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Trust and Control: characterization, bottlenecks, and solutions at the Radboud University Nijmegen

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Abstract: This paper investigates the relationship between trust and control in an intra-organizational relationship in the Radboud University. One faculty (Nijmegen School of Management) and the ICT provider (ICT Service Centre) are investigated. Using multiple perspectives provided by literature the exact situation is characterized, bottlenecks are discovered, and possible solutions are provided.

Keywords: Trust, Control, Intra-organizational, Radboud University.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Recently inter-organizational relationships have gained in popularity. They have become a staple in a lot of type of industries (Hagedoorn, 1993). However, a lot of these types of alliances do perform as well as expected or even underperform (Das and Teng, 2000). Moreover, (some) companies persist in these relationships even though the costs of persisting can cost millions of dollars (Inkpen and Ross, 2001). An example of such a relationship could be Koninklijke Vopak with the Estonian ally Vopak E.O.S. (Telegraaf, 2014). The partner of Koninklijke Vopak is not performing as well as expected due to reasons of a high degree of competition and bad market circumstances. Still, Koninklijke Vopak decides to reorganize rather than to stop the relationship (alliance).

Strategic alliances or relationship can be initiated for a variety of reasons. One might be to share the costs for the research and development part of two organizations. The idea behind this is that both (or several) companies share their knowledge about research and development and they share the costs. This decreases the overall costs of R&D while still producing the benefits as expected. However, on the competitive market, not all relationships do flourish in the manner just described. Some causes for unsuccessful alliances could be difference in cultures between countries, but also between companies within the same country (Zamir et al., 2014). There has been little research done in interfirm relationships with regard to control trust and accounting (Dekker, 2004).

Types of alliances can also be categorized as interfirm or intrafirm relationships. Interfirm or inter-organizational relationships are relationships between two different types of companies. While an intrafirm or intra-organizational relationships are those relationships within department or parts of one particular organization.

The ICT service centre of the Radboud University in Nijmegen in particular has relationships with other parties that seem to require trust. A lack of trust could therefore be a problem. Because, as a service provider for the primary processes of the university strictly sticking to formal contracts is not asked of them. They need to be flexible and in situations where their service is needed ad hoc. In those situations the ISC (ICT Service Centrum) cannot rely on saying that things are not agreed upon in the formal contracts. However, this requires flexibility and due to personal limitations and limitations in means they cannot always do their job. This is where they need to rely on trust to determine a reasonable term for the ISC to complete the job or provide the service. Trust can only be sustained by concertation. Also the ISC has to constantly keep providing the services in order to earn their trust with the faculties. A problem that arises here is that in order for the trust to be built there needs to be a lot of concertation to determine reasonable terms. If these are not met, trust will decrease.

More empirical research in the trust-control nexus is needed (Costa & Bijlsma-Frankema, 2007). It seems that there is still a lot of discussion about how the trust-control nexus works and therefore empirical research about the topic is needed. As mentioned at the start of this chapter there are some possible problems arising from the support services having to be flexible in order to keep the trust up to the level as needed. As said in Dutch: trust comes on foot and leaves on horseback. A better

understanding can help in increasing the effectiveness of relationships. Furthermore, as the Radboud University has a societal function to provide education of a high quality, so it produces good potential employees on the labour market. This indicates that this type of research has both scientific and societal relevance. The fact that this relationship is an intra-firm relationship can also help provide new knowledge and insights in the relationship between control and trust. As mentioned before inter-firm relationships have not been researched a sufficiently (Dekker, 2004). Intra-organizational relationships should also be investigated in more detail (Van de Bunt et al., 2005). Moreover Van de Bunt et al. (2005) investigate German paper factories, which are profit organizations, whereas the Radboud University Nijmegen is a non-profit organization. This means that the relationship of control and trust within this particular case could have different characteristics, than in profit organizations, and in interfirm relationships.

The importance of understanding the trust-control nexus within the Radboud University Nijmegen us quite high. Currently within the Radboud University Nijmegen (RU) there exist intra-organizational relationships. One in particular, is the relationship between faculties and the ICT department which provides the ICT services and goods for the faculties. The faculty in which this field of research is facilitated is called the NSM (Nijmegen School of Management). This faculty will be used as an example. These intra-organizational relationships within the RU, rely on control and trust to function well. It is not known what the exact dynamics and roles of the control and trust are within this relationship. A better understanding of the effects of using formal control or certain types of formal control and trust could increase the quality of ICT products and services delivered to the NSM (faculty). This, in turn can increase the quality of the research done and the education provided by the faculty. Seeing as the overall goal of providing the best education and research as possible, the relationship seems relevant to study. Within a non-profit organization control and trust have not been researched sufficiently (Dekker, 2004), so studying these types of intra-organizational relationships also can provide new knowledge. For the RU, it means that the possible outcome can lead to a better competitive position relative to other universities.

The relationship between the faculty (NSM) and the ISC (shared service centre) is seen as an alliance in this paper. The reason for that is the fact that both entities are part of a larger whole, which is the Radboud University. The university has the goal of trying to facilitate and provide the best education possible to its students. Moreover, it strives to do the best research possible. The faculty has the goal of providing education and doing research at the best quality possible in a certain area. For the NSM, these are: economics and business administration among others. The ISC is tasked with providing the faculty with ICT services and products. These will help the NSM in using the ICT to create a better educational experience for the students, by giving them access to useful databases for studying. This also applies for the employees of the faculty which are teaching students or doing research. The ISC therefore supports the NSM in order to provide the necessary education and research in the specific areas that the NSM specializes in. Both are working together and this also

helps achieve the overall goal of the RU of providing the best quality of education and research as possible. The faculty and the shared service centre are alliances and their relationship is seen as an intra-organizational relationship in this paper.

Additionally, the University has a societal function to provide good education for the students it seems necessary that potential flaws or bottlenecks between the intrafirm relationship investigated in this paper should be addressed and possible solutions to those should be given. In order to do this, the paper will use the reflective cycle presented by Van Aken (2004). This basically means that first a case must be chosen, then a diagnose of the situation should be made. Afterwards possible solutions (implementations) should be proposed and implemented. Finally the implementations can be evaluated (diagnosed) in order to see whether additional implementations are needed to resolve the bottlenecks that were found. This particular cycle is chosen, because it provides design knowledge and therefore, is to be used by professionals in the field (Van Aken, 2004). The type of relationship, its bottlenecks, and the possible solutions are needed to help the University to fulfil its societal role of providing good education. This type of knowledge is needed and therefore this particular choice is made in this research.

By investigating the trust-control nexus in intra-organizational relationships, this paper adds new knowledge to the existing research. Dekker (2004) found that intra-organizational relationships is needed as there is no sufficient body of research done yet. However, regarding the control-trust nexus research has been done by Van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman (2000) and Vosselman & Van der Meer-Kooistra (2009), from a rational perspective. On the other hand, there are other perspectives that have been developed recently by Mahama & Chua (2016) such as the trust-as-practice perspective. This paper tries to add new knowledge to these papers by investigating the relationship described above in the RU by looking from these different perspectives. As this approach of Mahama & Chua (2016) is so 'new' it could certainly provide some new knowledge. Taking different perspectives also ensures an overall characterization of the trust-control nexus within the RU.

The main route of this paper will contain an investigation and comparison between recent (state of the art) literature (Mahama & Chua, 2016 and Vosselman & Van der Meer-Kooistra, 2009) and the practical research done in this paper. The practical results that are found are investigated from the perspectives derived from these state of the art studies. These perspectives are presented in chapter 2 of this paper. The reason for choosing this main route of comparing the state of the art and the practical research is to add to the relatively new body of knowledge. Specifically, the relationship between practice and theory could be investigated as theory is not always in compliance with practice. So what parts of the theory is in compliance with the results found and what is not could increase the knowledge.

Based on the examples given above and the regulatory cycle proposed by Van Aken (2004), it seems that the relationship between control and trust can have some problems, but is also a reason for parties to remain and engage in relationships. The Radboud University and the fact that there could be

some problems, in being as flexible as possible in order to remain trustworthy or earn trust. Additionally, the scope of different perspectives available about control and trust, will be used to help answer the main research questions. This paper uses three main research questions. These are as follows:

1.How is the relationship between control and trust characterized between the support services and the faculties of the Radboud University Nijmegen?

2. What are the bottlenecks in the relationship between the support services and the faculties of the Radboud University Nijmegen, with regards to control and trust?

3. What improvements can be made in order to resolve the bottlenecks in the relationship between the support services and the faculties of the Radboud University Nijmegen, with regards to control and trust?

The research question is aimed trying to answer what type of relationship exists between control and trust in this particular case. In chapter two the possible relationships (between control and trust) are explained and how they are characterized. Moreover, the concepts of control and trust are elaborated.

The research questions presented above are both scientifically and practically relevant. The scientific relevance is that the study will generate knowledge which will increase the body of knowledge of the trust-control nexus in intrafirm relationships. This case is quite unique in the sense that the faculties do not have a choice, they have to work together with the service providers and how does that influence the trust between the parties.

The practical relevance of this study is that in answering the research question the Radboud University Nijmegen can benefit from the examination of the bottlenecks within the relationship and the possible solutions. Even if these (possible) solutions are not used, the characterization of the relationship and the bottlenecks can give them some insights for the future with regards to how to use control and trust.

The first chapter of this research introduced the central topic of the trust-control nexus and the research question is stated. Furthermore, chapter 2 presents a literature review of the different perspectives on the trust-control nexus as well as the definitions of trust and control. Chapter 3 presents the methodology and elaborates the case that is studied. In addition, chapter 4 entails presenting the results of the in chapter 3 described research. Finally, chapter 5 includes a conclusion based on the results, a discussion is given, the limitations of the research are elaborated, and there are some possibilities for future research.

Chapter 2: Literature review

The following chapter reviews the relevant literature for this research. First of all, the central concepts of control and trust are explained. Starting off in sections 2.1 the control is specifically elaborated upon. Following that section 2.2 explains the concept of trust and three perspectives there are on trust as well. Finally section 2.3 investigates the relevant literature for the relationship between control and trust.

2.1 Control

Formal control is a regulatory process, which make elements of a system more predictable by creating standards. People or employees should behave along the lines of those standards in order for it to work properly (Das & Teng, 2001). It is aimed at increasing the reliability of tasks being performed by employees. An employee or person's work is specified in a specific set of rules and he or she should behave in compliance with the formal rules (Bijlsma-Frankema & Costa, 2005). Another definition of control is that it entails influencing the behaviours of the organizational members (employees) in line with achieving the organizational goals (Cardinal et al., 2004).

In this study formal control will be defined along the lines of Das & Teng (2001). The formal controls *are the standards that specify what each party in relationship is responsible for*. These are the documents or contracts between two or more parties engaging in a particular relationship. A definition of trust stated by Rosseau (1998). *"Trust is a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based on positive expectations of the intentions or the behaviour of another (Rosseau et al., 1998, p.395)."*

Formal controls have three basic steps in which they are formed (Merchant, 1982). First standards are established. Secondly, performance is measured against these standards, and thirdly, deviations are corrected. Controls need to focus on the results and are needed because, not all people act in the best interest of the organization. Therefore controls are implemented to guide their behaviour into the desirable direction. As people on their own will behave in self-interest and are effort-averse. Perfect control is complete assurance that the desired activities are done by employees with absolute assurance (Merchant, 1982). Perfect control is however, not possible, as there are always ways in which an employee can act, that are not in the organizations' best interest.

Ahrens & Chapman (2004) make the distinction between coercive and enabling control. Coercive controls can be characterized as highly standardized rules, designed in order to create a fool proof system. These types of controls are used to strictly guide behaviour. It will constrict behaviour and will punish mistakes. Enabling controls are the opposite. They are designed to give employees options. This will call upon a person's feeling of responsibility and its capabilities, so a fool proof system is not needed.

Perception of controls by employees can be different from the intended type of control implemented by an employer. For example giving researchers the option to send in their articles to a set of publishers with the idea of choice can be seen as enabling by the employer. However, a

researcher might have the feeling that they are being constrained, because they cannot send in their work to all possible journals. Therefore they can have a different perception of the controls.

2.2 Trust

In literature there is little to no agreement of the exact definition of trust (Bijlsma-Frankema & Costa, 2005). Most researchers seem to agree that there are two conditions that are important for trust. First of all there is the willingness to be vulnerable to risks between parties in relationships. Secondly, and positive expectations about the relationship is the other conditions. A definition incorporating both conditions is as follows: "trust is a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based on positive expectations of the intentions or the behaviour of another (Rosseau et al., 1998, p.395)." This means that trusting another party it means becoming vulnerable, but one has the confidence that the other party does not take advantage of that vulnerability. On the other hand, if one party engages in a relationship with another party, both parties become vulnerable to each other and therefore, could believe that this cancels out. Moreover, the positive expectations will mean that the parties do not believe they will get taken advantage of.

Trust is needed for relationships to work, however it seems to also keep less than desirable relationships going. Patzelt &Shepherd (2008) find that factors such as goodwill trust, behavioural, and societal control play a definite role in determining the fact whether they stay in (under)performing alliances. Underperforming relationships must be seen as relationships not generating the expected benefits over an extended period of time, however these relationships in some situations persist. They investigated alliance managers in Germany (Bavaria) and suggested that more investigation in this topic is needed in order to fully comprehend the decisions for not ending underperforming relationships. They find that persistence is associated with output control. If there is a higher degree of output control, the relationship is more persistent even if the relationship in underperforming. Furthermore, a high level of competence trust is related with relationship persistence. Detienne et al. (2008) find that entrepreneurs tend to persist with under-performing firms because of a variety of reasons. Most relevant to this study is the factor of previous organizational success. This leads to investors persisting with organizations even while they are underperforming. It seems likely that a similar motivation could be behind firms persisting in underperforming relationships. After all, if this relationship has been successful in the past, it seems more likely that it could flourish in the future. In addition, similar to this, that R&D projects that underperform will persist if the respective R&D spokesmen receive positive feedback (Patzelt et al., 2011). Moreover, bigger companies have more control over their strategic alliances and are therefore more likely to persist in the relationship (Lerner & Merges, 1998).

2.2.1 Rational perspective

In the rationalist view, formal control and trust are both used to cope with uncertainty and behavioural risk (Vosselman & Van der Meer-Kooistra, 2009). Trust can be seen as something of a social control that replaces the need for formal control (Dekker, 2004). In situations of big uncertainty and chance of risk, the presence of trust is extremely important (Van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2000). This trust has to be present for if parties cooperate they cannot use formal contracts to make sure this risk and uncertainty can be absorbed. Trust can be defined as the confidence in another person's (party's) goodwill (Ring & Van de Ven, 1992). Trust in the rational perspective is the result of (individual) decisions made by people within an organization.

In literature there have been made distinguished several types of trust. There are in the rational perspective of the control-trust-nexus some particular forms of trust named in literature (Minnaar et al, 2016). First of all there is contractual trust. Which entails the trust of the parties that the other will carry out the contract that has been established in a particular relationship. Secondly, there is competence trust, which is one party trusting that the other party is capable of doing what it says it will do. For example, companies agree that one will ensure the needed materials will be at the right place at the right time. If the competence trust is there, other party, will trust that the needed materials are on time at the exact location specified in the contract. Thirdly there is the notion of goodwill trust. Goodwill trust is the trust that the other party will act in line with what is best for the relationship, even though another course of action might be more beneficial for that party on its own. So the trust that parties will act in favour of the relationship and not in favour of its own (Sako, 1998). Thin trust stems from the contracts and the formal incorporations that follow, such as balanced scorecards (Minnaar et al., 2016). On the other hand, "Thick trust, is produced during the course of the relationship through the relational signals ensuing from the local rational decisions (Minaar et al., 2016, p.1)." So in a sense the thin trust is the minimum that in required to engage in the interfirm relationship and thick trust eventually develops over time if the relationship is successful. Another form of trust could be the blind trust, which is quite naïve and is basically what is says. It regards one party blindly trusting the other party to do what it is supposed to do. Adler (2001) mentions a certain type of trust which is called reflective trust. This type of trust is derived from an open dialogue with peers.

According to Bijlsma-Frankema & Costa (2005) there are two types of trust. Interpersonal trust and system or institutional trust. Interpersonal trust entails trust between two or more people. For example a person can trust another person to bring him important information on time, or not take

advantage of him/her. System or institutional trust entails the trust in the functioning of organizational, social, and institutional systems. An example of this type of trust could be that an employee trust in the organizational to perform as it should. So if information is given to the appropriate person, it will end up where it is needed and on time.

Another manner in which trust can be distinguished is into three types: character-based trust, process-based trust, and institution-based trust (Zucker, 1986). Character-based trust is based on social similarities and shared moral codes between people. It is likely that interpersonal trust is high when character-based trust is high. Process-based trust is based on experiences of reciprocity , and finally institution-based trust is established around institutional arrangements. These arrangements create and sustain trust. This is similar as the thin trust based upon formal contract (Minnaar et al., 2016).

2.2.1.1 Relationship between control and trust

This section is here to improve the understanding of the relationship between control and trust by presenting three types of relationships found in the literature. These are the complementary, substitutive, and interactive relationships respectively. It is important to note that these are all sub-views within the overall rationalist perspective on control and trust.

2.2.1.1.1 Complementary

The relationship between control and trust and accounting in interfirm relationships has been characterized in different manners by different types of literature. Most interfirm relationships are based on contracts (Meira, et al., 2010). Moreover, more examination of this relationship is needed (Van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2009). There are several perspectives from which one could look at trust in these types of relationships. Trust and control can be seen as either substitutes or complementary to each other (Dekker, 2004). From the complementary perspective, control and trust are used to decrease the overall amount of uncertainty and risk in inter-firm relationships. Trust replaces the formal control in this case (Vosselman & Van der Meer-Kooistra, 2009). Trust may be the result of previous contracts being fulfilled as what was specified in that particular contract (Van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2000).

2.2.1.1.2 Substitutive

Van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman (2000) mention that the substitutes perspective suggests an inverse relationship between control and trust in inter-organizational relationships. This means that the higher the amount of control, the lower the need for trust and vice versa. If this is the case than in theory it should be possible to regulate certain relationship purely on trust or control. Also an increase in trust or control does not increase

the overall regulation of the relationship as an increase of the one, means a decline in the other. The balance will likely be found based on costs and the risks that are taken by relying on trust or contracts in certain situations. However, even if one uses an extreme amount of bureaucracy it seems to be impossible to include all possible problems and situations within formal contracts. This means that trust always has to play a role in inter/intrafirm relationships. In addition, this is also the case the other way around. As it is not possible to only rely on trust, because it would be too risky, and there would be no possibility to settle disputes in court.

2.2.1.1.3 Interactive

The manner in which the relationship can be viewed as interactive is strongly influenced by the relational perspective discussed in section 2.2.2. The relationship between trust and control is formed within a network and cannot be implemented in a by far-sighted actors (Minnaar, 2016). Trust and control and its relationship and how it comes to be is an interactive process and will form and change within the network. The controls are actors, rather than instruments to ensure relationships will work the way that was intended. Trust is not something that is objectively formed to ensure a good relationship, but is formed within the network. Both control and trust therefore interact. Controls become (non-human) actors in the sense that they influence decisions made by human actors in the network. If one takes the interaction perspective on the relationship between control and trust, control and trust are not seen as static. Both complementary and substitutive connections exist (Vosselman & Van der Meer-Kooistra, 2009).

2.2.1.2 Essence of rational perspective

The central theme when looking from a rational perspective on control and trust is the fact that control systems and trust are the result of deliberate negotiations and decisions. To use trust in order to regulate a relationship is a 'rational' choice. Trust can be shown by one party to the other by giving signals on purpose. This could mean deliberately communicating or not communicating specific pieces of information to customers. This will help increase or maintain the trust needed. The individual is central to those decisions that are taken in order to create trust (Vosselman & Van der Meer-Kooistra, 2009). Accounting can also take shape in this respect as a vehicle for trust building. These signals can be called 'relational signalling' (Vosselman & Van der Meer-Kooistra, 2009). From a rational perspective it is key in creating trust. The trust is a consequence of individual decision-making by actors. Accounting (control) is instrumental (are instruments) to individuals who make the (strategic) decisions (Wagensveld et al., 2016).

2.2.2 Relational perspective

Recently, there has been developments in literature which take a relational perspective on the control-trust-nexus (Minnaar et al., 2016). From this perspective trust is viewed not as something that can be objectively implemented by far-sighted actors. They are not results of isolated decisions (individual decision-making). Rather, trust is formed within a network of relationships within an organization. Control and contracts are not instruments, but actors from this viewpoint. In this case trust is not something of an objective or rational thing that is used to ensure a good relationship. In this perspective trust is formed within a network.

2.2.2.1 Trust-as-practice perspective

In recent literature even another approach to the relationship between control and trust has emerged. This is the trust-as-practice perspective. This approach has several implications according to Mahama & Chua (2016). Trust or non-trust between parties and the presence/absence thereof is extremely situational. In addition, trust/non-trust us situated within time-space. In a sense time could 'heal' broken relationships or breached trust. Trust could differ among countries, industries, and jurisdictions. This is different to the view that trust is a static end-state. In this trust-as-practice approach trust is seen as a continuous flow of ties. It could have cycles in that respect. Another implication of this perspective is that is follows 'materialities'. Which can be described as non-human actors, such as accounting expertise and inscriptions. Moreover, the perspective focuses on activities, which enables the analysis of the temporal shifts in trust or distrust. Trust is defined in this perspective as: "*an accomplishment constructed through the actions and routinized, situated practices of multiple actors, both human and non-human* (Mahama & Chua, 2016, p.8)." 'Trust in the doing' is investigated. This means seeing trust as bodily routines, understandings, and knowledges that are central to developing trust/distrust. The central practices are called trust-practices. These refer to specific routines that are explicitly carried out to form trust/distrust. As the trust-as-practice approach has not been used often and further research is needed on this subject, this is the approach that will be taken in this paper (Mahama & Chua, 2016). As this perspective on trust is brand new it will be interesting to be able to find routines that confirm this type of trust. Also, new knowledge is needed in this field, as it is a new type of perspective.

2.2.2.2 Essence of relational perspective

When taking the relational perspective on the trust-control nexus there are mainly six essentials to keep in mind (Wagensveld et al., 2016). The primary focus is on the associations that are influenced by and created by interactions between people within networks. The connections between certain entities or people within a network are the centre of what is looked at when taking a relational perspective.

Another essential point is that the identity, the actions and the places in which actors within a network meet are not fixed and unpredictable. This means that those are an outcome, rather than a starting point. Which is the reason for focusing on the associations/connections between entities. As a consequence of these interactions entities might become, either economic (wo)men, stewards, or a hybrid between the two (Vosselman, 2014). Entities are not by default one of the three categories, but become one of those, because of entities interacting. Moreover, the places in which the actors meet, can vary between a market, hierarchy, or a hybrid, because of the interaction.

The third essential of the perspective is the way in which control and accounting are seen. They are seen as symmetrical to human actors, rather than asymmetrical. This means that non-human actors within a network perform. They interact with humans and influence the behaviour of those human actors.

Taking a relational perspective when studying trust and control within organizations focuses on the performativity, rather than the instrumentality of control structures. Performativity can uncover the real effects, rather than the intended effects. Accounting and control can generate potential unpredictable effects, because they mediate. This means that controls can be implemented by an organization in order to promote desirable behaviour. This, intended behaviour can in reality be deviated from, which is a consequence of the performativity of the controls.

Moreover, a relational perspective is reflexive. Reflexive means that it does not use predetermined frameworks in order to study specific situations within organizations. Rather, the researchers, frameworks, and people claiming to use those frameworks or systems in practice, are part of the network and perform.

Lastly, research done from the relational perspective and the results thereof are of conceptual use to practitioners (Van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2012). In the rational perspective the results are intended to be of instrumental use to the practitioners.

2.3 Topics

Based on the perspectives on the relationship between control and trust as explained above, this section presents topics that are central to this paper. These topics derived from the literature review presented above. These will be used to assess the trust-control relationship within the RU. The main topics are also used to derive interview questions from. These interview questions are mainly used to determine what role trust plays and the bottlenecks that are present between the ISC and the NSM. These questions will also be used to investigate what people believe are the formal control in the relationship between the NSM and the ISC. There are six essential topics that are presented in this section. The topics are the link between the (state of the art) theory and the practical research done in this paper. It is important to note that not all these topics necessarily lead to exact questions, but will be used assess the results in order to attempt to answer the main questions using the results that are generated in chapter 4.

There is big variety of views/perspectives on the trust-control nexus. It is interesting to see how the exact relationship between trust and control is in this case. Are trust and controls substitutes, complementary, or relationally related? Trust and control are dynamic and a minimum of trust is needed for success in every type of collaboration. In order to have effective controls a certain degree or a minimum of trust is a necessity (Das & Teng, 1998). Because there always exists a degree of trust how minimal it means there is a relationship with control. Furthermore, the trust-as-practice approach argues that the relationship between control and trust is determined by trust-practices or routines that are used to create trust. Which brings us to the main topic of this paper, which will be to gain a better understanding of the relationship between control and trust within the Radboud University Nijmegen. In extension thereof, the bottlenecks and solutions to those could be presented.

Based on the most important dichotomy presented in this chapter, which is the rational vs the relational perspective, the most important topics are presented in this section. The reason for this being that these topics will play an essential role in acquiring the relevant knowledge in doing the actual research. These topics are selected on their ability to help answer the three main questions as presented in chapter 1. Important to note is the fact that these topics incorporate both the rational and relational perspective to help characterize the relationship that is studied in this paper. The reason for that being that, both perspectives can help understand the relationship. Also in trying to investigate bottlenecks and do recommendations, the instrumentality part of the rational perspective comes into play. However, practitioners can also use the results of this paper in a conceptual manner, in order to learn how the relationship is characterized and form their own opinion.

There are six topics that are central to developing the interview questions. The exact questions can be found in appendix A and the methodology is presented in chapter 3. A table including the topics and some questions that are related to the topic is presented in appendix E. These topics will be used to develop the research questions that should be used for the practical research. This section presents the six topics and the reasons for selecting the specific topics. The topics are control, trust, relationship between control and trust, essentials rational vs relational perspective, bottlenecks, and solutions to bottlenecks.

First of all, there is the topic of (formal) control. This is an essential topic as it can define the actual control that are present within the relationship between the NSM and the ISC. Moreover, things such as how the controls feel to both parties (enabling/coercive) are important to get a grip on if one is to help identify bottlenecks and possible solutions. The results regarding the questions that are derived from the topics are investigated from both a rational (Vosselman &Van der Meer-Kooistra, 2009 and Wagensveld et al., 2016) and a relational perspective (trust-as-practice , Mahama & Chua, 2016).

Secondly, there is the topic of trust. Trust is used as an essential topic to develop questions for respondents to get a sense if a party experiences trust. Additionally, if a party uses trust deliberately, when comes into play etc. As can be seen in this chapter there are a lot of different types of trust and ways in which it can be defined. This paper will attempt not to give respondents a definition of trust

(and control) as it is important to have them talk about when it comes into play. It does not help the study to potentially confuse the respondents with possible complicated definitions.

Thirdly, there is the topic of the relationship between control and trust. This is derived from the literature study as essential, because there are different perspectives on it. Moreover, this relationship is the central relationship that will be characterized in order to answer one of the main questions of this study. Taking a rational perspective for example can reveal if control and trust are seen as complementary or substitutive.

Fourthly, there is the topic of the essentials of the rational perspective on control and trust vs. the essentials of the relational perspective on control and trust. The essentials are presented above in this chapter. These are used to look from the perspectives to the results in order to characterize the relationship in this specific case (NSM & ISC) and the bottlenecks and how problems are dealt with.

Fifthly, the bottlenecks are important. This topic is not directly derived from the literature study done in this chapter. It is selected because it is a central subject of the second research question presented in chapter 1. The bottlenecks will be assessed by the researcher, after analysing the results.

Finally, the solutions to bottlenecks is the sixth topic. This topic is like topic five. It is not derived from the literature study, but is central to the third research question of this paper. Therefore it is selected to help develop interview questions from. The last two topics can only be investigated by using interviews. However, this study also makes use of another method to acquire results. This brings us to the next chapter, which describes the exact methodology of this paper.

Chapter 3: Methodology

This chapter elaborates the method of the study done, as well as a description of the case that is to be investigated. Following the reflective cycle of van Aken (2004) this paper follows a design-focused research method. That is done in order to help achieve the practical solutions to existing problems. This means that it can help solve existing problems in practice in this particular relationship between the ISC and the NSM. The reflective cycle involves firstly choosing a case. The particular case that will be examined in this study will be elaborated in section 3.1. Following that, a diagnose of the situation should be made. The diagnose will be made at the end of the results chapter (chapter 4). It entails in this particular case the characterization of the relationship and its bottlenecks. Afterwards possible solutions (implementations) should be proposed and implemented. In the final chapter possible solutions are presented based on the findings in this study. Actual implementation of these solutions cannot be done in this research. Finally the implementations can be evaluated (diagnosed) in order to see whether additional implementations are needed to resolve the bottlenecks that were found. This step in the process cannot be taken in this study, but could be a possibility for a future study.

As there are two central concepts in this research (control & trust) it is important to determine what is considered in this paper as control and when trust comes in. The formal document signed by the two parties describing the particular relationship and each party's responsibilities will be considered control. For example, rules and responsibilities described in formal documents are the formal controls. Document analysis will be the means by which the control is examined. Trust is seen as the practices done by the members of each party in order to ensure that trust is built. This trust is mainly investigated by making use of interviews. The topics mentioned in chapter 2 are the guidelines by which these interviews are held. The reasons for this are that formal controls are always stated in contracts and document analysis is the way in which the contract can be researched. Furthermore in interviews are chosen, because one is able to explicitly ask respondents to describe in what situations trust comes in, if they feel there is enough trust, and what actions are taken in order to develop trust. Alternatively, observation could be used in order to observe routines that are done in order to develop trust. This method is not chosen, however, because it is difficult to observe trust as an outsider. Therefore interviews are a much more effective means in order to help characterize the relationship between the ISC and NSM.

3.1 Case:

Case study of the Radboud University situated in Nijmegen. It provides education for students on the highest level. It has seven faculties specialized in different branches of science. For example, the Nijmegen school of management and the faculty of medical sciences. The faculties are supported in their primary tasks by secondary support services, such as the example given earlier in this paper, the ICT service centre. Which provides ICT workplaces and workplace support. In addition they provide

infrastructural services (e.g. network and hosting), and application development as well as database development. Moreover, application and database management. These are done for all the faculties, so the faculties can keep using computer and software to do their jobs of providing education and doing relevant research in their respective scientific areas.

Interviews with secondary services providers within the Radboud University and one of the seven faculties. Also documents analysis about the specific responsibilities of the supporting services such as the ICT service centre and the marketing and communication department. In this study the specifically the Nijmegen school of Management (NSM) and the ISC are investigated. The reason for that being is that the Nijmegen school of Management is the faculty that is the most accessible for the researcher as it is the faculty that provides the education for this researcher. The ISC (ICT Service Centre) is chosen, because the relationship will likely be a long one, as ICT is a big part of the workplace and is there to stay for the foreseeable future. The role of ICT might even get bigger and bigger in the faculties as the digital world gets an increasing amount of grip on the workplace as well as the lives of people in the Western world. Also, it seems that the relationship between the NSM and the ISC seems to be highly dependent on trust. Moreover, other support services such as the catering, do support the faculties, but will have no real trust relationship, as they only provide food for the employees. No actual working relationship is there to help improve the overall quality of education for the students.

An important thing to note is the fact that this ISC functions as a shared service centre (SSC). It is characterized as an independent organizational unit that provides services to other organizational units. This is most often done in non-core business activities. This can create economies of scale in particular in the ICT part of organizations, because of technological developments (Minnaar & Vosselman, 2013).

3.2 Method

The method of investigating the relationship will be done in two ways. Both interviews and document analysis will be done in order to understand the situation and help answer the main research question. The document analysis will focus on the user's agreement between the service provider (ISC) and the service user (Nijmegen school of Management). This user's agreement describes the exact relationship between the two parties. The exact services that are provided and used and which people can contact each other in order to fix potential problems with the services. The contract is implicitly renewed each year. The documents in this research will be assumed to present the formal 'control', as it is the contract in which the relationship is written down.

3.2.1 Document analysis & interviews

First of all, interviews should be done in order to try and get a grasp on the trust-practices (explicit practices to form trust). Interviews can help highlight problems with the formal

documentation of the relationship, as well as where is deviated from it. These document analysis of the particular relationship between the parties should be done in order to find out the formal contract, which will include the controls. Questions should be asked whether trust is seen by the parties as something static or continuous. Also it is necessary to understand whether the parties consider trust and formal controls to be substitutes and/or complements, to help the understanding of the control-trust-accounting nexus. In this study the trust-as-practice approach will be taken in order to help increase the knowledge on this perspective, which is needed (Mahama & Chua, 2016). Trust is considered situational and trust is located in time and space. The specific practices that are explicitly used to generate trust are important.

What should be known after collecting the data using interviews and the document analysis is what is seen as trust by parties. This could be different among the parties and different branches they work with as trust is located in space and time (Mahama & Chua, 2016). What exact measures the parties use to develop trust? What are the formal controls/what is the formal relationship between parties? What are the measures that would be/are taken in the possible event that trust is broken? How does the trust relationship change over time/has it changed, and in what manner?

These questions will help understand and characterize the relationship between control and trust. In addition this provides answers that can be used to help characterize the relationship between control and trust. Both the service providers of for one of the faculties and the faculty (of management sciences) should be interviewed in order to get the perspectives of both parties in order to understand where the bottlenecks are in this relationship, and also whether there are differences between the formal documents and practice.

The interviews are done to get a better understanding with the key people in this relationship of how 'trust' plays a role in the relationship. The reason for this is that trust is not written down in any agreement or contract. The key people that have to communicate and cooperate in order for the service to be provided are interviewed in order to get a sense of where trust is needed, or where there is a lack thereof. Specifically the relationship between control and trust can be determined. Whether the parties see the relationship between trust and control as complementary, substitutive, or interactive.

The interview will be a semi-structured interview. As it provides the possibility for the interviewer to ask relevant questions that come up in the interview that are relevant for the research. That means that the questions will be asked to the interviewee and that the interviewer can ask questions such as 'why?' as to get a better understanding of the answers that are given and as a consequence, of the relationship between trust and control. Taking both sources of information helps increase the validity and reliability of the research (Vennix, 2010). In addition to characterizing the relationship of trust and control in this interfirm relationship, the interviews can help in detecting possible bottlenecks and solutions to those bottlenecks. Evidently, the documents do not provide this type of information as contracts are used to describe each party's responsibilities. Therefore the interviews take a central role in this study. The interview questions are presented in appendix A.

Furthermore, the transcripts of the interviews are presented in appendix B. Before the interviews that have been done, two orientating talks have been done with a representative of the Nijmegen school of Management (21-6-16) and a representative of the ISC (29-6-16). These talks were not recorded, but these have helped in the process of getting temporary access to the user's agreement. Moreover, it has helped getting insights of how the relationship between control and trust is characterized as well as some problems. The orientating talks and the information that has been retrieved from these talks have been used in order to help answer the research questions (Appendix D). The key questions as presented in chapter 2 are the guidelines for the interviews that are done.

Due to some restrictions, the amount of interviews conducted in this paper is low. This is due to certain key people within the NSM and ISC not desiring to cooperate with this study. After asking these people their motives to not wish to participate, these people did not think they were accountable to the researcher of this paper. In the case of the NSM this meant that another key figure had to be approached. This has robbed this study of the chance to compare opinions between people from the NSM and the ISC with each other. It could have provided some insights in the differences within the two central parties in this study. The person spoken to have been a person from the NSM who is authorized to order services and goods from the ISC. As can be seen in appendix C this is one level under the director of the NSM, and this person can order ICT products. It is likely that person has a good idea of the trust and control relationship between the NSM and the ISC. This authorized person has been spoken to twice in this research. On the other hand, this paper uses information retrieved from speaking with the person of the ISC who is responsible for the relations management. This is the most important person to be spoken to as, he is the one who has the most contact with the NSM and has regular contact with them. This ensures the fact that he will have the best grasp on what the dynamics of control and trust are between the NSM and the ISC. This person has also been spoken to twice. As a consequence, the answers received in the orientating talks and the interviews are considered to be an accurate representation of the characterization, the bottlenecks, and possible solutions, based on a lower than desired amount of interviews. However, if people do not want to participate one cannot force them to do so.

The desired documents regarding the service agreement between the NSM and the ISC could not be retrieved by the researcher. This means that there is no actual formal document stating controls that can be used. However, it is possible in this paper to look in the documents by the courtesy of the NSM. This provided the opportunity to make exact notes of the relevant information within the service agreement for this study. These notes are as good as an exact copy of the service agreement. The information retrieved from the service agreement can be found in appendix C.

Chapter 4: Results

This chapter provides the results found in both the document analysis and the interviews taken with the key people in both the faculty and the ICT Service Centre. Firstly, the document analysis and it results are presented. Secondly, the results of the interviews are stated in this chapter. The results will help in answering the main research question.

4.1 Documents

This section will present the results of the document analysis. This is primarily based on the contract between the NSM and the ISC: the service agreement. It was not possible to acquire the exact agreement on paper or digitally, therefore notes had to be taken at 21-6-16. These notes that were taken of the service agreement are presented in Appendix C. In this section the relevant parts of the agreement are presented and some notable insights are provided.

The service agreement between the Nijmegen School of management and the ISC encompasses in short what services are provided and what is how it should be provided. In the following section the relevant parts of this agreement are presented. The information written down in this service agreement represents only formal controls as it is a contract describing the roles and responsibilities of the two parties.

4.1.1 Service agreement

The first important part of the service agreement states the general services and products that should be provided by the ISC to the NSM. This is called section one in the contract. The ISC is responsible for the delivery of ICT products and services. ISC makes agreements with faculties (NSM), clusters, and other entities Service agreements for ICT services. The ICT provided to the user should fit the needs of the user. Standardization should be striven for in trying to provide the services that are needed. Additional ICT services are possible, but require additional payments of the using party (NSM).

Section 2 of the agreement states what persons are the formal providers and users of the ICT services. The agreement has a duration of one year and is tacitly renewed each year if there are no changes made to the agreement. The services provided by the ISC are as follows: firstly, disruptions that are encountered, regarding this service agreement, should be reported to the ICT helpdesk of the ISC. The ICT helpdesk is a department of the ISC, which can be contacted by mail or by phone and questions and/or disruptions can be asked or reported. The helpdesk will then try to fix the problem. The service agreement states that is the responsibility of the helpdesk to react or respond as quickly as possible and fix the problem. No exact time within which the possible problems should be solved is established in the agreement. Secondly, non-acute problems, amendments, and questions and request are to be reported to the ICT helpdesk. Thirdly, the ICT helpdesk has the following tasks: registration of the problems, ensuring the progress, and feedback to the users of the ICT services. Fourthly, the

ICT helpdesk has to ensure to appropriate the questions or request to the appropriate department(s) of the ISC. Finally, for possible request, advice can be asked by the user and provided by the relations management of the ISC.

Section 3 is about the continuity and elaborates that in case of calamities the ISC has an obligation of effort. That means that the ISC has the obligation to make sure that the services should be in conformity with the service agreement as fast possible after calamities have occurred. The (acceptable) recovery time is based on the severity of the problem.

Section 4 of the agreement encompasses the RU (Radboud University) workplace service. The goal of the RU workplace service is stated. The goal is as follows: acquiring safe entrance to the RU ICT infrastructure, while making use of as much standardized hardware and software as possible and also making use of the concern information systems.

Section 5 is about the responsibilities of the user of the ICT products and/or services. Firstly the user should use the provided apparatus in the way which was intended. Misuse of the apparatus is not allowed and is the responsibility of the user (NSM). Secondly, the user has the obligation to name a person as an ICT contact. This contact will discuss ICT related problems or question with the contact within the ISC. Thirdly, people must be appointed to be allowed to order ICT products or services from the ISC. Only these appointed persons are allowed to order ICT resources.

A really short section 6 states that printers are not the responsibility of the ISC and are not included within the service agreement. Furthermore section 7 states the exact ICT services and products provided by the ISC to the NSM. These are: RU-workplace (desktop): employee; RU-laptop: employee; RU-workplace: student; RU-Imac: employee; RU-workplace: special; ICT helpdesk, and ICT service point. Workplaces are actual places at which employees or students can make use of computers and internet. Additionally, laptops and Imacs are provided for (certain) employees. The ICT helpdesk provides service by mail or phone from a distance to the user. The ICT service point provides services that cannot be provided by mail or phone, so one has to physically go to the service point. An example of this might be handing in a defect laptop or handing out mobile apparatus (Tablet/laptop).

Furthermore, section 8 encompasses the reporting. There are four things that should be reported. These are the amount of hardware and software units in use, the amount of data storage split to each organisation department/unit, the amount of incidents reported and solved to the ISC, and an analysis of possible big disruptions. The last sector states for both the NSM and the ISC the director. Moreover, two people that are allowed to order ICT products/services from the ISC are stated for the NSM. Finally, the relation manager and the head of budgets of the ISC are stated (The names of these people are not presented here, as it is irrelevant).

In short the document analysis has provided the necessary knowledge about what the formal responsibilities of the NSM and the ISC are. Moreover the manner in which, the NSM should act if problems occur, or what should be reported. Furthermore, the duration of the contract (one year) is provided and the fact that it is implicitly renewed each year. The formal procedures of the ISC are also

presented in the service agreement. It seems however, that the service agreement leaves room for interpretation and that is where trust could play a significant role. In particular the lines stating that the acceptable recovery time of incidents/calamities/problems is based on the severity of the incident/calamity/problem. There is no official time established for solving problems, and this should be determined each time a problem occurs. This is based on human interactions and trust. How this exactly is the case can be investigated better in an interview, which is discussed in the next section of this paper.

4.2 Interviews

This section provided the relevant results of the interviews done with the respondents of both the NSM and the ISC. The transcripts of the interviews are provided in appendix B.

4.2.1 Results from the NSM

Upon investigating the user of the service (the NSM) there have been some results. This section elaborated three key concepts that are central to this paper from the perspective of the NSM. Namely, the characterization of the relationship, the bottlenecks, and the possible solutions that the NSM thinks are there.

First of all the interviews/talks revealed that for a formal control or contracts there is a service agreement between the NSM and the ISC. Earlier there were a lot of separate service contracts, but in the present there is an all-encompassing service agreement. This service agreement and its exact contents are described in section 4.1. It is however interesting to see what the NSM believes is described in these contracts so a comparison can be made with what the ISC believes. A possible discrepancy can have consequences for the trust and control relationship. NSM states that the service agreement states what services are purchased by the NSM and what should be delivered by the ISC. The amount of workplaces bought and used is determined and the extra costs of extra services is stated within the agreement.

The NSM does not fall back upon these formal contracts often. This might happen in specific cases as it could be the case that there are disputes about what amount of workplaces or types of hardware are used and then the contracts can help solve disputes. This does not occur often according to the NSM.

Furthermore, the using party does not believe that the formal control (service agreement) is a tool in order to give the parties responsibilities or restrict certain behaviour. The agreement only states what is ordered by the NSM and what is delivered by the ISC. It is basically a piece of paper which states what is asked in detail.

The aspect of trust is there, but the NSM does not consciously think about the notion of trust when doing business with the ISC. They just want their ICT equipment to work properly and the ISC should make sure it does and it delivered at the right place at the right time. However, the ability to

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flexible by the ISC can increase the amount trust the NSM has in the ISC. Specifically, the ISC should not be extremely strict about the contract, but be flexible about it, in order to have a healthy trust relationship. In the past some contracts have been formed semi-annually and retroactive. This increases annoyance with the NSM and can therefore be a source of distrust. In addition, in the past there were situations, in which if less computers were used by the faculty, the costs for the NSM stayed the same. However, if more computers were used, the costs for the NSM increased. In order to avoid annoyance, the costs should go down. This, however is the case at the present.

Within the RU there is a culture of reorganizing the services for the faculties. Approximately every 2/3 years the services are organized differently. This means that people within each party have to deal with different people constantly each 2/3 years. This does not help in developing trust between people. The longer they work together with the same people, the better they get to know each other. This means that people know what to expect and a successful relationship increases the trust between parties. However, if the cooperation is not successful reorganizations are needed to improve this. This means that in certain situations this can increase or decrease trust. The culture is not necessarily a bad thing for developing trust between the ISC and the NSM. On the other hand, there is less trust in the continuity as things are changed quite often. The NSM indicates that in the past there have been ISC employees that were located at the faculty. This meant that people could literally walk over to the employees of the ISC and ask for help. Currently, the helpdesk is used in order to solve problems. This puts the ISC more at a distance, and decreases the human contact between the service provider and the service user. It seems that some people could prefer the old ways instead of the new helpdesk. In the eyes of the NSM, in order to develop trust, the ISC has to make sure that their services run as smoothly as possible. An example of this, is ICT updates working smoothly, as it could change the way things work. An ICT update and might not function as intended. If it does not function, trust can decrease, because the quality of the service provided is lower.

The formal contract (service agreement) and trust between the NSM and the ISC are seen as complementary. From an economical view, it makes sense to have certain things written down on paper. Similar to things being established on paper in a marriage. Even if people or parties trust each other completely, it is wise and useful to establish things, to prepare for situations in which things go awry, no matter how unlikely.

The NSM does not purposely try to create or increase trust between them and the ISC. The NSM contacts the ISC to make sure they get what they ordered. Trust is in their eyes the outcome of contracts or relationships working well. If services are delivered as established within the service agreements and things go smoothly, trust between parties will be created and increase.

The NSM and ISC should strive for a situation in which only the absolutely necessary details are stated within the service agreement. This will create the best balance between the trust and formal control. Formal controls such as administrative and organizational controls are always needed, but

little rules for specific situations should not be included. These type of rules are mostly created when one or both parties abuse the contract.

In situations where trust is broken between the NSM and the ISC, it depends on the situation what action(s) the NSM will take. The formal contracts could be used in specific situations in which there are different interpretations from both parties of agreements that were made. Then the NSM can fall back on formal contracts. In other cases it seems that trust has to be built up by receiving the services and products ordered on the right times at the right places.

Some bottlenecks that seem to arise from the point of view of the faculty are the helpdesk and ICT updates. First of all, the helpdesk, makes sure that problems are directed to the right department of the ISC. However, this can take time, the amount of time this takes in not disclosed to the NSM, so it can create a lot of uncertainty for the employees of the NSM. This can be frustrating for the NSM. Secondly, ICT updates of the computer systems of the faculty that are scheduled in the evenings or weekends, can also increase uncertainty with the NSM. This is due to employees being afraid that the new software does not work, or that their situation is different than other faculties and that things do not work smoothly. This idea feeling can only be among the NSM, if this has occurred one more times in the past. The service agreement is enough encompassing and does not need to be changed in order to include new rules. There seems to exist enough trust between the NSM and the ISC, according to the NSM. However, a person of the NSM said that "when I think about trust, I do not immediately think of the ISC." This indicates that there is trust, but the distance created, because of the helpdesk, does not ensure complete trust. Trust could be improved by making more use of human interaction than the computer of the helpdesk. The helpdesk, however, does work properly in the eyes of the NSM, but more contact between human makes the ISC more visible. Currently, the ISC is more of an abstract organization.

4.2.2 Results from the ISC

This section will elaborate the results found by investigating the other party, namely the ISC (ICT Service Centre). The relationship from the point of view of the ISC is explored, which will include elements of the characterization of the relationship between control and trust, the bottlenecks, and possible solutions to those bottlenecks.

There is some formal control between the NSM and the ISC, as each year the ISC gives insights on paper of the amount of workplaces being used and that is controlled by certain contacts. Moreover, the ISC delivered monthly data reports of the amount of data used by the NSM. Regular meetings between the faculty and the ISC can be seen as a sort of formal control according to the ISC. The quality of the service provided is evaluated in those meetings. Formal controls are not adjusted often, these could change every 2/3 years. The data reports have been implemented since 1-1-16. The ISC indicates that it is desirable for changes not to occur that often in the formal controls. The ISC

does help the NSM control the amount of data being used, if they use too much data in a certain month the ISC will report that. This indicates the NSM to use less data and save costs.

The formal controls are at least partly there to influence the behaviour of the NSM. In particular in the case of the reporting of data usage. This influences the NSM as said before, so they do not use too much data in order to manage costs. Also the quality control of administration influences the behaviour of the ISC as it makes sure that they keep the quality as high as possible. A higher quality means that the amount of registered used hardware and software is accurate. The more accurate, the better the quality.

As for the responsibilities the formal controls might give, these are written down on paper within the service agreement. There are sometimes discussions about who is responsible for what, in certain cases according to the ISC. Even though the responsibilities are established within formal contracts, the practical reality is more grey than it seems on paper. These grey areas are the things that can be discussed within meetings, regarding what is whose responsibility in the relationship between the NSM and the ISC.

Trust plays a role in the relationship between the faculty and the ISC. ISC sees the signing of a contract with the NSM as a sign of reciprocal trust. If the parties do not trust each other, they would not sign the particular contract or service agreement. In practice the NSM wants their problems to be solved as soon as possible. One can disclose within a contract that problems have to be solved within eight hours (this is not actually the case) for example, but sometimes it needs to be fixed within one hour. Even though the contract in such situations would give the ISC the right to take more time, this will decrease the trust between the NSM and ISC. It is implicitly agreed upon, that the ISC solves a problem as quickly as possible. It is important to note that the NSM has to have the idea that the ISC is working as hard as possible. If not, they will experience the actions of ISC as not intense enough to ensure a good quality of ICT service and trust will decrease. Problems do not even have to be solved all the time, as long as the NSM sees that the ISC works as hard as possible and does what it can do. The NSM trusts the ISC to do everything in their capability to solve problems that arise. If the ISC does not do that, or the NSM thinks that the ISC does not do that, it decreases trust between the two parties. The ISC indicates that for trust to be built and kept at a good level, communication from ISC to the NSM is essential. The ISC has to communicate what they are doing to solve specific problems regarding the ICT. Better informed customers will have a better sense of what is going on and what is being done. Furthermore, giving information will show the NSM that the ISC is work as hard as they can, even though it might not even be the case. In that scenario, the ISC would be abusing the trust of the NSM. That is not the aim of the ISC, however, as they work together with the faculty to achieve the same goal: facilitate education for students. Transparency about the actions taken might be more important than the solving the problems as soon as possible. There have been cases in which there was no solution found, but the faculty was still satisfied. This must not be the case often, as this decreases the quality of services or products delivered. A lack of quality will decrease trust.

Control and trust have a complementary relationship between each other, according to the ISC. Control alone is not enough for this relationship to work. This seems likely as there are certain parts in the service agreement that give room for concertation (See: section 4.1). Deliberate creation of trust is something that the ISC strives for. As mentioned earlier, communication and transparency is key to create and maintain trust between the NSM and the ISC. In situations which involve the slightest bit of emotion the ISC will use contact by phone instead of an email. The email is not a valid medium for discussing painful matters, while speaking to people directly via a phone is better for those types of problems. The ISC has different ways in which it contacts the NSM for different types of problems. This is done to create or maintain the level of trust between the two parties.

Searching for the right mix between control and trust is a priority and can depend on people, past experiences, and events. In addition the amount of formal control used differs between the several faculties that are supported by the ISC. Using too much control to regulate the relationship between the NSM and the ISC, could hurt the trust, even though both are assumed to be complementary to each other.

In cases of trust being broken, the ISC has the policy to meet up with the faculty and speak eye in eye about the what has caused this. In order to restore the trust between the two parties as quickly as possible. Solving this by phone or email is not the right procedure, according to the ISC. The ISC will then try to define the problem and align it with what the NSM defines the problem(s) as. If this is aligned the problem can be solved. The ISC can in those situations fall back on the contracts that have been signed. However, they should do this with caution, as they are 'only' service providers and therefore the underlying party. The ISC is secondary to the NSM and has to adapt to the general direction of the NSM. The ISC should be modest in using a formal contract in such situations. One should say: "this is the contract, but apparently the contract we both made is not good enough." The ISC should not say: "this is the contract, you (NSM) have signed it and should therefore be following the rules established within the contract."

On the operational level there are some problems between employees of the NSM and ISC in trusting each other. The actual problems cannot be disclosed, because this is internal business and can potentially harm the trust between these parties. These seem to be relatively small problems.

Furthermore, the service agreement between the NSM and the ISC is seen as a base for regulating the relationship. It does not give enough control on its own to ensure a healthy relationship. As mentioned before, the ISC sees signing such a contract in itself as a sign of trust, so trust is also needed. Communication and transparency of the ISC to the NSM is key to maintain trust. The ISC states that the service agreement establishes what the ISC should deliver and what the NSM should pay for the services and products delivered by the ISC. The agreement is a starting point and based on practice and intuition of employees the agreement can be evaluated and potentially changed if need be.

There is an acceptable amount of trust between the NSM and the ISC in order for the relationship to function well, in the eyes of the ISC. The contacts between the spokesperson of the

ISC with contacts within the NSM is as it should be. Parties are not afraid to report problems immediately and go about solving problems in a constructive way. In case of problems the NSM does not accuse the ISC of making faults or slacking off. There is a healthy amount of trust between the faculty and the ISC and it seems to be ensured for the future, as the ISC is focused on maintaining trust. The role of trust in the relationship between the NSM and the ISC is as it should be and the ISC is determined to continue the role of trust it now plays.

The service agreement however, should in the eyes of the spokesperson be changed. There should be an appendix added which includes some procedural aspects. This should allow employees of the NSM to follow these procedures with relatively simple problems and to solve them. This ensures that the employees of the faculty do not call or mail the helpdesk of the ISC for those relatively simple problems. The idea behind this is that it might help relieve the helpdesk from the smaller problems and let the ISC solve bigger, more impactful problems faster. This should not be a heavily procedural appendix, but an appendix stating guidelines. For example, this could help in situations of moving from one location to the other. This could help streamline the way in which these types of problems are solved.

4.2.3 Differences in viewpoint of NSM and ISC

This section will highlight some notable differences between the results gathered from the NSM and the ISC. It is important to note that there are also differences between the formal controls established in the service agreement (section 4.1) and results gathered from interviews (section 4.2). However, these differences will be elaborated upon in chapter 5 as it is in that section that this will help answer the main questions of this paper.

The formal control or contract (service agreement) is not intended to restrict behaviour according to the NSM, while the ISC believes the contracts are there to influence the NSM in their usage of data by reporting to them every month. From the perspective of the NSM they ask the ISC to support them in order to keep their costs low as for the data usage. On the other hand, one could say that the monthly data reporting of the ISC and the heads up for eventual excessive use of data is way to influence the behaviour of the NSM.

Furthermore, the NSM does not consciously think about creating or maintaining trust between the NSM and the ISC. On the other hand, the ISC goes out of its way to create trust between both parties. In addition, the ISC sees the signing of the formal contracts as a sign of trust, while the NSM sees this as strictly necessary in case of emergencies. The NSM states that trust in not a goal on its own. This difference might be explained by the fact that the NSM and the ISC are part of an non-profit organization, as they will have to work together no matter what. This could cause the NSM to not focus on the aspect of gaining trust and focusing on providing education, as there are no other alternatives who can provide ICT products and services.

In situations of trust being broken, the NSM simply has time 'heal' the broken trust, while the ISC states that they try to meet up with people involved in order to define the problem(s) that have caused this. After the alignment between parties the problem(s) can be solved and trust between parties is restored or partly restored. As mentioned above the difference in attitude might have to do with the fact that the NSM cannot choose its service provider, as the RU is a non-profit organization. The ISC seeks to help the NSM to provide the education to students as possible, and for this to work communication and transparency are key. From the perspective of the ISC being transparent is the quickest way to restore trust and ensure a healthy relationship.

Both the NSM and the ISC indicate several different types of bottlenecks or problems within the relationship. The NSM indicates that reorganizing the way in which services work every two/three years means that the people which one has contacts with changes. This does not let people develop long-term personal relationships, which are ideal for developing trust. Moreover, the NSM indicates that the helpdesk does not always communicate how long solving problems will take. Additionally, the helpdesk is not a person which can directly be spoken to, or it is someone different each time a problem is reported to the ISC. This can also affect, the quality of service provided, as one person might give a better solution than another person. The helpdesk makes the ISC more of an abstract organization as it has no figureheads in the eyes of the NSM.

The ISC on the other hand mentions that there are some problems between employees of the ISC and the NSM on the operational level currently. The exact nature of this problem is not known as the information is confidential. However, the ISC indicates that these problems are solvable and not a danger to the overall relationship between the NSM and the ISC. Furthermore the service agreement does not help streamline the way in which the helpdesk is used by the NSM to solve relatively medium or big problems. The formal control should therefore be changed in order to enable the NSM to solve the 'easier' problems. Because of the fact that the ISC has the obligation to solve the problems reported by the NSM, it can save time to streamline the service agreement.

The differences between the bottlenecks are interesting as both parties indicate different things (controls or trust) that could be improved. The problems on the operational level regarding trust is seen by the NSM as normal in relationships and therefore not as an explicit bottleneck. It makes sense that the ISC does see this as a bottleneck as it more focused on deliberate creation of trust as mentioned in sections 4.2.1/4.2.2.

4.3 Summary

In short, the documents and interviews have generated the following results: first of all, there is a formal contract which describes the services provided and delivered by the ISC to the NSM. This contract is called the service agreement. Additionally, the responsibilities of each party is elaborated as well as the continuity, the workplace service, the printers, the exact products and services ordered, and the reporting. The interviews have generated some corresponding results as well as some conflicting

results on varying subjects. Differences arise on the bottlenecks that the faculty and the ISC experience in this relationship regarding control and trust. The NSM experiences the reorganization of the services every two/three years and the abstractness of the helpdesk as bottlenecks. On the other hand the ISC, experiences problems on the operational level regarding trust and the meagreness of the service agreement as bottlenecks.

Chapter 5: Conclusion & discussion

This chapter contains two sections the conclusion and the discussion. The conclusion answers the three main research questions based on the results found in chapter 4. The discussion encompasses a critical view on the conclusions made in section 5.1, the limitations of this paper, and some possibilities for future research.

5.1 Conclusion

The conclusion is based upon the results gathered in chapter 4 and will try to answer the three main research questions. Starting off with the first question: *How is the relationship between control and trust characterized between the support services and the faculties of the Radboud University Nijmegen?* Central to answering this question is the characterization of the relationship between control and trust. The characterization that will be presented is formed by looking at the results from both a rational and relational perspective on control and trust. The essentials of these perspectives are presented in chapter 2 of this paper.

It seems that from an rational perspective there are some elements that are quite clear to gather from the results. First of all, the ISC deliberately strives to create and/or maintain trust within the relationship between them and the NSM. The ISC makes deliberate use of trust to improve the healthiness or successfulness of the relationship with the NSM. On the other hand, the NSM does not do this. Furthermore, the ISC uses certain signals in order to increase trust or maintain it. This relational signalling (Vosselman & Van der Meer-Kooistra, 2009) is done for example by reporting the data usage and if this is too much for a certain month they will signal this. Which therefore influences the behaviour of the NSM and ensure less costs for the faculty, if the NSM has indicated it wants to decrease costs. This indicates that ISC uses controls in a rational way in order to help the NSM and the university its goals. Another element in this relationship that is apparent from a rational perspective on control and trust the importance and usage of communication. Communication is extremely important as indicates by both parties in the intra-organizational relationship. It is important to have inter-personal communication in order for trust to be created between people and the departments of the university. More communication means a better understanding of problems that arise for the ISC. It also means a better understanding for the NSM of how long it will take to solve problem that has been reported to the ISC. A better understanding for both sides means more realistic expectations. If the expectations are realistic, they will most likely be met, and if expectations are met the trust between parties increase. The ISC in particular indicates that communication and transparency about their efforts and activities to solve problems is key in maintaining trust. Additionally both the NSM and the ISC see the formal contracts and trust as complementary to each other in the intra-organizational relationship.

From a relational perspective there are some other elements that can be gathered from the results acquired. The NSM indicates that it does not deliberately use or seek to create trust between

both parties. Trust is a result of the ISC doing their work properly, or at least meeting the expectations that the NSM has of the ISC. As mentioned before, even if the ISC does not solve a problem but communicates well about what it is doing, the NSM will adjust its expectations. This means that expectations will be met and trust is maintained. It is important to note that failures to solve problems must not occur frequently. Trust is not seen as something that can be a deliberate tool to regulate the relationship between the NSM and the ISC. Furthermore, the third essential of the relational perspective as mentioned in chapter 2 (Wagensveld et al., 2016), states that non-human actors perform within a network. One could say that the data usage reports by the ISC influence the behaviour of human actors within the NSM. The reports might indicate a big amount of data usage for one month. If this is seen as too much, it can lead the employees of the NSM (human actors) to lessen their data usage in following months. Additionally, the helpdesk of the ISC might perform differently that its intended purpose for the NSM. The helpdesk is set in place to help centralize the point where problems are reported and correctly contact the department of the ISC that can best solve particular problem. This means that problems are reported to some database, which feels impersonal to employees of the NSM. The goal of better appropriation of problems to the ISC and therefore a better quality of service, is also there to maintain trust. However, the impersonal contact that employees can experience can potentially decrease trust as the NSM has to wait for immediate responses, or get replies varying in quality. Varying quality might decrease the trust the NSM has in the ISC, while the helpdesk was intended to increase trust. The relational perspective includes the trust-as-practice perspective. From the that perspective one could say that the ISC has standard practices, one would do if trust is broken. Namely, immediately contacting the NSM and requesting a physical meeting in order to determine a misunderstanding and each other's perception. Moreover, there from this perspective one could argue that time can 'heal' broken trust for the NSM. As they do not have standard actions to combat broken trust. They will regain trust if the ISC does an appropriate job. Over time the same level of trust can be reached after trust is broken. This will take some time of the ISC providing the ICT products and services requested by the NSM.

   In conclusion, one could best answer the first research question in the manner which is stated below. There exists a client-supplier relationship in which the ISC provides ICT products and services to the NSM. Formal control is used a base for the relationship. For the most part trust is used to regulate the relationship. The controls give room for trust to be used in order to determine an acceptable time within which problems can be solved. The ISC actively tries to create and maintain trust by communication and transparency of their actions. The NSM does not actively create trust, but finds it if the ISC properly does its job or meets the expectations that the NSM has of the ISC. So in this sense the control and trust are complementary to each other within this intra-organizational relationship.

The second research question is as follows: *What are the bottlenecks in the relationship between the support services and the faculties of the Radboud University Nijmegen, with regards to control and trust?* This section answers the question and presents some bottlenecks that were found in the investigation. First of all, there are bottlenecks that the NSM experiences and there are some that the ISC experiences. The NSM indicates that the culture of reorganizing the services (ISC) every two/three years can results in having to work with different people each time they reorganize. This does not help facilitate long-term inter-personal relationships, which are key for people to form realistic expectations and eventually trust. Another bottleneck presented by the NSM is the helpdesk. The helpdesk does succeed in its function to solve problems, so it does fulfil its main purpose. However, the feeling about is that it makes the ISC into more of an abstract organization to the NSM. There is less inter-personal contact between the ISC and the NSM as in the past, when there were fixed ICT people located at the faculty.

The ISC indicates that currently there are some operational level trust issues between employees of the ISC and the NSM. The exact nature of the issue could not be retrieved as this was confidential. The ISC sees these problems as a regular occurrence and part of their core business. Issues like this are often present and solvable according to the ISC. In addition, the ISC experiences the bottleneck that the service agreement (formal control) is meagre. This means that there are times which every little problem regarding the ICT is reported to the ISC. These could be solved easily (see next section), according to the ISC. The ISC is however obligated to help solve all these small problems and it could cost valuable time. If smaller problems are solved by the NSM themselves, the ISC can focus their time on more important and severe problems. This can make the quality of service from the ISC to the NSM higher.

Overall the relationship does not have that many bottlenecks and works quite excellent. Therefore, some of these bottlenecks might be nit-picky. The overall relationship between the support services and the faculties with regards to control and trust can be describes as healthy and good.

The third research question of this paper is as follows: *What improvements can be made in order to resolve the bottlenecks in the relationship between the support services and the faculties of the Radboud University Nijmegen, with regards to control and trust?* It is important to note that the problems presented are based upon the results found in this paper and are recommendations. It would have been interesting to see these changes implemented and re-evaluated in compliance with the reflective cycle of Van Aken (2004). This is not possible for a student to accomplish. In theory this might be interesting to do in future studies, regarding this subject. As mentioned above there were roughly four bottlenecks detected in this study regarding control and trust in the relationship between the faculties of the university and the support services. First of all, the culture of reorganization and its problems of changing persons which the NSM has contact with is not easily solved as the reason of reorganization is to improve the relationship. It is however important for the ISC to keep in mind that

if the wish is there to keep the people the NSM employees have to deal with from the is the same, the ISC could try to not change that. Of course there might also be cases in which a particular person is decreasing the quality of service and he/she has to designated to another place within the organization. The best solution would be for the ISC to communicate with the NSM, what the NSM would like to see differently. If they feel that a particular person is doing well to support the NSM, let that person stay at that position as it facilitates a more long-term inter-personal relationship. This could increase the trust the NSM has in the ISC and vice versa.

The issue of the helpdesk could be quite difficult to solve, as a central entity such as a helpdesk cannot become one fixed person. So the problem of it feeling like something abstract is not solvable, other than to have fixed ICT located at the faculty. However, problems that arise regarding a lack of an indication of the length the ISC needs to solve a particular problems must be solvable. This could be done by implementing a procedure in which the ISC has to communicate, what other problems are currently being worked on (transparency). Moreover, the ISC should have to state or negotiate with the NSM in what time window they will solve a problem. If this cannot be met, it should be communicated to the NSM and also the reasons for this should be communicated. Also making more use of the phone instead of using the medium of email to contact the NSM might greatly change the feeling an NSM employee has towards the ISC. An email can be seen as somewhat impersonal, and that is often not likely to be met with the NSM becoming more patient. It might also be useful for the NSM to indicate the importance of a certain problem that has to be solved. This way, the ISC can prioritize certain problems. But the ISC has to communicate to other NSM employees why their problems are not prioritized. For example the NSM, could indicate three levels of importance to problems. Furthermore there might be some inconsistency of replies received from the helpdesk to the NSM, depending on the person of the ISC who responds. This problem could be solved by assigning a certain fixed person to the faculty as it was in the past. So the quality of the answers is at least consistent, but it might be consistently low as a result. This is not easily solved and does not need to be as the NSM does indicate that the helpdesk does work.

The operational issues as mentioned above by the ISC are a bottleneck, however as the exact nature of these problems are confidential to this research and easily solvable, a solution to this problem cannot be presented. The ISC does indicate that these types of problems occur regularly and it seen as a core business practice to solve these little trust issues. On the other hand, the fact that the service agreement is meagre, can be solved. The service agreement could be changed so as to include an appendix which states certain procedures for the NSM to follow in specific cases. An example of such a case could be procedure for the NSM to follow if they are to move location on the campus. This could decrease the amount of little problems reported to the helpdesk and help focus the ISC on the more important and severe problems. This could help streamline the problems-solving process of the ISC and in turn increase the quality provided by the ISC to the NSM. However, the inclusion of more procedures can also mean that the NSM sees the ISC as even more of an abstract organization, or the

procedures are not easily understandable and could create even more problems. The procedures should therefore be included only for those very simple problems and should be stated very clearly. If they are clear it should be helpful to ensure no additional problems and less reported issues to the ISC. A lot of care should go into such a procedural appendix, but can help streamline the problem-solving process.

5.2 Discussion

The discussion section of this paper will elaborate upon several limitations of this research and present some possibilities for future research which can help enrich the body of knowledge on this paper. There are also some useful insights however, to this study, which are the knowledge about an intra-organizational relationship. Research on this topic in particular has been scarce (Van de Bunt et al., 2005). This can probably explain the need and willingness of the ISC to obliterate itself in order to let the NSM its job, which is to provide education to students. There is also the fact that NSM is not able to choose other alternatives for the provision of ICT hardware and software. The parties are stuck with each other and are therefore forced to work with each other. This inevitably creates long-term relationships which can help in creating trust. However, there are always things such as a helpdesk being not an actual person, that one can see, that can potentially undermine the level of trust between parties.

Another point of discussion is the fact that people in practice (ISC) consider emails also a form of formal control. This is not included within the contracts as this is impossible. However, the idea that mail correspondence can be used as formal controls believable. If certain business agreements are made by communication using email, then those emails are written proof of those agreements. These can be printed out or used in situations of disagreements to determine who is responsible for certain things, or what should have been provided by whom. For this paper however, it is not possible to get access to confidential emails between the ISC and NSM, so these mails are not included in the documents section of chapter 4.

Furthermore, it is important to critically look at both the rational (Vosselman & Van der Meer-Kooistra, 2009) and relational (Mahama & Chua, 2016) perspectives, after the results and conclusions of this study. Based on the results found in this study one could say that from a rational perspective there are some elements that comply with it. The ISC makes deliberate use of trust to regulate and improve the relationship. In that sense, the ISC uses trust as an instrument. The ISC plans ahead on what signals to give the NSM (Relational signalling) to maintain the desired level of trust between the parties. In addition, the ISC and the NSM indicate that they find control and trust to be complementary to each other. The results found in the service agreement also seem to indicate this. Especially, in the case of the determination of the acceptable time-window in which problems have to be solved. It is said that this depends on the severity of the problem, but there are no levels of severity indicated in the agreement. This means that this severity and the acceptable time for problem solving has to be

determined by trust. In short, the rational perspective on control and trust can certainly be used to investigate intra-organizational relationships.

However, if one were to only look from the rational perspective to the results found in this paper, a lot of results would not have been found. The relational perspective can help analyse the NSM side of things. The NSM has indicated that it does not rationally make use of trust. It does not deliberately use trust to improve the relationship with the ISC. The NSM feels that trust is a consequence of the ISC and the NSM doing their job well. The NSM and the ISC have a different approach to trust and control. A reason for this could be the fact that the NSM does not have a choice in determining who provides the ICT goods and services. On the other hand, if the NSM were to make use of an inter-organizational relationship to get their ICT goods and services the attitude might be the same. The ISC, from a relational perspective, could be considered to use trust-practices. When confronted with trust that is broken the ISC immediately tries to set up a face-to-face meeting with the involved people, to restore trust. Moreover, the ISC indicates that for most problems that arise that only include a slight bit of emotion, they will pick up the phone, instead of using mails. This is due to the fact that actually speaking with people can send a better message to the NSM, so the trust is maintained or even improved. Whereas, an e-mail could be considered as impersonal and trust could therefore decrease, especially considering that the NSM and the ISC prefer inter-personal contact over e-mails. The relatively 'new' trust-as-practice perspective of Mahama & Chua (2016) seems to be a good perspective to take, when analysing control and trust within this specific relationship. In short, the relational perspective and the rational perspective both have their merits in discovering and understanding the relationship between control and trust. They could be seen as complementary to each other. In order to fully grasp specific situations such as the one investigated in this paper, taking both perspectives, gives one the best understanding of that particular situation.

It does seem the case that trust is a necessity for this relationship to work. This is in line with literature (Das & Teng, 1998). The ISC in particular indicates that signing a contract such as the service agreement, it is already a sign of reciprocal trust. If there is no trust between parties they would not sign such an agreement. The NSM does not explicitly state this, but does believe that trust alone can be a good way to regulate a relationship, but the controls are needed in cases of emergencies. This means that trust is always necessary, but control is also necessary.

The results of this study do not give cause for the existing literature to be questioned, according to the results found in this paper. However, seeing as the relational perspective has not been used that often in studies yet, it could be an interesting way to look at the control-trust nexus. It should be seen as an additional perspective that can give more insights and understanding. This is even more emphasized by the fact that the ISC indicates that the ratio of control and trust and how it works is can differ between the NSM and ISC and between the other faculties and the ISC. This is in line with the trust-as-practice perspective of Mahama & Chua (2016), which states that trust is situational and situated within time-space.

5.2.1 Limitations

In every study that is done there are some limitations which should be noted. This section will elaborate upon the limitations of this particular paper. First of all this study aims to answer questions about the Radboud University Nijmegen as a whole, while in fact only one faculty has been researched. The results also indicate that different mixes (characterizations) of control and trust are present between the ISC and the several faculties it supports. This means that a comparison between the faculties, or investigating one other faculty could have potentially generated different results.

The same goes for the fact that there are more support services than the ICT. For example there is the catering and more departments that support the university and faculties in other ways. Investigating one of those other support services might reveal other or new insights in the relationship between control and trust in intra-firm relationships. Possible differences between each support service might give a better view of the actual situation.

Furthermore, there is the issue of a low number of respondents. The reason for being that there are key contacts of both the faculty and the ISC, which basically deal with each other overall. Their trust relationship can best describe the situation which is done in this paper. However, more respondents were contacted for this study, but did not wish to participate. In addition, the potential respondents for interviews did not wish to motivate their decline to participate. More respondents would have made the conclusions more reliable, or could have indicates some differences in view within the NSM and/or ISC.

The issue of some problems within the NSM and ISC not being shared to the researcher, because this information is confidential. If it would have been possible to find out what the actual little problems on the operating level are. It could give more insights into the bottlenecks that are currently present and solutions for that could have been presented in the conclusion section of this paper. However, the ISC indicates that these types of problems are solvable.

Another limitation of this study might the fact that one point in time was investigated. Studying the relationship between the NSM and the ISC over a period of time might also give insight the way the ratio between control and trust changes or behaves. This was however not the aim of this paper. IT simply focuses on examining the situation at this point in time and attempts to characterize it.

5.2.2 Possibilities for future research

This section discusses possible areas that could be researched in the future to add new knowledge to this field of research. First of all, it could be the case that the dynamics of control and trust between the ISC and faculties other than the NSM could be different. This seems likely as this was indicated within an interview with a representative of the ISC. It is mentioned that some faculties make more use of formal control than other faculties. Different results might be found for this reason and could be an interesting case to study.

Moreover, studying another university and their support services might also provide the academics with other insights or a similar situation could found. Both of those conclusions could be interesting to the field of study and the knowledge about control and trust. In line with this other types of service providers than the ISC can be investigated as to see whether the dynamics of control and trust differ from the relationship investigated in this study.

Furthermore, there are also other types of organizations that make use of shared service centres. An example of this might be a municipality. Investigating such organizations and their intra-organizational dynamics regarding control and trust might provide useful insights and new knowledge. Municipalities have different goals than universities and could therefore vastly differ in their usage of control and trust within intra-organizational relationship.

As seen by the results from this paper some elements of the trust-as-practice perspective (Chua &Mahama, 2016) have found. Namely, the fact that trust is situated within time-space and trust-practices are found from the side of the ISC. The fact that the ISC indicates that the relationship between control and trust can differ between the ISC and other faculties gives the possibility for a future study to be done with other faculties and the ISC.

Lastly, due to time constraints it was not possible to investigate the implementation and re-evaluation phase of the reflective cycle (van Aken, 2004). In the future one could investigate the exact relationship studied in this paper, but also include the implementation of certain measures. It could give insights in what measures can increase trust or what causes new controls to be formed within the setting of a university (faculties) and support services thereof.

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7.1 Appendix A

Interview question (Semi-structured)

Characterizing the control and trust:

1.What formal control is used within the relationship between the NSM and the ISC?

   How often do you look at these formal controls/contracts?

2. How do you see trust and control in the relationship between the NSM and the ISC?

3. What do you say is the ratio between control and trust in the relationship between the NSM and the ISC?

4. Do you think control and trust are complementary?

   Do you think they are substitutes?

5. Does there exist a point at which more control will decrease the trust between the NSM and the ISC?

 6. What happens when trust in broken?

   Do you fall back on contracts?

7. Is it possible for time to 'heal' broken trust?

8. Is it possible that the amount of trust between NSM and the ISC is fluctuating? (cycles)

9. Are there specific actions that are taken in order to develop trust? (Trust-practices/routines)

Bottlenecks:

10. Do you think there are any problems with the relationship?

11. Do you think the service agreement give you enough control in order for the relationship to work?

12. Do you think there is enough trust from both sides in order for the relationship to perform well?

Solutions to bottlenecks:

13. Do you think there are any ways to solve problems in the relationship between NSM and ISC?

14. Are there any changes you would like to see made in the service agreement between the MSC and the ISC or formal controls?

15. Are there any changes you would like to see made in the role that trust plays between the MSC and the ISC?

Interview 17-8 (in Dutch)

The interviews are presented in Dutch as they were conducted in Dutch also. The lines said by C are those of the interviewer. I in this case represents the things said by the interviewee. The name of the interviewee is kept anonymous for the sake of being confidential.

C: Ten eerste, welke formele controle wordt er gebruikt, op welke manier, tussen het ISC en de faculteit der managementwetenschappen?

I: Welke formele controle, op de bestaande services neem ik aan?

C: Ja.

I: Wij leveren diensten, is er formele controle… Ja er is wel formele controle. Wij geven bijvoorbeeld, elk jaar een inzicht in een aantal werkplekken dat afgenomen wordt en dat wordt formeel gecontroleerd door desbetreffende contactpersonen. Staat hij hard genoeg?

C: Ja, ik zal hem even dichtbij leggen.

I: Ja, misschien wel verstandig. En daarnaast leveren we maandelijks een datarapportage. Dat geeft inzicht in de omvang van de, het gebruik van de diskspace op de RU-netwerkschijf. Dus dat is ook echt een vrij harde rapportage. Die twee denk ik dat, dat het meest formele controles zijn naast natuurlijk reguliere overleggen met de faculteit en dat kan je ook zien als een soort formele controle. Daar komen vraagstukken aan bod over de kwaliteit van de service. In die zin is dat ook een soort formele controle. Dus ik denk dat die drie dingen het meest als sprekende voorbeelden kan geven. Hmm, is er nog meer? Nee, dat is de standaard.

C: Ja?

I: Ja.

C: Zijn er vaak, dit soort, die drie voorbeelden die u noemt, zijn er ook vaak aanpassingen in hoe die verlopen? Zeg maar, worden daar veranderingen in gemaakt in hoe die formele controles worden gedaan?

I: Nee, niet in het proces van de controle zelf als je dat bedoelt.

C: Nee, ik bedoel…

I: Naar aanleiding van de controle?

C: Nee dat niet, gewoon of de controle zelf wordt aangepast.

I: Nee, die blijft hetzelfde.

C: Oké, eh…

I: Wacht even, dan moet ik er even bijzeggen dat die datarapportage pas sinds 1 januari geleverd wordt, dus daarvoor was die er niet.

C: Oké.

I: En die is vrij recent wel aangepast.

C: Dat wel.

I: Maar als die eenmaal staat, dan gaat dat een paar jaar verder.

C: Is daar een rede voor dat, dat vast blijft staan?

I: Omdat dat wenselijk is. Die datarapportage bijvoorbeeld, dat gaat ook over doorbelastingen. Afhankelijk van de omvang van het datagebruik wordt er betaald. En men wil natuurlijk bij FdM (Faculteit der Managementwetenschappen) kunnen sturen op omvang. Dan krijg ik een lijst van gebruiker X, gebruikt Z omvang en als dat gigantisch veel is moeten ze veel betalen. Dus dan is het gebruikelijk om naar de gebruiker om te zeggen van 'kan dat wat minder?' Dus daar wordt echt op gestuurd.

C: Ja. Is deze controle volgens u bedoelt om een bepaald gedrag in te perken? Of worden mensen door deze controle gedwongen om een bepaald iets te doen? Of ziet u het meer als, dat deze manier van controle, u als ISC meer verantwoordelijkheden geeft?

I: Je zegt gedrag. Maar bedoel je ons gedrag of het gedrag van de gebruikers?

C: Ja, voor u is het meer voor de gebruiker natuurlijk, maar vanuit uw oogpunt, wordt deze controle gedaan om het gedrag van de gebruiker te reguleren?

I: Deels. Ja het zijn- Ik heb verschillende controles genoemd en ze hebben eigenlijk alle drie een eigen karakter natuurlijk.

C: Ja.

I: En deels gaat het om administratieve controle, dus gaat het om het beïnvloeden van gedrag van gebruikers, bijvoorbeeld bij die datarapportage. Verder is het voor een deel controle op de kwaliteit van de administratie. Want wij leveren administratie van 'nou, volgens ons is dit het aantal gebruikte werkplekken, klopt dat?' Dus het is een controle. Dus er zitten diverse aspecten zitten erin. Het ging over gedrag en over verantwoordelijkheid zei je?

C: Ja, ook of er verantwoordelijkheden worden meegegeven?

I: Ik snap niet helemaal je vraag. Je hebt natuurlijk binnen het contract maak je afspraken over wie waarvoor verantwoordelijk is. Dat komt natuurlijk wel ter sprake als er afwijkingen zijn. 'Nee, wij vinden dat jullie daarvoor verantwoordelijk zijn.' Of andersom. Dat soort discussies zijn er zeker. In het contract staan natuurlijk wel verantwoordelijkheden beschreven. Dat is mooie schrijftaal, maar in de praktijk is, ligt het vaak wat grijzer, in plaats van zoals het in het contract staat. En dan zijn er discussies, ja. Dat komt zeker voor. Dus het gaat over gedrag en over verantwoordelijkheden.

C: Ja, oké. Speelt vertrouwen ook een rol in de relatie tussen de FdM en het ISC?

I: Uiteraard. Ja.

C: En in wat voor situaties dan, waar moet ik dan aan denken?

I: Dan wil je een voorbeeld natuurlijk, he? Ja, kijk, wat ik al in een eerdere fase aan je heb verteld, een contract opstellen is een soort, als je er een handtekening onder zet, een soort bevestiging van wederzijds vertrouwen. Dan ben je elkaars partner. Dan komt de praktijk vervolgens en in de praktijk is het zo dat als er problemen zijn, willen mensen zo snel mogelijk geholpen worden. Dan kan in je in het contract zetten, dat binnen 8 uur een oplossing komt, maar in sommige gevallen kan het zijn dat

mensen echt niet kunnen wachten en dat het binnen een uur moet worden opgelost. En dan ga je als een speer rennen om het voor mekaar te krijgen. En dan moet de ontvangende partij echt wel de indruk hebben dat jij je stinkende best doet om toch het eerder op te lossen. Als je dat doet, als je dat laat zien, dan kan het natuurlijk niet of wel lukken, dat doet er niet toe, maar als je dat laat zien dat je daar tijd en energie in steekt, dan krijgt men meer vertrouwen in je, zo werkt het gewoon.

C: Ja, Ja.

I: Dus er is altijd sprake van een vertrouwensrelatie. Los van de werkelijke inhoud van het contract. En als dat 8 uur/ 9 uur duurt, maar ze hebben wel het idee dat je hard gewerkt hebt, dan is het…

C: Dan is het ook goed.

I: Natuurlijk. Maar je moet wel transparant zijn waar je mee bezig bent. Dus niet zoals vroeger met oogkleppen op als ICT'er keihard gaan denken aan een oplossing, maar ook communiceren dat je aan het oplossen bent. Maar weten ze het, dan houden ze het vertrouwen.

C: Dus, communicatie is eigenlijk belangrijker dan wat er in het formele contract staat?

I: Ik heb weleens beweerd dat het niet eens belangrijk is dat je het oplost, maar wel dat je erover communiceert.

C: Dat je het oplost.

I: Ja, het is weleens gebeurd in het verleden dat, je niet met een oplossing kwam en dat men toch tevreden was. Dat had gewoon te maken met jouw inzet. Natuurlijk moet dat niet te vaak voorkomen.

C: Nee. Denkt u dat de formele controle en vertrouwen complementair aan elkaar zijn?

I: Ja.

C: Ja, en waarom denkt u dat?

I: Ja dat is de praktijkervaring. Bij formele controle, ja… Zeker in de situatie waarbij je collega's bent, is formele controle alleen, gewoon te weinig. Een hele rare verhouding. Je bent samen hier op de campus om iets te bereiken. We zijn geen commerciële dienstverlening. Dat is een andere verhouding. Maar ik denk ook in de commerciële wereld dat het mekaar complementeert.

C: Streeft u (ISC) naar creatie van vertrouwen tussen de FdM en het ISC?

I: Ja.

C: Zijn er dan ook specifieke dingen die u doet om vertrouwen te kweken?

I: Jazeker. Alleen echt zakelijke dingen, dat kan via mail. Maar als er maar een greintje emotie bijzit dan pak je de telefoon en spreek je mensen direct aan, hoor. Dat is veel beter. E-mail is geen goede manier om pijnlijke zaken te bespreken. Dus je kunt beter de telefoon pakken en mensen direct aanspreken. Dat is echt veel beter.

C: Maar vooral de manier waarop je communiceert.

I: Ja. Absoluut. En wat denk ik ook heel erg belangrijk is, is laten merken dat jij er voor hen bent en niet andersom.

C: Oké.

I: Wij zijn dienstverleners. En dat is het primaire proces. Daar zit de wetenschap en daar zit het onderwijs. Dus hun verantwoordelijkheden moeten vanuit hunzelf beleeft worden. Wij moeten niet zeggen: 'jullie zijn ergens verantwoordelijk voor,' zij moeten zelf ervaren dat ze ergens verantwoordelijk voor zijn.

C: Oké. Is er volgens u een soort punt waarop als er dan meer formele controle wordt ingevoerd, dat dan het vertrouwen afneemt, tussen de twee partijen? Wat ik daarmee bedoel: je voert zoveel formele richtlijntjes in dat partijen elkaar eerder gaan wantrouwen dan dat het vertrouwen toeneemt.

I: Dat is een theoretische vraag?

C: Ja.

I: Ja, maar het hangt ook van de situatie af. Ik kan me voorstellen dat dat een beetje een soort golfbeweging is. Afhankelijk van de ontwikkelingen is min of meer formele controle gewenst en je moet je daaraan aanpassen. Als het alleen maar groeit dan zit je denk ik op de verkeerde weg. Dan krijg je een bureaucratisch geheel. Dan wordt het afdingen op cijfertjes en ik het nog nooit meegemaakt dat het veel vertrouwen opwekt.

C: Oké. Nee, omdat u zei dat u denkt dat het complementair is aan elkaar. Maar de verhouding moet op een bepaalde manier liggen.

I: Die verhouding ligt niet vast. Dat is afhankelijk van persoonlijkheden, van gebeurtenissen, of je meer of minder humaniteit in je relatie inbouwt. Ik denk ook dat als ik kijk naar de faculteiten waarin ik actief ben, in de relatie met de ene faculteit meer of minder formele controle is als bij de ander. En dat ligt aan personen.

C: En dat ligt aan de personen?

I: Dat ligt aan de personen, ja. En natuurlijk aan de diensten die je geleverd hebt, wat de kwaliteit daarvan is geweest. Ik heb ook weleens geadviseerd, je moet gewoon meer formele controle vragen in dat geval. Dus vraag het ons. Oh ja, dat vonden ze eigenlijk wel een goed idee. Dus, ja, een beetje schipperen met de twee elementen. Dus in die zin zijn ze aan mekaar aanvullend. Maar de verandering zal wel plaatsvinden over langere periodes, het is niet zo dat je daarin maandelijks varieert.

C: In het vervolg daarop: maakt u ook bewust minder gebruik van formele controles om vertrouwen in stand te houden?

I: Nee.

C: Nee.

I: Het is meer een bewuste mix zoeken.

C: Stel, er komt een vertrouwensbreuk, wat gebeurd er dan? Wat doet u dan?

I: Aan tafel.

C: En dan zo snel mogelijk proberen…

I: Het vertrouwen te herstellen. Ja.

C: En hoe doet u dat dan?

I: Praten.

C: Praten. Ja?

I: Ja, kijk, natuurlijk. In zo'n gesprek gaat het over wat is jullie beleving het probleem, wat is in onze beleving het probleem. Ja, we zoeken naar een gelijke beleving van wat het probleem is. Je gaat eerst definiëren wat het probleem is. Kijken wie het veroorzaakt heeft of een fout heeft gemaakt of.

C: En valt u in zo'n situatie terug op bijvoorbeeld zo'n gebruikersovereenkomst (Appendix)?

I: Dat zou kunnen. Maar daar moet ook wel een beetje voorzichtig mee zijn. Als je als dienstverlener op de campus gaat zwaaien met je contract, dan ben je toch de onderliggende partij zeg maar. Het is natuurlijk een politieke omgeving en jij bent slechts de dienstverlener. Ik bedoel het niet onaardig, maar zo werkt het. Hun zijn primair en wij zijn secundair. Dus wij moeten zorgen dat wij ons aanpassen aan de grote richting.

C: Ja.

I: Dus je moet je bescheiden, dienstbaar opstellen. En je kunt zeggen: 'dit is het contract, maar blijkbaar hebben we dan geen goed contract.' Je kunt niet zeggen: 'en dit is het contract en hier heb je getekend, daar moet je aan voldoen,' dan ben je op de verkeerde weg bezig.

C: Oké. Even over de relatie tussen de ISC en de FmD. Denkt u dat er enige problemen in de relatie tussen het ISC en de FmD zijn?

I: De relatie?

C: Ja of het vertrouwen?

I: Er zijn wel enkele probleempjes, ja.

C: Kunt u me een voorbeeld daarvan geven?

I: Ja, ik weet niet of dat mag.

C: Oké.

I: Laat ik zeggen, er is op operationeel niveau, tussen enkele medewerkers is er een probleem in het vertrouwen. Dan heb ik het toch mooi omschreven.

C: Ja.

I: Oppervlakkig. En dat is aandachtspunt. Op hoog niveau is dat aandachtspunt. Dat is tussen mij en de directie. Daar is dat een punt van aandacht en we denken erover na hoe we dat kunnen oplossen. We zien dat niet als onoverkomelijk.

C:Oké. Vindt u dat die gebruikersovereenkomst, geeft u dat genoeg controle, om de relatie in goede banen te leiden tussen het ISC en de FdM?

I: Of dat genoeg controle boodt?

C: Ja, geeft dat genoeg controle om de relatie…

I: Nee, nee. Dat niet. Het is een start. Een heel basaal iets.

C: En dan voor de rest komt vooral de communicatie…

I: En de praktijk daar gaat het om, ja. Weet je, zo'n overeenkomst, het is trouwens een dienstverlenersovereenkomst, geen gebruikersovereenkomst…

C: Oké.

I: Daarin staat eigenlijk beschreven, grof, wat wij leveren. En wat onze verantwoordelijkheid is en wat de verantwoordelijkheid van de klant is. En de verantwoordelijkheid van de klant is toch vooral: betalen. Ik heb nu over het contract over werkplekken. We hebben ook nog een klein hosting contract en daarin staat iets meer over verantwoordelijkheden beschreven. Ja, dat is echt een uitgangspunt. Dit is wat wij in intentie leveren. En vervolgens op basis van rapportages en praktijkervaring en de plicht die we hebben kun je concluderen, nou misschien moet dat volgend jaar anders omschrijven in het contract, dat zou kunnen. Dan moeten we dat aanpassen.

C: Vindt u dat er – Is er genoeg vertrouwen tussen de FdM en het ISC op dit moment?

I: Ik hoop het.

C: Oké, maar wat denkt u?

I: Ik denk dat we ruim voldoende scoren.

C: Ja?

I: Dat denk ik wel, ja.

C: Is daar een rede voor?

I: Ja, ik denk dat op basis van mijn intuïtie. Ik heb twee personen waar ik veel contact mee heb en ik heb niet de indruk dat… Wij hadden afgelopen maand een vergadering met de kopstukken en eentje komt terug van vakantie en roept: 'hebben we überhaupt nog wat?' Dus dat is een goed teken.

C: Dat lijkt mij ook, inderdaad, ja.

I: En ook bij een aantal punten is zo van we gaan in oplossingssfeer kijken hoe we het gaan oplossen samen, en welke koers we gaan varen. Het is niet zo van: 'jullie doen het verkeerd dus, ik escaleer naar jouw directeur.' Ik ben in redelijk goed overleg, die indruk heb ik. Ik ben daar wel tevreden over. Men weet mij snel te vinden en belt mij ook meteen bij problemen. Men neemt geen blad voor de mond, uitstekend.

C: Dat klinkt goed.

I: Ja.

C: In het geval dat er problemen zouden zijn tussen de FmD en het ISC, de manier waarop u dat oplost, is dus aan tafel en communiceren.

I: Ja.

C: Dan hoef niet die vraag nog een keer te stellen. Zouden er volgens u nog aanpassingen gemaakt moeten worden in de dienstverleningsovereenkomst?

I: Ja, dat denk ik wel. Ik vind het vrij mager.

C: Mager? En wat zou u dan aanpassen?

I: Nou ik zou dan wat procedurele aspecten in willen als bijlage. Om mensen een stuk te gunnen, waarbij ze vrij snel kunnen vinden, wat ze moeten doen in een geval van. En nu van in paniek ICT-helpdesk bellen. En ja, in paniek, ja. Bij problemen bellen mensen standaard de ICT-helpdesk en als ze zouden weten, we moeten deze weg volgen dan is het meer een soort self-service modus. Ik denk dat dat zou kunnen helpen. Geen zware procedurele bijlage, maar meer richtinggevend, bijvoorbeeld, wat

te doen met een verhuizing? Nou dan kijk je op de website van de ISC, daar staat, dus bel de helpdesk. Ik zou willen proberen, ik zeg niet dat dat gaat lukken. Ik zou willen proberen om via zo'n DAP heet dat. Een dossier afspraken en procedures om het aantal meldingen bij de ICT-helpdesk naar beneden te brengen. Dat geldt heel breed over de campus, want men belt nu voor elke scheet.

C: Oké.

I: En daardoor lijkt het alsof er heel veel problemen zijn, maar dat is helemaal niet. Mensen weten vaak de weg niet te vinden in de brei van webinformatie die er beschikbaar is. Überhaupt op de campus, maar ook over ICT. Daar zijn we ook druk mee bezig. Het is de bedoeling om de dingen beter te stroomlijnen, dingen makkelijker te maken. Of dat gaat helpen bij vertrouwen, dat weet ik niet. Sowieso elk probleem daarbij proberen wij te ondersteunen, maar soms gaat het wat ver.

C: Oké. Ten slotte, de rol die vertrouwen nu speelt in de relatie tussen de FmD en het ISC, zou u daar verandering in willen zien?

I: De manier waarop?

C: Ja, momenteel is het vertrouwen goed en het speelt een prominente rol in de relatie tussen het FmD en het ISC en veel communicatie is nodig.

I: Ja, even terugkomend op eerder het is een combinatie van vertrouwen en formele controle. Maar als het vertrouwen er niet is, dan kan je die formele controle weggooien, dan krijg je problemen.

C: Maar u zou de manier waarop het nu gaat, die combinatie tussen die twee, stemt dat u tevreden, of zou u daar nog verandering in willen zien?

I:Even bij mezelf te raden gaan… Nou, op zich ben ik tevreden. Ik wil het graag continueren. Dat is een aandachtspunt, continueren. Dus het is goed, maar ik ben me heel erg van bewust: ik moet er energie in blijven steken.

C: Om het zo te houden zoals het nu gaat.

I: Ja, dat gaat niet vanzelf.

C: Oké, dat is duidelijk. Dat waren de vragen. Bedankt.

I: Graag gedaan.

Interview 18-8 (in Dutch)

The interviews are presented in Dutch as they were conducted in Dutch also. The lines said by C are those of the interviewer. I in this case represents the things said by the interviewee. The name of the interviewee is kept anonymous for the sake of being confidential.

C: Ten eerste, wat is de formele controle die gebruikt wordt, tussen de FmD en het ISC? Op basis van contracten of iets dergelijks?

I: Ja. Dat zijn jaarcontracten, ik heb je een eerdere keer een laten zien. Dat zijn in principe de overeenkomst die is gesloten. In het verleden waren er veel, hoe heet dat? Servicecontracten. Daar is een bepaalde naam voor, ik kom daar nu even niet op.

C: Oké.

I: Op basis van een aantal losse onderdelen, die zijn nu eigenlijk ondervangen door een raamcontract.

C: Oké. En wat voor een dingen (maatregelen/controles) staan daar in volgens u?

I: Nou daar staat in van wat voor diensten we gebruik kunnen maken en wat zij leveren. Daar staat in het aantal werkplekken wat door hun verzorgt wordt. En daar staat ook in wat er niet onder valt en wat dus extra betaald moet worden mochten we daar gebruik van maken.

C:Wordt er vaak op dat soort formele contracten teruggevallen?

I: Nee.

C: Oké. Deze formele controle wordt dat in uw oogpunt gebruikt om bepaald gedrag te beperken of juist verantwoordelijkheden te geven?

I: Geen van beide. Volgens mij is het een dienstmoment voor een heel jaar waarin de ene partij aan de andere zegt 'voor dit bedrag leveren wij bij jullie deze dienst.' En wij weten waar we op kunnen rekenen en zij kunnen leveren en ontvangen. En het heeft voor de rest niet zoveel met verantwoordelijkheden te maken denk ik. Op zich is het een dienstencontract dus zij leveren wat wij vragen. Als wij twee keer zoveel werkplekken willen hebben, dan zullen zij dat doen, wij zijn de vragende partij, hun zijn de leverende. Ook als wij een ander soort computer zouden willen hebben, daar staat een extra prijs aan vast, dat is onze verantwoordelijkheid en onze, hoe noem je dat? Onze policy die we zouden kunnen varen. In zoverre is dat wel duidelijk wie en wat kan doen en wat mag doen.

C: Oké. Als vertrouwen in beeld komt bij de relatie tussen de twee partijen, wanneer is dat het geval? Is er helemaal geen sprake van vertrouwen?

I: Ja, ik spreek nooit in die termen, dus ik denk daar ook nooit over na. Hebben wij vertrouwen in elkaar? Is het afhankelijk ook deels van momenten. Het hangt ook deels af met wie je te maken hebt. Op dit moment zijn er een paar accountmanagers van ISC die bij ons langskomen om het contract te bespreken, dingen met ons door te nemen. Naarmate zij meedenken en zich flexibel opstellen is het een totaal andere houding als we in het verleden hebben gehad van: 'ja, dit is het contract en hier moet je het mee doen.' Dat is weinig flexibel. Dus dat is wel iets wat de leverende partij denk ik, die de

diensten aan ons aanbiedt, opwaarts in vertrouwen kan waarderen om flexibel dus naar de klant te schikken. Als je… We hebben een paar keer een contract gehad, dat was halverwege het jaar met terugwerkende kracht. Nou, dat vind ik al niet zo goed.

C: Nee.

I: Je moet ruim van tevoren weten wat je met elkaar afspreekt. Toen was het ook zo van als er computers afgaan, dan blijft de prijs hetzelfde, als er computer bijkomen dan gaat meteen de prijs omhoog. Dan vond ik dan ook niet klantvriendelijk. Dat soort zaken, gaf nog wel eens wat irritatie, of hoe je het ook wil noemen tussen beide partijen. Maar dat was denk ik ook in de beginfase van die nieuwe dienst. Wij hebben binnen de RU een cultuur waarin om de paar jaar al die diensten worden hervormd, anders worden georganiseerd. Dat geeft nou niet een basis voor vertrouwen in continuïteit, omdat constant je met andere mensen op andere organisatieonderdelen hebt te maken. En primair, wat wil je als klant? Je wil een PC, en of ze nou in huisje A,B of C zitten, hij staat bij jou en hij moet het doen. In het verleden had ik iemand tegenover mij zitten toen ik hier werkte op de faculteit. Toen had elke faculteit zijn eigen ICT-afdeling. Ik zei toen 'Jaap, Jan of Karel, kom eens even kijken,' en binnen een minuut was het verholpen. Nu moet je een helpdesk bellen en je krijgt via de helpdesk een antwoord, je krijgt niemand aan de telefoon. Dus het is wel heel erg op afstand gezet. Dus dat betekent, dat je als… Dat is ook lastiger voor het ISC, denk ik, om het vertrouwen te krijgen, en dat kan alleen maar als de zaken een beetje op rolletjes lopen.

C: Ja.

I: Zelf zit ik met angst en beven elke keer als er een grote upload is van een systeem, waarbij ze iets moeten doen, in de verwachting van 'goh, zou alles het nog doen als dat achter de rug is?' Er wordt altijd van tevoren gezegd: 'het duurt niet zo veel tijd, we doen het 's avonds of in het weekend.'

C: Ja.

I: Maar in de praktijk blijkt heel vaak dat er bepaalde dingen of onderdelen dan worden vergeten, of de faculteit zit net anders in mekaar, houden niet overal rekening mee. Dat was met name een aantal jaar geleden heel sterk, ik vind dat de laatste tijd wel afgenomen, dat wat dat betreft heb ik er minder last van.

C: Minder last van, ja.

I: Nee, zo werkt het ook vaak bij, dat weet je ook, als je met mensen, diensten en prestaties. Er wordt geklaagd als het niet goed gaat, er wordt weinig gezegd als het goed gaat.

C: Ja, ja. Zo werkt het.

I: Het valt niet tegen de laatste jaren.

C: Oké. En wat u zei, dat vaak veranderen van hoe dingen georganiseerd zijn, hoe vaak gebeurd dat?

I: Nou, ik schat om de twee/drie jaar. En op dit moment loopt er volgens mij ook weer in discussie van moet dat niet weer wat dichter op de faculteit zitten, dat je met een vaste groep mensen te maken hebt. Met vaste accountmanagers. En eerst was het een grote box waar je dan je vraag kon stellen, iemand

gaf dan wel een keer een antwoord. Net wie je had, dan was dat een goed, een fout, of een minder goed antwoord.

C: Ja. U zegt ik spreek niet vaak in termen als 'vertrouwen'. Toch een vraag daarover: Ziet u formele controle (contracten) en vertrouwen als complementair aan elkaar of als substituut?

I: Nee, dat is complementair. Substituut betekent vervanging, dus je kan niet zeggen 'nou, ik mis het vertrouwen, dus ruil het in voor een contract.' Ik denk dat het goed is, vanuit bedrijfseconomische motieven, dat is net zoals met een huwelijk, bepaalde dingen leg je toch vast op papier. Want mocht er iets gebeuren, onder de tram lopen, of weet ik veel wat, is het toch heel fijn als ergens op papier staat hoe het geregeld is, ondanks dat heel erg goed vertrouwen in elkaar hebt. Dus het is voor mij geen substituut, dan zou het toch wel meer complementair zijn.

C: Ja, oké. Streeft u op de faculteit bewust naar creatie van vertrouwen onderling?

I: Tussen?

C: Ja, tussen het ISC en de FdM?

I: Nee, niet bewust. Wat we doen is we onderhouden contacten, niet met het doel om vertrouwen in elkaar te krijgen. Ik denk dat het een het gevolg is van het ander. Als contacten goed lopen, als gevraagde diensten goed worden geleverd, dan ontstaat er vanzelf vertrouwen. En dat is nooit een doel op zich.

C: Oké. Denkt u dat er… U zegt, ze zijn complementair, controle en vertrouwen. Zou er ook een punt kunnen ontstaan waarbij invoering van meer formele controle, meer regeltjes, het vertrouwen tussen beide partijen zou kunnen schaden? Dat het dan tot wantrouwen zal leiden?

I: Ja, dat duid je op de grenzen van de bureaucratie. De wetenschapper, met name, de creatieve mensen die zijn dwars van allerlei regels, hoe meer regels je hebt, des te meer onwil er is om mee te werken op allerlei vragen, of onmacht van 'wat is dit nu weer, ik snap dit helemaal niet en waar moet ik om hulp vragen?' Dus stel dat je al die regels zou afschaffen, dan heb je alleen nog met mensen te maken en met vertrouwen. Op zich werkt dat vaak heel erg goed. En waar je eigenlijk naar moet streven is denk ik zo min mogelijk regels. Want toch moet je de zaak wel vastleggen, organisatorisch, administratieve organisatie, maar met eigenlijk zo min mogelijk regels. Waar de regels vaak ontstaan is als er misbruik wordt gemaakt, of als er neiging tot misbruik zou kunnen ontstaan. Dat je zegt 'nou, we maken een regel om dat in te perken.'

C: Ja.

I: Maar de kans bestaat altijd dat je doorschiet in dat soort dingen. Mijn idee is niet daardoor meer regels is beter. Regels zijn daar eigenlijk waar dat nodig is. Dat geldt bij ons, dat geldt in Europees verband, dat geldt in nationaal verband. Bij elke verkiezing hoor je het ook weer: 'er moeten minder regels komen.'

C: Oké, duidelijk. Wat gebeurd er in uw beleving als vertrouwen wordt gebroken?

I: Nou dat is denk ik iets persoonlijks, je moet dat persoonlijk of zakelijk bekijken. Ik hecht heel veel aan relaties met mensen. Die ik al jaren ken. In bepaalde situaties weet ik ook dat ik daarop kan

vertrouwen. Ik weet wat ze kunnen en waar ik op kan rekenen. Maar stel dat het vertrouwen op een een of andere manier wordt misbruikt, dat ik me gepiepeld voel, of wat dan ook, in een bepaalde situatie, ja dan ben ik daar niet bepaald blij mee. Dat schaadt wel heel erg de relatie tussen mensen.

C: In zulke situaties valt u dan terug op formele contracten?

I: Nou, dat kan, als dat een hulpmiddel is. Stel, als dat vertrouwen wordt gebroken op basis van inzicht op interpretatie van afspraken die we hebben gemaakt, kan je terugvallen op zakelijke afspraken zoals die zijn. En dan kan je altijd nog betwisten, van wat staat er nou eigenlijk. Ik vind dat je dat moet leveren en de andere zegt van 'ja, maar dat heb ik geleverd.' Dat zou kunnen.

C: Ja.

I: Maar alleen in die gevallen. Over het algemeen grijp ik dan niet direct terug naar de regels als het over andere dingen gaat, die niet echt een zakelijk karakter hebben.

C: Dan probeer ik ook een beetje de knelpunten tussen de twee partijen te onderzoeken. In dat kader: Vindt u dat er op dit moment enige problemen zijn tussen het ISC en de FdM?

I: Nou, er spelen altijd wel wat kwesties, ik heb op dit moment niet direct op mijn netvlies, want de laatste maanden is er niet iets waar ik direct bij betrokken ben geweest. Dat ik kan zeggen van 'hé, er speelt dit.' Er spelen altijd wel wat zaken en ik wil ook niet zeggen dat het problemen zijn. Het is een dynamisch iets een faculteit. Wij gaan verhuizen volgend jaar naar het Gymnasion. Ik kan me goed voorstellen dat daar een aantal dingen moeten plaatsvinden waarbij het ISC aan zet is. Als er mensen daar komen zitten, is het fijn dat alles het doet, zodat ze kunnen werken. Ik heb geen idee, ik ben er niet direct bij betrokken, maar dat is iets wat moet worden kortgesloten tussen die twee. Het liefst van tevoren zodat ze daar in hun planning rekening mee kunnen houden. Andere dingen die spelen, maar ik weet niet of dat met het ISC is, dat is bijvoorbeeld, Windows…

C: Besturingssysteem…

I: Ja, het universitair systeem gaat over op een hoger niveau en het wordt uitgerold over de campus. Om wat ik net zei: 'het is nooit fijn als er iets verandert, dat er van alles is.' Daarom hebben we ervoor gezorgd dat we achteraan in de rij staan. Zodat alle kinderziektes er in ieder geval uit zijn als ze bij ons bij aan de beurt zijn.

C: Ja.

I: Dus, nou dat zijn wel allemaal dingen die spelen. Als dat gebeurd, als er een ingreep is, dan zijn er altijd wel wat dingetjes die dan gecommuniceerd moeten worden en kunnen worden-- Ik moet zeggen dat niks is zo dat het onopgelost blijft. Als bij mij iets niet werkt duurt het soms misschien heel even voordat ik iemand te pakken heb, maar dan is het ook vrij snel verholpen.

C: Ja, dat is dus wel acceptabel, de tijd dat het duurt?

I: Ja. Daar kan ik de laatste jaren zeker over spreken, ja.

C: Oké. De dienstverleningsovereenkomst, biedt dat volgens u genoeg controle op zich om de relatie tussen de ISC en de FdM goed te laten werken?

I: Ja dat denk ik wel. Want, wat ik al zei 'je hoeft het niet verder helemaal te specificeren.' Wat heb je hier: een werkplek. Een werkplek is basis: computer met een aantal programma's die het moeten doen. De afwijkingen worden benoemd, bijvoorbeeld een Mac of laptops, of afwijkende configuraties met meer prijzen. Ja, ik vind dat prima zo.

C: Ja?

I: Ja, de basis staat er. We weten ook van tevoren wat we moeten gaan betalen volgend jaar. Dus daar kunnen we rekening mee houden in de bedrijfsvoering. En volgens mij is dat de, wel de goede manier.

C: Oké. Denkt u ook dat er genoeg vertrouwen is tussen de twee partijen?

I: Ja, daar vraag je weer… Wat bedoel je er precies mee? In die termen denk ik nooit.

C: Nee.

I: Je hebt gedachte over allerlei diensten, maar ook over de zusterfaculteit, zelfs binnen een faculteit over allerlei mensen. En de ene keer geef je een hoger cijfer, dan een ander, maar het is niet, dat er een vertrouwensbreuk ofzo, is. Maar als je zo praat over vertrouwen, is niet het eerste waar ik aan denk is het ISC. Als je het hebt over wie kan ik honderd procent rekenen en zou ik meteen mee in zee gaan. Daarvoor staat het mij te veel op afstand en het mij te veel een abstracte organisatie.

C: Oké. U zag niet veel problemen tussen beide partijen. Dan heeft het geen zin om deze vraag te stellen. In de dienstverleningsovereenkomst, zou u daarin veranderingen willen aanbrengen?

I: Nou ik heb het niet onlangs doorgenomen, maar het staat mij op dit moment niet echt bij van nou, ik mis daar zaken in. De dingen die we wilden, het loopt nu een jaar of vijf zo'n soort vorm. Daar is wat aan gesleuteld met commentaar van onze kant en ook commentaar van andere faculteiten. Dus zoals die nu is, is het wel een document waarmee te werken valt. En ik mis niet direct iets van 'hé, dat zou erin moeten staan.

C: Dan kom ik nog eenmaal terug op het vertrouwen. Zou u nog veranderingen aangebracht zien worden in de rol van vertrouwen tussen ISC en de FdM?

I: Ja. Kijk, persoonlijk zeg ik: 'ik werk het liefst met mensen en niet met computers als contact.' Dus persoonlijk was ik heel erg tevreden met iemand die tegenover me zat en die ik even erbij kon roepen. En nu heb ik te maken met een veel logger apparaat wat op zich ook werkt, maar het is volkomen anoniem. Helpdesk zegt van: 'we hebben uw klacht genoteerd, we gaan er aan werken.' En dan zit je eigenlijk onwetend van wat betekent dat? Betekent dat vandaag? Hoor ik dat als het is gerepareerd? Dus te veel dingen… Normaal kan je communiceren met iemand van: 'ja, hoe lang zal dat duren, of wat zijn de problemen,' dat kan ik niet. Of dat vertrouwen is weet ik niet, ik vind het wel minder prettig. Het meest prettig zou zijn als er weer mensen in de buurt zijn die ik oog in oog, over de zaak kon communiceren. Dan zal het vertrouwen dus ook groter worden bij mij in de diensten die vraag en de dingen die ik vraag. En nu heb ik zoiets als ik de telefoon pak : 'ik hoop maar dat ze er zijn, dat ik een goede pak.'

C: Oké, dat is duidelijk. Dat ben ik door de vragen heen. Dan wil ik u bedanken.

7.3 Appendix C User's agreement of 2015/2016 between the Nijmegen School of Management and ICT Service Centre. It is important to note that the appendix does not include all of the agreement, as it is not allowed digitally acquire the agreement by an outsider. The following are notes taken of the actual user's agreement (in dutch).

1. *Algemeen:* ISC: Levering ICT producten en diensten.

Het ISC sluit met faculteiten, clusters en overige eenheden Dienst-verkopers overeenkomsten (DVO) voor diensten op het gebied van ICT. De ICT moet aansluiten bij de behoefte van de afnemer, waarna wordt gestreefd naar standaardisatie.

Aanvullende dienstverlening is mogelijk, echter brengt dit extra kosten voor de afnemer met zich mee.

2. *Overeenkomst:*

Opdrachtgever: Secretaris-directeur FM: dhr. H.L. Looijmans.

Opdrachtnemer: R.W.V. Rhemrev.

Algemene leveringsvoorwaarden: www.ru.nl/isc/over-ons/leverings/

Overeenkomstduur: 1 jaar. Deze overeenkomst wordt ieder jaar stilzwijgend verlengd.

Algemene dienstverlening:

1. Storingen in het kader van deze DVO dienen gemeld te worden bij helpdesk. De ICT helpdesk behoort zo snel mogelijk te reageren en is daarvoor verantwoordelijk.

2. Niet-acute problemen, wijzigingsvoorstellen, vragen en verzoeken, dienen gemeld te worden bij de ICT helpdesk.

3. ICT helpdesk heeft de taken: registratie, bewaking van de voortgang en terugmelding.

4. De ICT helpdesk legt het verzoek bij de goede afdeling van het ISC neer.

5. Voor eventuele verzoeken kan advies worden gevraagd aan het relatiebeheer van de ISC.

Continuïteit:

Bij calamiteiten heeft het ISC een inspanningsverplichting om de service zo snel mogelijk conform de DVO te leveren. De (acceptabele) hersteltijd is afhankelijk van de ernst van de situatie.

RU werkplek service: Hardware en software.

Doel van RU werkplek service: veilig toegang krijgen tot de RU ICT infrastructuur, gebruikmakend van zoveel mogelijk gestandaardiseerde hard- & software en gebruikmaking van de concern informatiesystemen.

Verantwoordelijkheden opdrachtgever:
- Apparatuur gebruiken waarvoor zij bedoeld is, niet misbruiken.
- Opdrachtgever dient een ICT-contactpersoon aan te wijzen. Deze functionaris zal ICT gerelateerde zaken contacteren.
- Bestelbevoegden moeten worden aangewezen, zij mogen ICT-middelen bestellen bij het ISC

Afbakening:

Printers zijn niet de verantwoordelijkheid van de ISC en zijn niet opgenomen in de DVO.

Afgenomen producten/diensten: www.radboudnet.nl/isc/pdc/ondersteuning/

RU-werkplek (desktop): medewerker;

RU-laptop: medewerker;

RU-werkplek: student;

RU-Imac: medewerker;

RU-werkplek: special;

ICT helpdesk;

ICT service punt.

Rapportage:
- Aantal in gebruik zijnde eenheden hard- en software;
- Hoeveelheden dataopslag, opgesplitst naar organisatie-eenheid/afdeling;
- Aantal bij de ICT aangemelde en opgeloste incidenten;
- Een analyse van eventueel grote verstoring.

FM:

Directeur:

h.looijmans@fm.ru.nl

Bestelbevoegde:

t.vanvoorst@fm.ru.nl

p.vaneerde@fm.ru.nl

ISC:

r.rhemrev@ru.nl (directeur ISC)

r.vangent@ru.nl (relatiebeheer)

a.vandergraaf@ru.nl (afdelingshoofd/budgethouder/service eigenaar gebruikersondersteuning)

7.4 Appendix D Notes taken during orientation talks with regards to the NSM and ISC

Talk with spokesperson of NSM
Date: 21-6-16

The role of ICT is becoming more important → has been put at a distance with the ISC.
User's agreement cannot be acquired but is allowed to be viewed.

Bottlenecks: the distance between the faculty and the ISC. Which was shorter in the past. One is not able to physically open a door and talk to ICT experts. If problems occur mails have to be sent to the helpdesk. Takes quite some time to get an email back.
The human factor is gone in the relationship.
Standardization can interleave.

Talk with spokesperson of NSM

Talk with spokesperson from the ISC (Name is not given, because it was requested) :
Date: 29-6-16

Control: Formal documents available about the relationship with the NSM
Names of ISC that are useful to know: none

Spokesperson indicates that: the relationship is fine, they make use of user's agreements, they use emails to communicate. Emails, user's agreements cannot be acquired by students.

Annually → contracts are made about workplaces, amount of data storage, costs
If amounts are not right, things are solved. Often by costs negotiations.

Service: If incidents (not escalated) occur → helpdesk is used → if it does not get solved → spokesperson solves it, mostly in a quick fashion.

The user's agreement is not exhausting, it is based mostly on trust, which is preferable according to the spokesperson.

History of the ISC: 3 years ago there has been a reorganization.
Two parts have been formed together: the GDI and the UDI.
GDI was critized to be too client focused, while the UDI was too rigid.

Spokesperson mentions that contracts to not matter, because problems have to be solved.
A relations manager → should generalize, operates at the level of trust instead of control.

For the ISC to exist there is a necessity for trust. The ISC is more active in relationships with the faculties than other service providers to the faculties. This however, does not mean that control does not have to be there. It is needed, but is not exhaustive.
Too much control means not enough flexibility to solve problems.
Communication is essential for building trust. Holding on to strict procedure does not improve communication and as a consequence improving trust between parties.

7.5 Appendix E Table containing topics and related questions (some of these were used in the actual interviews)

Question/topic	General	Rational perspective	Relational perspective
Controls coercive and/or enabling	Controls: What controls are used? Coercive/enabling controls? Which? What do you prefer?	Are they used as instruments by humans?	Are they formed within a network? Do they influence behaviour in a manner which is not intended?
Trust	Does trust come into the relationship? When? Is there enough trust?	Do you use certain signals in order to create or maintain trust?	Can broken trust be healed? How?
Relationship control and trust		Do you see control and trust as complementary or substitutive? Or do they interact (Are they both complementary and substitutes at the same time?)	Do you think trust and control is and how interact is based on routines (trust-practices)? What are these practices?
Essentials rational vs relational		Do you think trust and controls are instruments to be used by humans?	Is trust created in a network, by interacting with both people and formal controls?
Bottlenecks	Are there any problems within the relationship? Do you think there is enough trust between the NSM and the ISC? Do you think that formal controls alone are enough to regulate the		

	relationship between the NSM and the ISC?	60	
Solutions to bottlenecks	Do you think there is room for improvement in the relationship? What are those? Do you want to see any changes in the relationship? Which?		

8. Planning

Week	What to do?	What has to be done?
14 (4/4 - 10/4)	Up till this point: writing research proposal	Research proposal approved (8 april)
15 (11/4 – 17/4)	Sign supervision form	Correct issues
16 (18/4 – 24/4)		Hand in supervision form (18/4)
17 (25/4 – 1/5)	Start writing/finish chapter 1-3	CH 1
18 (2/5 – 8/5)	Start writing/finish chapter 1-3	CH 2
19 (9/5 – 15/5)	Start writing/finish chapter 1-3	CH 3
20 (16/5 – 22/5)	Meeting with supervisor	
21 (23/5 – 29/5)	Start collecting needed results (CH4)	Correct CH 1-3
22 (30/5 – 5/6)	Collect data	
23 (6/6 – 12/6)	Collect data	
24 (13/6 – 19/6)	Collect data	
25 (20/6 – 26/6)	Meeting with supervisor	Chapter 4 (results)
26 (27/6 – 3/7)	Write chapter 5 (conclusion and discussion	Hand in 1st draft of the thesis
27 (4/7 – 10-7)	Meeting with supervisor	Correct issues
28 (11/7 – 17/7)		
29 (18/7 – 24/7)	Hand in master thesis	
TBA	Defend master thesis	