



MASTER
THESIS

FROM REBELS TO RULERS

*A comparative case study on rebel-to-party
transitions in Mozambique and Sierra Leone*

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May 2009

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May 2009
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If you wish for peace, understand war
– B. H. Lidell Hart, 1967

This research could not have been carried out without the support of others.

First of all I like to thank my thesis supervisor, Gemma van der Haar, for the helpful comments and valuable encouragement during the writing process.

Many thanks are owed to those who provided me with valuable information:
Ellen van Koppen, Evert Kets, Jeroen de Zeeuw, Ms. Manhiça, Paul Richards, and the Netherlands Institute of Multiparty Democracy.

Special thanks to Marcel van den Bogaard and Ruth Emmerink, my former supervisors during the internship at the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

I am greatly indebted to my father, Jan Hertman, for getting my English to flow more fluently. Likewise I would like to thank Michiel, for your editorial work, your immense patience and continuous support.

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Acronyms

AFRC	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Sierra Leone)
ANC	African National Congress (South Africa)
APC	All People's Congress (Sierra Leone)
CDF	Civil Defence Forces (Sierra Leone)
CIO	Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organisation
CNDD-FDD	National Council for the Defense of Democracy - Forces for the Defense of Democracy (Burundi)
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EO	Executive Outcomes
FMLN	Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (El Salvador)
Frelimo	Liberation Front of Mozambique
NEC	National Election Commission (Mozambique)
NPRC	National Provisional Revolutionary Council (Sierra Leone)
ONUMOZ	United Nations Operations in Mozambique
PLP	People's Liberation Party (Sierra Leone)
PMDC	People's Movement for Democratic Change (Sierra Leone)
Renamo	Mozambican National Resistance
RUF	Revolutionary United Front (Sierra Leone)
RUFPP	Revolutionary United Front Party (Sierra Leone)
SLPP	Sierra Leone People's Party (Sierra Leone)
UN	United Nations
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front

Introduction

During 1991 when the war started there was no education but there was fighting everywhere. [...] You could not escape the fighting. And that led me to be with them [RUF], gradually I was getting involved in that. I started being with them, doing work for them. By that time I was a small boy. This is how the interaction started (former child soldier in Peters 2006:18).

What role can armed rebel groups play after conflict? Until the mid 1990s the answer to this fundamental question was formulated in terms of political exclusion and military marginalisation. The widespread notion amongst academics and policy makers prevailed that it was preferable to exclude rebel movements from the peace process after civil war.¹ Recently it has been argued by several researchers that it is necessary to (re-) open the debate concerning the transformation of rebel movements into political parties. By including former rebels into to the peace negotiation processes renewed initiation of the conflict may be avoided (Allison 2006; De Zeeuw 2007, 2008; Nilsson 2008; Ohlson & Söderberg 2002). Despite this knowledge and experience in the field the transformation of rebellions from battlefield to the political arena is in many cases still one of the hardest peace building challenges. It is not simply a process of disarmament, but an entire reorganisation of the war-focused rebel movements into peaceful dialogue based entities. More precisely, it is an intensive process of organisational and attitudinal change (De Zeeuw 2008).

Only a few rebel movements have transformed successfully into a political party. For instance the *Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front* (FMLN) in El Salvador and the *Mozambican National Resistance* (Renamo) did emerge as political parties in the post-settlement period (Kumar & De Zeeuw 2008). In other cases the transformation process has proven less straightforward. The *Revolutionary United Front* (RUF) in Sierra Leone and the *Burundi's National Council for the Defense of Democracy - Forces for the Defense of Democracy* (CNDD-FDD) are examples of failed attempts to convert their military struggles into political ones (De Zeeuw 2008).

¹ This argumentation is inspired by the speech of Tandeka C. Nkiwane during the international seminar on 'post-conflict democratisation' on the 22nd of May 2008 at the Netherland's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Nkiwane is Research Professor and Chair of the Programme on African Intellectuals, College of Human Sciences at the University of South Africa.

Despite the importance of the political transformations of armed rebel groups surprisingly little is known about this process (Allison 2006). Several policy makers and academics agree, though, that without achieving this critical goal war cannot be brought to an end. The vital role of young political parties is often neglected by the international community; most interest is focussed on post-war elections and exit strategies for international peace keeping missions. In order to build a stable post-conflict government accountable and responsive political parties are necessary. These bodies form the primary channels linking citizens with their political representatives. The focus on post-conflict party development is needed given the importance of party development in peace processes. Moreover, a careful intervention needs to be implemented since democratisation can amplify existing differences and thus renew violent conflict (Reilly, Nordlund, Newman 2008).

A number of high-quality single case studies on immediate conflict resolution on the one hand and post-war democratisation as a long term process on the other hand are available. Rebel-to-party transitions start during conflict resolution and continue throughout the post-war democratisation process. Studies on rebel-to-party transitions bridge the gap between these two processes, however, very little is examined in the realm of rebel-to-party transitions and little is known as to under what conditions this is likely to occur (De Zeeuw 2008; Kumar & De Zeeuw 2008; Lyons 2002; Söderberg 2004). Filling this research gap is of great relevance to both academics and policy makers concerned with the understanding of the factors that promote or discourage political party transitions. There is a need for a comparative method and research that focuses on the commitment and capacity of rebel movements themselves to transform into a political party (Söderberg 2004).²

Definition of the problem

This study aims to contribute to bridging the existing division in academic literature between conflict resolution and post-war democratisation by focusing on the transformation of rebel movements into political parties. By means of concentrating on

² Comparative analyses concerning rebel to party transitions are carried out by Allison 2006; Manning 2004; Söderberg 2004

the needs in academic literature regarding the political transition of former rebellion, the following central question is addressed in this study:

How did the process of rebel-to-party transition take shape in the cases of Renamo and the RUF and what internal and external factors explain the differences between these two cases?

These two cases have been selected since they represent a clear success story and an example of failure, respectively.

A few terms used in this study need to be clarified to avoid confusion. The definition for 'rebel movement' applied in this study is formulated to the description given by De Zeeuw (2008:4): "a non-state organisation with political objectives that contests a government's authority, legitimate monopoly on violence and uses armed forces in order to reform, overthrow, or secede from an existing state regime or control a specific geographic area". The term 'international community' refers to all the bilateral and multilateral agencies, private firms and international organisations involved in conflict management and resolution. In this study, the 'Western countries' or 'the West' represent geographical areas of Western Europe as well as the United States of America, Australia and New Zealand. Although there is a lot of discussion concerning the delimitation of these concepts, I prefer to use one term to identify this group of countries. I am aware of the fact that this area is not homogenous and the exact scope of the Western world is subjective in nature.

The concepts of 'success' and 'failure' are applied to the rebel-to-party transitions of the cases. In this thesis, success is defined as the absence of failure. Peace processes are successful when renewed violent struggle is prevented and does not return (Evert Kets, personal communication, December 9, 2008). More precisely, a successful party transformation must comprise the demilitarisation of politics, development of party organisation, democratisation of the decision-making procedures and adaption of strategies and goals (De Zeeuw 2008). In the case of failed or façade transitions, rebel organisations do not manage to change their military tactics into political goals. Rebel movements revert to the use of violence and other illegitimate means to achieve their

goals. Unfortunately, the literature on the development of political parties has not created a commonly accepted measure of individual party success (Allison 2006).

In contrast to many studies on rebel-to-party transitions that particularly focus on the role of the international community, this thesis will discuss both internal as well as external factors that influence political transition of rebel movements. Rebels' motivations to start the war, their commitment to the peace process and their capacity to transform their military strategies into political ones are considered as internal factors. These factors are interrelated with external factors, as the interferences of regional and global actors, and will therefore be elucidated in the light of domestic, regional and international context. The analysis will be set out in chronological order, specific for the different stages in conflict: in war, settlement, elections.

In this respect a number of sub-questions related to the central research issue must be considered. What were the motivations of the rebels in Mozambique and Sierra Leone to be transformed into peaceful democratic political parties? What were the influences of the nature of the rebel movements and the character of civil war on the transition to a political party? How did different actors, events and choices during the negotiation processes contribute to the success or failure of the rebel-to-party transitions? How did both rebel movements participate in the post-war elections and what do the election results say about both parties' future prospects? The final aim is not only to clarify the outcome of the transformation, the transformation process itself will also be analysed. In this study both internal as well as external factors will be addressed.

This thesis is a comprehensive analysis of the Mozambican Renamo and the Sierra Leonean RUF. In Mozambique³ violence emerged in 1976 less than a year after the Liberation Front of Mozambique, better known as Frelimo, had succeeded in driving out the Portuguese colonists (Söderberg Kovacs 2006). Frelimo supported the black ZANU-PF⁴ guerrilla's of Robert Mugabe in Rhodesia in their clash with the white Rhodesian minority and provided them with a place of safety in Mozambique (Cramer 2006). Consequently, the white Rhodesian government started to destabilise the Frelimo government by recruiting a commando unit of Mozambican exiles for an anti-Frelimo

³ See Appendix I for a geographical orientation

⁴ ZANU-PF is a Zimbabwean political party led by Robert Mugabe, which struggled against the white minority government until independence was reached in 1980.

campaign and operated against ZANU-PF guerrillas across the border. Renamo, the new national resistance group, was financed by the Rhodesia Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) and later by the South African government. In October 1992, Frelimo and Renamo signed the General Peace Accord in Rome (Paris 2004). The peace agreement comprised of seven protocols with the aim of ending the sixteen-year insurgency and of establishing a multiparty democracy through a parliament which would be elected in a system of proportional representation. Other main provisions were freedom of association, demobilisation of armed forces, reintegration of ex-combatants, and establishment of one united national army (Manning 2008).

In Sierra Leone⁵, the eleven-year insurgency was dominated by the Revolutionary United Front and resulted in a dislocation of over two-thirds of the population (Montague 2002). In March 1991, a group of hundred combatants, financed by the Liberian president Charles Taylor, crossed the border into Sierra Leone and captured several villages on their way to the capital. This group called themselves the RUF, a former radical student organisation, aiming to overthrow the one-party regime imposed by the All People's Congress (APC) since independence in 1961. The RUF opted for a more transparent and democratic state (Restoy 2006). In 1999 the peace agreement was signed in the capital of Togo, Lomé and after a ceasefire of nearly two years president Ahmad Tejan Kabbah formally announced the end of the war (Meredith 2005).

The selected cases share a number of similarities which justifies a valid comparison. Both the Mozambican Renamo and the Sierra Leonean RUF struggled in an armed conflict aiming to overthrow the ruling government. Both peace processes took place during the third wave of democratisation and the emergence of the good governance agenda within the Western development paradigm (Carothers 2008). Moreover, both movements have foreign origins and used similar warfare methods against civilians (Van de Goor & De Zeeuw 2008). However in 1994, the Mozambican Renamo participated successfully as political party in the post-war elections after a sixteen years' struggle with the Frelimo government while the RUF in Sierra Leone experienced a less straightforward political transition (Paris 2004). The political wing of this movement, the RUF, did not receive enough votes to get a seat in parliament and suffered from a lack of leadership and domestic support (Söderberg 2004).

⁵ See Appendix II for a geographical orientation

Besides the support of domestic voters also international allies and the geopolitical context played significant roles in both transition processes. One of the main differences between these cases is the actual completion of the peace building role by the international community. The Mozambican Renamo experienced a careful mentorship of the United Nations [UN] while the Sierra Leonean RUF felt neglected by the international donors. The international community “did not keep their promise” concerning financial and logistical assistance according to RUF commanders (Richards and Vincent 2008:95).

In a wider context, due to the collapse of communism the intercontinental relations changed considerably. It is interesting to see that these changes influenced Western attitude towards Africa. While the existence of the communist system provided legitimacy to one-party regimes in Africa, the fall of the ‘Eastern bloc’ combined with the economic misery depleted these legitimating principles. Since the end of the 1980s the West has been claiming that “democracy is the only model of government with any broad ideological legitimacy and appeal in the world today” (Abrahamsen 2000:2). A Western feeling of superiority concerning liberal democracy followed the fall of the Berlin Wall, without the fear of losing allies to communist opponents and thus it was easier for Western countries to interfere in Africa’s development (Campbell 2008).

Besides the changing geopolitical relations during the last decades of the twentieth century, a new type of organised violence has been developed. This type of violence is described as ‘new wars’ and refers to internal civil wars which are characterised by guerrilla techniques, large-scale human rights violations and global interconnectedness with foreign allies (Kaldor 2006). The Mozambican conflict as well as the conflict in Sierra Leone can be characterised as new wars. Both rebel groups used brute violence against civilian and witnessed a substantial involvement of regional and global actors during the peace process (Cramer 2006).

Research strategy

This master thesis is a comparative analysis of two cases. By examining case studies the researcher tries to gain an insight into several processes that are restricted in time and space depending on the research issue. A case study is characterised by several aspects. The most well-known and important facet is the relatively small number of research units and an intensive approach (Swanborn 1996). The focus is on the depth, underlying

processes and developments, rather than breadth. In this perspective a case study can be defined as a 'wealthy web consisting of contracted lines' which provides valuable and renewed understandings (Brubaker & Laitin 1998; Verschuren & Doorewaard 1999).

The comparison of case studies is significant for the development of theory. Although single case studies may be suitable for descriptive and narrative studies, they do not simply lend themselves for structured comparison (Bernard 2002; Van der Lijn 2006). I agree with Van der Lijn: "theory attempts to absorb the lessons of a variety of historical cases within a single analytical framework" (p.41). The importance of a case study research on rebel-to-party transitions is stressed by Manning (2004). This method provides a profound insight of the players themselves in contrast to most of the literature that concentrates particularly on the technical process of political transformation.

Several research methods are addressed in this thesis in order to examine the central question. Firstly, a meta-analysis is applied to the broad range of studies on the civil wars and rebel movements in Mozambique and Sierra Leone. This method aims to assemble the results of several scholars that address a set of related issues. In this thesis, analogous to Pawson and Tilley (1997), a meta-analysis is not only considered as a comparison of different discourses. This thesis aims to find underlying theories and looks out for a 'reality' behind several discourses. By means of comparison the analysis will be continually improved.

In addition, the sets of variables created in the meta-analysis are systematically compared. The comparison used in this research is structured and focused. The same set of (sub-) questions has been applied to the cases and I have focused selectively on certain aspects of each rebel movement and the political transitions before, during and after the peace processes (Van der Lijn 2006). Thus a non-quantitative analysis based on purpose sampling is practiced; the cases display differences and similarities of substantive importance and confirm or disconfirm a certain transition outcome. This methodology has been generated for researchers who want to go beyond quantitative facts to examine underlying processes. Consequently, the complexity of the issue asks for an individual narrative (George in Paris 2004; Silverman 2001).

Besides the documentary research I met some experts who were willing to share their thoughts and analysis with me. First of all, I interviewed Ms. Manhiça, a

Mozambican parliamentarian for the Mozambican Renamo. She clarified the motivations of Renamo in its early days and the current political situation in Mozambique. I also interviewed Ellen van Koppen, a political advisor for the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy. She has been working on Renamo and the civil war in Mozambique for 15 years. Paul Richards, a professor at Wageningen University, provided me with relevant information concerning the RUF in Sierra Leone. He has worked in Sierra Leone for over thirty years and is specialised in West African ethnography and the conflict in Sierra Leone. Jeroen de Zeeuw, a political scientist who has worked on democracy assistance in post-conflict societies, and Evert Kets, who is specialised on security sector reform and conflict and security in Sub-Saharan Africa, were willing to clarify technical aspects of rebel-to-party transitions.

This study is a hypothesis-generating research with an explanation-building character since my central questions were unanswered yet, before I started this research (Silverman 2001; Swanborn 1996). In order to acquire the most comprehensive vision possible, I have chosen for a broad range of sources of information by bringing together academic literature, project descriptions and personal views from country experts and practitioners. The combination of the theoretical debates, empirical data of ethnographers, and expert interviews make this study a valuable addition to the existing literature on rebel-to-party transitions.

Thesis outline

In the first chapter the theoretical framework of this study will be introduced. These theoretical debates form the theoretical guidelines and base of this thesis. Theories with reference to the concept of rebellion, the inclusiveness of peace agreements, and dynamics of the transition processes are discussed. I will refer to several scholars speaking on the dynamics of peace processes in greater detail.

The following chapters are structured in chronological order: before, during and after the signing of the peace agreement. In chapter two, the theoretical debates on the nature of rebellion and organisation of war are applied to Renamo and the RUF. Also the consequences of rebels' behaviour during war on the gain of popular support will be elucidated. Chapter three analyses the period after civil war and the commitment of both rebel movements to the peace agreements. Different actors, events and choices central

in the post-settlement phase are outlined in the light of rebels' organisational and attitudinal changes. Chapter four comprises the post-war elections and the participation of both movements. In this post-conflict settlement the political abilities are tested and both post-war election results are reflecting the future prospects of Renamo and the RUF. Finally my findings are summarised in the concluding chapter.

Chapter 1

Perspectives on rebellion and civil war

*Armed rebellions are generally multidimensional and hardly ever mono-causal.
(De Zeeuw 2008:5)*

Little theoretical research has been done on the transformation of rebel movements into political parties while a profound understanding of this process is necessary for a successful rebel-to-party transition. This study focuses on the underlying motives of the rebel movements themselves in contrast with most of the literature that concentrates particularly on the technical processes and the role of the international community (Manning 2004). In order to gain a reflective insight into the successes or failures of rebel-to-party transitions also the motives, goals and strategies of rebel movements should be examined before, during and after the peace process. Previous academic theories concerning post-conflict democratisation in combination with empirical findings concerning Mozambique and Sierra Leone will be the guidelines for the theoretical foundation in this thesis.

Rebel-to-party transitions became key issues of post-conflict democratisation and peace-building interventions, since exclusion of rebels from peace negotiations will not spirit them away, ways have to be found to engage them. This chapter will set out by discussing the argument in favour of transforming rebel groups to political parties in civil war peace processes for the sake of peace. This is followed by a closer look at the dynamics of political transitions in post-conflict societies.

The concept of rebellion

Analogous to De Zeeuw (2008) rebellion will be considered as a non-state organisation that contests a government's authority by using armed forces as a tool in order to reform or require political and or economical authority within a specific geographical area. De Zeeuw distinguishes on the one hand, politically-oriented movements with a primary aim to overthrow the government and, on the other hand, movements that primarily seek for financial gain and carry out terrorist attacks that cause massive civilian suffering and indiscriminate deaths. However, this distinction only survives in a

theoretical sense, since the empirical reality demonstrates that these two 'different' characteristics often come together.

Clapham (in De Zeeuw 2008) makes a distinction between four types of insurgent movements based on motivations of rebellions. Liberation movements strive for independence of colonial and or minority rule. They particularly emerged in the period between 1950 and 1990. Separatist groups normally fight a civil war to achieve a special autonomous status within a certain territory. Reform movements attempt to achieve a radically reform or even overthrow the national government. Warlord insurgencies also struggle for change of leadership, but this type may involve the designing of personal power and territory. Again, these characteristics can be easily unravelled on paper. On the other hand, in reality it is not a good versus bad case for civilians who are engaged in civil war and the struggle of rebellions. The story of the Ugandan Samuel illustrates and explains the local support for rebel movements.

Although they [he and his father] feared the rebels at first, the behaviour of government soldiers solidified their support for the insurgency. Government troops continued to wreak havoc in the village, killing people and raping women. Samuel recalled thinking that the rebels were different. While the government soldiers were intent on killing them, the insurgents played by different rules. [...] He found that the rebels were so disciplined because they hated the government soldiers for their misconduct among civilians (Weinstein 2007:2).

The classifications as presented by De Zeeuw (2008) contribute to the understanding of rebellion, however these macro level categories are too simplistic for a profound understanding. By means of an empirical approach and focus on internal and external factors this study aims to contribute to the existing literature on rebel-to-party transitions. Furthermore, this classification is problematic since rebel movements remain dynamic constructs, which are difficult to place in a fixed framework. Since the beginning of the 1990s rebel movements have experienced a certain metamorphose, most of all because of global interconnectedness (Cramer 2006; Kalyvas 2001). Nowadays, most rebel movements gain largely from foreign actors who support them

primarily in financial ways. Furthermore, the use of gratuitous violence has increased in order to fight for private goals instead of collective grievances.

This distinction in rebels' motivations is currently discussed in the 'greed versus grievances' debate which concerns the cause of rebellion. Supporters of the 'greed theory' argue that private economic gain is a primary reason for rebels to start an armed struggle while followers of the grievances discourse explain rebellion as a result of collective grievances (Collier 2000; Richards 2005).

Collier and Hoeffler (1998) advocate the 'greed causes war' discourse: "The incentive for rebellion is the product of the probability of victory and its consequences" (p. 564). The variables that are used in their regression analyses are mainly based on economic gain while social and political grievances are left out of consideration. Greed and the economic context are significant factors in the explanation of rebellion however it is not a sufficient clarification. Richards (2005) does not deny the importance of the presence of natural resources in relation to conflict but he disagrees with the assumption that economic factors necessary predominate. Le Billon (2000:565) completes this theoretical debate by linking the economical, social and political causes and consequences:

Both the resource abundance and resource scarcity perspective fail to take into account the socially constructed nature of resources, and in so doing, fail to explain why an abundance or scarcity of valuable resources is not a necessary or sufficient factor of conflict. [...] Resources are not; they become. Whether or not nature is transformed into a resource related to human desires, needs, and practices; or, from a political economy perspective, the conditions, means, and forces of production.

Analogous to Gberie (2005) I would say that motives for rebellion are not as simplistic as stated by Collier and Hoeffler (1998). Moreover, the 'Collier-tradition' is largely based on doubtful statistics rather than empirical field work. His scientific approach does not explain the local context and the contingent factors that trigger the outbreak of violence in a particular case like the conflict in Sierra Leone (Korf 2006). For a complete

understanding a holistic perspective must be applied to each case. Collier (2000) analyses war as a process in an interesting way, but I disagree with his contention that economic factors necessarily dominate the analysis of the conflict in Sierra Leone.

Many studies on political transitions of rebel movements focus primarily on internal factors like the motivation for rebellion. However, the influence of the motivations for rebellion on the rebel-to-party transition has not been made clear in previous studies. I presume that the motivation for rebellion is important but not decisive. This thesis will examine the influence of rebels' motivations and possible dynamics on the transition outcomes.

Inclusive peace deals

The political transformation of rebel movements is one of the hardest challenges in the field of post-conflict democratisation. War-focused organisations have to translate their military struggle into political ones. Recently, it has been agreed by several scholars that the key to stimulate the creation of political stability in post-conflict societies lies foremost in securing democratic intra-party governance and inter-party competition. Peace is best consolidated by a broad representation of all views in electoral politics. An inclusive political system will encourage the participants to secure their interests or express their discontentment by non-violent means. With the absence of strong political institutions societies are war-prone since divisions and cleavages can be easily expressed. Political parties have the capacity to bridge or worsen cleavages in societies (De Zeeuw 2008; Nillson 2008; Söderberg Kovacs 2006).

In line with this argumentation Jeong (in Söderberg Kovacs 2006:5) stresses the importance of an inclusive government:

The formation of a legitimate government is a necessary condition for order and stability in the aftermath of war, and trust and confidence in the new government can best be gained through the establishment of democratic principles reflecting an inclusive representation that may overcome the divisions created by wartime alignments.

A peace agreement aims to end armed conflict, but also lays foundations for a democratic state-building process (Ten Hoove & Pinto Scholtbach 2008). A too narrow-based peace agreement risks being undermined by excluded parties since they may feel unfairly ignored and thus increases the chance for recreation of conflict (Rogier 2004).

Although the inclusion of former rebels to the peace process has proven favourable, or even necessary to end civil war through a negotiated agreement, it may have negative consequences for the democratisation process in a post-conflict society. The rebellious and internally undemocratic nature of many of these movements may hinder the national development of peaceful and transparent politics. At the same time, the intra-democratic party structure of former insurgencies might be bolstered as a result of the acquirement of recognition as political party by other actors (Söderberg Kovacs 2006).

A second difficulty of all-inclusive peace deals is the suggestion that all participants are equal since everyone may draw up to the bargaining table. However, far from being equal, the risk is to grant legitimacy and recognition to non-representative groups; factions that participate in the peace processes only for personal gain. Moreover, participation does not guarantee full support and commitment. The first is not necessarily the condition for the latter. Ultimately, the peace agreement should be broadly supported while potential spoilers should be neutralised (Rogier 2004).

In spite of the high risk of failure many authors are in favour of all-inclusive agreements. Olson and Söderberg (2002:2): "In negotiated war termination processes a key issue is what political mechanism shall decide the future distribution of political power within the state". A future democratic administration needs to be as legitimate as possible and the exclusion of parties needs to be avoided. An equal power balance and the attention for a broad scale of grievances may contribute to a prevention of a renewed conflict. In a successful inclusive agreement, all political stakeholders need to be recognised (De Zeeuw 2007; Ten Hoove & Pinto Scholtbach 2008).

Nillson (2008) examines the differences in outcome of inclusive and exclusive agreements with data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program. This dataset includes yearly information of all rebel movements involved in conflict in the post Cold War era. Nillson doubts whether all-inclusive agreements are more likely to promote long-lasting peace than agreements that exclude former rebels. The expulsion of one or more actors

does not affect the signatories in their commitment to peace since signatories are aware of possible actions of warring parties. In conclusion he stresses that partial agreements may be a possible road to peace, although excluded parties often continue to use violence.

Many studies on rebel-to-party transition mainly focus on international intervention but lack attention to the willingness to transform of movements themselves. Why do rebel movements (not) wish for a transformation towards democratic and peaceful parties and change their military goals into political ideologies? The analysis of rebels' motivation (not) to transform into a political party is crucial for prospective international efforts, policy makers and academic researches. Besides the commitments also the capacity of the rebel organisations will determine the outcome of the transition. How able are rebel movements to transform into a political party?

Dynamics of transition processes

As argued before, the rebel-to-party transition is one of the hardest peace building challenges for the international community and has a high risk of failure. In this thesis I focus on the success story of Renamo in Mozambique and the failed transformation of the RUF in Sierra Leone. But how can we define success and failure? In situations where structural changes and attitudinal changes are adopted we can speak of a successful transformation. More precisely, demilitarisation of organisational structures, democratisation of the decision-making process, and the adaption of goals and strategies, need to be implemented (J. de Zeeuw, personal communication, November 11, 2008). When those attitudinal and structural changes are poorly implemented or are not implemented at all I will speak of a failed or a façade transformation.

De Zeeuw (2008) and Weinstein (2007) particularly focus on internal processes. However, similar to Söderberg (2004), this study presumes that external factors like acquirement of recognition and legitimacy are as significant in the party development as internal changes. Moreover, internal and external transformations are interconnected and useless if one dimension is absent in the transition process. To obtain a reason for existence, a political party needs a rank and file (Diamond 2006; Kaldor 2001; Ohlson & Söderberg 2002). Referring to this discussion, this thesis concentrates on the specific

relation between internal changes of rebel movements and the role of externally acquired legitimacy with regard to the outcomes of rebel-to-party transitions.

But what influences the outcome of the transformation processes and the realisation of the five indicators? In this section several dynamics of the success or failure of the rebel-to-party transformation will be specified. The first factor is defined as 'the type of rebellion'. Concerning the four types of rebellion defined by Clapham (in De Zeeuw 2008) reform movements are more likely to transform into a political party since they present political alternatives and often create a clear picture of governance for a particular geographical territory. Warlord militias often show a less straight forward political transition. These warring parties often fight for personal gain and these objectives differ enormously with democratic principles of a political party (De Zeeuw 2007).

Secondly 'the nature of resistance', which is often related to the type of rebellion, also affects the prospects of peace. However the first factor focuses on the character of the movements and the degree of political orientation, this aspect concentrates on the methods and means that are used to express discontentment. Violence against civilians and government troops is a common feature in armed conflict. Violent behaviour of rebels such as killing, abuse, coercion, destruction is experienced by individuals and communities. To examine the consequences of the destructive behaviour of rebel groups a micro perspective is required. Therefore empirical and ethnographical fieldwork of several researches will be cited in this thesis. Analogous to Weinstein (2007) and De Zeeuw (2007; 2008) I presume that the nature of resistance during civil war is significant and determinant in the outcome of a transition to a peaceful political party. Violence involves a range of tactics and characteristics: selective or indiscriminate, controlled or undisciplined. Previous cases have proven that the warfare techniques and the type of the insurgencies significantly influence the local and international support and the outcome of the transition process.

Further, the organisational capacity and conditions of leadership are important preconditions for the prospect of durable peace. The political transition requires significant security changes and it is unlikely that the same executives will be equally suitable within peaceful politics. The successful transition of the FMLN in El Salvador is partly brought about by the willingness of the former leaders to reform the command

structure and therefore the authoritarian decision-making process (De Zeeuw 2007). The road from a military entity towards a dialogue-based organisation requires new, politically-skilled leaders in order to receive local, regional and international support and be able to cope with electoral competition (Griffiths 1996; Söderberg 2004).

Contextual factors before, during and after civil war and support of regional actors also influence development of war and the post-conflict political transition of former rebels. Not only the movement itself must be willing to transform, also the efforts of the regional and international parties have to be optimal. All signatories of the peace agreement must be able to negotiate with former armed forces that might be previous enemies. In Mozambique as well as in Sierra Leone regional supporters played a significant role in the emergence of the rebel movements. Renamo received governmental support from Zimbabwe and South Africa and Charles Taylor from Liberia played a significant role in the emergence and development of the RUF in Sierra Leone (Paris 2004).

Further, global processes and interference of international supporters determine the character of civil war and also influence political transformation of rebel movements (Van de Goor & De Zeeuw 2008). Both peace agreements in Mozambique and Sierra Leone were signed in the post Cold War era. As described before, in the beginning of the 1990s the good governance agenda emerged and a proactive position of Western countries towards Africa came into being. Former enemies of the Soviet Union changed their international policy on post-conflict countries that were supported by former socialist allies (Abrahamsen 2000).

Summary

This study focuses on the influence of underlying motives, goals and strategies on the character of civil war and post-conflict the rebel-to-party transition of Renamo and the RUF. I am going to examine why those rebel movements went into war, why both groups co-operated (partially) in a political transition and how both organisations have developed during the conflict, what warfare methods were used and how combatants were recruited. While focusing on the RUF and Renamo, the multidimensionality of rebel movements will constantly be prevalent in this study. The question is which dynamics influenced the outcomes of the political transitions of Renamo and RUF in what way? My

assumption is that the outcomes of the transition processes largely depend on the willingness and capacity of the rebel movements to implement attitudinal and organisational changes, combined with external interferences.

Chapter 2

Nature of rebellion

We need a renewed understanding of war, of its diversity, of its ambiguous nature, of the relativity of morality and the need to take responsibility for one's own decisions and actions (Macek 2005:73).

In the process of examining the question why the Mozambican Renamo transformed into a political party and why the RUF from Sierra Leone failed in this transition, the motivations and nature of rebellion are of major importance. Underlying motivations and outspoken political and military goals will influence methods of warfare and, not unimportantly, the gain of domestic and international support. Consequently an assessment of incentives and interests can help identifying ways to increase rebels' commitment to the peace process (Ten Hoove & Pinto Scholtbach 2008). This chapter aims to look behind the façade of Renamo and the RUF in order to identify actual goals and strategies.

In this chapter, the natures of both rebel movements are discussed in relation to the political transformation of Renamo and the RUF after war. Firstly, the ideologies and motivations for rebellion will be analysed. This is followed by a closer look at the organisation of rebellion. This chapter concludes with consequences of both the ideologies and the rebels' organisations on the acquirement of popular support. The key question in this chapter, derived from the central question in this thesis, can be formulated as follows: how did the period of civil war influence the political transitions of Renamo and the RUF?

Towards rebellion

For a successful rebel-to-party transition former rebels need to change their military struggles into political ones and re-organise their war-focused organizations into dialogue-based entities. Before examining the rebels' behaviour during war, their motivations and goals need to be analysed in order to develop a profound understanding.

Renamo's struggle for democracy

Soon after the independence of Mozambique in 1975, fighting broke out between the Frelimo government and Mozambican armed forces, called Renamo, which were supported by the former Rhodesian government. During the first years, these armed forces fought for regional patrons in adjacent states; Mozambican combatants were recruited by the Rhodesian government to suppress ZANU-PF fighters operating from Mozambique. However, Renamo soon began to capitalise on internal grievances. Dissatisfaction among a broad range of Mozambican citizens in the central provinces emerged with the Marxist Frelimo government (Manning 2008).

In the eyes of many Mozambicans this government has always been in favour of the ethnic groups in the south. Since the colonial era has come to an end in Mozambique, regional divisions have been characterised by highly economic differences. Southerners were better educated, and the colonial rulers invested mainly in southern development and infrastructure. This while the Tsonga and related linguistic groups in southern Mozambique only comprise 23 percent of the Mozambican population (Weinstein 2007). Moreover, Frelimo's socialist campaign in rural areas is said to have discouraged highly valued local religious sensibilities and ruling traditions. Renamo spoke of democracy as synonymous as freedom. This movement laid great emphasis on the free will of the population meaning that people should be able to practise any religion or traditional habit (Harrison 1996; Morgan 1990).

The emergence of Renamo was one of the main topics I discussed with the Renamo parliamentarian Ms. Manhiça. She underlines, in line with Manning (2008) and Söderberg (2004), the clear political aims and democratic principles of Renamo. Furthermore, she implies that Renamo has never fitted into the category of 'rebel movement' since it emerged to liberate Mozambique (personal communication, December 3, 2008). The political inducements of Renamo in its early days are clearly explained by Ms. Manhiça, although several scholars have pointed out that Renamo did not immediately appear as a political organisation since the combatants fought for external patrons (Hall 1990; Morgan 1990; Weinstein 2007). Her point of view is understandable, since she currently is a Renamo representative in Mozambican parliament.

Besides internal grievances and discontent amongst marginal groups in central and northern Mozambique, also the regional political context must be understood. By the time Mozambique gained its independence from Portugal, this country was surrounded by white-settler regimes of Rhodesia and South Africa. African liberation movements in both countries like Robert Mugabe's ZANU-PF were supported by the Mozambican Frelimo government. This resulted in an inflammable geopolitical situation; Rhodesia's access to the Beira pipelines for export and import was obstructed. Moreover, on a global level, at the time of the independence of Mozambique, the United States and Soviet Union competed over control and influence in Africa. In this Cold War era Frelimo launched a socialist program and supported African liberation movements and thus established itself as an ally to the Eastern bloc countries, with South Africa and Rhodesia being strong opponents towards communism and actively supported by the United States (Weinstein 2007).

The elusive politics of the Revolutionary United Front

The RUF in Sierra Leone emerged under different circumstances. With the support of the Liberian president Charles Taylor, a group of 100 fighters crossed the border of Sierra Leone in 1991 and captured several villages. This Revolutionary United Front included Sierra Leonean dissidents, Liberian combatants, and soldiers from Burkina Faso (Meredith 2005). The RUF called for the return of the diamond revenues from foreigners and the personal reserves of president Joseph Momoh to the impoverished people of Sierra Leone. These diamond revenues were crucial for Charles Taylor to expand his arm trade which was based on natural resources (Montague 2002). The movement's anthem elucidates its message:

Where are our diamonds, Mr. President?

Where is our gold?

RUF is hungry to know where they are,

RUF is fighting to save Sierra Leone.

Our people are suffering without means of survival,

All our minerals have gone to foreign lands.

RUF is hungry to know where they are,
RUF is fighting to save Sierra Leone.
(Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone 1995)

There are opposing views concerning the motives of the RUF insurgency. One stressing the greed for diamonds aspect: “the RUF movement was essentially a kleptocratic effort cloaked in revolutionary rhetoric” (Montague 2002:231). Its principal goal was to gain control over the diamond fields for itself and Charles Taylor. Also Meredith (2005) emphasises the important role RUF greed for natural resources played by stating that its principal purpose was to gain control over the diamond field without a clear political message. “There was no ideology, no political strategy, behind the RUF, only the use of brute force” (p.564). In addition Abdullah (1998) argues that those who recruited Foday Sankoh, the leader of the RUF, underestimated his political capacities. “Sankoh was a militarist. [...] Before this period his world view did not go beyond the Sierra Leonean border; his ideas remained those of an angry man who had an axe to grind because of his imprisonment” (p.218).

The other view on the contrary stresses that the RUF did have some political ideas. I follow the argumentation of Richards and Vincent (2008) and Peters (2006) who accentuate the political orientation of the RUF which is often left out of consideration in studies on the Sierra Leonean civil war. The assumption that greed necessarily predominates in the motivation of the RUF is too limited. According to several former RUF combatants the movement strived for a political reformation because of misbehaviour of the Sierra Leonean government.

According to Richards and Vincent (2008) three distinct explanations are generally given for the conflict. The first one clarifies the emergence of the RUF in terms of conspiracy of the unemployed who were seeking economical prosperities. The second explanation focuses on external interference, especially by the Libyan Colonel Qadaffi and Charles Taylor from Liberia. The third explanation considers the RUF in terms of social movement theory: war adapts itself to the needs and the goals of those who are involved. According to Richards and Vincent the Sierra Leonean underprivileged did not only seek economic prosperity, they also fought for political reform in terms of an egalitarian revolution. The first two explanations assert that the RUF was only fighting

for the control over the diamond fields, and was no more than political illusion. In this case political transformation of an armed force seems a contradiction.

Richards and Vincent (2008: 88) argue that the RUF became “a real movement with real politics”. The political agenda was mainly built on its own grievances and was not only an instrument of Charles Taylor to be provided with the diamond revenues. The RUF’s politics were focused on social exclusion such as labour exploitation and domestic slavery. This movement was a proponent of a transformation in the agrarian sector, based on egalitarian principles; as such it reacted to the existing hierarchical structure of the Sierra Leonean society. The civil war can be understood in the light of resistance of subordinate classes against the ruling authorities (Richards in Fanthorpe 2005). The rebels’ policy vanguard based on rural transformations originates from the background of many RUF combatants. Most of them were born in rural subclasses with limited access to arable land and provisional appropriation (Peters 2006).

As regarding to the case of the RUF, the classification of the movement’s motivations is not a simple matter of economic gain or political dissatisfaction. Therefore this thesis distances itself from the generalities inherent in Collier’s (2000) ‘greed versus grievance’ debate. Current studies argue that modern conflicts are caused by greed rather than grievances. Analogous to Gberie (2005) I argue that the presence of diamonds in Sierra Leone did not cause the war. These natural resources were significant in the motivations of the RUF leaders and external supporters, particularly Charles Taylor, and secured the RUF’s position in the conflict. The presence of resources increases the ‘value of the state’. “As in Sierra Leone, where control over the diamond areas sufficiently weakened the state, capturing appears to be easy” (Fearon & Laitin in Humphreys 2005:511). It is too simplistic to state that greed was the only source since it is an interconnection of economical greed and political grievances (Keen 2005; Richards 2005).

Both Renamo and the RUF had several reasons to go into war. Internal grievances towards the ruling political parties, domestic inequality and interferences of external supporters were key factors in the emergence and development of both conflicts. Although both movements struggled for political demands such as democracy and equality, their approaches and their basic assumptions diverged. The RUF and Renamo did not emerge out of the same conditions and motivations. Renamo emerged

particularly as a politically-oriented organisation and can be defined as a reform movement (Manning 2004). Its primary aim was to radically reform or overthrow the ruling government. Renamo had always sought to legitimise itself and became a 'coalition of the marginalised' over a guerrilla organisation. In Sierra Leone, the presence of natural resources complicated the struggle, mainly because of the interests of Charles Taylor in Liberia. The RUF can be classified in between a reform movement and a warlord organisation because of the interconnection of political reform agenda, internal and external greed for resources and the utilisation of brute violence (De Zeeuw 2008).

Analogous to Macek (2005) I suggest that we should adapt our perception of war, meaning that we should be aware of the classification of the warring parties and not identify them simply as 'good' or 'bad', just as in the case of the international disregarding concerning to the RUF's political agenda. Categorisation is human but perilous; boundaries are dynamic and always constructed in a set of continuities. In wartime there are rarely two homogenous sides, and the roles of civilians, soldiers and deserters intertwine constantly.

Resorting to violence

In spite of their political aspirations as described above, the RUF and Renamo operated as military movements instead of political organisations. In many studies it is ascertained that rebel movements protect their security but *how* they will organise is largely underexposed (Weinstein 2007). Rebel movements use violence to secure their existence in two different ways: externally by recruiting new combatants and forcing support amongst the local population and internally by maintaining control within the movement.

Forced recruitment

Manpower is essential to fight a war and to sustain the durability of a rebel organisation. During the first months of the Sierra Leonean conflict, the RUF executed a mixture of voluntary and forced recruitment of young people, many of them under 18 years old. Most of the early recruits had a rural background, had low access to education and were discontent with the circumstances under which they worked. These young men joined the movement in its early days because of the RUF's agrarian orientation in the

ideological statements. The RUF offered them, in their perspective, an opportunity to escape from political, economic and social exclusion by the central authority (Richards & Vincent 2008).

However, the majority of the RUF warriors were kidnapped and forced to join this rebel movement. During the conflict, many young children were recruited at primary and secondary schools in the Sierra Leonean/Liberian border zone, and in diamond mines where school drop-outs used to work. Humphreys and Weinstein (2004) expounded that the vast majority of the RUF combatants were abducted into the faction and only a few suggested that they joined the movement because of the group's ideologies.⁶

In the early days of Renamo, discontent amongst Mozambicans living in Rhodesia was used as a means to recruit new people. These new insurgents had fled from Mozambique when Frelimo took power after independence. But also within Mozambique a successful recruitment campaign emerged. In military operations against the government, state prisoners were released and welcomed to Renamo. New insurgents were recruited with salaries and military training offered by the Rhodesian government (Weinstein 2007).

Selective incentives were also achieved by stressing shared identities and ethnicities. For a successful recruitment, rebellion must offer possible insurgents a different and better perspective for the near future in a material and immaterial sense of the word. By appealing to common ethnic, religious and cultural ideals and goals rebel movements will recruit civilians more successfully. This so-called concept of reciprocity creates a common understanding, collective action and responsibility (Mauss 1990). Renamo appealed to ethnic sentiments by stating that the southern Shangaans dominated Frelimo and excluded northern communities (Griffiths 1996). The organisation expanded from a few hundred members in its early days until thousands of insurgents during wartime. Recruitment is a dynamic process which depends on available offers and binding tactics for future combatants; social and economic

⁶ Humphreys and Weinstein (2004:25) conducted a survey of 367 former RUF combatants; 87% of the RUF combatants reported being abducted into the faction and only 9% suggest that they concur with the RUF because they supported the political goals.

endowments determine on a large degree the type of recruitment and new combatants (Weinstein 2007).

After Zimbabwe's independence, South Africa positioned itself as external supporter of Renamo in the form of logistical support, military trainings and supplies. The funding of salaries and food supplies came to an end. Consequently, the type of recruitment needed refreshment by renewing the tactics of bonding. Lacking financial tools, Renamo, like the RUF, started to recruit by force. Children were abducted, young men were kidnapped and villages were destroyed (Manning 1998). Renamo utilised brute coercion methods against civilians but not to the degree of the RUF (Söderberg 2004). Thus, both abundance as well as a lack of resources can lead towards the use of indiscriminate violence.

Primarily the RUF is 'well-known' because of the use of brute violence against civilians. The patterns of recruitment are consistent with a wider pattern of behaviour exposed by the RUF during the civil war: destruction and annihilation. Fear creates power. Civilians were forced to provide the rebels with food supplies and to work in diamond fields which were under control of the RUF (Peters 2006). In Mozambique, a lot of violence has been used by Renamo and Frelimo against civilians. Conversely, Ms. Manhiça and Ellen van Koppen nuance Renamo's widespread use of violence. They emphasise the regional character of this conflict. Since Renamo had been present in some regions for many years, civilians supported the movement without being forced. According to them, violence was not necessarily needed to maintain control in certain regions. Ms. Manhiça describes the period of war as "normal life and the healthy relationship between civil society and Renamo" (personal communication, December 3, 2008). Thus, in the case of Renamo the use of violence against civilians differed in time and place depending on available resources and the existence of moral support.

Internal control and governance

Besides violent recruitment methods, violence was also used to maintain control over the rebel insurgents. Every rebel movement needs to prevent mass desertion and find a way to bind the combatants to the movement, for example by a system of reward and punishment. A former RUF commander clarifies the internal detentions as follows:

They [the RUF] make a difference between the punishments of low ranking and high ranking fighters. If you do something wrong, the Military Police will investigate the matter and if guilty they will refer you to the commander. Then he will put you to 'people's court'. You will get a defender appointed. If you are guilty, in the morning you will be brought in front of the mass parade. All the fighters then decide upon your punishment: to be 500 times flogged, to be sent for three months of labour on the swamp, to spend some time in the training-base to learn again about the ideology, etc. (Peters 2006:61).

However, this system of punishment seems to be of a paradoxical nature: insurgents fear the threat of violence but will not flee; however, when violence is used excessively people will escape. This is a matter of a cost-and-benefit analysis. Besides the punishment, the insurgents needed rewarding in the form of power and goods. By providing guns, combatants ended up in a powerful position in order to command people and were free to take whatever they liked in captured villages.

Loyalty to the rebel movement was particularly created during the bush camp period from 1994 until 1997.⁷ Livelihoods and communities were destroyed so child soldiers had no place to return to if they decided to leave the group. Being isolated from the rest of the world and at the mercy of the 'new family', the RUF insurgents had no alternative but to obey the rules and laws of the rebel movement (Peters 2006). A remarkable development is the growing loyalty of coerced RUF combatants towards the movement and its objectives for the conflict. This is what psychologists call the 'Stockholm Syndrome', when hostages bond with their capturers. Some of the strugglers who were forced to join the movement became convinced proponents of the RUF (Peters 2006).

For most of the war the RUF's leadership was personalised and centralised in its founder, Sankoh, who controlled all RUF policies throughout the war, even when he was imprisoned in Nigeria and later in Sierra Leone. In spite of the extreme violent kidnapping of new recruits, Sankoh gave instructions not to kill abducted soldiers. He

⁷ After being almost totally annihilated the RUF moved to forest base camps in Gola Forest to change its military tactics into guerrilla warfare. In these difficult and inaccessible camps much of the ideological and military training of the abducted young people took place (Richards & Vincent 2008)

was convinced the hostages would see the rightness of the violent struggle of the RUF (Peters & Richards 1998). Although a large number of RUF officers were under 18 and most of the higher ranking officers shared very little of the group's initial ideology (Restoy 2006).

Renamo in Mozambique was also highly centralised under the authority of its leader Afonso Dhlakama, which is remarkable in a country with major distances and a poor infrastructure (Kumar & De Zeeuw 2008). Consequently, the top of the organisation kept ultimate authority in the decision making process. New recruits were not drawn into the political motivations of the war but participated in extensive military trainings (Manning 2008). Renamo re-established the hierarchal structures of the colonial period. Making use of a centralised decision-making structure, so characteristic of colonial times, local commanders could go their own way and have their own rules. Violence was used as a tool of controlling the rebels but in contrast to the RUF, Renamo also relied on ideological support from its combatants (Weinstein 2007). Unlike in Sierra Leone, Mozambican civilians could somehow understand the purposes of the Renamo campaign although their messages were often clouded by the rebels' behaviour.

Popular support

Both rebel movements as well as political parties require recognition and legitimacy from the rank and file (Söderberg 2004). The rebels' motivations and warfare techniques influence their domestic support which is necessary to emerge as a political party. If a rebel movement received substantial support during war, it is likely that this support will also be extensive after transformation into political party since it already mobilised a committed group of followers (Allison 2006).

The RUF lacked an intellectual core and failed to receive much popular support in spite of existing antigovernment sentiments among the population. The rebels' brutal warfare, including kidnapping, recruiting of young children and the use of indiscriminate violence, further led to popular alienation (Söderberg 2004). Although marginalised youth in the border districts and rural areas lent their support to the RUF, due to its unclear ideologies, significant domestic support was missing.

Much of the RUF's original ideology of the movement's top was not shared amongst RUF fighters themselves, partly since a large proportion consisted of Liberian

rebels fighting for their own cause. A RUF commander describes this lack of support from within the movement as follows:

The ones who joined the RUF later on do not have the RUF ideology. These [ones] are not interested in farming [as an aspect of an ideological agenda]. [...] These RUF combatants were not disciplined and were causing us a real “headache”. We feel that they betrayed and sabotaged the movement. [...] It was a time when “children” started to take over the movement and misused the funds and forgot about the civilians (Peters 2006:79).

Moreover after the bush camps in 1997 most educated sectarians ran away. The movement was led by a group of “embittered fatalists” as Richards and Vincent (2008) described the situation. At this stage there was little ideological vision left. Any primary popular support that the movement had benefited from in the past was destabilised by its use of intimidation and guerrilla tactics (Restoy 2006).

In Mozambique Renamo succeeded to receive some local support despite its brutal war tactics halfway through the war. Renamo’s political program was widely known and because of the financial support of Rhodesia and South Africa in its early days Renamo could offer attractive conditions to new combatants. Domestic support of minority groups for its initiatives grew rapidly. Particularly because of Renamo’s struggle for maintenance of local traditions and religious values. Frelimo was a firm opponent of these customs and behaviour (Cramer 2006). Besides the support of Rhodesian and South African government Renamo was never successful in generating outside support during the struggle, its brutality and use of indiscriminate violence damaged the rebels’ image and support internationally (Hall 1990).

Summary

This chapter started out with the following question: how did the period of civil war influence the political transitions of Renamo and the RUF? Both movements show remarkable differences between their political ideologies and violent implementation of these messages. But a significant difference between the movements also came forward.

Renamo is considered as a politically-oriented organisation that used military means to achieve its goals, while the RUF is characterised as a violent insurgency group that drafted a vague political agenda. The motivation of both movements and their use of violence significantly influenced the gain of popular support during war. This might be the first step in answering the question why Renamo transformed successfully into a political party whereas the RUF failed to transform.

Although the remarkable differences between motivations and nature of the rebel movements and consequently the character of both civil wars, these dissimilarities are not sufficient to account for the divergent outcomes of the political transformation process. Internal and external political recognition will play significant roles in the following phases of post-conflict processes, which will be discussed in the following chapters.

Chapter 3

On the threshold of peace

Peace has to be embodied in a network of institutions in which the participants are entangled and that provides an ongoing raison d'être to their commitments (Horowitz 2004:245).

After years of armed struggle the conflicts in both Mozambique and Sierra Leone came to an end. External support for the rebel movements decreased and especially the Mozambican Renamo ran out of supplies. Consequently, alternatives to violence had to be considered in order to continue promoting its ideology and goals (Manning 2008; Richards & Vincent 2008). Peaceful negotiations seemed to be the only key towards better prospects for the rebel movements. However, starting peace talks appears to be one of the main obstacles in post-conflict negotiation particularly when interests of the warring parties are extremely divergent (Hume 1994).

Regardless of these high thresholds and obstacles, many scholars agree that total participation of the former warring parties during the negotiations reduces the risk of post-settlement violence (De Zeeuw 2008; Nillson 2008; Ohlson & Söderberg 2002; Weinstein 2007). Both Renamo and the RUF were included into the peace talks and signed the peace agreement, and in doing so they pledged to transform into a political party. This chapter concentrates on the dynamics of the post-conflict processes that are associated with the outcomes of both political transitions.

In this chapter it is suggested that the outcome of a rebel-to-party transition can to a large extent be explained by an important degree of rebels' commitment to the peace process as well as domestic and international legitimacy that the rebel group is able to require in the transition period. These mechanisms are addressed in the following central question of this chapter: how did different actors, events and choices during the negotiation processes contribute to the success or failure of the rebel-to-party transitions?

Beginning of the end

The Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL) [...] determined to establish sustainable peace and security; to pledge forthwith, to settle all past, present and future differences and grievances by peaceful means; and to refrain from the threat and use of armed force to bring about any change in Sierra Leone (Lomé Peace Accord 1999).

The Lomé Peace Accord was signed on July 7, 1999 between president Ahmad Tejan Kabbah and the RUF leader Fodah Saybana Sankoh. However, these peaceful perspectives did not last for long. In the Lomé Peace Accord it was among other things agreed that the RUF would disarm and transform into a political party. After a successful disarmament, demobilisations and reintegration process (DDR) three ministerial posts in national government were promised to the RUF (Richards & Vincent 2008). The agreement granted a blanket amnesty to all combatants and required the government to share power with rebel leaders (Kandeh 2003). As Meredith (2005:571) describes the situation concisely, “Kabbah wanted peace, Sankoh wanted power”. However, the UN objected to the pardon for Sankoh and its insurgency group because of all the human rights violations during civil war. Years of negotiations after renewed violence followed until the civil war was officially declared over in January 2002.

In Mozambique more than a decade earlier, in 1990, after thirteen years of armed struggle, the first direct talks between the Frelimo government and Renamo took place, mediated by the Italian government and a Catholic organisation, the community of Sant’Egidio. After two years of negotiations the Frelimo government recognised Renamo’s right to exist as political party and Renamo recognised the existing government as legitimate (Manning 2008). The Frelimo president Joaquim Chissano and Renamo leader Afonso Dhlakama signed the agreement on the October 4, 1992. The constitution which was drafted by Frelimo in 1989, formed a new base for a multiparty system and in November 1990 a new constitution was adopted. Mozambique became a multiparty state, with periodic elections, and guaranteed democratic rights (Paris 2004).

During the negotiation processes two main elements can be identified that may influenced the rebel-to-party transitions. Firstly, the engagement of the rebels themselves to the peace process. A stable political environment based on democratic principles is a long term process and not feasible without engagement of the rebels. They need to be committed to implement intra-party changes and take an interest in peaceful politics. Secondly, domestic as well as international third parties play a significant role in stimulating the rebels to take place at the bargaining table. The RUF was treated much more critically by the international community and this chapter suggests that the negative image-framing by the third parties was crucial in the less straightforward political transition of the movement. Unlike the RUF, the Mozambican Renamo enjoyed generous support of the international community (Manning 2008; Paris 2004; Söderberg 2004).

A peace agreement aims to end conflict but also lays the foundations for the democratic state building process. An inclusive agreement needs to be pursued where all political stakeholders require recognition as legitimate political actors (Ten Hoove & Pinto Scholtbach 2008). To achieve these stable post-settlement conditions the above-mentioned dynamics are crucial during the transformation of former military organisations into peaceful democratic institutions. In the following sections these issues will be elucidated in order to explain the different outcomes between Renamo and the RUF.

Rebels' commitment

Halfway through the 1990s a first altering appeared in the Sierra Leonean civil war. Some of the diamond fields, captured by the RUF, were regained by government troops assisted by the South African Security Company, Executive Outcomes (EO). A first step towards defeating the RUF was taken and ultimately led to elections in 1996 which brought the major Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP), led by Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, to power. Despite the continuation of violence between the RUF and EO assisted by the Civil Defense Forces (CDF)⁸, peace talks proceeded between the warring parties. This

⁸ The CDF was a paramilitary group that fought in the civil war (1991-2002) of Sierra Leone against the rebel group of RUF.

ultimately resulted in the Abidjan Peace Accord, signed on November 3, 1996 by RUF leader Fodah Sankoh and president Kabbah (Ducasse-Rogier 2004).

The main reasons for reaching this agreement were contextual rather than political. The situation of the RUF deteriorated and consequently there was no alternative left than entering the negotiations. Moreover, some scholars argue that reasons for the RUF but to enter the peace talks were particularly tactical, since Sankoh would surely intend to postpone the elections planned for February 1996 and after that to jointly take power with the National Provisional Revolutionary Council (NPRC)⁹. Although the NPRC had always been contested by the RUF, it was in many respects fighting for similar goals as far as governance security and wealth divisions were concerned (Ducasse-Rogier 2004; Peters 2006).

The final text of the agreement provided an exit strategy for EO, one of the demands of the RUF, which left Sierra Leone in January 1997. Ironically, this was one of the few agreements that were actually accomplished. During the extremely chaotic implementation period the RUF continued its spoiler role, although it was not excluded from the negotiations, and consequently the agreement quickly collapsed as the RUF could not agree on disarmament and the creation of a monitoring force. The situation worsened when the insurgents of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC)¹⁰ overthrew President Kabbah and invited the RUF to share power in government. The violent 'alliance' between the AFRC and the RUF was greatly dysfunctional and the RUF's leadership underwent a period of crisis, particularly after the arrest of Sankoh in 1997. Again, the group continued a spoiler's role (Ducasse-Rogier 2004; Kandeh 2003).

Years of extreme violence followed in 1997 and 1998 while the peacekeeping force of West African states, ECOWAS, entered Sierra Leone. In 1999 new negotiations were held, Sankoh was released and granted amnesty. UMAMSIL, the Sierra Leonean UN mission, was reinforced to help implement the Lomé Peace Agreement which was signed between the RUF leader and the government on July 7, 1999. This accord granted Sankoh a position in the transitional government as well as amnesty for him and all

⁹ The NPRC was established by a group of six young soldiers in the Sierra Leonean army. They were frustrated by the government's performances and promised to defeat the RUF and bring an end to the corruption.

¹⁰ The AFRC consisted of Sierra Leonean combatants that allied itself with the RUF in the late 1990s. While the AFRC temporarily controlled the country in 1998, it was driven from the capital by a coalition of West African troops (ECOWAS).

combatants (Richards & Vincent 2008). The RUF continued its violent behaviour during the end of the war and the peace negotiations, although a power-sharing agreement was offered and the rebels' demand concerning the departure of ECOWAS was approved in the accord. Even though there were multiple attempts to negotiate in Sierra Leone, this conflict was mainly ended due to the military defeat of the rebel group and the breakdown of their organisational and leadership structures, including the arrest of its leader Sankoh (Gberie 2005; Rogier 2004).

Humphreys (2005) associates the lack of rebels' commitment with the presence of resources. "If combatants in diamond-rich areas are largely concerned with accumulating wealth during wartime, then we should expect little success of negotiations" (p. 531). In the case of Sierra Leone gaining the revenues from diamond sales were more likely to benefit the rebels than sharing power in a transitional government. Moreover, the commitment of the RUF has been made difficult by the engagement of third parties.

The absence of resources in Mozambique directly influenced the capacities and strategic positions of both warring parties and thus played a significant role in ending the conflict. Ever since 1988, both sides have lost most of its foreign support and in the beginning of the 1990s Mozambique became a victim of an intense drought. Donor activities were stopped at the end of the Cold War and the independence of Zimbabwe (Hume 1994). No was the time for change, and consequently both parties reconsidered their options, promoting their goals and ambitions through dialogue rather than armed struggle.

The political orientation of Renamo in the early days was already elucidated in the previous chapter. A decade later these developments were to be confirmed. During the 1980s Renamo began to strengthen its contacts in the United States, Portugal and the United Kingdom and asked for public relations advice from its foreign companions. At the end of the war in 1989 Renamo announced a unilateral ceasefire showing its willingness to find a peaceful solution. Both delegations, Frelimo as well as Renamo, composed a position paper with the party's most important statements. The final point of Renamo's document reflected its intention not to use violence anymore in order to change the existing ruling structure:

Renamo wants a genuine negotiation conducive to national reconciliation without victors or vanquished, and without recrimination followed by constitutional reform; united efforts in order to form a new Mozambique where brotherhood will be affirmed by free debate of ideas and decision of consensus; a new Mozambique where armed struggle need never be the last and only resort for the solution of our problems (Hume 1994:29).

In the same year the movement held its first party congress and this is seen as a significant turning point in the history of its political development. Here, Renamo's leader Dhlakama called for talks with its opponent Frelimo (Manning 2008).

The changing intraparty structures also supported the political transition process significantly. During the war both movements were characterised by a highly centralised and personalised party structure. The RUF's party organisation collapsed after the detainment of its leader Sankoh. Renamo's party composition developed the other way around. Despite the fact that Dhlakama did not intend to give up its leadership, he accomplished significant changes. Well-educated and communicative individuals who were recruited during the war were now rewarded with high level positions. Moreover, Dhlakama asked the international community to assist him in the creation of a statesmanlike image, in the eyes of his new foreign allies and the Mozambican voters (Manning 2008).

Summarising, the explanation concerning the rebels' commitment to a political transition may be twofold. Firstly, the presence of resources hindered the RUF in its political transformation. As Humphreys (2005) stated before, if rebel groups are able to continue their existence due to the revenues out of natural resources and their primary goal is to control those mines and profits, it will be hard for mediators to compose a peace agreement which offers the rebels a better perspectives than their current way of life. The more politically-organised Mozambican Renamo did not have an alternative since the financial resources had dried up and it could not afford the military struggle anymore and considering its nature a peaceful dialogue was not a bad solution from the rebels' point of view. Secondly, the political orientation and intraparty developments of Renamo seemed to pave the way for a peaceful political party. In contrast to the RUF,

Renamo concentrated on changing the party structure and image of its leader, reinforced international contacts with international allies, and changed its military means into political ones.

Obviously, these explanations are interconnected. Weinstein (2007) argues that movements that emerge in mineral-rich environments tend to commit high levels of indiscriminate violence and are less motivated to transform into a political party. More than politically-oriented insurgency groups, they use their violence unselectively, which is harder to control than hostilities specifically aimed at certain persons and parties. Thus, the presence of resources may influence the political orientation of rebel movements and therefore commitment of the rebels' to transform. Moreover, rebel behaviour cannot be dissociated from domestic and international image-framing. The next section clarifies the mechanisms concerning the international interventions and the rebels' position in relation to the political transformations.

Domestic and international actors

Many scholars agree that third party interventions influence the rebels' political transitions extensively. This chapter argues that in Mozambique and Sierra Leone third party interventions differed significantly in terms of interests of the international community and the relation between this community and the rebel movements. These factors play a decisive role in the process of acquiring legitimacy as political parties.

No democracy without money

The Mozambican civil war erupted simultaneously to the conflict in Angola. Here, the UN established several missions to verify the agreements by the government and the rebel movement UNITA and to monitor the ceasefires, elections and Angolan police (United Nations 2000). Despite their efforts successful implementations of ceasefires and agreements failed to occur during the mid 1990s. A representative of the United States declared this was the result of a lack of mutual recognition. The UN was determined to avoid such an embarrassment in Mozambique seeking for evidence that they could manage a political transition which would not collapse into chaos. The correct procedure still had to be invented: legitimacy for the government and a privileged role for Renamo in the peace process (Harrison 1996; Manning 2008).

Besides the clearly intervening motivations of the UN in Mozambique, more factors were important concerning international interferences. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Aldo Ajello, has been identified as a success factor of the UN mission in Mozambique, ONUMOZ. This mission was equipped with a strong mandate and “Ajello was not afraid to take bold steps to exercise it” as Manning describes (2008:65).

As Special Representative of the Secretary-General, I made use of all the powers accorded to me by the peace agreement. I was occasionally accused of exceeding these powers, but in reality I was working to ensure that the United Nations played the active role needed to keep the peace process on track (Ajello in Manning 2008:65).

As well as the substantial amount of diplomacy, the UN and bilateral donors provided generous financial support for Mozambican post-conflict settlement. The assistance to the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration process was identified as an essential component of Renamo’s political transition. A ‘compensation package’ was offered to former combatants that kept most demobilised soldiers satisfied for the coming two years (Manning 2008). This intervention is identified as cooperative disarmament: providing (financial) compensation after the delivering of their weapons (Spear 1996). Further, donors accomplished the establishment of several party offices in Mozambican cities and provided all the labour and material support that was needed (Söderberg 2004; Ten Hoove & Pinto Scholtbach 2008).

Financial support for post-conflict countries by international donors is not a rare phenomenon, although Mozambique received an exceptionally charitable amount. During the 1990s the donor community started to realise that post-conflict assistance is not a simple continuum linking emergency aid and long term development. Here, the challenge for donors is looking for complementarities between several interventions (Patrick 2000). In Mozambique, the assistance for post-conflict reconstruction and political transition continued after the departure of the UN, and this role was taken over by key donors, including the United States and the European Union (Manning 2008).

Besides the technical, logistical and financial support, Renamo’s legitimacy, too, was exceptionally bolstered by the international community. Here, personal

relationships between external actors, mediators and Renamo captains ensured the recognition of Renamo as a political organisation and thus its willingness to cooperate in the implementation. Renamo won the trust of the other actors by participating peacefully and as a consequence the movement was totally included into the peace process as a reliable partner (Söderberg 2004; Manning 2008).

The RUF did not receive the form of international assistance as Renamo did. Donors in the international arena tended to neglect the political message and the credibility of the RUF for its own political interests. Moreover, many researchers had a narrow-minded view of the organisational structure of the RUF and focused, to a large extent, on the war itself. The RUF became synonymous with extreme violence and knowledge about motivations of combatants is missing (Peters 2006). As demonstrated in the previous chapter the RUF did have ideologies and were more politically-based than the international community assumed, although the implementation of the rebels' principles took the form of forced recruitment and brute violence (Weinstein 2007). In contrast to Renamo, this movement did not show any commitment to the peace process or a political transition of the movement.

Thus, the generous moral and financial support of the international community for Renamo is tightly connected with the willingness of the movement to sign and implement the agreement. In this perspective, the international community and Renamo were also mutually dependent. Dhlakama desired to gain legitimacy as a political player from domestic and international supporters. On the other hand, the UN and bilateral donors were determined to complete this post-settlement process and political transition successfully. Renamo was aware of the strong international efforts to complete the transition successfully and thus every now and then the movements (mis)used its position. Dhlakama played successfully on the fears of the international community by constantly re-asking for financial resources. Renamo balanced accurately on the thin chord of diplomacy (Söderberg 2004; Manning 2008).

Legitimacy: a the key to success

Legitimacy is a critical variable in attempting to explain the successes or failures of rebel-to-party transitions. No post-conflict reconstruction can be successful without some degree of acceptance and mutual recognition of all parties. Legitimacy is an

empirical concept founded on notions and opinion. Something or someone is legitimate if it is considered as legally recognized by the members of a certain group. The acquirement of legitimacy in peace processes is expressed in terms of money and assistance in organisational development. Moreover, third parties press other actors in the post-conflict phase to recognise the rebel movements as well. Thus, requiring legitimacy from third parties as well as potential voters increases the possibility of a successful rebel-to-party transition (Diamond 2006; Ohlson & Söderberg 2002; Söderberg 2004).

As was made explicit above, Renamo was treated as a legitimate and reliable partner during the negotiations. Partly because it had been developing towards a political organisation themselves, and to a certain extent because of the interests and engagement of the international community. But what about the Sierra Leonean RUF? In this case the engagement of the international community is entirely different and in contrast with the international intervention in Mozambique.

The international engagement in the Sierra Leonean peace processes was considerably limited. Ever since the Cold War, Sierra Leone has been a strategically unimportant country to the major powers. Unlike Renamo the RUF was not supported by significant allies from the global stage. Moreover, during the mid 1990s the international community was involved in several 'regretful' peacekeeping operations. In the aftermath of the genocide in Rwanda, the killing of American troops in Somalia, and the massacre in Srebrenica, proactive intervention in Sierra Leone was infeasible. The international attention revived slightly in 1997, after the military coup committed by the RUF. However, it declined drastically when five hundred UN peacekeepers were abducted by force in May 2000 by RUF forces. The United States and France did no longer feel committed while the former colonial power, the United Kingdom felt obliged to intervene. Consequently the domestic and international de-legitimation of the RUF witnessed its low (Hirsch 2001).

Due to the lack of interests and engagement of the international community and the continuation of the RUF's brute behaviour, this insurgency group has not been treated as a reliable partner since the beginning of the peace talks. Although the RUF did have some political ideologies, the image-framing of the international community concentrated primarily on the RUF as a criminal organisation before, during and after

the war (Richards & Vincent 2008; Peters 2006). This perspective came to the fore in the refusal of the UN to provide blanket amnesty to the RUF combatants. The UN placed a marginal comment that the amnesty provided was not appropriate to “international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of international humanitarian law” (Francis in Söderberg Kovacs 2006:15).

As long as the rebels participated in the peace process and were willing to transform into a political party, they were unlikely to face trial. Regardless the extent of human rights abuses the rebels committed. When, however, the rebels failed in their commitment to peace, they were more likely to be held responsible for crimes committed during the armed conflict, in spite of previous guarantees of amnesty. This international reading is imaginable; the RUF had never been committed to the peace agreements and instead of entering a dialogue, violence remained its instrument to express dissatisfaction (Söderberg Kovacs 2006).

However, this superannuated perspective resulted in vacuum for both parties. I argue that both sides were captured in a vicious circle of violence and de-legitimisation. These two dynamics were interrelated and framed in mutual influence. The mutual dependency of the RUF and third parties is based upon the concept of reciprocity. A reciprocal action implies that an actor shall respond to a positive action with another positive action. But to a negative action shall be responded with another negative action (Mauss 1990). In the case of Sierra Leone, the international community as well as the RUF were not able or willing to be able, to break through these rhythms and continued their own strategies.

Besides the image-framing of the international community, also potential domestic voters and the acquirement of domestic support influence a rebel-to-party transition. International actors may contribute to create a climate in which democratic change can develop but they cannot guarantee a successful political transition (Schmidt 2008). In the former chapter it was made clear that the rebels’ use of violence and the degree of political orientation correlated with the degree of popular support during war.

During the conflict Renamo had identified a significant core constituency and after war its rank and file remained reliable. Renamo continued to bill itself as ‘a coalition of the marginalised’ stating that Frelimo was seeking to exclude certain parts of the country. Renamo’s political position was reinforced after structural constrains on

Frelimo's ability to improve the condition for those who live in economically depressed areas.

The RUF in Sierra Leone failed to preserve any popular support because of the increasingly widespread atrocities committed by the movement. Peters (2006) describes this process as "the erosion of its ideology". A former RUF commander explains the decline of popular support in an interview with Peters (p. 77):

At first they [the fighters] really tried to do the good thing, giving supplies to civilians and trying to protect them. Later they became bad. The movement changed because they did not promote people because they were educated but because they were ruthless in the fighting.

However, the civilian support for the RUF requires a special note. Nowadays, civilian support for the RUF is still a taboo subject and therefore difficult to measure. Certainly, some degree of support existed in Sierra Leone's border zone.

In contrast to Mozambique, both the international community and the Sierra Leonean rebellions did not legitimise each other's actions and the RUF was not capable to preserve its popular support. Legitimacy is a critical variable in attempting to explain the successes or failures of rebel-to-party transitions. Besides the domestic and/or international legitimacy that will be required after a successful transformation into a political party, this concept is of great relevance before and during the process towards the rebel-to-party transition. It is not a matter of providing blanket amnesty or forgetting the past and the committed criminal crimes against humanity; the international community must be aware of its push-and-pull-strategy and of possibilities to start the dialogue whenever possible (Diamond 2006; Ohlson & Söderberg 2002; Rogier 2004). As argued by Kaldor (2001), the restructuring of legitimacy is one of the most significant aspects in this post-war democratisation process of former rebellions. As we speak of the two cases in this thesis, the acquirement of legitimacy played a crucial role. New political parties in young democracies need domestic and international recognition to continue in their existence.

However, a former rebel movement must develop towards an organisation that deserves to be treated as a legitimate partner. That is to say, representing a significant

part of the population, drafting a political program and refraining from abandoning from extreme violence (Ducasse-Rogier 2004). If a party does not fulfil these conditions, it cannot be considered legitimate, as is the case with the Sierra Leonean RUF. In contrast to Renamo, it was more interested in war than in peace as a result of economic benefits. The conflict ultimately came to an end when the RUF was defeated and forced to disarm, not by offering them a power sharing agreement in government like the intervention in Mozambique.

In the RUF's perspective, political power did not compete with the merits from the diamond trade and thus transformation into a political party was not its primary goal. Political transformation was mainly blocked by the interferences of Liberia, due to Charles Taylor's interests over the diamond revenues. Consequently, intervention to transform former rebellions into peaceful politicians must be built on local capacities and interests. (Patrick 2000).

Summary

In the post-settlement phase several dynamics contributed to the success and failure of the rebel movements. In the first place, the position of both insurgencies diverged enormously. Renamo was defeated in a military sense and its resources dried up as a consequence of the end of the Cold War and non-aggression treaties between South Africa and Mozambique. In line with its political ideologies, peaceful negotiation seemed to be a solid solution of the conflict. The RUF continued a spoiler's role and in spite of military setbacks, the gain from national resources continued the rebels' existence. Instead of Renamo, power-sharing in government was not an attractive alternative as long as the diamond revenues accumulated the RUF's wealth. Moreover, sponsor state Liberia continued in stimulating the RUF to spoil the peace process. Consequently, the gain of popular support and international image-framing differed extremely as regards Renamo and the RUF. Renamo received generous financial, logistical and organisational support which was crucial for a successful political transformation. In contrast to the RUF, Renamo was treated as a reliable, legitimate partner. Thus, the engagement of the rebel movements themselves, the interests and agenda of the international community, and support of neighbouring states and allies overseas influenced the degree of

legitimacy and contributed to the success and failure of Renamo and the RUF respectively.

Chapter 4

Post-war elections and future prospects

Elections are widely expected to help consolidate a fragile peace and build legitimacy for the political system, but legitimation involves a lot more than competitive elections [...] it is also about what an elected government does in office or how it governs (Kandeh 2003:190).

Post-war elections are fundamentally different from those organised in stable circumstances; they form an integral element of current peace agreements by representing a symbolic end of the transition from war to peace. The term refers to the first regional or national elections after internal conflict which is brought to an end through peace negotiations. For the international community, post-settlement elections are symbolic ends of its intervention by means of handing over power to a legitimate government and they mark the beginning of an exit strategy (Chesterman 2004; Lyons 2002). However, for new political parties in young democracies it is the launch of a new phase, challenged by political rules. Post-war elections do not occur without dangers since they can become the focus of renewed violence. During electoral contests differences between parties are enlarged and the competition is intensified. In this perspective, the conflict continues, though through official institutions and dialogue (Mansfield & Snyder 1995; Reilly 2008).

Post-war elections are likely to be as a 'litmus test' to new political parties since their functioning and recognition as political parties are reflected in votes from constituencies. The degree of organisational capacity, leadership and international support during the electoral campaign contributes to the success or failures of young political organisations. This chapter focuses on Renamo and the RUF as political movements in the arena of post-settlement elections. Two main questions will guide the route in this part: how did both movements participate in the elections and with what results? What are the prospects for both movements as political parties after the post-war elections?

Parties in practise

Post-war elections are considered as an arena where capacity and commitment of new political parties in young democracies are tested. It should be clear that post-war political parties differ from political parties in well-established democracies (Kumar & De Zeeuw 2008). Analogous to De Zeeuw (2008) I argue that it is important not to put the bar too high, too soon for former rebel movements. Therefore a minimalist definition for a political party is preferred in this study: “any political group that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections, candidates for public office through nonviolent political means” (Sartori in De Zeeuw 2008:5).

This section focuses on Renamo’s and the RUF’s organisational capacity, structure and behaviour during the electoral campaigns. First of all, the willingness and capacity of both parties to participate seriously during the electoral campaign have been key factors in the determination of the functioning as political party. Compared to the motivated Renamo, the Sierra Leonean RUF failed to develop its political range of ideas. Despite the emergence of the RUF’s political wing, the Revolutionary United Front Party (RUF), the political career of this movement darkened during the electoral campaign. This deterioration of the RUF was a result of internal and external weaknesses.

Internally, the Sierra Leonean movement dealt with a lack of transparency in the organisation’s leadership structure. After the detention of Sankoh in 1997, the RUF was ruled by a five-men group who worked for their own interests instead of the overall RUF’s ideology. This group did not favour the egalitarian revolution Sankoh had strived for, but was characterised by Richards and Vincent (2008:90) as “embittered fatalists hell-bent on destroying those who had betrayed their charismatic leader”. Besides the crumbling ideology also the military capacity diminished as a result of the disarmament and demobilisation of RUF combatants, assisted by British forces. Therefore, the RUF was not capable of continuing a violent spoiler’s role or gain support from civilians by brute force. Due to this internal state of poverty and lacking commitment for a political agenda, there was no effective campaign as a consequence of poor organisation abilities. Moreover, during the electoral campaign, it was difficult to travel throughout the country because of poor security conditions. Consequently, the domestic support for the RUF decreased tremendously (United Nations Security Council 2004).

The detainment of the RUF's leader Sankoh and a large proportion of RUF members who were captured without trial were significant external factors causing further weakening. The hostage crisis of 500 UN peacekeepers executed by the RUF in 2000 resulted in a rigid treatment by the international community of the movement. Michael Ganawa, a former public relation officer of the RUF describes the situation as follows:

The weaknesses or cracks appeared immediately when Foday Sankoh was arrested in Nigeria [1997] and worsened after his death [in detention] in Freetown [2003]. Trust, which used to be the strength of the RUF, was lost, and the guiding principle of collective responsibility and ideas was also lost. Most of the main figures sourcing funds for the movement resigned after the death of Foday Sankoh. The international community did little to help the RUF maintain or regain momentum (Ganawa in Richards & Vincent 2008:94).

The RUF's international legitimacy declined further due to the detainment of 400 of the movement's politically-oriented followers. Also the changing geopolitics during the 'global war on terror' affected the role of the RUF on the world stage. Further marginalisation of the RUF and its declining legitimacy continued after the RUF had carried on selling blood diamonds¹¹ to the Islamist extremist movement, Al Qaeda (Richards & Vincent 2008).

Kumar (1998) argues that at the end of internal conflicts there tends to be consensus among the conflicting parties whether democratic elections should be organised to elect a new government capable of rebuilding the country and drafting a new constitution. However, parties may accept the elections for other reasons than supporting democratic principles. After a number of military losses, the arrest of its leader Sankoh and the disarmament of RUF combatants, the RUF was not able to continue fighting, and could not but sign the agreement in order to secure their existence (Gberie 2005; Rogier 2004).

¹¹ This term refers to diamonds that are converted in war zones and sold in order to finance an insurgency or a warlord's activity

In Mozambique, Renamo developed in the opposite direction and became serious and competent contenders by using legal mechanisms such as court trials to express its discontent. Their political agenda showed broadly shared initiatives among their constituencies due to political cleavages generated during war (Ms. Manhiça, personal communication, December 3, 2008). The polarisation of social and political arenas resulted in a core constituency of marginalised regions in northern and central Mozambique. Renamo primarily fought against the communist government systems and were in favour of free market economic policies which should result in diminished regional socioeconomic divisions (Manning 2008; Morgan 1990).

The Renamo Party was conceived to bring a new prosperous and free democratic era to post-colonial Mozambique. An era of democratic principles and good governance which prioritises human rights and individual liberty founded on a market economy; where the state is the referee under the rule of law; where there is a strong sustainable private sector. [...] Frelimo has failed in Mozambique. Failed to lower inequality, failed to reduce social exclusion and intolerance and fundamentally failed to make the achievements needed to further consolidate peace and democracy in Mozambique (Dhlakama 2004:3-4).

Although the ideological development conformed to a well-functioning political party, the internal party structure did not appear as a durable political organisation. The party's leadership structure remained considerably centralised and personalised in war time commander Dhlakama. Those who counterbalanced Renamo's front man were simply demoted or dismissed. These weaknesses do not furnish proof of an unsuccessful political transition, but rather imply that the movement underwent "routine growing pains" (Manning 2008:56).

Again, international assistance was a significant stimulating factor in the political transformation of Renamo and increased the commitment of the Mozambican voters. Although it differs from country to country, most post-settlement societies lack a political climate. Despite the signing of the peace agreement, those societies remain

highly centralised and deep political cleavages between competing parties still exist. Nevertheless, people are asked to vote despite their ongoing disappointment in politics and law and order during war (Turner, Nelson & Mahling-Clark 1998). During the post-settlement period in Mozambique, donors provided a comprehensive program containing political, financial and logistical elements.

Besides the comprehensive assistance to party development and engineering also the Mozambican voters were engaged in the focus of the international community. A nationwide voter educational program was established to increase the understanding and commitment of the Mozambican people. This voter program for civilians contributed positively to the post-war elections attendance. Many post-settlement societies suffer from widespread social disorganisation. Traditional community structures are affected by brute rebel behaviours and social and political trust among groups is harmed (Kumar & De Zeeuw 2008). Several research institutes explored the possibilities of a peaceful democracy. Discovered, for instance, by The National Democratic Institute that sustainable peace was more important than the post-war elections for Mozambican voters and consequently these two concepts were linked in the political campaign of Frelimo and Renamo (Turner, Nelson & Mahling-Clark 1998).

Furthermore, a National Election Commission (NEC) was established to implement the elections, consisting of both Frelimo as well as Renamo members and other unarmed parties. This politically-balanced organisation was given a broad range of responsibilities and tasks, including ensuring freedom and transparency, registering parties and announcing the results. Due to this international dedication, the Mozambican constituencies were stimulated to take part in the election (Turner, Nelson & Mahling-Clark 1998). Besides the efforts of all the distinctive agencies, the close donor cooperation contributed with a successful program that subsisted throughout the process:

The ONUMOZ Electoral Division developed the plan, and the USAID financed its execution through the International Organisation for Migration (for logistics) and CARE International and the International Republican Institute (for training). [...] The International Organisation for Migration used its nationwide network to transport 30,000 poll

watchers from nineteen parties to transport them to the polls on voting days. As a result of this assistance, at least four trained monitors from different political parties were present at every polling station nationwide for all three days of voting (Kumar 1998:157).

Renamo was aware of the dominant position concerning the succeeding of the international post-conflict intervention and played successfully on the fears of the donors. One month before the elections, Dhlakama accused Frelimo leader Chissano of fraud, and threatened to reject the post-war elections whereupon the UN Secretary-General interfered and provided financial resources to satisfy both parties. After the guarantee that the elections would be monitored more closely by neutral agencies and a deposit of one million dollar to the Renamo Trust Fund, Renamo agreed to continue with the process.

Compared to the RUF, Renamo developed itself, generously supported by international donors, into a successful political party. The political program enjoyed a significant amount of domestic support and the financial and logistical assistance from outside nurtured an effective political campaign throughout the country. Here, the political and governance situation emerging from conflict was beneficial to the growth of political parties.

As regards to other post-settlement societies, these circumstances are exceptional. With the recognition of new political movements, sitting parties will lose some of their authority and legitimacy. Despite the terms of the peace agreement and the end of the war, it is often difficult for young political organisations to gain ground (Kumar & De Zeeuw 2008). This was also the case in Sierra Leone, encouraged by the RUF's own spoiling behaviour. Besides its narrow political ideas, also physical freedom was restricted as a result of lacking security conditions in former war zones.

Summarising three divergent conditions can be identified concerning the emergence of political parties in Mozambique and Sierra Leone. First of all, the opportunities in the political arenas of both countries. Renamo adapted to the post-war political cleavages concerning the regional divisions and created its political legitimacy by developing its political program along these lines (Manning 2008). As to the RUF, due to failing organisational structures and commitment a serious political program was

absent and domestic support diminished. Moreover, the poor security conditions in Sierra Leone prevented the RUF from campaigning throughout the country and stimulating a continuation of rebel behaviour (Kandeh 2003; Richards & Vincent 2008).

The second condition comprises the political opportunities utilised by the parties themselves. Renamo developed a solid political program and secured its image as a serious political contender by expressing discontent with legal mechanisms (Manning 2008; Söderberg 2004). In Sierra Leone, the original political ideas of Sankoh were neglected by the new leaders of the RUF (Richards & Vincent 2008). Moreover, both leadership structures were centralised and personalised, but the Mozambican Dhlakama was willing to change into a political manager in contrast to the administration of the RUF (Söderberg 2004).

The third condition is defined as the international commitment towards intervening in Mozambique and Sierra Leone. Since wars tend to have devastating effects on the mental and physical well-being of civilians, political legitimacies and economic infrastructures of countries, international support is necessary for a rebuilding of those institutions. Moreover, economic resources are often dried up due to international sanctions or destructive use during war (Kumar & De Zeeuw 2008). As described before, Renamo received generous and ongoing support of the international community. This assistance comprised financial, logistical and political support to former combatants and new politicians. This large gesture also bolstered Renamo in a mental way and this movement felt its status was acknowledged by the other parties (Manning 2008). The RUF, on the other hand, experienced a lack of funding and thus continued its existence by resuming diamond trade (Richards & Vincent 2008). These three conditions concerning the development of political parties are analysed as separate variables, while in practice overlapping and sequencing occur.

Election results

Post-war elections have become a key component in the peace process and often symbolise the end of the transition from war to peace. Although political transition is not fully accomplished after post-war elections, the organisational challenges and requirement of recognition are actually just a beginning for the new political parties in young democracies. Elections aim at building legitimacy for the political system, but

legitimacy involves a lot more than competitive elections: a peaceful democratic government that uses political debates instead of armed violence on the long term (Kandeh 2003).

The question how the country should be governed is agreed in an accord but determining who will govern still needs to be resolved. Elections are a recognised arena for solving this last part of the peace process (Kumar 1998). In the previous section, it appeared that the electoral campaign of Renamo and the RUF passed off differently. Whereas Renamo created and made use of the political gap, inexhaustible foreign resources and training workshops for ex-combatants and freely conducted its campaign throughout the country, the RUF struggled with a lack of organisational capacity, financial resources, commitment and a political program. It continued a spoiler's role and diamond trade despite international warnings. This chapter will conclude with an analysis of both post-war elections and the anticipation of Renamo and the RUF on the elections results.

In Mozambique, the first democratic multiparty elections were held in October 1994. The Frelimo candidate and president since 1986, Chissano, was elected with a majority of 53 percent of the vote while the Renamo candidate, Dhlakama, received only 34 percent.¹² In the parliamentary elections, Renamo won a solid majority in five out of ten provinces. In most of these regions, the resistance movement had been active during war. Although Renamo complained of fraud throughout the process, it acknowledged its loss since the movement was satisfied to be a serious contender to Frelimo and it became a nonviolent opposition party (Turner, Nelson & Mahling-Clark 1998).

Although post-war elections are not the end of political transitions, they certainly generate significant conditions: Mozambique transformed from a one-party state into a democratically elected multiparty government with broadly based legitimacy. For Renamo, the minority position in parliament created new opportunities but also unexpected consequences. The Renamo legislators developed its own professional identity and purposes that sometimes differed from view of the party's leader, Dhlakama, who was not in the assembly. These developments have caused a shifting in the old personalised and centralised leadership structure and can be considered as signs

¹² See Appendix III for a detailed overview of the presidential and parliamentary election results in Mozambique

of institutional maturity since the political and organisational capacity is continually growing (Turner, Nelson & Mahling-Clark 1998).

In Sierra Leone, too, the post-war elections were scheduled roughly two years after the signing of the peace agreement in 1999. The civil war was officially declared over in January 2002, only four months before the elections in May. Due to this tight time schedule the disarmament of former combatants paralleled the electoral preparations. In those four months of campaigning, the RUF promised, among other things, to provide free education and health care under its motto 'power and wealth to the people'. The RUF was unable to launch an effective campaign due to poor organisation abilities (United Nations Security Council 2004).

Several organisational circumstances seemed to reduce its popularity. Firstly, the RUF failed to subscribe a presidential candidate in time, although it was still allowed to participate. Secondly, several landlords refused to hire out administrative centre space to the RUF in urban areas and were unable to conduct an effective campaign. Thirdly, a 'district block voting system' replaced the proportional 'representation system' during the elections (Kandeh 2003). It is argued that new political parties are more likely to succeed where candidates are elected via proportional representation rather than district voting. District voting tends to create a two-party system by over-representing the two largest parties and making it more difficult for third parties to compete effectively. "The district block system is less proportional and democratic than the PR system used in 1996. Six parties were elected to parliament in 1996 compared to three in 2002" (Kandeh, p.213). Voters also tend to vote for parties that have a clear chance of winning, while politicians seemed to join parties that they believe have the best chance of winning. Therefore district voting makes it much more difficult for new parties to intervene (Allison 2006).

On May 14, 2002 the RUF participated in Sierra Leone's most open and peaceful elections ever but failed poorly. Both in the presidential elections and in the parliamentary election it received roughly two percent of the popular vote and, consequently, no seats in government.¹³ The RUF election misery and despair reflected the lack of popular support due to a lack of organisational capacity, dearth of leadership

¹³ See Appendix III for a detailed overview of the presidential and parliamentary election results in Sierra Leone

and the absent of political statements. The Sierra Leonean constituency responded by rejecting RUF at the polls. Some prominent figures started to dissociate from the RUF even before the elections (Kandeh 2003).

But what happened to the wartime rank and file and the support of former combatants? The support for the RUF was superficial and unreliable, even from their natural constituency. In contrast to Liberia, where loyalties provided the base for the support of rebellion, the RUF agenda and expansion was not based on ethnic mobilisation. Supporters abandoned the movement as a result of dissatisfaction with the leadership and the corruption scandals of the RUF. This mass abandonment of prominent RUF members and constituencies occurred rapidly since violent recruitment was out of question as a result of the DDR process and supporters were not ethnically committed to the movement. Moreover, most of its recruits were simply abducted and consequently the 'left over' support declined significantly. As Kandeh already predicted in 2003: "With the RUF in disarray and given its total rejection by the populace, it is doubtful whether it has a political future" (p.212).

Remaining challenges

In the Mozambican elections in 2004, the pattern of the post-war elections was repeated. Again Renamo called the elections as 'fraudulent' and used legal routes by appealing to the National Electoral Commission in order to contest the results. Despite its complaints, Renamo accepted the outcome and took its seats in the end. The 2004 elections reflected a substantial decline in both presidential and parliamentary polls. Manning (2008) argues this was the consequence of Renamo's electoral strategy. The movement still relied on 'wartime polarisation politics' while its constituency desired political and organisational changes since the conflict already ended twelve years ago. The dismal results mirrored the voters' discontent with Dhlakama's authority since he was 'completely privatising the party'. Regardless of unsatisfactory electoral results, it may be clear that Frelimo and Renamo are the only parties that really matter, no other party managed to win seats in parliament.

Despite these positive developments, the transition towards a transparent democracy is still not accomplished. According to Ms. Manhiça the current political climate in Mozambique can be characterised as a 'façade democracy' since 'all means'

are used by Frelimo to stay in power (Ms. Manhiça, personal communication, December 3, 2008). Also Cramer (2006) stresses this issue. He describes Mozambique as a 'gangster democracy' where sharp inequalities throughout the country side still exist. However, generally speaking Mozambique remains one of the most obvious success cases of Africa.

In Sierra Leone, the RUF headed for its downfall after the elections of 2002. The RUF did not manage to put forward any candidates for the elections in 2007. Lack of funding and leadership problems prevented them from taking part in presidential and parliamentary elections in 2007 (P. Richards, personal communication, October 29, 2008). Jonathan Kposowa, spokesman of the RUF commented on the RUF's crisis in 2007:

We worry insofar as the elections date approaches and we have neither the time nor funds necessary to cover the costs related to the countryside. [...] We have requested the support of several financing organisation and financial backers, but it seems that nobody wants to help us, which is really frustrating. [...] The international community pushed us to disarm and join the political process, but now they gave us up. Nevertheless, we do not intend to take up arms again because we honestly chose the way of peace (African News Agency, April 30, 2007).

Since 2007 several Sierra Leonean media reports have been claiming that the RUF merged with the major political party, APC, barely five weeks before the elections (Awareness Times, July 9, 2007). Despite the failure of the RUF, the grievances on which the movement relied remain real (Richards & Vincent 2008). The specific challenge will be to implement a poverty-reducing agrarian reform in conditions where impoverished and excluded rural youth still live a daily struggle for existence.

Summary

Although post-war elections are not the end of political transitions, this chapter considers this process as a mechanism to test the capacity and commitment of new political parties in young democracies.

Due to internal and external obstacles the RUF did not succeed in drafting a serious political program and campaigning successfully throughout the country. The movement dealt with a lack of commitment and transparency and further weakened as a result of the detainment of its leader Sankoh and a large amount of RUF members. Moreover, necessary financial, technical and logistical assistance from third parties failed to appear. Consequently the domestic support for the RUF diminished enormously. Its rank and file was not reliable and many former combatants were Liberian and felt not committed to Sierra Leonean politics and domestic grievances of former RUF commanders.

In contrast to the RUF, the Mozambican Renamo developed towards a peaceful democratic organizations and a successful campaign was carried out roughly two years after the end of the war. This organisation made use of the opportunities in the Mozambican political arena, adapted internally to democratic principles and received generous support from third parties. Currently Renamo operates successfully as an opposition party in Mozambican government while the RUF merged with another political party barely five weeks before the elections in 2007.

Conclusion

Outsiders may create a climate in which democratic change can occur but they cannot ensure that such change will occur. That will depend on the political actors' behaviour in the society once the outsiders have gone (Schmidt 2008:119).

Party development plays an important role in creating stable political systems in post-conflict societies. Until the mid 1990s international interventions were mostly centred on the immediate need for peace and security while nowadays political governance is recognised as an essential component in peace-building interventions (Abrahamsen 2000; Carothers 2008). Since the end of the Cold War demilitarisation of politics has been a key issue in peace-building interventions and a debate concerning the involvement of former rebel movement into the peace process has been aroused. This thesis starts from the assumption that in order to achieve sustainable peace, a peace agreement should be all-inclusive. Excluded parties may feel ignored when they are kept out of the negotiations and this increases the risk of spoiler's behaviour and, consequently, reinitiating of conflict (De Zeeuw 2007; Rogier 2004; Söderberg 2004; Weinstein 2007). However, all-inclusiveness does not guarantee success since success stories concerning rebel-to-party transition are more exception than rule.

This thesis examines the necessary internal and external conditions for a successful rebel-to-party transformation on the basis of the Mozambican Renamo and the RUF from Sierra Leone. Renamo represents a successful political transition whereas the RUF failed to transform into a political party. Let us return to the main research question as outlined in the introduction of this thesis: How did the process of rebel-to-party transition take shape in the cases of Renamo and RUF and what internal and external factors explain the differences between these two cases?

There is no blueprint for rebel movements how to successfully transform but there are elements that depict whether these organisations are likely to transform into political parties. These factors were determined in the theoretical framework and were applied to the cases in the following chapters. Significant elements that influence the political transitions are the type of the rebel movements, the political context in the region, the commitment of the rebels to transform and the degree of domestic and

international legitimacy. There is however a high degree of interconnectedness between these elements. This will become clear in the following analysis of the impact of the four different indicators on Renamo's and the RUF's political transition.

Firstly, concerning the type of rebellion several studies demonstrated that reform movements are more likely to transform into political parties than warlord insurgents since they are more able to change their military goals into political ones (De Zeeuw 2008). Renamo, a politically-oriented organisation transformed successfully into a political party, this in contrast to the RUF which is in many studies characterised as an extreme violent resistance movement.

However, this explanation concerning the different outcomes is too superficial. Rebel movements are dynamic constructs and thus difficult to fit in an analytic framework. In the cases of Renamo and the RUF important nuances need to be stated. In contrast to Abdullah (1998), Meredith (2005) and Montague (2002) I argue that the RUF was not a purely militaristic organisation based on greed for natural resources. This movement did have political statements (Peters 2006; Richards and Vincent 2008). As Renamo is concerned, this movement was based on political ideology but it did not shun the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians (Manning 2008). These cases illustrate that rebel movements are rarely entirely political or militaristic. The type of rebellion is therefore important but not a comprehensive explanation.

Secondly, regional actors might also play an important role in a post-conflict democratisation process. Societies do not live in isolation and the prospects of democracy can be significantly affected by the relationship with and interference of regional actors (Schmidt 2008). The presence of resources and sponsoring of regional actors may hinder the rebel-to-party transformation if gaining from these revenues is more likely to benefit the movement than political power in a legitimate government (Humphreys 2005). In Sierra Leone, regional interests on diamond revenues complicated the peace process and the political transition of the RUF.

Rebels' commitment and domestic and the acquirement of legitimacy are the third and fourth indicators. In order to achieve enduring democracy all parties involved need to be convinced of the importance of the rebel-to-party transitions (Schmidt 2008). Mutual recognition of all actors is a crucial concept of this process; when rebels show their commitment to the peace agreement they will be more likely treated as legitimate

partners and when the international and domestic actors treat rebels as legitimate partners rebels tend to be more committed. In this perspective the relation between rebel movements and domestic and international actors involved in the peace negotiations is based upon reciprocity; a mutual dependency in an exchange of supportive attitudes towards rebel-to-party transitions (Mauss 1990). Principally the commitment of both movements and the acquirement of legitimacy determine largely the actual outcome of the transition processes. Without commitment of rebel movements themselves a political transition would be impossible (Schmidt 2008; Söderberg 2004).

Consequently a more general question arises; can outsiders bring democracy in post-settlement societies? International interventions can facilitate favourable conditions for political transitions of former rebels however the commitment of all parties involved is necessary in order to complete the transformation successfully. So far, little has been examined concerning this complex and relative new process. In order to create a comprehensive study on rebel-to-party transitions further research should more focus on the rebel movements themselves. Their perspective is missing in most of the literature. Moreover, further research needs to be conducted in order to find out whether the elements which influenced the political transitions of Renamo and the RUF are applicable in other post-conflict countries.

Rebel-to-party transitions are currently a central element in peace-building interventions and thus need much more attention. A holistic perspective must be adopted with a focus on the local context since top-down approaches had proved to be ineffective (Diamond 2006; Fanthorpe 2005; Kaldor 2001). Therefore, proper research and realistic goals and must be devised before stimulating the rebel-to-party transitions in post-settlement societies. A context approach like adopted in Mozambique is preferable. Besides concentrating on the political arena, also the potential voters were involved in 'voter educational programs' (Manning 2008). These recommendations need to be adopted in future research and post-war interventions in order to improve the transformation outcomes. A profound understanding of all parties involved, including the rebel movements themselves, and formulation of realistic goals concerning the dynamics of the transition process will contribute to enduring outcomes.

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Source: CIA The World Factbook 2009



Source: CIA The World Factbook 2009

Appendix III

Elections Results Mozambique and Sierra Leone¹⁴

A. Mozambique: results of parliamentary and presidential elections, 1994 - 2004

	Vote Share (%)		
	1994	1999	2004
Frelimo			
Parliamentary election	44.3	48.5	62.0
Presidential election, candidate J. A. Chissano	53.3	52.2	n/a
Presidential election, candidate A. E. Guebuza	n/a	n/a	63.7
Renamo			
Parliamentary election	37.8	38.8	29.7
Presidential election, candidate A. M. M. Dhlakama	33.7	47.7	31.7

Source: Mozambique National Elections Commission in Manning 2008

Note: n/a = not applicable

B. Sierra Leone: results of parliamentary and presidential elections, 2002 -2007

	Vote Share (%)	
	2002	2007
SLPP		
Parliamentary election	67.6	39.54
Presidential election, candidate A. T. Kabbah	70.06	n/a
Presidential election, candidate S. E. Berewa	n/a	38.28
APC		
Parliamentary election	21.4	40.73
Presidential election, candidate E. B. Koroma	22.35	44.34
PMDC		
Parliamentary election	n/a	15.39
Presidential election, candidate C. Margai	n/a	13.89
PLP		
Parliamentary election	3.6	0.38
Presidential election, candidate J. P. Koroma	3.00	n/a
Presidential election, candidate K. B. Conteh	n/a	0.57
RUFPP		
Parliamentary election	2.1	n/a
Presidential election, candidate A. P. Bangura	1.73	n/a

Source: Kande 2003 and National Electoral Commission 2007

Note: n/a = not applicable

¹⁴ Only the results of the largest parties are included