

The (Ab)use of Power

An analysis of the emergence of a hybrid regime

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Abstract

The last decade several democracies throughout the world have been disrupted. On numerous occasions the incumbent leader has taken undemocratic measures, making the democracy shift from a democracy toward a hybrid regime. In this research, three key studies into regime changes and democratic disruptions have been examined to gain an understanding of the emergence of hybrid regimes. The shift toward a hybrid regime is a gradual process in which repression of citizens is increased over time, but where constitutional changes made to the democratic system define the shift. Several factors contribute to the possibility of a hybrid regime emerging. A weak democracy must be in place, which defines as is a democracy with a polarized society, high level of income inequality and an unstable constitution. The crucial factor making a democracy change in a hybrid regime is the presence of a populist leader. An incumbent populist leader can take undemocratic measures whilst still being supported by citizens, due to the use of populist discourse. Most significantly, even when the populist leader does not truly act on behalf of the citizens, he still manages to gauge their support.

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Introduction

Several democracies across the world have been under threat the past years. Clear examples are the Maldives, Venezuela, Cambodia, Turkey, Poland and Hungary (Zakaria, 2019). These countries all have one thing in common; the incumbent has been harming the existing democracy the most. In 2013, Maduro unconstitutionally took the power in Venezuela, thereafter diminishing the power of the parliament (Watts, 2017). A similar event occurred on the Maldives in 2018, in which President Yameen abolished the checks and balances through shutting down the Supreme court and the parliament (Brewster, 2018). Alongside this, also in Europe undemocratic tendencies have emerged. For the last decade, the leaders in Turkey, Poland as well as Hungary have taken various measures to increase their power and diminish the influence of the democratic bodies (Matuszewska, 2019).

Both media and scholars have pointed out that in these countries the democracy has been disrupted by the incumbent leader. However, an overarching theory on how and why the democracies are deteriorated by the incumbent fails to exist, despite the extreme relevance of the topic (Selcuk & Arraras, 2018; Weiffen, 2012; Cameron, 1998; Levitsky & Way, 2002). I will research the breakdown of democracies by examining the causes of these democratic disruptions from multiple angles. This thesis will do so by first reviewing relevant literature and by exploring the gaps that exist in the field of research. Thereafter, I conduct a theoretical analysis of three articles into the field of democracies and non-democracies, regime changes and constitutions to get an understanding of democratic systems and the weakening thereof. Moreover, I will use the theories and models of these articles to explore a new theory on the change of a democratic regime.

Literature review

A broadly accepted conception of democracy is the definition of Schumpeter. Accordingly, a democracy can be defined as a specific institutional arrangement for making political decisions, in which individual people are granted the power to make decisions based upon the votes of people. Importantly, the competition for power is based upon free voting. In order to achieve this, a certain legal and moral principles and freedom of press should be in place within the community (Schumpeter, 1975). Hereby, Schumpeter makes democracy about free and contested elections, in which a ruler will step down if he loses elections (Przeworski, 2000).

A dictatorship contrasts with a democracy on numerous aspects. Within a dictatorship, the decision making process is less transparent than in a democracy. Crucial is the lack of fair and free elections and centralized power in a dictatorship. Importantly, dictatorships can have various dimensions of control and power of the leader (Cheihub et al., 2010). Wintrobe (1990) has made the classification between a tin-pot dictator and totalitarian dictator, which is based on the trade-off between power and repression. A tin-pot dictator tries to stay in power at the lowest costs, while a totalitarian dictator wants to maximize its power and thereby use a maximum of repression (Wintrobe, 1990). Interestingly, various regimes considered as dictatorships are holding elections; holding elections does not make a system necessarily democratic (Knutsen et al., 2017; Gandhi & Przeworski, 2007; Levitsky & Way, 2002). Levitsky and Way (2002) state that sometimes the existing democratic institutions are in place to get and keep authority. Related, Gandhi and Przeworski (2007) argue that if a dictatorship holds elections, these elections are always controlled.

Thus, not all regimes that hold elections can be defined as democratic. Namely, despite the elections these regimes systematically fail to have free and fair elections, and lack political rights and civil liberties for its citizens. Various scholars have classified regimes that both hold characteristics of a democracy as well as a dictatorship as an illiberal democracy (Zakaria, 1997; Buzogány, 2017). Zakaria has argued that although democracy and liberal rights go hand in hand in western democracies, various democracies across the world do not share the civil liberal values of western democracies. In these countries, civil rights of citizens are heavily violated (Zakaria, 1997). This approach has been followed by several authors (Smith & Siegler, 2008; Wigell, 2008; Bugozany, 2017). Levitsky and Way, on the other hand, argue that literature on illiberal democracy has been biased by the idea of

democratization. Accordingly, several regimes have been stable autocratic regimes while having democratic characteristics; they do not appear to move towards a democracy. Instead, they define this specific in-between regime type as competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky & Way, 2002). (Levitsky & Way, 2002). Zakaria indeed believes illiberal democracies have occurred from a democratization wave, but contemporary authors do state a country can remain stuck in illiberal democracy, although the durability is debated (Knutsen & Nygard, 2015; Buzogány, 2017; Zakaria, 1997). All in all, it appears various forms of in-between regimes exist, that may all have their own set of characteristics. However, consensus exist on that these regime types can be explained as being a form of hybrid regime. Typologies are created to still understand the differences between the various forms. In line with the definition of Schumpeter of democracies, various scholars have created a typology on free and fair elections (Wigell, 2008; Wintrobe, 2018; Smith & Ziegler, 2008).

Several scholars have written about the transition of regimes. In the end of the 20th century, various democracies appeared to have failed and changed into less democratic regimes. The overall argument is that mainly newly existing democracies have eventually failed; democracies founded after 1960s have often not succeeded (Newman, 2011; Levitsky & Murillo, 2013; Kapstein & Converse, 2008; Lust & Waldner, 2015). The failing of democracies is often characterized as ‘democratic backsliding’, which is the gradual process of the weakening of democratic institutions, possibly leading to a complete breakdown of the democracy. Specifically, several scholars argue that if democratic backsliding happens, the electoral competition, civil liberties and accountability of leaders is gradually diminishing (Lust & Waldner, 2015; Bermeo, 2016; Svobik, 2018).

Weak institutions are pointed out as a reason for democratic backsliding as well as a result of the process. In weak institutions, uncertainty exists on the rules and settings of the institutions. This gives agents the possibility to deviate from the set rules. While classical political theories have argued that created institutions are automatically strong, recent literature states that they are mostly weak at the point of creation and that it takes time to improve and stabilize them (Kapstein & Converse, 2008; Levitsky & Murillo, 2013). Another debate regarding institutions is the preference for either a presidential or parliamentary system. It remains unclear what the most stable system may be; researches contradict each other. Some authors argue that in unstable democracies a presidential system would grant too much power to the leader, leading to democratic backsliding. Other researches state that a presidential system is more durable as it is better in dealing with crises, thereby prevents

democratic backsliding (Kapstein & Converse, 2008; Bjornskov & Voigt, 2018; Stepan & Skack, 1993; Newman, 2011; Knutsen & Nygard, 2015).

Another identified reason for democratic backsliding is the polarization of a society. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) argue that having a strong middle class is crucial for preventing repression by the government. However, in a polarized society this middle class is not as strong. Svobik (2018) has later stated that if a society is polarized, leaders can manipulate democratic processes. Citizens are willing to vote for their preferred leader, even if this leader shows undemocratic behavior. Citizens are presented a trade-off, and they may prefer their leader over free and fair elections; even though these values are recognized by citizens (Svobik, 2018). Nalepa et al. (2018) add a nuance to this argument, arguing that chosen leaders may not directly engage in authoritarian practices. Instead, they initiate various institutional reforms that eventually lead to a more authoritarian regime. This gradual process of change may make it difficult for citizen to recognize the diminishing electoral competition, accountability and civil liberties within the country. Accordingly, only after the leader is in place, his autocratic tendencies become clearly visible (Nalepa et al., 2018). The idea of polarization is linked to the concept of civil society (Nalepa et al., 2018; Svobik, 2018; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; Wintrobe, 2018). If a society is well organized, there is a constant pressure on the incumbent to act democratically. Related, repression of citizens becomes more difficult as well. Moreover, without a strong civil society the accountability of the leaders is less high; they are not constantly checked (Lust & Waldner, 2015; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006). These points can be brought back to the theory of Nalepa et al. (2018); the citizens may not fully grasp the actions of the leader.

Not only polarization explains the possibility for repression, recently Wintrobe has explained the type of leadership of the incumbent ruler is influential as well (Wintrobe, 2018).

Wintrobe has expanded his theory on power in a dictatorship by looking at increasing power for the leader in a democracy. Wintrobe argues that if a democracy has a strong leader, repression may not decrease the level loyalty of the citizens heavily, which makes it possible for the leader to increase his power (Wintrobe, 2018). His theory can be drawn back to political theories on power in democracies. In 1971, Dahl already argued that the level of power depends on the costs of tolerating as well as on the costs of repression (Dahl, 1971). Various scholars have built upon the theory of Dahl (Berenskoetter, 2007). However, power theories specifically linking to hybrid regimes have not been thoroughly researched before.

The research into democratic backsliding focused on gradual changes weakening a democracy. However, they do explore the possibility of an abrupt change that breaks down the existing constitution (Nalepa et al., 2018; Svobik, 2018; Wintrobe, 2018). A coup can abruptly demolish existing democracies. A coup involves a small group of people trying to remove the establishment and is likely to occur in highly unequal societies is the consensus among researchers (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; Kirshin & Voigt, 2006; Grossman, 1999). A commonly discussed coup is a military coup, in which the executive authority is removed by the military by use of force or the threat thereof (Svobik, 2018; Marinov & Goemans, 2013; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2016).

Another type of coup is a self-coup. A self-coup is defined as a democratically elected leader that dissolves the existing democracy to take more power, by suspending the constitution (Cameron;1998; Weiffen, 2012; Bermeo, 2016). A studied example is the self-coup in Peru of Alberto Fujimori in 1992. In addition, the dissolving of the parliament and suspending of the Supreme Court in Russia by Boris Yeltsin in 1993 is characterized as a self-coup. Specific case studies have been performed to understand these self-coups, but no overarching theory has been conducted (Mauceri, 1995; Cameron, 1998; Bermeo, 2016; Levitsky & Way, 2002). Bermeo argues that self-coups have been in decline in the 21th century, instead he argues contemporary regime changes organized by the incumbent can better be called executive aggrandizement instead of executive coup. Namely, as the process has taken longer; democratic institutions have been weakened one by one (Bermeo, 2016). Overall, regardless of being defined as a self-coup, the tendency of incumbent leaders disrupting the democratic systems of states is clearly recognized the last decade. Contemporary examples are found in Asia in Cambodia and the Maledives; the media has defined the democratic crises as self-coups. For example, in Cambodia the incumbent claimed all seats in the bicameral parliament after pretend elections (Morgenbesser, 2019; Brewster, 2018). Also, democracies in Europe as in Poland, Turkey and Hungary have been disrupted by the incumbent leader (Selcuk & Arraras, 2018; Buzogány, 2017). Moreover, importantly, multiple democracies in Latin America have been threatened various times for decades. Recently, Venezuela is a striking example, in which elections have been postponed indefinitely by the incumbent (Watts, 2017; Levitsky & Murillo, 2017). Despite, the topic of incumbent leaders deteriorating democracies has not been researched thoroughly, neither in the previous century or recently.

Contributions of this research

Given that various democracies all over the world have been deteriorated and changed into a hybrid regime the last decade, it is crucial to understand how and why this happens. The literature review has indicated that democratic backsliding and self-coups are newly researched topics. Via the process of democratic backsliding a democracy is weakened and slowly changes into a more hybrid regime that holds both criteria of a dictatorship as well as a democracy. Weak civil society, weak institutions and polarization are identified as factors enhancing democratic backsliding. Importantly, several angles are not thoroughly researched yet. For example, while previous research focuses on societal tendencies, the influence of the incumbent leader on the disruption of a democracy has been mainly neglected. Moreover, research into democratic backsliding neglects the possibility of an abrupt regime change as well; the possibility of a self-coup. No critical moments fundamental to the disruption of a democracy are identified. However, as explored in the literature review, clear examples exist in which a key situation defined the deteriorating of democracies. The change of democratic formal institutions has indicated the disruption of democracies in various cases, as in Cambodia and Hungary. Importantly, in various cases the incumbent leader plays a crucial role. Examples exist of the incumbent changing a democratic system. This can possibly be defined as a self-coup; a clear example of a self-coup is the self-coup of President Fujimori in Peru in 1992. Newly deteriorated democracies by the incumbent show clear similarities with this self-coup of President Fujimori. However, as stated self-coups have not been thoroughly researched. Moreover, the role of the leader in the disruption of a democracy should be further researched. Also, which formal institutions change and how they change during the disruption of a democracy should be explored. Importantly, the societal tendencies that are put forward in studies into democratic backsliding should not be neglected in this research and should be further explored.

All in all, this research will try to contribute to the existing literature on regime changes by exploring factors contributing to the disruption of a democracy as well as identifying the crucial moments that explain a change towards a hybrid regime. Moreover, this research thoroughly examines the role of the incumbent in relation to the democratic backsliding. To understand the disruption of a democracy and regime changes better, I will answer the following research question:

‘What are the factors leading to a shift towards a hybrid regime?’

To answer this question, three academic articles will be examined in detail and critically discussed. By examining these articles I will get an understanding of various models and theories around the topic of regime changes and democratic backsliding. These models and theories both complement and contradict each other, making it valuable to explore them thoroughly. Importantly, in the analyses as well as in the own contribution these articles are compared and contrasted in order for me to combine aspects from the various models to create a new theoretical angle relevant for regime changes, democratic backsliding and self-coups.

First, Acemoglu and Robinson create a model in 'Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy', in which the shift from a democracy to a non-democracy is explained. Various chapters give a valuable insight in the factors leading to the abrupt disruption of a democracy. Second, the article of Wintrobe 'An economic theory of a hybrid regime' explores the process of democratic backsliding and the change toward a hybrid regime. Importantly, he included both the role of the citizens as well as of the leader. Lastly, the article 'Populism and Constitutional Reform in Latin American and the Caribbean' of Saenz de Vitieri Vazquez and Bjornskov empirically researches the relation between leaders and constitutional changes. Researching constitutional changes gives an insight in the institutional changes during a period of democratic backsliding.

Analysis

Acemoglu, D., Robinson, J. (2006). *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*.

To get an understanding of the mechanisms involved in an abrupt regime change from a democracy to a non-democracy, the analysis section will start with an analysis of chapters of Acemoglu and Robinson from 'Economic Origins of Dictatorship that focus on the change from a democracy to a non-democracy.

Summary

Acemoglu and Robinson have created a model that mathematically shows how a democracy can change into a non-democratic regime due to a coup. The model depicts which factors affect the likelihood a coup is staged in a society. The authors have derived thresholds from their model that determine under which circumstances a coup is staged. In these thresholds, inequality, but also the costs of coups as well as tax rates are considered. Before exploring the model and specifically these thresholds, I will examine the assumptions of the model.

Firstly, the authors divide society into two groups with two types of income. Society exists of the elite and the citizens, in which the elite are rich and the citizens are poor. This assumption is crucial for the model. I will use the term 'masses' for the citizens, for two reasons. First, 'the masses' better represents a bigger group in society with respect to the elite as a small group. Second, the elite are also citizens of a state and thus the term may be confusing. The authors assume the elite and the poor to be in constant conflict with each other, as the two groups have conflicting preferences.

The second assumption explains that the elite and the masses make decisions based on income preferences. The model revolves solely around income and income redistribution in society. Accordingly, the elite wants little redistribution while the masses want a lot of redistribution. Income redistribution is depicted by looking at the tax rates in a society. In a democracy the masses set the tax rate, while in the non-democracy the elite sets the tax rate. Important, the authors make a society with a democracy as the starting point of their model. A non-democracy will only occur if a coup is staged to abolish the existing democracy. The elite will stage a coup if their income after a coup is executed is higher than their income in a democracy. Overall, Acemoglu and Robinson model the likelihood of coups

by looking at the incentives of the elite to reduce distribution, considering the costs of a coup. Note that only the elite can stage a coup. Another important assumption that is made by considering the coups is that although coups are often undertaken by the military of a country, the military is representing the elite. Namely, the elite has the resources to control the military¹.

Third, the authors assume the tax rate is proportional. Note that in the case of a progressive system, the influence of a tax rate would be even greater. Namely, in a progressive system the high-earners pay the highest tax rate. With a progressive system the post-tax income of the elite in a democracy would be lower than with a proportional system, making it even more likely that the elite will stage a coup.

Fourth, the authors assume all individuals maximize their utility, meaning both the elite and the masses try to maximize their utility². This assumption is crucial for setting the thresholds. If utilities are not maximized, this will have various implications. If considering that the masses do not maximize their utility, a lower tax rate is possibly set by the masses, as they would be satisfied with less redistribution. If considering a lower utility for the elite, they would possibly be satisfied with a higher tax rate set by the masses. Therefore, a coup is less likely to be staged. Overall, it would imply that the conflict between the two groups is less harsh; both groups are more willing to accept the other groups demands, this means a coup is less likely to happen.

Summarizing the main thesis of the authors, they argue in a democracy the elite will stage a coup and create a non-democracy if the redistribution in the current society is high and the costs of a coup are low. Namely, Acemoglu and Robinson model the likelihood of coups by

¹ Statistics show that coups destroying a democracy have indeed mainly been military coups. In Latin America over hundred military coups have appeared in the period until 1980 (Fossum, 1967; Perez-Linan & Polga-Hecimovich, 2017). Also on other continents military coups have occurred; in Africa and the Middle East various military coups happened throughout the last century. In literature on coups, other groups staging a coup besides the military have hardly been mentioned (Hiroi & Omori, 2013; Marinov & Goemans, 2014; Newman, 2011).

² Acemoglu and Robinson argue this tax rate is set by the masses based upon the median voter theory. Each individual has its own preference. The median vote is the vote of the individual under which the same amount of people prefer a rate lower than tax rate τ and higher than τ . The outcome of majority voting will always be this middle point M . Namely, although all individuals have single preferences, a collective decision needs to be made. People who want a q lower than M will never reunite with people who want q to be higher than M . These subgroups are balanced into point M . However, the authors state people strive for maximum utility and all the masses all share one income, implying they all have the same preference τ . The median voter theory is thus irrelevant in this case.

looking at the possibility of the elite to create a non-democracy and thereby reduce redistribution, considering certain costs of coups. The authors argue that in a democracy, the masses set redistributive policies that are unfavorable to the elite. Importantly, especially in a society with high inequality, the set policies are highly unfavorable to the elite. Inequality is explained by the share of income of the masses with respect to the elite. If inequality is high, the masses want a lot of redistribution, while the elite want very little; they have a lot to lose with high redistribution. Namely, these redistributive policies mean in practice that the elite, who are the rich, will lose a large part of their income to the masses. Note that the authors argue that states not automatically remain in a certain regime type once it is established, instead states may go back and forth between regimes endlessly. This is not examined in their model. In the model, the authors derive a point where the elite is indifferent between staging a coup and keeping the democracy. This point is the threshold that shows under which circumstances a coup is or is not staged. The next section will analyze the mechanics of the model as well as of the threshold.

Analysis

The authors start with presenting a budget constraint of the government, which shows the maximum amount of redistribution in society given a certain tax rate. This budget constraint consists of the government's income given a tax rate. The budget constraint is derived the following. First, the overall societal income is considered an important variable, this is depicted as y . Each individual also has its own income, which is y^i . Since each society has a number of citizens n , the average income in society (\bar{y}) is explained as $\bar{y} = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n y^i$.

Namely, \bar{y} portrays the average income of all aggregate individuals y^i divided by the total numbers of individuals in a society n .

As previously stated, tax rates (τ) are crucial for redistribution. Acemoglu and Robinson consider that taxes come with benefits as well as distortions. The benefit of taxes is the accumulated tax income of the state. These tax earnings are assumed to be redistributed equally among all citizens of society. Importantly, each individual pays the same tax rate τ but has another income y^i . The benefits of taxes can thus be explained as τy^i . The distortions explain the costs that occur when taxes are collected. Accordingly, a loss to the economy will always exist when taxes are created; these costs are deadweight costs. An example of these

distortions are the incentive to work; an increase in taxes leads to a lower incentive to work. These deadweight costs are depicted by the authors as aggregate costs of taxes $C(\tau)n\bar{y}$, which is the costs C times tax rate τ . The authors state $n\bar{y}$ is only included for normalization. Namely, they assume that if $n\bar{y}$ increases or decrease, the costs of taxation will increase or decrease respectively as well.

The benefits and distortions lead to a certain amount being redistributed in society, which is equal to the government's budget constraint. This amount being redistributed is defined as lump sum transfer T , which is equal to the benefits and distortions given a certain tax rate τ . The lump sum transfer T is a transfer given to each individual in a society.

$$T = \frac{1}{n} (\sum_{i=1}^n \tau y^i - C(\tau)n\bar{y}) = (\tau - C(\tau))\bar{y} \quad (1)$$

As previously explained, Acemoglu and Robinson assume that all individuals in a society try to maximize their utility. They maximize their utility given the existing budget constraint. Since the authors only care about income, their highest utility is reached when their income is maximized. Thus an individual's utility is the income of an individual given a tax rate $V(y^i | \tau)$. Hence, the utility function of an individual is equal to the post-tax income of an individual, that is depicted as \hat{y}^i . The post-tax income \hat{y}^i consists of the income after taxes and the lump sum transfer given to the individual.

$$V(y^i | \tau) = \hat{y}^i = (1 - \tau) y^i + (\tau - C(\tau))\bar{y} \quad (2)$$

The authors have divided society in two groups; the elite and the masses. Also, only two types of income exist in their model. Individuals within the group of the elite have an income y^r , which stands for income of the rich. Individuals coming from the masses have an income y^p , which is income of the poor. The whole society is normalized to one, and the fraction of rich people is depicted as δ . The fraction of poor people is $1 - \delta$. If the two incomes y^r and y^p are considered instead of y^i , the government's budget constraint is the following:

$$T = \tau ((1 - \delta) y^p + \delta y^r) - C(\tau) \bar{y} = (\tau - C(\tau)) \bar{y} \quad (3)$$

The income of the elite and the masses can be derived from the mean income \bar{y} , the level of inequality in society and the fraction of society belonging to either the elite or the masses. Inequality is depicted as θ , which is equal to the share of mean income \bar{y} belonging to the rich. Secondly δ describes the fraction of elite in society normalized to one. Thus, in an

unequal society $\theta > \delta$. Given \bar{y} , δ and θ , the income of the elite y^r and masses y^p can be calculated the following:

$$y^r = \frac{\theta \bar{y}}{\delta} \quad (4)$$

$$y^p = \frac{(1-\theta)\bar{y}}{(1-\delta)} \quad (5)$$

According to Acemoglu and Robison, both the elite and the masses have different optimal tax rates. Importantly, they argue the tax rate in a democracy (D) is determined by the masses, while the tax rate set in a non-democracy (N) is set by the elite. However, both these tax rates will influence the utility of both groups. Thus, new utility functions are established, which are derived from the previous set utility function, equation (2). The utility functions vary based on the factors y^p , y^r , (D) and (N). Thus, the following utility functions are proposed:

$$V^p (D) = V (y^p | \tau^p)$$

$$V^r (D) = V (y^r | \tau^p)$$

$$V^p (N) = V (y^p | \tau^r)$$

$$V^r (N) = V (y^r | \tau^r)$$

Notice that in the case of a democracy, the utility of the elite is based upon the tax rate of the citizens τ^p , as they set the rate in a democracy. In a non-democracy, the utility of the masses is based upon the tax rate of the elite τ^r . As a result, masses have a higher utility in a democracy while the elite has a higher utility if a non-democracy is in place. Hence: $V^p (D) > V^p (N)$ and $V^r (D) < V^r (N)$. Therefore, accordingly the masses and elites must have conflicting ideas and goals.

Although the previous paragraph explains that the utility of the elite is always higher in a non-democracy than in a democracy, accordingly the elite does not always try to destroy the democracy and stage a coup. This depends on the costs of the coup. The authors derive a general utility function that includes these costs of a coup. This function is based upon the original utility function of an individual, equation (2), but including the costs of coup. ζ represents the existence of a coup, as $\zeta = 1$ denotes a coup. $\iota (S)$ depicts the costs due to a coup in state S . Moreover, the assumptions on income preferences and taxes still hold. Thus, the function looks the following, in which \hat{y}^i again depicts the post-tax income of an individual:

$$\hat{y}^i = \zeta \iota (S) y^i + (1 - \zeta) ((1 - \tau) y^i + (\tau - C (\tau)) \bar{y}) \quad (6)$$

$C(\tau)$ represents the fraction of income lost in society due to taxes. Similarly, the costs of coups is explained by the fraction of income lost due to a coup. Note that when $\zeta = 0$, there are no costs of coup. In this case $\iota = 1$, as no fraction of income is destroyed; hence ι explains the fraction of income surviving after a coup. Thus, the value of ι is only relevant when $\zeta = 1$. Namely, in this case, \hat{y}^i is affected; a fraction of income is destroyed. The relevant costs, meaning the costs when a coup is indeed staged are modeled as $\iota = 1 - \varphi$, with $0 < \varphi < 1$. Thus φ explains the fraction of income destroyed with a coup; these are the costs of a coup.

The tax rate τ is crucial for determining whether a coup is staged. Acemoglu and Robinson assume the starting point in their model is a democracy, with tax rate $= \tau^D$. Firstly, the authors assume the masses set the tax rate in a democracy: $\tau^D = \tau^P$, in which τ^P describes the preferred tax rate of the masses. The elite can either accept or reject $\tau^D = \tau^P$, if they reject τ^D a threat for a coup occurs. Importantly, at this point, the authors do not assume the coup is directly staged. Instead, to prevent a coup from happening, the masses can make a compromise and offer another tax rate, making $\tau^D \neq \tau^P$. If the masses do not compromise, a coup is staged for sure. The masses will be worse off with $\tau^N = \tau^r$, in which τ^r depicts the tax rate of the elite. Thus, given all individuals maximize their utility, the masses set a new tax rate to try to satisfy the elite and thereby avert a coup. The promised tax rate is depicted as $\tilde{\tau}$, making $\tau^D = \tilde{\tau}$. The elite can determine whether to accept $\tilde{\tau}$, or to stage a coup. In case they stage a coup the elite can still set their own tax rate $\tau^N = \tau^r$. Acemoglu and Robinson state that the elite has two trade-offs. First, a trade-off exists between staging a coup and accepting $\tau^D = \tau^P$. Second, a trade-off exists between staging a coup and accepting $\tau^D = \tilde{\tau}$. The outcome of these trade-off, being whether the elite stages a coup or keeps the democracy, depends on the utility functions of the elite of staging a coup and not staging a coup.

First, the utility function of the elite in a democracy with $\tau^D = \tau^P$ is described the following:

$$V^r(D) = V(y^r | \tau^D = \tau^P) = y^r + \tau^P(\bar{y} - y^r) - C(\tau^P)\bar{y} \quad (7)$$

In the function, the utility of the elite is the income generated by the elite in a democracy; explained by the original income of the elite y^r plus the benefits of taxes minus the distortions of taxes for the elite. Note that the elite is a net payer of taxes, as y^r is expected to be higher than \bar{y} . Secondly, the utility function of the elite of staging a coup is determined by ι , the fraction of income surviving after a coup. As explained, $\iota = 1 - \varphi$, in which φ is the

costs of coup that is depicted as the fraction of income destroyed with a coup. The utility of the elite of a coup, considering the costs of coup is the following:

$$V^r(C, \varphi) = (1 - \varphi)y^r \quad (8)$$

Accordingly, the elite will thus stage a coup if

$$V^r(C, \varphi) > V^r(y^r | \tau^D = \tau^P) \quad (9)$$

Which is described as:

$$(1 - \varphi)y^r > y^r + (\tau^P(\bar{y} - y^r) - C(\tau^P)\bar{y}) \quad (10)$$

This explains that the fraction of income of the elite surviving after a coup needs to be higher than the post-tax income of the elite in a democracy. The authors simplify this equation by the use of equations (4) and (5) into the following. The derivation to equation (11) can be found in Appendix A.

$$\varphi < \frac{1}{\theta}(\delta C(\tau^P) - \tau^P(\delta - \theta)) \quad (11)$$

This equation shows that if the costs of a coup φ are lower than the utility of the elite in a non-democracy, a coup is staged. It is used by the authors to determine the threshold under which the elite is indifferent between staging a coup and accepting $\tau^D = \tau^P$. The threshold is depicted the following:

$$\widehat{\varphi 1} = \frac{1}{\theta}(\delta C(\tau^P) - \tau^P(\delta - \theta)) \quad (12)$$

This threshold explicates the point at which the elite is indifferent between staging a coup and staying in the democracy. If the costs of a coup are below this threshold, a coup is staged, which is written as $\varphi < \widehat{\varphi 1}$.

Secondly, the authors explore the second trade-off between staging a coup and accepting the promised tax rate $\tau^D = \tilde{\tau}$. The utility function of the elite is described the following:

$$V^r(D | \tau^D = \tilde{\tau}) = y^r + p(\tilde{\tau}(\bar{y} - y^r) - C(\tilde{\tau})\bar{y}) + (1 - p)(\tau^P(\bar{y} - y^r) - C(\tau^P)\bar{y}) \quad (13)$$

Acemoglu and Robinson have considered two possible outcomes in this utility function, hence the inclusion of probability p . p depicts the probability for the masses to implement the promised tax rate $\tilde{\tau}$. However, the authors argue that also a probability exists that the masses will keep their preferred tax rate τ^P . This is depicted by $1 - p$. The utility function of the elite to stage a coup is again described as $V^r(C, \varphi) = (1 - \varphi)y^r$. Accordingly, the elite will still stage a coup, despite the new promised tax rate $\tilde{\tau}$ if the following equation holds:

$$(1 - \varphi)y^r > y^r + p(\tilde{\tau}(\bar{y} - y^r) - C(\tilde{\tau})\bar{y}) + (1 - p)(\tau^P(\bar{y} - y^r) - C(\tau^P)\bar{y}) \quad (14)$$

Again, this equation is used to find a threshold. The first threshold $\widehat{\varphi 1}$ has explained when the elite is indifferent between staging a coup and accepting τ^P . The new threshold $\widehat{\varphi 2}$ explains when the elite is indifferent between staging a coup and accepting the promised tax rate. To determine the second threshold, the authors consider the minimum redistribution that the masses can offer to the elite. The minimum redistribution depicts $\tilde{\tau} = 0$, as the masses can offer zero redistribution at last, which occurs when the tax rate is set at zero percent. The following equation helps the authors to determine the new threshold:

$$V^r(C, \varphi) > V^r(D, \tau^D = 0) \quad (15)$$

This is described as:

$$(1 - \varphi)y^r > y^r + p(0(\bar{y} - y^r) - C(\tilde{\tau})\bar{y}) + (1 - p)(\tau^P(\bar{y} - y^r) - C(\tau^P)\bar{y}) \quad (16)$$

Similar to equation (11) this is simplified into the following equation. The derivation can again be found in Appendix A.

$$\varphi < \frac{(1-p)}{\theta} (-\tau^P \delta + \tau^P \theta + C \tau^P \delta) \quad (17)$$

The threshold that shows when the elite is indifferent between staging a coup and accepting the promised tax rate thus is depicted the following:

$$\widehat{\varphi 2} = \frac{1-p}{\theta} (\delta C(\tau^P) - \tau^P(\delta - \theta)) \quad (18)$$

This threshold can be used to determine when a coup is staged despite the offer for low redistribution. If the costs of coup are lower than the utility at the new threshold, a coup is staged. This is depicted as: $\varphi < \widehat{\varphi 2}$.

The authors examine both functions and thresholds. Firstly, one can see inequality is an important factor. If inequality increases the threshold increases, which proves the elite is more likely to stage a coup if inequality is high. Secondly, the original tax rate τ^P clearly plays a role as well. If the tax rate increases, again the threshold will increase. Intuitively this makes sense as well, as if the elite pay more taxes, they are more likely to strive for a coup. Note is that the tax rate set depends on the existing inequality. Namely, if inequality is high, the citizens require more redistribution. Surprisingly, national income is not depicted as an influential factor. Implying the overall economic situation is not an influential factor for a regime change, but only the differences in income between groups play a role.

The authors set two thresholds in their model. These thresholds are based upon the utility of the elite in the current society. At the threshold, the utility in the current society is equal to

the costs of a coup φ . The first threshold $\widehat{\varphi}1$ explains the point where the elite is indifferent between staging a coup and accepting the current tax rate. The second threshold $\widehat{\varphi}2$ is the point where the elite is indifferent between staging a coup and accepting the promised tax rate $\tilde{\tau}$ of the masses, that they offer to try to avert a coup. The first threshold is always higher or equal to the second threshold, $\widehat{\varphi}1 \geq \widehat{\varphi}2$. Intuitively this makes sense as well. Namely, when the citizens offer a compromise, it becomes more attractive to remain in a democracy. The utility in a democracy is higher and a coup is less likely to happen. Therefore, the costs of a coup need to be lower in order to still pursue a coup in this new situation. Note that equal thresholds are highly unlikely, as the probability of the masses to set the promised tax rate would be 0% and the probability of keeping $\tau^P = 100\%$.

The thresholds are crucial to understand when a coup cannot be prevented. If a coup is still attractive to the elite despite the compromise, meaning the threshold for accepting the promised rate is higher than the costs of a coup, depicted as $\varphi < \widehat{\varphi}2$, a coup cannot be prevented. In this case, the democracy is identified as unconsolidated by the authors. Interestingly, a democracy can be semi-consolidated as well. In a semi-consolidated democracy the costs of a coup are $\widehat{\varphi}2 \leq \varphi < \widehat{\varphi}1$, In this case, the probability for a coup to emerge fully depends on the promised tax rate $\tilde{\tau}$. In practice, this means that whether the elite will stage a coup depends on the policies set by the government to satisfy the elite.

Case study discussion

To apply these models to real world examples, it is crucial to consider various case studies. In Latin America several military coups were staged in the period 1945-1980 that destroyed democracies in the region. In among other countries Chile, Argentina, Columbia and Peru military coups have been staged in the Cold War period. In the cases of Latin America, the military is considered as being the elite of the country that staged a coup. They were believed to represent a conservative group that tried to hamper social and economic changes occurring in the existing regimes (Dix, 1994; Baines, 1972). This fits the model of Acemoglu and Robinson, in which the elite may stage a coup to counter policies set by the masses.

In Chile the military staged a coup in 1973, leading to a right wing dictatorship that lasted until 1990. Chile had a history of switching between civilian and military regimes. Before the

military staged the coup in 1973, a civilian regime existed in which the notion was that the military should not interfere in politics; the military itself agreed. However, when socialist sentiments emerged, the country became more polarized and eventually the military wanted to be involved again. After the coup was staged, a regime emerged that was highly repressive as well as exclusionary to certain groups in society. Importantly, the civilian highest class of society got various advantages in the regime and benefitted of the military regime (Lemmer, 1989; Loveman, 1986). Linking the events to the model of Acemoglu and Robinson, one could argue that firstly during the civilian regime the elite were to be satisfied by policymaking of the masses. However, once the masses became more socialist, possibly wanting more redistribution, the point of view of the elite changed. Staging a coup became more attractive with respect to staying in the existing regime. In the new regime, the highest classes of society were better represented than in the democracy, showing the conflict between the elite and the masses regarding regimes. It is important to note that Chile already had a history of regime switches, this may imply a semi-consolidated or unconsolidated democracy existed in the first place, making the coup more likely to occur. A similar case occurred in Argentina, in 1976 the military staged a coup after years of political and economic unrest. While the existing government was not socialist, socialist movements occurred that proclaimed to start a revolution. Goals of the coup were to create an open economy with few interference as well as to weaken the trade unions (Pozzi, 1988; Schumacher, 1984).

Interestingly, both coups were allegedly supported by the United States. Research has shown that the United States has supported coups in various countries financially and by sending military. Namely, the United States allegedly was afraid the Latin American countries would become socialist states, as Cuba (Thyne, 2010; Baines, 1972). This support has diminished the costs of coups, as the countries were supported financially as well as in the international arena. Thereby, the costs of a coup were lowered, making it more likely to happen.

Surprisingly, a left-wing coup was staged by the military in Peru in 1968, leading to a left wing dictatorship that lasted until 1975. Juan Velasco lead the coup, who came from a lower middle class family. According to the military, the country was led by the oligarchy for years. Now, the goal of the military was to destroy this elitist oligarchy, end poverty as well as to go against the dominant economic powers as the United States (Philip, 2015). In this case, the military thus not represented the elite, but instead claimed to represent the masses.

In this period of military coups, economic development was low throughout Latin America for years already. Various scholars have argued that poverty is an important factor in staging coups. Related, countries in the region that had higher levels of social mobilization suffered fewer coups. This implies that indeed inequality is an influential factor (Dix, 1994; Perez-Linan & Polga-Hecimovich, 2017). Interestingly, also per capita income is named as a factor for the many coups in Latin America, which is not directly influential in the model of Acemoglu and Robinson (Hiroi & Omori, 2013).

Wintrobe, R. (2018). An economic theory of a hybrid (competitive authoritarian or illiberal) regime.

As explored in the previous section, Acemoglu and Robinson have modeled under which circumstances a coup is staged by the elite of society. The coup changes the society from a democracy in a non-democracy. The authors do not delve into the process of regime shifting, but merely define a threshold determining when a regime change takes place. The following paper that is examined ‘An economic theory of a hybrid (competitive authoritarian or illiberal) regime’ of Wintrobe tries to explain the process of the shift from a democratic to a more non-democratic regime. Note that while Acemoglu and Robinson only discuss democracies and a non-democracies, Wintrobe specifically focuses on hybrid regimes, that are regimes in-between a democracy and a dictatorship.

Summary

Wintrobe specifically discusses hybrid regimes. He characterizes a hybrid regime as a regime that holds competitive elections which are not necessarily free and in which citizens are repressed at the same time. A hybrid regime contains elements of both a democracy and a non-democracy. Various authors have defined this ‘in-between’ regime differently, as for example a competitive-authoritarian regime or an illiberal democracy. However, Wintrobe does not distinguish between these various definitions, he argues these various explanations all come down to the idea of a hybrid regime that is in between a democracy and a dictatorship.

Wintrobe schematically shows how a hybrid regime can emerge and stay in place. By the use of graphs he helps to create an understanding of factors leading to a shift towards a hybrid regime. His main claim is that the level of loyalty and repression of citizens determines what kind of regime emerges. The level of repression and loyalty in place are determined by several factors. Importantly, Wintrobe argues that in a weak democracy a strong populist leader can increase repression and gain loyalty at the same time. Namely, by the use of extremism and an ‘us vs them’ rhetoric, the populist can appeal to the majority of the citizens. At the same time, he can repress the opposition. The graphs explore these mechanisms and will thereby show when a hybrid regime emerges. These graphs will be studied after the assumptions made by Wintrobe are examined.

Wintrobe makes various assumptions. Importantly at first, he argues that a hybrid regime can only arise from a democracy if the democracy in place is not self-enforcing. On the other hand, if a democracy is self-enforcing, it will remain a democracy and it will not transit into a hybrid regime. Accordingly, a democracy is self-enforcing if the democracy is established and can be maintained, even if all actors within the state act upon selfish interests. Wintrobe establishes several criteria for a self-enforcing democracy. Checks and balances, fair elections and income equality are important prerequisites for a self-enforcing democracy. If a hybrid regime can rise, these criteria of a self-enforcing democracy are lacking, implying there are no good checks and balances, fair elections are missing and high inequality exists. Wintrobe makes a similar argument as Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) regarding income inequality. He states that if a country has high income inequality, a share of citizens feeling disadvantaged is more likely to strive for changing government policies, making the current government more unstable. Note that Wintrobe does not explain why having good checks and balances and fair elections is crucial to a self-enforcing democracy, he rather assumes this.

Secondly, Wintrobe argues that the rise of a hybrid regime can be explained by both the 'supply' and 'demand' side of regimes. First, the supply side explains the position of the leader of a country. Wintrobe assumes a strong leader is crucial for the emergence of a hybrid regime. Wintrobe calls this strong leader a strongman or strongwoman. This paper will only use the term 'strongman'. If a state has a strong leader, this leader can appeal to people. If many citizens support the leader, he may be able to widen his power. The strong leader may have to use repression in order to increase his power. This leader is assumed to always maximize his power. If this assumption does not hold, the suitable level of repression and loyalty might not be in place, making that the leader does not have the maximum amount of power possible. Importantly, in this situation a hybrid regime can still be in place. Namely, this is also dependent on the weakness of the existing democracy as well as on societal events, as for example crises. This will be further explored in the case study discussion.

On the demand side the author places the citizens of a state that are willing to support the strongman, despite the repression that may be imposed by the leader. Wintrobe argues citizens are likely to give their support if the leader uses his repression to hurt a specific group in society that is disliked by the majority. This notion links to Nalepa et al. (2018) who specifically claim that citizens may not prefer a less democratic regime, but still want to vote for the strong leader if he represents their political sentiments. Wintrobe therefore assumes the rise of this strong leader links to populism. A populist strongman will appeal to his

citizens by creating an ‘us vs. them’ feeling. This strategy is accordingly most likely to succeed in a polarized society, as strong opposing sentiments exist. Therefore, then the leader may even be supported in using repression.

Importantly, Wintrobe assumes that a strongman can predict the steps of the opposition and counter these steps by the use of repression. This implies the leader always know what to do to counter the opposition. This is a strong assumption, therefore it is important to consider what would happen if this assumption does not hold. If the leader does not know every step of the opposition, he will not set the perfect policy considering the trade-off policy and repression. If the leader sets a policy that is too extreme and will not repress enough, the opposition may beat the strongman. However, if the leader sets a moderate extreme policy, they could possibly successfully repress the existing opposition. Linking the argument to the case of a self-coup, it is important to consider that the leader has already been democratically elected, implying he has a big group of followers. The leader may not succeed in maximizing his power right away, but over time he may find the suitable amount of repression that he is able to successfully implement. This explains why a self-coup could be a gradual process instead of an instant coup.

Analysis

Starting with the previously explained supply side, Wintrobe’s model depicted in graph 1 shows how a leader can gain power. This model is based upon the author’s earlier model on dictatorships. The Tinpot and Totalitarian equilibria express two types of dictatorships that are characterized by the level of loyalty and repression in the regime, but these equilibria are irrelevant for the current analysis. (Wintrobe, 1990). The graph illustrates the power of a leader based upon the trade-off between repression (R) and loyalty (L). The graph shows an isoquant line of power π and a loyalty curve $S(L)$. The first function explains power and is depicted by the isoquant: $\pi = f(R, L)$. As abovementioned, a strong leader always wants to maximize his power. The slope of the power curve is based upon the marginal rate of technical substitution ($MRTS$) between repression and loyalty. The $MRTS$ explains the levels of loyalty and repression given a certain output, which is the level of power π . $MRTS = \left(\frac{MPR}{MPL}\right)$, which explains that $MRTS$ is equal to the marginal rate of repression with respect to the marginal rate of loyalty. It describes the change of loyalty resulting from a change in

repression and vice versa. Without changing the output π , an increase of repression leads to a certain decrease in loyalty and vice versa. The *MRTS* curve shows the level at which loyalty and repression can be substituted amongst each other. The author makes various assumptions regarding the isoquant $\pi = f(R, L)$. Firstly, the first derivatives of repression and loyalty are positive $f_R' > 0$; $f_L' > 0$. This explains that an increase in either loyalty or repression, while keeping the other constant, always leads to an increase in power. Secondly, *MRTS* is assumed to have diminishing rates of technical substitution. If the level of loyalty is increased, the level of repression decreases. However, if loyalty is increased more, the level of repression decreases less. This is explained by $f_{RR}'' < 0$; $f_{LL}'' < 0$. Together, these assumptions make the *MRTS* always convex to the origin (Wintrobe, 1990).

Wintrobe argues graph 1, which can be found in Appendix B, is relevant for determining a dictatorship, but can be used to understand the shift from a democracy to a hybrid regime as well. To explain this, the second function $S(L)$ needs to be considered. This upward sloping curve is the supply of loyalty curve, which explains the level of loyalty of citizens given a level of repression R . The author assumes the starting point of R is very low or even zero in a democracy, but in a not self-enforcing democracy R could be raised by a strongman. Importantly, he argues that in a not self-enforcing democracy an increase in R could lead to an increase in overall power, due to only a slight decrease in loyalty L or even an increase in L . Citizens may accept repression because they are so strongly in favor of the strongman. Wintrobe uses the substitution and income effects to explain these mechanisms. The substitution effect explains that if repression R goes up, the costs of loyalty decrease; it becomes costly to not support the leader. Therefore, L also goes up. On the other hand, the income effect explains that if repression R increases, the overall costs of political engagement become higher, therefore a citizen wants to engage less in politics; hence L goes down. In the model of Wintrobe, the substitution effect is first assumed to outweigh the income effect, causing the upward slope of $S(L)$. However, if R becomes larger, the income effect increases. Thus, accordingly the substitution effect does not continuously outweigh the income effect. This can be viewed in the shape of $S(L)$, which bends backwards after a continuous increase of both R and L . Hence, at a certain point, an increase in R leads to a decrease in L .

Importantly, originally this graph depicted the trade-offs between repression and loyalty in a dictatorship. However, when Wintrobe uses the graph to explain the shift from a democracy to a hybrid regime, the slope of $S(L)$ may look slightly different. The $S(L)$ might bend

backwards faster with an increase in repression in a hybrid regime than in a dictatorship. This implies that the leader cannot increase his power towards the degree of a dictatorship. Namely, in democracy citizens do not simply have a dilemma of either supporting or not supporting the incumbent leader when R increases. Instead, they can also support another candidate. Accordingly, in this situation the substitution effect is smaller. The costs of being disloyal could decrease, implying that the costs of loyalty increase. Wintrobe explains that the model with democracy as a starting point can have several outcomes. Firstly, a stable democracy can still emerge if L declines when R increases, which means power of the leader decreases when repression is imposed. Causes of this may be strong checks and balances as well as a strong civil society. Secondly, a hybrid regime emerges if L declines if R increases, but the increase in R is greater than the decline in L . Lastly, if L rises while R rises, the power of the leader increases. On the one hand, if L only slightly rises, a hybrid regime may still occur. On the other hand, if L rises severely, a dictatorship is likely to be created as the leader can continuously increase his power. To find the equilibrium for the emergence of a hybrid regime, graph 1 needs to be combined with graph 2, which is also shown in Appendix B.

In graph 2, the demand side is explained. In this graph, the voting behavior of citizens is depicted while considering a left-right division and repression. As a starting point for his analysis Wintrobe assumes a two-party democracy without any repression. In this case, the median voter theory explains the preferences of citizens and the outcome of policies. The preferences of voters can be lined next to each other and the candidate will decide on a policy based on how he can attract the most aggregate preferences. Voters decide to vote for the candidate closest to their preferences. Thus, the equilibrium of policies is set at the median by the candidate. This equilibrium is found at point M . However, Wintrobe argues that in a not self-enforcing democracy the median voter theory cannot be applied. Instead, a populist leader could be successful, as it can be beneficial for a leader to be more extreme so he can create a polarized 'us' vs. 'them' notion. Wintrobe states that this can be both extreme left as well as extreme right. Thus the policy will not be set at point M but rather either far on the right or left of the x-axis. Moreover, the author argued that if the possibility of repression is added, the strongman can instead of appealing to all voters, repress the group who heavily goes against him. This is explained by the Policy Preference Curve (PPC) of graph 2. The PPC explains the trade-off between an extreme policy and the amount of repression required for this policy; the more extreme a policy, the more repression must be used towards the group not in favor of the policy. As previously explained the strongman knows his opposition

and the steps taken by the opposition. If a policy is very popular, the PPC curve will be flatter than if a policy is not popular. Namely, for a popular policy, fewer repression is necessary in order to implement a policy.

Wintrobe uses graph 1 and 2 to find an equilibrium for the creation of a hybrid regime. The combination of both graphs is explored in graph 3 of Appendix B, in which 3a represents graph 2 and 3b represents graph 1. The starting point of Wintrobe is again M . First, he imagines a strongman is able to raise repression to point $R1$ on graph 3a. In this case, loyalty would increase considering the explained theory on $S(L)$, which is depicted in graph 3b. Namely, in a not self-enforcing democracy when starting with zero level of repression, raising repression will raise loyalty as well at first. Thus, a situation with both higher levels of loyalty and repression would emerge, as point $1'$. However, the author states point $1'$ may not be the optimal trade-off between loyalty and repression that gives the leader the most power. Accordingly, to determine the optimal point, the left-right wing division becomes important. For the analysis Wintrobe considers right-wing extremism of a strongman, but the analysis is assumed to work the same for extreme left-wing policies. A populist strongman will decide to set an extreme policy, so he can create the 'us vs. them' feeling and point towards an outcast group. If the extreme policy is chosen, point M does not exist anymore.

To help determine the perfect policy equilibrium, the PPC curve is considered. The PPC curve determines how much repression is required for a certain policy. Repression level $R1$ corresponds with a right-wing policy at point 2. Accordingly, due to the created 'us vs. them' notion, the level of loyalty becomes even higher under repression level $R1$. Looking at the $S(L)$ curve, point $2'$ shows how much loyalty exists under repression $R1$ and policy 2. However, Wintrobe argues point 2 may still not represent the optimal trade-off between loyalty and repression. In order to find the optimal point, the $S(L)$ is considered important again. The strongman can continuously rise repression and find the corresponding policy depicted by the PPC curve. However, at a certain point, in graph 3a, the $S(L)$ bends backwards; more repression will lead to a fall in loyalty. The unique equilibrium of the hybrid regime exists due to the bending of the $S(L)$ curve. The graph shows that from point 3 onwards loyalty falls with an increase of repression. Thus, even if the leader sets the perfect policy considering the trade-off between extreme policy and repression, loyalty still falls. Behind this point, the leader will keep his level of repression at the point where he can maximize power. To find the exact equilibrium, Wintrobe considers the level of power. As

previously explained, power is determined by the isoquant $\pi = f(R, L)$. At the point of the maximum amount of power, a certain amount of repression and loyalty is in place. At point πH in graph 3b the leader has the highest amount of power possible given the possible levels of loyalty and repression. The policy and repression relating to πH are found in point E , which represents the equilibrium policy and thus shows the equilibrium of a hybrid regime.

Case study discussion

An example of the influence of loyalty on regime changes is the self-coup staged by President Fujimori in Peru in 1992. He dissolved Congress and suspended the existing constitution, and eventually implemented a new constitution in 1993. In this new constitution he overpowered the existing judicial branch and increased his power as president. This self-coup had an approval rate of 85% and in 1995 Fujimori was re-elected. Thus he made far reaching repressive changes, while keeping popularity. Explored reasons for this are the instability of the country the decades before, the disastrous economic situation and the lack of success of previous state reforms. Citizens saw the self-coup of Fujimori as the necessary way to overcome the existing problem. Important as well, no better alternative appeared to exist as the other parties were having internal problems; the opposition was scattered (Cameron, 1998; Levitsky, 2017; Mauceri, 2004; Levitsky & Cameron, 2003).

On the other hand, in Guatemala President Serrano tried to stage a similar self-coup in 1993 but he failed. He also dissolved Congress, suspended the constitution and tried to restrict the rights of citizens. However, Serrano did not have the support that Fujimori got, citizens and the media protested against the coup. In the year before the coup Serrano had threatened to limit the freedom of speech. Also, he had been criticizing the citizens by stating that they were not supportive enough of the existing regime. This heavily influenced the popularity of the President. Moreover, the democratic institutions were stronger in Guatemala, making the Supreme Court and the office of Human Rights heavily opposing the coup and strongly fighting their own dissolution. These instances supported the anti-presidential movement of citizens. Moreover, also the media heavily opposed the coup by reporting critical articles and refusing to censor their news. Thus, a strong civil society existed that managed to overcome the coup and restore a democracy. Two weeks after the coup President Serrano resigned (Villagrán de León, 1993; Cameron, 1998). Linking to Wintrobe, the loyalty was already low

and heavily diminished further with the increase of repression, as a more self-enforcing democracy was in place in Guatemala due to the existing institutions and civil society.

Exploring specifically graph 3a, the PPC explains why leaders repress their citizens. Wintrobe believes this repression is used to be able to implement extreme policies. If a leader is right-wing and he wants to implement a far right wing policy, the level of repression needed depends on the support for his policymaking. If a society has a big opposition, more repression is necessary in order for a policy to be accepted, as the influence of the opposition needs to be repressed. An important implication of this is that even in polarized societies, extreme policies may not be automatically successful. If the opposition is the minority, an 'us vs. them' rhetoric may indeed help repress the small group in society and help the policies to pass. However, if this group becomes too large it may become problematic; taking the policies too far can have deteriorating results for the regime. In this case, the leader does not remain in the equilibrium level of repression, loyalty and power. For example, Hugo Chávez, a former left-wing populist leader in Venezuela lost support after he became more extreme in his policy making. He had come into power in 1998 and from 2007 onwards he became more extreme. The opposition of Chávez grew when he further restricted private companies and the import and export of the country. At the same time, he became more authoritarian, making the elections less competitive. Thereafter, not only the most wealthy opposed him, but the upper-middle class started to oppose him as well. Accordingly, this has been a first step to the destabilization of the regime (Corrales, 2011). Years later under, his successor Nicolás Maduro, the regime has become extremely unstable; the country is suffering from hyperinflation and violence. Moreover, the international arena has defined president Maduro as illegitimate president (Unknown, 2019).

Importantly, as aforementioned, Wintrobe explains the emergence of a hybrid regime. However, he also considers the durability of the regime. Wintrobe explains how the equilibrium can move due to exogenous shocks. Thus, the level of repression and the political extremism of a leader may change due to these shocks. He looks both at 'positive' shocks and 'negative' shocks for the leader. This implies the existence of hybrid regimes may depend on exogenous factors, as also already shown in the case of Fujimori.

First, if a negative shock hits the state, as an economic downturn, loyalty of citizens will decline. Since Wintrobe assumes the leader still tries to keep a maximum amount of power and thus keep π maximized, repression must be diminished if loyalty declines. If repression

is diminished, the policy needs to become less extreme as well. Thus, the hybrid regime becomes less authoritarian. Within Turkey one can see that their President Erdogan indeed may become less popular due to the economic recession, in the latest local elections he lost votes. Experts say he therefore may need to loosen his grip on the country (Ulgen, 2019; Weise, 2019). Note that a leader may successfully use ‘negative’ crises as an economic downturn to strengthen power as well, by either blaming a specific group in society for the downturn, or turning against other states. Taking the case of Hungary, President Orbán has been disputing the European Union for abusing power and being too influential within the home state. Hungary is suffering poverty, but instead of Orbán and his government being blamed, the European Union is blamed as well as the opposition (Magyar, 2019).

Second, a ‘positive’ shock will enhance extremism and repression. For example, if a state has a right-wing leader and migration increases, a country can move up on the spectrum and become more right-wing. Namely, the polarization increases; the ‘us vs. them’ notion intensifies. Therefore, the leader does not need more repression for a more extreme policy; hence the PPC shifts to the right. Related, the loyalty for the leader increases, thus the loyalty supply curve shifts to the right as well. To maximize power, the leader can and will increase his repression level as well; the regime becomes more authoritarian. These mechanisms show how a strong leader can use existing trends in societies for his own gain of power. The example of migration can be directly applied to various cases in Europe. During the refugee crisis in Europe, both in Poland and Hungary the leaders were strongly opposed to accepting refugees in their countries. This strengthened the position of the leaders as well as increased the hatred towards Muslims in both countries (Cienski, 2017).

Saenz de Vitieri Vazquez, A., Bjornskov, C. (2018). Populism and Constitutional Reform in Latin American and the Caribbean.

The previous analysis of Wintrobe explores how a hybrid regime can emerge. The author examines the process of the disruption of a democratic system. He explains how in a democracy a strong populist leader can increase repression and gain loyalty at the same time, which leads to a hybrid regime. However, what is lacking in the analysis of Wintrobe is the attention to formal institutions. The author does claim that in order for a hybrid regime to emerge in a state, among other factors the country must have weak checks and balances, but he does not expand this argument further. Related, Wintrobe does not explain what repressive and extreme policymaking does to the existing political institutions. He merely assumes it leads to a hybrid regime, but what this specifically entails for the institutions is neglected. It would be interesting to consider what happens to the political bodies during the process of democratic eruption. Wintrobe clearly shows how populism plays an important role in the emergence of an hybrid regime. Thus, exploring when formal institutions are not protecting the democracy sufficiently as well as what will happen to political bodies once a populist leader comes in power, can help understand how a strong leader can expand his power and formally establish a hybrid regime.

Summary

Saenz de Vitieri Vazquez and Bjornskov explore how a populist leader can influence the constitution, including the checks and balances set in constitutions. The authors conduct an empirical analysis on the relationship between constitutions and populism. The main claim of the authors is that having a populist leader increases the likelihood of having constitutional changes in a society. These leaders change the formal institutions that safeguard the democracy are diminished so the party in office gains power in the decision-making process. Importantly, the authors also have explored that in general constitutional changes are more likely to exist in poorer democracies that are not stable to begin with and that are relatively new democracies.

The authors study the relation between populism and constitutions. Various assumptions are made in their study. First, considering the definition of populism, four different definitions of populism are considered, but according to the authors the discursive approach is the most

commonly used in economic and political research. The main claim is that populists find a binary moral dimension in society, arguing that the populists represent one group and fight against another. This is clearly linked to the 'us vs them' notion as explained by Wintrobe. Importantly, the authors assume that a populist leader aims to secure the median vote, as via the median vote the public will is represented. However, in the previous analysis, Wintrobe explains that the behavior of a populist leader cannot be explained by the median voter theory. Namely, a populist leader tries to create an 'us vs. them' notion, as presented by the discursive approach. Thereby, the leader will set extreme policies that do not attract the whole population and separate a certain group of society from the majority. Saenz de Viteri Vazquez and Bjornskov on the other hand believe the median voter theory is applicable because populists tend to represent the 'normal' citizens of society; the majority. With this notion they neglect the use of extremism by populists and the repression of minority groups. However, importantly, the authors' assumption on the median voter theorem does not influence the outcome of the research. Namely, the argument stating that populists claim to represent the will of the people and go against the elite is still valid. This argument is used to explain why citizens would accept certain constitutional changes made by the incumbent populist leader.

Secondly, exploring constitutions, the authors claim that the goal of constitutions is to create stability and predictability in a state. Namely, this should encourage economic, social as well as political prosperity. Accordingly, formal and informal institutions established by the constitution, as checks and balances are crucial for creating stability. I do think constitutions are a good proxy for exploring democratic systems; various scholars have stated that the constitution is the basis for rules and guidelines of each democracy (Arato, 1995; Sunstein, 2001). Importantly, the authors argue the Latin American and Caribbean constitutions do not succeed in creating stability and predictability. Namely, accordingly many constitutions in the region have changed multiple times over the years. Moreover, many countries in the area have been harmed by corruption cases or other forms of abuse of power. The authors assume that the unstable constitutions and the failing in creating stability in a society are related, implying that if a democratic state has a weak constitution, the democracy is weak as well. Thus, the authors focus their research on Latin America and the Caribbean. Although this region indeed has numerous examples of unstable democracies, note that constitutions of former Soviet Union countries share the features of countries in this region. From 1950s onwards, various Latin American countries have democratized, leading to new democratic constitutions. Also, former communist countries have created their constitutions around 1990

after a period of instability. Moreover, these new constitutions have been amended multiple times as well (Bjornskov & Voigt, 2018).

Related, to the abovementioned assumption, the authors assume that the reason populist leaders can make changes in the constitutions is that the constitutions were weak to begin with. Namely, a weak constitution fails to successfully keep constraining the person in power. Therefore, populist leaders are incentivized and capable of making constitutional changes. The occurring situation can be understood as a vicious cycle. The already weak constitution continuously changes, reinforcing the lack of stability in the constitution. Thus, populist leaders are expected to further disrupt already weak democracies.

Saenz de Vitieri Vazquez and Bjornskov assume the populists can make two strings of arguments to find support for changing the constitutions. First, accordingly populists can argue the existing constitutions should be amended in order to make actual changes in society and satisfy the population. Namely, populists present their policy-making as a way to do good and go against the evil. In order to put their policies in action, the populists claim constitutional changes are a necessity. The existing constitution is blocking the noble goals of the people in power. Secondly, the authors argue populists may state the existing constitution is based upon preferences of the elite. Thus, in order to satisfy the will of the 'regular' people, this constitution must be changed. Importantly, both arguments lead to the same, a change in the constitution. The authors argue this change can be made in various ways as well. On the one hand, populists can make changes while not violating the current constitutions. For example, a new constitution can be written under the advice of citizens, or amendments can be made to the existing constitution. However, on the other hand leaders can also decide to make changes that do not fall within the bounds of this constitution. Examples are the staging of a coup or the dismantling of the existing judicial branch. This thesis questions whether examples of the latter are fully explored within this research. Although changes in institutions as the judicial branch are considered that are possibly unconstitutional, various unconstitutional measures are not quantified, while they harm the existing democracy as well. For example, cases of repressed press freedom are not measured in the research (Levitsky and Loxton, 2017; Zakaria, 2019).

Analysis

To analyze the relation between constitutions and populism over years, the authors conduct a fixed effect study of the effect of populism on the change in constitutions in Latin America and the Caribbean. A fixed effects regression controls for variables that remain stable over time. Various fixed effects regressions are conducted, they are explored later. The authors try to determine the changes in a constitutions by looking at the constitution before and after a populist leader came into power. The dependent variables are measurements of checks and balances as well as of power dispersion. The data is obtained from the Comparative Constitution Project, which is a database with information on constitutions across the world. The data runs from 1970 to 2014. This is a period in which various democracies in Latin America have been under threat, due to illiberal tendencies. Note that the threats did not come from military coups leading to dictatorships, which mainly occurred until around end of the 1970s (Smith & Ziegler, 2008).

For the independent variable populism, as explained the authors do not use the discursive approach. Instead, they measure populism indirectly. Populism is measured by looking at the amount of times the word populism is mentioned in relation to a certain country in English and American newspapers. An index is created based on the usage of the word, this index is an independent variable in the analysis. These newspapers are assumed to be unbiased, as the article only focuses on Latin American and Caribbean countries. The authors show the created index correlates with a measurement of populism of Hawkins, who quantified the discursive approach to populism. Hereby, they tend to prove the index is reliable. Importantly, the authors have researched the word populism in combination to the word constitution. They find the two are hardly used in combination. Accordingly, reverse causality between the two is thus less likely to exist, as the newspapers do not define a populist leader based upon the changes being made by him in the constitution.

Saenz de Vitieri Vazquez and Bjornskov explore both the extensive and intensive margin in the regressions. The extensive margin explains the likelihood of constitutions to change after a populist leader has gotten in to power. For the dependent variables of the extensive margin, the authors conduct two dummies that measure whether any constitutional reform occurred after the leader got in power. The first dummy explains whether a new constitution occurred in a certain year, the second dummy measures the same but adds the occurrence of an amendment in the given year as well. Secondly, the intensive margin explores what kind of

changes appear when constitutional changes have occurred in a state and whether these changes are different with a populist leader in power. It focuses on the size and direction of a change, once the constitutional change has taken place. The size of the change is measured by looking at the Index of Parliamentary Legislative Influence (IPLI) and the Index of Executive Influence (IEI). These indices include information on de jure power, which is formal power. The former looks at the de jure power of the parliament and includes for example whether the parliament can amend the constitution unilaterally as well as whether the legislature is checked by the judicial. The latter does the same for the de jure power of the executive. Importantly, to examine the changes more specifically, the authors also explore the PolCon III variable, that accounts for veto power and constrains to the political bodies. Moreover, the V-Dem variables measure the relation of the legislative and the executive with the judicial body.

First, the extensive margin is explored in table 1, which can be found in the Appendix C. A conditional logit fixed effect measurement is conducted, as the dependent variables are the dummies, which are binary variables. Column 1 represents the likelihood of a new constitution and column 2 the likelihood of an amendment if a populist leader has gotten into power. The authors find that a populist leader does not have a significant effect on the creation of a new constitution or amendments. The effects are positive, but insignificant.

Interestingly, the authors also consider what kind of constitutions are prone to change to begin with. For example, the authors test for age of the constitution, income level in a country and what kind of democracy is in place. It is found that old constitutions are less likely to be changed by populist leaders. Also, constitutions of richer countries are less likely to be amended. This fits the idea that weak democracies with weak constitutions are more likely to change. Importantly, if constitutions were created in a period of instability and were built after or during a period of oppression by other countries, this has a detrimental effect on the stability of the constitution. Namely, the results show that if a constitution emerges in a time of conflict and instability it is not likely to endure in the future either. Another interesting result found by the authors is that presidential democracies are more likely to get a new constitution than other forms of democracies. These insights are supported by various literature (Kapstein & Converse, 2008; Lust & Waldner, 2015; Bjornskov & Voigt).

Secondly, the authors explore the intensive margin in table 1 as well. The column 3 until 6 research the type of constitutional changes, once determined that a change has taken place. A

fixed effect OLS with a lagged dependent variable regression is estimated. A lagged dependent variable is partly predicted based upon the result of this dependent variable in the past. The IPLI and IEI indices are the dependent variables. Two types of samples are used, in which column 3 and 5 depict the whole sample of countries with constitutional changes, while column 4 and 6 only depict a subsample that includes years in which a constitutional change has actually occurred. Thereby, the authors aim to examine both long term effects as well as one-year effects of constitutional changes on the concentration of power. First, the results show that having a populist leader has a positive significant effect on the increasing power of the legislative (IPLI). The effects on IPLI are mainly found directly in the year a populist leader comes into power and is mainly driven by right wing ideologies. This implies a difference exists between left-wing and right-wing populists. On the other hand, the authors find that having a populist leader does not have a positive effect on the power granted to the executive (IEI). The authors therefore claim that both effects suggest that populist leaders indeed partly represent the will of the people, as proclaimed by the populists, as the parliament is representing the votes of people. However, note that even when the power is concentrated to the parliament instead of the executive, this does not mean it is more democratic. Namely, in various Latin American countries the parliament almost completely consists of members of the party of the leader (Levitsky & Murillo, 2013; Levitsky, 2017).

Lastly, the authors look at constraints imposed to political bodies by a populist leader, by considering the PolConIII and the V-Dem indicators. This is again the intensive margin, the results can be found in table 2 of Appendix C. Also, again a distinction is drawn between a sample of all years and a sample including only the years a populist leader got into power. The unequal numbered columns represent the former and the equal numbered the latter. First, the authors find that rich countries have more veto powers. Accordingly, this implies stable democracies have more constraints to begin with, as the authors stated rich countries are likely to be stable democracies. Moreover, presidential systems appear to have weak veto institutions.

Considering the influence of populist leaders, the authors find that veto powers, which often constrain policy making, are removed or reduced by populist leaders. Also, the results show populists influence the judicial independence. Changes are made both the year a leader has gotten in power as well as in other years. The authors find that especially left-wing populists appear to not accept the independence of the Supreme Court. On the other hand, especially right wing populists are influencing the whole judiciary body. Thus, again slightly diverging

results are found for left and right wing ideologies. Overall, the conflicting results on ideologies contradict with Wintrobe, who argues the mechanisms of democratic disruption are similar for both sides of the political spectrum. However, note that this research only focuses on Latin America and the Caribbean, which may affect the results. In these countries, many socialist populist leaders have gotten into power, compared to in other countries (Lust & Waldner, 2015). Linking the claims and results of the authors to regime changes, two arguments can be made. Firstly, having weak constitutions and institutions, as weak checks and balances and few constraints to the leader, creates the possibility to make changes in the constitution and thereby destroy the existing democratic regime. This possibly leads to a regime change towards a more authoritarian regime, as a hybrid regime. Also, importantly, a populist leader appears crucial in the disruption of a democratic system. The populist leader is likely to gradually disrupt the existing weak democracy, as changes are made in the year the leader has gotten into power as well as in the years thereafter. No direct self-coup is staged, but a gradual process occurs that eventually leads to the existence of a hybrid regime. Lastly, striking is the discourse of the populist leader, they claim to represent the will of the people. However, the paradox is that this eventually leads to a system in which the people are even less directly represented.

Case study discussion

Zooming in to the Latin American countries, among other countries Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia and Peru all have had populist leaders that disrupted democratic processes. All these cases except for in Peru have had left-wing leaders. Firstly, in Venezuela in 1998 the populist socialist leader Hugo Chávez came into power, after the Christian democrats that ruled the country had many corruption scandals. Chávez gradually dismantled the existing democratic bodies. In 2004, he made changes to the structures of the Supreme Court and in 2005 he canceled the elections for the National Assembly, giving all seats to Chávez' party (Shifter, 2006). The latter exemplifies how a populist leader can give a lot of power to the legislative, pretending to be very representative, while holding all the power. From 2007 onwards, after his re-election the competitiveness in Venezuela declined further. He repressed the opposition by banning them from the political arena due to alleged corruption without considering the court. The autonomy of the judicial branch overall heavily declined (Corrales, 2010).

In Bolivia an even more gradual process has taken place, also with a socialist leader. Evo Morales has been in power in Bolivia since 2006. He had been very popular in Bolivia as he is an anti-imperialist; he has been the first indigenous leader of the country. A new constitution was approved only three years after he got into power. Importantly, he has gotten great support for the changes made in the country (Kohl & Bresnahan, 2010). However, the last few years his popularity has declined. Despite, he has taken unconstitutional measures in order to stay in power. In Bolivia, it is unconstitutional to be elected more than three times. He held a referendum to change the constitution, but while this referendum did not pass, he was still re-elected a fourth time (Verdugo, 2017). This example shows that changes in a democracy are not only constitutional changes, but that also unconstitutional measures should be considered. All in all, the gradual disruptions of democracies presented link with the argument of Wintrobe, who also states that regime changes are a gradual process. Moreover, Wintrobe argues that citizens will remain loyal to a populist leader in an unstable democracy, despite making undemocratic changes. This is also found in the case studies. Interestingly, it appears that leaders become even more extreme after a re-election. An explanation would be that the leaders first try to determine how far they can take their repression and extremism, which again can be linked to the loyalty and repression trade-off of Wintrobe.

Interestingly, the arguments made in the article are applicable outside of Latin America and the Caribbean as well. For example, in Hungary the right wing populist Viktor Orbán became president in 2010. In the following years, he made several constitutional changes. After his re-election in 2014 he himself declared an illiberal democracy (Buzogány, 2017). Also in Poland, since 2015 the populist right wing party Law and Justice part PiS has become the biggest party in parliament. Their member Andrzej Duda became president as well, but in the case of Poland not necessarily the President has most power, but merely the party (Foy, 2015). The party almost immediately put forward new judges. Also, a law passed that dismissed all existing board of public broadcastings. The case of Poland can be viewed as surprising, given that it has had years of economic growth before PiS got into power. However, the party has been using European crises and the cultural backlash of the country due to the European Union in their discourse to gain popularity (Fomina & Kucharczyk, 2016).

Own contribution

The analysis sections of Wintrobe and Saenz de Vitieri Vazquez and Bjornskov have shown that populism increases the possibility of a 'gradual self-coup' and is thereby a threat to weak democracies. Weak democracies are democracies that lack several features crucial for a democracy, as equality, a strong civil society and good checks and balances. In these weak democracies, a populist leader can use extremism to appeal to citizens, as often in these democracies polarization is high. Extremist notions are either far right or far left wing and are likely to be exclusionary to a certain minority group in society. The populist leaders use discourse in which an 'us vs. them' mentality between the majority and a minority is created. The minority groups can come from within society as well as from abroad. People will be attracted to this 'us vs. them' rhetoric due to the existing polarization. The populist leader claims to be part of the 'normal' people and argues it will overcome problems in society, that accordingly exist because of the current democratic system. He argues he can only overcome these problems by disrupting the existing institutions and take more power. The checks and balances are diminished and more power is granted to either the legislative or the executive. Note that power granted to the legislative implies that the party of the incumbent leader gets more power, as in various cases it is found the parliament mainly consists of members of the party of the leader (Shifter, 2006; Levitsky, 2017; Levitsky & Cameron, 2003). Importantly, in a highly polarized weak democracy, the citizens continue to support the leader despite these undemocratic measures, because the citizens are appealed to the extreme policies the leader wants to implement, for which he needs to disrupt the democracy. All in all, the incumbent leader decreases the powers of various formal institutions in the democracy, thereby a hybrid regime slowly emerges. The analyses have shown that in contemporary societies a self-coup is not an abrupt coup in which a democracy is abruptly destroyed by the incumbent leader, but merely a gradual process in which the democratic system is slowly deteriorated by increasing repression of the leader and weakening formal institutions.

Acemoglu and Robinson do not focus on a gradual disruption and the emergence of a hybrid regime, but on the shift from a democracy to a non-democracy via a coup. They argue a coup is likely staged by the military that represents the elite; the influence of one specific leader is neglected. Various examples exist in which indeed the military represents the elite, as the coups in Chile and Argentina around the 1970s. Importantly, Acemoglu and Robinson believe the coup fully conflicts with the desires of the masses of people. Namely, they state the elite destroy a democracy if the income of the elite is too low with respect to in a non-

democracy despite the costs of a coup. On the other hand, the income of the masses is always higher in a democracy and the masses are thus always against a coup. Important, Acemoglu and Robinson base their arguments and model fully focus on income redistribution, political sentiments are not considered.

As Acemoglu and Robinson focus on military coups, the model does not appear automatically applicable to self-coups. However, the influence of inequality in society on coups as depicted by the authors does seem relevant in all forms of coups. The article of Wintrobe defines inequality as a criteria of a weak democracy as well. Moreover, the thresholds set by Acemoglu and Robinson are useful for determining in which cases a coup is successful while in other cases is not. Most importantly, while Wintrobe and Saenz de Vitieri Vazquez and Bjornskov explain how a leader improves his power, they do not thoroughly examine where the desire comes from to disrupt a democracy. Acemoglu and Robinson on the other hand set the societal factors under which a coup is staged, implying that societal factors as taxes and inequality are the drivers for the elite to stage a coup.

Wintrobe and Saenz de Vitieri Vazquez and Wintrobe do explore that the ‘normal’ people, the masses often support the leader despite him disrupting the democracy. On the other hand, Acemoglu and Robinson argue that the disruption of a democracy is never beneficial to the masses. Note that Acemoglu and Robinson discuss a military coup, while Wintrobe and Saenz de Vitieri Vazquez and Bjornskov discuss a regime change by the incumbent leader, identified as a gradual self-coup. Thus, one could possibly assume that military coups are staged by the elite and favorable to the elite, while self-coups are staged by a populist representative of the masses and thereby favorable to the masses. However, whether all populist leaders fully represent the masses is debatable. For example, President Donald Trump of the United States, President Orbán of Hungary and President Bolsonaro of Brazil possibly better represent the elite than the masses.

The question then is, how come the masses support these leaders, despite them not being an actual representative of the ‘normal’ citizens. To answer this, it is important to consider the promised and actual policy making of these populist leaders.

Case study discussion

President Trump perfectly exemplifies a populist leader belonging to the elite and being supported by the masses as well. Namely, Trump belongs to the wealthiest people of the country, being worth approximately 3 billion dollar. Despite, he has gotten enormous support of the American working class (Kruse, 2018). Although one can debate whether Trump is staging a self-coup, his actions show that he is trying to undemocratically make changes in the country. For example, he has accused several States of committing voter fraud after the lost midterm elections, and he has suspended a critical reporter from his work at the White House. He is constantly attacking the media and the opposition, claiming they are a threat to national security (Watkins, 2019; McCarthy, 2018). However, as explained in the analysis on constitutions and populism, a stable constitution and democratic system may hamper a president to actually disrupt the democracy. The United States has a stable, old constitution and is an economically rich country, possibly explaining why a self-coup is less likely to happen (Bjornskov & Voigt, 2018). The case of Trump is still a useful case to consider, given the question around the elite.

Already during his campaign for his election in 2016 Trump claimed to save the country from problems created by the existing establishment. These problems often appeared related to globalization. He promised to build a wall on the Mexican border, preventing immigrants from Latin America to enter the country. Moreover, he promised to half the number of refugees entering the country each year (Pierce et al., 2018). Trump's supporters share nativist views, meaning they share the notion that established inhabitants of a country should be protected against threats from outside of the country. The voters oppose globalization, they feel harmed by international openness. Strong negative attitudes towards immigrants exist (Smith & Hanley, 2018). Also, supporters appear to believe that the sovereignty of the country is under threat in a globalized world (Gusterson, 2018). Trump proclaimed an 'us vs. them' mentality. Discourse is used in order to identify the 'us' as the good and the 'them' as the bad, which are the 'normal' American against an outside group. This can be foreigners, minority groups within the country, as well as the political elite. In his campaign, Trump used clear anti-establishment and anti-elite rhetoric. It is found his voters shared hate and distrust towards the current political elite. Trump explains the elite to be the political elite that has been ruling the country unsuccessfully for years, not as the economic elite. Trump on the other hand, comes from the business world and accordingly stands far from this political elite. He has blamed the elite for 'raising money for global consideration' and being the cause

of ‘disastrous financial and foreign policy’ (Kruse, 2018). The election has been viewed as an election against the status quo. Thus, the voters were possibly convinced that going against the status quo would indeed improve their situation (Azevedo et al., 2017). In Trump’s campaign, he claimed that after them not being heard for years, he was going to listen to this working class (Mondon & Winter, 2018). Also, he used simple language and slogans, appealing to people with lower education; the percentage of voters not having a college education was significantly high (Schaffner et al., 2018).

Exploring his actual policymaking, it is found that his economic policymaking is not benefiting the working class, implying he is not sufficiently representing them as he promised. For example, the income tax in the United States has become more regressive during his presidency (DePillis, 2019). On the other hand, he has lived up to his promises in the election considering immigration policies. For example, in 2017 Trump banned people travelling from seven Muslim countries to enter the country as well as refused entrance to all Syrian refugees (Cohen & Hansler, 2019). Related, the number of refugees has severely dropped to around 25.000 refugees admitted in 2018 (Unknown, 2018), even less than proclaimed by Trump during his campaign.

President Orbán of Hungary can be viewed as an elitist populist leader as well. Interestingly, he has shown clear contradictory behavior. At the start of his political career he strived for a liberal democracy as opposed to the Soviet regime. Moreover, he was a proponent of European Union membership. However, years later he declared an illiberal democracy and has been severely Eurosceptical. He has been using anti- European rhetoric in his campaigns, claiming the European Union threatens the sovereignty of Hungary. This links to the nativism proclaimed by Trump. Another typical example of his shift has been his anti-Soros campaign. George Soros is a Hungarian liberal philanthropist, striving for liberal democratic values in the country. Interestingly, as a student, Orbán had studied in Oxford with the help of a scholarship of Soros. Importantly, similar as in the case of Trump, the working class has been severely harmed by the policymaking of the President and his party Fidesz. A progressive tax system changed into a flat tax system. Also, a law has passed stating that workers are required to do 400 hours overtime if required (Alderman & Santora, 2019; Waller, 2019).

Another example can be found in Brazil. In January 2019 President Jair Bolsonaro got into power due to support of both the elite and the working class. Bolsonaro is a clear right-wing leader, who promised less government intervention, deregulation and fewer taxes for

companies. Clear signs of oppression and antidemocratic measures have been already apparent in his recent presidency. Importantly, he applauded the former military dictatorship and is backed by the current military, he proclaims violence by the police and he has oppressed his opposition (Anderson, 2019). Thus, one can argue he does not go against the existing elite. However, again he does stand against the former political elite, similar to President Trump. The former party in power, the Worker's party had been disputed due to corruption scandals. Although from 2003 onwards they heavily reduced poverty levels, the last few years the development stagnated, crime rates went up and the former president has been imprisoned for corruption. During the campaign the crime rates of were Brazil were an important topic; Bolsonaro promised to fight these crime rates, unlike his predecessors. Moreover, also he focused on advocating for traditional family values and he is against abortion and he heavily disputes homosexuality. The Worker's Party on the other hand had tried to fight homophobia for years (Watson, 2018; Cowie, 2018). Similar to Trump and Orbán he has nativist views. His campaign slogan 'Brazil Above Else' exemplifies his view towards the globalized world. Similarly to President Trump, he wants to lower trade with China. Moreover, international treaties are disputed as they harm Brazil's domestic policymaking, as the Paris Climate Accord (Benner, 2018). Bolsonaro had placed himself outside the existing political arena and claimed to be different than the Worker's party; causing the masses to vote for him as well, possibly despite a probable loss of income.

All in all it appears several far-right populists share certain characteristics. A paradox appears to exist between populists supposedly representing the people, while at the same time being elitist and serving the interest of the elite. The Presidents of the explored cases all share nationalist sentiments and have turned themselves against the political elitist establishment. They all proclaim to fight the evil that is harming society, fitting the discourse theory discussed by Saenz de Vitieri Vazquez and Bjornskov. The leaders have fueled existing polarization. Overall, discontent on globalization, immigration and distrust in the existing government are crucial factors feeding the rise of the right-wing populist leaders. More examples can be found in Poland and Hungary, but also in Austria, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. However, note that not all political leaders merely target the political elite, but also the economic elite in their campaign. This makes them possibly even more likely to appeal to citizens (Spruyt et al., 2016; Inglehart & Norris, 2016; Rooduijn, 2015).

Revised model of coups

The model of Acemoglu and Robinson revolves around income. Both the elite and the masses will support a system that maximizes their post-tax income. For the masses, this is always a democracy. However, for the elite a non-democracy would possibly be more attractive. Since the starting point is assumed to be a democracy, whether a non-democracy is the best option for the elite depends on the costs of a coup. If the post-tax income is higher in a non-democracy, despite the costs of coup, than the post-tax income in a democracy, a coup is staged. However, the previous section has shown that the distinction between the masses and the elite, in which the elite only strive for a coup, may not always be correct. Not only the post-tax income appears important but also other factors play a role in determining whether a coup is staged. Thus, even when the post-tax income is lower in a non-democracy, this can still be desired by the masses. If negative attitudes towards the existing government and their policies exists among the masses, fighting this establishment could become more important than having the highest possible post-tax income; especially if populist leaders fuel these attitudes. Thus, the masses may support a populist leader representing the elite if he wants to stage a coup if their political sentiments align. Note that the revised model does not assume a military coup is staged, but merely a self-coup. Thus, in this situation a person, likely a populist leader is elected and thereafter disrupts the democratic system.

The existing model of Acemoglu and Robinson can be used to explain how and why the masses will support the elite and thereby support a coup. Importantly, while Acemoglu and Robinson's model revolves around a military coup, the revised model considers a self-coup of the elite. Given the case studies, it is assumed the elite staging a self-coup is the elite represented by a right-wing populist leader. Thus, instead of the focus on the elite staging a coup, this model will examine when the elite choses a populist leader to represent them and when the masses will support this leader as well.

In the original model a coup is staged if the utility of the elite after a coup, given the costs of a coup is higher than the utility of the elite in a democracy. This is expressed in equation (9) of the section on Acemoglu and Robinson:

$$V^r(C, \varphi) > V^r(y^r | \tau^D = \tau^P) \quad (9)$$

In the revised model, the elite does not choose between staging a coup and staying in a democracy, but between getting a leader that represents the elite and thereby also disrupts the existing democracy, and staying in the current democracy. As explored in the analysis

section, this leader is expected to be an populist leader. Thus, equation (9) can be rewritten the following. In which P means the elite chose a populist leader to represent them.

$$V^r(P, \varphi) > V^r(y^r | \tau^D = \tau^P) \quad (19)$$

Equation (9) and thus equation (19) as well are described the following:

$$(1 - \varphi)y^r > y^r + (\tau^P(\bar{y} - y^r) - C(\tau^P)\bar{y}) \quad (10)$$

y^r explains the income of the elite. Looking at the left side of the equation, ι depicts the fraction of income surviving after a coup, $\iota = 1 - \varphi$. The right side of the equation describes the post-tax income of the elite, which is the original income plus the income from taxes, minus the costs of taxes. Acemoglu and Robinson set a threshold at which the elite is indifferent between having the populist leader and staying in the current a democracy, derived from equation (10)

$$\widehat{\varphi} = \frac{1}{\theta}(\delta C(\tau^P) - \tau^P(\delta - \theta)) \quad (12)$$

First, the right side of the equation is considered. The model of Acemoglu and Robinson explores that taxes and level of inequality are crucial factors influencing the likelihood of a coup by the elite. Wintrobe assumed inequality to be a prerequisite for the emergence of a hybrid regime as well. Especially in the case of a right-wing leader, it appears logical that he is chosen if inequality is high and thus taxes are high; the elite wants a right-wing leader to change redistribution policies in their favor. Note that this is only a valid argument if the elite votes based upon income preferences, as assumed in this model. Looking at the previously explored case studies, the leaders were clearly backed by the economic elite, implying economic preferences are a crucial determinant for choosing a leader for them.

Considering the left side of the equation, the costs of choosing a populist leader can vary per situation. Getting the masses to support the populist leader bears costs with it. The campaign of the leader can be costly, but so are the certain promises that should be made to the masses in order to get their support. In a highly polarized society these costs may be lower than in a non-polarized society, as is easier to appeal to the masses in a polarized society. This again explains why in a polarized society a populist leader is more likely to occur. Second, importantly, as explained by Saenz de Vitieri Vazquez and Bjornskov a strong constitution can hamper the disruption of a democracy. Thus, if the constitutions and formal institutions as checks and balances and veto powers are strong in a country, a populist leader is less likely to succeed in deteriorating these institutions. This also is part of the costs of coups, if these

costs are high it is less likely that the costs φ will be under the threshold. Then, it is less likely that a populist leader is chosen by the elite.

Thus, the costs of a self-coup include the attracting of citizens. How the elite successfully attracts citizens, meaning appeals to the masses via a populist leader is explored schematically. In the model of Acemoglu and Robinson, the masses vote based upon income preferences. Moreover, policy making is based upon the median voter theory. However, according to Wintrobe the median voter theory is not applicable anymore with the influence of a populist. Via the use populist rhetoric and the 'us vs. them' discourse the populist may get the majority support of the masses despite this not being the median vote.

To explain this, first a new situation is assumed in which one extreme side votes solely based upon income preferences; the other extreme side votes solely based upon political sentiments. If populism does not exist, the median will be the vote for a candidate representing both income preference and political sentiments; a middle candidate. He will get the majority vote. Namely, the candidate will decide his campaign based upon how he will attract the highest aggregate preferences, and voters vote for the candidate closest to their preferences. However, once populism is included, a right-wing populist leader wants to get support of the masses solely based upon political sentiments. He is not a candidate staying at the median. Given that the leader will successfully attract support by the use of populist rhetoric and extremism, as explained by Wintrobe, he will find more people to vote based on political preferences. Namely, the leader fuels the anti-establishment sentiments and extremism against certain groups. Especially in a polarized society the masses may prefer to vote for somebody who represents their political sentiments better instead of that their income preferences are considered. Thus, part of the masses does not want to support the median anymore as this candidate does not sufficiently represent their political sentiments. Hence, the median vote does not apply anymore and voting is shifted toward more political sentiment voting. The majority vote is possibly not found at the median anymore, but toward the side of the populist leader. Whether the populists will get the majority vote, depends on the level of polarization in society as well as on the input into the populist of the elite. If polarization is high, it is easier to appeal to the masses in the first place. Moreover, as explained, if the threshold is high, the costs of a coup can be higher for the elite. Thus, they will put more effort in satisfying the masses and campaigning, making it more likely the populist will win.

Note that in the explained mechanisms, the elite still maximize their post-tax income utility while the masses do not. Instead, the masses can be attracted by the populist leader and therefore not strive for the highest post-tax income. This assumption may not be fully reasonable. Namely, if the masses are influenced by political sentiments, the elite can be as well. If few of the elite do vote based upon political preferences, they will possibly support another political leader than the populist one. In this case, more support from the masses is needed in order to still get the populist leader. The costs of a self-coup will be higher. However, note that the political preferences of the elite may align with their income preferences as well. Especially in weak democracies with weak constitutions that might be the case. Namely, a distrust of the current government may exist among the entire society. Moreover, including the political preferences in the model of Acemoglu and Robinson would cause methodological issues, as the model solely compares utilities based upon income with each other. A measurement of utility based upon political preferences cannot simply be combined and compared with utility based on income.

This section has described how a right-wing populist leader represents the elite and is supported by the masses, by the use of the model of coups of Acemoglu and Robinson as well as by the theories of Wintrobe and Saenz de Vitieri Vazquez and Bjornskov. The section has shown that societal factors lead the elite to choose a populist leader that can get power in the hands of the elite by appealing to the masses. The populist leader in this case must be a right-wing populist leader, as he is representing the elite and their income preferences. An important contribution of this section is that it explores why a right-wing populist leader wants to continuously gain power as assumed by Wintrobe. It shows he wants more power to make changes, since he is unsatisfied in the current system. Also, it shows how the populist gets in the position to gain power; he is likely elitist himself and is backed by the elite financially and politically as well. An important implication of this is that a difference exists between the emergence of a left and right-wing populist leader. This refutes the notion of Wintrobe, but supports the empirical evidence found by Saenz de Vitieri Vazquez and Bjornskov. However, the section does not explore how and when a left-wing populist leader then will into power. Also note, that while this section examines how a right-wing populist leader can get into power, it does not show how he will remain in power. The possibility for the masses to eventually turn against the populist leader and stop supporting him is not considered.

Conclusion and discussion

This research has examined the factors leading to a disruption of a democracy and the shift towards a hybrid regime. Three key articles have been examined, that helped me create an understanding of relevant insights and theories into the topic of regime changes and democratic disruption. By comparing, contrasting and critically discussing the theories and arguments of the different authors, I answered the following research question: ‘What are the factors leading to a shift towards a hybrid regime?’

All in all, the analyses of the three articles have indicated that various factors contribute to the possibility of a hybrid regime to emerge. A ‘weak democracy’ must be in place before a hybrid regime can emerge. A weak democracy exists if a society is polarized, the level of income inequality is high and if no enduring constitution nor good checks and balances are in place. Of additional significance is that the case studies have indicated that several societal events, such as economic downturns and political uncertainty, can increase the likelihood that a democracy will be disrupted. However, this thesis concludes the abuse of power of the populist leader to be the most important factor in the disruption of a democracy. A populist leader instigates the shift toward a hybrid regime. The shift is a gradual process in which repression of citizens is being increased over time, but where constitutional changes made to the democratic system are crucial for the regime shift. Populist leaders increased the power of the legislative as well as held unfair elections, diminished the power of the judicial branch and repressed the opposition by prohibiting certain parties and groups, controlling the media and closing universities. Important is that despite the use of repression, populist leaders continue to be supported by citizens. The populist leader appeals to its citizens through the use of rhetoric and extremism. In addition, the leader fuels polarization and dissatisfaction in society to gain support. Importantly, the existing polarization and dissatisfaction among citizens likely relates to harmful societal events that have occurred in a state. If a populist leader successfully appeals to citizens, the citizens tend to accept a level of repression and seem to believe undemocratic decision making by the leader is necessary for reforms. Examples exist in which the populist leader increased the level of repression and took more extreme undemocratic measures after he was elected for a second term. This indicates the link between the importance of support and the increase of undemocratic policies.

Moreover, by combining the key concepts of the three articles, this research has identified a paradox in which populist leaders are supported by the ‘normal’ citizens of society, whilst

being part of, as well as representing, the elite group of society. This thesis uses the theories of Acemoglu and Robinson of coups as well as the concepts of Saenz de Viteri Vazquez and Bjornskov and Wintrobe to explain this paradox. Through the provided analysis, it stands that right-wing populist leaders are often representing the elite; the highest classes of society. Paradoxically, they use populist discourse to persuade the masses they are working against the political elite. They place themselves outside of the existing political arena and claim to be anti-establishment. Due to dissatisfaction and existing polarization which is fueled by the populist leader, the masses can support a leader mainly based upon political sentiments, despite the leader not representing their economic interests at best.

Through the aforementioned findings, this research has contributed to the existing literature in various ways. First, previous literature on the disruption of democracies has focused on the process of a slow deterioration of a democracy, which is called democratic backsliding. Moreover, another insight into regime shifting is the theory on self-coups, that states that a change toward a hybrid regime happens at an abrupt moment and is instigated by the incumbent leader. This research takes a mid-stand in the two approaches. The thesis explores that a shift toward a hybrid regime is a gradual process, but the incumbent leader plays a key role and certain crucial moments can define the disruption of the democracy. Examples of these moments are constitutional changes to weaken the checks and balances and the creation of unfair uncompetitive elections. This theory links to Bermeo's notion on self-coups. She has argued that for the past decade actual direct self-coups have not occurred anymore, instead, the executive weakens the institutions one by one. However, note this thesis has argued that the incumbent leader successfully making these undemocratic changes is likely to be a populist leader. This aspect is neglected by Bermeo.

Several debates are identified in the literature review and have been examined in this research. This thesis refutes Zakaria's notion on illiberal democracies, arguing that hybrid regimes are likely to democratize in the future. Instead, the hybrid regimes explored in this thesis are regimes that recently moved away from a democracy. Whether they will continue to stay in the hybrid regime or will reform back to a democracy is not fully examined yet. Upcoming research may focus on the consolidation of hybrid regimes. Secondly, the research indicates that a difference exists between a left-wing and a right-wing populist leader. This thesis argues a right-wing populist leader is likely a part of the elite and is specifically representing their interests, while acting as a representative of the normal citizens. However, of importance is the limitation of this research which is that it fails to examine the goals and

desires of a left-wing populist. Further research should explore the difference between the two types of populism more thoroughly. It may specifically focus on how a left-wing populist leader can get into power, how he will cope with the elite and vice versa.

Another debate explicated in the literature review is the influence of the type of democratic system on the consolidation and strength of a democracy. A debate exists around whether a presidential democracy decreases or increases the possibility of a shift towards a hybrid regime. Given that this thesis identifies a populist incumbent leader as a crucial factor for the change towards a hybrid regime, a presidential democracy seems not the most viable system. Namely, in a presidential democracy the president will likely be viewed as the most important political leader. If a populist is president, he might be better able to get support of the citizens than when he is not viewed as a strong important leader. Next to this, the case studies explicate that the president of a state plays a crucial role in gaining power and setting undemocratic measures.

Considering the case studies, some examples of emerged hybrid regimes are discussed in more detail than others; this may diminish the reliability of the case studies. However, not each case has been reviewed in the media or by other scholars, making it hard to thoroughly examine them. Moreover, since the emergence of hybrid regimes is an extremely relevant topic, in many of the cases the long-lasting effects of the undemocratic measures taken by the incumbent cannot be examined yet. Thus, as abovementioned the consolidation of hybrid regimes could not be fully researched yet by the use of these case studies. Despite, overall the case studies still give a good indication of the practical application of certain theories, making the case studies highly relevant.

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Appendices

Appendix A

Appendix A involves the derivations of equations of the book from Acemoglu and Robinson ‘*Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*’.

Derivation of equation (10) to equation (11), page 17.

$V^r(C, \varphi) > V^r(D)$ gives:

$$\begin{aligned}(1 - \varphi)y^r &> y^r + (\tau^P(\bar{y} - y^r) - C(\tau^P)\bar{y}) \\ 0 &> y^r + (\tau^P(\bar{y} - y^r) - C(\tau^P)\bar{y}) - (1 - \varphi)y^r \\ 0 &> y^r + \tau^P\bar{y} - \tau^P y^r - C\tau^P\bar{y} - y^r + \varphi y^r \\ 0 &> \tau^P\bar{y} - \tau^P y^r - C\tau^P\bar{y} + \varphi y^r \\ y^r &= \frac{\theta\bar{y}}{\delta}, \text{ meaning that } \bar{y} = \frac{y^r\delta}{\theta} \\ 0 &> \tau^P\frac{y^r\delta}{\theta} - \tau^P y^r - C\tau^P\frac{y^r\delta}{\theta} + \varphi y^r \\ 0 &> \frac{\tau^P y^r\delta}{\theta} - \tau^P y^r - \frac{C\tau^P y^r\delta}{\theta} + \varphi y^r \\ 0 &> \frac{\tau^P\delta}{\theta} - \tau^P - \frac{C\tau^P\delta}{\theta} + \varphi \\ -\varphi &> \frac{1}{\theta}(\tau^P\delta - C\tau^P\delta) - \tau^P\frac{\theta}{\theta} \\ -\varphi &> \frac{1}{\theta}(\tau^P\delta - C\tau^P\delta - \tau^P\theta) \\ \varphi &< -\frac{1}{\theta}(\tau^P\delta - C\tau^P\delta - \tau^P\theta) \\ \varphi &< \frac{1}{\theta}(-\tau^P\delta + C\tau^P\delta + \tau^P\theta) \\ \varphi &< \frac{1}{\theta}(\delta C(\tau^P) - \tau^P(\delta - \theta))\end{aligned}$$

Derivation of equation (16) to equation (17), page 18.

$V^r(C, \varphi) > V^r(D, \tau^D = 0)$ gives:

$$(1 - \varphi)y^r > y^r + p(\tilde{\tau}(\bar{y} - y^r) - C(\tilde{\tau})\bar{y}) + (1 - p)(\tau^P(\bar{y} - y^r) - C(\tau^P)\bar{y})$$

$$0 > y^r(1-p)(\tau^P(\bar{y} - y^r) - C(\tau^P)\bar{y}) - (1-\varphi)y^r$$

$$0 > (1-p)(\tau^P(\bar{y} - y^r) - C(\tau^P)\bar{y}) + \varphi y^r$$

$$0 > (1-p)\left(\frac{\tau^P y^r \delta}{\theta} - \tau^P y^r - \frac{C \tau^P y^r \delta}{\theta}\right) + \varphi y^r$$


$$-\varphi > (1-p)\left(\frac{\tau^P \delta}{\theta} - \tau^P - \frac{C \tau^P \delta}{\theta}\right)$$

$$\varphi < \frac{(1-p)}{\theta}(-\tau^P \delta + \tau^P \theta + C \tau^P \delta)$$

Appendix B


Appendix B includes graphs both directly copied from the article ‘An economic theory of a hybrid (competitive authoritarian or illiberal) regime’ of Wintrobe (2018), as well as an adapted graph.

Graph 1- Examined on page 25.




Copied from Wintrobe, R. (2018), p. 222: Fig. 2.

Graph 2 - Examined on page 26.



Adapted from Wintrobe, R. (2018), p. 226: Fig. 4

Graph 3 - Examined on page 27.



Copied from Wintrobe, R. (2018), p. 226: Fig. 4.

Appendix C

Appendix C includes the results of the regression analyses of Saenz de Vitieri Vazquez and Bjornskov from the article: ‘Populism and Constitutional Reform in Latin American and the Caribbean’.

Table 1 - Examined on page 35.

Copied from Saenz de Vitieri Vazquez, A., Bjornskov, C. (2018). P. 30

	New const. 1	Const. change 2	IPLI 3	IPLI 4	IEI 5	IEI 6
Lagged dependent			.814*** (.115)	.478*** (.182)	.823*** (.037)	.429*** (.134)
Log age of constitution	-4.045*** (.787)	-.753*** (.151)				
Proportional voting	-13.255*** (1.716)	-1.070** (.512)	.014 (.009)	-.025 (.029)	.001 (.003)	-.042** (.020)
Bicameral parliament	2.355* (1.283)	-.922 (.640)	-.002 (.009)	.009 (.029)	.011** (.004)	.039*** (.014)
Successful coup	5.631* (3.376)	-16.134*** (.679)	-.025 (.027)	-	.004 (.003)	-
Communist regime	.135 (1.866)	-1.459 (1.274)	-.008 (.022)	.059* (.032)	-.001 (.011)	.054*** (.018)
Presidential democracy	-14.462*** (5.343)	-.118 (.663)	.019*** (.007)	.063* (.035)	-.009** (.004)	-.014* (.008)
Civilian autocracy	-18.817*** (6.369)	-1.363 (.755)	.014* (.007)	.058 (.035)	-.013*** (.003)	-.022** (.009)
Military dictatorship	-14.650*** (4.148)	-.596 (.581)	.016 (.018)	-	-.006 (.006)	-
Colony	-15.948*** (2.175)	-15.375*** (1.208)	-.002 (.004)	-	-.012*** (.004)	-
Log GDP per capita	-2.711 (2.532)	-.932* (.491)	.001 (.005)	-.005 (.015)	.005* (.003)	.009 (.013)
Population size	.116 (1.559)	.589 (.688)	-.005 (.008)	-.012 (.022)	-.006 (.004)	.004 (.015)
Government ideology	-.436 (2.041)	.214 (.256)	.001 (.003)	-.016 (.012)	.001 (.001)	.007 (.006)
Populism index	4.061 (2.041)	-1.491 (2.156)	.025 (.030)	.213** (.107)	.001 (.010)	-.026 (.031)
Ideology * populism	5.847 (12.092)	-.641 (1.889)	.016 (.030)	.223** (.089)	-.032*** (.012)	-.075* (.044)
Decadal fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1096	1382	1352	310	1354	312
Countries	35	35	35	33	35	33
Within R squared	.799	.097	.766	.581	.776	.380
Log likelihood	-26.347	-471.088	-	-	-	-
Wald Chi squared	8813.63	2547.60	-	-	-	-
<i>Marginal effect of populism at:</i>						
Ideology = -1	-.002 (.018)	-.000 (.000)	.009 (.027)	-.010 (.063)	.034*** (.013)	.049 (.043)
Ideology = -.5	.001 (.011)	-.000 (.000)	.017 (.024)	.101 (.077)	.018* (.009)	.011 (.031)
Ideology = 0	.005 (.007)	-.000 (.000)	.025 (.030)	.213** (.107)	.001 (.010)	-.026 (.031)
Ideology = .5	.008 (.009)	-.000 (.000)	.033 (.041)	.324** (.145)	-.015* (.013)	-.064 (.044)
Ideology = 1	.012 (.015)	-.000 (.000)	.041 (.054)	.436** (.186)	-.031* (.018)	-.101 (.063)

Note: *** (**) [*] denotes significance at p<.01 (p<.05) [p<.10]. Parentheses provide standard errors clustered at the country level.

Table 1 - Examined on page 36.

Copied from Saenz de Vitieri Vazquez, A., Bjornskov, C. (2018). P. 30

	Veto institutions		Influence over judiciary		Judiciary independence		Compliance with judiciary	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Lagged dependent	.669*** (.028)	.383*** (.096)	.737*** (.027)	.626*** (.129)	.822*** (.044)	.628*** (.177)	.804*** (.046)	.654*** (.134)
Proportional voting	.002 (.020)	-.075 (.061)	.079 (.061)	.188 (.207)	-.021 (.057)	-.009 (.241)	.056* (.029)	.222*** (.086)
Bicameral parliament	.005 (.023)	-.102 (.072)	-.015 (.057)	.191 (.165)	.152*** (.032)	.392** (.179)	.050 (.073)	.159 (.149)
Successful coup	-.060 (.049)	-.031 (.043)	-.117 (.114)	-.188 (.437)	-.133 (.119)	-.379 (.292)	-.130 (.098)	-.546** (.237)
Communist regime	.081 (.063)	-	.013 (.078)	-	-.004 (.079)	-	-.158 (.173)	-
Presidential democracy	-.041 (.065)	-.313*** (.056)	-.079 (.061)	.033 (.138)	-.056 (.058)	.484** (.189)	-.114** (.054)	.212 (.129)
Civilian autocracy	-.061 (.062)	-.260*** (.059)	-.3332* (.199)	-1.039** (.409)	-.419*** (.114)	-.624** (.289)	-.520** (.214)	-.957* (.506)
Military dictatorship	-.151** (.072)	-.459*** (.069)	-.138* (.072)	-	-.223*** (.078)	-	-.360*** (.088)	-
Colony	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Log GDP per capita	.033* (.018)	.113** (.051)	.022 (.072)	-.247 (.202)	-.038 (.049)	-.108 (.245)	.098 (.070)	-.038 (.195)
Population size	-.035 (.027)	-.005 (.079)	.136 (.115)	.189 (.167)	-.198* (.111)	-.195 (.282)	-.092 (.112)	-.299 (.272)
Government ideology	-.003 (.009)	-.028 (.024)	.020 (.029)	.092 (.062)	-.019 (.034)	.125 (.106)	.029 (.034)	.111 (.078)
Populism index	-.241*** (.081)	.029 (.204)	.049 (.150)	.989*** (.372)	.227 (.141)	-.003 (.491)	-.092 (.139)	.521 (.519)
Ideology * populism	-.065 (.089)	.173 (.243)	.618*** (.213)	1.039* (.587)	.699** (.261)	.601 (.577)	.190 (.139)	.888 (.816)
Decadal fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1106	148	889	126	889	126	889	126
Countries	30	30	22	22	22	22	22	22
Within R squared	.657	.426	.758	.661	.852	.626	.892	.826
F statistic	174.11	-	-	121.04	-	238.98	-	108.53
<i>Marginal effect of populism at:</i>								
Ideology = -1	-.177 (.122)	-.144 (.104)	-.568*** (.195)	-.049 (.280)	-.473** (.203)	-.604 (.707)	-.282 (.349)	-.367 (.426)
Ideology = -.5	-.209** (.093)	-.058 (.107)	-.259* (.138)	.470 (.149)	-.112 (.117)	-.304 (.536)	-.187 (.227)	.077 (.243)
Ideology = 0	-.242*** (.081)	.029 (.204)	.049 (.150)	.989*** (.372)	.227 (.141)	-.003 (.491)	-.092 (.139)	.521 (.519)
Ideology = .5	-.274*** (.091)	.115 (.318)	-.359 (.221)	1.509** (.653)	.577* (.245)	.297 (.602)	.003 (.158)	.965 (.902)
Ideology = 1	-.306** (.118)	.202 (.436)	.668** (.313)	2.029** (.942)	.926** (.367)	.598 (.806)	.099 (.261)	1.409 (.1300)

Note: *** (**) [*] denotes significance at p<.01 (p<.05) [p<.10]. Parentheses provide standard errors clustered at the country level.