THE EU’s CARTOGRAPHIC IMAGINATIONS OF UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRATION

A critical analysis of the EU’s immigration discourse under the European Agenda on Migration

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‘EU migration crisis’ by Paresh Nath (politicalcartoons.com)
Abstract

“Refugee flow from Libya must stop, or EU core values will be in danger”. These words of high EU representatives in March 2017 marked a new low in the EU’s immigration discourse. A crucial characteristic of immigration discourses is the use of maps, that is, cartographic imaginations. In this thesis I have researched how an immigration map created and published by the EU’s border agency Frontex co-constructs the EU’s immigration discourse. In order to do so, the EU’s immigration discourse needed to be unravelled. I conducted a critical discourse analysis, that is, a topoi analysis, of 95 EC press releases under the European Agenda on Migration. The EU’s immigration discourse fuels anxiety and xenophobia. The migrant is often labelled irregular or illegal, compared with an unstoppable natural force, or even with the enemy during war time. The undocumented migrant is reduced to a depoliticized life and is outside EU law, which is used to legitimize the inhumane treatment undocumented migrants receive. Furthermore the EU links immigration with internal security issues such as terrorism. Even though there is no evidence between terrorism and immigration, arguments like this are applied to justify border securitization and the systematic screening of undocumented migrants. Several concepts such as ‘the undocumented migrant’ (the unidirectional, unstoppable, large arrows), the border securitization and justification of the inhumane treatment (impenetrable, black border) and ‘our space’ vis-à-vis ‘their space’ (the greyish colour that accentuates Schengen countries) are visualized in a way that co-constructs this discourse.
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List of Abbreviations

CDA: Critical Discourse Analysis
EU: European Union
EAoM: European Agenda on Migration
EC: European Commission
FRONTEX: European Border and Coast Guard Agency
IOM: International Organization for Migration
UNHCR: the UN Refugee Agency
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1. Introduction

The Dutch newspaper *de Volkskrant* published an article in the spring of 2017 titled: EU: Refugee flow from Libya must stop, or EU core values will be in danger (‘EU: *Stroom vluchtelingen uit Libië moet stoppen, anders “komen kernwaarden in gevaar”* ’). According to this piece, president of the EU Council Donald Tusk; chairman of the European Commission Jean-Claude Junker; and temporary chairman of the EU Council Joseph Muscat were striving to block the undocumented immigration flow from Libya to Italy before the summer of 2017. Muscat claimed that if the blockage failed before summer, the European Union would be threatened by nationalist politicians like Marine Le Pen, Geert Wilders and their ‘angry supporters’ (Peeperkorn, 2017). According to the polls in the weeks before the several national elections, anti-EU parties in the Netherlands and France were heading for victory. Afraid to lose their electorate, the EU introduced new measures for the management of undocumented migration. As a result, the goal of the proposed measures was not only to block undocumented migration from Libya, but also not appeal to the electorate of the European politicians (Ibid, 2017). Muscat even stated that if the EU does not act now, its ‘core values will be at stake’ (Ibid, 2017). The core values concern ‘respect for human dignity and human rights, democracy, equality and the rule of law’.

The measures proposed that the already present rescue boats in the Mediterranean Sea – which include private organizations, as well as several international navy divisions – needed to operate within the territorial waters of Libya to “reduce the amount of deaths and to bring them back to Libyan shore more easily” (Ibid, 2017). Even though the measures seemed justified (saving lives), the measures contributed and still contribute to the inhumane conditions for undocumented migrants.

1.1. On the edge of Europe: the inhumane situation in Libya

To understand the situation undocumented migrants endure in Libya, one need to understand the political situation in Libya first. Many undocumented migrants are fleeing from unsafe countries like Nigeria, Mali or Syria, paying human smugglers to reach their destination: Europe. In 2017 for example, 102,000 Syrians, 47,000 Iraqi, 45,000 Afghans and

1 https://europarlamentti.info/en/values-and-objectives/values/
39,000 Nigerians filed for asylum in the EU (Eurostat, 2018, p. 3). The main corridor the EU officials refer to lies between Libya and Italy. The first part of their journey is to reach Libya, a dangerous route straight through the Sahara Desert, after which the next problem arises: the unstable political situation in Libya.

Since the interference of the ‘West’, that is, a NATO-led coalition, in Libya and the fall of general Moammar al-Qadhafi in 2011, Libya still lacks a solid central government. Dozens of armed militias as well as three other ‘authorities’ – one of which has been internationally recognized by the United Nations (the Government of National Accord) – compete to claim their legitimate rights over the control of Libya’s infrastructure and natural resources (United Nations Security Council, 2017; Human Rights Watch, 2017). Consequently Libya is a politically fragmented country in terms of sovereignty. The armed militias using force and violence to claim their territory are making Libya an extremely dangerous country (United Nations Security Council, 2017, p. 2).

When the migrants do reach Tripoli or another coastal city, they are often forced to work in abominable conditions to pay the smuggling networks. In other words migrants are held captive by non-state actors (IOM, 2016). The boats smugglers provide to cross the Mediterranean are no more than rubber dinghies, often overcrowded which causes them to capsize regularly. Since the boats are not made to drift two-hundred kilometres to Italy, Libyan coast-guard patrols their territorial waters to intercept these boats to rescue the undocumented migrants. When rescued, the undocumented migrants are sent back to Libya where after they will be detained in one of the detention centres in which they suffer from physical and verbal abuse. They also face a constant risk of being sent back to their home countries where they often face prosecution or torture. Important to note is that many formal and informal detention centres are under the control by the earlier mentioned armed militias. The militias use kidnappings and arbitrary detentions for their own political gain. The most alarming is that the United Nations Security Council states that not only human smugglers are violating human rights, but also Libya’s coast guard (2007, p. 21). It is clear that undocumented migrants in Libya are dealing with inhumane conditions created by numerous (non-state) actors.

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2 For a more in-depth analysis of the situation in Libya: ‘Ross Kemp: Libya’s Migrant Hell’ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NSkaLYs9v00
1.2. The role of the European Union
The European Union invests money in Libya’s coast guard, NGO’s and other rescue operations to intercept migrant boats on the Mediterranean Sea. Even though it may result in less deaths – a noble goal it seems – the intercepted migrants are sent back to Libya. After reaching Libyan shore again, Libyan coast guard puts these people in detention centres where they are confronted with inhumane living conditions. The European Union is, at least for the greater part, responsible for the inhumane situation undocumented migrants have to deal with in the detention centres as they pay for the operations executed by the Libyan coastguard. The inhumane situation is characterised by overcrowded detention centres and the constant risk of being sent back to their home countries. These people often fled their home country because they faced persecution. In the case of Libya, the EU established a deal with the internationally recognized government – including its coast guard – but the unstable political situation in Libya indirectly results in a deal with numerous armed militias as they also control certain regions. These armed militias oppose the internationally recognized government and are not subjected to any meaningful judicial control (UN Security Council, 2017). Consequently the militias are increasingly violating human rights in the form of exploitation, kidnappings, arbitrary detentions and even executions. The cases investigated by the United Nations Security Council included migrants among others (Ibid, 2017).

To summarize the above, the EU constitutes policies that rely on deals with other non-EU governments situated in the most unsafe and politically unstable countries. Libya’s government will receive two-hundred million euros, including funding for reinforcing its coast guard. In return, Yves Pascouau, director of migration and mobility policies at the European Policy Centre, says that Libya is capable to break the business models of smuggling networks\(^3\). Instead of breaking the smuggling networks, the money invested in Libya’s coastguard has mainly been used for the interception and detention of undocumented migrants by Libya’s coast guard.

The point of the previous sections is to illustrate the immorality of detaining undocumented migrants around the EU’s external borders instead of giving them a safe place in the Union. The established ‘deal’ with third countries like Libya and the financing of its coast guard results in inhumane circumstances for these migrants. This is a prime example of outsourcing the moral responsibility the EU has regarding migrants and in particular refugees. Moreover, since undocumented migrants are intercepted on the Mediterranean Sea, it is also an attempt to scare off people who want to seek refuge in the EU. When it comes to EU immigration policy the living conditions for undocumented migrants are often ignored or silenced. The saving-lives-argument is used to justify these policies. However the situation remains unbearable for many migrants, even to the point where they decide to return to their home country or try to commit suicide (Faiola, 2016).

1.3. Maps & Discourse
In this part I will introduce the actual topic of the thesis. The EU’s immigration policy – and discourse – is not only presented through written texts but also in accompanying ‘texts’ such as maps. Maps included in policy documents are often repeated or recreated by other (national) political parties, newspapers, news bulletins, TV shows and other (social) media. This means that, indirectly, the original map influences the public opinion. The maps used by the media are not exact copies of the maps created for policy documents. However the media does use the original map as a base-map for creating their own immigration map. This means that it does not matter whether people read the original map. Most people eventually will be confronted with one of its variations.

But why are maps influential tools in the communication of discourses in the first place? A map is a two-dimensional representation, a simplified image of a multi-dimensional world (van Houtum, 2013, p. 96-97). All maps display geographical phenomena using symbols, colours, but they frequently include ideological and rhetorical messages too (Wintle, 1999, p. 137). In addition mapmakers ventilate their own political, moral and socio-economic background through maps (Klinghoffer, 2006, p. 6), and albeit not all maps are consciously biased, unconscious assumptions and assertions will be inevitable (Wintle, 1999, p. 137). Hence, a map is never neutral as the mapmaker is never neutral (Monmonier, 1996, p1).
The maps and images published in newspapers, news bulletins, or social media influence and shape the public opinion (Kim, Carvalho, Davis & Mullins, 2014, p. 293; Brouwer, van der Woude & van der Leun, 2017, p. 101). Since it is impossible to fully understand or know the physical world, people try to get a better understanding of it by looking at maps (Kitchin, Perkins & Dodge, 2009, p. 1). People are often not fully aware that the maps they read function as ideological instruments, often for the crystallization of discourses. Cartographic images can display ‘a social history of power, especially power over space’ (Wintle, 1999, p. 137). All these features make maps attractive devices for creating geopolitical imaginations for political projects such as the European Union (what is Europe/non-Europe, who is included/excluded), and also why maps are dangerous for those who use these maps to make sense of their world (Bueno Lacy & van Houtum, 2015, p. 482).

1.4. Researching discourse: a Frontex map
The map central to this research was included in Frontex’s Risk Analysis Report 2014 (Figure 1.1). Established in 2004, Frontex is the “European Agency for the Management of Operation Coordination at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union” (Council of the European Union, 2004). It is the European border patrol agency, responsible for managing the EU’s and Schengen affiliated countries’ external border.4 Within the EU structure, Frontex is a decentralised agency that, like all other EU agencies, contributes to the implementation of EU policies. They have been ‘set up by the EU to perform technical and scientific tasks that help the EU institutions implement policies and take decisions’5. Frontex assists EU agencies with the management of its external border and its coast. Border management involves procedures where crossing a border is made easier or more restrictive (Newman, 2006, p. 178). The procedures of the EU’s border management include border checks and border surveillance. Border checks are comprised of checks on people, their possessions and vehicles at ‘authorized entry points’, whereas border surveillance is carried out between ‘authorized entry points’ (Hills, 2006, p. 42). The surveillances contain “monitoring and patrolling at places known to be sensitive, supported

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4 https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/agencies/frontex_en
5 https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/agencies/decentralised-agencies_en
by technical and electrical means” with stationary and mobile units (EU Schengen Catalogue, 2008, p. 12).

**Figure 1.1: ‘huge irregular migration flows’ towards Schengen in 2013.**

The Frontex map was included in the Annual Risk Analysis report of 2014, which “presents a European summary of trends and developments along the external borders of the member states of the EU” (Annual Risk Analysis Report, 2014, p. 6). The map demonstrates the ‘irregular border crossings’ in 2013. All activities of Frontex are ‘Risk Analysis driven’. ‘Frontex assesses risks with relation to EU border security’. In other words, every operation of Frontex is a direct response to its Risk Analysis Reports. The map shows the ‘risk’ of undocumented immigration to the European Union. Since Frontex is assisting with the implementation of EU policies, the map is a simplified visual image of the EU’s immigration policy.

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6 https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/agencies/frontex_en
1.5. What is a ‘discourse?’
I already mentioned the word *discourse* a few times, but what is a ‘discourse’? First I will provide a straightforward definition, after which I will further elaborate the concept in chapter two. A rather broad definition of a discourse is “a group of statements which provide a language for talking about – i.e. a way of representing – a particular kind of knowledge about a topic” (Hall, 1992, p. 291). Perhaps a more tangible idea is provided by Parker (1992, cited in Phillips and Hardy, 2002, p. 3): “a discourse is an interrelated set of texts, and the practices of their production, dissemination, and reception, that brings an object into being”. Texts in relation to discourses are not just texts in the sense of written statements or documents. Texts in a discourse can be written, videos, speech acts, pictures and even maps (Phillips & Hardy, 2002, p. 3). When trying to make sense of a discourse the individual texts have no meaning. It is through their interconnection with each other, other discourses on which the discourse is stemming from, and “the nature of their production, dissemination, and consumption” that they are meaningful (Ibid, p. 4). Phillips and Hardy (2002) define discourse as follows: “without discourse, there is no reality, and without understanding discourse, we cannot understand our reality, our experiences, ourselves.”(p. 2).
In short, the EU’s immigration discourse can be seen as interrelated texts, in any form, which creates a certain framework in which the EU determines how one can speak about the topic ‘immigration to the European Union.’ The Frontex map may enforce and co-construe the discourse through the selected symbols, colours, displayed *space* and the repetition through other channels. The (social) media and political parties are, sometimes unconsciously, spreading the EU’s immigration discourse among its followers. By analysing and unravelling the EU’s immigration discourse I can analyse how the Frontex map co-constructs and enforces this discourse.

1.6. The relevance of this thesis
Arguably the most striking aspect of the story about ‘losing Europe’s core values’ are the speakers and the relevance of their positions within the European Union. Both Tusk and Muscat were, at the time, high EU officials. By stating that ‘the EU’s core values are at stake’ if undocumented migrants reach the European Union, they insinuate that undocumented migrants are a threat to the EU and its citizens. Labelling the undocumented migrants as a threat is in contrast with the contemporary situation of migrants in Libya: they
are not the threat, they are fleeing the threat. The EU’s immigration policy has a great effect on the lives of other people as it results in the interception and return of migrant boats. Indicating that undocumented migrants endanger the core values of the European Union has led to blocking immigration.

Since the words of Muscat and Tusk reflect the position on undocumented immigration for the EU as a whole, EU citizens might assume that this is the best position to take regarding undocumented immigration to the EU. As a result EU citizens may take the same view on immigration to the EU as constructed by European leaders.

The societal relevance of this thesis is that the Frontex map is being repeated by other parties. Immigration maps in general are dominated with thick and impressive arrows, as if the receiving space is under attack. “Many of the current maps present migration as massive, unaffected, unidirectional, and unstoppable flows towards imaginatively reactive and vulnerable states” (van Houtum, 2010, p. 965). Maps depicting ‘illegal’ flows – such as the Frontex map – are applied for persuading, rather than informing the reader with accurate information. The more alarming or threatening these cartographic images are, the more effect they have on policy makers. The abundance of arrows on maps depicting ‘illegal’ flows is referred to as arrow disease (van Schendel, 2005, p. 42).

The following map (figure 1.2) is included in a commercial created by the Dutch political party de Dutch Freedom Party (or PVV), a nationalist, Islamophobic and Eurosceptic party in the Netherlands. This map demonstrates the ‘danger’ of third country immigrants. Although the map is not comprised with arrows as such – the map was an animation, which made arrowheads unnecessary – it shows similarities with the Frontex map. Again, some sort of arrows are heading towards Europe and, more specifically, the Netherlands and her neighbouring countries. The map is not a one-on-one copy, but the essence of depicting migration flows remains the same. More interesting is the narrative PVV leader Geert Wilders provides:

“A demographic tsunami from Africa is heading for us. It threatens to replace our society. And many of the migrants are Muslim. And bring more Islam with them. We do not want that. We must stop the African rush and the accompanied Islamisation.” (Wilders, 2017).
Wilders is using a metaphor to reinforce his reasoning about, in this case, African migrants. The phrase ‘a demographic tsunami from Africa’ implies a gigantic ‘wave’ of African immigrants heading for Europe and the Netherlands. To be clear, 1.2 million people entered the European Union in 2016, of which sixty percent arrived in Germany. Of all 1.2 million refugees, 28% were of Syrian descent. About 239,000—20% of the total—migrants were of African descent, which, compared to the total population of the EU is 0.05% (Vluchtel-ingewerk Nederland, 2017). More importantly, this number does not only represent Muslims. Many Christian African migrants are seeking refuge in Europe as the Christian minority is persecuted in their country of origin. The Islamophobic nature of the Dutch Freedom Party implies all immigrants are Muslim and thus are problematic for the Netherlands or the EU. In addition, it remains unclear where ‘we’ refers to in the commercial. Does ‘we’ refer to the PVV— and her electorate— or to the Dutch or even European society as a whole?

Figure 1.2: ‘migration’ map from the Dutch PVV-party
Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rN-LIMSS9tU

The second map (figure 1.3) in this sequence was published in an online article of the newspaper ‘The Economist’. Perhaps the most striking aspect is its one-on-one copy of the Frontex map with regard to the arrows. In fact, the main source of this map is the Frontex map. The only addition is the extra information concerning the main entry points into the

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7 See: www.opendoors.nl
Schengen countries. Again, no reflection for the circularity of the migrants’ journey or the heterogeneity. Similar to the Frontex map, this map describes migration as ‘illegal border crossings’.

![Migration map remarkably similar to that of Frontex](https://www.economist.com/news/europe/21662597-asylum-seekers-economic-migrants-and-residents-all-stripes-fret-over-their-place-looking)

The third and final map in this series is the map published by the BBC (figure 1.4). Similar to figure 1.3 this map shows resemblance to the Frontex map, especially with regard to the arrows and the accentuation of external border. The main source of this map is also Frontex.
Even though the Frontex map is published in the Annual Risk Analysis Report 2014, many other maps distributed by all types of media are based on it. All the other maps show for example the same type of arrows, without reflecting on the circularity of the journeys and the same implication of the impenetrable external border. By means of the report and the map Frontex constructs a particular image of the undocumented migrant. Through repetitions in newspapers, news programs, on social media, and even political parties the discourse becomes generally accepted.

This thesis focuses thus on two aspects: maps and discourse. The Frontex map forms the basis of this research. The map evokes a few questions which I will elaborate in the following section. The map is included in the Risk Analysis Report 2014, in which the ‘illegal migration’, the undocumented migrant, seems to pose a threat to the European Union. In order to find out how for example the undocumented migrant is constructed within the political debate, I will conduct a topoi analysis of EC press releases under the European Agenda on Migration, a newly set up migration policy in 2015. Topoi (topos singular) are parts of argumentation ‘which belongs to the obligatory premises of an argument, whether explicit or tacit’ (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, cited in Wodak, 2011, p. 42). Topoi can be seen as a system of public knowledge with resources for maintaining certain conclusions. They
are often used in the political arena and in discourses to create a bridge between an argument or arguments and the conclusion. After this analysis I will return to the Frontex map to identify how the map is co-constructing and/or reinforcing this particular discourse.

Returning to the Frontex map, it depicts several elements of immigration. The first thing that attracts attention is the depiction of the European Union, or how this map does not refer exclusively to the EU: according to this map Europe includes Schengen countries instead of just the EU member states. This is not peculiar since this is the zone within Europe where people can move freely without being checked at each internal border. One of Frontex’ main tasks is to manage the external border of Schengen (which automatically includes the EU). The external border is drawn with a thick, black line indicating a demarcation between Schengen and not Schengen. The external border is more prominent than internal borders within Schengen, suggesting a coherence of countries surrounded by an impenetrable external border. The large, impressive arrows refer to incoming undocumented migrants or, according to Frontex, the ‘irregular migration flow’. The use of ‘irregular’ is questionable to say the least. Not only is the migration regular as it follows a certain pattern, route and so on but it is also embedded in the region due to spatial inequalities. Moreover, for example Syrian, Iraqi or Libyan refugees do not have any legal option for entering the EU, as they are unable to obtain a Schengen Visa. The arrows have three implications. The first is depicting migration flows as a smooth and simple process, as if undocumented migrants made it to Europe without any difficulties, interruptions or circularity. Second, these arrows do not consider the heterogeneity of the migrants (Houtum, 2010, p. 965). Every migrant has his or her own background story and incentive to migrate. Third, the statistical information provided with the arrows show relatively small numbers of undocumented migrants crossing the external border, especially compared with the EU’s 508 million inhabitants. Yet the arrows are quite big. Furthermore, this map is dominated with symbols of several sizes containing statistical information about undocumented migrants, and similar as to the arrows, they are gigantic regarding the numbers they represent.

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8 https://www.schengenvisainfo.com/who-needs-schengen-visa/
9 https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/figures/living_en
The symbols are inconsistent in terms of the relation between size and statistical information. The percentage change between 2012 and 2013 is displayed alongside the statistical information.

As I mentioned before this map on its own does not ‘say’ much about the EU discourse regarding immigration. The map is included in the Annual Risk Analysis report, merely written to assess ‘risks’ and assisting the EU with the implementation of policy. Most EU citizens will probably not read the document, but eventually will be confronted with one of its variation in the media. Essential is the maps’ repetition as well as the relation to policy documents, images, maps, and speech acts that help co-constructing this discourse. Although the map is made for an official Frontex report there are many examples to demonstrate its repetition. All in all, this thesis aims to contribute to an ongoing discussion about cartographic images as a geopolitical tool for the (co)construction of discourses.

1.8 Research questions
In order to find out how the Frontex map reinforces the EU’s immigration discourse, the main research question of this thesis will be: How does this Frontex map represent, co-construct and reinforce the EU’s immigration discourse? ‘Co-constructing’ refers to how the various elements on the map contribute to the EU’s immigration discourse. Reinforce refers to the repetition of the map as demonstrated above, making it accessible to a wider audience. Naturally the map elements also play a role in reinforcing the discourse as they portray aspects of immigration in a way that fits within the EU’s immigration discourse. In order to answer the main question, the following sub-questions are relevant.

- What is discourse and why is it relevant for this research?
- Why are maps useful tools in discourses?
- What is critical discourse analysis, and how does it fit within this research?
- What is the EU’s immigration discourse?
- How is the EU’s immigration discourse depicted through the Frontex map?
To find an answer to all these questions I will conduct a critical discourse analysis, or to be more specific, a topoi analysis. Since discourses create reality, we need to understand discourse if we want to understand our reality (Phillips & Hardy, 2002, p. 2). Texts in discourses are not meaningful individually; it is through interconnectedness with other texts, discourses and the nature of their production that they become meaningful (Ibid, p. 4). It is thus important to analyse how texts are connected with each other and who the speaker or writer is. A discourse analyst attempts to uncover how social reality is produced (Ibid, p. 6). The key aim of topoi analysis is to uncover and identify these argumentation schemes and systematically analyse their development (Bauder, 2008, p. 297). The data consists of EC press releases regarding EU immigration published between April 2015 and December 2017. The reason for this time frame is the establishment of ‘A European Agenda on Migration’ on May 15th, 2015. This agenda proposed a broad guideline for EU policy regarding any form of immigration to the European Union. Not surprisingly, the greater part of the agenda is about managing the so called immigration crisis, referring to ‘irregular’ (undocumented) and ‘regular’ (documented) migration of refugees and economic migrants from Africa and Syria among others. The main reason to establish ‘A European Agenda on Migration’ was a new, European approach on migration since individual Member States were and are not able to manage the crisis. The new European approach “requires using all policies and tools at our disposal – combining internal and external policies to best effect” (European Commission, 2015a, p. 2).

1.9. Thesis structure
In the first half of chapter two I will further elaborate ‘discourse’ to provide a solid understanding of the concept. In the second half of chapter two I will explain to what extent maps can be used in discourses. Chapter three will be a further elaboration on the methodology. I will further discuss topoi analysis, how critical discourse analysts collect their data, and rhetoric. In chapter four I will discuss the analysis and provide examples of how I identified topoi and EU rhetoric with regard to immigration. In the fifth chapter I will discuss the results of the analysis and link them with the Frontex map. In chapter six I will conclude this thesis.
2. Theoretical Framework

Foucauldian discourse and Harleain cartography

In this chapter I will discuss the theoretical framework implemented in this thesis. The chapter is divided in two parts. In the first part I will further elaborate the concept discourse using the theories of the French philosopher Michel Foucault, as this will be the basis of doing a discourse analysis. In the second part of this chapter I will focus on how maps are linked to discourses. In order to find an answer to the main question, understanding both concepts and the relationship between them is essential.

2.1. Discourse, Power & Foucault

Even though I already provided a straightforward idea of discourse, the concept is much more complicated as it is comprised of many, often connected processes and systems. One of the most influential philosophers with regard to political discourses was Michel Foucault. A central theme in Foucauldian discourse is the idea of statements, which he further elaborated in his work *the Archaeology of Knowledge*. When statements about a topic are made within a certain discourse, the discourse makes it possible to construct the topic in a particular way, but it simultaneously limits other ways to construct this particular topic (Hall, 1992, p. 291). If EU officials for instance make statements or create certain narratives about undocumented migrants within the EU’s immigration discourse they construct undocumented migrants in a particular way. Simultaneously these narratives ensure that other ways of constructing undocumented migrants is limited. Foucault claims that statements have an “enunciative function” (Foucault, 1972[2002], p. 98). Since statements have this function, they can emerge as a sentence or proposition but it can also take other forms such as a list or table (Garrity, 2010, p. 201). Consequently, this also means that a statement can take the form of a map. In this manner discourses can be seen as a bridge between theory and social practices, as in ‘doing something’. (Ibid, p. 202). Therefore the form of stating is just as important as the content. This can be captured in three questions: “Who is speaking? Where is it being spoken from? What is the relation between the speaker and what is being spoken of?” (Brown & Cousins, 1986, cited in Garrity, 2010, p. 204). What follows is that a subject
– i.e. the rational human being – must hold a particular position in order to make a particular statement. For example, only doctors can make certain statements in the field of medicine (Foucault, 1972[2002], p. 56). It is not important who can speak, but who is sanctioned to speak, that is, the one who is thought to know the truth (Garrity, 2010, p. 204). This sentence perfectly summarizes the importance of the positions occupied by the speakers discussed in the first chapter. It is not only important what is said but, perhaps more important, who the speaker is.

In the most general way, a discourse is all what is produced by a group of signs. “Discourse is constituted by a group of sequences of signs, in so far as they are statements, that is, in so far they can be assigned particular modalities of existence” (Foucault, 1972[2002], p. 122f). A group of interconnected statements which produce a discourse is termed discursive formation: “we shall call discourse a group of statements in so far as they belong to the same discursive formation” (Ibid, p. 131). A statement belongs to a discursive formation like a sentence belongs to a text (Ibid, p. 130). Discursive formations have four characteristics. (1) Statements refer to the same object, (2) are enunciated in the same way, (3) share a common system of conceptualisation, and (4) have similar subjects or theories (Jansen, 2008, p. 109).

In in The Order of Discourse among others, Foucault discusses the connection between discourse and power. The central theme is “the rules, systems and procedures that constitute, and are constituted by, ‘our will to knowledge’” (Young, 1981, cited in Hook, 2001). This creates a domain of discursive practices in which knowledge is formed and produced (Hook, 2001, p. 522). “All discursive rules and categories that were a priori assumed as a constituent part of discourse and therefore knowledge” (Young, 1981, cited in Hook, 2001). The importance of these domains is that it is almost impossible to think outside the discursive practices. For instance the “will to knowledge” of the European Union and European officials regarding immigration creates a domain in which knowledge about immigration to the EU is shaped. It creates a metaphorical box in which it is possible to talk and think about immigration to the EU, but it simultaneously prohibits other ideas about this topic (to think outside the box). Since it shapes and prohibits knowledge, discursive practices are heavily related to the exercise of power: “discourse in itself is both constituted by, and
ensures the reproduction of, the social system, through forms of selection, exclusion and domination” (Young, 1981, cited in Hook, 2001).

In *The Order of Discourse* Foucault starts with the hypothesis that in every society the production of a discourse is “at once controlled, selected, organised and redistributed by a certain number of procedures” (p. 52). He centres the analysis of discourse within the political field (Hook, 2001, p. 523). All the more interesting for this thesis as the EU’s immigration discourse is a political discourse. For Foucault a discourse can both enable and constrain the things that can be said, written or thought (1981, p. 52). “What Foucault terms as discursive practices work in both inhibiting and productive ways, implying a play of prescription that designate both exclusions and choices” (Ibid, p. 523). Although Foucauldian discourse is vastly elaborated, I will point out some ideas that may be helpful for understanding discourse with regard to the topic of this thesis. There are two types of procedures in society for the production and limitation of discourses.

The first procedure are external systems of exclusion. Foucault (1981) elaborates on three principles for exclusion which are more or less interconnected with each other. The first is *prohibition*, which roughly includes taboos, privileges of the speaking subject, and rituals. He states that the intersecting grid of prohibition is the ‘tightest’ within the fields of politics and sexuality: “As if discourse (…) is in fact one of the places where sexuality and politics exercise in a privileged way some of their most formidable powers” (p. 52).

The second principle of external systems of exclusion in our society is the evermore existing division and opposition between reason and madness. “Since the depths of the Middle Ages, the madman has been the one whose discourse cannot have the same currency as others” (Foucault, 1970/[1981], p. 53). The word or speech-act of the madman is just a noise to discourse, but this voice may utter a hidden truth. The doctor uses the *framework of knowledge* and the *network of institutions* to decipher the madman’s speech (Ibid, p. 53). However, the madman’s speech does not fit in the framework of knowledge and network of institutions. This example demonstrates the importance of discourse. The madman’s words are meaningless and powerless since they do not fit inside the discourse. His speech is not what is considered to be acceptable and hence, his ideas are meaningless. The doctor only listens to the words that he recognizes as part of his framework of knowledge and what he does not recognize is considered mad.
The third principle of exclusion is the opposition between true and false. Foucault remarks that our will to truth is “something like a system of exclusion, a historical, modifiable, and institutional constraining system” (p. 54). He uses an example of archaic Greece to demonstrate the historical component. For Greek poets in the sixth century BC, the truth was “which inspired respect and terror, and to which one had to submit because it ruled (...) pronounced by men who spoke as of right and according to the required ritual” (p. 54). It was a discourse “which dispensed justice and gave everyone his share” (p. 54). It was a discourse that not only predicted the future, announcing what was going to happen, but also helped to make it happen by persuading the people (Ibid, p. 54). However, just over a century later, the highest order of truth was no longer what a discourse did but what was said. “The truth was displaced from the ritualised, efficacious and just an act of enunciation, towards the utterance itself, its meaning, its form, its object, its relation to its reference” (p. 54). This was not the only shift in our will to truth; it has never stopped changing and there are still ongoing mutations by, for example, scientific breakthroughs. The will to truth is, just as the other principles of exclusion, institutionally supported. It is reinforced and renewed by the “whole strata of practices” (Ibid, p. 55), and therefore limits and constrains the free flow of discourses (Hook, 2001, p. 524). This will to truth, then, is the way knowledge is ‘put to work, valorised and distributed’ and is a crucial component for creating a successful discourse. “The strongest discourses are those that have attempted to ground themselves on the natural, the sincere, the scientific” (Ibid, p. 524). This quote is important for this thesis because the sincerity in the EU’s immigration discourse, saving migrant lives for example, is a characteristic of a ‘strong’ discourse. Foucault states that the first two principles (prohibition, and madness vis-à-vis reason) are continuously drifting towards the third. This principle tries to assimilate the other two, whereas the other two become more fragile to the point where they are ‘invaded’ by the ‘will to truth’ (p. 56).

The second type of procedures in society for the production of discourse are the internal systems of exclusion and are part of the discourse where power and desire is at stake (Foucault, 1970/[1981], p. 56). Just as the external system of exclusion, the internal system is constituted by three principles. The first principle is that of the commentary. These discourses are based on the major narratives of society, creating some sort of classification of discourses among society. Foucault is speaking here about primary (e.g. religious or scientific) and secondary, cultural commentaries. Each commentary should tell what has already
been said, but also needs to repeat endlessly what has never been said (Ibid, p. 58). “It obeys a simple directive of recitation” (Hook, 2001, p. 526). Therefore it provides a chance to say something other than the text, on the premise the text itself is expressed (Foucault, 1970/[1981], p. 58). What Foucault suggests is that the importance of ‘originality and freedom’ of common discourses is exaggerated and that what is being spoken is merely a case of repetition, or ‘discursive recirculation’. Innovation or novelty is not a case of what is being said, but a case of recitation of what has been said before (Hook, 2001, p. 526).

A complementary principle is the role of the author. It is not an author in the traditional sense of the word (i.e. the writer of a text) but in the sense of the grouping of discourses, a focus of coherence and a unity and origin of their meanings. The ‘author function’ must be ‘stripped down’ from its creative role, and viewed as a complex and variable discursive function (Foucault, 1977, p. 138). By asking new questions as “what matters who’s speaking?”, Foucault asks how discourses create subjects (like authors) with privileged positions. Instead of asking what an author asserts in their texts, the focus should be on the question ‘what subject-positions are made possible within such texts’ (Hook, 2001, p. 527). This means that the focus when analysing discourse should not only be on the text itself, but also what is insinuated and implied, for example through the use of metaphors. After all, the EU’s immigration discourse does create subjects with privileged (EU officials, EU institutions, EU citizens) and underprivileged (undocumented migrants) subject-positions.

The third and last principle of internal exclusion is the discipline. A discipline is defined by ‘a domain of objects, a set of methods and propositions that are considered to be true’ (Foucault, 1970/[1981], p. 59). This means that in order for a proposition or statement to belong to a discipline, it has to fulfil certain conditions which are far more complex than the ‘simple’ truth (Ibid, p. 60). Thus, in order to make a statement belong to a discipline, it needs to fulfil certain conditions on the basis of existing theories, rules, techniques, methods, definitions, and so on. The point of demonstrating the systems of exclusion is that there are many ‘infinite resources for the creation of discourses’. However, these principles simultaneously have a constraining and restrictive consequences (Ibid, p. 61). As a consequence, when analysing discourses, the analyst must not only attempt to find the abundance of meaning but also the ‘scarcity’ of meaning, the things that cannot be said (Hook, 2001, p. 527).
After the detailed description and clarification of the procedures of exclusion operating upon discourse, Foucault engages on philosophical themes that may reinforce these procedures. These philosophical themes ensure that “discourse should occupy the smallest possible space between thought and speech” and that “discourse should appear to be no more than a certain bridging between thinking and speaking”. The question Foucault therefore raises is how in modern western society the actions of discourse are omitted so successfully (Foucault, 1970/[1981], p. 65). The first theme for hiding the reality of discourse is the founding subject, who is given the task “of directly animating the empty forms of language with his aims”. The founding subject has signs, marks, traces and letters at his disposal, but does not need to “pass via the singular instance in order to manifest them”. This subject will grasp the meaning through intuition and it is he who “founds the horizons of meaning”. This is where science, propositions and deductive thinking have their ultimate grounding (Ibid, p. 65).

The second theme is the originating experience and opposes the founding subject. The originating experience suggests that at the very basis of experience were prior meanings “wandering around in the world”. Our world is build up by things “already murmuring meanings which our language has only to pick up”. This language was “already speaking to us of a being of which it is like a skeleton” (Ibid, p. 65).

A third theme for eluding the reality of discourse is the universal mediation. It indicates the presumption of an omnipresent ‘logos’ (the logic behind an argument). “The logos elevates particularities to the status of concepts and allows immediate consciousness to unfurl in the end the whole rationality of the world” (Ibid, p. 65-66). If this logos is established, discourse is no more than “the gleaming of a truth in the process of being born to its own gaze” (p. 66). Through these three themes, discourse is little more than a play of writing (founding subject), of reading (originating experience), and of exchange (universal mediation). “This writing, reading, and exchange never put anything at stake except signs”. Therefore discourse can be “annulled in its reality and put at the disposal of the signifier” (Ibid, p. 66). With this three philosophical themes Foucault warns the discourse analyst not to focus just on power as a function of a text alone because power in texts stems from ‘material and tactical forms of power’. Not everything can be analysed through language and texts (Foucault, 1981).
I will continue this chapter with discussing the connection between maps and discourse and how maps can be powerful devices for spreading discourses.

2.2. Maps and the expression of power and knowledge
In the introduction of the thesis I briefly explained what a map is considered to be. In this part I will further discuss the importance of maps, especially how maps can be applied for the ventilation of power and knowledge is one of the major points for discussion in critical cartography. “The aim of critical cartography is to reduce the gap between a technically oriented map design and the theoretical analysis of power in society” (Fernandez & Buchroithner, (2014, p. 68). Critical cartography incorporates social theories to analyse how ‘categories of knowledge’ such as race, territory, and boundaries are produced or reproduced on and by maps. (Ibid, p. 68). J.B. Harley was, and perhaps still is, one of the most influential figures in the field of critical cartography. He was a co-writer and co-editor of a History of Cartography Vol. 1 and Vol. 2, and wrote many essays of which Deconstructing the Map is arguably the most influential in the field of critical cartography. In this essay he connects cartography with Foucault’s ideas on power and Derrida’s deconstruction theories. One of the aims in Deconstructing the Map is the “concern with its [map] social and political dimensions, and with understanding how the map works in society as a form of power-knowledge” (Harley, 1989, p. 11). It is not hard to find maps derived from political power, especially when produced or commissioned by any form of government, that reinforce for instance legal statuses, territories and values. Maps are often made by people who have the power and authority (Fernandez & Buchroithner, (2014, p. 77), as is the case with the Frontex map. I believe reinforcing territory, values or legal statuses through maps is closely related with reinforcing a certain discourse in which these aspects are important components.

Harley treated maps as texts. Since maps are texts and have a powerful rhetoric, maps can be critically examined (Harley, 1989, p. 3). “For Harley, ‘text’ is a better metaphor for maps than ‘the mirror of nature’” (Fernandez & Buchroithner, 2014, p. 76). Therefore maps can be deconstructed. Deconstruction, as a discourse analysis approach, means that the researcher need to read ‘between the lines’ or to find the ‘second text’ to ‘discover the silences and contradictions that challenge the apparent honesty of the image’ (Harley, 1989, p. 3; Kitchin & Dodge, 2007, p. 332).
For the scope of this thesis I will focus on the following to aspects of Harley’s deconstruction theory: power external to maps, and power internal to maps, as I think both forms of power can be found in the Frontex map. Power external to maps connects maps to the centres of political power, where power is practiced on the map. A cartographer often responds to an external need, that is, it fulfils a task ordered by a government. “It is an external power, often centralized and exercised bureaucratically, imposed from above, and manifest in particular acts or phases of deliberate policy” (Harley, 1989, p. 12). Power internal to maps is “the political effects of what cartographers do when they make maps” (Ibid, p. 12). Harley compares power internal to maps with the power words have in books and other texts ‘as a force of change’. Essential is the cartographic process. This power comes from within the map and it is exercised through the way the map is made. By the cartographic process Harley means how information is selected, categories have been made, the hierarchical composition of the elements in the landscapes and so on. The cartographer needs to make choices what to represent, how to represent it and what decisions are made with the representations (Crampton, 2010, p. 41). Consequently the cartographer exercises power over the knowledge of the world which he makes available to the people, the map reader (Harley, 1989, p. 12). It does not necessarily mean that the cartographer consciously shares biased information (Harley, 1989, p. 12; Wintle, 1999, p. 137). However, “the map is a silent arbiter of power” (Harley, 1989, p. 12).

The reason I selected power internal and external to maps is because I believe both forms of power are present in the Frontex map. External power is rather obvious as the Frontex map was published in an ‘Annual Risk Analysis Report’. The border agency has created a map that visualizes the relationship between undocumented immigration and ‘risk’ or threat. I think it is sound to say that the map is, what Harley called, manifested in particular acts or phases of deliberate policy: showing the dangers of undocumented immigration in order to develop anti-immigration policies – especially since the Risk Analysis Reports form the basis of further actions proposed by Frontex. Furthermore it seems that the definition Harley provides of power internal to maps suggest that all maps are (unconsciously) biased. This bias is inevitable since each individual cartographer has his or her own political, economic, and social background which will influence the decision made during the cartographic process. It automatically means that this type of power is present in every map. Although I think this type of power is far less present since this particular cartographer
produced the Frontex map, ‘ordered from above’. Yet to implement the ‘orders’ the cartographer needs to make decisions concerning the hierarchy, size, and colour of the symbols which will always be (unconsciously) biased by his or her socio-economic background.

Almost three decades later it is widely acknowledged that Harley’s ideas may be too limited, for example by misinterpreting some ideas of Foucault (Crampton, 2001; Kitchin & Dodge, 2007). The division of the two powers discussed above are simply too crude (Crampton, 2001, p. 243). As Harley explained himself, maps also have silencing powers. Silencing in cartography may be executed intentionally by censorship, exclusion, abstraction or falsification but also unintentionally by ‘historic rules’ in the form of scientific and/or political and social discourse (Harley, 1988). Both silencing powers are just as important when analysing the Frontex map and the EU’s immigration discourse. First of all, it is impossible to depict every object of the area that is being mapped. It results in a selection of information of what is considered to be important to show with regard to the map’s topic. Second, political discourses – such as the EU’s immigration discourse – ‘are responsible for differential emphases, through selection and generalisation, which privilege some aspects of ‘reality’ while others are silenced’ (Harley, 1988, p. 66). Even if the individual cartographer is aware of these nuances, he is not in the position to balance or correct them (Ibid, p. 66). This can be linked with power external to the map. The power is exerted on the map and the cartographer responds to an external need; the map is ordered ‘from above’. This power, the external need of a government, I believe, depends for great deal on the political discourse at that particular time. Consequently this political discourse is responsible for certain emphasis and silences on maps. Therefore the first step is unravelling the EU’s immigration discourse. This will help to answer the main question of this thesis.

What Harley did successfully demonstrated with Deconstructing the Map and is other writings is to never trust maps. I have discussed how maps are useful devices for creating power and knowledge, and that maps are never objective, ‘true’, or correct. This is especially true for political maps. “What Harley provided with his ‘deconstruction’, is an account of the power relations of mapping, and the map’s agency as discourse” (Crampton, 2001, p. 241). Even though the theories might be limited, the two kinds of power are useful with regard to the analysis of the Frontex map and other maps.
The rise, creation and use of discourses is thus a combination of complex theoretical and philosophical processes and principles that sometimes complement and reinforce, and sometimes oppose each other. Some ideas Foucault proposed are important for this research. For example the way statements within a certain discourse constructs a certain topic, but simultaneously limits other ways of constructing this topic. It creates a framework in which one can talk about this topic, but also how not to talk about this topic, for instance the mad man’s speech. Words that does not fit into this framework are just a noise to discourse. Furthermore Foucault mentions the ‘will to truth’ which is institutionalised and limits the free flows of discourses. Crucially for a successful discourse is how knowledge is distributed and put into work. Especially ‘sincere, scientific or natural’ discourses are the strongest ones, and therefore perhaps the most alarming since they are difficult to alter.

Maps are related to power and knowledge in numerous ways. First, maps like the Frontex map are created by those who have authority and power – Frontex as a distinct agency of the EU. They exercise power on the map that is included in a document that forms a basis for new policies or actions. Second, the socio-economic background of the cartographer will always result in biased information on maps. The selection, hierarchy and size of information portrayed on a map will therefore always be an (unconscious) result of this biased background. Third, maps have silencing powers, be it intentionally via censorship or exclusion, or unintentionally via political or scientific discourses.

In Chapter three I will elaborate and discuss the methodology used in this thesis. I will explain which type of discourse analysis I think is the most suitable, after which I will explain the specific method within that type of discourse analysis.
3. Methodology

The decision of doing discourse analysis was the first step for establishing a methodology. Since there are many different methods in discourse analysis, I had to find the most suitable method for this thesis. Eventually I found critical discourse analysis (hereafter CDA) most suitable for this thesis, as it ‘focuses on the role of discursive activity in constituting and sustaining unequal power relations’ (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997, cited in Phillips & Hardy, 2002, p. 25). As Foucault argued discursive activity involves statements, be it texts, speak-acts etc., about a certain discourse. The critical discourse analyst should aim at describing and explaining ‘how power abuse is enacted, reproduced or legitimated by the talk and text of dominant groups and institutions’ (van Dijk, 1996, cited in Phillips & Hardy, 2002, p. 25). This also means that CDA is characterized by explicit political commitment. For critical discourse analysts are people who see things wrong in our society, have noticed that language – in any form whatsoever – has been involved in what is wrong and are dedicated to make a change through the intervention of the involved language (Fairclough, 1996, p. 52). In other words, CDA makes a plea for the socially discriminated (Meyer, 2001, p. 15). As this thesis concerns a marginalized group of people, the undocumented migrants, mainly marginalized through EU discourse and policy, CDA is the most suitable type of discourse analysis for analysing EU’s immigration discourse. As a consequence I have taken a socio-political position: It is wrong to outsource the moral responsibility of taking in migrants, especially refugees, to politically unstable third countries as it renounces human rights, human dignity, and equality. In this respect, it seems that instead of the undocumented immigrants, the political approach on undocumented immigrants and refugees is endangering the EU’s core values (respect for human dignity and human rights, democracy, equality and the rule of law).

CDA is not denying that it defend its socio-political position. As a matter of fact, it is proud of it (van Dijk, 2001, p. 96). An important aspect of CDA is that all discourses are historical. Therefore discourses can only be understood with regard to their context and ideology. CDA refers not only to linguistic elements, but also to extralinguistic factors such as culture, society and ideology (Meyer, 2001, p. 15). This does not necessarily mean that I
am interested in the genesis of the EU’s immigration discourse but that it is important to consider society, culture and ideology. This is important as Foucault already warned that not everything can be analysed through texts alone.

Different from the causal explanations in for example natural sciences CDA is characterized by hermeneutic processes (Ibid, p. 16). Hermeneutics is concerned with how people “read, understand and handle texts, especially those written in a different time or in a context of life different from our own” (Thiselton, 2009, p. 1). In other words hermeneutics is the method of ‘grasping and producing meaning relations’ (Meyer, 2001, p. 16). The interpretation/analysis of one part of a text will contribute to the interpretation of the whole text, while the interpretation of the whole text will help to understand its separate parts: the hermeneutic circle (Ibid, p. 16). CDA analyses the dynamic relationship between semiosis (the process of signs, including language) and other elements in the social world (Fairclough, 2001, p. 123).

Since CDA concerns textual analysis and socio-political positions, it is associated with interpretation. This is one of the main points of critique on CDA when it comes to its analysis. Henry Widdowson (1995) for example wrote a critical paper on discourse analysis. In his view, discourse analysis is invalid as analysis since it is ‘an exercise in interpretation’ (Widdowson, 1995, p. 159). Each analyst has his or her own preferences which results in one particular way of interpreting the data. Therefore a text can contain more than one discourse. “The second person processors of text may not share much of the reality of the first person producer of text”. The interpreter may give priority to what he recognizes as familiar and ignores the rest (Ibid, p. 168-69). Widdowson’s view on discourse analysis explains how different discourses can be derived from the same text (p. 169). But this is not what CDA is about. CDA is analysis because it is a ‘reasonably systematic application of reasonably well-defined procedures to a reasonably well-defined body of data’ (Fairclough, 1996, p. 52). Since CDA concerns theories of power and ideologies and the analysis of for example media, language, gender and ethnicity it is inevitable not to take a political position (Ibid, p. 52).

3.1 Data-collection in CDA
CDA positions itself in the tradition of Grounded Theory: data collection and data analysis are not considered to be two separate steps. Data collection in CDA is not a phase that needs
to be finished before the actual analysis. It might even be a continuous process (Meyer, 2001, p. 18). There is no ‘CDA way’ of collecting data. After the first collection and following analysis, CDA analysts try to ‘find indicators for particular concepts, expand concepts into categories and, on the basis of these results, collect further data’ (Ibid, p. 24). There is little debate in the field of CDA concerning the ‘statistical or theoretical representativeness’ of the analysed data. Instead it is assumed that CDA analysts only work with a small body of data which is considered to be typical in certain discourses (Ibid, p. 25). This is also the reason why I have chosen to analyse press releases under the European Agenda on Migration. Even though it is a relatively small body of data – 95 press releases – it can be considered typical for the EU’s immigration discourse as it focuses on a new approach on managing immigration.

3.2 Creating a framework
In CDA many disparate methods can be applied for the actual analysis. However, two similarities exists between all methods. The first is that CDA is always problem oriented and not focused on ‘specific linguistic items’ (Meyer, 2001, p. 29). Researchers see something wrong in society and make a plea for the socially excluded, discriminated and underprivileged (Fairclough, 1996, p. 52; Meyer, 2001, p. 15; van Dijk, 2001, p. 96). Researchers then use linguistic items to investigate how people get socially excluded or discriminated. The second similarity is that there are no specific methods or theories for doing CDA. “Both are integrated as far as it is helpful to understand the social problems under investigation” (Meyer, 2001, p. 29). The methods and theories used in a research depend on the type of social problem that is being investigated. In the previous chapter I discussed Foucauldian discourse and Harleian ideas on (deconstructing) maps, and the relation between knowledge and power. These are the main theories that I considered important and helpful for answering the main question of this research.

Developing a framework for data-analysis is complicated as CDA scholars implement different approaches depending on their research topic. This means that a clear methodology for CDA is difficult to establish since the methodology depends on the problem investigated. However, what all CDA studies have in common is their interest in social power, hierarchy, exclusion and minorities. CDA ‘supports’ the underprivileged and tries to uncover what linguistic means are used by the privileged to strengthen and enforce the
already existing inequalities in society (Meyer, 2001, p. 30). As a result there is no simple how-to-do approach. I am interested in the exercise of power by speakers, writers and/or mapmakers over a marginalized group of people (undocumented migrants), and how linguistic elements construct certain concepts such as the ‘illegal’ immigrant, the border, and the European Union. These constructed concepts are visualized on the Frontex map. In a society relations of power “permeate, characterise and constitute the social body, and these relations of power cannot themselves be established, consolidated nor implemented without the production, accumulation, circulation and functioning of a discourse” (Foucault, 1976/1980, p. 92). In the eyes of Foucault, power constructs the social world but cannot be established, solidified or applied without discourses. The production, circulation and dispersion of discourses helps to establish these power relations and therefore construct the social world.

3.2.1. Топои
Political discourses such as the EU’s immigration discourse are predominantly characterized with persuasive argumentation. Therefore, its formal structure is foremost argumentative. These arguments are essential for discourse analysts since they may give information about underlying opinions (van der Valk, 2003, p. 318). Argumentation is a social activity which purpose is to persuade or overcome people’s doubt or objection. Argumentation comes into being through a difference of opinion regarding a certain (political) viewpoint. As persuasion is one of the main characteristics of argumentation, the assumed viewpoints may be presented as objective or common sense (van Eemeren et al, 1997, p. 2). In this sense, it is not the content of the arguments that is interesting to research but the procedures and interactions associated with argumentation as this identifies the transition between the argument to the corresponding conclusion (van der Valk, 2003, p. 318; Wodak, 2011, p. 42; van Eemeren, 1995, p. 1). Topoi analysis is one of the methods analysing these procedures and interactions. Topoi can be viewed as a ‘system of public knowledge, a discursive resource’ containing ‘resources for sustaining a conclusion’. Topoi are frequently used in the political arena, characterized by ‘self-evident issues of a community or rules of life at one point’. (Anscombe, 1995; cited in van der Valk, 2003, p. 319). ‘They are generalized key ideas from which statements and arguments can be generated’ (Richardson, 2004; cited in Wodak, 2011, p. 42). Topoi are general in the way that they can be applied to
different situations rather than a specific situation at a specific moment (Anscombe, 1995; cited in van der Valk, 2003, p. 319). The fact topoi are seen as ‘system of public knowledge’ or ‘rules of life at one point’ contribute to the objective and common sense style of argumentation. This means that topoi are sort of embedded in society: public knowledge with corresponding conclusions without any critical reflection. The aim of topoi analysis is to identify argumentation schemes and thought schemes embedded in texts. These schemes represent the ‘common sense rationalities relating to a body of collective knowledge shared among groups and communities’ (Burroughs, 2015, p. 483). Furthermore topoi analysis organise these topoi, or thought schemes, and systematically analyse their development (Bauder, 2008, p. 297). Finding distinct topoi will uncover hidden thought schemes and premises (Grue, 2009; cited in Burroughs 2015, p. 483). According to van der Valk (2003):

“Topoi are the socially shared beliefs underlying and discursively informing argumentative moves, thus rendering them more effective. It is their effectiveness as tools of persuasion that make topoi attractive to politicians who aim to have a decisive influence or policies and gain adherence to voters” (p. 319)

They key aim for the topoi analysis in this thesis is to identify these key argumentation schemes within the immigration discourse of the European Union and to mirror the schemes to the Frontex map in order to identify the maps’ role in the EU’s immigration discourse.

3.2.2. Rhetoric
In argumentation strategies rhetorical figures, such as metaphors, often play a central role because of their persuasive function. Although rhetorical figures do not have an ideological meaning itself, they can be used to accentuate certain ideological meanings (van Dijk, 2006b, p. 126). Two distinct discussions exist in the scientific field of the metaphor. The first is about metaphors used by political speakers to construct new meanings or to change the previous established meanings. The second discussion is the ‘routine’ use of metaphors in political discourses to diminish political consciousness (Billig & Macmillan, 2005, p. 459). In this thesis the focus lies on the latter as ‘water metaphors’ like *inflow of migrants* may be used in the press releases to emphasize the uncontrolled entrance of undocumented migrants into the EU. The water metaphor is a prime example of a routine metaphor used in
political discourses and debates about immigration. Hyperboles such as *being overwhelmed* or *exceptional* may be used to emphasize the ‘extensive’ dimension of the migration ‘crisis’. Rhetorical figures can ‘steer attention or enhance interest and thus reinforce the argumentation of the speaker’ (van der Valk, 2003, p. 320). If the EU applies metaphors in their discourse, it will be the routine use of immigration metaphors to reduce political consciousness in order to legitimize their migration policy.

In the forthcoming chapter I will present the results of the analysis. The first part consists of a further elaboration of the data. In the second part I will provide a list of identified topoi, after which I will demonstrate how I identified several topoi. The third part focuses on the role of rhetoric figures in the EU’s immigration discourse. In the last part of the chapter I will discuss the *positive self-presentation* and the *negative other-presentation* constructed by the EU representatives.
4. Results

Topoi, metaphors and hyperboles

In this section I will present the findings of my analysis. In the first part I will further elaborate on the selected data. The second part consists of the topoi analysis. Here I will explain the topoi I found in this data set after which I will provide some examples of how I identified certain topoi. The third part consist of rhetoric figures such as metaphors and hyperboles and how these are used in the EU’s immigration discourse. Rhetorical figures are frequently used to create in- and outgroups in immigration discourses and to justify certain actions, decisions and policies. The fourth and last part concerns positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation. This type of rhetoric emphasizes ‘our’ good things and de-emphasizes ‘our’ bad things. It emphasizes ‘their’ bad things and de-emphasizes ‘their’ good things (van Dijk, 2006b, p. 126). This argumentation strategy is also applied for the legitimization of actions and policy decisions.

4.1. The Data

For this thesis I have analysed 95 press releases between the 15th of May 2015 and the 20th of December 2017. The press releases were published under the European Agenda on Migration (hereafter EAoM), authorized on 15 May 2015. The establishment of this agenda marked the starting point for a common European approach on immigration. The main objective of the agenda was to ensure that Europe continued to be a safe haven for those in need of protection as well as ‘an attractive destination for the talent and entrepreneurship of students, researchers and workers’ (European Commission, 2015a, p. 2). The European Union needed a common European approach to address the ‘migration crisis’. Several policy priorities where adopted in the EAoM:

- ‘Saving lives at sea’
- ‘Targeting criminal smuggling networks’
- ‘Relocating asylum seekers among Member States’
- ‘Resettlement for those in need of protection (legal pathways to EU)’
- ‘Cooperation with third countries to tackle migration upstream’
• ‘Help frontline Member States’
• ‘Manage migration better’;
  o ‘Reduce the incentives for irregular migration’
  o ‘Border management – saving lives and securing external borders’
  o ‘Europe’s duty to protect: a strong common asylum policy’
  o ‘A new policy on legal migration’

All the policy priorities will play a central role in the press releases analysed in this thesis. Note that the so-called European approach includes cooperation with third-countries (non-EU countries). Table 4.1 shows the distribution of press releases within the selected period. The difference between 2016 and 2017, however, is striking. As I will discuss later, this is a consequence of the EU-Turkey statement, established on the 18th of May 2016. The EU and Turkey came to an agreement to stem the ‘irregular influx of refugees’ from countries as Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan to the European Union. The president of the European Council Donald Tusk announced that “the days of irregular migration to Europe are over”. Both parties argued that the main reason for the agreement was to target the people smugglers business model and to remove all incentives for ‘irregular routes’ to the EU, in full accordance of international and EU law (European Commission, 2016a). As a consequence ‘irregular arrivals’ on EU shore declined dramatically, which means that the real problem for the EU – undocumented immigration via Turkey – had vanished. In return for blocking undocumented migrants, The EU promised Turkey financial aid for accommodating refugees and visa-liberation for its citizens.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount of Press Releases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>(60 pages)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>(152 pages)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>(52 pages)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.1: distribution of press releases under the EAoM
4.2. Topoi analysis
The EU’s immigration discourse is characterized by topoi. Topoi provide a bridge between arguments and conclusions. This means that certain arguments in a cultural or ideological community always contain corresponding conclusions. As I mentioned, topoi are embedded in such communities. Later in this chapter I will demonstrate how I analysed the press releases, but first I will provide a list of the identified topoi:

- **Topos of Morality**
  The European Union is concerned with the situation of refugees.
  - **Implied conclusion:** Our immigration policies are drafted to improve the situation of incoming refugees.

- **Topos of exceptional humanitarian aid**
  The EU’s humanitarian aid regarding refugees is exceptional compared to the rest of the world.
  - **Implied conclusion:** No one has the right to criticize our migration policies.

- **Topos of law and right**
  All EU migration policies or actions are in full respect of human rights and international law.
  - **Implied conclusion:** We do not have to revise our migration policies.

- **Topos of External Dimension**
  The EU needs third (non-EU) countries to manage immigration.
  - **Implied conclusion:** We need to seek cooperation with third countries to prevent undocumented migrants to travel to the EU.

- **Topos of ‘quid-pro-quo’ (related to the previous topoi)**
  It will cost something (money, visa-liberation) to get something in return (holding migrants).
  - **Implied conclusion:** Visa-liberation and/or money will persuade third countries to hold undocumented migrants.

- **Topos of safe third countries**
  Safe third countries can provide protection of refugees.
  - **Implied conclusion:** There is no need for refugees coming to Europe if they can seek refuge in a third country that is considered to be safe.
To demonstrate how I identified these topoi, I will analyse the official press release of the European Agenda on Migration on the 13th of May 2015. On this date the European Commission (hereafter EC) presented a new approach in the ‘management’ of migration. It was initially a response to the ‘crisis situation’ – unclear what the EC exactly means with ‘crisis situation’, most likely the incoming refugees – in the Mediterranean but it also included

- **Topos of irregular migration**
  *Arrivals without migrating in the ‘regular’ way.*
  - **Implied conclusion:** ‘Irregular migration’ is against our rules, therefore it needs to be stemmed.

- **Topos of border securitization**
  *The EU needs to strengthen its external border by reinforcing Frontex and establishing an EU coast guard.*
  - **Implied conclusion:** In order to keep EU citizens safe the EU needs to fortify its external border.

- **Topos of internal security (related to the previous two topoi)**
  *Undocumented migrants from third countries threaten our internal security.*
  - **Implied conclusion:** We need to better manage migration, and stem the irregular migration flow in order to keep European citizens safe.

- **Topos of criminalise**
  *Undocumented migrants are kept at the external border in order to create biometric passports.*
  - **Implied conclusion:** We need to treat migrants as criminals to ensure our internal security.

- **Topos of ‘welcomeness’**
  *Migrants who have a legitimate reason are welcome.*
  - **Implied conclusion:** People who do not seek refuge or do not have added value to our knowledge and skills (EU-blue card) are not welcome.

- **Topos of solidarity**
  *Member States must stand together during the migration ‘crisis’*
  - **Implied conclusion:** We must emphasize that Member States cannot create their own migration policies or actions.
further steps for ‘managing’ migration in the future: “This Agenda sets out a European response, combining internal and external policies, making best use of EU agencies and tools, and involving all actors: Member States, EU institutions, International Organisations, civil society, local authorities and third countries.” First-Vice-President of the European Commission shows his concern about the tragic loss of lives in the Mediterranean that ‘shocked all Europeans’.

**Frans Timmermans:** “The tragic loss of life in the Mediterranean has shocked all Europeans. Our citizens expect Member States and European institutions to act to prevent this tragedy from continuing unabated. The European Council clearly stated that we need to find European solutions, based on internal solidarity and the realisation that we have a common responsibility to create an effective migration policy. That is why the Commission today proposes an agenda which reflects our common values and provides an answer to our citizens’ worries about unacceptable human suffering on the one hand and inadequate application of our agreed common asylum rules on the other hand. The measures we propose will help manage migration better and thus respond to the justified expectations of citizens”.

Timmermans makes a plea for a common European asylum system, which is, according to him, based on Europe’s common values and solidarity. He leaves implicit what these common values but it seems he refers to Europe’s moral responsibility to save migrant lives in the Mediterranean, e.g. respect for human dignity and human rights. Moreover what Timmermans means with managing migration is unclear, but what is clear is that managing migration requires European solidarity. The implication is that Member States cannot create their own migration policies or act on their own regarding immigration. In this section I have found the following topoi:

- Topos of morality
- Topos of solidarity

It is clear that Timmermans finds it necessary to aim for a common European approach on migration. The main argument for this new approach is to save migrant lives, the moral responsibility of the EU. In order to fulfil this task, he emphasizes that European solidarity is needed. This means that no Member State is allowed to create a national approach on immigration. The Commissioner of Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship, Dimitris Avramopoulos continues:
Dimitris Avramopoulos: “Europe cannot stand by whilst lives are being lost. The European Agenda on Migration concretely responds to the immediate need to save lives and assist frontline countries with bold actions, including strengthened presence at sea of Frontex-coordinated vessels, €60 million in emergency assistance and an action plan to crack down on smugglers who take advantage and abuse vulnerable migrants. In a spirit of greater solidarity, we are determined to implement a comprehensive approach that will improve significantly the management of migration in Europe”.

Avramopoulos also pleads for European solidarity when it comes to saving migrant lives beyond the EU’s external border. But, more importantly, he hyperbolically states that in order to do so the EU needs to take ‘bold actions’ to assist ‘frontline Member States’. Europe’s response is strengthening the external border and tackling smuggling networks that ‘take advantage and abuse vulnerable migrants’. He implies stricter border controls will save the lives of desperate migrants who try to reach European shore. Apart from the topos of morality and topos of solidarity, I have identified the topos of border securitization. Border securitization is the “tendency of modern nation-states to construct migration as a security risk and to link migration discursively and in practice to a range of other security problems” (Mavroudi & Nagel, 2016, p. 161-62). Even though Avramopoulos does not connect immigration with internal security threats in this section, I will argue later in this chapter that internal security is the main reason for strengthening the external border. Avramopoulos paradoxically argues that instead of opening up the border, giving undocumented migrants save and legal passage to the European Union, closing the external border will save migrant lives. He implies that if the EU strengthen its border, undocumented migrants do not need help of smuggling networks anymore. But does this mean that the EU will provide a legal pathway, or is it a discouraging strategy? For despite stricter border controls, undocumented migrants will find other, more open parts of the border to enter the EU. The document continues with several ‘immediate action’ points and ‘four pillars to manage migration better.’ The immediate action is, again, established to ‘prevent people from dying at sea.’ The immediate action include:

- Tripling the capacities and assets for the Frontex joint operations Triton and Poseidon in 2015 and 2016. An amending budget for 2015 was adopted today to secure the necessary funds a total of €89 million, including €57 million in AMIF and €5
million in ISF emergency funding for frontline Member States – and the new Triton Operational Plan will be presented by the end of May;

Proposing the first ever activation of the emergency mechanism to help Member states confronted with a sudden influx of migrants under Article 78(3) TFEU. By the end of May, the Commission will propose a temporary distribution mechanism for persons in clear need of international protection within the EU. A proposal for a permanent EU system for relocation in emergency situations of mass influxes will follow by the end of 2015;

Proposing, by the end of May, an EU-wide resettlement scheme to offer 20 000 places distributed in all Member States to displaced persons in clear need of international protection in Europe with a dedicated extra funding of €50 million for 2015 and 2016;

Working on a possible Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operation in the Mediterranean to dismantle traffickers' networks and fight smuggling of people, in accordance with international law.

The immediate action mainly involves stricter border controls and dismantling smuggling networks. Furthermore the European Commission needs to establish a proposal for relocating and resettling migrants in order to provide legal pathways into the Union. Note the use of a water metaphor: ‘mass influxes’, a traditional metaphor in immigration discourses. The main objective of the EAoM is summarized in the ‘four pillars to manage migration better.’ According to the European Commission better managing migration means:

**First Pillar:** “Reducing the incentives for irregular migration, notably by seconding European migration liaison officers to EU Delegations in key third countries; amending the Frontex legal basis to strengthen its role on return; a new action plan with measures that aim to transform people smuggling into high risk, low return criminal activity and addressing the root causes through development cooperation and humanitarian assistance”.

Note that the European Commission mentions ‘irregular’ migration here. There is no such thing as ‘irregular migration’. Migration is always ‘regular’ as it follows a certain pattern and route, is a result of spatial inequality – rich vs poor, peace vs conflict – and is embedded in the region. Perhaps even more important, refugees fleeing Iraq or Syria are not able to obtain a Schengen Visa. Instead of having a legal way to enter the EU, they have no other
option than to approach smuggling networks. Consequently I have identified the topos of ‘irregular’ migration. The argumentation implies is that ‘irregular migration’ is against ‘our’ rules. This topos is used to justify the blocking of the ‘irregular’ migration flow. The way to stem undocumented migration is in the next pillar:

Second Pillar: “Border management – saving lives and securing external borders, notably by strengthening the role and capacity of Frontex; helping strengthen the capacity of third countries to manage their borders; pooling further, where necessary, certain coast guard functions at EU level”.

Similar to Avramopoulos’ argument (topos of border securitization), the implication is that securing the EU’s external border and establishing an EU coast guard will lead to a decline of migrant deaths. Again, this seems paradoxical. Instead of securing the border, an open border approach will be more effective if saving lives of vulnerable migrants really is the main goal. This way it will be easier to provide for a safe and legal path to the European Union. However, the ‘saving lives’ argument (topos of morality) seems another justification for securing the external border and to stem undocumented migration. The third pillar is describing Europe’s duty to protect:

Third Pillar: “a strong common asylum policy: The priority is to ensure a full and coherent implementation of the Common European Asylum System, notably by promoting systematic identification and fingerprinting and with efforts to reduce its abuses by strengthening the Safe Country of Origin provisions of the Asylum Procedure Directive; evaluating and possibly revising the Dublin Regulation in 2016”.

Interestingly, the EC wrote on their Common European Asylum System webpage that Member States “need to have a joint approach to guarantee high standards of protection for refugees”. Also, Member States “have the shared responsibility to welcome asylum seekers in a dignified manner” and are “treated fairly” (European Commission, 2018). Note that fingerprinting incoming undocumented migrants does not seem to correspond with a fair and dignified treatment. If fingerprinting is refused, migrants will be confronted with physical and mental abuse (Amnesty International, 2016, p. 17). It rather bears resemblance with the treatment of arrested criminals. The fourth and last pillar focuses on a ‘new policy on legal migration’:

[45]
Fourth Pillar: “The focus is on maintaining a Europe in demographic decline as an attractive destination for migrants, notably by modernising and overhauling the Blue Card scheme, by reprioritising our integration policies, and by maximising the benefits of migration policy to individuals and countries of origin, including by facilitating cheaper, faster and safer remittance transfers.”

The striking aspect of pillar four is that, instead of keeping migrants out, the EC emphasizes to create strategies to attract migrants. (High) skilled third country nationals are more than welcome to fill in the economic gaps in the EU. In other words, the EU tries to attract (knowledge) workers who have so-called added value to the EU’s economy. Here I identified the topos of welcomeness. Third country nationals, especially refugees, without the right documents to enter the Union are being treated as criminals, while third-country nationals who have added value to the EU’s economy are more than welcome. So there seems to be a double standard for third country nationals in terms of who is ‘welcome’ and who is not. Ultimately I identified the following topoi in the European Agenda on Migration press release:

- Topos of Morality
- Topos of Solidarity
- Topos of Border Securitization
- Topos of ‘Irregular’ Migration
- Topos of ‘Welcomeness’
- Topos of Criminalise

All these topoi are more or less connected with each other. The implied conclusion of these topoi is that in order to save lives in the Mediterranean, the EU should stem ‘irregular’ migration by securing its external border. However, it seems that the ‘saving-lives’ argument is justifying the blockage of undocumented migration and the securitization of the external border, instead of being the actual goal of policy decisions. Note for example the promotion of systematic identification and fingerprinting. This is a classic example of border securitization. Border securitization results in an EU rhetoric that aims at excluding migrants (Boswell, 2007, p. 595). The topos of ‘irregular migration’ is such rhetoric since they arrived in the EU in a way that is against ‘our rules’. Similar can be said about the ‘topos of criminalise’.
People arriving in EU are systematically identified and fingerprinted with the purpose of creating biometric passports. The refusal of fingerprinting will lead to abuse or sexual humiliation; the EU treats undocumented migrants as criminals. These topoi imply that undocumented migrants are a threat to the internal security of the European Union.

4.3. Rhetoric
To get a further understanding of the EU’s immigration discourse I will now demonstrate how the rhetoric is involved in the EU’s immigration discourse. All speakers are highly placed officials in the European Commission. This is important since these high positions come with several responsibilities. For example, the first vice-president is responsible for the ‘rule of law’, meaning that every commission proposal and initiative is in respect with the Charter of the Fundamental Rights. He also guides the work of the Commissioner of Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship. The commissioner of Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship is responsible for improving border controls, promoting new European policy for ‘regular’ migration, dealing with ‘irregular’ migration, and fighting terrorism. These officials have great influence within the EU’s immigration discourse especially through political debates and migration policies. Moreover they are likely to influence the public debate through public press releases, picked up by for example news programs. Therefore analysing these officials could give valuable insights in the EU’s immigration discourse.

As the topoi analysis already illustrated, most important conclusion rules concerned undocumented migration and strengthening the external border. It seems the European Commission labels certain migrants, especially refugees without the right documents, as potentially dangerous for the internal security of the EU. Analysing several viewpoints of high commissioners in the press releases confirm this hypothesis. This part of the thesis will show that in a discourse it is not only important what is said, but perhaps even more important, who said it.

Dimitris Avramopoulos: “Terrorist attacks on our soil have shown the threat to our security, at the same time as we face a migratory crisis of unprecedented proportions. Information sharing is at the nexus of both. Our border guards, customs authorities, police officers and judicial authorities must have access to the necessary information and the right tools to tackle these issues rapidly, efficiently and effectively.”

In April 2016 Avramopoulos starts with two separate concerns: the first concern is the recent terrorist attacks in the European Union, referring to the Bataclan attack in Paris in November 2015 and the Zaventem airport attacks in Brussel in March 2016. His second, he hyperbolically argues, is a migratory crisis of unprecedented proportions. He leaves implicit what the ‘migratory crisis’ and ‘unprecedented proportions’ are. Moreover he leaves to the imagination of the reader if the terrorist attacks in the EU and the ‘migratory crisis’ are connected. On the same day another press release was published in which the commissioner further elaborated on his concerns:

Dimitris Avramopoulos: “The use of new technologies can help manage the flow of travellers arriving at our external borders, while at the same time tackling irregular migration and enhancing our internal security. Today, we address an important gap in our information systems and take concrete action to make our borders stronger, smarter and more efficient for the ever-increasing numbers of travellers coming to the EU”.

Here Avramopoulos seems to imply that there is a relation between undocumented migration and the EU’s internal security. Even though he does not mention it explicitly, the internal security threat is, among other things, terrorism. He still leaves to the imagination of the reader if migration and terrorism are connected and why the internal security needs to be enhanced. There exist ‘an important gap’ in Europe’s information system which, in his opinion, justifies securitization of the external border. In September 2016 he clarifies what internal security exactly is.

Dimitris Avramopoulos: “By strengthening our external borders we will be better prepared for facing severe migratory challenges. Enhancing the exchange of information will enable us to fight terrorism more effectively. To ensure Europe's security, we need both strong borders and smart intelligence. Measures like the European
Border and Coast Guard, the Entry-Exit System and the European Travel Information and Authorisation System will help secure Europe's borders, while strengthening Europol's role in the effective sharing of information and combatting document fraud are concrete steps towards establishing an effective Security Union”.

Here Avramopoulos does seem to link ‘severe migratory challenges’ with terrorism. His argumentation is that a stronger external border will ensure a better management of migration. The reason for this, or perhaps to justify border securitization, is to protect the EU from terrorism and to guarantee the safety for EU citizens. Also note the repetitive use of ‘we will be better prepared’ and ‘we need’. He emphasizes that the Member States need to stand together in order to overcome ‘sever migratory challenges’ and to fight terrorism. Again, Avramopoulos leaves implicit what the migratory challenges exactly are but judging from the press releases, he is referring to undocumented migration and terrorism. The first vice president also shows his concern:

**Frans Timmermans:** “Security is one of the major concerns of Europe’s citizens. Today the Commission is proposing practical measures to upgrade information exchange - essential to fighting terrorism – and to secure our Union’s external borders and strengthen control over who enters and leaves the EU. These measures will require closer coordination and cooperation within the EU and between Member States. There’s no escaping the fact that in this mobile world only truly closer cooperation will make us more secure”.

Different from Avramopoulos, Timmermans explicitly mentions that EU ‘security is a major concern of Europe’s citizens.’ Presumably the ‘concern’ Timmermans alludes to are the terrorist attacks I mentioned earlier. To strengthen the argument of ‘concerned EU citizens’, he indirectly links incoming undocumented migrants with internal security issues such as terrorism. The external border needs to be strengthened and a better (read; stricter) control of who enters and leaves the EU is necessary.

The above examples demonstrate that highly placed European Commissioners, people who are responsible for EU migration and security, make a plea for stricter border controls. If you read between the lines the commissioners accuse undocumented migrants of being a threat to the EU’s internal security and even of the recent terrorist attacks. EU
citizens are ‘concerned’ about their safety. Therefore strengthening the external border (including stricter controls) is essential, as well as keeping undocumented migrants out. This is perhaps the ultimate example of the EU’s immigration discourse under the EAoM.

4.4. Metaphors and hyperboles
Besides topoi, the European Union’s immigration discourse is characterized by rhetorical figures such as metaphors and hyperboles. Metaphorical texts used in discourses have concrete results as people make use of the world via the metaphor: ‘we make the world rather than describe it’ (Councilor, 2017, p. 142). Analysing linguistic elements such as metaphors may reveal values and assumptions of ‘a given cultural or political context’. Metaphors construct already existing things in a different way. (Ibid, p. 142). In addition, figurative language is present in immigration debates and narratives. These metaphors are important as they ‘establish basic principles for the legal treatment of migrants’ (Cunningham-Parmeter, 2011, p. 1568). The use of metaphors in immigration discourses frame already existing things/people such as ‘migrants’, ‘immigration’ or ‘the border’ differently. If a highly placed commissioner argues that undocumented immigration results in ‘immense pressures’ on the external border, it fuels the fear of being overwhelmed by third-country nationals. Therefore these metaphors are likely to construct in- and outgroups: us (EU citizens) vs them (undocumented migrants).

4.4.1. The Water metaphor
Common in immigration discourses is the use of ‘water’ metaphors. This type of metaphor can be directly linked with topoi of danger such as the topos of ‘internal security’, topos of ‘border securitization’, and the topos of ‘irregular migration’. Water metaphors construct immigration as a flood or the movement of water (Hart, 2010, p. 147). They can be dismantled in three distinct characteristics: direction, size and force (Cunningham-Parmeter, 2012, p. 1580). Water metaphors especially dominate the debates concerning undocumented migration. It classifies undocumented migration as a moving substance, giving it a starting point, direction, force and destination (Pinero-Pinero et al., 2014, p. 54). The water metaphors in the EU’s immigration discourse fuel the fear of being overwhelmed by unwelcome people. I have identified the following ‘water’ metaphors in the corpus of data.

- Flow
Influx
Inflow
Wave-through
Using the water metaphor is very common when it comes to the EU’s immigration discourses. In fact it has been used in abundance. Note the following citation:

Avramopoulos: “Today the world finds itself facing the worst refugee crisis since the Second World War. And Europe finds itself struggling to deal with the high influxes of people seeking refuge within our borders.”

Avramopoulos terms the immigration as ‘high influxes of people.’ Immigration is here treated as some kind of unstoppable, natural force. More importantly this unstoppable force is moving towards and even within ‘our’ borders. Just as water metaphors tend to do, Avramopoulos gives immigration a direction (towards and within our borders), a size (high influxes) and even a force (Europe is struggling). Also note how he concludes the speech:

“Europe's history if nothing else proves that we are a resilient continent, able to unite in face of that which seeks to divide us.”

Again he appeals to a united Europe regarding immigration. The striking aspect of this citation is ‘in the face of that which seeks to divide us.’ He implicitly accuses undocumented migrants of being a dividing force for the European Union. However, the migrants themselves do not ‘divide’ the EU. First, Timmermans seems to refer to the Eurosceptics taking advantage of the refugee crisis to ventilate their anti-EU messages. Second, the relocation and resettlement schemes. Many Member States are not willing to take their appointed responsibilities with regard to the relocation and resettling of migrants. As a result camps in Greece and Italy continue to be overcrowded. I will elaborate this further in chapter five.

4.4.2. The War & Aggression Metaphor
Aside from the water metaphor, a metaphorical strategy of militarisation can be found in the EU’s immigration discourse. This type of metaphor has a similar outcome as the water metaphor: it fuels the fear of being overwhelmed by a flood or invasion of undocumented, unwelcome migrants: we have to defend our space. War and aggression’ metaphors are manifested in the following lexical elements.
Similar to the water metaphor, the war & aggression metaphor is directly linked with topoi of danger. It suggests that non-EU people will invade the European Union similar to that of a military invasion. The war & aggression metaphor is for example present in the following statement of Jean Claude Junker during the State of the Union on 14 September 2016:

**Junker:** “Tolerance cannot come at the price of our security. We need to know who is crossing our borders. We will defend our borders with the new European Border and Coast Guard. We will defend our borders with strict controls on everyone crossing them”.

In the first sentence Juncker links tolerance with internal security. He leaves implicit what he exactly means with ‘tolerance’. He seems to refer to refugees who seek asylum in the European Union. Tolerance will lead to security issues if we do not know who is crossing our border. Here again, a classic example of ‘us’ versus ‘them’. It implies that the EU needs to screen every migrant in order to determine whether or not he or she is permitted (i.e. if he/she is a threat) to enter the Union. Similar to earlier statements, Juncker connects migrants with internal security issues. In fact, he mentions that it we need to defend our borders with a new European Border and Coast guard. This war and aggression metaphor suggests some kind of external aggressor is ready to invade our space or our Union. Two days later, Dimitris Avramopoulos (16th September 2016) argued:

“The Commission has been supporting all Member States to manage the refugee crisis - and Bulgaria is no exception. Bulgaria's efforts and commitments to ensure an efficient management of its external EU border are essential. The fast tracking of the requests received last night from the Bulgarian authorities shows that we are fully committed to providing additional assistance when justified and that Bulgaria, as a frontline Member State guarding our external borders, receives our full support in doing so. This once again proves that the external border of one Member State is the external border of all Member States”.
Here Avramopoulos focuses on Member States that constitute the external border. He emphasizes the importance of managing the EU’s external border and the role adjacent Member States need to play. Note that he terms Bulgaria as a ‘frontline Member State guarding our external borders.’ In war rhetoric the term ‘frontline’ refers to the combat area. Terms like ‘frontline’ and ‘guarding’ in the EU’s immigration discourse imply that the external borders are some sort of combat area and have an extremely negative connotation with regard to immigration. Once again these metaphors create the image of an external aggressor trying to invade the EU. As if the EU literally needs to defend herself against an enemy, in this case undocumented migrants. However, the only thing undocumented migrants are desperately striving for is a safe haven, something the EU can easily provide. Although these are just a few examples in the EU’s immigration discourse, these kind of metaphors will construct xenophobic images of immigration that will unmistakably fuel the fear of the ‘unknown’ migrant among EU citizens.

4.4.3. Positive self-presentation
Aside from metaphors the EU’s immigration discourse is further characterized by another rhetorical figure: hyperboles. Hyperboles are exaggerated statements not meant to take literally. They are used to emphasize or de-emphasize ideological meanings, but there are no specific hyperboles of specific events or situations (van Dijk, 2006b, 126). Dramatic rhetoric such as hyperboles may appeal to people’s emotions (van Dijk 2006a, p. 376). There are no standardized hyperboles for immigration debates or discourses but in the EU’s immigration discourse I have identified an argumentation strategy in which hyperboles play a significant role: positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation. It is a common approach in the construction of identities to create in- and outgroups. On one hand the EU’s immigration discourse concerns an in-group, EU citizens. On the other hand there is this out-group, undocumented migrants. Creating in- and out-groups goes hand in hand with positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation. Hyperboles are frequently adopted to emphasize ‘our’ good things and de-emphasize ‘our’ bad things, or to emphasize ‘their’ bad things and de-emphasize ‘their’ good things (van Dijk, 2006b, p. 126). Not only hyperboles create a positive self-image and a negative other-image. Many other examples, such as the discussed metaphors, topoi and the Frontex map play a role, especially to negative other-presentation. Positive self-presentation in political discourses only have one
purpose: legitimatization (van Dijk, 2011, p. 401). Thus the main purpose of positive self-presentation in the EU’s immigration discourse is justifying their actions, decisions and policies with regard to immigration. For example:

Table 4.2: Examples of positive self-presentation in the EU’s immigration discourse

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Representation of EU through hyperboles:</th>
<th>Positive self-presentation:</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>1. (...) a milestone in the history of European Border management</td>
<td>Our way of managing the external border is superb → we manage immigration perfectly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. (...) our biggest ever aid programme</td>
<td>We are doing everything within our capacity to give aid to migrants (in Turkey) → we are exceptionally humane</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. (...) the flagship programme is the largest ever humanitarian aid operation</td>
<td>We have morality → we take action on this humanitarian tragedy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Europe finally took the lead</td>
<td>We are the global leaders → no one can criticise our policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Europe (...) is and always has been a community of values.</td>
<td>Emphasizing the common values (respect for human rights and the rule of law) of the EU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Generous pledges of Member States</td>
<td>Member States relocate many refugees → they are big-hearted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. (...) solidarity with Greece</td>
<td>No Member State will be left alone → we are one</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. historical step [in relocating/resettling refugees]</td>
<td>The EU is doing things that is never seen before</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.2 illustrates how dramatic rhetoric such as hyperboles contribute to the positive self-presentation in the EU’s immigration discourse. Most hyperboles focus on the (financial) aid for refugees in third countries provided by the European Union, and thus emphasizing the ‘good things’ of the EU. Note for example words like ‘flagship programme’, ‘generous pledges’ or ‘biggest ever aid programme’. Phrases like this are used to emphasize the ‘positive and moral’ approach regarding immigration.

Although the frequently proclaimed ‘European identity’ is not mentioned, the high commissioners allude to Europe’s history (history of European Border Management) or to Europe as a community (Europe took the lead). It implies that all EU countries share a same history, culture, norms and values, and that these characteristics form the basis of a humanitarian immigration policy. By using hyperboles as ‘biggest ever aid programme’ or ‘flagship
programme’ the EU legitimizes its actions and decisions regarding for example border se-
curitization, undocumented migration or the controversial deals with third countries. It em-
phazises the EU’s ‘sheer devotion’ to help migrants in a dignified and humane way.

4.4.4. Negative Other-presentation
Of course EU’s immigration discourse is also typified by negative other-presentation, mainly to emphasize bad characteristics of undocumented migrants. The previous part about metaphors already illustrated that the EU often compares undocumented migration with an unstoppable natural force, a common enemy, and the external border to a war zone. The hyperboles and other examples continue to link immigration with dangers such as sec-
urity threats and criminality.

Table 4.3: Examples of negative other-presentation in the EU’s immigration discourse

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Representation of the ‘other’ through hyperboles</th>
<th>Negative other-presentation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. (...) migratory crisis of extraordinary pro-
porions | Migrants are linked with ‘crisis of extraordinary proportions’ → Unmanageable? → They are a risk for the EU |
| 2. [we] face unprecedented challenges | Migrants create enormous challenges for Member States and the territorial sovereignty of the EU → they are a threat |
| 3. illegal border crossings | Migrants enter the EU illegally → They are here against our rules → they are a threat to our internal security |
| 4. (...) Member States are overwhelmed | Hyperbole: overwhelmed. Migrants come massively → they are a threat to the EU |
| 5. Massive inflow of migrants (...) put Mem-
ber States under severe pressure | Massive inflow → Water metaphor Hyperbole: Severe pressure → They are a problem for the EU |
| 6. (...) sudden influxes of refugees or other dis-
ruptions | Sudden influxes → Water metaphor (...) or other disruptions: They disorganize our rules and policies → They are a problem |
| 7. refugee crisis | Crisis → negative connotation: we must stop this |
| 8. (...) EU citizens are concerned | → Our citizens are the real victims |
| 9. emergency assistance | Migrants will create crisis situations |
| 10. irregular migrants | Hyperbole: Irregular. They are here against our rules → they should be treated as criminals |
| 11. (...) migratory pressure at our external borders | Hyperbole: migratory pressure. They put pressure on our borders → they threaten the sovereignty of our Union |
| 12. The challenges (...) to security | Migrants threaten our security |
| 13. unprecedented scale | A vast number of migrants come to the EU → Too many migrants |
| 14. disproportionate inflow | Hyperbole: disproportionate → Too many migrants! Metaphor: inflow |
| 15. (...) enormous challenges Europe and its citizens facing at the moment | Immigration will cause problems → real victims are European citizens |
| 16. (...) exceptional numbers of refugees | Too many migrants heading for the EU |
| 17. Fingerprinting migrants | Criminalization → Since they are seen as a threat we need to treat them as criminals |

Table 4.3 shows how the EU constructs a negative image of the undocumented migrant. Firstly hyperboles such as ‘severe pressure’, ‘disproportionate’, ‘migratory pressure’ all have a negative connotation regarding immigration as a whole. It amplifies the already existing fear among EU citizens of third country migrants ‘overwhelming’ the Union. Secondly ‘illegal border crossings’ or ‘irregular migrants’ emphasize that migrants do not follow ‘our’ rules. This is another justification to treat migrants as criminals. Thirdly rhetoric referring to the external border suggests that migrants put severe pressure on the border. It implies that migrants threaten to penetrate the EU’s external border and therefore the sovereignty of the Union and its citizens. Words like ‘pressure’ imply that the external border of the EU is about to burst. Fourthly, without using actual statistics, the EU frequently uses terms like ‘exceptional numbers’, ‘massive inflow’ and ‘unprecedented scale’ to demonstrate the scale of immigration. These hyperboles imply that unmanageable numbers of migrants are heading to the European Union. All these hyperboles and negative connotations about migrants, especially undocumented migrants, and immigration contribute to the construction of a negative image of migrants. For example, undocumented migrants have travelled to the EU in a way that is against our (EU) rules. Therefore, it seems justified to criminalize undocumented migrants. However, as said earlier, Syrians for instance are not even able to obtain the right and legal documents for entering the EU, or in this case, Schengen. This example demonstrate that the discourse creates a contrasting image of undocumented migrants: they have no legal documents (and are thus labelled ‘illegal’ or treated as criminals),
but they have no other option. Moreover, using hyperboles is also a way of justifying the chosen policy approach regarding immigration.

In the next chapter I will discuss the presented results. I will further elaborate the concept of the ‘irregular’ migrants, whether Europe is really under siege by migrants, the lack of solidarity within the EU, and how this discourse creates a certain reality about immigration to the EU. Ultimately I will demonstrate how the Frontex map co-constructs and reinforces these elements.
5. Discussion

Europe under siege by bare bodies

In this chapter I will provide an in depth discussion of the results presented in the previous chapter. I will elaborate several concepts about immigration applied by the EU. The first part concerns the ‘irregular’ migrant. I will explain what the word ‘irregular’ implies about immigration and how this idea about immigration can be traced on the Frontex map. In the second part I will discuss the ‘immigration-is-a-threat’ argument. Is Europe really under siege and how is this depicted on the Frontex map? In the third part of the chapter I will discuss the lack of solidarity among the Member States. Member States refuse to take their moral responsibility to accept migrants relocated from Italy and Greece which ultimately lead to dubious deals with third countries. The last part of this chapter focuses on how the EU’s immigration discourse creates a certain reality about immigration.

5.1. “Irregular” Migrants as Homo Sacer

The word ‘irregular’ with regard to immigration is used in abundance in the EU’s immigration discourse. Besides the implication that ‘irregular’ is something against ‘our rules’, Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben developed a political theory on the archaic Roman phenomenon of the ‘Homo Sacer’ that can be applied to the irregular migrant. Agamben differentiated two types of lives: the zoë and the bios. Whereas zoë is the natural life (the fact of living common to all living beings), the bios is the politically formed life (Agamben, 1998, p. 9). I will mainly focus on the bios as politically formed lives are the result of political actions and decisions. These actions often exclude certain groups of people from the bios, that is, the politically formed live that is the norm. People in the excluded group are reduced to a Homo Sacer – the bare, depoliticized life. “The homo sacer is the bare or depoliticized life that is distinguished from politicized forms of life” (Prem-Kumar & Grundy-Warr, 2004, p. 34). The term Homo Sacer originated in archaic Roman law to describe a form of life which became known as bare: the sacred man is a man who is judged by the people of a crime. The people cannot sacrifice this man but if someone kills him, it is not considered homicide (Agamben, 1998, p. 47). The Homo Sacer is outside the law.
‘Irregular’ migration can be seen as a form of depoliticized life. The term Homo Sacer fits as “until they [migrants] have access to legal remedies” their treatment will be inhumane (Harrel-Bond, 2002, p. 52). The EU also hosts so called Hotspots. Hotspots are camps were migrants and asylum-seekers are identified, registered and fingerprinted (European Commission, n.d.). Fingerprinting is frequently refused as migrants prefer to travel onwards to another EU country to reunite with family, or a country where they have a better chance to integrate – i.e. already speaking the national language (Amnesty International, 2016, p. 30). Migrants who refuse fingerprinting are being forced, which result in repulsive treatments by the authorities. Numerous migrants reported that they were being electrocuted by means of electrical batons, severely beaten, or sexually humiliated and/or tortured (Amnesty International, 2016, p. 17). Authorities can use force without the facing any consequences. In fact, the EU encourages local authorities to forcibly fingerprint migrants if necessary (European Commission, 2015b, p. 4). The ‘irregular’ (undocumented) migrant is outside the law, the undocumented migrant is reduced to a bare life. The reason that undocumented migrants are outside the law is that the European Union keeps the law within itself: the implementation of law and justice ends at its external borders. The refugee or (undocumented) migrant is at or beyond the border and therefore outside the law (Prem-Kumar & Grundy-Warr, 2004, p. 40). A great example is the interception of migrant boats in the Mediterranean Sea by the EU coastguard and partners. Migrants are shipped back to a country other than their destination where they are placed in detention camps. Solely because “they have no basis to protest on” (Ibid, p. 40).

Connected with ‘irregular’ migration are the smuggling networks. These networks provide for the often overcrowded rubber dinghies floating on the Mediterranean Sea. Even though the EU tries to tackle these smuggling networks, the EU is also the main reason such networks exist. Syrian and Iraqi refugees are unable to obtain a Schengen visa, and therefore cannot use a legal pathway into the EU. Consequently, the only chance to enter the EU is to approach such smuggling networks to get across the Mediterranean Sea.

The Frontex map visualizes the demarcation between what is considered to be Europe, including Schengen affiliated countries, and what is considered to be non-Europe. This demarcation is emphasized with a black line. However, it not only shows the border between the EU and non-EU, but also where the implementation of EU law and justice ends. The map further emphasizes that, when beyond the border, undocumented migrants
are outside the law and that is legitimate to transport them back to third countries. The map justifies the way migrants are treated before reaching European shore.

5.2. Is Europe really under siege?
The term of *illegality* is connected to the concept of the Homo Sacer. The ‘Illegal’ migrant and ‘irregular’ migrant both have the same negative connotation when it comes to defining the undocumented migrant. But what does it mean to be ‘illegal’? “The label ‘illegality’ is attached to a state of *being* instead of a state of *acting*, and it becomes the basis of incarceration and forced repatriation” (Schinkel, 2009, p. 780). The EU treats migrants without the right documents as if they were criminals even though they are often not convicted of any crime: being ‘illegal’ is not a legal category (Ibid, p. 784). Just as the Homo Sacer, these migrants are not incarcerated because of their actions, rather they have been and will be incarcerated because of their *being*: they *are* illegal and therefore should be incarcerated. “The totality of the personhood of the irregular migrant is reduced to the instrumental label of ‘illegal alien’, so that the state maintains the balance of ‘inclusion and exclusion’” (Ibid, p. 787).

Although Schinkel focuses his research on the nation-state it has some interesting insights for the European Union as it presents itself as a nation-state, for example by promoting the EU identity, culture and symbols. This becomes apparent by terms as ‘our external borders’, ‘our history’ or ‘community of values.’ Similar to a state-membership, appealing to EU membership is an effective tool for the inclusion or exclusion of people. Interestingly, undocumented migrants undermine this traditional tool for inclusion and exclusion since the migrants lack any legal documents and thus have no membership. Since they are without a membership, and cannot be excluded based on a different membership, they challenge the sovereignty of the nation-state, or in this case the European Union (Brubaker, 1089, cited in Schinkel, 2009, p. 781). Instead of excluding them on the grounds of having a different membership, the EU exclude these people by treating them as bare lives because they have no membership at all.
5.2.1. Flooded by migrants
Since undocumented migrants are frequently treated as bare lives and labelled as being ‘irregular’ or ‘illegal’, water metaphors are effective rhetoric figures to emphasize their status. It gives immigration a starting-point, destination, force and size often visualized by a unidirectional movement of people. The unidirectional movement can be seen on the Frontex map with large arrows referring to undocumented migrants ‘floodling’ European space. Immigration of non-EU people, especially from Muslim and/or poor countries, towards the EU is often perceived to flood the EU (Houtum, 2010, p. 964). The political discourse on migrants being seen as a threat also has consequences for the public opinion as it fuels the idea that there are ‘too many’ migrants in the EU. This is often followed by the rejection of migrants (Cea D’Ancona, 2015, p. 582). The arrows on the Frontex map depict immigration as an unstoppable, natural force since the arrows are unidirectional. The Frontex map confirms that migration is depicted as a smooth and simple process, as if undocumented migrants reached Europe without any difficulties, interruptions or circularity. This type of arrows also do not consider the heterogeneity of the migrants (Houtum, 2010, p. 965). The Frontex map further reinforces the metaphor of being flooded and overwhelmed by an unstoppable force even though statistical information often tells otherwise.

5.2.2. Immigration as an invasion
Aside from the implication that non-EU people are flooding the Union, the map also portrays invasion-like characteristics. In the analysis I demonstrated how the EU applies war & aggression metaphors in their immigration discourse. The map co-constructs the war & aggression metaphors with an accentuated, black external border and arrows surrounding and ‘invading’ the EU. The external border can be viewed as the frontline of an ongoing ‘war’ against people who have legitimate reasons to enter the EU, but are treated as unwelcome and potentially dangerous. The Frontex map shows remarkable similarities with invasion maps applied by the German army in the Second World War.
Figure 5.1: Map of the German invasion in Poland. It portrays
Striking similarities with the Frontex map

Figure 5.1 demonstrates how the German regime used unidirectional arrows in maps. The map illustrates the first sixteen days of Nazi military forces invading Poland. Compared to the Frontex map, this map seems to be more accurate since it distinguishes several time periods. This is depicted with several arrow styles. Similar to the Frontex map there is a clear demarcation between the two spaces: the frontline. Although the arrows are in opposing direction compared to the Frontex map the arrows all start near or on the frontline. The Frontex map show similar characteristics, where immigration arrows start just beyond the external border. Of course immigration to the European Union does not start at its external border. The journey of many migrants start in central Africa or the Middle-East. They have to take dangerous routes and get across several countries in order to reach the external borders of the EU. Another similarity between the two maps is how
the arrows surround the space they seem to invade. German forces surrounded Poland at its border before starting the invasion just as undocumented migrants seem to surround Europe. The Frontex map depicts a Europe that is under siege by undocumented migrants. It co-constructs the war and aggression metaphors used in the EU’s immigration discourse and portrays immigration in a similar way German maps portrayed their invasions in the Second World war. These metaphors, as well as maps like this, appeal to the emotions and imaginations of EU citizens which makes them effective tools for persuasion.

5.3. Lacking EU solidarity: dubious deals with third-countries
In July 2013, the new Dublin Regulation concerning asylum applications in the EU came into effect. One of the key outcomes of the Dublin Regulation is the decision of which country is responsible for examining the asylum application of the migrant. Normally this is the Member State where the migrant first set foot in. However, since so many people migrated to the EU by boat, the regulation resulted in overcrowded refugee camps in Italy and Greece. Eventually, the EU decided to relocate 160,000 migrants from Italy and Greece to other Member States in order to ensure a ‘fair share of responsibilities’. The key aim was to “end irregular and dangerous movements and the business model of smugglers, and to replace these with safe and legal ways to the EU for those who need protection” (European Commission, 2016a, p. 2). The main outcome was a quicker asylum procedure for refugees and a legal pathway into the EU. By relocating refugees whose application has been approved among other Member States, migrants can travel further into the EU instead of waiting for an indefinite amount of time in refugee camps in Italy or Greece. This regulation thus requires EU solidarity: Distributing 160,000 migrants arrived in Greece and Italy over all other Member States.

However eighteen months after the initial agreement only 18,000 migrants were relocated among other Member States. In comparison, between the end of September 2016 and 9th of November 2016, roughly six weeks, 30,000 migrants arrived in Italy (Press release European Commission, November 2016). Even though the European Commission argued that Member States ‘continue to deliver positive results’ it demonstrates the lack of solidarity and unwillingness of Member States to take in refugees.

Simultaneously the conditions in refugee camps in Italy and Greece remained problematic. People in refugee camps faced all sorts of physical and psychological problems

[63]
Consequently the EU’s new approach was to stem undocumented immigration completely. This is emphasized in the EU’s immigration discourse with terms as ‘strengthening our external borders’, ‘guarding our borders’ or ‘defending our borders’. This type of border management is known as border securitization, and can be defined as “the tendency of modern nation-states to construct migration as a security risk and to link migration discursively and in practice to a range of other security problems” (Mavroudi & Nagel, 2016, p. 161-62). The way immigration is portrayed (invasion, flood, frontline etc.) corresponds with the concept of border securitization. It is a well-known argumentation strategy in (nationalist) immigration discourses: securitization of the borders serves as a political tool to show anxious people sovereignty is not at stake and that the state has control over its borders (Mavroudi & Nagel, 2016, p. 164). Thus the thick black external border on the Frontex map not only implies a ‘frontline’ of a Europe under siege but also that the border is impenetrable for unwelcome guests and that EU citizens are not in any danger. Moreover rhetoric such as ‘invasion of migrants’ and linking undocumented migration with internal security fuels xenophobia: a term related to the ‘fear of the strange or foreign’ (Johnson, 2010, p. 213). The term is commonly used for the ‘expression of mistrust, fear, and/or hatred of foreigners’ (De Master & Le Roy, 2010, p. 425). Although this is a common strategy in the discourse of nationalist parties, the EU implements this strategy in its discourse: xenophobia in the EU has led to ‘Fortress Europe’, “a xenophobic fortress against the wave of immigration” (Johnson, 2010, p. 219). After the Schengen agreement came into effect in 1995, the internal borders of the European Union had been dissolved. Consequently its common external border had to be fortified, as the fear of the stranger required restrictive immigrations policies to keep the cultural space of Europe safe (Johnson, 2010, p. 219-220). The EU’s immigration discourse shows a similar approach: we need to strengthen the border to guarantee the EU’s internal security.

Instead of implementing the relocation scheme for refugees and thus providing legal pathways into the EU, Member States refused to keep their end of the bargain concerning the number of refugees they needed to take in. The lack of solidarity eventually resulted in deals with third countries. This strategy began with the EU-Turkey agreement on the 18th of March 2016. Both parties stated the main reason for the agreement was to target the people smugglers business model and to remove all incentives for ‘irregular’ routes to the EU, in full accordance of international and EU law (European Commission, 2016b). Turkey
was keen to sign the deal as it was promised visa-liberalization for Turkish citizens when travelling to the European Union\textsuperscript{12}. Turkey needed to stop ‘irregular’ migration towards Greece in return. This eventually resulted in detaining migrants or sending them back to their country of origin by the Turkish government.

However, article 33, section 1 of the Refugee Convention held in 1951 states that “No contracting State shall expel or return (‘refoul’er’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular political group or political opinion” (The United Nations Refugee Agency, 1951, p. 233). This is known as the principle of Non-Refoulement. Note that in the corpus of data the European Commission and high commissioners keep emphasizing the importance of law and justice in its immigration policy. Paradoxically EU commissioners keep emphasizing that it is justified to intercept migrant boats in the Mediterranean Sea and to forcibly transport them back to ‘safe’ countries such as Turkey, a country with a dismantled democracy or Libya, a country led by numerous armed militias and without a solid, central government. The argument for this agreement is to ‘save migrant lives’, but instead of giving migrants refuge, Turkey sends them back to unsafe countries as Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria (Gogou, 2017). It seems that the principle of non-refoulement is completely neglected. Aside from the inhumane consequences of these deals and agreements, third countries have leverage on the EU as they function as Europe’s gatekeeper. If for example the Turkish government is dissatisfied with the progress on the promised visa-liberation, they may threaten to open the ‘gate’.

It is an illusion that securitization of the border will lead to a decline of migrants. The amount of migrants travelling via Turkey to Greece declined but people will find the more open parts of the external border. Thus EU deals with Turkey or Libya result in closed borders but it also encourages desperate migrants to find alternative, more dangerous routes since there is no legal alternative. It is shocking that according to the International Organisation for Migration, the EU external border was the deadliest border in 2016. Even though many migrants have lost their lives or live in camps under abhorrent circumstances, the EU still claims that these deals are a success.

\textsuperscript{12} http://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-eu-visa-idUSKBN16I081
The lack of solidarity in the EU results in a lack of legal pathways into the EU. Consequently migrants are stuck in Hotspots and other refugee camps in Greece and Italy. In order to relieve the ‘pressure’ for these countries the EU closes its border hoping to discourage smuggling networks and migrants. Although the Frontex map was created before the Turkey deal, this discourse of border securitization, especially for undocumented migrants, was already constructed by drawing an impenetrable black border. It is also likely that the sudden drop in press releases in 2017 are related with the Turkey deal. A lot less undocumented migrants reach European shore, which is considered to be positive according to high officials: it is not ‘our’ problem anymore.

5.4. Discourses create reality
To conclude this part, I will try to demonstrate how the EU’s immigration discourse creates a certain reality about immigration. Considering the established theoretical framework on discourse, ‘statements’ about a topic are made within a certain discourse. The discourse makes it possible to construct the topic in a particular way, but it simultaneously limits other ways to construct this particular topic (Hall, 1992, p. 291). In other words, discourses create reality. The EU’s immigration discourse constructs immigration to the EU in a certain way: ‘irregular’ migration is bad’, ‘irregular migration is a threat’, ‘we are overwhelmed by migrants’, ‘we need to stop it’, ‘we need to defend our borders’, etc. It constructs immigration as an unstoppable natural force threatening the internal security of the EU. Since this discourse is so dominant it is difficult to construct immigration in a more nuanced ‘reality’. Yet, I will try.

First of all the invasion-argument: an invasion of undocumented, third-country migrants are heading for the European Union. A little over 1.2 million people sought refuge in the EU in 2015. Although this seems a lot, the statistics need to be put into perspective. For example, the EU’s population at 1 January 2015 was 508 million, which means that incoming migrants only made up 0.23% compared to the EU population. In comparison the Netherlands alone, with seventeen million citizens, received more than fifteen million tourists 2015, of which three million were third country nationals. Even though almost

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13 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/6903510/3-10072015-AP-EN.pdf/d2bfb01f-6ac5-4775-8a7e-7b104c1146d0
14 Trendrapport toerisme, recreatie en vrije tijd 2016
three million third country nationals visited the Netherlands, they have never been labelled as a threat to society or the cultural space of the Netherlands. Plain statistical evidence demonstrates that the reality created by the EU’s immigration discourse, ‘invasion’ or ‘flood’ of migrants, is fictitious and misleading. It is a narrative created for justifying the exclusion of migrants, fortifying the external border and treating migrants as if they are outside the law and jurisdiction of the European Union.

Second, traditionally, the argumentation for border securitization is that migration is seen as a security risk. This is further emphasized by the ‘Risk Analysis Report 2014’ in which the Frontex map was included. Note the Annual Risk Analysis. Here the word ‘risk’ relates to the ‘illegal’ activities of migrants. But is immigration to the EU a security risk? In the EU’s immigration discourse the security risk mostly refers to terrorist attacks in the EU. It was assumed that asylum was misused by terrorists for the Charlie Hebdo shooting in January 2015, the Batclan attack in November 2015, both in Paris, the Zaventem airport attacks in Brussel in March 2016, and more recently the Manchester Arena bombing in 2017. The terrorists should have had connections with undocumented immigration and the smuggling networks. However, these attacks were not executed by migrants or asylum seekers. The Paris and Brussels attacks were the work of French and Belgian nationals, whereas the Manchester bombing was executed by an UK national (Farmer, 2016; Rubin et.al, 2016; Evans et. al, 2017). Yet, it is almost certain that some of the attackers had travelled to Libya and/or Syria, especially after finding a Syrian passport on one of the individuals who was responsible for the Paris attacks. Nevertheless, “there is little evidence that terrorists take advantage of refugee flows, to carry out acts of terrorism (...) research shows that very few refugees have actually carried out acts of terrorism”(United Nations General Assembly, 2016, p. 4). The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) added that there is little to no statistical and analytical evidence that ‘asylum is misused to hide or provide safe haven for terrorists’ (United Nations General Assembly, 2016, p. 4). The migrants are fleeing their country because they are themselves victims of war and persecution. Securitization of the EU borders seems counterproductive as building fences, sending back refugees, and criminalizing undocumented migration does not increase the EU’s internal security, rather it contributes to the chaotic and clandestine movement of incoming migrants, “which might ultimately assist those intent on committing acts of terrorism” (United
Nations General Assembly, 2016, p. 5-6). The EU creates a narrative where the undocumented migrant is a threat to the EU’s internal security without having any statistical or analytical evidence to support these bold statements.

In the next and final chapter I will conclude this thesis. I will answer the main question: *How does this Frontex map represent, co-construct and reinforce the EU’s immigration discourse?* I will also discuss the limitations of this thesis, and try to provide a few recommendations for future maps depicting immigration to the European Union.
6. Conclusion

The cartographic co-construction of the narrative

Discourses create reality. A discourse creates a framework in which it is accepted to talk about a certain subject in a certain way, but it also limits other ways to talk about it. The way EU representatives speak and write about immigration is such a discourse. They construct immigration, undocumented migrants, the EU’s external border, and the EU’s role in managing migration in such a way that it is almost wrong and impossible to think and talk otherwise. Besides written texts or speech acts, discourses also include pictures, art and maps. How maps strengthen or co-construct a discourse is researched in this thesis. To be more precise, how a Frontex immigration map included in the Risk Analysis Report 2014 co-constructs the EU’s immigration discourse. Similar to discourses, maps also create a reality: people make use of maps to understand the world around them (Kitchin, Perkins & Dodge, 2009, p. 1). Although people might use maps for such purposes, they are unaware that maps often create geopolitical imaginations. This is also why maps are dangerous for those who use maps to make sense of their world (Bueno Lacy & van Houtum, 2015, p. 482). EU immigration maps created by EU agencies like Frontex are often recreated and distributed by newspapers, national political parties, social media or news bulletins. The distribution by the media is important as maps and images published in the media influence and shape the public opinion (Kim, Carvalho, Davis & Mullins, 2014, p. 293; Brouwer, van der Woude & van der Leun, 2017, p. 101). Even though most people will not read the original map, they will eventually be confronted with a reproduction.

6.1. Conclusion: The impenetrable border and ‘the migrant’

In this thesis I have researched how a Frontex map co-constructs and/or reinforces the EU’s immigration discourse. The main question was: How does this Frontex map represent, co-construct and reinforce the EU’s immigration discourse? The first step involved unravelling the EU’s immigration discourse. The European Union has the moral responsibility to provide a safe haven for those who seek refuge as EU member states are among the safest countries
in the world. To do so, the solidarity of all Member States was required in order to create a fair share of responsibilities in terms of relocating and resettling migrants from Greece and Italy. Unfortunately the appeal for European solidarity has failed. This resulted in deals with (politically unstable) third countries. The third countries detain undocumented migrants who are forcibly captured at the Mediterranean Sea. In return the EU compensates the third countries for example with visa-liberation (Turkey) or financial compensations.

EC Press releases under the EAoM channelled through the media influence EU citizens and their attitude towards third country migrants. These press releases formed the data for this research. I conducted a topoi analysis to analyse the data. Topoi form a bridge between arguments and corresponding conclusions. Topoi used in politics are characterized as ‘self-evident issues of a community or rules of life at one point’. (Anscombe, 1995; cited in van der Valk, 2003, p. 319). ‘They are generalized key ideas from which statements and arguments can be generated’ (Richardson, 2004; cited in Wodak, 2011, p. 42). Topoi are general in the way that they can be applied to different situations rather than a specific situation at a specific moment (Anscombe, 1995; cited in van der Valk, 2003, p. 319). With the topoi analysis I identified certain argumentation schemes applied in the EU’s immigration discourse. The topos of irregular migration, for example, means that migrants did not arrive the ‘regular way’. The implied conclusion then is ‘Irregular migration’ is against our rules and therefore needs to be stemmed. Another example is the topos of criminalise. People arriving at the EU external border need to get fingerprinted in order to create biometric passports. The EU promotes the use of force by local authorities if migrants refuse fingerprinting. The implied conclusion of this topos is ‘we need to treat migrants as criminals to ensure our internal security’. These argumentation schemes can be viewed as common knowledge and are embedded in European society.

http://visionofhumanity.org/indexes/global-peace-index/
Most notable aspects of the EU’s immigration discourse that I have identified were securing the external border and the construction of the migrant. The Frontex map visualizes these aspect in the following way. First, the management and control of the external border. The speech acts and writings of EU representatives in the press releases often included war and aggression metaphors constructing undocumented migration as a common enemy. It implies that ‘we’ have to defend ‘our space’, for instance by strengthening the external border. On the Frontex map this discourse and rhetoric is co-constructed by a clear, black line that demonstrates the demarcation between ‘our space’ and third countries. It insinuates that the border is impenetrable, and it almost reminds to a frontline on war-maps. The line clearly reminds people what is considered European space and what is not. It also suggests that everyone behind this line is different from ‘us’, or do not share ‘our’ values: they do not belong in the EU. This fuels xenophobia and anxiety about what lies behind this demarcation. The clear demarcation also legitimizes a certain treatment of migrants. Beyond the EU’s external border, EU law ends. Capturing migrants on the Mediterranean Sea and
sending them back to so-called safe third countries is justified as the migrant is not inside EU law.

In line with this is the repetitive use of the word illegal or irregular. Besides the negative connotation, these terms reduce the migrant to a depoliticized life. Similar to the captured migrants beyond the external border, these people are outside the law. Being illegal or irregular becomes the basis of forced repatriation or detention. Migrants without the right documents are frequently treated as criminals even though they are rarely convicted for any crime: being ‘illegal’ is not a legal category (Schinkel, 2009, p. 784). Moreover, Syrian or Iraqi refugees do not have a legal pathways to enter the EU as they are unable to require a Schengen visa. Therefore, the only option they have is entering the EU is irregular, with the help of smuggling networks. These migrants are labelled irregular again and are forcibly returned to ‘safe’ third countries like Libya.

Furthermore, EU representatives often speak about securing the external border in order to keep EU citizens safe. They link immigration with internal security threats such as recent terrorist attacks in the Bataclan theatre, Charlie Hebdo, Zaventem Airport and the Manchester Arena to justify the securitization of the border. However, there is no link between these attacks and today’s so-called immigration crisis, as the attacks have been executed by France, Belgian and UK nationals. Even though they had travelled to Syria, there is no evidence they used the same channels as undocumented migrants. By continuously stating that undocumented migrants are pressuring the external border or threatening Europe’s internal security, the EU emphasizes the so-called bad things of these migrants. In contrast, The EU emphasizes their own good things, for instance by stating that their aid-programme regarding refugees is “the flagship programme (...) the largest ever humanitarian aid operation”.

Second, EU representatives compare immigration and undocumented migrants with unstoppable natural forces such as floods. This is emphasized with metaphors such as influx, inflow, or wave-through. It gives immigration a starting point, force, size and a destination. These metaphors are visualized on the Frontex map by unidirectional, large arrows without considering the circularity of the migrants. Maps depicting ‘illegal’ flows are applied for persuading, instead of informing the reader with accurate information. The more alarming or threatening these cartographic images are, the more effect they have on policy makers to create anti-immigration policies. The abundance of arrows on maps depicting ‘illegal’
flows is referred to as ‘arrow disease’ (van Schendel, 2005, p. 42). These large and impressive arrows fuel the already existing anxiety of being flooded by (undocumented) migrants. Statistical comparison demonstrates that the EU is not flooded by migrants, as only 0.23% of the EU’s population migrated from a third country into the EU in 2015. For comparison, the Netherlands alone received more than fifteen million tourists in 2015, that is, around 87% of its total population. Three million people were third country nationals. This comparison demonstrates that tourists form a far greater group of ‘other’ people in, for example, the Netherlands, than immigrants form in EU society. However, tourists do not seem to form a threat to our society.

All in all, the EU’s immigration discourse fuels anxiety and xenophobia. The undocumented migrant is often labelled as *irregular or illegal*, is compared with an unstoppable natural force or even with the enemy during war time. Since the undocumented migrant is also linked with internal security issues such as terrorism, the EU finds it justified to securitize (read: close) its border under the guise of keeping EU citizens safe. The Frontex map co-constructs this discourse by visualizing several aspects such as ‘the undocumented migrant’ (the unidirectional, unstoppable arrows), the border securitization (impenetrable black line) and ‘our space’ (the greyish accentuated Schengen countries).

### 6.2. Limitations

Firstly, one of the main critics on CDA is the so-called biased, interpretive analysis. Analysts taking a socio-political viewpoint is rather common in CDA. Even though taking a socio-political position does not necessarily mean a biased research, I think it is a valid point of critique. CDA analyst see something wrong in society, and try to make a plea for the socially excluded or discriminated. In my experience, it is quite difficult to stay objective when doing the analysis since almost everything in a written text or speech act can be viewed as contributing to the exclusion of certain groups of people, while this might not be the case at all.

Secondly, the data. Although it is common to use only a small body of data which is considered to be typical in a discourse, I excluded a lot of other data, such as press conferences or political debates. Nonetheless I believe the press releases published under the Eu-
European Agenda on Migration can be considered typical for the contemporary EU’s immigration discourse as it marked a new European approach regarding immigration, that is, the so-called refugee crisis.

6.3. Recommendations
It is clear that the EU is afraid to lose their electorate; they shifted towards a politically right approach regarding immigration. Even though statistical information demonstrates that the migration ‘flow’ is dried up compared to 2015, EU representatives continue to apply water metaphors in order to legitimize, for example, a further securitization of the external border. This approach on immigration needs to change.

Immigration exist since the beginning of mankind, and needs to be understood as a human right. Immigrants have a face, a story, and often a legitimate reason for coming to the EU. The way these people are threatened and have been utilized as a medium of exchange with third countries is questionable to say the least. Cartographic images can help to change this paradigm. Nowadays, EU immigration maps are dominated with the unidirectional, large arrows. They imply that the migration process is relatively smooth and easy. The arrows do not consider the many stops and set-backs of undocumented migrants in their attempt to reach the EU. Instead of drawing large arrows that start right at the EU’s external border, EU immigration maps should including the actual starting point of the migrants, that is, Syria, Iraq, Eritrea, Nigeria, and so on. Considering the actual starting point and the circularity of the migrants, a hubs-and-spokes approach would be more nuanced and accurate.

The way the border is depicted on maps also needs to change. A thick black line suggest an actual impenetrable wall surrounding the Schengen countries. It would be more nuanced if the border is drawn with more transparency, suggesting that it is in fact possible to enter the EU. Even better, remove the border line as the border is no more than a social construction, used to create the division of ‘us’ and ‘them’. This demarcation ultimately contributes to xenophobia in the EU society.

This recommendation is not addressed to EU agencies as Frontex, as their map is a mirror of its discourse. I believe the media has a crucial role. Instead of simply copy a Frontex map, the media should think about how to create their own cartographic images to inform EU citizens with a more nuanced narrative about immigration to the EU.
Reference List


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Appendix: the 95 EC press releases on the EAoM between May 2015 and December 2017

1. **13 May 2015**: Managing migration better in all aspects: A European Agenda on Migration
2. **27 May 2015**: European Commission makes progress on Agenda on Migration
3. **9 July 2015**: Remarks by Commissioner Avramopoulos after informal Home Affairs Council in Luxembourg
5. **4 August 2015**: Statement from Migration and Home Affairs Commissioner Dimitris Avramopoulos
6. **10 August 2015**: Managing migration and financing a safer and more secure Europe: €2.4 billion to support Member States
7. **14 August 2015**: A European Response to Migration: Showing solidarity and sharing responsibility
9. **31 Augustus 2015**: European Commission in Calais: Advancing on a European approach to migration
10. **9 September 2015**: Refugee Crisis: European Commission takes decisive action
11. **14 September 2015**: Statement of the European Commission following the Extraordinary Justice and Home Affairs Council
12. **17 September 2015**: European Commission Statement following the vote of the European Parliament in favour of an emergency relocation mechanism for another 120,000 refugees
13. **22 September 2015**: European Commission Statement following the decision at the Extraordinary Justice and Home Affairs Council to relocate 120,000 refugees
14. **23 September 2015**: Managing the refugee crisis: Immediate operational, budgetary and legal measures under the European Agenda on Migration
15. **15 October 2015**: EU-Turkey joint action plan
16. **25 October 2015**: Meeting on the Western Balkans Migration Route: Leaders agree on 17-point plan of action
17. **4 November 2015**: State of Play: Measures to Address the Refugee Crisis
18. **6 November 2015**: Financial support for managing migration: European Commission awards €10.17 million in emergency funding to Slovenia
19. **11 November 2015**: European Union and Ethiopia sign Common Agenda on Migration and Mobility
20. **24 November 2015**: EU-Turkey Cooperation: A €3 billion Refugee Facility for Turkey
21. **3 December 2015**: Refugee Crisis: Greece activates EU Civil protection mechanism, agrees Frontex operation at border with former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and triggers RABIT mechanism
22. **29 January 2016**: State of Play: Measures to Address the Refugee Crisis
23. 3 February 2016: EU-Turkey Cooperation: Commission welcomes Member State agreement on Refugee Facility for Turkey
24. 10 February 2016: Implementing the Common European Asylum System: Commission acts on 9 infringement proceedings
25. 10 February 2016: Implementing the European Agenda on Migration: Commission reports on progress in Greece, Italy and the Western Balkans
26. 10 February 2016: Implementing the European Agenda on Migration: Progress on Priority Actions
27. 10 February 2016: Managing the Refugee Crisis: Commission reports on implementation of EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan
28. 18 February 2016: EU-Turkey Cooperation: First meeting of the Steering Committee of the Facility for Refugees in Turkey
29. 2 March 2016: Commission proposes new Emergency Assistance instrument for faster crisis response within the EU
30. 2 March 2016: Managing the Refugee Crisis: Stepping up return procedures to Turkey
31. 2 March 2016: Questions and Answers: An instrument for Emergency assistance within the Union
32. 4 March 2016: Back to Schengen: Commission proposes Roadmap for restoring fully functioning Schengen system
33. 4 March 2016: Commission Visa Progress Report: Turkey makes progress towards visa liberalisation
34. 4 March 2016: EU announces first projects under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey: €95 million to be provided for immediate educational and humanitarian assistance
35. 11 March 2016: Refugee crisis: European Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Management Christos Stylianides meets with the Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras
36. 16 March 2016: Relocation and Resettlement: EU Member States urgently need to deliver
37. 16 March 2016: Six Principles for further developing EU-Turkey Cooperation in tackling the Migration Crisis
38. 19 March 2016: EU-Turkey Statement: Questions and Answers
39. 21 March 2016: Commission makes immediate proposal to implement EU-Turkey agreement: 54,000 places allocated for resettlement of Syrians from Turkey
40. 4 April 2016: Implementing the EU-Turkey Agreement – Questions and Answers
41. 6 April 2016: Commission launches discussion on future framework for stronger and smarter information systems for border management and internal security
42. 6 April 2016: Commission presents options for reforming the Common European Asylum System and developing safe and legal pathways to Europe
43. 6 April 2016: Stronger and Smarter Borders in the EU: Commission proposes to establish an Entry-Exit System
44. 19 April 2016: EU provides €83 million to improve conditions for refugees in Greece
45. **19 April 2016**: Facility for Refugees in Turkey: Commission delivers an additional €110 million under the implementation of EU-Turkey agreement

46. **20 April 2016**: Managing the Refugee Crisis: Commission reports on implementation of EU-Turkey Statement

47. **4 May 2016**: Back to Schengen: Commission takes next steps towards lifting of temporary internal border controls

48. **4 May 2016**: European Commission opens way for decision by June on visa-free travel for citizens of Turkey

49. **4 May 2016**: European Commission proposes visa-free travel for the people of Kosovo

50. **4 May 2016**: Towards a sustainable and fair Common European Asylum System

51. **12 May 2016**: Back to Schengen: Council adopts Commission proposal on next steps towards lifting of temporary internal border controls

52. **18 May 2016**: Relocation and Resettlement: EU Member States must act to sustain current management of flows

53. **7 June 2016**: Commission announces New Migration Partnership Framework: reinforced cooperation with third countries to better manage migration

54. **7 June 2016**: Delivering the European Agenda on Migration: Commission presents Action Plan on Integration and reforms 'Blue Card' scheme for highly skilled workers from outside the EU

55. **7 June 2016**: Questions and Answers: An improved EU Blue Card scheme and the Action Plan on Integration

56. **7 June 2016**: Towards a new Partnership Framework with third countries under the European Agenda on Migration: Frequently Asked Questions


58. **22 June 2016**: New EU package of more than €200 million to support one million refugees from Syria in Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon

59. **13 July 2016**: Completing the reform of the Common European Asylum System: towards an efficient, fair and humane asylum policy

60. **13 July 2016**: Completing the reform of the Common European Asylum System: towards an efficient, fair and humane asylum policy

61. **13 July 2016**: Relocation and Resettlement: Positive trend continues, but more efforts needed

62. **28 July 2016**: Facility for Refugees in Turkey: over €1.4 billion in support of education and health for Syrian refugees

63. **8 September 2016**: EU announces more projects under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey: €348 million in humanitarian aid to refugees in Turkey

64. **14 September 2016**: State of the Union 2016: Commission Targets Stronger External Borders

65. **16 September 2016**: European Commission announces up to €108 million in emergency funding to Bulgaria to improve border and migration management

66. **28 September 2016**: Delivering on migration and border management: Commission reports on progress made under the European Agenda on Migration
67. **6 October 2016**: Securing Europe's external borders: Launch of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency

68. **12 October 2016**: European Agenda on Security: First report on progress towards an effective and sustainable Security Union

69. **17 October 2016**: 10th EU Anti-Trafficking Day: Commission calls for intensified efforts to address new challenges

70. **17 October 2016**: Letter from President Juncker to the President and the Members of the European Council on progress in the implementation of the Facility for Refugees in Turkey

71. **18 October 2016**: Managing migration effectively: Commission reports on progress in the implementation of the Partnership Framework with third countries

72. **9 November 2016**: Relocation and Resettlement: Member States need to sustain efforts to deliver on commitments

73. **17 November 2016**: EU budget deal focuses on strengthening the economy and responding to the refugee crisis

74. **7 December 2016**: European Border and Coast Guard Agency launches rapid intervention pool

75. **8 December 2016**: Commission reports on progress made under the European Agenda on Migration

76. **14 December 2016**: Commission reports on first deliverables under the Partnership Framework on migration with third countries

77. **15 December 2016**: EU and IOM launch initiative for migrant protection and reintegration in Africa along the Central Mediterranean migration routes

78. **10 January 2017**: Frontex creates a new pool of return experts

79. **12 January 2017**: Facility for Refugees in Turkey: Commission Reports on Progress in Fifth Steering Committee

80. **25 January 2017**: Back to Schengen: Commission proposes that the Council allows Member States to maintain temporary controls for another three months

81. **25 January 2017**: European Agenda on Migration: Commission reports on progress in making the new European Border and Coast Guard fully operational

82. **25 January 2017**: Managing migration along the Central Mediterranean Route – Commission contributes to Malta discussion

83. **2 February 2017**: Irregular Migration via the Central Mediterranean (European Political Strategy Centre, issue 22)

84. **3 February 2017**: Europe’s migration and asylum policy: small steps to make a big difference

85. **8 February 2017**: Relocation and Resettlement: Member States need to build on encouraging results

86. **2 March 2017**: Commission calls for renewed efforts in implementing solidarity measures under the European Agenda on Migration

87. **13 June 2017**: European Agenda on Migration: Commission calls on all parties to sustain progress and make further efforts

88. **6 September 2017**: European Agenda on Migration: Good progress in managing migration flows needs to be sustained
89. **6 September 2017:** Partnership Framework on Migration: Joint management of migration shows positive results

90. **27 September 2017:** State of the Union 2017 – Commission presents next steps towards a stronger, more effective and fairer EU migration and asylum policy

91. **17 October 2017:** 1 million refugees in Turkey reached by EU’s Emergency Social Safety Net

92. **15 November 2017:** European Agenda on Migration: Consolidating progress made

93. **7 December 2017:** Future-proof migration management: European Commission sets out way forward

94. **20 December 2017:** Integration of refugees: Commission joins forces with social and economic partners

95. **20 December 2017:** Visa liberalisation: Commission reports on implementation of benchmarks for Western Balkans and Eastern Partnership countries