

# The Rocky Road to Postcolonial Stability

A case study of MINUSMA's role in the peace process of Mali's postcolonial conflict.

Martijn van Dongen

Bachelor Thesis Geography, Planning and Environment School of Management Radboud University Nijmegen 05-07-2016 [page intentionally left blank]

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### Foreword

#### Dear reader,

The research you are about to read will be the conclusion of my three year bachelor in Geography, Planning and the Environment. It is my Bachelor thesis and was written under the supervision of Olivier Kramsch. The theme of this thesis is the United Nations intervention in Mali's complex conflict situation. This foreword will shortly introduce you to me and the road I took to arrive here.

My fondest childhood memories are those where I went abroad, be it on vacation or a school excursion. I would play in my free time a game I called the Atlas game, where we named a random place on Earth and the other had to find it in the Atlas as quickly as possible. The world has interested me since a very young age. It really is no surprise that I ended up studying geography.

As I developed myself throughout my Bachelor I maintained this interest in the world around me. Concepts of globalization continued to fascinate me and slowly I began to understand and appreciate the field of geopolitics and international relations. In my second year I briefly entertained the thought of switching to a Master's degree in Political Science, specialized in international relations. Yet after following a course and eventually a minor in Conflict Studies, I knew this was what I truly wanted to study. I committed and chose relevant optional courses in Anthropology and History and combined the varied knowledge I had into a Bachelor thesis.

From the start of my thesis I knew I wanted to focus on a conflict with two characteristics: a complex colonial history and an international intervention. Mali ended up as the perfect case for me and my interests. I would like to thank my supervisor Kramsch for continually motivating me to keep going. All the challenges I ran into were faced by Kramsch with unrelenting optimism and faith in me. His endless knowledge of postcolonial literature was an inspiration to me.

Additionally, there are several other people I must thank greatly for their aid in the completion of this thesis. Firstly, I want to thank two of the lecturers and researchers of the CICAM institute for their help in finding amazing respondents whose experiences shaped this thesis. Marenne Jansen and Lotje de Vries referred me to exactly where I wanted to end up with their suggestions and personal network. Additionally, I must of course thank the six anonymous respondents, whose great expertise of Mali, its people and the United Nations is at the very core of this thesis. Lastly, I wish to thank my aunt Maureen for spending a free Sunday afternoon with me to share her expertise on graphic design and to clean up and beautify the formatting of my thesis. Without the help of these amazing people and my supervisor, this thesis would not be here for your reading pleasure.

I wish you great enjoyment as you read my Bachelor thesis.

Martijn van Dongen Nijmegen, June 2016

### Summary

Mali is a meeting point of a variety of ethnic groups in the Sahara and Sahel region. The independent state of Mali (1968) is a state in which the capital in the south, Bamako, is vastly different in culture and ethnicity than much of the lands it rules to the north. These northern lands are home to the Tuareg people. This group of Berber ethnicity has controlled Sahara trade routes since the age before European exploration. After France colonized Mali in the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> century, it was the Tuareg in the north who were the last to fall and first to rebel. They are a proud people who do not easily accept being ruled by a foreign source. Yet the government of Mali feels to them as a foreign source, leading to a continuum of rebellions in Mali's north since its inception as an independent state in 1968.

In 1963 the first among these postcolonial rebellions took place. This rebellion is referred to in Tuareg historical discourse as the 'Alfellaga', which literally translates to 'The Rebellion'. The Tuareg did not let go of the ideas of their previous generation and continued their work in 1975. This paved the path to the next armed rebellion of 1990, starting a six year armed conflict between Tuareg armed groups and Mali's government. During this conflict the world saw a hint of what would be repeated no less than two decades later. The peace ceremony of 1996 brought a solemn end to the second rebellion, but unrest continued into the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

In 2012 this led to another highly violent conflict. The Mouvement National de Libération de l'Azawad (MNLA) was formed in Libya. In the eve of the Arab Spring, the MNLA managed to equip the scattered Tuareg groups of Northern Mali with far greater arms than the previous rebellions had seen. Their attacks on cities in Northern Mali throughout 2012 were too much for the Malian national army to handle and they soon found themselves in control of much of Mali's north. Meanwhile Bamako was in a political crisis. The old president was ousted in a military coup as a result of his insufficient handling of the conflict in the north and he fled the country. The MNLA and a newly formed Ansar Dine, an armed group of Tuareg infused with Islamist beliefs, profited greatly from Bamako's political instability and proclaimed the independence of their homeland Azawad.

It was at this point in the conflict that former colonial power France militarily intervened in the form of Operation Serval. This mission brought highly trained and equipped specialized forces to Mali and managed to regain limited amounts of control in Northern Mali. Following French initiatives in the United Nations Security Council, African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) was deployed. This international missions consisted mostly of regional African troops. It was soon followed by the much more robust Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). This mission features a large military branch alongside a civil branch, in hopes of comprehensively dealing with Mali's conflict. The mandate of MINUSMA is broad and ambitious, aiming not only to bring a ceasefire, but to establish a form of long term stability, through a Security Sector Reform, rule of law, humanitarian assistance and more.

Yet the execution of such a broad mandate leads to challenges for the mission and its individual members. How does a soldier in the field or a policy maker in the office execute a mandate so broad and abstract? MINUSMA's work so far has assisted in the establishment of an Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali through the Algiers talks of 2015. The armed groups, a great variety of which are now aligned in the Platform Group and the Coordination Group, respect their leadership and have maintained the ceasefire well. Yet Islamist terrorist groups were not a part of the negotiation and asymmetrical violence from their side continues to threaten safety and stability throughout Mali.

While the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali has achieved a ceasefire, its further implementation remains severely lacking. Political progress is slow and the step from ceasefire to a negotiated comprehensive peace remains a challenge to all parties. Peace talks between the government and armed groups are regularly maintained, but continually reach indecision on key issues, because the two parties remain on complete opposite sides of the table.

Throughout this slow process, it is the regular people of Mali that remain in circumstances lacking basic services, education and jobs. While the research respects the progress of the high political realm, it emphasizes that progress must start at the bottom in order to create a truly stable Mali. Through improved civil-military cooperation within MINUSMA and between international actors (both governmental and non-governmental) more rapid responses to the day-to-day problems of Mali can be guaranteed. As the domestic actors are facilitated, they can become increasingly involved in the peace process. The spirit of the people is a key to success in peacebuilding, as proven by the Anefis pact, where several domestic actors met without the presence of the international community, to guarantee safety in their own region.

This difficult balance between political progress and its results on the ground is reflected in theory. Through a dialogue between peace and conflict studies and postcolonial literature, the local and personal scales can be explored alongside the political level.

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### 1. Introduction

Ever since decolonization processes started, they have been a hot topic for debate. Scholars such as Fanon (1961) describe from the perspective of the native how difficult identification processes are and what personal psychological struggles happen in the changing times of decolonization. Perhaps, as time goes on, these issues will resolve themselves. They have however proven not to be resolved yet. Many postcolonial states remain fragile in the yearly Fragile State Index by the Fund For Peace (2015) and it is unsurprising that several postcolonial states still find themselves in conflict situations today. Scholars attribute many of these and other issues faced by these countries to their often gruesome colonial history, this school of thought is called 'postcolonialism'. Throughout this thesis, the postcolonial history of conflict in Mali will be central. The conflict that started out in 2012 has grown incredibly complex through the involvement of various armed groups and even more so since the international community intervened. Through military and humanitarian interventions, the international community aims to assist those in need in insecure areas. So-called peacekeeping missions provide safety, food and water to the local population. As time goes on, they aim to provide more than that, including basic services, education and economic stabilization. Yet these interventions do not necessarily lead to long term solutions, nor to 'peace' in the broadest sense of the word. Throughout the thesis the concept of peace will be questioned and the ways to achieve it will be discussed. We must constantly realise that peace is not a given and that the challenge of an international mission is perhaps greater than they themselves realised at the start. The postcolonial nature of conflict further complicates this road to peace, however we may define it. This thesis provides an interesting dialogue between conflict studies, peace theory and postcolonial theory, which meet each other in Mali.

The recent conflict in Mali is an interesting example of a conflict that has been subjected to international intervention. The country gained independence from France though a slow process in the 1960's. The northern parts of the country are home to a people called the Tuareg, a Berber people living in the Sahel region. This group has never felt quite at home in the independent state of Mali and they have rebelled against it in 1963, in 1991 and again in 2012 in hopes of greater autonomy. In 2013 the international community sent a UN Peace Keeping mission to Mali in hopes of returning the country to stability. This mission is still there today and due for extension of its mandate in the near future.

#### 1.1.1 Reading guide

This reading guide will show the reader the way this thesis is set up. Following this introduction sections 1.2 and 1.3 will elaborate on the relevancy of research towards MINUSMA and peace keeping in Mali for both the policy field and the academic world. Next, the goal of the research will be clarified and the research question will be formulated with the intent of completing said goal. Several sub questions will be formed, whose answers together form a comprehensive answer to the main question. The theoretical framework of chapter 2 examines the useful concepts that will be utilized throughout the research. These theories come together in a conceptual model in section 2.2, the model is helpful in understanding the research and providing a visual interpretation of its concepts. The methods section elaborates on the scientific methods best fit to answer the research question of this thesis. The research strategy, its validity and reliability and the research material will be explained and its choices will be defended.


Next, the truly key parts of the thesis follow. Chapter 4 and 5 handle the research itself. Chapter 4 presents a comprehensive description of the case of Mali and its peacekeeping mission

MINUSMA. It starts in Mali's pre-colonial history and summarizes shortly how the country arrived at today's precarious situation. Chapter 5 then analyses the material of the official United Nations (UN) documents, secondary literature and six interviews. Based on the previous five chapters, the conclusion ends it all by providing a sufficient answer to the research question and discusses its interpretation and implication for the scientific field.

Throughout the thesis Arabic terms and a variety of abbreviations will be used. The first usage will always be paired with the translation and definition of all complicated terms. Yet confusion is understandable. Therefore Appendix A provides a glossary of terms, where important terms, organizations and names are compiled for the reader's benefit. Appendix B presents the interview guides used for the six interviews.

#### 1.2 Policy Relevance: Sending the men abroad

The UN troops in Mali include people of many nationalities. Because sending troops abroad is a risk few Western nations are willing to take, many UN Peace Keeping missions are made up of African or Asian troops, while the West does the planning and funding (from a safe distance). The 1990's were a turning point for this trend. Following several controversial missions in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda, Western nations took a step back from international peacekeeping, leaving countries like Bangladesh or Ethiopia the main suppliers of troops on the ground (Vermeulen, 2016). The following graph illustrates this discrepancy nicely.



*Figure 2: Translation: "Where do blue hats come from? Troop contributions 1990-2015" Based on IPI Peacekeeping Database (in Vermeulen, 2016)* 

Mali seems like an exception to the statistics above. When conflict arose again in 2012-2013, the Malian transitional government (which had just experienced a coup d'état) asked their old colonial power France for help. This marked the start of 'Operation Serval', later becoming the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) and then handing over the reins to the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). What made these UN missions exceptional is not their complicated and lengthy names, but the relatively high participation of Western troops. The mission's initiative was taken by France and later on Dutch and German troops, among others, contributed (Dutch Ministry of Defence, 2013). Right now, the Germans are in

charge of the operation, but Dutch troops remain active in the area (Volkskrant, February 2016). However, the majority remains of Asian and African descent, and although Western involvement is relatively large, MINUSMA is no statistical outlier.

The presence of European troops and the influence of France specifically, does make MINUSMA an interesting case for a research such as this. A critical analysis of the actions of European nations and the UN in the conflict in Mali is needed to ensure the influence of the West is not abusive and effective in the achievement of its goals. The postcolonial lens used in this theses will allow a reflection on the power relations between Mali, France and the international community.

What then, makes the actions of the international community in Mali so crucial? Why does the way a mission like MINUSMA is set up matter so much? Because the lives of the everyday man in Mali is on the line. In the end, a mission like this impacts the lives of everyone in Mali. The Malian state has been unstable since 2012 and has repeatedly experienced such times before. This naturally leads to lacking provision of public goods, basic services and infrastructure, but also bursts of violence and open rebellion in the Northern areas (an area known as 'Azawad' by some). In the end, what really, crucially, makes researching MINUSMA and the Malian conflict relevant is to reflect whether the international policy is effective in improving the local situation and providing long-term stability for the Malian people.

#### **1.3 Scientific Relevance**

In the academic world, critique on international intervention in local conflict is nothing new. Well known critics include Michael Pugh (e.g. Pugh, 2001; 2010), Noam Chomsky (e.g. Chomsky, 2003; 2008) and Jean Bricmont (e.g. Bricmont, 2006; 2010). Criticism also came from within the UN, leading to a changing nature of peacekeeping when it comes to the UN specifically. In the 2005 World Summit they first formulated a principle known as the 'Responsibility to Protect' (R2P) (United Nations General Assembly, 2005). It is defined as a responsibility that every individual state has, to protect their citizens from genocide, war crimes or other atrocities and if they fail to do so, the international community (through the UN) has the responsibility to diplomatically, humanitarian or otherwise intervene in a peaceful manner. This principle should be at the basis of every peace keeping missions organised by the UN in the past decade. This is known as the third generation of peace keeping missions (Ramsbotham, Miall and Woodhouse, 2011) and forms a crucial shift in the understanding of sovereignty for states. No longer is state sovereignty guaranteed and unconditional.

Chomsky and Bricmont are most known for their critique on the American interventions around the world, ranging from Vietnam in the 60's to Iraq just over a decade ago. Their respective terms for America's ungraceful position in the world are 'military humanism' (Chomsky, 2008) and 'humanitarian imperialism' (Bricmont, 2006). Their perspective is closely linked to colonialism, because they argue that under a veil of humanitarian aid ('humanism') the West is actually more concerned with their economic and strategic position in relation to the conflict. Nardin (2005) uses Bricmont's term humanitarian imperialism to describe the actions of the United States in Iraq. He distinguishes between a narrow rationale and a grand rationale behind the intervention. You could see US intervention as exercising *"its power for morally legitimate reasons – to promote freedom and democracy everywhere"* (Nardin, 2005, p. 26), but this is only the narrow perspective. The grand rationale though is that the US does it for purely selfish reasons, as a self-defence for their strategic position in the world. While humanitarian intervention is aimed at protecting others, Nardin argues that humanitarian imperialism is about protecting yourself (against others).

A previous wave of criticism of international peacekeeping critically reflected on mistakes made in Bosnia or Somalia among other cases (e.g. Van Genugten, 1995). Ten years after the 2005 World Summit the time has come to reflect again whether the R2P is successful and what better way to do so, then to study a contemporary mission involving a complex postcolonial conflict and close involvement of the old colonial power.

#### 1.4 Goal

Throughout the two previous sections, it has been made clear that there is a space in the academic community for feedback and critique on the policies of international intervention. At the same, it has been shown that there are several important pieces of criticism given to international intervention in local conflicts in the past. It is important to keep critically reflecting on this subject, because it is a crucial part of the path towards long term peace in Mali, or any other case. Therefore the goal of this thesis is formulated as following:

To create a deep understanding of the United Nations mission MINUSMA in Mali through a critical evaluation of personal experiences in comparison to the mission's official papers.

By completing this goal, this research can be an addition to existing theory, while also adding to public debates within the international community.

#### **1.5 Research question**

To achieve the aforementioned goal, a research question must be established. The following research question is to be interpreted as the baseline for the thesis as a whole. Its answer must be based on a variety of sources, be well nuanced and well thought out in order to answer a question of such a broad scope. The question is formulated as follows:

In what ways does the influence of colonial history and decolonization in the conflict in Mali, further complicate the international intervention MINUSMA by the United Nations?

By asking this question the understanding of MINUSMA is vital, while never losing touch with history. History shapes us and each day is only a part of tomorrow's history. When one aims to perform research on the conflict in Mali, its colonial history and long decolonization process must be kept at the forefront of the mind.

To form a comprehensive question to a large question, it must be split into smaller and digestible parts. The following sub questions do exactly that to the research question mentioned above. Together these questions will form a collected answer to the research question:

- How did the colonial history of Mali lead to the current conflict?
- What is the current situation of the conflict when it comes to peacekeeping?
- What does MINUSMA aim to achieve through their intervention in Mali?
- In what way can the current peacekeeping efforts lead to a long term stability in Mali?
- To what extent is the mission successful in achieving its mandate?
- What lessons can other UN missions learn from the case of Mali?

In section 2.2 below, a conceptual model will be presented along with a set of hypotheses of potential answers to these questions based on existing theory. After the empirical sections, the conclusion will definitively answer the sub questions and the research question and judge whether the initial hypotheses were correct in their estimations.


## 2 Theory

#### 2.1 Theoretical Framework

To execute a successful research, it must be sufficiently grounded within existing theory. Three key concepts are at the base of this research, they must be sufficiently understood before the final work can be written. These concepts are 'conflict', 'peace' and 'postcolonialism'. The international intervention is aimed at solving a conflict and creating peace. To reflect on that we must first be clear in our definitions of conflict and more importantly, a definition of peace. Yet these are troublesome and complicated terms. Peace in this thesis is not just the absence of violence, but a long term stability or even 'restoration' for Mali. To conceptualise this, the influential essay by Immanuel Kant on Perpetual Peace (Kant, 1903) will be taken as a historical base, but modern ideas will be used to create a 21<sup>st</sup> century definition of long term peace, stability and restoration. Next, a historic overview of postcolonial influence, such as Mali. Following the historic overview, modern authors will be brought up to describe the state of theory as of now, when it comes to postcolonial thought of a manual theory as of now, when it comes to postcolonial thought on conflict and military intervention.

#### 2.1.1 Conflict: intensity-based definitions

The definition of 'war' or 'conflict' is a subject of constant discussion. Should it, for example, be based on a numerical value? Famous war philosopher Clausewitz once assigned the statistic '1000 battle-related deaths per year' as the threshold for a conflict to be defined as war. For this thesis, Lund's conflict curve will be used to identify between unstable peace, crisis and war (Lund, 1996).



*Figure 3:* Lund's conflict curve. Vertically: intensity of conflict, horizontally: duration of conflict. Source: United States Institute of Peace (2004).

Within Lund's curve he makes the following differentiation between unstable peace, crisis and war:

- Unstable peace: tensions are high. Can be considered a negative peace (see next section), because there is no armed forces, yet parties still perceive the other as enemies.
- Crisis: a situation in which armed forces are mobilized and in tense confrontation, they are however not in outright war, because violence is sparse and mostly limited to threats. Risk of war is high.
- War: "*a sustained fighting between organized armed forces.*" (Lund, 1996, p. 39), may vary from all-out war like in Vietnam, to continuing low intensity conflict.

As you can see in Lund's definitions, war is not defined by its casualties, but instead by its level of consistency. War is a situation where fighting is consistent and sustained, while crisis is irregular and unstable peace lacks open confrontation of parties. In the next section the difference between an unstable peace and a 'perpetual peace' will be described.

#### 2.1.2 Peace: more than just an absence of violence

In this section we will define 'peace' in the broad sense of the word. This idea of peace as a long term stability where the threat of violence is non-existent is often called sustainable or durable peace. Immanuel Kant wrote an essay in 1795 which was ground-breaking for its time, in which he described a peace he called 'perpetual peace' (Kant, 1903). Such a state was defined by a long term solution of conflict. Because, asks Kant, what is peace if it is just material for future war? Eternal peace would be a pleonasm, because real peace cannot be temporary.

In his essay, Kant proposes a plan for perpetual peace. He does this based on three 'definitive articles of perpetual peace', these articles are the following (Kant, 1903):

- "The civil constitution of each state shall be republican." (p.120)
- *"The law of nations shall be founded on a federation of free states." (p.128)*
- "The rights of men, as citizens of the world, shall be limited to the conditions of universal hospitality." (p. 137)

The definition of 'republican constitution' in the first article is very similar to our modern definition of democracy. The main premise is that in a representative government, whether it is democratic or technocratic, the people will never willingly chose to go to war. This idea has later become the core of 'Democratic Peace Theory'. The second article envisions already in 1795 the arrival of a League of Nations or a United Nations, while the third seems to hint already at free border crossings (limited by regular laws of hospitality). In addition to these abstract articles, Kant names some 'preliminary articles' or things that must be done before one can strive for a perpetual peace, these include disarmament, a guarantee of independency of states, etc. For this particular thesis, the 5th preliminary article is quite interesting: *"No state shall violently interfere with the constitution and administration of another."* (Kant, 1903, p. 112)

We must question though, to what extent the guidelines Kant proposed over 200 years ago, are enough to create a perpetual peace today. A modern theory on peace is that of 'positive and negative peace' by Johan Galtung (2013). He argues that just a disarmament and end to physical violence is not enough for a long term solution (which he names positive peace). Neither is a republican constitution or a 'law of nations' enough, for structural and cultural violence must be handled as well. Structural violence is a form of violence not exerted in the physical sense, but for example through spatial segregation or unequal rights. This can be aimed at an ethic group, gender, economic class, etc. Cultural violence then, is the cultural legitimization for such practices. A true positive peace exists not just when a republican constitution exists, but when it is completely free from structural and cultural violence (Galtung, 2013). The following table shows Galtung's interpretation of the relation between negative and positive peace and the three types of violence:

Violence	Direct violence Intended harming, hurting	Structural violence Unintended harming, hurting	Cultural violence Intended or unintended justifying violence
Negative peace	<ol> <li>absence of</li></ol>	[2] absence of no exploitation;	[3] absence of no justification;
	ceasefire	or no structure = <i>atomie</i>	or no culture = <i>anomie</i>
Positive	[4] presence of	[5] presence of equity, equality	[6] presence of culture of
peace	cooperation		peace, and dialogue
Peace	Negative + positive	Negative + positive	Negative + positive

Table 17.1 Direct, structural and cultural violence

Source The author

Figure 4: The relation between direct (physical), structural and cultural violence and peace. By the author (Galtung, 2013).

Together these two theories form a modern conceptualization of peace as more than just the absence of violence. The work of Galtung (2013) helps in defining the unstable peace of Lund's conflict curve (1996). A tense situation in which there is no armed conflict, is still a form of (unarmed) conflict. Negative, unstable peace is not peace in the Kantian definition, for it remains material for future wars. For this thesis, peace is considered perpetual, sustainable, or durable when alongside an absence of violence, there is also an absence of structural violence (whether intended or not) and cultural justification for inequality. Postcolonial theory can assist in further defining structural and cultural inequalities.

#### 2.1.3 A short history of postcolonial thought

Schech and Haggis (2000) define postcolonial thought in their anthropological work on culture and development. Their definition is as following: "[...] postcolonial studies have challenged the underlying cultural representations of the Third World which had been established in the Western mind since the colonial era." (Schech and Haggis, 2000, p. 66) According to their definition, there are five elements to this challenge of the Western perspective(pp. 67-71):

- The study and analysis of European territorial conquests (geographical element)
- Institutions of European colonialism (institutional / structural element)
- Discourses presented by the empire (discursive element)
- The construction of the subject (psychological element)
- Resistance to colonialism (critical element)

I have tried to capture the essence of their categorization in a single word in brackets, though admittedly for the full grasp of their definition of postcolonialism such a short description remains lacking.

Some key authors and perhaps founders of postcolonial thought include Edward Said and Frantz Fanon. Fanon's iconic work "The Wretched of the Earth" focuses heavily on the psychological aspect of decolonization (Fanon, 1961). He explains the helplessness found in the native's mind when confronted with the issue of decolonization. Fanon states colonialism is naturally violent and thus, it can only be combated by further violence. However, violence exerted by the native is hopeless because they have "[...] no need to demonstrate their incapacity to triumph by violent methods" (Fanon, 1961, p. 49). But Fanon does not focus purely on the violence and helplessness of natives, as he consistently calls them. He also describes the position of a national culture in a colony, as a culture being systematically eradicated. Leaving the very identity of a native hiding in secrecy, afraid of domination.

The psychological element of postcolonialism is key in Fanon's work. Following a decolonization process, the native's culture often remains repressed and violence is over only in its physical form. Here the psychological element of postcolonial thought can aid in a clearer definition

of Galtung's (2013) structural and cultural violence in a colonial setting. The national culture of the native is not simply repressed (structural) but even denied (cultural). Fanon (1961) adds the example of the Songhay civilization. The fact that the Songhay were a great empire 400 years ago does not change that they are under-fed and poor today (the 1960's), yet their passionate search for their own culture is no less legitimate for it. It is their only way to fight back against a structural violence. To establish a postcolonial society free from the three forms of violence, native culture must be legitimized (cultural) and treated equally (structural). Yet the personal battle of a native to protect his culture and identity is not one that can be won on the personal level, it is much broader. The discursive and institutional elements of postcolonialism come in then.

Edward Said focuses more on the discursive side, he identifies a discourse in Western thinking about the 'East'. This he called 'Orientalism', in his similarly named book (Said, 1979). This discourse is the fundamental difference in Western thinking between 'us' and the Oriental 'them'. It presents the Orient as a fixed and singular other (Schech & Haggis, 2000). Well known African writer Chinua Achebe presents similar criticism in his literature and essays, arguing for a more varied representation of African culture. He finishes his essay on Colonialist Criticism (Achebe, 1988) with the following hopeful words: *"No! Let every people bring their gifts to the great festival of the world's cultural harvest and mankind will be all the richer for the variety and distinctiveness of the offerings."* (Achebe, 1988, p. 75) This grasps the essence of the discursive element of postcolonialism: a call to accept the variety of the world instead of the singular Western perspective.

#### 2.1.4 Postcolonialism in the context of international intervention

Lastly, the relevant postcolonial ideas must be specified for application to the subject matter: international intervention. Several writers have critiqued the international community for the way in which they have handled intervention. Belgian theorist Jean Bricmont argues that conflict between the West and the so-called 'Third World' is not just a thing of the past (Bricmont, 2004), according to him, us-and-them relations are still crucial to this day (like those portrayed by Achebe, 1988 and Said, 1979). This point of view has given modern forms of imperialism a neo-colonial nature. The impact for the Third World is fourfold according to Bricmont. He sees not just the unnecessary victims of elongated wars in Vietnam, Congo, etc. (first impact), but a second victim: hope (second impact). When America and the international community intervene in the Third World they tend to halt progress in favour of a pro-Western government, however unstable it may prove. In that sense, the West destroys hope for the Third World by prolonging instability (often in favour of its own strategic and economic position). Thirdly, the us-and-them relation denies potential discussion, functioning as a barricade between the Third World and the West. In addition to the victims, the end of hope and the barricade for discussion, the last form of impact described by Bricmont is that imperialism leads to (economic) dependency.

The neo-colonial form of imperialism is called 'humanitarian imperialism' by Bricmont (2004), because it is often framed as if 'we' are helping 'them'. Influential writer Noam Chomsky is well known for his criticism of American imperialism. Among his many ideas is the thought that this ideal form of humanitarian aid only exists in two places: the promises of great leaders and failed examples of their execution (Chomsky, 2008). He argues like Bricmont does, that intervening in another country often leads to negative impacts for that country, especially if it is considered a Third World country.


Both Chomsky and Bricmont are exceptionally negative in their critique of American imperialism in the modern world. Their theories occasionally lack examples on the ground, remaining in the abstract high political realm. For research purposes, we must be able to identify spatially or socially, which factors make international intervention intertwined with colonial history. Derek Gregory is a writer that has looked into this, he identifies prisons and the Western view on criminals in the Third World as a physical barricade functioning as a constant reminder to colonial pasts. He argues that the Americans taking an Iraqi prisoner to Guantanamo is an equal brutality to the treatment of Indonesians by the Dutch for example (Gregory, 2007). Another physical, spatial

phenomenon described by Farish (2007) is the creation of a war landscape. This is not just the frontline where two armed forces oppose each other, but the expansion of that frontline into the everyday life of every citizen in psychological (propaganda, framing) and physical (army presence) sense.

In postcolonial conflict (however you choose to define them) the difference between a physical and psychological war landscape is specifically important. The works of Fanon (1961) have shown the importance of this psychological war landscape and we can easily identify the link between a psychological war landscape and the cultural violence defined by Galtung's (2013) negative peace. Modern-day conflict is defined more and more by a 'psychewar' instead of a physical war. With the emergence of guerrilla and terror, conflicts have repeatedly targeted what Farish (2007) defines as the 'inner landscape': the mind. This targeting is not limited to either conflicting party, while a rebel group might practice guerrilla to influence discourse and shape the psychological war landscape to their liking, the government may use propaganda or their secret service to combat this.

#### 2.2 Conceptual model

Through a conceptual modelling of theoretical ideas, the step from abstract theory to a visual and practical research is made. The conceptual model is based on an ideal image of international intervention: international intervention leads to a ceasefire (peacekeeping) and the ceasefire begins a process that eventually leads to a comprehensive peace agreement through multilateral negotiations (peacebuilding). Yet this peacebuilding process is complicated by colonial history, both its physical (structural and direct) and psychological (discursive, framing) remains. The model below illustrates this. Throughout chapters 4 and 5 one can keep this model in mind to understand the importance of every detail regarding both the colonial history and the peacebuilding process of Mali.



The conceptual model provides a preliminary answer to the research question in the form of a hypothesis. It assumes a way in which the colonial history of Mali influences the peacebuilding process based on existing theory. Existing theory shows us the difficulty of peacebuilding. While a ceasefire might bring unstable peace, an absence of physical violence, it is in no way sustainable, durable or 'positive'. This peacebuilding process is influenced by colonial history in two ways. Physically, the existing institutions and societal structures form a challenge to MINUSMA. Psychologically, the results of lingering cultural violence (which characterizes the decolonization as a whole) and the psychological war landscape are an aspect of conflict that is exceptionally difficult to grasp and control as an international actor. Based on Bricmont (2004), one would then expect a situation in which the West is unsuccessful in changing much, while prolonging instability and ending 'hope' in the process.

### 3 Methods

#### 3.1 Strategy

To answer the research questions of section 1.4. and reach the goal of section 1.3. a solid research strategy must be presented. In this section, several key methodological questions will be answered based on the work of Verschuren and Doorewaard (2007), this will determine the type of research I will practice in this thesis. The research strategy conform to that type will be explained using Creswell's(2013) comprehensive work on '*Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design*'.

The first core decision one must make is whether the goal of one's research is to broaden the knowledge base or to deepen it (Verschuren & Doorewaard, 2007). While a broad research would make general statements about peacekeeping missions and peacebuilding processes, this thesis aims to deepen the knowledge on a single mission, i.e. MINUSMA. The next decision is the one between a qualitative or quantitative approach. A quantitative research bases its conclusions on statistics and displays them using numbers, tables and graphs. A qualitative research concludes based on interpretations of texts and ideas, displayed by quotes and text. Both types of research offer significant advantages and are a viable way to study peacekeeping in postcolonial context. Yet the research questions and available data make a qualitative research preferable. Through the interpretation of various sources one can more deeply answer each sub question posed in this thesis.

Next, one may decide whether a desk research or an empirical research is more fitting to your style of research (Verschuren & Doorewaard, 2007). An empirical researcher goes out into the field to gather experience through their own senses. Sadly practical, financial and safety reasons limit me from going to Mali for this Bachelor's thesis. The alternative is a desk research, where existing information and secondary sources are utilized to answer the research questions. Through interviews with people who are and have been a part of MINUSMA and analysis of the original policy decisions (resolutions and treaties), empirical data will be gathered. Yet a desk research using secondary literature must be done in addition, since the aforementioned limitation prevent me from empirically researching the local situation. In the end the combination of empirical and desk research will lead to the optimal answer to the research question. More information on the research material will follow in section 3.2.

These three core decisions logically lead to one research strategy that most optimally fits this thesis. Creswell (2013) names the following five methods of qualitative research: narrative research, phenomenological research, grounded theory research, ethnographic research and case study research.

Narrative research focusses on stories and experiences, while phenomenological research studies on phenomena and how their participants experience that phenomenon in particular. Both these methods have definite merits, especially when researching for example the history of the Tuareg people or the way a community experienced the conflict. Yet their scope is too limited to create a comprehensive analysis of the UN mission in Mali. Grounded theory research aims to generate a theory to explain a process or action, it is fitted more to a broad style of research, while I aim to deepen the knowledge on MINUSMA. Ethnographic research aims to describe a culture-sharing group and its behavior (Creswell, 2013). Therefore it is less useful in this thesis' analysis of an organization and the processes of peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

The last type of qualitative research is best fitted to the goal and questions of this thesis. It is the case study research. Creswell (2013) defines the case study methodology as following:

"Case study research is a qualitative approach in which the investigator explores a real-life, contemporary bounded system (a case) [...] over time, through detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of information" (Creswell, 2013, p. 97)

MINUSMA is a single and contemporary case. To significantly contribute to the ideas surrounding peace building in Mali, data collection from a variety of sources is more fitting than for example the narrative-based approach above. One can also do a case study involving multiple cases. However I consider the complexity of a post-colonial conflict far too great to attempt a multiple case study in the span of only half a year. To fully comprehend and respect the nuances of Mali's conflict a single case study is beneficial. All collected data will come together to form a case description and an analysis in which patterns are recognized. The researcher may develop "*naturalistic generalizations*" (Creswell, 2013, p. 200) from the case based on these patterns and their interpretation, yet these are limited by the external validity of the research (see below).

Case selection is vital in a case study research. The intent of this research is to specifically focus on postcolonial aspects of conflict. Therefore the case of MINUSMA was not chosen for its uniqueness (an *intrinsic* case) but because it allows understanding of a specific issue (an *instrumental* case). The sub questions ensure that a holistic analysis of MINUSMA is done, which includes both the context of the case (chapter 4) and a within-case analysis (chapter 5). One must always be mindful of certain challenges to research methods. Creswell (2013) names the challenge of case selection, but also the boundary of a case. Throughout this thesis the researcher must constantly remind himself that the peacebuilding process in Mali has recently grown much wider than just the MINUSMA mission, yet the boundaries of the case must be well-defined and kept in mind.

#### 3.1.1 Validity & Reliability

In every research the validity and reliability of the results are crucial, they define whether or not the research is actually legitimate in stating its conclusions. Yet because every research is influenced by its researcher, the participants and the social contexts of the data collection, validity and reliability are never guaranteed. In qualitative research the instrument of data gathering and interpretation is often the researcher himself, making it increasingly important to consider these concepts (Brink, 1993).

The validity of a research defines the accuracy of its findings. There are two types of validity, defined by Brink (1993) as following:

"Internal validity is the term used to refer to the extent to which research findings are a true reflection or representation of reality rather than being the effects of extraneous variables. External validity addresses the degree or extent to which such representations or reflections of reality are legitimately applicable across groups." (Brink, 1993, p. 35)

Since a case study as described above combines multiple sources to create an in-depth understanding of the case, the internal validity of such a research method is high. Yet the question of external validity is difficult. MINUSMA was defined as an instrumental case, so the results of this research must be applicable across different postcolonial cases of conflict and peacekeeping. However since this is a single case study, one must keep in mind the low external validity of its results. Although postcolonial conflicts, especially those in Africa and Francophone Africa, share several characteristics on an abstract level, their unique situation must always be respected. Only a limited amount of lessons can be transferred from this case to another as a result of the chosen research method.

The reliability of a research defines its consistently and repeatability. If one were to replicate this research, would the results be the same? While the consistent and proper use of the chosen research method leads to a certain level of repeatability, one must constantly realize how reliant a

qualitative case study is on the social context and time, the situation in Mali develops constantly and the respondents and primary data change their ideas accordingly.

Because of the importance of interpretation and nuance in this branch of research, Brink (1993) adds that some qualitative researchers avoid the terms validity and reliability in favor of terms such as creditability, trustworthiness or confirmability. Yet this terms are less well-defined and their usage is less widespread.

#### 3.2 Material

Section 3.1. elaborated on the strategy of this research, while shortly mentioning the material required to complete this strategy. A case study requires the collection of data from a variety of sources in order to establish an in-depth understanding of the case. To establish this, the research will ensure a triangulation of sources. Secondary literature, official policy papers of the United Nations and expert interviews will be utilized to ensure varied sources of information are combined.

Policy papers tend to be riddled in official language, which may not always accurately represent the feel of the situation on the ground. To counteract this bias towards official language and umbrella statements, the experiences of those experts that have visited Mali for both professional and personal reasons will introduce this sense of feeling and individuality. Yet individuals are limited to their own experience. Secondary literature adds a third layer by functioning as a compilation of information and offering comprehensive information on issues such as history and theory, that neither the official papers nor the experiences of experts can provide. The first two sub questions lend themselves to a mostly descriptive style, based directly on the literature. Creswell (2013) emphasizes the importance of facts in a case study, yet they must be combined with analysis to truly increase scientific understanding. Therefore the following four sub questions are of a more analytical nature in which the official policy papers are interpreted based on the experiences of interviewees. The interaction between policy and experience creates an interesting balance throughout chapter 5.

The secondary literature used throughout this thesis comes from a variety of sources, including the fields of geography, anthropology, history and political science. Not limiting oneself to a single disciple is the key to a thorough understanding of a case, since it allows a holistic view. The used literature will be referred to in the APA style (Poelmans & Severijnen, 2013) and listed in the Literature section at the end. All official documents of the United Nations regarding MINUSMA and the situation in Mali are compiled by the 'Security Council Report' and are publicly available on the internet. The used documents will be listed in the Official Documents section separately from the literary sources. They will be organized by the UN organ that they are published by. The relevant UN organs for this thesis are the Security Council and the General Assembly. The technical office Department of Public Information will also be used for their press releases.

Interviewing is an art in itself. Creswell (2013) provides several pieces of advice in conducting interviews. Interviews can be done in a one-on-one format or a focus group. For the interviews used in this case study, the questions mostly concern their personal experiences. Since the interviewees come from a variety of backgrounds, the one-on-one type of interview is most fitting in acquiring this information. Two of the six interviews will be held via Skype, since geographical locations made a one-on-one interview hard to execute. In such cases, Skype is the closest one can get to emulating the situation of a personal interview (Creswell, 2013), as the visual aspect of Skype in comparison to a simple telephone call prevents body language from being lost. The presence of body language helps in the interpretation of information and allows the interviewer to more easily recognize when furthering questioning is welcomed. Interviews will be recorded using the default voice recorder of an Android phone. The two interviews that are done via Skype will be recorded using the free trial version of Skype extension 'Evaer'. The downside of the free trial is that recordings are saved in segments of only five minutes. Several words or even a complete sentences will be lost in the

transition from file to file. This inconsistency of technology is a weakness that will not impact the overall piece.

The interviews will be held in a semi-structured fashion. While a structured interview leads to very exact information, the semi-structured interview allows the interviewer to take the role of the listener and allow the interview to be steered by the stories and experiences of the interviewee. To achieve this an interview guide was created, which starts off with five to six general questions that every interviewee can answer and at least two role specific questions based on the function and expertise of the interviewee. These questions should fill the first half of the one hour interview, while the experiences of the interviewee guide the rest. The interview guide brings a level of structure to the interview, in order to ensure material is easily comparable while still providing the space to allow interviewees to share their experience. The interview guides can be found in appendix B.

Several of the six respondents asked for the information to be treated anonymously as a result of the sensitivity of the political information. To ensure equal treatment of the respondents, they will all be treated anonymously. Their initials will be used to refer to them. I ask the reader to accept the anonymity of the interviewees and trust the following description of their function and expertise:

- K.: German researcher. She is in the process of writing a PhD thesis on the SSR processes in the Malian peace process. Spent the summer of 2015 in Mali for field work.
- **G.**: German researcher. He has done extensive anthropological fieldwork with the Tuareg and other nomad people of West Africa for several decades. He is a professor of African Ethnology
- M.: Employee of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He coordinates Dutch affairs with the Sahel, including but not limited to Mali. He has previous experience doing field work in Mali and has worked with MINUSMA since its inception.
- A.: Employee of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Advises the Dutch parliament on their decisions regarding Mali. Returned from Mali less than a week before the interview, after assisting the Dutch Embassy in Bamako for a visit of Koenders.
- J.: Member of the Dutch Air Force. Spent four months in 2015 in Mali as part of MINUSMA. Specialized in logistics and provided food for the Dutch army camp as part of a team of 35 international employees.
- **B.**: Member of the Dutch Special Forces. Spent four months in early 2016 in Mali as the commander of the Special Operations Land Task Group. Returned from Mali at the end of April 2016.

As seen above, three types of experts were chosen. The first two are researchers who witnessed MINUSMA as outsiders of the mission, yet experts of the local social and political context. Their insights add to the answering of the research question by providing a critical eye on the actions of the international community. The second two are members of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, they have regular contact and full insight on the civil branch of the mission. The experience of those who maintain professional contacts within Mali and MINUSMA are crucial in a better understanding of the political situation of the country. The last two respondents have been dispatched as part of the military branch of MINUSMA. The information they can provide on the inner working of MINUSMA, the communication between MINUSMA and the local population and the developments they witnessed over their four month stay are vital elements in all parts of the research process. Through the combination of these six stories with the official papers of the UN and plenty secondary literature, ample material exists to create a comprehensive and in-depth understanding of MINUSMA.

Throughout the thesis, these respondents will be referred to by their initial. Their initials are unique, but should the reader be confused, please refer to this list in section 3.2. to recall the expertise of whoever is quoted.

## 4 Case description

In this section the first and second sub questions will be discussed:

- How did the colonial history of Mali lead to the current conflict?
- What is the current situation of the conflict when it comes to peacekeeping?

To comprehensively answer these, the chapter is divided into a history of Mali and an overview of current facts and figures. Section 4.1 will discuss the recent history of Mali starting in pre-colonial times and moving deliberately towards the period of decolonization, which for Mali includes the years between 1946 and 1968. Firstly the history will be retold based primarily on the work of Baz Lecocq (2010), his book '*Disputed Desert: Decolonisation, Competing Nationalisms and Tuareg Rebellions in Northern Mali*' is the perfect starting point to discuss the regularly hostile relations between the Tuareg people and the Malian government. The history will not be geographically limited to Mali, because the Tuareg people are historically nomad and inhabit an area ranging from Mauritania in the west, to Niger in the east. Additionally, it is important to know the geopolitical context of France and the Sahara and Sahel regions to fully understand why Mali's history unfolded as it did.

Following the retelling of history the next section will delve into the root causes beneath the hostile relation throughout the recurring rebellions of Northern Mali, eventually leading to the 2012 crisis. The report by Grégory Chauzal and Thibault van Damme for the Clingendael Institute *'The Roots of Mali's conflict: Moving beyond the 2012 crisis'* will be among the primary sources for this section. Knowing only why things unfolded as they did is not enough though. In section 4.2 the focus will shift from history to a description of fact and figures of the contemporary conflict. This includes the variety of actors in Mali and all the details of international peacekeeping efforts. Section 4.2 ends the moment MINUSMA arrives, since its mandate, methods and results are treated in chapter 5. Alongside secondary literature, primary sources such as the UN's own policy papers will be utilized.

#### 4.1 History of Mali

#### 4.1.1 General overview

Mali is known to have a rich history reaching deep into pre-colonial times. The empire of Mali was a great powerhouse in the Western Sahara throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth century, most notably under Mansa Kanku Musa, a leader now elevated to a mythological status. This empire ranged from the Atlantic coast in the west to Gao and Timbuktu in the east (Ly-tall, 1984, p. 173). It controlled trade with the Arabs of the north through the Niger and Gambia rivers. However it included a large variety of ethnicities, as empires of that time often did. At a higher level of abstraction one could divide it into: the Berber and Arab groups in North Africa and the Mandé people of West Africa. The Mandingo people of Mali's fourteenth and fifteenth century empire are a member of het Mandé family (Ly-Tall, 1984). Yet we must continually realise that this region of Africa is incredibly diverse and many ethnic groups exist within the larger families, many of which are geographically dispersed or nomadic.

Towards the end of the fifteenth century the Malian empire faced several threats. In its Western reaches, Malian authority was under pressure by the Fulani. The Fula are a nomadic people spread throughout West Africa (Ndukwe, 1996). A Fulani ruling family took control of a large territory of the Malian empire in what we now know as Guinea. Meanwhile, to the east of the empire, the Berber peoples of the Tuareg and Songhay rebelled and were militarily superior over Mali. This

proved to be very advantageous to the Tuareg and Songhay, who now controlled vital parts of the Saharan salt- and gold trade routes (Ly-Tall, 1984).

The late fifteenth century and the sixteenth century specifically brought a new player into the political game. The arrival of European merchants proved to be the final nail in the coffin for Mali's empire. The Portuguese quickly succeeded in converting the Mansa (political leader) to Christianity, leading to internal conflict with the animistic and Muslim chiefs. Meanwhile the gold trade fell out of Mandingo hands and many of them migrated southwards to find more profitable products (Ly-Tall, 1984, p. 185-186).

Stories of the empire and its power are still retold and form an essential aspect of Malian nationalism. In an interview with respondent M., he recalls his regular visits to Mali and considers the national pride a common trait of people in the South:

"[...] in Mali the feeling of national pride [...] is very strong. It is a proud people, they have of course had a great empire in the past, the empire of Mali in what was the Middle Ages for us, you still encounter stories about it on a daily basis." (M., personal communication, 22-04-2016)

However, much of Mali's recent history is characterized primarily by colonialism and the decolonization process separating them from France. Despite the intricate histories of the region in the period between the empire and now, we will simply note that following the decline of the Malian empire and departure of many of the Mandingo, two things happened. The Bambara, a Mandé people, became the dominant ethnic group in the southern parts of what we now know as Mali (Ly-Tall, 1984). The Berber peoples took over much of the Sahara trading and under the rule of the Songhay, Northern Mali became an important economic and religious hub for Islamic scholars, mostly concentrated in Timbuktu, Djenné and Gao (Cissoko, 1984).

Throughout the history retold so far, the differences between Berbers and Arabs on the one side and the Mandé on the other has been constantly returning. While not every conflict can be defined purely on ethnic terms, we must remember the importance of these differences as we explore the decolonization process. When France entered the fray in the late 19th century, they found the Songhay empire broken down by pressure from the Tuareg and other Saharan peoples from the north, it continued to exist as a small kingdom in modern-day Niger, yet was in no state to defend against France. Meanwhile, the Tuareg continued to roam northern Mali while the southern and western parts of the ancient empire were fragmented into smaller states and kingdoms. Klute and Lecocq (2013) state that *"This political space [lands of the Tuareg] was among the last part of Africa to be colonized. Most Tuareg groups put up heavy resistance against colonial conquerors and were able to repeatedly defeat French expeditions."* It was eventually colonized in the early twentieth century, but Tuareg federations remained in active revolt.

French presence brought forced changes to the society of the nomadic Tuareg. Traditionally they have always been divided in a clan-based fashion. An example of such a clan is the 'Adagh n Ifoghas', living in a mountain range known as Ifoghas (Lecocq, 2010, p. 2). The Tuareg are united by their language 'Tamasheq'. Throughout his anthropological work, Lecocq (2010) refers to them not as Tuareg, but as 'Kel Tamasheq', which in their own language means as much as "speakers of the Tamasheq language". Throughout his work he focuses on *"internal debates about political changes within Tamasheq society [...]. These debates focus on new political structures introduced into Tamasheq society from outside – such as the colonial bureaucratic administration, post-independence socialist one-party state, nationalism, and multi-party democracy"* (Lecocq, 2010, p. 3).

Tuareg society was hierarchical and this has been a controversial issue in both the colonial power and internal politics. The holders of power aim to conserve it, while forces from within and without aim to change the handling of slaves and workmen. The hierarchy includes nobility at the top, followed in rank by Tuareg workmen and completed at the bottom by slaves of foreign and black descent (Lecocq, 2010). Slavery was ethnically characterized, in which the Mandé people were often

captured and held as a slaves. The French abolished slavery in its colonies in 1905, however it only indirectly ruled most of Northern Mali. Army officials were appointed and they practiced irregular contact with a local chief for tax collection and infrequent inspections. It was not until the 1940's that slaves were emancipated. France had successfully changed the functioning of Tuareg society, yet Lecocq (2010) emphasizes that we should not simply see the hierarchy as the French did (free vs slave). Instead he proposes to see it as three different oppositions: free-unfree; strong-weak; lineage-no lineage. Abolishment of slavery did not necessarily mean a full shift of Tuareg society to fit into the French and mostly black elite of the southern areas of Mali, most notably Bamako.

Starting in 1946 a long decolonization process took off. Malian independence was not decided in war, but was a peaceful and bureaucratic process. It started with a restyling of the colonial empire into a French Union in West Africa, however few of the organizations and institutions of post-World War II lasted long. The Communauté Française followed up the French Union in 1958, giving states the chance to vote out of this partial dependency (Lecocq, 2010, p. 43). Guinea was famously the only country to do so. The indirect rule and partial dependencies created through these institutions was considered by much of the African elite as a divide and rule technique. The unions rarely discussed territorial demarcations or how to handle ethnical differences. A debated topic of France in the 50's and 60's was the Sahel area; where did the Sahara end and the Soudan begin (Lecocq, 2010)? The Soudan is derived from the Arabic word 'Bilâd as-Sudân' (literally: Land of the Blacks), yet as we have seen in the histories above here, there is no static border to define where the Berber land ends and the land of the blacks begins, instead this demarcation has been historically contested. This led to a situation where the Tuareg people are divided between five different postcolonial states: Algeria, Burkina Faso, Libya, Mali and Niger (Klute & Lecocq, 2013). The institutions of the French Union and Communauté Française brought no solution to the territorial and ethnic issues of West Africa and neither did the French Ministry of Saharan Affairs (established in 1957).

Perhaps these institutions existed to keep the colonies connected to France as long as possible. Throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century more and more mineral riches were discovered, mostly in Algeria and Libya, alongside many existing salt and gold mines throughout the Sahara and Sahel regions. Giving France ample reason to remain politically involved.

As a result of these divide and rule tactics and a lack of political progress, a short lived declaration of independence occurred in 1960 when the Mali Federation was born, with a capital in Dakar (Lecocq, 2010). However, modern-day Mali has existed only since 1968. It includes the capital of Bamako in the south and the historic cities of Djenné, Gao and Timbuktu in the center and northern regions, alongside endless deserts where the nomadic Tuareg still live. The Tuareg were very rarely involved in the post-World War II politics. Lecocq (2010) mentions that this is attributed both to a lack of understanding and a lack of interest. However, historically there has always been a passive interest in the political arena from within the Kel Tamasheq, strongest of which in Mali, but the Tuareg of Niger also entertain secessionist ideas (Klute & Lecocg, 2013). There was not universal suffrage till 1956 though, and on the country side of Mali only a small percentage turned up to vote. The lack of understanding of politics can be attributed to a lack of information on elections throughout the widespread countryside and deserts of the Sahel. Yet lack of interest might not be a legitimate argument, since voting happened during rainy season, when neither farmers nor nomads had time for politics, while they generally did portray a certain interest in the political arena. Lecocq (2010) bases these arguments on differences in political activity in the Niger Bend, a populated area, and the mountainous north, where populations are spread out and nomadic.

Post-independence Mali was ruled firstly by the regime of Modibo Keita (Lecocq, 2010), not to be confused with Ibrahim Keita, the current president of Mali. Malian politics were mostly characterized by a Marxist socialism. Education was increased nationwide, though it heavily propagated socialist values (Lecocq, 2010). Tuareg society was considered too hierarchical once again and many traditional chiefs were ousted. The widespread north of Mali was divided into administrative fractions in which a chief had limited autonomy over a large group of people. This system was eerily

similar to the French divide and rule tactics Africa criticized just twenty years earlier. The system was not democratized and popularized until 1990.

Alongside the political agenda of Keita, there was also an enormous need for investments in infrastructure and economy. The five year plan that was established aimed to connect the southern regions of Bamako to the north with regional airports and creation of a regional railway connection to Conakry (Guinea) was proposed. However the economic policy of Mali's first independent regime was insufficient to support such investments. Meanwhile the North was unsatisfied by the administrative system that they viewed as far too similar to the colonial time (Lecocq, 2010). Altogether the first years of Malian independence paved the path towards future instability, as many structural problems remained in the country and the region, whilst the political agenda simultaneously aimed to build a nation through nationalism, historical pride and socialist ideals. The next section will further explore the structural problems within Mali up to 2012.

#### 4.1.2 Root causes of conflict

Following the relatively peaceful decolonization of Mali, the Tuareg were involved in an insurgency in 1963. One of the Tuareg clans (the Adagh n Ifoghas, previously mentioned as an example) rebelled against inclusion in the postcolonial state of Mali. This rebellion has an important place in the historical narrative of the Tuareg (Lecocq, 2010). Lecocq considers it the root of the 1990 uprising. In this section the hostile relations between the Tuareg and the Malian state will be described and seen as a driving force behind the 2012 crisis. Following a description of the conflicts of recent history, the work of Chauzal and Van Damme (2015) will be utilized to create a relatively comprehensive summary of the root causes and driving forces behind the recurring conflicts in Mali.

The 1963 insurgency did not succeed in its goals, but by the name of 'Alfellaga' (literal translation: The Rebellion) it has an important place in Tuareg society. Their historical discourse "emphasizes a continuum of resistance against foreign domination" (Lecocq, 2010, p. 153), which had started already in colonial times and has never stopped since, up to and including the recent events of 2012. In 1975 a movement going by the name of 'Tanekra' started preparations for a renewed uprising.

The 70's and the 80's were a period of great drought in Mali. For the Kel Tamasheq this meant that their pastoral livelihood was no longer guaranteed and many had to give up their old lifestyle in favour of an urban life. Among the Tuareg this was reason for great distrust of the regime in Bamako, they were blamed for *"taking the opportunity to settle 'the nomad problem' once and for all"* (Lecocq, 2010, p. 200). These rumours were never confirmed, yet questions were asked on whether the national government really distributed aid equally and did all that it could to help the nomadic Tuareg. The Tanekra movement emerged in these times of unrest and unhappiness.

In their (the Tanekra) ideas, Lecocq (2010) recognises three key elements. Firstly, territory was an important concept to them. This was new, because the Kel Tamasheq were historically united not by territory (they were nomads), but by their common language, culture and (occasionally fictive) blood ties, yet the Tanekra realised how important it was to be territorially bound to strengthen their position. Secondly, there was a feeling of revenge, which had always been a crucial in the Tuareg culture, which was so focused on the strong over the weak. Tanekra wanted to *"avenge the wrongdoings of the state."* (Lecocq, 2010, p. 193), which links clearly to the third element: the legacy of the Keita Regime. The Tanekra were heavily against the changes proposed and made by the first postcolonial regime, the results of which have already been shortly mentioned in the section above.

The emergence of the Tanekra movement did not lead instantaneously to violent conflict. Violence re-emerged in 1990, when a new rebellion led Mali into a six year conflict. The initial months were characterized by active fighting by a group of armed rebels, which won several victories over the Malian army. They were about 200 in number and operated mostly through guerrilla techniques (Klute & Lecocq, 2013). Towards the end of 1990 the Malian army took heavy losses and the rebel group grew in strength. There was negotiations and a ceasefire in 1991. This ceasefire lasted three years and was characterized mostly by internal conflicts in both sides of the rebellion, alongside constantly renewed negotiations aimed at a comprehensive peace agreement (Lecocq,

2010). The rebel group Popular Movement of Azawad (MPA), Azawad being the Tamasheq word for the Tuareg homeland, was among the biggest, but saw itself crumble and was threatened by a variety of smaller groups with varying goals. One of the efforts of the ceasefire period was in the field of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), respondent K. does research to the modern-day DDR process and specifically mentioned the failure in the 90's. Attempts were made to integrate former rebels in the Malian national army, but after the training period many of these rebels deserted and rejoined existing movements or formed their own well-trained units (K., personal communication, 22-04-2016). Hostilities restarted in 1994, when several ex-army officers joined together to combat rebel forces in the area of Gao and the Niger bend (Lecocq, 2010). What had changed was that a group of Songhay rebels had mobilized along the Niger river and carried out regular attacks against the Tuareg of Northern Mali. However much of Northern Mali's population had become war weary and reconciliatory meetings among different ethnic groups occurred after the ex-army officers managed to hold the Songhay for some time (Klute & Lecocq, 2013). This eventually lead to a solemn ceremony and peace pact on March 26<sup>th</sup>, 1996.

Based on the history so far, we can identify several underlying causes for recurring conflict in Mali. They can be roughly categorized into three distinct types: those related to identity, ethnicity and nationalism, those related to historical discourse and previous rebellions and a last category that has been barely mentioned so far: the influence of foreign actors and geopolitical interests.

The first category of issues has been emphasized throughout the whole history of Mali: ethnicity. The differences between the Mandé, the Berbers and Arabs are a constantly recurring theme in the history of the Sahara and Sahel region. During French colonialism these differences were emphasized further: *"The French Regime in the Niger bend was fundamentally structured along lines of racial difference."* (Hall, in Harmon, 2016, p. 6). While the French controlled most of southern Mali, the Tuareg remained their primary opposition until at least 1912. The French considered themselves to have a mission to civilize the French Sahara, but failed to infiltrate the people of the mountains and deserts in Northern Mali. As a result, several Northern warlords gained a special position in the relation with France. Their support was needed for the military and political legitimacy of France in the North, making France consciously overlook Berber people exploiting blacks as slaves. Harmon (2016, p. 18) describes the result of this policy as following: *"the image of "white" Tuareg and Bidan dominating "black" servants persevered throughout the colonial period."* Bidan in this quote refers to the white Arabs in the Sahara. Ethnic and racial differences in the Sahara-Sahel border area are ancient and were only strengthened through divide and rule tactics of the colonial and postcolonial era (Lecocq, 2010; Harmon, 2016).

Secondly, the history of rebellion of the Tuareg creates a vicious circle of conflict. The continuum of resistance quoted at the start of this section drives itself. This discourse in the Tuareg narrative has never been broken down, as DDR processes failed in the past (K., personal communication, 20-04-2016). Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration is a key process in peacebuilding, yet it is also a complicated task worthy of its own research (E.g. K., personal communication, 20-04-2016; Knight & Özerdem, 2004). Knight & Özerdem's influential article on DDR shows a variety of examples where insufficient execution of DDR has blocked the way to long-term peace. Mali appears to be a new addition to this list.

To break the cycle of violence, current peacebuilding efforts should aim to significantly reduce the amount of illegal weaponry in the north of Mali whilst simultaneously reintegrating the Tuareg into Mali. Knight and Özerdem (2004, p. 501) describe a successful DDR process as following:

"The efficient implementation of the DDR programme can reassure belligerent parties of the possibility of a permanent cessation of hostilities, as they are often the most visible element of the peace agreement. Moreover, a well-planned and flexible reintegration process can also promote the viability of long-term peace locally, nationally and internationally."

However, we must also realise that reintegration of the Tuareg into Malian society is squarely against their own goals. How can one reintegrate when integration has never even happened before. The continued rebellions since decolonization have grown worse in intensity and Klute and Lecocq (2013, p. 430) state that *"The MNLA [Mouvement National de Libération de l'Azawad] is the first Tuareg separatist movement to declare openly that its objective is an independent state of Azawad, and it has adopted explicitly nationalist symbols, such as a national flag."* While DDR is a crucial development to break down the driving forces behind recurring conflict and move towards a long term stability, we must also take notice of the Tuareg and their ideals and realise that it may not be a viable strategy to counter the situation.

Lastly, international actors have played a crucial role in Mali's conflicts in a variety of ways. Both the rebelling parties and the side of the government are influenced by foreign forces. The involvement of international terrorist groups with Malian rebel groups has been a point of discussion for many. Chauzal and Van Damme (2015) speak of *"deep divisions between secular and separatist movements (such as the MNLA) and radical Islamic groups with strong links to international terrorist coalitions and foreign sponsors (the case of Ansar Dine)"* (Chauzal & Van Damme, 2015, p. 52). In other words, within the rebelling groups of the North, some are supported by international terrorist coalitions, among which Ansar Dine and Al Qaeda in Maghreb (AQIM) are two primary organizations. After the Arab Spring a large amount of weaponry found its way into Mali via these terrorist links. Meanwhile, the Malian government has close ties to France, which intervened rapidly when Mali was at a risk of being overrun in 2012 (M., personal communication, 22-04-2016; Klute & Lecocq, 2013).

Apart from direct influences of international actors in the conflict, there is also the issue of mediation. Mediation between the parties of Mali's conflict is done by international actors, varying from leaders of neighboring countries to international organizations. In the early phases (2012- early 2013) of the conflict several mediators operated simultaneously or quickly following each other, these represented a variety of international organizations such as ECOWAS, the African Union and the United Nations, Chauzal & Van Damme (2015, p. 53) argue that the lack of coordination between international actors in this early phase of the conflict *"indirectly helped to change the nature of the Malian conflict."* Malian authorities lacked the strength to keep internationally funded Islamist groups under control, the Malian president was in France for medical treatment and the situation was altogether worsening (Chauzal & Van Damme, 2015). As the 2012 crisis started, the conflict rapidly internationalized in a way that the previous conflicts in Mali had not.

Why then is such a variety of actors interested in Mali? Based on Chauzal & Van Damme (2015) and Lecocq (2010) several different reasons can be assembled. As mentioned before, the Kel Tamasheq or Tuareg people are spread over five postcolonial states. With the MNLA in Mali came the first time any Tuareg group concretely stated their desire of independence, yet many feelings of community, kinship and pride are not limited to geopolitical borders (Klute & Lecocq, 2013). The 'Tanekra' mentioned in the previous section is an example of this. This movement planned a continuation of the 1963 'Alfellaga' rebellion and operated in Algeria as well as Mali. It was eventually found out by Algerian Secret Service, which consequently informed Malian Secret Service and led to the failure and eventual delay of the movement's plans (Lecocq, 2010, p. 234-235).

This is one reason for the governments of neighbouring states and regional powers. Another reason is that throughout the history of repeated conflict in Mali, Northern Malians fled the country to Algeria and Libya (Chauzal & Van Damme, 2015). An example of this was the time when armed Songhay groups forced out many Tuareg people from the Niger Bend at the end of the 1990's conflict. Due to migration patterns in the region, the people of neighbouring countries are connected, and governments are equally connected. In the 21st century this has developed further and Europe has gotten increasingly involved in the so-called refugee crises of North Africa and the Middle East. Mere days before I spoke to respondent A., he was in Mali to assist the Dutch embassy in Bamako while Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bert Koenders, made a visit to discuss migration policies (A., personal communication, 22-04-2016). As time continues, North Africa and Europe will be increasingly connected on a personal and political level.

On a more abstract level, Mali is involved in a geopolitical chess game. The countries of North- and West Africa are competing to be the most powerful actor in the Sahara and Sahel region, with France involved in these geopolitics from a distance. The influence of such power plays are hardly measureable. Lecocq (2010) mentions in his book how geopolitics is for a large portion simply an issue of framing. More and more the geopolitical field in the Sahara and Sahel is defined by the clash between radical Islam and Western ideas, but we must continually question whether or not this is actually a day-to-day problem or a frame used to shape the way the international community intervenes. It is however undeniable that Islamist ideas have become increasingly relevant in the latest conflict in Northern Mali. This trend was described by nearly all expert interviews (K., personal communication, 20-04-2016; M. & A., personal communication, 22-04-2016; B., personal communication, 16-05-2016).

To sum it up, there is a variety of driving forces leading slowly to the moment in 2012 when the MNLA fought for the independence of their homeland Azawad and armed groups attacked key cities of Southern and Central Mali. Firstly, ethnic differences between- and nationalist ideas of both the Mandé people of the south and the Tuareg in the north. Secondly, failed DDR processes of the past and a distinct lack of successful peacebuilding and (re)integration after previous conflicts has led to what I call a cycle of conflict. Lastly, international actors are heavily involved in handling the conflict since its beginning for a variety of reasons, they influence the shaping of the conflict both directly and indirectly.

#### 4.2 Current situation and key facts

After discussing the history of Mali in depth, the next step is to know exactly what is happening on the ground today. While the previous section 4.1. provided a plethora of background information to keep in mind when discussing Mali, the Tuareg and the 2012 rebellion, this section aims to summarize the contemporary facts and figures. Chauzal & Van Damme summarize the key moments of recent Malian history in the following figure for their Clingendael report:

1990-1996: Second Tuareg rebellion
1991: Tamanrasset agreements
1992: National pact
1996: Cérémonie des flammes de la paix
2006-2009: Third Tuareg rebellion

2006: Algiers agreements
2009: Sebha agreements (Libya)

2011: Creation of the MNLA
January 2012: Beginning of the fourth Tuareg rebellion
22 March 2012: Military coup in Bamako
April-May 2012: Islamist take-over of the rebellion

Figure 5: Timeline of Mali's recent history in Chauzal & Van Damme (2015, p. 11)

The Mouvement National de Libération de l'Azawad (MNLA) is a crucial actor in the unification of Tuareg forces in Northern Mali. It was formed in October 2011 by Tuareg exiles in Libya and gathered a variety of scattered Tuareg communities throughout Northern Mali (Chauzal &Van Damme, 2015). These include but are not limited to, remnants of the rebellion in the 90's, where the MPA fell apart.

Not all of the key figures of the 1996 peace pact are still trusted by the Tuareg community, since several of them radicalized and were involved with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). As a result of the radicalization of a relatively large group of Arabs and Tuareg, the MNLA was unsuccessful in keeping together the movement and fight for a single independent Azawad. The Islamist Tuareg united in a new organization called Ansar Dine (also referred to by its Arabic name 'Anṣār ad-Dīn' or 'Ansar Edine'). Chauzal and Van Damme (2015, p. 11) describe the founding of Ansar Dine as following:

"[...] a new Tuareg group called Ansar Dine was created, led by Iyad ag Ghali. Contrary to the MNLA's military and political commanders, Iyad ag Ghali had a long and varied role in Mali's history of rebellions, of particular note is his alleged collusion with the Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) movement."

In their interviews, respondents described this as a turning point for the conflict, because it was a transition from a north versus south type of conflict to a much more complex conflict. Much like during the ceasefire of 1992, in early 2012 Northern Mali found itself in a situation where different actors were fighting among themselves. Some, like Ansar Dine, sponsored by international terrorist networks, most notably AQIM and the Movement for Oneness and the Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) and others acting purely for Tuareg independence, like MNLA and smaller splinter groups. Respondent B. explained how during his time in Mali as part of the military branch of MINUSMA, he would recognize the different organization by their flags (B., personal communication, 16-05-2016).

While the above occurred in Northern Mali, the Malian army found itself incapable of stopping the advancing Tuareg. This led to unrest in the capital Bamako, where people were unsatisfied by the government's response to this direct threat. As a result, president Amadou Toumani Touré was expelled from his position by a military coup (by his own army) in March 2012 (Chauzal & Van Damme, 2015; Francis, 2013). The variety of groups in the North saw their opportunity and seized it. As the political crisis enveloped Bamako, the MNLA and Ansar Dine saw a short period of alliance in which they declared the Independent State of Azawad in Northern Mali. The military junta was far from capable of ruling Mali and soon a new president was assigned: Dioncounda Traoré (Francis, 2013). However, disagreement continued in Bamako, while the MNLA and Ansar Dine were rapidly taking over key cities in the North, including Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal (Francis, 2013). Ansar Dine being exceptionally strong, started to establish Sharia law in what they called the Islamic State of Azawad, most notably in the city of Timbuktu, which was mentioned in section 4.1. as once being a progressive hub for Islam scholasticism. Respondents M. and G. both have extensive histories with research, field work and professional experience in Mali, they look back at this time in the summer of 2012 as the deepest Mali has sunk in all its rebellions (personal communication, 22-04-2016; 02-05-2016). At this point, Mali is simultaneously in three types of conflict, Francis (2013) considers the political realm (military coup in Bamako), the secessionist ideas of the MNLA (nationalist aspect) and the religious aspect of Ansar Dine and its sponsors AQIM and MUJAO.

Where then, was the international community in all of this? This deep point is the moment Bamako called out for help and France successfully intervened with an initial deployment of 200 specialized troops in Northern Mali (Francis, 2013). M. fears that if they had not intervened at that time, Bamako might have been seized and Mali would have been driven even further into an impossible corner (M., personal communication, 22-04-2016). This short term success of the French transitioned into French initiative in the Security Council to establish a robust mission in Mali (Francis, 2013). This became known as the African-Led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA), officially mandated in resolution 2085 of the United Nations Security Council. This resolution starts with the iconic words: *"Reaffirming its [the UN's] strong commitment to the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Mali"* (UN Security Council, 2012, p. 1).

Francis' (2013) analysis of the French intervention in Mali for the Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre provides ample information to write a short timeline of interventions throughout the conflict. The first steps in international intervention in Mali are taken by regional organizations African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). In response to the military coup in Bamako, they attempted to mobilize international response (Francis, 2013; Van Vliet, 2014). They succeeded in the establishment of an interim government (led by Traoré) through negotiations mediated by Blaise Compaore, the former president of Burkina Faso. Next, the AU, UN and ECOWAS joined together to discuss the possibility of military intervention. However the situation in Mali deteriorated so rapidly that the response of these international organizations was too slow. France took the initiative to send military help first and continued to spur the Security Council for rapid response. On December 20<sup>th</sup> of 2012 the United Nations deployed AFISMA, article 9 of resolution 2085 sets out the mandate of the mission (UN Security Council, 2012, p. 4). It emphasizes rebuilding of the Malian army, retaking control of lost ground in the North and supporting the government in providing humanitarian assistance in all parts of Mali.

Just four months later, resolution 2100 was signed by the Security Council (2013a). It decided in article 7 that AFISMA would transfer its responsibilities to a new UN mission by July 2013. This was the start of the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), which was far more robust. All six interviewees of this research agreed that the mandate is (too) broad and highly ambitious. MINUSMA is a long term goal not just to bring a ceasefire, but to stabilize and solve the conflict through a multi-dimensional approach. In other words, MINUSMA is not a purely military intervention, it is an intervention on the civil (political) level supported by a military presence which protects the people and guarantees stability. In article 12 it is decided that MINUSMA will be composed of up to 11.200 military personnel (UN Security Council, 2013). This is purely the military branch, the mission as a whole includes a large civil office in Bamako and over a thousand police personnel. MINUSMA's mandate has since been extended and expanded in resolutions 2164 (UN Security Council, 2014a) and 2227 (UN Security Council, 2015a) and is due for extension in the months of June and July 2016. Alongside MINUSMA, several other organizations are active in the peacebuilding process of Mali. These include Operation Barkhane, a specialized French mission authorized by MINUSMA focused on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency in the Francophone Sahel (A., personal communication, 22-04-2016) and the European Union Training Mission (EUTM) which aims to train, equip and reform the Malian national army (K., personal communication, 20-04-2016).

Before we move on to discuss the contents of MINUSMA's mandate and the extent in which it has been achieved, it is important to elaborate further on the way in which the up to 11.200 military personnel is administratively set up. The headquarters of MINUSMA are in Bamako. These headquarters handle the civil branch of the mandate (see chapter 5, sections 5.1. and 5.2. specifically). Both employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that I have spoken to, have been in these headquarters in Bamako regularly (M., personal communication, 22-04-2016; A., personal communication, 22-04-2016). They explain it is an information hub for all different aspects of MINUSMA, alongside a variety of task-oriented groups to tackle civil issues (SSR, DDR, Rule of law, etc.). The unit that collects and organizes all information and intelligence is called the 'All Sources Information Fusion Unit' (ASIFU).

The military branch of MINUSMA falls under the command of a Force Commander. In March 2015 Danish Major General Michael Lollesgaard was appointed the new Force Commander (United Nations, March 6th 2015). Some parts of the military branch fall directly under the command of Lollesgaard. Among these are the Helidet, the unit that utilizes helicopters to gather intelligence, and the Special Operations Land Task Group (SOLTG) of which B. was the commander, this is a highly trained group specialized in gathering intelligence using both overt and covert methods (B., personal communication, 16-05-2016). The Helidet includes several Dutch helicopters (Apaches and Chinooks), in 2015 it reached Dutch national news because a technical defect led to the fatal crash of two members of the Dutch Air Force (NOS, March 17th 2015; J., personal communication, 26-04-2016). The SOLTG is a complete Dutch unit comprising a total of 120 people, they are based in Gao, but B. has people in many of the northern cities stationed both temporarily and permanently for the

gathering of intelligence. Units that are not directly under the command of the force commander are divided into sector HQs, each of these is responsible for a defined area of land where they must guarantee safety and security whilst also gathering information whenever possible (B., personal communication, 16-05-2016).

The complete bureaucratic machinery of MINUSMA is worthy of its own book. The explanation above handles some units that are relevant for this thesis and its respondents. Complete information is compiled on the UN Peacekeeping site (United Nations, n.d.). The next section will move on to a detailed analysis of the mission's mandate.

## 5 Data analysis

While the previous chapter answered the initial two descriptive sub questions, this chapter looks towards the four analytical sub questions. To remind the reader of these questions, they are repeated here:

- What does MINUSMA aim to achieve through their intervention in Mali?
- In what way can the current peacekeeping efforts lead to a long term stability in Mali?
- To what extent is the mission successful in achieving its mandate?
- What lessons can other UN missions learn from the case of Mali?

Each sub question will be handled in a separate section below. Firstly the mandate of MINUSMA will be discussed and analysed. The three relevant Security Council Resolutions will be described in detail and they will occasionally be added upon by the personal experience of the six experts, who all have their own way of defining MINUSMA's goal and aims. Following that, section 5.2. will propose several ways in which MINUSMA could improve their operations in order to move more rapidly towards a long term plan for stability or even peace. From both the literature and the respondents, several ideas arose on how stability for the future can be worked towards. Sometimes this means to continue what MINUSMA is doing, but often these ideas propose a change to its methods.

The next section will then judge to what extent the mission has achieved the things it set out to do. This includes a look back at the original mandate, but also a general overview to the changes that MINUSMA has brought to the people of Mali. It is important that in such an analysis progress is defined on the local scale for communities or even individuals. The experiences of the respondents help in describing the micro geographies of Mali and illustrate the day to day troubles of Malians local communities.

Based on the analysis of the previous three sub questions, the last sub questions will consider some strengths and flaws of the MINUSMA mission and consider what the UN can learn from it in its future operations.

#### 5.1 The Mandate and MINUSMA on paper

This section analyses MINUSMA based on the official documents of the UN Security Council and reports of various UN institutes. In section 4.2. the creation of AFISMA was discussed, this African-led mission was but a short term solution and the Security Council soon proposed, initiated once more by the French, a more robust and comprehensive mission. Thus, this section will focus purely on MINUSMA, while keeping in mind the history of Operation Serval and AFISMA.

Resolution 2100 acts under chapter VII of the UN Charter (UN Security Council, 2013). Chapter VII is the chapter concerning the Security Council's rights to act in response to conflict in the world. Its full text is available online on the official website of the UN. Within chapter VII the following is stated:

"Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 [measures not involving armed force] would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations." (United Nations Conference on International Organization, 1945, Article 42)

Chapter VII is a well-known chapter of the UN Charter, specifically because it is the one point where the UN allows armed intervention. While missions under chapter VI are non-violent (civil or economic for example), missions under chapter VII have access to arms in self-protection and are allowed to use them to "maintain or restore international peace and security".

MINUSMA is such a mission. In resolution 2100 the security council decides in 35 articles their actions and ambitions for MINUSMA. Not every article is equally crucial to define the goals of the mission. Articles 12, 14, 16, 18 and 22 will be mentioned and summarized here. In article 12 the size of MINUSMA is announced to be 11.200 military personnel alongside 1.440 police personnel (United Nations, 2013a). Continuing in article 14, the mission is allowed to have inter-mission cooperation with UNMIL (Liberia) and UNOCI (Ivory Coast). These three missions are all deployed in the region of West Africa and will share mostly logistical operations.

Article 16 decides the mandate of MINUSMA. Since this is absolutely vital to answer the sub question of MINUSMA's aims, the following table will summarize each article of the mandate in the author's own words (UN Security Council, 2013, p.7-8).

А	To stabilize populated areas and support the renewed establishment of state authority in the whole country, by assisting the rebuilding of the security sector and the implementation of DDR processes and supporting efforts by the transitional authorities.	
В	To support the transitional authorities in political dialogue and the arrangement of a proper election process.	
С	To protect civilians and UN personnel without prejudice within its capacities and areas of deployment.	
D	To promote and protect human rights through monitoring and deployment of MINUSMA human rights observers.	
Е	To support humanitarian assistance.	
F	To support cultural preservation in collaboration with UNESCO.	
G	To support national and international justice to bring to justice those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Mali.	

#### Article Summary

Figure 6: Mandate of MINUSMA as summarized by the author (based directly on: UN Security Council, 2013, p.7-8)

The mandate of MINUSMA provides a blueprint according to respondent M., a blueprint of how a peace building process in Mali should look, but not a step-by-step plan of how to arrive at that situation (M., personal communication, 22-04-2016). The mandate is extremely broad in the sense that it aims to stabilize a large country through support of the traditional authorities. In the mandate MINUSMA's goal is to support and protect, whilst also bringing stability, human rights, cultural preservation, law, etc. These goals must not be underestimated.

MINUSMA is not the only organization active in Mali though. Articles 18 and 22 explain the role of French and European missions. The French are assigned in article 18 a sort of supervising role, where they regularly report to the Secretary-General on the implementation of the mandate. Article 22 speaks of the employment of the European Union Training Mission (EUTM), which provides

training for the official Malian army. The Special Representative for the Sahel of the European Union is invited to closely coordinate and cooperate with MINUSMA. Other bilateral partners of Mali are similarly invited to coordinate their responsibilities with MINUSMA.

The mandate of a United Nation lasts a single year and must be extended on a yearly basis. Resolution 2164 (UN Security Council, 2014a) is the extension of MINUSMA's mandate on June 25<sup>th</sup>, 2014. Several changes are made as time goes on. Throughout 2013 and 2014 agreements were signed and resolution 2164 urges the continuation of SSR and DDR processes. It also stresses the further coordination between MINUSMA and all regional and bilateral actors: AU, EU, ECOWAS and the neighboring countries. Furthermore, the focus of the mandate is put on stabilization and the support of national political dialogue and reconciliation. It proposes in article 13.b.I. to launch a coordinated negotiation process for all communities of Northern Mali (UN Security Council, 2014a, article 13.b.I.). Article 32 adds a call to all Malian authorities to, assisted by MINUSMA, address the issue of proliferate trafficking of small arms and weapons in Northern Mali. The constant presence of weapons as a result of recurring conflict was mentioned as a root cause of the conflict in section 4.1. of this thesis.

The most recent extension was made in resolution 2227 (UN Security Council, 2015a), in this resolution the mandate of MINUSMA is extended until June 30<sup>th</sup> 2016 in article 12. By the time this is written, another extension is due within the next month. Respondents unanimously estimate that the mandate will be extended again, although B. adds that Dutch funding has gone down significantly (B., personal communication, 16-05-2016). The second extension of MINUSMA takes place after promising ceasefire agreements have been signed in 2014 and 2015 (see section 5.3.). Thus the focus has shifted this time towards the upholding of this agreement by all armed groups. Article 14 defines the new tasks of MINUSMA, the primary of which is as following:

"To support, monitor and supervise the implementation of the ceasefire arrangements and confidence-building measures by the Government of Mali, the Platform and Coordination armed groups [more information on these groups is found in section 5.3], to devise and support, as needed, local mechanisms with a view to consolidate these arrangements and measures, as well as to report to the Security Council on any violations of the ceasefire, consistent with the provisions of the Agreement, especially its Part III and Annex 2;" (UN Security Council, 2015, article 14.a.)

This article shows the steps MINUSMA has gone through, from regaining governmental control of occupied areas at first to the maintaining of a ceasefire now. What is next, one might ask? However articles D to G in the table above remain in some way or another part of the mandate, these much more abstract goals are ambitious and without a clear end goal. The next section will go in-depth into the methods of MINUSMA in executing their mandate, with a clear focus on the ideas of the six respondents on how MINUSMA could more effectively and efficiently reach their goal of stabilization and integration.

#### 5.2. The road to long term stability

This section discusses the ways in which the MINUSMA mandate can be executed. While the next section illustrates the progress and on the ground achievements of the mission, this section discusses not what *has* happened but what *could* or *should* happen. As respondents J. and B. are both members of the Dutch army, their input is specifically useful for this section. Their first hand experiences will guide the suggestions and ideas put forth here.

To fulfil MINUSMA's mandate, they are split into a civil branch in Bamako and a military branch spread throughout the north. Although they have unique tasks, they must consistently and constantly cooperate. B. explains that he had to regularly report all the information his task force collected to ASIFU (see section 4.2.), Bamako would then compile it, functioning really as an

information hub (B., personal communication, 16-05-2016). The civil branch takes this information and uses it to hopefully make progress in the peace talks and in the continued efforts to stabilize, demobilize, et cetera. The military branch then is given new tasks, used as a tool to provide safety and security while the civil branch looks to combat the long term issues. B. explains how communication works within the hierarchical military branch. It is clear from the description that the military is a well-oiled machine used to dealing with international missions, communication follows a clear hierarchy and consistently reaches the force commander (B., personal communication, 16-05-2016). Where communication becomes tough and when you really start to see the sluggishness of a large institution like MINUSMA, is when it comes to civil-military cooperation.

And that is an issue. Between several interviews the day-to-day problems of the local Malian population in the North are discussed. K., J. and B. all describe how the primary issues for many Malians are a lack of services and facilities (anything from education to health care) and often jobs too (personal communication, 20-04-2016; 26-04-2016; 16-05-2016). What then, can the soldiers that as part of their mandate regularly speak to locals, do to solve their problems? The locals will not understand the size of MINUSMA and the intricacies of its bureaucracy, they consider the soldier in front of them *the* representative of MINUSMA.

B. mentions so-called 'Quick Impact Projects' that one can initiate. Yet their effectiveness is often ridiculed even from within the mission (B., personal communication, 16-05-2016). Building a well in a town that needs it can take over six months of paper work. Not to finish the well, but to even start construction. For something as vital to the daily lives of a community as a well, this is simply not enough. Money needs to be made available through more efficient bureaucracy in a way where NGOs and MINUSMA's military branch can quickly and effectively solve the problems they run into in the field. To do this, information management, while efficiently organized throughout MINUSMA's hierarchy, may need to be less classified. J. and B. report their experiences, their needs and their questions in weekly reports to The Hague and Bamako (personal communication, 26-04-2016; 16-05-2016). There is space to make this line of communication more direct and transparent in order to enable more instantaneous responses.

In the interview with J., who is involved with the logistical side of the military branch, he speaks of the thirty-five employees with whom he leads the kitchen that provides food for up to 900 soldiers on a daily basis. His closeness with this multinational group of people is touching (J., personal communication, 26-04-2016). Not all employees are part of the international mission though, the local population was given the opportunity to fill several smaller jobs. Integrating the local population into the mission is a great step to provide them jobs and give them some insights on what MINUSMA is and what it does for them. It brings up a controversial point too, however. There is a large gap in living standards between the Western troops and the Malians. Each national army provides their own camp and the Dutch Ministry of Defence is renowned for providing an incredibly high standard of living for its soldiers. The soldiers of Camp Castor, the Dutch base near Gao, live in a very safe and well-provided encampment, with living standards much higher than those of other troops in the mission, let alone the Malians themselves.

There are large steps to be made when it comes to Civil-Military cooperation, although resolution 2100 already mentions the following: "and requests MINUSMA's civilian and military components to coordinate their work with the aim of supporting the tasks outlined in paragraph 16 above;" (UN Security Council, 2013, article 17). Clearly these words were not sufficiently put into action.

Another issue in the execution of the mandate is distance. Bamako to Gao is about 1000 kilometers, the goods for J.'s kitchen travel by cargo truck to reach Camp Castor in Gao. But that is not all, from Gao to a key city of the north like Kidal is another 400 kilometers. The size of Mali is never to be underestimated. J. explains: *"The north. From where we were in Gao, our only connection to the north was by helicopter. And even then, they did not go up that far."* (J., personal communication, 26-04-2016), illustrating the large physical and mental distance between northern cities. B. adds in his interview that roads from Gao to northern provinces were rare and often unusable due to the frequency of roadside mines, making helicopters the only safe option.

Whenever anyone from the civil branch wants to visit Kidal, this is done only under heavy guard, since this northern city is so isolated that rebel groups remain in control. Lack of proper and safely useable infrastructure remains an issue through the barren and often empty Sahara. Yet if MINUSMA aims to tackle underlying issues, they must find a situation where the relative distance between the capital and the north is sufficiently shortened. Throughout all six interviews it rapidly becomes clear that mentally, Bamako and Gao feel like a world apart and Kidal another world altogether.

Throughout this section the difficulties MINUSMA faces in the execution of its mandate have been laid out before the reader. Civil-military cooperation, integration of locals and distance (in absolute, relative and mental sense of the word) are three issues that all parts of the mission should consider. In the next section the progress they have made on the bumpy road to long-term stability will be the subject.

#### 5.3. An assessment of progress

The reports of the Secretary-General and the presidential statements of the Security council, alongside the experiences of the six respondents provide ample information to judge the extent to which MINUSMA has changed the situation in Mali. This section will first discuss the official peace talks and progress as the UN defines it in their reports, followed by the experiences of respondents of peace on the ground in Mali. Whereas the previous section discussed what *could* or *should* happen, this section is interested in what *has* happened.

Resolution 2100 requested the Secretary General to regularly inform the Security Council of the situation in Mali. Among the first of these reports is the one of October 1st 2013 (UN Security Council, 2013b). In this first report, some of the earliest accomplishments of the mission are the Ouagadougou talks in June 2013 to hold presidential elections (at this stage, the interim authorities described in section 4.2. are still in place). The preliminary agreement was signed and witnessed by the Special Representative as the eyes of the UN, it commenced a national electoral process and started political progress towards a stable government for Mali. The report states in article 12. that *"Dialogue and reconciliation activities remained limited during the reporting period."* (UN Security Council, 2013b, article 12). This is in line with the development of the mandate illustrated in section 5.1., where we saw MINUSMA bring some political stability and eventually a ceasefire, but struggled to bring reconciliation and solutions to the underlying issues.

Little over a year later, the Algiers peace negotiations occur in July 2014. A new report of the Secretary-General is written September 22<sup>nd</sup> when the second round of negotiations in Algiers is in progress (UN Security Council, 2014b). In the peace talks in Algiers, two coalitions of armed groups are present. The scattered variety of armed groups mentioned in section 4.2. is now aligned in the Coordination group on the one side and the Platform group on the other (ibid.; B., personal communication, 16-05-2016). The Coordination group includes the MNLA, the Haut Conseil Pour l'Unité de l'Azawad (HCUA) and the Mouvement Arabe de l'Azawad (MAA). These groups fight for the independence of Azawad, while the Platform group consists of armed groups that fight alongside the Malian army to maintain a unified Mali. The Arabian movement MAA was split during the conflict, B. explains that they are now named by their political leader: MAA Sidati (part of the Coordination group, fights for an independent Azawad) and MAA Sidi Mohamed (part of the Platform group, fights alongside the Malian government (B., personal communication, 16-05-2016). The Platform group consists of the Coordination des Mouvements et Fronts Patriotiques de Résistance (CMFPR), Coalition du People pour l'Azawad (CPA) and MAA Sidi Mohamed, a later addition to the Platform group is the Groupe d'Autodéfense Touareg Imghad et Alliés (GATIA). Terrorist armed groups such as Ansar Dine, AQIM or MUJAO are not part of the peace talks at any point.

The report of September 2014 was written after a ceasefire agreement earlier in the year, yet article 13 states that "the reporting period was marred by ceasefire violation – territorial gains made by the armed groups and clashes between armed groups including self-defense militias,

*reportedly ethnic-based and close to the Government – and human rights violations"* (UN Security Council, 2014b, article 13). This shows in a striking fashion that while peace negotiations are going on at the highest level, improvement on the ground in Northern Mali is limited if not non-existent.

The Secretary-General report of September 22<sup>nd</sup> of the next year speaks of noticeable progress (UN Security Council, 2015b). The participants of the Algiers talks have signed on June 20<sup>th</sup> 2015 the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, a great variety of mediators was present, including Algeria and other neighboring states, MINUSMA, ECOWAS and the EU. During the initial repositioning of troops and arms in the North, violations of the ceasefire agreement were made (UN Security Council, 2015b, article 16), but since then most parties have followed the agreements. This agreement is the first ceasefire agreement that both groups have consistently followed. However the most recent report of the Secretary-General shows that the terrorist groups that were not part of the agreement have consistently undermined the peace process (UN Security Council, 2016). There have been various cases of asymmetric violence in the form of terrorist attacks not just in the North, but also sparsely in Bamako and the centrally located Mopti region. Meanwhile, the implementation of the 2015 agreement is still far from finished and all respondents unanimously mention the slow speed of progress since the signing nearly a year ago.

How then, do the respondents experience the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali? All six of them have been in Mali since the summer of 2015. The implementation process is often characterized as slow, but what factors determine that? B. reminds us firstly that we should not forget how important it is that the aligned armed groups (Platform and Coordination) have kept to the ceasefire agreement. Yet the presence of Ansar Dine and their allies reminds us that work is far from done.

The step from ceasefire to comprehensive peace agreement is where the process repeatedly reaches a standstill. The mediators are attempting to keep meetings between the armed groups and the government regular and progressive, yet the following example shows how difficult this can be:

"One time such a meeting was cancelled, because the government of Mali had said 'if we come to Kidal, then the flag of Mali will be wound up' and they [Coordination group] responded by cancelling the meeting, since they do not acknowledge that flag and will not allow it to be hoist there." (B., personal communication, 16-05-2016).

The previous section 5.2. mentioned distance as a primary reason for the difficult execution of the MINUSMA mandate, perhaps distance is the key issue in this step from ceasefire to peace as well.

K. explains how the peace agreement does not solve the day to day issues of local Malians, as mentioned before. Domestic talks will likely have a greater effect on local security than the talks in Algiers. While the large scale initiatives of MINUSMA and the government are absolutely necessary, they must be partnered by domestic level meetings. An example of this occurred in Anefis towards the end of 2015. Local actors met there without the presence or 'help' of external parties:

"The international community was really not part of this process, most of them were taken by surprise and said 'we had no idea this was happening, we don't really know what they discussed'. If they were just discussing drug traffic routes or talking about who's in charge of security here [is unknown]. They [international actors] said afterwards the level of security incidents in that area reduced significantly." (K., personal communication, 20-04-2016)

The bottom up initiative of Anefis is a vital step forward in an otherwise fragile peace process. The International Crisis Group (ICG) describes the pact as an 'honor pact' signed by nomad communities (International Crisis Group, 2015). The contents of the pact are not officially known, yet if K. and the ICG are to be believed, the results speak for themselves.

Continuing on the idea of distance, we must also realize the discrepancies between different parts of Mali. While Kidal remains unsafe to visit for many (A., personal communication, 22-04-2016),

Gao is no longer an area of active contention. Yet the Dutch MINUSMA camp is no representation for all MINUSMA camps. The impeccable quality standards of the Dutch Ministry of Defense have been named before. Camp Castor is built with container units, while many other camps find themselves at great risk in every sandstorm, since they consist of tents (J., personal communication, 26-04-2016). These differences inevitably lead to differences in executing the mandate as well. MINUSMA continues to have a limited presence in Kidal and other hubs in the far North, where terrorist groups continually work against the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali.

Concluding, we can state that the progress made since MINUSMA's arrival is significant. However it is progress towards a ceasefire. Little indications exist that MINUSMA has accomplished steps towards a comprehensive peace. The fact that peace talks are cancelled over the issue of a flag, show that nationalist ideas remain crucial in the land of Azawad. The asymmetrical violence of terrorist organizations prove that extremist ideas continue to spread and disrupt the peace process. The Multi-Dimensional and Integrated aspects of MINUSMA's name are challenging to execute, as the issue of civil-military cooperation in section 5.2 illustrated. However it is exactly in that respect that the mission's results are lacking. Even in the most recent Secretary-General Report the human rights situation is considered *"of serious concern"* (UN Security Council, 2016, article 31) and access to basic services remains *"a challenge in northern Mali"* (UN Security Council, 2016, article 37). If MINUSMA wishes to create a stable situation in Mali, economic and humanitarian development in the form of domestic initiatives should be among the focal points of next year's progression.

### 5.4. Generalization and lessons for the future

The UN has several other missions in the region of Mali, among which the previously mentioned UNMIL (Liberia) and UNOCI (Ivory Coast). Other missions in the region include MINUSCA (Central African Republic) and UNMISS (South Sudan). What these four missions and MINUSMA have in common is that they are located in the Sahara and Sahel areas and often deal with conflicts whose roots are in ethnic, colonial and racial backgrounds. In this section several issues will be discussed that are not unique to MINUSMA, but common in international military intervention in general. Yet the challenge of external validity mentioned in section 2.1.1 should be kept in mind. These generalizable issues include the variety in skills and preparation between troops of different nationalities and the challenge each soldier faces to identify his 'mission' on a personal or operational level. Additionally, the contact between representatives of the mission and the local population calls for unique measures.

It is no secret that Dutch troops come with a different set of skills than troops of for example Chadian or Mozambique descent. When B. speaks of his three month training period before deployment, he fears that many African troops receive a much shorter training, more along the lines of three weeks (B., personal communication, 16-05-2016). Additionally the equipment with which African troops are sent is often only skirting the minimal requirements of the UN (M., personal communication, 22-04-2016). The result of these discrepancies is seen in the field, where the job of African troops is often limited to guarding, exploring and mine clearance, while the Dutch troops (i.e. Western troops) operate on a strategic level in surveillance and intelligence. With the postcolonial theories of section 2.1 in the back of the head, this seems to reiterate classical colonial thought of Western superiority. Especially in a postcolonial conflict such as Mali, it is dangerous to keep reaffirming these relations between Mali and the West. B. shares that whenever he walks around in Mali without being visibly recognizable as a member of MINUSMA, people will assume he is just another Frenchman (B., personal communication, 16-05-2016). Malian colonial history is recent and when intervening somewhere, respecting the history of the place you are in is crucial.

However, the difference in tasks for troops of different descent is only a natural result of their training and equipment. Although African troops might share memories of colonial pasts, making them mentally prepared to handle such a delicate issue, their training may not allow them

the strategic positions at the top of the ladder. Integrated missions where troops of different descent cooperate instead of working alongside each other might be a solution, but B. is short in his answer: integrated missions are not an option (B., personal communication, 16-05-2016). The variety in language, work ethic, organizational hierarchy and training makes it highly unlikely, bordering impossible to put such a mission into practice.

This is not an issue one can easily solve by reorganizing an existing mission, it requires a thorough overhaul of the UN training and equipment regulations to incentivize armies of all contributors to equally contribute. The UN has to take a facilitating and enabling role in supporting those armies not capable of delivering the international standard. This is an issue worth thinking and writing about in a different book. The work of Linda Polman (1997) provides a critique on this and other issues, it is a recommendation to those interested in critical analysis of a variety of UN peacekeeping missions.

Another issue arises at the level of the individual soldier, B. names this the operational level (B., personal communication, 16-05-2016). In a mission as huge as MINUSMA, with a mandate aiming to bring stability and ceasefire whilst simultaneously solving core issues on the level of human rights, ethnicity, et cetera, it remains difficult for the individual to know what they are working for. B. elaborates: "on the operational level, where I work, it was not clear what we actually want as MINUSMA. We want to gather a lot of information, we want to establish a lot of services (Security Sector Reform, rule of law, humanitarian assistance), but so little is changing." (B., personal communication, 16-05-2016). When change happens on the abstract level or at the political top, it is difficult for the individuals at the lower ends of the professional ladder to realize what they are working for. Especially in the multi-dimensional mission of MINUSMA, a military branch will provide intelligence only to see it lost (to them) within the organization, its results never to be felt on the ground.

Now imagine this same issue for the Malian people. The people of the North see all these MINUSMA troops, they see the white Toyota Land Cruisers with the black UN logo on the side. They provide whatever information they can and then the Land Cruiser rides away once more and nothing is changed. Nowadays, with the constant threat of Islamist violence, this is growing worse and worse. The UN troops visit, talk and leave, but the terrorists (for lack of a better or more representative word) live among the population of the town, they will know who spoke to MINUSMA and who stayed inside (G., personal communication, 02-05-2016; B., personal communication, 16-05-2016). Organizations like Ansar Dine will never target their attacks on locals, their goal is to win the locals to their cause. However once you speak to the UN you become a liability. Due to their irregular and distant presence, the people feel like the soldiers of the UN cannot sufficiently protect them from terrorism, while the soldiers of the UN themselves realize that hunting terrorists is not in their mandate, this is done by the French Operation Barkhane. In the end, it feels to the local population like wherever MINUSMA goes, the terrorists follow (G., personal communication, 16-05-2016). These guerilla tactics are successful in creating a feeling among the Malians of insecurity around MINUSMA.

Yet we must also realize that Malian critique on MINUSMA is often based on limited and local experience, while MINUSMA is varied, broad and complicated. Not all Malian critique is representative of MINUSMA's functioning (G., personal communication, 16-05-2016). German NGO Friedrich Ebert Stiftung brings more detailed analysis of Malian public opinion in their so-called 'Mali-Mètre' (e.g. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2015). It is a recommended read to those whose French allows it, as it portrays through a quantitative analysis an in-depth view into the mind of the Malian people and their opinions on MINUSMA among many other things.

In future UN missions to postcolonial conflicts, they can learn from the issues that MINUSMA is dealing with today. The perceptions of Malians are being actively measured and while their critique on the mission and its functioning may not always be representative of its true form, it offers new dilemmas for UN Peacekeeping. For example: how do you provide and maintain a secure environment in areas of limited statehood and insufficient infrastructure? How do you combat

guerilla and terrorist threats when the local population is afraid to share intelligence with the international troops? Is an equal representation of nationalities at the different levels of the missions desirable and if so, how will you realize it?

## 6 Conclusions

In the conclusion the research question will be answered. To do so, the answers to the six sub questions will first be summarized, then a reflection on the theory will follow. After a comprehensive answer for the research question is provided, several notes on its interpretation will be added, along with potential areas of further research.

Firstly, the following six questions will be shortly repeated and reflected upon:

- How did the colonial history of Mali lead to the current conflict?
- What is the current situation of the conflict when it comes to peacekeeping?
- What does MINUSMA aim to achieve through their intervention in Mali?
- In what way can the current peacekeeping efforts lead to a long term stability in Mali?
- To what extent is the mission successful in achieving its mandate?
- What lessons can other UN missions learn from the case of Mali?

These six questions were central in the case description of chapter 4 and the analysis of the interviews and official papers of the UN in chapter 5.

The colonial history of Mali takes place within a historical context. The ethnic differences that remain central in today's conflict in Mali were not shaped in colonial times, they have histories reaching into our Middle Ages. Yet the current conflict is rooted in the recent history of primarily the past century. Throughout this time the Tuareg of Northern Mali were ruled through divide and rule tactics utilized by both the French colonial power and the postcolonial Malian regime. Both colonization and decolonization further emphasized historic fault lines within the Sahara and Sahel areas through controversial (yet taboo) geopolitical demarcation. Regular patterns of conflict between the Tuareg and the Malian government are consistently left without a long term response, as both parties fall back in traditional patterns.

The current situation of Peacekeeping in Mali is the deployment of MINUSMA in 2013, alongside French, European and regional efforts. The 11.200 military troops of MINUSMA represent only the military branch, they are partnered with a civil headquarter in Bamako. In Bamako information is gathered in a unit known as ASIFU and a variety of focus groups aims to pave the road towards long term stability.

The mandate of MINUSMA was originally established in 2013 in resolution 2100 of the UN Security Council. It undergoes changes on a yearly basis, as the mandate gets renewed. The mandate can be seen as two parts. Firstly MINUSMA aims to regain government control of occupied areas, assist in the transition from interim authorities to a functioning government and create a non-violent and stable environment. Secondly, it aims to handle several more abstract and ambitious issues, such as rule of law, the humanitarian situation and human rights.

In the execution of the mandate, a way to reach long term stability must be found. However from the experiences of interviewees, it was soon clear that this aspect of the mandate was a true challenge. Quick Impact Projects are an attempt to improve the domestic situation of Malians, which would prove to be an important aspect in the solution of the slumbering issues in Malian society. However the execution of such projects remains lacking and local Malians rarely feel the impact of the mission on their daily lives beyond the ceasefire agreement.

The mission is successful in the establishment of a ceasefire. The Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali has been signed in June 2015 and has been mostly followed by all parties involved. Yet since the signing of this agreement in Algiers last year, progress on many levels has been excruciatingly slow and moving beyond a ceasefire and towards a comprehensive peace is still out of sights.

Lastly, there are some issues not limited to the situation in Mali that are vital in the functioning of a UN Peacekeeping Mission in a postcolonial context. Among these issues are the local perspectives on peacekeeping. Locals will often feel like the information they provide to the troops they speak to, simply gets lost in the system. There is no clarity for the Malians on what exactly the mission can do for them and why it has not yet solved crucial issues of poverty and basic services.

Throughout the theoretical framework the focus has been on the definition of conflict and peace. The conflict curve of Lund (2004) and its intensity-based variables proved to be an interesting perspective on the Malian conflict. Throughout the history outlined in section 4.1. it became clear that conflict in Mali did not follow the dichotomy of war and peace, but flowed between different states of crisis and unstable peace. Several moments in 2012 and 2013 could be considered an all-out war, while the irregular violence and ceasefire violations of 2014 and 2015 are characteristic of a crisis situation in Lund's theory. Mali right now finds itself in an unstable peace, where parties still hold very deeply embedded and hostile ideas towards each other, yet troops are relatively demobilized and the only cases of violence are asymmetric violence by terrorist groups.

In Galtung's theory (2013), this would qualify as a negative peace , where direct violence is absent but structural and cultural violence remains a part of Malian society. The Tuareg society for a large part still feels as little connected to the Malian state as they did before the conflict, as proven by the troublesome arrangement of peace talks since the signing of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali.

The difficulties in establishing a positive peace with the Tuareg is in large parts due to the large gap between the West and the Tuareg societies. The Tuareg have historically ruled the desert and its trade, albeit the goods have shifted from gold and salt to drugs and human trafficking. To them the foreign influences are a breach of their lifestyle. The Malian government as well as the international community must realise and accept that Western style rule of law might not be the way Tuareg society functions. This leaves us in a painful dilemma. The Tuareg want to rule their own land and the Malian government wants to maintain its territorial integrity. Yet if the (currently armed) Tuareg groups continue to smuggle drugs and refugees through the hardly navigable Sahara, they break national and international law and Malian and UN authorities are obliged by their morals and the treaties that they have signed to intervene.

The structural and cultural violence in Mali can be defined using the work of Farish (2007), while keeping the struggles described in Fanon (1961) in the back of our heads. What is outlined above is a situation where two societal structures are faced against each other. Both sides aim to justify and legitimize their way of living through influences on the psychological war landscape of Mali. The interview with G. (personal communication, 02-05-2016) shows the way in which terrorist organizations are successfully utilizing guerrilla tactics to influence the local population. They have created a situation in which violence follows MINUSMA and as a result, wherever MINUSMA goes, the population remains quiet and fearful (of both parties). While the physical war landscape is characterized by the ceasefire agreement, Fanon and Farish remind us how crucial the psychological war landscape is, while we know in the back of our heads, how difficult it is to change it. To achieve a positive peace in Galtung's definition, Mali must take large steps in erasing structural violence from their society. To do this, a shift in the psychological landscape is needed. It is hard to determine which happens first, a shift in mentality can lead to changing structures, while a shift of structure might also change mentality.

A potential first step in preventing structural violence is to once and for all end the divide and rule methods of ruling Mali's north. Allowing the Tuareg a voice in Bamako's political arena as a united and ruling party is a significant step towards a more sustainable ruling of Mali. However, we must also realise what risks it carries; decades of conflicting history and greatly differing national cultures make for a mighty difficult cooperation. A structural change is not enough on its own, it must be paired with reconciliation on both sides. Yet cultural violence is a psychological war landscape moulded over decades if not centuries, thus changing it requires a slow and deliberate process, unlikely to be smoothly executed in one try. Yet if MINUSMA aims to truly bring long term

stability, they must dedicate themselves to such a long term strategy, as the empirical sections have shown how slowly high level changes and negotiations are felt at a micro geographical scale.

Lastly, we might ask ourselves whether the critiques of Bricmont (2004) and Chomsky (2008) on American (imperialist) interventions apply also on MINUSMA. Could such a critique explain why progress towards a positive peace remains at a snail's pace. France is the initiator of intervention in Mali and of the Security Council resolutions that led to the deployment of AFISMA and MINUSMA. France remains heavily tied to North and West Africa, especially with the recent emergence of migration issues. Moreover the situation where MINUSMA has continually failed to move beyond a ceasefire and towards a lasting peace, is eerily similar to the idea of Bricmont (2004) that imperial states intentionally prolong instability in areas of weak governance for their own benefit. Yet nothing leads me to believe that France is acting out of a 'humanitarian colonialism'. The Security Council was surprisingly slow in its initial response, leaving a lot of space for regional actors (ECOWAS, Burkina Faso, Niger, Algeria, et cetera) to remain actively involved. While France remains heavily in control of Malian security (i.e. Operation Barkhane), their influence in Malian politics is limited.

In the end we can conclude by answering the main research question:

### In what ways does the influence of colonial history and decolonization, in the conflict in Mali further complicate the international intervention MINUSMA by the United Nations?

The postcolonial history of Mali clearly complicates the path to a lasting peace, as illustrated by the reflection above. The conceptual model of section 2.2 accurately displayed the process I will repeat here in text. Firstly, the amount of historic background for this conflict is not to be underestimated. While the sluggishness of MINUSMA is worthy of critique, we must also realise that the embeddedness of cultural, ethnic and racial differences in the region is exceptionally high. The continued structural and institutional handling of Tuareg clans as uncivilized nomads that had to conform themselves to French and Malian law, characterized the politics of Northern Mali throughout the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century. We must realise that this is not a productive way forward. Yet the consideration of new models often comes back to the dilemma above: either Mali controls the north, or the north functions in a way the Malian government nor the international community does not tolerate (be it Islamism, drug trade or human trafficking). One party must budge, or the entire peace progress will follow the example of the peace talks in Kidal that were cancelled over a flag.

Each aspect mentioned in section 2.2's hypothesis returns in the empirical work of chapters 4 and 5. International intervention initiated a peacebuilding process, which is highly complex in itself. The respondents have repeatedly highlighted the difficulties in communication between local and soldier, soldier and leadership, and military branch and civil branch. Yet the most difficult step is the transition from ceasefire through comprehensive peace agreement as a result by multilateral negotiations. It is exactly in that process, that the colonial influence of the research question is felt. It is felt in multiple ways.

The physical aspects of colonial history are seen throughout the peacebuilding process as the remains of the decade-long divide and rule tactics. Tuareg do not feel a part of Mali, they considered them ruled by Mali. Their own societal structure is a prideful one where vengeance and manly strength remain central. The anecdote of the flag in Kidal (section 5.3) reminds us that differences between north and south are not just in the minds of the people, but they exert themselves in institutions and symbols. Meanwhile, the primary way in which the colonial history influences peacebuilding in Mali is in the psychological landscape. While MINUSMA is successful in enabling talks at a high political level, their effects do not always seep through to the local level. Therefore many Malians do not feel as if MINUSMA can solve the issues they face. To provide peace and stability in the long term, the personal and domestic situation of Malians is a crucial step. Only if basic services, education and jobs are provided through an efficient civil-military cooperation, the ceasefire will start to *feel* in the psychological landscape of Mali like a positive peace.

Further research should be done in the field of civil-military cooperation, continuing for example the work of Pugh (2001). This remains a crucial, yet unexplored aspect of successful international intervention. The civil branch of a mission struggles to identify problems in the field, while the military branch may identify them, yet lack the means to solve them. A mission must not become an NGO, purely present to provide services. They must be sufficiently rooted in a political process and enable progress on the high level, whilst simultaneously being legitimized by their actions on the ground. This is a difficult balance worthy of further research.

The field of conflict studies has grown significantly over the last decades and the definitions of conflict and peace are continually redefined. The works of Lund (2004) and Galtung (2013) form an amazing theoretical background to analyse peace building processes. Yet the challenge remains to put the transition from ceasefire and an absence of violence into a situation of stable peace into practice. The transition is gradual, making progress hardly measurable and leading to continuing challenges for policy makers and scientists. The research of Farish (2007) gives us insight into the psychological war landscape of a postcolonial conflict, but given the frequency and intensity of conflicts in postcolonial contexts over the last three decades, this field requires more research specific to the postcolonial situation. Lingering postcolonial hierarchies remain a physical and psychological issue, therefore research must be varied. Both the local situation and the internal mission hierarchy are crucial and must be thoroughly understood. To achieve this, both the critique of Polman (1997) and the research of Farish (2007) should be continued and both fields must remain in a constant dialogue, as this thesis has shown the ways in which conflict studies and postcolonial literature are continually intertwined.

In section 4.1. Lecocq (2010, p 153) was quoted, describing the history of conflict between the Tuareg and Malian authorities as "a *continuum of resistance against foreign domination*". The following years will decide whether or not the 2012 crisis is just another continuation of the postcolonial history of conflicts in Mali. MINUSMA and a great variety of domestic and international actors are right there to decide. Yet only time will tell where history leads us.

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# Appendix A: Glossary of terms

AFISMA	African-led International Support Mission to Mali, authorized in resolution 2085 in December 2012
Alfellaga	The 1963 rebellion is fabled in history as 'Alfellaga', which literally translates to 'The Rebellion'.
Ansar Dine	Ansar Dine, also referred to as Ansar Ad-Din or Ansar Edine, is a Tuareg Islamist armed group sponsored by international terrorist organization AQIM and MUJAO
AQIM	Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. This is an international terrorist branch of the well-known Al Qaeda organization operation in the Sahara and Sahel region
Azawad	Azawad is the Tamasheq term for the Tuareg homeland. The MNLA announced independence of Azawad in 2013, but it was never internationally acknowledged
Bambara	The Bambara are an ethnic group belonging to the Mandé family. They are a black African people and are the majority in Southern Mali since the departure of the Mandinka people in the fifteenth century.
Berber	The Berbers are a family of ethnic groups native to North Africa
Bidan	The word Bidan is occasionally used to refer to Arabs in North Africa (e.g. Harmon, 2016)
Coordination Group	The Coordination group is a group of aligned armed groups fighting for independence of Azawad, exists of the MNLA, MAA Sidati and HCUA
EUTM	The European Union Training Missions trains and equips the Malian national army
GATIA	Groupe Autodéfense Touareg Imghad et Alliés, an armed group aligned with the Platform group
HCUA	Haut Conseil pour l'Unité de l'Azawad, an armed group aligned with the Coordination Group
Ifoghas	A mountain range in Northern Mali, its inhabitants are the Tuareg clan 'Adagh n Ifoghas', who played a large role in Malian history
Keita, Modibo	Mobido Keita was the president of Mali's first postcolonial regime. Not to be confused with Ibrahim Keita, who is the most recently elected president of Mali
ΜΑΑ	Arab Movement of Azawad. Armed Arab group, recently split into the MAA Sidi Mohamed (aligned with the Platform Group) and MAA Sidati (aligned with the Coordination Group)
Mandé	The Mandé are a family of ethnically black groups native to West Africa
Mansa Kanku Musa	Great leader of the Malian empire in the fourteenth century. Mansa is his political title. His name also appears as Keita Musa or Kankan Musa
MINUSMA	Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MNLA	Mouvement National de Libération de l'Azawad. Armed Tuareg group fighting for independence since the start of the 2012 conflict, later aligned with the Coordination group
MPA	Popular Movement of Azawad. Armed Tuareg group in the conflict of 1990- 1996

MUJAO	Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa. International terrorist organization operating throughout West Africa.
Operation Barkhane	French mission authorized by MINUSMA to handle counter-insurgency and counterterrorism in the Francophone Sahel, active since 2014
Operation Serval	Original French military intervention in 2012, later replaced by AFISMA
Platform Group	The Platform Group is a group of aligned armed groups fighting alongside the Malian army to preserve Mali's territorial integrity. Includes GATIA and MAA Sidi Mohamed
Soudan	Soudan is derived from the Arabic word 'Bilâd as-Sudân' (literally: Land of the Blacks)
Tamasheq	The language of the Tuareg people. 'Kel Tamasheq' (literally: speakers of the Tamasheq language) is sparsely used interchangeable with the term
Tuareg	Ethnic group part of the Berber family, split between five postcolonial states. Repeatedly rebelling against the Malian government in Northern Mali
Tanekra	Movement started in 1975 and later discovered by Algerian Secret Service, aimed to renew the efforts of the 1963 Alfellaga
Touré, Amadou	Amadou Touré was President of Mali from 2002 to 2012, expelled from his function by a military coup d'etat
Traoré, Dioncounda	Dioncounda Traoré was interim President of Mali in 2012 and 2013, he was followed by Ibrahim Keita after the elections of 2013

# Appendix B: Interviewguides

Interviewguide: A Postcolonial perspective on international intervention in Mali Interviewer: Martijn van Dongen Interviewee: K. Time of interview: 10.00 Date: 20-04-2016 Location: Radboud University Nijmegen, Skype

In this thesis I will analyze the UN Mission 'MINUSMA'. With geographical background, the project will look at international intervention in a postcolonial setting. The Touareg people have rebelled against the Malian government due to a background of distrust, cultural differences and colonial influence. Through expert interviews, the local situation will be described with a focus on the international influences.

### **Questions:**

What has been your role in Mali (research/military/civil)?

Did you have regular contact with locals? If so, were they open and willing to help outsiders?

Based on your experiences, how did the ongoing conflict influence daily life? And to what extent has this changed when an international troop force arrived?

What is your personal assessment of the UN Mission in Mali?

In what way have you noticed change / transformation in the situation over the past 4 years? Could you identify phases in the mission and conflict?

As a researcher you focus on SSR and areas of limited statehood, to what extent is the North of Mali an area of limited statehood? Does the MNLA/AQIM fill the gap?

What does this mean for international aid? Can it provide this aid in the North of Mali?

Interviewguide: A Postcolonial perspective on international intervention in Mali Interviewer: Martijn van Dongen Interviewee: G. Time of interview: 17.00 Date: 02-05-2016 Location: Radboud University Nijmegen, Skype

In this thesis I will analyze the UN Mission 'MINUSMA'. With geographical background, the project will look at international intervention in a postcolonial setting. The Touareg people have rebelled against the Malian government due to a background of distrust, cultural differences and colonial influence. Through expert interviews, the local situation will be described with a focus on the international influences.

### **Questions:**

What has been your role in Mali (research/military/civil)?

How would you personally describe the driving forces that led to the 2012 rebellion?

Did you have regular contact with locals? If so, were they open and willing to help outsiders?

Based on your experiences, how did the ongoing conflict influence daily life? And to what extent has this changed when an international troop force arrived?

What is your personal assessment of the UN Mission in Mali?

In what way have you noticed change / transformation in the situation over the past 4 years? Could you identify phases in the mission and conflict?

You have written extensively on the history of Mali, in what way do you think the international community has learnt from the past in handling this conflict? Will another Tuareg rebellion be prevented?

What is your assessment of colonial influences in the current relations between the Tuareg, Mali and the West?

Interviewguide: A Postcolonial perspective on international intervention in Mali Interviewer: Martijn van Dongen Interviewee: M. Time of interview: 13:30 Date: 22-04-2016 Location: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hague

In this thesis I will analyze the UN Mission 'MINUSMA'. With geographical background, the project will look at international intervention in a postcolonial setting. The Touareg people have rebelled against the Malian government due to a background of distrust, cultural differences and colonial influence. Through expert interviews, the local situation will be described with a focus on the international influences.

### **Questions:**

Wat is uw rol in Mali zoal geweest (onderzoek/politiek/militair)? En binnen de missie?

Had u daarbij regelmatig contact met de lokale bevolking? Zo ja, verliep dit contact open en verwelkomend of juist met wantrouwen? Hoe keek de lokale bevolking naar buitenstaanders?

In uw ervaring, wat is de impact van het conflict in het noorden van Mali op het dagelijkse leven in Bamako en daarbuiten? En in hoeverre is dit veranderd sinds de komst van internationale troepen?

Wat is uw persoonlijke mening over MINUSMA?

Op welke manier is het conflict in de afgelopen vier jaar veranderd/getransformeerd? Kunt u verschillende fases in het conflict en in de missie identificeren?

Hoe verloopt het contact tussen Bamako, Den Haag, New York en Kamp Castor (en andere kampen)?

Spreekt u regelmatig mensen vanuit de andere landen die aan de missie meedoen? Hoeveel samenwerking bestaat er tussen de participanten, zowel op praktisch als op besluitvormingsniveau?

Hoe vaak bezoekt u, en de rest van de civiele kant van de missie, het noorden van Mali? Wordt dit nog steeds als onveilig beschouwd?

Interviewguide: A Postcolonial perspective on international intervention in Mali Interviewer: Martijn van Dongen Interviewee: A. Time of interview: 15:00 Date: 22-04-2016 Location: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hague

In this thesis I will analyze the UN Mission 'MINUSMA'. With geographical background, the project will look at international intervention in a postcolonial setting. The Touareg people have rebelled against the Malian government due to a background of distrust, cultural differences and colonial influence. Through expert interviews, the local situation will be described with a focus on the international influences.

### **Questions:**

Wat is uw rol in Mali zoal geweest (onderzoek/politiek/militair)? En binnen de missie?

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Hoe vaak bezoekt u, en de rest van de civiele kant van de missie, het noorden van Mali? Wordt dit nog steeds als onveilig beschouwd?

Interviewguide: A Postcolonial perspective on international intervention in Mali Interviewer: Martijn van Dongen Interviewee: J. Time of interview: 15:00 Date: 26-04-2016 Location: Militair Revalidatiecentrum, Doorn

In this thesis I will analyze the UN Mission 'MINUSMA'. With geographical background, the project will look at international intervention in a postcolonial setting. The Touareg people have rebelled against the Malian government due to a background of distrust, cultural differences and colonial influence. Through expert interviews, the local situation will be described with a focus on the international influences.

### **Questions:**

Wat is uw rol in Mali zoal geweest (onderzoek/politiek/militair)? En binnen de missie?

Had u daarbij regelmatig contact met de lokale bevolking? Zo ja, verliep dit contact open en verwelkomend of juist met wantrouwen? Hoe keek de lokale bevolking naar buitenstaanders?

In uw ervaring, wat is de impact van het conflict in het noorden van Mali op het dagelijkse leven in Bamako en daarbuiten? En in hoeverre is dit veranderd sinds de komst van internationale troepen?

Wat is uw persoonlijke mening over MINUSMA?

Op welke manier is het conflict in de afgelopen vier jaar veranderd/getransformeerd? Kunt u verschillende fases in het conflict en in de missie identificeren?

Hoe verloopt het contact tussen Bamako, Den Haag, New York en Kamp Castor (en andere kampen)?

Spreekt u regelmatig mensen vanuit de andere landen die aan de missie meedoen? Hoeveel samenwerking bestaat er tussen de participanten, zowel op praktisch als op besluitvormingsniveau?

Hoe vaak bezoekt u, en de rest van de civiele/militaire kant van de missie, het noorden van Mali? Wordt dit nog steeds als onveilig beschouwd?

Interviewguide: A Postcolonial perspective on international intervention in Mali Interviewer: Martijn van Dongen Interviewee: B. Time of interview: 15:00 Date: 16-05-2016 Location: Hotel Asteria, Venray

In this thesis I will analyze the UN Mission 'MINUSMA'. With geographical background, the project will look at international intervention in a postcolonial setting. The Touareg people have rebelled against the Malian government due to a background of distrust, cultural differences and colonial influence. Through expert interviews, the local situation will be described with a focus on the international influences.

### **Questions:**

What has been your role in Mali (research/military/civil)?

Did you have regular contact with locals? If so, were they open and willing to help outsiders?

Based on your experiences, how did the ongoing conflict influence daily life? And to what extent has this changed when an international troop force arrived?

What is your personal assessment of the UN Mission in Mali?

In what way have you noticed change / transformation in the situation over the past 4 years? Could you identify phases in the mission and conflict?

How did you stay in contact with the Netherlands both professionally and personally?

How did the cooperation between Dutch troops and foreign troops go? Was it a daily communication or was it more sporadic?

What were the major differences you noticed between a UN mission and any other missions you might have done? If none, how would you compare it to your training?