“A PART OF THE WORLD IN EVERY CORNER OF MY COUNTRY”

EXPLAINING THE NON-SECURITIZATION OF THE LATIN AMERICAN MIGRATION REGIME

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The statement in the title belongs to Argentinian President Mauricio Macri, and was part of his closing argument in his address before the UN General Assembly on September 20, 2016, which expressed Argentina’s commitment to receiving more refugees from Syria and neighboring countries and integrate them into Argentinian society. The entire statement reads:

Argentina, which has just celebrated 200 years of independence, is a country that always opened its doors to men and women of the world who sought and seek a better life. There is a part of the world in every corner of my country. We live peacefully with Christians, Jews, and Muslims. We are a society that is enriched by diversity; we are an open society. In a world where fragmentation tends to proliferate, let us tell people to not fear interdependence.¹ (“Intervención,” 2016)

¹ Own translation.
Abstract
Migration is a global phenomenon, and one that is currently increasing in both scale and scope, diversity and complexity. Today, we see what appears to be a global trend of associating migration with risks and security, a reluctance to receive migrants, and hence restrictive migration policies. Latin America, however, despite its high levels of trans-border violence, stands out in this regard: it proclaims open, welcoming, and human rights-focused migration policies. This thesis aims to understand this non-securitization of the Latin American migration regime, and will do so through a combination of the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory and a hybrid institutionalist model created out of two complementary perspectives by Lavenex et al. (2016) and Van der Vleuten (2007). It is argued that the explanation of why one type of migration regime occurs over another one can be found in the nature of Latin American migration policies as well as the regional organization’s overall identity, specifically in four factors: an open regional identity; a material and/or ideational interest of the regional hegemon in a non-securitized migration regime; domestic and transnational pressures that are economy-, human rights-, and/or regional identity-driven; and the occurrence of institutional isomorphism.

Key words: Latin America, migration, securitization, non-securitization, human rights, regional regime, migration policies.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

**CA-4** Central America-4 Border Control Agreement, between El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua.

**CARICOM** Caribbean Community. Member States: Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Suriname, and Haiti. Associate Members: Anguilla, Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, and the Turks and Caicos Islands.

**CSME** Caribbean Single Market and Economy

**ILO** International Labour Organization

**IOM** International Organization for Migration

**Mercosur** *Mercado Común del Sur*; Southern Common Market. Member States: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela (suspended since December 2016). Associate Members: Chile, Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, Ecuador.

**SACM** South American Conference on Migration

**SICA** *Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana*; Central American Integration System. Members States: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Belize, and the Dominican Republic.

**OAS** Organization of American States

**ODECA** *Organización de Estados Centro-Americanos*; Organization of Central American States

**UNHCR** United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

**UNASUR** *Unión de Naciones Suramericanas*; Union of South American Nations

**UNCMW** United Nations Convention on Migrant Workers
CHAPTER I – INTRODUCTION

Especially in these difficult times, these times of crises, we have to welcome refugees with open arms.

(Brodzinsky, 2015)

This statement by former Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff, in reference to the global refugee crisis, is a telling one, one that might not be expected in a time where migration is often associated with walls and borders – and this is precisely what this research is about.

Migration is a universal phenomenon, and one that is currently at the center stage of public and political debate in many regions. In the 2017 elections in the Netherlands, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany, for example, the matter of migration is among the top concerns. It is the issue over which Dutch coalition talks have collapsed – twice. In a globalizing world, international migration flows have become larger in scale and scope, more diverse and more complex (Massey and Taylor, 2004; Grugel and Piper, 2007). In 2015, the UN International Migration Report estimated the total number of international migrants to be 244 million – a staggering growth from the approximately 173 million in 2000 (UN, 2016). This is 3.3 percent of the world’s population (“Migration Overview,” n.d.; “International Migration Statistics,” 2016). Or, as Grugel and Piper (2007) visualize it: one in approximately every 33 persons is moving across borders, and taken together, migrants would make up the world’s fifth most populous ‘country.’

These migration flows are, however, distributed across the world unevenly, with substantial differences between different regions. Table 1.1. provides an overview of the development of the share of international migrants and their area of arrival. It shows the growth of international migrant flows for the past twenty-five years, and gives a rough idea of where these migrants end up. It should be noted, however, that the table shows only the region of arrival, and does not take into account the area of origin and the specific patterns of global migration flows. The table suggests, for example, that Asia is the second most common arrival area for international migrants and Oceania the least. There is a lot more to the regional division of migration, however. First, in many parts of the world, migration largely takes place between countries within the same region. This is especially the case for Africa (with 87% of its migrants originating from the same region),

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2 Defined as a person living in a country other than his or her country of birth.

3 Throughout this thesis, the terms ‘area, region, or country of arrival’ will be used instead of ‘destination’ or ‘receiving’ area, region, or country. This to signify that a) migrants do not always end up in the country or region they intended, and often cannot control this, which would be suggested with ‘destination’ and b), arrival countries are not always willing to (permanently) host migrants, which would be suggested with ‘receiving’.
Table 1.1: International migrants at mid-year, as a percentage of the total population

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Source: UN, 2015a.

Asia (82%), and to a lesser extent for Latin America and the Caribbean (66%) and Europe (53%) (UN, 2015a). Second, patterns can be distinguished in where the majority of all migrants come from and end up in. This is only a small number of countries. Over a third of the world’s migrant population comes from ten countries: in descending order from India, Mexico, the Russian Federation, China, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Ukraine, the Philippines, the Syrian Arab Republic, and the United Kingdom (UN, 2016). On the flipside, approximately half of all international migrants reside in ten countries: the United States, Germany, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, the United Arab Emirates, Canada, France, Australia, and Spain (UN, 2016). Finally, in 2015, the number of international migrants born in developing countries who lived in developed countries for the first time almost equaled the number of migrants born in the developing countries who resided in developing countries⁴ (OECD, 2013).

But how are all these movements governed worldwide? While international migration flows are thus increasing, the share of migrants compared to the world population has remained roughly the same, at around three percent. Remarkably, more than the phenomenon itself, it is its perception that has changed over the years (Mayer, 2012). Historically, immigrants, as non-nationals, have been granted little legal protection, other than by their country’s diplomatic services. This changed with the development of international human rights regimes, bringing sets of rights to protect all individuals, regardless of status (Grugel and Piper, 2007).⁵ Still, different regions handle migration in different ways: while international migration is one of the most clear demonstrations of globalization, it is not exactly a stronghold of global governance (Betts, 2008;  

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⁴ Following the United Nation’s country classifications, the terms ‘developing’ and ‘developed’ are used to reflect basic economic country conditions (“World Economic Situation and Prospects,” 2016). Although these terms are criticized for their implication of inferiority and superiority, as well as a certain Western bias, they are used here to make a broad distinction between common areas of origin and arrival for migrants.

⁵ For example, the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESC); and the 2003 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families.
Lavenex and Panizzon, 2013). In contrast to other transnational issues such as finance, international trade, or the environment, migration is without a multilateral institutional framework to set out and monitor the principles, norms and rules to control cross-border population flows (Betts, 2010; Lavenex and Panizzon, 2013). Nation states still have a relatively high degree of sovereignty to determine their own migration policies, and there is no such thing as a UN Migration Organization, for example. Some countries are reluctant to receive migrants and integrate them into their economies and societies, and see a growth in hostility towards migration, especially from the developing countries. These sentiments have been more pronounced in developed, arrival countries, notably in Western Europe and the United States, but have also been shared, although to a lesser degree, in developing countries (Ghosh, 2000). Tirman (2006) and Ibrahim (2005) have argued that the association of migration with risks and security is a global phenomenon. As Ibrahim (2005) states, “due to the assertions of international organizations, states, academics and journalists, migration has become synonymous with a new risk to the liberal world. This discourse has reached its pinnacle, normalizing the view that migrants are a threat” (p. 163). But is that indeed the case?

§1.1. Puzzle and Research Question

As explained above, numbers of migrants are increasing, and different countries respond to migration in different ways. In the European Union, the policy response to contemporary migration has been reactive and essentially restrictive, especially in response to the 2015 and 2016 refugee crisis, when ad hoc border controls were reinstated between EU member states in order to control or prevent onwards movement by refugees (Geddes and Scholten, 2016). This is reflected, for example, in the coordination of visa policy in the EU, an emphasis on the need for restrictions of population flows, and the EU EuroDac fingerprint database for identifying asylum seekers. Jef Huysmans (2000) has argued that these instances exemplify that public debate and policies regarding migration in the European Union are securitized. This means that migration is considered a security issue, instead of an economic or human rights matter, for example. In this, Huysmans follows the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory, which does not adhere to a merely materialistic notion of security, but understands security more broadly, enabling the inclusion of

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6 Two exceptions should be noted: a formal regime in the area of asylum and refugee protection, overseen by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the UN Convention on Migrant Workers (Betts, 2008). Furthermore, there is the International Migration Organization (IOM) as the most prominent organization for international migration, which exists outside of the UN-system. The IOM has no clear mandate from the international community, however – like the statute that provides UN agencies with authority (Betts, 2008). Rather, the IOM is more like a service-provider to individual states, providing advice and facilitating migration and migrant health, for example.
societal security and focusing on the process of how an issue is constructed into a matter of security (Buzan et al., 1998).

Like the European Union, Latin America is also a region with a significant amount of migrants. In 2015, approximately 9.2 million international migrants resided in Latin America, which comes down to 1.5 percent of the total population (UN, 2015a). A majority of those migrants (66%) are intraregional migrants and originated from the region. Migration in Latin America thus differs from that in Europe, both in scope (approximately 76.1 million international migrants arrived in Europe that same year, which is 10.3% of the total population) and nature (53% of migrants in Europe is intraregional) (UN, 2015a). Also in contrast to the EU, Latin America sees a less restrictive, less securitized migration policy. Public opinion on migration is relatively positive (IOM, 2015b), and Latin American politicians and civil servants tend to stress the universality of migrants’ rights, the non-criminalization of irregular migration, and the inefficacy of restrictive responses to migration (Acosta, 2016). The last decades have seen laws catching up with this discourse towards migration: Latin America is moving towards a legislative framework on migration which is heavily guided by a respect of human rights, the principle of non-discrimination, and the idea that crossing a border should not necessarily equate a loss of rights (Acosta, 2016). Before discussing this more extensively in the following chapters, it can be said that it appears that Latin America – very much unlike the European Union – harbors open, welcoming migration policies.

This is remarkable: not only because it seems to go against the trend of securitizing migration policies seen elsewhere in the world (Ibrahim, 2005), but especially considering Latin America’s drug issues, violent and instable border regions (Briscoe, 2008), and the weak institutional and governance capabilities of its states (Mares and Kacowicz, 2015). Today, Latin America has the dubious distinction of being the most violent region in the world, with combined crime rates more than triple the world average, which are comparable to rates in nations at war (Watts, 2015). One would expect that policies regarding the movement of people are restrictive and securitized in especially such a region of violence, drug trafficking, and weak borders, yet this is apparently not the case. In sum, therefore, the fact that Latin America sees considerable levels of migration, but also has significant drug-, border- and governance issues, begs the question: why is there no securitization of migration in Latin America? This puzzle can be translated to a research question: Given both the worldwide trend of securitizing migration policies and the instable borders and high levels of crime, violence, and drug trafficking in Latin America, what explains the non-securitization of migration policies in the Latin American migration regime?
§1.2. Methods and Data

How to answer this question? The aim here is not quite to create the Latin American version of Huysmans’ article. Although he does suggest a few conditions for securitization to occur, Huysmans goes into the process of securitization in the EU itself, not necessary why securitization occurred in the EU. The question at stake here, however, is why Latin America does not see a securitization of migration policies. Instead of the bits and pieces inside a securitization process, we therefore have to look one level higher, to the explanations of why regional institutions institutionalize different ideas. In order to do this, this thesis will combine securitization theory with regime theory for the theoretical framework, in order to a) have a gauge to assess the extent of (non-)securitization of migration policies in Latin America and b) examine why a regime is shaped a certain way. In this combination of securitization- and regime theory, this research situates itself between constructivist and rationalist approaches, as it builds on both the (constructivist) idea of security as an intersubjective, social construct; as well as the (rationalist) view that regimes make certain choices that fit what is considered appropriate behavior.

In order to answer the research question, first, a supposition is deduced from securitization theory and regime theory. It will be used to determine whether Latin America indeed, as it appears, does not see a securitization of migration. Subsequently, a so-called hybrid institutionalist model is created from two regime theory-based perspectives by Lavenex et al. (2016) and Van der Vleuten (2007), in order to determine why different regional migration regimes look differently; i.e. why some are securitized and others are not – something securitization theory cannot do. From this model, a set of hypotheses is derived, which will be tested in a small-n, multiple case study.

As for sources, this research will include primary documents. Not only because academic literature on the securitization of migration in Latin America is scarce – as will be further elaborated on below – but also because this is where policy is made and where instances of securitization should be visible. Latin American regional migration policies are more scattered across different policy frameworks than those of the European Union. A majority of movement within Latin America is facilitated in regional (trade) agreements and fora, most importantly in the Mercosur framework, the Central American Integration System (SICA), the South American Conference on Migration (SACM), and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). These regional organizations, their founding documents and migration programs will therefore be used to assess how Latin American regional migration policies are shaped.

As further expanded upon in Chapter Two, regime theory, throughout this research, is not used in the classic, theoretical Krasner-sense of the notion (1983), but rather refers to a hybrid institutionalist model, created to explain the nature of migration regimes.
§1.3. Scientific and Societal Relevance

As regards to academic relevance, there are two significant gaps in the literature, which this thesis aims to advance on. First, there is the weak link between regime theory and securitization theory. While the (non-)securitization of migration in a certain region certainly suggests a type of migration regime, the connection between the two theories has hardly been explicated. As will be further discussed in Chapter Two, securitization theory does not provide explanations for why one would choose to securitize over any other alternatives, or why and when securitization would not happen. When looking at a case of apparent non-securitization of a migration regime, securitization theory thus offers few handles to explain why this is the case – a major gap in the theory. In combining the perspectives of securitization theory with regime theory, this thesis therefore aims to take a first step to mend that gap.

Secondly, literature on the securitization of migration in Latin America is scarce. While there are numerous studies on migration in Latin America, these generally focus on other aspects. A large part of the literature on migration in Latin America are data reports presenting numbers of migrants and their areas of origin or arrival (see: OECD, 2013; UN, 2015a; IOM, 2015a). But academic literature, too, is of limited use here. Many studies focus on migration to the United States (see: Pellegrino, 2000; Durand and Massey, 2010). Others focus on either labor migration, refugees, or unauthorized migrants (see: Mazza and Sohnen, 2010; Acosta, 2016) – not migration in general, as taken in this thesis. Furthermore, the other way around, those studies into security policies in Latin America tend to largely disregard the aspect of migration – possibly precisely because migration policies are not connected to security in Latin America. Hurrell (1998), for example, the author of a key work on security in Latin America, only mentions migration briefly as a part of an enumeration of the different issues facing Latin American regional security policies. The same can be said of Mares and Kacowicz’ (2015) more recent Handbook of Latin American Security. Many others discussing security in Latin America primarily focus on drug issues (see: Chabat et al., 2015; Diamint, 2004) or border issues (Briscoe, 2008).

These two gaps in the literature are not only problematic scientifically, but have a social relevance, too: an incomplete insight into the dynamics of securitization across regions has actual ramifications for individuals and social relations. For migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers themselves, of course: a specifically vulnerable social group, who are subject to harsher security discourses instead of humanitarian ones when migration is successfully securitized (Grugel and Piper, 2007, p. 27). But also for those on the other side: as Gupta (2014) observed, a study into the securitization of migration has relevance beyond academics as it can offer opportunities for critical self-awareness for security practitioners. The IOM has also highlighted that a simplistic causal link
between migration and security threats can lead to misguided, even backfiring policies (IOM, 2010). Similarly, it could be argued that securitization of migration limits the political space to evaluate the complex issue of migration, but introduces unhelpful degrees of hostility and urgency instead (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2014). Therefore, looking at Latin America, a region which has significant levels of migration and border security issues, but which apparently does not see a high level of securitization of migration, might help to improve the situation in those regimes that do (such as the European Union), by deducing some best practices or lessons learned.

§1.4. Terms and Definitions

Considering that the (non-)securitization of Latin American migration regimes is concerned with identity and a potential threat thereto, rather than the continent South America, the cultural entity of Latin America will be used here as the level of testing. Latin America is then taken to comprise South America plus Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean (see Figure 4.1).

Furthermore, this thesis follows the IOM in its definition of migrants and migration. The IOM characterizes migration as

the movement of a person or a group of persons, either across an international border, or within a State. It is a population movement, encompassing any kind of movement of people, whatever its length, composition and causes; it includes migration of refugees, displaced persons, economic migrants, and persons moving for other purposes, including family reunification. ("Key Migration Terms," 2015)

A migrant, then, is defined as

any person who is moving or has moved across an international border or within a State away from his/her habitual place of residence, regardless of (1) the person’s legal status; (2) whether the movement is voluntary or involuntary; (3) what the causes for the movement are; or (4) what the length of the stay is. ("Key Migration Terms," 2015)

Thus, migrants and migration are here taken as a general category, including immigrants, asylum-seekers and refugees.

§1.5. Outline

This research is divided into six chapters. Chapter Two presents the theoretical framework: it addresses the different theoretical concepts and explanatory power of the two schools of thought
which together make up the theoretical framework of this study, namely securitization theory and regime theory. From these two approaches, a supposition and an hypothesis are derived, which are operationalized in Chapter Three, along with a discussion of the methodology. Chapter Four, then, provides the historical context and current figures and patterns of migration in Latin America. Chapter Five dives into the three cases at hand, and, presents the development and contents of the policies which make up the Latin American migration regime, in order to test the supposition and lay the foundation for the testing of the hypotheses. Chapter Six, finally, presents the key findings of this work, a definitive answer to the research question, and this research’s limitations, generalizability, and suggestions for further research.
CHAPTER II – THEORETICAL CONTEXT

Introduction

The purpose of this thesis is to show why the Latin America migration regime appears to be not securitized. This chapter will explicate two theories in the field of International Relations, one based in the constructivist tradition, the other in a rationalist approach, which are likely to provide insight into the research question.

First, on the basis of its key concepts and main criticisms, securitization theory is discussed. Securitization theory, based on reflectivist perspectives, is a plausible candidate to answer part of the research question because it can provide insight into how securitized and non-securitized migration regimes are different. However, securitization theory by itself is not sufficient to answer the research question. Securitization theory does not go into the question of why a process of securitization would take place, and consequentially, why some regional migration regimes are securitized and others are not. We want to know, however, not just whether Latin America’s migration regime is (non-)securitized, but why this is the case.

This is where regime theory, based in the rationalist tradition, comes in, to be addressed in the second part of this chapter. Regime theory is a relevant approach in this research because it can say something about this why-question which securitization theory does not address. Two perspectives from this tradition, namely Lavenex et al. (2016) and Van der Vleuten (2007), are combined in a hybrid institutionalist model, which aims to explain why some regional migration regimes institutionalize different ideas in different ways.

Together, therefore, these two theories – securitization theory and the regime theory-based hybrid institutionalist model – are expected to provide tools to answer the research question. Thus, by combining a rationalist and constructivist approach, this research aims to advance on the link between securitization theory and regime theory.

§2.1. Securitization Theory

For a long time, the notion of ‘security’ was primarily concerned with military issues, with the state as the most important actor and object of reference. To be secure meant to be free from military threat. This traditional approach of security studies focused on the threat, use, and control of military force (Walt, 1991). However, this rather narrow, materialist ontological underpinning of security came under pressure. In the collapse of most communist systems and the eradication of Cold-War related international tensions, there were calls for a reconceptualization of security, as the realist concern with conventional and nuclear war became less important (Miller, 2000). As a
response, the 1990s saw the emergence of securitization theory, to take on the challenge of developing a coherent framework for a broader security agenda after the Cold War, but without making everything a security issue and then risking emptying the notion of its content.

In contrast to the conventional notion of security, securitization has a broader understanding of ‘security’. It is based on the ontological point of view that social relations, and security threats, are socially constructed. Consequently, securitization theory focuses on the process of how an issue is constructed into a matter of security. As such, securitization theory is a valuable addition to theories of International Relations, as this broader notion of security is well-equipped to deal with the security aspects of new global issues, such as migration, environmental issues, global health or cyber security, something the traditional notion of security is not always suitable for.

The Copenhagen School

The notion of securitization is strongly associated with the Copenhagen School of security studies. While securitization theory should be seen in the context of the changing security agendas, as mentioned above, and as a part of the wider theoretical movement that analyzes how security is socially constructed, the Copenhagen School occupies a distinctive position within these debates (Williams, 2003). The core argument was first outlined by Wæver (1995) and further elaborated on in Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde’s Security – A New Framework for Analysis (1998).

Speech acts

The defining feature of the Copenhagen School approach to security is the idea that security is a speech act. The term speech act can be applied to many fields of study, but goes back to the philosophy of language. Largely represented by Wittgenstein (1953), Searle (1969) and Austin (1962), the notion of a speech act takes language beyond the mere meaning of asserting or proposing something, as an utterance with a performative function (Austin, 1962). Performing a speech act creates (new) facts: betting, promising, or naming something, for example, changes something in the world (Buzan et al., 1998:26). Saying “I do” constitutes a marriage, but only in a certain context. Thus, in other words, a speech act is a statement which, when articulated in the appropriate context, can constitute social facts – they exist because they are collectively believed to exist (Sharman, 2009).

In the field of IR, and specifically the Copenhagen School, security as a speech act means that security is not treated as something objective, but rather as something intersubjective and socially constructed (Buzan et al., 1998:31). A speech act is the key action to start a securitizing
move: to treat something as a security issue. Security is the outcome of this process. Speech acts do not merely describe an existing security situation, but actually create it by successfully representing it as such (Williams, 2003). Nevertheless (hence the intersubjectivity), a security issue is still regarded as objective because the audience accepts it as truth. This articulation of security in a speech act is an essential form of security action, because it is this articulation which could shape the social practices that follow. The articulation of ‘security’ holds the claim that something is threatened to its existence, therefore legitimizing the use of extraordinary – i.e. security – measures (Stritzel, 2007). It is thus not necessarily the uttering of the word ‘security’ which is required, but rather the designation of an issue as an existential threat, needing emergency action (Nyman, 2013).

Securitization as a speech act, as conventionally understood by securitization theorists, is distinguished by the specific grammar and rhetorical structure it follows, which emphasizes priority, urgency and survival (Nyman, 2013; Buzan et al., 1998:33). Securitization as a speech act has four core concepts: the referent object, the threat, the securitizing actor, and the audience. First, the referent object is the thing that is seen to be existentially threatened and that has a legitimate claim to survival (Buzan et al., 1998:36). Traditionally this has been the state (when sovereignty is at stake) or, in a more hidden way, the nation (when identity is in danger), but with the Copenhagen School’s broader notion of security, anything can in principle be constructed as a referent object (Buzan et al., 1998:36). Secondly, there is the threat itself – which can be imaginary or real. Indeed, securitizing something has nothing to do with the ‘reality’ of the threat, but everything with the use of discourse to define it as such (Nyman, 2013; Buzan et al., 1998:29). Third, the securitizing actor, who is the one to perform the speech act by declaring a referent object to be threatened. They can only do so, however, if they have the legitimacy to speak on behalf of the referent object. Due to the legitimacy of their position, actors in a position of power are more likely to make a successful securitizing move – though this does not guarantee acceptance from the audience (Nyman, 2013). Securitizing actors are usually political leaders, bureaucracies, governments, lobbyists, or pressure groups (Buzan et al., 1998:40). Finally, there is the audience, the group to whom the securitizing actor makes its securitizing claims. Without the audience’s acceptance of the claims in the securitizing attempt and the proposed measures of action, the securitization act cannot be completed (Buzan et al., 1998:25). The acceptance of the securitizing claim by the audience can thus be seen as a necessary condition for securitization to be successful. This acceptance by the audience is also where the intersubjectivity of securitization is seen: by legitimizing certain actions, a speech act can change social reality and thus, it not only has a descriptive but also a performative character (Balzacq, 2005).
With this framework of conditions that together constitute a security speech act, Buzan et al. (1998) provide a high degree of analytical focus (Elbe, 2006). However, the Copenhagen School’s treatment of speech acts has also received a substantial amount of criticism. Some have argued that the narrow focus on speech acts dismisses the increasing impact of visual images (Williams, 2003; Hansen, 2000), the role of security experts and institutions (Bigo, 2002), the audience and political agency (Balzacq, 2005), or other forms of expressions such as physical action (Wilkinson, 2007). Others have criticized the Copenhagen School’s treatment of the ability to ‘speak’ security, with its narrow definition of what constitutes a speech act and a focus on the speech of dominant actors, and accusing Buzan et al. (1998) of disregarding other forms of representation, such as the gender dimension (Hansen, 2000) or marginalized actors (McDonald, 2008). Indeed, while Buzan et al. (1998) do not clearly specify who or what could constitute a securitizing actor – which is also problematic in itself – it is suggested that the most important thing to be a successful securitizing actor is power. Nevertheless, while these are legitimate criticisms, these strict boundaries of the Copenhagen School are not forming a significant problem for this research, as the motivation here is to explain why regional migration regimes are (not) securitized, not necessarily to draw attention to or explain other forms and/or speakers of speech acts.

In another point of criticism, and as something which also alludes to the importance of non-securitization, McDonald (2008) has argued that the narrow definition of the nature of a speech act only in terms of the designation of threats to security encourages a conceptualization of security politics as inherently negative and reactionary. Buzan et al. (1998) themselves also speak of “panic politics” (p. 34). This indeed appears to be the case, at least in the case of securitized migration policies: both the literature and the media tend to speak of the securitized EU migration policies in terms of ‘restrictions’ and ‘Fortress Europe’, versus ‘open’ and ‘welcoming’ Latin American non-securitized migration policies. While Buzan et al. (1998) have tried to somewhat qualify this issue in their development of the notion of desecuritization, “the shifting of issues out of emergency mode and into the normal bargaining processes of the political sphere” (p. 4), this does not quite make up for it, as these are two different things. Pulling securitized issues back into the political sphere is not the same as being watchful for unnecessary securitization in the first place, or explaining alternatives for doing so. There remains, therefore, a normative challenge in securitization theory. While Buzan et al. (1998) do “underline the responsibility of talking security” (p. 34) and recognize the potential dangers of securitization by emphasizing that a speech act always involves normative choices (Elbe, 2006), the red thread in their theory is still the very act of securitization – not this qualification of the normative choice. The focus in Buzan et al. (1998) lies
clearly on the fact that an actor can make the choice to perform a securitizing speech act – not on how one could prevent unnecessary harmful acts of securitization. The warnings against the potential dangers of securitization are thus rather undertheorized in Buzan et al. (1998), and could at least use some more emphasis. Still, while this under-theorization of the normative challenge of securitization theory in Buzan et al. (1998) is something to take serious, it is not the prime focus of this thesis, and therefore not a major limitation for this research.

_Spectrum nonpoliticized – securitized_

As an important notion within their securitization theory, Buzan et al. (1998) present their argument along the image of a spectrum of security, which ranges from nonpoliticized through politicized to securitized. Something is politicized once it has entered public debate; when it is part of public policy and requires a government decision (p. 23). Securitization, Buzan et al. (1998) argue, can be seen as a more extreme version of politicization: an issue is presented as an existential threat, which requires emergency measures and therefore extraordinary actions are justified, beyond the regular political rules (p. 23).

These distinctions between politicization and securitization have been subject to criticism. Buzan et al. (1998) regard them as separate, while it seems that the lines between them can be thin, and the moment of securitization can be unclear or incremental. This issue has also been addressed by Acharya (2006), McDonald (2008), and Floyd (2015). In a similar vein, Abrahamsen (2005) has suggested that a gradual, sliding scale is a better representation than Buzan et al.’s (1998) spectrum. Thus, while Buzan et al. (1998) provide specific criteria for securitization with their notion of a speech act and its different components, I believe they do not take the politicized-securitized distinction sufficiently into account. This is particularly problematic when looking at the securitization of migration, because migration in itself is already an ample concept: even when migration would be taken as a purely economic or human rights issue, the movement of people by its very nature touches upon security concepts. Buzan et al. (1998), then, offer little further handles to clearly distinguish between politicized or securitized migration. This is a challenge which will be further elaborated on in Chapter Five, where it will be assessed whether the regional migration regime of Latin America is indeed, as it appears, not securitized.

_Securitization’s five sectors_

As another key point of Buzan et al.’s (1998) securitization theory, the authors identify five sectors where securitization could take place: the military, environmental, economic, societal, and political sector. Each sector has a certain referent object and threat. The military sector, for
example, has the territorial integrity of the state as its primary referent object, and the threats it is concerned with are mostly external and military in nature (Buzan et al., 1998:49-51). In the political sector, by contrast, what is at stake is state sovereignty and sometimes ideology, which can be threatened by anything questioning the state’s recognition, legitimacy, or governing authority (Buzan et al., 1998:22). Quite far away from the classic, materialist notion of security is the concept of societal security, in which the collective identity is the referent object at stake. The type of relevant threat depends on the construction of a society’s identity, and can vary between nationalism, political integration, homogenization, or population movements (Buzan et al., 1998:124-125). The societal sector is where Buzan et al. (1998) locate this thesis’ subject of migration, because migration is a potential threat to the collective identity. The sectors are mostly analytical divisions, though: in practice, interplay between them is possible and more than one sector at a time can be involved in a securitization process – the area of migration, which touches upon political, economic, and societal matters for instance, is an example.

Buzan et al. (1998) identify three issues that are most commonly viewed as threats to societal security. Migration is the first one, when “X people are overrun or diluted by influxes of Y people; the X community will not be what it used to be, because others will make up the population; X identity is being changed by a shift in the composition of the population” (p. 121). The other two are horizontal competition, when X changes its ways due to influence neighboring Y; and vertical competition, when people stop seeing themselves as X due to either an integrating or secessionist project (Buzan et al., 1998:123). In practice, the three are often combined. Buzan et al. (1998) argue that these three types of threats to identity can also be placed on a spectrum from intentional to unintended. Migration, for example, can be an individual choice but also part of a political program to homogenize a state (Buzan et al., 1998:121).

The most important thing which is regarded as being threatened in the societal sector, the authors stress, is identity: the referent object is threatened as to its identity (Buzan et al., 1998:123). This is important to remember for when we will look at the (non-)securitization of migration in Latin America in Chapter Five: according to Buzan et al. (1998), migration is regarded as a threat when it endangers the identity of the referent object, which in the societal sector are most importantly tribes, clans, nations, civilizations, religions and race (Buzan et al., 1998:123).

Securitization of migration

To delve in deeper into the specific topic of securitization and migration: the matter of migration became a contested terrain within security studies, explored by numerous scholars (Huysmans and Squire, 2009). Kostakopoulou (2000), Guiraudon (2000), Karyotis (2007), Togral
are among those who have focused on the security logic of migration in the European Union specifically. Beyond the European context, Ceyhan and Tsoukala (2002) discuss the securitization of migration in both Europe and the United States to argue that security discourses dominate migration policies in all Western societies. Even broader, Tirman (2006), in his discussion of the changing conception of migration in the United States since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, has described the securitization of migration as a global phenomenon—a conclusion Ibrahim (2005) also arrives at.

Furthermore, a key work applying the theory of securitization to migration is Huysmans (2000). His article will be discussed more extensively here: not only because it is what prompted (the puzzle of) this research, but also because it is one of the few studies to go beyond asserting that a migration regime is securitized, and tending to the question why this is the case. In addition, his article is a good illustration of what the securitization of a migration regime might entail in practice—especially besides the theory-heavy explanation of Buzan et al.’s (1998) thesis.

Huysmans (2000) paints a complicated and—in his own words—messy picture of how the securitization of migration in the European Union is constructed and in which policy developments this frame is embedded. Huysmans argues that securitization of migration in the European Union is embedded in wider societal, political, and professional processes in which immigrants and asylum-seekers are seen as a challenge to the protection of national identity and welfare. In other words, institutional developments in regulations on migration are shaped by a thematic change in the problematization of migration, in which the key theme is that migration is a danger to society. Huysmans then relates this to three themes; themes which he argues are at the basis of the securitization of migration in the EU: internal security, cultural security, and the crisis of the welfare state. Briefly summarized, Huysmans argues that the creation of the EU internal economic market spilled over into an internal security project, following the reasoning “if we diminish internal border controls then we must harmonize and strengthen the control at the external borders [...] to control of who and what can legitimately enter the space of free movement” (p. 759). Secondly, Huysmans argues that cultural security is the key issue to connect migration and the politics of belonging. Through the idea that there is a homogenous cultural identity which must be protected or recreated, exclusion of migrants is justified, who are seen as latecomers disrupting a culturally homogenous space. In his argument, Huysmans provides a rather sociologically grounded version of securitization theory, focusing on the claim that society and conceptions of national identity are under threat in the securitization of migration, rather than the state, its institutions, or political stability (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2014). The issue of the crisis of the welfare state, finally,
entails that scarcity and a competitive struggle over social goods leads to welfare chauvinism, in which nationals view migrants as illegitimate recipients of socio-economic rights.

All in all, Huysmans’ argument has a clear constructivist nature: he explains how governments actively securitize in response to publicly perceived threats, which emphasizes the constructed quality of security definitions (Gupta, 2007). He links this to the security of identity and the potential hurtful effects this has on the treatment of outsiders (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al., 2014).

Huysmans also somewhat advances on the Copenhagen School’s theory of securitization by suggesting a different kind of speech act. Securitization as a speech act, as conventionally understood, follows a certain grammar and rhetorical structure (Buzan et al., 1998). In Huysmans’ argument, however, placing migration within the institutional framework of EU internal security also has the effect of securitization. In this way, as Peoples and Vaughan-Williams (2014) state, “an issue does not have to be literally spoken about or written of in the language of security for it to be securitized” (p. 137). Here, the sociological nature of Huysmans’ thesis becomes clear again, as in his view, processes of securitization are not so much about “dramatic” speech acts, but rather about institutional interests and how these interests affect society (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al., 2014). Security is then not simply a passive, analytical lens, but rather a political technique of framing that has significant complications (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2014). Such alternative ways to identify securitization as a speech act, rather than only in the rather narrow method as presented by Buzan et al. (1998), is useful to keep in mind when identifying instances of (non-)securitization of migration in Latin America.

To conclude, and zoom out on securitization theory in general again, there are two limitations of securitization theory which are particularly problematic considering the research aim of this thesis. First, while Buzan et al. (1998) present a highly detailed argument on what constitutes a securitization speech act and what happens inside the securitization process, they do not include the prior step: why some issues are securitized, and others are not. Their argument focuses on the fact that an issue can be socially constructed as a security issue and how this happens, not why that would occur or how the interests of the securitizing actor apparently change prior to the securitization move.8 While it is perfectly in line with Buzan et al.’s (1998) reflectivist epistemological standpoint to not attempt to answer this why-question – after all, the main goal of securitization theory is to interpret meaning given by social actors to understand social reality, not its explanation (Šulović, 2010) – it makes for a limitation of securitization theory in this study.

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8 This matter is also not addressed in their later works.
Another challenge of securitization theory considering the research question of this thesis is that Buzan et al. (1998) do not presume causality. After all, securitization theory sees security as socially constructed, and therefore, there is no causal mechanism. The only necessary condition Buzan et al. (1998) suggest is one for the very final ‘step’ of the securitization process, namely the audience accepting the security claims. The authors mention three facilitating conditions which give the securitizing move a higher plausibility of succeeding (Buzan et al., 1998:33), but these are not necessary nor sufficient. Again, while this lack of a causal mechanism is perfectly in line with their epistemology, it does form a limitation for the application of securitization theory in this research, as their theory does not provide specifications on when an issue (or, in this case, a regional migration regime) is securitized or not. It all depends on the specific social context. This also makes comparison between securitization processes difficult, and also means that securitization theory has little predictive value and can primarily be used in hindsight.

In sum, taking stock of the value of securitization theory for this thesis: securitization theory is an excellent tool to understand certain policy responses to migration flows. As migration is not a threat in the conventional, material sense, the traditionalist notion of security would have difficulty to explain why some states or regional organizations – for example the EU (Huysmans, 2000) – regard it as a security issue. In addition, Buzan et al.’s (1998) in-depth, detailed discussion on what exactly constitutes a securitization speech act and what happens inside the securitization process helps to understand how an issue becomes securitized. Nevertheless, the two characteristics of securitization theory which make it problematic to apply the theory to the matter at stake here, compel the use of a complementary theoretical framework to answer the research question. Therefore, regime theory will be added to the theoretical framework. But before moving to the discussion of regime theory, this section on securitization theory can be concluded with a supposition derived from the theory to determine whether migration in Latin America is indeed, as it appears, non-securitized:

If, in a region, securitizing actors do not present migration as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and therefore justifying extraordinary actions, and/or if such a securitizing claim is not accepted as such by the audience, then migration is not securitized.

Using a supposition here (instead of an hypothesis) is due to the fact that the non-securitization of Latin American migration policies is not really a causal mechanism which ought to be tested.

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9 The facilitating conditions, according to Buzan et al. (1998) are: “(1) the demand internal to the speech act of following the grammar of security, (2) the social conditions regarding the position of authority for the securitizing actor […] and (3) features of the alleged threats that either facilitate or impede securitization” (p. 33).
Neither is it useful to look for the presence or absence of certain variables to reject or accept the hypothesis. The facilitating conditions offered by Buzan et al. (1998) to increase the chance of a successful securitization move are not very relevant here, as we are not interested here in in what exactly happens within a securitizing move. After all, we assume that a successful securitizing move did not take place in the Latin American migration regime. Still, this is more than a conjecture – it is not a wild guess, it is based on certain indications – but less certain than an assumption: we do want to verify it first. This will be done in Chapter Five.

Let us now turn to an explication of the second half of the theoretical framework of this thesis, namely the perspectives based in regime theory.

§2.2. Regime Theory

The following section puts forward a hybrid institutionalist model, which combines the theoretical framework on the different types of regional migration regimes put forward by Lavenex et al. (2016) with Van der Vleuten’s (2007) explanations for the behavior of regional organizations. In this combination, the hybrid institutionalist model could shine a light where securitization theory is limited, namely on what a migration regime looks like when it is anything else than securitized, and on the question why some migration regimes are securitized and others are not.

The arguments of Lavenex et al. (2016) and Van der Vleuten (2007) are localized deeper inside a broader theoretical framework on both regionalism and regime theory. Within this framework, concepts from both global and regional migration governance and regime theory are used together and sometimes overlap or are not clearly distinguished. The following section therefore aims to disentangle these different concepts and define them as relative to each other. This will be done by moving from regime theory, through global and regional migration governance, to the theoretical perspectives of Lavenex et al. (2016) and Van der Vleuten (2007), followed by an explication of the hybrid intuitionalist model, and its pathways and variables. The hypotheses will then be derived from the model, and conclude the section.

Regime theory

The link between regime theory and regional migration governance might not be apparent and needs some explanation to be exposed. Although this thesis will primarily make use of the hybrid institutionalist model and not the classic regime theory as developed by Krasner (1983), some theoretical context is still useful. After all, the more recent regime theory-perspectives used in this thesis are all embedded in this more general theoretical framework.
Regime theory was developed to capture, describe, and analyze the entirety of cooperative efforts, assumptions, and behaviors in a given international issue area (Sterling-Folker, 2013). This can be migration, but regime theory has also been related to many other issues, particularly security, economics, and finance (Neumayer, 2001). Basically, regime theory focuses on the question: why does cooperation emerge in some cases but not in others? After all, international cooperation is difficult because of mixed-motive games: the preferences of the players are not clearly ranked and contain motivations for both cooperation and non-cooperation (Sterling-Folker, 2013). Regime theory, then, argues that international cooperation is possible due to international regimes. Stephen Krasner (1983) famously defined regimes and its components as a set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given issue-area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice. (Krasner, 1983:2)

Based in the neoliberal institutionalist tradition, regime theory views the international system as anarchic, but argues that regimes, despite this anarchy, can provide some degree of transparency and stability (Krasner, 1983). They do so by establishing rules, embedded in institutions, instead of through a higher authority. International politics, with its self-help system, after all has unequally distributed information and high transaction costs. Regimes can help with this. The anticipated effects of a regime include legal liability, a reduction of uncertainty due to the collecting and sharing of information, and a decrease in transaction costs of legitimate bargains through monitoring (Sterling-Folker, 2013). States are then likely to comply with international regimes, even if this goes against their short-term interest (Keohane, 1984). Regime theory explains this with the notions of so-called sunk costs (meaning that existing regimes are easier to maintain than to create new ones); the risk of retaliation (Keohane, 1984) when states know they will meet again; a concern about precedent; and the value of reputation. Regimes thus do not act, rather, they function through injunctions: they prescribe and proscribe actions and imply obligation, but this cannot be enforced, as there is no higher authority created by the regime. In this way, regimes also originate from interaction between states (Sterling-Folker, 2013). Regimes can also influence behavior: while institutions do not change states’ self-interests, they can and do change the attractiveness and the costs and benefits of different options (Krasner, 1982).
Regime theory, then, provides a solid theoretical background in cases when analyzing migration policies only would be too narrow, and the research purpose is rather to explain coalitional-type governance structures. Thus, in order to understand the patchwork of organizations and policies which govern migration in the Latin American migration regime, regime theory can be helpful. With that conclusion, we can further zoom in on regional migration regimes.

**Global migration governance**

Firstly, as a relative context to offset the discussion of migration governance on the regional level which the rest of this research will focus on, a few words about global migration governance.

Migration is often, though not only, a truly cross-border phenomenon, and most of the time migration issues cannot be dealt with by individual countries alone. International cooperation on migration is therefore necessary. However, as mentioned in Chapter One, while migration is one of the most clear demonstrations of globalization, there is no strong global framework to govern migration. Nevertheless, this does not mean that there is no global governance in the field of migration at all (Lavenex and Panizzon, 2013; Betts, 2010). States have acknowledged that the issue of international migration cannot be dealt with individually and that some form of coordination is necessary. Thus, despite the lack of a UN-like, top-down multilateral framework, over the past fifty years, states have developed their own institutions, norms, and forms of governance to regulate international migration, hereby creating a bottom-up framework for global migration governance (Betts, 2008). This has occurred in a fragmented and often undeveloped manner, though, and has resulted in an increasingly complex tapestry of overlapping institutions and cooperation arrangements, which exist across bilateral, regional, and multilateral levels (Betts, 2008; Lavenex and Panizzon, 2013). As the focus of this research is on the Latin American migration regime, the following section will address migration governance on these regional levels.

**Regional migration governance**

The notion of ‘region’ can be explained along multiple conceptual dimensions. Broadly, the level of regional governance of international migration is understood as being located between the levels of national policies and global efforts for more collaboration between states (Nita, 2013). But more specifically, as we will see throughout this research, the term ‘regional’ can still entail different levels of governance: a region can mean a continental region, such as South America; a

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10 Where the domestic level has a government, the international level seeks global governance. Governance can be defined as “[relating] to rules, norms, and practices that constrain or constitute behavior, and is generally distinguished from ‘government’ by the absence of a single overarching authority. By definition, it is something that goes beyond a purely state-led form of regulation” (Nita, 2013).
political and cultural region, such as Latin America; or a sub-region, such as the Caribbean. Regional governance can also refer to cooperation both within and between regions.

Within literature on the international governance of migration, the aspect regional has received less attention, as it tends to focus on the global governance of migration (for example Betts, 2010; Betts, 2011; Mayer, 2012). This is striking, because a major, increasing share of today’s cross-border population flows happens within regional spaces. Consequently, against the backdrop of a globalizing, multilateral system, migration governance on the regional level has seen a significant increase. And unlike on the global level, migration has increasingly been addressed in a cooperative manner on the regional level (Lavenex et al., 2016).

The hybrid institutionalist model

With the broader theoretical framework on regionalism and regime theory explained, we can now turn to the explication of the hybrid institutionalist model, aimed to understand how different regional migration regimes come about. The model is created by combining two theoretical perspectives: the recently developed framework of Lavenex et al. (2016) identifying different types of regional migration regimes, and the explanations for the behavior of regional organizations by van der Vleuten (2007).

Lavenex et al. (2016) aim to explain the diversity of regional migration regimes. They do so by identifying a number of potential drivers of regional migration cooperation. These drivers belong to three types of regional migration regimes, in which a different substantive dimension is central in each: an economic approach focusing on facilitating mobility; a rights-based approach focusing on the rights of migrants; and a security-based approach emphasizing the imperatives of migration control and the fight against irregular migration flows (Lavenex et al., 2016:459). A four-value scale defines the different scopes of regional integration of each of these substantive dimensions, as presented in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1. is useful to further understand what security-, economic (mobility)-, or human rights-based regional security regimes actually look like. It says something about the (non-)securitization of regional migration regimes: in what column policies and programs of a certain regional organization can be placed, indicates the type of regional migration regime. In the case of security-based approaches, at first sight, it might seem that checking off policies that belong in the security column as described by Lavenex et al (2016) equals a securitized regional migration regime as Buzan et al. (1998) would define it. However, this is not quite the case: harmonized entry requirements, for example, which are listed as an indicator of a very strong security-based regional migration regime, is not necessarily a sign of a securitized migration regime – it could also just
Table 2.1: Types of regional migration regimes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strength of regional migration regime</th>
<th>Economic approach</th>
<th>Rights-based approach</th>
<th>Security-based approach</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very strong</td>
<td>All citizens, full labor market access, unlimited stay</td>
<td>Harmonization exceeding the UNCMW</td>
<td>Harmonized entry requirements, joint external border management, exchange of liaison officers, readmission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>All citizens, labor market access, limited stay</td>
<td>Harmonization based on the UNCMW</td>
<td>Common rules on entry requirements and border management, operational cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>Selected workers, selected labor market access, limited stay</td>
<td>Common rules on specific social and economic rights for workers</td>
<td>Common rules on entry requirements and border management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Facilitated entry procedures, no labor market access</td>
<td>Exchange of best practices on migrant rights protection</td>
<td>Exchange of best practices on immigration control systems</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Lavenex et al., 2016:460.

mean that a regional regime has its border policies in good order. Having migration policies in the security-dimension does not say anything (yet) about a claimed threat of migration – after all, the central feature of securitization. Therefore, in order to make the distinction between securitized and other regime types, we need to analyze the contents and framing of these policies and programs, for example what exactly those harmonized entry requirements are. Thus, to summarize: whereas migration policies and programs of a certain regional organization that are located in the liberalization/mobility- or protection/rights-type are likely to indicate a regional migration regime that is respectively economic (mobility)- or human rights-based, and thus, non-securitized; policies that are in the security dimension can still belong to either of the three regime types, depending on the nature of those policies.

As a final remark regarding Table 2.1, note the division of policies into different scales ranging from ‘weak’ to ‘very strong.’ While it would be possible to assess different policies and programs all as equal indicators of a regime type, this research holds on to Lavenex et al.’s (2016) scale division, because it tells us something about the strength of the regime type. This is useful especially when considering the security-column, as it can say something about the extent of (non-

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11 Lavenex et al. (2016) also include a fourth institutional dimension concerning the extent of legalization of regional norms, but this is not included here because it is not relevant for the explanation of the nature of regional migration regimes.
securitization. Depending on the contents of the policies – meaning, when they indeed indicate securitization – a policy or program in a higher-up scale indicates a more strongly securitized migration regime. Joint border management, for example, indicates a more strongly securitized migration regime then seeing only, for instance, an exchange of best practices on immigration control systems.

However, Lavenex et al. (2016) has also limited utility for this research, as the authors do not explain why these different regional migration regimes look the way they do, but rather make clear how to recognize whether a migration regime is security, economic (mobility), or human-rights based. This is where a second perspective has to come in. Van der Vleuten and Ribeiro Hoffmann (2010) have identified potential explanations for the behavior of regional organizations. Therefore, both perspectives are used together in the hybrid institutionalist model, schematically set out in Figure 2.1. The following section will further explicate the model and its variables and pathways.

Figure 2.1: The hybrid institutionalist model

Source: created by author, adapted from Van der Vleuten (2007) and Lavenex et al. (2016).
Regional identity

The first variable is that of regional identity. As Santos (2015) states, “the formation of collective identity may be facilitated or constrained by structures, but it is never exogenously given or immutable” (p. 43). In other words, identity is not established and fixed, but rather processual. It shows not only how subjects – in this case, a regional organization – perceive themselves, but also how they want to construct themselves (Santos, 2015). Following Santos (2015), the dimension of identity is, then, understood here as self-perception and loyalties towards certain ideas (p. 51).

The significance of this variable builds on social-constructivist thinking. According to Keck and Sikkink (1998), identities, norms and interests are mutually constitutive. In a regional organization which promotes an open and welcoming identity, restrictive and securitized migration policies do not constitute an appropriate course of action (Van der Vleuten, 2007:156). Rather, the regional organization is likely to shape its migration policies in such a way that they fit either an economic (mobility)-based migration regime, or one that focuses on the protection of human rights. Conversely, a regional organization which identifies itself as a restricted area would, unsurprisingly, have a high probability of institutionalizing securitized migration policies.

Role of regional hegemon

Moving to the second variable, the interest of the regional hegemon also plays a role. This explanation is rooted in realist thinking: it focuses on power dynamics and the priorities of the leading nation. The role of the regional hegemon is important because, “as is often the case in an international system without a higher authority, collective action problems may prevent common action unless the major regional power takes the lead” (Van der Vleuten and Ribeiro Hoffmann, 2010:740-741). A regional organization is thus expected to adapt its policies if it is in the interest of the regional hegemon to do so (Van der Vleuten, 2007:157).

Generally speaking, the interest of the regional hegemon has three dimensions: “a geopolitical dimension, aimed at preserving or strengthening their relative power position; a material dimension, aimed at controlling wealth and resources; as well as an ideational dimension, spreading its values and defending its prestige” (Van der Vleuten and Ribeiro Hoffmann, 2010:741). These different interests lead to different types of regional migration regime. First, when a regional hegemon has a geopolitical interest in migration policies, a migration regime is likely to be securitized. According to Lavenex et al. (2016), the diffusion of security-related cooperation

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12 Risse (2016) has elaborated on the notion of diffusion. He uses the concept to explain how models of regional cooperation and integration can spread across the world. Risse (2016) defines diffusion as “any process where prior adoption of a trait or practice in a population alters the probability of adoption for remaining nonadopters” (p. 88). In other words, diffusion means that if there is no central coordination or coercion, policies or institutions developed in one setting influence political decisions in another setting.
in regional migration regime is mostly shaped by power dynamics on the part of regional hegemons (p. 472). Secondly, a material interest of the regional hegemon in regional migration policies is likely to lead to an economic (mobility)-based migration regime. In the case of unemployment and a need for extra workers, for example, provisions for freer movements of labor migrants can provide a solution. Lavenex et al. (2016) have also argued that a strong interest in liberalizing mobility among a leading country is a crucial factor for this to occur in the wider regional migration regime (p. 471). Third and finally, an ideational interest of the regional hegemon in regional migration policies could lead to either a security- or human rights-based migration regime, depending on the nature of its ideals.13

### Domestic and transnational pressures

As a third possible explanation for the behavior of a regional organization, domestic and transnational pressures can play a role. This argument follows Van der Vleuten’s (2005) model of pincers, meaning that a regional organization can be put under pressure by domestic and transnational actors simultaneously, in order for it to alter its policies. In this model, the pressure of the pincers from above comes from the mobilization of transnational non-state actors. After all, a regional organization does not exist in isolation from global processes, but is likely to take into account pressures from ‘outside,’ in order to preserve its position in the international system (Van der Vleuten and Ribeiro Hoffmann, 2010). At the same time, the pincers work from below with the mobilization of domestic civil society within the regional organization. This is the case when a regional organization offers non-state actors access to the political process. As societal groups gain political access and resources, they can put pressure on their own government (Van der Vleuten, 2007:157). The way in which these double pressures shape a regional migration regime depends not only on the amount of pressure exercised by societal actors (Van der Vleuten, 2005), but also on the nature of these concerns: pressures can be based on either economic, human rights, or national identity concerns – and all work towards different outcomes regarding the type of regional migration regime. When the mobilization of domestic and transnational non-state actors is driven by economic concerns, for example in a situation when there is a need for workers, this can work as a push towards a liberalization of (labor) mobility, leading to an economic (mobility)-based migration regime. Human rights concerns, for example a sudden increase in the number of refugees

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13 Consider, for example, the recent developments in the United States and Canada: whereas President Donald Trump in January 2017 signed an executive order to indefinitely halt the resettlement process for Syrian refugees and deny entry to citizens of seven Muslim-majority countries under the banner of protecting American religious freedom (Mason and Rampton, 2017), President Justin Trudeau shortly thereafter reiterated Canada’s open-door policy by using ideational concerns in a very different way, writing on Twitter: “To those fleeing persecution, terror and war, Canadians will welcome you, regardless of your faith. Diversity is our strength” (Ahmed, 2017).
and/or irregular migrants, is likely to lead to a human rights-based migration regime (Lavenex et al., 2016:471). Finally, domestic and transnational pressures can be driven by concerns about the national identity. This would be the case when there is a reference to the pursued place or role of the nation in the world. Similar to the ideational interest of the regional hegemon, this pathway has two possible outcomes, namely a regional migration regime based on human rights or security.

**Prestige**

Finally, as the last variable, the concern of a regional organization with defending its prestige is a possible explanation for the regional organization’s behavior. It is useful to consider this variable here, because, as will be demonstrated in Chapters Four and Five, Latin American migration regimes often mirror or refer to global human rights conventions. This suggests that reputation is important to these regional organizations. This is also tied to the notion of emulation, defined by Boehmke (2009) as “a situation in which a state intentionally changes its policy in a way to more closely conform with existing policy in another state” (p. 1126). According to Lavenex et al. (2016) policy emulation drives the proliferation of social rights instruments across regions through institutional isomorphism (p. 470). Institutional isomorphism is something which is alluded to in van der Vleuten (2007) in the discussion of the distribution of power and ideas in the wider international system, but elaborated more on in Lavenex et al. (2016). Coined by Meyer and Rowan (1977), institutional isomorphism means that organizations incorporate practices and procedures from prevailing phenomena in their environment, and tend to become similar in form – isomorphic – with them. However, despite such conventions and declarations being adopted, they are not always implemented. Meyer and Rowan (1977) have called this decoupling: there is a gap between formal structure and actual practice. A similar idea also appears in Van der Vleuten (2007), in the discussion of regional organizations as “image-boosting arenas,” in which the preservation of status quo is actually more important than the preservation of democracy – or, in this case, humanitarian concerns – per se (p. 156). Although decoupling is more concerned with the actual extent of implementation of these policies, and this is not the focus of this research, it is still useful to keep it in mind because it indicates that the regional organization cares about its reputation. After all, when the actual implementation of certain ‘good-looking’ policies comes in second place, it is likely that boosting prestige plays a role. In conclusion, then, the concern of a regional organization with its prestige, through institutional isomorphism, could result in a human-rights based regional migration regime.
Conclusion

To conclude, the significance of using both Lavenex et al. (2016) and van der Vleuten (2007) is that it not only shows what a regional migration regime looks like when it is not securitized, namely economic (mobility)- or human rights-based, but also how different types of regional migration regimes come about, as presented in the hybrid institutionalist model. From this model and its four independent variables, a set of hypotheses can be derived, aimed at determining why some regional migration regimes are securitized and others are not:

1A. If the regional identity of the regional organization is open, then the regional migration regime is likely to be either economic (mobility)- or human rights-based.
1B. If the regional identity of the regional organization is restrictive, then the regional migration regime is likely to be securitized.

2A. If the regional hegemon has a geopolitical interest in the regional organization’s migration policies, then the regional migration regime is likely to be securitized.
2B. If the regional hegemon has a material interest in the regional organization’s migration policies, then the regional migration regime is likely to be economic (mobility)-based.
2C. If the regional hegemon has an ideational interest in the regional organization’s migration policies, then the regional migration regime is likely to be either human rights- or security-based.

3A. If domestic and transnational pressures in the regional organization are economy-driven, then the regional migration regime is likely to be economic (mobility)-based.
3B. If domestic and transnational pressures in the regional organization are human rights-driven, then the regional migration regime is likely to be human rights-based.
3C. If domestic and transnational pressures in the regional organization are national identity-driven, then the regional migration regime is likely to be either human rights- or security-based.

4. If the safeguarding of prestige plays a role in the regional organization, and this occurs through institutional isomorphism, then the regional migration regime is likely to be human rights-based.

With the full theoretical framework now set out, these hypotheses will be further operationalized in the following chapter.
CHAPTER III: METHODOLOGY

Introduction

The previous chapter has put forward two different theories within IR as probable tools to explain the apparent non-securitization of the Latin American migration regime. One supposition and one set of hypotheses were derived from these theories, aiming to explain why some regional migration regimes are securitized and others are not. This chapter will explicate the methodological procedures to be used in order to accept or reject these hypotheses. First, the case study format and the choice of cases will be explained. Secondly, the supposition will be further explicated. Thirdly, the hypotheses will be operationalized by explicating the empirical indicators for the theoretical concepts, in order to make them applicable to analyze the data. Finally, this chapter will address the sources and data to be used to test the hypotheses.

§3.1. Research Format: Multiple Case Study

The type of research design ought to be informed by the nature of the research (van Evera, 1977). This thesis will make use of a multiple case study to test the hypothesis. A case study is a more in-depth, qualitative research of one or a few specific cases, as compared to a qualitative large-n analysis that analyzes fewer variables in a larger group of research units. A methodological advantage of going qualitatively ‘deep’ instead of more broad quantitative research is that it can elucidate on matters that are impractical to study in other ways. A disadvantage is that case study results are more problematic to generalize for a larger group, as the statistical validity needed for such generalizations cannot be based on little data (Van Evera, 1997). Nevertheless, case study research fits well with the specific theoretical framework in use here. Securitization theory, with its emphasis on speech acts and discourse, would be difficult to analyze quantitatively. With its focus on rhetoric, an in-depth study into a small number of cases is better suited to gain a deeper understanding of how securitization works (Gerring, 2007). In addition, a well-executed quantitative study would require a large sample size, or else, it would be of little statistical significance and it would be difficult to make any general statements going beyond the specific research data. The necessity of a large n is not very practical in this research: there is only a limited, rather small number of Latin American migration institutions and policies in place. Finally, as van Evera (1977) writes, “inferring and testing explanations that define how the independent causes the dependent variable are often easier with case-study than large-n methods” (p. 54). Demonstrating why securitization sometimes occurs and other times not, rather than whether this is the case, is exactly what this thesis is trying to do.
This thesis employs a small-\( n \) case study over a single case study. More than one case not only makes for a more thorough investigation, it is also preferable in order to specify the conditions under which a phenomenon will occur, as well as those under which a phenomenon will not occur (van Evera, 1977). In addition, the more explorative nature of a multiple case study-research is useful considering the aims of this thesis, as this research attempts to explore new ground by advancing on the currently weak link between regime- and securitization theory.

It can be concluded, then, that a multiple case study is an appropriate research method for the matter at stake here, considering the theoretical framework, data, and aim, as an in-depth explanation of a small-\( n \) study can reconstruct the conditions under which the securitization of a regional migration regime, or in this case rather the lack thereof, occurs.

**Case selection**

Latin America currently has nine different regional organizations and institutions in place which to differing extents govern migration in the region. These organizations and institutions and their policies sometimes overlap, contradict each other or are only partly implemented. Including all nine of them here as case studies is beyond the scope of this thesis.

Considering that the research question at stake here is how the non-securitization of the Latin American migration regime can be explained, it would make sense to select those regional organization as cases in which a). significant migration flows in relation to the population exist; and b). there are significant (drug, crime, and/or violence) security concerns. After all, we want to know why Latin American migration policies look a certain way, and why it appears that security is not their main focus, despite the fact that security issues in the regions exist. Similarly, there ought to be policies in place to analyze, and therefore cases with some institutional force and/or regulatory potential are necessary.

Ideally, those cases ought to be selected which together cover all of the Latin American region. There is significant overlap between the regional organizations which Latin American countries are a member of, however. Countries in the Caribbean, for example, are represented in CARICOM as well as CELAC, whereas the latter also covers Central and South America. Similarly, Mercosur, SACM, and UNASUR have practically the same set of members.

With the above conditions in mind, and aiming for as little overlap as possible while still covering the entire region, three cases are selected: SICA for Central America and Mexico, CARICOM for the Caribbean, and Mercosur for South America.
§3.2 Explication of the Supposition

In order to answer the first part of the research question of this thesis, “what explains the non-securitization of migration policies in the Latin American migration regime,” a supposition was formulated to determine whether Latin America indeed, as it appears, has a non-securitized migration regime:

If, in a region, securitizing actors do not present migration as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and therefore justifying extraordinary actions, and/or if such a securitizing claim is not accepted as such by the audience, then migration is not securitized.

In order to verify the supposition, the key terms from securitization theory need to be specified to this research and then operationalized.

First, the securitizing actor needs to be identified. Repeating Buzan et al. (1998), a securitizing actor is anyone who securitizes an issue by declaring a referent object to be existentially threatened (p. 36). In this research, the securitizing actors are those who shape and/or create the migration policies in the Latin American regional organizations studied, which, differing for each case, are the legislative bodies, working groups, and the domestic governments and representatives.

Secondly, it has to be established whether migration is presented by the securitizing actor as an existential threat, which threatens the referent object to its existence. The referent object, in the case of migration, located within the sector of societal security, is collective identity. Thus, specifically, in this study, it is taken as anything that is argued to threaten the collective identity of Latin America. To determine if this is the case, and hence whether a securitizing claim is being made, it will be assessed whether migrants and/or migratory flows are presented as a potential danger or risk to the Latin American identity or unity; something to be restricted and/or something the Latin American people need to be protected against.

Finally, the audience has to be identified. According to Buzan et al. (1998), the audience is the group to whom the securitizing actor speaks their claims in the securitizing move. In this research, the audience is taken as the population of the regional organization, as they are the people who are represented by the regional organization and are affected by its policies. Their potential rejection of the securitizing claim is taken as such when they, for example, protest the securitizing claim or in another way express their disbelief; whereas their acceptance of the securitizing claim is classified as such when there are no signs of protests and/or disagreements.

To summarize, then, the Latin American regional migration regime is classified as non-securitized – and the supposition accepted – when either those who shape the Latin American
migration policies in the regional organizations do not claim that migration threatens the collective identity of Latin America, requiring emergency measures and justifying extraordinary actions; or those who shape the Latin American migration policies in the regional organizations claim that migration threatens the collective identity of Latin America, requiring emergency measures and justifying extraordinary actions, but this claim is not accepted as such by the population.

The Latin American regional migration regime is classified as securitized – and the supposition rejected – when those who shape the Latin American migration policies in the regional organizations claim that migration threatens the collective identity of Latin America, requiring emergency measures and justifying extraordinary actions, and this claim is accepted as such by the population.

§3.3. The Hypotheses and Their Operationalization

Whereas the supposition is meant to verify the apparent non-securitization of the Latin American migration regime, Chapter Two has shown that securitization theory alone is not sufficient to answer the question why some regional migration regimes are securitized and others are not. Thus, in order to understand this, the hybrid institutionalist model was created. From this model, a set of hypotheses was derived. The different variables in the hypotheses are not that easy to ‘see,’ and are not directly measurable at first sight. The theoretical framework used in this research therefore needs to be translated into measurable concepts. The following section will clarify how these concepts will be operationalized, in order to be able to eventually falsify or verify the hypotheses according to the findings in Chapter Six.

Hypotheses 1A and 1B

1A. If the regional identity of the regional organization is open, then the regional migration regime is likely to be either economic (mobility)- or human rights-based.

1B. If the regional identity of the regional organization is restrictive, then the regional migration regime is likely to be securitized.

The regional identity of the regional organization is assessed here as either open or restrictive towards migrants, based on the founding documents of the three regional organizations studied. The regional identity is classified as open when a regional organization’s official documents include in its objectives or mission statement references to the value of free movement, an inclusive community, and/or human rights and social justice for all people regardless of nationality and/or
legal status. The regional identity is classified as restrictive when a regional organization’s official documents include in its objectives or mission statement references to the need to restrict and/or protect against migration flows, or make a clear distinction between nationals and ‘others’ from outside the region.

_Hypotheses 2A, 2B, and 2C_

2A. If the regional hegemon has a geopolitical interest in the regional organization’s migration policies, then the regional migration regime is likely to be securitized.
2B. If the regional hegemon has a material interest in the regional organization’s migration policies, then the regional migration regime is likely to be economic (mobility)-based.
2C. If the regional hegemon has an ideational interest in the regional organization’s migration policies, then the regional migration regime is likely to be either human rights- or security-based.

In order to test these hypotheses regarding the role of the interest of the regional hegemon, first, it will be established which nation is regarded as the regional hegemon, on the basis of its relative size, both in population and economic capacity, and the role it takes on within the regional organization, for example in chairmanship or as a moral leader. Second, in order to establish what the interest of the regional hegemon in a certain type of regional migration regime is, following van der Vleuten (2007), three dimensions will be distinguished: “a geopolitical dimension, aimed at preserving or strengthening its relative power position; a material dimension, aimed at controlling wealth and resources; and an ideational dimension, aimed at safeguarding its prestige” (Van der Vleuten 2007:157). Which of these three dimensions is at stake, then, cannot be measured but will rather be argued for, based on the empirical context.

_Hypotheses 3A, 3B, and 3C_

3A. If domestic and transnational pressures in the regional organization are economy-driven, then the regional migration regime is likely to be economic (mobility)-based.
3B. If domestic and transnational pressures in the regional organization are human rights-driven, then the regional migration regime is likely to be human rights-based.
3C. If domestic and transnational pressures in the regional organization are national identity-driven, then the regional migration regime is likely to be either human rights- or security-based.
Transnational pressures from non-state actors are taken here as statements of international organizations such as the United Nations on the policies and practices of the regional organization, or actions – such as lobbying – that interfere with it. Domestic pressures come from civil society groups, defined here as any individuals or organizations independent from government, including activist groups, trade unions, academia, community organizations, and/or social movement organizations. In order to judge whether these domestic and transnational pressures play a role in shaping the migration policies of the regional organization at stake, their access to the regional-level decision making process and their mobilization in favor of migration policies will be assessed. If non-state actors have access to decision making processes of the regional organization and mobilize in favor of migration policies, then the domestic and transnational pressure-variable will be classified as present. If non-state actors do not have access to the decision making processes of the regional organization and do not mobilize in favor of migration policies, then the domestic and transnational pressure-variable will be classified as absent.

Moving to the nature of these pressures, then, they will be classified as economy-driven when they emerge from a concern with (un)employment, the (lack of a) need for workers, or an economic growth or crisis. Pressures will be taken as human rights-driven when they refer to a concern with the humanitarian situation of migrants, their safety, health, and social rights, and/or the need to protection this. Finally, pressures will be classified as national identity-driven when they make a reference to the national identity in order to argue for or defend a certain policy; or when they refer to the assumed or pursued place or role of the regional organization in the world.

Hypothesis 4

4. If the safeguarding of prestige plays a role in the regional organization, and this occurs through institutional isomorphism, then the regional migration regime is likely to be human rights-based.

As for the final variable, whether a regional organization cares about defending its prestige will be argued for based on whether the regional organization demonstrates that it attaches importance to safeguarding its reputation. The sources of prestige are specific for each regional organization, “since they are linked to the national consciousness and the national identity of the state” (Van der Vleuten, 2005:467). Whether institutional isomorphism occurs in a regional organization, then, will be assessed by looking at whether the founding documents, treaties, and statements of the cases studied include references to existing global human rights conventions and adherence thereto.
All hypotheses

For all hypotheses, finally, it needs to be clarified how to distinguish between the different types of regional migration regimes that are possible outcomes of the hybrid institutionalist model. Whereas Buzan et al. (1998) provide handles to recognize a securitized regional migration regime, Lavenex et al. (2016) explain how to distinguish between the different kinds of regional migration regimes besides only a securitized one, as demonstrated in Table 2.1.

Finally, it should be noted that multiple ‘routes’ within the hybrid institutionalist model are possible – multiple variables can occur in the same regional organization at the same time. On the other hand, however, not all routes are possible, as not all variables go together with all types of regional migration regimes. Following securitization theory, a regional identity that is open towards migration cannot constitute a securitized migration regime, for example. Thus, while a number of pathways can exist at the same time in the same regime, a number of others are by definition ruled out.

§3.4. Data Sources

Having explained the methodological framework of this research and the operationalization of the hypotheses, this section will now briefly discuss the data to be used.

Primary sources will include founding documents, statements and treaties of the cases selected, proceedings of related work groups and statements from individual member states about the policies. These include the following:

- The Treaty of Chaguaramas (1971) and its revision (2001)
- The Charter of San Salvador (1951)
- The Treaty of Asunción (1991)
- The Tegucigalpa Declaration and Protocol (1991)
- The Mercosur Socio-Labor Declaration (1998)

Most of these documents are written in Spanish. When available, official translations in English will be used. For the rest of the texts, which are still to be included to prevent a biased approach, my own translations will be used, which will be specified. Furthermore, primarily for the testing of
the supposition, official statistics on migration flows of the United Nations, International Organization for Migration, and Organization of American States will be used.

As another primary source, in order to provide a more substantial image, gain more primary material and complement missing information, a number of interviews with several experts on the subject matter studied here was conducted. Although I had intended to do more interviews (considering the lack of sources on some of the cases – especially CARICOM), three interviews were eventually completed.¹⁴ As information from these interviews is used throughout this thesis, I will briefly introduce the interviewees here.

Pablo Ceriani Cernadas is a (regional) migration and human rights specialist and (co-)author of three books and five academic articles on migrant rights’ and Latin American migration. He is currently working as coordinator of the migration and asylum program at the Center of Human Rights of the National University of Lanús, Argentina; professor of Human Rights of Migrants at the University of Buenos Aires, Argentina; and vice-chairperson of the Committee on Migrant Workers of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.

Ludmilla Culpi is an expert on Mercosur, specifically its integration processes. She is currently a lecturer at the Federal University of Paraná, Brazil; and is a former researcher at the Center for International Relations Studies (CEFIR) of the University of Liège.

Miloushka Racamy, finally, is a senior policy officer at the Directorate of Foreign Relations of Curaçao, specializing in human rights and justice. In that capacity, she follows CARICOM closely, as Curaçao is an intended member of the organization.

The interview with Ludmilla Culpi took place over email, and I talked with Miloushka Racamy on Skype. With Pablo Cernadas, the interview (quite innovatively) took place over WhatsApp Messenger, through voice messages back and forth.¹⁵

As for secondary sources, these will include academic literature on the organizations, institutions, and policies of the selected cases and newspaper articles reporting on the process or

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¹⁴ In the period March-July 2017, I have been in contact with: Rose-Mary Allen, (anthropologist, lecturer at the University of Curaçao, and expert on intra-Caribbean migration movements from Curaçao); Marcia Bebianno Simoes (migration and development specialist with the OAS and co-author of the OAS’ annual reports on international migration in the Americas); Alma Louise de Bode-Olton (former director of the Directorate for Foreign Affairs, Curaçao); Georges Lemaître (international migration specialist, formerly with the OECD and co-author of the OAS’ annual reports on international migration in the Americas); Lucita Mounir Alam (former director of the Directorate for Foreign Affairs, Curaçao); Andrea Ribeiro Hoffmann (professor of International Relations at the Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro and co-author of Closing or Widening the Gap? Legitimacy and Democracy in Regional Integration Organizations (2007)); Gerda van Roozendael (Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations/International Organizations at the University of Groningen, the Netherlands, and author of the chapter “The Contribution of Non-State Actors to the Legitimacy of the CARICOM” in Closing or Widening the Gap? Legitimacy and Democracy in Regional Integration Organizations (2007)); Luciana Vaccotti (researcher of regional migration in Brazil and Argentina at the University of Buenos Aires); and Deisy Ventura (professor of International Law at the University of São Paulo). With the exception of Mr. Lemaître and Ms. Bebianno Simoes, whom unfortunately never replied, all those approached indicated to not be able to give me any information, and referred me to others.

¹⁵ Transcripts and copies available upon request.
implementation of the policies. As indicated in Chapter One, the specific topic of this research is not extensively covered in scholarly literature, and secondary sources are therefore limited.

Conclusion

In the following chapters, guided by these hypotheses and variables, first, an overview of the (historical) context of migration in Latin America will be provided, after which the migration policies of Mercosur, CARICOM, and SICA will be analyzed in three cases studies, in order to verify the supposition and test the hypotheses in Chapters Five and Six.
CHAPTER IV: LATIN AMERICAN MIGRATION REGIME: HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Introduction

Migration in Latin America is highly heterogeneous. Over time, migration flows to and from the region have increased and decreased, and both extra- and intraregional movements have been diversified in many different ways. This chapter will set out the Latin American migration regime through its historical context – through both early and current patterns and trends in migration flows, as well as a history of migration policies in the region. Throughout its history, Latin America has experienced significant changes in migration flow patterns. Broadly, three main phases can be identified: a period of in-migration up to the 1950s; a time of out-migration from the 1950s onwards; and most recently, since the early 2000s, a shift from out-migration to primarily intraregional migration flows.

Early patterns and trends

Up until the 1950s, Latin America was a net receiver of migrants. Europeans and Asians arrived in large numbers, especially to Argentina, Venezuela, Chile, Brazil, and Mexico (Mazza and Sohnen, 2011). Similar to the United States, Latin America was seen as lands of opportunity; as a horn of abundance (Mazza and Sohnen, 2011; Durand and Massey, 2010).

A turning point came in the late 1950s, when Latin America transitioned from being a place of destination to becoming a sender of migrants all throughout the world (Durand and Massey, 2010). This had a number of reasons. After World War II, European migration to Latin America decreased to insignificant levels, as the region’s economies could not create a labor demand equal to the reconstructing Europe. To immigrants from other regions, too, Latin America became a less attractive destination due to dictatorships and slow economic growth (Mazza and Sohnen, 2011). Other developments in Latin America influencing migration flows were the financial crisis of the 1980s (la década perdida; the lost decade) and an emerging shift towards democracy after the rule of military dictatorships in the 1970s (Pagnotta, 2014). At the same time, Central American civil wars caused a spiral of violence, leading to more than 200,000 deaths and creating two million refugees (Pagnotta, 2014). These internal economic and political crises drove large, new groups of Latin American nationals to migrate outside the region, primarily to the United States and Spain and Italy, countries with strong historical and cultural ties to Latin America (Pellegrino, 2004). Thus, this was a reversal of the migration flows of the 19th and 20th centuries, when Latin America was a

Starting around 2000, then, the latest and current trend in migration in Latin America began. At that time, extra-regional migration to destinations outside the region declined, both in absolute and relative terms, while intraregional migration flows within Latin America took the lead. While the largest amount of migrants in Latin America are still Mexican, Central American, and Caribbean people moving to the United States in search for work, those movements are stabilizing, while movement between Latin American countries is rapidly growing (Mazza and Sohnen, 2011; “South America,” n.d.).

Recent patterns and trends

With the early history of migration in Latin America now outlined, we can turn to the current figures and patterns of Latin American migration, as a way of context for the later section on the region’s migration policies and institutions. As the aim here is to eventually say something about the nature of Latin American migration policies, the focus will be on incoming extra- and intraregional migration.

Two remarks about the figures on migration in Latin America are in place. First, it should be noted that the numbers of international migrants in Latin America are relatively low compared to other regions. In absolute numbers, Latin America comes only slightly before Oceania (with respectively 9.2 and 8.1 million migrants) (UN, 2015a). Relatively speaking, too, Latin America has few migrants. Both Table 1.1. and 4.2. demonstrate that the number of international migrants in Latin America as a percentage of the total population is low, both relative to other regions in the world, as well as within Latin America itself.

Table 4.1: International migrants in Latin America as a percentage of the total population

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<td>Latin America as a whole</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central America</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UN, 2015a.

Secondly, it should be noted that these numbers do not distinguish between migrants coming to Latin America from outside the region and migration flows within the region – after all,
an international migrant is here simply defined as anyone living in a country other than his or her country of birth. There are significant differences between these two types of migration flows in Latin America, however. These numbers also do not include refugees, forcibly displaced persons, or irregular migrants. With these two qualifications in mind, the following paragraphs now outline the different trends and patterns in both extra-regional migration to the region and intraregional migration within Latin America.

**Extra-regional migration flows**

Extra-regional migration signifies those migration movements arriving in Latin America from outside the region. As demonstrated in Table 4.2, levels of extra-regional migration are relatively low compared to intraregional migration in Latin America.

Table 4.2: Total number of migrants in Latin America by region of origin x 1000

<table>
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<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>1839</td>
<td>1622</td>
<td>1419</td>
<td>1279</td>
<td>1153</td>
<td>1306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>4018</td>
<td>3709</td>
<td>3819</td>
<td>4292</td>
<td>5327</td>
<td>5918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>605</td>
<td>692</td>
<td>801</td>
<td>971</td>
<td>1191</td>
<td>1342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>7170</td>
<td>6695</td>
<td>6578</td>
<td>7233</td>
<td>8239</td>
<td>9234</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: compiled by author, based on UN, 2015b.

These numbers represent the region of origin of migrants in Latin America between 1990 and 2015. In that period, by far the largest group of migrants came from Latin America itself, something which will be further discussed below. With regards to migrants from other regions, in general, Brazil is the most common destination ("South America," n.d.). Furthermore, three patterns stand out.

First, the amount of migrants from Europe, the largest extra-regional migrant group. As explained earlier, Latin America was a major destination for European migrants up to the 1950s, but these numbers dwindled after the social and economic crises in Latin America between the 1960s and 1980s. Table 4.2 also suggests that this trend has not reversed yet. Still, numbers of European migrants in Latin America are significant, and even show a slight growth in the period 2010-2015. This can partly be explained by the high amount of both voluntary and involuntary returnees from developed countries, something which ties in with the second pattern in extra-regional migration to Latin America to be discussed here, namely the growth in immigration from
North America. Table 4.2 shows that these numbers more than doubled over 25 years. This trend of returnees is driven by a combination of lack of employment opportunities in the countries of arrival (something spurred by the 2008 global economic crisis), weak social protection systems in those countries, increasingly forceful deportation policies, and increased opportunities in countries of origin (IOM, 2015c). The IOM reported in 2015 that in the Latin American sub-regions of Central America and the Caribbean alone, the number of these North-South migrants reached approximately two million (IOM, 2015c). Several governments in the region (e.g. those of Chile and Colombia) also have return programs which include support for returning nationals (IOM, 2015c).

Third and finally, Table 4.2 shows the relatively large number of Asian immigrants in Latin America. This is for a large part due to the history of Japanese immigration to Latin America. In the late 19th and early 20th century, the Japanese diaspora led to many *Nikkei* arriving in the Americas (O’Toole, 2011). Brazil now even hosts the largest ethnic Japanese community outside of Japan (“Japan-Brazil Relations,” 2017).

Recently, refugees fleeing the Syrian Civil War have also arrived in Latin America. While exact numbers are unavailable, estimates make clear that it is only a fraction of the amounts of Syrian refugees Europe receives\(^{16}\) – the travel distance- and costs are a major impediment.\(^{17}\) Latin American countries have opened their doors to these refugees: Chile, Venezuela, Brazil, and Uruguay were among the first to offer to take in refugees and to create special programs to resettle them (Brodzinsky, 2015). Brazil is the primary destination of this flow of refugees in Latin America.\(^{18}\) Brazil’s former president, Dilma Rousseff, said she wanted to reiterate the government’s willingness to welcome those who, driven from their homeland, want to come live, work and contribute to the prosperity and peace of Brazil. Especially in these difficult times, these times of crisis, we have to welcome refugees with open arms. (Brodzinsky, 2015)

In 2013, Brazil, as the first country in Latin America to do so, launched a special fast-track visa program for those affected by the Syrian conflict. The program, which is recognized by the UNHCR as an example to the region and the world (Kurczy and Bons, n.d.), allows Syrian refugees


\(^{17}\) As point of context and comparison, in September 2016, there were 64,000 Syrian refugees living in the Netherlands, which comes down to 0.4 percent of the population (CBS, 2016).

\(^{18}\) Brazil is actually one of the best countries for refugees to live. The 2013 World Refugee Survey, which evaluates countries’ migration policies, grades countries based on countries based on refoulement/physical protection; detention/access to courts; freedom of movement and residence; and right to earn a livelihood. Brazil was the only country receiving an ‘A’ grade in all categories. As Becker (2015) states, Brazil’s refugee system might not excel quantitively as asylum requests are relatively low, but it excels qualitatively in its refugee resettlement policies.
to receive a humanitarian visa within days. Since December 2015, 7,380 of these humanitarian visas have been issued (Esthimer, 2016). In 2014, Argentina also launched a humanitarian visa program for Syrian refugees. Although no more than a hundred Syrian refugees have been resettled so far, the Argentinian government has restated its commitment to take in more: then-President’s Chief of Cabinet, Aníbal Fernández, stated that Syrian refugees would be welcomed in Argentina through the nation’s tradition of offering support during humanitarian crises: “When you do something like this, it is a very honest act that springs from affection and solidarity,” he said (Calatrava, 2015). He called this a “simple solution” to the refugee crisis (Glickhouse, 2015). In September 2015, Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro also pledged to resettle 20,000 Syrian refugees”19 saying: “I want 20,000 Syrians to come, Syrian families to our Venezuelan homeland to share this land of peace, this land of Christ, and of Bolivar, to work with us and to contribute to […] the development of this magic land”20 (Brodzinsky, 2015).

To conclude this section, then, it can be said that extra-regional migration to Latin America is relatively low, and consists mostly of returnees and (recently) refugees. The more significant migration flows the region are intraregional, and will be further discussed below.

**Intraregional migration flows**

Before turning to the matter of intraregional migration in Latin America, meaning migration movements within the region, two remarks are in place. First, it should first be noted that a lot of the literature discussing intraregional migration in Latin America does not look at the region as a whole as taken here, but outlines intraregional migration using specific geographic denominations, such as the Caribbean (see: Mazza and Sohnen, 2011), the Americas – including the U.S. and Canada – altogether (see: Fitzgerald and Cook-Martin, 2014; Chabat et al., 2015), or in distinguishing between Central, North and South America (see: Cerna das, 2013; Acosta, 2016; IOM, 2015c; UN, 2015a; UN, 2015b). As motivated in Chapter One, this thesis focuses on Latin America, and the following section will therefore make use of a combination of those studies to piece together an overview of intraregional migration flows in Latin America more broadly. Secondly, it should also be kept in mind that intraregional migration flows tend to be underestimated in official migration figures, and are typically highly outdated as regional comparisons are dependent on data from decennial census rounds (Mazza and Sohnen, 2011). The latest UN census data, for example, as demonstrated in Table 4.3, set the share of intraregional

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19 Ironically enough, in that same statement, Maduro also reiterated his support for the al-Assad regime, stating that he is “the only leader with authority in Syria” (Brodzinsky, 2015).

20 Incidentally, the same number of 20,000 Colombians has left Venezuela, forcibly as well as voluntarily, due to the ongoing border conflict between the two countries (Glickhouse, 2015).
migrants in Latin America to be nearly 66 percent. Out of 9.2 million international migrants in the region, this comes down to an estimated 6 million intraregional migrants – a significant amount (UN, 2015b). Finally, numbers of unauthorized migrants in the region are estimated to be high. These are, of course, not included in official figures, and even rough approximations are difficult to find. James Baer of the Council on Hemispheric Affairs estimates the number to at least exceed two million – with both intraregional and extra-regional unauthorized migrants together (2014). It is important to remember this group in this context of migration policies: not only are they not accurately represented in statistics on migratory flows in Latin America, the irregularity of the status of these migrants also makes the protection of their basic rights problematic. With that in mind, let us now turn to the patterns in intraregional migration in Latin America.

Figure 4.1: Latin America's sub-regions

As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, the period of out-migration in Latin America which started in the 1950s has now transitioned into a period in which intraregional migration is the dominant trend in Latin American migration today. While migration flows out of Latin America,
and then especially to the United States, are still considerable, intraregional migration in Latin America is increasing at a more rapid speed. Between 2000 and 2010, emigration to destinations outside the region declined, while migration flows within the region grew at an annual rate of nearly 3.5 percent in that same period: an acceleration from the previous twenty years, when they grew at a pace of roughly one percent (CEPAL, 2014). As presented in Table 4.3, the share of extra-regional migrants in Latin America has dropped significantly since the 1970s, whereas the share of intraregional migrants in the region has seen a major increase and is now at approximately 65 percent of the total number of international migrants in Latin America.

Table 4.3: Share of extra- and intraregional migrants in Latin America as a percentage of the total number of international migrants

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Extra-regional (%)</td>
<td>76.1</td>
<td>63.1</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>34.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intraregional (%)</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>60.6</td>
<td>66.5</td>
<td>65.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: created by author, adapted from Pagnotta (2014) and UN (2015b).

Besides this increase in intraregional migration in Latin America, both in absolute and in relative terms, these movements have also diversified in both routes and incentives. Latin American intraregional migration is highly heterogeneous, with different dynamics and various regional corridors. During the first decade of the 21st century, intraregional migration was limited to a handful of countries (Durand and Massey, 2010). Census data demonstrates that while intraregional migration is still highly concentrated along traditional top corridors based on historic patterns of the movements of indigenous peoples, markets and agricultural patterns (e.g. Guatemala-Mexico; Dominican Republic-Haiti; Nicaragua-Costa Rica; Bolivia and Paraguay to Argentina), additional routes have started to open up (Mazza and Sohnen, 2011). While intraregional migration was largely driven by conflict and political unrest in the past, today, these new corridors are mostly motivated by employment. Overall, still, higher-income countries are attracting the most significant regional migration.

Conclusion

Conclusively, it can be said that both the scope and patterns of migration to, from, and within Latin America have changed significantly over the years. After a long period of primarily immigration, followed by approximately fifty years of out-migration, intraregional movement is currently the dominant trend in Latin American migration. These flows are reshaping the region, “making it less like a compass pointing north and more like a hub with many spokes” (Cave, 2012).
Still, this is a very general overview of Latin American migration policies, which is not enough to say something about *why* it looks this way. In order to do this, the policies of Latin America’s migration regime need to be analyzed more closely. The following chapter will therefore introduce the three cases, in order to provide a more in-depth discussion of the various policy frameworks on migration in the region.
CHAPTER V: EXPLAINING NON-SECURITIZATION

Introduction

With the context of both early and more recent patterns and trends in migratory flows in Latin America now set out, we can move to the actual migration policies at stake here. As a more general introduction to the three case studies that will go deeper into the region’s migration policies, this chapter will first provide a brief overview of the history of Latin American migration policies. The second part of this chapter then introduces this research’s three cases: the migration regimes of the Latin American regional organizations Mercosur, CARICOM, and SICA will be analyzed on the basis of the variables of the hybrid institutionalist model, in order to check the supposition and lay the foundation for the eventual testing of the hypotheses in Chapter Six.

§5.1. History of Latin American Migration Policies

A large part of the history of Latin American migration policies is characterized by open borders. In the first period of in-migration, most countries in the region had an open door policy, some even working to actively encourage immigration (Durand and Massey, 2010). In 1811, the first Venezuelan constitution introduced a clause which was later replicated by all countries in the region: “All foreigners of any nation will be admitted into the State” (Acosta, 2016). Widespread optimism about the future led to a general agreement on the need for immigrants. Latin American intellectuals argued that immigration was welcome because the region did not have enough workers to maximally benefit from the region’s rich resources (Durand and Massey, 2010). “To govern is to populate,” leading Argentine political theorist Juan Bautista Alberdi wrote in 1852 (Fitzgerald and Cook-Martin, 2014). Equal civil rights and a quick path to naturalization were incorporated into migration policies in order to attract migrants (Acosta, 2016).

This openness steadily deteriorated, however, and migration policies in the region became more and more restrictive over the course of the 20th century. There was increasing disagreement about who exactly should be encouraged to come. “To govern is to populate” became “to govern is to populate well:” while executives of large companies were not exactly picky about whom to hire, government officials, on the other hand, tried not only to import labor force but also to ‘improve the race,’ which in practice meant the encouragement of immigration of white Europeans (Durand and Massey, 2010; Fitzgerald and Cook-Martin, 2014). Furthermore, in the early 1900s, after the unexpected Spanish defeat in Cuba in 1898, middle-class parties regularly voiced their resentment about the increasing numbers of immigrants (O’Toole, 2011). In these ways, nationalism gained force as an ideology throughout Latin America, to become a dominant doctrine.
by the late 1920s (O’Toole, 2011). As two opposing trends that would continue to raise their heads throughout the rest of Latin American history, this nationalist vision that originated in the 19th century with the construction of the nation-state competed simultaneously with the idea of a Latin American unifying project in opposition to a threat from an ‘Other’ (Santos, 2015:43).

The changes in migratory patterns, both in size and in diversification, eventually led Latin American nations to rewrite their migration policies. Over the past thirty years, migration has been progressively incorporated into both national and regional agendas in Latin America (Saad et al., 2012). Many Latin American countries maintain bilateral treaties with neighboring or friendly states to allow their respective nationals entry and limited stay with no or minimal procedural requirements, or labor migration provisions (Cantor, 2015). At the same time, the facilitation of migration in Latin America increasingly takes place in sub-regional organizations and integration processes, such as the Southern Common Market (Mercosur), the Andean Community (CAN; Comunidad Andina), the Central American Integration System (SICA), and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM): key forums in which migration issues in the region are addressed by governments and other stakeholders (Cantor, 2015). These forums exist alongside others at the regional and sub-regional level, where migration in Latin America is discussed in a more ad hoc fashion, including the Organization of American States (OAS), the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) (Cantor, 2015).

One of the most important region-wide Latin American migration policies, addressing refugees specifically, is the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees. The Cartagena Declaration was a response to unprecedented refugee flows following the civil wars in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua in the early 1980s, and was hailed as a progressive milestone in refugee-protection law. The Declaration established a protection framework that is still employed in the region today, with several countries having enshrined it in their national laws (Esthimer, 2016). The Cartagena Declaration was groundbreaking in that it extended the definition of ‘refugee’ to include those individuals fleeing “generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order” and because it linked refugee rights to humanitarian law and human rights, and enshrined this in a regional accord (“Cartagena Declaration,” 1984; Esthimer, 2016). The implementation of the Cartagena framework, however, differs greatly between countries in the region. Some, such as Ecuador, have embraced the Declaration’s principles and integrated them in humanitarian-focused domestic migration policies (Esthimer, 2016). Costa Rica, too, has taken steps to provide asylum seekers with more access to legal aid, and Argentina has created a special commission to ensure that asylum
seekers are provided with legal support during their status determination process (Esthimer, 2016). Still, other Latin American countries, such as Venezuela, in response to domestic political pressures, have adopted more restrictive policies: according to Esthimer (2016), the Venezuelan government’s close ties with Colombian insurgent groups and both government’s desires to downplay the severity of the refugee situation have shaped this response. Similarly restrictive, Mexico detains asylum seekers during their application process, and a negative decision in the case of an appeal could result in indefinite imprisonment; whereas in Panama, asylum seekers are given no protection as they await the decision on their claim, risking deportation (Esthimer, 2016). Finally, a somewhat special case here is Uruguay. While it signed on to the Cartagena Declaration and provided asylum seekers with the same rights to free legal aid services as other residents, despite these good intentions, in 2015, 42 Syrian refugees that were settled in Uruguay wanted to leave due to social isolation and difficulty finding employment. They protested in front of the presidential palace in Montevideo, asking for visas to leave the country (Esthimer, 2016). In response, Uruguayan public opinion towards the refugees turned sour, as Uruguayans perceived the refugees’ attitude as rude and ungrateful, and the demonstrations as offensive (Giechitelli and Valladeres, 2016). Apparently, thus, despite the Cartagena Declaration, many Latin American countries still lack the comprehensive framework and institutional capacity to integrate extra-regional migrants (Esthimer, 2016).

Latin American responses to the Syrian Civil War and the flow of refugees it produces have been fragmented (Kurczy and Bons, n.d.). On the one hand, they have been welcoming. The Syrian crisis has struck a nerve in Latin America, which is, after all, a region with a history of oppressive regimes and civil war itself. Add to this the principles of the Cartagena Declaration, a history of open door-policies, and a desire to be recognized as a valuable contributor to the international community instead of a developing region, and it is not surprising that countries in Latin America have welcomed Syrian refugees (Esthimer, 2016; Tiralongo, 2015). Chilean President Michelle Bachelet, for example, said that “as an international community, we are duty-bound to react with solidarity in order to restore peace and provide a response that will enable us to minimize the suffering of victims of war and those who are running away from it” (“Latin American leaders urge reform,” 2015). In the same vein, Javier Miranda, director of the secretariat for human rights of Uruguay, stated that accepting Syrian refugees is Latin America’s way of “repaying its debt to the world” – after all, by the late 20th century, it was Latin America that was producing a flow of refugees, fleeing from civil wars and dictatorships (Brodzinsky, 2015). And in an interview, Costa Rican President Luis Guillermo Solís, in reference to the global refugee crisis, stated:
I know one thing for certain: we have to remember that migration flows are social phenomena. They just happen, whether that was in the Middle Ages or now. We have to respect the human rights of migrating people. […] I believe that everyone should be able to leave a country if they want to protect their family or seek a better life. We are all humans and we all have legs. We are better off trying to facilitate than attempting to stop it. […] People travel, they move around, and we can all benefit from the advantages.21 (De Cooker, 2017)

These welcoming responses to the refugee crisis often go hand in hand with fierce criticism of the European Union and United States’ restrictive policies towards migrants. Referencing the death of Alan Kurdi, the toddler who drowned and washed up on a Turkish beach in September 2015, then-President Rousseff of Brazil said that “that three-year-old Syrian child died because he was not welcome. He died because he was abandoned, because countries created barriers to the entrance of that child” (“Latin America struggles,” 2016). Similarly, President Bachelet of Chile has stated that “it is disturbing that Europe sees refugees as a threat”22 (Amorós, 2016). And, responding to American President Trump’s (intended) migration policies, President Evo Morales of Bolivia said: “Brothers, Latin American presidents, we cannot follow the immigration policies of the North” (Romero and Politi, 2017). Also alluding to Trump, Ecuador’s former President Rafael Correa stated that “the solution to the question of migration is not the construction of walls or borders, but solidarity, humanity, and the creation of peaceful solutions for all of Earth’s inhabitants” (Fieser, 2017).

On the other hand, while many countries are thus welcoming Syrian refugees and have also started campaigns to inform their citizens of why these people are seeking asylum, misinformation and misunderstandings persist. The founder of an NGO assisting Syrians in São Paulo, for example, stated that “some people still think refugees are running away because they owe some money, and we have to make them realize that they are running for their lives” (Kurczy and Bons, n.d.).

To conclude this section, it can be said that Latin American policies governing migration have fluctuated between open and restrictive over time. While migration policies in the region are increasingly addressing freedom of movement, and cooperation on social rights is developing, policies are still at different stages of progress between sub-regions, especially with regards to protection and access to service of migrants. This broad overview provided an introduction to the region’s migration regime, but is still too superficial to answer the research question. Therefore, diving deeper into Latin America’s migration policies, the rest of this chapter will present the three cases, and analyze the migration policies of Mercosur, CARICOM, and SICA. For each case, first,

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21 Own translation.
22 Own translation.
an overview of the migratory patterns in the region and most important migration policies is provided, followed by an analysis based on the four variables of the hybrid institutionalist model.

§5.2. CASE I: Mercosur

The Mercado Común del Sur (Mercosur, Common Market of the South) is a sub-regional bloc in the Southern American region of Latin America. Mercosur began as a free-trade zone in 1991 with the Treaty of Asunción, with full members Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay, agreeing to a coordinated process of economic integration based on a shared external tariff and trade policy (O’Toole, 2011). Venezuela – after initial Brazilian concerns about its democratic credentials held up its membership for a long time – became a full member in 2012, but was suspended in December 2016 for failing to comply with Mercosur’s economic, human rights, and immigration requirements (Soto and Paraguassu, 2016). Between 1996 and 2004, Chile, Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, and Ecuador became associate members.

Migratory patterns in the region

War, conflict, and people forcibly displaced have played a significant role in migratory patterns in the Mercosur region. While the region has seen little interstate war for most of the 20th century, it has historically been a region plagued with tension, animosities, and war plans (Oelsner, 2013). Although democracy seems to be consolidated in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay, some of Mercosur’s associate members have even recently experienced serious political crisis, for example Bolivia in 2008, Ecuador in 2010, and Paraguay – a full member of Mercosur – in 2012 (Oelsner, 2013). In addition, a major domestic crisis which affects migration in the Mercosur region is the armed conflict in Colombia, and its spill-over impact on neighboring countries Ecuador and Venezuela. The conflict not only displaces a large number of people – estimated in 2015 to be 6.2 million people (IDMC, 2015) – but also dissuades migration into the country, although recent improvements in the Colombian security situation have increased immigration to Colombia again, with almost 30,000 migrants lawfully entering the country in 2013 (Cantor, 2015).

As for intraregional (labor) migration in the Mercosur region, Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, and Chile are the major destination for labor migrants from the Andean region and Paraguay, who are driven primarily by economic opportunities (IOM, 2015c; “South America,” n.d.; Mazza and Sohnen, 2011). Until recently24, in the case of Venezuela, these were mostly Colombian, Peruvian,

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23 At the time of writing (August 2017), Venezuela is still suspended from Mercosur.
24 A socioeconomic crisis that heavily escalated in late-2016 has changed this. As of mid-2017, Venezuela is heavily impoverished, with large shortages in food, medicine, and electricity, prompting many to flee the country, mostly to Colombia (Van De Water, 2017). While it remains to be seen how much longer this crisis will last and what its long-term effects on Latin America’s migration patterns will be, it can be said at least that the longstanding pattern of Venezuela as a popular place of arrival for migrants is crumbling.
and Ecuadorian higher- as well as lower-skilled workers, attracted by the relatively high salaries and economic opportunities in Venezuelan’s urban centers (Mazza and Sohnen, 2011). Bolivians and Paraguayans are working in large numbers in Argentina (Cantor, 2015; Mazza and Sohnen, 2011).

Mercosur migration policies

The Southern Cone sub-region – home to most of the Mercosur member states – can be characterized as the most advanced in terms of integration of labor migrants, as Mercosur countries have made considerably more progress in providing their nationals with the legal right to work and access to services than other sub-regions of Latin America (Mazza and Sohnen, 2011). Still, adoption and implementation of the Mercosur legislative framework continues to vary between member countries – something which will be further discussed below.

Even though migration has always been significant in the Mercosur region, the coordination of migration policy was not a priority for the organization at the beginning of the integration process (Maguid, 2007; Pérez Vichich, 2007). Of the ten working groups which together formed the Common Market Group, none were concerned with migration specifically (Margheritis, 2013). Migration was only indirectly addressed in the subgroups on labor and customs, which approached the matter from different angles. In the Subgroup on Customs Issues – comprised of migration management specialists – steps were taken to implement mechanisms to regulate and advance controls at the borders. In the Subgroup on Labor Relations, Employment and Security – comprised of labor ministers and representatives of the business sector and trade union – migration was dealt with as something beyond mere border controls, but rather as a social process (Maguid, 2007). Furthermore, due to Mercosur’s roots as a purely economic, commercial, and customs-related union, the freedom of movement of individuals was initially not explicitly recognized (Belén Olmos Giupponi, 2011). Indeed, Mercosur’s founding Asunción Treaty did not include the free movement of people in its provisions – people’s mobility was only conceptualized in terms of market mechanisms, as a necessary complement to the free circulation of capital, goods, and services within a regional market (Margheritis, 2013).

This changed when major economic and political crises in the Mercosur region in the early 2000s facilitated a ‘relaunch’ of Mercosur, shifting from a mainly economic focus to also include free movement on its agenda (Acosta and Freier, 2015). As a result of a Mercosur Meeting of Interior Ministers in 1996, the Mercosur Specialized Forum on Migration was established in 2003, with the objective of analyzing regional migrations and proposing regional measures and migration agreements (Belén Olmos Giupponi, 2011). It is aimed at deepening the regional integration concerning migration, and its approach maximizes the human rights perspective of migration.
Migration policy makers from Mercosur’s Member- and Associated States come together in this forum, which serves as a platform for capacity building, consultation and information sharing with regards to the movement of persons in the region (Opeskin et al., 2012:369). In May 2004, the Specialized Forum on Migration signed the Declaration of Santiago on Migration Principles, which was not only a major step forward for the coordination of migration policy within Mercosur (Culpi and Pereira, 2016) but also proved to be an important indicator for Mercosur’s regional identity towards migration. It “[recognizes] the right of the States to exercise adequate control of their borders, but without addressing migratory irregularity as a punishable act of criminal law,” and “[condemns] practices of xenophobia”25 (“Declaración de Santiago,” 2004). In addition, it “[recognizes] the important contribution of migrants in the formation of our State,” expresses the conviction that “the cultural dimension of migration is a valuable contribution in the transculturation of peoples,” and it is recognized that “the important role of migrant workers is a valuable social capital that energizes and strengthens the various economic and social sectors of migrant host countries”26 (“Declaración de Santiago,” 2004). In the Declaration of Santiago, migrants are thus regarded as a valuable cultural, social, and economic asset, not as a threat or something that has to be restricted. And, in addition, one of the migration principles as stated in the Declaration of Santiago is that nations outside of the Mercosur-bloc are required to provide “fair and human treatments to immigrants, in accordance with the treatment accorded to their nationals in our territories”27 (“Declaración de Santiago,” 2004). The equal treatment of intra- and extra-regional migrants is thus also expected from other nations.

This inclusion of migration on the Mercosur agenda only developed tacitly from the economic notion of liberating the circulation of goods and merchandise (Cernadas, 2013). In December 1998, Mercosur’s Common Market Council adopted the Socio-Labor Declaration (officially: Declaración Sociolaboral del Mercosur) (Pucheta, 2014). This Declaration had its roots in Working Group No. 10, a working group composed of representatives of labor ministries, unions, and employers’ associations, with the objective to create an instrument containing a core of fundamental rights and a monitoring mechanism for the social sectors (Lavenex et al., 2016; Belén Olmos Giupponi, 2017). The result was the Socio-Labor Declaration. Emulating many of the provisions of the 1990 UN Convention on Migrant Workers28, the Declaration recognizes a series of principles and rights that member states must respect regarding Mercosur’s workers, regardless

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25 Own translation.
26 Own translation.
27 Own translation.
28 The UN Convention on Migrant Workers (in full: the International Convention on the Protection of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families) is a UN multilateral treaty to govern the protection of migrant workers and families. Adopted in December 1990 and in force since 2003, it is currently ratified by 45 countries, most of which are North African or South American.
of their nationality (Belén Olmos Giupponi, 2017; Lavenex et al., 2016:462). It lays out the principles of non-discrimination and equal rights and obligations for migrant workers as well as for national workers (Maguid, 2007).

After the Socio-Labor Declaration, a second process of free movement promotion, concerned with the portability of social security benefits and the mutual recognition of qualification, was launched four years later, with the Residence Agreement (officially: Acuerdo sobre Residencia para Nacionales de los Estados Parte del Mercosur, Bolivia y Chile): the most prominent instrument of Mercosur today. It provides that any national of a Mercosur (associate) Member State may reside and work in a host state for two years, if they can prove citizenship and a clean criminal record. If the person can prove legitimate means of living, the temporary residence permit can become permanent (Acosta, 2014). In addition, to promote family reunification, the right of residence is also extended to members of the migrant’s family, irrespective of their original nationality (Maguid, 2007). Furthermore, the Residence Agreement includes the right to equal treatment with regard to social, cultural, and economic rights, on the basis of the principle of non-discrimination. Under the banner of “equal enjoyment of rights” 29, nationals of Mercosur states who have been granted residence have the same rights as nationals of the receiving country (“Acuerdo,” 2002), although Acosta (2016) argues that these provisions are not further defined, and discrimination with regards to aspects such as welfare benefit is therefore still common. The Residence Agreement is also a step forward in addressing the situation of undocumented regional migrants. According to the Agreement, for example, the access of children of migrants to basic education cannot be denied or limited because of the irregular status of their parents (“Acuerdo,” 2002).

Although all Mercosur members signed an accord to provide equal treatment and access in terms of residency, member states are at different stages of adjusting their domestic laws to line up with the Agreement (Mazza and Sohnen, 2011). After all, unlike in the European Union, where EU-law supersedes national law, the Mercosur Agreement is an international treaty which individual countries implement for themselves (Acosta, 2016). There is no coercive intraregional mechanism to guarantee implementation or sanction violations; no Commission or Court of Justice. Consequently, implementation of the Agreement varies greatly between countries. Some national governments, in particular Brazil and Argentina, have taken the lead in the implementation of the Residence Agreement, and have moved forward to grant nationals of other Mercosur member states legal permission to work or easier access (Mazza and Sohnen, 2011). However, Chile, for example, only partly complies and does not apply the Agreement to Ecuadorians,

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29 Own translation.
Peruvians, and Colombians (Acosta, 2016). Others member states, such as Ecuador in 2014, have only recently internalized the Agreement, and in addition impose high fees for the residence permits. Why, exactly, this is done is not clear, although it is likely to work as a deterrent because the fee charged for a permanent residence permit exceeds the minimal monthly fee in Ecuador (Acosta and Freier, 2015). Thus, as there is no supranational oversight on the implementation of the Agreement, migrants still largely depend on national laws and procedures (Acosta and Freier, 2015).

As for policies specifically regarding refugees, Mercosur has two important frameworks in place. One is the Rio de Janeiro Declaration on the Institution of Refuge, signed in November 2000. It has a clear focus on refugee human rights and the need to protection thereof. The motivation for the Declaration, the first page states, is a concern that “international protection should be given to individuals persecuted for reasons of race, nationality, religion, membership of a particular social group, public opinion, or victims of serious and generalized violations of human rights” (Rio de Janeiro, 2000). It furthermore recognizes that “racism, xenophobia, and political intolerance have created refugee flows in the world,” and expresses a humanitarian view of migration in “recognizing that people escaping situations of persecution and conflict represent a different category from those that emigrate due to economic or personal reasons” (Rio de Janeiro, 2000).

The other is the 2012 Mercosur Declaration of Principles on International Refugee Protection, which “[reaffirms] the desire of [Mercosur’s] States to reinforce national, regional and global efforts to the protection, promotion, and respect of human rights, following the principles of solidarity, diversity, access to justice, prosperity, security, and harmonious coexistence of peace for our people” (Mercosur Declaration, 2012). Solidarity, diversity, harmonious coexistence: this is not a picture of a region that is ‘us’ versus ‘the others.’ As for the rights of refugees within Mercosur nation states, the Declaration states that “refugees will have at least the same rights as of foreigners who hold permanent residency” (Mercosur Declaration, 2012). Furthermore, the Declaration clearly articulates a view of migration as an asset to society, not as a threat that ought to be constrained, in the statements that the signatories will “recognize refugees’ contribution to host societies” and “the importance of having non-restrictive immigration policies” (Mercosur Declaration, 2012).

Regional identity and migration

Before going into the open- or restrictiveness of Mercosur towards migrants, a remark about Mercosur’s regional identity is in place. Santos (2015) has pointed to a tension within
Mercosur between the opposing poles of regionalism and nationalism. On the one hand, Santos (2015) notes, there is certainly a sense of a collective identity, based on a shared history, common values, and certain achievements, which is manifested by stakeholders and decision-makers throughout the region – a certain “Mercosurness” (p. 51-54). On the other hand, there is another force of collective identity in the organization, namely a strong nationalism which developed during the post-independence nation-building process, emphasizing differences between countries, which is still present in the identity and political culture of the region today (Santos, 2015:45). Still, this tension between regionalism and nationalism within Mercosur does not mean that there is no regional identity towards migration to be discerned.

Whereas Mercosur’s policies regarding migration are clear in their recognition of the cultural, economic, and societal value that migration has for the region, and extends its discourse of an emphasis on human rights for migrants to third-country nationals, too, the organization’s founding documents are less pronounced in this. As an economic integration project in the first place, Mercosur’s Treaty of Asunción is purely economic, establishing the regime and its bodies and competencies, rules and procedures, etcetera. There is nothing on migration, refugees, free movement or other references to the region’s attitude towards ‘others.’ Therefore, we have to look for expressions of the region’s identity in other official statements.

According to Acosta and Freier (2015), as well as Ludmilla Culpi (personal communication, August 2017), a key development towards the open regional identity of Mercosur was its ‘relaunch’ in the early 2000s, which enabled the incorporation of new items on to the regional agenda, including the free movement of labor, which came to be framed as a socio-political issue instead of a purely economic one (Acosta and Freier, 2015). According to Acosta and Freier (2015), the South American Conference on Migration (SACM) also played a part in the development of this new liberal migration discourse. SACM worked to build consensus around three issues: the need to encourage regional integration, a critique of the restrictive migration policies in the United States and Europe, and a focus on human rights with an emphasis on migrants’ rights, regardless of their legal status. In line with principles of coherence and non-discrimination, this discourse has been extended to extra-regional migrants in the Mercosur-region (Acosta and Freier, 2015). This is important to note: apparently, third-country nationals from outside of the region are equated in their migrant rights with intraregional migrants who move within Latin America. This points to a regional identity that is open towards migrants, and does not feel the need to protect itself against migration flows of ‘others’ from outside. In addition, Mercosur’s recent responses to the Syrian refugee crisis are telling. The director of Mercosur’s Refugee National Commission, for example, stated that “we are trying to cure the effects of the extremely serious humanitarian crises happening
elsewhere” and that there are “communities from the Middle Eastern in all our Mercosur countries, who have greatly contributed to our development” (“Mercosur Mulls Hosting Refugees,” 2015). Furthermore, in September 2015, Mercosur approved a declaration which rejected the xenophobic attitudes of European countries who closed their borders before the massive influx of refugees” (“As Europe Closes Borders,” 2015). Thus, while this does not come forward in Mercosur’s founding Treaty of Asunción, from other official documents and statements, it can nevertheless be concluded that Mercosur’s regional identity is open towards migrants.

**Interest regional hegemon**

Within Mercosur, both Brazil and Argentina – in different ways – can be seen as the regional hegemon. Brazil, on the one hand, is largest in population, relative size, and economy, but according to Santos (2015) and Culpi (personal communication, August 2017), Brazil is not comfortable with being presented as the regional hegemon, and rejects any responsibility or attempt to be perceived as a regional leader and paymaster of the costs of integration (p. 50). As Ludmilla Culpi also says: “As the most important economy within the region, with the bigger population, Brazil has some characteristics to have this ‘natural leadership,’ but it does not want to pay the costs of leadership” (personal communication, August 2017). Argentina, on the other hand, has proved to be more interested to take on a leadership role within Mercosur, especially regarding the matter of migration (L. Culpi, personal communication, August 2017). It did so, for example when it put a halt to Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s proposal to regulate migration procedures in the development of the Mercosur Residence Agreement. The process of the adoption of this policy was the result of a number of historical conjunctions in primarily Brazil and Argentina. Lavenex et al. (2016) highlight that the adoption of the Residence Agreement responded to a very concrete humanitarian crisis, namely the need to address the high number of irregular migrants, especially in Argentina. The driving force behind the Residence Agreement, thus, was to find a solution to irregular migration, not to pave the way for an internal trade market (Acosta, 2014). In 2002, then, Brazil held the rotating Mercosur presidency. Brazilian President Cardoso wanted to end his final term on a personal mark with a measure to advance regional integration in the social sphere. Brazil therefore proposed a six-month period of migration amnesty for Mercosur nationals who resided elsewhere in the bloc irregularly (Acosta, 2014). Argentina, which already had experience with several regularization procedures, was not persuaded that this plan would bring about a long-term solution, and therefore suggested a counterproposal to establish a permanent rather than temporary mechanism for Mercosur citizens to gain access to regular status (Acosta,
2014). This was the Residence Agreement that was eventually signed, and transformed the South American migration regime.

Furthermore, in 2005, Argentina attempted to extend its own migration program to other Mercosur Member States through the Specialized Forum on Migration. Argentina succeeded in assuming a dominant position in Mercosur on the migration issue, partly due to its willingness to lead on the Residence Agreement – as this was modeled after Argentina’s domestic migration law – and partly because Brazil accepted Argentine leadership on migration (Culpi and Pereira, 2016). According to Margheritis (2015), Brazil did not consider migration as a particular important element to its agenda, and was not suffering from domestic migration-related problems.

What, then, were exactly the interests of Brazil and Argentina? Argentina, first, had an economic interest in less restrictive migration policies. In 2003, Argentina changed its own domestic strict migration policies and deportation practices to a more open migration policy, with a focus on human rights and allowing new asylum seekers to enter under refugee status (Tiralongo, 2015). According to Tiralongo (2015), this change was spurred by a wish to show gratitude to the international community for helping Argentinians who fled the country in the 1970s. At the same time, however, the country was recovering from great economic hardship. It would thus be likely that economic interests – and a need for workers in a return to economic growth – also played a role.

Brazil, then, seems to have had a two-fold interest: on the one hand, it had an ideational interest in open migration policies, and was influenced by economic concerns on the other. As for ideationally driven interests, consider President Cardoso’s personal wish to end his final term with a social measure, but also the fact that the symbolic importance of accepting refugees is important to Brazil due to its large diaspora community: nearly all Brazilians descend from African slaves or immigrants (Mora, 2016). In addition, many of the country’s political and economic elites came to Brazil fleeing persecution (Mora, 2016). In a 2015 speech before the United Nations, then-president Rousseff stated that Brazil is “a country of refugees” that always had an “open relationship” with refugees (Fellet, 2015). Today, diaspora communities play a prominent role in integrating refugees upon arrival. According to Mora (2016), the Syrian population in São Paulo has quadrupled since the beginnings of the Syrian Civil War, and the Syrian diaspora in Brazil has embraced integration efforts for these newly arriving people. In addition to these ideational concerns, there are also signs that the Brazil has an economic interest in opening its doors to migrants. Since the 1980s, Brazil

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30 Between 1998 and 2002, Argentina was in an economic depression in which the peso devaluated by 300 percent and which brought 42 percent of the population below the poverty line (Tiralongo, 2015). By the first half of 2003, after economic reforms by new President Eduardo Duhalde, the economy rebounded (Blustein, 2003).

31 Own translation.
has lacked low-skilled workers, most pressingly in the clothing manufacturing industry in São Paulo (Mora, 2016). The mass amnesties which Brazil has granted to undocumented migrants every ten years the 1980s, some argue, were a response to pressures from Brazilian manufacturers for more cheap labor, which would suggest that labor gaps are a factor taken into account by the government when it acts on migration policies, or, in other words, that the Brazilian government has an economic interest in an open migration policy (Da Silva, 2013; Mora, 2016). Today, Brazil has a shortage of skilled labor in the fields of technology and medicine – taking in migrants could be part of the solution for these shortages (Mora, 2016). Suggestions that economic considerations drive Brazil’s acceptance of refugees are also offered in political discourse (Mora, 2016). In 2015, for example, former President Rousseff said at a G4-meeting that “all refugees who want to come and work, live in peace, help construct our country, have children, live with dignity; we are here with open arms” (Fellet, 2015). Later that year, she reiterated this message when she stated that Brazil would welcome those “expelled from their homeland” who “wish to live and work in Brazil, and to make their contribution towards peace and prosperity “ (Rousseff, 2016).

**Domestic and transnational pressures**

Looking at the role of pressures of non-state domestic and transnational actors within Mercosur, there are a number of things that stand out. First, Mercosur has a sociopolitical program in place since 2005, *Somos Mercosur* (‘We are Mercosur’), aimed to give civil society a larger role in the process of integration by bringing citizens and decisionmakers closer and generating a sense of ownership over the regional project (Santos, 2015:49). Although this program, as it appears from its website, does not specifically address migration or migration policies in its priorities or objectives, the fact that it exists and is active signals that Mercosur does value the participation of civil society in its decision-making (“Somos Mercosur,” n.d.). As for domestic pressures for open migration policies, Ludmilla Culpi says that domestic non-state actors were important in deepening Mercosur’s migration agenda (personal communication, August 2017). For example, in Chile, citizens of Syrian descent requested the government to help Syrian refugees (Tiralongo, 2015). In Brazil, advocacy from NGOs and the Catholic Church has shaped Brazil’s pro-refugee policies (Mora, 2016). A large part of the Brazilian population is Catholic, and the Catholic Church has considerable influence in the country: acting through NGOs or the National Conference of Brazilian Bishops, the Church has effectively lobbied for government action in cases when the government failed to safeguard to human rights of refugees and migrants (Mora, 2016). Examples include the period after the 2010 Haiti earthquake, when the Catholic organization Pastoral Care for Migrants published a report on the conditions in which Haitians awaited refugee status, which
prompted government action after it attracted national press attention; or the amnesties granted every ten years to undocumented migrants due to NGO lobbying efforts (Mora, 2016). According to the Brazilian Federal Police, during the last amnesty in 2009, pressure from the Church has led the government to grant 18,000 amnesty requests providing legal work status to migrants (Da Silva, 2013). The Church is also actively holding the Brazilian government accountable to its commitments: in 2013, Brazil’s Ministry of Justice simplified its refugee visa renewal process, after which Father Parisi, coordinator of the NGO Missão Paz (‘Peace Mission’) which works towards a full acceptance of migrants and refugees, lauded this effort as a “grand gesture of human rights,” adding that “Brazil really has been able to be a worldwide expression of a country that welcomes this massacred population” (Brasil,” 2015). The fact that the Church has maintained this solidary stance with refugees has certainly had an impact on the political discourse (Da Silva, 2013).

Regarding transnational pressures, Brazil works together with 96 civil society organizations, cooperating with the UNHCR, to maintain its refugee system (Tiralongo, 2015). The UNHCR – although not a transnational non-state actor in itself, but rather an intergovernmental organization which other non-state actors lobby – regards Mercosur’s Specialized Migratory Forum “as an important vehicle for progress on the migration agenda in the region” to advocate for refugee protection (UNHCR, 2009).

In Uruguay, however, domestic pressures worked precisely towards less open, more restrictive policies. After the protests by Syrian refugees wanting to leave the country in 2015, public opinion turned against refugees. While Minister of Foreign Affairs Rodolfo Nin Novoa initially rejected criticism by Uruguayans who stated that the nation should not accept any more refugees, and appealed to them to understand the difficulties the Syrian refugees faced, eventually, the progressive efforts of José Mujica’s administration dissolved when his successor Tabaré Vazquez took office in 2015 and suspended the allocation of more Syrian families (Cicchitelli and Valladares, 2016; “Argentina official,” 2015; Rabuffetti, 2015). In Argentina, too, opinion polls showed a widespread support for limiting the country’s migration policies. Migrants from Bolivia, Paraguay, and Peru are associated with drug trafficking and contraband (Romero and Politi, 2017). An Argentinian right-wing congressman even called for building a wall on Argentina’s border with Bolivia (Romero and Politi, 2017). Pablo Cernadas also points to a recent phase of xenophobia in Argentina, in which migrants, for example, are accused of criminality (personal communication, July 2017). Unlike in the Uruguay case, officials in the Macri government, however, assure that they will uphold the country’s openness to migrants, with Argentina’s top immigration official saying that “everyone should remain calm, because Argentina will continue to be a hospitable and open

32 Own translation.
Pablo Cernadas also recognizes that there is a xenophobic rhetoric present in Argentina, but mixed with an idea of protection of migrants (personal communication, July 2017). As he says about this: “[Mercosur] is a region in transition, trying to build something new, something different. […] Of course that does not mean that change has always been going in the same direction or without contradiction” (P. Cernadas, personal communication, July 2017). In spite of anti-immigrant pressures, the government thus sticks to an open course.

**Prestige**

As for the role of prestige, it can be said that this plays an important role for Mercosur, especially regarding migration. According to Pablo Cernadas, “in terms of prestige on the issue of migration, the governments of many South American countries had been building this human rights-centered approach to migration at the national and regional level, but also made an effort to do so on the global level” (personal communication, July 2017). Brazil especially, as little as it is concerned with being perceived as the regional hegemon, cares greatly about safeguarding its international reputation. As noted before, the country’s refugee policies have earned it great international acclaim. Although it cannot be said with certainty that it is this recognition which motivates Brazil to pursue its open migration policies, it can be said that in the last decade, Brazil has definitely made efforts to increase its visibility on the international stage: then-president Luiz Inácio Lula Da Silva regularly made international appearances, Brazil has increased its participation in UN peacekeeping operations, and it is actively pursuing a permanent seat on the UN Security Council (Mora, 2016). These developments suggest that the search for stronger international influence has shaped Brazil’s foreign policy, and international legitimacy could form an important stimulus of the country’s open refugee policy (Mora, 2016).

Mercosur is also a clear example of the occurrence of institutional isomorphism. The Residence Agreement reiterates the International Labour Organization (ILO) Conventions and emulates many of the provisions of the UN Convention on Migrant Workers. The Socio-Labor Declaration and its formation, too, serves not only as an example of the ‘wave’ of protecting migrant rights in different regions throughout the world that came with the global debates surrounding the UN Convention on Migrant Workers, but also as an illustration of institutional isomorphism (Lavenex et al., 2016). Indeed, the Declaration recalls the Member States’ membership of the ILO and their ratification of its principle Conventions, which guarantee the fundamental rights of workers (Doumbia-Hendry and Gravel, 2006). Besides the ILO, according to Lavenex et al. (2016), the Declaration also emulated many of the provisions of the 1990 UN
Convention on Migrant Workers. One participant of the Working Group No. 10 even described its work as “comparable to the UN Convention on Migrant Workers, but offering even more protection” (Lavenex et al., 2016:471). Furthermore, the Santiago Declaration (2004) reiterates the Geneva Convention to “reaffirm the commitments of States to provide and promote international protection for refugees”33 (“Declaración de Santiago,” 2004).

Conclusions for this case and the ones following will be drawn in Chapter Six.

§5.3. CASE II: CARICOM

The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) is a political block of twenty countries of the Caribbean. There are fifteen Member States, and five Associate Members.34 All these states are considered developing countries, and with the exception of Belize, Guyana, and Suriname, all Members and Associate Members are small island states (“CARICOM,” n.d.). The Member States together have a population of over seventeen million (Lee Sam, 2012).

CARICOM was established on July 4, 1973, when the Prime Ministers of Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago signed the Treaty of Chaguaramas, which provided the overarching policy framework for integration matters in CARICOM (Mazza and Sohnen, 2011; “CARICOM,” n.d.). CARICOM was a further reaching agreement of regional integration replacing the 1968 free trade area Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA) (Fuchs and Straubhaar, 2003).

Migratory patterns in the region

Motivated by economic factors, over the last decade, the CARICOM region has seen an increase in intraregional migration (Ratha and Shaw, 2007). Of these intraregional migration flows, the majority consists of low-skilled workers. Under CARICOM’s work permit system which heavily favors skilled workers, this leads to relatively high numbers of undocumented migrants in low-skill categories (Mazza and Sohnen, 2011). Haitians looking for work in the Dominican Republic is the region’s top intraregional migration flow (Mazza and Sohnen, 2011). Furthermore, CARICOM-islands are being used by intraregional migrants as stopover countries in their attempt to gain entry into the United States (Mazza and Sohnen, 2011).

CARICOM migration policies

33 Own translation.
34 In order of accession, the Member States are Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Suriname, and Haiti. The Associate Members are Anguilla, Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, and the Turks and Caicos Islands.
CARICOM’s purposes are summarized in its four main pillars: the promotion of economic integration; the coordination of foreign policy; human and social development; and security (“CARICOM,” n.d.). Its major activities are of economic nature, and include coordinating economic policies, operating as a regional single market for many of its members, and handling regional trade disputes. Despite this clear aim for an integrated and inclusive community, CARICOM’s attitude towards migration specifically is not very pronounced. CARICOM does not have a large number of regionally governed migration policies in place, and even barely mentions migration in its documents at all. It should be noted here, that within the CARICOM region, migration is also mostly at the discretion of member states themselves, mainly in the form of work permit systems. The countries themselves can decide on duration of migration (MacAndrew, 2015). Still, some policy agreements governing migration flows within CARICOM exist, albeit rather implicit and mostly as a part of the economic integration project.

In 2002, the Treaty of Chaguaramas was “revised to allow for the eventual establishment of a single market and a single economy” (“CARICOM,” n.d.). This resulted in the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, which provides the legal basis for the current Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME). As it regulates the free movement of goods, services, capital and skilled workers, the right of establishment, and the implementation of a common external tariff and trade policy, CSME is the center program of CARICOM’s economic integration, and it is therefore unsurprisingly focused on economic objectives (Mazza and Sohnen, 2011). Nevertheless, it is also where CARICOM’s main policy to govern migration flows is located, namely the Single Market and Economy (CSME) Agreement.

CARICOM’s CMSE establishes the conditions for free movement between member states. Free movement here means the right for a qualified CARICOM national to live and work in any of the CARICOM states that participate in the CMSE, without the need for a work permit (UN, 2006). All member states have enacted this chapter in their domestic legislation. Initially, free movement was restricted to only those with university degrees, but eligibility was later widened to include nine more categories of workers, including artists, teachers, nurses, and holders of associate degrees. Non-wage earners or temporary service suppliers who engage in services in other member states may also move freely, as long as they are not seeking permanent employment (MacLaren, 2008). National treatment is guaranteed and CARICOM nationals in these categories are exempt from having to apply for work permits, although wage earners must apply for a skills certificate from their Ministry of Foreign Affairs before leaving their country (MacLaren, 2008). Whereas in the past, CARICOM nationals had to secure work before they could apply for a work permit, now
workers can spontaneously move to other Member States to look for jobs with a certificate alone (MacLaren, 2008).

So, it can be said that CARICOM has few policies governing migration in place, and barely references migration in its documents at all, neither as a good or bad thing. The freedom of movement and establishment is only referred to in the context of labor and the economy, most importantly in the Single Market and Economy Agreement. Unlike in the Mercosur case, where the social, economic, and cultural value that migrants can offer to a region is explicitly mentioned, in CARICOM, migrants are only addressed as a work force. The rights and position of third-country migrants from outside of the region are not even mentioned, while Table 4.3 has demonstrated that this group constitutes approximately a third of all international migrants in the region. This is a significant share, but apparently, they are not an matter or problem that needs to be addressed.

Regional identity and migration

Similar to the Mercosur case, question marks can be placed around the strength of CARICOM’s regional identity. Although the CARICOM mission statement itself includes the affirmation of the collective identity as its first point, and unity and togetherness as its top core value (“CARICOM,” n.d.), this does not come to the fore in practice. According to Byron (2014), national governments within CARICOM focus more on conserving a narrowly defined sense of national sovereignty, rather than on working towards a strong regional community—a conclusion also reached by Thorburn (2015) and Boxill (1993). How does this affect the regional identity concerning migration?

As for the nature of CARICOM’s regional identity, this is one focused heavily on social values. CARICOM’s core values include unity, equity, people-centeredness, and a respect for human rights, and CARICOM’s vision expresses the aim for a Caribbean Community that is not only a competitive force in the global arena, driven by knowledge, innovation, and productivity, but also a community that is integrated and inclusive, where every citizen is secure and has the opportunity to realize his or her potential with guaranteed human rights and social justice (“CARICOM,” n.d.).

CARICOM’s attitude towards migrants and migration is, however, less clearly articulated. We have already seen that CARICOM has few policies specifically targeting migration in place—

35 Thorburn (2015) argues that this is the case either because regionalism is not perceived as a viable symbol of identity, as is the case in Jamaica; or because there are other strong ethnocentric identities that reject the regional identity, for example the “Indocentric” sentiments in Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago, which reject what is perceived as an Afro- or Creole-centric regional identity (p. 78).
only the CSME-agreement governing the free movement of labor migrants within the region. The CARICOM website, also, presents and explains the organization’s nineteen areas of work, but migration or migrants are not one of them, and are even hardly mentioned within the other categories.

At least, CARICOM is open towards its own intraregional labor migrants: article 36 of the Treaty of Chaguaramas, for example, states that “each Member State agrees as far as practicable to extend to persons belonging to other Member States preferential treatment over persons belonging to States outside the Common Market with regard to the provision of services” (Treaty of Chaguaramas, 1973). In addition, the 2001 Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas has the principle of non-discrimination in a separate section, among the first pages. This was apparently a new issue to pay attention to, because discrimination on the grounds of nationality was not mentioned in the 1971 version of the Treaty.

As for CARICOM’s attitude towards extra-regional migrants, the only thing that can be said about it is that the fact that they are not explicitly mentioned in CARICOM’s treaties and declarations suggests that they are not made into an issue that needs special policies. However, this is not enough to say that CARICOM’s regional identity towards migrants is open – there are, after all, still no clear articulations of welcoming migration policies. At the most, therefore, it can be said at this point that CARICOM’s regional identity is considered as not restrictive.

Interest regional hegemon

There is no regional hegemon within CARICOM. Although Guyana has a somewhat special role within the organization, as its secretariat headquarters are located there and Guyana’s prime minister is CARICOM’s chairperson, the country does not appear to take on any leading role in the organization. Neither, however, do other member states. This variable, therefore, is not present in CARICOM.

Domestic and transnational pressures

As for domestic and transnational pressures within CARICOM, these – in general, not only with regards to migration policies – do not play a significant role. Although CARICOM has expressed commitment to strengthening the involvement of non-state actors in its policy making since the early 1990s, thus far, the formal ways in which these actors can participate and express their views remain limited, both in terms of the frequency and consequences of such meetings, as well as the variety of non-state actors involved (Van Roozendaal, 2007:141). The reasons for this lack of participation of non-state actors include low funds and capacity (on the part of the state as
well as the non-state actors), a lack of political will, little public understanding of the nature of CARICOM, and CARICOM’s emphasis on sovereignty (Van Roozendaal, 2007:135). It is, thus, not only the case that non-state actors within CARICOM have difficulty to access the regional decision-making processes, but also that there is little mobilization in favor of migration policies – or other issues for that matter – from these actors. Miloushka Racamy, too, says that domestic or transnational non-state actors do not play any significant role within CARICOM and its migration policies (personal communication, July 2017).

**Prestige**

There are no signs that CARICOM makes an effort to defend its reputation. The organization’s activities mostly concern the regional sphere, and it is not an active player on the international stage. Based on internal documents that Miloushka Racamy has seen, she believes that CARICOM does care about safeguarding its prestige, although she also argues that the organization does not act towards this goal, both because the organization does not have the means to do so and because its priorities lay elsewhere (personal communication, July 2017).

§5.4. CASE III: SICA

The Central American Integration System (SICA, *Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana*) is the institutional framework for the political, social, and economic regional integration of Central America (Espach and Haering, 2012). Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama are its founding members. Belize and the Dominican Republic joined as full members in 2013 (“SICA,” n.d.).

In 1951, with the Charter of San Salvador, the Organization of Central American States (*Organización de Estados Centro-Americanos*, ODECA) was founded. Its objectives and institutional setting emulated those of the UN and the Organization of American States (Papageorgiou, 2011). Despite its ambitious objectives, among them the elimination of all barriers dividing the member states, ODECA remained inactive for most of its continuation (Papageorgiou, 2011). In the early 1990s, with the return of democracy and the end of political tensions, Central America made a significant shift towards economic openness (Robert, 2007). The XI Summit Meeting of Central American Presidents in 1990 gave rise to the adoption of a plan to reactivate economic integration by amending the Charter of ODECA. This reformation of the Charter of ODECA established SICA: a legal and institutional structure for regional integration by means of the Tegucigalpa Protocol (Robert, 2007). SICA formally came into operation on February 1, 1993 (“SICA,” n.d.).
Under the Tegucigalpa Protocol, SICA is affiliated with the UN. It also maintains its offices at the UN Headquarters.

**Migratory patterns in the region**

Migratory patterns in the SICA region are mostly labor migrants moving back and forth intraregionally. El Salvador has seen increased flows of Nicaraguan and Honduran workers, while Guatemalan officials note an influx from El Salvador (Mazza and Sohnen, 2011; Cantor, 2015). Mexicans from the state of Chiapas are moving to the Yucatan for work, with Guatemalans replacing them (Cantor, 2015; Mazza and Sohnen, 2011). Furthermore, the whole of Central America, together with Mexico, sees relatively high levels of irregular intraregional migration, in the strict sense that many workers can only work for a short period of time (Mazza and Sohnen, 2011). These high levels of temporary travel make border control in the region difficult.

In addition, high levels of crime play a major role, and directly affect the migration situation in these countries. The Northern Triangle of Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, has one of the highest homicide rates in the world (Cantor, 2015). These levels of organized crime are a push-factor as well as a facilitating agent behind migration and displacement patterns (Cantor, 2015).

**SICA migration policies**

Central America is managing most of its migration flows through bilateral agreements or national initiatives, for example Costa Rica’s efforts to regularize Nicaraguan workers (Mazza and Sohnen, 2011). Nevertheless, there is one important regional policy regarding migration, and it belongs to SICA. This is the Central America-4 Border Control Agreement (CA-4) between Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, which regulates the free movement of persons within this sub-regional group (Mazza and Sohnen, 2011). The CA-4 Agreement was established with the aim that the elimination of migratory controls at the border posts of the CA-4 region, as stated by SICA’s Secretary General Aníbal Quiñónez, “will give way to free movement of people in the region and generate a greater Central American identity among its inhabitants”36 (“Discurso,” 2006). The Agreement was signed in June 2006, and eliminates many of the migration and customs controls between Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, thus allowing nationals to move throughout the territories without a passport – only an identification document is required (IBP, 2013; Alba and Castillo, 2012). Extra-regional migrants who enter one of the signatory countries can also travel to other signatory states by land (but not by air) without having to obtain additional permits or to undergo checks at border checkpoints. Note the inclusion of these third-

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36 Own translation.
country migrants. They are explicitly included in the migration policies, and largely equated with all other (intraregional) migrants.

Regional identity and migration

The 1951 Charter of San Salvador, which established SICA’s predecessor ODECA, already spoke of the necessity “to remove the artificial barriers that separate the Central American peoples” (Charter of San Salvador, 1951). SICA, then, was designed taking into account past attempts for regional unification, but also lessons learned from a history of political crisis, belligerent conflict, and dictatorial rule in Central America (“SICA,” n.d.). The aim was to transform the area into a region of peace, liberty, democracy, and development, based firmly on the respect, tutelage, and promotion of human rights (“SICA,” n.d.). SICA set wider goals for integration than ODECA, linking the traditional system of intergovernmental cooperation with a more advanced ‘Community’ legal order (Papageorgiou, 2011).

The recognition of a Central American identity is actually among SICA’s founding principles. The Tegucigalpa Declaration speaks of “taking into account […] the existence of a Central American identity” (“Tegucigalpa Declaration,” 1991), and although it is not further specified what exactly this identity holds, from the rest of SICA’s official documents (“SICA,” n.d.; Charter of San Salvador, 1951), it can be concluded that it is an identity based on solidarity, openness, and inclusion which is at the basis of SICA.

The Tegucigalpa Protocol states that “the fundamental objective of the Central American Integration System is to bring about the integration of Central America as a region of peace, freedom, democracy and development” (“Protocolo,” 1991). The protocol also defines a number of new goals for member states, including an unconditional respect of human rights, the elimination of social inequalities and the creation of a regional system for prosperity and economic and social justice (“Protocolo,” 1991).

Regarding the regional identity towards migrants, in 2007, SICA’s Secretary General Aníbal Quiñónez characterized migration for SICA as a “significant issue of its institutional tasks; and personally, because it is a human issue of which all Central Americans have to be aware in order to try to find the best conditions for our migrants” (“Speech,” 2007). Moreover, he stated:

The measures recently adopted in Central America to facilitate the transit of persons through our internal borders are only one aspect of the general freedom of transit that we must pursue in all orders of life in Central America. In other words, we must start thinking and feeling as one single country, one single territory under the same sky, and therefore, governed by the same juridical
system that allows us to stay or move in our land as if we were nationals of the same country. (“Speech,” 2007)

From its founding documents and statements from its officials, it thus becomes clear that SICA harbors a regional identity that is open towards migrants.

**Interest regional hegemon**

Within SICA, the interests of the regional hegemon do not play a significant role. Close to bigger powers Mexico and the United States, none of the SICA member states stand out in their region. Guatemala has the largest economy of the SICA region and the largest population by far (World Bank, 2017), but does not play a determinative, leading role within SICA, but nor do the other member states.

**Domestic and transnational pressures**

Domestic pressures for a non-securitized migration regime are very much present in the SICA region. In 2015, a group of 39 Central American civil society groups – ranging from migrant justice, faith-based, indigenous, labor, women’s, and environmental organizations – co-signed a letter calling on the presidents of the United States, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, and Mexico, in order to express concerns about the Plan of the Alliance for Prosperity of the Northern Triangle. In their letter, the group of civil society organizations warns against the criminalization of migrants, “which heightens the grave risk to their lives, physical safety and human dignity,” and calls on the governments of the region “to initiate a thorough process of revising migration policy that is currently based on a security framework, to one based on human rights” (“Civil Society Organizations,” 2015).

In addition to these domestic pressures, transnational non-state actors also play a role with regards to migration policies in the SICA region. In 2016, the OAS and UNHCR – although no transnational non-state actors by themselves, but places for those actors to lobby – called for a high-level roundtable during the 71st Session of the U.N. General Assembly, in order to address the humanitarian needs of refugees and migrants in Central America’s Northern Triangle (“A Call to Action,” 2016). Furthermore, SICA receives financial support from the European Commission. Strikingly enough, while SICA itself does not connect migration to security in any of its official

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37 The Plan of the Alliance for Prosperity of the Northern Triangle, announced in November 2014, is a five-year joint regional plan created and implemented by the United States, Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, in response to the large flows of migrants leaving for the United States (Iesue, 2018). The Plan is not further addressed in this research because it primarily addresses outgoing migration from Latin America.
documents or statements, the EC does so in its evaluation report on EU cooperation with Central America, grouping migration together with regional security, police, and counter-terrorism efforts ("Evaluation," 2015). While this could certainly be seen as a demonstration of the securitization of the EU’s migration regime, it is not really a pressure towards a securitized SICA-migration regime, too: the EC-program of financial support for SICA is primarily concerned with improvements of customs and border controls (“Evaluation,” 2015).

Prestige

Finally, while the importance SICA attaches to safeguarding its prestige is not as clear as in Mercosur, it can be said that institutional isomorphism occurs in SICA. SICA’s predecessor ODECA emulated the objectives and institutional setting of the UN and OAS, and SICA itself is officially affiliated with the United Nations. Furthermore, the governance system of SICA draws a lot from the European Union’s institutional mechanism, for example, its Parliament, Court of Justice, Executive Committee, Council of Ministers, and a General Secretariat (Papageorgiou, 2011). Besides this isomorphism in institutional design, the EU – or actually the increasing role of the European Community – also contributed to the realization that the region’s structural (economic) problems ought to be combated with regional coordination rather than national measures (Papageorgiou, 2011).

§5.5. Supposition

The purpose of this thesis is to explain the apparent non-securitization of Latin American migration policies. With the development and contents of the migration policies of three Latin American regional organizations now explicated, we can turn to the supposition to check whether the Latin American migration regime is indeed, as it appears, non-securitized:

If, in a region, securitizing actors do not present migration as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and therefore justifying extraordinary actions, and/or if such a securitizing claim is not accepted as such by the audience, then migration is not securitized.

Chapter Three described how this supposition can be verified in a two-step process: assessing first, whether the securitizing actors present migration as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and therefore justifying extraordinary actions; and second, if that is indeed the case, if the securitizing claim is accepted as such by the audience.
Looking at the Latin American migration regime and its policies, it can be said that overall, securitizing actors do not present migration as an existential threat. Quite the contrary, migration is seen as a valuable cultural, economic, and societal asset – exemplified most clearly in Mercosur’s Declaration of Santiago on Migration Principles. Furthermore, migration policies are primarily linked to the protection of human- and labor rights and the liberalization of economic mobility, not to security, protection and/or restriction. Extra-regional migrants are often not explicitly mentioned – they are not ‘others’ who are made into a policy issue. And if they are, their rights are largely equated with those of intraregional migrants.

This does not mean that there were never any moves towards more closed, restrictive migration policies. Venezuela, for example, has been somewhat ignoring the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees and has adopted restrictive policies in response to domestic political pressures to downplay the severity of the refugee situation. But this does not quite qualify as a securitization move as Buzan et al. (1998) define it: migration is not seen as a threat to the Latin American collective identity, but such restrictive responses are rather explained by the Venezuelan government’s relations with Colombian insurgent groups.

Thus, migration in Latin America is not presented by securitizing actors as an existential threat to the collective identity of Latin America, and therefore also does not require emergency measures or justifies extraordinary actions. The second step, assessing whether the audience – defined here as the population of Latin America – accepts the securitizing claims, is therefore not necessary consider. After all, without a securitizing move in the first place, securitization cannot occur anymore. The supposition is already verified.

Conclusion

This chapter’s overview of Latin America’s migration policies and introduction of the three cases has confirmed the supposition that, indeed, the Latin American regional migration regime is not securitized. Why this is the case – the ultimate question this thesis asks – will be explained in the following, final chapter, in testing the hypotheses and drawing conclusions from the case studies.
CHAPTER VI: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION

Introduction

This chapter will finally return to the research question presented in Chapter One: given both the worldwide trend of securitizing migration policies and the instable borders and high levels of crime, violence, and drug trafficking in Latin America, what explains the non-securitization of migration policies in the Latin American migration regime?

The following sections will answer this question in two parts: first, the implicit question how the Latin American migration regime can be characterized when it is not securitized; and second, why this is the case, which will be explained in a case-by-case presentation of the findings of the empirical analysis. The section thereafter will look back on this research in terms of its generalizability and limitations, after which several suggestions for further research will be discussed. Finally, this chapter, and with that the thesis itself, will end on some final remarks looking back on this project.

§6.1: Answering research question: part one

The verification of the supposition demonstrated that indeed, as it appeared, the Latin American migration regime is not securitized. Securitizing actors in the region do not present migration as an existential threat to the Latin American identity, and hence do not argue for any existential emergency measures or extraordinary actions. The precise explanations and motivations for the non-securitization of migration policies in each of the three cases studied vary greatly: they range from economic motivations, ideational interests, human rights concerns, the value attached to prestige – indeed, all the different variables and the various ways in which they can be realized. The policies have one thing in common, however: they are not shaped by a fear for a threat to the regional identity. It is not that the regional identity is non-existent or not important, which could also have been the case. Quite the contrary: the value of regional identity is very much emphasized throughout various official documents and statements of the regional organizations. Such a lack of fear for a threat to the regional identity has led to certain policies: ones that are rooted in a respect for human rights and freedom of mobility within the economic integration project.

So, when we can conclude that the Latin American migration regime is not securitized, what is it then? The different types of migration regimes as identified by Lavenex et al. (2016), presented in Table 2.1, can provide some insight here, and break non-securitization further down into two additional regime types. Table 6.1 applies that typology to the three different cases.
Table 6.1: The types of regional migration regimes for Mercosur, CARICOM, and SICA.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic approach</th>
<th>Mercosur</th>
<th>CARICOM</th>
<th>SICA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All citizens, full labor market access</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All citizens, unlimited stay</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All citizens, labor market access</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All citizens, limited stay</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selected workers, selected labor market access</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selected workers, limited stay</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitated entry procedures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No labor market access</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rights-based approach</th>
<th>Mercosur</th>
<th>CARICOM</th>
<th>SICA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Harmonization exceeding the UNCMW</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harmonization based on the UNCMW</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common rules on specific social/economic rights for workers</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exchange of best practices on migrant rights protection</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security-based approach</th>
<th>Mercosur</th>
<th>CARICOM</th>
<th>SICA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Harmonized entry requirements</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint external border management</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Exchange of liaison officers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Readmission</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common rules on entry requirements and border management</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational cooperation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common rules on entry requirements and border management</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exchange of best practices on immigration control system</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Lavenex et al., 2016:460.

The colors represent the four-value scale of the strength of the regional migration regime as proposed by Lavenex et al. (2016): green for ‘very strong,’ yellow for ‘strong,’ orange for ‘partial’ and red for ‘weak.’

By checking off adopted policies in each of the three cases studied, Table 6.1 is a visualization of what the nature is of the migration regime of each of the regional organizations. It shows that none of the three regimes can be characterized as securitized: the policies and programs in that column are only of the ‘partial’-category. In addition, these policies are not securitized in the Buzan et al. (1998) sense: rather, they are concerned with ‘regular’ security measures, and are not shaped by a fear for the regional identity. The other two types of regional migration regimes, then, come forward to a stronger extent. The Mercosur regime can be seen as a mix between economic mobility- and human-rights based: it scores high in both these two dimensions. CARICOM, with little migration policies in place, which are limited to free mobility for intraregional labor migrants, scores highest in the liberalization/mobility-dimension of the Lavenex-scale. SICA, finally, with freer mobility policies than CARICOM, has policies in place that are located higher in the liberalization/mobility dimension.
§6.2: Answering research question: part two

With the conclusion that the Latin American migration regimes are not securitized, but rather based on (economic) mobility and/or human rights, the first part of the research question has been answered. It goes a step further, however, and asks why this is the case. In order to explain this non-securitization, then, three cases were analyzed. As an answer to the research question, the section below presents the findings of these cases and applies the hybrid institutionalist model to them (with only the found pathways shown).

**CASE I: MERCOSUR**

Mercosur is a regional migration regime that is a mix between human rights- and economic (mobility)-based, as a result of four factors, as by Figure 6.1. It has a regional identity that is open towards migrants, which is demonstrated most clearly in the recognition of the cultural, economic, and societal value that migration has for the region, and the fact that the discourse of an emphasis on human rights for migrants extends to third-country nationals, too. With such an open regional identity, restrictive migration policies are not fitting.

Secondly, the interest of the regional hegemon in Mercosur’s migration policies is both material and ideational. Argentina had a material interest in open migration policies, whereas Brazil was motivated by ideational as well as material considerations. These hegemonic aims to control wealth and resources as well as to spread certain values, led Mercosur to respond in shaping its migration policies to fit a regional migration regime that is both economic (mobility)- as well as human rights-based.

Regarding the third variable, within Mercosur, both domestic and transnational human rights-driven pressures towards an open migration policy are visible. In hegemon Brazil, the Catholic Church and NGOs play an influential role in this. As for transnational pressures, there is a significant influence of the UNHCR, which lobbies in Mercosur’s Specialized Forum on Migration to advocate for refugee protection. Mercosur responds to these ‘pincers’ by adapting its migration policies, not only because the pressures are quite strong, but also because Mercosur has expressed an aim to give civil society a role in the process of integration, for example in establishing the Somos Mercosur-program. Ignoring pressures from non-state actors mobilizing for a certain kind of migration regime would then be an inappropriate course of action.

Finally, within Mercosur, especially hegemon Brazil has made clear that it cares greatly about safeguarding its prestige. Institutional isomorphism is also recognizable in Mercosur: it occurs in the Residence Agreement and the Socio-Labor Declaration. This helps explain
Mercosur’s regional migration regime-type: migration policies that are focused on human rights are beneficial to Mercosur’s reputation on the international stage.

CASE II: CARICOM

The CARICOM case is a difficult one. As the Latin American sub-region with the most international migrants (see Table 4.1), it is somewhat surprising that its regional migration regime is not more pronounced, considering also CARICOM’s clear aim for an integrated and inclusive community. This might be partly explained, however, by the fact that within CARICOM, migration policies are mostly at the discretion of member states individually. The empirical analysis has demonstrated that there is no regional hegemon in the CARICOM region, nor are there significant attempts by non-state actors to mobilize in favor of the institutionalization of certain migration policies – while as an organization of small, rather isolated, mostly island-states, economy-driven pressures for an economic (mobility)-based regional migration regime would not have been surprising. Neither are there expressions of CARICOM attempting to safeguard its prestige through institutional isomorphism. It is only in the regional identity-variable that expressions of the region’s attitude towards migrants can be recognized, specifically in the CSME-agreement (and its lack of attention for third-country migrants) and the founding Treaty of Chaguaramas. Because these documents express an openness towards (at least) intraregional labor migrants, I consider CARICOM’s regional identity as not restrictive. Furthermore, because CARICOM’s migration policies are hence mostly concerned with free movement within the economic integration project,
the regional migration regime-type can be characterized as economic (mobility)-based, rather than centered on human rights. But, this connection is thus not very strong, and the fact that CARICOM’s regional identity is rather weak, with nationalism prevailing over regionalism, can be added to that. Due to this weak link, but because the CARICOM migration regime is not human rights- or security based either, the connecting lines in Figure 6.2 are dotted.

Figure 6.2: The hybrid institutionalist model for CARICOM

**CASE III: SICA**

SICA is a human rights-based regional migration regime, because of three factors. First, its open regional identity, at least towards migrants within the region, demonstrated in the organization’s rhetoric and free movement policies which largely equate intra- and extra-regional migrants. Again, with such an open regional identity, restrictive migration policies would not be appropriate.

Furthermore, domestic and transnational human rights-driven domestic and transnational pressures are present within SICA, and have called for a regional migration policy based on human rights. With a large and diverse group of civil society organizations and intergovernmental organizations within the region mobilizing against the criminalization of migration, the pressure of these pincers was strong enough for SICA to adapt its migration policies accordingly.

As for the final variable, it can be said that institutional isomorphism occurs in SICA’s governance system. SICA is furthermore strongly affiliated with the UN and receives financial support from the European Commission. It is therefore not unsurprising for SICA to attempt to establish a good reputation in institutionalizing human rights-based migration policies.

As a side note: the SICA-case demonstrates that the Lavenex et al. (2016)-scale identifying different regional migration regimes says little by itself. Table 6.1 would suggest that SICA is an economic (mobility)-based regional migration regime, but taking a closer look at the organization’s migration policies made clear that they human rights-based. Only checking off policies at first sight would thus have provided a skewed image. Rather, we need to look further inside migration policies, to their contents and nature, to be able to assess the type of regional migration regime.
With these case-by-case findings, we can now return to the hypotheses. Table 6.2 shows the results of the empirical analysis for the hypotheses, in which the color green means verified and white signifies that the hypothesis for that case was not present. If the hypothesis were not true, the color red would be used.

Table 6.2: Testing the hypotheses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case → Hypothesis ↓</th>
<th>Mercosur</th>
<th>CARICOM</th>
<th>SICA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H1a: If the regional identity of the regional organization is open, then the regional migration regime is likely to be either economic (mobility)- or human rights-based.</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td></td>
<td>Green</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H1b: If the regional identity of the regional organization is restrictive, then the regional migration regime is likely to be securitized.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Green</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H2a: If the regional hegemon has a geopolitical interest in the regional organization’s migration policies, then the regional migration regime is likely to be securitized.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Green</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H2b: If the regional hegemon has a material interest in the regional organization’s migration policies, then the regional migration regime is likely to be economic (mobility)-based.</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H2c: If the regional hegemon has an ideational interest in the regional organization’s migration policies, then the regional migration regime is likely to be human rights- or security-based.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Green</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H3a: If domestic and transnational pressures in the regional organization are economy-driven, then the regional migration regime is likely to be economic (mobility)-based.</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H3b: If domestic and transnational pressures in the regional organization are human rights-driven, then the regional migration regime is likely to be human rights-based.</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
H3c: If domestic and transnational pressures in the regional organization are national identity-driven, then the regional migration regime is likely to be either human rights- or security-based.

H4: If the safeguarding of prestige plays a role in the regional organization, and this occurs through institutional isomorphism, then the regional migration regime is likely to be human rights-based.

For the hypotheses that were not found in the empirical analysis, further research is necessary in order to confirm and/or eliminate them. Suggestions on how to begin this undertaking are discussed below. For now, regarding the green squares, comparing the three cases can further shed light on the different factors that play a role in (non-)securitization:

H1a: If the regional identity of the regional organization is open, then the regional migration regime is likely to be either economic (mobility)- or human rights-based.

This hypothesis is confirmed in all cases under investigation. While the exact motivations for an open regional identity are rooted in different explanations across the cases (for example, the ‘relaunch’ of Mercosur which came to frame the free movement of labor as a socio-political issue instead of a purely economic one), and, in addition, there are still two possibilities regarding the type of regional migration regime, the outcome is still the same in the sense that an open regional identity leads to a non-securitized regional migration regime. Also, the fact that this hypothesis is present in all cases proves the relevance of the regional identity on the behavior of a regional organization. Indeed, as Keck and Sikkink (1998) argued, identities, norms, and interests are mutually constitutive: regional identity is not a one-way street, it has an effect on policies. It does not only shape how the regional organization perceives itself, but also how it is appropriate for it to act, and hence its policies.

H2b: If the regional hegemon has a material interest in the regional organization’s migration policies, then the regional migration regime is likely to be economic (mobility)-based.

H2c: If the regional hegemon has an ideational interest in the regional organization’s migration policies, then the regional migration regime is likely to be either human rights- or security-based.

The fact that the regional hegemon plays a role in Mercosur but not in SICA or CARICOM can be explained simply by the fact that there are no regional hegemons taking the lead in the latter two sub-regions. After all, Brazil and Argentina are not only the regional hegemons within
Mercosur, but also in Latin America as a whole, and hereby restrict the ability of other countries to have their interests in certain migration policies shape their regional organization’s migration regime.

H3b: If domestic and transnational pressures in the regional organization are human rights-driven, then the regional migration regime is likely to be human rights-based.

In Mercosur and SICA, human rights-driven domestic and transnational pressures were part of the forces to lead to a human rights-based regional migration regime, but this is not the case in CARICOM. It does not seem to be so that CARICOM simply does not respond to non-state pressures; that it does not feel the pincers or that the only explanation is that non-state actors are not provided access to the political process, but rather that the mobilization for certain migration policies is not present. It appears that the difference lies in the salience of the issue. In Mercosur, severe political crises (among which the armed conflict in Colombia), in addition to the fact that the region includes Latin America’s richest countries, all lead to more (labor) migrants. In the SICA region, too, high levels of crime in the Northern Triangle push migration numbers upwards. Within CARICOM, despite it being the Latin American sub-region with the highest relative number of international migrants, this is not the case: migration exists, but it is less urgent; less of a priority for non-state actors to mobilize for.

H4: If the safeguarding of prestige plays a role in the regional organization, and this occurs through institutional isomorphism, then the regional migration regime is likely to be human rights-based.

Safeguarding prestige and institutional isomorphism play a role in Mercosur and SICA, but both are not recognizable in CARICOM. A possible explanation is that CARICOM and its (island) member states play too small of a role within the region and are too isolated for its reputation on the world stage to be of importance.

To answer the research question, then, it can be concluded that the explanations for the non-securitization of the Latin American migration regime can be found both in the nature of the policies of that regime, as well as in the region’s identity at large, specifically in the four variables. The nature of migration policies indicates the type of regional migration regime (human rights-, (economic) mobility- or security-based), whereas the variables then explain why these policies constitute an appropriate course of action. These variables are not necessary nor sufficient by
themselves, but rather form a repertoire of different stimuli, which can make certain ways of institutionalizing migration policies appropriate. Which variables exactly are present, then, depends on the salience of migration within the region, and the position and power of the regional organization relative to other regional organizations, as well as the world. While no variables are necessary nor sufficient, the presence of more pathways does suggest a stronger regional migration regime.

Are any changes to the model in place, then? As it did not turn out that any of the pre-conceived variables did not occur in any of the cases, no variables need to be taken out of the model (yet). It could be considered, however, to add one. The strength of the regional identity, could be added to the first variable. Including this variable would enable taking into account the possibility of a regional identity being open, yet due to its weakness having little power to affect the regional migration regime and hence, having a securitized migration regime after all. Such a case did not occur in this study, but is imaginable.

In addition to these implications for the hybrid institutionalist model, a number of other conclusions can be drawn from the case studies. A first thing to be noted is that (although there are significant differences between individual countries as well as between sub-regions) implementation of these non-securitized migration policies in Latin America is difficult to say the least. This could be said to be problematic for the argument made here: with patchy, weak implementation, the non-securitization of the Latin American migration regime could arguably be set aside as ‘cheap talk’ and hence, not really substantial. However, the problems of implementation in Latin America do not seem to be a means to delay opening the doors to migrants due to what is actually a fear for migration. Rather, it comes out of some degree of incapability. This also shows that there is no willful decoupling. Consider, for example, the current situation in Colombia, a country which due to domestic problems of large amounts of internally displaced people has so far lacked the capacity to take in more than a hundred Syrian refugees (Kurczy and Bons, n.d.). In addition, the continuous emphasizing of the value and social, economic, and political contributions of migrants not only adds a sense of sincerity to the Latin American view on migration, but it is also a step further than would be absolutely necessary for ‘cheap talk,’ only in order to look good in front of the international community. If that were the case, stating that migrants are welcome would also satisfy. Therefore, while a further study into the precise extents of implementation of the migration policies would be necessary to be able to say more about this with more certainty, I would argue that the problematic implementation of the Latin American migration policies does not weaken the argument made here.
One potential critique of the argument presented here is whether it would still hold in the same way when numbers of migrants similar to, for example, the EU in the current refugee crisis, would arrive in Latin America. After all, the number of migrants could affect whether they are seen as a threat to the identity when a population fears to be outnumbered. In other words, it could be argued that the non-securitization of the Latin American migration regime is only due to the small migratory flows to the region. Indeed, the empirical analysis of the case studies has shown that the amounts of extra-regional migrants who arrive in Latin America are relatively low, especially compared to the (very securitized) European Union and United States. However, I would say first, that the magnitude of migratory flows or their relative share to the population is not the point here.

Rather, the bottom line is the way migration is perceived, namely whether this is as a threat to the regional identity, and how migration policies respond to this, not whether the level of migration by itself is high or low. Secondly, the relatively low amount of extra-regional migrants in Latin America does not weaken the argument presented here because the hybrid institutionalist model could also explain a possible shift to securitization driven by this reason. An increase in extra-regional migrants – or any other stimulus that might prompt a shift to securitization, for that matter – could still fit into the argument. The point of this research, after all, was not to prove that the Latin American migration regime is not securitized and that this is a permanent, irreversible situation, but rather to explain why this is the case. This then does not rule out a potential future move to securitization, for example due to an increase in the amount of extra-regional migrants, a fear of being outnumbered among the population, domestic pressures mobilizing for more restrictions and hence, changing migration policies. The argument thus provides for changes within the variables – such as in the amount of migrants – and hence a possible shift to or from non-securitization.

A third observation is that in the instances that there were moves towards a securitization of migration, these were coming from the public rather than from political leaders or expressions in official documents. What does this mean? First, it proves the relevance of the third variable, regarding the influence of domestic pressures. Secondly, returning to Buzan et al. (1998), there appears to occur a kind of bottom-up securitizing move which Buzan et al. (1998) do not seem to consider. Their explanation of a securitizing actor as someone in a legitimate, powerful position – and the examples of political leaders, bureaucracies, governments, lobbyists, or pressure groups as common securitizing actors (Buzan et al., 1998:40) – does not exactly suggest that this can also be the public. Nevertheless, in the cases studied in this research, it appears that the securitizing actor and audience – at least compared to how Buzan et al. (1998) appear to see their relationship – sometimes switch places. When securitizing moves come from the public rather than political
leaders or official documents, public opinion functions as the securitizing actor, and the leaders then represent the audience. Still, in line with Buzan et al. (1998), the success of the securitizing move depends on the audience accepting it or not. Indeed, as by the case studies, this is not always the case. In Uruguay, for example, a securitizing move by the public was successful: when public opinion turned against refugees, despite initial attempts by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to maintain the country’s progressive refugee policies, it resulted in a policy change: the allocation of Syrian families was suspended. In Argentina, however, the public's calls to limit the country’s migration policies in 2017, although acknowledged by the government, did not lead to a response in policy – in other words, the securitization move was not accepted by the audience. A possible explanations for these differences can be found in the shape of the political system. After all, in the case of an authoritarian regime as the audience, for example, it would be less likely that it accepts a securitizing move coming from the public, whereas a democratic government, or a very unstable one, would be more likely to listen to its population, accept the securitizing claims and hence adopt appropriate policies in response.

Finally, one suggestion that emerges from these findings is that a country opening its doors for refugees and extending fast-track, humanitarian visas to refugees, like Brazil, for example, has done, could very well be seen as an extraordinary, emergency measure in the face of a refugee crisis. How does such an instance of non-securitization line up with securitization theory? After all, the defining element of securitization, and what distinguishes securitization from politicization, are precisely those emergency measures and extraordinary actions (Buzan et al., 1998). How to distinguish, then, between securitization of migration policies on the one hand, and emergency, but non-securitized, migration measures (such as in Brazil) on the other? I would argue that there are two ways to locate non-securitization in Buzan et al.'s (1998) securitization theory, and that this depends on the nature of the migration policies.

First, when a non-securitized migration regime has institutionalized policies that can be classified as extraordinary, such as in the Brazil case, they can be seen as a new ‘level,’ next to securitization. The image of the spectrum of security of Buzan et al. (1998) is useful to refer back to here: these cases of non-securitization go beyond ordinary political action, and hence past the politicized level, and would therefore be added as a separate ‘stage’ – as demonstrated in Figure 6.4. This argument not exclusive to human rights-based policies and could also apply to economic mobility-based migration policies – as these can also be extraordinary, emergency measures – although I would expect that a human rights-based regional migration regime is more likely to resort to the justification of emergency measures than a migration regime based on economic mobility.
Second, when there are no emergency measures, non-securitized migration policies can also be grouped under the politicized ‘stage’ – as demonstrated in Figure 6.4. After all, migration policies can very well be part of the ‘regular’ public debate and public policy, and do not always involve extraordinary measures. Hence, they would ‘just’ be politicized. Note that security-related policies could also be located here: just like we established before that security-focused policies do not necessarily constitute a securitized migration regime – see Table 2.1. and its explanation – depending on the contents and nature of the policies, security-related migration policies could still be part of ‘just’ the politicized level.

Both the fact that the politicized-part can be further broken down, and that two types of regional migration regimes can be added to the spectrum, would be extensions on Buzan et al. (1998) and their spectrum of security, and could be seen as an elaboration of a gradual scale as a better visualization.

§6.3. Limitations, Generalizability, and Suggestions for Further Research

With the answering of the research question and the theoretical implications of this research explicated, we can now zoom out on this research and its methods, and consider its limitations, generalizability, and suggestions for further research.

First, several limitations for this research can be discerned. As for methodological restrictions, this research was a small-\(n\) multiple case study, with only three cases analyzed. This is a rather low number, and of course, the lower the amount of cases, the more difficult the generalizability of the results. It should be remembered, however, that this work was explorative in nature: it aimed to advance on the still rather underexposed link between securitization theory and regime theory, and the hybrid institutionalist model was operationalized for the first time. In
addition, this study was a plausibility probe: the hypotheses were aimed at understanding the likelihood of the occurrence of a (non-)securitized migration regime. Finally, looking back on this research, all four variables were present in the three cases, so while indeed, more cases would always have been better with regards to the validity, I believe the low amount of cases was not too limited for this thesis, as a first venture into new grounds.

One other weakness of this work regarding scope is that the hybrid institutionalist model, with four variables which split up into nine other ones, has a lot, and arguably too many possible pathways (as also seen in Table 6.2: no red but a lot of white). When, in addition, none of the variables are necessary nor sufficient, it could be argued that the argument is too broad, that ‘anything goes.’ While the number of possible routes was limited somewhat by excluding some pathways in advance based on the theory (for example that a restrictive regional identity cannot lead to a non-securitized regional migration policy), this still left a lot of possibilities. A good follow-up step in order to further define the hybrid institutionalist model, then, and to determine which pathways could be eliminated and/or assigned more weight, would be to test them with more cases. The pathways concerning the role of the regional hegemon, for example, could be further tested by looking at regional organizations in which a strong regional hegemon is present – for example, Indonesia in ASEAN. If, in such a most-likely case, the influence of the interest of the regional hegemon in certain migration policies is not present, the pathway should be taken out of the model.

A final, more practical limitation was concerned with the availability of sources. As noted throughout this research, few migration-specific policies are in place in the three regional organizations studied, and migrants – especially extra-regional migrants – are rarely mentioned in policies overall. Most of the policies and official statements regarding migration included were either concerned with free movement of intraregional labor migrants, within the economic integration project, or refugees, which is not the broad notion of migration this thesis adheres to. The topic, apparently, is not salient in the region. As a result, an image of the regional migration regime of Latin America had to be stitched together from these parts, and conclusions sometimes had to be drawn from reading between the lines. This is clearly not hard evidence, but it was the only possibility – and I do believe that the relevant policies were eventually included. In addition, not all migrants were included in the statistics and numbers presented throughout this study. While numbers of irregular migrants are high in Latin America, exact figures on this are simply not available, and hence this research had to rely on estimates. Not ideal, but unavoidable. As a solution to this scarcity and incompleteness of sources, I conducted interviews with experts on migration (policies) in the region. While not as many interviews were completed as I had hoped and intended, the talks that did take place could provide some missing information and the first-hand information
gave this research, I believe, more ‘meat on the bone.’ Still, these limitations as regards to sources might have resulted in a somewhat skewed image of migration in Latin America and how it is governed, although I do not think the difference is significant enough to revoke the argument made here.

As for the generalizability of this argument for other parts of the world, I would expect it to also hold outside of Latin America. After all, with variables that are not region- or regional organization-specific, and with both securitization as well as non-securitization as a possible outcome, the hybrid institutionalist model is well-suited to be applied to other regional migration regimes. A good next step would be to test the model for the EU and the United States: with multiple scholars already having argued that the these migration regimes are securitized (Huysmans, 2000; Kostakopoulou, 2000; Guiraudon, 2000; Tirman, 2006; Ceyhan and Tsoukala, 2002), but not yet for the variables in the model specifically, they are most-likely cases, and hence fitting as a first further step for this newly created model. In both the EU and the U.S., I would expect to see strong national identity-driven domestic pressures for more restrictive migration policies. Furthermore, for the United States specifically, we have already seen that the Trump Administration has a clear ideational interest in a securitized migration regime. Moreover, these expectations might primarily count for non-Western extra-regional migrants, who are regarded as more of a threat to the national identity than Western extra-regional migrants. Regarding the latter, I would expect that there are also some elements of economic (mobility)-driven migration regimes in both the U.S. and the EU, due to economy-driven pressures from both the regional hegemon and non-state actors, and a regional identity that is open – or at least not restrictive – towards at least those (Western) migrants.

This research has also raised further questions in need of investigation. One suggestion would be to extend the argument presented here to other parts of the world, not just as a way to further specify the hybrid institutionalist model, but also to gain further insight into the securitization of migration regimes. It would be interesting, for example, to apply the hybrid institutionalist model to the European Union, and see whether both the pathways and outcomes are in line with Huysmans’ (2000) findings explaining the securitization of the EU migration policies. The same goes for others who have explored the securitization of migration, for example Kostakopoulo (2000), also for the EU, and Tirman (2006) for the United States. In a similar vein, this argument of why a regional migration regime securitizes could be applied to the European Union, for example, in order to analyze the conditions for a shift to non-securitization of that migration regime.

In addition, as already noted, it would be interesting to conduct an analysis of the actual implementation of non-securitized migration policies, especially in order to shine a light on the
strength of the prestige-factor, and, at the same time, on the absence or presence of decoupling: after all, when implementation of policies that look good on the international stage is weak, this would suggest that a country or regional organization cares more about its prestige than the values of the policy.

One other, more practical area of further research could be to compare whether securitization or non-securitization of a regional migration regime has as an effect on the (success) level of integration of migrants in these regimes. This could be of interest to policy makers.

Further investigation into these questions would not only expand further on this still rather underexposed area of research which this study is located in, but could also further strengthen – or identify the weaknesses of – this new model presented here.

§6.4. Final Remarks

In combining securitization theory with the hybrid institutionalist model, this thesis has aimed to advance on two aspects where securitization theory is limited, namely the question what type a regional migration regime is when it is anything other than securitized, and on the question why there are these different types of regional migration regimes. In this, this study also advanced on the rather unexplored link between securitization theory and regime theory. While this project thus has some scientific relevance, I would like to use this very last section to also emphasize the social relevance this matter has. The (non-)securitization of regional migration regimes is a topic which is highly relevant today, as it is concerned with both the current migration crises and the global trend of securitizing migration. This research helps understand the debates we are currently in the middle of. In the Netherlands and the EU in general, we have almost grown accustomed to seeing heartbreaking images of the European refugee crisis: toddlers washed up on beaches, ‘jungle’ migrant camps, and overcrowded migrant boats. I am not arguing here either that securitized migration policies are the only thing to blame for these horrors, nor do I want to imply that the non-securitization of a regional migration regime is the solution to everything. However, it is good to know that the securitization of migration has not, as Ibrahim (2005) has argued, completely normalized, and that it does not have to be this way. The article by Jef Huysmans (2000) which triggered this research is a perfectly straightforward explanation of why and how the securitization of the European Union’s migration regime came about, but it left the question: why not something else? The European Union is currently far from a non-securitized migration regime, and this is something that is not quickly nor easily changed: it would require incremental change on a number of different policy and societal levels. Still, Latin America demonstrates that there are alternatives. In addition, it remains important to remember that while a non-securitization of migration policies
cannot halt the phenomenon of migration itself, it can make for a more humane treatment of migrants. When migration and its related policies are framed in terms of statistics and figures – and this study is no exception – it is easy to forget that these numbers are people, all with their own stories and experiences. The distinction between securitization and non-securitization is not something which only exists in theory and which has little relevance in reality. It is something which legitimates certain policies and hence has an actual influence on real people, people who are already in a vulnerable position: as they are seen as a threat, as a danger, it becomes legitimate to subject them to harsh controls, treat them with suspicion and distrust, and generally, not exactly give them a warm welcome in the country they newly arrive in. Thus, the (non-)securitization distinction is one that matters.

On that note, the statement that opened this thesis can close this research too. Former President Rousseff of Brazil, in her response to the Syrian crisis, was talking about refugees, but her call could be broadened to summarize the point underlying this thesis: especially in these difficult times, these times of crises, we have to welcome migrants with open arms, as perceiving migrants as non-threatening enables the non-securitization of migration policies.
A call to action: Protection needs in the Northern Triangle of Central America (2016).


Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.


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