

The nexus between ethnic conflict and violence: the case of Crimean Tatars

Master thesis

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Chapter 1. Introduction

The conflict of 2014 in Ukraine has changed the game of politics in the Black Sea region and brought far-reaching implications in international relations. Ukraine obviously lost control over Crimea after the Russian Federation had annexed it. A problematic political status of the Crimean peninsula brought another reality for the multiethnic peace, and a backbone of pro-Ukrainian supporters in the peninsula, the Crimean Tatar minority, faced new challenges. However, despite the presence of the moderate degree of tensions between the Russian majority and the Crimean Tatar minority, there were no reports about any kind of large-scale protests or mass violence since the annexation had happened.

On the other hand, the absence of clear manifestations of direct violence against Crimean Tatars does not evidence that other forms of oppression are missing. These forms could be less visible but significant. The indirect violence hints on unequal relations between different groups of people. A severe structural or cultural violence is very likely to cause the direct violence, and it is possible to notice a link between a growing global income gap and a magnitude of violent conflicts reaching an impasse. Although the cases of structural and cultural violence can follow a certain pattern, each case is unique and the media coverage brings some uncertainty and a tint of mystery over the real situation. From this perspective, the situation of Crimean Tatars appears to be an interesting object of research on different types of violence as the multiethnic environment of the peninsula with two clear-cut Crimean Tatar and Slavic communities, keeping rather opposite vision on the status of the peninsula and having a period of quite tense relations during the Ukrainian governance.

Moreover, since 2014, a geopolitical context has changed, and a power of the pro-Russian majority group in Crimea has been strengthened. This ethnic group does not experience any major control from Ukraine and have a direct support from the parent state. In turn, this fact has to challenge the problem of structural and cultural violence in Crimea as Ukrainian authorities have limited opportunities to leverage the influence of the Russian majority after the annexation. However, before 2014 Ukrainian authorities had strong bounds with Crimean Tatar organizations, such as the Mejlis. Reports about the cases of physical violence, the lag of reforms, a poor socio-economic performance, and feelings of insecurity and uncertainty about the future hint on a high likelihood of structural violence. The media coverage of the ethnic conflict situation in the peninsula is limited, and this thesis

will provide different perspectives of the situation in Crimea focusing on the development of the different types of violence.

Yet there is some ground to worry that the interethnic peace might be at a threat in the nearest future. The essential aspect is the different attitudes of Crimean Tatars and Crimean Russians towards the status of the peninsula. According to the official statistics, more than 96% of the Crimean population voted for the reunification of Crimea with the Russian Federation (Russia Today, 2014). These figures are likely to be exaggerated, because the Crimean society is not homogeneous concerning the issue of the self-determination and the territorial integrity.

According to TSN.ua, the major site of Ukrainian news, which found a temporary leak from the website of the Human Rights Council of the Russian Federation's President, 15% of voters favored the annexation and only 30% of eligible population took a vote (Gregory, 2014; TSN.ua, 2014). While Crimean Russians, who constitute more than 58% of Crimean population, were the main supporters of the referendum, and only a small share of them opposed or abstained, Crimean Tatars were far less enthusiastic. According to Mustafa Cemilev, a former leader of the Mejlis, the main representative body of Crimean Tatars, more than 90% of Tatars ignored the referendum (QHA, 2014a). Other sources of information asserted that a considerable number of Crimean Tatars did vote. For example, Milli Firka, another Crimean Tatar party opposed to the Mejlis, stated that 40% of Tatars took part in the referendum with a quarter of them supporting the annexation (Goble, 2014). The clash of interests among the ethnic communities exists and new tensions are likely to arise in case if the essential political and socio-economic problems remain unfixed (Goble, 2014).

In general, there are two opposing point of views on the current state of affairs in the Crimean Tatar community. According to the version of the Russian Federation, the majority of Crimean Tatars is gradually accepting changes and trying to integrate into the Russian society. Russian authorities acknowledge numerous problems such as resolution of self-seizure issues, provision of political and cultural rights; but the basic assessment of the situation is rather optimistic. Meanwhile, the position of the Mejlis, Ukrainian authorities, and the Western media point on numerous violations of Crimean Tatar rights and a considerable outflow of Crimean Tatars to the Ukrainian mainland. This opinion is supported by reports on abductions and deaths of Crimean Tatars remaining on the peninsula and directly opposing to the political changes (or suspected in these activities) (Brisiuck, 2015). Moreover, the issue of the religious extremism (the involvement in Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HUT) and the

certain number of Tatars allegedly fighting in Syria) cannot be ignored; however, this activity is limited due to a severe control from the Russian Federation (Vatchagaev, 2014).

1.1. Research problem

Thus, it is possible to conclude that there are two discourses: ‘pro-conflict’ discourse of Crimean Tatars, which puts emphasis on problematic aspects of the interethnic coexistence, and ‘pro-peaceful’ one of the current Crimean authorities, which tends to state that everything is fine. The above-mentioned situation encourages questioning whether the ‘pro-conflict’ or ‘pro-peaceful’ approach is the reality, and how the judgement about the real state of affairs of the ethnic conflict and the nature of changes, which took place in Crimea after the annexation of 2014, must be done. According to Džuverovic (2013), the important characteristic of any conflict is a multidimensionality, and in the thesis I shall try to identify and discuss the most important dimensions, which make an impact on the development of the ethnic conflict essentially and could lead to the outbreak of direct violence.

The complicated case of the interethnic situation in Crimea, as a research object, is particularly interesting, because it has not attracted strong academic interest until now; however, we lack knowledge to improve the understanding of the situation. It seems that the certain concerns about the birth of the new ethnic conflict in Crimea after the annexation of 2014 do not prove, but a vast majority of contradictory reports on the interethnic or intra-ethnic relations and outbreaks of violence encourage escalating the situation and opening a fruitful niche for the academic research.

The term of the ethnic conflict is a popular label of depicting a conflict, which involves problematic relations between two or more ethnic groups, also within an ethnic group. According to Parsons (2007), violence is the reality of the contemporary world, which is closely related to the notion of power. As a result, the domination of one group neglecting the interests of the other group could turn into the conflict. Adding the ethnicity element, we face the ethnic conflict. However, one of the most serious challenges is to make violence ‘visible’ and understand what encourages the repetition of the violence (Dilts, 2012). That is why it is important to understand the conception of violence, its nexus with the ethnic conflict, and identify the main expressions of violence, which could be monitored in order to judge about the ethnic situation and anticipate the main threats of conflicts.

For the research I select the constructionist approach towards the ethnic violence and ethnicity (Oberschall, 2000) as it allows to make a relative assessment/prioritization of the ethnic identity and its ability to change within a time lapse towards/backwards the conflict. The ethnic conflict is analysed applying the notion of ‘violence’ proposed by Galtung (1969), i. e. ‘peace is absence of violence’ (Galtung, 1969: 167). Although this concept attracted academic research and significantly contributed to the understanding of the violence and the essence of conflicts (for example, Galtung (1990), Ziyadov (2006), Parsons (2007), Dilts (2012), Schinkel (2013), Standish (2014), Stalinoi (2014), and etc.), the previous research mainly was not focused on the specific issues of the ethnic conflict.

Research aims to provide another insight on the phenomenon of the conflict, involving the aspect of ethnicity. The thesis explains the ethnic conflict applying the multidimensional notion of violence proposed by Galtung (1969). According to Galtung (1969; 1990), two types of violence could be identified: direct (personal) and structural. The first type of violence is visible; however, the monitoring of the structural violence is more complicated. Galtung (1969) concept of violence states that the elimination of ethnic conflict means an absence of both types of violence. In the later work Galtung (1990) develops the concept of violence and identifies a ‘violence triangle’ including cultural, structural, and direct types of violence. In fact, by introducing this change the scholar distinguishes the cultural violence from the structural, while the early work treated it as an integral part of the structural violence.

Hence, the research question follows: *How do different types of violence contribute to the development of the situation of the ethnic conflict between Crimean Tatar and Slavic population in Crimea?*

Therefore, two hypotheses emerge.

Hypothesis 1: The current situation of the ethnic conflict between Crimean Tatars and the Slavic majority has the evident feature of the conflict with the structural asymmetry and the state-of-the-art is mainly determined by the structural violence.

Moreover, the intra-ethnic cleavage within Crimean Tatars has become more visible after 2014, when one fraction remained loyal to the former political order, whereas the other groups of the Tatar

community have accepted the change of the territorial status of the peninsula as previous authorities were not able to solve important socio-economic problems.

I argue that in case of Crimean Tatars the element of the structural violence is providing a better explanation of the development of the ethnic conflict. The structural asymmetry of the conflict is valid for both the relations with the majority group of Slavs and the relations within the ethnic group. Moreover, I argue that the intra-ethnic divisions among Crimean Tatars exist. Crimean political elites to some extent contributed to the development of structural inequalities redistributing the available funds for their own prosperity and the satisfaction of political ambitions. They were channeling resentment of other Tatars towards the Slavic population and local authorities and creating a perception of a moderate ethnic conflict's presence.

The current situation of the ethnic conflict in Crimea could be better explained within a framework of structural violence, which is likely to decrease between the ethnic groups. However, a moderate presence of the structural violence will remain, but mostly the vertical one, because both Slavic and Tatar population feel resentment towards authorities and the Russian elite. Eventually I state that a moderate ethnic conflict before the annexation was determined by structural violence, which turned into the ethnic issue due to the influence of political and non-government organizations (NGO) contributing to the polarization of the ethnic identity between Slavic and Crimean Tatar communities. In that case, the instrumental attitude towards the ethnicity and ethnic violence could be as a trigger mechanism, which maintained the impression of the moderate ethnic conflict, however contributed to the fact of structural violence. The Mejlis lost its authority after activists had left Crimea and participated together with Ukraine in the economic blockade of the peninsula that hit many Crimean inhabitants including Crimean Tatars.

Hypothesis 2: Since the annexation the situation on the peninsula is developing towards the decrease of the ethnic conflict; however, additional efforts are needed to reduce the level of structural and cultural violence.

In this thesis I argue that after the annexation of Crimea the level of structural violence has decreased, because important decisions were made to solve chronic problems contributing to the development of the structural and cultural violence. The progress was achieved in the rapid acknowledgement of Tatar cultural rights, rehabilitation, and the resolution of land issues. A general decline in living

conditions in Crimea does not provide a foundation for the visible ethnic mobilization, and ethnic inequality is substituted to social inequality, which is common for the Slavic population too.

To answer the research question and test hypotheses, I shall address Galtung (1969; 1990) concept of violence and propose a framework mapping the most important criteria of violence, which contribute to the development of the ethnic conflicts. The contribution of the thesis to the academic discourse is twofold. First, the literature review allows discussing the nexus between the ethnic conflict and different types of violence focusing on criteria selection issues and problems, which are relevant when we are trying to measure violence and talk about the development of the situation between ethnic groups.

Second, I apply the selected framework of violence criteria to conduct an analytical and empirical research on the situation of the ethnic conflict in Crimea. The thesis is the first attempt to conduct the similar holistic research and it could be a start for the in-depth studies and further academic development of this topic. The research on the ethnic conflict situation is based on the analysis of available statistics, the previous academic research, and the media sources. These results are complemented by the outcomes of the experts' survey, which are critical to verify the achieved results and identify contradictions. The thesis shows the nature of problems when we start collecting the reliable data, which is vital for policy makers to control the situation of the ethnic conflict. Hence, the thesis could be useful to launch a discussion on the development of the official statistics and the demand of funded research to have a better understanding about the issues of the ethnic conflict situation.

1.2. Ethnicity and its role in conflict

The ethnic identity is one of the strongest among multiple kinds of identity people have, many conflicts, especially in the 1990s, have been labeled as ethnic ones. The academic debates concerning the role of ethnic factors in conflicts and the definition of ethnicity are common. According to Modood et al. (1997:13), 'Ethnicity is a multi-faceted phenomenon based on physical appearance, subjective identification, cultural and religious affiliation, stereotyping and social exclusion'. Bulmer (1996:54) gives a definition of an ethnic group as:

‘a collectivity within a larger population having real or putative common ancestry, memories of a shared past, and a cultural focus upon one or more symbolic elements which define the group’s identity, such as kinship, religion, language, shared territory, nationality or physical appearance. Members of an ethnic group are conscious of belonging to an ethnic group.’

The aforementioned characteristics of the ethnic group are very important. The ethnic group unites its members and makes a distinction from other groups. For that distinction, there should be mutually recognized by both sides a separation between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Modood et al., 1997). It is important to note that an ethnic group believes that it shares a common ancestry and traditions among its members, and it is the perception that matters, rather than the evidence of their uniqueness and distinction from other groups (Ethnic..., n.d.).

Ethnicity is treated as an important element of conflict, which is illustrated by the fact that in the media, scientific articles, and in daily use many conflicts are defined as ‘ethnic’. However, ethnicity in itself is not sufficient to be an essential cause of the conflict. ‘Ethnic conflict’ is a very convenient label applied to conflicts where a clash between ethnic groups takes place. The ethnicity is the most visible feature of such conflicts, however, often there are also underlying causes like socio-economic inequality, political oppression, struggle for resources, etc. In fact, ethnicity becomes only one of the elements of the conflict and serves as a strong tool for mobilization of people. Such situations are very amenable to political manipulation and could be used both for peaceful political or economic gains and for violent conflict (Obershall, 2000). However, there is a broader perspective that considers the historical and political context, socio-economic processes, which have influenced the formation of systematic inequalities with a potential to cause a conflict between ethnic groups.

There are many opinions and theories regarding the nexus of ethnicity and conflict. The most challenging question is whether ethnicity can be a source of conflict. According to Varshney (2009) and Oberschall (2000), from five to four approaches towards the ethnic conflict and ethnicity could be identified. In the thesis four approaches proposed by Oberschall (2000) are discussed.

According to the so-called primordialist approach (Oberschall, 2000), ethnicity is understood as something naturally given, as an objective entity with inherent features, such as territory, self-recognizable membership, common language, and mentality. Some apologists of primordialism relate the concept of ethnicity to some kind of sociobiological creation, a ‘comprehensive form of

natural selection and kinship connections' (Van den Berghe, 1981:35). As a result, ethnicity can be treated as a co-product of biology, culture, and history. Ethnic conflicts emerge as an outcome of ancient hatreds between ethnic groups, which compete with each other for power, resources, ideology, etc. The tensions are to a large extent the result of natural divisions between people. The primordialist approach is an object of harsh criticism, because it cannot explain the peaceful co-existence of many ethnic groups.

Another, instrumentalist approach states that ethnic conflicts happen, because politicians manipulate ethnic sentiments, appeal to the past and national pride in order to accomplish political goals, such as the creation of the state or simply gaining wealth and power (Oberschall, 2000). Language, cultural practices, values, and history appear as valuable resources and objects of manipulations by ethnic elites (political, governmental, and NGOs).

A third, constructivist approach, considers ethnic groups as artificial and socially constructed, rather than natural, and what is more, easily created and destroyed (Green and Seher, 2003:521). Contrary to the primordialist explanation, constructivists believe that ethnic differences do not necessarily bring violence as they are not entrenched in human beings as a part of natural features; an individual is not born with a given ethnic identity, but becomes a part of a concrete ethnos due to social practices.

Ethnic identity is not fixed in time and space; as a result, it can change. Indeed, due to the interrelation between various ethnic groups, many have been assimilated or have become part of a new ethnic group. Moreover, individuals can hold multiple identities, either because of a mixed origin or even by choice, because of cultural or even pragmatic preferences. For example, during the Soviet period, many Ukrainians used to identify themselves as Russians, whereas many Russians 'converted' into Ukrainians when the nationalist rhetoric became prevalent and the switch to another identity became politically gainful. Constructivists argue that ethnic conflicts arise as a result of peculiarities of historical processes (Weir, 2012). It allows the ethnic identity to be a product of manipulation, while ethnic myths become real and persistent in society, which can contribute to conflict. For instance, the fact of the deportation of Crimean Tatars in mid 1940s due to the alleged mass-collaboration with Nazis was a very important milestone of Crimean Tatar history which left a deep imprint on their identity, national consciousness, and contributed to the sense of certain alienation, distinction from the Slavic majority. Despite the fact that a long exile in places of the

deportation (mostly in Central Asia countries) was till the late 1980s, Crimea remained a promised land in national memory and the return to the peninsula became a desire of all Tatars-deportees.

The last approach focuses on the situation of anarchy and state breakdown which generates fear and security dilemma (Posen 1993; Gagnon 1997). These conditions force ethnic mobilization to provide group consolidation in order to protect themselves as soon as the distrust of official institutions is reasonable. In such case people do not rely on the institutional environment, because officials do not perform their duties and favor customers with the certain ethnicity.

I assume that violence takes a shape rather of a structural character, and it is based on inequalities of different social groups. Ethnic primordialism is not well suitable to explain the situation since it overstates biological and irrational factors, given the fact of the long peaceful co-existence of Slavs and Tatars with occasional exacerbations of tensions and further expulsions. Instrumental approach appears to be more feasible for the research as it points on the role of political and NGOs appealing to the violation of human rights, the exploitation of victim's image, and abilities to attract the international attention. However, in order to manipulate the identity, there should be some grievances, which lead to inequalities in society.

Constructionist approach gives more room for the relative assessment/prioritization of the ethnic identity and its ability to change within a time lapse towards/backwards the conflict. Again, in that situation changes in structures might matter – towards increase or decrease of inequality. The lesser is inequality the more likely that the ethnic identity will not polarize and ethnic relations will be more peaceful. Finally, the fourth approach also seems to be not suitable for this research as the state breakdown and security dilemma do not necessarily lead to the violent ethnic conflict. Actually, this approach does not reflect the situation in Crimea. As a result, the thesis relies on the constructionist approach of the ethnic violence stating that ethnicity could be one of the possible reasons for the conflict outbreak.

1.3. The nexus between ethnic conflict and violence

Galtung (1969) argues that a non-conflict situation means that the potentials meet the actuals; however, if the potentials are higher we have a case of violence that could result in a violent conflict. According to the typology of Galtung (1969), two the most significant types of violence could be

identified. The first type, personal or direct violence, is visible and the cases of violence could be easily monitored and quantified. The second type, structural violence, is not so obvious and some efforts must be done to identify the main critical elements contributing to the development of structural violence. To answer the research question we must be able to measure not only the visible cases of personal violence, but also to understand the phenomenon of structural violence and its elements in order to judge about the development of the conflict situation.

The term 'structural violence' was coined by the famous peace and conflict researcher Galtung (1969). Galtung asserts that structural violence, as opposed to personal or direct violence, is indirect and 'there may not be any person who directly harms another person in the structure. The violence is built into the structure and shows up as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances' (Galtung, 1969:167). As a result, there are some social structures, which systematically disadvantage certain groups of people, especially minorities by virtue of their limited availabilities to avoid such situation. That makes them vulnerable to the violation of their basic human rights and limitation of access to better jobs, education, services, etc.

Particularly important aspect of the structural violence is its tacit indirect forms, when there is no concrete perpetrator to blame and violent outcomes are not easily discernable. That might refer to hunger, deaths, related to health issues or accidents, when assistance has not been provided properly and in time. Violence does not necessarily take a form of a negative physical action, i. e. deaths, injuries, any kind of bloodshed, but it still creates constant grievances, inferiority complex, impression of helplessness, and inability to change the situation or have any alternative.

Although the mechanism of links between ethnicity, inequality, and violence remains not understood, there were attempts to provide an explanation how ethnicity and inequality generate violence. Fearon and Latin (2000) assert that the social construction of ethnic identity and the social construction of ethnic violence is implemented by ethnic leaders to increase cohesion within a group and encourage hostility to another ethnic group. Both aspects of primordialism and instrumentalism can be found, as elites attempt to create an 'everyday primordialism', which supports the border between the members of the group and another ethnic group and maintains ethnic myths, prejudices, and ancient hatreds. It is argued that the ethnic violence could happen only in case if there is a substantial proportion of ethnic extremists and thugs, who use violence to mobilize a larger number of people of the same ethnic group (Brass, 1997). However, Fearon and Latin (2000) argue that

there is no proper explanation of how social construction of ethnicity is linked with conflict and how the mobilization of individuals happens.

Galtung (1969) explains conflict by violence and makes a clear distinction between structural, cultural, and direct violence. Structural and cultural violence exists when some groups of people due to their race, ethnicity, religion, etc. enjoy better access to goods, services, education. That advantage is already embedded in the unequal social system, which regulates the relations among people. Such kind of inequality can be discerned on different scale, starting from family or small community and ending with global inequality in terms of industrialized developed Western countries/Third World.

Structural violence can be enrooted in legal systems, especially in cases of the underdeveloped societies where informal regulations and customary law predominates. Violations can take forms of apartheid regime (as in South Africa) or have some softer indirect means, for example, awarding certain groups with privileges, often based on the ethnic background of the ruling group. Institutions can deliberately create conditions for the presence of structural violence, but very often they conduce discriminatory policies ignoring and silencing the manifestations of structural violence (Sialoombe, 2016).

Important aspect is the principal avoidance of violence, such as the premature deaths from famine, poverty, which are caused by unequal distribution of resources and poor access to the health care, education, etc. (Galtung, 1969). Premature deaths from hunger and diseases are considered as an outcome of structural violence, when the victim's right to survive is not addressed while such possibility exists. According to Farmer (2005), structural violence is the outcome of unequal distribution of power and it is an outcome of historical process, which shapes the structures of oppression (racism, sexism, etc.) and constrains the agency of people. He also advocates the thorough investigation of the daily-life violence with all complexities and contradictions of marginalized groups.

Some researchers argue that structural violence as unequal distribution of resources and labour has already reached global dimension and the situation is maintained by several powerful states, international and transnational institutions, especially financial ones. According to Wallerstein (1979), there is a global system of inequality of states and their relations follow the model of 'core-periphery'. Rich states constitute the 'core', which pumps resources from poor 'peripheral' states.

In turn, 'peripheral' states are subjects (if not objects) of economic and political marginalisation. These countries are controlled by international institutions, who offer them loans. In turn, these loans are the source of corruption of political elites, who offer their resources and loyalty instead. Hence, poor countries become indebted, and the debt is an essential tool of a global governance of countries who belong to the 'core' (George, 1990). Furthermore, poor countries suffer from unequal bargaining power as their resources are purchased at lower costs and this behaviour allows to maintain higher living standards in 'core' countries (Kok et al., 2009).

It is worth mentioning that violent conflicts, involving ethnic relations, can be treated and analysed in a broader perspective. Ethnic groups can have a more beneficial/vulnerable position in a global system of distribution and control of resources in order to preserve the advantage or reverse the status-quo. In 'peripheral' countries with scarce resources stronger ethnic groups try to preserve political power, which allows to keep political and economic power in a dominant ethnic group. Monopolization of power by certain ethnic group facilitates domestic inequality and creates conditions for the grievances among deprived ethnic groups. It is essential that rich states from the 'core' are less prone to the so-called ethnic conflict due to relatively small degree of inequality between ethnic groups. In fact, it is possible to assume that ethnic equality and lesser degree of structural violence in the 'core' countries, are the outcomes of the high ethnic inequality maintained by high degrees of ethnic inequality in 'peripheral' states due to their systematic disadvantage.

Inequality and violence links are extensively discussed in the greed and grievance scientific debate. Proponents of the first concept, supporting the greed argument, argue that the main driver of conflict is the greed, i. e. easily attained economic gains (Collier, 2000; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). Economic issues like an absence of formal employment, low economic growth rates, general economic mismanagement and state malfunctioning, could be preconditions for the long run violent conflict (Collier, 2000; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). The noticeable characteristic of profit-driven conflicts is that natural resources are both the means and the purpose of fighting, what makes conflicts very protracted. Although many recent conflicts in the third world countries are strongly associated with natural resources and greed is a driving force, greed theorists downplay the role of identity issues and the emotional side of conflict – grievances, which is a very visible characteristic of the conflict.

The theory of grievance provides another, justice-seeking approach. The notion of grievances is enrooted in different forms of inequality. Identity issues occupy an important place in this theory. There are three main notions in grievance theory: relative deprivation, polarization, and horizontal

inequality. Relative deprivation is a term used by Gurr (1970), to characterize the discrepancy between aspirations that people deserve something and, on the other side, what they actually have or can expect. As a result, of perceived incomplete or not-fulfilled aspirations, people get frustrated and that induces them to revert to violence. In fact, this attitude is similar to the selected for the research notion of violence proposed by Galtung (1969).

Although Gurr (1970) focused on the individual manifestations of relative deprivation other scientists examined the collective forms of so-called fraternalistic relative deprivation (Gartrell, 1982; Martin, 1982). Collective relative deprivation can follow ethnic or religious lines, social classes, regional boundaries; it can also appear as a frustration towards the general situation.

Another dimension of grievance is polarization, which occurs when two groups show great inter-group heterogeneity, while retaining strong homogeneity within. Economic polarization together with a high level of vertical income inequality can take place in culturally diverse countries; ethnic polarization can exist when there is relative economic equality (Murshed and Tadjoeeddin, 2007). Esteban and Ray (1994) argue that polarization is the result of feelings of alienation between groups, which are caused by an awareness of intra-group identity.

The third notion – horizontal inequality – concerns inequalities based on ethnic, religious, linguistic, and other cultural differences. Contrary to vertical inequality, horizontal inequality happens in heterogeneous societies and implies deprivation of an identity group in relation to a privileged one in such areas as public spending and taxation, economic mismanagement, and grievances related to the distribution of natural resource rents.

It should be noted that type of inequality matters and it affects violence. Besancon (2005) asserts that economic inequality is related to the onset of class-based struggles and revolutions, while identity-based conflicts tend to occur under equal economic conditions. Economic inequality works in case people feel they have nothing to lose and that they can obtain everything they want by using arms. Conversely, economic inequality is not so benevolent for ethnic wars. When identity issues are concerned (a lack of political rights and representation, unequal treatment, and repressions, restrictions in education, group exclusion), people become more aware of their identity which becomes a strong reason for group formation and cohesion among members.

Structural violence is closely associated with social exclusion. Department for International Development defines social exclusion as a process of systemic disadvantage of certain groups on the basis of their physical, socio-economic, and cultural characteristics. Discrimination can take place both in case of public and social institutions (DFID, 2005). According to Beall and Piron (2004:6), the term describes ‘exclusion from social, political and economic institutions resulting from a complex and dynamic set of processes and relationships that prevent individuals or groups from accessing resources, participating in society and asserting their rights’. Certainly, it is possible to state that social injustice can be understood as the exclusion and violation of essential human rights.

What is more, the exclusion itself is an essential manifestation of the structural and cultural violence and this phenomenon has to be scrutinized in modern Crimea – whether Crimean Tatars are not properly involved in cultural, political, and socio-economic processes in the peninsula and whether they are deprived of rights of freedom, religion, language use, political representation, land access, and etc. Also, the exclusion is fraught with the increasing grievances (objective or subjective) and relative deprivation among members of the deprived group, which are often considered as underlying cause of the ethnic conflict (Gurr, 1970; Esteban and Ray, 1994; Besancon, 2005; Murshed and Tadjoeeddin, 2007).

Another manifestation of structural violence is institutional violence. Violence thus is (in)formally embedded in institutions and often accepted by society (Rubio and Rupesinghe, 1994). Institutional violence can be considered as a necessary evil in case of properly working mechanism and the relatively stable society. In the situation of malfunctioning and chaos institutions might become the source of violence itself, when they start their own interests apart from their duty to perform the acknowledged violence. Thus, they might lose the legitimacy as soon as they become the source of personal violence, which reproduces itself. It is worth mentioning that Galtung points out that in highly dynamic societies which undergo considerable social change structural violence becomes less accepted and that eventually paves a way to the direct violence (Galtung, 1969). Findings of Rubio and Rupesinghe (1994) and Galtung (1969) hint on current situation of political transition in Crimea, when many old cadre remained in their seats and are likely to maintain careless executions of their duties.

Structural violence is embedded in social structures which are shaped by the specific interrelation among individuals, involving both performers and victims of violence. These relations among

people are formed by particular rules of behaviour which make up social identity of each participant. In turn, these rules of behaviour are formed by very important element – culture. Despite the fact that socio-economic and political factors are often considered as leading motives for violence, given their considerable contribution to injustice as the very essence of structural violence, culture (ethnicity, religion, customs, traditions) lays the background of a personality: the way he/she interacts with society and which place the person occupies in the structures. Since structures tend to reproduce themselves, culture serves as mechanism which allows individuals to learn, apply, and transmit the rules of behaviour, including the discriminatory policies containing potential for violence (Rubio and Rupesinghe, 1994). Essentially, ethnic grievances, prejudices, and stereotypes constitute the cultural dimension of violence. They also reflect primordial aspect of ethnic conflict, i.e. ethnic groups in conflict might consider occurrence of these tensions as a natural process and inherent feature of humans.

Galtung (1969) actually shows importance of culture asserting that in the ‘triangle of violence’ – direct, cultural, and structural – culture is a binding element legitimizing both types of violence. In fact, the rules of structural violence are actually cultural, even if to consider political and socio-economic aspects of structures. Culture involves values, ideas about the organization of the society and behaviour of individuals. It influences the way structures develop, also, how structures constrain ability of individuals to make own conscious choice and violate human rights. Cultural analysts argue that security dilemma (the situation when one ethnic group considers to initiate pre-emptive attack on another group) is rather subjective than objective phenomenon as threats and fears are reproduced through myths, narratives, commemorations, which are often ad hoc picked by ethnic elites to sustain their domination (Atran, 1990; Tambiah, 1996). In order to define structural violence it is useful to consider discourses and narratives related of groups. Inequality leading to the violation of human rights thus also could be objective or subjective. Moreover, persons may have a perception of inequality, fears, and threats and consider themselves as victims of the structural violence.

In some cases, ethnic conflict can be explained by the elements of structural violence. For example, when conflict between two ethnic groups erupts, it is necessary to point out that within an ethnic group there is a certain proportion of ethnic extremists, who under the situation of crisis and growing fears of insecurity tend to manipulate the feelings of other members of ethnic groups and polarize the society (Lake and Rothschild, 1996). That is close to the instrumental approach to ethnicity and its relation to conflict.

The very illustrative case is the genocide in Rwanda, when in 1994 hundreds of thousands of people died in a seemingly Tutsi-Hutu conflict. The roots of this conflict are in a historical context of the Rwanda society. Belgian colonizers used rule and divide policies, which favoured Tutsi minority group. Tutsi, as a race, were considered closer to Europeans, compared to Hutu people (Storey, 2001). This behaviour generated substantial structural and cultural inequalities in education and employment. After the structural adjustment reforms poverty level and income inequality increased and in 1994 the situation became complicated. Moreover, rural overpopulation exerted the growing pressure on land and food security, leading to tense competition in rural neighbourhoods.

A discontent among Hutu elites after the independence was growing as they felt deprived of many goods Tutsi people enjoyed. Hutu extremist elites used to disseminate ethnic myths of Tutsi people as alien, non-native tribe, Belgian collaborationists and skewed the perception of reality. It is important to note that there were no major differences in culture and language between two groups. Moreover, they used to live in peace with each other for centuries and intermarriage was common. The genocidal level of violence was achieved, because moderate Hutu people were afraid of Hutu extremists, who used to kill them as well as Tutsis for their non-radical stand (Storey, 2001). Many Hutus, who were not affected by ethnic myths and political propaganda, had to take part in ethnic cleansing in order to save their own lives.

The aforementioned case of Rwanda shows how elements of structural violence could determine the appraisal of ethnic conflict. Eventually, that led to one of the most tremendous genocides in human history. As a result, Rwanda case shows the link how structural inequalities between ethnic groups led to the large-scale violence and created a skewed impression of an ethnic conflict, where ethnicity per se was not the essential cause.

To sum up, relations between ethnic groups are very complex and ethnic violence is conditioned by a set of objective and subjective factors. Objective factors reflect the existence of a concrete problem, material shortage (unemployment, outbreaks of the physical violence, etc.) and subjective factors, which reflect the attitude to the problem, its perception by one or another ethnic group. Inequality is the overarching concept which implies unsatisfied material and non-material needs. Identity is a cultural product and it is a quality of any ethnic group. Identity shapes the non-material needs of an ethnic group. It influences the way ethnic groups live together – whether in peace or in a conflict and depends much on the dynamics of environment where ethnic groups co-exist. I assume

that “triangle of violence” of Johan Galtung is a very suitable framework for identifying all manifestations of violence, and shedding a light on the situation in Crimea.

1.4. Research methodology

This section discusses the three-stage research methodology and introduces the created research framework. I also discuss research limitations and specific problems, which affected the results and were determined by the nature of the selected topic.

First stage. I conduct the literature review, focusing on scientific papers and other academic sources, to understand the nexus between the ethnic conflict and different types of violence. For the research I select the definition and typology of violence proposed by Galtung (1969; 1990). Hence, I intend to estimate the situation of the ethnic conflict focusing on criteria of direct, structural, and cultural violence, i. e. applying Galtung (1990) ‘violence triangle’.

The next step of the literature review was to identify the most important criteria of different types of violence relevant for the development of the ethnic conflict. The academic sources for this analysis were selected as a result of the search using key words ‘structural violence’, ‘ethnic conflict’, and ‘inequality’.

According to the literature review, the most widely cited factors influencing the assessment of *direct violence* are murders, abductions, beatings and verbal threats (Menjivar, 2011; Sheper-Hughes, 2004). In my thesis the direct violence is measured calculating the number of the accidents related to the selected criteria. I make the judgement about the development of the ethnic conflict situation identifying the cases with ethnic reasons and comparing the number of these accidents to the overall numbers of the accidents.

The content of the structural and cultural dimensions is influenced by the early works of Galtung (1969) and Khan (1978) arguing that there are only two types of violence (direct and structural or direct and indirect). They explained indirect or structural violence by inequality and found its roots in the distribution of power between the groups. Thus, the distribution of power between different ethnic groups or within the group is the matter of concern in my thesis.

In the mentioned early academic work the cultural violence was treated as an integral element of the structural or indirect type of violence. However, in the later work Galtung (1990) proposes a ‘violence triangle’ and identifies cultural violence as a separate and significant type of violence. I address the latest approach as, in my opinion, the cultural violence is one of the most important elements, which could contribute to the ethnic conflict and the separation of three types of violence allows understanding the roots of the ethnic conflicts better. Hence, the proposed research framework includes direct, cultural, and structural violence (Fig. 1).




Figure 1. The research framework

To judge about the development of the ethnic conflict in the dimension of *structural violence* I separate socio-economic and political inequality. I propose to measure the socio-economic inequality in different ethnic groups applying these criteria (Lenon, 2002; Bourgois, 2004a and 2004b, Brumbaugh-Smith et al., 2008): access to land, unemployment, income, and access to facilities (for example, health services, running water, electricity, heating, etc.). In my thesis I focus on the development of the access to the aforementioned criteria for Crimean Tatars within the analysed period and the differences of situations, compared to another dominant ethnic group.

The criteria of the socio-economic group are measured in a following way – access to land is measured applying the simple indicator of ratio between the number of Crimean Tatars to size of all land they dispose. In that case, a quantitative indicator is supported with qualitative assessment, which emphasize the discrepancy between formal land advantage and legal ownership issues. Unemployment indicators are presented in a twofold way: they show the certain discrepancy between an official and informal unemployment of Crimean Tatars, their ability to find a full-time permanent job. Income indicator contributes to the analysis of the employment situation and allows to compare the situation of Crimean Tatars with another ethnic group. It is presumed that in case if one ethnic group has worse socio-economic conditions than another the situation of structural violence contributes to the development of the ethnic conflict.

The second important element of structural violence is political inequality between the different ethnic groups. I monitor the development of the ethnic conflict situation in Crimea measuring the involvement of Crimean Tatars in political activities, compared to the dominant ethnic group, and analysing the in depth problems determining the situation. Political inequality is understood as a result of a specific form of social relations, which impede access to the power institutions (DFID, 2005). Political representation is reflected in the diversity of political organizations and involvement of Crimean Tatars in Ukrainian and Russian Parliaments, in Crimean governmental and administrative bodies.

In order to judge about the presence of *cultural violence* and the development of the situation I rely on criteria of cultural representation, access to media and the native language use, freedom of religion. I investigate cultural inequality in a more complex way, based on qualitative approach. This type of violence is closely related to the structural violence (Galtung, 1990; Farmer, 2005). The criteria of cultural representation covers general situation of cultural life of Crimean Tatars and investigates the development of freedom of a cultural life (celebrations, important historical events, pointing on bitter experience of violence in historical past) and mutual attitudes of Crimean Tatars and Slavs. To measure the situation I use the data from the previous surveys and polls in order to analyse the situation of Crimean Tatars on the peninsula and focus on the manifestation of violence. I included into the research framework criteria, which show freedom of media, religion, and language use. These criteria have a high importance as they often exacerbate the ethnic conflict situation and transform into the manifestations of the direct violence. The thesis investigates the development of the situation related to these freedoms of the expression of ethnic identity on the peninsula.

Second stage. The annexation of 2014 has transformed the processes in the society of Crimea and violated stability introducing remarkable changes in the situation of the ethnic conflict and the level of violence. The proposed research framework helps to identify the main manifestations of different types of violence and compare the situation in different ethnic groups. According to Galtung (1969), manifestations of direct violence can change over the time, while the elements of structural violence are less dynamic. As a result, to answer the research question and test the first hypothesis I rely on the elements of qualitative and quantitative research.

I use the proposed research framework, allowing to estimate the development of different forms of violence, to conduct the analytic research, which relies on the secondary data. The description of the situation of the ethnic conflict is based on the analysis of scientific papers and academic sources, reports from international organizations and NGOs, documented cases of human rights' violations, polls, official statistics, media sources (for example, local newspapers and news websites), various narratives, ethnic myths, claims, etc. The results of polls and available official statistics provide 'hard' facts, while other sources assist in creating a comprehensive picture of the development of the situation of the ethnic conflict filling the gaps, which are not covered by the official statistics. Most of the analysed articles are classified as reviews or analytic essays. However, the research also covers qualitative empirical studies. They focus on different sets of structural factors but very few of them provide operationalization or measurement of variables (James et al., 2003; Kohrt and Worthman, 2009).

Third stage. It should be noted that the collection of the secondary data for the second stage of the research is a challenge as both sides of the ethnic conflict are interested in misinterpretations of the facts and the analyzed data could be an object of manipulations. I select the three-stage research approach and introduce triangulation to reduce the impact of such manipulations on the conclusions of the thesis.

The triangulation approach provides a more comprehensive state of affairs as criteria of the research framework are described based on different research methods and reflect the positions of different stakeholders (often conflicting sides). Given the lack of data on ethnic issues, the selection of this approach employs different methods and simultaneously overcome their deficiencies (Denzin, 1970). Moreover, social realities are complex phenomena to investigate with one single method. The

triangulation provides a deeper and more detail picture of the research object (Olsen, 2004). It also allows to ensure the validity of the research (Denzin, 1978; Smith and Kleine, 1986.)

In order to get a more comprehensive understanding of the real situation of the ethnic conflict I conduct the third stage – the analysis of expert opinions. This stage provides the support for the second hypothesis and complements the findings of the first hypothesis. I selected the survey method for the analysis of expert opinion. The questionnaire was prepared using the research framework. The questions were formulated to explain the changes in different types of violence and the situation of the ethnic conflict after the annexation of the peninsula. Respondents were also encouraged to give additional comments on relevant issues.

The survey was conducted from April 15 to May 25, 2017. I sent the questionnaires via e-mail as attachments to an explanatory letter in English and Russian. I sent letters to different organizations familiar with the situation of Crimean Tatars and the development of the ethnic conflict situation: NGOs, academia, and other institutions. The overall number of the sent questionnaires was 43. However, only five organizations filled in the questionnaire after a second follow-up e-mail. The response rate accounted for 11.6%. In August 2018 the survey was repeated in order to increase the response rate; however, the respondents did not reply after the follow-up e-mail and ignored the survey even after the telephone conversation.

The overall number of received questionnaires is seven (some organizations provided the opinions of several experts). In fact, the response followed only from the organizations, which were attended during my internship couple of years before the survey. The following organizations provided answers: UNPO (Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization), an international non-governmental organization; Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, a local Ukrainian non-governmental organization; the Mejlis of Crimean Tatar People and Taurida National University in Crimea, Simferopol.

Although the experts agreed to fill the questionnaire anonymously, the competence of experts is known, and all of them have more than five-year experience in the area of ethnic issues related to Crimean Tatars. Two organizations attached additional comments on relevant issues. This empirical survey gives a broader understanding of the development of the different types of violence.

The conducted survey tackles a very sensitive topic and the design of survey was selected to reduce the impact of any statements that could be treated as accusing of one or another group of respondents. The respondents were guaranteed to hide their identity leaving only reference to the type of their organization. Although survey seeks to provide a general assessment of the situation of different types of violence, it is inevitable that conclusions are expected to favour one or another point of view. Research acknowledges that lack of information could be covered by expert assessment, however, respondents' opinion could influence the findings even without any intention. In order to avoid this problem, the research considers all viewpoints and interpretations and accepts a challenge to provide a generalization of different data and opinions to answer the research question. I add the main results of the survey to the each chapter discussing the relevant type of violence.

The structure of the thesis is set as follows. The first chapter explains the relevance of the selected topic, introduces research problem and question, sets research hypotheses. I show the role of ethnic identity and its place in ethnic conflict, the nexus between the ethnic conflict and different types of violence, introduce the three-stage methodological research framework. The second chapter investigates the development of the ethnic conflict focusing on the situation of the direct violence criteria. The third chapter analyses the development of structural violence in Crimea. The fourth chapter provides the results of the development of the main criteria of cultural violence. The fifth chapter provides general conclusions and discusses the relevance of the research for academic research and political implications.

Chapter 2. Manifestations of direct violence

This chapter discusses the development of the situation of direct violence in Crimea. In order to describe the dimension of Galtung's (1990) 'violence triangle' the following criteria, which provide the most important manifestations of direct violence, are analyzed: *murders*, *abductions* and *detentions*, *beatings* and *verbal threats*. These criteria can overlap, for example, an act of abduction could be accompanied by beatings or verbal threats, etc. Nevertheless, the conducted research considers each criteria separately.

2.1. Murders

On 22 July 2016, Emine Dzheppar, the Ukrainian First Deputy Minister of Information Policy, claimed that ten people were found dead in Crimea since the annexation, seven of those people were Crimean Tatars (European..., 2016). In 2014, in Crimea lived 232,340 Crimean Tatars, i. e. 10.6% of the entire population, while the majority was Russians – 1,492,708 (67.9%), Ukrainians accounted for 344, 515 people (15.7%) (Rosstat, 2014). Such a disproportion in favour of Crimean Tatars certainly raises a concern; however, it is necessary to analyse the circumstances of these deaths and their relation to intentional violence based on ethnicity. In some cases, true causes of deaths are not known; however, indirect factors, also, witnesses of relatives, local police, Tatar representative bodies, and NGOs provide the strong support for the confirmation of the intended murder. Thus, the above-mentioned sources should not be dismissed.

Reshat Akhmetov, an inhabitant of Simferopol, left his house to take part in a single protest against the annexation of Crimea in Lenin Square. A video shows that he was caught by Crimean self-defence members and forcefully placed in a car in the middle of the square. Two weeks later, his body, with obvious signs of torture, was found in a field near Sunychne village, Belohorsk district (OSCE, 2015). Police started an investigation only in April 2014. Amnesty International issued a report where the self-defence members were identified as culprits (OSCE, 2015).

Edem Asanov was found dead after he had allegedly committed a suicide by hanging in an abandoned sanatorium in Yevpatoria. A suicide note was found near the body. Later, his uncle, Riduan Dzhepparov, and cousin, Akim Dzhepparov, confirmed the suicide version and clarified that his death had no relation with political or criminal issues. The head of the Saki district's Mejlis, Eskender

Bilalov, also confirmed the suicide version and denied a prescribed link of Edem Asanov with the film director Oleg Sentsov, the Ukrainian citizen detained by Russian authorities and accused of plotting terrorist acts (QHA, 2014b).

Belial Belialov was poisoned by a smoking blend and there was no evident proof of any signs of violence on his body. Another victim, 20-years old Djohar Melyasanov fell off a cliff in Ai-Petri mountains (RIA..., 2016a).

On 30 August 2015 Crimean Tatar activists Osman Ibrahimov and Mehmet Selimov were found dead on the outskirts of the Crimean capital city – Simferopol. They were missing since the 21st August 2015. The bodies had signs of stabbing (UNPO, 2017). According to the Deputy Chairman of the Mejlis, Nariman Jelal, investigators assumed a domestic conflict caused by alcohol abuse. The killer was identified and detained later; he was a Ukrainian citizen. According to Nariman Jelal, Mehmet Selimov was an ambulance driver and was not involved in civil society or criminal activities (Censor.net, 2015a; Chernov, 2015).

On 10 October 2015 the body of Bekir Nebiyev was found. He was the father of Eskender Nebiyev who worked as a cameraman for the independent Crimean Tatar ‘ATR’ TV channel. The father was suspected in killing two medics prior to the referendum during protests in February 2014. According to UNPO (2015), Bekir Nebiyevs’ fault had not been proven. Moreover, UNPO argued that Russian authorities did not appeal to the principle of the presumption of innocence and his Tatar ethnicity was a sufficient reason to consider Nebiyev as a culprit.

Though the aforementioned report by Emine Dzhappar identified 3 murders of persons with non-Tatar origin, only 2 incidents were mentioned in the media: the death of a Ukrainian military officer Stanislav Karachevsky (April 2014) and Ukrainian student Mark Ivaniuk (April 2014). The Ukrainian military officer was shot by a Russian soldier in a drunken quarrel between a group of Russian militants in Novofedorovskoye village (Gander, 2014). The student died on the Chernomorskoe-Olenevka highway in a hit-and-run incident. The circumstances of Ivaniuk's death are still unknown; however, his mother assumes that the local police were responsible (Muižnieks, 2014).

To sum up, stemming from available data and taking in account that some missing people might be dead and some cases kept in secret from public, it is possible to see that the absolute number of Crimean Tatars’ deaths is larger, compared to other nationalities. However, the analysis shows that

most of these deaths have no obvious link to ethnicity and cannot be treated as a contribution to the development of ethnic conflict. The case of Reshat Akhmetov is the only one with a strong evidence of ethnic conflict qualities, other deaths provide a space for dispute or can be clearly classified as tragic accidents or homicides not based on ethnic origins.

2.2. Abductions and detentions

After the annexation of the Crimean peninsula in 2014, many reports about abductions and detentions arose, however, the declared figures of victims differed significantly. According to the Crimean Field Mission on Human Rights, 11 people were missing by 2015 (Crimean..., 2015). Mustafa Cemilev, the former Head of the Mejlis, claims that abductions of Crimean Tatars is a new phenomenon, which has never been practiced during the Soviet period (UNPO, 2016). The most outstanding cases are described in the thesis in order to analyse the importance of this variable in Crimean case.

According to media reports, the most important cases of abductions of Crimean Tatars are as follows: a Crimean Tatar journalist Ibrahim Umerov and an unnamed 'ATR' TV channel cameraman were holding as hostages in March 2014 (UNPO, 2014), the disappearance of two activists Seiran Zinedinov and Timur Shamardanov in May 2014, the capture of Dzevdet Islyamov and Islyam Dzeparov in September 2014 (TSN, 2014), the abduction of two Crimean Tatars a week later (Ryzhkov, 2014), the kidnapping of Eskender Apselamov in October 2014 (World Bulletin, 2014).

Although for the most of these cases the presence of the ethnic conflict is not obvious, the kidnapping of 17-years-old Islyam Dzeparov and 23-years-old Dzevdet Islamov on the 17th September 2014 could be classified as an ethnic case. Unknown men wearing military uniforms kidnapped two young Crimean Tatar activists (TSN, 2014). The father of one of the kidnapped activist, Abdureshit Dzeparov, clearly pointed at the ethnic cause of the kidnapping and blamed Russian authorities for the created atmosphere of fear of repressions and provocations for the radical actions. He also declared that the kidnappers were not police officers, because they were not aware of abductions when he contacted them immediately after the incident. He assumed that Russian security forces were involved in this case (Birnbaum, 2014).

It should be noted that the phenomenon of Crimean Tatars' abduction is still relevant. Although the long time passed since the annexation, the situation did not change. The first series of abductions

could be explained by political turmoil after the change of status-quo and the restructuring of the police and judicial system from Ukrainian to Russian. However, on 25 May 2016 a Crimean Tatar activist, the Vice President of World Congress of Crimean Tatars, Ervin Ibragimov, disappeared in Bakhchysarai (Walker, 2016). According to 'The Times' correspondent Tom Parfitt, two uniformed men stopped his car just a few hundred meters from his house (ZN.UA, 2016). Ervin Ibragimov was forcefully seated into the car and has been missing ever since. Ibragimov called his father to ask for the car documents. The father, Umer Ibragimov, found the car of his son with opened doors a few hours later. A stranger found his passport, driving license, and record of service on the street in Bakhchysarai (Segodnya, 2016). Umer Ibragimov was confident that the kidnappers had relations with authorities. Ervin Ibragimov's friends declared that the reason for the kidnapping was his membership in the Bakhchysarai's Mejlis and the authority among young Crimean Tatars (ZN.UA, 2016). According to Nariman Jelialov, the First Deputy Chairman of the Mejlis, a video tape revealed that the kidnappers were wearing uniforms of the Road Patrol Service (Segodnya, 2016).

The analysis of media sources shows many cases of the detentions of Crimean Tatars. One of the prominent Crimean Tatar activists, the Deputy Chairman of the Mejlis, Ahtem Chiygoz, was arrested on 29 January 2015. Russian authorities blamed him for the instigating of the public disorder during protests on 26 February 2014 (MFA, 2017). Later, Ali Asanov (16 April 2015) and Mustafa Degermendzhy (7 May 2015) were arrested. They were accused of running riots in February 2014. According to the media, these two men were kept in a jail as they refused to make misstatements against Chiygoz. Ali Asanov told that his family members were taken as hostages and he could have gotten out only if he gave a false testimony (UNPO, 2015; Vasilyeva, 2016; MFA, 2017). Overall, six people were detained on charges dating back to February events. However, pro-Russian protesters did not face any problems for the same events (Vasilyeva, 2016).

Similar to the described cases was the arrest of Eskender Nabiyeu on 20 April 2015; he was detained for two months. He worked for the oppositional 'ATR' TV channel and was charged for taking part in February 2014 demonstrations. Nabiyeu was released after the intervention of the Chief Mufty Emirali Ablayev. His family became a subject of regular interrogations (UNPO, 2015).

On 9 March 2015 three pro-Ukrainian sympathizers – Leonid Kuzmin, Oleksandr Kravchenko, and the Crimean Tatar Veldar Shukurdzhiiev – gathered in Simferopol to celebrate the 201st anniversary of Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko. They wore ribbons coloured in yellow and blue (a flag of Ukraine). They were detained for three hours, underwent the interrogation and had to complete 40

hours of community labour. After this incident, Leonid Kuzmin, a history teacher, lost his job (UNIAN, 2016).

On 27 August 2015 Muhtar Arislanov, an inhabitant of Simferopol Fontany district, disappeared (Censor.net, 2015a). On 15 September 2015 Tatar activist, the Head of Tatar Public Centre, Rafis Kashapov, was accused by Russian authorities of inciting the ethnic hatred and sentenced to three years in prison. He was known for his open critique of the Crimean annexation and the later development of the situation on the peninsula (UNPO, 2017).

On 15 January 2016 a famous Tatar blogger and journalist Zair Akadyrov was detained and threatened by the Counter-Extremist Centre. OMON officers and former Security Service members forced him to travel to the police station. Akadyrov was allegedly involved in the so-called the 26th February case (pre-annexation protests) (CrimeaSOS, 2016).

On 18 August 2016 Ilmi Umerov, a former mayor of Bakhchysarai, was detained and sent to forceful psychiatric treatment by Security Service officers. He was an outspoken critic of the new authorities, calling for international sanctions against Russia and the return of Crimea to Ukraine. Russian authorities charged him for the support of separatism. On 12 May, a criminal investigation against him was opened and he was a subject to travel restrictions. The District Court of Simferopol insisted on his psychiatric examination. Ilmi Umerov was not allowed to contact relatives and lawyers; his physical condition was under the risk, because he suffered from diabetes and Parkinson's disease. According to his family members, Ilmi Umerov did not receive an appropriate medical care. In turn, Human Rights Watch had expressed a concern and abruptly criticized these punitive measures (Amnesty International, 2016; Human Rights Watch, 2016).

One of the main reasons of the detention of Crimean Tatars is a suspicion of involvement in extremist organizations, for example, Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HUT), a pan-Islamist organization that is banned in the Russian Federation. In January 2015, four Crimean Tatars – Nuri Primov, Ferat Saifullayev, Rustem Vaitov, and Ruslan Zeitullayev – were arrested and charged for terrorist activities based on their alleged participation in HUT (Coynash, 2016).

On 11 February 2016 a mass detention took place in Crimea. 12 people were detained that day in Bakhchysarai, Yalta, and Alushta. Raids went in a hasty manner damaging private property. Behtiar Topuzov, a resident of Yalta, had an unexpected visit early in the morning. According to witnesses,

Russian security servicemen broke windows and scared children. They handcuffed people and forced them to lie down on the floor. Servicemen spent more than three hours and then took Behtiar Topuzov to the Federal Security Bureau in Simferopol. According to the Crimean Tatar lawyer Emil Kurbedinov, no explanations were given, although relatives of Topuzov rumoured that he was accused of terrorist activities.

Tatar activist Emir-Usein Kuku, Ukrainian Muslim convert Vadim Siruk, and Muslim Aliuev were arrested in Yalta. In Holmovka village, which is located in Bakhchysarai district, Nariman Mamedinov, Mamed Eminov, and Atrsen Khalilov had searches in their homes and later were taken for the interrogation to the Federal Security Service. In another village of this district, Victorovka, two men of Moskovskiyh family (likely Slavs) were detained. Four detainees were released, but others remained in custody. Natalya Poklonskaya, the Russian General Prosecutor in Crimea, acknowledged that they managed to identify four active members of HUT and also denied all talks about the selective detentions of Crimean Tatars (UAWire, 2016).

Indeed, some reports show another picture. For example, on the 4th April 2016 masked armed men detained 35 Crimean Tatars in a café situated near Simferopol in Pionerskoye settlement. According to Emile Kurbedinov, detainees were transferred to the Counter-Extremist Centre. Servicemen took DNA probes and fingerprints. It should be noted that all people with typical Slavic appearance were released in 4 hours (Coynash, 2016). Another mass detention took place on 7 May 2016 in Eupatoria. 25 Crimean Tatars were detained during a police operation aiming to catch criminals who killed a family in Krasnodar. They were interrogated and asked to leave their fingerprints. Again, police were not able to explain to local journalists why all suspects were Crimean Tatars (Krasov, 2016).

All previous causes of detentions were justified by the alleged involvement of the suspects in HUT activities. Five Crimean Tatars were imprisoned in October 2016. On 26 January Emil Kuberdinov, investigating the causes of Crimean Tatar detentions, was arrested for the dissemination of the extremist literature. Nevertheless, he was released on 5 February. Two weeks later, Crimean Tatar activist Marlen Mustafayev was taken into custody for 11 days. Together with him, 10 other Tatars were arrested for an unsanctioned public gathering, when they were taking footage of searches in Mustafayev's house (RFE/RL, 2017; UNPO, 2017).

One of the latest mass detentions happened in April 2017 in Bakhchysarai. Eight Crimean Tatars – Seidamet Mustafayev, Eskender Memetov, Shevket and Mustafa Abvduramanov, Remzi Zudiev,

Midat Mudzhaba, Amethan Umerov and Aiziz Azizov – were arrested for being suspected of extremism (GORDON, 2017). There was no sufficient information about them after their detention.

One of the most outstanding cases was the case of Nedim Chalilov who continuously conflicted with both Russian and Ukrainian authorities and strived for the recreation of Crimean Tatar statehood. He was a leader of the so-called Crimean Tatar Resistance Movement. In February 2016, he sent a letter to the authorities demanding the recognition of Crimean Tatars as an indigenous nation. Interestingly, he owned neither Russian passport nor Ukrainian one because of his hardline ideological stance. Eventually, the Crimean Court issued a decree on 7 November 2016 to deport him to Uzbekistan, his place of birth (GolosIslama 2016; Putilov, 2016).

The latest victim of selective justice is Ruslan Zeytullaev who was detained on 28 April 2017 and sentenced to 12 years for the involvement in the activities of the Mejlis, an organization banned a year prior to that. Ruslan Zeytullaev went on a three-week hunger strike, showing his disagreement with the charges (UNPO, 2017).

According to the head of Russian Central Investigative Committee for Crimea Mikhail Nazarov, 78 people were considered missing in January 2016: seven of them were Crimean Tatars. Mikhail Nazarov pointed to the fact that half of them disappeared when Crimea was still under the Ukrainian control (Argumenty..., 2016). Other figures were declared on the 2nd July 2016 by Emine Dzhappar, the First Deputy Minister of Information Policy of Ukraine, who announced that 18 out of 24 political prisoners and 10 out of 16 missing citizens were Crimean Tatars (UNPO, 2017).

According to the Commissioner for Human Rights in the Republic of Crimea Lyudmila Lubina, Crimean Tatars account for less than 3% of all missing people. She also confirmed that there was only one case proving the criminal aspect of a Crimean Tatar's disappearance. Instead, she pointed to the fact that some of the missing people indeed joined the war in Syria or the Donbass Conflict (RIA..., 2016a).

The analysis of the cases of abductions and detentions allows to state that the claims of Crimean Tatars are justified. Even the fact that these cases have an ethnic conflict characters is noticeable. According to the media analysis, abduction or detention cases exceed 100 incidents after the annexation of Crimea. The same media show that the number of non-Tatar victims is significantly

lower. It is important to note that official statistics give completely different snapshots for the same period.

2.3. Beatings and verbal threats

In Crimea, detentions and abductions of Crimean Tatars were often accompanied by beatings, while interrogations contained the aspect of intimidation, reprisal for family members, etc. This research considers only the cases containing descriptions of beatings that took place. In addition, confessions of the victims or comments of witnesses and relatives were analysed in order to show the fact of physical abuse or threats as these manifestations contribute to the development of the ethnic conflict.

Several cases of beatings were elucidated in the very first month following the annexation. Crimean Tatars certainly were not the only victims, starting from the first wave of massive abuses. In fact, the first victims were Ukrainian Greek Catholic priests who were kidnapped in March and interrogated on suspicion in extremism. Also, the Chief Reform Rabbi had to flee after he received anonymous messages promising retaliation.

One of the first reports of Crimean Tatar beatings was produced by the Human Rights Watch; it reported about two Crimean Euromaidan supporters who were abducted and later tortured in secret locations for 11 days. Within a week, another report was made about an act of hooliganism when a 14 years old Tatar adolescent was beaten by thugs for speaking Tatar language in public (Malinowski, 2014).

On 19 September 2014 Nadir Bekir, a Crimean Tatar scholar and a civil activist, reported having been assaulted by four masked men when he was in a taxi on his way to Dzhankoy from Simferopol, where he was supposed to catch a flight to New York. Perpetrators threw him out of the car, applied physical force, and took his passport and mobile phone, leaving other personal belongings with him. Being himself an expert in indigenous people, Nadir Bekir believes that he was assaulted in order to prevent his participation in the UN Conference on Indigenous People which took place on the 22–23rd September 2014 in New York (RFE/RL, 2014).

One of the most prominent Crimean Tatar activists is Lenur Islyamov. He is an Ukrainian and Russian entrepreneur that had cooperated with the Russian authorities in the first months after the annexation

and even had been involved in local governance activities. However, later he decided to support the pro-Ukrainian side. He gained notoriety for his ambitious endeavour – financing and organizing Crimean Tatar fighting units to launch a Crimean liberation campaign. His 17-years-old son, a Russian citizen, received threats from Chechen security officials and was asked to renounce his father. Eventually, these circumstances forced him to leave Russia (Vasilyeva, 2016).

On 20 April 2015 Emir Usein Kuku, a human rights activist from Yalta, was beaten early in the morning on his way to the bus stop. One of the offenders grabbed his folder with documents, while another tried to grasp his mobile phone. Later, a white Gazelle van appeared with machine gunners who forced Emir Usein Kuku inside the car. According to his wife, Emir Usein Kuku was driven to his house and was all maimed, gasping from pain. Medical expertise showed bruises both kidneys and the lumbar region. His health was at a serious risk, with a potential to develop an intervertebral hernia (Azar, 2016).

Damir Munadirov was beaten after the mass detention in Yalta on 10 February 2016 (Coynash, 2016). A shocking case of brutal violence was the eight-hour-long interrogation of Weldar Shukurdiyev who was beaten by two men on 16 May 2016. According to victim, they wanted to make him swallow the Ukrainian flag. Weldar Shukurdiyev was arrested in suspicion for preparing a rally in commemoration of the Deportation Day few days later. Weldar Shukurdiyev was already well-known to the new Crimean authorities – previously he was detained for carrying the Ukrainian flag during Taras Shevchenko's birthday (Blair, 2016).

Crimean Tatar activists point to an underlining atmosphere of fear, existing among Tatars. According to Gulnara Memetova, Crimean Tatar students face mocking from other students and teachers for Crimean Tatar language use, music they listen to and other specific attributes of Crimean Tatar culture they express (Kurmasheva et al., 2015).

The Crimean lawyer Emil Kurbedinov mentions frequent cases of ill-behavior and mistreatment during mass raids. Police used to inflict damage on private property and watch women that had just been woken up putting their clothes on. He also informed that his clients were being kept in horrible conditions, as in the case of Simferopol Remand Centre. Detainees complained about the quality of food, and the Centre being infested with fleas and bedbugs. It often happened that detainees could sleep only two hours; and they had to sleep in turns, because there were 10 beds in a cell with 20 people. Often lights or running water was turned off for the entire day in the cell. It was impossible

to take a bath, there were no curtains in the showers, and only cold water was available. Especially illustrative is the fact that detainees who were predominantly Muslims were offered pork, what was an apparent mocking and disrespect of their religion. Finally, Emil Kurbedinov admitted that a very common pattern of detentions were poorly-based accusations in involvement in HUT actions. There was also a common trend that investigative bodies presented the situation in such a way that the perpetrators were overwhelmingly Crimean Tatars and the victims – Slavs. Overall, Emil Kurbedinov argued that Crimean intelligence and security officials intentionally created a negative image of Crimean Tatars as Muslim radicals and rambunctious protesters (Mazur, 2016).

According to the information on the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO) website, there are other manifestations of Crimean Tatar rights' violations. There were reports about the walls of some Crimean Tatar houses being marked with crosses, a practice used during the period of deportation, which clearly hints on the desire of hostile groups to repeat the practice again. Moreover, there were some reports about pupils being prevented to attend lessons at school, because their mothers feared a persecution (UNPO, 2014).

To sum up, there are reasons to argue that the cases of physical and psychological abuse of Crimean Tatars constitute a clear-cut majority as a target group. People of other nationalities also become victims; still, their numbers are overshadowed in comparison with Crimean Tatars. Hence, the contribution of this criteria into the development of the situation of ethnic conflict is visible. Ethnic asymmetry in favour of Crimean Tatars is clearly shown.

2.4. Expert opinion on manifestations of direct violence

It should be also noted, that there is no much divergence in the assessment of a situation of structural violence in expert opinions, retrieved from their feedbacks. According to experts, manifestations of direct violence became more obvious after the annexation. The NGOs and the Mejlis reported that direct violence had increased and provided explanatory comments on the most outstanding cases (these incidents were identified during the previous research). One representative of an academic institution even noted that raids and arrests for the participation in the Mejlis and HUT used to happen. The same kind of punishment was applicable to those who clicked 'like' under the posts showing public complaint in the Internet.

Table 1. Manifestation of direct violence

	NGO	Academia	Other
<i>In your opinion, has the number of cases when Crimean Tatars became victims of direct violence and threats increased since 2014?</i>	2 respondents confirmed an increase	1 respondent confirmed an increase, 2 respondents – a decrease	2 respondents confirmed an increase

Experts also argue that young Crimean Tatars do not constitute a serious base for non-traditional Islam. The Mejlis and HUT have lost their importance in Crimea and the aforementioned mass detentions of Tatars, determined by their ethnic origin, have no justification.

To summarize, the survey showed that the contribution of the direct violence in the development of the ethnic conflict in Crimea is visible. The majority of experts support the position that the situation of direct violence has increased.

2.5. Conclusion

The study found a support for the statement that the direct violence contributes to the development of the ethnic conflict in Crimea. According to the analysed sources and expert opinion, most of the cases of direct violence towards Crimean Tatars are irresponsibly treated as the manifestation of the ethnic conflict. Although the conducted research shows that the cases of reported murders due to ethnic reasons are not confirmed, other manifestations of direct violence are important and experts argue that the development of the ethnic conflict situation after the annexation has worsened.

However, the conducted research allows to state that the availability of data for the analysis is a serious problem and it allows the media, local authorities, and alternative organizations of Crimean Tatars to channel the misleading information about the real state of affairs of the ethnic conflict. Another problem is the lack of information about analysed criteria of direct violence for the pre-annexation period. The change of status-quo created preconditions for the certain groups to manipulate the scarce data about direct violence in order to prove the growing magnitude of the ethnic conflict between Crimean Tatars and Slavic majority.

Chapter 3. Manifestations of structural violence

The chapter analyses important criteria of socio-economic and political inequality reflecting the presence (or absence) of structural violence between Crimean Tatars and other nationalities in the peninsula. The following criteria of structural violence, explaining the dimension of Galtung's (1990) 'violence triangle', are covered: access to land, unemployment and income, access to essential facilities (running water, heating, electricity, and healthcare services), political representation. These criteria were selected because they indicate the state of inequality and allow to avoid subjective assessments and speculations. The chapter shows the contribution of the structural violence to the development of the ethnic conflict in Crimea.

3.1. Land access and property

One of the most acute socio-economic problems – a 'visit card' of Crimean Tatars' physical presence on the peninsula – is a question of access to land and property restitution. Land seizure issues were an important source of tensions in Crimea since the repatriation of Crimean Tatars in the late 1980s. The young Ukrainian state, as well as the Crimean authorities, were incapable to deal with the numerous socio-economic problems. During the first years of Ukrainian independence, the socio-economic issues were not discussed in Crimea and the influx of Tatar repatriates from the former Soviet republics, mostly Uzbekistan, put an additional strain on the regional economy and resulted in an increased competition for land.

The majority of Tatars left their property and returned back to Crimea. The living standards were worse than in Central Asian countries which were the main sites of deportation. Nevertheless, there was some ground for optimism inspired by prospective future development of Ukraine as the country inherited a considerable industrial and agricultural potential, the sufficient level of technological development, and educated employees. Moreover, Crimean Tatars used to keep strong bond with Crimean peninsula through generations and that instigated the wish to return to the 'promised land'.

One of the major challenges for the repatriating Tatars was the absence of policies concerning the deportees. During the first decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union migrants and repatriates were barely controlled by local authorities. The appropriate institutions and legislation were not developed and many deportees were not able to obtain the Ukrainian citizenship (Ilyina, 2015). Various disputes

about land and illegal land acquisitions were common as Crimea had a good prospect for tourism. However, the contribution of the Tatar factor significantly altered the situation and produced new dimensions of conflict, incorporating the ethnic factor and creating two clearly defined conflicting camps: Slavs versus Crimean Tatars. Both groups had their own interpretation of land issues and made mutual accusations. Greed and grievances became important motives in public discussions.

Actually, before the annexation of Crimea the rehabilitation of deportees was not carried out. Ukraine covered the expenses of the Tatars' re-settlement in Crimea. The former Soviet republics agreed to contribute and shared the costs of the lost Tatar property. However, that was not sufficient to satisfy the needs of deportees and a compensation budget was gradually decreasing. After the annexation of 2014, Russian president Vladimir Putin promised to rehabilitate the good name of Crimean Tatars and address their cultural and economic needs. However, the clear proposal and a budget plan were not provided. Moreover, repatriates were excluded from the process of land redistribution. Officials explained that Tatars did not live in Crimea before the collapse of the Soviet Union and there was no justification to share the demanded land (Aydin, 2014).

The Crimean Tatars started land seizures as they lacked property and finances, the deportees simply captured unused parcels of land. Most of these land seizures were on the outskirts of the major cities. These areas became an integral part of the Crimean urban landscape. In Crimea, this process is called 'samozahvat' (self-seizure): people occupy a certain area and build small temporary constructions, known as Cemilev's houses. Later permanent houses are built and additional infrastructure (roads, electricity, water supplies, etc.) is developed.

Overall, there were four waves of land seizures: 1989–1991, 1999, 2002–2005, and 2006 (Mikelic, 2012). The first wave was the reaction of deportees to the very slow work of a bureaucratic machine, that was apparently poorly prepared for a sudden influx of repatriates. Also, local elites were artificially hampering the land allocation to Tatars fearing the change of both ethnic and political balance in favour of the latter.

The second wave was caused by the selective entitlements for former members of state and collective farms. A tiny segment of Tatars received a share of state-owned land during the privatization. Most of the attractive parcels with fertile soils were distributed among former leaders of collective farms. Deportees were offered less valuable areas and they had no money to invest in that land.

The third wave was caused by similar reasons; however, whereas the second wave happened in the northern regions, the wave of 2002–2005 embraced the southern Crimea. Squatters acquired land mostly for the individual housing purpose. The last wave concentrated in Simferopol and nearby territories. The Mejlis members were actively involved in this process. They dealt with a massive refusal of local authorities to allocate land for deportees needs and claims that there was no free land. At the same time, the lobby for various business groups took place and valuable land was given to them. Despite the lack of facilities, numerous socio-economic problems, and difficulties in attaining and legalizing land Tatars had a reputation of speculators and thieves, as they were formally better endowed with land. Actually, due to self-seizures Crimean Tatars had a higher index of provision with land in 2007: 0.81 ha per person, whereas the average among Crimean inhabitants was only 0.67 ha (Regnum, 2007).

The absence of working land legislation excused land seizure activities, which gradually transformed from getting land for survival into a profitable business, accompanied by the expulsion of former hosts and the destruction of previous buildings. Many Crimean Tatars, anticipating a rise in the value of land, intensified land grabs, particularly focusing on the Southern coast of Crimea. Currently, there were more than fifty squatting sites in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, occupying an area of approximately 2,000 hectares and involving from eight to fifteen thousand people (Mikelic, 2012). In 1999 one half of Crimean Tatars had no permanent housing (OSCE HCNM, 2013).

This land rush was relevant for the other ethnic groups too. In 2006, Slavs and other ethnic groups joined Tatars in a squatting competition for the first time and additional source of grievances between two ethnic groups became obvious (Mikelic, 2012). Tensions were seen as a consequence of the increased competition between various ethnic groups. Russians constructed buildings on lands previously owned by Crimean Tatars, sometimes even on sacred Muslim sites, and vice versa. In those cases, conflicts became frequent and identified grievances.

The Ukrainian Parliament introduced a new law prohibiting the unauthorized occupation of land in December 2006. The land seizures resulted in imprisonment up to six years (Graumann, 2007). Initiatives to impede land seizures were not welcomed by Crimean Tatars, but were supported by the Mejlis, involved in illegal land business (Mikhaylov, 2013). An effective land registration system was absent. There was also the popular perception among Crimean Tatars that Crimean authorities have a bias against them and favoured the Russian population in land distribution or interethnic land disputes.

Land issues often became the object of manipulations for both Crimean Tatars and local officials. Many Ukrainian politicians, oligarchs, state officials or people affiliated with the Ukrainian President evaded legal procedures, acquired lands, and built luxury villas in the most expensive parts of the Southern Crimea. Criminalization of land business did not follow ethnic lines, but local authorities, political organizations, and the media tended to frame disputes in a way that encouraged ethnic conflicts, thereby creating a negative image of the other ethnic group. Around 90 % of land seizures were made by Tatars (while the Mejlis reported only about one third), which created a negative image of thieves and robbers among the Russians (Ukrayinska Pravda, 2009; Mikhaylov, 2013).

Some victims suffered from conflicts, related to land disputes on both sides. One of the most serious incidents happened in November 2007 in Ay Petri. Almost thousand special police officers destroyed a Crimean Tatar café and some unfinished constructions with armed vehicles; five hundred Tatars attempted to block the destruction of their property (Mikelic, 2012). Although there were no human casualties, it was a serious event since local authorities were later blamed for the excessive use of force.

By the time of the annexation there were 12,500 people demanding some land for the living. After the peak of the land dispute in the mid-2000s some improvement was observed. For example, in 2013, 3,500 people obtained land ownership license. However, since the annexation, the process of endowment with land rights was very complicated, and as some observers pointed out, had actually stalled in dynamics (Azar, 2016). In accordance with Russian land regulations, all illegal constructions had to be removed by 2015. In fact, as the former Deputy Minister of the Crimean Government Ruslan Belbek stressed, 3,500 Crimean Tatars had managed to legalize the squats (Kanunnikova, 2016).

The media sources also point to the negative role of some Crimean Tatar ethnic leaders in hampering the land issues settlement. The case of one mixed Crimean Tatar family will explain the problem. Roman Gorodec moved to Crimea from Kherson oblast in Ukraine and married a Crimean Tatar woman. They needed a place to live and came to the 'protest glade' (unsanctioned settlements) in Mirnoe settlement near Simferopol and seized some land where they built a typical temporary construction. There was a fear of expulsion, however, there was no possibility to buy property. The family did not solve this problem when Crimea was Ukrainian. Land issues didn't change and they could not solve their problem during that period. In 2015 situation changed and those people who

voluntarily demolished their temporary constructions were given land permission. They destroyed a shack, sent a request, and, in 2016, had already received documents to legalize their land. The family was granted six acres of land and primary certificates in Mirnoe land seizure area where they actually demanded to settle (RIA..., 2016b).

This family had been waiting for 10 years to achieve their goal. They mentioned that the ‘protest glades’ were controlled by so-called elders who used to raise monthly fees from participants. These people were no longer present after the annexation. Then, Roman Gorodec had to meet with the ‘elder’ who had a list of free land plots and asked 2,000 hryvnas (~63.5€). Then family had to pay a monthly fee of 20 hryvnas and was obliged to patrol the squatting in case of necessity and take part in demonstrations. Otherwise, there was a risk to be driven out of the area. According to Zaur Smirnov, the Head of State Committee on Formerly Deported People and Interethnic Relations, land seizures are the legacy of Ukrainian land policy. The inability to solve the problem led to the burst of land seizures over Crimea. Zaur Smirnov told that Crimean authorities called for the decisive action to get rid of all negative legacy of the Ukrainian period. The Committee organized visits to all areas of the ‘protest glades’ and talked to people, who claimed the land plots. The Committee tried to leave people on the plots they used to occupy before. If that was not possible then a substitution was offered. Overall, the committee plans to allocate 8,000–9,000 land plots across the peninsula (RIA..., 2016b).

Nevertheless, a substantial number of people cannot obtain a license. Although the first wave of land seizures was legalized, still many cases belonging to the second wave are waiting for the resolution. A Turkish unofficial delegation conducted a study in April 2015, they investigated the situation of Tatar human rights’ violations, including the land issues. The study revealed that about 30 neighbourhoods out of 300 were Crimean Tatars dwelled. Often that implied the interest to transfer the ownership to non-Tatar residents and destroy existing buildings as the residence permit was absent. For instance, authorities required evictions in several areas, when residents did not have legal documents. It has to be noted, that there was a lack of legal definition of property rights, appropriate documentation, selling and bequeathing of the land property rights. Moreover, authorities did not provide all necessary information to Crimean Tatars and the delegation concluded that the transition to the new legal system delayed the allocation of land to Crimean Tatars. Thus, Crimean Tatars were deeply concerned about uncertainties with land endowment procedures and security of the property rights (Aydingun, 2016).

Even pro-Russian Crimean-Tatar representatives, such as Vasvi Abduraimov, the Head of Crimean Tatar Milli Firka party in opposition to the Mejlis, admitted that since 2013 new Crimean authorities did not allocate any land plot in frames of a rehabilitation program of the formerly deported people. He pointed out the negative role of the Euromaidan and ‘Crimean Spring’ events in 2014, which postponed the solution of the land problem, and blamed Crimean authorities and some Crimean Tatar organizations, such as Qirim and Qirim Birligi, affiliated with the Russian ruling political party ‘United Russia’ in hampering the solution of land provision (Filatov, 2016).

Although the certain steps had been taken to address these issues, and some Tatars were lucky to obtain land, it still takes time to overcome the difficulties of the transition process. Moreover, stemming from the report of Shaimardanov (2016) some people involved in dirty land deals and corruption schemes managed to retain their influence and continued to disturb the process of land conflict resolution. Also, new players from the Russian motherland have possibly contributed to this process (Shaimardanov, 2016). It is difficult to estimate whether this criterion contributes to the decrease of the structural violence in Crimea. However, the problem related to land endowment is not solved and that means the higher risk of the exacerbation of the ethnic conflict.

3.2. Income and unemployment

Crimean Tatars were in a very unstable position during their exile. The living conditions after the deportation, in Kazakhstan, for example, were worse and the majority of Crimean Tatars did not have any substantial source of income. The environment in Crimea, which suffered from the socio-economic crisis of the 1990s, was not welcoming either. Hyperinflation had considerably cut the faint amount of savings and property prices were higher in Crimea than in places of exile (OSCE HCNM, 2013).

Studies show that a significant number of Crimean Tatars remained unemployed before the annexation. According Ablyatifov (2004), less than a half (46.9%) of Crimean Tatars had a permanent job in 2002. A study conducted by Guzenkova et al. (2016) in 2009, 30% of Crimean Tatars were unemployed, 42% of Crimean Tatars lived under the poverty level, and only 10% had a higher education. A research conducted by UNPO in December 2014 revealed that up to 60% of Crimean Tatars were unemployed. This number was almost three times higher than Crimean average unemployment rates (UNPO, 2014).

The Equal Rights Trust (2016) found out that the level of unemployment among Crimean Tatars twice as high as the average. According to the mentioned report, Crimean Tatars were intentionally discriminated against women and workers above 40 years old could not find job (The Equal..., 2016). Another employment problem was the absence of the official residence status, which was obligatory to apply for a job. At the same time, an official employment was required for the registration of residence, therefore creating a vicious cycle. Furthermore, many repatriates moved to rural areas. They did not have any chance to get a well-paid job and use their competence, only low-paid occasional jobs were available (Razumkov Centre, 2001).

According to the OSCE 'Need assessment report' (August 2013), 43% of Crimean Tatars' households were considered as poor, while Ukrainians and Russians had lower indicators – 38% and 33% respectively. To some extent, the situation could be explained by the fact that the average number of people in Crimean Tatars' households was higher (traditionally Crimean Tatars had larger families: 3.2 people per household, compared to 2.3 people per household in Russian and 2.2 in Ukrainian households. The employment in the case of Crimean Tatars was lower (OSCE HCNR, 2013).

In Crimea, the difference between the registered and un-registered unemployment is big. The registered unemployment reached only 1.7% in 2012, but there were estimates that real unemployment was significantly higher and accounted for 61% in case of Crimean Tatars, 60% – Ukrainians and 54% – Russians (OSCE HCNM, 2013). Although the unemployment rates between the main ethnic groups were similar, the situation of Crimean Tatars was more critical, as they faced an intentional discrimination and lived in rural areas with limited opportunities to get jobs in a floundering agricultural sector after the collapse of collective farms. As a result, the ethnic division of labour force became obvious in Crimea and Crimean Tatars occupied small wholesale trade and private transport sectors. A big share of Crimean Tatars was employed in agriculture, the restaurant business, and street food system. Another important sector was seasonal tourism. Crimean Tatars were *de facto* excluded from employment in state sector, big business, culture and education, intelligence and security jobs, police (Guzenkova et al., 2016).

The collected data about the income and unemployment rates of Tatars allows stating that Crimean Tatars faced structural inequality, compared to other ethnic groups. The situation after the annexation seems to be similar and researchers still report about the problems. Thus, this criteria could be treated as important contribution empowering the preconditions of the outbreak of the ethnic conflict.

3.3. Access to facilities

According to the UNDP report conducted in 2012, 33% of all Crimean population did not have access to the urgent surgical intervention and long-term health care services. 9% of the population had a limited access to short-term health services. Due to unbearable fees private healthcare was almost inaccessible for deportees. Crimean Tatars were at a higher risk of catching chronic diseases and kept higher mortality rates than other ethnic groups in Crimea (OSCE HCNR, 2013; UNPO, 2014).

Given the fact that land problem remains acute among Crimean Tatars, as the representatives of this ethnic group mostly live in temporary settlements, there is a lack of proper sanitation and facilities. The example of the hardships of Crimean Tatars could be a recent scandal in Yalta in April 2016. Crimean Chief Prosecutor Natalya Poklonskaya issued a warning to the mayor of Yalta, Andrey Rostenko, for the clear case of negligence and irresponsibility to more than 200 families with 50 children in the 'Zvezdochka' dormitory. The dormitory was built in the 1960s and is mostly occupied by Crimean Tatar families. Natalya Poklonskaya admitted that the building was in a terrible state and could collapse at any time. Yalta municipal authorities used to settle people in rooms without sewage, heating, and gas until the year 2000 (RIA..., 2016).

It should be noted that even Crimean Tatars understand the situation differently. Both positive and negative assessments of socio-economic indicators were revealed in interviews and polls. According to the data presented during the roundtable called 'Crimea as a part of Russian culture and history' which took place on the 23rd March at Moscow House of Nationalities, 50% of Crimean Tatars confirmed that their living conditions improved after the annexation, also, 30% did not see any difference (Rossiya dlia vsekh, 2016). However, these figures do not address the presence of structural violence, which requires urgent solutions in different areas in policy.

Overall, it is possible to conclude that the data concerning the access of Crimean Tatars to facilities is limited. The additional research and the inclusion of the most critical indicators in official statistics would help to tackle this aspect of structural violence more efficiently.

3.4. Political representation

Political representation is an important indicator of the structural violence, because it allows to measure the political inclusion and involvement of an ethnic group in a political system, especially in case of a minority group. An ethnic group needs to have conditions to elect its representatives who defend their political, socio-economic, and cultural interests. The existence of political parties/movements matters, because it provides an ethnic group a mechanism to impact efficiently on the political system. An important nuance is a variety of political representation. It does not make feasible to co-opt the single representative body by external players. To add more, it favours conditions for the competition and diminishes the fact of abuse of a single political organization.

Another issue is the involvement of an ethnic group in all levels of governance, national and local, including Parliament and administrative units. In case if the above-mentioned criteria are not satisfied, the ethnic group is placed in a situation of the isolation from the political process, governance, and lack the sense of full-fledged citizenship. The outcome is frustration, limited opportunities to influence their lives, and this fact points on the presence of structural violence. This section considers the diversity of political organizations and the involvement of Crimean Tatars in both the Ukrainian and Russian Parliaments, Crimean governmental and administrative bodies. The subjective assessment, reflected in public opinions, follows. It allows understanding attitudes of Crimean Tatars towards current Tatar and Russian authorities, political changes better.

Crimean Tatars have always been active in politics and social life of Crimea. During the late decades of the Soviet Union, many Tatars joined the dissident movement involving those who formed the Organization of Crimean Tatar National Movement in 1989. The members of this organization established the most famous and widely known body – the Mejlis of Crimean Tatars (OSCE HCNM, 2013).

The Crimean Tatar National Movement struggled for the return of Crimean Tatars to Crimea; however, this permission was received only in 1989, i. e. after the four decades of deportation. Today the significant share of Crimean Tatars recognizes the Mejlis as the main representative body of their ethnic group, although the reputation of this organization is ambiguous.

The Mejlis is recognized internationally, at least, in the West. In the Russian Federation, the Mejlis was classified as an extremist organization and confirmed as illegal by the Supreme Court of Crimea

in April 2016. During the first months following the annexation, Russia tried to establish links with the Mejlis, but the majority of the Mejlis members, including the top leadership, refused to cooperate and opposed the Russian authorities. The Mejlis ideology retained numerous grievances to the Soviet period and opposed to the pro-Russian political forces in Crimea.

The Mejlis had always acted as the most pro-Ukrainian political force in the peninsula, despite the fact that its proper identification was rather vague and the organization did not have any clearly defined judicial status under Ukraine (it was banned by Russia as the law required to re-register the organizations functioning under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation). Only in March 2014 Ukrainian authorities recognized the Mejlis and Kurultai (Crimean Tatar National Assembly which elects the Mejlis) in haste, and this behaviour was a clearly *ad hoc* political move, a reaction to the Russian annexation (Zhidkova and Melichar, 2015).

Moreover, according to the Mejlis political doctrine, they sought to establish an independent Crimean Tatar state, reviving the idea of the medieval Crimean khanate. In 1991, the Mejlis expressed this principle in *Declaration of National Sovereignty of the Crimean Tatar People*, which declared that ‘Crimea is a national territory of the Crimean Tatar people, on which they alone possess the right to self-determination’ and ‘the political, economic, spiritual, and cultural rebirth of the Crimean Tatar people is possible only in their sovereign national state’ (Allworth, 1998: 353). A wide national-territorial autonomy within the Ukrainian borders was more realistic scenario they stand for and these plans were disturbing the official status of Ukraine as a unitary state. Nevertheless, policymakers in Kiev informally cooperated with the Mejlis to have a counter-weight against the influential pro-Russian forces. Some members of the Mejlis, including Cemilev and Chubarov, were members of the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada (Parliament). Today, despite the ban in Crimea, the Mejlis continues to cooperate with Ukrainian authorities.

After the annexation, the political ambitions of the Mejlis were certainly unwelcome in Crimea. The Mejlis was a symbol of hope and resistance for many Crimean Tatars who contributed to the return of the nation to their homeland. However, Slavs were concerned about the ideology of this organization and were not able to separate the declarations of the Mejlis from Crimean Tatars as a whole ethnic group. Attitudes towards the Mejlis contributed to the general image of Tatars, which was related to the ethnic group characterized by cunning, treachery, radical behaviour, and unfulfilled high expectations. However, it is fallacious to assume that the Mejlis was the only body of Crimean Tatars. There were few more organizations, such as Milli Firka, Qirim and Qirim Birligi, Sebat. The

Mejlis used to represent the ideological differences among its members. Some of the former members of the Mejlis established alternative organizations later.

Milli Firka (National Party) is the most prominent Crimean Tatar organization opposed to the Mejlis. This party was derived from the Crimean Tatar National Movement, which initially strived together with the Mejlis for the creation of the independent national state of Crimean Tatars. However, the organization revised principles and favoured a closer cooperation with Russian political forces and orientation towards the Russian policy. In 1993, the leader of Milli Firka, Yuriy Osmanov, was beaten to death by some thugs on the eve of important political actions (Sosnovsky, 2014). Although the official cause of his death was named as robbery, there were many contradictions in official reports, so rumours about the political ruin remain viable.

After his death, the influence of the organization on Crimean Tatar community severely declined and the Mejlis got a monopoly to be a single representative of the Crimean Tatar voice in the arena of politics. Milli Firka, led by Vasvi Abduraimov, considerably increased its influence after the annexation of Crimea as they ardently supported the new power. The leader of Milli Firka was even rewarded for his efforts to promote a cooperation of Crimean Tatars with Russian authorities (Shaimardanov, 2016). Nevertheless, Milli Firka remains critical towards Crimean authorities as their promises to Crimean Tatars haven't been accomplished till now, including the protraction of the solution of land issues.

Other important organizations are Qirim and Qirim Birligi. Leaders of these organizations, Remzi Ilyasov and Seitumer Nimetulaev, support Russian authorities and underline positive changes in regard to satisfy social, cultural, and political needs of Crimean Tatars. Their attitude is overtly optimist and this fact makes them an object of criticism from Milli Firka. However, all three organizations hold a very negative attitude towards the leadership of the Mejlis. They have their own positions and accuse each other of betraying interests of Crimean Tatars (Mirimanova, 2013).

For instance, the leader of Qirim Birligi reported to the Crimean Chief Prosecutor Natalya Poklonskaya that the Mejlis was an extremist organization and mentioned the number of 12,000 members of this organization. He accused the Mejlis of the authoritarianism and the usurpation of power playing the role of *de facto* sole representative body of Crimean Tatars. To some extent, this complaint could be supported as the Mejlis did not consider needs of Crimean Tatars if they participate in Crimean politics and represent other Tatar organizations (Mirimanova, 2013). In turn,

the former leader of the Mejlis, Mustafa Cemilev, pointed on a criminal case of the embezzlement raised against Seitumer Nimetulaev in Ukraine (BBC Russia, 2016). Eventually, Mustafa Cemilev and Refat Chubarov were claimed *persona non grata* and received a 5-year ban to visit Crimea. Zaur Smirnov, Remzi Ilyasov, Ruslan Balbec, and Sergey Aksionov argued that the Mejlis represented interests of the USA, disseminating the ethnic disdain and speculating on the tragedies of Crimean Tatar people (Petukhova, 2015).

According to Rinat Shaimardanov, the Head of Crimean Institute of Strategic Studies, the Russian Federation managed to split the members of the Mejlis and favoured those who agreed to cooperate in distributing of bounties and important positions in government and other institutions linking Crimean Tatars representatives with local authorities. In fact, Russia decided to co-opt the former members of the Mejlis and their close associates. As a result, members of Milli Firka were not represented in governmental bodies and practically had no power to influence any important decisions (Shaimardanov, 2016).

The Mejlis, despite its ban and the eviction of leaders, still retains the substantial degree of authority among Crimean Tatars including those who remained in Crimea. According to Renat Shaimardanov (2016), the Head of Crimean Institute of Strategic Studies, approximately 30% of Tatars still support this organization. A similar share of Crimean Tatars keeps the pro-Russian orientation and many of them are involved in activities of Milli Firka. For instance, Milli Firka claimed that more than 30% of Tatars took part in 2014 referendum (Shaimardanov, 2016). Actually, the Mejlis declared that a tiny part of Tatars voted. According to Ilmi Umerov, one of the Mejlis leaders, only about 5% of Tatars decided to cooperate with new authorities, while Zaur Smirnov gives a number of 70% (Walker, 2015). Given such a difference in assessments, it is possible to expect that quite a big proportion of Tatars keeps a neutral position and their eventual loyalty to current authorities depends on the way reforms and pledges to satisfy their rights. Approximately 40–60% of Crimean Tatars belong to the pragmatic group preferring to ‘wait and see’ (Shaimardanov, 2016). Certainly, the degree of their loyalty might change in the future; however, today it is quite contingent and reflects the transition period.

There are various estimates of the political representation of Crimean Tatars in Crimea. The Constitution of Crimean Autonomic Republic, dated by 1998, did not provide any proper mechanism for the ensuring of Crimean Tatars’ representation. The representatives of Crimean Tatars were almost absent in the Crimean Parliament for the period 1998–2002 as their quota was abolished. The

situation in local self-governance bodies and executive power structures was similar (Ablyatifov, 2004). There were several reasons explaining this situation. First of all, the prejudice against Crimean Tatars after their massive return in 1990s, which revived memories of Tatar collaboration with Nazis. Second, the majority election system and the disperse territorial distribution of Crimean Tatar settlements made triumph of Crimean Tatar representatives at elections difficult. Also, a major impediment was the absence of the Ukrainian citizenship during that period, which automatically made them ineligible for voting (Shevel, 2001).

In 2013, around 10% of the Crimean government officials and public servants were Crimean Tatars, this figure was less than their ethnic share in the peninsula. Crimean Tatars were underrepresented among Crimean Ministers and Deputy Ministers, where their share was lower (7%). However, the share was more or less proportional on the level of departments (13–20%). It should be noted, that a disproportionately large number of Crimean Tatars worked in Reskomnats (State Committee on Nationalities). If this institution is omitted, then the total share drops to only 5%. In case of district and city Council leadership there was only one Crimean Tatar as a head of the district administration (7%), whether on the level of deputies Tatars were represented slightly better – 10 people (22%). There was only one Crimean Tatar city mayor and six deputies of Crimean Tatar origin. Mustafa Cemilev and Refat Chubarov were members of Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine for several cadences (Mirimanova, 2013). Although there were reports of Crimean Tatars complaints on the low representation, authorities argued that the situation could be explained by the insufficient qualification of Crimean Tatar people to hold these positions (OSCE HCNM, 2013).

In 2014, in Ukraine, 6 Crimean Tatars, i. e. 6%, were members of the Supreme Council of Crimea. The overall number of Crimean Tatar deputies was 1,100 people, they were presented on different levels of councils over the peninsula. On 11 March 2014, the Russian Federation proposed a goal to reach 20% share of Crimean Tatar representatives in all elective and legislative bodies of Crimea (Goble, 2014). However, 4% of Crimean Tatars were employed in Russian state Council of Crimea, while the overall number of deputies was 75. The representation of Crimean Tatars on different levels of councils was less than 100 deputies (Shaimardanov, 2016). According to Remzi Ilyasov, the level of Crimean Tatars' representation in local Council had a tendency to grow after the annexation and reached almost 20% due to the involvement of deputies from rural areas and in some cases approached 40%. However, Ilyasov mentioned that the representation was still insufficient and that Crimean Tatars were forced to apply to a vice-speaker of the Crimean Parliament to resolve the local issues (Radeva, 2016).

The results of the different surveys show that political rights and political loyalty of Crimean Tatars differ. According to the study conducted by O'Loughlin and Toal (2015), only 28% of Crimean Tatars were satisfied with their life. Similar number – 20% considered the annexation as a favourable event (O'Loughlin and Toal, 2015). According to Igor Barinov, the Head of Russian Federal Agency on Ethnic Affairs, in 2014 only 14% of Tatars supported the annexation, however, in two years this figure grew up to 43%. Igor Barinov also mentioned that 61% of Tatars trusted the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin (Emelianenko and Yakovleva, 2016). Later, in March 2017, the results of polls showed that 75% of Tatars were satisfied with their life on the peninsula (RIA..., 2017). Crimean Tatar organizations in Crimea point on positive prospects of the Crimean Tatar elective behaviour. Remzi Ilyasov admitted that 60% of Tatars showed their readiness to vote in September 2016 in the elections of State Duma (RIA..., 2016b). However, the survey of the independent social project 'Open opinion – Crimea' found that half of Crimean Tatars remained quite critical towards the changes taking place in Crimea (politonline.ru, 2016).

Another interesting aspect was the fact that some foreign delegations had admitted that Crimean Tatars did not face any kind of discrimination. The French delegation, led by the deputy of French Parliament Tieri Mariani, and the Turkish delegation, led by Hasan Dzengiz, the head of Turkish Association of Eurasian Governments, have expressed their positive assessment of interethnic relations in Crimea during their visits to Crimea in 2016. Hasan Dzengiz, for instance, had criticised Ukraine and Western governments for the providing of false statements, which did not reflect the situation in Crimea (RIA..., 2016c; RIA..., 2016d).

To sum up, Crimean Tatars remain insufficiently represented in political and administrative institutions of Crimea. Statements that Crimean Tatars intentionally refuse to participate in decision-making might have some ground, although it is difficult to assess if such policies are really applied. Russia shows concern about the ethnicity issues after the annexation and does not favour any groups. That means that the mechanism allowing to reduce the structural violence and its contribution to the ethnic conflict is available. However, the state supports selection of officials with regard to their expertise level, this rule makes Tatars mostly uncompetitive. However, this fact does not necessarily imply purposeful discrimination of Crimean Tatars. Moreover, some foreign delegations did not find support for the discrimination of Crimean Tatars.

Polls and survey results show different attitudes of Crimean Tatars towards the annexation and the change of their rights. It should be noticed that a certain improvement of the situation is witnessed in the latest studies. Still, structural factor – the lack of experts among Crimean Tatars – matter.

Another issue of concern is the implementation of the federal government decrees in Crimea. Negative stereotypes among the former Russian elite towards Tatars might create a perception that central authorities are intentionally discriminating Tatars. Insufficient political representation of Crimean Tatars is better explained by the structural factor and impacts their lower numbers in various governmental and administrative bodies and prolonged process of their adaptation, first to Ukrainian, later – to Russian order. The fissure within Crimean Tatar community remains with approximately half of Tatars being cautious and sceptical towards Russian policies in Crimea. Again, to some extent, that is explained by the transition period.

3.5. Expert opinion on manifestation of structural violence

The opinions about the manifestations of socio-economic and political inequity differ. The organizations, representing the human rights or the interests of the Tatar community in Crimea, argue that the manifestations of socio-economic inequality criteria have increased. Representatives from academic institutions often report an improvement of the situation. Some of them even note that before the annexation Crimean Tatars were treated as a privileged group of society; however, after the annexation the situation changed.

Table 2. Manifestations of structural violence

<i>Has the situation of socio-economic inequality between Crimean Tatars and other ethnic groups changed since 2014 in the following cases:</i>	NGO	Academia	Other
<i>Land access/endowment of Tatars</i>	2 respondents confirmed that the situation has worsened	1 respondent confirmed that the situation did not change, 2 respondents confirmed that the situation has improved	2 respondents confirmed that the situation has worsened
<i>Unemployment</i>	2 respondents confirmed that the situation has worsened	1 respondent confirmed that the situation did not change, 2 respondents confirmed that the situation has improved	2 respondents confirmed that the situation has worsened
<i>Income inequality</i>	2 respondents confirmed that the situation has worsened	1 respondent confirmed that the situation did not change, 2 respondents confirmed that the situation has improved	2 respondents confirmed that the situation has worsened
<i>Access to facilities – healthcare, water, heating, electricity</i>	2 respondents confirmed that the situation has worsened	2 respondents confirmed that the situation did not change, 1 respondent confirmed that the situation has improved	2 respondents confirmed that the situation has worsened
<i>Did the situation of political and cultural inequality between Crimean Tatars and other ethnic groups change since 2014 in the following cases:</i>	NGO	Academia	Other
<i>Political and cultural representation of Tatars in parties, civic society, and other organizations</i>	2 respondents confirmed that the situation has worsened	2 respondents confirmed that the situation did not change, 1 respondent confirmed that something worsened and something improved	2 respondents confirmed that the situation has worsened

Political and cultural inequality are also treated differently. Representatives of academic institutions state that for the most of the mentioned indicators the situation has not changed or even improved. The NGOs and the Mejlis provide negative progress valuations.

The second explanatory comment confirms that the number of Crimean Tatars in government and other institutions of authority has reduced, compared to the situation before the annexation. It is argued that this statistic is treated as problem and different attempts to involve Tatars in governance are made. However, this problem is seen as Tatars' inability to participate in politics rather than their lack of political will.

3.6. Conclusion

The contribution of structural violence to the development of the ethnic conflict is crucial. The presence of the elements of the structural violence creates the environment favourable for the growth of grievances due to unequal living conditions. This situation contributes to the development of the ethnic conflict in the long run empowering the mobilization of ethnic groups dissatisfied with the state of affairs.

Especially painful are problems related to the issues of land provision and legalization. The structural asymmetry manifests itself in land ownership issues. According to research, Crimean Tatars own slightly more land per person, however most of their land is illegal. The certain steps have been done to improve the situation and legalize land deals. However, it is essential to note that such problems cannot be solved overnight due to old corruption schemes, involving substantial number of participants. This situation also affects the internal land inequality within Crimean Tatar community. In fact, a cautious remark can be made that the certain decrease in this element of structural violence is visible.

Structural asymmetry is also manifested as inequality in income and employment level. Although there is a lack of statistics for both the pre-annexation and post-annexation periods, available data shows that Crimean Tatars still get lower income and experience higher unemployment rates, vulnerability of stable employment, impact of seasons on their income, and dominant involvement in low-paid sectors. According to research, there is no major improvement of this criteria of structural violence.

The analysis of access to facilities and healthcare was limited due to insufficient data, yet it is possible to argue that the conflict has a structural asymmetry which comes out as poorer access to proper sanitation and healthcare, especially considering impediments to the former deportees and dwellers in illegal settlements. As a result, Crimean Tatars on average have much higher risk of serious illness and higher mortality index. Local polls reveal that only about half of Crimean Tatars see improvement in their living conditions.

The unequal political representation is a substantial element of structural asymmetry in case of Crimea. Research finds some support for the slight improvement in political representation of Crimean Tatars. The post-annexation period data shows a modest increase of political representation on the local level, i.e. the preconditions to reduce the asymmetry in the most important elements of structural violence are settled. Political institutions do function and develop; however, some organizations have faced restrictions imposed by current authorities. For example, the ban of the Mejlis encouraged the mobilization of its members, who are channelling their grievances in order to create the visibility of the ethnic conflict.

The expert opinions on the manifestations of socio-economic and political inequality differ. The organizations, representing human rights or interests of the Tatar community in Crimea, argue that the situation has worsened. Representatives from academic institutions often report about the improvement of the situation. Some of them even note that before the annexation Crimean Tatars were treated as a privileged group of society; however, after the annexation the situation had changed.

The socio-economic and political inequality is clearly-cut. According to the research, the main elements of the structural asymmetry create essential preconditions for the development of the ethnic conflict. However, the comparison of the pre- and post-annexation period shows that the political environment in Crimea has changed and it could contribute to the decrease of the structural asymmetry between Crimean Tatars and Slavs. Nevertheless, the protraction of important decisions solving problems of socio-economic and political representation might negatively influence the perception of the structural violence among Crimean Tatars.

Chapter 4. Manifestations of cultural violence

This chapter analyses criteria of cultural violence and its contribution to the ethnic conflict development in Crimea. The following criteria of cultural violence, describing Galtung's (1990) 'violence triangle' dimension, are investigated: cultural representation, access to media, native language use and freedom of religion. The influence of different criteria of cultural violence on ethnic conflict is estimated applying different research methods.

4.1. Cultural representation

The ability of the ethnic group to satisfy cultural needs – such as traditional celebrations, commemoration dates, festivals, theatre, sports, and etc. – is an important factor of the identity maintaining. When cultural needs are not met, the ethnic group is likely to experience the loss of their ethnic ties and the decrease of the ethnic cohesion. A person cannot be a member of a full-fledged community and further – as full-fledged individual. As a result, people belonging to the certain ethnic group feel frustration, resentment – experience cultural violence. Crimean Tatars have significant differences in their identity and a particular concern in their cultural rights. Some studies show that prior the annexation, despite some support from national and local authorities for cultural institutions and activities, the funding for the equipment and maintenance of the cultural organizations' apartments was poor and insufficient (OSCE HCNM, 2013). *De facto* Crimean authorities have declared measures to guarantee and develop cultural rights of minority groups. However, the numerous reports argue that the cultural life of Crimean Tatars faced certain restrictions, mostly categorized as violations of the freedom of assemblies and public gatherings.

Restrictions had been imposed on celebrations of the Deportation Day and the Crimean Tatar National Flag Day. For example, on 3 May 2014, around 200 people were fined and five were arrested receiving 40,000 rubles fine (~500 EUR) for gathering to meet the former leader of the Mejlis, Mustafa Cemilev. He was a *persona non grata* by *de facto* authorities. Two weeks later, on the eve of the 70th anniversary of the Deportation Day of Crimean Tatars, authorities banned all public gatherings for the period of 18 days. In 2015, 60 participants of the car rally dedicated to the Deportation Day were arrested and brought to police (UNPO, 2016; Shapovalova and Burlyuk, 2016). The report of Unofficial Turkish Delegation claimed that *de facto* authorities had prohibited the celebration of the Deportation Day instead introducing the 21st April, the day when the President

of the Russian Federation had adopted a law 'On the Measures for the Rehabilitation of Armenian, Bulgarian, Greek, Crimean Tatar, and German Peoples and the State Support of Their Revival and Development'. Turkish Delegation also mentioned the confiscation of cultural properties of the Crimean Fund, which belonged to the Mejlis, the celebration of the 23rd February – The Day of the Soviet Army, which coincides with the murder of the first president of the short-lived Crimean Peoples Republic, who was an ethnic Crimean Tatar (Aydingun, 2016). In turn, authorities explained such behaviour as measures to prevent any mass disturbances and provocations (Shapovalova and Burlyuk, 2016).

Since the annexation Russian authorities have favoured the establishment of the Crimean Tatar national autonomy led by Aivaz Umerov. According to the representatives of this organisation, the autonomy provides a wide choice of measures to preserve the Crimean Tatar culture. They acknowledge the damage to Crimean Tatar culture, but hope to revive it and even admit that there is a growing interest in Crimean Tatar culture (Vzglyad, 2016; Sufjanova, 2016). However, it is necessary to admit the popularity of the territorial autonomy idea among Crimean Tatars (Guzenkova et al., 2016). In Russia, a cultural autonomy has a similar legal status as NGO and can be considered as a weak substitution to the territorial one, with limited opportunities of involvement in decision-making. It is argued, that *de facto* authorities use the cultural autonomy as a tool against the territorial one (Goble, 2016). In turn, Russian officials, scientists, and public persons tend to give a contrary assessment of the cultural freedom of Crimean Tatars. According to Zaur Smirnov, Crimean Tatar national celebrations, such as Kurban-bairam and Uraza-bairam, became an integral part of the Crimean cultural life and became public holidays for all residents of the peninsula (RIA..., 2016e).

An important aspect of the appraisal of the cultural violence in cultural issues is the assessment of the interethnic situation. In order to tackle the presence of the structural violence it is necessary to consider the opinions of the Crimean Tatars reflected in surveys and polls. According to the study of the Russian Public Opinion Research Centre, conducted in 2015, 89% of all Crimean population did not see any interethnic problems in the peninsula (VCIOM, 2015). Igor Barinov, the Head of Federal Agency for Ethnic Affairs, estimated the rate of ethnic tensions at 9–10%, twice as much as the Russian average. That points on the certain salience of the ethnic and religious factors. However, he admitted that the figure is not critical and could be explained by the recent incorporation of Crimea into the Russian Federation (Emelianenko and Yakovleva, 2016).

Crimean Tatar experts pointed out that Crimean Tatars keep very positive attitudes to the fact of the official recognition of Crimean Tatar national and religious celebrations. Crimean Tatar youth acknowledged that they were no longer treated as traitors by Crimean Slavs (what was a vivid stereotype in Crimea). Otherwise, respondents of Crimean Tatar origin often gave the contradicting assessments. For instance, the survey of the Russian Institute of Strategic Studies showed that although 60% of Tatars considered interethnic relations as satisfactory, their dynamics were not so positive. 40% assumed that interethnic relations had worsened after the annexation and only 17% saw improvement of the situation. Approximately 40% of Tatars pointed on the fact of the unfair treatment (on their opinion) they faced because of their ethnic origin (Guzenkova et al., 2016).

To sum up, there is still much concern regarding the satisfaction of Crimean Tatar cultural needs. Certainly, a presence of cultural violence is visible, but the assessment of the dynamics is complicated. It is possible to assume that the situation of cultural violence did not change after the annexation. *De facto* authorities provide some room for cultural life, although they are quite sensitive in regard to some celebrations, including the Crimean Tatar National Day and The Deportation Day, due to politic importance of these issues and the hint on Crimean Tatars claims to revive their national state (or at least the territorial autonomy). Different attitudes, towards political situation in Crimea after 2014 and *de facto* authorities reflected in the results of polls and surveys, hint on existing fissures in Crimean Tatar society and complicate the generalization. The analysis show that the cultural representation has some support for the development of the ethnic conflict; however, it is based on subjective criteria and depends on memories of the past, the uncertainty of the future during the transition period. It is still unclear if this criteria of cultural violence has decreased or not, because polls show too big difference in opinions of Crimean Tatars.

4.2. Access to the media

The media, especially cognitive programs, is an important source of information for the ethnic group about themselves. It allows maintaining the ethnic identity and provides news about the cultural life. Moreover, the media shapes a certain narrative (attitudes to other ethnic groups, politics, global issues, worldviews, and values). In case if the national media is absent, the preservation of the ethnic identity becomes complicated and the ethnic group is influenced solely by the different information environment. Restrictions on the media violate the freedom of press, expression, and contributes to the escalation of the cultural violence. It is essential to note that in Crimean media there is an absolute

domination of the Russian media and Russian language. Under Ukrainian rule, there were some attempts to broadcast short programs in Crimean Tatar language. In 2012, a state-run 'GTRK' channel broadcasted programs in Crimean Tatar language 3.5 hours a week. Another popular private Crimean Tatar TV channel used to broadcast both in Russian and Crimean Tatar languages.

Since the annexation a lot of reports emerged, which mentioned the obstacles to the broadcasting of Crimean Tatar national media assets. In Crimea, the pressure from authorities made the registration of the media problematic. Russian authorities introduced new legal norms regulating extremist activities on the Crimean media and it allowed to persecute any journalist, blogger or the media asset. Some reports about intimidations and arrests of journalists, raids, and property seizures are available. Also, the Mejlis newspaper 'Avdet', and the Crimean News Agency 'QHA' had been persecuted by authorities and so-called self-defence groups. The broadcasting of 'QHA' was banned in Crimea on 22 January 2015 and the channel was not able to renew the license (Haring, 2015). 'ATR' Crimean Tatar TV channel was closed as Roskomnadzor denied a broadcasting license for this channel four times. 'ATR' staff reportedly received calls from politicians who exerted pressure on them offering to sell the station or stop broadcasting any news related to the Mejlis and their leaders.

The access to the media using radio channels is also problematic. 'Crimean Tatar radio' broadcasts 24 hours a day, however, the station is available only in Simferopol. 'Meydan' and 'Lider' radio stations and the web-site '15 minutes' were closed. OSCE had expressed its concern pointing on the fact that this behaviour of *de facto* authorities undermined the access to the important instrument for Crimean Tatars to preserve and maintain their identity (OSCE, 2015).

Crimean Tatar press had a limited range and it accounted for about 5% of the total press volume (OSCE HCNM, 2013). Ukraine used to provide some funding for the minority language media, including 'Qirim' newspaper, published in Crimean Tatar language. However, the funding rules were not clear and Crimean Tatar community was not able to increase the amount of funding for this particular purpose. 'Avdet' newspaper and a periodical named 'Yildiz' stopped publishing due to the lack of financial resources, the editor of 'Avdet' had been interrogated on the grounds of extremist activities. Facebook pages of Crimean Tatar activists were checked by authorities for any posts, which might be a pretext to initiate searches and arrests (Aydingun, 2016).

Non-Crimean Tatar media assets also faced similar difficulties. For instance, six Ukrainian radio stations belonging to 'TavrMedia', 'UMH Holding', and 'Business Radio Group' ceased the

broadcasting in Crimea due to technical and legal problems (OHCHR, 2014). However, instead of the Crimean Tatar media *de facto* authorities started to develop an alternative media network. In June 2015 was established a new Crimean Tatar TV channel 'Millet' (National) and the radio station 'Vatan sedasy' (Voice of Homeland). On 1 September 2015 'Millet' TV channel started to broadcast (in Crimean Tatar language). 177 million rubles had been allocated to support the TV channel. It was stated that 'Millet' was going to launch a satellite broadcasting in order to embrace the TV audience from Ukraine, Turkey, and Central Asia (RIA Novosti Krym, 2015). The new Crimean Tatar TV channel and the radio station successfully passed a registration procedure in Roskomnadzor on 10 August 2015 (Rossiya..., 2015).

Due to the state support and a relatively fast registration it is possible to identify 'Millet' TV channel as a pro-authority asset. According to the representatives of the Crimean-Tatar community and the opinions of Tatar youth and students, 'ATR' channel was very educative, providing enlightenment in various spheres of Crimean Tatars' life, customs, and history. In that sense, 'Millet' TV channel is not yet able to rival 'ATR' in terms of quality and quantity of TV programs, also considering the general concept of the broadcasting grid. The abolition of 'ATR' TV channel points on the lack of the objective reporting (Guzenkova et al., 2016).

To conclude, the Crimean Tatar media faces certain degree of pressure. Findings provide more ground for the worsening of the situation of this criteria of cultural violence after the annexation. Media assets, which are critical to *de facto* authorities find it difficult to legalize activity and continue broadcasting or publishing. Certainly, a political aspect can be witnessed, given close links of banned media assets with main opponent of *de facto* authorities – the Mejlis. There was no clear evidence if 'ATR' disseminated extremist views, but *de facto* authorities still suspect them and justify their abuses against the TV channel. Pro-Russian authorities attempt to satisfy needs of Tatar population in native language media, however, remain sensitive to critique, related to the status of Crimea. The situation of media freedom is ambiguous. It takes time to develop a full-fledged media network to make a proper assessment of a quality of the Crimean Tatar media. Findings provide more support for the presence of cultural aspect of inequality and its increase due to curtailed number of the Crimean Tatar media assets.

4.3. Native language use

Language is one of the essential manifestations of the ethnic identity. It has indirect value of the ethnic marker, even if the ethnic group uses foreign language instead. Language issues often constitute as a significant source of the ethnic tension, when there are restrictions on the certain language use. The right to use native language without restrictions is the inseparable constituent of human rights. If conditions to maintain the native language are unfavourable, then the aspect of the cultural violence is clearly visible, unless an ethnic group has completely switched to a foreign language due to its utility. It is necessary to admit that Crimean Tatars used to face difficulties in preserving their native language in decades following the deportation during the Soviet period. The nation became an object of Russification and their life in deportation had negatively affected the level of Crimean Tatar language knowledge, especially among younger generations.

In XXth century, Crimean Tatar language and culture used to face a significant decline and it was claimed that Crimean Tatar language was in a big threat (Aydin, 2014). For instance, Crimean Tatar language is considered as a severely endangered by UNESCO's Endangered Language Program and the Committee of Experts on the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (OSCE HCNM, 2013). Moreover, it is recognized that Crimean Tatars lack proficiency in the Crimean Tatar language. Although 92% of Tatars called this language their mother tongue, these figures should not mislead, because respondents tended to respond assuming Crimean Tatar language as an ethnic marker, which reflected their identity rather than their language skills. Many Tatars have a very poor knowledge limited to certain phrases and expressions. Local surveys and observations show much lower level of Crimean Tatar usage. According to one of latest surveys conducted before the annexation, only 4.8% Tatars consider members of their ethnic group to have a full command of Crimean Tatar language (OSCE HCNM, 2013).

After the annexation Crimean Tatar language was recognized as one of the three official languages in Crimea along with Russian and Ukrainian. The protection of this language was officially guaranteed by the Constitution of the Russian Federation. There are different estimates over the current situation of the Crimean Tatar language use. Reports of international organizations and delegations tend to provide a more critical assessment of the Crimean Tatar language issues. According to the findings of Unofficial Turkish Delegation, which visited Crimea in April 2015, there were no signs of improvement.

Although there were 16 schools where students were taught mostly in Crimean Tatar language, however, the delegation admitted that, in fact, 200 schools were needed to cover the entire Crimean Tatar youth (Aydingun, 2016; Radeva, 2016). The joint report of ODIHR and HCNM states that the situation has worsened in comparison to the pre-annexation period and the native-language education in both Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar languages reduced considerably (OSCE, 2015a). The report also mentioned that parents were strongly discouraged from letting their children to attend the native language classes. The number of students who were taught in Crimean Tatar language had fallen by 12% (from 5,551 for 2013–2014 school year to 4,895 for 2014–2015). It is necessary to admit the fact, that the deterioration of the Crimean Tatar language instruction happened during the Ukrainian period and many problems had already been inherited. Studies show that in 2008–2009 out of 34,610 Crimean Tatar children only 2,935 studied in Crimean Tatar language schools, 2,725 – in Crimean Tatar separate classes, 22,907 (66%) studied Tatar as the elective or foreign language, 17% did not study Tatar at all (Guzenkova et al., 2016). Prior to the annexation, a doctor of Crimean Tatar philology, Adile Emirova (2009) identified an intensive linguistic assimilation through Russian-Tatar bilingual practices and the increasing share of Russian language and its stronger acceptance.

Moreover, the number of class hours of the Crimean Tatar language as a school subject has dropped too and it is not taught in native language in senior classes of the secondary schools (Shapovalova and Burlyuk, 2016). Another problem is a shortage of Crimean Tatar textbooks in schools. Reportedly, former textbooks issued during the Ukrainian period have been banned and new ones are undersupplied (Aydingun, 2016).

Certain bureaucratic limits are imposed on the Crimean Tatar language use, which are perceived as attempts to block its development. For example, in order to open a Tatar class school the administration of the school has to gather at least eight applications from parents. There are reports that teachers of Crimean Tatar language complain about the insufficient network of schools to satisfy the community needs. Also, they assume that *de facto* authorities use any opportunity to impede the opening of new Crimean Tatar classes (OSCE, 2015). In some cases, Crimean Tatars were discouraged to speak Tatar language in public and even beaten for the use of the native language (Malinowski, 2014). The latter, however, is the case of an individual misbehaviour than the systematic practise.

Russian authorities and organizations provide the more positive assessment of the situation. Nevertheless, they point on the fact that there is still much work to be done to ensure Crimean Tatar

language rights. In February 2015, the members of the Russian Public Chamber together with representatives of the Crimean corresponding body made a visit to Simferopol and Bakhchysarai to evaluate the quality of interethnic relations and living standards of Crimean Tatars. They had critically admitted that some districts of Simferopol lacked kindergartens and after a visit to one of the schools they acknowledged the insufficient instruction in Crimean Tatar language, which was taught only twice a week. They called for measures to increase the number of hours or provide the ability for additional forms of schooling (Obcschesetvonnaya..., 2015).

Surveys conducted in Russia admitted that among Crimean Tatars, especially older generations, there was a substantial concern towards the quality and actuality of the Crimean Tatar language, attempts to change the compulsory Crimean Tatar language to the elective form of the courses and gradually displace the language from schools (Guzenkova et al., 2016). For example, a survey conducted in Simferopol found that 71% of respondents claimed that they did not have opportunities to study Crimean Tatar language; 46% said that they could not receive the education in national schools (Mukomel and Khaykin, 2016). Some respondents even argued that all programs dedicated to support the use and development of Crimean Tatar language were blocked or frozen, what allows even to suspect the sabotage from the certain policy makers (Shaimardanov, 2016).

Still there is some room for optimism and the important steps have been done to develop the Crimean Tatar language in Crimea. For instance, there is an updated information concerning the schoolbook supply in Crimean Tatar schools. According to the press-service of the Crimean Ministry of Education, Science, and Youth, by the end of November 2016, all schools with Crimean Tatar as the instruction language were fully endowed. 46.7 mln. rubles (~0.69 mln. €) were allocated from the Crimean budget for that purpose (RIA..., 2016f). Over the last two years the personnel of the Ministry have translated, edited, and issued 66 items (textbooks, programs, vocabularies) in Crimean Tatar language with a total volume of 61,000 copies (45 titles in 2015, 21 – in 2016) (RIA..., 2016f).

A mobile Crimean Tatar translator as an application for iOS and Android, called ‘Canlı luğat’, was introduced by the initiative group of Crimean Tatar youth ‘Medeniy Qirim’ (Cultural Crimea) with the support of the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Crimea and Sevastopol. The translator was presented to public in the Republican Crimean Tatar library. According to the press service of the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Crimea, the event was held with the participation of the deputy Mufti of Crimea Esadullah Bairov, doctor of philology, professor Ismail Kerimov, and other representatives from public and students. The deputy Mufti pointed out that the emergence of this

electronic application was a major breakthrough in the cultural life of Crimean Tatars (RIA..., 2016g).

To conclude, Crimean Tatars still face serious difficulties to use their language. The decline of Crimean Tatar language use is a result of ongoing enduring process, which was not strongly affected by the annexation. The replacement of Crimean Tatar language with Russian continues. Definitely, there are some signs of the situation improvement, but the fact of the language inequality exists. Both hard data and people perceptions point on that. There might be some speculation that authorities are not uniform towards the issue, given both positive and negative remarks about their attitude and actions in regard to Crimean Tatar language policies. In accordance with the results of research, there is more ground to emphasize the presence of cultural violence. The conjunctions of positive and negative factors concerning the dynamics of language use showed that the general situation did not change.

4.4. The freedom of religion

Religion is another clear-cut manifestation of the identity. Religion is related to the very fundamental matters of life, good and evil, injustice. A dissatisfaction with the situation of complicated religious practices create an acute sense of inequality and often leads to direct violence, especially if the religion prompts to resist to the situation of injustice. The situation becomes even more tense when the inequality towards different religious practices overlaps with the ethnic inequality. The religion, as well as the native language, has always been an important marker of the Crimean Tatar national identity, although the absolute majority of Crimean Tatars are moderate believers belonging to the Sunni branch of Islam. The negative attitude of the Soviet authorities to religion, the destruction of many religious sites in Crimea, and life in exile had contributed to the way Tatars practice Islam nowadays. After the post-collapse return to Crimea, religious communities had revived their practices and reconstructed their mosques from the scratch (Izmirli, 2013).

In Crimea, Muslims lacked land, mosques, religious schools, and there were tensions with the Orthodox Church, mainly based on disputes over the property. Although Crimea has been traditionally known for its religious tolerance and peaceful coexistence of various confessions, since the repatriations of Crimean Tatars many Slavs became worried about problems related to the

presence of the other faith. The Orthodox Church lost its monopoly in Crimea and after the resettlement of Tatars the inter-confessional tensions had manifested themselves (Izmirli, 2013). The interactions of the inter-confessional conflicts manifested themselves in such forms as vandalism. Although it is very difficult to identify precisely whether acts of vandalism have been implemented purposefully as a matter of religious intolerance, politically motivated, or simply as acts of hooliganism, it nevertheless exacerbated relations between Christians and Muslims in Crimea. In the Crimean society, there has been the perception (partially due to the coverage of events by various media, especially Crimean Tatar) that most of the vandalism acts target Muslim cultural sites. In fact, studies show that, for example, in 2006–2008 occurred 401 cases of vandalism in cemeteries and only eight of them took place in Muslim cemeteries (Shvets and Yakovlev, 2011).

Another issue was a ‘war’ over the cultural symbols. Considerable tensions between religious groups took place in 2000. Commemorating 2000 years of Christianity, the Russian organizations, without the endorsement from the Moscow Orthodox Church, initiated the mass construction of crosses all over Crimea, including the sacred sites of the Crimean Tatars. Another case was the mounting of the Orthodox crosses in July 2011 in Feodosiya, close to Crimean Tatar settlements. This behaviour was treated as an attempt to establish religious (and the ethnic) domination (OSCE HCNM, 2013). These activities resulted in protests among Crimean Tatars, supported by the Mejlis. The Mejlis claimed that xenophobia and Islamophobia were widespread among the local officials. Pro-Russian organizations, such as Russian Cossacks, were blamed for the tight collaboration with their counterparts in Russia (Qirim, 2011; OSCE HCNM, 2013). In fact, local authorities often used to take a pro-Tatar stance, they called the cross installation unlawful and issued orders to dismantle or relocate the crosses (Belitser, 2011).

Despite the fact of clear-cut manifestations of the religious intolerance Crimea can be considered a place of relative religious peace. However, the major concern was (and still keeps actual) the internal frictions within Muslim community. The highest concern was the activity of the radical Muslim organizations, which practised non-traditional and more fundamental forms of Islam. One of the most prominent organizations is HUT, known as Liberty Party, which seeks to revive the Caliphate and spread the laws of Sharia worldwide. Such project goes at odds not only with the views of the Slavic population, but also with most of the Crimean Tatars. It is estimated that the number of core members of HUT reaches about 2,000, which is quite a lot for Crimea with a population of two million (Grigorianc, 2011). The leaders of HUT claim that they seek religious and political goals by applying peaceful means only, although the option of jihad have also been mentioned. So far there

have been no confirmed acts of violence committed by HUT members. Although the organization is not banned in Ukraine and freely operated in Crimea before the annexation, in other countries, for instance Germany, USA, Russia, and some Arab states, HUT has been banned.

HUT was suspected in the recruitment of Crimean Tatars for the participation in the Syria war. Various internet sources give different numbers of participants in the Syrian war from Crimea. The Crimea's Russian community estimates that there are 350–450 people from Crimea involved in the Syrian events (E-Crimea, 2013). The Mejlis condemns the participation of Crimean Tatars in the Syrian war and suspects HUT of being involved in the recruitment of jihadists in Crimea. In turn, *de facto* authorities argue that the Mejlis is involved in tacit support of HUT. Although HUT leadership denied links with extremist organizations, on 6 June 2013 HUT members hold a meeting in Simferopol where they expressed the support for Muslims fighting in Syria (Regnum, 2013).

Although HUT was banned in Crimea after the annexation had happened, nevertheless, some cells might be active. Many people (the absolute majority of whom Crimean Tatars) were detained, abducted, and jailed for the alleged involvement in HUT activities. This explanation becomes especially important justifying the mass raids and detentions. In fact, it is possible to discern two stages of the pressure increase from *de facto* authorities. Massive raids in mosques and Islamic schools took place between June and September 2014. The Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Crimea has been suspected in support of radical Muslims too. Later authorities had moderated their position towards the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Crimea and in January 2015 the head of the post-annexation administration, Sergey Aksyonov, had publicly acknowledged the excessive manner and abuses during searches. In February 2015 the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Crimea was eventually officially registered as a religious organization under the Russian legislation. To the certain extent that was facilitated by the decision of the Chief Mufti Emerali Ablayev to moderate his criticism toward authorities and switch to the more intensive cooperation and involvement in official meetings (OSCE, 2015a; Shapovalova and Burlyuk, 2016).

The Unofficial Turkish Delegation in Crimea (April 2015) had admitted the pressure and attempts of Russian authorities to establish control over religious organizations and activities (Aydingun, 2016). The delegation claimed that a parallel religious body, the Mufti Office of Tavriya was established in order to counter-balance the influence of Mufti Office of Crimea. However, they acknowledged the absence of any obstacles to the individual religious practice (Aydingun, 2016). Pro-Russian Crimean Tatar organizations pointed out that strict measures against some religious

organizations and massive raids did not have any anti-Tatar orientation (Azar, 2016). The Crimean Tatar political scientist and the public figure Lenur Usmanov told that for many Tatars one of the main motivations to support the annexation was their fear of Crimea turning into Kosovo or province of so-called Islamic State (EADaily, 2016).

Although that sounds as the exaggeration, there is still some concern of the religious extremism among Crimean Tatars. In fact, results of recent polls revealed that 2% of Tatars expressed support to so-called Islamic State, a figure comparable to the estimated numbers of HUT – up to several thousand people (Mukomel and Khaykin, 2016). Despite the fact that only 10–15% of Crimean Tatars consider themselves as religious, there is a growing interest to Muslim identity in the Crimean society; also, the excessive activity of non-traditional Islamic organizations, including HUT, which manages to continue illegal action despite the ban (Guzenkova, 2016).

It is possible to conclude that there is no major manifestation of cultural violence in terms of religious freedom, at least on the individual level. The comparison of the pre-annexation and post-annexation periods shows the certain worsening of the situation of cultural violence during the first years after the annexation. However, later, the situation has improved due to the softening of repressive measures and other indicators cultural violence has decreased in comparison with period before the annexation. As a result, the impact on the worsening of the situation of the ethnic conflict has decreased.

There is less support for the ethnic inequality. Almost all Crimean Tatars are Muslims and the absolute majority of Crimean Muslims are Tatars. Detentions of Crimean Tatars on the ground of the religious extremism tackle a religious aspect which coincides with the ethnicity. The lack of reports about the continuation of vandalism practices, also activities related to the establishment of the symbolic domination of certain ethnic-religious groups point on the possible improvement of the situation of structural violence.

Overall, there is more tension within Crimean Muslims rather than with followers of other faiths. However, the pressure on religious authorities, even considering some proof of presence of extremist organizations might contribute to subjective perception of the religious inequality. The religious segment of Crimean Tatars is likely to experience higher dissatisfaction with their living conditions (and perception of cultural violence) in a new secular state, which, unlike Ukraine, is persistent in toughening its grip on the activities of religious organizations.

4.5. Expert opinion on manifestation of cultural violence

According to survey, the situation of cultural violence is important as many experts argue that after the annexation the situation has worsened. Although the results could be influenced by the desire of respondents to see a significant change in this area, the importance of this type of violence for respondents and the dissatisfaction with the current situation is visible. Thus, it could have an impact on the development of ethnic conflict.

Table 3. Manifestations of cultural violence

<i>Did the situation of political and cultural inequality between Crimean Tatars and other ethnic groups change since 2014 in the following cases:</i>	NGO	Academia	Other
<i>Political and cultural representation of Tatars in parties, civic society, and other organizations</i>	2 respondents confirmed that the situation has worsened	2 respondents confirmed that the situation did not change, 1 respondent confirmed that something worsened and something improved	2 respondents confirmed that the situation has worsened
<i>Access to Tatar media and other broadcast means</i>	2 respondents confirmed that situation has worsened	1 respondent confirmed that situation did not change, 2 respondents confirmed that situation has improved	2 respondents declared confirmed that the situation has worsened

<i>Percentage of Tatars employed in governing bodies</i>	2 respondents confirmed that situation has worsened	1 respondent confirmed that situation did not change, 1 respondent confirmed that situation has improved, 1 respondent was not aware of the situation	2 respondents confirmed that the situation has worsened
<i>Access of Tatars to mother language education</i>	2 respondents confirmed that situation has worsened	3 respondents confirmed that the situation has improved	2 respondents confirmed that the situation has worsened
<i>Freedom of religion and access to places of cult</i>	2 respondents confirmed that the situation has worsened	2 respondents confirmed that the situation did not change, 1 respondent confirmed that the situation has improved	2 respondents confirmed that the situation did not change

Although after the annexation the Tatar language received official status in Crimea, the explanatory comment shows that classes for Crimean Tatars were closed. Some attempts were made to forbid Crimean Tatar symbols. The Mejlis argues that cases of intervention in the cultural life of Crimean Tatars are common. The impact is seen in restrictions of cultural events, the media censorship.

The domination of negative estimations and declarations that the violence has increased witnesses in favor of higher possibility of ethnic conflict. Thus, the attention on policy makers to this type of violence is critical.

4.6. Conclusion

The history of humanity shows that many wars broke as a result of cultural violence (for example, such important element as religion). The thesis analysed the contribution of the main criteria of the cultural violence to the development of the ethnic conflict on the peninsula and found no evidence of the critical asymmetry, which could encourage the outbreak of the violent ethnic conflict.

The analysis of the cultural violence criteria shows different development trends. Criteria of access to media, native language use, and freedom of religion show that a visible degree of cultural violence remains. However, Crimean Tatars had a long history of adaptation to the cultural and political environment of Crimea, including the annexation of 2014. This means that their cultural identity does not represent a serious threat for the outbreak of the violent conflict in Crimea under current conditions.

The asymmetry in the cultural representation of Crimean Tatars has not changed significantly. Crimean Tatars do not face any major discriminations towards their national celebrations, commemorations, the establishment and participation in cultural organizations. As a result, this element of cultural violence does not contribute to the development of the ethnic conflict on the peninsula.

However, the research shows some restrictions concerning media freedom, which faces strong constraints and undergoes frequent tests on loyalty to the *de facto* authorities. Pro-Russian media appears to be not capable to substitute the previous banned media assets. Therefore, in case of the media, cultural violence has increased and it could contribute to the development of the ethnic conflict.

The limited use of Crimean Tatar language shows the strong asymmetry and there is no major change in the situation. The use of Crimean Tatar language has undergone continuous decline in XX–XXI century and still faces serious problems due to its gradual substitution with Russian language. This situation is not the case of restrictions and the contribution to the development of the conflict is unlikely, because the changes were caused by the adaptation of Crimean Tatars to cultural environment of Crimea.

Freedom of religion also does not constitute a major concern and has no feature of strong asymmetry. The contribution of this criteria to the development of the ethnic conflict is relatively low, moreover, the majority of Crimean Tatars are secular Muslims. There is a relatively small segment of clerical Tatars, some of whom sympathize to radical religious organizations. *De facto* authorities conduct mass searches and detain Tatars suspected in involvement in extremist activities. However, dynamics show gradual decrease of repressive measures. In general, Crimea remains a place of the religious tolerance and this element of cultural violence decreases.

Overall, Crimean Tatars have different estimates on the analysed aspects of cultural violence. Findings show that cultural violence is more visible and after the annexation the situation remains the same or tends to show some improvements.

Chapter 5. Conclusions

The thesis was aiming at investigating the nexus between the ethnic conflict and different types of violence focusing on the development of the ethnic conflict situation between Crimean Tatars and Slavs in Crimea. Galtung's (1990) 'violence triangle', distinguishing direct, structural, and cultural types of violence, was selected as a framework for the estimation of the situation of the ethnic conflict. The aforementioned research framework allows to identify and quantify visible manifestations of direct violence and estimate the threats of 'invisible' elements of structural and cultural violence, which manifest as inequality and accumulate ethnic grievances between Crimean Tatars and Slavs.

I argue that the monitoring of the development of structural and cultural violence and criteria of direct violence are equally important to predict the threat of the ethnic conflict. The conducted literature review witnesses that manifestation of such types of 'silent' (structural and cultural) violence could lead to the outbreak of violent ethnic conflict. Thus, it is important to understand the contribution of different types of violence to the development of ethnic conflict. According to the literature review, the most important criteria of structural violence, which contribute to the exacerbation of the situation, could be grouped into socio-economic and political inequalities. The most important socio-economic criteria are related to inequalities in access to land, facilities, and non-discriminatory involvement of the ethnic group in labour market. The discrimination of the ethnic group and exclusion from policymaking is also an important criterion, which could contribute to the worsening of the situation.

The most important manifestations of cultural violence are related to the issues of the cultural representation, access to the media, freedom of religion, and use of the native language. These elements of cultural violence could result in both: an outbreak of the personal violence on the ethnic background and the development of a long run violent ethnic conflict in the country.

The conducted research allows stating that the estimation and tackling of the development of these criteria in Crimea face multiple challenges. The main source of data is fragmentary previous research, while official statistics in many cases is absent. This situation leaves policy makers without important information and distorts the reality contributing to the negative development of the situation. According to the research, the current situation encourages speculations on ethnic issues in the media and manipulations with scarce data by interested stakeholders (both the representatives of the ethnic group and by authorities). Thus, the start of the discussion about the availability of more detail official

statistics or periodic continuous academic research on the most important criteria of different types of violence is critical as the better understanding of the situation empowers policy makers to act and do not allow to manipulate and exacerbate the ethnic situation. I provide the most important findings for each type of violence below.

Direct violence.

It should be noted that the absence of the reliable statistics for the criteria of this type of violence is one of the most important problems. It exacerbates the situation allowing different stakeholders to manipulate using single cases of direct violence and contributes to the development of the ethnic conflict situation leaving grievances and distrust between the ethnic groups, creating the image of hostile ethnicity.

However, the number of the direct violence accidents with ethnicity marker is not significant and could not be treated as a serious threat of the ethnic group mobilization with the perspective of the long run violent ethnic conflict. It is possible to conclude that the most worrisome elements of direct violence are mass abductions and detentions of people. This factor is especially sensitive as it contributes to the actual and alleged fear of insecurity. Lack of information on the further fate of abducted persons creates sharp grievances and feeling of despair among their relatives and other members of Crimean Tatar community. Therefore, I argue that manifestation of direct violence is a major problem, which requires further investigations, data collection, and better access to information.

According to the research, the situation of the direct violence remains similar, comparing the pre-annexation and post-annexation periods. Even the outbreak of mass raids, abductions, and detentions, related to HUT or the Mejlis activities, is decreasing. Nevertheless, elements of direct violence are not treated as a critical factor contributing to the potential outbreak of a sharp ethnic conflict. The number of victims is relatively low and only few intentional actions directed against Crimean Tatars as an ethnic group happened after the annexation.

Structural violence.

The data from both the pre-annexation and post-annexation periods shows that Crimean Tatars faced significant socio-economic and political inequality. The absence of the reliable data for the analysis

of the situation is important for the criteria of structural violence too. Hence, the improvement of the knowledge about the situation in this area is critical.

One of the most acute problems is the access to land. Crimean Tatars acquired land illegally and the average plot of land settled by Crimean Tatars was higher than for the other nationalities. However, many Tatars could not legalize that land. Criminalization of the land deals and participation of some influential Crimean Tatar groups in this process contributed to the negative stereotypes of Tatars among Crimean Slavs. It is possible to argue that land issue is one of the most remarkable manifestations of structural violence in Crimea, but the situation has slightly improved since the annexation and the contribution of this criterion to the development of the ethnic conflict is decreasing.

Unfortunately, there is no sufficient data on recent unemployment rates among Crimean Tatars. The data was available for the pre-annexation period and it showed the considerable number of unemployed people among Tatars. Structural and cultural factors, such as the absence of citizenship, housing, relevant education and skills, ethnicity, and other obstacles related to the deportee status contributed to the poor employment. The income inequality of Crimean Tatars is also obvious. The pre-annexation data shows that income inequality among ethnic groups was not high, but the share of poor Tatars was higher.

Access to facilities remains a major concern. The data was available only for the last few years before the annexation. Figures show that a considerable share of Crimean Tatars lacked the access to basic facilities, particularly proper medical treatment, and Crimean Tatars had a higher risk of infectious disease and mortality rates. Also, many Crimean Tatars have poor housing conditions. After the annexation reports declared that some of Crimean Tatars lived in conditions severely lacking security.

The available data does not allow to identify a worsening or improvement of political representation considering the post-annexation period. Some estimates detect the decrease in general, while other mentioned certain progress on local level. Russian authorities proposed a clear regulation of the share of Tatars (20%) to be employed in political and administrative positions. The implementation of this proposal in reality could significantly contribute to the solution of the problem of socio-economic and political inequality reducing the risk of the severe ethnic conflict.

Thus, it is possible to conclude that structural socio-economic inequality could be the most significant element contributing to the development of the ethnic conflict and challenging the mobilization of the ethnic group. However, the comparison of the pre-annexation and post-annexation periods allows to state that there is a visible improvement of the situation and the socio-economic inequality remains important for the other ethnic groups too. Due to these reasons the outbreak of severe ethnic conflict is unlikely, but the relevance of special programs improving the socio-economic situation is important to reduce the inequality gap and avoid negative development of the ethnic conflict situation. The active involvement of Tatars in policy-making is an important element, which could have twofold benefits: the better understanding of problems of Crimean Tatars and the presence of active stakeholders targeting to solve the problems of the ethnic group on different levels of government.

Cultural violence.

Although *de facto* authorities promised to ensure and support cultural rights of Crimean Tatars, the situation remains ambiguous. Studies show that the culture of Crimean Tatars and their celebrations gradually become an integral part of Crimean culture. On the other hand, *de facto* authorities impose restrictions on all celebrations related to the sensitive (to *de facto* authorities) topic of deportation and political issues. An important aspect of cultural inequality lies in the quality of interethnic relations. There are mixed attitudes of Crimean Tatars to this issue. Although, in general, the level of the interethnic tension is low, almost half of Crimean Tatars acknowledged that they had experienced an unfair treatment due to their ethnicity. Many of them also considered that since the annexation interethnic relations had worsened. I conclude that situation of the cultural representation did not change significantly and did not contribute to the development of the ethnic conflict.

Although before the annexation Crimean Tatar media faced funding problems and the share of the media was not significant, compared to the overall media share, the Tatar media assets could operate without restrictions. Since the annexation, *de facto* authorities imposed considerable restrictions on Crimean Tatar media assets to reduce the possible threats of the ethnic factor. Today *de facto* authorities endorse the development of Crimean Tatar media, but the political loyalty has to be acknowledged. Many Tatars complain that the quality of the alternative Crimean Tatar media have worsened. To conclude, research finds more support for the general worsening of the situation of media freedom due to the evident restriction.

Crimean Tatar language is currently considered as an endangered one and the pre-annexation data shows a poor state of language use. Since the annexation problems have remained – the number of students studying Crimean Tatar language decreased and the number of class hours of the Crimean Tatar language as a school subject fell. Crimean Tatars also complain on the quality of education and lack of opportunities to study the native language. Moreover, experts observe the gradual assimilation and the displacement of the native language with Russian language. Some reports witness the situations when Crimean Tatars were discouraged to speak Crimean Tatar. *De facto* authorities promised to protect the Crimean Tatar language and gave it a status of the official language on the peninsula. They provide financial support to improve the use of Crimean Tatar language, but the measures are not sufficient. So far, there is a lack of purposeful restriction of Crimean Tatar language use and all negative processes are mainly determined by the assimilation. Thus, the contribution of this criterion to the development of the ethnic conflict is minor. The comparison of two analyzed periods allows to state that negative factors balance out the positive and the situation has not changed.

The difficulties to practice Islam after the deportation had negative consequences to the current situation. After the return to Crimea, Muslims lacked land, mosques, religious schools and there were tensions with the Orthodox Church and pro-Russian groups, mainly based on disputes over the property and also some religious issues. By the end of the pre-annexation period the number of conflicts ceased. Today there is no ground to state that Crimea is a place of religious conflict and the dominant share of believers does not contribute to the development of the ethnic conflict.

Frictions within Muslim community were determined by the presence of a certain degree of radical Islamists among Crimean Tatars. Before the annexation HUT could officially operate in Crimea and these activities resulted in discords within Muslim communities, although there were no cases of direct violence perpetrated by HUT on the peninsula. After the annexation HUT was banned by *de facto* authorities and its activity has considerably diminished. However, mass detentions of Crimean Tatars started to happen on the suspicion in involvement in HUT activities. *De facto* authorities and alternative Crimean Tatar organizations deny any purposeful discrimination of Crimean Tatars due to their faith. Moreover, there are no obstacles for religious freedom on the individual level. Thus, ethnic aspect can be neglected.

The research shows that the state-of-the-art of the criteria of cultural violence did not change significantly. The exception is the media freedom, which was treated by the authorities as a threat contributing to the development of the ethnic conflict. As the religious ideology is widely recognized

as the most dangerous element, which empowers the mobilization of the ethnic group, the new authorities were trying to ban extremist organizations too. Although the element of religion is a very sensitive, in Crimea it appears to be less relevant than media restrictions. Moreover, many Crimean Tatars are concerned with the threat of the Islamic radicalization. As soon as restrictions on religion consider a tiny segment of Crimean Tatar population, impediments to media have a broader effect, involving larger segment of Tatars, who view ethnic media as a tool to preserve and develop their identity. Media factor is neatly related to the political representation element, considering the fact that media often represents the views and opinions of the Mejlis and other political fractions opposed to the current Crimean authorities. Also, in comparison with religion, the media situation shows rather worsening trend. Currently the visible manifestations of the cultural violence on the level of direct violence are diminishing and the study does not find any evidence of the possible outbreak of the severe ethnic conflict due to cultural violence.

As a result, I argue that the research found support for the first hypotheses: *The current situation of the ethnic conflict between Crimean Tatars and the Slavic majority has the evident feature of the conflict with the structural asymmetry and the state-of-the-art is mainly determined by the structural violence.*

The manifestations of the direct violence related to the ethnic issues are not significant, comparing the incidents with Crimean Tatars to the other ethnicities and the share of Tatar population on the peninsula to the total population. Hence, I can conclude that the situation in Crimea does not have features of the severe ethnic conflict as the most visible criteria of direct violence is not remarkable. The research also did not find the witnesses of problems, which could determine the mobilization of the ethnic group.

The most challenging problems of inequality are related to the situation of the structural violence, especially the simmering land provision and legalization issues. Urgent actions are needed to solve political representation problem and improve the situation of socio-economic criteria. Policy makers have to implement a set of measures to develop a more transparent land legalization system, reduce the impact of political and ethnic cronyism. A particular focus has to be set on the corruption and measures to increase the accountability of officials. Another target area is the development of local representation, which shows some improvement and can foster resolution of political and socio-economic needs of Crimean Tatars in remote areas, where population is more vulnerable. To add

more, a large-scale socio-economic and political reform on the state level has to be implemented, however, that task has to be solved along with the status of territorial dispute and its final settlement.

Cultural violence is a more subjective element, strongly dependent on attitudes, beliefs, and emotions. Yet the most troublesome situation concerns media restrictions. Media is a very important tool for the preservation of Crimean Tatar identity and transmitter of their political and societal position.

To sum up, given lesser impact on the entire Crimean Tatar population elements of cultural violence do not constitute a major threat for violent conflict, given also slight improvement in that field. For instance, elements of cultural violence in case of the exacerbation might be rather influenced by steady worsening of the socio-economic situation and political representation.

The research also found the support towards the statement of the second hypothesis: *Since the annexation the situation on the peninsula is developing towards the decrease of the ethnic conflict; however, additional efforts are needed to reduce the level of structural and cultural violence.*

The most serious problems of structural and cultural violence are the legacy of the pre-annexation period. The solutions to overcome the violence were made both during the pre-annexation and post-annexation period, however, the inappropriate funding and gaps between the declared goals and reality remain a painful problem. The outbreak of the visible direct violence was obvious during the early post-annexation period, but the research shows that it could be treated rather as the phenomenon of the transition period than a real threat of significant increase of violence developing to the emergence of severe ethnic conflict.

Hence the answer for the research question follows:

How do different types of violence contribute to the development of the situation of the ethnic conflict between Crimean Tatar and Slavic population in Crimea?

All three types of violence contribute to the development of ethnic conflict between Crimean Tatars and Slavs, but their impact varies. Whereas manifestations of direct and cultural violence are noticeable and contribute to fears and prejudices on current situation, elements of structural violence involve larger numbers of Crimean Tatars and make an everyday life concern the basement for the development of the ethnic conflict. The resolution of structural issues is the most important task for authorities and policy makers. To sum up, it is possible to observe the modest improvement of the

situation since the annexation. Nevertheless, the further research is needed to take over control and appropriately govern the ethnic conflict threats in Crimea.

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