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# **Does Chinese investment in Africa influence the German Africa policy?**

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## **Abstract**

Chinese investments on the African continent are extensively increasing. The Chinese focus is thereby more investment-oriented and contrasts with the more development aid-oriented approach by Western traditional actors. Since the differences between Chinese and traditional strategies on the African continent have been outlined thoroughly, this Thesis investigated a possible influence from Chinese investment on one specific traditional actor. In this case, Germany was the country of interest. In order to come to a conclusion, secondary data was reviewed and expert interviews were conducted with eight participants. I predicted that Germany is changing its Africa policy recently and that Germany gets hereby affected by Chinese investment in Africa. Analysis of the primary and secondary data demonstrated that Germany is changing its Africa policy recently. Although, Chinese investment in Africa were not majorly seen as the decisive factor. The decisive factor for the changing German Africa policy was seen in the desire to stop migration flows from Africa to Germany.

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## List of abbreviations

ACP countries	African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States
AGOA	African Growth and Opportunity Act
AfCFTA	The African Continental Free Trade Area
AfDB	African Development Bank
AU	African Union
BMZ	Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
CADFund	China-Africa Development Fund
CCCC	China Communications Construction
CCECC	China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation
CFTA	Continental Free Trade Area
CHEC	China Harbour Engineering
China Exim Bank	The Export-Import Bank of China
CNOOC	China National Offshore Oil
CNPC	China National Petroleum Corporation
CRBC	China Road and Bridge Corporation
CRCC	China Railway Construction Corporation Limited
CREC	China Railway Group Limited
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EIP	European Investment Plan
EPAs	European Economic Partnership Agreements
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FOCAC	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
ICBC	Industrial and Commercial Bank of China
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MOFTEC	Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Co-Operation
MOFCOM	Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China

OBOR	One Belt, One Road
ODA	Official development assistance
OEEC	Organisation for European Economic Co-operation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OFDI	Outward Foreign Direct Investment
OOF	Other Official Flows
PRC	People's Republic of China
ROC	Republic of China
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
UN	United Nations
US	United States
WTO	World Trade Organisation

# Choice of Topic

In the process of finding a topic for the Master Thesis, every student receives support from the Nijmegen School of Management at Radboud University. Everyone had to hand in two to three priorities out of a pool of 18 broad topics. Fortunately, I got assigned my first priority „China in Africa: Is Chinese engagement in Africa changing? Are Chinese actors more willing to engage military? (i.e. Zimbabwe)? How does Chinese aid investment look different from that of traditional actors?“. I chose this topic as my first priority because the topic receives more and more recognition but is still quite unpopular in daily politics. After being assigned to the broad topic it was my responsibility to narrow it down and to find my own research question. Before getting assigned to my topic, I already read some articles in German media which stated that „Europe is losing track in Africa“ (Knipper 2018). I wanted to find out more about the general topic of Chinese investment in sub-Saharan African countries<sup>1</sup> and contribute my part to it by exploring, if it has an effect on a third party. In consultation with my supervisor, Dr. Haley Swedlund, I started my research on this topic in March 2019, which I will present in detail in the next chapters.

## 1 Introduction

It is October 25<sup>th</sup>, 1971. The United Nations General Assembly discusses with the Resolution 2758 on recognition of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) or the Republic of China (ROC) as a legitimate representative in the United Nations Assembly. With 76 to 35 votes the UN recognizes „that the representatives of the Government of the People’s Republic of China are the only lawful representatives of China to the United Nations“ (General Assembly Twenty-sixth Session 1971: 2). The interesting point is the geopolitical situation at that time. The United States (US) had a political and military alliance with the Republic of China (ROC) and were, therefore, the strongest opposing power to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). At that time, numerous African states (12) were supporting the US vote.

Fast forward to 2007, where another crucial Assembly Resolution took place - Resolution 62/167. A change of influence becomes visible<sup>2</sup>. Since the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 62/167 questioned the Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, a

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<sup>1</sup> Hereafter referred to as African countries or Africa.

<sup>2</sup> Generally, voting patterns in the UN appear to have shifted. More on that topic can be found in Ferdinand (2014), Le et al. (2013), Newcombe et al. (1970) and Voeten (2013).

look at who supported the position of China<sup>3</sup> is interesting. 43 African states abstained or voted along with China. At the present day, only Eswatini (formally known as Swaziland) still maintains relations with the former ROC, which is nowadays known as Taiwan. It becomes obvious that in the last 40 years, political influence in Africa has shifted. China obtains more and more influence on the African continent.

Nevertheless, Chinese growing influence in Africa is nothing new, and has been discussed intensively<sup>4</sup>. Furthermore, research on the *way* China invests in Africa and *how* it is different from traditional (European and US-American) investment has been done largely as well<sup>5</sup>. Additionally, substantial research was conducted on how traditional donors are affected by Chinese investment<sup>6</sup>. Nevertheless, as this topic is highly controversial and vastly changing, it is utterly important to conduct research on the influence of countries in the Global South frequently. On the one hand, to gain up to date knowledge and on the other hand, not, as accused, to lose track.

With this Thesis, I will contribute to the scientific debate by taking a look at a topic that did not obtain a lot of attention. A scientific contribution to how a specific actor is affected by the Chinese investment policy in Africa is generally missing. With elaborating on one possible interrelation within the broad topic of Chinese investment in Africa, this Master-Thesis aims to fill the existing research gap.

To do so, I will compare Chinese investment to one traditional actor in Africa. Since Germany is one of the most influential countries in Europe, one of the largest donors worldwide<sup>7</sup>, and also a good example for a traditional actor, this Master-Thesis will deal with the question:

**Is Germany influenced by Chinese investment in Africa and eventually changes (or should change) its investment strategy in Africa?**

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<sup>3</sup> Throughout this Master-Thesis, I will use the term „China“ for the PRC.

<sup>4</sup> See e.g. Alden (2006); Bräutigam (2009); de Renzio & Seifert (2014); Gill, Huang and Morrison (2007).

<sup>5</sup> See e.g. Anshan (2007); Bräutigam (2011a); Campbell (2007).

<sup>6</sup> See e.g. Condon (2012); Swedlund (2017); Woods (2008).

<sup>7</sup> See e.g. OECD (2017).

## 1.1 Why the focus on Germany?

Recently, German media as well as political experts believe, that Europe is „loosing track“ in Africa (Hooijmaaijers 2018, Huotari et al. 2017, Knipper 2018). If this is the case, the question of possible influence from Chinese investment on a certain European actor, in this case Germany, on its investment policy is of utter importance. I will not only take a look at Germany as a Federal Republic, but also at German private enterprises. In my opinion, it should not be the task of research to only point out differences (in this case differences between Chinese and traditional investment in Africa), but also to investigate, if these differences have interrelated influences. Moreover, I consider it as a scientific contribution to the general discourse. If relations want to be understood, a scientific discourse, and thereby numerous scientific contributions are highly needed, and I hope to be a part of this contribution.

## 1.2 Organization of the Thesis

First of all, I will present the underlying concepts and the methodology in Chapter 2. The descriptive part, as well as the analysis of my research question, will be dealt with in different ways. In order to have valid and reliable data, which should be in the interest of good research, I will make use of data triangulation. Therefore, the definition of triangulation will be presented in chapter 2.1. On the one hand, literature will be reviewed. On the other hand, and to give my findings more explanatory value, I will present the results of eight Expert Interviews that were conducted in the time between March and June 2019. Finally, I rely on the analysis of key documents. Before starting, the relevance, the methodology and my scientific approach will be presented. Following, Chapter 3 will take a general look and compare traditional and Chinese strategies in Africa. To give one specific example and a better insight into traditional actors, I will explain one of the most important institutions that pools traditional international investment strategies. Thereby, I will elaborate on the structure and basic principles of the *Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development* (OECD). Moreover, this chapter will deal with the country of my interest: Germany. To do so, I will take a look at the so-called Marshall Plan with Africa. To better understand the differences of traditional and Chinese investment strategies, I will give a small discourse in the structure of general Global Finance in Chapter 3.2. In Chapter 3.3, I will then present how Chinese investment in Africa looks like and how it differs from traditional investment in Africa. Discussing the last 10 to 15 years by evaluating these topics is sufficient, as Chinese investment is clearly on

the rise in this time-frame<sup>8</sup>. The results of the Expert-Interviews that I conducted, will be presented and analyzed in Chapter 4. In the 5th and final chapter, the conclusion, I will elaborate on the research question and suggest prospective research.

## 2 Concepts and Methodology

This chapter will deal with my methodological and conceptual framework. First, I will explain data triangulation. In this Master-Thesis, I will triangulate primary and secondary data. Chapter 2.2 will elaborate on primary data in general. Specifically, which kind of primary data I use will be presented right after in Chapter 2.2.1. I will then elaborate on secondary data in general in Chapter 2.3. Following, I will present which kind of secondary data I make use of in Chapter 2.3.1. I will end the second Chapter by formulating two predictions.

### 2.1 Triangulation

Triangulation in Social Science means a „combination of methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon“ (Denzin 1978: 291). The idea of using multiple methods in Social Science leads back to the 1960s (e.g. Campbell and Fische 1959). In general, triangulation leads to more reliability and validity. The concept of triangulation developed over time and is nowadays not considered as a tool to ensure validity but as an alternative to validation (Flick 1992, Denzin 2012). Even though the concept developed and changed over time, triangulation still „reflects an attempt to secure an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon in question“ (Denzin 2012: 82). Denzin distinguishes between the „within-method“ and the „between-method“ and furthermore determines four different types of triangulation: (1) method triangulation, (2) investigator triangulation, (3) theory triangulation and (4) data source triangulation. The same categorization can be found in Patton (1999).

My focus lies on (4) data source triangulation. Whereas Jick (1979) talks about the triangulation of qualitative and quantitative data, I will make use of different methods of qualitative data. With the use of solely qualitative data, problems might occur. While statistical data is based on rules and

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<sup>8</sup> Chinese investment in Africa lasts back over 70 years ago but as it is clearly exponentially on the rise since the proposed time frame and to meet the requirements of a Master-Thesis, I made the decision to concentrate on this time frame. For more on the history of China-Africa relations, see Alden and Alves (2008).

formula<sup>9</sup>, qualitative data analysis „is a creative process“ (Patton 1999: 1190). To counter this problem, and by utilizing data source triangulation, I aim to enhance the quality of my analysis. The triangulation of qualitative data sources „means comparing and cross-checking the consistency of information derived at different times and by different means within qualitative methods“ (ibid.: 1195). For example, this could be a comparison of „observational data with interview data“ (ibid.: 1195) - which is exactly what I will do. By triangulating different data sources, I aim to capture different sights that might have been lost by only using one method. The combination of different data sources leads to multiple more advantages. Jick (1979) establishes a metaphor to the basic principles of geometry and claims, that „multiple viewpoints allow for greater accuracy“ (Jick 1979: 602).

In my case, I aim to increase the reliability and validity of my research by continuously combining primary and secondary data. The concept of primary data and secondary data will be explained in the next two chapters.

## 2.2 Primary Data

Primary data (in academia sometimes called „original“ data) is data that is conducted by the researcher himself. The materials „are gathered first-hand and have a *direct* relationship with the people, situations, or events that are studied“ (Henn, Weinstein, Foard 2006: 101). If primary data is used, the researcher has some kind of control over the data which is collected. Of course, in the case of an interview, for example, the researcher is dependent on the interviewee, but „the setting in which data is collected is still decided upon by the researcher“ (ibid.: 189). Being in charge of the objectives that are studied is the first big advantage of primary data. Often, primary data can give a true insight into a topic. This is only possible, if the researcher is aware of his method. If this is not the case, the data the researcher collects is easily biased and therefore in the end even useless.

As I conducted Expert Interviews, I had to be very aware of possible bias. The ones I faced and the ones occurring will be explained in the following.

### 2.2.1 Expert Interviews

As Expert Interviews (in academia sometimes called „Elite Interviews“) are conducted by the researcher himself, they fall under the category of primary data. To get an insight into the topic, I

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<sup>9</sup> I don't want to neglect that statistical data may be biased too. My aim is to point out, that working on the basis of numbers and formula is different by nature than working in a qualitative way.

conducted eight Expert Interviews between March and June 2019. Expert Interviews are defined in the following way:

„It is an interview with *any* interviewee - and stress would be placed on the word ‚any‘ - who in terms of the current purposes of the interviewer is given special, nonstandardized treatment. By special, nonstandard treatment I mean:

1. stressing the interviewee’s definition of the situation
2. encouraging the interviewee to structure an account of the situation
3. letting the interviewee introduce to a considerable extent (an extent which will of course vary from project to project and interviewer to interviewer) his notions of what he regards as relevant, instead of relying upon the investigator’s notions of relevance.“ (Dexter 2006: 18).

Dexter’s definition goes along with several other interpretations, such as Riesman, who is „not happy with the term ‚elite‘ [and] its connotations of superiority“ (Riesman 1964: 528). This might sound surprising, as the term „Expert“ or „Elite“ indicates some kind of expert knowledge which is not shared by everyone. Riesman clarifies, that his problem with the term „Elite“ is the feeling of superiority. But, and not as one may assume, he did not find another „term that is shorthand for the point [that he wants to make], namely that people in important or exposed positions may require VIP interviewing treatment on the topics which relate to their importance or exposure“ (ibid.: 528). Dexter becomes a bit more precise, as he defines the „Elite“ as „the influential, the prominent, and the well informed“ (Dexter 2006: 19). The point he makes is, that Expert / Elite Interviews do not (or should not) differ from Interviews with people who do not fall under the „Elite“ category. Equal constraints can be found in McDowell (1998) or Ostrander (1993). Harvey (2010) argues, for example, that „an individual’s position within a company [...] is not exclusively an indicator of elite status“ (Harvey 2010: 195).

All these constraints lead to the question if there is a difference in interviewing experts and interviewing people who do not fall under the category of an „Expert“. In order to answer this, I will first take a look at two guidelines on how to conduct an expert interview.

Dexter (2006) and Harvey (2011) both claim, that questions should be open-ended, because „they [the Experts] do not like to be confined to a restricted set of answers“ (Harvey 2011: 434). Open-ended questions are not only the right choice while interviewing experts because they provide Experts with some kind of a comfortable atmosphere, but they also „provide a greater opportunity for respondents to organize their answers within their own frameworks“ (Aberbach and Rockman 2002: 674), which leads to higher response validity. What has to be kept in mind is that the choice

of open-ended questions leads, according to Harvey and Dexter, to a challenging situation for the researcher. The researcher has to be flexible, not only in designing the interview but in the process of the interview.

Furthermore, Harvey gives a link to Sturges and Hanrahan (2004) who found out that a face-to-face interview might provide the researcher with more detailed information than a telephone interview and even more than in a questionnaire. These findings have to be dealt with caution, as there is a various evidence that there is no difference between telephone interviews and interviews that have been conducted face-to-face (Fenig and Levav 1993, Miller 1995, Sobin et al. 1993).

More concrete guidelines cannot be found in either Harveys or Dexters text. They rather offer general advice for their readers: The interviewer has to gain the trust of their respondents, has to be well informed, to provide the interviewee with sufficient information about himself, the research, the time the interview will take and how the results will be used. The question arises, if the given guidelines demand for a change in methodological efforts that differ from any other interview type. I think this could be neglected, because basic circumstances such as gaining trust or being prepared are the premises in all other kinds of interviews (Bryman 2016, Flick 2010, King and Horrocks 2010 and Schumann 2018).

The major constraint and maybe unique characteristic of an Expert Interview is, that the interviewer may feel himself of less social status than the interviewee. High-status interviewees may be difficult to interview because they are „used to being in control in their interactions with others" (King and Horrocks 2010: 57). This can result in answers that have minimal significance to one's research (ibid.: 59). In order to avoid situations like this, the researcher „should avoid challenging their [the interviewee] authority in their own field“ (ibid.: 57) and minimize the differences between him and the interviewee „through the way you [the researcher] present[s] himself and his research“ (ibid.: 57).

In the next section, I will discuss why I chose to conduct Expert Interviews.

As I already mentioned, one of the biggest advantages of primary data is that it is data that has been conducted by the researcher himself and is, therefore, data that fits perfectly to the research. Furthermore, Expert Interviews do not only give insight knowledge. One point, which is not highlighted enough in academia is, that an Expert may open more „opportunities for expanding the researcher's access to the field“ (Bogner, Littig and Menz 2009: 2). Thereby the Experts do not „only“ serve as „,crystallization points“ for practical insider knowledge“ (Bogner, Littig and Menz 2009: 2), but may also contribute to further research. High costs are one of the biggest disadvantages of primary data. In the case of Expert Interviews, money is not *that* relevant. I did not

have to undertake a huge number of interviews and also did not have to set up a survey or a questionnaire, which can be relatively expensive (Groves 1989). The argument of primary data being more expensive than secondary data applies more to primary data like a survey. Of course, using open-ended questions (which should / has to be done in expert interviews) leads to „substantial costs in time spent in doing the interviews themselves [and] transcribing them“ (Aberbach and Rockman 2002: 674). But concerning the insight-knowledge I got and regarding to the number of interviews I conducted, the cost-effectiveness of expert interviews was the most important aspect before starting my research.

Once new information is gathered and published by a researcher it is automatically „added to the existing store of social knowledge“ (Hox and Boeije 2005: 593). As soon as it gets used by another researcher it thereby becomes secondary data.

Due to the explained high cost and to enrich my research I used the already broad spectrum of existing research on general Chinese and traditional investment in Africa. Using primary data in order to explain Chinese and traditional investment in Africa would be very costly. Moreover, as my focus lies on a possible effect of Chinese investment in Africa on German investment in Africa, it would be even inefficient. Due to these facts, I decided to make use of secondary to explain Chinese and traditional investment in Africa. In the next chapter, I will explain what kind of secondary data I used in order to build the base for my research.

## 2.3 Secondary Data

In contrast to primary data, secondary data (in academia sometimes called „archival data“) is „produced *after* the event which the author had not personally witnessed“ (Henn, Weinstein, Foard 2006: 101). Furthermore, secondary research is defined as „any further analysis of a survey of social dataset that presents interpretations, conclusions or knowledge“ (Hakim 1982: 1). Moreover, most of the secondary data contain quantitative data. This means, that the conducted data that has been studied contains coded information. It is possible, that data like this may be hard to interpret, especially as it was collected for a different purpose. Qualitative data, which in contrast consists of documents for example, becomes shared increasingly by researchers and is thereby also added to the pool of scientific knowledge (Hox and Boeije 2005: 594).

This demonstrates that „secondary“ does not mean the data is of less importance than primary data. Often, and as it will be the case in this Master-Thesis, the use of secondary data is of utter

importance for the use of primary data. The biggest advantage of secondary data itself is that it is less time- and money consumable. Since someone has already collected the data, the researcher only has to review, structure and analyze the data (Glaser 1963, Smith 2006). On the other side, this leads to less reliability. Concerning reliability, one can thereby state that secondary and primary data differ a lot. As I already stated, I aim to ensure high reliability by triangulating my data. I will now present what kind of secondary data I have used.

### **2.3.1 Literature review**

As the information which is gathered in the literature already has been conducted by one or several other researchers, Literature review falls under the category of secondary data. In the following, I will elaborate which kind of literature was of interest to me. First of all, I reviewed books which were 1) only related to Chinese investment in Africa, 2) only related to traditional investment in Africa or 3) discussed the differences of Chinese and traditional investment in Africa. Furthermore, I incorporated general Chinese and traditional investments globally.

Considering all points of view, I tried to understand the topic not only from one perspective. The same method was used to examine journals, articles, official documents, and videos. Even though I tried to catch every perspective, I tried to maximize the reliability and validity of my secondary data even more by the means of data triangulation.

To gather as much information as possible, I searched the Internet (mainly Google Scholar, Sage Journals and academia.edu) as well as the University libraries (mainly the library of the Radboud University Nijmegen).

## **2.4 Predictions**

By using Predictions, I will narrow down the approach of this Thesis. Predictions are applicable, as I do not aim to generalize my findings onto other countries (as it would have been the case in an inductive approach). Furthermore, a prediction can be tested, which contributes to more reliability and validity of general research. As a general scientific contribution to this specific topic is missing in academia, I aim to fill this gap of knowledge. Throughout this Master-Thesis, I will refer to these

Predictions only as „P1“ and „P2“. Based on the literature and the interviews I conducted, this Master-Thesis will deal with the following predictions.

**P1: German investment in Africa has changed in the last 10-15 years.**

**P2: German investment in Africa gets affected by Chinese investment in Africa.**

At the end of the Master-Thesis, I aim to be able to narrow my findings down. In order to do this, I will make use of these Predictions again. If, for example, only P1 can be confirmed, we can say that Chinese investment in Africa has no major influence on the German-Africa relations.

### **3 Development aid vs. investment**

This chapter will deal with the differences between China-Africa relations and German-Africa relations. Germany can hereby be seen as an example of a traditional actor.

When the relation between Africa and China is discussed in academia, it is often written about Chinese *investment* in Africa (Alden 2006, Barton and Men 2016, Klaver and Trebilcock 2011). In contrast, when talking about European/US-American (traditional) relations with Africa, the term *development aid* is used (Hoebink 2010, Barton and Men 2016). Thus, in theory, there are other examples, such as Bräutigam (2011b). The obvious point is, that investment is, by definition, something different as development aid.

*Investment* is defined as „the act of putting money, effort, time, etc. into something to make a profit or get an advantage, or the money, time, etc. used to do this“ (Oxford English Dictionary 2019a).

*Development aid* is defined as the „money that rich countries give to poorer ones to help them develop (=increase their industry and economic activity and get richer)“ (Oxford English Dictionary 2019b).

Moreover, this Thesis will also question if there is maybe a shift from European *development aid* to European *investment* in Africa. Until this question is clarified, the data and of course the findings „must be contextualized within a rich understanding of what types of projects China is actually financing in Africa and how Chinese aid compares to traditional development aid (Swedlund 2017: 389f.) which will be done in the following chapters.

### **3.1 Can the relations between traditional actors and Africa be described as „development aid“?**

As I already mentioned, traditional and Chinese relations with African countries differ in the way they are called and framed. In order to present traditional relations with Africa in a congruent way, I will first present how the traditional international community is organizing itself to give aid to African countries. First, I will present the OECD, its structure and its basic principles. As general perceptions of principles like the market economy differ worldwide, and as I am interested in the effects on German policy, I will afterwards present the so-called German Marshall Plan with Africa. Both the OECD and the Marshall Plan with Africa can be understood as the main conduit of Western development aid for Africa and worldwide.

#### **3.1.1 Structure and basic principles of the OECD**

The OECD is an Intergovernmental economic organization. In 1948, the *Organisation for European Economic Co-operation* (OEEC) was established to administer the challenges of the Marshall Plan. In 1961, when the United States and Canada joined, the OEEC became the OECD. Later on, the OECD got even more enlarged and has nowadays 36 member countries<sup>10</sup>. The OECD intends to „promote policies that will improve the economic and social well-being of people around the world“ (OECD 2019). To do so, „[t]he common thread of our [the OECD] work is a shared commitment to market economies backed by democratic institutions“ (OECD 2019a). In 2018, the OECD had a budget of 377 million EUR, which was „increased approximately by half from voluntary contributions and extra budgetary resources“ (OECD 2018b: 24). To understand, how the OECD is working in Africa, one has to consider the structure and the basic means of the OECD.

In general, the OECD is divided into separate committees. The *Development Assistance Committee* (DAC) consists of 30 members and is dealing with questions surrounding aid, development and poverty reduction in developing countries. Since 1969 the DAC uses the term Official Development

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<sup>10</sup> The OECD member countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the US. At the moment (April 2019), Colombia is invited as the 37th member (OECD 2018a).

I want to put special emphasis on South Korea and Japan. Both are two important Asian actors and are, unlike China, part of the OECD. Both South Korea and Japan are emerging donor actors. This means that the OECD can be understood as a contributor for Asian actors in becoming an important actor in worldwide donor-politics. For more information see Chun et al. (2010) and Kim & Oh (2012) for South Korea and Akiko (2000) and Tuman & Ayoub (2010) for Japan.

Assistance (ODA) as an indicator of international aid flow. The DAC defines ODA as „government aid that promotes and specifically targets the economic development and welfare of developing countries“ (OECD 2019b: 1).

Furthermore, ODA flows are

- „i. Provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies; and
- ii. Concessional (i.e. grants and soft loans) and administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as the main objective“ (ibid.: 1).“

In 2015, ODA for Africa „amounted to more than 50 billion euros globally (BMZ 2015: 15). If we take a closer look at this definition, ODA „includes capital projects, food aid, emergency relief, peacekeeping efforts, technical cooperation, contributions to multilateral institutions and concessional funding to multilateral development banks“ (Ali, Malwanda and Suliman 1999: 504). Originally, ODA excluded a) Military aid and promotion of donors’ security interests and b) Transactions that have a primarily commercial objectives e.g. export credits (OECD 2019b). These rules were updated in 2016 to „recognise the marginal, but actual developmental role that military actors sometimes play“ (ibid.: 3). Since then, „development-related training for partner country military staff in limited topics“ (ibid.: 3) does fall under the category of ODA.

In the years 2018, 2019 and 2020, every country on the African continent is eligible to receive ODA. However, they are (as well as countries that are not on the African continent) divided into 4 groups: Least Developed Countries, Other Low Income Countries, Lower Middle Income Countries and Territories and Upper Middle Income Countries and Territories (OECD 2018c).

To conclude, the OECD can be understood as an international forum for traditional actors, that share the same principles like trust in the market economy and the belief in democratic institutions. One can thereby say, that the OECD comprehends democracy and a market economy as concessional. Once these features are not fulfilled, the OECD is not or less willing to engage. In the next chapter, I will present the work of one OECD member, Germany. This will give a specific example and deeper insight into traditional investments in Africa.

### 3.1.2 A Marshall Plan with Africa

German foreign development shall be realized through the so-called „Marshall Plan with Africa“. It is a political initiative by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and can be understood as a tool for the Agenda 2063. The Agenda 2063 has been developed by the African Union (AU) and is a strategic concept for the socio-economic transformation of the African continent. I call the Marshall Plan with Africa a tool for the Agenda 2063 because it has been set up to support the goals of the Agenda 2063<sup>11</sup>. The Marshall Plan with Africa is thereby a plan that has been set up by traditional actors to support an agenda that has been developed by African actors themselves.

The BMZ understands the Marshall Plan with Africa as „a European offer to support the African continent“ (BMZ 2017: 11). Since the inauguration of Gerd Müller, the German Federal Minister of Economic Cooperation and Development, in 2013, the Marshall Plan with Africa is on the German agenda for its relations with the African continent. By „redefin[ing] the basis for cooperation between the EU and Africa [and] by replacing the Cotonou Agreement<sup>12</sup> with a new partnership agreement“ (ibid.: 4), the BMZ (and thereby Germany) can be recognized as a traditional actor that has changed its Africa policy recently. The BMZ elaborates ten starting points for a Marshall Plan with Africa. In the following, I will present them and elaborate them based on the perceptions of my interviews. As I will present my findings more in detail in Chapter 4, the perceptions of the interviewees are only summed up at this moment.

In general, I had the understanding, that all my interviewees were demanding a new or different Africa-strategy. This point gets already addressed in the first point: „(1) We need a new pact on the future between Europe and Africa“. Only partly, and as I will present in Chapter 4 more in detail, the second starting point was addressed by my interviewees: „(2) Africa needs African solutions“. The third starting point, namely „(3) Prioritising Jobs and opportunities for young people“ got criticized a lot. In point „(4) Investment in Entrepreneurship“ a movement from traditional development aid to investment becomes visible. My interviews displayed the same shift. As I will demonstrate later, the transportation of values plays, in contrast to Chinese investment in Africa, a major role in traditional relations with Africa. This importance becomes visible in points number „(5) Value Creation, not Exploitation“, as well as in number „(6) Demanding the right political

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<sup>11</sup> For more, see African Union Commission (2015) and DeGhetto, Gray and Kiggundu (2016).

<sup>12</sup> The Cotonou Agreement is a treaty between the European Union (EU) and developing countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. For more information, see Arts (2003) and EU (2014).

environment and supporting its development“, „(7) Reform partnerships, not a blanket approach“, and „(8) Equitable global structures and institutions“. With points number „(9) ODA cannot provide all the answers“, and „(10) We will leave no one behind“, the BMZ ends the list with two more general points (BMZ 2017: 5f.).

Following these 10 starting points, the BMZ puts up the „most important question that must be answered by a Marshall Plan [...]: How can 20 million new jobs be created that give young people prospects for their future without destroying the environment?“ (ibid: 10). As I said, this focus got a lot of criticism. To answer the question about the creation of 20 million jobs, the BMZ is building its Marshall Plan with Africa on three pillars: (1) Economic activity, trade and employment, (2) Peace, security and stability and (3) Democracy, rule of law and human rights. In doing so, the BMZ wants to „move away from the concept of donor and recipient countries, and focus more on joint economic cooperation instead“ (ibid.: 13). Again, a conscious shift from development aid to more investment becomes visible. All these pillars should be exercised within the scope of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)<sup>13</sup>. This means, that the Marshall Plan with Africa is shaped by the political goals of the United Nations (UN). In order to explain, how the BMZ wants to work in Africa in detail, I will only describe Pillar 1: economic activity, trade, and employment.

The first pillar of the Marshall Plan in Africa elaborates on new possibilities for young people. To do so, „new ways of developing structures for small and medium-sized enterprises“ (ibid.: 16) have to be explored. The concentration on mid-sized enterprises got also advised by one interviewee (Interview 7: 2019). Furthermore, „Africa is not well integrated into the world economy“ (BMZ 2017: 16), which has to be changed by focusing on economic diversification. In the following, the BMZ is quite clear of what has to be done on all three sides - the African, the German and the International. To give an in-depth insight into one traditional actor, I will present the BMZ's approach in detail. Later on, and in comparison, I will also give an in-depth insight into one specific Chinese investment in Africa.

African countries, have to „[i]mprove the environment for doing business“ (BMZ 2017: 17), which also includes a climate for investment and innovation. In one interview it became clear that it is also the responsibility of African countries to deal sustainably with the means they receive (Interview 4: 2019) Therefore, Africa has to „[d]evelop stable and inclusive financial systems“ (BMZ 2017: 17). This includes to „[p]romote intra-African trade (ibid.: 17)“. Moreover, a „rapid and successful

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<sup>13</sup> The 17 Sustainable Development Goals are set up by the United Nations General Assembly in 2015 and are a part of the Agenda 2030. For more see United Nations (2015) and Sachs (2012).

conclusion of negotiations on a Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA)“ (ibid.: 17) has to be achieved. The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) has been signed with the so-called *African Continental Free Trade Agreement* in Kigali, Rwanda, on March 21<sup>st</sup> 2018 (AU 2018). Furthermore, „protective tariffs to provide partial and temporary protection of domestic markets against global competition“ (BMZ 2017: 17) have to be introduced. In addition, Africa has to „[e]xpand technical and vocational education and training and focus more on the needs of the labour market“ (ibid.: 17). Last but not least, Africa has to „[r]atify the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement“ (ibid.: 17). By signing the *African Continental Free Trade Agreement* 52 of the 55 AU states (Benin, Eritrea and Nigeria did not sign the agreement yet) have ratified the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement. It can be observed, that some of the demands by the BMZ have already been fulfilled by a large majority of the AU.

On the other side, the BMZ sets several ambitions that Germany has to follow. Germany has to „[l]aunch an alliance for jobs and vocational training for African’s youth collaboration with the German private sector and international partners (ILO, AfDB etc.)“ (BMZ 2017: 17). Therefore, Germany has to „[c]ollaborate with various ministries to put together a package of investment incentives for businesses“ (ibid.: 17). This package has to „conclude pro-development double taxation agreements with more African countries“, it has to „create tax incentives for investment in Africa“ and to „better dovetail the German Ministry for Economic Affairs’ business promotion instruments with German development policy“ (ibid.: 17). In this claim, the perceptions of the interviewees are mirrored. A more Foreign Affairs directed strategy for Africa was demanded by several interviewees (Interviews 1, 2 and 3: 2019). In general, Germany has to „[e]xpand the network for advising German businesses in Africa“ and has to „[s]upport the private sector in establishing sustainable supply chains, for example ‚no-deforestation‘ supply chains for soya and palm oil and ‚fair supply chains‘ for cocoa, coffee and bananas“ (BMZ: 17). A support from the government was assessed differently by the interviewees. Some saw it as of fundamental importance, for at least one interviewee this would go „too far“ (Interview 5: 2019). Moreover, Germany has to „[s]upport African financial markets and financial service providers (for example through local currency funds or acceptance of currency risks or guarantees“ (BMZ 2017: 17). In addition, Germany should „[u]se Official Development Assistance (ODA) to mobilise private capital to boost employment“ and „[d]evelop risk transfer mechanisms (e.g. credit and loan guarantee schemes) and expand such mechanisms (create a new ODA-financed guarantee scheme)“ (ibid.: 17). In what way Germany should actually take more risks will be dealt with in Chapter 4. In general, Germany has to „[c]reate new investment products (funds and bonds) for

private sectors“ and „[f]ound a digitalisation centre for African business in collaboration with African partners“ (ibid.: 17). This digitalization centre was identified as one of the most important next steps by one interviewee (Interview 3: 2019). I will elaborate this further in Chapter 4. How the relation of international traditional actors and Africa, according to the BMZ, (should) look(s) like, will also be elaborated in the next section.

Thus, internationally, a variety of things have to happen. Firstly, „economic and energy partnerships between the EU and North Africa (e.g. promoting Renewable energies, research cooperation and infrastructure partnerships)“ (BMZ 2017: 18) have to be supported. One interviewee claimed that the international community in general has to cooperate more in Africa (Interview 6: 2019). Furthermore, the „political and economic cooperation within the Union for the Mediterranean“ (BMZ 2017: 18) has to be expanded. „[P]ro-development trade and economic partnership agreements“ (ibid.: 18) have to be concluded and implemented. Following that, the European External Investment Plan<sup>14</sup> has to be supported and it has to be used „to achieve the goals and focuses of this Marshall Plan“ (ibid.: 18). A more common European Africa-strategy was a central perception throughout all my interviewees as well (Interviews 1, 2 and 3: 2019). The ongoing „integration into and opening of the EU single market“ (BMZ 2017: 18) has to be continued and „local value chains“ need to be promoted (ibid.: 18). This means, that the African private sector must be supported „in satisfying EU quality standards so as to be able to realise their export potential and use the opening of the EU single market to create more value within Africa“ (ibid.: 18). As there are already investment agreements<sup>15</sup> with African countries existing, a review of them and an „update [of] them in a way that boosts development“ (ibid.: 18) is needed. Furthermore, the use of local workforce has to be promoted, which is called „value creation within Africa“ (ibid.: 18). The use of local workforce was a central demand by one of the interviewees (Interview 8: 2019). In addition, international actors have to „[p]rovide information on and promote legal migration opportunities to the ER for the purposes of specialist training“ and „[s]upport private investors in preparing funding-ready projects (BMZ 2017: 18). For a successful future, development banks have to be prevented „from crowding out private capital and mobilise private capital instead“ and ODA should be deployed „only when projects are not suited to private funding“

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<sup>14</sup> The European External Investment Plan (EIP) wants to „encourage investment in our [The EU] partner countries in Africa and the EU Neighbourhood region“ (EU 2017). For more information on the EIP, see Jeune (2014).

<sup>15</sup> More information on European Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) can be found in European Commission (2016) and Hinkle & Schiff (2004).


(ibid.: 18). In the end, „foreign exchange risks involved in dollar or euro loans from placing excessive strain on partner countries’ budgets“ have to be prevented (ibid.: 18).

### 3.2 Other Official Flows and Foreign Direct Investment

ODA is important for traditional relations with Africa. In China-Africa relations (in academia sometimes called „Sino-African relations“), another term becomes important. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) plays a major role to describe China-Africa relations. In order to have a better understanding of ODA, FDI etc., I will now present the general global investment structure shortly. First of all it is thus important to know, that China refuses to use the term ODA and is instead „using [...] the term *south-south cooperation*“ (Kim and Oh 2012: 270).

ODA and FDI are by far not the only terms used to measure / describe development aid. Figure 1 „Global Development Finance“ presents, how differently development in foreign countries is financed.

**Fig. 1: Global Development Finance**



(Source: Bräutigam 2010: 9)

In this chapter I want to emphasize on the terms FDI and Other Official Flows (OOF). Both play an important role in allowing to make an assumption about the above-mentioned predictions P1 and P2. OOFs are defined by the OECD as „[t]ransactions by the official sector with countries on the

DAC List of ODA Recipients which do not meet the conditions for eligibility as OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE, either because they are not primarily aimed at development, or because they have a GRANT ELEMENT of less than 25%“ (OECD 2009: 246). In general, China „provides far more OOF than its Western counterparts“ (Dreher et al. 2018: 183).

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) defines FDI as a „category of international investment that reflects the objective of a resident entity in one economy obtaining a lasting interest in an enterprise resident in another economy“ (IMF 2005: 89). Furthermore, the „lasting interest implies the existence of a long-term relationship between the direct investor and the direct investment enterprise, and a significant degree of influence by the investor on the management of the enterprise“ (ibid.: 89). In the case of China-Africa relations, China’s outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) plays an important role. Generally, OFDI flows from China to Africa keep increasing or are at least at a constant level since 2000. For example, Chinese OFDI flows to Africa increased from US\$200 million in 2000 to US\$2.9 billion in 2011<sup>16</sup>. In comparison German ODA flows to Africa were on the same level with Chinese FDI in 2011 (US\$2.6 billion). Nevertheless, it is clearly not leading to the same increasing development (OECD 2015: 97).

### **3.3 Can the relations between China and Africa be described as „Investment“?**

Even though Chinese economic engagement in Africa lasts back to the 1960s, I will focus on the last 15-20 years. Thus, the year 1996 plays an important role in the China-Africa relations. In 1996, Jiang Zemin, then-president of China, presented a „Five Points Proposal“. Doing so, Jiang Zemin wanted to establish „the terms of a new relationship with Africa, centering around a reliable friendship, sovereign equality, non-intervention, mutually beneficial development and international cooperation“ (Alden 2006: 147). From then on, the trade volume between China and Africa increased from US\$6.5 billion in 1999 (Sandrey 2009: 4) to US\$204.19 billion in 2018 (MOFCOM 2019). As I will present, especially the principle of non-intervention plays an important role. What exactly is motivating China to invest in Africa? And how does Chinese investment in Africa look like? These questions will be answered in the following chapter.

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<sup>16</sup> I do not aim to go in detail about OFDI flows from China to Africa. For details see He and Zhu (2018).

### 3.3.1 Why is China interested in Africa?

In my Interviews, I asked about China's interests in Africa. One interviewee for example told me, that „the interest of the Chinese government is always the maintenance of power of the communist party and that is also what motivates much of the Chinese engagement in Africa“ (Interview 5: 2019). As this sounds quite abstract, I was looking for different fields that China is interested in. According to Alden (2006), four factors shape Chinese motivations to invest in Africa: Resource security, new markets and opportunities, symbolic diplomacy and development cooperation, and forging strategic partnerships. These four factors can be understood as securing the power of the communist party.

#### Resource security

China is not only one of the biggest economies in the world, it is also one of the fastest growing ones (World Bank 2019a). Though, it is not anymore growing as fast as it has been until 2015. Furthermore, the Chinese population is also growing fast (UN 2019). As China itself does not possess all the resources it is interested in and in order to keep growing, China needs to accumulate its resources elsewhere. One example is oil. After the US, and way ahead of India on 3rd place, China has been the second-largest oil consumer in the world in the year 2017 (BP 2018). To maintain their power, China is „attracted to Africa's relatively underexploited petroleum“ (Alden 2006: 148). Furthermore, it is not only oil that China is interested in Africa. Resources like iron ore, coking coal, and manganese are just a few examples of resources that China is also interested in. Many researchers (e.g. Mohan and Power 2008 or Berthelemy 2011) recognize resource security as the main motivation for China in its investments in Africa.

#### New markets and investment opportunities

As I said, the Chinese economy and population is growing fast. Moreover, China in general is emerging as a world economic power (World Bank 2019b). To keep this status and to grow even more, China understands Africa as a „market for low-value consumer goods [that are] brought in by Chinese-dominated import companies and sold through a growing informal network of trading posts across urban and rural Africa“ (Alden 2006: 150). As China „has built a network of trade, aid, and investment links with close to 50 African countries“ (Zafar 2007), it becomes clear, how big the interests and the need for new markets in Beijing are.

## Symbolic diplomacy and development cooperation

The promotion of national representation also plays an important role for China in Africa. Strengthening the bonds on different levels is important as China wants to be seen as a „key power on the world stage“ (Alden 2005: 151). The most important institution to strengthen China-Africa relations is the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), which will be presented in the next section.

The FOCAC was founded in 2000 to strengthen the bilateral China-Africa relations. In the same year, the first Ministerial Conference was held in Beijing, China. The outcome of this conference was the *Beijing Declaration of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation*<sup>17</sup> and the *Programme for China-Africa Cooperation in Economic and Social Development*<sup>18</sup>. Both these declarations can be understood as the base of modern China-Africa relations. Basic principles like *equality and mutual benefit* and the *pursuit of common progress* are now officially written down. Three years later, in December 2003, the second Ministerial Conference was held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. This Conference passed the *Addis Ababa Action Plan*<sup>19</sup>. In this declaration, the multilateral cooperation is strengthened and, for example, Peace and Security Issues are addressed. Sometimes academia dates the *real* start of the FOCAC in 2006. This is because, in 2006, the first FOCAC *Summit* and third Ministerial Conference took place in Beijing, China. Forty-eight African states were represented by their head of state or government and 41 of them were participating for the first time. At the end of the Summit, the participants concluded numerous ambitious commitments. *The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2007-2009)*<sup>20</sup> included to:“

- [Double] the aid to Africa to reach about US\$ 1 billion by 2009
- [Establish] a China-Africa Development Fund (CADFund) to boost Chinese companies' investments in Africa
- [Provide] US\$3 billion preferential loans and US\$ 2 billion in preferential buyer's credits to African countries
- [Cancel] the debts for 31 African countries“ (Cissé 2012).

The fourth Ministerial Conference of the FOCAC was held three years later in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt. During this summit, the declarations made in 2006 were reviewed. Moreover, extensive

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<sup>17</sup> See Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (2000a).

<sup>18</sup> See Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (2000b).

<sup>19</sup> See Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (2003).

<sup>20</sup> See Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (2006).

investments were declared. The US\$ 5 billion loan announced at the first FOCAC Summit in 2006 was doubled in 2009 to US\$ 10 billion. Furthermore, the topics of infrastructure and food security were of high importance. In the end, the *Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Sharm El Sheikh Action Plan (2010-2012)*<sup>21</sup> was declared. The fifth Ministerial Conference of the FOCAC (2012 in Beijing, China<sup>22</sup>) and the second FOCAC Summit and sixth Ministerial Conference (2015 in Johannesburg, South Africa<sup>23</sup>) followed the same patterns. In September 2018 the third FOCAC Summit and seventh Ministerial Conference took place in Beijing, China. Simultaneously, the 73<sup>rd</sup> Session of the UN General Assembly took place in New York, US. The interesting fact about those two meetings being held at the same time is that twice as many African representatives were present in Beijing as in New York (Dahir 2018). With the *Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2019-2021)*<sup>24</sup>, China's President Xi Jinping declared that China will offer another US\$ 60 billion in the next three years.

This illustrates, that Chinese investments in Africa are steadily increasing with every Ministerial Conference and / or Summit. Based on this, the expected amount of US\$ that might be guarded to Africa by China at the next FOCAC Summit in 2021 in Dakar, Senegal will surely be higher than US\$ 60 billion. Nevertheless, at least one interviewee was skeptical and expects, that China might review their intensive investment strategy (Interview 7: 2019). The reasons for this will be elaborated further in Chapter 4.

### Forging strategic partnerships

Another aspect of China's interest in Africa is its ongoing „concern with American hegemony“ (Alden 2006: 152). By investing in African countries and especially investing in countries where traditional donors are absent, China understands its investments in Africa as a chance to compete with the US in global politics. Chinese presence in countries where traditional donors are absent is not a coincidence. Thompson (2007) states, that „Chinese companies are particularly competitive in countries where unreliable political situations, sanctions or other potential liabilities keep large multinationals from committing themselves [and that] Chinese companies are attracted to the potential for large profits in markets with less competition from

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<sup>21</sup> See Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (2009).

<sup>22</sup> See Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (2012).

<sup>23</sup> See Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (2015).

<sup>24</sup> See Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (2018).

multinational firms“ (Thompson 2007: 52). One interviewee confirmed this assumption and stated that Sudan for example was one of the last available oil markets in which European companies were not active yet because of their normative aspect of EU Foreign policy. Thereby the interviewee called it „winds of opportunity“ for China. At the same time, participant 6 called this strategy the „only real chance for China“ (Interview 6: 2019). The idea of China’s „peaceful rise“ (as described in Alden 2006 or Bijan 2006) has to be seen in the light of this. Moreover, China aims to have a partner in African states when it comes to crucial votes at the UN Commissions (Bodomo 2008, Naidu and Mbazima 2008). Furthermore, China’s interest in the WTO could be secured by that strategy (Alden 2006).

### **3.3.2 What is China doing in Africa?**

To explain all projects would obviously expand the requirements for this Thesis, therefore, the chosen examples function as an overview of the different fields China chose to engage in on the African continent.

When it comes to ensuring its oil security, one has to look at China’s state oil company, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC)<sup>25</sup>. One of the most prominent examples is CNPC’s investment in Sudan’s oil exploration, transportation, and production infrastructure (Thompson 2007: 51)<sup>26</sup>. The CNPC is doing this by „purchasing equity shared in established oil fields rather than buying rights for future exploration and development“ (Alden 2006: 149). Thereby, China is able to consume oil „below the international market price“ (ibid.: 149). Moreover, experts say that „the acquisition of equity oil [is ...] more secure than buying oil on the international market“ (Downs 2004: 35). Whether China is doing this in a, how they claim it, sustainable way, is questioned for example by Thompson (2007: 52), who cites a „Chinese academic“ that described China’s energy strategy as „find it, buy it, then use it“. Equal constraints about Chinese oil companies in Africa can be found in Tan-Mullins & Mohan (2013) and Alden & Davies (2006). Some even comprehend Beijing’s Africa policy as a „kind of early test for China’s burgeoning global role“ (Gill and Reilly 2007). In the case of Sudan, another characteristic of Chinese investment in Africa can be recognized. Whereas traditional actors rely on „democratic institutions“ (OECD 2019a), China apparently tolerated „Khartoum’s involvement in the Darfur

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<sup>25</sup> The CNPC is not the only state-owned oil company that is active in Africa. Other examples are Petrochina, who is active in West Africa and the China National Offshore Oil (CNOOC), who is active for example in Algeria and Uganda, and Sinopec, who is active in Gabon.

<sup>26</sup> Moreover, the CNPC invested for example in Angola, Algeria and Gabon (Alden 2006: 148).

crisis“ (Thomson 2007: 52)<sup>27</sup>. This does not only apply to the case of Sudan but also for example to the cases of the Central African Republic, Mauritania, Guinea, Madagascar and Niger (Holslag 2011).

The Chinese government claims to respect other state’s sovereignty and to respect the principle of non-intervention. By framing their Africa-relations in this way, the Chinese government tries to justify its collaboration with these highly criticized governments. On the other side, the Chinese principle of non-intervention leads to a situation in which African governments have little incentives to improve / change their political attributes (Tsao et al. 2015, Obiorah 2008)<sup>28</sup>.

As the Chinese population is steadily increasing, food is another resource that China is trying to secure by its investments in Africa. In general, „food security is a growing concern“ (Alden 2006: 149). To avoid dependency on other traditional actors, China’s Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Co-Operation (MOFTEC) „has sought to encourage Chinese investment in Africa (ibid.: 149). Alden states, that „Chinese investors have set up joint ventures in fish processing in Gabon and Namibia [...] and leases agricultural land in Zambia, Tanzania and Zimbabwe“ (ibid.: 149).

To create new markets in Africa, China is also trying to benefit from the United States’ African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and the EU’s Cotonou Agreement with the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP countries). By using the special provisions of these agreements, the Chinese have established themselves „in the textile and agro-industries [and] joint ventures whose aim is to export goods to the West at concessional rates“ (ibid.: 150). Moreover, all the markets that are important for the resource stability described in Chapter 3.2.1, can be labeled as „new markets“ for China. Another tremendous field of Chinese investments in Africa is infrastructure. As this topic is broadly discussed in academia, I will give a broad summary.

First of all, I want to give a short overview of popular infrastructure projects financed by China. The most known and discussed is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In the following, I do not aim to present the BRI, as this has been done commonly (Huang 2016, Wang 2016, Rolland 2017). I rather want to illustrate to what extent China is investing in African infrastructure projects.

China built the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (Ighobor 2013) and the Headquarters for the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Abuja, Nigeria (Marsh 2018). Moreover, China is investing in Angola’s Caculo Cubaca Hydropower plant (China Daily 2017) and

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<sup>27</sup> More on the Sudanese government involvement in the Darfur crisis can be found e.g. in Straus (2005).

<sup>28</sup> I do not aim a discussion about this topic in this Thesis, but there is general evidence that the non-intervening stance from the Chinese government and their activities have „not contribute[d] to the promotion of peace, prosperity and democracy on the [African] continent“ (Taylor 2004: 99). Other views are expressed in e.g. Sautmann and Hairong (2007) and Wang (2007).

is building Nigeria's Edo State oil refinery (Brelsford 2018). Furthermore, China is building a cement factory in Zambia (Reuters 2017) and the new parliament in Zimbabwe (Africa News 2018). Investments in streets and universities, as happening for example in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), are common all over the African continent (Jansson 2009). As China is financing multiple railway projects all over Africa and in order to give insight about the different companies that are engaged in Africa, I will now give a more detailed overview of the railway projects that China is investing in.

The China Railway Construction Corporation Limited (CRCC) built the Benguela Railway in Angola (Kiala 2010), and is currently building the Mali-Guinea Railway (Tiemoko and Felix 2014) as well as the Mali Senegal Railway (Global Construction Review 2016). These projects are expected to cost a total amount of around US\$ 12.53bn. The China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECC) is currently building the Chad Railway (Reuters 2011), the Nigeria Coastal Railway (Odittah 2016), the Lagos-Kano Railway (Global Construction Review 2018), and the Sudan Railway (Vhumbunu 2016). In cooperation with the China Railway Group (CREC), the CCECC already built the High Plateau line in Algeria (AfDB 2012) and the Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway (China Daily 2011). The projects in which the CCECC and CREC are involved are estimated to have a total amount of around US\$ 31.8bn. The China Communications Construction (CCCC) built the Mombasa-Nairobi Railway for US\$ 3.6bn (Daily Nation 2014). Moreover, the China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC), which is a subsidiary company of the CCCC, is building the Kenya Uganda border (Biryabarema 2018) for US\$ 5.42bn and the China Harbour Engineering (CHEC), which is also a subsidiary company of the CCCC, is building the Uganda Railway (Daily Monitor 2015) for US\$ 8bn. In total, Chinese investments in African railway projects can thereby be estimated to have a total amount of around US\$ 62.85bn. These infrastructure projects were seen as „highly needed“ of some interviewees as they connect the continent with each other. Most of the time, a railway project is not an alternative route to connect A and B but the first ever fast option to travel and trade between A and B (Interviews 2, 3, 5 7 and 8:2019). In the next section, I will shortly clarify how China is financing all these infrastructure projects.

The Export-Import Bank of China (China Exim Bank) is one of three institutional banks in China and „plays a strategic role in strengthening the economic relations between China and Africa“ (Bosshard 2007: 2). It was established in 1994, is wholly owned by the Chinese government and under the direct leadership of the State Council and can be understood as „China's official export credit agency“ (ibid.: 2). Moreover, it is the only bank handling concessional loans. What

differentiates the China Exim Bank from other export credit agencies in other countries is the fact, that the Chinese government „does not formally guarantee its liabilities“ (ibid.: 3). By promoting exports, the China Exim Bank is thereby very important for trade and foreign investment. The different Chinese state-structure, in which the China Exim Bank plays a major role, was seen as a main indicator why China-Africa relations look so different from German-Africa relations (Interviews 7 and 8: 2019).

## **4 Does Chinese Africa-Investment policy influence German Africa-Investment policy?**

In this chapter, I will display the analysis of the conducted interviews. Throughout, the findings will be explained and linked to the relevant secondary data. First, I will present my interview guide and demonstrate in which way and setting the interviews have been conducted.

### **4.1 Interviews**

In order to, on the one side, obtain a good overview over the general understanding of China-Africa relations and German-Africa relations and, on the other side, receive an insight in the possible circumstances that may influence Germany's Africa policy, I developed these following 15 questions:

- (1) Short Introduction
- (2) What is your institution / organization etc. doing and since when do you work here?
- (3) What do you understand by Chinese investment in Africa?
- (4) How do you assess Chinese investment in Africa?
- (5) What do you understand by German investment in Africa?
- (6) How do you assess German investment in Africa?
- (7) Frequently, there is the talk of „development aid“ when the relation between „traditional actors“ and Africa are discussed, whereas the relation between China and Africa is called „investment“. Do you think this wording is appropriate?
- (8) To which degree can the relations between China and Africa be declared as Win-Win situation?
- (9) In what way should Germany care more about investments in Africa?
- (10) What chances does Africa provide to Germany?
- (11) What risks does Africa provide to Germany?

- (12) Given all the Chinese-African cooperation and all the FOAC summits, some people in the EU, and especially in Germany say, that „Europe is losing track“ in Africa. How do you assess these statements?
- (1) If the person agrees: What does Germany need to change?
  - (2) If the person disagrees: Which reasons do you see that Germany does not nearly invest in the same way in Africa as China does?
- (13) Do you see a real strategy change in the „Africa-investment-policy“ of Germany *because* of Chinese investment?
- (14) Why (or why not) should Germany orient itself at Chinese investment strategies?
- (15) Final look into the future: What kind of development do you expect in the German „Africa-investment-policy“?

Beginning in March 2019, I started to contact relevant people such as academics, people working in the business sector with China-Africa related expertise, and German officials with Africa-expertise. Since I was only interested in the effect on the German policy, I did not contact any African or Chinese official. In total, I contacted around 35 to 40 people / institutions. The above-mentioned advantage of expert interviews to receive contacts from a certain interviewee did not work out. In the beginning I thought this would happen more often as it did in the end. Every interviewee was keen to provide more contacts, but it was successful only once. Nevertheless, this possible advantage should not be underestimated. Unfortunately, I was not able to interview a single official of the BMZ, as I was told, that the BMZ receives too many Interview-requests and in order to be fair, no interviews with Master-students are held. The search for more interview partners ought to be even more challenging as the BMZ was not the only institution (or person) answered in this manner. Nevertheless, I was able to conduct eight expert interviews with high-ranked German officials and academics that are cited frequently in general China-Africa academia. Furthermore, I was also able to interview someone who founded a company that specialized itself advising governments and businesses to realize sustainable development in African countries and is doing so by having the Chinese perspective in mind. By conducting interviews with these partners, I was fortunate to be able to cover all the relevant perspectives.

Five interviews were conducted via Skype (three times via Webcam, twice via Voice-Call), whereas the other three interviews were conducted face-to-face in the *Bundestag*, the German government, in Berlin. As I was asked to grant full anonymity for all my interview partners, the names and the positions held at their workplace will not be mentioned in this Thesis. As the experts only function

to give insight into the topic, the positions and names per se are irrelevant anyway. Their expertise is still highly valuable for this Thesis. I numbered the interviews in the following order: Nr. 1 to 3 are German officials working at the *Bundestag*. Nr. 4 to 6 are German scholars with either China-Africa or Europe-Africa expertise. Nr. 7 and 8 are working in the business environment of China-Africa relations. Furthermore, as Interviews 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 were conducted in German, the translated passages that I used in this Thesis can be found in the Appendix. Moreover, I was specifically asked that those will not be used for further purposes apart from this Thesis.

## 4.2 Findings

In this chapter, I will chronologically present the findings of the above-presented questions. The introductory questions (1) and (2) will not be presented, but can be requested by the assessor.

### *(3) What do you understand by Chinese investment in Africa?*

Generally, Chinese investment in Africa was understood as multidimensional. Equal framings can be found in Campbell (2008), Gill, Huang & Morrison (2007) and Gu (2009). Numerous times, the interviewees told me that it is important to distinguish between several types of Chinese investment in Africa. Whether China is giving direct financial support, financing state-out enterprises, investing in private entities, exchanging socio-political principles or is doing political investments<sup>29</sup> always led to a different assessment. Furthermore, Chinese investment was understood as a counter trade agreement (Interview 7: 2019). Nearly all of my interviewees stated, that they comprehend Chinese investment different from traditional investment. Firstly, I was told, that China generally recognizes Africa differently. It was a general perception, that China understands Africa as a continent of chances, and that the Western states talk about war, crises, and development aid when talking about Africa (Interview 1: 2019). Moreover, the way of organizing their foreign relationships in terms of aid giving and investments is different, as China does not use the traditional development assistance definition from the OECD (Interview 4: 2019). Additionally it was perceived that China is thinking in „much longer horizons than Western donors possibly do in Africa“ (Interview 6: 2019). One of my interviewees called Chinas Africa-policy an „interest-led policy“ (Interview 1: 2019). Later in the interview, participant 1 stated, that the European Africa-policy is more value-oriented. The most

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<sup>29</sup> In chapter 3, I already elaborated on political investments in the sense of forging strategic partnerships. One interviewee (Interview 3: 2019) saw digital policies and the Huawei scandal in Addis Ababa, where the AU accused China of hacking headquarters as a big threat for African states (Aglionby, Feng and Yang 2018).

discussed point in question (3) was infrastructure. Whereas some saw the investments in infrastructure as a tool to gain more influence on the African continent (e.g. Interview 2: 2019), one interviewee saw infrastructure as a fundamental part and all in all positive (Interview 8: 2019). Without a direct question leading to the assessment of Chinese investment in Africa, seven out of eight gave an opinion on it. This led to the next question.

*(4) How do you assess Chinese investment in Africa?*

Question (4) led to different findings. On the one side, Chinese investment in Africa was assessed „very positively“ (Interview 8: 2019). By investing in infrastructure, African states in general attracted more investors, which lead to economic growth. Equal observations can be found in Omoruyi et al. (2016). Another aspect was the financial crisis in 2008. At a time where European states were not able to give as much aid as usually, China was able to secure African states from being affected by the financial crisis (Interview 4: 2019)<sup>30</sup>. Thereby, participant 4 called it a „great opportunity for African countries to have an additional partner“. This perception is shared by scholars like Mohan and Power (2008). In general, Chinese presence in African countries is one indicator for a „gradually reduc[ed ...] government’s dependence on traditional donors“ (Swedlund 2013: 367). On the other side, it was understood as „strange“ that Europeans would advise African states not to get exploited (Interview 2: 2019). Thereby, it was recognized as „generally okay“, that China is following its interests and that African states should have to decide themselves (Interview 2: 2019).

Some who assessed Chinese investment in Africa positively also saw another aspect. In their view, rising debt levels of African countries are a huge risk<sup>31</sup>. According to one interviewee, some African states have foreign debts in which 2/3 are Chinese foreign debts and called them future colonies (Interview 6: 2019). Moreover, the interviewees were concerned, that China uses this rising debt level in order to have strategic influence. Additionally, Chinese investment in Africa was called „non-transparent“ (Interview 1: 2019). The lack of transparency in China’s foreign aid giving and infrastructure investments has been criticized e.g. by Bräutigam (2010) and Rotberg (2009). Only one of my interviewees stressed the importance of how the African governments in the end use Chinese engagement. Whether they use it strategically to promote economy or whether they use resources in order for short term interests or to support elites should also be taken into consideration

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<sup>30</sup> For more on the effects of the financial crisis on African countries, see: AfDB (2009) and Allen & Giovannetti (2011).

<sup>31</sup> For more on the rising debt level on the African continent, see: IMF (2018).

while assessing Chinese investment (Interview 4: 2019). Studies like Dreher et al. (2016) show that „Chinese aid is disproportionately allocated to the birth regions of the recipient countries’ political leaders“ (Dreher et al. 2016: 4) and not necessarily to the areas of greatest need within countries. Others had neither *good* or *bad* impression of Chinese investment in Africa. As the „globalization of Africa“ is taking place at the moment, it would be too early to assess the Chinese investment (Interview 3: 2019).

As I was interested in a possible influence on German investment I wanted to know about their perception of German investment in Africa.

*(5) What do you understand by German investment in Africa?*

Before defining German investment in Africa, some interviewees told me, that African states understand German money as granted. Thereby, Chinese money is more „*on top*“ (Interview 8: 2019). In general, German investment in Africa was understood as diverse. On the one side, Germany would have economic interests on the African continent. On the other side, state-sponsored help is also existent. This opinion was not shared by everyone, as at least one interviewee believed, that s/he only recognizes security-related interests led by the EU and no economic interests (Interview 1: 2019). Kappel (2006), for example, supports this view. Normally, Germany would be investing in specific fields, such as water- or energy technology (Interview 7: 2019). The difficulties of the realization of innovative German-led technology projects in Africa can be recognized at the example of DESERTEC<sup>32</sup>. In general, the amount of projects that are realized by German enterprises in Africa was observed as insufficient and in general not coordinated sufficiently (e.g. Interview 2: 2019). Several times I was told, that gaining influence on the African market is only possible on the European level. At the same time, this was identified as problematic, since too many different interests would be present at the moment (e.g. Interview 3: 2019). If the EU would be guided in its Foreign Affairs policy, then France would be the most powerful state, whereas Germany would not be understood as a strategic point of reference (Interview 6: 2019). One interviewee, who deals with Foreign Affairs on a daily basis, told me, that s/he does not recognize the policy of the BMZ being a part of a bigger Foreign Affairs strategy (Interview 3: 2019). Also, the above-mentioned Marshall Plan for Africa was not understood as a part of a broader Foreign Affairs strategy. Another interviewee told me, that nearly 80% of German

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<sup>32</sup> For more information on DESERTEC and why (or if) it did fail, see: Anyu (2017) and Schmitt (2018).

investment in Africa is transferred to South Africa (Interview 8: 2019). Whereas Chinese investment in Africa is dispersed, German investment is creating a regional disparity.

Furthermore, the German-Africa relations were described as being too focused on migration. One interviewee was of the perception, that China sees Africa as a growing market, while Germany is understanding Africa as a „potential place of origin of migrants“ (Interview 6: 2019). According to several interviewees, Africa is obtaining more attention since 2015 only because Germany wants to secure its border. Thereby, in order to follow own interests, Germany is focused on job creation in Africa (Interview 4: 2019). Job creation is a major point in the above-presented Marshall Plan with Africa. It is criticized because it appears that Germany is not interested in creating jobs in general. It appears more that Germany is afraid of more migration flows from Africa and is therefore caring about jobs in Africa. Nevertheless, German investment was not understood as static. Moreover, it was recognized as changing and evolving at the moment. As the German focus is changing, one could even generally say, that Germany is nowadays more interested „in linking development assistance with the objective to promote investments and trade“ (Interview 4: 2019). As I said above, the Marshall Plan with Africa can be understood as an indicator for the change in the German Africa relations.

Although some assessments were already present in the answers of question (5), I was interested in gaining more in-depth assessments of German investment in Africa.

#### *(6) How do you assess German investment in Africa?*

In general, the missing strategy was criticized a lot. Sometimes, the focus on migration was called a „strategy“, but then it was assessed as „not ok“ (Interview 2: 2019). Additionally, the focus on migration was criticized for creating a negative image of Africa and a general perception how a positive cooperation between Europe and Africa could look like was missed (Interview 3: 2019). In comparison, the way Germany is investing in Africa was not criticized. The problem of German investment in Africa is, according to my interviewees, that it is happening too small scaled. While remaining in the current sectors, Germany was called „reluctant“ and would need to increase its investments and expand into other sectors (Interview 1: 2019). While expanding, Germany should thus remain active in the current sectors. Another interviewee even called the German strategy „backward-looking“ (Interview 6: 2019).

After getting to know what the interviewees understand by Chinese and German investment in Africa and how they assess them, I wanted to know whether they think the terms used in academia to describe German and Chinese investment in Africa are appropriate.

(7) *Frequently, there is the talk of „development aid“ when the relation between „traditional actors“ and Africa are discussed, whereas the relation between China and Africa is called „investment“. Do you think this wording is appropriate?*

Those who thought that the terms „investment“ and „development aid“ are appropriate to describe Chinese and German investment in Africa were saying, that Germany (and the EU) did not realize yet how important Africa will be in the future. One determinant is thereby seen in the population boom (Interview 3: 2019). Moreover, terms like *charity* are overrepresented in the German Africa policy (Interview 8: 2019). Furthermore it was believed that African states like the fact that China observes more investment possibilities and does not talk about development aid (Interview 3: 2019). Two interviewees, who were also generally saying that these terms are appropriate made one important point. It would always be important to be cautious and not to believe the wording and framing a given state uses. It is thereby understood critical to talk about Chinese investments in Africa only because the Chinese talk about investments (Interview 5: 2019). On the other side, the German Africa policy, which is framed as *development aid* by Germany, was called a „hidden agenda“ in order to intensify commercial relationships (Interview 7: 2019). If this is the case, and the Marshall Plan with Africa is a so-called hidden agenda, then the German-Africa relations could stand right in front of a problem. A hidden agenda, by definition<sup>33</sup>, is not a base for a positive shared future.

I also got to know the other perspective. One interviewee did not recognize the terms appropriate to describe German and Chinese relations in Africa. S/he told me, that „one would describe the one as good and the other as bad“ (Interview 2: 2019). Apparently, *investment* has a bad connotation for participant 2, whereas *development aid* has a more positive connotation. By saying that, participant 2 meant, that not everything the Chinese are doing in Africa is bad and not everything the Europeans are doing in Africa is good. In the opinion of participant 2, China also has „good arguments“ for themselves and for African states. With an overview of the understanding of Chinese and German investments in Africa, I was interested if both parties in the China-Africa relations are winning (equally).

(8) *To which degree can the relations between China and Africa be declared as Win-Win situation?*

The answers I got were quite diverse. One interviewee would not even use the term *Win-Win*, as it is Chinese propaganda (Interview 5: 2019). In general, China uses the term *Win-Win* to frame its

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<sup>33</sup> The Cambridge Dictionary (2019) defines *hidden agenda* as: „a secret reason for doing something“.

relations with the world. Seven out of eight of my interviewees were agreeing, that China is definitely winning in this relation. The opinions were different to what extent the Chinese are actually winning. One interviewee for example meant, that it could not be generalized and one would always have to evaluate *who* profits in *which* way (Interview 5: 2019). The eighth interviewee saw this discourse a bit different. For the participant, it was too early to say something about a winning situation. In the opinion of the interviewee, everyone is receiving what they want at the moment. Whether this will be the same in a 10 years time would be another question (Interview 3: 2019). The interviewees were more critical while assessing the Win situation for the African countries. The general perception was, that, of course, African states are also profiting from Chinese investment. The interviewees were skeptical about the extent. Equal observations can be found in Alves (2013). If, for example, African states win in the first place because they receive highly needed infrastructure, but then fall into the debt trap, one cannot talk about a Win-Win situation anymore (Interview 3: 2019). Another aspect is the actual quality of the infrastructure. The quality was not observed as good or sustainable, which was another indicator that the China-Africa relations are not a Win-Win situation (Interview 3: 2019). Constraints about the quality of the infrastructure built by the Chinese can be found in Alves (2013), Berthelemy (2011) and Sautman & Hairong (2009). Furthermore, African states (for example because of the debt trap) would become more and more dependent. Another aspect why one interviewee was skeptical, was the fact that s/he thinks that the Chinese policies in Africa are not only averse to Western perceptions but also to African perceptions (Interview 3: 2019). The extent to which people benefit locally from Chinese investments was thereby understood critical (Interview 4: 2019). For one interviewee, who did not recognize it as a Win-Win situation, it was important to keep in mind, that German policies are also not a Win-Win situation for African states (Interview 2: 2019). Two interviewees had completely different perceptions as the others. One was of the opinion, that when China says „win-win“, they mean that they win twice (Interview 1: 2019). The other interviewee had the most unusual perception in my opinion. The participant stated, that both sides are obtaining what they want and that no side is winning more than the other (Interview 8: 2019).

As the numbers, but also public debates, demonstrate, that Germany is not investing nearly the same (or in the same way) in Africa as China, I was interested if Germany should change its Africa-policy.

*(9) In what way should Germany care more about investments in Africa?*

The general perception of the interviewees was, that Germany has to care more about investments in Africa. One interviewee said, that this could, for example, be done through the Paris Club (Interview 3: 2019). The Paris Club was created in 1956 and is a group of currently 22 permanent members. It presents itself as a „central player in the resolution of developing and emerging countries' debt problems“ (Paris Club 2019)<sup>34</sup>. Besides on the level of the Paris Club, Germany has to become more active at the European level and also within the G20. It was clear, that the interviewees did not recognize Germany alone as being powerful enough. One interviewee highlighted the importance of Germany not telling Africans in general that the products Germany is manufacturing are too expensive (Interview 8: 2019). In the opinion of participant 8, this is „non-sense“. One could easily develop cheaper products and sell them in Africa. Not only selling them, but also building jobs and hiring people. Another interviewee did not see it as the duty of the state to improve the conditions. In the opinion of participant 5, this would go „too far“ (Interview 5: 2019). Private economic sectors should only do what they think is reasonable for them. Moreover, another interviewee was of the perception, that Germany would need to make the political dimension more relevant (Interview 4: 2019). In the opinion of the interviewee, the discussion about the economic cooperation is too important at the moment.

The way China invests in Africa suggests, that China recognizes a lot of chances on the African continent. I wanted to know, whether this counts for Germany as well.

*(10) What chances does Africa provide to Germany?*

It was interesting that the argument about expensive products I just presented in the question before was addressed by another interviewee now. The participant said, that Germany has a general problem as it is exporting high-end technology products, for which the market in Africa does not yet exist (Interview: 2019). By stating this, participant 3 wanted to make clear that Africa does not provide the same economic chances to Germany as it does to China. Furthermore, Germany does not yet need food or energy security as China does at the moment.

General chances for Germany were seen in the population boom, the growing middle class, the infrastructure and the need of urbanization. When it comes to urbanization, one interviewee pointed out the importance of green technology, which could be provided by Germany (Interview 3: 2019). All these factors led to the perception, that Africa is understood as a market with a huge potential.

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<sup>34</sup> For more information on the Paris Club, see: Rieffel (1985) and Paris Club (2019).

One interviewee was of the opinion, that „people are too afraid“ and need to be more positive towards the African continent (Interview 8: 2019). Nevertheless, the market opportunities would always depend on the countries and the sectors. Whereas for one interviewee the biggest chance for Germany in Africa was to control migration (Interview 1: 2019), another one argued that the focus on migration, is „one-sided“ and „not effective“ (Interview 5: 2019).

After asking about the chances, I was also interested whether specific risks for Germany are existing in African countries.

*(11) What risks does Africa provide to Germany?*

For some interviewees it was clear, that this could not be generalized. For them, Africa does not per se provide more risks than other countries. For one interviewee it was important to state, that Africa is „not Wild Wild West“ (Interview 8: 2019). Others had a different opinion. For them, security issues, uncertainty, corruption, the need of political and constitutional stability, and good governance are big risks for Germany in Africa (e.g. Interview 3: 2019). Furthermore, the planning security and the security of a stable law was detected critical (Interview 1: 2019). Another interviewee saw risks as something „quite natural“ from a banking point of view (Interview 7 2019). Furthermore, participant 8 mentioned the risks for companies back in the 1990s when they decided to invest in China. Whenever someone is investing somewhere, he has to deal with certain risks. Having risks while investing was understood as „part of the show“ (Interview 8: 2019).

For China, these risks might be lower, as everything is predictable. Even tough participant 8 admitted that Africa is not macroeconomic stable, and the political situations change quite frequently, s/he thought that the risks might be perceived too high. As these risks are perceived quite high at the moment, the back fundings, that companies have to use, are „very very expensive“, which makes it again even more risky (Interview 7: 2019).

In the next question, I came back to the statement that apparently „Europe is losing track“ in Africa.

*(12) Given all the Chinese-African cooperation and all the FOCAC summits, some people in the EU, and especially in Germany say, that „Europe is losing track“ in Africa. How do you assess such statements?*

Question (12) functioned as a central question in the interviews, because I asked whether the interviewees, with regard to Germany, agree or not that „Europe is losing track“ in Africa.

Again, the answers I got were quite diverse. On the one side, people were agreeing. In their opinion, the EU (and thereby Germany) does not care about Africa in the same way as China does. I asked them the follow-up question:

*What does Germany need to change?*

According to them, Germany would need to develop a strategy, that is not hostile to China<sup>35</sup>. Moreover, one interviewee criticized the non-sufficient cooperation within traditional donors in Africa and between traditional donors and China. He made an example with the connection from Nairobi, Kenya to Mombasa, Kenya. He told me that „the Chinese have [...] built a railway and the Americans are currently building a highway while, at the same time, the Europeans are renovating the existing road“ (Interview 6: 2019). Nevertheless, more cooperation was seen problematic, because a more common strategy is only realizable on e.g. the European level, where too many different foreign affairs interests are present. Germany would also have to make offers. Offers that are good enough for African states to say that they „care about values“ (Interview 2: 2019). If these offers are not sufficient, China is not to blame. If we have the commitment to freedom of association in Europe, this should also count for Africa. In general one could recognize, that it is not easy for democracies at the moment (Interview 2: 2019). Furthermore, Germany is losing track because it cannot only follow an interest-led policy as China does (Interview 1: 2019). By following an interest-led policy which is shaped by certain values, traditional actors still have, especially in their relations with authoritarian regimes, some limitations. In general, the „globalization of Africa“ was not understood as something bad and the fact that some actors are bigger than others is „part of the game“ (Interview 3: 2019). Though, Germany would need to come from words to deeds.

A more common perception was, that Europe is not *yet* losing track in Africa. At the moment, Germany (and Europe) and China are playing in different markets. But if, for example, China will have the First-Mover advantage<sup>36</sup> in the Digitalization process of Africa, it „can get problematic“ (Interview 3: 2019). For Germany not to lose track in Africa, it would have to change its narrative towards China. Whereas one interviewee admitted, that Europe has to carry a historical burden, s/he said that the narrative „Oh Africa is a weak continent, we need to help them“ is „tiring the people“ in Africa (Interview 8: 2019). Germany should cooperate more with Africa and stop

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<sup>35</sup> In the past there have been especially US-American driven Africa-Strategies that have been hostile towards Chinese investment in Africa. In 2012, for example, then secretary Hillary Clinton „implicitly warned Africa about China [and said, that] [t]he continent needs ‚a model of sustainable partnership that adds value, rather than extracts it‘“ (French 2014).

<sup>36</sup> For more information of the so called First-Mover Advantage, see: Kerin, Varadarajan and Peterson (1992), and Lieberman and Montgomery (1988).

letting the „aid narrative“ take over the German-Africa relations (Interview 8: 2019). On the other side, people were disagreeing. Again, I asked a follow-up question:

*Which reasons do you see that Germany doesn't nearly invest in the same way in Africa as China does?*

For them, Europe „is a bit too defensive“ (Interview 4: 2019). Thereby, Europe should not underestimate its relevance and importance on the African continent. Nevertheless, the internal situation in Europe makes it not easy to transport an image of an influential Europe to the world. The internal situation, mixed with other factors could lead to the perception, that Europe is „losing out“ (Interview 4: 2019). Moreover, the money China is able to spend because of its state-structure is simply not comparable to the money Germany and the EU could spend. Furthermore, one interviewee said that German companies did not care about Africa in the last 60 years and did not recognize a reason why they should do so now (Interview 5: 2019). The markets Germany and other European countries are interested in are apparently still working for German (and other European) companies.

Recently, a substantial number of European leaders, including Angela Merkel, have travelled to Africa. In my next question I wanted to know, whether these travels have only been shaped by symbolism or whether the interviewees detect a strategy change in the German „Africa-investment-policy“ *because* of Chinese investment.

*(13) Do you see a real strategy change in the own „Africa-investment-policy“ of Germany because of Chinese investment?*

First of all, visits by government leaders in foreign countries were always understood as being part of a symbolic act. Symbolism was also recognized as something important by my participants. But again, the Chinese were understood as being even more symbolic in the way of their Foreign Affairs strategy towards Africa. More symbolic acts could be witnessed by the way the Chinese travel and the connection to their Foreign Affairs strategy. Every year, the first trip made by Chinese officials is to the African continent (Interview 5: 2019).

Chinese investment in Africa was partly understood as one aspect - but not as the decisive one. The decisive reason was seen in the focus to stop migration and to follow own interests by creating jobs. Of course, there are differences within the EU. For example Great Britain has more economic interests due to BREXIT in Africa at the moment, as other European countries might have (Interview 3: 2019). But of course, everyone is recognizing the growing impact of China on the African continent, and, as one interviewee told me „no one wants to be late for the party“ (Interview

3: 2019). Furthermore, one interviewee saw a change in the strategy, as German officials are discussing *how* to cooperate with China in Africa (Interview 5: 2019). For two of my interviewees, Chinese activity in Africa was the main indicator for the growing German interest in Africa. These facts could not be denied anymore (Interview 8: 2019). They called it a „good phase“ for Africa and stated, that Africa in general is „a bit en vogue“ (Interview 7: 2019). They understand Africa as the next big market globally and especially the interest of the private sector as „very strong“ (Interview 7: 2019). What they had in common with the others was, that they also called for more triangular cooperation between Germany (in general the EU), China, and African countries. This perception is shared by e.g. Fordelone (2011) and Wissenbach (2009).

As I pointed out, the „German“ way of investing (and the amount of investing) in Africa is completely different as the „Chinese“ way. With my second last question, I wanted to know, whether Germany should orient itself at Chinese investment strategies.

*(14) Why (or why not) should Germany orient itself at Chinese investment strategies?*

For the first time, all my interviewees had the same opinion. It was consensus, that Germany needs a(nother) strategy. This would have to happen on the European level. Furthermore, Germany should work with bigger economic partners than just one African state alone. For example, Germany should „not only collaborate with Tanzania“ (Interview 2: 2019), but with the whole Southern African Development Community (SADC). But in the end, this would and should be the choice of the African states. Moreover, Germany should not give up its principles, stay liberal-democratic, and China should keep the „advantage“ of their non-intervention policy (Interview 2: 2019)<sup>37</sup>. Thereby, Germany should create / take part in a competition of different systems. Investing in Africa on the one side and keeping up democratic principles on the other side was thereby not understood as a contradiction. Moreover, Germany should be more transparent about their „hidden agendas“. Their policy in general was understood as „too slow“, but this is was not recognized as a reason to give up own values (Interview 7: 2019). One interviewee was of the perception, that European states are „losing credibility“ with their current policy „because it [Europe] has been so inactive“ (Interview 8: 2019). The same interviewee gave me an illustrative example that I want to share. While talking about the lost credibility, the participant said: „Finally there is this uncle coming and building everything you need and that you have been reacquiring for a long time, but others have denied you the financing. But finally. someone came and gave you the money and all

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<sup>37</sup> Research on how China in general influences traditional actors by its non-interventionist approach has been done for example by Condon (2012).

the infrastructure there is now. So, how can you tell me this guy is bad?“. By saying this he concluded, that „China has the best PR strategies actually sitting in Brussels“ (Interview 8: 2019). The perception that African states are receiving what they need from China is not only shared by Experts or scholars, but also by African government leaders, such as Rwanda’s president Paul Kagame (Handelsblatt 2009). In comparison, one interviewee was unsure if the Chinese strategy is successful and stated, that African states are also skeptical (Interview 2: 2019). Especially the case of Zambia was named a few times when the interviewees were talking about an Anti-China sentiment in African states. For more, see Negi (2008). Another interviewee heard African people saying, that they do not want Europe to become „more Chinese“ (Interview 3: 2019). In general, China was understood as a risk-taker (Interview 7: 2019). Germany, in the eye of two interviewees, is more keen to avoid risks and does not tend to experiment (Interviews 7 & 8: 2019). In the case of China, one could also recognize how experiments can fail, when considering Chinese investments in Venezuela<sup>38</sup>.

At the end of the interview I asked the interviewees for one final look into the future.

*(15) Final look into the future: What kind of development do you expect in the German „Africa-investment-policy“?*

It was important to me that the participants did not answer what they *want* to see in the future, but what kind of development they *expect*. The general perception was that German investment in Africa will increase and that we will recognize a „continuation of the current path“ (Interview 4: 2019). This „current path“ can also be recognized in the strategy of the BMZ that claims that „the days of ‚aid‘ and of ‚donors and recipients‘“ (BMZ 2017: 4) are over. Concretely, more budgetary spending is expected. In order to realize more investments, especially for mid-sized countries, Germany would need another „investment structure“, as the current structure would be „very bizarre“ (Interview 8: 2019). The recent travels of Angela Merkel to the African continent were not identified as a coincidence, neither was her saying that the European destiny is bound to the African destiny (Interview 3: 2019). Generally, more actors are expected on the African continent. At the same time, one interviewee advised Germany to not only think about African countries (Interview 5: 2019). As the future is always uncertain and political perceptions can change because of certain government formations, one should not look at one moment in time (Interview 7: 2019). The same interviewee advised to „analyze things looking back periods somehow“. In the end it would be

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<sup>38</sup> see Tiezzi (2019).

about developing a perception, like China did with Eurasia or OBOR<sup>39</sup>, of *Eurafrica* (Interview 3: 2019).

### Evaluation of the results and predictions

In general the results displayed how different China-Africa and German-Africa relations are. It became clear that Germany alone is not powerful enough to compete and / or cooperate with China in Africa and would have to cooperate more on different international levels. As I interviewed people working in different fields, the perceptions on German-Africa relations, China-Africa relations and the influences from Chinese presence in Africa on the German Africa policy differed as well. This led to a broad and diverse understanding of the topic.

In summary, the findings of the secondary data, especially the presentation of the Marshall Plan with Africa, demonstrated that Germany changed its Africa policy recently. A conscious shift from traditional German development aid to, what I call, *German-style investment* in Africa is visible. I make the comparison between *German-style investment* to *Chinese investment* because the state structures and therefore, as a consequence, the investment structure differs to a high extent. Nevertheless, P1 (German investment in Africa has changed in the last 10-15 years) can be confirmed on the basis of the presented secondary data.

The answers given by the participants were in line with the above-presented arguments found in the secondary data. I was thereby able to support the confirmation of P1 with the findings of my interviews. All participants were agreeing that the German Africa policy is changing recently. This ensures high reliability through the means of data triangulation. Additionally, I was not only able to find patterns in the presented information but also to add value to my personal research and fill the existing research gap. Although the interviewees were confirming P1, they were discordant which indicators lead to this shift. Either way, a change is visible. Furthermore, the findings illustrated that although Germany is changing its Africa policy, the change has to happen more extensive. In the following, the discord of my interviewees leads directly to the assessment of P2 (German investment in Africa gets affected by Chinese investment in Africa).

In comparison to P1, P2 can, on the basis of the data, only partly be confirmed. As I am filling a literature gap, secondary data on the effects from Chinese investments in Africa on Germany was not existent. Thereby the assessment of P2 is only possible on the basis of my expert interviews.

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<sup>39</sup> The One Belt One Road Initiative (OBOR) is nowadays known as the above-described BRI. The Chinese government changed the name, because the term „One Belt One Road“ led to misinterpretations (Bērziņa-Cerenkova 2016).

Although the majority of my participants (6 of 8) saw Chinese investments in Africa as a factor for the recent changes in Germany's Africa policy, the main indicator was understood in the desire to stop migration from Africa to Germany. Only two experts saw Chinese investments in Africa as the decisive factor.

## 5 Conclusion

As general research did not yet address the effects Chinese investments in Africa have on one specific traditional actor, I aimed to fill this existing research gap. If a traditional actor, in this case Germany, changes its Africa policy and if this change is attributable to Chinese investments in Africa, the influence and impact that China has is higher than expected. Concretely, this research aimed to answer the question **whether Germany gets influenced by Chinese investment in Africa and eventually changes (or should change) its investment strategy in Africa.**

I started this Thesis by presenting the methods I used and an elaboration on expert interviews.

Following, I formulated two predictions. P1 predicted that **German investment in Africa has changed in the last 10-15 years.** P2 went one step further and predicted that **German investment in Africa gets affected by Chinese investment in Africa.**

In order to be able to evaluate P1 and P2, I first presented secondary data. I divided this part in a section that presented secondary data on relations of traditional actors with Africa with special regards to German-Africa relations and a section that elaborated secondary data on China-Africa relations.

In the first part I presented the structure and basic principles of the OECD. It became obvious that the member states of the OECD share principles like trust in the market economy and the belief in democratic institutions. As I was interested in a possible influence on the German Africa policy, I presented the so-called Marshall Plan with Africa in the following. The chapter demonstrated that Germany is clearly changing its Africa policy through the Marshall Plan with Africa in the last years. On the basis of the presented secondary data, I was thereby able to confirm P1. Especially the Marshall Plan with Africa can be understood as a change in the German Africa policy.

After evaluating traditional development aid in Africa and a short elaboration on the international development structure I presented secondary data on the relations between China and Africa. I pointed out the different factors why China is interested in Africa and what the Chinese are doing in African countries. It became clear that the Chinese are engaged extensively on the African

continent. Moreover, it became visible that the different state structure plays a major role and that China is concentrating more on FDI and OOF than traditional development aid and ODA.

The secondary data in general helped to gain insight into different perspectives on the topic of foreign investment and aid on the African continent. As I made use of data triangulation the secondary data could be amplified with the findings of the expert interviews. In the following, chapter 4 presented the results of my expert interviews.

By conducting expert interviews with people working in a variety of fields, all the important perspectives were covered. Therefore, I was able to obtain detailed insights into the Chinese investment in Africa as well as the influence this might have on the German investment policy. As the interviewed experts agreed that Germany recently changed its Africa policy, I was able to support the confirmation of P1. By contrast, I was not able to completely confirm P2. The majority of the interviewees did not regard the Chinese presence on the African continent as the decisive factor for the recent change in the German Africa policy. The decisive factor was understood in the desire to stop migration from Africa to Germany. This allows direct conclusions on the research question, as the question was not whether Germany changes its Africa policy recently in the first place, but whether China has a major influence on this change. On the basis of my analysis, this question can mainly be denied. Although the perceptions of my interviewees showed that this might change with time, future research with an updated evaluation on P2 may come to a different conclusion. Furthermore, the question if Germany is *really* following its own aims or whether the Marshall Plan with Africa is part of a hidden agenda calls for further research.

As the interviewees covered different perspectives, the findings added a high value to my research and to research on this topic in general. By adding in-depth knowledge of German experts to the pool of secondary data on German-Africa and China-Africa relations I hope that this Thesis will contribute and give an outline for further research. Nevertheless, it has to be kept in mind that the study was conducted with participants working mainly in Europe. This could lead to a Eurocentric view on some of the questions asked. Another limitation might be that the literature about Chinese and other non-western aid may be guided by motives other than the pursuit of scientific knowledge (Hirono, & Suzuki 2014). In general, I was limited due to time and willingness of participants, to conduct further primary about this topic. An example was the non-availability of the BMZ, which would have helped to get an insight opinion of a German traditional actor. Their non-availability could be seen as an indicator for the sensitivity of the topic in German Foreign Affairs.

With some exceptions, the findings of my expert interviews were more or less predictable. Migration is one of the most discussed topics in recent German politics and omnipresent in media.

As some of my interviewees advised, Germany would have to change its Narrative towards Africa and create a more positive image of future German-Africa relations.

To conclude this Thesis, I would like to revert to one of the interviews: One participant stated that Europe would need to develop an image of *Eurafrica*. I could not agree more! I would personally advise Germany to be a leading voice within Europe to create a cooperation-shaped vision of *Eurafrica*. Moreover, it would be the best for the African countries if traditional actors in general notice China as a partner - and not as a competitor.

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# Appendix

As some interviews were conducted in German, the following will be a presentation of my own translation and interpretation. This will happen chronologically for every Interview.

## Appendix A - Interview 1, conducted on 17<sup>th</sup> of May 2019 in Berlin

Number	German	English
1	Also zunächst ein mal aus meiner Sicht gibt es ein Riesen Unterschied wie wir Afrika betrachten und wie die Chinesen Afrika betrachten. Wenn wir über Afrika reden, dann reden wir über humanitäre Maßnahmen, über Entwicklungshilfe, über Krisen, Kriege, Konflikte, Armut.	First of all, from my sight, there is a big difference how we see Africa and how the Chinese see Africa. When we talk about Africa, we talk about humanitarian activities, development aid, crises, wars, conflicts and poverty.
2	Investment..äh.. ich hab häufig den Eindruck, dass China eine bestimmte Politik verfolgt, das ist aus meiner Sicht eine Interessen-geleitete Politik, es sind Interessen, die Chinesen kennen ihre Interessen und sie wollen durch ihre Methoden ihre Interessen umsetzen.	Frequently, I have the impression that China is following a certain policy, which is, from my sight, an interest-led policy. These are interests, the Chinese know their interests and they want to follow their interests with their methods.
3	Also die sind übrigens diese Tätigkeiten sind oft intransparent und ich glaube dass der chinesische Staat die Staaten in erster Linie abhängig machen will.	Furthermore, these activities are often non-transparent, and I think that the Chinese state wants to make these states dependent.
4	Aber das sind eher außen- und sicherheitspolitische Interessen. Die große wirtschaftliche Tätigkeit - Investment - sehe ich da gar nicht.	Those are more foreign- and security policy related interests. The big economic activity - investment - I do not see it.
5	Das kann ich schlecht bewerten, dazu fehlen mir Informationen, aber im Kern habe ich den Eindruck dass Deutschland da sehr zurückhaltend ist.	I cannot really assess this, because I do not have enough information. Essentially I have the perception, that Germany is very reluctant.
6	Bei den Chinese ist oft wenn sie Win Win sagen dann meinen sie dass China zwei mal gewinnt.	When the Chinese talk about Win-Win they mean that they win twice.

Number	German	English
7	Das heißt wir sind gezwungen.. es liegt in unserem eigenen Interesse, dass wir in Afrika investieren, das wir dazu sorgen dass dort wirtschaftliche Entwicklung stattfindet und vor allem dass diese Staaten die dort sind auch Strukturen bekommen.	That means we are forced.. it lies in our own interest to invest in Africa, that we take care of the economic development and especially that the states gain a certain structure.
8	Naja also es ja so Unternehmen brauchen ja Planungssicherheit. Äh um Betriebswirtschaftliche Prozesse auch durchführen zu können, Und äh Unternehmen brauchen Rechtssicherheit.	So, companies need planing security. Äh, in order perform economic processes. And äh companies need legal certainty.
9	Wir sind nicht in der Lage Interessen geleitete Politik zu vertreten weil wir a) nicht in der Lage sind unsere Interessen zu artikulieren und b) sie dann auch entsprechend umzusetzen.	We are not able to pursue an interest-led policy because we are a) not able to articulate our interests and b) to implement them in the right way.

## Appendix B - Interview 2, conducted on 17<sup>th</sup> of May in Berlin

Number	German	English
1	Also das sind Flughäfen, Straßenbahnen, Häfen, Gefängnisse, Paläste für irgendwelche Staatsführer und damit einhergehend auch politischen Einfluss und ich äh weiß, also das hab ich jetzt nicht gesehen, das weiß ich einfach durch meine Arbeit, dass auch China selbst für seine eigenen äh für seine eigene Entwicklung Rohstoffe, Nahrungsgüter aus Afrika nach China importiert.	I see airports, trams, havens, prisons, palaces for certain national leaders and associated with that also political influence and äh I know, so I did not see that, I know that through my work, that China itself imports resources for its own development from Africa.
2	Also mein Herangehen ist immer folgendes: 1. Gegenüber den afrikanischen Ländern als Europäer zu argumentieren, dass man sich nicht von Großmächten ausbeuten lassen soll, finde ich skurril.	So, my approach every time is the following: 1. To argue as a European towards African states not to get exploited by a major power, is strange.
3	Aus chinesischer Sicht bin ich auch erst mal neutral weil es ist total ok dass ein Land seinen eigenen Interessen verfolgt und darauf basierend Verträge abschließt.	From the Chinese sight, I am in the beginning also neutral because it is totally ok if a state follows its own interest and is, based on that, negotiating contracts.
4	Mein Eindruck ist dass da zu vieles unkoordiniert ist und nebeneinander läuft und... dass wir aktuell eine, eine Neufokussierung haben die sich vor allem letztlich um das Thema Migration dreht.	My perception is that too much is not coordinated and is simultaneously and.. that we have a new focus on migration.
5	Nich ok find ich wenn man versucht eine Abschottungspolpolitik zu machen, da bin ich voll dagegen, das finde ich nicht richtig.	I do not think it is ok when we follow a policy of closure, I am totally against it, I do not think that's right.
6	Und ich will es immer nur in Relation setzen, dass auch europäische und deutsche Politik dort auch nicht sagt „wir wollen auf Augenhöhe immer nur“, da wird natürlich auch an die eigenen Interessen gedacht.	And I always want to put it into relation, that even European and German politics also does not say „we always want to be at one level“ and of course we also think about our own interests.

Number	German	English
7	Das muss sich lohnen für afrikanische Länder die sagen „ na für uns sind Werte auch wichtig“.	It has to be worthwhile for African states that say „we care about values“.
8	Also da chinesische oder singapursche oder vietnamesische, Saudi Arabien, VAE, das kann man ja alles durchgehen, die sind .. läuft für die gut.. und.. für die Demokratie eben nicht so, weil.. schlimmstes Beispiel USA, man eben auch mit der Demokratie zeigt, dass es auch Nachteile hat	So the Chinese or Singapurian or Vietnamese, Saudia Arabia, VAE, we can talk about all of them, they are... it's going well for them.. and.. for the democracy not, because.. worst example USA, it shows that a democracy also has disadvantages.
9	Also das halt nicht ein einziges Land zB Tansania sonder der SADC Raum Verhandlungen aufnimmt.	So, that not only a single state like Tanzania is initiating negotiation, but the whole SADC region.
10	Diesen Vorteil, wenn man das als Vorteil verstehen will, haben die Chinesen und sollen ihn auch behalten	This advantage, if we want to understand it as an advantage, is held by the Chinese and they should keep it.

**Appendix C - Interview 3, conducted on 20<sup>th</sup> of May 2019 in Berlin**

<b>Number</b>	<b>German</b>	<b>English</b>
1	Und wenn chinesische Unternehmen schaffen sollten in der sich herausbildenden Digitalwirtschaft in Afrika zu platzieren, dann hätten halt europäische und deutsche Unternehmen wahrscheinlich große Probleme da noch einen Fuß in die Tür zu bekommen.	And if Chinese companies were to succeed in positioning themselves in the emerging digital economy in Africa, then European and German companies would probably have big problems getting their foot in the door.
2	Und dann gibt es ich ne dritte Dimension an Investments.. sind politische Investments also dass man einfach beispielsweise der AU Headquarter in Addis Abeba baut äh inklusive der digitalpolitischen Infrastruktur wo ja jetzt kürzlich erst rausgekommen ist dass dort permanent eben abgehört wird, Stichwort Huawei.	And then there is a third dimension of investments.. are political investments so that one simply builds, for example, the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa äh including the digital political infrastructure where just recently came out that it is constantly being monitored, keyword Huawei.
3	Erstens ich glaube wir erleben in einer gewissen Art und Weise eine Globalisierung von Afrika	First, I believe that we are experiencing a kind of globalization of Africa.
4	Das BMZ, soweit ich das einschätzen kann, ist halt nicht eingebunden in eine größere außenpolitische Strategie	As far as I can tell, the BMZ is not involved in a larger foreign policy strategy
5	Aber das ist per se noch keine außenpolitische Strategie und es gibt nicht wirklich ne Vorstellung davon wie eine positive Kooperation zwischen Europa und Afrika aussieht	But that is not a foreign policy strategy per se and there is not really any idea of how a positive cooperation between Europe and Africa looks like.
6	Äh und auch noch nicht so richtig eingesickert ist, dass alleine aufgrund des Bevölkerungswachstums Afrika ein gewichtigerer Faktor in der Welt werden wird.	Äh and also what not really became clear is that alone due to the population growth Africa will become a weightier factor in the world.

Number	German	English
7	<p>Also dass man halt sagt „wir sprechen mit euch nicht im Sinne von Entwicklungshilfe, sondern Investment“ und mehr so auf Augenhöhe und ich kann mir sehr gut vorstellen, dass das bei afrikanischen Staaten sehr gut ankommt.</p>	<p>So that one just says „we do not talk to you in the sense of development aid, but investment“ and more at one level and I can imagine that this arrives very well in African countries.</p>
8	<p>Äh, es wird halt dann schwierig wenn beispielsweise die Infrastruktur von schlechter Qualität ist, es wird dann ein problem wenn die afrikanischen Staaten ihre Kredite nicht zurückzahlen können und in eine Verschuldungsspirale rutschen, was ja ein Riesen Problem ist</p>	<p>Äh, it becomes difficult if, for example, the infrastructure is of poor quality. It will be a problem if African countries can not repay their loans and fall into the debt trap, which is a huge problem.</p>
9	<p>Und es wird ein Problem wenn mit dem Geben von finanziellen Krediten politische Ordnungsmodelle mit einhergehen die halt westliche Ordnungsmodellen, westlichen Werten und Interessen zuwider laufen. Dann wird es halt zu einem Problem. Und ich glaube auch die halt teilweise afrikanische Ordnungsmodellen zuwider laufen.</p>	<p>And it will be a problem if the granting of financial loans is accompanied by political models that are averse to Western models of order, Western values and interests. Then it becomes a problem. And I also believe that they partially are averse to African models.</p>
10	<p>Beispielsweise im Rahmen des Pariser Clubs versucht man sich darum zu kümmern</p>	<p>For example, within the framework of the Paris Club, one tries to take care of this.</p>
11	<p>Dieser enorme Bedarf an Infrastruktur und die rapide Urbanisierung, da gibt es einfach einen enorm großen Bedarf und all diese Infrastruktur und die Städtebaulichen Maßnahmen müssen halt komplett grün sein, ansonsten werden wir die Pariser Klimaziele nicht erreichen, und da hat natürlich die deutsche Industrie was anzubieten, im Sinne von Know How, im Sinne von Expertise.</p>	<p>This huge need for infrastructure and rapid urbanization, there is simply an enormous need and all this infrastructure and the urban development must be completely green, otherwise we will not reach the Paris climate goals, and of course the German industry has something to offer, in the sense of know-how, in terms of expertise.</p>

Number	German	English
12	<p>Also ich glaube, ich hatte ja gesagt dass wir so die Globalisierung Afrikas erleben und dass sich dort dann chinesische Unternehmen breitmachen und zu Platzhirschen werden dass ist irgendwie part of the game, das ist per se nicht schlimm, wenn sich halt alle an die Spielregeln halten</p>	<p>So I think, I said that we are experiencing the globalization of Africa, and that Chinese companies are spreading and becoming top dogs is somehow part of the game, that's not bad per se, if all stick to the rules of the game.</p>
13	<p>Aber ich glaube Großbritannien, auch einfach vor dem Hintergrund des Brexits, und vor dem Hintergrund dass Großbritannien halt einfach neue Märkte erschließen muss um die heimische Wirtschaft zu erhalten, investiert halt politisch enorm viel in Afrika.</p>	<p>But I believe the UK, also in the light of Brexit, and given the fact that the UK needs to open up new markets to maintain the domestic economy, invests a lot politically in Africa.</p>
14	<p>Es sind immer mehr Player vor Ort und äh Natürlich gibt es auch in der internationalen Politik das Phänomen, dass niemand zu spät zur Party kommen will.</p>	<p>There are more and more players on the ground and of course the phenomenon that no one wants to be late for the party is also existing in international politics.</p>
15	<p>Und was aus vielen afrikanischen Staaten deutschen Gesprächspartnern vermittelt wird ist „wir brauchen.. also.. werdet nicht chinesischer, wir brauche nicht noch mehr China-inspired Ansätze hier in Afrika“, sondern „Wir sind sehr froh, dass es halt auch Systemalternativen gibt“.</p>	<p>And what is conveyed to German interlocutors from many African countries is „we need... so... do not become more Chinese, we do not need more China-inspired approaches here in Africa“, but „We are very glad that there are also system alternatives“.</p>
16	<p>Ich glaube, dass sich das deutsche Afrika Engagement verstärken wird, dass ist echt kein Zufall, dass die Kanzlerin in letzter Zeit so häufig nach Afrika reist und sich hat vollkommen recht wenn sie sagt, dass das europäische Schicksal mit dem afrikanischen Schicksal verbunden ist.</p>	<p>I believe that the German engagement in Africa will intensify, it is no coincidence that the Chancellor has been traveling to Africa so often lately and is absolutely right when she says that the European destiny is linked to the African destiny.</p>

Number	German	English
17	<p>Und so wie China mit OBOR und mit Eurasien eine Vorstellung entwickelt hat wie man zu wirtschaftlicher und politischer Integration zwischen Europa und Asien beitragen kann, muss Europa eine Vorstellung von Eurafrika entwickeln.</p>	<p>And just as China has developed a vision with OBOR and Eurasia on how to contribute to economic and political integration between Europe and Asia, so does Europe need to develop a vision of Eurafrika.</p>

**Appendix D - Interview 5, conducted on 26<sup>th</sup> of March 2019 via Skype**

<b>Number</b>	<b>German</b>	<b>English</b>
1	Also da sehe ich jetzt aber auch nicht die deutsche Regierung in der Pflicht, die Bedingungen da zu verbessern. Das geht mir, also das würde mir dann ein bisschen zu weit gehen.	But I do not think that the German government has any obligation to improve the conditions there. That would go a bit too far.
2	Also das Interesse der chinesischen Regierung ist immer der Machterhalt der kommunistischen Partei und das ist auch das was viel von dem chinesischen Engagement in Afrika motiviert	So the interest of the Chinese government is always the maintenance of power of the communist party and that is also what motivates much of the Chinese engagement in Africa
3	Äh und dann muss man aber schauen, was China macht und nur weil das Investment heißt oder von Investment gesprochen wird, von der chinesischen Regierung heißt das noch lange nicht das alles privatwirtschaftliche Investitionen sind.	Äh, and then you have to look at what China is doing and just because it's called investment, or the Chinese government is calling it investment does not mean it's all private investment.
4	Also ich würde den Begriff nicht verwenden, weil er aus der chinesischen Propaganda kommt.	So I would not use the term because it comes from Chinese propaganda.
5	Also da gibt es so eine Komplementarität würde ich sagen und wer da jetzt von chinesischem Engagement wie profitiert, das kommt dann halt auf den Einzelfall an.	So there is such a complementarity I would say and who now benefits from Chinese engagement how, that depends on the individual case.
6	Und ich denke dass das ein sehr sehr einseitiger Fokus ist äh und tatsächlich auch wenn man das so einseitig sieht nicht sehr, ja, wirkungsvoll ist.	And I think that this is a very one-sided focus äh and indeed, even if one sees it so one-sided it is not very.. effective.
7	Die deutsche Unternehmen haben sich die letzten 60 jahren nicht dafür interessiert und warum sollten sie das jetzt plötzlich tun, nur weil es jetzt chinesische Unternehm gibt die da was machen.	German companies have not been interested in the past 60 years and why should they suddenly do so, now just because there are Chinese companies doing something.

Number	German	English
8	Also die erste Reise des Außenministers jedes Jahr führt immer auf den afrikanischen Kontinent.	So the Foreign Minister's first trip every years always leads to the African continent.
9	Ja also ich glaube es wird in der deutschen Regierung darüber nachgedacht wie man mit chinesischen Akteuren zusammen arbeiten kann	I think the German government is thinking about how to work with Chinese actors.
10	Ich glaube da muss sich die Regierung in einen produktiven Dialog einsteigt und sich da jetzt einseitig auf China zu fokussieren, weil das vielleicht ind er Debatte prominent auftaucht ist nicht so sinnvoll.	I believe that the government has to enter into a productive dialogue and focus now unilaterally on China, because perhaps the debate emerges prominently, is not useful.

**Appendix E - Interview 6, conducted on 14<sup>th</sup> of June via Skype**

Number	German	English
1	<p>Also klassisch einfach völlig katastrophale Abstimmung und Koordination zwischen den verschiedenen donors. Und de facto wird halt die chinesische Eisenbahn überhaupt nicht verwendet da. Also da gibt es sehr sehr viele Beispiel, in kleineren Projekten, aber auch in den großen Infrastrukturprojekte wo einfach total gegeneinander gearbeitet wird im Prinzip. Äh.. und es ist auch durchaus schwierig, also die.. die .. ja.. also in einer perfekten Welt wäre es so, dass es eine starke Koordination geben würde zwischen den donors und eine starke Abstimmung, so sollte es eigentlich sein,</p>	<p>So, a completely catastrophic reconciliation and coordination between the different donors. And the Chinese railway gets de facto not used at all. So, there are very many examples, in smaller projects, but also in large infrastructure projects where they simply work against each other in principle. In a perfect world it would be that there is a strong coordination between the donors and a strong reconciliation.</p>
2	<p>Der Sudan beispielsweise war eines der der Länder mit mit Ölresourcen, mit zum Teil auch qualitativ hochwertigen Ölresourcen, die als Markt noch verfügbar waren weil sich eben europäische Firmen zum Beispiel da relativ rausgehalten haben durch diesen normativen Bezug der EU Außenpolitik oder der Außenpolitik der Mitgliedsstaaten, deswegen hatte man dort eben winds of opportunity.</p>	<p>Sudan, fir example, was one of the last countries with oil reserves, some with high-quality oil resources, that were still available as a market because, for example, European companies have kept relatively absent there because of there normative aspect of EU foreign policy and the foreign policy of the member states, so that's why China had winds of opportunity there.</p>
3	<p>Und das ist gleichzeitig aber auch die einzige Chance von China, also es gibt, wenn sie sich anschauendem teil in Lateinamerika zum Beispiel oder andere Märkte, Europa natürlich äh, ist es für China dort oftmals im Bezug auf Ressourcen sehr sehr schwierig Fuß zu fassen, weil der Markt dominiert ist von amerikanischen und Europäischen Unternehmen</p>	<p>And that's basically China's only chance at the same time, so, of course, take a look at Latin America, for example, or other markets, Europe for example, it's very difficult for China to get into the markets in terms of resources because the market is dominated by American and European companies.</p>

Number	German	English
4	Aber man denkt eben eher aus chinesischer Perspektive, würde ich sagen, in deutlich längeren Horizonten als es möglicherweise westliche donors in Afrika tun.	But, from the Chinese perspective thinks in much larger horizons than Western donors possibly do in Africa.
5	Und für manche Staaten sind die Auslandsschulden schon 2/3 chinesische Auslandsschulden.	And for some states, their foreign debt is already 2/3 Chinese foreign debt.
6	Also man orientiert sich sehr sehr stark an Frankreich. an USA möglicherweise, also man orientiert sich innerhalb seiner donor community die sich da abstimmt, und ich glaube China ist da .. also wird Deutschland nicht so sehr als strategischer Referenzpunkt wahrgenommen.	So the interests are very strongly oriented towards France. Maybe towards USA. So one does orientate himself within its donor community and I think China... so Germany is not so much perceived as a strategic point of reference.
7	Weil die eben ne andere Sicht haben, die sehen das halt als wachsenden Markt. Und in Deutschland sieht man das eher als potenziellen Herkunftsort von Migranten.	Because they have a different view, they see it as a growing market. And Germany sees it more as a potential place of origin of migrants
8	Innerhalb der Bundesregierung auch würde ich sagen, die sehr sehr stark bilateral orientiert sind auch würde ich sagen und auch sehr sehr stark rückwärtsgewandt würde ich jetzt einfach auch mal sagen sind.	Also within the federal government I would say that they are very very strongly bilaterally oriented and I would even say very strong backward-looking.
9	Ich will da ein Beispiel nennen, wieder Verbindung von Mombasa nach Nairobi, die Chinesen haben jetzt diese Eisenbahnlinie gebaut, und die Amerikaner bauen momentan gleichzeitig nen Highway runter, wähen die Europäer die bestehende Straße sanieren	I want to give you an example. Again the connection from Mombasa to Nairobi. The Chinese have built a railway, and the Americans are currently building a highway while, at the same time, the Europeans are renovating the existent road.