'Addressing the future without foresight'

An overview of Dutch defense policy
in response to changing security perceptions since 1989

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Contents

1 Summary

This study focuses on the changing security perceptions since the end of the Cold War and the related role of the Dutch armed forces in this process. Because the defence organization is a frequently used policy instrument of Dutch politics in shaping foreign policy, the structure and concepts within this organization are specifically subject to certain perceptions of threats in the Netherlands and the rest of the world. This issue has recently been revived with a renewed discussion on the future of the Dutch armed forces. Therefore, the main question of this study is: How have the Dutch armed forces responded to changing security environments?

The answer to this question has been divided into three subquestions, of which the first question focuses on finding the specific actors and developments in national and international politics and affairs which have influenced Dutch defense policy since the end of the Cold War. It appears that the institutional framework in which the Dutch armed forces operate, has not dramatically changed since 1989. The second subquestion deals with the identification of current threats and threat perceptions which could possibly influence Dutch defence policy in the next two decades. The results show that the Dutch armed forces will have to operate in a constantly changing security environment, in which a great diversity of threats will continue to influence ideas on security. The third subquestion deals with the description of specific policy measures which have been taken up by the Dutch Ministry of Defence in order to cope with this continuously changing security perception. The overarching policy change comes from the adaptation of the 'expeditionary warfare'-concept, which entails a highly mobile and adaptable armed forces apparatus, supported by flexible supply-chains in logistics, material planning procedures, as well as new force planning and communication techniques.

In sum, it can be concluded that the Dutch armed forces have responded to changing security perceptions with a thorough reform of funds, assets and manpower from an organization ready to stop a full scale Russian invasion to a small-scale, high tech, well trained and mobile force capable of addressing a great diversity of threats around the world. However, the question remains whether this reform is the most effective way in alleviating the identified threats.

2 Introduction

'Lack of proper motivation of means makes the armed forces vulnerable for further financial attacks'
(Staden, A. van, et al., 1999, p.85.)[1]

Over the last two decades, the Dutch armed forces have received a substantial amount of attention due to the relatively sudden change in the security landscape after the Cold War. A reorientation of capabilities took place, in order to cope with this new security environment. [2] In the defence White paper of 1993, it was decided to restructure the armed forces into a force that would focus on expeditionary capabilities, given the political ambition to make a contribution to both combat operations and reconstruction missions. This trend continued in the following years with decreasing defense budgets, ongoing restructuring and a focus on improving the 'toolbox' for expeditionary warfare. [3]

Recently, the discussion on how to cope with the new security environment has focused on the congruence between the political ambition level, size of the organization, personnel size and financial assets. As described in the policy letter '*New balance, new developments, towards future-durable armed forces*' [4] to the Dutch House of Representatives, there currently exists an imbalance between the organizational size, structure of the Dutch armed forces and the financial means to adequately perform on the politically required level.

More specifically, the current situation has led to demands for a more thorough analysis of the relation between the political ambition level, the international security environment and related financial issues. Due to the current budgetary deficiencies as a consequence of high operational costs of equipment and personnel, the financial situation does not allow the Dutch armed forces to continue operating at the current ambition level. [5] Therefore, in the policy letter 'Service Worldwide' the Minister of defence announced that the Dutch defence policy will be reviewed in relation to current defense expenditures, political ambition level and international cooperation of the Netherlands. [6] As a result, from the March 1, 2008 an interdepartmental commission will look into policy options through discussions with academics, policymakers and other external experts. In a first response, the Clingendael Institute sent out a policy brief regarding this issue. [7] It was argued that a discussion on a long term policy for the defence organization should not be based on current limitations and problems, but on the political ambitions of the Dutch government in the field of security policy.

However, in order to set these ambitions, it is helpful to understand the background in which these ambitions have to be set. Thence, many researchers have developed techniques and methods which help to identify possible future threats.[8] However, it is generally agreed that no single method is the most useful in identifying the future, therefore this study analyses in total 37 documents in which different future methods have been applied. That way, the most likely background in which the Dutch armed forces will have to operate in the next to decades can be identified. These results will be compared with the current theoretical concepts on which the Ministry of Defense is basing its policy. This, in turn, will enable the researchers from the interdepartmental commission to improve their review of policy options for the Dutch armed forces.

Therefore, this study will concentrate on describing the historical and current responses of the Dutch armed forces to changing security environments. The continuing tension between changing operational demands and the existing force composition is a complex process where many influences on defense policy can be identified. By identifying influential actors and processes, as well as describing current policy responses to changing operational demands, the decision making process will become more structured and transparent. Therefore, the main question of this study is '**How have the Dutch armed forces responded to changing**

security environments?' In order answer this question, several subquestions have been formulated.

First, the sub-question 'Which actors and developments have influenced the force composition since the end of the Cold War?' will focus on developments and actors that have influenced defense policy from 1989 onwards. This will be done through a literature review of policy documents from 1989-2007, which will help to develop insight in the changing perception of the security environment and correlated threats, and the changes in the corresponding force structure and capabilities, which have been developed in order to cope with this environment. [9]

Second, with the sub-question 'What are threats that influence the security environment of the Netherlands?' an exploration of possible threats will be used to develop insight in what is currently perceived to be the most likely future security environment in which the Dutch armed forces will have to operate during the next two decades. As Phillips & Bana e Costa [10] argue, managers in both profit and non-profit organizations continually face the challenging task of allocating resources by balancing costs, benefits and risks, while also gaining commitment by a wide constituency of stakeholders to those decisions. Because developments in the international environment significantly influence the future composition of the Dutch armed forces, this information will help to develop a more comprehensive framework that enables decision makers within the armed forces to improve decision making on allocation of forces and funds. [11]

Third, based on the answers to the first and second sub-questions, the focus will lie on the description of the more recent policy responses of the Dutch Ministry of defence. This assessment will help to structure thoughts on how the Dutch armed forces can develop itself into an organization which is capable of addressing these future threats in a suitable manner. More specifically, the changing security environment and the assessment of new threats has recently led to new responses from the Ministry of defence in the form of new materiel allocation procedures and operation planning tools. This task is complex and difficult since many options are present, benefits and risks are rarely expressed as single objectives, multiple stakeholders with different agendas compete for limited resources, while individually optimal resource allocations to organizational units are rarely collectively optimal, and those dissatisfied with the decisions taken may resist implementation.[12] Therefore, the third sub-question will be 'What are current policy responses of the Ministry of defence in response to new threats and changing operational demands?'

3 Theoretical Background

3.1 Decision making problems

In all organizations, decision makers continually face the difficult task of balancing benefits against costs and the risks of realizing the benefits. Already in 1940 an article was published in the *American Political Science Review* where the author was concerned about the inefficiency of the budgeting procedure in the public sector. His point was that budgeting focuses too much on requesting more resources and finding supporting arguments. Instead of asking for more funds, the authorities should focus on the underlying reasons why a certain amount of money should be allocated towards a specific project. [13]

More specifically, Phillips & Bana e Costa [14] identify five problems that managers in decision making processes in both profit and non-profit organizations are typically confronted with. First, benefits are typically characterized by multiple objectives, which often conflict. [15] This appears to be nearly universal for organizations in the private sector. [16] Second, when decision makers are presented with a large number of opportunities, they can not know the details of each one sufficiently well enough to make informed decisions. Third, if resources are allocated to each of several organizational units considered individually, the collective result appears not to make the best use of the total resource. [17] That is, individually optimal decisions are rarely collectively optimal, giving rise to an efficient use of the available total resource, a situation that illustrates the 'Tragedy of the Commons' dilemma from Hardin. In this dilemma the individually optimal use of for example a natural resource, leads to a non optimal use of the total available natural resource. [18] Fourth, many people are usually involved. Some provide expert judgment and advice to the decision maker, but that assistance inevitably reveals fundamental conflicts, which possibly creates competition. [19] Others, with power to interfere or influence decision making, are often difficult to identify. Fifth, implementation by those who disagree with the resource allocation can easily lead to the formation of small teams of people secretly working on non-approved projects in which they have heavily invested personally.

Consequently, decision makers need an approach which helps to weigh different costs, risks, advantages and disadvantages; to develop portfolios of investment in such a diversified way that the limited resources are used in a collectively optimal way; this approach has to be developed in consultancy with the different key stakeholders in a systematic way so that multiple views are taken up equally; key decision makers have to be engaged in such a way that their opinions on investment portfolios are agreed upon, while their individual preferences over this portfolio can be maintained. [20]

To be useful to decision makers, Phillips & Bana e Costa therefore argue that 'decision support arguments ideally should be able to accommodate financial and non-financial benefit criteria, risk and uncertainty, data and judgment, and be transparent, while providing an audit trail.' [21] That way, these criteria help to organize the decision maker's thoughts and to structure the decision problems, which facilitates a better understanding of the issues involved.

3.2 Decision making on security issues

In order to provide a more thorough framework which qualifies for the criteria from Phillips & Bana e Costa to improve desicionmaking processes on the Dutch armed forces, this study is based on the framework provided by the Dutch Strategy National Security. [22] That way, by providing and overview in data and judgment in a transparent way, especially risk and uncertainty can be more thoroughly identified.

Specifically, this study first focuses on making an analysis of the threats and challenges that are relevant

for the Netherlands. Based on this exploration, a report will be created in which several specific threats will be monitored which could possibly undermine the stability of the Netherlands. Thereafter, an analysis is required which maps the needed capacities in order to deal with the relevant identified threats. These capacities will be compared with the current capacities of the Dutch security services, military and domestic disaster facilities, after which the gaps that exist within the capacities can be filled through policy improvements.

In effect, this study will focus on identifying the security threats for the Dutch armed forces, as well as comparing whether the current policy changes made over the last decade in this direction have been sufficient to adequately cope with the threats identified.

3.3 Factors influencing defense policy

The process of identifying factors which influence defense policy comes with a number of challenges. First, the complexity of the issue has the effect that it can be analyzed on a variety of levels. For example, it is possible to focus on the dynamics of the decision making process that range from the interaction between EU, NATO and national defense policy, to the specific decision-making mechanisms on the domestic policy making levels. Moreover, the various interaction processes require that one must seek to conceptualize how domestic, inter governmental and transnational actors influence the formulation of defense policies. In addition, since the end of the Cold War the theater of operations has nowadays changed from a relatively simple environment to a multidimensional and diversified threat environment, thereby making the operationalization of concepts such as 'security' and 'defense' more controversial and debatable. [23] Two theoretical approaches on factors influencing policy decisions can be identified. [24]

First, neo-realism would argue that to understand defense policy, one has to look at the changing nature of the balance of power and how a state's search for relative gains influences the bargaining process on profit maximization. The neo-realists reinterpreted classical realists' propositions on the balance of power as a factor which determines a state's behavior in international relations. Thence, defense policy analysis focuses on the political process that is driven by a nation state's search for maximizing 'relative gains'. [25] However, the problem with neo-realism is that it treats states as unitary actors in pursuit of self interest, whereby it ignores the role that domestic politics can have on the dynamics of the international system. Moreover, the assumption that the international system is anarchic and solely driven by self-help is highly questionable. [26]

Second, neo-institutionalists analyze policy from an emphasis on local, national and international institutions. In defense policy therefore, they assume that the outcome of the policy will be decided by the creation and interaction between working groups, fora and bodies set up in order to influence or determine decisions related to defense policy. [27] One criticism of this theory is that it assumes that organizations are primary factors in the evolution of defense policies and so fails to explain satisfactorily the relationship between local and domestic considerations which can influence decision making as well. More specifically, neo-institutionalists, just as neo-realists, share the assumption that the state reasons from merely self-interest, thereby failing to explain the dynamics of interest formation within national, international and transnational policy making fora.

This study will focus on the identification of both actors and processes on the local, national and international level that influence decision making processes on defense issues. By looking at the roles of a variety of actors and processes without assuming a priori that there is a hierarchy among the different levels of analysis, this approach focuses on explaining the dynamics of interest formation between the different policymaking fora.

3.4 Actors influencing Dutch budgetary defense policy

Because the Dutch armed forces operate in a constitutional democracy, several additional political and democratic processes and actors influence decision making. Specifically, the Dutch constitution states in article 90 that the government has the final authority over the armed forces. [28] In general, three models exist which help to define influences of public policy decisions on defense budget. [29]

Model 1: International environment model

First, in the international environment model on Dutch armed forces budget policy, most emphasis is put on the consistency between international developments, goals of foreign policy, national security policy and defense policy and budget. More specifically, the international environment creates 'threats' to the stability and the external security of a state. Because external security is a prerequisite for the continuation of the society in freedom and political independence, national security is an important task of the government. [30]

This task is taken up by the government in the form of security policy, which consists of various instruments. The most important instruments are multinational organizations, bilateral economic relations, international aid and defense policy. Defense policy is the military component of the whole array of instruments, and can as such be regarded as a consequence of security policy. The major task of defense policy then, is to formulate and execute military programmes which are needed to support both national security and foreign policy goals. [31]

That way, goals of the Netherlands foreign policy are based upon the developments in the international environment. Because national security and integrity of the state are directly related to the continuation of the existence of the Dutch society, national security policy will accordingly be based upon the developments in the international environment. The conversion of these national interests into concrete objectives in policy then, is the result of a political process. [32]

First, within the international environment, several threats for the continuation of the existence of the Dutch society come forward. In order to address these threats, several affiliated organizations, ministries and political parties formulate foreign policy goals, which ultimately leads to a national security policy. This policy consists of explicitly spelled out policy goals that are related to the security of the Dutch society. Upon this policy the national security strategy is determined, which spells out the means and concrete policy options that are available in order to reach the policy goals from the national security policy. More specifically, this strategy consists of a political component that includes 'means' like diplomacy and negotiation through bilateral relationships. The other component of the national security strategy focuses on the military means and assets that are available for the House of Representatives in order to reach certain policy goals. These include not only defense plans, but also budgetary decisions on military programmes. [33]

international environment

↓

threats from international environment

↓

foreign policy goals

↓

national security policy

↓

strategy

↓

| political component | military component(defense policy) |

political component:
-diplomacy
-external relations
-development aid
-multinational ties

military component(defense policy)

↓

defense programmes

↓

defense budget

Model 2: Internal environment model

Second, in the internal environment model on Dutch armed forces budget policy, the emphasis lays on the relation between decision making on defense budget and domestic economic policy. [34] The goal of the Dutch government in this model is to provide a secure and stable economic and social well-being, mainly through the government budget. [35]

While the first model assumes that defense policy has a priority position in the allocation of the available financial assets, the internal environment model builds on the assumption that the Ministry of Defense has to compete over the available financial assets with other departments. More specifically, in order to provide a stable and secure economic well-being of its people, the Dutch state has to provide a stable financial environment in which businesses can thrive. In effect, domestic policy influences decisions on defense budget along two lines.

First, on the left side of the model, it appears that macro-economic and financial policy of the Netherlands limits the availability of financial means over which the public sector has influence. Namely, the goal of a stable financial environment can be further specified with the help of internal national domestic policy goals, such as a stable price level or opportunities for employment. In effect, several measures have been developed which help to reach these goals, for example specific rules and regulations on wages and price levels. These regulations however, are bounded by specific political and economic agreements on the accepted size of the public sector and its expenditures. This public sector, logically, includes the defense sector.

Second, the right side of the model shows that there exists a competition between the different departments and public organizations, which further limits the available funds for the armed forces. Since the House of Representatives has to negotiate on not only the size of the public sector, but also on various national public issues which require financial support, these domestic policy programmes further limit the financial resources for the defense sector. Defense financial policy in the internal environment model then, is the result of a process of agreement over tax revenues, requests for funds from the various public institutions and a negotiation process on the accepted size of the government budget. [36]

Model 3: Bureaucratic-political model

Third, the bureaucratic-political model focuses on actors which influence decision making from an actor based approach. Specifically, the first two models are rational models that assume that the action chosen is a calculated solution to a strategic problem. Alternatively, the bureaucratic-political model sees no unitary actor, but different actors within the environment that make decisions through various explicit and implicit goals. [37] Therefore, decision making processes in the bureaucratic-political model are not regarded as direct-cause-and-effect processes, but focus on various actors and developments within the environment that influence decision making processes on the Dutch armed forces. [38] Van der Hoogen uses the following model for budgetary decision making in 1987: [39]

First, in 1987 the center of power on defense decision making lay with the government. This is because budgetary and materiel proposals are formally regarded as acts that require the same procedure as any other legislation. More specifically, preparation of defense policy takes place in civil and military policy clusters within

the Ministry of Defense, whereby the coordination of this policy with foreign-political, economic and financial aspects takes place via interdepartmental working groups and NATO. In effect, determination of the defense budget requires cooperation between government and parliament. The Minister of defence is thus only authorized to spend money when the parliament has approved the budget.

Nevertheless, from an institutional perspective the Minister of Defense holds a key position, since the Minister is in the center of power between demands for budget from the Ministry of Defense and availability of financial assets from tax revenues. [40] Within the bureaucratic-political model, the framed center square describes this position. In addition, the square shows that a yearly budgetary proposal has to be approved by the Council of Ministers before it can be taken up in the national budget. Moreover, in 1987 important decisions on defense issues were discussed in a special sub council of the Council of Ministers (Ministerial General Defense Council), after which the House of Representatives took a final decision over special issues. The final responsibility on defense policy however, remains with the Minister of Defense and the state secretary.

Hypothesis 1: The minister of Defense holds a key position on defense budget decisions

Second, on the left side of the square in the bureaucratic-political model, three institutions which influence defense decision making processes on the demand-side can be identified. These institutions exercise their influence mostly via the international environment model. Specifically, Dutch membership of NATO heavily influenced the force composition of the Dutch armed forces. For example, NATO standards required its members to contribute a minimum of 2% of Gross Domestic Product on defense expenditures. Due to the strong identification of Dutch defense policy with NATO policy, the Dutch armed forces were strongly integrated into the NATO military structure. [41]

Hypothesis 2: Defense policy on the demand side of the bureaucratic-political model is influenced by NATO

Furthermore, because defense policy is part of the wider foreign affairs policy of the Netherlands, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is involved in defense policy issues. More specifically, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for foreign policy and the Ministry of Defense is responsible for one of the most important instruments of this foreign policy, which is defense policy. [42]

Hypothesis 3: Defense policy on the demand side of the bureaucratic-political model is influenced by the Minister of Foreign Affairs

Moreover, the three force components Navy, Air Force and Army are not only involved in the execution of defense policy, but are also involved in policy development and thus influence decision making via the demand-side of the model. [1] In 1987, the components were able to operate self-sufficiently and were thus organized as three separate components within the NATO framework. As a result, three separate budget allocation proposals were made by the three components, which were most often spread via the standard allocation formula 1:2:1 for Navy, Army and Air Force respectively. This had the effect that the force components did not compete over budget since the division of the budget was more or less fixed. Currently however, these standards have been

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[1]   In 1998, the Royal Military Policy received the status of a separate force component.

abandoned and no standard allocation formula for the three components is being used. [43]

> Hypothesis 4: Defense policy on the demand side of the bureaucratic-political model is influenced by the three force components

Third, on the right side of the square in the bureaucratic-political model, two other institutions which influence defense decision making processes on the supply-side can be identified. These institutions exercise their influence mostly via the internal environment model. Namely, the Minister of Finance has influence over defence budget in the overall development of the state budget. Specifically, since the Minister of Finance is responsible for the coordination of general financial policy, he has to align the budget from the Ministry of defence with the budget proposals from other departments. In effect, the Ministry of Defense has to compete over public funding with the other domestic departments. [44] This process takes place through administrative or bilateral negotiations with the Minister of Finance. In the rare case these negotiations are not successful, financial issues will be discussed and decided upon in the Council of Ministers.

> Hypothesis 5: Defense policy on the supply side of the bureaucratic-political model is influenced by the Minister of Finance
>
> Hypothesis 6: Defense policy on the supply side of the bureaucratic-political model is influenced by the other domestic departments

Fourth, other actors from neither the supply nor the demand side in the decision making process on defense budget and materiel allocation can be identified. These are media, public opinion and societal lobby groups. Public opinion can influence public policy through elections or a referendum. Moreover, societal lobby groups influence public affairs as well. For example, the size of the budget of other departments like Foreign Affairs or Economic Affairs is backed by supporting groups, which results in lobbying activities of these supporters in case these departments are threatened by financial cutbacks. The Ministry of Defense however, lacks such a supporting group with lobbying influence, and therefore is more sensitive to the decisions within the political arena. [45]

> Hypothesis 7: Defense policy on the supply side of the bureaucratic-political model is influenced by lobby groups and public opinion.

Although the bureaucratic-political model is a simplified version of a more complex process, Van der Hoogen notes that other long term factors influence budgetary decision making, which has the effect that a government budget is already tied to other commitments before the budget has been approved. The most important long term factors are NATO commitments, political coalition agreements, long term weapons purchase projects en labor agreements for civil and military personnel. Therefore, the bureaucratic-political model should be regarded as an illustration of the processes which continuously exercise influence on budgetary decision making within the Ministry of Defense. [46]

Ergo, the factors influencing the decision making process over the Dutch armed forces composition can be divided into three separate segments. The first segment involves the international environment model, where developments and perceived threats influence the international political ambition level of a country. This segment

also involves the question on the wider foreign and security policy of the Netherlands. [47] The second segment consists of the internal environment model where the Dutch Ministry of Defense has to compete over financial assets with other departments, in which the military plans or proposals revealing the need for money, must be fitted into the frame provided by the Dutch government and the Minister of Finance. The third segment is the bureaucratic-political model, where various actors and materiel processes influence the decision making process over the Dutch armed forces composition. These last two segments are interrelated through the actors that influence defense policy. In this study, the focus will lie on the first and third segment.

3.5 Threats

Based on two studies from the Ministry of Defense, future threats have been identified. First, within the department of conceptual cases of the MoD, a relatively extensive study has been executed in 2004 in order to identify the most likely trends and developments which could possibly influence the performance of the Dutch armed forces in the following decade.[48] In addition, the Defense Strategic Plan from 1998 has been used as a secondary source of information. Although this document is nearly 10 years old, it still provides some additional information on threats for the Dutch armed forces.[49]

Hypothesis 8: future threats will be marked by the growing complexity in the world

First, the increasing complexity in the world is noted by the Ministry of Defense. This is due to a great diversity of violence and tensions, combined with a widespread presence of armed means, both small and large caliber. Within conflicts, this increasing complexity can be identified in the presence of a great diversity of warring parties with various goals in the same conflict. That way, most conflicts can be marked as 'irregular conflicts', which are conflicts that are identified by hit-and-run tactics by small-scale, self-sufficient civilian fighters that mostly operate on civilian grounds and pursue and ethnic or fundamentalist goal.

Hypothesis 9: future conflicts will come from the spread and development of technology
Hypothesis 10: future conflicts will come from the scarcity of resources and water
Hypothesis 11: future conflicts will come from the collapse of state structures due to failing governance

Second, future conflicts will be come from the spread and development of new technology such as small and medium caliber arms, but also weapons with a larger impact such as chemical or nuclear weapons. Another source of potential conflict is the lack of water and natural resources in specific areas in the world, for example conflicts over access to the Nile river in northern Africa. These factors, combined with a lack of governance structures which frequently provide a system of settling tensions between different groups or countries, could lead to new conflicts.

Hypothesis 12: catalysts in conflict are ethnicity and religious extremism

Third, frequently in response to globalisation, an increasing amount of people will become more sensitive to extremism of any kind. This extremism can be used as an instrument to mobilize people, but can also be a cause of new conflicts in the world.

Hypothesis 13: effects from these conflicts are increased migration, organized crime, drug and human trafficking

Fourth, although a great diversity of effects come from any type of conflict, it is most likely that in case a conflict occurs, many of the above mentioned developments will take place at the same time in the same region, due to the growing complexity in the world. The most profound effects are migration pressures, growth of organized crime as a response to failing state structures, combined with illegal trade networks.

Hypothesis 14: international institutions (UN, NATO, EU) are not working efficiently due to their decision making structures
Hypothesis 15: an increasing trend towards regionalism can be identified

Fifth, it is expected that international institutions will not be able to adequately cope with the different conflicts in the world, due to their consensus-building structures in order to make a decision, but also due to the size of these organizations. Despite the recent NATO reforms and the European efforts for a single security policy, European powers remain handicapped in the structures currently present. As a result, it is expected that countries will increasingly focus on regional collaboration projects in order to reach a certain effect.

Hypothesis 16: growth of non-state actors in conflict areas

Sixth, due to the hampering state structures in many conflict areas, it is expected that there will be an increase in non-state actors. This can include aid organizations such as NGO's, which are growing in number and in strength worldwide. Another example of a non-state actor are international companies which are able to influence governments in conflict areas due to the economic power of these companies. In addition, in a conflict area the power vacuum which is frequently left by the state can also be filled with illegal crime networks that are active in drug of human trafficking, or terrorist organizations.

Hypothesis 17: possibility of a terrorist attack in the Netherlands is expected to increase

Due to the continued friendly ties with the American government, the Ministry of Defense does not expect that the possibility of a terrorist attack will decrease. More specifically, due to the open economy and open border policy of the Netherlands, combined with the presence of vulnerable mainports such as the Rotterdam harbor and Schiphol Airport, the possibility of a terrorist attack is likely to persist.

Hypothesis 18: growth of Chinese and Indian economic and military strength

It is expected that China will become an increasing power in the Asia-Pacific region in economic terms en on the long run, from 2010 onwards, in military terms. Tensions are expected between China, India, Tibet and Taiwan on the long run since the relation between these countries is not very positively minded. Therefore, an increase of power is expected to lead to an increased possibility of conflicts in this region.

3.6 Demands on future performance of the Dutch armed forces

The changes in threat perception and have led to an operationalization of new demands on the future performance of the Dutch armed forces. Specifically, in the Defense Strategic Plan and the 2004 study from the MoD conceptual cases department, as well as several additional publications, some specific demands on the military forces in the future have been identified.[50][51]

Hypothesis 19: future role of armed forces should be marked by flexibility in performance

Flexibility in performance involves a capacity of every separate force component to be tailor-made in any situation. In effect, this requires of the armed forces that they are increasingly flexible in their operations, training, location, and capable of executing expeditionary missions. This involves terrain, weather, coalitions, enemy forces, composition of own units, goals and type of mission. Many types of operations are possible, from conflict prevention to post-conflict reconstruction tasks, in large and small coalitions with both high and low levels of violence.[52]

Hypothesis 20: future role of armed forces should be marked by expeditionary skills

Since the threat of a major armed attack on NATO territory has diminished, while the need to respond more quickly to crises in any part of the world has grown, expeditionary skills are needed. These skills involve the capability to execute a mission with a long distance between the home base and the mission area by a more or less self sufficient force. In effect, this involves an increased need for transport planes, ships and helicopters that can transport troops and materiel over long distances in a relatively short amount of time.

Hypothesis 20: future role of armed forces should be marked by the capability to perform any operation together with other units, persons or organizations.

The capability to perform operations in a 'joint' manner, comes from the increased need for expeditionary skills. For example, the Army needs to be capable of cooperating with the Air Force in order to transport units and material, but also to improve effectiveness of bombings campaigns. Therefore, this 'joint' execution of a mission requires the need of combined missions planning, training, as well as overcoming technical and doctrinal barriers.

3.7 Conceptual Model

The discussion of the previous paragraphs leads to the following conceptual model:

4 Subquestion 1 Which actors and developments have influenced the Dutch armed forces force composition since the end of the Cold War?

Introduction

The three basic tasks of the Dutch armed forces have been subject to changes in the international security environment after the Cold War. [53] The first task is the protection of the integrity of its national and allied territory, including the Dutch Antilles and Aruba. During the Cold War, this task received most attention - regional collective defense tasks were organized around a possible large-scale military intervention from the Warsaw Pact of NATO territory. More recently however, this task of the protection of national territory has focused on threats such as terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which could pose a risk for the Dutch society. The second task, the improvement of international rule of law and stability, has received increasing attention since the end of the Cold War. Peace operations have become the guideline for the reform after 1989. These operations now require a highly maneuverable, tailor-made full spectrum force which is capable of operating under diverse circumstances around the world supported by precision weapons' systems, reliable intelligence, effective command and control and logistical capabilities. The third basic task of the Dutch armed forces is support of civil authorities, which has gained influence since 2001 under the increased terrorist threat. [54]

Several actors and developments have had an influence over this transfer of attention from the first to the second and third defense task. In this chapter, the most important developments between 1989 and 2007 will be reviewed, after which they will be integrated in the bureaucratic-political model. This review will be based on a review of the White Papers of the Ministry of defence since the end of the Cold War. By reviewing policy papers and comments of various scholars on these policy papers from the Ministry of Defense since the end of the Cold War, insight will be developed in the foreign and domestic developments which have influenced the decision making processes within the Ministry of Defense.

Although a literature review will not help to identify all developments involved in this process, it will help to provide a basic insight in the interaction between political, societal and military groups and individuals. In addition, this process will help to identify current identified 'threats' in policy and the translation of this policy into the concrete force composition of the Dutch armed forces. Document selection is based upon the time frame that starts in 1989 until 2007, since this period has been a relatively unstable period in security perceptions in combination with continuing financial cutbacks. Documents come from various publications on this subject, like Vrede en Veiligheid (Peace & Security magazine) and the Jaarboek Vrede en Veiligheid (Peace & Security Yearbook), as well as publications from the Ministry of defence itself on these issues. The time frame 1989-2007 has been chosen since in 2007 the most recent White Paper has been published by the Ministry of Defense. That way, insight will be developed in the changing perception of the security environment and correlated threats, the corresponding force structure and capabilities of the Dutch armed forces.

4.1 White Paper 1991 & 1993

End of the Cold War

During the Cold War, the threat of the Soviet Union made that defense tasks were organized around a potential large-scale military intervention from the Warsaw Pact. Until the Defense White Paper in 1991, the force posture of the Netherlands was therefore focused on the defense of NATO territory. This involved a need for a large number of active forces and conscripts, supplemented by naval, air and ground weapon systems.[55]

After the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the security landscape in the world changed dramatically.[56] These changes meant a victory for liberalism and capitalism, under which hostile states were posing new threats to this new world order. Since the end of World War 2, the international order has been organized around open markets, security alliances and multilateral cooperation and has provided the foundation of and operating logic for world politics.[57] As a result, 'new' threats after the collapse of the Soviet Union came from countries which did not live up to the standards of liberalism, such as the regime from Saddam Hussein in

Iraq.

Additional developments in the world influenced the changing security landscape. First, operation Desert Storm showed that peace-enforcement operations were a useful means in bringing global security by stability. [58] After a series of heavy bombings, an American led coalition force invaded Iraq and Kuwait from Saudi-Arabia. Although many thousands of military and civilian Iraqis died in this conflict, the international media displayed this invasion as a fast, high tech and 'clean' war. These experiences were combined with relatively successful UN missions in Namibia and Central America, which contributed to a new optimism in the UN that it was possible to maintain international peace and security. [59] Moreover, the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact had the effect that NATO started to look for new tasks such as an increasing contribution to out of area operations. In effect, the Alliance therefore had to develop from a relatively static organization to a more mobile expeditionary force. [60]

The changes in the international security situation, combined with the experiences from peacekeeping missions and NATO reform, made that the tasks of the Dutch armed forces were being reconsidered. In concrete terms this meant a focus on intensifying contributions to peacekeeping operations. The 1991 White Paper therefore focused on a thorough reorganization by reforming and reducing the materiel and personnel size of especially the Dutch Army. Personnel reduction would initially be 30%, whereas the number of tanks would be reduced with 50%, armed vehicles and artillery subsequently, would be reduced with 40% in 1998. The Navy and Air Force remained more or less intact, since these force components would be able to contribute to the new tasks of the armed forces. A major policy change included a reform of the first Army Corps into a German-Dutch Corps which would be responsible for a continuation of NATO territorial defense. Since an attack on NATO territory was minimized, it had not disappeared however. Another major policy change was the downsizing of mobilizable forces, in order to develop a smaller and more mobile Army. [61] Funds for the intended restructuring of the Army were created by the downsizing operation itself, since a smaller Army meant lower operational costs. [62] Moreover, it was decided to erect a new air-mobile brigade, capable of working on expeditionary task in continuously changing environments and compositions.

Another influential factor in the decision making process came from experiences in troop contributions to UN missions. [63] Specifically, in the discussions on a possible contribution of the Dutch armed forces to the peace keeping missions of UNTAC (Cambodia) and UNPROFOR (former Yugoslavia), the personnel structure of the armed forces had the effect that the armed forces would be continuously struggling on finding enough conscripts that would be willing to go on tour voluntarily. Since the Dutch government is only allowed to employ conscripts for territorial defense tasks, except when these conscripts voluntary agreed with a tour, it was not able to find enough volunteering conscripts for these missions. [64] Second, doubts on the purpose on the UNPROFOR mission led to a discussion on the acceptability of risk. Since politicians were hesitant on contributing troops to missions with an increased chance of casualties, continuing discussions led to a slowdown in the decision making process. [65]

A different direction

These experiences led to a new course of the armed forces in 1991, and were continued with the publication of the January 1993 White Paper named '*Another World, Another Defense'*. [66] It was decided to suspend conscription from 1998 onwards, since the Netherlands would otherwise not be able to structurally contribute to international coalitions of peacekeeping missions in the future. [67] Although it was acknowledged that professional troops were not automatically 'better' peace keepers then conscripts, this change was needed in order to address future personnel, moral and political problems that would otherwise come with the increasing number of

peacekeeping missions abroad. [68]

Decision making was further influenced by the changing societal perception after the Cold War. [69] Specifically, within the House of Representatives, among politicians and in the Dutch public a preference had arisen to 'cash' the peace dividend by thoroughly downsizing the number of armed forces. In the 1993 White Paper, this peace dividend was 'cashed' with the help of a framework which quantified how the armed forces should be able to simultaneously participate in four expeditionary missions. [70] Subsequently, the Dutch armed forces would need around 10 to 15 thousand forces for peacekeeping missions and around 11 thousand troops for peace enforcements missions in order to be able to make a 'substantial contribution' to international operations. Therefore, in this White Paper personnel reduction measures rose from 30% to 44%.

In concrete terms, a 'substantial contribution' to international operations means a contribution with the size of a battalion or the equivalent thereof, such as two frigates or a squadron of fighter planes. These operations should be continued for a maximum of three years, whereby the personnel rotation would take place within a six month interval period, after a break of twelve months. [71] More specifically, this means that for every available battalion for a tour, two more battalions would be needed to continue the operation for a longer period. Logically, it was a requirement for these battalions that they were able to cooperate and have similar methods in a mission area in order to be able to improve rotation transfers. The House of Representatives therefore decided to create four mechanized brigades, one mobilizable brigade and one air-mobile brigade, which enabled a brigade commander to effectively rotate personnel and to streamline methods of operation within a battalion. [72]

As an effect, a discussion arose in the military and society over the new motivation for current personnel to contribute to these new *out-of-area* operations. Many soldiers had joined the organization during the Cold War, aware of a possible armed conflict for protection of their country and territory. More recently however, these forces had to be motivated for a new type of conflict that required a different type of motivation – to bring stability in countries where no directly visible national priorities were present. [73] Some therefore argued to offer a single possibility of leaving the armed forces, but this possibility was ignored by the Minister of Defense Ter Beek. [74] Restructuring would continue, despite the hesitation in some parts of the organization

The decision to maintain all three force components within the framework for peacekeeping missions was partially influenced by the institutional 'will' to survive and by the timing of the cutbacks within the materiel replacement cycle. Logically, officers within the three components displayed the suitability of their assets for the new operations in the future. Moreover, since every materiel project has an investment cycle in which there are specific 'cost-efficient' moments to sell a weapon system, it would be a waste to sell assets within the organization immediately after a political decision, since this would not be cost-efficient in any way. [75] As a result, budget cuts were distributed evenly among the Navy, Air Force and Army, the so-called 'cheese slicer-method'. [76]

Implications of new out of area operations

The new role orientation had different repercussions for the three armed forces components, due to the specific composition of every component. The Navy and the Air Force would not need a thorough reorientation of doctrine, structure and methods in order to be able to contribute to peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions, since ships or fighter planes are naturally more flexible in their tasks. Although some tasks were scaled down such as the number of mining vessels for the Navy, the structure and type of operations did not change thoroughly. The Army on the other hand, would need to radically change in size and structure in order to contribute to the new tasks, because the Army would operate specifically between warring parties in the new environment. [77]

Specifically, the new focus in peacekeeping missions had the effect that army doctrine and structure would increasingly focus on separating warring parties and post conflict reconstruction tasks. This involved not only a thorough personnel downsizing operation from 140.000 soldiers of which many were conscripts, to 60.000 professional and voluntarily serving soldiers, but also new training programmes that dealt with specific peacekeeping and peace enforcement issues. Subsequently, new light-armored patrol vehicles were needed in order to be able to operate in environments were local populations could be monitored while offering protection against hostilities. New cooperation agreements with NGO's were set up to arrange civil-military cooperation projects which could help to initiate reconstruction activities in a post-conflict environment. In addition, the new air-mobile brigade would be equipped with helicopters for transport, airlift and firepower. [78]

The specific planned materiel force composition after the second White Paper is summarized in table 3.

	Situation in 1991	Projected situation in 2006 (according to White Paper 1991)	Projected situation in 2006 (according to White Paper 1993)
Air Force			
F-16	192	154	122
Light transport airplane	95		64
Army			
Leopard 2 tank	445	445	330
Light exploration airplane	0	311	240
155 mm - Howitzers	345	311	188
Air-defense vehicle	95	95	51
120 mm – Mortars	145	145	80
Navy			
Frigates	10	4	4
Vessels (mining etc.)	29	21	17
Submarines	6	4	4

Table 3 [79]

However, experiences from the field and in materiel projects had the effect that the new White Paper had already become outdated after only a few months. First, the UNPROFOR mission in former Yugoslavia showed that in the field, differences between peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations were not very clear. Second, a lack of financial assets, personnel and materiel had the effect that a sixth mobilizable brigade could not be realized. Third, many materiel projects were delayed or altered due to international commitments in materiel contracts or financial cutbacks from the White paper. [80]

An example is the NH-90 helicopter project -started in 1991 and not yet finished-, which has been continuously altered due to new operational demands and delayed as a consequence of technical difficulties and hampering collaboration. [81] The Netherlands would initially buy 20 NH-90's in the European collaboration project; however, technical difficulties such as a discussion over the specific type of engine, led to substantially higher development costs, whereas the collaboration hampered between the NH industries and the NATO Helicopter Management Agency. As an effect, politicians were hesitant to continue the project which would inevitably cause new problems once the new helicopters were in the air and would require additional adaptations. Moreover, other suitable helicopters such as the American Seahawk were available and properly functioning, which led to a continuous discussion in the House of Representatives in these years over the direction, alternatives and costs of this project. [82]

Additional financial cuts, based on political motivations, influenced the decision making process in terms

of new discussions in the following years over the effect of the cutbacks on the reform process and the possible undermining of the defense organization. Starting from a budget of 14 billion Guilders, the Minister of Defense had to accept an additional cutback of 2.5 billion Guilders between 1994 and 1998. [83] Consequently, these processes led to unrest among defense personnel and the Chief of the Defense Staff Van der Vlis even resigned because further cutbacks were 'irresponsible'. However, political parties still wanted the 1993 White Paper goals to be reached, despite the cutbacks. These cutbacks thus forced the organization to improve efficiency, economize on non-structural projects such as research and development and ground sanitation. In effect, 1.9% of the Dutch GDP was now spent on defense, compared to 2.2% on average in other NATO countries. [84]

Developments influencing defense policy 1989-1999
In sum, from the first decade after 1989 it appears that several developments have influenced defense policy. First, the **collapse of the Soviet Union** led to the rise of 'new' threats, emanating from hostile regimes and fragile states. Second, **NATO reform** from a relatively static organization to a more mobile expeditionary force led to a reconsideration of current Dutch armed forces materiel capabilities and demands. Third, **experiences from missions** such as UNTAC and UNPROFOR influenced defense policy, by creating problems for the defense staff on the use of conscripts abroad. Fourth, these **political considerations** further influenced the defense policy, in this case for example by allowing the transformation of the armed forces from a conscripted force into a fully volunteering force. Fifth, the **specific structure of the three force components** sorted the effect that not every force component had to drastically change it doctrines and materiels. This structure therefore can be considered as an influential development as well.

4.2 Frame Memorandum 1999 & White Paper 2000
Growing importance of peacekeeping
New experiences from Dutch contributions to especially KFOR (Kosovo), SFOR (former Yugoslavia) and UNFICYP (Cyprus) resulted in 1999 in a renewed debate on the continuing financial cutbacks and the ambition level of the Dutch armed forces. [85] This continuing discussion had been reinforced by the peacekeeping operations experiences, where the Netherlands had not been able to contribute additional troops to new requests for additional support. At that moment, the armed forces contributed 2000 forces to KFOR and an additional 1800 to SFOR and UNFICYP. [86] [87]These shortages in troops were partly a result of the personnel shortage, which had been growing since the change from a combined conscript/professional force into a full professional force. As a result, a request from NATO commander Clark for a Dutch contribution of a mechanized brigade of 4000 military personnel had to be denied. Moreover, there was no directly available mechanized replacement for the mechanized SFOR battalion, therefore the air-mobile brigade had to be called upon. [88]

These experiences led to the development of the 1999 Frame Memorandum, combined with the growing perception that a Russian attack would be nearly impossible. A political decision for an additional cutback of 375 million Guilders was taken up by the Minister of Defense to develop a plan to reconsider the role of the armed forces. [89] Subsequently, in this memorandum it was decided to continue current tasks, with additional attention for peacekeeping tasks instead of territorial defense tasks. This operation therefore involved further downsizing of the number of tanks, airplanes and frigates and extra expeditionary forces for the marines, military engineering and armored infantry. [90]

This memorandum was followed by a discussion round the *Strategic Future Debate*, although this debate showed that the say over Defense policy lay in the political arena. [91] Specifically, the Minister of Defense wanted

a discussion within society over the Dutch armed forces in the next decade. Although several criticisms came forward from various sources, the majority of the political parties had already been reviewing the current composition of the armed forces in response to the Frame Memorandum. Moreover, positive experiences from the Kosovo crisis with F-16's and the amphibious transport vessel 'Rotterdam' led to additional political discussions over the proposed cut of a F-16 squadron and broad support for the proposal to buy an extra amphibious transport vessel. [92] These discussions resulted in a political consensus within the House of Representatives on the relation between the defense budget and the ambition level, whereby societal criticisms had not substantially influenced the debate. In effect, this consensus over the future of the armed forces did not lead to any drastic policy changes in the following White Paper 2000. [93]

In this new White Paper the cheese-slicer method was used once more to save on expenditures, while the three armed forces components received new tasks that were increasingly focused on peacekeeping operations. [94] The Navy lost two guided weapon frigates and four standard frigates, although it would receive four additional command frigates and the extra amphibious transport vessel for peacekeeping tasks. The proposed cut of the F-16 squadron for the Air Force did not take place, and the Army had to sell aging tanks and vehicles while the rest of its materiel would receive a modernization update. Moreover, in order to improve the personnel availability for peacekeeping operations, an additional 2.100 jobs would be created. This would enable the armed forces to maintain the ambition level of four simultaneous peacekeeping operations. These modernization proposals would be financed by additional savings in operational costs, materiel development investment costs, improved efficiency measures and materiel sales. [95]

Developments influencing defense policy 1999-2003

Next to the already identified developments influencing defense policy, it appears that between 1999 and 2003 influential developments on defense policy came from **experiences from missions** such as KFOR and SFOR. In addition, defense policy was influenced by the **political considerations** that another 375 Million Guilders had to be saved on defense expenditures, because of an **economic decline**. This is in line with the experiences from the strategic future debate, in which the public was allowed to comment on Dutch defense policy, although this debate round this did not lead to any drastic policy changes in the White Paper of 2000. Moreover, the influence of the **three force components** could be seen as well with the application of the 'cheese-slicer-method', with their **institutional will to survive**.

4.3 Strategic Accord of 2003

Three years later, the White paper 2000 required an update mainly due to international developments which influenced the political agenda and defense priorities. First, the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon forced the Netherlands to revise its role in combating international terrorism. Second, developments on a collective European Defense initiative and the NATO relationship led to additional commitments in out of area operations and related financial obligations. [96] Third, an economic slowdown and a nationwide restraining budget had the effect that Defense once more had to cope with additional financial cuts, which now led to a reconsideration of the ambition level and operational capacities. [97]

First, the new threat perception of international terrorism and the American-led 'Global War on Terror' forced the Netherlands to take new and additional measures in terrorism prevention and resulted into new military involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq. [98] These developments led to a new awareness that internal and external security were interrelated, since the security of Dutch and European citizens was connected to the success of

operations abroad. Subsequently, the three core tasks of the Dutch armed forces, namely territorial defense, promotion of the international rule of law and civil authority support, were increasingly becoming interrelated as well. [99] Specifically, new domestic measures on fighting terrorism involved military support of civil authorities via intelligence services and special support forces.

However, the specific policy required abroad led to extensive political debates, since the government was hesitant on fully supporting the American 'Global War on Terror'. [100] On the one hand, the Netherlands was politically supporting the American invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq on the basis of self-defense and in the case of Iraq it was argued that Iraq was not living up to the international obligations concerning the possession of weapons of mass destruction. On the other hand, an active contribution in the War on Terror could have the effect that the Netherlands would become a more important target for terrorist attacks. Moreover, although a criterion for approval of Dutch contributions to international interventions is a UN Security Council approval, the American invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq had not been approved by the UN Security Council, which further influenced the political dualism of the Netherlands. [101]

More specifically, the Netherlands preferred a contribution via a multinational stabilization force. For Afghanistan, this initially meant no contribution of ground forces to the American *Operation Enduring Freedom*, but merely air and naval support through the *European Participating Air Forces* and *Maritime Taskforce 150* operations. Nonetheless, some special forces did contribute on the ground under American command in *Operation Enduring Freedom*. [102] In a later stage, the Netherlands contributed to the UN approved NATO *International Security Assistance Force* in Afghanistan in the form of a German-Dutch *High Readiness Forces Headquarters*, Apaches and 150 CIMIC officers for reconstruction tasks in *Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT)*. In 2006, *Task Force Uruzgan* was initiated with an additional 1.100 forces and a PRT team in the Southern province of Uruzgan. For Iraq, a contribution via a multinational stabilization force meant a contribution of 1.100 troops to the *Stabilization Operation Iraq* under British Command in the province of Al-Muthanna, whereby a priority lay in improving security and stability, but also in reconstruction tasks and humanitarian aid programmes. [103]

Second, new agreements on European Defense Capabilities and the NATO capability-based approach to future *out-of-area* operations, led to new financial and materiel contributions for possible future defense operations. [104] Both organizations were developing plans for expeditionary forces, that are both expensive and scarce and could be used against terrorism, rogue states or for humanitarian purposes. The United States want European countries to increase investment in military assets through NATO, since in the current situation success of NATO missions is more or less dependent of American contributions. To tighten the technological gap between European and American war fighting technology, some European countries on the other hand want to focus investment through a common European Defense initiative. The Netherlands wanted to prevent this transatlantic disconnection through strengthening European defense that can contribute to NATO missions. [105]

Therefore, the Netherlands opted for the development of a 'toolbox' of key military capabilities, in order to be able to contribute to operations of both organizations. Specifically, NATO was developing its NATO Response Force (NRF) with 20.000 troops capable of operating in the highest war fighting spectrum. In effect, the Netherlands contributed around readily available 4500 men in 2005. Nevertheless, this merely meant a contribution on paper, since the NRF has not become fully operational since its initiation. Moreover, the European Union was developing both battle groups of 1500 forces for mainly UN missions, and a quick reaction force of 60.000 forces. Due to shortages in so called 'force enablers' such as strategic airlift, command and control and intelligence, the initial plans to have these European forces operational in 2003, had to be delayed until 2010. In

addition, the NRF and EU contributions on paper were downsized in a later stage since no country appeared to be capable of making contributions as planned on paper to both the NRF and the EU Battle Groups. [106]

In addition, separate initiatives were developed through multilateral initiatives such as the European Amphibious Initiative and the High Readiness Headquarters for both NATO and EU operations. Moreover, specific pooling funds have been developed to focus financial investments for new assets in force enablers. [107] The Netherlands committed 300 million Euro as a single contribution to materiel investments which contributed to the European Security and Defense Policy missions, as well as another 130 million materiel investment over a period of four years. This fund is specifically erected to stimulate investments on pooled multilateral military resources, and will be used to improve European military capacity. This will be done in the form of, for example, the development of a common European air transport capacity or a European Air Transport Coordination Cell. [108]

However, new political plans to cut defense spending in 2002 and 2003 forced the Dutch armed forces once more to reconsider its current composition. [109] Due to an economic slowdown, a political accord to save on nationwide expenditures in 2002 and 2003 led to a further decrease of the percentage of GDP spent on military expenditures to 1.6%. These new plans were realized, for the first time since the end of the Cold War, by cuts in operational capacities. In effect, the ambition level of contributing to four parallel peacekeeping operations or three peace enforcement operations was scaled down to three peace operations or two peace enforcement operations. The number of tanks, F-16's, frigates, demining vessels, howitzers, and Apache helicopters was scaled down, while the mobilizable forces of the army were completely dissolved, since these were not contributing to the peacekeeping task abroad. In addition, the Army lost its multiple launch rocket system and the Navy its Orion patrol airplanes. The number of mechanized brigades was scaled down from three to two, as well as the plans for an additional third battalion of marines. Further integration of the three force components would save additional money since one-third of the bureaucratic functions would disappear, which meant a loss of 11.700 positions. [110] For instance, one single force commander would now lead the armed forces instead of three component commanders. [111]

Nevertheless, in order to further develop the expeditionary capabilities of the Dutch armed forces in multilateral coalitions some new investments were made that enabled the Netherlands to contribute relatively small, but well trained and equipped 'enabling' forces to future peacekeeping operations, which would have a substantial influence on a battlefield. Extra Special Forces, a DC-10 refueling plane, armored infantry and the second amphibious transport vessel were added to the 'force package'. [112]

Developments influencing defense policy 2003-2007

In sum, developments influencing defense policy in this period appear to come from new threat perception of **international terrorism** and the American-led 'Global War on Terror'. However, **political hesitation** on the full contribution on the American invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq led to support of peacekeeping or enforcement missions that are organized by NATO or EU. The growing **military and political cooperation** can be seen in growing contributions of the Dutch armed forces in **European** or NATO-led 'out-of-area' operations.

The following table provides an overview of Dutch defense expenditures over the last two decades.

year	Budget in millions (from 2003 on in Euro)	% Share of GDP	% NATO average share of GDP
1989	13.571	2.8	4.4
1993	13.072	2.3	3.3

1998	13.425	1.8	2.7
2003	7.265	1.6	2.7
2007	8.133	1.5	1.8

Table 4[113]

5 Subquestion 2 What are threats that influence the security environment of the Netherlands?

Introduction

This chapter focuses on an exploration of possible threats, which will be used to develop insight in what is currently perceived to be the most likely future security environment in which the Dutch armed forces will have to operate during the next two decades. Because developments in the international environment significantly influence the future composition of the Dutch armed forces, this overview of threats will enable decision makers within the armed forces to improve decision making on allocation of forces and funds. [114]

First, an introduction into future studies and commonly found problems with these future methods will be reviewed, as well as the methods used in this chapter. Second, several threats which have been identified from the literature research, that could possibly pose a threat for the Netherlands in the future, will then be described. Again, since there remains a high level of uncertainty in future study exercises, the effort of this subquestion merely is to give a general impression of possible future threats, not to make an exact prediction of the future.

5.1 Future Studies

In order to anticipate in policy or investment strategies on the future, different institutions, countries and companies are involved in future policy planning. More specifically, developing and renewing future views in order to adequately anticipate possible futures is a very important exercise for both profit and non-profit organizations. This exercise sometimes takes place through implicit decision making processes within organizations, but sometimes extensive processes are developed that help to build possible 'futures' and in turn raise the awareness of 'the future' among involved stakeholders. Although in the discipline of future studies scholars have been seeking for a well-based theoretical methodological background for these activities, no 'best' method has been found that provides policymakers with a thorough analysis of possible futures. [115]

In effect, no agreement exists on the proper way to categorize futures methods. One way to make a distinction between different future methodologies is normative forecasting versus exploratory forecasting. Normative work is based on norms and values. Hence, normative forecasting addresses questions like: what future do we want? What do we want to become? Exploratory forecasting on the other hand, explores what is possible regardless of what is desirable. However, this general division of futures work into normative and exploratory can be misleading, since many techniques can be used for both normative and exploratory forecasting. Specifically, a normative future project that focuses on the development of specific futures that people can pursue, can still be possible without displaying a desirable future. Thence, the differences between normative and exploratory are not as rigid as different categorical groups should be, in order to be a useful distinction.

Another more commonly used distinction can be made in the following way. A first group in this distinction consists of methods that focus on finding possible futures by extending currently existing developments or trends, in order to develop future images.[116] These developments or trends are then extrapolated in order to make predictions on the future. Examples are Delphi and environmental scanning. However, Glenn & Gordon find that it is not possible to simply take and extend future research methods in order to predict the future, since this technique assumes that the only forces shaping the future are those that exist in history. [117] Therefore, in order to overcome this problem, researchers have also tried to develop methods that not only build their models on the assumptions, trends and developments of their time, but allow ambiguity and that are sensitive to new and initial conditions.[118]

More specifically, the second group of methods in this distinction helps to develop future scenarios by

leaving room for alternative views or shocks in the prediction. Ergo, within the group of participants of the future method specific interaction patterns take place that influence the outcome of a future exercise. This second group of methods therefore leaves room for relying on different causal assumptions about how things happen. A basic assumption for this group of methods is that things happen through the (local) interaction of agents. New futures are then created trough the interaction of possibilities and constraints, which then in turn influence the direction of the future. As a result, in the use of these methods their use of interaction patterns leave room for agents to maneuver into new directions and thus find new 'futures.' [119]

Nevertheless, methods that allow more ambiguity are not seen as more useful methods than those that present the future as a continuation of the present. This is because a diversification of future methods helps to develop an improved sensitivity to finding 'new' futures. By triangulating findings from different future exercises, researchers are able to develop more coherent findings from different methods. For example, the findings from a Delphi method which concludes that the number of natural disasters will increase, can be supported by findings from a data mining exercise where a significant number of sources has been found that supports the claim that in the future the number of natural disasters will increase. More specifically, Aaltonen & Sanders therefore argue that 'No single method should be trusted; it requires an insightful combination of various, even contradictory methods to create more reliable foresight' [120]

5.2 Method

Therefore, this study will focus on finding future threats for the Dutch armed forces by analyzing a total of 37 documents where a diversity of methods has been applied. That way, a thorough summary of identified threats can be developed whereby the diversity of methods applied helps to improve triangulation and more reliable foresight. The documents upon which this literature study is based come from think-tanks, international and national institutions and organizations that have performed a recent scan of possible futures and identified related threats from these futures. Since this exercise has been taken up by many different organizations, document selection was based on three criteria. First, a document has to be relevant for the Netherlands, which can be operationalized in terms of the geographical location, the membership of international organizations in which the Netherlands participates, the scientific reputation or influence of a country (or source within a country) on world affairs. Second, a source is required to identify threats on a concrete level. For example, many studies identify only possible future worlds or scenarios, from which no concrete threats can be identified. A concrete level means the description of a process or threat, combined with a description of a direction in which this threat will develop within the next twenty years. In addition, since the author is aware of the fact that the selection process influences the final results in this process, an effort has been made to include indirect threats which do not directly influence Dutch security policy at the moment. For example, an aids epidemic in Africa does not influence Dutch security policy at the moment, but could possibly be of more significant influence in the future.

In effect, around 600 threats could be identified, which can be found in Annex A. Data was gathered from various sources on the internet and through literature search from academic libraries. Information processing took place via expert consensus building, through internal distribution within the Clingendael Institute and discussion rounds. Although this method is seen as very expensive and time consuming in general, the structure of the institute allowed the author to gather information through this method. Moreover, compared to other data analysis techniques, data mining methods such as phrasal cluster analysis or agglomerative hierarchical analysis appear to produce reasonably comparable quality on the subject of data clustering. [121]

In addition, since there is a significant amount of threats which overlap on specific topics, these

overlapping threats were clustered into different categories. In total 15 categories of clusters were created. The reason for the use of clusters is that in the selection process from the various documents, it appeared to be a complex exercise to dissolve cause and effect in the threat identification process. This lack of separation between cause and effect, varied heavily per document in this literature study. By clustering the different threats, the findings could be viewed in a more structured and coherent way, without interpreting the results any further. That way, the most frequently mentioned threat becomes the most relevant for the Dutch armed forces.

5.3 Problems future methods

In order to develop insight in the future military strategic environment, policymakers frequently use policies that identify and quantify risk, but this process can not straightforwardly be executed. Since risks or threats are diverse in origin and degree, the identification process is complicated by some frequent biases. For example, unfamiliarity with a risk in the international environment such as terrorism, can have the effect that the participant in a future exercise subjectively rates this risk higher. Another frequently found bias which influences future exercise outcomes, is the tendency to identify 'new' risks as more dangerous then less quantifiable and long term risks. Accordingly, risks that are based on readily available data and that require concrete measures to address are subject to preferential treatment over long term risks where a clear policy measure is lacking. [122]

In addition, a methodological complication is that the context in which the risk is being identified has an influence on the perceptions, definitions and the suitable policy measures that are identified. [123] It is therefore important to involve many different points of reference in this process, in order to develop a comprehensive understanding of the complex interactions which determine the future. This study therefore uses a diversity of literature resources in order to improve the variety in reference points. More specifically, literature sources include publications from think-tanks, universities, multinational organizations, Dutch national military sources and military sources from countries that influence Dutch security policy such as neighboring countries or NATO partners.

5.4.1 Negative effects from globalisation

The first threat or process that can be identified from the literature study which influences other future threats for the Netherlands and the Dutch armed forces is globalisation. This process is referred to as the 'increasing worldwide flow of commodities, people and ideas' and is accelerated by the use of new techniques in telecommunications, transport and media.[124] There is no exact definition of when this process started or what it exactly entails, since it is such a widely used concept. However, most literature refers to the start of the globalizing era from the Second World War onwards: from that point in time new media and techniques became available to a wider audience. Some argue that the world has become a 'global village' in terms of the direct contact people can have with physically distant people, which results in an increasing spread of ideas and contacts between people from culturally diverse backgrounds.[125] This process was in turn catalyzed by the development of the internet which enables individuals and groups to spread and discuss information and ideas in new regions.

Although this process creates new and diverse possibilities in economic and cultural development, it also has negative effects. Therefore, globalisation is referred to as a main process that has several negative effects that could possibly create a significant future threat to the Netherlands. This is partly due to the rising global complexity, since the increasing complexity of networks creates new problems: one policy intervention has a substantial influence on processes on the other side of the globe.

In the literature, negative effects from globalisation are mostly mentioned in relation to undermining the power and legitimacy of current international institutions. More specifically, a lack of coherent policy measures to address financial or economic crisis of the international institutions contribute to this insight.[126] Moreover, the diminishing influence of state-driven acts such as a military intervention or cooperation in international disputes leads to the creation of new agents that are able to address these issues more adequately. In the case of conflict, private security firms can be regarded as new agents delivering a good that was formerly considered to be part of the state-monopoly. [127] Some sources argue that regionalisation and the development of regional cooperation organisations would be useful means to address future issues. Although the globalisation process in itself is not a direct threat for the Netherlands or the Dutch armed forces, it does have negative influences which can result in more concrete threats.

5.4.2 General threats - Demographic Issues

Partly as a result from globalisation, the increased movement of people around the world leads to an imbalanced population growth between countries. This does carry significant relevance for the Netherlands as an open economy. For example, in main ports such as Rotterdam and Schiphol the increasing flow of people could be a significant threat in terms of illegal migration and international crime or terrorism. Accordingly, the increasing influx of illegal immigrants from North Africa could pose a threat to the Mediterranean countries as long as there is no common European migration policy.[128] Although these migrants do not pose a direct threat, there are possible negative side effects that need an adequate response from the EU and national governments.[129]

From the literature review, documents can be categorized in three groups. The first group of issues in the migration sphere sees negative effects on international migration from developing countries to developed countries. This can for example be seen on the US-Mexican border where an increasing influx of illegal immigrants places pressure on local border resources in the southern American states.[130] Another example in this group is the societal tensions that are related to integration of a migrant population within a country. A second group of issues is global demographic imbalance between developing and developed countries. The latter are facing increasing pressure on their social services with a graying population, while in developing countries a relatively large group of young people is growing up. A third group of possible issues in the demographic sphere is focusing on issues of urbanization, since this specific process places increasing pressure on local governments and city councils on how to cope with this influx of people. Concrete problems can be found in many cities in the world where poverty, crime, lack of hygienic standards and jobs for the migrants are problems which require comprehensive policy adaptations on a higher level then city councils.

For the Dutch armed forces, these increasing tensions do not lead to a single effect that can be addressed easily. For example, a graying population in the Netherlands has the effect that new personnel will become increasingly scarce and therefore the current problems with recruitment will most likely continue to exist.[131] However, this is merely the case for the the wider Dutch economy, as well as the problems that come from societal tensions related to integration of the migrant population within a country. Therefore, although these issues will influence the Dutch nation, no single effect can be identified for the Dutch armed forces specifically.

5.4.3 Energy and scarce resources

Resource scarcity is a possible source of future tensions or threats. Because of the rising economies in China, India and Brazil, this threat has received more attention in recent years. Although the growth of these economies has lifted many people out of extreme poverty, the production processes within these countries are forcing these

countries to search for additional natural resources.

For example, the surge in China's energy consumption is explained by the growth of heavy industry. Firms had been investing in energy-intensive industries which caused the share of metal-processing in national output to double, and that of petrochemicals to rise by 66% between 2000 and 2005. Although the new factories tend to use fewer resources and less energy per unit of output than most of China's older stock, the growth in their number has diminished efficiency. Moreover, the increasing availability of consumer products for the Chinese consumers in turn increases energy demand for electricity and gas.[132]

As a result, in the search for access to oil and other raw materials to fuel its booming economy, Beijing has boosted its bilateral relations with resource-rich states, sometimes striking deals with rogue governments, such as Myanmar and Sudan.[133] In both places China's diplomatic support and investment has made it easier for these regimes to defy international pressure. More specifically, Chinese firms have invested $15 billion in Sudan since 1996, largely in the oil industry, which now results in some 10% of China's oil imports coming from Sudan.[134]

Competition over scarce resources could pose a significant threat in the future in terms of increasing tensions between countries in political and even military conflict. This demand includes pressure on oil, gas, water, food and energy. In effect, energy will become a security issue since the wealth and prosperity of an economy in a country becomes increasingly dependent on the access to natural resources. Moreover, oil pipelines and seafaring routes of LNG and oil ships will require increasing security measures in order to guarantee delivery of these products to countries. An illustrative example is the land-picking in the North Pole by Russia and Canada.[135] A specific subcategory in this cluster is the increasing pressure on water sources around the world, with local tensions on waterways and access to fresh water.[136]

Moreover, current conflicts could become increasingly complex due to the presence of natural resources in conflict areas. As can be seen in the current conflict in the Eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo, the presence of minerals in this area fuels tensions between warring parties.[137] Although the relation between natural resources and conflict is a heavily debated one, conflicts in the future could become more complex due to the involvement of third parties in a conflict which see possibilities for economic profit in this case.[138]

Although this cluster does not hold concrete threats for the Dutch armed forces, its future task will most likely be influenced by these developments. This can for example come from new tensions or conflict between countries which will require a peacekeeping intervention, or the increasing complexity of peacekeeping missions especially because of the presence of natural resources which attracts additional third parties to a conflict environment.

5.4.4 Hampering international institutions

The slow decision-making pace of international and multilateral institutions can be regarded as a potential threat since it places the international community without proper instruments to cope with upcoming threats in the future. This, in turn, undermines efficiency and credibility of current international institutions, which has an effect on both the international cooperation and national institutions. In addition, because of the dependency of the Netherlands on international institutions as a useful means of gaining influence in the world, this development could lead to a decreasing international role for the Netherlands in the world as well. Many sources in the literature review refer to this unclear role of the western security institutions and organisations, which can be seen in the current struggle of NATO in Afghanistan or the debates on the role of NATO in light of the European

Defence policy.[139]

In effect, the rise of small groups like NGO's or companies that deliver services or address issues which used to be addressed by the state or international institutions can be seen as a reaction to this development. This leads to the growing influence of these actors in political and economic processes. An example of the diminishing role of the state and its hampering institutions that lose credibility in delivering a service is for example the rise of private security firms in failing states, which deliver security for wealthy people. This influences the effectiveness of peace operations or other military interventions, since these states lose their monopoly on delivering security.[140] For the Dutch armed forces therefore, this loss of monopoly on delivering security will lead to increasing complex conflict environments with many actors and enemies present. These actors all have to be dealt with in a tailor-made way, which requires additional skills for the Dutch armed forces in liaison and negotiation activities.

5.4.5 Non-proliferation

International negotiation and cooperation to stop the spread of WMD (weapons of mass destruction) is hampering. This can partly be explained by hampering international institutions, but the effect from this spread could have a more significant influence of the security of the Netherlands in the future. Since the end of the Cold War the large nuclear weapon powers (the Russian Federation, the United States, France, and United Kingdom) with exception of China, have been working on reducing the size of their nuclear arsenals. Nevertheless, about 30.000 tactical and strategic warheads still exist throughout the world.[141]

Moreover, an erosion has been going on of nuclear arms control agreements.[142] Disarmament negations came to a halt in the mid-1990s and since then the arms control architecture has been crumbling. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty did not become operational and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty neither. In 2005, a review conference of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty failed as well as the UN Summit Declaration where none of the seven countries involved dared to include a text on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. In effect, the UN Secretary-General called on the Seven Nation Initiative to find new possibilities on improving international negotiations on non-proliferation. In addition, although the Chemical Weapon Convention has been ratified by more than 110 states, chemical disarmament goes slowly since the involved states have been granted a period from ten up to fifteen years to be get rid of their chemical arsenals.

In the literature two patterns can be distinguished. The first is the hampering effort of non-proliferation of WMD, and the second pattern is the increasing availability of WMD on the world market. More specifically, the continued spread of nuclear materiel could pose a significant security threat to the Western world because of the growing influence of international crime networks that create new barriers in stopping the spread of these weapons. For example, Abdul Qadeer Khan had been trading nuclear weapons materiel for more then two decades throughout the 1980s and 1990s. As an effect, his network sold the equipment and expertise needed to produce nuclear weapons to states as Iran, Libya and North Korea. This network has caused major damage to efforts aimed at stopping the spread of WMD.[143]

For the Dutch armed forces, this threat has the effect that the possibility of a WMD attack from a terrorist group or rogue state has become more realistic. In effect, the Dutch armed forces have acquired new Patriot PAC 3 missiles and support the NATO Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) initiative by offering to build a testing facility for ballistic defense.

5.4.6 Democracy and democratisation

Democracy has been rising steadily over the last few decades.[144] A well known theoretical debate in this cluster stems from Huntington's book *The Third Wave*, in which democratization was described in three different waves. The first wave took place in Europe and North America in the 19th century, followed by a second wave that took place after 1945 until 1970. The most recent wave started in 1974 and continues today in Eastern Europe and Latin-America.[145]

Though democracy is a political system that strives to deal peacefully with conflicting interests in society, democratisation processes can themselves have a negative impact on dynamics of conflict and peace. Therefore, transitional democracies can be found in relatively unstable processes whereby old structures and former influential people are being replaced by new transparent and open procedures and structures. Thus, with the rise of democratization over the last few decades, many countries went through a turbulent process or are still within this transitional process.

Specifically, semi-democracies or semi-authoritarian regimes seem to be more prone to intra-state conflicts over power than mature democracies or stable suppressive autocracies. Democratic transition processes appear to be depending on linkages to formal and actual power structures and relations, as well as on the social culture and values in society. In addition, early multi-party elections in a post-conflict situation and in weak states can drive conflict, due to the risk of premature closure of the democratisation process and entrenchment of existing power structures.[146] For the Dutch armed forces therefore, future operations such as post conflict reconstruction and peace monitoring missions which are frequently combined with the settlement of new democracies, could lead to new or additional tensions in a society which is recovering from a conflict.

5.4.7 International power blocks

Several studies signal a turn to regionalism and the emergence of regional power blocs. In these power blocs a number of countries join forces in international cooperation and bundle their economic and military power. This regional focus gives them a way to rise to a world power status. These actors are frequently related to drives such as globalisation and identity processes are often used in the description of these actors. These power blocs are generally regionally based and cover a diverse number of regions. Such potential power blocs are amongst others ASEAN, the African Union and Latin America. Moreover, the growth of influence of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation between China, Russia and other countries within that region, is a typical case of such a regional bloc. The relevance for the Dutch armed forces of this cluster of threats is that some countries could influence not only the Dutch economy which is dependent on international trade, but merely the increase in political and military strength which could alter current international relations.

5.4.8 Old and new major powers

New powers (amongst others China and India)

Several studies identify the rise of China and India as major economic powers. Since early 2000, these countries are no longer merely seen only as economic powers, but also militarily the size and technical capabilities of their armed forces are increasing.[147] Especially the increasing power of the PR China receives a lot of attention in literature. China is perceived to become increasingly stronger and more influential in the world economy and politics, because of its economic and military power. China's growth is rooted in the liberalization of a surplus labour economy that has a high saving rate. The reallocation of surplus agriculture labour to industry and service sectors generates a growth effect that shows up in total factor productivity growth.[148]

The military strength of China has also been increasing. The specific growth numbers are not known, however. More specifically, a series of White papers published by the Chinese government since 1998 on its military developments have shed little light on how much the Chinese armed forces are spending and on what. By China's calculations, the armed forces enjoyed an average annual budget increase of more than 15% between 1990 and 2005. However, this appears not to include arms imports, spending on strategic missile forces and research and development. Therefore, the IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies) argues that the real level of spending in 2004 could have been about 1.7 times higher than the officially declared budget of 220 billion yuan.[149] Especially the growing military strength of China could influence the international relations between China and the United States, which in turn influences many other developments such as economic and political tensions between the two countries or the type of future warfare in case of a new arms race.

Nevertheless, critics point out that the great economic expectations of these countries could also pose a significant threat in case of a sudden political or economic collapse, since over the last two decades the economic growth in these countries has been relatively high and negative effects from this growth are increasingly putting pressure on the current system that has been created.[150] For example, negative effects of economic growth in China are intensifying internal pollution and caused some 60.000 protests in 2006 alone, from well organised civilians in Shanghai and Xiamen.[151] Another example is the increasing pressure from the Tibet issue, which forces the Peoples' Congress to address these rising tensions in society.[152] If this exercise fails, the economic rise of China could be halted, which will have a substantial influence on the world economy.

In addition, India's economy is threatened by hampering reforms within the country. Although India's GDP has risen 9% every year over the last three years, several issues like power cuts, rigid labour laws, inefficient bureaucrats and a government that depends on support to the caste system are not being addressed. These internal struggles could lead to an economic slowdown, which in turn might lead to a global slowdown since China and India's economic growth is responsible for the major share of global economic growth over the last decade.[153] A global economic slowdown could in turn influence global trade networks, international stability and increase tensions between and within countries, which would influence Dutch foreign policy and the role of the Dutch armed forces within this policy. For example, a possible scenario is that countries follow an economic protectionist policy in response to the economic slowdown, where the Dutch armed forces will then be used for increasing protection of national territory instead of peacekeeping missions abroad.

Russia

The role of Russia in the future is unclear when looking at the threats that are identified on this topic. Although many see the current economic progress in this country, the specific political position in the future of this country remains unspecified.[154] The rising strength of Russia could significantly alter current regional international relations and related tasks for the Dutch armed forces. An example is the increasing attention of the role of Russia in light of a return to a new Cold War scenario, which would mean that the territorial defense task would become more important for the Dutch armed forces.

However, two issues could influence this current Russian increase in strength. First, the strong position of Russia is based on the high energy prices, which creates a situation that cannot be maintained if energy prices drop.[155] The current energy prices have caused rising imports; the country has failed to convert the oil stimulus into domestic production. Moreover, the rapid real appreciation of the currency hurts Russia's producers, in addition to the current low quality standards of domestic production. For example, Algeria has recently claimed it wants to return 15 military jets it has purchased from Russia, because of the substandard quality of parts of the

plane.[156] In addition, inflation has been rising into double digits recently, because of a high inflow of capital attracted by the strong currency and growing financial reserves.

Second, another issue that plagues Russian policy-makers is the low birth rate with the effect that the Russian population will continue to shrink the next years.[157] Recent pro-family policy measures have had effect: births are on the rise, from 1.4 million in 2006 to 1.6 million in 2007, the highest level in 15 years. Nevertheless, because of falling birth rates and rising death rates, the number of Russians dropped between 1989 and 2008 from about 148 million to 141.4 million.

United States

Most documents referring to the USA focus on the decreasing power of the United States. This refers to economic, political and ideological decline in power. Moreover, the USA has started to lose its worldwide dominance in critical areas of science and innovation.[158] Since the USA currently is the main catalyst of technical development for the Dutch armed forces, a decline in science and innovation could influence the future technical development of the Dutch armed forces. For example, the development of concepts and systems from the Command and Control concept which currently has a significant effect over Dutch thinking on how a military mission should be executed could be altered when other, new major powers offer alternative concepts which influence technical development and war fighting doctrine.

Another issue which is frequently mentioned in the literature is the hampering capacity to of the White House to persuade other nations on making contributions in the 'war on terror'.[159] The Dutch political dualism that came with the case of the war in Iraq, where political debates revolved around the question on whether the Netherlands should support the American invasion of Iraq, can be seen as an example of this decreasing strength of the White House.[160] However, this decline is frequently seen in the literature as a relative decline of power due to the rise of the new global players. Generally, most sources do not see profound changes or new threats coming from the current developments in North America, which could significantly alter Dutch armed forces tasks.[161]

European Union

Although this is a relatively small cluster, threats that do mention the EU focus on the growing size and cooperation within the Union, and on future internal issues like growing health care costs for its greying population.[162] Recently, the EU has been striving for a more active role in the security field with its ESDP and CFSP.[163] With the adoption of the European Security Strategy (ESS), *A Secure Europe in a Better World* in 2003, member states of the Union solemnly adopted a common strategic vision for EU foreign policy. So far, the ESS can be found in many policy decisions and documents such as the ESDP and CFSP. Thus, a strategic culture is on the rise, whereby the growing economic influence and geographical scope of the Union have been receiving more attention.[164]

However, much of the Union's current power lies in presenting itself as a 'normative' or 'civilian' power. Critics argue that in order to make the ESS, ESDP and CFSP more effective, more 'hard power' in terms of military capabilities and political dedication is required. The development of EU Battle Groups can be regarded as a step in this direction, which in turn influences the role of the Dutch armed forces in the future. The commitments of the Dutch government to European initiatives on the security field are expected to grow in the future, thereby making the growing power of the EU in the security field one of the most significant development for the future of the Dutch armed forces.[165] This development would for example lead to an increasing European shared defence

initiative, in which the Dutch armed forces could take up a specialised role within the wider array of war fighting capabilities.

5.4.9 Radicalisation

Radicalisation processes can be identified in several cultural processes. In theoretical debates, this process is often referred to as 'glocalisation', which is a cultural response to globalisation and an anti-reaction to the 'global culture'. As an effect, people tend to find stability in their local identity or by reinventing their cultural 'roots'.[166] A possible threat for the Netherlands in this cluster is that these processes could lead to radicalism and ethnocentrism among the Dutch population with a different ethnic background, but also among the traditional white Dutch population.[167] In the literature this process is highlighted in marginalization of subcultures within the mainstream western culture.

Accordingly, in the literature review these issues are identified under many different topics or indirect references towards these processes. However, many documents identify an increase in radicalisation processes in the Western world and in other parts of the world. This process can be split into two subcategories: processes of glocalisation and Islamist radicalisation. The first category contains radicalisation processes such as growth of nationalism within several countries. Another example in this category is the rise of identity politics; the literature also specifically mentions the possible rise of anarchist ideas or religious extremism in for example Christianity.

The second, and substantially larger subcategory within radicalisation processes, is Muslim extremism. Salafism is seen as the prime example of radicalisation along ethnic lines and is therefore frequently mentioned. Accordingly, sometimes reference is made towards the possibility of increasingly complex conflict environments as an effect from radicalisation processes, not only in Islamist countries but also in growing religious upheaval and/or terrorism focused against the western world. An example of this category can be seen in the current conflict in Afghanistan or Iraq.[168]

For the Dutch armed forces, radicalisation in the Netherlands could lead to additional attention for military and civilian intelligence services, which enable police services to trace people that could possibly have radical ideas and are willing to harm Dutch society. The growth of the budget for the civilian and military intelligence and security services in the Netherlands, as well as the increasing cooperation between these agencies, can be seen as a reaction to this process.[169] Moreover, the increasing attention for international terrorism since 9-11 has the effect that military interventions have become increasingly focused on fighting possible sources of terrorism.[170]

5.4.10 Polarisation/growth income disparity

On a world scale, the national income has been rising steadily over the past few decades, both in developing and developed countries. However, this rise seems to be for only a lucky few in the world. The poorest 40 percent of the world's population accounts for 5 percent of the global income. The richest 20 percent accounts for three-quarters of the world's income.[171] Two subcategories can be identified within this cluster.

The first 'threat' comes from rising income disparities between continents. On the basis of the literature review it becomes apparent that poverty is expected to increase, even when the contribution in GDP growth of China, India and Brazil is compensated for. Although this does not have to be a threat in itself, it could certainly be a cause of conflicts through, for example, the mechanism of frustration. Due to new mass communication media, the differences within the world are becoming more explicit, which could fuel frustration. Therefore, the threats from this cluster could be related to the cluster of extremism and radicalisation.

A second subcategory that can be identified within this cluster is the rising income disparities within

countries. In combination with the aforementioned category of radicalisation processes increasing poverty could be a potential source of frustration and provide new ground for crime and extremism within a country.[172] The recent example in Kenya shows that a relatively highly educated youth bulge within a country where most jobs are only available for an elitist class, can be mobilised quite easily.[173] Although the Kenyan case is more complex, the influence of this mechanism should not be ignored. For the Dutch armed forces polarization can therefore become a new source of future conflicts in the world, which will lead to a call for new peacekeeping interventions in these countries that are susceptible to these increasing differences in the world.[174]

5.4.11 Technical progress

In accordance to the driver globalisation, technical progress can have negative side effects, although the process in itself is not a direct threat. Within this cluster three categories can be identified. The first subcategory consists of the majority of threats, which focus on the increasing vulnerability of the Western world that comes with the increasing use of digital and technological systems. The example of the recent black out in internet connection in India and Iran due to a broken cable near Egypt is a sign of the physical vulnerability of digital systems. [175]

In accordance, another subcategory of threats can be found in new conflict environments in space and cyberspace. The example from the PRC to destroy one of their own communication satellites last year was interpreted by the USA as a potential threat for the future in their GPS-system. In effect, more recently the USA destroyed one of its own satellites. This threat can also be seen in the current focus of several nations on Network Centric Warfare which uses ICT systems in combat situations. [176] For the Dutch armed forces, the increasing use of ICT within a battlefield environment (such as the TITAAN system) comes with an increasing vulnerability for cyber attacks. A third subcategory of threats focuses on the increasing vulnerability in relation to a possible terrorist threat and sees technologically advanced systems as a potential source of future terrorist attacks. A recent example is the computer blackout in Estonia, which is said to be caused by Russian government computers after a dispute over the removal of a Soviet-era war memorial from Tallinn. [177]

5.4.12 Greenhouse effect/environmental degradation

This relatively small cluster from the literature study focuses on natural disasters: several documents found a relation to the increase of natural disasters and an increase of CO_2 emissions and other environmental issues. Growth of CO_2 emissions causes, at least partly, a rise in the overall temperatures, thereby leading to a rising ocean level, an increase of an unstable climate and thereby influencing the human habitat. Therefore, an increase in natural disasters like earthquakes and floods is expected in the future decades.[178]

More specifically, the effects of these disasters create an increasing threat to human populations since an increasing number of people are living in urban areas, mostly in cities close to the coastline. The combination with urbanisation could pose new future threats, since a major part of the world population is directly exposed to rising sea levels and possible increased floods. In addition, the increasing pressure on natural sea habitats for the protection against floods is diminishing as a consequence of human activities. An example is the disappearance of mangrove forests in Bangladesh which does not only diminish biodiversity but also deletes a natural barrier against tsunamis.[179]

From the disaster mitigation literature it appears that richer nations do suffer lower death tolls while experiencing the same amount of disasters. Because climate change is expected to increase, the frequency of natural disasters such as floods will most likely increase as well. Specifically, for the Dutch armed forces these increasing number of threats will most likely lead to increasing calls for humanitarian intervention, especially

because developing countries are more sensitive to suffer from natural disasters then developing countries.[180] Moreover, the chaos in the aftermath of the hurricane Katrina in the city of New Orleans shows that humanitarian operations require an increasing array of skills, material and assets in order to increase the aid-efficiency. Therefore, with the number of calls for humanitarian intervention for the Dutch armed forces, the number of different capabilities is expected to increase as well, in order to make a humanitarian intervention more effective.

Another influence of the growing number of disasters is the growing influence of disasters in geographically distant places, which have a potential influence on the situation in the Netherlands. For example, hurricane Katrina which destroyed oil-platforms in the Gulf of Mexico influenced the European economic growth due to rising oil prices.[181] Therefore, the increasing number of natural disasters could become a major 'threat' to the Netherlands in terms of influencing international instability and increasing calls for humanitarian intervention from the Dutch armed forces.

Another future problem is the increasing pressure in fast growing economies like China, Brazil and India, whereby local nature is suffering from pollution. Pan Yue, deputy minister at the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA), China's paramount environmental regulator, estimates the annual cost of environmental damage at 8-13% of China's GDP. This is nearly the same as the overall economic growth rate. If it continues like this, Pan Yue expects levels of pollution to double over the next 15 years.[182] Moreover, the latest report from the IPCC (International Panel on Climate Change) notes that temperatures in China are rising and extreme weather, including cyclones, droughts and floods, is on the increase. In addition, the report notes that the Himalayan glaciers that feed China's biggest rivers are melting.[183]

5.4.13 Rogue states

A rogue state is 'a state that does not respect other states in its international actions'.[184] A state is seen as a rogue state when its meets several criteria such as authoritarian rulers, restriction of human rights, and proliferation of WMD. The Clinton administration has used the term 'states of concern' for a few months; however, the Bush administration returned to the old vocabulary. Current rogue states are Iran and North Korea , while former rogue states are Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya.[185] Nevertheless, the specific definition and role of a rogue state remains debatable. The central assumption of aggressiveness of rogue states has not been proven. In addition, although Iran and North-Korea are regarded as rogue states by the US, the term rogue state is highly problematic since it does not provide a clear picture.[186]

Several threats in the literature focused on rogue states as a possible actor that could lead to new threats in the western world. Because of the complex relationship of these countries with the wider international community, political negotiations or the development of unilateral ties are nearly impossible.[187] North Korea and Iran are exemplary; these states are mentioned in relation to the proliferation of WMD, which could be a threat to the Netherlands in the future. Although the Netherlands does not have direct affiliation with these countries, they do remain a permanent threat since these countries pose a threat to international stability and in that way could influence the future tasks and performance of the Dutch armed forces, for example in the form of new missions to new conflict environments.

5.4.14 Failing states

A 'failing state' is a state which is unable to control its territory or large parts of its territory and guarantee the security of its citizens, not able to uphold its internal legal order and not able to deliver public services to its population or create the conditions for such delivery.[188]

The processes that make a state 'fail' are caused by humans. For example, politicians in a weak state choose to abuse their position in parliament, which in turn will undermine the state structures. External influences can only increase pressure on a weak state. Failing states are mentioned relatively frequent in the literature as a possible actor in creating future threats for the Netherlands, since failing states create new negative influences for their own population, the wider region and individual neighbouring states. Moreover, due to the lacking state control, these countries could become 'black holes' for the international community and are mentioned as a possible breeding ground for terrorism or international crime networks.[189]

Therefore, these countries could pose a significant threat to international stability, economic interests and the international legal order. Intervention in these regions or states therefore comes from solidarity with the population, concern over regional stability and care for peace and security within the region. For example, the decision over a contribution of 60 marines to a stabilisation mission in Chad has been recently approved by the Dutch House of Representatives.[190] Since the mission in Chad and the current mission in Afghanistan can be regarded as examples of an intervention in a failing state, it is likely to expect that future missions of the Dutch armed forces will focus on this type of contributions.

5.4.15 Networks

International crime networks

Due to the spread of communication technologies, widely dispersed and loosely formed networks could be a new threat to the Netherlands since they threaten international stability. The rise of criminal organisations coincides closely with local undermining or the disappearance of a central state. In a number of cases violent conflicts or socio-economic tensions have been related to the development of grey zones, where the authority of states has evaporated or is hardly respected and the criminal organisations can develop themselves relatively easily.[191] An illustrative example is the Strait of Malacca and the Indian Ocean where maritime piracy is posing a potential threat to the safety of trade routes and cargo.[192]

It also occurs that guerilla movements develop criminal activities in order to remain self-sufficient. Suspicions on this issue exist against the PKK (Turkey/Iraq), the NPA (Philippines), the Tamil Tigers (Sri Lanka) and the FARC (Colombia). Since in failing states corruption and illegal transfers of money, goods and drugs undermine state power even further, spin-off effects in such countries could destabilize a wider region. For instance in East-Africa in the vicinity of Rwanda, Uganda and the Eastern parts of D.R.Congo (the availability of resources in this case plays a catalysing role in the endurance of illegal trade and the conflict in this country).[193] Furthermore, because of the position of the Netherlands as a main port for transport of people and goods, illegal trade could in effect affect the safety of these ports such as Schiphol and Rotterdam, but also the wider country in terms of illegal immigrants and a growth of organized crime within the Netherlands.[194] For the armed forces, the increasing strength of criminal networks has the effect that interventions in failing states become increasingly complex due to the variety of actors involved in illegal activities. In order to anticipate on this development, the newly installed ISTAR battalion will focus on finding suitable information for addressing criminal activities in failing states.[195]

Terrorism

Another actor that is related to the clusters of failing states and crime networks is terrorism. Terrorism does not have one single definition; however, under current customary rules in international law, terrorism in peacetime is referred to as 'a discrete international crime or a crime against humanity'. In conflict situations, terrorism is

regarded as 'a war crime in international law.'[196] Another definition from the AIVD is: 'Terrorism is committing or threatening with violence aimed at human lives, with the goal of bringing about social changes or influencing political decision-making.' [197]

Although interrelated with the two aforementioned categories, the growth of terrorism is mentioned frequently as a separate source of potential threats. This is because of the American Global War on Terror and the fact that most sources in the literature study are from the post 9-11 era. Most sources acknowledge that a combination of illegal trade, crime networks, increasing unequal income and the lack of state control could be a fruitful ground for extremism and terrorism focused against Western countries, but also within countries itself.

Accordingly, a recent study on the effectiveness of national and transnational terrorism has focused on the impact of the initiatives of current security institutions. It showed that worldwide spending on homeland security has risen since 2001 to between $65 billion (when terrorism is narrowly defined) and more than $200 billion a year (if one included the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq). Terrorism's economic impact is limited, however. This is mostly because anti-terrorist spending displaces terrorist activities to new sectors, geographical locations or techniques.[198]

In addition, numbers from actual deaths from terrorism show that impact of international terrorism compared to other causes of death is limited. In 2007 in total 3.467 incidents took place which caused 8.763 killings, of which 8.490 deaths from attacks came from in-country terrorism. Moreover, of the 3.467 terrorist incidents, 2.419 took place in the Middle East, none in North America, 50 in Western Europe and 149 in Afghanistan. According to the WHO, 29.3% or 26.8 million of all deaths in 2004 came from cardiovascular diseases, 19.1% or 17.5 million from infectious and parasitic diseases as major causes of death.[199]

Nevertheless, the perception of terrorism as a major threat to international stability has the effect that armed forces' tasks have become increasingly focused on military support of domestic anti-terrorism measures within the Netherlands, as well as military contributions to the American anti-terrorism Operation , in which the Dutch Navy contributed vessels and the Army contributed Special Forces in order to help fighting the regime of Saddam Hussain which supposedly supported the terrorist organisation Al-Qaeda.[200]

TNCs and NGOs

Trans National Corporations (TNCs) and Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) are mentioned as future nonstate actors that are most likely to increase in power. This process is related to other processes described earlier such as globalisation and hampering international institutions. For this, NGOs are a plausible alternative since they can focus on very specific issues that are hard to address through formal state-related mechanisms. Although these are not direct sources for future threats for the Netherlands, they can be seen as the 'legal side' of the growth of nonstate international networks. Their 'unpredictability' is most often referred to as a potential source of future disputes.[201] An example of this growing influence is the protests of the anti-globalist movement in Seattle in 1998, which mobilised a large group of people that were connected through new media and focused on one single issue.[202]

In addition, the increasing size and power of TNCs is frequently debated since these companies provide many advantages to, for instance, developing countries where they settle in terms of access to capital (FDI), (low-skilled) jobs and improvement of infrastructure. However, without a proper policy in developing countries, TNCs can have negative effects on the environment, local population and the countries' own economy.[203] In developing countries governments 'fear' these global companies since they are sometimes suspected of an increasing influence on government policy due to the size of the firms. This, however, is heavily debatable and the main

threat from TNCs comes from a lack of institutions with mandates that can deal with these supranational organizations. As long as TNCs are guided by effective measures and institutions, they can have very positive effects specifically because of their size and power. [204]

For the Dutch armed forces, these non state actors will thus most likely become increasingly influential, specifically in decision-making processes within a failing state where a mission takes place. In effect, the armed forces will need to deal with these organisations through a variety of ways, such as installing special liaison officers or setting up special communication platforms in order to streamline activities in a conflict or post-conflict area.

6 Sub-question 3

What are current policy responses of the Ministry of Defense
in response to new threats and changing operational demands?

Introduction

Based on the information from the first and second sub-question, the focus in this sub-question will lie on the description of the more recent policy responses of the Ministry of Defence in response to the already identified threats by the Dutch MoD. Specifically, this question will focus on the description of the most significant changes made by the Dutch armed forces over the last few years, which include technical, doctrine and material changes. That way, one can assess whether the current policy responses are effective means in order to address the identified threats from sub-question two. This will help to structure the decision making process on how scarce public resources can be allocated in a more efficient way.

6.1 Implications of the changing security perception

The end of the Cold War has substantially changed the security environment for the Dutch armed forces. Before 1989 military planning was not based on a diversity of threats, but on calculable models where Russian morale, personnel strength and firepower could be identified.[205] The conflicts in which the armed forces currently operate are frequently described with the term 'three block war'. This means that soldiers may be required to conduct full scale military action, peacekeeping operations and humanitarian relief within the space of three contiguous city blocks. The thrust of the concept is that modern armed forces must be trained to operate in all three conditions simultaneously in order to improve effectiveness of the military intervention. This development is not completely new however, since over the last decades outside the European Cold War arena, armed forces from different states have been involved in these irregular conflicts. An example is the post-colonial war of liberation, whereby attacks from irregular forces can be compared with the current theater of operations.

Nevertheless, the current situation has changed for several reasons. First, the end of the Cold War has had a significant impact on the role of the armed forces in Europe. That way, the lens through which conflicts had been reviewed the last 50 years has disappeared, which leads to a reconsideration of purpose and legitimacy in relation to new threats. Specifically, for many countries, including the Netherlands, this paradigm shift led to the creation of the concepts 'wars by choice' and 'wars of necessity', in which wars of necessity are distinguished by the requirement to respond to the use of military force by an aggressor and the fact that no option other than military force exists to reverse what has been done.[206] For the Dutch armed forces, a full-scale military conflict before 1989 would have been considered as a war by necessity, while more recent conflicts such as Iraq and Afghanistan can be considered as wars by choice, since the Dutch House of Representatives had the option of not participating in these conflicts.

For the Dutch House of Representatives therefore, the challenge has grown to label a possible threat such as terrorism, as a legitimate threat in which the use of force is necessary. This can be done on various motivations, although any motivation remains limited to the framework provided by the Dutch constitution. Specifically, it has been stated in articles 90 and 97 that the use of force is limited to the protection of the Dutch territory and its national interests, as well as promotion of the international rule of law. [207]

However, the effect of the shift from 'wars by necessity' to 'wars by choice' is that the variety of threats requires a variety of measures in order to alleviate the threats. More specifically, due to the small size and influence of the Netherlands in world politics the response to a certain threat is frequently determined by external powers and decisions, such as the American decision to invade Iraq and Afghanistan which led to the Dutch

decision to send troops to these areas as well. Therefore, the Netherlands has multiple measures to address specific threats, which frequently run through multinational organizations such as NATO and EU. That way, threats such as the prevention of migrative pressures in Sudan and Chad region by protecting refugee camps through the EU-led and UN-led mission, can be addressed more effectively. The tools that the Netherlands has available for these purposes range from lobbying activities in international organizations to development aid in order to support good governance in specific African countries.

Another effect of the shift from 'wars by necessity' to 'wars by choice' is that the reason to send out troops to far-away countries in which the Netherlands does not have a direct stake, becomes increasingly contested. In effect, although the Netherlands performs its missions in cooperation with NATO or European allies, the question of the legitimacy of the use of force in these countries has become increasingly challenged. This discussion has started since the dilemma of sending out conscripts to international peacekeeping missions, which has been solved by transferring the Dutch armed forces into a full volunteer force.[208] While the number of casualties has remained relatively low compared to other countries in the current missions in Afghanistan, this mission and the Dutch armed forces are now under a permanent pressure to legitimize its presence in Afghanistan, Iraq or any other conflict area where the Netherlands does not have any direct stake next to contributing to the international stability and rule of law.

Thence, an effect of the changing security landscape is that the relative decline of power of the current international organizations has the effect that future operations will be formed in ad hoc coalitions serving specific states' interests.[209] This is because the diversity of threats around the world has the effect that the decision on which 'threat' is going to be addressed remains a political decision. Therefore, for the Netherlands the decision on which threats should be addressed through a military contribution, will be based on the perception on which threat is perceived to endanger Dutch interests the most. In addition, this decision also involves the specific force composition that is needed to address certain threats. For example, the United Kingdom and the United States focus on full spectrum capabilities which enable their forces to execute the full array of mission scenarios from peace enforcement operations to reconstruction missions. In contrast, other countries have decided to specialize in only one or two aspects of operations such as Canada which has specialized in contributions to UN peacekeeping missions.

An additional change since the end of the Cold War is that the role of the state monopoly as security provider has been become increasingly challenged. This is because in current conflicts the role of the state as merely a security provider among militias, security companies and paramilitary forces has become contested. In addition, in appeared that new tasks such as post-conflict reconstruction were added to the military curriculum, in order to stimulate a wider process of social transformation.[210] Moreover, the traditional axiom that distance provides security is disappearing, whereby former distant threats can now threaten current stability in a home country.[211]

Another effect of the shift from 'wars by necessity' to 'wars by choice' is that the Dutch armed forces will have to be able to operate in the next two decades in a highly flexible and constantly changing environment.[212] More specifically, future operations will vary heavily in terms of climate and geographical location, because threats will have an increasing global scope. Moreover, the concept of 'enemy' will be highly fluid and the enemy's goals will vary heavily per mission and even within a mission area. In effect, this requires of the armed forces that they are increasingly flexible in their operations, training, location, and capable of executing expeditionary missions. This involves terrain, weather, coalitions, enemy forces, composition of own units, goals and type of mission. Many types of operations are possible, from conflict prevention to post-conflict reconstruction tasks, in

large and small coalitions with both high and low levels of violence. This is mostly because the number of possible actors within a conflict environment has increased such as TNCs and NGOs, but also criminal organizations and civilians which have extremist ideas which could lead to terrorist activities against the Dutch armed forces.

6.2 Changes in doctrine

Because every new mission will be a tailor-made job, Dutch defense is currently experimenting with developing integrated units, which can be composed from different force components in such a way that they are tailor made for the specific requirements of the mission.[213] This is done through the stimulation of several distinct developments.

A first development is the increased focus on expeditionary warfare. This is the execution of missions with a relatively long distance between the home base and the mission area by a more or less self sufficient force. In effect, recent expeditionary missions in Iraq and Afghanistan show that there is an increased need for transport planes, ships and helicopters that can transport troops and materiel over long distances in a relatively short amount of time. However, this need for 'strategic airlift' can only be fulfilled by the United States and the United Kingdom, since these countries have the financial and technical means to invest in large transport helicopters and airplanes.[214] The need for additional strategic airlift for the Netherlands can be seen in the decision to invest in a joint air transport capability project, whereby NATO countries can buy flight hours of a C17 transport plane. In addition, expeditionary warfare requires integration and cooperation between the three force components Army, Navy and Air Force. This cooperation is mainly required because of the greater flexibility that comes with the cooperation and lower overhead costs of three separate force components. [215] Therefore, within the Ministry of Defence since 2003 organisational reforms since 2003 were pointed in this direction. [216] This trend can already be identified in the development of joint or integrated command lines, practices and missions in the defence organisation. [217]

A second process is the growth of networked operations or network enabled capabilities. Because of the increasing availability of technologically advanced information and communication systems, timely and accurate information for an improved chain of command and coordination of fighting activities become critical for the success of a mission. Therefore, a robust network improves information sharing and collaboration, which leads to increased situational awareness for a force commander, because this commander will be able to use his available forces for a better defined task. That way, mission effectiveness and chances for success will increase. [218] Similar concepts of networked warfare have been developing elsewhere. For example, NetDefence in Sweden or the network-enabled capability concept which has recently been developed in the United Kingdom. More recently, the People's Republic of China has announced its intention to adopt NCW-related technologies as well. [219] The Dutch Ministry of Defence has recently invested additional funds for the network system Titaan, in order to stimulate the development of networked operations. [220]

A third development is the process of explicit operationalization of possible future tasks and required means. More specifically, this operationalization is based upon the international situation, from which Dutch security policy is formulated. This process has recently been spelled out more explicitly, in order to create a more coherent and transparent defense policy. The process consists of several concepts and ideas which are used to formulate defense policy and related tasks, starting with the broadly defined concepts and ending with more thoroughly spelled out operationalizations of the theoretical ideas in this model. More specifically, this process can be illustrated as follows:[221]

```
international context
  ↳ security policy
      ↳ main tasks armed forces
          ↳ defence tasks
              ↳ typical military operations
                  ↳ ambition level
                      ↳ levels of operation
                          ↳ defence capacities
                              ↳ capacity modules
                                  ↳ personnel and material means
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The three main tasks of the Dutch armed forces have been formulated in response to the threats and developments in the international context, namely protection of the integrity of the national and allied territory, including the Dutch Antilles and Aruba, promotion of international rule of law and civil authority support. These tasks entail the national security policy in its broadest sense, and are also the main defense tasks of the armed forces. These main defense tasks have been specified further in defense tasks, which are a specific objective of Dutch security policy. The list of defense tasks consists of both military and civil assistance tasks, such as active and passive defense of national territory or the protection of national vital infrastructure.[222] From these defense tasks, generic military operations have been defined, on which military operations can be specified further. The difference between these operations lies in the political risk, the objectives, type of military activities and the type of enemy. In total this list consists of 17 generic operations of the Dutch armed forces. Examples are the general defense operation, the extraction operation, conflict control operation at sea, at land or in the air, the exploration operation, the stabilisation operation, the pre-emptive operation, the embargo operation, the preventive operation, the preparation operation and the reconstruction operation.[223]

In response, from this list the operationalized level of ambition can be defined. Since 2003, this ambition level for the Dutch armed forces is to be able to contribute a brigade or the equivalent thereof to three peace operations or two peace enforcement operations, whereby the three separate force components need to be capable of operating in every part of the violence spectrum.[224] That way, the ambition level bridges the gap between defense tasks and defense capabilities. The next level of operationalization of future defense requirements is done via essential operational capabilities (EOC), which help to define more specific defense capabilities from the generic military operations. These EOCs help to identify the shortfalls within a military operation through questions like 'which requirements are needed for effective logistical support?' or 'which requirements are needed to guarantee mobility and deployability?' That way, the military capacity of combined force components in a mission can be identified. In effect, instead of using the traditional calculation model of a battlefield whereby the firepower of every tank could be identified, mission planning now shows a tendency on developing a more diversified analysis framework of defense capabilities.

Finally, these EOCs lead to the identification of 47 specific separate capacities of the Dutch armed forces, among them air traffic control capability, counter-guerrilla warfare capability and security sector reform capability. The commander of a mission is now able to identify the specific shortfalls and see which additional units can be used for addressing this task, or request new specialized units. More specifically, within the Ministry of Defence

policy planners are currently working on the composition of separate pre-composed units, which can be deployed for executing a generic military operation. These units can come from any force component; however, the focus is now on the composition of the right military 'tools' in order to reach a specific effect. Based on the specific composition of these pre-composed units, specific materiel and personnel shortfalls can be identified. That way, the Ministry of Defence is aiming to develop more flexible armed forces.[225]

An additional goal of the Ministry of Defence is to apply this methodology in a political framework for defense policy planning. Future political requests for the contribution to a specific peacekeeping mission can then be identified within the capacity planning framework since it will provide a specific overview of available means, but the defense organization will also be able to precisely identify the specific shortfalls in order to reach a specific effect with the military intervention.[226]

6.3 Changes in material allocation processes

Logically, the changing operational demands and new threats have the effect that force planning becomes directed towards expeditionary missions. In effect, materiel defence planning is increasingly focused on improving flexibility for the specialized needs and the unexpected demands from mission areas. On the other hand, current armed forces policy is also focused on retaining a consistently credible military posture over time, in which the Dutch armed forces are capable of operating under very diverse circumstances and within the full spectrum of war fighting capabilities.[227] Within this process of leveraging between these two extremes, additional factors that influence the defence materiel acquisition process need to be taken into account.

First, materiel defence planning is dependent on long term needs and capabilities. Specifically, weapon systems and platforms can take more than 15 years to design and acquire and may be retained in service for twenty to thirty years. Therefore, the current force composition influences the capabilities of the Dutch armed forces, while some of these weapon systems and platforms have been designed for addressing outdated threats from the 1970's. In effect, the current force composition limits the expeditionary capacity of armed forces. Although the Netherlands has restructured its armed forces quite thoroughly since the end of the Cold War from materiel capable of defending NATO territory to expeditionary missions, relatively outdated materiel products still influence current capabilities.

An example of the use of more or less 'outdated product' is the decision not to use the Leopard 2a4 tank in Afghanistan and Iraq. This tank had been bought in 1983 as a response to the increasing number of tanks from the Warsaw Pact. Discussions at that time focused merely on the number of tanks and the specific requirements, while the question on whether the tank was the most suitable product in response to the threat from the increasing number of tanks was had not been properly discussed. Currently however, for the position of the tank within the Dutch Army remains unclear, because there are doubts on the usability of the tank within the new operational environment.[228] The argument here is that tanks could scare the local population, which could undermine future reconstruction efforts. It has therefore been decided not to use tank in the field. However, it should be noted that Dutch tanks that have recently been sold to the Canadian armed forces, are used in Afghanistan.[229]

Second, relatively slow procedures in the materiel acquisition process influence the speed of addressing new needs from a mission area. Because of the diversity of actors involved, combined with the diverse and sometimes unclear future materiel requirements, the materiel acquisition process takes a substantial amount of time.[230] In effect, the management and control of investment projects require clearly defined procedures, which also make it possible to provide adequate information to the cabinet members and the Dutch House of

Representatives.

More specifically, the acquisition process within defense consists of various steps, which all require a substantial amount of time. The projects are initiated with a specification of requirements, after which a selection of possible options takes place, whereby the consequences of the available options are being mapped. Specifically, for each procurement alternative the scheduling and the cost-assessment are identified. This phase is concerned with the total life cycle of the materiel which includes investment, operating, and disposal costs. Once the order as been placed, the development of the materiel has to be continuously monitored in terms of requirements and finances.[231]

Moreover, a majority of acquisition of defence products goes according European invitation to tender rules, which takes up additional time in the materiel process. These rules have been developed to stimulate economic competition between contractors.[232] Although some exceptions exist to these rules, for example in the case of a classified order which does not require an invitation to tender, this process can take up so much precious time that a framework for fast track procurement has been developed where the rules of tender can be quickened.[233] Specifically, if the Defence Materiel Organization can prove that the materiel is required for the immediate protection of security interest of a member state, the rules of tender do not have to be applied. The fast procurement track does have disadvantages like higher prices and higher chances of lower quality of the materiel. Some recent projects which have been acquired through fast track procurement are the Bushmaster, automatic grenade launchers and mini UAV Aladin.[234]

In effect, a third influence on the defence materiel process is the availability of products. Specifically, some products do not need to be developed from scratch, but can be bought 'off the shelf' from defense industry firms. This direct availability leads to other choices in the force composition, since some materiel projects come from the direct need from the field and are therefore preferred above projects that still have to be developed and tested. Logically, developing projects from scratch requires more time, something that can be seen in the combined acquisition of the light armored exploration and guarding vehicle with the German Bundeswehr. This project stalled, when the German government in 2000 decided to stop the project. The Dutch Ministry of Defence then decided to continue the project against higher costs and a later date of final delivery, since there was no comparable alternative available for this product.[235]

Thence, these additional factors influence the balancing act of the Dutch armed forces between the need for direct availability of materiel in missions, while retaining a consistently credible military posture over time. Specifically, the operationalisation of defence materiel projects in response to a continuously changing security environment has become the most complex policy exercise of the defence organisation due to the described processes involved. This is because strategy, doctrine, war fighting concepts and personnel can be adapted more quickly and easily than the capacities of twenty year old defence products which can hardly be adapted at all.[236]

7 Conclusion

7.1 Actors shaping defense policy since 1989

Based upon the developments described in subquestion one, several specific influential factors can be identified.

Hypothesis 1: The minister of Defense holds a key position on defense budget decisions

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First, the role of the Minister of Foreign Affairs as influential actor in shaping defense policy remains. This Minister is responsible for the foreign policy of the Netherlands, a role that has not been institutionally changed since 1987. However, Van der Hoogen notes that the ministry of Foreign Affairs is merely connected through NATO with the Ministry of Defense, while Dutch security policy more recently is shaped through the new multinational organizations EU and UN as well. [237] The hypothesis is therefore confirmed.

Hypothesis 2: Defense policy on the demand side of the bureaucratic-political model is influenced by NATO

Second, it appears that the role of NATO as an institutional factor shaping Dutch defense policy has not changed significantly, despite the end of the Cold War. In 1987, NATO defense planning was integrated into Dutch defense planning. Although the type of defense planning has significantly changed, Dutch defense planning is still integrated into NATO's military structure, as can for example be seen in the NRF planning and Dutch contributions to ISAF.[238] Nevertheless, some additional multinational organizations have come forward which influence Dutch defense planning. Specifically, the more profound role of the UN in international peacekeeping missions after 1989 has led to increasing contributions of the Dutch armed forces to the UN.[239] The missions of UNFICYP and UNPROFOR are two examples in this case. The growing role of the EU in peacekeeping or monitoring missions has led to increasing contributions to this organization as well, as can be seen in the EU battlegroup planning and recent contributions to EUFOR in Chad.[240] Therefore, hypothesis 2 can be confirmed, however the EU and UN should be taken up as factors shaping defense policy in the conceptual model.

Hypothesis 3: Defense policy on the demand side of the bureaucratic-political model is influenced by the Minister of Foreign Affairs

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Third, the role of the Minister of Foreign has not been significantly altered, when looking at the major institutions which have influenced Dutch defense policy over the last two decades. Van der Hoogen notes that Dutch foreign policy and security policy in 1987 are set by the Minister of Defence, as can be seen in the international arena at that time. Currently, Dutch defense policy is still part of Dutch foreign policy, as can be seen in the collaboration between the two departments in for example the policy note 'reconstruction after violent conflict', upon which most recent peacekeeping missions are being based.[241] The hypothesis is therefore confirmed.

Hypothesis 4: Defense policy on the demand side of the bureaucratic-political model is influenced by the three force components


Fourth, the influence of the three separate force components over defense policy remains as well. Although the

Navy, Air Force and Army have been increasingly integrated into one organization, the influence of these three components on budget and materiel defense policy remains. For example, this can be seen in the application of the 'cheese-slicer-method', in which budget cuts were distributed evenly among the three force components, since no single force component would logically be willing to give up its own assets. The hypothesis is therefore confirmed.

> Hypothesis 5: Defense policy on the supply side of the bureaucratic-political model is influenced by the Minister of Finance
>
> Hypothesis 6: Defense policy on the supply side of the bureaucratic-political model is influenced by the other domestic departments
>
> Hypothesis 7: Defense policy on the supply side of the bureaucratic-political model is influenced by lobby groups and public opinion.

Fifth, the role of the Minister of Finance, as well of those of the other domestic ministries, has not changed significantly in its institutional setting since 1987. As Jacobs noted, the structure of the decision-making procedures as described by Van der Hoogen has not been thoroughly changed since that period, in such a way that the decision-making on the defense budget is drastically altered.[242] In addition, the institutional setting around the lobby groups, as well as the public opinion and media as actors in the model by Van der Hoogen has most likely not changed significantly either. Although Van der Hoogen does not pay attention to these two actors, there is no reason to assume from the descriptions on defense policy so far, that the role of the media, lobby groups or public opinion has changed. [243] The hypotheses 5, 6 and 7 can therefore be confirmed.

Thence, it appears that the bureaucratic-political model has not changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War. The only significant change in actors is the rise of the EU as an influential actor in Dutch defense policy, as well as the contributions to UN missions after 1989, which in turn influenced defense policy as well. The model can be 'updated' as follows:

7.2 Developments shaping Defense policy since 1989

In addition, several developments can be identified from the chronological descriptions on defense policy so far, which have influenced the actors that have determined defense policy from 1989 until 2007. First, the **collapse of the Soviet Union** led to the rise of 'new' threats, emanating from hostile regimes and fragile states. Second, **NATO reform** from a relatively static organization to a more mobile expeditionary force led to a reconsideration of current Dutch armed forces materiel capabilities and demands. Third, **experiences from missions** such as UNTAC and UNPROFOR influenced defense policy, by creating problems for the defense staff on the use of conscripts abroad. Fourth, these **political considerations** further influenced the defense policy, in this case for example by allowing the transformation of the armed forces from a conscripted force into a fully volunteering force. Fifth, the **specific structure of the three force components** sorted the effect that not every force component had to drastically change it doctrines and materiels. This structure therefore can be considered as an influential development as well. Moreover, **experiences from missions** such as KFOR and SFOR influenced defense policy from 1999-2003. In addition, defense policy was influenced by the **political considerations** that another 375 Million Guilders had to be saved on defense expenditures, because of an **economic decline**. This is in line with the experiences from the strategic future debate, in which the public was allowed to comment on Dutch defense policy, although this debate round this did not lead to any drastic policy changes in the White Paper of 2000. Moreover, the influence of the **three force components** could be seen as well with the application of the 'cheese-slicer-method', with their **institutional will to survive**. In 2001, **international terrorism** and the American-led 'Global War on Terror' led to a significant change in the security landscape. However, **political hesitation** on the full contribution on the American invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq led to support of peacekeeping or enforcement missions that are organized by NATO or EU. The growing **military and political cooperation** can be seen in growing contributions of the Dutch armed forces in **European** or NATO-led 'out-of-area' operations.

The specific developments have been divided in two categories. First, developments which influence the demand side on defense policy, and that are related to the international environment model, can be found on the left side of the model. Second, developments which have influenced the supply side on defense policy and that can be related to the internal environment model have been put on the right side.

7.3 Conclusion sub-question 1

In sum, the first sub-question in this study 'Which actors and developments have influenced the Dutch armed forces force composition since the end of the Cold War?' has used the model from Van der Hoogen[244] to elaborate on the specific actors and developments which have influenced defence policy from 1989 to 2003. It appears, despite the changing security perceptions since 1989, that the model from 1987 has not changed dramatically, since only the EU and UN with new military interventions and European Defence Initiatives have shown an increase of power on the demand side of the model.

When developments within the international and national political-military environment are taken into account and applied within the bureaucratic-political model, it appears that developments in the international environment influence Dutch defence policy the most. Specifically, the threats that arise from this international political-military environment influence defence policy via international organizations such as NATO and EU in their actions. Because of the membership and integration of the armed forces in these organisations, defence policy is dependent on the actions from these organizations. A third major influence over defense policy appears to come from the experiences from missions, which in turn influence future defense policy decisions, as well as the armed forces composition.

7.4 Threats for the Dutch armed forces

In order to verify the hypotheses which have been formulated in the theoretical framework, the findings from subquestion two will be compared with the hypotheses that have been based upon the study from the Ministry of Defence in 2004.[245]

Hypothesis 8: future threats will be marked by the growing complexity in the world

First, the described growing complexity in the world by the Ministry of Defense focused on different types of conflicts that do not have a single solution or warring party. From the literature study, the first 'threat' that has been identified is the 'negative effects from globalisation', which focused on this growing complexity as well: '[...] due to the rising global complexity, since the increasing complexity of networks creates new problems: one policy intervention has a substantial influence on processes on the other side of the globe' (p.) Moreover, negative effects from globalisation appear to be related to conflict areas as well. Therefore, hypothesis 8 can be verified.

Hypothesis 9: future conflicts will come from the spread and development of technology
Hypothesis 10: future conflicts will come from the scarcity of resources and water
Hypothesis 11: future conflicts will come from the collapse of state structures due to failing governance

Second, according to the Ministry of Defense in 2004, future conflicts would come from the spread and development of new technology, a lack of water and natural resources as well as suitable governance structures. In the literature study, several related threats to these topics have been found as well. These are 'energy and scarce resources', 'non-proliferation' and 'technical progress', which all focus on various described aspects which have been found by the Ministry of Defense as well. For example, the literature study notes: 'Competition over scarce resources could pose a significant threat in the future in terms of increasing tensions between countries in political and even military conflict.' (p.), whereas the 2004 study from the MoD mentions scarce water and

resources as one of the most important factors which will cause conflict. (MoD, 2004, p.6) All three hypotheses can therefore be verified.

Hypothesis 12: catalysts in conflict are ethnicity and religious extremism

Third, in the literature study, religious extremism and ethnicity are seen as possible drivers of conflict as well. This is described under the cluster of 'radicalisation', in which the same subdivision has been made as the MoD study does: identity and ethnicity struggles and religious extremism. It should be noted that the literature study frequently found that religious extremism was related to Salafism, the extremist Islamist religion. This hypothesis can therefore be verified as well.

Hypothesis 13: effects from these conflicts are increased migration, organized crime, drug and human trafficking

Fourth, this hypothesis can be confirmed. Specifically, the literature study mentions these threats as well in the clusters 'demographic issues' and 'networks', which describe the expected growth if increased migration, organized crime and and illegal trade.

Hypothesis 14: international institutions (UN, NATO, EU) are not working efficiently due to their decision making structures
Hypothesis 15: an increasing trend towards regionalism can be identified

Fifth, the literature study has identified the same threats as well in the clusters 'hampering international institutions' and 'international power blocks'. More specifically, within the literature study these clusters are mentioned in relation to each other as well. Therefore, hypotheses 14 and 15 can be confirmed as well.

Hypothesis 16: growth of non-state actors in conflict areas

Sixth, the cluster 'networks' in the literature study covers the growth of non-state actors such as NGO's, TNC's and other related non-state actors as well. This hypothesis can therefore be confirmed.

Hypothesis 17: possibility of a terrorist attack in the Netherlands is expected to increase

Seventh, the MoD expects that the threat from a possible terrorist attack will increase, due to to the continued friendly ties with the American government. Within the literature, terrorism in general is mentioned frequently as a separate source of potential threats. This is because of the American Global War on Terror and the fact that most sources in the literature study are from the post 9-11 era. Most sources acknowledge that a combination of illegal trade, crime networks, increasing unequal income and the lack of state control could be a fruitful ground for extremism and terrorism focused against Western countries, but also within countries itself. Although no direct relation was laid in the literature study with the increased possibility of a terrorist attack in the Netherlands, the hypothesis can be confirmed. This is because the sources in this study have not explicitly focused on the Netherlands, while it is stated that within countries in the western world the growth of a terrorist attack could

increase.

Hypothesis 18: growth of Chinese and Indian economic and military strength

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The MoD expects that an increase of power of China and India will lead to an increased possibility of conflicts in this region. The literature study however, does not see such a direct relationship, but is somewhat more nuanced since it takes more explicitly account of the internal struggles within China and India such as pollution or tension between different ethnic groups: '[...] critics point out that the great economic expectations of these countries could also pose a significant threat in case of a sudden political or economic collapse, since over the last two decades the economic growth in these countries has been relatively high and negative effects from this growth are increasingly putting pressure on the current system that has been created.' However, although the literature study sees the future a bit more open ended, the hypothesis should not be rejected.

However, it appears that some threats which have been identified in the literature study, not have been identified by the study from the Ministry of Defence in 2004. These threats will be now be discussed. First, 'democracy and democratisation' has been identified in the literature study as an explicit threat. Although this cluster was relatively small, the democratisation process which takes place in many developing countries comes with insecurity within a country. For this reason the democratisation process is seen as a possible threat. Nevertheless, this threat is not an explicit threat for the Dutch armed forces and therefore does not lead to any drastic different conclusion in this study.

Second, the identification of the growth of income disparity in the world as a threat for the Netherlands is mostly because it can be regarded as a potential source of conflict in the developing world through the mechanism of frustration and radicalisation. Nevertheless, although the MoD has not explicitly identified this threat, it can be labelled under the already identified threats in the hypothesis, since the mechanism of frustration and radicalisation are related to failing states and migration.

Third, the MoD study does not take account of any environmental issues, while the literature study expects that environmental degradation could lead to additional requests for humanitarian aid for the Netherlands and the armed forces specifically. This issue has come somewhat more in the public sphere over the last four years, which could explain why many sources in the literature study do mention environmental degradation as a possible threat.

Fourth, the MoD study does not pay attention to rogue states. This could be explained by the lack of direct relation these states have with the Netherlands, since most international tensions on these states are mediated through bigger countries. Since the literature study has dealt with various studies from various countries and regions over the world, the threat from rogue states is therefore more frequently mentioned since these countries are most likely more exposed to these rogue states, for example the US or China.

7.5 Conclusion sub-question 2
The second sub-question 'What are threats that influence the security environment for the Netherlands?' explores possible threats in order to develop insight in what is currently perceived to be the most likely future security environment in which the Dutch armed forces will have to operate the next two decades. From this process, identified threats for the Netherlands are: negative effects from globalisation, demographic issues, energy and scarce resources, hampering international institutions, non-proliferation, democracy and democratization,

international power blocks and old and new major powers, radicalisation, polarisation or growth of income disparity, technical progress, greenhouse effect or environmental degradation, rogue states, failing states and the growing influence and power of networks.

Moreover, it appeared that some threats that have not been found by the MoD in 2004 are rogue states, environmental degradation, growth of income disparity and democratization. The explanation for the change in findings comes from the time difference between the two studies, differences in definitions and a different scope of analysis on the subjects researched. Nevertheless, the inconsistencies found between the two studies do not carry severe implications on the future tasks of the Dutch armed forces.

7.6 Policy responses by the Ministry of Defense

In order to verify the hypotheses which have been formulated in the theoretical framework, the findings from subquestion three will be compared with the hypotheses stated.

> Hypothesis 19: future role of armed forces should be marked by flexibility in performance

As described in sub-question three, the future of the armed forces can be described as a force capable of executing a great variety of missions in any region in the world. More specifically, because of the relation of the Netherlands in NATO, EU and UN, as well as the close relationship with the United States, it can be assumed that the Dutch armed forces should be capable of these tasks indeed. However, the question on whether the Netherlands wants to fight at the highest violence level in the military spectrum remains a political decision since other countries which are as close embedded in these multinational organizations, such as Canada, have made the decision to focus on other skills that are needed in order to address specific threats in the world. Thence, this decision remains dependent on the ambition level of the Netherlands and the goals set in its foreign policy, since the frequently mentioned reason for having a relatively expensive small scale military organization is that it provides 'a seat around the table' on international negotiations. [246] Therefore, this hypothesis can be confirmed, although it requires the pre-ambule that states: 'In case the House of Representatives wants to maintain the current ambition level...'

> Hypothesis 20: future role of armed forces should be marked by expeditionary skills
> Hypothesis 21: future role of armed forces should be marked by the capability to perform any operation together with other units, persons or organizations.

The MoD argues that the need to respond more quickly to crises in any part of the world has grown, expeditionary and 'joint' skills are needed. From the description in sub-question three, this appears to be true. In order to be able to exercise missions in countries which are relatively far away compared to the threats from before 1989, the capacity of having a self-sufficient force that is flexible in its operations through 'joint' performance in a conflict area does have many advantages. Not only in military conflicts, but also in disaster mitigation in which the logistical means of the military are frequently very much welcomed. Therefore, these hypotheses can be confirmed, but again with the remarks that states that it remains a political decision to have a force with expeditionary skills.

7.7 Conclusion subquestion 3

In effect, the third sub-question 'What are current policy responses of the Ministry of Defence in response to new threats and changing operational demands?' can be answered in the following way. First, one effect is that current missions of the Dutch armed forces have become 'wars by choice', which are based solely on political decisions on the use of force, instead of 'wars by necessity' in which no other option was left in order to reverse what has been done in a conflict. Second, the relative decline of power of the current international organizations UN, NATO and EU, has the effect that future operations will be formed in ad hoc coalitions serving specific states' interests. These interests are not only dependent on geographical distances, but merely on the effect of the perceived threat on the interests of a specific country. Since these perceptions and interests vary from country to country, the growth of regional and ad-hoc coalitions in order to reach a specific goal appears to be a relatively logical step. A third effect is that the changed theater of operations has changed from calculable models into an environment whereby highly diversified threats create a highly flexible and constantly changing environment. This is because in a missions area, many identified threats from sub-question two are combined in one geographical location, while each threats requires specific strategies, materiel and means in order to address these threats in an effective manner.

In addition, several policy responses to these effects have been identified. Because every new mission will be a tailor-made job, the Dutch defense is currently developing and experimenting with integrated units, which can be composed from different force components in such a way that they are tailor-made for the specific requirements of the mission. This is done by an increasing focus on expeditionary warfare and network enabled capabilities in the battlefield. Moreover, via a process of explicit operationalization of possible future tasks and required means, specific requirements per task and mission on a force component can now be identified. In addition, the defence products and the materiel acquisition process has to be made suitable to develop multi-usable weapon systems and equipment pieces. This reform process is a very complex because materiel defence planning is dependent on long term needs and capabilities, thereby involving many considerations and parties which lead to a slowdown of the acquisition process. Therefore, the DMO has developed the Fast Procurement Track which helps to address direct needs from a mission area more quickly. Nevertheless, these policy responses remain a complicated exercise due to the many actors and developments involved, whereby the Ministry of Defence is balancing between the need for direct availability of materiel in missions and retaining a consistently credible military posture over time.

To summarize, for a number of the identified threats, the Dutch armed forces can be a suitable policy instrument to address these threats. Therefore, from the description on how the Dutch armed forces can develop itself into an organization which is capable of addressing these diverse threats in a suitable manner, it can be concluded that the Dutch armed forces are quite far in the military reforms and the adaption of new concepts and doctrines. Nevertheless, the question on whether a specific threat for the Netherlands should be addressed by the military remains a political issue (and therefore dependent on external decisions made in multinational organizations and/or powerful countries such as the United States), but in the cases that are relied upon the military apparatus, the armed forces are be capable of coping with a variety of challenges.

9 Implications

The main question of this study 'How have the Dutch armed forces responded to changing security environments?' can be answered in the following way: the Dutch armed forces have responded to changing security perceptions with a thorough reform of funds, assets and manpower from an organisation ready to stop a full scale Russian invasion to a small-scale, high tech, well trained and mobile force capable of addressing a great diversity of threats around the world.

However, the price of reforms can be questioned compared to its revenues. More specifically, these decisions on reforming the military are embedded in a more widespread framework of political ambitions in international relations of the Netherlands. Currently, the status of the military, as well as a variety of other instruments such as development aid, provides the Dutch politics space to negotiate or to speak out its opinion in specific international affairs. Nevertheless, the question remains whether it is efficient to have such an expensive military organization for such a small country in order to be able to exert some influence in the world. Although it might be frequently mentioned that the Netherlands is dependent on international stability for its economic dependence on international trade networks, there are other ways to provide stability in the world.

In addition, it might be questioned whether the armed forces that the Netherlands currently has, is the most cost-efficient policy instrument in mitigating the earlier mentioned wide variety of threats. This is because the majority of identified threats such as demographic issues, scarce resources, hampering international institutions, non-proliferation, radicalisation, growth of income disparity, environmental degradation and failing states can be addressed in a variety of ways, which all contribute to the stability in the world. This can for example be done by investing more heavily in development aid and military capabilities to cooperate with aid organizations. That way, regions that are suffering from natural disasters can be helped more effectively. Another example can be by investing more heavily in good governance structures and multilateral aid programmes from the UN or EU which also help to stabilize a failing state.

More specifically, for a small country like the Netherlands with limited capabilities in financial and personnel resources it would be advisable to conceptualize a more focused idea on how to allocate its limited resources in such a way, that they become more effective in the long term. This is because many of the identified threats will require a long term investment in order to be alleviated, while with the current frequently changing security perceptions, one runs the risk of developing a short term and ad-hoc focused policy.[247] More specifically, as mentioned in this study, the decision on which threats should be addressed will be based on the perception on which threat is perceived to endanger Dutch interests the most. When the capacities of the armed forces are used in a security policy that is based on a frequently changing threat perception, the defence organization runs the risk of 'addressing' each threat with limited effort for a relatively short period of time.[248] In effect, policy responses from the Ministry of Defence over the last few years have been separate reactions from the Ministry of Defence to international developments or commitments to NATO, UN or EU.[249]

More specifically, some welcome efforts have been made in this direction, such as the policy paper '*Reconstruction after armed conflict*' of the Ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs and Economic Affairs in 2005 and the adaption of the Defence, Diplomacy and development concept within the Ministry of Defence. Although these efforts are very much welcome, it would be wise to strive for the development of an explicit vision, concept or idea in which separate policy instruments such as diplomacy, development aid, economic measures, humanitarian assistance and military contributions have been merged together.[250] Based on this vision, the role and position of the armed forces can accordingly be determined more concretely in relation to other policy instruments. For example, a more comprehensive framework will allow policy makers and politicians to set

indicators for specific requirements of the role of the Dutch armed forces in a mission area.

Moreover, a specific role outline of the armed forces helps to improve policy responses since the framework in which they are made will become more clearly outlined.[251] For example, although the DMO argues that fast-track procedures can be used, with the clear understanding that it constitutes an exceptional situation, there exists no coherent vision on what is to be done with products bought via the Fast Track Procurement such as the Bushmaster after the mission in Afghanistan.[252] Therefore, a specific role profile for the Dutch armed forces will help to identify the materiel products that are needed in response to specific threats, as well to underscore specific measures which are needed to adequately perform on the politically required level. That way, the 'lack of proper motivation of means which makes the armed forces vulnerable for further financial attacks' as stated on page two, will be addressed as well.

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