



What motivates people to participate in anti-refugee protest?

An analysis of ethnic exclusionist attitudes, social capital and resource mobilization theory in the case of Geldermalsen

Beau van Ooijen – s4132777

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Supervisor: Dr. A.S. Zaslove

Abstract

In the past few years, thousands of refugees have tried to get from their native land to the safe grounds of Europe, which put extra pressure on many administrations – amongst others the Dutch administration. To relieve the pressure in the Netherlands, several Dutch municipalities were approached to harbour refugees. In turn, this led to much resistance from their citizens, one of the most notable cases being Geldermalsen. The city council's plan to accommodate 1,500 refugees was met with public resistance, and eventually resulted in violent riots. In this thesis I have investigated what motivates individuals to participate in anti-refugee protest. The analysis shows that an individual with an ethnic exclusionist attitude, bonding social capital, a network positive toward anti-refugee protest participation and who is informed by his or her network is more likely to participate in such protests. However, these characteristics may be present, if the individual does not feel comfortable protesting, he or she is unlikely to do so. In other words, individuals need to identify with protest as a means of collective action in order to participate. This implies some individuals will never protest, despite what their characteristics might predict. These outcomes should be recognized by governments and local authorities, if wish to pacify the threat of future anti-refugee protests.

Key words: Anti-refugee protest participation, ethnic exclusionist attitude, bonding and bridging social capital, networks, information dissemination, protest identification, Geldermalsen, city council, binary logistic regression analysis

Index

Abstract	2
Chapter 1: Introduction	5
Chapter 2: Literature Review	10
2.1 Ethnic Competition Theory	10
2.1.1 Realistic Conflict Theory	11
2.1.2 Social Identity Theory	12
2.1.3 Ethnic Competition Theory	12
2.2 Social Capital Theory	14
2.2.1 Social Capital and Protest	15
2.2.2 Social Capital and Ethnic Exclusionist Attitudes	18
2.3 Resource Mobilization Theory	21
2.3.1 The Importance of Networks	21
Chapter 3: Methods	26
3.1 Case Selection	26
3.1.1 What Happened on 16 December 2015 in Geldermalsen?	26
3.1.2 Why the Case of Geldermalsen?	27
3.2 Research Design	29
3.2.1 Advantages of (Online) Surveys	29
3.2.2 Disadvantages of (Online) Surveys	30
3.3 Population and Data Collection	31
3.3.1 Data Collection	31
3.3.2 Representativeness	33
3.4 Operationalizations	36
3.4.1 Dependent Variable	36
3.4.2 Independent Variables	37
3.5 Research Method	48
Chapter 4: Results	49
4.1 Quantitative Results	50
4.1.1 Model 1: Ethnic Competition Theory	50
4.1.2 Model 2: Social Capital Theory	52
4.1.3 Model 3: Ethnic Competition Theory and Social Capital Theory	53
4.1.4 Model 4: Resource Mobilization Theory – Attitude Network	55
4.1.5 Model 5: Resource Mobilization Theory – Information Dissemination	56
4.1.8 Interpretation Quantitative Results	58
4.2 Qualitative Results	61
4.2.1 Answering Category: No	62
4.2.2 Answering Category: Yes	69
4.2.3 Answering Categories: No, But I Would Have Wanted to Participate and No, But I Did Sympathize with the Protests	72
4.2.4 Interpretation Qualitative Results	75
Chapter 5: Conclusion and Discussion	80
5.1 Conclusion	80
5.2 Discussion and Future Research	83
5.3 Implications	85
Reference List	88
Appendix	96
A1: Survey	96
A2: Answers to Open Question – Respondents That Did Not Protest	120

Chapter 1: Introduction

The Netherlands has been a safe haven for refugees as early as the 16th century. Back then, the Netherlands was known as a tolerant and (relatively) religiously free country. Hence, it attracted many different groups whose safety could not be guaranteed by their own government (Van der Plicht, 2016). Nowadays, though asylum applications vary over the years, the Netherlands is still regarded as a safe haven for many different refugee groups. For example, in 1994 over 50,000 refugees applied for asylum in the Netherlands. From 2001 to 2013 the amount of applications decreased and varied between 10,000 and 20,000 applications per year. From 2013, there has been an increase in applications again, mainly from Syria and Eritrea. In 2015 and 2016, over 61,000 people applied for asylum in the Netherlands. Most applications come from Syrian, Albanian and Eritrean refugees (VluchtelingenWerk Nederland, 2017).

Not surprisingly, in recent years the immigration debate has again become the topic of intense public and policy debate. I say again, since this issue has been hotly debated before. In the early 1990s, the advent of refugees was also a main topic of public and political debate. Refugee centres were built at sites designated by the government. This caused much public resistance. Cities like Middelburg, Nuis and Staphorst protested against the advent of refugees or the construction of refugee centres in their neighbourhood. In some municipalities, this even led to violent acts. In 1991 for example, inhabitants of Leeuwarden threw tiles through the windows of a refugee centre. In 1994, a fire broke out in the refugee centre of Goes, caused by Goes' inhabitants. A few weeks later, the refugee centre even got shot at. Fires in refugee centres were also caused in the municipalities of Wijk aan Zee and Lunteren. These are only a few examples of the many utterances of resistance regarding the advent of refugees. Due to public protests, some communities never even built a refugee centre, like Sellingeren and Appelscha (Fennema, 2015).

Violent outbreaks as seen in the early 1990s happened again in the Netherlands, and were brought about by the same issue: the (potential) advent of refugees. Immigration has once again become a current and hotly debated topic of public and policy debate. The debate gained new impetus from a stream of immigrants coming mainly from Syria, Albania and Eritrea seeking refuge in Europe, including the Netherlands. Up until this day, the debate is characterized by a polarization of opinions.

The most notable cases of protest against the advent of refugees are Geldermalsen, Oranje, Steenberg and Heesch. In Oranje and Steenberg, city council meetings were tumultuous, received much criticism and were sometimes even violent (Fontein, 2015; NOS, 2015). In the town of Heesch, people protested against the advent of 500 refugees by hanging a pig in a tree and placing one on a rooftop (Rippe, 2016).

The case of Geldermalsen might be the most striking one. The city council's plan was to accommodate 1,500 refugees in the area of Hondsgemet – Geldermalsen's business area dealing with severe economic slowdown. Due to tragic economic times, writing off Hondsgemet was going to cost Geldermalsen immense amounts of money. The proposal by the COA (Centraal Orgaan opvang Asielzoekers) to build one of the Netherlands' largest refugee centres in the area of Hondsgemet thus came at just the right time for the city council. However, the plan was prematurely leaked by a VVD-faction member before any real decisions were made, causing much unrest among the inhabitants of Geldermalsen (Nieuwsblad Geldermalsen,nl, 2015; NRC, 2015). For them, the foundation of a large refugee centre did not sound like financial salvation. On the contrary, citizens felt ignored by their city council. Eventually public resistance resulted in violent riots. As a consequence, the refugee centre was never realised in Geldermalsen (Van Dinther, 2016).

As previously stated, the Netherlands has dealt with migrant streams for centuries. It is therefore not unlikely the Netherlands will deal with oppressed groups seeking refuge here again in the future. Understanding what motivates individuals to participate in anti-refugee protests is therefore important. Consequent findings can help shape present and future social policy directions, which might also help prevent similar protests in the future. This not only goes for the Netherlands, but for other European countries as well dealing with large migrant streams and subsequent anti-refugee protests, like Germany, France and England.

Not only is protest participation relevant from a societal point of view, but from a scientific point of view as well. Protest participation has been a topic of interest for scholars for decades. The question of why people sacrifice their wealth, pleasant lifestyle and/or status for a common cause has been answered in various ways, though a clear-cut explanation remains to be formulated (Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2013). Originally, protest participation was understood as an action that existed outside of conventional politics and democratic processes (Lipset, 1960 in DiGrazia, 2014). In the early days of protest participation research,

protesters were viewed as socially excluded individuals, who harbour high levels of anti-state sentiments and who are alienated from the political system. This early line of research however was characterized by contradictory findings, where some scholars found an effect, while others didn't (DiGrazia, 2014).

Protest was regarded a more common form of political action in the latter half of the 20th century. In a later line of research, protest was increasingly viewed not as an act against the system instigated by alienated outsiders, but rather as part of a range of legitimate political actions (Tarrow 1994; Inglehart, 1997; Meyer and Tarrow, 1998 in DiGrazia, 2014). This line of research focussed on structural factors supposedly related to protest participation such as resources, social networks and biographical availability. According to Van Stekelenburg *et al* (2011), research on protest participation has explored three pathways: instrumentality, identity and group-based anger. Saunders *et al* (2012) on the other hand argue that much of the protest participation literature has looked at recruitment, persistence and commitment. Many scholars have looked at protest participation in relation to a particular movement and/or organization. Other (sociological) theories have also been linked to protest participation, amongst others ethnic competition theory, social capital theory and resource mobilization theory. What's more, the same theoretical concepts are sometimes studied from different theoretical angles.

Thus, research, theories and concepts on protest participation aplenty. Consensus however over the most important factors has not been reached. As DiGrazia (2014) argues, this might have to do with the fact that many studies do not distinguish between different forms of protest. Different forms of protest vary in terms of level of risk, costs and political legitimacy, which makes treating them as theoretically similar problematic. I argue the same can be said about the subject of protest. Some topics are less controversial and therefore lower cost than are other topics, e.g. pay raise for teachers or improvement of employment terms. On the other hand, anarchist protests or anti-refugee protests are more controversial and hence higher cost. That is, being linked to such protests can harm someone's image, something not everyone can – or is willing to – afford. Therefore, I have decided to focus on a specific kind of protest, namely anti-refugee protest. My research question is therefore formulated as follows:

What motivates people to participate in anti-refugee protests?

As there are many theories and concepts related to protest participation, I have chosen three that I believe are interesting regarding anti-refugee protest participation. First of all, by means of ethnic competition theory I look at attitudes toward refugees. After all, when people do not believe in the cause of protest, they are not likely to participate (Benson and Rochon, 2004). Understanding individuals' attitudes toward refugees is important for another reason. In the case of Geldermalsen, journalists have suggested that some people protested not because they were anti-refugee per se, but rather because they were displeased by the way the city council acted (Voorn, 2016). Attitudes alone are not enough to explain protest participation. The second theory I therefore take into account is social capital theory. I make a distinction between bonding (characterized by strong ties) and bridging (characterized by weak ties) social capital. I go against the ideas of some authors, by suggesting that bonding social capital is related to protest participation. Moreover, I suggest there is a relation between having an ethnic exclusionist attitude and bonding social capital. Third, I apply resource mobilization theory to get a better understanding of information dissemination and the attitude of someone's network. As Knoke (1988) suggests, through whom people become informed about protest matters for their participation in it. As I will argue, an individual may have an ethnic exclusionist attitude and a higher level of bonding social capital, if he or she does not receive the right information from the right individual(s), protest participation is less likely to happen.

In line with Saunders *et al* (2012) I therefore approach protest participation from two different angles, or *explanans*: the *structural* and the *agential* angle. The structural explanans regards the position of individuals in relation to others, that is, to external factors. Central to the structural explanans is the individual's network and who informed them about the protests, explained through resource mobilization theory. In other words, I consider the individual's context by looking at their network. The agential explanans looks at internal characteristics of the individual, in this case the individual's ethnic exclusionist attitude. Moreover, I combine the structural and agential explanans with social capital theory. As I will further elaborate on in Chapter 3, I measure social capital by looking at the individual's trust and membership (agential explanans) and the strength of their personal relations (structural explanans). Thus, next to context, I also take into account individual characteristics and the individual's relation to others.

My research is different from previous research in another respect as well. My research question is concerned with what motivates individuals to participate in anti-refugee protests, though individuals that did not protest were also part of my sample. In my qualitative analysis I was able to specifically look at not-protesters' motivations to not participate. Not-protesters are an overlooked group in existing research and literature, though this group can tell much about protest participation. For example, certain characteristics may motivate some individuals to protest, while this may not apply to others. By investigating a specific kind of protest and by including a generally disregarded group, I hope to meaningfully contribute to the existing literature on protest participation and hope to formulate insights that will prove helpful in future research, or more practical, in the dealing with anti-refugee protests.

In order to answer my research question, I have chosen to focus on the case of Geldermalsen, which witnessed violent anti-refugee protests on 16 December 2015. The case is interesting for multiple reasons. First of all, the Geldermalsen protests were not part of a social movement, but a single act of protest. The existing literature often focuses on social movements, or on a single protest as part of some social movement. Second, nowhere in the Netherlands had the potential arrival of refugees caused so much resistance as it did in Geldermalsen. However, some inhabitants suggested that though smaller, the anti-refugee group was much louder than the pro-refugee group (Voorn, 2016). If this is indeed the case, the city council might have made a rather undemocratic decision by letting a loud and dominant minority decide for a silent and unobtrusive majority. Third, Voorn (2016) suggests that not all participants protested because they were anti-refugee, rather, they were angry with their city council for not involving the inhabitants of Geldermalsen enough in the decision to harbour 1,500 refugees.

In the following chapter, I will further elaborate on ethnic competition theory, social capital theory and resource mobilization theory and their relation to protest participation. I combine existing insights with my own expectations whereupon my hypotheses are based. In Chapter 3, I will go deeper into the research methods I chose to use. As there was no existing dataset available to test my research question, I have created and conducted a survey myself. Chapter 3 will clarify some of the choices I have made in this regard, my research design, the research population and the statistical tests I have applied. The operationalizations of the research variables as well as why I chose the case of Geldermalsen will be discussed in more detail. In Chapter 4, the hypotheses as formulated in Chapter 2 will be statistically tested. My survey

has yielded both quantitative and qualitative data. The quantitative data was tested by means of a binary logistic regression analysis. I did a content analysis for the qualitative data. The outcomes of both analyses will be extensively discussed. I conclude my thesis with Chapter 5, in which I will answer my research question based on an interpretation of my findings. I will reflect on the literature and discuss what insights my thesis has provided our understanding of anti-refugee protest participation. The chapter ends with a discussion and critical reflection on my work, as well as recommendations for future research and implementations of my results.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

As mentioned in Chapter 1, there are various theoretical insights that have distinguished factors that influence protest participation. However, consensus about what factors are most important in explaining protest participation has not been reached. Moreover, specific anti-refugee protest literature is scarce. I have decided to focus on three theoretical perspectives: ethnic competition theory, social capital theory and resource mobilization theory. I will start from the ideas of ethnic competition theory to better understand ethnic exclusionist attitudes and from where they originate. Above all, someone has to believe in the cause of protest is he or she to participate. Attitudes alone however cannot fully explain why someone is willing to participate in anti-refugee protest. Therefore, I continue my theoretical discussion with social capital theory. Following multiple scholars, I make the distinction between bonding and bridging social capital, also referred to as respectively strong and weak ties. Finally, I elaborate on resource mobilization theory, to gain a better understanding of the role of the individuals' networks regarding information dissemination. As I will argue, an individual may have an ethnic exclusionist attitude and bonding social capital, if he or she does not receive the right information from the right people, protest participation is less likely to happen. In the end, these theoretical insights create the idea of an embedded individual. How an individual is embedded matters for his or her odds of anti-refugee protest participation.

2.1 Ethnic Competition Theory

Social scientists have long been concerned with describing factors that can explain intergroup attitudes. Sumner was one of the first social scientists to coin the term ethnocentrism. He suggested that there is an association between positive ingroup orientations and negative outgroup orientations. Consequently, ethnocentrism is said to create intergroup bias that fuels prejudice, xenophobia and even intergroup violence (De Dreu *et al*, 2010). The question that

arises is how attitudes come about. Coenders and colleagues provide an answer to this question in the form of ethnic competition theory (Coenders, 2001; Coenders *et al*, 2004; Lubbers *et al*, 2006; Scheepers *et al*, 1998; Scheepers *et al*, 2002). Ethnic competition theory is based on realistic conflict theory and social identity theory, which will now be shortly discussed.

2.1.1 Realistic Conflict Theory

Realistic conflict theory is concerned with conflicts of interest between social groups. According to this approach, conflicts of interest arise from competition over scarce resources and values. Such conflicts are seen as the source of antagonistic and hostile intergroup attitudes and intergroup conflict. Individuals are assumed to be selfish, and will try to maximize their own resources and rewards (Coenders, 2001).

Sherif is an important scholar in this respect. His conclusions based on maximal group experiments in boy summer camps laid the basis for realistic conflict theory, in which group allocation was based on comparable background characteristics. The bottom line is that intergroup competition leads to increased ingroup favouritism, ingroup solidarity and ingroup pride on the one hand, while causing outgroup prejudice and hostility on the other hand. The causal relation between competition, ingroup favourability and outgroup hostility forms the basic proposition of realistic conflict theory (Sherif *et al*, 1955; Sherif, 1958; Coenders, 2001).

However, identification with the ingroup was given relatively little attention within realistic conflict theory research. Hence, the question arose whether ingroup favouritism and outgroup hostility would also occur when social groups are not in a competitive condition. Put differently, is intergroup competition a necessary condition for ingroup favouritism and outgroup hostility to occur (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Coenders, 2001)? Is it a case of competition or a case of social categorization?

Tajfel and Turner (1979) agreed with Sherif that competition is a sufficient condition for intergroup hostile attitudes. However, they were uncertain whether competition was also a necessary condition for such antagonistic attitudes. Therefore, Tajfel and colleagues conducted minimal group experiments, where group assignment was done randomly. Participants were given the task to distribute money to members of their own group and to

members of the outgroup. The results showed that participants allocated money with a bias toward their own group members. Existing social psychological theories at the time could not easily account for these surprising results. Therefore a new theory explaining the consequences of group membership, instead of the functional relations between groups, was needed (Kurzban, 2006).

2.1.2 Social Identity Theory

The gaps in realistic conflict theory led to the development of social identity theory, which attempts to explain intergroup attitudes and behaviour through underlying psychological processes of the development and maintenance of group identity. Social identity theory has given researchers insight into understanding group attitudes and behaviour. It describes the individual's awareness that he or she belongs to a certain social group. Such identification with a social group provides a link for individuals between them and society. Identification with social groups also provides a mean for individuals to express their concerns, to translate these concerns into collective concerns, and possibly collective action. It is thus rewarding for individuals to have positive ingroup relations, which is achieved through social comparison and negatively distinguishing outgroups. In order to achieve a positive ingroup evaluation, individuals attribute positive characteristics to members of the ingroup, while attributing mainly negative characteristics to members of outgroups. This is also referred to as social identification (Brown, 2000). Outgroups are valued negatively via mechanisms of social contra-identification (Coenders *et al*, 2004). Such mechanisms may even have an effect under conditions of absence of ethnic groups. This might explain anti-Semitic attitudes without Jewish people in the vicinity of a group.

2.1.3 Ethnic Competition Theory

Coenders *et al* (2004) propose that under competitive conditions (central to realistic conflict theory), processes of social identification (central to social identity theory) may intensify. This is referred to as ethnic competition theory, and is summarized as follows: "The stronger the actual competition between ethnic groups – induced by socio-economic, socio-cultural or socio-historical circumstances, whether at the individual or the contextual level – the stronger the perceived ethnic threat, that in turn reinforces the mechanisms of social (contra-) identification, leading to stronger nationalistic and ethnic exclusionist attitudes" (Coenders, 2001). Ethnic competition theory thus proposes that intergroup competition may reinforce mechanisms of social identification and contra-identification, which eventually could lead to

an ethnic exclusionist attitude. The empirical strength of ethnic competition theory has been repeatedly proven by Coenders, Scheepers and Lubbers (Coenders, 2001; Coenders *et al*, 2004; Lubbers *et al*, 2006; Scheepers *et al*, 1998; Scheepers *et al*, 2002).

The question that now arises is how an ethnic exclusionist attitude relates to protest participation. The idea is rather simple: individuals will join their fellow-citizens in protest when they believe in its cause. An ethnic exclusionist attitude forms the basis of believing in the cause of anti-refugee protest.

Boutcher *et al* (2017) conducted a research on white supremacist protest in the United States, and show the influence of a common attitude on protest participation – in this case a feeling of threat to the traditional economic, political and social power of whites. The authors argue that individuals may not be inspired to mobilize for collective action like protests until they actually face a threat, e.g. political or economic competition from minority groups. Such feelings can come about when more outgroup-members arrive, when scarce resources become scarcer, or a combination of the both. Whether an increase in the minority population generates perceived or real competition between majority and minority groups does not matter. When competition from minority groups feels like a threat, this manifests itself in an ethnic exclusionist attitude. Subsequently, the collectiveness of an ethnic exclusionist attitude forms a basis for mobilization, which can result in protest participation. Benson and Rochon (2004) endorse the conclusions of Boutcher *et al* and state that individuals will join a social movement only – and hence participate in protest – if they believe in its cause. Based on the literature discussed, I therefore formulate the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: Individuals with a higher level of ethnic exclusionist attitude are more likely to participate in anti-refugee protest

This may seem like an obvious hypothesis: believing in the cause of protest seems like a logical prerequisite for protest participation. However, I do believe it is important to statistically test this assumption, especially since I take not-protesters into consideration as well. It might be possible that individuals do believe in the cause of protest, but for some other reason decide not to participate.

An attitude alone however, is not enough to initiate protest, let alone violent protests. This has to do with the costs and benefits of protest participation, which are difficult to assess. The costs of protest participation may be rather high, e.g. when protests turn violent. Also the impact and outcome of protests are not easy to estimate. As regards the individual, it is unlikely that his or her participation will make the difference (Benson and Rochon, 2004). However, people still show willingness to protest. To bridge these uncertainties, attitudes do not provide sufficient explanatory value, but insights from social capital theory do. In the following section, I will further elaborate on the influence of social capital on protest participation. The focus primarily lies on trust and the individual's relation to others, since these concepts are most recurring in existing literature and most successful in explaining protest participation.

2.2 Social Capital Theory

Before discussing social capital theory and its relation to protest participation in more depth, it is helpful to briefly introduce the concept. Few theories in the social sciences have been so intensely studied and discussed as social capital theory. Its prominent status is evident, since it answers one of the most basic questions the social sciences are concerned with: what keeps societies together and leads individuals to act for collective goals (Welzel *et al*, 2005)? Not surprisingly, social capital has been studied in many different theoretical fields, including sociology, conflict studies, cultural studies, economics and political science. Hence, social capital theory has been linked to many concepts among which democratization, voting preferences, health, employment, social structure and also protest participation.

Though intensely studied and often applauded for its positive effects and broad applicability, there is no consensus as to what social capital exactly entails. The variety of definitions is the result of the context specific nature of social capital and its complex conceptualization and operationalization (Claridge, 2004). I prefer the OECD definition of social capital, because of its focus on networks and trust, which as stated earlier are important concepts within the literature on protest participation: “networks together with shared norms, values and understandings that facilitate cooperation within or among groups” (Keeley, 2007).

In line with the OECD definition, two forms of social capital can be distinguished: bonding and bridging social capital. Bonding social capital refers to links between people based on a sense of common identity, for example family, close friends, colleagues and people with

whom a certain culture or ethnicity is shared. That is, people ‘like us’. Bridging social capital describes links between people that go beyond a shared sense of identity. Examples include distant friends, acquaintances from some other group or class, or people from different cultural or ethnic groups (Keeley, 2007; Deschouwer and Hooghe, 2015).

Some authors make a distinction between strong ties and weak ties, rather than bonding or bridging social capital. For example, Granovetter (1973) describes strong ties as friends and family, while weak ties can best be understood as acquaintances. A strong tie is someone you know well and information between you and the other flows freely. The information strong-tied individuals receive often comes from the same sources. A weak tie on the other hand is a more tenuous relationship in which people do not necessarily share interests and don’t interact much. Weak-tied individuals receive information from different sources and therefore generally receive more varied information. Like Ellison *et al* (2007, 2010) suggest, weak ties are best compared to bridging social capital, whereas strong ties are best compared to bonding social capital.

2.2.1 Social Capital and Protest

How do social capital and protest participation relate? As briefly stated before, the costs and benefits of protest participation are hard to estimate. The fact that people still show willingness to participate and thus to give up time, money and energy and to risk their status or even prosecution for a common cause, means there must be mechanisms at play that give individuals the confidence to protest despite the risks. Various authors have suggested this has to do with trust and the strength of the individual’s relations to others. Generally speaking, trust enables reciprocal relations between members of a community and lowers ‘transaction costs’ between people. This means an individual does not have to check all information he or she receives; when there is trust, people assume the information others provide is true. Also communication and the spread of information improve when there is trust between people, again because trust makes checking sources redundant (Putnam, 2000; Deschouwer and Hooghe, 2015).

Benson and Rochon (2004) demonstrate that interpersonal trust is an important motivating factor linked to protest participation. Trust is even linked to raising the intensity of protest. The authors argue that a high level of trust makes the individual more likely to expect lower costs of protest participation. Moreover, high-trusting individuals have more optimistic

estimates of the potential benefits of protesting. Benson and Rochon explain this relation by suggesting that trust may lead to the perception that there is a more stable base for protest, as well as certain positive expectations concerning the potential impact protest will have. This goes for violent as well as non-violent protests.

The results of a study by Born *et al* (2016) are in line with the conclusions of Benson and Rochon (2004). Born *et al* looked into strike behaviour of cleaning personnel. The authors found that when people trust each other, the odds of strike participation increase. As Waldinger (1995) points out, trust between individuals who belong to the same group is higher than trust between individuals from different groups. Trust and networks thus are related to one another. Waldinger furthermore argues that trust is likely to be higher within bonding social capital networks rather than in bridging social capital networks. Born *et al* also state that people will act like other people they trust. The influence of one person on another is therefore more likely to be more powerful when there is a strong tie between two people. Thus, next to trust, the individual's relation to others is also important in explaining protest participation. When individuals have to decide to participate in protest or not, they look within their network for guidance. Networks in this regard are best understood as the amount of links and the strength of those links, which is therefore either regarded as bonding or bridging. One of the assumptions regarding bonding and bridging social capital is that within a homogeneous (bonding) network more uniform opinions exist. Vice versa, people who have a more heterogeneous (bridging) network are more likely to receive varied information, opinions and evaluations.

What's more, the level of bonding or bridging social capital is not only determining for the diversity of opinions within someone's network, but also for its mobilization potential – though not all scholars agree whether bonding or bridging social capital is more beneficial for mobilization. For example, Leonard and Pelling (2010) examined the ability of civil society actors to fight for environmental justice in South Africa, by ways of mobilization and protest action. The authors argue that a higher level of bridging social capital in a community is more likely to promote broader mobilization and large-scale protest action than is a higher level of bonding social capital. Bridging social capital is more likely to link members of different groups than would be the case with bonding social capital, which tends to be concentrated in particular groups, restricting social networking and popular mobilization across different groups. Swain (2000) also argues that mobilization potential depends heavily on the strength

of communal ties, and draws the same conclusions as Leonard and Pelling: weak ties among social networks are better suited for broader mobilization and large-scale collective action, since they are more likely to link members of different small groups than strong ties would. Strong ties within a homogeneous group are more likely to lead to the creation of cliques and factions and tend to be concentrated within a particular group. This does not benefit the mobilization potential, as the author argues.

However, I find the ideas of Leonard and Pelling (2010) and Swain (2000) not compelling. Discussion on the acceptance of refugees is often characterized by emotions, feelings and non-factual arguments (Van Vugt and Wildschut, 2015). Moreover, it is a sensitive topic, which makes participation in anti-refugee protests high cost. After all, not everyone is willing to get involved in the discussion – let alone participate in anti-refugee protests – as it can inflict damage on someone's image. Therefore, I expect bonding social capital to be more important in explaining participation in anti-refugee protests. Ultimately, discussing a sensitive topic with like-minded people less likely damages your image. According to the literature on social capital theory, networks of bonding social capital and strong ties consist mainly of like-minded people. Hence, I expect bonding social capital to therefore be more important in explaining anti-refugee protest participation.

Next to his discussion on the strength of weak ties, Granovetter (1978) also argues that different types of ties potentially contribute in different ways to for example protest participation. Strong ties between individuals increases interpersonal influence by a greater extent than do weak ties. Hence, a friend asking you to protest with him or her is therefore more persuasive than a stranger asking you the same thing. Also Somma (2009) found evidence pointing in the same direction. He looked into the importance of strong ties for accepting a protest invitation and consequently attending the protest event. The results of his study suggest that strong ties indeed are more important for protest mobilization, and hence participation. He argues that strong ties mean higher emotional involvement and trust, which supposedly boosts interpersonal influence. Moreover, the stronger the tie, the more similar individuals are. Also McAdam and Paulsen (1993) suggest that strong ties are an important source of social influence, and hence state “the stronger the tie, the stronger the influence”. Moreover, McGehee (2002) suggests that the power of network ties increases motivation for future activism.

To summarize, protest participation from a cost-benefit perspective seem unlikely. Yet, people still show willingness to protest. Social capital theory is helpful in explaining why. As the costs, benefits and outcomes of protest are hard to estimate, trust and networks (indispensable concepts within social capital theory) boost the individual's confidence for protest participation. A higher level of trust makes it easier for the individual to assess the potential costs and benefits of protest participation, as trust may lead to the perception that there is a more stable base for protest. Networks on the other hand help individuals assess options. The individual's network is therefore an important tool for guidance. Trust and networks come together in the distinction between bonding and bridging social capital. Put briefly, bonding social capital refers to people 'like us', who share a sense of common identity. Trust within such networks is often higher. Bridging social capital on the other hand describes links between people that go beyond a shared sense of identity. Bonding social capital is also referred to as strong ties, whereas bridging social capital is also referred to as weak ties. Not only does the individual's level of bonding or bridging social capital influence his or her level of trust, it also affects the information and opinions that circulate within a network. Information circulating within bonding social capital networks often comes from the same sources. Vice versa, within bridging social capital networks, information comes from different sources. Discussing a sensitive topic (which the refugee discussion is) is easier with like-minded people, found within bonding social capital networks. This means that when someone's network is positive toward protest participation, an individual – fuelled by trust – is more inclined to be positive and hence to decide to participate (Born *et al*, 2016). All in all, it can be said that bonding social capital results in a greater likeliness to participate in anti-refugee protests. Based on these insights, I formulate the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 2: Individuals with a higher level of bonding social capital are more likely to participate in anti-refugee protest

2.2.2 Social Capital and Ethnic Exclusionist Attitudes

One of the assumptions within the literature on social capital theory is that trust within bonding social capital networks is possibly linked to ingroup favouritism and inequality. Glaeser (2016) for example measured the potential exclusive aspects of social trust as support for radical right parties. She suggests that an atmosphere with too much stability and homogeneity may be related to favouring more restricted forms of solidarity and the promotion of ingroup interests. As suggested by Granovetter (1973), Keeley (2007) and

Deschouwer and Hooghe (2015), such homogeneity is a characteristic of bonding social capital and strong ties.

Being a member of the ingroup comes with certain benefits, which outgroups on the other hand do not enjoy. It is rewarding for an individual to exclude members of the outgroup, so that the benefits of being an ingroup member are protected. When social ties within a network are strong, this can breed exclusion for outgroups (Glaeser, 2016). As Waldinger (1995) points out, the more embedded individuals are in dense, many-sided relations, the stronger mechanisms are for excluding outgroups, and the greater the individual's motivation to do so. The fact that excluding and negatively distinguishing outgroups is rewarding is also proposed by social identity theory, as previously discussed. One of the possible outcomes of the exclusion of outgroups is an ethnic exclusionist attitude. An ethnic exclusionist attitude is a way for an individual to negatively value the outgroup, which leads to a more positive view of the ingroup. As I suggest that both an ethnic exclusionist attitude and bonding social capital are related to protest participation, I argue these factors taken together also have an impact on anti-refugee protest participation. Therefore, based on insights from the literature on ethnic exclusionist attitude and social capital theory on protest participation, I formulate the following hypothesis, which assumes an interaction between social capital and ethnic exclusionist attitude:

Hypothesis 3: Individuals with a higher level of bonding social capital and a higher level of ethnic exclusionist attitude are more likely to participate in anti-refugee protest

The influence of networks on protest participation is also discussed within a different theoretical framework, namely resource mobilization theory. The literature on social capital and protest participation focuses on the strength of networks – i.e. bonding and bridging social capital, respectively strong and weak ties – often in combination with trust. Resource mobilization theory is more concerned with information dissemination and the attitudes within a network. As this line of research suggests, information dissemination plays a vital role in protest mobilization and subsequently participation, in the sense that it greatly matters from whom an individual receives certain information and what kind of information. Also, networks act as a platform for support (Knoke, 1988). In the following section, I will therefore elaborate further on the importance of networks and how they can aid information dissemination within the framework of resource mobilization theory.

Before discussing resource mobilization theory in more detail though, I would like to make some remarks. The literature on resource mobilization theory focuses mainly on social movements. Social movements are a series of contentious performances, displays and campaigns by which ordinary people make collective claims on others (Lim, 2012; Tilly, 2004). In other words, social movements are directed toward social change and development, and generally tackle issues that lie deep beneath the surface of societies. Protest, as defined by Leonard and Pelling (2010), is about engagement in a public demonstration. Protest is one particular moment, and it can either be part of a social movement or not, as Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2013) argue. Furthermore, the authors suggest protest can be a form of collective action and of social movement participation at the same time. However, social movement participation not per se equals protest. As Uba and Uggla (2011) mention, protests include any non-institutionalized collective action aimed at exerting pressure or expressing opinion on the policy-making process. In any case, it should be understood that though there is certain overlap, social movements and protest are two different things.

This distinction is especially important regarding anti-refugee protests in the Netherlands. In various Dutch municipalities protests against the advent of refugees were organized. Sometimes these protests were initiated by larger organizations, indeed as part of a social movement. Pegida (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West) for example organized protest meetings in Utrecht, Rotterdam, Apeldoorn and Amsterdam. Demonstranten Tegen Gemeenten (Demonstrators Against Municipalities) is an organization against the Dutch “absurd asylum policy” active in multiple municipalities, amongst which Enschede. Finally, AZC-Alert has developed into a nation-wide platform for local action groups. Despite existing larger action groups, most protest meetings against the advent of refugees were initiated by local groups without any interference from external organizations or groups (Andringa and Meindersma, 2016). Though protests against the advent of refugees have taken place all over the Netherlands, they only share the immediate cause for protest, and not an overlapping organization. Therefore, many anti-refugee protests should not be considered a social movement. Despite the fact that many anti-refugee protests were not part of some social movement, resource mobilization theory can still give insight into what motivates people to participate in protest.

2.3 Resource Mobilization Theory

The question of why people are willing to give up time, money and energy and risk their status for a common cause has been investigated by several theoretical frameworks, including resource mobilization theory. Scholars within this field of study focus on the variety of resources that must be mobilized, the linkages of social movements to other groups, the dependence from external actors and tactics used by authorities. Resource mobilization theory posits that people engage in collective action when they believe they have the necessary resources at their disposal to improve the group's position (McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Morgan and Chan, 2016). Though resources may vary among social movements, their availability and usability and the actors' ability to use them effectively are very important. Groups who have more resources and are given the right opportunity are more likely to mobilize (Eltantawy and Wiest, 2011).

2.3.1 The Importance of Networks

Within the literature on resource mobilization theory, one of the most important predictors of social movement participation is networks (Knoke, 1988). According to this line of research, the function of networks is twofold: (1) networks act as a platform for support and; (2) networks act as a platform for discussion and information dissemination.

First of all, networks act as a platform for support. Conforming yields social approval, which is regarded a social reward. Non-conformity on the other hand can lead to a loss of social standing, which is considered a sanction. The process of social approval by individuals leads to higher group conformity. Going along with group decisions is thus rewarding – this includes protest participation when other members of the group do so as well. In this regard, the process of social approval can be linked to social capital. As it happens, commitment to one's network often results from mobilizing activities of associations, clubs, churches, civic groups, etc. In other words, the process of conforming and social approval is enabled and promoted by the individual's network, inherent to social capital (Oberschall, 1994). Networks are thus vital to individuals. Not surprisingly then, Oberschall argued that most people decide to participate in protest not in isolation, but together with others. The importance of close networks for mobilization and subsequently (protest) participation has been repeatedly indicated by the literature on resource mobilization theory (Klandermans and Oegema, 1987). It is suggested – and moreover empirically established – that people close to the individual are

most likely to influence the individual's decision to participate in protest (Gamson, 1992 in McGehee, 2002).

As going along with the group is rewarding for an individual, it has an affect on behaviour. As Stoner (1961, in Gass and Seiter, 2014) pointed out, individuals make riskier decisions when they are in groups than when they are alone. Multiple scholars confirmed Stoner's conclusions, and soon this effect became known as the risky shift phenomenon. In short, groups cause people to become more extreme in their decisions. This means that if an individual is inclined to make a slightly risky decision, being in a group might have the individual make an even riskier decision. At the same time, if an individual is predisposed to make a conservative decision, being in a group may cause him or her to make a more conservative decision. Deciding as an individual or deciding as a group thus has an influence on the extremity of the decision.

Taking these theoretical insights into consideration, the barrier to participate in protest is therefore lower when someone's network is more positive about protest participation. Not only is going along with the ingroup rewarding, decisions made as a group are generally more extreme – and protest can be regarded as a rather extreme way to convey standpoints. Based on these insights, I formulate the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 4: When an individual's network is generally positive about anti-refugee protest participation, the individual is more likely to participate in such protests

Second, networks act as a platform for discussion and information dissemination. While networks are not the only predictor of social movement participation, they are generally the strongest (Barkan *et al*, 1995). As Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2013) illustrate, networks create space for (critical) conversation. This is because networks function as communication channels through which people become informed, for example about protest intentions. In this way, through networks, consensus can be established about ideals and common goals. This makes networks an important platform where collective opposition – for example to authorities – is created. Hence, networks are an important mean for mobilization (Klandermans *et al*, 2008; Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2013).

Snow *et al* (1980) argue that being recruited for social movement participation is largely the result of two conditions: (1) connections to one or more movement members through a pre-existing or emergent interpersonal tie and; (2) absence of alternative networks. The second condition the authors mention is interesting in light of the discussion on bonding social capital. Namely, it implies a lack of alternative networks, meaning the individual has no counter-option, or at least has no access to a counter-option.

Scholars within the field of resource mobilization theory have however not reached consensus what type of network is most beneficial for protest mobilization. Kitts (2000) for example suggests that weak ties are more beneficial for protest mobilization and subsequently participation. This idea is supported by other scholars as well. As transmission of information is a key mechanism for protest participation, weak ties supposedly are more effective as they enable information from multiple sources to spread more easily and to reach a larger audience than do strong ties (Bakshy *et al*, 2012; Goldenberg *et al*, 2001; Weimann, 1983). These ideas are in line with the conclusions of Leonard and Pelling (2010) and Swain (2000) on the greater mobilization potential of weak ties.

As with my argumentation on the relation between bonding and bridging social capital and protest participation, I reason the opposite: I believe strong ties are better for information dissemination and the spread of mobilizing messages regarding anti-refugee protests. This is because the refugee discussion concerns a sensitive topic. As mentioned before, the discussion often is not characterized by factual arguments, but rather by emotions and feelings. First of all, a sensitive topic is easier to discuss with like-minded people, as the risk of loss of face is smaller. As previously discussed, the stronger the tie, the more similar individuals generally are. In such discussions, there is less interest for information and factual arguments coming from various sources. Feelings and emotions, then, matter a great deal more, which are shared easiest with like-minded people. From the literature on bonding and bridging social capital, like-minded people are often found within bonding social capital networks. Such networks generally consist of friends, family and colleagues. I argue therefore that networks consisting of similar people and who receive information from comparable sources are most important for anti-refugee protest mobilization. That means people are most likely to be mobilized by people that are close to them, e.g. family, friends, colleagues, co-members of an association or neighbours. Based on these insights, I formulate the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 5: Individuals who are informed about the protests by their close network are more likely to participate in protest

To summarize, ethnic competition theory suggests that competition between ethnic groups reinforces mechanisms of social identification, which leads to an ethnic exclusionist attitude. Subsequently, as protesters need to believe in the cause of protest, an ethnic exclusionist attitude is linked to anti-refugee protest participation. The costs and benefits of protest participation are difficult to assess, and hence an attitude alone is not enough to convince an individual to protest. Social capital theory offers more insight into what motivates individuals to protest. As suggested, trust and personal ties boost the individual's confidence for protest participation. I make a distinction between bonding and bridging social capital. Bonding social capital refers to people 'like us', with whom people share a sense of common identity. Bridging social capital on the other hand describes links between people that go beyond a shared sense of identity. I argue that bonding social capital is linked to anti-refugee protest participation. When social ties within a network are strong, this can breed exclusion for outgroups. Being part of the ingroup includes certain benefits, which would have to be shared when more people join the ingroup. Moreover, the anti-refugee discussion concerns a sensitive topic. Being embedded in a network of similar-minded individuals makes it easier to discuss such a sensitive topic, as opinions will generally not vary much. Still unanswered remains the question from whom individuals receive their information. An individual may have an ethnic exclusionist attitude and a higher level of bonding social capital, but where does the information come from? Resource mobilization theory gives insight into the embeddedness of the individual in certain networks and what this means for information dissemination and the opinions and attitudes within a network. As the theory suggests, individuals whose network is generally positive about anti-refugee protest participation, the individual is more likely to participate in such protests. Moreover, individuals who are informed about the protests by their close network are more likely to participate in protest. All in all, the three theoretical perspectives combined create the idea of an embedded individual, influencing his or her odds of anti-refugee protest participation.

On the following page, a figure is presented of the three discussed theoretical perspectives, as well as a table that gives an overview of the hypotheses.

Figure 1: Presentation of Theoretical Perspectives Combined




Table 1: Summary of the Hypotheses

<i>Theory</i>	<i>Level</i>	<i>Hypothesis</i>	<i>Variables</i>
Ethnic competition theory	Micro	H1: Individuals with a higher level of ethnic exclusionist attitude are more likely to participate in anti-refugee protest	Ethnic exclusionist attitude and protest
Social capital theory	Micro	H2: Individuals with a higher level of bonding social capital are more likely to participate in anti-refugee protest	Bonding social capital, bridging social capital, ethnic exclusionist attitude, protest
	Interaction	H3: Individuals with a higher level of bonding social capital and a higher level of ethnic exclusionist attitude are more likely to participate in anti-refugee protest	Bonding social capital, bridging social capital, protest
Resource mobilization theory	Micro	H4: When an individual's network is generally positive about anti-refugee protest participation, the individual is more likely to participate in such protests	Attitude network and protest
	Micro	H5: Individuals who are informed about the protests by their close network are more likely to participate in protest	Information dissemination and protest

Chapter 3: Methods

In this chapter, I will elaborate on the methodology I have used to answer my research question: what motivates people to participate in anti-refugee protests? In order to answer my research question, I specifically focus on the case of Geldermalsen. First, I will explain why I have chosen this case. Second, I will discuss my choice of research design. Since there was no dataset available related to the case of Geldermalsen and suited for answering my research question, I have decided to create and conduct a survey myself. Third, I will reflect on the research population and the data I have collected. Fourth, I will elaborate on the operationalizations of the used variables, starting with the dependent variables, followed by the independent variables and concluding with the control variables. Fifth and finally, I will reflect on the research method selected to analyse and interpret the collected data, which is a binary logistic regression analysis.

3.1 Case Selection

As briefly mentioned in the introduction, the case of Geldermalsen is interesting for multiple reasons. Before discussing its relevance however, I would like to briefly sketch the context, and describe what happened on 16 December 2015 in Geldermalsen – the day the protests took place.

3.1.1 What Happened on 16 December 2015 in Geldermalsen?

In the past few years, thousands of refugees have tried to get from their native land to the safe grounds of Europe. Refugees are crossing the Mediterranean Sea on fragile boats, to then continue their journey to find a new home. At some point, this migration turned into a crisis, since Europe was not prepared for such an upsurge in the amount of refugee arrivals. It put extra pressure on all European administrations, including the Dutch administration. Therefore, several Dutch municipalities were approached to harbour extra refugees. Geldermalsen was one of those municipalities.

Geldermalsen is a municipality located in the province of Gelderland and consists of eleven towns and villages: Acquoy, Beesd, Buurmalsen, Deil, Enspijk, Geldermalsen, Gellicum, Meteren, Rhenoy, Rumpt and Tricht. In total, the municipality of Geldermalsen is inhabited by approximately 26,000 people. The town Geldermalsen is inhabited by approximately 11,000 people (Nieuwsblad Geldermalsen.nl, 2017). As the refugee centre was supposed to be realized in the town Geldermalsen – not the municipality, that is – thereon I will focus.

The Geldermalsen city council has evaluated multiple possibilities for the admission of refugees, contributing to handling the refugee crisis. The board of mayor and aldermen received a request from the Province of Gelderland to realize large-scale accommodation for 1,500 refugees, over a period of at least 10 years. The board of mayor and aldermen accepted this request, and on 8 December 2015 the city council was informed. All members swore to secrecy until a planned press conference on 11 December 2015, when the plan would be made public. The city council wanted to deliver the message itself to their inhabitants and prevent it from prematurely leaking. Unfortunately, things did not go down the way the city council had planned. Before the press conference could take place, by mistake the news was leaked by the VVD-faction. In turn, this caused a lot of unrest and resistance among the inhabitants of Geldermalsen. From the beginning, opponents had the upper hand. The city council tried to meet the inhabitants' concerns by organizing a public council meeting on 16 December 2015. Shortly after the meeting had begun however, the council chamber had to be cleared out and the meeting was cancelled. Rioters broke through security fences, banged on the windows of the council chamber and threw fireworks and stones at the police. Eventually the riot police had to step in and fired warning shots. Looking back on the protests, police spokesman Paul Koetsiers described the situation as follows: "It was almost like war" (Omroep Gelderland, 2015).

3.1.2 Why the Case of Geldermalsen?

The case of Geldermalsen is interesting for multiple reasons. First of all, the protests were not part of a social movement, but can best be regarded as a single act of protest. As mentioned previously, a social movement is a series of contentious performances, displays and campaigns by which ordinary people make collective claims on others (Lim, 2012; Tilly, 2004). Protest is about engagement in a public demonstration (Leonard and Pelling, 2010). That is, protest is one particular moment, and it can either be part of a social movement or not (Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2013). Indeed there are multiple social movements active in the Netherlands that organized protest actions against the advent of refugees. As regards the protests in Geldermalsen, there are no indications to assume some social movement organization was behind initiating the protests. As the existing literature on protest participation generally focuses on protests as part of some social movement, Geldermalsen makes for an interesting case, as it was not part of a social movement.

Second, nowhere in the Netherlands did the potential arrival of refugees cause so much resistance as in Geldermalsen. In total, 88 protests against plans to establish a refugee centre or the like were registered in the Netherlands. Only in 4 cases did the city council decide to cancel its initial plans, Geldermalsen being one of those cases (Altena and Prenger, 2017). However, there are no signs that the majority of the Geldermalsen inhabitants was indeed against the foundation of a refugee centre. As was the case in most municipalities who witnessed anti-refugee protest actions, the plans were continued. Apparently the base of support for harbouring refugees was large enough despite protest actions. If this was also the case for Geldermalsen, the city council might have made a rather undemocratic decision by letting a loud and dominant minority decide for a silent majority.

Third, as Voorn (2016) suggests, not all participants protested because they were anti-refugee per se. Rather, they did so because they were angry about the way the city council acted. According to some, the city council did not involve the inhabitants of Geldermalsen enough in the decision to accommodate 1,500 refugees. The city council's plan to realize a large refugee centre was leaked, which heavily influenced the intended communication toward its inhabitants. One inhabitant said: "They did not involve us. Within three days, the decision was pushed through. That is like asking for trouble" (Voorn, 2016).

Based on these arguments, I define Geldermalsen as an extreme case. An extreme case is selected for its extreme value on an independent or dependent variable. This means an observation is made that lies far from the normal distribution. It is the rareness of the case that makes it valuable, as it can tell a lot about other similar, though less extreme, cases (Gerring, 2008). As regards the case of Geldermalsen, nowhere in the Netherlands had the plan of realizing a refugee centre caused so much resistance as it did in this particular town. The Geldermalsen protests had the largest turnout and were the most violent protests seen in the Netherlands between August 2015 and May 2016, the heyday of anti-refugee protests (Altena and Prenger, 2017), my research's dependent variable.

Geldermalsen is interesting for another reason as well. Though I regard Geldermalsen's reaction to the potential advent of refugees extreme, Geldermalsen itself is a rather average Dutch town. That is, it does not have many notable characteristics not shared by other Dutch municipalities, e.g. when it comes to welfare and population dynamics (Bureau Louter, 2015). This makes it unlikely the protests were the result of extreme or one-of-a-kind municipality

characteristics. Moreover, it makes the case easier to compare to other municipalities in the Netherlands. Thus, the circumstances under which the protests took place and the initial reaction of the Geldermalsen inhabitants were rather unique; the town of Geldermalsen itself on the other hand compares easily to other Dutch municipalities. Therefore, it is interesting to investigate which individual characteristics and motivations are related to protest participation, and how they unfold within a certain context – in this case the potential arrival of 1,500 refugees.

3.2 Research Design

As there was no dataset available suited for my case and the purpose of my research, I have created and conducted a survey myself. As I created an online survey, I used the software program Qualtrics to create and distribute the survey. In the following section, I will discuss the advantages and disadvantages of surveys, and how I tried to cope with the disadvantages.

3.2.1 Advantages of (Online) Surveys

There are several reasons why (online) surveys are a good method of research, especially so within the context of my research. For example, online surveys are far less intimidating than face-to-face surveys, since it is easier to ensure privacy and guarantee anonymity of respondents. This is especially important when the survey concerns a sensitive topic, which it is in this case. That is also why I included the answering category ‘I don’t know/I don’t want to say’ for many questions, as this makes the survey more ethical and truthful. The anonymity of online surveys should make it easier for respondents to provide open and honest answers. The researcher is not present and therefore respondents do not need to worry about the researcher’s judgement. For example, the researcher’s intonation can already affect the respondent significantly. Moreover, online distribution allows respondents to decide when and where to complete the survey (Brinkman, 2000; Johnston, 2008).

Surveys are also ideal since they provide respondents with standardized answers. This increases precision in terms of measuring variables and data analysis. Surveys allow for extensive data collection about a large population, which aids the research’s representativeness. This makes surveys a great method for comparison. Moreover, from the perspective of the researcher, an online survey is efficient and cheap in reaching a large number of respondents. Data generally can easily be transferred to e.g. a statistical program for further analysis (Brinkman, 2000; ‘t Hart *et al*, 2009; Wester *et al*, 2006).

Compared to other methods of data gathering, surveys enable data collection that has the potential to come as close as possible to exact attributes of the larger population. Furthermore, because of the relatively high level of representativeness, it is often easier to find statistically significant results than other data gathering methods allow for (Brinkman, 2000; 't Hart *et al*, 2009; Johnston, 2008; Wester *et al*, 2006).

3.2.2 Disadvantages of (Online) Surveys

Despite the advantages of surveys, it is not a perfect research method. For example, though the anonymity of surveys is an asset when the topic is controversial, this characteristic is not always ideal. Controversial questions are not always answered precisely because recalling related information can be difficult for respondents. Also, respondents might be ashamed of telling the researcher how they really feel about a certain issue. To limit these risks, I formulated my questions as unbiased as possible and always reminded respondents that there is no such thing as a wrong answer (Brinkman, 2000; Johnston, 2008). When approaching potential respondents, I never gave them my opinion on the subject of the survey. Also, respondents could fill in the survey without my presence.

Some scholars suggest surveys could lead to unclear data because respondents could interpret the questions or answering categories differently (Brinkman, 2000; Johnston, 2008). In order to limit this risk, I asked a few people to fill in my survey before distributing it online. In this way unclear formulated or disputable questions or answers were noticed and adjusted. The people that filled in the test-survey do not belong to the research population, in order to exclude illegitimate responses. Also the survey's routing was checked and optimized. This lead to using 'paging' instead of 'scrolling'. Respondents' answers in this way are saved at several points while filling in the survey, which reduces missing data (Brinkman, 2000).

What's more, respondents may not always be fully aware of their own behaviour or attitudes. Also, either due to a lack of memory or boredom, respondents might not always answer honestly (Johnston, 2008). Therefore, I have tried to keep my survey as short as possible. My survey consisted mostly of closed questions. Since closed questions not necessarily allow for a detailed response – affecting the research's validity – I included an open question. In that way, respondents were free to give as much information and details as they wanted. For some

questions I also added an open answering category, so that respondents always could choose an answer that suited them best (Brinkman, 2000).

However, one of the biggest problems that taint survey research is the risk of non-response. Response rates for online surveys are usually low (Brinkman, 2000). A personal approach is beneficial for response rates and therefore I personally asked people on the streets of Geldermalsen for their email addresses. This also allowed me to send people a reminder to fill in my survey. Another way I tried to improve response rates was by allotting 10 book tokens worth €20,- each. Also when approaching potential respondents, I kept my opinion to myself, I stressed the survey's anonymity and that answers are never wrong – all to limit the researcher's bias, potentially affecting the respondent.

An issue with non-response is that data errors can occur. This is because individuals who do fill in the survey may have different characteristics compared to those who do not, subsequently creating a biased sample (Johnston, 2008; 't Hart *et al*, 2009). Not only does this affect the representativeness of a sample, it may also influence research variables related to individual characteristics. I will reflect on the representativeness of my sample and the consequences in the following paragraph.

3.3 Population and Data Collection

The population of my interest is all adult inhabitants of the town of Geldermalsen – not the municipality, that is. I consider respondents adults when they are 18 years or older. They are considered inhabitants of Geldermalsen when they are registered with the city council of Geldermalsen. To ensure all respondents were from Geldermalsen, I personally asked people whether they live in the town of Geldermalsen. Also, I handed out slips door-to-door only in Geldermalsen. The survey was online from May 11 2017 until July 9 2017.

3.3.1 Data Collection

Because it is unpractical to question all adult inhabitants of Geldermalsen, I have selected a sample. To ensure that response would be as high as possible, potential respondents were always informed that by filling in the survey they made a chance of winning a book token. Also, I always stressed that survey answers would be processed completely anonymous and that answers are never wrong. I have always kept my opinion to myself to prevent potential respondents from assuming I am biased.

I used different ways to approach potential respondents to achieve a higher response and a sample as representative as possible (Brinkman, 2000). First of all, I asked two acquaintances who live in Geldermalsen to fill in my survey and distribute it amongst their network of Geldermalsen inhabitants. This is best described as a snowballing sample. This way of sampling is a non-probability sample, based on finding a suitable number of respondents to complete the survey. A downside is that potential bias is hard to establish ('t Hart *et al*, 2009).

The other ways I tried to find respondents are best described as convenience sampling. For example, I handed out slips of paper door-to-door through Geldermalsen, on which I kindly requested people to fill in my online survey. In total, I handed out 900 such slips. During my route through Geldermalsen I tried to cover most areas to ensure a sample as representative as possible ('t Hart *et al*, 2009), as different neighbourhoods generally have varying characteristics.

As a personal approach is beneficial for response rates, I approached people on the streets in Geldermalsen to fill in my survey. I decided to stand in front of several supermarkets in the Geldermalsen city centre, as super markets are busy places that attract a varied audience. I tried to ask everyone who was about to enter the supermarket, or – if I missed them while entering – when they left the store. Also, I walked around the city centre to find potential respondents. As it turned out, not many people were willing to fill in my survey on the spot, mostly because they were busy running errands. I therefore decided to ask people for their email address, so I could personally send them the link to my survey. Respondents could now fill in the survey whenever and wherever they wanted. It also gave me the opportunity to send people a reminder, beneficial for response rates ('t Hart *et al*, 2009; Wester *et al*, 2006).


Finally I tried to reach potential respondents online. I posted a message on the Facebook page 'Geldermalsen zegt nee tegen AZC', in which I requested people to fill in my survey. The page's content is predominantly anti-refugee. Hence, I hoped it would help me reach people who participated in the Geldermalsen protests. However, since that message did not yield much response, I send members of the Facebook page who lived in Geldermalsen a direct message on Facebook, in which I asked them to fill in my survey.

A convenience sample – like mine – has some clear advantages. In comparison to probability sampling techniques, it is relatively time and cost friendly. On the other hand, a convenience sample is often biased. For example, when I was approaching potential respondents in the streets in Geldermalsen, I stood in front of various supermarkets and walked around the city centre. After all, these are often busy places and attract a varying audience. However, the disadvantage of this method is that I was not able to approach individuals that did not do their groceries that day, or were not in the city centre at that particular moment. The risk is that people who are excluded from the sample share different characteristics, which leads to a biased sample. I tried to diminish this risk by going to Geldermalsen on different weekdays as well as on a Saturday. In any case, a convenience sample is unlikely to lead to a representative and unbiased sample. This undermines the ability to make generalizations, in this case about the Geldermalsen population. In the next paragraph, I will discuss the representativeness of my sample and the implications in more detail.

3.3.2 Representativeness


In total, 173 respondents filled in my survey. According to CBS (2011), in 2011 Geldermalsen had a total of 9490 inhabitants. Of those inhabitants, 4910 were female, and 4580 of them were male, meaning 51.7% of all Geldermalsen inhabitants was female. Of my respondents, 117 are female, 56 of them are male. Thus, 67.6% of my respondents are female. Therefore this group is overrepresented in my sample. The following histogram shows a comparison between my data and CBS data regarding gender.

Figure 2: Histogram Representativeness Gender




According to CBS (2011), in 2011 the average age of all Geldermalsen inhabitants was 41 years. The average age of my respondents is 49 years, indicating an overrepresentation of older inhabitants. On the other hand, I did not include individuals in my sample below the age of 18, which explains the underrepresentation of the age group below 25 and could explain the higher average age of my sample compared to CBS data. Regardless, as the histogram below shows, my sample does show a clear overrepresentation for the age group 46-65.

Figure 3: Histogram Representativeness Age



Furthermore, CBS (2011) determined that in 2011 40% of the Geldermalsen inhabitants was lower educated, another 40% was middle educated, and a final 20% was higher educated. As regards my sample, 21.4% of the respondents completed lower education, 31.2% completed middle education, and 46.2% completed higher education. This means my sample is also not representative when it comes to education for the Geldermalsen population. My sample is overrepresented for the higher educated, whereas it is underrepresented for the lower and middle educated. In the histogram below, a comparison of my data and CBS data regarding education is presented. The classification of lower (basisonderwijs, LBO, VMBO, MAVO), middle (MBO, HAVO, VWO) and higher education (HBO, WO, PhD) was based on the Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek classification (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, 2016).

Figure 4: Histogram Representativeness Education



What do these insights tell? First of all, as the comparison between my data and the CBS data shows, when it comes to gender, age and level of education, my sample is not representative for the population of Geldermalsen. Most likely, this is due to the fact that my sample is relatively small. Also, it might be due to the fact that I have gathered a convenience sample. As mentioned before, a convenience sample can lead to a biased sample, as I selected potential respondents based on their accessibility and proximity as convenient to me. In any case, this means I should be cautious making generalizations about the Geldermalsen population. Also, overrepresentation means the effects of a certain group might be exaggerated, and vice versa underrepresentation might lead to an underestimated effect. For example, since women are overrepresented in my sample, the effect of being female might be exaggerated. Vice versa, the effect of being male might be underestimated.

Not only does the overrepresentation or underrepresentation of my sample make it difficult to make generalizations about the Geldermalsen population, it also possibly affects other research variables. Social capital for example is related to age, gender and level of education. As these variables are not representative for the research population, it might hamper finding an effect of social capital close to the real effect. This also applies to ethnic exclusionist attitude, as Coenders *et al* (2004) found that favouring such an attitude is related to age, gender and level of education.

In the following chapter, when the statistical analysis of my data will be discussed, I will

reflect further on the consequences of a non-representative dataset. The following table summarizes the above-discussed numbers:

Table 2: Comparison My Data and CBS Data

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Category</i>	<i>My Data</i>	<i>CBS Data</i>
Gender	Female	67.6%	51.7%
	Male	32.4%	48.3%
Age	<25	9.8%	29.4%
	26 – 45	25.4%	23.4%
	46 – 65	50.9%	29.1%
	>66	13.9%	18.1%
	Average	49 years	41 years
Level of education	Lower education	21.4%	40%
	Middle education	31.2%	40%
	Higher education	46.2%	20%

3.4 Operationalizations

In the following section I will discuss the operationalizations of the dependent, independent and control variables. I will make a link between the hypotheses as formulated in Chapter 2 and the survey questions that fit the theoretical idea behind these hypotheses. The complete survey (in Dutch) can be found in the Appendix, section A1. For a detailed overview of the variables' descriptive statistics, please consult Table 3.

3.4.1 Dependent Variable

Protest Participation

I am interested in what motivates people to participate in anti-refugee protests. To answer my research question, I look at the case of Geldermalsen, which witnessed violent anti-refugee protests on 16 December 2015. Hence, my dependent variable is protest participation in the Geldermalsen protests. Respondents were therefore asked the following question:

- Heeft u meegedaan aan de protesten in Geldermalsen in december 2015? (*Did you participate in the Geldermalsen protests in December 2015?*)
 - Ja (Yes)
 - Nee maar ik had wel mee willen doen (*No, but I wanted to participate*)
 - Nee maar ik was het wel eens met de protesten (*No, but I did agree with the*

protests)

- Nee (*No*)

Since this question does not yield very detailed answers, I also included an open question to find out more about respondents' motivations for either protesting or not protesting. I formulated the following question, the answers to which will be extensively discussed in Chapter 4:

- Kunt u aangeven waarom u (niet) met de protesten heeft meegedaan? (*Can you indicate why you (did not) participate(d) in the protests?*)

Based on respondents' answers to the open question, I have decided to create two respondent categories for my statistical analysis: protest participants and protest non-participants. In Chapter 4 I will discuss this decision more deeply. The protest variable is hence a dichotomous one, which is most suited for the binary logistic regression analysis I conducted. I created a dummy variable. If respondents answered 'Yes' the answering category was coded as 1. The other three answering categories were coded as 0.

3.4.2 Independent Variables

Ethnic Exclusionist Attitude

Above all, an individual has to believe in the cause of protest is he or she to participate. An ethnic exclusionist attitude forms the basis of believing in the cause of anti-refugee protest. A good case can be made for using the methods applied by Coenders and colleagues for measuring an ethnic exclusionist attitude. The authors have used comparable measures for the past two decades (Coenders, 2001; Coenders *et al*, 2004; Coenders *et al*, 2015; Coenders and Scheepers, 1998; Coenders and Scheepers, 2008; Lubbers *et al*, 2006; Savelkoul *et al*, 2011; Scheepers *et al*, 2002). I base my measure of an ethnic exclusionist attitude on: 1) the perceived threat someone experiences regarding refugees and; 2) how someone feels regarding harbouring refugees.

As regards perceived threat, I selected statements most suited for my research from Scheepers *et al* (2002), Coenders (2001) and Boelhouwer *et al* (2016). These statements regard threat as experienced for social security, society, security in general, unemployment and culture. Respondents were asked to what extent they agreed or disagreed with the following statements, and were able to answer on a five-point scale (totally agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, totally disagree):

- Mensen van etnische minderheidsgroepen maken misbruik van de sociale zekerheden die de Nederlandse overheid biedt (*People from ethnic minority groups abuse social securities offered by the Dutch government*)
- De (religieuze) tradities van etnische minderheidsgroepen zijn een gevaar voor de Nederlandse maatschappij (*Ethnic minority groups' (religious) traditions are a danger to Dutch society*)
- De aanwezigheid van etnische minderheidsgroepen is een reden voor onveiligheid in Nederland (*The presence of ethnic minority groups is a reason for unsafety in the Netherlands*)
- De aanwezigheid van etnische minderheden zorgt voor meer werkloosheid onder Nederlanders (*The presence of ethnic minority groups causes unemployment among Dutch people*)
- De aanwezigheid van verschillende culturen is een verrijking van onze samenleving (*The presence of different cultures is an enrichment to our society*)

To measure how someone feels regarding harbouring refugees, I included statements from Kanne *et al* (2015). Again, respondents were asked to what extent they agreed or disagreed with the following statements, and were able to answer on a five-point scale:

- Het aantal vluchtelingen dat momenteel in Nederland verblijft moet worden teruggedrongen (*The number of refugees currently staying in the Netherlands has to be reduced*)
- De Nederlandse overheid moet stoppen met het opnemen van vluchtelingen (*The Dutch government needs to stop taking in refugees*)
- De Nederlandse overheid moet strenger optreden om de komst van vluchtelingen tegen te gaan (*The Dutch government needs to act more resolutely to stop the arrival of refugees*)

The first step in creating the variable for ethnic exclusionist attitude was to recode respondents' answers. In that way interpretation of the results is more logical, as a higher score now indicates a higher level of ethnic exclusionist attitude. All statements were recoded, except for statement 5, which was already stated in the opposite direction in regard to the other statements. The second step was to conduct a factor analysis in SPSS to check to what extent all statements correlate. The Cronbach's Alpha of 0.944 shows all items correlate very well. No item was deleted from the scale, since this would have only lowered the Cronbach's

Alpha. The third step was to take all 8 statements and create a new variable, using the option 'Mean'.

Social Capital

As discussed in Chapter 2, from a cost-benefit perspective, protest participation seems unlikely. Social capital theory is helpful in explaining why individuals still show a willingness to protest. Trust and networks (indispensable concepts within social capital theory) boost the individual's confidence for protest participation. Based on the OECD definition, I have divided social capital into the following three categories to create an elaborate measure: trust, participation and personal ties. Ultimately, I have created a scale for social capital for which a higher score indicates bridging social capital, whereas a lower score indicates bonding social capital.

Trust

Trust is seen as a good proxy of social capital. It is generally accepted and holds relatively well against other, broader measures (Benson and Rochon, 2004; Glaeser, 2016; World Values Survey Wave 6 201-2014; Van Beuningen *et al*, 2011; Green and Fletcher, 2003). As regards the difference between bonding and bridging social capital, individuals characterized by bonding social capital generally have less trust in groups other than their own, and are less trusting toward institutions (Kawachi *et al*, 2004). Therefore, I have created a scale in which a high level of trust indicates bridging social capital, whereas a lower level of trust indicates bonding social capital. Respondents could answer the following statements on a five-point scale (ranging from totally agree to totally disagree, and respectively from I trust them a lot to I distrust them a lot):

- Trust in other people:
 - Je kunt niet voorzichtig genoeg zijn in de omgang met mensen (*You can never be too careful in dealing with people*)
 - De meeste mensen proberen eerlijk te zijn (*Most people try to be honest*)
 - Kunt u aangeven in welke mate u mensen van verschillende groepen vertrouwt of niet vertrouwt? (*Can you please indicate how much you trust people from various groups?*)
 - Uw familie (*Your family*)
 - Uw burens (*Your neighbours*)
 - Uw vrienden (*Your friends*)

- Uw collega's (*Your colleagues*)
- Mensen die u voor het eerst ontmoet (*People you meet for the first time*)
- Mensen van een andere religie (*People from another religion*)
- Mensen van een andere nationaliteit (*People with another nationaliy*)
- Trust in institutions:
 - Kunt u aangeven in welke mate u de volgende instellingen vertrouwt of niet vertrouwt? (*Can you please indicate to what extent you trust the following institutions?*)
 - De kerk (*The church*)
 - De media (*The media*)
 - De politie (*The police*)
 - De rechtspraak (*The justice*)
 - De regering (*The administration*)
 - De gemeenteraad (*The city council*)
 - Politieke partijen (*Political parties*)
 - Wetenschappers (*Scientists*)
 - Grote bedrijven (*Big companies*)
 - Banken (*Banks*)
 - Goede doelen (*Charity organizations*)
 - Humanitaire organisaties (*Humanitarian organizations*)

All mentioned items were subjected to a factor analysis to determine their correlation. The Cronbach's Alpha for the scale trust is .893, which means the items correlate very well. If item Q20_1 (trust in institutions: church), respectively item Q20_10 (trust in institutions: banks) would be removed from the scale, the Cronbach's Alpha would rise to .898, respectively .894. However, since this only leads to a minimal increase in the Cronbach's Alpha, I have decided to not leave out any items, as this results in a more elaborate measure of trust, and subsequently social capital.

Participation

Participation is another category of social capital as well, as it indicates the individual's involvement. I have not discussed participation in relation to protest. However, it is assumed that being a member of various organizations is beneficial for a broader network, and hence

can be regarded as an indicator for bonding and bridging social capital (Harper and Kelly, 2003; Harpham *et al*, 2002; Kawachi *et al*, 2004). I define participation by means of organization membership, often measured by counting the number of organizations of which an individual is a member (Van Beuningen *et al*, 2011; Engbers *et al*, 2017). Though it is not a perfect proxy, higher membership assumes a greater chance to get into contact with people from different backgrounds (Engbers *et al*, 2017). Hence, a higher score on membership is an indicator of bridging social capital. Vice versa, a lower score on membership indicates bonding social capital. The following statements were used to measure participation, which respondents could answer either with ‘member’ or ‘no member’:

- Kunt u voor de volgende organisaties of verenigingen aangeven of u lid bent of niet?
(*Can you please indicate whether you are or are not a member of the following organizations or associations?*)
 - Religieuze of kerkelijke organisatie (*Religious or ecclesiastic organization*)
 - Sportvereniging (*Sport association*)
 - Hobbyvereniging (*Passtime association*)
 - Onderwijs, kunst, culturele of muzikale organisatie (*Education, art, culture or music organization*)
 - Vakbond (*Trade union*)
 - Politieke partij of groepering (*Political party or group*)
 - Milieuorganisatie (*Environmental organization*)
 - Beroepsvereniging (*Professional association*)
 - Mensenrechtenorganisatie (*Human rights organization*)
 - Liefdadigheidsorganisatie (*Charitable organization*)
 - Zelfhulpgroep (*Self-help group*)
 - Buurtvereniging (*Neighbourhood association*)
 - Consumentenorganisatie (*Consumer organization*)
 - Studenten- of studievereniging (*Student or study association*)

Respondents were given a score between 1 and 5 depending on the count of their organization and association membership for a more straightforward interpretation. A higher score indicates membership of more organizations, whereas a lower score indicates membership of fewer organizations.

Personal Ties

The final social capital category I used is personal ties. Individuals interact with each other through formal and informal, close and less close contacts – i.e. their networks – which generates social capital. The most commonly used way to measure someone's social network is therefore to ask how often individuals meet friends, family or colleagues for social reasons (Engbers *et al*, 2017). Respondents were asked the following question and could choose from the following answers: every day, multiple times per week, once per week, multiple times per month, once per month, less than once per month, rarely/never, I don't know/I don't want to say.

- Kunt u aangeven hoe vaak u om sociale redenen vrienden, familie of collega's ontmoet? (*Can you indicate how often you meet friends, family or colleagues for social reasons?*)

The answering category 'I don't know/I don't want to say' was coded missing. The other seven answering categories were given a score between 1 and 5, where a higher score indicates meeting friends, family or colleagues more often.

After determining the three indicators (trust, participation and personal ties), the final social capital variable was created. The first step was conducting a factor analysis in SPSS to establish to what extent all statements and measures correlate. The factor analysis shows that all statements and questions correlate well, with a Cronbach's Alpha of .885. If item Q20_1 (trust in institutions: church), respectively item Q24 (membership) and item Q21 (personal ties) would have been removed from the scale, the Cronbach's Alpha would rise to .887, respectively .890 and .888. However, since this would only result in a slight increase of the Cronbach's Alpha, I have decided to leave all items in the scale. The second step was to take all statements and create a new variable, using the option 'Mean' in SPSS. As mentioned before, a higher score indicates bridging social capital, whereas a lower score indicates bonding social capital.

Resource Mobilization Theory: Information Dissemination and Attitude Network

As discussed in Chapter 2, according to resource mobilization theory, networks function in two different ways. First of all, within networks opinions are formulated. Hence, networks act as a platform for support. Second, networks act as a platform for discussion and information dissemination, as they function as communication channels through which people can become informed. As opinions within someone's network can be of great influence, it matters

through whom individuals become informed about protest intentions, and what attitudes they come across within their network. As multiple scholars suggest, the influence of someone close is larger than that of a relative stranger (Barkan *et al*, 1995; Klandermans, 1984; McCarthy and Zald, 1977; McGehee, 2002).

Attitude Network

Networks act as a platform for support. Conforming yields social approval, and thus going along with the group is rewarding for an individual. The barrier to participate in anti-refugee protest is then lower when someone's network is more positive about participation in such protests. To measure how the individuals' network felt about the Geldermalsen protests, I asked the following question:

- Over het algemeen, wat vonden uw vrienden/familie/collega's van de protesten? (*In general, what did your friends/family/colleagues think of the protests?*)
 - Iedereen was het met de protesten eens (*Everyone agreed with the protests*)
 - De meesten waren het met de protesten eens (*Most of them agreed with the protests*)
 - Ongeveer de helft was het met de protesten eens (*Approximately half of them agreed with the protests*)
 - De meesten waren het met de protesten oneens (*Most of them disagreed with the protests*)
 - Iedereen was het met de protesten oneens (*Everyone disagreed with the protests*)
 - Zij hebben zich er niet mee bezig gehouden (*They did not involve themselves*)
 - Weet niet/wil ik niet zeggen (*I don't know/I don't want to say*)

The first step in creating the new variable was to recode respondents' answers. In this way, a higher score now indicates that more family, friends or colleagues agreed with the protests. The final two answering categories were coded missing and therefore not included in the analysis.

Information Dissemination

Networks function as communication channels through which people can become informed and where discussions are held. As discussed in Chapter 2, I argue people are most likely to

be mobilized by people that are close to them. Therefore, to measure how people were informed about the Geldermalsen protests, the following question was asked:

- Hoe bent u op de hoogte gebracht dat er geprotesteerd zou gaan worden in Geldermalsen? (*How were you informed about the Geldermalsen protests?*)
 - Via familie/vrienden/collega's (*Through family/friends/colleagues*)
 - Via social media (bijvoorbeeld Facebook of Twitter) (*Through social media (for example Facebook or Twitter)*)
 - Via (lokale) traditionele media (*Through (local) traditional media*)
 - Anders, namelijk... (*Other, namely...*)
 - Weet niet/wil ik niet zeggen (*I don't know/I don't want to say*)

Since I am interested in the influence of family, friends and colleagues (i.e. people close to the individual) on protest participation, I created a dummy variable. The answering category friends/family/colleagues was coded as 1. All other answering categories were coded as 0, except for the last answering category. This category was coded as missing and was therefore not included in the analysis.

Geldermalsen city council

Since it was suggested several times that some people participated not because they were anti-refugee per se, but because they were dissatisfied with the Geldermalsen city council, I included some statements about the Geldermalsen city council on how they handled the situation. The statements could be answered on a five-point scale, ranging from totally agree to totally disagree:

- De gemeente heeft goed gehandeld wat betreft de opvang van vluchtelingen (*The city council acted well regarding the harbouring of refugees*)
- De gemeente heeft naar haar inwoners geluisterd (*The city council listened to its inhabitants*)

Respondents' answers to the first statement were recoded. In this way, a higher score now indicates a higher satisfaction with the Geldermalsen city council.

Interaction Variable

Adding interaction effects to a regression model can significantly increase the understanding of the relationship among variables in the model. Two independent variables interact if the effect of one independent variable may depend on the level of the other independent variable.

Interaction between Social Capital and Ethnic Exclusionist Attitude

Before creating an interaction variable between social capital and ethnic exclusionist attitude, I checked whether both variables – besides theoretically – correlate statistically. The correlation analysis executed in SPSS demonstrated that the social capital and ethnic exclusionist attitude variables indeed correlate. The correlation coefficient of $-.672$ indicates that a one-unit increase in social capital (which on my scale would indicate an increase in the level of bridging social capital) means a $.672$ decrease in ethnic exclusionist attitude – as theoretically expected. Moreover, the found effect shows a strong relation (McGraw Hill, 2010). In other words, this means an individual with bridging social capital is less likely to have an ethnic exclusionist attitude. An individual with bonding social capital (indicated by a lower score on the social capital scale) is vice versa more likely to have an ethnic exclusionist attitude. The correlation between social capital and ethnic exclusionist attitude is significant ($p < 0.001$). The final step was to create a new variable in SPSS, multiplying the social capital variable with the ethnic exclusionist attitude variable.

Control Variables

An observed correlation between an independent and dependent variable can be the result of other factors, that is, spurious factors. Certain variables are therefore kept constant, so that the researcher can come as close as possible to the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable. Such variables are generally referred to as control variables, and can best be described as a variable held constant to minimize its effect on the dependent variable ('t Hart *et al*, 2009). To ensure the independent variables indeed are related to protest participation, I controlled for three individual characteristics: gender, age and level of education.

Gender

In order to determine someone's gender, I asked respondents the following question:

- Wat is uw geslacht? (*What is your gender?*)
 - Vrouw (*Female*)
 - Man (*Male*)

The gender variable is recoded into a dummy variable, with females as reference category, hence coded as 1. The male category was coded as 0.

Age

In order to measure someone's age, I asked respondents the following question:

- Wat is uw leeftijd? (*What is your age?*)

Respondents were able to enter their age numerically. The measurement level is therefore ordinal/ratio.

Level of Education

To measure level of education, respondents were asked the following question:

- Wat is uw hoogst genoten opleiding? (*What is your highest level of education you have completed?*)
 - Basisonderwijs
 - Lager beroepsonderwijs (LBO, VMBO)
 - Middelbaar algemeen voorbereidend onderwijs (MAVO)
 - Middelbaar beroepsonderwijs (MBO)
 - Hoger algemeen voorbereidend, wetenschappelijk onderwijs (HAVO, VWO)
 - Hoger beroepsonderwijs (HBO)
 - Wetenschappelijk onderwijs (WO)
 - Post wetenschappelijk onderwijs (PhD)
 - Anders, namelijk...
 - Weet niet/wil ik niet zeggen

The final two categories were coded missing. The education variable is recoded into a dummy variable, with lower education as the baseline category. The classification of lower (basisonderwijs, LBO, VMBO, MAVO), middle (MBO, HAVO, VWO) and higher education (HBO, WO, PhD) was based on the Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek classification (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, 2016).

The following table gives an overview of the descriptive statistics of all discussed variables. The valid N, minimum, maximum, mean and standard deviation are given. For the dummy variables, I included the percentage of the relevant group as part of the total valid N. By

running descriptives, odd values stand out and can subsequently be dealt with. Also, it is an easy way to check whether all values that should be coded ‘missing’ are in fact coded as such. Descriptive statistics also help clarify the answering pattern of a specific variable. It moreover serves as a check of the data to see which part is suitable for more advanced statistical analysis (Te Grotenhuis and Matthijsen, 2011).

Table 3: Descriptive Values of Control Variables, Dependent Variable and Independent Variables

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Valid N</i>	<i>Minimum</i>	<i>Maximum</i>	<i>Mean/ Percentage</i>	<i>Standard Deviation</i>
<u>DEPENDENT VARIABLE</u>					
Protest participation (dummy)					
Participation	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference
Non-participation	173	0	1	12.7%	n/a
<u>INDEPENDENT VARIABLES</u>					
Ethnic exclusionist attitude	173	1	5	2.962	1.053
Social capital	173	2.09	4.22	3.348	0.441
Interaction social capital and ethnic exclusionist attitude	173	3.91	15.7	9.608	2.780
Attitude network	167	1	5	3.036	1.275
Information dissemination (dummy)					
Informed by family, friends or colleagues	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference
Other	161	0	1	43.5%	n/a
Attitude city council (The city council has handled the issue of harbouring refugees well)	171	1	5	2.204	1.051
Attitude city council (The city council has listened to its inhabitants)	172	1	5	3.520	1.235
<u>CONTROL VARIABLES</u>					
Gender (dummy)					
Female	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference
Male	173	0	1	67.7%	n/a
Age	173	17	74	49.27	14.918
Level of education (dummy)					
Lower educated	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference
Middle educated	171	0	1	31.2%	n/a
Higher educated	171	0	1	46.2%	n/a

3.5 Research Method

To analyse and interpret the collected data, and to see whether the theoretically established independent variables predict the dependent variable, I conducted a binary logistic regression analysis. Such an analysis is suited when the purpose of research is to assess if a set of independent variables predicts a dichotomous dependent variable. This type of analysis can be applied when the independent variables – or predictors – are continuous, discrete, or a combination of continuous and discrete (Peng *et al*, 2002). The dependent variable I am interested in is protest participation. The independent variables are ethnic exclusionist attitude, social capital, the attitude of someone's network toward protest participation and information dissemination. I also consider an interaction variable between social capital and ethnic exclusionist attitude.

The main assumption of a binary logistic regression analysis is that the outcome variable is dichotomous, and thus consists of two levels: case and non-case. The two categories are usually coded as 0 and 1, as this leads to the most straightforward interpretation. In this case 0 means non-case or not present, whereas 1 indicates case or present. For my research, protest participation is denoted as 1, non-participation is denoted as 0 (McGraw Hill, 2010).

As the dependent variable has only two values (0 and 1), the result cannot be a linear line. Though the resultant plot will be linear in the middle, it will be curved at the ends. Such an S-shape is difficult to interpret with a linear equation. Also, the errors are not normally distributed and are not constant across the data. For interpretation of the results, the logistic regression therefore applies the logit transformation to the dependent variable. That is, the logistic model predicts the logit of Y from X. The logit is the natural logarithm (ln) of the odds of Y. Odds are ratios of the probability of Y happening. Odds ratios on the other hand are the probability that an event will happen, divided by the probability that the event will not happen (Peng *et al*, 2002). Odds ratios have a minimum value of zero, but have no upper limit. A value less than 1 indicates a negative effect of the independent on the dependent variable. In other words, the odds of the event happening against the odds of the event not happening are lower. On the other hand, when the odds ratio is above 1, this indicates a positive effect. Vice versa, the odds of the event happening against the odds of the event not happening are higher. A binary logistic regression analysis, then, allows me to evaluate the odds that someone will or will not participate in protest, based on the combination of

established theoretical predictors. Such an analysis quantifies the relationship between the dichotomous dependent variable and the predictors using odds ratios.

One of the assumptions that should not be violated when conducting a binary logistic regression analysis is that of multicollinearity: the independent variables ideally should not correlate too much. However, as it turned out, there is multicollinearity between most variables in my analysis. Though some variables were theoretically expected to correlate, this does not apply to all. The fact that variables significantly correlate means that one can be linearly predicted from the other, with a substantial degree of accuracy. Though multicollinearity does not reduce the predictive power or reliability of the model as a whole, it affects the interpretation of the independent variables. That is, a regression analysis with correlated independent variables can indicate how well all independent variables predict the dependent variable, but it may not give valid results about any individual predictors, or about which predictors are superfluous with respect to others (McGraw Hill, 2010). When executing the statistical analyses, a model including all predictors did not yield significant results (Model 6). I have therefore decided to test and present all hypotheses in separate models. Please consult Table 9 for an overview of all models.

Next to a binary logistic regression analysis – applied to the closed survey questions – I also did a content analysis of the answers to the open question I included in the survey. As mentioned before, the closed survey questions do not necessarily give insight into respondents' motivations, especially ones that lie on the top of their mind regarding protest participation. Adding an open question therefore allowed me to gather more detailed information about protest participation. Moreover, I was able to look into motivations for not protesting. I created various categories, some of which are based on the literature discussed in Chapter 2, others who are not theoretically linked.

Chapter 4: Results

To test the hypotheses and subsequently answer the research question, I have gathered quantitative as well as qualitative data by creating and conducting a survey myself. First, I will discuss the quantitative results. I conducted a binary logistic regression analysis to investigate which independent variables have a significant effect on the dependent variable. I will discuss my results hypothesis-for-hypothesis to explore the relationship between my

dependent and independent variables and subsequently determine whether they can be supported or not. Second, I will discuss the qualitative results based on an open question from the survey. For an overview of all statistical models and the model including all predictors, please consult Table 9.

4.1 Quantitative Results

In the previous chapter I have provided the theoretical and methodological arguments for conducting a binary logistic regression analysis. For the record, a binary logistic regression analysis is an appropriate way for the multivariate modelling of one categorical dependent variable. The dependent variable in a binary logistic regression analysis is a dichotomous variable. This means it is a nominal variable consisting of only two categories. In addition, this type of analysis is also often used in comparative research to investigate the influence of several relevant independent variables.

4.1.1 Model 1: Ethnic Competition Theory

The first hypothesis is formulated as follows: Individuals with a higher level of ethnic exclusionist attitude are more likely to participate in anti-refugee protest. In order to test this hypothesis, two variables were subjected to a binary logistic regression analysis: ethnic exclusionist attitude and protest participation. A test of the model without controls in which protest participation is the dependent, and ethnic exclusionist attitude is the independent variable, was statistically significant. The results indicate that the higher someone's ethnic exclusionist attitude, the more likely he or she is to participate in anti-refugee protest (chi square=33.957, $p<.001$ with $df=1$). When controlling for age, gender and level of education, the model seems to be a slight improvement over the baseline model (chi square=42.826, $p<.05$ with $df=5$). This means the model with controls is explaining more of the variance in the outcome than the baseline model.

As regards the coefficient of ethnic exclusionist attitude, the logged odds regression coefficient itself is not directly meaningful, nor intuitive. Therefore, it is better to interpret the $\text{Exp}(B)$ column, that reports an odds ratio based on the logged odds regression coefficient. As can be read from Table 4, in the model with controls ethnic exclusionist attitude has an odds ratio of 4.606. This means that for every one-unit increase on the scale of ethnic exclusionist attitude – indicating a higher level of ethnic exclusionist attitude – the odds of protest participation increase by factor 4.606. In other words, when controlling for the effects of age,

gender and level of education, the predicted odds of protest participation increase by 360.6% $((4.606-1)*100)$.

As can be read from Table 4, regarding the model with controls, gender and level of education are not significant. This means the influence of these variables on the found relationship between protest participation and ethnic exclusionist attitude cannot be established with certainty. This strengthens the assumption that an ethnic exclusionist attitude influences protest participation. Age on the other hand is found significant. The odds ratio of age of .949 indicate that every one-unit increase in age leads to a decrease in the odds of protest participation. Thus, when controlling for the effect of age, the predicted odds of protest participation decrease by factor .949 or by 5.1% $((.949-1)*100)$ for every year a person is older. In other words, this means the younger someone is, the more likely he or she is to participate in anti-refugee protests.

Taking these results into consideration, hypothesis 1 is supported. Thus, as was theoretically predicted, individuals with a higher level of ethnic exclusionist attitude are more likely to participate in anti-refugee protest. The results are summarized in the following table:

Table 4: Binary Logistic Regression Analysis Protest Participation (Y) and Ethnic Exclusionist Attitude (X)

Variables	B	S.E.	p value	Odds Ratio	Wald
<i>Model without controls</i>					
Ethnic exclusionist attitude	1.526***	.324	.000	4.600	22.241
Chi square	33.957***		.000		
Nagelkerke R ²	.336				
<i>Model with controls</i>					
Ethnic exclusionist attitude	1.527***	.380	.000	4.606	16.118
Age	-.052*	.020	.010	.949	6.680
Gender (dummy)					
Female	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference
Male	.686	.625	.273	1.985	1.203
Level of education (dummy)					
Lower education	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference
Middle education	-1.172	.741	.114	.310	2.498
Higher education	-.987	.899	.273	.373	1.204
Chi Square	42.826***		.000		

4.1.2 Model 2: Social Capital Theory

Hypothesis 2 states that individuals with a higher level of bonding social capital are more likely to participate in anti-refugee protest. In order to test this hypothesis, two variables were subjected to a binary logistic regression analysis: social capital and protest participation. A test of the model without controls in which protest participation is the dependent, and social capital the independent variable, was statistically significant (chi square=28.011, $p<.001$ with $df=1$). The results indicate that bonding social capital – indicated by a lower score on the social capital scale – indeed is related to protest participation. When controlling for age, gender and level of education, the model seems to be an improvement over the baseline model (chi square=42.119, $p<0.001$ with $df=5$). This means the model with controls is explaining more of the variance in the outcome than the baseline model.

As discussed in Chapter 3, a higher score on the social capital scale indicates bridging social capital. Subsequently, a lower score should be interpreted as bonding social capital. As can be read from Table 5, the model with controls shows an odds ratio for social capital of .049. Since the odds ratio is below 1, this indicates a negative relationship between the dependent and independent variable. This means that a one-unit increase on the scale of social capital, the odds of protest participation decrease. An odds ratio below 1 is however not very intuitive to interpret. Therefore, inverting the odds ratio leads to a more straightforward interpretation. Then, for a one-unit increase on the scale of social capital, I expect an increase of factor 20.408 ($1/.049$) or a 1,940.8% $((20.408-1)*100)$ increase in not participating in anti-refugee protests. In other words, an individual with bridging social capital is less likely to participate in anti-refugee protest. On the other hand, an individual with bonding social capital is therefore more likely to participate in anti-refugee protest.

When looking at the influence of age, gender and level of education on the relation between protest participation and social capital, only age is found to have a significant influence. The odds ratio of age of .944 indicate that every one-unit increase in age leads to a decrease in the odds of protest participation. When controlling for the effect of age, the predicted odds of protest participation decrease by 5.6% $((.944-1)*100)$ for every year a person is older. As was

the case in Model 1, the younger someone is, the more likely he or she is to participate in anti-refugee protests.

Taking these results into consideration, hypothesis 2 can be supported. Thus, as theoretically expected, an individual with bonding social capital is more likely to participate in anti-refugee protest. Vice versa, an individual with bridging social capital is less likely to participate in anti-refugee protest. The results are presented in the following table:

Table 5: Binary Logistic Regression Analysis Protest Participation (Y) and Social Capital (X)

Variables	B	S.E.	p value	Odds Ratio	Wald
<i>Model without controls</i>					
Social capital	-2.919***	.637	.000	.054	20.989
Chi square	28.011***		.000		
Nagelkerke R ²	.282				
<i>Model with controls</i>					
Social capital	-3.012***	.751	.000	.049	16.069
Age	-.058*	.019	.003	.944	9.033
Gender (dummy)					
Female	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference
Male	1.135	.072	.084	3.113	3.245
Level of education (dummy)					
Lower education	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference
Middle education	-1.123	.716	.117	.325	2.458
Higher education	-1.523	.821	.064	.218	3.438
Chi square	42.119***		.000		
Nagelkerke R ²	.407				

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

4.1.3 Model 3: Ethnic Competition Theory and Social Capital Theory

Hypothesis 3 assumes an interaction effect between social capital and ethnic exclusionist attitude, as it states that individuals with a higher level of bonding social capital and a higher level of ethnic exclusionist attitude are more likely to participate in anti-refugee protest. In order to test the hypothesis, four variables were subjected to a binary logistic regression analysis: the interaction variable, ethnic exclusionist attitude, social capital and protest participation. A test of the model without controls in which protest participation is the

dependent, and the interaction variable, ethnic exclusionist attitude and social capital are the independent variables, was statistically significant (chi square=36.711, $p<.001$ with $df=3$). As Table 6 shows however, none of the independent variables was found to have a significant effect. When controlling for age, gender and level of education, the model seems to be a slight improvement over the baseline model (chi square=46.279, $p<0.001$ with $df=6$). However, besides the effect of age, also the model with controls does not yield significant effects. Hypothesis 3 therefore cannot be supported by my data.

The fact that Model 3 does not yield significant results (besides for the control variable age) might be due to the fact that my sample is relatively small and hence lacks statistical power. When a sample is small, there is less statistical power left the more variables are entered in a model. On the other hand, a larger sample is no guarantee for a significant effect. It is possible there is indeed no interaction between ethnic exclusionist attitude and social capital, as Model 3 suggests. The results are presented in the following table:

Table 6: Binary Logistic Regression Analysis Protest Participation (Y) and Interaction Ethnic Exclusionist Attitude and Social Capital (X)

Variables	B	S.E.	p value	Odds Ratio	Wald
<i>Model without controls</i>					
Interaction ethnic exclusionist attitude and social capital	-.156	.726	.830	.855	.046
Ethnic exclusionist attitude	1.594	2.363	.500	4.923	.455
Social capital	-.670	3.044	.826	.511	.048
Chi square	36.711***		.000		
Nagelkerke R ²	.361				
<i>Model with controls</i>					
Interaction ethnic exclusionist attitude and social capital	-.433	.821	.598	.648	.278
Ethnic exclusionist attitude	2.319	2.632	.378	10.166	.776
Social capital	-.071	3.392	.983	.932	.000
Age	-.060*	.021	.005	.942	7.870
Gender (dummy)					
Female	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference
Male	.983	.675	.145	2.672	2.123
Level of education (dummy)	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference

Lower education	-1.380	.811	.089	.252	2.896
Middle education	-1.249	.983	.204	.287	1.613
Higher education					
Chi Square	47.676***		.000		
Nagelkerke R ²	.454				

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

4.1.4 Model 4: Resource Mobilization Theory – Attitude Network

Hypothesis 4 suggests that when an individual's network is generally positive about anti-refugee protest participation, the individual is more likely to participate in such protests. In order to test this hypothesis, two variables were subjected to a binary logistic regression analysis: attitude network and protest participation. A test of the model without controls in which protest participation is the dependent, and attitude network the independent variable, was statistically significant (chi square=29.542, $p<.001$ with $df=1$). When controlling for age, gender and level of education, the model seems to be a slight improvement compared to the baseline model (chi square=38.701, $p<.001$ with $df=4$). This means the model with controls is explaining more of the variance in the outcome than the baseline model.

As can be read from Table 7, in the model with controls the odds ratio of attitude network is 3.463. As the odds ratio is larger than 1, the relationship between the dependent and independent variable is a positive one. This means every one-unit increase on the scale of attitude network (indicating a network more positive toward anti-refugee protest participation), the odds of protest participation increase by factor 3.463 or by 246.3% $((3.463-1)*100)$, compared to not participating in protest.

When considering the influence of age, gender and level of education, only age is found to have a significant effect. The odds ratio of age of .956 again indicates a negative influence on the found relation between protest participation and attitude network. In other words, every one-unit increase in age leads to a decrease in protest participation of factor .956 or 4.4% $((.956-1)*100)$. As is the case in Model 1, 2 and 3, the younger someone is the more likely he or she is to participate in anti-refugee protest. Gender and level of education are not significant, and therefore do not have an influence in this model.

Based on these findings, hypothesis 4 is supported by my data. This means that when an individual's network is more positive about anti-refugee protest participation, the individual is more likely to participate in such protests. The results are presented in the following table:

Table 7: Binary Logistic Regression Analysis Protest Participation (Y) and Attitude Network (X)

Variables	B	S.E.	p value	Odds Ratio	Wald
<i>Model without controls</i>					
Attitude network	1.309***	.311	.000	3.703	17.723
Chi square	29.542***		.000		
Nagelkerke R ²	.307				
<i>Model with controls</i>					
Attitude network	1.242***	.337	.000	3.463	13.582
Age	-.047*	.019	.012	.954	6.311
Gender (dummy)					
Female	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference
Male	.798	.643	.215	2.222	1.539
Level of education					
Lower education	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference
Middle education	-.969	.715	.176	.380	1.833
Higher education	-1.447	.867	.095	.235	2.784
Chi square	38.701***		.000		
Nagelkerke R ²	.392				

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

4.1.5 Model 5: Resource Mobilization Theory – Information Dissemination

Hypothesis 5 assumes that when an individual is informed by his or her network about anti-refugee protests, he or she is more likely to participate in such protests. In order to test this hypothesis, two variables were subjected to a binary logistic regression analysis: information dissemination and protest participation. A test of the model without controls in which protest participation is the dependent, and information dissemination the independent variable, was statistically significant (chi square=9.170, p<0.01 with df=1). When controlling for age, gender and level of education, the model appears to be an improvement compared to the baseline model (chi square=25.170, p<0.001 with df=4). This means the model with controls is explaining more of the variance in the outcome than the baseline model.

As can be read from Table 8, the odds ratio in the model with controls for information dissemination is calculated at 3.565. As the odds ratio is larger than 1, it indicates a positive relationship between the dependent and independent variable. Since information dissemination is a dummy variable, the interpretation of the odds ratio is slightly different from the other hypotheses, where the independent variables are continuous. The odds of protest participation of the group that was informed by family, friends or colleagues is larger than the odds of protest participation for the group that was informed in another way. Being informed by family, friends or colleagues increases an individual's odds of anti-refugee protest participation by factor 3.565. Put differently, being informed by family, friends or colleagues increases the odds of protest participation by 254.6% $((3.565-1)*100)$.

Looking at the influence of age, gender and level of education, only level of education has a significant effect on the found relation between information dissemination and protest participation – though only so for the dummy Higher education. The odds ratio of .088 is lower than 1, which indicates the odds of anti-refugee protest participation for the group of higher educated individuals is lower than the odds for the other group. Inverting the odds ratio, I expect an increase of factor 11.364 $(1/.088)$ or a 1,036.4% $((11.364-1)*100)$ increase in not participating when an individual is higher educated. In other words, a higher educated individual is less likely to participate in anti-refugee protests. Gender and age are not significant, and therefore do not have an influence in this model.

Taking these results into consideration, hypothesis 5 is supported by my data. Thus, when informed by his or her network, an individual is more likely to participate in anti-refugee protest. The results are presented in the following table:

Table 8: Binary Logistic Regression Analysis Protest Participation (Y) and Information Dissemination (X)

Variables	<i>B</i>	<i>S.E.</i>	<i>p value</i>	<i>Odds Ratio</i>	<i>Wald</i>
<i>Model without controls</i>					
Information dissemination (dummy)					
Informed by family, friends or colleagues	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference
Other	1.453***	.510	.004	4.277	8.128
Chi Square	9.170**		.002		
Nagelkerke R ²	.101				

<i>Model with controls</i>					
Information dissemination (dummy)					
Informed by family, friends or colleagues	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference
Other	1.271*	.567	.025	3.565	5.025
Age	-.033	.018	.065	.967	3.416
Gender	1.009	.570	.077	2.742	3.128
Level of education (dummy)					
Lower education	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference
Middle education	-1.257	.673	.062	.284	3.493
Higher education	-2.434**	.744	.001	.088	10.701
Chi Square	25.170***		.001		
Nagelkerke R ²	.264				

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

4.1.8 Interpretation Quantitative Results

As a final step in my statistical analysis, I put all predictors together in one model – though this does violate the assumption of no multicollinearity. However, I was not able to get any significant results, except for the control variable age. This makes determining what predictor has the strongest effect on the dependent variable less straightforward. Therefore, interpreting the R² of each model might be helpful. In a linear regression model the R² summarizes the proportion of variance in the dependent variable associated with the independent variables. A larger R² indicates the model explains more of the variance. A smaller R² indicates the opposite; the model explains less of the variance. The Nagelkerke R² – which I reported – is an adjusted version of the Cox & Snell R² that adjusts the scale of the statistic to cover the full range from 0 to 1. The Cox & Snell R² has a theoretical maximum value of less than 1, even for a perfect model. Therefore, the Nagelkerke R² provides a better interpretation of the explained variance (McGraw Hill, 2010).

When looking at the models with significant predictors (that is, all models except Model 3) the lowest Nagelkerke R² is .264 and was calculated for the model that tests the effect of information dissemination on protest participation, in which level of education is a significant control variable (Model 5). The highest Nagelkerke R² is .413 and was calculated for the model that tests the effect of ethnic exclusionist attitude on protest participation, where age is a significant control variable (Model 1). This means my models explain 26.4 per cent of all

variance at the lowest, and 41.3 per cent of all variance at the highest – indicating there is still quite some variance left to explain.

When looking at the odds ratio of the models, the largest effect was calculated for social capital. The (relative) smallest effect was calculated for the attitude of someone's network. As regards the models I have calculated, social capital seems to have the largest effect, though the model that tests the effect between social capital and protest participation did not show the largest R^2 . The individual's ethnic exclusionist attitude on the other hand seems to explain the most variance within that model, though not the largest effect on protest participation. In any case, without a significant model that tests all predictors, it is hard to establish what predictor has the strongest influence on protest participation. However, the point of the binary logistic regression analysis was to see if there is a reliable relationship – even a small one. And as it turned out, there is.

Table 9 gives an overview of all models with control variables, including Model 6, where all predictors are put together in one model. As can be read from Table 9, my statistical analysis has pointed out several significant predictors of anti-refugee protest participation. Attitudes matter, as well as the individual's social capital, the individual's network's attitude toward protest participation and by whom the individual was informed about the protests. Both the structural and agential explanans seem to be of influence in motivating an individual to participate in anti-refugee protest. However – as the R^2 of the models suggests – these predictors do not fully explain what motivates individuals to participate in anti-refugee protests. The question arises what other factors motivate an individual to participate in anti-refugee protest – or not protest, for that matter. For example, it remains unclear what motivates individuals in the first place to participate in anti-refugee protests. Therefore, in an attempt to gain a better and deeper insight quantitative results cannot provide, I will continue my analysis qualitatively: the following section presents the answers respondents have given to the open question included in my survey.

Table 9: Overview Logit Estimates of Protest Participation (Y)

Model	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
	B	OR	B	OR	B	OR	B	OR	B	OR	B	OR
<i>Variables</i>												
<i>Ethnic exclusionist attitude</i>	1.527*** (.380)	4.606	.	.	2.319 (2.632)	10.166	.	.	.	.	3.013 (2.978)	20.346
<i>Social capital</i>	.	.	-3.012*** (.751)	.049	-.071 (3.392)	.932	.	.	.	.	.970 (3.708)	2.638
<i>Interaction ethnic exclusionist attitude and social capital</i>	.	.	.	.	-.433 (.821)	.648	.	.	.	.	-.848 (.913)	.428
<i>Attitude network</i>	.	.	.	.	.	.	1.242*** (.337)	3.463	.	.	.675 (.427)	1.964
<i>Information dissemination</i>	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	1.271* (.567)	3.565	1.455 (.793)	4.283
<i>Age</i>	-.052* (.020)	.949	-.058* (.019)	.944	-.060* (.021)	.942	-.047* (.019)	.954	-.033 (.018)	.967	-.045* (.023)	.956
<i>Gender</i>												
<i>Female</i>	Reference		Reference		Reference		Reference		Reference		Reference	
<i>Male</i>	.686 (.625)	1.985	1.135 (.072)	3.113	.983 (.675)	2.672	.798 (.643)	2.222	1.009 (.570)	2.742	.973 (.777)	2.645
<i>Level of education</i>												
<i>Lower education</i>	Reference		Reference		Reference		Reference		Reference		Reference	
<i>Middle education</i>	-1.172 (.741)	.310	-1.123 (.716)	.325	-1.380 (.811)	.252	-.969 (.715)	.380	-1.257 (.673)	.284	-.836 (.907)	.433
<i>Higher education</i>	-.987 (.899)	.373	-1.523 (.821)	.218	-1.249 (.983)	.287	1.447 (.867)	.235	-2.434** (.744)	.088	-1.002 (1.121)	.367
<i>Nagelkerke R²</i>	.413		.407		.454		.392		.264		.537	

b logit-coefficient, standard errors in parentheses, odds ratio, *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

4.2 Qualitative Results

Statistical analysis provides a good insight into underlying individual characteristics that are related to anti-refugee protest participation, as well as contextual factors, which the previous paragraph has made clear. However, presenting conclusions solely based on numbers does not necessarily bring forth a comprehensive understanding of anti-refugee protest participation. Quantitative data often lacks profundity and provides relatively superficial results (Brinkman, 2000). Moreover, as the R^2 of the models has shown, there is still quite some variance left to explain. Therefore, to find out more about what motivates respondents in the first place to participate in anti-refugee protests, I added an open question to my survey. Through the combination of both quantitative and qualitative results, I hope to create a more comprehensive explanation of what motivates people to participate in anti-refugee protests.

The literature discussed in Chapter 2 is primarily focussed on underlying individual characteristics and contextual factors – as mentioned before the structural and agential explanans. Therefore, adding an open question to my survey hopefully gives better insight into somewhat more superficial reasons for anti-refugee protest participation. While I will go beyond the discussed literature when analysing respondents' answers, I do reflect back on it. Ultimately, not all answers could be classified within the theoretical categories as discussed in Chapter 2. I have not included all statements in the following section. For an overview and count of all answering categories please consult Table 10. For an overview of all statements, please consult the Appendix, section A2 and A3.

Before continuing with the discussion of respondents' answers, it is helpful to first explain how I have categorized respondents' answers. First of all, all respondents were asked 'Have you participated in the Geldermalsen protests in December 2015?' They were able to choose from four answering categories: (1) Yes; (2) No, but I would have wanted to participate; (3) No, but I did sympathize with the protests; (4) No. In my statistical analysis I have divided all participants into two groups: 1) Those who participated in the Geldermalsen protests, and; 2) those who did not. I will elaborate on that decision later on. For the qualitative analysis however, I have decided to divide respondents into three categories. The first category consists of respondents who answered 'No' to the previous question (answer (4)). The second category consists of respondents who did participate, and hence answered 'Yes' (answer (1)). The final category consists of respondents who did not protest, but either had wanted to participate (answer (2)), or sympathized with the protesters (answer (3)). Finally, since the

survey was in Dutch, respondents' answers are not translated in order to prevent inaccurate interpretation as much as possible.

4.2.1 Answering Category: No

I will start by discussing the group of respondents that did not protest. Of this group, a total of 101 out of the 113 respondents answered the question 'Can you explain why you did not participate in the Geldermalsen protests?'

In Favour of Refugee Centre/Disagree with Goal of Protests

Quite some respondents mentioned they disagreed with the goal of protest. Respondents stated that they either were in favour of a refugee centre, or were against the cause of protest, that is, to cancel the plan to establish a refugee centre in Geldermalsen. To some extent, these answers reflect aspects of the opposite of an ethnic exclusionist attitude. This is indirect support for hypothesis 1, which states that individuals with a higher ethnic exclusionist attitude are more likely to participate in protest.

"Ik was het niet eens met de standpunten en argumenten die werden gegeven tegen het AZC."

"Ik wil graag dat er een AZC in Geldermalsen komt, ook als het gaat om meer dan 1500 vluchtelingen. Als wij voor Wilders moeten vluchten zouden wij het ook op prijs stellen als we in een ander land welkom zouden zijn. Ik vind het belachelijk dat mensen tegen het opnemen van vluchtelingen zijn."

"Ik was het niet eens met de protesten. De vluchtelingen waren welkom."

Against (Violent) Protest/It Is Not in Me to Protest

Quite some respondents stated they did not protest because they are against protesting in general, or more specifically, against violent protests. One respondent even mentioned that protests as seen in Geldermalsen hurt democracy. This answering category suggests that some individuals might never protest whatever the goal of protest is, simply because they do not identify with this way of collective action.

"Ik was het oneens met het doel van de protesten, en al was ik het ermee eens geweest dan wijs ik verstoring van een openbare raadsvergadering af, zeker als er verbaal- en fysiek geweld aan te pas komt."

“Het lijkt me niet de manier om je mening kenbaar te maken. Geweld en agressie is ten principale een onjuist middel.”

“Protesteren ligt niet in mijn karakter.”

Concerns for Escalation

Another reason respondents gave for not protesting was concern for escalation. Respondents repeatedly expressed their worry for escalation, a too high turn-out or their fear for the protests turning violent. Especially the first quote is interesting, as it might imply a lack of self-efficacy, which means having the feeling that you can make a difference.

“Ik ben niet naar het gemeentehuis gegaan omdat ik verwachtte dat het er zo druk zou zijn dat er geen plaats voor me was.”

“(…) Aan de voorbereidingen te zien, was het mij duidelijk dat de politie op een gewelddadige confrontatie uit was.”

“Ik had een voorgevoel dat het wel eens uit de hand kon gaan lopen en ik ben helemaal niet van geweld gebruiken dus ben daar niet geweest.”

Fear to Express Opinion

Next to concerns about escalation, some respondents explained they did not feel safe to express their opinion to their fellow-inhabitants. One respondent mentioned being present during the protests to represent the pro-refugee group. The respondent left when he or she was being threatened.

The fear to express your opinion not only suggests the issue is highly sensitive, it also emphasizes the influence of embeddedness on individual behaviour. Having an opinion that goes against the general or dominant opinion of your network, might have negative consequences. Being embedded within a certain network thus influences what you can and especially what you cannot talk about. Moreover, the following quotes point out that having an opinion that goes against the general or dominant opinion of someone's network might give individuals the feeling it is better to not say anything at all. Not going against your network might have to do with social approval, as discussed in Chapter 2.

“Ik was voor het AZC. Ik wilde hier niet voor demonstreren, ik vond de sfeer in het dorp niet goed om voor deze mening uit te komen. De kans dat je eigendommen worden beklad of dat je grof gebekt wordt benaderd was mij te groot. In zekere zin was de situatie bedreigend voor mij om mijn mening openlijk te geven. Alleen met burens die ik vertrouw heb ik de situatie besproken.”

“Ik heb niet meegedaan, omdat ik NIET tegen de komst van een AZC in Geldermalsen was. Ik heb op de bewuste avond zelfs met een vriend bij het gemeentehuis gestaan met een bord met de tekst ‘Vluchtelingen Welkom’. Dit hebben we volgehouden totdat we bedreigd werden, het bord uit onze handen was geslagen en we ons niet meer veilig voelden.”

“Omdat ik het verafschuwde, ik wist niet dat er zo veel mensen in dit dorp zich bedreigd zouden voelen.”

Two respondents mentioned the imbalance between the pro-refugee group and the anti-refugee group. This indicates an unfair process, and leaves one wondering what would have happened had the anti-refugee group not been as dominant and expressive as they were.

“(…) Ik ken dus wel veel mensen die het oneens waren met de komst van het AZC en dat op indringende negatieve wijze duidelijk gemaakt hebben. Er waren vast ook wel mensen die voor het AZC waren, net als ik, maar die waren minder agressief in het nieuws. Waarschijnlijk durfden zij dit ook niet vanwege bedreigingen op o.a. Facebook. Ik ben dan ook blij dat deze enquête anoniem is.

“(…) De (in mijn ogen) stelligheid en harde manier van communiceren van het ‘nee-AZC-kamp’ gaf weinig ruimte voor die discussie.”

Compassion for Refugees

Another reason to not participate that was mentioned rather often, had to do with a feeling of compassion and sympathy toward refugees. Respondents argued they felt with the refugees for having to flee their country and homes, and leaving everything behind. To some extent, this answering category reflects aspects of the opposite of an ethnic exclusionist attitude, as respondents show their willingness to harbour refugees.

“(...) Als je door oorlog en geweld getekend bent voor het leven en je komt eindelijk ergens veilig, is het laatste wat je nodig hebt of wilt is dat er mensen tegen je gaan protesteren. Hoe kun je protesteren tegen mensen die zoveel mee gemaakt hebben.”

“Mensen in nood moeten worden opgevangen, daar protesteer ik niet tegen als de opvang toevallig in mijn omgeving is.”

“Vluchtelingen hebben recht op een veilige opvang. Ze zijn slachtoffer van oorlogsgeweld en vluchten niet om ons tot last te zijn maar omdat de situatie in hun land onveilig is.”

Regardless of understanding the difficulty of the situation, harbouring refugees is not an ideal situation for all respondents:

“Ik realiseer me goed dat een vluchteling niet zomaar kiest om te vluchten; de situatie is onhoudbaar en men ziet het vluchten als enige oplossing. Mensen die in deze humanitaire nood verkeren moet opvang aan worden geboden. (...) Ik merk dat vluchtelingen nu een voorkeurspositie krijgen en gratis zorg krijgen die ze nodig hebben, maar wat de Nederlander niet krijgt (terwijl hij deze nodig heeft). Dat geeft een scheve verhouding.

No Time/Not Present

A few respondents indicated they did not participate simply because they had no time, or were not in Geldermalsen at the time of the protests. Some respondents added that even though they were not in Geldermalsen at the time of the protests, this did not make a difference for them, since they would not have participated in any case.

“De belangrijkste reden was dat ik in het ziekehuis lag. Maar had ik instaat geweest om wel te gaan had ik dat niet gedaan.”

“Ik was die dag niet in de buurt en vernam al ruimschoots van tevoren dat het een hele happening zou worden. Ik woon op misschien 200 meter van het stadhuis. Spandoeken, ME etc. zijn nou niet mijn manier om het gesprek aan te gaan.”

“Geen tijd.”

It Is Pointless

Two respondents mentioned they did not protest because they felt there would be no point in protesting. This implies a lack of efficacy, or in any case the sense that such collective actions do not make a difference.

“Was er vanuit gegaan dat het besluit toch al genomen was.”

“Meestal zijn dit soort proteseten zinloos.”

In Favour of Goal, Opposed to Means

Some respondents reported they did agree or sympathized with the protesters, though they were not in favour of how the protesters acted. This possibly means the goal of collective action is important, but the means with which that goal is reached matter more. It might therefore be the case that some individuals will never protest, simply because protest is not their preferred kind of collective action.

“We zijn het eens met de protesten maar niet met de manier waarop het gebeurd is (geweld).”

“Was het gedeeltelijk wel eens met de protesten. Zoals het gegaan is was niet juist. Wilde dit zo snel mogelijk er doorheen duwen. Zonder medeweten van de burgers. Is uitgelekt. Meer openheid was veel beter geweest. Maar niet op deze manier de protesten.”

“Ik hoorde in een winkel dat het uit de uit de hand kon lopen. Mijn (ex) man is wel geweest, maar is op de vlucht geslagen. Ik was het wel eens met de protesten, maar niet op deze manier .”

Unaware of Protests

Some respondents mentioned they did not know a protest was being organized against the city council's decision to harbour 1,500 refugees. Regardless of the fact of being unaware, some respondents did mention they had no intention of protesting even if they had been aware. These quotes indicate the city council did not communicate the matter sufficiently to its inhabitants. Moreover, as there was a small group that was unaware of the protests, this means they could not have discussed it with friends, family or colleagues – or even strangers for that

matter. This could mean the topic was either not relevant within some networks, or too sensitive to discuss.

“Ik had hier geen reden voor en wist overigens ook niet dat er een bijeenkomst was. Ik houd de locale politiek niet zo goed bij.”

“Wij waren niet op de hoogte van het feit dat de gemeenteraad over een AZC zou besluiten, noch dat daartegen actie gevoerd zou gaan worden.”

“(…) Bovendien wist ik ook niet af van de protesten, ben niet actief op social media.”

Criticism City Council

Going through all the answers, most striking was how respondents evaluated the way the Geldermalsen city council handled the refugee issue. Respondents' reasons for not protesting often came with a 'but', judging the Geldermalsen city council, even though they were in favour of a refugee centre being established.

“(…) Ik vind overigens wel, dat de gemeente Geldermalsen de bevolking van tevoren niet goed heeft ingelicht en de mensen heeft overvallen met de mogelijke komst van een AZC.”

“(…) Denk wel dat de gemeente in het hele traject fouten heeft gemaakt. De gemeente had eerder de dialog moeten zoeken. Ook dan was er weerstand geweest en wellicht zelfs in dezelfde mate, maar nu werden mensen wel heel erg overvallen.”

“Ik was het niet eens met de protesten. De vluchtelingen waren welkom. Waar ik niet mee een was dat de Gemeente niet eerlijk is geweest over de aanleiding van het besluit om de vluchtelingen naar Geldermalsen te halen. Er was een financieel tekort wat men hiermee wilde oplossen. Dat klopt niet en was ik niet mee eens.”

Some respondents suggested the way the city council handled the issue was the main cause of protest, or at least provoked such intense reactions.

“(…) Toch begrijp ik de protesten wel en treft de gemeenteraad blaam. 1e. Een AZC van deze omvang (10% van de bevolking) is m.i. te groot voor deze gemeente. 2e. De geplande locatie (op een industrieterrein buiten het dorp langs een drukke aanvoer-route) was gekozen om verliezen op de gemeentebegroting te verdoezelen, en zeker

niet in het belang van asielzoekers vanwege slechte verbindingen en gevaarlijke situaties. 3e. Het plan was in strijd met eerdere toezeggingen/beloftes van B&W. (...) Dat is niet zoals democratie hoort te zijn!”

“(…) Ik snap overigens wel dat de protesten ontstonden. De manier waarop de gemeente Geldermalsen het process heeft gemanaged is niet transparent geweest en was mede oorzaak van de heftigheid van de reactie.”

Doubts Regarding Size Refugee Centre

Criticism was not only directed toward the city council, but also regarded a concern for the total amount of refugees Geldermalsen was supposed to harbour.

“Ik was er niet tegen, alleen had wel moeite met het grote aantal dat zou kunnen gaan komen.”

“Totaal niet kunnen vinden in het verzet tegen vluchtelingen, hoewel het beoogde aantal vluchtelingen niet in verhouding stond met het aantal inwoners.”

“(…) 1.500 vind ik wel veel voor een gemeente zoals Geldermalsen. Het aantal zou in een andere verhouding moeten zijn.”

Shame

Though no respondents mentioned shame as a reason not to participate, it was brought up rather frequently and therefore worth mentioning. Respondents stated they felt ashamed and repulsed about the behaviour of their fellow citizens.

“(…) Ik schaamde me diep voor Geldermalsen.”

“(…) Ik schaam me voor mijn familie en vrienden. Zo doe je niet als je een beetje fatsoen hebt. Er zijn andere manieren om je ongenoegen te uiten.”

“(…) Schaam me nu nog steeds als ik moet zeggen dat ik in Geldermalsen woon.”

Other Reasons

Some answers did not fit well into the above-discussed categories, and have hence been placed together in this category.

“Omdat het mijn baan is die te bestrijden.”

“Ik was een van de genodigden in de raadszaal. Het is mij zinvoller zaken te bespreken dan geweld te gebruiken.”

“De vluchtelingen verschaffen veel werk, het geeft een boost aan de lokale economie, een deel van demografische probleem kan opgelost worden.”

“(...) Ik zag het als een kans, niet als een bedreiging.”

4.2.2 Answering Category: Yes

In the following section I will discuss the answers of the group of respondents that protested. In total, 19 out of the 22 protesters answered the question ‘Can you explain why you participated in the Geldermalsen protests?’

Against the Establishment of a Refugee Centre

One of the most frequently stated reasons to protest was because respondents were against the establishment of a refugee centre. As mentioned in Chapter 3, I measure an ethnic exclusionist attitude as: 1) the perceived threat someone experiences regarding refugees and; 2) how someone feels regarding harbouring refugees. The following answers reflect the first part of an ethnic exclusionist attitude, and therefore support hypothesis 1.

“Dat ie geluks zoekers maar lekker in hun eigen land blijven.”

“Willen niet overlopen worden door een gewelddadige intolerante politieke ideologie die haaks staat op onze normen waarden en cultuur en de vrije westerse beschaving. Daarbij krijgen die mensen zonder pardon alles terwijl de eigen bevolking wordt achter gesteld en overal financieel voor op mogen draaien. Het zijn ook geen vluchtelingen maar illegal immigranten die komen parasiteren op ons sociale system. En in die tussentijd het gastland willen islamiseren.”

“Omdat ik tegen het AZC ben.”

Fear

Some respondents mentioned that they feared the advent of refugees would disturb the city of Geldermalsen. The following answers reflect the second part of my measure of an ethnic exclusionist attitude, and therefore partially support hypothesis 1.

“(...) Ik was en ben bang voor de veiligheid van mijn kind en vrouw. En de rest van eventuele bekende. Er hoeft er maar 1 tussen te zitten met de verkeerde bedoelingen. En dat is er al een te veel. Dit is een vrij rustig dorp met weinig criminaliteit. Wat ik graag zo wil houden. (...) Ik hou van dit dorp. Ik ben hier geboren en ik sterf hier. Ook zou ik de waarden van mijn huis vlink zaken. Als ik hier voor het kopen van mijn nieuwbouwhuis dit wist. Had ik het niet gekocht in 2013.”

“Omdat t voor kinderen en vrouwen met 1500 mannen voornamelijk zeer onveilig was geworden.”

Amount of Refugees

The respondents who protested also had considerable doubts regarding the amount of refugees supposedly to be vested in Geldermalsen – just like the group of respondents that did not protest. It must be noted that some respondents left the scene when the protests turned violent. This indicates ends do not always justify means, at least not for everybody. It also suggests that some individuals do identify with protest, but not with violent protest.

“Ik vond het aantal vluchtelingen dat de gemeente in Geldermalsen wou laten komen te veel, ik ben echter wel weg gegaan toen er rellen ontstonden.”

“Nederland is vol en men ziet dat ze zich niet aanpassen. En zoveel asielzoekers in en klein dorp kan gewoon niet en het zijn allemaal jonge mannen die goed in hun eigen land kunnen werken en niet zielig zijn dus gewoon niet toelaten.”

“Omdat dat 1500 mensen in een gebouw op te sluiten vraagt om problemen. Ongeacht uit welke cultuur ze ook komen. En het hoeft zakelijk alleen maar mannen waren is ook raar.”

Criticism City Council

The group of respondents who protested also repeatedly mentioned their dissatisfaction with the Geldermalsen city council on how they handled the situation – just like the group of respondents who did not protest. Respondents' reasons for protesting often came with a 'but',

judging the Geldermalsen city council. Both groups criticized the Geldermalsen city council, as part of their answer why they did or did not protest. It therefore seems the city council's behaviour was not enough reason to instigate protest.

“Omdat ik het er niet mee eens was dat er een azc in Geldermalsen zou komen omdat het ook binnen een paar dagen door onze burgemeester (hoofdschuldige van alles) geregeld zou willen hebben. (...) De politiek maakt verkeerde keuzes jammer dat ze er zo mee weggkomen. Als dit volgende week weer zou moeten zal ik er weer bij willen zijn omdat wij op moeten komen voor onze vrijheid. Door de rellen werd het azc afgewezen. Daarom heel veel dank aan alle protesterenden Geldermalsenaren.”

“Ten eerste: de burgemeester van Geldermalsen had aangekondigd dat er een AZC zou komen in Geldermalsen. Dit is niet van te voren gecommuniceerd naar de inwoners. Ten tweede vind ik het niet goed dat er zoveel asielzoekers naar Nederland komen. Het kost de belastingbetaler heel veel geld, criminaliteit neemt toe. Je hoort het alleen maar mondjesmaat in de media. Maar ik ben er van overtuigd dat er heel veel informatie achter wordt gehouden.”

“Doordat de gemeenteraad je voor een voldongen feit stelde, geen overleg. Daarnaast was de burgemeester nalatig.”

Bystander

Some respondents stated they did protest, but left the scene when the protests became too violent. Others stated they were mere bystanders. As was the case for the group of respondents that did not protest, this could indicate (violent) protest is not something everyone identifies or agrees with. It could also indicate participating in violent protest is too high cost for them, as these individuals left the scene when the protests turned violent.

“Ik heb niet meegedaan maar was er wel bij. Het is niet netjes hoe de burgemeester achter ons rug om ineens heel veel vluchtelingen wilde opvangen in Geldermalsen. Ik ben niet tegen vluchtelingen maar wel tegen het principe hoe het gegaan is.”

“Ik vond het aantal vluchtelingen dat de gemeente in Geldermalsen wou laten komen te veel, ik ben echter wel weg gegaan toen er rellen ontstonden.”

“Gewoon om er bij te zijn zodat er zoveel mogelijk mensen waren een stil protest.”

4.2.3 Answering Categories: No, But I Would Have Wanted to Participate and No, But I Did Sympathize with the Protests

The remaining answering categories to the question ‘Did you participate in the Geldermalsen protests in December 2015?’ are ‘No, but I would have wanted to participate’ and ‘No, but I did agree with the protests’, and will be discussed below.

First of all, the group that answered ‘No, but I would have wanted to participate’ consisted only of three respondents. Two of them answered the open question ‘Can you explain why you did not participate in the Geldermalsen protests?’ Their answers were as follows:

“Was niet in Geldermalsen.”

“Ik was thuis bij de kinderen. En wie had er voor mijn kinderen gezorgd als ik door de M.E. in elkaar geslagen was geworden?”

The two respondents seemed to have not participated mainly because they were not in the possibility to participate. However, it is not clear from their answers if they would have protested had they been in the opportunity to do so.

The ‘No, but I did agree with the protests’ group was somewhat larger. In total, 30 out of 34 respondents answered the open question ‘Can you explain why you did not participate in the Geldermalsen protests?’ As becomes clear from the analysis of respondents’ answers, there is quite some overlap between the group of respondents that did not protest.

No Time/Not Present

A few respondents stated they did not participate because they did not have the opportunity to participate. That is, they could not find the time, or were not present when the protests took place. Whether these respondents would have participated had they had the time is not clear.

“Geen tijd.”

“Was niet aanwezig op die dagen wegens vakantie.”

Concerns for Escalation

Other respondents mentioned their concern for escalation as a reason not to protest, which was also mentioned by the group of respondents that did not protest. Apparently, the risk of escalation made it not worth for them to protest for a common goal.

“Omdat het bekend was dat het uit de hand zou lopen.”

“Omdat ik daar niet tussen wilde staan omdat ik van te voren al wist dat het uit de hand zou gaan lopen.”

“Het was al duidelijk dat het uit de hand zou gaan lopen omdat de gemeente niet erg netjes is (geweest) naar haar burgers (...) Dan kun je wachten op ellende en daar ga ik niet tussen staan.”

Against (Violent) Protest/It Is Not in Me to Protest

Quite some respondents stated that they are not the type of person to participate in protests like those in Geldermalsen. For some, this was a hint toward violent protest. Some respondents even said they did participate, but went home as soon as things got out of hand. In any case, these answers suggest that some people may never participate in protest, even though they do agree with the cause of protest. As it turns out, it is not their preferred kind of collective action.

“Ik was wel aanwezig, maar heb niet geprotesteerd. Uiteindelijk is er een gekozen volksvertegenwoordiging die mogen dat beslissen. Uiteraard is er ook het recht om te protesteren, maar dat zit niet zo in mij.”

“Ik ben geen aktievoerder.”

“De protest manier op die wijze is niet passend bij mij.”

Unaware of Protests

Some respondents mentioned they did not know a protest was being organized against the city council's decision to harbour 1,500 refugees. Whether these respondents would have participated had they known about the protests is not clear from their answers. What these quotes do indicate is that the group unaware of the protests could not have discussed it with others. This could mean the topic was either not relevant within some networks, or too sensitive to discuss.

“Ik was niet op de hoogte van de gebeurtenissen, totdat mijn zoon belde, want die had het gezien op t.v.”

“Ik was niet op de hoogte van de protest.”

“Was niet op de hoogte, dat op deze manier geprotesteerd ging worden.”

Protest is Pointless

Two respondents argued that protests like these are pointless. This could imply a lack of efficacy. In the case of Geldermalsen however, the protesters did get it their way: the refugee centre was never realized. Protests thus are not always useless. However, why the respondents thought such protests are useless, they did not state.

“Meestal zijn dit soort protesten zinloos.”

“Protesten op deze manier hebben geen zin.”

Criticism City Council

Also this group of respondents expressed their criticism toward the Geldermalsen city council. This confirms that no matter how people feel about refugees, the Geldermalsen city council – in the eyes of its inhabitants – has made mistakes, or at least did not handle the matter well.

“Het werd snel een ondemocratische reactie op een ondemocratisch gemeentebestuurbeleid.”

“Ik was het niet eens met de keuze van de gemeente, maar vond de wijze van protesteren niet juist. Het heeft echter wel geholpen!”

“Het was al duidelijk dat het uit de hand zou gaan lopen omdat de gemeente niet erg netjes is (geweest) naar haar burgers. En ook het uitsluiten van mensen qua inspraak en alles afschermen voor de meeste media.. Bovendien was het al duidelijk dat de gemeente de boel verdraaid naar buiten bracht. Dan kun je wachten op ellende en daar ga ik niet tussen staan.”

Based on the answers of the ‘No, but I would have wanted to participate’ and the ‘No, but I did agree with the protests’ group, in my statistical analysis I added them to the ‘No’ group. I find that there is too little proof to add them to the ‘Yes’ group, or to create a separate group. After all, their reasons for not protesting are rather similar to the ‘No’ group’s answers. Besides, adding the ‘No, but I would have wanted to participate’ and the ‘No, but I did agree with the protests’ group to the ‘Yes’ group would not be the best option. As it turned out, these two groups did not protest, but merely agreed (to some extent) with the protest group.

4.2.4 Interpretation Qualitative Results

Now that all answering categories have been discussed, what expectations as formulated in Chapter 2 can be supported, and what extra insights does the qualitative data provide? In other words, do the qualitative results contribute to a better understanding of anti-refugee protest participation?

One of the most important reasons for the group of participants that did not protest was because they disagreed with the cause of protest. Though these respondents did not mention being anti-refugee, some did criticize the Geldermalsen city council or expressed concerns about the amount of refugees supposed to be harboured in Geldermalsen. In any case, their answers contradict an ethnic exclusionist attitude. Vice versa, as regards respondents that did protest, their main reason appears to be that they did not want refugees to come to Geldermalsen, or at least not as many as initially intended by the city council. Therefore these insights support hypothesis 1, which assumes a relation between an ethnic exclusionist attitude and anti-refugee protest participation.

As regards social capital, the qualitative analysis did not lead to new insights in comparison to the quantitative conclusions. Though some respondents did mention discussing the issue with friends or others, such discussions were never mentioned as a factor that influenced their decision to either protest or not. This might have to do with the fact that people are often unaware of their social capital, or in any case not consciously occupied with it. Moreover, as Evers and De Boer (2012) mention, the question asked is of utmost importance and can influence the course of the survey or interview and its answers considerably. A different – perhaps more direct – question about social capital might have yielded different results.

As regards resource mobilization theory, the qualitative results add to the statistical insights on the role of the individual's network, though only so for the group of respondents that did not protest. Some respondents mentioned they feared expressing their opinion. This indicates having an opinion that goes against the general or dominant opinion of your network, might have negative consequences. Being embedded within a certain network thus influences what you can and – in this case – what you cannot talk about. On the other hand, the group of respondents that did participate did not mention their network. Therefore, these insights do not provide extra support for any of my hypotheses regarding resource mobilization theory and the importance of networks. They do however support the idea of an embedded individual and the subsequent influence.

Most striking though – as this is not suggested by the discussed literature – is that quite some respondents mentioned they did not protest because they do not identify with or prefer such kind of (violent) collective action. This implies that some people will never participate in a protest action because they do not identify with the kind of collective action, despite the fact that they might agree with the cause of protest, have bonding social capital, or are part of a very convincing network. Possibly this means there will only be a limited amount of people willing to protest, and an even more limited amount of people willing to participate in violent protests.

Previous research on willingness to participate in collective action – including protest participation – often links it to social identification, either with some social movement or the cause of protest. In some way, so have I by looking at ethnic exclusionist attitudes. The conclusion within this line of research is often that group identification fosters protest participation and that protest participation reinforces group identification (Klandermans, 2002; Stürmer and Simon, 2009; Veenstra and Haslam, 2000; De Weerd and Klandermans, 1999). However, as my qualitative results suggest, identification also applies to the kind of collective action. As some respondents pointed out, they did not protest – even though some did agree with the cause of protest – because protesting is not their preferred kind of collective action. As identification within research on collective action often focuses on the subject of protest or the group that is duped, shifting that focus to identification with the means of protest might lead to new and interesting results. The individual's embeddedness might thus have to compete with the individual's sense of identification with the means of collective action.

Though it was never mentioned as a reason to (not) protest, the Geldermalsen city council was frequently criticized by many respondents, both protesters and not-protesters. The critique varied from wanting to harbour too many refugees, to making a decision in an undemocratic manner and not consulting with their inhabitants first. As regards the protesters, part of their answer often included an expression of discontent with the city council. The group of respondents that did not protest on the other hand also was not pleased by the way the city council acted. However, in their case it did not lead to protest participation. This might have to do with what I suggested before, regarding identification with the kind of collective action. In any case, critique on the city council is not enough reason to participate in protest, but it does add to all factors that contribute to explaining protest participation in the case of Geldermalsen.

When reading about the Geldermalsen protests, the way the Geldermalsen city council handled the situation was brought up multiple times. I therefore decided to include two statements about the Geldermalsen city council. These statements could be answered on a five-point scale, ranging from totally disagree to totally agree. A higher score indicates a higher satisfaction with the Geldermalsen city council. The results are summarized in the following table:

Table 10: Descriptive Values of Statements Geldermalsen City Council

<i>Statement</i>	<i>Valid N</i>	<i>Minimum</i>	<i>Maximum</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Standard Deviation</i>
De gemeente heeft goed gehandeld wat betreft de opvang van vluchtelingen (<i>The city council has handled the issue of harbouring refugees well</i>)	171	1	5	2.204	1.051
De gemeente heeft naar haar inwoners geluisterd (<i>The city council has listened to its inhabitants</i>)	172	1	5	3.520	1.235

As the results of the first statement indicate, respondents were not very satisfied with the way the city council handled the matter. When looking at the second statement however, respondents seem to be more satisfied. This may be due to the fact that the refugee centre was never actually realized. Overall, respondents were not very satisfied with their city council. Both the qualitative as well as the quantitative results point this out.

In conclusion, do the qualitative results provide insights other than the quantitative results did? I believe they do. In any case, the qualitative results provide further support for some of the quantitative evidence. Most importantly, the qualitative results suggest identification with the kind of collective action matters. This adds a new insight to the existing literature, as identification within research on collective action was primarily focused on the subject of protest or the deprived group. The qualitative results also exposed respondents' thoughts on the city council, and even on their fellow-citizens. Multiple respondents stated they felt ashamed about the protests, or expressed their fear to express their opinion toward their fellow-citizens.

On the other hand, also qualitative results are limited. I only asked respondents one open question. I was not in the opportunity to ask additional or follow-up questions, which could have yielded more insights. Also, not all respondents came up with – in my opinion – satisfactory answers that clarified why they did or did not protest. On the other hand, the qualitative analysis was meant as an addition to the quantitative results, not as a substitute. Follow-up or additional questions would therefore have surpassed the initial goal of adding the open question to my survey. My primary interest was to find out what comes to mind first when respondents think of why they did or did not protest. In any case, respondents' answers have provided me with insights the quantitative results did not. Finally, it should be noted that the group of respondents that protested was rather small. Had the participation-group been larger, more varying answers and insights might have been collected.

The answering categories are summarized in the following table. Note that some answers are included in more than one category, which is why the total number of respondents does not match the count of the categories. Some respondents gave quite elaborate answers. Allocating them to only one category would undermine their detailed answer.

Table 11: Answering Categories Open Survey Question

<i>Non-Protest Participation Group (101)</i>	<i>Count</i>	<i>Protest Participation Group (19)</i>	<i>Count</i>	<i>Other Non-Protest Participation Group (32)</i>	<i>Count</i>
Against (violent) protest/It is not in me to protest	46	Against the establishment of a refugee centre	6	Against (violent) protest/It is not in me to protest	12
Concerns for escalation	9	Bystander	4	Concerns for escalation	5
Criticism city council	31	Criticism city council	9	Criticism city council	5
Doubts regarding size refugee centre	8	Amount of refugees	4	Bystander	2
No time/Not present	13	Fear	2	No time/Not present	8
It Is Pointless	2			Protest is pointless	2
In agreement with protesters	10			Unaware of protests	3
Unaware of protests	8			Other reasons	2
Other reasons	13				
In favour of refugee centre/disagree with goal of protest	37				
Fear to express opinion	5				
Compassion for refugees	10				
Shame	7				

Chapter 5: Conclusion and Discussion

The aim of my thesis is to gain a better understanding of what motivates people to participate in anti-refugee protests. In order to provide an answer to the research question I have used existing theoretical insights and empirically tested the derived hypotheses with data I collected myself. Having thus far presented – and to some extent interpreted – the results of my study, the following chapter will move on to answer the research question as well as possible. A final assessment of my research question would not be complete though without a critical note. Therefore, I will also discuss some shortcomings and limitations to my research. Finally, I will formulate some recommendations for future research and implications based on the insights and limitations from my research.

5.1 Conclusion

The aim of my thesis is to find an answer to the question ‘What motivates people to participate in anti-refugee protests?’ To answer this question, I have used several theoretical insights linked to protest participation, combining both a structural as well as an agential explanans. First of all, I discussed ethnic competition theory. This theory suggests that competition between ethnic groups reinforces mechanisms of social identification, which leads to an ethnic exclusionist attitude. Subsequently, an ethnic exclusionist attitude is linked to protest participation, as it is unlikely an individual will participate in protest if he or she does not believe in the cause of protest. An attitude alone however, is not enough to initiate protest, let alone violent protest. This has to do with the costs and benefits of protest participation, which are difficult to assess. To bridge these uncertainties, attitudes do not provide sufficient explanatory value. I therefore used insights from social capital theory. In line with other authors, I have made a distinction between bonding and bridging social capital. Bonding social capital refers to people ‘like us’, with whom people share a sense of common identity, whereas bridging social capital describes links between people that go beyond a shared sense of identity. Individuals with bonding social capital generally have higher trust in the ingroup, which makes it easier for them to assess the costs of protest, e.g. when assessing how many others will join in the protest action. Moreover, bonding social capital networks exist of similar and like-minded people, which makes discussing a sensitive topic easier, e.g. the refugee discussion. Also, it is rewarding to go with the group – and the less varied opinions circle within a network, the easier it is to go with the group. I therefore argue that bonding social capital is linked to protest participation. However, an individual may have an

ethnic exclusionist attitude and a higher level of bonding social capital, it also matters from whom he or she receives information. Whereas the literature on social capital and protest participation focuses on the strength of networks, resource mobilization theory is more concerned with information dissemination and the attitudes that circle within a network. As the theory suggests, individuals whose network is generally positive about anti-refugee protest participation are more likely to participate in such protests. Moreover, individuals who are informed about the protests by their close network are more likely to participate in protest, as the influence of someone close to you is larger than that of a relative stranger.

Based on my self-gathered data, I found support for all hypotheses formulated in Chapter 2, except for hypothesis 3. What do these results mean? First of all, belief in the cause of protest is an important condition for participation. In the case of Geldermalsen, this meant having an ethnic exclusionist attitude. As my results suggest, an ethnic exclusionist attitude makes it more likely an individual will participate in anti-refugee protests. This assumption was supported by my statistical analysis as well as my qualitative analysis.

Second, also the individual's social capital is linked to anti-refugee protest participation. As my analysis points out, bonding social capital increases the odds of protest participation, whereas bridging social capital has the opposite effect. This assumption was supported by my statistical analysis only – my qualitative analysis did not provide any further support. The found relation is opposite to what some scholars suggest, as bridging social capital is often linked to an increase in the odds of protest participation. As regards the assumed relation between social capital and ethnic exclusionist attitude on protest participation, I did not find significant proof. This might be due to the fact that my sample is relatively small and hence lacks statistical power, especially when more predictors are entered in a model. On the other hand, perhaps there is indeed no interaction between social capital and ethnic exclusionist attitude. In any case, a larger sample is no guarantee for a significant effect.

Third, I found support for the expectation that a generally positive attitude of the individual's network increases his or her odds of protest participation. Moreover, my data support the idea that an individual informed by his or her network about anti-refugee protests is more likely to participate in said protests. These assumptions were supported only by my statistical analysis. Discussing the issue with friends, family or colleagues was mentioned by respondents in their

answers to the open question, though never as a reason for to participate in protest – or not, for that matter.

Considering the results and the supported hypotheses, the idea of the structural and agential explanans as discussed in Chapter 1 is endorsed. This strengthens the idea of the embedded individual and the subsequent influence on anti-refugee protest participation. These conclusions are primarily based on the quantitative data I have gathered and the corresponding statistical analysis. Based on the R^2 of all models, it becomes clear these factors do not fully explain why it is that people decide to participate in anti-refugee protests. This raises the question what other factors play a role in explaining anti-refugee protest participation.


Part of the answer can be found in my qualitative analysis, based on answers to an open question in my survey. As it turned out from the content analysis, the above-mentioned factors possibly matter less when an individual does not identify with protesting as a kind of collective action. This implies that some people will never participate in a protest action because they do not identify with the kind of collective action, despite the fact that they might agree with the cause of protest, have bonding social capital, or are part of a very convincing network. I believe identification with the kind of collective action is best seen as an agential explanans, that is, an internal characteristics of the individual. Moreover, this finding possibly implies there will only be a limited amount of people willing to protest – and perhaps an even more limited amount of people willing to participate in violent protest. Previous research on willingness to participate in collective action mainly looks at social identification (either with some social movement or the cause of protest), but not at identification with the kind of collective action applied to reach some goal. As my results suggest, some individuals possibly will never protest, despite what some of their characteristics might suggest.

This idea is also supported by the fact that both protesters and not-protesters pointed out their discontent with the way the Geldermalsen city council handled the situation. Both groups were displeased by their city council, though only part of that group took to the streets. In any case, critique on the city council is not enough reason to participate in protest, but it does add to all factors that contribute to explaining anti-refugee protest participation in the case of Geldermalsen. Furthermore, it leaves me wondering whether the situation would have resulted in violent protests as well, had the Geldermalsen city council chosen a different

approach. This suggests the extremity of the situation – in which proper communication lacks, information is leaked and the number of refugees is relatively high – adds to already existing motivations that foster a willingness to protest.

The following figure presents the insights from my data – an updated version of figure 1:

Figure 5: Presentation of Insights from Data



5.2 Discussion and Future Research

In writing this thesis, I have hopefully provided insights that lead to a better understanding of anti-refugee protest participation. However, there are some shortcomings to my research that might have influenced the final outcomes. I will now discuss some of the shortcomings of my research and what future research could improve on.

For starters, I have only reviewed one case. Though the case of Geldermalsen is an interesting case that has resulted in new and interesting insights, exploring multiple cases probably leads to more insights and perhaps more statistical power to base conclusions on. On top of that, the protests took place in December 2015, whereas I have conducted my survey between May

and July 2017. On the one hand, since a considerable amount of time has passed the subject is less sensitive and therefore easier to discuss. On the other hand, since the protests happened over a year and a half ago at the moment the survey was distributed, there is a risk respondents do not remember how they really felt during the time around the protests. It might therefore be interesting to conduct similar research sooner after such protests take place.

Another limitation is the size of my research sample. A larger sample generally yields more statistical power, which makes it more likely to calculate a significant model of all predictors together – which did not bring forth significant effects in my case. As regards the qualitative analysis, a larger sample might lead to new and diverse insights why individuals protest. Moreover, as my sample was not representative for age, gender and level of education, this might have affected my results. As discussed in Chapter 3, not only can a not-representative sample lead to overestimation or underestimation of certain variables, it also affects their relation to the dependent variable. For example, social capital is related to age, gender and level of education. As my sample was not representative on these variables, this might have affected social capital. This leads to an inaccurate measure, subsequently affecting social capital's influence on protest participation. This not only has to do with the size of my sample, but also the fact that it is a convenience sample. A larger and random sample might solve this issue, or in any case benefit a more representative sample. However, considering the limits of my dataset, I have been able to find statistical significant results and support all but one of my hypotheses.

Finally, I would like to point out some limits to my survey. As it turned out, the survey was rather long. Most participants needed 10-15 minutes to complete all questions. This creates the risk that respondents get tired or bored. Though hard to tell, this could lead to inaccurate answers. Furthermore, though my survey was rather long, it is impossible to ask everything in a survey, which is one of the reasons I added an open question. When it comes to future research, I therefore suggest creating a shorter survey and combining those results with insights from for example interviews.

Regarding my results on bonding and bridging social capital, I believe it is beneficial for future research to make that distinction as well. Moreover, a distinction between different topics of protest might also lead to new and interesting results and hence a better

understanding of protest participation in general. Anti-refugee protest for example is a rather sensitive topic, which not everyone is willing to get involved with. This does not necessarily go for topics that are less sensitive, such as a pay raise for teachers or improvement of employment terms. I also believe that focussing on networks specifically – either as an aspect of social capital theory or resource mobilization theory – can lead to a better understanding of protest participation. As the effect of social capital on protest participation is quite extensive, it is interesting to look into what categories of social capital generate the largest effect, for example networks. Within the framework of resource mobilization theory, the influence of networks has also been explored and established, and seems to have quite an effect on protest participation.

As identification within research on collective action often focuses on the subject of protest or the group that is duped, shifting that focus to identification with the means of protest could lead to a better understanding of protest participation. Finally, since there was multicollinearity between my independent variables I did not put them together in one model. As regards future research, combining all variables in one model might give a better idea of what factors are the strongest predictors of anti-refugee protest participation.

5.3 Implications

Recently, a new study was published about asylum seekers and neighbourhood crime rates. The study pointed out that living near a refugee centre does not seem to increase the chance of becoming a crime victim. On the other hand, the report also concluded there are higher levels of recorded perpetrators among asylum seekers. This rather paradoxical conclusion might be explained by the fact that most crimes committed by asylum seekers take place within the perimeters of the refugee centre, and not in the wider surroundings of the centre (Achbari and Leerkes, 2017).

One of the indicators of an ethnic exclusionist attitude is a perceived threat someone experiences regarding refugees, e.g. becoming a crime victim. Taking the conclusions of this report into consideration – living near a refugee centre does not increase the chance of becoming a crime victim – it seems such fears are unfounded. However, as I indicated earlier on, facts do not always matter as much as feelings. This new study might therefore not alter someone's ethnic exclusionist attitude. This raises the question what would be the best way to tackle such attitudes.

The act of changing attitudes takes me back to my previous studies in Communication Science. I remember reading a story about rumours that spread about McDonald's hamburgers. Supposedly McDonald's was using worms to prepare their hamburgers. Though the rumour was false and consumers said they did not believe the rumour, sales plummeted by more than 30 per cent. In a first response, McDonald's tried to counter the rumour through advertising, in-store communication and public relations messages – all emphasizing McDonald's did not use worms in their hamburgers. However, their appeal to consumer reason failed to have a positive effect.

To understand the issue, Tybout *et al* (1981) looked at consumer memory. They argued that learning about the rumour made consumers form an associative link in their memory between McDonald's and worms. Every time the brand name was activated, so was the concept of worms. Whether the rumour was regarded true or false did not matter. To solve this problem, Tybout *et al* argued the brand name McDonald's needed to activate other harmless concepts that would overshadow the salience of worms. The authors did this by conducting a survey in which they asked about features of McDonald's restaurants, which would forge other associative links in consumer memory and hence weaken the association with worms. In the end, their reasoning proofed right; those who completed the survey were less likely to think of worms when exposed to McDonald's and showed a more favourable evaluation of the chain restaurant (Tybout *et al*, 1981 in Fennis and Stroebe, 2010).

The study by Tybout *et al* (1981) shows that showering consumers with facts can be ineffective in changing misconceptions and may sometimes even backfire. Trying to alter an ethnic exclusionist attitude with facts therefore might not do the trick. I am not suggesting to conduct a survey in order to form new associative links in the minds of people. However, as my analysis points out, the network someone is part of does seem to matter. That is, with whom people talk and have discussions with impacts their opinion. Therefore, new associative links might be created through interaction with individuals from outside someone's existing network. For example, with those who have a different opinion on refugees and don't have an ethnic exclusionist attitude, for that matter. A network might hinder the creation of new attitudes, but might just have the opposite effect when it is enough varied.

What the McDonald's example also makes clear is the importance of proper communication. Dialogue between government and citizen is thus very important, and a lack of it can have serious consequences. Hopefully we learn from our past actions, and make sure that next time we deliver better.

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Appendix

A1: Survey

Vragenlijst Geldermalsen

Start of Block: Default Block

Introductie Beste mevrouw, meneer,

U gaat zo een vragenlijst invullen ten behoeve van mijn afstudeeronderzoek. Daar wil ik u alvast hartelijk voor bedanken. Mijn onderzoek gaat over de protesten die in december 2015 in Geldermalsen hebben plaatsgevonden tegen het plan van de gemeente om vluchtelingen op te vangen. Met deze vragenlijst bent u ongeveer 10 minuten bezig. Met uw antwoorden ga ik betrouwbaar om; uw antwoorden worden geheel anoniem verwerkt en zijn dus niet naar u te herleiden.

Onder alle deelnemers worden 10 boekenbonnen ter waarde van €20,- verloot. Met het invullen van deze enquête maakt u dus kans op een van deze bonnen. Dit geldt echter alleen wanneer u de vragenlijst volledig afrondt.

Mocht u nog vragen of opmerkingen hebben, neem dan contact op met mij via beau.ooijen@student.ru.nl. Nogmaals hartelijk dank voor uw deelname.

Met vriendelijke groet,

Beau van Ooijen

Page Break

Introductie Ik ga u eerst een aantal algemene vragen stellen. Lees de vragen goed door. Geef zo eerlijk mogelijk antwoord.

De vragenlijst gaat nu beginnen.



Q1 Wat is uw leeftijd?

Q2 Wat is uw geslacht?

☐ Vrouw

☐ Man

Q3 Wat is uw hoogst genoten opleiding?

☐ Basisonderwijs

☐ Lager beroepsonderwijs (LBO, VMBO)

☐ Middelbaar algemeen voorbereidend onderwijs (MAVO)

☐ Middelbaar beroepsonderwijs (MBO)

☐ Hoger algemeen voorbereidend, wetenschappelijk onderwijs (HAVO, VWO)

☐ Hoger beroepsonderwijs (HBO)

☐ Wetenschappelijk onderwijs (WO)

☐ Post wetenschappelijk onderwijs (PhD)

☐ Click to write Choice 9

☐ Weet niet/wil ik niet zeggen

Q4 Tot welke kerkelijke gezindte of levensbeschouwelijke groepering rekent u zichzelf?

- ☐ Geen kerkelijke gezindte of levensbeschouwelijke groepering
 - ☐ Rooms-Katholiek
 - ☐ Nederlands Hervormd
 - ☐ Gereformeerde kerken
 - ☐ Protestantse Kerk Nederland
 - ☐ Islam
 - ☐ Jodendom
 - ☐ Hindoe
 - ☐ Boeddhist
 - ☐ Weet niet/wil ik niet zeggen
 - ☐ Anders, namelijk... _____
-

Q5 Hoe vaak bezoekt u een kerkdienst?

- ☐ 1 keer per week of vaker
 - ☐ 2 tot 3 keer per maand
 - ☐ 1 keer per maand
 - ☐ Minder dan 1 keer per maand
 - ☐ Een paar keer per jaar
 - ☐ Zelden/nooit
 - ☐ Weet niet/wil ik niet zeggen
-

Q6 Wat is uw postcode?

Q7 Als er nu landelijke verkiezingen zouden zijn, op welke politieke partij zou u dan stemmen?

- ☐ Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD)
- ☐ Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA)
- ☐ Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV)
- ☐ Socialistische Partij (SP)
- ☐ Christen-Democratisch Appel (CDA)
- ☐ Democraten 66 (D66)
- ☐ ChristenUnie (CU)
- ☐ GroenLinks (GL)
- ☐ Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij (SGP)
- ☐ Partij voor de Dieren (PvdD)
- ☐ 50PLUS
- ☐ VoorNederland (VNL)
- ☐ DENK
- ☐ Nieuwe Wegen
- ☐ Vrijzinnige Partij
- ☐ Ondernemerspartij
- ☐ Forum voor Democratie
- ☐ De Burger Beweging
- ☐ GeenPeil
- ☐ Piratenpartij
- ☐ Artikel 1
- ☐ Niet Stemmers

- ☐ Libertarische Partij
 - ☐ Lokaal in de Kamer
 - ☐ JEZUS LEEFT
 - ☐ StemNL
 - ☐ MenS en Spirit/Basisinkomen Partij/V-R
 - ☐ Vrije Democratische Partij
 - ☐ Ik zou blanco stemmen
 - ☐ Ik zou niet stemmen
-

Q8 Welke situatie is op u van toepassing?

- ☐ Ik werk fulltime
 - ☐ Ik werk parttime
 - ☐ Ik ben werkzoekende
 - ☐ Ik ben huisvrouw/huisman
 - ☐ Ik ben werkloos
 - ☐ Ik ben met pensioen
 - ☐ Ik ben student
 - ☐ Weet niet/wil ik niet zeggen
-

Q9 Wat is uw beroep? Bent u met pensioen of op dit moment werkloos, vul dan uw laatst beoefende beroep in. Bent u huisvrouw/huisman, vult u dat dan alstublieft in.

Q10 Binnen welke categorie valt uw maandelijkse inkomen netto (na aftrek belastingen)?

- ☐ < €1.500
- ☐ €1.500 - €2.000
- ☐ €2.000 - €3.000
- ☐ €3.000 - €4.000
- ☐ > €4.000
- ☐ Weet niet/wil ik niet zeggen

End of Block: Default Block

Start of Block: Block 1

Introductie In het volgende deel van de vragenlijst leg ik u een aantal stellingen voor. Deze stellingen gaan over vluchtelingen en de invloed daarvan op de Nederlandse samenleving. Geeft u alstublieft aan in hoeverre u het eens of oneens bent met de stellingen. Het gaat om uw mening, een fout antwoord bestaat dus niet.

Q11 Click to write the question text

	Helemaal mee eens	Mee eens	Niet mee eens, niet mee oneens	Mee oneens	Helemaal mee oneens	Weet niet
Mensen van etnische minderheidsgroepen maken misbruik van de sociale zekerheden die de Nederlandse overheid biedt	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
De (religieuze) tradities van ethnische minderheidsgroepen zijn een gevaar voor de Nederlandse maatschappij	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
De aanwezigheid van etnische minderheidsgroepen is een reden voor onveiligheid in Nederland	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
De aanwezigheid van etnische minderheden zorgt voor meer werkloosheid onder Nederlanders	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
De aanwezigheid van verschillende culturen is een verrijking van onze samenleving	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Page Break

Introductie Ik leg u nu weer een aantal stellingen voor over de Nederlandse overheid en vluchtelingen. Geeft u alstublieft weer aan in hoeverre u het eens of oneens bent met de stellingen. Ook hier gaat het om uw mening, foute antwoorden bestaan niet.

Q15 Click to write the question text

	Helemaal mee eens	Mee eens	Niet mee eens, niet mee oneens	Mee oneens	Helemaal mee oneens	Weet niet
Het aantal vluchtelingen dat momenteel in Nederland verblijft moet worden teruggedrongen	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
De Nederlandse overheid moet stoppen met het opnemen van vluchtelingen	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
De Nederlandse overheid moet strenger optreden om de komst van vluchtelingen tegen te gaan	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Page Break

End of Block: Block 1

Start of Block: Block 2

Introductie De volgende vragen en stellingen gaan over vertrouwen in de medemens en in de samenleving. Ook stel ik u een aantal vragen over uw netwerk. Geeft u alstublieft zo eerlijk mogelijk antwoord. Het gaat ook hier weer om uw mening, een fout antwoord bestaat niet.

Q17 Je kunt niet voorzichtig genoeg zijn in de omgang met mensen.

- ☐ Helemaal mee eens
 - ☐ Mee eens
 - ☐ Niet mee eens, niet mee oneens
 - ☐ Mee oneens
 - ☐ Helemaal mee oneens
-

Q18 De meeste mensen proberen eerlijk te zijn.

- ☐ Helemaal mee eens
 - ☐ Mee eens
 - ☐ Niet mee eens, niet mee oneens
 - ☐ Mee oneens
 - ☐ Helemaal mee oneens
-

Q19 Kunt u aangeven in welke mate u mensen van verschillende groepen vertrouwt of niet vertrouwt?

	Vertrouw ik veel	Vertrouw ik	Geen vertrouwen/geen wantrouwen	Wantrouw ik	Wantrouw ik veel
Uw familie	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Uw buren	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Uw vrienden	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Uw collega's	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Mensen die u voor het eerst ontmoet	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Mensen van een andere religie	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Mensen van een andere nationaliteit	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Q20 Kunt u aangeven in welke mate u de volgende instellingen vertrouwt of niet vertrouwt?

	Vertrouw ik veel	Vertrouw ik	Geen vertrouwen/geen wantrouwen	Wantrouw ik	Wantrouw ik veel
De kerk	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
De media	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
De politie	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
De rechtspraak	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
De regering	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
De gemeenteraad	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Politieke partijen	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Wetenschappers	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Grote bedrijven	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Banken	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Goede doelen (bijvoorbeeld KWF Kankerbestrijding of Greenpeace)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Humanitaire organisaties (bijvoorbeeld UNICEF of Artsen Zonder Grenzen)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

End of Block: Block 2

Start of Block: Block 3

Introductie De volgende vragen gaan over uw netwerk en organisaties. Geeft u alstublieft zo goed en eerlijk mogelijk antwoord. Het gaat om uw netwerken, foute antwoorden bestaan niet.

Q21 Kunt u aangeven hoe vaak u om sociale redenen vrienden, familie of collega's ontmoet?

- ☐ Elke dag
 - ☐ Meerdere keren per week
 - ☐ 1 keer per week
 - ☐ Meerdere keren per maand
 - ☐ 1 keer per maand
 - ☐ Minder dan 1 keer per maand
 - ☐ Zelden/nooit
 - ☐ Weet niet/wil ik niet zeggen
-

Q22 Bespreekt of bediscussieert u wel eens publieke zaken met familie, vrienden of collega's? In welke mate?

- ☐ Regelmatig
 - ☐ Weleens
 - ☐ Zelden/nooit
 - ☐ Weet niet/wil ik niet zeggen
-

Q23 Bespreekt of bediscussieert u wel eens publieke zaken met mensen die u niet zo goed kent? In welke mate?

- ☐ Regelmatig
 - ☐ Weleens
 - ☐ Zelden/nooit
 - ☐ Weet niet/wil ik niet zeggen
-

Q24 Kunt u voor de volgende organisaties of verenigingen aangeven of u lid bent of niet?

	Lid	Geen lid
Religieuze of kerkelijke organisatie	☐	☐
Sportvereniging	☐	☐
Hobbyvereniging	☐	☐
Onderwijs, kunst, culturele of muzikale organisatie	☐	☐
Vakbond	☐	☐
Politieke partij of groepering	☐	☐
Milieu organisatie	☐	☐
Beroepsvereniging	☐	☐
Mensenrechtenorganisatie	☐	☐
Liefdadigheidsorganisatie	☐	☐
Zelfhulp groep	☐	☐
Buurtvereniging	☐	☐
Consumentenorganisatie	☐	☐
Studenten- of studievereniging	☐	☐

Q25 Is er een andere organisatie waar u lid van bent of waar u actief meedoet die net niet genoemd stond? Zo niet, vult u dan alstublieft nee in.

Q26 Doet u vrijwilligerswerk?

- ☐ Ja
- ☐ Nee
- ☐ Nee, maar ik heb wel vrijwilligerswerk gedaan
- ☐ Nee, maar ik zou het wel willen doen

Q27 Als u kijkt naar het gemiddelde opleidingsniveau van uw familie/vrienden/collega's, dan...

- ☐ Is dat gelijk aan mijn opleidingsniveau
- ☐ Is dat hoger dan mijn opleidingsniveau
- ☐ Is dat lager dan mijn opleidingsniveau
- ☐ Is dat zowel hoger als lager dan mijn opleidingsniveau
- ☐ Weet niet/wil ik niet zeggen

Q28 Als u kijkt naar de etnische achtergrond van uw familie/vrienden/collega's, dan...

- ☐ Heeft (bijna) iedereen dezelfde etnische achtergrond
- ☐ Zijn er een aantal mensen met een andere etnische achtergrond
- ☐ Zijn er veel mensen met een andere etnische achtergrond
- ☐ Heeft (bijna) iedereen een andere etnische achtergrond
- ☐ Weet niet/wil ik niet zeggen

End of Block: Block 3

Start of Block: Block 4

Introductie De volgende vragen gaan over de protesten in Geldermalsen die hebben plaatsgevonden in december 2015. Deze protesten waren tegen het plan van de gemeente Geldermalsen om zo'n 1.500 vluchtelingen te plaatsen in Geldermalsen. Geeft u alstublieft zo eerlijk mogelijk antwoord. Het gaat om uw mening, dus er zijn geen foute antwoorden.

Q29 Over het algemeen, wat vonden uw vrienden/familie/collega's van de protesten?

- ☐ Iedereen was het met de protesten eens
 - ☐ De meesten waren het met de protesten eens
 - ☐ Ongeveer de helft was het met de protesten eens
 - ☐ De meesten waren het met de protesten oneens
 - ☐ Iedereen was het met de protesten oneens
 - ☐ Zij hebben zich er niet mee bezig gehouden
 - ☐ Weet niet/wil ik niet zeggen
-

Q30 Over het algemeen, hebben uw vrienden/familie/collega's meegedaan aan de protesten?

- ☐ Iedereen heeft meegedaan aan de protesten
 - ☐ De meesten hebben meegedaan aan de protesten
 - ☐ Ongeveer de helft heeft meegedaan aan de protesten
 - ☐ De meesten hebben niet meegedaan aan de protesten
 - ☐ Niemand heeft meegedaan aan de protesten
 - ☐ Weet niet/wil ik niet zeggen
-

Q31 Heeft u meegedaan aan de protesten in Geldermalsen in december 2015?

- ☐ Ja
- ☐ Nee, maar ik had wel mee willen doen
- ☐ Nee, maar ik was het wel eens met de protesten
- ☐ Nee

End of Block: Block 4

Start of Block: Block 5

Q43 Kunt u aangeven waarom u niet met de protesten heeft meegedaan?

Q44 Naast meedoen aan een protest zijn er ook andere acties die men kan ondernemen om een standpunt duidelijk te maken. Heeft u een van de volgende acties ondernomen omtrent het plan van de gemeente Geldermalsen om 1.500 vluchtelingen op te vangen? Er zijn meerdere antwoorden mogelijk.

- ☐ Discussie met familie/vrienden/collega's over dit onderwerp
- ☐ Discussie met vreemden over dit onderwerp
- ☐ Online discussie (bijvoorbeeld Facebook) met familie/vrienden/collega's over dit onderwerp
- ☐ Online discussie (bijvoorbeeld Facebook) met vreemden
- ☐ Een brief of e-mail gestuurd naar een politicus
- ☐ Een brief of e-mail gestuurd naar een medium (krant, televisie, radio, etc.)
- ☐ Flyers of brochures uitdelen over dit onderwerp
- ☐ Een Facebookpost geliked over dit onderwerp
- ☐ Een Tweet gestuurd over dit onderwerp
- ☐ Een blog geschreven over dit onderwerp
- ☐ Anders, namelijk... _____
- ☐ Ik heb geen van de bovenstaande acties ondernomen

Q50 Hoe bent u op de hoogte gebracht dat er geprotesteerd zou gaan worden in Geldermalsen? Er zijn meerdere antwoorden mogelijk.

- ☐ Via familie/vrienden/collega's
- ☐ Via social media (bijvoorbeeld Facebook of Twitter)
- ☐ Via (lokale) traditionele media (krant, televisie, radio)
- ☐ Anders, namelijk _____
- ☐ Weet niet/wil ik niet zeggen

Q54 In hoeverre bent u het eens met de volgende stellingen?

	Helemaal mee eens	Mee eens	Niet mee eens, niet mee oneens	Niet mee eens	Helemaal niet mee eens
Mensen zoals ik kunnen zich met politieke besluiten bemoeien	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Deelname aan protest is belangrijk. Het is een manier om de gemeenschap te steunen	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
De gemeente heeft goed gehandeld wat betreft de opvang van vluchtelingen	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
De gemeente heeft naar haar inwoners geluisterd	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Q51 Zijn er volgens u dingen die de gemeente Geldermalsen beter aan had kunnen pakken?

End of Block: Block 5

Start of Block: Block 6

Q45 Kunt u aangeven waarom u mee heeft gedaan met de protesten in Geldermalsen in december 2015?

Q46 Naast meedoen aan een protest zijn er ook andere acties die men kan ondernemen om een standpunt duidelijk te maken. Heeft u een van de volgende acties ondernomen omtrent het plan van de gemeente Geldermalsen om 1.500 vluchtelingen op te vangen? Er zijn meerdere antwoorden mogelijk.

- ☐ Discussie met familie/vrienden/collega's over dit onderwerp
 - ☐ Discussie met vreemden over dit onderwerp
 - ☐ Online discussie (bijvoorbeeld Facebook) met familie/vrienden/collega's over dit onderwerp
 - ☐ Online discussie (bijvoorbeeld Facebook) met vreemden
 - ☐ Een brief of e-mail gestuurd naar een politicus
 - ☐ Een brief of e-mail gestuurd naar een medium (krant, televisie, radio, etc.)
 - ☐ Flyers of brochures uitdelen over dit onderwerp
 - ☐ Een Facebookpost geliked over dit onderwerp
 - ☐ Een Tweet gestuurd over dit onderwerp
 - ☐ Een blog geschreven over dit onderwerp
 - ☐ Anders, namelijk... _____
 - ☐ Ik heb geen van de bovenstaande acties ondernomen
-

Q51 Hoe bent u op de hoogte gebracht dat er geprotesteerd zou gaan worden in Geldermalsen? Er zijn meerdere antwoorden mogelijk.

- ☐ Via familie/vrienden/collega's
- ☐ Via social media (bijvoorbeeld Facebook of Twitter)
- ☐ Via (lokale) traditionele media (krant, televisie, radio)
- ☐ Anders, namelijk _____
- ☐ Weet niet/wil ik niet zeggen

Q53 In hoeverre bent u het eens met de volgende stellingen?

	Helemaal mee eens	Mee eens	Niet mee eens, niet mee oneens	Niet mee eens	Helemaal niet mee eens
Mensen zoals ik kunnen zich met politieke besluiten bemoeien	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Deelname aan protest is belangrijk. Het is een manier om de gemeenschap te steunen	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Voorafgaand aan de demonstratie had ik het volste vertrouwen dat de demonstranten hun gelijk zouden krijgen	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
De gemeente heeft goed gehandeld wat betreft de opvang van vluchtelingen	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
De gemeente heeft naar haar inwoners geluisterd	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Q52 Hoe veel mensen verwachtte u dat er mee zouden doen aan de protesten?

Q50 Zijn er volgens u dingen die de gemeente Geldermalsen beter aan had kunnen pakken?

End of Block: Block 6

Start of Block: Block 7

Q53 Dit was de vragenlijst. Hartelijk dank voor uw tijd en deelname. Mocht u kans willen maken op een van de boekenbonnen, laat dan hieronder alstublieft uw e-mailadres achter. Zodra er genoeg vragenlijsten zijn ingevuld worden de winnaars willekeurig gekozen en neem ik contact op met de winnaars. Met uw e-mailadres wordt anoniem omgegaan. Uw e-mailadres valt dus niet te herleiden naar uw antwoorden.

Q54 Mijn e-mailadres is:

End of Block: Block 7

Kunt u aangeven waarom u niet met de protesten heeft meegedaan?

Was niet op de hoogte, dat op deze manier geprotesteerd ging worden

Vluchtelingen hebben recht op een veilige opvang. Ze zijn slachtoffer van oorlogsgeweld en vluchten niet om ons tot last te zijn maar omdat de situatie in hun land onveilig is. Ik vind het dan niet meer dan normaal dat je zorgt voor een humane opvang waar mensen d tijd krijgen om te verwerken wat er is gebeurt en zich te kunnen ontwikkelen om weer te werken aan de toekomst.

Het lijkt me niet de juiste weg om te laten weten hoe je er over denkt. Zeker niet wanneer dit uitmondt in geweld.

geen goed gevoel bij

Ik was het eens met de gemeente om een asielzoekerscentrum te openen. Ook Geldermalsen moest zijn deel bijdragen.

Ik vind dat echte vluchtelingen geholpen moeten worden en dat iedereen (dus ook de Gemeente Geldermalsen) daar wel een steentje aan mag bijdragen. We hebben het hier in Nederland allemaal goed (of we nu werk hebben of niet). Wie zijn wij dan om dat een ander die in een crisissituatie zit hulp te misgunnen?>

Fundamenteel oneens met deze protesten

Was niet aanwezig die dag

Ik had een voorgevoel dat het wel eens uit de hand kon gaan lopen en ik ben helemaal niet van geweld gebruiken dus ben daar niet geweest.

De manier waarop deugt niet. Verder mag iedereen protesteren, maar doe dat fatsoenlijk! En ik vind het een moeilijk onderwerp.Mensen in nood moet je helpen.liefst in de regio....je kunt niet de hele wereld in ons land onderbrengen.....een groot werelds probleem dus. Wat onze gemeente betreft:zij hebben de bevolking overdonderd en dus niet goed overlegt. Ik wist het niet.

Ik vind dat er opvang moet zijn voor echte vluchtelingen. Ook was dit naar mijn mening niet het juiste moment en de juiste manier.

Ik was/ben helemaal niet tegen de komst van het AZC in mijn woonplaats.

Ik was er niet

ik was aanwezig in het gemeentehuis.

Ieder mens heeft recht op een veilige omgeving. Ongeacht ras en / of religie

Aan protesteren met geweld beret je niets!

Ik laat liever op een andere manier mijn mening weten.

Ik was een van de genodigden in de raadszaal. Het is mij zinvoller zaken te bespreken dan geweld te gebruiken.

Die avond had ik een workshop. Reed er voordat het begon langs. Ik was geen voorstanders van het AZC, maar dat de protesten zo uit de hand zouden lopen had ik niet verwacht, en vond ik niet nodig.

Meestal zijn dit soort proteseten zinloos

Ik hoorde in een winkel dat het uit de uit de hand kon lopen. Mijn (ex) man is wel geweest, maar is op de vlucht geslagen. Ik was het wel eens met de protesten, maar niet op deze manier .

Geen behoefte aan

Protesten op deze manier hebben geen zin

ik ben niet tegen de komst van een AZC

Geen tijd.

Dit is niet de manier om jouw mening kenbaar te maken. Mensen gedroegen zich als beesten als ik de beelden mag/kan geloven. Laat onverlet dat de burgemeester deze zaak niet goed heeft aangepakt.

ik vond het een prima initiatief van de Gemeente Geldermalsen om de vluchtelingen te helpen. Het was noodzaak op dat moment dat er geholpen werd en dan moet dat gebeuren als dat mogelijk is..

Ten tijden van de raadsvergadering lag ik in het ziekenhuis. Inmiddels wist iedereen in het ziekenhuis in Utrecht waar ik vandaan kwam en waar Geldermalsen lag. Het ging de hele wereld over. Familie in Curacao en Argentinië reageerden zelfs per mail!

Ik was het niet eens met de keuze van de gemeente, maar vond de wijze van protesteren niet juist. Het heeft echter wel geholpen!

Ik heb daar niks te zoeken.

Inhoudelijk mee oneens. Te duidelijk opruiend.

Ik was het niet eens met de protesten.

Geen protest type

Dat is niet mijn ding. En ik wilde me niet associëren met de hele felle tegenstanders. De taal op fb vond ik schokkend, ook al was ik het niet eens met een AZC in Geldermalsen. Via mijn werk ben ik betrokken bij de vluchtelingen maar ook bij de minima (de grootste en felste tegenstanders) dus ik spreek me zelden in het openbaar over deze kwestie uit.

Was van mening dat dit een volksoploop zou worden voor totaal geen opvang. Escalatie vanuit bevolking was vooraf zichtbaar. Reden, gemeentelijke onvoorzichtige communicatie en gebrek aan dialoog vooraf.

Ik ben sowieso niet een persoon die protesteert in massa's.

Ik was het niet eens met de manier waar op geprotesteerd werd. Ik had ook geen probleem met de komst van de vluchtelingen. Gemeente heeft een grote fout gemaakt door niet eerder hierover te communiceren. Ik heb wel gediscussieerd met mensen die fel tegen waren.

Heb wel politieke partijen benaderd om te vragen naar reden van de te snelle besluitvorming zonder democratische basis. Omwonenden niet benaderd voor geheimhouding werd verbroken. Vragen die niet konden worden beantwoord van bewoners, zoals gezondheidszorg, onderwijs, verkeersproblemen (lopen over randweg die aansluiting aan a 15 geeft) naar de aldi in meteren. Enz.

Ik ben van mening dat ook vluchtelingen een plek nodig hebben zolang dit goed geregeld is en de omgeving er weinig hinder van ondervindt. Ik was het echter niet eens met de manier waarop de gemeente al bedacht had het gewoon te gaan doen.

Ik was niet op de hoogte van de protest.

Omdat ik niet tegen een asielzoeker centrum ben

Omdat het niet met geweld moet op gelost worden

Ik vind dit soort geweldadige protesten beneden alle niveau's.

Ik kan me niet voorstellen dat iemand zomaar vlucht naar een voor hen vreemd land. Iedereen heeft recht op veiligheid, wij zouden ook blij zijn, dat wanneer ons leven gevaar liep, we in een veilig land welkom zouden zijn.

Omdat de plek die wij op deze aarde gekregen hebben, ons geen recht geeft om anderen (vluchtelingen) die plek niet te gunnen. Als wij vluchtelingen geen veilige plaats gunnen, zijn wij erg op onszelf gericht, en dat is bijbels niet te verantwoorden. God vraagt van ons om de vreemdeling gastvrij te ontvangen.

Een dergelijk protest is niet mijn manier van laten weten dat ik het ergens niet mee eens ben. Bovendien wist ik ook niet af van de protesten, ben niet actief op social media.

Ik was er niet van op de hoogte! Mijn kring was het eens met de protesten vanwege het feit dat de burgemeester zonder overleg zo'n groot besluit wou nemen. En het genoemde aantal vluchtelingen (1500) was erg veel voor ons dorp. Wat begrijpelijk een 'onveilig' gevoel zou geven.

Heb wel meegelopen met vreedzame protestmars. Voor aankomst van de ME naar huis gegaan.

Buiten iedere proporties, zinloze agressie,. Wil ik me nooit mee identificeren. De gemeenteraad, het college en de burgemeester hebben mogelijk in de aanloop onhandig met de materie omgegaan, maar dat geeft mensen niet een vrijbrief zich op zo'n barbaarse wijze tegen hen te keren.

Ik hou er niet van om op deze manier je mening te uiten. Ook al ben ik absoluut niet voor zo'n groot aantal asielzoekers in Geldermalsen.

Zoiets gaat mij te ver.

Protesteren is niet de juiste manier van communiceren. Zeker niet op de bewuste avond tijdens een raadsvergadering. Daarnaast had ik geen problemen met een toekomstig AZC maar wel met de grote van het AZC wat zou komen. Daarnaast lag bij mij persoonlijk zo gevoelig dat ik zou gaan demonstreren.

Ik was niet op de hoogte van de gebeurtenissen, totdat mijn zoon belde, want die had het gezien op t.v.

ik blijf lekker thuis

Ik ben het oneens met de manier van protesteren. Ik vind dat iedereen in Nederland een steentje moet bijdragen in de opvang van vluchtelingen. 1.500 vind ik wel veel voor een Gemeente zoals Geldermalsen. Het aantal zou in een andere verhouding moeten zijn. Ik snap overigens wel dat de protesten ontstonden, De manier waarop de gemeente Geldermalsen het proces heeft gemanaged is niet transparant geweest en was mede oorzaak van de heftigheid van de reactie.

Komst van azc leek me op dat moment een humanitaire noodzaak waar we niet van weg mochten kijken maar ook ons steentje moesten bijdragen.

Was het gedeeltelijk wel eens met de Protesten. Zoals het gegaan is was niet Juist. Wilde dit zo snel mogelijk er doorheen duwen. Zonder medeweten van de burgers. Is uitgelekt . Meer Openheid was veel beter Geweest. Maar niet op Deze Manier de Protesten.

Geen comtentaar.

nee

totaal niet kunnen vinden in het verzet tegen vluchtelingen, hoewel het beoogde aantal vluchtelingen niet in verhouding stond met het aantal inwoners. De wijze waarop men heeft gedemonstreerd exceptioneel was, veel agressie bij de betogers. Vindt het vluchtelingenvraagstuk best moeilijk. Vindt dat wij de echte oorlogsslachtoffers een veilig onderkomen moeten kunnen bieden.

Wij waren niet op de hoogte van het feit dat de gemeenteraad over een AZC zou besluiten, noch dat daartegen actie gevoerd zou gaan worden. Los daarvan is rel-schoppen niet zozeer onze stijl. Toch begrijp ik de protesten wel en treft de gemeenteraad blaam. 1e. Een AZC van deze omvang (10% van de bevolking) is m.i. te groot voor deze gemeente. 2e. De geplande locatie (op een industrieterrein buiten het dorp langs een drukke aanvoer-route) was gekozen om verliezen op de gemeentebegroting te verdoezelen, en zeker niet in het belang van asielzoekers vanwege slechte verbindingen en gevaarlijke situaties. 3e. Het plan was in strijd met eerdere toezeggingen/beloftes van B&W. Voor wat deze beloftes waard zijn natuurlijk, maar dan worden we cynisch. Dat is niet zoals democratie hoort te zijn!

Ik was het niet eens met de protesten. De vluchtelingen waren welkom. Waar ik niet mee eens was dat de Gemeente niet eerlijk is geweest over de aanleiding van het besluit om de vluchtelingen naar Geldermalsen te halen. Er was een financieel tekort wat men hiermee wilde oplossen. Dat klopt niet en was ik niet mee eens. Ik realiseer me goed dat een vluchteling niet zomaar kiest om te vluchten; de situatie is onhoudbaar en men ziet het vluchten als enige oplossing. Mensen die in deze humanitaire nood verkeren moet opvang aan worden geboden. Dit is een verantwoordelijkheid van Europa en ook Nederland. Ik merk dat vluchtelingen nu een voorkeurspositie krijgen en gratis zorg krijgen die ze nodig hebben, maar wat de Nederlander niet krijgt (terwijl hij deze nodig heeft). Dat geeft een scheve verhouding.

Omdat ik vond dat wij wel een AZC konden hebben, maar liever de helft bijv.

Was niet aanwezig op die dagen wegens vakantie

Ik ben niet iemand die protesteert. Ga liever in gesprek.

Vind het niet leuk om aan protesten mee te doen

Omdat ik daar geen heil in zie het moet op een andere manier opgelost kunnen worden bijvoorbeeld door praten als dat mogelijk is.

Ik was het absoluut niet eens met de manier waarop dat ging en wij zijn geen tegenstander van het AZC

Protesteren ligt niet in mijn karakter.

Ik ben niet tegen een azc. Vluchtelingen moeten ook een plaats hebben om te wonen.

Walgelijk en in-humaan, ik wilde er eerder naar toe gaan om de mensen tegen te houden om dit gedrag te tonen. Uit eigen veiligheid heb ik dat niet gedaan. Ik kan me herinneren dat ik erg boos was en zeer teleurgesteld dat ik in een dorp ben gaan wonen waar dit gedrag vertoont wordt.

Ik had niet het gevoel dat het veel invloed op mijn privé zou hebben. En de vluchtelingen moeten ergens wonen

Protesten zoals in Geldermalsen zijn niet acceptabel.

wist het niet,pertinent oneens

Ik was thuis bij de kinderen. En wie had er voor mijn kinderen gezorgd als ik door de M.E. in elkaar geslagen was geworden?

Het zo mee doen aan een protest, schaad de democratie.

Omdat ik vind dat mensen die vluchten voor oorlog recht hebben op bescherming. Nederland en daarmee dus ook de gemeenten hebben daarin een taak te vervullen. Ik snap best dat sommige mensen bang zijn, maar dat uit je niet op de manier waarop dat hier is gegaan. Te beschamend voor woorden! Geldermalsen onwaardig! Denk wel dat de gemeente in het hele traject fouten heeft gemaakt. De gemeente had eerder de dialoog moeten zoeken. Ook dan was er weerstand geweest en wellicht zelfs in dezelfde mate, maar nu werden mensen wel heel erg overvallen.

Omdat ze beschamend zijn

omdat ik het onzin vond

De raadsvergadering zou op de tv komen en via internet te volgen zijn. Dat is dus niet gebeurd. Bovendien was er wel een voetbal wedstrijd op de tv van mijn club.

Was het niet eens, ieder mens heeft recht op woonruimte en een veilige omgeving. Schaamde me zelfs voor wat er plaats gevonden heeft.

Omdat ik het prima had gevonden als een AZC in Geldermalsen was gekomen, er vanuit gaande dat alles goed geregeld zou worden vanuit de gemeente. Ik zag het als een kans, niet als een bedreiging. Ik vond het verschrikkelijk hoe men zich hier in het dorp opgesteld heeft met al die spandoeken en borden, ik wist niet hoe ik mijn kinderen moest uitleggen dat zij in zo'n intolerant dorp wonen. Mijn vrienden/ familie/ collega's hebben niet meegedaan aan de protesten want die wonen niet hier, maar veel kennissen die ik via de buurt of de scholen van de kinderen ken wel. Dat werd in de vorige vragen niet genoemd. Ik ken dus wel veel mensen die het oneens waren met de komst van het AZC en dat op indringende negatieve wijze duidelijk gemaakt hebben. Er waren vast ook wel mensen die voor het AZC waren, net als ik, maar die waren minder agressief in het nieuws. Waarschijnlijk durfden zij dit ook niet vanwege bedreigingen op o.a. Facebook. Ik ben dan ook blij dat deze enquête anoniem is.

Ik wil graag dat er een AZC in Geldermalsen komt, ook als het gaat om mee dan 1500 vluchtelingen. Als wij voor Wilders moeten vluchten zouden wij het ook op prijs stellen als we in een ander land welkom zouden zijn. Ik vind het belachelijk dat mensen tegen het opnemen van vluchtelingen zijn.

Ik sta open voor het opvangen van vluchtelingen, er valt te discussiëren over de manier waarop. Maar de (in mijn ogen) stelligheid en harde manier van communiceren van het 'nee-AZC-kamp' gaf weinig ruimte voor die discussie.

Ik was niet tegen, had wel bedenkingen over de manier waarop het college het te overhaast hebben aangegekondigd. Maar geen reden om hiervoor de straat op te gaan.

Omdat ik het verafschuwde, ik wist niet dat er zo veel mensen in dit dorp zich bedreigd zouden voelen.

Het lijkt me niet de manier om je mening kenbaar te maken. Geweld en agressie is ten principale een onjuist middel.

Ik vond het wel goed als Geldermalsen de vluchtelingen had opgenomen.

De wijze waarop de protesten hebben plaatsgevonden keur ik sterk af. Ik heb begrip dat er verschillend over het vluchtelingenprobleem wordt gedacht. Maar de vluchtelingen worden nu met vooral de negatieve zijde sterk geëtaled. De manier waarop de protesten hebben plaatsgevonden lost het vluchtelingenprobleem niet op, het levert alleen maar verliezers op en de meeste protestvoerders hebben zich zodanig verlaagd dat er weinig meer over het gedrag van de vluchtelingen gezegd kan worden.

De vluchtelingen verschaffen veel werk, het geeft een boost aan de lokale economie, een deel van demografische probleem kan opgelost worden.

ik ben nou ook weer niet het type dat aan protestmarsen of dergelijke meedoet meestal loopt het uit de hand dit protest steunde ik wel omdat de gemeente op het laatste moment een brief rond liet gaan terwijl het plan er al weken lag de bevolking wist van niks ik vind met zo'n belangrijk iets mogen wij best inspraak hebben

Omdat het mijn baan is die te bestrijden

omdat ik het daar niet mee eens was ik ben er voor om echte vluchtelingen te helpen maar wel op kleinere schaal

Ik wist dat er rellen zouden komen, dat werd in het dorp al aangekondigd door een aantal mensen die wij kennen, ik bemoei me daar liever niet mee, ook heb ik een dochter van vier die ik daar niet in wil betrekken zij mag later eigen keuze maken wat zij goed en fout vindt.

Mensen in nood moeten worden opgevangen, daar protesteer ik niet tegen als de opvang toevallig in mijn omgeving is. Ben vrijwilligster geweest bij vluchtelingenwer in de jaren 90.

Omdat ik daar niet tussen wilde staan omdat ik van te voren al wist dat het uit de hand zou gaan lopen

De protest manier op die wijze is niet passend bij mij.

Het slechte gedrag van de Gemeente leidde tot walgelijk gedrag van protesterenden. Zo leek het alsof niemand in Geldermalsen een paar asielzoekers zou dulden. De Gemeente heeft het slecht aangepakt; er is ruimte voor asielzoekers, maar niet zoveel in één centrum en niet op deze wijze gebracht. De man van wie bekend is dat hij het grootste deel van zijn volwassen leven in de gevangenis heeft gezeten, had met zijn vriendjes de leiding van het protest en vormde in de media het beeld. Fijn.

Ik was een voorstander van een AZC opvang in Geldermalsen. Het proces vanuit de gemeentelijke organisatie verdient echter geen schoonheidsprijs.

Ik was het niet eens met de standpunten en argumenten die werden gegeven tegen het AZC. Naar mijn mening waren de deelnemers van de protesten over het algemeen onwetend en bevooroordeeld. Bovendien waren de protesten onnodig fysiek. Er was geen reden voor fysiek geweld, maar toch vonden enkele simpele zielen dat wel.

Omdat ik vind dat je mensen in nood moet helpen. En het lijkt me dat mensen op de vlucht voor een oorlogssituatie in nood verkeren.

Ik was die dag niet in de buurt en vernam al ruimschoots van tevoren dat het een hele happening zou worden. Ik woon op misschien 200 meter van het stadhuis. Spandoeken, ME etc. zijn nou niet mijn manier om het gesprek aan te gaan.

Ik had hier geen reden voor en wist overigens ook niet dat er een bijeenkomst was. Ik houd de lokale politiek niet zo goed bij. Alhoewel ik wel verrast was het nieuw via de landelijke media te moeten horen. Ik ben het wel eens dat de gemeente anders had moeten communiceren om zo een beter draagvlak te creëren.

Omdat ik niet zo op de voorgrond treed..

humanitaire overwegingen

Was er vanuit gegaan dat het besluit toch al genomen was.

ik ben niet zo van de barricaden., maar ik begreep de frustratie wel

Hier voelde ik mij niet goed bij

Protesten waren verschrikkelijk. Onnodig: laat democratisch proces gebeuren Fout: we moeten onze naasten liefhebben als onszelf is mijn christelijke levensvisie

Protest is goed, maar deze vorm van geweld keur ik sterk af. Anderzijds heb ik moeten constateren dat het wel heeft geloond !

We zijn het eens met de protesten maar niet met de manier waarop het gebeurd is{geweld}. De gemeente heeft gefaald want ze heeft de burgers niet ingelicht. We hebben die mogelijkheid niet gehad want het was zo onverwachts dat we die mogelijkheid niet gehad hebben.

Al was ik niet eens met het aantal mensen die naar de azc zou gaan (1500 op een bevolking van 11000), en de locatie (naast de AVRI terwijl je het terrein zelfs aan de andere kant van het centrum kunt ruiken); was ik niet van plan om mee te doen aan geweld. (aan de voorbereidingen te zien, was het mij duidelijk dat politie op een geweldadige confrontatie uit was)

Belachelijk zoals men zich toen zo heeft gedragen. Schaam me nu nog steeds als ik moet zeggen dat ik Geldermalsen woon. Ik kom zelf uit de grote stad en vind de mensen hier nogal bekrompen. Zijn bang voor alles wat anders is. Als communicatiewetenschapper vond ik het wel slecht hoe Miranda de Vries dit even snel heeft willen regelen, zonder dat daar vooraf goede communicatie over was. Wij werden als het waren voor het blok gezet. Op zich is het dan niet zo vreemd dat men dan in protest komt maar dat het zo uit de hand zou lopen had ik niet verwacht. Maar die fout zal ze hopelijk ook niet snel meer maken.

Ik ben niet naar het gemeentehuis gegaan omdat ik verwachtte dat het er zo druk zou zijn dat er geen plaats voor me was.

Het was al duidelijk dat het uit de hand zou gaan lopen omdat de gemeente niet erg netjes is (geweest) naar haar burgers. En ook het uitsluiten van mensen qua inspraak en alles afschermen voor de meeste media.. Bovendien was het al duidelijk dat de gemeente de boel verdraaid naar buiten bracht. Dan kun je wachten op ellende en daar ga ik niet tussen staan

Geen tijd

Ik ben geen aktievoerder

x

Ik was er niet tegen, alleen had wel moeite met het grote aantal dat zou kunnen gaan komen. Ik was in het gemeentehuis toen de rellen uitbraken en dat vond ik een hele nare ervaring en voelde me zeer bedreigd.

Ik heb niet meegedaan, omdat ik NIET tegen de komst van een AZC in Geldermalsen was. Ik heb op de bewuste avond zelfs met een vriend bij het gemeentehuis gestaan met een bord met de tekst 'Vluchtelingen Welkom'. Dit hebben we volgehouden totdat we bedreigd werden, het bord uit onze handen was geslagen en we ons niet meer veilig voelden. Ik vind overigens wel, dat de gemeente Geldermalsen de bevolking van tevoren niet goed heeft ingelicht en de mensen heeft overvallen met de mogelijke komst van een AZC.

Omdat ik het niet eens was met de protesten.

Het werd snel een ondemocratische reactie op een ondemocratisch gemeentebestuurbeleid

Ik was het oneens met het doel van de protesten, en al was ik het ermee eens geweest dan wijs ik verstoring van een openbare raadsvergadering af, zeker als er verbaal- en fysiek geweld aan te pas komt.

Ik vond de protesten buitensporig! Schandalig hoe mensen zich kunnen gedragen. Ik schaamde me diep voor Geldermalsen.

omdat het bekend was dat het uit de hand zou lopen.

Omdat ik niet tegen de komst van een AZC was

AZC had best kunnen komen. Burgemeester heeft het zeer slecht aangepakt. Misschien iets kleiner aantal vluchtelingen, maar echte vluchtelingen moet je opvangen.

Omdat ik het heel erg oneens was met de protesten. Ik vind/vond het geen handige actie van de gemeenteraad, omdat het wel om een heel grote AZC ging in verhouding met de rest van Geldermalsen en omdat er in die tijd sowieso veel maatschappelijk protest was tegen AZC's en er, volgens mij, te ondoordacht is gehandeld. Maar: in principe ben ik er van overtuigd dat mensen alleen vluchten als ze echt in heel grote nood zitten en echt niet meer kunnen leven in hun eigen land. Je verlaat je land echt niet zomaar, daar ben ik van overtuigd, zeker niet met gevaar voor eigen leven. Wij in Nederland hebben het goed, dus ik vind dat wij ook wat voor anderen moeten doen. Ik denk dat kleinschalige opvang voor vluchtelingen en de omgeving waarin ze komen verreweg het fijnst is, dus daar zou mijn voorkeur wel naar uitgaan. Volgens mij heeft het dan de grootste kans van slagen. Ik denk wel dat het COA fouten heeft gemaakt. Mijn zusje en een paar andere vrienden hebben zich als vrijwilliger aangemeld, allemaal zijn ze afgestudeerd arts. Het COA heeft dit afgehouden. Dit snap ik echt niet.

Ik was niet tegen de komst van een AZC (al had ik twijfels bij de grootte die werd voorgesteld).

De belangrijkste reden was dat ik in het ziekenhuis lag. Maar had ik instaat geweest om wel te gaan had ik dat niet gedaan. Ik schaam me voor mijn familie en vrienden. Zo doe je niet als je een beetje fatsoen heb. Er zijn andere manieren om je ongenoegen te uiten. Dit was sensatie, welvaart, angst en dom gedrag. Jammer dat deze kortzichtige mensen niet beter zijn voorgelicht. Een gemiste kans van de burgemeester en andere bestuurs leden. Mijn advies is dan ook, geef meer openheid van zaken. En laat ze aan ideeën wennen, geef het de tijd. En kijk goed of er ook andere oplossingen zijn. Als er goed wordt gekeken zijn die er vaak wel.

Ik ben een christen, de Heere vraagt van ons verdraagzaamheid, zachtmoedigheid en de ander hoger achten als jezelf..

Wij zijn/ waren het met de protesten beslist niet eens. Ook deze mensen moeten geholpen worden. De actievoerders waren te vroeg. De genen die het naar buiten heeft gebracht is buiten zijn of haar boekje gegaan.

Ik was niet tegen de komst van een azc. Communicatie vanuit de gemeente had beter moeten. Maar ik denk dat een dergelijk besluit meestal op weerstand stuit. Sowieso pas demonstreren niet bij mijn karakter.

Ik was voor het AZC. Ik wilde hier niet voor demonstreren, ik vond de sfeer in het dorp niet goed om voor deze mening uit te komen. De kans dat je eigendommen worden beklad of dat je grof gebekt wordt benaderd was mij te groot. In zekere zin was de situatie bedreigend voor mij om mijn mening openlijk te geven. Alleen met burens die ik vertrouw heb ik de situatie besproken.

Nee

niet mijn ding

Was niet in Geldermalsen

Ik was wel aanwezig, maar heb niet geprotesteerd. Uiteindelijk is er een gekozen volksvertegenwoordiging die mogen dat beslissen. Uiteraard is er ook het recht om te protesteren, maar dat zit niet zo in mij.

Als ik zelf een vluchteling geweest zou zijn, zou ik ook ergens veilig heen willen. Als je door oorlog en geweld getekend bent voor het leven en je komt eindelijk ergens veilig, is het laatste wat je nodig hebt of wilt is dat er mensen tegen je gaan protesteren. Hoe kun je protesteren tegen mensen die zoveel mee gemaakt hebben.

Omdat ik het ontzettend zwakbegaafd vind van iedereen. Heel laag bij de grond, naastenliefde nergens meer te bekennen. Niemand is illegaal.

Geen tijd

Omdat ik het gevoel had dat het uit de hand zou lopen en omdat ik het idee had dat er goed over nagedacht was.

omdat de mens achter de vluchteling de opvang (voorlopig) moet kunnen ontvangen

Kunt u aangeven waarom u mee heeft gedaan met de protesten in Geldermalsen in december 2015?

Willen niet overlopen worden door een geweldadige intolerante politieke ideologie die haaks staat op onze normen waarden en cultuur en de vrije westerse beschaving. Daarbij krijgen die mensen zonder pardon alles terwijl de eigen bevolking wordt achter gesteld en overall financieel voor op mogen draaien. Het zijn ook geen vluchtelingen maar illegale immigranten die komen parasiteren op ons sociale systeem. En in die tussentijd het gastland willen islamiseren.

Ten eerste: de burgemeester van Geldermalsen had aangekondigd dat er een AZC zou komen in Geldermalsen. Dit is niet van te voren gecommuniceerd naar de inwoners. Ten tweede vind ik het niet goed dat er zoveel asielzoekers naar Nederland komen. Het kost de belastingbetalers heel veel geld, criminaliteit neemt toe. Je hoort het alleen maar monddesmaats in de media. Maar ik ben ervan overtuigd dat er heel veel informatie achter wordt gehouden.

tegen de komst van een azc

tegen de gemeente

Te snel en niet democratische beslissing die er genomen ging worden

Sensatie wat later uit de hand liep door komst ME

Omdat t voor kinderen en vrouwen met 1500 mannen voornamelijk zeer onveilig was geworden ook zou de burgemeester t zonder t te overleggen met de bevolking t azc door de strot hebben willen duwen

Omdat ik tegen het AZC ben

Omdat ik het er niet mee eens was dat er een azc in Geldermalsen zou komen omdat het ook binnen een paar dagen door onze burgemeester (hoofdschuldige van alles) geregeld zou willen hebben Door de media werden we allemaal als relschoppers veroordeeld dit was niet zo. Van de 1500 protestanten was 70% oudere mensen tussen de 50 en 80 jaar die alleen maar een vreedzaam protest wilden maar toen de ME ter plaatse kwam werden ook veel oudere mensen geslagen die geen kant op konden. Voordat de mE arriveerde werd er alleen een beetje met vuurwerk gegooid. Ook werd er 2 uur later in het centrum van Geldermalsen door de ME er op los geslagen waarom er was daar niets meer aan de hand De politiek maakt verkeerde keuzes jammer dat ze er zo mee weggamen Als dit volgende week weer zou moeten zal ik er weer bij willen zijn omdat wij op moeten komen voor onze vrijheid. Door de rellen werd het azc afgewezen Daarom heel veel dank aan alle protesterende Geldermalsenaren

Omdat het teveel tesnel als een verassing kwam je had geen tijd om er goed over na te denken omdat dat 1500 mensen in een gebouw op te sluiten vraagt om problemen. ongeacht uit welke cultuur ze ook komen. en het hoeft zakelijk alleen maar mannen waren is ook raar.

Nederland in vol en men ziet dat ze zich niet aanpassen. En zoveel asielzoekers in en klein dorp kan gewoon niet en het zijn allemaal jonge mannen die goed in hun eigen land kunnen werken en niet zielig zijn dus gewoon niet toelaten

Ik vond het aantal vluchtelingen dat de gemeente in Geldermalsen wou laten komen te veel, ik ben echter wel weg gegaan toen er rellen ontstonden.

Ik heb niet meegedaan maar was er wel bij. Het is niet netjes hoe de burgemeester achter ons rug om ineens heel veel vluchtelingen wilde opvangen in Geldermalsen. Ik ben niet tegen vluchtelingen maar wel tegen het principe hoe het gegaan is.

Ik heb het zelf georganiseerd. Omdat ik er nog geen 500 m er vanaf woon. Ik was en ben dan bang voor de veiligheid van mijn kind en vrouw. En de rest van eventuele bekende. Er hoeft er maar 1 tussen te zitten met de verkeerde bedoelingen. En dat is er al een te veel. Dit is een vrij rustig dorp met weinig criminaliteit. Wat ik graag zo wil houden. Ook zijn hier nog geen achterstands blokken of wijken. Waar ik ook veel waarden aan hecht. Ik hou van dit dorp. Ik ben hier geboren en ik sterf hier. Ook zou de waarden van mijn huis vlink zaken. Als ik hier voor het kopen van mijn nieuwbouw huis dit wist. Had ik het niet gekocht in 2013.

Het op korte termijn zo bij ons neer te leggen

gewoon om te er bij te zijn zodat er zoveel mogelijk mensen waren een stil protest

Er kwamen teveel vluchtelingen in de te kleine bevolking (Geldermalsen)

Doordat de gemeenteraad je voor een voldongen feit stelde, geen overleg. Daarnaast was de burgemeester nalatig.

Doordat de gemeente de bewoners van Geldermalsen niet had ingelicht.

Dat ie geluks zoekers maar lekker in hun eigen land blijven.
