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Abstract

The Israel-Palestine conflict is a prime example of a conflict involving competing territorial claims. To accommodate these, the international community has fixated on one possible solution: the two-state solution. The imagination of the two conflict parties, however, appear to be fundamentally at odds with this proposed plan for peace, an issue neglected both in the proposed solution and the academic debate. To counter these shortcomings, this thesis builds on the hypothesis that a closer understanding of the individual imaginaries provides insights as to why the two-state solution has failed to be realised. It therefore thoroughly analyses existing imaginaries to understand how they impact the respective perceptions on the two-state solution. Relying on an approach that acknowledges the fluidity of claim-making and the dialogue of imaginary geographies through a novel style of combining in-depth interviews with confrontational mapping exercises, the hypothesis can be confirmed. It is evident from the findings that the two-state solution builds on a particular imaginary that disregards references to highly relevant claims, closely connected to group identity, meaning it cannot be accepted without serious re-negotiation of identity by the conflict parties. The findings are not only of prime societal relevance but hold academic significance as they highlight the important role of imaginary geographies in conflict resolution.

Key Words: Imaginary Geography, Perception, Israel-Palestine, Conflict, Claim-Making
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Paulina Wagner
1 INTRODUCTION

“The rebirth of Israel is a testament to the indomitable spirit of my people. For a hundred generations, the Jewish people dreamed of returning to the Land of Israel. Even in our darkest hours, and we had so many, even in our darkest hours we never gave up hope of rebuilding our eternal capital Jerusalem. The establishment of Israel made realising that dream possible. It has enabled us to live as a free people in our ancestral homeland” (Netanyahu 2015).1

“In short, to say the least, on the Palestinian scene, is that Palestine is the homeland and its people, history and heritage, identity and geopolitical presence has been subjected to historical massacre and theft unmatched in the twentieth century and is still going on in the twenty first century, under the watchful eyes and of the international community” (Abbas 2016).2

Focusing on the Israel-Palestine conflict, this thesis builds on the hypothesis that a closer understanding of the individual imaginaries of the conflict parties involved will provide insights as to why the two-state solution has failed to be realised in decades. This assumes that identity and territoriality play a role for people and the existence of both have an impact on their views on conflict resolution. The research therefore sets out to thoroughly analyse existing imaginary geographies and their impact on the perception of the two-state solution. In the following, the current state of the debate is showcased, highlighting both how this research contributes to the existing debate and its scientific and societal relevance.

The Israel-Palestine conflict is generally rationalised as one between two groups whose conflicting identities and territorialities lead to fundamentally different perceptions on how they imagine their home through seemingly incompatible imaginary geographies. ‘Imaginary’ in this context does not denote the geographies as false or made up but rather should be understood as a synonym to perception (see Said 1978). Imaginary geographies, therefore, refer to the perception of a space ‘created’ through certain discourses. As seen in the quotes above, in the

case of the Israel-Palestine conflict, these involve contradictory and possibly mutually exclusive claims of first occupancy, referring to the expulsion and or return to the same space. This imagination of the two conflict parties, however, appears to be fundamentally at odds with the international communities proposed plan for peace (Wallach, 2011 p362). In contrast, the international community imagines the same space as shared, divided between the two groups by borders and walls: the two-state solution. The solution calls for ‘two states for two groups of people’ and envisages an independent State of Palestine alongside the State of Israel. It has been reiterated over decades despite the many failed diplomatic efforts to realise it. Similarly, both Israeli and Palestinian officials have publicly stated an interest in the realisation, but support for the two-state solution currently stands at a mere 46 percent among both Israelis and Palestinians (Tami Steinmetz Centre for Peace Research, 2018).

The problem: as a physical and real object, the territory is but land. This means it can, of course, be divided, distributed, re-distributed, experience a change of inhabitant through selling, buying or other means. Borders are lines that are non-permanent. They are boundaries that can and have been redrawn many times in history. Names of places have changed, and people have moved from one place to another. Yet, for some, places and borders are fixed. They are set ‘in stone’ through the use of maps, but most of all they are fixed in people’s imagination (Toft, 2003 p1). In this context, the value of a territory surpasses the factual and real descriptions, because it has become an “indivisible component of a groups identity” (Ibid.). This deep connection of identity and territoriality permits territory to gain a centre stage in so many human-environmental relationships.

In the past as today, a majority of conflicts revolve around a high number of territorial claims of a variety of competing national groups - mainly because there are more potential nations than conceivable states (Gagnon & Tully 2001 p39). To accommodate the competing claims of Israelis and Palestinians, the international community has fixated on one possible solution: the two-state solution. An artificial creation of two states carved into the contested territory, without regard for the personal connection people may have with any given territory that they call their home. Thus, disregarding the imaginary geographies and claims with reference to history culture and ideology in favour of one particular imaginary geography. For the two-state solution is yet another competing imaginary in this conflict. But territory is closely related to identity, and it is safe to assume that the imaginary geographies of the conflict parties influence the
perception of this third imaginary and therefore directly impact the acceptance or rejection of such a proposal. Imaginary geographies matter.

To better understand how they matter, the ambition of the thesis is to achieve a more thorough understanding of the impact of imaginary geography on conflict resolution. The thesis will demonstrate that the impact of imaginary geographies on the perception of the two-state solution is indeed a complex process that does not only impact significantly but actually appears to have a reciprocal relationship. This reciprocal relationship may lead to re-negotiation of imaginaries and identity, a process that was tentatively observed. The findings will show that an acceptance of the two-state solution is impossible to combine with the current identity identification of at least one of the conflict parties, because it implies a prior renegotiation of identity. The academic relevance therefore is to underscore the relevance of imaginary geographies in conflict resolution. Its societal relevance is to contribute to a better understanding as to why the two-state solution has yet to be implemented and to provide concrete suggestions for moving forward.

To date, the existing body of academic work on territorial conflicts tends to ignore the role of imaginary geography in relation to conflict resolution and concentrates mainly on their contribution to the arising of conflict (compare Campbell, 1999; Robinson & Pobri, 2005). In doing so, both the imaginaries and territorial claims are treated in a rather primordial fashion. More so, imaginary geographies are frequently implicitly and explicitly portrayed as causal factors. They are interpreted as reasons for conflict. Their continuous role as part of a development and dialogue that involves changing territoriality and identity during the conflict resolution process has sorely been neglected.

Yiftachel (2006 p5) points out that most of the past works on the conflict have fallen short because they did not offer sufficiently rigorous accounts of the main forces at work and thus failed to predict or offer solutions to the development of the conflict. And indeed, the neglect of imaginary geography as a crucial factor in conflict resolution and not just its presence in conflict have allowed for a tendency in the scholarly work to see reductionist causality between ethnic tensions, borders and the conflict. As a consequence, this has led to a frequent endorsement of the two-state solution as the best way to accommodate two groups with different identities.

The common conceptual approaches to the Israel-Palestine analysis relegate the extent that proposed borders are a process of imagined geography as well as the impacts on these. That
long before borders can appear in actual space, they are constructed in people’s minds and recorded in narratives (van Houtum, 2016). Indeed, the word ‘border’ unjustly assumes that places are fixed spaces in time, instead Van Houtum et al. (2001 p126) argue, they “should rather be understood in terms of bordering, as an ongoing strategic effort to make a difference in space among the movements of people, money and products”. The creation of real borders, in short, is dependent on how they are imagined beforehand. A resolution too must be imagined first. Thus, this thesis will argue that imaginary geography needs to be understood as a crucial factor not just in the understanding of conflict but in the induction process of a solution, especially if the solution involves territorial separation.

In congruence with the shortcomings of the academic debate, the main method relied on to analyse existing imaginary geographies, mental mapping, currently only gives an illusion of transparency in the sense that it frequently neglects how mental maps themselves are products and impacted by relationship between space, power and knowledge (Soja, 1996 p80)\(^3\). Simply put, mental maps are “representation of the subject’s imaginary relationship to his or her real conditions of existence” (Jameson, 1991 p51). They have the ability to provide researchers with new insights on human spatiality, but the results of mental maps are frequently over-generalised into categorical idealisations (Soja,1996 pp79-80). Consequently, showcasing that the interviewees’ mental maps are the result of their group's identity, but neglecting that their imaginary geography, in turn, has an effect on how they perceive their social surrounding, e.g. the conflict and the proposed solution. Indeed, how the very action of drawing a map ‘borders’ others, by drawing the line of what is included and thereby excluding whoever is perceived outside the imaginary community. This leads to a tendency of understanding human-space relationships as a one-sided interpretation. As a result, these works have a propensity of propping up reductionist views of the conflict.

In the case of the Israel-Palestine conflict, not only do the two sides offer competing imaginaries, but the international community has imagined its own: the two-state solution. What is missing is a method that allows for more thorough understanding of the expression of

\(^3\) Notable exceptions to these shortcomings in the literature include Ben-Sev (2012), who utilises mental maps and interviews to understand the spatial perception of Israeli and Palestinian students and Schnell (1994), who relies on the analysis of interviews and mental maps to study the perception of Israeli-Arabs on territoriality and identity. Both researchers take into account the dual process of socialisation and are aware of the constant flux their participants negotiate in.
territorality and identity groups who themselves operate within a disputed space possess, as well as their effects on the perception of a third. It is vital to bear in mind that the way the solution to the conflict is perceived is influenced by the imaginaries of the two groups, and may also impact on their imaginaries from outside, a process that mental mapping in its current form is not able to lay open.

To counter this, this work emphasises that imaginaries produce and re-produce different territorial separations through diverse combinations of claims. Significant importance is placed on the observation of claim-making through in-depth interviews and the expression of imaginary geographies through *confrontational mental mapping exercises*. The former is seen as crucial, as it constitutes the very act of instituting or defending a particular imaginary geography. The latter allows for the expression of territoriality and identity in an additional fashion, making visual the claims and imaginary geographies. The method, developed specifically for this research, builds on the use of mental maps but amends it, adding a confrontational component to the process. This entails an implicit as well as explicit confrontation with the existence of other imaginaries. Taking as its very starting point that geographies are non-static, a crucial aspect missing in the current debate, this confrontation allows to observe and better understand the development imaginary geographies may undergo in relation to other imaginaries. Implicit confrontation is triggered by providing the possibility of another imaginary without explicitly confronting with it. While, the explicit confrontation, in turn, forces a crude juxtaposition of the own imaginaries with a different imaginary. In combination with the first mapping confrontation-free mapping exercise, this allows for the observation of the impact of increasing confrontation with another imaginaries and a comparison of the effects. The accompanying in-depth interviews permit direct clarifications as to what brought on the changes. As a result, the analysis shifts the focal point of scrutiny to the individuals imagined geography and combats the tendency of interpreting territorial conflicts as conflict over ‘empty space’ and imaginaries as fixed.
2 Theories

The following section first explores the theoretical connections between group identity and territoriality, and second provides the theoretical background to claim-making in territorial conflicts.

2.1 Imaginary Geography: Territoriality and Group Identity

“It is the magic of nationalism to turn chance into destiny.”

(Anderson, 1983 p12)

Territory is essential in identity formation. No matter how seemingly worthless, infertile, depleted of natural resources; No matter how many people had to die for it - no territory is meaningless if it is a homeland to an imagined community. History is rife with territorial conflicts fought out over decades and centuries over what seems to be a territory of debatable value. According to Toft (2003), this is because of the unique character of territory. She argues, territory is “simultaneously a divisible, quantifiable object and an indivisible and romantic subject” (p1). It is because of this distinct character that scholars have devoted special attention to constructing a theory on territoriality. Inspired by the works of Robert Andrey and Konrad Lorenz, academics have hypothesised a similar innate human connection to specific space as visible in individual animals and groups of them (Burghardt, 1973 p243).

According to Soja (1971), there are three basic ingredients to human territoriality: “the sense of spatial identity, the sense of exclusiveness, and the compartmentalisation or channelling of human interaction in space” (in Burghardt, 1973 pp242-243). Spatial identity serves to legitimise claims that an imagined group perceives to have to a territory. It grounds a certain group to a certain territory, much like an organism into soil. A sense of exclusiveness refers to the nature of these claims which simultaneously include members of the same group but draw a boundary for all others. It refers to the exclusive destiny of one group in one place. A sense of exclusiveness therefore “provides the historic justification for the development of [for example] a nationalist sense of spatial identity [emphasis added]” (Kaiser, 2017 p21). The compartmentalisation or channelling of human interaction in space represents the attempt to construct and therefore enforce “political, economic, social, and ethnocultural barriers to any
international interaction perceived as threatening to the indigenous nation’s standing in its homeland” (Ibid., p28). Hence, in its broadest definition ‘territoriality’ expresses the connection between people, both the individual and the group, and spatial entities. In its extreme, territoriality finds its manifestation in the willingness to use force against ‘others’ that threaten to invade or occupy the same demarcated area - the defence of one's territory, one’s home.

According to Newman (2001 p238), the education and to some extent indoctrination of a territorial identity is a central part of the process of political socialisation. Hence, perceptions of territoriality and territorial identity as well as belonging rise amongst national groups (compare Schnell, 1994) and continue to impact territorial conflicts until today. Paasi (1994) holds that instead of realising boundaries as solely physical manifestations, they are equally located on the socio-spatial consciousness of society. Not only are barriers constructed in empirical manifestations, but they are laden with meaning (Ibid., p103). ‘Home’ that is in its most straightforward definition a piece of land that an imagined political community has attached meaning to. ‘Imagined political community’ because this group may be a nation with a nation-state, a community with cultural claims to a particular territory or a nation that is struggling to secure its nation-state, possibly having lost its territory but not given up on its claims for it. Again, ‘imagined’ is not meant to convey falsity or genuineness but may be regarded as a synonym to perception. Hence, referring to imagined communities allows to differentiate by the style in which distinct groups perceive themselves (Anderson, 1983 p6).

It is notable that these communities imagine themselves both as sovereign and inherently limited (Ibid., p6). Limited, because the ‘natural boundary’ of one nation is another nation. Sovereign, because it implies a territorial claim affiliated to an emotional connection to a specific place (Ibid. p7). Furthermore, the imagined community includes a perceived kinship - a deep horizontal comradeship, regardless of actual inequality or exploitation that may prevail - whether the members of the community know each other or merely know of each other (Anderson, 1983 p7). These kinships are formed through and simultaneously translated into narratives that perpetuate them.

Memories, stories and the role of home and distinct spaces within them have the potential to significantly affect identity (Said, 1999 p176). Here, the connection of territoriality and identity may be used to underline the togetherness of one people vis a vis the ‘Other’ through nationalism. In that way, they are concepts that touch on power and authority (Said, 1999 p176), because it is through streamlined narratives that link imagined communities to certain places.
that state-centred identities, nationalism is born. Equally, the borders they erect are not fixed in any manner, but rather “they symbolise a social practice of spatial differentiation” (van Houtum et al., 2001 p126). It is exactly through these processes, a society can develop a common identity that may be inherently connected to a certain territory, distinct from another group.

When two such imagined communities perceive themselves as connected to the same territory this frequently results in conflict, specifically if identity and territoriality are closely interlinked. This is the case for the Israel-Palestine conflict. Palestinians have experienced the loss of their home and observed Palestine ‘shrinking’ to small regions, as well as a physical expulsion and loss of control of territory that they claim as home. Concurrently, Israelis have experienced the institutionalisation of their imagined community in space and time through the establishment of the Israeli state. Until today, both sides have repeatedly demonstrated their willingness to use force against the ‘Other’ that continues to threaten or circumvent the territorial aspirations of the former simply due to its existence.

Today, territory is a principal factor of national identity in the current political discourse and continued confrontations between Israelis and Palestinians. While territorial components represent the ‘historic rights’ to a specific territory and a certain continuity in history, there are of course other notions that influence the homogeneous imaginary of a self-defined group. Ethnic components, for example, are frequently cited as unifying factors. While territoriality is based on the continuity of a piece of land, ethnic components refer to the population the piece of land holds (Conforti, 2014 p37). Ethnic components may be of relevance to the claim-making processes of territorial conflicts in general, but the Israel-Palestine conflict forces a focus on territoriality and identity and not ethnic claim-making. This is because both parties involved in the conflict do not primarily regard themselves as ethnic groups. In some instances, the opposite is the case, Israel is regarded as the home of all Jews, whether they are Ashkenazi (European), Mizrahi (Arabic) or Spharadi (of Spanish descent). Palestinians, in contrast, see themselves as Arab brethren, not an ethnically distinct group. Ethnicity is therefore unhelpful to further the analysis. Moreover, territorial aspects place “greater weight on land and by extension, on the borders and the importance of their protection” (Ibid.). Thus, territoriality linked to identity is more likely to affect notions of territorial claim-making in the case of Israel-Palestine.

2.2. CREATING AND DEFENDING IMAGINARY GEOGRAPHY: CLAIM-MAKING IN TERRITORIAL CONFLICTS
As established in the previous section, territory is crucial in identity formation. There are various ways in which claims of ownership are being expressed. According to Gagnon & Tully (2001), such claims are not arbitrary but develop from a long practice of political mobilisation (p40). Furthermore, they are frequently regarded as a form of zero-sum politics. The exclusive claims to territory for one imagined community, the claims for independence and statehood, seem indeed non-divisible and non-negotiable (Ibid.).

At the base of nationality claims of imagined communities lies exactly this: territorialisation, or re-territorialisation along with historical experience, distinguishable through the variation in claim-making. According to Burghardt (1973) claims to territory can be categorised in one or more of the following groups: effective control, territorial integrity, economic, elitist, ideological and historical with a frequent overlap of the categories (p228). Effective control, today, is primarily acknowledged as the legal basis in claims. The emotional basis however, rests chiefly on historical claims (Ibid.). Indeed, one may hold, it is because too much history is recalled that many conflicts arise, as the history of a nation is fundamental to its identity (Ibid.).

What sets claims relying on historical arguments apart is that they classically incorporate claims founded on alleged ‘first occupancy’, a ‘historical right’ to a certain territory. The ‘first occupancy’ argument appears in various versions as well as in a variety of locations throughout history. It is a powerful claim because it binds an emotion of experienced or perceived ‘injustice’ with historic narratives. The most established form of these claims appeals to the concept of corrective justice (Meisels, 2002 p959). Here the claim to a “particular piece of land is based on the (alleged) fact of prior possession and subsequent wrongful dispossession” (Ibid., p65). When a community succeeds in reclaiming territory, restitution is said to occur. The re-acquisition of land goes hand in hand with a perceived ‘righting of injustice’ of the past. This is based entirely on the assumption that restitution for justice has taken place as the “normal course of history was rent by conquest” (Burghardt, 1973 p233). These claims appear in one of two scenarios (Ibid.). Both scenarios rely on an understanding of justice that deems the wrongs of the past as ethically significant to the present. In the first, the current occupant of the territory in question acquired it (in one fashion or another) directly from the group claiming historical entitlement to the territory. Aboriginal, Maori and Native American claims for the reinstitution of the past state affairs fall into this scenario, but also the Palestinian claims. In the second
scenario, the group makes its territorial claims against a current occupant, but the territory was initially lost to a third party (Ibid.). In these instances, a party other than the current inhabitant ‘disconnected’ the people from their historic territories (or parts of it) (Ibid.). Zionism is a prominent example of the second scenario.

While claims of one group against a third are common in regions where colonial powers drew borders and swapped land without regard for tribal, national or territorial identification, the Israel-Palestine case stands out. It involves a reinstating of a former state of affairs, and the actual reinstitution of ‘justice’ and ‘historic right’ to a territory for one group (Israel) directly resulting in loss of territory for the other group (Palestinians). Therefore, resulting in emerging claims of ‘first occupancy’ by the other group. The fact that the reinstating of ‘justice’ for one group leads to the loss of ‘historic land’ for the other contributes to the complexity of the conflict. Said (1994), argues that the main claims of Palestinians are based on this: centred around experiences of loss and dispossession, resistance to the ‘occupation’ (in Harbaki 2001) and the resulting existential insecurity (Khalidi 1997). As Hammack (2010) points out, this assumes a form of historic tragedy, which is centred around the loss of territory and the unsatisfied aspiration to establish a Palestinian national state (Ibid.).

While claims based on efficiency are far less romantic, they are indeed more practical in legal discussions. Israeli politicians for example frequently cite the efficient use of land and supposedly barren landscape before their arrival. “The country [Palestine] was mostly an empty desert, with only a few islands of Arab settlement; and Israel's cultivable land today was indeed redeemed [emphasis added] from swamp and wilderness” (Shimon Peres, former President of Israel). “It was only after the Zionists made the desert bloom … that they [the Palestinians] became interested in taking it from us” (Levi Eshkol, former Prime Minister of Israel). This line of argumentation further rests on a notion of ‘worthiness’. Simply put, the one who efficiently uses the territory has the right to it, disregarding any potential moral rights or argumentation.

Cultural claims in turn, include all claims founded in an imaginary groups sense of comradeship. These claims do not only refer to nationalism and the loyalty of people to each other, their land and their country, but cultural claims also include ethnic, religious and other cultural characteristics that impact on people’s group identity such as language (Burghardt, 1973 p233). In the Middle Eastern territorial conflicts, religion has frequently been cited as a primary cultural differentiating claim (Ibid.). Muslim Palestinians and Christian Palestinians alike, refer to the Bible and Koran respectively to point out the religious connections to the territory, as
well as the dominant Arabic language. Indeed, the Arabic language is dominant from Egypt to Jordan and Lebanon, with a small disruption of Hebrew. On the other side, the notion of a Jewish diaspora community has been deeply ingrained in the Jewish faith for centuries. There is detailed documentation of the connections between the faith and territory, as well as countless ‘promises of God’ to return the tribe of Israel to its rightful home in the Torah. Many of the places bear the same names today as they did in biblical times. This makes it easy to locate the territory that should become ‘once again’ the home for all Jews (Newman, 2002).

Claims of territorial integrity in turn are founded in the relative location of the piece of land. It is claimed accordingly either because connectivity is perceived, or it is bordering on territory already controlled (Ibid., p235). These claims are more commonly connected to the Age of Discovery and Colonialism and have to an extent subsided today. Nonetheless, while geographers have spent countless hours and studies attempting to destroy concepts of ‘natural boundaries’, people persist in claiming that certain areas should be ‘whole’ or form a natural ‘unit’ (Ibid.).

Further territorial claims include economic claims. These build on the notion that certain land is vital for the viability or construction of a state. Therefore, these claims are usually used for the attainments of smaller bits of land that serve specific functions, e.g. those that are beneficial for trade (Burghardt, 1973 p235). For instance, the northern regions of Israel around the Sea of Galilee are far more fertile land than the southern desert and are therefore a topic of contention concerning the division of territory. Equally, Palestinians have demanded access to the sea and airspace, which currently is severely limited and crucial for economic activity (United Nation Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2015).

Elitist claims, by contrast, include the assertion that a specific minority has the right or even duty to control a particular territory. Last but not least, ideological claims build their own subgroup of territorial claims. While the case can be made that all claims are founded in some ideology, these so-called claims refer to claims that directly use ideology as justification. The region of the Middle East has been affected by many ideological claims ranging from the early Crusades to the Ottoman Turks to the rise of anti-colonialism (Burghardt, 1973 p235). Within the Israel-Palestine context, Zionists sought to use a romantic nationalist notion that contended that philosophical bonds both ‘naturally’ untied and excluded others to press for the need of a Jewish state (Newman, 2002). This was accompanied by the pressing of the belief that in an
ideal world, each naturally linked community should be awarded an independent state – in this case a Jewish state.

Essentially, Zionist ideology promoted a love for the ‘Land of Israel’, highlighting the collective identity of all Jews through the mutual use of textbooks throughout Europe and in Palestine (Bar-Gal, 1993 p425). These textbooks relied heavily on descriptions of “divinely promised borders and the boundaries attained during the early Israelite period, in addition to some physical geographical elements” (Ibid.). Despite the lack of clear borders, the ideology was connected with strong explicit claims, mainly taken from the bible which made evident that the promised land would include such explicit territorial elements as the Dead Sea, the Negev and Jerusalem (Ibid., p425-426). Palestinians, or other inhabitants of the region, were non-existent in this ideological claim-making, as demonstrated by the Zionist slogan: “A land without a people for a people without a land” (Shapira, 1999 p41).

Today, hardly any group relies on one form of claim-making. The most refined claims combine a number of assertions, e.g. historical justification arguments involving cultural claims. These further address identity-related arguments, thereby tying the history of the disputed territory to the culture, religion or more aspects of a specific group. Most notably, however, they tie the disputed territory to the personal identity of the members of this group (Ibid.), making it a useful tool in claims for territory.

While claim-making in relation to the Israel-Palestine conflict has been the implicit and explicit topic of much scholarly work (compare Schnell 1994, Wallach 2011, Leuenberger 2012), there are some shortcoming in those works. Notably, the lack of explicitly linking claim-making and the concept of imaginary geography seems like an oversight because imaginary geographies, by their very nature, are the result of but also impact the process of claim-making. Their very existence may carry political implications. More so, however, is the tendency of treating territorial claims in a primordial sense, i.e. unchangeable, rather than subject to ongoing re-interpretation and re-framing. This overlooks that particular imaginaries may serve to legitimise specific policies and underpin the rejections of others. Ignoring the link between imaginary geographies, which are fluid and may be imagined and re-imagined due to a number of circumstances. Instead, claims concerning territory are frequently linked to either identity or ethnicity. But with the changing of the imaginaries, so may the claims to those imaginaries change. Discourses are never fixed, and the discourses that allow for a certain perception may adapt or alter counter-narratives over time (compare Schneck, 1987). In a conflict situation,
where territory is disputed, and confrontation with competing as well as third imaginaries from the outside takes place, it is almost certain that the 'own' imaginaries impacts on how one understands one's surrounding. Just as discourses alter over time, responding to counter-discourses, so too, are imaginary geographies part of a dialogue. This is vital to take into account.

Likewise, it is not just conflict parties that hold and express particular imaginary geographies through the use of claims, but third parties do so as well. The two-state solution, for instance, is an imaginary that is built on a very specific perception of the conflict and the parties involved. It is profoundly influenced by its perception of Israelis and Palestinians as two parties that hold legitimate claims to the territory, therefore insisting on both 'getting a piece': "Two states for two groups of people". Moreover, it is driven by the logic that conflict parties have to be separated in order to provide peace, a notion that in turn rests on the primordial assumptions that identities are fixed and will never change to allow a peaceful living together without hard borders and separation (compare Kaufmann, 1996). While this view is reductionist and disregards the fluidity of both identities and imaginaries, it is also dangerous, as it may inadvertently prop up nationalist aspirations of separation. Conflict parties who identify with a particular imaginary suggested by a third party may seek to use these, strategically referring to outsiders' imaginations in their claim-making practices as legitimisation for their claims.

The very understanding of imaginary geography as fixed therefore may very well contribute to their perpetuation. After all, it is through stories and narratives - streamlined discourses - that we make sense of the world around us (Newman & Paasi, 1998). Accordingly, it is vital to look at claim-making in territorial conflicts as a form of defending but also creating imaginary geographies.
3 Methodology & Data Collection

The previous section has made clear that academics are aware of the interconnection between territorial imagination and identity formation. Moreover, it has demonstrated that while different practices of territorial claim-making have been identified, little is known about how these develop, change and impact conflict resolution. Indeed, there are a number of shortcomings in the existing literature in this regard. What needs to be understood is firstly the prevailing territorial claims within the identity groups - the existing imaginary geographies. Secondly, the practices of claim-making and how these are legitimised. And thirdly, how these imaginations contrast with other imaginaries geographies, how this contrast is perceived and how it affects the imaginaries of the participants.

Regarding imaginary geographies as fixed is an issue that translates into the methods, leading to shortcomings in the acknowledgement of fluidity and the recognition of their general impact. What is missing is a means to comprehend how imaginaries, the perceptions of territoriality and identity, impact on attitudes towards proposed conflict resolution, specifically territorial partition, without treating these imaginaries as fixed or static. To achieve this, this work places significant importance on the observation of claim-making through structured in-depth interviews and the differentiation in the expression of imaginary geographies through a newly introduced method of confrontational mental mapping exercises.

A drawback of structured interviews is that they may neglect the validity of interviewees' responses to a certain extent (Langley, 1987 p24). It is the possibility to stray from the structured questions that allows getting closer to the interviewees 'real' views, which they might have been unable to express in response to structured questions (Ibid.). Hence, by solely stressing the structure, one may indeed forgo the chance of exploring the interviewee's deeper feelings and perceptions. Loosely structured or themed interviews, however, have a tendency of denying more precise and concrete questions surrounding complex topics. Furthermore, they make detection of themes more difficult and run the danger of drifting away from the main subjects. With this in mind, and to avoid both of these pitfalls, the interviews were set up in a structured format but allowed for the possibility to amend them with loosely structured follow-up questions. Furthermore, the choice to combine both multiple-choice questions and other closed-ended questions, as well as open-ended questions, allows for interviewees to express their own beliefs and opinions without restrictions in the categories where it was deemed relevant. In this
manner, the structured questions serve as the basis for the interview but allow for variations in the question posing and most of all an addition of 'why' questions to be raised. This simultaneously permits quantifiable and comparable answers as well as a qualitative analysis of the perceptions and feelings expressed.

The ability of interviewees to verbally express themselves clearly and comprehensively is a form of gathering data that has been taken for granted. Therefore, this form of expression is frequently prioritised (Gieseking, 2013 pp6-7). According to Gieseking (p7), it is "inevitable that researchers have ignored a wealth of data by not considering … multiple intelligences". To counter this, the interviews were amended with confrontational mapping exercises. Consequently, allowing for different forms of expression and considering multiple intelligences. Mental mapping as an approach, "unlike verbal-only methods such as interviewing, always depends upon various social and material components" (Ibid., pp9-10), and therefore provides additional insights that could not be gathered by relying on interviews alone.

The method provides a glimpse into the way people construct and understand space and the dynamics of human interactions with territory reaching from the occurrences of everyday life to bigger structural oppressions (see Milgram & Jodelet, 1976; Saarninen, 1974). What is more, mental mapping allows for a representation of an individual's but also a group's cognitive maps. Thus, the use of mental maps enables the researcher to gain visual depictions of the individual participant's perception of territoriality but also to an extent, of the imaginary community that the participant feels part of. The analysis of the structure of perceived space through executing mapping exercises and the subsequent analysis of such mental maps is a well-founded method within the field of Geography (compare Saarinen 1973, Cox & Colledge 2015). While most qualitative approaches would reiterate the accounts of the interviewees narrative only verbally, the visual and spatial qualitative method of mental mapping affords another way of understanding and indeed visualising their claims to territory (Gieseking, 2013 p3). Mental maps allow the interviewees to express their imaginaries and can indeed "elicit responses that might be difficult to obtain by other means because it reveals an invisible landscape (i.e., the 'invisible' effects of social prestige)" (Ibid. p6).

While, mental maps have the ability to provide researchers with new insights on human spatiality, the results of mental maps are frequently over-generalised into categorical idealisations such as: "men's mental maps are extensive, detailed, and relatively accurate' while
women were 'domicentric' (centred on home), more compact, and less accurate in terms of urban details" (Soja, 1996 pp79-80). Soja (Ibid., p80) argues that the process only gives an illusion of transparency in the sense that it neglects how mental maps themselves are products and impacted by relationship between space, power and knowledge. Thus, showcasing that their interviewees' mental maps are the result of their group's identity, but neglecting that their imaginary geography, in turn, affects how they perceive their social surrounding, e.g. the conflict. They, therefore, understand human-space relationships as a one-sided interpretation. Taking Soja's criticism into account implies the need for change in the method. To showcase the fluidity of imaginary geographies as well as their impact this research, therefore, utilises a novel approach of confrontational mental mapping exercises. The method, developed specifically for this research, builds on the use of mental maps but amends it, adding an increasingly confrontational component to the process. This entails two rounds of mapping exercises, one without confrontation and one with an implicit confrontation of a possible other imaginary. This first implicit confrontation is achieved by offering the option to draw the ‘Other’ into the map and taking away the focus of solely displaying the participants' geography. The method allows for observations of changes and close scrutiny of the effects of the existence of other imaginaries on the participants' imaginaries. In a third step, the maps produced in the first and second exercise are juxtaposed with a map depicting the two-state solution, thereby undergoing an explicit confrontation with a third imaginary. Taking as its very starting point that geographies are non-static, a crucial aspect missing in the current debate, this confrontation allows to observe and better understand the development and possible re-negotiation imaginary geographies may undergo.

While mental maps are very useful to the researcher, they also can cause complications both in the production and in the coding process. One of the main problems with mental maps is that interviewees themselves rely on different drawing abilities. Ben-Zev (2012) for instance, noted that asking interviewees to sketch the outlines of their home proved difficult. When analysing the territorial perceptions of Israeli Arabs, Schnell (1994) encountered similar problems of accuracy in the production of mental maps. Furthermore, the analysis of mental maps relies in no small extent on the interpretation by the scholar. Specifically, Schnell (1994) showcased the use of mental maps in the analysis of the perception of territoriality and identity. In his work, he relied on a mixed method of interviews including scale-continuums to analyse Israeli-Arabs identity in adults and mental maps to analyse territorial perception in Israeli-Arab children.
Dealing with two very different age groups, Schnell devised a method which allowed both groups to express territoriality and identity to a certain extent (Ibid.). While the scale continuum provided an efficient way of measuring the Israeli-Arabs feelings of belonging to different groups within Israeli society, the mental maps allowed children to more freely display their feelings of territoriality. In combination, they provided a number of new insights. Nonetheless, this method had its drawbacks. While it is, of course, difficult to interview children on their depictions of their homeland, a more vigilant interview process would, for instance, have made it easier to refrain from errors in interpretation of the children's drawings.

Mental maps are very valuable in capturing the imaginary geographies of people, but unless they are accompanied with explanations as to their meaning and the choices of their author, a crucial part of the information remains missing. Interviewees might want to express the same imaginaries, but the difference in their drawing abilities might hinder them to do so. Similarly, two interviewees may agree on the same in spoken word but portray what they mean entirely differently when asked to visually display it.

Taking these difficulties into account, the method of *confrontational mental mapping exercises* consciously facilitated the drawing process, as well as amended mapping exercises with immediate commentary by the author as well as reflections on the challenges in the depiction process. The choice to seek immediate clarification with the participants and offer a chance to point out the difficulties is crucial to limit the room for interpretation, especially during subsequent analysis of the maps. It further sought to circumvent the dilemma of encountering different levels of geographical knowledge by providing the participants with maps that carry place indicators, such as specific labelling for orientation purposes (see Map1 & Map2) and refrained from understanding the expressed imaginaries as fixed. The following elaborated on the approach to the research.

### 3.1 Approach to Research

The previous sections have made clear that what needs to be understood is firstly the prevailing territorial claims within the identity groups - the existing imaginary geographies. Secondly, the practices of claim-making and how these are legitimised. And thirdly, how these imaginations contrast with other imaginaries geographies, how this contrast is perceived and how it affects the imaginaries of the participants. These three components cannot be separated rigorously and
should not be, as the very aim is to comprehend how they impact on each other. Thus, due to the overlap of the three, there was no intended clear separation between interview or mapping exercise parts. Instead, the aim of both, conducted simultaneously, was to gain both quantifiable and qualitative comprehensive data. The objective of this approach was to ensure that each participant is presented with the same or similar questions in a similar order. This consistency approach allows for more concrete comparison of respondents’ answers.

In preparation of the research tools and method, three students were interviewed. During the trial, it became evident that the wording had been too complicated, in response, the language was simplified and the questions adjusted accordingly. Furthermore, it made evident that students would need geographical indications in order to properly perform the mapping exercise. The participants also questioned the reasoning behind assigning certain colours to symbolise specific things in the second part of the confrontational mapping exercise and whether that had a meaning. As the meaning of colours was irrelevant, the decision was made to allow students a free choice of colour. The results of these ‘test-interviews’ formed the basis for the sets of questions and mapping exercises to be given both Israeli and Palestinian interviewees.

To attain both quantifiable and qualitative data interview questions were formulated partly open-ended, partly closed-ended. This included questions of an ordinal scale and multiple choice. The ordinal scale question, multiple choice-questions and closed-ended questions served the purpose of quantifying answers. These questions were amended by open-ended questions, allowing the interview to instantly elaborate on their choices, perceptions and claims, limiting the amount of interpretation. Recording the interviews and subsequent transcription further allowed to scrutinize the themes. The list of structured questions can be found in the Appendix.

In order to gain understanding for existing claims and imaginaries, students were not only interviewed as to their origin as well as their family’s origin, but also challenged to voice claims as well as their imaginaries. This was achieved through the use of in depth-interviews in conjunction with confrontational mapping exercises, consisting of three parts.
In the first mapping exercise, participants were asked to amend a regional map (see Map1) with the borders of their ‘home country’ as well as locate the five cities that were most relevant to them on the map. The term ‘home country’ was chosen for the purpose of neutrality. In this manner no preference had to be shown to either Israel or Palestine. The territory on the map was deliberately designed to be two-coloured making ‘greater Palestine’/’greater Israel’ stand out. In addition, the shape was intended to provide a visual clue, as it can be safely assumed that both Israelis and Palestinians have been confronted with this map, whether in school, at home or in the media.

This exercise was devised to gain understanding as to how Israelis and Palestinians respectively imagined their home country, whether they imagined it as one, as excluding or including certain regions. Additionally, the location of five relevant cities was aimed to understand more about their territorial perception, whether it is concentrated, local or dispersed. During the exercise no confrontation with another imaginary took place, meaning it allowed for a first impression of the imaginary present without apparent challenges to it.

Upon completion of the drawing process, the imaginary geographies were questioned by asking for the reasoning for the depiction and how they imagined a reaction of the ‘Other’ or where the ‘Other’ would be located. This anticipated to encourage participants to voice their territorial claims, elaborate these and provide the reasoning for exclusion/inclusion choices (e.g. West Bank, Gaza). Simultaneously, part one provided a first insight on whether the claims were compatible with the proposed territorial division of the two-state solution, without having confronted the participants with that particular imaginary. The combination of immediate commentary and elaboration on the choices during the mapping exercise were crucial in order to diminish a possibility of wrong interpretation. In addition, participants would be able to immediately voice their difficulties, providing further insights into the imaginaries and limiting discrepancies of interpretation. This also provided the opportunity to voice the factors that influenced the decision-making process during the mapping exercise.
PART 2

The second part of the confrontational mapping exercise was created to better understand the links between specific claims and specific group identities in a fashion that gathered both quantifiable as well as qualitative data. In this second exercise, the participants were provided with a close up of the disputed region of Israel-Palestine (see Map 2). Again, borders were missing and had to be amended by the participant. Again, the Mediterranean Sea, the Dead Sea and the neighbour country were labelled to provide points of orientation. The map was left white with exception for the bodies of water in order to make it possible to colour in the map, as the exercise was expanded. Having been asked to place the importance of their religious, national and ethnic identity on an ordinal scale, participants were provided with four colours that represented different notions closely connected to identity and territoriality. This meant participants were implicitly confronted with the possibility of another imaginary geography, simply by being awarded the possibility to provide space to another group. The four colours were labelled as follows:

- Territories that are the core of Israeli/Palestinian Identity respectively.
- Territories that a compromise might be reached on – unclear whether they are Israeli or Palestinian or both;
- Territories that are clearly perceived as Israeli/Palestinian respectively, but participants would be willing to give up for peace.
- Territories that were clearly ‘the Others’, Israeli/Palestinian respectively, they had no claims to.
During this exercise, the participants would be explicitly told that they were not obligated to use all colours and could use as many as they felt were needed, including the possibility to stripe the territories if they felt it was more than one colour. They were further encouraged to showcase what they personally believed and not necessarily what they felt they had to draw. In addition to the conformational aspects, the addition of colour-coded identity in the mental mapping process is novel. It allows for a visual depiction of the hypothesised interconnectedness between identity and territoriality, thereby giving the opportunity to understand whether there are identity related imaginaries, and what they might be. Furthermore, the choice to let participants colour in their territorial claims according to identity, with the option and visual of a possible second competing identity available was a conscious confrontation, anticipated to provide a different reaction than the mere depiction of the border. Even though participants would not be forced to use the colour of ‘the Other’ they would have a clear visual of its existence while being provided the option to either ignore it or allocate it space. Space allocation could either be done by allowing for space that could be compromised on, by making clear that the territory was claimed but might be given up for peace, or by removing all claim of one’s own group from certain territory.

Again, participants would be asked to verbally summarise their drawings and elaborate on the difficulties of this exercise. While these questions are intended as control measures against premature interpretations, they may provide additional insight into the socialisation of the participants as well as the influence participants’ imaginary geography on the perception of the two-state solution, the main goal of the thesis.

Mental maps are a method to gather data but also provide an orientation to draw upon for the other parts of the interview. They can be used to further inspire conversation focused on the social and emotional meaning of a physical geographic territory (see Saarinen, 1974).
their value to serve as reference points and inspiration during interviews, the mapping exercises were intended to be executed at an early stage. The interview structure and timing were created to purposefully leave the maps visible for the following interview questions devised to collect data on the perception of conflict aspect, including but not limited to territorial aspects. Specifically, the confrontation of their imaginaries with a third imaginary, the two state-solution and the juxtaposition of their own imaginaries was crucial in understanding the impact of their imaginaries on their perception of the two-state solution.

Accordingly, the first parts of the interview were devised to establish the existing claims and imaginaries, as well as the manner in which certain imaginaries are linked to certain imaginaries. My aim in the third part was to test the attitude of my interview partners to some aspects of the conflict, ranging from what they perceived as conditions for peace and whether the conflict was solvable to possible territorial partitions scenarios. To do so, I devised a mix of multiple-choice questions as well as open-ended questions to reflect on the previously expressed imaginaries. The multiple-choice questions were constructed to provide a number of selected response items and required the participants to list the ones that applied. Questions concerning preferred solutions to the main issues of the conflict, such as the question of return for Palestinians or the settlement question, were restricted to multiple-choice. This limited the answers to the known suggested approaches that underlie the two-state solution – the relevant information for understanding the impact of identity and territoriality on common conflict resolution suggestions. Moreover, the multiple-choice questions, again, served the purpose of quantifying answers, while the open-ended questions amended these to allow for a more qualitative analysis approach and eliminating interpretation to a certain extent.

PART 3

In order to link the three aspects under scrutiny and make visible the extent to which perceptions of territoriality and identity impact on the perception on the two-state solution, the participants’ imaginaries were challenged through explicit confrontation. This was done by firstly questioning the ability of their expressed geographies to bring peace. Secondly, by asking how they assumed ‘the Other’ would react and thirdly by directly juxtaposing their expressed imaginaries with a UN map that showed the same territory divided like it technically is today and similar to how it would be manifested in the event of a two-state solution (see Map 3). The
United Nations map was chosen as it made a clear colour distinction between the Palestinian territories and Israel.

The juxtaposition would not serve to test geography skills but was intended and anticipated to trigger reactions from participants. Concretely, in a confronting manner, participants would be asked to describe what differed and how these differences made them feel, whether and why/why not they still perceived the territory their home (in this depiction), and whether they thought their self-assessment of the importance of the different identities influenced their perception of this map. Here, a manifestation of the relationship between imaginaries, territoriality and group identity, and the territorial implications of the two-state solution was expected. Thus, recording the reaction to this map and letting students analyse the differences to their map was crucial for the analysis.

In practice, this part of the **confrontational mapping exercise** triggered the most extreme reactions. As will become apparent in the conclusion, this juxtaposition of imaginaries proved to be vital in understanding the relationship between the personal imaginaries and the proposed imaginary of the two-state solution. Through this explicit confrontation, it appeared that a re-imagination of the participant's identity in relation to the two-state solution took place, showcasing the main argument that imaginaries are not fixed. As will become clear in the analysis participants hinted at alternative imaginations, giving further credibility to the notion that imaginary geographies are in a state of constant dialogue. Thus, this part of the **confrontational mapping exercise** was indicative of how the processes work at large.

In a final step, participants were invited to reflect on their experience of the interview and mapping exercises, and possibly add notions and ideas that they felt were relevant but had not specifically been asked for. This last step was mainly devised as personal feedback and to learn for further future research.

### 3.2 DATA COLLECTION
The data used to do so was collected during fieldwork conducted between March 2017 and July 2017. Interviews and two mapping exercises were carried out with 60 university students, 30 Jewish-Israeli and 30 Arab-Palestinian\(^4\), collecting both qualitative and quantitative data. The choice of \(n\) (population) = 30 per group was deliberate. Firstly, while the minimum sample size for using quantitative statistical analysis varies among tests Pett (1997) and Salkind (2004) who note \(n>30\), or Warner (2008) who notes \(n>20\), a number of statisticians conclude that the sample size of 30 is sufficient to present results that indicate the shape of the underlying population, even if the population \(n\) is skewed. Furthermore, as a rule of thumb, \(n=30\) or \(n>30\) forms a boundary between small and large samples (see Hoggs and Tanis, 1977).

Regarding qualitative research, the sample size selection is to a degree even more disputed in the literature. Guidelines for ‘fixed’ numbers or minimum thresholds are almost non-existent (Guest et al., 2006 p59). Instead, qualitative research frequently relies on the notion of saturation. This is the moment a minimum of new information and new answers is reached (Ibid.). It is hard to determine when this point of saturation is reached, as the literature indicates possibilities between 5-50 interviewees. According to Guest et al. (2006 p60), new claims and themes may start to show around the first six interviews. A choice of 30 allows for certainty that the point of saturation will be reached.

The students’ ages ranged from 20 to 30, with Israeli students on average being two to three years older than Palestinian participants due to the fact that the Jewish-Israeli students have conscription. All Israeli interviewees were Israeli citizens and Jewish. They came from varying places within Israel as well as settlements in the West Bank. The Palestinian group of interviewees was more diverse than the Israeli one, including both Christians and Muslims, resident card holders, Israeli citizens, Jordanian citizens and Palestinians from the occupied areas in West Bank. Crucially, all members of the Palestinian group of interviewees identified as Palestinian. Hence, the Palestinian group of interviewees mirrored the great diversity of Palestinians living in Israel and the Palestinian territories with one exception. The Palestinian

\(^4\)Students identified so themselves, when they were given the opportunity to express their group identity affiliations early on.
The group of interviewees did not include any students from Gaza, due to the inaccessibility of the region.

The selection of the interviewees is decisive for the results and the composition of the group of interviewees crucial (Kvale 2007, p8). The Israeli, as well as the Palestinian populations, are diverse communities that comprise many different population groups. Concentrating on the student section that receives their education at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem or Tel Aviv University in Tel Aviv allowed access to both Israelis and Palestinians from all over the country, as both universities draw high numbers of students from across the region.

According to Soja “society and space … are components of one whole” (in Schnell, 1994 p29). Following the notion of Soja (1989), individuals are meaningful in the context of the society they operate in. The current generation, therefore, is meaningful in the context of their respective societies (Ibid.). Their perceptions matter and it is essential to understand how the young generation, the future elite, perceives both territoriality and identity in the context of the conflict and territorial distribution. Their perception and awareness of territoriality and the conflict does and will continue to influence the future of both communities. Additionally, the high level of education was necessary to guarantee an understanding of both the interview language and subject. Moreover, as both schools are known to be rather liberal, the student’s choice of attending a ‘known’ liberal university that attracts both Palestinians and Israelis led me to expect that they would be more open to discussing matters relating to conflict solutions and the role and space of the respective ‘Other’.

Their common educational background also allowed me to present both group of interviewees with an almost identical set of questions and mapping exercises, differing only in minor points, e.g. those that identify ‘the Other’ and oneself. Thereby scaling down the risk of skewed results or bias that could arise due to different sets of questions. Within the limitations of being a student at either one of the two universities, students were selected at random. The average interview, including the mapping exercises, lasted approximately 40 minutes. The interviews ranged from twenty minutes to over an hour, depending on the interview partner’s willingness to engage and their level of English.

Except for one interview, all interviews conducted with Israeli students were conducted one on one. Palestinian students, in contrast, frequently insisted on being interviewed in groups of two or even three. They justified their requests due to the language barrier that was more evident with the Palestinian group of interviewees than the Israeli one. To my awareness, the
Palestinians students helped each other in translating the questions as well as parts of their answers from English to Arabic and vice versa. I was not under the impression that the interviewees discussed the questions at length or coordinated responses. The group dynamic nonetheless, should be taken into account as they may have influenced their answers. For some of the interviews with the Palestinian students at the Hebrew University, I also noticed that a young Palestinian woman would keep showing up and attempting to interfere, specifically with the mapping exercise. She declined to be interviewed herself and was asked to leave by the interviewees themselves. This may also have influenced the answers and drawings of some of the Palestinian respondents.

3.3 APPROACH TO DATA ANALYSIS

The analysis of the interviews was broken down into three categories, one for closed-ended questions that allow quantitative analysis and one for open-ended questions that allow for thematic analysis and decoding of the mapping exercises. Especially in the latter, it was crucial to take descriptions of the mapping process and the difficulties expressed by the participants into account, as this provided an entirely different conclusion than relying solely on the drawing would have. The themes here followed the three main components. Within these groupings, attention was paid to identifiable regularities in the ways people imagined territory, linked it to group identity or perceived conflict resolution aspects. The following sections clarify the threefold analysis process that was involved to analyse firstly the qualitative data, secondly the quantitative data and thirdly the visual data gathered through mapping exercises.

QUALITATIVE DATA

The qualitative research laid its primary focus on the exploration of the perception of the interviewees, highlighting the thoughts, claims, experiences and feelings the informants have on the phenomenon under analysis (compare Halcomb & Davidson, 2006 p39). Qualitative interviews further provided new insights into social phenomenon because they permit the participants to reflect and reason on a selection of questions in a different way (Folkestad, 2008 p1). Consequently, conducting interviews with Palestinians as well as Israelis in the same setting with the same set of question was seen as an option that provides insights into the
perception of parts of the population with a similar level of education. Since the qualitative questions sets were one of three methods of data gathering dealing with a comparatively large data set, it was necessary to be mindful of the kind of data analysis from an early stage. Thematic analysis is one of the most widely used approaches to analysing qualitative interview data. The conceptual framework for this method of analysis largely built on the theoretical positions of Braun and Clarke (2006). The method is ideal to identify, analyse and report themes within the data (Ibid., p79). Furthermore, this approach complements the build-up of my research, as the setup of one main research question and three components it entails allow to check if the data was indeed consistent with the research questions and providing sufficient information. Thus, the reason for this method was that the “rigorous thematic approach can produce an insightful analysis that answers particular research questions” (Ibid., p97).

It is, therefore, necessary to consider what counts as a theme. According to Braun and Clarke (2006 p82), a theme is something that encapsulates the key ideas of the data provided in relation to the research question. In addition, it has to represent to a certain degree organised response or meaning within the data set (Ibid.). Consistency in the determination of themes is hence crucial. Themes or patterns within the collected data can be recognised either in an inductive fashion (bottom-up), or in a theoretical, deductive fashion (top-down) (Ibid.). Obviously, the two approaches are to some degree overlapping or interactive due to the fact that the research holds a certain interest in identifying themes which in turn is influenced by the theoretical framework. Reporting results follows the simple formula: Description, Comparison, Relation (Ibid.).

This research relies primarily on the inductive approach, because this approach permits research findings to materialise from the themes intrinsic in the raw data without limitations imposed by structured methodologies (Thomas, 2003 p2). This approach is appropriate because it firstly condenses extensive amounts of data into briefer version. Secondly, it allows for establishing clear links between the objectives set out in the research questions guiding the research and the summary findings derived from the data. Thirdly, it allows for tentative tendencies to be discovered about the underlying processes observable in the data.

To do so, all interviews were recorded and subsequently transcribed, clustered according to questions. Recording interviews facilitated firstly a review of the interview and secondly allowed me to fill in the blank spaces in my notes and “check the relationship between the notes and the actual responses” (Fasick, 2001 in Halcomb & Davidson, 2006 p41). Also,
transcriptions have reducing effects on the interviewer bias and so allowed me to reflect on the interview to ensure that the meaning and intentions of the interviewee are represented adequately (Ibid.). Hence, a thematic transcription method that purely records the answer that is deemed appropriate for the closed-ended questions and clusters common ideas is of benefit for the research. In a second step, the data was analysed in an inductive fashion according to three components. Here, clear themes emerged from the data itself. Furthermore, the detection of themes allowed me to cross check within and between the two group of interviewees for reoccurrences.

**QUANTITATIVE DATA**

In contrast, the closed-ended questions provide structure for the interview and compel participants to make choices between predetermined response categories. Thus, the collected data may easily be transposed into numerical rather than verbal data for the analysis that follows (Halcomb & Davidson, 2006 p39). Answers were recorded according to question and subsequently translated into data tabulation using Excel. The results were then used for descriptive analysis to complement the thematic analyses and detect the frequency of patterns.

**VISUAL DATA**

The analysis of the mapping exercises was less straightforward. While some variables (asked for through closed-ended questions: the existence or lacking certain borders in the mapping exercise; the number of colours used in the second mapping exercise; which colours used were used in the mapping exercise) were quantifiable and could therefore be translated into tabulation and subsequently into descriptive analysis, others (such as the open-ended questions; qualifying which areas have been coloured in the mapping exercise and why) proved more challenging. To decode the latter, I summed up the answers thematically in a deductive manner and was therefore able to address the different themes that arose from the data itself. As I did not aim to test geographical knowledge with the use of mental maps, there was no need to work with scales that define the accuracy of the maps. Nonetheless, some observations concerning the proportions of territories depicted (e.g. are West Bank and Gaza generally proportionally drawn in maps?) and the inclusiveness and exclusiveness of territory (are there borders inside the territory? Are there differences in the demarcation of Gaza and West Bank?) were possible and needed special attention as they do in fact contribute to answering the research question. Thus,
similarly to the open-ended questions, the aim was to categorise the observations thematically, select key topics concerning the analysis (e.g. the partition of space; the size of the space allocated to one’s community; the size of space allocated to the respective ‘Other’; the importance attributed to territorial places) and present them through thematic analysis.

3.4 REFLECTIONS ON THE LIMITATIONS OF THIS APPROACH

When conducting research, certain limitations arise from the choice of methods. One of the implications of a thematic analysis of large amount of data (in this case of 60 interviews of an average length of ca 40 minutes and 120 mapping exercises) is that in order to arrive at results, the researcher has to summarise the raw data. As a result, more nuanced and personal deliberations of the interviewee may get lost. The participants entrusted me with not only their time, but with their personal insights, and during some parts of the analysis this made it difficult to choose which quote e.g. represents the observed tendencies most adequately, which nuances are relevant, and which are less relevant in relation to the research. Some interviewees further felt a need to elaborate on their answer during the multiple-choice questions; these elaborations for instance could not be taken into account during the analysis. The nature of the closed-ended questions also limited the answer possibilities.

I have tried to do the interviewees justice, to make sure I have not ignored context when relevant to the research question and the sub-question and most importantly to be mindful of contrasting statement. Nonetheless, homogeneity only becomes visible after a certain amount of abstraction. Consequently, while Israeli and Palestinians participants for instance gave varying reasons as to why they did not represent borders within what they perceive as Palestine/Israel, the responses were summarised into broader reoccurring themes such as: ‘All of it is my home’, ‘I forgot’, ‘I don’t know where the borders are’, despite the fact that answers included slight variations. This is one of the drawbacks of working with a larger data-set.

While qualitative research approaches sample size selection typically in a purposeful sampling fashion to achieve deep understanding permitted by using information rich interviews, quantitative research tends to use broader sampling, to allow for the detection of trends and allow generalisations (Sandelowski, 1995 p180). Although a sample will most likely never be sufficient to permit generalisations of findings for entire populations, it may permit the detection of tendencies. Specifically, studies combining qualitative and quantitative approaches prerequisite additional considerations in determining an appropriate sample size (Ibid., p182).
While these limitations were taken into account, some of them are unfortunately unavoidable. Furthermore, it should be considered that due to the ongoing conflict my access to Palestinian universities was severely limited, which of course impacted on the sample choice of the Palestinian group of interviewees. In addition, particularly female Muslim Palestinian students, and religious Jewish Israeli students were easily identifiable due to their customary clothing style. This may have skewed the sample group.

Moreover, it is clear that the selection of highly educated participants from a certain age group is not representative for entire populations. It is to be expected that the ability to visit a university as well as the level of education impact on the perceptions and territorialities of the participants. Therefore, no generalisations are to be drawn for the two-conflict parties at large, but the research only refers to a section of the population. Nonetheless, this section of society is crucial. They most likely constitute a significant part of the future elites of their country and their perception matters. Kvale (2007 p10) argues that there is persistent demand for the social science to produce generalisable knowledge involves the ontological notion that universal knowledge holds validity for all places and times. I do, however, refrain from anything that goes beyond careful tendencies, or perceived regularities, as findings of a self-selected sample group are difficult to transfer to the population at large (Ibid.).
4 ANALYSIS

The research set out to investigate how the perception of territoriality and identity impact on attitudes towards the two-state solution, specifically territorial partition in the case of the Israel-Palestine conflict. During the gathering of data, the hypothesised close interconnectedness of territoriality, identity, territorial claims and attitudes towards the conflict and the ‘Other’ became evident. This was also noticeable during the analysis of the data. Despite some overlap, for the sake of understanding and structure, the following section presents the results of the interviews divided by the main three components explored, for Palestinian and Israeli interviewees respectively.

4.1. WHICH CLAIMS EXIST AND WHAT IMAGINARIES ARE PRESENT?

As detailed in the method section, the set-up of both the interviews and the mapping exercises did not only allow for expressions of territoriality to be voiced freely and in some instances to be addressed directly but stimulated both. Thus, as anticipated and encouraged, territorial claims in both group of interviewees were expressed clearly and with relatively little hesitancy. Imaginaries were presented both during the interview and throughout the mapping exercises.

4.1.1 ISRAELI PARTICIPANTS

The interview set-up, which started with questions concerning the origin of the participants allowed for an instant insight into territoriality and claims concerning said territory. Answering the question of their origin, Israeli participants expressed where they were from mainly by referring to cities within Israel, without clarification of a national belonging (see Table 1). One-third of the group, provided an instant national identification - ‘Israel’. Expressions of national identification increased, when Israelis were asked where their family was from. Here, Israeli participants tended to refer to ‘Israel’, instead of a particular town, frequently, adding generational context, that was not asked for, such as “We are from Israel seven or eight generations” (I24).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: Where are you from?</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Israeli Interviewees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israeli city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The addition of a number of generations seemed to provide further implicit historical claims to where they were from. Not only was the family from Israel, but ‘generations’ had been. One should note that historically, it is, of course, impossible to be seven or eight generations Israeli, since the state of Israel was founded in 1948, and is merely 69 years old. Generations born before that in the same region were registered as born in the British Palestine Mandate, neither born in Israel nor Palestine. Nonetheless, the voluntary addition of a notion of a decade-long lineage seemed indicative of a ‘need’ to showcase a long historic connection with the land. Referring to a line of ancestors present in the territory paints a picture of continuity of occupants. Another indication for this was that answers to the questions concerning their families’ origin appeared indignant at times, as if the very question concerning their families’ origin was challenging their previous answer. ‘Where is your family from?’ “Also from Israel!” (13). Thus, for some, the perceived connection of people and place seems to date back further than the official establishment of the state.

Moreover, claims of ownership due to Jewish identity and a link between Jewish identity and the state were expressed by some Israeli participants. They became especially prominent when participants were asked how their Jewish and Israeli identity was relevant to them. Here a number of participants expressed explicitly that they felt that Israel belonged to them as a member of the Jewish community.

"It is because I feel Israel belongs to me as a Jew. It doesn't mean that I don't want peace or give up the occupation but the idea. I have the idea that Israel belongs to me also” (124).

Further they highlighted that the Jewish identity and the Israeli identity belonged together, expressing: “Israel is the home of the Jews … that affects my connection to the land” (111). Specifically, for participants who had themselves immigrated to Israel the former constituted their main claims to the territory, making clear: “… I am Israeli for one year, but I feel very linked to this country, because it is our [belonging to Jews] country” (128) and “I am here [in Israel] because I am Jewish” (117). In this context, Israelis expressed territoriality mainly through cultural and ideological claims. Israel as the home of the Jews, belonging to an extent conditional on being Jewish, is a very Zionist idea. For a number of Israeli interviewees these cultural claims were paired with contextualisation that served as reasoning for the need of a territory for Jewish people, such as that Israel was the home for Jewish people because in the wider context there was no other place for Jews in the world (111). This draws on claims that a
specific minority has the right to control the particular territory due to security-related reasons (Burghardt, 1973 p228).

These kinds of claims also reappeared frequently during other parts of the interview as well as during the mapping exercises. References to history that is riddled with persecution of Jews were often made. In addition, the current security issue of the Israel-Palestine conflict and the threatening Arabic neighbours were pointed out, thereby further extending claims to territory. Some participants even made clear that security was a main issue for continued claims to certain territories, and possibly the claim. The security claim further posed a dilemma for some participants. While there was frequently acknowledgement for Palestinian claims to West Bank, the visualisation of this imaginary led to a discrepancy between theory and practice:

“What I think is Palestinian, ... I don't think we should give it. You know the width of the country is really short and if Israeli give[s] it, it will be a problem to defend the borders. So even if it is not ours I think we should keep it, for security” (I13).

This notion was even echoed in relation to the question of what they would give for peace: “Theoretically I would give it for peace, practically I think it would be a security disaster” (I11). It became evident that security was another central argument to territoriality, that was specifically referred to during the visualisation of their territorial imaginaries. Indeed, participants frequently referred to the map provided during the first mapping exercise to point out the size of Israel and the relative size of the surrounding Arabic states. Here the argument was one of “this is really is a tiny piece of land” (I11), thereby seemingly relativising the claims to territory implicitly. A number of interviewees seemed to imply notions of ‘we have so little land’ or even ‘we claim such little land’. Others made it clear that they did not believe that Palestinians “deserved a piece of [their] tiny country” (I11). Nonetheless, when asked to display the borders of their home country, 50% of Israeli participants drew borders that excluded both Gaza and the West Bank during the first mapping exercise. This was without

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Israeli Interviewees</th>
<th>Drew no internal borders</th>
<th>Drew Gaza border</th>
<th>Drew West Bank border</th>
<th>Drew both Gaza &amp; West Bank borders</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
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Table 2 Depiction of border during mapping exercise 1
any visible hesitation, thereby making territorial claims to only a part of the territory discussed (see Table 2).

Indeed, half of the participants from this group of interviewees displayed a region that is of rather similar shape to the country proposed in the two-state solution (see Graphic 1). Upon questioning the reasoning behind this decision, a distinct perception of segregation between Israeli and Palestinians became evident. Interviewees made clear that Israelis generally did not currently live in Gaza or the West Bank or for the most part there was limited access to them.

“I think when I think about home, when I think about Israel, it is the places where you feel like you belong there. I am sure if I walk around Gaza, I would not feel like I belong there. And also, in the West Bank or places like Ramallah, that I heard so much about it but I have never been there and if I go there, I am sure I feel like a tourist. It is like going to a different country. So that's what makes it difficult, because as a kid, you know, they show you the map and they show you the borders and I know that it looks like Israel but there is so many parts that are not Israel, or at least not the Israel that I know” (I21).

It appeared that a territorial imagination that left out the West Bank and Gaza, was seen as contradiction to the dominant discourse they had learned at school. In Israeli school atlases and maps, Israel is generally portrayed as one, with borders of both Gaza and West Bank either negligible or not marked at all. Cities in the West Bank bear Hebrew names i.e. Nablus is labelled as Shechem (compare Wallach 2011).

Curiously, a number of interviewees highlighted a cultural connection to the West Bank, which they however did not choose to use as basis for territorial claims. Instead participants who left out these regions made clear that they felt they could not include those regions due to the fact that it was the current home of another nation with a distinct identity:

"There is a historical significance of Yehuda and Samaria and there is the border. And then there is justice where people should have independence over their own land. I would put the border straight over the Jordan river [to draw the borders of my home] but my country borders I cannot say include that land because there is another nation there with a different identity.”(I3)

But there were definite differences in the claims of territoriality regarding Gaza and the West Bank (see Table2). Gaza was more frequently excluded (21/30) from the borders of their home country than the West Bank (16/30) in the first mapping exercise. Again, this may have to do with the accessibility of the regions. While there is some access to parts of the West Bank via
highways and due to settlements, there has been no access to Gaza since the evacuation of all Israeli citizens and the formal end of occupation in 2005 under then Prime Minister Sharon. The fact that Gaza is regarded as less accessible, and an absence of an Israeli population was noted more strongly with Gaza than West Bank: “Jews do not reside in Gaza … there are a lot of Jews that reside in the West Bank” (I10). Furthermore, the element of security reappeared, with one participant noting that Jews would not get ‘butchered’ in West Bank, implying that this would be the case in Gaza:

“First of all, I can go to the West Bank, I will not get butchered … I believe that Gaza was never really a part of Israel, but I don't see a problem with the Occupied Territories. I think if you go to war, or war goes to you and you win, you can keep the territory” (I11).

The disconnection from Gaza specifically was even more visual in the depictions of the second mapping exercise. Here 18/30 Israeli participants indicated Gaza as being clearly Palestinian, meaning they expressed that there was no Israeli claims to this region whatsoever. Moreover, half of the interviewees (15/30) indicated a region similar to the West Bank as clearly Palestinian, thereby removing all territorial claims from these regions (see Graphic 2).

Examining the mental maps, the majority of participants indicated a border between their community (core of Israeli identity) and the ‘Other’ (Palestinian) in both the first and second exercise. Feelings of territoriality and the expressions thereof were articulated clearly by all participants for the places where Israelis hold the majority. Consequently, these were the regions that territorial claims were made for. This became even more evident when the interviewees were asked to list the most relevant cities to them personally of their home country. The bulk of participants (29/30) did not refer to any places located in today’s West Bank, and not a single participant mentioned Gaza. Instead, cities that were cited had a clear Jewish majority and were located in the area that would remain Israel in the events of a two-state solution. No settlements were referred to as personally relevant by any interviewees of the Israeli Group of interviewees, even though two of the participants mentioned they had family living in the West Bank area.

Referring to regions which Israeli interviewees indicated as their home as well as the core of Israeli identity in the mapping exercises, the participants again mainly referred to historic, cultural and security claims. Specifically, the minority of the Israeli group of interviewees (7/30) that depicted both Gaza and West Bank as within the borders of their home country (see
Graphic 3) argued territoriality based on religious connections and what they referred to as ‘religious proof’, in the sense of the bible and the Tanakh:

“I am a Jew who believes in the Tanakh and the bible and according to the bible the whole Israel belongs to us ... Personally I believe it is part of my country, based on biblical evidence” (I24).

These participants further had a tendency of referring to historical claims of the first occupancy, with the bible as proof and elite claims that they were ‘destined’ to rule this land. In some extreme cases, the borders of their home country incorporated far more territory than their secular group members, reaching far beyond today’s Israel and Palestinian Territories (see Graphic 4).

In general, however, the majority of the Israeli interviewees displayed borders resembling a two-state solution in both mapping exercises, leaving to question how this came about. While the interviewees themselves highlighted the varying inaccessibility of the territories in question, it may also be that maps offered in the peace process, the two-state solution have been internalised to such an extent that they have become part of their own imaginaries. Indeed, when confronted with a UN map of the territory under discussion displaying a border between Gaza, Israel and the West Bank, the majority of Israeli participants had no strong reactions. To most, the map provided no stark clash of imaginary vs. ‘real’ geography. A majority of the Israeli interviewees described the UN map as similar to their own regards to the territory disputed by Palestinians. Interviewees who did disagree with the UN map mainly reacted indignant, reiterating historic claims as well as territorial claims based on the idea of ‘just occupation’. The notion of ‘just occupation’ mostly referred to historic arguments and frequently included phrases such as “we did not want that war, we did not start it” (I11), thereby mainly justifying occupation of the West Bank as a consequence of the action of the ‘Other’. Other interviewees explained that the map was not looking at the situation ‘truthfully’. According to one participant, for instance, the map ignored the fact, that in reality Israeli militarily controlled the entire area (including Gaza and West Bank), reserving judgement whether that should be the case or not (I12). For some, claims of historic and cultural connections further were interpreted

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5 The absence of the Golan Heights in the UN map, however, was disputed by a wide majority of Israeli interviewees, including the ones that had allocated the West Bank and Gaza as not belonging to Israel.
as exclusive to people who were involved in the conflict on a daily basis, therefore rejecting the visual interpretation provided by the UN as an outsider perspective.

Nonetheless, more than half of all participants displayed territorial claims to a territory similar to a two-state solution. This number rose from about 57% in the first mapping exercise to about 76% in the second mapping exercise, which forced a visualisation of the space in discussion in addition to the borders of the home country, thereby forcing a visualisation of territorial claims. Participants were not forced to allocate space to the ‘Other’, but they were given the option to colour in clearly Palestinian regions (see Graphic 5). Here, 23/30 Israelis, indicated a territory that is similar to the two-state solution as either being clearly Palestinian, comprisable, or as territory they would be willing to give for peace. Again, one should question how this came about, and why a significant number of participants renegotiated additional space to the Palestinians during the second mapping exercise.

Indeed, the question of how to border their home country was the main difficulty in the first mapping exercise, with participants frequently referring to historical events and how places like Sinai and Gaza had changed ownership in their lifetime. In the second mapping exercise the main difficulties changed to the ‘mix of people’ that made it difficult to indicate identities. Participants expressed this by pointing to the fact that it was “such a mosaic of people” (I22).

In general it seemed that during the second exercise the issue of the population – of the people became far more prevalent, making the second exercise more difficult:

“Now we have such a mixed population, Settlers and Palestinians ... And as the populations grow, how can you divide the land over to clear lines of nationality? It's kind of impossible ... So I really don't know” (I3).

"Because it is really complicated. People just live and live their life and .... And it is not always goes together with the political ideology and the view ... I don't know it was hard.”(I23)

Others pointed to the fact that colouring space according to identity was simplifying the issues:

"This is just like, what I always find ... I identify with the left-wing politics, but I don't like talking about things like this, because I think it makes things a bit too simple. And it is really easy for me to colour this, but ... I am not really understanding what I am colouring. And I think this is something ... that happens to most of us in Israel and around the world that we talk about things that we don't understand.”(I30)
Simultaneously, a majority of these interviewees showed awareness for cultural claims that could be interpreted as a sense of loyalty to other parts of their community. While they personally refrained from expressing claims to certain territories such as the West Bank, they mentioned an understanding of cultural and religious claims of other parts of their community to said territory. Here, a self-perceived connection between territoriality and Jewish identity became evident with a number of participants stating that if they themselves were more religious, they would extend their claims to those regions as well: “I think if I was more nationalistic or religious, so I will want also this part, for sure. I will miss this part from my identity” (I27). Others pointed out that it was easier for them, assuming a more secular identity, to look at maps that clearly separated the regions of Gaza, Israel and West Bank, than for someone who had a stronger religious identity.

Therefore, it appears, that self-described more secular participants expected a strong relationship between certain territories and a strong Jewish identity. This became evident by the explicit pointing out that a more secular identity was a factor for these participants who refrained from claiming the regions of West Bank. Simultaneously, secular participants displayed an awareness of the more religious members of the community their cultural claims to those territories. Curiously, while these claims are not relied on by these participants themselves, they seemed to express an understanding for the use of these cultural claims, going as far as linking increased Jewish religiousness with increased territoriality.

“There is this Jewish idea that Israel should be complete. So, I think if a really religious person would look at it I think they would say 'no, you can't just cut this big chunk, or even this one [Gaza and West Bank]. So I think it is easier for me to look at this map [UN map] and say 'hey, it's still Israel’” (I24).

This phenomenon was equally visible when Israeli participants were asked whether they would be willing to divide Jerusalem, commonly regarded by Israelis as the capital of Israel, and give half to the Palestinians for peace. While the majority of Israelis indicated Jerusalem as one of the most relevant cities to them (29/30), the mapping exercises showed that a large number of Israeli participants did not make any territorial claims concerning East Jerusalem. Again, this was mainly attributed to the inability to enter the place “It can be divided, because if I look at East Jerusalem, [I] can't go there with the Israeli passport and speaking Hebrew because … [I] will die” (I14). Another reason provided was similar as with the case of Gaza, the ‘Other’s’ majority in the territory:
“Firstly, by now we only have half. ... The other half is Israeli, but we cannot go there. It is not much of giving as they already have it. It is only announcing that it is really not ours ... The same is with Gaza, there is a majority of Arabs there. We do not own it, it is already theirs” (I7).

Another reason for the lack of claims was once more attributed to a lack of personal religious beliefs. In contrast, participants that voiced strong territoriality for a united Jerusalem relied on a mix of historic and cultural claim-making, but also included arguments of territorial integrity not only in the name of Jewish religion but for the three monotheistic religions: “Have you been to Jerusalem? It's all on top of each other. You have the mosque on top of the Western Wall? How do you divide it? Division is a problem!” (I4); “I wouldn't divide Jerusalem because it has to remain whole, I think there are parts that are sacred to all in all parts” (I10).

Nonetheless, it was observable that Israeli participants expressed territorial claims in a rather homogeneous manner. The majority of participants seems to share certain imaginaries of the territory and referred to the same kind of claims when doing so.
Graphic 1

Compilation of maps created during mapping exercise 1 - depicting imaginary geographies by Israeli participants similar to territorial distribution of a two-state solution. Compiled by the author.

Graphic 2

Compilation of maps created during mapping exercise 2 - depicting imaginary geographies by Israeli participants that remove any claim to Gaza or the West Bank. Compiled by the author.
Graphic 3

Compilation of maps created during mapping exercise 1 - depicting imaginary geographies by Israeli participants with no internal borders. Compiled by the author.

Graphic 4

Compilation of maps created during mapping exercise 1 - depicting imaginary geographies by Israeli participants reaching beyond today's borders. Compiled by the author.
Compilation of maps created during mapping exercise 1 and 2 by the same participant - depicting an increase in allocated space to Palestinians by Israeli participants. Compiled by the author.
4.1.2 PALESTINIAN PARTICIPANTS

Palestinian participants expressed territoriality in a very homogeneous manner. When first asked about where they were from, the vast majority of Palestinians answered Jerusalem (see Table 3). When asked in a second step where their parents were from they frequently named different specific places within the region such as Ramallah, Nazareth or Haifa. It is possible that the questions ‘Where are you from?’ was understood as asking ‘Where do you live?’, but the answer pattern may point to a different, more local understanding of territoriality and home. Merely two of 30 participants provided an immediate national identification and said they were from Palestine. Notably, the vast majority of Palestinian participants did not refer to ‘Palestine’, but cities in the region, without an apparent distinction of whether located in the Palestinian Territories or in what today is officially Israel. Being Palestinian was more strongly expressed during discussions of identity, as well as when discussing the depiction of borders and allocation of space during the mapping exercises. Culture, territory and identity seemed to be interconnected to such an extent that the topics overlapped and were difficult to separate, with participants noting themselves that both the religious and Palestinian identity ‘forced’ a connection to the territory:

“The religious identity and the Palestinian [identity] they force you to connect with the territory and where we live. This is territory that is first connected to our religious and our Palestinian, it is connected with Jerusalem and we are here and we try to save it” (P4).

Indeed, the majority of the Palestinian interviewees’ claims were based on historic claims of first occupancy and the ‘unjust occupation’ by Israel of their homeland – the need to ‘save Palestine’.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3: Where are you from?</th>
<th>Palestinian Interviewees</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>20/30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City within Israel/or the Territories</td>
<td>5/30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>2/30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>5/30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>1/30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This was paired with a certain disregard for current borders or separations during the mapping exercises. The majority of Palestinian participants seemed to omit or neglect the reality of separations between the West Bank, Gaza and the rest of the territory in the mapping exercises. The borders that are visible on the UN map and real in the sense that checkpoints, walls and barbed wire separate these parts were nowhere to be found in the mental maps of the vast majority of Palestinians (see Table 4). In fact, 27/30 drew no internal borders when asked to draw the borders of their home country in the first mapping exercise (see Graphic 6).

When asked why they had not drawn borders, a rather homogeneous argument of one perceived community that culturally belonged to the entire region was presented. This is noteworthy, as the group of interviewees consisted of both Christian Palestinians and Muslim Palestinians. Moreover, a strong appeal to feelings of belonging was apparent, with participants pointing out that they felt a clear connection to places that would be considered Israel today:

“Why do I not draw Gaza and so on? Because I feel like this all belongs to the Palestinian [people]” (P2);

“It is all included. Because it doesn't make sense that this is only my home [West Bank], I also belong to here and here [Gaza and today’s Israel]” (P25).

These feelings of belonging should not be confused with ignorance or denial. Palestinian participants were aware of the existence of borders, pointing out that “in real life they exist” (P13). They were also aware of Israelis living in certain regions. Nonetheless, the majority insisted that this fact did not negate the fact that in ‘reality’, in their imaginaries the region was and still continued to be Palestine:

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| Table 4 Depiction of border during mapping exercise 1 |
|---------------------------------|-------|------|--------|--------|
| Drew no internal borders | Drew Gaza border | Drew West Bank border | Drew both Gaza & West Bank borders |
| Palestinian Interviewees | 27 | 3 | 1 | 1 |
It is for Palestinians, but I can't deny that there is Israelis living here, it is the truth. But in the real thing it is Palestinian” (P13).

Additionally, the perceived cultural and territorial unity, experienced through a common language and culture was seen as a reason for territorial claims that showed no regard to borders. Frequently, the ‘Other’, Israelis, were referred to, to express the contrast of Palestinians who would be at home in the West Bank or Gaza in contrast to Israelis who would not be able to enter certain regions. The existence of a border, therefore was interpreted to be a hindrance to the unity of Palestinians, with participants pointing out that “nothing should divide us” (P24). Furthermore, the border was said to infringe on Palestinian identity, therefore if “there is no borders there would be a stronger [Palestinian] identity” (P24). In fact, this sentiment further highlighted the close link between territoriality and identity. This connection became even more evident during the second mapping exercise in which Palestinian interviewees to a large extent reiterated that the entirety of the land was the core of Palestinian identity (see Graphic 7).

While the bulk of participants (21/30) indicated some territory, they would likely be willing to compromise on the map, the majority of the region was simultaneously shown as the core of Palestinian identity (see Graphic 8). This accentuated the impressions gained in the first mapping exercises, that Palestinian participants for the most part did not differentiate between territories in regard to their identification with it, regardless whether they constitute the majority in it or not. This further became apparent when Palestinian interviewees were asked to list the five most relevant cities to them personally. Three cities that were among the most frequently mentioned (Nazareth, Haifa and Jaffa) are all located in today’s Israel and have a Palestinian minority population. The choice of these places was explained with cultural and historic claims to them. As part of the explanation, some Palestinian participants explicitly referred to a ‘Palestinian narrative’: “I think for me they [the chosen cities] connect to the Palestinian narrative. Jaffa, I immediately connect it with refugees” (P10), while others explained that they had been taught that their history was not limited to the places they currently held a majority in: “I have been taught we have history here and here and here … Nazareth it is a part of my history, Haifa, Akko …” (P17).

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7 The interviews were conducted within Israeli territory.
Up to this point claim-making of the Palestinian group of interviewees was largely homogeneous. A few differentiations amongst the group of interviewees became visible when the question of the ‘Other’ was addressed, nonetheless the trend of relative homogeneity continued. The majority of participants clearly labelled the ‘Other’, Israelis, as an illegitimate occupier and made explicit claims of first occupancy. They did however differ on how they extended their claims. For some (4/30) the right of first occupancy was an exclusive right to the territory that required the ‘Other’ to ‘leave’ in order to reinstate a Palestinian state:

“The place that right now in modern history is an Israeli place. But they take it from Palestinians from 70 years. They take it with force. They forced people to leave this place. They didn’t have a deal with them. They didn’t buy it with money. They just take it and made a war and killed people. I think you cannot just take something from you and killing people and say this is what my religious says so this is a place for us. The Palestinian were there from a really ancient time, they were just right there. When people came and said this area is to us. It is our place. So, they should leave, and we should stay. That’s it!” (P4).

In contrast to this, some of the interviewees seemed to have combined claims of first occupancy with a non-exclusive, indeed inclusive understanding of territoriality. While a majority of Palestinians did not display any borders during the first mapping exercise (27/30) more than 50% of them (17/30) expressed the ‘Other’ could live alongside them in the same territory without separation during the follow-up questions or during the second mapping exercise (see Graphic 9). It seems that ‘the core of Palestinian identity’ was not understood to be exclusive for a large segment of the participants.

The task of dividing up space was nonetheless perceived as difficult and labelled unnecessary or even unhelpful for a majority of the Palestinian participants. They attributed this to the fact that the interview questions were largely based on a two-state solution premise, which the vast majority of Palestinians did not seem to understand as a solution. “It is all together” (P20).

As with Israeli participants, it seemed that the task of dividing up according to identities brought to light the issue of population and people, more so than the first task:

8 This thesis refrains from all evaluations of the question of whether there was a Palestinian state prior the existence of the Israeli state and the author has no intentions of participating in this discussion. Instead communities are presented in the style they imagine themselves in.
“Because I live in Jerusalem, so every day I meet Israeli. It is difficult because we own this land and, it is hard to say that it is ok to share the land with the Israeli and it is hard to say that it is just ours” (P1);

“The fact that we have Israelis we live with them. I can't say that there is no Israelis and there is just Palestinians because there is” (P13);

“It is hard because … because I want to draw Palestine … when I draw it I know that we have actually Israeli people here” (P19).

Instead, many made clear that to them a solution entailed Palestinian claims to the entirety of the territory and to a majority, shared space, living side by side.

“I think it is problematic that I give it [the land] by piece. I think we can have peace by having one country for one people. I will give it for peace means that we divide it and then there will be peace. No, I think that we can share it” (P22);

Some interviewees specifically pointed out that recognition of Palestinians’ right of first occupancy and an acknowledgement of the Palestinian people was a prerequisite to live together, making clear that a lack of this form of recognition was a hindrance for territorial discussions:

“They [Jews] can be on the pink [core of Palestinian identity]. But they [Jews] need to accept that they can't come and tell the pink [Palestinians] this is my house and that it [we] needs to leave. And they need to acknowledge that said pink [Palestinians] exists and that for this country to exist it did have to do some things. And that some things that were done need to be acknowledge. And those people that things were done to exist”(P10).

Again, for the majority of Palestinian interviewees, claims that referred to historic rights of first occupancy as well of cultural claims did not necessarily exclude ‘the Other’ from the space. Notably, there seemed to be a distinction of perception between Israelis and Jews. While for a majority Jews were not to be excluded from their geographies, Israelis frequently were. It became evident that some participants distinguished between the two, and that this differentiation affected feelings of territoriality and expression thereof:

“I cannot say that they haven't been here in the beginning, because Jews were here, living with Palestinians in Palestine long before. But it is just … it is Jews, it is not really Israelis.
While Jews were seen for some to be part of a former shared community, references to where Israelis would be located on the map were met with: “How do you define Israelis, you mean like immigrants from Europe?” (P14.) Thus, clearly negating any potential claims Israelis might have to the territory, by emphasising that they had immigrated to the area. It became evident that ‘Israeli’ was associated with the current politics of the Israeli state (P26), the ‘Other’ who had no claim to the territory, in contrast to Jews who for the most part were acknowledged to have also lived in the area prior to the establishment of the Israeli state and the ensuing Israel-Palestine conflict.

This acknowledgement of the history of Jews in the region was also visible in the context of Jerusalem. During the second mapping exercise a number of Palestinian interviewees recognised Jewish claims to Jerusalem and a greater number verbalised a view of a shared city, especially when considering whether Jerusalem could be divided. Here many of the interviewees made clear that, in their perception, Jerusalem was holy in all three monotheistic religions, and therefore should be accessible to all:

>“Jerusalem is for all religions. It doesn't matter who we are or where we are from. It is our right to actually pray in these area. I see that some people don't have the right to pray in this place or that they close it for political reasons. But I think it is a place where, even if we are not on the same place you have a right to be there” (P8).

Moreover, the majority of Palestinian participants (22/30) strongly expressed the desire for one united Jerusalem: “The city for the three religions. Why divide it? Each person in the whole world has the right to visit all Jerusalem” (P9). While their personal claims to Jerusalem were very much culture- and religion-based, the majority of Palestinians did not seem to understand these claims as exclusive or excluding Jews, but possibly excluding Israelis. A minority of interviewees made exclusive culture-based claims to the territory, some even claiming exclusivity of Jerusalem for Muslims making clear: “I think the solution is that Jewish people need to leave” (P15).

Due to the strong, rather homogeneous, historical first occupancy as well as cultural claims, Palestinian participants experienced the United Nations map as confrontational. This map clashed strongly with their particular imaginaries of the territory, mainly because it depicted
borders that the majority of participants had not depicted in their mental maps. Instead, Palestinians participants had overwhelmingly displayed a different map, one without internal borders representing one Palestine and argued for it with one culture and one identity. Here the confrontation with the boundaries led to emotion-laden answers, but also explicit reiterations of the territorial claims based on historical first occupancy. In addition, faced with the separation of the territory, Palestinians referred to territorial integrity claims – mostly steeped in the recent ‘events of injustice’: "See, it is not logical that the West Bank and Gaza is a country. This [all of the region] is Palestine” (P22). Furthermore, the inaccessibility of this particular depiction of the territory was noted:

“If you say Gaza is part of the West Bank, it is the same country, how can it be one country if someone cannot enter Gaza or West Bank?” (P14).

Palestinian participants further showcased the clash of their imaginary geography and current facts on the ground when they were asked about the difficulties experienced during the mapping exercise, making clear that the country, to them, was owned as well as destined for the Palestinian people but currently their people had no place (P18).

“I]t is not just Palestine, it is also Israel. It is kind of hard because we don't want that it will be Israel. I am sorry, but we just want it, like we feel it should be Palestine” (P24).

Some even expressed that in reality it was not Palestine, that Palestine did not exist but was an aspiration (P28). And while some Palestinian interviewees made clear that the UN map, with its separation of space, did not represent their home country; that the Hebrew naming and the labelling of Israel impacted on their identity.

“Akko, Haifa, it is all Arabic places and now it is just for Israelis ... seeing a map like this, definitely with the name of Israel in it definitely opposes my identity” (P15).

Nonetheless, a large number of Palestinian participants said that the UN map still showed their home, despite the borders reiterating that the sense of belonging, territoriality did not have to be visible but was felt - “I don't see I feel my home country”(P19). Nonetheless, the borders affected the participants and underlined the stark difference and loss of territory between the
imagined home country and the current reality, because it “shows the home country for what it is and not what you want it to be, that is why it is different” (P20).
Indeed, the interviewees emphasised the very strong connection they felt between territory and identity and how that manifested itself and impacted on them. ‘Do you still see your home country on the UN map?’:

“I see it, but not the same way. I feel like I don't belong here. I should be only in these grey borders and the rest is not mine. Even though it was all Palestinian” (P25).
Compilation of maps created during mapping exercise 1 - depicting imaginary geographies by Palestinian participants with no internal borders. Compiled by the author.

Compilation of maps created during mapping exercise 2 - depicting imaginary geographies by Palestinian participants allocating no space to Israelis. Compiled by the author.
Graphic 8

Compilation of maps created during mapping exercise 1 and 2 by the same participant - depicting imaginary geographies by Palestinian participants allocating increasing space to Israelis. Compiled by the author.

Graphic 9

Compilation of maps created during mapping exercise 1 and 2 by the same participant - depicting imaginary geographies by Palestinian participants that are not necessarily exclusive territorial claims. Compiled by the author.
4.2. HOW DO CERTAIN TERRITORIAL CLAIMS COME ABOUT AND HOW ARE THEY LINKED TO CERTAIN FORMS OF GROUP IDENTIFICATION?

As the previous section has demonstrated, the themes of identity and expression thereof were prominent throughout the interview as well as mapping exercises in both groups of interviewees. In order to understand the link between certain territorial claims and certain forms of identification, the participants were limited to certain sets of group identities deemed relevant to the main question: religious, ethnic and national identification. In the academic debate, these are the group identities most frequently connected to the conflict as well as to the rise of territorial conflict overall.

To establish an understanding of their general relationship with the group identities early on, the participants were asked to position the importance of group identities such as religion, national belonging and regional belonging on an ordinal scale ranging from 1-7 at the beginning of the interview. This allowed for a more nuanced assessment differentiating between religious and national identity (if the case) and was used to understand how certain territorial claims were linked to certain forms of group identification. In addition, it gave a first impression of the interviewee and allowed for tentative estimation of which subjects might be sensitive. On the scale one was listed as not important and seven being very or extremely important. Ordinal scales are, of course to some extent open to interpretation, thus, to allow for a more general understanding of the ordinal importance, the results were grouped: 1-3 less important, 5-7 more important. Four, being in the middle, was interpreted as relatively neutral. The following sections look at the individual group of interviewees in turn.
4.2.1 Israeli Participants

When asked to place themselves on the ordinal identity scale, the Israeli group of interviewees seemed to place high relevance on Israeli identity with a majority (21/30) participants indicating 5-7 on the ordinal scale, and a minority of about 17% (5/30) indicating Israeli identity would be of little relevance between a 1-3 (see Table 5). This stood in contrast to the Jewish identity, which was more split. Here, 50% of Israeli participants listed a 1-3 on the ordinal scale and a similar number listed as 5-7 on the ordinal scale (14/30). When pressed how the two identities were relevant to the participants it became clear, however, that to the majority of interviewees the identities were distinct yet closely linked. The main reasoning for this was the perception of Israel’s existence as a de facto Jewish state: “I think because […] Israel is a religious country, kind of, so it’s connected to each other” (I1). Indeed, participants highlighted that the two identities were not only connected, but that to a large section of the participants they were to an extent interdependent:

“I am here because I am Jewish so I think maybe it goes together” (I17);

“I think it comes together because this […] the state that we belong to. So, the Israeli identity comes together with the Jewish one. The Jewish identity makes the Israeli identity” (I15).

Nonetheless, a number of participants regarded Israeli identity as more important to them than Jewish identity on the ordinal scale. When questioned on the difference of the two identities, a relative consensus emerged among the participants that gave Israeli identity more importance. Jewish identity was linked to tradition and a link to past generations, while Israeli identity was more a current as well as cultural identity.

Table 5 – Ordinal Scale Israeli Interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How important is your Israeli/Jewish identity to you on a scale from 1 to 7, 1 being not important at all and 7 being extremely important?</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Israeli Identity</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish Identity</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
“I think in one way my Israeli identity connects me to my friends and family and gives me like a bigger connection to things that happen now, in the present. And in a way my Jewish identity is something that connects me to older generations of my family, my history, which in many cases didn't happen in Israel e.g. in Europe but it still connects me to this part of my identity” (I16);

"I used to think they are about the same, but the Jewish identity, maybe it is more tradition, my grandparents and more religious. But not only, more tradition. The Israeli identity is different it is more about Israel and less about traditions. It has different components" (I30).

Despite these differences, there was a clearly expressed connection between the two identities for all participants. Indeed, although a majority of Israeli participants allocated their Israeli identity as more relevant than their Jewish identity, they seemed to be aware that their Jewish identity had an impact on their Israeli identity. Further, the participants who placed less importance on the Jewish group identity frequently expressed their consideration for participants that may consider a Jewish identity to be more relevant to them personally (as demonstrated in the previous section). And while a majority of Israeli participants appeared to distance themselves from a relevant Jewish identity, they simultaneously expressed concerns towards the effect the division of territory had on more religious group members, taking into account possible Jewish-identity inspired territoriality claims. This became especially evident when Israeli participants were asked whether they felt their group identity impacted on how they perceived the UN map⁹. Here, more secular participants frequently pointed out that if they themselves identified as more religious, they would miss part of the territory, making an explicit connection between territory and a certain group identity:

“...I am sure that if I was religious Jerusalem would take a bigger part and also other holy cities like Tzfat and Tveria and Akko [...] all the areas here [West Bank] that were in the bible where Abraham and Sara were buried and stuff. I am sure that would have bigger meaning to me, and I would relate to that more” (I8);

“I think if I was more religious, I [would] want also this part [West Bank], for sure. I will miss this part from my identity” (I27).

---

⁹ 29/30 Israeli answered this question
Evidently, there was a high level of awareness of non-religious participants for the identity of more religious group members. In a curious fashion, some more secular participants even voiced the existence and connection of group identity and claims of historic first occupancy, but instantaneously dismissed those as non-relevant for themselves.

"Yes of course, if I felt more strongly about being Jewish, then I would also feel strongly about Jewish history and then I would feel strongly about certain areas and say no this is ours. There is like three time periods. First the Jewish people were here, then the Palestinians were here and then the Jewish people. So, if I cared about all this I would say: 'OK, we were here first'. But I don't care about all this. Let's look at how it is now and figure something out" (I25).

In general, around 80% of Israeli participants\textsuperscript{10} said that they felt their identity impacted how they perceived the UN map depicting the area of their home country (see Table 6). The reasoning followed two main themes: Being affected directly due to their group identity and being affected if they were to place more importance on Jewish group identity. The majority of them expressed this by indeed contrasting their view with the view of more religious Israelis. Participants that had indicated a higher value for Israeli identity than Jewish nonetheless expressed that their identity linked them to the land with one of the secular participants expressing: “I really care about Israel and I don't want them to take parts from my country, my homeland” (I1).

Despite this, it became obvious that participants who gave a higher relevance to the Israeli identity than the Jewish were more willing to compromise about the shape or size the territory in question. So, expression of group identity (or the lack of) was in most instances directly connected to claims to territory or a specifically expressed lack of claims. While this may sound confusing, these participants made clear that these aspects of the Jewish group identity were less important to them, explaining how this allowed them to simultaneously disconnect from territoriality:

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|}
\hline
Do they feel their identity impacts on how they perceive the UN map? & Yes & No & Maybe \\
\hline
Israeli Interviewees & 23 & 3 & 3 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Impact identity on UN map}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{10} 29 Israeli participants answered the question. One declined to answer.
"I think because I define myself more as an Israeli than a Jewish, I am not attached to Israel as described in the bible. So, I do not think there is something holy or sacred to fight over this piece of land because it used to be ours at some point in history. But as an Israeli, I think it is important for Israelis and Jewish people to have a place to be. So as long as it exists ... and not only land but also as a nation, as an organisation this is more important to me than the shape of the map." (I4)

Others made clear that they did not perceive a connection between identity and territory, with one participant pointing out that the UN map affected him in the sense that “I don't think defining our identity through the map is the right thing to do. ... A nation should be more than where the nation sits … And frankly we are” (I12). And another participant making assertions that from his Israeli identity perspective any solution was good. Clarifying: “I care about this land because honestly I love it … but I don't feel I need to hold it” (I3).

In contrast, participants who did place their Jewish identity high on the ordinal scale did refer to that identity numerous times, specifically in the context of territory. They reiterated what their more secular peers had anticipated, that their identity, specifically the Jewish identity affected how they saw the division of territory on the UN map:

“Yeah of course. Because all the education and the Torah affects what I think. And I also think about the Jewish people that live here and it is hard for me to imagine them out of their home and disconnect. And also for the entire country not to be connected to part of it” (I23).

Here, group identity was directly linked with the claim to territory based on culture and religion. Thus, when asked whether they believed their identity impacted on how they felt about the UN map, answers referred to the bible - “Of course, I am a Jew who believes in the Tanakh and the bible and according to the bible the whole Israel belongs to us” (I24). In contrast to the more secular participants, these participants did not include statements on how other parts of their group would feel, or whether they would feel differently if they were less religious.
4.2.2 Palestinian Participants

Palestinian participants were questioned on three different group identities: National, Religious and Cultural: Palestinian, Muslim or Christian and Arab respectively. As with the previous section, Palestinian participants’ responses were largely homogeneous. Among the three group identities, the Palestinian identity received the most relevance with around 93% (28/30) of participants allocating it between a 5-7 on the ordinal scale. Arab identity was stated to be similarly important, receiving about 83% on allocations between 5-7 (see Table 7). Both of these group identities were regarded as relevant to all interviewees, indeed no interviewee expressed a low importance ranging from 1-3 on the ordinal scale. The allocated importance of religious group identity on the other hand varied in importance to the interviewees. While the majority of Palestinian interviewees allocated religious identity, either Christian or Muslim, between a 5-7 (ca 63%), about 27% allocated the relevance of religious identity between 1-3\(^\text{11}\).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 7 – Ordinal Scale Palestinian Interviewees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How important is your Arab, Palestinian, religious identity to you on a scale from 1 to 7, 1 being not important at all and 7 being extremely important?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab Identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Identity (Muslim/Christian)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When questioned in how far the different identities were relevant to the interviewees and what their relation was, identity seemed to first and foremost serve as ‘a reminder’:

> “It is very important to keep it, to remind people that we are here and not forget it ... If we forget this, if it is not important then you are forgetting who you are” (P25).

\(^{11}\) Two Palestinian participants said they wanted to allocate the significance of religious identity lower than 1.
A negation of relevance of specifically the Palestinian and Arabic identities was even described as impossible by some of the participants: “You can't say ‘no I am not Arabic’, you are proud that you are Arabic” (P28). It became evident that for a number of participants the different group identities were not distinct but related: “They are connected, they are the same” (P12). Participants who did point out differences made clear that that did not negate the relevance of either of the identities in question, that they were nonetheless connected. Some pointed out the difference between being Arab or Palestinian stressing “It is important that I am both” (P1). These participants seemed to agree that the Arabic identity was broader than the Palestinian identity, in the sense that it encompassed more people. Participants pointed out that their Arab culture connected them to people from other Arabic countries through for instance language and religion, but that their culture was different to them on ground of being Palestinian:

“For example, if I talk to someone that is from another country, for example Lebanon, the only thing that is common between me and him is the language: Arabic. Each one between me and him would have different cultures, different ideologies. Being Palestinian differs completely from being Arab” (P14).

When discussing the differences in relevance of the three group identities, most refrained from giving Palestinian identity priority over Arabic identity, but some participants singled out religious identity as far less important than the other identities. One participant explained this in an anecdotal fashion:

“I don't think that religion is really in the same area with my Palestinian identity or my Arabic identity. Arabic is my language; my mother language and it is the best language that I can express myself in. It is the language of my family, my boyfriend. Palestinian because my father is a refugee from Tiberius. We were originally from Tiberius ... and ’48 my family was, they took them out of Tiberius because they feared for their lives and then they went to Syria. My family were for two years in Syria until 1950 and then they came back as refugees, because ... it was a political act that brought them back, 10,000 refugees. And he came back to Nazareth and in Nazareth they welcomed them and treat them like family because we share the same Palestinian identity” (P22).

During the discussion of the identities, participants frequently directly related their identity to territory. “The religious identity and the Palestinian they force you to connect you with the territory and where we live” (P4). Indeed, some made clear that territory was not only connected but part of specifically the Palestinian identity: “Palestinian is more specific to certain groups, certain places” (P24). Frequently, the interviewees made clear that specifically their Palestinian,
but also their religious identities connected them with certain places – territory, making territory an integral part of their identity. This connection in turn seemed to be closely related to the ongoing conflict and a need to ‘return’ the places and territory in question in some manner:

“This is territory that is first connected to our religious and our Palestinian [identity], it is connected with Jerusalem and we are here and we try to save it” (P4).

The stark impact of conflict was noticeable as well through the contrasting of identities. During this discussion some differences between the interviewees were noticeable. This was to be expected as some interviewees held Israeli citizenship, while others only possessed residency permits and others had Jordanian citizenship, consequently their experience of Israeli presence and/or occupation differed. Overall, only a few Palestinian participants gave input on how their religious identity was relevant, but most interviewees brought up the ‘Other’ in one way or another. This seemed to generally be used to compare their own identity with an outsider: “It [Palestinian and Arabic identity] can contradict with the Israeli [identity]” (P23). Some elaborated as to why this was the case even though they lived in Israel:

“Talking about Palestinian vs. Israeli, I suppose that Palestinian is obviously more important to me because it is who I am, and it is all what I have been thought about in school and my family, my tradition and all of the traditional stuff I do in my society. So obviously being Palestinian is a huge part of me and I am not going to give it up whatsoever” (P17).

To others, ‘the Other’ did not only serve to juxtapose but was blamed for a lack of common identity among Palestinians:

“I think Israel is trying to demolish this Palestinian identity from the Arab people from the inside, and they show us the differences ... but I think we share mutual history and language and traditions” (P22)

Specifically, interviewees who were in possession of an Israeli citizenship described the affiliation with Israel as a complex relationship, that seemed to leave them questioning their belonging and identity:

“It is complex to be an Arab-Israeli. Because you also don’t know if you are Arab or Israeli - so where do you belong? How do you identify?” (P25).
While one participant described themselves as sometimes feeling lost between two places, and not able to say they were either Palestinian or Israeli (P10), another one pointed out that due to the coming into existence of Israeli in 1948, they were forced to become Israeli, thus making them less Palestinian – because they weren’t born into it (P11). The struggle with this fourth identity and the explicit juxtaposition of the Israeli and Palestinian identity became even more prominent during the discussion of the UN map.

When asked whether they felt their identity impacted on how they perceived a UN map that depicted borders between Gaza, Israeli Territory and the West Bank, the majority of Palestinian participants (23/27) expressed that their identity impacted on how they perceived the UN map (see table 8). Some even insisting that it should affect all Palestinians: “If any Palestinian sees this he will feel this is not his country. You know what I mean, this is not my country” (P15). Other participants made clear that they were aware of the influence of identity, even pointing out that for instance a Jewish person would draw the map entirely different to them, stating: “So it affects, the way we grow up, the way we think, what our parents thought us, what our religion taught us” (P13). This view was echoed by a number of participants who emphasised that once you had learned that the territory was Palestine, one could never see it as Israel (P14). Furthermore, participants reiterated that from a Palestinian perspective all the territory should be united, drawing a direct link to the strength of the Palestinian identity:

“There is nothing that should divide us. So, having these borders somehow marginalises some of the Palestinian aspects of identity […] So if there is no borders there would be a stronger identity. […] It is not the same as the separation between Egypt and this is Palestinian. They are both Arabs, but there is an obvious separation in the identity. This is Palestinian this is Egyptian. But in Israel it is a lot more complex” (P24).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 8 – Impact identity on UN map</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Do they feel their identity impacts on how they perceive the UN map?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Interviewees</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12 Three Palestinian participants did not answer the question.
During this question, Palestinian participants also started to differentiate more between the religious and Palestinian identity. Specifically, Christian Palestinians seemed to feel that these two identities impacted differently on how they felt about the UN map. Here again, the conflict was seen as making Palestinian identity more relevant:

“Speaking from the Christian [perspective] I would want to live in peace, have no more death, no more war. I think that would satisfy me more. That everyone is just happy. But then again, my Palestinian identity doesn’t want to ... just the memory of it” (P20).

“Palestinian I think is different, because we can actually feel it more here. It is the conflict that makes you feel more Palestinian than your Israeli identity your Christian identity” (P8).

From the way that Palestinian interviewees explained the relevance of their identity and differentiated between them, it became clear that, while there was a high interconnection of the different identities, the conflict in particularly highlighted the importance of a Palestinian identity. This particular identity was associated with either not permitting a division of territory or is directly being threatened by partition. Indeed, the Palestinian identity specifically seemed to be somewhat amplified by the existence of the conflict and the juxtaposition with Israelis. A territorial connection of mostly the Palestinians but also the religious identity was evident implicitly in all comments concerning identity and more explicitly during the discussion of the UN map. Here, participants frequently referred to claims of first occupancy by means of pointing to the connection of the territory and previous generations:

“It is an important town for me, and city, and the country too. For me the religion it is a holy place for us. But as a Palestinian it is my grandparents, my grand grandparents they were born here. So it is all my homeland” (P9)
4.3. How are main aspects of the two state solution perceived, and are they linked to identity and/or territoriality?

To answer this sub-question, data was gathered and analysed for two purposes. In contrast to the other segments, data concerning attitudes towards various aspects of the conflict was gathered mainly through quantitative questions. Specifically addressing different aspects of conflict resolution, this made sure that the answers were reliable, repeatable information and allowed for a certain degree of generalisation. This was amended, in a second step, with open-ended questions that permitted to understand the relationship between the former and identity and territoriality. The quantitative question style permits that a portion of the data is discussed for both group of interviewees simultaneously, while the qualitative data will be addressed separately as previously. In the following, first the quantitative data is discussed and then the qualitative data is presented.

When discussing aspects of the conflict participants were asked about the relevance of different approaches and preconditions for peace, as well as whether they believed the conflict was solvable. Only about 13% of participants of both group of interviewees believed that the conflict was solvable in their lifetime. About 37% of the combined participants believed that the conflict was solvable, but not in their lifetime. A majority of all interviewees does not believe the conflict is solvable (see Table 9). The numbers of the two distinct group of interviewees are rather similar for this question, with one differentiation. The majority of Israelis believe the conflict is solvable but not in their lifetime (14/27), while the majority of Palestinians believe the conflict is not solvable (16/27).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 9: Do you believe the conflict is solvable?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Israeli Interviewees (27/30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, but not in our time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Interviewees (27/30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Interviewees (54/60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
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<tr>
<td>24</td>
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</table>
When confronted with a list of possible conditions that could make peace imaginable to them (see Table 10), the main concern for both group of interviewees was ‘solving the Israeli settlement question’ (26/30 Israeli participants and 23/26 Palestinian participants). The second and third most important issues for Israeli participants were ‘security condition’ (23/30) and ‘territorial conditions’ (20/30), mirroring the claim-making narrative, which centred on security threats and territorial division. The second and third most relevant conditions for peace to Palestinian interviewees were ‘solving the Palestinian refugee question’ (20/26) and ‘economic condition’ (17/26). This too, mirrors the claim-making narrative of Palestinians, which was largely based on historic claims of first-occupancy and a restoration of justice.

Taking a closer look at the number one condition that would make peace imaginable for both Palestinian and Israeli participants, the interviewees were given a multiple-choice question concerning what, to them, was an acceptable solution to the Israeli settlement question. This question was relevant, because it strongly related to territoriality and the question of division of space, in the way the two-state solution imagines it. Overall, both Palestinian and Israeli

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conditions:</th>
<th>Territorial conditions</th>
<th>Security conditions</th>
<th>Solving the Palestinian refugee question</th>
<th>Solving the Israeli settlement conditions</th>
<th>Economic conditions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Israeli Interviewees (30/30)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Interviewees (26/30)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Interviewees (54/60)</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13 Participants were asked to say which of these conditions they saw as conditions that would make peace possible: territorial conditions, security conditions, solving the Palestinian refugee question, solving the Israeli settlement question, economic condition. They could choose as many as they wanted.

14 Four Palestinian interviewees did not answer the question.

15 The multiple choice answers were: a) Settlements should remain autonomous regions of the Israeli state within the Palestinian state; b) Settlers are welcomed in the Palestinian state and can become Palestinian; c) Settlements should be evacuated and settlers relocated to Israel; d) There is no connection between the settlement question and the peace agreement.
interviewees favoured to evacuate the settlements and relocate settlers to Israeli territory (26/56) or integrate settlers into Palestine by the majority. A large group of interviewees also regarded offering Israeli settlers the opportunity to become Palestinian as an adequate solution (18/56). A minority of Israelis and Palestinians believed that settlements should remain autonomous regions of the Israeli state within the Palestinian state (8/56). Looking at the individual groups of interviewees, 11/28 Israelis believed that settlements should be evacuated, and settlers relocated to Israel. A large section expressed that settlers should be welcomed in the Palestinians state and be offered the option to become Palestinian (10/28). A minority believed that there was ‘no connection between the settlement question and a peace agreement’ (4/28). A slightly smaller minority believed that settlements should ‘remain autonomous regions of the Israeli state within the Palestinian state’ (3/28). By comparison, no Palestinian stated that there was ‘no connection between the settlement question and a peace agreement’, a majority of Palestinians believed that settlements should be ‘evacuated and settlers relocated to Israel’ (15/28). A large section believed that settlers should be ‘welcomed in the Palestinian state and could become Palestinian’ (8/28). A minority expressed that settlements should ‘remain autonomous regions of the Israeli state within the Palestinian state’ (5/28).

Another major issue concerning a peace agreement, especially for Palestinians, was the question of ‘what an acceptable condition for the Palestinian refugee question is?’. As with the previous question, participants were given four multiple-choice answers. In contrast to the relative overlapping of answers in both groups in the previous section, here the answers of the two groups diverged in accordance with the territorial claim-making observed in the previous sections. The majority of Israeli participants stated that they believed the solution was for Palestinian refugees to be able to return to a Palestinian state (22/30). About half of these participants believed this should occur with compensation. A number of Israelis mentioned that they would have liked to say a) ‘Palestinians should be able to return to their original home, whether that is located in Israel or Palestine’, but were hesitant to do so due to security issues and the fear of losing majority status should all Palestinians be granted the right to return. Israeli

16 The multiple-choice answers were: a) Palestinians should be able to return to their original home, whether that is located in Israel or Palestine; b) Palestinian refugees should be able to return to a Palestinian state and be compensated by Israel; c) Palestinian refugees should be able to return to a Palestinian state; d) There in no connection between the refugee question and a peace agreement.
interviewees frequently added the problem of the hereditary refugee status that meant while about half a million refugees left in 1948/1967, today the number of refugees had skyrocketed, leaving them ‘no choice’ but to pick among the other answers, or choosing that due to these issues there was no connection between the refugee question and a peace agreement (3/30). This very much confirmed the previously observed notion of linking a majority population to territory and identity, as well as the notion of territorial separation according to identity, which was observable during the mapping exercises.

Concerning the Palestinian group of interviewees, half of the participants believed refugees should be able to return to a Palestinian state (15/30), the majority of which expressed that they should also be compensated by Israel (13/15). An almost equal section of Palestinians believed that refugees should be able to return to their original home, whether that is in an Israeli or Palestinian state (14/30), citing that a return to a Palestinian state presumed a two-state solution, that was missing the homes of people who lived in areas outside of the West Bank and Gaza prior 1948/1967. It remains unclear, whether the interviewees who chose ‘refugees should be able to return to a Palestinian state’ as the solution indeed imagined that in the setting of a spatial separation in accordance with a two state-solution. The mapping exercises suggest otherwise. Nonetheless, the argument further underlines the sense of territoriality and claim-making that was provided during the discussion of identity. One that is based on historic first occupancy and asks for a ‘righting of the wrongs’, a return to the state prior the injustice occurred. Four Palestinians expressed that there is no connection between the refugee question and a peace agreement, stating that this was mostly due to the fact that they do not believe in peace.

In addition to these closed-ended question, participants were asked a number of open-ended questions. Both groups of interviewees participated in two mapping exercises and were subsequently asked whether they believed what they had drawn was an option for peace. Moreover, they were asked why they believed the ‘Other’ would or would not be satisfied with their ‘solution’. To understand the answers to these questions, a brief summary of the findings around the second mapping exercise as well as the verbal explanations of space allocation is necessary (for overview of use of identity markers provided see table 11). The following is a constellation of results from the second mapping exercise that takes into account the explanations and clarifications provided by the interviewees during the exercise as well upon completion:
• 33% of Israeli interviewees allocated Palestinians all over the country, sharing space.
• 57% of Palestinian interviewees allocate Israelis all over the country, sharing space.
• A minority of both Israelis and Palestinians expressed their side has an exclusive right to the territory and the ‘Other’ should leave.
• 7% of Palestinians placed the ‘Other’ within the borders of a two-state solution
• 76% of Israelis placed the ‘Other’ within the borders of a two-state solution.

During these mapping exercise, it hence became once more evident that Israelis displayed a preference for a space allocation that resembles a two-state solution, while Palestinians displayed a preference of a space allocation that resembled a one-state solution. The discussion of certain aspects such their anticipations of the reactions of the ‘Other’ allowed for a better understanding on how the perception of the two-state solution may be linked to territoriality. In the following the open-questions that allowed for an analysis of the former are presented by group of interviewees.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 11: Use of identity markers during mapping exercise 2</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Core of Israeli /Palestinian Identity respectively indicated</td>
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<tr>
<td>Israeli Interviewees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Interviewees</td>
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4.3.1 Israeli Participants

When asked whether they believed ‘their side’ could make compromises for peace, the majority of Israelis (26/30) expressed that there were compromises they could make. Pressed upon which compromises their side could make, participants were not limited to one suggestion, as the question was left open-ended. The vast majority of Israeli participants listed territorial compromises as a possible compromise their side could make. This ranged from expressing the
possibility of returning to the 47’ borders, “I don't think the Palestinians are asking too much” (I2), to giving Palestinians more land:

“I think we can give them land, as much is possible and makes sense ... I think maybe the biggest thing that we can do is actually want it. If our leadership would want it it would actually be possible. I think the biggest thing we can offer is that we actually want it. I think if we actually want it, it can happen” (I4).

Others stressed the importance of Palestinians autonomy in their borders:

"We should give them full authority over their land. Such as we cannot go and put our army or having business in Gaza or elsewhere. All the Israelis including settlements should move and we should help them economically to be able to provide themselves electricity and whatever else they get from Israel so they won't be dependent on us and have the ability to be a strong country by themselves" (I7).

And some even phrased it as “giving them a country” (I5). A total of six participants explicitly stated that a change of the settlement policy or a withdrawal from Palestinian Territory would be a compromise they would gladly make:

"First of all, the settlement issue, I don't like it. Also in the army I was exposed, and I don't like it. So, I think the ones that are after the green line shouldn't be there. Help with economy. ... To make it possible for them to have a state. Not just divide the map and let them be."(I30)

It seemed that while the majority of Israeli participants immediately imagined a territorial divide as a compromise and in large parts also expected this to be wanted by Palestinians, not all of them simultaneously imagined these as rigorous borders. Instead a variety of assistance ideas steeped in economic compromises was suggested:

"I would like to say that, to give more who got discriminated, like east of Jerusalem they got little money for education, so to give a lot of money. ... Money, help, social help, resources. To live side by side. I don't want my Arab friends to live on the other side of a border. I don't want to show my passport to see them ...I would like Israel to give a lot of effort to make a combined narrative. To make something that really makes us one people. One common future. I don't believe in dividing."(I18)
This painted a picture of a dominant two-state imaginary, with possibly more fluid borders than could be anticipated from the previous sections of the analysis. Simultaneously, the security claims that had been voiced in previous part of the interview resurfaced:

“I think that economic things can help them, like building them a port in Gaza. I think this is a good solution. Because you can build them a port and even an airport in the sea, not on land. Because if there is only one connection, then the Israeli intelligence can see what is going on there and if something is going on, then they can use power ... I hope it will not happen but that can help them, because they will not be dependent on Israel, they will be able to go to other countries from their airport” (I5).

“Let them to build a country. Because we have a strong army so if something will happen ... It will be army against army and not guerrilla against army. And probably they won’t attack” (I14).

Three participants highlighted that their own government would have to change first in order to discuss compromises, while one of them even offered the possibility of a shared government:

“Like the best solution is that they will have equal rights, like all of them. And maybe this means that someday we will have a Palestinian prime minister, and like half of the government will be Palestinians. And I think most of the Israeli don't agree, so for me it is like a compromise” (I27).

This stood in stark contrast with the participants who believed that there were no compromises their side could or should make (4/30). Three of the participants highlighted that their side had tried on many occasions: “No, we gave them too much. We give, give, give and they keep asking for more so this is not an option” (I17). One participant however made clear that compromises were not the same as justice. Instead the participant argued:

"I am thinking less about compromises and more about justice. Like providing Arab towns with just as much funding as Jewish towns. Less discrimination, better education."(I22)

Concerning the question whether their depiction of the territory might be a solution for peace, Israeli participants were divided almost equally. While five participants were unsure or did not know whether their depictions were indeed a solution, 12/30 expressed that they believed it was a solution, while 13/30 noted that it was not. All but one of the interviewees who believed that
they had drawn a map that could be a solution for peace had drawn a partition of territory that resembled a two-state solution.

From the explanations they gave, it seemed that the participants believed their depiction to be a solution for two reasons. First, because it was what they thought Palestinians wanted. Secondly, because a split in this manner would divide the territory into regions that hold a majority of Palestinians and majority of Israelis respectively. “That's what the conditions are right now, that the demands are coming back to the borders of ’47, that’s what I drew … I think that’s mainly what they want” (I10). Some further indicated that the question of majority was decisive in the division of land making clear: “I wouldn't mind giving more. This is just the two big parts that I know they are already there” (I21).

Participants who believed they had depicted a solution did mention that they had acknowledged the existence of Palestinians today. And while they realised the territory they indicated was small or would make Israeli borders difficult to defend, they believed that in theory they depicted the most viable option (I25). Some also made clear that any kind of compromise would be great and that they would be willing to give up more land in exchange for peace, stating: “I don't see any other options to be honest. If they need more territory I can give them half of the Negev [desert]” (I6).

Participants who did not believe that their imaginary depicted a solution for peace argued so for two main reason. Firstly, because the borders they had drawn did not depict what they anticipated the other side to want. ‘Do you think what you drew could be a viable option for peace?’:

“No. Not in these borders. ... This is a very complex argument. I mean there are a lot of them, they are a big population and they believe that they deserve this land just like we do, I believe. So, it is problematic. That is the core of the argument. That we both believe that we need to be here ... Instead of the other people”(I8).

Secondly, they further expressed a sense of hopelessness with the situation, pointing out that a two-state border was the status quo and “we don't have peace” (I15). Another reason cited referred to the participants perception of the ‘Other’ and the security situation they linked to this. This led some participants to an impasse, in which they could not imagine another option than partition, with one participant loosely quoting Golda Meir, the former Israeli prime minister, from memory:
“I will quote, or at least try to quote Golda Meir ... The moment the Arabs put down their guns there will be peace but the moment we put down our guns we will be slaughtered. I do see reality like that unfortunately” (I11).

This was a persistent argument, that also returned when discussing why the participants did or did not expect ‘the Other’ (Palestinians) to be satisfied with the borders they had depicted. Nonetheless, some Israeli participants explicitly stressed that they did not believe in spatial separation as a solution, despite depicting exactly this. Indeed, they made clear that they neither believed this was a viable option, nor that they wanted it to be:

“No, I think the Palestinian and the Israeli should live in the same place. [...] I don't think that you need borders for peace. I don't want them to live in this territory and I live in this territory [separated]. You know Neve Shalom? It is a village that is Palestinian and Israeli, and they live together. That is the way I want to live” (I18).

Others pointed to the fact that the two-state solution they had drawn had been offered to Palestinians time and time again and only met with refusal: “I think the history shows us that it might be impossible”(I20)”. However, some also met the question in a more nuanced fashion, pointing out that the situation was more complex than ‘geography and borders’:

"I don't think it is that simple, again, because there is always the utopian option. And I don't think it is a lot of space ... I think for now, it is all that can happen [referring to the two-state solution] ... I think it is much more complicated than just giving back space. It is not just geography” (I30).

The themes expressed when asked whether their maps would be a viable option for peace were further elaborated on when the participants were asked whether they believed the ‘Other’, Palestinians, would be satisfied with their mental maps. The majority of Israelis (17/30) stated that they did not expect Palestinians to be satisfied. Explanations as to why they anticipated this were twofold. Firstly, they expected no approval, because the participants believed that it was not possible to combine with what they perceived as the ‘Palestinian refugee narrative’ and claims of first occupancy:

“I think they would not be satisfied because their narrative [...] they still see themselves as refugees ... As long as you still see yourself as a refugee you will never see yourself as comfortable where things are right now or accept it” (I3).
Secondly, many voiced a perceived lack of recognition of the existence of Israel and the right of Jews to live on the territory, which, according to them, would result in no acceptance to anything other than the entire territory:

“\[I\] don't think they will be satisfied \[\ldots\] I mean they would be satisfied with the whole country, I don't think they will be satisfied with less \[\ldots\] It would be easier to speak about peace and territory if the other side would acknowledge our existence - the leadership. I don't know about the people” (I11).

"I think I they won't be satisfied. The main problem is that many of them won't recognise Israel at all \[\ldots\] They see only that they own this territory that I marked \[\ldots\] Like Israeli, most people in Israel as most people in Palestine see that this entire area belongs to their own nation and only to their own nation. The Palestinians believe that we came here from far-away land to take their homes and steal from them. So, they believe this entire area belongs to them. Also, they are really educated to believe this entire area belongs to them and the people living in this area, the Jews don't have any rights about it” (I16).

Israeli participants who expressed confidence that Palestinians would be satisfied with their drawings were a clear minority (3/30). Their answers were partly based on “everything is better than the current situation they live in” (I16), and believing they had expressed what Palestinians wanted. Notably, the participant who was confident that he had expressed what Palestinians wanted, had indicated no internal borders, but had shared all space to be inhabited by both Israelis and Palestinians:

“I think that's what their argument is \[\ldots\] That this is as much our country as yours, when they talk about the Jews that came in. And frankly a lot of Israeli Palestinians, that do see themselves as Israeli, consider it part of their nation. They do not necessarily want to join a Palestinian nation-state that will be made. I see people working, studying with me. I know that it's not a clear-cut thing, just like it is not a clear-cut thing on the Jewish side”(I12).

Indeed, more interviewees (5/30) expressed a more nuanced view, making clear that there was no such thing as ‘the Other’, ‘the Palestinians’. That asking what ‘the Palestinians’ would think constituted a generalisation, which they were unwilling to go along with. They further argued that it did not take into account the difference between Palestinians living in Gaza, in the West Bank and in Israel, as well as the difference between ordinary people, politicians and extremists.

“I think you can't say 'Palestinian', there are different opinion in the Palestinian people. Some of them [\ldots] All of them won't be happy with it because it is a really small territory
and most of them want to go back to their homes, so for sure they won't be happy. But I think some of them will want only part of the map, some of them will want all of it. So, it is hard to talk about the group [...] The same about the Jewish” (I27).

Others just plainly said they could not answer this question, as they did not know what ‘the Other’s’ thoughts.

4.3.2 PALESTINIAN PARTICIPANTS

When asked whether there were compromises ‘their side’ could or should make for peace, the majority of Palestinian participants expressed that they did not believe there were any (15/28)17. This was mainly attributed to the fact that they saw Israel in the power-position and did not feel like there was anything left they could give up – “There is nothing” (P1). “They [Palestinians] already lost their houses, all the land … What else can we give?” (P20). One participant put it like this:

“Good question, I have thought about it a lot. Technically, yes both should make compromises. But it is the same as asking a woman, living in a patriarchy society: what compromises are you willing to make, in order to help the man contain leadership over said household? How can you take a bit more of your rights, except give up a bit more of your rights ... I think it is an unfair question when it comes to Palestinian and the current situation” (P10).

While three participants stated that they did not know whether their side could make any compromises, a number of Palestinian participants believed that they could (10/28). Few participants however elaborated on compromises their side could or should make and were unsure as to ‘which’ compromises when pressed on the matter. Instead they pointed out that both sides had to make compromises – “Both should do all they can” (P3). Participants who did elaborate on their side’s compromises pointed out that it would constitute a compromise to let Jews or Israelis stay in Palestine:

“Maybe the people that came here, e.g. Jews from all over the world, they can stay here. Palestinians can come back we can all live together. They don't have to come [means go] back. It's ok, they can stay here ... If Jews think that they have things, religious things in

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17 Two Palestinian Participants did not answer the question.
Palestine they can come here. I don't have to take the country if I want to live somewhere” (P27).

“Maybe some areas, to let the Israeli people stay there, where they live. Give them some areas” (P29).

Again, the answers of the Palestinian interviewees were very homogeneous. Their responses made clear once more that, in their imaginaries, narratives and claims, Palestine was first and foremost exclusively theirs. ‘Letting Israelis or Jews stay’ was considered a compromise and not a starting point of negotiation. This further underlined the claims of ‘first occupancy’ that were voiced frequently in the previous interview questions.

In contrast to the Israeli participants, the majority of Palestinian participants believed they had depicted a solution for peace. In fact, around 67% of Palestinians interviewees said that their depiction was a possibility for peace. As in the previous section, the Palestinian interviewees were a lot more homogeneous with a large majority of Palestinian participants believing that their maps were an option for peace due to one factor. The majority reasoned that it was a solution because both Jews and Palestinians could live together, because it was the only solution that recognised both:

“Maybe, if they come to a conclusion that will be like this one. To accept the facts and move on, forget the history and move on” (P11);

“Yes, I think if we continue to negotiate how we divide it, we will never get a solution. Like, I tried to divide it now in my head and I can't” (P22);

“I think we need, it is the last solution. I don't think there is another solution. Peace is the better solution for all of us, for the two sides ... If we want to make peace we will have to find a third name” (P29);

“I think yeah, ... I don't think that if we keep saying there is no Israel there is no peace and I don't think if they say there is no Palestine there will be peace” (P30)

Palestinian participants (11/30) who did not believe that their map was an option for peace also provided rather homogeneous reasoning, mainly referring to the fact that they did not believe in peace:

“I think there will not be peace. Some side will have to lose, a compromise for sure. Some Palestinian will have to let go of their homes ... there is a side that will definitely lose something” (P24);
“No, because we don't really talk about peace. It is not really about peace. Everybody wants the whole place for themselves ... No one really is talking about peace” (P8).

Others, who had indicated Palestine to be exclusively Palestinian, also did not believe their depiction was an option for peace:

“No, it is not. It is definitely not. But that is what they did. They gave us little space and they expect us to agree on it” (P25).

Only one interviewee said they did not know. Thus, the majority of participants that depicted a shared state solution believed that it was indeed an option for peace, while participants who depicted an exclusive Palestinian state tended not to see this as a viable option for peace. Despite a majority believing they had depicted a solution for peace, only 9/30 interviewees believed that the ‘Other’, Israelis, would be satisfied with the map they drew. Similar to the Israeli participants, Palestinians who did believe the ‘Other’ would be satisfied with the map they drew, argued that they had acknowledged the ‘Others’ existence. “I think they will be happy because I admit that we have Israeli people” (P19).

Some however, pointed out that while Israelis would be satisfied with their drawing, Palestinians would not be. These participants had either drawn a map similar to the two-state solution or indicated a large amount of space as ‘core of Israeli identity’, removing Palestinian claims to it. “Palestinians believe that all of this map belongs to them and Israelis I think would be happy with the drawing from me” (P3).

They majority of Palestinian interviewees however did not believe the ‘Other’ would be satisfied with their map18. Indeed 14/30 believed the ‘Other’ would not be satisfied. Again, the reasoning was homogeneous. All of the participants stated in one form or another that the reason was that Israelis would not agree to a shared state, because according to them, Israelis “think that this whole land is for them” (P2):

“I don't think they will be happy. I think they were also thought that all of this belongs to them and that we were just intruders ... Same way as it hurts me, I think it will hurt them that they see I don't recognise them in all the places, and I think they belong just to the one place” (P17);

18 Not all participants answered this question.
“No, they wouldn’t. They want their own country, they want their own home land. That’s what I think” (P21);

“No, they will not, because they do believe it is their country and it is Israel” (P27).

Only one interviewee said they did not know. Three participants gave a more nuanced answer, making clear that they believed Israelis are not one homogeneous group, but that there are different views possible on the Israeli side.

“Also in Israel they have a divided group. There is some Israelis who believe that this land is not for them and they had really terrible relationship with the other Israelis because they say that Palestine is their land” (P4).

“Depends which Israelis. There are some Israelis, which think like me, that they would give it all or peace and we can share. And there are Israelis that it is their historical right and Palestinian people should deal with it” (P22);

Thus, both Palestinian and Israeli participants frequently pointed to the ‘Other’s’ territoriality and identity as a connected factor. Moreover, they highlighted the similarities, that ‘they too’ would feel a certain way, due to their ties to the country, due to their belief it was rightfully theirs.
5 DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION

The Israel-Palestine conflict is a prime example of a conflict involving competing territorial claims. To accommodate these, the international community has fixated on one possible solution: the two-state solution. The imaginaries of the two conflict parties, however, appear to be fundamentally at odds with this proposed plan for peace, an issue neglected both in the proposed solution and the academic debate. To counter these shortcomings in the academic debate, this thesis built on the hypothesis that a closer understanding of the individual imaginaries provides insights as to why the two-state solution has failed to be realised.

In the analysis, thorough scrutiny of the existing imaginary geographies, the practices of claim-making and how these are legitimised was provided. Likewise, how these imaginations contrast with other imaginaries geographies, how this contrast is perceived and how it affects the imaginaries of the participants were analysed in detail. In doing so, it has become evident that the imaginary geographies, the perception of territoriality and identity, of both Israelis and Palestinians impact significantly on their perception towards the two-state solution. Moreover, it has become clear that the existing imaginaries of the Palestinian participants and Israeli participants differ significantly, both in form and impact. To discuss and establish the societal relevance of the findings as well as the contributions to the academic debate, the following section briefly provides a summary of the main conclusions. In doing so, specific attention is paid to how the combination of the different aspects impact on the perception of the two-state solution for Palestinians and Israelis respectively.

The imaginaries of Palestinian participants clashed fundamentally with the suggested two-state solution. Overall, Palestinian participants did not regard a two-state solution or the partition of the space as a viable option. Indeed, the impact was a profound rejection of ‘solutions’ that were perceived to build on the two-state solution idea. The perceptions of territoriality and identity impacted in a fashion that not only prevented the acceptance of the two-state solution as a solution but, more so, the two-state solution was regarded as a form of loss or defeat. Instead, the majority of Palestinian participants depicted a one-state solution as their imaginary, and the majority of these participants (67% of Palestinian participants) believed that this was the viable option for peace.

Palestinian participants mainly expressed territorial claims ‘in response’ to a perceived injustice of illegitimate occupancy and based largely on historical claims of first occupancy as well as
cultural claims that strengthened the first occupancy claims. Consequently, imaginary geographies of Palestinians overwhelmingly featured ‘all of Palestine’, without borders between any territories. The current spatial divide accordingly was regarded as an injustice that ought to be rectified instead of institutionalised through a confirmation of borders. It became apparent that rather than accommodating ‘reality’, the current de facto separation, claims were primarily based on ‘righting the historical wrongs’, the return to one Palestine. Historical claims, entirely neglected by the two-state solution.

For Palestinian interviewees, the role of group identity seemed to be of high relevance in this respect. Participants were rather homogeneous in their expression of the link between identity and territory. Specifically, the Palestinian identity was referred to as an identity that was steeped in the conflict and forced you to connect to the territory. Even more so, participants tended to point out the increasing relevance of the Palestinian identity due to the conflict situation, as well as its significance in relation to the perception of spatial divides. Palestinian identity specifically did not only make for a strongly perceived territorial connection for most participants, a particular set of imaginaries that was made up of one Palestine and the negation of Israel, but also served as a stark distinction with the ‘Other’.

Throughout the analysis, it became clear, that based on their claims of first occupancy, the majority of Palestinians did not perceive Israeli presence in the disputed territories as a valid starting point for a solution. Indeed, some participants voiced that it would be a compromise to ‘let Israelis stay’. Palestinian claims to territory, as well as the imaginaries in relation to their identity, seemed to be understood by themselves, not as a concept of exclusive claim, but more as an ‘acknowledgement’ of the historical and cultural roots to those who ‘belonged’ to Palestine. Meaning, Israelis were very rarely present in Palestinian imaginary geographies, Jews, however, were generally not excluded. This was evident as a majority of Palestinians expressed anger and sadness towards the existence of Israel as a country of 'European immigrants' that took ‘their land’ in the name of the Jewish religion.

Confronted with the existence of the 'Other' in the explicit confrontation, a renegotiation of imaginaries seemed to take place, most obvious in the change of narrative of the claim-making process. Claims of first occupancy turned into a more pronounced 'victim narrative', highlighting the aggressor role of Israel and explicitly pointing towards experiences with checkpoints, walls and borders. This further underlined that the perception of their own identity and territoriality of Palestinians appears to be fundamentally at odds with the premise of the
two-state solution: that two nations have a valid claim to one territory, and it, therefore, should be split. This, of course, impacts the perception of Palestinians because they regard the two-state solution - justified by 'two states for two people' with legitimate claims to territory, as a falsity.

Israeli participants, in contrast, by and large depicted imaginary geographies resembling or even conforming to territorial divides of the two-state solution. Indeed, more than two-thirds of Israeli participants portrayed a spatial separation that was similar to the popular two-state solution in the second mapping exercise. Thus, most of the participants did not experience a clash of imaginaries but seemed to either understand the two-state solution as a manifestation of their perception, as reality or a possible distribution of territory. The two-state solution and the premise of exclusive spaces for distinct groups that accompanied it, concerning spatial division, therefore appeared to be acceptable from this perspective.

As justification for their imaginaries, Israeli participants mainly relied on historical and cultural claims backed with arguments referring to security risks. Distinctively, there were very few claims expressed to the territories that would constitute a Palestinian state in a two-state solution (Gaza or West Bank). Participants mainly attributed this to two factors. One based on a clear understanding of their own identity as distinct from the ‘Other’ and one based on the perception that these regions were inaccessible for Israelis. From this perspective, formal recognition of the regions as a Palestinian state was alleged to have a relatively small impact on Israelis in regard to territory. Instead, it was already perceived to be the status quo to many. Accordingly, a majority of Israeli participants allocated space either to their group or the ‘Other’, thereby predominantly excluding Palestinians from their space in the imaginary geography, a notion similar to the two-state solution. Besides this, it seemed that Palestinians did not have much of a presence in Israeli imaginaries but solely served to border their own community. In that sense, their community and boundaries were placed where the other community, a different identity, was perceived to begin.

Notably few Israeli participants expressed claims of first occupancy. Instead, territorial claims based on security and the imaginary of a ‘Jewish safe-haven’ - the Jewish state - stood out. Claim-making based on cultural claims such as religion was also dominant, however in an implicit fashion. This was because a majority of the Israeli interviewees expressed no personal interest or feelings of territoriality based on religious or other cultural claims but mentioned their existence nonetheless, pointing out that religious identity was intimately connected with
the prevalence of these kinds of claims (religious, cultural and first occupancy). According to the more secular participants, it was the lack of relevance of the religious identity, as well as a lack of perceived connection, that enabled these participants to ‘see’ their home country in a different shape or size than more religious participants and ‘give up’ claims to certain territory. These participants overwhelmingly presented imaginary geographies that resembled the two-state solution.

Both more religious and more secular Israeli participants emphasised the role identity played on the perception of territory, and non-religious members seemed acutely aware of the schism within their group, while more religious members did not refer to more secular members. Moreover, territorial presence and control seemed to be taken for granted, possibly because Israelis are the current majority occupant of the territory, or because they effectively control all of the territories. It became clear that prioritising the different identities of religious vs more secular Israeli was the main reason for the distinctive claims to territories. Interviewees who did place high relevance on their Jewish identity presented imaginaries that mostly included the West Bank and Gaza, potentially even more territory. Justifications for these claims varied from the security-related claims of the more secular participants. Instead, cultural and religious claims, as well as claims of first occupancy took centre stage. In these instances, the Thora and the Tanakh served as central ‘evidence’ for the claims of first occupancy.

Thus, the analysis showed that the distinct Israeli and Palestinian perceptions of territoriality and identity impact inversely on the attitude towards the two-state solution. The majority of Israeli participants appeared to perceive a clear distinction of identity between the inhabitants of Gaza, West Bank and Israel, which they used for orientation when placing borders in their imaginary geographies. In contrast, Palestinian participants stressed one threatened collective identity that would be weakened as the primary factor for a rejection of internal boundaries. Accordingly, Palestinian participants appeared to understand the two-state solution or the drawing of any border as a division of one identity while Israelis saw it as a bordering between their own identity and another respectively. These findings are of prime societal relevance as they indeed offer an understanding as to why the two-state solution has not been realised, despite being pursued for decades.

In addition to showcasing how the distinct identities and territorialities impact on the two-state solution, the method chosen allowed the highlighting of a process of renegotiation of both identity and territoriality in relation to other imaginaries. The findings, therefore, do not only
emphasise that the perceptions of territoriality and identity impact on the attitudes towards the proposed solution, but point to a reciprocal relationship between the competing imaginaries. Indeed, the use of *confrontational mental mapping exercises*, the method of combining increasingly confrontational mapping exercises and the juxtaposition of the third imaginary with structured in-depth interview questions showcased a continued negotiation process of territoriality and identity that in turn seemed to lead to a renegotiation of imaginaries. This was observable for instance during the second mapping exercise, where due to an implicit confrontation with another imaginary (by giving the option of another identity that could be coloured in) changes in the allocation of space, the expression of imaginaries, took place. Here a definite increase in a depiction of the two-state solution by Israeli participants was observable. A significant number of Palestinian participants too increased the presence of the 'Other' in the productions of their imaginary geographies. Concretely, this meant they coloured in regions that might be compromised on or that they perceived as the core of Israeli identity, thereby removing Palestinian claim from that area in the second mapping exercise, despite having insisted the entire region was Palestine during the first mapping exercise. It appeared that the implicit confrontation, the very possibility that the same area could be coloured in differently lead to a re-negotiation of space that allowed some Palestinian participants to alter their imaginaries to include Israelis. The difficulties that participants of both groups, but specifically Palestinian participants expressed when locating Israelis in one form or another on the map, further provided clues that a re-negotiation of imaginary took place. A renegotiation was particularly evident with Palestinian participants, during the juxtaposition of their imaginaries with the UN map depicting the two-state solution. At this point, aspects of the conflict seemed to harden Palestinian resolve for one Palestine. More so, the confrontation with the depiction of a two-state solution appeared to have a significant impact on Palestinians, with many participants acting increasingly emotional, altering from their previous form of claim-making to a distinctly different line of argumentation that included Israel as an aggressor and highlighted their victim-position. Some participants who had indicated space to Israel in the second mapping exercise and had insisted that 'they could all live together' even reverted to claims of exclusive historic right to the territory. Frequent references to borders, checkpoints, fences and walls, as well as their personal experiences with those were made at this point. In this confrontation, the two-state solution seemed to be perceived as beneficial to Israelis and a loss to Palestinians, therefore leading to a labelling of the solution as 'unfair' and outright
rejection. In addition, some participants highlighted that the allocation of any space to Israel constituted an act of injustice towards Palestinians.

More so, the very act of drawing and redrawing borders and boundaries may be part of an identity formation process. It appears that, instead of the anticipated one-sided relationship, that identity and territoriality impact on the perception of conflict resolution or territorial distribution, a continuous process of redefining and renegotiating identity takes place. This was observable not only due to the alteration in claim-making but the changes in the depictions of the imaginary geographies. Tendencies of such a phenomenon were brought out by the choice of methodology that placed emphasis on the detection of such elements and was conceptualised to be very confrontational in this respect. Indeed, it seems that through the development and use of this method, the research was able to bring out an interaction between identity and boundary drawing as observable in the comments and explanations of the interviewees. This academic contribution showcased that it may well be that the very act of boundary drawing or discussion of borders and identity contributes to the process of imaginary geographies.

If true, this too has far-reaching political and societal implications. Any act such as coming to a peace agreement, which includes strong political components and a particular imaginary of the spatial division then should be anticipated to have direct repercussions on how people affected identify themselves in the future. From this perspective, peace negotiations and the redrawing of maps should be understood as an act of reinterpreting, reconfiguring identity. Both by outsiders and by the people who observe these processes and those who are affected by it, because they, in turn, come to respond to these new territorial imaginaries that those maps represent. This is precisely what occurs when confronting participants with the UN map. In response to this confrontation, participants appeared to re-imagine their home and their identity in relation to that particular representation. The result was varying degrees of reaction, depending on the degree of variation between the own and the other imaginary. The more they differed, the stronger and increasingly emotional responses seemed to get, specifically when they appeared to affect identity. Thus, it appears that the particular methodology developed is a valuable starting point in bringing up this phenomenon because phenomena as these have proved difficult to trace and identify in the past.

It should therefore be understood that the act of boundary drawing and the act of peace agreements is a highly political act. This is further demonstrated by the fact that Israeli participants appear to reproduce the UN partition as their own imaginaries. Indeed, the third-
party imaginaries seem to have been affecting Israeli participants imaginaries to such an extent that they may have become internalised. Through the act of being constantly confronted with separated spaces, the imaginaries of Israeli participants may have become separated too, possibly overshadowing other imaginaries that have existed previously (e.g. the Zionist imaginary of greater Israel or one Israel incorporating West Bank). This observation is crucial as it highlights the fluidity of imaginary geography and that territoriality may indeed change in accordance with new narratives. What appears to be essential in this regard is that the changes go hand in hand with modifications in the identity affiliations but do not simply disregard them. More secular Israelis embraced the two-state solution, while more religious ones rejected it on grounds of territorial-identity connections. The latter, perceived neglect or attack on the identity, arguably hardens the previous imaginaries, as observable in the reactions of Palestinian participants when confronted with the two-state solution. The highly political nature of the reassigning of space and the interconnectedness of identity and space was further demonstrated by recent political events. Palestinians’ reactions to the recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital by the American President Donald Trump serves as a perfect illustration for the kind of high politics involved in redrawing boundary lines and their effect on the territorial imagination and renegotiation of identity. The severity of the reactions and the accompanying violent outbursts to the decision were publicly condemned, and the reasoning was questioned, mainly because Israelis had not reacted in such a manner when a UNESCO resolution denied Israeli claims to Jerusalem. But the reactions of Palestinians when confronted with this particular representation of space may better be understood in the light of the findings presented. The very perception expressed by Palestinian participants was that any bordering would be understood as actively trying to weaken their identity, placing a border in-between one people with one group identity. Thus, the recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital may not be regarded as a spatial or a political decision but has a profound impact on identity of those affected. In line with the findings of this thesis, placing a border between people of the same identity is thereby understood as intentionally weakening the Palestinian identity: An attack on the geographical imagination of one community that is being torn into or cut apart by Trump’s discourse. Here, the perceived neglect or attack on identity, has arguably hardened the existing imaginaries that understand Jerusalem as the Palestinian capital and led to resistance to this attack.
Israelis in turn, who effectively control all of Jerusalem, did not seem to struggle with the UNESCO decision in the same manner. While Israelis strongly condemned the resolution as a politically motivated decision that was biased against Israel, it did not seem to affect a renegotiation of identity in the same manner, possibly because the majority of secular Israelis do not personally identify with the religious and historical first occupancy claims voiced by more religious Israelis. Moreover, the UNESCO decision does not in effect take anything away from Israelis, who remain in de facto control over the territory and Jerusalem. This stands in contrast to the Palestinian situation, where an acknowledgement of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital can be understood as an institutionalisation of the perceived injustice. The different reactions by Israelis does not mean that Israelis do not perceive strong ties with Jerusalem, but their overall perception of identity and territoriality differs. This allows for a different impact of such decision. Thus, it is evident that perceptions of identity and territoriality appear to be crucial and an understanding of their impact is necessary when trying to understand or foresee reactions to political decisions.

Another societal implication drawn from the findings is that it has become evident that while intuitively the international community may think the two-state solution is a ‘just’ or ‘fair’ solution to the conflict, it appears to be, in fact, underscoring either side. The findings demonstrate clearly that the UN two-state solution resonates strongly with one particular group imagination rather than both. It is of course entirely possible that the borders the Israeli participants both depicted and spoke of may in fact be imagined more fluid than has come across so far, or are intended in the two-state solution. While a division was expressed in the territory through borders, a number of interviewees showed in one form or another that they did not believe in division referring to economic assistance, shared resources and a common future. Nonetheless, the majority of their depicted imaginaries did conform to the territorial division of a two-state solution, and ultimately there was little renegotiation of identity or territoriality observable with Israeli participants during the juxtaposition with the UN map.

In conclusion, this thesis has explored the shortcomings of the academic debate concerning the role imaginary geographies play in conflict resolutions. Following the hypothesis that a closer understanding of the imaginary geographies of the conflict parties may, in fact, explain why the two-state solution has yet to become a reality, the thesis has highlighted the impact of imaginaries on conflict resolution in general. Through the use of confrontational mental mapping exercises in conjunction with structured in-depth interviews, the thesis could not only
be confirmed, but a more nuanced understanding of the impact of imaginary geographies and their relations to other imaginaries has contributed to the existing academic debate. The findings have made clear that the two-state solution has had a profound effect on the imaginaries of Israeli participants and has yet to be instated because it neglects crucial claims on the Palestinian side, meaning a re-negotiation of identity is needed for Palestinians to accept this solution. As identity formation is a complicated process, impacted by territoriality and narratives and the concepts of first-occupancy and occurred injustice are currently key features in the Palestinian identity, it seems unlikely that an identity renegotiation, that permits for a renegotiation of imaginaries in line with the two-state solution, will occur.

The findings are not only of prime societal relevance but hold academic significance as they highlight the important role of imaginary geographies in conflict resolution. Besides, the findings have added to the current academic debate, by introducing a method that allows showcasing the existing relationship between the perceptions of territoriality and identity, the imaginary geographies, of not only the two conflict parties but also of the international community's imaginary. What remains to be scrutinised is whether the suggested 'solution' simply conforms to one side's perceptions of space and territoriality or whether Israeli participants have possibly been impacted by the international community's imaginaries to such an extent that they have taken over these specific imaginary geographies and now perceive them as their own. If this is the case, a study of how the imaginary of the two-state solution impacted on the Israeli imaginaries may give insights as to how imaginaries may be altered by third parties. Similarly, closer attention should be paid as to why a confrontation with the two-state solution appears to strengthen a rather homogeneous Palestinian imaginary geography of one Palestine. Additional research into the reciprocal impact of different imaginaries is strongly encouraged. Hopefully, the findings and method introduced in this thesis will be taken into account in future research.
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APPENDIX I – INTERVIEW QUESTIONS & MAPPING
INSTRUCTIONS

Identity and Existing Claims

1. What is your name?
2. Where are you from?
3. Where is your family from?
4. How important is your Palestinian/Arab/Israeli/religious identity to you on a scale from 1 to 7, 1 being not important at all and 7 being extremely important?
5. In what way are the different identities relevant to you?

provide with Map 1

6. On Map 1 - Please amend the map with the borders of your home country?
7. What are the difficulties in drawing the borders?

8. On Map 1 - Please locate 5 relevant cities.
9. Why have you chosen to locate the following cities? → (if relevant)

How Claims come about and their Link to Identity

10. Why have you excluded certain cities?
11. (if applicable) Why have you not displayed certain border (Gaza, Westbank/ Green Line)?

→ provide with Map 2 with 4 colours
   a. colour 1 : territories that are core of Israeli/Palestinian Identity (without them you cannot say we have self-determination)
   b. colour 2: territories can be compromised on
   c. colour 3: territories are Israeli/Palestinian, but we can give them up for peace
   d. colour 4: territories that are ‘the Other’, Palestinian/Israeli respectively
   → colours may be allocated freely by participant

12. Please colour in Map 2 with the four colours respectively.
13. Please clarify what you mean to colour with each colour in 2-3 sentences

→ Talk about the obstacles & attitude

14. Where is the ‘Other’ located? (Israeli or Palestinian respectively, should they not be presented in some way on the map)

15. You left the other side with almost no space - do you think it viable option?

16. What were the difficulties in colouring the map in?
Conflict Perception & Link to Territoriality

17. Do you think this viable option for obtaining peace?
18. Why would you think ‘the Other’ (Israelis/Palestinians) would be satisfied with how you drew in the map? Why not?

19. Do you think the conflict is solvable?
   a. Yes it is.
   b. Yes, but not in our time.
   c. No.

20. What are the conditions that make peace possible? (multiple options possible)
   a. Territorial conditions
   b. Security conditions
   c. Solving the Palestinian refugee question
   d. Solving the Israeli settlement question
   e. Economic conditions

21. To what extent is the return of refugees to a Palestinian state a prerequisite to peace? (What is an acceptable solution to the Palestinian refugee issue?) (multiple options possible)
   a. Refugees are able to return to their original home whether that is Israel or a Palestinian state.
   b. Refugees are able to return to a Palestinian state and be compensated by Israel.
   c. Refugees are able to return to a Palestinian state.
   d. There is no connection between the refugee question and the peace agreement.

22. To what extent is the Jewish settlements issue a prerequisite to peace? (What is an acceptable solution to the settlement issue?) (multiple options possible)
   a. Settlements should remain autonomous regions of the Israeli state within the Palestinian state.
   b. Settlers are welcomed in the Palestinian state and can become Palestinian.
   c. Settlements should be evacuated, and settlers relocated to Israel.
   d. There is no connection between the settlement question and the peace agreement.

23. What solution do you imagine for Jerusalem?
24. How could Jerusalem be divided?
25. Why would you agree to a divided Jerusalem? Why would you not agree to a divided Jerusalem?
26. Would you agree to a divided Jerusalem under certain conditions?
27. What compromises do you believe your side should make?
Provide the students with a United Nations Map of the region, which includes the green line as well as the different Zones the Palestinian Regions are divided into according to the Oslo Agreement.

**Identity and Link to Claims**

28. How do you feel about this map in contrast to the one you made?
29. How does this map differ from yours?
30. Why do the difference in border effect the way you feel about the territory? Why not?
31. Looking at this map - in how far do you see your home country? Please be specific what makes it your home country or does not make is your home country.
32. You said that - *(insert identity that was the strongest in first set of questions)* is of importance to you - does that effect how you feel about this map?

*End of the mapping exercise and the questions - reflect together about the exercise and result (mainly for personal learning experience).*

33. How did this exercise make you feel?
34. Are there things you would like to add that I did not ask you about?
35. In how far do you feel like you were able to articulate your vision of your home country and perception a solution?