GEOSOCIAL SOLIDARITY INITIATIVES

LEAVE IT TO THE PEOPLE

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Geosocial solidarity initiatives: leave it to the people
A cross section of Italy’s solidarity field - How initiatives cope with a changing borderscape.

Abstract
This bachelor thesis is focused on civil society’s response to the European refugee crisis in Italy. Particularly from 2014 onward, a rise in arrivals of migrants and refugees via land and sea has created large tensions. While the European Union and national governments responded with securitisation, fortifying Europe’s outer borders and criminalising migration, many citizens reacted differently. Solidarians all over Europe came to the aid of migrants in diverse ways. With the securitisation of borders and criminalisation of migrants, solidarians seem to be increasingly criminalised as well. This research looks at this discrepancy between the solidarian response and the strengthened border policies, using a cross-sectional case study and a grounded theory approach. The differences in coping strategies between the various geosocial solidarity initiatives are analysed and the ways in which these affect their borderwork practices and their ability to reach their goals are investigated.

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Preface

I am writing this preface just before I am handing in this thesis for good. It feels good to be finally able to write this, but it also feels like I am concluding an important part of my life. This thesis signifies the finalisation of my bachelor Geography, Planning and Environment, which has been the focal point of the last three years for me.

I want to thank some people that helped to make the success of this thesis possible. First, I want to thank Pafsanias and Céline, with their expertise on the subjects they helped me to make sense of the complexity of the European borderscape and helped me to focus on the most relevant aspects needed to answer my research questions. I want to thank Manuela, Valentina, Roberto, Stefania, Valeria, Antonella, Nicola and Gabriella for telling me about their wonderful initiatives, having interesting conversations and giving honest answers. Special thanks to Federico, who helped me to start up my search for respondents. Of course, I want to thank my supervisors Joris and Mirjam, for their commitment to helping me during the entire process, setting up the proposal, suggesting valuable literature, helping me to find respondents and their constructive feedback. The last thanks go to my friends and fellow study associates for being valuable sparring partners and for reading through my unfinished work and pointing out the errors.

The process has been long but very valuable to me. Reading and hearing all about migration, the borderscape we are in, the struggles of migration support but more importantly the virtues of solidarity, has taught me a lot of valuable lessons. With this thesis, I am probably not solving criminalisation and all problems that it causes. I do hope, however, that this research contributes to a better understanding of the difficulties for migrant support and solidarity, and to the finding of better ways to tackle those difficulties. I hope you, the reader, will find this thesis as interesting as I do, and I hope it will teach you something new.
Summary

Migration is a topic almost everyone has an opinion about. It was a major theme in the latest EU parliamentary elections. The newspapers are full of it and academic literature on migration is abundant. While most of these articles focus on migrants and their journeys, we should not forget that there is also a large number of people that sacrifice a lot of their time to support these migrants. This thesis is about those people.

This bachelor thesis asks about the responses of solidarity initiatives to the changing borderscape and to their criminalisation by governments. Particularly from 2014 onward, a rise in arrivals of migrants and refugees via land and sea has created large tensions. Those tensions are partly due to the framing of the situation as a ‘crisis’. While the European Union and most national governments responded to this ‘crisis’ (or the framing as such) with securitisation, fortifying Europe’s outer borders and criminalising migration, many citizens reacted otherwise. Solidarians all over Europe came to the aid of migrants in many diverse ways.

With the securitisation of borders and the criminalisation of migrants, solidarians appear to be increasingly criminalised as well. This forms a large strain on the work of solidarity initiatives in migrant support. Using Rumford’s (2008) ideas on borderwork, I argue that these two forces form the two sides of borderwork. I argue that the securitisation and criminalisation by states can be seen as bordermaking, and solidarity as borderbreaking. In this research I ask myself how these solidarity initiatives pursue their borderbreaking aspirations and continue their support, in spite of this policy of criminalisation and bordermaking efforts directed at them.

I try to answer these questions with the help of a cross-sectional research design. This is applied to provide an insight into the entire field of solidarity in Italy, rather than focussing on one aspect or location. For this cross-section I interviewed representatives of six different initiatives, located in different parts of the country, active in different aspects of migrant journeys. Some initiatives are focussing more on reception and accommodation, while others are focused on integration. Several initiatives also partake in activities that are more activist in nature. Furthermore I spoke with two academics who have specific expertise on European border policy and civil society, who helped to contextualise the research.

The answers were analysed with a grounded theory approach, which helped to achieve an in depth understanding of the environments, realities, motivations and strategies of the solidarity initiatives in the cross-section. Based on this, I am able to draw some conclusions. I point out that a lot of actors are reacting to changes in the European borderscape in many different ways, and are shaping this borderscape in return. Secondly, I show that criminalisation efforts by governments generally do not work on solidarity, but are met with more solidarity instead. The third conclusion is that the impact of criminalisation differs case by case, depending on a lot of different aspects, while initiatives actively deploy strategies to counter criminalisation as well. Finally, I argue that despite criminalisation and an increasingly hostile environment, solidarity continues its borderbreaking efforts, and their work is shaking Europe’s borders.
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1. Introduction

1.1 Project framework

Since 2014 the EU and its member states have responded hastily and desperately to the increased numbers of migrants, often referred to as the refugee crisis. In Italy, the height of the “refugee crisis” meant the arrival of 170 thousand migrants in 2014, more than 150 thousand in 2015 and 180 thousand arrivals in 2016. The arrivals have seen a sharp decrease in the last years with a mere 23 thousand arrivals in 2018 and in the first three months of 2019 an even lower rate of arrivals is measured in Italy (UN-High Commissioner on Refugees [UNHCR], 2019). The reasons for this decrease are debated, but it is safe to say that increased securitisation of migration policy by Europe and the Italian government has been a major reason. This decrease in arrivals on Italian shores does not mean that Italy has resolved its problems now. Instead, there is a lot of work to do.

The Italian government reacted to the “refugee crisis” by framing the situation as an emergency (Cantat, 2016; Zamponi, 2018). The prolongation of high arrival rates caused the continuation of a situation of humanitarian emergency and produced a chaotic reception regime (Kuschminder, 2019). It has been argued by scholars such as Cantat (2016) that framing the situation in terms of an emergency legitimizes the employment of emergency interventions and tightened border policy, as well as the criminalisation of migration by the state. Since the unfolding of the refugee crisis, Italy saw a rise in discriminatory sentiment in public discourse, saw increasing refusals of independent rescue vessels at Italian ports (The Guardian, 2019) and was gripped by political changes like the formation of a right-oriented government with Matteo Salvini as deputy prime minister and minister of Interior in the spring 2018. This government passed a decree on migration and security in November 2018 which, among other things, abolishes the humanitarian protection status, restricts access to the reception system and makes evictions easier (ECRE, 2018).

Also on the European level, the rise in immigration provoked hasty responses (Tazzioli & Marten, 2016). For instance, one of their reactions to the “refugee crisis” was to implement a new agenda in March 2015, the European Agenda on Migration. This agenda introduced the “Hotspot approach” (European Commission, 2015; Tazzioli & Marten, 2016). It was initially thought of as the way to solve the “refugee crisis” and was supposed to enhance the enforcement of the Dublin agreements by combining migrant reception, identification, registration, processing of asylum claims and preparing for relocation or deportation in one spot (European Parliamentary Research Service [EPRS], 2018; Tazzioli, 2016). These “Hotspots” are located in both Italy, notably on the island of Lampedusa and in Sicily, as well as in Greece, on the Eastern Aegean islands on the border waters with Turkey (EPRS, 2018). On the one hand, this new approach might have helped prevent some unauthorised movement to other member states, by increasing the control over migrant’s movements. On the other hand, this policy has created significant tensions, as the capacity of the camps is exceeded, waiting times have increased, adequate aid is often unavailable and living conditions deplorable (among many others: EPRS, 2018). It has, in contrast to the initial intentions of the Hotspot approach, not resulted in the diminishing of pressure on the national governments and perhaps even increased that stress (European Commission, 2018).

The EPRS (2018) also points at the EU-Turkey deal that has turned (mostly Greek) Hotspots into detention and return centres instead of reception structures. Similarly, return arrangements between Italy and North African countries have strengthened European Borders.
(Van Houtum, personal communication, 2018). These and the former examples signify the increasing difficulty to enter EU territory for migrants. These examples, in other words, show the ‘fortification’ of Europe’s outer borders. Increased securitisation and criminalisation of migration have thus led to the creation of a harsh ‘borderscape’ in the Mediterranean region. Remarkably, next to European and Italian government’s policy responses, many geosocial solidarity initiatives arose within this borderscape that attempt to help migrants outside of the system of government and official humanitarian aid suppliers (Mitchell & Sparke, 2018). The increasingly hostile European borderscape therefore leaves little room for migrants. Consequently, this borderscape leaves little margin for civilians to assist these migrants either. A trend of shrinking space for civil society is thus observable too, as Maccanico, Hayes, Kenny and Barat (2018) explain.

‘Civil society’ takes many shapes and many different initiatives take place in the European borderscape. These initiatives appear to vary enormously in their activities and services, in terms of success, in terms of ideology, their political agenda (Papataxiarchis, 2016c), but also regarding the way they deal with border policy. Some initiatives have a more activist or political agenda, while others tend to comply more to (supra-)national policy while supporting and accommodating migrants. While trying to alleviate the stress posed on migrants by the border regime, initiatives recreate and reshape the border policy contexts through their humanitarian borderwork (Pallister-Wilkins, 2016). There has been plenty of research (Hörschelmann & Reich, 2016; Mitchell & Kallio, 2016; Mitchell & Sparke, 2018) showing the benefits for migrants of the bottom-up, inclusionary and empowering actions of these - in the terms of Mitchell and Sparke - “geosocial solidarity initiatives”. Still, there is much discussion on whether these initiatives can provide an adequate response to the migration challenges that the European Union faces (Papataxiarchis, 2016c) and, if so, what types of response would be most suitable to reach solidarity’s goals of supporting and accommodating migrants with dignity?

1.2 Research objective

The goal of this thesis is to investigate in what ways compliance to (supra-)national border policy affects the viability of geosocial solidarity initiatives that provide migrant support and accommodation in the Italian borderscape. It aims to provide insight into how different geosocial solidarity initiatives are shaped by, and are shaping, the borderscape through their borderwork practices. This research is therefore aiming to find out in what ways the different initiatives vary in terms of policy compliance. It will, in other words, describe the different initiatives and try to see whether they tend to comply to border policy (and thus helping to make the border) or lean towards defying border policy (helping to break the border).

This investigation is needed to help understand the position and role of geosocial solidarity initiatives in the complex border policy contexts in Europe and Italy in particular. The insight into the different ways in which initiatives go about their activities, meaning in what ways they are doing borderwork (Rumford, 2008), is a step towards understanding what forms of solidarity initiatives work best in achieving their goals in the current border policy landscape of Italy and how both governments’ and civil society’s responses can be improved.

1.3 Research model

To reach these objectives, this research investigates the geosocial solidarity initiatives in the border policy context in Italy. The different geosocial solidarity initiatives are analysed and
compared. This research looks, as explained in 1.2, into the ways in which the initiatives cope with border policy, and how compliance enables or confines initiatives in reaching their goals.

The objects of enquiry of this research are the geosocial solidarity initiatives that provide a wide array of different activities (for example legal assistance, education and accommodation) for migrants that have entered the European Union. I will be looking at the different ways geosocial solidarity initiatives act in the borderscape, that is, the Italian border policy context. These practices of support and accommodation are in fact reproducing, reshaping and shaped by this borderscape. In the words of Rumford (2008) the initiatives are doing ‘borderwork’, which is a central aspect in this research.

The nature of this research’ optics, or the lens through which this research deals with the units of enquiry, is based on Rumford’s (2008) theory on borderwork and the concept of geosocial solidarity (Mitchell & sparke, 2018), which relates to the concepts of humanitarianism, hospitality and volunteerism. The relation between the borderwork of initiatives and the policy context can be best captured through this geosocial lens. These concepts together form the lenses that help focus this research on the ways in which solidarity initiatives navigate through the Italian borderscape and the ways they try to reach their goals.

In order to attain the stated objective, this research makes use of the knowledge acquired through semi-structured interviews with actors active in the field of geosocial solidarity in the European border policy context. To get an optimal idea of solidarity responses, this research is designed as a cross-sectional case study. This shows initiatives in different parts of the country and active in different stages in people’s migratory paths. The interviews will be held with people involved in the activities first-hand, in Papataxiarchis’ (2016) terms, ‘solidarians’. The cross-section will be supported with interviews with people with expertise on migration and border policy or studying solidarity and civil society. This is in order to place the information gathered from the solidarity initiatives in a broader, European, context. To analyse and explain the realities of the solidarity initiatives in the borderscape, relevant theory on borderwork, criminalisation, civil society and solidarity (developed further in 2.1) are used.

To reach the goals of this research the interviews, solidarity’s responses and the policy context are then analysed with the use of Atlas.TI. This program helps to analyse the gathered information as it allows the cross checking of various documents, descriptions of initiatives and the interview responses of the respondents in an organised manner. Because of the explorative and descriptive character of this research, a grounded theory approach is used in this analysis of the acquired information. This theory is especially useful for finding new insights into the ways policy compliance affects the viability of geosocial solidarity initiatives. Grounded theory allows analysis without being biased through the use of variables or criteria derived from preceding research or theories, meaning that the results are grounded in realities as presented by the respondents of this research.
1.4 Research questions

The goal of this research can be rephrased into the following main and secondary questions, wherein the secondary questions serve as steps to formulate an elaborate answer to the former. The main question that is central to this bachelor thesis is:

- In what ways does (non-)compliance to policy affect the borderwork of geosocial solidarity initiatives in the Italian border policy context?

This main question is informed by three secondary questions:

1. What types of geosocial solidarity initiatives exist in the Italian context and who initiated, run, oppose or support them?
2. What differences are there between types of initiatives in terms of policy compliance to different policy levels (Local, national and EU)?
3. In what ways does (non-)compliance to policy explain the overall viability of geosocial solidarity initiatives and their ability to reach their goals?
2. Theory

2.1 Theoretical framework

To be able to study geosocial solidarity initiatives, their policy compliance, and the field in which (and with which) they interact, we need to know the policy context as well as the academic context and debate around the subject that exists up until now. For that purpose, this theoretical framework is divided into four sections, each section discussing the concepts that form the basis of this research. The first concept that is discussed in this framework is the concept of geosocial solidarity. Geosocial solidarity is, in the form of initiatives, the central object of enquiry in this research. Therefore, this concept deserves a thorough description. The second body of theory is developed around the concept of borderwork, which is relevant to understand the processes which geosocial solidarity initiatives are involved within the borderscape of the border policy context. As I will explain more thoroughly at a later stage, borderwork roughly falls into two categories - although in reality this distinction is not as clear cut. One kind of borderwork that breaks down the border and a second kind that enforces borders. The former coinciding with the principles of humanitarianism and hospitality (discussed in 2.1.4), whereas the latter can be coupled to the concept of securitisation (see 2.1.3).

2.1.1 Geosocial solidarity

This concept is two legged and needs to be dissected. In order to understand the concept, both parts of the term need to be explained. First, I will talk about the term “geosocial”. This term, according to Mitchell and Sparke (2018), refers to “the social geographic imaginations and associated practices connecting people across borders.” Following the argumentation of Hörschelmann and Reich (2016), who use the term primarily in the context of insecurity, “the geosocial” is the societal counterpart of geopolitics, which is the field of international politics. These authors say (transboundary) social relations form an important “connective tissue” which entangles the different dimensions of (in)security. In a broader sense, Mitchell and Kallio (2016) advocate wider use of the geosocial within geography as it has much explanatory and theoretical value to add by bringing transnational relations to the foreground.

“The geosocial can be used as a focus for examining the dynamic relations by which, on one hand, the borders and territories of the world order are maintained, challenged, and (re)defined; and on the other hand, people constitute themselves as subjects and communities capable of transformative agency across and within such border-laden realities.” (Mitchell & Kallio, 2016).

They further explain that the concept is grounded in feminist and critical geography traditions that claim the need for new ways of thinking and criticism of the traditional realist methods of geopolitics. On an interpersonal level, it is Hörschelmann and Reich (2016) who use the geosocial on marginalised individuals, by showing how geosocial solidarity also shape individual social relations. That could be an example to show the versatility of the concept in research. This makes the geosocial an adequate lens for examining the object of enquiry of this research too, which is roughly halfway between the interpersonal and the geopolitical.
The second leg of geosocial solidarity is the concept “solidarity”. While this term is often unreflectively used in everyday speech, this term also requires elaboration in the context of the geosocial approach. Solidarity as a concept was already used in Roman law and later found in Napoleón’s Civil Code. In social sciences, the term was adopted already by the classical theorist Durkheim, who used the term while describing the modernising society near the end of the 19th century (Durkheim [1893], as cited in Laitinen & Pessi, 2014). It has therefore been a norm in Western society for a long time and has been seen as a moral duty by many. As solidarity focuses on “we-thinking” instead of one-sided “thou-thinking”, which is true for altruism, caring and charity, and solidarity is a matter of “us together” (Laitinen & Pessi, 2014), solidarity initiatives are clearly different from the humanitarian field (as I will explain more in more detail at 2.1.3). This thou-thinking has caused critics to disapprove of humanitarianism and for some favour solidarity for that reason. The term solidarity is according to Karathanasis (Interview 1, 17-04-2019) and Cantat (Interview 2, 09-05-2019) also a term which is hard to describe. In my interviews with them they explain that, by looking at how it is used by people in the field, it is safe to say that solidarity is, before all else, a term that contradicts traditional humanitarianism or charity and is based on the we-thinking mentioned above.

In the context of migration, solidarity practices are described by Mitchell and Sparke (2018) as “the work of activists and refugees in open camps and accommodation centres […] They involve transnational but also local space-making struggles that we explore in terms of physical safety, personal dignity, organizational autonomy, radical democracy, spatial liberty, and social community” (p.2). In this view, solidarity practices are narrowly defined as they define it as work in camps and accommodation centres. I therefore would like to broaden their definition by looking beyond accommodation in centres and open camps, so that it can include also initiatives without a geographical situation. According to Giugni and Passy (2001) solidarity can also be described as a movement, thus geographical location is not a prerequisite of an initiative. The authors describe this movement as a movement of individuals defending the rights, identities and interests of asylum seekers, political refugees, immigrant workers, peoples whose human rights are being infringed and victims of racist acts or sentiments (Giugni & Passy, 2001). This view of solidarity offers a wider definition. Combining the different definitions leads to a better understanding of the term.

The best I can do here, however, is to give a general idea of what the term geosocial solidarity means. It has to be said that in reality, the meaning of the term is not as clear. It is used in various ways and has different connotations, depending on who you ask. Different organisations use different words to describe it and even within organisations the term has different specificities. This discrepancy is exemplified by the confusion that broke out during the interview with Stefania of the Hi Bro initiative, and her interpreter after I asked whether they saw themselves as solidarians (Interview 5, 10-05-2019). To avoid confusion and for the purpose of my thesis, I work with my own definition where I try take the differences into account. Therefore, I define geosocial solidarity initiatives as including all kinds of initiatives that are involved in practices of supporting migrants, aiming to improve the lives of migrants.

2.1.2 Borderwork

The second theoretical concept in this framework is the theory of borderwork. This theory is put forward by Rumford (2008). His definition entails “the activities of citizens (and indeed non-citizens) in envisioning, constructing, maintaining and erasing borders” (Rumford, 2008, p.2). Borderwork can, according to Rumford, thus be seen as the practices of civilians, groups, organisations and institutions. For that reason, this theoretical concept is applicable to the
object of enquiry of this research, the geosocial solidarity initiatives. Furthermore, this concept helps to understand the context in which these solidarity initiatives exist as it also applies to the actions of the EU, governments and other organisations, like UNHCR and NGOs. Borderwork is a key concept to understand the process of bordering, as this cannot be understood by looking at it from only one perspective. Borderwork makes this multiperspectival approach to borders possible (Rumford, 2012).

In his article *Introduction: Citizens and Borderwork in Europe* (2008), Rumford first explains how borders have become asymmetrical membranes in the sense that they form barriers for some but not for others, but also in the sense that its location is not necessarily at the edges of territories and that they can also be found at airports, schools, supermarkets, etc. In the case of migration policy, it can be argued that this border can be found in the camps and Hotspots within European territory where migrants are stopped and immobilised (Tazzioli, 2016). This takes the border from the physical border and in a way moves it inland (at least for migrants). In turn, this movement creates a “borderscape”. Brambilla (2014) explains how the European borders take the form of borderscapes and how these are not static but “fluid and shifting”. According to Brambilla, thinking in borderscapes takes our focus from the territorial and “opens up spaces within which the organisation of new forms of the political and the social become possible” (Brambilla, 2014, p.18). Borderwork, like that of geosocial solidarity initiatives, thus takes place not necessarily at the physical border but within a borderland or -scape.

Rumford continues his work explaining in what ways borderwork manifests itself. This can be both constructive as well as destructive, he refers to this as bordermaking and borderbreaking. In Rumford’s view, Europeans not only became used to the ever increasing number of new kinds of borders, at the edges and deep within their territories, they also support the creation of borders to a greater or lesser extent by for example demanding “management of borders” and securitisation (as I will discuss in paragraph 2.1.4). Meanwhile, borderwork can also be an expression of the power of civil society to remake or erode existing borders. A large number of civil society actors help breaking the border somewhat unconsciously, by working across them, while some are explicitly trying to bring them down (Rumford, 2008).

2.1.3 Humanitarianism, hospitality and volunteerism

The European borderscape and the response to the “migration crisis” is signified by the presence of a multitude of civil society actors involved in migrant protection. Many of these actors consider themselves part of humanitarian organisations. Especially groups that are actively trying to counter the securitisation of migration do this in name of the concepts of hospitality and humanitarianism. There is growing critique towards these ideas by many academics (see Karakayali, 2017; Papataxiarchis, 2016; Rozakou, 2016), as there seems to be a divide between humanitarianism on the one hand, and solidarity on the other. This is exemplified in the fact that many people active in solidarity initiatives refuse to be called volunteers, preferring the term ‘solidarian’ (Papataxiarchis, 2016; Rozakou, 2016).

Humanitarianism is defined by Oxford Dictionaries (https://en.oxforddictionaries.com, n.d.) as “the promotion of human welfare”. Because it has a very broad definition, the term is used in many ways and on many different occasions. Generally, however, the term applies to practices that place human life as the central value. Humanitarianism also forms the basis of many civil society responses to injustices (Pallister-Wilkins, 2016). In the case of migration, as Pallister-Wilkins (2016) explains in her research on humanitarian borderwork, the violence and life-threatening situations created by the securitisation of states and the EU are countered by
humanitarianism. This is done both through pressuring governments to create more humane policy, as well as through humanitarian interventions by civil society.

There are many critics of the field of humanitarianism. The argument that is heard most frequently is that humanitarianism is increasingly institutionalised and bureaucratised since the end of the twentieth century (Rozakou, 2016; Sinatti, 2019). They argue that the field of humanitarianism is being used as an instrument of governments in order to respond to crises. They explain that by willingly creating an institutional gap (Sinatti, 2019), governments assume humanitarian actors fulfill these instead. This way, states place a large liability on the shoulders of the humanitarian field. This is made possible by the simple humanitarian principle of saving lives at all costs. Sinatti continues her argument by stating that because of the fact that humanitarian actors appear to focus on the saving of lives and keeping alive, they seem not to be very critical on the fact that they could be unintentionally exploited or institutionalised by states. This uncritical practice perpetuates that system of exploitation and humanitarianism can, in that view, be held complicit in the maintenance of the borderscape and of securitisation of border policies by states (Sinatti, 2019). According to some definitions, solidarity (which I addressed in 2.1.1) is different from humanitarianism in theory, in the fact that it is critical of what some scholars critical of humanitarianism such as Rozakou (2017) see as hierarchical dependencies, institutionalisation and exploitation of civil society.

Similarly, it can be argued that not only organisations are institutionalised, but also the volunteers, that carry the field of humanitarianism, are influenced and used as instruments by governments. It is noted by some of the aforementioned critics that neoliberal states have been pushing for creating an ideal form of volunteers. The promotion of voluntary work and also the idea of the volunteer as an exemplary democratically engaged citizen by the European Union and member states is, in this line of argumentation, seen as an example of institutionalisation on the individual level (Rozakou, 2016). The criticism on volunteerism is akin to that of humanitarianism, and likewise, ‘volunteers’ could be blamed for their uncritical attitude and therefore also for being complicit in the perpetuation of injustices and the ‘system’. The point that volunteerism is akin to humanitarianism is also explained by Karakayali (2017). He researched the emotions and motives of a diverse group of volunteers active in Greece. He points out that many volunteers act out of feelings of compassion or pity rather than solidarity, what Laitinen and Pessi (2014) called thou-thinking. Karakayali explains that the volunteers he spoke with rather maintain a kind of boundary between themselves and the people they help. In her work, Rozakou (2017) explains how the divide between volunteers and solidarians is becoming increasingly blurred, as humanitarian actors started adopting solidarian thought and practices and solidarity initiatives turning towards the humanitarian field by registering as non-governmental organisations. The terms solidarity and solidarian seem to get adopted by actors that have previously been considered as humanitarian actors, and are no longer reserved for activist groups and persons.

Closely related to humanitarianism is the concept of hospitality. This term is especially relevant in the context of migration, where strangers have to be received by inhabitants of a particular locale and assigned a place in their community (Friese, 2010). Friese, who researched “the limits of hospitality” on Lampedusa, explains how hospitality (much like solidarity) has had a place in Europe’s history, ethically and even legally, for a long time. On an interpersonal level, the term is about welcoming guests and visitors in a friendly manner (dictionary.cambridge.org, n.d.). Upscaled to the level of migration the definition of hospitality remains practically the same. Only ‘guests and visitors’ could perhaps be replaced with ‘migrants’ and ‘friendly’ could then be replaced with ‘dignified’.
In the securitising context of Europe’s borders and migration policy, Friese (2010) explains that we seem to have reached the ‘limits of hospitality’. He explains that hospitality is contested as the carrying capacities of European communities are perceived to be reached. That is, he argues, one of the reasons why conflicts around migrant reception are flaring up. Hopefully, the statement that we are approaching the limits of hospitality is not entirely true, as there are still many Europeans that try to provide a warm welcome to migrants.

2.1.4 Securitisation and criminalisation

Above I point out, drawing on the theory of Rumford (2008; 2012), how borderwork can strengthen borders. This is well captured in the idea of securitisation of borders and migration. In this section, I will explain this concept to give an idea of this concept, which is an important part of the changing border contexts.

There is a growing inclination of Europe and its member states towards the securitisation of migration and their borders. In line with calls of many Europeans for increased security, the EU and its member states have fortified their border policy (Van Houtum, personal communication, 2018). Van Houtum argues that many people see immigration as a threat to their comfortable lifestyles. To protect this comfortable position, governments are pressured to increase their grips on borders and implement stricter border policies that try to keep more people out. In line with that argument also the implementation of Hotspot policy can be seen as a sign of governments (in that case the EU) trying to increase their control of migration, and thus of securitisation.

This criminalisation of migration also translates into the criminalisation actors active in migrant support. According to Jalušič (2019) pro-immigrant initiatives are criminalised in several different ways. He discerns five stages of criminalisation policy applied by governments (‘crimmigration policy’ is the term he uses, combining ‘criminal’ with ‘migration’). The first stage is ‘criticism and public attacks’; this involves the discrediting of the work of NGOs in media and politics and the spreading of disinformation by right-wing politicians. The second is ‘bureaucratic tightening of the space of civic action’; which is about policy aimed at the restriction of access and obstruction of work by, for example, restricting access to border areas or refugee camps. The third is the ‘banning of access and prohibiting monitoring’; this is already a much more practical measure, banning organisations from certain areas completely. Number four is the ‘deterrence and marking of “dangerous” organisations and persons’; He explains that governments create lists of suspects, which “create the living targets of governmental and nongovernmental attacks”(p.119). And the last form of policy is what Jalušič calls the ‘direct criminalization of assistance’; This involves the introduction of legal restrictions and enables charges and penalties within the legal system. “The targeted organizations were those that are very active in supporting asylum seekers or refugees, in particular human rights defenders [in Hungary’s new legislation]” (Jalušič, 2019, pp. 117-118). These five stages show how the space for civil society is intentionally being shrunk by governments.

Samers (2010) points out that securitisation is not only present in policy imposed by the national or supranational levels but is also found on a small scale. In line with the theory of borderwork, it is therefore also individuals and groups of individuals who can contribute to the securitisation of borders. While there is clearly a trend of securitisation of border and migration management (as argued by Van Houtum, 2018; Rumford, 2008; Samers, 2010), there are also many who are trying to counter this trend, Samers explains. This “grassroots geography of opposition to securitisation” (Samers, 2010, p.227) is, in other words, the borderwork that is breaking the borders, which I have discussed in the previous section.
2.2 Conceptual model

How the above concepts relate to each other in the Italian border policy context can be visualised in the following way.

In a very basic schematic visualisation, this conceptual model represents how geosocial solidarity is positioned in the border policy borderscape. Firstly, geosocial solidarity is initiated in response to, and reshaped by, the border policy context. Secondly, through the borderwork of its practices of supporting migrants, initiatives either (unconsciously and unintendedly) contribute to weakening the border policy context or help strengthen it. In either way, this borderwork reshapes the border policy borderscape. This oversimplified model can be interpreted as a feedback-loop, showing how this relation is perpetual and an ongoing process, rather than a rather simple causal relation.

Geosocial solidarity initiatives are included in this broader model as part of civil society. While the theory at sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.3 shows that solidarity could vary from other civil society actors (see Karakayali, 2017; Papataxiarchis, 2016; Rozakou, 2016), they can still take on some aspects of bordermaking. This is of course, as said in the introduction, what this research is aiming to find.
3. Methodology

3.1 Research strategy

To reach the objectives posed in paragraph 1.3, this research investigates the geosocial solidarity initiatives and their policy compliance in the border policy context of Italy. This needs a solid strategy in order to acquire valid and reliable data and to consequently analyse and formulate answers in a proper manner. The methodological choices at the basis of this research are elaborated and substantiated in the following paragraphs.

The first choice to make is whether to choose a quantitative, qualitative or mixed-methods approach. For this research, a qualitative method is the most suitable. It is not viable to survey such a large number of initiatives in the given time and on the other hand using only a small sample may not be representative for geosocial solidarity as a whole. As Papataxiarchis (2016c) explains, there is much differentiation between initiatives, making generalisation difficult. In this line of thought, getting to understand a small number of cases thoroughly and grasping their complexity and nuances is a way to find out in what ways policy compliance affects the initiatives’ ability to reach their goals. With this qualitative approach it is possible to explore the complexities and nuances that contribute to the ways in which initiatives are enabled or blocked in their activities. It is this in-depth knowledge that this research needs in order to find out in what particular ways solidarity initiatives navigate the borderscape and how compliance influences their viability. While choosing qualitative methods for this research might trade off generalisability, it can help us understand the particular workings in more detail.

On the basis of the choices above, a mixed approach consisting of a comparative case study and grounded theory is considered the best method to approach the research questions. This combination is ideal for the different parts of this research. For sub-questions one and two, taking stock of the different types of geosocial solidarity initiatives and finding differences in terms of policy compliance, the comparative case study is most suitable. That is because a comparative case study, besides helping reach a thorough understanding of the complexities and contexts of cases, helps uncover similarities, nuances and even patterns among the cases (Mills, Durepos, & Wiebe, 2010; Creswell, 2007, p. 73). This comparative aspect is valuable for this research that aims to comment on the differences and similarities between geosocial solidarity initiatives.

To ensure the validity of this comparative case study, a good design has to be provided (Yin, 2003). I have chosen to approach this study as a cross-section of the Italian field of solidarity. It therefore takes multiple cases, i.e. solidarity initiatives, with varying characteristics and operational in different parts of the country and in different moments of migrant journeys (e.g. arrival, transit, accommodation and integration). This cross-sectional design is based on the cross-sectional survey methodology often applied in the field of developmental psychology or sociology. This observational method is meant to gather a large number of different variables from multiple units of enquiry at one point in time (Cherry, 2019). In this research this can be translated to a case study design where cases of different forms and in different locations are described at the same time. This offers a descriptive overview of the population, in this case the field of solidarity in Italy. According to Yin (2003) the case study design also means that for this comparative case-study we need to use the logic of replication, to collect the same data from each case. Thus, the cases need to be approached in a similar way in order to compare them properly. That is why I have come up with an interview guide that allowed for the same
structure in the interviews and tried to retrieve data on the same points in each case (see annexes A and B).

As is explained before, a comparative case study is preferred instead of a quantitative approach, which generally makes use of a much larger sample. This choice does limit this research in terms of generalisation, as the selected cases are not randomised but rather chosen based on an “educated guess” to what the most representative cases are, what Creswell (2007) calls “theoretical sampling” (p.64). The cross-sectional comparative case study design is, as middle ground between a single case and a large quantitative sample, the best option for this research and provides valid and reliable results that are useful for this bachelor thesis’ purposes.

The grounded theory part of this mixed approach is especially useful for the third sub-question. To remind the reader, this question is about the ways in which compliance affects viability and the successes of geosocial solidarity. As there is no prior knowledge readily available on this relation or process in this context, a holistic approach is needed to chart the different ways this relation manifests itself. The approach of grounded theory is a good way to gain this insight based on the material that will be collected and analysed in the comparative case study. Grounded theory is a method that is aimed at creating or discovering new theory. This theory is found by analysing the collected data through coding - starting with open coding, axial coding and finally selective coding. This analysis takes consecutive steps, going from a practical to more abstract or theoretical levels (Creswell, 2007, p.64). In this research, especially for the last sub-question, this approach will best lead to insights into the different processes that form the relation between policy compliance and viability.

Another of the five qualitative methods suggested by Creswell (Narrative research, phenomenology, grounded theory and the case study) that was considered for this research is the phenomenological approach. Phenomenology provides a researcher with an understanding of a phenomenon as experienced by multiple people (Creswell, 2007, p.62). It is, however, not applicable as a research strategy on this subject, as individuals are not the objects of enquiry, but organisations formed by groups. A last option for answering the last sub-question that was considered was critical discourse analysis. Wagenaar (2011) suggests to use this method to grasp the discourses that are applied to a particular subject. Discourse analysis is, however, focused primarily on the examination of the use of language. This requires extensive research on written sources. More importantly, it does not exactly fit the research questions that this research tries to answer, in the sense that I am trying to find the practical differences and nuances between the solidarity initiatives, and not to uncover underlying discourse. Having considered these arguments, the choice was made to approach this research with the methods of grounded theory in combination with a comparative case study.

3.2 Research material and analysis

3.2.1 Finding cases
The first step in gathering research material, to start selecting cases for the comparative case study, is the inventorisation of the different geosocial solidarity initiatives and other relevant players present in the border context of Italy. Finding cases for the cross-sectional case study had to be done in a way that results in a fairly complete overview of the field of geosocial solidarity. I have approached the preparation of my research by compiling an overview of relevant initiatives, starting with looking for names of initiatives in documents, articles and
websites provided by some of the larger players in the field (NGOs like the Red Cross, MSF, the Italian organisations CIR, ASGI and ARCI, as well as institutions like the UNHCR or the EU). The names I came across through subsequent searches lead to new documents or web pages and in turn provided new suggestions for new sources and names of initiatives and actors. Facebook was used in addition, because I was advised that many smaller organisations, movements and groups use this medium for communication, providing information and posting developments.

Another way I found new names and organisations was by combining this desk research with approaching experts on the subject or with knowledge of the areas. In the interviews, or in subsequent email correspondence with my respondents, I asked them for suggestions for other names and initiatives that might be of interest for this research.

Besides listing names, I tried to include some general information about the organisations and initiatives I found. I noted relevant information like capacity, activities, donors and alliances. I also tried to make a distinction between solidarian actors and humanitarian actors, between initiatives and official organisations and between local and national or international actors. The list I ended up with at the time I had to start contacting respondents and doing the actual interviews contained several initiatives and organisations of interest. It helped me generate an insight into the field of solidarity and helped direct my focus, but I was aware that this list is not exhaustive.

After the inventorisation of solidarity initiatives, the next step was the selection of cases. The cases eventually used in the cross-section were chosen through the process of theoretical sampling. More specifically, purposeful maximal sampling, which is aimed at selecting cases that may provide different perspectives on the same subject. This is quite commonly applied in grounded theory for the purpose of providing a pool of cases or respondents that are relatively representative for the “population” or field as a whole and allows for the creation of new (grounded) theory (Creswell, 2007, p.64). A satisfying number of cases and interviews needed to be selected in order for the grounded theory method to be effective. For this research, I decided to aim for eight to twelve interviews. The method derives evidence from multiple sources that are relatively representative for the phenomenon in order to provide meaningful answers or theories. The use of purposeful maximal sampling to decide which cases to include in the cross-sectional case study helped find cases and respondents with the greatest value for this research.

3.2.2 Respondents

The second step in gathering research material for this research was finding respondents. I first made contact with a number of academics with a research background in migration, civil society response and solidarity. Joris Schapendonk helped me get in touch with the first of the two, which is Pafsanias Karathanasis. I consider Pafsanias as an expert, with knowledge essential for this research, because, as a political anthropologist, he has done plenty of research among other things into grassroots political activism in contested urban spaces and in borderlands. He worked as a coordinator for the Observatory of the Refugee and Migration Crisis in the Aegean (Found on Pafsanias’ profile on Academia.edu). On top of his professional knowledge, Pafsanias also has experience as activist in grassroots initiatives in Greece himself (Interview 1, P. Karathanasis, 17-05-2019). The second researcher I approached was Celine Cantat, author of several of my sources that I used above. Celine is a post-doc researcher at the Central European University and the Center for Policy Studies, based in Budapest. Her recent work is focused on migration solidarity and acts of citizenship along the Balkan Route.
and Hungary in particular. Because I knew she would be very helpful to me, I approached her through the website Academia.edu and she was very eager to help. A third expert I approached through Academia too, whose work I also refer to in the theoretical paragraph, sadly did not have the time to help. The two expert interviews have been very useful, especially in the stage before interviewing the initiatives, as they helped develop an oversight of the European borderscape and the field of solidarity in general. These interviews have helped explain some important concepts and have helped me to prepare for further interviews. They helped point out some factors to include in the interview guide and some mistakes to avoid while conducting the interviews.

To get in touch with initiatives and find some more respondents in the solidarity field I was helped by Federico Alagna, soon after I started. He is working on a research on European migration policy at Radboud University. Besides being a researcher, he is active as a member of the political group Cambiamo Messina del Basso (CMdB) in the city of Messina, and in this organisation’s network has several contacts that are in initiatives working with migrants. After talking to Alagna he helped me get into contact with LaMin Project (interview 3) and Hi Bro (interview 5), which both operate in Messina. Also he gave me the contact at the Baobab Experience, contact information which he had gathered in the framework of his own research (interview 4). After the first interviews I also asked my respondents if they knew any other people or initiatives who would like to speak to me. Via this route I acquired the contact information of my respondents at K_Alma, Accoglienza Degna and SIAMO. Below is an overview of all interviews conducted in this research. All names are real and all have given their consent to me for using their names, only Antonella and Nicola did not feel the need for me to use their last names.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interview</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Respondent</th>
<th>Initiative Name</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>17-04-2019</td>
<td>Pafsanias Karathanasis</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>09-05-2019</td>
<td>Céline Cantat</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>09-05-2019</td>
<td>Manuela Bucciarelli and Valentina Guerrera</td>
<td>LaMin Progetto</td>
<td>Messina, Rome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>12-05-2019</td>
<td>Roberto Viviani</td>
<td>Baobab Experience</td>
<td>Rome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>22-05-2019</td>
<td>Stefania La Malfa (and Valeria, interpreter)</td>
<td>Hi Bro</td>
<td>Messina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>29-05-2019</td>
<td>Antonella and Nicola</td>
<td>Accoglienza Degna, Mediterranea</td>
<td>Bologna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>29-05-2019</td>
<td>Cristina Rapone</td>
<td>Cooperativa sociale SIAMO</td>
<td>Rome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>31-05-2019</td>
<td>Gabriella Guido</td>
<td>K_Alma</td>
<td>Rome</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3.1: Respondent list
In my view, the eight respondents do not form a representative group in the field of solidarity in Italy. These six initiatives do not even come close to all different forms, shapes and sizes of initiatives found in the European or Italian borderscape. However, they are able to offer a window into the field of solidarity and offer a good insight into the current socio-political situation and the ways they navigate it. What my respondents provide insight into how state processes of criminalisation are felt by the initiatives and how initiatives like these navigate the borderscape. Therefore, for the purposes of this research, these eight interviews suffice in providing workable insights.

3.2.3 Interviews

The interviews were not conducted face to face but through the means of Skype and telephone calls. Still, in my opinion, the video calls in Skype closely resembled a face to face interview. The drawback is that there is not a perfect feel for body language. Also, a drawback of doing it this way is that the interviews could not be combined with a visit to the place of action. I considered the option of going to Italy but found that this was difficult to arrange in the limited time available for this bachelor thesis. Also, the research design required arranging interviews with initiatives from all over Italy, so it made more sense to have virtual meetings instead.

I conducted these interviews in a semi-structured manner (see interview guides in annex A and B). This strategy has, of course, its pros and cons. The use of pre-organised clusters of questions helped structure the interview and keep the focus on what is necessary in line with the research goals. A drawback of this choice is that the respondents were not given all the time they wanted to elaborate on the subjects that they felt important. The semi-structured interview format has the disadvantage that some topics might be inadvertently be excluded from the conversation (Newton, 2010). The method also meant that I asked questions which were thought of beforehand and might not be formulated optimally for the particular interview at hand. This might have steered and influenced the interview and the respondent’s answers in a certain direction unintentionally. Despite these drawbacks, I conducted semi-structured interviews because it allows for a better comparison of the initiatives. Whereas unstructured interviews have the chance of focusing on different topics, making the results hard to compare. Working with a certain degree of structure helps to find different opinions on a subject within a small sample of individuals, Newton (2010) argues. The last reason why I used a semi-structured interview design is the practical reason that I wanted to get all the information needed for the description of the initiatives and that I would not forget to ask any essential details.

Finally, the validity of the answers should be discussed, too. The interviewees might have been biased in several ways. Some of my respondents are the representative of an organisation and may thus have not been completely honest or fully open about the more sensitive topics. Some of my questions may be considered slightly intrusive and may have evoked a more politically correct answer. But personally, I am inclined to say that my respondents have responded from a personal point of view and have given honest answers. Also, I have received some more radical remarks from the people than I expected, regarding their function, to be more modest in their answers. That supports my view that the answers are honest and relevant.

3.2.4 Analysis

Analysing the interviews was done with the help of the programme Atlas.TI. This programme was used because it aides with highlighting sections of text that are of importance. After
transcribing the interviews and reading through it in several rounds of coding, Atlas helped find meaning and information in the answers. As explained in section 3.1, the programme helps the researcher in the process of coding, which is needed in the grounded theory approach.

The process of the analysis could be described as an iteration of several rounds of coding. The first round is a basic form of coding. While reading through the transcripts, relevant sections of texts were highlighted and a “code” was formulated which grasped the main ideas of that section. A section could also have multiple codes when respondents answers contained more than one factor of importance. After all documents were processed this way, I acquired a thorough understanding of the respondents’ answers and was able to structure these. That is done in the second step, where codes are combined in case they are making the same point, or split when they include more points of interest. By going through the texts multiple times and reconsidering the codes, an exhaustive list of codes was reached which covered all the relevant answers. the last step was the creation of categories, known as code groups in Atlas. The categories were formed on the basis of recurring themes in the codes. For example, all codes concerning funding were placed in the category of funding and when codes concerned the border context, these were placed in that category. These categories, in turn, helped structure the three chapters dealing with the results.

After compiling the extensive list of codes I looked at how these related to each other. I visualised these using the “network” function offered in Atlas.Ti. Although individual codes could also relate to codes in other categories, the network (presented in figure 3.1 below) is based on the categories or code groups for the sake of simplicity.
Figure 3.2: Atlas.TI output: Network of codes.
Figure 3.2 is an output of Atlas.TI in the form of a network. The network is designed to compare to the conceptual model (figure 2.1) and has the elements borderscape, as well as the two opposing sides of borderwork: bordermaking and borderbreaking. It is these concepts that formed the backbone of the analysis. The network consists of all code groups formed in the analysis. Each code group includes several linked codes that fit the category, these individual codes are not shown in the figure because there are approximately 160 codes, and that would not be possible to visualise in a network. See annex C for the complete list of codes.

The code groups contain both positive and negative aspects of a certain category. Therefore the network does not show the nature of the relations. For example the group “Crisis discourse” is placed in relation to the border/policy context, while the group “crisis discourse” also contains codes that link to the responses of solidarity initiatives. The network thus does not show a nuanced image, but is rather assumptive. It therefore only serves as an insight into the method and Atlas.TI programme, but also as a framework for connecting the many codes and place these in a broader perspective. The code groups presented shape the structure of argumentation in the chapters below.

As explained in paragraph 3.1, this research makes use of the grounded theory approach. This is useful for the descriptive analysis of the cases and their context, as well as for the holistic search for an answer to sub-question three. The argumentation in the following chapters is based on the data collected through the interviews and subsequent processing in Atlas.TI. The result is the emergence of new theory, which is as the name suggests, ‘grounded’ in the empirical data.
4. The Borderscape

This first part of the analysis considers the first of the three secondary research questions on the types of geosocial solidarity initiatives existing in the Italian context. In section 4.1 I will look into the solidarity field and offer a close look at the initiatives that were approached to create the cross section, the basis of this research design. Following this description, I zoom out to give an overview of Italian and European migration and border policy, in the last years associated with the “migration crisis”. This includes the evolution of criminalisation within this borderscape. Section 4.3 will follow the institutional perspective with a description of the reaction of civil society in the same time period. This section relies largely on the contents of the two expert interviews, but is supported by the views of respondents experiencing those larger processes first hand.

4.1 Description of the initiatives

Before describing the more general processes that play out around the field of solidarity, this section offers a more in depth description of the six initiatives interviewed, including a short history of when and why they started and their most important partners and funders. Each description includes the initiatives' main activities and ends with their view on their own future. This is primarily to give the reader an idea of the initiatives and their representatives, as their answers are the basis on which the following analysis is built. The specific responses and strategies these initiatives use to cope with the changing environment will not be included in their descriptions here, but will be discussed in section 5.

4.1.1 Lamin Progetto:

The first of the initiatives I discuss is the Lamin project. For this initiative I got in contact with Manuela and Valentina (interview 3, 09-05-2019). Lamin is very young, as this association was founded in 2018. It is based in Rome and in the Sicilian city Messina. Their main goal is achieving integration for vulnerable people like migrants. At this point in time they are helping 15 people simultaneously. Their view is that providing job opportunities through improving and developing the capacities of migrants is the best way to reach integration. To reach this, the main activity of Lamin is to offer tailoring workshops. With the help of a professional fashion designer they, together with the migrants, worked towards the creation of a fashion line and a festive presentation of the results, Manuela explains. They have done this once successfully and are now in the second run. Also the exchange of and interaction between cultures is important to them in achieving integration. To that end, the fashion and event attempt to tell a story using African textile and design and, my respondents explain, they are open to all people interested in their activities.

Lamin’s activity is not limited to textile workshops, but also food related activities are organised, which is according to Manuela and Valentina the best way to connect people. The workshops are intended to improve the skills of the participants and allow creativity and ingenuity for the sake of personal development. They intend also to support the migrants in their search for a job, either by arranging internships or helping find paid jobs. Manuela explains that the migrants in their programme generally live in government accommodation centres - SPRAR - and most of them are still in the process of acquiring their asylum permits. In Messina, Lamin has close contact with the accommodation centre, where migrants are informed of the possibility to participate in the project.
Lamin works together with several local actors in their activities. Manuela and Valentina tell me how they work together with the municipality of Messina in the sense that they use a social centre to house their workshops. In Rome, the project is hosted by a non-governmental church-related NGO, where they pay a small sum of money for their workshop-space. The workspace is offered by a partner organisation called Casa Scalabrini.

Lamin is funded by the Migrantes foundation. This is a Catholic foundation that is in the 8 per 1000 construction. This is a government scheme that requires every citizen to give 0.8 percent of their annual income to a religious organisation or the state’s own social assistance fund. (Also, there is the 5 per 1000 construction that is aimed towards non-religious non-profit organisations). This way, indirectly, Lamin is funded by donations (albeit institutional and compulsory). This allows the initiative to pay for accommodation, reimburse their designer and tailoring teacher, and in the future reimburse the participants during their internships.

The plan of Manuela and Valentina is for Lamin to continue and grow in terms of participants and market. They are hopeful that by growing in the future, the projects can be more self-sustainable. The idea is to continue to bring opportunities for development, training and jobs to migrants. In conclusion, the two initiators explain that they will continue see to their goal of achieving cultural exchange and integration.

4.1.2 Baobab Experience:
The interview was held with the spokesperson of Baobab Experience, Roberto Viviani (interview 4, 12-05-2019). The Baobab Experience is an association with its roots in East Rome. Roberto explains how Baobab Experience emerged in the summer of 2015 when an informal camp was evicted and the inhabitants, after being dispersed and staying around Rome’s Tiburtina station, were sent by the police to the, at that time vacant, community centre called the Baobab centre. While the centre offered 210 beds, this was not enough for the 400 to 500 migrants. That is when people from the city and the neighbourhood came to help. They were an incoherent group of volunteers, offering supplies, food and clothes, until the initial volunteers formalised and started having formal assemblies, approximately one month after it started. Shortly after this, the group formalised and became a legal association. This way they were eligible to create formal ties with institutions and other organisations, allowing them to organise and raise funding, roberto explains. From this point, as a collective, they held weekly meetings for volunteers, and another weekly assembly with the migrants staying in their encampment.

The Baobab Experience has since then been involved in the processes in and around the accommodation of migrants in informal encampments, as well as with taking care for migrants in transit in or near the train station. These activities include the collection of goods, clothes and food, the managing of daily life in the camp and the offering of medical, psychological and legal aid. As they continued, new activities evolved that are more activist in nature. As Roberto explains, for many of the people involved in the daily business of running the camps or dealing with the migrants in their custody, the desire grew to try to change the situation, which was not becoming better despite their help. These activist activities thus came to include the organisation of protests and marches, in Rome but also nationwide, the occupation of buildings and organising petitions. The first of these demonstrations took place in December 2016. Roberto explains this evolution as the association having two souls, a humanitarian and an activist soul. Both helping people on a daily basis, as well as trying to change the overall situation. Furthermore, the association has the ‘Baobab for Jobs’ initiative.
which makes the association also operational on the integration side to solidarity. Roberto argues that these activities do not exclude each other but are complementary.

Baobab has ties with many specialised and multinational organisations. To offer medical support to the migrants, in the streets or in the accommodation, Baobab cooperates with Médecins sans frontières and two Italian doctors’ associations called MEDU and Dritto al Cuore, translated “Right to the heart”. The latter helped Baobab supply medical aid by coming to the camp four times a week. For the legal assistance they work together with association of lawyers. Also, international organisations like UNHCR, UNICEF or Intersos. There is also support from religious organisations, like the Catholic, Mormon, Protestant churches and Islamic communities. On a more local level, collaborations with organisations in the city and the neighbourhood are plenty, Roberto explains.

From the beginning the project was funded through voluntary donations, mostly in the form of goods, needed for upholding the accommodation. Also they have found larger private donors among which the organisation Help Refugees from the UK. With the money received from these donors the association is able to pay rent for the warehouse and to employ three cultural mediators, helping the association in the aid and support of migrants living in the streets.

Sadly, Baobab Experience has suffered from a series of evictions and is at this moment not in the position of having a location to organise any activities or offer support. So at the moment the association does whatever they can to help migrants in the streets and in transit. For the future, my respondent cannot say exactly whether they are looking for a new potential location. What is certain is that as long as the situation does not change for the better, Baobab will continue their activist efforts, and will become more vocal if necessary, according to Roberto.

4.1.3 Hi Bro Laboratory:
The interview was conducted with Stefania La Malfa, aided by her friend Valeria who helped translate (Interview 5, S. La Malfa, 22-05-2019). As a part of the political movement Cambiamo Messina del Basso (CMdB for short), the Hi Bro project started in December 2018 with the objective of opening the doors of the movement to migrants, creating an opportunity for meeting and exchange among all citizens. The first project was the Hi Bro art workshop, aimed at young adult migrants, which concluded with an exposition and event. After the first art projects, respondent Stefania explains, the focus shifted to minors and Hi Bro continued with what they call the Italian language and culture laboratory. According to Stefania, as a reaction to national politics in the field of immigration, Hi Bro favours the integration in the city of Messina by offering these workshops, helping migrants learn the language and culture, while developing their skills.

Hi Bro is part of a municipal political movement and is therefore not dependent on external funding or support. CMdB itself is also financially independent and functions through private support and the efforts of volunteers. Stefania tells me that Hi Bro has received help and collaborates with some local associations to run their activities. Also, they rent their two workshop rooms in the city from a private actor.

At this moment, Hi Bro is in the process of evaluating its activities up until now. They do not yet know what will change in their activities, but they are certain they want to continue doing this work and improve their teaching capacities to continue to help migrants this way.
4.1.4 Accoglienza Degna and Mediterranea:

The interview about Accoglienza Degna and Mediterranea was conducted the 29th of May 2019 with Antonella and Nicola, two young activists that have been involved since the start of the group’s activities around migration in October of 2015. What is important to know, which I discovered only during the interview, is that we are talking about a broader political movement in the Northern Italian city of Bologna. This movement has several activities around the topic of migration, among other things. The movement consists of three associations, Ya Basta Bologna, TPO and Làbas. During the interview, Antonella and Nicola explained that, as one of the movement’s activities, Accoglienza Degna existed only for two years, from October 2015 until August 2017. The name Accoglienza Degna in English means something along the line of Dignified Reception. Although “accoglienza” in Italy has a broader meaning, also meaning “welcome”, “acceptance” or “hospitality” (https://dictionary.cambridge.org). Accoglienza Degna was housed in occupied former military barracks in central Bologna and offered room for 15 migrants. Other than official accommodations around the area, Accoglienza Degna did not require their guests to have documents, but of course did ask some questions before their acceptance, also to help look at the possibilities of other accommodation options, Antonella and Nicola explain.

Other than accommodation, Accoglienza Degna offered medical and legal assistance and aimed at providing job opportunities. The latter was realised through their on-site pizzeria and brewery. Here, migrants were trained in these trades and were even granted certificates after finishing their training. In addition to their catering, a boutique was set up to sell used clothing. Maintaining the operation required the help of many volunteers, up to 100 at the most. Accoglienza Degna held weekly meetings with volunteers as well as regular meetings with their guests, in an attempt to build a real community. Parallel to their accommodation and integration efforts an assistance programme called “Supporte Migranti” was launched to offer legal assistance. This also included a school offering language classes. As Antonella and Nicola point out, these activities continued up to this day, while Accoglienza itself was evicted from their location.

Because the movement was unable to find a new place to host migrants, they had found different ways to remain active in migrant protection through a new project called “Mediterranea”. The idea developed in June 2018 to buy a ship and in October that year the first rescue mission started. Parallel to both initiatives, Nicola explains, the movement continuously organised marches and demonstrations. Like Baobab, the movement is both involved in the daily practice of refugee protection, as well as in activist actions. This shows the movement is ever evolving and always trying to be where people are most in need of help.

To fund their activities, Accoglienza Degna relied on financial support by the movement, particularly Làbas and TPO Bologna, Nicola says. Also, some income was generated in their catering, bars and boutique. Most money was needed to heat the accommodation in winter, while other necessities were donated in the form of goods. After the eviction, rent was paid for their office space to the municipality.

Besides monetary, other forms of cooperation have helped Accoglienza Degna, but even more explicitly Mediterranea, to have an impact. As Antonella and Nicola illustrate, the movement acts like an enzyme, sowing seeds for new projects and allowing others to join and become part of the initiatives and actions. Mediterranea started in July 2018 as one of their own ideas, but now acts more like a platform for other groups and organisations to form an alliance and have an impact. This has resulted in the movement involving many collaborations, both internally as externally.
The future of the movement is not set in stone. According to my interview partners, the movement decides case by case on what is the best way forward and what has the most positive impact on the situation. This pragmatism is what the organisation has already done, exemplified by their shift from Accoglienza Degna to Mediterranea, and will remain their way of doing “until one day we become useless”, as Nicola put it.

4.1.5 Cooperativa Sociale SIAMO:

To find out about the SIAMO initiative I have spoken to Cristina Rapone, one of the cooperative’s co-founders (interview 7, 29-05-2019). This social cooperative was founded in late 2014 in order to create job opportunities for young migrants in Rome. They started from the conviction that reaching full integration starts with jobs, and if there aren’t any jobs, they might just as well create them. Thus, they started the social cooperative called SIAMO, “We Are” in English. Siamo is organised as a social cooperative following the social business theory of nobel prize winner Muhammad Yunus. According to Cristina, this construction allows for an equal relation between all people involved in the enterprise.

The main activities of Siamo are the crafting and selling of gifts and gadgets and the selling of organic products at their food assembly. A central precondition of their work, Cristina explains, is that it works with and expands the capacities of the refugees they employ. Another part of the cooperative is the Siamo Umani (We are all Human) project. This project is the more vocal side of the initiative. Siamo Umani is aimed at countering the presently negative public and political narrative around refugees and migrants. What they try to do is to counter xenophobia by telling the stories of the migrants. Siamo Umani is the central concept of what they want to convey, Cristina says.

The work Siamo does is done in a space owned by a Catholic organisation with whom they cooperate in a multitude of ways. For instance, the exchange of volunteers, counselling and teaching activities, and the finding of suitable participants. Another collaboration is that with Casa Scalabrin, which also hosts the LaMin Project in Rome. While, according to Cristina, the plan is to one day be fully self-sustaining as an enterprise, at this moment SIAMO receives two small grants in order to support their initial growth, develop training material and professionalise their activities. These grants are partly funded through the 5 per 1000 system. In order to receive these grants, SIAMO is registered as an NGO, or ONLUS in Italian, instead of as a business. This is what Manuela Bucciarelli of LaMin (interview 3, 09-05-2019) also experienced in one of her previous initiatives. It shows that the Italian legal system does not offer a formal option for creating a social cooperative, as both Manuela and Cristina have encountered.

Cristina finally explains that SIAMO will continue their work, albeit possibly in very different ways. As they have changed their products and services before, Cristina does not exclude the possibility that the exact activities of SIAMO will change, but the objective will not. That objective is, and will remain, the opening of job opportunities while continuing to make products that are of good quality. “People appreciate the quality of the products, that is the entry point” (interview 7, C. Rapone, 29-05-2019).

4.1.6 K_Alma:

The last interview I conducted was with Gabriella Guido, who is the coordinator and spokesperson for the social carpentry K_Alma (interview 8, 31-05-2019). Similar to, but simultaneously very different from SIAMO, K_Alma was founded to create job opportunities and pursuing inclusion and integration of migrants. K_alma started in 2016 and offers free
workshops on woodworking and carpentry as their main activity. K_Alma offers a place to meet, exchange knowledge and to follow classes, Gabriella explains. The items produced in the wood workshops are sold to anyone who is interested. Also, some organisations have made contact with K_Alma for several bigger projects. The last activity the carpentry undertakes according to Gabriella, is the organisation of open days several times per year. These open days are to show their initiative to the world. Until now, some 50 people (excluding open day visitors) have made use of K_Alma’s services, including some Italians but mostly concerning migrants.

K_Alma partners up with several associations, and has in the last years started to create a network. In their midst, K_Alma has a social worker who is there to help with legal issues and another worker who offers medical and psychological support. Furthermore, the carpentry has ties to medical associations, the university, the Baobab Experience and a multitude of other local partners. The carpentry is funded in several ways. They have received grants from the Waldensian Church (through the 8 per 1000 system), an organisation called Charlemagne and the Swiss Haiku foundation. With this money they are able to buy their supplies, machines and wood, and to have insurance, Gabriella says.

Furthermore, she explains that in the future they are planning to continue with their “little activities” of solidarity. Gabriella says that, even in a changing political environment that is increasingly hostile to migrants and solidarity, they will continue to pursue a situation of inclusion.

4.1.7 Solidarian?

After reading the descriptions some questions might come to mind considering the definition of solidarity, and how these seemingly different initiatives fit that definition. It is something I have tried to figure out myself. Rozakou (2017) explains also how these definitions have become blurred, and therefore also increasingly vague for its users. As explained in 2.1, the definition I have used for describing solidarity is broad for that reason. On the suggestion of Pafsanias Karathanasis (interview 1, 17-04-2019), I then decided to ask my respondents themselves if they consider themselves solidarian, or if they define themselves differently. This has led to some very interesting conversations. In several cases respondents asked me to remind them of the meaning of solidarity, others gave an answer that indicate that the respondents explain solidarity very differently. What appears several times in the cross-section is that solidarity is not something that either ‘is’ or ‘is not’. In the opinion of many, including Celine Cantat (interview 2, 09-05-2019), solidarity could better be seen as a process or project with a very strong ideal or goal in mind. Many initiatives say they are trying to be solidarian, but are very aware that they do not fit the picture of solidarity perfectly, and that there is a lot to work on. Several initiatives try to achieve solidarity by having regular meetings with volunteers and migrants that allow co-decision about both daily issues as the course of the initiative, for example Baobab and Accoglienza Degna. In reality, Roberto from Baobab adds, it is hard to include migrants in decision making, as they have other problems of their own to worry about. “You can imagine that you are in the street, you have no bathroom, no privacy, you are waiting for your papers. Then it is not so easy to be involved or have a free mind to think about politics or think about the organisation of demonstrations.” (Interview 4, R. Viviani, 12-05-2019). SIAMO, being a social cooperative, aims to have several migrants as co-owners of the cooperation, the design of the enterprise shows the prospect of true solidarity. But as Cristina adds, until now only one migrant is in the process of becoming owner, because there are many restrictions for everyone to be truly equally adept in managing the cooperative
This is another example showing that achieving solidarity is a process. This still is not a reason to rule out the initiatives as being, or disapprove them identifying as, solidarian.

4.2 Italian border policy in European context

This section of the analysis deals with my findings regarding the broader context in which the above six initiatives operate. This paragraph deals with the bordermaking side to borderwork. Starting with the processes happening in policy there.

4.2.1 Crisis discourse

In 2014, the first people started talking about the situation of increased numbers of migrants coming to Europe as “the refugee crisis” or “the migration crisis”. Especially in media and politics, the use of the term “crisis” has major repercussions (see also the work of Cantat, 2016; Zamponi, 2018). Cantat (2016) explains that as a result of the framing of the situation as abnormal or an exception, everything appears to be allowed to bring the situation back to normal. In an effort to do this, restrictive measures were undertaken and repressive policy was put forward. In Italy, this has eventually amounted to the installment of the new conservative right government in June 2018 (Kirchgaessner, 2018). Particularly the subsequent (very fast) adoption of the “Salvini decree” in autumn 2018 (ECRE, 2018; Wallis, 2019), the key point on the agenda of Italy’s minister of interior Matteo Salvini, can be seen as an example of this. This decree was referred to by multiple respondents as being a critical turning point, having much effect on the initiatives circumstances and the position of the migrants participating in their projects (more on that in the following paragraph).

Similarly, Antonella and Nicola (interview 6) speak not only of the problems that the framing of crisis brings about, they also say that the government is creating the problem by calling the situation a problem:

“We see here in Italy, is a government that tries to in a sense create the migration problem. Because we never had a migration problem here, but only people that were saying there is a migration problem. So at first you bombard the social networks with fake or altered news, scary news about migrants, of migrants raping Italian women. At the same time you create fear in the population, you show some kind of a solution, saying to offer a solution.” (interview 6, Antonella and Nicola, 29-05-2019).

This narrative of crisis amplifies xenophobic narratives and in turn raises the number of votes for xenophobic or anti-migration parties and politicians. To Pafsanias (interview 1, P. Karathanasis, 17-04-2019), xenophobia seems to have increased mostly after these government attempts at securitisation. The xenophobic narrative started resonating mostly after the slowing down or stopping of migrants’ journeys and other associated problems that these interventions caused. Showing that securitisation is not necessarily due to xenophobia, but may also be its cause.

More concretely, governments have responded with some measures that try to control the numbers of arrivals. Examples of this are the bilateral deals made for example between European member states and neighbouring countries. An example is the EU-Turkey deal that was designed to prevent migrants from reaching Greece. Despite that arrangement, Pafsanias explains, the externalisation of borders traps migrants on the Eastern Aegean islands of
Greece. This geographical restriction is European policy that tries to prevent migrants, that are technically already in Europe, to reach the mainland. They are trapped on the islands because it is easier to find and deport migrants when they are on an island, “when they are in mainland Greece, they could go anywhere”, says Pafsanias.

Similar deals are made between EU member states and the governments of various North African countries that receive large sums of European money to contain migrants and prevent them from reaching the north. For example the EU-Turkey deal given in the project framework (EPRS, 2018; van Houtum, personal communication, 2018). Furthermore, Italy has a long standing arrangement with Libya. Cantat explains during the interview that she sees the externalisation of borders as something that is embedded in Europe’s border regime and the Schengen agreements. She says that, because the internal borders have been slowly disappearing, external borders have been securitised instead. The “crisis” has exacerbated this securitisation further, however. This situation, according to Cantat, is exemplified by Hungary that built fences along the borders with Serbia and Croatia.

However, the states’ responses do not end with the securitisation of external borders, also internal borders have been put under extensive control. Although this happened before, for example at the time of the Tunisian revolution between France and Italy in 2011, Cantat explains to me, the limited free travel between member states became normalised as a short term solution, resulting from the crisis discourse. Furthermore, the Hotspot policy, adapted by the European Union in 2015 (see Tazzioli, 2016), can also be seen as an extension of this reaction. In Tazzioli’s view Hotspots were intended to keep migrants outside of, or contained at, the edges of Europe. To Cantat, “this again is not new, because these countries have always been expected to act as a buffer zone for European countries” (interview 2, 09-05-2019), as pinned down in the Schengen design.

4.2.2 Criminalisation

The major category under which we can place all the above consequences of the “crisis” (or of crisis discourse) is the criminalisation of migration by the EU and its member states. (see paragraph 2.4 of the theoretical framework). As explained in the theoretical framework on securitisation and criminalisation (section 2.1.4) criminalisation did not turn up in the European borderscape, but as a trend, has a long history instead. Furthermore, governments’ criminalisation is not only aimed at the migrants themselves, but as this research once again points out, also aimed at anyone in favour of or supporting migrants, as the respondents testify below. It is too simple to speak of criminalisation affecting all people involved in migrant support, because (as explained in also 2.1.3) there seems to be a difference between those initiatives that move outside of the government-led system and those that adhere to that system, generally meaning humanitarian actors.

As said, governments’ criminalisation of civil society did not appear overnight but needs to be historicised, says Céline (interview 2, 09-05-2019). She explains that also before 2015 criminalisation of migrants and of migrant support was happening. More recently, these developments led to the establishment of a new government in Italy in May 2018. The new government is comprised of mostly conservative and right wing politicians, notably Matteo Salvini as minister of Interior. Soon after the establishment, in November 2018, the “Salvini Decree”, as it is often referred to, was adopted by parliament (ECRE, 2018; Wallis, 2019). This has been a giant step towards criminalisation and changed a lot for anything related to migration in the Italian context.
The reasons for the criminalisation of civil society, and solidarity specifically, vary. After 2015, the criminalisation of civil society has worsened in part because of the scale of migrant support, which Céline sees to have increased dramatically since 2015. This, according to Pafsanias, has made governments feel less in control. The desire to have control over the entire situation, in fact key to the concept of securitisation, to Pafsanias, seems to be a large reason for states to criminalise solidarity initiatives. Antonella and Nicola, involved in one of the more political and activist initiatives see themselves being “a bit uncomfortable and tricky for the public administration to cope with” (Interview 6, Antonella & Nicola, 29-05-2019) and explain that this is a reason for the fact that they are being criminalised.

Antonella and Nicola also mention the absence of NGOs in the Mediterranean sea as a strategy of governments to get rid of actors that could monitor and report the actions of government activities, or that of government-backed operations at sea. Pafsanias’ remark can be added to this: “The less autonomous [monitors] you have around, the more safe you [the state] are to do what you want.” (interview 1, P. Karathanasis, 17-04-2019).

Lastly, he says, besides states’ fears of monitoring, there is a fear of the spreading of radical thought or political defiance. Pafsanias exemplifies this by explaining that people identifying as activists or solidarians, at least in Greece and potentially elsewhere, are (historically) connected to broader politics besides migration issues, with governments seeing them as anarchists or radical leftists. In line with his argument, the fear of governments that these solidarians are the spreading contra-government ideas is therefore also a reason for states to criminalise solidarity movements. As an example I take Antonella and Nicola’s case, who say that they feel that the recent trend of evicting squats in Italy, of which Accoglienza Degna has also been victim, has been aimed at political groups in general. however, they feel that this may have been part of anti-migrant and anti-solidarity policy as well, because of the interconnection many of these groups have to migrant solidarity. This example shows again the relation between fear of political defiance and criminalisation of solidarity.

Criminalisation takes many forms and can occur in different degrees of severity. In the literature, five forms of criminalisation are distinguished by Jalušič (2019): criticism and public attacks; bureaucratic tightening of the space for civic action; prohibiting monitoring; deterrence and marking of “dangerous” organizations and persons, and lastly; direct criminalization of assistance (see also paragraph 2.1.4). These five types are aimed at the broader field of civil society, however. Therefore I identified four forms of criminalisation that I have understood to affect the solidarity initiatives assessed, based on the interviews.

The first is the defamation by politicians and media. In the interview with Antonella and Nicola, it became clear that much of the accusations made by politicians are empty threats made on media like Twitter or Facebook. Take for example this message by Salvini, as cited on Mediterranea’s website:

“Good news, listen up! A ship organised by NGOs is going to roam the Mediterranean looking for migrants that want to come to our shores," the League party leader wrote on Facebook. “They can do what they want, go where they want, but for them to come to Italy ... Never!” (Matteo Salvini, as cited in Pronczuk, 2018).

This does not mean that these threats do not have consequences. Cantat (interview 2, 09-05-2019) explains that these forms of media harassment are still a way for politicians to put immense pressure on groups. Salvini’s tweets might contribute to more strict implementation of policy or may force a different treatment of the accused in court decisions.
That brings me to the second form of criminalisation, court cases. Criminalisation does not only play out in the media but increasingly often takes place in the realm of justice. Prosecution of activists knows almost uncountable examples in Italy and the European context in general. Many of my interview respondents, when the topic was brought up, mentioned examples of this. In the case of Mediterranea this is most evident, as the captain and mission coordinator were arrested and brought to court right after their first rescue mission, Nicola explains (see also the article published on Mediterranea’s website by Mezzadra, 2019). Roberto of the Baobab Experience also explains that several times it has come close to this in their initiative. He explains that after the occupation of an empty building several years ago, the activists, including himself, were arrested. Although that day he was released after some paperwork, he fears that nowadays arrests like this will probably end in persecution. “we know that if we do something like that right now, we can have lots and lots of problems, and serious problems.” (interview 4, R. Viviani, 12-05-2019).

Baobab is also not unfamiliar with the third form of criminalisation that I distinguish: evictions. The initiative has had many different informal accommodations, and as many times were they evicted from those occupied locations. Baobab Experience is not alone in this, Accoglienza Degna was forced to stop their accommodation activity after police had evicted them from their location, Nicola explains. These evictions can be regarded as a direct attempt by the government to stop solidarity activities.

The last form of criminalisation of solidarity I came across in the interviews is the direct force presented in police operations, often during the aforementioned evictions. After the interview I held with Roberto Viviani, Baobab encountered this force in dramatically. Gabriella Guido of K_alma, who is operative in Rome and therefore close to the incident on May 26, tells me in our interview that solidarians of the Baobab Experience and the migrants they were helping in the streets were held up by the police in a more violent way than they had experienced until then. Instead of just being asked for documents, the solidarians and migrants were offended and treated in a particularly bad way (interview 8, G. Guido, 31-05-2019). In a press release I found on Baobab’s website they stated the following:

“The police have tolerated our presence until yesterday, when they arrived in force, identifying the volunteers and some migrants present there to receive assistance, with the threat of fines, complaints and detentions.” (Baobab Experience, 2019).

This could be seen as a clear example of police violence, resulting from the worsening criminalisation of solidarity.

Many times, however, criminalisation presents itself in much more subtle ways. Also, less direct measures seem to me as a result of criminalisation, such as the often mentioned factor of funding. Funding as a form of criminalisation does not seem as direct as the above forms, but it has great consequences for groups and organisations involved in migrant support. Funding as a way to influence groups and organisations into ceasing or changing their activities is mentioned by multiple respondents. Céline Cantat explains in our interview that funding is very closely related to policy. For many initiatives, the availability of funding determines how many people they can help and what activities they can do. As shown in the previous section, almost all initiatives in the cross-section are reliant on external actors for funding, but the nature of this funding can be very different. As alterations in funding can have grave consequences for initiatives and provides the donor with great leverage, criminalisation could thus entail that governments cut their funding to initiatives that do not cooperate or comply to their policy, Cantat explains (interview 2, 09-05-2019). In any case can governments use financial measures as an instrument to coerce groups and organisations.
The criminalisation of migrants and civil society by governments has many reasons, as mentioned shown in this paragraph. The reality is that criminalisation of migrants and of civil society actors has grave consequences for the borderscape. I will discuss my findings regarding the responses of solidarity initiatives to criminalisation in paragraph 5.

4.2.3 Local, national and supranational differences

Having explained the ways securitisation and criminalisation have increased their pressure on politics, society, solidarity and the borderscape in general, it is necessary to show that the European border context is not homogenous. On the contrary, there is great difference between policy in different European member states, between European policy and national policies, and similarly, between national and local policies.

In general it can be said that the trend is the same in all of Europe but the extent to which criminalisation is expanded and the speed in which this policy is implemented differs. Within the European border regime, Celine explains, nations at the edges of Europe share a similar role. Italy, like for example Hungary or Greece, has the role of bufferzone for the mostly Northwestern European member states, according to Cantat. They are legally in charge of border surveillance on their part of the external border, but also are they required to handle the asylum application according to the Dublin regulations. In this sense, the policies should not vary too much, but of course there are many more factors at play. Celine says that the national contexts differ a lot, in terms of political developments and economic situation, but also in terms of historical differences. For example, Celine says that Italy has a long history of being a reception country, while Pafsanias talks of the Greek situation since 2015 being the first time that Greece receives migrants on this scale, rather than being a transit country. These differences contribute to the way migrants are perceived, how politics deals with these situations and shape public discourse.

On a local level there are many differences as well. Roberto says, in response to the question if there is any kind of policy that benefits solidarity, that some cities and mayors have been as brave as to implement local policy that counters the national trends. Baobab is in that view unlucky to be in Rome, he says, because their mayor in practice does not step up to national policy, but is rather compliant to national policy. Roberto explains that in several cities, for example Naples, Milan or Bologna, solidarity is helped in some ways by municipal authorities. Gabriella from K_Alma explains that even within cities, city district councils can help create very different environments. In three of Rome’s thirteen city districts, where more left wing politicians were elected, they are able to grant migrants a residence and help build a network to help migrants and allow solidarity. Another example of these local differences is given by Valentina and Manuela of LaMin, who operate in both Rome and Messina. They tell me that in Messina they were able to use the space owned by the municipality for their activities, while in Rome they relied on the help of an NGO to find accommodation to house their initiative. Again, this shows how local differences in policy can be quite significant and can have far reaching effects on solidarity.

4.3 Civil response

This second part of my analysis gives an insight into civil society’s response to the situation that evolved from 2014 onwards in Italy. As this topic is much too complex to describe to its full extent in the scope of this research, I will limit myself to explaining what was discussed during the interviews in this research. In the same way that the crisis discourse has inflated
criminalisation and externalisation in government policy, the crisis discourse has also helped mobilise civil actors in migrant support and people in favour of migrant solidarity, is what Cantat observes. “A lot of people who wouldn’t usually be politicised got outside and got engaged in various initiatives” (interview 2, C. Cantat, 09-05-2019). Roberto saw this happening, too, in the starting phase of the Baobab Experience. In a way the reactions from civil society to the “crisis” is the same as the reaction of governments, in Celine’s words, civil society is trying to get the situation back to “normal”, too. This section strongly links to paragraph 2.1.3 of the theoretical framework, where I discussed the concepts of humanitarianism, hospitality and volunteerism, which relates to the so called “civil society”.

Civil society actors have played a large role in the European and Italian borderscape. Non-governmental organisations have been active in many ways and in different parts of the borderscape. Large international actors like the UNHCR and IOM, humanitarian actors like Red Cross, Médecins Sans Frontières and Unicef, as well as national and local NGOs like the Italian organisations CIR, ASGI or ARCI are all exemplary organisations operative in migrant support activities. Arguably, the six initiatives in my cross-section could be included in this list as well. As discussed in the theoretical framework, a large number of critics see several reasons why the civil response should be regarded with care (see among others: Rozakou, 2016; Pallister-Wilkins, 2016; Sinatti, 2019). This discussion was reflected in the analysis of interviews and supports the arguments made by the aforementioned authors.

Firstly, the idea that governments intentionally disregard some of their responsibilities and rely on civil actors to fill the gap they leave, as argued by Rozakou (2016) and Sinatti (2019), reverberates in several of the conversations I had with solidarians. Stefania of HiBro tells me one of the reasons they developed their initiative was in response to an absence of these kind of cultural and educational activities for migrants in their local environment. Similarly, Gabriella Guido of K_Alma explains that their objective to create job opportunities should not have been necessary, as it is something the government, the municipality, should do. Manuela of LaMin sees the growing of a social movement in Italy and attributes this to the growing gap. She says: “I think they are feeling a gap at the governmental level [...] wherever government or politics is not addressing some key issues or problems.” (interview 3, M. Bucciarelli, V. guerrera, 09-05-2019). Pafsanias observes a similar trend in the Greek situation, especially in the beginning, where NGOs were taking up a lot of tasks the government was unable to fulfill, mostly due to financial problems. However, Pafsanias adds to this observation that the situation in Italy is different from the situation in Greece, he argues, because the Italian government was in a much better financial and administrative position to respond to the migration situation, and was therefore less inclined to hand over the migration management to non-state actors than the Greek government for example.

The second point in this discussion, which is an extension of the previous, is that humanitarian actors are institutionalised by the state as an instrument to respond to crises (Sinatti, 2019), which sets the institutional gap in stone. This seems to be seen in the same way by several of my respondents. Pafsanias sees humanitarian actors being in many ways state-driven. With which he hints at what Rozakou (2017) explains as the hierarchical dependencies civil society actors have to the government. In other ways, the large extent of government control over humanitarian organisations. Céline ads to this by calling humanitarian organisations in a great extent “mediated and framed by [governments’] dispositions to securitise, manage or govern migration” (interview 2, C. Cantat, 09-05-2019). Antonella and Nicola argue that most rescue missions run by humanitarian NGOs were discontinued as soon as the Italian government decided upon it, while, as a political movement, Mediterranea is not
stopped as easily as that. This too demonstrates how humanitarian actors are influenced strongly by governments.

We see that these civil actors can, as Céline explains in our interview, contribute to the victimisation, dehumanisation and depoliticisation of migration. In other words, civil actors are contributing to bordermaking practices, to use Rumford’s (2008) terms. As explained before (section 2.1.3), humanitarian actors, with their core value being human lives, might unconsciously contribute or perpetuate the “system” or the European and national border regimes. For these reasons, most civil society actors do not necessarily fit the borderbreaking side of borderwork, and might rather be placed on the bordermaking side of the spectrum. Solidarity on the other hand, because of the definitions given by the respondents, could fit the label.

It is important to remember that partly because of the “migration crisis”, or as a result of the framing and narrative around crisis, civil society has become very active in the European borderscape. Just as important is that this field is not acting as one, but is rather heterogeneous in its goals, methods and ambitions. Also, while in this research I assume civil society to be roughly falling into a humanitarian and a solidarian part, I can see from the interviews and literature (for example Rozakou, 2017) that these lines are often blurred in practice. As one might see in the initiative descriptions in 4.1, many initiatives have solidarian, activist and humanitarian attributes.
5. Solidarity responses to criminalisation

After discussing the different aspects of the Italian and European borderscape, this chapter is concerned with the responses of solidarity initiatives to process of criminalisation by the Italian state. Analysing the interviews from the cross-section, I found that the initiatives respond in different ways, depending on many factors that are further discussed in paragraph 6.2. The responses themselves are covered here with the use of three categories, each discussed in a different sub-paragraph. The first section argues that criminalisation may lead solidarity initiatives to stop, change or continue their activities, while the second shows that initiatives can respond by countering criminalisation. The third category, covered in 5.3, is termed “More solidarity” and includes the ways in which solidarity is expanding and evolving, despite, or perhaps due to, criminalisation.

5.1 Stopping, changing or continuing activities

Criminalisation, as explained in 2.1.4 and 4.2, is aimed to control migration and to control migrant support, and therefore aimed at stopping solidarity initiatives from doing their work. Successful criminalisation would entail the absence of solidarity initiatives, but the fact that I was able to interview solidarians in Italy shows that this is not the case there yet. Outside of Italy this might perhaps be the reality, however. Celine says on this topic: "I know that in Hungary the new laws criminalise so many activities, that many groups have just stopped their activities altogether, because anything can put you in prison there." (interview 2, C. Cantat, 09-05-2019). Only one of the initiatives in the cross-section of Italian initiatives has had to cease a part of their activities due to criminalisation efforts, presumably. Accoglienza Degna, the accommodation centre, has had to stop after two years of operation when they were evicted from their building, Antonella and Nicola explain (see paragraph 4.1).

While it is not (yet) as serious in Italy for my respondents, they do show that in some cases, changes are inevitable. In response to my question regarding the ways initiatives are forced to change, Céline argues that in order to remain active, keep receiving funding and to not continue activities that were illegalised, initiatives might need to adapt. This can be seen in several of the initiatives as well. Roberto, for instance, says that at present, Baobab’s political actions and demonstrations need to be well considered before they are put to action, because they fear that actions like for example the aforementioned squatting of a building would end in persecutions, despite having done this multiple times in the past. This shows that the Baobab Experience did have to change their ways of doing activism as a reaction to the changing political climate. Other initiatives, when asked, said they were prepared to change their ways if they would be required to do so, for example to receive money. Manuela of LaMin says that the initiative, although their core business is now fashion, would be willing to change as long as they can keep on creating opportunities for jobs, exchange and integration. Manuela says they might just as well offer cooking courses. This pragmatic view on changing resonates with more respondents, SIAMO is in this sense similar to LaMin. SIAMO is changing, however, not to meet the demands of donors, but to meet the demands on the labour market, Cristina explains. Change due to policy pressures, as far as pressure appears in these six initiatives, does apparently not mean the dismantling of solidarity.

What is seen most, however, is a stoic continuation of all activities in the initiatives. The majority of the respondents, in response to my question on the ways they were forced to change due to policy pressures, answered that they did not see the point in changing
fundamentally. Cristina tells me that SIAMO did not change their goals since they started. Stefania tells me that they do not feel any pressure from the government or local institutions to change at all. Otherwise, Roberto provides an argument for continuing Baobab’s actions:

“We say okay we cannot change our way to act, just because the minister changed the law. We think we are doing the right thing to do. We know that we have more risks right now, we know that the repression can be very heavy, that the police can use some new weapons in some ways against us. [...] So yes, until now the activists did not receive any new punishment because of the new law. But we know that they can use it, if they want we can be found guilty of a lot of things right now. But we don’t change our ways to act, to be honest.” (interview 4, R. Viviani, 12-05-2019).

This is also in line with the answer given by Antonella and Nicola, who say that their political movement does not stop or change their activities because it is against the state’s interests, even though Accoglienza Degna unfortunately had to dissolve. Instead, their movement continues its actions because they feel the need to counter the system, as long as the situation does not change for the better for the migrants, Antonella and Nicola argue.

What we see is that, while most solidarity initiatives interviewed in this research continue their activities, or change them voluntarily, there is a lot of variation in the reasons why they made certain decisions. This will be further discussed in chapter 6.

5.2 more vocal, activist and radical

While the interviewed initiatives generally seem to continue their activities in terms of migrant support, there are a lot of changes in terms of what I will call “activism” for short. The story that returns multiple times is that initiatives emerge in response to a situation that demands immediate action in any form of migrant support. However, as time passes initiatives seem to ‘grow up’, to use Roberto’s words (interview 4, 12-05-2019). Solidarians start noticing how little has improved for the migrants in Italy, despite all the initiatives’ efforts. It is that realisation that incites initiatives to change in a way. I found that initiatives tend to become more vocal, radical or activist, for example by taking a political stance, (co-)organising demonstrations or raising awareness in general. This is, however, not taken up by each initiative in the same manner or degree.

The turn to activism can be seen most clearly in the movement which Antonella and Nicola are involved in. With a clear change from direct migrant support in Accoglienza Degna, to activism in the form of demonstrations, marches and campaigns (in the name of Ya Basta, TPO and/or Làbas). While their recent developments return to direct migrant support, the search and rescue missions of Mediterranea, their core activities are now clearly activist in nature. As mentioned in the description, Baobab has two souls according to Roberto. He explains that the activist soul emerged in the last years as an addition to their humanitarian soul, meaning the direct support. The activist element emerged because the situation did not improve, Roberto argues:

“It was because nothing changed […] So we understand that we cannot wait for the institutions to find a solution, and in the meantime we can only give clothes or something like that. We have to be more active, more critical with the system.” (interview 4, R. Viviani, 12-05-2019).
Other initiatives became more vocal as well. Stefania defines her initiative, Hi Bro, as being part of a political project, which aims to be an answer or resistance to anti-migration politics. SIAMO is similar. Cristina explains that they are not practically engaged in politics, but are political in the sense of society engagement: “we are spreading another perspective, another narrative around migrants and refugees, for sure.” (interview 7, C. Rapone, 29-05-2019). Cristina also tells me that they felt the need to step up with the rise of the new government: “We need to make our voice heard. There are so many lies around the phenomenon, we feel like we cannot be silent anymore!”, she exclaims.

K_Alma is similar in another way. Like the latter two initiatives, it has said from the beginning to aim for the bringing in contact of people from different backgrounds, migrants and Italians, in an attempt to facilitate integration and inclusion, Gabriella tells me (interview 8, 31-05-2019). By co-organising open days at their workspace and by hosting groups (children) to teach about their projects, K_Alma’s community might not be demonstrating in the streets literally, but they are very vocal nonetheless.

5.3 More solidarity

This last category I identified was termed “more solidarity”. During my interview with Pafsanias, I asked how solidarity initiatives deal with their own criminalisation. He simply said “with more solidarity”. He elaborated: “It’s really interesting to see that the more harsh the authorities are towards both solidarians and refugees, the more development of solidarity there is.” (interview 1, P. Karathanasis, 17-04-2019). While states aim to weaken solidarity, the results can be the opposite, Pafsanias concludes.

This idea is seen across the initiatives in different ways. The first is already explained in the previous paragraph, activism. However, we are now talking of collective activism, not unilateral, which is why it is included in this category. This collective activism is exemplified by the marches Baobab started to organise in Rome since 2016, in close collaboration with other local and national actors, which Roberto told about. Likewise, the continuous demonstrations by the Accoglienza Degna community show how solidarity responds with more solidarity, too. In the process of analysis, I often used the codes “becoming more activist” and “more solidarity” together or interchangeably. That exemplifies why I see the responses to criminalisation in this and the previous section as being strongly linked to each other.

Besides collective activism, “more solidarity” takes the form of networking, too. Cristina says that besides hosting open days, SIAMO collaborates with many local actors in co-organising events in the city. Manuela and Valentina show that LaMin tries to collaborate more closely with like-minded groups and organisations, creating a network that can work together and combine forces. Similarly, Gabriella explains that K_Alma undertakes efforts to work with a greater network to accomplish their solidarian goals. In my view, this too falls under the category of “more solidarity”, because people can create a more welcoming environment for them to express solidarity.
6. Solidarity’s success

This last chapter dealing with the results is concerned with the last of the three secondary questions. Here, I will discuss how solidarity initiatives remain active and keep trying to achieve their goals in a criminalising context. This topic will be dissected into three parts, the first will go into how initiatives define success, or in other words, what it is they are trying to achieve. The second part is about the factors that might determine the initiatives’ success. This is different from the last section, which concerns the strategies initiatives actively employ to counter policy pressures in their endeavour to reach their goals.

6.1 Success

The success of solidarity is not something unambiguous or clear-cut, for reasons corresponding with the reasons for the many different meanings the term ‘solidarity’ bears. Also, the understanding of solidarity as a process, as explained in paragraph 4.1, adds to the complexity because it assumes the process to lead up to a certain goal. But what this goal or definition of success is, cannot be answered in this research. Instead, in this paragraph I approach this task by giving the explanations of the goals as provided by the respondents themselves.

The first kind of goals are short term. Focused on practical support for migrants, including things like accommodation, medical or psychological help, food and perhaps legal assistance. Shortly put, making migrants’ lives better in the short term and often in very practical ways. Manuela and Valentina, for example, say their personal desire is to make the lives of the 15 people involved in LaMin a little brighter. At Baobab, they keep putting a lot of effort in helping newly arrived migrants with their basic needs, despite their growing consciousness of the situation, as Roberto says they “became wiser and wiser” (interview 4, 12-05-2019). For Antonella and Nicola, Mediterranea will primarily be there to save migrants from drowning, and they take pride in saying their first mission saved 70 people in despair. On a more abstract level, Gabriella Guido of the K_Alma initiative explains: “We have only the possibility to give little solidarities day by day, unfortunately not to solve the problem.” (interview 8, 31-05-2019). K_Alma, even when working together in the network, is not powerful enough to change politics on its own, but therefore feels the need to work hard to support migrants on the local level, Gabriella says. This precisely links up with Rumford’s (2008) theory of borderwork, where small steps together combine to shape the broader context.

“Our main objective right now, obviously while keeping on doing the search and rescue missions, [...] to building the via de terra, the earth’s route” (Interview 6, Antonella and Nicola, 29-05-2019). This statement brings us to the second category of goals brought up by the respondents: changing the context in the long term. “Our desire is to change the situation. Not only to be at the end, helping the people arriving here, but to try to change the system.” Roberto says about Baobab’s activist soul (interview 4, 12-05-2019). This example shows that initiatives also have long term aspirations, either from the start or as a product of evolution in the last couple of years. Especially the more activist initiatives such as the Baobab Experience or Mediterranea, audibly express these wishes. Meanwhile, also the more quiet initiatives act in the direction of a greater goal, mostly relating to the third type of goal, relating to integration.

Integration is seen as the central issue or purpose for the majority of the respondents in the cross-section. For LaMin, Hi Bro, SIAMO and K_Alma, their main activities revolve around the integration of migrants into the Italian or European society. They do this in various
ways, like creating job opportunities, education, self-development and through cultural exchange. While these four initiatives have this as their core business, the two more activist initiatives incorporated integration as well. Accoglienza Degna ran the pizzeria and brewery for the purpose of creating jobs. Baobab offers their Baobab for Jobs project for this exact reason. This clearly signifies how solidarity initiatives recognize integration as an important factor and as a strategy to making the lives of migrants better in the long term. Pafsanias explains that integration of migrants is perhaps as indispensable as the granting of asylum or residence permits. He elaborates:

“I suppose that people that went through 5 months of City Plaza [a solidarity initiative in Greece] are more equipped than the people that have gone through a year in a camp. I mean the language may be learned in the camp as well, but the opportunity they have to relate to people that, at least in theory, see themselves as equal. That is much different than being in a relation [with authorities] that look down on you, giving you food and telling you what to do and deciding for you.” (interview 1, P. Karathanasis, 17-04-2019).

Again there is an observable gap which civil society is filling in this case. The government offers only very basic opportunities for integration, far from sufficient to function in society. The solidarity initiatives seem to have picked up on this and started offering these opportunities themselves. This ubiquity of integration efforts among my respondents demonstrates that this could be a very important goal of solidarity.

These three goals of solidarity are also mergeable into a seemingly simple overarching principle. Nicola stipulates their movement’s ultimate goal in this very compelling way:

“Our Idea is that hopefully we become useless. The main thing with Mediterranea, but also all the other political aspects of our everyday work, is that in the perfect world we were not needed. Because there wouldn’t be any need for a group of students and workers, for rescuing, but also to create opportunities and projects which the state should take care of. So yeah, maybe that is our main goal: To one day become useless. That is the only way I would ever see myself as saying ‘Alright, that’s it, I’m done.’ But we are far, far away from that.” (interview 6, antonella and Nicola, 29-05-2019).

To define the goals of solidarity as the aspiration of becoming obsolete might perhaps seem counterintuitive, especially coming from groups of people that are doing their best to keep their heads above the water in a borderscape that is criminalising solidarity initiatives. However, the overarching goal of becoming useless is true for any project, as these always finish as soon as the objectives are obtained. The activities of solidarity initiatives, whether focused on short term support, finding long term outcomes or integration efforts, are no different.

6.2 Factors

Initiatives are dependent on many factors that shape their chances of surviving or continuing their efforts in times of criminalisation by the state. The cross-section provides several reasons why some initiatives are able to continue all their work in migrant support and integration, while others seem to struggle while being targeted by state efforts of criminalisation. The reasons given by the respondents fall into the broader categories of funding, support, experience, size and dependence.
Firstly, the question of funding became apparent in many different ways. Céline points out the importance of funding for civil actors. In our interview, she explains how funding can be used as a disciplinary mechanism by states, who can use financial measures to steer actors in the desired direction. For solidarity initiatives this means that “In order to access this money, you need to basically fit in the frame and in the understanding of refugee support which is put forward by those agencies and policy makers that designed the funding schemes.”, Cantat explains (interview 2, 09-05-2019). It has therefore been very valuable for me to ask for the ways initiatives are funded, but also whether they have to adapt to their donors demands. Stefania explains that Hi Bro did not have this issue themselves, but they have seen many similar groups succumb to the disappearing of funding from the government (Interview 5, S. La Malfa, 22-05-2019). Most initiatives in the cross-section do not receive money from governments but are recipients of private donations or are funded indirectly through the 8 per 1000 or 5 per 1000 schemes. This makes the initiatives not directly dependent on government policy decisions or budget cuts. Still, they may have to meet certain demands to be eligible for these intermediary organisations’ contributions. As an example we can take the LaMin project. When asked, Manuela tells me that they were recently approached by a larger NGO, who could offer them funding, but in return asks LaMin to make certain types of products. While this would mean that LaMin steps away from their initial activity of making fashion to more menial production work. This is not a problem for LaMin, she explains, because they can still reach their goal of creating job opportunities, so they are seriously considering this opportunity. None of the interviewed actors said they had to give up their primary goals, but that does not mean they are immune to the influence of funding.

The second factor that is often mentioned is the amount of support. Having much support from the population or of other groups and organisations in the network is a big advantage when an initiative tries to counter criminalisation efforts. When the topic is brought up, Roberto says they have had a lot of help from society in their efforts:

“They create this sort of popular defence around us. So also the government, also the mayor, knows that if they do something very bad against Baobab Experience, or the migrants we support, a lot of newspapers, media, will talk about it. And a lot of people would be very very afraid of this.” (Interview 4, R. Viviani, 12-09-2019).

Antonella and Nicola explain that they experienced something similar. Also in the start-up phase of Accoglienza Degna, they had a lot of help from their local network. Later, when Mediterranea was launched, this created a large network that helps to put pressure on the government. Smaller initiatives rely perhaps as heavily on their network. Gabriella explains K_Alma wants to be part of a larger network in order to create a strong community with the ability to create a situation of inclusion.

The third factor enabling initiatives to cope with the intensifying border policy is experience. For example in Greece, Pafsanias explains, there is a longer history of solidarity, and many groups active in migrant support now have existed before the ‘refugee crisis’ started (interview 1, 17-04-2019). These groups are well equipped to deal with difficulties, with media and politics, acquiring funding, et cetera. Céline adds to the topic of experience in interview 2 (09-05-2019), saying that technical experience, for example on how to organise protests, how to run a squat or how to manage a community centre, plays a significant role in creating a functional solidarity initiative.

Size has been a recurring theme as well. This factor is of importance in the amount of pressure that initiatives receive. Stefania makes a valid point in this regard. She says: “I wonder..."
if institutions are even aware of the project. It is not officially recognised. And so there is no
pressure, because it would be unknown to institutions." This is of course a significant difference
between small and relatively young initiatives like Hi Bro, and a well-established organisation
like Baobab, who have had plenty of media attention and are a much debated theme in local
and national politics. Size also makes a difference when you are actively trying to get media
attention.

The last factor I distinguish is dependence. With this I mean the dependence on
external actors, both government institutions as civil actors. Hi Bro is an example of a very
independent initiatives. They are not a registered entity, like for example an official NGO (Or
ONLUS in Italian) or as an enterprise (Like Manuela’s previous project Manuka, which had to
fulfil taxes and other duties (interview 3, 09-05-2019)). Therefore, they have no legal
requirements to anyone. They are not reliant on funding by government or organisations, but
rather from generosity and people associated with their political movement Cambiamo
Messina del Basso. Lastly, they rent their workshop place from a private actor, and are unlike
LaMin who use municipal facilities, independent of regulations and institutional barriers, like
rules on who initiatives can or cannot help or what activities they do in these facilities. This
independence makes them able to do what they think is the best for their organisation. Of
course, it has to be mentioned, this independence appears to be linked to the initiative’s size.
Both in order to grow, and to sustain success, initiatives seem to have to engage in relations
and register, as was the case with Baobab, Roberto explains: “We are an association because
we need it and can be useful for the donations and the relationships with other organisations,
the relationship with institutions.” (interview 4, R. Viviani, 12-05-2019).

6.3 Strategies

Closely related to the factors above are the strategies which initiatives actively employ. While
the factors above are now presented as external elements, some of them are seen by
respondents also as a strategy towards reaching their goals.

For instance the factor network. The creation of networks or becoming part of larger
existing networks can be a way to step up to criminalisation. For example K_Alma clearly states
that they are combining forces with many other actors. Although they are still not powerful
enough to change laws, Gabriella explains in our interview, they can still resist the harsh
political environment because of their network. Other initiatives also speak of seeking
collaborations and connecting with like-minded groups. Manuela of LaMin sees the Italian field
of solidarity as very disconnected, as “happy islands, here and there, trying to survive”
(interview 5, M. Buccionelli & V. Guerrera, 10-05-2019). She believes it would be a good
strategy for these islands to build bridges between each other. Ahead of them are Antonella
and Nicola, who say that Mediterranea is already using this strategy to its advantage. They
explain that Mediterranea is, in fact, a network. Nicola explains:

“We created it as a symbol, as something for people to identify with and to make it their
own thing. We do not organise every single event that happens in Italy involved in
Mediterranea, because we want people, small organisations, groups of friends,
anywhere in Italy, to find their ways to learn about Mediterranea and to find their own
way to spread the message. We do not want to be that entity which tells the people to
do this, or do that. Usually when we explain what we are, we call ourselves "enzymes".
We just facilitate things to happen, but do not cause them. We put ourselves in the mix
to spice things up, we are not the solution, [but we] put our organisation to the help of the people.” (interview 6, Antonella & Nicola, 29-05-2019).

Networking also has the advantage of creating a popular defence against criminalisation. The network then helps to pressure the government. “The opposition is in the social movements...” (interview 1, P. Karathanasis, 17-04-2019).

However, networking is not the only way to continue an initiative’s activities. To counter criminalisation in court, it is a good strategy to arm your initiative with good lawyers. This is what Nicola and Antonella explain about Mediterranea. As the movement is well aware that they risk persecutions, they spend a big part of their budget on lawyers. When asked if they think this is a good strategy, Nicola tells me that they trust that (international) law protects them on the right of demonstration and international human rights laws. In the cross-section, they are the only initiatives that tell me they invest in lawyers as a strategy. Perhaps this is due to the fact that the other initiatives have not in fact been faced with persecutions, while Mediterranea has.

The previous strategies are examples on how to continue the migrant support activities. This final strategy is explicitly linked to the activist endeavours of solidarity initiatives. Nicola and Antonella explain their method to make their voice heard, despite being a relatively small movement:

“We evolved in the sense that we decided to do actually what we always did, to try and find where the political conflict is, where is the problem? We love to be on the frontline of the conflict, because we think that that is the place you can be heard.” (interview 6, Antonella & Nicola, 29-05-2019).

The strategy is to seek the focal point of the discussions in media and politics, in their case the Mediterranean, where migrants keep getting in distress, while government policy forbids the search and rescue operations and disembarkation on Italian soil, despite international law. Other initiatives are also seeking ways to make their voice heard. Although, as explained above, this might also increase the pressure aimed at them, seeking the attention in the frontline might work for them as well. It might help to reach a greater audience despite their size. To elaborate this argument, Nicola continues:

“We are loved in the city but still we are a small reality, small also in the city, I mean if you count how many are involved in the city its around 100 people, in the world that is nothing! So we have to be in the spotlight to actually be heard. So we decided to buy this ship.” (interview 6, Antonella & Nicola, 29-05-2019).
7. Conclusions and recommendations

I started this thesis off in chapter 1 with an introduction to the tumultuous borderscape of Europe and Italy, which migrants and solidarians alike are navigating. I followed this introduction by formulating the goals I wanted to achieve with this research. I said: “This investigation is needed to help understand the position and role of geosocial solidarity initiatives in the complex border policy contexts in Europe and Italy in particular.” In line with that goal, I constructed the main research question: “In what ways does (non-)compliance to policy affect the borderwork of geosocial solidarity initiatives in the Italian border policy context?” To try to find an answer to this, I raised several secondary questions.

The last three chapters have been answering exactly those questions, using data acquired through in-depth-interviews with initiatives operative within the borderscapes, and with academics that have expertise on that same borderscape and civil society response. I outlined the characteristics of the Italian and European borderscape in which solidarity takes place, I analysed the initiatives responses to the changing borderscape and to their criminalisation by the government, and finished with the discussion of solidarity’s hurdles and strategies on the path to success.

In this final chapter I am giving the answers to my research questions, as found in the three previous chapters. The conclusions are followed by a reflection, where I discuss the process and outcomes of this thesis. I will then use these points to formulate several recommendations, both for practitioners in the borderscape, as well as for future research.

7.1 Conclusions

The last three chapters dealt with finding answers to my research questions. Chapter 4 answers the first of three sub-questions and explains what types of geosocial solidarity initiatives operate in the Italian context, while also describing that context extensively. I show that a lot of actors are reacting to changes in the European borderscape, and are shaping this borderscape in return. Firstly, the EU and member states’ governments responded with accelerated securitisation of borders and criminalisation of migration and migrant support. From the ground, civil society actors responded with various forms of migrant support. Secondly, I make clear that the European borderscape itself is not homogenous, but knows differences between and within different member states. Finally, I conclude that the differences between humanitarian actors and solidarity initiatives, corresponding with section 2.1.3 of the theoretical framework, have different impacts on the borderscape. Humanitarian actors can unconsciously contribute to bordermaking, while solidarity, in principle, is borderbreaking.

Following the description of the borderscape, I show the responses of initiatives to the Italian government’s criminalisation efforts directed at them. The main findings of chapter 5 were that criminalisation could in some cases be able to cause initiatives to stop or change their activities, but generally does not succeed in that. Most initiatives instead felt an ever increasing need to continue or expand their activities. Their support feels necessary more than ever in the increasingly hostile borderscape. Moreover, the interviews showed that these initiatives also responded with activities that are more activist in nature. Simply put, these answers uncover that criminalisation of solidarity is only met with more solidarity.

Chapter 6 concludes the three result sections with an explanation of the range of different goals of solidarity, the many different factors that determine the success of initiatives in reaching those goals, and the strategies adopted to counter the criminalisation efforts. It
becomes clear that like the definition of solidarity, the goals of solidarity are not monolithic either, but are explained and valued differently by different people as well. We see that the initiatives in this cross-section have long and short term goals, practical help and changing the situation, as well as goals related to integration. I did not only find answers regarding the definitions of success, but also to the factors determining, and the strategies applied on, the paths towards that success. The interviews show that the factors determining the success of initiatives are funding, support, experience, size and dependence. In various ways, these factors shape the initiatives’ responses to criminalisation, and its impact on the initiatives. Finally, the analysis shows that initiatives deploy several different strategies to counter their criminalisation. The strategies that come forward in my research include: the creation or joining of networks, securing their activities using the justice of law, and making use of the media by placing themselves in the spotlight.

The answers provided above are based on this research’s sub questions and are meant to help me find the information needed to answer the main question. To remind the reader, this question was formulated as: “In what ways does (non-)compliance to policy affect the borderwork of geosocial solidarity initiatives in the Italian border policy context?” The degree of compliance or non-compliance of solidarity initiatives to border policy has proven hard to give a straightforward answer to. We can see that among the initiatives in this research, there appear to be multiple aspects that shape the initiatives’ identity. Some of those aspects are more and some are less compliant to government policy. Initiatives are therefore never simply compliant or not. What we see is that, in agreement with the authors in 2.1.3 (e.g. Rozakou, 2017; Sinatti, 2019), humanitarian aspects of initiatives are seen as more policy compliant, while the more solidarian or activist activities could be considered less compliant. For these reasons, the direct effects of the degree of compliance are hard to show.

What this research does show, however, is that solidarity initiatives are persisting to continue their activities to reach their goals. In addition, many solidarity groups are gaining momentum to make their voices heard, as well as the voices of migrants. This shows that in spite of the increasingly hostile environment, solidarity initiatives are continuing and even developing their borderbreaking borderwork.

7.2 Reflection

7.2.1 Research setup and theory
Through the process of literature research and narrowing down the topic step-by-step, I arrived at the specific research question “In what ways does (non-)compliance to policy affect the borderwork of geosocial solidarity initiatives in the Italian border policy context?” Although this question has been rephrased several times in the running up to the research proposal in March, it had not changed since then. However, especially the part “(non-)compliance to policy” has proven a stumbling block. Primarily the fact that finding out the degree to which initiatives are compliant or not was a task that was out of my abilities using the information I got. As I explain above, there are many different aspects to solidarity, taking up humanitarian and activist characteristics, giving the initiatives both compliant and non-compliant sides.

The question of compliance also seemed less important than initially thought. The situation at hand appears to be less about compliance or not (nor at what position in between the two ends of that spectrum), but more about the ways initiatives cope, or the strategies they utilise. In a way, (non-)compliance seems dependent on the coping mechanisms described, which signifies an indirect relation. It appears that, although the formulation of the main
question could have been sharper, it helped me to uncover a lot of relevant aspects. I therefore chose to leave the research questions the way formulated in the proposal.

After the introductory chapter I presented the theoretical framework, which I used to connect the data with reality. The making of this theoretical framework has felt like it was never finished. I kept finding new insights and new bodies of literature I wanted to keep adding to the chapter, but it had to remain limited to remain a useable framework. Also, it was hard to create headings and to decide on how many paragraphs the theoretical framework needed. As it was really hard to separate the concepts and they felt too interconnected. For example the concepts of humanitarianism and solidarity are very much interwoven, so it was hard to talk about or define one concept without talking about the other.

I would also like to reflect briefly on the way this framework frames certain concepts in a fairly limited way, as legibility and length requirements dictate that not all nuances and counter arguments can be given. This thesis is also framing in the sense that it categorises. The categorisations of certain organisations or aspects as, for example, 'humanitarian', are sometimes based on hasty generalisations.

The chapter ends with a conceptual model. This model shows how the four theoretical concepts interact in a very basic overview. It was intentionally made abstract because of the explorative character of the research questions. This left room for new connections and findings. I used this free room in the analysis, as you can see in the Atlas.TI output (figure 3.2) which is in a sense an expansion of the conceptual model.

7.2.2 Methods, data and outcomes

After constructing the theoretical framework I pointed out how I conducted the research. My methodology chapter shows why I chose for a qualitative methodology, and why I chose the cross-sectional case study design. I also explained that the data collected here would be analysed in a later phase using a grounded theory approach. These methods have shown to capture a lot of insight into the environments, realities, motivations and strategies of the solidarity initiatives in the cross-section. However, there appeared to be some drawbacks to these choices as well.

A drawback of the cross-sectional case study design is the relatively small sample. It has to be said that six initiatives cannot reflect the large number of different initiatives in Italy. In my search for cases, I first set out to construct a list of possible respondents. I started by collecting as many initiatives as possible via internet. In this search I soon hit some dead ends. What I found is, for example, that many (smaller) initiatives do not appear on the websites or documents of larger institutions or organisations in the field. So besides internet, I used Facebook which allowed finding more initiatives. However, this was limited, too, primarily in the amount of information it allowed me to find. For these reasons this initial search did not result in a large list, but it did provide me with a better idea of the different initiatives and civil actors active in Italy.

In chapter three I explained why I chose to use purposeful maximal sampling to determine which cases I was going to examine. This was, in the end, not the method by which I selected cases, but it does still justify the set of initiatives chosen. The reason for this is that I did not have full control over the respondents, as I was dependent on whatever contacts I was able to find and the suggestions of my respondents. Because of this, in combination with the limited time, I decided to work with the contacts at hand. However, I argue that the respondents did represent a variety of initiatives, and approaches the purposeful maximal sampling method. That is also true because I have opted out on some of the suggestions, and
did not contact some of those people because I felt that their initiatives were similar to some of those that I already included in my cross-section, and would not add to the research.

When I approached my respondents, with some initial help, arranging the interviews went easier than expected as people were eager to help, and replied fast. The interviews themselves were conducted with ease and all information that I needed was acquired within the available time.

The last stage was to find answers to my research questions on the basis of the interviews. I used the programme Atlas.TI to do my analysis. In this analysis I used a grounded theory approach. My opinion is that the programme helped me in this process as it helped me to make use of all parts of the interviews. Writing down the findings in the final three chapters was simplified this way, too. Regarding the observations stated in those chapters: the methods have enabled me to thoroughly substantiate the points found.

The last point of this reflection is the generalisation of the answers. As I have done a cross-section to provide insight into the whole of Italy’s field of solidarity, the arguments made here are to a certain extent generalisable to the field, in Italy and Europe. As I have explained, the Italian borderscape is in many ways the same as in other European countries. However, the sample was small and the cross-section was in the end limited to only three Italian cities. Also, as said above, purposeful maximal sampling of the cases was not feasible here. Therefore, I have to say that the results and conclusions of this thesis cannot be held true for all existing geosocial solidarity initiatives. This doesn’t mean that this research has no valuable answers. Instead, many new insights were acquired.

7.3 The way forward

This thesis has of course answered a few questions, but in doing so, many more questions have popped up. The reason for that is the explorative character of this research. This thesis has uncovered a lot of factors associated with solidarity initiatives and their borderwork, which were hidden from view at first. It did not, however, see exactly how and to which extent these factors affect solidarity. Frankly, as said in 7.2, the main question remains partly unanswered due to the inability of this research to measure policy compliance, or the effects of it on borderwork. My view remains unchanged that this knowledge would be very relevant if we want to understand the success of solidarity more thoroughly. Future research would be required to uncover those relations. This could help provide a better understanding of the workings of civil society and its relations with government actors.

I did, however, uncover a lot of other factors that contribute to the response of solidarity to its criminalisation. On the basis of those findings, I am able to give some suggestions for practitioners in the field. For solidarity initiatives, a lesson might be learned from the different strategies I found and explain in section 6.3. These insights might be helpful to minimise the impact of criminalisation, and help create more space to act. To civil society as a whole I would like to say, on the basis of the findings in literature and the interviews (notably sections 2.1.3 and 4.3), that there is a lot to learn from geosocial solidarity initiatives. For example, a more critical stance to the interdependencies of civil and government actors could help minimise the exploitation of civil society by governments. Secondly, the focus of humanitarian actors on practical assistance might benefit people better when combined with efforts aimed at integration and efforts aimed at ensuring long term dignified lives. Finally, I suggest that joining forces, expanding networks and building bridges between civil society actors, despite any possible differences that this might encounter, will be a step towards a less hostile borderscape, and might effectively counter the trend of criminalisation.
Literature overview


Annex A: Interview guide experts

**Introduction**
My research is about solidarity initiatives helping migrants in Italy. I found that there are several opposing forces, primarily securitisation and criminalisation of migration by states, and on the other hand a growing opposition, which can take the form of solidarity.

I am looking at how compliance or non-compliance to policy affects the practices of solidarity initiatives, and how this changes their viability/effectivity.
In that regard I am firstly looking at what the field of solidarity looks like in Italy and Europe, that is why I contacted you mostly, as I consider you an expert in the field.

*First, I'd like to know a bit about your activities in the field.*
1: Could you tell me briefly about yourself and your work as a researcher?

- I am still struggling a bit on finding a definition for solidarity. There are many variations by of course.
many different researchers.
2: How would you define Solidarity?

2.1 and in what ways does it contrast with humanitarianism?

- To have some context and practical example, as it is something you must know a lot about:
3: What does the field of solidarity look like in Europe?

3.2 Would you know how the Italian situation might differ from the rest of Europe, if so?

- I would now like to go into the direction of policies and policy change, as this is also a key concept in my research.
4.1 How have recent policy changes changed the field of solidarity?

4.2 Do you think policies could also be helpful for initiatives? fund

- There seems to be a certain point in the lifespan of initiatives where they are forced to make a decision. They need to choose to remain/become political/activist or they become humanitarian and adjust to the “system”.
5: In what ways do you think that solidarity initiatives (are forced to) change due to policy pressures?

- I ask myself primarily how “policy compliance” affects the viability/survival of initiatives.
6.1: What are the most important factors that determine the viability of solidarity, according to you?
6.2: Which ones are the most important? (Is it policy?)
Intro
My research is about solidarity initiatives helping migrants in Italy. There are several opposing forces at play here, primarily securitisation and criminalisation of migration by states, and on the other hand a growing opposition to this, which can take the form of solidarity.

I am looking at how (non-)compliance to policy affects the practices of solidarity initiatives, and how this changes their viability/effectivity.

To understand this, I am interviewing people from initiatives on different parts of the country, in different parts of migrants’ journeys and on different levels to create an overview of the field of solidarity as a whole. This way I can see how different initiatives in different circumstances deal with the situation in different ways.

-----
First, I’d like to know more about your organisation.
1: Could you tell me about your initiative?
   • When did the project start, who were the initiators?
   • What kind of people do you help and how?
   • What is your personal role within the project?
   • Who support your initiative, with whom do you cooperate?
   • How are you funded?

-----
I try to place the initiatives existing in Italy in an overview and try to structure and compare these. Therefore I would like to gain some more information on the nature of the initiative. Especially looking at how groups define themselves in terms of activism and solidarianism.
2: How would you define your initiative?
   • Are you a solidarian initiative?
   • How is it officially recognised?
   • Has this changed over time, how?
   • Has its structure/way of operating changed over time?
   • Have your main focus areas/activities changed over time?

-----
In my research I focus on the the effects of policies on solidarity. I would like to ask you about those effects:
3: How have recent policy changes in Italy affected the solidarity field in general, and your organisation specifically?
3.2: Is there also government policy that is beneficial for your organisation?

There seems to be a certain point in the lifespan of initiatives where initiatives are forced to make a decision. They need to choose to remain/become political/activist or they become humanitarian and adjust to the “system”.
4: In what ways do you think that your solidarity initiatives (is forced to) change(d) due to policy pressures?
4.2 Do you know how other related initiatives cope with this?

-----
I ask myself primarily how “policy compliance” affects the viability/survival of initiatives.
5: What are the factors that you depend on to be/remain successful? (what is “success”?)
5.2: Which factors are the most important? (Is it policy, involvement of activists, etc.?)
## Annex C: Codebook

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document Group</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Initiative information  | Border context: hostile environment for solidarity initiatives  
criminalisation of solidarity: solidarity initiatives hard to control by state  
criminalisation of solidarity: states cut support to initiatives and ngos  
Definitions: Initiatives differ in their own definitions, their own meanings  
factor: size of initiative  
Group: Initiative information  
initiative activities: awareness creation  
initiative activities: facilitation / "enzymes"  
initiative activities: helping find home  
initiative activities: Job opportunities  
initiative activities: legal/medical assistance  
initiative activities: meeting place  
initiative activities: monitoring  
initiative activities: night accommodation  
initiative activities: organising protest  
initiative activities: teaching  
initiative specifics: cooperative  
initiative specifics: Activist  
initiative specifics: association  
initiative specifics: charity  
initiative specifics: collective  
initiative specifics: has a humanitarian part  
initiative specifics: history: started humanitarian --> evolved to activism  
initiative specifics: history: started with practical help  
initiative specifics: NGO/Onlus  
initiative specifics: not activist  
initiative specifics: part of larger structure  
initiative specifics: political  
initiative specifics: solidarity  |
| Criminalisation Reasons | Criminalisation of solidarity: non-humanitarians connected to political deviance  
criminalisation of solidarity: solidarity initiatives hard to control by state  
criminalisation of solidarity: states cut support to initiatives and ngos  
criminalisation of solidarity: states scared of spreading of radical politics  
Criminalisation of solidarity: states want full control  
criminalising of solidarity: states prosecute  
criminalising of solidarity: targeting key figures  
criminalisation of solidarity: prevent information/monitoring/ leaking of wrongdoings  
Group: Criminalisation reasons |
| Border/policy context | Border context: criminalising or restriction of formal NGOs  
Border context: difficult environment for social business  
Border context: hostile environment for solidarity initiatives  
Border context: no legal routes  
Border policy - differences GR/IT: accepting foreign help  
Border policy - Italy: Salvini Decree  
border policy - Italy: SPRAR  
Border policy - Italy: Took EU funds  
Border policy- differences GR/IT: International Organisations were present  
Border policy: EU: Hotspots as continuation of bufferzones  
Border policy: External border states share role in EU border policy  
Border policy: Externalisation of borders  
Border policy: Greece took control later than Italy  
Border Policy: Greece: Geographical restriction  
Border policy: Greece: leftist government  
Border policy: municipal differences  
border policy: securitisation bco Schengen in EU-DNA  
Border policy: securitising internal borders since 2015 again  
Border policy: to what extent policies are local, national or EU  
Border-policy: EU same trends as national  
Context Italy: no work  
Group: Border/policy context  
Historical context Italy: historically big role of church in society  
historical context Italy: long time immigration country  
historical context Italy: many squatters, now almost gone  
historical context: greece little migrant experience  
Italian border system: 3 kinds of accommodation  
Italian border system: camps segregated from society  
Italian border system: Different forms of protection  
migration long time in political agenda  
old government also hostile to migrants  
Social movement in Italy  
State regulation of initiatives: institutionalisation |
|---|---|
| Solidarity goals | Goals of solidarity: integration/connecting people  
goals of solidarity: long term change  
goals of solidarity: short term making lives better  
Group: Solidarity goals |
| Solidarity context | Definitions: Solidarity has long history in Greece  
Group: Solidarity context  
solidarity history: 2015 changes - bigger scale  
Solidarity history: after 2015 blurred lines  
Solidarity history: at first support, because passers by  
solidarity history: long history  
Solidarity history: Opinion migrants changed: bc they were there to stay  
Solidarity history: pre 2015 binary field: activism-aid  
Solidarity history: the opposition is in the movements  
Solidarity shaped by history: Activist experience  
Solidarity shaped by history: arrival of foreign volunteers  
Solidarity shaped by history: economic crisis in Greece |
| Solidarity reasons | Group: Solidarity reasons  
Reason solidarity: Government creates gap |
| Criminalisation forms | Group: Criminalisation forms  
level of criminalisation: court trials  
level of criminalisation: evictions of accommodation  
level of criminalisation: police violence  
level of criminalisation: politics/media try to defame |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Miscellaneous         | “Nothing happened” instead of “changes in politics”  
Cases are unique  
Group: Miscellaneous                                                                                                 |
| Partners/funders      | Group: Partners/funders  
partners/funders: 5x1000 or 8x1000  
Partners/funders: Demands/requirements  
partners/funders: EU funds  
Partners/funders: international organisations  
Partners/funders: Legal assistance partnerships  
partners/funders: local government  
Partners/funders: local partnerships  
Partners/funders: Medical partnerships  
Partners/funders: part of political movement  
partners/funders: partnership w/ government (SPRAR)  
Partners/funders: private actors  
Partners/funders: Religious actors  
partners/funding: generate own income                                                                                   |
| Policy effects/consequences | Group: Policy effects/consequences  
Policy effects: affects initiatives’ activities  
policy effects: Choice: bc activities now become illegal  
policy effects: Discouraging/enticing fear  
policy effects: It spreads xenophobe discourse  
Polic effects: more illegalised migrants in Italy  
policy effects: Politicising/radicalising  
Reason solidarity: Government creates gap  
solidarity declined post-“crisis”                                                                                           |
| Crisis Discourse      | Crisis discourse  
Crisis discourse: allowed repressive policies  
crisis discourse: helped mobilise the masses  
crisis discourse: made drastic measures possible  
Group: Crisis discourse  
solidarity declined post-“crisis”                                                                                           |
| Definitions           | Definition humanitarianism: contribute to victimisation, dehumanisation and depolitisation  
Definitions Unclear definition of political or cultural  
definitions: define themselves as solidarian  
definitions: define themselves as volunteers  
Definitions: Humanitarianism: is philanthropy/charity/thou-thinking  
Definitions: Humanitarianism: More technical term  
Definitions: Humanitarianism: state-driven  
definitions: Important how people define themselves  
definitions: Refugee protection = brings together all aid  
definitions: solidarity as exchange  
definitions: solidarity as process/project with ideal/goal  
definitions: Solidarity can be explained in different ways  
definitions: Solidarity has long history in Greece  
definitions: solidarity opposes system  
definitions: Solidarity strictly does not take money from government  
definitions: solidarity unclear  
definitions: solidarity: a positioning  
definitions: Solidarity: empowering  
definitions: Solidarity: related to anarchism, anti-authoritarianism.  
definitions: Solidarity: requires changing relation - equality  
definitions: Solidarity: opposes philanthropy/humanitarianism  
Group: Definitions  
Group: Xenophobia                                                                                                           |
| Factor: civil support | Factor: experience |
| Factor: Funding       | Factor: funding: difficult in Italy now |
| Factor: funding: Disciplinary mechanism | Factor: funding: enabling or disabling |
| Factor: funding: more difficult in future | Factor: funding: saying one thing, doing st else |
| factor: independence  | Factor: network |
| Factor: personal willingness and commitment | Factor: funding: Disciplinary mechanism |
| Factor: publicity/spotlight/frontline | factor: size of initiative |
| Group: Factors/strategies for/to success |
| migrants have other things on their mind |
| strategy: juridical defence/lawyers |
| strategy: popular defence |
| strategy: pragmatic |
| strategy: respond to demand |

| Xenophobia |
| xenophobia also bco right wing mobilising. |
| xenophobia: also anti NGO/anti solidarian |
| xenophobia: everyday lives disturbed |
| xenophobia: people do not know eachother |

| Factors/strategies for/to success |
| achieving solidarity: a challenge |
| achieving solidarity: co-decision/assemblies |
| EU as support against state repression |

| Solidarity responses to criminalisation |
| Group: Solidarity responses to criminalisation |
| Social movement in Italy |
| Solidarity responses to criminalisation: broad support bc includes a lot of (all) people |
| solidarity responses to criminalisation: change activities |
| Solidarity responses to criminalisation: Continue activities |
| Solidarity responses to criminalisation: EU (court of Justice) for support |
| solidarity responses to criminalisation: more activist, vocal, radical |
| Solidarity responses to criminalisation: stop activities |
| solidarity responses to criminalisation: strategies differ between initiatives |
| solidarity responses to criminalisation: With more solidarity |