Imagining the European Union
A geo-historical overview of dominant metaphors on the EU’s political geography

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Summary

In this thesis, I analyse and review dominant metaphors on the European Union’s political geographical nature. Since the establishment of the ECSC, scholars, politicians, EU-bureaucrats and the media have been trying to name and describe the nature of this unidentified political object. I focus especially on the EU’s territory, which has been constructed, conceptualized and imagined. The so-called agents of European consciousness have given meaning to the political territory of the European project. During the past 60 years, territorial transformations have been intensive in Europe. Many different metaphors have therefore been used to describe the EU’s nature. Commonly used metaphors are the United States of Europe, Europe of the regions, new medieval Europe, fortress Europe, and Europe as an empire. I explain and review these metaphors in this thesis; moreover, I show that they have all been constructed within their own social, economic and political circumstances, and that they are part of a broader development of thinking about the project Europe. Since the establishment of the ECSC, the project Europe has been evolving towards a state at the European level: a United States of Europe. The European integration process has therefore been characterized by an aim to weaken the position of the member states and to erase national borders. The European Commission therefore increasingly focused on regions during the 1980s and 1990s, and the European project was therefore often described as a Europe of the regions or a new medieval Europe. The creation of a common market with economic and social cohesion was followed by acts and policies to demarcate, border and protect the common European space. This has inspired scholars, politicians, the media and artists to describe the EU as a fortress Europe. Especially scholars have conceptualized the EU’s attempts to govern external territories, in order the keep its own internal space safe and stable, as a Europe as an empire. The metaphors are thus not isolated concepts but part of a development of constructing and naming the European project in which the project seems to evolve towards a replication of the nation-state.

After the Second World War, the European continent became divided by the Iron Curtain. In Western Europe, the political leaders saw a replacement of the traditional system of relations among European states by new federal arrangements as the only ‘rational’ option for the future of their own countries. They saw a United States of Europe as the final stage of the European integration process. France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands therefore established the ECSC, which was an economic alliance that had the aim to make conflict between them impossible; moreover, they saw this as the beginning of the creation of a European federal polity. There were nevertheless both supporters of a federal and an intergovernmental polity within the Community. Especially the UK, who joined the EEC in 1973, favoured an intergovernmental Europe instead of a United States of Europe. This hampered the integration process during the 1970s and caused discussions whether ‘deepening’ of the Community structures was desirable. Several successful steps towards the creation of a European state have nevertheless been made, such as the creation of the European Monetary Union and the signing of the Single European Act. Even today, with the recent ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon, the United States of Europe still seems to be a relevant metaphor. The EU has nevertheless not (yet) become a federal polity and it was especially in the first decades after the Second World War overenthusiastic and utopian to think that the European continent could become a United States of Europe on short notice.
Because the European project was (and is) evolving towards a replication of the nation-state, a single market was created and the Commission promoted economic and social cohesion within the Community. The Commission’s regional policy became an increasingly more important policy area that supported regions and cross-border activities. Regional governments increasingly invested in direct links with the European institutions in order to influence European decision-making. The subnational level became as a result Europeanized and the Community became in a way regionalized. Especially regional governments, politicians and Commission officials therefore described the European project as a Europe of the regions: a European federation of regions instead of states. Many scholars rather criticized this metaphor for being utopian and unrealistic. The metaphor is also problematic because it assumes a replacement of states by regions as fixed units of geographical space with a clear inside/outside division.

Several scholars preferred to describe the project Europe as a new medieval Europe in the 1980s and 1990s. Those scholars used the political order of the Middle Ages, a system of overlapping authority and multiple loyalty, as background for the diagnostic of changes in the EU’s political geography. They focused on the fragmentation of national territory, the challenging of traditional territorial ‘levels’ and the blurring of the distinction between ‘internal’ and ‘external’. New medieval Europe describes a partial and selective ‘unbundling’ of sovereignty as a result of partial and selective ceding and pooling of authority and policies between the regional, national, and European level. Although the concept itself is somewhat vague, most writings on this metaphor shed an interesting light on the complexity of the territoriality within the Community.

Triggered by the progressing creation of a common market and the successful abolition of internal border controls, concerns about the safety of the Union raised in the 1990s. This resulted in a focus on the controls at the external borders of the EU in order to reduce unwanted migration. Scholars, politicians, media, and artists commonly used the fortress Europe metaphor to describe the EU’s restrictive immigration and asylum policy, and the policing of its external borders. This metaphor is, to some extent, useful because it is able to show that fears of uncontrolled migration can make the creation of hard borders and a restrictive immigration and asylum policy legitimate, this is the so-called ‘fortress rhetoric’. The metaphor is nevertheless somewhat misleading, especially in its traditional and literal meaning. The EU is not simply a traditional fortress with walls and towers, but excludes unwanted migrants with physical borders, hardware, immigration laws, asylum and visa rules, and internal surveillance. Moreover, the fortress Europe metaphor implies a closed and inward-looking Union, however, its external borders are not completely closed.

The Europe as an empire metaphor also emphasizes on the EU’s external dimensions, however in a different way. The metaphor conceptualizes the relationship between the EU and applicant members and its surrounding states. The metaphor describes that the authority of the EU does not stop at its own external borders and that its borders thus not have a sharp inside/outside distinction. This metaphor conceptualizes the EU’s relationship with surrounding states as asymmetrical, because it attempts to govern non-EU countries in order to export its own stability, security and prosperity. The metaphor is well able to describe the imbalance of power between the EU and applicant states.

The fortress Europe metaphor describes that the EU’s external borders have become hard and closed, while the Europe as an empire metaphor on the contrary describes that the EU is rather becoming a ‘maze Europe’ with soft and flux external borders that are less territorial, less physical
and less visible. In fact, they are in a sense both right. The recent enlargements, the European Neighbourhood Policy and the EU’s contemporary immigration and asylum policy, which all have the aim to keep the internal territory safe and stable, result in the paradoxical tendency that its borders are getting both more and less territorial, physical and visible.

Because the process of naming the European project is an ongoing process that continues into the future, it is to be expected that the current economic and financial crisis brings about new metaphors. The current circumstances could encourage protectionist economic policies and result in a re-invention of fortress Europe. However, it is also likely that the Union will broadens its liberal foreign economic policies and become a lighthouse of liberal foreign economic policies. Moreover, in another, more unlikely scenario, some members might break away from the Union. In anyway, the naming of the Union continuous and new metaphors will be constructed.
Preface

During my studies in Human Geography, I became fascinated with the European Union. The EU is a social, economic and political fact of life for my own generation of students. I have grown up with the European Union, the European Commission, and the European Parliament, and I have accepted them as part of the contemporary world. During my life, the European continent has been reunited and the EU has evolved towards the current deeply integrated Union of 27 members. Within this polity, not only the border between east and west has vanished. For my whole life, I have been living just a few kilometers from the German border and I have thus seen this border changing. Physical borders and border controls clearly demarcated the distinction between the Netherlands and Germany when I was a child. These borders have been removed and the division between the two countries has blurred. There have been many more events throughout my life that show the creation of a European project, for example the completion of the single market, the introduction of the Euro, and the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. This has inspired me to write my thesis on metaphors that describe the nature of the European Union.

This thesis marks the end of my master studies in Human Geography at the Radboud University. I started the master programme in the autumn of 2007 with a semester at the University of Bergen, where I took courses in European politics and globalization. When I came back in Nijmegen, I took the obligatory courses for my master programme and wrote the research proposal for this thesis. In the beginning of 2009, I left for Brussels to do my internship at the European Parliament. After this great experience, I returned to Nijmegen and wrote this thesis in the summer and autumn of 2009.

I wish to express my greatest thanks to my supervisor dr. Henk van Houtum for giving me very valuable and constructive feedback on early drafts of this thesis. Moreover, I want to thank him for his suggestion of the thesis topic and for his interest in my internship.

Finally, I would like to direct my warmest thanks to my parents for always supporting me. Their support was especially important in fulfilling my wish to study in Bergen and to do my internship in Brussels. *Heel erg bedankt!*

Thomas Thijs de Jager

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1 Introduction

The satellite photo on this page shows Europe without human influence. It is an image of Europe without borders, demarcated spatial units and meaning. The European Union has demarcated a part of the continent Europe. EU-bureaucrats, politicians, scholars and the media give meaning to this space. In a view from space on Europe, this demarcation and meaning are not visible and thus non-existing. They are thus imagined and constructed by humans who use metaphors and concepts to describe these constructed shapes and meanings. Both the shape and meaning of the EU have been changing since the creation of the first European community. In this thesis, I will show that the metaphors and concepts that conceptualize the meaning of this Union do not describe a universal, comprehensive and timeless truth of what the EU is. They are instead perspectives on the EU that are part of a broader development of thinking about the project Europe.
1.1 The unidentified political object that is the European Union?

The European Union is an ‘unidentified political object’. This is how Jacques Delors once described the EU (Drake, 2000: 24). Although this description of the EU seems to be vague and meaningless at a first glance, Delors is absolutely right. As Diez (1999) explains, the European Union can be compared with an unknown animal and students of the subject with zoologists who explore the nature of the beast. They classify and categorize, they put the Union into the frameworks of political, economic, geographical, cultural and anthropological knowledge. Although there is much effort to name this unknown beast, categorising, classifying and describing the nature of the EU is and will always be problematic. Most students of Europe agree that the EU is not a state; however, the EU can neither be characterized as a traditional intergovernmental or international organization (Sidaway, 2006: 2).

The most problematic is the European Union itself, because it is not a neutral reality. The European Union is on the contrary a ‘contested concept’ that does not have a fixed meaning. This is how the EU should be understood, because it cannot be known outside a discourse (Diez, 1999: 602). Michael Foucault explains a discourse as ‘a violence which we do to things, or in any as a practise which we impose on them’ (Foucault, 1984: 127). This means that the European Union cannot have a fixed and universal meaning, because ‘we’ impose meaning from a subject position that is the result of the discursive context in which we are situated (Foucault, 1991: 58).

My focus, as a student of the political geography of Europe, is on the EU’s territory; a territory that has expanded and changed much and that ‘we’ construct, conceptualize and imagine. I do not understand the EU as merely a description of a group of neighbouring nation-states or the simple description of the final state of an integration process. I rather understand the EU in terms of the ‘Europeanization’ of Europe. This idea seeks to position Europe as an actual way of thinking about culture and territory (see also McNeill, 2004: 6). It thus understands Europe as something that operates discursively and symbolically, imagined by politicians, bureaucrats and ordinary people (McNeill, 2004: 33). I therefore define ‘Europeanization’ as the construction of an idea of the European Union by the creation of institutions, policies, maps, texts and symbols.

Approaching the study of the European Union from the idea of the Europeanization of Europe means that we recognize that spaces are not pre-existent but imagined, socially constructed, and endlessly represented and consumed (see also McNeill, 2004). ‘Europe’ has thus no pre-existent and fixed territory, borders and meaning, neither is the ‘European Union’ a neutral title. This name should rather be understood as part of a naming process in which politicians and officials are giving social meaning to a certain political territory. Europe is thus constructed, built or created day by day. In fact, Europe is being Europeanized in a process in which different actors try to influence this Europeanization, some by pushing it forward others by resisting it (McNeill, 2004: 9). Like the nation, which is an ‘imagined construct’, the EU can also be understood as a creation or a fabrication. This makes the EU an invention that involves the internalization of its citizens. The term EU has become an equivalent of the construction of a state on the European level (Boedeltje and van Houtum, 2008: 362). The ‘European idea’ is becoming accepted and aware by the work of ‘agents of European

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1 Jacques Delors is a former President of the European Commission who served two terms between 1985 and 1995. In a speech to the inaugural session of the Intergovernmental Conference in Luxembourg on 9 September 1985, Delors said: ‘For we must face the fact that in 30 or 40 years Europe will constitute a UPO—a sort of unidentified political object...’
consciousness’ (Shore, 2000: 26). These agents of European consciousness can be both human and material objects and actors. Actors, actions, artefacts, bodies, institutions, policies and representations form a set of agents that are part of the Europeanization of Europe and that re-order the scales of governance (Shore, 2000: 26). This process always reflects asymmetrical power relations in the sense that some actors are more actively involved in the production of space and scale, in this case Europe, while most people are consuming and reproducing them (Paasi, 2001: 13). ‘Especially politicians, business people, actors operating in governance and media, teachers, and researchers are usually in a crucial position in defining, giving shape and meanings to space’ (Paasi, 2001: 13).

Lila Leontidou (2004) sheds an interesting light on the continent Europe. She explains that Europe has never been a clearly demarcated continent or a fixed bordered entity. The notion of ‘Europe’ is rather flexible and has been culturally constructed through ages (Leontidou, 2004: 594). Although there is often referred to Europe as a continent, it has never been a demarcated spatial entity like Africa, Australia and the America’s. She shows that Europe has always been characterized by shifting spatialities that involves the shifts of Europe’s internal and external borders and the interaction of hard and soft borders around spatial units of several scales (Leontidou, 2004: 594). She shows for example how the Mediterranean, that once were the core of Europe and the sea that once was a bridge of civilizations between Europe and Africa, became a European periphery and a border (Leontidou, 2004: 595-603). Because Europe’s narratives and related borderings are flexible and variable, scholars of Europe should have an anti-essentialist attitude to Europe and ‘Europeanness’ (Leontidou, 2004: 611). In her understanding of ontology, ‘spatialities are constellations of relation and meaning’ (Leontidou, 2004: 612). This means that Europe is actively constructed by geographical imaginations. This does however not mean that Europe simply is what you choose it to be. Europe should rather be analysed as ‘an intersubjective cultural and political construct, which has materialized according to political circumstance, power relations, geopolitics, and cultures in a period’ (Leontidou, 2004: 612).

Territorial structures thus have meanings associated with them. Both these structures and the meanings are made by human action. They change over time and therefore reflect the continuous regional transformations of economic, political, administrative, and cultural practices and discourses (Paasi, 2005: 580). Especially in Europe have territorial transformations been intensive. They have been most dramatic since the 1970s. The changing face of capitalism and the changed relations between national economies and the international market was attended with a reorganization of geographical scale. This shows that these scales are products of social activity and struggle instead of neutral givens (Paasi, 2001: 7-8).

Paasi (2001) makes a three-part division of geographical perspectives on what Europe is. ‘Europe as an experience’ refers to Europe as a specific idea or socio-spatial experience. This experience changes over time and each generation will therefore find its own Europe. The ‘European experience’ is also nation-bound, and a common experience is therefore missing (Paasi, 2001: 9-11). The ‘institutional Europe’ is an image of Europe based on the European Union. It is a Europe defined through institutional structures that constitute European economic and cultural integration (Paasi, 2001: 11-12). ‘Europe as a structure’ refers to Europe as a physical and human geographical entity. Because there has been a variety of spatial imaginations among scholars and predominantly geographers, the knowledge (maps) produced about the European structure is divers (Paasi, 2001: 12-13). This division shows that the EU is just a perspective on what Europe is. Europe and the
European Union are thus not the same. The political entity the European Union, constructed by the bordering, disciplining and normalizing of Europe, is not what Europe is, but rather a vision of Europe (Boedeltje and van Houtum, 2008: 363). Agnew (2005) explains this as the difference between Europe as an ‘idea’ and Europe as a ‘project’ (Agnew, 2005: 578). The former refers to Europe as a geographical entity. This means that the borders of Europe can be definitively recognized and defined (though this is in contradiction with Leontidou’s understanding of the European continent). The latter refers to the European project that began after the Second World War (Agnew, 2005: 578). Monnet, Schuman, De Gasperi and Adenauer started the project to break down the boundaries between the European states. These ‘founding fathers’ of the European Union were not concerned with the question of where Europe began and ended. They were neither concerned with the question of which states were naturals for the project according to their relative location and which were not. It was a geographically open project with ideological and institutional goals (Agnew, 2005: 578). Recently, the previously divided Europe came to overlap with the territorially more complicated EU (Agnew, 2005: 579).

The project Europe can merely rely on its process. This means that the idea of Europe has an intrinsic openness and cannot be understood with a definite beginning or end (see also Boedeltje and van Houtum, 2008: 364). What we nowadays understand as Europe differs from the Europe of the 1980s and probably from the Europe of 2020s. After five decades of nonstop theorizing about European integration, scholars are still concerned with the question of what exactly the EU is and what it may comes to resemble in the future (Sidaway, 2006: 4). Indeed as Delors framed it, the European Union is an unidentified political and geographical object. It is lacking any one geographical or political grand theory. This makes it difficult to grasp what Europe really is. Although the European Union has a relatively short history, many authors have attempted to create representations of the supposed spatial continuity of this entity and its identity (Paasi, 2001: 8). I believe that the question of what the EU exactly is will however stay at the forefront of academic debates, because the unknown animal remains a process of becoming, a construction with no pre-designated end-point.

In this research, I am interested in this process of understanding the project Europe. More concretely, I am interested in the imaginations, representations and constructions of Europe that have existed from the moment that the founding fathers of the European Union established the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 to the present European Union which aims to construct itself as a polity with nation-state characteristics. My research will thus explore the shifting discourses on the political geography of the European Union.

1.2 Central goal
As discussed in the previous paragraph, the European Union is a social construct and a process of becoming. EU-bureaucrats, politicians, scholars and the media construct the meaning of the EU (see also McNeill, 2004). In this thesis, I want to show that definitions, concepts, metaphors and paradigms of the EU’s spatialities are always imaginations and representations. Moreover, I want to prove that dominant discourses on the political geography of the European Union are variable. I thus want to show that they do not represent the nature of the European Union in the long run or even the EU’s end-point; they are rather part of a development in which agents of European
consciousness try to give the project Europe meaning. It is my objective to show that metaphors are not a universal and comprehensive description of the EU, but rather a perspective. Moreover, I want to show that they can be contextualized in a broader development of European integration. I therefore define the objective of this research project as:

The objective of this research project is to analyse and review the imaginations and representations of the European Union’s political geography by providing a geo-historical overview of the dominant metaphors on the European Union’s political geographical nature and by showing that they are part of a broader development of thinking about the project Europe.

It is thus not my intention to join the debate on how the European Union should be defined in the sense that I will not end this thesis with a one-dimensional definition of what the EU is. On the contrary, I have the aim to show with my research that dominant discourses on the political geography of the EU, and the metaphors used in these discourses, represent an understanding of the project Europe in their social, economic and political circumstances and that they are therefore not capable of defining the EU in the long run. The European Commission nowadays conceptualizes the EU as a demarcated area with a clear inside and outside, surrounded by a ‘ring of friends’.

2 See for example the EU-strategy paper (2003) ‘Wider Europe— Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours’ that refers to the post-enlargement territory as a clearly demarcated space, using language such as ‘within and beyond the new borders of the Union’ and uses the concept ‘ring of friends’ to refer to the EU aim to develop a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood.
1.3 Research questions

As I have explained above, I will make use of a geo-historical overview of dominant metaphors on the EU’s political geographical nature to analyse imaginations and representations of the EU and their variability. I therefore formulate the main question of this research as:

Which dominant metaphors on the EU’s political geography have there been since the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community until the present time and how do they represent a development in thinking about the project Europe?

I have formulated four sub-questions that will help me to explain and review the different dominant metaphors and to show that they are part of a broader development in thinking about the project Europe:

1. What are the characteristics of the different metaphors?
   In my research, I will distinguish different metaphors. This sub-question refers to the description of their characteristics. Such a description contains the way of thinking about territoriality and borders of the project Europe in a particular discourse. I will explain how EU-bureaucrats, politicians, scholars and the media construct metaphors on the EU’s political geography by describing their statements and descriptions, but also by describing the institutions, policies, maps and cartoons they have created.

2. How do the metaphors fit their own social, economic and political circumstances?
   This sub-question has the aim to reflect on the social, economic and political circumstances in which the metaphors represent a way of thinking about the EU’s political geography. I will show in this research that the metaphors fit the social, political and economic circumstances of their time and that changes in these circumstances can bring about new ways of thinking.

3. How does a particular metaphor react on or stem from previous dominant metaphors?
   Like the second sub-question, this question has the aim to prove that the different dominant metaphors do not emerge spontaneously. I will therefore pay attention to the linkages between different metaphors, by showing how one reacts on or stems from a previous way of thinking. By so doing, I will show that the metaphors are not isolated concepts, but that they fit in a broader development of thinking about the project Europe. Because this thinking changes over time, the metaphors that describe the EU’s political geography become outdated at a certain point and agents of European consciousness construct new metaphors to describe the new realities.

4. What are the main advantages and disadvantages of every metaphor?
   This research question has the aim to review the metaphors discussed in this thesis. I will thus explain for every metaphor whether it is an appropriate and adequate conceptualization of the EU’s political geographic nature within their own social, economic and political circumstances.
1.4 Social relevance

As Boedeltje and van Houtum (2008) analyse, the EU is now evolving towards a reproduction of the state by presenting itself as being one single space and by bordering, disciplining and normalizing itself with practices similar to those of nation-states (Boedeltje and van Houtum, 2008: 362-363). I have observed, especially in the Dutch media, that many people seem to dislike this development of the Europe project. They experience globalization and Europeanization as a threat to the nation state and their national and regional identities. They have the feeling that this supranational level imposes itself on them, even though they do not want this. Recent events and developments in my own country the Netherlands, such as the rejection of the Constitution of Europe in 2005 and the increase in nationalism after the murders on populist politician Fortuyn and film-maker Van Gogh, have shown an increase in ‘Euroscepticism’ (see also Boedeltje and van Houtum, 2008: 362). The last elections for the European Parliament, held on 4 June 2009, have shown a gain of eurosceptic and anti-European parties that want to return powers from Brussels or even plea for the breakup of the Union (Hadas-Lebel, 2009). An important social relevance of my research is that it can show the EU’s citizens that the European Union does not have to be a replication of the nation-state that imposes itself on them, because the European Union is a variable construction. Different scenarios for the future of the EU are thus possible. Instead of experiencing the EU as threat and therefore rejecting it, citizens could involve themselves in the process of constructing and giving meaning to the European project. After all, the European Union is not a pre-existing supranational level that imposes itself on its citizens, but a construction (see also McNeill, 2004).

Another social relevance of my research is that the knowledge that the EU’s territory and meaning are variable and constructed instead of fixed and pre-excising could enrich the public and political debates about the EU. Representations of the EU’s political geography are never the end point of the development of the Union and not part of a fixed path the EU has to take. I have observed that in the recent debates and discussions on the European Union, and especially those before the recent elections of the European Parliament, both politicians and ordinary people often speak about the EU’s territory as a fixed and taken for granted spatial unit. Probably the best example is the discussion whether Turkey should join the EU or not. Opponents of a Turkey’s membership used the argument that the country should not join, because the present border between the EU and Turkey has always been the border between Europe and Turkey. They thus assume that the EU/Europe has always been a fixed territory and that some countries therefore cannot belong to it. Awareness in public and political debates of the fact that every discourse on Europe is a construction would mean that they understand that there are different options for the EU’s political geography. If they would understand that every idea of the EU is a subjective way of thinking about its culture and territory, they would understand that its territorial shape and borders cannot be taken for granted. Every country could thus be a potential EU-member if we imagine it as European. Furthermore, the direction in which the EU is now evolving is not a necessary path it has to take and different ideas of Europe’s spatialities should be taken into account in these debates. Awareness in public and political

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3 See for example Peter van Dalen, Dutch member of the European Parliament for the ChristenUnie, who argued that Turkey should not become a member of the European Parliament because of its geographical location. He argued that Turkey is not European because 95 percent of its territory and its capital Ankara are located on the Asian continent (See also in Dutch: http://www.eufractie.nl/k/n9216/news/view/345940/62573/Van-Dalen-Turkije-hoort-niet-bij-de-Europese-Unie.html).
debates about the construction of the EU and the variability of its territory and meaning would therefore enrich the debates.

1.5 Scientific relevance
I am obviously not the first who explores political geographical representations and imaginations of Europe and the European Union. Prior texts on Europe and the EU as social constructs provide useful insights and points of departure. McNeill (2004) already discussed the imagination of European territory: Europe as an invention. Paasi (2001) showed that different images of Europe and different narratives on European identity imply different forms and conceptualizations of spatiality. Leontidou (2004) examined that the spatialities, territory and borders of Europe have shifted dramatically over several millennia. Europe has been rebounded several times and its borders are still being negotiated, shifting and expanding. Sidaway (2006) showed that there is little consensus about what the EU represents. He argues that, because of the enormous diversity in positions and views, we should not ask the question what the political geography of the EU governance is, but rather how this is constructed.

The main scientific relevance of my research is that it contributes to this stream of literature that understands Europe as a social and imagined construct. Building on the existing literature, I argue that an overview of the dominant metaphors on the EU’s political geography is needed. Although many have already proven that the EU is an imagined construct, such a geo-historical overview is still a missing element in the existing literature. My research fills this gap by distinguishing and contextualising different dominant imaginations of Europe’s political geography over time. It will thereby provide insights in the flexible and variable nature of the EU and contribute to the scientific debate on the EU’s nature.

1.6 Methodology
The geo-historical analysis of dominant metaphors on the European Union’s political geography that I make in this research is in some way what Michel Foucault calls a ‘genealogy’. Foucault (1977) explains the notion of genealogy in his article ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’. He begins this explanation with: ‘Genealogy is gray, meticulous and patiently documentary. It operates on a field of entangled and confused parchments, on documents that have been scratches over and recopied many times’ (Foucault, 1977: 139). Foucault describes genealogy as gray in contradiction to black or white, because it is not random or haphazard. Genealogy is rather a careful consideration of text, written and rewritten from multiple perspectives (see also Foucault, 1977: 139). In contradiction to ‘metahistory’, genealogy does not search for origins and does not presuppose a grand teleology (see also Foucault, 1977: 141). Foucault refers in his discussions of origins to Nietzsche’s work on genealogy. Nietzsche used the German words ‘ursprung’, ‘herkunft’, and ‘entstehung’ to refer to the source or origin of historical events. Crucial is the distinction between the meaning of ‘ursprung’, ‘herkunft’, and ‘entstehung’. The former refers to an ultimate origin, the latter two refer to a more immediate and contingent origin. According to Foucault, the proper objects of genealogical research are ‘herkunft’ and ‘entstehung’ (Foucault, 1977: 141-142).
For a genealogist, the present is not just the culmination of events that occurred in the past. The present is rather one of many events in a process that continues into the future. This means that the present in some way ‘emerged’ from the past, however, not in a fixed and frozen form. The forces at the origin are therefore ‘the endlessly repeated play of dominations’ (Foucault, 1977: 150). History is a conflict and struggle between weak and strong which is recorded in text. Foucault explains this process as: ‘humanity does not gradually progress from combat to combat until it arrives at universal reciprocity, where the rule of law finally replaces warfare; humanity installs each of its violences in a system of rules and thus proceeds from domination to domination’ (Foucault, 1977: 151). The development of humanity, through the eyes of the genealogist, is a series of interpretations. Genealogical research thus rejects the search for origins as a means of recovering truth and it challenges the idea that history merely consists of causes and effects. In fact, genealogy weakens the relation between the origin and following events (see also Foucault, 1977: 151).

Like the genealogist, I will approach the history of naming and imagining the EU’s political geography as a series of interpretations of what its territory, borders and identity are. I understand this history as a process without a clear origin and without an end-point. However, my approach in this research differs slightly from the genealogist approach. In contradiction to the genealogist, I will not pay much attention to the struggle of different discourses for domination in specific periods. I will thus not deconstruct the contemporary dominant imagination and representation of the EU by making a discourse analysis. My approach is rather to place imaginations and representations of the EU’s political geography in a geo-historical perspective to show that the contemporary dominant discourse is part of a process in which it ‘emerged’ in a non-fixed and non-frozen form from the past and continues into the future (see also Foucault, 1977: 150). In will thus primarily focus on the variability of different dominant discourse instead of the struggle for domination.

Moreover, it is important to note that I do thus not approach the individual metaphors as isolated concepts. On the contrary, they represent a development in thinking about the project Europe. This means that the metaphors are thus related to each other and part of the same process of building a European polity. This can be illustrated by the Actor Network Theory (ANT) that understands actors, events and process as the result of many connections and relations among a variety of human and non-human actors (Bosco, 2006: 136). The Actor Network Theory thus tells us that things such as knowledge, institutions, organizations, and society as a whole are in fact effects. This means that they are constructed by relations enacted through heterogeneous networks of both humans and non-humans (see also Bosco and Etringer, 2004). Because entities and things (knowledge, institutions, organizations, and society) are thus produced by relational effects that are facilitated and enacted through networks, the network effects (actors and things) take the attributes of the entities which they include (Law, 1999: 4). In other words, ANT argues that scholars should emphasize on and considers all surrounding factors of human acts and things (see also Bosco, 2006). This means for my geo-historic overview of metaphors that they are not isolated discourses, but that they are the effects of relations too. The metaphors thus exist because they inhabit their social, economic and political circumstances, and because they inhabit something of the metaphors they react on and/or stem from. As I will show in this thesis, there are thus linkages between different metaphors. Since metaphors are the effects of relations, they would not be the same metaphors without the relations with their social, economic and political circumstances and other metaphors. The metaphors are thus part of a broader development of thinking about the nature of the project Europe instead of isolated concepts. The construction of the project Europe shows a shift from a
Europe as being an ‘imagined place, a philosophical place that incorporates several places, representing a fable-like emptiness which is open to manifold interpretations and expressions’ to a Europe that represents itself as being ‘one single place’ that ‘through the forceful bordering of Europe, disciplining and normalizing it as if it were a nation-state’ creates a limited vision of Europe (Boedeltje and van Houtum, 2008: 363). The metaphors can be placed within this changing idea of the project Europe. Within this shift to Europe as a polity that is similar to the nation-state, the European integration process was characterized by attempts to weaken the position of its member states and to erase national borders in the first decades of the project Europe (see also Heffernan, 1998; Keating, 1998; van Thoor, 1996). This was followed by acts and policies to demarcate, border and protect the common European space (see also Albrecht, 2002; Geddes, 2001; Islam, 1994; Zielonka, 2006). Every phase of this development of building a European state has its own thinking about the nature of the project and thus its own metaphors. I argue that the metaphors should thus be understood as the effects of the same process of building a European polity that is similar to the nation-state.

I start my analysis as from the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), because this marked the beginning of European cooperation by creating common institutions, policies, and ways of thinking about the European project (see also van Thoor, 1996: 40). Because this project Europe is the research object of my research, it is not necessary to analyse metaphors on Europe prior to the establishment of the ECSC.

I will use different sources for my research. Scholars have been attempting to define the nature of the EU and Europe by developing concepts, metaphors and paradigms since the beginning of European integration. As a result, there is a huge amount of existing literature available that has been produced through these years. This will provide my research much and useful information on different imaginations and representations within the different dominant discourses. The EU itself provides another useful source, since it has created institutions, policies and many documents through the years that represent a way of thinking about its own political geography. These documents have different forms, such as policy documents, speeches by politicians and EU-bureaucrats, information brochures and maps. Newspapers are another important source. Journalists and artists have been publishing many articles and cartoons about the EU since the beginning of the project.

Another good source of inspiration for my research has been Michael Heffernan’s (1998) book ‘The Meaning of Europe: Geography and Geopolitics’. Heffernan tries to deconstruct and destabilize the idea of Europe by stressing the nature of Europe as a contested and ambivalent geographical concept. His analysis that recount a tale of dramatic transformations in Europe’s political geography cover a period from the Early Middle Ages through to the civil wars of post-communist Yugoslavia. My research will however not just be a repetition of his work for three reasons. First, his analysis ends with the late 1980s. Europe has been going through many developments ever since. Second, my approach differs slightly from Heffernan’s approach, because my focus is on the European Union rather than on the continent Europe. Third, Heffernan’s work tends toward an ordinary history of Europe, while my focus will be more specific on the EU’s political geographical imaginations. His book was nevertheless a good source for the first two ways of thinking about the project Europe: a federal ‘United States of Europe’ and the alternative of European integration along intergovernmental lines. Another important source and inspiration for my research is James Anderson’s and Warwick
Armstrong’s (2007) book ‘Geopolitics of the European Union enlargement: the fortress Empire’ that discusses among other things the ‘Europe of the regions’, ‘new medieval Europe’ and ‘Europe as an empire’ metaphors as visions on the EU’s territoriality. I have completed this with ‘fortress Europe’, because that metaphor is widely used by politicians, scholars, and the media and therefore one of the most well known metaphors on the EU’s political geography. These metaphors give an overview of dominant ways of thinking about the EU’s political geography since the Second World War. The United States of Europe was favoured by many leaders, politicians and thinkers from the late 1940s until the 1970s. Some however preferred the alternative of an intergovernmental Europe. The United States of Europe metaphor is even today, with the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon, a commonly used concept to describe the direction in which the EU is evolving. During the 1980s and 1990s, many scholars, politicians and EU-officials believed that the project Europe was becoming a Europe of the regions. During the same decades, an alternative stream of scientific literature described the project Europe as a new medieval Europe. Scholars, politicians, media and even artist have been describing the EU as a fortress Europe since the late 1990s. The Europe as an empire metaphor is another contemporary dominant way of thinking about the EU’s political geography. The main sources for making this geo-historical overview and explaining the different metaphors are scientific literature, newspapers and document of the European Commission.

I have used two methods to search for the sources I use in this research. I first looked at the references that Michael Heffernan used in his discussion of the United States of Europe metaphor and the references that James Anderson and Warwick Armstrong used in their discussions on Europe of the regions, new medieval Europe, and Europe as an empire. I collected much of the literature they referred to and the references of these books and articles were a source for even more literature. I furthermore used the PiCarta-database and the web search engine of ISI Web of Knowledge (www.isiwebofknowledge.com) to search for articles and books on the specific metaphors. From all the hits, I read the abstracts of the articles and books that were selected as most relevant and the articles and books with interesting titles. This is how I collected a big amount of books and articles that I read in order to select the important and/or interesting writings on a specific metaphor. I selected the articles and books that were often referred to in other literature and/or that gave good and clear descriptions of a specific metaphor. Searching in PiCarta and ISI Web of Knowledge on other metaphors than those discussed by Michael Heffernan and James Anderson and Warwick Armstrong also learned that an enormous amount of literature has been produced on the fortress Europe metaphor. I have therefore added this metaphor to the overview I present in this thesis. I also used the two search engines to search on other metaphors that I found in literature in order to see if there is a significant amount of literature on other metaphors, however, fortress Europe is the only one that has been so widely used that it was worthwhile to add it to the overview.

I used the LexisNexis-database to search for newspaper publications about the metaphors. There were hardly hits for most of the metaphors; however, there were many hits for the fortress Europe metaphor. I read many articles that were selected as relevant and used those who give clear and interesting descriptions of the fortress Europe metaphor. I also used the European Navigator (www.ena.lu) to search for newspaper articles, background information about policies and cartoons. I used the website of the European Commission to search for policy documents, speeches of Commissioners and maps. I mainly used the information that I found with LexisNexis, European Navigator and on the website of the Commission to describe the social, economic and political circumstances in which the metaphors were constructed.
Because I approach the history of naming and imagining the EU’s political geography as a process without an end-point, I will also try to look ahead. The current economic and financial crisis creates new social, economic and political circumstances. It is thus likely that this influences the process of naming and imagining the EU. I will therefore end this thesis with a discussion of possible futures for the EU and ways of thinking about its political geography.

1.7 Readers guide
This thesis is structured in 5 chapters. The first chapter is the introduction and introduces the thesis’ subject, research goal, research questions, methodology, and social and scientific relevance. The second chapter describes the state of the continent Europe after the Second World War. This is followed by an explanation of the United States of Europe metaphor. This metaphor was a dominant way of thinking about the project Europe in the first decades after the war. The alternative of an intergovernmental project is also discussed in this chapter. I will explain how European leaders and governments who supported one of these two approaches thought about the nature of the project Europe and its future, and which organizations and institutions they created. This chapter ends with a review of the United States of Europe metaphor. The third chapter of this thesis discusses the Europe of the regions and new medieval Europe metaphors. These metaphors are conceptualizations of the process called the regionalization of Europe and Europeanization of the region. I will therefore first discuss the Community’s regional policy and the attempts of regional governments to influence European decision-making, because these were the relevant circumstances in which both metaphors were constructed. In the last paragraph of this chapter, I will explain why I believe that the new medieval Europe metaphor is a much better conceptualization of the regionalization and Europeanization in the 1980s and 1990s than the Europe of the regions metaphor. The fourth chapter discusses two metaphors that are currently still dominant in science, politics and/or the media: fortress Europe and Europe as an empire. Both metaphors emphasize on the external dimensions of the EU’s territoriality, however in a different way. I will explain how and in which circumstances they were constructed. The advantages and disadvantages of both metaphors will be discussed at the last paragraph of this chapter. I will reflect on the metaphors in the thesis’ last chapter. The first part of this chapter discusses what metaphors may be constructed in the future and the second part draws conclusions from the analysis in the previous chapters.
2 Post-war Europe: towards a federal or intergovernmental polity?

Because the Second World War had damaged Europe, the continent faced enormous economic and political problems in the mid-1940s (van Thoor, 1996: 183). Most Western European leaders saw a federal state-building process, and thus the creation of a United States of Europe, as the only ‘rational’ option for the future of Europe (Heffernan, 1998: 201). Many people dreamed of a unified Europe. This was however impossible, because the Iron Curtain divided the continent. There were nevertheless several initiatives for cooperation in Western Europe. The idea of a United States of Europe met with opposition from especially the United Kingdom that pursued integration along intergovernmental lines (Dinan, 2006: 301). In this chapter, I will explain the state of the continent Europe after WWII, moreover, I will discuss the two competing ideas of the project Europe and how federalists and intergovernmentalists would eventually cooperate.
2.1 Post-war Europe: no longer hegemonic and a new bipolar order

To transform the ‘dark continent’ into a unified Europe was the new narrative in the first years after the Second World War (Leontidou, 2004, 603). This was however impossible, because the Iron Curtain divided the European continent. One side of Europe was controlled by the USA and the other side by the USSR. The Western European countries nevertheless decided to cooperate and link their economies. This was desirable, because Western Europe was facing great economic and political problems. There was a strong need to restore the economy and to prevent another war in Europe (van Thoor, 1996: 183). The dominant political idea that emerged from the war was therefore the uniting of Western European nation-states into a common framework. This should relieve the Franco-German tension. It was thus in the late 1940s and 1950s that concrete manifestations of both political and economic integration between European states began to emerge in the form of legal treaties, intergovernmental institutions and pan-European organizations (van Thoor, 1996: 183).

The wish for integration and cooperation between European nation states reflects a revulsion at the excesses of Nazi geopolitics and a very urgent need for a political system that was able to provide food, shelter and gainful employment (Heffernan, 1998: 185). It was from a geopolitical perspective also an expression of the definitive collapse of Europe’s global hegemony. The power of some of the European states had shifted from global hegemony at the end of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th century to destroyed states that were controlled by ‘external’ superpowers (Heffernan, 1998: 185).

Already during the war, resistant leaders in Nazi-occupied states and British leaders considered the European territoriality of the post-war period and thought about a European federation and an order based on free trade. The Soviet leaders did not share this view of Europe’s future, because it was too much based on US-style capitalism (Heffernan, 1998: 190). Although some politicians and thinkers called for cooperation between all states of the European continent, and although some truly believed in a European federation, the military division of Europe in 1945 made this highly unlikely. A bipolar world order was the only option for the European continent (Heffernan, 1998: 185). The new bipolar and transnational ideological confrontation of the Cold War replaced the older forms of national geopolitics. It was in some way however also a continuation of the classical geopolitics from the beginning of the 20th century, because the Cold War was still a struggle for space, now operating on a global scale. Both the Soviet and the Anglo-American side tried to get as much space as possible under their control after the collapse of the Nazi empire (Heffernan, 1998: 187). Because Europe was no longer hegemonic and divided in two conflicting camps, the meaning and territoriality of the continent were no longer part of debates on Europe. After all, its meaning and geographical parameters were already decided (Heffernan, 1998: 185).

The USA’s Marshall Plan was one of the attempts to encourage cooperation between all the states of the European continent (Heffernan, 1998: 197). An enormous injection of capital between 1948 and 1951 supported European states to repair their war damage and stimulated cooperation. Only
Western European states made use of this offer, the USSR and consequently all Eastern European states rejected the offer to make use of US capital. Thanks to the injection of the Marshall funds, the economic growth rates between 1948 and 1951 were impressive (Heffernan, 1998: 198). The Plan had an important geopolitical implication, since it focused on co-ordinated economic recovery in Europe (Heffernan, 1998: 199). On 16 April 1948, 16 mainly Western European countries established an international economic planning agency, the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). The organization was based on US economic and geopolitical values and promoted US-style capitalism (Heffernan, 1998: 199).

There was besides economic cooperation also a military alliance between Western European countries and the USA. Especially Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg had concerns about the ability of the United Nations to protect the region’s collective security. They feared a future attack from the east and established therefore a military alliance in March 1948, known as the Treaty of Brussels (Heffernan, 1998: 200). Only half a year later, the alliance was joined by the USA and Canada. As a result, the agenda that was formerly based on a traditional European alliance of nation-states changed into a wider military cooperation linking both sides of the Atlantic (Heffernan, 1998: 200). The Treaty of Brussels was replaced by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) on 4 April 1949. The NATO was set up by the five Treaty of Brussels states, the USA, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway, and Portugal. The parties agreed that an attack against one of the members would be considered as an attack against all (Heffernan, 1998: 200).

Because the European continent was divided by the Cold War, only Western European countries were involved in the creation of the project Europe. The cartoon ‘Peep under the Iron Curtain’ (see picture 2.1), that was published in the Daily Mail on 6 March 1946, shows perfectly how Western Europe would think about the meaning and geographical parameters of the European continent in the upcoming decades. The cartoon shows Eastern Europe, controlled by the communist USSR, at the right side of the Iron Curtain. It is rapidly building up its industries. The people in Western Europe, on the left side of the Iron Curtain, are obviously afraid of the regime in the east. Most remarkable in the cartoon is however the place where the world ‘Europe’ is written: almost entirely on Western European territory. Only a part of the last ‘e’ is written under the Iron Curtain. This shows how the Western European countries would think about Europe in the upcoming decades. The ‘real’ Europe is the western part of the continent. This is where a number of countries would create the common project Europe. In the upcoming decades, they would construct its meaning and shape (see also Blacksell, 1977; Heffernan, 1998; van Thoor, 1996). This means that there were no clear descriptions, concepts, and metaphors of these Western European countries as a community or association yet. As the explanation of thinking about the Western European political geography below shows, this thinking was predominantly focused on the future, on what the European project should become. In the first post-war years, a federal United States of Europe or an intergovernmental polity with a wide geographical scope were a wish for the future instead of reality.

4 The OEEC was founded by Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Eire, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the United Kingdom. The established Federal Republic of Germany joined in 1949. The USA and Canada joined in 1950 (Heffernan, 1998: 199).
Picture 2.1: ‘Peep under the Iron Curtain’ by Leslie Gilbert. (The British Cartoon Archive, University of Kent)
2.2 Towards a United States of Europe?

The USA’s federal polity was the main example for thinking about the European project in Western Europe during the first years after the Second World War. Western European leaders saw a replication of the federal state-building process that had created the USA as the only ‘rational’ option for the future of their own countries. In this view, the final stage of Western European integration would be a political union: a ‘United States of Europe’ (Dinan, 2006: 299). This idea of replacing the traditional system of relations among European states by new federal arrangements was the most popular in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. The popular sentiment in favour of European integration was besides the experience of the war also strengthened by the experience of the interwar years and the early Cold War (Dinan, 2006: 299). Various proposals for supranational organizations floated around. Public figures and politicians in both Europe and the United States advocated a European federation, which was however rarely precisely defined (Dinan, 2006: 300). This gave rise to the European Movement, a loose collection of individuals and interest groups, in the late 1940s. The enormous interest in a European federation culminated in the Congress of Europe in The Hague in May 1948. This gathering of approximately 600 leading European politicians and influential thinkers agreed that European unity was desirable, however, they could not agree on what they exactly meant. The Congress resulted in an ineffectual organization instead of providing the institutional architecture for a European federation (Dinan, 2006: 300). Although many European leaders favoured a United States of Europe, it was thus difficult to make steps in the direction of such a political union during the first post-war years.

Winston Churchill was one of the European politicians who advocated a European federation. He called for a United States of Europe in his famous speech delivered at the University of Zurich on 19 September 1946:

‘If Europe were once united in the sharing of its common inheritance there would be no limit to the happiness, prosperity and glory which its 300 million or 400 million people would enjoy. … it is to recreate the European fabric, or as much of it as we can, and to provide it with a structure under which it can dwell in peace, safety and freedom. We must build a kind of United States of Europe. … why should there not be a European group which could give a sense of enlarged patriotism and common citizenship to the distracted peoples of this mighty continent? … The first step in the re-creation of the European family must be a partnership between France and Germany. … The structure of the United States of Europe will be such as to make the material strength of a single State less important. … Our constant aim must be to build and fortify the United Nations Organisation. Under and within that world concept we must re-create the European family in a regional structure called, it may be, the United States of Europe … Let Europe arise!’ (Churchill, 1946).

Churchill’s words express a utopian idea of Europe. As I will discuss below, he was not the only European politician and thinker who had ambitious and utopian ideas of the continent’s future. The idea of European unity spread rapidly in the first post-war years. Many people favoured the creation of an autonomous European entity in order to prevent the continent from another war and to avoid Europe being divided into two antagonistic blocs (see also Heffernan, 1998). Ideas of the nature of such a unified Europe diverged according to political and ideological affiliation. Some favoured a
federation led by a federal authority or European government, others preferred an association of sovereign nation states (see also Blacksell, 1977: 109; Dinan, 2006: 299). Emery Reves, writer and advocate of world federalism, argued in 1948: ‘we should not waste our time in opposing a European federation, but should rather encourage it, provided that it is the beginning of a process and not a closed, new sovereign state’ (Reves, 1948). He furthermore argued that Europe needed more than intergovernmental treaties: ‘by suggesting to encourage the quickest possible federation of any two or more European or other nations, I am thinking on FEDERATION and not on a treaty arrangement between sovereign states’ (Reves, 1948). He believed that a federation would be the only democratic and legal framework within which the national economic and the innumerable other conflicts among men could be solved by legal methods instead of violence (Reves, 1948). The ideas of Churchill and Reves are characteristic for the spirit of the age in the late 1940s and early 1950s. I was a period in which everything seemed to be possible and it therefore gave way to several initiatives that raised hopes for a federal Europe, a United States of Europe or more generally said a supranational approach (Dinan, 2006: 299).

2.2.1 The ECSC: creating the first supranational community

One of the proposals for an organization that should be a first step in the direction of the United States of Europe was made by the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman in the beginning of the 1950s. He proposed an economic alliance between the age-old enemies France and Germany. This alliance would link the economies of the countries and in so doing make conflict between them ‘materially impossible’ (van Thoor, 1996: 140). Schuman suggested linking the economies by placing the German and French production of coal and steel under the joint supervision of one organization (van Thoor, 1996: 140). Schuman’s ideas for European integration were inspired by the ideas of another Frenchman, General Commissioner of the National Planning Board Jean Monnet. He had suggested some years earlier to place the joint output of coal and steel in France and Germany within one single framework. He called this strong supranational structure the ‘High Authority’ (van Thoor, 1996: 140). Schuman took political responsibility for Monnet’s plan, because he was also convinced that this was the right approach for cooperation between the former enemies (van Thoor, 1996: 140). The organization he proposed was also open for other European countries. It is therefore the first successful plan for cooperation between Western European states (van Thoor, 1996: 140).

Although the essence of Schuman’s proposal was the integration of coal and steel policy, there were a number of other motives for the creation of this single framework that made it a first step in the direction of a European federation (see also Appelman and Canoy, 2002: 602). As Robert Schuman stated:

‘In this way there will be realised, simply and speedily, that fusion of interests which is indispensable to the establishment of an economic community; that will be the leaven from which may grow a wider and deeper community between countries long opposed to one another by bloody conflicts ... This proposal will build the first concrete foundation of a European federation’ (cited in Appelman and Canoy, 2002: 602).

This statement shows that the organization that Schuman proposed was in fact also a security community, an experiment in supranational government, and an experiment in economic policy co-
ordination (Appelman and Canoy, 2002: 602). Also the German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer was of the opinion that this organization would be more than simply economic cooperation, but also a first step in the direction of political cooperation and federalism: ‘I was in full agreement with the French government that the significance of the Schuman proposal was first and foremost political not economic. This plan was to be the beginning of a federal structure of Europe’ (cited in Appelman and Canoy, 2002: 604).

The Cold War was another motive for European integration in the 1950s (van Thoor, 1996: 141). The Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jan Willem Beyen, explained that there were two threats to Western European civilization. This was first internal fascist and communist powers that tried to destroy the democratic character of Western European countries, and second the Soviet Union and its satellites that tried to annex the territories of Western European countries (van Thoor, 1996: 141). The fear of the Soviet Union thus strengthened the feelings of European unity (van Thoor, 1996: 141). Adenauer made a similar argument:

‘A completely new political alignment is taking shape in the world today. Action is therefore necessary, otherwise Europe will disappear from the world scene where, since the time of the Greeks and Romans, it has played a decisive role. Undoubtedly, all risk of war is now excluded between European nations, but more needs to be done’ (cited in Le Lorrain, 1956).

The German Chancellor also explained that there were four factors behind the transformations in the world political order: first the consolidation of the USSR, second the concentration of both political and economic power in the United States, third the huge difference between the political and economic strengths of the United States and the USSR on the one hand and those of other countries on the other hand, and fourth the appearance of coloured people on the world scene (Le Lorrain, 1956).

On 18 April 1951, the governments of France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands established the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The ‘Six’ formed the first European community, including a supranational High Authority, a Council of Ministers and two control bodies: the Common Assembly and a Court of Justice (van Thoor, 1996: 140). Not only the economic, but also the political impact was considerable. The ECSC established the idea of an independent supranational European authority, including its own income and its own judicial codes (Heffernan, 1998: 205). The French government also proposed a common European army and defence strategy, but this failed. The European leaders took the failure of this proposal and the success of the ECSC as a lesson that pan-European institutions needed a pragmatic and above all primary economic agenda (Heffernan, 1998: 206). Robert Schuman stated that the ECSC would lay the foundation for a European federation. This was the essence of the so-called ‘Community method’: a progress towards political unity by integrating one economic sector at a time (van Thoor, 1996: 140). Also the leaders of the other member states saw the creation of the ECSC as the beginning of a European integration process (see also Brink, 1952). As Jan van den Brink, Dutch Minister for Economic Affairs, explained: ‘The people of the Netherlands are convinced that a united Europe is the only basis on which a better future can be built, and they confidently applaud the adoption of the Schuman Plan as the first step in its creation’ (Brink, 1952).
The ECSC was the first truly supranational European organization with executive functions (Blacksell, 1977: 144). Its High Authority was the first supranational government in post-war Europe. It was the chief executive body and responsible for the day-to-day running of the ECSC’s business. It theoretically had the power to make and implement laws without direct resource to the governments of the member states. This makes its creation an extremely important step in the history of European economic and political integration (Blacksell, 1977: 132). The Special Council of Ministers was responsible for liaising between the High Authority and the national governments. This was the most powerful organ of the ECSC, since it was the ultimate authority to which the executive was responsible (van Thoor, 1996: 143). The Court of Justice undertook the legal interpretation of the Treaty of Paris (van Thoor, 1996: 143). The Common Assembly, which consisted of seventy-eight members nominated by national governments among their democratically elected politicians, could only censure the High Authority after it had acted and was therefore hardly influential (van Thoor, 1996: 143). The ECSC as a whole was a pioneering attempt at supranational government. The scope of the organization was however limited (Blacksell, 1977: 144). It is thus not surprisingly that the European Economic Community, an organization with a much broader scope, would be established only six years later (Blacksell, 1977: 95).

In the years after the creation of the ECSC, the ‘Six’ would discuss further development of the Community that mainly focussed on economic, technological and scientific cooperation (van Thoor, 1996: 143). Jean Monnet suggested to work out sectoral integration in greater detail, however, West Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg advocated a more integral approach. The main point of contention would be the regulations regarding the relationship with member states’ governments (van Thoor, 1996: 143). The ultimate objective was a European federation in which certain government tasks would be centralized within a European governing body and some areas would maintain the national government’s autonomy (van Thoor, 1996: 143).

2.2.2 The establishment of the EEC: further economic integration

The ‘Six’ established the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) by signing the Treaty of Rome in March 1957. The EEC envisaged integration of the whole economic sector instead of only a part of it (Heffernan, 1998: 209). Its creation expressed a shift in the European debate. In the beginning of the 1950s, economic integration was seen as an instrument to avoid war; however, with the preamble to the Treaty of Rome, an economic union became an end in itself (Heffernan, 1998: 209). Like the ECSC, the Treaty did not only have an economic, but in some way also a political character (van Thoor, 1996: 144). The objective of the Treaty was formulated as:

‘It shall be the aim of the Community, by establishing a Common Market and progressively approximating the economic policies of the member states, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increased stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations between its member states’ (cited in van Thoor, 1996: 143-144).

The political character of the EEC is mainly reflected by the objective of closer relations between member states (van Thoor, 1996: 144).
The Treaty was not only concerned with setting up free trade in a common market, it also had the aim to establish common economic policies. The ultimate goal was to harmonize legislation in the member states (Blacksell, 1977: 95). Although the creation of the EEC was also the beginning of cooperation in the field of agriculture, transport policy, and the free movement of goods, persons, capital and services, the cornerstones of the Community were the common market and the common external trade tariff (Blacksell, 1977: 95).

The supranational element was also incorporated in the Treaty of Rome. The principle of supranationalism had nevertheless been weakened. The Commission had less far-reaching decision-making powers in relation with the Council of Ministers than the ECSC’s High Authority, moreover, many matters remained unregulated, leaving decision-making to the Council of Ministers (van Thoor, 1996: 144). This was the result of a struggle between on the one hand the Dutch preference for a supranational approach and thus a prominent role for the Commission, and on the other hand the French position that did not want too much emphasis on this supranationalism (van Thoor, 1996: 144). Even though the creation of the EEC did not weaken the sovereignty of the Community’s member states, there was still a strong feeling among the ‘Six’ that this economic union was only a first step towards political integration (van Thoor, 1996: 144).

The institutions that governed the EEC were quite similar to the institutions already developed for the ECSC (Blacksell, 1977: 102). The Commission, located in Brussels, was the main executive organ being responsible for the formulation and the executing of policy (Blacksell, 1977: 102). The Council of Ministers, made up of ministers from member states, acted as the main channel of communication between the EEC and the national governments (Blacksell, 1977: 102). The Commission was responsible to this Council of Ministers and to a lesser extend to the European Parliament in Strasbourg (Blacksell, 1977: 102). The Court of Justice was to make sure that the provisions of the treaties were correctly implemented (Blacksell, 1977: 102). The Economic and Social Committee was the only truly new established institution. Its duty was to advise the Commission on how to develop a common policy for social welfare and social services (Blacksell, 1977: 100; 102).

The 1950s were thus a decade in which several European institutions were created. They depended on the support of European governments and could not directly challenge the economic and political domestic interests. The European project was thus determined by national requirements and there was hardly a surrender of national sovereignty (see also Heffernan, 1998). This means that the European integration process in these years was rather a complex conciliation of both national and international objectives than a marked break with the traditional national geopolitics (see also Heffernan, 1998). There was nevertheless still a desire for far-reaching integration in the future: a federal United States of Europe (van Thoor, 1996: 144).

### 2.2.3 The EFTA: European integration along intergovernmental lines

The idea of a European federation was the dominant discourse in Western Europe in the first post-war years (see also Blacksell, 1977: 109). The United Kingdom did nevertheless not favour this idea of Europe at all. Both social democrats and conservatives in the UK opposed the federalist approach (Dinan, 2006: 300). Even though Churchill, who was at that time the Conservative leader of the opposition, had called for a United States of Europe in 1946, he did not support proposals with
federalist ambitions when it came to putting words into action. Churchill explained that he favoured the Schuman Plan because it strengthened Franco-German relations, but nonetheless did not want the UK to join this far-reaching integration process (Dinan, 2006: 300-301). The UK thus rejected Schuman’s declaration and advocated cooperation among European states that was organized solely along intergovernmental lines. This means that national governments would have to remain firmly in control and would not cede authority and sovereignty to any supranational institution (Dinan, 2006: 301).

The public opinion in the UK did not favour the idea of pooling national authority to a common supranational institution either. There were some liberal newspapers that displayed little support for a sectoral common market, however, the idea of a European supranational power failed to win over public opinion (Appelman and Canoy, 2002: 605). The supranational character of the Community, and in particular the emphasis of some members on the federal structure of the future of the project Europe, held the United Kingdom outside the ECSC. This does not mean that they rejected any kind of cooperation; this should however be exclusively economic (Appelman and Canoy, 2002: 605). The British newspaper The Observer (1950) reported on the Schuman Plan and described it as ‘one fatal flaw which, unless clearly diagnosed and corrected now, is bound to wreck it’ (The Observer, 1950). The newspaper explained that this flaw was rather political than economic: ‘it lies in the insufficient thought that has been given to the constitutional character of the ‘Higher Authority’ which is to run the scheme’ (The Observer, 1950). The most ‘unorthodox and sensational’ feature of Schuman’s proposal was its advocate for ‘the creation of new vast powers, not at present enjoyed by most governments, in order to vest them in a supranational authority’ (The Observer, 1950). The UK’s main problem with the Schuman Plan was thus the creation of a policy-making body with supranational authority and power that would be so ‘enormous’ that it would influence the economic welfare of millions of people (The Observer, 1950). According to The Observer, this authority would be ‘powerful enough to enforce its decisions, it will become an irresponsible managerial dictatorship; or, if it is not powerful enough for that, it will become a sham and a flop’ and ‘its impotence will be displayed at the first serious clash with really strong private or national interests’ (The Observer, 1950).

Because the UK did not want to be totally excluded from European cooperation either, they formed a ‘Group of Seven’ and set up the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) (Heffernan, 1998: 209). In 1960, the United Kingdom signed together with Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland the Stockholm Convention that established the Association. The process of forming the European free trade area was rapid. It took only a year of negotiating to establish the EFTA (Blacksell, 1977: 107). The Association had a limited objective. The members only wanted to create a free trade area for industrial goods instead of creating a customs union. A free trade area exempted the constituent countries gradually from all restrictions on trade, but gave every member the freedom to retain their own external tariffs and their own tax structures and social services (Blacksell, 1977: 109). This ‘minimalist’ approach to European integration was exclusively concerned with stimulating trade and had absolutely no political or cultural aspirations (Heffernan, 1998: 209). The EFTA’s approach towards European integration took the existing nation states for granted. It thus built on what there was and they sought for ways to improve the international behaviour between states, instead of creating better states (see also Blacksell, 1977: 109).
The Association was completely independent of the EEC in a strictly legal sense. However, its origin was very much a reaction to the signing of the Treaty of Rome and its developments have always been tied closely to the European Economic Community (Blacksell, 1977: 107). There was a variety of economic and political reasons why the EFTA members joined the Association instead of the EEC. Some could not sign a treaty with such supranational connotations by virtue of their constitutions, others were economically too weak to join a customs union, and still others refused to renounce existing trade commitments to countries outside Europe (Blacksell, 1977: 108). The UK definitely took the lead in opposing the project Europe of the ‘Six’. The country even tried to persuade the EEC members to participate in a much wider free trade area restricted to industrial goods, but this failed (Blacksell, 1977: 108-109).

The Stockholm Convention that established the EFTA shows that this agreement differs quite a lot from the treaties that established the European Communities and that the nature of the organizations differ (Blacksell, 1977: 112). The EFTA was essentially a voluntary association. It could freely welcome new members at any time and existing members were free to withdraw without theoretically damaging the organization or themselves (Blacksell, 1977: 112). The objective of the Stockholm Convention was to create a free trade area that was hemmed in as little as possible by institutions, rules and regulations (Blacksell, 1977: 113). It was of course unavoidable to enforce a minimal structure. One of the distinguished features of the organization was the absence of centralized institutions and supranational control. The Council was the only statutory body and operated at ministerial level. It decided the broad objectives of the EFTA and did not have any powers or machinery to implement decisions, since that was left entirely to the governments of the individual member states (Blacksell, 1977: 116).

Although the EFTA successfully pursued its free trade objectives, there were many tensions within the organization. These tensions resulted from the desire of all the members to achieve a working relationship with the EEC (Blacksell, 1977: 110). Another and even more important source of tensions were the several applications of the UK, the EFTA’s most important member, for an EEC membership. Especially the UK’s second application in 1967 brought the organization in a state of uncertainty (Blacksell, 1977: 111). The EEC rejected the UK’s application; however, it was clear that the UK had placed its long-term hopes on the EEC instead of the EFTA (Blacksell, 1977: 112). Although the UK did not want to involve in the EEC’s deeper economic integration, they also desired to participate in the early success of the organization. That is why they constructed the EFTA, but also pursued EEC membership (Vanke, 2006: 155). The UK and Denmark would eventually leave the EFTA when they signed, together with Ireland, the Treaty of Rome in 1973. The organization was consequently robbed of approximately 60 million people. The EFTA-market was reduced by almost two-thirds (Blacksell, 1977: 111-112).

2.2.4 Widening and/or deepening of the project Europe?
As I discussed above, the European communities created in the 1950s pursued a federal system. During the 1960s and 1970s, this objective created tensions generated by enlargement attempts of the EEC and, more important, different fundamental geopolitical opinions about the future nature of
the project Europe (Heffernan, 1998: 210). As a result, discussions about European integration were about the questions of how much ‘widening’ and ‘deepening’ was desirable. This largely replaced the clear visions of the project Europe in terms of a federal United States of Europe or an intergovernmental Europe (see also van Thoor, 1996).

In the early 1960s, France launched a new plan for a political union with institutions that would enable a common defence and foreign policy (van Thoor, 1996: 145). This proposal for deepening the European project met with opposition from the Netherlands, because this member feared that France and Germany would hedge it. The Netherlands therefore also invited the United Kingdom to participate in the negotiations for such a union. The UK was willing to open these negotiations, even though they had just founded the EFTA. France nevertheless refused to involve the UK in the creation of the political union and the ‘Six’ never came to a compromise on such an organization (van Thoor, 1996: 145). On the contrary, France prevented greater use of qualified-majority voting, an instrument of supranationalism, although all the other members agreed on it. The French president Charles de Gaulle demanded that any national government was allowed to block decision-making in the Council on points that opposed a nation its ‘very important interests’ (Vanke, 2006: 142).

Proposals for widening the EEC met also with opposition from France (Vanke, 2006: 140). The United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland applied for an EEC membership for the first time in 1961. EEC leaders were however concerned about any possible join by the UK and feared that British involvement would work as a brake on the process of strengthening and uniting Europe (Heffernan, 1998: 211). Another concern was related to the east-west divide in Europe, since the UK’s strong relation with the USA could undermine the prospect of a pan-European system that could break this divide. This also shows that there was a fear among the ‘Six’ that a prominent role for the UK in the EEC would strengthen USA geopolitical influence on Europe and thus undermine the idea of an autonomous Europe (Heffernan, 1998: 211).

There were especially tensions between the United Kingdom and France, partly because France was still afraid that the UK would damage Europe’s independence and most important France’s European hegemony (Vanke, 2006: 140). Charles de Gaulle wanted to use the EEC to help achieve a number of long-standing objectives for his own country. He wanted to use the European setting to develop the French economy, to place France at the head of cultural developments in European civilization, and to leverage French power globally. He believed that France would be the natural leader in a European organization of nation states without the UK (Vanke, 2006: 141). His ideas of the European project were to preserve French sovereignty and to suppress Germany’s sovereignty, because he still did not fully trust that country (Vanke, 2006: 141). Because France played the prominent political role in the EEC and de Gaulle was not keen on sharing this pond with the UK, he vetoed the first two British EEC-applications (Vanke, 2006: 142). The UK’s strong relation with the USA was for De Gaulle also a reason to keep the UK outside the EEC. He explained that he saw the UK as a ‘Trojan Horse’ for the United States and that he was afraid that if the UK would join the EEC, the United States of America ‘would make the rules’ (Vanke, 2006: 156).

The question of enlargement was thus a thornier problem. With de Gaulle’s second veto against British, Danish and Irish membership became the future of the project Europe extremely uncertain at the end of the 1960s (Blacksell, 1977: 103). However, this was in the eyes of some members of the
At the end of the 1960s, the Commission, Belgium, Germany and Luxembourg designed plans for the realization of an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) (see also van Thoor: 1996: 146-147). Karl Schiller, West German Minister of Economic Affairs, stated that a monetary union would be a prelude to political integration (van Thoor: 1996: 146). The Dutch Minister of Finance, Hendrikus Johannes Witteveen even noticed that 'political integration is a precondition for a real monetary union' (cited in van Thoor: 1996: 146). The plans had a sequel in The Hague where a summit of the government leaders was held in December 1969. The leaders of the ‘Six’ agreed to pursue a simultaneous expansion and deepening of the Community. Deepening would be achieved by the realization of the EMU (van Thoor: 1996, 147). Piet de Jong, Prime Minister of the Netherlands, explained that his country favoured further economic integration, because he considered this as a decisive step towards political unification (van Thoor: 1996, 147). The same view was reflected by the Werner Report from 1970. The report that the Luxembourg Prime Minister Pierre Werner wrote by order of the Heads of State or Government of the EC member states, suggested that the EMU had the aim to realize a European federation. In order to achieve this, the member states ‘must first take the step of creating an economic and currency union’ (van Thoor: 1996, 147). The report described the objective of the EMU as: ‘to guarantee growth and stability within the Community, to strengthen the Community's contribution to a global economic and monetary equilibrium and to turn the Community into a stable bloc’ (cited in van Thoor: 1996, 147). Important policy decisions therefore ought to be taken by the Community and the relevant powers needed to be transferred to the supranational level. The Werner Report also argued that the powers of the European Parliament had to be expanded so it could democratically control the policy decisions at the Community level (van Thoor: 1996, 147). Little would however come off the objectives formulated by Pierre Werner. The member states would in practice not agree about how far reaching the deepening of integration should be (van Thoor: 1996, 148). Especially the views of France and Germany regarding the European integration process did not run parallel. They both wanted a broadening and deepening of the Community, however, with very different interests. Germany, supported by the Netherlands, wanted a political union as complement of the EMU (van Thoor: 1996, 160). France supported European integration in order to secure and extend its own influence in Europe. De Gaulle consequently lacked the willingness to give up any French national sovereignty (van Thoor: 1996, 160).

The integration process vacillated during the 1970s. This was partly because of global economic instability resulting from the US decision to abandon the convertibility of the dollar into gold, and partly because of the 1973 oil crisis. The crisis caused an enormous increase of the price of crude petroleum and eventually even a worldwide depression (Heffernan, 1998: 215). The discussions and disagreements about federalism or intergovernmentalism continued between the members of the EEC. Some member states still wanted to ‘deepen’ the existing arrangements and pursued a fully functioning federal system, including its own budget, elected parliament and the building of federal
institutions. Others wanted to enlarge the geographical scope before ‘deepening’ the Community. Elements of both ideas of Europe can be detected in the EEC (Heffernan, 1998: 216).

The expanding of the Community with the United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland in 1973 was a big change for the EEC, and its basic aims and objectives consequently had to be redefined to take account of the new interests and in particular the interests of the UK. The impact of the enlargement was quite radical and delayed the ‘deepening’ of the existing Community structures. On the contrary, it reinforced the intergovernmental nature of the EEC (Heffernan, 1998: 216). This nature was even more reinforced by the establishment of the European Council in 1974, which was made up of the heads of national government (Heffernan, 1998: 216).

That the UK and others opposed ‘deepening’ of the Community does however not mean that federalist ideas were moribund. There were also several agreements made towards greater political unity during the 1970s (Heffernan, 1998: 216). The Treaty of Luxembourg, signed in April 1970, increased the overall recourses of the EEC and set an ambitious course for strengthening the European Assembly (Heffernan, 1998: 216). The Community also introduced the regional policy in order to correct regional imbalances in the Community’s economy. A Regional Development Fund was therefore created (see paragraph 3.1) (Heffernan, 1998: 216). The EEC strengthened its social policy and common policies for science, technology, environment and energy were received priority (Heffernan, 1998: 216). The Treaty of Luxembourg, signed in April 1970, increased the overall recourses of the EEC and set an ambitious course for strengthening the European Assembly (Heffernan, 1998: 216). The Community also introduced the regional policy in order to correct regional imbalances in the Community’s economy. A Regional Development Fund was therefore created (see paragraph 3.1) (Heffernan, 1998: 216). The EEC strengthened its social policy and common policies for science, technology, environment and energy were received priority (Heffernan, 1998: 216). As mentioned before, the EEC also made a first step towards a common European currency by establishing a European Monetary System that began to operate in 1979 (Heffernan, 1998: 216). Furthermore, the Copenhagen summit of December 1973 ended with a declaration that looked forward to a common European foreign policy (Heffernan, 1998: 216). In 1979, the populations of the nine member states were for the first time allowed to elect their own representatives in the European Parliament (Heffernan, 1998: 216). Although these developments were slow, they reflected some degree of deepening of the project Europe and a gradual shift form the idea of an Atlantic Europe to the idea of a more independent Europe (Heffernan, 1998: 216). Progress in most of these fields was nevertheless very slow. Many developments were constrained because the commitment of member governments was not total (Blacksell, 1977: 105). The conflict between national loyalties on the one hand and a single supranational Community on the other hand remained thus unresolved (Blacksell, 1977: 106).

2.2.5 Further steps towards European integration in the 1980s

The 1970s were a transitional decade between the launch of the Community in the 1950s and 1960s and the acceleration of integration in the late 1980s (see also Heffernan, 1998). The European integration process was still faltering in the beginning of the 1980s. The Community faced many difficulties, such as high unemployment, sluggish growth and high inflation that were the prolongation of the economic difficulties in the 1970s (Heffernan, 1998: 216). The federalists and intergovernmentalists were still compromising their different ideas of Europe. This resulted in several European institutions that were for the most part undemocratic (Heffernan, 1998: 217). The thirty-five years of endless negotiation had created a common space characterized by ‘Eurosclerosis’: an
economic pattern of high unemployment and slow job creation that caused an overall economic stagnation (Heffernan, 1998: 216-217).

The ‘new right’ conservative governments in the UK under Margaret Thatcher and in the USA under Ronald Reagan established a new and aggressive Atlantic alliance. This made deepening of the Community even more difficult and increased the tensions between the USA and Western Europe on the one hand and the USSR on the other hand (Heffernan, 1998: 217). This new conservatism was also contradictory with the ideals of the EEC and the federalist perspectives of the newly elected French president François Mitterand and the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl (Heffernan, 1998: 217). However, it was in the 1980s that the static and uncertainty of the European project ended and the serious debates about Europe’s meaning and geographical scope returned. These debates had been on the background since the 1970, but revived in the mid-1980s. They resumed by the establishment of a strong Anglo-American alliance by Thatcher and Reagan on the one hand and the establishment of the Franco-German federalist program on the other hand (Heffernan, 1998: 217).

The position of the USSR was also changing in the 1980s. Gorbachev presented the Soviet republics as an integral part of the international arena instead of a total alien and enemy of the western world (Heffernan, 1998: 221). Gorbachev’s perspective was a major shift in the Soviet attitude towards Western Europe, to which they previously only referred to in a narrow and descriptive term. He even claimed that Russia is European from a historical, cultural and political perspective (Heffernan, 1998: 221).

Because different schemes were promoted within the Community, a clash between the federalist oriented member states and those in favour of an intergovernmentalists approach was avoided (Heffernan, 1998: 222). Several agreements made in the 1980s show this consensus within the Community. The adoption in principle of a draft treaty on the European Union by the European Parliament in 1984 is a typical example of deepening the Community as the federalist wished. The agreement also expressed the intergovernmentalists’ desire to enlarge the scope of the Community by establishing a free-trade zone encompassing not only the EEC, but also the EFTA states (Heffernan, 1998: 222). A strategy that appealed both parties was the bringing together of the mishmash of existing economic agreements into one single act that would complete the common market. President of the European Commission, Jacques Delores, recommended 300 measures that should be implemented before 1992 and that would integrate all sectors of the economy. This would thus create a space without internal frontiers and where goods, persons, services and capital could move freely (Heffernan, 1998: 223). Delores enthusiasm for European unity resulted in a three-stage plan to create the European Monetary Union (EMU), including a common European currency, at the end of the 1980s (Heffernan, 1998: 224). Although further steps towards European integration were made throughout the 1980s, national concerns were still dominant in the negotiation processes and the steps towards economic integration did not fundamentally challenge the power of the traditional nation-states (Heffernan, 1998: 224).

In the course of the mid-1980s, the faltering European integration process changed in a rapidly developing success story that was characterized by two moves of great significance (van Thoor, 1996: 152). First, in early 1981, the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, proposed to draw up a ‘European Act’. It was a proposal to convert the relationships between the Community’s member states into a European Union (EU) in which economic and monetary integration was to run
parallel with political cooperation. The Act would explicitly include cooperation in political and security areas and assign new rights to the European Parliament. Genscher also proposed to change decision-making within the Community as the Council would only accept the veto right of the members stated in exceptional cases (van Thoor, 1996: 152). The member states signed this Single European Act (SEA), which was a major revision of the Rome Treaty in 1986. The Act underpinned completion of the single marked, also called the ‘1992 programme’ (Griffiths, 2006: 188). Second, the Maastricht Treaty, also known as the Treaty on European Union, was signed in 1992. It was the largest leap forward in European integration since the Rome Treaty. One of the central aims was the EMU: the introduction of a single currency, a single monetary authority and a single monetary policy (Griffiths, 2006: 188). There were not only success stories in the deepening of integration during the 1980s, also the ‘widening’ of the European project continued. Greece joined the EEC in 1981, and Spain and Portugal joined in 1986 (see also van Thoor, 1996).

After the faltering integration process during the 1970s, there were several rapid developments in the deepening and widening of the Community during the 1980s (see also Heffernan, 1998; van Thoor, 1996). This gave also rise to new ways of thinking about the Community’s political geography and many scholars began to think and write about the nature of the project Europe (see for example Anderson, 1996; Liesbet Hooge and Gary Marks, 1996; Loughlin, 1996). They did not only write ordinary stories about its history or discussions about its nature in terms of a federal or intergovernmental polity. The deepening of the Community and its policies also gave rise to new ways of thinking about its political geography and new metaphors would be created (see chapter 3 and 4).
2.3 Considering the United States of Europe metaphor

The explanation of the United States of Europe metaphor in the previous paragraphs shows that a replication of the USA’s federal polity was the dominant discourse in the first post-war years (see also Dinan, 2006: 299). The USA was the major example for European cooperation and many leaders like Adenauer, Churchill, Monet and Schuman sincerely believed that the western part of the European continent could become a United States of Europe (Dinan, 2006: 299). Although this metaphor was the dominant discourse, it became clear that the project Europe would not become at short notice the federation that Robert Schuman had in mind when he made his famous Schuman Declaration (see also Heffernan, 1998). The wish to build a European federal state has nevertheless not disappeared. Recent events, such as the rejection of the European Constitution by France and the Netherlands in 2005, show that the idea of a United States of Europe is still a wish for some European citizens and a fear for others. This Constitution would have been a big step in the direction of a European state with the creation of a President of the European Council, a Minister of Foreign Affairs, an increase of powers for the European Parliament, a European flag and a European anthem (Beneyto, 2008: 6-7). The United States of Europe metaphor is thus still alive and represents both a desirable and an undesirable future for the project Europe. The Treaty of Lisbon also makes a step forward to the creation of a state at the European level. This Treaty, which has already been ratified by all member states, replaces the Constitution of Europe and is in fact quite similar to the rejected Constitution. It also creates a European President, stronger Parliament and a Minister of Foreign Affairs, renamed in the Lisbon Treaty as the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (Beneyto, 2008: 6).

The project Europe has not yet become the federal structure that the founding fathers of the ECSC had in mind. Their idea of a United States of Europe has met with much opposition throughout the years. Does this mean that this metaphor was a utopian and therefore useless perspective on European cooperation? Or did the idea of a United States of Europe make sense in a certain way? I will attempt to answer these questions in this paragraph; moreover, I will redefine the United States of Europe metaphor in such a way that it is better able to accommodate the European integration process and the different perspectives on integration during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. Furthermore, I will discuss the usefulness of the United States of Europe metaphor to describe the contemporary European Union. After all, the Treaty of Lisbon implies that the idea of building a federal European state is alive and well.

Let me start by saying that I believe that the idea of a United States of Europe was overenthusiastic and utopian; however, it is in my opinion also quite understandable that the Western European leaders saw the USA’s federal polity as an example for the European continent, even though this perspective was unrealistic. After all, some of these European states were a global hegemony in the beginning of the 20th century and had become destroyed countries after the Second World War. The USA had on the contrary become a superpower in the world arena (see also Heffernan, 1998: 183). In my opinion, it is thus very understandable that the Western European leaders desired a structure in
which sovereignty was no longer exclusively bound to the nation state’s territory in order to prevent another war, and that they took the world’s new superpower as their main example.

I argue that an important weakness of the United States of Europe metaphor was thus its utopian and overenthusiastic perspective on the project Europe. I think that the desire to prevent another war in Europe and to restore the economy made people believe in a federal Europe that would not become reality on short notice. Replacing the traditional system of relations among European states by a federal state-building process turned out to be extremely difficult (Dinan, 2006: 299). In the modern system, according to which European nation-states were organized before the Second World War, territorial sovereignty was exercised by the nation-state. There was a clear division between ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’, ‘internal’ and ‘external’, and ‘belonging’ and ‘not belonging’ (Anderson and Goodman, 1995: 606-607). This modern system was characterized by territorially defined, territorially fixed, and mutually exclusive state formations, and sovereignty was thus ‘bundled’ together in states (see also Ruggie, 1993). I believe that it was unrealistic to think that this system could transform easily and fast into a system in which sovereignty would largely belong to a new supranational authority. After all, the upcoming decades would show that pooling power to the High Authority and the Commission would be limited and selective (Anderson and Goodman, 1995: 609). A transformation from the traditional system of relations among European states to a European federation was in my opinion thus unrealistic.

An advantage of the United States of Europe metaphor was however that the idea of a united and peaceful Europe gave people in Europe hope for a better future. In that sense, the metaphor also gave direction to the integration process (Dinan, 2006: 299). Although the European integration process would mainly become a struggle between federalist and more intergovernmentalists perspectives (Heffernan, 1998: 222), the process that once started with the objective to build a United States of Europe marked the beginning of the, in my opinion, most successful international cooperation ever. After all, the main objective of the first European community was to recover the member states’ economies and to prevent another war among the member states (van Thoor, 1996: 183). The project Europe has been successful in both objectives. Schuman’s proposal that was supported by other European leaders created the ECSC including the High Authority, the Common Assembly and the Court of Justice that was the beginning of the contemporary European Union (van Thoor, 1996: 140). They were established because the leaders of its ‘Six’ believed in a United States of Europe (van Thoor, 1996: 140). Without this utopian and overenthusiastic dream, they had maybe not created these foundations of the contemporary European Union. Even though the European Union has not yet become the federation that Schuman had in mind, his proposal marked the beginning of the creation of the current European Union (Thoor, 1996: 40).

I argue that the idea of a federal United States of Europe was a good perspective on the wishes for the future of Europe of the six member states that created the ECSC. However, I also argue that from the moment that both federal and intergovernmental schemes were promoted within the Community, especially when the UK joined the EEC, this metaphor was no longer an adequate vocabulary to accommodate the European integration process and its actors. In my opinion, the ideas of a united Europe and a United States of Europe should have been redefined in order to accommodate both federalist and intergovernmentalist actors and to conceptualize that the project Europe contained both federal and intergovernmental elements (Heffernan, 1998: 222). Because national concerns remained dominant within the European integration process and the sovereignty...
of the member states was by far not that much challenged that Europe was truly evolving towards a federation (Heffernan, 1998: 224), I suggest that the United States of Europe could better have been redefined as:

_The United States of Europe is a collaboration of Western European nation states that will increasingly cooperate on especially economic affairs and to a lesser extent on political affairs, and that will partly pool government tasks to a supranational European governing body while some policy areas will maintain organized at the national level._

As I stated above, it was unrealistic to think that the project Europe could become a European federation on short notice. This makes it difficult to predict whether the EU becomes a United States of Europe in the future (even if this is its objective). However, several recent developments in the European Union, such as the creation of the Schengen Area, the introduction of the European currency the euro, and the Lisbon Treaty, show that the idea of creating a European federal state has not disappeared during the last 60 years of European integration. This raises the question whether it may be possible to create a true federal European super-state on the long run. After all, the deepening of the European project has been continuing since its establishment and the contemporary European Union still seems to evolve towards a polity at the supranational level with the characteristics of a state.

In my opinion, it is however undesirable to create a United States of Europe. The European Union still makes steps forward to a European federation, however, the French and Dutch rejection of the European Constitution in 2005 show that there is not enough citizens’ support in every member state for the creation of a federal Europe. Another reason why the contemporary tendency towards a European super-state with a Constitution, President, Minister of Foreign Affairs and most importantly, a clearly demarcated entity with a sharp inside/outside dichotomy, is undesirable is that it represents a very restrictive and closed European Union (see also Boedeltje and van Houtum, 2008: 361). As I will discuss in chapter 4, the creation of a European state means that the EU becomes consequently a significantly closed and in some way inward-looking polity (see also Albrecht, 2002; Islam, 1994). The EU has received the contours of a European state by creating policies to border and order the project Europe. This has consequently demarcated the European Union and created an ‘other’ that is non-EU (Boedeltje and van Houtum, 2008: 362). The EU has recently clearly defined its non-EU neighbours (see for example European Commission, 2003: 4). As Boedeltje and van Houtum explain, the European Union creates a limited vision of Europe by bordering, disciplining and normalizing its own entity like a nation-state: ‘the EU disciplines, borders and appropriates Europeans according to its demands, as if it were a true nation’ (Boedeltje and van Houtum, 2008: 363). However, when Schuman, Monnet and Adenauer designed plans for a United States of Europe, their aim was to protect the continent Europe from another war and to restore the damaged economies (see also Heffernan, 1998; van Thoor, 1996). The aim of early thinkers on a European federation was rather to incorporate as many states as possible, than to create a restrictive Union, to define a non-EU and to exclude particular categories of states and people. In my opinion, the current tendency towards a demarcated European state with a clear definition of what this European Union is, and what and who do not belong to it, is undesirable. Instead of becoming a European super-state, the European Union should not clearly define an EU and non-EU. It should rather be an open
organization instead of a restrictive and demarcated state. Moreover, I think that the EU should rather be seen as a process of becoming without the pre-designated end-point of becoming a United States of Europe.

Because many people fear the development towards a European federation, The United States of Europe metaphor is currently not only used to describe a desirable future of the EU. The idea of a federal Europe has become associated with a more pejorative meaning. Concepts such as the United States of Europe and a European super-state are also used to express a fear for a European state. For example, the Dutch Socialist Party (SP) warned that the adopting of the Constitution for Europe would mean that the member states would definitely become a kind of province and that a vote in favour of the Constitution would thus be a vote in favour of an undesirable European super-state\(^5\). The far right’s Geert Wilders was also one of the Dutch ‘No’ campaigners during the referendum for the European Constitution. He also claimed that a small country like the Netherlands would become ‘a province in a super-state’ (Smith, 2005: 19).

As I have discussed in this chapter, the founding fathers of the European Union dreamed of a United States of Europe that could solve the safety and economic problems of its member states. Although this idea of building a federal super-state has met with much opposition, the project Europe has been developing towards a state at the European level since the establishment of the ECSC. In order to transform the loose collection of nation-states into a European federation, the main focus was on weakening the position of the nation-state and erasing its borders during the first decades of the European integration. Because nation-states were loosing authority and their borders were blurring, and because regions became increasingly important during the 1980s and 1990s, the ways of thinking about the project Europe’s territoriality were changing and new metaphors were constructed. These developments and the new metaphors to describe them will be discussed in the next chapter.

\(^5\) See also in Dutch: http://www.sp.nl/nieuws/actie/grondwet/ja1.shtml.
3 Strengthening the subnational and supranational level

The deepening of the European Community during the 1980s and 1990s and its successful regional policy that Europeanized the subnational level, created a growing believe that the usefulness of the nation-state was declining (see also Keating, 1998). There were two dominant metaphors that described this process and its outcome: Europe of the regions and new medieval Europe. The former refers to a federal polity in which subnational governments replace the nation-states (Loughlin, 1996: 151). It was particularly popular among regional governments, regional politicians and Commission officials (Loughlin, 1996). The latter also points to the fragmentation of national territory, however, it describes this process as the emergence of a system of overlapping authority and multiple loyalty (Friedrichs, 2001: 482). New medievalism was predominantly favoured among scholars.
3.1 The regionalization of Europe and the Europeanization of regions

The deepening and widening of the European Community continued during the 1980s and 1990s (see also van Thoor, 1996). Especially the European Commission gained more authority. One of its main objectives became the promotion of economic and social cohesion within the Community (Loughlin, 1996). The promotion of cohesion, the creation of an Economic and Monetary Union and a single market (Griffiths, 2006: 188) perfectly fit within the Community’s development towards a United States of Europe. Besides erasing borders and barriers between the member states, the EU also wanted to make this common market a cohesive and homogeneous space. Instead of accepting differences between the individual members, the Community clearly had the aim to make the different members equal, which would facilitate the creation of a European state. Moreover, because European leaders and Commission officials saw the Community as a polity that was (and is) evolving towards a state at the European level, they focused increasingly more on regions and less on nation-states. Its regional policy became therefore a powerful instrument to support regions (see also Loughlin, 1996).

As a result of the Community’s regional policy, the subnational level became Europeanized and many subnational governments took this change to strengthen their own position and attempted to encourage and influence the Commission’s decision-making (Keating, 1998: 169). They invested in direct links with the European institutions by opening offices in Brussels, so that they were able to lobby Commission officials and members of the European Parliament (Keating, 1998: 169-170). Because the regional policy became one of the Community’s most important policies and because regional governments successfully created direct links with the Commission and the Parliament, the European Community became in a way regionalized (see also Keating, 1998). The Community’s territoriality thus changed, because some sovereignty and authority shifted from the member states to the European Commission and regional governments (Keating, 1998: 161). As I will show in this chapter, the changing nature of the Community’s political geography that followed from these combined effects of regionalization and Europeanization encouraged politicians, Commission officials and scholars to come up with new metaphors.

I will give a detailed explanation of this so-called regionalization of Europe and Europeanization of the region in this paragraph. One of the main agents of European consciousness that inspired politicians and EU-officials to construct the Europe of the regions and new medieval Europe metaphors was the Commissions regional policy, commonly known as the Structural Funds. An explanation of the evolution of this policy shows how the Commission attempted to reshape Europe’s territorial profile by gaining more authority for the subnational and supranational level (Keating, 1998: 161). The Commission increased the possibilities for regional governments to influence European policymaking even more by establishing the Committee of the Regions, which was also an agent of European consciousness (Keating, 1998: 155). Other agents of European consciousness were maps produced by the Commission that show a European Community with

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6 Michael Keating (1998) used these words to describe the growing influence of the European Commission on the substate level and the growing influence of regional governments in the Commission’s decision-making.
regions instead of nation states. The traffic between regional interests and the Community was however not all one way. Regional governments contributed to the influence of regional interests in the European institutions (Keating, 1998: 161). The project Europe thus provided a new context for regional restructuring that consequently altered the architecture of the Western European states (Keating, 1998: 161).

3.1.1 Early manifestations of a European regional policy
An early manifestation of the importance of regions vis-à-vis the project Europe can be found in the preamble of the Rome Treaty, signed in 1957 (Borrás-Alomar, et al, 1994: 5). The European Economic Community described one of its objectives as: ‘harmonious development by reducing the differences existing between the various regions and the backwardness of the less favoured regions’ (cited in Borrás-Alomar, et al, 1994: 5). Nevertheless, not much would happen on the regional front until the mid-1970s. Regional policy was in fact almost nonexistent in the beginning of the European project (Bache, 1998: 35). There was a European Social Fund (ESF), created in 1957, that supported regions with high unemployment in South Italy and West Germany. There was furthermore the European Agriculture Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF), created in 1962, that provided investment aid to assist less favoured agricultural areas. The Commission proposed the creation of a European Regional Development Fund in 1969, but all the member states except Italy opposed the plan (Bache, 1998: 35-36). The ESF and the EAGGF did not constitute a Community regional policy and were of little importance compared to the Regional Development Fund (ERDF) that would be founded in 1975 (Bache, 1998: 36).

Another early manifestation of European regional policy can be found in the Werner Plan from 1970 (Trofin, 2003). The plan focused primarily on the creation of an economic and monetary union; however, it also proposed an intervention mechanism to reduce territorial inequalities in the EC. This was necessary, because the entry of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom would bring several new disadvantaged regions to be dealt with. This would consequently also face the Community with new and more inequalities. That is why the EC was searching for new policies to deal with these problems (Trofin, 2003).

3.1.2 The Regional Development Fund
A real European regional policy was introduced with the Regional Development Fund in 1975 (Bache, 1998: 36). The main objective of the fund was the promotion of economic and social cohesion within the Community and the reduction of regional imbalances resulting from industrial change and structural unemployment (Fitzgerald and Michie, 1997: 14). The EU’s regional policy became visible and more concrete in the twelve years after the creation of this fund. The ERDF was distributed according to a quota system and would only fund a maximum of 50 per cent of the costs of regional development projects. Domestic sources provided the remaining costs (Bache, 1998: 42). During the first years of the ERDF, the fund was thus primarily complementary to the individual member states’ regional policy and its resources were only used to co-finance projects within the plans of national
regional policies (Trofin, 2003). The European council was the main decision maker and the European Commission acted rather as an administrator of the policy, because it was hardly allowed to exercise control over the allocation of funds (Mawson et. al. 1985, 30).

The first revision of the ERDF in 1979 created some opportunities for the European Commission to pursue its own interest, although this was still very limited (Bache, 1998: 54). A more effective policy was necessary, because, as the Commission explained, ‘despite increased efforts by the member states and the Community to aid the development of their least favoured regions there had been no fundamental change for the better’ (cited in Bache, 1998: 54). This remained a serious obstacle to the functioning of the Common Market. The Commission therefore called for a more influential role for itself, because that would make the policy more efficient (Bache, 1998: 54). To increase its own influence, the Commission proposed that 13 per cent of the funds should be allocated through a non-quota section for ‘specific Community measures’ (Bache, 1998: 54). The Commission described its proposal as: ‘a ‘non-quota’ section of the fund, which is not subject to the system of national quotas and can, if appropriate, be used outside the assisted areas designated at national level’ (European Commission, 1979: 7). The Commission proposed this in order to ‘make some modest movement towards the ERDF becoming a development agency of a more genuine ‘Community’ character rather than a somewhat limited subsidizer of separate national policies’ (cited in Bache, 1998: 54-55). The Commission’s non-quota proposal met, not surprisingly, with opposition within the Council. After negotiations with the member states, a maximum of 5 per cent of the ERDF was set (Bache, 1998: 55). The reform furthermore created detailed profiles of problem regions, lists of project proposals from local authorities, and medium-term development targets (Anderson, 1990: 428).

The ERDF was again reformed in 1984. This reform resulted in the ‘greater coordination of Member States’ regional policies, the replacement of national quotas by a system of ranges, an increase in aid rates, possibilities of assisting small and medium-sized businesses in the context of measures to exploit the potential for internally generated development of regions, growing use of programme financing and recognition of the integrated development approach’ (European Commission, 1984: V). The new system of ranges meant that ‘governments are guaranteed their minimum share in any one year; award amounts between the minimum and maximum are made at the discretion of the Commission on the basis of its own priorities and aid criteria’ (cited in Anderson, 1990: 428). The revision should make the ERDF better able to contribute to the correction of regional imbalances within the Community and was in a way again an increase of the Commission’s authority (Anderson, 1990: 428). The reformed policy also increased the regional governments’ power by allowing them to participate more actively in drawing up programmes, not simply when plans were finalized, but already from the preparation stage (European Commission, 1984: V).

3.1.3 The Structural Funds
When Greece joined the Community in 1981, and Spain and Portugal in 1985, this influenced the regional policy because quite a few regions in these new member states were less developed than the Community’s average (Trofin, 2003). The population of the regions with a per capita GDP of less than 60% of the Community’s average GDP doubled and they were all demanders of structural aid (Trofin, 2003). In addition, the ongoing process of market liberalization was expected to further
increase regional imbalances (Fitzgerald and Michie, 1997: 14). A major reform of the ERDF, ESF, and EAGGF was therefore needed in 1988 (Loughlin, 1996: 154). The three funds were brought together in a common framework, known as the Structural Funds, which came into force on 1 January 1989 (Loughlin, 1996: 154). From then on, the Commission largely defined the criteria for allocation and had the responsibility of verifying whether the criteria were met, moreover, it had better scope to develop ‘Community initiatives’. These were projects defined by the Commission with funding based on criteria that were also defined by the Commission (Loughlin, 1996: 154). Subnational governments were recognized as having an important role in the execution of these projects alongside the national governments and the Commission (Loughlin, 1996: 154). The Community brought the regional level of government into the decision-making process through the principle of partnership (Borràs-Alomar, et al, 1994: 6). The Commission defined this partnership as a ‘close consultation between the Commission, the member states concerned and the competent authorities designated by the latter at national, regional or local level, with each party acting as a partner in pursuit of a common goal’ (Commission of the European Communities, 1988: article 4). The European Commission could for the first time in its history directly concern itself with regional problems and move away from the sphere of national trade-offs (Borràs-Alomar, et al, 1994: 6).

The regional policy had become an increasingly more important policy area for the European Community (Anderson, 1990: 427). The Commission raised the ERDF budget from ECU 257.6 million to ECU 4.5 billion between 1975 and 1989. This was, in terms of a percentage of the total EC budget, an increase from 4.8 per cent to 9.7 per cent (Anderson, 1990: 427). The Commission increased this budget even more after 1989. By 1993, the Structural Funds accounted for a third of the EU budget. This was less than agricultural spending, but far more than any other policy area (Trofin, 2003). The Commission, who thus clearly invested in the substate level, had become a pivotal actor in the drafting of regulations for regional policy. It had the exclusive right to propose legislation on the Community level and to propose the list with regions eligible for funding (Trofin, 2003). Some scholars argued that these developments weakened the nation states’ sovereignty and authority (see also Trofin, 2003).

The Maastricht treaty that entered into force in 1993 did more than harmonising the macroeconomic policies of the different member states and establishing a common currency. It also founded the Cohesion Fund and the Committee of the Regions (Fitzgerald and Michie, 1997: 20). The Structural Funds were reformed in the same year. This reform meant that some power shifted back to the member states who acquired some competencies in the selection of eligible regions. The Commission remained however arbiter of the entire process (Fitzgerald and Michie, 1997: 20). Most of the member states wanted to move the Community towards a closer economic and political union: the European Union. They recognised that measures to achieve economic convergence would be endangered without associated action to improve economic and social cohesion. Economic and social cohesion became therefore one of the pillars of the Community’s structure (Fitzgerald and Michie, 1997: 20). The new Cohesion Fund had the aim to support the poorer member states. As a result, the Maastricht treaty upgraded the importance of the regional policy (Fitzgerald and Michie, 1997: 20).

The European Commission has published several reports and information leaflets on its regional policy. It has used many maps in these documents to illustrate for example unemployment and the distribution of funds (see map 3.1 and map 3.2).
It is remarkable that most of these maps do not show (or very vague) the member states as spatial units, but only the borders and territorial shapes of the Community and the regions. Without knowing where the borders between the different member states are, one cannot even distinguish between them. These representations of the Community’s structure contribute to the construction of the idea that the European level and the regional governments are, at least in this policy area, the only relevant government levels.

Map 3.1: Regional distribution of ERDF grants from 1975 to 1984. (European Commission, 1984: 8)


The regions on these maps are predominantly not regions with a strong regional identity, but rather statistical regions. Regional and national governments used these units to get European funds from the European Commission. The regions became consequently more important. Some existing regional political structures were therefore recreated and new statistical regions were even created in Portugal, Greece and the Irish Republic in order to be able to get more European funds (see also Anderson and Goodman, 1995: 617). Map 3.1 and map 3.2 are excellent visual illustrations that the project Europe was evolving towards a single state without internal states and their national borders. In other words, this shows a part of the development towards a European state with a single space in
which the Commission represents the Community as a European state with regions instead of member states.

A programme that deserves special attention here is the Community’s INTERREG initiative. This programme, which is financed under ERDF, aims to promote socio-economic cohesion in EU’s territory by providing funds for environmental protection, employment, social integration, and gender equality in border areas (Bray and Harguindéguy, 2009: 747). The European Commission launched INTERREG in 1988 in order to promote cross-border cooperation projects within the Community. With this initiative, the Commission acts directly at the level of subnational actors, such as regional governments and local authorities (Bray and Harguindéguy, 2009: 747). The promotion of cross-border activities with funded programmes such as INTERREG has even led to the emergence of new territories and organizational forms of governance: the ‘Euregio’ (Pikner, 2008: 211). These invented and constructed cross-border regions have been the dominating governance forms for activities in these border regions since the 1990s (Pikner, 2008: 213). This cross-border governance makes it possible to involve actors and interests from various spatial scales (region, municipality, European Union, member states) (Pikner, 2008: 212). In fact, the creation of these Euregios is a restructuring of the spaces of formal politics, which includes the rise of new forms of both economic and political regionalism (see also Amin, 2002: 396). Map 3.3 shows the present cross border programmes. The creation of Euregios and the promotion of cross-border activities also fit in the Commission’s objective to create one single space and to erase national borders. As the cross-border regions in map 3.3 show, the European programmes in fact have the aim to create regions in which national borders no longer exists, or in other words, they have the aim to wipe away the borders between the member states.

Map 3.3: Cross-border programmes under the European Territorial Cooperation Objective. (ec.europa.eu/regional_policy)
The cross-border agencies have the task to bring actors and cross-border activities under the governance umbrella of the Euregio in order to make them collective. This means that they have to institutionalize those activities by presenting them as ‘Eurogio activities’ (Pikner, 2008: 213). This is however not fully achieved yet. Activities mainly take place through the selective and free-will relations of actors in the border areas (Pikner, 2008: 213). This is why some argue that Euregios operate as temporary ‘thin-regions’, which territorial structures are fragile and where the involvement of actors and public interests from different spatial scales is still limited (Pikner, 2008: 213).

In short, the Commission had become a key actor in regional policy. Its role had changed from an administrator of the policy to an actor that could develop its own initiatives. This means that it had created direct links with the substate level of government. These developments, together with the increased budget, made the regional policy one of the most important policies of the Community (see also Keating, 1998). The increased authority for the European level of governance and its focus on regions instead of nation-states are part of the construction of a European federation.

3.1.4 Direct links between regional governments and the Community
Regional governments have increasingly been investing in direct links with the European Community since the end of the 1980s (Keating, 1998). They started to visit the European institutions frequently and even opened permanent offices in Brussels to lobby Commission officials and members of the European Parliament. The number of offices from regional governments or related organizations grew from 2 in 1986 to 115 in 1996 (Keating, 1998: 169). The lobbying served three roles: influencing decision-making, providing information to regions on upcoming initiatives, and providing information and regional viewpoints to Commission officials (Keating, 1998: 169-170). There were also several organizations set up that lobbied for regions as a whole. Examples of this are the International Union of Local Authorities and the Council of Communes and Regions of Europe (Keating, 1998: 170). In 1985, the Council of European Regions was launched. The 107 members of this Council pressed for the involvement of regions in European decision-making (Keating, 1998: 170). There were also organizations created for specific kind of regions, like the Conference of Peripheral Maritime regions, the Association of European Frontier Regions and Regions of Industrial technology (Keating, 1998: 170).

The European Commission established the Consultative Council of Regional and Local Authorities in 1988. The Council had consultative rights over regional policies and the regional implications of other Community policies (Keating, 1998: 169). The Maastricht Treaty replaced this Council with a much stronger Committee of the Regions (CoR) (Keating, 1998: 170). The Commission tried to increase the power of regional governments by proposing that the CoR should act as the ‘upper house’ of the Parliament. The Council of Ministers, who represents the member states, however watered this proposal down (Keating, 1998: 171). The CoR had 222 members that were all elected regional or local politicians. They were given formal rights of consultation on proposals from the Commission, but no initiative or veto powers (Keating, 1998: 170). Commission officials believed nonetheless that the role of the CoR would enhance in the future, because it provided a political platform for important regional politicians from states with a highly federalised polity (Keating, 1998: 171).
The developments described above show that the Commission created several policies to encourage development strategies in the regions. The Community became an important actor in regional policy and the political significance of regions increased (Keating, 1998: 161). In some way, the Commission tended to undermine the member states authorities. Regional interests used this opportunity to challenge, together with the EU, the development priorities of member states (Keating, 1998: 161). The regional governments were no longer confined within national borders and became an element in European politics (Keating, 1998: 161). As a result of the Commission’s regional policy, regional political structures were even (re-)created in some member states such as Portugal, Greece and the Irish Republic (Anderson and Goodman, 1995: 617). As I will discuss in the next paragraphs, some scholars, politicians and EU-bureaucrats conceptualized these developments as ‘the end of the nation state’, others however argued that nation states were still the main political actors because they were the driving forces behind the European project and the most important channel of influence for regions remained via the national governments (Keating, 1998: 166). Two very commonly used metaphors to describe the EU’s territoriality in the 1980s and 1990s are the Europe of the regions and new medieval Europe metaphors. I will explain them in the upcoming paragraphs. Although they described the Community’s territoriality differently, they have in common that they were both inspired by the new wave of regionalism in the 1980s and 1990s (Keating, 1998: 166).
3.2 Europe of the Regions

The ‘Europe of the regions’ metaphor was a dominant way to describe the political geography of the project Europe during the wave of regionalism in the 1980s and 1990s (see also Loughlin, 1996). It does however not exclusively belong to these political circumstances. The ‘regional question’ has emerged regularly on the European political agendas. In the 1950s, the metaphor was already used by several federalist authors to describe a normative and utopian future for the continent Europe (Loughlin, 1996: 50). Their work inspired regional governments, politicians and Commission officials in the 1980s and 1990s (Keating, 1998: 161). Among scholars, the Europe of the regions metaphor was however rather criticized for being utopian and unrealistic (see also Borrás-Alomar, et al, 1994; Liesbet Hooge and Gary Marks, 1996; Loughlin, 1996). I will first discuss the early writings on the Europe of the regions, before I explain the rediscovery of the metaphor and the criticism from scholars in the 1980s and 1990s.

3.2.1 Early manifestations of the Europe of the regions metaphor

The Europe of the regions metaphor had its origins in the conceptualizations of a united federal Europe. There is thus a close connection between regionalism and federalism (Loughlin, 1996: 50). The metaphor was used by several federalist authors. Key players in these previous ideas of a Europe of the regions were Leopold Kohr, Denis de Rougemont and Guy Héraud (Loughlin, 1996: 50). Their idea of Europe was a model of federalism in which subnational levels of government, and especially regions, would replace the nation states by taking over some of the nation state’s functions and responsibilities (Loughlin, 1996: 150). The Europe of the regions metaphor thus stemmed in a way from the United States of Europe metaphor.

Leopold Kohr’s book ‘Size theory of social misery’ is one of the most idealist and influential writings in this stream of literature (Borrás-Alomar, et al, 1994: 3). He argued that the principle cause of war is the critical mass of power achieved by states. The bigger the power and size of a state, the bigger the potential risk of driving towards conflicts and war (Borrás-Alomar, et al, 1994: 3). His main argument was therefore that ‘small is beautiful and harmless’ (Borrás-Alomar, et al, 1994: 3). States should thus be dismantled into natural regional units in order to preserve peace (Borrás-Alomar, et al, 1994: 3).

Denis de Rougemont argued that it was necessary to create regions in order to re-establish the essential base communities in which individuals can recover their ‘civic dimension without which she/he is not a real person’ (Borrás-Alomar, et al, 1994: 3). He also said that the European nation state was dangerous and obsolete. Communities should therefore be the primary element from which a potential European federation could be institutionalized (Anderson, 2008: 12). The extreme form of decentralization he proposed would in effect mean the dismantling of the nation state (Borrás-Alomar, et al, 1994: 3).

Guy Héraud distinguished three possible alternative models for a European federation: ‘Une fédération des Etats historiques’, ‘une fédération des régions économiques’ and ‘une fédération...’
ethnique’ (Borräš-Alomar, et al, 1994: 3). He argued that the last alternative, the Ethnic Federation, would be the optimal political structure, because that would account for the spiritual and cultural order in Europe (Borräš-Alomar, et al, 1994: 3). He emphasized the importance of following these ‘natural characteristics’, because a Europe based on the ethnic federation model was according to Héraud a project of re-construction of previous socio-cultural entities (Borräš-Alomar, et al, 1994: 3).

The perspectives of Kohr, de Rougemont and Héraud about the role of regions in Europe are all based on the idea that the traditional organization of European nation states will cause conflicts (Borräš-Alomar, et al, 1994: 4). Their utopian ideas and perceptions were formed prior to the political processes of increased political decentralization, regional economic development and interregional cooperation during the 1980s and 1990s (Borräš-Alomar, et al, 1994: 4). This new wave of regionalism also created new perceptions, expectations and political interests at subnational levels of government and also invoked a new utopian vision of a Europe of the regions (Borräš-Alomar, et al, 1994: 4). In contradiction to the early notions of a Europe of the regions, which were constructed in the post-war period, they were constructed in a political and economic environment characterized by European integration (Borräš-Alomar, et al, 1994: 4). Although the core of the perceptions and expectations in the writings of Kohr, de Rougemont and Héraud impinged on a whole generation of regional politicians and public administrators during the 1980s and 1990s, the two streams of Europe of the regions cannot be seen as a homogeneous and coherent school of thought (Borräš-Alomar, et al, 1994: 2).

3.2.2 Towards a Europe of the regions in the 1980s and 1990s?

The combined effects of regionalization and European integration, two forces that seemed to undermine the nation state, inspired many regional governments, politicians and Commission officials to describe the project Europe as a Europe of the regions (Anderson, 2007: 14). Since the late 1970s, they have been attempting to create new political arenas at the supranational and subnational level. Some of them even saw the nation state as caught in a vice between the European Community and sub-state regions, and therefore as doomed to disappear (Keating, 1998: 161).

There were several reasons why many believed in a Europe of the regions. As a result of the economic integration in the Single European Market and the strengthening of regional authority, the sovereignty of member states was eroding from above by the European Community and from below by regionalism (Anderson, 1995: 76; 82). New opportunities were thereby created for the subnational level, because the European Community provided an institutional ‘umbrella’ for regions (Anderson, 1995: 84). Traditional states were argued to be too small for global competition, but too big for cultural identification and active citizenship (Anderson, 1995: 83). Rosy scenarios for sub-state governments were therefore propagated and many believed that the EU would evolve towards a decentralized federation of regions (Anderson, 1995: 85). Another reason why the idea of a Europe of the regions was popular was the European institutions’ legitimacy crisis in the 1990s that resulted from the very fast integration process. The European Commission was unpopular in the public opinion and the European Parliament was a weak institution (OpenLearn). In contradiction to the predominantly top-down nature of integration and the perception that the Economic and Monetary Union would lead to a centralization of economic power, a more democratic EU could be suggested.
by linking regional identity to European identity (OpenLearn). Both the EU and the regions could thus gain legitimacy by working closely together. This normative ideology was picked up by regional governments and politicians (OpenLearn).

EU President Jacques Delors also favoured the idea of a Europe of the regions (OpenLearn). He was supported by several members of the European Parliament, among others the Northern Irish MEP John Hume. He counterpoised to De Gaulle’s and Thatcher’s intergovernmental Europe and argued for ‘a Europe which is much more comprehensive in its unity and which values its regional and cultural diversity while working to provide for a convergence of living standards’ (cited in OpenLearn). Some even predicted that during the 1990s, The European Union would ‘leave the Europe of competing nationalisms behind’, that the member states would break up and that the project Europe needed to move beyond the nation-state to ‘a European federation of equal regions’ (Anderson, 1995: 85).

In 1991, the Chef of the Cabinet to the Regional Commissioner called for greater political autonomy for regional authorities within the Community: ‘The Europe of the regions is already a cultural reality and in the new single European market there will soon be an economic one. Why not turn it into a political reality too?’ (cited in OpenLearn). Ideas like this were supported by success stories of economic strong regions such as Baden-Württemberg, Catalonia, Lombardy and Rhône-Alpes (OpenLearn).

The Europe of the regions metaphor was also widely discussed among scholars. Although the publications of Kohr, de Rougemont and Héraud had influenced the ideas of a Europe of the regions among regional politicians and public administrators during the 1980s and 1990s (Borràs-Alomar, et al, 1994: 2), the dominant way of thinking among scholars during this wave of regionalism was much more critical towards the idea that regions would replace nation-states. Many authors described that some sovereignty and authority indeed shifted from the national level to the subnational governments and to the European Commission. However, most scholars also argued that nation-states continued to be a very important actor. Instead of describing a replacement of the nation-states by regions, most authors argued that a much more complex system was being created in which the three levels of governments compete and coexist (Jones and Keating, 1995; Keating and Hooghe, 1996). Most authors thus agreed that the outcome of the institutional and territorial changes could not be captured by the Europe of the regions metaphor and if they used the concept, they rather used it to describe that regions had become more important actors within the EU without totally replacing the nation-state (see for example Anderson, 1990; Keating, 1998; Meegan, 1994). I have selected three publications of authors who reflected on the Europe of the regions metaphor and that show a critical stance towards it. I will first pay attention to Susana Borràs-Alomar’s suggestion that the EU was not becoming a Europe of the regions, but rather a Europe with the regions. I have selected her article because it is representative for how many scholars thought about Europe of the regions and because I like her attempt to redefine the metaphor. I will then discuss John Loughlin’s criticism on Europe of the regions. I have chosen to explain his point of view on the metaphor because this is also quite representative for the dominant way of thinking about the institutional and territorial changing in the 1980s and 1990s. Another reason why I have selected his viewpoint is that he is a very influential scholar of European politics and regional governance. I will end this overview with Liesbet Hooge’s and Gary Marks’s concept multilevel governance. I have selected their concept for two reasons. First, because they describe the institutional and territorial
changing within the EU very clearly, and second because their multilevel governance concept has been very influential in research on institutional changes and European integration.

**Susana Borrás-Alomar on 'Europe with, not of, the regions’**

Like many other scholars, Susana Borrás-Alomar explained that the Europe of the regions metaphor was favoured by regional governments, politicians and some Commission officials, but highly criticized by scholars during the 1980s and 1990s. She argued that the metaphor is just a utopian ideology of regional governments and to some extent of the Commission and the European Parliament (Borräs-Alomar, et al, 1994: 1). The main conclusion in most of the writings on Europe of the regions is that this scenario is far from reality. As Susana Borräs-Alomar concludes: ‘some advances have been made, the overall picture remains dominated by the influence of national level (f)actors. Consequently, the often anticipated drive towards the Europe of the regions does not really connect with actual developments’ (Borräs-Alomar, et al, 1994: 1). The concept is rather a commonplace used to describe many activities that have some sort of relationship with subnational entities. Regional movements and parties brandished the metaphor in their quest for more power. Even some national governments used it in order to support their pleas for more European funding for their own regions. The Commission used it as a tool in its confrontation with the Council of Ministers over the enlargement of its own authority (Borräs-Alomar, et al, 1994: 1). Susana Borrás-Alomar argued that the EU could be conceptualized, without doing injustice to both the developments of integration and regionalization and the continuing significance of the national level, as a ‘Europe with, not of, the regions’ (Borräs-Alomar, et al, 1994: 14).

**John Loughlin’s criticism on Europe of the regions**

John Loughlin (1996) argued that a new Europe was emerging, however, he described this Europe as neither a federalist Europe of the regions nor an intergovernmental Europe based on the primacy of the nation-state (Loughlin, 1996: 161-162). He argued that the emerging Europe was rather ‘a kind of hybrid system where nation-states continue to exist, but in a considerably modified form alongside the institutions of the EU and regions with enhanced political and policymaking roles’ (Loughlin, 1996: 162). According to Loughlin, the European Union could be seen as a confederation that was laying the basis for becoming more like a federation in the future. His arguments were based on his observations that, in the mid-1990s, the EU had a stronger Commission, minority voting in the Council of Ministers, a stronger Parliament, the national borders were becoming less important and regions were developing transnational associations and activities (Loughlin, 1996: 162). Although regions were the key actors, Loughlin argued that the significance of regions should not be overestimated. He argued that the old nation-state was indeed possibly disappearing, however, a new type of nation-state was born. This new nation-state would be characterized by more decentralization and regionalization (Loughlin, 1996: 161-162).

**Liesbet Hooge’s and Gary Marks’ criticism on Europe of the regions**

Also Liesbet Hooge and Gary Marks (1996) argued that, although the institutional changes during the 1980s and 1990s brought subnational actors directly into the European arena, the outcome of this
process cannot be captured by the Europe of the regions metaphor (Hooge and Marks, 1996: 90). According to them, the role of the member states had indeed changed, because they no longer played the critical role of intermediary between regions and international relations. Subnational governments were thus no longer nested only within nation-states. They had created dense networks of influence with the European institutions and with other regional governments across Europe (Hooge and Marks, 1996: 90). Member states nevertheless still provided important arenas for subnational influence (Hooge and Marks, 1996: 90). According to Hooge and Marks, the European Union was not evolving towards an overarching model of governance. The absence of such an overarching model ‘is a fundamental feature of the European polity’ (Hooge and Marks, 1996: 91). They described the EU as ‘a variety of mutually exclusive models with widely different conceptions of how authority should be organized territorially’ (Hooge and Marks, 1996: 91). European integration and regionalization would create ‘multilevel governance’: authority relations that are unstable, contested, territorially heterogeneous, and non-hierarchical (Hooge and Marks, 1996: 91). The emergence of a Europe of the regions would mean a replacement of one stable political organization by another. Hooge and Marks describe the institutional changes in the 1980s and 1990s however as ‘a messy process of deconstruction and reconstruction’ (Hooge and Marks, 1996: 91). Multilevel governance therefore entails a conception of the EU as consisting of ‘overlapping competencies among multiple levels of governments and the interaction of political actors across those levels’ (Marks et al., 1996: 167).

The study of regions and regionalism was thus a booming industry in the 1980s and 1990s. A considerable body of work on the Europe of the regions metaphor tried to conceptualize the combined effects of regional assertion and European integration (Keating, 1998: 161). It was a political fashion to suggest that the project Europe was moving towards a Europe of the regions. This idea was especially encouraged by regional authorities, politicians and the European Commission (see also Anderson, 1995). There was indeed, as Borrás-Alomar, Loughlin, Hooge and Marks explained, a redistribution of sovereignty and authority from the member states to the European Commission and to a lesser extent to regional governments (see also Loughlin, 1996). Many writings on Europe of the regions from the 1980s and 1990s argued that European integration indeed encouraged the revival of regionalism; however, they rejected the idea that regions would replace the member states (see also Borrás-Alomar, et al, 1994; Hooge and Marks, 1996; Loughlin, 1996). Most academic scholars rather presented a more complex picture (Keating, 1998: 161), as the three examples above did. Within the debate on what the outcome of the combined effects of regionalization and Europeanization would be, most scholars thus agreed that the EU would not become a European federation of regions in which nation-states no longer exist. The debate among scholars rather focused on the question what the complex picture looks like and how the sovereignty and authority was shared. Susana Borrás-Alomar argued that the regional and European level had gained authority, but that the national level remained dominant (Borrás-Alomar, et al, 1994: 1). John Loughlin supported this claim, though he went a step further by arguing that the EU was becoming a kind of hybrid system and that the institutional and territorial changed in the 1980s and 1990s modified the nation-states because they became more characterized by regionalization (Loughlin, 1996: 161-162). Liesbet Hooge and Gary Marks also described the EU as a very complex system and described dense networks of influence and authority relations that connected regions with other regions and the European institutions (Hooge and Marks, 1996: 90). I do favour their explanation,
because it captures the emergence of a very complex system without underestimate the remaining importance of the member states (Hooge and Marks, 1996: 90). In my opinion, regions and the European Commission played an increasingly important role in a very complex multi-level structure in which the nation states remained dominant. There was indeed some competition between the different levels of governance, but this did not mean that the nation-states were doomed to disappear (see also Keating, 1998: 161). Moreover, I think it is important to realize that the EU was becoming territorially heterogeneous, because it is in my opinion difficult to speak about the ‘regions’ as one group. After all, there were (and are) many differences in economic and political power among these regions. Some regions, such as Baden-Württemberg, Catalonia, Lombardy and Rhône-Alpes, were (and are) economically and/or politically very powerful and had become considerably more important actors than regions in member states such as Portugal and Greece. In these countries, regions were mainly statistical regions, created in order to get European funds, and regional governments were thus weak (see also Anderson and Goodman, 1995; Hooge and Marks, 1996: 74). In short, I do thus reject the idea that the EU was evolving towards a true Europe of the regions, the EU was rather becoming a very complex multi-level structure (or hybrid system) in which different levels coexist and in which the nation states remained dominant. I argue that the Europe of the regions metaphor was therefore not capable of defining this complexity of relations and the heterogeneous territoriality.
3.3 New Medieval Europe

Conceptualizations of the European Union’s territorial and institutional changes in the 1980s and 1990s as a Europe of the regions were highly criticized by many scholars (see also Borrás-Alomar, et al, 1994; Liesbet Hooge and Gary Marks, 1996; Loughlin, 1996). The ‘new medieval Europe’ metaphor was on the contrary favoured by a lot of scholars during this wave of regionalism (see also, Friedrichs, 2001; Anderson, 1996). New medievalism, or sometimes also called neo medievalism, is a stream of literature that uses the political order of the Middle Ages as background for the diagnostic of changes in the political geography of the European Union during the 1980s and 1990s (Friedrichs, 2001: 467). Conceptualizations of the EU’s territoriality as new medieval focus on the fragmentation of national territory (Anderson, 2007: 15). Those scholars who described the EU as new medieval saw this fragmentation as the result of the integration in the Single European Market, which challenged the traditional territorial ‘levels’ (Anderson, 1995: 66). They suggested that this was a transformation in state sovereignty and the way in which people experience and represent space that is comparable to the transformation from medieval to modern sovereignty in the sixteenth century (Anderson, 1995: 68). Territoriality in the Middle Ages was characterized by an absence of clearly defined borders and sharp inside/outside distinctions (Anderson, 1995: 69). In the transformation to modern territoriality and sovereignty, the complex nested hierarchies were displaced by the development of an absolute authority within a clearly demarcated territory. This was in fact the territorialisation of politics and the creation of an ‘internal’ and ‘external’ at state borders (Anderson, 1995: 70). The transformation from modern to new medieval made it again increasingly difficult to distinguish between ‘internal’ and ‘external’, and between ‘foreign’ and ‘domestic’ affairs (Anderson, 1995: 71).

James Anderson explained the new medievalism discourse as a reaction on ‘realist’, ‘functionalist’ and ‘post-nationalist’ interpretations of European integration (Anderson, 1996: 136). The realist school of international relations approaches European integration as intergovernmental relations between independent states. This assumes a traditional conception of territorial sovereignty (Anderson, 1996: 136). The functionalist approach approaches European integration as ‘low politics’ of economic or functional integration in civil society as a means of bypassing the state sovereignty’s ‘high politics’ (Anderson, 1996: 136). Post-nationalism points to the potential of globalization to transform territoriality, and to the transnational economic and cultural interdependencies and networks that shrink the world (Anderson, 1996: 136). Anderson argued that these approaches were all becoming increasingly inadequate for understanding the EU’s territoriality in the 1990s. The essence of their inadequacy is caught in John Agnew’s ‘territorial trap’ that is taken for granted in debates on the territoriality of the state by international relations theorists (Agnew, 1994: 53; Anderson, 1996: 139). Agnew describes this ‘territorial trap’ as the three geographical assumptions that states are the fixed units of geographical space, that there is a clear division of the domestic from the foreign, and that the territorial state existed prior to and as a ‘container’ of society (Agnew, 1994: 76-77). According to Anderson, the realist approach was problematic, because it assumes that states are fixed units of sovereign space. The functionalist approach was inadequate, because it obscures cross-border processes by dichotomising domestic and foreign, and inside and outside. The post-national approach was problematic, because is assumes that the state is the pre-existing container of society (Anderson, 1996: 139). Anderson explained that these approaches capture a traditional ‘one-level’ thinking. This makes them, according to Anderson, completely inappropriate
for understanding the complex political transformations of the 1980s and 1990s (Anderson, 1996: 140). Anderson exemplified this complexity as: ‘we have to deal with multileveled and multifaceted processes which span global regulatory regions, global regions, world cities, sub-state regions and localities, as well as states’ (Anderson, 1996: 140).

The new medieval Europe metaphor thus reacted in a way on the United States of Europe and Europe of the regions metaphors by rejecting their traditional one-level thinking. New medievalism conceptualized territoriality in a postmodern instead of the traditional modern way. This postmodern conceptualization of territoriality involves a partial and selective ‘unbundling’ of sovereignty (Anderson and Goodman, 1995: 603). There are important differences between new medieval Europe and Europe of the regions, although the two metaphors conceptualized the same transformations in the EU’s political geography. The new medieval metaphor did not involve a replacement of a federal or intergovernmental Europe by regionalism. It also conceptualized the pressures on the state ‘from above’ and ‘from below’, but without describing the outcome of this process as ‘the death of the nation-state’ (Anderson, 1995: 85). Anderson and Goodman argued, for example, that ‘the death of the nation state and a Europe of the regions are rather an imagination of ‘over-enthusiastic ‘post-modernists’’(Anderson and Goodman, 1995: 603). New medievalism did thus not predict a federation of regions and a centralized power in a ‘Euro-state’. On the contrary, new medievalism argued that the EU was still territorially based, though in a new form (Anderson and Goodman, 1995: 604). ‘Singular sovereignty’ exercised by member states or the EU as a political collective remained dominant. After all, the integration process was and is controlled by member states (Anderson and Goodman, 1995: 601).

The notion of new medievalism was first used by Arnold Wolvers to describe changes in the international arena in 1962. His main evidence for a tendency towards new medievalism was his observation that the dividing lines between domestic and foreign policy were blurring and that the world was once again faced with ‘double loyalties and overlapping realms of power’ (Friedrichs, 2001: 467). Hedley Bull reconsidered, refined and again dismissed the concept in the mid-1970s (see also Bull, 1977). In the 1990s the concept attracted many scholars and became a common metaphor for the world order and European territoriality (Friedrichs, 2001: 467). In these years, it was often argued that the EU’s territory was evolving towards a divers, plural and complex pattern that had many similarities with medieval territoriality (Anderson, 2007: 15). I will first go into detail about Bull’s discussion of new medievalism, since most of the writings on new medievalism in the 1990s were based on his work (see for example Deibert, 1997; Gamble, 1993; Gamble and Payne 1996; Wæver, 1996). Then I will discuss the writings of Jörg Friedrichs and James Anderson on new medieval Europe. I have selected these two authors because their publications are representative for thinking about new-medievalism in the 1990s. Many other authors referred to their publication. Jörg Friedrichs point of view is furthermore interesting to explain here because his publication shows very well how Hedley Bull’s description of new medievalism influenced scholars in the 1990s. I have selected James Anderson’s publications on new medieval Europe, because he was a leading thinker within this stream of literature who published several articles with detailed explanations of new medieval territoriality.
Hedley Bull's new medievalism

Hedley Bull (1977) explained ‘new medievalism’ in his book *The Anarchical Society*. He speculated about different alternatives to the modern state system and one of these alternatives was a new medieval order (Bull, 1977). Back in 1977, Bull reconsidered and refined this model as a possible future for the world order; however, he also dismissed it. He defined new medievalism as:

‘It is ... conceivable that sovereign states might disappear and be replaced ... by a modern and secular equivalent of the kind of universal political organization that existed in Western Christendom in the Middle Ages. In that system no ruler or state was sovereign in the sense of being supreme over a given territory and a given segment of the Christian population; each had to share authority with vassals beneath, and with the Pope and the Holy Roman Emperor above. The universal political order of Western Christendom represents an alternative to the system of states.... All authority in medieval Christendom was thought to derive ultimately from God and the political system was basically theocratic. It might therefore seem fanciful to contemplate a return to the medieval model, but it is not fanciful to imagine that there might develop a modern and secular counterpart of it that embodies its central characteristic: a system of overlapping authority and multiple loyalty’ (Bull, 1977: 254).

After all, already in 1977, the sovereign states shared the stage of the world politics with ‘other actors’ (Bull, 1977: 237). Bull argued that a new medieval form of universal political order could emerge if modern states would share both their authority over their citizens and their ability to command with world authorities and with substate authorities to such an extent that the concept of sovereignty would no longer be applicable (Bull, 1977: 237).

Bull suggested five evaluation criteria in his book to examine whether the world order is moving towards the new medieval order: first the regional integration of states, second the disintegration of states, third the restoration of private international violence, fourth the existence of transnational organizations, and fifth a technological unification of the world (Bull, 1977: 264-274). According to Bull’s analysis, there were certain tendencies towards the emergence of a new medieval form of universal order in the 1970s, however, he also argued that it was unlikely that the traditional state system would make place for this scenario in the next few decades (Bull, 1977: 275).

Following Bull’s lead, others like Friedrichs (2001) and Anderson (1995; 1996) elaborated on the similarities between territoriality in medieval times and the EU’s territoriality in the 1980s and 1990s. They focused especially on the surface similarities between the cross-cutting and overlapping layers of authority characteristic of both the medieval times and the wave of regionalism in the 1980s and 1990s (Deibert, 1997: 184).

Jörg Friedrichs’ new medievalism

Almost 25 years after Bull had reconsidered, refined and dismissed the new medieval scenario, Jörg Friedrichs redefined Bull’s definition as: ‘a system of overlapping authority and multiple loyalty, held together by a duality competing universalistic claims’ (Friedrichs, 2001: 482). He redefined the concept, because the system Bull described was bound to be very unstable. The decentralization of the Middle Ages was however balanced by the dual universalism of the Empire and the Church (Friedrichs, 2001: 482). Friedrichs also criticized Bull’s definition for focussing too much on
fragmentation. He argued that in reality, ‘medieval order was not only fragmented into a decentralized plurality of authorities and allegiances; as a counterpoise to these centrifugal forces, the social system was held together by Christian universalism’ (Friedrichs, 2001: 485).

Friedrichs used the same criteria as Bull to examine whether the world was moving towards a new medieval order in the beginning of the 20th century. His analysis show that the world, and especially Europe, was evolving towards the new medieval order (Friedrichs, 2001: 484). First, there was increasingly more regional integration in Europe. The EU resembled a ‘dynamic multi-layer system’ (Friedrichs, 2001: 484). Second, there were examples of disintegration states (for example Yugoslavia) (Friedrichs, 2001: 484). Third, private international violence was re-emerging, especially in the form of terrorism and organized crime (Friedrichs, 2001: 484). Fourth, there was a trend of proliferation and increasing significance of international NGO’s and multinational corporations (Friedrichs, 2001: 484). Fifth, there was a progressive technological unification, especially in the area of information technologies (Friedrichs, 2001: 484). Friedrich used this as evidence for his claim that there were trends towards new medievalism (Friedrichs, 2001: 484).

He explained new medievalism as a tool to understand the world order ‘after Westphalia’. This makes it different from the study of international politics that predominantly presumes the existence of the modern nation state system (Friedrichs, 2001: 467). The new medieval metaphor was also an answer to ‘the triple dilemma of international relation theory’ (Friedrichs, 2001: 478). Friedrichs defined this dilemma as meandering, in the face of globalization and local fragmentation, between:

1. The traditional state-centric approach that was dominant over the last 50 years;
2. The discourse about globalization, according to which the nation-state is being eroded by the forces of economic, technological and societal transformations;
3. The discourse of fragmentation, according to which the nation-state is being eroded by the emergence and re-emergence of the cleavages along ethnic, cultural and religious lines (Friedrichs, 2001: 479).

These three perspectives all captured a part of the reality, but failed to account for other fundamental aspects (Friedrichs, 2001: 479). According to Friedrichs, medievalism has the ability to overcome this triple dilemma. The main problem is that scholars have much difficulty in imagining a world with more than one organising principle (Friedrichs, 2001: 479). Friedrichs explained that from an empirical perspective, the modern state system was moving simultaneously in two opposite directions: on the one hand towards global integration and on the other hand towards local fragmentation. Medievalism had the ability to conceptualize ‘the trend towards simultaneous globalization and fragmentation in a world of nation-states’ (Friedrichs, 2001: 479).

**James Anderson’s new medieval Europe**

In the 1990s, Anderson suggested that there was a need for new ways of thinking about politics, states, and territories, because of changing time-space relations, known in David Harvey’s words as ‘space-time compression’. In these new realities, traditional nation-states increasingly shared the world stage with international actors (Anderson, 1996: 134). This made it increasingly difficult to distinguish unambiguously between ‘foreign’ and ‘domestic’ affairs, and between the ‘inside’ and the
‘outside’ of a territory. ‘New medievalism opened up interesting questions about overlapping sovereignties and the increasing complexity of territories’ (Anderson and Goodman, 1995: 602).

According to Anderson, there was more happening than borders becoming porous, in fact, ‘the world turned inside out and outside in’ (Anderson, 1996: 133). Especially the geography of the European Union changed: ‘the ‘nation-states’ in the EU are ... being eroded ‘from below’ by regionalism and ‘from above’ by EU institutions and globalization’ (Anderson, 1996: 133). Central EU institutions and the Single European Market encouraged sub-state regionalism. Instead of involving himself in the debate whether the EU was evolving towards a intergovernmental organization or a federal state, he speculated that the future had already arrived in the form of a new medieval system: ‘Maybe ‘this is it’... something quite different from both, an ‘intermediate’ form which is distinct in its own right rather than merely ‘transitional’’ (Anderson and Goodman, 1995: 607). He referred here to John Ruggie’s ‘postmodern EU’, which is neither a traditional intergovernmental organization nor a federal state (Ruggie, 1993: 171). Postmodern EU is a Union characterized by the ‘unbundling’ of territory, as opposite to the ‘bundling’ of territory in the medieval to modern transformation (Ruggie, 1993: 172). This process was accelerated by growing transnational interdependency and ‘space-time compression’ (Anderson and Goodman, 1995: 607). Unbundled territory included ‘various types of functional regimes, common markets, political communities, and the like’ (Ruggie, 1993: 164-165).

To understand this bundling and unbundling of territory, it is necessary to look back to the pre-modern territorialities and the transformation to the modern nation-state. Nation-states and nationalism are now firmly stamped in the world map, but were unimagined and unimaginable in the Middle Ages (Anderson, 1996: 140). That means that we cannot take for granted that they are ‘natural’ and unchangeable (Anderson, 1996: 140). During the Middle Ages, people in Europe identified themselves with communities and political units which were in general a lot smaller than contemporary states. These small units (dioceses, manors, guilds and cities) were often hierarchically embedded in larger political and cultural entities (the Church of Rome, the Hanseatic League, the Habsburg Empire) (Anderson, 1996: 140). Political sovereignty was not based on territory per se with precise and fixed borders, but shared between a wide range of secular and religious institutions and different levels of authority. The medieval European territories were therefore discontinuous and the borders were ill-defined fluid frontier zones (Anderson, 1996: 141). People were not directly members of higher-level collectivities, but by virtue of their membership of lower level bodies (Anderson, 1996: 141). The different levels of overlapping sovereignty constituted ‘nested’ hierarchies (Anderson, 1996: 141). Politics were later territorialized in the transition from medieval to modern (Anderson, 1996: 141). Modern states with clear borders and a division between ‘us’ and ‘them’ were created and territorial sovereignty was ‘democratized’ as something that could only be exercised by ‘the nation’ (Anderson, 1996: 141). This is however not a natural or given situation, since pre-modern territories were characterized by variety, fluidity, no territoriality or nonexclusive territoriality (Anderson, 1996: 141).

Space was regaining some of the fluidity of the medieval era in the modern-to-postmodern transformation (Anderson, 1996: 144). There are however three important differences between the medieval and the new medieval era. First, the experience of democracy. New medievalism gives citizens a possibility to respond to the unbundling of EU territory, by either voting against the transfer of powers from national government to EU institutions, or accepting this transfer and reducing the democratic deficit by strengthening the European Parliament (Anderson, 1995: 103). A
second difference is the lack of ‘universalism’ that stemmed from medieval Christendom. The transformation from modern to new medieval happened predominantly within the EU and not all over the globe (Anderson, 1995: 103). Third, the relative absence of ordered hierarchies. In medieval Europe, sovereignty was divided between different institutions and hierarchies. People could only be a member of higher-level collectivities by virtue of their membership of lower level bodies. This is called nested hierarchies (Anderson, 1995: 103). The hierarchies of new medieval territoriality are not nested, because people are often directly members of transnational institutions. Small local groups can increasingly deal directly with transnational institutions or their counterparts in other nation states. The involvement of the respective states is no longer necessary (Anderson, 1995: 103).

Anderson explained that this territorial unbundling developed furthest in the European Union. Sovereignty was rather getting undermined and diffused than clearly relocated (Anderson, 1996: 146). There were two interrelated developments in the EU: regional integration of states into lager units and the disintegration of these states into smaller units. (Anderson, 1996: 146). The EU also showed that the unbundling of state sovereignty was highly selective. It varied much between different state roles. Some powers, predominantly in the field of economic policy, were ceded to the European Commission. At that time, there had been less ceding of powers in areas such as security and defence, and hardly in the welfare policy (Anderson and Goodman, 1995: 609). Because the unbundling is selective, new medieval territoriality could be more complex than medieval territoriality (Anderson and Goodman, 1995: 609). Anderson argued that the selectivity and partiality of unbundling resulted in a complex mixture of old, new and hybrid forms of association and authority coexisting and interacting within Europe (Anderson, 1996: 149). Territoriality was becoming less dominant as mode of social organization. On the contrary, ‘Nonterritorial’ and ‘transterritorial’ authority was regaining some of the importance it used to have in the Middle Ages (Anderson, 1996: 149). The EU became, according to Anderson, multiperspective in some respects, although singular sovereignty remained dominant in many areas. After all, much policy was still made by individual member states or by the EU as political collective (Anderson, 1996: 149).

I agree with Friedrichs that the EU was evolving towards a dynamic multi-layer system (Friedrichs, 2001: 484). Moreover, I agree that state-centric approaches, globalization approaches that predict the death of the nation-states, and a Europe of the regions approach that assumes a replacement of nation-states by regions as fixed containers of space, are not capable of defining the EU’s complex territoriality in the 1980s and 1990s (Friedrichs, 2001: 479). The new medieval metaphor is part of the same debate as the Europe of the regions metaphor on how the combined effects of regionalization and European integration should be defined. I like the new medieval approach, because the comparison with medieval territoriality brings the evolving divers, plural and complex pattern of the territoriality in the 1980s and 1990s to the light. In my opinion, the new medieval Europe metaphor is a very meaningful contribution to this debate, because it is able to overcome the triple dilemma of international relation theory (Friedrichs, 2001: 478), which was in my opinion essential in order to conceptualize the emerging complexities.

Descriptions of the EU’s territoriality as new medievalism have in fact important similarities with concepts and descriptions such as ‘multilevel governance’ (Hooge and Marks, 1996: 91) and a ‘hybrid system where nation-states continue to exist’ (Loughlin, 1996: 162). These descriptions all attempt to
conceptualize the simultaneous tendencies of globalization and regionalization in the European Union in which nation-states continue to exist and remain important. Moreover, they all point towards the emerging complexities in the EU’s institutional and/or territorial organisation. Instead of being competing visions, they were rather different approaches for conceptualizing the same institutional and territorial complexities. Although I do favour Anderson’s writings on new medievalism, I can therefore not agree with him that new medievalism was the only adequate way to describe European territoriality and sovereignty in the 1980s and 1990s. A debate in which scholars tried to find metaphors and concepts in which territoriality is not exclusively national, or regional, or European was in my opinion needed, however, a concept such as multilevel governance is also able to overcome the triple dilemma of international relation theory. Moreover, in fact, there are important parallels between multilevel governance and new medievalism, because they both point to overlapping authorities (see also Aalberts, 2004). As Aalberts (2004) explains, the picture presented by multilevel governance bears a resemblance to new-medievalism (Aalberts, 2004: 33). An advantage of the new medieval metaphor is however that it is very well able to describe the territorial changes as unbundling (Ruggie, 1993: 172) by referring to the transformation from modern to new medieval territoriality (Anderson, 1996: 144). I thus favour the approach of placing the territorial changes in the 1980s and 1990s in a broader development of a transformation from medieval to modern and from modern to new medieval. The term new medieval Europe itself is on the contrary rather problematic, because it is difficult to imagine what this Europe looks like without a detailed explanation of what this new medievalism is.
3.4 Considering Europe of the regions and new medieval Europe

In the previous paragraphs, I have discussed the processes of regionalization and Europeanization that caused territorial changes in the European Union during the 1980s and 1990s. The two most commonly used metaphors to conceptualize these changes, the Europe of the regions and the new medieval Europe metaphors, describe the same wave of regionalism, however in a very different way. In this paragraph, I will give my point of view on these two approaches; moreover, I will clearly explain my position within the debates about how the EU’s territorial changes in the 1980s and 1990s should be defined.

I argue that the Europe of the regions metaphor is problematic for two reasons. One of its main weaknesses is that the metaphor gives a utopian description of the EU that was not (becoming) reality. The Commission’s policies that had the aim to strengthen the regions in Europe and to shift authority and sovereignty to the subnational and supranational level were indeed an attempt to weaken the nation-states in order to make the creation of a European state possible. I nevertheless argue that neither the Commission nor the nation-states had the aim to fade away the member states and replace them by regions. After all, the Europe of the regions was not the objective of the EU’s regional policy. The regional level became indeed increasingly important and gained authority, however, most of these regions did not want to become independent from their nation-states and did not want to place themselves under the institutional umbrella of the European Community. Regions were rather getting more important because they provided a way to get European funds. Some member states even constructed statistical regions in order to be able to get European regional funds (see also Anderson and Goodman, 1995: 617). The idea of a Europe of the regions seems therefore overblown. In my opinion, the regional politicians and Commission officials who described the EU as a Europe of the regions highly underestimated the power of nation-states and overestimated the power of the European Commission and regional governments. After all, the sovereignty, authority and policies that shifted from the nation-states to the regional level and the European level were selective and partial (Anderson and Goodman, 1995: 603). Even though the EU’s sovereignty was to some extend unbundling, it was, as Anderson explained, rather getting undermined and diffused than clearly relocated to the supranational and subnational level (Anderson, 1996: 146). I argue that it was naive to believe that the EU was seriously becoming a Europe of the regions, since the integration process was and is controlled by its member states (see also Anderson and Goodman, 1995: 601). This means that sovereignty could only be relocated to the European Union or the regional authorities if the member states’ governments agreed with this. It was of course highly unlikely that those nation-states would support Commission officials and regional politicians in the creation of a decentralized federation of regions in Europe that meant that the nation-states would die. I therefore argue that this shows that those people who believed in the idea of a Europe of the regions overestimated the power of both the European Union and regional governments.

A second problematic aspect of the Europe of the regions metaphor is that it assumed a traditional one-level thinking. According to Agnew, some international relations theorists assume that the state
is the ‘container’ of society and that it is a fixed unit of geographical space with a clear inside/outside division (Agnew, 1994). The idea of a Europe of the regions suggests in fact that these states will be replaced by regions. The regions of Europe would then become the new ‘containers’ of society and fixed geographical units with a clear inside and a clear outside (Borràs-Alomar, et al, 1994). I argue however that conceptualization of the territorial changes in the 1980s and 1990s should not assume this ‘territorial trap’, since this one-level thinking was inadequate in a Europe where sovereignty, authority and policies were partially and selectively shifted to other government levels and where market liberalization rather blurred the divisions between inside and outside (see also Anderson and Goodman, 1995). The regional policy, as described in paragraph 3.1, perfectly shows that policies were partly and selectively shared between the different government levels. The policy was not defined, funded and executed by one level of governance, but these tasks were shared among subnational governments, national governments and the Commission (Loughlin, 1996: 154). I argue therefore that it is impossible to understand these changes in the EU’s political geography with an approach that assumes a one-level thinking in which member states are vanishing and in which regions are understood as clearly demarcated units.

Because we should not forget that there were indeed changes in the EU’s political geography that asked for a new vocabulary to accommodate the processes of Europeanization and regionalization, I like Borràs-Alomar’s idea of a ‘Europe with, not of, the regions’ (see also Borràs-Alomar, et al, 1994). It suggested that both regions and the EU were becoming more important without doing injustice to the continuing significance of the nation-state (see also Borràs-Alomar, et al, 1994). I nevertheless also criticize her metaphor because it refrains from describing the selective and partial unbundling of territory (Ruggie, 1993: 172). Loughlin’s description of a Europe of the regions as ‘a kind of hybrid system where nation-states continue to exist, but in a considerably modified form alongside the institutions of the EU and regions with enhanced political and policymaking roles’ is therefore an better conceptualization (Loughlin, 1996: 162). I also favour his writings on Europe of the regions, because he understood that the EU was laying the basis for becoming more like a federation (Loughlin, 1996: 162). Another good conceptualization of the regionalization and Europeanization in the 1980s and 1990s is the concept ‘multilevel governance’ of Liesbet Hooge and Gary Marks. They describe the outcome of these processes as unstable, contested, territorially heterogeneous, and non-hierarchical authority relations (Hooge and Marks, 1996: 91). They thus understood that the EU’s territoriality was becoming very complex. They furthermore understood that although the EU’s member states were no longer intermediary between regions and international relations, they remained a very important arena for subnational influence (Hooge and Marks, 1996: 90). I thus favour their concept of multilevel governance, because they do not underestimate the power of the nation-states, moreover, their description of ‘a messy process of deconstruction and reconstruction’ breaks with the traditional one-level thinking (Hooge and Marks, 1996: 91).

I prefer the new medieval Europe metaphor above the idea of a Europe of the regions because it conceptualized changes in the EU’s political geography that are not described in the Europe of the regions metaphor: the challenging of self-contained territorial levels by the integration in the Single European Market (see also Anderson, 2007: 15). Where the Europe of the regions metaphor replaced the traditional state-centric approach by a region-centric approach, new medievalism rejected both. Moreover, the new medieval metaphor fortunately did not predict the death of the nation-states as
a result of eroding by globalization and/or the discourse of fragmentation (see also Friedrichs, 2001: 478). In other words, I favour the new medieval metaphor because it describes that the nation-states in the Community were not simply replaced by regions, but that the EU was evolving towards a very complex system in which the nation-states continue to exists alongside a stronger subnational and supranational level and where authority and sovereignty was selectively and partially shared between these three levels.

I am however not uncritical towards the idea of a new medieval Europe. Although I like most writings on this metaphor, the concept itself is somewhat vague. Every use of new medievalism needs quite some explanation what this new medievalism means, since it is not very clear (in contradiction to metaphors such as the United States of Europe and Europe of the regions) to what new medievalism refers.

I favour most writings on new medieval Europe because they did not describe the regionalization and Europeanization in the 1980s and 1990s as a replacement of a federal or intergovernmental policy by a federation of regions and a European state. It gave a much more truthful description of the changes in the EU’s territoriality. There was selective and partial ceding of sovereignty to the European Commission and sub-state governments that resulted in porous and fuzzy internal borders, however, the sovereignty of member states, who controlled the integration process, remained dominant (see also Anderson, 1996). This is perfectly illustrated by James Anderson who explained the unbundling of territory that resulted in a complex mixture of old, new and hybrid forms of association and authority that coexisted and interacted within Europe (Anderson, 1996: 149). I like the way that Anderson described that the territoriality in the EU was a mixture of both old and traditional authority, such as the nation-states, and new forms of authority, such as the European Union. In my opinion, this is a fundamental distinguishing feature of new medievalism.

I thus prefer the new medieval Europe metaphor above the Europe of the regions because it also points to a simultaneous development of Europeanization and regionalization, however, it also conceptualizes a complex system in which national territoriality is fragmentised, in which national borders downgrade and lose their sharp inside/outside dichotomy (see also Anderson, 2007: 15). As I have explained, the term new medieval Europe is nevertheless problematic, because it is a first glance unclear what this Europe looks like. Multilevel governance, which also points to multiple levels of governments with overlapping authority and the interaction of actors across the regional, national and European levels (Marks et al., 1996: 167), is therefore a much clearer term to describe the institutional and territorial complexity that emerged during the 1980s and 1990s.

I suggest redefining Bull’s definition of new medieval territoriality, ‘a system of overlapping authority and multiple loyalty’, in such a way that it also describes that the European integration process was controlled by nation-states. A good definition of EU’s changing territoriality should in my opinion furthermore incorporate that it was, as Hooge and Marks showed, characterized by unstable, contested, heterogeneous authority (Hooge and Marks, 1996: 91). Hooge and Marks also argued that the EU was non-hierarchical (Hooge and Marks, 1996: 91). I nevertheless do not incorporate that in my definition, because the fact that nation-states controlled the integration process suggests that there was not a total lack of hierarchy. I furthermore argue that a good definition should describe the EU’s authority as a mixture of old and new forms of authority. Finally, I also argue that it should be
very clear that the unbundling of territory is partial and selective (Anderson and Goodman, 1995: 603).

Because the new medieval Europe metaphor has a disadvantage because of the vagueness of the concept itself, I prefer to describe the outcome of the simultaneous processes of Europeanization and regionalization in the 1980s and 1990s as a multilevel Europe, which I define as:

*Multilevel Europe is a system that is a mixture of old, new and hybrid forms of unstable, contested, heterogeneous, and overlapping authority and multiple loyalty in which the partial and selective ceding and pooling of authority and sovereignty is controlled by nation-states.*

As I have explained in this chapter, the focus of the European Commission on regions and the shift of authority to the subnational and supranational level are part of the development towards a European state (even though it is not sure that the EU will actually become a replication of the nation-state). The creation of a common market and hence the vanishing of internal borders raised questions about the safety of this common area. The creation of a single space triggered a wish to demarcate and border the European entity (Islam, 1994: 38). After all, a European state in the making needs a clear understanding of what belongs, and what does not belong to the entity. The demarcation, bordering and securing of the common space inspired scholars, politicians, the media and artists to construct new metaphors to describe the EU’s political geography. This will be discussed in the next chapter.
4 The EU’s external dimensions

Scholars, politicians, the media and even artists have been emphasizing on the external dimensions of the EU’s territory since recently. Either by stressing on the policing of Europe’s external borders and its restrictive immigration policy or by stressing on its tendency to govern regions behind its own external borders in order to export stability, security and prosperity. The former has resulted in the construction of the fortress Europe metaphor that refers to the idea of a closed and inward looking Union (see also Islam, 1994). The latter has resulted in the construction of the Europe as an empire metaphor that implies that the authority of the EU does not stop at its own external borders (see also Anderson, 2007).
4.1 Fortress Europe

‘Fortress Europe’ is probably one of the most well known metaphors of the European Union. It has been claimed that the EU is evolving towards a fortress since the end of the 1980s (see also Albrecht, 2002). The metaphor has particularly been used by scholars, politicians, the media and even artist to describe the EU’s restrictive asylum policy and the policing of its external borders. In contradiction to the metaphors discussed in the previous chapters, the agents of European consciousness who have constructed the idea of fortress Europe do not use this metaphor in order to describe a desired future of Europe. Fortress Europe is rather used as a pejorative term and a description of an undesirable present or future (see for example GUE/NGL, 2008). Supporters of the EU’s immigration policy would surely not describe this in such a negative and pejorative way.

The successful abolition of internal border controls and the creation of a common market with economic and social cohesion triggered concerns about the safety and stability of the internal space. Since the border controls of the member states were removed as part of the creation of a United States of Europe, a new common external frontier became needed to protect the entire Union (see also Geddes, 2001; Harvey, 2000). The Commission has therefore created common European asylum and immigration policies; moreover, the external borders have been increasingly policed (see also Albrecht, 2002). Scholars, politicians, the media and artists have very often described these developments as the creation of a fortress Europe.

Fortress Europe was initially used to describe the EC’s protectionist economic policy that had the aim to keep out competing foreign goods and services (Islam, 1994: 37). Especially foreign businesses had mixed feelings towards the creation of the Single European Market. Although the removal of internal borders would create opportunities for businesses already active within the Single European Market, they feared that the European Community would adopt a more protectionist stance towards third countries in order to protect the internal market (Zanzi, 1989: 32). The Community was therefore often described as a fortress (Zanzi, 1989: 32). The opposite however happened in the years after 1992. Foreign economic relations with the world were further liberalized (Martin, 2009).

The fortress metaphor did however not disappear, but became charged with a more sinister meaning when the first signs of a common EU immigration policy became visible and many politicians and scholars argued that the creation of a fortress Europe was to the disadvantage of the developing world, refugees, asylum seekers and the poor (Albrecht, 2002: 1). These voices, demanding for a more open Europe, grew louder during the 1990s. They reflected both the concerns that were raised by partisans of human rights and critics of alleged negative effects of globalization (Albrecht, 2002: 1). European police forces and ministries of home affairs demanded, on the contrary, for harder borders and policies that would cut down the number of immigrants to the EU member states (Albrecht, 2002: 1). A wide range of political parties and the media participated in and profited from the discourse on safety, crime and immigration. From their perspective, a fortress Europe points to the urgent need for the exclusion of risks in order to pursuit safety and economic and social stability (Albrecht, 2002: 1).

The fortress Europe metaphor reacts in a way on the conceptualizations of the EU’s political geography as federal, intergovernmental and new medieval by emphasizing on the external
dimensions of the territory (see for example Albrecht, 2002; Geddes, 2001). The federal, intergovernmental and new medieval metaphors were predominantly concerned with the internal shape of the EU’s territory (Anderson, 2007: 14-15). I argue that the fortress Europe metaphor therefore reacts on the previous metaphors, since it describes and theorizes a dimension of the EU that has not had much attention from scholars yet.

The use of the fortress Europe metaphor, especially by the media, is very extensive. I will first elaborate on the changes in migration and changes in the EU’s immigration and asylum policy that are the political and social circumstances in which this metaphor is constructed. After that, I will discuss several examples of how politicians, the media, artists and scholars have contributed to the construction of the idea of a fortress Europe.

4.1.1 The emergence of a restrictive European immigration policy

Since the end of the 1980s, politicians and the media have increasingly focussed on the issue of international migration. The issue came also into the limelight of European policy by growing actual immigration from Eastern Europe and Africa (Leitner, 1995: 260). The pool of potential immigrants was growing because of the opening of borders between the former communist countries in the east of Europe and Western Europe; moreover, there was a sharp gradient in welfare between the EU and countries in Eastern Europe and Africa (Leitner, 1995: 260). The growing immigration constituted new challenges to the Western European countries that received migrants (Leitner, 1995: 260). Most EU nations had been active recruiters of migrant labour in the 1950s and 1960s. Many guest workers, mainly semi-skilled and unskilled workers from the Mediterranean basin, were given permission to come to Western European countries during these decades (Leitner, 1995: 264). The Western European countries demanded the labour and it was thus a primarily self-interested way in dealing with foreigners (Leitner, 1995: 264). Most of them stopped recruiting guest workers by the 1970s and introduced, on the contrary, restrictive immigration policies (Leitner, 1995: 265). Their labour markets did demand increasingly less foreign labour because of the economic recession of the early 1970s (Leitner, 1995: 265). The mostly economically and socially marginal foreigners were now seen as a ‘problem’ because of the many cultural differences. They often lived in highly concentrated bad housing and sometimes even in inner city ‘ghetto’ areas; moreover, there were high unemployment and school dropout rates among the children of the guest workers (Leitner, 1995: 265). The receiving countries were afraid that this social situation could constitute a potential source of social unrest (Leitner, 1995: 265). Xenophobia and racism were rising among the indigenous citizens of the receiving countries and most European states became increasingly defensive and raised barriers to exclude immigrants (Leitner, 1995: 260).

The new focus on the controlling of the EU’s external borders was also triggered by the Schengen Treaties and the abolition of border controls between most Western European countries. These changes in the EU’s spatialities raised concerns about the safety of the Union in the 1990s (Albrecht, 2002: 1). Commission officials said that it was clear that the dismantling of Europe’s internal borders made it necessary to make sure that the controls at the external borders of their shared territory were reliable (Islam, 1994: 40). Strengthening the control of the external borders of the Schengen
space has therefore become one of the main measures to reduce unwanted migration (Albrecht, 2002: 2).

Both the removal of barriers to the mobility of capital, commodities and labour in order to create freedom of movement within the Schengen space and the restriction of possibilities for non EU-citizens to travel inspired scholars, politicians and media to use the fortress Europe metaphor as a critical and sometimes pejorative explanation of the EU’s changing territoriality (Kofman and Sales, 1992: 29). Besides greatly strengthening its external border controls, the EU also improved the internal surveillance. Fortress Europe thus became a commonly used metaphor for the effects of the Single European Market on the EU’s external borders and its internal surveillance (Kofman and Sales, 1992: 29).

The integration in the Single European Market was a big step in the unification of the European Union (Zanzi, 1989: 32). The European integration process was brought to a standstill by the oil shocks of the 1970s and the following reversal of member states towards a protectionist standing (Zanzi, 1989: 32). The economic prosperity of the mid-1980s, together with the admission of Greece, Spain and Portugal, and together with the improved political relations with the eastern flanks of Europe, resulted in a new trust for taking further steps towards a unified Europe (Zanzi, 1989: 33). The economic scenario in the mid-1980s was characterized by the declining price of oil, an overvalued dollar, and the restructuring of European industries. This resulted in a less protectionist climate between member states (Zanzi, 1989: 33). It became as a result possible to shift the politics of admission and exclusion to the supra-national plane, combined with a trend of creating a European identity and citizenship in order to match who belongs to the inside (Leitner, 1995: 264).

The Schengen space was created by the Schengen Accord of 1985. It was initially signed by Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France and Germany. The accord was joined by Italy in 1990, followed by Spain and Portugal in 1991, and Greece in 1992 (Islam, 1994: 41). The Treaty implementing the Schengen Accord, which is now part of the European Union treaties, adopted rules that established:

- a common regime of control of immigration into the Schengen area;
- a common practice of issuing visas;
- harmonization of criminal offence statutes as regards smuggling and trafficking of immigrants;
- a common framework of asylum procedures;
- a common structure of duties of transportation companies in terms of controlling visa and immigration requirements (Albrecht, 2002: 10).

The Schengen Information System (SIS) made it possible to exchange information on immigrants and visas and to better control illegal immigration (Albrecht, 2002: 10).

The Schengen rules were soon reinforced by the implementation of ‘a programme of collecting and analysing permanently intelligence on immigration and a call for measures to control smuggling and trafficking activities’ (Albrecht, 2002: 10). The Commission also established close cooperation with sending and transit countries to reduce illegal migration (Albrecht, 2002: 10). The Treaty of Amsterdam, signed in 1999, moved the rules for visa, asylum and immigration from the third pillar to
the first pillar and was therefore one of the most important moves towards the creation and implementation of a common immigration and asylum policy (Albrecht, 2002: 11). The Amsterdam Treaty shifted the policy from ‘pillarization’ to ‘communitarization’, in other words, a shift from an intergovernmentally-based cooperation to a more Community-based approach (Geddes, 2001: 21). This means that immigration and asylum policy moved closer to normal EU decision-making processes and that the Commission, the Parliament and the European Court of Justice now also play an important role in these policy fields (Geddes, 2001: 22). Some scholars explain this shift to a Community-based immigration policy as a sign that member states are losing control. Such explanations highlight the role played by supranational institutions such as the European Commission and point to general tendencies of globalization effecting state sovereignty (Geddes, 2001: 28). There are however also scholars who argue that states do not lose power, but rather use the EU to escape domestic legal and political constraints in order to restrict unwanted migration (Geddes, 2001: 28).

Another factor that has encouraged a restrictive immigration policy was the mingling of the topic of immigration with other sensitive issues such as ethnic differences, nationality, identity, national identities, order, safety and stability. Migration became as a result linked with organized crime, human trafficking and the emerging shadow economies (for example prostitution and sweatshop labour) (Albrecht, 2002: 2). Crime, deviance and conflict even characterized the dominant perspective on immigration and ethnic minorities (Albrecht, 2002: 2). Foreign and international terrorism has also been linked to immigrants and immigration. This dates back to the seventies and is thus not a new phenomenon; however, the 11th of September 2001 terrorist acts in New York and Washington have clearly even more mingled immigration and terrorism (Albrecht, 2002: 2). Hans-Jörg Albrecht argues that the ‘fortress’ rhetoric can therefore be explained by ‘safety feelings’ and crime: ‘as is demonstrated through the creation and implementation of the Schengen treaties the immigration topic has grown into a most significant concept as regards the European Union policies with respect to crime and crime control’ (Albrecht, 2002: 5)

Control of illegal immigration has become a way to distinguish between genuine politically motivated refuges and economic migrants (Albrecht, 2002: 5). Another important purpose of the restrictive immigration policy is to separate migrants who could be a threat for the EU’s order, stability and peace from migrants who are wanted for their professional skills (Albrecht, 2002: 5). The unwanted and thus illegal migrants in contemporary society can be compared with the ‘Lumpenproletariat’ and the ‘dangerous classes’ in the metropolitan areas that emerged in the 19th century (Albrecht, 2002: 17). They are the ‘dangerous classes’ in postmodern society, the ‘risks in need of management and control’ (Albrecht, 2002: 17).

The creation of a common European immigration and asylum policy as described above follows mainly from the desire to create free movement within an internal market that is safe and stable (Harvey, 2000: 374). Colin Harvey explains that membership of and belonging to the EU thus creates the exclusion of others. After all, he clarifies, ‘supranationalism requires a process of boundary drawing just as much as nationalism’ (Harvey, 2000: 374). Besides, distrust and a culture of hostility towards ‘strangers’ is encouraged by the grand narrative of ‘abuse’ (Harvey, 2000: 374). He also says that a boundary between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and the construction of mechanisms to ensure inclusion
cannot be wished away, because it is the consequence of the ambitious aims of the European Union (Harvey, 2000: 374). Helga Leitner explains these politics of admission and exclusion as: ‘freedom of exit is considered by most nation-states to be a basic human right; whereas freedom of entry into nation-states is universally denied as a legal right’ (Leitner, 1995: 261). On the contrary, the access of foreigners to a nation state’s territory is even considered as a privilege extended by the nation-state on its own terms. After all, the right to control and deny admission of foreigners is often seen as crucial to a nation state’s sovereignty and territorial integrity (Leitner, 1995: 261).

### 4.1.2 How politicians make a plea against fortress Europe

Some politicians, such as the members of the European parliamentary group European United Left/Nordic Green left (GUE/NGL), which is a collaboration of leftwing politicians in the European Parliament, have contributed to the construction of the fortress Europe metaphor by using it to criticize the EU’s restrictive immigration and asylum policy and the policing of the Union’s external borders (see for example GUE/NGL, 2008). One of the most clear examples is their ‘No Fortress Europe Campaign’. According to the GUE/NGL, the EU’s immigration policy is ‘negative’ and characterized by an ‘extreme repressiveness in dealing with illegal migrants’ (GUE/NGL, 2008: 4). The campaign therefore has the aim to win over public opinion for closing down all the detention centres in the EU and creating a less restrictive immigration policy (GUE/NGL, 2008: 4). Campaigns like these contribute to the construction of the idea of a fortress Europe by telling a normative story of the EU’s asylum and immigration policy, supported by maps and pictures. I discuss the ‘No Fortress Europe Campaign’ of the GUE/NGL in this thesis to show how politicians can contribute to the construction of a metaphor and in particular the fortress Europe metaphor. I have selected this example because this parliamentary group has been very active in making a plea against fortress Europe, moreover, they have used a variety of texts, maps, and pictures to support their claim, which makes it a good illustrative example. This does however not mean that their opinion with regard to the EU’s immigration and asylum policy or the fortress Europe metaphor is representative for politicians or politics in general.

The GUE/NGL criticizes the EU’s asylum and immigration policy for being neo-liberal and for depriving humanity of freedom of movement (GUE/NGL, 2008: 5). According to them, a fortress Europe has been created in a world where ‘poverty has been increasing and the gap between rich and poor growing’ (GUE/NGL, 2008: 5). The EU’s migration policy has brought about a society in which different cultures ‘keep themselves to themselves and are regarded with suspicion’ (GUE/NGL, 2008: 5). A ‘pre-packaged notion that migrants, particularly Muslim migrants, are dangerous’ has been constructed and thereby, as Giusto Catania MEP argues, has helped to feed ‘the clash of civilizations’ (GUE/NGL, 2008: 5). This parliamentary group explains that the EU is now a fortress that restricts opportunities to travel around the world and to flee war, moreover, the external borders of the fortress have become an obstacle for cultural and human exchanges (GUE/NGL, 2008: 5).

This parliamentary group furthermore argues in their campaign that the EU has an obsession with security and uses a rhetoric of invasion to demonstrate that migrants who seek for refuge or work in the EU are dangerous. The Union therefore identifies those migrants as criminals or terrorists (GUE/NGL, 2008: 22). This rhetoric of security in its asylum and immigration policy has taken priority after the events of 11 September 2001 and the terrorist attacks on London and Madrid (GUE/NGL,
The GUE/NGL says that this seems to be even more important in contemporary society than human rights and democratic values (GUE/NGL, 2008: 22). They argue that the EU’s obsession with security can be observed in the creation of the fortress by ‘stepping up controls and ‘rapid response forces’ at the external borders of the EU, abolishing asylum and protection for refugees and further repressing economic migration’ (GUE/NGL, 2008: 22). The GUE/NGL questions whether it is really necessary for the EU ‘to use rapid border intervention teams, which have the right to arrest, bear arms, use their weapons, and act violently like Special Forces with advanced technological equipment, in order to deal with ragged migrants’ (GUE/NGL, 2008: 22). The EU’s migration policy is therefore explained as ‘designed to reinforce the mechanisms of forced repatriation of ‘illegal’ migrants’ and thus ‘the mass deportations of economic migrants and refugees’ (GUE/NGL, 2008: 22). Millions of migrants throughout the EU are kept in an illegal or quasi-illegal regime. They often have poorly paid and insecure work, no fundamental employment rights and are excluded from access to basic social and political rights (GUE/NGL, 2008: 22).

The GUE/NGL collected signatures, launched an internet site, organized public meetings and photo exhibitions in order to resist against fortress Europe (see also www.no-fortress-europe.eu). They used especially maps and pictures to support their normative stories of a fortress. Map 4.1 is one of those maps. The borders of the Schengen space are clearly demarcated with a red line. The blue circles along the external borders of the Schengen space show the places where illegal migrants tried to enter fortress Europe and the amount of migrants who died. The GUE/NGL explains that these deaths ‘can be put down to border militarization, asylum laws, detention policies, deportations and carrier sanctions’ (www.no-fortress-europe.eu). They are linked to the implementation of decisions taken at the highest political level: the Schengen Treaty, the Dublin Convention and EU border control programmes’ (www.no-fortress-europe.eu).

Map 4.1 The fatal consequences of ‘fortress Europe’: over 8100 deaths. Map used by the GUE/NGL in their ‘No Fortress Europe Campaign’. (www.no-fortress-europe.eu)
The GUE/NGL also used pictures in their normative story about fortress Europe (see also (GUE/NGL, 2008; www.no-fortress-europe.eu). These are mainly pictures of ‘illegal’ migrants, temporary holding centres and the extremely policed borders. In other words, they use pictures of the places where many unwanted migrants try to enter the ‘fortress’. These are the Spanish enclaves Ceuta and Melilla in Northern Morocco, the Italian island Lampedusa between Sicily and Africa, the Canary Islands and Malta. They call these places the ‘southern frontier of Fortress Europe’ (www.no-fortress-europe.eu). Pictures 4.1-4.6 show some of the pictures used by the GUE/NGL to support their claim that the EU is a fortress.

![Picture 4.1: The border between Morocco and Melilla. (www.no-fortress-europe.eu)](image1)

![Picture 4.2: An ‘illegal’ migrant in Melilla. (www.no-fortress-europe.eu)](image2)

![Picture 4.3: Migrants on their way to ‘fortress Europe’. (GUE/NGL, 2008: 1)](image3)

![Picture 4.4: ‘Illegal’ migrant in Lampedusa. (GUE/NGL, 2008: 43)](image4)
4.1.3 The use of fortress Europe by the media

There are innumerable examples of the use of the fortress Europe metaphor by the media. I will show several examples of how journalists describe the metaphor and how they use it to describe the EU’s territory. It is not my intention to argue that fortress Europe is the dominant discourse in the media to describe the EU’s external borders and its immigration and asylum policy. A more specific and extensive research on how the EU’s external borders and its immigration and asylum policy are described by journalist would be needed to draw conclusions about that. I use these examples to illustrate that also journalist contribute to the construction of the idea that the EU is a fortress and to show how they do this. I have used the LexisNexis-database and Google to search for newspaper publications that use the fortress Europe metaphor. Both web search engines gave an enormous amount of hits for the metaphor, which shows that fortress Europe is an extensively used metaphor. I have selected the examples below because they illustrate the several ways in which journalist use the metaphor. The first examples (Ash, 1999; Murphy, 2003; Reynolds, 2002) show that some journalist use the metaphor as if it is taken for granted knowledge that the EU is a fortress. They have an uncritical stance towards the metaphor. The two following examples (Elliott, 2002; Lloyd, 2003) illustrate that some journalist analyse the EU’s immigration and asylum policy, also by referring to the analyses of academic scholars, and conclude that the EU is a fortress or gated continent. Others (Algemeen Dagblad, 2005; Schenkel, 2008) rather refer to descriptions of specific parts of the EU’s external borders.

The BBC News reported in an article with the title ‘Fortress Europe raises the drawbridge’ on changes in the EU’s immigration policy (Reynolds, 2002). This media wrote about the EU’s immigration policy in terms of: ‘Fortress Europe is willing to lower the drawbridge for the few but keep it firmly up for the many’ and ‘it is trying to tell those already inside the castle that they ought to join in and not keep themselves to themselves’ (Reynolds, 2002). In another article with the title ‘Fortress Europe boosts its defences’, a BBC News journalist reported on a new fingerprinting system being
implemented throughout the European Union, a plan to combat ‘asylum shopping’ (Murphy, 2003). The journalist wrote: ‘civil liberties groups have attacked the plan, saying that the measures contribute to the idea of ‘fortress Europe’ and that asylum seekers are akin to criminals’ (Murphy, 2003). Back in 1999, before the borders of Ceuta and Melilla were as policed as they are today, the BBC News published an article about migrants who tried to enter Europe via Morocco and the Straits of Gibraltar (Ash, 1999). Approximately 3,000 migrants had drowned between 1994 and 1999, the borders between Morocco and the Spanish enclaves were at that time a less dangerous route to the EU (Ash, 1999). The journalist described Ceuta and Melilla as ‘the unlocked doors into fortress Europe’ (Ash, 1999). The journalist also described how these unlocked doors were being closed by an ‘eight and a half kilometre double security fence… with razor wire, infrared cameras and heat sensors’ (Ash, 1999).

The Canadian newspaper Globe and Mail wrote about the EU’s increasingly restrictive immigration policy: ‘the time when European leaders would have made some obeisance to multiculturalism is passing’ (Lloyd, 2003). Instead, the European leaders wanted a more restrictive approach to immigrants and pressed on the Union’s external borders. The EU was thus ‘raising higher the walls of fortress Europe’ (Lloyd, 2003). The newspaper wrote that the clearest reason for this was that ‘the war on terrorism still rages, and the terrorists - and those who support them - still rage’ (Lloyd, 2003). The article in Globe and Mail observed a change in the discourse on immigration. The benefits of immigration and multiculturalism were increasingly less stressed in European countries. This was illustrated by a quote of Bob Rowthorn, an economics professor at Cambridge:

‘Much of the concern in rich countries about immigration ... is that the potential flow of migrants is so great. Without barriers - even the rather leaky ones we have today - there would be a massive and unacceptable flow of migrants into rich countries. For this reason, I see no alternative but to support what is pejoratively known as ‘fortress Europe”’ (cited in Lloyd, 2003).

In 2002, The Guardian (London) wrote that the EU was becoming the ‘first gated continent’ (Elliott, 2002). This was the result of high running anti-immigrant sentiments and right-wing parties on the march (Elliott, 2002). The EU built a ‘new Iron Curtain ... with armed guards patrolling the eastern frontier and warships in the Mediterranean to protect our European home’ (Elliott, 2002). The newspaper furthermore analysed the development of the EU towards a ‘gated continent’ by concluding that ‘the essence of globalization is mobility, but now it is clear that true mobility is to be limited to money and the global elite that manipulates it’ (Elliott, 2002). The Guardian referred also to the analysis of a scholar by quoting Nigel Harris, economics professor at City University:

‘No matter how many misguided people seek to cross borders without the legal right to do so or, more commonly, overstay their visas or work when their visa forbids it, governments believe that unrestricted immigration is contrary to the social and economic interests of their population. They see immigrants as a cause of racism and xenophobia which, in turn, produce political instability’ (Elliott, 2002).

The Dutch newspaper Algemeen Dagblad described the situation along the external borders of fortress Europe by reporting on the case of the border between Melilla and Morocco:

‘The twelve mile long barrier between Melilla and Morocco is composed of two rolls of barbed wire. They have a height of six meters on the Spanish and three meters on the Moroccan side ...
Spanish soldiers and policemen patrol in the three meter space between the fences and keep a look-out on the frontier from twenty brand new watchtowers. On the other side, there is every 300 meters an observation post with about a dozen soldiers ... The illegal immigrants who hide in the woods, make use of simple ladders, made of branches and twigs, which are put in large numbers against the fence ... The Spanish police complains that they are not allowed to use weapons. Their Moroccan colleagues on the contrary admitted that they shot six immigrants dead yesterday7 (Algemeen Dagblad, 2005).

The Dutch newspaper NRC Handelsblad wrote that since recently, the EU has been stopping many migrants on their way to Europe before they even reach the borders of the fortress. The Spanish Guardia Civil stops refugees from Niger, who travel via Mauritania to the Canary Islands, just after they have started their journey on sea and sends them back to the coast. This has stopped thousands of migrants to cross the sea to the Canary Islands (Schenkel, 2008). The NRC Handelsblad explains this as: ‘In the year 2008, fortress Europe already begins in Africa’8 (Schenkel, 2008).

The examples above are just a selection of newspaper publications that use the fortress Europe metaphor. I have discussed these examples here in order to show how journalists use the metaphor. They remain however just a selection, because the use of the metaphor by journalist is very extensive.

### 4.1.4 The use of fortress Europe by artists

Artists also use the fortress Europe metaphor and thus contribute to the construction of it. For example, cartoonists contribute to the construction of the metaphor by drawing political cartoons that show the EU as a fortress that defends itself against non-EU citizens. Visual modes, and more specifically cartoons, can very well express metaphors, since they are a common and expected device in political cartoons (El Refaie, 2003: 77). Metaphors are one of the main tools of cartoonists to express their ideas (El Refaie, 2003: 77). I show two examples of cartoons that use the fortress Europe metaphor. I have used Google to search for cartoons on fortress Europe and I have searched in academic literature for analyzes about cartoons that use the metaphor. I have selected the two cartoons below, because they are very representative for all the cartoons that I have found, namely cartoons of the EU as a building with high walls and towers. Most cartoonists who use the fortress Europe metaphor use these elements to draw the EU. I have furthermore selected these two cartoons, because they very clearly show that the metaphor is used to describe that the EU is closed for unwanted migrants. Picture 4.7 is a good example of a cartoon that is highly metaphorical. This cartoon was published in the Austrian newspaper Kurier on 4 January 1998. Elisabeth El Refaie (2003) explains that this cartoon presupposes that people are already familiar with the verbal metaphor of fortress Europe, because the concept of Europe as a fortress is presented as commonly background knowledge. Viewers would otherwise not be able to understand the central meanings of the cartoon,

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7 This quote is translated from Dutch. I have attempted to stay as close to the exact meaning of the Dutch as possible.

8 This quote is translated from Dutch. I have attempted to stay as close to the exact meaning of the Dutch as possible.
which is the images of the drawbridge being pulled up and a star falling from the symbol of the EU. Because this fortress Europe metaphor is already well known, the cartoon can now communicate the thought that this fortress has a lack of solidarity towards refugees (El Refaie, 2003: 83). The constant repetition of this fortress Europe metaphor in cartoons probably encourages unconscious (or maybe semi-conscious) acceptance of it as the normal and natural way of seeing the EU’s political geography (El Refaie, 2003: 83).


Picture 4.8: Fortress Europe by Walter Hanel. (Ackermann and Arndt, 1993: 35)
Picture 4.8 is another good example of a highly metaphorical cartoon that shows the EU as a fortress. The German cartoonist Walter Hanel (November 1991) speculated with his cartoon whether the European Union was maybe constructing a fortress that excludes non-EU citizens.

Other contributors to the construction of the fortress Europe metaphor are maybe quite unexpected: pop artists. I will show two examples of pop artist who use the metaphor. There is not an extensive use of the metaphor in music and I therefore not argue that these examples are representative for how (pop) artists think about the EU’s external borders and its immigration and asylum policy. I rather use these examples to show that the use of the fortress Europe metaphor is not limited to scholars, the media and/or politicians, but that it has even inspired musicians. The British band Asian Dub Foundation had for example a hit in their own country with a single named ‘Fortress Europe’. They criticize the EU’s migration policy and predict the future of Europe’s territoriality. They sing about the European order by 2022 in terms of:

‘Robot guards patrolling the border, Cybernetic dogs are getting closer and closer, armoured cars and immigration officers ... Machine guns strut on the cliffs of Dover ... We're the children of globalization, No borders only true connection, Light the fuse of the insurrection, This generation has no nation ... Past the landmines and cybernetic sentries ... Break out of the detention centres ... Tear down the walls of Fortress Europe’ (www.asiandubfoundation.com).

The Swedish group Looptroop had a hit in their country with ‘Fort Europa’ from the album of the same name. They criticize the EU for building a fortress Europe that excludes unwanted migrants, even if they have entered the fortress, by singing:

‘But we built up and tore down the Berlin wall, only to build up a new and improved around our crumblin' Fort (Europa), this one was a bit tricky, not visible to the naked eye and if you was lucky you could slip through the cracks and the crevices tuckin’, your life under your arm, this way some people snuck in, only to become second class citizens, not listed in the system not existing in a sense, illegal immigrants ... Fort Europa, my so called Eutopia ... feel the walls getting closer and closer and closer ... right here on Fort Europa, nothing but claustrophobia’ (www.looptrooprockers.com).

The fact that fortress Europe is, in contradiction to the other metaphors discussed in this thesis, also constructed and used by artists is a distinguished feature of this metaphor.

4.1.5 Scholars on fortress Europe

Scholars have also used the fortress Europe metaphor to reflect on the EU’s changing immigration and asylum policy. Although many scholars use the metaphor, it is also widely criticized within academic literature. I will discuss some writings on fortress Europe and alternatives to the metaphor in this paragraph. I start with the use of fortress Europe by Shada Islam (1994). Fifteen years ago, she described that the EU had become a fortress Europe that was closed and inward-looking. I have selected her article on fortress Europe to show that there are authors who have an uncritical stance towards the fortress Europe metaphor. She used the metaphor in a time that the restrictive European immigration policy emerged and was therefore searching for a new vocabulary to describe
the EU’s territoriality. Some scholars, like Islam (1994), argued that the fortress Europe metaphor was able to describe the EU’s changing external borders and immigration policy. However, scholars have, especially recently, taken a more critical stance towards the metaphor. Islam’s article is thus not representative and she does not describe the dominant way of thinking about fortress Europe in academic literature. Most authors who describe the EU as a fortress do not understand the EU as a sealed entity with only physical walls and towers, but rather redefine the fortress metaphor in order to describe that the EU uses a variety of mechanisms to exclude unwanted migrants and to explain that the EU is not totally closed. The writings of Albrecht (2002) and Geddes (2001) are representative for this understanding of fortress Europe. I thus discuss them in this paragraph because they represent a dominant way of thinking about fortress Europe and because they clearly explain their definition of this fortress, moreover, I have selected them because many other articles and books referred to them. I complete the overview with two alternatives to the fortress Europe metaphor. The first describes the European Union as a ‘gated community’ (van Houtum and Pijpers, 2007) and the second as a ‘ban-opticon’ (Bigo, 2006). I have selected them for two reasons. First, because I want to show that there are scholars, who also explore the EU’s immigration policy and external borders, that argue that it is needed to offer alternatives to the fortress metaphor. Second, I like their alternatives, because they show an emphasize on explaining why certain categories of migrants are excluded and how this is legitimized.

**Shada Islam on fortress Europe**

Shada Islam explains that the fears of mass migration, and thus the construction of fortress Europe, can be explained by the fact that more than a million people moved from Eastern to Western Europe in just a few months after the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 (Islam, 1994: 39). This fear of mass migration from the east was later compounded by migration from North Africa to the EU’s southern flanks. Many refugees fled religious extremism and economic difficulties in North Africa. France, Spain, Portugal and Italy were however not ready to accept them (Islam, 1994: 39). Although member states were before not willing to work together in the area of immigration, they now understood that a common immigration policy was necessary. Under the Maastricht Treaty, the member states have agreed to cooperate on justice and home affairs. Many foreigners were to be kept out, while EU citizens would have the privileges of free movement (Islam, 1994: 40).

Shada Islam argues that the Single European Market has created a closed and inward-looking Europe. A Europe that does not only tries to keep out foreign televisions and cars, but also people by designing new visa regulations, immigration laws and asylum rules (Islam, 1994: 38). The Maastricht Treaty signed in 1991 recognized immigration for the first time as a matter of ‘common interest’. Islam says nevertheless that the ‘new fortress is being built, at least partly, in secret’, because most of the normal EU meetings on immigration and asylum policies were held almost without publicity (Islam, 1994: 38).

**Hans-Jörg Albrecht on fortress Europe**

Hans-Jörg Albrecht observed, at the beginning of the 21st century, a massive increase in the number of border police at the external borders of the Schengen space and a massive upgrading of hardware deployed with the purpose of sealing the borders completely (Albrecht, 2002: 13). He argues that the
EU is a fortress that is however not much characterized by physical walls, but rather through control mechanisms within the Schengen area that seek to identify illegal immigrants (Albrecht, 2002: 14). The EU has attempted to make the fortress EU less attractive for immigrants, for example by creating strict deportation and repatriation policies and heavy penalties for people who support illegal immigration through smuggling or otherwise facilitating entering and remaining in the Schengen space (Albrecht, 2002: 14).

Albrecht distinguishes two approaches in controlling immigration. Either by exclusion from entry or exclusion after migrants have entered the EU (Albrecht, 2002: 20). Unwanted migrants within the Schengen space can be excluded by denying an asylum or refugee status or, for those who already live in the Schengen space, by revocation of a residence permit (Albrecht, 2002: 20). According to Albrecht, these kinds of measures may result in a fortress Europe (Albrecht, 2002: 20). Albrecht describes his idea of a fortress Europe as:

‘Certainly it is not the traditional fortress we usually think of when talking about fortresses – with tall walls and powerful towers – but it is a fortress that is made out of internal and soft controls on the one hand and a certain amount of hardware to detect and identify intruders at the borders on the other hand’ (Albrecht, 2002: 21).

According to Albrecht, this fortress also consists of a mixture of normative concepts made out of laws and political programmes and factual concepts set up to prevent unwanted immigration (Albrecht, 2002: 21). This means that fortress Europe is a fortress established through the creation of images and beliefs as regards positive and negative consequences of immigration and selection criteria separating positively evaluated immigrants and unwanted immigrants (Albrecht, 2002: 21).

Albrecht explains that the control of illegal immigration is a way to distinguish between real politically motivated refugees from economic migrants, moreover, the purpose of border controls is also to separate migrants who could threaten order, stability and peace within the EU from migrants who are wanted or needed for their specific professional and technological skills (Albrecht, 2002: 5). The EU thus makes a selection among immigrants by defining which immigrants could be a potential risk and which are welcome as an ‘asset’ for the economy and culture (Albrecht, 2002: 5).

According to Albrecht, the most important reasons why this ‘fortress rhetoric’ exists in the EU are ‘safety feelings’ and crime (Albrecht, 2002: 5). He explains that immigration in Europe has been associated with crime and that immigration has consequently become a central topic in the debates on safety in the EU (Albrecht, 2002: 5).

Andrew Geddes on fortress Europe
Andrew Geddes argues that the idea of a fortress Europe in literal terms is overblown (Geddes, 2001: 23). He nevertheless says that the fortress Europe metaphor is useful, because it points to policy challenges and legitimacy issues that face the EU, especially if the EU seeks to reconstruct border regimes into hard and fixed external borders similar to those of the Westphalian state (Geddes, 2001: 23). A literal meaning of the term fortress Europe refers, according to Geddes, to exclusion of non-EU citizens, based on tight border controls on the one hand and internal exclusion based on social marginalization of immigrants on the other hand (Geddes, 2001: 35). Geddes argues that this
literal meaning is flawed for three reasons. First, the development of immigration policy has a strong state-centred focus. Second, although the EU has developed a restrictive immigration policy, there has been continued migration into the EU. EU member states can restrict international migration, but cannot fully control it, because controls are ‘gappy’. Moreover, there are openings to labour migration in some member states and there are even measures to encourage it, such as the French ‘scientific visa’ and the German ‘green card’ (Geddes, 2001: 35). Third, the fortress implies that immigrants are socially excluded in the EU, however, not all immigrants have remained marginalized and discriminated (Geddes, 2001: 36). According to Geddes, the EU is thus not literally a fortress. After all, the EU as an institution lacks the resources to take on this role. Nevertheless, the fortress Europe metaphor has meaning. This lies mainly in its power as an idea and how it shows that fears of uncontrolled migration can legitimate restrictive policies (Geddes, 2001: 36). Geddes explains the ideas about re-establishing hard borders as the result of fear of large-scale and uncontrolled migration, even though there is limited evidence for a vast and global demand for admission. It is furthermore the result of ideas about the impact of migration on the EU societies (Geddes, 2001: 36). According to Geddes, the politics of immigration are driven by fears and insecurities in the face of the perceived threat of uncontrolled migration (Geddes, 2001: 36).

Alternatives to the fortress Europe metaphor
As Albrecht (2002) and Geddes (2001) argue, the fortress metaphor is not unproblematic. Several scholars have therefore critisized the idea of a fortress Europe that has totally sealed its borders. Some scholars, such as Albrecht and Geddes, have nuanced the fortress metaphor by explaining that the EU is not a fortress in its ‘traditional’ (Albrecht, 2002: 21) and ‘literal’ meaning (Geddes, 2001: 23). Others however have offered alternatives to the fortress Europe metaphor and use other concepts to describe how a discourse on safety, crime and immigration results in and legitimizes a restrictive immigration and asylum policy.

Henk van Houtum and Roos Pijpers offer an alternative to the fortress Europe metaphor by describing the EU as a ‘gated community’ (van Houtum and Pijpers, 2007). They argue that the European Union follows a geo-strategic logic that resembles the management of a gated community, because the external borders are economically closed for the majority of the migrant workers, but open for some who’s knowledge or skills are needed in the EU and who will be of economic value (van Houtum and Pijpers, 2007: 301). Like Albrecht and Geddes, they argue that the fear for the consequences of immigration from third countries is an important aspect of the social-spatial bordering of immigrants within the European Union (van Houtum and Pijpers, 2007: 306). According to van Houtum and Pijpers, this fear can be material, for example the fear to lose one’s job or that national welfare and social funds will be decreased, moreover, it can also be a fear for the stranger that is associated with the fear of losing a community’s self-defined identity (van Houtum and Pijpers, 2007: 291). Van Houtum and Pijpers explain that the EU’s contemporary migration policies protect the comfort of job security in a labour market that is highly inflexible (van Houtum and Pijpers, 2007). The EU denies outsiders access to the domestic labour markets in order to protect its domestic workers (van Houtum and Pijpers, 2007: 294). They argue that the EU is beginning to look like a gated community, because these defended neighbourhoods also gate themselves of from the rest of the society and this bordering is ‘primarily driven by fear of crime and the need to be amongst ‘ourselves’, hence protecting welfare, security and identity’ (van Houtum and Pijpers, 2007: 303).
Gated communities offer the people who inhabit it an assumed greater level of control over the territory and gives them the possibility to only give right of entry to those people who are attractive to the upgrading of their welfare (van Houtum and Pijpers, 2007: 303). Van Houtum and Pijpers argue that ‘much like a gated community, the European Union has also constructed a bio-politically controlled, monitored and managed external border, thereby safeguarding those who are in from those who are out’ (van Houtum and Pijpers, 2007: 304).

Another concept that is a good alternative for the fortress Europe metaphor is Didier Bigo’s (2006) ‘ban-opticon’. Bigo’s ban-opticon is mainly inspired by Michael Foucault’s notion of the panopticon, which is a form of governmentality of modern society that controls and disciplines its population (Bigo, 2006: 34). The ban-option is furthermore inspired by Zygmunt Bauman’s book Globalization: the human consequences, in which he explains the normalization of the new logics of exclusion between those people who are free to circulate and travel around the world and those who are trapped in the local (Bigo, 2006: 41-42). Bigo rejects the idea of a fortress Europe and argues that Europe is rather a ban-opticon that is a governmentality of unease (or ban), which is characterized by three criteria: practices of exceptionalism, acts of profiling and containing foreigners, and a normative imperative of mobility (Bigo, 2006: 6). Bigo explains the ‘ban’ as the way to exclude, to normalize and to try to monitor the future in order to control the present. It is in fact a belief in ‘technologies of ‘morphing’, of ‘profiling’, of computer databases and their capacities to ‘anticipate’ who will be ‘evil’ and who is ‘normal” (Bigo, 2005: 86). The European Union as a ban-opticon can thus be characterized by three dimensions. First exceptionality inside liberalism that refers to the EU’s liberal policies that encourage the free movement of its own citizens, but that restrict the mobility of some categories of people from third countries by denying them access to the EU (Bigo, 2006: 36-38). Second, exclusion and pro-active governmentality that refers to the construction of categories of excluded people in order to exclude those who might be a threat to the EU (Bigo, 2006: 38-40). Third, normalization and the imperative of free movement refers to the normalization of the fact that the EU’s citizens have plenty of possibilities to travel to other countries while the EU restricts others in their possibilities to travel (Bigo, 2006: 41-42). I favour Bigo’s concept because it shows that the EU categorizes people from third countries in order to exclude those who could be a risk for the EU’s safety and stability, and because it shows that this rhetoric is normalized.

While many politicians, journalists and artists use the fortress Europe metaphor as if it is a given that the EU is a fortress, the examples above show that there is a lively debate among scholars about this metaphor and how the EU’s immigration policy and external borders should be defined. The examples also show that most scholars have taken a much more critical stance towards the fortress Europe metaphor. Even though scholars like Albrecht (2002) and Geddes (2001) used the metaphor, they redefined it and clearly explained that the EU has not simply the contours of a bordered and sealed space that excludes all unwanted migrants and only with external borders. Most scholars argue that the EU has developed a much more complex system to identify and exclude unwanted immigrants; moreover, they also argue that migrants are also excluded within the EU (Albrecht, 2002; Geddes, 2001).

Besides explaining that the EU has created a much more restrictive immigration policy that results from a wish to keep unwanted migrants out, several scholars have also attempted to explain why this
‘fortress rhetoric’ exists. Several authors have argued that this can be explained by ‘safety feelings’ (Albrecht, 2002) and feelings of fear (Bigo, 2006; Geddes, 2001; van Houtum and Pijpers, 2007; Islam, 1994).

The main argument with regard to the EU’s external borders in most publications on fortress Europe is that the idea of a fortress with totally sealed borders is overblown, because some categories of migrants are most welcome (Albrecht, 2002; van Houtum and Pijpers, 2007). These scholars point to the fact that there has been continued immigration from outside the EU and some scholars, such as van Houtum and Pijpers (2007) and Bigo (2006), even see a need to come up with other metaphors.

As most authors explain, the fortress Europe metaphor is very problematic, because the term fortress rather implies a Europe that excludes all non-EU citizens with tight controls at the external borders, which look like high walls and towers. This picture of the EU is however far from reality and I therefore argue that the fortress metaphor is not capable of defining the EU’s immigration policy and its contemporary external borders. Even though the metaphor has, as Geddes argues, the power to shows that fears of uncontrolled migration can legitimate restrictive policies (Geddes, 2001: 36), I argue that it is better to use other metaphors. After all, the gated community metaphor (van Houtum and Pijpers, 2007) and the ban-opticon metaphor (Bigo, 2006) are also able to explain the ‘fortress rhetoric’. Although I really favour Bigo’s ban-opticon, because he very clearly explains that the EU excludes certain categories of people in order to exclude every potential threat, that this is in sharp contrast with the EU’s policies that support mobility within the Union, and that this sharp contrast is normalized, I argue that the term ban-opticon is problematic, because it is at a first glance unclear what this refers to (Bigo, 2006: 6). It is especially difficult for people who are not familiar with Foucault’s panopticon to imagine what this ban-opticon looks like and the metaphor therefore needs a lot of explanation. I therefore prefer the gated community metaphor above the fortress Europe and ban-opticon metaphors, because it is clear to what kind of a structure it refers. Moreover, this metaphor is also capable of explaining the ‘fortress rhetoric’ and it shows that the EU’s external borders are not fully closed.
4.2 Europe as an Empire

The ‘Europe as an empire’ metaphor emphasizes, like the fortress Europe metaphor, on the external dimensions of the EU’s territory (see also Anderson, 2007: 18). Europe as an empire is also constructed within the same political and social circumstances: the growing fear for global terrorism and mass migration (Joffé, 2007: 92). However, the EU’s aim to protect the common internal space of the European state in the making, did not only result in hard and considerably closed borders. The concerns about the EU’s safety and stability have also resulted in policies to transform the regions behind the EU’s own external borders in safe and stable territories (Böröcz, 2001: 18-19). The EU has exported its own stability, security and prosperity by two rounds of enlargement of the Union and by the European Neighbourhood Policy (see also Anderson, 2007). Several scholars therefore describe the contemporary EU as an empire. In contradiction to fortress Europe, Europe as an empire does not conceptualize the EU as a clearly demarcated territory with a sharp inside and outside. This metaphor rather implies that the authority of the EU does not stop at its own external borders, since it attempts to govern non-EU countries (Böröcz, 2001: 18-19). Europe as an empire is predominantly used by scholars and not so much by politicians and the media. Nevertheless, Jose Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission, has used the Europe as an empire metaphor several times to describe the contemporary European Union (see also Charter, 2007; Crolly and Wergin, 2007).

Like the fortress Europe metaphor, Europe as an empire also reacts in a way on the conceptualizations of the EU’s political geography as federal, intergovernmental and new medieval by emphasizing on the external dimensions of the Union (see also Anderson, 2007: 18). This does however not mean that conceptualizations of the EU as an empire necessarily ignore its internal shape and reject the federal, intergovernmental and new medieval metaphors. James Anderson, for example, argues that the EU empire is also capable of absorbing elements of federalism, sub-state regionalism, and a medieval sharing of sovereignty (Anderson, 2007: 23-26). Jan Zielonka combines the medieval and empire metaphors and describes the contemporary EU as a ‘neo-medieval empire’ (Zielonka, 2006).

I will first explain the EU’s behaviour towards applicant states in the recent enlargements of the Union and towards the current neighbouring countries. Many scholars argue nowadays that this behaviour and the power relationship with applicants and neighbours have the characteristics of an empire (see also Anderson, 2007; Böröcz, 2001; Zielonka, 2006). I will furthermore discuss statements of EU Commissioners and maps that contribute to the idea of a contemporary European empire. After that, I will discuss the use of the Europe as an empire metaphor by several scholars.

4.2.1 European enlargement in the post-September 11 period

The territory and borders of the European Union have changed dramatically after the turn of the century. The EU had several enlargement rounds in 1973, 1981, 1986 and 1995. These were however not as big as the enlargement of May 2004. This fifth enlargement increased the number of member states from 15 to 25, making the Union bigger and more diversified than ever (see also Zielonka, 2006: 24). Eight out of the ten new members were post-communist states (Zielonka, 2006: 23). This
enlargement was followed by the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in January 2007 (Bush and Kryżanowski, 2007: 109). The EU’s current territory thus also covers a big part of the post-communist states that were its enemy before the fall of the Iron Curtain. This part of the continent was in fact a hostile empire with different laws, economy, ideology and culture during the Cold War (see also Heffernan, 1998: 221; Zielonka, 2006, 25).

In several speeches, Günter Verheugen, EU commissioner for enlargement, explained that the enlargements of 2004 and 2007 were the only way to solve problems such as illegal migration, illegal employment, growing international organized crime, unfair conditions of competition and corruption (Verheugen, 2002b). According to the EU commissioner, these problems could only be solved if countries on both sides of the former Iron Curtain had common rules, common values, prosperity and equal chances and opportunities (Verheugen, 2002b). The last enlargements were, from a strategically point of view, thus essentially a policy of peace and stability and the candidate states were in fact objects of security policy (Verheugen, 2003). The creation of a united Europe is for the Commission a necessary condition to keep the continent peaceful and stable (Verheugen, 2003). As Verheugen said, the EU has very strong political and strategic reasons for the accession of the post-communist states (Verheugen, 2002b). He explained that the geopolitical reason behind the enlargement was not solely to stabilize the Central and Eastern European countries that joined the EU, but also to stabilize the entire region. He referred explicitly to the accession of Slovenia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria and their crucial importance in the EU’s aim to achieve stability in the Balkans (Verheugen, 2002b). The last two rounds of enlargement were however more than a political and strategic necessity. The Commission saw enlargement also as its moral duty to involve the post-communist states in the project Europe (Verheugen, 2002a). After all, the EU is, according to Verheugen, surely the part of Europe that profits from ‘peace, stability and growth’ (Verheugen, 2002b).

The EU commissioner also explained that the candidate member states in Central and Eastern Europe transformed themselves into stable democratic countries and marked economies (Verheugen, 2002b). The new member states had to introduce, before their accession, far-reaching reforms and they had to accept and implement the acquis communautaire: the whole body of EU legislation and policies (European Commission, 2006: 5). These reforms and transformations were mainly driven forward by the perspective of accession to the peaceful, stable and prosperous European Union (European Commission, 2006: 5). Negotiations between the EU and the candidate countries were thus based on conditionality: countries could make steps forward by ‘meeting the necessary conditions at each stage of the accession process’ (European Commission, 2006: 5). The reforms were carefully monitored by the European Commission. Also after the enlargement, the Commission, that calls itself the ‘guardian of the Treaties’, continued the monitoring of the new member states’ EU-law-implementation (Verheugen, 2002b). The promise of membership in return for the reforms is, according to Verheugen, crucial to the success of the reform process. The candidate countries needed such a clear and visible goal to be able to sustain the economic, political, legal and administrative reforms successfully (Verheugen, 2003).

Because the EU’s external borders have shifted eastward to the former Soviet Union and southward to North Africa and the Middle East, the EU has several new neighbours. Some of them are unstable
states and the political, economic and social gaps between the EU and its new neighbours are large (European Commission, 2006: 2). This is one of the main reasons why the EU has increasingly secured its foreign and security policy (Joffé, 2007: 92). One of the reasons for enlargement was thus to stabilize the regions behind its own external borders, however, the new neighbours are also unstable states. In fact, enlargement was thus not a solution for the problem of unstable neighbours, but rather shifted it eastwards. Another important reason for the increase in the securing of the EU’s foreign and security policy is the growing fear for international crime and global terrorism, in particular Muslim terrorism. Especially the events of 11 September 2001 have increased this fear. It was even more accelerated in Europe by the Madrid train bombings in March 2004 and the London bombings of July 2005 (Joffé, 2007: 92). These are the circumstances in which the EU’s external policies are created and in which the EU has increasingly secured its external borders (Joffé, 2007: 92-93). The EU’s attempts to secure its external borders and the regions behind these borders should thus be understood in the context of fear for global terrorism.

The present EU enlargement agenda covers Turkey and the Balkans. The EU and Turkey are still in discussion about accession. Croatia and Macedonia are already candidate countries. The other Balkan countries are in a less far stadium of the accession trajectory (European Commission, 2006: 2). Concerns about the ongoing enlargement of the Union are however growing. Existing commitments towards countries that are already in a process for accession are honoured, but the EU is reserved in making new commitments (European Commission, 2006: 3). Since the last enlargement in 2007, there has been a lively debate about further enlargements. This debate is too extensive to discuss in every detail here, but I will draw attention to some main issues in these debates.

An important region for further enlargement is the Balkan region. In 2003, the European Commission declared that the ‘the future of the Balkans is within the European Union’ (Brown and Attenborough, 2007: 3). Motivated by a desire to increase stability in the Balkan region, the Western Balkan states were promised a membership if they reached the EU standards (Brown and Attenborough, 2007: 3). However, the attitude towards enlargement is today quite negative in most EU member states. The negative results of the French and Dutch referendums on the EU Constitution showed a public dissatisfaction with many aspects of EU policy, which also includes further enlargement (Brown and Attenborough, 2007: 3). The EU’s enlargement strategy published in 2006 consequently contained a shift in policy by linking accession to the EU’s ‘integration capacity’ (Brown and Attenborough, 2007: 3). The lack of public support for further enlargement makes enlargements in the Balkan difficult, because a broad public support is essential to sustain enlargement policy (Brown and Attenborough, 2007: 27).

Further enlargement of the EU is quite unpopular in many EU countries, and especially in the older member states. A commonly used argument in member states is that further enlargement would make the EU unwieldy, moreover, their citizens blame the last two enlargements for an unwelcome inflow of cheap labour and for letting too many countries in that were not ready for accession yet (The Economist, 2008). Recently, Germany and France have raised doubts about further EU expansion after the accession of Croatia. In the beginning of 2009, the German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who are skeptical about further enlargement, argued that the EU first needs a ‘phase of consolidation’ (Cendrowicz, 2009). The German government argued that during this phase, a consolidation of the EU’s values and institutions should be made and no countries, except Croatia, should therefore get permission to become a member of the EU
Turkey’s potential EU accession has also captured a lot of attention in the European Union. Turkey is a candidate that differs from any other country that has joined the EU, because of its location at the crossroads of Europe, the Middle East and Central Asia (Grigoriadis, 2006: 147). Moreover, also its large population, low per-capita income and level of economic development, make the country subject of discussion within the EU (Grigoriadis, 2006: 147). Although the European Union and Turkey have been negotiating about a Turkey’s EU membership since 2005, it is still highly uncertain what the result of these negotiations will be. Turkey first has to complete a process of democratic consolidation and has to win over an unfriendly European public opinion (Grigoriadis, 2006: 147). The debates about Turkey’s EU application are complex because they have a strategic, political, and economical dimension, moreover, Turkey’s EU membership is also related to debates on what the EU is or should be (Grigoriadis, 2006: 152). Turkey’s Islamic religion and cultural identity is one of the main arguments against its potential membership and especially used by many European conservatives who argue that the Islamic religion is contrary to the EU’s identity (Grigoriadis, 2006: 152). There are however also supporters of a Turkey’s EU membership who have a different definition of a European identity and argue that this identity should be based on liberal democratic values and cultural diversity. They use Turkey’s Islamic religion as an argument to support its membership (Grigoriadis, 2006: 152). There are thus different opinions on how to deal with Turkey’s religion in the debates about its potential EU membership (Grigoriadis, 2006: 152). Turkey still has a long way to go. The country first has to carry out a political and economic reform program (Grigoriadis, 2006: 156). Although Turkey has already made significant progress, there are still problematic issues. More progress in the fields of minority rights and freedom of expression is necessary (Grigoriadis, 2006: 156). Furthermore, there is the Cyprus issue. Because the Republic of Cyprus has full veto rights, it is able to block a Turkish membership and the unresolved Cyprus issue will thus likely remain a source of friction on Turkey’s way to EU accession (Grigoriadis, 2006: 156).

The offering of an EU membership is the Union’s most powerful policy instrument to stabilize other countries and to increase its political stature in the international politics (European Commission, 2006: 5). However, enlargement is unpopular in the contemporary European Union and the EU thus has to search for alternatives. The European Neighbourhood Policy, that stabilizes surrounding countries without internalising them, is a powerful instrument if a membership is not an option (European Commission, 2006: 5). Both approaches contribute to the EU’s current geopolitical objective that is to have a greater political stature in the international politics and to increase its power and influence in the surrounding regions (European Commission, 2006: 5).

4.2.2 The EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy
The increased fear for international terrorism, criminality and migration, together with the EU’s desire to have a greater political stature, has resulted in the exercise of control over territories ‘near
Commission President Romano Prodi spoke about the EU’s relationship with neighbouring states, especially in the Mediterranean, in a speech in November 2002. His words show a first glance of the EU’s desire to exercise control over territories behind the external borders of the Union:

‘At a time when we are building a new Europe ... we must also develop our strategy towards the regions closest to Europe ... We have two very different alternatives. The first involves viewing the Mediterranean primarily as a question of security. In this case, the Mediterranean becomes the southern border of the Union, where we must take up position to manage the flows of migrants, combat any forms of international terrorism there and encourage a development policy heavily geared towards cooperation in the fight against unlawful activities. The second option involves viewing the Mediterranean as a new area of cooperation, where a special relationship can be established within the context of a broader proximity policy which will need to address the whole band of regions around the Union, stretching from the Maghreb to Russia’ (cited in Clark and Jones, 2008: 550).

With ‘building a new Europe’ Prodi referred to the upcoming enlargements in 2004 and 2007. Prodi’s words show the EU’s fear for migrants and international terrorism, moreover, it shows the desire to exercise political control over the neighbouring territories in order to create a safe zone around the new external borders of the Union (Clark and Jones, 2008: 551).

Christopher Patten, Commissioner for External Relations, explained that the EU had to find new ways to export the Unions stability, security and prosperity behind its own borders (European Commission, 2003: 4). The European Commission therefore launched the ENP in February 2003. The aim of the ENP is to strengthen the relationship with the new and the existing neighbours, moreover, it has the aim ‘to avoid drawing new dividing lines in Europe and to promote stability and prosperity within and beyond the new borders of the Union’ (European Commission, 2003: 4). The EU wants to work together with its new neighbours on issues such as reducing poverty, economic integration, intensified political and cultural relations, cross-border cooperation, and conflict prevention (European Commission, 2003: 9). The EU offers its neighbours benefits as a responds to progress in economic and political reforms: the more deeply a partner engages with the EU, the more political, economic and financial benefits this country will get (European Commission, 2007: 2).

Benita Ferrero-Waldner, Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy in the first Barroso Commission, described her vision of the EU’s relation to its outside world as being a global actor with big international responsibilities (Ferrero-Waldner, 2005a). She explained that it is the Unions self-interest to act globally, because the security of EU-citizens is related to international cooperation and solidarity. Therefore, the EU has to ‘export’ stability behind its own borders (Ferrero-Waldner, 2005a). The EU is, according to Ferrero-Waldner, however not a traditional foreign policy actor, but rather a ‘Postmodern Superpower’ (Ferrero-Waldner, 2005b). Commission President Barroso explained the reason for the EU’s interest in governing non-EU territory as: ‘Our social stability will be affected if we do not address the political, economic and humanitarian problems in our neighbourhood’ and ‘we will not live in peace if we do not face the external threats to our security and the instability in the regions close to Europe’ (Barroso, 2008). In an official communication document to the Council and the Parliament, the European Commission explained however that the ENP is more than just self interest. One of the objectives of the ENP is to help the neighbouring countries to reduce poverty and social division, and to promote political stability and
economic development. The Commission does this because ‘the EU has a duty, not only towards its citizens and those of new member states, but also towards its present and future neighbours’ (European Commission, 2003: 3).

The EU’s highly intensified interest in cooperation with the territories behind its own external borders means that its borders are rather becoming fuzzy than, as suggested by the fortress Europe metaphor, hard and fixed. In official documents, the Commission writes about its new external borders that it wants to avoid new dividing lines and therefore stimulates human interaction among these borders (European Commission, 2003: 4). Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner explained: ‘the human dimension is a key feature of the ENP: education, health and people–to–people contacts; greater mobility and exchanges of pupils, students and scientists are a high priority’ (Ferrero-Waldner, 2007: 3). The Commission does not deny that borders are a political reality between the EU and the ENP countries, but tries nevertheless to increase contact between the societies on both sides of the border. Cross-Border Cooperation must encourage cooperation and exchange between local authorities and people in the border regions (Ferrero-Waldner, 2007: 3). Ferrero-Waldner explained that it is the Commission’s objective to create well developed border regions by promoting the social and economic development, addressing common challenges regarding the environment, health and education, ensuring the security and efficiency of border crossings and by encouraging people-to-people cooperation (Ferrero-Waldner, 2007: 3).

The European Commission has also produced maps that show its interest in neighbouring countries. Those maps, used in official documents, brochures, leaflets, on websites and as posters, contribute to the construction of the idea that the EU is surrounded by a zone of neighbours that somehow relate to the Union. All the EU member states on map 4.2 have the colour orange. Although this implies in some way a sense of unity (and could thus imply the idea of one common internal space), the map also shows internal borders that rather mean that nation states are the main building blocks of the EU. The candidate countries Croatia, Macedonia and Turkey have the colour dark grey. The potential candidate countries in the Balkans are shown by a lighter grey. The European Neighbourhood Policy countries are all represented by the colour blue. The different colours of these non-EU states represent a different level of cooperation and therefore a different level of inclusion and exclusion in the European Union. By representing the, what the EU calls, ‘ring of friends’ as one zone around the Union, the EU constructs the idea of an area consisting of countries that belong together. However, this ring is a constructed idea, a creation of the European Commission. In reality, the countries within this European Neighbourhood are highly differentiated and did not choose to form one zone. A Moroccan citizen will most likely not understand why his country is represented in one area with the Ukraine.

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9 The potential candidate countries in the Balkans are Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia.
10 The ENP includes the following countries: Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijian, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine.
4.2.3 Commission President Barroso on the empire metaphor

As I will discuss below, scholars nowadays often conceptualize the European Union as some sort of an empire. The Europe as an empire metaphor emphasizes on the EU’s exercise of power in neighbouring territory and the asymmetrical relationship between the EU and both candidate countries and the ENP (see also Anderson, 2007; Zielonka, 2006). Although this metaphor is hardly used by politicians and Commission officials, Commission President Barroso does recognise that the EU is in some way an empire (Charter, 2007; Crolly and Wergin, 2007). In an interview with the German newspaper Die Welt, he answered on the question ‘What is the EU actually? A kind of empire, as some say?’:

‘It has the dimensions of an empire, but not a centralistic structure, not a leadership with an omnipotent claim. The membership is based on voluntariness, the Union did not arise from battle or war. The members do not hand over their sovereignty, but rather share it. The EU is therefore the most magnificent construction that has ever existed in history’ (cited in Crolly and Wergin, 2007).

11 This quote is translated from German. I have attempted to stay as close to the exact meaning of the German as possible.
12 This quote is translated from German. I have attempted to stay as close to the exact meaning of the German as possible.
Barroso also made this comment at a press conference on the Treaty of Lisbon in the European Parliament in Strasbourg on 10 July 2007. A Dutch journalist asked him what the European Union will be in the future. The Commission President answered:

‘Normal people, they will understand that the European Union is ... not a super state. We are not the United States of Europe in the way we have the United States of America ... at the same time we are not also an international organisation. We are in fact a very special construction, unique in the history of mankind. We never had that kind of organization ... where we have free countries that are united and that have decided to work together with some degree of cooperation or even integration, that is what we are. We are not ... creating a super state that is diluting the national identity. Sometimes I like to compare the European Union as a creation to the organization of empires ... because we have the dimension of empires. Empires were usually made with force with a center imposing diktat, a will on the others. Now we have ... the first non-imperial empire. We have ... 27 countries that fully decided to work together, to pool their sovereignty’.

Barroso’s answer that the European Union is an empire was immediately criticized; especially the reactions of the British conservative politicians and press were furious (Lanting, 2007). As Mark Francois, Conservative shadow minister for Europe, said: ‘The British public will be genuinely surprised to hear the suggestion that we are now part of an EU empire’ (cited in Waterfield, 2007). The newspaper The Times wrote that Barroso had declared himself the emperor of his European empire (Charter, 2007; Lanting, 2007). In the UK, Gordon Brown was already under pressure to hold a referendum for the Treaty of Lisbon. British conservatives and eurosceptics used the comments of the Commission President to press their Prime Minister even more for a referendum (Waterfield, 2007). The spokesman of the Commission President said, in an attempt to limit the damage, that ‘no one needs to have imperial nightmares’. Barroso’s comment about the similarities between the contemporary EU and empires referred to a quote by the German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk and had the aim to emphasize that the EU is something else than a super state (Waterfield, 2007).

The journalist who asked Barroso what the European Union will be in the future expected to receive a simple and clear answer in terms of what the EU means for its citizens. Barroso responded however with a very academic answer. The argument that the EU is a non-imperial empire had already been made by several scholars (see paragraph 4.2.4), it is however not the kind of description of the European Union that one expects from the president of the EU’s executive body. EU citizens do not expect that the Commission creates an academic concept, but a polity for the Union’s citizens. Although Barroso thus called the EU an empire in order to demonstrate that it is something unique and, in contradiction to a super state, not a threat to the member states’ sovereignty, some media and politicians (especially in the UK) associated the idea of a European empire with a policy that is rather an enormous threat to the member states (Lanting, 2007). Conservative politicians and press in the UK consequently used Barroso’s comment to argue against the Treaty of Lisbon (Lanting, 2007).

13 A video of the press conference where Barroso made this comment is available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I8M1T-GgRU
4.2.4 Scholars on Europe as an empire

As I discussed above, the political geography of the European Union has been changing dramatically since the turn of the century. The EU’s territory became bigger and more diversified than ever, because most of the new members are post-communist states (see also Zielonka, 2006: 23-24). Although Eastern and Western Europe share important characteristics from a broad historical perspective, they were absolute opposites during the time of communist rule in Eastern Europe (Zielonka, 2006: 25). The EU’s external borders have shifted eastwards and in a way it seems that they have become both fuzzy and hard, moreover, the Commission tries to govern those regions closest to the EU (European Commission, 2006: 2). Scholars reflect on the EU’s attempts to govern non-EU territories in many recent publications on the nature of the European Union. The last two enlargements and the ENP have brought about a new stream of literature that attempts to apply theoretical notions such as ‘empire’ and ‘coloniality’ on the European Union (see also Böröcz, 2001). At a first glance, these concepts seem to belong to the Europe of the nineteenth and early twentieth century; however, there is a renewed interest in these concepts in studying the EU and especially European enlargements in the eastern flanks of the continent (Böröcz, 2001: 5). In the last two rounds of enlargements, the relation between the EU and the negotiation partners shows an imbalance of power (Scott, 2006: 18). It is furthermore argued that there is an important geopolitical consideration behind European enlargement. Many scholars explain that the promise of membership can be understood as the EU’s most powerful policy tool, used in order to secure peace, stability and prosperity within the EU and its surroundings (Tassinari, 2005: 4). With negotiation mechanisms based on conditionality and a legal set-up based on the Copenhagen criteria, the EU penetrated the eastern flanks of the continent to reform those countries. These reforms were based on European norms, values and institutions (Tassinari, 2005: 4). Below, I will discuss the writings of several authors who claim that the contemporary European Union is (evolving towards) an empire.

I will first discuss an e-book of József Böröcz’s (2001) on the European enlargement in the east. I have selected his e-book because he was one of the first who applied the empire concept on the European Union’s enlargement in the east. The second publication that I will discuss is a text by Alun Jones and Julian Clark (2008) on Europeanization behind the borders of the EU. Although they do not use the empire concept, I have chosen to discuss their article here because they also explain how the EU governs non-EU territories. Their article describes this very clearly and that makes it worthwhile to discuss it here too. Moreover, I want to show that there are other concepts available that are also capable of defining the EU’s behaviour towards applicant states and ENP-states. I will then discuss James Anderson’s explanation of the empire metaphor. I have selected him for three reasons. First because he is a very influential scholar within political geography who has published many books and articles on the European Union. Second, as a geographer, he focuses on space and especially his explanation of the EU’s territory as a hierarchical pattern of concentric circles is a valuable addition in this overview. Third, I have also discussed publications of Anderson on new-medieval Europe and it is therefore interesting to show that an author who described the EU’s territorality as new-medieval in the 1990s, currently uses the Europe as an empire metaphor to describe the Union. I will end this overview with Jan Zielonka’s neo-medieval empire. I have selected his book for two reasons. First, because it is one of the most well-known publications on Europe as an empire and second, because he gives a very detailed explanation of why the EU should be understood as a neo-medieval empire. This makes it an interesting contribution to this stream of literature.
József Böröcz on ‘empire’, ‘coloniality’ and European enlargement

József Böröcz (2001) argues that the theoretical concepts ‘empire’ and ‘coloniality’ are still relevant for studying the EU and especially for studying European enlargement in the east (Böröcz, 2001: 5). He reminds his readers that the Western European countries that constituted the EU were also the major colonial powers in the period of world capitalism (Böröcz, 2001: 13). For these countries, the colonial history is a crucial component of the social imaginaries in their societies (Böröcz, 2001: 13). Those Western European countries differ from the new members and non-EU states, because they have inherited the entirety of the European colonial legacy (Böröcz, 2001: 14). Coloniality influenced the home-states of colonial empires, even if they were dealing with issues that were strictly internal (Böröcz, 2001: 14). Böröcz argues therefore that every study of the EU’s behaviour vis-à-vis its surrounding world should consider that the EU formations in fact represent a global imperial strategy and that the histories of colonialism and empire are reflected in the social-cultural patterns of European Union governmentality (Böröcz, 2001: 14). These histories are characterized by patterns of inequality, hierarchy, exclusion and power. This is most obvious in the EU’s projection of power to its outside world (Böröcz, 2001: 14). Böröcz reminds his readers furthermore that the core status of Western European countries in the present world economy and their privileged position in the global organization of consumption is the consequence of post-coloniality (Böröcz, 2001: 15).

According to Böröcz, the characteristics of ‘empire’, a polity that binds different and formerly independent states together, can be recognized in the contemporary European Union (Böröcz, 2001: 16; 18). He defines the substance of imperial order as a combination of four mechanisms of control:

- Unequal exchange: sustained centripetal funnelling of economic value.
- Coloniality: cognitive mapping of the empires population.
- Export of governmentality: the launching of the normalising, standardising and control mechanisms of modern statehood.
- Geopolitics: fitting all of the above into a long-term global strategy of projecting the central state’s power to its external environment (Böröcz, 2001: 16).

Böröcz argues that these mechanisms are nowadays also at work in Europe (Böröcz, 2001: 18). He shows how these mechanisms worked between the EU and Eastern Europe before the enlargements of 2004 and 2007. He explains the contemporary substance of imperial order as: the EU was by far the largest investors group in Central and Eastern Europe, while the significance of eastern investors in the west was very small. Eastern Europe is negatively stereotyped by the west. The old member states often describe the eastern part of the continent as a ‘treat’ or ‘problem’. Applicant states must transpose and implement the EU’s body of legal materials that presents conditions that are extremely conductive to the imposition of a highly bureaucratized-legal sense of Foucauldian Eurogovernmentality on the applicant societies’ (Böröcz, 2001: 18). Given these facts, Böröcz argues that the eastern enlargement can be seen as a global strategy (Böröcz, 2001: 19).

Alun Jones and Julian Clark on Europeanization behind the borders of the EU

Alun Jones and Julian Clark also reflect on the EU’s relationship with the outside world. They use the concept Europeanization to describe a ‘legitimising process through which the European Union stress to gain meaning, actorness and presence internationally’ (Clark and Jones, 2008: 546). Their study explores the discourses, values and norms that underpin the external activities of the European
Commission (Clark and Jones, 2008: 547). They describe the relationship between the EU and third countries as a binary relationship in which Europe is privileged. This gives the EU the possibility to differentiate these third countries from the EU by giving them taken for granted characteristics (Clark and Jones, 2008: 548). Then the Commission produces discourses that render logical and legitimate European interventions. These discourses work to define and enable certain ways of acting towards the world and also silence and exclude others (Clark and Jones, 2008: 548). As they analyse, the performance of discourse by the Commission is unstable. Its contested knowledge and identities have to be communicated, coordinated and stabilized. Europeanization is therefore changeable and historically contingent (Clark and Jones, 2008: 548). Clark and Jones understand the European Neighbourhood Policy as the ‘external projection of Europeanization’ (Clark and Jones, 2008: 551). Although they do not refer to the empire concept in their analysis, their conceptualization of Europe’s policy towards the wider world makes a similar argument. They conceptualize the ENP as representing ‘both the articulation of the limits of Europe’s physical and legal space and, through a series of rewards for ‘neighbourliness’, an extension of norms and discourses of ‘Europeaness’ beyond those limits’ (Clark and Jones, 2008: 551). Like the empire metaphors, they also focus on the EU’s exercise of power beyond its own territory. They argue that the external projection of Europeanization by the Commission brings about separated spaces that frame inclusion and exclusion, created by a variety of geopolitical, transactional, institutional and cultural forces (Clark and Jones, 2008: 552). Europeanization thus means the construction of ‘systems of meaning and collective understanding’ of the EU’s neighbourhood (Clark and Jones, 2008: 552). The creation of an area called ‘neighbourhood’ or a ‘ring of friends’ was intended to make possible a projection of Europeanization into the Unions ‘near abroad’ (Clark and Jones, 2008: 553). This Europeanization is, according to Clark and Jones, a dynamic, socially constructed and contested process, mainly produced by the European Commission (Clark and Jones, 2008: 567).

**James Anderson on Europe as an empire**

James Anderson (2007) argues that the Europe as an empire metaphor is a likely option for the future nature of the EU (Anderson, 2007: 18). He describes imperial territoriality as a gradation of direct or indirect control or domination of ‘external’ territories. Imperial territories have expansionist tendencies that are self-justified by ‘moral superiority’ and that are often seen as a ‘civilising mission’. Its space is often highly differentiated and unequal. Its borders can also have a variety of forms, from precise lines to fuzzy zones (Anderson, 2007: 19). An empire is made up by a variety of entities which characteristics and interconnections are heterogeneous and asymmetrical (Anderson, 2007: 19). The relationships between territory and sovereignty are weak (Anderson, 2007: 19). There is a pattern of spatial gradations in the heterogeneity and asymmetry. The power and authority decrease outwards from the core of the empire. Indirect methods of rule continue beyond the frontiers of the empire (Anderson, 2007: 19). In so doing, the empire includes external relations without creating any sharp inside/outside dichotomy. This is how a hierarchical pattern of concentric circles is created (Anderson, 2007: 19). Anderson argues that this very abstract model looks like the present-day EU territory, with its increasingly differentiated constitutive territories and internal borders (Anderson, 2007: 19-20). These concentric circles can be recognized in the form of a euro and non-euro zone, Schengen and non-Schengen member states, the old member states and the member states that joined in 2004 and 2007, European Union member states and ENP states (see figure 4.1) (Anderson, 2007: 19).
Anderson argues that the EU’s eastward expansion shows that the Union has genuinely new expressions of imperial territoriosity (Anderson, 2007: 23). According to Anderson, this enlargement was the enlarging of the core of a would-be hegemony that created a zonal border defence by creating new member states, candidate countries and a ring of friends (Anderson, 2007: 19). The EU used the ‘carrot’ of formal inclusion in the empire or access to the EU markets, which Anderson describes as ‘implicitly imperialistic’ and an ‘asymmetrical power relationship’. This made it possible for the EU to impose its norms of liberal democracy and a privatized marked on its eastern neighbours (Anderson, 2007: 20). He argues that the main driven force behind enlargement and integration is the strengthening of the EU’s global competitiveness. This gives substance to the idea of Europe as Empire (Anderson, 2007: 24). Anderson says that in the post-Cold War Europe, European politics unfolded around a single centre and did not revert back to the traditional ‘balance of power’ between many European centres (Anderson, 2007: 24). He argues that a stronger and politically more unified EU empire would have a benign influence on the struggle for world hegemony, a struggle that involves the USA, China and others (Anderson, 2007: 25). However, it is also a fact that the EU is underneath, and despite all its overlays of transnationalism, still is a collection of separated nation states that have their own ideologies (Anderson, 2007: 26). It is therefore likely that the EU evolves towards an empire in a weak form: an empire that is capable of absorbing elements of federalism, sub-state regionalism, and a medieval sharing of sovereignty. A
weak empire would thus mean an EU empire that does not achieve full singularity (Anderson, 2007: 26).

**Jan Zielonka on the EU as ‘neo-medieval empire’**

Jan Zielonka analysed the accession process of the ten new member states before the 2004 enlargement. He does not only pay attention to the institutional perspective of this enlargement, but also to the strategic considerations behind the whole process (Zielonka, 2006: 23-24). His main conclusion is that the contemporary European Union is evolving towards a ‘neo-medieval empire’. This means that the post-enlarged EU is characterized by a ‘polycentric system of government, multiple and overlapping jurisdictions, striking cultural and economic heterogeneity, fuzzy borders, and divided sovereignty’ (Zielonka, 2006: vii). He rejects the dominant Westphalian paradigm in academic literature, which defines the EU as a federation with a central government and a given and clearly defined territory that tries to control its outside world (Zielonka, 2006: 1). Empires with Westphalian characteristics are for example the nineteenth-century Britain and the contemporary United States of America (Zielonka, 2006: 1). His neo-medieval paradigm on the contrary has a polycentric polity that rather penetrates than controls its outside world. This kind of empire, to which Europe is evolving, has the characteristics of systems from the Middle Ages, before the rise of the nation states (Zielonka, 2006: 1).

Zielonka explains his metaphor by distinguishing two abstract empire concepts: the neo-Westphalian empire and the neo-medieval empire. The former is based on the European sovereign nation states that emerged from the peace of Westphalia in 1648. For the latter, it is not clear to which empire Zielonka exactly refers (Zielonka, 2006: 16). Zielonka derives two abstract models of Europe from his empire models. These two ‘Europe’s’ show the contrasting options for the future course of European integration: the neo-Westphalian Europe and the neo-medieval Europe (Zielonka, 2006: 12). The neo-Westphalian Europe is characterized by a concentration of power and sovereignty, with a clear hierarchical structure and one centre of authority. This Europe has one pan-European cultural identity and one single type of citizenship. There is overlap between legal, administrative, economic and military regimes. It has only one European army and police force. The external borders of this Europe are rather hard and fixed. As a consequence, the distinction between EU-members and non-members is sharp and important (Zielonka, 2006: 12). The neo-medieval Europe has on the contrary overlapping authorities, divided sovereignty and diversified institutional arrangements. It is in fact an interpenetration of various types of political units and loyalties. It has multiple cultural identities and also diversified types of citizenship with different sets of rights and duties. This Europe is characterized by disassociation between authoritative allocations, functional competencies and territorial constituencies. It has a multiplicity of various overlapping military and police institutions. With its soft and flux border zones, the distinction between centre and periphery is most crucial but blurred (Zielonka, 2006: 12). Zielonka then argues that the contemporary European Union contains characteristics of both the neo-Westphalian and the neo-medieval model, though it is evolving towards the latter (Zielonka, 2006: 16).

Zielonka explains that the EU is an empire by revealing the strategic considerations behind the 2004 enlargement. He shows that subjects as EU budget were of little significance for the old member states within the accession negotiations. For them, European enlargement was rather about
paradigms, interests and power (Zielonka, 2006: 44). The enlargement was in fact a complex and sophisticated response to the many problems Europe has been facing since the end of the Cold War (Zielonka, 2006: 44). Zielonka describes the essence of the enlargement as trying ‘to assert political and economic control over the unstable and impoverished eastern part of the continent’ (Zielonka, 2006: 44). The enlargement was therefore about ‘filling in an unprecedented power vacuum in the northern, eastern, and southern part of the continent’ (Zielonka, 2006: 44-45). The EU conquered, reformed and regulated the new emerging markets. The essence of the enlargement was about ‘securing peace and prosperity in the future Europe through the skilful use of EU membership conditionality’ (Zielonka, 2006: 45). This makes the last two enlargements an ‘impressive exercise in empire building’ (Zielonka, 2006: 44). The enormous asymmetry of power between the EU and the applicant states gave the Union the possibility to make successfully use of EU membership conditionality. This asymmetry of power between the two negotiation partners in an enlargement process had never been so big and the geopolitical considerations behind enlargement had never been so obvious (Zielonka, 2006: 45). Zielonka argues that this proves that the EU’s behaviour towards its applicants was truly imperial (Zielonka, 2006: 48).

That the EU behaved in an imperial fashion towards its neighbours does however not mean that its policies are similar to the imperial policies of the nineteenth and twentieth century Westphalian states (Zielonka, 2006: 141). The EU’s imperial policies have a very different purpose, which makes it, in Zielonka’s terminology, rather Neo-Medieval than Neo-Westphalian (Zielonka, 2006: 141). Although the EU’s foreign policy might appears to be Westphalian, due to its typical Westphalian state characteristics such as diplomacy, army, police, intelligence, and hard external borders, this image is deceptive. After all, individual member states still have their own foreign and security policy and can be extremely divided about these issues (Zielonka, 2006: 140). Individual member states have furthermore complex diplomatic relations within and across the Unions borders. They act not only within the framework of the EU, but also within the frameworks of international organizations like the United Nations (Zielonka, 2006: 141). This makes Europe a polycentric system with multiple overlapping and loosely coupled arenas (Zielonka, 2006: 141).

The EU’s purpose was not the conquest of its Eastern European neighbours, but the establishment of peace, democracy and prosperity at the eastern flanks of the continent. In other words, the means of EU enlargement were not military but civilian (Zielonka, 2006: 50). The EU wanted to maintain economic growth in the European countries, to stabilize its own political and economic order and secure its borders by the export of its own institutions, norms and practices to the new member states (Zielonka, 2006: 50). From this point of view, the purpose of the last two enlargements was rather for the EU’s self-benefit than for helping the applicant states (Zielonka, 2006: 54). The new member states voluntary cooperated in this asymmetrical relation: ‘The compliance of candidate states was largely voluntary and mostly based on incentives rather than punishments’ (Zielonka, 2006: 55). Europe presented itself thus as a truly imperialist, using a policy of conditionality in which the applicants participated voluntary and in cooperation with the Union (Zielonka, 2006: 55). An important difference with Westphalian imperial exercise is that the EU tried to make the Eastern European countries look like themselves instead of conquering the these countries (Zielonka, 2006: 59).

According to Zielonka, the external borders of this neo-medieval empire are not simply lines on a map demarcating were the EU’s jurisdiction ends and another starts. The present functional and
The geographical borders of the EU do not overlap (Zielonka, 2006: 3). Although the hard border regime of the Schengen system and the large support of European leaders for it might presuppose that Europe’s borders are hard and clear, the system is also ‘unduly harsh, impractical, and at odds with the Unions main foreign policy objectives’ (Zielonka, 2006: 3). Some of the eastern member states are even discontented with the Schengen system, because it frustrates cross-border human links with neighbouring countries that are not members of the EU (Zielonka, 2006: 4). Zielonka argues therefore that it is more likely that Europe will end up as a ‘maze Europe’ with soft and flux borders (Zielonka, 2006: 4). In such a maze Europe are different legal, economic, security, and cultural spaces separately bound. In the external border areas of this Europe will be increasingly more cross-border multiple cooperation. The borders of a neo-medieval empire are less territorial, less physical and less visible. They are zones where people and their identities mingle (Zielonka, 2006: 4). The EU’s new foreign and security policy increasingly blurs its inside/outside dichotomy. Especially the enlargements make it difficult to distinguish inside and outside, domestic and foreign policy (Zielonka, 2006: 144).

The contributions to the Europe as an empire metaphor that I have discussed above show that the imperial relations of the Europe of the nineteenth and early twentieth century are a major inspiration for scholars to conceptualize the contemporary power relations between the EU and non-EU regions as imperial. In my opinion, the Europe as an empire metaphor is an interesting and useful approach to bring this relationship to the light. Böröcz (2001) concludes that the institutional elements of an imperial order are present in the process of eastern enlargement, without critically examining the differences between the nineteenth and early twentieth century empires and the contemporary EU. On the contrary, several other scholars, like Anderson (2007) and Zielonka (2006), stress that there are important differences between the contemporary Europe as an empire and the empires in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Although Anderson also conceptualizes the EU’s power relationship with candidate states and the ENP-states as asymmetrical and imperialistic (Anderson, 2007: 20), he states very clearly that the EU is not simply a replication of nineteenth and early twentieth century empires but a polity that likely evolves towards a weak empire (Anderson, 2007: 26). Zielonka also explains very clearly that the assert of control over non-EU countries shows an imbalance of power and imperial behaviour, but that this does not mean that the EU has the characteristics of, for example, nineteenth-century Britain, because the EU penetrates instead of controls its outside world with civilian instead of military means (Zielonka, 2006: 1). In my opinion, this nuance that the EU is a weak or soft empire is essential in any application of the empire concept on European enlargement and the ENP-policy. After all, as Zielonka rightly mentioned, the means of enlargement were civilian, the EU’s aim was not to conquer regions behind its own borders, but to make them look like themselves, furthermore, the compliance of candidate states and ENP-states is predominantly voluntary (Zielonka, 2006: 55; 59). I argue that an understanding of the European Union as an empire that is similar to the nineteenth and early twentieth century empires is therefore wrong. In my opinion, the contemporary European empire does not mean a return to the nineteenth century.

Some authors, such as Böröcz, solely conceptualize the EU’s external dimensions and its behaviour to non-EU countries, while others, like Anderson and Zielonka, also describe the internal space of the Europe as an Empire. According to Zielonka, this EU’s internal space is a neo medieval institutional
and territorial organisation, which he describes as a polycentric system with multiple overlapping and loosely coupled arenas, economic heterogeneity, fuzzy borders, and divided sovereignty (Zielonka, 2006: vii; 141). I do however prefer Anderson’s description of the EU’s internal space, because he outlines a complexity of highly differentiated and unequal space, borders that can have a variety of forms, and entities which characters and interconnections are heterogeneous and asymmetrical (Anderson, 2007: 19). The EU is at the same time also a hierarchical pattern of concentric circles (Anderson, 2007: 19). Moreover, Anderson argues that underneath these complex overlays of transnationalism, the EU is still a collection of separated nation states. I agree with Anderson that the contemporary European Union indeed incorporates all these elements and thus has an extremely complex territorial pattern. I thus also agree with him that, what he calls an empire in a weak form, is capable of absorbing elements of the United States of Europe, Europe of the regions and new medieval Europe (Anderson, 2007: 26). However, I argue that the contemporary EU also absorbs elements of the fortress Europe metaphor, because it has developed mechanisms to exclude unwanted migrants.

I argue that the term ‘empire’ of Europe as an empire is a disadvantage of the metaphor, because many people probably associate it with an extremely negative image of the single-centered nineteenth and early twentieth century empires, even if the EU is explained as a soft empire. The enormous criticism on Commission President Barroso when he called the EU the first non-imperial empire shows that the idea of a Europe as an empire is for many people (especially outside science) a threatening image (see for example Lanting, 2007). Because it is difficult to separate the image of the nineteenth century empires from the contemporary soft European empire, I would prefer to use other concepts to describe the EU’s exercise of power in the regions behind its borders. In my opinion, Alun Jones’ and Julian Clark’s explanation of ‘Europeanization behind the borders of the EU’ is also very well capable of doing this. They also conceptualize the EU’s privileged position in its relationship with candidate states and the ENP, the differentiation between European and non-European, and the EU’s attempt to govern non-EU territories, however, their description of this as the ‘external projection of Europeanization’ does not have the negative meaning of the Europe as an empire metaphor (see also Clark and Jones, 2008). A disadvantage of their concept is however that the term itself does not make clear at a first glance that the EU has imperial characteristics. Their concept is in my opinion thus an interesting addition to Europe as an empire, but not capable of replacing it.

Both Anderson (2007) and Zielonka (2006) refer explicitly to the external borders and inside/outside dichotomy of the contemporary European empire and describe that the EU’s inside/outside dichotomy increasingly blurs and Zielonka even predicts a ‘maze Europe’ (Zielonka, 2006, 4). This is in my opinion highly problematic, because it ignores that the EU also absorbs elements of fortress Europe. I will discuss this in more detail in the next paragraph.
4.3 Considering fortress Europe and Europe as an empire

In the previous paragraphs, I have discussed the recent changes in and the current state of the EU’s external dimensions. Moreover, I have also discussed how this has been conceptualized by scholars, politicians, the media and artists. The fortress Europe metaphor and the Europe as an empire metaphor are most commonly used to describe the consequences of the EU’s policies that have recently changed the Union’s external dimensions. However, they conceptualize its territory in a very different way. The fortress metaphor suggests that the EU has become a closed and inward-looking space with sharp and hard external borders (Islam, 1994: 38). The empire metaphor on the contrary describes that the inside/outside dichotomy of the EU’s external borders is blurring and that the Union is evolving towards a ‘maze Europe’ (Zielonka, 2006: 6; 144). In this paragraph, I will try to explain why these two metaphors give such a divergent perspective on the EU’s territoriality. I will also discuss the advantages and disadvantages of these two metaphors; moreover, I will attempt to formulate my own definition of the external dimensions of the contemporary European Union.

Developments such as the integration in the Single European Market and the creation of the Schengen space have resulted in the abolition of internal border controls, but also triggered the control and surveillance of the EU’s external borders (Albrecht, 2002: 1). The EU’s borders have indeed become hard and closed towards unwanted economic migrants in order to protect the internal space (see also Albrecht, 2002). If the European Union is a space of free movement for those people who belong to the Union, and excludes all people that are not EU-citizens, the EU would indeed be a fortress Europe. The idea of a fortress Europe suggests after all, as for example Shada Islam argued, that the EU is closed an inward-looking (Islam, 1994: 38). I argue however that this image of the contemporary European Union is far from reality. The idea of a closed and inward-looking Europe with clearly defined and hard borders is problematic for three reasons.

First, the idea of a fortress Europe in terms of a traditional fortress is misleading. The explanation of the fortress Europe metaphor in paragraph 4.1 shows that especially the politicians, the media and the artists that I have discussed tend to refer to a traditional fortress with walls and towers when they criticize the EU’s immigration and asylum policy. This idea is misleading because the EU has not the characteristics of traditional fortresses at all (see also Albrecht, 2002: 21). Some parts of the EU’s external borders, such as the Spanish enclaves Ceuta and Melilla, have indeed many similarities with the walls and towers of a traditional fortress. However, as Albrecht explains, the external borders exist mainly out of hardware to detect and identify unwanted migrants instead of high physical walls and towers (Albrecht, 2002: 21). Moreover, unwanted migrants are not only excluded from the EU by denying them access at the physical borders of the EU, but for example also by rejecting visa and asylum applications (see also Albrecht, 2002: 10). Furthermore, as Hans-Jörg Albrecht explains, the European Union also excludes unwanted migrants with internal surveillance (Albrecht, 2002: 21). In contradiction to a traditional fortress, which Albrecht describes as a fortress only made out of ‘tall walls and powerful towers’ (Albrecht, 2002: 21), the EU does thus not only controls and excludes unwanted people at its external borders, but also from the inside of its territory (Kofman and Sales, 1992: 29). I therefore favour Albrecht’s writings on fortress Europe, because he conceptualizes that
unwanted migrants are excluded by physical borders, hardware, immigration laws, asylum and visa rules, and internal surveillance and therefore calls the EU a ‘not traditional fortress’ (Albrecht, 2002: 21).

A second reason why the closed and inward-looking image of Europe is problematic is the fact that the EU’s external borders are not completely closed. The idea of a Europe that has completely sealed its borders is therefore wrong (Geddes, 2001: 36). The media, artists and some politicians, such as the members of the European parliamentary group the GUE/NGL, try to construct this idea of the EU’s territoriality; however it is incorrect for two reasons. First, even though the EU wants to exclude all migrants that are unwanted, it cannot completely seal its borders, because border controls are ‘gappy’ (see also Geddes, 2001: 36). Second, the EU allows specific categories of people from third countries entry to the Union. This means that its external borders are not completely closed. Some needed migrant workers from outside the EU are granted a residence permit (see also van Houtum and Pijpers, 2007: 300). The EU member states have for example shortages of specific (academic) knowledge and skills and have therefore created possibilities for desired employees from third countries, like top managers, engineers, PhD-students and talented soccer players, to bypass immigration procedures (van Houtum and Pijpers, 2007: 300). In contradiction to the idea that the EU’s external borders are economically closed for all migrants workers from third countries, some economically desirable workers are thus most welcome in the European Union (van Houtum and Pijpers: 2007: 300).

A third disadvantage of the fortress Europe metaphor is, in my opinion, that it gives a somewhat one-sided and partial perspective on the EU’s territoriality. I agree that the image of the EU as a territory that has become more closed and that has created harder external borders with intensive control and surveillance is correct with regard to its immigration and asylum policy. However, the fortress metaphor is one-sided because the EU is not closed and inward-looking in many other policy areas (see for example Zielonka, 2006: 50). In fact, one could even argue that the EU is not even inward-looking in its own immigration policy, since it has established close cooperation with sending and transit countries in order to stop unwanted migrants before they arrive at the EU’s external borders (Albrecht, 2002: 10). The process of Europeanization of the world outside the EU and its wish to gain meaning, actorness and presence internationally as described by Clark and Jones (Clark and Jones, 2008: 546), is in sharp contrast with the idea of a closed and inward-looking fortress. I argue that the idea of a closed and inward-looking Europe makes thus only sense with regard to those unwanted migrants that are excluded and neither with regard to migrant workers who are most welcome, nor with regard to many other policy areas where the EU shows itself rather an outward-looking actor.

I favour the Europe as an empire metaphor, because it brings the EU’s imperial behaviour and the asymmetrical power relationship between the EU and non-EU territories to the light. However, in my opinion, scholars should make very clear that there are fundamental difference between the nineteenth and early twentieth century empires and the contemporary European Union. I therefore like the contributions of Anderson and Zielonka to this stream of literature, because they do not use the ‘empire’ concept in its traditional meaning, but describe the EU as a new kind of empire (Anderson, 2007; Zielonka, 2006). As Anderson explains, the EU will not become an empire with full singularity, but rather an empire in a weak form (Anderson, 2007: 26). According to Anderson, this
means for the contemporary EU that it has differentiated constitutive territories and internal borders (Anderson, 2007: 19-20). Zielonka made a similar argument by arguing that the EU is not an empire with Westphalian characteristics, but an empire that absorbs elements of medieval sharing of sovereignty (Zielonka, 2006: 1). This makes his metaphor very meaningful in my opinion, because the idea of the EU as a weak empire furthermore means that this empire does not conquer foreign territories, but exercises power behind its own external borders in order to establish peace, democracy and prosperity (Zielonka, 2006: 50). In my opinion, this conceptualization of the EU as a ‘weak empire’ illustrates a crucial characteristic of the relationship between the contemporary European Union and its surrounding states.

An aspect of the Europe as an empire metaphor that is in my opinion rather a disadvantage is the way in which it describes the EU’s external borders and inside/outside dichotomy. This is related to what I already described as the very one-sided perspective on the EU’s territoriality of the fortress Europe metaphor. For example Zielonka argues that it is very likely that the EU will end up as a ‘maze Europe’ with soft and flux external borders (Zielonka, 2006: 4). These borders will thus be less territorial, less physical and less visible; they will be zones with much cross-border cooperation where people and their identities mingle (Zielonka, 2006: 4). I agree with Zielonka that this is to some extent true for many policy areas in which the EU seeks cooperation with neighbouring states; moreover, I agree that the processes before the last two rounds of enlargement made it difficult to distinguish between inside and outside, and between domestic and foreign policy (Zielonka, 2006: 144). However, the idea of a ‘maze Europe’ and external border areas in which people and identities mingle is in my opinion overblown. After all, the EU’s immigration and asylum policy shows that its borders can also be very territorial, very physical and very visible, especially in places such as Ceuta and Melilla (see for example GUE/NGL, 2008). I therefore suggest conceptualizing in one metaphor that there are two paradoxical tendencies: the EU’s external borders are both blurring and becoming hard. It is interesting to note that these two paradoxical developments are both happening in the same circumstances and that they are partly the result of the same policy objectives. The objective of the EU’s restrictive immigration and asylum policy is to keep the European Union a safe and stable space (Albrecht, 2002), and the recent EU’s enlargements had the objective to create peace and stability too (Verheugen, 2003). Both the hardening of external borders as described by the fortress Europe metaphor, and the Europeanization of the EU’s surrounding states as described by the Europe as an empire metaphor, are thus conceptualized as a response to fear for unwanted migration, international crime and global terrorism (Albrecht, 2002: 1; Joffé, 2007: 92). I argue that the recent enlargements, the ENP and the EU’s contemporary immigration and asylum policy thus show that the EU’s attempts to keep its own territory safe and stable result in both the securing and hardening of its external borders (Albrecht, 2002: 13), and in the Europeanization of its outside world. The latter rather means that its inside/outside dichotomy is blurring (Clark and Jones, 2008: 551).

I therefore suggest combining the Europe as an empire metaphor with elements of the gated community and ban-opticon metaphors. I prefer to use elements of the gated community and ban-opticon metaphors instead of elements of the fortress Europe metaphor, because the idea of a fortress Europe is overblown, moreover, the gated community and ban-opticon metaphors are better able to describe the ‘fortress rhetoric’. Europe as an empire should incorporate the paradoxical tendency that the EU’s borders are not only getting blurred, but that they are at the same time also very hard towards certain categories of unwanted migrants that are considered as a
threat to the EU’s safety and stability. I therefore suggest defining the Europe as an empire metaphor as:

The contemporary European Union is a soft empire which internal space is highly differentiated and unequal, which borders vary from precise lines to fuzzy zones, and which entities and interconnections between them are heterogeneous and asymmetrical. Its internal space is at the same time also a hierarchical pattern of concentric circles, because power and authority decrease outwards from the core of the empire. Underneath these complex overlays of transnationalism, the EU is still a collection of separated nation states. The empire’s relations with its surrounding states are characterized by voluntary and asymmetrical power relations in which it penetrates external territories with civilian objectives in order to establish peace, democracy and prosperity behind its own external borders and by so doing to keep the safety, stability and welfare of the internal territory. The inside/outside dichotomy between the domestic and foreign territory therefore seems to blur for most policy areas. In order to defend the domestic territory against possible threats, certain categories of migrant that are considered as a possible risk are excluded by external border controls of both physical borders and hardware, internal surveillance, immigration laws, and asylum and visa rules. This is mainly driven by the fear that certain categories of migrants will damage the community’s safety, stability and welfare, and the fear that the community will lose its self-defined identity. This soft empire does not exclude all migrants from third countries, because its border controls are ‘gappy’ and because practices of exceptionalism allow certain workers with desired knowledge or skills entry to the internal space. Consequently, the borders of this empire are very paradoxical getting both more and less territorial, physical and visible.
5 A reflection on the metaphors

In the previous chapters, I have given an overview of the metaphors on the EU's political geography that have been dominant since the establishment of the ECSC. I will now reflect on the metaphors by drawing conclusions about this overview of metaphors and by discussing what kind of metaphors could possibly be created in the contemporary new social, economic and political circumstances. Because every dominant discourse on the EU emerged in a non-fixed and non-frozen form from the past and because this process continues into the future, it is to be expected that the current economic and financial crisis brings about new ways of thinking about the nature of the EU (see also Martin, 2009). Old metaphors possibly revive or new discourses may be constructed. I will therefore first discuss three possible futures for the EU and ways of thinking about its political geography, after that, I will draw final conclusions about this research.
5.1 Future metaphors on the EU

The current worldwide economic and financial crisis creates new social, economic and political circumstances that thus likely bring about new metaphors on the EU’s political geography (see also: Martin, 2009). Scholars, politicians, EU-bureaucrats and the media will thus probably think about new scenarios for the European Union. Some of them might consider abandoning globalization by arguing that economic globalization has failed to shield the EU from the contemporary economic and financial crisis (Martin, 2009). The current circumstances could encourage especially politicians in calling for protectionist policies, because this can be ‘politically’ efficient to those politicians who want to maximize political support (Martin, 2009). We can already observe that several European governments want to subsidize and protect their own ‘key’ industries. There are on the other hand also many European leaders, politicians and EU-officials who argue that the member states should resist the temptation of protectionism and should choose for a common European approach to recover the economy (see also Martin, 2009). Christian Martin (2009) discusses three possible scenarios for the future of the EU within this new narrative: a re-invention of ‘fortress Europe’, Europe as a ‘lighthouse of liberal foreign economic policies’, and a ‘breakup of the Union’ (Martin, 2009).

5.1.1 A re-invention of fortress Europe?

With a re-invention of fortress Europe, Martin does not mean a fortress in terms of restrictive immigration and asylum policy, but rather in terms of protectionism in economic policy (Martin, 2009). This scenario thus suggests that the EU will create trade and capital policies that have the aim to protect the EU’s economy and thereby restrict international trade (Martin, 2009). He explains that this is a likely scenario, because protectionism often grows stronger in times of crisis. Especially politicians tend to play to populist demands for policies that ‘protect’ domestic jobs (Martin, 2009). According to Martin, resurrection of such tendencies can already be observed in the European Union and the rest of the world (Martin, 2009).

I argue that several recent events show that there is indeed a spectre of protectionism looming over the European Union. Probably the most outstanding example of contemporary tendencies towards economic protectionism is the French aid to its car sector (EUbusiness, 2009). French President Nicolas Sarkozy suggested that French car groups should keep their factories in France and bring back production from abroad in exchange for financial aid from the government (EUbusiness, 2009). For several years, French companies have been relocating a part of their manufacturing of cars to Eastern European member states (EUbusiness, 2009). Sarkozy wanted to prevent the relocation of more factories to other countries in order to protect jobs and the French economy as a whole (EUbusiness, 2009). He singled out the car industry in particular and said that the plans of some French companies to build factories in the Czech Republic to manufacture cars for the French market was unacceptable (EUbusiness, 2009).

This French rhetoric is not unique within the Union (see also Spiegel online, 2009). Italy’s Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi proposed to support the Italian car industry, tried to keep car companies
home and warned them not to uproot jobs to other countries (Spiegel online, 2009). Despite the plea of the British Prime Minister Gordon Brown against protectionism, workers in his own country asked for ‘British jobs for British workers’ (Spiegel online, 2009). German Chancellor Angela Merkel was also on a protectionist tone in the beginning of the crisis. The German government reduced non-wage labour costs without consulting with the other members of the European currency area (Münchau, 2009). This measure has led to an immediate cost advantage for their own companies (Münchau, 2009). Moreover, Germany’s economic stimulus program to recover from the crisis is designed to primarily benefit the German car industry (Münchau, 2009). These examples show that protectionism is alive and well in the European Union.

Martin argues that it is thus well possible that the European Union will create policies that restrict trade. A re-invention of fortress Europe is especially likely if member states would demand such policies on the European level because they believe that this would save the project Europe (Martin, 2009). In terms of thinking about the EU’s political geography, this means that the new social, economic and political circumstances may bring about a re-invention of fortress Europe (Martin, 2009). However, I argue that recent events show that it is also possible that individual member states develop their own national measures to protect their economies (EUbusiness, 2009; Spiegel online, 2009). I suggest that this fortress metaphor would therefore not only describe the EU’s external borders as getting harder, but maybe also its internal borders. I suggest that such a re-invention of fortress Europe would probably describe the EU as clearly demarcated from its outside and divided within. In other words, the EU as a collection of nation states instead of one internal space.

5.1.2 Europe as a lighthouse of liberal foreign economic policies

The Europe as a lighthouse of liberal foreign economic policies scenario suggests that the European Union will maintain and possibly even broadens its liberal foreign economic policies as a reaction to foreign protectionism and demands by member states for more protectionism (Martin, 2009). It is, after all, very difficult to change the EU’s contemporary liberal trade policies at short notice, because these policies are determined at the Community level (Martin, 2009). The EU has currently an inability to reach decisions and that could work to the advantage of liberal foreign economic policies (Martin, 2009). The Union is thus well suited to resist populist pressures for closure of the European market. This makes the lighthouse of liberal foreign economic policies a likely scenario (Martin, 2009).

The plea of several European leaders and politicians for maintaining European free trade and avoiding protectionism proves that there are indeed tendencies within the EU towards this scenario (van Puyvelde, 2009). The Czech Republic organized during its Presidency of the Council of the European Union a European summit on the economic crisis in March 2009. They asked the leaders of the member states to come together to discuss the rising protectionism within the Union (van Puyvelde, 2009). They got support from Commission President Barroso who also appealed to the member states to refrain from resorting to protectionism in the current economic crisis. He argued that it is important that ‘we maintain, at the highest level, a common approach that is compatible with EU principles and that we resist the temptation of protectionism, both with respect to non-EU counties and EU countries’ (cited in van Puyvelde, 2009). British Prime Minister Gordon Brown is one
of the most active European leaders in warning against the rise of economic protectionism in the European Union. Like Barroso, he also advocates a common European approach (Brown, 2008). Brown said that ‘protectionism is a great fear for both the threat to open trade around the world and then the effect on living standards of people in our countries’ (Brown, 2008). He even said that he feared the threat of a new ‘Iron Curtain’, referring to the risk that the crisis may split rich and poor countries (Walker, 2009). According to Brown, Economic protectionism would therefore be ‘the road to ruin’ (Agence France Presse, 2009). Another example of a plea for maintaining European free trade is the proposal of Guy Verhofstadt, former Belgian Prime Minister and member of the European Parliament, for recovery of the economic recession without protectionism. He wrote a manifesto in which he argues that the EU cannot emerge successfully from the current economic and financial crisis ‘with 27 vertical and at times even protectionist recovery plans, but by one major horizontal European investment plan’ (cited in Kerevan, 2009). He suggests that the EU should set up a new and centralized Eurobond market in order to finance his ‘Europlan’ (Kerevan, 2009). There are thus tendencies within the EU that make the Europe as a lighthouse of liberal foreign economic policies scenario likely (Martin, 2009). I suggest that in terms of thinking about the EU’s political geography, a Europe as a lighthouse of liberal foreign economic policies metaphor would describe the Union as an open space with a lot of cross-border trade. This metaphor would thus not only describe the internal borders as soft, but also the external borders. I suggest that it would describe the EU as a collectively that cooperates with the rest of the world.

5.1.3 The breakup of the Union

The breakup of the Union scenario suggests that the crisis will be extremely deep, long and difficult to overcome (Martin, 2009). This would consequently encourage populist movements that blame European integration and globalization. The project Europe could therefore come under pressure from new anti-European parties, but also from existing parties that demand nationalist policies (Martin, 2009). It is even possible that some member states will decide that they are better off without the European Union (Martin, 2009). Martin argues that if this scenario comes true, this could even end the existence of the EU (Martin, 2009).

The contemporary tendency towards protectionism shows that this can cause tensions between member states (EUbusiness, 2009). Especially Sarkozy’s suggestion to stop factories from relocating abroad met with opposition from other European leaders (EUbusiness, 2009). It caused in particular tensions between France and the Czech Republic. Czech Prime Minister Mirek Topolanek was unhappy with Sakoz’s suggestion and called it a threat to the revival of the European economy (EUbusiness, 2009). From all over the EU, leaders criticized the French and other attempts to protect domestic economies for being counterproductive (EUbusiness, 2009). Moreover, Sarkozy also clashed with EU officials about his plan to give financial aid to the domestic car sector (EUbusiness, 2009).

Also the rise of Euroscepticism and anti-European parties is a threat to the Union (Martin, 2009). The last elections for the European Parliament, held on 4 June 2009, show a gain of far-right and eurosceptic parties (The Economist, 2009: 29-30). Although the campaigns for the European Parliament were usually dominated by regional and national concerns, during the last elections, the
The worldwide economic crisis was one of the main issues (together with immigration and asylum policy) throughout the European Union (The Economist, 2009: 29-30). The eurosceptic parties want to defend national boundaries against alien influences, including policies made at the supranational level. They thus want to return powers from Brussels or even plea for the breakup of the Union (Hadas-Lebel, 2009). In the Netherlands, the ‘Partij voor de Vrijheid’, which vows to ban the Koran, scrap the European Parliament and force Romania and Bulgaria to leave the EU, won 17 percent of the votes (Hadas-Lebel, 2009). Also in Austria, Denmark, Hungary, Slovakia, and the United Kingdom gained the eurosceptic and anti-European parties (Hadas-Lebel, 2009). The European Union thus comes under pressure from new anti-European parties (Martin, 2009).

Both the tensions between European leaders about economic protectionism and the rise of Euroscepticism within the EU could give substance to the idea that the breakup of the Union scenario is a likely future for the EU (Martin, 2009). I suggest that in terms of EU’s political geography, this would mean a return to individual nation states. However, I believe that the tensions between European leaders and the rise in Euroscepticism are not that big that a breakup of the EU is likely.

It is difficult to predict what the effects of the contemporary economic and financial crisis will be on the thinking about the EU’s political geography. The future of the EU may well be a combination of the extremes outlined above (Martin, 2009). Martin suggests that some countries may break away from the EU, while the remaining members will form a more tightly Union that shields its economy from the world (Martin, 2009). It is however also possible that some countries that wish for more protectionist policies break away from the EU, because it sticks to liberal trade policies (Martin, 2009). I argue that it still remains uncertain how the EU will develop and what discourses and metaphors on the EU’s political geography will be constructed. One thing is however certain, scholars, politicians, EU-bureaucrats, the media and maybe even artists will construct new metaphors on the nature of the European Union.
5.2 Conclusion

I have discussed several metaphors that have been commonly used to describe the EU’s political geographical nature in this thesis. My aim has been to expose those metaphors as ways of thinking about the EU and its territoriality that fit in their own social, economic and political circumstances and that make place for other dominant ways of thinking about the EU when the circumstances change. By critically reviewing the metaphors, I have attempted to show that they are perspectives on what the European Union is, instead of universal and comprehensive concepts. I have thus tried to show that they are socially constructed. The overview of dominant metaphors therefore proves that the European Union is a contested concept. Instead of one fixed meaning, the project Europe has many meanings that only make sense and can only be known within their own discourse (see also Diez, 1999: 602).

The analysis I have made in this thesis show that metaphors can often be contextualized to the social, economic and political circumstances in which they were materialized. This makes every metaphor to a greater or lesser extent useful within its own discourse (Diez, 1999: 602). Because I believe that it is important to know and realize in which social, economic and political circumstances metaphors were materialized, I have paid much attention to these circumstances. After all, the metaphors that I have discussed did not appear spontaneously, they were commonly used because they fit in their spirit of the age. Scholars, politicians, EU-bureaucrats, the media and artists construct new metaphors because they become unsatisfied with the available vocabulary that describes the EU when the circumstances change (Deibert, 1997: 184). They therefore employ a novel set of categories to redescribe the present and better accommodate new actors and processes emerging in the project Europe (Deibert, 1997: 184). This means that they are thus ‘stepping from one part of their web-of-believes into another’ (Deibert, 1997: 184). All the metaphors that I have discussed can thus only remain parenthetical devices, one senses, because they are, ‘just metaphors’ (Deibert, 1997: 184).

In the overview of metaphors that I have given in this thesis, I have explained that the new narrative after the Second World War was to transform the ‘dark continent’ into a unified Europe (Leontidou, 2004, 603). Even though the Iron Curtain made it impossible to unite all European nation states in one common framework, the Western European countries tried to cooperate (van Thoor, 1996: 183). Many Western European leaders saw a replication of the USA’s federal state-building process as the only ‘rational’ option for Europe and dreamed of a United States of Europe, which means a federal Europe as the final stage of European integration (Dinan, 2006: 299). Robert Schuman proposed an economic alliance between the age-old enemies France and Germany in order to make another war between them ‘materially impossible’ (van Thoor, 1996: 140). This European Coal and Steel Community marked the beginning of the European integration process and the members saw this community as the foundation for a European federation (van Thoor, 1996: 140). Although economic integration was originally an instrument to maintain peace, an economic union became an end in itself with the establishment of the European Economic Community (Heffernan, 1998: 209). Most leaders of the member states still believed in the idea of a United States of Europe. Nonetheless, the principle of supranationalism had already weakened with the establishment of the EEC (van Thoor, 1996: 144).
The idea of a United Stated of Europe was however not supported by all Western European states. Especially the UK advocated European cooperation along intergovernmental lines (Dinan, 2006: 301). The UK and six other European countries set up the European Free Trade Association (Heffernan, 1998: 209). With its limited objective, the association only pursued the creation of a free trade area for industrial goods (Blacksell, 1977: 109). In contradiction to the objectives of the EEC, the EFTA had absolutely no political or cultural aspirations, but was solely concerned with stimulating trade (Heffernan, 1998: 209). The desire of most members to achieve a working relationship with the EEC and the UK’s applications for an EEC membership caused tensions within the EFTA (Blacksell, 1977: 110-111). Both the UK and Denmark would eventually leave the EFTA and join the EEC in 1973 (Blacksell, 1977: 111).

The shared objective of a United States of Europe that characterized the beginning of the European integration process was soon replaced by discussions about how much ‘widening’ and ‘deepening’ of the community was actually desirable. This was the result of different fundamental geopolitical opinions about the EEC’s future (Heffernan, 1998: 210; van Thoor, 1996). The integration process vacillated during the 1970s and the accession of the UK made deepening of the Community even more difficult. The EEC therefore had to redefine its basic aims and objectives (Heffernan, 1998: 215-216). Consequently, both federalist and intergovernmentalist schemes were promoted within the Community during the 1970s and 1980s (Heffernan, 1998: 222).

In my opinion, the United States of Europe was an appropriate metaphor to describe the objective of the project Europe in the beginning of the integration process, because the leaders of the member states saw a replication of the USA’s federal polity as the final stage of their European project (Dinan, 2006: 299). However, replacing the traditional system of relations among European states by a federal state-building process turned out to be extremely difficult and the idea of a United States of Europe was thus utopian and overenthusiastic. I have argued that this unrealistic perspective on the project Europe is this metaphor’s main weakness. An advantage of this metaphor is however that it gave people hope for a better future in the first post-war years. In so doing, the idea of a United States of Europe also gave direction to the first steps of the European integration process. I have also argued that from the moment that both federal and intergovernmental schemes were promoted within the Community, the idea of a United States of Europe should have been redefined in order to accommodate both federalist and intergovernmentalist actors and to conceptualize that the project Europe contained both federal and intergovernmental elements (Heffernan, 1998: 222). I have suggested that an appropriate definition of the United States of Europe should describe that the Western European member states increasingly cooperate on economic matters and to a lesser extent on political affairs. Moreover, I have suggested that it should include that government tasks were partly pooled to a supranational European governing body while some policy areas maintained organized at the national level. The United States of Europe metaphor still seems to be alive. The recently ratified Treaty of Lisbon makes a step forward to the creation of a state at the European level, by creating a European President, stronger Parliament and a High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (Beneyto, 2008: 6).

The European integration process accelerated in the late 1980s and especially the European Commission gained more authority (Loughlin, 1996: 154). One of its main objectives became the
promotion of economic and social cohesion and the correction of regional imbalances that resulted from industrial change, structural unemployment and the integration in the Single European Market (European Commission, 1984: V; Fitzgerald and Michie, 1997: 14). Its regional policy became a powerful instrument to support regions (Loughlin, 1996: 154). This Europeanized the subnational level and many subnational governments took this change to strengthen their own position and attempted to encourage and influence the Commission’s decision-making (Keating, 1998: 169). Regional governments invested in direct links with the European institutions and the Community created possibilities for regional influence by establishing the Committee of the Regions (Keating, 1998: 155; 169). As a result, the European Community became in a way regionalized (see also Keating, 1998). The shift of some sovereignty and authority from the member states to the European Commission and regional governments reshaped the EU’s territorial profile (Keating, 1998: 161). The United States of Europe metaphor was consequently no longer an appropriate vocabulary to describe the EU’s political geography. New metaphors were therefore constructed to accommodate the combined effects of regionalization and European integration (Anderson, 2007: 14).

As I have explained, the Europe of the regions metaphor is a metaphor that was especially used by Commission officials and regional governments to describe the shift of authority from the member states to the European and subnational level was. These Commission-officials and regional governments were inspired by previous ideas of a European federation of regions that were formulated by federalist thinkers from the 1950s (Loughlin, 1996: 50). This metaphor stemmed in a way from the United States of Europe metaphor, because it is also a model of federalism. However, in this model, the subnational governments would replace the nation-states (Loughlin, 1996: 150). Most scholars criticized the Europe of the regions metaphor, because they rather argued that the influence of national level (f)actors remained dominant and that a Europe of the regions was far from reality (Borrás-Alomar, et al, 1994: 1). Susana Borrás-Alomar therefore argued that the EU was rather a ‘Europe with, not of, the regions’ (Borrás-Alomar, et al, 1994: 14). According to John Loughlin, the EU was emerging to a kind of hybrid system in which nation-states would continue to exist, however they would become more decentralized and considerably modified form alongside the EU institutions (Loughlin, 1996: 162). Liesbet Hooge and Gary Marks also rejected the idea of a Europe of the regions, even though regions were no longer nested only within nation states, the European Union was not evolving towards an overarching model of governance. They argued that European integration and regionalization were rather creating ‘multilevel governance’ (Hooge and Marks, 1996: 91).

Another metaphor that was rather favoured among scholars is the new medieval Europe metaphor (see also Friedrichs, 2001; Anderson, 1996). Scholars like Friedrichs (2001) and Anderson (1995; 1996) used the political order of the Middle Ages as background for the diagnostic of changes in the EU’s political geography during the 1980s and 1990s. Their descriptions of the EU’s territoriality as new medieval emphasized on the fragmentation of the nation states’ territory and the blurring of internal/external divisions (Anderson, 1995: 15; 71). The new medieval Europe metaphor reacted in a way on the ideas of a United States of Europe and Europe of the regions by rejecting their traditional one-level thinking (Anderson, 1996: 139-140). It furthermore rejected the Europe of the regions metaphor because the idea that regions could replace nation states was, according to the new medievalism stream of literature, overblown (Anderson and Goodman, 1995: 603).
Based on Bull’s definition of new medievalism: ‘a system of overlapping authority and multiple loyalty’ (Bull, 1977: 254), Friedrichs argued that Europe was evolving towards a new medieval order (Friedrichs, 2001: 484). According to him, the new medieval metaphor was the appropriate vocabulary to describe the EU’s territorial transformations, because it has the ability to conceptualize a Europe with more than one organizing principle, moreover, it is able to conceptualize the simultaneous tends towards globalization and fragmentation in a Europe that is still dominated by nation states (Friedrichs, 2001: 479). Anderson also agreed that the new medieval metaphor was the right way to describe the unbundling of territory in the EU, because it recognized that the EU’s geographical space was becoming more complex and ‘relative’ (Anderson, 1996: 133). Anderson explained that this unbundling of territory was highly selective and partial and that it varied much between different state roles (Anderson and Goodman, 1995: 609). As a result, the EU became a complex mixture of old, new and hybrid forms of association and authority coexisting and interacting within its territory (Anderson, 1996: 149).

I have argued that the new medieval Europe metaphor is a much better metaphor to accommodate the territorial changes in the 1980s and 1990s than the Europe of the regions metaphor. In my opinion, the latter is very problematic for two reasons. First, Europe of the regions was a utopian perspective and overestimated the power of both the European Union and regional governments; after all, the integration process was and is controlled by member states (see also Anderson and Goodman, 1995: 601). Second, the metaphor assumed a traditional one-level thinking that is inadequate for defining partial and selective sharing of sovereignty between different government levels (Anderson and Goodman, 1995: 603). The new medieval Europe metaphor provides thus a better vocabulary, because it conceptualized the fragmentation of national territoriality, the downgrading of internal borders and the dissolving of sharp inside/outside dichotomies (Anderson, 2007: 15). Although I favour Friedrich’s definition of new medievalism, I have argued that a huge disadvantage of this metaphor is its vagueness. At a first glance, it is quite unclear what new medieval territoriality looks like. I therefore prefer to describe the outcome of the simultaneous processes of Europeanization and regionalization in the 1980s and 1990s as a multilevel Europe, which I have defined as a system that is a mixture of old, new and hybrid forms of unstable, contested, heterogeneous, and overlapping authority and multiple loyalty in which the partial and selective ceding and pooling of authority and sovereignty is controlled by nation states.

The United States of Europe, Europe of the regions and new medieval Europe metaphors were hardly concerned with the external dimensions of the European Union. I have explained that the Fortress Europe and Europe of the Empire metaphors by contrast emphasis on these dimensions in order to conceptualize the recent EU policies in the field of immigration and asylum affairs and foreign affairs. These policies have greatly changed the EU’s external borders and relationships with surrounding states. Fortress Europe is used as a pejorative term to describe the EU’s immigration and asylum policy that is, according to most people who use this metaphor, to the disadvantage of the developing world, refugees, asylum seekers and the poor (Albrecht, 2002: 1). The improved controlling of the EU’s external borders and internal surveillance was triggered by the creation of the Single European Market and the creation of the Schengen space, moreover, it was also triggered because immigration became mingled with sensitive issues such as ethnic differences, nationality, identity, national identities, order, safety and stability (Albrecht, 2002: 1-2; Kofman and Sales, 1992: 29).
Different actors in the field of politics, media and arts have contributed to the production and reproduction of the fortress Europe metaphor by using the term fortress in its traditional and literal meaning. Those actors often described the EU’s external borders by stressing on the parts of the borders that are most militarized and on the migrants who are excluded. Also many scholars have discussed the fortress Europe metaphor. Shada Islam argues that the Single European Market has indeed created a closed and inward-looking Europe that looks like a fortress (Islam, 1994: 38). However, most scholars have taken a more critical stance towards the idea of a fortress Europe. For example Albrecht argues that the EU is certainly not a traditional fortress, but a fortress with internal and soft controls, with hardware to detect and identify unwanted migrants at the external borders, and with a mixture of normative concepts to prevent unwanted immigration (Albrecht, 2002: 21). Geddens agrees that the idea of a traditional fortress is overblown; however, he argues that the concept has meaning, because its idea has the ability to show that fear of uncontrolled and unwanted migration legitimates restrictive policies (Geddes, 2001: 36). Henk van Houtum and Roos Pijpers also argue that the fear for the consequences of immigration is an important aspect of the social-spatial bordering of immigrants, however, they argue that the European Union follows a geo-strategic logic that resembles the management of a gated community instead of a fortress (van Houtum and Pijpers, 2007: 301). Didier Bigo also argues that the EU cannot be understood as a fortress and argues that the European Union is rather a ban-opticon, which he describes as an governmentality of unease. Practices of exceptionalism, acts of profiling and containing foreigners, and a normative imperative of mobility characterize this governmentality (Bigo, 2006: 6).

Contrary to fortress Europe, Europe as an empire does not suggest that the EU has a clearly demarcated territory, but rather that its inside/outside division is blurred because its authority does not stop at its own external borders (see also Böröcz, 2001: 18-19). Like the fortress Europe metaphor, Europe as an empire also reacts in a way on the United States of Europe, Europe of the regions and new medieval Europe metaphors by emphasising on the external dimensions of the Union (see also Anderson, 2007: 18). Nevertheless, the European empire is also capable of absorbing elements of federalism, sub-state regionalism, and a medieval sharing of sovereignty (Anderson, 2007: 23-26).

Europe as an empire is a metaphor that is predominantly used by scholars to describe the relationship between the European Union and the candidate member states in the enlargements of 2004 and 2007. Moreover, it is also used to describe the relationship between the EU and its neighbouring states that are part of the European Neighbourhood Policy. The last two rounds of enlargement were, from a strategically point of view, a policy of peace and stability with the objective to solve problems such as illegal migration, illegal employment, and growing international organized crime. From this point of view, the aim of the enlargement was to keep the continent peaceful and stable (Verheugen, 2002b; 2003). The new member states had to implement the acquis communautaire and far-reaching reforms, moreover, the negotiations between the EU and the candidate countries were based on conditionality (European Commission, 2006: 5). The contemporary European Neighbourhood Policy, in which the Union exports its stability, security and prosperity behind its own borders, is also based on conditionality (European Commission, 2003: 4; 2007: 2). This shows that there is thus an enormous imbalance of power between the EU and its surrounding states (see also Scott, 2006). Although it is of course primarily in the EU’s own interest to stabilize its surrounding states and to avoid sharp dividing lines in welfare, the commission argues...
that the ENP is not only self-interest and sees it as the EU’s duty to support its neighbours (European Commission, 2003: 3-4).

The EU’s attempts to govern non-EU territories have encouraged scholars to develop new metaphors to describe the EU’s contemporary territoriality. Many have suggested applying theoretical notions such as ‘empire’ and ‘coloniality’ on the contemporary European Union (see for example Böröcz, 2001). Böröcz argues that the characteristics of ‘empire’ can be recognized in the EU, because the eastern enlargements were a global strategy (Böröcz, 2001: 19). The relation with the candidates was characterized by unequal exchange, negatively stereotyping of the candidates and export of governmentality (Böröcz, 2001: 16-19). The EU’s attempts to gain meaning, actorness and presence internationally is conceptualized by Clark and Jones as the external projection of Europeanization (Clark and Jones, 2008: 546). According to Anderson, the EU could likely evolve towards a Europe as an empire. He describes the imperial territoriality of the EU as an empire as a gradation of direct or indirect control or domination of ‘external’ territories. An important characteristic of these expansionist tendencies is that they are self-justified by ‘moral superiority’ (Anderson, 2007: 19). According to Anderson, Europe as an empire does not create any sharp inside/outside dichotomies when it includes external relations, moreover, it creates a hierarchical pattern of concentric circles (Anderson, 2007: 19). Zielonka combines the medieval and empire metaphor and argues that the EU is evolving towards a neo-medieval empire (Zielonka, 2006: vii). The government of this empire is a polycentric system, its jurisdictions are multiple and overlapping, it is furthermore characterized by striking cultural and economic heterogeneity, fuzzy borders, and its sovereignty is divided. Zielonka describes the last two enlargements as an exercise in empire building, because the EU asserted political and economic control over the candidates, moreover, the EU conquered, reformed and regulated the new emerging markets and thereby secured peace and prosperity in the future Europe (Zielonka, 2006: 44-45). Zielonka emphasizes on the enormous asymmetry of power between the EU and candidate states (Zielonka, 2006: 45). He furthermore argues that this relationship makes it difficult to distinguish inside and outside, domestic and foreign policy (Zielonka, 2006: 144).

I have argued that the fortress Europe metaphor in its traditional and literal meaning, as used by mainly politicians, the media and artist, is problematic because it describes a closed and inward-looking Europe that is far from reality. Moreover, the EU does not only exclude unwanted migrants with walls and towers, but also with a mixture of physical borders, hardware, internal surveillance, immigration laws, and asylum and visa rules (Albrecht, 2002: 21). The metaphor is also problematic because the EU is not a closed fortress. On the contrary, its border controls are ‘gappy’ (Geddes, 2001: 36), and some economically desirable workers are not excluded from the EU (van Houtum and Pijpers: 2007). I have argued that the fortress Europe metaphor thus gives a one-sided perspective on the EU’s territoriality, because the Union is only closed and inward-looking towards unwanted migrants. The EU is however not inward-looking with regard to desirable migrant workers and not with regard to many other policy areas. Even though I do not favour this metaphor, I have agreed with Geddens that the metaphor has some meaning, because it shows that a restrictive immigration and asylum policy is the result of a desire to exclude risk and keep the internal space safe and economically and socially stable (Geddes, 2001: 36). Albrecht called this the ‘fortress rhetoric’ (Albrecht, 2002: 1). I have given two alternatives for the fortress Europe metaphor that are in my opinion a better vocabulary to understand the EU’s contemporary nature with regard to this ‘fortress rhetoric’: the European Union as a gated community (van Houtum and Pijpers: 2007) and the European Union as a ban-opticon (Bigo, 2006).
I have explained that I favour the Europe as an empire metaphor, because it perfectly describes the EU’s relationship with its surrounding states as imperialistic and an asymmetrical power relationship (Anderson, 2007: 19-20). I especially like it that this metaphor understands Europe as a weak empire that does not conquer its outside world, but establishes peace, democracy and prosperity behind its own borders (Zielonka, 2006: 50). This is in my opinion a crucial element of the contemporary European Union.

I have argued that it is a disadvantage of both the fortress Europe metaphor and the Europe as an empire metaphor that they give a somehow one-sided perspective on the external dimensions of the EU’s territoriality. Fortress Europe implies hard and sharp borders, while Europe as an empire suggests that the EU’s inside/outside division is rather blurring and that the EU will end up as a ‘maze Europe’ with soft and flux external borders (Zielonka, 2006: 4). These are two very divergent perspectives that are however both reality in the contemporary EU. I have therefore suggested conceptualizing these two paradoxical tendencies in one metaphor. I have argued that an adequate metaphor to understand the EU’s contemporary political geography should incorporate that it is a weak empire with a polycentric system of government, multiple and overlapping jurisdictions, striking cultural and economic heterogeneity, and divided sovereignty (see also Zielonka, 2006: vii). It should also incorporate that the EU’s relationship with its surrounding world is voluntary and asymmetrical, that the EU has civilian objectives and wants to establish peace, democracy and prosperity behind its own external borders to keep the Union safe, stable, and prosperous (see also Zielonka, 2006). Another essential element is that the inside/outside dichotomy consequently seems to blur for most policy areas (see also Anderson, 2007). Driven by the fear that certain categories of migrants will damage the community’s safety, stability and welfare, and the fear that the community will loose its self-defined identity (van Houtum and Pijpers, 2007), many migrants are excluded by external border controls of both physical borders and hardware, internal surveillance, immigration laws, and asylum and visa rules (Albrecht, 2002: 21). However, border controls are ‘gappy’ and practices of exceptionalism allow certain workers with desired knowledge or skills entry to the internal space (see also Bigo, 2006; Geddes, 2001; van Houtum and Pijpers, 2007). As a consequence, the borders of this empire are very paradoxical getting both more and less territorial, physical and visible.

I argue that all the metaphors that I have discussed in this thesis should be understood in the light of the creation of a state at the European level. The Europe of the regions and new medieval Europe metaphors can be contextualized in the attempts to weaken the position of the member states, to erase national borders, to create a common market with economic and social cohesion and to strengthen the authority of subnational governments and the European Commission. These measures were all necessary for the creation of a European state. The fortress Europe metaphor can be contextualized in the EU’s policies to demarcate, border and protect the common European space. The Europe as an empire metaphor can be contextualized in the EU’s attempts to govern external territories in order the keep its own internal space safe and stable. These measures were necessary to defend the European state in the making. The ultimate goal of the European integration process thus still seems to be the realization of a United States of Europe.
The overview of metaphors in this thesis has shown that scholars, EU-bureaucrats, politicians, the media and artists have to change the vocabulary they use to describe the EU’s political geography when the social, economic and political circumstances change. Existing metaphors become outdated and are no longer an adequate approach to describe and study the European Union. This means that the European Union remains in some way an unidentified political object, after all, there will never be a one-dimensional definition of what the European Union is. I argue however that this should not be seen as a disadvantage of any metaphor. I have reviewed several metaphors in this thesis that all became or will become outdated one day. Nevertheless, I have never mentioned this as a disadvantage, because I believe that the metaphors should only be judged on the way that they accommodate processes and actors within their own discourse. I believe that it is rather magnificent that every metaphor fits in particular social, economic and political circumstances and that new metaphors are constructed when the circumstances change. It is impossible to define a universal and timeless metaphor on the EU’s political geography and I argue that no one should therefore even have the aim to invent the grand theory of the European Union.

I have presented the metaphors as dominant ways of thinking about the EU’s political geographical nature. The examples of how they were and are used by several scholars prove that they were or are commonly used metaphors. Metaphors only become scientifically acceptable and dominant if they have been tested, questioned, extended and accepted by many scholars. As a result, metaphors can become an almost literal expression with specific reference (see also Knudsen, 2003: 1248). I have shown in this thesis that there have been debates on every metaphor in which they have been tested, questioned, and extended. The analysis in my thesis show that the United States of Europe, Europe of the regions, new medieval Europe, fortress Europe, and Europe as an empire have all become concepts with a specific reference.

The examples in this thesis show that metaphors are not comprehensive and universal, but rather focus our attention upon particular aspects of the European Union. Scholars, politicians, journalists or artists use a metaphor because they want us to draw attention upon something that we might otherwise overlook. As a consequence, a metaphor deflects our attention from other aspects (see also Young, 2001: 2001: 610). For example the fortress Europe metaphors makes us draw attention to the EU’s hard borders and sharp inside/outside dichotomy towards unwanted migrants and thereby draws our attention away from the fact that the EU’s external borders are very open for needed workers and that the EU’s external borders do not show a sharp inside/outside dichotomy in many other policy areas. Metaphors thus direct and deflect our attention and in so doing they help us to construct a perception of what the European Union is (see also Young, 2001: 2001: 610).

Although the metaphors that I have discussed do thus not reflect a reality, but rather a perception on a particular aspect of the European Union, they are very useful in science, because scholars can use them to generate scientific ideas. The metaphors were and are used to generate and construct hypotheses, ideas, and theories (see also Knudsen, 2003: 1248). Metaphors such as the Europe of the regions and new medieval Europe can thus be understood as tools to generate scientific ideas about the outcome of the combined effect of regionalization and Europeanization. By using them as a hypothesis, idea, and theory, scholars can use them as a tool to explore the nature of the European Union. In other words, metaphors can help us in order to understand transformations in the EU’s political geography.
Metaphors can also be useful in giving shape to the integration process. The United States of Europe metaphor was used to describe the end-point of the project Europe and thereby gave shape to the integration process in the first post-war years. For example, the establishment of the ECSC was meant as the first step in the creation of a United States of Europe. The founding fathers of the European Union did not use that metaphor to describe a reality, but rather a utopian future of Europe. Even though the EU is still not a United States of Europe, it made sense by giving direction for European integration during the 1950s and 1960s. Even today, the metaphor still seems to give direction to the integration process, because the EU is still evolving towards a state at the European level.

The fortress Europe metaphor shows that metaphors can also be useful in criticizing European policies. Fortress Europe is not only a tool for scholars to study the EU’s hard borders and restrictive asylum and immigration policy, but is also commonly used to give pejorative descriptions of these policies. Although fortress Europe does not give a true and comprehensive description of what the EU is, it can thus be a very useful instrument to study and criticize certain European policies and its external borders.

The given that the metaphors that I have discussed are a perception on a specific aspect of the European Union is in my opinion also a disadvantage of metaphors. I argue that they therefore make us blind for the complexities of the reality, because metaphors give not only a partial and subjective perspective on the EU, but also tend to simplify the reality. For example, the idea of a Europe of the regions points to a strengthening of regional authority, which indeed happened in the Community during the 1980s and 1990s, however, it totally ignores that nation-states remained important, that regions were not fixed units of geographical space, and that there were authority relations that connected regions, member states and European institutions with each other (Anderson, 1996; Hooge and Marks, 1996). Metaphors thus give people a constructed perspective on the European Union, which is a partial, subjective and simplified representation of the reality. Since metaphors contribute to the way that we understand the European Union, I argue that this is a disadvantage of metaphors, because they make people believe in an image of the EU that is not reality (see also Marks, 2004). I therefore argue that scholars, EU-bureaucrats, politicians, the media and artists should always choose their metaphors with care, moreover, existing metaphors should be re-examined on a regular basis in order to assess whether they are still capable of defining the EU’s political geography.

Because metaphors are never universal, comprehensive, and timeless, the naming of the EU will continue. I argue that the ongoing process of creating metaphors on the EU is rather splendid than a weakness of individual metaphors. In other words, the power of the process of naming the European Union is its endlessness. As I have explained, the story does not end here, but continues into the future. It is still uncertain how scholars, EU-bureaucrats, politicians, the media and artists will conceptualize the EU in the upcoming years and decades. It could be as a fortress Europe in economic terms, maybe as a lighthouse of liberal foreign economic policies, or perhaps the Union will breakup (Martin, 2009). However, it is also possible that very different metaphors will be created. It is anyhow certain that the creation of metaphors on the nature of the European Union is fortunately an endless process and many new metaphors will thus be created in the future.
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