The Road to European Military Cooperation: Exploring Obstacles and Conditions for Joint Development

A qualitative study on the main obstacles and conditions contributing to the slow and difficult progress in improving the nexus between European policy and military capabilities

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Abstract

For years European defence cooperation has been in turmoil. Against the background of threats from Russia, Northern Africa and the Middle East, the member states of the European Union are divided regarding the development objectives of the Common Security and Defence Policy and military capabilities. This has resulted in a slow and difficult progress in improving the nexus between European policy and military capabilities. This study focuses on explaining this process by exploring the relationship between European policy and European military capabilities, and the obstacles and conditions that influence the improvement of the nexus. Relevant policy documents have been analysed and interpreted in light of theories on strategic cultures and military innovation, resulting in a matrix reflecting the strengths and weaknesses with regard to improvement. The progress in military capability development over the past two decades is explained, illustrating that development has made progress, yet not living up to its potential. The obstacles and conditions that influence the process are multiple. However, the differences in strategic cultures and financial circumstances have the greatest impact on improving the nexus; divergent perceptions of member states and insufficient investments are holding back the consensus on policy and capability development.

Key words: EU; security and defence policy; military capabilities; strategic culture; military innovation

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THE ROAD TO EUROPEAN MILITARY COOPERATION: PREFACE

> Most conduct is guided by norms rather than by laws. Norms are voluntary and are effective because they are enforced by peer pressure. (Collier, 2007, p. 139)

The study that lies before you is my final project within the specialisation Conflict, Territories and Identities of the Master Human Geography at the Radboud University in Nijmegen. With this study I have been given the opportunity to combine the various aspects of the Master's program with a topic that is of great interest to me. In a world where the chances of a large-scale conflict are increasing and Europe is faced with threats of different proportions, the safety of the European Union's citizens is of major importance. My involvement with issues in the European society, in particular the field of defence, have led me to choose this topic for my final project. With this thesis I try to help with solving societal and military issues, by attempting to contribute to create a safer environment within, but also outside, the borders of Europe. At the same time, the subject of this study proved to be a topical matter given the information provided during the expert interviews, but also given the many issues that stemmed from Europe's security environment during the period I was occupied with this research.

The study was conducted during an internship at the Netherlands Defence Academy. My research questions were formulated in collaboration with my internship supervisor, Frans Osinga. The research was long and difficult, but conducting such an extensive investigation has allowed me to answer the questions that we identified. Fortunately, I also had the support of my thesis supervisor, Bert Bomert, who was always available and willing to answer my queries, and who helped me shape the entire study and the corresponding research process. I would like to thank my supervisors for their excellent guidance and support during this process. I also wish to thank all of the participants, without whose cooperation I would not have been able to conduct this study. To my other colleagues at the Netherlands Defence Academy: I would like to thank you for your informative cooperation as well, especially Berma Klein Goldewijk and Sabine Mengelberg for reviewing parts of this study. In addition, I also want to thank my girlfriend, family and friends. If I ever lost interest, you kept me motivated, to keep going on and finish my study. My girlfriend, Cindy Balvert, deserves a particular note of thanks: your advice and kind words have, as always, done me well.

Kevin van Haaren
Utrecht, 13 December 2019

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

3D	Defence, Diplomacy and Development
AI	Artificial intelligence
BG	Battlegroups
C2	Command and control
CADSP	Common African Defence and Security Policy
CARD	Coordinated Annual Review on Defence
CBP	Capability-based planning
CDP	Capability Development Plan
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CHG 2010	Civilian Headline Goal 2010
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
EC	European Commission
ECAP	European Capability Action Plan
EDA	European Defence Agency
EDAP	European Defence Action Plan
EDF	European Defence Fund
EDTIB	European defence, technological and industrial base
EEAS	European External Action Service
EP	European Parliament
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
EUGS	European Union Global Strategy
EUISS	European Union Institute for Security Studies
EUMC	European Union Military Committee
EUMS	European Union Military Staff
EUPM	European Union Police Mission
FC	Force Catalogue
HCSS	The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies
HHG	Helsinki Headline Goal
HG 2010	Headline Goal 2010
HR/VP	High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission
MI	Military innovation
MPCC	Military Conduct and Capability Planning
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDPP	NATO Defence Planning Process
OCCAR	Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en matière d'Armement
OSRA	Overarching Strategic Research Agenda
PESCO	Permanent Structured Cooperation
PSC	Political and Security Committee
R&D	Research and development
R&T	Research and technology
RDM	Robust decision-making
SC	Strategic culture
SDM	Strategic defence management
SWOT	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US	United States
WEU	Western European Union

Chapter 1   INTRODUCTION: DEVELOPING A NEW GLOBAL PLAYER

> The purpose, even existence, of our Union is being questioned. Yet, our citizens and the world need a strong European Union like never before. Our wider region has become more unstable and more insecure. The crises within and beyond our borders are affecting directly our citizens' lives. In challenging times, a strong Union is one that thinks strategically, shares a vision and acts together. (Mogherini, 2016, p. 3)

Mogherini's statement evidently depicts the irrevocable relationship between the internal and external security issues the European Union (EU) is facing. This relationship is even more significant considering the potential threats to the EU touching upon the safety and security of its citizens (Mitzen, 2018, p. 394). In response to these threats, in 2015 the EU leaders authorised the formulation of a global strategy for the EU's foreign and security policy. A year later, on 28 June 2016, High Representative and Vice-President (HR/VP) of the European Commission (EC) Federica Mogherini presented such a strategy to the European Council. In her opening statement on the global strategy, Mogherini emphasised the importance of cooperation between the EU member states in order to respond to their security challenges. Back in June 2015, nobody obviously expected that the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) would be presented only days after the referendum vote was cast for the United Kingdom (UK) to leave the European Union (Mogherini, 2016).[1] This referendum, in turn, caused a political tsunami endangering the very foundations of European integration (Grevi, 2016, p. 1). Now, it was even more important for the Union to find common ground on its foreign and security policy – a strong strategy, albeit without the UK's participation. This strategy, published under the title Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe, was set up by the European External Action Service (EEAS) under the leadership of Mogherini. It is a manifestation of all the views expressed during the process by the various EU member states and contains the strategic vision for the global role the European Union wants to play (EEAS, 2016, p. 7). The strategy highlights the common ground and presents a common way forward in these challenging times, for Europe as well as for the wider international community. In addition, the strategy also focuses on the development of European military capabilities. It explores the necessity of such military capabilities in order to respond to external crises, while guaranteeing the safety and security of its European citizens and territory. The member states are encouraged to acquire the necessary capabilities to defend themselves and live up to the commitments previously made whilst maintaining sovereignty in their defence decisions (EEAS, 2016, p. 11).

Finding the common ground between EU member states and moving forwards in the field of cooperative defence planning is what interests me about the European Union. That, alongside my interest in military cooperation and the development of military capabilities, makes this study a good opportunity to find out which obstacles influence the slow and difficult progress in capability development, and to analyse and interpret the conditions that influence the progress in developing the nexus between European policy and military capabilities. This study is conducted so as to unveil the discrepancies between the intended and implemented European policy documents.

1.1 *Departure: Main challenges in developing coherent policy and capabilities*

After the Second World War, Europe was confronted with many changes to its political landscape. Various European (as well as non-European) nations engaged in multilateral cooperation by joining economic and military partnerships in order to compete on a global scale and to promote strategic stability and peace (Adler, 2008, p. 207). However, it was not until the 1998 British-French summit at St Malo that a European security and defence policy really started to take shape. During this summit, a treaty was signed that laid the foundation for further European defence cooperation, divulging the response of the EU to the new security context which had emerged after the Cold War. Previously, the

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[1] In her opening statement, Mogherini (2016) also explains that her decision to present the strategy to the European Council, even after the result of the UK referendum, could not have been taken for granted. She is convinced that the EU needs to focus on what it needs to do for its citizens, being an actor on a global scale; the member states have to act together as a united Europe, since none of these members would have the size, the power nor the tools to act effectively as a global player.

European Union had mainly focused on low intensity peace operations. It was now time for Europe to be able to act more robustly; however, it soon became aware of its capability shortfalls. Accordingly, the Union developed various initiatives and policies to try and solve this capability gap. In 2003, it presented the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The ESDP was primarily directed at crisis management and was not only limited to military affairs, as it also encompassed a civilian dimension. It was an exclusive intergovernmental policy, requiring the consensus of all EU member states. Member states could not be outvoted nor compelled to participate in or pay for operations against their will. Without consensus, there was no common policy (Missiroli, 2004, p. 57). Later, after the Treaty of Lisbon, the ESDP was renamed into the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The CSDP is an integral part of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The institutional frameworks of the CFSP and CSDP overlap to a great extent, although the specific operational character of the CSDP has resulted in a distinctive sub-set of institutions generally charged with the planning and conduct of security and crisis management operations (Grevi, 2009, p. 19). The speedy implementation of the CSDP and its sub-set of institutions – in terms of concepts, instruments, and field interventions – has generated questions regarding the nature and added value of the EU approach to security and defence (Biavi, 2001, p. 41).

The EU Global Strategy incorporates this sub-set of institutions into the context that illustrates the Union's internal and external problems. These contexts are crucial in determining its main rationale, features and added value. Looking at contemporary EU politics, one of the main features is the unprecedented pressure as a consequence of the Brexit vote, leading to a series of interrelated crises. These crises have deepened the political polarisation within and between EU member states, which in turn resulted into greater uncertainty about the future of the Union (Grevi, 2016, p. 1). The anticipated departure of the UK coincides with other pressing matters. The EU needs to cope with an increasing migration flow from and a need for humanitarian aid to failing states in the belt of instability – stretching from Northern Africa into the Middle East. In addition, it must also deal adequately with assertive and authoritarian neighbours such as Russia and Turkey (Advisory Council on International Affairs, 2018, p. 7). Both are part of a changing geopolitical landscape, in which non-Western powers are one the rise. With the use of (dis)information and cyber-attacks, threats become more hybrid. Other new technologies, like drones and autonomous weapon systems, also pose an increased threat to the EU (Osinga, 2019, p. 10). Each and every one of these issues adds a little more to the severe pressures on the external borders of the European Union, contributing to a growing list of threats the EU needs to consider when drafting policy.

Against this background, two challenges can be identified when it comes to developing a compatible policy. The first challenge arises from the argument that the EU security and defence policy needs to incorporate the values, interests, and priorities of all EU member states. The second challenge for the EU is the need to align its means and ends as well as to offer a solid framework for external actions across a wide policy spectrum (Grevi, 2016, p. 1). Although these challenges highlight the issues of drafting compatible security and defence policies, they do not yet encompass the problems that characterise the development of military capabilities.

Regardless of the uncertainties caused by the Brexit and the external threats to the EU, the development of European military capabilities is a slow and difficult process. The current ambition levels of the CSDP are still based on goals set during the Cold War era. The European Union can no longer avoid a structural review of the new security environment, as Europe faces increased challenges. Even if all EU member states acknowledge these challenges, the appreciation of these varies (Bakker, Drent, Landman & Zandee, 2016, p. 3). Since the end of the Cold War, in particular since the mid-1990s, the military capabilities of almost every EU member state have been reduced mostly due to cuts in national defence budgets. Strengthened by the EU's post-Cold War focus on expeditionary operations and the constraints of scarcity (Munich Security Conference, 2017, p. 11), European nations are often overwhelmed by the demands that come with their responsibilities. Recent studies by the International Institute for Strategic Studies show that the EU member states are confronted with significant gaps in their capabilities and are not able to meet the operational ambitions as set out by the EU strategy (Barrie et al., 2018, p. 2).

Some analysts (fore)see that the member states, in trying to close the gap will not be able to foot the bill when it comes to military spending, given the budgetary constraints of individual member states. They argue that it would be a waste to spend any money on developing European military capabilities, however, because of the different strategic cultures and political views within the European Union (Sangiovanni, 2003). Political as well as institutional hurdles would have to be cleared before the EU can solve its capability gap. This might take at least another decade. Nevertheless, the widening of the EU's military and civilian responsibilities calls for the closure of the capability gap and overcoming the current fragmentation (Trybus, 2006, p. 694).[2] Based on this situation, Drent, Landman and Zandee (2016, p. 11) argue:

> A widened set of CSDP tasks will ask for military capacities across all levels of the spectrum. […] New European capability programmes should be launched to solve the gaps, to direct capability-driven research and technology investment and to retain or acquire key industrial capacities within the EU. Capability improvement targets should be realistic in order to deliver in the near term.

This indicates an increased urgency to develop military capabilities. In order to meet the EU's operational ambitions and solve the capability gap, European nations need to focus on military cooperation initiatives and on developing a defence industry capable of filling this gap.

By exploring the issues raised above, two more challenges regarding the development of military capabilities can be identified. The first challenge results from the debate on whether or not political and institutional determination, and the policy documents resulting from it, will strengthen (or rather weaken) the development of military capabilities. Some scholars argue that the EU's political unit and EU Military Committee (EUMC) must have institutions and policies capable of developing and mobilising credible military capabilities (Toje, 2008; Menon, 2011); past policies and its goals are not effective (Bakker et al., 2016, p. 3). The second challenge stems from the argument that it is necessary to (substantially) raise the military budget. It has often been argued that the EU member states have to invest more in defence and defence innovation. A higher degree of commitment and investment would positively impact the development of their defence industry, potentially filling the capability gap (Fiott, 2017, p. 400).

This study brings two main challenges to light. The first challenge addressed is the formulation of a coherent security and defence policy for the European Union; the second is the actual development of European military capabilities in the light of recent changes in its security environment. These challenges are the key principles of this study and play a central role throughout, as it aims to explore potential solutions and recommendations to both. The two challenges will be properly 'resolved' in the final chapter of this study.

1.2 *Scientific, societal and policy relevance*

The scientific relevance of this research project is given with the – anticipated – increased understanding of the complexities of European security and defence policy documents and European military capabilities as well as the development of a policy analysis framework to explore the relationship between these key concepts. There are only a few studies that touch upon the subject of developing European security and defence policies, military capabilities and corresponding issues: the policy appears not to form a good basis for the development of military capabilities. Since the creation of the European security and defence policies and the more recent EU Global Strategy, various problems regarding the improvement of European military capabilities have surfaced. Scholars argue that the European Union as such lacks a strategic culture, causing the development of European military capabilities to fall behind (Haine, 2011; Margaras, 2010). Others state that the obstacles are primarily of a financial nature; "as a result of falling real defence budgets and rising input costs, policymakers cannot avoid the need for some difficult defence choices" (Hartley, 2003, p. 3). There is an obvious gap in the scientific literature on improving the nexus between European military policies and capabilities.

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[2] Although this article was published pre-CSDP, the purpose of the policies and initiatives nowadays is still the same as of that explored in the article. Therefore, it would be safe to assume that the EU's increasing responsibilities still call for overcoming the capability gap and the current transformation in practice.

Some studies touch upon the obstacles causing the slow and difficult progress; other studies mainly focus on *national* military capabilities, policies, and strategic cultures, or on whether the EU actually has (made progress towards) any military capabilities or strategic culture (Jakobsen, 2018; Zandee, 2017). These studies often only discuss a singular obstacle to the progress, do not always give an in-depth analysis or are outdated (Rynning, 2011; Toje, 2005). In other words, none provides an in-depth analysis of the multitude of obstacles.

This research addresses the current state of affairs in the drafting of European security and defence policies and its various schools of thought. It explores the different types of European military cooperation initiatives founded on the basis of policies, their evolution during the last two decades (post-Cold War Europe) and their main characteristics. By examining the evolution and characteristics of the various initiatives, it might be possible to expand upon the knowledge and interpretation of whether the obstacles to improve the nexus between European policy and military capabilities are influenced by previous actions or decisions. Several research institutes, such as The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) in the Netherlands and the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) in France, are engaged in research on the development of military capabilities and security and defence policies, on a national as well as European level. They do not, however, provide insight into the obstacles to improvement. These institutes are mainly concerned with studying the establishment and improvement of European security and defence policies and strategies, and the safeguarding of the Union against a number of internal and external threats.

The societal relevance of this study relates to the fact that there seems to be a hiatus in in-depth analyses of the main obstacles and conditions contributing to the slow and difficult progress in improving European policies and military capabilities (Ulriksen, 2004). This lack in progress and shortfalls in the capabilities directly affect people's safety and security. In order to guarantee the safety and security of EU citizens, the obstacles and conditions for improvement have to be analysed first. This study tries to reflect upon these issues by taking an initial step toward the development of an in-depth analysis framework for European policy documents, incorporating key principles of strategic culture and military innovation. However, this study is not intended to 'predict' all obstacles – present or future – as it focuses on the analysis of possible obstacles rather than on the prediction of them. Each obstacle has an ingrained uncertainty; some obstacles are simply too enigmatic and can only be explained in retrospect (Heuer, 1999, p. 167).[3] This study tries to strengthen the knowledge and insight about obstacles affecting the progress in improvement. With this knowledge, insight, and an analysis and interpretation based on the obstacles that have not been sufficiently analysed yet, better informed decisions can be made, and more effective actions can be taken – directly improving people's safety and security.

Apart from being socially relevant, this study can therefore also be relevant for policy drafting, as policymakers will be provided with an in-depth knowledge of elements that might dilute or even prevent any further improvement.

1.3 *Objectives and research questions*

The objective of this study is twofold: first, to develop a framework for analysing and interpreting European policy documents – its common policy on security and defence and related strategies – and, second, to expand the knowledge of and insight in the slow and difficult progress in improving the nexus between European military capabilities and policy. This study contributes in filling the gap in the literature about the possibilities of European military cooperation and the obstacles that hinder the development of capabilities. The anticipated framework for analysis grasps the character of the European policy documents by using the key principles of strategic culture and military innovation. European military cooperation is a developing phenomenon, albeit in an early stage (Mälksoo, 2016, p. 375). Both public and private actors are engaged in research into the possibilities European military cooperation might offer. As a result of this study, a clear picture outlining the possibilities in

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[3] According to Heuer (1999) there is a tendency to believe analysts should have foreseen events on the basis of information that was available at the time, as if what occurred was inevitable and therefore predictable

improvement, the discrepancies between intended and implemented policy, and the obstacles and conditions that accompany the slow and difficult process, might be sketched.

In order to conduct this study, a main research questions has to be formulated first. In addition, a number of sub-questions are also formulated to delve deeper into the scientific literature and explain it in more detail. By answering the various questions, this study aims to find out what obstacles and conditions contribute to the slow and difficult progress. Thus, this study starts with the following main research question: *How can the slow and difficult progress in improving the nexus between European policy and military capabilities be explained?*

This main research question includes two important dimensions: 1) the relationship between European policy documents and European military capabilities, and 2) an explanation of the obstacles and conditions contributing to the slow and difficult progress. The main research question can only be answered if both dimensions are clear. This results in the first sub-question: *How did the evolution in European security and defence policy contribute to developing military capabilities?* Next, the study touches upon the subject of capability development with the sub-question: *What progress has been achieved in developing military capabilities on the basis of policy during the last two decades?* Subsequently, the concepts of strategic culture and military innovation are merged into the final sub-question: *What explains the discrepancies between the intended and implemented policy influencing the progress in developing military capabilities?*

The first sub-question aims to address the European policy documents and the different schools of thought on this issue. It discusses the various characteristics of European security and defence policy and how they contribute to the conditions for improving military capability development. In addition, it examines the various initiatives on the basis of policy and seeks to find out whether and how these initiatives contribute to the slow and difficult progress in improving the nexus between European military capabilities and policy. The second sub-question aims to explain the (lack of) progress in developing military capabilities, both contemporary and in retrospect. This will provide an insight into the obstacles that contributed to the slow and difficult progress in the past and those that affect it today. It can also help to find an answer to the main research question by comparing the obstacles from the past to those the EU is facing today. The final sub-question discusses possible obstacles causing discrepancies in intended and implemented policy, therewith influencing the slow and difficult progress. It aims to examine contributing obstacles that have not been taken into account in the first two sub-questions. These obstacles range from the various strategic cultures of the individual member states to the internal and external barriers influenced by geopolitical and economic forces.

1.4 *Methodology*

This section explains the methodological choices made in this study; it outlines and specifies the choices in terms of research strategy, methods of data collection, type of data analysis, methodological quality and research ethics.

Research strategy

This study is based on the assumption that a good understanding of (a lack of) European military cooperation strongly depends on an analysis of the obstacles and conditions. Given that European security and defence are issues within an international context, this research project entails an in-depth study of a subject of considerable importance to the European community. It aims to explain obstacles and conditions and generate knowledge and insight that might contribute to the academic literature on European military cooperation. To achieve this aim, an explanatory research approach is used. Considering that an explanatory research approach aims to explain how and why some conditions came to be, and to provide insights in and knowledge about the problems faced by the researcher (Yin, 2003, p. 7), such an approach is suitable for this study. The primary objective is to create a better understanding of the problems surrounding capability development. In addition, it provides insights that might be used in a further exploration of the subject matter. Through an explanatory approach, this study explores the research area of the subject matter and lays the foundation for follow-up research, providing an opportunity for considering all aspects related to the problem. This is accomplished by using inductive

reasoning. Inductive reasoning – being a bottom-up approach – follows the logic from the ground up, rather than it being passed down from theory or the researcher's perspective (Creswell, 2007, p. 19).

In order to answer the main research question, this study is primarily of a qualitative nature. This qualitative nature is characterised by the process of "collecting, analysing, and interpreting data by observing what people do and say" (Monfared & Derakshan, 2015, p. 1111). Qualitative research methods were appropriate as the research questions are open-ended, evolving, and nondirectional – or *what* questions (Creswell, 2007, p. 107). A qualitative research method allows for the exploration of the obstacles to and conditions for improvement, but even more important, it allows a plausible and coherent explanation of the progress in improving European policy military capabilities (Mays & Pope, 1995, p. 110). The latter is relevant for the development of a comprehensive understanding of the processes behind European military cooperation.

The research strategy used in this study starts with an analysis and interpretation of EU policy documents on the basis of the theoretical framework, followed by expert interviews. These key respondents are chosen to help in understanding the theory better and they are relevant sources based on their knowledge or experience – also known as purposive sampling (Creswell, 2007, p. 64; Tongco, 2007, p. 151). These nine key respondents are attached to government organisations or research institutes in the Netherlands, Belgium, and France. These countries were chosen because of the proximity to the researcher's work place.

By choosing European military cooperation over international military cooperation, an attempt has been made to narrow down the subject matter. International military cooperation would have been too broad of a subject, as it needs to consider the different discourses of countries and supranational organisations with a military strategic culture worldwide. By only analysing and interpreting the European policy and strategies on security and defence, it is acknowledged that this approach of course sets the limits of this study. These limitations do not allow for a detailed examination of the policy and strategies of each individual member state over time (Zyla, 2011, p. 668). Narrowing it down to European military cooperation makes the research more viable and respond to the ongoing debate of creating a European army and the development of European military capabilities and policy (Munich Security Conference, 2019). This debate highlights the importance of this subject to the European community, considering the threats from the south and east becoming more immediate – putting a lot of pressure on the border of the EU (Béraud-Sudreau & Giegerich, 2018, pp. 53-54).

Data collection methods

This study is based on academic and non-academic literature on European military cooperation, strategic culture and military innovation. This literature has been used to acquire insight in the theories and concepts related to the development of European military capabilities and policy. In addition, it has been used to develop a framework for analysing and interpreting European policy documents. Most of the literature has been collected through online academic search engines and the university libraries of the Radboud University Nijmegen and the Netherlands Defence Academy. Other literature was recommended by staff members of the Netherlands Defence Academy and Radboud University, or by respondents during the interviews.

The second part of the data collection is based on the grounded theory approach and consists of expert interviews. Through purposive sampling, nine key respondents were selected on the basis of their capability to deliberately apprise an understanding of the main phenomenon within the field of this study (Creswell, 2007, p. 125; Longhurst, 2016, p. 148). Table 1 lists the expert interviews for this research. Interviews have an important value in the data collection in this grounded theory study. The interviews were semi-structured, meaning a conversation in which the interviewer tries to acquire knowledge and insight by asking specific questions. The interviewer had a list of predetermined questions; however, participants could shape the conversation as they saw fit and introduce themes they deemed to be important (Longhurst, 2016, p. 143). Like in most studies, an interview lasted approximately one hour in order to strengthen the academic value (Creswell & Brown, 1992). Semi-structured interviews were appropriate for this study as they enable the researcher to determine the direction of the interviews, ensuring that the relevant topics for answering the research questions were

explored. In addition, they provided sufficient freedom to deviate from the protocol in order to obtain additional insights which were thought to benefit the results of the study.

Table 1. Data collection sources

Data collection method	Organisation	Additional information	
Interview	HCSS	Frank Bekkers	Director Security Programme
Interview	Egmont Institute	Sven Biscop	Director 'Europe in the World' Programme
Interview	European Commission	Inge Ceuppens	Policy Officer I.5 Defence 2
Interview	EUISS	Daniel Fiott	Security and Defence Editor
Interview	EUMC	Claudio Graziano	Chairman EUMC
Interview	Leiden University	Niels van Willigen	Associate Professor International relations
Interview	Ministry of Defence	Eric Wilms	Senior Staff Officer
Interview	Clingendael Institute	Dick Zandee	Head of Security Unit and Research
Interview	Maastricht University	Mathieu Segers	Professor European history and integration

Data analysis

To examine the obstacles and conditions created by the European policy documents, two distinct theories are introduced in Chapter 2, namely strategic culture and military innovation. These theories establish the foundation on which the analytical framework is build. In a certain sense, the policy documents are explored through the lenses of both main theories. Various key principles are extracted from these two theories and used to analyse the policy documents. Next, it is possible to code the key principles present in each policy document. On the basis of the coding process, it can then be determined to what extent the key principles are actually part of the European policy and strategies. Subsequently, an analysis can be made depicting the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) of the policy documents. As a framework, SWOT analysis is used for focusing attention on key issues that affect development, in a simplistic albeit valuable manner. For this study, a SWOT analysis is a pragmatic option, since it is a significant tool to identify the obstacles and conditions which are most likely to influence the policy and strategies of the EU (Pickton & Wright, 1998, p. 102). The tables based on this process are part of the analysis; the conclusions drawn from these tables are the interpretation of the policy documents. This interpretation corresponds with the main research question and sub-questions (Paliwal, 2006). In addition, several important insights stem from the interpretation. These have been included in the interview protocol, which can be found in the appendix.

The analysis is fixed, but the resulting interpretation still needs to be verified or falsified. Consequently, the expert interviews have been used as either a verification or falsification of the interpretation. The grounded theory method for data analysis was most appropriate to analyse the expert interviews (Glaser, 2017). The method is in accordance with the inductive character of this explanatory study, as the patterns and categories of analysis emerge from the data rather than being (mis)guided by it prior to data collection and analysis (Patton, 1980, p. 306). Prior to analysing the interviews, the recorded interviews were transcribed verbatim. Various categories were identified in the transcripts as a result of coding. Initially, the coding was largely descriptive, meaning that only descriptive labels where attached to certain parts of the transcripts. During the coding process, attempts were made to identify higher-level categories by means of analytical coding. These categories methodically integrate low-level categories into relevant units (Willig, 2013, p. 214). The grounded theory approach aims to develop new, context-specific theories. Therefore, "categories labels should not be derived from existing theoretical formulations but should be grounded in the data instead" (Willig, 2013, p. 214). In addition, various similarities and differences were identified by moving back and forth between the different categories. All transcripts are elaborated in ATLAS.ti.

Methodological quality

Evaluating qualitative research is not a simple task, as it is first necessary to look at the epistemological position from which it was conducted. In order to be able to conduct a fair and relevant evaluation of the quality of this research, we must know what kind of knowledge this study tries to produce and what kind of contribution it wants to make to the research field (Henwood & Pidgeon, 1992, p. 104). This is important, given that the criteria used to evaluate this study must match the type of study (Willig, 2013, p. 508). Several scholars have attempted to identify these criteria (Creswell, 2007; LeCompte & Goetz, 1982). In order to characterise good qualitative research, Henwood and Pidgeon (1992) propose seven attributes based upon the assumption that the researcher and the topic of researched are not separate, independent entities and that, therefore, absence of bias is not a meaningful criterion for judging qualitative research.

First of all, it is important to assess the fit of the study. Whilst analysing the data, various analytic categories were created in an attempt to fit the data. To establish a good fit, clear and comprehensive definitions were written, summarising why phenomena have been categorised in a particular way (Henwood & Pidgeon, 1992, p. 105). Second is the integration of theory. The aim here is "to ensure that the theory at all levels of abstraction is meaningfully related to the problem domain" (Henwood & Pidgeon, 1992, p. 105). The amalgamated structure of the theory provides possible connections between data and lower- and higher-level abstractions of categories (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). To ensure that the theory is integrated at diverse levels of the study, newly found and significant knowledge has been incorporated into the theoretical framework. Third, a qualitative study is dependable when the researcher's role is acknowledged in the documentation of the research – clearly describing methodological changes in the research process that shape the object of analysis (Hayners, 2012, p. 86; Willig, 2013, p. 493). Therefore, a record was kept of these changes. This information is included in the next section of this study, making it available for evaluation. Fourth, the documentation of a study should provide a comprehensive account that clearly indicates what is done, and why it is done, during all phases of the research process (Henwood & Pidgeon, 1992, p. 106) – also known as confirmability. To ensure confirmability, all steps performed during this study are recorded in this section. Therefore, it is possible for colleagues and peers to replicate the research. Fifth, sampling is an important development in qualitative research. Emerging theory should continuously be extended and modified (Willig, 2013, p. 493). To do so, this study has also explored various theories, debates and cases that do not fit as well as those that were likely to develop new knowledge and insight. This examination can be found in the theoretical framework of this study. Sixth, a qualitative study is valid when the data is readily recognisable to those participants that provided data (Henwood & Pidgeon, 1992, p. 107). This study took the sensitivity of the participants' negotiated realities into account and ensured validity through participant validation. Interpretation and direct quotations from the transcripts were sent to the participants, thereby giving them the opportunity to decide whether the interpreted data was valid. Finally, in order to allow readers to determine whether the study is applicable beyond the specific context within which the data was generated (Willig, 2013, p. 493), this study provides an extensive description of its contextual features.

Research ethics

In this section, it is discussed how this study addressed its potential ethical issues. As a researcher, it is important to heighten one's awareness of ethical issues and develop an ability to conduct research deliberately when confronted with dilemmas. To ensure ethicality, the research needs to be "carried out by thoughtful, informed and reflexive researchers who act honourably because it is the 'right' thing to do, not just because someone is making them do so" (Hay, 2016, p. 30). According to Diener and Crandall (1978), there are four main areas in ethical research principles: 1) whether there is harm to participants, 2) whether there is a lack of informed consent, 3) whether there is an invasion of privacy, and 4) whether deception is involved. These principles might overlap, as they occasionally touch upon the same topics.

In order to ensure no harm is done to the participants, researchers should anticipate and guard against the consequences predicted to impair the research participants. In addition, they should carefully consider whether the research experience might possibly be disturbing (Bryman, 2016, p. 127). The

principle is further supplemented in the ethical codes with the importance of preserving the confidentiality of records. In order to protect the identities of the key respondents in this study, it was asked whether they desired to remain anonymous. All of them discarded their anonymity, providing the possibility to use their names in this study. Prior to the interview, all respondents were informed about recording the interview and it was mentioned that they were free to withdraw from this study at a moment's notice. The collected data was handled with the utmost confidentiality, meaning that only the thesis and internship supervisors had access to it. In addition, the collected data – both recordings and transcripts – has been stored on drives at the Ministry of Defence and the Radboud University, which are well-protected. The lack of informed consent concerns the amount of information provided to the prospective research participants. Bryman (2016, p. 129) indicates that the participants should be given as much information as needed to make an informed decision about whether or not they wish to participate. In addition, it is argued that this principle is linked to the harm of participants, as participants can be wrongly informed, so that harm might overcome them afterwards (Erikson, 1976, p. 369). Although it is difficult to provide prospective participants with all the information necessary to make an informed decision, this study has tried to achieve it by informing participants as much as possible via e-mail and requesting confirmation about the clarity of the research design prior to the interviews.

By many, the transgression of the right to privacy in the name of research is regarded as unacceptable. Therefore, it is important that the study ensures anonymity and confidentiality in relation to the recording of information (Bryman, 2016, p. 133). This study acknowledges the fact that the research participants do not entirely abolish their right to privacy by providing informed consent, thereby respecting any refusal of answering certain questions during the interviews. Furthermore, researchers can deceive participants by representing their work as something other than what it is. The participants' understanding of what the research is about can be limited by deception in various degrees, resulting in a 'more natural' response to any inquiries (Bryman, 2016, p. 133). In line with ethical codes, this study does not pursue methods of inquiry that are likely to violate human values and sensibilities, as doing so would endanger the reputation of the researcher and this study.

1.5 *Thesis outline*

Chapter 2 addresses the construction of the conceptual framework for European military capabilities and policy, the theoretical foundation of this study. It conceptualises both strategic culture and military innovation in the context of European policy as well as military capability development. The analyses and results are discussed in the consecutive chapters. In Chapter 3, the various schools of thought are explored when interpreting the European policy documents – thereby answering the first sub-question. It explains the evolution of European security and defence policy by analysing and interpreting the CSDP and two relevant strategies. In addition, it examines the initiatives based on this policy and the characteristics of this policy. Chapter 4 revolves around the sub-question on the progress in developing military capabilities during the last two decades. It defines European military capabilities and examines the contribution of various initiatives to improving military capability development. Chapter 5 addresses obstacles explaining the discrepancies in the intended and implemented policy. It compares the different groups of strategic cultures within the European Union and examines the internal and external barriers to capability development. In the final chapter, the main research question of this study is answered, referring to the previous chapters and sub-questions.

Chapter 2 CONCEPTS IN DEVELOPING POLICY AND MILITARY CAPABILITIES

> As early as the Franco-British Summit at St Malo in 1998 which launched the idea of an ESDP, explicit reference was made to the need for the EU to have 'the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces' as well as 'strengthened armed forces that can react rapidly to […] new risks, and which are supported by a strong and competitive European defence industry and technology'. (Reynolds, 2007, p. 360)

This quote from Reynolds (2007) shows the importance of the concepts regarding the development of European policy and military capabilities. Without a proper knowledge of these concepts, one cannot fully comprehend the processes of improving the nexus between European military capabilities and policy – resulting in the slow and difficult progress characterising it today (Rynning, 2011). Therefore, this chapter defines and explains the key concepts of this study and discusses their relationship. The first two sections focus on the theoretical lenses through which the policy documents are examined, since it is said that the respective theories form the basis of the formulation of security and defence policy and the development of military capabilities. Next, efforts are made to explain the concepts of security and defence policy and strategies, and military capabilities, respectively. By doing so, this chapter tries to develop a foundation for a better understanding of the key concepts on which the research is based. Subsequently, the relationship between the two key concepts is highlighted, as the nexus between European military capabilities and policy is explored.

2.1 *Strategic culture*

In this section, the key terminologies and semantics regarding strategic culture theory and concepts are defined and explained. It discusses the literature about strategic culture in relation to security and defence policies and strategies. In addition, this section determines one of the theoretical perspectives that is used in this study to analyse and interpret the European security and defence policy and strategies. It takes off by exploring the scientific debate on strategic culture, distinguishing three generations of strategic culture research. Furthermore, it highlights the basic definitions of strategic culture – as used by Biehl, Giegerich and Jonas (2013) – in order to provide a comprehensive outline of the main terminologies. Next, it explains the key principles emerging from the theory and concepts. Throughout this entire study these basic definitions and key principles are used as the guiding principles.

Three generations of strategic culture studies
The strategic culture approach originates in the 1970s as a state-centric approach, intended to capture the identity of nation-states in security and defence matters. Snyder (1977) was the first to pioneer the concept of political culture into the field of security studies. In his study on Soviet and United States (US) nuclear strategies, he defined strategic culture as "the sum of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behaviour that members of a national strategic community have acquired […] with regard to nuclear strategy" (Snyder, 1977, p. 8). In Snyder's view, strategic cultures are the product of each state's unique historical experience. These products are then reaffirmed and sustained as new generations of policymakers are socialised into a particular way of thinking (Nordheim-Martisen, 2011, p. 518). The strategic culture of a state provides the context for understanding the intellectual, institutional and strategic-cultural motivations that affect policy choices and decision-making in times of crisis, and the behavioural bias that motivates or constrains the political elite (Biava, Drent & Herd, 2011, p. 1227; Longhurst, 2000, p. 302). Several years later, the work of Snyder was refined by Gray (1984), who argued that "everything a security community does, if not a manifestation of strategic culture, is at least an example of behaviour effected by culturally shaped, or encultured, people, organisations, procedures, and weapons" (Gray, 1999, p. 52). Gray states that the context for all things strategic is provided by culture and, therefore, strategic behaviour is undeniably a part of strategic culture. Gray is associated with the first generation of strategic culture research. This first generation focuses on conceptualising strategic culture as an environment in which nation-states form their security and defence policy and make decisions regarding national security issues. They argue that strategic culture generates trends that help shape the context for behaviour, though it does not

determine any behaviour or policy choices (Biehl, Giegerich & Jonas, 2013, p. 10; Booth, 2005, p. 25). The foreign policy behaviour of states is instead subject to the influence of distinctive security communities with unique historical experiences (Schmidt & Zyla, 2011, p. 486). The first generation regards strategic culture as "a context that bridges the epistemological divide between both cause and effect" (Schmidt & Zyla, 2011, p. 486) and as a tool to help understand rather than explain the behaviour of states (Haglund, 2011). It is important to understand their interpretation of strategic culture – an environment that is streamlined for conducting security and defence policy whilst emphasising historical experiences – as it shapes the context for strategic behaviour and at the same time is itself an element of that behaviour.

The second generation of strategic culture research is concerned with discovering the real aims and motives of the policy elite as opposed to the official policy documents that are published by security communities (Klein, 1988). Klein (1991) argues that the set of beliefs, assumptions, attitudes, norms, world views and patterns of habitual behaviour held by strategic decision-makers regarding political security and defence issues shapes the strategic culture of a security community or nation-state. The second generation divulges the epistemological claims of the first generation and makes testable hypotheses for the purpose of constructing a falsifiable methodology – based on strategic culture – to predict the future behaviour of states (Johnston, 1995, p. 45). In order to isolate strategic culture as an independent variable, they conceptualised this behaviour as being detached from political culture. The consistency of the independent variable is important, as it determines the coherence of a strategic culture (Schmidt & Zyla, 2011, p. 486). To summarise the view of this generation, one could say their interpretation of strategic culture is solely based on the argument that strategic culture is an independent variable, influenced by a set of patterns detached from any culture.

Finally, the third generation of strategic culture scholarship, like their predecessors, also questions the epistemological assumptions of the earlier generations. They maintain a more positivist view of strategic culture. Similar to the scholarship of the second generation, they conceptualise strategic culture as an independent or intervening variable that determines the foreign and security behaviour of nation-states (Johnston, 1995; Johnston, 1998). Johnston (1999) builds on the idea that the motivations and causes of state behaviour can be explained by certain cultural, ideational and normative influences. In his point of view, strategic culture is a set of grand strategic preferences that does not lose its consistency across all objects of analysis and is persistent throughout time (Johnston, 1998, p. 38). Therefore, strategic culture is a meta-concept, surpassing the definite process of cause and effect (Jepperson & Swidler, 1994, p. 360). The underlying central assumption embedded within this generation is that strategic culture shapes the strategic behaviour and agency of nation-states and security communities.

Basic definitions of strategic culture
The significance of strategic culture becomes apparent through this scientific debate. However, it remains an abstract phenomenon which cannot be defined objectively and unambiguously. The first influential definition came from Snyder (1977), as cited above. For the purpose of clarity, a unitary definition was chosen for strategic culture, one that primarily draws on the first generation of strategic culture scholarship. In this study, strategic culture is conceptualised as a variable that structures the interactions of a specific actor in security and defence, hence understanding, but not dictating, its strategic behaviour. It gives this study a tool for helping to understand the strategic behaviour of nation-states and security communities instead of explaining it.

In order to fully comprehend the theory and concepts of strategic culture, some topics have to be explored first: what is strategic culture, who are the carriers of strategic culture, is strategic culture monolithic, is it changeable? These inquiries, set out by Biehl, Giegerich and Jonas (2013), help to establish the basic definitions of strategic culture. To determine what exactly entails strategic culture, we can fall back on the previously formulated unitary definition. Correspondingly, strategic culture manifests itself as the shared perception within a security community in terms of preferences and actions regarding security and defence policy (Biehl, Giegerich & Jonas, 2013, p. 12). In addition, strategic culture is interpreted as a constitutive element in the field of security and defence that shapes the distribution of burdens among members of a security community, as decision-makers often rely on its

representation when engaging in burden sharing practices (Mérand & Rayroux, 2016, p. 444; Mérand & Reyroux, 2016, p 454). The carriers of strategic culture are often the decision-makers and experts in the respective field of study. However, more recently, there has been a greater public interest in strategic culture and the security challenges in and around Europe – involving the public more often in decision-making and mobilising their opinion behind the CSDP (Biscop, 2016, p. 431; Rynning, 2011, p. 542). It has been argued that in particular circumstances it is necessary to examine the interaction between the policy elite and the public; analysing how these conflicting perspectives can be balanced (Biehl, Giegerich & Jonas, 2013, p. 12). One might therefore also say that strategic culture is not monolithic. It is a constructed phenomenon and thus will always be contested within a community. Some scholars argue that there are multiple competing perspectives and attitudes and that the concept implies the existence of different subcultures in the field of security and defence (Chappell, 2010; Volten, 2009). In order to find out whether strategic culture changes, one must make a distinction between common perspectives on the one hand and strategic culture on the other. Strategic culture is persistent, rather than static. It might change significantly due to external and internal pressures: changing threat perceptions, institutional socialisation and cultural dissonance (Meyer, 2005, pp. 532-533). In addition, these pressures can be considered windows of opportunity for the policy elite to instigate the development of European policy and strategy.

Key principles of strategic culture
This section aims to examine the key principles needed for developing the framework for analysis of security and defence policy and strategies. In line with the basic definitions established above and drawing on the various literature on strategic culture (Biava, Drent & Herd, 2011; Biehl, Giegerich & Jonas, 2013), five key principles have been identified that reflect important elements of security and defence policy and strategies.

First, the *level of ambition* assesses the positioning on a continuum between active international leadership and passive indifference. The level of ambition is evaluated by the positioning of a state or organisation on the global political stage; in other words, to what extent an actor plays an active pioneering role in international relations, global security and defence, and military operations (Biehl, Giegerich & Jonas, 2013, p. 14). Some of the important determinants of the level of ambition are brought to light in the security and defence policy documents of the state or organisation. They define the role they seek to play on the world stage. For example, some actors can claim a certain responsibility for international order, peace and stability (EEAS, 2016). It does not only encompass the number of military forces being sent to conflict zones and other zones of interest, it also concerns the substantial role they (want to) play and which distinct areas of geographic responsibility a state or organisation defines for itself (Biehl, Giegerich & Jonas, 2013, p. 14). A nuance needs to be taken into consideration, as there may be a discrepancy between the discourse – the way social actors understand the environment in which they act – and practice – the way in which they engage each other in various types of action – of a state or organisation (Rasmussen, 2005, p. 71).

Second, *executive flexibility* examines the scope of action for the executive in decision-making. It evaluates the degree of flexibility, the political and constitutional leeway executive and legislative actors have regarding decision-making on security and defence policy and issues. It does not only concern whether military forces are deployed and where they are deployed, but also what degree of freedom and flexibility the national policy elite has in its decision-making (Howorth, 2012, pp. 448-449). In addition, it examines both the parliamentary and legal regulatory means that can be disseminated and influence the choices in the deployment of military forces. Contrariwise, it also examines the means to circumvent parliamentary and legal control and informal mechanisms that operate instead of (or alongside) formal legal instruments (Biehl, Giegerich & Jonas, 2013, pp. 14-15). Subsequently, it explores who the key actors are in security and defence decision-making.

Third, the *willingness to use military force* examines whether policies and strategies show a reluctance to use military force or are rather unconstrained in their use of military force, as an instrument of security and defence policy. This principle examines the vision of a state or organisation regarding the use of military forces; it tries to understand whether there is a reluctance to deploy armed forces or whether the actor sees its military as a crucial instrument in strategic issues (Biehl, Giegerich & Jonas,

2013, p. 16). It sheds light on the preferences of states and organisations in terms of security and defence policy – do they promote military instruments or diplomatic and economic instruments? What is interesting about this willingness is the dilemma encountered by most actors. On the one hand they want to fulfil their international obligations, on the other there are restrictions and caveats in their national security and defence policy. It has been argued that this severely impacts the choices a state has regarding the deployment of their military forces (Barbé, Costa & Kissack, 2016). In addition, various issues such as risk aversion and the nature of missions also play a part in these choices. Therefore, the public opinion is often framed by states and organisations using terms as 'combat missions' and 'build-up missions'.

Fourth, the *recognition of and response to new threats* assesses whether states or organisations identify new threats to their security and safety, and the subsequent adaptation of their institutional capacities and capabilities in response to these threats (Biava, Drent & Herd, 2011). It represents the shift from a Cold War period rational focused on the prevention of known threats to "a new governmental logic which emphasises the complexity and uncertainty and thus the impossibility of predicting threats" (Juncos, 2017, p. 4). By adapting to these various risks, states and organisations can develop a response to both internal and external security issues and learn to live with rather than discard uncertainty (Evans & Reid, 2014). Therefore, a state or organisation seeks consensus regarding threat identification and management.

Fifth, the *shared norms and institutionalisation of these norms* is assessed through the presence of shared norms regarding the use of all tools – both soft and hard power – to tackle security challenge and the processes by which these norms are institutionalised. The identity-derived shared norms are comprised by strategic culture and provide a narrative on what is appropriate and legitimate concerning the use of military and civilian instruments for the respective state's or organisation's security and defence ambition (Biava, Drent & Herd, 2011, p. 8). In order to understand this principle, we should ask how and why states and organisations use a range of relevant instruments to achieve their strategic political objectives.

2.2 *Military innovation*

In this section, the key terminologies and semantics regarding military innovation studies and concepts are defined and explained. It discusses the existing knowledge about military innovation in relation to security and defence policies and strategies. The section begins with exploring the scientific debate on military innovation, identifying the various narratives in the field of military innovation studies. Furthermore, it highlights the basic definitions of military innovation, providing an inclusive framework of the main terminologies used in this section. Next, it explores the key principles derived from the theory and concepts. Throughout the rest of this study, these basic definitions and key principles are used as the guiding principles.

Drivers for military innovation
Many scholars acknowledge that the scientific debate on military innovation started in the early 1980s (Grissom, 2006; Sinterniklaas, 2018). Changes in the behaviour of militaries have been placed in historical narrative before; this time, however, it highlighted the various perspectives on internal and external drivers for military innovation. Stulberg and Salomone (2007, p. 17) refer to these as the 'outside-in' and 'inside-out' approaches. Posen (1984) started the scholarly discourse on military innovation with his work on the sources of military doctrines. He explains how military doctrine takes shape by comparing the explanatory power of two important competing studies in the field of international security: organisation theory and the balance of power theory. The first explains how organisations can achieve efficiency and effectiveness, the latter examines how states and organisations react to threats. However, both theories were inadequate in explaining why military organisations innovate since it is not in their nature to do so (Posen, 1984). It is argued that intervention of civilian leadership was required in order to innovate. Posen states that "civilians somehow found ways to overcome the limits of their own military knowledge and get around the bureaucratic shenanigans of their military organisations" (Posen, 1984, p. 223), implying that civilian innovators indeed have an

effect on military innovation. For that reason, Grissom (2006, pp. 908-909) regards Posen as the founder of the civil-military model of innovation. Other scholars also support Posen's analysis of the influence of civil-military dynamics on innovation (Avant, 1993).

However, not everybody agrees with Posen on this matter. In reaction, a second school of thought arose, based on the study of Sapolsky (1972). This approach – dubbed the inter-service model by Grissom – indicates that military innovation is the product of competition between armed services. The division of scarce resources forced these services to renew or change their capabilities as the type of mission changed, causing them to compete by innovating those capabilities that best fit their new missions (Grissom, 2006 p. 910). Furthermore, this school distinguishes itself by primarily dealing with the acquisition of new military hardware, implying that is closely tied to technological innovation.

A more evident and acclaimed reaction to Posen's theory came from Rosen (1988). In his studies, Grissom identifies Rosen as the founder of the intra-service model. Rosen and Posen both agree that military innovation is a form of bureaucratic innovation, as military organisations often resemble bureaucracies (Rosen, 1988, p. 138). However, when we focus on the factors that actually cause innovation, Rosen disagrees with Posen. According to Rosen, it is not civilian intervention that explains military innovation, but rather innovation is triggered by the way in which leaderships imagine what will contribute to victory in a coming war (Rosen, 1991, p. 20). In addition, he determines that "rather than money, talented military personnel, time, and information have been the key resources for innovation" (Rosen, 1991, p. 252). Therefore, one could argue that the well-connected and often talented leadership which is the group responsible for innovation within a military organisation instead of the civilian innovators Posen refers to.

Some scholars highlight a fourth school of thought in this field: the cultural model of military innovation (Grissom, 2006; Sinterniklaas, 2018). In the late 1990s, Farrell (1998) underlined the explanatory power of culture in exploring the causal factors of military change and innovation. In his study, he concludes:

> Culture, as both professional norms and national traditions, shapes preference formation by telling military organisational members who they are and what is possible, and thereby suggesting what they should do. In this way, culture explains why military organisations choose the structures and strategies they do, and thus how states generate military power. (Farrell, 1998, p. 146)

Following his own argument, Farrell and Terriff expanded on this statement by arguing that Posen's approach to military innovation was too restrictive and concentrated too much on external influences (Farrell & Terriff, 2002, pp. 140-141). They argue that military change can only be explained by focusing on the processes within military organisations, thereby defining military change as "the change in the goals, actual strategies, and/or structure of a military organisation" (Farrell & Terriff, 2002, p. 5). In addition, they state that military change is influenced by the irrational and intermittent behaviour of humans and that military innovation is one of the outcomes of a process leading to important military change (Farrell & Terriff, 2002a, pp. 266-267). In conclusion, they explain that elements such as the legitimacy of the organisation and the identity of its members are on par with increased military effectiveness when it comes to being an influential reason for military change.

Basic definitions of military innovation
In order to form a unitary definition of military innovation, Grissom explores four schools of thought. Since this study follows in his footsteps, it also uses the definition for innovation proposed by Grissom: "approximately, 'a change in operational praxis that produces a significant increase in military effectiveness' as measured by battlefield results" (Grissom, 2006, p. 907). He argues that most scholars focused too extensively on top-down innovation, suggesting that the field of military innovation should be strengthened with bottom-up initiatives (Grissom, 2006, p. 920). Top-down and bottom-up initiatives are both important to military innovation, as it is about the development of new ways and means of doing business in the field of military development. It affects the higher echelons of the militaries, as well as the operational commanders and their subordinates (Grissom, 2006, p. 930).

The drivers for military innovation can be identified in Grissom's four schools of thought; this does, however, not yet reflect what military innovation exactly entails. Some scholars state that military innovation is a multifaceted phenomenon, comprised of the change in how military forces prepare for, fight and triumph in particular wars (Ross, 2010, p. 1). A wide spectrum can be covered between the two concepts encompassed by military innovation: modernisation and transformation. Innovating military hardware and software can either be slow or rapid, simultaneous or sequential, modest of profound (Ross, 2010, p. 2). This is supplemented by other academics arguing that a major innovation is a change that demands military forces to substitute their concepts of operation and its relations to other forces, and to discontinue or downgrade conventional missions (Rosen, 1988, p. 134). Such innovations involve modernisation and transformation, as they induce new ways of war and new ideas of how the elements of the military organisation relate to each other and to new threats.

Key principles of military innovation

This section aims to examine the key principles needed in developing the framework for the analysis of the security and defence policy and strategies. In line with the basic definitions established above and drawing on the literature on military innovation and its drivers (Farrell & Terriff, 2002; Posen, 1984), two key principles are identified that reflect important elements of security and defence policy and strategies. These key principles are derived from the four school of thought as elaborated upon by Grissom. Since the European Union does not have the ability to field its own armed forces, only two of the four principles that came out of the theory were chosen in developing the framework, as two of them relate to a state or organisation in having the ability to deploy its own forces.

First, the principle of *civil-military relations* assesses the presence of relationships between empowered external agents and creative insiders that define the character and degree of innovation. It examines whether there is a role for civilian innovators in initiating and managing military innovation (Sinterniklaas, 2018, p. 10). It tries to highlight the cooperation between civilian and military industries, explaining their role in civil-military dynamics. Civilian intervention is required to force a military organisation to change, as the organisation will tend to resist this change because of its stake in current military practices, equipment, and structures (Terriff & Osinga, 2010, p. 197).

Subsequently, the *military cultural influences on innovation* are evaluated by the presence of military cultural aspects influencing certain ways of innovation. Military cultural aspects are particularly proficient at addressing some evident caveats in our understanding of military innovation (Griffin, 2017, p. 200). The military and political elites use the internal culture as an instrument to influence particular behaviour (Farrell & Terriff, 2002, p. 8). The leadership with political power can reshape this culture and thus drive innovation (Griffin, 2017, p. 200). In addition, a changing security environment also tends to shape the culture of states and organisations, causing them to innovate as they perceive that they face new challenges (Terriff & Osinga, 2010, p. 195). Therefore, one should examine the various cultural influences and changes in order to determine whether they affect innovation.

2.3 *Security and defence policy and strategies*

To understand the influences of strategic culture and military innovation on security and defence policy and strategies, these policies and strategies must first be understood. Numerous states and organisation have adopted them, yet each one of them defines them from a different perspective. In Africa, for example, in 2004 the African Union adopted the Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP), argued to be the most important multinational system on peace and security (Touray, 2005, pp. 635-636). The CADSP is "a common understanding among African states about their defence and security challenges and a set of measures they seek to take collectively to respond to those challenges" (Touray, 2005, p. 642). It uses three underlying notions that also often form the guiding principles of other security and defence policy globally: defence, security and common threats. The European Union also values these notions and expands on them in its Common Security and Defence Policy by stating that the CSDP aims to establish a common European defence capability including a dynamic framing of a common European defence policy (Eur-Lex, 2015, p. 1). Although this policy establishes certain

laws and rules for individual member states, it does not predispose the different identities of the security and defence policies of these member states.

In order to develop a coherent policy, scholars and policy makers have often sought to understand, explain, and predict the various structures of conflict within the international system. In Western society, this generally took place from a Cold War era perspective – "the lens of the bipolar superpower conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union" (Snyder, 2011, p. 1). During this time, it was commonly assumed that a state's strategic behaviour was dictated by its security and defence policy (Kolodziej, 1993, p. 16). The focus of security and defence policies was affected by the Cold War. It changed the way how policymakers tried to fit the security and defence policy into a larger foreign policy, as they emphasised a more technically and theoretically underlined policy touching upon the relations between the East and the West, their nuclear weapons and strategies, and the security threats that Western Europe and the United States had to face (Snyder, 2011, p. 8). This perspective obviously began to disappear from the scholarly debates. The changes in the theoretical development on policy alongside the changes within the international system made it possible to adopt a more extensive collective policy framework, as they contributed to a global shift that embraced a more liberalist perspective (Touray, 2005).

Nowadays, policies, and its makers, face various challenges with complex uncertainties (Black, Hall, Cox, Kepe & Silfversten, 2017, p. 156). The Brexit and the issues in the belt of instability are two examples of these uncertain situations. In addition, they have to address the various perspectives and interests of the participating actors and stakeholders (Black et al., 2017, p. 157). In response to modern-day challenges and a broad spectrum of perspectives, it has been argued that capability-based planning (CBP) should become the standard for security and defence policy (De Spiegeleire, 2011, p. 20). CBP encompasses a comprehensive range of capabilities beyond just military materiel and personnel, giving existing policies a chance to evolve into one that explores a wider range of factors contributing to security and defence (De Spiegeleire, 2011, pp. 23-24). Most policies and strategies focus on the downstream part of security and defence planning only: the current threats and the response to them. However, some scholars state that more can be accomplished if policy makers start thinking about how to tackle the prime causes of this problem: arduous defence planning (Advisory Council on International Affairs, 2017; De Spiegeleire, 2011, p. 26). In addition, states and organisations need to invest in "horizon-scanning and futures studies" (Black et al., 2017, p. 157). These organisations would also need "to construct strategies that would be effective across the greatest range of different plausible futures" (Black et al., 2017, p. 157). This so-called robust decision-making (RDM) has already been applied in various policies in the field of resource planning, technology development, energy and resilience.

2.4 *Military capabilities*

The definition of military capabilities has encompassed various interpretations during the past twenty years. Until about two decades ago, the term military capabilities was mostly used with regard to materiel and personnel. In this study, the term military capabilities will be expanded on by including important elements such as doctrine, organisation, training, leadership and facilities. De Spiegeleire (2011) uses a structure to examine the jump from material and personnel to a broader capability requirement. He argues that the first two elements – service-based materiel and personnel and joint materiel and personnel – in this structure only express themselves in national military organisations. As an increasing number of states and organisations have come to accept that military capabilities surpass mere military means, they started to include the majority of governmental instruments available to them (De Spiegeleire, 2011, p. 21). Subsequently, the next step was towards an approach combining the capabilities of defence, diplomacy and development (3D). It was argued that as a consequence of increased cooperation between the departments in these fields, they were mostly dealing with aforementioned subsequent parts of their operations – current threats and the responses to them (Constantinou & Opondo, 2016, p. 309-310; De Spiegeleire, 2011, p. 21). When states and organisations progress through a 3D approach, they will conclude that they need to mobilise the capabilities of all their government departments in order to achieve the desired security and defence (Fiott, 2018; De Spiegeleire, 2011, p. 21). In the final phase of his structure, De Spiegeleire (2011) explains that states

and organisations nowadays follow a rather undeveloped trend of not just thinking about their own capabilities, but also about the capabilities of those in the security environment around them. It has become apparent that the term military capabilities is no longer affiliated with just military hardware, but instead has evolved into a more extensive approach of capabilities as 'the ability to'.

This is partially reflected in the definition given by Saxena (2009, p. 5), who specifies military capabilities as "the enduring ability to generate a desired operational outcome or effect, and is relative to the threat, physical environment and the contribution of coalitions partners". This relation to coalition partners is also emphasised by capabilities aggregation models, as they state how states form alliances in order to improve their security and defence by combining military capabilities (Duffield, Michota & Miller, 2008, p. 296). These alliances are often formed in response to the ever-changing global security environment. The changing character of this environment, alongside the rising costs of military development, should entice states and organisations to vigorously develop new capabilities that capitalise on their strengths (Sweijs, Bekkers & De Spiegeleire, 2018, p. 5). These advantages should be put to good use by not only experimenting with new concepts and strategies, but also by developing and adopting new military capabilities that correspond with the strategic and societal culture of the respective states and organisations (Sweijs, Bekkers & De Spiegeleire, 2018, p. 6). All in all, it can be stated that the definition of military capability is influenced by particular time- and geographically bound phenomena.

2.5 *The nexus between policy and military capabilities*

The nexus between policy and military capabilities explains the relationship between both concepts – how they affect themselves and each other. The relationship between developing policy and capabilities can best be explained through the research of De Spiegeleire (2011). He begins with explaining that the majority of actors starts to explore alternatives for aligning their capability development to their policies on security and defence (De Spiegeleire, 2011, p. 26). The recurrent attempts made by states and organisations to manage their capability development is often described by the term strategic defence management (SDM) (De Spiegeleire, Van Hooft, Culpepper & Willems, 2009, pp. 4-6). Some organisations are encouraging greater military cooperation and management, therefore coordinating and supporting different perspectives on security and defence policy (Keohane, 2018, p. 4). The political elite continues the process by defining specific policy parameters for their development ambition. Through particular policy options, defence planners are provided with the important guidance to develop a capability summary (De Spiegeleire, 2011, p. 26). The security environment, the ambition level to which the state or organisation should aspire, and the resources that can be made available for achieving this ambition influence the decisions made by specific actors within a state or organisation (Keohane, 2018, p. 5) and the guidance given to the defence planners (De Spiegeleire, 2011, p. 26). They dictate how the planners translate this policy guidance into meaningful hypotheses in the field of security and defence. These hypotheses then guide the concrete choices of defence organisations which may include the type of missions, compatibility requirements, the spectrum of violence, and the long-term limits within budgets (De Spiegeleire et al., 2009, p. 4). Subsequently, substantial capabilities can be acquired through this guidance, assembling an organised military force. This force is then utilised to put the choices made by the political elite into practice within the set budgetary limits (De Spiegeleire, 2011, p. 26). However, before this can take place, hurdles – both political and institutional – should be cleared in order to negate any political division within a state or organisation (Sangiovanni, 2003, p. 198). Afterwards, the effectiveness and efficiency of the new defence posture must be assessed by the respective state or organisation. In doing so, they develop performance indicators which can be monitored, resulting in reports for the political elite to reflect on (De Spiegeleire, 2011, p. 26) – potentially reconsidering particular choices to improve effectiveness and efficiency. In summary, it can be concluded that strategic defence management has been in high demand due to the ever-changing security environment and corresponding security and defence policy.

Chapter 3 INTERPRETING EUROPEAN AMBITION: SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT

> EU military capability development has suffered from a lack of understanding of the complexity of the defence planning and strategy development required by a new entity such as the ESDP/CSDP. But it has also suffered from Member States' reluctance to live up to their commitments. If Europe is to play a role in international peace and security, it needs to develop the appropriate capabilities. (Major & Mölling, 2010, p. 27)

In order to better understand the complexity of defence planning and strategy development that Major and Mölling (2010) are referring to, this chapter draws attention to the theory and concepts of strategic culture and military innovation and applies them to the EU's security and defence policies and strategies in order to answer the main question and a sub-question of this study. Therefore, the first section focuses on examining the development of European security and defence policy and strategies. Based on the backgrounds and developments deriving from this section, the main characteristics of the policy documents can be identified and analysed on the basis of the key principles that emerged from the strategic culture and military innovation studies. Subsequently, the Union's military ambition is explored; the various intentions that have been projected in the policy documents and how they have evolved on the basis of policies in the last two decades. Finally, the question that has to be answered is: *How did the evolution in European security and defence policy contribute to developing military capabilities?*

3.1 *Examining the evolution of European policy and strategies on security and defence*

Back in 1948, the UK, France, The Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg signed the Treaty of Brussels, shaping the idea of a common security and defence policy for Europe. This agreement laid the foundation for the Western European Union (WEU), an organisation that emphasised the mutual defence obligations of each state. Subsequently, the WEU developed into a defensive alliance of ten member states, which primary purpose was to offer mutual military assistance in case of external aggression. This provided the framework for the creation of a European defence policy, some decades later (European External Action Service, 2016a, p. 2). One of the first steps in that direction was the endorsement of the so-called Petersberg Tasks. These tasks later became a fundamental element of the European Security and Defence Policy – now Common Security and Defence Policy – and determine "the spectrum of military actions/functions that the EU can undertake in its crisis management operations" (European External Action Service, 2016a, p. 4). It determined the three purposes for which the WEU could deploy military forces. These were humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping tasks, and operations regarding crisis management. It was not until June 2011 that the WEU – its functions then already integrated into the European Union and mostly used for consultation and discussion – was closed down. The Petersberg Tasks were also incorporated into the organisation through the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam. It summarised numerous new structures for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and defined the spectrum of military tasks the EU could engage in (European External Action Service, 2016a, p. 4). To resolve the pressure put on the member states by the conflicts in the Balkans and to strengthen the CFSP, the Treaty of Amsterdam also created the post of High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy. This post was created to contribute to policy decision-making and to conduct the political dialogue with foreign actors (European Union, 2012, p. 32). All of the events above precede the official establishment of the ESDP and laid the foundation for the developments taking place in St Malo in 1999.

Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)
In June 1999, the European Council launched the ESDP after the French and British governments paved a political path for its development by signing the St Malo Declaration six months before. It stated that in order to respond to any international crisis, the EU required the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by a solid military force that can react rapidly to emerging risks, and the means to decide whether to use that force (Grevi, Helly & Keohane, 2009, p. 13; Virtual Centre for Knowledge on Europe, 2015, p. 2). The ESDP was an example of the Union's evolution in the security and political

domain in response to the new security context. It was used by the Union to try and fulfil its role on the international stage (EEAS, 2016, p. 6). During the early months of 2003, the Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) agreed to improve the military cooperation between the two. Through the Berlin Plus agreement they decided that the EU was authorised to use NATO capabilities for its own crisis management operations. The framework created by the Berlin Plus agreement also facilitated the first two CSDP operations – Operation Concordia (Macedonia) and EUFOR Althea (Bosnia and Herzegovina). These were bolstered by targets set in the Helsinki Headline Goal (HHG) to improve the ability of the member states to field and sustain their forces (Tardy, 2018, p. 121). With the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the policy was renamed to CSDP. The CSDP had the capacity to improve upon itself – both politically and institutionally – even though it did not change considerably during the first few years following its adoption (European Parliament, 2018, p. 3).

Recognising the need to further develop Europe's military capabilities, the European Council set a number of additional targets (Major & Mölling, 2010, pp. 11-17) and tasked the European Commission with assessing the impact of the changing global theatre on the EU (European Parliament, 2018, p. 3). The outcome of an earlier assessment – the European Security Strategy – was firmly commented upon whilst the European community was in expectation of the strategic review of the sort, which it did not get (Mälksoo, 2016, p. 375). High Representative and Vice-President of the EC Mogherini presented the new strategy – the European Union Global Strategy – to the European Council in June 2016. The preliminary work for the EUGS was launched directly after the European Council tasked its development and it turned it out be an extensive process (Missiroli, 2015).[4] Prior to the presentation of the EUGS, various scholars and experts argued that the EUGS would only illustrate the implications for security and defence along general lines, highlighting the general need of a stronger CSDP and enhanced military cooperation (Bakker et al., 2016).

The CSDP is an intergovernmental policy: it sets a framework for the political institution and military structures of the EU, as well as for civilian and military operations within and outside of Europe. Recently, the CSDP has undergone major strategic and operational changes in order to fulfil the need for increased security and the EU response (European Parliament, 2018, p. 1). As instability in the regions bordering Europe cause spill-over effects, the Union faces complex threats stemming from state and non-state actors alike (Bakker et al., 2016, p. 2). The CSDP responds to the growing number of issues that emanate from the failed and fragile states in the Global South. The regional instability in the Middle East and Africa causes mass migration flows to the EU and an increase in terrorist acts across Europe – showing that external and internal security are closely linked (Rowlands, 2016, p. 277). The EU also includes potential threats from the east in its security and defence policies, as it faces a non-cooperative Russia, seen as a hybrid threat to European security, often not willing to adhere to the rules of international law (Bakker et al., 2016, p. 2). Other risks considered by the CSDP are the new technological developments in cybernetics and space, especially since these innovations are continuously subject to change.

The CSDP aims to meet the EU member states' needs to be able to conduct a range of military operations on an institutional level. Through the use of various operational parameters, it tries to create the possibility to develop policy-compliant missions and operations (Barrie et al., 2018, pp. 4-7). These missions and operations illustrate the level of military ambition the EU is trying to achieve. As long as the scenarios are plausible, they offer a valuable backdrop to determine the force requirements that meet the level of ambition (Biscop, 2018). Based on this information, it is then possible to evaluate the existing and future military capabilities of the EU in light of these requirements and process the results in the CSDP (Barrie et al., 2018, p. 4).

Although the CSDP tries to keep up with the ever-changing security environment, some scholars argue that the policy is outdated in the sense that its current level of ambition is still based on goals set in the previous era (Bakker et al., 2016). They question the use of the CSDP as "an instrument in the wider set of EU tools to deal with the challenges coming from both directions" (Bakker et al., 2016, p. 3). As the EU develops its security and defence policy, and with its military capabilities, one

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[4] In his book, Missiroli contextualises important documents that have successively systematised the EU's extern action objectives.

could argue that it should be built on the cumulative set of political ambitions and goals of all of its member states, while taking the threats from the east and south in consideration.

European Security Strategy (ESS)
Since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, EU member states were divided in their positions on strategic decision-making and it had become apparent that the EU was in need of a common strategic vision so as to improve the internal and external cohesion of the Union (EEAS, 2016, p. 8). In response, HR Solana drafted a strategy, *A Secure Europe in a Better World*; according to some scholars this marked the Union's advance as a strategic actor on the world stage (Mälksoo, 2016, p. 378). Though brief, it assessed and defined the EU's security environment for the first time. It gave a comprehensive overview of the key security challenges and their political significance for the EU (EEAS, 2016, p. 8). The strategy starts by bringing up the prosperous and peaceful period, commemorating the peace project Europe was envisioned to be. It states that "large-scale aggression against any member state is improbable. Instead, Europe faces new threats which are more diverse, less visible and less predictable" (European Council, 2003, p. 3). It identifies five threats, characteristic of the beginning of the 21st century: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflict, state failure and organised crime. This assessment developed into a security-development nexus, linking the various economic and societal issues and providing the EU with the ability to use its soft power capabilities (Mälksoo, 2016, p. 378). In addition, the strategy addresses the importance of the geographical position of the Union and the security along its borders; the EU wants to create a surrounding ring of countries characterised by good governance, open to close political ties and economic cooperation (European Council, 2003, p. 8). Subsequently, the ESS explains the political significance of the new security environment. It argues that in order for the EU to become a global player, it has "to contribute to an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and more united world" (European Council, 2008, p. 14), thus profiling itself as an actor aiming for a more prominent role in active international leadership. Although this aspiration to become a key actor on the world stage is emphasised throughout the ESS, several scholars argue that the strategy fails to outline any coherent policy objectives, means and instruments for achieving this ambition (Rayroux, 2014; Toje, 2008). After these critical appraisals, the EU started making efforts to move towards an improved security and defence policy, which resulted in the establishment of its next strategy.

European Union Global Strategy (EUGS)
Following the development of the ESS, foreign and security policy-building became a more serious effort. Previously, the EU had focused on developing military capabilities so that it could implement specific arrangements with regard to security and defence. There were still various pending issues on which no consensus could be reached, such as the Union's scope of ambition, the role of hard power instruments in its policy, and the relationship between the EU and NATO (Biscop, 2005, p. 13). Initially, the United Kingdom and Germany blocked the efforts of numerous member states that called for the development of a new strategy (Müller, 2016, p. 368). Nevertheless, in 2008 these member states got what they wanted, when it was decided that an assessment of the ESS' operational parameters was necessary. The subsequent report explained the EU's increase in strategic decision-making, and its presence and effectiveness on a global scale (European Union, 2008, p. 2). Although most resources were drained away by the Eurozone crisis, various member states were convinced that a new strategy was needed, given the changes in global relations and in the EU's security environment (Smith, 2017, p. 508); the EU had to face the wider global threats and challenges: financial unrest, increased cybercrime, climate change, and various humanitarian crises. Tocci (2017, p. 16) argues that as a result of spending time in reaction to the long list of threats and challenges, the leaders of the Union increasingly felt the urgency to counter them with a practicable approach backed by a proactive policy.

This sense of urgency was answered by HR/VP Mogherini, who initiated the formulation of a global strategy. She repeatedly stated that the process of developing a global strategy in itself was as important as, if not more important than, the outcome (Mogherini, 2016). In the process, the European External Action Service consulted numerous actors and stakeholders – member states, think thanks, civil society organisations – in order to give the strategy a stronger, recurring sense of identity than its

predecessor (Smith, 2017, p. 509). Mogherini wanted to create a strategy which changed its focus from security to global, defining the latter in thematic terms rather than geographical (Tocci, 2016, p. 464). As a consequence, the EUGS resulted in a larger document than the ESS. In addition, it deviated from the approach set by the ESS, as it also reacted to the assertive practices of Russia – the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its involvement in the Ukrainian civil war (Mälksoo, 2016, p. 381). Subsequently, it focused on the resilience of European security and the protection of its borders.

A substantial difference between the ESS and the EUGS is said to be the ubiquity of this resilience as a guiding principle. One of the reasons that the strategy exceedingly mentions resilience is because of its reference to a broad range of antecedent practices (Wagner & Anholt, 2016, p. 415). Resilience embodies a new school of thought within the development of policy, in that it provides opportunities to reflect on hybrid solutions, to build further on an existing foundation, and to preserve a well-functioning structure (De Weijer, 2013, p. 14). This would give the EU the opportunity to navigate a more complex world affected by globalisation and conflict. The Union aims to invest in and develop not only its own societal and security resilience, but also that of states stretching into Central Asia and Central Africa. Wagner and Anholt (2016, p. 415) argue that promoting resilience is the ideal middle ground for the EU – "between over-ambitious liberal peace-building and the under-ambitious objective of stability". Its focus on internal resilience is emboldened by "the recent erosion of European values within parts of the Union itself, reminding of the interdependence between the EU's external credibility, influence, and the Union's own consistency in living up to its self-proclaimed democratic values" (Mälksoo, 2016, p. 380).

However, resilience is not the only focus of the Union's new global strategy, since it also emphasises internal and external security. Furthermore, it provides an integrated approach to conflicts and crises and wants to facilitate the creation of cooperative regional orders. The EUGS gave Mogherini and her team the instruments to get engaged in the most challenging issues of 2015: Russia, defence, and migration (Tocci, 2016, p. 468). The opinions on how to respond to Russia's assertiveness were divided, however, as Eastern Europe was more pragmatic in its relationship with Russia. Nevertheless, by guaranteeing a balanced approach to both sides of this discussion, the European Union managed to maintain its internal cohesion (Tocci, 2016, p. 468). The defence process itself, on the other hand, went effortless as the member states had gained insight into the importance of European security and defence. In addition, the existing security community and its corresponding institutions acted as a catalyst for this process (Tocci, 2016, p. 468). Also, the issue of migration was brought to light. This sparked yet another divide between the member states, as some of them were sceptical about making references to the international dimensions of migration. Some scholars argue that Mogherini made the right choice by including the internal-external nexus of migration, whereas dealing only with the external dimension would have given the impression that the EU's approach to migration is exclusively focused on the exclusion of migrants (Tocci, 2016, p. 469). Furthermore, the EUGS sets itself apart from the previous strategy by highlighting the Union's soft power capabilities. It is argued that the EU wants to contribute to positive change on a global scale by addressing the causal factors of conflict and poverty, whilst advocating the ubiquity of human rights (Mälksoo, 2016, p. 381). By doing so, the EU pictures itself as an organisation willing to allocate its resources to aid not only its own society, but also the societies of other states and organisations.

Although the threat of illegal mass migration to Europe is mentioned under the heading of 'crises at the borders of the EU', some scholars state that the issue is increasingly seen as a security threat of its own that deserves a separate analysis (Drent, 2017, p. 3). Nonetheless, Mälksoo (2016, p. 382) argues that the Union's ability to develop a comprehensive understanding of the contemporary security environment and its acknowledgment of threat have considerably increased over time, unveiling an interesting progress: in an attempt to comprehend the world and positioning the EU in it, the development of both strategies contributed to an internal reorganisation of the Union itself.

3.2 *Characteristics of European security and defence policy and strategies*

This section examines the characteristics of the CSDP and both strategies on the basis of the key principles as addressed in Chapter 2. It explains how these key principles are reflected in the policy documents and simultaneously tries to summarise them in a comprehensible analysis. This results in an overview of their limitations, subsequently organised in a table by their strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats.

Level of ambition

The examination of the ambition level in the European policy documents positions the organisation somewhere on the continuum between active international leadership and passive indifference. The CSDP shows a high level of ambition, envisaging the Union's role as an active international actor. However, it occasionally limits its ambitions to the European theatre, contrary to an ambition on a more global scale. The CSDP emphasises the implementation of three major pillars to boost the security of the EU and its citizens: "new political goals and ambitions for Europeans to take more responsibility for their own security and defence; new financial tools to help Member States and the European defence industry to develop defence capabilities and a set of concrete actions as follow-up to the EU-NATO Joint Declaration which identified areas of cooperation" (EEAS, 2016a, p. 2). However, it cannot be assumed that the Union has no interest in participating in political and military activities on the world stage. This is addressed by the Union's efforts to maintain public support for its global activities; "In modern democracies, where media and public opinion are crucial to shaping policy, popular commitment is essential in sustaining our commitments abroad. We deploy police, judicial experts and soldiers in unstable zones around the world" (European Parliament, 2018, p. 2). The ambition of the CSDP is also visible in its pursuit for a secure Europe by means of international multilateral cooperation: "International co-operation is a necessity. We need to pursue our objectives both through multilateral co-operation in international organisations and through partnerships with key actors" (EEAS, 2016b, p. 6). Nevertheless, the CSDP foresees that the Union should have the military capability to respond to international crises autonomously, encouraging a shift of the policy focus back to the internal issues regarding capability development.

The European Security Strategy's level of ambition is moderately higher when examining the role the EU wants to play on an international level. The EU aspired to become a more credible and effective actor which would strengthen the entire international community, as it explores the possibility that "an active and capable European Union would make an impact on a global scale. In doing so, it would contribute to an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and more united world" (European Council, 2003, p. 14). In addition, it also wants to support international organisations, such as the United Nations (UN), and increase their capabilities: "Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European priority. We want international organisations, regimes and treaties to be effective in confronting threats to international peace and security, and must therefore be ready to act when their rules are broken" (European Council, 2003, p. 9). It can be concluded that the ESS is a document in which the Union expresses its wish to become a major global stakeholder.

The European Global Strategy takes it even a step further by showing that it truly is a *global* strategy. It addresses the Union's vision on an internal and external security strategy: "our security at home entails a parallel interest in peace in our neighbouring and surrounding regions" (EEAS, 2016, p. 14). Furthermore, it highlights numerous tasks in the field of peace and security: "a broader interest in preventing conflict, promoting human security, addressing the root causes of instability and working towards a safer world" (EEAS, 2016, p. 14). However, the EUGS does not only focus on the subject of peace and security. The strategy also states that the EU is guided by clear principles that stem from both "a realistic assessment of the strategic environment and an idealistic aspiration to advance a better world" (EEAS, 2016, p. 16). Their endeavour to demonstrate active international leadership is most evidently depicted by the following quote:

We will therefore act promptly to prevent violent conflict, be able and ready to respond responsibly yet decisively to crises, facilitate locally owned agreements, and commit long-term. We will take responsibility foremost in Europe and its surrounding regions, while pursuing targeted engagement further afield. We will act globally to address the root of conflict and poverty, and to champion the indivisibility and universality of human rights. (EEAS, 2016, p. 18)

This clearly illustrates the effort that the Union wants to put into practice worldwide, as it not only focuses on security and defence, but also on prosperity, political freedom and human rights.

Executive flexibility

By analysing the scope of action for the executive in decision-making in the Union's policy documents, the executive flexibility can be measured. The level of flexibility within the CSDP is adequate, since much of the capacity in the EU decision-making process lies with the Commission and Council – setting guidelines with its policy for the member states when developing their own security and defence strategies. Most decisions relating to the CSDP are taken by the European Council and the European Commission, as is stated by the European Union (2012, p 39): "Decisions relating to the common security and defence policy, including those initiating a mission as referred to in this Article, shall be adopted by the Council acting unanimously on a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy or an initiative from a Member State". This likewise illustrates that the Council's decision is a product of the unanimity among the member states. The member states are also represented in the Parliament. This grants them a limited scope of action if a decision is made, since the Parliament also has some influence: "Parliament has the right to scrutinise the CSDP and to take the initiative of addressing the HR/VP and the Council on it" (European Parliament, 2017, p. 1). In certain areas in the CSDP "decisions are not made by unanimity but instead by qualified majority voting" (EEAS, 2016a, p. 10). This happens, among other things, when setting up projects of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). In addition, some EU institutions can influence CSDP decision-making through recommendations or an advisory role, such as the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the EU Military Committee.

Little is to be found in the ESS about the scope of action in decision-making. Therefore, the strategy scores low on the continuum of executive flexibility. The strategy lists numerous instruments to be used in decision-making, pursuing a more active role in its strategic objectives. Nonetheless, it does not elaborate on this, other than referring to "the full spectrum of instruments available for crisis management and conflict prevention at our disposal, including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and development activities" (European Council, 2003, p. 11).

The EU Global Strategy aims slightly higher than the ESS with reference to the scope of action for decision-making executives, but still shows a rather low level of executive flexibility. Although not often indicated, the strategy highlights that the member states are supported in their decision-making by EU-NATO cooperation: "At the same time, EU-NATO relations shall not prejudice the security and defence policy of those Members which are not in NATO" (EEAS, 2016, p. 20) – as well as by initiatives like PESCO and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD): "Member states will remain sovereign in their defence decisions […] The voluntary approach to defence cooperation must translate into real commitment" (EEAS, 2016, pp. 45-46). Accordingly, they are guaranteed to maintain a degree of flexibility for their national policy elite in decision-making and the freedom to individually develop security and defence policies – safeguarding the sovereignty of each member state, yet ensuring that they contribute to various European initiatives.

Willingness to use military force

The EU's military willingness is reflected by its tendency to use military force, as it would either show that the EU is prepared to use military force to achieve its (political) goals or a reluctance to deploy armed forces. The CSDP shows a (very) high level of willingness to use military force, considering it states that the Union sees it as a crucial instrument in its strategic issues. The policy states that the Union has military capabilities that can be deployed for operations outside its territory:

> The tasks referred to in Article 42(1), in course of which the Union may use civilian and military means, shall include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-keeping and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories. (European Union, 2012, p. 39)

This shows that the EU is willing to use military force in various situations. In addition, member states are urged to develop capabilities for autonomous military action, confirming that they indeed are willing to use military force: "Member states reaffirmed the Union's willingness to develop capabilities for autonomous action, backed by a credible military force" (EEAS, 2016a, p. 1). The Union has already launched over twenty CSDP missions and operations, testifying that it wants to provide military forces to various peace-keeping and military missions, such as those of the UN: "Over the years, the European Union has provided operational, financial and political support to peacekeeping efforts of the UN. The launch of about twenty CSDP operations, military and civil, on several continents, bears testimony to such continued support" (EEAS, 2016b, p. 6). Subsequently, the Union also resorts to use military force when one of its member states were to come under attack: "If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power" (EEAS, 2016b, p. 6). Although the latter indicates the use of military force, it does not represent offensive military practices. It purely focuses on the defence and guaranteeing the security of member states.

The ESS is ambiguous in illustrating its willingness to use military force. It does not show a direct focus on operational military practices, nor does it frequently state that the Union should have the necessary capabilities. It does, however, explain one of the Union's military activities abroad: "The European Union and Member States have intervened to help deal with regional conflicts and to put failed states back on their feet, including in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and in the DRC" (European Council, 2003, p. 1). It claims that sometimes military force is necessary in order to solve certain challenges: "Dealing with terrorism may require a mixture of intelligence, police, judicial, military and other means. In failed states, military instruments may be needed to restore order […] Regional conflicts need political solutions but military assets" (European Council, 2003, p. 7). The strategy occasionally shows a slight reluctance to use military force, however, as it implies that conflicts might be solved by other means: "In contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold War, none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means" (European Council, 2003, p. 7).

Similar to the CSDP, the Union's Global Strategy focuses its attention on the defence of its member states and their territories. However, the strategy has the same level of willingness to use military force as its predecessor. It often addresses defensive measures as one of the primary reasons for the use of military force: "Europeans must be able to protect Europe, respond to external crises, and assist in developing our partners' security and defence capacities" (EEAS, 2016, p. 19). The Union wants to create the ability to act autonomously if and when necessary: "An appropriate level of ambition and strategic autonomy is important for Europe's ability to foster peace and safeguard security within and beyond its borders" (EEAS, 2016, p. 19). Although the strategy implies a focus on hard power operations, the EU prefers soft power solutions, as it deems that military force is not always necessary to solve particular issues: "There are many ways to build inclusive, prosperous and secure societies. We will therefore pursue tailor-made policies to support inclusive and accountable governance, critical for the fight against terrorism, corruption and organised crime" (EEAS, 2016, pp. 25-26). This suggests that the Union will primarily focus on soft power resources when given the possibility.

Recognition of and response to threats
Whether the Union identifies new challenges in its security environment and properly responds to these new threats on an institutional level, can be illustrated by exploring its recognition of and response to threats. The focus on new threats was initially not incorporated into the CSDP. Nevertheless, the current policy shows an overall recognition of new threats and responses, mainly because the CSDP itself was developed to address the new issues the Union was facing: "The inclusion of what would eventually

become the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) under the CFSP was designed to enable the Union to adopt a coherent approach when addressing security challenges" (EEAS, 2016a, p. 5). Furthermore, the CSDP would allow the Union to respond to threats on a more substantial scale. With this new ambition, new threats came forward and the member states recognised the need to respond to them: "EU Member States agreed in Cologne on the necessity to put in place institutional arrangements for the analysis, planning and conduct of military operations" (EEAS, 2016a, p. 6). In addition, the CSDP has had to respond to the growing demand for the Union to become a more capable and strategic global actor due to the threats emerging from an ever-changing security environment: "A comprehensive approach is a key asset to tackle the complex, multi-actor and multidimensional crises and growing security threats of today and tomorrow" (EEAS, 2016c, p. 1). This statement is strengthened even more by the following quote:

> The Treaty's implementation will facilitate and maximize effectiveness of the use of the variety of policies at the EU's disposal in a more coherent manner, in order to address the whole cycle, from preparedness and preventative action; through crisis response and management, including stabilisation, peace-making and peace-keeping; to peace-building, recovery, reconstruction and a return to longer-term development. (EEAS, 2016c, p. 1)

It depicts the Union's subsequent adaptation of its institutional capacities and capabilities in response to the new challenges it faces when becoming an influential actor on the global playing field.

The ESS shows the same level of recognition and response as the CSDP. It dedicates an entire chapter to the Union's security environment, explaining the various global challenges and key threats. In response to these key threats, it emphasises that the EU has solved similar threats before: "The European Union and its Member States have intervened to help deal with regional conflict and to put failed states back on their feet […] Restoring good government to the Balkans, fostering democracy and enabling authorities there to tackle organised crime is one of the most effective ways of dealing with organised crime in the EU" (European Council, 2003, p. 6). Therefore, it can be argued that it has identified particular solutions which can be used as a foundation in response to new threats it might face. The strategy acknowledges that the increasing number of members and partners of the Union contributes to new threats, but also offers a means of adaptation to these threats: "The integration of acceding states increases our security but also brings the EU closer to troubled areas. Our task is to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations" (European Council, 2003, p. 8). Although the Union addresses numerous threats in the ESS, the strategy lacks the institutionalisation of the responses to them.

The Global Strategy, on the other hand, recognises the various threats to the Union in multiple areas – from issues in energy security and communications to threats stemming from Russia, East Asia and the belt of instability – and names numerous responses to counter them, both practical and institutional. Its substantial quantity of recognition and response is illustrated by the comprehensive approach taken on these issues: "All of these conflicts feature multiple dimensions – from security to gender, from governance to economy. Implementing a multi-dimensional approach through the use of all available policies and instrument aimed at conflict prevention, management and resolution is essential" (EEAS, 2016, p. 28). The strategy also emphasises the importance of cooperative regional order policies. These will be the institutional backbone in solving certain security issues on a smaller, more local scale: "We will continue to support peace and security efforts […] on conflict prevention, counter-terrorism and organised crime, migration and border management. We will do so through diplomacy, CSDP and development, as well as trust funds to back up regional strategies" (EEAS, 2016, p. 36). In addition, it also shows that the Union is willing to cooperate on solving threats abroad, taking foreign institutions into account.

Shared norms and institutionalisation of norms
This part examines the presence of shared norms on the use of soft and hard power and the institutionalisation of these norms in European policy documents. These norms are certainly present in

the CSDP, which justify the use of civilian and military means to contribute to tackle security issues. This is illustrated by the norms the CSDP sets out for the use of these capabilities: "It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security" (European Union, 2012, p. 38). Besides that, the CSDP highlights the various initiatives founded on these norms, showing that the Union translated their guiding principles into practices. With the Treaty of Lisbon, it also took significant steps in institutionalising these norms: "The Lisbon Treaty came into force December 2009 and was a cornerstone in the development of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The treaty includes both a mutual assistance and a solidarity clause" (EEAS, 2016a, p. 1). This represents the Union's perspective on shared norms in its cooperative efforts on security and defence worldwide.

The shared norms of the Union are well represented in the ESS, although the strategy does not specifically focus on their institutionalisation. It states that the Union aims to solve its challenges through mutual efforts: "European countries are committed to dealing peacefully with disputes and to co-operating through common institutions" (European Council, 2003, p. 1). The norms it values in conducting operations are highlighted in the strategy as well: "The best protection to our security is a world of well-governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means to strengthen the international order" (European Council, 2003, p. 10). In addition, the ESS underlines the importance of combining capacities and European institutions in an attempt to improve communication and understanding: "Stronger diplomatic capability: we need a system that combines the resources of Member States with those of EU institutions" (European Council, 2003, p. 12). Another example of combining capabilities featured by the strategy is that of EU-NATO cooperation: "The EU-NATO permanent arrangements, in particular Berlin Plus, enhance the operational capability of the EU and provide the framework for the strategic partnership between the two organisations in crisis management. This reflects our common determination to tackle the challenges of the new century" (European Council, 2003, p. 12). The strategy shows a certain range of opportunities the Union set out to utilise in order to achieve its goals.

The EUGS strengthens the presence of shared norms and their institutionalisation. There is a strong presence of guiding principles which underline their actions through the various policy documents. The Global Strategy emphasises the full institutionalisation of soft and hard power practices guided by the Union's norms:

> Our diplomatic action must be fully grounded in the Lisbon Treaty. EU foreign policy is not a solo performance: it is an orchestra which plays from the same score. Our diversity is a tremendous asset provided we stand united and work in a coordinated way. Cooperation between Member States can strengthen our engagement in the world. (EEAS, 2016, pp. 46-47)

Moreover, the strategy summarises the further standards that explain the EU's use of civilian and military instruments: "At the same time, our fundamental values are embedded in our interests. Peace and security, prosperity, democracy and a rules based global order are the vital interests underpinning our external action" (EEAS, 2016, p. 13). The strategy also implies the use of various principles which influence these external actions of the EU: "The EU will engage the world manifesting responsibility towards others and sensitivity to contingency. Principled pragmatism will guide our external actions in the years ahead" (EEAS, 2016, p. 16). It highlights four principles, which are unity, engagement, responsibility, and partnership. The Union also applies these norms to its multi-dimensional approach, which has been addressed earlier. It underlines certain norms and institutionalises them in the approach: "All of these conflicts feature multiple dimensions – from security to gender, from governance to the economy. Implementing a multi-dimensional approach through the use of all available policies and instruments aimed at conflict prevention, management and resolution is essential" (EEAS, 2016, p. 28). The Global Strategy is a testament to the Union's ambition of capitalising its capabilities for improving the world.

Civil-military relations
The presence of civil-military relations in European policies is determined by the empowerment of external actors and the role of creative insiders that define the character and degree of innovation. The CSDP puts an average focus on civil-military relations when it comes to capability development, although it emphasises the importance of cooperation between their civilian and military Headline Goals, illustrated by the following quote:

> EU Member States then set an additional goal, the Civilian Headline Goal 2010 (CHG 2010), to continue the capability-development process and to synchronise it with the Military Headline Goal 2010. The CHG 2010 goal drew on the now extensive experience in civilian crisis management of the EU, and placed greater emphasis on civil-military cooperation in addition to a continued focus on improving readiness and deployability. It also identified other capabilities to be developed, such as making available 285 additional experts on transitional justice, dialogue, and conflict analysis. (EEAS, 2016a, p. 11)

It depicts the Union's willingness to explore civil-military relations in the field of capability development. Although the CSDP does not immediately pay much attention to civil-military cooperation, it does have a strong focus on the European Defence Agency (EDA). EDA, in its turn, cooperates with civilian organisations in order to advance military capability development. By these means, the organisation indirectly strengthens the role of civil-military cooperation in capability development, as it is the main instrument for intergovernmental capability planning: "The European Defence Agency's initial missions are to develop capabilities; promote defence research and technology (R&T); foster armaments co-operation; and to create a competitive European Defence Equipment Market as well as to strengthen the European Defence, Technological and Industrial Base" (EEAS, 2016b, p. 3). In other words, EDA has a significant impact in civil-military dynamics.

The Security Strategy scores lowest on the presence of civil-military relations. It only mentions the interdependency in civil-military cooperation once: "These developments have also increased the scope for non-state groups to play part in international affairs. And they have increased European dependence – and so vulnerability – on an interconnected infrastructure in transport, energy, information and other fields" (European Council, 2003, p. 2). This does not even depict the presence of civil-military relations, as it just describes the relationship between the Union and non-state actors.

Contrariwise, the EUGS scores good on civil-military relations. It illustrates the Union's aim to improve the cooperation between the public and private sector: "The EU's response will also be embedded in strong public-private partnerships" (EEAS, 2016, p. 22). The EUGS emphasises solid civil-military cooperation, as previously planned by the European Council: "While a sectoral strategy, to be agreed by the Council, should further specify the civil-military level of ambition, tasks, requirements and capability priorities stemming from this strategy, some such areas can already be highlighted in line with commitments made by the European Council" (EEAS, 2016, p. 45). Just like the CSDP, the Global Strategy also underlines the importance of EDA and by doing so indirectly strengthens civil-military relations: "Union funds to support defence research and technologies and multinational cooperation, and full use of the European Defence Agency's potentials are essential prerequisites for European security and defence efforts underpinned by a strong European defence industry" (EEAS, 2016, p. 21). However, it does not delve deep into the specific military side of the cooperation and provides only a limited explanation of how the Union wants to improve this relationship: "We will deepen our partnership with civil society and the private sector as key actors in a networked world. We will do so through dialogue and support, but also through more innovative forms of engagement" (EEAS, 2016, p. 18).

Military cultural influences on innovation
The military cultural influences in European policy are examined by the presence of aspects regarding military culture that influence particular ways of military innovation. The amount of military cultural influences in the CSDP is low, but there are multiple statements from which it can be deduced that they contribute to military innovation through certain cultural perspectives: "Member States reaffirmed the Union's willingness to develop capabilities for autonomous action" (EEAS, 2016a, p. 1). The cultural

shift in transatlantic military cooperation signifies that the European Union must focus on developing its own means of defence. The Union's ambition for autonomous capability is reaffirmed by another quote: "EU heads of state and government agreed that the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO" (EEAS, 2016a, p. 5). In addition, one could argue that being able to carry out Petersberg Tasks with regard to the EU's sense of responsibility has also encouraged military innovation: "The Military Headline Goals (HLGs) are designed to ensure that the EU possesses the military capabilities required to conduct the full range of missions encompassed by the Petersberg Tasks" (EEAS, 2016a, p. 11). Subsequently, new frontiers and ideas also bring forth innovation, as it influences the Union's development of military capabilities: "This concerns in particular the Union's research, industrial and space policies, for which Parliament was empowered to seek to develop a much stronger role regarding the CSDP than it had in the past" (European Parliament, 2017, p. 1). If this study was to look at the multiple interpretations of military cultural influences on military innovation in the CSDP, then certainly several could be mentioned in retrospect.

In the European Security Strategy, the cultural influences on military innovation are almost non-existent. The only influences present in the strategy are those from the transatlantic perspective; one could argue that NATO indirectly influences military innovation through shared aims and goals: "The United States had played a critical role in European integration and European security, in particular through NATO" (European Council, 2003, p. 1). The strategy implies that the transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable. Subsequently, it can be argued that the United States and, by extension, NATO can significantly influence the capability development practices of the Union's member states.

The military cultural influences on innovation in the EUGS are more apparent, yet still limited to defence cooperation. The Global Strategy states that developing military capabilities requires a deeper cooperation between member states. This is part of a more extensive cooperation culture: "Deeper defence cooperation engenders interoperability, effectiveness, efficiency and trust: it increases the output of defence spending. Developing and maintaining defence capabilities requires both investments and optimising the use of national resources through deeper cooperation" (EEAS, 2016, p. 20). Therefore, the need for improved cooperation leads to innovation on both sides. Alongside the influences that could emerge from cooperation, the EUGS also highlights that information-sharing might support a shared military culture: "Cooperation and information-sharing between Member States, institutions, the private sector and civil society can foster a common cyber security culture, and raise preparedness for possible cyber disruptions and attacks" (EEAS, 2016, p. 22). Military innovation is also influenced through information-sharing and the cultures that emerge from this. In this strategy likewise, cooperation between the EU and NATO exerts an influence on military innovation: "The EU will deepen its partnership with NATO through coordinated defence capability development, parallel and synchronised exercises, and mutually reinforcing actions to build the capacities of our partners, counter hybrid and cyber threats, and promote maritime security" (EEAS, 2016, p. 37). As the NATO keeps putting pressure on EU capability development, it is argued that NATO is seen as an influence on military culture in its own.

Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats
In order to assess how the evolution in European security and defence policy contributed to the conditions for improvement, results gained from the policy analysis are ordered in a table which highlights the 'score' of each key principle for the respective policy documents. On the basis of this table, a SWOT analysis is made, so as to explain the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats for European policy regarding security and defence in general. The strengths and weaknesses highlight the characteristics of European policy regarding the conditions for improvement and are therefore explicitly bound to the internal elements of both the CSDP and the two strategies (Dyson, 2004, p. 632). The opportunities and threats refer to the developments influencing European policy and only relate to the external elements in influencing the conditions for improvement (Dyson, 2004, p. 632). The analysis eventually leads to a matrix, in which the internal and external elements are plotted against each other.

The matrix can be used as a tool to identify the positive and negative conditions for improving European policy (Dyson, 2004), based on only the most important issues.

Table 2. Analysis visualisation based on key principles of strategic culture (SC) and military innovation (MI)

		European policy and strategies		
		CSDP	**ESS**	**EUGS**
Key principles	**Level of ambition (SC)**	+	++	++
	Executive flexibility (SC)	+/–	– –	– –
	Willingness to use military force (SC)	+	+/–	+/–
	Recognition of and response to new threats (SC)	+	+	++
	Shared norms and institutionalisation of these norms (SC)	+	+	++
	Civil-military relations (MI)	+/–	–	++
	Military cultural influences on innovation (MI)	+/–	– –	+/–

Table 2 clearly illustrates the 'score' of all seven key principles when plotted against the European policy and strategies. This table, combined with the outcomes of the analysis, can be translated into strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats.

Table 3. SWOT-matrix of the conditions for improvement on basis of European policy documents

	Positive	Negative
	Strengths	**Weaknesses**
Internal	▪ Overall good level of ambition: active European and global leadership (SC) ▪ EUGS scores high on most principles, except executive flexibility (SC) ▪ Strong focus on civil-military cooperation in EUGS (MI)	▪ Lack of executive flexibility in both strategies, especially on lower levels of governance (member states, etc.) (SC) ▪ Average willingness to use military force, mostly in defensive situations (SC) ▪ Limited attention for military innovation in both CSDP and ESS (MI)
	Opportunities	**Threats**
External	▪ Promoting shared norms and institutionalising them (SC) ▪ More and improved civil-military cooperation (MI) ▪ Better understanding of military capability development process (MI)	▪ Low level of executive flexibility can lead to the disintegration of cooperation (SC) ▪ Lack of focus on military innovation and influences on military culture can lead to less military change (MI)

These parameters emerge from the apprehension of the results in Table 2. The interpretations as depicted in the table have also been used to shape the interview protocol, so that they could be validated or falsified by means of expert interviews. An overview of the four parameters and the corresponding interpretations can be found in Table 3. From these interpretations it can be deduced whether the policy documents comply with the principles that are extracted from the theories that form the basis of policy development and military capabilities. The negative parameters that can be taken from the model are the issues that must be addressed by the EU and its member states in order to formulate an adequate policy for developing military capabilities. On the other hand, the positive parameters must be embraced and, where possible, also taken into account and expanded upon. The SWOT analysis provides a clear overview of the misses in European policy with which a further explanation can derived for the slow progress in developing European military capabilities.

The European Union Global Strategy has learned a lot from the flaws in the Common Security and Defence Policy and European Security Strategy. As a result, the strategy has also been able to advance in the field of military capability development, therewith creating more favourable conditions for improvement. This is evidently illustrated in the strategy's sections on external action and shared norms for utilising the Union's civilian and military instruments. By pursuing an active role in international leadership in its policy and strategies, the member states are also incentivised to scrutinise and broaden their capability development. Reason for this is that they must have the ability to deploy well-equipped military forces in multiple conflict zones simultaneously. In addition, there are some opportunities for developing the conditions for improvement. Although the EUGS puts a strong emphasis on civil-military cooperation, the overall level of civil-military cooperation in EU policy and strategies is far from perfect. Embracing an improved degree of civilian intervention in the development of military capabilities would force military organisations within the Union to implement certain changes. Furthermore, the institutionalisation of shared norms regarding the use of soft and hard power tools would provide European policy with a more comprehensive understanding of the capability development process, as it would expose the similarities between the various stakeholders. These similarities could outline the foundation for a more sustainable cooperation in capability development.

However, there are still some areas for improvement. The average extent to which the policy documents pay attention to the willingness to use military force can possibly become an impediment. Considering that the Union would not require any capabilities due to their low willingness to deploy military forces, member states and other stakeholders could interpret this absence as a reluctance to develop military capabilities – contributing to an overall decrease in the efforts towards capability development. In addition, EU policy and strategies exhibit a low level of executive flexibility. By depriving pioneering member states of the possibility to innovate and explore new possibilities and partnerships, a decline in the will to develop military capabilities can arise which will impede the development of conditions for improvement. Subsequently, both the CSDP and ESS have limited attention for military innovation, which in turn can lead to the same decline as discussed above. The lack of focus on the cultural aspects that influence military innovation can also be an obstacle to developing the conditions for improvement. Since they address essential caveats in the Union's understanding of military innovation, it is possible that the military and political elite are unaware of the current processes and therefore may counteract innovation, thus impeding the development of military capabilities.

3.3 *The Union's ambitious policy: Joint objectives and the required capabilities*

The Union's security and defence policy is characterised by a political level of ambition, in order to defend the vital interests of all its member states. This ambition followed shortly after the preparation of the Petersberg Tasks and the signing of the St Malo Declaration. A direct consequence of this was the Helsinki Headline Goal, in which the member states were presented with a target regarding the strengthening of European military forces – being able to support a rapidly deployable force of at least 50,000 troops (EEAS, 2016, pp. 11-12). The EU's priority is to develop the military capabilities of member states for the various CSDP missions. However, it soon discovered that there were too many shortfalls to realise this initiative.

In the more recent EU Global Strategy, the Union adopted a renewed ambition. The strategy has led to some adjustments but not to an extensive reassessment of its military-planning culture. Its member states still aspire to be able to conduct a range of military operations under the heading of the CSDP. Therefore, they need a military force capable of managing the following scenarios: peace enforcement, conflict prevention, stabilisation and support to capacity building, rescue and evacuation, and support to humanitarian assistance up to a range of 4,000 to 15,000 kilometres from the European capital (Barrie et al., 2018, p. 7). The member states have indicated that they want to have the capacity to perform multiple CSDP missions simultaneously. This consistency of military operations requires a large amount of sustainable capabilities with the possibility to overstretch European armed forces. They also want to replace the aging equipment, which is gradually becoming a problem. Instead, the EU wants to develop and deploy more technologically advanced capabilities (EEAS, 2016, p. 42). They want to use the new capabilities for military purposes, in addition to countering their economic and societal problems, such as refugee flows and regional instability in the surrounding regions.

3.4 *In conclusion*

This chapter explored the evolution of European security and defence policy. In addition, it analysed the CSDP and both strategies, so that it could be used to provide an interpretation of the conditions for improvement achieved by the EU. Subsequently, it promptly explained the ambition of the Union, according to its strategy, for its military capabilities. The question that was posed at the start of this chapter was: *How did the evolution in European security and defence policy contribute to developing military capabilities?* This question can now be answered concisely based upon the analysis of the policy documents.

The evolution in European security and defence policy has made a positive contribution to the conditions for improvement of the nexus between European policy and military capabilities. Since its establishment, the Common Security and Defence Policy has experienced a substantial and significant transformation. The ever-changing security environment was one of the primary causes of this process, as it provided the Union with the justification to reshape its entire security strategy. By emphasizing the ambition for international leadership in policy, the EU also wants to take on a more active (military) role in the global theatre. To achieve this, the EU and its member states have begun to develop more capabilities. These capabilities are not only used for military purposes, but they can also be used by the EU to support their soft power measures. The Union also wants to be able to respond to the worrying situations in the nearby regions around its territory. This in turn also requires more capabilities, since the member states must now be able to carry out internationally oriented operations as well as defending Europe's sovereign territory. According to the policy documents, some of the capabilities that will be developed must be used to combat societal problems, such as the migration flows arising from the belt of instability in the Middle East and Northern Africa. This fulfils the Union's idea of resilience as guiding principles of their efforts, wanting the increase the resilience of both its member states, the surrounding regions and on a global scale. Subsequently, the EU's policy highlights the urgency of keeping up with global technological advancements. This decision will also act as a catalyst for the development of military capabilities, as member states must comply with these measures in order not to fall behind. By including various objectives in the security and defence policy, the EU has tried to ensure that the member states would contribute to the development of military capabilities. One of these objectives is to work with NATO at both a strategic and operational level. This cooperation provided the EU and its member states with access to NATO's capabilities and ensured a better and more streamlined development of (joint) capabilities.

The policy documents have also been improved from a perspective based on the theory, which in turn has had an effect on the development of capabilities. By improving on principles like the shared norms and civil-military cooperation, and striving for a more active role in international leadership, the EU created more favourable conditions for the development of military capabilities. This in turn led to the common ambition of creating a more autonomous European force.

Chapter 4   TWO DECADES OF DEVELOPING MILITARY CAPABILITIES

> Hence the Member States are now aware of the usefulness of investing more and acting in a more coordinated manner to rise to these challenges, or otherwise witness Europe slowly relinquish its territory. The European Commission has given shape to the nine political priorities set out by President Jean-Claude Juncker to strengthen the European Union in the international arena notably by developing its military capabilities. (Giuliani, Danjean, Grossetête & Tardy, 2018, p. 18)

This quote by Giuliani et al. (2018) illustrates the emphasis the European Commission places on the development of military capabilities. In addition, it establishes a connection with the results from the previous chapter, which state that the new security environment contributes to stimulating the conditions for improvement. This chapter examines discrepancies between the intended and implemented policy measures on development of the European Union's military capabilities over the last two decades. It focuses on three different periods in the past decades, exploring the progress made in developing military capabilities at those moments and the progress nowadays by examining discrepancies in policy initiatives. At the end, the question dealt with in this chapter is: *What progress has been achieved in developing military capabilities on the basis of policy during the last two decades?*

Over the past two decades, EU member states have been involved in the development of military capabilities for a variety of reasons. It is argued that some countries have worked on rebuilding their conventional defence capabilities in the light of increasingly assertive neighbouring countries and the consecutive threats from the belt of instability, exhibiting a strong preference for NATO cooperation (Giegerich, 2016, p. 2). Others, however, indicated that they would develop their capabilities to perform multi-faceted crisis management operations and to train and equip their troops, as it would fit the EU's mentality better. Multinational defence and operating side by side during crisis management are nothing new for the Union. For a long time, Europe has been confronted with various challenges which affected the development of their military capabilities (Giegerich, 2016, p. 2). Under pressure from the United States, the member states' history of long and deep defence cuts is only just coming to an end, as they are trying to reach the standard imposed on them by NATO. Nonetheless, it is argued that various member states are withdrawing from their commitment to develop military capabilities, potentially jeopardising future military practices (Giegerich, 2016, p. 2). In response, the Union initiated multiple projects in order to strengthen the capability development process. However, Zandee (2017) argues that with European financing comes the question of decision-making and responsibility – who decides to spend how much and on what? With the involvement of multiple actors, capability development becomes a difficult process as it needs take into account the requirements of military organisations, which then must be connected to the industrial capacity of the Union (Zandee, 2017, p. 1). The complexity of stakeholders is reflected by the numerous interests that are involved, being either political, economic, industrial or military. The organisations responsible for the defence planning and armaments procurement vary between member states, causing even more implications (Zandee, 2017, p. 3). Key actors employed by those organisations define the capability requirements without being fully informed, which often results in duplications or incompatibility.

The Union's strategies have been given a concrete policy translation by setting up various initiatives with the objective of developing military capabilities in support of the intended policy. Although a commonly agreed definition for capabilities is not given in the CSDP, the term was diversely used in the document for designating the resources that can be used to achieve certain goals defined by the Council (European Union, 2012, p. 38). Sequentially, these resources are referred to as physical assets, which the Union describes as either military hardware or trained personnel. However, it is argued that it is necessary to consider them as a dynamic concept that encompasses not only the physical military assets, but also a lasting ability to shape the outcome of CSDP operations and to adapt to the corresponding issues by improving its assets (Duke, 2017, p. 154; Saxena, 2009, p. 5). As the EU's most powerful military ally is looking to reduce its engagement in European security, the Union is forced to develop its security and defence policy in order to present itself as a more credible security actor (Munich Security Conference, 2017, p. 3). However, this policy will remain unimplemented

without the proper capabilities and political will to use them. It is argued that the development of European military capabilities is inadequate, as words on improving capabilities are often not translated into concrete results (Bakker et al., 2016, p. 4). The Union's policy and new strategy have paved the way for practical initiatives to reinforce European military cooperation. In support, some scholars argue that the current ways of capability development need to be subjected to change now that the previous way of conducting development has been unsuccessful (Faleg, 2012, p. 178). The lack of deployable capabilities and criticism from the academic world triggered the European Council to commence with the development of numerous capability initiatives. The Council of the European Union frequently entailed further development of military capabilities to sustain and enhance the CSDP (Council of the European Union, 2012). The three priority themes that the European Council envisioned for these initiatives were to increase the effectiveness and impact of the CSDP, improve the development of capabilities, and sustain the European defence industry (Duke, 2017, p. 163). In order to adhere to these themes and realise any change, experts say that the Union has to move towards a more committed and politically steered way of improving military capabilities (Bakker et al., 2016, p. 4). Hence, the past and recent direction towards developing and institutionalising European military capability initiatives.

In this chapter, the various military capability initiatives founded by the Union on the basis of its policy will briefly be highlighted, arranged by date of establishment. This study only addresses the initiatives involved in development military capabilities, as the civilian capabilities are not included in this study's objective. Only the most important contributions are summarised in this study to keep this section comprehensible and brief. This also encompasses the initiatives and contributions that have failed to achieve their goal, as their attempt, and corresponding failure, could have triggered subsequent developments.

4.1 *Initiating a common security and defence policy*

The St. Malo Declaration launched the European defence practices into a new age. In this study, the period occurred between 1999, the establishment of the ESDP, and 2003, when the European Council adopted the European Security Strategy. Before the declaration, several European states already created a permanent organisation to manage the cooperative development and procurement of armaments: Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en matière d'Armement (OCCAR). The organisation officially became operational in 2001 and was tasked to address not only the needs of the European states, but also the principle of openness within the process of capability development that was necessary to allow other countries to participate in the structure (Mawdsley, 2003, p. 99). With the creation of the ESDP, the Union envisaged an ability to operate autonomously by developing its own capabilities. The idea was to create a European group within NATO on the basis of the ESDP that could perform a number of tasks. Washington agreed, but emphasised that European and transatlantic security should not be disconnected (Van Willingen, personal communication, 8 May, 2019). When the Kosovo War started Europe had more than two million soldiers ready and able. However, it lacked the ability to deploy a proper force based on this pool of resources (Major & Mölling, 2012, p. 12). It is argued that the EU's experiences in Kosovo rapidly moved the process of capability development forward, as European heads of state were disappointed and frustrated over the scale of effort exhibited by European forces compared to that of the United States (Cornish & Edwards, 2001, p. 588).

After the Union's reprehensible display in Kosovo, its leaders came to an agreement on improving the European military structure and capability development practices. In the Helsinki Headline Goal, they committed to developing capabilities that, by 2003, could support a force of 60,000 troops. This force would be able to deploy within a two months' notice and sustain itself in a theatre for one year. In addition, the force would be capable of carrying out the full spectrum of responsibilities, better known as the Petersberg Tasks. Furthermore, at the dawn of the new millennium the European Council established new political and military bodies within its own structure. The Political and Security Committee and the European Union Military Committee were to decide on capability development in terms of the Union's new approach to European defence planning (Major & Mölling, 2010, p. 13). This development was in line with Rosen's understanding of military innovation, bestowing the responsibility for military innovation upon influential political leaders and organisations (Rosen, 1991,

p. 252). In December 2001, the Union presented the initial results of the development process, which were met by severe capability shortfalls. The EU's economic project had taken precedence, thereby reducing the importance of military capability development. That need changed in light of certain events, 9/11 in particular, subsequently pressuring the EU to release its first security strategy (Bekkers, personal communication, 7 May, 2019). In order to address these shortfalls, the EU also launched the European Capability Action Plan. However, the approach of this plan relied on bottom-up initiatives from member states, which expected them to make voluntary commitments (Duke, 2017, p. 162). Some scholars argue that the previous plans mainly failed due to the member states' lack of commitment and the fact that none of them could be held responsible for it (Major & Mölling, 2010, p. 13). In addition, this failure can be explained through Grissom's perspective on the importance of strengthening military innovation with bottom-up initiatives. Since they were important drivers behind identifying new ways and means of doing business in the field of capability development, the member states' deprivation of these initiatives caused a substantial setback in the development process (Grissom, 2006, p. 930). The only capabilities that were successfully expanded, were those in the area of command and control (C2), as the EU secured a headquarters for its military and civilian operations.

Helsinki Headline Goal
The introduction of the Helsinki Headline Goal provided the Union with a structure that gave it the opportunity to increase its capability to conduct the Petersberg Tasks: humanitarian and rescue missions, peace-keeping, and tasks of military forces in crisis management (Giegerich & Wallace, 2004, p. 174; Robinson, 2002). One of the targets of the HHG was to equip member states with the ability to field 50,000 to 60,000 troops within 60 days, along with the appropriate air and maritime hardware, which were capable of conducting crisis management operations up to one year (EEAS, 2016, pp. 11-12; Lindstrom, 2005, p. 1). It is stated that this was definitely not a regular armed force, but rather the possibility to make an inventory of existing forces so that they could find a better approach to cooperation, identifying and solving gaps, and developing interoperability (Clarke & Cornish, 2002, p. 784). Political and strategic guidance would be provided by newly established political and military bodies, directing military operations while adhering to the institutional framework (European Parliament, 1999). Therewith, the Goal ensured the establishment of the European Union Military Staff in 2001, which by then housed around 140 employees. The Staff offers its military expertise to the European Union Military Committee and creates a connection between the Committee and military capabilities by providing early warnings, situation assessments, and strategic planning (Robinson, 2002). Some scholars argue that this was all done under the pressure of the United States, as opposed to pure European commitment (Giegerich & Wallace, 2004, p. 165).

In addition, the Helsinki Force Catalogue (FC) was created in 2000. The FC was comprised of the military equipment and personnel that was dedicated in support of the HHG, which by then included 100,000 existing combat troops, 400 combat aircraft, and 100 naval vessels. This was expanded a year later with more military forces and around 5,000 policemen and women (Lindstrom, 2005, p. 2; Robinson, 2002). Although this catalogue was a contributing ambition, there are, however, no further concrete actions based on the catalogue, especially because there were no consequences (Wilms, personal communication, 5 June, 2019). After a capabilities conference in Brussels, the member states identified that only five out of the 55 major shortfalls were resolved (Lindstrom, 2005, p. 3). In May 2003, the EU's operational capability was reviewed by the Council, which confirmed the progress made in accordance with the Petersberg Tasks. However, it indicated several shortfalls in regards to deployment time and dealing with high risks. A full overview of the EU force components made available for crisis management operation can be found in *The Military Balance 2002/2003* of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (2002). In order to test the Union's ability to apply its security policy instruments as conceptualised in the HHG, three operations were launched: European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia – the Union's first civilian crisis management operation, *Operation Concordia* in Macedonia – the Union's first military operation, and *Operation Artemis* in the Democratic Republic of Congo – the Union's first long-range operation to prevent a widespread humanitarian and civil crisis (Missiroli, 2003, pp. 496-500).

4.2 *The European Security Strategy*

The following period is characterised by developments that occurred after the formulation of the ESS in 2003 up until publication of the 2016 EU Global Strategy. The targets set out in the HHG had not been met when its deadline neared. Although the quantitative aim of the Goal was reached, there were still some significant shortfalls on the qualitative side of the capability development process. It is argued that this would cause various problems during high-level intensity operations (Major & Mölling, 2010, p. 13). Some member states were dissatisfied with the results of the HHG, resulting in new capability development process that focused on smaller combat units. In order to remedy the shortfalls recognised in the HHG process and support the development of these combat units, the Union adopted the Headline Goal 2010. One of the Headline Goal 2010 (HG 2010) key targets was creating the capacity to field a high-readiness force based on so-called EU Battlegroups (BG), which would provide member states with the capabilities to turn their militaries into more flexible, mobile forces (Fiott, 2018, p. 4; Major & Mölling, 2010, p. 14). By adapting to this new security environment, the Union developed a response to both internal and external security issues (Evans & Reid, 2014). These threats encouraged a growth in cooperation between member states regarding military capability development, as argued by Constantinou and Opondo (2016). The development of these high-readiness forces achieved something that all previous initiatives had failed to do: "setting up a functional capability-generation mechanism with a palpable output" (Major & Mölling, 2010, p. 15). The flaws of previous plans were addressed by the European Defence Agency; its successor, the Capability Development Plan, was the product of this cooperative process between EU member states and the EDA. Founded in 2004, the Agency's primary job was to pressure member states into spending more on military capability development (Keohane, 2004, p. 1). Although it is stated that the EDA does not carry out the development and procurement of military capabilities, the Agency plays an important role in defining common requirements and managing and improving cooperative research and technology programmes (Zandee, 2017, p. 4). However, the progress thus far has been strongly dependent on voluntary commitments.

When the Treaty of Lisbon came into force, the EU continued its endeavours to tackle the capability shortfalls identified in 1999 and 2003. These shortfalls were mostly in the areas of intelligence, strategic logistics and transport and force protection (Major & Mölling, 2010, p. 15). In the period prior to the Lisbon Treaty, the Union slowly started to divert its attention away from its Cold War era perspective on capability development. The quantitative evaluation by Keohane and Blommestijn (2009) shows that a fair amount of progress is made in terms of military capability development. Major and Mölling (2010), on the other hand, argue that the development and procurement of armaments on a national level does not necessarily imply that the member states have developed any European military capabilities. For example, the criteria to join the BG has been limited in its guidelines on capability, allowing every member state willing to participate to join the structure. It is argued that this, in turn, decreased the overall military effectiveness of the BG formations (Major & Mölling, 2010, p. 15). Consecutively, the Union never fielded the BG as it chose to favour ad hoc force generation over the already existing force structures. It is argued that this harmed the high-readiness response mechanism's credibility, as financially and politically burdened the participating member states (Reykers, 2017, p. 466). It also meant that capability development was not yet connected to force generation at that time. When a large part of the finances was diverted to more important political issues in 2010-2014, the tendency to develop capabilities nationally increased, as most member states considered international cooperation to be a side project. It meant that everything that was carried out on top of the national development also entailed additional and undesirable costs (Zandee, personal communication, 7 May, 2019). Another aspect that contributed to the slow progress in developing military capabilities was that both the Union and its member states rarely took into account the influence of commanders and experts on the ground which were responsible for various innovative developments during operations (Major & Mölling, 2010, p. 16). It confirms Rosen's theory on the significance of talented military personnel, since he argued that they are one of the key resources to military innovation. This approach is also supported by Farrell & Terriff (2002) who state that military change, and subsequently innovation, is caused by the irrational and intermittent behaviour of humans – pointing at the innovative solutions by military personnel in the field. They showed that capability development is

possible without relinquishing national sovereignty. However, some scholars argue that most member states are unwilling to transform their ad hoc solutions into permanent institutions (Major & Mölling, 2010, p 16).

The Treaty of Lisbon tried to improve the development of military capabilities and strengthen Europe's defence industry. In it, several capability development areas were highlighted by the Council: cyber defence, air-to-air refuelling, and satellite communications. It is argued that since many of these major capability developments have a deadline ultimately beyond 2025, the Council itself also implies that the research and development of major military assets is a slow process (Duke, 2017, pp. 163-164). Some scholars argue that keeping the member states committed to capability development under the Union's framework is the only way to guarantee the success of the capability-generation mechanisms (Major & Mölling, 2010, p. 16). By acknowledging the capability gaps generated by the ever-changing security environment, the decision-making of member states can be dictated, as is theorised by Keohane (2018), thus influencing their decisions in capability development. Anno 2014, most of the capability development process is still controlled by individual member states instead of the EU. Less than 8% of the member states' investments in defence research and technology is spent on cooperative European programmes, whereas only 20% of armament development and procurement is multilateral (Zandee, 2017, p. 2). Schilde (2017) also recognised significant changes in capability development around 2013-2015, which indicated that the process was influenced by the security environment during that time. This was especially the case with member states in Eastern Europe, as they altered their capability development in response to Russia's assertive behaviour and annexation of Crimea (Schilde, 2017, p. 39). In addition, it is explained that these countries have also expanded territorial defence capabilities on their eastern border (Sharkov, 2016), sometimes even without increasing their defence spending.

European Defence Agency
During a French-British summit in Le Tourquet in February 2003, the plan for a European agency for the development and research on armaments was conceived. A policy on the development of European capabilities and armaments was integrated into the ESDP and was to be regulated by EDA. In 2004, EDA was officially established to support the Union's member states and Council in improving European capabilities. It was designed to address the military capability shortfalls of the EU in mind (Trybus, 2006, p. 678). As a part of the proposed new 'Level of Ambition', EDA would support the Union's aims to develop a durable security and defence, which was able to tackle the threats and challenges during that time more effectively and with the appropriate instruments (Council of the European Union, 2016, Annex). It has been stated that EDA generated a more coherent and integrative approach to military cooperation among the Union's member states, whilst having to work with various perspectives within EU policy decision-making (Bátora, 2009, p. 1075). Some scholars even argue that EDA has been directing decision-making at the political level (Gehring & Krapohl, 2007, p. 209), combining it with its characteristics as a supranational coordinator (Everson & Joerges, 2006; Egeberg, 2006). However, the European political elite limits EDA's power with several mandates. Its abilities are concentrated to providing information to member states, thus allowing them to "operate based on a common informational basis which in turn fosters harmonisation in policies and standards" (Bátora, 2009, p. 1078).

Over the years, the European Defence Agency has kept a persistent focus on strengthening the member states' development of their military capabilities, therewith also encouraging investments in the European defence, technological and industrial base (EDTIB) – an organisational structure aiming to negate certain inefficiencies in the EU defence market. Since its establishment, EDA has turned itself into one of the most important actors within the European defence community. The reason is that the organisation possesses essential data and expertise important in guiding pooling and sharing initiatives at a strategic level, as argued by Chappell and Petrov (2015). The Agency evaluated whether its projects are feasible and facilitated meetings for the participating member states in order to identify common pillars that can function as a foundation for coordinating development within the projects. It is argued that EDA has been an important actor in the process of capability development and that it provides member states with numerous opportunities to improve the European pooling and sharing process by identifying common capability requirements (Chappell & Petrov, 2015, p. 203).

The Agency seeks to sustain EU policy and strategies such as the CSDP and the EUGS. The Agency tries to enhance the effective use of the Union's instruments and resources in EU policy by improving the communication between the defence community, the European Commission and other EU institutions (European Union, 2019). EDA is subjected to the authority of the Council by the CSDP and is given five key tasks: 1) to contribute to identifying the military capability objectives of the member states and evaluating their capability commitment, 2) to endorse the compatibility of operational needs and adoption of effective procurement measures, 3) to propose and manage multilateral projects to close the capability gap, 4) to support defence technology research and coordinate joint research activities, and 5) to strengthen the base for defence industry and technologies (European Union, 2012, p. 40). In addition, the CSDP states that EDA should be open to all member states that wish to participate in the Agency's development programmes. Furthermore, it cooperates with the EC in synchronising policy regarding the investments in technology, with a particular focus on the overlap between military and civilian imperatives (Drent & Zandee, 2016, p. 7).

EDA's support for the member states increased with the implementation of the EUGS in 2016, as defence became one of the main priorities on the agenda of the Union (EDA, 2018b, p. 1). It also profiled itself as an important instrument for multilateral programmes focused on identifying key areas in capability development at the EU level, supporting this task with initiatives like the Capability Development Plan and Overarching Strategic Research Agenda (OSRA) (EDA, 2018b, p. 1). In addition, it supported the Union and its member states in developing their technology and capability development. In 2018, the Agency cooperated in 97 ad hoc research and capability projects and numerous other activities related to capability development and the defence industry (EDA, 2018b, p. 2). It is active across several different domains, varying from capability planning and operational support to air-to-air refuelling and cyber defence. The Agency also argues that while its practices regarding EDTIB play a key role in supporting the member states' capability development, it also needs to attract key innovators beyond the traditional sphere of the European defence industry (EDA, 2017, p. 2). The revised 2018 capability plan provided a more output-oriented angle that addressed the full scope of member states' capabilities, thus improving cooperative programmes by carefully exploring the possibilities and translating them into collaborative projects (EDA, 2017). Subsequently, in the last decade, EDA published multiple annual reports which show a continuous line in capability development and provide a more detailed overview of the process and its results. Overall, one can state that EDA is committed to determining a reliable approach to the nexus of policy, capability development, and research.

Capability Development Plan
In 2002, the European Capability Action Plan (ECAP) was launched to highlight the shortfalls in capability development. Various groups of experts were tasked to develop possible solutions for those policy areas where the most shortfalls could be identified. However, these solutions were only possible if the member states would commit themselves through various bottom-up approaches, committing national capabilities in the effort (Duke, 2017, p. 162). In addition, the ECAP also identified shortfalls where no capabilities were available at the national and European level (Haroche, 2017). Some of these shortfalls were dealt with due to temporary solutions, whereas for others major investments were necessary (Duke, 2017, p. 162). In turn, some of the institutional limitations and flaws of the ECAP were transferred to EDA, as it was responsible for monitoring the shortfalls. The successor to the ECAP is the Capability Development Plan (CDP), the product of cooperation between EDA, the EUMC and the member states. In 2018, a revised CPD has been developed, which was enhanced by the output of evaluating the Headline Goals and the aims identified in the CSDP (European Defence Agency, 2018, p. 1). In addition, the CDP revision took into account the various targets mentioned in the EUGS, focusing on a wider European security and defence environment.

The Capability Development Plan contributed to the decision-making process regarding military capability development at both European and national levels. It assisted in improving the cooperation between member states' defence planners, as it set the guidelines for future capability developments (EDA, 2018, p. 1). These defence planners used the CDP to identify key shortfalls in capability development. They benefited from the opportunities for cooperation presented to them by the

CDP (EDA, 2018, p. 1). The CDP provided the member states with an overview of priority shortfall areas and aided them in organising their capability development. It also highlighted various cooperative endeavours which can be expanded upon through a preferable cooperation framework, such as the Permanent Structured Cooperation and the European Defence Fund. Four different concepts were used to develop the CDP. These guidelines have all been used to draw up different perspectives in the field of capability development (EDA, 2018, p. 2). This includes a short-term, mid-term, and longer-term perspective of which Fiott (2018) argues that they are essential to capability prioritisation. He states that "the CDP should be seen as a vital element of the EU's broader defence policies because of the important role it plays in arbitrating between short-term capability requirements and longer-term capability and technology needs" (Fiott, 2018, p. 8). Subsequently, the CDP is operationalised by CARD, as it reviews the member states' implementations of capability priorities that emerged from the three perspectives.

Some scholars argue that the Plan is more than a simple enumeration of military capabilities, explaining that it is in fact a process based on a specific methodology (Fiott, 2018, pp. 2-4). In his work, Fiott (2018) identifies four strands that provide the basis for the guidance that the CDP supplies to the decision-making process. The first strand analyses actual capability shortfalls, the second strand gives an overview of future capability trends, the third strand examines any potential cooperation at the European level, and the final strand assesses the experiences acquired from CSDP operations and missions (Fiott, 2018, p. 2). Once all four strands are processed, the CDP provides an analysis of the capability development priorities, which contribute to a comprehensive understand of capability requirements over the short and a mid-term perspective, as well as a longer-term perspective (EDA, 2018, p. 2; Fiott, 2018, p. 2). This process, along with the corresponding results, ensures that the Union and its member states are constantly well informed on the current state of their capability development.

2010 Headline Goals

The Headline Goal 2010 established a link with the security environment through the ESS. The HG 2010 was a response to its predecessor, as it addressed the shortfalls leftover from the first Headline Goal and attempted to provide the member states with a military force that could coordinate swift and decisive actions in regard to the entire spectrum of crisis management operations (Duke, 2017, p. 161). Several scenarios dictated the calculation of military capabilities for the new HLG. Duke (2017, p. 161) argues that the HG 2010 provided the Union with the possibility of conducting one major or several smaller operations and missions in an extended scope of action. The role of the European Defence Agency – created in 2004 – was also included in the HG 2010, which emphasised the interoperability at the various levels within capability development. To mitigate the gap in capabilities set by the HHG, the member states established the European Capability Action Plan. Some scholars argue that only seven of 64 shortfalls that were identified were solved in 2005 (Lindley-French, 2005, p. 5). However, others state that there were 144 shortfalls of which 104 were resolved (Duke, 2017, p. 162), leaving approximately 40 shortfalls for which the Union still needed to develop capabilities.[5]

4.3 *The European Union Global Strategy*

This period explores the developments in military capabilities from 2016 up to this particular point in time. The EU Global Strategy left an impact on the capability development process. Some scholars argue that the process is influenced by the military capability requirements that are interpreted from the strategy and its ambition level (Duke, 2017, p. 164). Correspondingly, the European Commission proposed the European Defence Action Plan (EDAP). The Commission tried to stimulate defence research by means of EU financing and offered monetary incentives to member states for establishing new capability programmes (Zandee, 2017, p. 7). It implemented EDAP as a means of creating improved conditions for defence cooperation and strengthening the European defence, technological and industrial base. It is argued that the investments made in the defence industry have a substantial multiplier effect in terms of promoting information and technology transfers, thus encouraging capability development (European Commission, 2016, p. 1). In addition to the influences of the Global

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[5] It has been difficult to examine the progress on capability shortfalls since the European Union stopped publishing public reports on their shortfalls after 2006.

Strategy and EDAP, the development of European military capabilities was partly determined by the EU-NATO Joint Declaration. The declaration brought new impetus and developments to the strategic partnership, as it emphasised the mobilisation of a wide spectrum of capabilities to respond to the issues affecting both organisations (European Council, 2016, p. 1). Both parties agreed on a set of strategic priorities, which would improve cooperation in certain areas, such as complementary and interoperable defence capabilities (European Council, 2016, pp. 1-2) In order to ensure significant progress on these objectives in the coming years, it was decided that the developments are reviewed on a regular basis.

Nowadays, capability development is characterised by a shift in focus, emphasising more than just the development and procurement of military equipment. It encompasses important elements such as doctrine, organisation, training, logistics, and leadership to determine the progress in developing military capabilities (Zandee, 2017, p. 2). Quite a few developments have taken place in recent years. What is particularly noticeable is that the concrete developments, other than the important shift in the mindset around capabilities, focused primarily on the competitive phase of R&D and the link to European industrial competitiveness by promoting the EDTIB (Bekkers, personal communication, 7 May, 2019). The defence industry is another important element in establishing military capabilities, as it plays a crucial role in the capability development chain (Zandee, 2017, p. 4). This chain consists of four different phases which ensure that the supply is linked to the European demand: 1) defining requirements, 2) research and technology, 3) development, and 4) procurement and production. The defence industry differs from other stakeholders in the development chain by means of specific characteristics. In contrast to organisations like EDA, the European defence industry is mostly privately owned and its practices are based on business models rather than policies (Zandee, 2017, p. 4). It also plays a substantial role in the European economy, as it provides jobs and income for many Europeans and is part of the European defence, technological and industrial base. The European Defence Fund was established in 2017 with the purpose of fostering the EDTIB, therewith contributing to the EU's capability development and strategic autonomy (European Commission, 2019, p. 4). The European Commission tries the stimulate cooperation in the field of capability development trough monetary instruments, providing the member states with funding and incentives. The EDF (European Defence Fund) attempts to improve the interoperability between capabilities, as it facilitates member states' cooperation on capability procurement and maintenance. It would achieve its goals by supporting the development process of multinational capabilities at the EU level. (Duke, 2017, p. 176). It is argued that without this support, European military capabilities could not be developed optimally due to the inoperability between them (Wilms, De Jong, Kertysova, Bekkers & Jans, 2018, p. 3).

The EDF is not an instrument intended to perform its work alone. The process behind the EDF is supplemented by the practices that stem from the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence and Permanent Structured Cooperation. Some scholars state that these separate but interdependent initiatives strongly influence European capability development and bring forth a European Union which is more efficient and more cooperative in the field of defence (Wilms et al., 2018, p. 4). CARD ensures that the cooperative development of capabilities between the EU, NATO and member states is properly coordinated. It provides the Council with an assessment of the development process. This allows the Council in turn to respond to the related problems that have emerged from the report (Duke, 2017, p. 175). Fiott (2018) explained that CARD could in time provide the Union with an improved overview of the development process, granting it the opportunity to scrutinise and strengthen defence planning integration and identify new ways for cooperative defence research. PESCO, on the other hand, provided the member states with their own instrument to develop capabilities. It is argued that PESCO needs to stabilise long-term arrangements between member states and has to be connected to various cooperative capability commitments in order to provide the necessary results (Duke, 2017, p. 178). EDF, CARD and PESCO are defence planning structures created to address the issues which could not be solved by the initiatives in the past. All three initiatives have been created for enhanced European defence cooperation, and all of these mechanisms have the same goal, but work from their own regulations and decision-making, and is not inextricably linked (European Commission, personal communication, 20 June, 2019). However, experts still struggle to determine how to sustain cooperative capability development and which capabilities the EU could prioritise (Fiott, 2018, p. 2). The capability shortfalls have been established, however, member states propose projects that often do not resolve

these shortfalls. Of the 34 PESCO projects that are now operational, none are actually addressing these shortfalls (Biscop, personal communication, 3 June, 2019). Although member states cannot be forced to propose projects within a certain framework, restructuring of the initiative itself can be considered. The forerunners in this area must come up with proposals that are of value for capability development, making PESCO a platform for the sustainable development of capabilities, for EU, NATO and national military organisations (Biscop, personal communication, 3 June, 2019). Subsequently, this problem is the primary reason for the revised version of the EU's Capability Development Plan. With the 2018 CDP, EDA tried to assist both EU and national decision-making processes concerning military capability development. It is stated that the CDP contributes to enhanced cohesion between member states' defence planning and addresses the security and defence issues from the perspective of European capability development (European Defence Agency, 2018, p. 1). The EUMC, supported by its military staff, frequently provides two out of four working strands used by EDA in shaping the CDP. According to Graziano (personal communication, 25 July, 2019) maintaining technological superiority is a must for European defence and an essential requirement in order to develop military capabilities that are in line with the Global Strategy.

During this period, the EU and NATO signed a new Joint Declaration, establishing a common vision of how the EU and NATO will cooperatively tackle common security and defence issues. This declaration also emphasised capability development through EU-NATO initiatives and highlighted the importance of a coherent and complementary process (European Council, 2018, p. 1). In addition, the Military Planning and Capability Conduct (MPCC) was set up in order to strengthen civil-military cooperation and to avoid unnecessary duplication and inoperability with NATO (European Council, 2018a, p. 1). The MPCC is a permanent structure that focuses on C2 at a military strategic level within the European Union Military Staff. The Council reported that the structure already has had some positive and visible impact on the C2 of various military training missions (European Council, 2018a, p. 2). Therefore, it would be safe to state that the MPCC also contributed to the capability process in its own way, by facilitating training and logistics for the Union and its partners.

EU-NATO cooperation

The declaration of St Malo not only gave the impetus for the establishment of a European security and defence strategy, but also laid the foundation for the development of EU-NATO cooperation in the coming generations. The strategic partnership between EU and NATO, which initially focused on crisis management and conflict prevention, was established in 2002. It reflected the shared values of the EU and NATO, their consensus on security practices, and their determination to tackle the challenges stemming from a new security environment (NATO, 2002, p. 1). This partnership rested on the Berlin Plus agreements. Within the ESDP, it would be guaranteed that non-EU European members of NATO are given the opportunity to fully participate in any EU-NATO cooperation. In turn, NATO would support the ESDP and grant the Union access to its planning capabilities for planning its own operations (EEAS, 2016b, p. 7). Both organisations acknowledged the need for these arrangements, thus establishing a coherent and transparent partnership that would mutually reinforce the development of capabilities requirements common to both organisations (NATO, 2002, p. 2).

Ever since the establishment of the Common Security and Defence Policy, the focus of EU-NATO cooperation has been on capability development. Although their attempts to support the development process were a step in the right direction, it only yielded few results. The cooperation between the EU and NATO is weakened due to a deteriorated coherence of the processes surrounding European capability development and the harmonisation of national defence practices (Raik & Järvenpää, 2017, p. 2). In 2003, an EU-NATO Capability Group was established to strengthen the mutual development efforts by providing both organisations with a coherent structure to engage in. This group later addressed various common capability shortfalls, such as countering improvised explosive devices and medical support (NATO, 2016, p. 1). The connection between the organisations is deemed important on both sides. It strongly emphasises the mutual security and defence aspects they share, as 22 of the EU member states are also NATO allies. The cooperation provides both organisations with a broad range of tools that can be mobilised in order to face the issues and challenges in the new security environment and to address capability development. However, it does not necessarily mean that when

they combine their resources they are also used in the most efficient way. Therefore, there should be no discrimination between NATO and non-NATO states within the EU in the area of capability development. The Americans are afraid that an increased European defence cooperation will lead to duplication, which costs money and will be at the expense of the power of both NATO and the EU member states (Van Willigen, personal communication, 8 May, 2019). All in all they have implemented 74 concrete practices into seven different areas (EEAS, 2019, p. 1). These areas include: hybrid threats, operational cooperation including maritime issues, cyber security, defence capabilities, defence industry and research, exercises, and capacity-building. The main achievements and added value of EU-NATO cooperation in different areas is highlighted in detail in the four progress reports they published.

A more recently set up initiative on EU-NATO cooperation is the Joint Declaration of 2016. This declaration highlights that both organisations face the greatest security challenges of this generation. It is stated that Europeans, and the entire Western world, must strengthen their cooperation and develop a dependable security and defence policy (Raik & Järvenpää, 2017, p. 1). The reason behind the realignment of a cooperation policy is that of an outdated Berlin Plus agreement due to the new security environment (Bakker, Drent & Zandee, 2017, p. 19). From this new environment arise various new challenges, including supporting local capacities, hybrid threats and cyber security. Under these circumstances, the EU and NATO joined efforts in order to identify the specific policy and operations areas which could be enhanced through cooperation (NATO, 2019, p. 1). However, both organisations have barely scraped the surface of the measures they have to employ in order to adapt to the new security environment. It is argued that the burden of strengthening Europe's resilience lies on the shoulders of the EU, though the Union has yet to develop a comprehensive response that includes a shared analysis based on policies relevant to EU-NATO cooperation (Raik & Järvenpää, 2017, p. 2). The Union depends on NATO for its support in territorial defence practices, whereas NATO depends on the EU for strengthening states and societies, both outside of and within Europe. It is argued that they must combine their efforts to stabilise the regions surrounding the continent and stop the spill-over effect before it will degenerate (Bakker et al., 2017, p. 19). As both organisation actively seek to cooperate in response to these challenges, coordination of their policy and developments is necessary in order to prevent any duplication and competition.

Through close cooperation the EU and NATO developed an international *Comprehensive Approach* to crisis management and operations, which require both military and civilian instruments to be put to use (NATO, 2016, p. 1). The cooperation also provided the opportunity for regular meetings between foreign ministers, ambassadors, military representatives and defence advisors. Thus, the dialogue between the EU and NATO laid the foundation for an improved capability development process (NATO, 2016, p. 1). Permanent military liaison arrangements were made to facilitate this cooperation at the operational level. This capability was put to use during the EU-NATO anti-piracy operations and migrant crisis in the Aegean Sea. In addition, they established an exchange programme for officers in EU-NATO states, which shows another aspect of the more contemporary style of capability development that also encompasses training and organisation (Toje, 2008a, p. 21). Subsequently, they each contributed to the development of a unique set of institutional instruments for managing the multinational capability programmes and procurement.

Military Planning and Conduct Capability
As the United States reduced its involvement in European security, the EU had to take responsibility for security in its own neighbourhood. This aim, alongside several others, shaped a strategic protocol on developing the CSDP (Bendiek, 2017, p. 18) It is argued that he CSDP could no longer be limited to operations with a low and medium-level intensity (Drent, Landman & Zandee, 2016, p. 3). Therefore, the Union needed the ability to organise interventions with a high-level intensity as well as lower level crisis management operations. The requirements for conducting this variety of operations were met by the development of the EUGS in 2016, and consequently in the realisation of the goals set in it (Giuliani, Danjean, Grossetête & Tardy, 2018, p. 22). Hence, the Union established the Military Planning and Conduct Capability in June 2017.

The MPCC is part of the Union's external action service and is created to manage the strategic command of several training missions outside Europe (Giuliani et al., 2018, p. 24). It is argued that the

creation of the MPCC was actually the result of three comparable processes, which included the identification of the need for a specialised service, the impetus created by the EUGS, and the UK referendum and Brexit (Tardy, 2018, p. 127). In general terms, the MPCC is a permanent strategic-level headquarter responsible for the operational planning and conduct of the Union's non-executive missions, implying that its missions only support host nations via an advisory position. Tardy (2018) argues that the MPCC carries an important political meaning, as previous debates on the Union's permanent planning and conduct framework revealed numerous sensitivities. It indicates that the EU can acquire a legitimate scope of command. It has been stated that even though the MPCC is a step towards something more ambitious in the field of operational organisation, the breakthroughs in this field will still only be incremental and slow (Tardy, 2018, p. 127).

The MPCC has proven to be a valuable asset, as it improved the crisis management structure of the Union. It assumed direct control over the Union's non-executive military missions of which there are currently three: Somalia, Central Africa, and Mali. In addition, it provides the forces in the field to focus on their own activities, with improved support from the EU. Despite the member states wishing to make several changes within the MPCC to improve its functionality, no state is willing to send additional staff officers to contribute to the process (Biscop, personal communication, 3 June, 2019). Yet, the Council of the European Union (2018) states that it welcomes the positive impact of the MPCC in the C2 of EU operations. It also argued that through the MPCC's contribution the EU was given the ability to react in a faster and more effective manner in crisis management operations (Council of the European Union, 2018, p. 3). This shows that the MPCC primarily impacted the level of operational efficiency. Some scholars argue that it enhanced the information transmission that was delivered to the Union from the field by translating military requirements into political messages through a single framework (Reykers, 2019, p. 14). This enhanced role of the MPCC is complementary with all other existing C2 capabilities available for crisis management operations. Therefore, it made a substantial contribution to the Union's command structure by strengthening the coordination and organisation at the Union's operational level.

Coordinated Annual Review on Defence
The establishment of the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence is one of the answers to the EUGS' call for joint transformation and coordination in the field of national defence planning and capability development practices (Fiott, 2017a, p. 1). CARD institutionalises the organisational interdependencies between member states with the support of EDA. It is argued that this contributes to identifying and solving the shortfalls within the capabilities of EU member states (Beckmann & Kempin, 2017, p. 2). After the publication of the EUGS in 2016, member states attempted to benefit from the political shift of focus onto European defence practices. It is argued that CARD facilitates the member states' efforts to coordinate their national defence plans at the EU level (Fiott, 2017a, p. 1).

The analyses of CARD are concluded in a report drafted by EDA – also known as the CARD Trial Run Report. This report indicates the focus of the various member states in their national defence planning. It determines the progress in European defence cooperation and identifies opportunities for cooperation in the future (Bijleveld-Schouten, 2019, p. 2). It is argued that this gives CARD an efficient tool for better streamlining priority and capability development in the EU (Bijleveld-Schouten, 2019, p. 2). By analysing the defence planning of individual member states, EDA can outline the border of the Union's capability landscape. This outcome is then plotted against the CSDP level of military ambition the Union aspires to in EUGS (EDA, 2018a, p. 1). In general, the member states develop their own defence capabilities on a national basis. However, this has impeded a common defence practice, as individual development plans often produce duplicative and costly capabilities (Howorth, 2017, p. 457). Some scholars argue that CARD could therefore provide a relevant assessment of national defence plans, which clearly depicts the various opportunities for cooperation that may arise when assessing these plans together (Fiott, 2017a, p. 1). This could, in turn, also strengthen the interdependency between EU and NATO capability development. In addition, it is argued that member states which actively pursue the development of their capability, aim for consistency between their national development plans and more frequently participate in cooperative activities (EDA, 2018a, p. 2). Subsequently, Beckmann and Kempin (2017) state that in order to achieve the goals set in the EUGS and provide a

framework for advancing the EU's strategic autonomy, the Union and EDA should shift their focus towards discussing strategic goals in the CARD framework.

Together with PESCO and EDF, CARD has contributed to promoting defence cooperation and investing in the capability development process. It has provided the Union and its member states with multiple perspectives of future capability development in the short to long-term. But not only within the EU has CARD contributed to the development process. In coherence with the CDP and NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP), CARD provided an overview of the various overlaps in capability development (European Union, 2018, p. 6). It is an important mechanism that could lead to greater synchronisation between member states and military organisation, ensuring that they do not miss out on opportunities to cooperate with each other (Fiott, personal communication, 16 May, 2019). Most of these findings are presented in the outcomes of CARD Trial Run. It confirmed that there was an increase in the overall defence spending of the 27 member states who participated over a four year period (EDA, 2018a, p. 1). Data on CARD presented by EDA shows a consistent increase in cooperative capability development: from 24% in 2015 to almost 31% in 2017 (EDA, 2018a, p. 1). Other data, however, shows an overall decrease of 6% in investments in European defence research between 2015 and 2017 (EDA, 2018a, p. 1). Of course, it must be taken into account that this data concerns cumulative percentages and that it may differ per member state whether they increased or decreased their expenditure on capability development. Since CARD proved to be a reliable structure, the Council of the European Union agreed on launching it as a permanent endeavour, meaning that the first full CARD cycle will start in 2019/2020 (Council of the European Union, 2018, p. 6). To sum up, CARD gives the EU a useful overview of the current state of affairs regarding capability development and identified the next steps necessary, providing the Union with additional directions for opportunities on further cooperation in developing European military capabilities.

European Defence Fund

In 2016, President Juncker of the European Commission announced the creation of the European Defence Fund. The Commission's vision for this fund is to support and encourage the cooperation between member states in developing technology and capabilities with the purpose of strengthening European security in response to numerous threats (EC, 2018, p. 1). Therefore, it is necessary to comprehend the Union's preferences in choosing which capabilities it primarily want to develop and how they will fund them (Besch, 2017, p. 2). The Global Strategy set out an elaborate scenario for European security and defence by stating that the EU should makes efforts to counter both internal and external issues, coordinate capability development, and guarantee the safety of its borders and citizens (EEAS, 2016). In addition, it was outlined how the Fund could support the member states in constructing an innovative industrial base for developing joint capabilities (EC, 2017, p. 2). It is argued that the EDF can only be sufficiently utilised when it provides the funds for the necessary platforms (Besch, 2017, p. 2). The foundation of the Fund led to the revitalisation of the defence debate on the European level. Some academics state that these developments should not be underestimated, since they do not only involve the sovereignty of the member states, but also reflect a shared vision for European security and defence practices (Tardy, 2018, p. 120).

The Fund has only been established in 2017, but it already left its mark on the European capability development process. It provides financial support to the member states divided into two different strands: one on research and one on development and acquisition. In addition to its attempt to reduce duplication by supporting cooperation on research and joint military capability development, the Fund will maximise the value that can be derived from defence investments (Giuliani et al., 2018, p. 24). The fund explores the fundamental issues that reduce the effectiveness and productivity and the European defence, technological and industrial base. It is argued that in the Union's efforts to create an innovative EDTIB, it has laid too much focus on regulating defence market supplies, with little progress (Besch, 2017, p. 1). Nonetheless, the Commission wants to address the diminishing development of European capabilities by facilitating a new research and innovation programme called Horizon Europe (EC, 2018, p. 4). This lays the foundation for an increased funding in European military research and capability development. According to the European Commission (personal communication, 20 June 2019), the EDF should function as a catalyst that attracts the capital of different member states in order

to invest in R&T and capability development. Part of the costs are paid by the Union and the other part by the member states themselves. Some years ago, the EU member states spent around €200 million annually on cooperative research projects. However, they only spent 80% of their budget for defence capabilities on national requirements (European Commission, 2019, p. 2). This led to a costly duplication of military capabilities, which in some cases also had to deal with inoperability. The EDF stepped in by providing support during key moments in the capability development chain: from research, to development, to acquisition. It also provided a substantial boost to the European defence, technological and industrial base (Council of the European Union, 2018, p. 7).

The European Commission stated that EU funded defence cooperation is becoming a reality, as the EU is already encouraging collaborative capability projects with a budget of €590 million (European Commission, 2019, p. 3). Several research projects have already been initiated. These should contribute to new development projects in all areas where military practices take place. The EDF estimates that in 2019 it will spend €25 million on research and €245 million on development (European Commission, 2019, p. 3). A few examples of the projects that are already underway are Ocean2020 and Eurodrone – both projects with a focus on unmanned vehicles. The EDF helps to solve the problems in the phase in which industrial developments must be started. It aids initiatives and projects to get through the 'valley of death' with a substantial financial contribution (Zandee, personal communication, 7 May, 2019). However, some scholars argue that the EDF is not a significant answer to all Europe's capability issues, but that it should been seen as part of a coherent approach to capability development (Fiott, 2018, p. 8; Wilms et al., 2018, p. 16). Although the Fund has provided the member states with substantial funding, it must be taken into account that the process is interconnected with many different actors and initiatives, all of which can pursue separate goals simultaneously.

Permanent Structured Cooperation
Since the Union's member states started to recognise the need for an improvement in their coordination and development of military capabilities, the Permanent Structured Cooperation was launched to address the effectiveness of defence cooperation by further integrating it into the EU structure. Even though the establishment of PESCO only took place in 2017, the idea of a new permanent structured organisation mechanism was already circulating a decade earlier. The first thought behind PESCO was to allow different speeds of integration and coordination in the military domain. It was stated that the possibility of a more flexible cooperation in security and defence would encourage a concentrated body of member states to increase mutual efforts (Álvarez, 2007, p. 95). During the development process, not only the participating member states contributed to the development of the mechanism, but also those who would be able to participate. Some experts argue that this is one of the most significant features of the mechanism's design (Álvarez, 2007; Duke, 2017). It provided all member states with the ability to politically influence the decision-making process, hence it would incorporate their various perspectives regardless of their position in the CSDP (Aydin-Düzgit & Marrone, 2018, p. 2). The mechanism of PESCO has a broader focus on capability development than military practices. Álvarez (2007) stated that the objective during the development of the structured cooperation was to build the ability to deploy a military force, that could sustain itself for a prolonged period of time, within the period of a few weeks.

Through the establishment of a legally binding framework which is deeply rooted in EU institutions, PESCO differs from previously developed cooperation initiatives (Valášek, 2017). As much of its content will be shaped by EU member states in the near future, PESCO aims to achieve the development of interoperable capabilities by establishing and supporting numerous ad hoc projects on the basis of both national and European shortfalls (Aydin-Düzgit & Marrone, 2018, p. 2). To realise its aims, PESCO has established five benchmarks: 1) cooperation in defence expenditure, 2) harmonisation of military shortfalls through the implementation of CARD and involvement of the EDF, 3) improvement of flexibility, availability, interoperability and deployability, 4) prioritising European shortfalls in capability development, and 5) commitment to joint equipment programmes within the EDA framework (Zandee, 2018, pp. 3-6). All member states participating in PESCO are involved in its decision-making process, in which decision are taken unanimously. At the lower level, only those member states committed to specific projects decide on the implementation, financing and development

practices of the respective project (Aydin-Düzgit & Marrone, 2018, p. 3). This gives PESCO the opportunity to operate simultaneous projects at different speeds.

However, the mechanism has lost a little momentum because all member states want to participate in it regardless of their commitment (Segers, personal communication, 27 May, 2019). The current state of PESCO highlights the efforts to address the Union's capability development goals (Béraud-Sudreau, Efstathiou & Hannigan, 2019, p. 10). PESCO allowed member states to participate in mutual military investments, making their forces more interoperable. In addition, it provided them with the opportunity to standardise their defence apparatus and, subsequently, set up major joint equipment projects to solve their capability gaps. An initial list of seventeen projects was developed under PESCO in 2018. The projects covered certain areas like training, capability development and operational readiness. Half a year later, an additional list was introduced with another seventeen projects, ranging from a joint EU intelligence school to military space surveillance. These projects were all listed in the roadmap that the Council put together in 2018. It addressed the various governance issues that had not been touched yet. In addition, a calendar was established for a review and assessment of the implementation plans of individual member states. These explore the member states' plans to carry out their legally binding commitments (Zandee, 2018, p. 3).

Although the work on several projects is under way, the dimension of them still remains ambiguous. Béraud-Sudreau et al. (2019) state that in most cases member states cannot identify any milestones beyond their date of establishment. On the other hand, some projects have already made some minor breakthroughs, such as the EuroArtillery and Eurodrone projects. PESCO also helped strengthening the EDTIB by associating itself with various actors in the defence industry. It developed further cross-border cooperation that increased mutual coherence and responsibility sharing, and reduced duplications in national defence planning (Béraud-Sudreau et al., 2019, p. 5). The issue of PESCO is that on the one hand the EU pursues the ambition of strategic autonomy and on the other tries to do so through small and concrete projects of PESCO. These projects are very important for European military capability development, but compared to the large gap between the current situation and strategic autonomy, it feels a bit like overdue maintenance (Van Willigen, personal communication, 8 May, 2019). Some of these PESCO projects were also in line with the priorities set in the CDP, as they demonstrated the intention and occasionally ability to address their respective shortfalls. Would they succeed, it would fit in with the Union's ambition set out in the EUGS and provide them with the capabilities to conduct their crisis management operations. If member states would be reluctant in committing themselves to these projects – even though they signed up as participating members – then they can become an impediment to the successful planning and subsequent implementation of PESCO's capability development process.

4.4 *In conclusion*

This chapter explored the progress in military capability development from the St Malo Declaration up to its present-day situation. In addition, it examined the various initiatives that contributed – or failed to contribute – to the development process. The question that was posed at the start of this chapter was: *What progress has been achieved in developing military capabilities on the basis of policy during the last two decades?* This question can now be answered concisely based upon a literary review, which is expanded upon by the knowledge gathered during expert interview.

During the last two decades the European Union has made a substantial progress in developing military capabilities. When the first European security and defence policy was presented, the Union had nothing in terms of military capabilities. The sole focus of the Union had been on developing its soft power capabilities, therewith neglecting its politico-military component – leaving it in the hands of NATO. In light of the European Security and Defence Policy, the EU started to develop capabilities that would harmonise with its mentality: taking a leading role in peacekeeping operations, conflict prevention and in the strengthening of the international security. It tried to develop military capabilities that could perform multi-faceted crisis management operations with the support of their soft power. However, the EU soon discovered that it could not match the force projection of the United States. The member states have jointly set up several goals and initiatives to change this situation. Influential

leadership within the EU has led to innovation within the different military organisations of the member states, resulting in the development of various European military capabilities.

When looking at the time frame in which these developments have been implemented in comparison with what the Union has really achieved in the field of military capability development, one could argue that the result is actually below par. During this period, the activities surrounding the capability initiatives were not executed in the most efficient manner, causing shortfalls among the European member states. This progression was mainly impeded by poor cohesion between these member states concerning the streamlining of the development process. The level of commitment varies from state to state, creating a multi-speed Europe. Although this concept does not necessarily have a negative impact on capability development, as it also allows member state to establish their own partnerships within and outside of a European context, in this case it does not contribute to improving the development process. There has been adequate progress in the development of national capabilities, but these are unfortunately not interoperable and therefore cannot be included in European military capabilities. Subsequently, the lack of capability development can also be explained by the decrease of national defence funding in most of the states. This also left a noticeable mark on the possibilities to properly set up a strong European defence industry and capability development process. The process is difficult to manage as there are so many different perspectives within the organisation of the Union. In addition, the member states could often not be held responsible for the impediments that occurred during the already slow and difficult process.

In addition, on the basis of the initiatives, the EU has demonstrated to some extent that the policy documents are able to respond to the need of applicable mechanisms in order to solve the capability gap. However, some initiatives have not yet shown concrete results. It is not possible to say with certainty whether these initiatives will actually contribute to the development of military capabilities in the future – presenting various discrepancies between the intended and implemented policy of the Union. At the moment, the EU therefore focuses all its attention and resources on three important capability initiatives: PESCO, CARD and EDF. These initiatives have a strong interdependence, which could improve the synchronisation between member states and military organisations, and make the development process more efficient and cost-effective. The extensive change of the EU institutional environment related to CSDP and the launch these capability initiatives could pave the way to a renewed effectiveness in planning and developing military capabilities within the EU framework.

Chapter 5 EXPLAINING THE DISCREPANCIES: OBSTACLES AND CONDITIONS

> […] If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle. (Giles, 2000, p. 11, while citing Sun Tzu)

Sun Tzu's statement illustrates the importance of understanding the Union's security environment and its response to these threats. By understanding both the threats affecting the Union and its internal nature and possibilities to tackle these threats, we can paint a better picture of the current process of developing military capabilities. This chapter examines obstacles and conditions that explain the discrepancies of the nexus between European policy and military capabilities. The first section explains the various internal obstacles and conditions affecting the progress in developing European military capabilities. Thereafter, the second section elaborates on one the of the internal obstacles that is also influenced by certain externalities: the differences in strategic culture between the Union's member states. Subsequently, the progress is approached with regard to the external influences on the member states' military organisations. The chapter is concluded by answering the following sub-question: *What explains the discrepancies between the intended and implemented policy influencing the progress in developing military capabilities?*

5.1 *The Union's internal barriers in developing European military capabilities*

The current process of developing European military capabilities demonstrates a lethargic pace of progress in improvement. Over the years, the Union has accomplished much to speed up and improve this stagnant process, but as of today it is still not running as coveted. These discrepancies can be explained by the various obstacles and conditions that the process has to address. The slow and difficult progress is reflected by the member states' political decisions over the allocation of corresponding defence resources – both unrestricted spending and procurement, as well as threat assessment indications (Schilde, 2017, p. 37). In the Union's policy and strategies on security and defence no clear indication is given about its focus on military innovation and capability development. Some experts define them as inadequate regarding their support of capability development. They state that the policy documents must become more concrete if defensive capabilities are to be linked to them – highlighting the threats and military capacities attributed to them, and what it will cost (Wilms, personal communication, 5 June, 2019). It is possible that the lack of recognition for military innovation and capability development draws less attention to this subject. As a result, the member states, but also partners and other third parties, may think that the Union does not consider this process of paramount importance. Although the policies do not focus on capability development, the creation of the CSDP, however, was driven by the need for the Union to generate expeditionary force capabilities. The member states have been slow in adopting autonomous and comprehensive expeditionary capabilities, but most of their strategic decisions regarding procurement and technology investment have been in order to attain this purpose (Schilde, 2017, p. 40).

Lack of a proper connection between policy and technology
A further flaw in the analysed European policy documents is the lack of a proper connection between the policy side and the technological side of capability development. At the moment there is no befitting translation of the processes that are conducted in the technological field into policy. According to Zandee (personal communication, 7 May, 2019), there is a problem with translating the technological knowledge of the people working in research and technology (R&T) to the European parliament and citizens. He argues that these people are often unable to properly explain their results in a way that is understandable for the average citizen with a somewhat educated background and that, therefore, it would weaken their advocacy. If this knowledge is transferred in a more alluring and comprehensible manner, it would be able to reach the policy level more efficiently. Unfortunately, this bridge in terms of better communication between policy and R&T is currently not being built, which leads to a setback in capability development (Zandee, personal communication, 7 May, 2019). Policy makers and other

actors often do not know what the findings in R&T can mean for capability development, resulting in a deterioration of the development process, as the aim of the research is to provide defence actors with something producible.

Lack of transparency

The lack of transparency from the EU and its member states, alongside inadequate public awareness, is also an obstacle to the development of military capabilities. There is not enough transparency towards the citizens of the Union when it comes to the necessity of military capabilities. In addition, too little is being done to create sufficient public awareness regarding the subject. Wilms (personal communication, 5 June, 2019) states that it is important for people to understand more about these developments and having a military force in the broadest sense of the word, but that this information must then be given to them. Due to the lack of transparency and public awareness, there is currently little public support for military capability development. This low level of support can ensure that funding and investments are drawn away to subjects of more interest to the citizens of the Union. At present, the citizens in a number of EU member states have adopted an attitude that scorns everything that is happening in Brussels. That must change before the Union can start adequately with the further advancement of plans for developing military capabilities: it has to let the average citizen of the Union know what the return is (Wilms, personal communication, 5 June, 2019). If the people do not support the developments, then it is possible that this may cause a setback in those developments.

Lack of cohesion between member states

The lack of cohesion between EU member states often contributes to the slow and difficult development process. At the moment, the member states do not cooperate sufficiently in the field of military capability development. The reason for this is that defence as an activity is being reconsidered. It is argued that the defence dimension of certain activities cannot easily be characterised, as the intermission between defence and security is difficult to comprehend (Tardy, 2018, p. 134). Most member states cannot agree on what defence exactly is – whether it is the use of force or the deterrence of a political opponent. In addition, they disagree on the merits the use of force will provide the Union in international politics. Therefore, they have doubts about fully embracing the EU defence agenda if this agenda places great emphasis on defence in the form of the use of hard power. Based on this situation, Bekkers argues:

> Politics looks nice on paper, but capacities are in the hands of the member states. If, apart from financing, the need for a common policy is recognized, each country has a different perspective on it. This will give you relatively abstract documents, such as the EU security and defence policy. Countries are then unwilling to provide capacities for purposes that are not their own. So what remains is a discrepancy between the need for a common policy and where you need to deploy specific capacities. That will remain an eternal bottleneck. (Bekkers, personal communication, 7 May, 2019)

The changes in patterns of capability development and material investment can be explained by the various external threats, "specifically in a partial shift from a dominant focus on defence reform via expeditionary capability investment over the last two decades towards strategies of investing in territorial and internal security capabilities" (Schilde, 2017, p. 37). It has become clear that some member states are not able to contribute to European defence, and those who can afford to contribute have a reflex to keep their capabilities to themselves. This is in contrast to what is actually expected to happen: the member states pooling their capacities considering they do not possess enough individually. The result is that it the process deteriorates even further, because it is not enough to make an impact at the global level (Biscop, personal communication, 3 June, 2019). It was argued that a united European perspective on the structure and depth of defence cooperation – a European strategic culture – would create an impetus for developing European military capabilities collectively (Cornish & Edward, 2001, 597). However, this is impeded by the divergent strategic cultures among the Union's member states. Current defence developments within the Union, along with the UK's departure, illustrate a growing convergence over the merits of defending its territory. Yet, the differences are strong and likely to interfere with the development of European military capabilities. Although initiatives such as PESCO

make a good contribution to the development of military capabilities, there are also a number of implications. A multi-speed Europa can be beneficial in cooperation, but also ensures that certain member states that do not want to fall behind will participate – which slows down the process significantly. The divergence in strategic cultures as an obstacle to military capability development is further explained in section 5.2.

Financial restrictions
The financial situation within the various (military) organisation, both within the EU and at a national level, often also form an obstacle to the development of military capabilities. Besides a lack of funding for capability development – partly due to the lack of public support and political decision-making – there is not enough financial space to live up to the Union's level of ambition. Reykers (2017) also states that a flawed funding principle and national financial constraints can be identified as obstacles to the development process. More specifically, she highlights that the future of capability development is determined by the Union's ability to diminish both the political and financial costs simultaneously (Reykers, 2017, p. 461). Over the past few years, there has been an emergence and gradual unification of a joint approach to economic diplomacy within the EU, especially within the economic-political-security nexus and the need for a better connection between the Union's defence and security policy and its financial and monetary role on a global scale (EEAS, 2019b, pp. 28-29). However, this also ensures that EU residents become closely involved in the capability development process, since part of their money is invested in it. Therefore, Eastern European countries often complain that 'Europe' does talk about military capabilities in fine words, but when investments have to be made, many member states opt to invest in matters other than military capabilities (Segers, personal communication, 27 May, 2019). One of the conflicting points within the EU is to achieve a larger budget for defence. This can be spent on pensions, but also on developing and maintaining capabilities. The latter, which is also agreed on within NATO, should also be larger when it comes to European military cooperation (Van Willigen, personal communication, 8 May, 2019). All this requires a significant increase of financial investment in the Union's external action, including defence, greater visibility, and expanding joint capability development among member states.

In recent years it has been criticised that European member states invest too little in developing military capabilities, in both European and NATO context. Within the European Union itself there are enough funds available for the development of capabilities. To be eligible for funding, the states must first find suitable partners and present a joint design. This requires compromises and a market to be found that embraces the initiative, which unfortunately is not always possible (Wilms, personal communication, 5 June, 2019). The states often also have to reimburse the costs of providing their own capabilities for CSDP missions. As a result, it is possible that the states no longer want to develop capabilities. A different budgeting mechanism is therefore advocated, so that states contributing to the missions do not have to pay for all costs (Bekkers, personal communication, 7 May, 2019). It has been argued that the high financial and political costs of capability development as well as the unanimity requirement for EU decision on security and defence comprise the primary causes for the lack of European military capabilities (Reykers, 2017, p. 461). This is reflected by the rising costs of military hardware and high costs for research and development (R&D) as a result of the rapidly evolving technological environment. This limits the launch of new defence programmes and affects European innovation and capability development directly (European Commission, 2018a, p. 7). The rate at which the costs of military hardware increase over consecutive generations considerably surpasses the average inflation rates for civil products. Estimates of intergenerational cost escalation can reach figures with an average increase of 5% per year in real terms (Nordlund, 2016, p. 268). It is a long-term trend in capability development and originates from the technological competition in an area where innovation often takes place at a technological frontier that can be associated with high expenses (Hove & Lillekvelland, 2016, p. 211). Because the defence equipment budgets cannot keep up with rising costs, the amount of military hardware that can be purchased with national budgets will decrease and so will the amount of new development projects.

The progress in capability development has been further complicated by national defence budget cutbacks in the past ten years. This had a major impact on R&D and equipment expenditures in particular, as the expenditure of member states was lowered by 12% between 2006 and 2013 (European Defence Agency, 2018c, p. 14). These trends pose a long-term threat to the Union's ability to maintain military capabilities corresponding to its level of ambition, considering that defence R&T is fundamental for capability development. The uncertainty about the procurement of military hardware is an obstacle for the defence industry. The industry is prepared to invest in R&D if it has certainty that products will be purchased at the end of the process (Bekkers, personal communication, 7 May, 2019). Within many member states, efforts are being made to provide greater financial security through national defence strategies. By this means they assure companies that their products are purchased if they are involved in the development process at an early stage. Despite the interaction between the increasing costs and cutbacks in defence budgets, the development of capabilities has remained largely at a national level with limited joint equipment procurement (European Commission, 2018a, p. 10). Individual European procurement cycles ensure that states miss out on opportunities to cooperate with each other because their budget is spent on other projects – stressing the importance of CARD, as it could lead to greater synchronisation between governments and military organisations (Fiott, personal communication, 16 May, 2019). The joint capability development can also be affected by problems with the synchronisation of budget procedures, causing duplications and withholding an efficient process (European Commission, 2018a, p. 12). Although the European Commission has a sufficient budget to support these developments, the cooperation initiative must come from the member states themselves.

These problems lead to fragmentation and lack of collaboration in the defence industry. Limited defence cooperation and joint capability development implies duplications and "results in a defence industry that remains highly fragmented along national borders" (European Commissions, 2018a, p. 14). Due to the resulting duplications, the defence industry is impeded from establishing an efficient production process, because the relatively small national markets are favoured on the basis of domestic solutions and a nationally oriented R&D sector (Bellais, 2018, p. 95). As a result, the European defence market faces a serious threat of losing its innovative capacity and technological advantage at the global level. For this reason, the European Parliament has increased the budget for innovation from 5% to 8%, which means that more than 120 million euros per year is spent on innovation (European Commission, personal communication, 20 June, 2019). The European Commission therefore encourages universities and companies to come up with ideas for defence and the development of military capabilities, with the idea in mind that the progress made through this research will yield high technological capabilities over twenty years.

5.2 Divergences in capability development intentions: Strategic cultures within the EU

Strategic cultures are one of the obstacles to the development of military capabilities. The European member states each have their own strategic culture and these often differ in certain areas, causing the states to clash in their perspective on which priorities should shape the development process. There are several challenges within the field of strategic cultures, most of them shaped by both internal and external influences (Haine, 2011, p. 589). These issues contribute to the perspective of the various states regarding defence and the associated military capabilities. The reduced contribution of America to European security and defence, for example, plays a major role in dividing the European states and this has an impact on what available resources the member states afford to the EU versus NATO (Fiott, personal communication, 16 May, 2019).

In addition, the member states are struggling among themselves about the implementation of initiatives such as PESCO. On the one hand, France wants to see PESCO as a restricted association of states willing to pool capabilities so as to conduct important CSDP missions, and on the other hand Germany has enunciated a more inclusive approach in which PESCO is the means to an end – improving overall cooperation around capability development projects. It is argued that at this moment it is not clear what approached will be adopted by the member states in the long run, although "there is a chance or risk that with the UK out, the German conception would become more central, at the expense of an EU mission-oriented role" (Tardy, 2018, p. 133). It is hard to predict this outcome, as each different

state looks differently at the development of military capabilities. In order to clarify these differences, this section explores which positions are adopted within the strategic cultures, thus explaining how the differences in strategic culture contribute to the difficult development.

Eastern Europe versus Western Europe

The differences in strategic culture between the member states in Eastern Europe and those in Western Europe can largely be explained on the basis of their level of ambition in international security policy and their security environment. The member states in Western Europe have politically promoted security and defence policy and have made the largest operational contribution. However, advancing this policy requires that the different perceptions of threats are taken into account, as they may influence the development of military capabilities (Chappell, 2010, p. 225). Eastern Europe has to deal with an ever-present threat from its assertive neighbour Russia. The focus of these states, such as Poland, Romania and the Baltic States, is primarily on the collective defence of their borders and territory (Biehl, Giegerich & Jonas, 2013, p. 394), since they are at the front should a war break out with Russia. Western Europe, on the other hand, focuses more on either their ambition or the manifestation of their state. Some states, such as France, the UK and the Netherlands, are engaged in carrying out CSDP missions and interventions at a global level, while states such as Austria, Ireland and Luxembourg want to contribute to defence cooperation but do not necessarily aspire to play a role on the global stage (Biehl, Giegerich & Jonas, 2013, p. 394).

Both sides have a different perception of the impending threats. The differences in culture, especially if you also consider the threat perception as a part of it, affect the interests of those member states. This has led to a discussion about the reason why Europe must develop its military capabilities. For years there has been a complaint from Eastern Europe that Western Europe is not sufficiently prepared to invest in security and defence and that they have to invest in military capabilities if they want to improve European defence cooperation. In recent years, the priority of defence and investing in capability development has increased across the board. This process has been going on in Eastern Europe during this time, but this cannot be said about the situation in Western Europe (Segers, personal communication, 27 May, 2019). If you look at which countries invest enough when it comes to NATO's requirement – spending 2% of their GDP on defence – then those are Eastern European countries. Although they have to cut back on important issues in society, they never cut back on defence – the reason being that their priorities are defending against Russia.

Northern Europe versus Southern Europe

The differences in strategic culture between the member states in Northern Europe and Southern Europe can mainly be explained on the basis of their security environment and perception of threats. The north of Europa prefers to protect and project its state power. States such as Sweden and Denmark are often engaged in foreign interventions and emphasise their willingness to use military force (Biehl, Giegerich and Jonas, 2013, p. 394). However, this is not the only reason why Northern Europe wants to develop military capabilities. These states also have to contend with the threat from Russia, just like Eastern Europe. Finland and Sweden in particular see this as a priority within their own defence planning (European Commission, personal communication, 20 June, 2019). The northern European states often join the initiatives that originate from Western member states or NATO, whereas the southern European states diverged from the pro-interventionist mainstream early on in European military cooperation (Meyer, 2004, p. 19). In Southern Europe, the priorities are primarily to counteract the problems that arise from the belt of instability – Northern Africa and the Middle East. The urgency of this situation is also emphasised by Graziano:

> In relation to the multidimensional threats and challenges that we are currently facing, it is worth noting how those threats and challenges are interlinked and able to deeply affect our perceptions. Especially within the African continent, the triangular relationship between the variables – terrorism-migration-instability – retains particular importance and requires governments and international organisations to tackle the ensuing security challenges by systematically targeting all three variables. Although there is not a direct connection between terrorism and migration, and recalling that immigrants as such are not criminals, we cannot mitigate the consequences of migration without supporting the countries of origin, be it through

capacity building measures or through support to their fight against terrorism. Needless to say, that coherence of efforts is paramount to achieve these goals, and it can be only promoted by a unified vision and the development of a common defence culture. (Graziano, personal communication, 25 July, 2019)

Controlling and counteracting these (illegal) migration flows and terrorism are matters of great importance to the southern European member states. In addition, territorial defence is important for a state such as Greece. During the Eurozone crisis, Greece has had to cut back a lot, but they have never cut back on their defence spending. This is because of the circumstances with Turkey, Cyprus and, to a certain extent, North Macedonia which bring the Greeks to the decision: 'no matter how hard we have to cut back, we will not cut back on defence' (Segers, personal communication, 27 May, 2019). Although there are a number of similarities in both strategic cultures, there are also a number of differences that can hinder the development of military capabilities. The way in which these capabilities are planned to be deployed in particular may have an impact on the development process.

Transatlantic oriented versus European Union oriented
There is also a division between the European member states on the orientation of foreign security and defence policy. Some of the states regard NATO as their primary political-security actor, while others have a tendency towards the EU. Although most states initially only looked at NATO for their collective defence, there are now a number of states that increasingly deviate from the transatlantic alliance. This is due to the alliance's internal struggles: disagreements within the alliance on burden sharing aggravated by the economic ties that limit many European states, the American captivation of hard power and a tendency to militarise most security related issues, and the European fear of abandonment in the wake of the American pivot to the Pacific (Sperling, 2017, p. 300). While these external factors play a role in the ambition to improve European security cooperation, it also seems clear that internal factors explain how European member states specifically choose which military capabilities they require to develop and for what purpose. The requirement of common policies and engagement is generated by the shared problems and vulnerabilities in European defence cooperation. It is argued that various institutional instruments (such as the CSDP) can help with supplying the foundation for defence cooperation and joint capability development (Smith, 2018, p. 608). However, there is a basic difference between the EU and NATO. NATO is a military alliance and in that sense is incomparable with the EU, since the EU is an international organisation with supranational characteristics that has traditionally focused on the economy. This is the reason why a number of member states, in particular the UK and the Netherlands, strongly advocate European defence cooperation via NATO and also adjust their capability development accordingly. Due to the departure of the UK, some states look with suspicion at possible initiatives in the field of security policy from the EU that are dominated by the German-French axis (Bekkers, personal communication, 7 May, 2019). NATO has greater credibility than the EU for most Member States when it comes to military intervention. On top of that, NATO is generally seen as the main protector against possible new threats from the East, especially in Central and Eastern Europe.

States such as France and Portugal are increasingly focusing on defence cooperation within the institutional framework of the European Union. These EU member states within NATO have not yet given up the idea of a common defence pact, even though they are increasingly trying to develop their own defence structure within the EU. Alternatively, they embrace their own approach to security and defence, which involves "a utilitarian ethic in terms of what policies it believes are most effective in the management of Europe's modern security problems; and a deontological ethic in terms of what policies it believes are not just more effective but also more reflective of the fundamental values of a larger community, in this case the EU itself" (Smith, 2018, p. 609). This approach conflicts with that of the states with a transatlantic orientation. In particular, the more transatlantic oriented states are reluctant to weaken NATO's employability, intentionally or unintentionally, by embarking on too many new initiatives on the European ground (Van Willigen, personal communication, 8 May, 2019). Various states set the conditions for developing military capabilities – only developing capabilities if they are also coordinated with NATO. This is all the more problematic because there are states, such as France, that often try to use the EU as a way to distance themselves from NATO. The French are not content with NATO being led by the Americans and that the Americans dominate its foreign policy (Segers,

personal communication, 27 May, 2019). The EU oriented states want to set an independent course and anticipate they can better use the EU for their defence cooperation and capability development.

Urgency versus ambition
Within the strategic cultures of the different member states, a distinction can be made between urgency and ambition. Some states, such as those in Eastern and Southern Europe, often develop their military capabilities because of the necessity that arises from the threats in their security environment, while states in Northern and Western Europe develop capabilities that can be utilised during CSDP missions and other global security challenges. The perception of threats in Eastern and Southern Europe differs from that of the rest of the Union. The differences in culture, including the threat perception, influence the interests of these states in the development of military capabilities (Bekkers, personal communication, 7 May, 2019). Several states, including the Baltic and other eastern European states, are mainly interested in collective defence. Their military capability development is driven by the desire to generate dependable security guarantees for themselves. They try to keep the military ties within the EU and NATO as strong as possible in the expectation that their allies will retaliate should they ever be attacked. It is argued that their concern about the conventional military threat from Russia stresses them to develop capabilities for territorial defence, rather than reorientation towards global security challenges (Biehl, Giegerich & Jonas, 2013, p. 392). The difference between the interests of the member states concerns how threatening the circumstances are and is likewise related to geographical location – a difference that cannot be solved easily. These differences in turn contribute to the slow and difficult process in capability development.

5.3 *External influences from the global economic and geopolitical force field*

In contrast to the obstacles that impede the development process from within the Union itself, there are also a number of external influences by which these discrepancies can be solved – or worsened if not properly addressed. The three most common and important influences are discussed in this section.

EU-NATO cooperation
One of these influences is the EU-NATO cooperation. Both organisations could benefit from an increased cohesion among the member states. The states' diverging threat priorities and the division of labour among them would improve capability development, as "each state could focus on areas in which it enjoys a competitive advantage, with allies complementing each other, in effect creating federated capabilities" (Béraud-Sudreau & Giegerich, 2018, p. 70). However, this would require member states to embrace greater interconnection and a new form of burden sharing, which requires strong mutual trust. Unfortunately, this strong mutual trust is not yet present between the EU member states. The situation in NATO is not much better in this stage, since the same obstacles apply to both parties. Based on this situation, Wilms states:

> The cooperation between the EU and NATO is very important. However, this cooperation could be improved upon, also in the area of capabilities development. We, the Netherlands, have a single centred force. We do not have separate EU or NATO troops. Our equipment must be usable everywhere, including UN and OSCE mission. The member states must consult better and develop their capabilities together, so that they have more power. The Americans are also not a partner that you can just put aside easily. In addition, it is strange that every state within the EU and also within NATO has a whole range of capabilities. They need to focus on specialization, that a state such as the Netherlands, for example, focuses on mine-hunting or special forces, but that requires great trust in each other. If it is really necessary, then they must also be ready for each other. At the moment, there is no such confidence and until there is, everyone will develop their capabilities through national programmes. (Wilms, personal communication, 5 June, 2019)

Duplication and the tension around capability development within NATO are important reasons for the reluctance to jointly develop military capabilities within the EU. It is argued that the anathema must be broken on both sides, after which it must be recognised that in many domains it makes no sense to set capability targets for individual countries that they will never achieve (Biscop, personal communication, 3 June, 2019). There must be collective targets for member states and European partners that can be

achieved through EU initiatives and mechanisms, while they must realise that PESCO does not function well if it is only used to develop capabilities for CSDP operations (Biscop, personal communication, 3 June, 2019). If cooperation between the EU and NATO could reach this level, the Union would be strong enough to develop sufficient military capabilities, to reform its existing international status, and to take on a hegemonic global role. It is argued that investing in this cooperation will have a favourable output for the Union, since the global level of ambition it aspires to achieve can only evolve through a strong and effective NATO (Demetriou, 2016, p. 12).

However, at the moment the cooperation is not going as desired, as working in a NATO context comes with certain constraints. The development of military capabilities alongside the EU comes with technology costs: European firms do not hold any rights on the intellectual properties and military organisation are often not able to fully use the newly developed capabilities (Fiott, personal communication, 16 May, 2019). The Union must look for member states that are willing to cooperate and have confidence in European defence. This allows the EU to grow into a strong military actor without weakening NATO (Van Willigen, personal communication, 8 May, 2019). Since the EU cannot afford to go solo, the transatlantic partnership still has many years of existence ahead. NATO's close cooperation with the CSDP is valuable for EU-US relations and will result evidently in a more effective and enduring EU-NATO cooperation if both parties are committed to it. Initiatives like PESCO, CARD and EDF represent a way for strengthening the European pillar inside NATO, providing it with a broader spectrum of capabilities in line with the strategic goal of NATO itself (Graziano, personal communication, 25 July, 2019). Therefore, it is not an attempt to dissolve the transatlantic cooperation, but rather a way to strengthen cohesion and strengthen ties within the alliance.

Civil-military relations

The second influence is civil-military relations. The relationship between civilian and military actors in the field of military innovation also plays an important role in the development of military capabilities, as it is argued that civil-military relations are primary drivers, or inhibitors of this innovation (Avant, 1993, p. 410). Military capabilities are increasingly based on technologies that have not been developed for military purposes, but for civilian use. An R&T budget is often also made available for this, after which the technology is used for military use – artificial intelligence (AI) or robotics. That is a point where companies that are currently purely civilian are also going to militarise technology through initiatives from the Commission or Council (Bekkers, personal communication, 7 May, 2019). Military capability development increasingly uses civilian technology. Therefore, a powerful European innovation, in the general sense, will certainly contribute to innovative military capabilities. Some scholars confirm that the relationship between military organisations and their civilian environment are interactive, influencing the depth and width of military innovation and with that also capability development (Farrell & Terriff, 2002a, p. 275). In addition, the European Commission plays a major role in supporting a good civil-military relationship. With their financial instrument Horizon 2020 – an extensive EU research and innovation programme, also known as Horizon Europe – they provide funding for civil research in areas such as AI and cyber, therewith also supporting the application of these technologies into military capabilities. However, there is a reluctance among a part of the civilian sector to cooperate with governments and military organisations because of reputational issues and the fear that they will lose their intellectual rights to these institutions (Fiott, personal communication, 16 May, 2019). If Europe does not get involved in these civil technological developments, while other countries on the world scene are often leading the way, it also means that the Union cannot keep up with development of new military capabilities either.

Industrial interests

The capability development process is also affected by (international) industrial interests. These differences make an obstacle for closer cooperation in general, as some member states retain closed markets and others not. Some favour cooperation with parties outside of Europe, other not (Fiott, personal communication, 16 May, 2019). It is argued that the upper echelon of military organisations prefers military hardware available on international markets over domestic development programmes, even though the political elite wants to balance economic development and provide jobs, knowledge

and profits through their own industries (Moravcsik, 1991, p. 40). Little attention is being paid in the EU to the industrial influence on the process. In large countries, such as France, Italy, Germany and also still the United Kingdom, where the defence industry is much larger than in the other medium and small member states, the retention of jobs, knowledge and assignments in a purely national context plays a more important role then in countries that purchase military hardware fully off-the-shelf (Zandee, personal communication, 7 May, 2019). Many European military capabilities are therefore being developed in a unilateral context, since some member states want to protect their own defence industry. The preservation of the national defence industry causes a certain amount of economic pressure on the member states, which often makes them less willing to cooperatively develop military capabilities. This is often interconnected with their sovereignty, but also simply with economic reasons. As a result, the competition for capability development in the international field is considerably lost. There is therefore also a need from an industrial point of view to work together to maintain a viable defence industry on a global scale (Bekkers, personal communication, 7 May, 2019). It is also argued that member states with different state-defence industry relations behave differently towards each other within certain CSDP institutions and that it is important for the Union to focus attention to the amalgamated politico-economic base of these member states in order to protect the development of military capabilities (Calcara, 2017, p. 545). There is not enough mutual trust between member states. The states with a large defence industry would like to expand, but the Union believes that it should therefore be open to the other member states if they want to be funded by the EU (European Commission, personal communication, 20 June, 2019). While not all of these national projects are representative of the Union as a whole, it is suggested that the defence industry itself is less keen on pursuing national projects and is somewhat inclined to streamline its capability development with the global market (Kluth, 2017, p. 171). This also leads to an impediment of the joint development of military capabilities within the European Union, as the European defence industry and military organisation cannot find common ground on these developments.

5.4 *In conclusion*

This chapter aimed to identify the obstacles and conditions influencing the improvement of the development process. It did so by explaining the various issues that affecting European policy and capability development. Hence, the following sub-question can now be answered: *What explains the discrepancies between the intended and implemented policy influencing the progress in developing military capabilities?*

The lack of military innovation and capability development in the European policy documents has a negative impact on the progress, as the repudiation of both subjects draws away the attention of the member states. In addition, the process is deficient in a proper connection between the policy and the technological aspects of military capability development. The lack of transparency and public awareness also play a major role in influencing progress. Without the support of the public, it will be difficult for member states to justify their defence spending. Accordingly, most member states desire to maintain a part of their sovereignty regarding of capabilities development and therefore attempt to keep a completely independent national defence industry to preserve the latter. Nevertheless, the progress can also be influenced by cooperation between the EU and NATO. Both organisations can benefit from better cohesion in the field of military cooperation, as it would enhance their ability to field joint capabilities. At the moment, however, the collaboration is not proceeding as desired. The poor coordination between both parties generates duplications and capabilities that are not interoperable. Another condition that affects the progress is civil-military relations. Improved cooperation between civilian and military organisations can lead to a major leap in technological developments in the military domain, as long as the civilian sector is able to keep up with competition at the global level.

The different strategic cultures within the European Union are also an obstacle to the progress. Because states each have different perceptions of threats to their borders and territory - Eastern Europe focuses on the threat from Russia and Southern Europe on those from the belt of instability - the opinions on which policies and capabilities need to be developed and for which reasons differ. Northern and Western Europe would like to see the developed capabilities used for crisis management operations and

consolidating global security, which is contrary to the wishes of the other side of Europe. In addition, there is also a transatlantic-European divide, since some states want to develop capabilities in accordance with NATO guidelines, while others look at the EU for their defence and security. These divergent perceptions on policy and capabilities ensure that the member states cannot reach a consensus, meaning that the process is being obstructed from further advancement.

Financial obstacles also contribute to the difficult progress. It is said that some member states do not invest enough in defence. In addition, the costs for the procurement of military hardware and R&D are increasing. In combination with the budget cutbacks of recent years, it can be concluded that the member states generally do not spend enough on defence. Subsequently, the fragmentation of the defence industry also generates some obstacles, as limited cooperation in that area often leads to duplications and unusable capabilities.

Chapter 6   CONCLUSION: THE LONG ROAD AHEAD

> Europeans now know and are acting upon the recognition that security, including defence, is an integral part of the European project. The road ahead is still long. Yet for a Union that has traditionally struggled to move forward together on security and defence, the initiatives taken over the last three years represent a step-change in the history of the European project. (EEAS, 2019b, p. 12)

The groundwork of this study was based on a twofold objective: to develop a framework for analysing and interpreting European policy documents on security and defence and to expand the knowledge of and insight in the slow and difficult progress in improving the nexus between European military capabilities and policy. Hence, the main research question was: *What explains the slow and difficult progress in improving the nexus between European policy and military capabilities?* Subsequently, three sub-questions were answered to facilitate the comprehensive conclusion of this study.

The first step was to address the European policy documents and the different schools of thought on the ambiguous development process. Based on the defined principles of strategic culture and military innovation, an analytical tool was developed to analyse and interpret the European policy documents on security and defence (CSDP, ESS and EUGS). Hence, the first sub-question was: *How did the evolution in European security and defence policy contribute to developing military capabilities?* The significant transformation of European policy has made a positive contribution to the improvement of the nexus. Although there are still some areas for improvement, the evolution of the CSDP and the corresponding security strategies have created favourable conditions for further development of both the policies themselves as well as military capabilities. The Global Strategy learned from the flaws of its predecessor, as illustrated by its emphasis on external actions and shared norms in acting on the global stage. Various conditions were highlighted in the documents that could further the development of the nexus. A clear prominence of civil-military cooperation in all policy documents would force the European military organisation to implement more innovative ways of capability development. Furthermore, this would also apply to the institutionalisation of shared norms regarding the use of soft and hard power instruments, as it would provide the Union and its member states with a more comprehensive understanding of the capability development process and the stakeholders involved. However, the lack of focus on elements such as military innovation and its cultural aspects, and the willingness to use military force could be an impediment for improvement, as member states and other stakeholders could interpret this absence as a reluctance to develop military capabilities. In addition, the low level of executive flexibility deprives pioneering member states of the possibility to innovate, obstructing further improvement of the nexus.

The second step was to answer the sub-question: *What progress has been achieved in developing military capabilities on the basis of policy during the last two decades?* This chapter aimed to explain the (lack of) progress in developing military capabilities, both contemporary and in retrospect. It provided an insight into the obstacles that contributed to the slow and difficult progress in the past and those that affect it present-day. Since the creation of the first security and defence policy, the Union has made some substantial progress in developing military capabilities. Since its previous focus on soft power neglected the Union's politico-military component, it now started the development of military capabilities that could perform multi-faceted crisis management operations by setting up several goals and initiatives in support of this process. However, when looking at the time frame in which this progress was achieved, one could argue that the results are actually inadequate. The policy documents also demonstrated the Union's response to solving important capability shortfalls, although it is too early to say whether this response in the form of capability initiatives will yield the desired result – contributing to capability development efforts in the future. The inadequate execution of various initiatives caused several shortfalls, as the progress was impeded by the poor cohesion between member states in streamlining capability development efforts. In addition, the varying level of commitment among member states administered a multi-speed Europe. Although usually a seamless concept, it now impedes the capability development process, causing member states to focus on national development planning. Subsequently, cutbacks in national defence budgets exhausted the possibility to set up a strong European defence industry, thus limiting capability development. In response, the Union emphasises

three important initiatives (PESCO, CARD and EDF), allocating resources in order to ensure that these capability initiatives could improve the synchronisation between member states and military organisation – paving a way to a renewed effectiveness in planning and developing military capabilities within the Union's framework.

After the policy documents were analysed and interpreted and two decades of military capabilities have been explored, Chapter 5 focused on the obstacles and conditions influencing the slow and difficult progress in improvement were. Accordingly, the third sub-question was: *What explains the discrepancies between the intended and implemented policy influencing the slow and difficult progress in developing military capabilities?* In this chapter it is concluded that there is a multitude of obstacles and conditions that cause various discrepancies between the intended and implemented policy – influencing the progress in improving the nexus. First, the internal barriers are addressed, explaining that the lack of military innovation, capability development and a proper connection with its technological aspects in European policy documents ensures that member states are less concerned about these issues. Financial circumstances, on the other hand, illustrate that member states do not invest enough in military capabilities, while the costs of procuring military hardware and R&D are increasing. In addition, the process is affected by the absence of transparency and public awareness. Subsequently, the chapter identifies another major obstacle that explains the various discrepancies: strategic culture. The differing perceptions of the member states ensure that no consensus can be reached, impeding the improvement of the nexus. Regarding the external influences, the cooperation between the civil-military relations and cooperation between the EU and NATO can both affect the progress in either a positive or negative manner, as they can enhance the ability to develop capabilities and may provide the Union with a technological edge.

Finally, the main research question of this study can be answered: *What explains the slow and difficult progress in improving the nexus between European policy and military capabilities?* Evading to repeat the previous answers to the sub-questions, one can argue that the slow and difficult progress can be explained by multiple elements. Military capability development within the framework of the European Union is a complex and sometimes incomprehensible process which is of great importance to a favourable implementation of the European policy on security and defence. Improving the nexus between them involves several steps and stakeholders, including the member states and the Union itself. Close cooperation between these stakeholders is crucial throughout the process, both at the early stage of identifying shortfalls in Europe's military capabilities and later on when establishing joint projects to solve the capability gap. It almost goes without saying that the entire development process is completely controlled by the EU member states – with moderate support of the Union's various institutions. However, it can be concluded that the progress in improvement is impeded by the different perspectives on the development and use of military capabilities. The interactions of member states in security and defence is structured through their strategic culture, as their strategic behaviour is subject to the influence of unique historical experiences of the respective security community. These experiences, in addition to the contemporary and often distinct security environment of each member state, generate perspectives that are often not in harmony, causing disagreement within the Union, which further obstructs the improvement of the nexus between European policy and military capabilities.

The current EU policy documents on security and defence are suitable to develop the right conditions to generate and improve European military cooperation, including capability development. They provide the foundation on which the nexus between policy and military capability can be improved. Various initiatives have been set up on the basis of these policy documents to support and improve the development process. Unfortunately, these initiatives have not always been effective, providing multiple impetuses, but never a major breakthrough. This illustrates the considerable discrepancies between the intended and implemented policy. Most significant steps in the field of defence in the history of European integration actually come from individual member states, as it directly affects their sovereignty, which remains an important element among EU member states. Therefore, it can be concluded that the willingness of the member states remains at the heart of the issue. It is worth highlighting that the current policy documents and related initiatives are just tools, which for their implementation require efforts as well as to be underpinned by the acknowledgement that no single state can face the existing threats alone.

The already overstretched European defence budgets, given the financial crisis, were severely affected by cutbacks, resulting in a decreased expenditure on defence R&D and equipment procurement. This not only suppressed the Union's inclination for expeditionary crisis management operations, but also affected the capabilities of Europe's armed forces. With defence spending remaining at a historical low, it poses a long-term threat to the Union's ability to maintain military capabilities corresponding with its level of ambition. The member states face the common challenge of how to finance their capability development efforts given the substantial budget constraints, needing to manage the combination of limited budgets and a complex and diverse portfolio of civil and military operations and missions. In addition, the insufficient administering of budget procedures causes duplications, withholding member states of an efficient development of military capabilities. If strategic priorities on defence spending were better established, it could improve cooperation on developing complementary and interoperable capabilities. Subsequently, the European defence market faces the threat of losing its innovative capacity and technological advantage at the global level, due to the national orientation on R&D and defence expenditures, contributing to an already declining investment on developing common policy and military capabilities.

Discussion

This study examined what explains the slow and difficult progress in improving the nexus between European policy and military capabilities in the light of the historical and contemporary obstacles and advancements in the subject as outlined in previous chapters. The results indicate that the progress can be explained by several elements, such as certain hiatus in European security and defence policy, strategic cultures, and financial circumstances. Each of these elements plays a significant role on its own, affecting the improvement of the nexus. However, this does not happen within an individual timeframe for each element. These obstacles and conditions simultaneously influence the progress together, resulting in the many challenges that the European member states face today.

The results contradict the claim of Schilde (2007) that changes in capability development are not influenced by defence spending. It is clear that the budget cutbacks – which directly influence spending – alongside the increasing costs of R&D and equipment procurement are among the main obstacles that explain the slow and difficult progress in improvement. Financial activity can also be connected to strategic culture, as the perspective of member states on the initial threats stemming from their security environment influences defence expenditure, highlighting changes in their capability development and procurement. In addition, both the financial circumstances and strategic cultures are interconnected with European policy, as European policy makers must take the different strategic perceptions and budgetary capacities of each individual member states into account. However, the key to better European military cooperation lies not with the policy makers of the EU, but with those of the member states. The differences between them are perhaps the biggest obstacle to improving the nexus. The EU provides the member states with the tools and financing to build a strong and resilient Europe, but they are not using this opportunity – forfeiting the ability to address the threats they face together. They maintain a strong national orientation, hesitating to commit to the joint development of policy and military capabilities. By sacrificing a part of their sovereignty, consensus on the development of military capabilities could be achieved in a more efficient manner. Finally, the results are in line with theory on military innovation of Posen (1984), as this study highlights the importance of civil-military relations. It illustrates that civilian intervention is required to force the military organisation within the EU to change, providing the Union with an incentive to develop its capabilities according to the technological advancements in the civil sector.

This study provides a new insight into the relationship between European policy and military capability development. It concludes that a well thought out and supportive policy can lay a strong foundation for the development of military capabilities. However, it does not guarantee that the quality of the policy is significant when the progress in improving the nexus is also influenced by issues such as the discrepancy of member states. It also illustrates that military capabilities are not always formed on the basis of policy, but often also an ad hoc basis of certain necessities or security environment. In addition, the results confirm existing theories that individually address the different obstacles and

conditions. The results build on the existing evidence that "everything a security community does, if not a manifestation of strategic culture, is at least an example of behaviour effected by culturally shaped, or encultured, people, organisations, procedures, and weapons" (Gray, 1999, p. 52), highlighting the influence of strategic cultures on improving the nexus. It also confirmed the research done by Farrell and Terriff (2002), demonstrating that elements such as the legitimacy of an organisation and the identity of its members are on par with increased military effectiveness when it comes to being an influential reason for military change – showing that EU member states must align their expectations and cooperate to change and improve the nexus between policy and military capability development. By examining the main challenges, key drivers, evolution, and obstacles and conditions in the post-Cold War development of military capabilities, this study helped the European Union and its member states in exploring what explains the slow and difficult progress in improving European military cooperation, as it provides them with a comprehensive overview of the various obstacles and condition that influence the development of both security and defence policies and military capabilities.

This study sheds a light on the conceptual and practical imbalance in the European policy documents on security and defence. Using only a Eurocentric analytical lens without initially looking at the national level, it limited the generalisability of the results. Excluding the national level in a comparative perspective, it becomes hard to comprehend the complexity of, and divergences in, European policy and military capability development. The validity of this study is impacted by the difficulty of testing the results and interpretations of the analysis of the policy documents in practice. Although it was not a feasible ambition for this research, it would have improved on showing whether the results corresponded to established theories and other measures of the same concept. In addition, the reliability could be affected, as both the policy analysis and the resulting tables can be interpreted differently by other researchers. Whereas it would not limit the overall research or results, it could induce a slight change in the perspective of which obstacles and conditions are most relevant in improving the nexus. It was also difficult to explore and explain the contributions of the various capability initiatives due to the lack of available data. At some point, the EU stopped releasing data on European capability development, because otherwise too much information would be made public. Furthermore, this study investigated the influence of sustainability on improving the nexus. However, nothing of significance could be discovered in the existing literature and the interview participants were not knowledgeable enough in this field of study. As a result, the input was not adequate enough to include the subject in the results of this study.

Since certain implementations were beyond the scope of this study, further research is needed to establish a cross-European comparative overview of national defence policies and capability development. The study of European military cooperation would be significantly enhanced through a more detailed elaboration on the security and defence policies and military capabilities of each European member state. Such a comparative analysis would provide an assessment of the degree of divergence of strategic cultures and capabilities across the Union. By refocusing attention on national defence policy and capabilities, the Union could address the increasing imbalances within the nexus between policy and military capabilities. In addition, future studies should consider the effect of the growing movement surrounding sustainability within European military organisation. Since it is not yet known whether 'the greening of defence' would be an obstacle to the development of policy and capabilities, it is important to explore whether this development would enable rather than constrain the development of European military capabilities. By analysing the focus on sustainability of various military organisations within the European Union and its member states, it could provide a significant insight in further possibilities for capability development.

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APPENDIX

Appendix I. Interview protocol

(Time ± 60 min.)

> Name participant:
> Company/organization:
> Function:

General note:

Try to let the participant speak as much as possible. Stimulate this by asking 'how' and 'why' questions. (❖ are main questions and ▪ are follow-up questions)

> Introduction of attendees

- ▪ Short social talk
- ▪ Introduction of attendees

> Short introduction of my thesis and the interview (± 5 min)

Practical

- ▪ Time
- ▪ Recording equipment (ask permission!)
- ▪ Confidentiality and anonymity of participant and company
- ▪ Results
- ▪ Possibility to withdraw at any time

Content

- ▪ Explanation study
  - o Study applies to the EU and its member states, not NATO's European members
  - o RQ: *What explains the slow and difficult progress in improving the nexus between European military capabilities and policy?*
  - o Structure, strategic culture and military innovation, methodology

- ▪ Questions/comments

> Questions on European security and defence policy (± 20 min)

- ❖ What characterizes the EU security and defence policy documents (CSDP, ESS and EUGS)?
- ❖ Are the current EU policy documents on security and defence in your view adequate enough to provide the conditions for the improvement of military capabilities?
- ❖ What are in your view the main challenges the CSDP faces today?

- ❖ In order to improve the nexus between military capabilities and policy, the EU set up certain initiatives. Why would initiatives set up in a more recent security environment (like PESCO and CARD) have the desired result, while initiatives that have been set up in the past (like the EDA) did not?
- ▪ Do you think the EU's pursuit of active international leadership, as depicted by their policy, is too ambitious and would interfere with improving the nexus between military capabilities and policy?
- ▪ My analysis shows that EU security and defence policy mostly lack executive flexibility on lower levels of governance, only granting a large scope of action for the European Council. Do you think this hinders the improvement of military capabilities and policy?
- ▪ The CSDP states that the EU has a reasonably high level of willingness to use military force, yet both EU strategies are more reluctant when it comes to the use of military force. Can you explain this?
- ▪ Do you expect any major strategic or operational changes in the way CSDP operations and missions are planned and implemented?
- ▪ Do you anticipate more EU operations in the future as a result of the renewed dynamic of the EUGS and the EU's contemporary security environment?
- ▪ To launch CSDP operations and missions, it requires not only political will but also the necessary capabilities. To what extend have lacking capabilities already become a stumbling block for new EU operations?
- ▪ All EU security and defence policy documents highlight shared norms within the EU when it comes to defining its external actions. How do you think the EU will react when a situations calls for actions for which it has no shared norms?

Questions on the development of military capabilities (± 20 min)

- ❖ What would be your definition of military capabilities?
- ❖ The EU has already set up certain initiatives in order to improve the nexus between its military capabilities and policy. How important are these initiatives?
- ❖ What role do these initiatives play in developing military capabilities?
- ▪ Which additional role can these initiatives play in order to ensure the availability of necessary military capabilities now and in the future?
- ▪ Is there any initiative missing that you think it would be able to contribute to the development of military capabilities?
- ❖ My analysis shows that there is little attention for military innovation in EU security and defence policy. How would you explain this?
- ▪ Would stronger civil-military relations in your view contribute to more innovation and therefore improve the development of military capabilities?
- ▪ Do you think certain cultures, be them strategic or not, can influence military innovation and the development of military capabilities?

- Is it true that most of the EU's military innovations stems from necessity due to the changing security environment?

Questions on the other obstacles to the improvement (± 10 min)

- ❖ There are many divergences across the EU member states' strategic cultures. Some of them are transatlantic oriented, while others are EU oriented. To what extent does it matter whether the initiative was taken by the EU or NATO when it comes to the development of military capabilities?
- ■ Could it be that some countries value the development of military capabilities less because they do not see the EU as the primary security political actor?
- ❖ Are there any other differences in strategic cultures that may or may not lead to obstacles for the improvement?
- ❖ How big a role do budgets and funding play when it comes to obstacles to improving military capabilities?
- ❖ Do you anticipate that new developments around the theme of sustainability will play an important role in creating suitable conditions for the development of military capabilities?
- ■ What can be done to negate the impact of obstacles and develop a certain resilience to them?

Closing questions (± 5 min)

- ❖ What is the biggest challenge for the European Union regarding improving the nexus between military capabilities and policy?
- ■ Are there any important issues that have not been discussed during the interview?

Completion interview

- ■ Thank the participant
- ■ Inform about planning