The Use of Race and Racialisation for
Critical Counter-Radicalisation Studies:
A Conceptual Contribution

Student name: A.L. (Sanne) Groothuis
Student number: s4616596
Study: Research Master Philosophy
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Evert van der Zweerde
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Radboud University Nijmegen
I hereby declare and assure that I, A.L. (Sanne) Groothuis, have drafted this thesis independently, that no other sources and/or means other than those mentioned have been used and that the passages of which the text content or meaning originates in other works – including electronic media – have been identified and the sources clearly stated.

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Abstract

Scholars increasingly criticise counter-radicalisation policies for discriminating Muslims. Despite literature demonstrating the relation between racism and discrimination of Muslims in other discourses, critical counter-radicalisation theories overlook the role of race and racialisation. As is illustrated by studies criticizing the British counter-radicalisation policy PREVENT, these theories are consequently unable to explain at least two issues: the relation between the logic of PREVENT, which focuses on Muslims, and the people predominantly targeted by it, South-Asians and Blacks, and how vulnerability and risk are turned into a natural aspect of being Muslim. The concepts of race and racialisation will bring conceptual clarity and allow critical counter-radicalisation scholars to analyse these and other issues while simultaneously maintaining an overview of how they are related.

Keywords: race, racialisation, counter-radicalisation, PREVENT, religion, Muslims, Islamophobia
Introduction

Counter-radicalisation has become a standard part of the counter-terrorism policies of Western European governments.¹ Although there is no consensus on the exact definition of ‘radicalisation,’ it is generally considered to signify ‘what goes on before the bomb goes off.’² Through counter-radicalisation policies and practices, governments aim at preventing people from becoming terrorists. However, scholars increasingly criticise these attempts, not only for lack of clear definitions,³ but also for being discriminatory in their focus on a specific religious group, namely Muslim populations.⁴ Considering the prevalence of counter-radicalisation discourse in media as well as its influence on everyday life,⁵ such critical research constitutes a highly

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important development that allows rectification of problematic assumptions, logics, and consequences of invasive policies and practices.

Nevertheless, most critical counter-radicalisation studies, especially those focusing on Western European states, do not address certain gaps in their analyses, because they lack a theoretical framework that includes the right concepts. To repair this situation, I argue in this article that the concepts of race and racialisation should become part of the theoretical framework of critical counter-radicalisation research. The use of race and racialisation will allow scholars to both disentangle the different ways in which Muslims are constructed as the subjects of counter-radicalisation policies and produce a clear overview of how these ways are connected. I argue that the current conceptual framework does allow for an analysis of the construction of ‘the Muslim community,’ but not for how this construction is naturalised onto individual Muslims. Concepts are not neutral: they have their own effects on discourses, thoughts, and policies. One only has to think of the effect that labelling an action as ‘terrorist’ instead of ‘violent’ has on political discourse, public opinion, and media discussions.6 Hence, it is important to use the right concepts – ones that have analytical and explanatory power7 – in order to ask the right questions. In this article, I argue that critical counter-radicalisation researchers need the concepts of race and racialisation to

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analyse the intertwinement of religion and race within counter-radicalisation policies and practices. This article therefore provides conceptual tools that will allow these scholars to conduct comprehensive analyses of the different ways in which the targets of counter-radicalisation policies and practices are constructed.

As the conceptual relations between race and religion are frequently questioned by politicians and scholar alike, the first section of this article explains why I assume this intertwinement is plausible. It also provides the definitions of the concepts race and racialisation that I argue should be used by critical counter-radicalisation scholars. The second section goes into the critiques of PREVENT, the British governmental counter-radicalisation policy. Critical research into counter-radicalisation policies is a relatively new academic endeavour, with most of the studies focusing on the US or Britain. As there are some critical counter-radicalisation studies researching the US policies that consider the role of race and racialisation, this article focuses on British studies, while taking into account the literature on the US. The

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10 Rana, ‘The racial infrastructure of the terror-industrial complex’; Kundnani, The Muslims are Coming!
different context of each country means that the way in which the concepts of race and racialisation can aid in the analyses also differs. As such, I believe that it is helpful to preliminarily delineate possible paths for critical counter-radicalisation studies focusing on European countries, taking analyses of PREVENT as an example of such research. This context limitation is in line with most literature on the role of race and racialisation in governmental and societal discourse.\textsuperscript{11} Section three begins with a brief overview of the current most dominant theoretical frameworks in British critical counter-radicalisation research. It argues these theories fall short on at least two accounts: the link between the logic of PREVENT, which focuses on Muslims, and who it predominantly targets, namely South-Asians and Blacks, and how vulnerability and risk are turned into a natural aspect of being Muslim. Although it is beyond the scope of this article to conduct a critical analysis of PREVENT using the concepts of race and racialisation, I will briefly touch upon possible paths for such research.

1. Race, religion, racialisation
I assume that race and religion are in certain contexts – among others that of contemporary European counter-radicalisation policies – interrelated. The interrelation

of race and religion is argued for by several scholars. For example, Topolski demonstrates how current conceptions of race are built upon religious categories of the 16th and 17th century. Whereas Topolski focuses on the European context, Maldonado-Torres illustrates how a similar intertwining between religion and race can be found in the Americas by tracing the development of colonialism. Moreover, several authors claim that contemporary forms of Islamophobia include or are forms of racism. According to Taras and Goldberg, contemporary European Islamophobia is a combination of anti-immigration, anti-minority, and anti-terrorism narratives, coupled with the idea that those adhering to Islam could never accept a secular constitution. These narratives naturalise certain characteristics thought to belong to Muslims, such as being aggressive, hostile, and emotional. Similarly, Lauwers explains that anti-Muslim racism, part of Islamophobia, generally produces a stereotype of ‘the Muslim’ on the basis of three main characteristics: danger,
backwardness, and foreignness.\textsuperscript{19} As Allen shows, this stereotype entails a particular and seemingly contradictory relation between race and religion, as these characteristics are considered a natural part of Muslims while simultaneously seen as arising from Islamic teachings.\textsuperscript{20} Nevertheless, it is a common view in which Muslims are viewed as a singular people with certain inherent character traits that make them into Europe’s Other.\textsuperscript{21}

As such, I define race as a concept that encompasses more than merely a biological construct. Races are socially constructed categories that convey ideas about human capacity and the ‘possibility/impossibility and the desirability/undesirability of contact between some individuals or groups and others.’\textsuperscript{22} The construction of a race naturalises ideas about certain characteristics, making them into inherent, unchangeable traits of a certain constructed category of persons. This category is considered to refer to a potentially reproductive community-like group, like a culture or an ethnicity (in contrast to, for example, carpenters or men).\textsuperscript{23} Races delineate who does and does not belong, and what can and cannot be said about belonging.\textsuperscript{24} They

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{19} Lauwers, ‘Is Islamophobia (always) racism?’.
\item\textsuperscript{20} Christopher Allen, \textit{Islamophobia} (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing 2010); see also Lauwers, ‘Is Islamophobia (always) racism?’.
\item\textsuperscript{22} Maldonado-Torres, ‘Race, religion, and ethics in the modern/colonial world’, 691; see also Topolski, ‘The race-religion constellation’, 59-60.
\item\textsuperscript{23} Lauwers, ‘Is Islamophobia (always) racism?’.
\item\textsuperscript{24} Goldberg, ‘Racial Europeanization’.
\end{itemize}
reduce groups and/or persons to the characteristics relevant to the construction. In contrast to Goldberg, I approach race as a concept that first and foremost represents how people thought to belong to a race are viewed, rather than their way of ‘being in the world.’ A race is thus a category that exists within the mind of those constructing it. I define racialisation as the process of [1] placing attributes thought to belong to these socially constructed categories in a naturalised framing and [2] using the categories as tools of hierarchy and exclusion. The institutionalisation of related exclusionary and power-dividing practices is racism, which can take many forms (and thus is more aptly referred to as racisms). Examples are biological/ethnic racism, cultural racism, and religious racism. Biological racism entails exclusionary and power-dividing practices on the basis of a belief in the existence of discrete biological groups that behave in a different way due to their biological constitution. In contrast to biological racism, cultural racism does not argue that certain people are innately superior, but rather that there exists a difference in cultural superiority due to historical developments, leading to the view that the only way for the inferior group(s) to

overcome backwardness is to follow the superior group’s guidance.\textsuperscript{28} Cultural racism thus naturalises ‘backwardness’ not on the basis of one’s potential for achievement, but on the assumed attained level of achievement, which is often connected to a certain mentality thought to belong to a specific culture.\textsuperscript{29} Religious racism assumes that certain religions are threatening signs of difference and otherness, links these religions to certain negative characteristics, and naturalises characteristics thought to belong to the people following that religion.\textsuperscript{30} A form of religious racism is the stereotype that all Muslims are inherently violent, because Islam is thought to promote violent fundamentalism.\textsuperscript{31} Although each type of racism naturalises different types of characteristics or groups, all entail naturalisation, the reduction of people to a naturalised construction, and exclusion. Moreover, different forms of racism often intersect, for example in the racist imagination existing within British discourse that all Christians are European and white, while all Muslims are coloured and from Arab, South-Asian, or African origin.\textsuperscript{32}

Before demonstrating how these definitions of race and racialisation can advance critical counter-radicalisation research, it is necessary to briefly describe this field’s main findings, focusing on studies of PREVENT. Summarising these findings

\begin{itemize}
  \item Blaut, ‘The theory of cultural racism’.
  \item Blaut, ‘The theory of cultural racism’.
  \item Williamson and Khiabany, ‘UK: The veil and the politics of racism’.
  \item Allen, \textit{Islamophobia}.
  \item Leon Moosavi, ‘The racialization of Muslim converts in Britain and their experiences of Islamophobia’, \textit{Critical Sociology}, vol. 41, no. 1, 2015, 41-56.
\end{itemize}
will help to demonstrate where current analyses overlook the role of race and racialisation. By relating these results to the theories used in the third section of this article, it will become clear how the concepts of race and racialisation can aid to repair this situation.

2. Critical counter-radicalisation research

In 2004, counter-radicalisation became a dominant strand in governmental counter-terrorism policies. Counter-radicalisation aims at signalling individuals who may be at risk of becoming attracted to propagating or committing terrorism in order to deter them from following such goals. PREVENT, the British governmental counter-radicalisation policy, specifically aims at responding to the ideas legitimising terrorism and those who promote them, at preventing ‘people from being drawn into terrorism’ and guarantee that these people are provided with advice and support, and at working with organisations and sectors ‘where there are risks of radicalisation’ that the government ‘needs to address.’ However, like other Western European counter-radicalisation policies, PREVENT is severely criticised for its assumptions, logic, and consequences.

33 Baker-Beall, Heath-Kelly and Jarvis (eds), Counter-Radicalisation; Kundnani, The Muslims are Coming!.
According to Kundnani, the discourse of counter-radicalisation was, from its conception onwards, guided in its assumptions by the demands of policymakers in the context of 9/11, the murder of the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam, and the 7/7 attacks in London. These demands can be summarised as the demand to have knowledge on how governments can prevent terrorism before a criminal offence has taken place. This led to the following built-in assumptions within the concept of radicalisation itself: that (aspiring) terrorists come from a larger group of people who sympathise with extremist versions of Islamic religion, that one can predict who will enter this group by monitoring psychological or religious factors, and that knowing about these components will help governments construct policies that reduce the risk of terrorist acts on their soil. Risk knowledge is thus a major part of counter-radicalisation policies, discourse, and research, as conceptions of risk make terrorism knowable and governable. Counter-radicalisation concerns itself with the effort to govern pre-emptively, to govern the future. Research on radicalisation aims at

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36 Kundnani, ‘Radicalisation’, 16.
37 Kundnani, ‘Radicalisation’, 15.
39 Heath-Kelly, ‘Reinventing prevention or exposing the gap?’; Heath-Kelly, ‘Counter-terrorism and the counterfactual’.
providing information to support that effort. Radicalisation studies can generally be divided into two approaches that overlap but focus on a different aspect. One approach mainly focuses on the supposed role of religion, aiming to find a set of religious beliefs shared by terrorists and rejected by ‘moderate’ Muslims. The other approach focuses on psychological factors, especially processes that cause some individuals to escalate from mental states of alienation or resentment to radicalisation, which is then linked to the process of supporting extremist interpretations of Islam. As such, Kundnani argues that radicalisation studies generally investigate a much narrower question than the question how terrorism comes into being, namely: ‘Why do some individual Muslims support an extremist interpretation of Islam that leads to violence?’ In contrast to the preventive counter-terrorism approaches of the previous century, like those against the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), the driver of radicalisation is thought to be a certain religious belief in combination with a certain mental state, rather than an organisation.

Counter-radicalisation policies thus assume that a mental state of alienation or resentment, when coupled with a belief in a certain interpretation of religion, may lead to terrorist risk. As such, PREVENT ‘has developed a set of knowledges that

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40 Kundnani, ‘Radicalisation’, 16.
41 Heath-Kelly, ‘Reinventing prevention or exposing the gap?’.
articulate, classify and connect particular subjectivities with the possibilities of future violence.'\(^{43}\) According to Martin, PREVENT ties these projected subjectivities, the feeling of not belonging or being accepted, to a ‘dis-identification from the normalcy of British society.’\(^{44}\) Within counter-radicalisation, this (supposed) dis-identification is constructed as a risk factor. Those who do not identify with the ‘standard’ of British norms and values are assumed to be vulnerable to radicalisation.\(^{45}\) As Heath-Kelly explains, PREVENT divides its targets group into two: individuals who are at risk and those who are risky.\(^{46}\) The ones at risk are presumed to be vulnerable to the ideas and attraction of radicalised, i.e. risky, individuals.\(^{47}\) Hence, PREVENT simultaneously presents ‘“vulnerability indicators’ for radicalisation as threats to the wider collective.’\(^{48}\) And because dis-identification from the normalcy of British society is assumed to make someone vulnerable and by extension a potential future risk, ‘British’ norms and values are constructed in and of themselves as preventing someone from

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\(^{44}\) Martin, ‘Challenging the separation of counter-terrorism and community cohesion in Prevent’, 194.

\(^{45}\) Heath-Kelly, ‘Counter-terrorism and the counterfactual’.

\(^{46}\) Heath-Kelly, ‘Reinventing prevention or exposing the gap?’; Heath-Kelly, ‘Counter-terrorism and the counterfactual’.


\(^{48}\) Heath-Kelly, ‘Counter-terrorism and the counterfactual’, 394.
becoming attracted to terrorism.\textsuperscript{49} In a logic of infections and immunity, dis-identification with ‘Britishness’ is constructed as contagious and ‘British’ values as the vaccine. As Martin argues, PREVENT shows ‘how the demands of unthreatening similitude is itself constitutive of the outside, mapped onto and through the bodies of those now deemed potentially threatening.’\textsuperscript{50} Similarly, Heath-Kelly claims that a gap exists between a terrorist event and its pre-emption, which is concealed by the use of force upon innocent people, who are temporarily considered guilty due to signs of ‘suspectness.’\textsuperscript{51} These signs are constructed by depicting racial characteristics and behaviours as immediately dangerous.\textsuperscript{52} That which is not ‘British’ or similar to ‘Britishness’ is considered a potential risk and thus worthy of investigation and governance. And within the larger discourse in which counter-radicalisation operates, those who are presumed to be most likely to inherently dis-identify with ‘Britishness’ are Muslims.\textsuperscript{53} This is exemplified in the allocation of PREVENT resources: arguing that funds should be focused on the areas of highest priority, the resources were

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{49} Martin, ‘Challenging the separation of counter-terrorism and community cohesion in Prevent’.
\item \textsuperscript{50} Martin, ‘Challenging the separation of counter-terrorism and community cohesion in Prevent’, 192.
\item \textsuperscript{51} Heath-Kelly, ‘Reinventing prevention or exposing the gap?’, 69, 80.
\item \textsuperscript{52} Heath-Kelly, ‘Reinventing prevention or exposing the gap?’.
\end{itemize}
allocated to ‘local authorities with sizeable Muslim communities,’ without explanation of why those constitute the highest priority.54

According to Ali, ‘identifying and in so doing constituting the “Muslim community” as the site of radicalisation in need of governmental reform’ is, despite not being acknowledged as such, one of the most important functions of PREVENT.55 This process starts with the acceptance of ‘the Muslims community’ as an unproblematic identity label in counter-radicalisation discourse and policies. As Ali shows, British radicalisation literature, upon which PREVENT is based, links ‘the Muslims community’ to a breakdown of the ethnicity and socio-economic makeup of Muslims in Britain.56 The identity and experience of British Muslims, which is presumed to differ from ‘British’ identity, is thus sought through generic statistical information. Through this practice, the government fixes ‘the British Muslim identity,’ without questioning if that is possible and desirable, and it ultimately decides what constitutes the Muslim community.57 As such, it is complicit in the production of the idea of the

54 UK Department for Communities and Local Government as cited in Heath-Kelly, ‘Counter-terrorism and the counterfactual’, 403.
56 Ali, ‘Mapping the Muslim community’, 141-142.
57 Ali, ‘Mapping the Muslim community’, 150.
Muslim community, without recognizing this role. The statistical information used to ‘identify’ the community is supplemented by information from surveillance practices. Surveillance takes place through both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ approaches. The hard approach uses full coercive state powers to obtain information and monitor communities. For example, in 2000 the UK legalised ‘stop-and-search powers,’ giving the police the authority to stop and search people within specified, but large geographic areas without the need for reasonable suspicion linked to a specific person. The people subject to these powers are more than three times likely to be Blacks and Asians than Whites. The soft approach often uses indirect surveillance methods. The government establishes collaboration with certain Muslim religious leaders, coaches, teachers, and community leaders, who provide information regarding their population and individuals who portray signals (as defined by the government) of being at risk or risky with regard to radicalisation. The demographic investigation, monitoring, surveillance, and cooperation with people inside the target ‘community,’ coupled with

58 Ali, ‘Mapping the Muslim community’, 150.
59 Kundnani, *The Muslims are Coming!*; Rana, ‘The racial infrastructure of the terror-industrial complex’.
60 Ragazzi, ‘Policed multiculturalism?’.
61 Ragazzi, ‘Policed multiculturalism?’, 159.
63 Ragazzi, ‘Policed multiculturalism?’; Kundnani, *The Muslims are Coming!*; Baker-Beall, Heath-Kelly and Jarvis (eds), *Counter-Radicalisation.*
the assumptions regarding the psychological and religious factors presumed to lead to radicalisation together construct a certain fixed idea of ‘the Muslim community,’ its identity, characteristics, and experience. However, there exists no one identity, set of characteristics, or experience of Muslim people in Britain, as there is a variety of Muslim communities and Muslim individuals. Fixating ‘the Muslim identity’ legitimises treating all Muslims in the same manner despite their differences, thereby doing injustice to the reality of their diversity.

Moreover, this fixed idea of ‘the Muslim community’ defines what an acceptable versus unacceptable form and conduct of that community and its population is. As several scholars demonstrate, this is both evident in the language of PREVENT, which distinguishes ‘extremist’ versus ‘moderate’ interpretations of Islamic theology, and in the organisations and individuals it chooses to cooperate with in its governance of ‘the Muslim community.’ The idea of this approach is to ‘disrupt the “circle of tacit support” that terrorist may find in the community, while empowering communities and involving them in the management of what is presented as “their problem”.’ As terrorists are presumed to come from a larger pool of people sympathizing with

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64 Ali, ‘Mapping the Muslim community’.
66 Kundnani, *The Muslims are Coming!*, Baker-Beall, Heath-Kelly and Jarvis (eds), *Counter-Radicalisation*; Heath-Kelly, ‘Counter-terrorism and the counterfactual’.
68 Ragazzi, ‘Policed multiculturalism?’; 164.
extremist interpretations of Islamic religion, ‘the Muslim community’ is constructed as simultaneously at risk and risky, exhausting the entire population of Muslims with the use of two categories.\(^6^9\) On the basis of this assumption, British counter-radicalisation practices ‘securitis[es] Muslim communities] in the name of others, as a locale from which future threats might emerge, while simultaneously disciplining them for their own good.’\(^7^0\) Through PREVENT’s governance of British Muslims, certain types of dissent are not just made illegal in the name of security, but also pathologized and thereby depoliticised: they are barred entry from public and political debate, treated as something that is not worthy of discussion.\(^7^1\) As Sedgwick explains, the concept of radicalisation de-emphasises the wider circumstances producing the declared grievances of a ‘radical,’ making him or her ‘often appear as a “rebel without a cause”’.\(^7^2\)

Having summarised the main critiques of PREVENT, it is now time to show why the current theoretical frameworks used in European critical counter-radicalisation research should incorporate the concepts of race and racialisation. In order to do so,


\(^7^0\) Heath-Kelly, ‘Counter-terrorism and the counterfactual’, 405 (emphasis in original).

\(^7^1\) Baker-Beall, Heath-Kelly and Jarvis (eds), Counter-Radicalisation; Heath-Kelly, ‘Counter-terrorism and the counterfactual’; Imran Awan, “I am a Muslim not an extremist”: how the Prevent Strategy has constructed a “suspect” community, Politics & Policy, vol. 40, no. 6, 2012, 1158-1185.

section three first discusses the most dominant framework and an alternative built on criticism of that theory. Consequently, I will describe two issues that cannot be analysed using either one but could be properly analysed when using the conceptual tools of race and racialisation. These issues are examples to demonstrate the use of race and racialisation for critical counter-radicalisation research, rather than an exhaustive list of such uses. Section three will also address a possible objection to the use of these concepts for this field of studies.

3. The use of race and racialisation for critical counter-radicalisation studies

3.1. The suspect community thesis

Currently, the suspect community thesis is one of the most dominant conceptual frameworks underlying the critical analyses of PREVENT and counter-radicalisation. This thesis draws upon the work of Hillyard, which is concerned with the effects of the British Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) in 1974. According to Hillyard, certain features of the PTA led to the construction of the Irish as a suspect community. In its contemporary use, the suspect community thesis represents how Muslims as a faith community are viewed as a group that is ‘at risk’ and that is constructed as ‘the other’.

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73 Baker-Beall, Heath-Kelly and Jarvis (eds), Counter-Radicalisation.
75 Hillyard, Suspect Community.
76 Body-Gendrot, ‘Muslims’; Spalek, ‘Community policing, trust, and Muslim communities in relation to “new” terrorism’; Sarah Joy Pickering, Judith McCulloch and David Peter
In a study that is illustrative of the suspect community thesis, Pantazis and Pemberton argue that Muslims have replaced the Irish as the suspect community in Britain.\textsuperscript{77} They define a suspect community as

a subgroup of the population that is singled out for state attention as being “problematic.” Specifically in terms of policing, individuals may be targeted, not necessarily as a result of suspected wrongdoing, but simply because of their presumed membership to that sub-group. Race, ethnicity, religion, class, gender, language, accent, dress, political ideology or any combination of these factors may serve to delineate the sub-group.\textsuperscript{78}

In their definition, the term suspect does not only refer to a legal category, but also to how people experience the law. The term ‘community’ has two meanings in Pantazis’ and Pemberton’s framework.\textsuperscript{79} Sometimes, it means a group of people perceived as being suspect, while at other times they suggest this suspicion generates a social identity in such a way that the group can be considered a community. The meaning of community thus seems to oscillate between something that only exists in the mind of

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\textsuperscript{77} Pantazis and Pemberton, ‘From the “old” to the “new” suspect community’; see Heath-Kelly, ‘Reinventing prevention or exposing the gap?’ for a study of the similarities and differences between the construction and treatment of targets within PTA and PREVENT.
\textsuperscript{78} Pantazis and Pemberton, ‘From the “old” to the “new” suspect community’, 649.
\textsuperscript{79} Pantazis and Pemberton, ‘From the “old” to the “new” suspect community’.
\end{flushright}
government officials and something that has been brought into reality by governmental and police practices.\textsuperscript{80}

However, scholars have criticised the suspect community thesis for treating the construction of Muslims as a suspect community as an unintended consequence of government practices.\textsuperscript{81} Rather than collateral damage, Ali\textsuperscript{82} and Ragazzi\textsuperscript{83} argue the governance of diversity and construction of distinct communities is at the core of the modus operandi of British governmental counter-terrorism. According to Ali, one of the most important functions of the concept of radicalisation within British counter-terrorism measures is ‘to identify and in so doing constitute the “Muslim community” as the site of radicalisation in need of governmental reform.’\textsuperscript{84} Through PREVENT, ‘the Muslim community’ has been constituted and turned into a governable entity subject to intervention and management.\textsuperscript{85} This entity is constituted by a variety of statistical information, used to derive an image of the identity and experience of ‘the

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{80}]Ragazzi, ‘Policed multiculturalism?’.
\item[\textsuperscript{81}]Ali, ‘Mapping the Muslim community’; Ragazzi, ‘Policed multiculturalism?’; Martin, ‘Challenging the separation of counter-terrorism and community cohesion in Prevent’.
\item[\textsuperscript{82}]Ali, ‘Mapping the Muslim community’.
\item[\textsuperscript{83}]Ragazzi, ‘Policed multiculturalism?’.
\item[\textsuperscript{84}]Ali, ‘Mapping the Muslim community’, 140.
\end{itemize}
British Muslim.’ By making the presupposed ‘Muslim community’ knowable, counter-radicalisation makes it governable: ‘Whoever gets to decide what constitutes the Muslim community also decides how they [i.e., Muslims] should conduct themselves.’ 86 Ali argues that, through PREVENT, the British government was the decision-maker, as government officials decided with whom to partner in order to counter radicalisation, just like they placed the causes of radicalisation within Muslim communities. 87

Ragazzi places PREVENT within a larger framework of dealing with diversity. 88 His thesis, called ‘policed multiculturalism,’ argues that counter-radicalisation consists of ‘practices of the production and management of diversity that remove fundamental questions about plurality and citizenship from the political debate, casting them instead in the expert, technical and depoliticised language of security.’ 89 By involving communities in counter-radicalisation, the government produces self-managed communities, while depoliticizing what they deem unacceptable forms of dissent. 90 The government thereby partially transfers responsibility to those who it deems ‘moderate’ community leaders to deal with the ‘risky’ elements in their community. The community is to monitor and manage their own population, informing the British government of at risk and risky individuals, who are subsequently referred

87 Ali, ‘Mapping the Muslim community’.
88 Ragazzi, ‘Policed multiculturalism?’.
89 Ragazzi, ‘Policed multiculturalism?’, 163.
90 Ragazzi, ‘Policed multiculturalism?’; Awan, “‘I am a Muslim not an extremist’”.
to a multi-agency risk assessment and case management system.91 After a tailored programme of intervention based on this assessment, these individuals are to be turned into subjects who are able to monitor their own risk.92 Rather than engaging with the reasons these individuals have for portraying signs of radicalisation as defined by the government in a (potentially political) discussion, they are thus pathologized, securitised, and depoliticised.

3.2. The added value of race and racialisation

Ali’s analysis93 and Ragazzi’s policed multiculturalism thesis94 both present valuable insights into the workings of counter-radicalisation. Nevertheless, they lack analytical and explanatory power on at least two fronts. Firstly, they do not explain how the logic of PREVENT, which targets the religious group of Muslims, results in the construction of a specific image of embodying radicalisation. Although Ragazzi states the diversity that is recognised and managed is divided into distinct communities along ethnic-religious lines, he does not explain what the process behind the establishment of these lines is and how ethnicity comes to play a role.95 Similarly, Heath-Kelly mentions that the community cohesion discourse, which is also part of PREVENT, demanded Asians, and particularly Muslims, to assimilate to ‘core British values’ without explaining the

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93 Ali, ‘Mapping the Muslim community’.
94 Ragazzi, ‘Policed multiculturalism?’.
95 Ragazzi, ‘Policed multiculturalism?’.
link made in that discourse between Asians and Muslims. And Pantazis’ and Pemberton’s study on British counter-terrorism demonstrates that Asian and Black people in Britain were three times more likely than Whites to be stopped and searched on the counter-terrorism powers of the police, without elaboration upon the logic of British counter-terrorism and these results. Without understanding how religion can become related to racism in its different forms, it will be complicated to understand how the effects of counter-radicalisation, which seem at first hand distinct from its logic, are dependent on the deeper lying structure of its discourse and context.

Secondly, the existing conceptual frameworks do not yet enable a comprehensive analysis of how vulnerability and risk are turned into an aspect of being Muslim as opposed to being British. Current critical counter-radicalisation research shows how these characteristics are constructed as part of ‘the Muslim community,’ but have not been provided a theoretical foundation to research how they are also constructed as a natural part of being Muslim, i.e. of every individual Muslim rather than the community. Currently, analyses like those of Heath-Kelly demonstrate that Muslims as individuals are doubly identified, as both risky and at risk, in specific PREVENT programmes. Nevertheless, an explanation of this process of identification (and construction) on an individual level is lacking. Without concepts

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97 Pantazis and Pemberton, ‘From the “old” to the “new” suspect community’.
98 Heath-Kelly, ‘Reinventing prevention or exposing the gap?’; Heath-Kelly, ‘Counter-terrorism and the counterfactual’.
that allow scholars to research this construction on the level of individuals, analyses will thus remain ambiguous. Expanding the existing theoretical framework of critical counter-radicalisation studies with the concepts of racialisation and race, as defined in the first section, will allow for an analysis of how vulnerability and risk are turned into characteristics of every individual Muslims, i.e. are turned into natural aspects that belong to every member of ‘the Muslim community.’

Rana provides an illustrative example of a study that uses racialisation in order to unravel the relations between the targets of the practices and of the logic of counter-radicalisation.\textsuperscript{99} Based on her ethnographic fieldwork studying everyday life in a New York neighbourhood in the decades after 9/11, she describes the ‘structural violence of an emergent racial infrastructure of the War on Terror.’\textsuperscript{100} In her article, it becomes clear how the focus group of US counter-radicalisation practices expanded from Pakistanis, to Muslims, to ‘youth’ in order to incorporate the surrounding areas of the neighbourhood, which existed predominantly of communities of colour. This expansion accepts the racial order at the centre of the US domestic War on Terror, without recognising or acknowledging that it does, because abiding by this order is presented as participation and engagement.\textsuperscript{101} By incorporating the concepts of racialisation and racism in the theoretical framework of critical counter-radicalisation

\textsuperscript{99} Rana, ‘The racial infrastructure of the terror-industrial complex’.
\textsuperscript{100} Rana, ‘The racial infrastructure of the terror-industrial complex’, 115.
\textsuperscript{101} Rana, ‘The racial infrastructure of the terror-industrial complex’, 130.
scholars, similar studies could be conducted with regard to PREVENT and other European counter-radicalisation policies.

A study that illustrates how the concepts of race and racialisation can help to answer to the second critique has yet to be published. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to provide such an analysis, I will briefly touch upon some possible paths for further research. One possibility is to focus on the treatment of radical Islam as a pathology rather than as a serious political stance that should be treated as such. By connecting this to the concept of race as a construct that conveys ideas about human capacity and the (im)possibility or (un)desirability of contact between people, a more comprehensive analysis of the pathologizing nature of this depoliticization of Muslims is enabled. Although the framework of suspicion and/or security enables the study of this depoliticization, it does not allow for the connection between a construction of Muslims as vulnerable to a construction of their human capacity. Studies on European Islamophobia have shown that the concepts of race and racialisation are eminently suited to such pursuits. For example, Goldberg analyses how the figure of the Muslim in European imaginations, ‘read as inevitably hostile, aggressive, engaged for religious purpose in constant jihad against Europe and Christianity in particular, and

102 Heath-Kelly, ‘Counter-terrorism and the counterfactual’; Awan, “I am a Muslim not an extremist”.
later the West and its supposed secularist leanings more generally,’ became conceived of as inferior in ability to self-govern. Rather than using suspicion or policing as conceptual tools, race and racialisation offer the required relation with naturalisation in order to conduct such analyses.

An alternative focus for studies concerned with how vulnerability and risk are turned into an aspect of being Muslim is the construction of alienation from and/or dis-identification with ‘Britishness’ as radicalisation, i.e., as something to be countered. This construction indicates cultural racism. Whereas in biological racism, somatic characteristics, such as skin colour, denominate one’s assumed superiority or inferiority, in cultural racism it is a specific culture, such as ‘Western European,’ or in this case, ‘British.’ By constituting the outside – the radicals –, PREVENT also constitutes the inside, the content of ‘Britishness.’ This is clear in, for example, the 2011 version of PREVENT, which described ‘extremism’ as the ‘vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs.’

Using race and racialisation, critical counter-radicalisation research could study how these values are constructed as specifically British in opposition to ‘extremist,’ thereby constructing the target group of PREVENT, i.e. Muslims, as the ‘Other.’

104 Goldberg, ‘Racial Europeanization’.
105 HO (Home Office), Prevent Strategy (London: TSO 2011), 107; also see Martin, ‘Challenging the separation of counter-terrorism and community cohesion in Prevent’.
However, not all scholars agree that race and racialisation can conceptually be interrelated with religion and other categories. As such, the next paragraphs consider this objection to my argument.

3.3. Objection to conceptually interrelating race and religion

In contrast to my proposal, Hussain and Bagguley argue that racism and Islamophobia should be conceptually distinguished.\textsuperscript{106} Examining the impact of the London bombings of 7/7 on the communities associated with the bombers, they conceptualise racism as ‘the negative signification or cultural construction of biological or somatic characteristics’ and Islamophobia as constructing ‘the distinctiveness of Islam and its representatives – Muslims – on the basis of belief and practice.’\textsuperscript{107} Although they argue the concepts are often empirically interrelated, they discard any analytical intertwinement, arguing that such an extension of the concept of racism would inappropriately inflate it, resulting in the loss of its distinctiveness and specific empirical referents.\textsuperscript{108} Similarly, Miles and Brown argue that the ‘race relations paradigm’ defines race too broadly, resulting philosophically in a meaningless concept and politically in racism escaping censure, as it is turned into ‘nothing worse than a product of cultural determinism or an expression of human nature.’\textsuperscript{109}

\textsuperscript{106} Hussain and Bagguley, ‘Securitized citizens’.
\textsuperscript{107} Hussain and Bagguley, ‘Securitized citizens’, 718.
\textsuperscript{108} Hussain and Bagguley, ‘Securitized citizens’, 718.
\textsuperscript{109} Miles and Brown, \textit{Racism}, 3-4.
Without going into the historical co-development of race and religion,\textsuperscript{110} I suggest that conceptualising race beyond its biological construction is useful, especially – but not only – for critical counter-radicalisation research. As Blaut explains, different forms of racism within Europe have at their core a similar assumption: the superiority of ‘Europeans’.\textsuperscript{111} Whether this is argued for using biological theories, e.g. Darwinism (biological racism), by referring to the superiority of Christianity over Islam (religious racism), or by stating that European values are more developed than non-Western values (cultural racism), ‘Europeanness’ is the standard. By analytically limiting racism to its biological form, it becomes impossible to analyse the role of ‘Britishness’ as preventive in and of itself against terrorism.\textsuperscript{112} For this construction of ‘Britishness’ is neither purely based on a biological form of racism nor on Islamophobia. It is based on the \textit{conceptual} intertwinement of biological, religious, and cultural racism, as the elements assumed to predict radicalisation are a combination of psychological (vulnerability) and religious (extremist interpretations of Islam) factors, both of which are presumed to influence each other (adhering to an extremist interpretation makes one more vulnerable, and being more vulnerable makes


\textsuperscript{111} Blaut, ‘The theory of cultural racism’.

\textsuperscript{112} Martin, ‘Challenging the separation of counter-terrorism and community cohesion in Prevent’.
one more susceptible to extremists interpretations). Without having one concept – race – that can be used to analyse the different strands of the logic of PREVENT, the conceptual intertwining inherent to it will be overlooked. Hence, my argument is that the concept of race does not lose its distinctiveness or empirical referents, as one can – and should – specify how different forms of racism are at play within one’s analyses. By being able to relate it to a shared structure of how race operates, however, it becomes possible to disentangle the different strands while maintaining a view of the bigger picture in which they operate.

Conclusion

In this article, I have aimed to show how the concepts of race and racialisation would be beneficial to European critical counter-radicalisation studies. As such research currently lacks these conceptual tools, it is not able to explain how counter-radicalisation policies like PREVENT, which predominantly target Muslims in their logic, result in the targeting of certain ethnic groups in practice. Moreover, it overlooks how vulnerability and risk are not only constructed as part of Muslim communities, but also as a natural part of being Muslim. Using race and racialisation, critical counter-radicalisation studies could disentangle the different ways in which counter-radicalisation policies and practices construct the people they target, while placing these ways within an overview that shows how they are connected.

113 Kundnani, ‘Radicalisation’.
Critical counter-radicalisation research currently provides important new insights for both security studies and research into Islamophobia. With the help of the concepts of race and racialisation, it could expand this influence to investigations of (religious) racism. By bringing these different but overlapping fields of research together, contemporary discourses, policies, and practices can be more comprehensively analysed. As a result, these analyses could help combat problematic assumptions and logics, because they could offer an improved view of their different aspects.

These are only some preliminary ideas for how the concepts of race and racialisation could help develop current and future research. Using these conceptual tools will, no doubt, open up many more important questions. Because asking the right questions requires using the right concepts, this article has aimed to provide a foundation that critical counter-radicalisation scholars can use to further develop their important work.
The Role of Othering in Toleration: Accidental, Potential, or Inherent?

PhD proposal

Summary (max. 200 words)

Radicalisation – the socio-psychological processes deemed a precursor to terrorism – exemplifies the ultimate test to the limits of toleration. Counter-radicalisation policies indicate the limits and risks of what the state and society ought to tolerate. In doing so, they have been criticized for (re)producing ‘another’ that is/is not to be tolerated. Although ‘the other’ is a floating signifier, the political process of othering always manifests itself on a concrete and particular other. This dichotomy of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ points to the possible use of toleration as a state technology to maintain unity in the polity. However, what remains to be analysed is whether toleration and/or tolerance presuppose and (re)produce ‘another’ regardless of the context, i.e. whether othering is inherent to these concepts. Using the Netherlands, which holds a unique position in the debate on toleration and tolerance, as a case study, this project is the first to research this question. Concretely, it will study contemporary Dutch governmental counter-radicalisation documents and investigate philosophical literature on toleration, focusing on studies by Dutch philosophers. Conducting this research is important, as
inherently presupposing and (re)producing ‘another’ is likely to violate the principles of equality and justice underlying the constitution of Western democracies.

**Description of the proposed research (max. 2,500 words)**

Radicalisation – the socio-psychological processes deemed a precursor to terrorism – exemplifies the ultimate test to the limits of toleration (Scruton 2007). Counter-radicalisation policies, based upon the concept of toleration, indicate the limits and risks of what ought to be tolerated/ permitted. In doing so, they have been criticized for (re)producing ‘another’ that is/is not to be tolerated. Although ‘the other’ is a floating signifier, the political process of othering always manifests itself on a concrete and particular other, a subject (as used by Brown and Forst (2014) in their debate on the relation between power and toleration), based on perceptions, assumptions, and biases about this other. This dichotomy of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ points to the possible use of toleration as a state technology to maintain unity in the polity (Brown and Forst 2014). However, what remains to be analysed is whether toleration presupposes and (re)produces ‘another’ regardless of the context, i.e. whether this is inherent to toleration itself. Using the Netherlands, which holds a unique position in the debate on toleration (Buruma 2006; Schama 2011), as a case study, this project is the first to research this question. Concretely, it will, first, conduct a study of contemporary Dutch governmental counter-radicalisation documents and, second, investigate philosophical literature on the concepts of toleration. If toleration necessarily entails ‘othering,’ this project will argue that the concept needs to be rethought to avoid violating the
principles of equality and justice underlying the constitutions of Western democracies (Furedi 2011). If toleration does not necessarily presuppose and (re)produce ‘another,’ it will address how toleration should be conceptualised in order to avoid ‘othering.’

*Status Quaestionis*

A well-accepted academic definition of toleration is letting ‘other people [be] free to behave as they think best, though their behaviour looks objectionable and could be checked’ (Galeotti 2015: 1; see also King 1998; Nicholson 1985; Mendus 1987). Surprisingly, philosophical discussions on toleration commonly do not consider an important distinction, introduced by the political philosopher Michael Walzer (1997), between toleration as attitude and toleration as policy. When using the term toleration, scholars often refer to tolerance as attitude. This attitude functions both on an individual and a group/collective level. Tolerance may be either horizontal or vertical, i.e. either between individuals/groups who have a choice whether to tolerate or not, or hierarchically between individuals/groups where there is only one with the power and choice to tolerate the other (top-down). With the concept of toleration, Walzer introduces a way to research toleration on a *state* level. According to Walzer, toleration is always top-down, established by an authority or power. Nevertheless, people may object to certain policies of toleration. This happened in 1795 in the Netherlands,

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114 Throughout this proposal I will use ‘the Netherlands’ to refer to the governments and region currently considered to historically have been part of the Netherlands, despite their different names (e.g. Republic of the Seven United Netherlands) and territorial boundaries.
when unrest amongst Protestants, due to public Catholic processions, led the
government to retract part of its newly established religious freedom for this group
(Rowen et al. 2017; Homan 1966). Moreover, some scholars argue that toleration in a
democracy can be grounded in mutual respect of the tolerated and the tolerating as
equals, hence requiring mutually acceptable reasons for toleration and avoiding the
production of ‘stigmatized, “non-normal” identities’ (Wendy and Forst 2014, 26).
Despite being conceptually different, tolerance and toleration (TT)\(^{115}\) are thus not
practically separable, but rather intertwined and interdependent. Moreover, they are
connected to human relationships and power, as they are connected to
inclusion/exclusion. In the case of tolerance, this concerns inclusion/exclusion from
the community. In the case of toleration, it involves inclusion/exclusion from the polity,
a political community, such as the state. Therefore, these concepts are linked to
inclusion/exclusion, at least in their manifestation. With the choice whether to tolerate
some individual or group, perspectives on what the community or polity should include
and exclude are taken into account.

This is the case for the Netherlands, which has a reputation for currently and
historically being one of the most tolerant nations in Europe. This image is also
reflected in the self-perception of many Dutch people (Essed and Hoving 2014). The
Netherlands was one of the first countries to officially declare personal freedom of
religion through the Union of Utrecht in 1579, thereby including Catholics in its

\(^{115}\) Wherever I write TT, I refer to both tolerance and toleration.
predominantly Protestant polity (Rowen et al. 2017). Moreover, it hosted people who were exiled from other countries, such as political philosophers John Locke and Pierre Bayle (Po-chia Hsia and Van Nierop 2002; Forst 2017). Starting around the 16th century, an intense academic debate took place concerning what toleration should entail in the Netherlands, in part shaped by the changes in the country’s political situation (Galeotti 2010; Israel 2001; Brunner et al. 1990). As Jonathan Israel (2001) explains, two faces of toleration were prevalent in 1650-1750. There was the ‘acceptable’ face, expressed amongst others by Locke, which had as its core ‘freedom of worship and the peaceful coexistence of dissenting Churches alongside each national, or public, Church’ (ibid.: 265). Additionally, the ‘radical’ face existed, chiefly represented by Baruch de Spinoza, which demanded freedom of thought and expression, including of thoughts that were incompatible with key claims of the Churches’ revealed religion (ibid.; Van der Zweerde, 2005). The Netherlands harboured both faces (and both philosophers): it was devoted to a strictly Calvinist public Church, while simultaneously being committed to religious plurality (Berkvens-Stevelinck, Israel and Posthumus Meyjes 1997; Frijhoff 2002). As such, it used a unique approach within Europe, thereby contributing considerably to international debates on TT (Haefeli 2016; Shorto 2004).

However, this reputation is questioned within fields such as history (Po-chia Hsia and Van Nierop 2002; Dupertuis Bangs 2010), secularism (Renton 2017), and racial studies (Wekker 2017; Alba and Duyvendak 2017). Surprisingly, philosophers have not yet sufficiently examined the context in which Dutch philosophical
contributions on TT were written. This is despite the flourishing of political philosophical literature on toleration in the last 30 years (e.g. McKinnon 2006; Galeotti 2012; Edyvane and Matravers 2012; Scanlon 1996; Heyd 1996), including those emphasising the importance of proper historical sensitivity (e.g. Laursen 2011; Parkin and Stanton 2013; Nederman 2000). Such research is essential. By analysing the foundational aspects of the legacy of Dutch TT, this project will fill a lacuna in these conceptually-based scholarly and societal debates. Moreover, it will provide a new perspective on the philosophical debate on the relation between tolerance, toleration and their limits. Resarching the philosophical variety in definitions of TT in the Netherlands and the context of these definitions is the first step in distinguishing aspects of possible embodiments of these concepts versus features that are part of them in every context, i.e. that are inherent to them. The project will research this by examining the philosophical and contemporary meanings of TT in the Netherlands, as well as their contexts.

The contemporary meaning and functions of TT are most explicitly formulated in Dutch counter-radicalisation policies, because radicalisation is considered one of the greatest tests to the limits of these concepts in the Netherlands. Firstly, these policies test out the limits of toleration by establishing which practices are suspect, but can be tolerated, and which form a risk to toleration. Secondly, by cooperating with certain schools, community centres, etc. to ensure this risk is monitored and minimized, they shape the limits of tolerance. Lastly, Dutch counter-radicalisation documents explicitly use TT to provide a foundation for their strategies,
referring to them as essential values of Dutch society, thereby invoking the story of the extraordinarily tolerant Dutch history. Consequently, Dutch counter-radicalisation documents are exceptional in intertwining notions considered to belong to Dutch identity, tolerance, toleration, and the limits of and risks to both. Moreover, they contain many interesting areas of tension. For example, what to do with those who have to be tolerated, but do not display the virtue of tolerance? By dealing with the complexity of the relationship between tolerance, toleration, and counter-radicalisation, these strategies form a perfect venue for discovering potential problems with these concepts in contemporary uses, such as the production of a specific ‘other.’

This view is strengthened by the criticism on British and American counter-radicalisation policies. Research in fields such as political science, anthropology, etc., but not in philosophy, argue these strategies depend on questionable assumptions about race, religion, and liability to extremism (Baker-Beall, Heath-Kelly, and Jarvis 2015; Kundnani 2014). Specifically, they argue counter-radicalisation policies create a ‘Muslim other’ (ibid.). Similar research is being initiated in the Netherlands and Belgium (De Koning et al. forthcoming). Although some of these critical counter-radicalisation scholars mention toleration in passing, they do not discuss the potential relationship between this production of ‘another’ and TT. The lack of this research on the Netherlands is even more surprising considering its position as pioneer in the creation of these policies (Vidino and Brandon 2012; Demant and De Graaf 2010). Studying how TT are defined and function within Dutch counter-radicalisation strategies will clarify how limits to TT are established in the Netherlands, including
whether they presuppose and (re)produce ‘another.’ Hence, this project will illuminate foundational assumptions and potential structural biases at the basis of the contemporary Dutch discourse on TT.

Connecting this to the philosophical definitions of these concepts in the Netherlands, their contexts, and the philosophical debate on them will discern two main issues. Firstly, in which ways TT can embody forms of ‘othering’ (Hirschkind 2008) and secondly, if TT inherently presuppose and (re)produce ‘another.’

Research questions and methodology

The central question in my research is whether toleration and/or tolerance inherently presuppose and (re)produce ‘another.’ As such, it does not focus on how the limits of TT entail inclusion/exclusion, but on whether this inclusion/exclusion is necessarily based on the (re)production of ‘another.’ The project will aim to answer this by researching three sub-questions.

[1] How are TT conceptualised and used in Dutch governmental counter-radicalisation documents?

In order to gain an understanding of the contemporary meaning and functioning of TT in the Netherlands, the first step in this project will be to research Dutch governmental counter-radicalisation documents. These documents explicitly discuss limits to toleration, justifying these limits by referring to aspects seen as central to the Dutch state, society, and identity, which should be protected against threats. By examining
how these threats are characterised and how the Dutch state defends its policies, the project will be able to clarify the role of TT in these strategies and expose assumptions and potential structural biases underlying them, e.g. regarding race and religion (Van Nieuwkerk 2006; Jansen 2013; Topolski 2017). As such, it will establish if current Dutch counter-radicalisation strategies presuppose and (re)produce ‘another’ in their use of TT and if so, how this other is constructed.

Regarding the method used for this first question, I will conduct a discourse analysis of Dutch counter-radicalisation documents, investigating the definitions, justification, and limits of TT expressed within them. With ‘documents,’ I mean Dutch governmental documents that are explicitly concerned with counter-radicalisation such as policy notes and research reports. I will focus on online documents produced by the two ministries responsible for counter-radicalisation, starting with three periods, namely the start of the counter-radicalisation approach (around 2004), the establishment of a four-year action plan (around 2007), and the institutionalisation of three laws on the basis of the counter-radicalisation approach (around 2017). The analyses will be limited to those parts of the documents explicitly concerned with TT.

Considering the criticism expressed by counter-radicalisation scholars focusing on the UK and USA, the analysis will discern whether similar problematic assumptions also play a role within Dutch counter-radicalisation strategies.

[2] How do philosophical works on TT written in the Netherlands conceptualise toleration and/or tolerance, taking into account the context in which they were written?
As stated above, the Netherlands is seen as occupying a unique position when it comes to debates about TT. However, philosophical literature on the conceptualisations of TT in the Netherlands has insufficiently considered the importance of proper historical sensitivity.

This project aims at repairing this situation by conducting a conceptual analysis of the concepts of TT written about by philosophers in the Netherlands, taking into account the context in which these works were produced. On the basis of the results of section 1, I will formulate questions to guide this analysis. Within this second section, I approach TT as context-dependent terms, which are shaped by discourses and (institutional) practices as well as each other, rather than as abstract concepts (Brunner et al. 1990; Foucault 1997; Brown and Forst 2014). Expanding on the work of historians like Israel (1995; 2002) and Otto Brunner et al. (1990), who discuss Thomas Aquinas, Spinoza, and Desiderius Erasmus, I begin my analysis with works published in the 16th century, researching the philosophical debate on how TT should be conceptualised and what it should entail. Focusing on works of philosophers in the Netherlands who occupy a considerable role in philosophical literature on TT and have not extensively been discussed by Israel (1995; 2002) and Brunner et al. (1990), such as Bayle, Locke, Martin Luther, Hugo Grotius, Balthasar Bekker, Bernard Nieuwentyt, and Samuel Pufendorf, I trace the changes within the conceptualisations, taking into account the context in which they took place. Hence, this part will yield a more balanced view on the potential conceptual content of TT, as well as how the context
and the conceptualisations may have influenced each other. Moreover, it will produce a foundation for discerning which aspects are not and which may be inherent to TT.

[3] Do toleration and/or tolerance as concepts inherently presuppose and (re)produce ‘another,’ given the way that are and have been conceptualised in the Netherlands, and should either one or both be rethought?

On the basis of the results of the first two questions, I will provide a philosophical argument on whether or not toleration and/or tolerance as concepts inherently presuppose and (re)produce ‘another.’ If both do not necessarily presuppose and (re)produce ‘another,’ this project will address how they should be conceptualised in order to avoid ‘othering.’ If one or both do entail ‘othering,’ however, this project will argue that the concepts need to be rethought in such a way as to avoid violating the principles of equality and justice. As toleration affects tolerance and vice versa, it is important to question which ‘other’ should be generated if ‘another’ is necessarily (re)produced.

Moreover, as the project includes an analysis of the role of TT in Dutch governmental counter-radicalisation strategies, this phase will indicate if the conceptualisation of toleration and/or tolerance in these strategies should be rethought so as to be in line with the philosophical argument of the project.

As such, this project is innovative, both by conducting philosophical research on Dutch counter-radicalisation strategies for the first time and by offering a new perspective on TT based on the Dutch case. Moreover, it is urgent, as numerable
practices in society are founded on contemporary discourses of these concepts, some of which may have extensive consequences for certain already marginalised groups of citizens.

**Keywords**

Toleration, tolerance, the ‘other,’ conceptualisation, the Netherlands, counter-radicalisation

**Timetable**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Research Activities</th>
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| Sep. 2018 – Dec. 24, 2018 | ▪ PhD training  
▪ Literature review of critical research on counter-radicalisation strategies in the UK, USA, and the Netherlands  
▪ Attend conference on counter-radicalisation |
▪ Write blog on counter-radicalisation in the Netherlands  
▪ Present lecture organised by Radboud Reflects on counter-radicalisation |
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date Range</th>
<th>Activities</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Attend conference in Europe on tolerance/toleration</td>
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<td>- Present at network meeting/Centre for Contemporary European Philosophy</td>
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<td>- Publication article: ‘Counter-Radicalisation in the Netherlands: Good Intentions, Problematic Assumptions’ (<a href="#">Critical Discourse Studies</a>)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jan. 2020 – July 2020</td>
<td>- Conceptual analysis of tolerance/toleration in Dutch philosophical works</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Present at conference</td>
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<td>- Write blog on the story of Dutch tolerance</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Research abroad at University of Berkeley, USA, working with Prof. Dr. Wendy Brown, a leading scholar in the field of political philosophy with expertise on Foucault and the concept of tolerance/toleration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Write blog on manifestation of tolerance and toleration as state technology</td>
</tr>
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Summary for non-specialists (max. 500 words)

Radicalisation is the (socio-)psychological processes considered to lead people to become terrorists. This process poses one of the greatest tests to the limits of tolerance (an attitude) and toleration (a policy), i.e. to letting other people be free to behave as they think best, although you find their behaviour objectionable and have the power to
Therefore, it is within counter-radicalisation policies that tolerance and toleration play a key role. These policies [1] define the limits of toleration, [2] shape the limits of tolerance, and [3] use the concepts of tolerance/toleration to provide a foundation for their strategies. In doing so, they imply and (re)produce ‘another’ that is or is not to be tolerated. Although ‘the other’ is a term that can signify many things in different contexts, it is always concretely a specific other, based on views and assumptions about certain groups. This dichotomy of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ points to the possible use of toleration as a state technology to maintain unity in the polity – a political community, such as the state. However, what remains to be analysed is whether tolerance and toleration presuppose and (re)produce ‘another’ regardless of the context in which they are used, i.e. whether othering is inherent to tolerance and toleration themselves. Using the Netherlands, which holds a unique position in the debate on tolerance and toleration, as a case study, this project is the first to research this question. Concretely, it will conduct a study of contemporary Dutch governmental counter-radicalisation documents and a conceptual analysis of tolerance and toleration in the philosophical works written in the Netherlands about these concepts. If neither necessarily presupposes and (re)produces ‘another,’ this project will address how toleration and tolerance should be conceptualised in order to avoid ‘othering.’ If one or both do entail ‘othering,’ however, this project will argue that the concepts need to be rethought in such a way as to avoid violating the principles of equality and justice underlying the constitutions of Western democracies. Whereas society (and hence the attitudes within society) decides issues as laws and policies on
the long term, policies and especially the discourse surrounding them seriously influence the attitudes of the members of society and how they treat those around them. As toleration thus affects tolerance and vice versa, it is important to question which ‘other’ should be generated if ‘another’ is necessarily presupposed.

Bibliography


Renton, James. “The Figure of the Fanatic: A Rebel Against Christian Sovereignty.”


**Curriculum vitae**

I. **Education**

(only courses considered relevant for the PhD project are mentioned)

- Research Master’s Programme Philosophy, Specialisation: Social and Political Philosophy
  
  Radboud University Nijmegen, Sept 2016 – (planned) Aug 2018
  
  Current average: 8.2
  
  - Philosophical Research Methods and Skills I
  - Philosophical Anthropology
  - Social and Political Philosophy
  - Capita Selecta Social and Political Philosophy
Research Essay
Thesis ‘The Use of Race and Racialisation for Critical Counter-Radicalisation Studies: A Conceptual Contribution’
- Master’s Programme Political Science, Specialisation: Political Theory
  Radboud University Nijmegen, Sept 2015 – Aug 2016
  Average: 8.3
  - Advanced Research Methods
  - Power and Persuasion in Politics
  - Power in Political Theory
  - Recognition, Redistribution and Citizenship
  - Contemporary Debates in Political Theory
  - Philosophy of Law/Jurisprudence
  - Thesis ‘The Bodies of Beirut versus the Precious of Paris: How the Guardian Reflects and (Re)Produces Power Relations’

- Bachelor in Liberal Arts and Sciences, Major: Political Science and International Relations, Minor: Philosophy,
  Amsterdam University College, Amsterdam, Sept 2011 – July 2014
  Exchange at Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain, Jan – Jun 2013
  Average GPA: 3.85 (out of 4)
  - Theme social systems: Introduction to social policy
  - Comparative Public Policy
  - History of National Civil Rights Movements
o International Crimes
o Theories of Democracy and Justice
o Human Rights and Human Security
o Classical and Modern Political Thought
o The History of Ideas: Power and Change
o Modern Thought
o Contemporary Thought
o Ethics and Political Philosophy
o Modern and Contemporary Ethics
o Thesis ‘The Necessary Debate on Global Citizenship: An Incentive for its Revival’

II. Honours, prizes, scholarships and grants

▪ Erasmus+ EU Grant for exchange at Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Jan – Jun 2013.


III. Relevant academic experience

▪ Coordinator of 5 teaching assistants
Radboud University Nijmegen, Aug 2017 – Jan 2018
- Beroepsethiek voor Psychologen [Professional Ethics for Psychologists] (BA Psychology)
  - Teaching assistant
  Radboud University Nijmegen, Apr 2016 – Jan 2018
- Filosofie voor de Managementwetenschappen [Philosophy for the Management Sciences] (BA Political Science, Economics, Business Administration), Apr - Jul 2018
- Beroepsethiek voor Psychologen [Professional Ethics for Psychologists] (BA Psychology), Sep 2017-Jan 2018
- Sociology, Philosophy, and Ethics of Research (MSc Political Science), Sep - Oct 2016 and 2017
- Politics, Ethics, and Practice (BA Political Science), Apr – Jul 2016 and 2017
  - Participant & moderator of session on Dutch racism
    Radboud University Race & Postcolonial Reading Group, Sep 2017 – present
  - Presenter
    Women in Philosophy’s 4th Annual Conference, Amsterdam, Jul 2017
    Paper ‘Stupidity and Responsibility: Mutually Exclusive or Possibly Compatible?’
  - Chair panel discussion
    CLUE+ conference ‘Critical theory in the humanities. Resonances of the work of Judith Butler’, 5-7 Apr 2017
o Introducing speakers, moderating session “Processing In/Exclusion”

- Member programme council
  Radboud Honours Academy, Sept 2016 – Aug 2017
  o Preserving the quality, actuality, and interdisciplinarity of the programme, monitoring selection

- Conversation leader
  InScience Film Festival, 3 Nov 2016
  o Introducing movie ‘The Origami Code’ and speaker, moderate discussion

- Participant Think Tank
  Radboud Honours Academy, Aug 2015 – July 2016
  o Researching the credibility of the WHL by the client, the Netherlands National Commission for UNESCO, in an international and interdisciplinary think tank

- Project assistant
  Platform INS, Rotterdam, Sept 2014 – Feb 2015
  o Writing course material for “Moslim zijn in het Westen” [Being Muslim in the West]

- Intern
  Platform INS, Rotterdam, Jan – Jul 2014
  o Writing booklets on issues related to Fethullah Gülen and Islam
- Member formatting team

  Editorial Board Journal of Academic English II, Fall 2013

  o Ensuring deadlines were met, deciding on and implementing journal format

IV. Publications