



All passports Passport control

Koninklijke Marechaussee

Please keep passport ready.

Paspoort gereedhouden a.u.b.

Por favor, tenga su pasaporte preparado.



PHILIPS

THE BORDER MACHINE

Security measures of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee on the border on
Amsterdam Airport Schiphol

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'You cannot escape the responsibility of tomorrow by evading it today'

Abraham Lincoln (1809-1865)

Preface

With great pleasure and dedication, I hereby present to you my master thesis: *The Border Machine: Security measures of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee on the border on Amsterdam Airport Schiphol*. This master thesis is established by conducting an internship at the Royal Marechaussee Netherlands for five intense months. A period, which I have experienced as very informative and useful in gathering data for this master thesis. This master thesis has been written in order to fulfil the graduation requirements of the master study *Human Geography*, specialization *Europe: Borders, Identities and Governance* at the Radboud University Nijmegen.

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Last but not least, I would like to thank the respondents, without their cooperation I would not have been able to conduct this research.

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Abstract

A border forms a dividing line between two countries or other entities. Borders of countries protect the inhabitants against the threat from the outside and create a sense of belonging for the inhabitants on the inside. The Royal Netherlands Marechaussee contributes in their responsibility for the border process to both these intents.

Over the last twenty-five years, the number of passengers in EU aviation have increased tremendously. Together with cargo transportation, this led to significant economic growth. The rapid growth of mobility and newly introduced the relatively easy possibilities of travelling provided new vulnerabilities. After 9/11, the fear of terrorist attacks radically changed the border process. The state, being responsible for the safety of its citizens, was confronted with new challenges in the protection of its society. At Amsterdam Airport Schiphol, The Royal Netherlands Marechaussee is the responsible unit for this protective task. Besides being a military-police force, the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee is also responsible for the safety and security on the airports ground and the border process (immigration). In order to execute this task, a closer cooperation with private partners is required. An optimal balance between safety and the economic importance is crucial for the proper functioning of the airport. For this thesis the following main question has been formulated:

To what extent do security measures of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee influence the daily flow of passengers at the border on Amsterdam Airport Schiphol?

This research explores the extent in which the role of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee and the security measures they take contributes to this balance. The economic interest of Amsterdam Airport Schiphol seems to be the leading factor in praxis. In order to cope with the expansive growth in the number of movements of persons crossing the border, a closer cooperation between the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee and private partners within the security domain is essential in order to handle the flows. Solutions for smooth cooperation can be found within the domain of legislation and technology. However, particularly innovations in technological solutions also create new issues. These issues concern both the privacy of passengers and the position of the government. In the areas where it is a challenge for a government to physically protect its citizens: the government faces a new challenge, namely the protection of its citizens in a digitalizing world.

There is plentiful of academic literature available about the safety on airports and the phenomenon of airport borders. However, limited papers of research are available that focus on the expansive growth of airports, the growing demand in societies for safety and suitable solutions. Most of the literature found deals with the risk of government losing its position of power in terms of its relationship with private partner organizations in the security domain and its constitutional consequences. Interviews held with strategic advisors and managers of the border process introduce some unambiguous solutions. Solutions to cope with the growing demand for safety needs to be found in new policies on visa, shared intelligence and technology. Five-months of observation for this research led to the insight that the only distinction between private and public organization concerning security is the distinguishment in the different uniforms that officials wear. At first sight, security tasks may seem unstructured to the observer, but the opposite appears to be true. The border process functions like an oiled machine in which each cog is well connected. Observations also confirmed the notion that perfect alignment of all the different cogs is essential for a smooth passengers flow. The challenge is to make the machine function efficiently and effectively and to keep it in constant in balance with the flow of passengers border movements.

Abbreviations

CCTV	Closed Circuit Television
CEEC	Central and Eastern European Countries
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
ECFR	European Council on Foreign Relations
ECHR	The European Convention on Human Rights
ECJ	The European Court of Justice
ECSC	The European Coal and Steel Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EU	The European Union
EURATOM	European Atomic Energy Community
EUROJUST	The EU agency for judicial cooperation
EUROPOL	European Police agency
EUROSUR	European Border Surveillance System
FRA	European Agency for Fundamental Rights
FRONTEX	European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the external borders
GAMM	The EU Global Approach to Migration and Mobility
GATT	The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
IBM	The EU Integrated Border Management Strategy
IOM	International Organization for Migration
ISS	The EU Internal Security Strategy
RMar	Royal Netherlands Marechaussee (Koninklijke Marechaussee)
SIS	Schengen Information System
VIS	Visa Information System
USA	The United States of America
USSR	The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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1. Introduction

A man is walking towards the immigration check point. He stops and looks around nervously. One can see that he is searching. Searching for directions. In his left hand, he holds a bag. In his right hand, he holds something that might be his passport. 'Sir' says the border official in his booth, 'please step forward'. The man walks towards the booth and hands the official his passport. 'Would you mind showing your boarding pass?', says the border official. The nervous-looking man drops his bag and starts searching for his papers. 'Of course, Sir. Here you go'. I am a bit nervous. It is the first time that I will fly. I am not sure where to go and what to do', says the nervous-looking man, while bursting out in sweat. The border official checks his passport and puts it under the reader. Less than a minute passes by, but it feels like hours for the nervous passenger. 'It is ok, Sir. Everything checks out. For information about your flight, you can contact the yellow stand'. 'Ok, thank you?', the man replies still with some discomfort, but clearly relieved. He is now free to pass the border and is granted permission to leave the country.

Before entering the passport control at the immigration, the man was confronted with the immense impression that he had of the departure hall of Amsterdam Airport Schiphol made on him. Between thousands of travellers, he saw pairs of highly armed officials of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee. Every day these armed uniforms create a certain atmosphere of tension with their advanced weapons and equipment.

The highly armed officials continuously scan and observe the moving mass, entering and leaving Schiphol Plaza, trying to scan for deviant behaviour.

Regular visitors do hardly any more notice of this, as to them it has become a normal part of this airport and its scenery. The observations of this research were of a five months internship at the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee. It shows a procedure that is engraved in the minds of these armed officials, whose task is to keep all passengers, personnel and visitor's safe.

Ever since the attacks of 11 September 2001 in the USA, global demand for safety and security has grown rapidly. Airports have become vital objects that needed to be secured and kept safe as they could be subject to terrorist attacks. Most recent is the attack on Brussels Airport Zaventem in 2016, whereby thirty-two persons were killed. Often not visible to passers-by, the amount of security measures is growing. Highly armed fierce looking guards are part of the scenery at airports. Their presence also intends to give passengers a safe feeling of being

protected. After passing these officials charged with safety and security, private security companies perform the security procedures on luggage and passengers.

What the man was probably not aware of are the officials of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee responsible for policing the area in- and around Amsterdam Airport Schiphol, another of the main tasks of this force.

The Royal Netherlands Marechaussee is one of the cogs in the machine', carriers and private security with their activities in order to enable air mobility also operate as parts of the machine. Security and immigration are the most time-consuming activities in the border process. When different sub-processes do not match, undesirable delays between air traffic might occur. This can have enormous economic impact and provoke claiming procedures (Schoch, 2012). It is therefore of vital importance for both government and carriers to make sure that the machine functions like it is well oiled. Let's call this the border machine.

1.1 Context

Borders define areas in which certain types of order and activities take place. Whether those borders are between ideas, fields of activity or territories the fundamental function of the border as a marker remains constant (Guild, 2001). This thesis zooms in on borders functioning as a line of differentiation for the movement of persons. The border restricting the movement of persons is the gate point where the control takes place that decides whether the individual is granted entrance or not. For persons this border check acts as the determinant of their passing through. The border of movement of persons within and to the European Union is no longer consistent with the edges of the physical territory of the Member States of the European Union (Guild, 2001). Borders consist in various shapes on land, at sea and in the air.

This thesis is limited to borders at airports and specifically to Amsterdam Airport Schiphol. Borders on airports are unique in their structure and legal form. Countries can organize their borders in various ways in protecting their sovereignty.

For example, a Croatian national travelling by car towards Ljubljana will encounter the EU border for the first time at the physical edge of Slovenia. A Filipino national arriving at Amsterdam Airport Schiphol directly by plane from Manila, first meets the EU border first at check-in already in Manila where passports are examined by airline staff and security officers, specifically assigned for this duty of controlling the EU border. The Filipino citizen will meet another EU

border when passing through immigration control upon arrival at Amsterdam Airport Schiphol.

The last twenty-five years, passenger numbers of EU aviation have almost tripled, from more than 300 million passengers in 1993 to more than 900 million passengers in 2015, according to research done by the EU (European Commission, 2015). The same research also stated that a revolution in air travel started since the EU's internal Market for Aviation on 1992. The increase of passengers can be explained by several factors: air travel has become cheaper, safer and open to more people than ever before. In addition, a comprehensive set of EUs' passengers rights, (as stated in the IOM; 2015) travellers may rely on a safe guarded journey. The EU research states that the EU initiative to replace a series of national rules by a single set of EU rules partly explains this increase in passengers' numbers over the past twenty-five years. During this period, air cargo worldwide quadrupled (European Commission, 2017). The enormous growth of air cargo has no impact on the border task of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee, but it is the responsibility for Customs and Excise. According to Adey (2004), both passengers and cargo air travel are of major importance to the economy of a country.

According to the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA, 2014), the international airports in the European Union are the biggest entry points for nationals of third-world countries. Based on this research (FRA, 2014), it can be concluded that over a hundred million people of third-world countries arrive at the four largest international airports of the European Union per year, growing year over year. These four airports are: London-Heathrow in the United Kingdom, Paris-Charles de Gaulle in France, Frankfurt am Main in Germany and Amsterdam Airport Schiphol in the Netherlands.

1.2 Relevance

1.2.1 Scientific Relevance

The debate on airport management needs to be seen in international perspective, due to the interconnectivity that is created by air-travelling. Large scale terrorist events have taken place in the last fifty years, involving airplanes and airports such as the hijacking of the Israeli airline El Al flight on 22 July 1968, the Lockerbie bombing in 1988, the Al Qaeda USA attacks on 11 September 2001 and most recently the attack on Zaventum airport in 2016. All of these had tremendous impact for the requirements for safety and security on airports. These events have showed that threats to the EU vary heavily and have become increasingly international and fluid. The rapid growth of mobility made the world 'smaller', the relatively easy options to travel and the expansive growth of air travel since the twentieth century, has made the protection against threats increasingly difficult, according to HM Government (2017). In order to cope with the increased demand for safety and security within the EU, this was often getting outsourced to private companies for luggage checking and the provision of airport security (den Boer, Bosma, de Graf, Horrevorts, van Lunteren & Stolwijk, 2007). However, outsourcing to private companies created new dilemmas concerning the treatment of the privacy of travellers. *'The Weberian definition of essential characteristics of the state is that which successfully upholds a claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order within a defined territory'* (Henderson & Parsons, 1964, p.154).

Therefore, the responsibility for safety and security at Amsterdam Airport Schiphol is primarily organized by the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee by law, drawn up in conformity with the vision of Max Weber (artikel 4 Politiewet 2012). The article mentions three tasks for the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee:

1. Border Police;
2. Safety and Security;
3. International Military Police Tasks.

Source: artikel 4 Politiewet 2012

The Royal Netherlands Marechaussee task on the border, as stated in article 4 is to fight cross-border crime, identity fraud, human trafficking and money-laundering in conjunction with other EU agencies. The challenge of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee is to find the right balance between these three tasks. This process occurs in an era where the debate focused on airport privatization is taking place on a global scale (Baker, 2018). According to a recent report by the Airport Council International World (ACI), the percentage of privatization and growth of passengers has increased enormously since the twentieth-first century (Baker, 2018). This also applies to on Amsterdam Airport Schiphol (Annual Report 2017 Schiphol Group), a development that forces the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee to take a stand and make trade-offs in the balancing act of executing its tasks.

A part of the debate about airports is on the cooperation between private and public organisation on immigration. The example mentioned before, a Filipino national arriving at Amsterdam Airport Schiphol by plane from Manila, will encounter the EU border first at check-in in Manila when his or her passport is examined by airline staff and security officers assigned for the purpose of controlling the EU border. This is an example of a public-private partnership (PPP). Guiraudon and Lahav (2000) describe a changing character of European Union border management and a tendency towards remote control. This concept refers to the removal of the locus of control activities away from the physical border to outside of the state (Guiraudon & Lahav, 2000). Even though internal border checks within the EU have disappeared, there is an increasing pressure on the EU external border. Due to mutual interest of EU member states in fortifying the borders of the Schengen area, the global face of the EU is changing as stated by van Houtum (2010). To what extent this development affect the position of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee in their border-task on the long-term is unclear.

When Weber mentioned that the state by outsourcing its force, a state remains full responsibility for its force, Weber refers to force as a physical action, a power of the state. Bell (2015) states that data is knowledge and knowledge is power. The question is to what extend the state should be able to outsource their force and still maintain responsibility and keep ownership.

1.2.2 Societal Relevance

'EU border management is not only in public hands, but also in private and professional hands' (Dijstelbloem & Broeders, 2014).

The second relevant debate regarding borders on the airport, is the public-private partnership and its effect on passenger's legal protection.

'In the eyes of Max Weber, the state is the institution with a monopoly on the legitimate use of force and even when states outsource their force, they maintain ownership' (Civic & Miklaucic, 2011).

According to Guiraudon and Lahav (2000), tendencies of remote control involve a double placement since it moves the locus of control activities away from the borders of the territory and in some cases beyond the formal apparatus of the state, a shift from public service professionals to private companies.

Border control in the Netherlands is strictly executed by the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee (artikel 4 Politiewet 2012), as the implementation of the state's monopoly in the legitimate use of force (Bell, 2015).

The necessity of passengers can be ambivalent. In an online survey on Amsterdam Airport Schiphol (2018), almost 50 percent of the passengers find the security measures a violation of their privacy. However, 85 percent of the same passengers in this survey, saw the intense security screening a necessity that needs to be accepted.

Since airports became vulnerable objects that require security and safety, the demand for safety and security measures grew rapidly among passengers and carriers (Adey, 2004). The pressure also increased because of the worldwide economic growth of passengers and cargo (Annual Report Schiphol Group, 2017). This development requires the government to guarantee the safety of their citizens as one of its main goals. In order to reach this goal, governments more often look for solutions in public-private partnerships (Guiraudon & Lahav, 2000).

The public-private partnerships predominantly occur in technology. The use of Biometric data, finger-, iris-print, and other body parts for identity information will likely increase in the near future in border security management (Adey, 2004). This would mean that more information of individual passengers will be a part of information systems in the hands of private companies, anyway it certainly will be used. If it is the state that has the monopoly on the legitimate use of force, even when outsourcing this force and still remain the owner, there will cause challenges.

How can ownership be safeguarded in the field of biometric data and other body information of individual passengers? And how will the states protect their citizens data and privacy? When a majority of 85 percent of passengers accepts an intrusion of their privacy to secure safe travelling, does this imply they can oversee the future consequences of this intrusion? And what does this mean for the minority of passengers that do not agree with this intrusion of privacy? Will they be limited in their EU or global travel movements?

1.3 Research objective and research questions

This master thesis explores the role of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee as a part of the border process of Amsterdam Airport Schiphol. The task of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee is an important cog in a process that can be compared with a machine, the connections of the cogs and the oil lubrication of the system determines the output of the process.

The border machine is a complex process consisting of several subprocesses. The overall objective of this master thesis is to examine how this process functions and how the role of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee is performed in the border process. The main question of this master thesis is formulated as followed:

To what extent do security measures of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee influence the daily flow of passengers at the border on Amsterdam Airport Schiphol?

By law, the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee is the party responsible for *border policing, safety and security* and *international military police tasks*. Focus in this main research question is on the border process, border policing, safety and security.

The main research question is supported by a number of sub questions. These sub questions will provide a clear understanding of the functioning of airport borders are the role and position of specifically the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee within the border process.

Sub-question 1:

What are borders and how are they constructed?

This sub question aims in gaining more knowledge in the phenomenon 'the border' and particularly the border on airports within the EU. How are borders originated, constructed and how do they protect a state's sovereignty?

Sub-question 2:

What policies on borders are created by the European Union and how are they implemented in safeguarding the European Union's borders?

Research is aimed at how policies are created by the European Union for the safeguarding of its the borders and to what extent is this influenced by the debates on societal and economic developments in international perspective?

Sub-question 3:

What is the role of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee in the border process?

This sub question examines the organization and the working methods of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee focusing on its border task.

Sub-question 4:

How does the debate on airport borders influence the position of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee?

In the turbulent environment of aviation, the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee is required to adapt to an everchanging society with technological, political and societal developments.

1.4 Thesis outline

The first part of this thesis has provided an introduction of the subject in terms of relevance, research objectives and structure of the research. The next chapter will explore the organization of the Amsterdam Airport Schiphol border, its actors and the relevant theoretical debate on airports which serve as a framework for the thesis. In chapter three the methodology of research will be explained consisting of five-month observations, desk research and field research in the form of interviews with relevant border actors. In chapter four, the research findings will be analysed. In chapter five, the conclusions with relevant insight findings, critical reflections and recommendations of the research will be formulated.

2. Borders and Border policing

A Thursday afternoon in April, 4 pm. As typical at this time of the day, it is relatively quiet at Amsterdam Airport Schiphol. The fully booked intercontinental flights arrive and departs in the morning and late in the evening. At this time of day, it is most crowded at the Schengen arrival hall, where all of the flights arrive of various European destinations.

Two heavily armed officials of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee are patrolling in the Schengen arrival hall. One of the officials is visible a lot taller than the other, thereby making the other official look tiny.

A business man dressed in a dark blue suit with red tie is leaving the Schengen arrival hall. In his hand he holds a briefcase as he walks passed the officials. The smallest of the two officials greets the business man with the briefcase. The business man now stops, saying: How are you doing, long time no see! Apparently, they know each other well. 'I am doing fine sir, how about yourself? I have not seen you in a while. Have you been on holidays? The official asks. This makes the business man smile, 'I wish it was true. I think we just missed each other', says the businessman. 'Ah, yes, that could be, due to our irregular shifts, the official says, the last two weeks I have had several nightshifts'. The business man looks on his watch, 'each working-day, with exception of the Friday, I leave at the same time in the morning towards my office in London'. The business man looks back on his watch. 'I am sorry, but I have to catch my train to Utrecht'. The two officials greets the man and continue with their patrol. The business man walks towards Schiphol Plaza for his train at Schiphol train station.

None of the three men give the impression of finding it special that the business man, while living in Utrecht, works at a London office and daily commutes between London and Amsterdam by plane.

2.1 Nation-states

2.1.1. Twentieth century

Borders between countries on a map of Europe are indicated by a thin line. Lines that marks not only territorial borders territory but has more functions in reality.

Borders are not simply lines on a map and fences in the landscape, as Kafka (1915), Popescu (2011) and van Houtum (2011) claim. In their vision, borders are not fixed, but transitory, continuously transforming.

This chapter gives description to the function of borders, the threats that nation-states faces and how they deal with these threats, to understand recent developments in the border checking. It explores the concept of borders as a marker of territory. Territorialisation is an exclusive power and it expresses who is a member of society within these borders. It decides who belongs where, who belongs where, who is an insider and who is outsider, who is part of us and who is part of them? (Paasi, 1996). It is a mean of ordering space (van Houtum, 2011).

European cities in the Middle Ages were surrounded by enormous walls in order to protect inhabitants from enemies trying to invade the city. Violence decreased over time, hence walls became unnecessary and this openness led to economic prosperity of these European cities. According to Huijter and van Hees (2016), in the seventeenth century borders took over the role of protecting citizens against threats from enemy states. These delineated countries developed during the last hundreds of years into nation states characterized as a group that shares a common ideology, customs, has a sense of homogeneity and a sense of belonging associated with a particular territory considered to be its own (Connor, 1978). Thus, borders offer protection against threats of the outside and therefore create a mutual sense of belonging by the social contract of the inhabitants on the inside (van Zuijlen, 2012). Or as Paasi (1998) states: *'state borders can be walled fortresses and spaces of Othering one's neighbours, intended to keep insiders in and outsiders out, or they can be windows to the world and interfaces of interaction with neighbouring countries'* (Popescu, 2011, p.17).

After the First World War, with increased prosperity, also smuggle and international crime increased. This resulted in a shift from military presence at the border to the policing aspects of border control (Winterdyk & Sundberg, 2010). After the Second World War, East-European countries became part of the new Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Meanwhile, the physical borders between western European countries were slowly transformed into social, moral and legal concepts. This shift of borders has further developed with the rise of prosperity

and times of peace between nations. According to Winterdyk and Sundberg (2010), the integrity of nation state borders has become the key to the safety, security and prosperity of its citizens. This also applies to the Netherlands, where border-checks nowadays play an important role in the protection of the important interests such as its territory, a healthy economy and a stable and political landscape (Muller, Helsloot & van Wegberg, 2012).

2.1.2. Schengen implementation agreement

On 14 June 1985, the Schengen area agreement between member states of the EU was signed in Schengen, Luxembourg. The agreement led to the abolishment of the inner border checks within the EU. As a consequence, however, the external borders of the EU became more prominent as they were meant to provide protection for all the EU countries as part of the Schengen agreement. Since the implementation of the agreement, access to the Netherlands means access to all the countries of the Schengen area (van Heerwaarde, 2016). By the Treaty of Amsterdam signed in June 1997 (enforced in May 1999), the Schengen Acquis was integrated in the EU. Since then EU countries have been active in integrating policies concerning borders within the legal and institutional framework of the EU, thereby impacting their own sovereignty. The Schengen agreement can be perceived as a geographical concept because the area can be entered or exited, however there are no 'Schengen nationals' (van Heerwaarde, 2016). The Schengen Border Code defines the regulations regarding freedom of movement or stricter external border control (van Heerwaarde, 2016). Article 21 of the treaty on the Functioning of the European Union states: *Every EU citizen has the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the EU member states, subject to the limitations and conditions formulated in the Treaty and by the measures adopted to give it effect. These limitations and conditions are set out in Directive 2004/38/EC (OJ L 158, 30.4.2004, p.77).*

2.2 Border Security

According to Koser (2010), borders can be crossed for various reasons. Some may travel for business, others for vacation or to visit friends or family and then others travel in the hope of finding a better future. Border crossing can be done documented in a legal manner as in accordance with the ruling, or undocumented in an illegal fashion, thus violating the rules. However, what exactly is legal or illegal may not always be clear and people have to know the rules to be able to follow them. Irregular migration for instance, may be a deliberate choice or might be caused by administrative obstacles or due to a lack of information (Koser, 2010). The

complexity of rules and laws concerning border crossing and the enforcement of these laws is subsequently even more complex.

Winterdyk and Sundberg (2010) distinguish three different targets of border enforcement, namely terrorism, unauthorized migration and transnational crime. In the process of border crossing, each of these targets requires a different legal approach. Migration problems have strong connections with geopolitical issues (Lindjier & Vermeulen, 2015). In addition, terrorists can misuse migration rulings to enter the EU (NOS, 2016). In figure 2.1, a scheme of targets has been outlined and table 2.1 provides a list with the types of threats actors related to border enforcement.




Figure 2.1. Targets of border enforcement

	Terrorists	Transnational Criminals	Unauthorized migrants
Motivations	-ideological- Achieve socially transformative change or narrower, specific ends. Typically, not focused on controlling turf or underground markets but react to particular grievances	-profit driven- create and maintain illicit wealth and prestige. Defend criminal markets and turf. Stave off 'enemies' including law enforcement, other state actors, and rival criminal groups.	-personal opportunity- some combination of factors such as employment opportunities, a general desire to improve their economic circumstances, family connections, and dangerous or difficult conditions in their home countries.
Means	-propaganda and violence featuring symbolic dimension- Justify violence in moral terms. Intend it to restore a particular sense of justice in a society perceived as unjust. Propaganda used to justify cause, recruit and raise support.	-engage in violence and corruption aimed at goals tied to illicit markets- use violence to intimidate officials and rivals to protect operations. Corrupt public officials and people in the private sector. Use violence to exploit innocent victims. Tend to act in obscurity. Occasionally use propaganda to besmirch rivals.	-illegal entry or visa overstay- apart from immigration-related offenses such as illegal entry or the use of fraudulent documents to obtain employment, most unauthorized aliens never commit a criminal offense. Some become involved with transnational criminals during the course of their migration or while obtaining employment.

Table 2.1. Types of Threat Actors related to border enforcement (Rosenblum, Bjelopera & Finklea, 2013).

Both migration and terrorism influence the culture and identity of inhabitants (Ceyhan, 2008). For governments and politics, border control therefore is of growing importance. It is a search in finding the proper balance between the security of passengers and individual freedom of movement. Due to globalization, the protection of borders has become more complex over the years. As Scheffer (2016) states, no one wants a totalitarian state that uses oppressive means to ban all illegitimate offences.

2.3 Amsterdam Airport Schiphol

One of the main international airports within the Schengen Area is Amsterdam Airport Schiphol. During the First World War, in 1916, this airport started as a military airport. After the war, Royal Dutch Airlines (KLM) founder Jan Dellaert set up the first steps in the creation of an international airport in the Netherlands that would enable the rebuilding of the Dutch economy (AAS, 2015).

In 2015 Amsterdam Airport Schiphol was the third listed airport in the EU that loaded more than 1,5 million tons of cargo. And with a record amount of almost seventy-six million passengers in 2017, Amsterdam Airport Schiphol is now one of the biggest airports in the world. Amsterdam Airport Schiphol has a total of 300 destinations around the world and nearly 40 percent of the travellers transfer at the airport to various destinations (AAS, 2015). Amsterdam Airport Schiphol can thus be seen as one of the economic moderators in the Netherlands (AAS, 2016). This thesis is limited to the flow of passenger and cargo is disregard.

2.4 Border Policing

The Royal Netherlands Marechaussee was founded in 1814 and one of its main tasks is to guard national borders (Oostdijk & van Vark, 2014). Therefore, they have been present since the start of Amsterdam Airport Schiphol in 1920 as an international airport.

Table 2.2 shows the current development of passengers in relation to the border officials of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee at Amsterdam Airport Schiphol from 1920 till 2012.

Year:	1920	1926	1946	1973	2012
Number of passengers:	440	10,000	-	7,500,000	51,000,000
Number of Border Officials (KMar):	-	-	35	-	1,800

Table 2.2. Numbers of Passengers and border officials at Amsterdam Airport Schiphol (Bethlehem, 2013)

In 2017, 76 million passengers passed Amsterdam Airport Schiphol at that time the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee consisted out of 1,900 border officials (Daniel, 2017).

The border check in 1946 consisted out of an inspection of proper documentation (papers and visa). The documents were also checked for forgery. Foreign passengers were asked for the purpose of their visit and if they carried money in large amounts. The rise of terrorism on airports since the seventies of the twentieth century influenced the way in which border checks were executed. The Royal Netherlands Marechaussee shifted to checking for forged passports and disguised passengers (Bethlehem, 2013). The expansion of Amsterdam Airport Schiphol in this period forced the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee to follow a new strategy. A strategy included the use of technology, such as cameras and automated police search files. This development ignited a debate on the privacy matter. The automated police search systems of border checks at the gate was debated by with the Dutch Refugee Aid Association (Stichting Vluchtelingenwerk) (Bethlehem, 2013). At the same time, the airport needed enormous

infrastructural investments to make sure that transit time for passengers was kept to a minimum. Before the infrastructural adjustments were implemented, the solution was found in increasing the number of border officials of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee (Bethlehem, 2013) (Figure 2.2.). The goal was that 95 percent of the departing and transiting passengers should pass the border check within six minutes and 95 percent of the arriving passengers should pass the border check within ten minutes.

Next to the restrictive law enforcement, the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee also provides services. It is authorized to issue Tourist Cards, Temporary Passports and other travel documents.




Figure 2.2. The factors determined on the workload of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee

2.5 Border Checks

Almost 1,000 border officials of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee are deployed within the border process. The border-check at Amsterdam Airport Schiphol consists out of two types: the *minimum border-check* and the *thorough border-check*.

Article 7. Section 2 of the Schengen Border Code, states that the minimum border-check applies to EU citizens that include the right of community free movement. The aim of the minimum border-check is to establish only the identity of a traveller based on his or hers travel documents. The EU border-check consists out of a document check and a person check. Bethlehem (2013) describes the document-check as a fast verification of the validity of a person's document. It is checked upon signs of counterfeiting, falsification, or whether it has been reported stolen, invalidated or lost. The person check involves a non-systematic basis,

where consultation of national and European databases takes place based on potential threats to the public order or internal security (van der Molen, 2016) (Table 2.3).

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2014 (incl overstayers)
inadmissibles	3024	2189	1994	2172	2172
asylum requests	820	623	777	873	873
overstayers					3108
Permission under ...	2899	1959	1514	397	397
Clausules	5261	3412	4256	2725	2725
Identity fraude	866	615	650	767	767
total Migr law incidents	12870	8798	9191	6934	10042
Number pax total Spl	49800000	51000000	52500000	55000000	
no. of pax arriving Spl	16600000	17000000	17500000	18333333	2014 (incl. overstayers)
% migr threat total	0,026%	0,017%	0,018%	0,013%	Migration Incidents/pax
% migr threat arr	0,078%	0,052%	0,053%	0,038%	0,055%
no. persons involved in:					
Human Smuggling (HS)	140	97	77	69	Crime Incidents/pax
Human Trafficking (HT)	97	347	204	157	0,00669%
total HS/HT	237	444	281	226	
% HS/HT total	0,00048%	0,00087%	0,00054%	0,00041%	Terrorism incidents/pax
% HS/HT arrival	0,00144%	0,00261%	0,00162%	0,00123%	0,00058%
No. of Drugs Couriers	1037	1089	1049	1001	
% drugs crime	0,00208%	0,00214%	0,00200%	0,00182%	
% drugs crime arrival	0,00624%	0,00640%	0,00599%	0,00546%	
Terrorism related incidents			71	318	
% terr total			0,00013%	0,00058%	

Table 2.3 Output Border Checks at Amsterdam Airport Schiphol by the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee (Internal information Royal Netherlands Marechaussee, 2015)

The thorough border check, as stated in article. 7 section 3 of the Schengen Border Code, applies to nationals of third-countries. The main goal of this border-check is the verification of the conditions to enter the EU (Schengen Border Code, 2018) (Greydanus, 2017). The limiting conditions are listed in order for a national of a third country crossing the EU-border. Every third-country national must have a valid travel document and must also be in the possession of a valid visa. Purpose, duration and sufficient financial means for the duration of the intended stay are also conditions for admission, see table 2.4. And third country nationals with a potential threat to the public order, public health, domestic security or international relations can be refused entry. As clearly mentioned in the Schengen Border Code: *‘a border-check should always be performed with complete respect for human dignity, specifically when vulnerable persons are*

involved. Hence, border officials need to perform the border-check without discrimination of race, ethnicity, religion, conviction, handicap, age or sexual orientation' (article 6 Schengen Border Code).

Entry conditions Third-country national		Entry conditions EU Citizen (on non-systematic basis)	
1.	Valid travel document	1.	Valid travel document
2.	Valid visa for short-stay, long-stay or free movement in the Schengen area	2.	Person check (consultation on EU and national database for public order or internal security)
3.	Valid purpose		
4.	Financial means for the duration of intended stay		
5.	Return to their home-country		

Table 2.4 Entry conditions EU for EU citizens and for Third-country national (Schengen Border Code, 2018)

These border-checks can be seen as multi-layered law-systems, based on the Schengen Border Code and national migration laws.

The performed border checks are very rules-based and bureaucratic, they categorize persons, differentiating between EU citizens and third country nationals. Even though aforementioned article 6 of the Schengen Border Code state that discrimination on ground of race and ethnicity is forbidden, the rules and regulations are to a certain extent discriminating, as it does discriminate between nationalities.

In the article *Wasted Lives*, Zygmunt Bauman (2004), states that the border categorizes many people as human waste, thereby people are being dumped into refuse heaps of asylum systems and detention centres.

2.6 Passports

'Passports are a police measure of governments, no other than the issuing government, or its agents, has the right to bestow them, for none has the interest and none other has the right and obligation to watch over good order, liberty and the public security. The agent of the foreign power cannot be one's agent, even in his own interest; one cannot give it any authority, let alone one that the constitution expressly delegates exclusively to the French and to the magistrates of the people. A foreigner is, same as any resident, is subject to the law of the country in which he travels. This subjection is the price for the protection and safety of a nation; it is by law the right of the state authority. A natural-born Frenchman cannot travel in France without the permission

of the government or the magistrates of the people; the foreigners should therefore obtain permission as well' (Torpey, 2000, p.24).

Even though the passport is the most important document for international travel (mobility), little has been written in the social science about this document (Adey, 2004). The passport is one of the primary tools of states use in the surveillance of human border movement. The Huffington Post posted the question: *'How powerful is your passport? And it concluded: 'More than a simple grant of access into a country, passports and the visas they contain reflect geopolitics, the relationship between two nations, and a country's stature relative to the rest of the world'* (Huffington Post, 30 June 2014).

According to Adey (2004), passports provide a means to regulate movements of people. *'Violating an individual to 'embrace' a people. Passports are used to identify a person, making a person legible for a state who may then enforce its authority and decide over the person's movement* (Adey, 2004, p.510). Passports are symbols of nation-states and one's adherence to them. It provides information where do people are from and what their physical characteristics are. Or as Paul Fussell (1982) calls it: *'all our characteristics and appearances which we continually negotiate and question, are narrowed down to the limited category widths a passport provides'*.

2.7 Visa

Mau et al (2015), describes a visa as an international travel document that allows free movement between countries and can be perceived as a type of permission to enter a place or location. A visa is a form of declaration of authority, permission to enter a territory or state, yet not merely the physical manifestation of the authorization but a process as well. Clarke (2011) formulates visa as: *'an endorsement on a passport indicating that the holder is allowed to enter, leave or stay for a specified period of time in a country'*. In Regulation No. 2317/95, O.J. 1995, L 234/1, visa was first mentioned in a European context whereby citizens of listed third countries of which its citizens have to be in possession of a valid visa in order to enter EU member states. Article 5 of the Regulation No. 2317/95, O.J. 1995, L 234/1 states: *'visa is the authorization given or a decision taken by a Member state which is required for entry into its territory with a view to: an intended stay in that Member state or in several Member states of no more than three months in total, and transit through the territory of that Member State or several Member states*

except for transit through the international zones of the airports and transfers between airports in a Member state’.

Visa can be divided into a short stay visa and a long stay visa. A short stay visa is a small document attached to or a stamp in a passport that enables the holder to pass the border of a member state, subject to potential additional checks in order to pass the border and to stay in the member state for a given time(Clarke, 2011) (Figure 2.3).




Figure 2.3 Border Process Travel documents (Passport and Visa)

Mau et al. (2015) state that a visa has three policy functions, namely to guarantee the national security, to ban and prevent crime, and to regulate immigration. Visa is a foreigner control instrument, and relationship between member states and countries of origin determine whether visa requirement are imposed.

To further elaborate on considerations for visa, the three policy functions are being explained. As mentioned before, national security and relations between countries plays a key role in establishing visa requirements. According to Torpey (2000), visas were implemented during the French Revolution with the purpose of restricting the access to a country. The historical explanation for the construction of the visa is based on the vision of Montagnar Julien Souhait in France, who envisioned an international visa system in the eighteenth century. Souhait explains the argumentation for the visa as followed: *‘as proof of their good conduct and their respect for liberty and public tranquillity’*. He further elaborates his statement by stating: *‘men who cannot offer, like the French, the natural guarantee of their attachment to the nation, nor the same means to repair the damage they might do through corruption and immorality’* (Torpey, 2000).

Thus, Torpey (2000) states that foreign emissaries cannot be trusted to be responsible for passport practices for French citizens.

In order to counteract the problem of foreign undesirables entering the country with documents issued by foreign other than French authorities is by creating a system in which French representatives in the traveller's country of origin, issue passports to those who want to come to France. Torpey (2000) states that French representatives can be trusted not to give passports to those who might undermine public order in France.

Hence, the security function is based on the historical relationship between countries and the interstate tensions and the distrust of the 'other.' When tensions and distrust are high, a visa is required and this went both ways. Therefore, it can be concluded that visas regulations reflect the relationship between states, rather than the behaviour of individuals belonging to a particular state (Torpey, 2000).

After the implementation of visa policy by France in the eighteenth century, several countries in Europe also adopted a visa policy. During the eighties of the twentieth century, the ideology behind visa changed and instead of solely bilateral relations, the link to individual behaviour became inherent. Two new policy objectives were added to ban and prevent crime and regulate immigration.

Mau et al. (2015) state that visas have long been a tool for immigration countries. Especially in countries like the USA, Australia and Canada, governments are wary of potential migrant and in order to restrict migration, they maintain strict entry protocols. And visa requirements are effective instruments for the screening of potential migrants. According to Mau et al. (2015) the general public's attitude towards immigration influences the imposition of visas. For example, Mau et al. (2015) state that in periods of economic depression and recession, rising unemployment and economic instability, hostility towards immigration rises. This is often reflected in the imposition of visa requirements and explains tensions in general immigration and visa policy.

During the nineties of the twentieth century, the perception grew that many immigrants tried to benefit from the EU's welfare system, something that posed challenges in several European societies. It can be concluded that visa liberalization or requirement are linked to bilateral relations between the EU and migrant's countries of origin, in which the EU wants to decrease the growing number of migrants.

Perhaps the fiercest weapon used on the Dutch border is not the MP5 automatic rifle, carried by the border officials, but might the visa policy. Refugees and migrants who do not meet the necessary requirements to apply for a visa are left with no other option than to take higher risks if they still wish to enter the country.

3. Methodology of research

3.1 Methodological approach

This research predominantly consist out of qualitative research to gather data, so that the collected datasets can be brought in relation to existing theories, and new insights may spring. Qualitative research is a scientific method of observation to gather non-numerical data (Lincoln, 1994). In order to make the world visible, a set of interpretive, material practices is used. These practices show the world into a series of representations that include conversations, fieldnotes, interviews and memos (Mortelmans, 2009). Qualitative research involves an interpretive, naturalistic approach to the world. This implies that qualitative research studies things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or to interpret, phenomena in terms of the meaning people bring to them (Mortelmans, 2009, p.20).

A qualitative research can be applied when the goal of the research is to describe, to understand, to interpret and to explain experiences or behaviours (Creswell, 2007).

Besides qualitative research, quantitative research is conducted to substantiate findings and insights. Quantitative research is the empirical examination of phenomena via statistical techniques. The objective of this type of research is to develop and employ models, theories and hypotheses for to the phenomena subject to the research.

The goal of this research is to examine to what extent security measures of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee influence the daily flow of passengers at the border on Amsterdam Airport Schiphol. Descriptive research with the aim to describe characteristics of the concept. The choice to conduct descriptive research is because it primarily addresses primarily the 'what'-question by observing, recording, describing and classifying phenomena (Mortelmans, 2009). Without a long-term observation there is the risk that this research may only describe how the procedures are followed according to the observations rather than looking at the entire process. For instance, could it miss unwritten cooperation, cultural aspects and attitudes of passengers towards the border process.

3.2 Data collection and analysis

Collecting data is an essential step in any type of analysis and research. According to Mortelmans (2009), data collection can be described as a process of collecting information from all the relevant sources in order to find answers to the research problem.

Data collection in this research was focussed on collecting data regarding security measures of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee and the influence of the daily flow of passengers at the borders on Amsterdam Airport Schiphol by finding out which agreements, policies and/or documents apply. In order to answer the main research question, this research consist out of a variety of data collection tools. Such variety is called triangulation. According to Creswell (2007), triangulation can be considered is the use of numerous theories, data sources and methods to study a phenomenon, a technique was introduced to bypass potential biases arising from the use of one methodology. Yin (2003) states that by using triangulation, multiple data sets through different methodology are used thereby allowing to compare findings from different perspectives. Hence, multiple data collection strategies ensure this research to provide accurate and balanced findings.

In this research, data collection is gathered in three ways. Desk research is applied to collect data. Desk research involves collecting data from existing sources (Creswell, 2007). The main focus of this research was to get an understanding of the functioning of borders and security on airports, EU policies on borders and the role of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee. In order to gain knowledge, international researches, websites, memos, policies, newspapers, rules and regulations were used. The Centre for European Policy Studies, academic literature and policy papers of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee provided relevant qualitative and quantitative data for the research. In addition, EuroStat, CBS (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek) and CoESS white papers were used for statistical datasets.

Observation was done as another method of data collection. According to Creswell (2007), *observation* can be perceived as a method of collecting data in which the researcher observes within a specific research field. The main question to answer during these observations, was: *'what is going on here'*. In order to perform the observations, the researcher did an internship of five months at the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee. Observation gave a better understanding in order to capture the context within people interact and it provided a chance to learn things that people not want to talk about in an interview setting.

According to Creswell (2007), the strength of applying observations is that observations provide good insight into how different participants behave and interact. They also allow to see things that are taken for granted by participants and may give context to the mere analysis of documents and materials. This research consists out of several observation-moments during day- and nightshifts with the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee on Amsterdam Airport Schiphol. A specific list of the moments of observations is included in the appendix.

During the observations, the focus was on six elements, that were drafted based on questions that came from findings in the literature. The data gathered from the observations adds for a better understanding of the border process and the participants.

The six elements were:

1. What is going on?
2. What are people doing and what do they want to achieve?
3. How exactly do they do this?
4. How do officials characterize passengers and who do they read their intentions?
5. What assumptions do they make?
6. What other observed events at the site are relevant to this research

Interviews were held in order to delve into specific topics with experts and actors involved. Interviewing allows to explore the thinking, assumptions made, emotions, attitudes and perceptions that may influence observed behaviour of those involved to the related research topic (Yin, 2003).

Interviews also provide a more in-depth qualitative exploration of an individual's perception of a topic. And it follows up on unexpected results or confirms interpretations that were generated by other means of data collection. The strength of using interviews offers the flexibility to adapt questioning according to the responses of interviewee in order to clarify questions or answers. Interviews in this research were semi-structured, the interview topics were open, thereby allowing new ideas to be brought up during the interview as a result of what the interviewee stated. This type of interviews consist out of a framework of several themes related to the research. These themes forms the basis for preparing the questions. In this research six persons were interviewed. The selection for the interviewee was based on their strategical position, expertise and their knowledge related to this research. The interviews were analysed based on

equally composed questions for each interviewee and the answers were compared with the other interviews and also with academic literature.

A list of the interviewed persons, an interview overview, questions and a summary are included in the appendix.

In addition, many conversations have taken place during the five-month internship between the researcher and a variety of border officials at Amsterdam Airport Schiphol. The combination of the non-structured interviews with the conversations from both border officials from the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee and private security officials created solid insights into the structure and the professional culture of the border process. The unique opportunity of an internship of five-months made it possible to experience all parts of the border process a great value add to the research.

3.3 Research limitations

The Royal Netherlands Marechaussee is an organization where work processes consist of sensitive and confidential information. Therefore, not all operational internal information of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee could be analysed in this research. Subject to the use of information, consultation was needed with the intern supervisor of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee. Another limitation concerns the number of interviews, only six persons were interviewed for this research, which was rather limited in number. However, all of the interviewees are of strategic level, they work in the very top positions in their organizations, thus limiting the potential number that could be interviewed. In terms of quality validation, the interviewed experts who work as executors and advisers of the policy, they might be biased in their visions and opinions. Even though the researcher had many conversations with passengers, security officials and carriers, these conversations are not included in the research. This could be of relevance in order to see this research in another perspective. However, by making observations as part of the research, perspectives from passengers were also included.

A bigger limitation is the fact that this research was done from an internship, embedded in the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee. Naturally, working together side by side for a while, some identification with colleagues starts occurring for a researcher, and this did indeed happen to the researcher with the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee organization after a month or so. An important notion in order to always keep the objective attitude of an independent researcher.

4. Research findings

It approaches from far, gliding through the air like an eagle with its magistral appearance. It is coming closer rapidly, lowering altitude in a smooth descent. On its sides, the familiar blue colours of KLM. From the other direction, an even larger plane from the Flying Emirates approaches. In perfectly synchronised choreography, they approach the airport, with each appointed a lane for landing. During landing, again more planes in all shapes and forms approach from all directions, awaiting permission to land. Who would have imagined a hundred years ago, that man would be able to transport by air so easily, and that this way of travel would become so popular? Air travel has made destinations that were once too far to travel, so much closer. Where it took Phileas Fogg in Verne's adventure story 80 days to round the globe, the other end of the world is now less than a day away.

Air travel has grown so rapidly that airports today have become the symbol of mobility and a central element in the world as we know it.

4.1 Security on the airport

Airports in their current forms with large numbers of passengers offer countless opportunities for shopping and dining. At the start of the twentieth century, airport transportation was far more exclusive, to be used next to military air forces only by the elite. Flying was seen as a social and cultural gathering for the upper class and by its high cost excluded to the lower classes, according to Zukowsky (1996). In the twentieth century, air travel grew rapidly with the decrease of prices and this created a mind shift that airport transportation was so exclusive. Airports began to grow in both size and economic importance for a country. The transformation of airports created new job opportunities and became a boost for a nation's economy. A symbol of success. Economic growth of a country is dependent of the mobility of trade, finance and capital. Movetalli and Stough (2004) state that civil air transportation is becoming key in global trade and tourism. The progression of airports turned into enormous terminals and runway sites that host millions of passengers pass every year. Cities with major airports became 'airport cities', as described by Adey (2004) that provide employment for urban populations. Motevalli and Stough (2004) describe airports as 'the space of flows' on the global network of mobility. Yet terminals are also built to accommodate for internal mobility. A terminal according to Adey (2004, p.504) is: *'predicated on confluence, whereby passengers are precisely timed pumped into and out of space. Airlines then constructed specially designed terminals to control and direct the masses of passengers.'*

Over time airports have changed, and so has our perception of the function of airports. Airports are not just tools that facilitate air transportation to far and remote areas, making the world 'smaller', but they have also changed the natural borders of a nation. Adey (2004) states that the border is now centralised in the country, near our major cities. He states that airports act as border zones that cross national and state boundaries. Airports function in a similar way to border guarding the geographical boundaries of the countries, regulating the movement of people entering and leaving. Gschrey (2011) states that the doors to the city are its tollbooths while its customs posts are dams, filtering the fluidity of the masses, the penetrating power of the migrating hordes.

As Adey (2004) and Motevalli and Stough (2004) argued, due to the rise of airports globally as a main way of mobility, they have achieved a much more important role in today's society. With their changing function, surveillance and securitization are now playing an important role at airports.

While physical landmarks of countries fade, the need for protection of airport borders became clearer and significance increased in the late sixties. According to Adey (2004), during that time the aviation industry became a target of terrorism because the use of airplanes as a way of transportation experienced a rapid growth and provided an opportunity to disrupt a country's economy. The hijacking of an El Al flight (Israeli airline) on 22 July 1968 can be perceived as the first terrorist attack on such a means of transportation. The hijack was done as a political act where passengers, predominantly Israelis, who were held hostage to be traded for Palestinian prisoners in Israel. According to Hoffman (1998), by attacking the El Al flight, the terrorists were really attacking the state of Israel. The media all over the world covered the hijacking drama. Hoffman (1998) states that the aviation industry had become a target of terror and has since the hijack events in 1968 endured a rapid increase in these attacks. When Al Qaeda attacked the USA on 11 September 2001, this led countries to make severe adjustments to border security.

In order to deal with the increasing fear of terrorist attacks, carriers and governments intensified security measures on airports. Creating sterile lounge concepts, baggage and security checks, hanging legislation, reorganizing public services at airports, making bilateral and multilateral agreements with other countries were the effects of this development (Adey, 2004).

4.2 Security and surveillance

One of the most important tools applied on airports is continuous surveillance. Surveillance has become one of the primary means of ensuring that airports are kept safe and secure. This concentration on surveillance created the securitized airports as we know them today. It is believed that by controlling airports, terrorism, transnational crime and (unauthorized) migration can be monitored, controlled and risks are kept to the minimum.

Monitoring passengers is important in order to control migration, but monitoring each person equally is impossible, according to Jenkins (2002). Jenkins (2002) states that airports need to put surveillance on passengers but cannot examine every passenger as rigorously. Hence, methods of passengers screening and profiling are implemented to effectively sort the most probable threat to security from other passengers (Table 4.2). Profiling can be perceived as one of the most controversial and debated forms of surveillance. According to Adey (2004), profiling is the ability for information or data about an individual to make it possible to sort people into profiles of particular groups.

Profiles are made to predict a person's likely behaviour and list typical characteristics of a criminal. Profiling was first used as a method to improve security on airports in the USA. In 1996, the government stated that passengers could be separated into a large majority with little risk and small minority who merit additional attention (Adey, 2004, p.506). The rationale behind profiling is then to concentrate upon this minority. The selected 'few' are subject to personal checking of possessions and perhaps an interview or questioning.

Profiling is a very subjective way of surveillance, it embodies the possibility of discrimination towards particular passengers based on ethnicity and national origin. As Adey (2004) formulates it directly: *'a person becomes sorted based on personal prejudice'* (Adey, 2004, p. 506).




Table 4.2 Surveillance and Security: Human actions and Technology

4.3 Biometric surveillance

Another way of sorting by surveillance is by using biometric technologies, an increasing method used on airports. Adey (2004) states that biometry is the measurement of a body. Biometrics sees the body as a set of data points, identifying specific of the body such as the iris, face and palm signatures to identify an individual. The use of such biometrics data is also commonly used in the search for forensic evidence, such as fingerprints to identify a suspect of a crime. Biometrics works by containing detailed records of a passenger's data. Biometric systems are referred to as authentication systems, where a positive match with stored data authenticates the identity.

However, other biometric systems referred to as identification systems, compare the captured body data to large amounts of records kept on other databases (Adey, 2004, p. 507). At the airports, passengers do not attest their identity, the airports identifies them (Adey, 2004). The use of biometric systems is concerning in terms of privacy rights. By applying biometric systems, passengers are treated like objects like a baggage item with a barcode. Another critique is the way information is stored, particularly the sharing of the biometric data with other parties. The possibility for data to be hacked or misused by external sources is of concern. And biometric systems have several sorting implications. Amsterdam Airport Schiphol has the 'Privium' system to bypass busy queues and avoid check-in delays. The program offers passengers the option to enrol at a yearly subscription fee by registering their biometric data on a Privium card. This system influences the movement of passengers as they are now sorted into Privium card holders and non-holders. One could call this the elite option, for privileged travellers. For the airport, it is

a system that functions similar to human profiling and it saves time to perform additional security measures for those not enrolled in the program

Sorting comes in many shapes and forms. One of the most uprising and used form is digital surveillance or formally called algorithmic surveillance (Graham & Wood, 2003). Huge quantity of cameras (CCTV: Closed Circuit Television) are an inseparable part of the airport, which is one of the most common modes of surveillance within airports. The ability of CCTV for detecting up deviant and threatening behaviour and identifying suspects are already present in large numbers on Amsterdam Airport Schiphol. Airports are a part of the digitalizing world. The possibilities of digital sorting will increase, whereby data can be used to predict, interact or analyse deviant behaviour (Graham & Wood, 2003). It is inevitable that the storage and application of these data will also be the responsibility of public companies (Adey, 2004).

4.4 Security and privacy

'He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows about it, takes responsibility for the constraints of power, allows them to record him, he inscribes in himself the power relation in which he plays both roles, becomes the principle of his own subjection' (Foucault, 1975, p. 202-203).

Passengers on airports accept that they are fully surrendered to the will of the border officials with their instrument to safeguard security.

Airports are monitored around the clock. In line with the *Panopticon theory*, travellers are subjects and constantly placed in a state of visibility. According to Foucault (1975), the efficiency of the institution is maximized, it guarantees the power function, even when no one asserts it. Foucault (1975) states: *'it is in the respect that the Panopticon functions automatically'*. The *Panopticon* at airports explains the behaviour why passengers accept reduced privacy.

4.5 Border actors

The six interviewees all are actors in the Amsterdam Schiphol border process. All of them have positions on strategic levels involved in the border process at Amsterdam Schiphol airport. Their influence varies from management positions as senior law enforcement officers of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee, to a policy advisor for the ministry of Justice, to a safety and policy advisor of the European Commission.

The deputy commander of the Border Control of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee explains the importance of sharing intelligence with all the other European Union countries and some

Western countries, like the United States, Canada and Australia. Multilateral agreements make it possible to share relevant information. In his opinion the responsibility of the Netherlands and not just the Dutch border at Amsterdam Schiphol Airport needs to be guarded and protected, but due to free movement of persons and multilateral agreements, the Netherlands are also responsible for the neighbouring countries and the other EU member states. He states that collective measures in guarding and protecting airport borders are necessary to guarantee the security. In his opinion, the requirements like technology and intelligence need to be the same in the Netherlands as in Poland or Spain. As a law enforcement agency, the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee need to adjust to the expansion of Amsterdam Airport Schiphol. Shared intelligence is crucial, thus spoke the deputy commander.

The commander, who is responsible for foreign affairs at the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee, is responsible for the execution of the law to Foreigners, a dedicated element of the border process. Their role in the border procedure is very often the last in the chain. This brigade is responsible for the deportation of unwanted visitors. In his opinion, the contribution of this brigade for the security on Amsterdam Airport Schiphol is limited. The security issue for them is not happening on the border, but more during the transportation on airplanes.

According to the Staff Officer Border Management of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee, a focus on internal and external borders of the EU is crucial. He states that the Schengen Agreement has made cooperation with the other member states on the topic of security more accessible. However, a growing amount of states joining the EU for free movement of people and goods, can complicate matters. In his opinion it is difficult to oversee if each member applies the same policies to adhere to the rules and regulation of EU level. One of his other tasks is to have direct contact with the EU and Coast Guard agency FRONTEX. The information FRONTEX provides is of great importance for the security on an EU border. According to this Staff Officer, the increase of migrants, especially on the East and South borders of the EU, offered a concerning development. Member states like Italy and Hungary do not act in conformity with the rules and regulations formulated in the Schengen Border Code. In his opinion the local political pressures were heavier than the desire to adhere to the Schengen Border Code.

The policy advisors of the Ministry of Justice and Safety underlined the importance of political relations both in and outside of Europe. Security on airports depends on rules, regulations and policies on either national, European and international level. They see granting country visa

liberalization as a political tool to bargain with. Free movement within the Schengen area is highly desired. According to both advisors, the implementation of an ETIAS in combined with humanitarian visa, would contribute to the security of the EU borders.

The responsibility of the policy advisor of the European Commission interviewed is to advise the European Commission on both external and internal border policies. He is also responsible for the evaluation of the border procedure in the Schengen Committee, which are conducted on airports at EU member states. Like the Staff Officer Border Management of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee, this policy advisor mentioned that EU member states in the East and in the South felt victim of the Schengen agreement. With the growing number of migrants, these countries experience major challenges that sometimes makes them violate the Schengen Border Code. He also states that the European Commission proposed the introduction of ETIAS, an online automated travel authorization, to screen visa free travellers before they enter the Schengen area, a proposal currently negotiated in the European Council.

All the interviewees emphasize the expansive growth of Amsterdam Airport Schiphol. On political and departmental level, solutions are found in new rules and legislations that contribute to the security of the borders. Humanitarian visas and online travel authorization procedures are under negotiation in the European Council. Border officials underline the importance of shared intelligence. An information system for all the EU member states and other Western countries should reduce threats and will contribute to higher security on airports.

5. Conclusions

It is Easter morning when the briefing starts at 6 am. Walking through Schiphol Plaza on the way to the briefing room, it is already very crowded. Many passengers travelling with children. At the briefing it is apparent that there are not many border officials from the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee present. Even though this day had been indicated to get very busy, busier than a normal day at the airport several brigades of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee were called to support. Other border officials were called to cancel their day off to help relieve the pressure at the border. Two extra check in booths are opened in order to cope with the expected crowd. The queues are long and run all the way through the hall. Passengers are excited for their holiday, even though some of them have been waiting for half an hour at the security check that is operated by private security officers. The automated fast pass No-Q for EU citizens is also open, providing together with the booths of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee a total of eight points to pass the border. But even this does not suffice, and the number of passengers grows, the queues get longer as the morning progresses. Suddenly, one of the No-Q booths gives a red light and the bar shuts. One of the No-Q is malfunctioning and stops working, leaving passengers no other option but to join the queues. Then, at one of the booths of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee, a passenger has problems with his travel and id documents. He starts to argue with the border official of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee why he is not allowed to pass the border. He is visibly irritated and raises his voice that also changes the mood in the queue: the happy and excited expressions on the faces of passengers turn somewhat irritated and anxious. Suddenly a man dressed in blue representing a carrier holding a portophone, passes the queue towards the booths. 'The queues are growing until the hallway. People will miss their flights and claim. You will need to speed up!', he says with irritation. One of the senior border officials walks towards the booth and says: 'we are trying our best, we cannot do any faster'. The man in blue looks at him and walks away. 'Pfft, those carriers, only thinking profit, instead of obligations', the senior border official says while returning to his office. Five minutes later he comes back out, face changed. The calmness he kept during the argument has now changed into seriousness. 'We will need to speed up this process now, that is an order', he snarls. 'Well then, I will do it with less accuracy, if that is what they want', mumbles one border official to the border official in the booth next to him. But even an hour later, the length of the queue is no shorter.

5.1 Conclusion

The Royal Netherlands Marechaussee plays a unique role in the border process of Amsterdam Airport Schiphol. It functions as an important cog in the process that can be compared with a machine, at work in a world of growing mobility. Operating in an era of economic growth when demand for security is increasing and where passengers privacy gets pressurised.

The aim of this research is to capture this process of border controlling and to get an insight in how the different border actors are connected. The complexity of the process is in the public and private cooperation, economic interests, the increase of passengers and the continuous challenges in a jungle of legal rulings and international agreements. To get a proper understanding of its complexity, the research was done from different angles, combining literature with sets of data, observations and interviews in order to answer the main research question.

To what extent do security measures of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee influence the daily flow of passengers at the border on Amsterdam Airport Schiphol?

The complicated border process has a large variety of actors who function as cogwheels in a machine that makes the border function. Although the Marechaussee has a unique role and position within this border machine, it cannot function without seamless connections to the other cogs in the machine. Security on Schiphol Airport partly lies in the hand of commercial partners. These partners take responsibility in securing Schiphol Airport to prevent unwanted visitors entering the country. Although the machine seems to be functioning properly, there are fundamental questions concerning the privacy of individuals, making the legitimacy of the border process part of a debate on airport border management. According to Max Weber, the state is the only institution that holds a monopoly on legitimate use of force, the state may outsource its force, but it remains owner (Civic & Miklaucic, 2011). How does government oversee a correct use of this force? Where technology plays a key role in the border process, is a big cog in the machine for the security on airports. Innovations in technology change the operating mode of the Marechaussee.

The main research question could give the impression that it are the security measures of the Marechaussee that determine the flowthrough of passengers at the border on Amsterdam Airport Schiphol. This is only partly the case, the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee has limited

influenced on the flowthrough. The quantity of passengers is determined by time of the day, the season, the economic situation and the capacity of an airport and its carriers. The security measures of the Marechaussee have to adapt to the flow of passengers. Inefficient planning or insufficient number of border officials cause unacceptable delays and security risks. In the end this would lead to political pressure on the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee organisation as the minister is held responsible for failures. In practice this led to an increase in border officials instead of infrastructural investments (Bethlehem, 2013) (as mentioned in Chapter 2.4 Border Policing).

Transparency concerning border security is crucial in a democratic society. The democratic, legal and social legitimacy must be kept. The balance scale between economic interest and security measures are influenced by the state of the economy. And if this is reality, the main research question may be altered since the daily flow of passengers actually influences the security measurements of the Marechaussee, both on the long and the short term. On the short term, it affects the number of border officials of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee, on the long term, it requires technological solutions and infrastructural investments.

Borders are not fixed, they are transitory and keep changing in space and time (van Houtum, 2011). Sometimes borders change because of political events, for instance by the increasing popularity of right-wing parties following the refugee debate in 2015. Discussions about borders have been the cause of arguments between member states. Protecting EU borders and their sovereignty, some EU-member states are not acting in accordance with EU principles for human rights. Changing borders in practice bring a need for change in the border process. For security measures on Amsterdam Airport Schiphol, the change of borders is limited in its influence. Even when carriers and private security officers abroad would guard the gates of the EU (remote control), border officials of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee on Amsterdam Airport Schiphol, are always competent to take decisions on entry.

Although there are substantial differences between public and private security actors in the border process, both are indispensable in keeping the border machine running. The Royal Netherlands Marechaussee is driven by social issues as its main concern, while private actors are driven by business interests and profit. Being business oriented does not mean lacking awareness of their responsibility of society (Bervoets & Eijgenraam, 2014). In practice these

actors are more adaptive to changing circumstances in the daily flow of passengers as they may operate less bureaucratic. On the other hand, private security actors will rarely act against their profit-oriented business goals.

Major events as mentioned in chapter 4.1 Security on the Airport, have shown that threats to airports heavily vary and have become increasingly international and fluid, more challenging to cope for governments (HM Government, 2017). After 9/11, the security measures of borders all over the world changed forever. The threat of terrorism became the highest priority of every Western country. Specifically, on airports, draconic security measures became part of the security procedure. The fear of terrorism, transnational crime and (unauthorized) migration legitimized such far-reaching security measures. Statistically, such threats may seem negligibly small (figure 5.1). Two comments should be made here. First, the low percentage of threats in the total amount of passenger flows may be thanks to the draconic security measures. Second, no country would want to risk a terrorist attack, even if the chances are statistically tiny.




Figure 5.1 Migration, Transnational crime and Terrorism at border checks in 2014. Source: Output Border Checks at Amsterdam Airport Schiphol by the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee (Internal information Royal Netherlands Marechaussee, 2015)

In the future developments concerning security on Amsterdam Airport Schiphol are inevitably found in the implementation of technology. The increase of surveillance cameras connected to biometric systems will be applied to a greater extent where passengers are identified as unique barcodes. Before the process of biometric identification operates, the system needs to store information about specific body parts of each passenger. Fingerprint reading, iridology, face recognition, palm recognition, and even a person's movement registering are data collection methods used for the identification of passengers. Technological innovations will allow security border actors to be even more accurate. The Royal Netherlands Marechaussee is responsible for all the data used in biometric systems for identifying passengers. This responsibility does not change if the process of identifying is outsourced to private security officers.

To what extent the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee guarantees the protection and management of the data is not a research goal of this thesis. It goes without saying that the protection of this data is importance to protect the privacy of the passenger. It is beyond debate that technological security, like biometric surveillance, has a positive effect on the security level reached by the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee. Another question that is left unanswered has to do with those passengers that principally object to share biometrical data, to what extent they can appeal to the right of freedom of movement.

Coming back to the main research question, the influence of border security measures on the daily passenger's flowthrough, a large number of actors and factors influence the flow of passengers at the airport border. This thesis is limited to the role of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee. The main and foremost influencers are the set of rules and regulations, the attitude of government and the carriers.

The growth of passengers is not best met with increasing numbers of border officials. Infrastructural measures and innovative technological solutions will be needed to keep security in balance with economic interests. It would be best to keep the border machine running smoothly and assure the right lubrication in running it.

The Royal Netherlands Marechaussee is tasked by government to run the security border-process and it has to make sure that government keeps ownership of the force, even when services are outsourced.

The passenger data usage to make the surveillance systems work, should stay in the hands of government. Technological innovations will only contribute to better security when they are shared and implemented globally, as stated by border officials of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee in interviews.

How to safeguard the privacy of each passenger will remain a challenge in the future. How to facilitate the ones that want to keep their privacy and refuse to cooperate with the requirements by technological security systems in their freedom of movement, is an even bigger challenge.

5.2 Research findings compared to existing findings in literature

The research has collected data in order to gather new insights in the field of the execution of border control. The collection was performed in three ways, as mentioned in the research methodology, chapter 3: desk research on available data sources and publications in addition to field research in the form of observations and interviews.

In this paragraph, a comparison is made between the findings of the research to existing scientific literature and given rulings and prescribed procedures for the execution of the border control. In table 5.1, a summary is given of those main findings and the delta of the difference.

#	Scientific literature	Research findings	Delta
a.	<i>50 percent of the passengers experience the security measures a violation of their privacy.</i>	<i>In none of the observations, any discomfort of passengers, a dispute or discussion with passengers regarding privacy violations of border officials was recorded. Neither was there any narrative about such an event.</i>	<i>No difference found in the legality of executions of the procedures. Yet, this research did not attempt to record passengers feelings towards privacy.</i>
b.	<i>The state is the sole institution holding a monopoly on legitimate use of force (Civic & Miklaucic, 2011).</i>	<i>The research did not find an issue with the monopoly on the ownership and none of the interviews mentioned force as an issue.</i>	<i>No difference found.</i>
c.	<i>The balance between economic interest and security measures are influenced by the State.</i>	<i>Security measures do follow the economic trend. A rebalance is often found in adjusting the number of border officials of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee.</i>	<i>No difference found. However, finding a rebalance by adjusting heads alone is not ideal, the research suggests.</i>
d.	<i>Distinct separation should exist between the management of public and</i>	<i>In practice, this research shows that private companies like the carriers, do intervene and direct</i>	<i>A distinct separation is not guaranteed.</i>

	<i>private officials (Bervoets & Eijgenraam, 2018).</i>	<i>public officials without line responsibility.</i>	
e.	<i>A distinct difference between public and private security officials should be noticeable.</i>	<i>Most of the passengers do not notice a difference between public and private security officials and their corresponding authorizations. The majority of outgoing passengers passing migration, think they pass Customs officials.</i>	<i>The public and private security officials are not recognisable by their uniforms.</i>

Table 5.1 Scientific literature compared with research findings

A *50 percent of the passengers experience the security measures a violation of their privacy*

In an online survey on Amsterdam Airport Schiphol (2018), almost 50 percent of the passengers experienced the security measures as a violation of their privacy. The expansion of Amsterdam Airport Schiphol in this period forced the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee to follow a new strategy. A strategy included the use of technology, such as cameras and automated police search files. This development ignited a debate on the privacy matter. The automated police search systems of border checks at the gate was debated by the Dutch Refugee Aid Association (Stichting Vluchtelingenwerk) (Bethlehem, 2013).

If passengers have questions concerning their personal data, they may file a request for access with the relevant airline or the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee. Both organisations store relevant passengers data. The privacy declaration used by the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee states that the government of the Netherlands handles passengers data with the utmost care. Personal data is information that can be traced to an individual, such as names, home address and e-mail address. Personal data is protected under the General Data Protection Regulation (Rijksoverheid, 2018). It also states that government processes personal data in order to carry out its public tasks. These tasks may require the government to share information, including personal data, with other organisations. The government also ensures passengers that personal data is appropriately protected and they will retain personal data no longer than necessary for the purpose concerned or required under the Public Records Act (Rijksoverheid, 2018).

The carrier privacy policy can be considered similar to the content of the privacy declaration. The most notable difference concerns the way they share passengers information. They state that the information collected when a passenger uses their website, or a service is confidential. However, they can disclose personal information to a third party in one particular circumstance, to *'third party service providers and partners in connection with their business'* (Carrier Privacy Policy, 2018).

During the five months internship I witnessed several confrontations between border officials, security officials and passengers. None of the confrontations were about privacy related issues.

Neither have I witnessed passengers questioning their privacy rights and the privacy policy rules on Amsterdam Schiphol Airport. It seems that on the area of the airport passengers accept every authority without questioning their jurisdiction. Privacy seems a non-issue. Like Foucault (1975) states: *'it is in the respect that the Panopticon functions automatically'*. The *Panopticon* at airports explains the behaviour why passengers accept reduced privacy.

- B According to Weber: *'the state is the only institution that holds a monopoly on legitimate use of force, the state may outsource its force, but it remains owner'* (Civic & Miklaucic, 2011). All the interviewee were asked to give their opinion and vision concerning security and security measures on airport borders in the EU. None of them mentioned passengers privacy as one of the important factors in the future developments of border security. Technological solutions and their consequences were in their opinion inevitable. All though the interviewee were concerned about the attitude of some EU member states. *'With the growing number of migrants, these countries experience major challenges that sometimes makes them violate the Schengen Border Code'* (Chapter 4.5). None of the interviewee had any concern if these violations could also take place regarding passengers data.
- C The balance between economic interest and security measures should be influenced by the State. According to Weber, the government upholds a claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force. Without this force, the security of the passengers could not be guaranteed. One might think that the economic interest would be determined by the

capacity of the State. During my internship I have observed a different practice. The State (The Royal Netherlands Marechaussee) has no influence in the flow of passengers or in the planning process of the carriers. With an increasing flow of passengers, I observed a scarcity of border officials. Several brigades of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee were called to support to make sure that security and border process could continue in a responsible matter. Pending on technological solutions an increase in border officials were deployed instead of infrastructural investments (Bethlehem, 2013).

- D Although there are substantial differences between public and private security actors in the border process, both are indispensable in keeping the border machine running. The Royal Netherlands Marechaussee is driven by social issues as its main concern, while private actors are driven by business interests and profit. Being business oriented does not mean lacking awareness of their responsibility of society (Bervoets & Eijgenraam, 2014). Public security actors have different legal authorizations. With this legal authorization comes responsibility in theory this means, that private officials cannot execute tasks by law granted to public officials. In practice I witnessed several times that senior private officials representing carriers exert pressure on the management of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee. *Suddenly a man dressed in blue representing a carrier holding a portophone, passes the queue towards the booths. 'The queues are growing until the hallway. People will miss their flights and claim. You will need to speed up!', he says with irritation..... "We will need to speed up this process now, that is an order", he snarls.'* (Chapter 5).
- E Five-months of observation for this research led to the insight that the only distinction between private and public organization concerning security is the distinguishment in the different uniforms that officials wear. During my observation I noticed that passengers do not know the difference in who they approach when they have any questions concerning security or migration. In their perception, every official uniform is an authorized official. Especially foreigners who are not familiar with the local situation, do not see any difference between the private and public officials, unless these officials are armed. I witnessed private security officials asking passengers their travel destination without any authority to do so.

5.3 Limitations and Recommendations

The goal of this research is to give a clear view on the relationship between security measures by the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee and the daily flowthrough of passengers. The study does not come without shortcomings. Critically reflecting on the research setup, a baseline measurement would have been appropriate to get a more accurate picture. The focus has been on qualitative measurements and not on quantitative. Security measures are not only performed by the Marechaussee. The image that the border process operates like a machine implies that the cogwheel of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee depends on how other wheels, such as private security companies, run in sync. Looking at the border process of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee, the measures taken by them should be seen in relation to the other security actors, together they influence the flowthrough of passengers.

The increasing numbers of migrants coming to the EU has limited effects on the security measures of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee on the border of Amsterdam Airport Schiphol so it does not influence on the flowthrough of passengers. This was stated by several border officials of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee.

Most migrants that report at the border of Amsterdam Airport Schiphol are no threat, because they arrive from cleared areas out of airplanes. Amongst these migrants could of course be criminals or potential threats to EU member states, but this is business as usual, according to border officials of the Marechaussee, a statement not further examined in this scope of thesis. There are no data available to the researcher to confirm the statement either.

The number of interviews for the research was limited. The interviewees are all of strategic level and they move in a position to influence the policies. Their input is in line with other findings and in line with the general outcome of the research.

Furthermore, in terms of security measures, no comparison was made with other international airports in the EU. No insights have been gathered in this field as to their influence on the flow of passengers. Neither has better understanding been gained in other working processes concerning border security at those airports.

Looking back on this research, insight is obtained in the border process of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee, their influence in the entire border security process. Additionally, insight has been gained in the limitations of their physical capabilities. Subsequently, insight has been obtained in possible solutions that deal with an exponential growth in the flow of passengers. The possible solutions found bring new challenges.

Further research can be recommended in the following border security issues on (EU) airports:

- The involvement of private security in the public domain;
- The development of technological security measures and their effect on the privacy on individual passengers;
- Sharing intelligence with member states becoming crucial for security measures;
- The guarantee to protect individual's privacy while sharing information – the balance between security and privacy;
- The responsibility of the state to protect the privacy and security of its citizens and to preserve the ownership of force;
- Much of the academic literature found provided substantiating insights such as the article *Wasted Lives* by Zygmunt Bauman (2004) where Bauman states that the border categorizes people as human waste, referring to article 6 of the Schengen Border Code. In relation with the national discussion about ethnic profiling, a relevant matter and subject to further research.

5.4 Recommendations for praxis

As the internship functioned as a means for gathering insights for the thesis, a daily presence on the border control sites provided insights for various improvements. Some of these ideas were dismissed after submitting them to management. Five months may not even suffice to gather all relevant factors and analyse legislative operations with respect to the role of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee on Amsterdam Airport Schiphol. A few ideas were not immediately rejected. Some ideas resonated well with the force and are potentially interesting to explore in further detail, in order to determine its suitability for future deployment:

- EU Citizens should ideally be able to travel free of checks. Movement should be as easy as travelling within borders. This could be achieved by fully automating the border checking

process, where a digital apparatus verifies a passport in combination with face recognition.

Such non-manned operated digital checks could be applied in all EU member states;

- Humanitarian visa should be created for migrants in order to travel to the EU;
- Uniforms of border officials of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee should be designed with a friendlier civilian appeal, instead of the somewhat aggressive appearance expressed by a military uniform;
- Civilians should be recruited by the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee for the execution of the border process, in order to make the organization more adaptive and flexible;
- Army reservists can easily be trained to support border checking on Amsterdam Airport Schiphol, allowing for more flexibility during high seasons and carriers could pay the bill for this;
- Many border officials have personal reasons to plan their own holidays during peak seasons. It could be made financially more attractive to continue to work during peak season to compensate for this.

5.5 Reflections

Reflecting on the world in the days of Peter Stuyvensant.

A continuous flow of people in an area almost like a city on its own. Nearly 70.000 employees to keep the city running. At each blink of your eyes, airplanes take off or land. A world where almost every nationality and culture is presented in the daily flow of passengers. To be personally part of this turbulent environment for five months can only be described as a tremendous opportunity. The ability to observe on a daily basis the process of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee, to be able to take note of confidential information and to visit areas at the airport where passengers are not allowed is highly exclusive and a unique opportunity for a researcher! I felt privileged to be in this environment to do my research where my observation task was not exactly a tough job, and every day was full of insight material to look forward to.

I learned and experienced a lot during this period about airports and specifically Amsterdam Airport Schiphol, border security and the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee. Airports are currently one of the biggest possibilities to travel abroad. With thousands of flights over the world every day, airports have become fascinating phenomena's and interesting research objects. Some airports have remarkable architecture, others are located on the most exotic places of the world.

International airports function as a border, which was the reason for my presence. Gathering knowledge and gaining insights about the border process and its actors was the very research goal. During my internship at the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee I have indeed gained a lot of knowledge about the border and its border processes. The border process is one of the cogs in a very complex process that allows people and goods to move over the world. The research has shown that this airport process at Amsterdam Airport Schiphol is a well-oiled machine. In this thesis I focussed on one part of this machine, the border process, which I titled the border machine. Each day, the same procedure is applied to airport travellers when crossing the border

There is plentiful of literature available about airports and border control. In the academic literature about this topic, there is hardly any discussion about major differences in opinion. Much of the academic literature found on this topic applies particularly to the risk of economic developments in relation to individual interest and the role of the government. A lot has been published about the phenomenon 'the border', in historical, philosophical and in present

perspective. During the observations of the activities of border officials of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee I took advantage of the opportunity to discuss the different academic visions with many of the officials I met. It led to interesting conversations that broadened my perspectives. These interviews were not merely important for my research, but also gave me the opportunity to deliberate with strategic advisors, policy makers and decision makers of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee. Even though this kind of internship at an airport is quite unique in its kind, an academic researcher embedded in the organisation also brings along a certain risk of partisanship and comradery, whereas the researcher should remain absolutely objective and independent in its observations and analysis. I have to admit that the way in which I was made part of the organization sometimes made me feel more like a colleague of the subjects than of their research observer. For me it meant that I needed to be aware of this all the time to not let it bias my research.

Initially, the research goal was to examine the effect of visa liberalization of Turkish residents on the border on Amsterdam Airport Schiphol. Shortly, after starting my internship at the airport, political upheaval between Turkey and EU forced me to redirect the research goals, which caused a delay in my research planning.

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Appendix I: Observation list

Observation list		
Date	Location	Description
23-02-2017	Arrival check 2, Schiphol	Observing border control guards of the Royal Marechaussee, executing passport control of people from international flight from Mexico, Indonesia and India.
28-02-2017	Judicial Schiphol Detention Centre	Tour around the Schiphol Detention Centre, where undocumented persons and crime suspects are being held awaiting their trial. This gave an insight in how the border procedure is executed. Predominantly foreign non-European persons are being held in the detention centre as suspect of drugs-smuggle related crimes.
01-03-2017	Arrival check 2, Schiphol	Observing border control guards of the Royal Marechaussee, executing passport control of people from international flight from African and Asian countries (Nigeria, Morocco, the Philippines and Singapore).
03-03-2017	Arrival check 3 (International), Schiphol	Attending a shift with a group commander, where we visited several border control check point and gate-controls.
05-03-2017	Departure check 3 (International), Schiphol	Observing border control guards of the Royal Marechaussee, executing passport control of people leaving the Netherlands and thereby the European Union. This observation gave a better insight in how departure procedures are being executed.
12-03-2017	Tour Schiphol	A colleague gave a tour on the whole Schiphol Airport area. We visited every border control check point.

22-03-2017	Brigade Foreign Affairs, Schiphol	Attended a shift with the brigade commander Foreign Affairs in order to get a better insight in how second-line investigations are being executed and how the foreigner's law is executed and implemented within this part of the border procedure.
04-04-2017	Customs clearance hall, Schiphol	Attending a shift with crime investigations officer on drugs-crime joint with custom officers in baggage hall in order to get a better insight on the procedure on profiling and checking luggage.
13-04-2017	Departure check 1, Schiphol	Attended a whole shift in the border control check point next to a border control guard of people leaving the Netherlands and thereby the European Union.
17-04-2017	Arrival check 3 (International), Schiphol	Observing border control guards of the Royal Marechaussee, executing passport control of people from international flight connecting to another flight within the European Union. Hence, this control was a 'Schengen-control'. Because the people didn't exit the airport.
25-04-2017	Arrival check 2, Schiphol	Attended a whole shift in the border control check point next to a border control guard.
27-04-2017	Departure check 3, Schiphol	Observing border control guards of the Royal Marechaussee, executing passport control of people leaving the Netherlands and thereby the European Union. This observation gave a better insight in how departure procedures are being executed.

17-05-2018	Tour Schiphol	A colleague gave a second tour on the whole Schiphol Airport area. We visited every border control check point.
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Appendix II: Interview questions

Interview questions

1. Could you explain your function?
2. How is border policy currently implemented and executed at the borders of Netherland?
 - a. How are you involved in the creation of new policy?
3. How is an EU member states' national policy used and implemented in to European Union policy?
 - a. Is visa policy sustainable in the light of the current international events?
 - b. To what extent does the visa policy need (or does not need) to adapt in order to cope with refugees or migrants?
4. To what extent does European Union border policy contradict with interest on national level?
5. What shifts are likely to occur within the light of the present terrorist attacks, migrant crisis and other current events?
6. Scholars often state that the European Union's foreign policy is a discriminatory tool. To what extent is this a true or false statement, perceived throughout your perspective as a policy advisor?
7. The migrant crisis, which started in 2015, has created disputes between member states of the European Union, especially in the Eastern parts of Europe. Is the Schengen agreement in danger?
8. To what extent does the rise of populist and Eurosceptic right-wing parties dominate or plays a role in the establishment of foreign policy and even endanger the continuation of the European Union?
9. Many experts and politicians state that possible visa liberalization is impossible for Turkey after the recent happenings. As an expert, what is your perspective of this topic?
 - a. Is visa liberalization still possible?
 - b. How will the relationship between Turkey and the Netherlands continue?
 - c. Will there be more similar agreements expected in the future?
10. Which changes should be implemented in the current EU border policy in order to create more stability between EU member states?
11. How is security implemented on the border on airports in the EU?
12. How do these security measures influence the border process on airports in the EU?

Appendix III: Interview overview

Interview overview			
Name	Function	Expertise	Location
Major J. Greydanus	Deputy Brigade Commander Border Control KMar	As a deputy Brigade Commander Border Control, Major Greydanus is responsible for monitoring the border process which is executed on Schiphol Airport Amsterdam.	Amsterdam Airport Schiphol, The Netherlands
Lieutenant-Colonel E. van der Molen	Commander Brigade Foreigner Affairs KMar	As a commander Brigade Foreign Affairs, Lieutenant- Colonel E. van der Molen is responsible for executing investigations on foreign affairs.	Amsterdam Airport Schiphol, The Netherlands
Mr. F. Topcu and Mr. C. Springveld	Policy advisor Department of Justice and Safety	Mr. Topcu and Mr. Springveld are both policy advisors on border policy. They formulate laws and processes which are being executed by the KMar.	Ministry of Justice and Safety. The Hague, The Netherlands
Major P. Moret	Staff Officer Border Management KMar	Major P. Moret is a policy advisor responsible for establishing policies on how to govern the border.	Ministry of Defense. The Hague, The Netherlands
Mr. S. Mujagic	Policy advisor European Commission	Mr. Mujagic is responsible for establishing policies on European level for executing border control and policies within the Schengen area.	European Commission. Brussels, Belgium

Appendix IV: Interviews summary

Interview 1	
Major J. Greydanus	Deputy Brigade Commander Border Control Royal Netherlands Marechaussee
Date	Location
10 April 2017	Amsterdam Airport Schiphol
<p>Major J. Greydanus is the deputy commander of the brigade Border Control of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee. In his function is second in command of the brigade that is responsible for guarding the borders on Amsterdam Airport Schiphol and controlling passport. Their primary tasks are to check whether people, who need to hand in their passport when they cross the Dutch and the European Union border fulfil the requirements, like a valid visa, or not being wanted for a criminal act. According to Major J. Greydanus, his brigade takes the necessary legal measures in order to monitor or regulate the border. The monitoring of the border is based on shared intelligence with all the other European Union countries and some Western countries, like the United States of America, Canada and Australia for example. These multilateral agreements make it easier and more efficient to share information about possible 'threats' for the borders of the European Union. Major J. Greydanus state that not solely the Dutch border and safety needs to be guard and protected by his brigade on Amsterdam Airport Schiphol, but due to the free movement of persons (Schengen-agreement, 1984) they are also responsible for the neighboring countries and the other EU member states. This requires collective measures in guarding and protecting the border. For example, the requirements need to be the same in the Netherlands as in Poland or Spain. The increase of migrants wanting to come to the European Union has increased the pressure on this brigade. Next to this, the increase of flight and the rapid expansion of Amsterdam Airport Schiphol. According to Major J. Greydanus, the economic relevance and worldwide position of this airport is of great importance, therefore, that this airport is always expanding. As law enforcement agency we need to cope with that expansion in order to be able to fulfil our tasks to keep the borders of the European Union safe. His brigade can be perceived as the first in line of chain of the border. Their brigade is also physical the first that sees foreigners, travelers and migrants. It depends on their systems whether they let a person proceed that border or not...</p>	

Interview 2

Lieutenant-Colonel E. van der Molen	Brigade Commander Foreign Affairs Royal Netherlands Marechaussee
Date	Location
20 April 2017	Amsterdam Airport Schiphol
<p>Lieutenant-Colonel E. Van der Molen is a commander of the brigade Foreign Affairs of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee. In his function he is responsible of giving charge of all the affairs concerning foreign affairs based on the Law on foreigners (de Vreemdelingenwet 2000), but also the law and regulation on foreigners in criminal law (Foreigner in Criminal Law). According to Lieutenant-Colonel E. Van der Molen, the workload of his brigade has rapidly grown over the several years. Due to the expansion of civil aviation, like the low-budget flights and the increase of mobility his brigade has expanded. His brigade has always a 'special brigade', due to the very often difficult tasks they execute, like the deportation of foreign criminals and undocumented migrants. Whole families, including small children can be deported back to their home country. This makes his brigade very special. They execute on behalf of legal statements and political decisions. Decisions which are often very difficult to personally cope with. However, these very often biased decisions need to be executed. Therefore, his brigade has special educated 'family officers' for deportation of families, which is very often the deportation procedures are being checked by the government (Ministry of Safety and Justice, IND, etc.) and human right organisations. His brigade organises the whole procedure for deportation. They adjust their approach and personnel based on the person(s) they deport. This includes requesting visa, ticket and contact with a person's home-country. His brigade can also, based on the situation, include brigade-personnel that joins on a deportation for safety or other reasons. This always has to be unarmed due to international law on aviation (like stated in the Treaty of Tokyo. Onboard an airplane, the cabin pilot is primary responsible for the safety. Therefore, his personnel are specially educated and equipped to guide people on an airplane. According to Lieutenant-Colonel E. Van der Molen, the current expansion of Amsterdam Airport Schiphol and especially the uprise of terrorist attacks on European cities has increased the role of the brigade. Their role in the whole border-procedure is very often as the last in the chain. They deport, they bring people, whether they're migrants or criminals, back based on our judicial and political system.</p>	

Interview 3

Mr. F. Topcu & Mr. C. Springveld	Policy Advisor Ministry of Justice and Safety
Date	Location
31 May 2017	Ministry of Justice and Safety, The Hague

Mr. F. Topcu and Mr. C. Springveld are both policy advisors at the Ministry of Justice and Safety. Mr. F. Topcu is a policy advisor that is focused on border management. Mr. C. Springveld is a policy advisor that is focused on visa policy. According to Mr. F. Topcu, border management needs to be perceived as a continuous cycle where every different governmental organization plays a part in the cycle. A migrant or traveler that is coming to a border is just put in to the cycle to either be positive or negative rolled out. How the decision on the faith of a traveler or migrant is made, depends on rules, regulations and policies on either national, European or international level. Mr. C. Springveld state that establishing visa policy depends on bilateral and multilateral agreements with other non-EU countries. The decision to either implement visa for a country depends on political relations with a country. In the past years Colombia and Georgia were liberalized for visa for the EU. Mr. C. Springveld state that the whole process in order to liberalize a country for visa for the EU is a very long and complex process. However, reversing liberalization of a visa for a non-country can be done very quickly. This is called an *emergency-procedure*. According to Mr. C. Springveld granting a country visa liberalization is often used as a political tool in order to bargain. Hence, to the advantages persons have from free movement in the Schengen-area it is very wanted. Mr. F. Topcu state that the current deal between the EU and Turkey could mean that visa liberalization would be an option for Turkish citizens. It is therefore very willing for Turkey's citizens and it would make movement in the Schengen-area easier. The current increasing number of migrants entering Italy and Greece has influenced policies and often the political field. The uprising right-wing movement has also influenced the content of policies. Mr. F. Topcu state that some current rules and regulation are suggested by left-parties in the political field, which could be described in the past as very right-wing thoughts and ideas. One of the policies, that Mr. F. Topcu means is the ever-growing power of Frontex as an EU border agency. And also, the controversial EU-Turkey agreement.

According to both Mr. C. Springveld and Mr. F. Topcu, the current agreement is a short-term solution for lowering the number of migrants coming to the EU. However, it is a biased and temporary deal. Mr. F. Topcu and Mr. C. Springveld state that the implementation of an ESTA-

like system, such as ETIAS would be a suitable part of the solution in combination with a humanitarian visa for short stay of migrants who are fleeing for conflicts.

Interview 4

Major P. Moret	Staff Officer Border Management
Date	Location
8 May 2017	Ministry of Defense, The Hague
<p>Major P. Moret is currently working as a Staff Officer at the department Border Management of the Royal Marechaussee. In his function he is responsible for translating European and national law on border management and immigration to policy for the Royal Marechaussee. Besides, he is also responsible to describe international developments on border management and immigration and what these developments mean for the execution of border tasks for the Royal Marechaussee. According to Major P. Moret, he not only focusses on the border procedure on the airports, in which the Royal Marechaussee holds the border management and immigration tasks. He also focusses on the internal and external borders of the European Union. Therefore, he has briefly meetings with his fellow peers and with European Commission policy makers. According to Major P. Moret, the Schengen-agreement has made cooperation with other member states on the topic's safety and security easier. However, the growing amount of member states of the EU, that also joins the free movement of goods and people can also make it very complicate to oversee if every member state has the same policy that suit the rules and regulations of EU-level. Hence, to monitor member states in the implementation of the rules and regulation, as formulated in the Schengen-border code (Schengen-grenscore) the Schengen-comity, which is established by the European Commission evaluate each member state in the executing of these laws. Next to this role in the Schengen-comity, Major P. Moret also has closely contact which Frontex. Frontex is the European Border and Coast Guard Agency and established in 2005 to control the border of the European Schengen Area in coordination with the border and coast guard of Schengen Area Member states. According to Major P. Moret, by closely cooperating and also sending officers to work in the multidisciplinary Border Security Teams of Frontex, very relevant information about migration are being shared. This information can be used to reduce or increase personnel on border tasks. Major P. Moret state that over the course of time, Frontex has grew almost three times as big as since the beginning. The reason for this expansion was predominantly that monitoring and controlling the external borders of the European Union became an important task for EU member states. Hence, the Royal Marechaussee deploys officers frequently to join in Frontex operations. According to Major P. Moret, the current</p>	

tasks of Frontex are merely fighting against symptoms instead of creating a sustainable solution for the ever-growing number of migrants from North-Africa and the Middle East coming to Europe. In his function he also discusses these topics with his peers on other countries, who deal with migrants first. Countries such as Italy, Spain and Greece. They literally request for help in seeking a suitable sustainable solution. Or on the short term an equal share of taking migrants as EU member states. However, as Major P. Moret explains this is politics. The solution should be a political choice made by the EU and its member states. As border control officers we gather information to give a better view on migration, but we execute policy. Major P. Moret state the very 'controversial' deal with Turkey is partly reducing migrants coming to the EU. However, this is in his perspective not the suitable solution in solving this issue. Besides, the deal of Turkey can also create a kind of dependency of each other. Whereby Turkey demands financial aid in order to keep the migrants in their country.

According to Major P. Moret, a suitable solution would be that EU Member states collectively in depth themselves in the push- and pull-factors of migrants coming towards the EU. Thereby financially or politically helping countries from which migrants come. This counts predominantly for countries in Africa and the migrants coming from North Africa. Besides, the relation and support with neighboring countries, such as Tunisia, Morocco, Libya and Algeria should be improved. Also, agreements for the return

For the migrant coming from the Middle East, this solution is much more complex due to the war in Syria and the terrorist organization IS. Hence, the international world should work together in solving this complex conflict.

Interview 5

Mr. S. Mujagic	Policy Advisor European Commission
Date	Location
14 June 2017	European Commission, Brussels, Belgium

Mr. S. Mujagic is currently working as a policy advisor for the European Commission in Brussels, Belgium. In his function he is responsible on creating policy on EU external and internal border policy. He is also present in the Schengen-comity, where he evaluates the border procedures, which are conducted at airports of EU member states. According to Mr. S. Mujagic the Schengen-agreement has led that some parts of sovereignty have vanished for some countries. Countries in the East and South part of the EU, who are bordered to non-EU countries felt themselves victim of the Schengen-agreement. Partly because they didn't fully control the way in which they wanted to manage and control the border. However, the Schengen-agreement has also led to economic opportunities for these, in comparison to West EU countries, lower economic developed countries to opportunities. Hence, the EU and its Schengen-agreement was from an economic perspective a huge advantage. With the growing number of migrants, these countries are experiencing a huge challenge. According to Mr. S. Mujagic, border management is a task that need to be handled in EU collectively. Therefore, other EU member states are obligated to support and deploy capacity to the EU member states that experience the arrival of migrants first. The Schengen-comity, where Mr. S. Mujagic is a part of, consist of several policy advisors of the EU Commission, and different policy advisors from EU member states. This last group of policy advisors changed, depending on the EU country the evaluate. In their Schengen-comity, a border procedure is being evaluated with the purpose to examine if EU rules and regulation are being performed as obligated.

According to Mr. S. Mujagic, migration is of all time. The migrant-crisis started in 2015 is not something new that happened. However, the media increases the attention on this topic and we have seen that not every EU country is performing equally in this matter.

According to Mr. S. Mujagic, visa policy of the EU is still sustainable even though its facing huge complaints for non-EU persons that are coming to the EU by boats, because they are not granted an EU visa. According to Mr. S. Mujagic, the visa-procedure is a useful tool to screen applicant and grant visas to bona-fide travelers. There are of course cases of abuse and overstay, but exact figures will be gathered once the EES works. However, one important

statement of Mr. S. Mujagic is that visa policy can't prevent irregular migration through irregular channels. Hence there is the question for a humanitarian visa legal channels into the EU, but that is not directly linked to short-stay visa policy. Mr. S. Mujagic explains that the European Commission has and is adapting its policy in some ways. Thereby strengthening of the visa suspension mechanism in order to be able to quickly react in case of strong increase of irregular migration from a visa-free country by suspending visa-free travel from that country. Besides this measure, the European Commission proposed the introduction of ETIAS (like US ESTA, online travel authorization procedure) to screen visa-free travelers before they come to the Schengen-area. However, this proposal is currently under negotiation in the European Council.