# Identity and Child Soldiering

A statistical analysis on the influence of identity on the use of child soldiers by armed non-state actors.

Radboud University Nijmegen

Master's Thesis in Conflict Power Politics, Department of Political Science, Faculty of Management, Radboud University, Nijmegen, Netherlands.
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Abstract

The focus of research on child soldiers has been primarily on structural variables. This research tends to extend the focus onto the characteristics of armed non-state actors by looking at the identity foundations of these groups and their connection to child soldiering. This focus leads to a theory-building effort on the demand side of child soldiering. large N studies are scarce on the topic of child soldiering. By using a dataset containing 237 different armed non-state actors this thesis also attempts to contribute to this gap of research on child soldiers. The research question for this thesis is as followed; Does the role of identity within armed non-state actors influence the use of child soldiers? This thesis looks at the three identities most common to conflict analysis; ethnicity, religion and class-based ideology. The goal of an armed non-state actor and the strength of their central command serve as control variables. The results indicate both foundations of ethnic identities and class-based ideologies by an armed non-state actor influence an armed non-state actors use of child soldiers. In contrast to the other identities in this research, this thesis finds no significant effect of a religious foundation of an armed non-state actor and the use of child soldiers. This thesis offers an argument as to why identity can matter, namely as a way to legitimize their conflict and the necessity of using child soldiers. This argument, however, is unable to be tested in this thesis. The main findings of this thesis indicate that in-depth research on these identities is necessary, to understand the possible causal connection. Beyond this, this thesis argues that the need for further research beyond structural variables in violent conflict is important and deserves more academic attention.

Acknowledgements

This master thesis is the last part of the degree of Master of Science in 'Political Science' for the specialization 'Conflict, Power and Politics' at the Radboud University in Nijmegen.

I would like to thank Dr. Francois Lenfant, my thesis supervisor. I highly appreciated his support, insights and encouragements during the writing of this thesis. After each meeting, I regained motivation which has helped me greatly to get to this point.

I would also like to thank Dr. Roos van der Haer and Dr. Tobias Bömelt for their work on the Child soldier dataset as well as Dr. Jessica Maves Braithwaite and Dr. Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham for their work on the FORGE dataset. Without these datasets, this thesis would not have been possible for me to write.

Finally, I would like to thank my family for being there at all times. Their encouragement and support have helped me through every moment of this research.

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Michiel Koning

Eindhoven, 11 August 2019

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Chapter One: Introduction

1.1　Background

Armed conflicts lead to the suffering of millions of children worldwide. Out of all these children, child soldiers form a particularly vulnerable group. The use of children in violent conflict constitutes a grave violation of human rights yet the practice of child soldiering still is present in various countries across the globe. In 2016, reports identified 18 countries where child soldiers were being used (Child soldiers international, 2019). The use of child soldiers is not just a phenomenon of the last decades. Throughout history and different contexts, children have participated in various ways to warfare. The middle ages knew squires, young boys preparing to become knights, medals of honour were granted to boys aged 11 and 15 during the American civil war, and both world wars contain stories of young boys, in the name of patriotism, lying about their age to join the battle (Singer, 2006, Twum-Danso, 2003). Suffice to say, it would be easier to make a list of wars in the past where children did not participate in.

Despite the long history of child soldiering, the period after the second world war has been called the *"era of the child soldier"* (Brett & McCallin, 1998 p, 20). The changing nature of violent conflict with an increased number of non-state actors involved and advancements of warfare have been attributed to this fact (Singer, 2006). Indeed, the uneasy truth is that the rise of small weapons has enabled children to become as deadly as adults in warfare. The "era of the child soldier" also saw the start of an international response against the use of child soldiers. In 1977 an additional protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 prohibited the recruitment and participation in conflicts of children under the age of fifteen years and for recruitment of children between ages fifteen and eighteen, states had to prioritize those who were oldest (see, Geneva Protocol, 1977). The choice of age was a compromise, as there was a call to raise the age limit to 18 years old, yet various states opposed to this age limit (Brett, 1997). It was only in 2002, that the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict (OPAC) came into force, increasing the legal age to eighteen.

The use of child soldiers has been documented by various organisations (e.g. Child Soldiers International, Human Rights Watch, UNICEF). The number of child soldiers active is difficult to estimate accurately. Access to ANSA's is not always possible and estimations can be biased. Human rights organizations might be inclined to exaggerate the number of child soldiers used by armed forces to increase the attention for their objective. On the other side, ANSA's could be incentivized understate, or even deny entirely, their use of child soldiers to avoid punishment by the international community (Haer & Böhmelt, 2017; Lasley & Thyne, 2014). Due to these difficulties, total numbers are not clear, Child Soldiers International (2017) estimate the number to be in the tens of thousands and possibly more than a 100,000. This estimation is far more conservative than previous estimations of 200,000 up to 300,000 (Human Rights Watch, 1998,

Twum-Danso, 2003).

Despite the difficulties to estimate the number of active child soldiers, scholars note that since the cold war there has been a significant increase in child soldiers (Haer & Böhmelt, 2018; Singer, 2006). This, in turn, has drawn increased attention of media, the international community and child rights advocates towards this topic. These past few decades have witnessed several high profile trial cases linked to child soldiering. Child soldiering was the main charge against Thomas Lubanga, military commander of the Union of Congolese Patriots, and the first person ever convicted by the International Criminal Court. Charles Taylor has been the first former head of state convicted since the Nuremberg trials. Furthermore, the first ICC Trials against ex-members from the Lord's Resistance Army have started with a case against former child soldier Dominic Ongwen.

Beyond these trials, there has been a strong push by the international community to put an end to the use of child soldiers. Peacekeeping operations have started to include training to UN personnel on children's rights and protection (United Nations, 2011). Naming and Shaming of armed forces using child soldiers is another used method to try to curb the use of child soldiers. For example, the United Nations lists groups and national armies using child soldiers. To get out of this list, armed forces can enter action plans with the United Nations that focus on releasing children from these groups (United Nations, 2008). Similarly to the United Nations, NGO's such as Geneva Call, engage in dialogue with armed non-state actors (ANSA's) in order to persuade them to halt the use of child soldiers. Various non-state armed groups have been reported to halt their use of children (Geneva Call, 2017). For example, the People's Protection Units (YPG) and the Women's Protection Units (YPJ) demobilized 149 children from their ranks in 2014 after negotiations with Geneva Call. The process of monitoring the commitments made by these groups, however, remains difficult. Despite these efforts by the international community to put a stop to the use of child soldiers, the trend of child soldiering has been on the rise in the last decade (Child soldiers International, 2019).

The efforts mentioned above focus on limiting the use of child soldiers through engagement with armed forces. Beyond these efforts is the task to rehabilitate former child soldiers into society. This is done within the context of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR). DDR is a general practice within post-conflict societies. Child soldier DDR programmes are aimed to remove children from a violent context and provide them with a safe environment where they can rehabilitate and complete their development (Pauletto & Patel, 2010). These programmes are different from DDR programs aimed at adults. One major difference is that child soldier DDR programs occur while conflict might be ongoing (ibid.). A second major difference is the context of transitional justice, where former adult soldiers might be held accountable for their actions, while children are considered victims of armed forces (ibid.).

The efforts to curb the use of child soldiers have faced criticism though. For example, the United Nations list previously mentioned has received criticism from various NGO's. Child Soldiers

International states that the list is non-exhaustive and politicised. This argument is based on a decision made in 2017 to split the list into two separate lists; one list for those who have taken positive steps during the reporting period and one for those who have not done so (Child Soldiers International, 2018). Meanwhile, Peter Singer (2004) criticises various groups who waste political capital by extensive lobbying with states such as the USA and Great Brittain, whom both have 17 year old children in their military. Singer (ibid.) addresses that while this may be against the norm and OPAC status, it is of lesser significance than examples such as the Lords Resistance Army's use of child soldiers. Reintegration of child soldiers has faced criticism as well. Various scholars note a lack of provisions on mental health care (Betancourt et. al., 2008; Wessels, 2004). Others point out that the cultural context is overlooked in the process of DDR (Gislesen, 2006; Pauletto & Patel, 2010). Finally, DDR programs have faced criticism on gender-bias, where girl child soldiers have often received less attention (Haer, 2017; Williamson, 2006).

Not only is the use of children in violent conflict a serious violation of human rights, it also deteriorates societies by changing the dynamics of violent conflict and post-conflict processes. The use of children can make small rebel groups suddenly a capable fighting force (Haer & Böhmelt, 2016). Children growing up in organizations of violence disrupts their psychological and moral development. This development is hard to reverse resulting in a higher likelihood to engage in violent behaviour in post-conflict societies (Singer, 2001). The use of child soldiers furthermore increases the risk of large scale violent conflict recurrence in a post-conflict society (Haer & Böhmelt, 2016).

While both governments and ANSA's make use of child soldiers, this thesis will be specified on ANSA's. In particular, this thesis attempts to explore identities an ANSA may have and the relation these identities can have on the use of child soldiers. The relation of an ANSA's identity and their practice of child soldiering has not been explored yet. Several ANSA's have been documented to have been found on a particular identity and make use of child soldiers, such as the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) (Global March, 2005) and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) (Human Right Watch, 2003). Examples of ANSA's with a clear foundation based upon an identity that do not use child soldiers exists as well, such as the Islamic Arab Front of Azawad (FIAA) in Mali (Child Soldiers International, 2004). With the use of statistical analysis, this thesis will explore whether these two variables have a potential causal relationship or not. In the next sections of this chapter, the research goal and research question will be specified, both academic and societal relevance of this thesis will be examined and the research design will be explained.

1.2 Research goal and sub-questions

This thesis attempts to examine whether certain identities of an ANSA have an impact on their practice of child soldiering. The aim of this research question and sub-questions is to build onto a theory of identity within a context of violent conflict. It is explorative in nature and focuses on theory-building rather than theory testing. Theories on the role of identity on violent conflict paired with Lasley and Thyne's (2014) argument on secessionism and legitimacy serve as a starting question to identity's role on the use of child soldiers. The role of identity has been thoroughly examined regarding violent conflict. A particular aspect of identity that has been discussed by various scholars is its effect in legitimizing violent conflict. However, this factor has not been applied in a similar fashion to child soldiering. This leads us to this thesis research question as following:

"*Does the identity of an armed non-state actor influence their use of child soldiers?*".

Several identities are repeatedly mentioned in research on violent conflicts. Bernauer (2016) argues that three identity dimensions are ever latently present in societies. Political exclusion generally becomes based on one or more of these identity dimensions. In turn, these identities become salient in conflict dynamics (ibid.). These identities are based on ethnicity, religion and class-based ideology. This thesis will analyse these three identities, leading to three sub-questions each based on a specific identity:

Sub-question 1: Does a religious identity influence the use of child soldiers within armed non-state actors?
Sub-question 2: Does an ethnic identity influence the use of child soldiers within armed non-state actors?
Sub-question 3: Does an identity based on a class-based political ideology influence the use of child soldiers within armed non-state actors?

1.3 Academic relevance

Academic research related to child soldiers tends to split into two different categories. The first focuses on reintegration and issues regarding justice within the context of child soldiering. The second category explores the question of why child soldiers are used in violent conflict. This thesis falls into the latter category. Various reasons have been proposed why child soldiering as a phenomenon occurs. Most research focuses on a rational framework. For example. Beber & Blattman (2013) explain that the "costs" of child soldiering are lower and are easier to control by rebel command. Another example of this research includes Singer's (2006) argument that the use of child soldiers has become more prominent due to the rise of light weaponry. Dallaire (2011) hints

towards overpopulation and the need to quickly refill and replace troops within a rebel organization.

Causes of child soldiering can also be examined from a supply and demand perspective. The supply side poses arguments why children participate within armed forces, while the supply-side explores the question of why armed forces are willing to make use of child soldiers (Haer, 2019). Supply side factors have received the most scholarly attention. The demand side arguments mostly focus on factors that explain the general usefulness of recruiting child soldiers, rather than specific characteristics that might make an ANSA more or less inclined to make use of child soldiers.

However, recent research by Lasley & Thyne (2014) has shifted the focus towards ANSA's goals and structure. This research is a new attempt in explaining the demand side of child soldiering. They reason that secessionist ANSA's are less likely to use child soldiers as this interferes with their attempts to seek and gain international legitimacy (ibid.). Understanding whether certain ANSA's are more or less likely to make use of child soldiering has not yet been explored. This research takes a similar approach as Lasley & Thyne's (ibid), however, instead of the primary focus on goals, this research is specified on the identity foundations of an ANSA.

Aside from the lack of research on the characteristics of ANSA's as a potential causal link on the use of child soldiers, this thesis also has academic relevance on a methodological basis. Research on child soldiers has been scarce on large N studies (Haer, 2019, Ames, 2007). Instead, most research has been based on case studies, often specified to a single country (Ames, 2007). As a result, most findings have been difficult to generalize. To determine how important factors influencing child soldiering are, statistical modelling needs to be taken into account. This thesis thus also gains academic relevance by contributing to a dataset that makes such research possible.

1.4   Societal relevance

The use of children in violent conflict is in sharp contrast to our standards of human rights. Child soldiering entails serious consequences for not only the children involved but also entire societies as well as the danger of violent conflict to last longer (Haer & Böhmelt, 2017). A better understanding of this phenomenon is pivotal for policies aimed at reducing the number of child soldiers. While various academics have coined new policy ideas (e.g. Reich & Achvarina, 2006, Malan, 2000), Most policy developments aimed to reduce the use of child soldiers consists of measures attempting to stop the ongoing use of child soldiers in a particular conflict (Dudenhoefer, 2016). An example of this is the naming and shaming and DDR practices mentioned above. While these policies are necessary, the need for preventive measures is as important. This need is further underlined by the difficulties shown in the DDR progress (e.g. Betancourt et. al., 2008; Gislesen, 2006). New literature has provided policy ideas that aim to prevent child soldiering beforehand, for example, Reich and Achvarina (2005) suggest stronger protection at refugee

camps. Early assessments on a rising ANSA can help us identify possible dangers to children. By doing so, preventive measures can be taken to better protect children from being recruited in the first place.

1.5 Research design

This research will make use of a binary logistic regression analysis, using child soldiering as a binary variable. The unit of analysis will be ANSA's, three separate independent variables on identity and the dependent variable will be the use of child soldiers. The identity variables will be paired with control variables based on the ANSA's goals and the strength of the central command of the ANSA. The dataset contains data on ANSA's operating between 1989-2010. This time frame leads us to a relatively large-N study with the most data on child soldier usage.

It is important to understand the difficulties that may arise in researching this subject. ANSA's may have multiple identities. Some ANSA's have a specific single based identity such as a religious identity, (e.g. Lord's Resistance Army and Al-Qaeda). Yet by no means does this mean all ANSA's which have religious doctrines are within their rebel structure. Secessionists, for example, may very well be also facing a divide with the rest of the country on religious grounds exemplified by the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front. Ethnicity and religion can also be mixed. For example, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army can be considered an ethnic based ANSA, yet they also have a separate religious identity (Islamic) while the majority of Myanmar is predominantly Buddhist. This leads to a difficulty regarding statistical analysis. Without an in-depth overview of a ANSA's structure, it is difficult to pinpoint the role of identity for many ANSA's. The use of child soldiers and research thereof can similarly present difficulties (Ames, 2007). For statistical analysis, these difficulties rest in missing data, and time variation. Furthermore, several variables that have previously been connected to child soldiering are not analysed within this logistic regression. The reason for this exclusions is based on limitations of this data. For example, data on poverty and population are primarily collected on state levels, yet it can differ within the state, while also fluctuate over time.

1.6 Outline Thesis

This thesis is divided into six chapters. This introduction forms the first chapter. Chapter two will provide the theoretical framework for this research. This chapter is split into three parts, the first part will cover theories concerning child soldiering. The second part will present a general theory regarding identity, followed by theoretical arguments that look into the role of identity in the context of violent conflict. Section three will provide a quick overview of the theories and formulates the sub-questions based on the previous sections. Chapter three will provide the conceptualization and operationalization of the used variables necessary for this research. It furthermore discusses the data used and what type of method is used for the analysis. The results of this analysis will be then

applied to the research question and sub-questions in chapter four. The conclusion and discussion on the limitations of this thesis are in chapter five as well as suggestions for further research. The final chapter provides a list of literature and appendices of the research.

Chapter Two: Theoretical framework

This chapter serves to provide an overview of the current literature of the phenomenon of child soldiering and identity, particular within the context of conflict studies. It extends the overview given in the introduction to better understand what has been researched and what still needs to be explored. As described in the introduction, the role of identity has been used for various research regarding violent conflict. However, the connection to child soldiering has remained overlooked, despite various theories hinting towards a possible link. In this chapter, the theoretical arguments regarding both the use of child soldiers and identities are further examined and result in sub-questions that contribute to answering the main research question, namely, whether identities of ANSA's may affect the use of child soldiering. This chapter is divided into three sub-chapters. First, this thesis will explore the phenomenon of child soldiering, Secondly, the concept of identity will be discussed, and in particular the role of identity in violent conflicts as well as in ANSA's. Finally, in this chapter, this thesis will propose sub-questions based on the theoretical findings.

2.1   Child soldiers

This thesis follows the definition of child soldiers as stated in the 1997 Cape Town Principles;

"Child soldier […] any person under 18 years of age, who is part of any kind of regular or irregular armed force or armed group in any capacity, including, but not limited to cooks, porters, messengers, and anyone accompanying such groups, other than family members. The definition includes girls recruited for sexual purposes and for forced marriage. It does not, therefore, only refer to a child who is carrying or has carried arms". (UNICEF, Cape Town Principles 1997, p12).

As mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, the use of children in violent conflict is not just a modern occurrence. While the historic accounts are worth to be studied, the phenomenon has garnered most research on modern violent conflicts, post world war II, however. This focus is not without reason, nor is it only out of pragmatic choices. Violent conflict shifted to an intra-state character. Mary Kaldor (2013) reasons for a difference between old wars, typified by states as central actors and a certain code of conduct, and new wars. In short, these new wars, according to Kaldor (ibid.) are opposite to the old wars, various actors beyond the state are engaged, violence is targetted towards civilians and distinctions between combatant and non-combatant are blurred. These so called new wars have introduced a new rise in numbers of children into warfare (Honwana, 2009). Numbers vary per year, added by the difficulty of research on this topic, yet since the cold war, the number of children engaged in violent conflict has been higher than before (Singer, 2006, Child soldiers International, 2019).

The image of child soldiers is sometimes oversimplified; a young African boy with a

Kalashnikov rifle. This image has its roots in the media attention to Liberia and Sierra Leona during the 1990s and early 2000s (Child Soldiers International, 2019b). Media portrayals of child soldiers are but one of the many faces of child soldiers. In these contemporary conflicts, children operate in all degrees of warfare. Some fight on the battlefield, others perform logistical chores, etc. Both girls and boys fight (Haer, 2019). Around thirty to forty per cent of the child soldiers are girls (Child Soldiers International, 2019; Haer, 2019) Both government and ANSA's make use of child soldiers, although their recruitment practices tend to differ (Aning & McIntyre, 2005). Another portrayal highlight abduction and coercion of these children, yet a substantial group of children join armed forces voluntarily (Brett & Specht, 2004, Twum-Danso, 2003). Reasons for voluntary recruitment often are based on the context in which children find themselves. Poverty, fear and abuse pave the way towards voluntary participation in armed forces (Brett & Specht, 2004; Wessels, 2006). The notion of volunteerism is debatable. The lack of other choices as well as limited rationality makes for a strong argument that such a decision is not all voluntary (Bjørkhaug, 2010, Dudenhoefer, 2016). Regardless, this remains a different aspect in contrast to coerced child soldiers. Various coercive methods are used to recruit child soldiers. Abduction of children refugee camps has been widely researched(e.g. Dudenhoefer, 2016, Reich & Achvarina, 2005). Beyond abduction, a form of mass recruitment of children is impressment, the forced recruitment of survivors after a raid by an armed force (Wessels, 2006). Another known recruitment method takes on the form of blackmailing. Town elders or local authorities are presented with the threat of a raid by an armed force which can be diverted by offering recruits to the armed force (ibid.). A final

The topic of child soldiers has often been linked to the African continent. Not only the media image contributes to this. The high profile trials mentioned in chapter one also focus on African cases. Furthermore, scholarly notes also contribute, albeit more nuanced, to the link of child soldiers and Africa (Drumbl, 2012). For example, Reich and Achvarina (2006, p130) state that *"since 1975, Africa has become the epicentre of the problem, providing the largest concentration of both conflicts and child soldiers"* (see also, Bennet 1998; Kalis, 2002). Although Africa has seen a lot of cases of child soldiering, child soldiering is more than just an African phenomenon. To put this picture in perspective, 40 % of the child soldiers active are located on the African continent (Drumbl, 2012). Historical arguments have furthermore established that child soldiering is not a topic particularly unique to only Africa (Honwana, 2002; Twum-Danso, 2003)

Roos Haer (2019) Identifies that due to the difficulties of extracting data there is a lack of comparative research on child soldiers. Beyond this several topics have not received enough attention according to Haer (ibid.). These topics include the variation between forced and voluntary recruitment, the variation in the use of female child soldiers and the effects, sometimes limited, of international responses against the use of child soldiers (ibid.) This thesis attempts to contribute to the current literature by comparative research that focuses on groups over the world rather than in a certain continent or nation-state.

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2.1.2 Causes of child soldiering

Although the use of child soldiers is not a new phenomenon, academic research has been quite limited until recent years. Civil society groups have conducted most of the earlier research on child soldiers, scholars have started to contribute to this topic the last two to three decades (Haer, 2019). Most studies, however, focus on single case studies and suffer other limitations that restrict generalizing interpretations (ibid.). The phenomenon has since gained interest from various academic fields, including law, psychology and political science. These fields contribute to different topics, such as international law and reintegration of former child soldiers. One of the current fields of research has drawn focus on the current rise of child soldiering. Scholars have provided various explanations as to what is the cause behind this rise. Current literature provides three different arguments for this recent growth in the use of child soldiers. These arguments are based on economic factors, a technological advancement factor and a supply factor (ibid.).

The first argument reasons that structural economic factors are behind the rise of child soldiers. These factors are poverty and increasing inequality within low-income countries. This is similar to violent conflict in general (Goodhand, 2001). Cohn and Goodwin-Gill (1994), who are regarded as having written the first comprehensive book on the child soldiering argue that poverty drives children into recruitment. These findings have been reproduced since then and explored further (e.g. Brett, 2003; Schmidt, 2007). Brett and Specht (2004), who used interviews with 53 former child soldiers, find that poverty yields strong evidence as to why children join rebel groups. The economic argument can also be reversed, by looking at the armed forces as to why they take in child soldiers. Beber & Blattman (2013) argue that the costs of child soldiers are lower as well as the fact that child soldiers are easier to control by rebel commanders.

The argument for the technological advancement factor holds that with the current advancements of weaponry, children become as effective as adults in violent conflict (Singer, 2006). Singer (ibid.) pairs this with the drop of costs for small arms since the end of the cold war. The low costs of small arms make violent conflict more accessible for willing fighters (Killicoat, 2006). According to Singer (2006) pairing the low costs of arms with the fact that these weapons now can be used by children leads to a rise in the use of child soldiers.

The final argument is based on the population. The argument for this factor reasons that most countries where child soldiers are present, particularly in Africa, have a large supply of children. The number of people under 18 sometimes is larger than 50% of the overall population. Since young people make up a larger share of the population, it becomes an important group for governments and ANSA's alike to recruit from (Dallaire, 2011; Peters, Richard & Vlassenroot, 2003). Meanwhile, others note that due to continuous violent conflict many children are located in camps where they are subject to abduction (Achvarina & Reich, 2006).

All three arguments do share some interrelation, and most scholars mentioned above do highlight the notion that multiple factors weigh into the use of child soldiers. Beyond this

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interrelation, all arguments also share limitations, despite their significant results. Aside from the lack of comparative data each argument carries limitations specific to their position as well. The poverty argument, aside from Beber and Blattman's argument, primarily focuses on volunteering child soldiers. While this is not an insignificant group, this excludes the children that are being abducted, sold or in any other way coerced into armed forces (both governments and ANSA's). Deviance exists as well in the case of poverty, child soldiering is not always prominent in impoverished countries such (e.g. Laos, Niger and Eritrea). Achvarina & Reich (2006) go a step further, their research suggests that poverty rates have little impact on whether a country is likely to have child soldiers in armed conflict. The technological advancement argument misses out on the use of child soldiers outside of combat roles. Furthermore, Haer (2019) addresses the issue of testing the hypothesis due to the lack of data on illicit arms trade. Aside of these two limitations, the argument also draws heavily on post cold war conflicts, yet prior to the end of the cold war the use of child soldiers started to become more prevalent as well (e.g. Eritrea's war of independence, El Salvador's civil war and the Cambodian civil war). Finally, the supply factor argument has mostly been researched on African case studies, yet large groups of child soldiers were active in other countries such as Myanmar, Afghanistan and India. Furthermore, certain variables, such as orphan rates, opted for this argument have shown mixed results (Achvarina & Reich, 2006).

Another way to examine the use of child soldiers is by looking at the supply and demand of child soldiers. The supply side looks at factors as to why children would join armed forces, while the demand side explores the reasons for armed forces to make use of child soldiers. The supply side can be further divided into the concepts of push and pull factors (Brett & Specht, 2004; Haer, 2018; Wessels, 2006). These situations can be similar to the causal explanations above yet they take agency into account. Push factors are situations for children that affect them negatively, which they try to escape from by joining armed forces (Wessels, 2006). For example the lack of opportunity to get a proper education or job and similarly, poverty (ibid.). Other push factors rely on escaping violence and or abuse from home (Brett & Specht, 2004). Twum-Danso (2003, p43) explains how Children conceived during rape are branded as "children of hate and bad memories". This, in turn, can lead to stigmatisation and rejection which in turn can lead them to the path of an armed force (ibid.). Pull factors on the other hand focus on the rewards children perceive to get out of joining armed forces (Wessels, 2006). These rewards include monetary gains and security, but also a sense of belonging and dreams of glory and heroism (Brett & Specht, 2004; Wessels, 2006). Somasundaram (2002) argues that one of the pull factors is linked to the cause of the fight. Children may want to join armed forces by beliefs in the cause of armed forces (ibid.). Somasundaram explores the phenomenon within the context of Sri Lanka. He explains that children joined the Tamil separatist movements, out of altruistic reasons to protect their group identity (ibid.). Push and pull factors are similar to an extent and it is the interaction between them that makes for a strong explanation of child soldiering (Haer, 2018; Sanin, 2007). The push factor

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of poverty is supported by the pull factor of monetary gains, for example, both work as a pair as to why children might join an armed force.

While the supply side provides arguments particularly for voluntary recruitment of children, the demand side can provide arguments for both voluntary as well as coerced child soldiering. Despite this, the demand side of the use of child soldiers has received less attention and scholarly arguments. Since the demand side has to explain why a group is willing to use child soldiers it also needs to explain the negatives for child soldiering. The recruitment of children has shortcomings, children tend to have lower discipline, especially coerced children, and have lesser strength than adults which is necessary for many roles within an armed force (Sanin, 2007). Furthermore, the lack of psychological development tends to lead to higher defect rates (Beber & Blattman, 2013). Finally, the use of child soldiers conflicts with strong normative values regarding age (Honwana, 2006, Lasley & Thyne, 2013). Despite all of the above, many armed forces do make use of child soldiers. Two explanations are given for this phenomenon in general, while a third explanation is reasoned to be particularly profound amongst terrorist organisations. The first argument is based on necessity, recruiters need to fill ranks when armed forces face shortages of preferable adult recruits (Woods, 1993). This argument appears to follow close to the population argument previously mentioned. The second argument contradicts Sanin's (2007) notion of discipline and effectiveness. In contrast to the lack of discipline, children are easier to indoctrinate making them more obedient (Beber & Blattman, 2013) They furthermore can perform functions that make use of a more "stealth" approach such as stealing and infiltration (Twum-Danso, 2003). Finally, the third argument is which is the shock factor. Opposing a child in conflict can provide a moral dilemma for a soldier (Singer, 2005). Armed forces can utilize this factor as a means to gain a tactical advantage in battle (Singer, 2006).

2.1.3   Armed non-state actors and child soldiering

The first group of theoretical arguments presented in this chapter explain the phenomenon of child soldiering based on structural causes. These factors contrast this thesis in the unit of analysis. This thesis focuses on the characteristics of ANSA's rather than structural factors that are based on regions or technological advancement. ANSA's in this context are armed non-state actors who are engaged in violent conflict that, per calendar year, surpasses 25 deaths (Cunningham et. al. 2013). This also splits with the role of the supply side of child soldiering, thus positioning this thesis in the research of the demand side of child soldiering. Research on the influence of ANSA's characteristics on child soldiering has so far been limited to Lasley and Thyne in *"Secession, legitimacy and the use of child soldiers"* (2014). Lasley and Thyne (ibid.) argue that the characteristics of ANSA's does matter. The characteristics analysed are the goals ANSA's set specifically secession. They argue from a constructivist position, where not every ANSA follows the same rules and norms. As child soldiering is clear to be a strong norm violation in the international

setting, the argument is made that those who seek recognition from the international community are less likely to use child soldiers (ibid.) This leads them to hypothesize that secessionists, seeking international legitimacy are less likely to make use of child soldiers. Lasley and Thyne (ibid.) use a dataset containing 103 rebellions active at some point between 1998 and 2008. Their findings predict that secessionist ANSA's are indeed less likely to make use of child soldiers as this may hurt their chances in gaining international legitimacy (ibid.). They conclude their research on the note that further research on the types and goals of ANSA's is necessary to evaluate the variations between ANSA's and their use of child soldiers (ibid.).

The importance of differences between ANSA's is not unknown in academic literature. In *Handling and Manhandling Civilians in Civil War* (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2006) the differences of ANSA's behaviour with noncombatants, including the forced capture of children, are explored by comparing a set of different theories ANSA. Humphreys and Weinstein (ibid.) find that variation the structure of an ANSA influences the behaviour of members within an ANSA with higher disorganization leading to more chance of the occurrence of civilian abuse. According to Humphreys and Weinstein (ibid.), ineffective leadership limits ANSA's cooperation with civilians communities which makes these communities less important to the ANSA. Another possible explanation for this relationship is that members of disorganized groups are uncertain of their position within an ANSA leading them to display violence to create a certain status (Richards 1996). The findings of Humphreys and Weinstein indicate that ANSA characteristics thus matter, similarly to Lasley and Thyne's findings.

Lasley and Thyne's argument is of particular importance to this thesis, as it provides an important control variable for the same unit of analysis this thesis uses. This thesis will apply various goals as control variables in order to better understand whether identity itself plays a role in the recruitment of child soldiers. Beyond the goals of identity, the strength of an ANSA's central command is also taken into account.

2. 2   Identity

Identity is a broad concept that defines social categories. Monroe, Hankin & Vechten (2000, p. 420) define the concept as a realisation that a person is both an active agent and an object that is seen and perceived by others. This concept, however, remains broad and contested. Debates and research revolving around identity has lead to a lack of consensus on how we should conceptualize identity (Abdelal et al., 2009). Despite this lack of consensus, certain aspects have gained scholarly agreement. Most concepts share the view that persons can hold multiple identities and are subject to changes in context (Brewer, 1991; Monroe, Hankin & Vechten 2000; Sen, 2006). For example, a person can hold an identity based on political preferences, nationality and also as a worker in a factory. Furthermore, identity is also derived by both oneself and others. Constructing an identity of oneself is facilitated by the construction of identities of others (Hall, 1996). Identity is

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thus formed by social interaction with others (ibid.). Debates regarding this idea do surround which aspect is more important, and it varies between research. While most concepts of identity focus on self-realization, some scholars argue that identity is composed on to you from the outside (Fearon & Laitin, 2000). As an example, a Jew in 1930's Germany may have paid little attention to his heritage, yet for the anti-semite, his identity was by and large Jewish. Despite the scholarly agreements, the concept of identity thus remains a broad concept and it is important to specify the variations and discussions regarding identity for this paper. Therefore, this thesis will specify aspects of identity that are used for this research by evaluating which identities are more consistently present within conflict studies.

A major distinction between identities in the academic debate is the focus on personal and social identities. Personal identity is referred to personality or individual character distinct from all others while social identity is a person's sense of whom he or she is, based on a certain membership with a group (Brewer, 1991; Monroe, Hankin & Vechten 2000). A person can have multiple personal as well as social categories, and both can vary over time and context. Most research, particularly concerning violent conflict focus on social identity. This paper will focus on social identities as the subjects for this research are group-based organizations.

Within the studies of social identity, a debate exists between Primordialism and Constructivism. Primordialism, which considers identity more as an unchangeable aspect of an individual and group, is for example emphasized in Samuel Huntington's *Clash of civilizations* (1996). Primordialism sees social identities as a product one can not separate themselves off. Constructivism is highlighted by Amartya Sen's (2006) theory of identity as a social construct where identity has a more interchangeable role as a subject to rational and moral choices. For the constructivists, social identities are more subject to interpretation by the individual. Membership of any social identity is thus not a product of nature, rather of human interaction (Fearon & Laitin, 2000; Hammack, 2006). Sen (2006.) argues that we have various identities at once, our differences and characteristics are all part to how we can identify ourselves and others.

Social identities can also transform normative behaviour (Brewer, 1999; Hogg, Turner, & Davidson, 1990). This, in turn, has the possibility to turn an identity into a manichaeistic identity. Manichaeism refers to a gnostic religion that puts a strong emphasis on a struggle between good and evil. Beyond this religion, this emphasis can be salient in other social identities. Sartre in *Anti-semite and Jew* (1946, p28) describes this to antisemitism. In contemporary politics, we see similar patterns where political opposition is sometimes hastily described as fascist, nazi or communist which in turn translated them as evil. It is this aspect that can further legitimize acts that normally fall outside of certain normative group behaviour. This justification is described by various authors. Walzer (1977) uses the argument of Nazi-Germany as an immeasurable evil to justify acts of war that normally fall outside a just war argument. Similarly, terrorism has seen justifications as a reaction to evil as well (Wilkins, 1992; Corlett, 2003). Beyond Sartre's referral to manichaeism as

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part of the antisemite identity, the concept has not garnered a clear conceptualization. Despite this, the understanding that identity and context can adjust normative behaviour has been notified by various scholars. Cohen (2013) discusses how perpetrators of violence reinterpret behaviour to fit a moral standard, for example by arguing on a basis of self-defence rather than as violence. Brewer (1999) explains how social identity groups make use of an idea that they are morally superior to an outgroup. Moral superiority in this argument shows a similarity to a manicheistic identity. Brewer argues that when a social identity group grows, the moral order of that identity becomes more absolute, leading to incompatibility with tolerance to others (ibid.).

2 .2.2 Identity and violent conflict

The role of identity in violent conflict has been widely researched. According to Sen (2006.), in order to understand violent conflict in terms of identity, it is first necessary to understand what role identity plays in violent conflict. This debate is nested within a grander debate of greed versus grievances. Introduced by Collier (2000) the argument is made that economic opportunity and inequality rather than cultural aspects are the cause of violent conflict. The greed argument prioritizes variables such as territory and resources. Olsson and Fors (2004) for example argue that profit from diamonds was an important factor for rebels and their support in the civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Despite the priority for greed variables, scholars of the greed perspective still argue that identity can play a role for leaders to get the necessary support for their conflict (Collier 2000). Later research on the greed perspective has signalled a nuance of their argument, by reasoning a more important role for grievances. Grievances became a necessary aspect without being the primary cause for violent conflict (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Arnson & Zartman 2005). Beyond and possibly regardless of whether identity is a cause of violent conflict, many ANSA's do make use of certain identities for their goal and organization. Various ANSA's name themselves based upon a certain identity, usually ethnic or religious based, such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). This thesis examines whether these identities play a role when it comes to child soldiering. This potential link places the research in an ambiguous position, outside of above mentioned debates on the roles of identity and its potential cause of violent conflict yet unmistakenly linked to theories on identity and its effects on violent conflict itself.

As mentioned before, people and groups can hold multiple identities, however not all play the same role in a certain context. Regarding violent conflict, certain identities have been researched and appear to play a factor. Various articles tend to focus on single identities such as ethnic identity (e.g. Brown, 1993; Fearon & Laitin, 2000). Academic debate exists within the focus of a single identity. For example, Sambanis (2001) argue that states with high ethnic diversity are more prone to ethnic conflict. Meanwhile, Wimmer, Cederman and Brim (2009) oppose Sambanis and reason that ethnic competition over state power, rather than ethnic heterogeneity, can fuel

violent conflict.   Beyond ethnicity, several authors argue for religious identity as a factor for violent conflict (e.g. Anthony, Hermans & Sterkens 2015). A specific interesting argument for religious conflict comes from Jeffrey R Seul. Seul (1999) argues that religious identity is more capable than other identities to fulfil identity-supporting content, which in turn can lead to conflict when this identity faces competition.

In contrast to the arguments above that focus on a single identity is research based on multiple social identities. Scholars have produced new insights on the multitude of identities that factor in violent conflict (Abdelal et al, 2009; Slocum-Bradley, 2008). Focus on a single identity leaves out the fact that various conflicts can be the product of competition on multiple identity lines. This, in turn, can also be the case for ANSA's. For example, the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran is based on a class-based ideology and religious ideology. Eva Bernauer (2016) Identifies three major identity dimensions for ANSA's; ethnicity, religion and class-based ideology (Bernauer argues this as a leftwing or rightwing political ideology, p 35). Bernauer (ibid.) argues that political exclusion within a country typically runs along these three lines, which in turn can drive civil conflict. Langer and Stewart contribute to the argument made by Bernauer in *"Horizontal inequalities and violent conflict: Conceptual and empirical linkages"* (2014) by adding "horizontal inequality" as a factor. Inequalities between culturally defined groups, rather than based on individual capabilities can form grievances ready for violent conflict (ibid.). In a similar fashion, Ash (2016) explains how collective resentment transforms from a top-down mechanism towards a bottom-up mechanism that explains as to why individuals join certain conflict actors, including ANSA's.

The findings of Langer & Stewart and Ash are similar in one aspect important to this thesis. Both indicate that identity can legitimize the reason to pick up arms and engage in violent conflict for both collective groups as individuals. This argument is supported by Oberschall. Oberschall (2000) provides us with three different positions within the constructivist setting. The first position of constructionism relates to the idea that identity matters as a way to frame one within a collective, creating a community with a shared factor (ibid.). The second position is Instrumentalism and it follows a more rational based argument for identity as a cause for violent conflict. Instrumentalism argues that ethnicity and identity are strategic constructs to create a group ready to engage for a cause (ibid.). The third position Oberschall mentions is the crisis frame position. As a result of failing institutions or economic stagnation create a situation where people start to focus more on their identity and fall back on their ethnic/religious or cultural community to survive (ibid.).

Scholars with the perspective that violent conflict is caused by economic factors apply the instrumentalist argument. While considering greed as the driving factor behind violent conflict, they argue that identity and grievances may still be used as a frame to legitimize violent conflict within a group or organization (Arnson & Zartman 2005). Sen (2006) goes a step further arguing that identity is used in a primordial fashion. According to Sen (2006, p.13) "violence is promoted by the

cultivation of a sense of inevitability about some allegedly unique identity that we are supposed to have and which apparently makes extensive demands on us".

The manicheistic element that identity may possess has been touched by scholars, although the term itself is not used. Moshman writes in *"Us and Them: Identity and Genocide"* (2007) that genocide is the result of four phases that make use of identity. The first phase is dichotomization, the construction where one identity becomes salient over all other identities that it is the sole defining factor deciding who someone is (ibid.). Dehumanization is the second phase, the sole salient identity is categorized, where one is deemed inferior, and ultimately members of the inferior identity are revoked of their human status (ibid.). The third phase consists of destruction, the previous phases lead to the idea that destruction is within the boundaries of normative behaviour (ibid.) The last phase is denial, which essentially is the result of the previous three phases, where the behaviour up so far becomes morally legitimized entirely (ibid.). These phases overlap and reinforce another in such a way that justifies horrendous acts (ibid.). Hintjens (2001) examines the role of ethnic identity on the genocide in Rwanda. She explains how Tutsi became dehumanized and depicted as evil. This links to the manicheistic element. Ethnic Identity fueled within a context of a crisis lead to legitimacy for the horrible situation in Rwanda, *"killing simply became a civic duty, and a norm rather than an exceptional act of violence"*. (Hintjens, 2001, p, 51)

2 .2.3 Identity and child soldiering

The role of identity has been used in research on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration efforts towards child soldiers (e.g. Glöckner, 2007; Honwana, 2002). However, research on identity in relation to child soldiering has been scarce. Identity has been researched as a factor for the supply side of child soldiers (Somasundaram 2002). Children potentially join armed forces in order to protect a certain social identity to which they feel a sense of belonging (ibid.) This theoretical position, however, is limited to a case study of Sri Lanka. Furthermore, while the supply side of child soldiering is important, it's explanatory power is specified on child soldier volunteers. The demand side of child soldiering can go beyond this limitation. Scholarship on the demand side of child soldiering, however, has not produced any research on the role of identity.

In the previous sections, this thesis has established a theoretical argument that social identities can serve as a factor to legitimize violent conflict, this thesis aims to connect whether this argument is viable regarding child soldiering. The importance of legitimacy has been largely overlooked in theoretical explanations regarding child soldiering. Lasley & Thyne (2014) have been pioneering the importance of legitimacy from an outer group perspective, secessionists are less likely to use child soldiers as it may harm their goal to gain international recognition. The focus of this theoretical position, however, shifts towards in-group legitimacy. To my knowledge, there is no study yet present that explores the importance of legitimacy within a group to the use of child

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soldiers. Identity has been analyzed as a variable that can promote legitimacy for war crimes as genocide (Hintjens, 2001; Moshman, 2007). The use of child soldiers has been considered a norm violation beyond cultural and political lines (Twum-Danso, 2003, Honwana, 2006). Even among various ANSA's, shown for example trough Geneva Call's work, there is a basis to argue that ANSA's and particularly their leaders need to legitimize the use of child soldiers rather than it being a "taken for granted" norm (Honwana, 2006). Norm violation requires an argument that legitimizes such behaviour. ANSA leaders need to convince themselves, their organization and potential supporters outside of their organization that the use of child soldiers is necessary for their cause. This can be linked to a manichaeistic portrayal of identities and can for example support such norm violations.

A certain amount of nuance can be and should be, applied to the assumption that the use of child soldiers violates the basic normative positions of ANSA's. It portrays an idea of universal morality which on its own is a topic of debate. Beyond this debate, more specific factors may also play a role. For example, the age of a child and when it would be acceptable to take up arms may not be similar among all groups and cultures. Twum-Danso (2003) argues against the notion of an "African culture". She mentions how child soldiering is a global phenomenon, specifically when taking historical contexts into account. Beyond that, the link of African cultures and children in armed roles has not been supported from a historical perspective (Bennett, 1998). Nonetheless, making the argument for a norm violation still needs to be credited as an assumption that might be wrong. While this thesis acknowledges the need for this nuance, the explorative nature of this thesis and the difficulty collecting data regarding child soldiers call for this simplified theoretical assumption.

2 .3   Sub-questions

Combining the previous subchapters theoretical arguments this part will develop three sub-questions in order to better explain the research question, *Does the identity of an armed non-state actor influence their use of child soldiers?*". By answering these three sub-questions, the three most common identities related to violent conflict will be accounted for. These three answers, in turn, will lead to an answer to the main research question.

This thesis aims to identify whether the social identities, based on a constructivist approach, that play a role in violent conflict also play a role in the normative behaviour of ANSA's regarding the recruitment of child soldiers. This places the research in the category of understanding the demand side of child soldiering. Regardless of whether identity itself is a direct cause of violent conflict, the scholarly agreement that identities play a role in legitimizing violent conflict is large (Arnson & Zartman 2005; Collier, 2000; Sen, 2006). The debate on whether identity is a cause of violent conflict or not is thus of lesser importance. This places the research outside of the debate

regarding identity as a cause for violent conflict. Although identity is a single factor in the main research question, it is unclear yet whether different dimensions of identity have a similar effect. Because of this, it is important to distinguish identities and analyze them separately. Using Bernauer's (2016) position that three identity dimensions; ethnicity, religion and class-based ideology are latently present and are potential causes of conflict, this thesis will create three sub-questions each focused on one of these identity dimensions. As argued before these identities can play a role in legitimizing grievances of political exclusion and possibly even further promote a manichaeistic argument for violent conflict. The theoretical assumption that ANSA may or may not use identity to legitimize the use of child soldiers is not tested in this analysis. Instead, this analysis attempts to indicate whether an ANSA's identity foundations appear to have an effect on the use of child soldiers. This leads to the following sub-questions

Does a religious identity influence the use of child soldiers within armed non-state actors?
Does an ethnic identity influence the use of child soldiers within armed non-state actors?
Does an identity based on a class-based political ideology influence the use of child soldiers within armed non-state actors?

Chapter Three: Methodology

This chapter is divided into four sections. Section one will conceptualize and operationalize the used variables. Section two explains what method is used for the statistical analysis. Section three will cover the datasets used for this thesis. Finally, section four will provide a reflection regarding the research design.

Before outlining the methodology of this research, this thesis will first briefly outline the methodological issues regarding research on child soldiers. Ames (2007) provides a comprehensive list of these issues is in *"Methodological Problems in the Study of Child Soldiers"*. Ames addresses the limitations in current research due to the lack of Large N studies. He then continues to address the necessity for the correct unit of analysis and the limitation of statewide variables. The next problem comes with surveys. Ames (ibid.) highlights that more sociological based surveys, directed to those in close proximity of child soldiers are important when collecting data on trough surveys yet that this can lead to selection bias. For quantitative analysis, it is important to include cases that did not utilize child soldiers to avoid selection bias. The next problem Ames (ibid.) addresses is the centrality of time. Single data points for each case can result in a problem regarding analysis, particularly since conflicts can highly vary and change over time. Missing data is another potential problem for analysis. Missing data can be specified into three types, Missing completely at random (MCAR), Missing at random (MAR) and Not missing at random (NMAR). Depending on the type of missing data, several methods can be applied to account for the missing data.

3.1   Conceptualization & Operationalization

For this research, it is important to conceptualize and operationalize the key variables in order to analyse them. In this section, the variables will be conceptualized and an operationalization of ANSA's, identity, child soldiers and the control variables will be provided.

Unit of analysis: Armed non-state actor
ANSA's are derived from the Non-state Actor dataset by Cunningham et. al. (2013). The definition is a non-state group, formally organised or informally organised, that is engaged in a violent conflict that per calendar year, surpasses 25 deaths.

Independent variable: Identity
Identity in this analysis will be focused on whether the ANSA has been founded upon a specific social identity. This thesis follows Bernauer's (2016) framework of social identity. This thesis will investigate three dimensions of identity; religion, ethnicity and class-based political ideology. Identity can be a broader concept, however, in line with the theoretical argument presented in

chapter three, these three dimensions are chosen as the most used and most common identities in conflict analysis. An ANSA can be founded upon none, one or multiple of the above three mentioned identities. This creates three separate identity variables;

> *The ANSA was found upon a religious identity*
>
> *The ANSA was found upon an ethnic identity*
>
> *The ANSA was found upon a class-based ideology*

Each of these variables is binary in form, where 1 represents the ANSA is founded upon the specific social identity.

Dependent variable: *Child soldiers*

The operationalization of child soldiers follows the definition given in chapter two; *"any person under 18 years of age, who is part of any kind of regular or irregular armed force or armed group in any capacity […] The definition includes girls recruited for sexual purposes and for forced marriage. It does not, therefore, only refer to a child who is carrying or has carried arms"* (UNICEF, Cape Town Principles 1997, p12)

This variable is coded binary, where 1 represents an ANSA did or does make use of child soldiers.

Control variable: ANSA stated goals

ANSA stated goals are divided into seven different variables within the used dataset. These goals are the following:

Independence, the group's initial goal is the pursuit of an independent state

Increased autonomy, the group's initial goal is the pursuit of (increased) autonomy for their region within the existing state

Improving group rights, the group's initial goal is the pursuit of increased/improved group rights (e.g. language, education)

Increased political representation, the group's initial goal is the pursuit of increased/improved political representation and/or participation

Overthrow government (non-democratic), the group's initial goal is to remove the current leader(s) of government with a non-democratic pursuit.

Democratization, the group's initial goal is to democratize the political system

Other goal, the group's initial goal is something other than the above categories

All these variables are binary coded, where 1 represents that an ANSA has the specific goal. Aside from ANSA's stated goals, this research also integrates the *strength of central command* of an ANSA. This variable is ordinal scaling from 1 to 3 with 1 being the lowest strength, and 3 the highest.

3.2   Statistical analysis

Since this research uses a binary variable, whether or not an ANSA uses child soldiers. Binary variable violates OLS assumptions of homoscedasticity and linearity. This means that this thesis will make use of a multiple logistic regression analysis to test the identity variables paired with control variables. The regression output is interpreted as log-odss, these log-odss will be transformed into odds ratios by taking the exponential. Hence, independent variables should be interpreted as influencing the odds that an ANSA makes use of child soldiers.

The analysis will contain a bivariate logistic regression for each of the three independent variables. Followed by this are two models generated by a multivariate logistic regression. Model 1 contains the three independent variables together, while model 2 will take the control variables into account.

3.3   Data

The data used in this research is a combination of two datasets. The Girl Child Soldier Dataset (G-CSDS) by Haer and Böhmelt (2018) found at https://www.prio.org/jpr/datasets/. The second set is the Foundations of Rebel Group Emergence (FORGE) dataset by Braithewaive and Cullingham (2019) found at https://www.jessicamaves.com/forge.html.

The G-CSDS includes data on armed forces active between 1989 and 2013. It includes data whether they used child soldiers based on a conservative approach. Grading a group to have used no child soldiers, less than 50% of the group consisted out of children or more than 50% of the group consisting out of child soldiers. Beside the data on child soldier usage, the strength of central command is also found within this dataset. The FORGE dataset provides data on ANSA's operating between 1946 up until 2010. It includes a variety of data on ANSA's, particularly for this research is the data regarding the organization's foundations on class-based ideology, ethnicity and religion. ANSA's are not all founded upon one of these three foundations and can be founded upon more than one.

Important in the framework of this thesis is that the political ideology can be based upon an ethnic or religious ideal which has to be accounted for in applying the data. Class-based ideology has to be implemented, This is done by coding an ANSA as having a class-based ideology if the have a communist, leftwing or right political ideology found in the FORGE dataset. The dataset contains 237 different ANSA's. Out of these 237 ANSA's 130 were founded upon an ethnic identity, 61 upon a religious identity and 51 upon a class-based ideology. 51 ANSA's neither had an ethnic, religious or communist identity. 4 ANSA's had missing data on the child soldier variable.

3.4   Reflection on the research design.

The research design attempts to follow Ames' (2007) arguments for solving the methodological issues regarding research on child soldiers. Despite the aim to follow Ames' suggestions, certain

limitations do exist with this research design as well. Structural factors are not taken into account in this research, as they tend to be statewide in data, while they may actually vary within the state (ibid.) Furthermore, these variables can fluctuate over time while our dependent variable is not set for time variations. Using a binary variable on child soldiering solves the centrality of time issue partially as there is less focus on a particular time frame of an ANSA, rather it looks at their entire existence. This thesis does take ANSA's that split from another ANSA into account. This can lead to potential bias. The reason these split ANSA's are taken into account is that they can vary on goals, command strength and even use of child soldiers (e.g. Moro National Liberation Front - Nur Misauri faction)

Statistical analysis might be able to show patterns of an ANSA's social identity and child soldiering, yet it is unable to explore in-depth the causal mechanism behind it. The aim of this study first included a qualitative aspect to further understand the causal mechanism. However, due to several limitations, this qualitative aspect has not been achieved. Despite the lack of a qualitative part, this research still has academic value due to its explorative nature. It is an effort of theory-building rather than theory testing. While the results of this analysis may not provide clear causal answers, they can provide a basis for further research.

Chapter Four: Empyrical analysis

The following chapter will present the analysis results and discuss them by linking them to the research sub-questions. In section 4.1 the descriptive statistics are presented. In section 4.2 the results of the bivariate and multivariate logistic regression are presented and discussed. Section 4.3 will examine these results in relation to the (sub-)research question(s). A full table of the ANSA's used in this research and their characteristics can be found in appendix A.

4.1 Descriptive statistics

Table 4.1 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in this research. All variables in this table are binary, this means that the mean can be read as the percentage of the sample for which the variable is coded 1. Each variable furthermore has been tested for multicollinearity. Variables such as overthrow government could correlate with class-based ideology for example. Surprisingly, none of the variables appeared to correlate strongly with other variables.

	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max	N
Variable					
Child Soldier Usage	0.75	0.436	0	1	233
Ethnic Identity	0.55	0.499	0	1	237
Religious Identity	0.26	0.438	0	1	237
Class-based Ideology	0.22	0.412	0	1	237
Control Variable					
Idenpendence	0.28	0.449	0	1	237
Increased autonomy	0.13	0.333	0	1	237
Improving group rights	0.13	0.338	0	1	237
Increased political representation	0.04	0.192	0	1	237
Overthrow government (non democratic)	0.51	0.501	0	1	237
Democratization	0.10	0.297	0	1	237
Other Goal	0.29	0.453	0	1	237
Strenght central command	1.97	0.664	1	3	214

(Table 4.1)

4.2 Bivariate & Multivariate logistic regression

Table 4.2 presents the results of a bivariate logistic regression of each identity variable, the results of a multivariate logistic regression of all three identity variables (Model 1) and the results of a multivariate logistic regression of all three identity variables and the control variables (Model 2). The bivariate logistic regression models show how each variable affects child soldiering separately without any other control factors. These results are possibly biased due to omitted variable bias. The outcomes of the multivariate logistic regression show how the independent variable affects child soldiering, controlled for by all other independent variables.

	Bivariate model			Multivariate model 1			Multivariate model 2		
	log-odss ratio	S.E.	Odds	log-odss ratio	S.E.	Odds	log-odss ratio	S.E.	Odds
Variable									
Ethnic Identity	0.587	0.304	1.798	0.832*	0.338	2.297	1.440**	0.430	4.220
Religious Identity	0.023	0.345	1.023	0.199	0.393	1.220	-0.086	0.447	0.918
Class-based Ideology	0.922*	0.439	2.514	0.963*	0.461	2.619	1.340**	0.512	3.818
Control Variable									
Idenpendence							1.078	0.666	2.939
Increased autonomy							-0.821	0.706	0.440
Improving group rights							0.385	0.598	1.470
Increased political representation							0.009	0.980	1.009
Overthrow government (non democratic)							1.802**	0.602	6.061
Democratization							0.419	0.634	1.520
Other goal							-0.070	0.429	0.933
Strenght central command							-0.764**	0.296	0.466

(Table 4.2) ***p<0.001 **p<0.01 *p<0.05

The results of this logistic regression present a few surprising outcomes. First of ethnic identity appears to have quite a variation in the odds ratios between not only the bivariate and multivariate analysis but also between the two multivariate models. Furthermore, ethnic identity appears only statistically significant in the multivariate models, thus controlled for by other factors. Religious identity differs a lot between the bivariate and multivariate analysis, but no model shows a statistically significant effect. Class-based ideology appears to be relatively steady over each analysis. Furthermore, in contrast to Lasley and Thyne's (2014) research, secessionism, portrayed in this analysis as having the goal for independence, signals a positive effect yet appears to have no statistically significant effect in this thesis model. Non-democratic regime change, however, appears to have a significant effect. In fact, this effect appears to be larger than any other characteristic an ANSA may hold that this study takes into account. A stronger central command shows to have a negative effect on child soldiering. The odds ratio show that the predicted odds of using child soldiers, controlled for by the other variables, increase by 0.466 times. In other words, the predicted odds of using child soldiers decrease by roughly 50% for each step of increase in the variable on the strength of the central command. This is in line with Humphreys & Weinstein's (2006) research on civilian abuse by ANSA's.

The overall model is important to discuss in to get a grasp of understanding of whether the results of this analysis could be used to predict future instances of child soldier use. Using Nagelkerke's (1991) R² this analysis gets a result of 0.227, thus the explained variance is around 22%. Using Pearson's chi-square test indicates that multivariate model 1 is an improvement over the baseline model with $p < 0.05$, whereas model 2 is an improvement over model 1 with $p < 0.01$ regarding model 1 and $p < 0.001$ regarding the baseline model.

4.3   Sub-questions and research question

The main research question of this thesis is "*Does the identity of an armed non-state actor influence their use of child soldiers?*". Based on the theoretical foundations, three sub-questions have been formulated that focus on different identities recurring in conflict analysis. The next sections will discuss each social identity and its sub-question separately based on the findings displayed in Table 4.2. Afterwards, the general research question will be evaluated based on the three previous sections.

4.3.1   Religious Identity

Sub-question 1: Does a religious identity influence the use of child soldiers within armed non-state actors?

The multivariate model 2's odds ratio signal that the predicted odds of using child soldiers, controlled for by the other identities and goals of an ANSA, are 0.918 times higher when an ANSA

is founded upon a religious identity. This value, however, is not statistically significant. This means that while the log-odss value is incorporated into the full model, religious identity itself has no influence on the use of child soldiers by ANSA's according to this research.

4.3.2   Ethnic Identity

Sub-question 2: Does an ethnic identity influence the use of child soldiers within armed non-state actors?

The multivariate model 2's odds ratio signal that the predicted odds of using child soldiers, controlled for by the other identities and goals of an ANSA, are 4.220 times higher when an ANSA is founded upon an ethnic identity. The findings of model 1 and model 2 are both statistically significant. Based on this research, ethnic identity has a positive effect on the use of child soldiers by ANSA's.

4.3.3   Class-based Ideology

Sub-question 3: Does an identity based on a class-based political ideology influence the use of child soldiers within armed non-state actors?

The multivariate model 2's odds ratio signal that the predicted odds of using child soldiers, controlled for by the other identities and goals of an ANSA, are 3.818 times higher when an ANSA is founded upon an ethnic class-based ideology. The findings of model 1 and model 2 are both statistically significant. Therefore, this thesis concludes that based on this research class-based ideology has a positive effect on the use of child soldiers by ANSA's.

4.3.4 Influence of identities

Main research question: Does the identity of an armed non-state actor influence their use of child soldiers?

Out of the three tested identities, ethnic and class-based ideology indicate a positive effect on whether an ANSA makes use of child soldiers. In contrast, religious identity appears to have no statistical effect. With both ethnicity and class-based ideology appearing to be statistically significant, the statistical analysis signals that social identity can influence an ANSA's use of child soldiers. This result is in line with expectations based on previous research on both identity and conflict. Previous research explains that these three identities can drive violent conflict (Bernauer, 2016). Meanwhile, research on identity has shown that identity can potentially justify behaviour (Moshman, 2007; Hintjens, 2001). This answer does need to include that not all identities appear to influence an ANSA. Religious identity yields no statistically significant effect. In other words, while identity appears to influence an ANSA's use of child soldiers, this influence is dependent on the social identity upon which the ANSA is founded. Beyond this result, the three identities tested are not exhaustive for the variable identity. Other identities thus may or may not have an effect that

is unable to be deciphered from this analysis.

Using model 2 we can create a formula that predicts the probability of using child soldiers using the variables accounted for in this analysis. For this, we need the constant log-odss value, which is 0.579. This formula, however, does not take into account other variables that may explain why certain ANSA's use of child soldiers.

$$P = 1/(1 + e^{-(0.579 + 1.440\,i - 0.086\,i + 1.340\,i + 1.078\,i - 0.821\,i + 0.385\,i + 0.009\,i + 1.802\,i + 0.419\,i - 0.070\,i - 0.0764\,i)})$$

Chapter Five: Conclusion

In this chapter, the conclusion of this thesis research goal will be provided. Furthermore, a section is devoted to discussion and limitations of this thesis. Based on the previous two sections ideas and suggestions for future research are presented in the final section

5.1   Conclusion

This thesis aimed to explore whether the identity of an ANSA influenced their use of child soldiers. The theoretical position is based on three social identities; ethnic identity, religious identity and class-based ideology. The theoretical position of this thesis focused on the demand side of child soldiering. As argued in chapter two, ANSA's can potentially make use of identity as a way to legitimize the use of child soldiers.

Based on the statistical research a positive effect was found between both ethnic identity and class-based ideology on child soldiering. In contrast, this research did not find a significant effect from an ANSA's religious identity on the use of child soldiering. Therefore, the conclusive argument is that social identities can play a role, yet not all identities influence the likelihood that ANSA's make use of child soldiers. This signals a research gap in the theoretical foundations on the use of child soldiers. Most previous research on the causes of child soldiering focus on structural variables such as poverty and population. This thesis shows that while these variables may influence child soldiers, the characteristics of ANSA's matter as well. This result is similar to Lasley and Thyne's (2014) findings. These findings furthermore add up to the existing literature within conflict analysis on identity.

The theoretical argument that identities can be used to legitimize child soldiers serves as a logical step as to why identity can matter for the use of child soldiers by an ANSA. However, this analysis does not explicitly test this theoretical assumption. Therefore, the results can not reject or accept the theoretical foundations as to whether this means that ANSA does or does not use their identity to legitimize the use of child soldiers. Furthermore, cases can deviate from the statistical analysis. The results thus have to be interpreted as whether an ANSA is more likely to make use of child soldiers based on their identity foundations.

Beyond the scope of identity, an ANSA's goal of non-democratic regime change appears to have a significant effect on the use of child soldiers. This thesis finds no evidence that a goal for independence lowers the odds on the use of child soldiers. This is in contrast to Lasley and Thyne's (ibid.) argument that secessionists are less likely to use child soldiers. Stronger central command over an ANSA appears to have a negative effect on the use of child soldiers. This finding is in line with previous research on civilian abuse by ANSA's (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2006).

Secondary goals of this thesis were based on methodology. Comparative literature on child soldiering remains scarce (Ames, 2007; Haer, 2019). By using a statistical analysis with a (relatively) large N database this thesis attempts to fill a portion of the gap in child soldier research.

Despite the need for comparative analysis, the need for qualitative research should not be forgotten or become lesser valued. Qualitative research can provide further understandings of how certain factors, such as social identity, influence the role of child soldiering.

These conclusions facilitate further research and understandings of child soldiering, yet they also carry a potential for conflict analysis and policymakers. ANSA goals and identities are usually early determined. With this research in mind, such goals and identities can serve as indicators for possible misuse of children.

5.2   Discussion and limitations

Every research has limitations. It is vital that these are discussed to provide a more correct answer to the findings of any particular research. This thesis has focused on the potential link of ANSA's identities and their use of child soldiers. This has been done by using a statistical analysis of 237 ANSA's operating between 1989 and 2010. While it appears that there is a connection between these variables, this analysis cannot explain why this is the case.

The data itself also suffers from drawbacks. The data is derived from two databases. Both databases deserve credit for their hard work yet due to the combination of many ANSA's outside of the time frame could not be analysed. It would be particularly interesting to compare ANSA's operating before and after the cold war era, as the number of child soldiers being used has increased since the end of the cold war (Singer, 2006). The number of cases is relatively large compared to previous research, yet the N is still on the low side for statistical analysis. This, however, is an ever present issue regarding conflict analysis and research on child soldiers (Ames, 2007). To continue on the limitations of the data, this thesis makes use of rather simple binary variables. These variables can help us give indications, yet the binary version of the variable child soldier use makes no difference between a large scale operation of child soldiering, or a small number of child soldiers. Furthermore, this variable does not differ between age nor whether the child soldiers are volunteers or are coerced into the ANSA. Data for these differences are rather hard to gather (Haer & Böhmelt, 2018). However, with this data more precise research could be executed. This thesis does include ANSA's that split off from another ANSA. This can lead to potential bias. However, since these split ANSA's can show differences in certain variables, this thesis does analyse both. Furthermore, the dataset and this research do not include governmental forces into the calculation. The focus of this thesis was on ANSA's particular. Despite this focus, various governments have made use of child soldiers and are thus important to look at as well. In this thesis, the data variable child soldiering has been conceptualized as the use of any person under 18 part of a regular or irregular armed force in any capacity. However, up until 2002, this was considered acceptable under international standards. This could affect the variable for governmental forces. Regarding data, the final limitation is the lack of structural variables. This choice has been made since structural variables can vary strongly over time and often appear to

be statewide based yet can differ strongly within a state (Ames, 2007). Regardless, structural variables have been analysed to impact the use of child soldiers (see Singer, 2006; Cohn and Goodwin-Gill, 1994: Dallaire, 2011). integrating these variables requires a different methodology yet could have an impact on this thesis' findings.

Beyond the dataset and the methodological limitations. The theoretical foundations of this thesis lend itself too for discussion. As mentioned in chapter two, one assumption for legitimizing child soldiers is that it needs to be legitimized in the first place. While there is a certain defence for this assumption based on the works of Geneva call and Twum-Danso (2003), it remains questionable whether the idea that the use of children below eighteen is always a moral challenge for an ANSA. Furthermore, the theoretical chapter is undecisive to what accounts for the differences in the analysis between the identities and their possible legitimacy to the use of child soldiers. The importance for splitting identity into multiple dimensions has shown to be important, as the results are different for each dimension, yet it remains a challenge to explain why ethnic identity and class-based ideology appear to have a positive effect, while religious identity does not.

5.3   Recommendations for future research

Ideas for future research have been coined in the previous sections and chapters. This section will readdress these recommendations and further elaborate on them. As this thesis is explorative in nature, the results of this thesis are recommended to be further examined through qualitative analysis. Qualitative analysis can further examine whether a social identity indeed follows the causal mechanisms described as possible explanations for a causal link between ANSA's identities and child soldiering in chapter two. Furthermore, statistical analysis can be broadened by implementing structural variables and or using a more detailed variable on the use of child soldiers. Based on the findings of this thesis, further research on the characteristics of ANSA's can help to identify possible variables that affect both child soldiering and violent conflict in general. This thesis took a liberal approach to Lasley and Thyne's (2014)'s findings by incorporating not just the goal of independence but also other goals. A side product of this approach consists of a finding that the goal of non-democratic regime change appears to influence an ANSA's use of child soldiers. Thus further examination of an ANSA's goals appears to be another important option for future research. The results of this thesis on identities connection with child soldiering differ per social identity analysed. The findings of this thesis indicate that not every social identity linked to violent conflict leads to similar or even significant results. This leads to a recommendation that compares different identities to the supply side of child soldiering, in contrast to this study's aim towards the demand side of child soldiering. The difference between social identities can furthermore be analysed on more general patterns of violent conflict and other specific topics within the field of conflict analysis.

Chapter Six: Reference list

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6.2 Apendices

Appendix A: Table of ANSA's and their characteristics

A	Child soldiers used	0 = no 1 = yes	
B	Religious Identity	0 = no 1 = yes	
C	Ethnic Identity	0 = no 1 = yes	
D	Class-based Ideology	0 = no 1 = yes	
E	Strenght Central command	1 = lowest 3 = highest	
F	Goal Independence	0 = no 1 = yes	
G	Goal Autonomy	0 = no 1 = yes	
H	Goal Improved Rights	0 = no 1 = yes	
I	Goal Improved Representation	0 = no 1 = yes	
J	Goal Regime Change (Non-democratic)	0 = no 1 = yes	
K	Goal Democratization	0 = no 1 = yes	
L	Goal Other	0 = no 1 = yes	

ANSA Name	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L
Islamic Party of Afghanistan	1	1	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Islamic Party of Afghanistan - Khalis faction	1	1	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Taleban	1	1	1	0	3	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Unity Party	1	1	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Islamic Movement	1	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Forces of Shahnawaz Tanay		0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Movement of the Islamic Revolution/Uprising of Afghanistan	1	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
National Islamic Movement	1	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Armed Islamic Group	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Armed Islamic Movement	1	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Exile and Redemption	0	1	0	0		0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat	1	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola	1	0	1	1	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda-Armed Forces of Cabinda	1	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda-Renewed	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Republic of Artsakh/Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh	1	0	1	0	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Forces of Suret Husseinov	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Special Police Brigade	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
People's Solidarity Association/Peace Force	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina	1	0	1	0	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Croatian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina	1	0	1	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia	0	0	0	0	3	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
National Council for the Defense of Democracy	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
National Council for the Defense of Democracy-Forces for the Defense of Democracy	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
National Liberation Front	1	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People	1	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People-Forces for National Liberation	1	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Khmer People's National Liberation Front	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
United National Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Forces of Francois Bozize	1	0	1	0	3	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Forces of Andre Kolingba	0	0	1	0		0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace	1	0	1	0		0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Union of Democratic Forces for Unity	1	1	0	0		0	0	0	1	1	0	0
Patriotic Salvation Movement	0	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Islamic Legion	0	1	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Rally for Democray and Liberty	1	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Popular Front for National Renaissance	1	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Armed Forces of the Federal Republic	0	0	0	0	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Committee of National Revival for Peace and Democracy	0	0	0	0	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Forces of Maldoum Bada Abbas	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Movement for Democracy and Development	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
National Alliance	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
National Council for Recovery	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	1	0
National Liberation Front of Chad	1	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
Rally of Democratic Forces	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Union Force for Democracy and Development	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Union of Forces for the Resistance	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
National Liberation Army	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
People's Liberation Army	1	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Anjouan People's Movement/Republic of Anjouan	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Ninjas	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Ntsiloulous	1	1	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0

Group	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Cocoyes	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Cobras	1	0	1	1	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Serbian Republic of Krajina	0	0	1	0	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy	1	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	1	1	1	0
Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy - Ahmed Dini faction	1	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	1	1	1	1
National Congress for the Defence of the People	1	0	1	0	3	0	0	1	0	1	0	0
Congolese Rally for Democracy	1	0	1	0	3	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Kinshasa	1	0	1	1	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Movement for the Liberation of Congo	1	0	1	0	3	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Kingdom of Kongo	1	1	1	0	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Islamic Group	1	1	0	0		0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Farabundo Marti Front for National Liberation	1	1	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Farabundo Marti Popular Liberation Forces	1	1	0	1		0	0	0	0	1	0	0
EIJM-AS: Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement-Abu Suhail faction	0	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Ogaden National Liberation Front	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Oromo Liberation Front	1	0	1	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Issa and Gurgura Liberation Front		0	1	0		0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Eritrean People's Liberation Front	1	0	0	1	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	1	1	0
Islamic Unity	1	1	0	0		1	0	0	0	0	0	0
South Ossetian Soviet Democratic Republic	0	0	1	0	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Republic of Abkhazia	1	0	1	0	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
National Guard and Mkhedrioni (Anti-Government Alliance)	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Zviadists	0	0	1	1	3	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity	1	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Rally of Democratic Forces of Guinea	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Military Junta for the Consolidation of Democracy, Peace and Justice	1	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	1	1	0
Military faction (forces of Raol CÃ©dras)	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
National Front for the Liberation of Haiti	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
OP Lavalas (Chimares)	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	1
All Tripura Tiger Force	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
National Liberation Front of Tripura	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
People's United Liberation Front	1	1	1	0		1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kangleipak Communist Party	1	0	1	1	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak	1	0	1	1	2	1	0	1	0	0	0	1
United National Liberation Front	1	0	1	1	2	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
Kuki National Front	1	0	1	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
All Bodo Student's Union	0	0	1	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bodo Security Force	1	0	1	0		1	0	0	0	0	0	0
National Democratic Front for Bodoland - Ranjan Daimary faction	1	0	1	0	2	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
United Liberation Front of Assam	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Communist Party of India-Maoist	1	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Maoist Communist Centre	1	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
People's Liberation Army	1	0	0	1	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Free Aceh Movement	1	0	1	0	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Islamic State		1	0	0		0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor	1	0	0	1	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Republic of Kurdistan	1	0	1	1	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
The Free Life Party of Kurdistan	1	0	1	1	3	0	1	1	0	0	1	0
Godâ's Army	0	1	1	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
People's Mujahideen	1	1	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Kurdish Democratic Party	1	0	1	1	2	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
Kurdistan Democratic Party-Provisional Command	1	0	1	1	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan	1	0	1	1	2	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
al-Mahdi Army	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Islamic Army of Iraq	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Supporters of Islam	0	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
The Monotheism and Jihad Group	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades	1	0	1	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Islamic Resistance Movement	1	1	1	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Palestine Liberation Organization	1	0	1	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Palestinian Islamic Jihad	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Palestinian National Authority	1	0	1	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Palestinian National Liberation Movement	0	0	1	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)	1	0	1	1	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP-GC	1	0	1	1	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Hezbollah	0	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Ivorian Movement for the Greater West	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Movement for Justice and Peace	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
New Forces	1	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Patriotic Movement of Ivory Coast	1	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Lao Resistance Movement	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0
Military faction	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy	1	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0

Movement for Democracy in Liberia	1	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
National Patriotic Front of Liberia	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	1	0
National Liberation Army	1	0	1	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
May 23 Democratic Alliance for Change - Ibrahim Bahanga faction	0	0	1	0		0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Azawad	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0
Islamic Arab Front of Azawad	0	1	1	0		0	1	1	0	0	0	0
Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat	1	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Zapatista National Liberation Army	1	0	1	1	3	0	1	1	0	1	0	0
Popular Revolutionary Army	1	0	0	1	3	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Dniestr Republic	0	0	1	0	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mozambican National Resistance	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	1	1	1	0
United Wa State Army	1	0	1	1	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Mong Tai Army	1	0	1	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Restoration Council of Shan States	1	0	1	0		0	1	1	0	0	0	0
Shan State Army	1	0	1	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Shan State Progress Party		0	1	0		1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Rohingya Solidarity Organisation	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
National Socialist Council of Nagaland- Khaplang faction	1	0	1	1	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Beik Mon Army	0	0	1	1	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
New Mon State Party	1	0	1	1	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army	1	0	1	0	2	0	1	1	0	0	0	1
Karenni National Progressive Party	1	1	1	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Democratic Karen Buddhist Army Brigade 5	1	0	1	0	2	0	0	1	0	1	0	1
God's Army	1	1	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Karen National Union	1	0	1	0	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kachin Independence Organization	1	1	1	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
All-Burma Students Democratic Front	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist	1	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Contras/Nicaraguan Democratic Forces	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
AÑr and Azawad Liberation Front	0	0	1	0	2	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
Coordination of the Armed Resistance	0	0	1	0		0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Union of Forces of the Armed Resistance	0	0	1	0	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Democratic Front for Renewal	0	0	1	0		0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Niger Movement for Justice	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force	1	0	1	0	2	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
Followers of the Prophet	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
People Committed to Propagating the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad	0	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Mohajir National Movement	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Baloch Unity	1	0	1	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Balochistan Liberation Army	1	0	1	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Balochistan Republican Army	1	0	1	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Taleban Movement of Pakistan	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Bougainville Revolutionary Army	1	0	1	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Shining Path	1	0	0	1	3	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement	1	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Moro National Liberation Front	1	1	1	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Moro National Liberation Front - Nur Misauri faction	0	1	1	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Abu Sayyaf Group	1	1	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Communist Party of the Philippines	1	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Military faction (forces of Honasan, Abenina & Zumel)	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Moro Islamic Liberation Front	1	1	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Wahhabi movement of the Buinaksk district (Republic of Dagestan)	1	1	1	0		0	1	0	0	0	0	1
Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (Republic of Chechnya)	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Forces of the Caucasus Emirate	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Parliamentary Forces	0	0	0	1	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Rwandan Patriotic Front	1	0	1	0	3	0	0	0	1	1	1	0
Army for the Liberation of Rwanda	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Movement of the Democratic Forces of the Casamance	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kamajors	1	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Revolutionary United Front	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
West Side Boys	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Harakat Ras Kamboni	1	1	1	0		0	1	0	0	0	0	1
Somali Patriotic Movement	1	0	1	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Somali National Movement	1	0	1	0	3	0	0	0	0	1	1	0
United Somali Congress	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Islamic Party	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
United Somali Congress/Somali National Alliance	1	0	1	0	3	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Al-Shabaab	1	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Supreme Islamic Council of Somalia	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Basque Nation and Liberty	1	0	1	1	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam	1	0	1	0	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0

People's Liberation Front	1	0	1	1	2	0	0	1	0	1	0	0
Sudan Liberation Movement/Army - Minni Minawi faction	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Justice and Equality Movement	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0
Sudan Liberation Movement/Army	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	0
National Democratic Alliance	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0
National Redemption Front	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
South Sudan Defence Movement/Army (Forces of George Athor)	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0
Sudan Liberation Movement/Army-Unity	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army	1	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	1	1	0
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan	1	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
United Tajik Opposition	1	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	1	1	0	0
Patani insurgents	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Muslim Society	0	1	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Kurdistan Worker's Party	1	0	1	1	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Maoist Communist Party	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Revolutionary Left	0	0	0	1	3	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Uganda People's Army	1	0	1	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Uganda National Rescue Front II	1	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Uganda Democratic Christian Army	1	1	1	0	3	0	0	1	0	1	0	0
Alliance of Democratic Forces	1	1	0	0		0	0	0	0	1	0	1
West Nile Bank Front	1	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	1	1	0
Provisional Irish Republican Army	0	1	0	0	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Real Irish Republican Army	1	1	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Republic of Armenia (Armenian National Movement)	0	0	1	0	3	0	1	0	0	0	1	0
Azerbaijani Popular Front	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan	1	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Jihad Islamic Group	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Forces of Hugo Chavez	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	1	0	1	0	1
Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Democratic Republic of Yemen	1	0	0	1	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Republic of Slovenia	0	0	1	0	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kosovo Liberation Army	1	0	1	1	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Republic of Croatia	0	0	1	0	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0