The Metropolitan Reform Debate
An analysis of the (re)constitution of the metropolitan region Twente

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‘Petit a petit, l’oiseau fait son nid’ – French proverb
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To all readers, I hope you enjoy reading my ‘masterpiece’.

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Abstract

More and more cities and other affected stakeholders pooling their resources together and form metropolitan regions in order to face cross-border problems. In a debate on the proper way to constitute these metropolitan regions, involved actors have different conflicting demands on efficient problem-solving on the one hand, and democratic legitimacy on the other hand. This MA thesis aims to examine to what extent and in what ways these different conflicting demands of the involved actors affect the outcome of the constitution of the metropolitan region Twente.

The theoretical framework highlights the debate on metropolitan reform and elaborates on the constitutional process where actors with, often conflicting, beliefs compete with each other over the preferred outcome of the constitution of the metropolitan region. Actors with the same beliefs, which entails an image on how the metropolitan region should be constituted, form advocacy coalitions in order to hold a stronger position. The two or more advocacy coalitions compete with each other and use different network constitution strategies in order to achieve their objectives. The influence of the coalitions and their strategies depends on the available resources of the advocacy coalition.

In the empirical part the different demands and strategies of the participating actors in the constitution of the metropolitan region Twente are investigated by depth-interviews and a content analysis. The analysis shows that there are two advocacy coalitions in the constitution of the metropolitan region Twente. These coalitions, the dominant and the minority coalition, think differently about the constitution of the metropolitan region Twente. While the minority coalition wants to achieve effective problem-solving through the constitution of metropolitan – polycentric – region, the dominant coalition rather wants to maintain the existing constitutional arrangement which entails a clear distinction between tasks and jurisdictions, grounded on democratic legitimacy.

The most important conclusion of this research is that although the different demands play part in the constitution of the metropolitan region Twente, the outcome is strongly determined by the demands of the coalition with the formal power and authority to make decisions.
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1. Introduction

The idea to construct and constitute a metropolitan region in order to keep up with developments that go beyond the territorial borders of local governments is not a new phenomenon. The last decades have shown a growing trend of the establishment of metropolitan areas or city regions, in many, if not all, European countries (European Metropolitan Network Institute, n.d.). A metropolitan region encompasses a wide range of policy fields such as economic development, transport, security and housing and in many metropolitan areas broader private and public partnerships has been created involving civil society, private companies and NGOs (Ahrend et all, 2014).

The territorial-administrative scale of cities hardly ever covers the problems that exist in real-life boundaries of the city and their surrounding areas (Eurocities, 2011). In other words, the management of several public services and goods goes beyond the actual administrations that are responsible for delivering the public services or goods. In solving these ‘cross-border problems’ neither the local governments nor non-state actors, such as businesses, have the ability to solve the collective problems on their own (Hamilton, 2004). Therefore, many cities and affected stakeholders are pooling their resources together and form a metropolitan region in order to face problems, issues and policies that cross the borders of existing local, regional and sometimes even national authorities and jurisdictions (Kübler & Schwab, 2007; Eroi, 2016).

1.2 Problem definition

Metropolitan regions are complex systems where a diverse set of actors are working together. This collaboration asks for the right constitutional structures or institutional arrangements, which coordinate the interaction between the different involved actors and in the end lead to efficient problem-solving. However, it is impossible to speak of one ‘best’ way to constitute the metropolitan region. There are different ideas about the proper way to constitute the metropolitan region (Eurocities, 2011; Kübler, 2012b). With constituting I refer to shaping, coordinating and structuring the cooperation between different actors and their jointly need to pool resources together in order to solve ‘cross border’ problems in a metropolitan region.
Since the 1960s, the proper way to constitute the metropolitan region is a strongly debated issue (Denters, Klok, Boogers & Sanders, 2016). In this debate on metropolitan reform exists two rival traditions towards the constitution of the metropolitan region. Although both sides recognize the need for cooperation at the regional level in order to face collective issues and to produce effective outcomes, they have different beliefs about the proper constitutional arrangement for the metropolitan region. The ‘old’ tradition has the preference for a monocentric solution through the creation of one regional authority, which has the responsibility for all the decisions in the metropolitan region (Denters, Klok, Boogers & Sanders, 2016). The ‘new’ tradition, conversely, favors a more polycentric solution, in which decision-making is not exclusive to one centralized and steering decision-making body (Hamilton, Miller & Paytas, 2004), but includes a set of interdependent actors building mutual trust and working together in order to accommodate the pooling of resources and knowledge in order to solve cross-border problems (Ostrom, 1982; Zimmermann, 2006; Oakerson, 2010).

However, the constitution of the metropolitan region is not only a question of efficient problem-solving, but it has also consequences for democratic legitimacy. Metropolitan regions find themselves among the tension of finding appropriate and efficient constitutional structures to solve metropolitan problems, while at the same time ensuring democratic legitimacy (Zimmermann, 2014; Kübler, 2012b). This is exactly where the problem currently exists. More precisely, in the debate on metropolitan reform the ‘old’ tradition advocates fear that the representative institutions are losing importance when choosing for the ‘new’ tradition, not only because there are other – private – actors engaged whom lack the mandate the make legitimate decisions, but also because in the polycentric network multiple decisions are made without being effectively controlled by representative democratic bodies (Papadopoulos, 1998 in Kübler & Schwab, 2007).

Thus, the metropolitan debate is about this enduring tension between one the other hand, aiming for effective problem-solving and on the other hand maintaining democratic legitimacy (Kübler, 2012b). The question that will be investigated in this study is to what extent the different demands of the involved actors on effective problem-solving on the one hand and democratic legitimacy on
the other hand will affect the outcome of the constitution of the metropolitan region in the region of Twente, the Netherlands.

1.3 Research objective and questions

This thesis will be about the conflicting demands on efficient problem-solving and democratic legitimacy and in what way the involved actors cope with this enduring tension between efficient problem-solving and democratic legitimacy in the constitution of the metropolitan region Twente. Empirically, this study will focus on the constitution of the region Twente, because here the debate on metropolitan reform has revived. In the region opposing beliefs are present about the about the proper constitutional arrangement of region Twente. The aim of this research is to analyze and understand how in the metropolitan Twente is dealt with the conflicting beliefs of involved actors on efficient problem-solving and democratic legitimacy and to what extent this tension affects the outcome of the constitution of the metropolitan region Twente. In order to accomplish this, the following main research question needs to be answered:

To what extent and in what ways do the conflicting demands on effective problem-solving and democratic legitimacy of the involved actors affect the constitution of the metropolitan region Twente?

The main question will be divided in the following theoretical and empirical sub-questions. The first three sub-questions will structure the theoretical framework and eventually help to formulate an answer to the central question of this research:

1. Which constitutional arrangements or models in the constitution of the metropolitan region can be distinguished?
2. What are the consequences of these models for democratic legitimacy in the metropolitan region?
3. How to explain the outcome of the constitution of the metropolitan region?
The remaining four sub-questions will be answered in the empirical part of this thesis. The data to answer these questions will be retrieved through a careful content analysis of documents and interviews with actors involved in the constitution of the metropolitan region Twente:

1. What is the history of the metropolitan regions in the Netherlands and the region Twente?
2. What debate is currently taking place in the region of Twente?
3. To what extent do the actors’ beliefs influence the constitution of the metropolitan region Twente?
4. Which constitutional arrangement does the region of Twente adhere to?

1.4 Type of research

1.4.1 Theoretical considerations

The purpose of the theoretical framework is to design a conceptual model which can be applied to the case study. The starting point of the theoretical framework will be the ongoing metropolitan debate. This chapter already shortly introduced the constitution of metropolitan regions and the enduring tension between effective problem-solving and democratic legitimacy. However, the theoretical framework will give a careful and elaborated picture of metropolitan regions. In order to explain the constitution of these networks i.e. metropolitan regions I will make use of network theories of Klijn & Koppenjan (2000; 2004). They assume that in the constitution of the metropolitan region steering and coordination between the interacting actors is necessary.

In the constitution of the metropolitan region interacting actors compete over the two different traditions that exist in the metropolitan debate. Around these traditions actors with the same preferences on efficient problem-solving and democratic legitimacy form coalitions in order to achieve their objectives. Therefore, it is considered highly relevant to include elements from the Advocacy Coalition Framework of Sabatier (1988; 1998). The framework will be used to explain the competition between different coalitions and their preferences in the constitution of the metropolitan region.
1.4.2 Methodological considerations

The methodological design of this thesis will be a qualitative in-depth case study. This is considered the best way to measure opinions, ideas and beliefs of actors in the region of Twente. An in-depth analysis of the constitution of the metropolitan region Twente will be carried out by using a content analysis and interviews in order to retrieve enough data to provide a sound answer to the research question.

1.5 Relevance

According to King et al (1996), a research question, whether it concerns quantitative or qualitative research, should be important to the real world and contribute to the existing scholarly literature. In this thesis, the research question might be important to the real world because a majority of the citizens in the world lives in metropolitan areas (Kübler, 2012a). Metropolitan bodies make decisions about public goods and services that impact citizens living in the urban areas. This study can contribute to the good governance debate in the metropolitan areas since it will give an understanding to what extent beliefs on the main principles of good governance determine the outcome of the constitution of the metropolitan region.

The results of this study might also be a valuable contribution to the research agenda on the constitution of the metropolitan regions. Although this study compromises only one case study with an in-depth analysis, this research attempts to provide a better understanding in the choice for a certain constitutional arrangement of a metropolitan region. As stated earlier, there is not one shared idea on which constitutional arrangement metropolitan region should adhere to i.e. the organization of the metropolitan region does not entail a one-size-fits-all model. Therefore, it is interesting to inquire the conflicting beliefs on effective problems solving and democratic legitimacy in the constitution of one metropolitan region, because these beliefs might give valuable findings on why regions choose for a certain constitutional arrangement.
1.6 Outline of this study

The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. After this chapter, chapter one, where the topic of this research is introduced and the research problem is defined, chapter two and three will outline the theoretical dimensions of the research. Also, the current state of research on this research topic shall be discussed. Then chapter four is concerned with the methodology of this thesis. The steps of selecting the case, collecting the data and the design of the research will be described. In the fifth and sixth chapter the empirical findings of this research will be presented and analysed. Finally, the seventh chapter will provide an answer to the main research question. Here, also, the theoretical framework, methodology and results of this study will be discussed and recommendations for further research will be given.
2. The metropolitan reform debate: old wine in new bottles?

2.1 Introduction

This theoretical framework will determine ideas, concepts and models that are present in the theory and important to the topic of this study. The presented ‘frame’ will provide a theoretical and conceptual foundation for the rest of this study. This theoretical framework compromises two chapters. The first chapter begins with an introduction to the metropolitan reform debate which discusses the ‘best’ way to constitute the metropolitan region. Nowadays, the debate on metropolitan reform is still tremendously up-to-date. The second paragraph will first outline the structure of the metropolitan region and then discuss the two types of multi-level governance that exist in the current metropolitan governance debate. Following, the third paragraph will point out the democratic deficit in the metropolitan governance. Finally, the last paragraph of the first chapter will summarize all the arguments of the first chapter.

The second chapter will give explanations for the outcome of the metropolitan reform debate. In networks different interacting actors compete over conflicting beliefs about the constitution of the metropolitan region. The first and second paragraph will explain the competition between different beliefs and the formation of advocacy coalitions. The third and fourth paragraph will explain why actors with shared beliefs utilize strategies and resources in the constitution of the metropolitan region. Finally, in the last paragraph, I will synthesize the central arguments of the theoretical framework into a conceptual model.

2.2 Too many governments and not enough governance

The question how to best organize (constitute) and govern metropolitan regions is not new. The organization of the metropolitan regions is a long-standing debate in public administration. The debate on public administration reform in metropolitan regions started around 1960. This debate on the metropolitan reform had – and still has - two opposing perspectives. Metropolitan regions were considered as functional integrated territorial systems, with a large number of independent
jurisdictions (Kübner, 2012a; Aligica & Tarko, 2012), which was according to metropolitan reformers the major problem of metropolitan regions.

The ‘reformers’ argued that there were too many jurisdictions (governments, agencies, special districts) overlapping and subverting each other (Aligica & Tarko, 2012, Ostrom, 1972). There were ‘too many governments and not enough government’ (Ostrom, Tiebout & Warren, 1961; also in Aligica & Tarko, 2012). The overlapping domains of responsibilities made the metropolitan regions inefficient, because without a metropolitan-wide government or one single dominant decision-making center, local governments would only act in their own interests (Léfreve & Weir, 2012; Ostrom, 1972). The different and overlapping jurisdictions are confusing citizens, who have difficulties to gain access to the public services and to require a voice in decision-making processes (Ostrom, 1972).

The metropolitan reformers suggested that in each metropolitan region there should be one government (Ostrom, 1972; Aligica & Tarko, 2012). The ‘best’ way, according to the reformers, to govern metropolitan regions was by consolidating the multiple decision-making centers into one political decision-making unit, which provide and produce all the public goods and services (Léfreve & Weir, 2012; Aligica & Tarko, 2012).

Drawing on the idea of one efficient and effective dominant center, many metropolitan regions started constitutional and institutional reforms (Kübner, 2012a). In order to combat the metropolitan problems, a number of European countries started to merge their municipalities in order to enlarge their territorial scales. Nevertheless, new metropolitan governmental institutions to connect the whole metropolitan region did not arise (Léfevre & Weir, 2012). In Europe and in the United States as well the reforms failed to win support (Léfevre & Weir, 2012). The major reason was the political resistance of local governments. The fear of losing power and responsibilities and also place identity hampered the institutional metropolitan reforms (Kübner, 2012a; Léfevre & Weir, 2012).

The public choice analysts studied the ‘metropolitan problem’ (too many governments) from another more economic – efficiency - perspective. They counteracted the argument that the production and provision of public good and services would be more efficient, when organized on one optimum scale under one single central government. The public choice analysts presumed that one optimal scale to provide public goods and services simply does not exist (Ostrom, 1972).
the reason that some services are more efficiently produced on a larger scale while other services are easier to produce on smaller scales (Ostrom, 1972; Aligica & Tarko, 2012). The existence of multiple governments with overlapping jurisdictions, makes it possible to perform some services at a larger scale and others services at a small scale. It is easy to provide, for example, police patrol in a smaller neighborhood (Parks & Oakerson, 1989; Ostrom, 1972). However, controlling air pollution on a small scale where there is no overlap between local, regional and national agencies becomes a more difficult task. In that case, it is more efficient to combat air pollution on a larger scale (Parks & Oakerson, 1989; Ostrom, 1972).

The metropolitan regions exist of a variety of small, medium and large provision units, linked to a variety of production units (Parks & Oakerson, 2000). Unlike the criticism of the reformers on the system of overlapping domains of responsibilities or jurisdiction the public choice theorists argue that this is a positive contribution to the metropolitan regions. Different scale units, from small to large scales, are necessary to solve collective action problems (Ostrom, 2010).

In summary, the biggest concern of the metropolitan reformers was (and still is) the large number of overlapping jurisdictions, subverting each other (Aligica & Tarko, 2012). The proposed solution to create metropolitan government failed to win support. This was mainly caused by the political resistance of local governments (Kübler, 2012a; Lèfevre & Weir, 2012). Metropolitan reformers neglected the fact that metropolitan regions are complex systems (Savitch & Vogel, 2009). According to public choice analysts, metropolitan regions exist of provision and production units. Local governments can provide public services without necessarily producing them. Provision units are nested inside other units whereby diverse problems can be addressed at different scales or organization (Parks & Oakerson, 1989). Public choice analysts recognized the metropolitan region, as a complex - polycentric - system with multiple units and overlapping jurisdictions, which allows the region to find the right scale and provide services efficiently (Savitch & Vogel, 2009).

### 2.3 Metropolitan governance

The metropolitan reform debate shows that the recognition of metropolitan regions as systems with multiple overlapping units and jurisdictions is more efficient than neglecting the complex character
of the metropolitan region by creating one single metropolitan government (Ostrom, Tiebout & Warren, 1961; Hamilton, Miller & Paytas, 2004). Consequently, metropolitan regions should not be seen as a new tier of government, but rather as a collaboration between many governments, civil society and private actors at different levels of governance (Oakerson, 2010; Hamilton, Miller & Paytas, 2004). However, the proper organization of the metropolitan region is still a topical debate. Researchers and practitioners recognize the need for some form of governance to avoid that the ‘cross-border’ problems become irresolvable. But there still is disagreement about the proper way to govern (constitute) the metropolitan region (Denters, Klok, Booger & Sanders, 2016). To some extent the two opposing perspectives (reformers vs. public choice analysts) in the metropolitan reform debate can relate to the two types of multi-level governance, created by Marks & Hooghe (2003). Before the contrasting types are discussed, the structure of the metropolitan region will be elaborated.

2.3.1 Structure of the metropolitan region

The metropolitan region of the public choice analysts can be labeled as a polycentric system. Ostrom, Tiebout and Warren introduced the term ‘polycentricity’ in 1961. They used the term to explain how public and private agencies were engaged in providing collective goods in metropolitan areas. Polycentricity refers to a system of governance where multiple authorities with overlapping domains of responsibility, interact with each other through a system of interdependent relationships, within a system of rules, in order to produce one common outcome (Aglica & Tarko, 2012; McGinnis, 2016; Oakerson, 2010; Ostrom, 1972; Ostrom, Tiebout & Warren, 1961). This system of governance can also be considered as a polycentric network.

The metropolitan region is characterized by multiple decision-making authorities or actors, which are mutually independent. The decision-making authority in the polycentric network is dispersed in nested hierarchy and does not belong to one single decision-making unit (McGinnis, 2016; Aligica & Tarko, 2012). This means that neither the higher level nor the lower level has the complete freedom to make decisions. The autonomous decision-making units share overlapping responsibilities for the governance of different policy domains (McGinnis, 2016). These overlapping
Jurisdictions are the result of the fact that different services require a different scale for efficient and effective delivery of public services and goods (McGinnis, 2016). Jurisdictions in the polycentric system are rarely bounded to specific territorial areas, they are usually defined in functional or in other terms as well (McGinnis, 2016).

However, the existence of multiple decision-making authorities interacting with each other in order to solve a common problem or realize shared goals is not the only is characteristic of the polycentric network. As Ostrom 1972 in Aligica and Tarko (2012, p.247) puts it:

‘A polycentric order means more than just a matter of different decision-making centers of decision-making operating in competition with each other in a specific domain or area. Polycentricism is a complex system of powers, incentives, rules, values, and individual attitudes combined in a complex system of relationships at different levels (...)’. (Ostrom, 1972 in Aligica and Tarko, 2012, p. 247)

Fundamental to the polycentric system and the – related – network governance approach is the ability of groups (decision-making centers) to solve their own problems, which is based on the independence, as well as interdependence between governance institutions and organization at all levels (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000). This means that in order to survive or solve problems each actor in the polycentric system requires resources form other actors (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000). Referring back to the metropolitan reform debate, the public choice analysts explain this interdependence by the distinction between provision and production units, which exist in the same environment. Provision units need to interact with production units in order to produce common goods. In other words, the different actors or decision-making units form relations with each other and as a consequence a network of mutually dependent actors emerge (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000).

This interdependence will create spontaneous self-organization, which entails that the actors in the polycentric system have the incentives to create or enforce a set of ordered relationships. This means that the various actors at different levels, with interdependent relations, take each other into account and develop patterns of interacting behavior which eventually function as a set of ordered relationships (Ostrom, Tiebout & Warren, 1961; Aligica & Tarko, 2012).
2.3.2 Type I of multi-level governance

The evolution of the metropolitan region occurred within a system of hierarchical and vertical relationships between a few levels of jurisdictions. This system, which Marks & Hooghe (2003) has labeled as type I of multi-level governance, emphasizes the relationship between central government and sub national governments. These multiple jurisdictions do exist next to each other, but they do not cross each other (Marks & Hooghe, 2003). The power to decision-making is shared between a limited number of jurisdictions, usually, this contains a central, an intermediate and local level (Marks & Hooghe, 2003). The governmental levels remain the most powerful and influential actors in the type I systems (Curry, 2015).

There exists a clear distinction between the responsibilities for a wide range of policies. Every jurisdiction (or governmental level) has a wide spread of functions and tasks, often organized in a *trias politica* structure, which includes a distinction between an elected legislature, an executive and a court system (Marks & Hooghe, 2003). Membership in type I is mainly territorially bounded to one scale of government. Actors have a tendency to belong to only one jurisdictions. Hence type I of multi-level governance can rather be seen as multi-level government because it is closely linked to the traditional structures of intergovernmental relations (Faludi, 2011). Type I of multi-level governance tend to maintain the traditional system of relations which is deeply institutionalized in rules and beliefs about how each jurisdiction (government) should perform as an element in the system (Hamilton, Miller & Paytas, 2004).

Also in terms of democratic legitimacy, type I of multi-level governance sticks to the traditional institutional system, built on representative bodies which get the legitimate mandate to rule and manage public problems. In other words, type I of multi-level governance emphasizes input legitimacy. Political decisions that are made in the type I system are ‘democratic’ because they reflect the ‘will of the people’ (Schmidt, 2013). Input legitimacy is seen as government by the people. Input legitimacy is gained through representation of citizens in the decision-making process, which means that the ‘will of the people’ or preferences and demands of the people are translated into political decisions through their elected representatives (Schmidt, 2013; Lindgren & Persson, 2010; Lieberherr, 2013).
2.3.3 Type II of multi-level governance

In this system of notably hierarchical relations the metropolitan region has emerged. The metropolitan region emerges as an overlay on this system (Hamilton, Miller & Paytas, 2004). The metropolitan region is not committed to the formal institutional structures as described in type I of governance. The metropolitan region is more suited to type II of multi-level governance (Marks & Hooghe, 2003). Type II systems envision the boundaries and separation between different governmental levels quite differently (Curry, 2015). Jurisdictions are not aligned to a few territorial jurisdictions but rather to different task-specific jurisdictions (Marks & Hooghe, 2003). In other words, the jurisdictions are not limited to the borders of local, regional and (inter)national layers or jurisdictions (Marks & Hooghe, 2003). Thus, membership is in type II is not bounded, but overlaps on numerous different levels (Marks & Hooghe, 2003). The power to make decisions is dispersed across multiple decision-making centers of jurisdictions.

The design of type II is concentrated around policy areas instead of the right governmental level. Thus, the number of jurisdictions, the decision-making power and implementation can be adjusted to the particular public problem (Marks & Hooghe, 2003).

In the type II system emphasis is given to effective solving common problems and producing efficient outcomes. With regard to democratic legitimacy, output legitimacy is often related to effective and efficient problem-solving (Lindgren & Persson, 2010). Output legitimacy concerns the extent that democratic processes are able to ensure that the outcome of decisions serves the public interest of the citizens affected by the decisions and not the particular interests of some well-organized groups (Scharpf, 1999). In other words, output legitimacy refers to the extent political decisions succeed in providing effective solutions for common problems, in a way that they resemble the opinions, references and demands of the people who are affected by these decisions (Scharpf, 2003).

2.3.4 Conclusions

There are clear parallels between the two typologies and the two approaches (reformers versus public analyst) in the metropolitan reform debate. The type I of multi-level government corresponds
with the ideas and preferences of the old tradition reformers in the metropolitan reform debate. Advocates in this tradition prefer the monocentric solution in the governance of the metropolitan region. In its extreme form, reformers aim for consolidation of the municipalities or they want to organize the metropolitan region by one single authority which takes all the decisions for the metropolitan region (Denters, Klok, Booger & Sanders, 2016). Type I of multi-level governance intends to create these preferences through a clear distinction between the different tiers of government and their responsibilities.

Type II of multi-level governance, instead, takes after the public choice analysisist approach which prefer a more polycentric system, in which the smaller jurisdictions are nested within wider jurisdiction whereby these jurisdictions intersect in order to provide public goods and services in an efficient and effective way (Marks & Hooghe, 2003; Parks & Oakerson, 1989).

In conclusion, in the constitution of the metropolitan region arises a tension between those favoring a more regional and centralized government system (type I) and those favoring a more polycentric system (type II). Table 1 below provides an overview of the two constitutional arrangements in the metropolitan region.

Table 1: Type I versus Type II of multi-level governance (Marks & Hooghe, 2003).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type I</th>
<th>Type II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Multi-task jurisdictions</td>
<td>Specific-task jurisdictions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small number of jurisdictions</td>
<td>High number of jurisdictions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchical</td>
<td>Non-hierarchical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territory bounded, mutually exclusive</td>
<td>Overlapping jurisdictions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Few levels of governance</td>
<td>Numerous levels of governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Input-oriented legitimacy</td>
<td>Output – oriented legitimacy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.4 The democratic deficit of metropolitan governance

With this distinction between type I and type II of multi-level governance solutions in mind, we can now see that the classic reformers, typically have a type I solution in mind, when thinking about the question how to constitute metropolitan regions. The public choice analysts, on the other hand, typically have a type II solution in mind. However, it is important to understand that the metropolitan region tends to be embedded in the legal – constitutional – framework of type I of multi-level governance. This means that many self-sufficient, different specialized and task-specific type II jurisdictions are nested within the institutional and constitutional architecture of the general-purpose type I jurisdictions (Marks & Hooghe, 2003).

The constitutional architecture of the type I governance is built on representative democracy where through fair and competitive elections, elected representative political bodies get the legitimate mandate from their constituency to rule and manage public problems (Ansell, 2011). Decision-making in type I of governance is therefore linked to a small numbers of representative political bodies which are related to territorial jurisdictions. Although the polycentric metropolitan regions are embedded in the architecture of type I governance, the metropolitan decision-making is not limited to a small number of representative political bodies which are related to a territory (Heinelt & Kübler, 2002). The type II system cuts across these jurisdictional territorial boundaries. Authority is diffused between different decision-making centers. Decisions are not exclusively made by democratic representatives, but decision-making is displaced to multiple jurisdictions, where also private actors, civil society and citizens are involved in decision-making in to solve societal problems (Marks & Hooghe, 2003; Marres; 2005). On the one hand, the involvement of a wide range of public and private actors has consequences for the democratic representation of citizens (Zimmermann, 2014; Lindgren & Persson, 2010). However, on the other hand, a greater emphasis on the input side in the metropolitan region, might lower output-legitimacy which means less effective problems solving and not producing efficient outcomes (Lieberherr, 2013).

Consequently, the evolution of the metropolitan region, within and beyond the realm of type I of multi-level governance, embodies a tension between input and output legitimacy in the
emergence of the metropolitan regions. Adherents of type I approach stress that metropolitan governance negatively hampers the representative democracy because decision-making finds place beyond the democratic representative bodies (Zimmermann, 2014). The emphasize on effective problem-solving, which eventually will increase problem-solving capacity according to advocates of type II systems, fuels a ‘democratic deficit’ i.e. the decision-making process weakens because policy making extend beyond representative political institutions. Supporters of the type I approach propose to order the metropolitan region by introducing one regional authority, which serves as a complement body to the traditional intergovernmental system of relations (Denters, Klok, Booger & Sanders, 2016). This means that elected members of the municipal council represent their communities in governing boards or a regional council of the metropolitan institutions (Zimmermann, 2014).

Type II advocates, instead, argue that input legitimacy can as well be enhanced through the increased participation of public and mainly private actors (Heinelt & Kübler, 2002; Kübler & Walti, 2000). Type II approach emphasizes that the control over public policies is not only exercised through elected bodies within the state, but it is also possible directly by citizens through their associations, in which people organize to serve common public goods independently from the state (Schwab & Kübler, 2001).

### 2.5 Conclusions

The metropolitan region should not be seen as a new tier of government, but rather as a collaboration between many administrations, civil society and private actors working together in new forms of metropolitan governance that blur jurisdictional and territorial boundaries (Oakerson, 2010; Hamilton, Miller & Paytas, 2004). The metropolitan region seems to be an increasingly relevant scale for effective problem-solving (Zimmermann, 2014). However, more than 50 years after the metropolitan reform debate took place, the debate is still actual in the organization of the metropolitan region. In summary, two different arrangements on the ordering of the metropolitan region are distinguished in the literature: Type I of multi-level governance or government (Faludi, 2011) and type II of multi-level
governance\(^1\). The latter argues that metropolitan region is made up of a variety of public institutions from different administrative levels and other private stakeholders who work together in order to address common problems. Instead of creating one single government, constitutional arrangements that include a plurality of actors is the best way to organize a metropolitan region.

Conversely, the type I of multi-level governance rather sticks to the traditional institutional system, based on the representative democracy. According to supporters of the type I the turn to type II involves that the traditional institutions and representative democracy become less relevant and is supplemented with a network of public and private actors (Zimmermann, 2014). In the type II system emphasis is given to output-legitimacy, that is, effective solving problems and producing efficient outcomes (Zimmermann, 2014). The input versus output model of legitimacy is essential for understanding the tension in the governance of metropolitan regions. This input-output debate can also be seen as a democratic dilemma in metropolitan governance. On the one hand, by focusing on the output, or the effectiveness of problem-solving, a democratic deficit emerges because it tends to bypass legitimacy in terms of citizens’ participation and representation (Zimmermann, 2014). On the other hand, the emphasis on input legitimacy may lower output legitimacy because non-democratic stakeholders will not be included in the decision-making process. In table 2 (below) the two models and their different features are summarized.

The (post) metropolitan reform debate confront essentially two opposing typologies or constitutional arrangements. Underlying this clash of conflicting typologies exist a tension between democratic legitimacy and efficient problem-solving. It is necessary to understand how and why involved actors in the constitution of the metropolitan region order the metropolitan region by type I of multi-level governance or type II of multi-level governance.

\(^1\) These indications for the two different multi-level governance models are based on the Marks and Hooghe (2003) classification of multi-level governance types.
Table 2: Type I of multi-level governance versus type II of multi-level governance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Type I</th>
<th>Type II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relationships</td>
<td>Hierarchical relationships</td>
<td>Nested relationships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jurisdictional functions</td>
<td>Multi-tasks jurisdictions</td>
<td>Specific task jurisdictions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jurisdictional levels</td>
<td>Limited number of jurisdictions</td>
<td>Unlimited number of levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership</td>
<td>Non-overlapping, territory bounded</td>
<td>Intersecting, functional and not bounded to territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power to make decisions</td>
<td>Distributed between a small number of jurisdictions (central, intermediate and local level)</td>
<td>Decision-making authority is dispersed across multiple decision-making units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in decision-making process</td>
<td>Elected representatives have the legitimate mandate to participate in the decision-making process</td>
<td>Inclusion of various actors such as citizens, private businesses and NGO’s in order to provide public goods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td>Input legitimacy</td>
<td>Output legitimacy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. Constitutional processes and the architecture of metropolitan regions

3.1 Introduction

As was mentioned in the previous chapter metropolitan regions are complex polycentric systems where multiple authorities with overlapping domains of responsibility, interact with each other through a system of interdependencies, in order to produce one common outcome (Ostrom, Tiebout & Warren, 1961; Aligica & Tarko, 2012). The polycentric model – new tradition - assumes, that through these interdependencies the metropolitan region emerge by spontaneous self-organization. This chapter will lay out that it is not evident that metropolitan regions emerge spontaneously. In order to explain this, the first paragraph will highlight the constitutional process where actors with different demands are involved. These actors seek for allies and form advocacy coalitions in order to turn their beliefs into public policies and to hold a stronger position in the process. The third paragraph will point out the strategies the coalitions can use in order to come to their preferred outcome. Followed by the fourth paragraph on the resources, which are necessary to carry out strategies and influence the existing policies (Weible, 2006). The final paragraph will synthesize all the arguments of this theoretical framework into a conceptual model.

3.2 Advocacy coalitions in a constitutional process

As stated by McGinnis (2016) polycentric systems can only be defined as a spontaneous order in a way that these systems are not the result of a central planner. Also, Klijn & Koppenjan (2000) believe that the (re)constitution of the metropolitan region does not emerge spontaneously. The outcome of the constitution of the metropolitan region is the product of a constitutional process. In this research, the constitutional process entails the process of designing or changing – reconstitute – a constitutional arrangement. As shown in the previous chapter, two constitutional arrangements can be distinguished: type I and type II of multi-level governance. These two types are underpinned by values, norms and rules that form the constitutional arrangement. To set up or reconstitute a metropolitan region is deeply influenced by the preferences of the actors involved in the constitutional
These actors, as we have seen in the previous chapter, have different ideas about the way values, norms and rules i.e. institutions should constitute the metropolitan region.

Within the constitutional process a multiplicity of actors with their various, often conflicting, perceptions and preferences compete over the proper constitutional arrangement for the metropolitan region (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2014). However, in the process supporters of a certain constitutional arrangement (type I or type II system) cannot achieve their objectives i.e. preferred outcomes, without the support of other like-minded actors (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000). The various actors in the constitutional process search for allies with the same beliefs about the constitution of the metropolitan region to form advocacy coalitions with and to compete with actors with different beliefs (Sabatier & Weible, 2007). Hence, advocacy coalitions consist of actors from various organization whom have the same ideas about the involvement of actors, norms and values regarding their environment and the problems and opportunities within it.

Sabatier and his co-authors (1988) conceptualized these ideas, perceptions and preferences as belief systems. Belief systems exist of a set of basic core values and ideas about the cause and the perception of the problem on a certain issues or policy domain (Mintrom & Vergari, 1996; Sabatier & Weible, 2007). These beliefs system can be divided into three interrelated hierarchical tiers of beliefs (Sabatier & Weible, 2007). At the deepest level actors have deep core beliefs, these are fundamental norms and values that define a vision of the individual, society and the world (Kübler, 2001; Sabatier & Weible, 2007), such as opinions on good and bad and the relative priority of numerous values: freedom, power, security, health, etc. (Sabatier, 1998). At the next level are the policy core beliefs, these beliefs are fundamental positions and strategies for achieving the deep core values (Kübler, 2001; Sabatier, 1998). This concerns, for instance, the proper distribution of power among different levels of government, the right scope of governmental vs. market activity or who should participate in the decision-making process (Sabatier, 1988; Sabatier & Weible, 2007). Finally, the secondary aspects or beliefs are the strategies and instrumental consideration on how to implement the policy core beliefs Kübler, 2001; Sabatier & Weible, 2007). The resistance to change the belief system is low for the secondary aspects. Yet it is more difficult to alter the policy core beliefs and the deep core beliefs have the highest resistance to change (Sabatier & Weible,
2007). This is also the case for the extent of consensus between the members of the advocacy coalition. There is strong consensus on the deep core beliefs, a little less on the policy core beliefs, and there is limited consensus on the secondary beliefs (Sabatier, 1988).

The glue that sticks these advocacy coalitions together are the shared policy core beliefs. These policy core beliefs are normative beliefs which provide an image of how the policy subsystem or network should be, vision to the strategies, and it helps to bring together allies and divide opponents (Sabatier & Weible, 2007). However, this does not mean that the member of the coalition do not disagree on policy matters. According to Sabatier members of coalition will often disagree on minor – secondary – matters, but that disagreement is usually limited (Mintrom & Vergari, 1996).

Hence around belief systems and particularly around the policy core beliefs, actors seek for allies with the same beliefs in order to turn their beliefs into public policies or programs and to hold a stronger position in the constitutional process.

![Figure 1: The structure of the belief system (Sabatier, 1988; Sabatier & Weible, 2007)](image)

The constitutional process finds place in a policy subsystem (Mintrom & Vergari, 1996). A political subsystem is defined by its territorial boundary, a substantive topic and participants from all levels (Sabatier & Weible, 2007). However, there is no single rule for defining a policy subsystem which makes it difficult to characterize a policy subsystem. The policy subsystem can include, local state and federal officials, interest groups, non-governmental organizations, community groups, research
scientist, members of the media (Weible, 2006). In this research the policy subsystem will be defined as a network of interdependent individuals from a variety of public and private organization and where outcomes emergences from interactions between actors (Sabatier & Weible, 2007; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000). The subsystems are broad in scope and usually contain a number of advocacy coalitions (Mintrom & Vergari, 1996).

3.3 Network constitution strategies

The constitution of the metropolitan region takes place in a network which exists of interdependent actors which need each other in order to solve common problems. Although the actors are mutually dependent on each other, these actors do also have conflicting perceptions and perceptions on the preferred outcome i.e. the constitution to collectively solve common problems. Therefore, the constitution of the metropolitan region does not happen spontaneously, steering in the complex network is necessary.

Steering strategies or network management put emphasis on improving the cooperation between involved actors (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2004). Network management aims at initiating and enabling interactions processes between actors, creating and changing the network arrangements for better coordination and creating new content by exploring new ideas for instance (Klijn, Steijn & Edelenbos, 2010). Several network management strategies can be distinguished. Klijn & Koppenjan (2000) categorize these strategies either as strategies of process management or of network constitution. Process management is focused on improving the interactions between actors in the network (Klijn, 2005), while network constitution is based on changes in the network setting, where the interactions and actions between actors find place (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000; Klijn, 2005). This research's emphasis will be on network constitution strategies because in process management the composition, rules and structure of the network are considered as a given (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000), while network constitution strategies do not consider the network as a given. They aim to change the whole network (Klijn, 1996). In network management, the role of the network manager, which can be fulfilled by one or several actors, is crucial. The network manager has various options – strategies – to invoke change in the network (Klijn, 1996). Three key aspects represent the starting
points in managing the network: actors, perceptions and institutions (Klijn, 1996). Yet, these three categories cannot be seen entirely separated, they do overlap but represent different starting points in network management (Klijn, 1996).

3.3.1 Reframing strategies of advocacy coalitions

The aim of advocacy coalitions in the constitutional process is to make changes in the existing network i.e. metropolitan region. Advocacy coalitions can use network constitution strategies in order to achieve their objectives. Three strategies can be distinguished within network constitution.

The first strategy includes the strategy of reframing that is changing the ideas and perceptions about the functioning of the network; what is does, what it stands for, and what the relations between the actors of the network are. (Klijn, 1996; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000). Reframing is a way to stimulate actors involved to put their own frame or perception into perspective and consider a situation from another frame (Klijn, Koppenjan & Termeer, 1995). Usually the minority advocacy coalition tries to alter the beliefs of the dominant coalition in the network (Sabatier & Weible, 2007). This can be achieved by proposing new ideas or solutions and providing the process with new information and knowledge on how the network can be constituted (Klijn, 2005). Reframing also is a fruitful strategy to stimulate learning in the network.

Beliefs can develop or change as a consequence of learning processes. Advocacy coalitions engage in these learning processes, which according to Sabatier (1998) can lead to minor and even major policy change over an extended period of time (Cairney, 2015). Sabatier (1998) distinguishes two forms of learning. First, policy learning can take place within the system of shared beliefs, where members of one coalition bring in new information. In the light of this new information the advocacy coalition adapts their beliefs to this new information, as long as it does not undermine the coalition main objectives (Sabatier, 1988; Cairney, 2015). Secondly, advocacy coalition can also employ another form of learning, namely adapting the beliefs of another advocacy coalition (Cairney, 2015). This mainly occurs when the views of the other coalition are “too important to ignore” (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1993, p. 43). However, learning from another is not a simple process, the dominant advocacy coalition will not simply adapt the beliefs of their opposing coalition. Successful reframing
strategies can help the opposing coalition to stimulate the actors of the dominant coalition to put their own perception into perspective (Klijn, Koppenjan & Termeer, 1995). Yet, this form of learning is only considered successful if the other belief system becomes dominant.

3.3.2 Changing the rules

The other two network constitution strategies that can be distinguished are first on the one hand, the strategy to influence the composition of the network. Advocacy coalitions can try to influence the composition of the actors in the network by adding new actors (Klijn, 1996; Klijn, 2005). The introduction of new actors can change the position of power and the relation patterns in the network (Klijn, 1996; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000). This strategy is related to the third network constitution strategy which concerns changing the existing rules of the network. Advocacy coalitions can try to change the entry rules in the network, which specify the rules on who is permitted to enter the network and who is not (Klijn, 2001; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000). Advocacy coalitions can also adopt a two-thirds instead of a majority voting rule (Ostrom & Kiser, 1982).

Rules are an important feature of the metropolitan network. Rules regulate the behavior of actors in the network. Rules specify what is and what is not permitted to do in the network, clarify which actors are allowed to entry the network and what actors come to decisions (Klijn, Koppenjan & Termeer, 1995). It is essential to know that rules in the polycentric network are not static. Rules can be shaped in the interactions, and also strengthen and altered in these interactions (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000). The following six rules will be distinguished in the polycentric network, based on various rules found in the literature (Ostrom & Kiser, 1982, Kiser, 1984, Klijn & Koppenjan, 2004):

- **Boundary rules** or **entry rules** indicate who is permitted to enter into the network and who is excluded from the network (Klijn, 2001; Kiser, 1984). The boundary rules may be opening the network to anyone who wishes to participate, or the rules may establish precise limits on who is allowed to enter (Kiser, 1984).

- **Position rules** identify the types of actors and the positions that actors may hold in the network. For instance, elected officials, private companies or citizens (Polski & Ostrom 1999).
- **Action rules** specify the set of actions actors in certain positions are allowed to take (Polski & Ostrom, 1999).

- **Decision rules** determine how decision are made. Three forms of decision-making rules can be distinguished; power based-decision-making, consensual decision-making and majority rule decision-making (Ostrom & Kiser, 1982).

- **Scope rules** concern the jurisdictions of outcomes that should be addressed in the network. Traffic policy can cover all traffic intersections in a state, or it can apply to a more limited class of intersections. (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2004).

- **Information rules** clarify how and what information will be made available to participants in the network (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2004).

### 3.4 Resources

Reformers and public analysts can select different strategies to promote their policy core beliefs in the constitution of the metropolitan region. The advocacy coalition can try to alter the actors, institutions or perceptions of dominant coalition in the metropolitan region network. These forms of strategies were comprehensively described in the previous paragraph (3.3). However, in order to influence the constitution of the metropolitan region with these strategies, the Advocacy Coalition Framework of Sabatier assumes that members of the coalition need to employ available resources which enable them to carry out their strategies (Weible, 2006).

Sabatier and Weible (2007) set out six resources that participants in the network can use to influence public policy. Some of these resources may be used by participants in their attempts to influence the constitution of the metropolitan region, like having members with formal legal authority to make decisions which is a major advantage to the advocacy coalition. Actors with formal legal authority are elected representatives, agency officials and legislators (Sabatier & Weible, 2007). Political access and influence is a major resource (Weible, 2006). The dominant coalition often has more of its members in the position of formal authority than minority coalitions (Sabatier & Weible, 2007). Another main resource to the advocacy coalition are financial resources. Financial resources make it possible to obtain other resources, mobilize supporters and finance the outcomes (Weible,
Coalitions with minimal financial resources, however, often rely upon an inexpensive alternative namely mobilizable troops. These are people who share the same beliefs on who you can rely on (Sabatier & Weible, 2007). In line with the mobilizable troops, public opinion as well is a major benefit to the advocacy coalition. Public opinion as a resource entails opinion polls documenting support for views of the coalition. A coalition with strong public support can claim they represent the public interests (Weible, 2006). Also the monopoly on information is a useful resources in order to argue against the views of the opposing coalition (Weible, 2006). It helps to convince the public to support their positions. Last of all, leadership – or network manager – can be a valuable resource to the advocacy coalition, because a skillful leader can create a coherent vision for the coalition members, strategically use resources and attract new resources (Weible, 2006; Mintrom & Vergari, 1996).

3.5 Towards a conceptual framework

In this last paragraph I will bring all the pieces of the theoretical puzzle into one conceptual framework. All actors involved in the constitution of the metropolitan region are concerned with the same question: how to proper organize – constitute – the metropolitan region? The outcome of the constitution of the metropolitan region is dependent on multiple interacting actors. However, these actors involved in the constitutional process have their own answers to this question. In order to come to their preferred outcome, the different actors seek for allies with the same preferences on the constitution of the metropolitan region and join themselves in advocacy coalitions. These different preferences of actors can be observed as different belief systems. Belief systems are a set of basic core values, casual expectations and problem perceptions (Sabatier, 1988). Sabatier and his co-writers (1988; 2007) divided the belief system in three hierarchical layers, namely the deep core beliefs, policy core beliefs and the secondary beliefs. In this research, the policy core beliefs are considered the most important because these beliefs offer an idea on how the network should be, provide vision to the strategies and make a distinction between allies and opponents (Sabatier & Weible, 2007).
Thus the outcome constitution of the metropolitan region is dependent on conflicting beliefs of two or more interacting advocacy coalitions about the proper constitutional arrangement for the metropolitan region. The two constitutional arrangements that have been distinguished in this theoretical framework show an underlying tension between effective problem-solving and democratic legitimacy.

On the one hand, type I of multi-level governance beliefs that the metropolitan region should be constituted regarding the standards of the representative democracy, that is through fair and competitive elections where elective representative get the legitimate mandate from their constituency to manage and rule public problems (Ansell, 2011). Yet on the other hand, type II of multi-level governance gives emphasis to a non-hierarchical decision-making process which involves the inclusion of private – non-legitimate actors. Problem-solving is not exclusively destined to the democratic representatives, but problem-solving should be displaced to multiple jurisdictions, where also private actors, civil society and citizens are involved in decision-making in to solve societal problems (Marks & Hooghe, 2003; Marres; 2005).

However, as the last chapter has demonstrated, the emergence of the metropolitan region does not happen spontaneously. The advocacy coalitions need to use network constitution strategies, such as reframing perception, changing the rules and changing the composition of the network) in order to constitute their metropolitan region. The coalitions adopt their strategies on the basis of their own beliefs. On the basis of their beliefs advocacy coalitions develop and select strategies in order to further their policy core beliefs and preferred outcomes. According to Klijn & Koppenjan (2000), these strategies aim to influence the actors, perceptions and institutions. A coalition can, for instance, try to change the composition of the network by introducing new actors or changing the entry rules to the network. The influence of the strategies is determined by the resources of the coalition. These resources are derived from the Advocacy Coalition Framework theory of Sabatier (1988). According to Sabatier and Weible (2007), participants can use these resources in order to influence the public policy. In this research, participants can use these resources in order to influence the strategies and therefore the constitution of the metropolitan region.

In conclusion, in a constitutional process, the advocacy coalitions compete on the basis of their
beliefs and with the use of their strategies and resources over a preferred outcome, which is either type I of multi-level governance or type II of multi-level governance.

Figure 2: Conceptual model
4. Methodology

4.1 Introduction

This chapter will describe the methodology that is used in this study. The first paragraph will set out the research design and methods. The research design reflects ‘an action plan from getting here to there (Yin, 1994, p. 19)’, where here is defined as the research questions that aimed to be answered and there are the results and answers to these questions (Yin, 1994). This chapter will function as a bridge between the here and there. To get from here to there, relevant data has been collected and analyzed (Yin, 1994). In paragraph two, the research methods, which are meant to gather relevant data, will be presented. The third paragraph will reflect upon the validity and reliability of this research. The last paragraph will be dedicated to the description of key concepts from the theoretical framework and their operationalization into clear and measurable variables. It is important to operationalize these concepts into well-defined variables because in the end the evidence of the research has to address the initial research question.

4.2 Research design

This research focusses on how different demands on effective problem-solving and democratic legitimacy of involved actors will affect the constitution of governance in metropolitan region Twente. This section will present ‘the action plan from getting here to there (Yin, 1994, p.19)’. In order to answer the research question, this study has conduct an in-depth qualitative case-study. There has been chosen for one single case-study instead of multiple case studies because one specific in-depth case-study is more viable to answer the research question or as Gerring (2007) puts it,

‘Sometimes, in-depth knowledge of an individual example is more helpful than fleeting knowledge about a larger number of examples. We gain better understanding of the whole by focusing on a key part (Gerring, 2007, p.1).

A qualitative in-depth case study research is considered most suitable in this study because the in-depth case study can produce explanatory insights about contemporary phenomenon within its real-
life context (Yin, 2009), as in this study it will try to understand the beliefs about the constitution of the metropolitan region, with regard to legitimacy.

4.2.1 Unit of analysis

The unit of analysis describes ‘what’ or ‘who’ has been studied in this research. Typical examples of units of analysis include individuals, groups, organizations, processes, institutions or even events (Yin, 2009). The unit of analysis in this study is what Sabatier (1988) defines as the policy subsystem. The policy subsystem is defined as a network of interdependent individuals from a variety of public and private organization and where outcomes emergences from interactions among actors (Sabatier & Weible, 2007; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000). In this study, the policy subsystem is the territorial ‘space’ where the constitution of the metropolitan region Twente takes place. The policy subsystem contains of two or more advocacy coalitions. It is important to distinguish these advocacy coalitions into the dominant coalition and minority coalitions. The dominant advocacy coalition leads the policy subsystem and contains over the authority to make decisions. The minority coalitions try to challenge the dominant coalition. An advocacy coalition exists of a group of actors from different organizations which share the same basic values, assumptions and perceptions of a problem (Mintrom & Vergari, 1999; Sabatier & Weible, 2007), which in this research is defined as a group of actors from different organizations which share the same values, ideas and perceptions (beliefs) about the constitution of the metropolitan region Twente.

4.3 Research methods

This research has used two research methods to retrieve data. Six research methods exist for gathering data (Van Thiel, 2007, p.68). These methods are interviews, participative observation, questionnaire, content analysis, meta-analysis and secondary analysis. Methods that have been used, are interviews with involved actors and content analysis of relevant documents. These methods are considered to answer the research question.
4.3.1 Content analysis

In a content analysis researchers study the content of existing data sources (Van Thiel, 2014, p.108). These data sources can be divided into primary and secondary data. Primary data is information that has not been created for research goals (Van Thiel, 2014, p. 102). Primary data has been collected for the specific purposes of the study. This data takes various form, such as policy documents, annual reports, legal papers, newsletters, reports, speeches etcetera (van Thiel, 2014, p.102). These data sources are usually traceable on the Internet. A wide range of selected documents related to the metropolitan region Twente have been primary data. Secondary data, however, is (statistical) data which is gathered by others and collected for different research purposes (van Thiel, 2014, p. 104). This research has barely used secondary data, because they were not considered relevant in order to answer the research question.

According to van Thiel (2014), there are two objectives of content analysis. First, content analysis is able to establish facts and opinions and second to reconstruct arguments used in the text (van Thiel, 2007, p.110). The logic behind the selection of the documents is based on these two objectives. First, the content of the document have provided enough information about the development of region Twente in order to make a chronical reconstruction. Second, the selected documents have offered different perspectives from different key actors involved in the constitution of the metropolitan region. For an overview of the selected documents, see Appendix I (p.95-97).

4.3.2 Interviews

The second research method of this study have been interviews. An interview can be structured, semi-structured or totally open. The structured interview is basically an oral version of a questionnaire (van Thiel, 2014, p.91). This type, however, does not contribute to the gathering of in-depth information, therefore this type of interviewing has not been used in this study. During open and semi-structured interviews, the researcher is able to gather more in-depth and specific information. The researcher can ask for explanation to get a better understanding of answers that will be given (van Thiel, 2014, p.94). Although an open interview does provide much in-depth information, it did not fit the deductive research design of this study. In the open interview type is it
difficult to establish on the operationalized variables derived from the theoretical framework. Hence, in this research, the interviews have been semi-structured which entails that the prepared questions or a number of topics were used as a guideline. These questions or topics were based on the operationalization of the key concepts derived from the theoretical framework (van Thiel, 2014, p.94).

Different respondents, from the advocacy coalitions, involved in the constitution of the metropolitan region have been selected. The selected respondents were the key actors in the advocacy coalitions, whom have been asked about their opinions, ideas and perceptions of the constitution of the metropolitan region Twente. For an overview of the selected respondents, see appendix II (pp. 98).

The design of a semi-structured interview involves a number of stages. First, the researcher starts with introducing the research topic. The researcher makes clear what the aim of the interview is, seeking consent to record the interview and reaffirming confidentially (Legard, Keegan & Ward, 2003). The second stage opens with easy opening questions. Answers to these questions deliver background and contextual information (Legard, Keegan & Ward, 2003). In the core part of the interview, and the third stage, the questioning will be more in-depth, touching upon the central themes of the research (Legard, Keegan & Ward, 2003). The interview will end with some last questions or suggestions, looking to the future and the researcher will ask the respondent for some additional information if necessary (Legard, Keegan & Ward, 2003)

4.4 Data analysis

In the analysis the results of interviews and retrieved documents have been investigated. The data is analyzed through coding. According to Babbie (2001, p.309), coding is a manner to convert raw data, such as written documents or interviews, into a standardized and readable form. According to Van Thiel (2014): ‘Coding creates the possibility to compare and merge research data, and discover certain patterns. These patterns can lead to conclusions (Van Thiel, 2014, p.176)’

Codes are key words, assigned to different kind of things such as opinions, facts, meanings, events, situations and so forth (Van Thiel, 2014, p.143). The codes have been based on the operationalization, described in paragraph 4.6. Three sorts of coding can be distinguished:
interpretative codes, thematic codes and descriptive codes. The first two sorts are based on the content (Van Thiel, 2014, p.146). The interpretative codes aim to generate an interpretation of a data fragment and the thematic codes are codes which identify parts of text linked to a common theme. As example, feeling can be seen as a thematic code. The thematic code feeling can be subdivided into different sorts of feeling, such as happy, sad, angry and jealous etcetera (Van Thiel, 2014, p.146). Descriptive codes, in contrast, are used to describe the characteristics of a data source or respondent (van Thiel, 2014, p. 147).

In this study, the codes have been incorporated in a code scheme. This scheme is divided the codes into several categories. The first category was the history of region Twente. This category has not been derived from the operationalization, but it has been used to make a reconstruction of the evolution of the region Twente. The codes of the other categories in the code scheme fit the operationalization in paragraph 4.6, though there is also room to add other codes.

With help from the software Atlas.ti the analysis of data have been accomplished. This program is a tool to systematically analyze the unstructured data (Ngalande & Mkwinda, 2013). Advantage of the use of Atlas.ti is that it will reduce time in comparison with coding data manually, which also includes a lot of paper prints (Ngalande & Mkwinda, 2013).

4.5 Validity and reliability

This paragraph will discuss the validity and reliability of this research. Two important indicators for the quality of this research are validity and reliability (Boeije, 2005, p.145). Validity is concerned with the question whether or not a study is well designed and to what extent it provides appropriate results that can be generalized. Reliability means that if a future researcher follows the same research methods and conducts the same case study all over again, the future researcher has to find the same results and conclusions (Yin, 2009).
4.5.1 Validity

For validity two types can be distinguished, namely: external and internal validity (van Thiel, 2014, p.49). External validity refers to the extent to which a study can be generalized (Van Thiel, 2014, p.49). Internal validity is concerned with the operationalization of the variables in relation to the research aim of this research. In other words, do you really measure what you are supposed to measure? When reflecting on the external validity of this research, it must be noticed that the external validity has been threatened because of the research design of this study. A one single case-study, has made it difficult to make generalizations. Still, the outcomes of this research can contribute to the development of the theory on the constitution of metropolitan region and the role of the tension between effective problem-solving and democratic legitimacy. Though, this is not believed to be a simple task (Yin, 2009), because there is no one-size-fits all model to the ordering of the metropolitan regions. Therefore, the external validity of this research has been considered as low. Yet, the internal validity of this research has been considered high because the indicators are derived from previous studies. This is done in order to minimalize systematic errors (constant bias) in the research. For instance, elements from the Sabatier’s Advocacy Coalition Framework have been used in order to measure the different belief systems.

4.5.2 Reliability

Van Thiel (2014) argues that reliability consists of two elements, namely accuracy and consistency. The latter concerns the ‘repeatability’ of the research findings. This entails that a study is reliable if the same measurement will give the same results over and over again, assuming that what is measured will not change (van Thiel, 2014). In order to guarantee replication good documentation about the procedures that has been followed in the in-depth case study is important (van Thiel, 2014). Yet, the small-N of this research probably hampers the replication of this study. The one single case study in this research is very specific wherein the beliefs of people are central. Through learning and other external factors, beliefs can change over time, which will probably give other outcomes. However, according to Yin (2009), the repeatability in this research can be enhanced by underpinning the considerations and motives to conduct the research the way it does, this will enable
future researches to conduct the research with the same outcomes. The other element of reliability, as stated by van Thiel (2014), is accuracy. This refers to the measurement instruments that will be used. Measuring the beliefs of involved actors does not conform with only a document analysis, it asks for a more reliable instruments such as in-depth interviews. In this study the variables have been measured by using different measurement instruments in order to measure the variable as properly as possible (van Thiel, 2014).

4.5.3 Triangulation

In order to deal with the low external validity and the repeatability caused by the small-N, triangulation have been applied to enhance the reliability and validity of a research (van Thiel, 2014, p.52). Triangulation entails that there is more than one method is used in the study (van Thiel, 2014, p.52).

Triangulation can be employed in four different manners, namely through (1) operationalization (several measures for one concept), (2) gathering information from different data sources, (3) several researches, (4) research methods. In this study, triangulation has been applied to the gathering of data. Information is not only collected from existing documents, but information has also be gathered from interviews with involved actors. In line with the latter, this research has also applies triangulation to research methods. This study has conducted interviews and as well as analyzing documents (Van Thiel, 2007, p.61). The use of triangulation provide more validity and reliability, because evidence is gained from different sources of data. The use of triangulation provides a way to control how reliable and valid the gathered data are. If, for example, results of one and the same subject are incomplete, further research is necessary (van Thiel, 2014).

4.6 Operationalization

Operationalization provides a crossover from the theoretical framework to the empirical findings. The operationalization of the key concepts of the theoretical framework will lead to the measurements tools, which enables measuring the abstract theoretical key concepts and variables in real-life situations. The key concepts or variables that have been operationalized are the existing belief systems of the involved actors, the resources and the network rules (strategies).
4.6.1 Belief systems

In order to determine the beliefs of the actors it is important to operationalize the belief systems of the actors involved. Although the Advocacy Coalition Framework of Sabatier (1998) distinguish three layers of beliefs, this thesis will particularly focus on the policy core beliefs and the secondary beliefs, because the advocacy coalition framework theory assumes that the policy core beliefs are the fundamental glue that sticks the advocacy coalition together. The deep core beliefs are beliefs that go beyond the policy subsystem and usually concern personal visions on society and the world. Therefore, they have not been measured in this research. In this study, policy core beliefs are defined as opinions which provide an image on how the metropolitan region of Twente should be constituted.

In order to measure the policy core beliefs of the involved actors, I have made use of the ‘checklist’ of normative and empirical dimensions of such beliefs (Sabatier, 1998, p. 112). This checklist have been applied to the case study in order to define the beliefs systems of the actors in the constitution of the metropolitan region. The operationalization of belief systems is summarized in the table 5 (below).

As shown in table 5, the first dimension of the belief system are the basic value priorities, which basically are the normative policy core beliefs. This dimension aims to answer the question on what values bases the advocacy coalition their ideas. In this study, these basic values has been measured by asking respondents about their ideas on the constitution of a metropolitan region. In chapter two of the theoretical framework two ideal types of multi-level governance in the metropolitan reform debate have been distinguished. These two types can be considered as two different belief systems on the constitution of the metropolitan region. Regarding legitimacy Type I considers input legitimacy as the basic value. Input legitimacy means that decisions that are made in the metropolitan region must represent the ‘will of the people’. Thus, political decisions should be made directly by the citizens or indirectly by representative electives whom represent the will of the constituents. Type II, on the other hand, regard output legitimacy as the basic value in the constitution of the metropolitan region. Output legitimacy is more focused on problem-solving and therefore decision-making is not exclusive to elected representatives. Decision-making is displaced beyond the representative electives, where private actors, civil society and citizens make decisions.
in order to solve a common problem. Output legitimacy is the extent the decisions, achieving the goals where citizens actively care about (Scharpf, 2003).

The second dimension is the identification of the groups whose welfare is of greatest concern. This means which groups should be involved and which groups are most affected by the consequences or outcomes according to the respondents.

The view on the problem is the third dimension, which concerns the perception of the problem. What is the problem according to the advocacy coalition? In the metropolitan debate this is the overlapping jurisdictions and the lack of democratic legitimacy. This will be measured by asking respondents about their opinion. The cause of the problem is the fourth dimension. What causes the problem? Type I supporters argue that the involvement of a wide range of public and private actors hampers the representative democracy because decision-making takes place beyond the representative bodies. Whereas Type I proponents claim that the involvement assures effective problem-solving and effective outcomes. The fifth dimension concerns the allocation of authority, which means the beliefs about the role and positions of the actors involved in the metropolitan region Twente.

The final dimension concerns the preferred solutions. This are specific instruments or proposals on dealing with the problem. Preferred solutions can also be seen as the secondary beliefs of the advocacy coalition. Secondary beliefs are the instrumental considerations on how to implement to policy core beliefs (Kübler, 2001; Sabatier & Weible, 2007). Type I supporters propose to constitute the region by introducing one regional authority, which serves as an complement body to the traditional intergovernmental system (Denters, Klok, Boogers & Sanders, 2016). Elected members of the municipal council represent their communities in governing board or regional councils (Zimmermann, 2014). The type II adherents, on the other hand, have a more polycentric solution in mind which means that different participants pool resources and knowledge together in order to solve common problems.
Table 3: Operationalization of belief systems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Belief system</th>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic core values</td>
<td></td>
<td>The normative beliefs of actors about the constitution of the region of Twente</td>
<td>- How is democratic legitimacy guaranteed in the region of Twente?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- What stakeholders should be involved in order to come to efficient problem-solving?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- To what extent do the policy outcomes of the region of Twente achieving the goals the residents of the region collectively care about (Scharpf, 2003)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification of groups whose welfare is of greatest concern</td>
<td></td>
<td>The affected groups involved in the constitution of the metropolitan region</td>
<td>Which groups or actors are affected by the actions and policy outcomes of the region of Twente?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>View on the problem and the cause of the problem</td>
<td></td>
<td>A problem is the discrepancy between the current situation and the preferred situation</td>
<td>What do you think of the current constitution of the region of Twente?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allocation of authority</td>
<td></td>
<td>The way the power to make decision is distributed to the actors involved in the constitution of the metropolitan region</td>
<td>Who should have the authority to make the decisions in the region?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preferred solutions (secondary aspects)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Specific instruments or proposals for dealing with the problem or achieving certain policy goals</td>
<td>How should the metropolitan region Twente be constituted?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Which policy domains should be addressed at the regional level?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.6.3 Resources

The beliefs systems determine in which direction the advocacy coalition will seek in order to achieve their objectives, however its ability to do so will be dependent upon its resources (Sabatier, 1988).
Resources are the instruments the members of the advocacy coalition have to realize their preferred outcomes. These instruments enable the advocacy coalition to carry out their strategies and influence the opposing advocacy coalition. Sabatier & Weible (2007) distinguishes the six following resources: (1) access to formal legal authority to make decisions, (2) financial resources, (3) mobilizable troops, (4) information, (5) public opinion and (6) leadership. Although conceptualizing each of these resources can be done very easily, operationalizing them seems to be extremely difficult (Sabatier & Weible, 2007). Therefore, I have decided that public opinion and leadership will not be measured in this study. The operationalization of the other resources in this thesis have been based on my understanding of the Advocacy Coalition Framework’s purpose of each resource and inspired by other studies.

Table 4: Operationalization of resources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resources</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Access to formal legal  authority</td>
<td>Members of a coalition have the formal legal authority to make decisions</td>
<td>The number of members with the authority to make decisions by law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial resources</td>
<td>Money available to the advocacy coalition for realizing their preferred outcomes</td>
<td>The amount of money available for the constitution of the metropolitan region Twente</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilizable troops</td>
<td>Supporters of the advocacy coalition connected to members of the advocacy coalitions whom share the same beliefs</td>
<td>Groups or organization outside the advocacy coalition which share the same opinions on the constitution of the metropolitan region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information</td>
<td>The extent of access to relevant information on the constitution of the metropolitan region Twente.</td>
<td>Which sources of information are available to the actors involved in the constitution of the metropolitan region?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.6.4 Network constitution strategies

A network constitution strategy is defined as a way to influence the constitution of the metropolitan region. Advocacy coalitions determine their strategies based on their policy core beliefs. With these strategies advocacy coalitions try to realize their preferred outcome. In the metropolitan region the minority advocacy coalition tries to alter the beliefs about the actors, institutions and perceptions of the dominant coalition in the network. In the table 6, below, I have operationalized the network constitution strategies by three dimensions; actors, institutions and perceptions. The strategies per dimension are derived from the theoretical framework. The first two strategies propose to change the rules in the network. Rules in the metropolitan region regulate the behavior of actors, specify what is and what is not permitted to do in the network, in what way actors come to decision and which actors are allowed to enter the network (Klijn, Koppenjan & Termeer, 1995).

The first dimension concerns the rules on actors in the network. This strategy aims to change the relations and position of actors in the region. The strategy will be measured by first looking at the existing position rules and boundary rules and secondly, see to in what way the opposing coalitions try to alter these rules. The second dimension relates to changing the institutions. In the theoretical framework a set of six rules were distinguished. However, the position and boundary rules are covered by the first strategy. The other four rules, which concern the information rules, action rules, decision rules and scope rules, are subjected to the second dimension. In the empirical analysis, I have first measured the existing rules of the dominant coalition and thereafter I have tried to figure out to what extent and in what way the opposing coalition want to change these rules. Finally, the third strategy entails reframing the perceptions of the dominant coalition. Reframing has been measured by asking the minority advocacy coalitions about their ideas of the functioning of the metropolitan region in order to determine to what extent it has changed the ideas and perceptions of the dominant advocacy coalition.
### Table 5: Operationalization of network constitution strategy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Sub dimensions</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actors</strong></td>
<td>Position rules</td>
<td>i. Which type of actors have a key position within the policy subsystem?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Specify the types of actors and the positions that actors may hold (Polski &amp; Ostrom 1999).</td>
<td>ii. Which positions do these actors hold?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Boundary rules</strong></td>
<td>Specify how and which participants enter or leave the network</td>
<td>Statements defining requirements for entry the network and when actors excluded from the network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutions</strong></td>
<td>Information rules</td>
<td>i. What information is available to participants in the network?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Clarify how and what information will be made available to participants in the network (Klijn &amp; Koppenjan, 2004).</td>
<td>ii. What participants have access to information?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Authority rules</strong></td>
<td>Specify the set of actions actors in certain positions are allowed to take (Polski &amp; Ostrom 1999)</td>
<td>Statements about the which actors should have the power to make decisions or carry out certain actions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Decision rules</strong></td>
<td>Determine how actors make decisions together</td>
<td>Statements that address how the actors make decisions together</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>a) power based decision – making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>b) consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>c) majority rule decision-making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Scope rules</strong></td>
<td>Specify what (policy) areas should fall within the jurisdiction of the region.</td>
<td>i. Where the region should set their cornerstones?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceptions</td>
<td>Reframing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Changing the ideas about the functioning and the substantive problems of the metropolitan region Twente (Klijn, Koppenjan &amp; Termeer, 2005)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ii. What policy domains should fall under the authority of the regional level?

| Statements about where the region Twente should stand for, where should the region Twente aim what should be the relations between actors in the region. |

4.6.5 Outcomes

The dependent variable is the outcome, which is the preferred constitution of the metropolitan region Twente. In the theoretical framework two possible constitutional arrangements in the constitution of the metropolitan region were distinguished: type I of multi-level governance or type II of multi-level governance. The former favors a monocentric solution. Type I wants to constitute the metropolitan region Twente according to the traditional constitutional system, based on the representative democracy, whereas the latter stands for a more polycentric solution to the constitution of the metropolitan region Twente. This means a network of a variety of public institutions from different governance levels and other private stakeholders who work together and bring together their resources in order to solve common problems.
5. Constituting the metropolitan region Twente

5.1 Introduction
This chapter is an introductory chapter to the results. The chapter will start with a case description of (metropolitan) regions in the Netherlands. Thereafter in the third paragraph, I will introduce the case of the region of Twente. Lastly, in the final paragraph, I will give a profound description of the current developments in the region of Twente in order to become more understanding of the current situation in the region of Twente.

5.2 History of metropolitan regions in the Netherlands
Intermunicipal cooperation in large urban regions is a long-standing debate in the Netherlands. This debate started in 1946. The national government aimed to establish a new layer between the province and municipalities: the district. However, the government experienced much resistance against this idea from the national parliament. The parliament sought to avoid the establishment of an additional governmental tier, which might jeopardize the house of Thorbecke² (Castenmiller & Peters, 2016). Instead, the national government decided to implement the Joints Regulations Act (Wet Gemeenschappelijke Regelingen or WGR Act). The WGR Act was enacted to stimulate and regulate cooperation between local authorities (Hulst, 2005; Castenmiller & Peters, 2016).

In 1960, with the national policy report on spatial planning, the debate on cooperation in major urban areas was reborn. The note on spatial planning plead for the consolidation of small cities and called for attention to the large cities which rapidly were growing beyond their territorial and historical borders. These cities asked for new organizational models in order be able to deal with problems of suburbanization such as spatial planning and housing. Although the central government acknowledged the problems caused by the growth of the cities, they did not agree to upscale the local level into larger local entities (Castenmiller & Peters, 2016). Yet in 1969, some policy areas became too small for the national and provincial government, but too large for the municipalities to

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² The House of Thorbecke is a metaphor for the three territorial tiers (central, intermediate and local level) of government in the Netherlands.
handle. Therefore, in order to close the gap between provincial level and the municipalities, the national government proposed to extent the WGR Act (Castenmiller & Peters, 2016). The national government suggested for the introduction of ‘Gewesten’, translated as small-scale city provinces. Municipalities could decide themselves in what way and if they wanted to form ‘Gewesten’. However, in the 1970s the proposal for small-scale city provinces was disapproved by the parliament out of fear for a new tier of government.

At the end of 1980s, the discussion about the organization of metropolitan areas was re-opened in a report by the Committee-Montijn (External Committee for Urban Policies (Castenmiller & Peters, 2016)). The Committee claimed that, in order to compete with other European regions, the seven major city regions should strengthen their positions by creating new governance structures for the metropolitan areas (Hulst, 2005). The national government did not want to reorganize the regions from ‘top down’ and therefore the seven major urban areas i.e. metropolitan regions, including Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Den Haag, Eindhoven, Utrecht, Arnhem-Nijmegen and Twente, were invited to form and set up new regional cooperative arrangements (Hulst, 2005). In 1994, these ideas about regional cooperation were written down in a special act, the so-called Kaderwet, which entrusted the new regional authorities with the responsibilities for public housing, infrastructure and transport, and regional economic development. The seven city regions were meant to be temporary and serve as a stepping stone to the establishment of city-provinces (Hulst, 2005). However, after much discussion and resistance from citizens of the different cities in the region, the idea of city provinces was dropped (Hulst, 2005; Castenmiller & Peter, 2016).

Therefore, in 2006, the Kaderwet was followed up by the Joint Regulations plus Act (WGR Plus Act), where, unlike the Joint Regulations Act which is characterized by voluntary cooperation, cooperation between the municipalities in the major urban areas or the so-called WGR plus regions, became mandatory. Several tasks and responsibilities from the municipalities and provinces were devoted to the WGR plus regions (Castenmiller & Peters, 2016). The WGR plus regions were governed by autonomous regional institutions compromising representatives from the municipalities in the region. The city regions offered public services that single municipalities themselves could not efficiently provide (Hulst, 2005). These regions had sufficient power to coordinate local government
policies, such as transport, spatial planning, housing, infrastructure and economic affairs (Hulst, 2005). Moreover, some WGR plus regions also worked together on other policy areas, for instance health, safety and environment.

However, the increasing power of the city regions became, again, the subject of many political and administrative debates. The very wide powers of the city regions were not accepted by the municipalities. Policy making at the regional level crossed the jurisdictional borders of the municipalities and was hardly impressible to political control by the elected local councils (Hulst, 2005; Castenmiller & Peters, 2016). Eventually this discussion eliminated the mandatory cooperation in the WGR plus regions. In 2015, the national government dropped the Act on WGR plus regions. This meant that cooperation between municipalities in the city regions was no longer obligatory. The national government wanted to prevent that the WGR plus regions became a new tier of government, which departed from the traditional constitutional structure of the Netherlands, which consists of three levels of government, a central intermediate and local level (Castenmiller & Peters, 2016).

Voluntary collaboration in the regions was still possible, as it did not threaten the house of Thorbecke. In some city regions the collaboration ceased to exist, but most city regions, including the region of Twente, searched for other possibilities to work together.

5.3 The region of Twente

Twente is a region situated in the East of the Netherlands and inhabits around 626 thousand people (Regio Twente, 2017). The region of Twente has a long history of collaboration. From the 1960s onwards attempts were made to foster collaboration in the region of Twente (Benneworth, 2005). In the end of the 1970s ‘Gewest Twente’, a regional authority had been created, covering what were at that moment the 22 municipalities within the historical boundaries of the Region of Twente (Benneworth, 2005). The regional council aimed for a provincial status in order to obtain more resources for the region. However, this proposal was defeated by the national parliament. Instead, the region of Twente became one of the seven city regions, covered by the Kaderwet. The Act was meant to be temporary and to serve as a way to the establishment of city-provinces (Castenmiller & Peters, 2016). As part of the Kaderwet, the fourteen municipalities established the institution Twente
Region\(^3\), which functioned as the new regional authority. This new regional authority was entrusted with responsibilities for housing, infrastructure and transport, regional economic development. In 2006, the Kaderwet was followed up by the Joint Regulations Plus Act (\textit{WGR Plus Act}). Under the WGR Plus Act cooperation in the region was mandatory. (De) centralized tasks from the municipalities and the national government were devoted to the Twente Region. The region of Twente was governed by the Regioraad, consisting of two members of each municipality: a city councilor and an alderman. The Regioraad had the control over several policy domains, such as infrastructure and transport, spatial planning, housing, environment and economic development.

However, in 2015 due to the abolishment of the WGR+ Act cooperation between the fourteen municipalities in the region was no longer mandatory. In the transition period of a year the municipalities got the opportunity to review the cooperation in the region of Twente. After the abolition of the WGR Plus Act, it was no longer obligatory to transfer the powers of the municipal councils to the regional level. Therefore, in the new constitutional arrangement, the fourteen municipalities eliminated the idea of one regional authority of government, as underlying in the WGR + Act. The municipalities agreed that cooperation in the region should be based on the principle of ‘local subsidiarity’.

‘Our primary focus is on the local domain, the regional domain will only be addressed if the local domain fall short (...) we will not delegate [our tasks] to a regional government, but we will organize it ourselves, individually and in mutual cooperation (Stuurgroep \textit{Heroriëntatie Twentse Samenwerking, April 13, 2015}).

Local autonomy and subsidiarity are the guiding constitutional principles in the region of Twente. Instead of top-down compulsory regional collaboration, the municipal councils determine themselves on which policy domains there will be regional cooperation. In other words, regional cooperation is

\(^3\) Note that \textit{Twente Region} is the joint venture of the fourteen municipalities in the region and the \textit{region of Twente} concerns the policy subsystem, which is the territorial space where the constitution of the (metropolitan) region of Twente takes place.
on voluntary basis. The municipalities can decide themselves if they aim to join the ‘coalition of the willing’. The ‘coalition of the willing’ comprises a group of municipalities who decide to work together on a certain policy domain in order to decrease their transaction costs (Stuurgroep Heroriëntatie Twentse Samenwerking, April 13, 2015).

In this new constitutional arrangement the fourteen municipalities have a central position. The fourteen municipalities operate in a joint venture called the Twente Region. However, as opposed to the cooperation under WGR Plus ACT, the tasks of the municipal councils are no longer transferred to the Twente Region. At the regional level fifteen members, one alderman of every municipality and the major of the largest city in the region as chairman, take seat in the general board of the Twente Region. The general board can be considered as the regional ‘council’ of the region of Twente The general board has the coordination task between the various policy domains in which municipalities cooperate through their portfolio holders. The daily board is responsible for the day-to-day management, which entails preparing and implementing decisions of the general board. The daily board consists of three members, appointed by the general board.

The veto positions in the region are hold by the fourteen municipalities or more specifically, the authority to take action lies with the portfolio holders. The portfolio holders in the region are ‘in the lead’. Portfolio holders (translated as portefeuillehouders in Dutch) are aldermen who are responsible for a certain policy domain in their own municipality. The portfolio holders meet at regional level in special gatherings or in steering committees. Steering committees are formal meetings of the portfolio holders on a certain policy domain such as regional economy, public health care, youth care, safety and tourism. In the steering committee the portfolio holders have the power to make decisions over a certain policy area.

The portfolio holder is accountable to their own municipal council which means that the political control and accountability remains anchored to the municipal councils of the fourteen autonomous municipalities. In this way the Twente Region guarantees their democratic legitimacy (Stuurgroep Heroriëntatie Twentse Samenwerking, April 13, 2015). The general board transfers their decision-making power to a steering committee.
The 346 local politicians of the fourteen municipalities take seat in the ‘Twenteraad’ (translated as the Twente council). The members have an informational and advisory role. The Twente council members share developments in Twente and they establish the regional agenda for each administrative period. The board of the Twente Region is responsible for the implementation of this regional agenda.

The decisions in the Twente Region are made by formal voting procedures. The general board decides through consensus and sometimes, to be more efficient, the general board decide on majority rules decision-making (Stuurgroep Heroriëntatie Twentse Samenwerking, April 13, 2015). Decisions in the steering committees are made by majority rule decision-making. A valid decision can only be taken in a meeting in which at least half of the members is present (Regio Twente, 2016). Regarding the information rules, there is an open exchange of information through Extranet, which is an internal electronic network. Local politicians, civil servants and staff of the Twente Region get informed about meetings and decisions of the general board of the Twente Region. Background information and relevant information on meetings and decisions can also be found on also Extranet. For people, for example, citizens, whom have no access to the Extranet information about meetings and decisions are available on the website of the Twente Region.

With the new constitutional structure that entered into force on January 2016, the debate on the proper constitutional arrangement in the region of Twente appeared to be a ‘case closed’, but nothing was less true. Not long after the constitutional arrangement entered into force, as a result of the substantial debate about the new regional investment program, new questions and ideas came up around the constitutional arrangement of the region of Twente (Tubantia, September 2016).

5.4 The ‘bumpy’ road to a new Agenda of Twente

In the region of Twente, the strengthening of the social-economic structure of the region became one of the main tasks, since the region lay behind on the economic developments of other regions in the Netherlands (Agenda van Twente, n.d.). For that reason, the fourteen municipalities, in cooperation with the province of Overijssel, drew up a joint multi-annual investment program: the Agenda of Twente (Lohuis & Derksen, 2007). The aim of the Agenda of Twente was to belong to the
top five of the European regions and the top two of the Dutch regions in the field of innovation and technology. The municipalities invested 80 million euro in the Agenda of Twente for innovation programs, labor market, leisure economy and mobility in the region of Twente. The Agenda of Twente has a term of ten years and will end in 2017. Whether the Agenda of Twente will get a follow up after 2017 depends on the preferences of the fourteen municipalities.

In 2016, with the ending of the important regional investment program (Agenda of Twente) in sight and the new constitutional arrangement that entered in force, regional cooperation became a ‘hot issue’ in the region of Twente. A debate emerged around the question whether the region of Twente needed a new regional economic agenda (Agenda of Twente).

In February 2016 the general board of the Twente Region unanimously decided to set up a steering committee for the Agenda of Twente. This committee must deal with the evaluation of the Agenda of Twente (2007-2017) and the exploration and preparation of a new Agenda of Twente. From each municipality one alderman takes a seat in the steering committee and also two members with an advisory role take part. This will be one member of the Twenteboard and one deputy from the Province of Overijssel, with the portfolio Economy. However, before the general board of the Twente Region can formalize the steering committee. The rules in region of Twente prescribe that the municipal councils should be given the opportunity to express their concerns and preferences about the establishment of the new steering committee. All the municipal councils gave their permission to form a steering committee for the Agenda of Twente. In this way, the steering committee started evaluating the Agenda of Twente (2007-2017).

In June 2016, the steering committee presented the results of the evaluation of the Agenda of Twente (2007-2017). In response to these results of the evaluation a group of entrepreneurs, urban architects, and, at the same time, ‘Twentse’ citizens exposed the mutual cooperation in the region of Twente. They united themselves in the Taskforce Regio Metropool Twente. The evaluation of the Agenda of Twente (2007-2017) and the ideas to develop a new Agenda provided a window of opportunity for the taskforce to denounce the current constitutional arrangement. According to the taskforce, stakeholders in the region of Twente act in an environment with a complex set of issues, different interests and a diversity of involved actors. Answers to
complex societal problems in the region, such as climate change, security, migration climate and sustainability, require intense cooperation between the municipalities, at regional level (Manifest Regio metropool Twente, 2016). The region of Twente has to form a metropolitan region where municipalities, in close contact with the private sector, civil society organization and citizens, work together in a network.

‘In order to establish a metropolitan region Twente, the large scale [regional level] need to go hand in hand with small scale [local level]. In order to achieve our common goals, we need to do as much as possible at the large scale, and yet at small scale we need to guarantee the identity and goals of the existing communities. In the metropolitan region Twente, the fourteen municipalities decide, together with private stakeholders, at which domains cooperation is necessary at regional level and which affairs are cared for at local level in order to achieve effective results(Taskforce Metropolitan Region Twente, September 7, 2016)’.

In a letter to the fourteen municipal councils the taskforce asked the members of the fourteen municipal councils to seriously investigate contemplate their ideas during the Twenteraad in September 2016. During this Twenteraad, the municipal councils discussed the results of the evaluation of the Agenda of Twente. The main question during the gathering was if the municipalities, considering the results of the Agenda of Twente (2007-2017), wanted to invest in a new Agenda of Twente. On the basis of the results of the evaluation all the city councils decided to develop a new Agenda of Twente. In this way they gave the steering committee the start sign and permission to develop a new Agenda.

At the end of 2016, the Twenteboard provided opinions on the future Agenda of Twente. The Twenteboard is an economic board with ten representatives from the industry sectors, education and research institutions and governments. The Twenteboard argues that a thriving economy in the region is essential in order to tackle societal challenges in the regions. The Twente Region has to develop itself as a high-tech technology region.
On 18 January 2017 the city councils had the opportunity to provide input for the new Agenda of Twente. Especially the rural cities called for more attention to the agricultural sector and to the livability in rural areas. The city councils also asked to pay more attention to the bottom-end of the labor market.

Meanwhile, the taskforce members visited the different municipalities in the region, and spoke to different city councilors and experts on regional cooperation. They were propagating the constitution of a metropolitan region Twente and raised questions, such as: ‘Why do we collaborate in the region of Twente?’ and ‘Where should the region of Twente stand for?’ The taskforce aimed to change the existing ideas on regional collaboration and urge the municipalities to join their forces at the regional level.

The taskforce seized the debate around the agenda as an opportunity to draw attention to their own ideas about the region of Twente. In order to achieve their purposes, the members of the advocacy coalition decided to change their strategy by focusing on the development of the Agenda of Twente:

‘At one moment, the Agenda of Twente became hot-issue. The Agenda is about how they – the established order – see the Region of Twente. It is important to adopt an attitude towards the Agenda, because all the important stakeholders play a role in the development of the Agenda of Twente (personal communication, May 29, 2017)’

On the basis of input from the Twenteboard, the fourteen city councils and conversations with the business sector, research and education institutions, the steering committee developed a conceptual version of the Agenda of Twente.

In April 2017, the steering committee presented the main themes of the conceptual version of the new Agenda of Twente to the city councilors and to the members of the triple helix (referred to in Dutch as the 4O’s: overheid, onderwijs, onderzoek en ondernemers), which represent the research and educational institutions, and the industry sector. The objective of the new Agenda of Twente is to put the region of Twente on the (inter)national map as a technological top region. In the
Agenda of Twente technology is central in the constitution of the region of Twente. Technology is seen as the leverage to provide innovative answers to societal issues in and from the various policy domains.

‘Who says Twente, says technology (concept Agenda voor Twente, May 17, 2017)’.

With technology as the basis, the Agenda endeavors – through circular economy – to strengthening the labor market, encouraging sustainability and improving the attractiveness of the region of Twente for industrial location by developing favorable conditions for establishing businesses such as better accessibility to the region (concept Agenda voor Twente, May 17, 2017).

In order to make the New Agenda a success, it was important that every municipality would invest certain amount of money. The proposed amount of the steering committee is to invest 7,50 euro per capita in the region. On the one hand, the amount calls for resistance from some municipalities. They ask: ‘if I invest money, to what extent does my own city benefit from the investment?’ They believe it is unclear what the money will be used for. On the other hand, however, the Twenteboard, for instance argues that the 7,50 per capita is too low if we want to be the top region in the Netherlands. Following the conceptual version, the Taskforce again sent a letter to the municipal councils. In the letter the taskforce made appeal to widen the scope of the agenda. In the Agenda the steering committee puts their efforts on improving the regional economy, which will also provide answers to other social problems in the region of Twente. The steering committee considers technology as the key in the development of a strong region of Twente. However, the taskforce considers that the solution - technology as the engineer of a stronger region - is too narrow and lacks attention for societal challenges in the region, such as demographic decline, green energy, and preservation of public facilities, culture and art (personal communication, May 29, 2017). The taskforce asks for a wider scope, which involves more attention for and focus to other social issues in the collaboration at regional level and less focus on the economic aspects.

The taskforce also calls on the municipal councilors to introduce a new constitutional arrangement with the introduction of the new Agenda of Twente. In the region of Twente there has to be non-voluntary collaboration on specific policy domains and also citizens and other private actors should have the opportunity to influence the decision-making processes in the region. Face
–to – face gatherings and digital platform where politicians, citizens, entrepreneurs and business are involved, determine what will happen at the local level and what at the regional level. However, the taskforce got little to no response to their letter.

At 12 May 2017 the final version of the Agenda of Twente is sent to the municipal councils for adoption of the new Agenda. If the municipalities and the O’s agree with the final version, the steering committee will make, together with the 4O’s elaborate on how the agenda will implemented and managed.

In June and July 2017 the final version is discussed within the separate municipal councils. The councils have to decide if they want to join the ‘coalition of willing’. However, the councils gave a lot of remarks on the final version of the agenda – in terms of both substance and finance. Although the municipalities agreed on the main elements of the Agenda of Twente, several doubts were raised, such as: do we really need the regional level in order to solve our local problems? What is in it for me if I invest in the Agenda of Twente? The municipalities keep balancing between their own residents and the residents of the Region of Twente. The end of July 2017 will show whether all the municipalities join the new Agenda of Twente.

Table 6: Timeline of events in the debate on the Agenda of Twente

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 2016</td>
<td>The new constitutional structure comes into force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2016</td>
<td>The general board of the Twente Region suggest to introduce a steering committee Agenda of Twente. This committee will be responsible for the evaluation of the Agenda of Twente and the preparation of a new Agenda of Twente.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March – June 2016</td>
<td>The city councils are asked to accept the appointment of the new steering committee ‘Agenda of Twente’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date Range</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June – September 2016</td>
<td>The municipal councils got the opportunity to discuss the results of the evaluation of the Agenda of Twente within their own councils.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 September 2016</td>
<td>The Taskforce member sends a letter to the fourteen city councils.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 September 2016</td>
<td>Debate about the results of the evaluation of the Agenda of Twente (2007-2017) in the Twenteraad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October – November 2016</td>
<td>The municipal councils decided if they would support a new regional agenda.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November – December 2016</td>
<td>Exploration of the aspirations and objectives in the region of Twente.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 January 2017</td>
<td>The Twente board presents its advice rapport on the new agenda of Twente. The municipal councils get the opportunity to give input on the new Agenda of Twente.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 March 2017</td>
<td>Twenteboard and steering committee Agenda of Twente gather in order to further specify the Agenda of Twente.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 April 2017</td>
<td>The municipal council respond to the conceptual version.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 May 2017</td>
<td>The Taskforce send a new letter to the city councils.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 May 2017</td>
<td>The final version of the Agenda is send to the city councils.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June – July 2017</td>
<td>The fourteen municipalities vote in their municipal councils if they want to join and invest the Agenda of Twente.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2017</td>
<td>All the municipal council have made a decision if they want to take part in the Agenda of Twente.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. A renewed metropolitan reform debate

6.1 Introduction

The previous chapter has shown the debate around the process of the development of the Agenda of Twente. Underlying the development of the new regional economic agenda of Twente different issues are being discussed. On the one hand, a group of actors aims for institutional reform of the current constitutional arrangement in order to guarantee effective problem-solving in the region, while on the other hand, different demands on the role of democratic legitimacy in region are present.

This chapter will describe the empirical findings of this research. The results are gathered through analyzing the independent variables, which have been carefully operationalized in chapter four. Based on the argumentation and statements of the different actors on the constitution of the metropolitan region Twente, there has been made a distinction between advocates and opponents in the constitution of the metropolitan region of Twente. Each actor in the region, in favor or against the reconstitution of the metropolitan region, seek for allies in order to form themselves in advocacy coalitions. The coalitions are distinguished in a dominant coalition and minority coalition, both adhere to another approach towards the constitution of the metropolitan region Twente. These two approaches will be discussed in the first two paragraphs. Thereafter, I will discuss the strategies both the advocacy coalitions use and the role of their resources in the constitution of the metropolitan region. Finally, I will summarize the results of the analysis and discuss how the policy core beliefs, resources and strategies affect the outcome of the constitution of the metropolitan region Twente.

6.2 Supporters of the type II system

In the region of Twente, one group of actors urgently asks for the reconstitution of the region of Twente. This group of actors consists of members of the Taskforce Regio Metropool Twente, which is a group of active citizens and entrepreneurs with different background in terms of knowledge and experiences in the governance of the region of Twente. This group is considered as one of the two advocacy coalitions and will be referred to as the minority coalition because the members of the advocacy coalition seek to influence the ideas and preferences of the dominant coalition. The
preference of the dominant coalition in the region of Twente is to maintain the current constitutional arrangement of the region. As a result of dissatisfaction with this current arrangement, the entrepreneurs established the Taskforce Regio Metropool Twente. The aim of the taskforce is to fulfill the role of initiator or an advocate for the reconstitution of the metropolitan region of Twente. As one member of the Taskforce explained it:

‘We established the taskforce because of a shared sense of discontent with the current situation in the Region of Twente (...) the present organization is far from effective, and under no circumstances capable of overseeing the urgency, nature and scope of problems in important policy areas in the region (personal communication, May 29, 2017)’.

There seems to be lack of a strong will of the members in the dominant coalition to produce collective responses to cross-border problems and their consequences. According to the respondents of the minority coalition this is caused by the fact that the municipalities in the region of Twente tend to pursue their own interest, rather than looking for the welfare of the region as a whole. This is reinforced by the constitutional arrangement of the region of Twente (personal communication, May 26, 2017). The members of the minority coalition urge that the existing constitutional arrangement of the region of Twente has to be reformed in order to solve cross-border problems in the region efficiently. The dominant coalition has not consciously thought about collaboration at the different levels of scales in the region, which ensures efficient solutions to common problems. The cooperation between the different stakeholders in the region of Twente is considered as too loosely and informal. The minority would like to see more obligatory cooperation in the region. However, intensive and obligatory cooperation is hampered by the ‘coalition of the willing’ regulation. This means that the municipalities have the opportunity to ‘opt-out’ from regional cooperation on different policy domains.

The minority coalition believes that solving complex social issues in the region of Twente requires far-reaching regional cooperation. Therefore, the minority coalition pleas for the constitution of a metropolitan region Twente, which entails that in order to solve collective problems in the region,
the municipalities should concentrate around policy problems or domains instead of the right jurisdiction. The ‘cross-border’ collective problems in the region have to lead the regional cooperation. For some collective problems it is more efficient to solve problems at the regional scale, while other social issues ask for solutions on smaller scale. In the metropolitan region Twente, different actors with overlapping domains of responsibility search for the right scale for solving a certain issue. For this reason, it can be argued that the minority coalition tend to lean towards type II-system of multi-level governance.

Concerning democratic legitimacy, the minority coalition believes that in order to come to effective problem-solving it is necessary that people who are directly affected by the problem, such as citizens or private actors should also have influence on the outcome (solution). The minority coalition believes that legitimacy is more than just representation by elective representatives. According to the minority coalition decisions in the region of Twente have to be made on the basis of the best available and inclusive information about the issue at stake, rather than on partisan interests from a restricted group of stakeholders. Democratic legitimacy should be enhanced by direct participation of citizens, civil society and other private actors than the usual suspects. The minority coalition argues that solely indirect participation of citizens is old-fashioned or as one member of the coalition puts it: ‘The established order [dominant coalition] has an outdated idea of local democracy (personal communication, May 29, 2017)’. Other arrangements are necessary to involve citizens and other private actors in the regional decision-processes (personal communication, May 29, 2017).

However, it is remarkable that although the minority coalition favors the type II of multi-level governance, the coalition is convinced that the constitution of a metropolitan region Twente also entails the displacement of local power to the regional level. Thus, the minority coalition would like to create a polycentric network, with one regional authority instead of multiple decision-making centers. In other words, the minority coalition would like to see the constitution of ‘one municipality Twente’ (personal communication, May 29, 2017). This monocentric solution to the metropolitan region contrast strongly with the way the minority coalition wants to solve problems in the region.
6.3 Supporters of the type I system

The dominant coalition does not really react to the plea of the minority coalition for the reconstitution of the region of Twente. The members of the dominant coalition are willing to equip regional cooperation, as long as their local powers will not be jeopardized. The municipalities do not want to handover their powers to the regional level, because the autonomy of the municipalities remains the most important basic value in regional cooperation. As a result, regional collaboration in the region of Twente depends on decision-making between all the municipalities involved.

The dominant advocacy coalition is mainly compromised of public actors and is considered as the dominant player, because most of the members hold the power to make decisions in the policy subsystem i.e. the regional network. The coalition consists of the fourteen municipalities, including Almelo, Borne, Dinkelland, Enschede, Hof van Twente, Haaksbergen, Hellendoorn, Hengelo, Losser, Oldenzaal, Rijssen-Holten, Tubbergen, Twenterand en Wierden, which are the key actors within the coalition. These fourteen municipalities work together in a joint venture, called the Twente Region. Furthermore, the Twenteboard is also part of the dominant coalition. The Twenteboard is an economic board with ten representatives from the industry sector, educational sector, research institutions and other governments. The board aims to develop the region of Twente as one of the leading top region in Europe on the area of technology.

As outlined at the beginning of this sub-paragraph, the dominant coalition values the strict distinction between the different tiers of government and their autonomy. The dominant coalition wants to preserve the traditional structure of intergovernmental relations in the Netherlands. The institutionalized rules determine what role the different levels of governments should have in the system. The Dutch administrative structure is based on the House of Thorbecke, which means that there are three traditional levels of authority (the central, intermediate and local level). As the history has shown, this principle has many times been used to block the constitution of regional authorities. A new tier of government or a regional authority can jeopardize the ‘central, intermediate and local level’ structure.
Regarding legitimacy, the dominant coalition put their emphasis on input or democratic legitimacy. Elected representatives translated ‘the will of the people’ i.e. represent the interests of their constituencies. In regional cooperation democratic legitimacy should be guaranteed through institutional and electoral systems. The elected representatives have to mandate the rule and manage social issues. Input legitimacy in the region of Twente is rooted in the municipal councils. In other words, the democratic legitimacy in the region is based on the local decision-making processes. Although the dominant coalition also believes that it is necessary to work with other (private) actors if you want to solve problems that cross the borders of the cities, the formal decision-making powers stick to the elected representatives.

Concluding, the dominant coalition seems to lean towards the type I of multi-level governance, because they favor a clear distinction between levels of governments, jurisdictions and tasks. The idea of the constitution of the metropolitan region Twente calls for resistance from the local governments which are afraid of losing their powers and that it will jeopardize democratic legitimacy, which is anchored in the municipal councils.

6.4 Resources

The ability of an advocacy coalition to pursue its policy core beliefs is to a certain extent determined by its resources. The advocacy coalitions’ resources which were identified in the literature, include access to formal legal authority to make decisions, financial resources, mobilizable troops and access to information. In table 7 (below) an overview is given on the available resources of each advocacy coalition. It is not very surprising that the dominant coalition has many members who have access to formal legal authority, because most of the members are public actors with the formal legal authority to make decisions. The minority coalition, however, lacks members with formal legal authority. The taskforce exists of eight members with no legal authority to make decisions. However, the members do have connections in their own network whom in their turn have access to members with formal legal authority. Regarding the financial resources, the dominant coalition is dependent on the municipalities, business sector and the province of Overijssel. Their amount of financial resources is relatively high compared to the minority coalition. The taskforce works on voluntary
basis and has no financial partners which support them. Therefore, in order to realize their preferred outcomes, the minority coalition relies more on the mobilization of troops than the dominant coalition. The minority coalition has various mobilizable troops who support the ideas of the taskforce:

‘We have spoken with many stakeholders in the region. Different officials, entrepreneurs and policy makers in the region, such as the Groene Metropool Twente, Architecture Centrum Twente and the Embassy of Twente, support our ideas (personal communication, May 26, 2017).’

They also have easy access to the regional newspaper Twentse Courant Tubantia. The regional paper has set up ‘shadow-Twenteboard’ referring to the official Twenteboard. The ‘shadow-Twenteboard’ weekly report ideas about the future of the region of Twente of citizens with different backgrounds. Since the minority coalition lacks the monetary resources and members with formal legal authority the minority coalition uses mobilizable troops to put pressure on the decision-makers in the dominant coalition, from the outside. Regarding the mobilizable troops of the dominant coalition, it was difficult to determine which actors support the ideas of the dominant coalition. The dominant coalition is supported by actors, such as the actors in the Triple Helix, who want to maintain the status quo.

As to the resource information, it is interesting to notice that both coalitions were informed by the same reports about the current situation in the region of Twente. However, the two opposing coalitions interpret the reports for their own benefit. The minority coalition also searched for supportive information by experts and researches outside their advocacy coalition in order to demonstrate the opposite or to fund their own ideas. Yet the minority coalition partly depends on the dominant coalition in terms of information about the process and constitution of the Agenda of Twente. The minority coalition experienced difficulties with access to information about the constitution of the Agenda of Twente. As one respondent pointed out: ‘Several times we have asked for information about the Agenda for Twente, but we do not receive anything (personal communication, May 29, 2017)’. The dominant coalition possesses the information about the
development of the Agenda of Twente. However, on the website of the Twente Region, everyone has access to documents about the constitution of the Agenda of Twente.

**Table 7: Overview of the available resources of the advocacy coalitions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Legal authority</th>
<th>Financial resources</th>
<th>Mobilizable troops</th>
<th>Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coalition A</strong></td>
<td>(+)⁴</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>(+/-)</td>
<td>(+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coalition B</strong></td>
<td>(–)</td>
<td>(–)</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>(+/-)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In conclusion, the access to legal authority is considered the most important resource in the constitution of the metropolitan region. The minority coalition puts pressure and influence on the dominant coalition, but without the authority to make decisions it is hardly possible to change the organizational and constitutional structure of the region of Twente.

**6.5 Reforming the constitutional arrangement**

Network constitution strategies are focused on realizing changes or even reforms in the network. Advocacy coalitions, in this case the minority coalition, use strategies in order to transform their beliefs into preferred outcomes. Among these strategies we find changing the composition of actors in the network, changing the rules of the network and reframing the ideas of the dominant coalition.

⁴ The (+) indicates that the resource is available to the advocacy coalition. The (+/-) specifies that the advocacy coalition possesses the resource, but not as strong as the opposing advocacy coalition. The (–) indicates that the advocacy coalition does not have the resource at its disposal.
6.5.1 Reframing beliefs

In this case-study the main strategy of the members of the minority coalition have been changing the perceptions i.e. beliefs of the dominant coalition on the constitution of the region of Twente. The minority coalition aims to reconstitute the region of Twente into a metropolitan region Twente. In order to change or reframe the beliefs of the dominant coalition about the constitution of the metropolitan region Twente, the members of the minority coalition raised questions about the current constitutional arrangement in the region of Twente, such as: What should be the relations between actors in the region? Where should the region Twente stand for? Which problems should be solved at the regional level? Through participating in the debate about the Agenda of Twente, the minority coalition encouraged involved actors to put their own ideas and beliefs into perspective. According to the minority coalition:

‘The vision, urgency, utility and necessity to collaborate [in the region of Twente] is unclear. The why question is imprecise. Why do we need to cooperate? What do we need to collaborate and how do we need to form this? These are questions you can only answer when the why question is evident (personal communication, May 26, 2017)’.

In the debate around the Agenda of Twente, the minority coalition tries to reframe the approach of the Agenda of Twente with the end to change the perspective on the constitutional arrangement in the region of Twente. The agenda of Twente puts great emphasize on technology and on strengthening the regional economy. Technology has to be the catalyst for the developments in the region of Twente (Agenda voor Twente, 2017). The minority coalition argues to view collaboration in the region of Twente not only from the technological perspective. The dominant coalition has to give greater emphasis to cross-sectoral problems and the interaction between different levels of scales.

6.5.2 (Changing) the existing rules

As regards to the strategy on changing the rules in the network, the minority coalition primarily desires to change the position rules, the boundary rules, the authority rules and the scope rules.
First, beginning with the position and boundary rules, the minority coalition claims that the current regional network lacks important stakeholders. According to the minority coalition, there is only case of partial involvement of the important stakeholders in the region. Other stakeholders should be included, for example, stakeholders from the agriculture and cultural sectors or citizens whom are directly affected by the decisions. Currently, the Twente Region works together with actors in the Triple Helix, which entails a partnership between government, universities and other educational institutions, research institutions and the industry sector. Secondly, the minority coalition endeavors to alter the authority rules. The members of the minority coalition would like to see the authority taking actions for the region lies with decisive regional decision-making instead of regional cooperation based on local decision-making processes. Third, the minority coalition aims to change the scope rules, which concern the rules that specify what (policy) areas should fall within the scope of the region. In the current situation the municipalities work together at five policy domains or areas, including regional economic affairs, security, and public health care (GGD), youth care, tourism and leisure. According to the minority coalition the region should widen their scope rules, more policy domains and social issues should be addressed at the regional level such as education, culture and agriculture (letter to the city councils, April, 2017). Regarding the other rules, the minority coalition calls for more transparency in regional policy-making. However, it is not clear how the minority coalition wants to achieve more transparency. Finally, with a view to enhance the efficiency of decision making in the region, the minority coalition is in favor of majority rule decision-making. Table 8 (below) provides an overview of the existing rules in the Twente Region and the rules which the minority coalition aims to change.

Table 8: Changing the existing rules in the metropolitan network

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rules</th>
<th>Rules in the Twente Region</th>
<th>Changing the rules</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Position rules</td>
<td>The fourteen municipalities are considered as the key actors with the veto-positions.</td>
<td>The minority coalition wants to include citizens and other private actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Boundary rules</strong></td>
<td>The general board decides whether a new municipality or stakeholder can enter the Twente Region.</td>
<td>Other members than municipalities and the members of the Triple Helix should be able to enter the network of the Twente Region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Authority rules</strong></td>
<td>The decision-making power in the region lies with the portfolio holders in the general board or the steering committees.</td>
<td>The decision-making power should lie with a regional authority instead of regional collaboration based on local decision-making.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Scope rules</strong></td>
<td>The Twente Region carries the responsibility for regional economic policy, public health care, youth care, safety policy and tourism.</td>
<td>Widening the scope of the Twente Region. The region should also invest in the quality of education, agriculture, sustainability and cultural affairs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Information rules</strong></td>
<td>‘Open’ exchange of information through the Extranet and the website of Twente Region.</td>
<td>More transparency in regional decision-making.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Decision Rules</strong></td>
<td>Decisions are based on consensus, however, in some cases, it is possible to choose for majority-rule decision making in order to make decision-making more efficient.</td>
<td>Decisions should be based on majority rule decision-making to make decision-making more efficient.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In summary, this paragraph outlined the network constitution strategies of the minority coalition. In the debate on the Agenda of Twente, the minority coalition mobilized every possible resource in order to put the ideas and beliefs of the dominant coalition in another perspective. In their attempt they made clear what rules should be changed in order to make problem-solving the region of Twente more efficient.
6.6 Conclusions of the results

The case study has shown that the constitution of the metropolitan region Twente was overshadowed by the debate on the development of a new regional agenda in the region of Twente. Nevertheless, the debate around the regional agenda gave important insights on the demands of involved actors in the constitution of the metropolitan region Twente. Two advocacy coalitions have been identified, who think differently about effective problem-solving and democratic legitimacy in the region of Twente.

In terms of effective problem-solving, the municipalities in the dominant coalition are not willing to give up their autonomy and put great value to the traditional constitutional structure of the Netherlands. According to the minority coalition, the great emphasize to the local autonomy cause a collective action problem which seems to barricade effective problem-solving in the region. The minority coalition believes that the problem-solving of common problems that go beyond the cities’ borders should be organized in the metropolitan region Twente. The minority coalition favors a more polycentric system where the common problem should the guideline for the organization in the metropolitan region rather than the form of government. In the metropolitan region Twente, public and private actors need to gather and pool their resources around a certain public problem.

Concerning democratic legitimacy, the minority coalition aims to extend the input legitimacy. Input legitimacy is not only representation of the ‘will of the people’, but also entails the participation of actors who are affected by the decisions. According to the members of the minority coalitions this will eventually lead to more efficient problem-solving. Although the minority coalition favors a type II of multi-level governance, it is remarkable that the minority also plead for one regional authority in the metropolitan region. The development of a regional authority, as suggested by the minority coalition, finds much resistance of the local authorities out of fear to lose their powers.

In order to influence the dominant coalition, the minority coalition made use of a reframing strategy in order to convince the dominant coalition to reform the current constitutional arrangement in the region of Twente. The minority coalition aims to change the position, authority and scope rules.
However, despite the efforts of the minority coalition, the outcome of the constitution of the metropolitan region did not result in a metropolitan region Twente. The reform of the minority coalition is hampered by the beliefs of the dominant coalition on the constitution of the metropolitan region Twente. The dominant coalition vigorously believes in collaboration from the bottom up. The local authorities can decide themselves if they want to solve problems at the regional level. The dominant coalition values the traditional administrative structure in the Netherlands, which is grounded in the representative democracy. The dominant coalition wants to maintain the type I of multi-level governance system, with clear distinction between tasks and jurisdictions. Therefore, the only regional constitutional arrangement in the region of Twente will remain voluntary cooperation based on local subsidiarity and autonomy.
7. Conclusion and discussion

7.1 Introduction

The final chapter of this study will summarize all the gathered arguments and findings in order to provide an answer to the research question, followed by a discussion section, in which I will consider the limitations of the research conducted. Thereafter, the most remarkable findings will be discussed with the aim to give recommendations for further research.

7.2 Towards answering the research question

The starting point of this thesis was the enduring tension between aiming for effective problem-solving at the one hand, and maintaining democratic legitimacy on the other hand in the debate on metropolitan reform. The aim of this research was to gain understanding of the constitution of metropolitan regions and especially in what way the involved actors reconcile the conflicting demands on effective problem-solving and democratic legitimacy in the constitution of the metropolitan region. Therefore, the following main research question was formulated:

*To what extent and in what ways do the conflicting demands on effective problem-solving and democratic legitimacy of the involved actors affect the constitution of the metropolitan region Twente?*

The following sub questions guided this thesis and helped to answer the research question. Before answering the main research question, I will first provide answers to the sub – questions listed below.

1. Which constitutional arrangements or models in the constitution of the metropolitan region can be distinguished?

Metropolitan reform has been debated for a long time in public administration. The debate represents two opposing perspectives on the proper way to constitute a metropolitan region. On the one hand are the ‘reformers’, representing the ‘old tradition’, that stated that there should be one regional authority or metropolitan government that has the power to make decisions. Therefore, reformers
aim for consolidation of the multiple decision-making centers in order to provide public goods and services in the most efficient way. The public analysts or the so-called ‘new tradition’, on the other hand, argue that problem-solving is more efficient if public goods and services are provided at different scales. This is enabled by the existence of different decision-making centers.

These opposing views in the debate on metropolitan reform show some clear parallels with the two contrasting types or constitutional models that can be distinguished in the current metropolitan debate, namely type I and type II of multi-level governance. Type I of multi-level governance emphasizes the traditional constitutional structures, by making a clear distinction between the tasks and responsibilities of the jurisdictions. The power to make decisions is shared between a limited number of governments. Although type II of multi-level governance is embedded in the constitutional framework of type I of multi-level governance, type II puts great emphasis on overlapping and task-specific jurisdictions, which provide an efficient way to solve problems. The power to make decisions is not limited to a small number of jurisdictions.

2. What are the consequences of these models for democratic legitimacy?

In terms of democratic legitimacy, these two arrangements, put different focus on input legitimacy and output legitimacy. Type II emphasizes governance for the people and considers it necessary that people who are directly affected by the outcome should have a direct influence on the outcome. Even though these people do not have the legitimate mandate to make decisions. The inclusion of different public and private actors will improve effective problem-solving and producing efficient outcomes. Type I, on the other hand, is more focused on input legitimacy and governance of the people. In order to solve public problems, representative bodies have the legitimate mandate from their constituencies to make rules and manage problems. Since type II systems are embedded in the constitutional framework of the type I system, the emphasis of the type II system-advocates on output legitimacy is believed to threaten democratic legitimacy. Stressing output legitimacy or effective problem-solving will trigger a democratic deficit, type I advocates would argue, because it tends to bypass the representative bodies. On the contrary, if the emphasis only lays on input
legitimacy it may lower output legitimacy because citizens who are affected directly are not included in the decision-making process.

3. How to explain the outcome in the constitution of the metropolitan region?

The outcome of the constitution of the metropolitan region can be explained by the interaction between actors with different beliefs involved in a constitutional process. In this process, actors with different, often conflicting, beliefs compete with each other over their preferred outcome of the constitution of the metropolitan region. In order to hold a stronger position in this constitutional process actors seek for like-minded actors about the constitution of the metropolitan region and form advocacy coalitions. Members of an advocacy coalition share the same belief systems, which entails an image of the how the metropolitan region should be constituted. More specifically, the policy core beliefs are the cement that holds the advocacy coalition together.

In the constitution of the metropolitan region two or more advocacy coalitions compete with each other. However, in order to achieve their objectives, advocacy coalitions need to use different network constitution strategies, which concern changing the positions, changing the rules and the reframing strategy. The influence of the advocacy coalitions and their strategies depends on the available resources in the advocacy coalition.

4. What is the history of the metropolitan regions in the Netherlands and the region Twente?

Since 1946 exist a long-standing debate on regional cooperation and metropolitan regions in the Netherlands. For many years the national, provincial and the local authorities searched for a solution to solve public problems that are too large for municipalities, but too small for the national and provincial governments to deal with. There have been many shifts of tasks and responsibilities from meso - and local level to the regional authority. However, over and over, the extensive powers and strong position of the region was not accepted, because it jeopardized the House of Thorbecke and often lacked political control by representative bodies. Since 2015, it is no longer mandatory to devote several tasks and responsibilities to the regional level. Voluntary cooperation remains the only form of regional cooperation.
The same situation applies to the region of Twente, a region situated in the east of the Netherlands and part of the Province of Overijssel. Over the years, the municipalities in Twente have tried to cope with the tension between solving cross-border problems and local autonomy. Since the cooperation is no longer mandatory, the fourteen municipalities work together in a joint-venture called the Twente Region. However, municipal collaboration in the region of Twente is based on local subsidiarity and the local autonomy of the municipalities stays the guiding principle. The municipalities in the Twente region determine themselves whether they want to cooperate at the regional level or not.

5. What debate is currently taking place in the region of Twente?

In 2016, not long after the new constitutional structure entered into force the constitutional arrangement of the region of Twente was questioned again. The general board of the Twente Region started a debate about the development of a new regional economic agenda. A group of entrepreneurs, assembled in the Taskforce ‘Regiometropool Twente’, used this debate on the new agenda as a window of opportunity to draw attention to inefficiency of the current constitutional arrangement, which entered into force in January 2016. According to the taskforce, the municipalities in the region of Twente have to deal with complex problems. These complex societal problems require intense – non-voluntary - cooperation at regional level. The members of the taskforce suggested to implement a new constitutional arrangement in the form of a metropolitan region. However, the municipalities –who are the most dominant and powerful coalition – did not want to question the current constitutional arrangement. They were instead more focused on strengthening the regional economy and the financial consequences for their own municipality. Yet, during the debate on the new agenda, questions were raised on how the municipalities want to work together in the region and to what extent collaboration at the regional level is necessary to solve local problems.

6. What are the actors’ beliefs on the constitution of the metropolitan region Twente?

The debate on the regional agenda reveals an underlying discussion about the constitution of the metropolitan region. In this discussion, two advocacy coalitions, the minority and dominant coalition,
were identified. Both coalitions have different and conflicting beliefs on effective problem-solving and democratic legitimacy. Regarding effective problem-solving, the minority coalition beliefs in the constitution of a metropolitan region. This coalition postulates that effective problem-solving asks for far reaching regional cooperation. They envision different actors with overlapping domains of responsibility working together and searching for the right scale for solving a certain issue. The dominant coalition, however, is not in favor of the ideas of the minority coalition. The dominant coalition is willing to cooperate at regional level as long as local autonomy is not jeopardized.

As for the implications for democratic legitimacy, the dominant coalition sticks to the traditional constitutional system, based on representative democracy. The dominant coalition beliefs in input legitimacy. The ‘will of the people’ is represented by the elective representatives. The minority coalition, however, aims to extend democratic legitimacy. Citizens or private actors that are affected by the problem should be able to directly influence the outcome.

7. Which constitutional arrangement does the region of Twente adhere to?

At this point, the battle between the two advocacy coalitions in the constitutional process had no or little effect to the constitutional order of the Twente region. The case-study has shown that the minority coalition suggested to constitute a metropolitan region Twente in order to improve effective and efficient problem-solving. However, despite the efforts of the minority coalition, the dominant coalition maintains the existing constitutional arrangement in the region of Twente. The constitutional arrangement adheres to the type I of multi-level governance, where there has to be a strict distinction between the different tiers of government. The municipalities in the region want to maintain their local autonomy to great disappointment of the members of the minority coalition.

7.3 Answer to the research question

The case study showed that the debate on metropolitan reform has revived and that metropolitan governance remains an ongoing concern for actors involved. In the constitution of the metropolitan region, two opposing groups or coalitions competed over the tension between efficient problem-solving and democratic legitimacy. Whereas the minority coalition wanted to achieve effective problem-solving through the constitution of a metropolitan – polycentric - region, the dominant
coalition rather maintained the existing arrangement, arguing that it would guarantee democratic legitimacy. For the minority coalition it was very difficult to accomplish reform because of a lack of (access to) legal authority. This also hampered their ability to implement their strategies.

Although conflicting demands on effective problem-solving and democratic legitimacy were found, the extent and the ways these conflicting demands of the involved actors affect the constitution of the metropolitan region is strongly dependent on who has the ‘power’ to decide on the rules. This means that the outcome of the constitution of the metropolitan region Twente is determined by the dominant coalition, which holds the veto-position in the constitutional process. The demands of the dominant coalition or the municipalities in the region of Twente is to hold on to traditional constitutional structures that exist in the Netherlands, because they believe that these structures will guarantee democratic legitimacy and effective problem-solving in the region of Twente.

Consequently, the regional constitutional arrangement in the region of Twente will remain on voluntary cooperation based on local subsidiarity and autonomy, with clear distinction between tasks and jurisdictions where democratic legitimacy is guaranteed through institutional and electoral systems. Finally, this conclusion demonstrates that the debate on metropolitan reform is (still) caught in the antagonism between type I and type II of multi-level governance.

7.4 Reflection

7.4.1 Reflection on the research

In this study I have conducted an in-depth case study, because of constitutional reforms in the region of Twente. The main reason to select the case region of Twente is that there were calls to develop – constitute – a metropolitan region Twente. A group of actors in the region, united in a taskforce, initiated this idea. However, the central debate in the region was about the constitution of the new regional agenda, and not so much about the constitution of the metropolitan region Twente. Therefore, it was sometimes difficult to detect the beliefs of the involved actors. I have tried to solve this by questioning the respondents about their beliefs on the constitution of a metropolitan region in the context of the new regional agenda and I also found relevant documents on the constitution of the (metropolitan) region of Twente. While this brought relevant data and interesting findings, it might
have jeopardized the reliability and validity of the study. For further research I recommend to increase the number of cases in order to prevent this problem and also to see whether the conclusion of this research can be applied to other cases. However, as already mentioned, the case study of this research is very specific wherein the beliefs of people are central. These beliefs of people can change over time and can also give other outcomes in different settings.

7 4.2 Reflection on the results

Perhaps one of the most surprising findings are the preferred outcomes of the two advocacy coalitions. In the theory it was assumed that typically type I systems aim for consolidating general jurisdictions and type II of multi-level governance system aim for polycentric systems. However, the results showed that the dominant coalition did not aim for consolidation or one regional authority but rather stuck to the traditional constitutional structures. This, however, can be explained by the fact that there exists no administrative tier between the municipalities and provinces in the Netherlands and as well by the historical events and the fear of losing power and responsibilities of the dominant coalition, which according to Kübler (2012) and Lèfevre & Weir (2012) also hampered the metropolitan reforms in the (old) metropolitan reform debate. The minority coalition, on the other hand, aimed for the constitution of a metropolitan polycentric system, but coordinated and organized through one regional authority.

In addition, the findings showed that the distinction between type I and type II of multi-level governance is too limited, only ranging from type I to type II forms. In order to properly measure the organizational arrangements of the metropolitan region is it would be interesting to go beyond the simple dichotomy between type I and type II. Type I and type II can be considered as the contrary ends of a continuum of multi-level governance. Also, in the metropolitan reform debate the continuously distinction between different constitutional arrangements does not solve the debate. In the following paragraph I will elaborate on going beyond this distinction, in an attempt to find an answer to the enduring debate on metropolitan reform and a reason for further research.

Furthermore, more research is necessary to provide a determined response to the research question. As regards to further research, I would stress the effect of path-dependency in a
constitutional process or institutional reform in the constitution of the metropolitan region, because this can explain why metropolitan regions are constituted the way they are. Furthermore, regarding the formation of advocacy coalitions, it could be meaningful to highlight the role of resources. Although actors form coalitions with allies with the same beliefs, actors also seek for other actors, because the other actors possess resources which the actors themselves do not have. This raises the question to what extent actors take into account the resources of their allies when they form advocacy coalitions.

7.5 Food for thought: An answer to the metropolitan reform debate?

Against the background of this research rests the problem that governments of today, at all levels, struggle with the government’s inability to address complex problems that none of them can solve alone. This also applies to the municipalities in metropolitan regions, which struggle with complex problems that often cross the territorial and administrative borders of their cities. In solving these problems governments seek for new structures to manage these problems. This thesis showed us that governments, in this search, continuously make a distinction between different constitutional arrangements, where there appears to be a trade-off between ensuring the values of the representative democracy on the one hand, and efficient problem-solving on the other hand.

Precisely, this distinction is a problem in the search for an answer to the metropolitan reform debate. In order to answer the debate on metropolitan reform it is important that we move beyond the simple dichotomy between type I and type II of multi-level governance, because as long as this distinction is made, the debate on metropolitan governance will persist. The diversity of local circumstances and procedures makes the implementation and adoption of a uniform set of strict constitutional rules difficult (Sabel & Zeitlin, 2012). This asks for an alternative and more pragmatic way of thinking about the constitution of metropolitan regions.

Thus, in an answer to the metropolitan reform debate we need to find out how these constitutional arrangements can be complementary to each other. In his book ‘Pragmatist Democracy’, Ansell (2011) search for complementarity between the representative democracy and
the problem-solving democracy (Helderman, 2017). He suggests to break down this dualism by offering a mediating ‘third way’ or third type (Farjoun, Ansell & Boin, 2015).

In this third type, governments have to reimagine how they function as an organization and how they should interact with civil society and other private actors. It is important to keep in mind that this third type does not envision to replace the two constitutional arrangements in the constitution of the metropolitan region. On the contrary, the third type would provide the government a new venue and space for exploration and deliberation in order to figure out how complementarity between the two constitutional arrangements can be established.

However, time will tell whether this third type will be discovered and embraced by the actors involved in the metropolitan reform debate.
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APPENDIX

Appendix I: Overview of selected documents

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## Appendix II - overview of selected respondents

### Table 9: overview of the selected respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Respondent A</td>
<td>Twente Region</td>
<td>May 22, 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent B</td>
<td>Twenteboard</td>
<td>May 22, 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent C</td>
<td>Twente Region</td>
<td>May 22, 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent D</td>
<td>Taskforce of the Metropolitan Region Twente</td>
<td>May 26, 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent E</td>
<td>Taskforce of the Metropolitan Region Twente</td>
<td>May 26, 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondents F, G, H, I, J, K</td>
<td>Taskforce of the Metropolitan Region Twente</td>
<td>May 29, 2017</td>
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<tr>
<td>Respondent L</td>
<td>The steering committee on the Agenda of Twente</td>
<td>June 7, 2017</td>
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