Analysing the impact of conflict transformations projects on peace and security in Kashmir

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Master thesis Conflict, Territories and Identities
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Supervisor: Mr Bomert, 30 October 2019
Acknowledgements

I had the opportunity to travel to India and research the Kashmir conflict for my thesis. The months I spent in India and Kashmir were tremendously enjoyable and had great impact on my life. Many people inspired me with their stories of courage and hope for a better future. I was truly fortunate to able to spend time in Kashmir.

Firstly, I would like to thank the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies in New Delhi, India, for giving me the opportunity to be a Research Intern with them. Not only did they make my stay in India more pleasant, but they were the first ones to give me an insider view of the situation in Kashmir, as well as provide me with contacts of people I could get in touch with to interview for my research.

Secondly, I would like to thank all the people who took part in my research. Many people were so welcoming to me and willing to share personal experiences on difficult subjects. I will never forget their hospitality and their kindness.

Thirdly, I would like to thank my family and friends who supported me throughout my research and writing of my thesis. They encouraged me to research something I thought was important, in this case to research an intractable conflict in South Asia.

Fourthly, I would like to thank my girlfriend, Valeria, who was always supporting me during my Master’s. She was there when times became stressful and helped me carry on going and finish my thesis. I am indebted to her for her unwavering love and support.

Finally, I am grateful for the constructive feedback and patience of Bert Bomert, my thesis supervisor at Radboud University, Nijmegen, for taking his time to give me some orientation when I felt lost, or give me the feedback that I needed at the right time, helping me get a better structure of my paper.

Tim Walpot, August 2019.
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AJK - Azad Jammu and Kashmir
ATA - Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997
CPEC - China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
CT - Conflict transformation
C & Ds - Connectors and Dividers
DAC - Development Assistance Committee
FIR - First Information Report
GB - Gilgit-Baltistan
HRCP - Human Rights Commission of Pakistan
ICRC - International Committee of the Red Cross
JKCCS - Jammu Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society
KP - Kashmiri Pandits
OHCHR - Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
MDGs - Millennium Development Goals
NGO - Non-governmental Organisation
UN – United Nations
UNCIP - United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan
UNDP - United Nations Development Program
UNHDR - The United Nations Human Development Report
UNHRC - United Nations Human Rights Committee
UNMOGIP - United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNODC - United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNSG – United Nations Secretary-General
SHRC - Jammu and Kashmir State Human Rights Commission
WDR - World Development Report
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Chapter 1: Impact of conflict transformation projects on peace and security in Kashmir

1.1 Introduction

Every year hundreds of millions of dollars are channelled towards peacebuilding and economic development activities in conflict-affected regions. (International) non-governmental organisations ((I)NGOs) as well as agencies of the United Nations and regional organisations often intervene in conflict areas (Anderson & Olson, 2003). Despite this increased focus on conflict areas, many intervention plans are based on little evidence of their effects on society and long-term prospects for peace and stability (Andersen, Bull & Kennedy-Chouane, 2014). In order to deliver better results in regions of conflict, it is vitally important to improve the understanding of the impacts and the effectiveness of conflict transformation initiatives.

Kashmir has seen an increase in the number of NGOs active in the region. Civil society organisations and NGOs began working in the region after 1989, when an armed conflict erupted; an armed conflict that created socio, economic and political instability in the state. Recently, the number of NGOs has increased dramatically and they are playing a role in the development of Jammu and Kashmir (Wani, 2011).

However, this increase is in contrast to the limited knowledge of their impact on the ground, as projects in Kashmir find it difficult to evaluate the extent of their impact. It is therefore important to improve the understanding of (the impact of) these interventions in order to improve conflict transformation practices (Scherrer, 2012). This master’s thesis attempts to research Kashmir and whether the few local conflict transformation projects are effective and genuinely work in the interests of the different stakeholders and do justice to the complexity and magnitude of the conflict.

1.2 Research objective and research questions

The objective of this research is to first identify the so-called Connectors and Dividers in Kashmir using the C&D framework for analysis (see Table 4 for an overview), followed by determining whether specific conflict transformation projects can be seen as Connectors and perform the role of peacebuilding in helping transform the conflict. The impact of conflict transformation projects in Jammu and Kashmir will be evaluated. By setting up an evaluation framework, this thesis examines whether conflict transformation projects can contribute to increased peaceful and secure societies and genuinely work in the interests of the various stakeholders.

My research question therefore is:

How and to what extent do conflict transformation projects in the case of Jammu and Kashmir contribute to more peaceful and secure societies?

In addition to the central question, six sub-questions have been formulated so as to be able to answer the central question:

1) What are the theoretical perspectives of conflict transformation and the role it can play in local peacebuilding processes?
2) What is the (historical) context of the Kashmir conflict?
3) How has the NGO culture in Kashmir evolved?
4) What are the Connectors and Dividers in Kashmir for each of the identified categories: systems, structures and institutions; attitudes and actions; shared values and interests; common experience; symbols and occasions?
5) What are the approaches, goals and activities of NGOs working on conflict transformation projects in Kashmir?
6) Which changes are visible, if any, due to the conflict transformation projects in Kashmir?

The aim of the different sub-questions is to examine whether conflict transformation projects in Kashmir have contributed to a positive change regarding peace and security in society. The first three sub-questions are answered based on researching the academic and theoretical literature. The final three sub-questions are answered by conducting a literature study as well as data gathered from in-depth interviews.

1.3 Scientific and societal relevance

Researching the impact of conflict transformation projects that focus on security and peace is very pertinent and important in the field of peacebuilding. The essential notion this thesis investigates is whether conflict transformation projects can produce encouraging changes in a society characterized by conflict. During the last twenty years there has been a considerable increase in the number of (I)NGOs. Alongside this growth, there has also been an increase in the number of conflict transformation projects implemented in conflict regions. Despite this increase, however, little is known about the true impact of these projects. It is therefore essential to get a clearer picture of the projects that NGOs implement and investigate what impacts they may have on the local population and long-term prospects for peace.

During my research, it turned out there is a lacuna in the conflict transformation literature which explicitly looks at a "civil society-initiated contextual analysis that focuses on the societal tensions" (Singh, 2015, p.16). Especially for regions with a longstanding conflict there is a need to provide a systematic context and intervention analysis, using a framework from the field of conflict transformation and peacebuilding. This analysis can then help to bridge the gap between theory and praxis (Singh, 2015).

There is also a need to understand the capacity of specific projects or organisations to build transformation capacities within a particular region. This study aims to research and analyse conflict transformation projects and their capacity to build peace.

Evaluation of projects is challenging as it is problematic to attribute particular changes in a society to a specific project intervention, since there may be other factors which play a role in these changes (Walton, 2012). Furthermore, with only limited funds and resources, in many cases NGOs prioritise spending time and money on intervention projects rather than on evaluating the impact of these projects. Nonetheless, an attempt to research evaluation should be of primary importance for NGOs and other organisations working on conflict transformation, because it can provide data on the genuine impact of an intervention.

This thesis attempts to provide information and awareness of the impact conflict transformation projects can have. This is valuable information that not only might benefit the individuals, communities and societies that are reached within these projects but also indicate to NGOs how future projects could be changed so as to have greater success. If a specific project does not have the desired effects, it is important to know this in order to prevent the same interventions being implemented again.
Impact evaluation may legitimise or undermine the conflict resolution work of NGOs. If the impacts are found to be positive in society, the NGOs’ work would become further legitimised and could help secure conflict resolution ideas and approaches to be used by international organisations (Church & Shouldice, 2002). With this research I hope to offer insights in the impact that projects have and provide recommendations and knowledge on how future projects might potentially move forward.

This research is scientifically relevant in several ways. Most importantly, this thesis can make a theoretical contribution as the research will attempt to gain answers as to whether NGO conflict transformation projects can contribute to greater security and justice. This thesis builds on past theory on conflict transformation and assess whether current academic insights reflect what is happening on the ground in Kashmir. Currently, there has been limited research on assessing the impact of conflict transformation projects; therefore, it is important to conduct this research to begin to gain a better understanding of these projects’ real impacts.

The empirical insights of this research are based on qualitative field research that has been conducted in India with respect to conflict transformation projects and the presence of NGOs in Kashmir. The empirical evidence is important for this thesis as it will provide more insight into the central question of the thesis on whether NGO conflict transformation projects are able to bring about increased peace and security in Kashmir.

Kashmir was chosen as a case study because it is an intractable conflict in South Asia which poses a noteworthy challenge to the theory and practice of conflict transformation (Singh, 2015). The conflict in Kashmir can be analysed at three separate, although interconnected levels: interstate (India vs. Pakistan), centre-state (India vs. Jammu and Kashmir), and inter-regional (Jammu-Kashmir vs. Ladakh). Long-term transformation of the conflict in Kashmir needs to engage all three levels. In Kashmir, the protracted nature of the conflict creates permanent societal costs, including fostering an atmosphere that traumatizes future generations and hindering reconciliation (Singh & Nissanka, 2015). Singh & Nissanka (2015) highlight that South Asia has many intractable conflicts; the dynamics of the conflicts indicate that each context is a unique combination of local actors, issues and attitudes. It is therefore necessary to conduct bottom-up research regarding a specific conflict, in order to reach a better understanding of the uniqueness of a conflict. This research explores and evaluates the conflict transformation efforts in Kashmir and may serve as an example for other contexts and other conflict transformation efforts.

1.4 Methodology

The central focus of this thesis is on evaluating conflict transformation projects in Jammu and Kashmir. Evaluating or measuring the real impact of peacebuilding and conflict transformation projects is complicated however, as there are no clear methods or a well-defined framework. There is arguably a lack of understanding of “how best to evaluate policy operational initiatives in complex conflict contexts” (Paffenholz, 2011, p.1). Evaluation difficulties include the fact that conflict transformation is an ongoing long-term process rather than a process with fixed and rapid results. Moreover, possible effects or impacts of conflict transformation projects might be perceived differently by different actors within a given society. In sum, evaluation of conflict transformation projects is extremely difficult and there is little consensus in the field of what methodological approach to take.

Lederach (1997) highlights the difficulties in evaluating conflict transformation initiatives, and suggests that a strategic, responsive approach to evaluation is needed. According to him, evaluation should be seen as a tool for learning and feedback, and therefore a critical aspect of the peacebuilding process. Evaluation should not be about measuring final results but
about sketching the 'big picture'. He suggests that inquests should aim to assess coordination between the various actors and levels, identify provisional and long-term goals and consider the reaction to the interventions in the context of the conflict.

An evaluation can be described as an assessment of an on-going project where its central aim should be to “determine the relevance and fulfilment of objectives, development efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability” (DAC, 2012, p.12). The evaluation in this thesis is concerned with the consequences conflict transformation initiatives have had on individuals, communities and institutions, and whether these effects can be attributed to the project. The OECD Development Assistance Committee describes evaluation as a “systematic and objective assessment of an on-going or completed project, programme or policy, its design, implementation and results” (DAC, 2012, p.12). The process of monitoring will keep the project management and stakeholders up to date about the development and achievements of the objectives of the initiatives and may point to ways to strengthen implementation in the future.

A key challenge in peacebuilding evaluations is how to find appropriate approaches and methodologies to evaluate the relevance and effectiveness of implemented initiatives. It is vitally important to find out whether initiatives are addressing the needs for peacebuilding in the Kashmir context.

1.4.1 Methods
In order to be able to answer the sub-questions and the central question of this thesis, two main methodological approaches were used: a literature review and a qualitative empirical study.

1.4.2 Literature review
With a focus on theories on conflict transformation and the positive and negative aspects of conflict transformation projects, the main rationale behind the approach of literature analysis was to set up a framework for analysing the approaches and activities of projects on the ground, in the region of Jammu and Kashmir. In this research, the literature review focused on the central concepts of conflict transformation, aimed at conducting a comprehensive evaluation of scientific studies through a qualitative content analysis.

This literature study can be seen as desk research, defined as “a research strategy in which the researcher [...] uses material produced by others” (Verschuren & Doorewaard, 2010, p.194). In addition to academic literature on conflict transformation, reports, guidelines, news articles and evaluation reports of peacebuilding NGOs working in Jammu and Kashmir were analysed in order to gain greater insight and more data on the aims, approaches and activities of these organizations.

1.4.3 Qualitative empirical field study
A qualitative method was used to understand, first, the Connectors and Dividers in Kashmir, and second, to understand Kashmiri and civil society perceptions towards the interventions that were selected for this research. In this research, two case studies of conflict transformation projects have been used: Hum Kadam, a NGO-initiated programme and Operation Sadbhavana, a government-backed programme. Regarding these two case studies a qualitative empirical field study has been conducted, using in-depth interviews. Interviews were conducted in New Delhi and Kashmir and they form the ‘empirical inquiry’ of this study. In addition, field visits were made to Srinager and Sopore.

The methodological approach focuses on a qualitative empirical study, using a semi-structured interview technique. An interview guide was used, so as to help create a basic structure to the interview but also to allow for an open conversation to take place in which
interviewees could express their ideas. Qualitative data has been collected through in-depth interviews with experts on the subject and recipients of the projects.

1.4.4 Sampling
As a research intern at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies I was in a good position to investigate the two selected projects of Hum Kadam and Operation Sadbhavana. Subsequently, I interviewed experts on the conflict in Kashmir and participants involved in the implementation of the projects.

Between August and October 2018, in-depth interviews were conducted based on purposive sampling and snowball sampling. Purposive sampling was used as interviewees were required that were experts on the Kashmir conflict and conflict transformation projects. This group consisted of political activists, academics, people linked to the Indian government, and NGO workers. The target I had set and achieved was to conduct at least eight interviews with independent experts on the conflict in Kashmir.

Snowball sampling was also used as participants were needed that had been involved in the implementation of the two selected projects. Snowball sampling involves building a network of research participants through recommendations, and is especially useful for people that are not easily reached (O’Leary, 2004). Once I had contact with some research participants, they very kindly put me in touch with further potential interviewees. The target I had set and also achieved was to conduct at least ten in-depth interviews. During my stay in India I conducted 14 interviews from August 14 to October 1, 2018. Table 1 shows an overview of conducted interviews. Specific dates and locations of the interviews are included in the Appendix.

Table 1: Conducted Interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Independent experts</td>
<td>8 people, 7 interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Kashmiris</td>
<td>13 people, 7 interviews</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.4.5 Methods per research question
The aim of the various sub-questions is to examine whether the projects of Hum Kadam and Operation Sadbhavana have contributed to a positive change regarding peace and security in Kashmir. The first three sub-questions (What are the theoretical perspectives of conflict transformation and what role can it play in local peacebuilding processes?; What is the (historical) context of the Kashmir conflict?; How has the NGO culture in Kashmir evolved?) were primarily answered by researching the academic and theoretical literature. The final three sub-questions (What are the main Connectors and Dividers in Kashmir?; What are the approaches, goals and activities of NGOs working on conflict transformation projects in Kashmir?; Which changes are visible, if any, due to the conflict transformation projects in Kashmir?) were answered using data gathered from in-depth interviews with experts on the Kashmir conflict and recipients of the projects.

1.4.6 Challenges and limitations
The methods I have used to analyse the potential role of conflict transformation projects on the conflict did not aim to deliver a ‘simple’ analysis or solution for future implementation. I chose to analyse the work of Hum Kadam and Operation Sadbhavana in a qualitative style, using semi-structured interviews and direct observation in Kashmir. In addition, I have researched the contextual factors that shape and influence the role of the projects. There are, however, a number of challenges in the methods chosen, also listed in the literature, such as bias in analysis and sensitivity of the subject in a conflict setting (Paffenholz, 2011).
The major limitation in this research is that it is not fully objective. Firstly, the purposive sampling technique chosen to identify interviewees relies on the researcher making a judgement on who should be interviewed and therefore is not fully objective. Secondly, the information gathered through the interviews is based on personal perceptions and interpretations, so findings may not be completely objective. A further consideration that has to be acknowledged is the fact that I conducted my research in India and with predominantly Indian experts. This may result in viewpoints and opinions that are predisposed to be favourable to India. The methodological approach of literature analysis could partially tackle this limitation, yet overall the research cannot be said to be fully impartial.

A risk for researchers is to be drawn into “unwarranted generalizations” and “unjustified simplification” (Mikkelsen, 2005, p. 32). In trying to avoid this, two groups of respondents were interviewed: the recipients of the projects, and the experts who have knowledge about the situation and conflict in Kashmir. This might increase the reliability of the research as – particularly with qualitative research – reliability of the data plays a role and can become subjective.

1.4.7 Analysis
The analysis of the interviews was conducted by coding. Coding is a way of evaluating and categorising data in order to identify and understand meanings. Coding is an analytical practice which can reveal categories, patterns in data and establish the presence of certain ideas or words in any kind of recorded human communication (Busch et al., 2012). Coding also helps in developing bigger picture themes that are more closely linked to the conceptual frame of the research (Clifford, et al., 2016).

In this research, an inductive coding style was chosen in which the codes come directly from reading and thinking about the data from the interviews. As a researcher, I decided to not use computer-aided qualitative data analysis software and instead used traditional note-card and white board methods. A selection of content from the in-depth interviews took place, followed by the selection of units to analyse from the transcripts from the interviews. Coding of the content then took place, followed by drawing conclusions from the analysed and coded content.

1.5 Structure of the thesis
Chapter 2 starts with understanding how the role of peacebuilding activities in conflict is addressed in the theory of conflict transformation. Chapter 3 explores the general contextual characteristics of the conflict in Kashmir. It addresses the history of the conflict, the work of NGOs in Kashmir and the activities of conflict transformation projects of Hum Kadam and Operation Sadbhavana. In Chapter 4, I present my analysis while linking the findings with the theoretical framework of the study. Finally, the most important findings and conclusions are summarised in Chapter 5.
Chapter 2: Theory of conflict transformation

This study analyses and evaluates the potential of initiatives in Kashmir to transform conflict in the region. In order to do so, we need to understand how the role of peacebuilding activities in conflict is addressed in the theory of conflict transformation. Consequently, this chapter will discuss different theoretical understandings of human security and conflict transformation. Firstly, I will explore the ‘new security framework’ and the concept of ‘human security’. After a brief exploration of the notion of ‘human security’, I discuss the guiding principles and ideas of the theory of conflict transformation. This theory is explored alongside an explanation of how it has emerged. In conclusion, I will then filter the important and relevant aspects of the theory of conflict transformation into a framework for analysing and evaluating Kashmiri conflict transformation projects and their ability to transform conflict.

2.1 Human security and the new security framework

In 1994, the United Nations Human Development Report (UNHDR) highlighted and addressed a ‘new concept of security’:

“Forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily lives. For many of them, security symbolized protection from the threat of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression and environmental hazards.” (UNHDR, 1994, p. 22)

This new security framework suggests a shift from a state-centric model of security, with the focus mainly on military threats to the state, to a security framework centred around people (Alkire, 2003). The statement above focuses on the “legitimate concerns of ordinary people” which include hunger, disease, unemployment and political repression. Security is no longer just about military threats, bombs and bullets; the new concept of security has been turned upside down and underdevelopment and human suffering have also become directly linked to security.

This new human security approach as addressed in the UNHDR proposes a necessary change in public policy, so as to focus on developing the welfare, dignity and personal security of individuals and communities. “The world can never be at peace unless people have security in their daily lives”. (UNHDR, 1994, p. 1) In a 2002 United Nations University Research Brief, seven types of security are listed as components of human security: food security, health security, economic security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security. The new all-encompassing human security approach gives primacy to human beings and their often difficult social and economic connections and aims for people’s safety from chronic threats and protection from unexpected hurtful disruptions in daily life.

A key feature of the human security approach is acknowledging that when using it in conflict zones, peacebuilding activities must “form the cornerstone of all development co-operation strategies and programmes” (OECD, 2003, p.85). Peacebuilding must aim to strengthen the capacity of a society to manage conflict, tensions and disputes without violence.

Tadjbakhsh (2005) argues that the human security approach begins to understand the root causes of conflicts in terms of “social and political exclusion, horizontal inequality or structural violence” (Tadjbakhsh, 2005, p. 118. In the context of a response to and intervention in conflict, this understanding requires peacebuilding to move beyond quick
impact projects with short-term goals: “in-depth knowledge of the situation and context-specific solutions” are required, instead of using external models which will most likely not take the local context into account.

Another feature of using the human security approach in response to conflict, involves dealing with institutional benchmarks such as the state and democracy. Alkire (2003) argues that the creation of a democratic, strong state and functioning market can act as means for the safety of citizens, but is not an end goal in itself. Peacebuilding should go beyond economic growth and address social relations, building trust and community integration.

It has been highlighted that the new concept of human security focuses not just on a traditional state-centric model of security, but rather on the security of civilians. Building peace should therefore not only use state-centric models of security but aim to provide security to the people. In integrating this human security approach into responses and interventions in conflict, it should be ensured that projects aim to provide security to civilians and agency to people as providers of security.

2.2 Conflict transformation

In recent years an accruing body of literature has resulted in a range of developments and adaptations in the field of peace and conflict studies. One of these developments is the emergence of the term ‘conflict transformation’, which has become central to the peace discourse. This research uses the term conflict transformation extensively, particularly focusing on the conflict transformation model expressed by Lederach; a distinct theory of conflict transformation that differs from other theories of conflict, conflict resolution and conflict management.

As a field of study and practice, conflict transformation developed during the early 1990s, incorporating core ideas from both conflict resolution and conflict management approaches. As far back as the 1980s, Lederach used the term conflict transformation, while working in Central America, where he began re-examining the language in the field (Lederach, 2003). He acknowledged that many colleagues had suspicions about what was meant by conflict resolution and conflict management. Lederach became increasingly convinced that what was needed was a new framework advocating for constructive change, emphasising the “importance of building relationships and social structures through a radical respect for human rights and life” (Lederach, 2003, p.1). In the course of the 1990s, this new term and theory became known as conflict transformation theory, but it took some time before the terminology of transformation became more widely expressed in academic circles.

Nevertheless, by the late 1990s the concept of conflict transformation had materialised as a powerful and dominant ideal in many areas of conflict intervention (Dukes, 1999) – even though there is no clear definitive conception of ‘conflict transformation’, nor is there a clear distinction between the term and other terms used to describe modes of addressing conflict, such as ‘settlement,’ ‘management,’ and ‘resolution’ (Dukes, 1999, p. 47). The term has amassed a number of meanings in recent works and has begun to mean the transformation of individuals, relationships and social systems (Dukes, 1999). Conflict transformation as a term is nowadays also used as a tool to signify specific approaches to practice and training (Brubaker & Verdonk, 1999).

Table 2: Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation: a comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict Resolution Perspective</th>
<th>Conflict Transformation Perspective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How do we end something that is not desired?</td>
<td>How do we end something not desired and build something we do desire?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The focus

It is content-centred.

It is relationship-centred.

The purpose

To achieve an agreement and solution to the presenting problem creating the crisis.

To promote constructive change processes, inclusive of, but not limited to, immediate solutions.

The development of the process

It is embedded and built around the immediacy of the relationship where the symptoms of disruptions appear.

It envisions the presenting problem as an opportunity for response to symptoms and engagement of systems within which relationships are embedded.

Time frame

The horizon is short-term relief to pain, anxiety, and difficulties.

The horizon for change is mid- to long-range and is intentionally crisis-responsive rather than crisis driven.

View of conflict

It envisions the need to de-escalate conflict processes.

It envisions conflict as an ecology that is relationally dynamic with ebb (conflict de-escalation to pursue constructive change) and flow (conflict escalation to pursue constructive change).

Source: Lederach (2003), p. 33

Table 2 shows a comparison between the conflict transformation perspective and a conflict resolution perspective. According to a conflict resolution approach, the emphasis is placed on solving the problems that led to the conflict, often by third party intervention. The conflicting groups are aided by third parties to uncover the root causes of the conflict and reframe the groups’ positions in order to move away from zero-sum damaging conflict (Azar & Burton, 1986). An assumption of conflict resolution is that all conflict is bad and therefore something that should be ended. Conflict resolution attempts to get rid of conflict, although in many cases people are raising legitimate issues that need to be listened to and addressed (Lederach, 2003). The term ‘resolution’, although perhaps unintentionally, “carries the connotation of a bias toward ‘ending’ a given crisis or at least its outward expression, without being sufficiently concerned with the deeper structural, cultural, and long-term relational aspects of conflict” (Lederach, 1995, p. 201). In essence, conflict resolution assumes that conflict is only a short-term experience that can be permanently resolved through intervention or mediation processes.

A conflict management approach, on the other hand, emphasises the control and containment of conflict. Conflict management is the positive and constructive handling of differences and divergence, where an agreement is reached in a cooperative process, in order to achieve successful management of differences (Bloomfield & Beilly, 1998). Conflict management theorists often view violence as developing from present institutions and their power divisions; as well as a permanent consequence of differences of values and interests within different groups (Miall, 2004). To a conflict management theorist, resolving such conflicts is seen as unrealistic; the best way forward would be the cessation of violence and the management and containment of conflict in order for local politics to be resumed. In many cases, the focus is merely on looking for solutions to the immediate problems without seeing the bigger picture of the conflict itself (Lederach, 2003). The issue with the notion of ‘management’ is that it suggests that people can be directed and controlled – and conflict largely contained (Miall, 2004). Moreover, it assumes the end goal is the control of people’s explosiveness, rather than actually dealing with the source of the problem.

A number of conflict theorists and practitioners therefore rather advocate the pursuit of ‘conflict transformation’, as opposed to ‘conflict resolution’ or ‘conflict management’. Lederach (1995) asserts that conflict transformation is different than resolution or management and reflects a better understanding of the nature of conflict itself. The focus of conflict transformation is on deeper structural, cultural and long-term relational aspects that are imbedded in a social system which sustain patterns of violence (Botes, 2003). In essence, conflict transformation can be seen as the process of transforming relationships, interests and discourses that continue to promulgate conflicts. Miall (2004) argues that the very constitution of society that supports the continuation of violent conflict needs to be addressed and transformed. Conflict transformation focuses on wide-ranging, extended and
destructive conflicts and on how they can change to be conducted constructively (Kriesberg, 2004).

A key aspect of conflict transformation theory is that it recognises conflict as common to and part of social systems; conflicts are inevitable in societies – inevitable outcomes of human interaction (Burton, 1987). Conflicts not only need to be managed and resolved, but transformed and only then can societies move forward. Conflict transformation theorists are aware, however, that the process of transforming conflicts takes place only gradually through a series of small changes and particular steps, involving a range of different actors playing different roles. Lederach (2003) furthermore asserts that conflict can be viewed as a series of challenges and failures, peaks and valleys. The peaks signify the noteworthy challenges in the conflict, while the valleys represent the inability and failure to negotiate suitable solutions (Lederach, 2003). He compares conflict to a mountain range, which is often vague and difficult to see, as it is also difficult to picture a particular conflict and all of its complexities.

Lederach (1995) argues that conflict transformation is about the inherent dialogue process and the ability to transform the dynamics of the conflict and the relationship between the parties. What is needed is an understanding of the long-term goal of conflict transformation in order to build on people and resources within a given setting. Lederach (1995) further suggests that a new set of lenses is needed; we should no longer view the setting and the people in a conflict as the problem and the outsider as the answer. Conflict transformation is needed, actively involving and promoting human and cultural resources from all of society. The response to conflict should go “beyond the presenting problems toward the deeper patterns of relationship, including the context in which the conflict finds expression” (Lederach, 2003, p.10).

Many academics agree that conflict transformation should engage all of society. Miall, Ramsbotham & Woodhouse (1999) argue that conflict transformation mediation should aim to empower the actors, augment and encourage acknowledgement of the many parties involved in the conflict and assume that conflict is a long-term process with abundant opportunities for transformation. This aim is different than the traditional problem-solving or ‘settlement-oriented’ approaches of mediation, where conflict is viewed as a short-term situation in need of a solution; the chief goal is to identify and then resolve problems through a mutually acceptable settlement (Miall, Ramsbotham & Woodhouse, 1999).

Empowering local actors in a conflict setting can be complicated, however. Although stated as an aim by conflict transformation projects, actually empowering the local people may not occur. The rhetoric of humanitarian organisations and conflict transformation projects widely diverge from concrete practice (Reich, 2006). According to Reich, if the empowerment of the local people is a concrete project objective, then the “demand for local ownership in externally funded conflict transformation projects is counterproductive” (Reich, 2006, p. 3). The demand is needed for a policy ideal, but ‘local ownership’ of a foreign-funded project is an impossible goal. She maintains that the focus should be on changing the nature of the relationship between the donors and the beneficiaries and creating greater shared equality of all partners involved (Reich, 2006).

Reich (2006) states that a new concept of ‘learning sites’ is required in order to create greater equal partnerships between local ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ in international peacebuilding work. Some authors argue that the UN, the World Bank and NGOs have used ‘local ownership’ and ‘participation’ as buzzwords to try and enhance the legitimacy of international intervention and escape accusations of intrusion. In some cases, the voices of local actors may be heard but are not listened to; often local ownership is denied even though intervention projects claim that they are empowering local participation (Richmond, 2012).
A number of authors describe conflict transformation in the context of a continuum, where it largely starts with conflict settlement, followed by management, resolution and finally by conflict transformation (Kriesberg, 1997). This expression of conflict transformation as (part of) a continuum provides some efficacy regarding the understanding of peace processes as a series of necessary transitional steps. However, some scholars disagree that the term conflict transformation necessarily is part of a continuum. According to them, it is overly simplistic to delineate conflict and its resolution on a management-settlement-resolution-transformation continuum (Botes, 2003). The labelling of conflict transformation into four different stages is ill-advised, as “categories are often viewed as part of a fluid and somewhat circular discussion of overlapping terms” (Botes, 2003, p. 3). Even though the labelling of different stages and specific terms may lead to a common vocabulary for the field, complications will also arise as these terms may mean something different for different scholars or actors involved in a given conflict. These terms are often used interchangeably and the key question is to what extent they should be defined rigidly or separately (Botes, 2003).

2.2.1 Critiques of conflict transformation

There are also scholars who argue that conflict transformation is essentially very similar to conflict resolution – with just minor adaptations. For example, Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (1999) see conflict transformation as not substantially different than conflict resolution; they argue that the aim of conflict resolution is to transform conflict. According to them, the concept of conflict resolution also includes the transformation of attitudes and relationships between the parties. Mitchell (2002) agrees and highlights how in the initial conflict resolution practice, ‘resolutions’ undoubtedly “implied the need to bring about major structural changes in social systems, countries, and communities, as well as changes in fundamental relationships” (Mitchell, 2002, p. 2). There was an understanding that if the resolutions were to be really sustainable and enduring, structural changes were needed. This similarity between the intentions of conflict transformation and conflict resolution weakens the argument put forward by conflict transformationalists who argue that “systemic change, in order to end conflicts, is what distinguishes transformation from resolution” (Botes, 2003, p. 5).

Mitchell (2002) contends that the term conflict transformation has no greater value or function than conflict resolution. He posits that “the concept of conflict transformation has emerged because of the corruption of the conception of resolution” (Mitchell, 2002, p.1). According to Mitchell, the misuse of the term ‘resolution’ has triggered the use of this new term ‘transformation’; the term conflict resolution became corrupted and used to describe covert coercion resolution methods such as sanctions, in order to obtain parties’ compliance in a dictated settlement. The term was in effect used for anything short of success (Mitchell, 2002).

A further explanation of how the term became corrupted is offered by Bush and Folger (1994). According to them, the discipline of conflict settlement started to take route during the 1960s, beginning at a grassroots level emphasising the need for structural changes. However, by the 1990s the field had radically changed and had become a professional and organised practice, with its foremost goal to solve the problems for clients and donors. Bush and Folger (1994) argue that the term conflict resolution became associated with Machiavellian attempts to search for agreements that were satisfactory to the third party and its interests as well as to the belligerent parties. They term this a ‘win-win-win solution’ and maintain that few people nowadays believe “the mediation movement as even relevant to the problems of disempowerment, division and alienation that lie at the heart of societal tragedies” (Bush & Folger, 1994, p. 51). This corruption of the term led to a new appeal of the term ‘transformation’ rather than ‘resolution’ (Mitchell, 2002; Bush & Folger, 1994).
Mitchell (2002) regrets that a dichotomy has arisen between conflict resolution and conflict transformation. Firstly, he believes that conflict resolution is a term adequately covering what conflict transformation is argued to stand for. Secondly, it was unnecessary to coin yet another term which will only obfuscate the field even more. For Mitchell, the field of conflict management is already full of conceptual and definitional imprecision. Reimann (2004) concurs and states that the conceptual and definitional imprecision is perhaps caused by the innate multidisciplinary nature of the overall field. While there has been a trend in the academic literature to make the distinctions between the terms conflict resolution, conflict management and conflict transformation clear, in common language and academic circles they are still used loosely and interchangeably; in many cases they refer to the same strategies (Reimann, 2004). Although the term conflict transformation has been widely used in the literature, particularly in recent years, the definitions are not universally accepted (Botes, 2003).

2.2.2 Mediation in conflict
Curle’s approach of the early 1970s became influential for Galtung and his later work. Curle (1971) argues that in some types of conflict, mediation is impractical. He traces how disproportionate relationships between different actors can be transformed through a process of conscientisation, negotiation and development (Curle, 1971). In addition, he created an understanding of the concept of ‘unmediable violence’; a concept that has become significant to the field of peace and conflict studies. This concept serves as a reminder to NGOs or conflict transformation projects that although they might be working for peace or stability, they shouldn’t make the mistake of thinking they can work beyond human limitations and that they somehow have a complete view of the whole picture. In other words, in some cases nothing should be done but bear witness (Curle, 1971). For Curle, there is no point in mediation when the actors involved in a given conflict are not serious about mediation. There are several reasons why mediation is rejected, including for example an excessive distrust of outside intervention or the idea that others should be excluded from information regarding their affairs (Curle, 1971). In addition, people or groups may believe that they can get a better deal by fighting rather than by negotiating.

Pillar (1983) argues that if one side in a conflict can, by choosing to continue fighting, increase the costs and problems of an opponent, it does at the same time increase the opponent’s incentives to settle. Pillar highlights how third-party intervention can manipulate the costs and benefits of a particular conflict. An actor that is confident of victory over its opponents is most likely to reject intervention or any sort of mediation. However, if an actor becomes less successful than expected and fears it may fail, it will more likely turn to mediation.

There are many scholars who have expressed their concerns about any intervention or mediation by a third party. In his seminal book Preparing for Peace, Lederach (1995) voices powerful and serious concerns about intervention. He questions what the West could actually teach people about conflict resolution; moreover, is it even possible for the West to react appropriately to its own interests, whilst at the same time do justice to the depth and breadth of the conflict?

Given that the field of conflict studies is relatively young, there is no clear-cut answer yet about how to determine if and when third-party intervention enables a negotiation or creates additional obstacles to peace. In Grasping the Nettle: Analysing Cases of Intractable Conflict, Crocker, Hampson and Aall (2005) address this issue. They examine multiple cases and conclude that many intractable conflicts have become trapped or embedded in larger geopolitical relations. In some cases, third parties may make conflicts even worse through inept action, lack of attention or by using conflict resolution behaviour for their own strategic and/or economic interests.
2.2.3 Galtung on social conflict

Galtung has also contributed to conflict transformation theory. He argues that a conflict transformation perspective has a lot more to offer than a conflict resolution perspective. Galtung (1995) maintains that the conflict resolution perspective is based on the assumption that conflicts can be solved and have a clear end. According to Galtung, however, conflicts are generally not solved and even if conflict has disappeared from the agenda, “conflict energy can be reproduced and produced” (Galtung, 1995, p. 53). This is the life cycle of conflict, where conflict appears, reaches an emotional and violent climax, then fades away and supposedly disappears, before – in many cases – it reappears again. Individuals and groups have goals that may be incompatible and when any actor’s goals are not realised, frustration increases. This frustration can lead to distrust and hatred and might in some cases even result in physical violence towards the groups standing in the way of one’s goal; a spiral of (counter-)violence and retaliation is propagated. Galtung argues that the incompatibility which arises between parties might be limited by transcending the contradiction.

Galtung shows how through conflict transformation we can transcend the difficulties that lead to conflict. Conflicts are “never-ending waxing and waning of social interactions” (Botes, 2003, p. 4) and will not be amenable to resolution; therefore the conflict needs to be transformed. Galtung explains, however, that we should not only focus on the contradiction, but also on the ‘attitudes’ and ‘behaviour’ in a given conflict. In other words, attitude + behaviour + contradiction = conflict, as depicted in Galtung’s Triangle.

![Figure 1: Conflict Triangle](image)

Source: Galtung (2000), p. 1

This figure shows the ‘triadic construct’ of conflict. Negative attitudes in conflict could be distrust or hatred while negative behaviour in conflict could be physical or verbal violence. Conflict transformation, however, is looking for attitudes such as empathy and behaviour such as non-violence.

Galtung believes that conflict creates lots of energy and the key problem is how to channel this energy the most effectively. In too many cases the energy of conflict will lead to damaging behaviour and this “tears down, it hurts and harms” (Galtung, 1996, p. 70). However, the key is to channel this energy to build something, to build trust, to create life
and new opportunities to promote cooperative relationships and overcome unjust social relationships. In discussing ‘building trust’ in conflict zones, Galtung (1996) differentiates between horizontal and vertical social relationships. He argues that horizontal social relationships occur within communities, while vertical social relationships occur between communities or individuals and the state and market.

2.2.4 Goals of conflict transformation in peacebuilding
For Galtung, the most important goal of conflict transformation is to change a conflict “upwards, positively, finding positive goals for all parties, imaginative ways of combining them” (Galtung, 2000, p. 3) without using violence. Based on Galtung’s triangle, the attitude of hatred and distrust needs to be transformed into apathy and empathy. In addition, the ‘C’ of ‘contradiction’ should be changed into ‘creativity’ and ways have to be found that move away from destructive conflict.

Lederach believes that violence affects a society in a personal, relational, structural and cultural way. He thus argues that conflict transformation goals of change are needed to tackle these four categories. The ultimate aim for these change goals is to maximise the potential of conflict as a creator in society and restrict the effects of conflict as a destroyer. A further key goal for Lederach (2005) is to find the catalysts for social change. He argues that in order to bring about constructive long-term social change, catalysts need to be identified, classified as ‘critical yeast’. It is not simply about increasing the number of people involved in conflict transformation processes, but also about discovering small initial steps that make exponentially larger changes possible. In other words, since we are connected in networks it is in fact possible for what might seem to be like a small step to significantly affect the whole society and conflict.

So far, we have discussed the theory of conflict transformation, its guiding principles and explanation of how it has emerged as a concept. Also, the goals of conflict transformation have been highlighted, as well as the differences between conflict transformation, conflict resolution and conflict management. The next section addresses how conflict transformation can be used by NGOs as a method in building peace.

2.2.5 Transformation capacities of working in, around or on conflict
According to Goodhand (2006), there are three approaches to peacebuilding among NGOs: working in, working around, and working on conflict. Some scholars, such as Duffield (2001), argue that the work of NGOs should not be joined with peacebuilding and thus advocate for NGOs to work solely ‘in’ or ‘around’ conflict. There are many NGOs however, that work ‘in’ or ‘around’ conflict and assume that “development by definition promotes peace” (Goodhand, 2006, p. 16). NGOs working ‘in’ conflict attempt to minimize the programs’ potential to fuel conflict and aim to mitigate conflict-related risks.

There are NGOs using, advocating and promoting conflict transformation as a method in building peace. By doing so, these NGOs are working ‘on’ conflict. In implementing programs and projects they do, explicitly and primarily, work on building peace (Goodhand, 2006).

Galtung (2000) argues that in order to transform a conflict, it is critical to build conflict transformation capacities. Goodhand (2006) develops this idea further and argues that conflict transformation capacities can be built ‘from the outside in’ as well as ‘from the inside out’; ‘from the outside in’ refers to the contextual factors which shape and influence the potential of the NGOs, while ‘from the inside out’ relates to the internal dynamics of the NGO and its organizational structures that can contribute to the potential to transform a conflict.

2.3 Conceptual Framework
In concluding this chapter, the most important and relevant aspects of the theory of conflict transformation are brought together in a framework for analysing and evaluating Kashmiri conflict transformation projects and their ability to transform conflict.

In this thesis, Lederach’s conflict transformation approach is used as he presents the most complete model of conflict transformation. Lederach’s (1997) work provides the most “comprehensive current statements of conflict transformation thinking for practitioners” (Wimmer et al., 2004, p. 65). Motivated by values of peace and justice, mercy and truth, Lederach (1997) perceives peacebuilding as a long-term transformation of a war system into a peace system. The important dimensions are the changes brought about through various time periods in the personal, structural, relational and cultural aspects of conflict (Wimmer et al., 2004). For Lederach, a comprehensive process addresses changes at many levels. He has designed a three-level pyramid of actors and approaches to peacebuilding (see Figure 2). The top level contains the top leadership consisting of the key military, political and religious leaders. The medium level contains the middle-range leadership consisting of social organisations, churches and leaders from NGOs and academia. The bottom level and largest part of the pyramid consists of the grassroots community leaders. This bottom level also includes the rest of the citizens who are, one way or another, involved in the conflict. This is the great strength of the model, as it widens its outlook from the conflict parties and draws peacebuilding resources from the wider society.

Figure 2: Lederach’s peacebuilding model

![Figure 2: Lederach's peacebuilding model](Source: Lederach (1997), p. 39)

This study mainly focuses on grassroots leadership, level 3 of Lederach’s model, as this research looks into whether or not conflict transformation projects in Kashmir are effectively working at the grassroots level. Are these projects taking a grassroots approach to peacebuilding, and do local leaders contribute to creating peace?
In order to analyse the various interventions and conflict transformation projects as described under the research objectives in Chapter 1 (and explored in greater detail in Chapter 3), the analytical framework adapted from Anderson (1999) is used.

2.3.1 Anderson’s Connectors and Dividers analytical framework

Anderson’s Connectors and Dividers (C&Ds) model aims to mitigate the unintended negative consequences of NGOs and humanitarian responses. It is a conflict-sensitive approach that is not a ‘Western model’ and “has been successfully applied to diverse environments” (Singh, 2015, p.19). The C&D framework originates from the Do No Harm framework, a concept that can be translated into a set of working tools. It is used as an analytical and practical framework to explore how project interventions and conflicts interact. The framework also assists in developing programming options in order to connect people across conflicting lines and support capacities for peace. Anderson (1999) argues that the framework can help shape the development and implementation of successful interventions under the condition of an existing (or developing) long-term vision.

The Do No Harm framework from Anderson (1999) is based on the idea that if societal Connectors and Dividers are understood in a local context, tensions related to interventions and humanitarian responses can be alleviated. Anderson’s C&D framework is appropriate for assessing the success and impact of humanitarian projects in conflict sensitive situations. In addition, the framework assesses the people-centric Connectors and Dividers and can generate recommendations for policy initiatives. The approach is conflict-sensitive, in that it attempts to understand the context of the conflict and inter-group relations, in order to avoid negative impacts and maximise positive outcomes when working in conflict regions.

Goodhand (2006) has made an in-depth analysis of the Do No Harm framework of Anderson (1999), and examines whether projects in armed conflict settings support or obstruct peacebuilding processes. In post-conflict regions, Goodhand (2006) differentiates between projects that either can do some good, do no harm, or do some harm. Projects that do some harm but also some good will have no positive or negative effect on peacebuilding. However, projects that do harm will have a negative effect on relationships and peacebuilding. Aid or peacebuilding projects that do not address the conflict sensitivity of a situation will often cause unintentional harm to the people involved in the project.

The C&D framework has been used before by various organisations in different countries. For example, Veterinaires Sans Frontières Germany has used the framework for projects in the communities in conflict along the Kenyan/Ethiopian border. In Sri Lanka, the framework has been used by various NGOs and it has been reported as being particularly useful in analysing conflict dynamics (Singh, 2015). Although the C&D framework has been used in different settings, academic debate and analysis is still needed, especially in the regional and cultural differences in Connectors and Dividers.

According to Anderson’s framework (see Figure 3), similarities in values, attitudes and experiences create a Connector, while differences in the soft variables constitute a Divider. Connectors refer to all existing issues and factors that link people across conflict lines in support of peace and conflict prevention. In conflict situations, Connectors are the elements in societies which can serve as local capacities for peace. Dividers, on the other hand, refer to everything that divides people, including the source of the conflict (Anderson, 1999). They are the elements in societies which serve as sources of tension.

Anderson also argues that the extent of these Connectors and Dividers will consequently determine the potential resolution or continuation of a conflict. In addition, outside interventions can interact with both Dividers and Connectors. Components of an intervention may have a positive impact by strengthening Connectors and reducing Dividers. On the
other hand, an intervention may likewise aggravate Dividers and undermine Connectors and have a negative impact.

**Figure 3: Context of the conflict**

The C&D framework can be categorised into five areas: systems and institutions; attitudes and actions; shared values and interests; common experience; and symbols and occasions. These categories help in identifying Connectors and Dividers in a particular conflict. Some Connectors/Dividers may overlap between categories. In addition, a proposed Connector/Divider might appear to bring people together and push people apart. In this scenario, I will analyse how this factor might be a Divider and/or what aspects might be a Connector.

### 2.3.2 The C&D framework applied to Kashmir

The C&D framework is applied to Kashmir and the five categories of the model: systems and institutions; attitudes and actions; shared values and interests; common experience; and symbols and occasions. A comprehensive analysis of Connectors and Dividers in Kashmir will be made, from a people-centric perspective, using both tangible and intangible variables. The variables selected to be included in the analysis are based on personal creativity and their relevance to the conflict in Kashmir. An attempt is also made to include both Kashmiri Muslims’ and Pandits’ views. Based on a better understanding of the Connectors and Dividers in society, future interventions might be improved and thus help in developing long-term transformation in Kashmir.

**Variables selected for Kashmir**

Land, laws and education are the three key indicators which are analysed from the standpoint of Connectors and Dividers for this study. The rationale for this selection of variables is based on their importance in the academic literature on the Kashmir conflict.

**Tangible variables**

Land: the reason for using land as an indicator stems from its importance for Kashmiris and its linkages to inter-ethnic relations (Pandit-Muslim) and state-society dynamics.
Laws: The counter-insurgency laws that have been in place in Kashmir have helped create a narrative of repression by the state and resulted in numerous Kashmiris being subjected to many abuses by the security forces. These laws create a sense of victimhood and humiliation and thus, assume relevance.

Education: The conflict has greatly disrupted education in the state. There is also a common interest among different stakeholders to improve education for the young people in Kashmir.

State/civil society interventions of Hum Kadam and Operation Sadhbhavana: These interventions are important to research and analyse in order to determine their role in strengthening Connectors or worsening Dividers.

**Intangible Variables**

To investigate and analyse the broader categories of the C&D framework, the Kashmir youth and their attitudes, experiences, interests and aspirations are examined. The rationale for examining youth in particular stems from an effort to focus on the ‘marginalised’ voices in the discourse on conflict and peace.

Table 3 provides a classification of the tangible as well as intangible variables analysed for Kashmir. The table includes all five identified categories of the C&D framework and the variables in Kashmir that fit those categories.

**Table 3: The C&D framework and the variables selected to be researched in Kashmir**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>C&amp;D Framework</th>
<th>Tangible Variable</th>
<th>Intangible Variables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Systems/Institutions</td>
<td>Land; Laws: AFSPA, Public Safety Act (PSA); Education, Operation Sadhbhavana, Local capacities for peacebuilding (Hum Kadam)</td>
<td>Victimhood, shame, humiliation, memory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitudes, Actions</td>
<td></td>
<td>Interests, Aspirational values, quality of education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared Values</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experiences</td>
<td>Displacement, disappearances, crackdown, arbitrary detentions, protests</td>
<td>Memories of conflict, history of conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbols and Occasions</td>
<td></td>
<td>Homeland, protest, resistance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By using this framework and applying it to Kashmir, we will gain more insight and a better understanding of the local dynamics framed as Connectors and Dividers and how policies and conflict transformation projects address them. In particular, we also analyse whether the two projects investigated in this research (have) become Connectors themselves.

The C&D framework is used to evaluate the conflict transformation projects and whether they have helped in bringing about changes in Kashmir society. By using this framework, the research can then determine and conclude whether the grassroots leadership, level 3 of Lederach’s model, is implemented effectively in Kashmir and contributing to long-term conflict transformation.
Chapter 3: The conflict in Kashmir in context

This chapter addresses the history of Kashmir, the contextual characteristics of the conflict, and the work of NGOs in Kashmir. In order to analyse the collected data from the field and literature, I will elaborate on the history of this conflict as well as the bigger picture of NGO work, before going into the activities of the specific conflict transformation projects Hum Kadam and Operation Sadbhavana.

3.1 Jammu and Kashmir

Jammu and Kashmir, a former princely state of India, is a Muslim-majority region located in the northern-most part of India (see Figure 4). Since the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947, this rugged mountainous state is divided between India and Pakistan. Two-thirds of the former princely state is controlled by India; this area consists of the regions of Ladakh, Jammu and the Kashmir valley. The remaining one-third of the former princely state is controlled by Pakistan; this area includes Gilgit-Baltistan (also referred to as Northern Areas or Northern Territories) and Azad Kashmir. In the north-east, China controls Aksai Chin and Shaksgam, two regions which also used to be part of the princely state. There is a border called the Line of Actual Control (LAC) between the Indian and Chinese held territories although it has never been exactly delineated.

Figure 4: Map of Kashmir


India routinely claims Gilgit-Baltistan as part of Jammu and Kashmir and therefore as an 'integral part' of the Indian Union. Nearly every Indian map shows Gilgit-Baltistan as part of
India even though it has been controlled by Pakistan since 1947. Most Indian maps show these regions as part of India, without giving even a hint that this might be a dubious claim (Sökefeld, 2015). On the other hand, Pakistan also claims to be the rightful heir to the entirety of the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir.

3.1.1 Dogra rule

A century before British colonial withdrawal, in 1846, the British sold the valley of Kashmir to the Hindu Dogra ruler, Gulab Singh. He became Maharaja of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, which included Jammu, Ladakh, Baltistan and numerous other hill states (see Figure 5). As a consequence of the sale of the valley, people of different religious, linguistic and cultural traditions were brought together under the rule of one Maharaja. In addition, the inclusion of the predominantly Muslim valley meant that the Hindus, Sikhs and Buddhists were in a minority.

The princely state of Jammu and Kashmir under Dogra rule was a conglomeration of many smaller kingdoms, ethnically the most diverse and geographically the largest out of all the 565 states during the British imperial control of India (Bose, 1997). The princely state at the time consisted of Ladakh to the east, ethnically and culturally Tibetan with a majority of its inhabitants practicing Buddhism; to the south of the state lay Jammu with a mixed population of Sikhs, Muslims and Hindus; to the northeast lay Baltistan which was sparsely inhabited with Shia Muslims; the Kashmir valley was predominantly populated with Sunni Muslims but also had a small but significant influential Hindu minority, the Kashmiri Pandits; Gilget Agency and Punch, finally, were areas with mostly Shia Muslims. Bowers (2004) argues that the princely state had been somewhat artificially created and had never developed a coherent identity due to its origins and “as a result of the autocratic rule which the state had experienced on the fringes of India” (Bowers, 2004, p.11).

According to various scholars, the roots of polarisation in Kashmir started during the Dogra rule when Gulab Singh came to power. Chadda (2006) directly traces the roots of polarisation to the Dogra system which deprived sections of the population of their political and religious rights. It is widely documented that Muslims suffered severe oppression under Hindu rule. Bose (2005) argues that the Muslim peasantry were impoverished and suffered in the form of unpaid labour, discriminatory laws and high taxes. Many Kashmiri peasants were also forced to migrate from the valley due to famines and the harsh policies of the Dogra rulers (Sevea, 2012). Bazaz (1954) argues that the Dogras regarded Jammu as their home and the Kashmir valley as a captured country; the Dogras established an oligarchy in which all other communities were inferior. Bose (2005) emphasises that the Muslim peasants lacked education, awareness of rights and often were in constant debt to landlords and moneylenders.

Some scholars maintain, however, that Britain still had much control over Kashmir. Dasgupta (2002) points to how the British had initially helped to create the princely state by selling the Kashmir valley to the Dogras and had since governed the state through indirect rule. Schofield (2003) also claims that especially after 1889, the British maintained strong control over the state. The British set up a ruling Council and the Maharaja was divested of much of his power. As Schofield highlights, the Council and new Prime Minister made decisions but the real power was invested in the British resident, appointed by the Government of India. According to her, the British residency had discovered over thirty letters of treasonable nature from the Maharaja, Pratap Singh, to the Tsar of Russia. Although there is some evidence to suggest that these letters were forgeries, this episode was nonetheless sufficient enough to undermine any trust the British had in the Maharaja. The major concern of the British was a Russian invasion into the sub-continent; a concern right up until Indian independence (Schofield, 2003). In trying to mitigate this threat, the British worked out a defensive strategy in Gilget Agency (bordering Afghanistan) by using Kashmir Imperial Service Troops.
3.1.2 An overview of conflict in Kashmir

The Kashmir conflict began in 1947 after the partition of the sub-continent into two dominions influenced the political discourse in the state (Singh & Jha, 2017). During the partition of the sub-continent after independence in 1947, Hari Singh, the Maharaja of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir and great-grandson of Gulab Singh, could not decide whether to join the new dominion of Pakistan or India (Schofield, 2003). As far as Britain was concerned, all the states were free to join either India or Pakistan. Rulers of the princely states were encouraged to accede to either dominion, considering the wishes of their people and the geographical location. Although many princes, including Hari Singh, wanted to become independent, some had to yield to their people's protests which turned violent in many provinces.

Hari Singh initially opted for independence and his state did remain independent for over two months. After large numbers of tribesmen from the North-West Frontier in Pakistan had invaded the state, he agreed to join India; subsequently he signed the Instrument of Accession on October 26, 1947. Lord Mountbatten, the Governor-General of India, had made it clear that Singh had to sign the Instrument of Accession before India could send in troops to support the Maharaja (Schofield, 2003). This decision was immediately disputed by Pakistan on the basis of the state’s majority Muslim population and Pakistan’s opinion that the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir had no authority left; Pakistan maintained he was not in any position to sign an Instrument of Accession as the people had revolted and he had to escape his home in the capital of Srinagar. In addition, Pakistan claimed that the question of accession of the state had to be decided by the people (Schofield, 2003).

India, after receiving the Instrument of Accession signed by both Lord Mountbatten and Hari Singh, considered itself to be in legal possession of the princely state and immediately sent in troops to fight the tribesmen which it claimed were being backed by the Pakistan army.
The subsequent war lasted until 1949; India had already referred the dispute to the United Nations on 1 January 1948 and a ceasefire was agreed exactly one year later. In a resolution dated August 13, 1948, the UN requested Pakistan to remove its troops, after which India was also to withdraw the bulk of its forces and then a ‘free and fair’ plebiscite was to be held. This would allow the Kashmiri people to decide their future.

A plebiscite never took place, however, and Pakistan and India have fought three wars over Kashmir. The ceasefire was intended to be only temporary but the Line of Control (LoC) remains the de facto border between the two countries. Both India and Pakistan continue to assert claims over the entire territory of Kashmir. The Indian government has always maintained that it has legal possession of the state of Jammu and Kashmir by virtue of the Instrument of Accession. On the other hand, Pakistan does not accept the legality of this Instrument of Accession and claims that since Kashmir is predominantly Muslim, Jammu and Kashmir should belong to them. Kashmiris themselves are divided in their views – some being pro-India, some pro-Pakistan and others wanting to be independent from both countries (Singh, 2015).

Unresolved grievances regarding these historic disputes create regional instability and challenge efforts for demilitarisation and relations between India and Pakistan (Ganguly, 2016). The ongoing conflict between the countries has prevented South Asian integration and there have been catastrophic consequences because of Indo-Pakistani mistrust (Ganguly, 2016). The Kashmir conflict obstructs any potential for greater regional cooperation in South Asia, particularly through international fora such as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).

In addition, there are huge human and development-related consequences of protracted conflict in South Asia, home to one fifth of the world’s population. Throughout the years the conflict has resulted in tens of thousands of lives being lost and it has left many more displaced. According to the reports of the Jammu and Kashmir government, between 1990 and April 2011 about 40,000 people have lost their lives (Singh, 2017). In contrast to these figures, however, Kashmir’s main separatist group – the All Parties Hurriyat (Freedom) Conference – claims that since 1990 more than 100,000 have died in violent incidents in Kashmir (Singh, 2017). The impact of the armed conflict has been worsened by other factors such as poverty, lack of state-based social welfare measures, abuses of civil and political rights and environmental exploitation (Singh, 2017).

The recent years have been characterized, despite some periods of calm and progress, by a deadlock in the peace talks and periods of heightened tensions between the two countries. This frequently leads to increased shelling and violence across the Line of Control (LoC). Recently, in February 2019, India and Pakistan engaged in cross-border skirmishes. The heightened tensions stemmed from a car bombing in Kashmir, resulting in the deaths of forty Indian security personnel. Jaish-e-Mohammad, a Pakistan based militant group, quickly claimed responsibility for the attack. In response, India conducted airstrikes against targets on Pakistani territory, claiming they were pre-emptive strikes against a terrorist training camp. Pakistan retaliated with airstrikes of its own in Indian administered Kashmir. Periods of heightened tensions with shelling across the LoC is likely to continue until progress in the peace talks between the two countries is made.

Today the Kashmir conflict seems to be entrenched in the very identities of all parties involved and it is as complex as ever. The conflict is South Asia’s longest war and one of the longest-running intractable conflicts in the world (Suri, 2015). Three-quarters of a century after the partition of the sub-continent, and after many explosive violent situations, a solution to the conflict still seems far off. Many observers, including the United Nations, agree that unconditional dialogue between all parties involved – India, Pakistan, Kashmiris, Muslims, Pandits and other minorities – is needed. In addition, many scholars argue that a cessation
of hostilities across the LoC and between militants and Indian forces is necessary. Others argue for the removal of the majority of the half a million Indian soldiers from the valley (Schofield, 2003). Overall, however, a solution to the conflict remains distant and it is not clear which solution would be acceptable to all parties.

3.1.3 Origins of the conflict
Regarding the origins of the conflict, the legitimacy of the 1947 Instrument of Accession has been heavily debated. Lamb (1994) questions the legality and argues that Hari Singh was no longer in a position to sign the document. Scholars such as Snedden (2012), who studied the period leading up to partition, maintain that in the early summer of 1947, discontent about a lack of land rights and high taxes resulted in an armed uprising against Maharaja Hari Singh, giving the azaadi (freedom) movement significant momentum. According to him, this uprising played a large role in persuading the Maharaja to declare accession with India. Sarwar Hasan (1966) maintains that Jawaharlal Nehru's backtracking of his pledge to hold a plebiscite in the region led to unrest and was therefore a major factor in conflict formation. Competing nationalist claims within Kashmir as well as in India and Pakistan can explain the conflict (Varshney, 1991). Varshney argues that the “Kashmir problem is a result of three forces: religious nationalism represented by Pakistan, secular nationalism epitomized by India, and ethnic nationalism embodied in what Kashmiris call Kashmiriyat” (Varshney, 1991, p. 999). Pakistan and India were not able to accommodate these competing forces of nationalism and consequently conflict erupted.

Many other factors have been attributed to the formation and subsequent re-emerging of the conflict. Ganguly (1997) argues that forces of political mobilisation and institutional decay have helped fuel the conflict. His work focuses on the political mobilisation of the youth, and he claims that development-related activities helped in accelerating the mobilisation of the 'rights-aware' youth (Ganguly, 1997). Jha (1991) maintains that "in Kashmir militancy is not born out of poverty or economic deprivation, but of the despair of a small, select group of young people who form a new but disinheritd middle-class sector" (Jha, 1991, p. 35). He argues that it was the growing middle-class that was trained to wield power, but not given jobs and the opportunity to do so, which explains the rising militancy. The growth of employment opportunities did not keep pace with the expansion of an educated middle-class in Kashmir.

The "severe authoritarianism" of the Indian rule has also been emphasised as a key factor in aggravating the conflict in the 1990s (Bose, 2005). This authoritarianism helped empower the Kashmiri independence movement and fuelled the guerrilla war waged by Islamist and militant groups. Scholars as Navlakha (1999) similarly argue that the aggressive and coercive tactics of India as part of its Kashmir policy is another explanatory factor for the conflict in Kashmir.

Some scholars have presented a rather reductionist analysis of the conflict, arguing that solely religious differences, developmental failures, institutional decay, Pakistani attacks, Indian authoritarianism or international factors explain the outbreak of violence in Jammu and Kashmir. Others argue that instead a more nuanced interplay of religion and regional, economic, social and political rights in combination with the local people’s longing for self-determination and freedom explains the outbreak of conflict in Kashmir. For instance, Chowdhary (2015) argues that it is the lack of democratic rights that accounts for the rise of separatism and not just because of externally sponsored terrorist networks; militant networks only found local support when democratic, political and social rights were denied to the people.

In other words, in the case of Kashmir only the interrelationship of many different factors can help in explaining the outbreak of conflict; in particular a combination of the politics of deprivation and the “aspirations for statehood, recognition and legitimacy also explain
mobilisation by ethno-nationalist and communal groups” (Singh, 2015, p. 92). Many locals in the state had grievances about their condition and this helped in mobilising armed conflict.

3.1.4 International issue
The conflict which initially was a dispute between two countries already became internationalised in 1948, when the Indian government made a formal complaint against Pakistan to the Security Council of the newly formed United Nations. This immediately distinguished the Kashmir conflict from other regional disputes (Schofield, 2003), as this meant that the dispute demanded international consideration. Initially, many international observers viewed India and Pakistan as the principle actors in the conflict (Sökefeld, 2015). However, the various UN resolutions and recommendations formalised the presence of the Kashmiris as the third party in the debate. The three resolutions passed by the UN Security Council in 1948 and 1949 also considered the wishes of the people living in Kashmir, as all resolutions recommended that a plebiscite take place, which the respective governments had already agreed to do, so that the Kashmiri people could decide upon their own future (Schofield, 2003).

In 1948-49, the United Nations Commission in India and Pakistan (UNCIP) made three visits to the sub-continent and in its final report concluded that the origins of the Kashmir conflict were deep and complex (Kashmir Papers, 1952). The report argues there were strong under-currents, political, economic, as well as religious in both India and Pakistan which did not contribute to an easy and quick solution. The UN made it clear that a settlement of the Kashmir issue had to be reached, but outlined that the respective positions of India and Pakistan made it very difficult for the parties to come to an agreed solution. The UN did not have the authority nor the mandate to impose a solution; it could only make recommendations (Schofield, 2003).

From the first recommendations provided by UNCIP up until the present day the international community has contributed little in solving the conflict. The UN and the international community have only watched and hoped that the conflict wouldn’t escalate into another war. Since the first UN resolution in 1948, the Indian government has repeatedly resisted any attempt at international mediation, by the UN or any other country or body (Schofield, 2003). The Indian government has always maintained that it has legal possession of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, because the last Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession.

The so-called Simla agreement, signed in 1972, committed the two countries to settle their differences through bilateral talks. This agreement also enabled India to claim that the conflict is a bilateral issue, no longer an international one, as the 1972 Simla agreement supersedes the UN resolutions. However, Pakistan still maintains that the UN resolutions should be upheld as part of the settlement. Bilateral talks between the countries over Jammu and Kashmir have not been successful and only resulted in a stalemate of rhetoric. Pakistan has often called for third-party mediation, but India has resisted all international involvement (Schofield, 2003).

3.1.5 Armed conflict in Kashmir since 1989
In 1989, another armed conflict erupted in Kashmir which created socio, economic and political instability in the state. A distinct ethno-national consciousness surfaced in the Kashmir valley, resulting in a strong and massive secessionist movement (Ganguly, 2001). Some killings of Kashmiri Pandits in the early 1990s created great fear amongst the community; Pandits began to migrate out of the valley into the Jammu region and the rest of India (Bose, 2005). The total number of people leaving the valley is estimated to be more than 300,000, over 95 per cent of the original Kashmiri Pandit population in the valley (Ganguly, 2001). In response to this movement, the Indian government enacted laws such as the Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act 1990 (AFSPA), providing immunity for soldiers’ actions.
On the Kashmir side, the conflict was initially dominated by the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), led by Yasin Malik and Javid Mir. The JKLF’s main objective was to fight for an independent and secular Kashmir, resisting the continued allegiance to the Indian Union (Schofield, 2003). The group’s aim has, however, never been a merger with Pakistan; therefore, the JKLF became alienated from its supporters across the border.

In the mid-1990s, the Hizbul Mujahideen began waging an armed struggle against the Indian security forces. During this phase of the conflict, Pakistan aided and abetted the armed groups in Jammu and Kashmir (Sikand, 2001). The nature of the conflict gradually transformed from one that was primarily indigenous to one that was being supported by Pakistan. In addition, Lashkar-e-Taiba, a pan-Islamic outfit, became more prominent and controlled many of the militants. At the time, the conflict acquired a more fundamentalist and jihadi streak. Although in 1989 the armed struggle in the valley began as a more secular movement for greater independence, the conflict had, because of Pakistan’s support, become an ‘Islamic’ movement for accession with Pakistan (Sikand, 2001). In the course of this armed struggle, violence and counter-violence, huge losses, human rights violations and strong militarization of the Kashmir valley took place (Sikand, 2001).

The Kargil war, an armed conflict between India and Pakistan in 1999 in the Kargil district of Kashmir and along the LoC, marked a turning point for the secessionist movement. After this war, insurgency violence declined substantially. The Indian government even coined the phrase, “normalcy returned to Kashmir” (Sökefeld, 2015). However, the year 2008 saw another increase in mass protests mainly because of land given by the Jammu and Kashmir government to the board governing the Sri Amarnath Shrine, a celebrated place for Hindu pilgrimage in Kashmir. Protests erupted, as many locals felt that this land dispute was a direct attack on their Kashmiri identity (Singh, 2018).

In 2010, protests erupted once more, primarily in response to a boy being killed when he was travelling home. Other killings of civilians and human rights violations by the armed forces spiralled into a series of protests in the Kashmir valley. This time, internet groups and social media discussions emerged as places for political mobilisation. Huge protests took place on the streets, not only in protest against the land that was handed over, but also calling for greater autonomy.

Since the 2008 and 2010 protests, the Kashmir valley has witnessed greater hostile street protests, including more incidents of stone throwing (Singh, 2018). The protesters and stone throwers are usually very young, often below the age of 18. When in some instances the Indian security forces retaliated by firing at teenagers carrying rocks, the kids killed would be referred to as ‘shaheed’ or martyrs to the separatist cause. This in turn provided a fresh drive to separatist protests and fuelled people’s anger; for some it was reason enough to join the militants and pick up guns (Parthasarathy, 2010). According to Singh (2018), during this period many young people became increasingly alienated and religiously radicalised. Many youth identified primarily as Kashmiri Muslim and became active on social media, promoting the separatist movement.

Huge protests erupted again in 2016, after the killing of Burhan Wani, a militant commander, seen as a symbol of resistance against the Indian state and army. He was the poster boy with a gun for many Kashmiris and he immediately became a martyr. Although for the Indian forces his death represented a strategic success, for many his power to influence became greater from the grave (Singh, 2018). His funeral was attended by tens of thousands of people and sparked massive protests against the state that lasted for many months. These protests appeared to be different and led by a younger generation, social media-aware and technology-driven. Singh (2018) argues that these protests were a response to an increased sense of victimisation and oppression by the state and armed forces. A series of incidents
followed by the killing of Burhan Wani resulted in this expression of anger and frustration due to their own de-humanisation and alienation.

In its 2018 report on the Situation of Human Rights in Kashmir, the United Nations states that “impunity for human rights violations and lack of access to justice are key human rights challenges in the state of Jammu and Kashmir” (UN, 2018, p. 11). The same report highlights how the customary course of law, and justice for victims of human rights violations is obstructed by the special laws in place, such as the 1990 Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act (AFSPA) and the 1978 Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act (PSA). AFSPA allows the security forces to conduct operations in the state and essentially grants immunity from prosecution in civilian courts for any unlawful conduct. Prosecution of security forces can only take place once the government of India gives authorisation to prosecute or sanctioning. However, as the UN report states, during the three decades this law has been in place, the Indian government has not once granted prosecution of armed forces personnel. Thus, it is evident that the security forces in Jammu and Kashmir have virtual immunity against prosecution for any human rights violations (UN, 2018).

3.2 An overview of NGOs in Kashmir

There has been a substantial increase in the number of NGOs active in the region. In analysing the rise of NGOs in India, Sen (1992) highlights the growth of the middle classes, the influence of Christian missionaries, and the powerful ideas of Mahatma Gandhi, as the main driving factors of developing NGOs in South Asia. Gandhi already placed the idea of voluntary action at the centre of his vision of a new India; a vision that specifically led to the creation of organizations such as the Association of Sarva Seva Farms (ASSEFA) (Lewis & Kanji, 2009).

Before 1989 Kashmir did not have a significant NGO sector. The only organisations that were present prior to this date were religious and education-based organisations helping the very poor in society. Traditionally, Kashmir has always been a very close-knit religious and plural society where people helped and cared for each other, believing in the concept of Kashmiriyat. This concept signifies the idea of a separate identity for all Kashmiris, based on a unique language, culture and history – regardless of whether people are Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists or Sikhs (Suri, 2003). If someone was in difficulty, he or she would be supported by the community. According to Suri, this Kashmiri understanding was so prevalent that every family could be considered as an NGO and consequently very few voluntary organisations were present in Kashmir before 1989, the start of the militancy period.

The post-1989 period marked a significant shift in Kashmir; for the first time the need for NGOs was deeply felt (Suri, 2003). The violent conflict situation that erupted led to many lives being lost and countless casualties. Kashmiri society changed drastically, as people began to feel the impact of the militancy and counterinsurgency policies of the Indian army. The extensive violence affected the rather peaceful and flourishing Kashmiri society – high unemployment, a lack of freedom of speech, increasing numbers of orphans and psychiatric disorders (Suri, 2003). For many, life during the period of militancy became very difficult as locals struggled with the growing number of victims of violence, extended curfews, businesses closing down, food supplies being disrupted, and the tourism industry coming to a standstill. NGOs were needed to help alleviate the living conditions of the locals and caring for the growing numbers of children without parents. From the early 1990s on, NGOs based themselves in Kashmir. Many of these new NGOs were sponsored by the government in an effort to restore normalcy and peace in the region (Singh, 2018). For instance, many orphanages were set up to assist the tens of thousands of orphans rendered homeless during the conflict.
During recent years the general climate for civil society and NGOs in Kashmir has been positive. The number of NGOs has increased dramatically and they are playing an important role in the development of Jammu and Kashmir (Wani, 2011). The intervention of NGOs has been critical, as the governments of Pakistan and India alike have been found to be lacking in many areas. Nowadays, there are many NGOs in Jammu and Kashmir, particularly active in the fields of health care, child development education, women empowerment, care for widows and orphans, rural development and environmental groups. Overall, under the Societies Registration Act there are hundreds of NGOs registered, serving a specific purpose; varying from religious and media organizations to human rights organizations (Suri, 2015). Most of these NGOs are based in Srinagar; their presence is not felt in far-off areas of the state.

Although the number of NGOs has increased substantially and some individuals and groups have established a civil society in Kashmir, there are nonetheless countless concerns with many of the NGOs. People in charge of NGOs have been accused of just making money and not really helping the local people. Some NGOs’ accountability and transparency have been questioned, typically in cases where organisations state that they represent the most deprived sections of society, in order to raise funds. In addition, there have been reports that corrupt bureaucrats have siphoned funds for themselves (Suri, 2003).

NGOs in a conflict region, like Kashmir, often face numerous challenges impeding their functioning. According to Suri (2003), challenges in Kashmir include a lack of funding, little or no trust in the government and a lack of direction, experience and knowledge in how to effectively run a NGO. In Kashmir, there is little trust in many organizations and problems can already begin before NGOs become registered. Singh (2018) argues that it is notoriously difficult to become a registered NGO in Kashmir; many have to stop even before getting properly started. A new organization that wants to start is often viewed with suspicion. The government shows very little trust in NGOs; they are accused of supporting militants or being anti-nationalist, trying to undermine the government (Ismail & Kamat, 2018).

India has implemented strict laws on a tighter regulation of taxes, political affiliation and contributions of (I)NGOs (Lewis & Kanji, 2009). In 2005, India passed the Foreign Contributions Management and Control Bill, restricting foreign contributions in a much more rigid fashion and “raised concerns about ‘anti-nationalistic’ activities” (Lewis & Kanji, 2009, p.35). In addition, a leaked report by India’s Intelligence Bureau (IB) accused NGOs of reducing India’s overall GDP by 2-3% per annum, due to their campaigning against major projects that were essential for economic growth. This leaked report also accused INGOs, including Greenpeace, Amnesty International and Cordaid, of “serving as tools for foreign policy interests of western governments,” by supporting campaigns to protect the environment or support human rights (Times of India, 2014). Funds entering India were closely scrutinised by the Indian home ministry.

International NGOs find it therefore very difficult to work in Kashmir. All international NGOs have to have permission of the government before engaging in any activity; foreign researchers and other personnel have to be accompanied by government officials when travelling into specific regions. All INGOs that want to work in Kashmir have to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Indian state, which arguably limits their abilities to research sensitive areas and publish their findings.

During the 1990s, human rights organizations like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch published very critical reports on the human rights violations in the Kashmir valley by various government agencies, including the armed forces. Human rights violations have also been widely reported by NGOs and the United Nations in Jammu and Kashmir. These reports have led to severe criticism of India by the international community and,
consequently, the government of India significantly restricted INGO activities. On the grounds of ‘national interest’ and ‘security reasons’, many restrictions were imposed on the activities of INGOs in Kashmir: INGOs were not allowed to publish any reports based on their findings and could not conduct field work without guided tours.

As a consequence of these restrictions, very few NGOs are active as pressure groups to hold the Indian and Pakistani governments and armed forces accountable for their actions. Pakistan routinely accuses India of committing human rights violations in the Kashmir valley. Similarly, India in turn accuses Pakistan of committing the same atrocities across the border. Human rights have been a sensitive issue in the region and both governments have adopted a high-handed approach towards it (Singh, 2018). NGOs which have been fighting against human rights violations; campaigning for justice has been labelled as anti-nationalist activities undermining the state.

NGOs and INGOs are obviously dependent on the government for their activities and ‘room for manoeuvre’, at the international as well as national or local level (Clark, 1991). Clark illustrates the reality as confronted by all NGOs; they cannot ignore the state although they can contest, praise or reform it (Clark, 1991). Singh (2015) argues that for many in India, NGOs are viewed negatively as being a continuation of the influence of foreign powers in India. These views resonate with post-development critics such as Temple (1997), who holds that NGOs are a continuation of colonial missionary traditions, working towards the destruction of non-Western societies. Dupuy, Ron & Prakash (2016) maintain that governments have the right to political control, if evidence shows that funding has been used to undermine their power.

3.2.1 NGOS working in conflict transformation

During the past twenty years of conflict in Jammu and Kashmir, a number of (I)NGOs have been working towards the resolution of the conflict – either India-based or foreign-based, in direct as well as indirect ways. NGOs have organised seminars, symposiums and discussion groups dealing with the resolution of the Kashmir conflict. There are furthermore NGOs based in India and Kashmir that work on conflict transformation through focusing on education, health care, human resources, development, rehabilitation of widows and orphans of the conflict.

Two such interventions which have been cited as contributing to peacebuilding in the state are Project Hum Kadam and Operation Sadbhavana. The former is a NGO initiated programme, and the latter is a government backed programme.

3.2.2 Hum Kadam

Hum Kadam project has been set up by Women in Security, Conflict Management and Peace (WISCOMP). The Hum Kadam: Education for Peace initiative ran from 2012-2015 and brought together youth leaders and educators from schools and colleges from Kashmir and Delhi. They were brought together to engage in dialogue groups, interactions, conflict transformation workshops and training. People joined in an effort to foster cooperation and dialogue (Kaul, 2015).

WISCOMP is a New Delhi-based organisation, supporting women in forming networks and increasing their participation in multi-track diplomacy processes in South Asia. WISCOMP has also been actively involved in conflict transformation initiatives in Jammu and Kashmir for the last twenty years. The organisation strives to create spaces in the state where it can collaborate with multiple actors in order to democratize the conflict transformation process (Kaul, 2015). The Hum Kadam project was the third major WISCOMP initiative in the state. The intervention began with the creation of the Athwaas programme, later followed by the Samanbals programme. The Hum Kadam project built upon these previous programmes by incorporating their design, outline and strategic objectives. Athwaas began when in 2001 a
group of Kashmiri women came together in trying to bring about peaceful spaces in Kashmir. The purpose was to empower people to start working on conflict resolution and thus create a ‘ripple effect’ of people working for peace (Kaul, 2015).

In 2003, the members of Athwaas established the Samanbals programme, designed to heal and help the larger community. It was concluded that these programmes were “successful in their strategy to provide safe spaces for conflict resolution for various groups” (Kaul, 2015, p. 11) located in different parts of Jammu and Kashmir. They were able to effectively engage (young) people in conflict resolution activities. After the success of the previous initiatives, the Hum Kadam intervention started with the goal of reaching more people, specifically young people.

The initiative also sought to deepen the links between educational institutions in Jammu and Kashmir with the rest of India. Linkages between schools were established in order to create a mutual learning community (Singh, 2018). The Hum Kadam initiative brought together 390 school students, 478 university and college students, and over 400 educators from major educational institutions in Kashmir and New Delhi. People involved in the project were taught the skills, values, and attitudes required for effective peacebuilding.

The Hum Kadam intervention was a multilevel intervention that sought to address the existing trust deficit between the youth in Kashmir and the rest of India. According to Kaul (2015), this trust deficit is at the root of negative stereotypes and hostility which contributes to conflict escalation. One of the aims of the project was to “reduce the likelihood of violent incidents on the street spearheaded by the youth” (Kaul, 2015, p.15). The project recognises that Kashmiri Muslims face challenges to their sense of self, and experience humiliation and ‘othering’ in their everyday lives. For the young Kashmiri, the state, the army or people outside the valley can all be seen as the ‘other’ (Singh, 2018). In Kashmir there is a lack of civil society focus on education and conflict transformation, and thus projects such as Hum Kadam can be classified as critical yeast, working for a long-term transformative purpose through dialogue and educational spaces (Singh, 2018).

3.2.3 Sadbhavana
Sadbhavana began twenty years ago and was an army initiative to constructively change and transform the narrative in Kashmir. During the early 1990s the Indian strategy to curb the armed conflict was to rule the state with an iron fist. Operation Sadbhavana was an initiative directed at changing the way the army was seen and to win the hearts of the young Kashmiris. One of the major obstacles preventing conflict resolution and transformation is the lack of empathy and rampant hate between the two parties in the conflict (White, 1984). In order to transform a conflict, steps are needed that begin to change the attitudes and behaviour of the masses.

The army recognised the existence of a lack of empathy and in many cases antagonism among Kashmiris; therefore it was decided to win the trust of the ordinary Kashmiri and change the way they were viewed (Singh, 2015). During the Kargil war, it had become clear that many locals supported the intruders, rather than supporting the army. Lt.Gen. Arjun Ray, one of the officials behind the initial project, believed that it was no longer possible to win the fight with money or armed force, but rather by winning the hearts and minds of the people. Against this backdrop, the army began its Sadbhavana program in the border areas of Jammu and Kashmir. Initially, the Sadbhavana project focused on bringing development to the two hundred some villages all along the 265 km Ladakh-PoK border (Suri, 2003).

The army started development projects, education and health care programs in remote areas the government and NGOs had failed to reach. The aim of the project was to reduce support for the Pakistan-backed militancy by providing development to win over the people.
Although this strategy initially was successful, in that the support for the Army increased, many locals remained quite sceptical of the programme.

In recent years, the Sadbhavana project has expanded and further initiatives were launched. Lt.Gen. Said Ata Hasnain made additional steps to win the hearts and minds of the people. One of the first steps initiated, was the 'open house' discussion with students at the Badami Bagh cantonment. Next, he instructed the armed forces to greet passengers by saying ‘adaab’ when conducting checks of buses and other vehicles on the roads. ‘Adaab’ means honour and respect and was intended to courteously recognise the Kashmiri people. According to some scholars, Said Ata Hasnain can be classified as a ‘critical yeast’ (Singh, 2015).
Chapter 4: Analysis and Results

In a previous chapter we explored the contextual and theoretical characteristics that allow us to interpret the qualitative data collected in the state of Kashmir. In this chapter I present these findings, linking them to the literature discussed in Chapter 2. The chapter begins with a detailed systematic analysis of the Connector and Dividers in the case of Kashmir.

4.1 Systems and Institutions

In a protracted conflict, systems and institutions continue to link or divide people in society across conflict lines (Anderson, 1999). This is arguably also the case in Kashmir; the three indicators (land, laws and education) which in this study are analysed from a C&D perspective connect and/or divide people who live in the region.

Land

Land continues to connect and divide people across conflict lines. The issue of land is also strongly linked with inter-ethnic relations between Pandits and Muslims. A common theme, also emerging from the interviews, is the fact that historically, the Kashmiri Muslims did not own the land. It is therefore pertinent to understand that land is a Divider in the context of inter-ethnic relations between the Pandits and Muslims.

During the Dogra rule, dating back to 1846, the Kashmiri Pandits were beneficiaries of state patronage; the lands were in control of the Maharaja and the administration was in control of the Kashmiri Pandits. This policy of state patronage on the issue of land ownership can be classified as a Divider, particularly as this angered many Muslims. Muslims were mainly tenants and workers in the fields, the lowest class in society and they had to pay taxes to the Maharaja. The Muslim peasantry were impoverished and suffered in the form of unpaid labour, discriminatory laws and high taxes (Bose, 2005).

In 1950, after the National Conference led by Sheikh Abdullah came to power, the new leader, in the Naya Kashmir document, outlined radical social and economic changes (Singh, 2015). Two major pieces of legislation were passed: The Abolition of Big Landed Estates Act, and the Distresses Debtor’s Relief Act. This legislation was obviously a Divider for the Kashmiri Pandits, as in some cases they had to give up parts of their land. However, for the large Muslim peasantry, this legislation proved to be an intra-group Connector (Singh, 2015).

One respondent maintained that, despite this new legislation, the “bureaucracy remained with the Pandits. They always held that control over Kashmiri Muslims, up until 1987 when the militancy for the first time broke out and the tables were turned” (Interview #3).

Kashmir is an agrarian society where agriculture and horticulture are the main sources of employment (Singh, 2015). Consequently, for local Kashmiri Muslims, the issue of the army occupying large areas of agricultural land has been a major Divider; not only because the land does have a territorial value, but also because it is part of their culture and notion of homeland.

The issue of land can also be seen as a Connector for Pandits and Muslims, however. For most Kashmiri Pandits and Muslims alike the state’s coercive activities and institutions are seen as Dividers. For all Kashmiris land is extremely important. It is part of their history and
culture; when the state, or state institutions like the army or police, occupies or uses their ancestral homeland, many – in both groups – feel a great sense of violation and pain.

**Security Laws**

Many of the state’s laws and its counter-insurgency operations since the 1990s can be classified as Dividers. Acts such as the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) or the Public Safety Act (PSA), have given substantial power to the security agencies at the expense of civilians. The security forces in Jammu and Kashmir have virtual immunity against prosecution for any human rights violation (UN, 2018). One Kashmiri student states that “AFSPA is in place because Delhi wants it” (Interview #1). In 2005, the Supreme Court of India appointed a special committee to review AFSPA, which found that the law had become “a symbol of oppression, an object of hate and an instrument of discrimination and high-handedness”.

Under these laws numerous civilians in Kashmir have been subjected to abuses by the security forces. Kashmiri Pandits and Muslims have both been targeted; the sense of violation, shame and humiliation felt by civilians in the region creates an intra-Connector in this respect. Many groups in Kashmir call for these laws to be repealed.

Additional relevant constitutional laws in Kashmir are Article 370, referring to the right of Jammu and Kashmir to have a separate constitution, and Article 35A, granting special rights to Jammu and Kashmir residents such as privileges regarding employment with the state government, settling in the state, and purchase of property in the state. In 2014, We the Citizens, a Delhi-based NGO, filed a petition challenging the validity of Article 35A in the Supreme Court. These legal challenges are viewed with huge concern by the local populace.

Several respondents mentioned that they see the (legal) challenges to Article 35A as deeply worrying; the challenges as such can be identified as a Divider. Some Kashmiris feel that these court cases are “attempts to subjugate the local population, bring [about] a demographic change, change the demography of Jammu and Kashmir – from being [an] almost 80% Muslim majority, and bringing in more and more Hindu or other denominations there and making it less Muslim. Changing the broader character of the state. Changing it from a Muslim majority to a normal Indian state” (Interview #1).

**Education**

A common notion connecting actors ranging from academics, the armed forces, the local people to civil society actors, is the idea that the conflict has had a strong impact on children and education; the challenge is to engage the next generation of children and to foster educational institutions in Kashmir. Stakeholders might disagree on the content and method of education, but they do acknowledge that education is vital to building peace. Actions for peacebuilding have to be positioned within education systems (Singh, 2015).

According to the 2011 Census, the literacy rate in Jammu and Kashmir is 67.16 per cent, lower than the Indian national rate (74.04 per cent). According to Jammu and Kashmir census data, the total child population in the age group 0-6 was 2,018,905 (Indian Census, 2011), being 16.10 percent of the Jammu and Kashmir population. Local students in Srinager pointed out that, given the number of children in the state, it is very important that educational systems are created that engage the new generation(s).

As part of Operation Sadbhavana, so-called Army Goodwill Schools (AGSs) were set up which can be seen as both Connectors and Dividers. On the one hand, they are Connectors as they brought quality education to regions characterized by a vicious cycle of violence. Many respondents, such as teachers and parents, argued that the AGSs provided much needed quality education which really helped young people; the AGSs were actually better
than the government schools as many of these latter lacked infrastructure facilities. In addition, many of the schools were opened in areas where previously no schools existed and consequently, provided much needed education for large groups of children. A further strength of the AGSs is the fact that they draw students from all backgrounds and specifically accommodate children who have been affected by armed violence in the family (Singh, 2015).

However, some local Kashmiris were not as positive about the AGSs and felt that the Army was trying to “assimilate the children and to condition the new youth through propaganda” (Interview #1). Some Kashmiris argued that the Army should not be setting up schools. For many people in Kashmir, the armed forces are a Divider and consequently they do not trust the schools being set up by the Army.

4.2 Shared values and interest, symbols and occasions

This section offers a systematic analysis of two of the indicators for the C&D framework: shared values and interests, as well as symbols and occasions from the perspective of both Kashmiri Muslims and Kashmiri Pandits. These two indicators from the C&D framework have common characteristics and will therefore be analysed together.

Kashmiri feeling of home

For Kashmiri Pandits, Kashmiri Muslims and Kashmiri Buddhists the Kashmiri culture and language can be seen as a Connector. Many respondents in interviews discussed the feeling of Kashmir being their home and despite the level of violence, they feel safe when they are home. One young Muslim Kashmiri student discussed how, when he moved to Delhi, he made many good friends with Kashmiri Pandits.

“I never had the experience of meeting with Kashmiri Pandits, but now I am in Delhi I have made very good friends with some. I have been here 10 to 12 days and I met some Kashmiri Pandits. If I leave Delhi at this point in time, this will be my takeaway. That feeling of home, in Delhi, comes from them” (Interview #3).

Another student said how he connected with a Kashmiri Pandit in Delhi, just by speaking Kashmiri:

“I had a beautiful experience when I was in my hospital. My fellow doctor, he happens to be a Kashmiri Pandit, and on the first day I saw him, all along he was talking to other people in Hindi. But then we met, we spoke the Kashmiri language immediately. So, you know, this little bit of community building, that little realm of Kashmiri people coming together in the unlikeliest place, forming a community and forming a home there. For me that was very beautiful” (Interview #3).

A Kashmiri Pandit student I interviewed in Delhi reinforced his connection with Kashmir. He said: "Kashmir is our homeland, our land, our culture and our heritage" (Interview #5). A common theme emerging from the interviews were stories and experiences of exile and displacement from the ancestral homeland. Respondents highlighted how they don’t feel at home in Delhi, but also know that they cannot go back to Kashmir.

The responses of the Kashmiri Muslims also suggest feelings of displacement and alienation from their homeland: “The land is occupied by soldiers, we are not free in our homeland” (Interview #9).

Given the experiences of both Kashmiri Pandits and Kashmiri Muslims, it can be stated that the notion of homeland is a Connector between different Kashmiri communities. However,
the notion of homeland Kashmir is complex and multi-layered. Singh argues that it is difficult to provide "conventional frames of analysis as the narratives are intertwined with memories of displacement, pain, betrayal, and more importantly victimhood" (Singh, 2015, p. 40).

Another narrative that emerged from the interviews was the idea that prior to the Pandits’ displacement from the Valley, Pandits and Muslims used to live in harmony:

“We used to go to their functions uninvited. They used to come to our functions uninvited. If there was a family conflict or if a couple was having a divorce, we used to call them for their advice, their counsel. It was vice versa. We would send them sweets on Diwali. They would send us sweets and biryani on Eid. They used to study together. This was before the exodus. The children of the headmaster and many others would study vigorously together” (Interview #3).

The Kashmiri Flag
For many Kashmiri people, the Kashmiri flag evokes deep emotions. The flag is a symbol of their homeland and their culture. It is also a symbol of particular desires and aspirations. Kashmiri people in general have similar aspirational values and this can therefore be seen as a Connector. A theme that emerged from the interviews was that most Kashmiris want a peaceful, prosperous future for themselves and their children. The flag can in particular can be considered as a Connector for Kashmiris.

The flag has its origins in the bloodshed that took place on July 13, 1931, in Srinager. A protest against the Dogra rulers at the time, resulted in 21 people being killed after the police opened fire (Mir Qāsim, 1993). Someone in the crowd hoisted the blood-stained shirt of one of the victims and declared that this would be the new flag of Kashmir; Kashmiris had obtained their own flag, rejecting the old flag and Dogra flag with it.

In 1939 the flag was officially adopted by the political party Jammu & Kashmir National Conference. In 1952 the flag became the official flag of the state, after a resolution was passed in the Constituent Assembly. One of the advocates of the new flag, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, stated at the time:

“It was the 13th July 1931, when for the first time the people of Kashmir raised their voices against the system which had trampled upon their hopes and desires. Their voice made their aspiration obvious, and the sacrifices they had to undergo in raising this voice form part of history now which I need not reiterate here. People marched on consistently and underwent various privations. They went ahead unflinchingly. It will not be out of place to give a brief description of their desires and aspirations in this House. Kashmir has always been the cradle of humanism, knowledge, unity, brotherhood and religious tolerance.” (Mir Qāsim, 1993, p. 197)

The colour of the flag (Figure 6) is dark red, originally representing the blood of the 21 martyrs who died during the 13 July 1931 demonstration, but later came to also symbolise the workers and labourers of the state (Mir Qāsim, 1993). The second significant feature of the flag is a white plough, situated in the middle of the flag. This plough symbolises the peasants who work the land and is especially important as Kashmir is an agricultural state with no significant industry. One respondent from Srinager told how the flag became especially significant to Kashmiri rural inhabitants: “The flag came to represent the peasants as important for Kashmir” (Interview #9). Next to the plough, the three vertical white stripes represent the three regions of the state: Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh.

Figure 6: The Kashmir flag
As outlined above, July 13, 1931, is one of the most important dates in the history of contemporary Kashmir. For Kashmiris the date represents – both historically and politically – the beginning of the modern-day struggle for independence and freedom. For many it represents the uprising of a victimised and enslaved people against a powerful and domineering ruler. It is the date Kashmiri people began their struggle for a better life, fighting for improved economic, moral and social conditions for the poor peasants in Kashmir.

4.3 Common Experience

The shared experiences of the conflict for both Pandits and Muslims can provide the context for linkages across conflict lines. Shared experiences of war or violence might provide connections, even if people are on different sides of the conflict (Anderson, 1999).

Memories of conflict

The memories of more than two decades of conflict are very much alive in the minds of Kashmiris, also among young students. For many Kashmiris I interviewed, the conflict as such is their immediate experience. During one of the first interviews I had with some Kashmiri students, I asked them about their experiences of conflict – one replied by saying: “What is our immediate reality? It is the conflict. The conflict is our immediate reality and that is what we will talk about” (Interview #3). Many other Kashmiris also describe the stories of the conflict, of present and past violence that has affected their lives.

According to a respondent: “if you are in Kashmir today and you try and go from the airport to the hotel, you will be checked five times at different checkpoints. Someone who is born in 1989 or ’90 or later has only seen the jackboot, they have only seen the weapon outside his house, he has only seen a soldier there, at midnight there is someone who comes crashing on his door – this is a very unnatural existence, so there is an antipathy in his mind against the army, against the government of India, against the people of India” (Interview #2).

Many Kashmiris have experienced violence themselves. An interviewee showed me his arm which was covered with scars. He told me that he got wounded by pellets when protesting in Srinager. This experience had just made him even more determined to protest against the government of India.

Several other respondents talked about historical experiences of Kashmiris. A respondent brought up the so-called Konenshpura case of 1991: according to many local women the army went into the village searching for militants, and raped between 23 and 70 women for two days. Other respondents highlighted comparable past events.
These particular experiences of conflict illustrate how the history of conflict echoes in the memories of the local people. Memories of conflict are also deeply ingrained in the Kashmiri Pandit community. Memories and experiences of violence can be seen as a Connector for Kashmiri Pandits and Kashmiri Muslims alike, as both communities have experienced violence and war. The Kashmiri Pandits were forced out of their land after the emergence of militancy in 1990. Insurgents killed Pandits and over 300,000 had to flee the valley (Ganguly, 2001).

**Discrimination, disappearances, and arbitrary detentions**

Among many stakeholders there is a common voice, calling for a repeal of the many acts and laws such as the Armed Forces Special Powers (AFSPA) and Public Safety Act (PSA). UN reports conclude that these laws are used to discriminate against Kashmiri people (UN, 2018). Under the PSA, for example, the government can detain a person without trial for up to six months and this can in some cases even be extended to up to two years. An interviewee pointed out that many people also get denied any legal aid. Arbitrary arrests and detentions, torture, human rights violations have all taken place in Kashmir (UN, 2018). The responses of Kashmiri Muslims also suggest feelings of discrimination at the national level. One interviewee highlighted how he felt alienated after moving away from Kashmir: “When I come to Delhi, I am being viewed with suspicion here. They won’t note my existence as a research scholar, no. They would note my existence as a Kashmiri, a Muslim. So, my identity comes first, then my profile, what am I” (Interview #1). Feelings of discrimination are common amongst Kashmiri Muslims and Pandits living away from Kashmir. These feelings of alienation can be seen as a Connector for Kashmiriris.

Several respondents argued that the Kashmiri people experience administrative discrimination in Kashmir. A Kashmiri business owner: “The government discriminates against you in multiple ways: creating conditions that are not good for investments, and not financially aiding the state” (Interview #10). An example given, relates to the 2014 floods. Several Arab and Gulf countries offered to help, but the government of India flatly refused. Many in Kashmir were not happy about this; only resulting in more and stronger feelings of discrimination on financial matters.

**4.4 Attitudes and actions**

Attitudes and actions in a protracted conflict can unite or divide people and stakeholders across conflict lines. In Kashmir, there are many shared views and attitudes that connect people.

**Hostility towards Indian government**

Throughout Kashmir, there is widespread hostility and antipathy towards the Indian government. A general in the Indian army said: ‘there is a very unnatural existence, there is an antipathy in [the] mind against the army, against the government of India, against the people of India” (Interview #2). Many people view the government of India as a government that wants to crush Kashmiri nationalism and Kashmiri identity. One Kashmiri student highlighted this view: “They are being seen as kind of colonisers” (Interview #1). This view is not uncommon in Kashmir.

Many Kashmiri people feel powerless and have very little agency in the management of their society. This narrative is epitomised by the following quote of a Kashmiri student:

“The problem was the bureaucracy, the power, it lied with those bureaucratic chambers of power. Kashmiri Muslims did not have power. Even now it does not have power. It is a powerless society” (Interview #3).
Some feel that because of recent events, such as the abolishment of article 35A, the Indian government is trying to take away even more of their power. The people have a feeling that India is trying to terminate those powers, to take away the powers of the Prime Minister, of the President, the Election Commissioner, and the local Supreme Court. According to a Kashmiri student:

“All those promises of having a separate autonomy, greater autonomy within the region to assimilationist of New Delhi. That is being viewed as, they are trying to absorb that character of the state, they are trying to enforce that broader agenda on you, they are trying to assimilate your identity” (Interview #1).

Violation of the sense of dignity
The head of a former education for peace initiative in Kashmir maintained that Kashmiris’ sense of dignity has been violated and the extent of the alienation is extreme. She believes that, referring to the extent of the alienation: “It’s not about jobs anymore, it is about dignity. It is about their right to live with their head held high. It’s about them being able to cultivate their land without seeing the face of soldiers. It’s about demilitarisation” (Interview #7). Feelings of shame and humiliation can be considered as inter-group Connecters as people across conflict lines have similar feelings of victimhood and infringement of dignity. However, these feelings can also be seen as Dividers, as the Kashmiri people feel more antipathy towards the Indian army and government.

Aspirational values
Many local Kashmiri people have similar aspirational values, which can be seen as a Connector. A theme that emerged from the interviews was that most Kashmiris want a peaceful, prosperous future. They have similar aspirations for a better life for themselves and their children. The Kashmiri people have their own aspirations, desires and aims. Many want to regain their sense of dignity and live a peaceful life.

Lots of initiatives and events are taking place in Kashmir despite the conflict and many people are living their lives.

“People are living there. The national media – what they do is, they portray the same single narrative, the security narrative, the national security narrative of the Indian government. Military, security personnel killing the anti-nationals, killing the militants, terrorists. But on the ground level – if you see the newspapers from there on my own experience – broader things are happening, people are living there, they do things that every other state does. We just want to focus on our lives” (Interview #1).

Another respondent added that Kashmir is a place with lovely, beautiful people:

“They are very interesting, educated people. And you know, they have so much arts and crafts, and the climate is very good. [...] What a region wants, they have all of that” (Interview #7).

4.5 Hum Kadam

In this chapter I have so far provided a detailed systematic analysis of the Connectors and Dividers in Kashmir. In the following section I will present the findings of the conflict transformation projects and whether they have helped in bringing about changes in Kashmir society.
Hum Kadam initiatives are mentioned by many of the respondents interviewed, some of whom have themselves participated in these initiatives. The Hum Kadam project ran from 2012-2015 and brought together youth and educators from schools and colleges from both Kashmir and Delhi to engage in dialogue groups, interactions, conflict transformation workshops and/or training (Kaul, 2015). Hum Kadam means ‘together in the same journey’ or “in step with each other. People from a certain part of India, in sync with the people of Kashmir” (Interview #2).

Kaul documented and evaluated the Hum Kadam initiative from 2012-2015. Her main conclusion is that Hum Kadam has resulted in a “positive change in individual attitudes and beliefs of participating youth leaders” and “increased access of meritorious and marginalised youth leaders from J&K to institutions of educational excellence to further their dignity and empowerment” (Kaul, 2015, p. 49). Overall, there have been encouraging results from the Hum Kadam project; what was now needed was a rethinking of the intervention design to estimate its impact and application elsewhere. Within this process re-mapping, the variety of “formal and non-formal learning sites is key to consider how best to scale up the program” (Kaul, 2015, p. 75).

Responses from Interviews
There are mixed responses when discussing the project and how successful it has been. Some respondents thought it has been a great success and the challenge now is how to scale up the program:

“Absolutely, I think they are wonderful, the challenge is really how to scale it up. How to multiply it many, many times over because we went through that process, and many young people discovered things where they could connect” (Interview #7).

Other respondents agreed and thought that the initiative has been excellent and has resulted in many young people connecting with each other. An interviewee who had met many Hum Kadam participants concluded:

“It is an excellent initiative and I did talk to a lot of young people, from different schools and I think there was a tremendous sense of connect, [a] good feeling and hope that this would continue, but it does take a very long time – but I think everyone agreed that it was a very beautiful and productive process. So much power to them and I hope it goes places. And I hope many more such initiatives take place” (Interview #7).

A researcher from South Asian University who analysed the Hum Kadam project also thought the initiative had provided a valuable space for young people to connect with others:

“I think Hum Kadam provided a platform to retell that story. So, in some ways it was also cathartic, it was addressing years of trauma, which had not found its space, because in the school curriculum there is no space for that. It also had a context in terms of specifically addressing alienation because it was building networks” (Interview #15).

Several other respondents, however, particularly young people, did not think that initiatives such as Hum Kadam were useful. A Kashmiri student living in New Delhi outlined his thoughts:

“I personally feel those projects can have any influence or success, only if you accept the existence of the other. If the Indian youth, for example, accept my existence as a Kashmiri, not as an Indian, this is a first level. There are grievances. I have a strong sense of my nationalism – that others would call sub-nationalism – but for me it is a
nationalism. So that identity, the other person should acknowledge my existence – I have a separate identity, separate in the sense that I have that cultural notion of myself of who I am and what constitutes me as a Kashmiri. So, you have to respect that identity firstly” (Interview #1).

Other Kashmiri youth had similar views that projects like Hum Kadam struggle to find success, because many people involved in the projects do not accept the existence of the other. One student interviewed in Srinagar believes that whilst there are local Kashmiri people being viewed as terrorists as they don’t accept forced nationalism, the projects will not work. He states that “within that context, within that environment there will be no success of these major projects” (Interview #9).

A respondent argued there is no conflict transformation from the armed to the peaceful taking place in Kashmir.

“But in [the] Kashmir context, there is no reconciliation as of now, it’s just conflict going on. There is no transformation. We see conflict being transformed from the violent to the non-violent and then from the non-violent to the violent again. But in terms of resolution, there is none. So, we cannot talk about reconciliation or transformation. It is just grassroots work that is needed as of now” (Interview #1).

4.6 Operation Saddbhavana

Operation Saddbhavana is mentioned by many of the respondents interviewed, some of whom were very involved or have participated in the project. The initiative Saddbhavana started in 1997 and its aim was to change the way the army was seen and win the hearts and minds of the young Kashmiris. Lt.Gen. Syed Ata Hasnain was interviewed and he claimed that Saddbhavana came about “as an automatic realization by the army that it had to institutionalise what is called military civil action” (Interview #2). The army realised that the “people are the centre of gravity. It is the people who are up at the stakes. You have to grab the people towards your side. And you have to see the maximum of people with you. How to do it? You do it by psychological warfare” (Interview #2).

The word Saddbhavana means good will, and the army tried to generate goodwill among the people. An independent researcher focusing on the Kashmir conflict, talked about why the army wants to generate good will:

“And why would you want to generate good will? Because they will then cooperate. They will not get in the way of operations and sometimes even help in the sharing of intelligence. They will tell you if there is a new person in the village for example. He has come from Pakistan or he has come from the borders” (Interview #14).

In his interview Hasnain maintained that under Saddbhavana lots of successful schemes were implemented, particularly in the outlying areas that the civil administration cannot easily reach. He claimed:

“We run a very successful domain in Saddbhavana called nation integration, where we take tours of young children, youth, old people, women only, all over India, by showing them different parts of India to give them a push to their aspirations. Make the people feel that we too can have this kind of a peace. And Kashmir too can become like this. So, Saddbhavana is a huge contribution” (Interview #2).
The General argued that the tours are a strategic Connector, as it gives many students the opportunity to step out of their remote villages and experience the larger India and connect with others around the country.

Through Sadbhavana the Army has attempted ways to win the trust of the ordinary Kashmiri. Lt.Gen. Hasnain and Operation Sadbhavana are often mentioned in conversations with students, academics and locals. His attempts to bring about small changes in the attitude of the security forces are talked about. For example, his initiative to instruct the security forces to say ‘adaad’ and greet the passengers during checks of buses or vehicles on the highway, is talked about positively.

In his interview the general agreed with the idea that a long-term transformation of the Kashmir conflict requires efforts towards changing the attitudes and behaviour of the masses. He believes that Operation Sadbhavana and his “attempts to initiate steps for constructive change can bring about a change in the narrative in Kashmir and win the hearts and minds of the people” (Interview #2).

The General does acknowledge, however, that Sadbhavana is perceived suspiciously by many local Kashmiris.

“This is inevitable. You see, to achieve 100% success through Sadbhavana is never possible. Sadbhavana is something to just influence the people. Influence their minds that we mean well” (Interview #2).

Many respondents in the interviews echoed this sentiment that at a local level people are suspicious of the project:

“People are taken on these tours in an effort to bring them closer to the Indian mainland, trying to assimilate them within the broader society, to Indian society. But on a local level they are being viewed with scepticism, with the suspicion that India is trying to have the cultural colonisation kind of thing. Trying to prop up the civilian and cultural operations. Trying to condition the new youth or the other children through the propaganda. That is being viewed with scepticism by the people” (Interview #1).

In the dominant narratives in Kashmir and by many of the local people the Army is, in many ways, perceived as a Divider. Perceiving the Army as a Divider comes from the people’s past experiences, from the militarization, and the crackdowns and curfews in the state that still take place regularly. Because of this general distrust in the Army, many people also do not trust the initiatives that are run by the Army.

Several respondents do not want the Army to participate in initiatives under Operation Sadbhavana. Some questioned why the Army is conducting all these initiatives. The head of a former education for peace initiative in Kashmir argued that the Army should just be guarding the borders and maintain security:

“yet, instead of guarding the borders, they have gone into all kinds of other work. Aid to civil authority. I don’t think it builds good civil military relations” (Interview #7).

She concludes:

“Ultimately, Sadbhavana – and from the point of view of democracy, why should the Army be doing this work? Is this the job of the Army? Why should they be restoring roads, going on tours, even so much as disaster relief and so on. There should be separate agencies and forces to do those works. What should have been a
secondary duty of the Army has become its primary duty. Are they supposed to be doing this? Is this their main mission?” (Interview #7).

According to a professor from Jamia Millia Islamia University, it is better if non-state actors are involved because the trust deficit is huge. She claims:

“No matter what the Army does, people will not trust the Army. They won’t trust the state, because apart from these people-to-people initiatives, the people on the ground also need to see something concrete which is not really happening” (Interview #8).

The General disagreed however and believes that is the Army’s job.

“To my mind the Army’s job is everything. If you are managing the conflict, you are responsible for everything, from facilitating the environment for the political outreach to happen, to creating better facilities for governance. Doing lots of local administrations in the border areas, helping out the people” (Interview #2).

There is some agreement that Sadbhavana has been successful in the border regions of Kashmir. The following account from a professor of conflict transformation outlines this view:

“The ones who live along the border – in the border regions they have a different relationship with the Army because the Army has always been there. They have always been there since 1947. So there the Army is more integrated into the everyday life of the citizens, they have shops, and they give them business; people are more used to it because they have been there since 1947” (Interview #8).

However, in the main towns and cities, Sadbhavana has not been well received due to the fact that most people see the Army as an occupying force. An independent researcher focusing on the Kashmir conflict maintains that “in Srinager people say the Indian Army is an occupation” and in these areas “it has not been well received” (Interview #14). On the one hand the Army does “very efficiently build a couple of roads and all of that. But it doesn’t take away from the fact that their everyday lives are being disrupted by this very same Army” (Interview #14).

A local Kashmiri student from Srinager was asked what he thought about Operation Sadbhavana and replied:

“The people having seen the kind of operations that they have been in, they see these kinds of operations as diversionary tactics, that aim to assimilate them and strip them of their cultural identity, that is for the sake of what is going on. And I personally do not see any success of that operation” (Interview #1).

4.7 Kashmiri youth

Just as elsewhere, in the conflict in Kashmir also, what gets often lost are the unheard voices of youth. They have struggled for a long time, an assertion that gets substantiated through the voice of a Kashmiri student:

“You are being treated as a criminal. Your life inside is being made a hell [...] we are regularly facing the oppression, regularly facing the state oppression, the police harassment, the state harassment. So, that has contributed a lot to what we are seeing today” (Interview #2).
On the basis of both personal interviews and available literature, it can be stated that Kashmiri youth have grown up seeing the repressive side of the state. This generation of youth has also been educated in a ‘rights-conscious’ paradigm, has progressive aspirational values and recognises when the state has denied them rights (Singh, 2015). For many, there is a growing impatience, frustration and anger, and in some cases radicalisation especially amongst the youth.

During the period of my field research, the youth of Kashmir and the difficulties they face was echoed across the spectrum of actors. A common thread that ran across many conversations was the feeling of powerlessness, insecurity and alienation:

“Alienation is very, very high. People [are] absolutely alienated, the youth is completely alienated. No one is with India, very few people are with the Army, with us. What is happening, is that it is just a situation […] you can say tenuous because it can be very upsetting on a given day” (Interview #3).

An interviewee highlighted how he felt discriminated against, his Kashmiri identity not respected: “I am constantly being viewed with suspicion” whilst living in New Delhi – “not many people understand what we are going through” (Interview #1). This feeling of being the other, constantly being viewed with suspicion, reinforces the idea that India is largely insensitive to the Kashmiris. An Indian academic argued that “Kashmiris are very misunderstood in the rest of India, with many Indians not empathetic or understanding about the needs of the Kashmiris” (Interview #7).

The identity of being born a ‘Kashmir Muslim’ is a difficult narrative for youth to navigate, “as it is intertwined with forces of de-humanisation, victimhood and alienation” (Singh, 2015, p. 49). There is, however, a sense of victimhood and memory that connects and divides the youth in Kashmir (Singh, 2015). The experiences and memories of the conflict sustain many in their struggle against injustice. An assistant lecturer from South Asian University maintained that a young Kashmiri has a powerful memory, ‘the young Kashmiri also has a story – his or her lived experience” (Interview #15).

In many cases, the memory of ‘victimhood’ and a growing sense of powerlessness defines the youth’ call for resistance or ‘azaadi’. One young Kashmiri I interviewed explained why so many young men become militants:

‘It’s almost, I can label it – it’s 90% the police, and the Army which have forced the militants to become militants. You see even the Burhan Wani case, he became a militant after some incident involving his brother and him, being thrashed by the police. He became a militant due to that. There are hundreds of others who have become militants because their lives have been made hell” (Interview #1).

Many of the youth in Kashmir have experienced a lot of violence in their lives. I met one young man whose arm was heavily scared by pellets. He described how this happened one day, whilst out protesting in the streets of Srinager. An interviewee explained:

“this thing with the pellets, the amount of problems that have been created with the pellets, and the blinding and so on. Of course, it was not the intention of the Indian state to blind a whole generation of Kashmiris. But did they not know that this could be an outcome. Pellet guns are supposed to be fired at the body” (Interview #7).

Another focus of several interviews was on the fact that the Indian state has made very few efforts to engage with the Kashmiri youth. Many believe that they are not listened to by the state. This feeling is echoed by Hamilton, who states that “Youth voices tend to go unheard by political and economic leaders (even by social scientists) unless they are raised as a
revolutionary cry or as an articulated threat to the social order” (Hamilton, 2010, p. 7). On the other hand, however, any kind of initiative by the state is often only seen as an attempt to dilute the resistance and their cause. This is perhaps the darker side of the movement of ‘Azaadi’, where entrenched political leadership obstructs efforts for change or engagement.

Role of social media
Another common thread that ran across many interviews was the role of social media and how it is used by the youth of Kashmir. The youth in Kashmir are also part of the social media generation that shares its side of the story of Kashmir online and informs the rest of the world about the situation. A student interviewed in Srinagar maintained that online platforms allow youth a space for dissent and expression and a feeling that their voices are being heard by someone (Interview #9).

Facebook is mentioned as the most popular platform where youth can express themselves online. On the one hand, it can be seen as a Connector as groups have been set up to build solidarity networks, where people can share their experiences. These spaces can be seen as positive as “people can become aware of what is going on” (Interview #8). However, on the other hand, there have been several cases of posts or groups glorifying violent action. In addition, there have been problems when social media have been used to “send a message and tell people so and so is going to be attacked, so people come out, and then the army is taken aback, why is everybody on the streets, and they start firing” (Interview #8).

Many youngsters did share that they are scared about what they post online. I spoke to a group of students about social media and one student explained why his friend was interrogated:

“So, about the social media. So, social media is absolutely continuously being watched. The fact that he was being interrogated was because he overtly posts strong comments against the state. For obvious reasons. I would too. But I am obviously scared, so I deleted my Facebook for that reason. There is a reason why I deleted my social media, because I was also overt about it when something would happen. Not like him, who would make long posts about certain things. I would just report certain things. Like twelve people who were killed by the Indian state. And after he was interrogated and a few other friends of ours were interrogated, I was like: no, I don’t want this. Of course, I was worried. I need to save my ass. I deleted my Facebook. Even on social media you have no authority, you have no right to speak” (Interview #9).

Another student explained how their online activity is being monitored and controlled. He says that the Indian state checks all their online activity:

“Our Facebook accounts were deleted. It is sort of that big boss, big brother sort of thing. Everything is being watched. A totalitarian thing. Thought police, thought crime. 2 + 2 = 5. Yes, that sort of thing is happening. It is actually everywhere. It is like the panopticon of Foucault. It is happening everywhere” (Interview #3).

Despite the social media monitoring, many young people feel that they need to speak about their situation and the conflict. One student expressed the reason why his best friend creates cartoons about the conflict and tries to get them published:

“The conflict is his immediate reality and that is what he is going to talk about. What is his immediate reality? His immediate reality is the conflict and he will talk about it. That’s how I see it and I think everybody who can think should contribute as much as they can” (Interview #3).
The cartoonist carries on creating, as it is his way of protesting and resisting in a non-violent way. Nevertheless, he does admit that he finds it very difficult when his cartoons get constantly rejected:

“Yeah, so I work for an E-paper [for] like two months or so. And my fifteen cartoons so far have all been rejected because they were not subtle. They got rejected. It was not subtle, it was too direct. The Indian government could sue us. It's terrible. So how do we fight it? I mean the cartoons that get rejected, I post on my social media” (Interview #3).

This idea that they must do something to protest is echoed strongly amongst all the young people I interviewed. Many of them do not want to turn to violence but try to find non-violent ways of protest, ways of resisting. Some believe that it is also their duty to contribute. The final quote illustrates this perfectly:

“We belong to a certain society, a certain section of the society which is privileged. A privilege to talk about certain things. The fact that I am able to talk to you, an English person in English comes from a certain privilege. And I think If you ask me certain things about my immediate reality which is the conflict, I must contribute, what I am doing right now is contributing” (Interview #3).
Chapter 5: Conclusions and Recommendations

This study focused on the role of conflict transformation projects in Kashmir. More specifically, this study identified the main Connectors and Dividers in Kashmir and analysed specific conflict transformation projects to understand whether they can serve as local capacities for peace. This thesis was designed to answer the following main research question:

‘How and to what extent do conflict transformation projects in the case of Jammu and Kashmir contribute to more peaceful and secure societies?’

Six sub-questions have been formulated to answer the main research question. This final chapter will provide answers based on the theoretical, contextual and analytical chapters of this study.

The first sub-question was about the theoretical perspectives of conflict transformation and the role it can play in local peacebuilding processes. We need to understand this in order to place conflict transformation projects in and on conflict in a bigger theoretical picture. In Chapter 2 we first addressed the new concept of human security, emerging in the 1990s, that not only focuses on a state-centric model of security, but rather on the security of civilians. This focus on civilians led, in turn, to a greater emphasis on human suffering and underdevelopment. In addition, around the same time conflict transformation developed as a field of study and practice and by the late 1990s the concept of conflict transformation had materialised as a powerful and dominant ideal in many areas of conflict intervention. Conflict transformation is about the inherent dialogue process and the ability to transform the dynamic of the conflict by engaging all parties in society. In addition, we discussed how the theory of conflict transformation argues that conflict can create life and new opportunities to build conflict transformation capacities. Central to conflict transformation is the impact of interventions and projects on the dynamics of peace; the goal is to change a conflict ‘upwards’, finding positive goals for all parties and maximising peace and security. In order to do so and use conflict as a ‘creator’, it is important to acknowledge both the visible causes and underlying causes of conflict and subsequently change them.

The second sub-question dealt with the contextual factors that shape the Kashmir conflict. In Chapter 3, we debated the underlying causes of the conflict and the historical experiences of many of the Kashmiri people. According to various scholars, the roots of polarisation in Kashmir can be directly traced back to the Dogra system which deprived (large) sections of the population of their political and religious rights. We also traced the start of the Kashmir conflict back to 1947, the partition of the sub-continent into two dominions. Several recent causes of an escalation of the conflict were brought up, such as competing nationalist claims inside Kashmir, religious differences, developmental failures, ‘severe authoritarianism’ of the Indian rule, and political mobilisation of the youth. Since I do not subscribe to a reductionist analysis of the conflict, the conclusion is that a nuanced interplay of religion and regional, economic, social and political rights in combination with the local people’s longing for self-determination and freedom explains the outbreak of conflict in Kashmir.

In order to analyse the conflict in all its aspects, the various actors and stakeholders involved in the conflict have been addressed. In line with the conflict triangle of Galtung (2000), I mapped the attitude and behaviour of these actors and stakeholders in the conflict. In addition, I analysed the way in which they explained or framed the conflict; in interviews the different actors (from a former general in the Indian army to the local Kashmiri youth) obviously address the conflict differently. Indian scholars see the Kashmir conflict as a
bilateral issue between Pakistan and India, caused by a Pakistani-instigated infiltration across the border. However, many of the local Kashmiri youth I interviewed, see the conflict primarily as a fight for self-determination and freedom.

The third sub-question dealt with the evolution of the NGO culture in Kashmir. Prior to 1989 Kashmir did not have a significant NGO sector; only recently there has been a substantial increase in the number of NGOs active in the region. Despite the increased presence of NGOs, India’s strict laws on the regulation of taxes, political affiliation and contributions of (I)NGOs have made it very difficult for them to work in Kashmir. Any international NGO has to have permission of the government before engaging in any activity.

Due to these restrictions, only few NGOs are active as pressure groups to hold the Indian and Pakistani governments and armed forces accountable for their actions. NGOs that have been fighting against human rights violations and campaigning for justice have been labelled as anti-nationalist, working to undermine the state. There are just a few (I)NGOs which have been working towards the resolution of the conflict – India-based and foreign-based, in direct as well as indirect ways. NGOs have organised seminars, symposiums and discussion groups dealing with the resolution of the Kashmir conflict. There are furthermore some NGOs based in India and Kashmir focusing on conflict transformation through initiatives dedicated to for instance education, health care, human resources, development and rehabilitation of widows and orphans of the conflict.

The fourth sub-question was about the main Connectors and Dividers (C&Ds) in Kashmir. A bottom-up empirical analysis focusing on local C&Ds is important, from the perspective of both the theory and practice of conflict transformation. At a policy planning and intervention level it is highly important to become aware of patterns and trends that can be classified as Connectors and Dividers. Anderson (1999) states that as individual stories are gathered, patterns, themes and terms become visible. By using the C&D framework for analysis, we saw that there are elements in Kashmir society which connect people across conflict lines. The main Connectors in Kashmir are the Kashmiri culture, shared memories of the homeland, the Kashmiri flag, shared experiences of conflict for both Kashmiri Pandits and Muslims, and a common voice to repeal acts and laws such as the AFSPA and PSA. On the other hand, the main Dividers in Kashmir which serve as sources of tension, are the state institutions of the Army, police and judiciary, acts and laws such as the AFSPA and PSA, religious extremism, competing forces of nationalism, and curfews disrupting the education of Kashmiri youth.

The fifth sub-question dealt with the approaches, goals and activities of NGOs working on conflict transformation projects in Kashmir. It is important to understand the work of organisations which are working towards facilitating long-term efforts towards peacebuilding. The first project investigated was Hum Kadam, an Education for Peace initiative, organising dialogue groups, interactions, conflict transformation workshops and training. The main goal of this intervention was to address the trust deficit between the youth in Kashmir on the one hand and the rest of India on the other. The second project, Operation Sadbhavana, was an Army initiative to transform the narrative in Kashmir and change the way the Army was seen and to win the hearts and minds of the young Kashmiris. The main activities of Sadbhavana focus on development, education and health care programs in the remote areas of Kashmir.

The sixth and final sub-question was about the visible changes in society, due to the conflict transformation projects of Hum Kadam and Sadbhavana. Firstly, focusing on Hum Kadam, it can be concluded that the intervention has resulted in some positive change in individual attitudes of participating youth as well as many young people getting connected to each other. However, although the project has had some positive results, the extent of the changes in society that can be attributed to this specific project are rather minimal. From the
perspective of a needs assessment of the context in Kashmir, it is hard to classify this project as an example of ‘critical yeast’, with a long-term transformative purpose.

Secondly, Operation Sadbhavana has also not been able to create significant changes in Kashmir society. From the Army’s point of view, the project might have changed some people’s attitudes in the sense of no longer seeing the Indian Army as an occupying force. The project has also been able to successfully implement development projects, schools and health care programs. However, people in Kashmir still view the intervention with scepticism and have doubts about the ulterior motives. Although the Army claims it is taking care of the grievances of the local people and bridging the gap between them and the Indian population, many local people perceive these kinds of operations as diversionary tactics, aimed at assimilation and stripping them of their cultural identity.

Overall, the conflict transformation projects researched in this study do not result in tangible changes in attitudes or facilitate long-term efforts towards peacebuilding. The Hum Kadam project could have the potential to bring participants together and provide a space for people to share their stories and by doing so address alienation through creating networks. However, when it comes to responding to the deeper patterns of conflict, the skills and activities of Hum Kadam need to be strengthened and built upon. The project is capable of providing spaces to connect people, but to actually ‘transform’ existing patterns and conflicts is another level, which the project is currently unable to do.

**Contribution to theory**

This study tried to add knowledge to the theories of conflict transformation working on peacebuilding. During my research, I found that there is a lacuna in the conflict transformation literature which explicitly looks at the capacity of certain projects to build transformation capacities and thus facilitate long-term efforts towards peacebuilding. This study aimed to analyse two project interventions and their capacity to build peace. In order to analyse the conflict transformation projects and their capacity to build peace, a conceptual framework was used. Although this study cannot really prove the impact or success of conflict transformation projects in Kashmir, we do find there is a significant potential for similar projects in this case study.

The study suggests that further research should not only focus on the visible changes in society as a consequence of a conflict transformation project, but research should also focus on a better understanding of the local dynamics of the conflict and how to delegitimise systems or structures that promote violence and conflict in Kashmir. More case studies from Kashmir and other conflict countries could help us understand why the potential to have an impact may or may not result in actual impact and changes. Further questions need to be researched: What are the key Connectors in a conflict situation that can be strengthened to move towards peace? Can we build or strengthen these elements? What are the main factors working against peace – or for conflict?

**Policy Recommendations for Kashmir**

Despite the positive aims of conflict transformation interventions around the world, the reality is that transitioning from a cycle of conflict to a peaceful situation is extremely difficult. Recent political events in Kashmir have also provided further obstacles to the prospect of facilitating long-term efforts towards peace. The Kashmir conflict still lacks resolution and long-term conflict transformation.

While the research questions have already been answered in this Chapter, this section briefly lists some policy recommendations based on the C&D analysis and research of
conflict transformation projects. Two key policy recommendations are provided that may be feasible in the current situation in Kashmir.

Firstly, for Kashmir a 3D approach is needed: Dialogue, Development and Demilitarisation. The term ‘3D Approach’ has been drawn from Lisa Schirch’s writing on peace-building (Singh, 2015). In the case of Kashmir, Lederach’s peacebuilding model which addresses changes at three different levels could to be followed: the top level directed at interstate dialogue between India and Pakistan; the second level of centre-state dialogue between Kashmir and New Delhi; and the third level addressing interregional dialogue between Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh.

I also suggest there is a need for conflict transformation programmes focussing on youth in Kashmir. Local youth networks and local community leaders should be involved, in order to scale up and legitimise programmes. Educational projects could play an important role in delegitimising acts of violence and structures that promote violence and conflict in Kashmir (Singh, 2015). However, projects need to also respect the aspirational motivations of the young people. In addition, I believe there need to be spaces where different stakeholders in Kashmir can engage in informal dialogue. The local views of people need to be respected and safe spaces need to be created in order for people to voice their dissent.
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Appendix A – Interview Guide

Interview Guide
Let me begin with introducing myself. My name is Tim Walpot and I am an intern at IPCS. I am doing research for IPCS, which is also linked to my master thesis. For my thesis, I am focusing on the subject of impact evaluation in the field of security and justice initiatives/projects in Jammu and Kashmir.

In order to assess the impact of such projects, I am interviewing people involved with the implementation of the projects and people who are experts on the Kashmir issue/conflict. I want to emphasise that this research is connected to my study and is not part of an evaluation of any particular organisation and activities. During this interview I’m interested in your personal opinion on the subject. The information gathered with this interview and your details will be treated strictly confidential and will not be granted to a third person.

I would very much like to record this interview, only for my personal use, so that I can re-listen to it again. Do you have any objections to this? The interview will take around 30 to 45 minutes. Before we begin, do you have any questions? Then I propose to start the interview.

1. How would you describe the current situation in Jammu and Kashmir?

2. How do you think the government is perceived by the people in Kashmir? Has this perception changed over the years?

3. Regarding trust in people and satisfaction within the community, how would you describe the current situation in Kashmir? Have you observed any changes concerning this matter in the last years?

4. Many people have claims that in Kashmir there are strong feelings of discrimination and marginalisation. a. Regarding the subject of discrimination and marginalisation, how would you describe this issue in the current situation in Kashmir?

5. How would you describe the situation in Kashmir concerning access to legal representation? (Is it easy to access?) How is the situation in Kashmir concerning pre-trial detainees? (Are there many people imprisoned with no form of trial?)

6. How would you describe the situation concerning procedural fairness in the legal system? (Do you think that people are treated with respect and with a neutral stand?) Has this changed over the last years?

7. How is the current situation in Kashmir concerning accessibility of legal and court information? Has this changed over the last years?

8. Concerning corruption of the government, how would you describe the current situation in Kashmir. Have there been changes concerning this issue in the last years? Have there been attempts to address this issue over the last years?

9. Concerning the freedom of the press, how would you describe the current situation in Kashmir? Has this situation changed over the last years in Kashmir?

10. What do you think of Operation Sadbhavana? Initially it was started nearly twenty years ago I believe and is still ongoing. How do you view this operation by the Army?

11. What do you think of Hum Kadam? the initiative that aimed to bridge the trust deficit between the local youth and the rest of India. What do you think of the project?

12. Generation changes in Kashmir? How do you see the views of the youth towards India?

13. I want to get your views on NGOs working on conflict transformation. Overall how do you view NGOs working on security and trying to bring about greater dialogue between different stakeholders?

14. What would you say be the best way forward to transforming conflict in Kashmir?

This were all my questions. Thank you very much for your time and your openness to share your vision on these subjects. Do you have any suggestions or questions for me?
Appendix B – Chronological Listing of Conducted Interviews

#1 Interview Kashmiri student, New Delhi, 14 August 2018
#2 Interview General Syed Ata Hasnain, New Delhi, 8 September 2018
#3 Interview group of four Kashmiri students, New Delhi, 10 September 2018
#4 Interview, Professor of Peace & Conflict Studies, Lady Shri College for Women, 11 September 2018
#5 Interview Kashmiri Pandit student, New Delhi, 13 September 2018
#6 Interview, researcher at IPCS, New Delhi, 17 September 2018
#7 Interview, Education for Peace initiative, New Delhi, 18 September 2018
#8 Interview, Professor of Conflict transformation Jammia Millia Islamia, New Delhi, 18 September 2018
#9 Interview Kashmiri PhD Student, Srinager, 20 September 2018
#10 Interview local business owner, Srinager, 20 September 2018
#11 Interview with three teachers in Pari Mahal, Srinager, 21 September 2018
#12 Interview with two local students in Sopore, 22 September 2018
#13 Interview Senior fellow at Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi, 22 September 2018
#14 Interview independent researcher focusing on Kashmir, New Delhi, 22 September 2018
#15 Interview, Professor from South Asian University, New Delhi, 1 October 2018