IN THE ABSENCE OF A SILVER BULLET

Public value creation by network collaborations in the detection and prevention of radicalization in Dutch municipalities

A.M. van Heerwaarden
Department of Public Administration
Faculty of Management Sciences
Radboud University Nijmegen

17 AUGUST 2017
MASTER THESIS
A.M. van Heerwaarden
a.vanheerwaarden@student.ru.nl
s4584740

Master thesis Comparative Politics, Administration and Society
Track Public Administration
Utrecht, 17 August 2017

Thesis supervisor: Dr. T. Brandsen
Summary
As there is not a ‘silver bullet’ to deal with radicalization, local governments pursue a collaborative approach with societal partners in which knowledge, expertise and resources are shared. Network collaborations are the preferred approach by municipalities for detecting and preventing radicalization as they are said to contribute to better policy performance. To date little is known about how these network collaborations actually contribute to creating valuable results in detecting and preventing radicalization. Therefore this study investigates how Dutch municipal network collaborations in Schiedam, Haarlemmermeer and Dordrecht create publicly valuable outcomes in light of the radicalization approach. The main research question in this study is: ‘How do local network collaborations in the Netherlands, aimed at detecting and preventing Islamic radicalization, create public value’. Through a multiple case study a total of three network collaborations were investigated upon. Cross-sectional data were obtained from fifteen semi-structured in-depth interviews and from several policy documents published by the municipalities and their stakeholders.

Notable similarities were found in the way these network collaborations have been set up in general as they are all built on informal contact between network partners without formal and structural network meetings. The networks set up by municipalities to detect radicalization are characterized by loose connections through which information, concerns and questions can be shared quickly. Despite its advantages, the approach carries the risk that awareness for radicalization detection fades away into the background in the day-to-day practices of these network partners. Differences between the networks were found in the adopted network coordination structure and the effectivness of these networks. Haarlemmermeer chose for a shared governance (SG) in which the network and its activities are managed collectively by the network partners. Schiedam adopted a lead organization network (LON) in which the network is driven by the municipality who clearly takes the lead in the network. Other network partners take a backseat. Dordrecht chose for a network administrative organization (NAO) in which the network activities are coordinated by the municipality. Yet, the municipality is not part of the network. The network effectiveness of these network collaborations was assessed by scoring the networks on the number of stakeholders included, the commitment of the network actors to the process, the distribution of trust within the network and the degree of goal consensus. It was found that in Dordrecht the network can be considered to operate effectively, whereas in Haarlemmermeer and Schiedam the network structure is not matched with the requirements for an effectively functioning network. In Schiedam the network is moderately effective, whereas in Haarlemmermeer the network is the least effective.

1 A silver bullet refers to an immediate solution
The concept of public value by Moore (1995) was used to evaluate the outcomes of these network collaborations. Public value can be created on the three interrelated elements ‘public value proposition’, ‘legitimacy and support’, and ‘operational capacity’. The network collaborations of Dordrecht, Haarlemmermeer and Schiedam have all succeeded in creating public value on the three different elements, but to differing degrees. Especially the investments made by the municipalities and the different network partners in training and development have been important in making the network more equipped to deal with the issue of radicalization. Haarlemmermeer was most successful in creating public value on all three elements followed by Dordrecht. In both network collaborations the three public value elements were in alignment. Schiedam was least effective in creating public value overall and a situation of misalignment was found between the public value proposition aimed for and the actual practices.

The NAO and SG network coordination structures in which responsibility was shared were more successful in creating public value than the LON. Therefore the findings of this research imply that not the effectiveness of network collaborations is most important in explaining how public value is created, but rather that the type of network coordination structure is decisive. In addition to that, in order to be more successful in creating public value the fit between the three elements of the strategic triangle needs to be tightly coupled rather than decoupled. For municipalities currently developing or strengthening their network collaboration aimed at detecting radicalization, municipalities can use these insights to evaluate the choices they have made in their own networks. These municipal network collaborations could furthermore be strengthened by: developing a clear operating framework for network partners; ensuring more shared responsibility between the network partners; and investing in training and knowledge development to ensure awareness for radicalization detection.
List of abbreviations

**AIVD** - General Intelligence and Security Service
**CTER** - Counter Terrorism, Extremism and Radicalization
**DTN** – The Terrorist Threat Assessment Netherlands
**ESS** – Expertise Unit Social Stability
**ICCT** - International Centre for Counter-Terrorism
**IS** – Islamic State
**LON** – Lead Organization Network
**MoJ** – Ministry of Security and Justice
**NCTV** – National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism
**NAO** – Network Administrative Organization
**NPG** – New Public Governance
**NPM** – New Public Management
**OM** - Public Prosecution Service
**SG** – Shared Governance Network
**VNG** - Association of Netherlands Municipalities
# Table of contents

**Summary** ........................................................................................................................................... 2

**List of abbreviations** ......................................................................................................................... 4

**Chapter 1 - Introduction** .................................................................................................................. 7

1.1 Research question and aim .................................................................................................................. 8
1.2 Scientific and social relevance ............................................................................................................ 9
1.3 Outline of thesis .................................................................................................................................... 11

**Chapter 2 - Effective radicalization policy** ....................................................................................... 12

2.1 The phenomenon of home-grown terrorism and radicalization ...................................................... 12
2.2 Counter-radicalization policies .......................................................................................................... 13
2.3 Radicalization in the Netherlands .................................................................................................... 15
2.4 Effectiveness of preventive radicalization policies ........................................................................... 19
2.5 Concluding remarks .......................................................................................................................... 20

**Chapter 3 - Creating public value** .................................................................................................... 21

3.1 A shift towards New Public Governance .......................................................................................... 21
3.2 Public value, a multidimensional construct .................................................................................... 22
3.3 Public value creation through the strategic triangle ......................................................................... 24
3.4 Tight coupling and decoupling ........................................................................................................ 27
3.5 Concluding remarks .......................................................................................................................... 30

**Chapter 4 - Network collaboration** .................................................................................................. 31

4.1 From government to governance with and trough networks ............................................................ 31
4.2 Defining network collaboration ........................................................................................................ 32
4.3 Requirements for effective network collaboration ........................................................................... 33
4.4 Concluding remarks .......................................................................................................................... 40

**Chapter 5 - Research expectations** .................................................................................................. 41

5.1 Theoretical model ............................................................................................................................... 41
5.2 Research expectations ....................................................................................................................... 42
5.3 Operationalization of concepts ......................................................................................................... 47
5.4 Concluding remarks .......................................................................................................................... 49

**Chapter 6 - Research design and strategy** ....................................................................................... 50

6.1 Research design ............................................................................................................................... 50
6.2 Case selection ..................................................................................................................................... 51
6.3 Research methods ............................................................................................................................. 55
6.4 Reliability and validity ...................................................................................................................... 57

**Chapter 7 - Network collaborations in practice** ................................................................................. 60

7.1 Dordrecht ......................................................................................................................................... 60
Chapter 1 - Introduction

The murder of Dutch film director Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam (2004), the attacks in Madrid (2004) and the attacks on the London transport system (2005), triggered European countries to set up policy measures and programs to deal with the issue of home-grown terrorists. The main aim of these policy measures was to prevent other second-generation immigrants from becoming violent extremists. This process is better known as Islamic radicalization (Vermeulen, 2014; Kundnani, 2012). More than a decade later the increased threat of these home-grown terrorists, made visible by terrorist attacks in the United Kingdom, France, Belgium and Germany, once again put the matter of countering and preventing Islamic radicalization high on the agendas of European, national and local policy officers (Weggemans, Bakker & Grol, 2014; European Commission, 2016a).

The matter of Islamic radicalization possibly culminating in terrorism is both dynamically complex and deeply uncertain (Pruyt & Kwakkel, 2014, p.1). Neither academia nor politicians and practitioners have established a clear consensus on the nature of the problem and the objectives to be pursued in order to prevent it (Sedgwick, 2010; Hegeman & Kahn, 2016; Noordegraaf, Douglas, Bos & Klem, 2016). Due to this wickedness of radicalization as a policy issue, governments struggle to deal with- and prevent radicalization of its citizens (Hegemann & Kahn, 2016, p. 16). In recent years working in both horizontal and vertical networks across policy boundaries has become a dominant way for local, national and international institutions to deal with wicked problems since it provides for a comprehensive response to a complex problem (Geuijen, 2011; Christensen, 2012; Resodihardjo & Prins, 2014). A common assumption underlying this collaborative approach is that by sharing knowledge, expertise and resources in policy networks, societal problems such as radicalization can be dealt with more effectively and better results can be achieved (Eijkman & Roodnat, 2017). To date little is known about how these network collaborations actually contribute to creating valuable results in preventing radicalization.

Suitable cases to investigate these network collaborations into depth can be found in the Netherlands. One of the features of the Dutch counter-radicalization policy is its focus on the preventive role of local authorities (Eijkman & Roodnat, 2017). Since the mid-2000’s, the Netherlands has been one of the European countries at the forefront of developing counter-radicalization initiatives from a network approach (Vidino & Brandon, 2012, p. 7). After Dutch

\footnote{In this report the term radicalization is used to denote Islamic radicalization. If there are other forms of radicalization mentioned, this is referred to explicitly.}

\footnote{In the Netherlands the extent of ‘Jihad tourism’, Dutch citizens fighting in Syria and other areas on behalf of ISIS, increased quickly from 2013 onwards. This alarming development has led the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV) to raise the threat level for a possible terrorist attack from limited to substantial (Government of the Netherlands, 2012).}
film director Theo van Gogh was killed by home-grown terrorist Mohammed Bouyeri in 2004, the development of counter-radicalization policies became an urgent matter in the Netherlands. After this peak the attention for radicalization prevention declined steadily due to budget cuts and the absence of attacks and threats (Vidino & Brandon, 2012, p. 33-34). According to Ahmed Marcouch, a Dutch member of parliament, national government and municipalities only started taking radicalization as a policy issue serious again late 2014 (Radio Eenvandaag, 2015). A recent report by Noordegraaf et al. (2016) evaluating the Dutch counter-terrorism strategy is consistent with Marchouch’s observation of declined attention until 2014. After that the matter rose to the center of national and local policy agendas due to renewed threats. These threats triggered the Dutch government to re-strengthen their approach to tackle jihadism and increase attention to prevent violent Islamic radicalization from a network approach in 2014. Dutch municipalities are attributed a central role in this approach as the local level is considered to be the best place to prevent and detect radicalization of its citizens both in the short-term and the long-term (Rijksoverheid, 2014a). Following this development, a growing number of Dutch municipalities renewed or developed their policy and networks to prevent radicalization in local communities (ESS, 2015, p.5). Both the national government and the Dutch municipalities have stressed the need for a well-functioning network of local organizations, frontline professionals, religious organizations and civil society to successfully detect and prevent radicalization.

1.1 Research question and aim
Network collaborations are the preferred approach by municipalities for detecting and preventing radicalization as they are said to contribute to better policy performance (Gielen, 2015). Yet there has been little empirical research to date dealing with the value of these network collaborations for radicalization prevention policy. Effective networks are a prerequisite for activities with regards to radicalization prevention activities such as information sharing (Eijkman & Roodnat, 2017). According to the literature regarding network collaborations whether a network collaboration can be effective in achieving valuable results is dependent upon several requirements (Provan & Kenis, 2008; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; Ansell & Gash, 2008). Therefore the first aim of this research is to investigate what kind of municipal network collaborations aimed at preventing radicalizations have been set up by Dutch municipalities and whether they fulfill the requirements for effective network collaboration. The second aim of this research is to investigate how these network collaborations create valuable results in light of preventive radicalization policy. Measuring the results or outcomes of prevention policy poses some difficulties since the absence of a terrorist attack by radicalized individuals can be ascribed to a multitude of factors. It

4 Ahmed Marcouch was invested with developing counter-radicalization policy in Amsterdam as a city district chair between 2006 and 2010.
does not necessarily say much about the effectiveness of the policy. A broader approach to assessing the network collaboration’s counter-radicalization activities is chosen by incorporating the concept of public value. Public value focuses on the fact that value can be created in different ways. Through output, but also through establishing a common purpose, a legitimate process and building operational capacity (Meynhardt, 2015, p. 147). Public value offers a different way of assessing government performance and policy decisions. This can offer valuable insights with regards to network collaborations preventing radicalization. The assumption on which this research is grounded is that network collaborations can create public value (Moore, 1995; Bryson et al., 2006; Geuijen, 2011), but it is dependent upon the type of network how public value is shaped. To date only few empirical studies have been conducted with regards to this matter (Geuijen, 2011; Bryson et al., 2016; Alford et al., 2016). To fill this gap in the literature, this research investigates how Dutch municipalities and their local collaborations aimed at detecting and preventing radicalization contribute to public value creation in that policy dossier.

Thus the overarching aim of this research is to explore the way Dutch municipal network collaborations have organized themselves to deal with the prevention and detection of radicalization and how their approach leads them to create public value. Therefore the following research question is adopted:

‘How do local network collaborations in the Netherlands, aimed at detecting and preventing Islamic radicalization, create public value?’

In order to answer the central research question, the following sub questions are addressed to answer the overarching research question.

**Theoretical sub questions**

1. How is public value created with respect to counter-radicalization policy?
2. What are the requirements for effective network collaboration?
3. How can network collaborations contribute to public value creation?

**Empirical sub questions**

1. What is the Dutch approach towards preventing radicalization?
2. How do Dutch municipalities collaborate in local networks aimed at preventing and detecting radicalization?
3. How do these network collaborations create public value?

**1.2 Scientific and social relevance**

**1.2.1 Scientific relevance**

The majority of societal problems can no longer be solved by the government alone. The development from ‘government to governance’ that has taken place in public administration shows the growing importance of the private sector and civil society in formulating and implementing
public policy (van der Meer, 2010, p.8). Network collaboration has therefore become a widely applied approach for governments to deal with wicked societal problems and to create public value. Although the body of academic literature concerning these topics has grown in recent years, public value creation through network collaborations remains underexplored (Cuganesan et al., 2014, p.24; Page et al., 2015; Bryson et al., 2016; Hartley et al., 2016). This lack of empirical knowledge regarding public value creation through networks contradicts the claimed importance of establishing interorganizational networks (Cuganesan et al., 2014, p.24). This research therefore aims to strengthen the empirical knowledge on how public organizations create public value through collaboration in a complex policy field such as radicalization. Furthermore the lens of public value is adopted in this research as a performance measurement construct. The concept of public value has become fashionable in contemporary public administration studies, yet its meaning has remained vague due to a lack of empirical research (Williams & Shearer, 2011; Cuganesan et al., 2014). This research tries to provide greater clarity on its possible meaning and examines it in an empirical way. Therefore it answers to the call of scholars to increase the understanding of public value and the ability to apply it practically and evaluate its performance (Alford et al., 2016).

With regard to the field of radicalization there have been relatively few studies conducted in the Netherlands outside of the four major cities of Rotterdam, Amsterdam, Utrecht and the Hague (Witte et al., 2015; Azough, 2017). This research focuses on the ‘black-box’ of mid-sized to large municipalities that have not yet been investigated thoroughly with regards to the current state of radicalization prevention policy. Therefore this focus could lead to new insights on how this group of municipalities deals with radicalization prevention, furthering academic and societal debate on this topic.

1.2.2 Societal relevance
As the issue of violent radicalization has been widely publicized due to recent terrorist attacks in European cities, the Dutch national government has stressed the need for good networks and network collaborations in the detection and prevention of radicalization (Gielen, 2015). Therefore the majority of Dutch municipalities are currently developing or strengthening their collaboration to detect and prevent radicalization (NCTV, 2016). The results of this study have societal relevance since it results in recommendations for municipalities on how to organize their networks with the relevant stakeholders. Furthermore it provides insight in how the chosen network structure of municipal network collaborations potentially influences the creation of public value. These recommendations are relevant for municipalities that are developing or improving their local approach to prevent radicalization. It provides the municipalities that are studied in this research insight in the way stakeholders perceive the collaboration and how public
value is currently created. The insights from this research can also improve the current network collaboration between stakeholders.

1.3 Outline of thesis
In the next chapter the concept of radicalization is introduced and placed within the Dutch approach to prevent and counter radicalization. This chapter provides the context of this research by describing the main grounds for the Dutch national and local counter radicalization policies. In chapters three to five, the theoretical foundations for this research are put forth. In chapter three the theoretical concept of public value creation is discussed in order to provide an answer for the first theoretical sub question. In chapter four the emergence and characteristics of network collaboration are presented. Chapter five links both chapters together as it discusses the way public value creation and network collaborations are expected to influence one another. The main theoretical expectations of this research are put forward and an answer towards the third theoretical sub-question is given. In chapter six the methodological approach of this research is explained and justified. In chapter seven and eight the empirical part of this research is put forward as the cases are presented. In chapter seven the network effectiveness of the network collaborations are assessed and in chapter eight the way public value is created by these network collaborations is discussed. In the final chapter, the findings of this research are summarized and the central research question is answered. In addition to that, the implications of the findings are discussed and limitations of this research are reflected upon.
Chapter 2 - Effective radicalization policy

In this chapter the concept of radicalization is introduced and placed within the context of this research. This is important, since the understanding of radicalization forms the point of departure for (Dutch) governmental policy to prevent radicalization. Furthermore the main outline for the Dutch municipal policy and responsibilities towards the radicalization dossier are discussed. This provides an answer to the first empirical sub-question 'What is the Dutch approach towards preventing radicalization?'. In the last part of this chapter attention is shifted towards the measurement of effective counter-radicalization policy. As this is rather difficult when focusing merely on output, this research adopts a wider lens to assess counter-radicalization policies. This approach is further discussed in chapter three.

2.1 The phenomenon of home-grown terrorism and radicalization

The popularity of the concept of radicalization in terrorism studies and counter-terrorism policy making has grown remarkably since 2004 (Kundnani, 2012). In the policy discourse surrounding terrorism, radicalization is considered to create the motivational or cognitive preconditions for terrorist violence (Sedgwick, 2010). The concept of radicalization provides an opportunity to discuss 'what goes on before the bomb goes off'. It acknowledges that reasons for terrorism can be investigated, analyzed and subjected to policy solutions beyond the use of physical measures, especially now that violent extremists are born and raised on Western soil (Kundnani, 2012, p.5; Sedgwick, 2010, p. 480). Therefore understanding and combating radicalization is seen as an important prerequisite for effectively combating terrorism (Mandel, 2010). It is also from this perspective, that governments started developing counter-radicalization policies.

Radicalization is a diverse phenomenon that is not exclusive to any region, nationality, system or belief (United Nations, 2015). In recent years terrorist groups such as Islamic State and Al-Qaida have shaped the image of violent extremism in Western societies. Therefore the study of radicalization in the last decennia has in practice often been limited to why individual Muslims support an extremist interpretation of Islam that leads to violence. This interpretation of radicalization makes a distinction between 'new terrorism' originating in Islamic extremism, and the 'old terrorism' of nationalist or leftist political violence. Attention for radicalization in the latter form is not nearly as prevalent in governmental policy as attention for Islamic radicalization (Kundnani, 2012). This research also focuses on Islamic radicalization, although it should be taken into account that some of the activities of municipalities to prevent and signal radicalization target other forms of radicalization as well (Vidino & Brandon, 2012, p.1). This research specifically

---

5 There is much skepticism though about the proclaimed causality between terrorism and radicalization.
focuses on home-grown radicalization, the process whereby individuals are radicalized in the
country they inhibit (King & Taylor, 2011, p. 603).

Although radicalization has become a widely used concept, the issue of radicalization is by
no means as solid and clear as it may seem. Radicalization as a policy issue is what they call a
wicked problem. Wicked problems cross boundaries of disciplines, actors, and practices
(Noordegraaf et al., 2016). In the case of wicked problems, there is incomplete or controversial
information surrounding these problems making it difficult to interpret them and find an
appropriate and definite solution (Osborne, 2010). Wicked problems are often social issues, to
which there is no ultimate solution. Wicked problems are hard to resolve since they often involve
conflicts between prioritizing certain values and scarce resources and are connected to other
problems as well. Therefore there are differences in the way the problem is defined. In the case of
radicalization policy, neither academia, nor politicians and practitioners have established a clear
consensus on the nature of the problem and the objectives to be pursued to prevent it (Sedgwick,
2010; Hegeman & Kahl, 2016; Noordegraaf et al., 2016). Radicalization as a policy issue is subject
to intense and continuous uncertainty contestation by a multiplicity of actors and instruments
(Hegeman & Kahl, 2016, p.16). Radicalization can even be seen as relentless, as the problems
related to the matter are never going to be solved once and for all. Radicalization thus matches
the criteria of a wicked problem as there is a lot of uncertainty about the causes and appropriate
solutions to deal with the matter (Noordegraaf et al., 2016). Radicalization is furthermore seen as
an evolving and context-bound phenomenon (Schmid, 2013, p.5). The fact that radicalization is
such a wicked problem, poses difficulties for developing effective counter-radicalization policies.

2.2 Counter-radicalization policies
The way radicalization is conceptualized is important in understanding the approach of
governments in countering radicalization. Throughout the 21st century radicalization has
acquired the meaning of a socio-psychological or theological process in which people move
towards extremist views, carrying the risk of resulting in terrorist violence (Kundnani, 2012, p.8).
Radicalization is conceptualized this way in most Western countries. Although there is no single
definition of radicalization used across the scholarly field, a relatively common understanding of
radicalization is given by Romaniuk and Chowdhury Funk (2012). They define radicalization as:
"a multistep process through which an individual or small group becomes imbued with extremist
views and might seek to realize them through violence" (Romaniuk & Chowdhury Funk, 2012, p.6).
The adopted definition acknowledges that radicalization is a process which is by no means a single
pathway to (violent) radicalization (NSPG, 2011, p.15). This definition of radicalization is adopted
in this research as the Dutch government also sees radicalization as a process (NCTV, 2014).
According to the Dutch government, nobody is ‘born a terrorist’, meaning that a person develops
towards a point where he or she wants to commit violent terrorist attacks (Witte et al., 2015, p.10). The AIVD sees radicalism in this light. Radicalism is defined by the AIVD as "A growing willingness to pursue and/or support fundamental changes in society that would endanger the democratic order possibly by undemocratic means which are in conflict with or could pose a threat to that order" (AIVD, 2013, p. 78). The AIVD furthermore states that "by extension, then, radicalization is the process of increasing readiness to pursue such changes – possibly by undemocratic means – and/or to encourage others to do so" (2007, p. 10). This definition of radicalization highlights its relation to the social order and cohesion, but also emphasizes the perception of possible danger and threat for the safety of citizens (Mandel, 2010).

As a result of the understanding of radicalization as a process, authorities have started to develop counter-radicalization policies6 aimed at detecting signals of radicalization and intervening to prevent or counter the drift towards violent extremism (Kundnani, 2012). A distinction can be made between repressive and preventive strategies. Repressive strategies are seen as means to achieve the desired outcomes driven by security priorities of the state. These measures include military or police intervention, intelligence-gathering methods by thwarting possible terrorist activities and economic sanctions and confiscating passports (OSCE, 2014, p.68; NCTV, 2014). Preventive measures try to early detect and prevent non-radicalized citizens from becoming radicalized, by creating resilience against radicalization and terrorism through predominantly non-coercive means (Romaniuk & Chowdhury Funk, 2012, p.5; OSCE, 2014, p.69). Preventive strategies address the factors which feed radicalization and are aimed at creating resilience towards those factors. These strategies therefore focus on better schooling and housing, providing job perspectives and countering discrimination to create a more equal and inclusive society. An important part of the preventive approach is (early) detection of individuals possibly at risk of radicalizing. Other concepts related to counter-radicalization programs are deradicalization and rehabilitation. These concepts specifically apply to individuals that have already become radicalized instead of preventing citizens from (further) radicalizing (Romaniuk & Chowdhury Funk, 2012, p.7).

The focus of this research lies on the local approach aimed at detecting and preventing radicalization. It might be that practices concerning deradicalization and disengagement are somewhat integrated with these preventive policies. As every country has its own specific approach, the following paragraph sheds some light on the current situation with regards to radicalization in the Netherlands.

---

6 As mentioned by Romaniuk and Chowdhury Funk (2012, p.3) terrorism prevention policies have been pursued under different names such as counter-radicalization, preventing violent extremism and countering violent extremism, but refer to roughly the same.
2.3 Radicalization in the Netherlands

2.3.1 Current situation in the Netherlands

After the peak of attention in the Netherlands for the radicalization of home-grown terrorists inspired by the death of Theo van Gogh in 2004, the Dutch government presented the threat level assessment for terrorist attacks (DTN) in the Netherlands. The threat level scale ranges from level 1 which is a minimal threat, to level 5 in which there is a critical threat. Table 1 shows that since 2005 the threat level assessment (DTN) of the NCTV has fluctuated between substantial and limited. After a period without a visible threat and with reduced political attention for radicalization, the threat level in the Netherlands was once again raised to substantial in 2013 (Noordegraaf et al., 2016). Although the Netherlands has not witnessed a jihadist inspired terrorist attack since 2004, the assessment of the NCTV is that there is a real chance that an attack could occur in the Netherlands. In the past years the threat level has remained on the level of substantial, as there are no developments that reduce the conceivable threat of a terrorist attack (NCTV, 2017a).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DTN-Number</th>
<th>Date of publication</th>
<th>Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DTN 1 to DTN 7</td>
<td>May 2005</td>
<td>Substantial (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTN 8 to DTN 11</td>
<td>March 2007</td>
<td>Limited (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTN 12 to DTN 18</td>
<td>March 2008</td>
<td>Substantial (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTN 19 to DTN 31</td>
<td>November 2009</td>
<td>Limited (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTN 32 to DTN 44</td>
<td>March 2013 – present</td>
<td>Substantial (4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Development of the DTN in the Netherlands (NCTV, 2017b)

An important cause for the increased threat level in 2013 was the rapidly growing number of Dutch citizens that travelled to jihadist territories from 2012 onwards (NCTV, 2017a). The number of people leaving for jihadist purposes is considered an important indicator for the degree to which radicalization occurs in a country. Although not every radicalized individual will eventually attempt to leave towards jihadist territories or return from it to carry out a terrorist attack, it does give tangible insight into the scope of the problem. As figure 1 shows, the number of Dutch jihadists who travelled out to fight in Syria and Iraq increased substantially in the past few years. The rapid increase in foreign fighters slowed down a bit in 2016 when the increase was smaller than in previous years (AIVD, 2017b). By 1 April 2017, 280 individuals had left the Netherlands for Syria and Iraq inspired by Jihadist purposes. Of this number, 50 have returned to the Netherlands and 45 are deceased. The current number of individuals remaining in Syria and Iraq is estimated at 190 (NCTV, 2017a, p.3). A recent report by the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) regarding foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq describes that the majority of the Dutch foreign fighters are under the age of 25, with a lower or middle class socio-economic
background, low-to-medium levels of education and limited levels on the labor market, often deeply frustrated about their social position or that of their ethnic group (van Ginkel & Entemann, 2016, p. 35-36).

*Figure 1: Development in numbers of Dutch travelers and returnees. (AIVD, 2017b).*

Both local authorities and central government bodies are active in tackling radicalization and recruitment of jihadists, focused at this target group. In the following subparagraphs both the policies at the national and local level are discussed.

### 2.3.2 The national policy

The exponential increase in the number of foreign fighters, terrorist attacks in surrounding countries, and the developments in both Syria and Iraq, not only led the Dutch government to increase the threat level once again in 2013 but also prompted them to renew the preventive radicalization policy on both the national and the local level (Witte et al., 2015). The Ministry of Security and Justice (MoJ), the NCTV, and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment presented a Comprehensive Action Plan to Combat Jihadism on 29 August 2014. The action plan aims “to protect democracy and the rule of law, to combat and weaken the jihadist movement in the Netherlands and to remove the breeding ground for radicalization” (Rijksoverheid, 2014a, p.2). The Comprehensive Action Plan takes a broad approach, combining soft preventive and hard
repressive measures. The national government, in cooperation with the NCTV, the National Police, the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) and the Public Prosecution Service (OM), is in the lead when it comes to the more repressive measures to tackle violent radicalized individuals (Rijksoverheid, 2014a). In the softer area of prevention and curation measures the local level is the central actor. The measures described in the action plan can be divided into five topic areas. The first group of measures is aimed at risk reduction of jihadist travelers by all administrative and legal means necessary. An example is the increased scope for authorities to revoke the Dutch nationality of jihadists that have joined or educated by terrorist groupings. The second group is aimed at preventing or disrupting potential departures by posing travel interventions. If there is reasonable suspicion of an individual wanting to travel to leave the country for jihadist purposes their passport can be revoked. The third group of measures is aimed at countering and disrupting recruiters, facilitators and disseminators of (online) jihadist material which encourages violence, radicalization or hatred (Rijksoverheid, 2014a). The fourth group of measures aims to prevent new adherents to the jihadist movement and to counter social tensions. One of these measures is the establishment of the Expertise Unit Social Stability (ESS). The ESS aims to assist and provide information to municipalities, professionals, parents and other organizations to prevent radicalization. The fifth and final group of measures is aimed at optimizing the effectiveness of the involved organizations by investing knowledge, expertise and partnerships at the local, national and international level by information exchange and cooperation. The national government has made funding available to develop counter-radicalization measures for the local level. The support provided by the national government focuses on building local networks and strengthening collaboration between municipalities, local partners (welfare, social affairs), educational institutions and the police (European Forum for Urban Security, 2016).

2.3.3 Local responsibilities
In light of the Comprehensive Action Plan the Dutch national government works together with municipalities towards strengthening their approach to prevent and counter radicalization. In the action plan, municipalities are attributed a key coordinating role in preventing, early identifying and preventing the threat of violent radicalization (Eijkman & Roodnat, 2017). The municipalities are attributed this role as they are responsible for ensuring the local safety and public order according to article 172 of the Local Government Act (IVF, 2015). In the case of disturbance of the public order or in case of fear for the occurrence of disturbance, the mayor is authorized to take actions. The municipality is both responsible for the physical and social safety within the municipality (IVF, 2015). The municipality can steer, intervene and create conditions through which different involved parties effectively work together and establish an acceptable level of safety and livability in the municipality (Ibid.). Thus the local level is firstly responsible for the
radicalization approach. It is furthermore best equipped to take the social context into account, to judge and monitor changes in behavior of individuals, to collaborate with local partners for possible interventions and to pick up signals of possible violent extremism (Noordegraaf et al., 2016; Eijkman & Roodnat, 2017).

Since the launch of the Action plan more and more municipalities, often supported by the national government, have set up their own policies and networks aimed at detecting and preventing radicalization. In the local approach, there is a combination of prevention and repression in which municipalities and network partners from both the security and the welfare domain work together (Gielen, 2015). The local approach is largely focused at collaboration and coordination between public authorities and communities. This is deemed important as radicalization is a widespread societal phenomenon for which it is important to have a well-functioning network of organizations, professionals, citizens and caretakers.

In 2015, the Association of Dutch Municipalities (VNG) presented a guideline factsheet which describes the responsibilities of the municipality and the mayor with regards to countering and preventing radicalization. The VNG distinguishes three phases in the local approach to prevent radicalization, which is visualized in figure 2. The first phase is aimed at the prevention of social tensions and radicalization by creating resilience and detecting (early) signals of radicalization. The second phase is the person-specific approach and deals with radicalized individuals through a multidisciplinary case meeting. The third phase focuses on the re-integration and aftercare of returnees or deceased individuals.

This research focuses on the type of network collaboration municipalities have set up with regards to the first phase. The goal of the first phase is to detect and share signals of possibly radicalized individuals. These signals can eventually lead to the possible launch of interventions towards that person through the person-specific approach in the second phase. But before municipal authorities can launch interventions, it is essential to set up local structures, find partners for cooperation and develop the knowledge of the problems (Eijkman & Roodnat, 2017). In this first phase, the VNG distinguishes multiple measures. The first measure is to appoint a chef the dossier that is the primary person of contact for questions and signals from local partners with regards to radicalization. The second measure is to formulate policy for a preventive and comprehensive approach in which the strategy is laid out to gather information through the
networks. The third line of action is to invest in the knowledge and expertise of the municipal employees, professionals and network partners in order for them to be able to adequately and effectively detect and share information. It is important to have clear guidelines in place. The fourth measure is to build a relationship of trust with societal organizations and religious communities in the area. The fifth measure is to make clear agreements with the security partners and the welfare partners about the responsibilities of each group and the way they will cooperate. The sixth and final measure that is recommended is to organize a structure in which signals are reported, shared and interpreted to assess whether a multidisciplinary case meeting is necessary (Gielen, 2015).

Effective networks are an important prerequisite to be able to share information about possible radicalized individuals. Therefore building up broad networks around the problem of violent radicalization is essential (Eijkman & Roodnat, 2017; Gielen, 2015). These networks are preferably broader than merely the security partners and should include frontline workers, key figures and other relevant parties involved in preventing violent radicalization (Gielen, 2015; Eijkman & Roodnat, 2017). These local professionals are deemed to possess knowledge and expertise that makes them capable and useful for detecting and interpreting signals of radicalization (Ibid). In the empirical part of this research, the way the municipalities under analysis have set up their respective networks for the detection and prevention of radicalization are discussed.

2.4 Effectiveness of preventive radicalization policies

As discussed in the previous paragraphs, Dutch municipalities have set up preventive policies to counter radicalization from a network approach. Yet it is difficult to establish whether this approach effectively deals with preventing radicalization. Problems in assessing effectiveness of counter-radicalization measures arise because it is difficult to fully understand, causally attribute and precisely measure the relationship between activities and outcome of radicalization policy. Prevention of radicalization leading to violent extremism is considered to be successful when the individual or group does not complete the process of radicalization and thus does not act to pursue violent activities (Romaniuk & Chowdhury Funk, 2012, p.6). The question whether a terrorist attack did not occur because the prevention program worked, or if there were few or no attempts or plots to begin with, remains difficult to answer. The absence of a terrorist attack by radicalized individuals can be ascribed to a multitude of factors. Since successful prevention would result in a nonevent or an outcome that does not happen (e.g. not radicalizing of individuals), outcomes of the preventive measures can be difficult to observe (Romaniuk & Chowdhury Funk, 2012). Therefore its effectiveness can always be questioned. As a radicalization process can depend on many factors, it is problematic to disentangle the different influences and assess the effects of
counter-radicalization policies with complete certainty. According to Hegemann and Kahl (2015) radicalization in the context of terrorism is "characterized by multiple 'unknowns' and therefore defies the logic of calculability, controllability and malleability". Hard facts about the effectiveness of counter-radicalization policies are therefore often not available (Hegemann & Kahl, 2015, p. 202). Thus local, national and international decision makers cannot rely on consensual knowledge about effective responses to inform their policies. The inherent problems of measuring the effectiveness of counter-radicalization policies ask for a different way of assessing the current policies enacted by Dutch municipalities. As was established in the previous paragraphs, it is merely not possible to analyze the concrete output of counter-radicalization policies. Yet accountability of actions in such a highly politicized policy field is important. It is therefore that in the next chapter the concept of public value is introduced. Public value offers a broader way of measuring government performance and guiding policy decisions, which not only focuses on output but also takes aspects of legitimacy and support and the capacity to act into account. The public value perspective therefore offers valuable insights with regards to radicalization prevention and detection policies.

2.5 Concluding remarks
This chapter has provided for a description of the way radicalization and counter-radicalization policies are conceptualized in this research. Furthermore the Dutch approach towards countering radicalization has been discussed. In the next chapter the public value lens is adopted and juxtaposed towards decoupling to provide for a framework to assess whether the radicalization policies, enacted through network collaborations, can be seen as providing positive societal impact as planned or whether you can speak of symbolic adaptation or implementation.
Chapter 3 - Creating public value

In the previous chapter it was discussed that it is highly challenging to assess the effectiveness of counter-radicalization policy. This chapter introduces the public value perspective on public policy, as it offers a different outlook on whether and how public policy can be valuable. This chapter therefore provides an answer for the first theoretical sub question: ‘How is public value created with respect to counter-radicalization policy?’. First, the shift towards New Public Governance is discussed as this sets the frame for the focus on public value. Second, this chapter explains what public value is and how it can be created according to the strategic triangle of Moore (1995). In the final part of this chapter, the concept of decoupling is introduced to give attention to the consequences when the elements in the strategic triangle are not tied together and there are conflicting demands. These concepts provide an analytical lens which allows to explore whether network collaboration to counter radicalization can be deemed valuable or if it could better be seen as symbolic.

3.1. A shift towards New Public Governance

Public administration thinking and practice is continuously evolving (Bryson, Crosby & Bloomberg, 2014). Before the 1980s there was the more traditional ‘Weberian’ view on public administration, characterized by a focus on supplying welfare, emphasizing an excessive reliance on administrative procedures through hierarchy and bureaucracy (Alford & Hughes, 2008, p. 134). This traditional paradigm was supplanted by the New Public Management (NPM) doctrine in the 80’s (Stoker, 2006; Bryson et al., 2014). NPM came to the fore as an answer to the slow, inflexible and inefficient bureaucracy that had developed. NPM is demand-driven and strives to make government provided services more responsive and accountable to citizens by taking a financial focus and applying market principles and techniques. This approach resulted in a strong focus on a sized down government, competition, customer satisfaction and focus on measurable results (Bao, Wang, Larsen & Morgan, 2012, p. 445). But the NPM paradigm also led to problems of its own as it was not fit to cope with the variety of complex problems governments faced in an ever growing globalized world. The dominance of organizational targets and performance contracts under NPM led to an emphasis on output and efficiency, shifting away the focus on the eventual outcome and (immaterial) impact of a policy (Stoker, 2006). This worsened government’s capacity to deal holistically with cross-cutting policy problems such as radicalization (Candel & Biesbroek, 2016).
As a response to these limitations a countermovement named New Public Governance (NPG)\(^7\) came to the fore (Bryson et al., 2014). NPG is an emerging paradigm which refocuses the core objective of government towards the achievement of public value (Osborne, 2010; Bao et al., 2012; Bryson et al., 2014). The central question in this paradigm is not whether output criteria of organizations are being met or if the strict hierarchical rules are followed, but if the service delivers valued social or economic outcomes and delivers public value for the society as a whole. As that judgement can only be made in the context of debate and deliberation, another important characteristic is engagement and exchange between relevant stakeholders through networking (Bao et al., 2012, p. 447; Stoker, 2006). These stakeholders include the public, the private market and the nonprofit sectors. The NPG approach is dynamic and flexible, and can be designed to differently cope with wicked problems in different situations (Moore, 2013). These three paradigms for governmental steering have been summarized by Bennington & Moore (2011) in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>Traditional Public Administration</th>
<th>New Public Management</th>
<th>New Public Governance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>Stable</td>
<td>Competitive</td>
<td>Continuously changing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Needs/Problems</td>
<td>Homogeneous</td>
<td>Atomized</td>
<td>Diverse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy</td>
<td>Straightforward; defined by professionals</td>
<td>Wants, expressed through the market</td>
<td>Complex, volatile and prone to risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance through</td>
<td>State- and producer-centered</td>
<td>Market- and customer-centered</td>
<td>Shaped by civil society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulation by Actors</td>
<td>Hierarchies</td>
<td>Markets</td>
<td>Networks and partnerships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theory</td>
<td>Public servants</td>
<td>Purchasers and providers, clients and contractors</td>
<td>Civic leaders</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 2: Different paradigms for governmental steering (Bennington & Moore, 2011, p.34).*

### 3.2 Public value, a multidimensional construct

As Table 2 shows, the central theory in the NPG approach is public value creation. Public value theory argues that the creation of public value is the ultimate goal of public sector activities and programs (Try & Radnor, 2007). The concept of public value was firstly introduced over two decennia ago by Mark Moore in his book *Creating Public Value* (1995). Although the concept of public value came as a welcome new approach to the field of public administration, it has also attracted some criticism in recent years. Williams & Shearer (2011, p.8) warn for the risk of it becoming a catch-all concept, which lacks clarity, specificity and consensus on what exactly is meant by public value. One of the difficulties with public value is that there is still no unambiguous

---

\(^7\) According to Bryson, Crosby & Bloomberg (2014) there is not a consensually agreed name for this new approach, but there are a lot of authors pointing to the need for a new approach and to aspects of its emergence in practice and theory.
definition of public value. Public value encompasses, but is not limited to related concepts such as the public good or public interest. It is about the positive societal, political and economic outcomes generated by public interventions (van der Meer, 2010, p. 26). Some see public value as an aggregation of individual satisfactions, others see it as what the government considers as publicly valuable and others see it as a combination of individual and collective valuable purposes (Moore, 2005, p. 16). According to Kelly, Mulgan & Muers (2002, p.4) this perspective should be widened, as something can only be considered as public value if citizens, either individually or collectively, are prepared to give up something, for example information or privacy in return for security. This can only be done through dialogue and reaffirmation by actors in society (Rhodes & Wanna, 2009; van der Meer, 2010, p. 26). Due to the lack of a clear definition, the broad interpretation of public value provided by O’Flynn (2007) is adopted in this research. O’Flynn (2007) describes public value as a ‘multidimensional construct’ which is “a reflection of collectively expressed, politically mediated preference consumed by the citizenry – created not just through ‘outcomes’ but also through process which may generate trust or fairness” (p.358).

Despite the fact that public value remains a rather broad concept on its own, it can be a valuable framework from which to look at counter-radicalization policies. In order for the framework to be useful, there is a need to further specify how the public value framework is adopted in this research. The interpretation of the public value framework differs in the literature (Williams & Shearer, 2011; Rhodes & Wanna, 2007). Alford & O’Flynn (2009) identified four different meanings that are attributed to public value. The first meaning of public value adopted in some articles is seeing public value as a new paradigm as opposed to NPM, which was broadly discussed in the previous paragraph. A second meaning attributed to public value by critics is public value as a rhetorical strategy, designed to defend the increasing bureaucratic power of public managers (p. 180). A third emergent meaning is public value as a narrative, in a world of competing stories. The last meaning Alford & O’Flynn (2009, p. 184) describe is public value as a performance measurement framework from which to look at the total benefits which flow from governmental action. It is the latter meaning of public value that is adopted in this research, as the purpose of this research is to evaluate how networks create and enact valuable counter-radicalization policy rather than providing a normative account on what is the most valuable policy. In the case of radicalization policy that would be a highly troublesome effort.

The novelty of the concept of public value as a way of looking at performance lies in the notion that the public value framework not only focuses on the fact that value can be created through output, but also through establishing a common purpose, a legitimate process and building operational capacity (Meynhardt, 2015, p. 147). By combining objective and subjective performance within a larger picture of human values established in the public sphere, public value offers a broad way of measuring government performance and guiding policy decisions.
(Meynhardt, 2015, p.147). In turn, this can help improve policy decisions and improve the relations between government and citizens (Alford & O’Flynn, 2009). Recognizing and reporting public value can therefore be seen as a form of accountability of governmental actions. The central point of focus in public value as a performance measurement framework is the strategic triangle (Moore, 2008). According to Moore (2008) the strategic triangle can be used as a framework to assess the public value performance of an organization. Therefore this research focuses on the strategic triangle as the central principle in Moore’s Public Value framework. In the following paragraphs, the concept of public value in light of the strategic triangle is further discussed.

### 3.3 Public value creation through the strategic triangle

The strategic triangle can be used as a framework for assessing the value of the performance by organizations, or in other words the creation of public value (Moore, 2008; Alford & O’Flynn, 2009). Moore (1995) visualizes public value through a ‘strategic triangle’, which consists of three interdependent elements. The strategic triangle is visualized in figure 3. These elements, which can be seen as variables of public value, are ‘public value proposition’, ‘legitimacy and support’, and ‘operational capacity’. These elements reflect distinct priorities and concerns for public administration. In the following sections, these three core elements of the strategic triangle are discussed in more detail. Subsequently, the way the strategic triangle can be applied is discussed.

![Figure 3: The Strategic Triangle (based on Moore, 1995)](image)

#### 3.3.1 Public value proposition

The public value proposition focuses on the value the organization wants to achieve, in other words the substantive aims against which impact and performance should be assessed (Williams

---

8 If for example the legitimacy and support changes, this will also have effect on the operational capacity and public value proposition
Whereas in private organizations this is often focused on maximizing profit, in public organizations this is aimed at societal outcomes that cannot be captured in financial terms. Although these goals might be vague, Moore (1995; 2013) considers it of the utmost importance that the mission and vision of an organization are defined in terms of a public value proposition, aimed at creating value for the environment. The organization also needs to show that the goals and activities relate to the output and outcomes envisioned and formulate clear strategic goals from the proposition (Moore, 2003). A more extensive and detailed public value proposition is preferred. It is important to note that the element ‘public value proposition’ should not be conflated with (overall) public value. The public value proposition is merely one way of creating public value, next to the other two elements in the strategic triangle (Moore, 2003, p. 23). The idea behind the public value proposition is that the organization strives for and achieves publicly valuable purposes through a value proposition and a plan of action that relates to the proposition. What is publicly valuable in this context is not an absolute standard, but is relative to the circumstances in the task environment (Alford & O’Flynn, 2009). The public value proposition should be valuable in the context of the material and social problems that arise (ibid.). The proposition is prone to change if environmental conditions change, just like the other two elements in the strategic triangle (Moore, 2013, p. 104).

With regards to counter-radicalization programs, different goals and courses of action can lie at the essence of the policy. Depending on the environmental context of municipalities, relating to whether terrorist attacks have taken place and/or the threat level of possible terrorist attacks, it is assumable that different priorities or ambitions may lie at the heart of the public value proposition of counter-radicalization policies. These policies can for example be aimed at creating a large network in the community for detection purposes, investing in the training of professionals to cope with radicalization or be predominantly focused at building community resilience through improving intercommunity harmony, social cohesion and socio-economic conditions. It is important that municipalities develop a coherent and clear policy strategy guiding the overall approach and actions to radicalization prevention. This approach can be adapted if necessary. (NCTV, 2014, p. 11).

### 3.3.2 Legitimacy and support

The second element described in the strategic triangle is ‘legitimacy and support’. In order to fulfill their goal, public organizations need to create sources of legitimacy and support from the authorizing environment to achieve the outcomes defined (Moore, 2013, p.103). The authorizing environment consists of relevant stakeholders, politicians, media and civil society (Moore, 1995; Geuijen, 2014). Legitimacy and support needs to be addressed both internally and externally (Provan & Kenis, 2008, p. 243). Internal legitimacy and support refers to the fact that the
organization needs their stakeholders to acknowledge the relevance of investing time, budgets, authority and resources to continue the process or intervention. External legitimacy refers to the fact that public sector organizations need to be accountable outwardly to their authorizing environment to garner their support (Williams & Shearer, 2011, p. 1372). It is important to obtain a 'license to operate' so that actions can be taken to achieve the public value proposition (Moore & Khagram, 2004, p.11). The more legitimacy and support an organization enjoys, the better its chances are for operating autonomously and contributing to creating public value (Moore, 2003). For counter-radicalization policies this means that the municipalities need political support from the national government, the city council, the alderman and the mayor. Support from local partners is also important. Parties involved are police, (local) media, local citizens and the target group (NCTV, 2014, p. 11-12). According to Moore (2003) for support and legitimacy it is of high importance to maintain good relationships with the stakeholders, have visibility and support with the public for the actions taken, build a positive media image and have a high degree of trustworthiness and credibility with relevant stakeholders.

3.3.3 Operational capacity
The third and final element in the strategic triangle is ‘operational capacity’. Operational capacity refers to whether the organization can organize enough knowledge and capacity to actually produce the public value proposed (Moore, 1995). The necessary operational capacity for public value production goes beyond organizational capacity as external capabilities are often needed to produce the proposed public value. Operational capacity relates to financial resources, employees, technology and capacity (Moore, 2013, p. 227). In the case of radicalization policy, governments have therefore started to work together with societal partners in network collaborations. Public organizations are expected to align people, processes and resources to achieve the task at hand, coordinating and collaborating between a range of organizations and groups within and beyond government (Alford et al., 2016). The essence of operational capacity lies in connecting the outcomes and public value proposition with the capacities of the organization (Moore, 2003). It is important for organizations to learn new ways of doing their current work. Some part of the value created by organizations lies in the capacity to link contributing individuals to one another (Moore, 2003). In the field of counter-radicalization policy, the operational capacity can be strengthened by sharing knowledge, training professionals and improving the knowledge of and with the stakeholders. Making more people available for working on the counter-radicalization policy can furthermore have a positive impact on the operational capacity. For municipalities facing greater radicalization problems than average, the operational capacity could be strengthened by appointing a radicalization expert as a local person of contact and coordinator (NCTV, 2014, p. 12).
3.4 Tight coupling and decoupling

3.4.1 Tight coupling

The strategic triangle stresses the fact that public value can be created by an understanding of what actions should be taken in a particular context to counter radicalization, authorization and legitimacy to create it and the capacity to act upon it (Bryson et al., 2016, p. 2). These three elements are all attributed equal status and are interdependent (Moore & Kahram, 2004). Organizations can attain each of these elements of public value to a higher or lesser degree. Moore’s assumption is that when the three elements of the strategic triangle are aligned and balanced this will have positive effects on the overall public value that can be created, as the elements positively reinforce each other (Moore, 1995; Geuijen, 2014). In applying the strategic triangle, it is therefore the challenge to maximize the degree of alignment between these three elements (Alford & O’Flynn, 2009). Alignment in this case means that a public value proposition is adopted, for which there is adequate legitimacy and support from the authorizing environment and sufficient operational capacity has been made available to fulfill the goal. In Moore’s visualization of the strategic triangle, a logical way of creating public value in which the elements are aligned, would be to find a common proposition of action, mobilize the legitimacy and support and create the operational capacity to act upon that line of action (Moore, 2003). From an institutionalist perspective, this situation of alignment can be seen as a situation of tight coupling (Bromley & Powell, 2012). Tight coupling refers to a situation in which the different parts of an organization, system or practice are organized in a sequence or a series, pointing towards the same direction (Weick, 1976), similar to the proposed application of the strategic triangle. As the three elements in the strategic triangle are rarely in alignment or coupled in their natural state, there is a constant need for trade-offs to be made between the three elements to remain tightly coupled (Alford & O’Flynn, 2009, p. 173-174). If, for example, a more extensive public value proposition is not achievable within the available operational capacity, trade-offs need to be made by adjusting the public value proposition to a less ambitious one or by trying to create more operational capacity to fulfill the public value proposition (ibid.). Similarly, if the legitimacy and support for the proposed public value proposition is lacking, the strategy can be to either persuade the key players in the authorizing environment to change their position or revise the public value proposition (Alford & O’Flynn, 2009, p. 174).

Situations of tight coupling and successful trade-offs do not often occur naturally or even at all (Bromley & Powell, 2012). Especially in the case of network collaborations, the coexistence of multiple actors with their own logics about what is effective and legitimate increases the likelihood that there are different expectations and pressures with regards to the elements in the public value triangle. This leads to misalignment. Conflicting institutional demands may influence
organizations at the ideological level, prescribing which goals should be pursued in the public value proposition. They may also exert pressure at the functional level of operational capacity, requiring organizations to adopt certain means in light of the policies. Satisfying one demand may require violating others, which potentially jeopardizes the legitimacy of the activities (Pache & Santos, 2010, p.457).

3.4.2 Decoupling
Numerous studies found that in order to cope with conflicting demands, organizations in practice decouple their original structures or procedures. This allows them to meet multiple and conflicting demands from the multilayered environment while remaining effective and legitimate (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Pache & Santos, 2010; Bromley & Powell, 2012). Decoupling can therefore be seen as “a situation where expectations of the institutional environment appear to conflict with the interests of the organizations, and therefore the organizations might try to acquire legitimacy without necessarily changing their practices, by deploying formal structures that meet institutional demands but are disconnected from the actual practice” (MacLean & Benham, 2010, p. 1500). This notion of decoupling is a strategic response by organizations to cope with conflicting demands and allows for connecting elements of public value that in practice do not align with each other. It seems that organizations or collaborations might adopt a certain policy on paper, in reality they might not implement this policy as the necessary operational capacity might be lacking. This means that while a situation may seem tightly coupled to the outside world, in reality it is not.

Despite the fact that decoupling can be seen as a potentially misleading way of handling the conflicting demands put on an organization, institutional theorists have also pointed at the virtues of decoupling the internal work activities from the more formal structures and assessment from the outside. It can be seen as a means to maintain faith and legitimacy of the organization (Oliver, 1991, p.145; MacLean & Benham, 2010, p. 1500). Decoupling can serve the interests of an organization or network collaboration in maintaining autonomy and legitimacy, minimizing intervention and maximizing efficiency (Oliver, 1991, p. 155). Yet if under a lot of public scrutiny, the effort to decouple activities might make the organization or network’s activities regarding radicalization open to suspicion and therefore potentially reducing its ability to obtain resources, legitimacy and support (Oliver, 1991, p. 155). Thus decoupling can be seen as a two-faced coping mechanism, which can have both a positive and a negative influence on the public value elements. Although decoupling does not per definition hint at a problematic situation, incorporating the notion of decoupling as opposed to tight coupling does provide for a richer story about how and on what account public value is created. To understand the consequences of alignment and misalignment of the elements in the strategic triangle, the concept of the seemingly tightly coupled process of public value creation is juxtaposed with the concept of decoupling.
3.4.3 Types of decoupling
Bromley & Powell (2012) have identified two types of decoupling that can occur with regards to public value creation. In this paragraph both types and their expected relevance for radicalization policies are discussed. The first type that is discussed is policy-practice decoupling and the second is means-ends decoupling.

Policy-practice decoupling
In policy-practice decoupling, also known as symbolic adoption, there is a disconnect between the official policies and the practices organizations engage in. Policy-practice decoupling can occur when official policies are not implemented or are routinely violated either through a lack of will (legitimacy and support) or a lack of (operational) capacity (Bromley & Powell, 2012, p.7). Policy-practice decoupling occurs when there is a mismatch between what is written in paper and what happens in reality. On paper the radicalization approach may be put forward better than it is deployed in practice. The idea is that this could potentially help to confer legitimacy and support and/or operational capacities and can therefore be a valuable mechanism (Haack & Schoeneborn, 2015). On the other hand, if stakeholders lack confidence and good faith in the collaboration, this may lead them to see the organization as illegitimate which will enforce negative sanctions. For example, municipalities could state that they are creating a broad network of stakeholders. It may be that in reality the network collaboration consists of a small group of stakeholders. This could potentially harm the support for a certain policy, if excluded groups speak out and scrutinize the policy. Another example is a situation where the official policy focuses on an inclusive approach towards radicalization prevention, but in reality other practices occur. It could also be the case that there is a very ambitious public value proposition, but there is not enough legitimacy and support and/or operational capacity, which could results in less valuable results. Policies could also be routinely violated by stakeholders due to a lack of support and/or capacity (Bromley & Powell, 2012). The actions in practice are decoupled from the policy on paper. Although decoupling can occur in the beginning of a policy or collaboration, it can also develop over time. The goals that organizations initially establish and the means they engage in to achieve these goals are not static over time, but dynamic. Grodal & O’Mahoney (2015) argue that this can make coordination among stakeholders and maintain convergence on a common goal challenging. In the multi-stakeholder context of preventive counter-radicalization policies, collaboration and coordination between these stakeholders is needed. It could be the case that stakeholders over time shift to neglecting the shared goal and give priority to their own goals in their daily practices, either deliberately or not if the topic of radicalization fades away.

Means-ends decoupling
Means-ends decoupling, also known as symbolic implementation, describes the existence of organizational practices that are aligned with the public value proposition but have unproven
utility towards that policy or goal. The focus on information and procedure rather than directly on the achievement of goals or technical or administrative needs is at the core of means-ends decoupling (Bromley & Powell, 2012, p.26). The extensive efforts to attract legitimacy and support from stakeholders for a certain policy could actually detract from working towards the original program goal. If there are too many demands from the authorizing environment that need to be accommodated before action can be taken, this can lead to goal drift or goal displacement. Means-ends decoupling often occurs when practices are implemented but the link between these formal policy practices and the intended outcome or goal of an organization or collaboration is uncertain (Bromley & Powell, 2012). Means-ends decoupling is especially prevalent in practices with a social goal, and in contexts where the effects of actions and outcomes are difficult to measure and when there is a complex fragmented environment (Orton & Weick, 1990; Bromley & Powell, 2012). A fragmented environment is characterized by a direct accountability to a large number of stakeholders and when there is a lot of societal pressure due to visibility because of size, status or perception of the public interest (Bromley & Powell, 2012, p. 7). In the second chapter of this research it was established that the matter of radicalization fits the described context. As it is not within the scope of this research to assess what the ‘ends’ are and how the means contribute to those ends, this type of decoupling is not investigated. The focus is rather on how the network collaboration creates public value, not whether the outcomes are effective in preventing radicalization.

3.5 Concluding remarks
This chapter has provided an answer to the first theoretical sub-question ‘How is public value created with respect to counter-radicalization policy’. By discussing the strategic triangle of public value creation by Moore (1995) it was found that public value can be created on three interrelated elements. These are the public value proposition, legitimacy and support and operational capacity. When these are all in place and tightly coupled, this is the most favorable situation for maximizing public value creation. As was mentioned in paragraph 3.4, in reality this situation does not always occur. Therefore the concept of decoupling is introduced to better understand what it means for public value creation if there is misalignment of the elements in the strategic triangle. Due to conflicting demands, organizations may purposefully or accidentally decouple policy from practice. In describing these concepts from a theoretical perspective, this chapter has laid the groundwork for the measurement of public value creation. This is the dependent variable in this research. In the next chapter the notion of network collaborations is theoretically introduced, through which public value is created. In the case of counter-radicalization policies, municipalities work together with stakeholders in network collaborations to deal with the issues at hand.
Chapter 4 - Network collaboration

The previous chapter described that the concepts of public value and decoupling are used to analyze the counter-radicalization approach of municipalities aimed at creating public value. The counter-radicalization approach is more and more enacted by stakeholders collaborating in networks. Yet the creation of public value in a network collaboration is only possible if these networks meet the requirements for successful network collaboration (Geuijen, 2011; Ansell & Gash, 2008; Provan & Kenis, 2008). These requirements provide insight into whether organizations are equipped to jointly address problems. Therefore this chapter discusses the characteristics of network collaboration and requirements for successful network collaboration as these are of influence on the type of public value creation. In chapter five the relations between public value creation and network collaborations are further specified. This chapter thus provides the answer to the second theoretical sub question ‘What are the requirements for effective network collaboration?’.

4.1 From government to governance with and through networks

The problems that societies deal with are too complex and the resources are too fragmented and scarce for the government to tackle societal problems and create public value on its own (Geuijen, 2011). As was discussed in chapter two, radicalization is considered a wicked problem as there is a lot of uncertainty about the causes and appropriate solutions to deal with the matter (Noordegraaf et al., 2016, p.146). Cross-sector collaborations in the form of networks have risen in importance as an attempt to deal with these wicked problems as they are considered to be the most successful strategy to do so (Noordegraaf et al., 2016, p. 145; Geuijen, 2011).

Wicked problems transcend organizational and sectoral boundaries and therefore approaches by traditional governmental hierarchies and the market no longer proved adequate to provide the problem-solving capacity necessary to deal with wicked issues (Head & Alford, 2015). Governments have become more and more (inter)dependent on other actors from civil society and the market to achieve their goals. The government is no longer the central steering organization with a monopoly on knowledge. Rather, it needs its partners to develop the problem-solving capacity to deal with wicked problems (Weber & Khademian, 2008). This development, in which the government plays a less central and decisive role and in which other societal actors are becoming more important in developing and implementing public policy, can be seen as the shift from government to governance (Rhodes, 1996). Governance in this context can be defined as “the attempt to steer society and the economy through collective actions and forms of regulation that links values and objectives to outputs and outcomes” (Torfing, 2012). Governance involves a shift in the role of government, not the elimination of government itself. The government does still
remain overall responsible for the public service (McGuire & Agranoff, 2011, p. 278). In this shift from government to governance, networks have become a new dominant mode of organizing the way public problems are governed and implemented as opposed to the principles of hierarchy and market (Powell, 1990).

In the literature there is a stable consensus that network collaborations demonstrate desirable characteristics to accomplish dealing with complex tasks related to wicked problems such as radicalization (Head & Alford, 2015; Noordegraaf et al., 2016). Networks are flexible, efficient, and innovative organizing hybrids that enable the participants to accomplish something collectively that could not be accomplished individually (Weber & Khademian, 2008, p. 334). They have the potential to create public value and accumulate resources, knowledge and expertise needed to carry out complex tasks and missions. Networks provide a platform for coordinating and safeguarding information exchanges and have the capacity for sharing experiences and learning between network participants (Ibid., 2008). This enables new ways of thinking about complex issues, both for understanding why the problem has emerged and for formulating solutions that are supported. Collaborations may also be helpful in improving the quality and effectiveness of implementation, because it enables shared contributions, coordinated actions and mutual adjustments as problems arise in putting the agreed solutions in practice (Head & Alford, 2015, p.724).

4.2 Defining network collaboration

Networks have become a central concept in the public administration and management literature. Provan & Kenis (2008) have defined networks as "three or more legally autonomous organizations that work together to achieve not only their own goals but also a collective goal" (p.231). As it is not yet clear how municipal networks collaborate, and due to the fact that these networks differ per municipality, this definition makes it possible to investigate all the networks in which three or more organizations collaborate. Network collaboration is what happens when the organization is in a network work together. The goal of public networks is to share information, build capacity, solve problems and deliver services. The following definition of network collaboration by Page et al. (2015) is adopted: "the sharing or linking of information, capabilities and decision-making, coordinating activities to address problems together and jointly achieve an outcome that the organization could not achieve on its own" (p. 716). Such a collaboration does not require the partners to equally share information, resources, activities or capabilities (ibid.). The ultimate test for network collaborations is whether and how it creates public value (Moore, 1995; Geuijen, 2011; Page et al., 2015, p. 2).

Although network collaboration is the most-opted for approach to tackle wicked problems, it is hardly an easy one (Bryson, Crosby & Stone, 2015; van Delden, 2009). Policy issues
such as radicalization involve a wide variety of actors who often have different, and sometimes competing, understandings of the issue, interests, values, concerns, expectations and the desired solution (OSCE, 2014, p. 71). Effectively countering radicalization threats requires the involvement of both traditional actors from the security and criminal-justice sectors (especially the police) and a varying number of additional public authorities such as social and health services and community actors (OSCE, 2014, p. 70; Gielen, 2015). The conflicting values, understandings and interests of these actors pose difficulties with regards to effective collaboration (Weber & Khademian, 2008; OSCE, 2014). In practice the advantages of network collaboration might remain rather limited if the network collaboration encounters internal or external limitations and therefore cannot operate effectively (van Delden, 2009, p. 36). It is therefore important to investigate the requirements for effective network collaboration.

### 4.3 Requirements for effective network collaboration

In the previous paragraph it was established that network collaborations have the potential to generate advantages. But, according to Provan & Kenis (2008) networks can only truly generate advantages if they operate effectively. Effectiveness of network collaboration can be broadly described as “the attainment of positive network level outcomes, that could not normally be achieved by individual organizational participants acting independently” (Provan & Kenis, 2008, p. 230). As was discussed in chapter three, outcome is broader than merely output. In this research the concept of public value is used to assess what kind of outcome network collaborations produce. In order to produce public value, networks need to operate effectively.

Research indicates that process and structure work closely together to foster effective cross-sector collaboration (Provan & Kenis, 2008; Ansell & Gash, 2008, p. 550; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000, p.144). Network collaborations can emerge in many different structures. Provan & Kenis (2008) have identified three effective network coordination structures, whose structural patterns of relations matter as they lead to different network effects (p. 233). These network types are a **shared governance**, a **lead organization network** and a **network administrative organization (NAO)**. These ‘ideal type’ network structures differently engage their stakeholders through the adopted configuration and therefore can be effective under different process-oriented circumstances. Although several holistic frameworks for cross-sector collaboration have been published in the last decade (Bryson et al., 2015, p. 648), the one provided by Provan & Kenis (2008) provides for the clearest theoretical rationale for the adoption of one network type over another in a certain circumstance. For the purpose of this research, in which different types of municipal networks aimed at countering radicalization are compared, this is the most suitable framework.

---

9 See Box 1 for more information about stakeholders involved
Relating to the process of a network collaboration, the literature describes many elements that are deemed important process elements of network collaboration. Yet due to the size and scope of this study these cannot all be incorporated. Therefore a selection of four key predictors for effective network collaboration have been chosen from the literature. Although the selected requirements are not the only criteria to assess the effectiveness of a network, the literature regarding the requirements for network collaboration suggests that these elements selected present the factors particularly important in explaining the variance in choice of one form over another (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Provan & Kenis, 2008; Hermansson, 2016). These four predictors deemed to be important for effective network collaboration have been based on the theoretical argument of Provan & Kenis (2008) and supplemented by insights from Ansell & Gash (2008) and Bryson et al (2015). The conditions chosen are: ‘Stakeholder inclusion’, ‘Commitment to process’, ‘Mutual trust’, and ‘Goal consensus’ which are all discussed in the sections starting from paragraph 4.3.1. The selection of these requirements is grounded on the basis of several considerations.

First, as the main argument put forward in this thesis regarding network collaboration is inspired by the work of Provan & Kenis (2008), the elements of mutual trust, stakeholder inclusion and goal consensus have been incorporated. These three requirements selected were deemed important for the effectiveness of networks in the other scholarly articles conducted as well and therefore are relevant to this research (Provan & Kenis, 2008; Ansell & Gash, 2008; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000; Bryson et al., 2015). The fourth requirement used by Provan & Kenis (2008) is network level competencies. This element is not incorporated in this research as the network collaborations under investigation all concern the same task and therefore are not expected to vary on this account. Instead of this requirement, the element of ‘commitment to process’ was added. This requirement partly overlaps with the network level competency element of Provan & Kenis (2008), as it is different for each type of network to what extent the commitment and competences of its stakeholders is needed to for an effective network (Ansell & Gash, 2008). Commitment to process relates to both the initial conditions for an organization to participate in a network collaboration and the actual commitment enacted in the process. A stakeholder’s level of commitment to collaboration is therefore a critical variable in explaining success or failure of the different network types (Ansell & Gash, 2008) and is therefore incorporated.

The second consideration that led to the choice of the four requirements has to do with the specific context of network collaborations for counter-radicalization policies. The requirements were compared with the key factors for the success of multi-stakeholder partnerships as described by the Organization for Security Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in their report ‘Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: A Community-Policing Approach’ (2014, p. 71-72). The key factors for successful cooperation distinguished by the OSCE are commitment of all parties, readiness to identify shared
objectives and interests and mutual trust towards all partners in the collaboration. Thus the selected requirements also prove to be relevant in the specific issue of radicalization prevention.

Because it depends on the chosen network coordination structure whether the requirements lead to more or less effectiveness of the network collaboration, the following paragraph first describes the different structures of network collaborations. Afterwards, the requirements for effective collaboration are presented combined with a discussion on how they relate to the three coordination structures as provided by Provan & Kenis (2008).

4.3.1 Network coordination structures

Provan and Kenis (2008) distinguish three forms of network governance which describe the way a network is coordinated and how leadership and power is divided. These more structural forms of a network are deemed to have an impact on the outcomes (Provan & Kenis, 2008). The institutional arrangements are critical factors, which affect both the success and the failure of networks (Hermansson, 2016).

The first form is shared governance. In this form the network is completely governed by the multiple organizations that the network is composed of. Every organization interacts on an equal basis with every other organization in the network, decisions are made jointly and activities are managed together (Provan & Kenis, 2008, p.233-234). There is no distinct formal administrative entity, although some administrative and coordinative activities may be performed by a subset of the network. Power in the network is more or less symmetrical, although differences may exist with regards to resource capabilities and organizational size (ibid). The network participants itself are responsible for maintaining contact with each other and stakeholders outside of the network. This model’s strength lies in the inclusion and involvement of all network participants and in its flexibility and responsiveness to the needs of network participants. On the other hand it can be a relatively inefficient network type (Kenis & Provan, 2009, p. 446).

In the second form, the lead organization network, all the network’s activities and decisions are coordinated through and by a single participating actor who acts as a lead organization (Provan & Kenis, 2008, p. 235). All the network participants are directly connected to the lead organization, but not necessarily as directly to the other participants. The lead organization provides administration for the network and/or facilitates the activities of member organizations in their efforts to achieve network goals. The network participants need to share a common goal to a certain extent as well as maintaining individual goals. The power in this type of governance is centralized and brokered, which gives the lead organization more power than other parties, for example in making important decisions. If this is not handled carefully it might lead to frustration and friction. The perks of this type is its efficiency (Provan & Kenis, 2008).
The third form that Provan & Kenis (2008) discuss is the *Network Administrative Organization (NAO)*. In this form of governance, there is also one organization in the lead of the organization. This is not a network member but a separate centralized administrative entity set up to specifically coordinate and sustain the network and the activities. This is not one of the network participants but a separate entity that is not involved in the content of the collaboration. The main task of the NAO is to coordinate. A NAO might be built on relatively informal structures consisting of a single individual acting as the network’s facilitator but it can also be more formalized (Kenis & Provan, 2009, p. 448). The different type of network coordination structures are visualized in figure 4.

![Diagram of network coordination structures](image)

*Figure 4: Types of network collaborations adapted from Provan & Kenis (2008)*

### 4.3.2 Stakeholder inclusion

The first requirement for effective network collaboration is stakeholder inclusion. According to Ansell & Gash (2008, p. 556) collaborations have to pay attention to getting stakeholders to participate meaningfully in the network in order to be successful. First of all, this relates to the size of the network and to which extent stakeholders are included and excluded in the network (Provan & Kenis, 2008; Ansell & Gash, 2008). The most effective form of governance of a network in a certain context depends for a large part on the number of network members. When a network is small, the shared governance model is typically the most effective as it is still manageable to coordinate the network (Provan & Kenis, 2008). In a shared governance structure there is a lot of face-to-face contact and therefore problems can be solved more adequately. The larger the network, the harder it is to coordinate. In turn this can lead to inefficiency. The NAO and lead organization network tend to be more effective when the network is larger, as they can steer the network. If the network is very large, the NAO is more suitable then the lead organization network as it does not require direct contact with all members.
Another important factor relating to stakeholder inclusion is whether the network consists of the main key stakeholders and that they feel involved in the process (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000, p. 141). Attempts to exclude certain stakeholders can ultimately threaten the collaboration process or lead to direct failure of the collaboration and hamper the potential of a collaboration (O’Brien, 2010, p.5; Ansell & Gash, 2008, p. 556; Hermansson, 2016). The legitimacy of a network collaboration depends for a large part on being inclusive of a broad spectrum of stakeholders in the problem under consideration. It is more likely that lead organization networks and NAO’s include more stakeholders, as they have the potential to be larger. Most importantly, the way stakeholders are included needs to correspond with the structure adopted. The network governance types of Provan & Kenis (2008) describe that power between stakeholders can differ in networks. In shared governance network modes the assumption is that organizations are equal, whereas in the other two types some organizations have more power than others. Although power imbalances in the latter two types are not necessarily problematic as it is part of the network structure, this might be problematic if it occurs in a shared governance arrangement. In that situation the structure and process do not fit each other well, potentially hampering effective collaboration (Provan & Kenis, 2008).

### 4.3.3 Mutual trust

Many scholars describe the importance of trust in network collaborations. Trust and trust building among stakeholders is considered to be essential for collaboration to take place and be effective (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; Ansell & Gash, 2008; Willem & Lucidarme, 2013; Bryson et al., 2015). Actors will refrain from action and cooperation if trust is absent (Klijn, Steijn & Edelenbos., 2010, p.3). Trust in networks can be seen as the belief that opportunism and power will not be (ab)used at the cost of others in the network (Willem & Lucidarme, 2013). Trust can be defined as confidence in the reliability of a person or a system, regarding a given set of outcomes or events (Klijn et al., 2010, p. 10). Trust reduces uncertainty about the actions of other actors (Bryson et al., 2015). In a network context, the distribution of trust and whether it is reciprocated is important (Provan & Kenis, 2008).

Trust is a difficult concept to measure as it often mainly relies on the perception or feeling of the stakeholders. Therefore a few objective indicators are used to measure whether trust is distributed within the network, next to stakeholder perceptions. In the literature several factors that affect the level of trust are distinguished. In dealing with ambiguous problems that cannot be easily parsed into intermediate outcomes, trust can be built by face-to-face dialogue (Ansell & Gash, 2008, p.561; Klijn, et al., 2010, p.14). The frequency of contact through meetings and outside of meetings has a positive influence on the distribution of trust in the network and is therefore incorporated (Ansell & Gash, 2008, p. 16-17). In addition to that, the history of the relationship
between stakeholders can negatively or positively affect the trust level. If there is a history of antagonism instead of cooperation, this can hinder the trust level needed for effective collaboration and information sharing. On the other hand, if there has been a positive experience with previous collaboration this can be positive for the degree of trust (Ansell & Gash, 2008, p. 553). The sharing of information is an important indicator for whether trust is distributed in a collaboration (Klijn et al., 2010). Therefore the way and the frequency information is shared was measured. As control and supervision is often seen as the opposite of trust, one indicator of trust is looking at if and how activities of stakeholders are supervised (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; Hermansson, 2016). The degree to which trust is decisive for the effectiveness of a network collaboration depends on the chosen network type of Provan & Kenis (2008). In a shared governance network a high degree of trust between all actors is more important than in a NAO or lead organization network. In the latter types trust only needs to exist towards the leading/administrative organization or person.

4.3.4 Commitment to process

The third predictor of network effectiveness is commitment to the process. Ansell & Gash (2008, p. 559) have found that stakeholder commitment to the collaboration process is a critical variable in explaining success or failure of a network collaboration as it impacts the competencies made available. A belief in success and a sense of urgency for the collaboration and effort put in by the network members is needed for effective cooperation. Commitment to the process entails a mutual recognition of interdependence or in other words a shared interest to work together, even if the results of the collaboration goes into a direction that a stakeholder does not fully support from its own perspective (Ansell & Gash, 2008). If there is no shared feeling of mutual dependency, the network partners will feel less need and commitment to work together in a network and share their organization specific input. Furthermore a feeling of shared ownership and responsibility for the process and its outcome is necessary (Bryson et al., 2015). The stakeholders should feel shared responsibility and urgency for involvement the process, the choices and the policy solutions decided upon in the collaboration (Ansell & Gash, 2008). A higher degree of commitment by the stakeholders will presumably result in a more effective network collaboration, whereas a lack of commitment leads to an ineffective network collaboration (ibid.). If there is a high degree of urgency with multiple organizations in a network, a shared governance network is more effective. If there is a relatively low degree of urgency, a lead organization network can be useful, as the lead organization can guide and steer the network. For a NAO, the sense of urgency should be higher for it to be effective, as the NAO merely coordinates rather than acts.
4.3.5 Goal consensus

The final key predictor that is distinguished from the literature is the degree to which organizations strive for the same goal in a network collaboration. Ansell & Gash (2008, p. 560) describe the importance of stakeholders having a shared understanding of the goal of the collaboration, of what they can and want to achieve together. There might be variance across the network members regarding the agreement on network-level goals and the extent to which their own organizational goals can be achieved through the network (Provan & Kenis, 2008, p. 240). Stakeholders can collaborate on certain goals, despite maintaining different interests. Therefore a shared understanding of the networks’ goal is not the same as shared interest of the network members. The individual goals of the members do not have to be the same, as long as they can find a shared goal to work towards. The degree of goal consensus was measured by analyzing whether the network collaboration goals for the stakeholders overlap or differ and whether individual goals are placed over network goals or not. A high level of goal consensus is an advantage especially in building commitment and sharing information, but networks can still be effective with only moderate levels of goal consensus. The critical issue is then how the network relationships are governed. Shared governance networks are most effective when the degree of goal consensus is high, as this leads to less conflict. If there is a lot of conflict this is especially harmful for such a close knit network as a shared governance network. If the degree of goal consensus is lower, the NAO and lead organization network are more effective. A NAO can also still be effective if there is a lower degree of goal consensus, as they have a coordinating and conflict resolving role, which can have a positive influence on goal consensus (Provan & Kenis, 2008). Especially in the lead organization network, the lead organization can make the most strategic and operational decisions and therefore a lower degree of goal consensus amongst all partners is required. On the other hand, if the level of goal consensus is extremely low, there is little point to network involvement at all.

4.3.6 Predictors for network effectiveness

Effectiveness of the network collaboration can be assessed based on the four characteristics that have been discussed in the previous section. It is important to note that it is dependent upon the coordination structure, to what degree the other requirements of network effectiveness apply (Provan & Kenis, 2008). These four network effectiveness indicators can also influence each other, but this was not investigated as it is beyond the scope of this research. The predictors for network effectiveness, depending on the adopted structure have been summarized in Table 3. A shared governance network is the most effective network when there are relatively few stakeholders included in the collaboration, there is a high and widespread level of goal consensus, there is a high density of mutual trust between the stakeholders and there is a high density of commitment.
The lead organization network is the most effective network if there are a moderate number of stakeholders included, the goal consensus is moderately low, there is a low density of trust, but there is trust towards the lead organization and there is a low density of commitment, except with the lead organization. The NAO is most effective when there are many stakeholders involved, that have a moderately high goal consensus, a moderate density of trust among the members and a moderate density of commitment towards the network collaboration.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coordination structure</th>
<th>Stakeholder inclusion (Size)*</th>
<th>Goal consensus*</th>
<th>Mutual trust*</th>
<th>Commitment to process</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shared Governance</strong></td>
<td>Few (6-8)</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High density</td>
<td>High density of commitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lead organization network</strong></td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderately low</td>
<td>Low density, highly centralized</td>
<td>Low density of commitment, centralized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NAO</strong></td>
<td>Moderate to many</td>
<td>Moderately high</td>
<td>Moderate density</td>
<td>Moderate density of commitment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 3: Predictors for network effectiveness (Adapted from Provan & Kenis, 2008).

4.4 Concluding remarks
In this chapter the concept of network collaborations was thoroughly discussed. It was established that depending on the chosen coordination structure, there are four requirements of network collaboration that serve as predictors for the potential effectiveness of the collaboration in the network. These requirements are stakeholder inclusion, goal consensus, mutual trust and commitment to process. If network collaborations fulfill these requirements of effectiveness it is assumed that they are also more capable of creating public value on the different accounts of the strategic triangle. Thus this chapter has provided the answer to the second theoretical sub-question: ‘What are the requirements for effective network collaboration?’. For the purpose of this research it is important to characterize the municipal network collaborations to prevent radicalization based on these requirements. Doing so makes it possible to assess whether a network collaboration operates effectively with regards to public value creation. In the following chapter it is further explained how these more or less effective network collaborations can create public value.
Chapter 5 – Research expectations

In the previous two theoretical chapters the main concepts of this research have been discussed. This chapter addresses the presumed relationship between the type of network collaborations and the possibility for public value creation. This chapter answers the third theoretical sub-question ‘How can network collaborations contribute to public value creation’. The relation between these concepts is visualized and expectations about how they cohere are put forward. In the first paragraph the theoretical model is explained. In the second paragraph expectations are put forward on how the different type of network collaborations can create public value. Thereafter the central theoretical concepts are operationalized to measurable indicators. This resulted in an analytical framework from which to assess public value creation through network collaboration.

5.1 Theoretical model

Network collaboration is not easy nor always effective. Yet it is the most opted for approach in dealing with wicked problems. There is increasing demand for visible creation of public value by network collaborations that deal with wicked problems (Page et al., 2015). Therefore this research investigates how network collaborations (can) create public value. The theoretical model that was used to do so is visualized in figure 5.

**Figure 5 – Research model**

The independent variable (X) in this research is effective network collaboration with its varying characteristics. The three types of effective network collaborations of Provan & Kenis
(2008) are used to investigate whether the type of network matters for how public value is created. The dependent variable (Y) in this research is public value creation. As mentioned previously in chapter three, public value can be created in three ways. Public value can be created by establishing a public value proposition, by establishing a large basis of legitimacy and support and by attaining operational capacity to fulfill the goal. The assumption is that the three network types lead to different results on either three elements of public value. As these elements of public value interact, they can pose conflicting demands upon the network collaboration. In order to remain an effective network collaboration capable of creating public value on the three accounts, the network and organization are expected to use decoupling as a coping mechanism. In the following paragraphs, the research expectations on how these concepts cohere are put forward.

5.2. Research expectations

The first central expectation in this research is that it is dependent on the type of network coordination structure (1) and the fit with the network requirements (2,3,4,5) whether a network can be effective in creating public value. If each network coordination structure is matched with the fitting requirements, the network can be deemed effective (Provan & Kenis, 2008).

**Research expectation 1:** A network collaboration tends to be more successful in creating public value if its coordination structure is in line with the characteristics for effective network collaboration

The typology of Provan & Kenis (2008) provides for three 'ideal types' of effective network collaborations. The three ideal types of network coordination structures score differently on the network requirements. It is expected that these differences in network type matter for the suitability of these networks to create public value on the three elements of the strategic triangle. This leads to the second central expectation in this research, which is grounded on the assumption that the type of network matters in the way these collaborations create public value. This means that depending on whether the network collaboration is a shared governance network, lead organization network or a NAO, this will affect their likeliness to create public value on either the public value proposition, legitimacy and support or operational capacity. The expectations regarding each type of network and the likeliness for public value creation are discussed separately in the following paragraphs.

**Research expectation 2:** The type of network collaboration has consequences for how these collaborations create public value

5.2.1. Shared governance network

The 'ideal' shared governance network consists of relatively few stakeholders (a maximum of 8), is characterized by high levels of goal consensus, a high density of trust and a high density of commitment to the network process. With regards to the public value proposition, which puts
forward the vision, goals and actions of the network collaboration to counter radicalization, an
ideal type shared governance network is expected to be especially suitable put forward an
extensive and clear public value proposition, deemed valuable by its participants. The network
participants share a high level of goal consensus and commitment to the process, which eases the
creation of a public value proposition. Furthermore there are relatively few stakeholders that
need to be involved in the process making it easier to draft the proposition.

On the element of legitimacy and support, the shared governance form is expected to be
best suited to provide for internal legitimacy due to its participatory focus, the high level of trust,
commitment and consensus (Provan & Kenis, 2008). Trust creates stability in the relationship
between stakeholders with regards to support and therefore provides the relationship with a
stronger basis for collaboration (Klijn et al., 2010; Bryson et al., 2006, p. 46). Commitment to the
process is also an important provider for internal legitimacy, as it is related to the original
motivation to participate in the network (Ansell & Gash, 2008, p. 559). If the network participants
would not support the network’s goal, they would most likely not be so committed in
participating. Despite the expectation that a shared governance positively relates to internal
legitimacy, the expectation is that it is not best suited to create a lot of external legitimacy, due to
the few stakeholders involved (Provan & Kenis, 2008). Therefore it might exclude important
stakeholders. Establishing external legitimacy furthermore is more difficult, because there is not
a centralized network structure. Individual participants acting on their own, as in a shared
governance, will not generally be seen as representing the full network, making it more difficult
to gain external legitimacy (Provan & Kenis, 2008, p. 243). If there is a high degree of goal
consensus between the small network, but other stakeholders do not agree, there might be little
(external) legitimacy and support to enact upon these policies, which hampers the possibility to
create public value.

For the last element of public value, operational capacity, a shared governance network is
expected to have a positive effect. As there is a high density of commitment and a shared goal,
network participants are more likely to invest their own resources such as money, knowledge and
(employee) resources for the purpose of the network (Klijn et al., 2010, p. 4). The high level of
trust stimulates the learning between stakeholders, the exchange of information and knowledge
and fosters innovation (ibid.). One of the possible downsides in a shared governance network is
that due to the few number of participants, the size of the operational capacity that can be attained
is lower than the other two network types. Another hampering factor is that network involvement
and activities could take an increasing toll on the time and energies of the small number of
involved stakeholders. This might lead to a ‘burn-out’ where a few stakeholders end up doing most
of the work, This can produce a drop in enthusiasm and frustration amongst the stakeholders to
actively participate and contribute (Provan & Kenis, 2008, p. 244). The expectations with regards to the public value creation by the shared governance network have been summarized in Table 4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Network coordination structure</th>
<th>Public value proposition</th>
<th>Legitimacy and support</th>
<th>Operational capacity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shared governance network</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 4: Expectations shared governance network*

5.2.2. Lead organization network

The lead organization network is characterized by a medium number of participants and a moderately low goal consensus. There furthermore needs to be only a low density of trust and commitment, as long as they are centralized toward the lead organization. A lead organization network is well suited to establish a public value proposition. Despite the fact that the inclusion of a wide array of stakeholders potentially makes it more difficult to develop a shared public value proposition, the lead organization is central in making the decisions. This structure, in which the lead organization coordinates and takes the lead with little expected resistance from the other participants makes the network efficient (Provan & Kenis, 2008) and probably effective with regards to the public value proposition. Yet if the network needs the participation of other stakeholders for the activities as described, there might be more friction as the participants are not very committed. Substantive actions and perceived effectiveness might turn out lower due to that fact.

The lead organization form is most suited to address external legitimacy needs of the network, as they already have legitimacy as an organization they can leverage legitimacy on behalf of the whole network (Provan & Kenis, 2008). The incentive for the lead organization to gain a lot of external legitimacy is high, as it gains the most with it (Provan & Kenis, 2008, p. 244). With regards to internal legitimacy, this type of organization poses more difficulties, as the powerful position of the leader might dominate over views of other participants, leading to less internal legitimacy. On the other hand, if all stakeholders favor the leading organization this might not be all too problematic (ibid.).

The lead organization network most likely has a moderate impact on the operational capacity out of the three forms. Despite the fact that there are a wide variety of stakeholders involved, the network partners are not expected to contribute as much as in the other network types. As there is a low density of trust towards the other network participants, and relatively low commitment to the network, the sharing of information and resources by other organizations than the lead organization is expected to be relatively low. Although a lead organization network reduces the burden of involvement for the participants, it might also lead to a focus on the needs of the lead organization instead of the needs and views of other stakeholders. This could
potentially reduce the problem solving capacity, learning and exchange and thus the operational capacity. Especially when there is little trust and a low density of commitment, it is plausible that other organizations do not provide their capacities for the cooperation and the lead organization needs to do the largest share of the work, without gaining the true benefits of cooperation with regards to operational capacity. Yet if there is trust and moderate commitment this could lead the other organizations to invest some of their resources. The lead organization could also invest a lot itself, through which the operational capacity could grow. The expectations with regards to the public value creation by the LON have been summarized in Table 5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Network coordination structure</th>
<th>Public value proposition</th>
<th>Legitimacy and support</th>
<th>Operational capacity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lead organization network</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+/ -</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Expectations lead organization network

5.2.3. Network Administrative Organization

The Network Administrative Organization is characterized by a high number of network participants, a moderately high goal consensus amongst its participants, a moderate density of mutual trust and a moderate density of commitment towards the network collaboration. With regards to the public value proposition, there is modest agreement about what the network should be doing and how participants should be involved (Provan & Kenis, 2008, p. 240). There is often a subset of the network more committed and involved, and another part less committed. The wide array of stakeholders involved, presumably with different voices and wishes, therefore only results in a reasonably shared public value proposition. The coordination through the NAO for the alignment of network activities and goals makes this type of network more effective as well (Provan & Kenis, 2008). One possible downside of the NAO is that this extra layer of bureaucracy due to the administrative organization can lead to inconsistency with regards to the coordination of network goals and activities, possibly leading to goal displacement (ibid.). The substantive actions and perceived effectiveness could therefore be a bit lower.

The NAO can be both beneficial for the internal and external legitimacy as the centralized administration can represent the collaboration externally and the representative structure can provide for internal legitimacy (Provan & Kenis, 2008, p. 244). It may be quite difficult to adequately address both legitimacy needs, especially at the same time as the demands from both sides can differ or even conflict. On the other hand, a strong internal legitimacy with a lot of stakeholders could have a positive influence on its external legitimacy. Overall, the NAO is expected to have a positive influence on both the internal and the external legitimacy.

A NAO type of network is expected to do well on operational capacity. The inclusion of a wide array of stakeholders, that have a moderate degree of commitment, trust and some degree of goal consensus, are expected to share their information and knowledge and increase the
problem-solving capacity (Sorensen & Torfing, 2007; Klijn et al., 2010). If the extra administrative layer is not effective in coordinating properly due to the fact it is too formalized, this could hamper the operational capacity. Overall, an effective NAO is expected to do well on the public value element of operational capacity. The expectations with regards to the public value creation by the NAO have been summarized in Table 6.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Network coordination structure</th>
<th>Public value proposition</th>
<th>Legitimacy and support</th>
<th>Operational capacity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Network Administrative Organization</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 6: Expectations NAO*

### 5.2.4. Expectations with regards to misalignment

As was discussed in the previous sections, each network type configuration leads to different expectations on how they score on the three elements of public value. This is in line with the assumption that it matters which network structure is adopted for the creation of public value. The expectations regarding these implications are summarized in Table 7. The overview of the expectations show that the different networks do not necessarily score well on all the elements of public value. This potentially leads to conflicting pressures between the elements that do not align. In chapter three it was discussed that in order to cope with possible conflicting pressures that stem from this situation, either trade-offs need to be made or organizations can cope with these conflicting elements by decoupling either policy from practice or means from ends.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Network coordination structure</th>
<th>Public value proposition</th>
<th>Legitimacy and support</th>
<th>Operational capacity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shared Governance</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead Organization Network</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAO</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 7: Expectations of public value creation by network types*

**Shared governance**

The shared governance network is expected to have to deal with a situation of misalignment between the public value proposition on one hand and the external legitimacy and the operational capacity on the other hand. The public value proposition and the high internal legitimacy may lead the network collaboration to be more ambitious and demanding than that the operational capacity and external legitimacy available to pursue those goals. As there are relatively few stakeholders involved and the external legitimacy is low, it is expected that it is more difficult to completely live up to the goals, vision and actions in the public value proposition. In this situation, the collaboration could make a trade off by adjusting their public value proposition to a point for which there is enough external legitimacy and/or operational capacity. Another strategy that
could be used due to the lack of operational capacity and/or external will is that the actual practices are decoupled from what is claimed to be done. Institutional practices could be deployed that are disconnected from the actual practice.

**Lead Organization Network**

In the lead organization network, tensions are expected to occur due to the mismatch between the public value proposition and the external legitimacy one the one hand and a low operational capacity and internal legitimacy on the other hand. The proposition and external legitimacy are presumably mostly created by the leading organization, but cannot always count on the commitment and support of the network partners. Although quite a number of stakeholders are involved, they are not expected to be very committed to the network collaboration. Therefore a situation where there is a lack of capacity due to a lack of will might lead to the decoupling of policy and practice. This can be done purposefully to still remain legitimate to the outside. If the lead organization aims to increase its internal legitimacy and takes more voices and wishes into account of the other stakeholders, this might positively affect the operational capacity but could also hamper a clear public value proposition and possibly the external legitimacy of the radicalization approach.

**Network Administrative Organization**

The NAO is least expected to run into a situation in which trade-offs or decoupling need to be made. Yet tensions could occur due to the fact that a lot of focus is put on gaining legitimacy from all involved internal and external stakeholders. This could potentially lead to a situation in which there is not a clear public value proposition, or it does not resemble what happens in practice. Another hampering factor can be found in the extra administrative and formalized layer that is added through a NAO. This may make it less more difficult for network parties to directly contact each other. Policy practice decoupling could also occur from an abundance of operational capacity than from a lack of will or capacity. The practices might be more extensive than the original public value proposition.

**5.3. Operationalization of concepts**

In the previous paragraph the expected relationship between the type of network collaboration and the creation of public value have been discussed. In the remainder of this paragraph, the operationalization of these concepts are presented and explained.

**5.3.1. Operationalization of network collaboration effectiveness**

The second empirical sub-question ‘How do Dutch municipalities collaborate in local networks aimed at preventing and detecting radicalization?’ is answered in the first part of the empirical research. In order to do so it is important to operationalize the characteristics of network collaborations as discussed in chapter four. Five elements have been identified which are used in
this research: Network governance coordination, stakeholder inclusion, mutual trust, commitment to process and goal consensus. These elements have been subdivided in several variables, measured by the defined indicators. The values attributed to the indicators are relative to the other cases instead of absolute numbers or values. The reason for this choice is that there is often no standard of ‘a lot’ of contact. Therefore to attribute the best value, the results are seen relative to each other. Combined, these variables offer a sufficient picture of the background and the functioning of the network. Annex A offers an overview of the operationalization of the constructs that are used in this thesis.

5.3.2 Operationalization of public value and decoupling
Public value creation can be evaluated against whether a public value proposition has been made and the actions towards the goals described are executed, whether legitimacy and support is sufficiently built and whether the operational capacity meets or exceeds the necessary capabilities. Due to possible conflicting tensions between these elements, decoupling is a coping mechanism that allows for the network collaborations to remain effective in creating public value. In the next few sections the elements from the strategic triangle are operationalized. The operationalization of the public value construct and decoupling can be found in Annex A.

Public value proposition
For the measurement of the public value proposition, four indicators are distinguished. The first indicator strategy document is put in place to assess whether a strategy or policy document has been developed as well as the legal status of the document (Moore, 1995). It is important though that these structure, goals and activities as described in the document are sufficiently clear to the other network participants. Therefore clearness of strategy is the second indicator. The third indicator is substantive actions and is an adaptation of a measure proposed by Page et al. (2015) and Rogers & Webers (2010). Instead of measuring intermediate and final outcomes of activities relating to the goals of the collaboration, which is difficult to measure in the case of radicalization policy, the substantive action indicator measures whether the output and activities of the collaboration are in line with the activities described in the strategy document. The fourth and final indicator measures whether these activities are perceived to be effective and essential. Other indicators of measuring the public value proposition are focused on efficiency and equity, but these are not taken into account as they are less relevant for the purpose of the research conducted.

Legitimacy and support
To measure the legitimacy and support for the policies enacted by the network collaboration, the internal and external legitimacy are measured (Provan & Kenis, 2008). If there is both internal and external legitimacy and support, this means that the support for the policy and the network
collaboration’s work is widespread, meaning that in the eyes of stakeholders and outsiders valuable work is done. Legitimacy and support does not have to be unanimous, but it needs to be sufficient. It is furthermore measured whether there have been expressions of objections and sanctions by both internal as external authorizers.

**Operational capacity**
The operational capacity is assessed by looking at whether material, financial and employee resources have in- or decreased. Also, investment in training and learning is important to gain operational capacity and is therefore assessed. The last indicator is the improvement of public problem-solving capacity. The enhanced problem-solving capacity measures whether the collaboration resulted in new behavior or norms that increase the potential to address complex problems in the future as this increases the operational capacity. This can be assessed by studying whether the collaboration led to new approaches or activities that potentially increase the problem-solving capacity (Page et al., 2015).

**Tight coupling and decoupling**
Two situations are identified which describe how the elements in the strategic triangle could relate to each other. Tight coupling occurs when the elements in the strategic triangle resonate with each other which marks the absence of concrete tensions. Trade-offs can be made to reach a situation of tight coupling. If the elements do not resonate due to a lack of will or capacity, the network collaboration can cope with the misalignment through policy-practice decoupling.

### 5.4 Concluding remarks
In this chapter the relationship between the two central concepts of this research were discussed in light of the third theoretical sub-question ‘How can network collaborations contribute to public value creation’. It is assumed that the type of network collaboration influences how public value can be created with regards to their radicalization approach. This chapter put forward expectations of this relationship based on theoretical insights from chapter three and four. Therefore it answered potential ways of how network collaborations could potentially create public value. Both concepts were operationalized to measurable indicators. In the next chapter, the research design, the way these indicators are measured and the overall approach taken are discussed.
Chapter 6 - Research design and strategy

This chapter elaborates on the research strategy used. First, the choice for a qualitative multiple case study is explained, after which the selection of the counter radicalization networks is clarified. Second, the methods that are applied to gather data are discussed and the steps taken to analyze the results are put forward. The final part of this chapter discusses the implications of these methodological choices by elaborating on the reliability and validity of the chosen research design.

6.1. Research design

The research design reflects the structure within which the research is conducted (Kothari, 2004, p.31). It outlines the pre-defined research objectives and guides the process of collecting, analyzing and interpreting observations enabling the answering of the research questions. This research examines how municipal network collaborations aimed at detecting and preventing radicalization create public value. Its goal is to explore how municipalities have set up their network collaborations and to assess how the presumed relationship between network collaboration and public value creation plays out. This research therefore tries to answer the questions of how the network collaborations can be characterized (descriptive), in what kind of public value this has resulted (evaluating) and what lessons can be learned (advising). The research design that is most suited to achieve these goals is a cross-sectional qualitative multiple case study.

A case study is "an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident" (Yin, 2009, p. 13). A case study is a research strategy which investigates the unit of interest – the municipal network collaboration- in her natural situation and context (van Thiel, 2010, p. 99). A case study aims to investigate a case into depth rather than taking a broad approach. This provides for detailed and extensive descriptions of the phenomena under investigation (van Thiel, 2010, p. 100; Kothari, 2004, p. 113). As there are three network collaborations under investigation in this thesis, this research concerns a multiple case study (Yin, 2009, p. 46). Each of the cases concerns an individual case study, but the combined empirical research consists of the three cases combined. There are several considerations relevant for the choice of the case study design.

First of all, case studies are suitable for research questions that want to explain how a particular ongoing phenomenon occurs and require an in-depth description of this phenomenon. (Yin, 2009, p.4; Silverman, 2011, p. 17). The context in which the network collaborations operate need to be taken into account, as it is important to understand and explain possible differences between the municipal network collaborations in light of these differing contexts. A multiple case...
study design offers the possibility to compare several municipal network collaborations, without losing the nuances of the context (Yin, 2009). A qualitative case study is furthermore a suitable approach for investigating real-life settings and events (van Thiel, 2010; Yin, 2009). As the network collaborations dealing with counter-radicalization policies are currently in place a case study is a suitable approach for this research.

A second consideration relates to the fact that this research aims to find out how network collaboration and public value creation is evaluated and experienced by the stakeholders. Qualitative research methods offer the opportunity to consider network collaborations from the experiences of the relevant stakeholders and to dig deeper into those experiences (Kaplan & Maxwell, 1994, p. 32). A quantitative approach could lead to a loss of nuance in the statements made by the stakeholders (Kaplan & Maxwell, 1994, p. 32). A case study design is especially appropriate for studying qualitative elements (van Thiel, 2010). With regards to the purpose of this research this is especially important, since the public value framework is interpreted as a performance measurement tool. As has been discussed previously, it is rather difficult to provide insight in the creation of public value based on (only) quantitative performance measures as there are no straightforward results (Noordegraaf, Geuijen & van der Meulen, 2010). Public value creation with regards to radicalization is thus difficult to quantify. Therefore this research also relies on how stakeholders evaluate and experience the network collaboration, its output, activities and outcome. A qualitative case study is especially suited to help understand how the stakeholders feel, perceive and experience certain situations.

6.2 Case selection
This research uses a cross-sectional, multiple case study design with a qualitative approach to study the way network collaborations create public value with regards to counter-radicalization policies. Three network collaborations have been selected as cases for this research. Incorporating multiple cases increases the reliability of the inferences made based on the expectations put forward in this research (Yin, 2009). The unit of analysis in this research is the municipal network collaboration aimed at detecting and preventing radicalization. In paragraph 2.3.3 it was mentioned that in this research the focus lies on the local network that has been set up in the first phase of the municipal approach focused on the prevention and detection of radicalization. As an appropriate selection of cases is a crucial element in a multiple case study design (van Thiel, 2010), a few essential choices have been made which are discussed and justified below.

In order to verify the theoretical assumptions adopted in this research, several cases can be compared to ascertain the effects of various independent variables. In light of the recommendations of van Thiel (2010, p. 104) the variance in the selection of cases has been applied on the independent variable. As one of the main expectations in this research is that the
type of network matters for the creation of public value, variance on the independent variable is necessary to establish whether this is indeed the case. Thus in the initial case selection, network collaborations have been chosen that were expected to be diverse with regards to coordination structure of the network collaboration. By choosing for variance on the independent variable, the relationship between the independent and the dependent variable can be identified more directly and success and risk factors can be distinguished (ibid.). For the independent variable, three types of networks have been distinguished based on the literature. These are the NAO, the shared governance network and the lead organization network. In order to select heterogeneous cases based on the independent variable, it is necessary to know the classifications of the case for the independent variable (van Thiel, 2010, p. 104). In the selection of cases policy documents and secondary sources have been used to make a preliminary classification of the network characteristics. It furthermore needs to be noted that the classification of the cases that has been made beforehand, does not strictly need to match the real characteristics and practices of the collaboration. As the theoretical models of Provan & Kenis (2008) are ideal types, one needs to be wary of the fact that these ideal types do not completely align with the network types found in practice. The initial indication has been drafted based on a first assessment of relevant policy documents. In order to answer the second empirical sub question ‘How do Dutch municipalities collaborate in local networks aimed at preventing and detecting radicalization?’, a thorough assessment of the cases was made based upon all the network characteristics.

For comparability purposes, other factors related to the municipal network collaborations need to be as similar as possible. First of all, the Netherlands has been chosen as the country of interest. Although other countries are also developing counter-radicalization policies and employ network collaborations in light of those policies, the Netherlands has been at the forefront of developing counter-radicalization initiatives from a local network approach (Vidino & Brandon, 2012, p. 7; Eijkman & Roodnat, 2017). Due to the differences in counter-radicalization policies varying in each country, with too many country-specific contextual details relating to municipal authority, it was decided to investigate several cases within one country rather than choosing for a cross-country comparison. In order to assure comparability of the network collaborations in the Netherlands, the cases under investigation are all network collaborations that focus on detection and prevention of radicalization. This research does not focus on the networks that have been set up for the person-specific approach or the re-integration of returnees. An important selection criteria in this respect was that the municipality of interest has published one or more policy documents in which it states that they collaborate with partners to detect and prevent radicalization. In addition to that only middle sized to large municipalities have been considered situated in the Randstad area, as the issue of radicalization is expected to be a policy issue especially in these larger sized municipalities. Small municipalities often do not have a lot of cases
relevant to the issue of radicalization. In more rural provinces, Islamic radicalization is not considered a very urgent issue. The largest four cities (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, and Utrecht) have been excluded from the case selection both due to reasons of practicality and relevance. These cities have been the focus of the majority of researches regarding counter-radicalization studies in the Netherlands. Therefore they represent less of a 'black-box' than the smaller cities. Furthermore mid-sized to large municipalities have only recently started addressing radicalization as a policy issue, whereas the largest four cities have done so over the past decade (Witte et al., 2015). As the majority of mid-sized to large municipalities are currently in the process of further improving and developing their counter-radicalization policies and network collaborations, it is expected that the findings of this research are able to provide more insight about a larger number of municipalities. In addition to that, the recommendations that can be drafted based upon this research are also be more relevant for mid-sized to large municipalities as the research has been conducted in these municipalities.

A final but important consideration that affected the case selection is of a practical nature. Radicalization is currently a hot topic for researchers, think tanks and consultancy firms. A lot of municipalities were not able to contribute to this research due to an overload of requests. Due to the limited time frame of this research the cases selected are cases that had approved to collaborate with this research. The chosen municipalities in which the network collaborations have been investigated are briefly discussed and summarized in Table 8. A thorough description of the cases selected is provided together with the analysis in the next chapter.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case selection</th>
<th>Dordrecht</th>
<th>Haarlemmermeer</th>
<th>Schiedam</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expected coordination structure</td>
<td>Network Administrative Organization</td>
<td>Shared Governance</td>
<td>Lead Organization Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of inhabitants</td>
<td>118.801</td>
<td>145.998</td>
<td>77.838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main policy document</td>
<td>Action plan working together towards Social Stability (September 2016)</td>
<td>Action plan radicalization (September 2016)</td>
<td>Framework document comprehensive safety (June 2016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Province</td>
<td>South-Holland</td>
<td>North-Holland</td>
<td>South-Holland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety Region</td>
<td>Zuid-Holland Zuid</td>
<td>Kennemerland</td>
<td>Rotterdam-Rijnmond</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8: Case selection and description

6.2.1 Dordrecht
Dordrecht is a large municipality with 118.801 inhabitants, situated in the province of South-Holland and relatively close to Rotterdam. The city of Dordrecht has chosen an approach towards radicalization that is mostly focused on the prevention and detection of radicalization. Their action plan ‘Working together towards social stability: attentive of signals of radicalization’ was published in September 2016 (Gemeente Dordrecht, 2016a). In their action plan they mention the
Knowledge & Detection Network Radicalization, of which several appointed radicalization dossier holders of welfare and security parties are a part. The role of the Cabinet and safety department of the municipality is to foster, facilitate and coordinate the network. They are responsible for maintaining in contact with these partners and organize meetings for the network partners. Yet the municipality itself does not actively engage in the network activity of detecting radicalization. As the municipality finds itself outside the network, but is involved in coordinating the network and its activities, the coordination structure that is expected in Dordrecht is that of a Network Administrative Organization.

6.2.2. Haarlemmermeer
Haarlemmermeer is a large municipality in the heart of the Randstad conurbation with 145,998 inhabitants spread around 26 villages. Hoofddorp is the largest village and can be considered a midsized city in itself due to its 74,034 inhabitants. The main airport of the Netherlands, Schiphol is also situated in Haarlemmermeer (Gemeente Haarlemmermeer, 2017a). Thus Haarlemmermeer reflects rural to metropolitan contrasts. Most attention with regards to prevention of radicalization is aimed at the metropolitan area of Hoofddorp. Haarlemmermeer has published the policy document ‘Radicalization approach: prevention, detection and repression of radicalization in the municipality of Haarlemmermeer’ in September 2016. This document was approved by the city council in December 2016. In this document a lot of focus is put on the prevention and detection of radicalization in collaboration with their partners (Gemeente Haarlemmermeer, 2016a). In the policy document several important parties in the network and their responsibilities are acknowledged. There is no mention of a separate point of contact or network specifically established for the purpose of radicalization prevention, or an organization that is specifically in the lead. Information with regards to radicalization can be detected and reported to different parties. There is a multidisciplinary working group radicalization focused on information- and knowledge sharing, in which the responsibility lies with all involved partners (ibid, 2016a, p.9). Based on this preliminary information, the network collaboration established by Haarlemmermeer is seen as a shard governance arrangement.

6.2.3 Schiedam
Schiedam is a mid-sized municipality situated next to the city of Rotterdam in the province of South-Holland. Schiedam currently has 77,838 inhabitants. In the prevention of radicalization Schiedam is mostly focused on the person-specific approach, in which it works together closely with the safety house Rotterdam-Rijnmond (Gemeente Schiedam, 2017a). For the prevention and detection of radicalization it has strengthened its approach in the ‘Kadernota Integrale Veiligheid 2016’. The municipality has set up a municipal advice and information point radicalization which
professionals and other relevant network partners can consult and share information with if necessary. This advice and information point exists out of two policy officers public order and safety specially tasked with radicalization of the municipality that keep in touch with their relevant network partners (Gemeente Schiedam, 2016). There is also a process manager that keeps in touch with the central figures within Schiedam. Thus the municipality is the leading and primary party within the network with regards to the prevention and detection of radicalization. Therefore the network collaboration established by Schiedam is expected to have the structure of a lead organization network.

6.3 Research methods
In this research data has been gathered through multiple research methods. The mixed method approach helps built a more complete image of the unit of research and results in more meaningful data. It furthermore increases the reliability of the data gathered as it offers possibilities to check whether the gathered data through the different methods align (van Thiel, 2010, p. 105). The research methods used in this research are semi-structured in-depth interviews and document analysis.

6.3.1. Documents
Written documents are an important and valuable source of information for this research, which have been subjected to a content analysis. Written documents are ‘naturally occurring data’, created without interference by the researcher. They have been established independently from this research and can therefore be studied directly (Bryman, 2012, p. 543). Documents thus are a reliable source of information, as they are stable, can be retrieved repeatedly and do not affect the unit of analysis. The most important documents that have been analyzed are national and local policy documents, minutes of meetings, (multi-) annual budgets and press releases regarding radicalization policy. The documents that have been analyzed for this research describe the plans and vision of municipalities and stakeholders with regards to the network collaboration and the counter-radicalization strategy. These documents have mainly been used to reconstruct the local integrated approach and the network collaborations. The documents served as a first exploration of the network collaborations under investigation in the categorization of the type of network and as a guideline for the interviews that were conducted. The documents that have been used in the document analysis are shown in Annex C and have been selected based on their relevance for the radicalization prevention policy and network collaboration.

6.3.2. Interviews
As written documents are only a formal representation of reality, interviews are used as another important source of information in this research. Interviews are a flexible and rich source of
information to understand and determine what the respondent values (Bryman 2012, p. 470-471). Interviews offer a way to map and reflect on the municipal network collaborations by the stakeholders involved and to verify the facts distilled from the document analyses with the perceptions of the stakeholders (van Thiel, 2010, p. 109). An interview is a good method for understanding how the stakeholders experience and evaluate the network collaboration and the creation of public value. The interviews have been used to check and complement the information found in the policy documents. The interviews with stakeholders of the network collaboration were conducted in a semi-structured manner. Other than in an open interview, a semi-structured interview uses a pre-defined list of topics. These topics are distilled from the operationalization of the theoretical concepts central in this research. The same list of topics guided all the interviews and therefore provided for a more structured way of answering the empirical sub-questions. This enhanced the comparability of the interviews. The difference with a fully structured interview is that the exact development and formulation of the interview is not established a priori in a semi-structured interview. This leaves ample possibility to go into more depth on certain issues, based on the answers of the respondents and thus provides for flexibility. The list of topics that has been used during the interviews can be found in Annex 1.

A large group of stakeholders are involved or deemed important in the prevention of radicalization (Noordegraaf et al., 2016). Due to the limitations in the size of this research, the empirical data is gathered by focusing on three categories of stakeholders that are considered to be of the most importance in the network collaboration. These are municipal public officers, security domain parties and welfare stakeholders. Whether these stakeholders are also part of the municipal network, is expected to differ for each collaboration. The participants that have been interviewed were selected based on their involvement with radicalization prevention policy and the network collaboration in the municipality. The first interview in all municipalities has been conducted with the responsible policy officer. After each interview, relevant other parties in the network that could be interviewed have been selected through the method of snowball sampling. In total, 15 interviews have been conducted with 16 individuals. Unfortunately not all potential respondents that were approached were able to or wanted to contribute to this research. Especially in Schiedam different parties involved did not wish to participate. Therefore only four interviews have been held in that municipality, whereas in the other municipalities at least five interviews have been conducted. This could potentially lead to a bias in the research as the welfare oriented parties are over represented. It is possible that their perspective on the collaboration is not fully taken into account. Yet the interviews and written policy documents still provide a thorough overview of the network collaboration in practice. The respondents are shown in Annex D. The interview quotes used in this research were transcribed in Dutch and translated from Dutch to English.
6.3.3 Analyzing data
The information that has been collected through the interviews and the documents has been put together in a database. The emphasis of the analysis was put on the factual and evaluative information. The method of coding has been used to analyze the data in order to make inferences between the findings. First of all, the policy documents of the municipalities have been analyzed and coded in the first part of this research. The gathered documents were analyzed based on an initial list of codes. These codes have been based on the topic list established from the theoretical operationalization of the concepts of effective network collaboration, public value and decoupling. This topic list can be found in Annex B. This first analysis has been used to make a classification of the cases under investigations. Afterwards, semi-structured interviews have been conducted with the involved stakeholders to check and complement the results from the document analysis. Through this approach, the interviewed stakeholders could be questioned more thoroughly and focused. In the analysis of the interviews, the strategy of open coding was adopted. Next to the initial list of codes, new labels have been added, to incorporate elements that were initially left out in the theoretical codes. Together, this has led to an overall and exhaustive coding scheme. Once the exhaustive coding scheme was developed, the empirical data was analyzed through re-coding the scheme back to the operationalization. In this phase, patterns of used codes were sought which makes it possible to seek for differences and similarities (Bryman, 2012; van Thiel, 2010, p. 165). Based on the operationalization in Annex A, the network collaborations were scored for each element relatively from each other as it was not possible to score based on absolute standards.

6.4 Reliability and validity
In this paragraph the reliability and validity of this research are discussed and scrutinized. Most importantly, the measures adopted in order to assure and improve the reliability and validity are put forward. Reliability and validity are important criteria for scientific research. Therefore the following sections first discuss the reliability of this research, after which the internal and external validity is elaborated upon.

6.4.1 Reliability
Reliability concerns the extent to which the research is accurate and consistent. The more accurate, objective and consistent the research has been conducted, the more the research findings can be deemed reliable, producing the same results under similar circumstances (van Thiel, 2010, p. 57). The main objective of reliability is minimizing unsystematic errors and biases in a study (Yin, 2009, p.45; Boeije, 2012, p.145). In this research this was done by ensuring accuracy and consistency in several ways.
The accuracy refers to the instruments that the researcher has applied to measure the data. In this research a topic list has been used based on the operationalization of the theoretical concepts. These topic lists are a framework for guiding interviews and the analysis of documents. These topics capture the elements that are deemed important theoretically and therefore ensures the reliability. For every interview the same topic list was used. This safeguards the comparability of the interviews and therefore improves the reliability of the data that is gathered (ibid.).

Consistency refers to the replicability of the research under circumstances of ceteris paribus. In social studies this is deemed more difficult as people are central information sources. People can learn from past experiences and therefore adjust their answers which affect the findings, the replicability can be more difficult to ensure (van Thiel, 2010). For the research conducted, this problem is not expected to undermine the results as the chances of it occurring in the time period of this research is rather small. It does mean that the reliability of the findings of this research are bound by the time-span of the research and do not necessarily apply for future network collaborations. As there are a limited amount of cases under investigation in this research, there is the possibility that the small-N increases the chances of unforeseen and undetected factors influencing the results (van Thiel, 2010, p. 58). An important measure adopted to deal with the small-N problem is the usage of mixed methods of data and operationalization (van Thiel, 2010, p. 106). By gathering data through mixed methods and through operationalization of the constructs through different indicators, the findings can be compared and checked. Through these mixed methods, the cases are investigated into depth and a wealth of information is produced which can be used to make convincing and reliable inferences. (van Thiel, 2010, p. 107). A last measure adopted to increase the reliability of the research is that the document analyses and the interviews have been documented and the same codes have been used in the analysis. The interviews have furthermore been recorded and made into verbatim transcripts. These verbatim transcripts have been sent to the respondents for a final check of any faults or flaws in the transcription process.

6.4.2 Validity
In contrast to reliability, validity focuses on systematic errors in a research (Boeije, 2012, p. 145). Validity concerns both internal validity and external validity. The internal validity refers to the plausibility of the assumed relationship between the theoretical constructs and the research findings (Bryman, 2012, p. 390). The most important way to ensure the internal validity is the consistency of the operationalization of the constructs. By thoroughly discussing the literature concerning the main concepts of effective network collaboration, public value and decoupling and an extensive operationalization of the variables of interest resulting from this literature, this thesis has provided for a detailed account of the operational framework.
The external validity refers to the generalizability of the findings of this research. One of the pitfalls of case studies as a research design is the possibility to generalize the findings to other situations, due to the unicity of the case or the contextuality of the results (van Thiel, 2010, p. 100). Because the case study design only studies a limited number of cases, the findings do only apply to the network collaborations investigated, bound by the time-span of the research and do not necessarily apply for future network collaborations. Therefore the external validity is often limited, whereas the internal validity of the research is deemed high due to the rich sources of information gathered. The goal of this study is not to generate generalizable results, but rather to provide insight into how municipalities shape network collaborations to prevent radicalization and how these collaborations produce public value. Despite that fact, this research investigates three cases of mid-sized to large municipalities in the Netherlands that are relatively comparable on the basis of population, size, area and degree to which radicalization is a problem. Thus recommendations and conclusions that apply for these three municipalities are very likely to also be relevant for other municipalities in the Netherlands with a similar profile. Lastly, the relationship between the type of effective network collaboration and the creation of public value has limited external validity, considering the fact that the cases under investigation are very specific and the relationship between the constructs is not tested in a very deductive manner.
Chapter 7 - Network collaborations in practice

This chapter provides insight in the way Dordrecht, Haarlemmermeer and Schiedam have set up their respective network collaborations aimed at detecting and preventing radicalization. For each municipality, the main local policy developments are described based on the interviews and the available written documents. Subsequently, the local network collaborations and their characteristics are discussed and scored on the five elements for effective network collaboration. At the end of each case an assessment of the effectiveness of the network collaboration is made. In the final paragraph of this chapter a comparison of the network collaborations is put forward. Overall, this chapter provides an answer to the second empirical sub question ‘How do Dutch municipalities collaborate in local networks aimed at preventing and detecting radicalization?’

7.1 Dordrecht

7.1.1. Local developments with regards to radicalization

Radicalization in Dordrecht

The caseload of radicalized individuals in Dordrecht is not considered to be very high, although there have been a few cases (Sok, 2016, p.1; Respondent 12). ‘Compared to the Hague or Zoetermeer, fortunately relatively little happens in Dordrecht. But due to all the tensions and the political developments, there is always the chance that youngsters go down that road’ (Respondent 12, r.75-79). There are two radicalized individuals from Dordrecht who have travelled to Syria, but their current status is unknown to the public (Schramm, 2016, p. 105).

In 2012, Dordrecht became involved again with radicalization prevention policy after the police of the Rotterdam Region had asked every municipality in their region to appoint a radicalization dossier holder. It was considered a new policy issue for which no structure or collaboration had been set up (Respondent 12, r. 44-51). Radicalization as a possible policy issue first appeared in the comprehensive safety strategy for 2015-2018 (Gemeente Dordrecht, 2014, p.6). In the actualization of the comprehensive safety strategy for 2017-2018, preventing radicalization was specifically added as a target goal for vulnerable youth (Gemeente Dordrecht, 2017). In September 2016, Dordrecht published its main policy document in which it describes its approach to tackle radicalization and violent extremism. The plan of action ‘Working together towards social stability: attentive of signals of radicalization’ was presented by the executive board of Dordrecht in September 2016 and consists of three pillars (Gemeente Dordrecht, 2016a).

---

10 Dordrecht’s plan of action is focused at tackling radicalization and violent jihadism. Other forms of radicalization, such as right extremism are also acknowledged but are not the main focus of the policy as they pose a significantly smaller risk (Gemeente Dordrecht, 2016a, p.3).
1) Working together towards social stability through interaction and dialogue with societal partners and schools.

2) Detection and expertise enhancement of radicalization through the knowledge- and detection network radicalization. The municipality boosts and supports education, healthcare and welfare partners with enhancing expertise on and detection of radicalization.\(^{(11)}\)

3) The person-specific approach in which cases of radicalized individuals are discussed in multidisciplinary case meetings. Dordrecht has joined the safety house Rotterdam Rijnmond for these meetings, as the number of cases in the safety region of Dordrecht is relatively low.

As mentioned previously in this research, the focus lies on the network collaboration the municipality has set up to detect and prevent radicalization. Therefore the focus of the analysis in Dordrecht lies on activities within the second pillar. Activities with regards to the other pillars have not been investigated. Within the second pillar, several activities have been set up to detect signals of radicalization as early as possible through collaboration with its partners (Gemeente Dordrecht, 2016b). This is mainly shaped through the knowledge- and detection network, which received a formal place in the plan of action of 2016. Although the plan of action was presented late 2016, the municipality states they have been rolling out their plan for a longer period of time, in close collaboration with the relevant parties (Gemeente Dordrecht, 2016b, p.2). The main network participants have been involved in the detection of radicalization since two to three years (Respondent 13, r. 416-417; Respondent 14, r. 47; Respondent 16, r. 67; Gemeente Dordrecht, 2016b)

7.1.2 Network coordination structure
Dordrecht appointed a civil servant from the Cabinet and Safety department who is the chef the dossier of radicalization (Gemeente Dordrecht, 2016a). The chef the dossier is the central point of contact where questions and signals from the network partners are collected and actions are coordinated. The civil servant is not a part of the network as that person is not involved in the network activities of detection. “I’m inside, so I do not see anyone. Therefore I need others to get a view of who is radicalizing” (Respondent 12, r. 54-57). Most of the organizations within the network have appointed a radicalization officer who functions as the point of contact for their own colleagues to contact if they have signals or doubts about possible cases of radicalization (Respondent 13, r. 41-44; Respondent 15, r. 143-147; Respondent 16, r.88-98; Gemeente Dordrecht, 2106a). The radicalization officers are tasked to share information within their own
organization and to keep up to date on new developments on this matter. The point of contact remains in close contact with the municipal chef the dossier and assesses whether the signal(s) picked up in their organization should be notified to the municipality or the police (Sok, 2016; Gemeente Dordrecht, 2016a). The network is not a place where the participants only report a case or a signal. Dordrecht sees a shared responsibility for its societal partners in their task to detect and prevent radicalization (Gemeente Dordrecht, 2016a). If signals are detected by network participants, they will often stay involved in the case. The municipality does not immediately take over a case, but manages the case together with its participant(s) and jointly decide on the subsequent steps (Respondent 12, r. 93-98; Respondent 13, r. 312-314; Respondent 15, r. 156-157; r.334-345). If decisions have to be made concerning a case or if there is conflict on the approach of a case, the municipality coordinates (Respondent 12, 13, 14, 15; Respondent 16, r. 228-229). The municipal chef the dossier coordinates and aligns the approach on how to deal with possible cases and assesses whether it is useful to refer the case to a higher level in their approach, the person-specific approach. The chef the dossier is in close contact with the Counter Terrorism, Extremism and Radicalization (CTER)-expert of the National Police and joins the person-specific case meetings in the safety house (Respondent 12, r.328-330; Respondent 15, r. 170-174; Respondent 16, r.104-106; Gemeente Dordrecht, 2016a). The coordination structure of the network is simple and not very much formalized (Respondent 12, r.101-102; Respondent 14, r. 436-437; Respondent 15, r. 157-161). The network participants themselves are not necessarily in close contact with all the other radicalization officers in the network (Respondent 14, r. 118; Respondent 16, r. 95-98). “When more parties are involved, the information passes through via the municipality to the other partners ‘...’ The municipality is the main linking point” (Respondent 14, r. 211-218).

The information provided in the municipal policy documents align with the analysis of the interviews. The municipality is clearly the party that is in the lead of coordinating and managing the network collaboration. Since the municipality does not take over cases and is not involved in the detection of individuals, it is not part of the network but a separate administrative and coordinating entity. Therefore the network collaboration in Dordrecht is considered to be a Network Administrative Organization.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Network coordination</td>
<td>Shared Governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>structure</td>
<td>Lead Organization Network</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.1.3 Stakeholder inclusion
For the knowledge- and detection network Dordrecht has identified the main group of professionals that are most likely to encounter cases of radicalization and that can be of added value in the approach. The current network collaboration consists of community police officers,
youth workers, education institutions, social district teams and a number of welfare institutions (Sok, 2016, p.1; Gemeente Dordrecht, 2016a). These are considered to be ‘the eyes and the ears of the streets’ (Gemeente Dordrecht, 2016a). The plan of action mentions twelve organizations that have joined the network collaboration. This means that they have been in contact with the municipality and have appointed a point of contact (Respondent 12, r. 68-69; Respondent 13, r. 46; Respondent 15, r. 186-187). The network is slowly expanding by adding more possibly relevant organizations. Despite the fact that quite a number of organizations have joined the network, there are still many more that could be relevant but that are hesitant to join (Respondent 12, r.62-66; Respondent 13, r. 238-240, 596-598; Respondent 15, r. 675-677). “You try to include the whole field, although you can’t completely. But you start with the most important parties. I still have not been in touch with all the parties, some take a while before they are willing to find the time” (Respondent 12, r. 57-60). Other network participants also acknowledge that the network could and perhaps should be expanded (Respondent 12, 13, 15). “It is important to see where more information can be retrieved. I think there are still some blind spots that can be connected in some way” (Respondent 13, r.596-598). The main issue of expanding the network lies in the fact that organizations often feel a certain hesitation to join or do not see how the matter of radicalization is relevant to their organization (Respondent 12, 16).

With regards to stakeholder inclusion, the network in Dordrecht has a moderate number of participants included in the network. The perception of the participants is that there are still some important stakeholders not included yet.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stakeholder inclusion</th>
<th>Size of Network</th>
<th>Few participants</th>
<th>Moderate number of participants</th>
<th>Many participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stakeholder exclusion</td>
<td>No important stakeholders excluded</td>
<td>Some important stakeholders excluded</td>
<td>Many important stakeholders excluded</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.1.4 Mutual trust
Mutual trust within the network in Dordrecht is built in several ways. The municipal chef the dossier visited all network participants at least once to explain who they can reach for questions and signals, how the process goes if there is a case and what they can expect from each other (Respondent 12; Gemeente Dordrecht, 2016a). Besides that, there are no regular formal meetings in which signals are discussed horizontally in the network. Occasionally voluntary meetings are organized in which the network participants are updated on information. So far this has been organized twice (Respondent 12; Gemeente Dordrecht, 2016a). Although there are few formal meetings between the network participants, they assure that there are very short lines of communication with the radicalization officers and the municipality (Respondent 13, 14, 15, 16). They regularly consult each other in case of doubts, signals or questions and are confident that
the NAO coordinates their signals well. “I know that if I share signals it is allocated well and I have full confidence in them. I know where to go if I am concerned and I know the police is connected properly, so I do not have any additions” (Respondent 16, r. 342-346).

Most of the contact takes place outside of formal meetings and is often by mail or telephone contact if something pops up. The network is furthermore frequently sent information about new developments (Respondent 12, r. 71-72). “There is a very open line of communication, direct mailing or calling has been working well so far” (Respondent 13, r. 284-285). This is the case both for partners with which there is only contact if something pops up, as for the partners that are in touch with the municipality more often. “My assumption, and I believe that is correct is that if the municipality receives signals about a situation in my district that they share these signals with me” (Respondent 14, r 201-203).

The distribution of mutual trust within the network is further exemplified by the willingness to share information with the municipality (Respondent 12, 13, 14, 15, 16). “In principle, we share everything ‘…’ We can share openly” (Respondent 15, r. 440-444). It is important to note that the distribution of mutual trust is quite centralized towards the NAO. One of the most important reasons is that there are less limitations with regards to privacy to share information (Respondent 13, 14, 15, 16). If there is any hesitation to share information, privacy is in most cases the limiting factor. “I cannot simply share information with youth workers and other parties, so I am cautious about that” (Respondent 14, r. 110-112). With the municipality there are no problems posed as there are agreements about privacy and the sharing of information (Respondent 12, 14, 16). For information to be shared between other network parties, agreements about privacy might help to lift the hesitation in sharing information (Respondent 13). Information does not always immediately get shared, as they first want to make sure that what they picked up is correct internally (Respondent 13, 15). “We really try to perform a good analysis of the situation before we alarm anyone, to avoid panic reactions. So we say that we might be worried about a person and then we check what the situation really is” (Respondent 15, r. 170-175).

As some of the network participants are also in different meetings with each other, they can more easily discuss certain signals with each other (Respondent 12, 16). If network participants already know each other and are aware of their role with regards to radicalization, they find it easier to share information and have trust in each other. "That is the added value of knowing each other... that you call one another if you are worried" (Respondent 16, r.140-144). Strict agreements about when or how often the partners should consult each other have not been made. With the youth workers the municipality has provided a subsidy in which some general activities are described. For the other network participants they have loose arrangements on their tasks and role and how and when to contact each other.
Although there is some variance between the network participants in with whom and how
often they share information, the trust towards the NAO and how they deal with their information
and questions is considerable to be quite high. If cases or signals pop up, the network participants
share information with the municipality and trust that the right partners are involved. Trust
between the network participants can be more limited due to reasons of privacy or simply not
knowing each other as there are not many meetings. Yet it does not seem to affect the overall trust
they have in the functioning of the network. Therefore Dordrecht is scored on a high density of
mutual trust.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mutual trust</th>
<th>Low density</th>
<th>Moderate density</th>
<th>High density</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Formal face-to-face contact</td>
<td>Low frequency</td>
<td>Moderate frequency</td>
<td>High frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal face-to-face contact</td>
<td>Low frequency</td>
<td>Moderate frequency</td>
<td>High frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information sharing frequency</td>
<td>Information is never shared</td>
<td>Information is sometimes shared</td>
<td>Information is often shared</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stance towards information sharing</td>
<td>Participants do not want to share information</td>
<td>Participants are hesitant to share information</td>
<td>Participants share information without objection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring of activities</td>
<td>There are strict arrangements in place</td>
<td>There are loose arrangements in place</td>
<td>There are no arrangements in place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History of relationship</td>
<td>Negative previous relationship</td>
<td>Neutral previous relationship</td>
<td>Positive previous relationship</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.1.5 Commitment to process
For the municipality the commitment and urgency of the network collaboration is clear cut. “If we
do not have the network collaboration, we cannot detect signals on time, with all the associated
consequences” (Respondent 12, r. 432-433). Thus the network collaboration on this matter is
indispensable (Gemeente Dordrecht, 2016a). The municipality relies on the commitment of its
partners that are willing to contribute. The other network partners also see a responsibility and
urgency for their collaboration, as there is a relationship of mutual dependency. “You are
dependent on the information provided to you by others and what you provide others” (Respondent
14, r. 280-284). Yet the issue of radicalization seems to be more of a moderate priority to the
partners as they have many more tasks (Respondent 13, r. 203-205). “Radicalization does not
really have priority. But you do need to keep your eyes and ears open for the moment that something
grows out of hand” (Respondent 14, r. 319-325). The necessity of collaboration is widely felt. “The
network is very important for us. We need the mandate from the municipality to be able to take steps
and position ourselves well in the network as the party in Dordrecht that has commitment and
knowledge on this topic. So the network is very important for us” (Respondent 15, r. 480-483). Overall, the general perception is that the more active parties in the collaboration are very much involved. “I think that all the parties that are involved and that have something to gain, certainly
have commitment” (Respondent 15, r. 511-513). All interviewed organizations acknowledge the
importance of the collaboration and their dependency on others (Respondent 12, 13, 14, 15, 16). “For us the network is important, especially from a preventive perspective and the trust that things are taken care of” (Respondent 16, r. 407-413). There are relatively few network activities such as meetings or trainings and not all members show up for these activities (Respondent 12; 13; 14). But it is noticeable that more participants are eager to receive a training and want to invest more in knowledge development and information sharing (Respondent 12, r.112-117; Respondent 13; 14). “Previously, the social district team sent one representative for the radicalization training, now they want to give everyone a training” (Respondent 12, r. 442-446). The commitment to the network activities thus seems to be related to the urgency of the situation. “If something is going on, then you really need to take the time for it. Other tasks then will have to wait” (Respondent 14, r.241-244).

When asked about the commitment of other parties in the involvement, they admit the issue might be less relevant for some organizations. Especially when there are no cases it can be more difficult to get commitment from other parties (Respondent 12, 13, 16). “If you are not so much involved with the topic of radicalization and you do not hear much about it in your organization ‘...’ so if you do not have a case or think well this is not really a problem here, then there is little sense of urgency. But if there have been a few cases or worrying developments, you will acknowledge the urgency” (Respondent 16, r. 304-312). The sense of urgency varies with regards to developments in society (Respondent 12, 13, 16). “You notice that the urgency grows when the situation is more unstable. But I am convinced that everyone feels the urgency” (Respondent 16, r. 429-432).

The network is considered quite important and the priority to direct attention to the matter is felt. Yet not many resources besides time and commitment are put into the collaboration. The safety department of the municipality itself does not invest financial resources, but provides the chef the dossier and shares money for training and development granted by the national government (Respondent 12; Gemeente Dordrecht, 2016a). For more investments with regards to radicalization, the municipality has the principle that if organizations feel the urgency to invest in this topic, they should also use their own resources (Respondent 12; Respondent 15; Gemeente Dordrecht, 2016a). For the execution of the network activities, the municipality relies upon the regular work activities of the organization. The municipalities commitment and that of the collaborating organizations is financed within the budget of these partners (Gemeente Dordrecht, 2016a; Respondent 12). The network participants predominantly invest employee time into this network collaboration for purposes of detection and knowledge development. This is often fitted within their regular work package as it does not take up a lot of hours (Respondent 12, 13, 14, 16). “If it starts taking up a lot of time than we need to see whether I should get some extra hours, but for now it does not take up much time, so it can be done this way” (Respondent 16, r. 454-457).
network participants do not invest a lot of financial resources towards this goal. The subsidy for the youth workers aimed at preventing radicalization\(^{12}\) is paid for by the department of social support. In the Dordrecht network, the youth workers have invested a lot of extra time and money outside of their subsidy practices to develop knowledge on this matter, to train their youth workers and to share this information with the network (Clarijs, 2016, p.112; R-Newt, 2017; Respondent 15). "We ourselves also invest a lot in our people on this matter. We send them to national conferences, international, we ask speakers and we contribute to different studies on this matter. So we invest a lot timewise, where we do not have a direct assignment for. We do that from the commitment towards this theme from our own organization and our employees. (Respondent 15, r.340-348).

It can be concluded that in Dordrecht the network collaboration overall has a moderate to high density of commitment. If there are many cases, which is not the case, the urgency is very much felt and the commitment grows. If the situation is relatively stable, which is the case, it is not the necessarily the top priority of the network participants. But the network participants do feel responsible for keeping their eyes and ears open. On average the network participants do share resources, but do not invest a whole lot of financial and employee time as it is not deemed necessary.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commitment to process</th>
<th>Low density of commitment</th>
<th>Moderate density of commitment</th>
<th>High density of commitment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participation in network activities</td>
<td>Participants contribute to none of the activities</td>
<td>Participants contribute to some activities</td>
<td>Participants contribute to all activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participants share resources</td>
<td>Participants do not want to share their own resources</td>
<td>Participants are hesitant to share own resources</td>
<td>Participants are eager to share resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urgency of network by participants</td>
<td>The network collaboration has a low priority for the participant</td>
<td>The network collaboration has a moderate priority for the participant</td>
<td>The network collaboration has a high priority for the participant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception of urgency with other participants</td>
<td>The network collaboration has a low priority for other participants</td>
<td>The network collaboration has a moderate priority for other participants</td>
<td>The network collaboration has a high priority for other participants</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.1.6 Goal Consensus
In the plan of action, the municipality of Dordrecht states that the goal of the network collaboration is that professionals that possibly have to deal with cases of radicalization know what it entails, what the possible signals are, how to act and where they can go to for signals and questions. The goal is to increase awareness and through that detect radicalization in the earliest stage possible (Gemeente Dordrecht, 2016 a; Sok, 2016, p.1). This goal is shared by the partners

\(^{12}\) The department of social support (MO) has incorporated €21.000,- for the prevention of radicalization in the subsidy for the youth workers.
in the network collaboration. "The common goal is prevention. Preventing that someone radicalizes and that you use each other in the detection of situations that do not go well. So yes, that is a common goal" (Respondent 16, r. 300-304). "The common goal is ensuring and creating safety. And be able to detect signals in time, so you can follow up on those signal. That is the most important in my opinion" (Respondent 14, r. 166-168). Although the partners all subscribe to this overarching goal, there are sometimes different interests that could lead to friction. "It is our concern that there is a thorough analysis before further action is taken or a scenario is built. The police is concerned with the fact that it does not take too long to build a scenario as it can go from bad to worse. Those are different interests that can be difficult" (Respondent 15, r. 403-407). They are often able to discuss these differences and this has not led to any conflicts to date. Therefore the individual goals do not seem to conflict with the network goal. "I do believe the network goal supersedes the individual goal of organizations so to say" (Respondent 13, r.268-269).

As the different parties do underscore their different individual organizational interests and acknowledge the different concerns, but do completely share the network goal, the Dordrecht network is considered to have a high degree of goal consensus.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goal consensus</th>
<th>Moderately low</th>
<th>Moderately high</th>
<th>High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Goal Consensus</td>
<td>Network goals are not shared</td>
<td>Goals are somewhat shared</td>
<td>Network goals are completely shared</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal conflict</td>
<td>There has been conflict over the individual and network goals</td>
<td>There has been some conflict over individual and network goals</td>
<td>There has been no conflict over individual and network goals</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.1.7. The network effectiveness of Dordrecht

The network collaboration aimed at detecting and preventing radicalization that has been set up in Dordrecht takes the form of a NAO, with the municipal chef the dossier as the coordinating and managing actor outside of the network. As a NAO, the Dordrecht network can be seen as functioning effectively. On all four requirements of network effectiveness the network scores in line with or more positive than the theoretical requirements for an effective NAO. These scores are summarized in Table 9. The NAO could improve its effectiveness by including even more partners into the network collaboration.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coordination structure</th>
<th>Stakeholder inclusion (Size)</th>
<th>Goal consensus</th>
<th>Mutual trust</th>
<th>Commitment to process</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NAO</td>
<td>Moderate to many</td>
<td>Moderately high</td>
<td>Moderate density</td>
<td>Moderate density</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dordrecht</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High density</td>
<td>Moderate to high density</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9: Network effectiveness Dordrecht
7.2 Haarlemmermeer
7.2.1. Local developments with regards to radicalization

Radicalization in Haarlemmermeer

Compared to other large municipalities in the Netherlands, the issue of radicalization is less prominent in Haarlemmermeer due to the composition of its inhabitants and the municipality itself (Gemeente Haarlemmermeer, 2016b). "It is not that much of an issue in Haarlemmermeer" (Respondent 6, r. 111). According to mayor Theo Weterings, so far four cases of radicalization have occurred in Haarlemmermeer, of which one has presumably left to jihadist territories (Gemeente Haarlemmermeer, 2016b). The number of radicalized citizens is not seen as alarming, especially compared to other cities (ibid). Haarlemmermeer is one of the priority municipalities appointed by the national government with regards to radicalization and therefore receives funding to enhance their comprehensive approach (NCTV, 2016).

In Haarlemmermeer the police started to develop an approach towards tackling radicalization approximately four years ago (Respondent 4, 5). "I think the police has been the leading actor and that the municipality has really tagged along" (Respondent 5, r. 215-217). The matter of radicalization in the region of Haarlemmermeer was first mentioned in the multi-annual policy plan for 2015-2018 of the North-Holland police district as a focus area. At that point, it was not yet considered an important policy priority, but developments regarding radicalization were monitored closely as the threat for the safety of the municipality became more apparent (WIS, 2014). Cases of radicalization were mainly tackled within the judicial system of the police and the OM. The municipality and the safety house were not very much involved yet (Respondent 1, 4). In the past two years this has changed to a situation in which there is closer collaboration between the police, the OM, the municipality and the safety house (Gemeente Haarlemmermeer, 2016a; Respondent 1,4,5). "You notice that within the unit that it has grown and has become standardized and a network for CTER has been developed" (Respondent 5, r. 48-50). Previous to the strengthened collaboration, there was not really a deliberate approach in place within the municipality (Respondent 1,2). "If there was a case, we would act, but prevention-wise we did not do much on the matter" (Respondent 2, r. 29-30). In the comprehensive safety strategy of the municipality, radicalization is not one of the main priorities due to its low occurrence, but is considered an important focus area (Gemeente Haarlemmermeer, 2015).

In September 2016, the municipality published its plan of action to tackle radicalization, named ‘Radicalization approach: prevention, detection and repression of radicalization in the municipality of Haarlemmermeer’. This document was approved by the city council in December 2016 (Gemeente Haarlemmermeer, 2016a). The goal of the plan of action is to “prevent
radicalization where possible, detect it and if it occurs to tackle it through repressive measures” (Gemeente Haarlemmermeer, 2016a). The plain of action is aimed at the whole spectrum of radicalization. As the majority of cases concern violent Islamic radicalization, most of the attention is focused on that area. The plan of action distinguishes three roles for the municipality:

1. Prevention: Enlarging resilience towards and decreasing the breeding ground for radicalization.

2. Detection: Awareness, education and using (existing) points of contact. This role is focused at training frontline professionals in detecting and reporting signals, strengthening the internal and external network of partners and invest in key figures and organizations in the districts (Gemeente Haarlemmermeer, 2016c).

3. Repression: Person- and system-specific approach13. Once detection of radicalization has taken place, it is coordinated through the regional based CTER approach.

In this research, the focus lies on the network collaboration that the municipality has set up to detect radicalization. Therefore the analysis in Haarlemmermeer includes the activities described in the second role of the municipality. Activities in the second pillar are shaped through different partners within the municipality and have mainly started to develop in the past two years (Respondent 1, 2, 4, 5, 6). In the prevention of radicalization, frontline professionals and healthcare providers are attributed a crucial role, as they are in daily contact with citizens. Therefore they are in the position to detect, report and intervene in time. The strengthening of the internal and external network of the municipality, training frontline professionals in detecting and reporting signals of radicalization is at the center of the policy. Signals of radicalization can therefore come in through different points of contact and are coordinated in a multidisciplinary network aimed at detecting and preventing radicalization (Gemeente Haarlemmermeer, 2016a).

7.2.2 Network coordination structure

In Haarlemmermeer there is a broad multidisciplinary network, that is now also used for the detection of signals (Gemeente Haarlemmermeer 2016a). There is not a specific network established for radicalization prevention, because there are already strong local networks in the districts. “We work district oriented and our structure is aligned with that of the municipality. So with the district manager of the municipality, the other parties, law enforcement and the social area. We have a general meeting once every six weeks in which cases of youth and radicalization can be

---

13 For the person-specific approach there are a variety of levels in which cases are discussed. There is a person-specific meeting in the safety house between relevant partners to gather information and discuss the approach towards cases. Information is then sent to the Integrated Tactical Meeting (ITO) for CTER in which all cases of radicalization are discussed by the OM, the police and the municipal experts. The ITO then advises whether to use the integrated person-specific approach. This advice is then led to the local triangle of the mayor, police and the OM that decide which actions are to be taken. One of the options is then a person-specific approach coordinated by the safety house. In the safety house individual case meetings can also be held (Veiligheidshuis Kennemerland, 2016, p.18).
discussed and sent to the municipality, investigated” (Respondent 7, r. 55-58). These networks are now also used to detect radicalization and share information (Gemeente Haarlemmermeer, 2016a; Respondent 1, 5). ‘It is important that all parties work together to collect and detect as many signals as possible and that they align those signals” (Respondent 1, r.472-473). This network can be divided into an internal and external local network. The internal network consists of different departments of the municipality that can all collect signals of radicalization. The municipality itself can also gather signals through a municipal information point that can be used by citizens and professionals for questions and possible signals of radicalization (Gemeente Haarlemmermeer, 2016a; Respondent 2). The external network exists of welfare partners, schools, health care institutions et cetera, who are also in close contact with citizens (Gemeente Haarlemmermeer, 2016a; Respondent 1, r. 49-62).

The main organizations in the multidisciplinary network in Haarlemmermeer are the police and the municipality, to which the most signals of radicalization are reported via their respective networks (Respondent 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7). Another partner that collects signals from some institutions in Haarlemmermeer is the regional safety house. Yet they are not very active in detecting signals themselves but are rather a connection between the welfare domain, the municipality and the police14 (Respondent 4; Veiligheidshuis Kennemerland, 2015). There is not a separate network structure for the detection of radicalization or a party clearly in the lead (Respondent 6). “It can be reported to the municipality, the police gets a lot of signals and sometimes organizations directly report to us. Thus especially via the police and then the local officers, youth coordinators, those kind of figures. From the municipality, that is often the policy officer of Haarlemmermeer. And mainly from schools. And with schools, sometimes they report to the municipality and sometimes they report to us. That mainly depends whether they know about us”. (Respondent 4, r. 27-33). The network arrangement in Haarlemmermeer aimed at detecting signals is therefore layered, with three parties that are coordinating information with regards to radicalization detection and a large group of over 20 partners that detect signals and share them with (one of) these three partners.

The municipality sees a shared responsibility for its partners to detect and so do the partners themselves (Gemeente Haarlemmermeer, 2016a). “In detecting signals we all have the task, we are all together in the task to detect” (Respondent 7, r. 226-228). “We have our own responsibility, so in that sense we need to develop our own policy. We need to decide that for ourselves, because a municipality cannot decide for my organization how they want things to happen” (Respondent 6, r. 284-286). The different network participants have appointed radicalization officers as a point of contact towards their own organization and the other network

14 The safety house is an even more important partner in the person-specific approach (Respondent 1, 4; Gemeente Haarlemmermeer 2016a).
participants (Respondent 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7). These radicalization officers have different points of contact within the network. In the network, signals are not structurally shared but all partners themselves check whether the signals are serious enough to scale it up to the person specific approach or to share it with their partners (ibid.). There is not a separate guideline for when to share information with each other. “It is often dependent on the situation how and when the partners are in contact with each other” (Respondent 5, r.109). Some share their information with the police, some with the municipality and others with the safety house (ibid.). Also between the main partners, it depends on the situation and the organization to what extent and with whom information is shared.

Thus the network participants itself are responsible for maintaining contact with each other as there is no separate structure to do so. Information with regards to radicalization can be detected and reported to different parties, with the main parties being the police, the municipality and the safety house. The police and the municipality are the network parties that perform the more administrative and coordinative activities in the network. Thus the information provided in the municipal policy documents aligns the situation described in the interviews and other relevant policy documents. There is not a separate point of contact or network established specifically for radicalization prevention and detection. Information is shared between parties which can differ for each case. The partners feel a responsibility themselves to do so and in that sense. Therefore the network collaboration in Haarlemmermeer is considered to be a Shared Governance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Network coordination structure</td>
<td>Network Administrative Organization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.2.3 Stakeholder inclusion
The multidisciplinary network that is used by the municipality of Haarlemmermeer for the purpose of detecting radicalization is set up quite broad and includes over 20 partners. The ones specifically mentioned are the police, schools, key figures, citizens, youth workers, front office employees of the municipality, school attendance officers, correction officers, street coaches, district managers, the municipal call center and municipal safety policy officers (Gemeente Haarlemmermeer, 2016a, p.5-6; Respondent 1). These actors are attributed a crucial role, as they are in daily contact with citizens. Therefore they are in the position to detect, report and intervene in time. There are numerous of parties with whom the district police officer is in contact with, direct or indirect (Respondent 5, r. 95-96). The municipality finds that it important that as many people as possible within the network can detect and report radicalization in time. “Radicalization is a wide societal phenomenon and therefore it is important to have a broad network” (Gemeente Haarlemmermeer, 2016a). As the network is not set up in the way that the municipality directly is in contact with all relevant partners, but this can also be done through the police or the safety
house, not all parties feel necessarily a part of a larger network. “Well, our partner is the safety house. And I would like to have the municipality next to it” (Respondent 6, r. 246). That also makes that not everybody is aware to what extent other partners are included (Respondent 3, 4, 5, 6, 7). “I cannot really assess whether everyone knows how to find each other” (Respondent 4, r. 159). The network participants have not yet identified important parties that are missing in the multidisciplinary network, as the current social infrastructure is deemed strong (Gemeente Haarlemmermeer, 2016a; Respondent 1, 5). Based on the information gathered it is hard to assess to what extent the parties that are included that do not have a lot of cases are really active on the matter or should be more involved (Respondent 4). Some parties could be included more thoroughly (Respondent 5, r. 397-403). “I: You have mentioned quite a large number of parties that are involved, should more parties be involved as well? R1: On the local level? Probably. But there are so many parties, you need to start somewhere. And then it is best to start with the parties you have, that are most relevant and most important. You could also include soccer clubs, but where does it end?” (Respondent 1, r. 92-95).

With regards to stakeholder inclusion, the ambition in Haarlemmermeer is that a large number of stakeholders are to be included. This is achieved through the large social infrastructure the municipality, police and the safety house have. Due to the fact that the network is set up quite broad with different points of contact, it is not completely clear to the network participants who is in- or excluded. The general perception is that some important stakeholders are not included yet.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stakeholder inclusion</th>
<th>Size of Network</th>
<th>Few participants</th>
<th>Moderate number of participants</th>
<th>Many participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stakeholder exclusion</td>
<td>No important stakeholders excluded</td>
<td>Some important stakeholders excluded</td>
<td>Many important stakeholders excluded</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.2.4 Mutual trust
In Haarlemmermeer, the trust within the network differs for each partners. There are no regular formal meetings in which the network partners meet and discuss signals, outside of the person-specific approach. As mentioned previously, there is not a very clear structure in Haarlemmermeer and therefore the network is mainly built around informal contact between the different participants. Informal contact is maintained through phone calls, email or by discussing the matter with each other when they see each other in other type of meetings, where they can informally discuss or update each other briefly (Respondent 1, 3, 5, 7). In between other meetings there is contact with the relevant parties if needed. “If something is happening, it is immediately tackled, shared or investigated. With that regard, we are on top of it” (Respondent 7, r. 107-108). Most of the participants are satisfied with that way of communication as the parties seem to find
each other when necessary (Respondent 1, 4, 5, 6, 7; Gemeente Haarlemmermeer, 2016a). “I know that I can always drop by. For me there is no barrier to do so” (Respondent 5, r. 305-306). The frequency of contact between the network partners mainly depends on whether there are clear signals of radicalization. If that is not the case, there is little contact between the partners as information is not shared systemically (Respondent 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7). “I’m well connected to the municipal officer and he has a lot of contact with the police, at least more than I do so with that respect the circle is sort of round. But it is very irregular, more irregular than with other municipalities” (Respondent 4, r. 272-280). The frequency of contact between partners differs. The municipality is mainly in touch with the police. With other parties, the frequency of contact is more incidental (Respondent 1, r. 119-125). Some of the parties would like to have more contact with certain members of the network or are unaware of whether other parties are involved (Respondent 1, 3, 4, 6). “So maybe a bit more communication from both sides on the matter, to keep the subject a bit more vivid. If it is necessary. If there are no real concerns then well why would you” (Respondent 3, r. 137-142).

Information is also shared quite easily amongst the preferred partners (Gemeente Haarlemmermeer, 2016a; Respondent 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7). “The municipal radicalization officer is known to us and my colleagues, so if there is information, we share it with him” (Respondent 7, r. 128-129). The sharing of information is directed at one or two partners and does not account for the network as a whole. Therefore the density of trust is more centralized than widespread. For example, the school officer only shares its information with the safety house at the moment. “It has to do with trust, do you trust someone. I’m under the impression that they are careful with the information provided” (Respondent 6, r. 406-408). For other parties, trust that their partners will treat their information carefully is also an important factor in creating willingness to share information. “It has also become clear that somebody is not immediately lifted from its bed, because that fear used to exist in our working group. In societal work, the relationship with the client is often the most important. The fear existed that with difficult issues like this, it is tackled in a judicial manner” (Respondent 3, r. 40-45). Although concerns have been lifted, the network partners do not share information right away, but often thoroughly assess the situation themselves (Respondent 1, 3, 5, 6, 7). Another main reason why information is or cannot be shared with other parties has to do with privacy (Respondent 3, 4, 5, 6, 7). “With welfare institutions, we cannot share information. We can retrieve information from them ‘...’ With the municipality we can share openly and freely and we do so as well” (Respondent 5, r. 161-162 ‘...’ r. 313-315). Hesitation to share also seems to be related to the urgency of the matter (Respondent 7). “The seriousness of the situation contributes to whether you give up someone’s privacy” (Respondent 6, r. 213).

In Haarlemmermeer there are no formal agreements in place that deal with the sharing of information, except for in the person-specific approach (Respondent 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7). The partners
are imbued with the shared agreement that they should notify each other if they have any concerns and trust each other that they do so (Respondent 3, r. 160-164). “We do have the agreement that if we notice something, to share it with each other and check whether others have complementary information that can confirm or reject your view on the matter” (Respondent 7, r. 65-68). The previous relationship between the partners are often quite positive between the partners that share information with each other (Gemeente Haarlemmermeer 2016a; Respondent 1, 4, 5, 6, 7). Traditionally there is a good social infrastructure in Haarlemmermeer (Gemeente Haarlemmermeer, 2016a; Respondent 1; Respondent 5).

There is a moderate density of trust between the partners in Haarlemmermeer. The trust between the preferred partners can be deemed quite high, yet trust towards other partners is there to a lesser degree as they are often not aware of each other’s role and position. If there are concerns, most partners share their information with their partner of preference freely. On the other hand they do not necessarily know how their signals are followed up on and therefore often only share when they are very certain that there is a case of radicalization. Overall Haarlemmermeer is scored on a moderate density of mutual trust, which is centralized to the preferred partners.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mutual trust</th>
<th>Low density</th>
<th>Moderate density (centralized)</th>
<th>High density</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Formal face-to-face contact</td>
<td>Low frequency</td>
<td>Moderate frequency</td>
<td>High frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal face-to-face contact</td>
<td>Low frequency</td>
<td>Moderate frequency</td>
<td>High frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information sharing frequency</td>
<td>Information is never shared</td>
<td>Information is sometimes shared</td>
<td>Information is often shared</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stance towards information sharing</td>
<td>Participants do not want to share information</td>
<td>Participants are hesitant to share information</td>
<td>Participants share information without objection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring of activities</td>
<td>There are strict arrangements in place</td>
<td>There are loose arrangements in place</td>
<td>There are no arrangements in place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History of relationship</td>
<td>Negative previous relationship</td>
<td>Neutral previous relationship</td>
<td>Positive previous relationship</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.2.5 Commitment to process
The partners in Haarlemmermeer clearly see a responsibility of their own in the task to tackle radicalization. “Everyone has that sense of urgency” (Respondent 5). The necessity and urgency of collaboration to share signals is felt, as otherwise information is missed or the next steps cannot be taken (Respondent 1, 4, 5, 6, r. 466-468). “To create a proper view of the reality you need the experiences and picture of other parties. And most of the time it is there. A lot of the time you think, well is he known and yes he is known and there is a whole file or at least known. So it is very important to get a clear picture” (Respondent 7, r. 394-397). It is seen as a shared responsibility between the municipality and the different partners (Gemeente Haarlemmermeer, 2016a; Respondent 7). “It

75
is a shared responsibility, so I would like to call it a mutual dependency. It is not only us that are dependent on other parties, but it is something you do collectively” (Respondent 2, r.150-152). The network partners also see the commitment of their other partners, although it sometimes depends on the person involved rather than the organization and the frequency of cases (Respondent 1, 4, 5, 6, 7). “They may have it once and then it depends on the person whether they have a specific feeling with it of whether it is right or not and whether they are going to report it. So that is the difficult thing, how much do you actually deal with it” (Respondent 5, r. 358-366). Therefore it is not necessarily the top priority for all the network partners (Respondent 3, 4, 5, 7). “It is an important subject because the consequences can be big, but on the other side if you see what else is going on, it is one of the many things and only a small part so I also understand if it gets overshadowed” (Respondent 4, r. 404-410).

The partners in Haarlemmermeer are quite eager to share resources, as the organizations either invest time and money of their own into the matter or are willing to do so (Respondent 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7). “Other parties are also willing to invest their own resources, for example to take trainings. They do not mind to pay a share of the costs. That is also because of the positive reactions they have had from colleagues” (Respondent 1, r. 342-344). This is furthermore exemplified by the fact that some organizations have even set up their own policy and developed their own training on an individual basis (Respondent 6, 7). “The last few times, I have really invested time in it” (Respondent 6, r. 569). The amount of resources dedicated towards the matter of radicalization does depend on the urgency of a situation and should not be exaggerated. “It is just a small part of my job so I do not want to invest in it too much, with all due respect, we are doing very well here, we will keep it that way. It is good that we have attention for it but we should not make it too big that it becomes a day filling activity. Because in theory you could, but that is not feasible, no that is not feasible” (Respondent 7, r. 416-420). Because there is a relatively small case load, the partners in practice do not have to share or dedicate much resources (Respondent 1, 3, 4, 5 6. 7). “If it is necessary, we make the resources available” (Respondent 5, r. 457). Therefore it is often fitted within their normal tasks (Respondent 1, 3,4,5,6,7). Thus the partners in Haarlemmermeer are committed in the sense that if something is off, they will act upon it (Respondent 3, 6, 7). “If there are concerns, I do not think that there is any hesitation to act upon it” (Respondent 3, r. 158-159). Network activities, besides sharing information with the preferred partners, do not really occur, but if so the participants are open to it and take it seriously (Respondent 3, 4, 6, 7). “Yes, this is dealt with seriously in the examples we have seen and the extensive training we have had in which a lot of background information was given. For me it was about 2,5 days. That time is cleared for that indicates that it is seen as important. (Respondent 3, r. 238-241).

In Haarlemmermeer there is a clear sense of responsibility imbued in all the network partners for the issue of radicalization and they take measures of their own. Yet it does not
necessarily mean that is the top priority for most participants as the case load is relatively small. The participants contribute when necessary and have developed initiatives of their own. They are therefore eager to share resources. All in all there is a relatively high density of commitment in Haarlemmermeer.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commitment to process</th>
<th>Low density of commitment</th>
<th>Moderate density of commitment</th>
<th>High density of commitment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participation in network activities</td>
<td>Participants contribute to none of the activities</td>
<td>Participants contribute to some activities</td>
<td>Participants contribute to all activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participants share resources</td>
<td>Participants do not want to share their own resources</td>
<td>Participants are hesitant to share resources</td>
<td>Participants are eager to share resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urgency of network by participants</td>
<td>The network collaboration has a low priority for the participant</td>
<td>The network collaboration has a moderate priority for the participant</td>
<td>The network collaboration has a high priority for the participant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception of urgency with other participants</td>
<td>The network collaboration has a low priority for other participants</td>
<td>The network collaboration has a moderate priority for other participants</td>
<td>The network collaboration has a high priority for other participants</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.2.6 Goal Consensus
The municipality's goal is to prevent radicalization as much as possible, detect it where it occurs and tackle it through repressive measures. They find it important that a large group in the network is able to detect signals of radicalization in time and that they know where to report it (Gemeente Haarlemmermeer 2016a; Respondent 1). All network participants underline this more general goal (Respondent 3, 4, 5, 6, 7). “I think that all parties that are contributing have a common goal, I can underline that” (Respondent 7, r. 261-262). Yet not all of them let it prevail over their own organizational responsibilities. “I think it is good that you realize that we have our own responsibility towards our students and that I do not take that lightly. Because if you are not seen as trustworthy by the students then you lose them. So you need to be really careful about that. Nobody likes to be accused of something and that is important to me. Other parties need to realize that. We have our own responsibility to our students. And that is a different responsibility than just reporting cases at the slightest disturbance” (Respondent 6, r. 647-653). There have been situations in which the different responsibilities or point of views have been a slight issue, although it has not led to any real conflicts (Respondent 1). "No I do think that there is a difference that when you are in touch with clients that you well if you report it and an intervention takes place, what does that mean for the professional relationship with the client. I think that that is a sensitive issue [...]”After we reported a signal, it was difficult for us to remain working with the client” (Respondent 3, r. 121-123 [...] r. 194-197).

Thus in Haarlemmermeer the different parties do underscore the importance of the overarching goal of collaboration with each other and the prevention of radicalization. Yet it
differs between the partners to what regard they actually let the overarching goal prevail over their own organizational responsibilities. Therefore there is a moderately high degree of goal consensus in Haarlemmermeer.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goal consensus</th>
<th>Moderately low</th>
<th>Moderately high</th>
<th>High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Goal Consensus</td>
<td>Network goals are not shared</td>
<td>Goals are somewhat shared</td>
<td>Network goals are completely shared</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal conflict</td>
<td>There has been conflict over the individual and network goals</td>
<td>There has been some conflict over individual and network goals</td>
<td>There has been no conflict over individual and network goals</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.2.7. The network effectiveness of Haarlemmermeer
The network collaboration in Haarlemmermeer is a shared governance arrangement in which different partners each feel their own responsibility. The network collaboration in Haarlemmermeer has been set up quite broadly, with a lot of partners included that each report to either the safety house, the police or the municipality. These three main partners are in closer contact with each other. The trust towards one of the main parties by other network participants is considered to be higher than to the network as a whole, as the network partners are often not aware of who is part of the network and who is not. The scores for network effectiveness are summarized in Table 10. Based on the theoretical assumptions, the shared governance collaboration in Haarlemmermeer does not fulfill all the requirements of an effective network collaboration. A shared governance is often more effective when it only consists of a few stakeholders that have close connections. In the case of Haarlemmermeer, the shared governance arrangement therefore seems atypical as it is more layered. This leads to the fact that a lot of parties are included but are not necessarily aware of the complete structure of the network. Therefore the benefits of a shared governance arrangement are not fully utilized. For the other elements of network effectiveness, the shared governance arrangement could increase in effectiveness by creating a higher degree of goal consensus, trust and commitment to the process.

Another possibility for the municipality is to shift towards either a network administrative organization or a lead organization network. In both these type of networks the current network characteristics of Haarlemmermeer would make it a more effective network configuration.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coordination structure</th>
<th>Stakeholder inclusion (Size)</th>
<th>Goal consensus</th>
<th>Mutual trust</th>
<th>Commitment to process</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shared Governance</td>
<td>Few (6-8)</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High Density</td>
<td>High density</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haarlemmermeer</td>
<td>Many</td>
<td>Moderately high</td>
<td>Moderate to high</td>
<td>Moderate to high</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10: Network effectiveness Haarlemmermeer
7.3 Schiedam
7.3.1. Local developments with regards to radicalization

Radicalization in Schiedam
A report in 2015 conducted by RADAR concluded that people in Schiedam have the feeling that people in their city are radicalizing or susceptible to radicalization (van Drie, 2015, p.17). The municipality is aware that there are is some activity in Schiedam with regards to radicalization and therefore it is a development that asks for attention (Gemeente Schiedam, 2016). Yet there have not been any nameworthy incidents and only a few cases of radicalization so far. Compared to other cities the problem of radicalization in Schiedam is average to low (Schiedamnieuws, 2015). In 2016, Schiedam was named one of the priority municipalities and therefore received €168.345 from the NCTV to strengthen its comprehensive approach, together with the neighboring municipalities of Vlaardingen and Maasluis.

The issue of radicalization has been incorporated in different policy documents in Schiedam in the past years and the municipality has taken actions previous to becoming one of the priority municipalities (Respondent 8; Gemeente Schiedam, 2017). In 2010, a first research was conducted by RADAR investigating the nature and degree of radicalization in Schiedam. Despite the fact that there had not been any nameworthy incidents, the municipality stated in the comprehensive safety strategy 2012-2015 that it takes active measures to limit and prevent societal tensions related to radicalization (Gemeente Schiedam, 2012, p. 31). These activities were not specified into great detail. On 3 November 2015, the city council asked the municipality to develop an intensification of the radicalization approach, within the person-specific approach (Gemeente Schiedam, 2017). In the comprehensive safety approach of 2016, this strengthened approach was put forward consisting of both measures aimed at tackling radicalization and polarization (Gemeente Schiedam 2016). An important aspect in Schiedam is that the strengthened approach mainly focuses on radicalized individuals. These cases are a part of the person-specific approach and are dealt with within the safety house of Rotterdam-Rijnmond (Gemeente Schiedam 2017; Respondent 8). Another part of the Schiedam is focused at tackling polarization. “It is not only about detecting signals of radicalization but also about creating societal resilience” (Gemeente Schiedam, 2017, p. 26).

Thus the municipality has not published a separate policy document in which it describes its approach to tackle and prevent radicalization, but has incorporated the measures within the safety strategy. “We have a broad policy plan, we have the key figures, education on schools, a welfare institution, we approach mosques and relevant parties” (Respondent 8, r. 408-410). The measures adopted are aimed at limiting and preventing societal tensions and strengthening the
social network. Therefore the municipality has invested in a relevant social network that can be involved and approached in times of crisis and works together with partners to deal with radicalization (Gemeente Schiedam, 2016b). In the prevention of radicalization and polarization, creating good relationships with key partners in Schiedam is considered very important (Gemeente Schiedam, 2017, p. 26). The goal is to make the issue of radicalization part of the discussion and make societal partners more comfortable with dealing with the matter (Gemeente Schiedam, 2017). The different measures of the strengthened approach took shape around 2016. “I think somewhere medio 2016 this was translated into concrete actions in the sense that the teams were visited and were handed information, and that it was said clearly what the contact details were” (Respondent 9, r. 86-88). In December 2016, a network of key figures was established (Gemeente Schiedam, 2017; Respondent 10). The municipality offers training and development for youth workers, district police officers and health care professionals, so they are able to detect signals. The municipality has assigned two radicalization officers as a point of contact, who is in contact with societal partners and joins the case meetings in the safety house. These radicalization officers also make up the information- and advise point of radicalization, which is the main point of focus of the Schiedam analysis.

7.3.2 Network coordination structure
In Schiedam the municipality created an information and advice point radicalization which consists of two municipal radicalization officers that are the main point of contact (Respondent 8). Both of the policy officers are partly involved in policy and spent a large amount of their time in the field (Respondent 8). One of them is hired 20 hours a week for the radicalization approach and is also involved in visiting families and dealing with cases. They join the person-specific meetings in the safety house and keep in touch with societal partners for the detection of signals of radicalization (Gemeente Schiedam, 2017). In addition to that Schiedam, together with the municipalities of Maassluis and Vlaardingen, hired a process manager radicalization prevention who started at 1 July 2016. The process manager coordinates a network of 25 key figures in Schiedam who can be consulted on the matter of radicalization and are also in touch with the municipal radicalization officers (Gemeente Schiedam, 2017). These key figures have a certain constituency within Schiedam and have various backgrounds (Respondent 10). The information and advice point is the main switching board between the different network parties, the municipality and the safety house. It can be consulted by professionals and active citizens, for example from the key figure network. The network partners with whom the municipality collaborates all have a person to contact for radicalization, although it is not clearly named that way (Gemeente Schiedam, 2017; Respondent 8, 9, 11).
In the network collaboration structure of Schiedam, the municipal radicalization officers that form the information and advice point are seen as the leading actor. They visit the network partners, advise the professionals, support the ongoing processes and conducts on cases (Respondent 8, 9, 10, 11). “And what they do very well, and I see the municipality has a clear leading role, is creating awareness. That is it. And that was done by dropping by in my team but also other places to tell at a meeting what radicalization is, what it means in daily practice” (Respondent 9, r. 69-73). The municipality has not set up a formalized structure through which it keeps in touch with its partners but maintains the contact by informal contact. “I drop by regularly, they also have had a small information session of two hours and another information session, and they have been made aware of the information and advice point. I sometimes drop by to show my face or you email with them”. (Respondent 8, r. 164-167). The task of the other network partners is to detect signals and carry them over to the municipal radicalization officers who know what to do with the matter (Respondent 9, 10, 11). All the network activities are coordinated through and by the municipal officers. Other network participants are directly connected to the municipality and do not also contact the safety house. The municipality acts as the switching board of information (Respondent 8, 9, 10, 11). “We are in touch with the radicalization officers. They can call them, have their phone number. So in case of doubts than they can discuss anonymously’ (Respondent 11, r. 66-69). The matter of radicalization is not discussed horizontally between network partners (Respondent 8, 9, 11). The local structure in Schiedam is quite strong, but the subject of radicalization is not very prominently discussed in those local structures (Respondent 9). The municipality furthermore facilitates the activities of their network partners such as trainings and the possibility to organize information afternoons with local partners (Gemeente Schiedam, 2017).

In Schiedam, the municipality is clearly the party that is in the lead of coordinating and managing the network collaboration. As the municipality takes over cases from their network partners, are involved in the frontline and manage the activities, they are considered to be a Lead Organization Network.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Network coordination structure</strong></td>
<td>Network Administrative Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shared Governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lead Organization Network</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 7.3.3 Stakeholder inclusion

The network in Schiedam has been set up broadly, as citizens, mosques, the police, welfare and healthcare institutions, key figures and several associations are included (Gemeente Schiedam, 2017; Respondent 8). “We have approached all actors in the field” (Respondent 8, r. 144-145). These organizations and individuals have been visited by the municipal radicalization and are informed that they can contact the municipality by phone or email for advice (Gemeente Schiedam, 2017; Respondent 8, 9, 10, 11). The activities of the network collaboration in Schiedam...
are also directed at normal citizens. Citizens can contact the information and advice point and can participate in trainings (Respondent 8, 10). The municipality has not made a formal list of included partners, but is in touch with the partners that are relevant at that time (Respondent 8). It depends for each network partner whether they are in touch with other relevant network partners on the matter of radicalization. “We are here in the district and we are in touch with all possible parties you can think of. The housing corporation, the police that visits the neighborhood center daily for a cup of coffee and we are just often in touch with each other and then you also discuss signals we have” (Respondent 9, r. 560-564). Thus over 20 stakeholders are somehow included in the approach in Schiedam and are a part of the network. Therefore no specific type of stakeholders are excluded, but the connection could be strengthened with some of the partners (Respondent 8, 9, 11). For example, the municipality encounters some difficulties to include schools, although activities have been organized for them. “We noticed that schools were not very keen on it. That they did not want to be associated with the subject, so that is something we are working on” (Respondent 8, r. 273-274).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stakeholder inclusion</th>
<th>Size of Network</th>
<th>Few participants</th>
<th>Moderate number of participants</th>
<th>Many participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stakeholder exclusion</td>
<td>No important stakeholders excluded</td>
<td>Some important stakeholders excluded</td>
<td>Many important stakeholders excluded</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.3.4 Mutual trust
In Schiedam, the mutual trust between partners is exemplified by the way and frequency the partners go to each other for help and advice. The parties in the network collaboration do not have structural, formalized meetings with each other specifically focused on radicalization, outside of the person-specific approach in the safety house (Respondent 8, 9, 11). One of the reasons why the network was set up informally and unstructured is that the different network partners are very busy already and have to deal with a lot of different subjects. Radicalization is only a small part of their job, and they do not want to overload them (Respondent 8, 9, 11). “We deliberately chose not to formalize it so that they are not obliged to do something. So it is spontaneously and when we need to we see each other, but it is important to see each other every now and then. So it is also deliberately to not give the district teams the feel that they need to do even more, or well there they are again. So I also drop by spontaneously for a little talk or I find a reason to drop by so they see my face. Then you can chat informally and you hope to receive some information” (Respondent 8, r. 294-305). Thus the network partners are in touch whenever it occurs and know how to contact each other if necessary (Respondent 8, 9, 10, 11). “In my experience and the experience of other key figures, it is made very low key for them, they can just ask whenever they have questions” (Respondent 10, r. 403-404). The way the contact is organized in Schiedam is considered to be
sufficient considering the number of cases, yet the partners also stress it is important to sometimes see each other to keep creating awareness for the matter (Respondent 8, 9, 10, 11). An exception is the key figure network, which do meet every two to three months for training, peer reviews and information sessions (Respondent 10).

In Schiedam, the different network partners mention various difficulties with sharing information with each other. The network partners can be hesitant to share information because they do not always know what would be done with the information that they have shared. (Respondent 8, 9, 11). “That is a question towards the municipality what happens with it, that is a question that remains” (Respondent 9, r. 452-454). “Some are afraid that a police officer in uniform is immediately deployed based on the information they gave. We need to adjust that image, we need to be clear what happens when a signal is reported, where you need to report it. An operating framework, they are not scared to act, but they need to know what exactly happens to take away the fear that we do not directly notify the police” (Respondent 8, r. 437-446). Others have the feeling they might lose their relationship with their clients or constituency as they can been as a spy or a snitch (Respondent 8, 9, 10, 11). “There are people that have the image oh you are an extension of the municipality, you are only here to get information which you will snitch, so you are seen as a spy” (Respondent 10, r. 513-515). Another aspect that creates hesitation amongst the network partners to share signals of radicalization is that there is a lot of unclarity and insecurity with regards to when something is radicalization. “If we even have a case here then it is always the question do I see it correctly and you cannot get the answer. You only get the answer when someone leaves to go abroad” (Respondent 9, r. 234-237). Internally signals are sometimes discussed, but not always shared with the municipality (Respondent 9, 10, 11). Radicalization is seen as a sensitive topic which makes people more careful to share information. A related factor is the issue of privacy, making it more difficult to share information. The possibility that advice can be asked for anonymously is considered to be positive (Respondent 9, 11).

Despite the fact that there is unclarity and hesitation, there is mutual trust in each other’s capacities. “I have known the municipal officer quite some time and I know this is something she has a lot of knowledge in and does a lot in”. (Respondent 9, r. 67-69). Based on the previous relationship with the municipality, there is confidence in the municipal approach (Respondent 9, 11). “I think they know more and that they can tell me where I should report it and also anonymously” (Respondent 11, r. 116-117). Yet it is still the task to further spread that trust within their organizations. There are no formal agreements made between the partners about the sharing of information or the detection of signals outside of the person-specific approach (Respondent 9, 10, 11).

Thus in Schiedam there is little face-to-face contact between the network partners. If there is, this is often informal and happens occasionally. It can be noted that there still remains quite a
bit of hesitation with regards to the sharing of information between the partners, as it is unclear to them what happens with the information, what steps are taken, due to reasons of privacy and the relationship with clients. There are no arrangements in place to check up on each other. The network participants do have trust in each other’s capacities, but this is directed towards the municipality. Therefore the mutual trust in Schiedam is of an overall moderate density, centralized to the lead organization.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mutual trust</th>
<th>Low density</th>
<th>Moderate density (centralized)</th>
<th>High density</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Formal face-to-face contact</td>
<td>Low frequency</td>
<td>Moderate frequency</td>
<td>High frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal face-to-face contact</td>
<td>Low frequency</td>
<td>Moderate frequency</td>
<td>High frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information sharing frequency</td>
<td>Information is never shared</td>
<td>Information is sometimes shared</td>
<td>Information is often shared</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stance towards information sharing</td>
<td>Participants do not want to share information</td>
<td>Participants are hesitant to share information</td>
<td>Participants share information without objection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring of activities</td>
<td>There are strict arrangements in place</td>
<td>There are loose arrangements in place</td>
<td>There are no arrangements in place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History of relationship</td>
<td>Negative previous relationship</td>
<td>Neutral previous relationship</td>
<td>Positive previous relationship</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 7.3.5 Commitment to process

In Schiedam, the municipality sees the network collaboration as an important part of their radicalization approach (Respondent 8). Yet the network collaboration is not attributed a prominent role in their policy documents. The priority is put on the person-specific approach rather than the detection of radicalization signals (Gemeente Schiedam, 2017). For the network partners, the sense of urgency for the network collaboration is not that clear cut (Respondent 9,11). “Very honestly, I think that it is too much a far-off scenario. Radicalization will be there, for us it is intangible and what we understand of radicalization we see it in the media. So I think it is too much a far-off scenario. For us it has too little priority” (Respondent 9, r. 486-489). For a part of the network it has a low priority, especially because they are very busy with other topics. Radicalization is only a minor part of their work (Respondent 9,11). “The municipality came to us, it was not a question from us to the municipality. We did not encounter it at all or thought we did not encounter it, so I do not know yet. It is more the need of the municipality than the other way around. On the other hand, it is good to discuss it openly” (Respondent 11, r. 376-380). The key figures are an exception, as they are active on this topic from a more voluntarily basis. “We feel responsibility, we need to do something, we need to take responsibility for our community to ensure a safe environment and ensure the livability of the municipality” (Respondent 10, r. 459-461).

The municipality is content with the way other parties contribute. “It can always be better of course, but I think we are quite busy with it” (Respondent 8, r. 416). Other partners agree that the municipality is active on the matter (Respondent 9,11), yet for them it is not something they
are very active on and also do not necessarily see that they need to be (Respondent 9, 11). "I think for now it is sufficient, but as I said in the day-to-day affairs, in the work we do, radicalization is only a part and not a very prominent part" (Respondent 9, r. 93-94). The municipality offers resources for its network partner to organize meetings or activities and participate in trainings (Gemeente Schiedam, 2017; Respondent 8, 10, 11). The network partners participate and contribute to these activities if possible and find them somewhat important. "I have not heard someone who said this is nonsense" (Respondent 11, r. 523). Yet they do not very actively deploy activities of their own for the network and instead see a clear responsibility for the municipality to do so (Respondent 9, 10, 11).

The network partners find the current way of dealing with radicalization sufficient but are not very eager to invest a lot more time or money into the matter. They mainly want to rely on the municipality and be able for them to invest their resources. "I think this is sufficient, also due to the fact that in all kind of networks we need to do a lot and we have a busy team with psychotic patients, police stuff and then another thing is added. I need one or two people where I can go to for advice and then they can handle it or tell me what to do" (Respondent 11, r. 123-127). The network parties in Schiedam do not actively share their information or resources as they still do not feel all to equipped to do so. "With radicalization now we have the idea that is someone with an explosive belt that goes into a station and we need to report it. It is a concept that we do not know that well" (Respondent 11, r. 417-420). There is some reluctance notable to share resources and participate in the network activities. "If we detect something we can share it with the municipality but they will undoubtedly ask us if we can keep an eye on it. So that is a bit of a struggle, what do they expect from us. First of all, we do not know if it is the case and second of all we cannot check a kid for 24 hours" (Respondent 9, r. 270-277). They do provide employee resources to participate in the trainings.

The fact that little commitment of the partners is noticed can be explained by the fact that for some the awareness for the matter is not very high and because there have been very few cases of radicalization (Respondent 9, 11).

Overall, the network in Schiedam has a low to moderate density of commitment. For the municipality and the key figure network, there is commitment and a sense of urgency to act upon the matter, but for other network partners radicalization is only a low priority. On their own initiative they do not invest a lot of time or feel a lot of priority to actively engage in the network collaboration.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commitment to process</th>
<th>Low density of commitment</th>
<th>Moderate density of commitment</th>
<th>High density of commitment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participation in network activities</td>
<td>Participants contribute to none of the activities</td>
<td>Participants contribute to some activities</td>
<td>Participants contribute to all activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participants share resources</td>
<td>Participants do not want to</td>
<td>Participants are hesitant to share own resources</td>
<td>Participants are eager to share resources</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7.3.6 Goal Consensus

The goal of the approach in Schiedam is to detect radicalizing individuals as soon as possible and stop the process of radicalization (Gemeente Schiedam, 2017, p. 21). The network partners all share this goal to a certain extent (Respondent 8, 9, 10, 11). "Eventually it is about the fact that the family or youngster within the family has a healthier and happier future. And from our Western perspective, for radicalization there is not a place for that. So we all have the same goal" (Respondent 9, r. 340-342). The information that can be provided by the different network partners is seen as complementary to each other, but there are also some important differences between the partners. "You need to detect whether these kind of signals are there, you need to do something with it, you should not walk away for it. But it does mean your position as a caretaker in a family becomes a point of discussion or that you start to feel unpleasant or unsafe in that role" (Respondent 9, r. 148-153). For some this is more problematic than for others. "Every organization has its own, how will I say it, perspective which is occupation related. The police looks whether there are criminal activities, me as a caretaker looks at psychosocial factors. The police has a different perspective. So I think you can complement each other. Sometimes that takes a bit, you need to get to know each other especially with this subject" (Respondent 8, r. 353-358). Thus there is an overarching goal to which the partners can work together based on a responsibility they feel to the society, but that is only to a certain extent (Respondent 8, 9, 11). There have not been notable conflicts in the network collaboration in Schiedam, but the dilemma’s mentioned previously in this chapter prove that the network participants struggle to commit themselves to the network goals. They do not necessarily put the network goals before the individual goals (Respondent 9, 11). “It could be strengthened. But to be honest, that is also due to ourselves. In the day-to-day affairs we have a very busy agenda" (Respondent 9, r.414-415).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goal consensus</th>
<th>Moderately low</th>
<th>Moderately high</th>
<th>High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Goal Consensus</td>
<td>Network goals are not shared</td>
<td>Goals are somewhat shared</td>
<td>Network goals are completely shared</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal conflict</td>
<td>There has been conflict over the individual and network goals</td>
<td>There has been some conflict over individual and network goals</td>
<td>There has been no conflict over individual and network goals</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7.3.7. The network effectiveness of Schiedam

In Schiedam, the municipality is clearly the leading party in the network collaboration aimed at preventing and detecting radicalization. The municipality takes initiative and the other parties follow based on that initiative. Yet the network partners are not all too committed to the network collaboration themselves. In the lead organization network this is not deemed necessary for the network in order for it to be effective. Based on the indicators for network effectiveness the network can be deemed moderately effective as the goal consensus, commitment to process and mutual trust amongst the network participants does not need to be high. These scores are summarized in Table 11. The network collaboration in Schiedam could improve its effectiveness if it would focus on a smaller range of network participants that have a higher commitment to the network process.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coordination structure</th>
<th>Stakeholder inclusion (Size)</th>
<th>Goal consensus</th>
<th>Mutual trust</th>
<th>Commitment to process</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lead Organization Network Schiedam</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderately Low</td>
<td>Low Density (Centralized)</td>
<td>Low density of commitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Many</td>
<td>Moderately High</td>
<td>Moderate density (centralized)</td>
<td>Low to moderate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11: Network effectiveness Schiedam

7.4 Comparing the cases

The separate descriptions of the network collaborations found in the municipalities under investigations provide a thorough description and assessment of the effectiveness of the network collaboration. Therefore this chapter has provided an answer to the second empirical sub-question ‘How do Dutch municipalities collaborate in local networks aimed at preventing and detecting radicalization?’. In the final part of this chapter these network collaborations are reflected upon by comparing the cases and discussing the differences and similarities found.

In the Netherlands, the municipalities of Dordrecht, Schiedam and Haarlemmermeer have set up different structures in which they collaborate with their network partners in the detection and prevention of radicalization. Despite the fact that differences can be found in the coordination structure adopted there are also similarities found in the way these network collaborations have been set up. All network collaborations are built around informal contact between the different partners. There are no separate formal meetings or structural network activities in which the detection of radicalization is discussed. Radicalization is sometimes discussed in other meetings in which some of the network partners also participate, but this is rarely the case. Rather, informal contact by phone, email or by visiting each other is the most common approach to keep each other informed. As there are no formal meetings, there are also rarely any structural moments in which the matter is discussed. In all three municipalities, signals of radicalization are shared if a situation occurs or if there are concerns or questions. Considering the caseload in all municipalities, that is
deemed sufficient. An informal approach in which detecting radicalization is a small part of the job seems to be a suitable way to incorporate many partners and make it possible to easily share relevant information. Yet the network partners also see a risk with this approach. They warn for the fact that because there is not a more structured way in which radicalization is put under their attention and the issue is not a large part of their day to day practice, there is a risk that attention for it fades away over time.

As the network collaborations are set up rather informally, there are few agreements about when and how the partners should share information. Although that can exemplify trust in one another, a majority of the partners also mention that due to the fact that there is a lot of undecority surrounding radicalization, privacy agreements or a clear operating framework would support them in sharing signals more easily. This could have a positive contribution towards the network’s effectiveness. In most cases, radicalization officers have been assigned by the network partners to be the point of contact within their own organization and towards the municipality and/or other network partners. The goal consensus in all municipalities is moderately high to high, as all relevant parties subscribe to the goal of the network collaboration. Yet the degree to which they let the collaboration’s goals prevail above their own differs in each municipality. The municipalities have chosen to incorporate a large number of partners into the network collaboration. Only in Dordrecht, a moderate number of partners is identified. In Schiedam and Haarlemmermeer the network collaboration is set up as broadly as possible. As the commitment of these partners also differ, it is interesting to see how the size of the network collaboration matters for the elements on which public value is created.

The most significant difference can be noted with regards to the commitment of other actors in the process. In all three network collaborations the municipality is a very committed partner, but the degree to which other partners are committed to the network collaboration differs. The cases seem to differ in the shared responsibility the municipalities give to their network partners due to the chosen coordination structure. This is in line with the theoretical expectations. In Schiedam, which takes the form of a lead organization network, the responsibility is clearly put upon the municipality. As a result, the commitment to the process of other partners is lower than that in Haarlemmermeer and Dordrecht. In the shared governance arrangement in Haarlemmermeer, the commitment to the process is highest as the partners not only see it as a shared responsibility but also their own responsibility. In Dordrecht, the NAO, it differs for each network participant how committed they are. Responsibility and commitment is shown by all partners, but this is higher for some parties than for others.

As was expected, the different type of network collaborations score differently on the requirements for network effectiveness. The scores of the different network collaborations on the requirements for network effectiveness have been summarized in Table 12. In light of the
theoretical model based on Provan & Kenis (2008) presented in chapter four, the network characteristics were matched with the requirements for network effectiveness for each type of collaboration. Based on these theoretical assumptions, only the municipality of Dordrecht can be qualified as an effective type of network collaboration. The lead organization network of Schiedam is moderately effective as it focuses on too many stakeholders than would be ideal for this type of network. The shared governance network of Haarlemmermeer is the least effective type of network, as the scores on the requirements do not resonate with the theoretical assumptions. In the next chapter the implications of the type of network collaboration and its effectiveness on the way public value is created is discussed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>Dordrecht</th>
<th>Haarlemmermeer</th>
<th>Schiedam</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coordination structure</td>
<td>NAO</td>
<td>Shared Governance</td>
<td>Lead organization network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stakeholder inclusion</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Many</td>
<td>Many</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of network</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Many</td>
<td>Many</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stakeholder exclusion</td>
<td>Some excluded</td>
<td>Some excluded</td>
<td>Some excluded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutual trust</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal face-to-face contact</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal face-to-face contact</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information sharing frequency</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stance towards information sharing</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring of activities</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History of relationship</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commitment to process</td>
<td>Moderate to high</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low to moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in network activities</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participants share resources</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urgency of network by participants</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception of urgency with other participants</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal consensus</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderately high</td>
<td>Moderately high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal consensus</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal conflict</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network effectiveness</td>
<td>Effective</td>
<td>Less effective</td>
<td>Moderately effective</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 12: Overview of network effectiveness characteristics

16 The colors reflect whether they fulfill the requirements for network effectiveness. Green = Yes. Yellow = Moderately. Red = No.
Chapter 8 - Public value creation

In the previous chapter the different network collaborations in Dordrecht, Haarlemmermeer and Schiedam were thoroughly discussed and their network effectiveness was assessed. This chapter provides insight in how these network collaborations have created public value focusing on the three public value elements of the strategic triangle of Moore (1995). These elements are the public value proposition, legitimacy and support and operational capacity. Based on the results of this chapter, the possible occurrence of tight coupling or decoupling is discussed. That information combined, this chapter provides an answer to the third empirical sub question; “How do these network collaborations create public value”.

8.1 Dordrecht
8.1.1. Public value proposition

The municipality of Dordrecht has published quite an extensive separate policy document late 2016. The fact that they have done so is valuable in the eyes of the network participants. “Well the municipality has put a clear vision on paper and a way they want to deal with the issue in Dordrecht” (Respondent 15, r. 239-240). The structure and the plan of action have made that the process is organized and the focus is clear for both internal and external parties (Respondent 13; Respondent 14, r. 113; 555-558). “The theme is more vivid I think. So it is clear and people know their way. It is important that if there is information, that it eventually reaches the next station and I do think that has changed through this approach”(Respondent 13, r. 573-575). Although it is clear for the network participants what they should do when they encounter a case, they would appreciate a more thorough working process of what they do and what others do (Respondent 13, r. 208-217; Respondent 15). “So there is a global document but not a detailed work process of what we do, when and what.” (Respondent 15, r. 101-104).

Substantive actions as a result of this document have also been taken. Most of the network participants have taken actions contributing to the goal of the network collaboration that they would not have done without the policy. “This plan of action has made sure that all involved organizations have taken steps on this part to put people in action mode. So that ensures that everybody is a bit more active on the topic”(Respondent 15, r. 581-583). Appointing radicalization officers seems to have contributed to taking substantive actions. “If you look at the last year and see those six cases pass that we have reported to the chef the dossier, than I wonder, indeed I know for a fact, that I would have reported far less if the chef the dossier was not there and if I hadn’t had the training so to say”(Respondent 13, r. 405-409). The perceived effectiveness of the activities in Dordrecht by its network participants is that it is valuable in the detection of signals or radicalization (Respondent 15, r.683-684). “By placing points of contact in the organization, that you also provide with a bit of extra information so they have a better understanding and are more
able to review a case, then I think that you increase the level of quality so to say on that topic” (Respondent 13, r. 89-92). The municipality receives more cases (Respondent 12; 208-211; r. 563). The current approach in Dordrecht is considered to be effective when it entails the detection of signals. “For detecting signals it is, and thus hope that you can pull someone over the other side of the line and in that way prevent it. Yes, I do think this approach works well for that, because several parties are on the table that are positioned closely in the communities. I think that is the power of collaboration. That everyone knows, that is what it is about for me, that the main parties know that they are losing sight of someone. Then we alert each other and we know where to go. People feel supported and do not have to keep their worries for themselves” (Respondent 16, r. 561-567). Yet for the prevention of radicalization as a whole this cannot be said to the same extent (Respondent 15, r. 335-336). “Well effective, I do have some doubts about it, doubts that we can never truly prevent it, because especially lone wolves so to say, you do not control that” (Respondent 14, r. 380-387).

In Dordrecht, the municipality has created public value by following a public value proposition that consists of the main activities and goals to be pursued by the municipality and the network partners. The actions and goals aimed for seem to be achieved in the eyes of the network partners. “For us it is more the assumption that we know we can go somewhere if we are worried and as I mentioned previously the assurance of a good approach, that is reassuring that it is handled well” (Respondent 16, r. 593-595).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public value proposition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategy document</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No separate policy document / limited description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Clearness of strategy</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure, goals and activities are not clear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Substantive actions</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No alignment between activities and realized output</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Perceived effectiveness</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The output activities are deemed ineffective</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 8.1.2 Legitimacy and support

The network collaboration in Dordrecht has affected both the internal and external legitimacy and support. With regards to the internal legitimacy and support, there is wide support for the network collaboration and the prevention policy (Respondent 12, 13, 14, 15, 16). “Our employees really see the value of it. Especially because they want it to be assessed right” (Respondent 15, r. 622-623). When there has been a case in an organization, this adds to the support for the network.
“You do see, but that also has to do with the fact that if you have had a case then you experience how useful it is. Then they say that they are so happy that they can call someone, for example” (Respondent 12, r. 445-447). The fact that responsibilities are more clear on who does what and who is responsible is furthermore supported (Respondent 14). The network participants acknowledge the need to invest time and resources into the network collaboration (Respondent 13, 14, 15, 16).

The legitimacy and support expressed outside of the people directly involved in the network collaboration is experienced more mixed (Respondent 12, 13, 16). “Sometimes you really need to look for support” (Respondent 12, r. 456). Although no objections or sanctions are expressed directly, other parties can be hesitant to provide their support to the collaboration. For example, the chef the dossier encounters difficulties to discuss radicalization prevention with possible new partners or to gain funding from some departments to direct to the matter. “A lot of organizations say that they have nothing to do with the matter, so you sometimes need to really haul” (Respondent 12, r. 204-206). The social support department pays for youth work and they needed to be convinced that radicalization prevention should be included in their subsidy. “Convincing them of the necessity is sometimes essential” (Respondent 16, r. 240). Other employees that are not directly involved with the matter do not necessarily see the advantages of the collaboration as they are often not informed on what kind of valuable results are generated (Respondent 12, 13). Some of the network participants also mention that they doubt whether other parties really know what is going on with regards to radicalization prevention (Respondent 16). The fact that others need to be persuaded also holds for the political commitment. “It has taken the chef the dossier quite some trouble to get that [support from the executive]. But I think that now it is clearly in the minds of the executive” (Respondent 16, r.513-518). The executive branch has endorsed the policy and have sent it to the city council. “That has helped as it shows that the executive finds it important” (Respondent 12, r. 467-469) “It stands stronger and you can go ahead and tackle the issue if you think something needs to happen” (Respondent 16, r. 119). In the council it has not received much attention and has been postponed several times. According to one of the network participants the political commitment could be improved to ease the investment and collaboration at lower levels as now they are somewhat evasive about the fact it can also happen in Dordrecht (Respondent 15). “So more political commitment, someone that really commits himself to it, who says alright despite the fact that it does not happen often here, we do want to send a strong message that everyone is included in our community” (Respondent 15, r. 334-338).

In Dordrecht, the network collaboration created high internal legitimacy and support of its direct partners. They all see the value of the network collaboration and are positive about contributing to the collaboration. With regards to external legitimacy and support this is not necessarily the case. Parties outside of the network collaboration and the executive need to be
Convinced of the necessity of the network and they do not actively endorse it. Therefore there is only moderate external legitimacy in Dordrecht.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legitimacy and support</th>
<th>External legitimacy and support expressions</th>
<th>Internal legitimacy and support expressions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Absence of support expressed</td>
<td>Low internal legitimacy and support</td>
<td>Absence of support expressed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some support expressed</td>
<td>Moderate internal legitimacy and support</td>
<td>A lot of support expressed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absence of objections or sanctions expressed</td>
<td>High internal legitimacy and support</td>
<td>Some objections or sanctions expressed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 8.1.3 Operational capacity

The network has sufficient employee resources to tackle the issues and to contribute to the execution of the plan of action for the few hours needed (Respondent 12, 13, 14, 15, 16). Their task is fitted within their normal work package which is deemed sufficient (Respondent 13, 14, 15, 16). The main investment in employee resources comes from the municipality and youth workers. "I spent quite some hours on this matter, a large part of my job is directed towards this and I get all the space to do so" (Respondent 12, r. 512-514). Youth workers have increased their capacity with 2fte, paid for by the municipality, to direct towards radicalization (Respondent 15, 16). Besides the subsidy for youth workers for radicalization and the employee resources, there are no financial resources directed towards the execution of the radicalization action plan. The current activities are all fitted within the budgets of its partners (Respondent 12; Gemeente Dordrecht, 2016a). "Well effective, I do think that with very little resources we achieve a lot. By getting in touch with the parties and share your concerns and show them they are important to us" (Respondent 12, r. 555-558). That does mean that although current activities can be paid for there is little to no room to organize (new) activities or really invest in prevention work (Respondent 12, 15). For the current activities, the capacity is said to be sufficient.

With regards to training and development, a basic training radicalization has been organized for some network partners and professionals in Dordrecht. Yet not all parties are trained as it is considered to also be their own responsibility. "Organizations, such as education or a social district team, also have their own budgets to invest in knowledge development. If they find it necessary they could also use their own resources, so it does not always have to come from us" (Respondent 12, r. 532-537). Thus the municipality considers to what extent training is necessary and for whom as it can be quite an investment (Gemeente Dordrecht, 2016a; Respondent 12, 15, 16). The participants acknowledge that more could be done with regards to training and knowledge development of network partners (Respondent 13, 14, r. 326-330; 15, r. 672-679). "I
think it would be valuable if there would be a follow-up day with people that have followed the training” (Respondent 13, r.208-209). The number of people that have or will receive training is growing. “So far we have had two trainings and now we are going to train more social district teams and a large group of the social services”. (Respondent 12, r. 545-551). Youth workers have thoroughly invested in training and knowledge development for themselves as well (Respondent 12, 15). All the network partners that have had invested in training see the added value of training and development directly in their work practices to detect radicalization (Respondent 12, 13, 15). “For me training and development on this matter has been very useful. And I also notice that all colleagues have benefited from the training” (Respondent 15, r. 602-603).

Due to the investments in and attention for radicalization detection, the problem solving capacity of the municipality and the network partners has grown. “We are now a helpdesk in assessing signals of radicalization in Dordrecht” (R-Newt, 2017). Because Dordrecht has invested in the matter of radicalization prevention, they also sometimes assist surrounding smaller municipalities that do not have the knowledge or resources to deal with these kind of issues. (Respondent 12, r. 519-521). Furthermore there is increased awareness among the partners, which results in the fact that they are more focused on possible signals of radicalization and report it sooner (Respondent 12, 13, 14, 15, 16). “It is also a bit that everything you give attention to it grows, that also applies to this theme. So yes you are seeing and detecting more and you receive more questions out of a lack of knowledge” (Respondent 15, r.692-694). The fact that people now do not feel hesitation to ask questions is considered to be valuable (Respondent 15, r. 697-698). Other than the fact that detection of radicalization now goes more smoothly, the participants have not started developing new activities or approaches to address radicalization (Respondent 13, 14, 16). “We do our job the way we used to before. It is not like for every report there is a paragraph in which we discuss whether the individual fits the radicalization criteria. With that respect it has not changed in our organization”. (Respondent 13, r.517-536).

In terms of operational capacity several resources in Dordrecht increased slightly. A lot is fitted within normal municipal budgets and employee resources. Next to the youth workers, the other participants do not direct much of their resources towards the radicalization approach. Despite the limited resources made available, the network participants have all increased their problem solving capacity on this matter, are more equipped to detect signals and do so quite actively.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operational capacity</th>
<th>Financial resources</th>
<th>Employee resources</th>
<th>Investment in training and development</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Financial resources</td>
<td>Budget stayed the same or decreased</td>
<td>Budget increased slightly</td>
<td>Budget increased significantly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employee resources</td>
<td>Number of fte stayed the same or decreased</td>
<td>Number of fte increased slightly</td>
<td>Number of fte increased significantly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment in training and development</td>
<td>No investment in courses and training</td>
<td>Investment in courses and training for some participants</td>
<td>Investment in courses and training for a lot of participants</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8.1.4 Public value creation

Overall, the NAO in Dordrecht has focused on creating public value through a public value proposition that is deemed sufficient, it has invested in a high internal legitimacy amongst its participants and has created a slight increase in operational capacity to detect signals of radicalization. Compared with the initial assumptions made in chapter five, the network of Dordrecht scores better on the public value proposition. The effective network collaboration has led to a clear public value proposition followed by substantive actions amongst the participants. The coordinative function of the NAO has functioned well and has thus enabled public value on that account. The internal legitimacy and support is in line with the expectations. The network partners are committed and provide invest time into the collaboration. With regards to external legitimacy and support and operational capacity, the network collaboration performs under expectation. Radicalization is not really an important topic in Dordrecht. The radicalization approach can therefore not count on a lot of interest from other parties. With regards to operational capacity, the performance of Dordrecht is slightly lower. Not many resources are invested into the approach. The partners in the network collaboration are sufficiently equipped to enact the current approach, but the operational capacity is not deemed enough for a more ambitious policy approach. Despite the limited resources that have become available in Dordrecht, the problem-solving capacity has grown as the network members are committed in their task.

As there is alignment between the three elements in the strategic triangle, there is a situation of tight coupling in Dordrecht. There is both sufficient legitimacy and support and operational capacity to enact the current public value proposition. A situation of decoupling, in which the policy and the practice do not align is not encountered in Dordrecht. For the NAO type of network collaboration, this was also least likely to be encountered. What could be at hand is that the municipality has made trade-offs in the sense that a less ambitious public value proposition has been adopted which is in line with the external legitimacy and operational capacity made available. Internally there is support for a more ambitious public value proposition. If Dordrecht would want to create more public value, the operational capacity could be increased by including a wider group of organizations. Dordrecht is now focused on a relatively small group of organizations. Investing in a higher degree of external legitimacy and support could also have a positive impact on the operational capacity in Dordrecht, as more resources could become available to them.
8.2 Haarlemmermeer

8.2.1. Public value proposition

The radicalization approach in Haarlemmermeer laid out a structure for the approach of the municipality which is seen as valuable to them and has made them more conscious in their actions (Respondent 1, 2; Gemeente Haarlemmermeer, 2016d). “There is a structure now, that is always different, it feels better. You now know who the points of contact are, where you need to go and what you need to ask when, how many trainings you need to organize. Previous it was more ad hoc, now you see what to do, when, how much and what it leads to. I see that as added value, it feels a lot better” (Respondent 1, r. 400-407). Although the other network participants are included in the network’s training activities and information sharing, the current approach does not provide all of them with much clarity on how other partners are included in the plan and with whom they are in touch (Respondent 3, 4, 6, 7). On the other hand, all partners do have their own point of contact, know how to reach them and what steps to follow. A point of reference has been created (Respondent 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7). “In the beginning it was very vague where we needed to go if something was going on. So I think it is really important that there is a point of contact and that has become clear. So we know that […] now we can either go to the municipal officer or the safety house” (Respondent 3, r. 104-108; r.40-42).

As the organizations all feel their own responsibility in the light of radicalization approach, substantive actions are taken by the different partners. Partners have developed or followed trainings, information is shared when deemed necessary and spread within the own organization (Gemeente Haarlemmermeer 2016c; Respondent 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 6, 7). The first group of professionals have been trained by the municipality. Activities focused on the further strengthening of the network as a whole and the continuous investment in awareness has not yet taken a more structural shape. This is set to be done in light of the approach (Respondent 1, 2). “You continuously need to invest, keep the connections warm, invest in the trainings. That is probably the crux of the problem here” (Respondent 1, r. 322-324). Different parties address the fact that the network could be developed more as a whole and that it would be good to get radicalization on the agenda a bit more often, to maintain awareness for the issue (Respondent 3, r.148-150). “I think it would be good to keep focusing attention on it, because it is quite easy to think it is going all fine and then you get lazy and something happens. Of course you cannot prevent it for a hundred percent, but you can have a regular reminder to keep people focused” (Respondent 7, r. 530-533).
The municipality has set general targets to develop their network and train as many professionals as possible, as it is hard to quantify results. "Because what decrease do you want to see, what increase do you want to see, how many measures do you us. It is undoable on this theme" (Respondent 1, r. 184-186). Although the activities deployed in Haarlemmermeer could be set up a bit more thorough or coordinated, the network participants do perceive the approach as being more effective than doing nothing (Respondent 3, 4, 7). The approach does not guarantee that there will never be an incident with regards to radicalization in Haarlemmermeer (Gemeente Haarlemmermeer, 2016d), but through this approach signals will be picked up faster and earlier than if you would not collaborate (Gemeente Haarlemmermeer, 2016d; Respondent 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7). “We are only a small part, so it is not super effective, but good that we do it” (Respondent 3, r. 380-381). The perceived effectiveness is focused on the detection of the signals, as countering or preventing radicalization through this approach is more questionable (Respondent 3, 4, 5, 6, 7). “There is attention for it but the whole preventive policy is in a very early stage” (Respondent 4, r. 95-96).

By establishing an extensive public value proposition on the matter of radicalization detection and prevention by the municipality, the radicalization approach in Haarlemmermeer has become strengthened. The partners in the network collaboration have been contributing more than before by taking more substantive actions in light of the radicalization approach. Yet there are no structural connections between the partners or a clear image of the larger network, which risks the awareness for and focus on radicalization from fading to the background.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public value proposition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategy document</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No separate policy document / limited description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Clearness of strategy</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure, goals and activities are not clear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Substantive actions</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No alignment between activities and realized output</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Perceived effectiveness</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The output activities are deemed ineffective</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8.2.2 Legitimacy and support
In Haarlemmermeer, the approach to tackle radicalization through the network collaboration can count on a moderate degree of internal legitimacy and support. The organizations participating feel supported by their own organization to contribute to detecting radicalization (Respondent 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7). "You do not have to explain that you need to do something. So everyone understands
that you need to do something” (Respondent 6, r. 523-427). “I feel support from other parties, that
what you do is good” (Respondent 7, r. 275). Sometimes they are even stimulated to remain
focused on the matter by their own organization (Respondent 5, 6, 7). Especially when there have
been cases, the organizations see the added value of the collaboration (Respondent 3, 5, 6, 7). “I
think everybody sees it. Because with certain cases you can see how fast you can take action, make
contact and investigate, so everyone sees that” (Respondent 5, r. 425-426). The partners also stress
that if they would need more time or resources from their own organization to be able to deal with
the matter, this is not considered a problem (Respondent 1, 4, 5, 6, 7). Although there is support
for the fact that attention is focused on detecting and preventing radicalization, there are critical
notes outing by some network partners on how the network functions as a whole (Respondent 3,
4,6). “I think it is a bit limited, well very limited. We know where to go, the people at schools know
where to go […] but is not the case that in that sense it is spoken about much on the level of
practitioners” (Respondent 3, r. 73-77). The network collaboration is not very visible to the other
network participants. Not all parties are visible enough in what they do and who is aligned. Thus
the network could be positioned more clearly to become more effective (Respondent 3, 4, 6).

Outside of the network collaboration, the political support seems to be quite high.
Although radicalization is not a main policy theme and has only been a priority in the region for
the past 2,5 years, the executive support in Haarlemmermeer is quite high (Respondent 1, 2, 4). This
is stimulated by the fact that the mayor is the project leader for the regional CTER project
and is therefore actively involved in the matter of radicalization, which is also positive for the local
level (Gemeente Haarlemmermeer 2016d; Respondent 1, 4). The city council discussed the plan
of action within two months after it was first published. Furthermore it has been shared through
the regular media. The executive board of the municipality has approved the approach. In the
debate concerning the radicalization approach, the majority of the parties supported the plan
presented (Gemeente Haarlemmermeer, 2016d). “It is a good step that the plan of action has been
developed” (Gemeente Haarlemmermeer, 2016d). The parties in the city council even stress the
fact that if more costs were to be involved, that the municipal budget could be used (ibid;
Respondent 1). The city council thus supports the plan and some even stress that it is maybe not
ambitious enough. More activities could be deployed more structurally (Gemeente
Haarlemmermeer, 2016d; Respondent 1). There are no complaints that certain parties are very
difficult to reach or do not want to collaborate on the matter. The parties that have become
involved, have done so either voluntarily or without much hesitation. “I think when they detect a
lot of signals or if something is really going on, that they would take initiative to start the network,
to contribute” (Respondent 4, r 464-468).

In Haarlemmermeer, there is a high level of external legitimacy and support for the
Collaboration and the activities. Internally, the partners are positive about the network
collaboration and the set-up of the radicalization approach, but they also see room for improvement with regards to internal visibility of the network. Yet they do invest time and resources in the process if necessary. Therefore there is high internal legitimacy and support in Haarlemmermeer.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legitimacy and support</th>
<th>Low external legitimacy and support</th>
<th>Moderate external legitimacy and support</th>
<th>High external legitimacy and support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>External legitimacy and support expressions</td>
<td>Absence of support expressed</td>
<td>Some support expressed</td>
<td>A lot of support expressed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External objections or sanctions</td>
<td>A lot of objections or sanctions expressed</td>
<td>Some objections or sanctions expressed</td>
<td>Absence of objections or sanctions expressed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal legitimacy and support</td>
<td>Low internal legitimacy and support</td>
<td>Moderate internal legitimacy and support</td>
<td>High internal legitimacy and support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal legitimacy and support expressions</td>
<td>Absence of support expressed</td>
<td>Some support expressed</td>
<td>A lot of support expressed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal objections or sanctions</td>
<td>A lot of objections or sanctions expressed</td>
<td>Some objections or sanctions expressed</td>
<td>Absence of objections or sanctions expressed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8.2.3 Operational capacity
In Haarlemmermeer, a lot is invested by the municipality in training and development of frontline professionals and the parties themselves also invest in the training of their employees (Respondent 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7). In 2016 the municipality of Haarlemmermeer was granted €131,200,- from the NCTV to deploy activities with regards to the training of professionals and the prevention of radicalization. For Haarlemmermeer this was spent on a one day training for 15 professionals and a two-day training for three professionals (Gemeente Haarlemmermeer, 2016a). The municipality is currently training more frontline professionals. For them the training is obliged. (Respondent 1,2; Gemeente Haarlemmermeer, 2016a; 2016d). The safety house also has put €30,000 of their own budget into the radicalization approach, but this is mainly spent on the person-specific approach. The safety house is planning to spend more in 2018 (Veiligheidshuis, 2017; Respondent 4). Other parties mainly invest in training trough employee time and employee resources (Respondent 3, 5, 6, 7). “Yes this is being approached seriously in the examples we have seen so far and the extensive training we have gotten, in which a lot of background information was provided. It took me about 2,5 days. That time is being made free for that, which shows it is important” (Respondent 3, r. 238-241). The youth workers in Haarlemmermeer have developed their own training which they have given to as many members in their organization and are currently trying to see whether they can also share their knowledge with other parties (Respondent 7). These trainings have helped the participants to feel more equipped. “We are more equipped in the sense that we have the basic knowledge”(Respondent 4, r. 512-513). The

---

17 This budget needs to be shared over all municipalities in the North-Holland police district and is distributed in the form of training courses.
investment in training and development is seen as valuable (Respondent 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7). “Because of the training, you deal with signals more seriously I think” (Respondent 3, r. 84).

The partners in the network collaboration also invest employee resources, although a lot of the tasks with regards to radicalization need to be fitted within their normal working hours. “My boss hopes I can do it within the hours that I do not spent on school work” (Respondent 6, r. 234). For most partners the employee resources made available are sufficient (1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7). “Capacity is more in the quality of it, in the knowledge. And with this engagement and the training internally, the people who share information and discuss it, I think that that is good. It has not yet happened yet that I think well, if you have more time I would have done it better. That has not yet happened yet” (Respondent 7, r. 516-520). The employee resources are sufficient in the sense that it is prioritized if necessary (Respondent 5). The fact that the tasks need to be fitted within the normal hours is not always considered to be sufficient to really bring everybody on board or invest thoroughly on the preventive side (Respondent 1, r. 369; Respondent 2, 4, 6). “Employees often do not have a lot of extra time to deal with this matter. And of course that is fine, but if you want to deal with it seriously then it is a large subject. If you really want to develop the local network and make sure everyone knows where they can report signals and the whole preventive policy, that is quite a big job” (Respondent 4, r. 444-448).

The investments in Haarlemmermeer, predominantly in training and development of as many professionals as possible, has had an impact on the problem solving capacity (Respondent 1, 3, 5, 7). The approach that is chosen yields more information about where radicalization possibly occurs or where it does not occur (Gemeente Haarlemmermeer, 2016d). Tasks can also be handed out to other partners. By working together, the police has been relieved in some of its previous tasks, leaving more time to focus on their core business. “What it has generated is that, and that is due to the municipality, there has been information meetings and points of contact, and the municipality has been able to position itself as the point of contact if it is not judicial, that they can provide information or advice. So I think that is good because you relieve the police. Previous to that people mainly would go to the district police officer or the desk. And now, when such an organization has a question then I can send it to the municipality who takes care of it. That is the power of the integrated approach, putting the things where they need to be” (Respondent 5, r. 514-518). The partners have really used the collaboration and their organization to take a serious look at certain cases (Respondent 3, 6, 7). “Well a colleague that came to me with a case, we have jointly looked at it how we could deal with it and how we can approach it. For me that is a new activity on this matter” (Respondent 3, r. 351-353). There is still room for improvement though, as it has not been truly incorporated as a structural feature in all organizations (Respondent 3, 4, 6).

The operational capacity at the moment is deemed sufficient and increased due to the radicalization approach and the network collaboration. Yet if the caseload were to grow or if the
ambitions would be higher, more money and capacity is needed (Respondent 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7). “I do several dossiers and if I need to coordinate a lot on this theme, if it grows, then it becomes a priority, we get more cases, you will need to get capacity from somewhere” (Respondent 1, r. 212-220). If it would be necessary, more resources can be made available. Considering the caseload that is not necessary at the moment (Respondent 1; 3; 4;5; Gemeente Haarlemmermeer, 2016d).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operational capacity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Financial resources</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget stayed the same or decreased</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget increased slightly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget increased significantly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Employee resources</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of fte stayed the same or decreased</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of fte increased slightly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of fte increased significantly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Investment in training and development</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No investment in courses and training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment in courses and training for some participants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment in courses and training for a lot of participants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Problem solving capacity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No new activities or approaches have been developed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some new activities or approaches have been developed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A lot of new activities and approaches have been developed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8.2.4 Public value creation

The shared governance arrangement in Haarlemmermeer invested in creating public value on the three accounts of the public value triangle. By developing an extensive policy document it has laid out the activities and structure through which Haarlemmermeer pursues to deal with the prevention and detection of radicalization. The partners in the network collaboration see it as their own responsibility to contribute to the matter and take substantive actions in light of the municipal or their own radicalization policy. Yet activities could be set up a bit more thorough to ensure that the awareness for and focus on radicalization by the network partners does not fade into the background. In Haarlemmermeer there is not much structural alignment in the activities taken by the different parties and therefore the collaboration is not perceived as strong as it might be. Therefore the internal legitimacy and support for the network, not for the policy issue, is not as strong as it would be assumed for a shared governance arrangement. Externally though, the network collaboration in Haarlemmermeer can count on a high degree of legitimacy and support. The executive board and the city council see it as an important subject and other partners that are not yet involved are not hesitant to contribute if necessary. With regards to operational capacity, the different network partners have all invested in creating sufficient operational capacity. If the caseload were to grow or if the ambitions would become higher, more resources can be made available.

Compared with the initial assumptions made in chapter five, the network of Haarlemmermeer scores in line with or better on all elements except for internal legitimacy and support. The fact that the collaboration does not create as much public value in terms of internal legitimacy could highlight that the shared governance form is not yet living up to its full potential. As the Haarlemmermeer network collaboration is seen as not completely effective as a shared
governance type, considering the lower degree of mutual trust and the large number of participants involved, not fully aware of each other’s role, they do not yet create the public value on the element of internal legitimacy as expected. For external legitimacy and support the network collaboration scores above expectation as they do not exclude important partners and subscribe to the networks activities. With regards to operational capacity the different network partners feel responsible for the radicalization approach and therefore invest resources when necessary. As there are not many cases in Haarlemmermeer, the time that needs to be spent on the matter is not lead to an overkill for the stakeholders.

There is alignment between what is aimed for and what is done in practice by the different network participants. The internal capacity leaves room for improvement with regards to public value creation as the network is not perceived as strong by the network participants due to a lack of clearness of the way the network functions. Yet this does not negatively affect the operational capacity or public value proposition in Haarlemmermeer. As there is no conflict between the three elements in the strategic triangle, there is a situation of tight coupling in Haarlemmermeer. There is both sufficient legitimacy and support and operational capacity to enact the current public value proposition. A situation of decoupling, in which the policy and the practice do not align is not encountered in Haarlemmermeer.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Network coordination structure</th>
<th>Public value proposition</th>
<th>Legitimacy and support</th>
<th>Operational capacity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Haarlemmermeer</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared governance (Assumptions)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8.3 Schiedam
8.3.1. Public value proposition

In Schiedam, the municipality has not published a separate policy document with regards to radicalization in which its goals and activities are laid out. They incorporated their radicalization approach in their general safety strategy (Gemeente Schiedam, 2017). Despite the fact that Schiedam has not published a separate extensive policy plan or approach, the relevant parties are aware of where they can report signals (Respondent 8, 9, 10, 11). “Almost every organization has its own radicalization officer and it has become clear within all organizations and departments where to report cases, so that structure has become clear that if something is going on, report it there and there and then they will discuss it and if they decide to report it with us we will take a look on what needs to happen. That has become clear, with the police, the GGZ, the district teams. So that is good, the structure is clear” (Respondent 8, r. 532-536). Before the municipality took a leading position in the network by developing all sorts of activities, it was not clear to network
participants that the municipality was involved on the matter and there was little to now attention for radicalization within the own organization (Respondent 9, 10, 11).

The network participants agree that the structure has become clear to them where they can report signals, yet they question to what extent their employees actually share signals or questions with the municipal advice point (Respondent 9, 11). “It remains a vague concept and I think it is a subject you need to continuously create awareness for. It is not that you have an information session, you know who the point of contact is and then you will ask the questions. Because I wonder, and the municipality knows that better, but I wonder how many questions they get from our teams. While we are the eyes and ears of the district. It does not say the questions are not there, but it is also because it fades away, awareness for that.” (Respondent 9, r. 92-98). As became clear in paragraph 7.3.4, network participants in Schiedam are still quite hesitant to share their information with the municipality as they are not yet certain what happens with the information and there is still a lack of a clear guiding framework (Respondent 8, 9, 11). Despite the fact that the network partners have taken few substantive actions to detect radicalization on their behalf, the municipality has done so by investing in training and knowledge development of itself and its partners, establishing the key figure network and organizing other activities (Respondent 8,10).

The network participants in Schiedam might be less active, they do see the network collaboration and the approach in Schiedam as valuable (Respondent 8, 9, 10, 11). “Because it is not tangible there are a lot of insecurities with caretakers. So it is very necessary to be able to rely upon someone. The municipal officer is someone with whom we can share our concerns and signals and make it discussable. If that would not be there, I think nothing would happen” (Respondent 9, r. 75-80). Without the municipal information sessions, another participant says they would not even realized radicalization was an issue in Schiedam (Respondent 11). It is seen as important that the municipality has strong connections with the different communities in Schiedam to be able to intervene during societal tensions or just know what is going on when relatively little is happening (Respondent 10). All interviewed participants do address that to remain effective, it is important to keep investing in awareness of the stakeholders that radicalization detection is part of their job which takes a longer period of time (Respondent 9). “You need to repeat that. Because when nothing is happening then it fades away” (Respondent 11, r. 265-266).

In Schiedam, the municipality created public value by taking a leading role in developing activities and providing trainings and knowledge development for a broad number of partners. Despite not having an extensive strategy document, the partners in the network do know where to report signals if necessary. Yet two of the interviewed partners question to what extent this actually happens. The downside of the municipal leading role is that the substantive actions are mostly taken by the municipality and in far lesser extent by the other network participants.
### Public value proposition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy document</th>
<th>Clearness of strategy</th>
<th>Substantive actions</th>
<th>Perceived effectiveness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No separate policy document / limited description</td>
<td>Structure, goals and activities are not clear</td>
<td>No alignment between activities and realized output</td>
<td>The output activities are deemed ineffective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No separate policy document / extensive description</td>
<td>Structure, goals and activities are somewhat clear</td>
<td>Some alignment between activities and realized output</td>
<td>The output activities are deemed somewhat effective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separate policy document / limited description</td>
<td>Structure, goals and activities are clear</td>
<td>High alignment between activities and realized output</td>
<td>The output activities are deemed very effective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separate policy document / extensive description</td>
<td>Structure, goals and activities are clear</td>
<td>Structure, goals and activities are clear</td>
<td>Structure, goals and activities are clear</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 8.3.2 Legitimacy and support

The network collaboration in Schiedam, in which the municipality is the leading actor, can count on the external legitimacy and support of its executive. It was the city council that asked the municipality to intensify the radicalization approach in 2015 (Gemeente Schiedam 2016) and they have supported the measures taken (Respondent 8, 9). “*Well they have hired me for 20 hours that is quite something. And it is high on the agenda of course. Politically it is quite sensitive*” (Respondent 8, r. 494-495). That it is quite a politically sensitive issue in Schiedam also makes that some of the parties would like some more support from external parties to involve themselves on this matter (Respondent 9, 11). “*It is also a theme that no one wants to burn its fingers on, in other words, and that is political, if someone out of this district chooses to travel abroad and we had provided some support, then we will get the question how and why that happened. So you are then called to account for the situation, that pressure is there, what did you do, so the possibility is there and that does not feel good. Then you think well, so that makes that maybe on the front side you say listen, I will not touch it at all*” (Respondent 9, r. 297-305). Thus some of the network partners would like the legitimacy and support from external partners to be more pronounced (Respondent 9, 11).

Internally the legitimacy and support of the network collaboration in Schiedam can be considered to be moderate. The radicalization point of contacts see the added value of the collaboration (Respondent 8, 9, 10, 11). “*I think collaboration is good, and that is for all areas also with safety at home and other institutions, that you know how to find each other better, collaborate, provide feedback of what they can do, what you can do and also say that someone is wrong*” (Respondent 11, r. 540-542). Yet for their employees it is sometimes more difficult to see the importance of the collaboration (Respondent 9, 11). “*It brings us a lot. It is not always felt that way, especially not with my employees. They feel a lot is put on their shoulders because on a lot of themes something is asked from us*” (Respondent 9, r. 681-683). The network participants do feel supported by their own organization to act upon the matter, but the point of overkill and the
matter of privacy on what to report and what not to report remains (Respondent 11). Better agreements between the partners about privacy and protection could help the functioning of the network collaboration (Respondent 8, 9, 11).

In Schiedam there is a higher external legitimacy than internal legitimacy. Although the parties are positive about the fact that there is attention for and collaboration to detect and prevent radicalization, they do not yet feel completely supported to participate in the collaboration.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legitimacy and support</th>
<th>External legitimacy and support expressions</th>
<th>Internal legitimacy and support expressions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low external legitimacy and support</td>
<td>Absence of support expressed</td>
<td>Absence of support expressed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate external legitimacy and support</td>
<td>Some support expressed</td>
<td>Some support expressed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High external legitimacy and support</td>
<td>A lot of support expressed</td>
<td>A lot of support expressed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8.3.3 Operational capacity
The network collaboration in Schiedam is considered to have sufficient financial resources to enact the current radicalization approach (Gemeente Schiedam, 2016; Respondent 8, 10). This partly has to do with the fact that Schiedam as a focus municipality receives €168,345 from the national government to finance the trainings they provide and the costs of the key figure network (Respondent 8). Other activities are financed by budget from the national government or within other municipal budgets (Gemeente Schiedam, 2017). "At the moment the municipality can do everything they would like" (Respondent 8, r. 581-581). Budget has also been made available for partners to organize events (Respondent 8, 10; Gemeente Schiedam). The other network partners do not invest financial resources of their own into the network collaboration, outside of time spent by their employees on the trainings.

The municipality invests quite a bit of employee resources into the network collaboration through the two radicalization officers in the information and advice point. Furthermore a process manager was hired who manages the key figure network (Gemeente Schiedam 2017, Respondent 8, 10). More resources can be made available if necessary. The partners in the network collaboration invest employee resources as they make time and personnel available to attend the trainings (Respondent 9, 11). Their function as point of contact is fitted within their normal working hours, as it does not take up much time (Respondent 9, 11). The employee resources made available by the network partners are deemed sufficient. “Capacity is not the key to
strengthen this theme, that is creating awareness. And in creating awareness you need to create time in certain ways to constantly make and keep it discussable” (Respondent 9, r. 416-418).

With regards to training and development the municipality offers a broad range of trainings to its professionals (Respondent 8, 9, 10, 11; Gemeente Schiedam, 2017). The network partners are offered trainings but the municipality also invests in trainings for citizens in Schiedam aimed to make them more aware and resilient of and to radicalization (Respondent 8, 10). Thus a large group of people are trained. Through training and knowledge development the municipality sees that the knowledge has become widespread (Respondent 8, r. 525-530). The other network participants clearly see the value of the investment in training and development (Respondent 8, 9, 10, 11). "The people I know in the key figure network have learned a lot. A lot of things they did not know. They would not see it as a signal, but a lot of knowledge is transferred. They are expert, or a professional in it if I can name it that way” (Respondent 10, r. 241-244). Yet choices are made within organizations who is being trained as it is not always possible to train everyone. These people then become responsible to transfer the knowledge in their organization (Respondent 9).

The investments made by the municipality in training and development and personnel has increased the problem solving capacity of the municipality. “I do not have any numbers that tell it works, but in my experience it does work. I just said that when you start a conversation with people, new things will come forward, signals will come forward. That is going on here, that is going on there. I feel like it is that way. And maybe the municipality already received a signal, but now they have multiple signals about the same thing and they can take actions. Then they can do something about it and take it seriously” (Respondent 10, r. 540-545). For other network partners, it has not had a major impact on the problem solving capacity in the sense that they have not incorporated in their daily practices, developed new activities or actively share information (Respondent 9, 11). Although awareness amongst partners has increased they also warn for the risk of it fading away if there are not more moments in which it is discussed (Respondent 9, 10, 11). "It is not something caretakers have been confronted with for a longer time or in the awareness process it has not been something that has gone on for a long time. That needs to start to materialize more. So that is one. The awareness of radicalization, what is that, how do I do that and what do I need to do with it. The aspect of okay we detect broad signals on different problem areas in a household or in a district, that makes it very vulnerable whether radicalization is not forgotten. So there is a flaw there I think” (Respondent 9, r. 52-58). Radicalization in Schiedam therefore remains something that continuously needs to be put under attention for it to be noticed by the network partners.

In Schiedam, the operational capacity has grown quite a bit. This mainly has to do with the investments made by the municipality, not so much by investments of the other network participants. Therefore the increase in financial and employee resources and the investment in
training and development have not led to an equally large increase in the problem solving capacity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operational capacity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Financial resources</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Employee resources</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Investment in training and development</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Problem solving capacity</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8.3.4 Public value creation
The lead organization network in Schiedam has created public value on the three elements of the strategic triangle in different ways. Compared to the theoretical assumption formulated in chapter five, the lead organization network in Schiedam scores differently than expected on some of the elements of the strategic triangle. The municipality has not developed a clear strategy document and the network participants do not undertake substantive actions towards the goal of the lead organization. The other participants rely more on the municipalities actions. Internally the network participants see the importance of the collaboration to a certain extent, but also have some concerns with the collaboration and their role in it. Therefore they do not invest much time and resources into the process. Externally, there is sufficient legitimacy and support by the executive but it could be more pronounced. This perhaps has to do with the fact that radicalization is not the highest priority in Schiedam. Despite the fact that the other network participants do not really contribute, the operational capacity is not hampered because the lead organization invests a lot in the matter itself.

In Schiedam, the occurrence of policy-practice decoupling can be noted as the other network participants are not as much contributing as would be expected in a network collaboration. Due to the fact that the municipality is the leading party in this collaboration and takes that role upon themselves, the other participants do not really need to contribute much and do not do so. The situation of decoupling seemingly results in a higher internal legitimacy as the participants do not need to contribute that much. Besides that, it results in sufficient external legitimacy as through decoupling it seems there is a large network collaboration actively engaged in the matter. The operational capacity is not hampered by the decoupling of policy and practice, as the municipality invests quite a lot of resources into the radicalization approach. It is questionable though to what extent the problem-solving capacity of the other network participants has grown. If the network collaboration would be strengthened by a higher commitment, it is likely that more valuable results could be produced on all accounts.
### 8.4 Comparing public value creation

In this chapter the way public value was created by the different network collaborations in Dordrecht, Haarlemmermeer and Schiedam was thoroughly discussed. This has provided an answer to the third empirical sub question ‘How do these network collaborations create public value?’. The way public value was created by the network collaborations is summarized in Table 13. In the final part of this chapter the way public value is created by the network collaborations is reflected upon by comparing the cases and discussing the differences and similarities found.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>Dordrecht</th>
<th>Haarlemmermeer</th>
<th>Schiedam</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effective NAO</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less effective SG</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/–</td>
<td>–/–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderately effective LON</td>
<td>+/–</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public value proposition</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy document</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clarity of strategy</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Substantive actions</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived effectiveness</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support expressions</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objections or sanctions</td>
<td>+/–</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External legitimacy and support</td>
<td>+/–</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support expressions</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objections or sanctions</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational capacity</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial resources</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employee resources</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment in training and development</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem solving capacity</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alignment</td>
<td>Tightly coupled</td>
<td>Tightly coupled</td>
<td>Decoupling</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 13: Public value creation by network collaborations*

In general it can be noted that the network collaborations set up by Dordrecht, Schiedam and Haarlemmermeer to detect and prevent radicalization have all created public value on the three elements of the strategic triangle. By incorporating other network participants, awareness

---

18 The colors reflect whether they are in line with the expectations formulated in chapter five. Green = In line with or above expectation. Yellow = Slightly below expectation. Red = Below expectation
has been created, substantive actions have been taken, legitimacy and support was created and the operational capacity was strengthened. Especially the investments done by the municipalities and the different network partners in training and development have been very important in making the network more equipped to deal with the issue of radicalization. Through training both awareness is increased and insecurities and hesitations are taken away. Thus it is valuable that municipalities have undertaken steps to collaborate in networks with the purpose to prevent and detect radicalization. Based on the results gathered in this research the value of network collaborations can be stressed. Yet differences can also be noted in the way these different type of network collaborations have created public value. In chapter five the following research expectation was formulated: ‘The type of network collaboration has consequences for how these collaborations create public value’. The findings of this research are in line with this more general expectation as the different network collaborations have led to different outcomes on the public value triangle. Due to the approach of this research it is not possible to make causal inferences on which network type leads to what public value outcome. Yet some general observations can be made.

The NAO and the SG were found to be most suited to create a public value proposition that is pursued by the network as a whole. Especially since the network collaborations aimed at detecting radicalization are set up in a loose informal way, providing clarity and sharing responsibility are likely to contribute to a better public value proposition. The network types of the NAO and the shared governance are better suited to do so than the lead organization network. With regards to operational capacity, the LON and the SG network structure seem to provide better opportunities to create public value. The LON is suited to create public value on operational capacity through the large investment done by the lead organization. In this case that is the municipality. The other network participants do not invest much in the operational capacity. Therefore it can be questioned to what extent the perks of collaborating are utilized. The SG network also seems suited to create public value on operational capacity as the shared responsibility leads other network participants next to the municipality to contribute resources of their own and more actively engage in the network collaboration. The NAO in this case was less successful in creating public value on operational capacity, mainly because both the municipality and the network participants did not invest a whole lot of resources into the network collaboration. Despite that fact, the problem-solving capacity has grown. With regards to legitimacy and support the picture is less clear. The NAO in this case was best suited to create internal legitimacy and support. The combination of own responsibility and a party that coordinates the activities count on the support of its participants. Based on the theoretical assumptions, the shared governance model would also be well suited to create internal legitimacy. This SG in Haarlemmermeer only created moderate internal legitimacy and support. A possible
explanation could be that the SG found in Haarlemmermeer is a less effective SG and therefore does not live up to its theoretical potential. With regards to external legitimacy and support no clear coherence between the type of network collaboration can be found. In the cases studied, the SG created the most external legitimacy and support against expectation. Both the LON and the NAO could count on moderate external legitimacy. A possible explanation for this fact could have to do with the fact that radicalization in all three municipalities is not a very prominent issue and therefore does not receive much attention from external parties.

Both Haarlemmermeer and Dordrecht were most successful in creating public value on the three accounts of the strategic triangle. In these network collaborations, a situation of tight coupling was noted in which the public value proposition, legitimacy and support and the operational capacity were in alignment. In line with the assumption of Moore (1995), it is supported that a situation of alignment, or tight coupling, indeed has a positive effect on the public value creation. In Schiedam the actual practices are somewhat decoupled from the policy, as other network participants did not contribute much to the network collaboration. The municipality as the lead actor is the main participant and responsible for the large increase in operational capacity and substantive actions. By decoupling the policy from the practice, they do maintain sufficient internal and external legitimacy. Therefore by decoupling policy from practice the network collaboration remains effective and legitimate. Yet the network collaboration is less equipped to benefit from the possible advantages of network collaboration as a result of its chosen structure.

Although there are notable differences in the way public value was created, the way these network collaborations have created public value are not completely in line with the expectations formulated in chapter five. For some elements the outcome was more positive, for others it was less so. A possible explanation for this fact could be that not all of the network collaborations investigated fulfilled their respective requirements for network effectiveness. The expectations were formulated based upon the assumption of effective network collaborations. Only in Dordrecht a fully effective NAO was found. The lead organization network in Schiedam was moderately effective and the shared governance network in Haarlemmermeer was the least effective.
Chapter 9 - Conclusion

Over the past few years, radicalization of citizens has presented itself as a complex phenomenon for which a ‘silver bullet’ solution has not yet been found. In dealing with this issue, municipalities in the Netherlands have started setting up local network collaborations aimed at detecting and preventing radicalization in the early phases of the radicalization process, hoping to create valuable results. In this study this relationship between effective network collaboration and the way public value was created in Schiedam, Haarlemmermeer and Dordrecht was investigated. In this chapter the main findings are discussed in light of the main research question: ‘How do local network collaborations in the Netherlands, aimed at detecting and preventing Islamic radicalization, create public value?’.

After an answer to the central research question is formulated, the findings of this research are reflected upon and their implications are discussed and put into a wider perspective.

9.1 Public value creation by Dutch network collaborations

9.1.1 Network effectiveness in Schiedam, Haarlemmermeer and Dordrecht

A first step to answering the central research question was taken by establishing how the Dutch municipalities of Schiedam, Haarlemmermeer and Dordrecht have set up their local network collaborations to detect and prevent radicalization. Effective networks are seen an important prerequisite for network partners to be able to share information about possible radicalized individuals and to create valuable results. The three network collaborations in this research have been classified according to the different network coordination structures identified by Provan & Kenis (2008) and their respective effectiveness. These network types are a shared governance (SG), a lead organization network (LON) and a network administrative organization (NAO). These network structures differently engage their stakeholders through the adopted configuration. In the SG the network and its activities are managed collectively by the network. In the LON, the network is driven by a single actor that clearly takes the lead in the network activities. Other partners are less included in the network. In the NAO, the network partners activities are coordinated by a separate actor that is not involved in the network activities. Other partners are less included in the network. In the NAO, the network partners activities are coordinated by a separate actor that is not involved in the network activities. The network partners are required to engage in this network type. Due to the different structure, the networks can be effective under different process-oriented circumstances. Four requirements for effective network collaboration have been identified from the literature. These are ‘Stakeholder inclusion’, ‘Commitment to process’, ‘Mutual trust’, and ‘Goal consensus’. The network collaborations were scored on all these requirements.

Besides the chosen network coordination structure, the most notable difference was found in the commitment of the network participants to the network process. The municipality is a very committed partner in all network collaborations but the degree to which other partners are
committed to the network collaboration differs quite a bit. In Haarlemmermeer and Dordrecht the network partners are more committed to the network than in Schiedam. This can be seen as a reflection of the extent to which they are engaged through the adopted coordination structure. The results with regards to network effectiveness have been summarized in Table 14. In Dordrecht there is a fully effective NAO, whereas in Haarlemmermeer and Schiedam the network effectiveness requirements do not resonate with the situation found in practice. These networks are respectively a less effective shared governance and a moderately effective lead organization network.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>Dordrecht</th>
<th>Haarlemmermeer</th>
<th>Schiedam</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coordination structure</td>
<td>NAO</td>
<td>Shared Governance</td>
<td>Lead Organization Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of network</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Many</td>
<td>Many</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutual trust</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate, highly centralized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commitment to process</td>
<td>Moderate to High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low to moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal consensus</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderately high</td>
<td>Moderately high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network effectiveness</td>
<td>Effective</td>
<td>Less effective</td>
<td>Moderately effective</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 14: Network effectiveness scores

Despite the fact that differences were found in the coordination structure adopted and the way these networks score on the requirements for network effectiveness, notable similarities were found in the way these network collaborations have been set up in general. All network collaborations are built around informal contact between the different partners. There are no separate formal meetings or structural network activities in which the detection of radicalization is discussed. Radicalization is sometimes discussed in other meetings in which some of the network partners also participate, but this is rarely the case. Rather, informal contact by phone, email or by visiting each other, is the most common approach to keep each other informed. Considering the caseload in these municipalities this is deemed a good approach. The informal set-up creates a low-key environment in which information, concerns and questions can be shared quickly. Yet there is also a risk to this informal set-up that potentially hampers the effectiveness of network collaborations. As there are no formal meetings, there are also rarely any structural moments in which the matter is really discussed. Due to this informal approach there is a risk that attention for radicalization fades away over time, especially in municipalities where radicalization is not seen as an urgent problem. Another risk related to the informal set up is the fact that the network partners struggle with unclarity regarding information sharing. There is hesitation due to privacy- and patient-caretaker concerns. Furthermore the network partners struggle to assess when a signal is serious enough to report and when not. A clear operating framework in that
regard and with respect to privacy could help network partners in their task to detect radicalization in time.

9.1.2 Public value creation in Haarlemmermeer, Schiedam and Dordrecht

The second step in answering the central research question is to assess how these different network collaborations have pursued to create publicly valuable outcomes. The general line of thought is that by sharing knowledge, expertise and resources through these networks, the issue of radicalization can be dealt with more effectively. As it is difficult to establish effectiveness in the case of radicalization detection and prevention, this study has adopted a public value lens to investigate how these local network collaborations have created public value. The assumption on which this research is grounded is that network collaborations can create public value (Moore, 1995; Bryson et al., 2006; Geuijen, 2011), but it is dependent upon the type of network how public value is shaped. By discussing the strategic triangle of public value creation by Moore (1995) it was found that public value can be created on three interrelated elements related to counter-radicalization policy. These elements, which can be seen as variables of public value, are ‘public value proposition’, ‘legitimacy and support’, and ‘operational capacity’. The network collaborations were scored on all these elements. These results are summarized in Table 15.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>Dordrecht</th>
<th>Haarlemmermeer</th>
<th>Schiedam</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public value proposition</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal legitimacy and support</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External legitimacy and support</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational capacity</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alignment</td>
<td>Tightly coupled</td>
<td>Tightly coupled</td>
<td>Decoupling</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 15: Public value creation by network collaborations

In general it can be noted that the network collaborations set up by Dordrecht, Schiedam and Haarlemmermeer to detect and prevent radicalization have all created public value on the three elements of the strategic triangle. By incorporating other network participants, awareness has been created, substantive actions have been taken, legitimacy and support is created and the operational capacity is strengthened. Especially the investments done by the municipalities and the different network partners in training and development have been very important in making the network more equipped to deal with the issue of radicalization. Through training and knowledge development the awareness amongst the partners is increased and they feel more equipped to detect radicalization. It thus is valuable that municipalities have undertaken steps to collaborate in networks with the purpose to prevent and detect radicalization. Therefore the value of network collaborations to detect and prevent radicalization can be stressed.
Differences could also be noted in the way the network collaborations of Dordrecht, Haarlemmermeer and Schiedam have created public value. The findings of this research are in line with the more general expectation that different network coordination structures lead to different outcomes on the public value triangle. Thus the findings support that there are indeed consequences to the choice of the network coordination structure. Haarlemmermeer and Dordrecht were most successful in creating public value on the three accounts of the strategic triangle. Although this research cannot provide for causal inferences between the type of network collaboration and the way public value was created, some observations can be made regarding this specific case study. Based on the network collaborations investigated, it was found that an NAO and SG type of network are more suited to create a public value proposition that is pursued by the network as a whole, as they share responsibility with the network partners and require more commitment from them from the beginning. The LON does not require this to the same extent. With regards to operational capacity, the LON and the SG network structure seem to provide better opportunities to create public value. The LON is efficient in organizing municipal resources, whereas the SG is better equipped to obtain resources from all network partners. For the element of legitimacy and support, the NAO and the SG seem to provide better opportunities overall.

Another important factor in explaining the differences in public value creation between the network collaborations can be found in the occurrence of decoupling. In the network collaborations of Dordrecht and Haarlemmermeer, a situation of tight coupling was noted in which the public value proposition, legitimacy and support and the operational capacity were in alignment. This has led to a favorable situation to create public value on the three accounts in line with the assumption of Moore (1995). In Dordrecht this did mean that trade-offs were made. They developed a less ambitious public value proposition that could count on the relatively low external legitimacy and support and operational capacity. In Schiedam, misalignment was found between the public value proposition aimed for and the actual practices and contributions of the other network participants. By decoupling the municipal policy and investments from the actual practice, they did manage to maintain sufficient internal and external legitimacy. Yet they were less effective in creating public value overall. Based on the findings of this research, network collaborations are advised to create a situation in which the elements of the strategic triangle are in alignment.

The final expectation formulated in this research referred to the presumed relationship between effective network collaborations and the creation of public value. The following research expectation was formulated: 'A network collaboration tends to be more successful in creating public value if its coordination structure is in line with the characteristics for effective network collaboration'. In this research three different type of network collaborations were investigated,
all with differing degrees of effectiveness. Dordrecht was the most effective network collaboration, followed by Schiedam and Haarlemmermeer. Yet the most effective network collaboration of Dordrecht did not perform notably better in creating public value on the three elements of the strategic triangle than the least effective network collaboration of Haarlemmermeer. Based on the findings of this research it is not possible to support the expectation that more effective networks necessarily lead to more successful public value creation. On the other hand it also seems too early to refute the expectation. The network collaborations all fulfilled some requirements of network effectiveness and were able to create public value. As there were no ineffective networks studied, the results remain inconclusive towards this expectation. In order to make valuable inferences in the future, further research is required to investigate and compare how three effective and/or ineffective networks score on the three elements of public value. What can also be noted is that the SG type of network has been most successful in creating public value on the three accounts, despite the fact that the network characteristics did not completely match the requirements for network effectiveness. Further research aimed at investigating if and how a fully effective SG network would score differently on the three elements of public value, compared to the less effective SG found in Haarlemmermeer could be valuable to better understand the (possible) relationship between network effectiveness and public value creation.

Overall, the findings of this research imply that not the effectiveness of network collaborations is most important in explaining how public value is created, rather the type of network coordination structure is decisive. In addition to that, in order to be more successful in creating public value the fit between the three elements of the strategic triangle needs to be tightly coupled rather than decoupled.

9.2 Limitations of research conducted
This research has tried to provide a thorough picture of how network collaborations aimed at detection and prevention of radicalization in the Netherlands have created public value. Despite the fact that several measures have been taken to ensure the reliability and validity of the findings, there were a few limitations while conducting the research that make it necessary to put the findings of this research into perspective. This chapter discusses these limitations and provides suggestions for further research.

First of all, several limiting factors can be found in the selection of cases of this research. Due to the limited time frame in which this research needed to be conducted and the political sensitivity of the matter of radicalization, a majority of the initial cases selected did not want to participate in the research. Therefore cases were selected in which radicalization was less of an issue and where the network collaboration was less far developed. This research took place while
the different municipalities were still implementing their radicalization approach and developing their network collaboration. This has implications for the findings of the research as the professionals only have had little time to experience and evaluate the consequences of the network collaboration. It might be relevant to investigate network collaborations that have already been in place for quite some time to really evaluate how they create public value. Yet all cases eventually selected were in the same stage and therefore this did not hamper the comparability of the network collaborations. With that said, the research could probably provide more interesting insights in municipalities in which radicalization is a more pronounced policy issue and/or where network collaborations have been set up for a longer period of time. It would be interesting to investigate how the network collaborations in those cities differ in how they operate and create public value.

Another limiting factor in this research is the fact that only network participants have been interviewed that were willing to participate. There were more respondents ascribed but they were not willing to contribute due to a lack of time, will or relevance. Thus it is assumable that the respondents that were interviewed are biased in the sense that they were more active within the collaboration. Therefore the results of this research might be more positive than would be the case if all the network participants were interviewed. As the network collaborations are quite large, only a subset of the network could be interviewed. It was furthermore not possible to interview an equal number of participants in all municipalities. Especially in Schiedam only four stakeholders were willing to participate with this research. Therefore less empirical data was gathered in Schiedam. Yet the fact that few participants were willing to participate is in line with the picture that other participants in Schiedam created. The network participants in Schiedam were less committed, therefore it is not surprising that there were also less participants willing to contribute. Overall, this is not expected to have impacted the findings of this research in a major way but it is an important factor to consider when interpreting the findings of this research.

In the cases selected there might also have been external factors that influenced the eventual results. Both Haarlemmermeer and Schiedam received quite significant amounts from the national government to invest in activities within their radicalization approach, Dordrecht only received a small budget through money made available for Rotterdam to set up trainings. As resources are a major part of the operational capacity element, Haarlemmermeer and Schiedam might have been favored with respect to that element. It is unclear how the situation in both cities would be if they would not have received money from the central government. Although most other contextual factors were quite similar, for further research on this matter it is advised to ensure that the context is as similar as possible. Due to constraints of time and municipalities that were willing to participate, this factor could not be circumvented in this research.
In this research, the public value lens was adopted to visualize the added value of the network collaboration on the three elements of the strategic triangle. The concept of public value offered the possibility to better understand and reflect upon the dynamics of network collaboration and is therefore a valuable framework from which to investigate network collaborations. But, in line with previous studies adopting the public value construct, difficulties with univocally adopting the construct in measuring effectiveness did arise. Its adoption as a performance measurement instrument is not completely fulfilling as it cannot account for clear statements about the eventual effectivity of the network collaborations studied. In order for public value to become a more valuable construct for the purpose of assessing effectiveness, developing more standardized and previously tested measurement indicators is advised.

Another factor that needs to be taken into account in this research is the fact that the cases were compared with each other based on relative standards rather than absolute standards. It could well be the case that when different cases were selected, the relative scores attributed to the network collaborations in Schiedam, Haarlemmermeer and Dordrecht would differ from the scores that have been attributed to them in this study. These factors put the results of this study into perspective as the scores attributed to the networks could be different in another comparison. Yet the main purpose of this research was not to assess the absolute effectiveness of the network collaborations. Rather its objective was to provide a picture of how the network collaborations succeeded in creating public value. Therefore the findings of the research still provide insight in the current situation in all three municipalities.

Another potential limitation to the research conducted is related to the theories used to assess both the network effectiveness and the public value creation. In this research different theories were used and purposefully combined to be able to provide insight in the public value creation of network collaboration. As both the concept of network effectiveness and public value creation are still widely discussed in the scholarly field and no clear cut concepts have been put forward, choices needed to be made on how to interpret the meaning of the concepts, operationalize them and relate the concepts to each other. Therefore potential factors that could also have had an influence on either public value creation and network effectiveness could have been excluded in this research. The network elements that were incorporated are not exhaustive and therefore this research does not discuss all potential elements that have contributed to network effectiveness and public value creation. Yet by making deliberate choices which have been thoroughly discussed in chapter three, four and five, this research did present a clear picture in which public value creation by network collaborations could be investigated.

Lastly, as this thesis was conducted as an exploratory research towards how network collaborations aiming to prevent and detect radicalization create public value, the theoretical model developed for this research has not yet been thoroughly tested in a deductive manner.
Therefore it only provides for limited generalizable knowledge. Based on the findings of this research it can be argued that it indeed matters for the public value creation of a network collaboration what kind of network structure is chosen. The research expectation that the type of network collaboration has consequences for how these collaborations create public value is in line with the findings of this research. Yet the initial expectations on how the type of network collaboration would lead to public value on the different elements were not all supported by the findings of this research. Therefore it is not possible to make causal and generalizable inferences on which network type leads to what public value outcome on the different elements based on the findings of this research. Further research is required to better understand the relationship between public value creation and effective network collaboration. In order to develop generalizable statements in the future, it would be interesting to investigate the relationship between network effectiveness and public value creation for different policy issues, to see whether more general rules apply.

9.3 Implications of research findings
For the literature on network effectiveness and public value creation, this study has enriched the body of literature about public value creation through network collaborations. Table 15 in paragraph 9.1.2 visualizes that there are differences in the way the network collaborations have created public value. Based on the findings of this research it can be argued that next to the type of network structure, the occurrence of tight coupling rather than decoupling matters for successful public value creation of a network collaboration. Against initial expectations based on the network literature, the network effectiveness of the collaboration was not identified as an explanatory factor for public value creation in this research. The assumption that the four requirements for network effectiveness are decisive in creating valuable outcomes can therefore not be supported based on the findings of this research. In this study, the SG arrangement was still the most effective in creating public value while not matching the network effectiveness requirements provided by Provan & Kenis (2008). The importance of these requirements and the value attributed to them in network effectiveness literature can therefore be questioned. It might be that there are other requirements for network effectiveness that should be added to the model of Provan & Kenis (2008) or that the requirements need to be adjusted. Further research into when a network is and is not effective and what requirements come with those networks is highly advised. Network theory so far does not say much about the network level outcomes of the different network types. It could perhaps be that for example a SG always attains higher network level outcomes when compared with the other two network types as they differently engage their network partners. Thus the findings of this research invite scholars to further investigate the dynamics of the different type of network structures and their network effectiveness.
The results of this research also have implications that are of societal relevance. The findings of the network collaborations in Schiedam, Dordrecht and Haarlemmermeer could help municipalities make more thought through choices in developing and setting up their networks to detect and prevent radicalization as this research has made clear that the type of network you choose has consequences for the way you can create public value. Municipalities can use this research as a yardstick for their own networks and analyze whether they have organized their network effectively and whether this leads to the public vale wished for. In light of the findings of this research, municipalities are advised to take the following recommendations into account to strengthen their network collaborations aimed at detecting radicalization

- **Develop a clear operating framework for network partners:** In order to ensure the support and commitment of the network partners to share information it is advised to develop a clear operating framework that takes safeguards with regards to privacy into account. This can take away current hesitations amongst network partners to more actively share information. This operating framework should contain a more detailed working process of the steps to be taken if a situation of radicalization occurs and guidelines on when and how to detect and report signals of radicalization.

- **Ensure shared responsibility between network partners:** Collaborating with stakeholders is valuable in enlarging the opportunities to detect and prevent radicalization in a municipality. An important factor in ensuring substantive actions by the network partners is to create shared responsibility and commitment with network partners. The SG and NAO network structure are more suited to create an environment of shared responsibility between the network participants than the lead-organization network. Commitment can also be strengthened by including the network partners more when they have shared a signal or providing feedback on what has happened with the case.

- **Invest in training and knowledge development to ensure awareness:** Radicalization is often not the main priority for network partners as it is only a small part of their job. Yet awareness for radicalization is important in order to be able to detect it. Now this is mostly done through one training course, which is not deemed enough by the network partners to ensure awareness in the long run. Therefore it is advised to create (recurring) moments in which the matter of radicalization is brought to the attention of the network partners also if little is going on. This could be done by organizing a ‘return day’ once a year for network partners in which cases, questions and concerns are discussed and reflected upon. A more informal way to do so could be to send a regular update to the network partners concerning the latest developments.
with regards to radicalization in- and outside the municipality in which the importance of the collaboration is stressed.
References


Gemeente Haarlemmermeer (2016c) *Uitvoeringsprogramma veiligheid, vergunningen, toezicht en handhaving 2017*. Retrieved from [https://portal.ibabs.eu/Document/DownloadAgendaItemDocument/88991f09-b83b-4fec-9f4d-b33ad25799d0/275f3e0a-bd22-461c-adf1-48359b1c2931](https://portal.ibabs.eu/Document/DownloadAgendaItemDocument/88991f09-b83b-4fec-9f4d-b33ad25799d0/275f3e0a-bd22-461c-adf1-48359b1c2931)


## Annex A – Operationalization of concepts

**Operationalization of network effectiveness**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Network coordination structure** | The structure of the network       | The way the network is governed                                             | - There is a separate administrative entity set up to coordinate the network process (NAO)  
- The network participants themselves maintain contact with each other and coordinate (SG)  
- One network participant is in the lead to coordinate the network (LON) |
| **Stakeholder inclusion**       | Size of network                    | Number of participants included in network activities                      | - Few participants (max 8)  
- Moderate number of participants (8-15)  
- Many participants (15+) |
| **Stakeholder Exclusion**       | Perception of key participants excluded from the network activities          |                                                                             | - Many (-)  
- Some (+/-)  
- None (+) |
| **Mutual trust**                | Formal face-to-face contact        | Frequency of formal contact with other network participants due to network meetings | - Low frequency (-)  
- Moderate frequency (+/-)  
- High frequency (+) |
| **Informal face-to-face contact** | Frequency of informal contacts with other network participants outside of formal meetings |                                                                             | - Low frequency (-)  
- Moderate frequency (+/-)  
- High frequency (+) |
| **Information sharing frequency** | Degree to which information is shared between network participants         |                                                                             | - Information is never shared (-)  
- Information is sometimes shared (+/-)  
- Information is often shared (+) |
| **Stance towards information sharing** | Degree to which participants feel hesitant to share information          |                                                                             | - Participants do not want to share information (-)  
- Participants are hesitant to share information (+/-)  
- Participants share information without objection (+) |
| **Monitoring of activities**    | Practical arrangements or informal control to monitor each other's activities |                                                                             | - There are strict arrangements in place (-)  
- There are loose arrangements in place (+/-)  
- There are no arrangements in place (+) |
| **History of relationship**     | Perception of previous collaborations between the partners                  |                                                                             | - Negative previous relationship (-)  
- Neutral previous relationship (+/-)  
- Positive previous relationship (+) |
| **Commitment to the process**   | Participation in network activities | Participation in network activities                                        | - Participants contribute to none of the activities (-)  
- Participants contribute to some activities (+/-)  
- Participants contributes to all activities (+) |
| **Participants share resources** | Degree to which participants want to use organization specific input or resources for network |                                                                             | - Participants do not want to share their own resources (-)  
- Participants are hesitant to share resources (+/-)  
- Participants are eager to share resources (+) |
| **Urgency of network by participants** | Degree to which the network collaboration is a priority to the participants |                                                                             | - The network collaboration has a low priority for the participant (-)  
- The network collaboration has a moderate priority for the participant (+/-)  
- The network collaboration has a high priority for the participant (+) |
<p>| <strong>Perception of urgency with</strong>   | Perception of the degree to which the network collaboration                |                                                                             | - The network collaboration has a low priority for other participants (-) |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>other participants</th>
<th>is deemed a priority by the other network participants</th>
<th>-</th>
<th>The network collaboration has a moderate priority for other participants (+/-)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Goal Consensus</td>
<td>Goal consensus</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Goals are not shared (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Degree to which the goal of the network collaboration and individual participants is shared</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Goals are somewhat shared (+/-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Goals are completely shared (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal conflict</td>
<td>Conflict over network goals</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>There has been a lot of conflict over network goals (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>There has been some conflict over network goals (+/-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>There has been no conflict over network goals (+)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Operationalization of public value proposition**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public value proposition</td>
<td>Strategy document: A policy document which describes structure, goals and activities of the network collaboration</td>
<td>Extensiveness of strategy or policy document</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clearness of strategy</td>
<td>Structure, goals and activities are clear to network participants</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Substantive actions:</td>
<td>Output (activities) of collaboration with regards to radicalization prevention</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily practices of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>collaboration align with</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>described activities,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>that supposedly relate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to achieving the goal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived effectiveness</td>
<td>The output activities are seen as effective for dealing with counter</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of policy</td>
<td>radicalization policy</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Operationalization of legitimacy and support**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy and support</td>
<td>External: Extent to which decisions and implementation are supported and responsive to external authorizers</td>
<td>Support expressions of elected officials, outsiders, agency directors or civil society</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Expression of objections or sanctions by elected officials, outsiders, agency directors or civil society</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Operationalization of operational capacity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Operational capacity</strong></td>
<td>Financial resources that have been made available by network participants</td>
<td>Financial resources (budget)</td>
<td>- Budget stayed the same or decreased (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Budget increased slightly (+/-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Budget increased significantly (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Employee resources that have been made available by network participants</td>
<td>Employee resources (fte, hours)</td>
<td>- The number of fte stayed the same or decreased (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- The number of fte increased slightly (+/-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- The number of fte increased significantly (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Investment in training and development by network participants</td>
<td>Investment in courses and training of employees</td>
<td>- No investment in courses and training (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Investment in courses and training for some participants (+/-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Investment in courses and training for a lot of participants (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Problem-solving capacity</strong></td>
<td>New activities or approaches to address radicalization</td>
<td></td>
<td>- No new activities or approaches have been developed (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Some new activities or approaches have been developed (+/-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- A lot of new activities and approaches have been developed (+)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Operationalization of tight coupling and decoupling

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tight coupling</strong></td>
<td>There are no tensions between the public value proposition, the operational capacity and the legitimacy and support. They all point in the same directions.</td>
<td>- There is sufficient legitimacy and support to enact the public value proposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- There is sufficient operational capacity to enact the public value proposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Policy-practice decoupling</strong></td>
<td>Public value proposition is not aligned with actual practices</td>
<td>- There is insufficient legitimacy and support to enact the public value proposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- There is insufficient operational capacity to enact the public value proposition</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Annex B - Topic list

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Subtopic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Local context</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction respondent</td>
<td>Function and role in radicalization policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local context</td>
<td>History of radicalization policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>History of network collaboration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Effective network collaboration</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network coordination structure</td>
<td>Type of collaboration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Leading actor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stakeholder inclusion</td>
<td>Size of network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stakeholder exclusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutual trust</td>
<td>Formal contact with network participants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Informal contact with network participants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Information sharing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Monitoring of activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>History of relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commitment to process</td>
<td>Participation in network activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Participants share resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urgency of network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dependency on others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal consensus</td>
<td>Organization goal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Network goal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Goal conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public value</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public value proposition</td>
<td>Vision, goals and activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Clearness of vision, goals and activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Substantive actions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Perceived effectiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy and support</td>
<td>External legitimacy and support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>External legitimacy and objections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Internal legitimacy and support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Internal legitimacy and objections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational capacity</td>
<td>Material and financial resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Employee resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Investment in training and development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Problem solving capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Decoupling</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tight coupling</td>
<td>Alignment of goals and actions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy-practice decoupling</td>
<td>Symbolic adoption of policies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Annex C – Documents used for analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>Policy document</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Dordrecht** | Plan of action: *Working together towards social stability: attentive of signals of radicalization* (Gemeente Dordrecht, September 2016)  
City Council information letter with regards to the plan of action social stability (Gemeente Dordrecht, October 2016)  
City Council information with regards to the answer of resolution M9 ‘Comprehensive youth work’ and fulfilment T7. (Gemeente Dordrecht, April 2017).  
The daily practice of the Youth Work of R-Newt (Clarijs, 2016)  
Newspaper article: ‘Radicalization barely a problem’ (De Telegraaf, 18 October 2016, Sebastian Schramm, p.105).  
Newspaper article: ‘Dordt tackles jihadism and radicalization’ (AD/ De Dordtenaar, 14 October 2016, Albert Sok). |
| **Haarlemmermeer** | Radicalization Approach: Prevention, detection and repression of radicalization in the municipality of Haarlemmermeer (Gemeente Haarlemmermeer, September 2016)  
Answering of informative questions of the VVD concerning the Note Radicalization Approach (Gemeente Haarlemmermeer 13 december 2016)  
Implementation program Safety, licences, supervision and enforcement 2017  
Framework Memorandum Safety, supervision and enforcement 2015-2018  
Yearplan Safety House Kennemerland 2016  
Annual pieces safety region Kennemerland 2015, 2016, 2017  
Annual documents 2016  
Report session debate 22 december 2016  
Implementing program safety 2017 |
| **Schiedam** | Implementation Program Comprehensive Safety 2017 (Gemeente Schiedam 2017).  
Research possible societal tensions Schiedam (van Drie, 2015).  
Policy plan comprehensive safety 2012-2015 (Gemeente Schiedam, 2012)  
Budget municipality of Schiedam 2017 (Gemeente Schiedam 2016c)  
Framework Memorandum Comprehensive Safety 2016 (Gemeente Schiedam 2016)  
Answering questions annual report discrimination 2015 (Gemeente Schiedam 2016b)  
Starting notition comprehensive safety 2016 (Gemeente Schiedam 2016d).  
Minutes council commission 10 februari 2015 (Gemeente Schiedam, 2015).  
Website article: Serious signals radicalization Schiedam (Schiedamnieuws 2015) |
Annex D – List of interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nr.</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Municipality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Policy officer public order and safety</td>
<td>Haarlemmermeer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Policy trainee public order and safety</td>
<td>Haarlemmermeer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>School attendance officer</td>
<td>Haarlemmermeer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Safety house representative</td>
<td>Haarlemmermeer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Operational expert police</td>
<td>Haarlemmermeer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Social worker school</td>
<td>Haarlemmermeer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Youth worker welfare institution</td>
<td>Haarlemmermeer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Policy officer public order and safety</td>
<td>Schiedam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Coordinator social district team</td>
<td>Schiedam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Key figure municipality</td>
<td>Schiedam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Mental health care worker</td>
<td>Schiedam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Policy officer public order and safety</td>
<td>Dordrecht</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Social services officer</td>
<td>Dordrecht</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Community policeman</td>
<td>Dordrecht</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Coordinator youth workers</td>
<td>Dordrecht</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>District manager social stability</td>
<td>Dordrecht</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>