American New Left Populism

How Students for a Democratic Society fits into the American populist tradition

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Abstract

2016 saw the election of Donald Trump and at the same time, on the other side of the political aisle, Senator Sanders started his political revolution. By examining populist movements and parties throughout US history, we see that populism has been a constant in American politics. Moreover, we distill two traditions: civic nationalist populism and racial nationalist populism, which are different in why they oppose immigration. This discussion will allow us to distill certain characteristics of these two traditions. Most lists of examples of populism in America do not include New Left movements even though they seem to fit the bill perfectly. In order to prove this, we will apply the characteristics distilled in chapter 1 to the Students for a Democratic Society, a New Left movement established in the US in the late 1950s/early 1960s. We will see that this New Left movement fits into the American populist tradition, further strengthening the idea that populism has been a constant in American populism.

**Keywords:** United States of America, Populism, New Left, Students for a Democratic Society, racial nationalism, civic nationalism, Trump, Sanders, Democratic Party
Contents

Introduction .........................................................................................................................1
Chapter 1: Populism throughout US history .............................................................. 3
Chapter 2: The American New Left ........................................................................ 15
Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 26
Reference list .................................................................................................................... 28
Introduction

During a campaign rally in Augustine, Florida presidential candidate Donald Trump made the following promise: “We are going to drain the swamp in Washington” This promise signals an anti-elitist sentiment voiced all over the globe. “Populism” is a word you cannot escape while talking about contemporary politics. Donald Trump winning the presidency, the Brexit, Senator Sanders presidential bid and campaign, polling success for Wilders, Le Pen, and the AFD are all examples of how contemporary populism seems to dominate the political landscape. As populism is so much in the news nowadays, one might get the idea that it is something new. However, populism is not new and there have been many people, parties and movements that can be considered populist throughout history. Especially in the history of the United States, populism has been a constant (Rochester, Rhodes, Kauer, Kazin, Judis). There have been many political parties, people and movements throughout US history that can be considered populist: from contemporary examples like Senator Sanders and Donald Trump all the way back to the People’s Party and the Farmers Alliances of the 1880s. Rhodes & Johnson (2017) argue that the Democratic Party has been flirting with populism ever since 1932. Michael Kazin (2016) argues that there are two types of populism in America: civic nationalist populism and racial nationalist populism. This distinction will be explained and used in Chapter 1 to show how populism has been a constant in American populism. However, in most discussions about populism in the United States the New Left is never mentioned, even though the general message of this movement could be summarized as the wish to replace the elite. Therefore the research question for this paper is: to what extent does the New Left in America fit into the American populist tradition?

In order to determine whether the New Left can be considered populist, Chapter 2 will start by giving a quick overview of the main developments in the United States during the 1950s and 1960s. Inglehart’s (1977) theory on post-material values will be discussed followed by Kitschelt’s (1988) necessary and sufficient conditions for the establishment of a New Left party or movement. These conditions were met in the United States and thus political space for a New Left movement existed in the United States. Unsurprisingly, a New Left ideology established itself during the 1960s. We will use Students for a Democratic Society, a student’s movement, as an exemplary American New Left movement. By comparing the SDS’ manifesto to the discussion of populism in Chapter 1, we will then conclude that the SDS fits into the American
populist tradition. Furthermore, as the SDS was the core New Left organization in America, this means that the New Left might be populist as well.

Before we start discussing the populist history of the United States, it is important to clearly define populism. The contemporary political climate seems to have “twisted” the meaning of populism. Just look at any of the big news outlets: if they mention populism it will most likely be in regard to the nativist ideology of President Trump, the United Kingdom Independence party, Wilders, and the Radical Right in general. This is why you will see people stressing the importance of “defeating populism” followed by a discussion on the dangers of the Trump presidency. However, there are many examples of left wing populism: Podemos in Spain, Syriza in Greece, and Senator Sanders to name a few. To have a meaningful discussion about populism, in whatever context, we should first define exactly what it entails.

However, this poses a problem: there is no clear definition of populism as it is a contested concept. It can be seen as a strategy (grassroots movements, power to the people), a style (dressing like a “commoner” to be relatable or frequent use of terms like “the people”), a discourse (direct democracy) and as a thin centered ideology. Cas Mudde (2004), one of the more influential scholars on (radical right) populism has argued for the latter. He defines populism as “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people” (p. 543). Thus, populism can be understood as stressing this cleavage by standing up for the “pure people”, defending them from the corrupt elite, and rallying against the elite. This means that populism can be considered a ‘thin-centered ideology’, meaning that the label ‘populist’ does not say anything substantial about the policies proposed by said populist. Therefore, left wing and right wing populism exists: the core ideology is different but they both claim to stand up for the people. Left wing populists mostly use socialist rhetoric to stand up for the people, whereas right wing populists use nativism to stand up for the people. What follows from this is that any ideology can be paired with populism and that populism cannot automatically be linked to nativist and authoritarian ideologies.
Chapter 1: Populism throughout US History

Populism, as defined in the introduction, is a thin-centered ideology that uses the people versus elite cleavage to mobilize voters. The identity of these antagonistic groups is not always the same but they do always share some characteristics. “The people” are a vaguely defined group whereas the “elites” are often more distinctly identified. For example, during the last election in the Netherlands, the elites were defined mostly as the cartel parties consisting of the christian democrats (CDA), the liberals (VVD) and the labor party (PvdA). During the last presidential election in the United States, the elite was distinctively identified by Senator Sanders. The establishment that he rallied against consisted of big businesses (especially Wall Street and pharmaceutical companies) and the politicians that they supposedly had bought. Michael Kazin (2016) states that President Trump also “blames elites in big business and government for undermining the common folk’s economic interest and political liberties” (p. 17).

According to Kazin, American populists always rally against the moneyed elite but they differ in their perception of the people. Therefore, he and other scholars like Gerstle (2001) and Ignatieff (1995), distinguish between two types of American populism. Kazin argues that calling these types Left or Right wing doesn’t “capture the most meaningful distinction” (p.17). Instead he argues that one type of populism adheres to “civic nationalism” and the other to “racial nationalism”. These are contested concepts as they have no clear definition but combining the definitions of both the historian Gare Gerstle and political scientist/politician Michael Ignatieff, we can understand civic nationalism as the belief that every individual living under the same law should be equal and is equally free in their pursuit of happiness. Kazin argues that this form of populism bases its definition of the people on “class and avoid identifying themselves as supporters or opponents of any particular ethnic group or religion” (p.17). Racial nationalism can then be understood as the belief that every individual belonging to the “original” nation should be equal and is equally free to pursue happiness. Kazin says this tradition “alleges that there is a nefarious alliance between evil forces on high and the unworthy, dark-skinned poor below” (p.17) which threatens the existence of the white American. Thus, civic nationalist populism in the United States defines “the people” as all the inhabitants of the United States whereas racial nationalist populism defines “the people” as white Americans of European descent.

Kazin gives a few examples for both types of populism, which also proves that this distinction has been throughout US history. The examples he gives for civic nationalist populism
are the Farmers Alliances which transformed into the People’s Party; Democratic presidential candidate William Jennings Bryan (who was a candidate in 1896, 1900 and 1908); and Senator Sanders. He leaves a gap of over a century in his examples. However, Jesse H. Rhodes and Kaylee T. Johsnon argue in their paper (2017) that class populism has been an important factor in Democratic Presidential Campaigns all the way from 1932 through 2012. Thus, the Democratic Party might be another example of populism. For racial nationalist populism, Kazin (2016) gives the examples of the Workingmen’s party of California, the Ku Klux Klan during the prohibition, the America First committee during the Second World War, and President Trump. Another example which is not mentioned by Kazin that comes to mind are the Know Nothings (also known as the American Party). In order to show how populism has played a significant role in American politics, a closer look at these aforementioned examples is needed. I will start by examining the civic nationalist populist examples given by Kazin, followed by the Democratic party before examining the racial nationalist examples.

It is important that this distinction should not distract from the fact that all but one of the to-be-discussed parties, people and movements are populist. The only true difference between these two types of populism is that racial nationalist populists are considered racist, whereas civic nationalist populists are not. They are, however, often critical of immigration or economic globalization. Being critical of immigration does not equal being racist and being critical of economic globalization is another way to defend the people from the elite. The distinction is so small that some (Johnson, M.) call Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders “two sides of the same coin” as they both “vow to restore the working class white man to his former glory, by returning what was stolen from him. Trump alleges that his wealth and place in society was stolen by minorities … Sanders alleges that his wealth and place in society have been stolen by the nebulous billionaire class”.

Another way to look at this is that most racial nationalist populists would be willing to deport the subjects of their criticism whereas most civic nationalist populists would only criticize immigration but would not support deporting those already in the country. The difference between the two sides of the populist coin might be small but is very significant. This is why I chose to use this distinction in the overview below but the most important point to take away from the following discussion is that populism has been a constant in American politics.

Civic nationalist Populism
The most recent example of a civic nationalist populist (according to Kazin) is Senator Sanders. Most readers will be more familiar with his ideas compared to the other examples that will be discussed, which is why I want to discuss Sanders’s ideas first. This way, it will be easier to compare and understand the other examples.

Kazin’s argument for placing Sanders into the civic nationalist populist tradition is that “during the 2016 campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination, he railed against “the billionaire class” for betraying the promise of American democracy” (p.18) and because he “has hailed his supporters as the vanguard of a “political revolution”’’ (p.18). It is especially the anti-billionaire class (the 1%) rhetoric used by Sanders that makes him a populist. Rallying against a government controlled by special interest, big business or the moneyed elite is typical of a (American) populist. If the elite support a free market, then populists will oppose it. Sanders has argued against trade deals like the TPP and has criticized companies that use loopholes to pay less tax or move their companies to countries with cheap labor. He is clearly critical of economic globalization but he supports migration, taking in Syrian refugees, and a path to citizenship for illegal immigrants. The combination of rallying against the moneyed elite, defending the people, opposing economic globalization and free markets makes him a typical civic nationalist populist. This why the following examples of civic nationalist populism will all be comparable to Sanders’ policies and ideas. The first movement we will discuss are the Farmers Alliances of the 1880s and 1890s.

The Farmers Alliances are widely considered to be part of one of the first populist movements in the United States, especially because the movement transcended state boundaries (unlike the Workingmen’s party of California which came before). Moreover, their supporters/leaders went on to form the People’s Party (which was also known as the Populist Party). According to Anna Rochester (1943) these farmer alliances can be understood as the expression of “the struggle of farmers and other small producers to protect themselves against the rising power of monopoly and finance capital” (p.6). According to the farmers, this rising power of monopoly and finance capital had led to the Long Depression. During the second part of this Long Depression, prices of crops dropped so dramatically that according to Glasner and Cooley (1997) some farmers in Kansas resorted to burning their corn instead of normal fuel because their corn had become worthless. This meant disaster for the farmers and they “were convinced that the monopolist and the bankers were actively robbing them” (Rochester, p.15) and thus they felt a
need to unite in order to combat the robbing. This resulted in the Farmers Alliances and other organizations like the Farmer’s Mutual Benefit Association.

These organizations started out locally so they could deal with “the most immediate grievances” (Rochester, p.40). As time went by the alliances became increasingly political and they had some success during the midterm elections of 1890. However, the need for a nationwide third party “seemed obvious to the leaders of the independent state parties” (Rochester, p.61). This sentiment eventually led to the establishment of the National People’s Party (also known as the Populist Party) with a platform known as the Omaha Platform. Its political goals were made very clear, as the preamble states that “we seek to restore the government of the Republic to the hands of the “plain people”, with which class it originated”, clearly signaling that they choose the side of the people in the people versus elite cleavage. The way the political landscape is painted in this preamble is very reminiscent of phrases Senator Sanders uses, with phrases like “the fruits of the toil of millions are boldly stolen to build up colossal fortunes for a few” and “the newspapers are largely subsidized or muzzled, public opinion silenced, business prostrated, homes covered with mortgages, labor impoverished, and the land concentrating the hands of the capitalists”. The People’s party rallied against the moneyed elite, especially regarding the issue of Free Silver.

The party favored a Dollar based on both silver and gold, whereas the moneyed elite favored the gold standard. Gold was worth much more than silver and thus only wealthy people could afford to buy gold. The elite argued against adopting a bimetallic standard because it would devalue their gold due to a decrease in demand for gold. The People’s party argued for adopting the standard because it would create a better power relation between the elite and the people. They saw adopting the bimetallic standard as symbolizing “an end to special privileges for the rich and the return of government to the people by lifting common people out of debt, increasing the cash in circulation and reducing interest rates” (Norton et al., 2011, p. 534). It was this sentiment that was at the core of the party’s message, but on other issues the party was also populist.

The Omaha platform includes several sentiments that are not part of the official party platform but they are “resolutions expressive of the sentiment of this convention”. The fourth resolution reads “[ … ] we condemn the fallacy of protecting American labor under the present system, which opens our ports to the pauper and criminal classes of the world and crowds out our
wage-earners … and demand the further restriction of undesirable emigration”.

This sentiment is akin to sentiments expressed by President Trump during the campaign (in regard to Mexican immigrants as a “criminal class” and the protection of American labor) but also to Sanders’ campaign (protecting American labor). This seems to indicate that the People’s Party could be put under either civic or racial nationalist populism. Why does Kazin (2016) label the party as civic nationalist populist? Perhaps it is because this anti-emigration sentiment was not an official part of the platform. Critique on immigration and globalization does not make a person racist and criticizing economic globalization seems to go together with populism. Moreover, they do not single out a particular group whereas racial nationalist populists do and they also define the people based on class. The main reason I consider the People’s party civic nationalist populists is because immigration was never close to being the focus of the party, as Free Silver was the most important issue for these populists.

The populist movement of the 1880s and 1890s resulted in the nomination of William J. Bryan as the Democratic presidential candidate. Bryan was both a blessing and a disaster for the People’s Party, as he was a populist but not a member of the party (Norton et al., 2011. p.535). While his nomination meant that the issues the People’s Party stood for would be broadcasted to a far greater audience, it also meant the dilemma of supporting Bryan or putting their own candidate forward. They chose to do the former. In the end, Bryan lost the election to Republican candidate McKinley and the People’s party quickly faded away due to lack of support from potential support groups like labor movements and social movements. Both the People’s Party as Bryan’s campaign focused primarily on the issue of Free Silver, which ultimately was the reason Bryan did not get the support he needed as the “obsession with silver prevented Populists from building the urban-rural coalition that would have expanded their appeal” (Norton et al., 2011. p.535).

The Democratic Party

With Bryan, the Democrats had a civic nationalist populist as candidate, but he would not be the only such candidate they would have. Rhodes and Johnson (2017) argue that class populism has been part of Democratic presidential campaigns throughout the period of 1932-2012 (which is the scope of their research). They define class populism as “a style of

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1 With “emigration”, migration from other countries to the United States is meant.
argumentation in which the president/candidate presents the people – often embodied in
him/herself – opposing a corrupt self-interest, or unrepresentative economic elite enjoying unfair
access to government largesse” (p. 100). The definition of “the elite” used in this article is
comparable to the definition we have used so far and thus we can use the conclusion of this
research. It should be noted that even though this conclusion is true for the Democratic Party
from 1932 and onward, this does not mean that the party has always been an example of either
populist tradition. Both the Democratic Party and the GOP have existed for a very long time and
have undergone some major transformations. During the 19th century the Democratic Party was
the party of the South and the Republican party was the party of the North and this continued into
the 1960 (Norton et al., 2011). This shifted dramatically when president Johnson signed the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 into law. Even though Johnson won the presidency, he had “lost the Deep
South – the first Democrat since the Civil War to do so” (Norton et al., 2011. p.797). He knew
that the Civil Rights Act would cost him those states, even telling an aide that “his support for
African American civil rights had “delivered the south to the Republican Party for my lifetime
and yours” (p.797).

The point is that we should never assume that conclusions made about the Democratic
Party in the 2000s also hold true for the party in the 19th century. Therefore, we can use Rhodes
and Johnson’s research to say something about populism in the Democratic party between 1932-
2012, but we cannot assume that these conclusions are also true for the party in the 19th century.
The research consists of analyzing rhetoric in stump speeches given by Democratic presidential
candidates. With these analyses, the research can determine whether the use of class populism
has remained a factor, has decreased or has increased. The conclusion of this research is that:

... rhetorical attention to the wealthy has grown exponentially over the past eight
decades. Moreover, Democratic candidates have hardly adopted a warm tone toward
the rich: in fact, quantitative and qualitative measures of tone in statements referring to
the affluent suggest that negative sentiment has held steady over time. (p.94)

The research points to the fact that Democratic Presidential campaigns have always focused on
the cleavage between the people (“less fortunate Americans) and the elite (the rich/ the
wealthy/the affluent (and the GOP as their party)). The research starts with Franklin D. Roosevelt
and they quote some of his speeches. These quotes are even more reminiscent of Senator Sanders
campaign than the Omaha Platform is. Compare for example the following tweet from Senator
Sanders: “Will Wall Street like me? No. Will they begin to play by the rules if I’m president? You better believe it.”, with Roosevelt’s address in New York City in 1936, in which he said: “Never before in all our history have these forces [Government by organized money] been so united against one candidate as they stand today. They are unanimous in their hate for me – and I welcome their hatred”. Sanders and Roosevelt welcome hate from organized money/Wall Street because this means they take the side of the people in the people vs elite cleavage. This makes Roosevelt a populist but whether he was a civic nationalist populist or a racial nationalist populist remains to be seen. The Internment Camps for the Japanese were said to be erected because of security reasons but at the same time “long-standing racism” toward Japanese American “was evident” (Norton et al., 2011. p.713) His isolationist views also led to a refusal to change the immigration quotas to take in more Jewish refugees. Isolationism is a way to protect the American people but it can also be a way to legally enact racism.

Because of the racist past of the Democratic Party and the example of Roosevelt, it remains to be seen whether the party can be considered civic nationalist or racial national. You could argue that the party was racist and thus should be a racial nationalist populist party. This could be countered by arguing that racism simply was the norm in 1930s America. For example, segregation in the military had existed under presidencies of both parties. This goes to show that that we cannot make conclusions about racism in the Democratic party when using contemporary standards. If we want to put the party into either category we need to look beyond the supposed racism.

Rhodes and Johnson’s work focuses solely on the economic aspect; it does not take critique on globalization into account. The contemporary Democratic party has increasingly become the party of immigrants which leads me to argue that the party (in its current form) generally could be considered civic nationalist populist, that is most Democrats could be considered civic nationalist populists. Moreover, the contemporary Democratic Party is supportive of illegal immigrants. Because the research spans over 8 decades we cannot generalize too much. Roosevelt in the 1930s can hardly be compared to Obama in the late 2000s/ early 2010s. Because the party has existed so long it is impossible to put them in either a civic nationalist or racial nationalist populist tradition. There is enough evidence to put them in either tradition but the party cannot have an official platform that adheres to both traditions at the same time. Moreover, within there are different wings. The Democratic party have their moderates and
their extremes and so do the Republicans. In relation to populism, the Democrats have had racial nationalist populists and civic nationalist populists within the party at the same time. Therefore, we cannot claim that the party as whole adheres to a racial or civic nationalist populism, but we can conclude that the party has been a populist party since 1932 and probably still

**Racial nationalist populism**

Before we discuss examples of racial nationalist populism, a brief discussion of President Trump will warrant a better understanding of the differences between racial and civic nationalist populism. We have already seen that both trends of populism are critical of economic globalization or immigration. While campaigning, Trump spoke the now infamous words about Mexican immigrants in his announcement speech: “They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists. And some, I assume, are good people” (2015). He has promised to deport illegal immigrants and wants to cut down on immigration in general. It is the singling out of one group which makes the claims racist. It is no longer just a criticism of immigration and Mexicans in general. What makes Trump populist is his “America First” ideology. It is a direct response to the way economic globalization has led to labor leaving America. Just like Sanders, Trump has rejected current trade deals and criticized companies that move their labor to countries with cheaper labor. He has declared himself to be the voice of the silent majority in their fight against the special interests controlling the government. Clearly, Trump positions himself on the side of the people.

This type of populism has always had a part in American political culture. Michael Kazin (2016) traces the origin of racial nationalist populism to the Workingmen's Party of California (WPC) led by Denis Kearney. However, the Know-Nothings or the American Party might actually be the origin of this type of populism in the United States. The Know-Nothing movement was a nativist movement which arose because of the unprecedented influx of immigrants during the 1850s. The movement was especially fearful of Catholics because they “would owe primary allegiance to the pope in Rome” (Norton et al., 2011. p.355) instead of to the American government. Their 1856 platform included statements like “None but American for office” and “the sending back of all foreign paupers”. All the sentiments stated by the platform relate to issues of nativism and nationalism and thus they were racial nationalists. However, there seems to be no mention of populist attitudes regarding attacking the elite and standing up for the
people.

If you read between the lines however, the Know-Nothings equated paupers with Catholicism because a lot of these immigrants came from Ireland, which had been struck by the Great Potato famine. The Know-Nothings saw this influx of foreign paupers as a threat to the government’s ability to help the American poor. So, there is an implicit economic dimension to these statements. Resisting the immigration of poor people would benefit the American people greatly. Moreover, and consistent with contemporary populist rhetoric concerning the Islam, the Know-Nothing were afraid that the influx of Catholics presented a wave of immigrants that would pave the way for the Pope to move to America. Even Protestant reverends saw this as a possibility:

“Have we not reason to believe … that he [the pope] is now sending out his minions to accomplish his fiend-like purpose, to prepare the way before him, that he may make a grand and triumphant entree into this country when he shall be hurled from his tyrannous and polluted throne in Europe” (“the protestant annual”, 1847)

Viewing the wave of catholic immigrants as paving the way for a possible Papal tyranny in the United States is reminiscent of some anti-immigration rhetoric used against Muslim immigrants. When understanding the anti-Catholicism of the Know Nothings in this way we could argue that anti-Catholicism was a way to protect the American people from poverty and a possible Papal tyranny.

This understanding combined with the understanding that the immigration of foreign ‘paupers’ would decrease the American government’s possibilities in protecting the American poor means that the Know-Nothing actively sided themselves with the people. This is sufficient to say they were populists. Therefore, I do not agree with Kazin that the Workingmen’s Party of California was the first racial nationalist populist party in the United States.

The WPC was established on September 22, 1877 under comparable circumstances as the Farmers Alliances. The party was created as a response to the existing parties and their failure to protect the interest of the workingmen. Kearney addressed this in 1878 by saying that

“Our moneyed men have ruled us for the past thirty years. Under the flag of the slaveholder they hoped to destroy our liberty. Failing in that, they have rallied under the banner of the millionaire, the banker and the monopolist, the railroad king and the false politician …”
Kearney accuses moneyed men of asserting influence on government in order to satisfy their own needs, foregoing the needs of others. This rhetoric is comparable to the rhetoric used by populists. What makes the WPC the an example of racial nationalist populism is the blatant racist attacks on Chinese immigrants and Chinese-Americans that accompanied the populist rhetoric. In the same speech, Kearney accuses the “meanest slave on earth – the Chinese coolie” of stealing jobs from Americans. According to Kauer (1944), Chinese laborers “were willing to work for low wages and … furnished a competition which white workers were unable or unwilling to meet” (p. 278) and thus they were often chosen over American workers resulting in unemployment. The supporters of the WPC also connected their hatred for these Chinese immigrants with their hatred for big business, especially the railroads. Many Chinese immigrants had come to the US to help build the transcontinental railroad of which the Central Pacific Railroad is a part. The CPR was based in California and was thus seen as responsible for the unemployment of white Americans in that state.

In the same speech, Kearney also accuses the Chinese of buying property on which Americans could have lived. According to him, this all resulted in that the American workingmen could only resort “to crime or suicide, his wife and daughter to prostitution, and his boys to hoodlumism and the penitentiary”. What makes this sentiment an example of racial nationalism instead of civic nationalism is that discrimination toward these Chinese Americans went beyond simple economics and job statistics as they were seemingly blamed for everything wrong in the White Americans’ life.

Michael Kazin’s (2016) next example is the Ku Klux Klan during the prohibition. The racial nationalist aspect of the KKK is not something I need to discuss, as the KKK’s nativism and racist views are known throughout the world. They differ from civic nationalists’ critique on immigration and globalization in their willingness to physically attack the subject of their criticism. They can also be considered populists during the 1920s. Their rhetoric is comparable to that of the WPC, as they argued (according to Nancy MacLean (1994)) that “the Little Group of Kings in Wall Street” were “very deliberately wiping out your independence” by supporting globalization and thus also immigration (p.77). Kazin (2016) argues that the KKK were using markedly populist rhetoric to defend the Eighteenth Amendment (which established prohibition of alcohol). He quotes a pro-KKK newspaper: “The enemy liquor gang – angry, vindictive, unpatriotic – is seeking the overthrow of the highest authority in the land” (p.20). The KKK
argued that those arguing for the repeal of the eighteenth amendment were paid by big business who wanted to sell alcohol again. Their opposition to globalization fits into the American populist tradition and the overt racism and willingness to physically attack the subject of their racism makes them racial nationalist populist organization during the 1920s.

The next movement (a pressure group to be precise) Kazin discusses also opposed globalization: the America First Committee. The committee in particularly opposed the involvement of the United States into World War II but was disbanded after the attack on Pearl Harbor (Norton et al., 2011). However, as I have defined populism (in the American context) as mobilization of the people vs (business) elite cleavage, the America First Committee cannot be considered either civic nationalist or racial nationalist populist, as they seem to be focused solely on non-interventionism. If they had opposed globalization because it either meant opening the border to cheap labor (which would be a racial nationalist populist argument) or because companies move their factories to other countries (a civic nationalist populist argument) they could be considered part of that specific tradition. The reason why I still discuss the committee, even though I disagree with Kazin and do not agree that they are racial nationalist populist, is that the rhetoric and especially the slogan “America First” has been recycled many times, most recently by President Trump, who was discussed above.

Conclusion

Populism is as American as apple pie. Civic nationalist populism and racial nationalist populism can be found in multiple different parties, people, and movements, some of which have been discussed above. Civic nationalist populism started with the Farmers Alliances and the subsequent People’s Party and has played a role all the way up to Senator Sanders’ presidential campaign. Racial nationalist populism can be found in the US as early as the 1850s with the Know-Nothings and has had representatives come and go during the 20th and 21st century. Donald Trump is the latest addition to this brand of populism. Therefore I agree with Judis when he says that “the only thing unprecedented is Trump’s degree of success”. This is true regarding racial nationalist populism as Trump was the first populist of this type to become the candidate for a major party and the first president of this type. Sanders might be a perfect example of civic nationalist populism but the Democratic Party has used populist rhetoric ever since 1932. Does this mean that Sanders achievement is not as impressive as Trump’s was? No, because, as Trump
also did, Sanders railed very vocally against the party he was trying to become the candidate for. The Democratic party talked the talk but Sanders also walked the walk so to say.

What becomes evident from this chapter is that populism has played a major role in American politics. All populists mentioned above defended the people from an elite that tried to satisfy their own interests without taking the people into account. Moreover, almost all the examples were critical of immigration or downright opposed to it. However, a key movement seems to be a lacking in all discussions about populism, namely the New Left. This movement will be discussed in chapter 2.
Chapter 2: The American New Left

Before we can say anything meaningful about the American New Left we need to understand the environment in which this school of thought came up. Therefore, an overview of the major issues in 1950s/60s America will be provided below. During this discussion, certain theories will be discussed that explain why the New Left came up in most Western countries. We will see that the required conditions for a New Left movement are met in the United States. After that the Students for a Democratic Society, a New Left movement, will be discussed, beginning with their foundation and how the reasons for its foundation fit the requirements that we have sketched out before. This will be followed by a discussion of the Port Huron Statement, which can be seen as the SDS’s manifesto. Following this discussion, a comparison is made with the populist traditions we have seen in Chapter 1 and we will conclude that the SDS’s rhetoric is comparable to that of American populism in how they define the elite. We will also see that the SDS does not oppose immigration. This seems to be a reason to not label the SDS as a typical American populist organization, but we will see that this is not the case. The SDS is a core organization of the American New Left, and they self-identified with the New Left. This means we can conclude whether the American New Left fits the American populist tradition based on whether the SDS does.

America in the 1950s/60s.

The 1950s and 60s were years of division for America. The Cold War was heating up in Korea and at home the war effort resulted in the Red Scare, anti-communism, discussions on America’s place in the world and the growth of the military-industrial complex as the arms race continued. At the same time, domestic tensions grew as the Civil Rights movement began growing, traditional gender roles and family life were being challenged by a new wave of feminism, and the baby boom generation started speaking out against the generation in power. The 50s and 60s were a hectic time during which the United States slowly started to lose its authority in the world. It was the combination of the Cold War, anti-communism, the huge number of young adolescents, a disappointment in politics and a belief in equal rights that gave rise to the New Left. Therefore, these issues deserve an in-depth look at their role in establishing the New Left.

The Cold War played out abroad but that did not mean that there were no issues at home.
Because the Cold War was also a war of culture, criticasters were not welcome. After all, it is difficult to prove that the American system is superior if American citizens are advocating for communism. Anti-communist propaganda proved to be a useful tool: more and more Americans began to fear communism, the threat of which became known as the Red Scare. Fueled by these anti-communist sentiments, committees like the House Un-American Activities Committee (established in the late 1930s) began researching possible communists in America. Most infamous are the Hollywood blacklist, a list of American entertainment figures who were suspected of having communist sympathies, and McCarthyism which refers to the witch-hunt like tactics used by Senator Joseph McCarthy during his hunt on communists (Norton et al., 2011). Besides the Red Scare, events in the early 1950s in Communist territory “disillusioned a young generation of radicals, leading them to reject the dogmas of their fathers” (“The Port Huron”, 2015. p.52). These events included, for example, the crushing of the Hungarian uprising. This young generation of radicals sought a different way to express their ideology.

It was the young generation in the 60s, the generation of the baby boomers, that furthered this cause. The sheer number of young people in the 60s (those of under age 20 made up 41% of the population (Norton et al., 2011)) would undeniably have effect on politics and culture. During the 1940s and 50s the United States was doing incredibly well economically, so much so that the period has been dubbed the golden age of capitalism. The baby boom generation grew up in an environment where scarcity did not exist. The effect of this population growth can be explained using Ronald Inglehart’s (1977) post-material values theory. It states that when people grow up in an environment where there is no scarcity they will grow without material concerns, and thus they will become increasingly interested in post-material values such as personal freedom, women’s rights, minority rights, and environmental issues. Moreover, because people socialize mainly with people from their own generation certain ideas will be confirmed easier. This is of course true for every generation but young people in the 60s “spent more time with peers than any previous generation, as three-quarters of them graduated from high school (up from one-fifth in the 1920s) and almost half of them went to college (up 16 percent in the 1940s)” (Norton et al., 2011. p.805). 41% of the population was under the age of twenty and almost half of them went to colleges, it means that almost 20% reached adolescence on college campuses. This led to the trend in which “campuses themselves became sites for left-oriented students to protest the power dynamics, structures of capitalism, and universities’ role in a larger...
military-industrial complex” (“The Port Huron”, 2015. p.57). This influx of young left-wing voters could have resulted in huge elections success for the Democratic Party. This did not happen because many of these young people saw both parties as part of the general problem. In fact, they saw the party system in the United States as a cartel, in which the Democrats and the Republicans were both benefitting from keeping third parties out of power.² The campus brought like-minded people together and thus it is of no surprise that the definitive American New Left movement was established by students.

**Necessary and sufficient conditions for a New Left movement**

We now know what the most important developments in the United States were during the 1950s and 1960s. This is important as it will enable us to apply Herbert Kitschelt’s theory on why New Left parties and movements came up during this time. In his article (1988) on left-libertarian parties he distills three necessary conditions and two sufficient conditions for a left-libertarian party or movement to emerge. He defines left-libertarian parties as parties that grow out of the sentiment that the realms of instrumental action in modern society – the market place and the bureaucratic organization – dominate too much of social life and have displaced relations of solidarity (in the private sphere of interpersonal communication) and participatory political deliberation (in the public sphere of collective decision making). (p.197)

This means that left-libertarian parties and movements politicize daily life and argue that personal freedom is an important issue, which relates to post-material values. In order to achieve this, they argue for a participatory democracy in which decisions are made based on the collective. Kitschelt argues that the New Left is part of this left-libertarian tradition, arguing that “these parties appeared first in Scandinavia, France and the Netherlands under “New Left” labels and competed with the established communist and social democratic parties” (p.194). Some left-libertarian parties choose to focus on environmental issues instead of social issues and this gave rise to Green parties. But what they have in common is that they are both “critical of the logic of societal development and the institutions that underlie the postwar compromise between capital and labor in industrial societies” (Kitschelt, p.195). We can thus use Kitschelt’s conditions to

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¹² In the long run, this might have hurt both parties even greater than allowing a third party to become significant. The success of both Sanders and Trump might prove to be fatal for the both the Democratic Party and the Republican party.
explain why a New Left movement emerged in the United States.

The necessary conditions Kitschelt theorizes include an advanced industrialization, a high level of bureaucracy (and thus the existence of a welfare state) and an increasing number of educated voters. Sufficient conditions are discussions about nuclear power and weapons and whether left parties were in charge. The necessary conditions explain why “there is pressure to represent left-libertarian interest in the political arena” (p.209) but the sufficient conditions determine whether this New Left movement becomes significant, meaning that they “have received about 4 percent of the vote” (p.198) in national elections. A further explanation of these conditions will help understand whether these conditions are true for the United States.

An high level of industrialization relates to Inglehart’s theory of post-material values. A country with a high level of industrialization is more likely to not experience scarcity and thus those growing up in that society will develop a primary interest in post-material values. A high level of bureaucracy is a sign that the country is a Welfare state and Kitschelt’s research shows that “the existence of left-libertarian parties is strongly linked to public social expenditure as a percentage of gross domestic product” (p.210), meaning that the higher the public social expenditure is the more likely it is that a New Left movement or party emerged. The condition of a high population of higher educated is related to the socialization theory which was discussed above.

The sufficient condition of a left party being in charge has a two-fold explanation. First, when a left-wing party is in the office there is no direct threat of a conservative party getting power. Supporters of New Left parties would obviously rather see a left party in charge. This is of importance because the lack of an immediate conservative threat means that the New Left is free to critique the left party in charge and distance itself from that party. When there is a direct threat of a conservative party or a conservative party is in charge, this present a common enemy for the entire left wing and thus the Left Wing is expected to work together to attack the conservatives. Secondly, Kitschelt argues that “the longer socialist parties participate in government, the more likely left-libertarians will be to defect from them (p.216). This has to do with the power that these left-party have while they are incumbents which ties in with the first explanation. Moreover, he says that “the performance record of socialist governments

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3 This is not relevant for this thesis as the SDS was not a political party
4 Kitschelt notes that “Surveys show that most left-libertarian voters do prefer post-material values. But the reverse does not hold true: not all postmaterialists support left-libertarian parties” (206)
agonizes left-libertarians and dampens hopes that the traditional left can incorporate new demands into its policies while simultaneous catering to its working class constituency” (p.216). This is because it was the values and interests of that working class voters that put the party in power. Shifting their policies to a more post-material values based discourse could mean the loss of that constituency resulting in a loss of power. Both reasons combined explain why a left party in power means an opportunity for a New Left party or movement to establish itself distinctively.

Kitschelt argues that controversy about nuclear power and weaponry is a sufficient condition because “antinuclear activist first attempted to work through the established parties, but neither conservative nor socialist parties were willing to represent and support them” (p.219). This explains why antinuclear activist felt a need for different party or movement and this provides a space for a New Left movement or party.

It should be clear now why these conditions have effect on the possible emergence of a New Left movement or party. We now turn to applying these conditions to the United States in the 1960s. The level of industrialization in the United States had been declining as the economy was shifting towards a more service based economy. Nevertheless, in 1962 15,513,000 people worked in the manufacturing industry (US Department of Labor, 2017). The United States had seen its greatest industrialization in the late 19th century so even though young people were less likely to work in industry themselves, most of the older generations did.

The United States had a welfare state in the 1960s but it was not as developed as it was in Europe. Only about 5% of the total GDP was spend on public social spending, which is much less compared to European countries during that time (OECD, 2016). This means that this variable is not in play here.

The third necessary condition was a high level of educated voters. We have already seen that during the 1950s and 1960s the student population in the United States almost doubled. At least 20% of the population was now considered to be high educated.

This means that two of the three necessary conditions are true for the United States in the 1960s. The sufficient conditions are also met. The arms race between the USSR and the United States and the use of the Nuclear bomb on Japan meant that a discussion of nuclear power and energy was a factor in the United States. This satisfies that sufficient condition. Whether or not a Left-wing party was in charge in the United States did not matter. The American New Left railed against both the Democrats and the Republicans. Therefore, New Left parties were in favor of
participatory democracy and in America this translated to the wish to “end the “organized stalemate” in Washington and open the possibility of a more progressive party” (“The Port Huron”, 2015. p.23). They knew that their policies and issues would not be adopted by the Democratic Party in a quick enough fashion and real change would only come with a real change of the power elite. Regardless of which party was in charge during the 1960s, New Left supporters would not have supported these parties.

The fact that two of the three necessary conditions were met and both sufficient conditions were met means that the odds of a New Left movement emerging in the United States was high. This movement was established in 1959 and was called the Students for a Democratic society. The SDS is one the core organization of the New Left in America. Tom Hayden, who was president of the SDS from 1962 and 63, has said that “the New Left became our hybrid brand” (“The Port Huron”, 2015. p.22). The Statement itself argues that the university was the perfect breeding ground to create a New Left movement (282). In order to create this New Left it had to include both “liberals and socialist, the former for their relevance, the latter for their sense of thoroughgoing reforms in the system” (282). This combination of liberal influence and social influence explains why the New Left is considered part of the left-libertarian tradition.

It’s manifesto, the Port Huron Statement, confirms the theories of both Inglehart and Kitschelt. In its introduction, the statement says: “We are people of this generation, bred in at least modest comfort, housed now in universities, looking uncomfortably to the world we inherit. When we were kids the United States was the wealthiest and strongest country in the world.” (“The Port Huron”, 2015. p.239) The members of the movement had never experienced scarcity and thus became more concerned with post-material values. The Statement admits that in this laid the danger of “complacency”, had it not been for “events too troubling to dismiss. First, the permeating and victimizing fact of human degradation, symbolized by the Southern struggle against racial bigotry, compelled most of us from silence to activism.” (“The Port Huron”, 2015. p.239) The existence of racism and bigotry inhibited any complacent feelings about their own position. The Cold War provided the feeling that “we, our friends … might die at any time” (“The Port Huron”, 2015. p.239) resulting in a feeling of togetherness. The racial tensions and the Cold War were “too immediate and crushing in their impact” to remain complacent about the political situation in the United States. They felt a need to become active about the situation they were in.
However, the Hungarian revolution of 1956 and the way the Soviet Union handled it was another reason why communism was not a viable option. At universities all over the world “academics and left-intellectuals proposed a new middle way and a “humane socialism”” (“The Port Huron”, 2015. p.53) later dubbed the New Left. This was also true in the United States were “the New Left arose out of the ashes of the old left, which had been dealt lethal blows by the combined impact of McCarthysim and the Khrushchev/Stalin revolutions (“The Port Huron”, 2015. p.53). Thus, the New Left came from the wish to create a leftist-ideology that incorporated post-material values and did not have the dogma’s that the old left had. It was from this that the Students for a Democratic Society came forth.

**Students for a Democratic Society**

The Port Huron Statement was drafted in 1962 and it reflected the core ideas of the movement. The statement condemned “racism, poverty in the midst of plenty, and the Cold War.”, and called for “participatory democracy,” as the “SDS sought to wrest power from the corporations, the military, and the politicians and return it to “the people”” (Norton, et al. 805/6). Hayden has said that much of what the 60s are known for cannot be found in the statement, as it was drafted before the advent of the hippies and before the women’s right movement took off. However, the core of the SDS ideology has stood the test of time, as “its passionate democratic core was of permanent value” (“The Port Huron”, 2015. p.21) . Hayden further claims that “participatory democracy” was the key issue for the SDS and the thing that stood in its way was the “power elite”, a term coined by C. Wright Mills (2000) in his book of the same name.

The power elite, as paraphrased by Hayden, means “the intersected (though not coordinated) hierarchies of banks, corporations, the military, the media, and religion” (“The Port Huron”, 2015. p.26). This is also what Hayden means when he talks about “the system”. He sees “the system” as one of the three main reasons the SDS never accomplished what they had imagined. Especially the paradigm of the military-industrial complex was a direct opponent for the change SDS envisioned. Hayden defines a paradigm as “an understanding of power as cultural hegemony or dominance, a thought system in which there seems to be no alternative” (“The Port Huron”, 2015. p.) He admits that “this paradigm froze us in fear. The Legacy of McCarthyism, if continued in the 1960s, would mean that all our work, form the sit-ins to the Freedom Rides to the Port Huron Statement, would be marginalized as taking the wrong side in
the Cold War” (“The Port Huron”, 2015. p.26). It was the fear of being labeled “un-American” that spurred the drafters on to attack this mentality in the statement.

The SDS was obviously trying to break with the ways of the Old Left and the American political tradition. The SDS regarded the highly theorized political landscape of the 60s as a problem and called for a return to idealism and utopian views. This becomes clear from the following quote from The Port Huron Statement:

> the decline of utopia and hope is in fact one of the defining features of social life today. The reasons are various: the dreams of the older left were perverted by Stalinism and never recreated; the congressional stalemate makes men narrow their view of the possible; the specialization of human activity leaves little room for sweeping thought; the horrors of the twentieth century … have blasted hopefulness. To be idealistic is to be considered apocalyptic, deluded. To have no serious aspirations, on the contrary, is to be “though-minded” (“The Port Huron”, 2015. p.241)

The perversion of the Old Left meant that ideology was considered dead by politicians. Even though the Berlin Wall did not fall until 1989, communism as an ideology was debunked (according to western scholars). The SDS saw this as Western liberalist saying that Western liberal democracy was obviously the better ideology and thus ideology was of no avail anymore. The SDS disagreed and gave other arguments as to why ideological discussion was over in the United States. Multiple factors had led to this perceived end of ideology and one of them had to do with the congressional stalemate. This is why they call for participatory democracy as it would mean the return of competing ideologies in politics.

Participatory democracy as a discourse is considered populist because it is based on the premise that the people know very well what to do and they do not need an elite to tell them that. Tom Hayden says that the concept of participatory democracy came “in response to the severe limitations of an undemocratic system that we saw as representing an oligarchy” (“The Port Huron”, 2015. p.21). Attacking the cartel parties and their “organized stalemate” is of course also an attack on a political elite whose interest is keeping their job and thus they do not care about the people. There are other examples of a general populist attitude from the SDS members. Hayden acknowledges the prophetic value of the Statement “in condemning the 1%, who in 1962 owned more than 80 percent of all personal shares of stock” (“The Port Huron”, 2015. p.17). This is of
course prophetic in the sense that Senator Sanders used the same terminology during the 2016 presidential bid. You could also argue that the SDS used populism as a style. Hayden says that, under influence of the SNCC (Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee), the SDS saw that listening and speaking in clear vernacular English was crucial. Books were treasured, but where you stood, with whom, and against what risks was even more important, because if the people you were organizing could not understand your theories, you had to adjust. This led to a language and a form of thinking cleansed of ideological infection, with an emphasis on trying to say what people were already thinking but had not put into words” (“The Port Huron”, 2015. p.19)

It is not put into words very directly but reading between the lines tells you that the above quote comes down to speaking to the common person in a way they understand. It seems to suggest that those who have not studied political science or have not gone to higher education may have trouble understanding highly theorized political concepts. They will easier relate to a utopian vision put into words they understand. This is also a jab to the cartel politicians as they would benefit from speaking in high theorized vernacular as it would prevent the people from seeing the truth about their cartel-ish ways (according to the SDS that is).

In Chapter 1 we have defined populism as a thin ideology to which a broader ideology is attached. We then focused on how this translates to the populist tradition and saw how there are two schools of populism in America: civic nationalist populism and racial nationalist populism. These two types shared the broad characteristic of attacking the elite, defined as the moneyed elite, big business, special interests or the 1%. The SDS lays most blame on the military-industrial complex. The SDS vehemently opposed the war in Vietnam and it was not just for pacifist reasons. The Port Huron Statement defines the military-industrial complex as “the powerful congruence of interest and structure among military and business elites which affect so much of our development and destiny” (“The Port Huron”, 2015. p.249). It is in the interest of these elites to create a permanent war economy and what makes it worse is that the growth of the weapon industry and the defense industry has “included the steady concentration of military spending among a few corporations” (“The Port Huron”, 2015. p.250). The SDS also rails against the politicians who support this military-industrial complex and the monopolization of the industry: “the politicians, of course, take the line of least resistance and thickest support: warfare, instead of welfare, is easiest to stand up for: after all, the Free World is at stake” (“The Port
According to the SDS the military business elite provided the greatest threat to American democracy.

This fits the trend of American populists railing against a defined elite. Even if we use other definitions of populism, the SDS can still be fitted into that definition. Their style is populist, their call for participatory democracy is populist, and the fact that it is a student movement that had many chapters throughout the United States means that the SDS could also be seen as a grassroots movement. The SDS can be is a populist movement. We have previously used the distinction of civic nationalist and racial nationalist populism in chapter 1 and the SDS seemingly fall into the first category.

The Port Huron statement has an entire section dedicated to discrimination starting with saying that “Our America is still white” and continuing by stating many socioeconomic fields in which non-whites are disadvantaged in the United States. The SDS were clearly not racists. The other side of the American populist tradition is attacking globalization. Here it is not as clear, as the Port Huron Statement does not explicitly state a view on immigration. The SDS did argue in support for an American role in industrializing the world, which does not fit into an “America First”, isolationist position as is sometimes the case in racial nationalist populism in the United States. They also support giving aid through institutions as the United Nations (“The Port Huron”, 2015. p.269). In this sense they seem to not really fit the mold of the civic nationalist populist as they do not oppose immigration. However, we should not forget that our definition of American populism is based primarily on parties and movements from a time where few people supported completely open borders. Moreover, it was during the 1960 that the restrictive immigration quotas set by the immigration act of 1924 were loosened. We could argue that this anti-immigration sentiment has shifted from opposing immigration in every aspect to solely opposing the migration of companies made possible by globalization, at least for the civic nationalist tradition that is. Senator Sanders is an example of this. In this context, it is seems logically that the SDS would not oppose immigration the way civic nationalist populists parties did in the early 19th century. It is this context that allows me to conclude that the SDS was a civic nationalist organization.
Conclusion

Chapter 2 started out with an overview of the 1950s and 1960s America. We saw that the developments that characterized these periods are also identified by Kitschelt as the necessary and sufficient conditions for a New Left party or movement to develop. Unsurprisingly, this happened in the United States when the Students for a Democratic Society was founded in 1959. It’s manifest, known as the Port Huron Statement, is a typical New Left document as it calls for a new form of socialist democracy through participatory democracy. The SDS frequently attacks the power elite and especially the military-industrial complex, in whose interest it is to create a permanent war economy. This is why the SDS was against the Vietnam war. The SDS is populist in how they attack the elite, in their populist discourse (participatory democracy) and in their style, and is thus a populist movement.
Conclusion

This thesis has tried to answer the question to what extent the American New Left fits into the American populist tradition. Chapter 1 showed us that populism has been a constant in American politics. We used two labels to show how certain themes keep coming back in the American populism. These themes include primarily an elite that tries to satisfy their own interests without taking the people into account. Whether it was the wealthy supporting the Gold Standard, the entrepreneurs trying to overturn the abolition of alcohol, government by big business, the 1% attracting all the profits, railroad businesses attracting cheap Chinese labor, or even a Pope suspected of sending waves of Catholics to pave the way for a Papal state in America.

There are of course also differences between these populists. Some movements or parties like the Workingmen’s Party of California or the KKK are blatantly racist, even when you take into account that racism was widespread up until the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and arguably still is today. Other parties are not (as) racist and primarily focused on other issues. The Peoples Party and William J. Bryan focused primarily on the Free Silver issue to protect the people from the elite. Because of this distinction we used Kazin’s two types of populism: civic nationalist populism and racial nationalist populism. Civic nationalist populism is a tradition that includes the Farmers Alliances, the People’s Party, William J. Bryan, and Senator Sanders. Racial nationalist populism is the tradition that includes the Know-Nothings, the WPC, and Donald Trump (among others). The main message of the chapter was that populism has been a constant in American politics.

Chapter 2 started with a discussion about America in the 1950s and 1960s. The Cold War was beginning to unfold during this time and Americans experienced unprecedented amounts of wealth. The huge influx of the baby boom generation meant that in the early 60s about 40% of American’s population was twenty years old or even younger. This population boom also led to a boom in the student population. The greatest part of this generation had not experienced economic hardship. We used Inglehart’s scarcity hypothesis to explain that this meant that this generation developed an interest in post-material values. Furthermore, his socialization theory explains that this interest in post-material values was only strengthened through the enormous student population living on campus. It was of no surprise that students became increasingly politically active.

We then applied Kitschelt’s necessary and sufficient conditions to the American situation.
Besides this boom in student population, a relatively high level of industrialization, the role of the Democratic Party in American politics, and the discussion about nuclear power and weaponry mean that Kitschelt’s conditions were met and thus there was space for a New Left movement to emerge. This space in combination with an increasingly politically active student population resulted in the Students for a Democratic Society, which formed the core of the New Left movement in America.

We concluded that the SDS stood up for the people in their battle against the power elite and the military-industrial complex. To do so, they argued that a participatory democracy should be established in the United States. This would break up the cartel consisting of the two main political parties and the business that used them to satisfy their own needs. Besides choosing the side of the people in the people versus elite cleavage, they also used populism as a style and as a discourse.

We can label the SDS a civic nationalist populist movement because even though they did not oppose immigration, they did support efforts to democratize the world. However, we have to place this into context. Civic nationalist populists began to stop opposing immigration, with the Immigration act of 1965 as an example of this sentiment. An argument can be made that the civic nationalist tradition has shifted from critique on immigration to critique on economic globalization. Further research can be done on how opposition to immigration has shifted from cultural to economic immigration.

Moreover, the SDS fits the American populist tradition in how they rail against a government that is controlled by an elite that tries to maximize profits for themselves without taking the people into account. The SDS saw the industrial-military complex as part of the power elite and it was this elite that they railed against. Therefore, to answer the research question, we can conclude that the SDS (and thus the New Left) fits the American populist tradition perfectly and is an example of civic nationalist populism.
Reference List


