

The Kissinger Administration

*An Analysis of the Effect of Kissinger's Personality on the
Yom Kippur War Crisis Decision-Making Process*

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INTRODUCTION

Henry Kissinger is one of the most paradoxical men of the twentieth century. From 1969 until 1974 Kissinger first served as Nixon's National Security Advisor and from 1973 onwards also as his Secretary of State. In these years, Kissinger grew out to be the star of the Nixon administration due to Nixon's emphasis on foreign policy and lack of charisma. Kissinger fascinated ordinary Americans, journalists and other politicians. In 1973, 78% of Americans were able to identify him. Presidents, presidential candidates, and major celebrities are the only people to match this high percentage (Isaacson 537).

This thesis exposes the influence of Henry Kissinger's personality on the Yom Kippur War decision-making process. The research question that accompanies this is the following: "What was the influence of Kissinger's personality on the Yom Kippur War crisis decision-making process?" My hypothesis to this research question is that Kissinger's personality must have influenced the decision-making process of the Yom Kippur War to some degree. If someone else had held the positions of NSA and Secretary of State during the Yom Kippur War, different decisions would have been made. I can however, not conclude if this would also have affected the outcome of the Yom Kippur War.

In trying to find out the influence of a politician's personality on a decision-making process I had the possibility to choose from a wide range of politicians and events. I have chosen to analyze Kissinger in relation to the Yom Kippur War because of multiple reasons. The first important element my thesis had to contain was a crisis. A crisis is, by definition, an unexpected event. It is an ambiguous situation that requires a quick response and a critical point in the history of a state (Roberts 10). A crisis situation is essentially different from routine events and is characterized by the perceptions of the decision-maker of (1) a severe threat to national interests that result in (2) a surprise with (3) only little time to act in response. While this thesis does not undermine the importance of organizational structures, foreign policy routines, and bureaucratic models there is a strong emphasis on the fact that during crises, decision-making is ruled by other dynamics. It is a dominant perception that crises are managed by small groups of individuals in a highly personal way driven by individual perceptions of the situation (Haney 9). Organizational structures may lose their importance as personalities increase in significance and take over crisis decision-making.

Choosing Kissinger was a personal preference. Kissinger grabbed my attention when I read about the rather controversial Nobel Peace Prize he was awarded back in 1973. By choosing Kissinger, I had little reason not to choose the Yom Kippur War. During the Yom Kippur War, President Nixon was incredibly preoccupied by domestic affairs. These included

Watergate, the resignation of Vice-President Agnew, and the Saturday Night Massacre. Because Nixon's attention was mostly devoted to domestic issues, Kissinger almost exercised complete control over the decision-making process of the Yom Kippur War. Because interference from Nixon was so little, the Yom Kippur War best shows Kissinger's personality. Next to this, Kissinger's Judaism made Nixon question his credibility. It is therefore interesting to look if and how his religious heritage influenced the decisions that he made during the Yom Kippur War.

The opening chapter of this thesis explains the political arena in which Kissinger operated. The chapter starts off with an explanation of the theory of realism. It is important to understand the notion of realism in order to understand Kissinger. The chapter continues with an explanation of the three main models of foreign policy decision-making: the rational actor model, the bureaucratic politics model, and the personal-actor model. The rational actor model is also known as the realist model, and was therefore the ideal model to both Nixon and Kissinger. It is however, almost impossible to apply the rational actor model to crisis decision-making. The multiple impediments to the rational actor model during crisis decision-making are discussed in light of the elements that then take over crisis decision-making. The first chapter therefore provides a solid foundation to answer the question if individuals and personalities even matter at all when operating in bureaucratic institutions.

The second chapter is a personality analysis of Kissinger. It builds on the first chapter because it explains what caused Kissinger to act the way he did. This analysis is based on an assessment of key experiences in his life, his inspirations, and his personality that was shaped by this. It further seeks to expose if there were certain patterns of life experiences that influenced the decisions Kissinger made during the Yom Kippur War. The chapter is divided into three subchapters. These subchapters help the reader to understand the source of Kissinger's personality traits but also analyze how his personality traits are reflected in his negotiating skills and relationship with Nixon.

The last chapter seeks to find a correlation between Kissinger's personality traits discussed in chapter two and the decisions he made during the Yom Kippur War. It also briefly touches upon Judaism, and tries to reveal to what extent this played a role in his Middle East diplomacy. Two important events during the Yom Kippur War clearly showed Kissinger's personal influence on the course of the crisis. During the resupply of Israel and the nuclear alert Kissinger did not obey Nixon's wishes or consult with Nixon at all. These moments clearly show Kissinger's personality. An analysis of all the abovementioned elements will answer the question if Kissinger did personally influence the course of the Yom

Kippur War by the decisions that he made. More importantly, they show the extent to which Kissinger's personality was reflected in his decisions.

CHAPTER 1

CRISIS DECISION-MAKING AND PERSONALITY

Decision-making during the Nixon-Kissinger years was one of the most pro-active and dynamic during the different Cold War presidencies. Although not free of criticism, Nixon and Kissinger managed to open relations with China, end the Vietnam War, reach détente with the Soviet Union and settle disputes between bitter enemies in the Middle East. In order to answer the question of how influential Kissinger's personality was during the Yom Kippur War decision-making process it is important to realize that the core of this thesis is to reveal the importance of human decision-making during crises. To start off this chapter, we will ask ourselves if individuals count, and if so, how influential they are when operating in bureaucratic institutions.

Before we can draw any conclusions about the influence and worth of Kissinger's personality on his political achievements during the Yom Kippur War it is important to analyze the political arena in which he operated. By looking at realism, different decision-making models and the impediments to Kissinger's beloved rational actor model, we will conclude when, why, and how much of Kissinger's personality was influential during the decision-making process of the Yom Kippur War. Kissinger operated within two frames during the Yom Kippur War: one of fixed institutions and structures, and a psychological one: one of his own values and ideas, which were shaped by his personality and his education at Harvard. It is important to take into account that foreign policy is a series of decisions taken on a personal as well as an institutional level.

1.1 REALISM

Kissinger's Harvard years and studies of history led him to believe in realism, one of the dominant schools of international relations theory. To start off, it is important to mention that there is not one fixed realist theory of international relations. There is, however, a "family" of realist theories with a shared idea regarding power and international relations (Klein Bluemink 113).

In general, realists believe that the international system is anarchic, which means that states are not subject to a higher overarching actor. Anarchy is crucial in understanding the realist theory. The state, or its representative, has a final say because there is no higher authority. Because there is no higher authority, states are required to protect themselves through self-help in order to stay secure. The effect of each state pursuing its self-interest is

that they easily clash with one another. This eventually leads to violence, and violence will oftentimes lead to war (Pease 7).

As a result, realists, as a worldview, conceive the world as conflictual. This is because sovereign states seek power and therefore exercise power against each other. Realists take the state as their focus point of analysis. They recognize the existence of non-state actors but see these as less important because in the end they are still responsible to the state. Realists, like Kissinger, assume the state to be a unitary rational actor. This means that the state is a single entity that makes decisions based on a thorough cost-benefit analysis. Realists look at the world from a dark point of view and therefore always try to maximize national interests.

According to realists, international politics is all about a struggle for power. Whatever politicians might say their motivations are, it is almost always an obvious or sometimes less obvious cover-up for the immediate aim: power. According to Morgenthau, power is “men’s control over the mind and actions of other men” (Morgenthau qtd in Mazlisch 264). In order to exercise this power, politicians always use hard power or soft power. It is quite difficult to ‘measure’ the power of an individual. In economics, value can be measured in monetary terms, but in politics, measuring power is not that easy. One individual can create a major change in history and politics. Kissinger himself once stated that “the nature of power has never been easy to assess” (Kissinger qtd in Mazlisch 267). Nuclear weapons have made individuals more powerful than ever but launching nuclear weapons also translates into mutual suicide. This mutual disincentive requires both parties to act rational.

Here we see the most difficult part of understanding international politics. Actors do not always act in a rational and predictable way. The fact that realists believe in a state’s struggle for power without a higher authority does not mean that there is no order. Realists regard the balance of power, the distribution of capabilities, as a means to create order (Pease 7). International stability and order are based on the power of the hegemon (Pease 8). Kissinger’s idea of the balance of power theory is classical. He believes that indeed the great superpowers are essential in creating international order (Klein Bluemink 124). Kissinger is further convinced that the concept of the balance of power is timeless and peace is not possible without reaching a balance (Klein Bluemink 125). It is therefore crucial that a balance of power should be maintained if it already exists or pursued if it does not exist yet. There are however a few issues concerning the maintenance and the pursuing of the balance of power. The main goal of the politician is the national interest. This means that a balance of power position is preferred in which there is a favorable position for the own state. The

changing spheres of influence however make it difficult to have a clear-cut balance of power system (Klein Bluemink 141).

Because of the different types of realism it is essential to keep in mind that there is not one distinct theory that unambiguously leads to a clear policy. As mentioned earlier, there is not one single definition of realism, and the theory can roughly be divided into four types. We will not dive into these different types of realism. It is however, essential to not overlook the different types of realism. Yet there is one big similarity between these different types, i.e. the aforementioned concept of rationality.

1.2 RATIONALITY

There are three main models of foreign policy decision-making: the rational actor model, the bureaucratic politics model, and the personal-actor model. In this chapter, I will elaborate on these three models. Emphasis will be put on the rational actor model because it is also called the realist model. The rational actor model was preferred by Kissinger and will be referred to throughout the other chapters of this thesis. Each of these models is crucial to American politics depending on the President holding office.

The rational actor model. The rational actor model perceives the government as a unitary actor with agreed upon goals to be achieved (Komine 2). Through a process of cost-benefit analysis decision-makers want to make sure that their conclusion will be the best way to reach their goals. The model supposes that foreign policy is the product of a national guiding intelligence. It further counts on a clear national interest that does not depend on the individuals or a single decision maker (Mazlisch 228). The rational actor model is oftentimes referred to as the realist model. It is easiest to predict a decision-makers decision by assuming that the decision-maker is rational. A rational approach to decision making would imply that decision-makers always decide on issues with clear objectives in mind.

The bureaucratic politics model. The bureaucratic politics model puts more emphasis on the government as a body to represent different interests that need to be mediated. Foreign policy is the ultimate product of the bureaucratic politics model (Klein Bluemink 115). It is however politics with a focus on the outcome of the decision-making process. The outcome can be a decision that no one initially favored, but that has come to life because different groups favor different things. Kissinger's dislike of the bureaucratic politics model comes from the fact that

it does not give a clear signal to other countries. Vague signals are interpreted to one's own advance and can be used against the US.

The personal-actor model. The third model, the personal-actor model, reflects the idea that the decision-maker decides whatever he wants to decide. This model provides a strong link to the psychological analysis of the decision-maker. President John F. Kennedy once described the model, as “the essence of ultimate decision remains impenetrable to the observer – often, indeed, to the decider himself... There will always be the dark entangled stretches in the decision-making process – mysterious even to those who may be the most intimately involved” (Kennedy qtd in Mazlisch 229). If we look at Kissinger, we can say that although he preferred the rational actor model, his reality would be a combination of model one and three: a man who preferred the idea of rational choice, but was often guided by an intuitive insight (Mazlisch 229).

Although the rational actor model seems to be the ‘ideal’ decision-making approach to foreign policy it is quite close to impossible to fully apply this model to foreign policy decision-making. Decisions are not always made through an exclusively rational process because of multiple impediments. First, psychological factors can interfere with the ability of the government and its decision-makers to solve a problem according to the rational actor model. Subconsciously, decision-makers can put personal interests before national needs. A second impediment to the rational actor model is the effect of unmotivated biases. This includes cognitive shortcomings like the reliance on bias, stereotypes, and risk avoidance. Third, crisis decision-making is often accompanied by high amounts of stress. One important effect of stress on decision-makers is the tendency to not look for further information and quickly come up with solutions before any alternatives have been considered. According to Alexander George, individuals who have reached high-level policymaking have already acquired the experience that should make them able to cope with the stresses of crisis decision-making. Although high-office officials have learnt to cope with decisional stress, there are a few distinct patterns used for coping with stress. These coping patterns can either have their roots in the decision-maker's personality or its education. Coping with stress during crises does not solely include the individual's actions (e.g., denial, withdrawal, or rationalization), but also the extent to which an individual can cope with stress emotionally. The ego processes that lead to a reality-minded approach are therefore crucial to understand (George 532).

Another important factor that influences crisis decision-making is time pressure. A short as well as an uncertain deadline impairs the ability to analyze options thoughtfully and necessitate a quick decision. Even if decision-makers do have more time, they might choose not to use it in order to surprise ‘the enemy.’ One crucial impediment to the rational actor model is the lack of information decision-makers frequently face. Crisis decisions are oftentimes made in an uncertain environment, and information may be lacking. Next to the high amounts of lacking information, available information can also be false, misleading or contradicting. There can also be an overload of information, which leads to decision-makers being unable to distinguish irrelevant information from useful information, this is can be measured by the signal-to-noise ratio. Another impediment to the rational actor model is the identifying the goals of a state. When decision-makers choose their goals they often choose from a multiple of evils, which means that choosing one goal leads to a violation of another. These choices are called *value trade-offs*. Exercising a cost-benefit analysis is an immensely time-consuming task. Analyzes are often made in secrecy and, in order to prevent the leaking of information, with as little people as possible. According to McGeorge Bundy, a late American expert in foreign and defense policy, this was especially true during the Cold War administrations (Cashman 51). The last impediment to the rational actor model is influence of the actual person making the decision. Although there is a general agreement to decide rationally individuals often have different opinions on what rationality actually is. Different decision-makers may want different goals and have differing priorities. It is here that the realist approach of rational decision making as group work comes to light. It is important to understand the policy decision-making is always made within a ‘group’ in which individuals operate and influence others (Cashman 50).

It is therefore interesting to discuss if we can still call this decision-making process rational, partly rational or irrational. Herbert Simon, a late American political scientist, came up with the term *bounded rationality*. Bounded rationality takes the earlier discussed impediments into account and defines a decision-maker as a person who is limited in its capacity to look at all the possibilities. The search of this person is not complete and often partially based on incomplete or wrong information. This does not make the decision-process irrational, but “imperfectly rational”, which means that the decision-maker bases its decisions to the best of its abilities given real-world circumstances and human limitations. The fact that decision-making process is imperfectly rational implies that other factors influence the decision-making process, of which the personal characteristics of the decision-maker are the most important ones (Guru).

1.3 PERSONALITY

There is a correspondence between personality and policy because decisions are unique processes occurring among policy makers. A different personality unanimously means a different policy. The fact that Kissinger held both the position of NSA and Secretary of State, and not someone else, during the Yom Kippur War makes a difference. It matters because crises are often expedited by individuals (e.g. the President) and their advisors (e.g. Secretary of State, NSA).

It is paramount, however, to keep in mind that the course of the Yom Kippur War was not exclusively reduced to the psychological make-up of Kissinger. The ability of an individual alone to decide the course a conflict takes is bounded by many decisive factors. These include the international as well as the domestic environment, the influence of governmental policies, and informal as well as formal decision-making processes (Cashman 50). There are, however, situations in which these restraints are less influential and individuals exercise a lot of power over the decision-making process. These are the situations in which personality and characteristics are crucial.

The influence of the decision-maker increases depending on the position in the bureaucratic hierarchy. The smaller the amount of restrictions, the higher the influence of a decision-maker's personality on the decision-making process. If there is only a small number of individuals involved, it is easier to focus on personality factors instead of large influential bureaucratic bodies of government. Decisions are only made by a small number of people under limited conditions. First, when constitutional procedures require this. Second, when the decision-maker is constitutionally authorized to personally go to great lengths during the decision-making process and when power is extremely centered and in the hands of one individual. The third condition for leaders to exercise a lot of power individually is when leaders have a high degree of interest in the decision-making process. The fourth condition is that only one single institution is responsible for the decision-making process (Cashman 50).

Next to the above-mentioned conditions, personal characteristics of decision-makers are especially influential when a decision has to be made in an unexpected situation where standards routines are inapplicable. This would be the case during a crisis. Personality traits also play a bigger role when decision-makers are provided with little and incomplete or contradicting information. Because wrong and incomplete information makes a situation rather enigmatic, decision-makers interpret the decisions themselves based on their own susceptibility. A third reason for personalities to be especially influential is when the decision-maker is inexperienced on the issue. In such a case, decision-makers base their

decisions mostly on their natural problem-solving ability. Fourth and final is the presence of stress. When many of these conditions apply to the situation, personal characteristics of the decision-maker may be of highly influential (Cashman 51).

Now that we know that applying a completely rational decision-making process to crisis decision-making is a utopian idea, it makes sense to look at the factors that take over this rational decision-making process. Nixon once stated that “reaction and response to crisis is uniquely personal in the sense that it depends on what the individual brings to bear on the situation – his own traits of personality and character, his training and religious background, his strengths and weaknesses” (Nixon qtd in White 39). It is important to gain insight in the mind of the decision-maker because emotions, memory, experiences, self-image, and belief can eventually all influence the outcome of a crisis. The fact that experience leads to a certain pattern of choice also puts the concept of rationality into doubt. During crisis, when there is a lot of time pressure and often limited access to information, these characteristics play a bigger role in decision-making. It is crucial to understand that an individual’s decision is never truly rational, as decisions are made limited by institutions and image. Next to this, it is important to consider the role of manipulative behavior. Decision-makers rely on past experiences and behavior in order to prepare for future situations. They are human beings and must adapt to every situations with the given information. They always need to take into account the history of the conflict and the area and the range of options they have access to.

In this chapter we have laid out the concept of realism and identified Kissinger as a realist. One of the most important characteristics of realists is rationality. While rationality seems indeed a fair and right approach to decision-making, we have also identified the arguments that underscore the impossibility of applying the rational actor model to crisis decision-making. Emphasis is put on the fact that the rational actor model is especially vulnerable to failure during crisis (e.g. the Yom Kippur War) because of time, stress, information shortage, personal interests, secrecy, and unmotivated bias. This chapter further exposes the elements that take over crisis decision-making when the rational actor model fails. The importance of personal characteristics of the decision-maker increases in a crisis-situation. Decision-makers need to gather and process information in order to reach an appropriate decision. The way in which information is understood and how it is framed, and the cognitive perceptions to help them do so, affects the course of international politics.

CHAPTER 2

KISSINGER: A PERSONALITY ANALYSIS

At the heart of the course a country takes stand individual human beings. People whom, by their wealth, talent, upbringing, and personal attributes have the power to make crucial decisions. In the first chapter we recognized that individuals, under certain circumstances, do personally influence the directions a country takes. That the much preferred rational choice is often blocked, especially during crises, by numerous impediments. But if this is indeed the case, what causes individuals to choose certain options over others? Are there certain patterns of life experiences that influence these decisions?

In this chapter we will answer this question with regard to Kissinger by an assessment of key experiences in his life, his inspirations, and his personality that was shaped by this. Drawing clear lines is not that easy, because there is no equation to find out how much he got inspired by his education, his friends and family, his genes, his life experiences, and faith. The Kissinger analysis in this chapter is purely biographical and historical and seeks to expose the influences that pushed Kissinger into a certain direction of choice. Another important part of this chapter describes the relationship between Kissinger and Nixon. It is important to keep in mind that the decisions that were made during the Yom Kippur War were not solely Kissinger's. His main achievements from 1968 to 1973 were closely intermixed with Nixon. Determining who deserves credit for which decision is quite complicated, but not necessarily incredibly important. More important, however, is determining how the men related to one another and the effect of their personalities on each other's thinking.

This chapter is based on William Chafe's assumptions that family, friends and upbringing play an utmost crucial role in one's later life. That a set of choices can form a pattern as to how individuals approach (crisis) situations. It will also stress the influence of a personal crisis of very high impact can work out a lifetime and fourth, the fact that these elements have shaped part of America's and the world's history. It will underscore the relevance of Kissinger's personal attributes during the decision-making process of the Yom Kippur War (Chafe 4).

2.1 FROM YOUTH INTO ADULTHOOD

In understanding Kissinger as a person it is essential to go back to his roots. Heinz Alfred Kissinger was born on May 27 1923 in Fürth, Germany. He is the son of Louis Kissinger, an extremely devout and orthodox Jew. When the Nazis came to power in 1930 Kissinger witnessed an ever-increasing hostility toward Jews. In 1933, his father was no longer allowed

to practice his job as a teacher because Jews were banned from government positions. The 1935 Nuremberg Laws dispossessed all German Jews of their German citizenship. The Kissinger family sought refuge in the United States and arrived in New York City in 1938. Kissinger later learned that thirteen of his relatives had not survived the war (Klein Bluemink 19). Only seventy of Fürth's three thousand Jews survived the war. Kissinger was lucky to have survived, but as a fifteen-year-old, had to learn the completely new language of an earlier foreign country. He changed his name from Heinz to Henry and gained American citizenship in 1943.

Growing up in Germany in the 1930s Kissinger witnessed contending forces and manipulation firsthand. As an adult, Kissinger always minimized his Jewish heritage. He rarely mentioned his background, only to stress the fact that, according to him, it did not influence him in any way. He denied the fact that he faced traumas as a child and that persecution and feelings of being an outcast would have influenced his personality and policy at all. His childhood friends and family members however say that Kissinger continues to be in a state of denial. Despite Kissinger's claims that his family's persecution did not leave a scar on his personality he did watch his father lose everything he ever was and owned. According to Robert Kaplan, Kissinger is the one diplomat most influenced by Nazism: "If there is any diplomat whose ideas were shaped early, immutably, and meticulously by the experience of Nazism and Munich, it is Kissinger" (Kaplan). Many scholars, including Kissinger himself, seem very apprehensive to this idea, but Fritz Kraemer, a non-Jewish German who fought Hitler and was Kissinger's mentor in the US Army, endorsed this statement by saying that Kissinger was exposed to the horror of this world during his formative years: "You can do damage to the soul of a man and never touch his body" (Kraemer qtd in Blumenfeld).

To make matters even more contradicting, Oval Office tapes that were released in 2010 have revealed Kissinger telling Nixon that helping the Soviet Jews escape oppression was "not an objective of American foreign policy", and "if they put Jews in the gas chambers in the Soviet Union, it is not an American concern" (Kissinger qtd in Haberman). Kissinger's words sparked anger across the Jewish community. If his parents had not decided to flee Germany he might have ended up in a gas chamber himself. It is clear that Kissinger felt almost ashamed to be Jewish. He completely distanced himself from Judaism during his college years and was obsessed with being accepted a full American.

Kissinger's obsession with acceptance is therefore a result of his youth. During his entire life Kissinger has been afraid he would not be fully accepted if he were too closely

associated with his religion. During his childhood, Kissinger had been an outcast in his own country, the country his family had lived for generations. People often accused Kissinger of being deceitful, but his tendency to appease both sides in a conflict can very much be the result of growing up an outcast. My interpretation of why Kissinger was so appalled by Judaism is because he hated weakness. Jews had been the victims for decades, not only during the Second World War. Kissinger no longer wanted to be associated with the weak but be part of the strong. I can underscore this by the fact that Kissinger henceforth refused to show signs of weakness and the fact that Isaacson concluded that Kissinger always surrounded himself with powerful and forceful men like Richard Nixon (Isaacson 30).

This also relates to Kissinger's lust for power. Kissinger's effort to become part of the Kennedy administration illustrates his "nonpolitical" eagerness to go to Washington, regardless of the party. This is however not unique of Kissinger, as many foreign policy types, including Kissinger, were willing to work for Humphrey as for Nixon during the 1968 presidential elections (Mazlish 19). This attitude is justified in the doctrine of bipartisanship. Bipartisanship is a situation in which Congress and the presidency reach a compromise and find common ground. Realists like Kissinger that Congress is not well suited for foreign policy making because congressmen are guided by re-elections (Harris).

Kissinger grew up during the darkest times of human history. The horrors he witnessed firsthand, persecution in Germany, his father's job loss, fleeing his home country and the death of relatives in extermination camps, made him a pessimist (although Kissinger would say a realist). He learned about tragedy and human evil early in life. We can trace this back to Hobbes, who lived during the English civil wars and therefore believed that humans are inherently evil. Although his experiences in Nazi Germany could have sparked in him a strong desire to fight evil and protect human rights, Kissinger became a realist with a realpolitik approach: a determination to preserve order through the balance of power. His youth led him to believe that the world is a constant battle of forces of chaos and forces of order (Starr 477). Here we see that his obsession with stability and the balance of power can be traced back to his experiences early in life (Starr 478). It also made him turn against revolutionary movements, which had the power to change people's lives desperately and humiliate them. His experiences in Nazi Germany therefore only deepened the political conservatism he already that got already installed in him by Orthodox Judaism (Mazlish 35).

In 1943, after Kissinger received American citizenship, he was drafted by the US Army and became part of the 84th Infantry Division at Camp Claiborne in Louisiana. During this training program, fellow German refugee Fritz Kraemer was Kissinger's teacher during

“orientation class.” Mr. Kraemer was one of the first people to put a political mark on Kissinger. He guided through his first years of political conscience and further sparked in him a love for conservatism. Kraemer supported him intellectually and introduced him to the works of Spengler and Kant. It was also Kraemer who made Kissinger discover his German background. They spoke German to each other and the conservative values Kraemer preached were of German conservatism. Without Kraemer, Kissinger would probably have turned out more American and less German (Mazlish 51). The values preached by Kraemer have also become characteristic of Kissinger. Kraemer’s love of lonely courage, strength and manly power convinced Kissinger that power is needed to face violence (Mazlish 52). Kraemer also influenced Kissinger with his anti-communism, which was very influential during the Yom Kippur War. Kissinger now considered both the Nazis and the Communists as barbarians. He believed that a lack of order gave rise to such totalitarian regimes, whether they were left or right (Isaacson 46).

After Kissinger served as private Kissinger in the US Army for two years, he returned to the US as a new man. His time in the army had Americanized him and toughened him up. He still struggled with insecurities, but he had more confidence after surviving the war. After he returned to the US, Kissinger’s contradictions seemed more evident. His newfound confidence existed alongside his insecurities; his craving for approval was often misread because of his arrogance: his personality had become one of many contradictions that would persist throughout his entire adult life (Isaacson 56).

In 1947, Kissinger came to Harvard as part of one of the last “veteran classes.” His time at Harvard would span more than twenty years. He first came to Harvard as a student and later as a faculty member. Kissinger’s Harvard years as a student were dominated by many successes. He gained his Bachelor’s, Master’s and PhD degrees all within six years time (Mazlish 55). Kissinger was on good terms with both his academic tutor William Yandell Elliott and Carl Friedrich, head of Harvard’s government department. The fact that Kissinger was on good terms with the two rivaling ‘high priests’ of Harvard is characteristic of his obsession with appeasement. Elliot introduced him further to the works of (German) philosophers Kant and Spengler and his intense anti-communism only underscored the words Kissinger had heard from Kraemer.

When Kissinger rose in prominence, first as a Harvard professor and later as politician, his sensitivity to criticism came more and more to light. Although Kissinger maintained an excellent relationship with the press, he often called up journalists who had written negatively about him and complained about their criticism. According to his

colleagues, Kissinger's extreme reactions to criticism were a result of his insecurities and the fact that he did not feel confident in his role and status. As a result, Kissinger was extremely suspicious and sensitive (Mazlish 88). Kissinger was often called slightly depressed because of his pessimistic worldview. He could be melancholic, moody, and negative. His philosophical darkness however does not mean that he was deeply depressed. In fact, Kissinger also held many positive qualities. He had a great sense of humor, believed firmly in creativity and his perseverance often served a good cause (Mazlish 89).

Up until now we have identified Kissinger as a man of contradictions. His arrogance overshadowed his insecurities. His dark worldview led him to be quite depressive. He could be melancholic and sometimes paranoid. There are however, two more character traits that need further elaborations. First is Kissinger's love for a lone-cowboy performance. In Machiavelli's *The Prince* Kissinger learned a great deal about leadership. He agreed with Machiavelli that a leader should be willful, lonely, and strong (Mazlish 167). Kissinger applied these characteristics to himself once he got into the powerful position of Secretary of State. In an interview with Fallaci Kissinger said that he has "always acted alone" and that "Americans admire that enormously" (Kissinger qtd in Mazlish 168). Americans just love the lone-cowboy style. It turns a man into a powerful Wild West conqueror. Second is the fact that Kissinger was often accused of lying, manipulative behavior, and plagiarism. Both colleagues and friends have noticed that Kissinger often times lied to them uselessly, whereas at other times he was devotedly truthful (again contradictions). One reason for his behavior can be the tendency to avoid unpleasant reality. Another reason might be the fact that Kissinger himself believed he was telling the truth (Mazlish 92). Shading the truth is however an important part of international politics. This is justified by the belief that sometimes withholding the truth serves a higher national purpose.

2.2 NEGOTIATING SKILLS

One of Kissinger's most important tricks in accomplishing his goals is understanding the other in negotiations. Although Kissinger was critical of the psychoanalytic approach to foreign policy he did state "the US must study the psychology of its opponents as carefully as they have studied ours" (Kissinger qtd in Mazlish 198). Kissinger's famous mediating efforts first came to light during his Harvard years. He was able to create links between right and left wing groups. He was also very good at finding support in both camps, a talent he used time and again during his political career.

Kissinger practiced outstanding negotiating skills. His negotiating skills are a result of his historical and psychological approach to foreign affairs. We have already seen that his negotiating skills first came to light at Harvard. However, it was not until under Nixon that he gained the confidence and experience to demonstrate his unique talents. Albeit Kissinger acted differently with different opponents in different situations, there are a few recurring elements in his negotiating behavior that made him so successful (Mazlish 202). First is his optimal condition to succeed. According to Kissinger, a negotiation is most likely to succeed if it is personal. This means that outcomes are determined by the negotiating individuals and not by economic or social ties. Another interesting part of this is that Kissinger depersonalized himself: he wanted the opponent to know as little about him as possible and disguised his personality. The second condition for Kissinger's success is that he combined his talks with (the threat of) force. Kissinger disdained legal individuals in foreign policy decision-making. He felt that policy making was useless without the use of power (Mazlish 203). The fact that the US stopped military operations in the Korean War proved to Kissinger that separating force from diplomacy made power lack purpose and therefore the negotiations fruitless.

Negotiation is persuasion and intended to reach compromise by anything but force. For Kissinger, force was certainly a part of his negotiation style. His most important tool however, was his ability to convince the opponent that he sympathized and understood their point of view. It was often quite easy for him to identify with the opponent. Because of this identification, Kissinger was able to make his opponents believe that he was sincere. Admirers of Kissinger's personal approach are however critical of his foreign policy approach in the Middle East. They often feel it was too personal. This argument was disproved by the argument that Kissinger always acted within a large framework and never failed to lose sight of bigger objectives.

All in all Kissinger gives his opponents the feeling he understands them. In order to appeal to the opponent, Kissinger makes hateful remarks about powerful Americans. His offensive remarks about Nixon often turned out to be effective. Next to this, Kissinger uses humor and flattery. By flattering the opponent, Kissinger seduces them in an attempt to win over the opponent. By creating this mutual understanding Kissinger hopes to create trust between one another (Mazlish 205).

2.3 NIXON AND KISSINGER

At the time of the Yom Kippur War Kissinger held the position of both National Security Advisor and Secretary of State. Although both posts awarded Kissinger different tasks and power we will not look at these positions in detail. The amount of power awarded to these functions is highly dependent on the President holding office. It is therefore more relevant to look at the relationship between Nixon and Kissinger and the decision-making structures that were in place in 1973.

The decision-making structure that was in place back in 1973 was highly formalistic. This means that is situated at the top of the hierarchy and has a structured policy with well-defined procedures. Nixon's staff was clearly structured. This meant that departments reported to department head, department heads to Kissinger, and Kissinger to Nixon (Haney 75). Nixon only depended on a few people and rarely reached down or outside this circle for information. Despite the fact that Nixon's crisis decision-making was not very different to his regular decision-making process, it was subject to crisis characteristics discussed earlier (Haney 9). President Nixon held final authority for making decisions, although he always did this in close consultation with Kissinger. Nixon relied on the structure he had instituted and Kissinger to provide him with advice, information, and analysis. The WSAG, Washington Special Actions Group, a small group of decision-makers chaired by Kissinger, was especially influential. The WSAG led to a dyadic, binary, interaction between Nixon and Kissinger at the start of the Yom Kippur War. The WSAG provided Nixon with crisis advice (Haney 76). Nixon held final authority over all institutions, but his attention was divided.

Domestic issues made it difficult for Nixon to fully focus on what was going on in the Middle East. The Watergate scandal strengthened Kissinger's authority and position in the Nixon administration. Much of the American people had lost their faith in president Nixon and questioned his authority and strong presidency. In the summer of 1973, after a few of Nixon's key people resigned, he was in desperate need of a new strong figure whose reputation and image was still relatively untouched by all the drama that had lately affected the presidency. Nixon nominated Kissinger as Secretary of State, mostly because of Nixon's own weakness and the strength of Kissinger's public image.

Nixon and Kissinger formed an odd couple. Although Nixon appointed Kissinger himself, he often underscored the high amount of differences between the two of them. He once said that the combination of the two of them was actually highly unlikely because he was "the grocer's son from Whittier" and Kissinger "the refugee from Hitler's Germany, the politician and the academic" (Nixon qtd in Isaacson 139). Even though the two men

themselves acknowledge their obvious differences, they also shared important inner similarities. Thomas Hughes best described the similarities and differences between Nixon and Kissinger during a 1973 speech:

“Both were incurably covert, but Kissinger was charming about it. Both abhorred bureaucracy, but Nixon was reclusive about it. Both engaged in double-talk, but Kissinger was often convincing. Both were fiercely anti-ideological, but Nixon had recurrent relapses. Both jealously guarded against any diffusion of power, but Kissinger dispensed balm. Both were inveterate manipulators, but Nixon was more transparent. Both insisted on extremes of loyalty, but Kissinger endeared himself to his critics. Both had a penchant for secrecy, but neither uniformly practiced what he preached. Both were deeply suspicious, but Kissinger was irrepressibly gregarious. Neither was widely admired for truthfulness, but Kissinger excelled at articulation. Neither worshiped the First Amendment, but Kissinger mesmerized the press” (Hughes qtd in Isaacson 141).

Kissinger and Nixon had much in common. According to historian George Herring, both were “loners and outsiders in their own professions” (Herring qtd in Chafe 265). Both men had affinity with secrecy and conspiracy and favored unpredictable moves. Kissinger became part of Nixon’s inner circle of confidants by sharing secret information about the Paris peace talks. Apparently, Kissinger was so eager for personal power that he chose to share information with both Nixon and Humphrey, who lost to Nixon during the 1968 Presidential elections (Chafe 266).

Kissinger and Nixon increased each other’s distrust of others and sparked in each other a sense of political paranoia. Both complained about each other to Haldeman and Ehrlichman respectively, but they could not afford to split up and let their differences divide them. They were to no extent friendly companions, and would always keep a cool and distant bond (Mazlish 211). Although they were not friends, and each other’s opposites in many ways, both acknowledged that the two of them together made for a powerful couple. In 1972, Kissinger admitted that he and Nixon maintained “...such a special relationship. I mean, the relationship between the President and me, always depends on the style of both men [...] What I’ve done was achieved because he made it possible for me to do it” (Kissinger qtd in Mazlish 212). Although a special bond between the president and his aides is not new, the relationship between Nixon and Kissinger changed in an unusual way, with Kissinger growing stronger and Nixon getting weaker, leading to a situation in which Kissinger seemingly acted independently (Mazlish 212).

By 1973, Kissinger had reached his peak of popularity. In the 1972 Gallup Poll, Kissinger was ranked fourth as the “most admired” person in America, after Nixon, Billy Graham and Harry Truman. One year later, Graham and Truman were dead and Nixon had fallen to the third place, making Kissinger “the most admired person in America.” Howard K. Smith of ABC News called Kissinger “a genuine star that tourists gather to get a glimpse of as they would Elizabeth Taylor” (Smith qtd in Isaacson 500).

The relationship between Nixon and Kissinger fascinated many. The two men, who were so different in background, formed a strong duo that was ultimately responsible for major changes in US foreign relations. The fact that Nixon and Kissinger were able to get along so well despite obvious and important differences in personality traits, views, and policies, shows how skilled Kissinger was at fitting in with different types of men. When Nixon and Kissinger first met in December 1967, Kissinger’s first impression of Nixon seemed quite positive, although he later stated that “that man Nixon is not fit to be President” (Kissinger qtd in Mazlish 213). He did however accept Nixon’s job offer as special assistant in 1969, but, because he wanted to work for the presidency, not the president. Nixon wanted Kissinger because of his academic abilities. They were often like-minded on several foreign policy issues. Next to this, Kissinger seemed bipartisan because he had also served the Democrats. After Kissinger became a member of the Nixon administration, he proved himself to be a very loyal man.

Although the two men were each other’s most important partners for many years, Kissinger held no personal respect for Nixon. He did however commit himself to Nixon’s ideas and tried to put his own ideas into action. In Kissinger’s *White House Years* he often talks negatively of Nixon, calling him a “lonely, tortured, and insecure man”, “eager for acceptance”, “shy”, and “ill at ease with strangers” (Kissinger qtd in Starr 481). Although it seems as if these are the characteristics Kissinger dislikes about Nixon, the exact same words were often used to describe Kissinger’s personality. As a little boy, Kissinger already used to be quite shy. Also, we have already determined that Kissinger was, like Nixon, needy of acceptance. Kissinger has also written about Nixon’s depressive personality, calling him “mean”, “withdrawn,” and “unhappy” (Starr 482). Again, these words coincide with Kissinger’s depressive personality we discussed earlier.

In this chapter, we have exposed Kissinger’s key characteristics. This was accomplished by an analysis of his childhood and the impact of his persecution during his formative years. The main character traits we discovered can be traced back to his earliest days. One of Kissinger’s most important reasons for success was his negotiating skill.

Kissinger was an excellent negotiator, and we can see that many of his character traits stand for the reason why: appeasement, secrecy, lying, but also charm, humor, and brilliance. We further laid out his relationship with Nixon. The two men worked together intensively for many years but seemed very different on the outside. On the inside, however, we have discovered that they are indeed very much the same. Both were loners, shy, and secretive, and formed world's most powerful duo during the early seventies.

CHAPTER 3

CASE STUDY: YOM KIPPUR WAR, OCTOBER 1973

The Yom Kippur War started on October 6 1973 and was named after the holy Jewish celebration of Yom Kippur. It was the fourth Arab-Israeli war and lasted for approximately three weeks. In chapter two we have already determined that especially during this crisis, President Nixon was intensely occupied by domestic affairs. One of his big concerns was the Watergate affair. On top of this, Nixon's Vice President Agnew resigned and pled *nolo contendere* to charges of bribery and evasion only four days into the Yom Kippur War. On October 20, when Kissinger was in Moscow to negotiate an end to the war, Attorney General Elliot Richardson and his Deputy William French Smith resigned during the "Saturday Night Massacre" (Siniver 185).

Kissinger benefited from Nixon's preoccupation with domestic politics. The new war in the Middle East made Kissinger reach his climax, as he had become the executor of US foreign policy in the Middle East. Two weeks prior to the Yom Kippur War Kissinger was appointed Secretary of State. This new position gave Kissinger unprecedented control over foreign policy. Kissinger did not have a large role in Middle East diplomacy during Nixon's first term (Mazlish 153). Mainly because of Kissinger's Judaism, Nixon questioned his objectivity and credibility. The fact that Kissinger had risen in power during the Yom Kippur War had an adverse effect on the formal decision-making process. As NSA and Secretary of State Kissinger had a dual position in the decision-making process. It created a situation in which one person, Kissinger, simultaneously argued for different policy preferences and represented the interests of the two institutions he represented (Siniver 188).

Kissinger himself recognized that the Middle East was the most personal of all political areas. "The Middle East has a tendency to personalize issues. And therefore, in the Middle East, there has been a great tendency to throw me into the fray. At some point we have to turn it into more regular channels. On the other hand, I don't know if we could have moved so fast if it hadn't been for the personal participation" (Kissinger qtd in Mazlish 249). The fact that policy and personalities are more intertwined in the Middle East leads to the fact that emotions, and psychological factors, play a bigger role in Middle East negotiations than elsewhere. In chapter two we determined that Kissinger carried out superb negotiating skills. We also found out that his personal approach was different in every situation and with every person. When Kissinger negotiated with Arab and Israeli leaders he often changed his negotiating style. Important Arabs like Sadat, Assad, Faisal and Boumediene required a different approach than Israelis Rabin and Prime Minister Meir. Kissinger's central message

however remained the same, and implied that the US wanted to preserve Israel (not its territorial annexations) and bring peace to the region as a genuine broker (Mazlish 249). Finding out what to tell each party took all of Kissinger's skills, and he had to be careful not to come across as deceitful.

Although the Middle East had been quite turbulent for a while, the US had failed to anticipate a new crisis after the Jordanian Crisis of 1970. The US was aware of the growing tensions in the region, but did not see immediate hostilities coming. Kissinger was also quite surprised, mostly because he could not believe that the Arabs would actually be stupid enough to start a losing war (Mazlish 255). The military balance had moved decisively in Israel's favor after the end of the Jordanian Crisis three years earlier (Siniver 189). Next to the fact that America failed to anticipate the Yom Kippur War, the Israeli military intelligence did so either. On October 4, it still estimated the risk of war to be low. Israel was completely caught off guard by the surprise attack of Egypt and Syria. At the start of the war, Egyptian forces crossed the Suez Canal and Syrian forces attacked from the Golan Heights simultaneously. Because of the unexpected nature, the time-pressure and the threat to national security we can define the Yom Kippur War as a crisis.

Kissinger viewed the Middle East in light of American-Soviet relations. The presence of the Soviet Union influenced Kissinger's view of the Middle East. Although he recognized the value of the Middle East to the Soviet Union he did not understand their dominance in that area. America's attitude throughout the Yom Kippur War was characterized by Kissinger's firm distrust of the Soviet Union and America's self-interest to strengthen its position in the Middle East (Sinivir 185).

This chapter analyzes the important decisions that were made during the course of the Yom Kippur War. It particularly focuses on two important decisions that expose the changed power relations between Nixon and Kissinger. These decisions shaped the course of the Yom Kippur War and showed that Kissinger almost completely executed total control. Because of the large extent of Kissinger's power during this crisis the Yom Kippur War provides us with the best case study to analyze the effect of Kissinger's personality on the important decisions that were of huge significance during these three weeks in October (Siniver 188). The two important decisions during the Yom Kippur War revolve around the military airlift to Israel on October 14 and the Nuclear Alert issued at the end of the war (Mazlish 260).

3.1 THE YOM KIPPUR WAR AS IT UNFOLDED: DECISIONS THAT WERE MADE

3.1.1 Airlift to Israel

On the night of October 6 1973, Joseph Sisco woke Kissinger to tell him that Egypt and Syria had launched a surprise attack on Israel. Kissinger was in New York City, but immediately flew back to Washington to meet with the WSAG. That same day, Israel asked the US to resupply material that had been lost during the earliest hours of the war. Although Nixon approved quiet resupply, this resupply never took place. Kissinger decided to go against resupplying Israel because according to him there was no real shortage. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger at first also opposed resupplying Israel with military material because it would damage the reputation of the US as an honest broker. That night, Kissinger called White House chief of staff Haig, who was with President Nixon in Florida, to tell him that “Defense wants to turn against the Israelis” (Kissinger qtd in Isaacson). On October 9, Nixon again ordered Schlesinger to resupply Israel, and once again, no resupply took place. It was not until October 13 that Nixon openly ordered full-scale resupply of Israel that resupply of Israel eventually took place (Haney). The resupplying issue dominated Washington for an entire week.

Many books have been written on the resupplying of Israel issue. All those works revolve around two key players: Kissinger en Schlesinger. Kissinger sympathizers believe that he was really willing to help Israel and tried to convince the Pentagon to help Israel. Kissinger critics however say that he played a sneaky game. They believe that Kissinger deliberately blocked the resupplying of Israel in order to create a favorable diplomatic climate. When talking to Israeli and Jewish leaders, Kissinger would unjustly blame the Pentagon for delaying the resupply, but when talking to Arab and Soviet leaders, he would take credit for the delays. When the resupply did start after a week, Kissinger once again took credit for the fact that it had finally started (Isaacson 513).

The resupplying of Israel issue has been accurately recorded and transcribed, and because of that it is possible to see who said what to whom. Recordings show that many decisions made by Kissinger and Haig were not even consulted with Nixon. During the telephone conversations on October 6 Kissinger and Haig decided to not resupply Israel without informing Nixon. Haig made clear to Kissinger that the American public should be convinced that the decisions were made by Nixon and not by them. Kissinger agreed, and both men wanted to show the people that Nixon, who already faced huge popularity loss, was still a strong leader on top of all the issues (Isaacson 514).

There were two main reasons for Washington to take so long to respond to Israel's request. The first was the desire to remain low profile and to keep all options once the war would end. The second was Kissinger's concern that acting too quickly and openly would assure attacks on US citizens. However, not responding to Israel's request would also damage American-Israeli ties after the war. The way in which Kissinger dealt with this dilemma is very characteristic of his personality. Kissinger told Israel Ambassador Dinitz that the delay was caused by some bureaucratic difficulties and blamed Schlesinger and the Pentagon for not acting quickly enough (Siniver 200).

Kissinger did not want to mobilize MAC (Military Aircraft Command) aircraft, but rather use commercial charter airlines in order to remain more low profile. However, this decision turned out to be fruitless as not one single commercial airline wanted to fly over this war zone. Kissinger told Dinitz time and again that his hands were tied by the bureaucracy. This was obviously exaggerated because we have determined that Kissinger was seemingly the most powerful man in the White House at that time. Although Kissinger often stated that Schlesinger blocked Nixon's orders to resupply Israel, Prof. William B. Quandt, who served as a member of the NSC at that time, says it was the other way around. Kissinger gave Schlesinger orders to not resupply Israel whereas Schlesinger argued the US had no choice but to resupply Israel with MAC aircraft. Kissinger and Haig agreed that sending MAC aircraft would be foolish (Siniver 201).

However, Kissinger did not only tell Dinitz that Schlesinger was to blame for the delay, he also talked of Schlesinger being too cautious to resupply Israel during WSAG meetings. Kissinger lied during the WSAG meetings when he told the staff that the airlift must continue, when it had not even started, until the Arabs and the Soviets capitulated. When the meeting had ended Kissinger told the WSAG principles that his decision was not based on love for Israel but rather on America's willingness to exercise power over post-war negotiations (Siniver 204).

In the mean time, Israeli forces were losing ground on the battlefield, and Dinitz told Kissinger that the US would face consequences after the war and that Israel would draw very serious conclusions from this behavior. He also threatened to find support in Congress, something Kissinger absolutely did not want because the Nixon administration could not afford an extra public crisis at this time. At this point, Nixon became personally involved and told Kissinger and Schlesinger to stop blocking the resupply of Israel. He told Kissinger that they should use everything they had. Within a few hours, Kissinger organized a WSAG meeting to prepare the first airlift. At the end of the war, on October 25, the US had supplied

Israel with a total of 12,880 tons of supplies. The fact that Nixon entered the resupplying issue personally ended Kissinger's manipulation that had lasted for almost a week. It showed that Nixon in the end still exercised the most power. Kissinger did however manage to delay the resupply of Israel with an entire week (Siniver 202). Dinitz and other Israelis however still believed Kissinger's story, and they saw the Pentagon and Schlesinger as their enemies, while in fact they tried to speed-up the resupply. This shows that Kissinger personally succeeded in captivating the Israelis. His personal charm had enabled him to exercise a lot of power regarding the resupply issue for at least a week.

3.1.2 Nuclear Alert

On 20 October Nixon sent Kissinger to Moscow to negotiate a cease-fire agreement. During this cease-fire agreement, Kissinger was completely in charge of the negotiations. The fact that Israelis were almost winning the war on both fronts made Soviets nervous, and Brezhnev immediately invited Kissinger to come over to Moscow (Siniver 205). Nixon ordered Kissinger to arrange an immediate cease-fire (Isaacson 524). Kissinger, however, did not want to reach a partnership with the Soviet Union. Kissinger was also not happy with the fact that he was in full charge of the negotiations. This meant that he was not able to delay the process by using one of his tricks, which was that he needed to talk to the President to ask his approval.

Kissinger wanted to stay faithful to his idea that peace is not solely achieved by the balance of power but also by a stable international order in which all parties feel their interests are represented (Mazlisch 255). Although Kissinger wanted Israel to gain a better position, he did realize that it was not in America's favor if Egypt would suffer massive humiliations (Isaacson 524). Nixon's idea was that Moscow and Washington should make up a peace plan and impose it on the Arabs and the Israelis. Kissinger however, did not fancy any form of partnership with the Soviet Union at all, and rather wanted the Soviets out of the diplomacy (Isaacson 525). Kissinger, who ignored Nixon's wishes, and the elements he wanted the Soviets to sign included negotiations between the parties concerned and a cease-fire resolution. Because of tense situations on the ground, the Soviets were quick to agree to Kissinger's proposal. Kissinger, who wanted to delay the process, had left the papers elsewhere and would not be able to send them until the next day.

Here we see the effect Kissinger's lone-cowboy style. Golda Meir did not understand why Kissinger had not informed her and why he had negotiated on Israel's behalf without Israeli consent. The Israeli army was close to defeating the Egyptian army and therefore

wanted the cease-fire to be delayed. The fact that Kissinger did not consult with Israel once again shows traces of his arrogance and deceiving character (Isaacson 527). Kissinger convinced the Israelis that the cease-fire agreement was not thought through yet and that he was willing to turn a blind eye if the Israelis would not abide the cease-fire agreement (Siniver 207). It once again showed Kissinger's manipulative and conspiring side. The cease-fire agreement already collapsed three hours after it went into effect. According to Russian Ambassador Dobrynin the Israelis took advantage of the confusion at the start of the cease-fire and encircled the Egyptian army. Although Kissinger had kind of given the Israelis green light to allow some slippage, he had not expected the Israelis to destroy the Egyptian army (Siniver 208). At this point, Kissinger's Jewishness came into play, and Kissinger often used his humor to conceal the fact that it made him uncomfortable. He joked about the pressure he felt to forgive is "co-religionists." Israel's violation of the cease-fire and especially its circulation of Egyptian forces made him furious, and he spoke about it during one of the WSAG meetings: "It if were not for the accident of my birth, I would be anti-Semitic" (Kissinger qtd in Isaacson 561).

The Soviets and Egyptians accused Kissinger of giving Israel permission to violate the cease-fire agreement. Israel, on the other hand, was furious at the US for cooperating with the Soviets and Egyptians and forcing the Israelis to agree to a cease-fire they did not even desire in the first place (Isaacson 528). At this point, American-Soviet détente was under threat. Two weeks after the start of the Yom Kippur War the US found itself in a superpower conflict equal to the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. On the evening of October 24, Kissinger decided to not agree to enforce a cease-fire. Kissinger did not consult this decision with Nixon, even though he had the chance. Kissinger was convinced that Nixon would not be able to decide rationally on this issue because of his preoccupation with Watergate. Because Kissinger refused to agree to a cease-fire, Soviets sent military forces to Israel. In response, the US sent out a military threat to Moscow, and decided to place American nuclear forces worldwide on a higher state of nuclear alert. The nuclear alert was put into place without informing the President first. Kissinger, who of course wanted things to stay secret, warned everyone to not leak a thing about the nuclear alert (Isaacson 531). The next day, the Soviets, still unaware of the raised nuclear alert, wanted superpower collaboration. It therefore seemed as if Kissinger and his men acted rather excessively, but given Kissinger's suspicious nature, rightly so. The Yom Kippur War started to come to an end when negotiations replaced the armed conflict. His strategy had worked, and his wish for a military stalemate had come true. The Soviets had

lost quite a lot of their influence over the Middle East, whereas the US had been able to increase its power in the region.

3.2 JUDAISM

Kissinger served as America's first Jewish Secretary of State. Although he had not practiced his religion since his college years, Kissinger still could not escape the role his religious heritage played during his political career. Nixon deliberately kept Kissinger away from Middle East policy during his first term because he was afraid that Kissinger's Jewish heritage would put him in a vulnerable position (Isaacson 560). Kissinger himself found his religious heritage to be irrelevant. He could of course not deny the fact that he was born Jewish, but he often stressed the fact that he was first and foremost an American. Nixon's attitude toward Judaism made Kissinger feel vulnerable, and Nixon often referred to Kissinger as "my Jew boy" (Nixon qtd in Isaacson 561). Nixon was afraid that Kissinger would be more loyal to Israel than to the US (Whitfield 437). When Kissinger became Secretary of State, he was therefore very inexperienced on Middle East diplomacy. In chapter one we saw that inexperience can also cause decision-makers to rely on intuition. Despite the fact that Kissinger held ambivalent feelings toward his Jewish heritage he did feel a strong emotional responsibility to protect Israel if her safety was at stake (Isaacson 562). Although Kissinger wanted to be considered a full American, he did use his Jewish background during negotiations with Israeli leaders. Kissinger once tried to convince them by saying "how can I, as a Jew who lost thirteen relatives in the holocaust, do anything that would betray Israel" (Kissinger qtd in Isaacson 562)?

In the conclusion of this chapter we will compare the important events and decisions of the Yom Kippur War to Kissinger's personality. To start off, the US failed to anticipate a new crisis in the Middle East. Kissinger was aware of the fact that the end of the Jordanian Crisis had given Israel a great amount of power that destabilized the entire region. The fact that Kissinger was appointed Secretary of State only two weeks prior to the start of the Yom Kippur War without any foreknowledge of Middle East policy made him incapable of predicting the crisis already. Nixon had not engaged Kissinger in Middle East diplomacy before and this made Kissinger unable to predict the crisis on such short notice. Although this has nothing to do with Kissinger personally, it is an indirect result of Kissinger's religious heritage: Judaism.

The resupply issue dominated the first week of the war. In this chapter we have analyzed the many times Kissinger did not follow Nixon's orders to resupply. It is important to notice however, that Kissinger did not want anyone to find out that he was the one who was blocking the resupply of Israel. When talking to the Israelis, Kissinger blamed Schlesinger and the Pentagon, but when talking to the Arabs, he took credit for delaying the process. Kissinger wanted to delay the resupply because he thought that this would give the US more power in post-war negotiations. If the US would resupply Israel too quickly, the Arabs might be infuriated. This decision is very typical of Kissinger because of his lust for power. Kissinger knew very well that appeasing both sides in a conflict could only benefit the US in a later stage of the war. Kissinger's personality becomes especially visible in the way he negotiated with Israeli and Arab leaders. Kissinger made the negotiations very personal by telling Israeli leaders that he, as a Jew, would never betray his own people. On the other hand, he convinced Nixon and Arab leaders that the US had given him everything he ever wished for and that his Judaism was part his past. In the first week of the Yom Kippur War, Kissinger played a devious game in which he manipulated, lied, and used his charm to win over both sides.

When Nixon sent Kissinger to Moscow to negotiate a cease-fire, Kissinger was not very content. Although he wanted the Arabs and Israelis to negotiate, he did not want to infuriate the Israelis by presenting them with a cease-fire moments before their victory. The fact that he vaguely gave them the green light to abolish the cease-fire is once again part of his devious personality. It also reflects his obsession with appeasement. The Soviets were not happy and suspected Kissinger of giving the Israelis permission to ignore the cease-fire. The Soviets sent military personnel to Israel in response. This move sparked paranoia in Kissinger, and he, without consultation with Nixon, raised a nuclear alert. Kissinger's paranoia in combination with time pressure possibly made him raise a nuclear alert. The fact that Kissinger had not processed the information rationally but in light of Soviet-American relations (and anti-communism) made him jump to conclusions too quickly. If he had more time, be less paranoia or not be incredibly suspicious of Soviets the nuclear alert might not have taken place at all.

Israeli Prime Minister Meir accused Kissinger of his lone ranger technique. This was not merely a technique, but also part of Kissinger's personality: he preferred to do things on his own. The fact that he did not share important information with Meir led to a situation in which the Israelis already in advance did not want to accept the cease-fire. Nixon was a loner

too, so it is hard to say if this would not have happened if Nixon were involved in this decision.

CONCLUSION

This thesis has concluded that decision-makers give meaning to foreign policy. Personal characteristics determine priorities and the decision-making process. Although a formalistic decision-making procedure was in place during the Nixon-Kissinger years the importance of such structures always depends on the President. The Nixon-Kissinger dyad has shown that the President determines the influence and role of his advisory bodies. The President also determines how much he uses his Secretary of State and National Security Advisor. Nixon only sparsely used his advisory bodies and preferred to make his decisions based on intuition and his consultancies with Kissinger. This style is rather unique for a president, and only further underscores the importance of Kissinger during Nixon's presidency.

In chapter one, we determined that Kissinger preferred the rational actor model to carry out decision-making. Reality has often proven that, while in theory, this indeed seems to be the best approach to decision-making. Constraints of time, a lack of information, and stress may force the President and his aides to choose a less desirable option. Nixon and Kissinger's realistic worldview, preference for the rational actor model, and Nixon's highly formalistic decision-making structure in theory should all have minimized the vulnerability of the decision-making process to human flaws. However, the fact that Kissinger had to deal with a crisis in the Middle East and Nixon with a crisis at home, made the Yom Kippur decision-making process ever so vulnerable to the impediments of rational choice. This is because impediments to a rational decision-making process are particular evident during crisis management.

Much paradoxically, Nixon and Kissinger's shared personality characteristics of distrust, suspicion, and a dark view of the world also contributed to the imperfections of rational choice. On top of this, the fast pace of events during the Yom Kippur War made rational crisis decision-making ever more difficult. The formalistic structure that was chosen by Nixon could have been discussed more elaborately. This would, however, require an entire chapter without a specific contribution to the research question.

In order to answer the research question if specific character traits of Kissinger influenced the course of the Yom Kippur War we looked at two important events during the war. Although we determined that Nixon and Kissinger were actually quite the same in nature, these events show Kissinger going against Nixon's wishes and pursuing his own ideas. The moments that Kissinger ignored Nixon or 'failed' to consult with Nixon are the times when his own personality comes into play. During the first week of the Yom Kippur War we saw how Kissinger played a devious game in order to appease all sides in conflict. The

analysis of the resupply issue was a clear example of the discussion of Kissinger's negotiating skills in chapter two. The lying, manipulation, appeasement, and persuasion were all fueled by his lust for power. Kissinger's choice to put nuclear forces on a worldwide alert is the result of his paranoid and mistrusting character. Next to this, the fact that it was the Soviets who had sent military personnel to Egypt might have made Kissinger more certain to issue a nuclear alert. Despite détente, Kissinger's mistrust of the Soviets and anti-communism took over the decision-making process. The fact that Kissinger was very well able to identify with the opponent was especially obvious in the case of the Yom Kippur War. Kissinger never liked references to his Jewish heritage, but did use it to charm Prime Minister Meir of Israel. This hypocritical behavior perfectly fits with what we have learnt about Kissinger in chapter two.

Direct results of Kissinger's personality were the delay of the resupply of Israel, the broken cease-fire agreement by Israel, and the hasty decision to put American nuclear forces on worldwide alert. There is however, no guarantee that the outcome of the Yom Kippur War would have been completely different if Nixon, or another Secretary of State for that matter, was in charge of the decision-making process. Because of this, we can answer our research question with yes: Kissinger's personality certainly influenced the course of the Yom Kippur War. I would not by any means conclude that his decisions were motivated by his religious heritage. The decisions were always made with American interests in mind, and not necessarily Jewish.

To conclude, this thesis not only explored the degree to which Kissinger's personality determined the course of the Yom Kippur War but also bridged the gap as to why theory of decision-making is different from reality of decision-making. An important note is that the amount of power Kissinger exercised during the Yom Kippur War was exceptionally high, and the conclusions that were drawn are applicable to the Yom Kippur War only. The Yom Kippur War cannot be seen separately from the Watergate affair and the shift in balance of power this created between Nixon and Kissinger subsequently.

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