond rules that would otherwise bind" (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.5; Šulovic, 2010, p.3). Referent objects are those who are considered to be existentially threatened, whereas the securitizing actor is the one who declares something, the objects, existentially threatened (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.36).

One can consider an issue to be securitized when it meets the following criteria. To start with, it should be presented as an existential threat. What constitutes an existential threat greatly varies across the different sectors. Presenting something as a threat does not imply that a real existential threat exists, but only that the particular issue is framed as such. Taurek (2006) argues that "it is by labelling something a security issue that it becomes one" (p.54). However, this does not mean that the issue is therewith securitized; it inly refers to a "securitizing move" (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p. 25). As Šulovic (2010) notes, "language exists prior to security" (Šulovic, 2010 p.4). The issue becomes securitized only when the audience of the securitizing actor accepts it as such. Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde (1998) define the audience as "those the securitizing act attempts to convince to accept exceptional procedures because of the specific security nature of some issue" (p.41). Additionally, Wæver (2003) states that:

> *"Audience is those who have to be convinced in order for the securitizing move to be*
> *successful. Although one often tends to think in terms of 'the population' or citizenry*
> *being the audience (the ideal situation regarding 'national security' in a democratic*
> *society), it actually varies according to the political system and the nature of the*
> *issue"* (p.11-12).

Therefore, Wæver (2003) emphasizes that multiple categories of audience exists within the securitization framework and they can be simultaneously involved in the same securitization process (Wæver, 2003, p.26; Leonard & Kaunert, 2010, p.58-60). As regards to acceptance, Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde (1998) note that "accept does not necessarily mean in civilized, dominance-free discussion; it only means that an order always rests on coercion as well as consent" (p.25). It implies that the appointment of an existential threat receives enough consent for the creation of a platform from which emergency measures, or other actions initiated outside of the realm of 'normal' politics, can be legitimized. The emergency measures do not have to be adopted; they only have to be legitimized through the creation of a platform which would not have been possible had the issue not been presented as an existential threat, with an urgent necessity and 'point of no return' (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.25/31). Trombetta (2008) indicates that "if an issue succeeds in being labelled as a security issues, the method of handling it will be transformed" (Trombetta, 2008, p.588). Thus, the particular issue is then moved outside of the realm of normal democratic political procedures and onto that of emergence or panic politics (Šulovic, 2010, p.4). Thus, a securitization cannot be imposed and always requires acceptance of the audience. Hence, no sign of acceptance indicates that only a securitizing move has taken place and the issue has not actually been securitized. Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde (1998) state that "if by means of an argument about the priority and urgency of an existential threat the securitizing actor has managed to break free of procedures or rules he or she would otherwise be bound by, we are witnessing a case of securitization" (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.25). Thus, the definition and criteria of a securitization are based on an intersubjective construction of an existential threat which has a saliency and urgency sufficient enough to have significant political consequences (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.25; Taureck, 2006, p.54). The breaking of rules implies that the 'normal' political rules are not adhered to, through for example "the form of secrecy, levying taxes or conscription, placing limitations on otherwise inviolable rights or focusing society's energy and resources on a specific task" (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.24). However, the rules referred to throughout this research particularly apply to a liberal-democracy. 'Normal' politics varies across societies and there can be distinct rules in different parts of the world. Therefore, the breaking of rules can assume many forms (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.24-25).

The purpose of this research is to study the securitization of environmental issues in the Lake Chad region and Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde (1998) explicitly argue that "the way to study securitization is to study discourse and political constellations: When does an

argument achieve sufficient effect to make an audience tolerate violations of rules that would otherwise have to be obeyed?" (p.25). Or, As Charett (2009) puts it, "the security analyzer's role is therefore one of observation and interpretation. Using the logic of securitization the analyst acknowledges whether certain actions 'fulfil the security criteria'" (p.14). She lists several important questions a security analysist should answer in order to examine and determine to what extent a securitization has occurred and approximates the criteria. These are: who is the audience?; has the securitizing actor managed to mobilize support?; what are the facilitating conditions?; have extraordinary measures been taken?; what is the potential impact of the securitizing act on other units? (Charett, 2009, p.14). Therefore, these questions serve as a guideline to trace processes of securitization in the Lake Chad region (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998; Šulovic, 2010; Charrett, 2009; Balzaq, 2005; Trombetta, 2008). The following section describes the characteristics and role of a securitizing actor.

2.2.1. The securitizing actor

Securitizing actors are "actors who securitize issues by declaring something – a referent object – existentially threatened" (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.36). In short, "a securitizing actor is someone, or a group, who performs the security speech act" (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.40/36). Wæver (2003) indicates that, looking at the traditional approach to security, there was no clear distinction between the actor and the referent object because both were often considered to be the state. However, after incorporating other sectors into the security agenda, this distinction has become more obvious and necessary (Wæver, 2003, p.11).

Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde (1998) note that although political leaders, national governments, bureaucracies, lobbyists and pressure groups are commonly known actors, there are many other players who can assume the role of the securitizing actor (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.40). They describe how one can identify a securitizing actor. A securitizing move is defined as a "speech act" and locating the securitizing actor can be done by looking at how specific issues are framed and presented. Particularly, a securitizing actor frames an issue as a problem that should be dealt with immediately, before it is too late and there is no way back. He often refers to the survival of the referent object and the priority of employing emergency measures. It is important to note that the word 'security' can, but does not have to, be present in the speech act. It is rather about presenting something as an existential threat that requires special measures, and the subsequent acceptance of such a denomination by the audience. A securitizing actor always indicates what will happen if special security measures

are taken and more importantly, what will happen if not. Although individual persons are the ones who do the actual speech acts, they are usually not referred to as the securitizing actors. They are often understood as part of, and hence speak on behalf of, a larger collectivity or organization such as a political party, state, agency or non-governmental organization (NGO) (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.40-41). More precisely, Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde (1998) state that "individuals can always be said to be the actors, but if they are locked into strong roles it is usually more relevant to see as the 'speaker' the collectivities for which individuals are designated authoritative representatives" (p.40/41). Thus, a speech act can be executed according to organizational logic or individual logic. Therefore, in order to identify who or what is the securitizing actor, one should focus on the organizational logic that shapes the speech act rather than on who performs the act (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.40-42).

A securitization can involve different units of analysis. Oftentimes, a securitization process involves a joint effort of different local, regional, national and international actors. However, Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde (1998) indicate that, for the purpose of conducting a convincing and coherent research, one should focus on only one unit of analysis. They note that "other units exist, but only one is chosen as the instrument of measurement" (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.18-19). Including multiples units of analysis would make a single case study too extensive and indistinct. The upcoming section defines the process by which issues become securitized.

2.2.2. The process and dynamics of securitization

As mentioned before, a "securitization is intersubjective and socially constructed" (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.31). Therefore, in order to conduct a precise analysis of a securitization process, it is necessary to understand who securitizes, on what issue, for which referent objects, for what reason, with what results and under what conditions. One can identify three sorts of facilitating conditions that contribute to a convincing speech act and successful securitization. First, internal, linguistic and grammatical conditions, which relate to the speech act itself. A securitizing actor should identify something as an existential threat, declare a 'point of no return' and provide a possible solution. Presenting something as a security issue or existential threat always has two components. It includes a prediction about what will happen if security measures are taken and a prediction about what will happen if not (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.32-33). Furthermore, internal linguistic conditions of the speech act also refer to commonly used dialects in the sector in which the act takes place,

such as talking about identity in the societal sector, about sovereignty in the political sector and about sustainability in the environmental sector (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.33). Second, external, contextual and social conditions are important, which relate to the position from which the speech act is made. This concerns the social capital or authority of the securitizing actor and the relationship to its audience, which influences the likelihood of acceptance. This does not have to be officially recognized authority but can also refer to a particular dominant or influential societal position of the securitizing actor (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.33). Moreover, not only do the specific characteristics of the speech act itself and the securitizing actor matter, but also the intrinsic features of the group or audience that recognizes and accepts the act. Third, external conditions also include particular features of the appointed existential threat itself, which are decisive in the successfulness of a securitization. These features could "either facilitate or impede securitization" (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.33). For example, if certain objects are cited that are commonly considered to be threatening, such as guns or environmental pollution, one is more likely to establish a security threat (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.32-33/40). Buzan and Waever (2003) provide some examples of facilitating conditions, such as the length and ferocity of historical enmity, the vulnerability of the referent objects and geography (Buzan and Wæver, 2003, p.86-87). Summarized, a successful securitization contains features of appropriate and convincing language of the speech act itself and conducive external and societal conditions (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.32-33; Charrett, 2009, p.13).

Based on the theoretical assumptions delineated above, several expectations can be formulated with respect to the securitization of environmental issues in the Lake Chad region and the role of the UN. First, it is anticipated that the UN appoints the shrinking of Lake Chad an existential threat to the people living in the region in its press releases and during conferences and meetings involving its member states and other international organizations, which are taken to be the audience. In doing this, it will most likely emphasize that it is a pressing problem which requires urgent action because otherwise the humanitarian situation will not improve or even deteriorate. In this particular case, it is expected that acceptance by its member states and by international (non-governmental) actors will become evident from their financial or material contribution to projects and missions addressing the environmental problems. Additionally, it is expected that acceptance will also appear from press releases and public statements by international organizations and individual nation states in which they recognize the environmental threats identified by the UN and endorse the proposed extraordinary measures. Regarding the conditions, it is expected that the UN introduces the

issue using particular words and grammar representative of the severity and urgency of the threat. Moreover, it is assumed that the UN, as the securitizing actor, finds itself in a societal and authoritative position beneficial for the likelihood of acceptance by the audience. Furthermore, considering the immense size of the problem and its interconnectedness with other sectors, e.g. a shortage of water also has implications for the economic sector in the region, it is expected that the securitizing act will have a considerable impact on other units. Finally, the breaking of 'normal' rules or procedures, as defined by Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde (1998), is very measure-specific and is to be established in the empirical analysis. It is therefore not feasible to specifically state what is anticipated here.

The section below outlines some of the criticism of the securitization approach.

2.2.3. Criticism

Before turning to environmental securitization in particular, the general criticism of widening the security agenda and recognizing the securitization process should be acknowledged.

First, widening the security agenda risks everything being securitized, which downgrades the essential meaning of security (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.2). Besides, widening the agenda implies that security is a universal good thing, which can be considered a too limited and dangerous notion of the concept. For example, too much economic security can be destructive to a liberal market economy. Moreover, widening the agenda requires extending state mobilization to a variety of other issues, which could be undesirable in sectors thriving especially without too much state interference (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.4). Some argue that the process of securitization invalidates regular and democratic political procedures by overriding them. Therefore, they argue that one should aim for the de-securitization of issues, moving them out of the extraordinary agenda and domain of urgency. They consider securitization to be inherently negative (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.4; Šulovic, 2010, p.4).

Next to this, one can identify more substantive criticism of the process of securitization. To start with, some scholars argue that the act of establishing a security issue is defined too narrow by only focussing on the speech acts of leading actors. This implies that securitization can only take place if dominant actors, such as senior state officials or CEOs, initiate it (Mcdonald, 2008, p.564-565; Šulovic, 2010, p.4-5). However, as mentioned above, there are many different types of actors who can securitize (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998 p.40). Second, they argue that the context and external conditions of the speech act are defined too narrow. The attention is concentrated on the moment of intervention, whereas the

historical and cultural context in which the securitizing move takes place should also be taken into consideration. Third, they stress that the framework of securitization is too narrow because "the nature of the act is defined solely in terms of the designation of threats to security" (Mcdonald, 2008, p.564). This encourages the notion that security can be defined solely in terms of dangers and threats, which prompts the idea that security politics is inherently negative. Finally, a more general remark holds that it is hard to determine whether an issue is merely politicized or also securitized. This is an essential distinction to be made by security analysts (Mcdonald, 2008, p.564-565; Šulovic, 2010, p.4-5; Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.3-4).

Additionally, several scholars, among which Ole Wæver himself, criticize the conceptualization of 'the audience', the 'facilitating conditions' and 'emergency measures' in the securitization approach presented by Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde (1998). They argue that the definitions of audience, facilitating conditions and emergency measures are oversimplified, under-theorised and lack clarity and precision. That is, it is not entirely clear from their conceptualization what or who the potential audience is. Leonart & Kaunert (2010) note that an audience is always case specific and this requires clear rules about how to recognize and define it (Leonart and Kaunert, 2010, p.60). As regards to emergency measures, it is argued that their work lacks an identification of, and does not distinguish between, ordinary and extra-ordinary measures. This leaves too much room for interpretation. Therefore, "if the concept of 'extraordinary measures' contain distinct sub-categories, it might be easier to develop degrees of securitization without watering out the theory" (Wæver, 2003, p.27; McDonald, 2008; Balzaq, 2010; Leonart & Kaunert, 2010, p. 58-61; Coté, 2016, p.541-555; Wæver, 2003, p.26-34).

This thesis nevertheless draws on the securitization approach as argued for by Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde (1998) in order to examine to what extent it is possible to analyse the securitization of environmental issues in the Lake Chad region on the basis of their proposed framework. This provides insights as to whether their approach needs adjustment or extension as regards to the purpose of this research. Furthermore, determining whether the securitization of environmental issues provides a way to deal with the humanitarian crisis in a more urgent and effective manner, points towards the opportunities of the securitization approach in general. If it shows to be an effective approach to raise issues on the political agenda, or even above the agenda, and legitimize the employment of emergency measures in this case, it might prove useful in other cases as well. That is, it offers insights as to how the securitization of environmental issues in the Lake Chad region comes about, which indicates possibilities

for securitizing other issues in both the environmental sector as well as in different sectors. Moreover, as will become clear throughout this research, drawing on this approach also sheds light on its risks and limitations. This, in turn, points towards new avenues for scientific research.

The following section describes environmental security and the securitization of environmental issues in more detail.

2.3. The environmental sector & environmental securitization

The environmental sector concerns the relationship between human activity and the planetary biosphere (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.7). As stated by Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde (1998), "environmental security concerns the maintenance of the local and the planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend" (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.8/76). They argue that the basic logic of environmental security holds that we, as humans, are living beyond the earth's carrying capacity. Therefore, a central assumption within the environmental sector is that it is within our power as human beings to change direction (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.80-81). Thus, environmental security is not so much about a threat to "Mother Earth" as such, but about the mutual interconnectedness between humans and the environment (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.76).

Within this sector, there are many different possible referent objects that can be existentially threatened, such as particular species, certain types of habitat or larger ecologically important areas. Most of these referent objects are closely connected to our well-being and subsistence as human beings (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.23). Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde (1998) provide a short example of a securitizing move within the environmental sector. They indicate how a securitizing actor would frame the issue:

> "The environment has to survive; therefore, this issue should take priority over all others, because if the environment is degraded to the point of no return all other issues will lose their meaning. If the normal system (politics according to the rules as they exist) is not able to handle this situation, we (Greenpeace and especially the more extremist ecoterrorists) will have to take extraordinary measures to save the environment" (p.38).

Wæver (2003) describes a similar scenario. He notes that "environmental activists claim that we face irreparable disasters: 'if we do not give absolute priority to this, it will soon be too

late, and exactly therefore, we (Greenpeace, Earth First, etc.) have a right to use extra-ordinary means, to depart from the usual political rules of the game'" (p.17-18). With such a statement a securitizing actor implies that environmental security problems require urgent action because the situation is moving towards a 'point of no return' and, in order to make sure that this critical point is not crossed, the issues cannot enter the realm of normal politics and should be dealt with immediately, through emergency measures (Wæver, 2003, p.18).

As stated before, previously the military sector was the only recognized sector within security studies and the referent object that was declared existentially threatened almost always concerned to the sovereignty and integrity of a state. With regard to the environmental sector, Buzan Wæver and De Wilde note that "sustainability might be the environmentalist' equivalent of the state's sovereignty and the nation's identity; it is the essential constitutive principle that has to be protected" (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.38). A referent object within the environmental sector can be of two sorts. First, it can be the environment as such or specific strategic or valuable elements of the environment, e.g. rivers, dams or mines. Second, the referent object can be the preservation of levels of civilization, such as "northern elite, middle class or Amazon Indian" (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p. 75-76). This refers to the relationship between the environment and civilization. It specifically relates to the concern about whether the ecosystems that are essential for the preservation and development of existing levels of civilization are sustainable (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.75). Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde (1998) argue that the environmental sector is constituted of two different agendas, the scientific agenda and the political agenda (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.71). The first is predominantly concerned with the assessment of threats and the subsequent securitizing moves, and involves scientific and non-governmental actors. The latter is mainly concerned with public decision-making and public policies that address the environmental problems raised in the scientific agenda. This involves governmental and non-governmental actors. More specifically, the political agenda is concerned with shaping public awareness about securitizing moves and subsequently allocating collective means that address the environmental issues. Thus, the political agenda is highly dependent on the issues raised in the scientific agenda (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.71-74). The authors appoint six key issues of the environmental agenda: disruption of ecosystems, energy problems, population problems, food problems, economic problems and civil strife. These issues are mutually interconnected and highly influence each other (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.74-75; Foster, 2001).

One can identify three different types of securitizing actors within the environmental

sector: lead actors, veto actors and veto coalitions (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, p.77). Within the environmental sector, referring to the political agenda in particular, lead actors may be states or activist and non-governmental organizations, such as Greenpeace. Concerning the scientific agenda, however, "the lead actor is not the state but a global, environmental epistemic community that investigates the urgency of a wide range of environmental subjects, constructs an agenda, and communicates that agenda to the press and political elites" (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p. 77). Lead actors can raise awareness of certain environmental issues by financing scientific research or informing the population of involved states. Moreover, their proceedings can assume forms of direct action, such as protests, or diplomatic moves to put issues on the agenda. Lead actors are often located on or close to the areas affected by environmental degradation. However, when environmental issues are a global concern, or when solving the issue requires the involvement of international actors, lead actors can be situated anywhere (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p. 77-79).Veto actors can also be NGOs, in the case of industrial or agricultural lobbying organizations, but are predominately states and firms. A state can have veto power due to its sovereignty, whereas a firm can possess veto power because of monopolies on knowledge and innovation. Furthermore, firms can acquire veto power through successful lobbying, persuading states to follow them. Next to lead and veto actors, one can identify functional actors in the environmental sector, whose activity is strongly connected to the well-being of the environment. The behaviour of these actors, particularly economic actors such as nuclear and mining industries, strongly influences ecosystems. However, they are not involved in the securitization process. Functional actors can also be governments and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) since they define the environmental rules for economic actors and need to make sure that these rules are adhered to (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.79).

This research focuses on one lead actor, the United Nations. Lead actors "have a strong commitment to effective international action on an environmental issue in specific cases" (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.77). Chapter 4 explains the case selection process of this research and will more extensively elaborate on the reasons why the UN qualifies as a lead actor and is chosen as the unit of analysis (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.77-79).

Section 2.4 on the next page describes the core value of an existential threat and indicates what can be interpreted as an environmental threat.

2.4. Definition of terms

2.4.1. Existential threats

The meaning of an existential threat is not fixed and clear-cut. That is, an existential threat can assume many different forms, especially when recognizing a widening of the security agenda. However, by stating that something is an existential threat, a securitizing actor always refers to a threat to the referent object's survival, or 'existence' (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p. 24). Taurek (2006) describes it as "to present an issue as an existential threat is to say that: 'If we do not tackle this problem, everything else will be irrelevant (because we will not be here or will not be free to deal with it in our own way'" (Taurek, 2006, p. 3). What constitutes the existential threat with respect to this particular research is subject to the empirical analysis.

2.4.2. Environmental issues & Environmental threats

Lake Chad has vastly diminished in size due to climate change, extreme drought and the over- and misuse of its water resources (U.N. environment, 2018). As argued by Foster (2001), such an environmental scarcity can emanate from "degradation or depletion of the resource, increased consumption of the resource or uneven distribution of the resource, or a combination these" (Foster, 2001, p.390). In addition to competition over scarce resources and migration resulting from resource shortages, Foster (2001) identifies three ways in which the use-and misuse of scarce resources may lead to conflict. First, the deliberate manipulation of resource shortages for hostile goals might underlie conflicts and violence. Second, a situation of competing claims over the ownership of resources could result in conflict. Third, areas that are already characterized by political instability, a deteriorating economic situation, high societal stress and a rapidly growing population are especially vulnerable to conflicts and violence as a result of environmental degradation and resource scarcity (Foster, 2001, p.384). As will be illustrated in the empirical analysis, all three can be observed in the Lake Chad region (Nett & Rüttinger, 2016, p.9-19). The environment-conflict nexus is depicted in Figure 5.4 in Chapter 5.

Additionally, Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde (1998) identify three dimensions of environmental threats or environmental security. First, "threats to human civilization from the natural environmental that are not caused by human activity", such as earthquakes and volcanic activity (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p. 79). Second, "threats from human activity to the natural systems or structures of the planet when the changes made *do* seem to pose existential threats to (parts of) civilization", such as the effect of gas emissions on the

ozone layer or the effect of environmental exploitation on a local level (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, p. 80). This indicates a circular relationship of threat and security between the environment and civilization, which is predominantly the result of massive population growth and increased economic activity. Third, "threats from human activity to the natural systems or structures of the planet when the changes made *do not* seem to pose existential threats to (parts of) civilization", such as the depletion of certain mineral resources (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, p.80).

The second dimension is particularly applicable to this case study. Lake Chad diminished in size due to both climate change and the mis-and overuse of its water resources, which can both be related back to human activity (U.N. environment, 2018). It starts with a threat from human activity to the natural systems of the planet; emissions, pollution and the mis-and overuse of water lead up to climate change and a depletion of the lake's water resources. This results in the shrinking of Lake Chad, which in turn poses a threat to parts of civilization; the people living in the Lake Chad region. However, what exactly is identified as an environmental security problem or threat by the UN remains subject to the empirical analysis of this research. Besides, the contemporary humanitarian and environmental situation in the Lake Chad region will be more extensively discussed and illustrated in Chapter 5.

The following chapter delineates the methods used to examine the securitization of environmental issues in the Lake Chad region. It clarifies what is taken as evidence to identify and asses the securitization process.

3. Methods

As indicated in the introduction, this in-depth qualitative case-study of environmental securitization by the UN is executed using deductive content analysis and process tracing based on the theoretical approach delineated above. It analyses written language use (speech-acts) and published documents by, and about, the UN in order to determine how environmental issues in the Lake Chad region are framed. It aims to identify the securitization process and establish how it came about. As stated before, although individual persons are the ones who do the actual speech act, they are considered part of a larger entity. Thus, people working for the United Nations are speaking on behalf of the UN, which is therefore referred to as the securitizing actor (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.41).

In order to identify a securitization process, determine how it came about and indicate whether it has been successful or not, the following steps should be followed. First, it needs to be established whether the environmental issue is presented as an existential threat to a referent object. That is, it needs to be framed as an urgent issue and threatening to the referent object's survival, which therefore requires extraordinary measures. As presented in Chapter 2.2.3, criticism of the securitization approach includes the argument that the conceptualization of an emergency measure lacks clarity about what qualifies as one. However, Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde (1998) state that the execution of contingency plans and acute crisis and disaster management can be considered emergency measures in the environmental sector (p.83). The preparation of the contingency plans is part of 'normal' politics, unless the allocation of the required resources can only be achieved through securitization. One of the most important aspects of an emergency measure is that it receives priority over ordinary politics (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.83). Therefore, the execution of contingency plans, acute crisis and disaster management and other measures that are assigned priority are taken as evidence of emergency actions in this research as well. More specifically, plans and projects initiated to halt or reverse the shrinking of Lake Chad, or to increase climate resilience and adaptability in the region, are considered emergency measures, next to crisis and disaster aid. As regards to the appointment of an existential threat, this research draws on content analysis to determine whether the UN presents environmental issues as an existential threat to the people living in the Lake Chad region. In doing this, it applies a deductive approach and seeks to identify specific words or codes indicative of a securitizing move. These observable words, or variables, are as follows. The securitizing actor, the UN in this case, should refer to the 'priority' or 'urgency' of an issue. He should indicate a 'point of no

return' or refer to a time frame in which the issue must be addressed, such as 'immediately', 'urgently', 'now', 'as soon as possible' or 'within several years'. Furthermore, a securitizing actor always emphasizes what happens if no special measures are taken, which in this case is expected to relate to the survival or well-being of the people living in the region. Besides, a securitizing actor points out the advantages of employing emergency measures, which is again anticipated to refer to the survival of the people in the region or the alleviation of human suffering. Additionally, this can also refer to the survival of Lake Chad, which is very much related to the subsistence of the people. Finally, the securitizing actor, the UN, should provide a possible solution to the issue. It is expected that for this case, this will be projects that address the shrinking of the lake and prevent a deterioration of, or improve the, humanitarian situation in the region. Thus, this research uses content analysis to confirm whether certain sets of words or variables, representative of a securitizing move, are observable in UN speech acts. The documents that are being analysed to determine this are respectively an UN Security Council resolution and multiple UN meeting coverages and press releases. Additionally, the data analysed also include statements by representatives of different UN agencies and offices, such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP), in order to better capture how environmental issues are framed by the UN. Complementary to this, it includes documents of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) in order to demonstrate how other lead actors contribute to the securitization process.

Second, one needs to investigate whether the issue is accepted by the audience in such a way that they tolerate the breaking free of rules that would otherwise have to be obeyed and the employment of emergency measures. As Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde (1998) emphasized, acceptance does not mean in a public, democratic and civilized discussion (p.25). It only implies that the securitizing move receives enough consent for the legitimization of emergency measures (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.25-30). This research takes open support, which can be expressed in various ways, of the securitization moves as evidence for acceptance. This can be voiced through press releases and other statements in which the environmental threats identified by the UN are recognized and the projects addressing the issues endorsed. Moreover, acceptance is even more so evinced by the participation in, or funding of, emergency measures addressing the issues. In order to establish the degree of acceptance, this research specifically looks at two international conferences. The International

Conference on Lake Chad (ICLC), held in 2018, and the Oslo Humanitarian Conference on Nigeria and the Lake Chad Region, organized in 2017. Both conferences assembled the securitizing actors: UN agencies and the LCBC; and the audience: UN member states, banks, civil society organizations and many more (ICLC, 2017; UN OCHA, 2017). The empirical analysis particularly draws on the agreements, declarations and reports that resulted from the conferences in order to determine the acceptance in terms of support. This is mainly demonstrated though material and financial pledges for humanitarian missions and projects addressing the desiccation of Lake Chad. That is, the outcome of the conferences represents a joint agreement or effort by the participating parties, which reflects the degree of acceptance among the audience. Considering the limited amount of time and length available for this research, it is not feasible to study the individual responses of the audience and the conferences provide a useful way to capture the overall degree of acceptance.

Third, it is necessary to examine what effect a securitization act has on other units, and other securitizing moves, by the breaking free of rules. A security act is negotiated between the securitizing actor and the audience, which is internally and within the unit. By way of acceptance, the securitizing actor is allowed to override rules that would otherwise constrain its actions. The more significant and noticeable effects on interunit relations the more successful a securitization (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.26/34). However, given the confined size of this research, a comprehensive and detailed analysis of the impact of the securitization of environmental issues in the Lake Chad region on other units remains subject to future scholarly research. This thesis only provides an indication of the potential effects of the securitizing act. Besides, not being able to definitively establish its effects is also due to the fact that the securitization of environmental issues in the region has not finished yet.

Buzan, Weaver & De Wilde (1998) provide a series of questions that should guide a securitization study, which are: who securitizes?; on what issue?; for which referent objects?; for what reason?; who is the audience?; what are the facilitation conditions?; has the issue been accepted by the audience?; have emergency measures been taken?; what is the result?; what impact does the act have other units? (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.26/33). These questions are also applied to this research.

Finally, the time frame of the analysis concerns a 10-year period from 2008 to 2018. The speech acts and documents revealing the securitizing moves by the UN and the acceptance by the audience are all very recent, published no earlier than 2016. In light of the limited amount of time and length available for this research, it seemed most relevant and appropriate to focus on the pieces that are particularly recent. Some of the measures that

address the shrinking of Lake Chad, however, have been initiated long before 2016. With the exception of 'Lake Chad Vision 2025', which was adopted between 2000 and 2003 but still influential today, the most relevant and ongoing measures were initiated from 2008 onwards (LCBC et al., 2008, p.3). Therefore, as regards to the extraordinary measures, 2008 is considered the starting point of the analysis.

Recapitulated, the aim of this research is not merely to determine whether a securitization of environmental issues in the Lake Chad region is taking place, but also how it comes about. It seeks to establish which conditions and factors are present and conducive the securitization. Thus, tracing and mapping the steps and characteristics of the process by identifying the observable implications mentioned above. Next to this, it draws on an additional inductive approach to identify other, not predetermined, indicators of securitizing moves, audience acceptance and emergency measures from the documents to complete the analysis. Concerning the process that is being analysed, Chapter 5.2 of the empirical analysis briefly introduces how the securitization of environmental issues in the region started and evolved.

The next chapter elucidates the case selection process of this research. It explains why the Lake Chad region is the chosen case study and clarifies why the UN is taken as the unit of analysis.

4. Case Selection

This chapter delineates the case selection process of this research. As stated before, the unit of analysis is the United Nations. The UN is one of the most influential and permanently engaged actors in the field of humanitarian assistance and emergency relief. This is reflected in the General Assembly resolution 46/182, which holds that the UN should "provide leadership and coordinate international efforts to support disaster- and emergency- effected countries" (Kent, 2004, p.219). Moreover, it is one of the largest international organisations actively involved in peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations on behalf of its member states (Kent, 2004, p.229-230). This is also reflected by the articles of the Charter of the United Nations (1945). Article 1.1 holds that the purpose of the UN is to "To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace" (Charter of the United Nations, 1945, art.1/ par.1, p.3). Additionally, Article 1, Paragraph 3 states that the United Nations aims "to achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion" (Charter of the United Nations, 1945, art.1/par.3, p.3).

The UN has been actively engaged in discussing and addressing the Boko Haram insurgency and humanitarian crisis in the Lake Chad region from their onset onwards. It has frequently been subject of discussion in the UNSC and other involved UN agencies and offices, such as the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT) and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) (UNOCT, 2017, p. 13-14; UN OCHA, 2018). Because the UN is one of the, if not the, biggest international actors concerned with countering the insurgency and solving the humanitarian crisis, and has published and released many relevant documents and reports, it is chosen as the unit of analysis of which a comprehensive examination will be conducted (Gallagher, 2017; Buzan, Wæver, De Wilde, 1998, p. 19). Since this research focuses on the UN as the securitizing actor, it aims to identify securitization on an international, cross-border level. As Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde argue, "securitization on the international level means to present an issue as urgent and existential, as so important that it should not be exposed to the normal haggling of politics" (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.29).

The Lake Chad region is chosen as the case study on which the securitization approach

is applied. The choice for this region emanates from its contemporary relevance. That is, the crisis in this region is considered to be one of, if not the, biggest and most complex humanitarian disasters the world is facing today (Taub, 2017). Moreover, Lake Chad was one of the largest lakes in the world but has declined by almost 90 percent in the last 60 years (U.N. Environment, 2018). This can also be considered one of the biggest "creeping" natural disasters the world is facing today. Creeping, as Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde (1998) argue, implies "a slow, but steady deterioration of living conditions" (p.38). A region in which both one of the largest humanitarian disasters as well as natural disasters is taking place constitutes an interesting case to analyse security dynamics. Examining the securitization of environmental issues in this region might offer insights and opportunities as to how to address the humanitarian crisis. More generally, it is interesting to investigate to what extent the shrinking of Lake Chad is associated with the humanitarian crisis.

The following chapter concerns the empirical analysis. It examines how and to what extent environmental issues, the shrinking of Lake Chad in particular, are being securitized by the UN and other lead actors.

5. Empirical Analysis

This chapter contains the main analysis of this research and establishes how environmental issues in the Lake Chad region are being securitized, particularly by the UN. More specifically, it traces the process of securitization by applying the theoretical approach set out in the Chapter 2. It examines whether the steps and features of a securitization process can be observed in this specific case. The analysis is structured as follows. First, it illustrates, using five figures, the current environmental and humanitarian situation in the Lake Chad region. Second, it shortly describes when the securitization of the environment with respect to this region started to occur. After that, it clarifies who is taken to be the securitizing actor, the referent object and the audience in this case study. Following that, UN speech acts are analysed in order to determine whether environmental issues in this region are being presented as existential threats. Subsequently, it turns to the audience of the speech acts, which are predominantly UN member states and other involved actors such as the LCBC, and determines whether they show any signs of acceptance. Hereafter, it indicates which measures, either ordinary or extra-ordinary, have been initiated or employed so far. Having established the existential threat, acceptance by the audience and the (potential) employment of emergency measures, the subsequent section demonstrates what the facilitating conditions are. Finally, the last section hints at the potential impact of the securitizing act on other units and sectors, which, however, remains subject to future scholarly research considering the limited amount of time and length available for this research and having concluded that the securitization process is ongoing.

5.1. Illustrating the situation in the Lake Chad region

A region, as defined by Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde (1998) is "a spatially coherent territory composed of two or more states" (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.18-19). In its original condition, Lake Chad covered parts of the Republic of Niger, the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the Republic of Cameroon and the Republic of Chad, depicted in Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2. As mentioned by Okpara et al. (2015), "a concern with regional security relates security to the well-being of individuals and communities in the four nations, which constitute the Lake Chad region" (Okpara et al., 2015, p.310). When talking about the Lake Chad region, this thesis therefore refers to the area in and around the lake that includes parts of all four states. The Lake Chad Basin, however, refers to a different area. The basin extends further and covers eight countries. It spans over parts of the Republic of the Niger, the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the Republic of the Sudan, the Republic of Chad, the Republic of Cameroon, the

People's Democratic Republic of Algeria, the State of Libya and the Central African Republic (CAR) (Figure 5.1).The total basin covers 2,434,000 km2, shared as follows: "Chad (45%), Niger (28%), CAR (9%), Nigeria (7%), Algeria (4%), Sudan (4%), Cameroon (2%) and Libya (0.5%)", as illustrated in Figure 5.1 (Galeazzi et al., 2017, p.3-4). The LCBC, frequently referred to throughout this research, is composed of representatives from these eight member governments. It was established by the four countries that border Lake Chad with the purpose to "sustainably and equitably manage the Lake Chad and other shared water resources of the Lake Chad Basin, to preserve the ecosystems of the Lake Chad Conventional Basin, to promote regional integration, peace and security across the Basin" (LCBC, 2018).

There are several environmental problems existing in the Lake Chad region, of which one is by far the largest and most influential. This concerns the desiccation of Lake Chad, which is strongly connected to many other 'minor' issues. Over the last 60 years, the surface of the lake has shrunk by roughly 90 percent, as demonstrated in Figure 5.2. This has been the result of environmental degradation, population growth, depletion of its water resources and further impacts of climate change, as shown in Figure 5.3 (U.N. Environment, 2018; Nett & Rüttinger, 2016, p.9-19). Figure 5.4 pictures the relationship between the receding lake and conflicts and insecurity in the region. It demonstrates the environment-conflict nexus and indicates how the Boko Haram insurgency and the humanitarian crisis are related to the shrinking of Lake Chad. Figure 5.5 depicts the population growth around Lake Chad alongside the decline of the lake from the 1960s to 2017. This shows that whereas the lake has enormously diminished in size, the population dependent on its resources has considerably grown. The demand for its resources is only increasing, which leads to a further reduction of its size. The shrinking of the lake, in turn, has negatively affected fishery, agriculture and livestock keeping productivity in the region and resulted in mass migration and internal displacement. This has led to social unrest and further desertification and deforestation (World Food Programme, 2016, p.14; U.N. Environment, 2018). A reduction of the water supply proved to be disastrous for a growing population which is mainly self-sufficient and highly dependent on a fertile environment. "It had left desperate communities prey to lawlessness and religious extremism" (Coghlan, 2015; Nett & Rüttinger, 2016, p.9-19). Therefore, a further degradation of the environment is expected to be a source of aggravating tensions, conflicts and a deteriorating humanitarian situation. Besides, the humanitarian crisis and environmental degradation are worsening due to the Boko Haram insurgency sweeping through the region (U.N. Environment, 2018; UNFPA, 2017, p.17-18; ICLC, 2018, p.2-3).

Figure 5.1. **Lake Chad Basin.** Retrieved from "*Insurgency, Terrorism and Organised Crime in a Warming Climate*" from K. Nett & L. Rüttinger, 2016, p.11. Copyright 2016, Adelphi.

Figure 5.2. **The desiccation of Lake Chad.** Retrieved from "*Too Little Water: The Lake Chad Story*" from U. Okpara, 2014 (https://www.anthropocene-curriculum.org/pages/root/campus-2014/filtering-the-anthropocene/lake-chad-sharing-diminishing-resource/too-little-water-the-lake-chad-story/) Copyright 2015-2018, U.Haus der Kulturen der Welt.

Figure 5.3. **The causes of the shrinking lake.** Retrieved from "*Insurgency, Terrorism and Organised Crime in a Warming Climate*" from K. Nett & L. Rüttinger, 2016, p.12. Copyright 2016, Adelphi.


Figure 5.4. **The Environment-Conflict nexus.** Retrieved from "*Insurgency, Terrorism and Organised Crime in a Warming Climate*" from K. Nett & L. Rüttinger, 2016, p.14. Copyright 2016, Adelphi.


28

Figure 5.5. **The population growth and the receding lake from 1960s to 2017.** Retrieved from "*From crisis to development around Lake Chad*" from UNFPA, 2017, p.16. Copyright 2017, UNFPA.

5.2. The onset of the securitization of Lake Chad

As illustrated above, Lake Chad has been diminishing in size since the 1960s. However, it was not until recently that this is being recognized as a security issue, next to an environmental issue. This notion especially started to evolve with the growing presence of Boko Haram in the region and the escalation of violence in 2009 (Comolli, 2017, p.7; Lanzer, 2017, p.5-7; LCBC, World Bank & AFD, 2015, p.16-18). This led to an increasing concern among policy makers and riparian agencies about the security implications of the disappearing lake (Okpara et al., 2015, p.309). As Boko Haram gained territory many people were physically isolated from the lake and it became painfully clear how much the people living in the region are dependent on the lake's resources (Lanzer, 2017, p.5). The Boko Haram insurgency shed light on the connection between the receding lake and regional insecurity (Okpara, 2015, p.309). It revealed how the receding lake resulted in economic decline, poverty and migration, which fuels tensions and conflicts in the region and fosters Boko Haram recruitment (Torbjörnsson & Jonsson, 2017, p. 37, 44-47; Nett & Rüttinger, 2016, p.9-19; LCBC, World Bank & AFD, 2015, p.16-18). From that moment onwards, the shrinking of Lake Chad has increasingly been considered a security problem. This research further examines the securitization of Lake Chad and establishes the role of the UN in this process.

The upcoming section describes who is taken to be the securitizing actor, the referent object and the audience in this particular case study.

5.3. The securitizing actor, the referent object & the audience

The United Nations is considered to be the securitizing actor in this research. This thesis aims to determine how environmental issues in the Lake Chad region, especially focussing on the shrinking of the lake, are framed and presented by the UN. It traces the speech acts in which the issues are appointed existential threats. This is complemented by examples of several other actors, such as representatives of individual nation states and the LCBC, who also contribute to the securitization by declaring the shrinking of the lake existentially threatening.

The referent object that, according to the securitizing actors, needs to be protected from the existential threat is 'the people living around Lake Chad'. More specifically, the people affected by environmental degradation. As Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde (1998) indicate, referent objects in the environmental sector can be the environment as such, strategic parts of the environment or existing levels of civilization (p.75). In the case of the latter, they argue that "the ultimate referent object of environmental security is the risk of losing achieved levels of civilization" (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.75). As mentioned in Chapter 2.3,

the main concern is whether the ecosystems on which the levels of civilization depend for preservation are sustainable (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.76). This is also the concern in the Lake Chad region, where millions of people depend on the water of the lake and are threatened by environmental degradation. Therefore, the referent object in this research is also not so much the lake itself, but the people depending on it, 'the levels of civilization around Lake Chad'. Namely, the ultimate aim of the UN is to protect the people threatened by the shrinking of the lake and the violent conflicts and to solve the humanitarian crisis (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.75-76).

As will become clear in the course of the analysis, the audience that needs to be convinced and accept the attempts to securitize, the 'securitizing moves', are UN member states, the LCBC and financial donors such as the African Development Bank (AFDB) (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p. 25). The UN sometimes addresses specific countries or international players but predominantly calls on the 'international community', of which the 193 UN member states are proxies, to get involved in tackling the humanitarian crisis in one way or another. Next to this, some speech acts are specifically addressed at the LCBC and the proximate countries of the lake. Regarding the latter, these countries are closely involved with, and affected by, the receding lake. Therefore, they are expected to be most concerned with the issue and able to exercise direct influence on the region, which makes them for a logical and explicable audience. The different instances of 'securitizing moves' discussed below will more evidently indicate what and who the audience is.

5.4. The securitizing moves

The United Nations has frequently reported on, and made statements about, the humanitarian crisis in the Lake Chad region. More specifically, for about 10 years, its affiliated bodies, agencies and offices have been publishing reports, meeting coverages, press releases and assessments about the Boko Haram insurgency and humanitarian crisis. During these years, they have increasingly recognized and addressed environmental issues as underlying causes and drivers of the conflicts and crisis in the region. Through analysing these pieces, this research establishes how environmental issues are framed by the UN.

To start with, the United Nations Security Council adopted 'Resolution 2349 (2017)' in March 2017, which included the following statement:

> *"The Security Council recognises the adverse effects of climate change and*
> *ecological changes among other factors on the stability of the Region, including*
> *through water scarcity, drought, desertification, land degradation, and food*

insecurity, and emphasises the need for adequate risk assessments and risk management strategies by governments and the United Nations relating to these factors" (U.N. Security Council, Resolution 2349, 2017, p.7).

This concern was also expressed in a Security Council Presidential Statement in January 2018. The council "recognized the adverse effects of climate change on regional stability, while calling for significant humanitarian and development action (U.N. Security Council, 8170th meeting, SC/13189, 2018). Moreover, at an UN Security Council meeting on the 22nd of March 2018, Tijjani Muhammad-Bande, the delegate of Nigeria who was speaking on behalf of Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon and Niger, argued that the Boko Haram insurgency and the subsequent humanitarian crisis can be traced back to the shrinking of Lake Chad. He stressed that "we must treat the issues in the Lake Chad [region] with the urgency they deserve and show the needed political commitment towards reviving the lake, adding that inaction or delay would accelerate a deteriorating standard of living for millions, with dire consequences for the continent as well" (U.N. Security Council, 8212th meeting, SC/13259, 2018). These were also the exact words used by the president of Nigeria, Muhammadu Buhari, in his speech to the international community at the ICLC. He repeatedly stressed that the time to act is now and emphasized that his is the moment that we, the international community, need to show our humanity (Nwachukwu, 2018). Additionality, Van Oosterom (2018), who was the Dutch delegate, stated that the contemporary humanitarian crisis is the result of not dealing with its root causes 15 years ago. Subsequently, he stressed that water availability and climate variability are two of the most important challenges that have a major effect on the livelihood and security of people living around Lake Chad (U.N. Security Council, 8212th meeting, SC/13259, 2018).

Next to the Security Council meetings cited above, there were many other recent meetings at which all delegates recognized the crucial importance of addressing the underlying causes of the Boko Haram insurgency and humanitarian crisis in order to prevent a further deterioration of the situation. In their speeches, they all emphasized the need to manage and coordinate environmental degradation and climate change. At the 7818th Security Council meeting, several African delegates and the representatives from Belgium and Cyprus urged stepping up the efforts that deal with the desiccation of Lake Chad. They stressed that the Lake Chad Basin crisis is a perfect example of a clear-cut link between the availability of water and peace, arguing that water scarcity and poor water management can result in youth radicalization, extremism, insurgent recruitment and eventually terrorism and violence (U.N.

Security Council, 7818th meeting, SC/12598, 2016; U.N. Security Council, 8212th meeting, SC/13259, 2018; U.N. Security Council, 7861st meeting, SC/12679, 2017; U.N. Security Council, 8170th meeting, SC/13189, 2018; U.N. Security Council, 7748th meeting, S/PV.7748, 2016).

Looking at the above statements, particularly the speech act by the Nigerian president and the Nigerian delegate, one can identify clear signs of securitization moves. That is, they indicate a certain urgency by which the environmental issue need to be addressed and emphasize what happens when no immediate action is taken. Stressing the urgency of an issue and providing a prediction about what will happen if no action is taken are two main components of a securitizing move, as explained by Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde (1998, p. 3/ 25-26/29/31/40-41).

Additionally, UN deputy Secretary-General Amina Mohammed briefed the Security Council about the Boko Haram insurgency and the humanitarian situation in the Lake Chad Basin and also argued that it is essential to restore Lake Chad's ecosystem. Besides, she noted that security measures and military operations have proven to be limited solutions and stated that "there could be no sustaining peace without sustainable development, and development gains will always be at risk without lasting peace" (U.N. Deputy Secretary-General, DSG/SM/1146-SC/13261, 2018). Moreover, in her remarks on the Lake Chad Basin and Sahel Family Planning Summit of 2017, she also affirmed that unless the root causes of the crisis are tackled, referring to the rapid population growth and increasing scarcity of natural resources, human suffering will deteriorate (U.N. Deputy Secretary-General, DSG/SM/1072-POP/1065, 2017). This also testifies of a securitizing move. She underlines the urgency of the issue and provides predictions about what will happen if no change of approach is adopted. That is, she stresses that there will be no long-term peace, no effective development and no alleviation of human suffering without the employment of different measures. Furthermore, she refers to "sustainable" development, which is facilitating her securitizing move. Namely, as Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde (1998) note, internal facilitating conditions of a speech act also include commonly used dialects of the sector in which the securitizing move takes place, such as referring to sustainability in the environmental sector (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.33; U.N. Deputy Secretary-General, DSG/SM/1072-POP/1065, 2017).

Mohammed's opinion is shared by UN Secretary-General António Guterres' in his message to the ICLC on the 22nd of February 2018. He notes that we should include environmental considerations into our strategy to counter the insurgency. He concludes his message by calling "on the Governments of the countries of the Lake Chad area and the

international community at large to take decisive action to save Lake Chad. Doing so will help restore lives and livelihoods for millions of people, foster regional integration and development, and offer a durable solution to the Lake Chad Basin crisis" (U.N. Secretary-General, SG/SM/18918, 2018). As indicated by Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde (1998, p.3), not only do securitizing actors mention what will happen if we do not take special measures, they also emphasize what will happen if we do. This is exactly what Guterres' does. He provides a prediction about the positive effects of decisive action. This is also done by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) Director-General José Graziano da Silva, who emphasises that environmental degradation and climate change are deteriorating the humanitarian situation. Therefore, he argues, to address the crisis sufficiently, one should aim for long-term sustainable solutions in order for people to be able to adapt to climate change and cope with an increasing shortage of natural resources (FAO, 2017). Guterres' and Da Silva's statements include three important elements of a securitizing move. Firstly, they provide ideas for addressing the shrinking of Lake Chad and its effects. Secondly, they indicate the potential positive outcome of taking emergency action and thirdly, they both refer to sustainability and durability, which is a facilitating condition for the securitization.

Muhammed Ibn Chambas, who is a special representative of the United Nations Secretary General and head of UNOWAS, argued that reviving Lake Chad should be the absolute priority measure in order for the crisis to weaken and eventually be solved (UNDP Nigeria, 2018). Moreover, UNDP Nigeria Deputy Country Director for Programmes, Joerg Kuehnel, argued that the UNDP strongly emphasizes the need to recharge Lake Chad because millions of people are dependent on its resources and therefore threatened by its desiccation (UNDP Nigeria, 2018). Additionally, Edward Kallon (2017), who is a UN Resident Coordinator and UNDP representative, stresses that the number of people who are in urgent need of food and water is incredibly high and will only rise if no immediate action is taken. He urges that if we do not help now millions of people will be at risk of starvation. Furthermore, in its analysis of the Lake Chad Basin, the World Food Programme (WFP) (2016), which is part of the UN, stated that the desiccation of the lake constitutes a threat to the survival of entire populations. Therefore, managing and reviving the lake's water resources should be the priority strategy in tackling the humanitarian crisis (World Food Programme, 2016, p. 41). The above statements also clearly reflect securitizing moves. Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde (1998) note that a security argument is about the priority and urgency of dealing with an existential threat (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.24-26). Ibn

Chambas, the World Food Programme and Kallon all specifically stress the priority and urgency of addressing the shrinking of Lake Chad. Moreover, Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde (1998) argue that a securitizing actor presents an issue as a threat to the referent object's survival (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.40-41). This is precisely what is done by Kallon (2017) and the WFP (2016) as well, who point to the risk of millions of people dying. As mentioned before, a securitizing actor designates a 'point of no return' and provides a possible solution to the issue at hand (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.3/25/31). This is what is being done by approximately all of the above cited actors. They emphasize that if we do not act immediately or within a very short period of time, which can be considered the 'point of no return', it is too late and the humanitarian situation will deteriorate. Additionally, they provide a solution by indicating what should be done about the receding lake in order to alleviate human suffering (Kallon, 2017; UNDP Nigeria, 2018; UNDP Nigeria, 2018; World Food Programme, 2016).

Resulting from the 2018 ICLC, organized by the Federal Government of Nigeria, the LCBC and UNESCO, a roadmap on saving the lake was drafted. It posed that a transfer of water, the Inter-Basin Water Transfer (IBWT) project, was "no longer an option but an necessity" (ICLC, 2018, p.1/6). The conference emphasized that there is no other solution but to recharge the lake (ICLC, 2018, p.6). Furthermore, it stressed that a failure to take effective measures in time will aggravate the humanitarian crisis and result in severe security issues, "not only for the region, but for the entire African continent and the World" (ICLC, 2018, p.6). Therefore, the conference urged the international community to cooperate with each other and support the Lake Chad Basin projects aimed at addressing the issues emanating from the shrinking of the lake (ICLC, 2018, p.7). The statements put forward in this roadmap also approximate the securitization language criteria, as set out by Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde (1998). That is, it appoints a threat: the desiccation of the lake; a point of no return: 'now 'or 'in time'; a solution: the IBWT project; and a prediction about what will happen if no urgent measures are taken: an aggravation of the crisis and serious security issues.

Additionally, in a speech to the ICLC, Deputy Director-General of UNESCO Getachew Engida argued that the health of Lake Chad is as much a security and humanitarian issue as an ecological issue (UNESCO, 2018, p.1). He stated that "we need to act now to break the cycle of ecological disaster, livelihood disruption, and political upheaval which leads to more ecological disaster" (UNESCO, 2018, p.2). Thus, he also indicates a 'point of no return' and provides a prediction about what will happen of no immediate action is taken. Moreover, Mariam Katagum, who is Ambassador and Permanent Delegate of Nigeria to

UNESCO, was also present at the conference and emphasized that UNESCO assigned the task of dealing with the shrinking lake and the respective humanitarian crisis highest priority, which also testifies of securitization language (Waheed, 2018, p.2).

Chapter 2 defined the conditions conducive for a successful securitization. As regards to the speech act itself, linguistic and grammatical conditions are important. That is, a securitizing actor should appoint something an existential threat, declare a 'point of no return' and provide a possible solution. Additionally, certain dialects commonly used within the environmental sector, such as referring to sustainability, can contribute to a convincing 'securitizing move' (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.33). Examining speech acts by the UN, or actors related to the UN, revealed the frequent usage of these internal linguistic manners. Although already touched upon in this section, Chapter 5.7 will specifically elaborate on the internal and external facilitating conditions with respect the securitization of Lake Chad.

The following section turns to the audience of the speech acts or 'securitizing moves'. It establishes to what extent the appointment of the existential threat is accepted by the audience in a such a way that emergency measures are legitimized.

5.5. Are the securitizing moves accepted?

As explained in Chapter 2, acceptance of an audience implies that the assigning of an existential threat by the securitizing actor receives enough consent for emergency measures, or other actions implemented outside the sphere of 'normal' democratic political procedures, to be legitimized (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.25). It requires a certain level of consent of the audience that would not have been achieved had the issue not been presented as an existential threat. To elucidate, the audience in this case refers to representatives of UN member states, the LCBC and other involved organisations and potential donors.

There exists an incredible amount of press releases, individual statements and academic and public debates about the shrinking of the lake in which one can identify clear signs of acceptance by the audience. However, considering the limited amount of time available for this research, it is not feasible to study all these individual responses and separate pieces. Therefore, this research focusses on the International Conference on Lake Chad and the Oslo Humanitarian Conference on Nigeria and the Lake Chad Region to capture the overall degree of acceptance among the audience. That is, these two conferences hosted many UN member states, the LCBC, financial contributors and other involved organisations (ICLC, 2017; UN OCHA, 2017). This offers a way to examine the reaction of the audience by

focussing on the coverage of two conferences rather than analysing multiple separate pieces. In this respect, the outcome of the conferences is considered to be a joint opinion or response of the audience. Besides, both conferences illustrate different aspects of audience acceptance. The ICLC is particularly relevant to demonstrate acceptance by the audience through words, whereas the Oslo Conference reveals acceptance of the audience through practice. The different signs of acceptance provided reason for drawing on these two pieces of evidence.

The ICLC was held in Abuja, Nigeria on 26-28 February 2018. It was organized by UNESCO, the LCBC and the Federal Government of Nigeria, and was titled "Saving the Lake Chad to revitalise the Basin's ecosystem for sustainable livelihood, security and development" (ICLC, 2017). More than 1100 participants attended the conference, among them ministries, departments and agencies, Heads of States and Governments, civil society organisations, the European Union (EU) and African Union (AU), academia and the private sector. As regards to the UN, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), UNDP, UNESCO, UNICEF, FAO and the International Labour Organization (ILO) were present as well. In addition to addressing the problems related to the shrinking of the lake, the conference provided a platform for mobilizing political and financial support for the projects aimed at its restoration. That is, the Word Bank, the AFDB, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and various potential financial partners and donors were also present (UNDP Nigeria, 2018; ICLC, 2017). As was mentioned in the previous section, the conference was concluded with a roadmap on saving the lake and additionally the Abuja Declaration was signed. The 'roadmap on saving the lake to revitalize the basin ecosystem for sustainable livelihood, security and development' includes multiple recommendations, of which the most important ones are discussed here. First of all, the conference, which is taken to be a proxy of the audience, introduces the issue by noting that the shrinking of Lake Chad caused a mass migration of people and animals in search for water which resulted in conflicts and unrest, notably the Boko Haram insurgency (ICLC, 2018, p.2-3). This already indicates that the audience recognizes the link between the environment and security. The roadmap holds that "there is no solution to the shrinking of Lake Chad that does not involve recharging the lake by transfer of water from outside the basin" (ICLC, 2018, p.6). Therefore, the IBWT project, referred to as the Transaqua project, is considered to be a necessity. In addition, the conference urged the AU to not contemplate the shrinking of the lake as a regional problem but to take a Pan-African approach to the IBTW project and consider it part of its agenda (ICLC, 2018, p.6). More specifically, it urged the AU to "endorse the Inter-Basin Water Transfer (IBWT) initiative as a Pan-African project to restore

the Lake toward peace and security in the Lake Chad region" (ICLC, 2018, p.1/7/10). This also illustrates that the conference, and hence the audience, emphasizes the link between the shrinking of the lake and insecurity in the region. Furthermore, the conference urged "the International Technical and Financial Partners and Donors agree to support the Lake Chad Basin initiative through the financing of LCBC Development programmes aimed at addressing the problems caused by the shrinking of the Lake" (ICLC, 2018, p.7). Besides, it urgently requested "The African Development Bank to facilitate the creation of the Lake Chad Fund of US $50 billion, to be sourced from African States and donations by Africa's Development Partners to fund the Lake Chad IBWT and infrastructure projects" (ICLC, 2018, p.7). Finally, the conference emphasized that inaction or a delay of action would cause Lake Chad to completely disappear, which would deteriorate the humanitarian crisis and result in "serious security challenges, not only for the region, but for the entire African continent and the World (ICLC, 2018, p.6). This again demonstrates that the conference participants recognized and underlined the link between the environment and security in the region. As is evident from the last quote, environmental problems, the receding lake in particular, are also considered to be security problems.

In addition to the roadmap, the Abuja Declaration was signed and published at the end of the conference by all Heads of State of the Lake Chad Basin countries and the African Union Commission (LCBC & UNESCO, 2018, p.1). It is composed of nine points, among which the following. First, the Heads of States and Governments of the LCBC and the International Commission of the Congo Basin endorse, and are committed to, the realisation of the IBWT project. Second, they are devoted to take part in missions to raise money for the IBWT and allow international access to the region in order to conduct feasibility studies and implement the IBWT project. Moreover, the declaration affirms that the AU agrees to consider it an African, rather than a regional, issue and part of its own agenda (LCBC & UNESCO, 2018, p.2-3). Additionally, following the recommendations in the roadmap, the declaration holds that the AU supports the IBWT as a Pan-African endeavour to revitalize the lake for peace and security in the region (LCBC & UNESCO, 2018, p.3). 'To revitalize the lake for peace and security in the region' shows that the security implications of the disappearing lake are recognized. The declaration emphasizes that restoring the lake is essential for restoring peace and security, which indicates that the shrinking of Lake Chad is also considered a security threat. Besides, the declaration holds that "The International Technical and Financial Partners and Donors agree to support the Lake Chad Basin initiative through the financing of LCBC Development programmes" (LCBC & UNESCO, 2018, p. 3).

Moreover, it affirms that the AFDB facilitates the establishment of the Lake Chad Fund of $50 billion. This fund will be compiled of contributions by African states and Africa's development partners and allocated to the IBTW project and other Pan-African undertakings (LCBC & UNESCO, 2018, p.1-3).

Ahead of the conference, the shrinking of Lake Chad had frequently been presented as an existential threat by, amongst others, the UN. The denomination of the issue as an existential threat was accepted and endorsed during the ICLC by all Heads of States and Governments and other participating actors. The final recommendations and requests by 'the conference' and the Abuja Declaration refer to shared, or agreed upon, opinions of the participating parties at the conference. "The political commitment and the determination to save Lake Chad have generally been accepted by all stakeholders" (African Business Magazine, 2018). However, it should be admitted that the members of the Congo Basin Commission have a reserved and critical attitude towards the IBWT project because of its reducing effect on natural resource availability and energy generation in the Congo Basin region. They emphasized the need for more studies to assess the environmental impact of the IBWT project (Campbell, 2018).

Finally, other evidence of widespread acceptance among the audience is demonstrated by the outcome of the Oslo Humanitarian Conference for Nigeria and the Lake Chad Region. This conference, at which about 170 representatives from 40 countries, UN agencies and regional and civil society organizations assembled, was organized in February 2017 after UN agencies stressed that the humanitarian crisis was radically deteriorating (U.N. OCHA, 2017). The UN stated that $1.5 billion emergency funding was needed in order to prevent an aggravation of human suffering. At the conference, donors pledged $672 000 000 to the humanitarian crisis in this region, an amount much higher than expected and constituting more than a third of the funding sought by the UN. The 14 donors are Germany, Norway, Ireland, Denmark, The Netherlands, Finland, Italy, France, Luxembourg, The Republic of Korea, Japan, Switzerland, Sweden and the European Commission. Combined they pledged $458 million for humanitarian relief in 2017 and $214 million for 2018 and the years following (U.N. OCHA, 2017). The conference concluded that the major underlying causes of the humanitarian crisis and conflicts in the region, among which environmental degradation, need to be addressed. This was specifically emphasized by the Foreign Minister of Germany, Sigmar Gabriel, who argued that "in the long run, we have to strengthen our partnership with the countries involved to address the root causes of terror, displacement and poverty" (U.N. OCHA, 2017, p.2). The Conference Chair's outcome statement posed that "we agreed to

address medium- and long-term development needs and identify durable solutions for the affected people, to avoid escalating the crisis further" and confirmed that "the Oslo Conference…generated strong support for the UN-coordinated Humanitarian Response Plans and appeals for the respective countries" (U.N. OCHA, 2017, p.1). The above statements show that environmental issues are being linked to security issues and indicate support for UN proposed actions. The final consideration of the conference holds that "now is the time to muster our action, our political engagement, and sustained assistance to end the suffering and pave the way for long-term development for the people of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger" (U.N. OCHA, 2017, p.3). This proves that the urgency of the threat was recognized and endorsed during the conference. Besides, it emphasizes that the humanitarian situation would only deteriorate as long as no emergency action is taken (U.N. OCHA, 2017).

The Oslo conference provides one of the most evident examples of acceptance by the audience. That is, UN agencies stressed the importance and urgency of the environmental threat, after which a conference was held involving the audience, who subsequently decided to pledge incredible amounts of money for humanitarian relief and development efforts, which are taken to be emergency measures (UNOCHA, 2017; Quinn, 2017).

The section below delineates implications of this acceptance for the employment of emergency measures. It concludes that the securitization of environmental issues in the Lake Chad region is ongoing and many relevant measures are, however already proposed, still to be implemented or completed.

5.6. Potential, proposed & employed emergency measures

One could consider peacekeeping and humanitarian missions to the Lake Chad region extraordinary measures since these are often not legitimized through normal political procedures and implemented without a democratic say. These missions are generally funded by the international community through trusts, foundations, donor organizations and individual nation states' contributions, which testifies of acceptance by the audience (Stirk, 2015). Moreover, the endorsement of these missions, which is voiced through press releases and public support of the action, also testifies of acceptance by the audience and legitimizes emergency measures (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.83). As regards to the UN, "United Nations peacekeeping operations enjoy a high degree of international legitimacy and represent the collective will of the international community" (United Nations, 2008, p.24). Therefore, UN peacekeeping and humanitarian operations can be viewed as extraordinary measures accepted and legitimized by the international community.

Next to peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, there are some other major extraordinary measures which are not operative yet or need to be completed. The largest and potentially most influential one is the Inter-Basin Water Transfer project, also known as Transaqua. As mentioned in Chapter 5.4, this project was accepted at the ICLC and included in the Abuja Declaration (Campbell, 2018, ICLC, 2018, LCBC & UNESCO, 2018). Concerning this project, the Italian government agreed to donate $1.8 million to conduct environmental and engineering studies and finalise the plans (Campbell, 2018; Celani, 2017). Additionally, the Chinese constructing company PowerChina, who is assigned the project in cooperation with the Italian engineering firm Bonifica, signed a memorandum of understanding with the LCBC and will also carry out a feasibility study (LCBC, 2016; Campbell, 2018). Moreover, this memorandum sets out the provisions for financial and technical assistance towards the realization of the project (Campbell, 2018). The following paragraph provides a short overview of the project.

The IBWT project will build a 2400 km waterway that transfers water from the right tributary of River Congo to the Chari river. This channel will convey 100 million cubic meters of water per year from the Congo River Basin to the Lake Chad Basin. In addition to refilling the lake, the dams that are planned along the route are able to generate energy and regulate river flows. This will allow for the development of livestock, fishery, agricultural and industrial settlements. Additionally, it creates a new infrastructure network and economic zone (Campbell, 2018; Celani, 2017; LCBC, 2016). The project was initially proposed in the 1960s and was updated and put on the agenda several times again in following decades. However, it was never realized and put into practice, partly because there was no consensus on who should finance and run the project (Celani, 2017; LCBC, 2016). The ICLC showed the commitment of all relevant stakeholders towards the actualization of the project and the initial steps are already taken. That is, funds are being raised and feasibilities studies conducted. Once this project is finally launched, one could argue that the biggest emergency measure, in addition to humanitarian and peacekeeping operations, is employed.

Besides supporting the IBWT, UNESCO officially adopted and launched the BIOsphere and Heritage of Lake Chad project (BIOPALT) at the ICLC. BIOPALT (2018), preceded by the Lake Chad Basin Sustainable Development Programme (PRODEBALT) (2008) and complementary to PRESIBALT (2014), which is the Programme to Rehabilitate and Strengthen the Resilience of Lake Chad Basin Systems, is established to promote peace and reduce poverty in the Lake Chad Basin by promoting effective and sustainable management of its natural resources. More specifically, this three-year project "aims to

increase knowledge of Lake Chad, restore wetlands, rehabilitate wildlife migration corridors and promote sustainable income-generating activities in Abuja, Nigeria" (UNESCO World Heritage Centre, 2018; UNESCO, 2018; Campbell, 2018). Its launch involved over 150 people, amongst which representatives of the countries neighbouring Lake Chad. BIOPALT is financed by the AFDB up to the amount of $6,456,000 (UNESCO World Heritage Centre, 2018). Since BIOPALT was officially implemented and agreed upon at the conference, the presence and involvement of a great variety of actors implies a broad acceptance and endorsement of the project. It needs to be noted that, although BIOPALT is an UNESCO initiative, PRODEBALT and PRESIBALT are developed by the AFDB (UNESCO Word Heritage Centre, 2018; UNESCO, 2018).

5.6.1. Emergency measures initiated by other Lead Actors

Next to the emergency measures proposed and implemented by the UN, the LCBC and its member states also adopted several extraordinary measures in order to halt the shrinking of the lake and address the root causes of the humanitarian crisis, of which the most important and influential ones are chronologically discussed below.

First, the Heads of State of the LCBC adopted 'Lake Chad Basin Vision 2025' between 2000 and 2003. This vision holds that Lake Chad should be common heritage. Moreover, it affirms the need for sustainable conservation of the Lake's resources, ecosystems and biodiversity in order to ensure economic security and reduce poverty. Sustainable development and effective water management should provide for equal access to the lake's resources for all neighbouring member states (LCBC et al., 2008, p.3; African Development Bank Group, 2008, p.iii). Second, the 'Strategic Action Programme for the Lake Chad Basin' (SAP) has been developed in 2008 as part of a shared UNDP-Word Bank-Global Environment Facility (GEF) project. SAP also aims to restore and preserve the natural resources, ecosystems and biodiversity of the Lake Chad Basin. Furthermore, the programme strives to reduce ecosystem stress and build climate change resilience. It emphasizes that the shrinking of the lake leads to an increased risk of violent conflict over the use of its resources. This clearly shows that the link between environment and security is recognized in this programme. SAP has a 15-year time frame and its implementation is up to the member states of the LCBC since the programme is considered to be a component of their National Action Plans (NAP) (LCBC et al., 2008, p. i/1-2/5/21). Third, the LCBC implemented the 'Water Charter for the Lake Chad Basin' in 2011. This charter established a framework for water resource management, sustainable development and the prevention of conflicts in the Lake

Chad Basin. Parties to the charter expressed serious concern about the risks of inter-community and interstate conflicts resulting from a dwindling of the lake's resources, which also indicates that the shrinking of Lake Chad is considered a security problem (LCBC, 2011, p.9-14). Fourth, the Heads of States of the LCBC approved the LCBC 'Five-year Investment Plan 2013-2017' (FYIP) in 2012. This plan proposed several investments to counter the desiccation of the lake, among which earlier ideas to transfer water from the Congo Basin to Lake Chad. An 'International Donors Round Table Conference' was held in Bologna, Italy in 2014 to raise funds for the FYIP. The plan was predominantly financed by the AFDB and the LCBC member states (Campbell, 2018; LCBC, 2016). Fifth, the 'Lake Chad Development and Climate Resilience Action Plan (2016-2025)' was proposed and validated in 2015. This is an initiative of the LCBC and the member countries of the lake, which are Nigeria, Libya, Cameroon, Chad, Central African Republic and Niger, and prepared with support of the French Development Agency (AFD) and the World Bank (LCBC, World Bank & AFD, 2015, p. ii) In short, the main purpose of the plan is to create an environment conducive for regional rural development, in addition to restoring peace and security in the region. The objectives are very similar, and add up, to those proposed in the earlier action plans, including the Water Charter, the SAP and the Lake Chad vision 2025. It defines seven priority themes and proposes 173 actions in total. Theme 3, theme 5 and theme 6 are particularly relevant to this research and read as follows: 'Securing access to natural resources, and managing conflicts', 'Preserving the environmental capital of the lake and its basin' and 'Better managing the water resources of the basin' (LCBC, World Bank & AFD, 2015, p. v/ii/iv-vi/1-3). The estimated total cost of the Lake Chad Development and Climate Resilience Action Plan is approximately 916 million euros, still to be specified and pledged by donors (LCBC, World Bank & AFD, 2015, p.vi/33). The action plan recognizes accentuates the link between conflict, particularly the Boko Haram insurgency, and the receding lake. It notes that the terrorist group benefits from the shrinking of the lake since resource shortages make people vulnerable to Boko Haram recruitment. Moreover, it emphasizes that the insurgency significantly deteriorates the humanitarian crisis. Therefore, the plan indicates that countering the insurgency and solving the humanitarian crisis are both very much dependent on addressing the desiccation of Lake Chad (LCBC, World Bank & AFD, 2015, p.2/4/16-18/25). Finally, the LCBC is also a strong supporter of, and participant to, the IBWT project. This project is, as described above, not yet operative. Feasibility studies are to be carried out and funds to be raised in order to specify the details and potentials of this project (LCBC & UNESCO, 2018).

As delineated in this section, multiple measures have been undertaken by the UN and other lead actors such as the LCBC in order to address the shrinking of Lake Chad. Although already accepted by the audience and legitimized as such, many of these measures still need to be executed or accomplished. The IBWT has been a proposed solution for decades and is starting to progress in the shape of feasibility studies and environmental studies since the ICLC in February 2018. These studies are conducted in order to specify how exactly the project should be organized and proceed. Even though it can still take several years before the studies are completed and the project becomes operational, the IBWT can be considered an emergency measure, and even more so an extraordinary measure, given its size and incredible amount of money and effort required to carry it through. Moreover, implementation within several years, which is the aim set at the ICLC, still reflects the urgency of the measure considering the enormous size of the project and its direct influence on the livelihood of millions of people (ICLC, 2018). With regard to the 'breaking free of rules', it is difficult to establish whether these measures, and the IBWT in particular, are legitimized through the breaking of rules that would otherwise have to be obeyed. As put forward in Chapter 2, the breaking of rules could imply "the form of secrecy, levying taxes or conscription, placing limitations on otherwise inviolable rights or focusing society's energy and resources on a specific task" (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.24). It can be argued that the IBWT entails the latter. That is, if a 2400 km canal is to be built with roads and dams along the route, with an estimated cost of almost 15 billion euros, one could assume that a significant part of society's energy and resources will be focused on this specific task. As expensive as this may seem, the estimated costs of abstaining from action might be greater (Steely, n.d., p. 1; LCBC & UNESCO, 2018). However, it remains to be seen whether the project will evolve as anticipated.

The following section identifies which of the facilitation conditions, as described by Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde (1998, p.32-33), can be observed at the securitization acts presented in this chapter.

5.7. Conditions conducive to the securitization of Lake Chad

As indicated before, there are three sorts of facilitating conditions; internal linguistic conditions, referring to the speech act itself, external and contextual conditions, referring to the social position of the securitizing actor and its audience, and the features of the appointed existential threat itself, which are also denominated as external conditions (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.32-33).

Chapter 5.4 already implied that the internal linguistic and grammatical conditions can be detected in the securitizing moves by the UN and other lead actors. These conditions are identified as follows. First, the securitizing actors appointed the desiccation of the lake a threat to the survival of the people living in, and depending on, the Lake Chad Basin. This can refer to a direct threat, through a shortage of drinking water, or an indirect threat through for example malnutrition or aggravating violent conflicts. Second, the securitizing actors also identified a 'point of no return', which was often immediately or within a very short period of time, before it is too late. Third, they provided different solutions to the existential threat. Some stressed the need for increased humanitarian and development aid, whereas others pointed at more long-term, large-scale solutions such as the Intern-Basin Water Transfer project. Next to this, Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde (1998) state that a securitizing actor always indicates what will happen if special measures are taken and what consequences will follow if not (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.32). The actors discussed in this research all stressed that the humanitarian crisis will not improve or even deteriorate if no change of approach is adopted. As mentioned before, internal facilitating conditions of a speech act also include particular dialects commonly used within each sector, such as referring to identity in the societal sector or to sustainability in the environmental sector (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.33). The majority of the speech acts about the shrinking of Lake Chad include references to the need for sustainable and durable development. Several UN representatives, among which Mohammed, Da Silva and Guterres', emphasized that there will be no peace and security without sustainable development. This, again, shows the link being made between the environment and security in the Lake Chad region (U.N. Deputy Secretary-General, DSG/SM/1146-SC/13261, 2018; U.N. Secretary-General, SG/SM/18918, 2018; FAO, 2017).

With regard to the external and contextual conditions, it is more difficult to determine whether they were conducive to the securitization of Lake Chad. These conditions relate to the authority of the securitizing actor and its relation with the audience, as well as to the intrinsic features of the audience itself (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.33). The UN is considered to be a responsible, well-respected and well-informed organisation. In short, all 193 member states of the UN have agreed to settle disputes peacefully and to not use force or threats against each other, and to refrain from assisting countries that oppose United Nations' actions (Charter of the United Nations, 1945, art.2, p.3). Moreover, they have agreed to accept the UN Charter, which defines four main purposes of the UN: "to maintain international peace and security, to develop friendly relations among nations, to achieve

international cooperation in solving international problems and in promoting respect for human rights and to be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations" (Charter of the United Nations, 1945, art.1/art.2, p.3). The UN Security Council is considered to be the most powerful organ of the organisation. It consists of five permanent members; Russia, China, France, The United States and Great-Britain, and 10 non-permanent members. Its decisions are binding, if they say they are, and all UN members are obliged to carry them out. Furthermore, the Security Council is also the sole entity with the officially recognized power to declare international uses of legitimate military force. Yet, any of the 5 permanent members can veto any measure put forward in the council. Therefore, its true authority is disputed since it is very much dependent on the consent of its members (Charter of the United Nations, 1945, art.23-art.38, p.6-9; U.N. Security Council, n.d.). However, Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde (1998) argue that a securitizing actor does not have to wield officially recognized authority. An authoritative status can also refer to a particular dominant or influential societal position (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.33). Since the UN is in the position to give advice, address problems and raise awareness and provides a ground for cooperation and consultation, it is able to exercise influence and pressure on its members, who are also taken to be 'the audience'. Its authority emanates from bringing people together where they would not do so otherwise and persuade them to help solve humanitarian crises (Charter of the United Nations, 1945). Therefore, one could argue that the UN is in a position conducive for the likelihood of acceptance by the audience. This can be considered a facilitating condition.

Concerning the intrinsic features of the audience itself, it is also difficult to establish whether they are facilitative to the process of securitization. The UN aims to raise awareness of the severity and urgency of the threat among the international community and wants to convince various actors to get on board and take part in the measures that address the issue. In this respect, the audience does not have specifically defined intrinsic features since it concerns the 'international community'. However, the intrinsic features of the appointed threat do contribute to a successful securitization. Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde (1998) argue that if a securitizing actor refers to objects that are commonly considered to be threatening, such as pollution or weapons, one is more likely to establish a security threat (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.40/33). Environmental degradation, climate change, drought, desertification, deforestation, resource depletion and resource scarcity are all associated with the shrinking of Lake Chad and are frequently cited terms by the UN and other securitizing actors. These issues are commonly expected to have negative consequences and are therefore considered to be threatening as such, which has facilitated the securitization process.

The upcoming section hints at the potential impact of the securitization of Lake Chad on other units and sectors, which is an important indicator for determining the success of the securitization. However, a comprehensive examination of its effects remains subject to future academic research.

5.8. Impact of the securitization on other units and sectors

Having determined that the disappearance of Lake Chad, and its subsequent consequences, is presented as an existential threat to the people living in the region, and having established that the securitization move is accepted by the audience and emergency measures have been initiated or employed, a security analyst should examine what effect the securitization act has on interunit relations (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.26/34). That is, in what way and to what extent are environmental issues (environmental security) in the Lake Chad region linked to security issues in other sectors and different regions? The mutual linkage of security issues is called 'security interdependence', or in more extreme cases a 'security complex' (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p. 11-12). Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde (1998) define a security complex as "a set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their national security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another" (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.12). The authors especially adopt the notion of heterogeneous complexes. This approach holds that security complexes can involve different types of actors interacting across multiple sectors, in contrast to the homogeneous view of security complexes locked into specific sectors (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p. 16). They state that one should examine how security dynamics interact with each other and spill over into different sectors (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.14). As acknowledged before, this is beyond the scope and limits of this research. Therefore, an extensive and thorough analysis of the impact on interunit relations remains subject to further scholarly research.

However, it is possible and within the limits of this research to hint at the potential effects of the securitization act on different units and other sectors. First of all, the securitization of the environmental issues, the shrinking of Lake Chad in particular, will likely result in securitizations or security threats in other sectors. Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde (1998) argue that "the environmental sector provides a lens that enables us to highlight root causes of existential threats that become manifest in other sectors" (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.84). They state that oftentimes the securitization focuses on conflicts in other sectors. That is, "environmental degradation may lead to interstate wars, ethnic conflict, political disintegration, or civil strife, and economic deprivation" (Buzan, Wæver & De

Wilde, 1998, p.84). In such a scenario, the actual securitization could take place in a different sector because it is too late for the environmental root causes to be addressed. Thus, though environmental issues might constitute existential threats themselves, they often result in the formation of existential threats in other sectors as well. One could argue that this can be observed in the Lake Chad region. In the environmental sector, the shrinking of Lake Chad is considered to be an existential threat itself because it leads to severe water shortages and malnutrition. Additionally, it also results in an existential threat in the economic sector. The desiccation of Lake Chad caused a catastrophic decline in agriculture, fishery and livestock farming productivity, further increasing poverty and malnutrition. Next to this, the shrinking of the lake also causes and fuels existential threats in the military and political sector. That is, increased poverty, dissatisfaction and insecurity make people, especially young men and boys, vulnerable to recruitment for violent extremist and terrorist movements who provide economic incentives for its recruits. This is also the major recruitment tactic applied by Boko Harm, next to forced-recruitment (Torbjörnsson & Jonsson, 2017, p. 37, 44-47; UNFPA, 2017, p.9). Boko Haram can be considered an existential threat to the existing state, or its government, in which it is active. Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde (1998) note that, in the military sector, the referent object is usually the state or an existing government, whereas in the political sector, the referent object often relates to the sovereignty or ideology of the state (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.22). Therefore, Boko Haram can be argued to constitute an existential threat in both the political and military sector since it does not recognize the authority and legitimacy of the government, strongly opposes the state's ideology and aims to overthrow it (Torbjörnsson & Jonsson, 2017, p. 37, 44-47). Having established that the shrinking of Lake Chad fuels the Boko Haram insurgency, one could assume that there is a strong interrelatedness between the different sectors. Furthermore, mass migration and internal displacement resulting from the shrinking of the lake have led to increased threats in the military and societal sector. That is, migration and internal displacement have aggravated tensions and conflicts in the region between people competing for the same scarce natural resources. This, in turn, has led a to further depletion and exploitation of the region's resources (Okpara et al., 2015, 311-316/321). As regards to the societal sector, "the referent object is large-scale collective identities that can function independent of the state, such as nations and religions" (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.23). Migrants or rival identities can therefore be securitized by the people holding a collective identify who are afraid of, and oppose, external influences. This is also a potential consequence of mass migration and internal displacement in the Lake Chad region (Torbjörnsson & Jonsson, 2017, p. 37, 44-47;

Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.21-24). As demonstrated in this section, the securitization of Lake Chad is likely to have an impact on other units and sectors. This impact is evident but, however, needs to be more extensively established and examined in future scholarly research.

The concluding chapter of this thesis answers the research question, identifies the limitations and implications of this study and provides suggestions for future academic research.

6. Conclusion

This final chapter recapitulates the findings of the empirical analysis and answers the research question. Furthermore, it discusses the implications of the findings for the humanitarian crisis in the Lake Chad region and indicates further societal and scientific implications. Additionally, it presents the limitations of this research and identifies opportunities for future studies. To clarify, the main question of this research is:

'How are environmental issues in the Lake Chad region being securitized, and what role does the United Nations play in this process?'

6.1. Presentation and discussion of empirical evidence

Chapter 2 set out multiple questions a security analyst should answer in order to trace and examine securitization acts and subsequently establish whether they have been successful or not. These questions are: who securitizes?; on what issue?; for which referent objects?; for what reason?; who is the audience?; what are the facilitating conditions?; has the issue been accepted by the audience?; have emergency measures been taken?; what is the (potential) impact of the securitizing act on other units? (Charett, 2009, p.14; Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.32-33).

This research provided evidence that the shrinking of Lake Chad is being securitized by the UN, a process which is supplemented and reinforced by the LCBC, and pointed towards multiple signs of acceptance by the audience. The securitizing moves are especially apparent in the UN Security Council Resolution 2349 and many other Security Council meeting coverages and press releases. Moreover, the securitizing moves are also reflected in statements by representatives of various other UN agencies. The audience, in this case, is comprised of UN member states, the LCBC and potential donors and partners. Acceptance was voiced through press releases and public support, but even more so through the endorsement of, participation in and funding of projects addressing the receding lake. The outcomes of the ICLC and the Oslo humanitarian conference revealed an overall acceptance among the audience by way of words, i.e. through the recognition of the existential threat identified by the UN, and by way of practice, i.e. through pledges for projects addressing the issue. Furthermore, this research presented the initiation and implementation of several emergency measures and explained the IBWT project, which is the biggest and potentially most influential emergency measure yet to be employed. The proposed measures aim to alleviate human suffering and provide a long-term solution to the humanitarian crisis and insecurity in the region. Additionally, it showed that the three types of facilitating conditions

described by Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde (1998) can be observed at the various securitization attempts by the UN. First, the internal linguistic and grammatical conditions of the speech acts are conducive to the securitization. That is, an existential threat is identified and points of no return are stated. Moreover, the securitizing actors indicate what will happen if no special measures are taken, which in most instances refers to a deterioration of the humanitarian situation. Subsequently, they provide possible solutions, such as the IBWT and several other emergency programmes. Additionally, the dialect used in the speech acts also facilitates the securitization. Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde (1998) note that, for the environmental sector, this dialect refers to talking about sustainability (p.33). UN representatives and the LCBC frequently emphasize the need for sustainable solutions. Second, the external and contextual conditions are also facilitative to the securitization. This research concluded that the UN is in a position conducive for the likelihood of acceptance by the audience because of its power and authority to bring people together and exercise influence and pressure on its member states. Third, the specific characteristics of the threat itself are also considered to be a facilitating condition in this case. Buzan, Weaver and De Wilde (1998) argue that if particular terms are referred to that are commonly taken to be threatening, this benefits the securitizing moves (p.32-33). Concepts such as environmental degradation, drought, climate change and resource scarcity are commonly considered to be threatening and were frequently referred to in the speech acts delineated in the empirical analysis (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.32-33).

Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde (1998) state that "a successful securitization has three components (or steps): existential threats, emergency action, and effects on interunit relations by the breaking free of rules" (p.26). This research established that there is an existential threat and that emergency actions are being initiated and employed. However, it has not been able to sufficiently determine the effects of the securitization act on interunit relations. This is due to two reasons. First, the time and length available for this research did not allow for a comprehensive analysis of the consequences of the securitization act. Second, since the process of securitizing Lake Chad is ongoing and emergency measures are still being developed, one is not yet able to determine its definitive effects on other units and therewith assess its significance (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.26/34).

Thus, this research evinced that the UN appointed Lake Chad an existential threat to the survival of the people living in the region. It frequently emphasized, through press releases, conferences and other speech acts, that Lake Chad should be accorded priority. Moreover, it affirmed that the desiccation of the lake is one of the root causes of the violent

conflicts in the region and stressed that inaction would deteriorate the humanitarian situation. Its securitizing moves were accepted by the audience and the emergency projects developed and endorsed by the UN received widespread support.

6.2. Limitations & Opportunities for improvement

This research was conducted with a few limitations, largely consistent with the critique of the securitization approach presented in Chapter 2. The most important limitations are discussed below.

First, it is very hard for a security analysist to distinguish between instances of securitization and instances of politicization. Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde (1998) state that "in the case of issues (notably the environment) that have moved dramatically out of the nonpoliticized category, we face the double question of whether they have merely been politicized or have also been securitized" (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.24). This is also very difficult to determine with regard to the shrinking of Lake Chad. Since multiple emergency measures are still being developed and not yet fully implemented, it is hard to establish whether these are, or will be, initiated and carried through beyond the existing political procedures. Therefore, it is difficult to establish whether the issue is merely politicized or also securitized. However, taking for example the IBWT, one could argue that its implementation implies an extraordinary kind of politics considering its huge magnitude, international involvement and amount of resources required. This points towards a more general, and probably the most important, limitation of this research. That is, the securitization of environmental issues in the Lake Chad region is ongoing, which only allows for rather premature conclusions. Therefore, the success of the securitization of environmental issues, which is largely derived from its effects on interunit relations, is yet to be established. Once the major, and presumably also more, emergency measures are operational, one should further examine and re-analyse the securitization process and its effects. Another limitation of this research concerns the conceptualization of the audience and the facilitating conditions, as was emphasized by critics of the securitization approach. Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde (1998) only provide limited and poorly defined concepts of the audience and the facilitating conditions. Therefore, it remains rather unclear how to identify them and how to determine what should be taken as evidence for their presence. Moreover, it also remains quite unclear what the 'breaking of rules' and the employment of 'emergency measures' imply. They only vaguely define what qualifies as an emergency measure and what should be taken as evidence for the breaking of rules. A comprehensive and explicit conceptualization of these concepts

would allow for a more focused securitization analysis. Wæver (2003) argues that "it will be helpful in the future if the criteria to apply in specific instances is less the extra-ordinary nature of particular measures (because hard to make precise) but rather the threat construction as such and the argument about necessity" (Wæver, 2003, p.26-27). This would be another way to address the problem of not being able to determine whether a measure is extraordinary or not. Besides, Floyd (2016) stresses that the measure does not even have to be extraordinary. He notes that what is more important instead is that the securitizing actors believe whatever they are doing to address the threat is security policy (Floyd, 2016, p.685). In short, he argues that " just because practitioners of security do not address a threat with extraordinary emergency measures does not mean that they do not consider their response a security policy" (Floyd, 2016. p.682). Therefore, in his view, a successful securitization does not require emergency measures but can also involve non-exceptional measures (Floyd, 2016, p.682-685). However, given the fact that Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde (1998), and this thesis subsequently, adopt a wideners approach to the concept of security, it is understandable that they do not provide clear-cut definitions of the concepts discussed above. That is, if the security agenda is widened, the conceptualizations should apply to many other sectors as well, which explains the room for interpretation. Another remark, which can be considered a shortcoming of this research as well as an opportunity for future security studies, concerns what is taken as the existential threat and the referent object in this study. Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde (1998) note that:

> *"In the environmental sector, the range of possible referent objects is very large, ranging from relatively concrete things, such as the survival of individual species (tigers, whales, humankind) or types of habitat (rainforests, lakes), to much fuzzier, larger-scale issues, such as maintenance of the planetary climate and biosphere…"* (p.23), and "*at either the macro or micro extreme are some clear cases of existential threat (the survival of species, the survival of human civilization) that can be securitized. In between… lies a huge mass of problems that are more difficult, although not impossible, to construct in existential terms"* (p.23).

What becomes clear from this quote is that there is a very wide range of possibilities regarding the construction of existential threats and referent objects within the environmental sector. This, subsequently, allows for a different approach to examine the securitization of environmental issues. Namely, this research has taken the people inhabiting the Lake Chad region as the referent objects who are threatened by the shrinking of the lake, which is

considered to be the existential threat. However, a possibility for future research would be to take Lake Chad as the referent object and climate change, drought, the mis-and overuse of water or population growth as the existential threats. As indicated with the quote, Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde (1998) specifically argue that a lake can be taken as a referent object as well (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.23). This relates to a distinction made between the securitization of causes and the securitization of effects in the environmental sector (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, p.82-84). A securitization of causes would in this particular case refer to a securitization of climate change, environmental degradation, mis-and overuse of water resources or population growth, which all cause the lake to shrink. A securitization of effects would in this case mean to securitize the shrinking of Lake Chad itself, which is the effect of the causes mentioned above. This is what is being done by the UN and what has been established in this research (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.82-84). However, it is interesting to examine whether a securitization of the causes of environmental problems in the Lake Chad region can also be observed, which would be complementary to the insights of this research.

6.3. Implications of the findings & New avenues for future research

As argued by Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde (1998) and confirmed in this study, if an issue is presented as an existential threat and eventually becomes securitized, it is considered to be a priority issue and extraordinary measures are legitimized and employed. This opens up opportunities, as well as indicates risks, for future securitization attempts. That is, it shows that a securitizing act provides a way to raise awareness about issues and implement special measures. It can be used as an accelerated way to put issues high on the political agenda, or even above the agenda, and address within a very short period of time. This is a positive prospect, and offers opportunities, for countering the humanitarian crisis in the Lake Chad region. That is, having established that the securitization of Lake Chad is ongoing, it reveals a pathway to address the root causes of the humanitarian crisis in an accelerated manner. However, as indicated by critics of the securitization approach, this exactly points towards one of the risks of presenting something as a security issue. That is, securitizing acts are vulnerable to the misuse of people who securitize issues for the wrong purposes, such as 'legitimately' violating or bypassing existing rules. Moreover, the securitization of a wide range of issues can result in 'real' security issues being ousted from the agenda and downgrades the intrinsic value of the concept of security.

Thus, the securitization approach offers societal and scientific opportunities as well as

involves dangers for civilization and the world we live in. Therefore, a more detailed and extensive examination of the approach is needed in order to carefully determine and map its potential risks and opportunities. Moreover, since the humanitarian crisis is far from being solved, future scholarly research should further establish the role of the United Nations in the securitization of Lake Chad. Finally, having concluded that the securitization process is ongoing and emergency measures will continue to be implemented, future academic research should identify its effects on interunit relations.

7. Reference List

African Business Magazine. (2018, April 18). *Saving Lake Chad*. Retrieved June 03, 2018, from African Business Magazine: https://africanbusinessmagazine.com/sectors/development/saving-lake-chad/

African Development Bank Group. (2008). *MULTINATIONAL:LAKE CHAD BASIN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (PRODEBALT). APPRAISAL REPORT.* Retrieved March 14, 2018, from https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/Multinational_-_Lake_Chad_Basin_Sustainable_Development_Programme_-_Prodebalt_-_Appraisal_Report.PDF

Balzacq, T. (2005). The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context. *European Journal of International Relations, 11*(2), 171-201.

BBC. (2017, June 24). *Lake Chad: The faces of the world's 'silent emergency'*. Retrieved March 22, 2018, from BBC: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-39886641

Buzan, B. (1983). *People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations.* University of North Carolina Press.

Buzan, B., & Weaver, O. (2003). *Regions And Powers.* United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

Buzan, B., Wæver, O., & De Wilde, J. (1998). *Security: a new framework for analysis.* United States of America: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Byanyima, W., & Egeland, J. (2017, February 23). *Lake Chad Basin: World's most neglected crisis rages on*. Retrieved March 19, 2018, from Aljazeera: https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/02/lake-chad-basin-world-neglected-crisis-rages-170222104058402.html

Campbell, H. G. (2018, March 16). *Saving Lake Chad: A pan-African project. Reflections on the international conference to save Lake Chad.* Retrieved April 20, 2018, from Pambazuka News: https://www.pambazuka.org/human-security/saving-lake-chad-pan-african-project

Celani, C. (2017, January). *Transaqua: A Dream Is Becoming Reality*. Retrieved June 3, 2018, from The Schiller Institute: http://www.schillerinstitute.org/economy/phys_econ/2017/0106-transaqua/traq.html

Charett, C. (2009). A Critical Application of Securitization Theory: Overcoming the Normative Dilemma of Writing Security. *SSRN Electronic Journal*(7). Retrieved April 10, 2018, from https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1884149

Coghlan, A. (2015, January 21). *Did shrinking Lake Chad help Boko Haram grow?* . Retrieved February 22, 2018, from New Scientist: https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn26829-did-shrinking-lake-chad-help-boko-haram-grow/

Comolli, V. (2017, October). *The evolution and impact of Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin*. Retrieved May 11, 2018, from Humanitarian Practice Network: https://odihpn.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/he-70-web.pdf

Côté, A. (2016). Agents without agency: Assessing the role of the audience in securitization theory. *Security Dialogue, 47*(6), 541-558.

Drummond, J. (2017, February 23). *Lake Chad crisis: 'If Nigeria fails, Africa fails'*. Retrieved March 22, 2018, from Euractiv: https://www.euractiv.com/section/development-policy/opinion/lake-chad-crisis-if-nigeria-fails-africa-fails/

FAO. (2017, April 11). *Lake Chad Basin: a crisis rooted in hunger, poverty and lack of rural development*. Retrieved April 15, 2018, from Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations: http://www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/880741/icode/

Floyd, R. (2016). Extraordinary or ordinary emergency measures: what, and who, defines the 'success' of securitization? *Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 29*(2), 677-694.

Foster, G. D. (2001). Environmental Security: The Search for Strategic Legitimacy. *Armed Forces & Society, 27*(3), 373-395.

Freeman, L. (2017). Environmental Change, Migration, and Conflict in Africa: A Critical Examination of the Interconnections. *Journal of Environment & Development, 26*(4), 351-374.

Galeazzi, G., Medinilla, A., Ebiede, T. M., & Desmidt, S. (2017, March). Understanding the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC). Retrieved February 10, 2018, from https://ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/LCBC-Background-Paper-PEDRO-Political-Economy-Dynamics-Regional-Organisations-Africa-ECDPM-2017.pdf

Gallagher, M. (2017, March 07). *UN Security Council visits the Lake Chad region*. Retrieved February 18, 2018, from Government Offices of Sweden. Ministry for Foreign Affairs: http://www.swemfa.se/2017/03/07/un-security-council-visits-the-lake-chad-region/

ICLC. (2017). *International Conference - LAKE CHAD CONFERENCE 2017*. Retrieved March 10, 2018, from lcbconference2017: http://lcbconference2017.ng

ICLC. (2018, February 28). *Roadmap.* Retrieved May 10, 2018, from Save Lake Chad: http://savelakechad.com/analysis-of-transaqua.html

Kallon, E. (2017, May 04). *Leave no one behind – even in times of crisis*. Retrieved June 06, 2018, from United Nations Development Programme: http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/blog/2017/5/4/Stabilizing-vulnerable-communities-in-Nigeria-is-key-for-easing-dependency-on-humanitarian-aid.html

Kent, R. C. (2004). The United Nations' Humanitarian Pillar: Refocusing the UN's Disaster and Emergency Roles and Responsibilities. *Disasters, 28*(2), 216-233.

Kirawa, U. Y. (2018, May 15). *Lake Chad: Better late than never...* Retrieved May 5, 2018, from Daily Trust: https://www.dailytrust.com.ng/lake-chad-better-late-than-never--250586.html

Lanzer, T. (2017, October). *The Lake Chad crisis: drivers, responses and ways forward*. Retrieved May 11, 2018, from Humanitarian Practice Network: https://odihpn.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/he-70-web.pdf

Lanzer, T., Tatay, M., & Dewar, B. (2016, September 16). *Preventing Catastrophe? Responding to the Humanitarian Crisis in North-East Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin.* Retrieved February 20, 2018, from Chatham House. The Royal Institute of International Affairs: https://www.chathamhouse.org/event/preventing-catastrophe-responding-humanitarian-crisis-north-east-nigeria-and-lake-chad-basin

LCBC. (2011, April 8). Water Charter for the Lake Chad Basin.

LCBC. (2015, November 13). *The Lake Chad Development and Climate Resilience Action Plan.* Retrieved January 06, 2018, from The World Bank: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/489801468186879029/Main-report

LCBC. (2016, December 28). *Inter Basin Water Transfer Project: Signing of a memorandum of Understanding between LCBC and PowerChina International Group Limited*. Retrieved January 12, 2018, from Lake Chad Basin Commission: http://www.cblt.org/en/news/inter-basin-water-transfer-project-signing-memorandum-understanding-between-lcbc-and-PowerChina

LCBC. (2016, October 28). *Programme for the Rehabilitation and Strengthening of the Resilience of Socio-ecologic Systems of the Lake Chad Basin (PRESIBALT): National Coordination of Cameroon commissioned!.* Retrieved May 14, 2018, from Lake Chad Basin Commission: http://www.cblt.org/en/news/programme-rehabilitation-and-strengthening-resilience-socio-ecologic-systems-lake-chad-basin

LCBC. (2018). *The Lake Chad Basin Commission*. Retrieved March 10, 2018, from Lake Chad Basin Commission: http://www.cblt.org/en/lake-chad-basin-commission

LCBC, & UNESCO. (2018). *International Conference on Lake Chad. Abuja Declaration.* Retrieved May 27, 2018, from Google Drive: https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1uB6xgjIwYwOjn6xhJbDrTU3-N9ihVSb8

LCBC, World Bank, & AFD. (2015, November 13). *The Lake Chad Development and Climate Resilience Action Plan.* Retrieved April 11, 2018, from World Bank Group: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/23793

LCBC, World Bank, UNDP, Global Environment Facility, & UNOPS. (2008, June 11). Strategic Action Programme for the Lake Chad Basin.

Léonard, S., & Kaunert, C. (2010). Reconceptualizing the audience in securitization theory. In T. Balzacq, *Securitization Theory* (pp. 57-76). London: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group.

McDonald, M. (2008). Securitization and the Construction of Security. *European Journal of International Relations, 14*(4), 563-587.

MNJTF. (2018). *MANDATE OF THE MULTINATIONAL JOINT TASK FORCE*. Retrieved March 09, 2018, from MULTINATIONAL JOINT TASK FORCE: https://www.mnjtf.org/about-mnjtf/mnjtf-mandate/

Nett, K., & Rüttinger, L. (2016). *Insurgency, Terrorism and Organised Crime in a Warming Climate.* Berlin: Adelphi.

Nwachukwu, J. O. (2018, February 28). *Lake Chad International Conference: Full text of Buhari's address*. Retrieved May 11, 2018, from Daily Post: http://dailypost.ng/2018/02/28/lake-chad-international-conference-full-text-buharis-address/

OCHA. (2018, January 22). *Lake Chad Basin: Crisis Overview (as of 22 January 2018).* Retrieved February 15, 2018, from Reliefweb: https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/lake-chad-basin-crisis-overview-22-january-2018

OCHA. (2018). *OCHA. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs*. Retrieved April 10, 2018, from OCHA: https://www.unocha.org/search/node/lake%20chad

Okpara, U. T. (2014). *Too Little Water: The Lake Chad Story*. Retrieved from Anthropocene Curriculum: https://www.anthropocene-curriculum.org/pages/root/campus-2014/filtering-the-anthropocene/lake-chad-sharing-diminishing-resource/too-little-water-the-lake-chad-story/

Okpara, U.T., et al . (2015). Conflicts about water in Lake Chad: are environmental, vulnerability and security issues linked? *Progress in Development Studies, 15*(4), 308-325.

Quinn, B. (2017, February 24). *Donors pledge $672m at Oslo summit to avert famine in Nigeria and Lake Chad*. Retrieved May 22, 2018, from The Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2017/feb/24/oslo-donor-conference-raises-672m-for-nigeria-and-lake-chad-food-crisis

SDC. (2018). *Humanitarian crisis in the Lake Chad Basin region.* Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation. Retrieved June 05, 2018, from https://www.eda.admin.ch/dam/countries/countries-content/nigeria/en/factsheet-lake-chad_EN.pdf

Steely, L. (n.d.). *Saving Lake Chad: An analysis of the Oubangui-Chari water transfer proposal.* Retrieved March 25, 2018, from http://laurensteely.net/writing%20samples/Lauren%20Steely%20-%20Lake%20Chad%20Paper.pdf

Stirk, C. (2015, May). Humanitarian Assistance From Non-State Donors. *Briefing Paper*. Retrieved April 25, 2018, from http://devinit.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Private-Funding-2015_May2015.pdf

Šulović, V. (2010, October 5). Meaning of Security and Theory of Securitization. Belgrade, Serbia.

Tarry, S. (1999). 'Deepening' and 'Widening': An Analysis of Security Definitions in the 1990s. *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, 2*(1).

Taub, B. (2017, December 4). *Lake Chad: The world's most complex humanitarian disaster*. Retrieved February 20, 2018, from The New Yorker: https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/12/04/lake-chad-the-worlds-most-complex-humanitarian-disaster

Taureck, R. (2006). Securitization theory and securitization studies. *Journal of International Relations and Development, 9*(1), 53-61.

Theirworld. (2016, September). *Neglected Crisis: Poverty, terror and the threat of famine in the Lake Chad Basin (September 2016)*. Retrieved March 22, 2018, from Theirworld: https://theirworld.org/resources/detail/neglected-crisis-poverty-terror-and-the-threat-of-famine-in-the-lake-chad-basin

Torbjörnsson, D., & Jonsson, M. (2017, November). Boko Haram. On the verge of retreat or a long term threat? Swedish National Defence Research Institute.

Trombetta, M. J. (2008). Environmental security and climate change: Analysing the discourse. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 21*(4), 585-602.

U.N. Deputy Secretary-General. (2017, July 10). *Limited Access to Education, Rapid Population Growth 'Powerful Illustrations' of Challenges Facing Lake Chad Basin, Sahel, Says Deputy Secretary-General. DSG/SM/1072-POP/1065*. Retrieved April 16, 2018, from United Nations: Meetings Coverage and Press Releases: https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/dsgsm1072.doc.htm

U.N. Deputy Secretary-General. (2018, March 22). *Despite Gains, Sustained Effort Needed to Fight Boko Haram, Humanitarian Crisis in Lake Chad Basin, Deputy Secretary-General Tells Security Council. DSG/SM/1146. (Press Release: SC/13261)*. Retrieved April 28, 2018, from United Nations: Meetings Coverage and Press Releases: https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/dsgsm1146.doc.htm

U.N. Environment. (2018, February 28). *The tale of a disappearing lake*. Retrieved May 05, 2018, from United Nations Environment Programme: https://www.unenvironment.org/news-and-stories/story/tale-disappearing-lake

U.N. OCHA. (2017, February 24). *Oslo humanitarian conference for Nigeria and the Lake Chad region raises $672 million to help people in need.* Retrieved February 12, 2018, from Reliefweb: https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/oslo-humanitarian-conference-nigeria-and-lake-chad-region-raises-672-million-help

U.N. OCHA. (2017, February 24). *Oslo Humanitarian Conference on Nigeria and the Lake Chad Region.* Retrieved June 02, 2018, from Reliefweb: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Outcome%20Statement1.pdf

U.N. Secretary-General. (2018, February 28). *Take Decisive Action to Save Lake Chad, Secretary-General Urges Governments, International Community, in Message for International Conference. Statements and Messages. SG/SM/18918*. Retrieved from United Nations:

Meetings Coverage and Press Releases:
https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sgsm18918.doc.htm

U.N. Security Council . (n.d.). *The Security Council*. Retrieved March 17, 2018, from United Nations
Security Council: http://www.un.org/en/sc/

U.N. Security Council. (2016). *7748th meeting. S/PV.7748.* United Nations, United Nations Security
Council, New York.

U.N. Security Council. (2016, July 27). *7748th Security Council Meeting: Peace and Security in Africa*.
Retrieved March 10, 2018, from United Nations: Audiovisual Library:
https://www.unmultimedia.org/avlibrary/asset/1682/1682811/

U.N. Security Council. (2016, November 22). *Secretary-General, in Security Council, Stresses
Promotion of Water-resource Management as Tool to Foster Cooperation, Prevent Conflict.
7818th meeting. (Press Release SC/12598)*. Retrieved May 22, 2018, from United Nations:
Meetings Coverage and Press Releases:
https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12598.doc.htm

U.N. Security Council. (2017, January 12). *Boko Haram Still Threatens Civilians in Lake Chad Basin,
Officials Warn Security Council, Urging United Front to Repair Material, Social Damage.
7861st meeting. (Press Release SC/12679)*. Retrieved April 08, 2018, from United Nations:
Meetings Coverage and Press Releases:
https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc12679.doc.htm

U.N. Security Council. (2017, March 31). *Resolution 2349 (2017). 7911th meeting. S/RES/2349.*
Retrieved from https://undocs.org/S/RES/2349(2017)

U.N. Security Council. (2018, March 22). *Better Governance of Underfunded, Poorly Managed Lake
Chad Basin Key to Resolving Conflict, Suffering across Region, Speakers Tell Security Council.
8212th meeting. (Press Release SC/13259)*. Retrieved May 23, 2018, from United Nations:
Meetings Coverage and Press Releases:
https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13259.doc.htm

U.N. Security Council. (2018, March 22). *Better Governance of Underfunded, Poorly Managed Lake
Chad Basin Key to Resolving Conflict, Suffering across Region, Speakers Tell Security Council.
8212th meeting. (Press Release SC/13259)*. Opgeroepen op May 11, 2018, van United
Nations: Meetings Coverage and Press Releases:
https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13259.doc.htm

U.N. Security Council. (2018, January 30). *Security Council Presidential Statement Expresses Serious
Concern over Security Situation in West Africa, Sahel. 8170th meeting. (Press Release
SC/13189)*. Retrieved February 22, 2018, from United Nations: Meetings Coverage and Press
Releases: https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13189.doc.htm

UNDP Nigeria. (2018, March 09). *Conference recommends inter-basin water transfer to save Lake
Chad*. Retrieved June 08, 2018, from UNDP Nigeria:

http://www.ng.undp.org/content/nigeria/en/home/presscenter/articles/2018/03/09/confer
ence-recommends-inter-basin-water-transfer-to-save-lake-chad.html

UNDP Nigeria. (2018, May 9). *UNDP facilitates establishment of Lake Chad Basin Governors' Forum*.
Retrieved June 6, 2018, from UNDP Nigeria:
http://www.ng.undp.org/content/nigeria/en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2018/05/09/
undp-facilitates-establishment-of-lake-chad-basin-governors-forum.html

UNESCO. (2018). *Address by Mr Getachew Engida, Deputy Director-General of UNESCO on the
occasion of the International Conference on Lake Chad.* Retrieved March 25, 2018, from
Google Drive: https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1uB6xgjIwYwOjn6xhJbDrTU3-
N9ihVSb8

UNESCO. (2018). *BIOsphere and Heritage of Lake Chad (BIOPALT) project*. Retrieved April 29, 2018,
from UNESCO: https://en.unesco.org/biopalt?language=en

UNESCO. (2018, February 22). *UNESCO commits to safeguarding Lake Chad*. Retrieved June 01, 2018,
from UNESCO: https://en.unesco.org/news/unesco-commits-safeguarding-lake-chad

UNESCO World Heritage Centre. (2018, March 05). *UNESCO launches BIOPALT project to safeguard
Lake Chad*. Retrieved April 27, 2018, from WHC UNESCO:
https://whc.unesco.org/en/news/1792

UNFPA. (2017). *Demographic Dynamics and the Crisis of Countries around Lake Chad .* United Nations
Population Fund. West and Central Africa Regional Office.

UNFPA. (2017). *From crisis to development around Lake Chad. Strategy for an Integrated, Holistic and
Sustainable Response.* United Nations Population Fund. Reginal Office for West and Central
Africa.

United Nations. (1945). Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of
Justice. San Francisco.

United Nations. (2008). United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. Principles and Guidelines. New
York. Retrieved February 22, 2018, from UN.org:
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/capstone_eng.pdf

UNOCT. (2017). *The General Assembly Creates a New Office of Counter-Terrorism.* Retrieved March
20, 2018, from United Nations:
https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/sites/www.un.org.counterterrorism.ctitf/files/be
am/BEAM%2013_FINAL.pdf

Wæver, O. (2003, February). Securitisation: Taking stock of a research programme in Security
Studies. *Unpublished Draft*.

Waheed, A. (2018). *Recap of Day 2 Plenary Sessions – Dr. Alayande Waheed.* Retrieved June 2, 2018,
from Google Drive: https://drive.google.com/drive/search?q=recap

Whiting, A. (2016, May 25). *Lake Chad Basin is world's most neglected humanitarian crisis: U.N. aid
chief*. Retrieved March 23, 2018, from Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-

%09humanitarian-summit-lake-chad/lake-chad-basin-is-worlds-most-neglected-
%09humanitarian-crisis-u-n-aid-chief-idUSKCN0YF2UV

World Food Programme. (2016, April). *Lake Chad Basin - Desk Review: Socio-economic analysis of the Lake Chad Basin Region, with focus on regional environmental factors, armed conflict, gender and food security issues, April 2016.* Retrieved April 20, 2018, from World Food Programme. Publications: https://www.wfp.org/content/lake-chad-socio-economic-analysis-environment-armed-conflict-gender-food-security-april-2016