SSR and Gender within the Dutch Fragile States Policy: a Burundian Example?

Charlotte Capello

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Charlotte Capello
s0228184

This thesis was presented to the faculty of Human Geography for the degree of Master of Science in the Master specialization 'Conflicts, Territories, and Identities'.

Thesis supervisor: Dr. Ir. G. van der Haar
Second Reader: Prof. Dr. Ir. J.J.C. Voorhoeve

Radboud University Nijmegen
August 2009

The picture on the front page was taken during my research in Burundi. It shows a community meeting which discussed the security situation of the people living in this village; mainly widows and children since it was heavily affected by the civil war.

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Introduction

> "It is a great pleasure for me to address you today on the challenges of engagement in fragile states. […] In these states, conflict, corruption or weak capacity has eaten away at governments' capacity to carry out the main tasks that their citizens expect from them. […] Today, international security is far more threatened by weak states and the shadowy structures that seek their home within them. Since the end of the Cold War, the vast majority of international crises have been triggered by states that are unable and sometimes unwilling to uphold the rule of law. State failure in places like Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti and Afghanistan not only caused unspeakable human suffering at home, but also compromised the international order through international terrorism, regional wars and the mass exodus of refugees. Human rights and the international order are one reason why fragile states should top the world's agenda. International development is another. […] And when development fails to take off, the seeds of war can germinate." (Speech by Bert Koenders, 2007a)

With these words, Bert Koenders (the Dutch Minister of Development Cooperation) started his speech on the importance of engagement in fragile states. This, almost horror-like image of 'shadowy structures' and 'seeds of war', illustrates that with an increasing worldwide interdependence, the link between security and development becomes more and more important in Dutch politics and policies. Following on a lively international debate on how to assist the most vulnerable nations, together with national efforts to integrate this subject into policy making, a national policy on fragile states is emerging. The final policy paper on the Dutch strategy ~which should have been completed at the end of 2007~ appeared a year later than planned (in November 2008). How come it took so long? Perhaps this is due to the various complexities of each given fragile state, such as violence, bad governance, corruption, terrorism and low levels of economic development; what resulted in many different policies regarding each problem and thus many different donor agendas. (Van der Borgh, 2008) There seems to be no consensus on what the key problem is. Regardless of this lack of consensus, donor agendas to support fragile states do exist. As the persuasiveness for engagement in fragile states in speeches like the one above demonstrates, efforts to stabilize fragile states are widely encouraged. This triggered me to find out more about these fragile states policies; and within this broad theme I will mainly concentrate on security and SSR (security sector reform) and how they are addressed in fragile states policy.

Policy discourses

Researchers often mention two difficulties concerning fragile states programming: the term 'fragile state' being a container concept and that policies directed at them need a context-dependent approach. First, let me describe why the vagueness of the concept is considered problematic. Van der Borgh (2008) defines a fragile state as *"a country where there is overt or latent insecurity and/or bad governance, and low levels of social and economic development"*. But when exactly is insecurity overt or latent, governance good or bad, and how to measure all this? Without a clear notion of fragility, designing policies to support fragile states is difficult; which is why the vagueness is considered a problem. Although there is no consensus on how to define and measure state fragility, most researchers do agree that the functionality of the state lies at the heart of the fragility or stability of a given state. (Van der Borgh, 2008; Di John, 2008; Kets, 2008) International donors consider fragile states a security risk for everyone and not just for their own population, and therefore put their efforts in stabilizing them. (Kets, 2008; Van der Borgh, 2008; Duffield, 2007; Hout, 2009) It is the combination of a diverse nature of fragile states' problems, the difficulty to diagnose state fragility, the nature of its violence and governance that calls for a different policy for each problem. The real problem is thus much bigger than how to conceptualize a fragile state; instead, the main challenge is how to design policies directed at fragile states that take into account the real needs of the people; and are thus based on the specific context and issues of a particular state.

This context-dependency is the second difficulty I want to put forward. Since every state has its particular problems policies should follow a comprehensive approach to identify these issues, so it can seize on what the priorities are and where to start in practice. This second difficulty is more important to overcome than the vagueness of the concept; because responding to the real needs and priorities of the people should be starting point, not how to develop a normative notion of what a state should look like. I believe that within fragile states programming, the security of the fragile states' citizens is most important. This is a basic need without which other (such as development and economic) efforts will not be sustainable.

Donors base their agenda on the idea that *"strengthening weak states contributes to local stability […], as well as international security"*, which shows that security can be seen as both a means and a goal. (Chandler, 2007; Van der Borgh, 2008) This explains why strengthening states, or state-building, is on top of the many agendas. According to this idea, the government should provide security, and the risk of violence (also on the international level) will be higher when a government is not doing so, for instance when it does not have

the monopoly on violence. There are even scholars that rank security on the highest position in the hierarchy of positive state functions. (Di John, 2008) To stabilize a states' security situation, and prevent ~to continue in Koenders' style~ its contagious effects, it is considered important to strengthen government institutions like the security sector. This can be done by strengthening the three most important state security institutions: the police, army and justice sector. This security sector reform (SSR) ~or security sector development (SSD) in case of no existing or functioning security sector at all~ plays a significant role in donors' fragile states agendas. However, the state security institutions are often the violator in fragile states. (Woodward, 2005) Therefore, I believe it would be interesting to find out how security and SSR are addressed in fragile states policies. To further explain the role of international SSR support in fragile states I will use a case of one of the nine fragile states the Dutch are working with: Burundi.

Burundi is an interesting case for multiple reasons when it comes to fragility. For instance, according to the Failed States Index the majority of failed states are African. (The Fund for Peace, 2008) Therefore, an evaluation of a fragile states policy in an African country might give useful insights into the nature of fragility and perhaps it will show possible solutions. Moreover, the Dutch consider their efforts in Burundi as a pilot-case for their newly promoted comprehensive approach. (Koenders, 2007b) Within their cooperation, the Dutch efforts in Burundi are mainly concentrated on SSR. (Koenders, 2008) Considering the emphasis put on SSR in the fragile states literature and policy, it would be interesting to find out how this Dutch SSR policy in Burundi is realized. Therefore, the central goal of my research is to contribute insights on how policies to support fragile states address security issues and SSR. Consequently, by showing the reality of the Dutch Fragile States Policy in the context of Burundi, I hope to add to the discussion on policy discourses which choices, priorities or possible improvements can be made in future policy making.

SSR and gender

As I described earlier, the context of a fragile state is important for designing a fragile states policy. When talking about fragility and SSR in Burundi it is thus important to know the nature of its fragility, who are the most vulnerable people in this country and why its security sector needs improvement. Since the war in Burundi has ended,[1] violence against women increased, especially sexual violence: a shocking nineteen percent of the Burundian women

[1] For a further explanation, see Chapter 3.

have been victims of sexual violence. (ICTJ, 2008) Instead of protecting the population, the security sector (especially the police) is involved in much of the sexual violence against women. Although the rates of sexual violence committed by the police are declining, civilians still consider the police responsible for a large amount of these violations. (Nindorera, 2007) Furthermore, sexual violence committed by civilians is increasing, which means that the police are not able to protect women against these violations. In addition to sexual violence, women are also culturally subordinated to men; in both their private and professional lives. Fragility and vulnerability in Burundi thus involves less security for women.

This is a key problem, because the well-being of women has major implications for the development of their country. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007) Their social impact on the community can not be overlooked; especially in times of conflict when men are not around and women become breadwinners and role models. To make sure that the state takes on the responsibility to protect its population (which, according to Di John (2008), in the opposite way is one of the characteristics of a fragile state) and thus specifically women, in order that women can provide a contribution to the development of their country; I argue that gender, and especially the protection of women, should play a bigger role in the Dutch Fragile States Policy. Besides, when the state itself does not take the responsibility, intervention forces should take on the Responsibility to Protect[2] ~the Netherlands endorse this agreement~ the population, to provide basic security and protection to *all* members of society, men and women. Besides, the Netherlands made claims to improve the security sector, and I wonder what exactly they did to include the Burundian gender-issue ~which is obviously related to the security sector~ and thus fulfil their intentions to improve the security sector. I therefore argue in favour for gender-sensitive SSR policies to strengthen the Dutch Fragile States Policy in Burundi, because this would show that the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs really takes Burundi's issues seriously.

Foreign Affairs does declare that it wants to integrate gender in the Fragile States Policy, which it showed by signing UN Resolution 1325 that states that gender should be mainstreamed within all sectors. However, Foreign Affairs also states that it does not know as yet how to match this with their SSR efforts. (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken et al, 2007) However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2007) did describe, in another policy paper called *"Developing the security sector: security for whom, by whom? Security sector reform and gender"*, that they are aware of the importance of gender mainstreaming, that it is important

[2] International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001.

to take account of the differences between men and women and the special attention women in conflict need, and what should be done or changed in the security sector to do so. Obviously, implementation has its difficulties, but it seems that the Dutch ~at least in theory~ see the challenge of gender-sensitive SSR policies, and I wonder if they have an idea how to address it. It would be interesting to explore how the issues of SSR and gender could be met in a gender-sensitive SSR policy, and how they are addressed in the Dutch Fragile States Policy.

Research questions

According to the goals and arguments described, my central research question is: *"How does the Dutch Fragile States Policy, in particular its SSR policy, address gender-related security issues, and how could this be improved?"* This question covers three domains: insecurity in fragile states, SSR and gender. The issue of fragile states will be approached in two different ways, a theoretical and practical one. The theoretical discussion in my thesis will deal with a sub question that focuses on the what and why of policies directed at fragile states. It actually combines several interrelated questions: *"What are fragile states, why does this definition exist and what theoretical discourses are there on policies to support fragile states?"* These theoretical questions will be followed by a more practical way of looking at fragile states, namely at the nature of the Dutch Fragile States Policy. The following sub questions will be discussed: *"What are the central points of the Dutch Fragile States Policy?"* and *"What fragile states discourse(s) does the Dutch Fragile States Policy follow?"*. Both sections concern the security theme in general and the SSR theme more specifically, respectively I would like to know: *"How do security and SSR play a role in the theoretical fragile states discussion?"* and *"How does the Fragile States Policy address security and SSR?"*

The second and third part of my central question, SSR and gender, are interrelated in this thesis in two ways: first, security has to do with vulnerability, and women are considered the most vulnerable in many conflict situations; (Hoogensen & Stuvøy, 2006) and secondly, in the case of Burundi women are victims of the security sector, and the Dutch intent on mainstreaming gender in their SSR efforts to find a way to protect the entire population. Again, a theoretical and more practical analysis will come up. As for the theoretical part: *"How do theoretical discussions regarding (human) security and SSR address gender?"* and *"What is UN Resolution 1325 and how can this resolution contribute to a better security of women (in Burundi)?"*. As for the practical analysis: *"What is the role of gender in the Dutch SSR efforts in the field?"*, *"Why does the Burundian security sector needs to be reformed and*

how?", *"How do the Dutch try to realize gender-sensitive SSR policies in Burundi?"* and *"How could the creation of a greater (political) basis for gender-sensitive SSR policies be part of the Dutch Fragile States Policy in Burundi?"*.

Methods and reflection

In this research I used different methods in data collection. The 'practical' or case part is based on about twenty expert interviews I conducted in Burundi and The Netherlands. In The Netherlands these experts concerned Oxfam Novib regional experts and regional and fragile states experts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Since I did an internship for Oxfam Novib, they provided me with these contacts. As for Burundi, I got the opportunity to go there by joining Eveline Rooijmans, a lobbyist for Oxfam Novib, on a work trip in July and August 2008. This trip gave me the chance to use different sources of data and different methods of data collection.

First, by travelling with a lobbyist from a donor organization I had the chance to see how such an organization works in a fragile state like Burundi. Joining meetings with her and people from all kind of partner- and government institutions, gave me useful insights in the way international organizations work with each other, with their local partners and with foreign governments. Next to a lively image of different sections of the Burundian society, it also gave me an idea how international development cooperation works in practice. I am aware that donor organizations are not the ones that implement the Fragile States Policy I am studying, but joining them did provide me with rich information on this subject. Namely, these organizations have an important advising role towards the government and its policies. This counts for both the Dutch as the Burundian government, since NGO's have a lot of know-how of both the local conditions as of the international relations and work ethics, and they see ~through Burundian partners~ more of the needs on the ground and the effects of policy.

Secondly, I conducted my own research on SSR and gender in Burundi. By doing so I could prevent that the information I got would not be through Oxfam Novib eyes only. Due to a tight planning, this research focused on one aspect of insecurity in fragile states, SSR and gender, with special attention to what is already happening regarding these themes, what the Dutch efforts are and what they could do to integrate gender more into their SSR efforts in Burundi. The choice for this topic seemed advantageous for both Oxfam Novib and me: since the beginning of my masters I wanted the theme of my thesis should be a topical issue, so it might be of use to an organization or government policy. Plus, Oxfam Novib planned on

lobby and advocacy to promote gender-sensitive SSR policies in Burundian and international efforts to improve the Burundian security situation, so I hope to contribute to their work. SSR and gender thus match with my aim to do a relevant research with a practical approach, and within the context of the fragile states debate.

During this research I conducted about twenty interviews with representatives of the Burundian National Police, Burundian and international human rights organizations and NGO's, SSR advisors sent abroad by the Dutch government, representatives of the Dutch Embassy, of BINUB and UNIFEM, and victims of sexual violence. I contacted most of these experts via the Oxfam Novib lobbyist or via partner organizations, and I found new contacts via snowball sampling during the expert interviews. The interviews themselves can be described as semi-structured interviews. This type of interviewing makes use of an interview guide that should be finished in a certain order. (Bernard, 2002) To do this, I used a topic list and put down notes not to lose track.

For those interviews conducted in French I used an interpreter, because my fluency in French is not that good. Afterwards, this seemed very useful because Burundian French was even harder to understand. Besides, the interpreter helped me formulating questions on sensitive issues (for instance on sexual violence when interviewing a victim), which would have been difficult on my own because I did not know the cultural norms regarding these issues. However, it took some more time and when interviewing more provincial Burundians the interpreter had the tension to shift to the local language which I did not understand at all. This made it hard to interrupt at times she went in the wrong direction with translating my question, plus if I had the idea she gave a simplified translation, I could not find out if she really did.

The interviews in Burundi also brought in some useful articles and references to literature for this thesis. Most of these contain data on SSR and gender in Burundi, in the form of policy papers, project proposals or evaluations done by international organizations. They appeared to be most useful to analyse policies, to find out how they take shape and as background information on the Burundian context and international donor assistance. However, the main source of data I use in this research will be scientific literature. A combination of a document-based research and a secondary literature research seemed most suitable.

Organization of the thesis

This thesis contains of four chapters in which I present both a review of the literature and policy analyses as the research data of the interviews I conducted. Chapter 1 is the theoretical framework in which I discuss the different fragile states discourses, the role of SSR and gender in this policy and the implications these discourses have for policy making. Further, I examine the nature of the Dutch Fragile States Policy in Chapter 2, compared to the discourses described in Chapter 1. In Chapter 3 I focus on the context in which this policy is implemented, by analyzing the Burundian security issues. I indicate the role of gender in Burundian security problems and continue on this topic in Chapter 4 by looking at what measures the Dutch (via bilateral and multilateral efforts) actually take in favor of gender-sensitive SSR policies in Burundi. For answering my central research question I will bring all sub questions dealt with in the previous chapters together by showing how the Dutch Fragile States Policy addresses security and gender in the context of Burundi. In this way I will show how the choices and dilemmas have influenced the process of implementing security policies in fragile states. By linking the Dutch SSR efforts in the Burundian context to the theoretical analysis, I propose some recommendations in the final concluding chapter by considering how the Dutch might realize its Fragile States Policy differently concerning SSR and gender.

Chapter 1. Security in Fragile States

§1.1 Fragile states discourse

As I made clear in the Introduction, the term 'fragile states' involves many different definitions and issues. This variety has led to many academic discussions concerning the concept, but also regarding its policy implications. In this chapter I will discuss some of the most dominant discourses within the broad spectrum of fragile states thinking. These include the concept of the state and its functions, the different policy areas within fragile states efforts and how they interrelate, and the security imperative of intervention in fragile states.

The state and its functions

Even though there is no consensus on the definition of fragility, most researchers do agree that fragility is mainly depending on the functionality of the state. An example of an (by donors) often used definition that addresses the functionality of the state is that of the OECD/DAC (2007a: 2): *"States are fragile where state structures lack political will and/or capacity to provide the basic functions needed for poverty reduction, development and to safeguard the security and human rights of their populations."* This definition includes multiple facets ~and weaknesses which I will discuss later~, but state functionality is clearly considered vital in defining state fragility. Therefore it is important to have a deeper understanding of what a state exactly is or should do. After all, the definitions of state fragility depend on the different definitions of statehood.

In that case, what is this statehood? Historically, state formation is a violent process, in which states shape their institutional structure and compete over power in the international system. Statehood was thus seen in relation to other international actors. In continuation of this process, states are usually perceived to function after the example of the classic Weberian model in which the state has the legitimate use of force in a given territory (Peace, Security and Development Network, 2009: 6); and as sovereign actors that have to perform certain functions to protect its citizens and take care of their well-being (Di John, 2008). With regard to these functions, both Di John (2008) and Milliken and Krause (2002) describe similar core functions a state has to perform. Namely, statehood: a) requires recognition, provide legitimate representation and a state should be treated as an equal by other states, b) comes with the principle of a monopoly over the use of force, and c) involves a social contract between the state and its citizens, in which citizens give up some of their freedom in exchange

for security, basic services and welfare. If states fail to meet these functions, they can be described as fragile.

However, concerning the conceptualization of states that fail to meet these functions, 'fragile' state is not the only label put on them. 'Failed' is often used as well, for instance one could think of the Failed States Index. But this notion does not immediately mean that a state has failed in the sense of a complete breakdown. According to Di John (2008) the term failure is inappropriate, since *"it implies an end state in which the failure arrives in final form."* He states that fail*ing* would be better; which suggests a *process* of failing and allows for a wide range of degrees of failing. Consequently, he describes three categories: fragile states, crisis states and failed states; which can be considered a framework to assess state effectiveness along a continuum. Personally, I prefer to use the term fragility; because Di John's continuum implies that the direction can only go downwards and my research concerns policies for that very reason to support fragile states to become more stable. After all, Di John considers a stable state the opposite of a fragile state, one that is able to withstand internal and external shocks.

The OECD/DAC (2008: 18) calls this ability to cope with change, without breaking the social contract, resilience. It rather focuses on resilience instead of stability as the opposite of fragility, because resilience refers to a broader range of political processes surrounding the social contract; which gives a better image of the issues at stake. (Hout, 2009: 4-5) Accordingly, the OECD concludes that fragility *"for the most part occurs in the absence or insufficiency of political processes for managing changes in the state-society contract"*. Security, which can thus be considered as coping with change, seems to be a key state function; and the state seems to be the sole actor in providing this security, as the monopoly on violence in Di John's and Milliken and Krause's ~Weberian~ state functions implies. The social contract makes this monopoly legitimate, but only in exchange for providing services; which is similar to what the OECD concludes. Although a state monopoly on violence and a social contract between the state and its citizens seem to make sense to a Western citizen, they are not as self-evident at all. Many researchers question why the state should have the monopoly on violence, and why it should be the sole service provider of security and other basic needs. To understand these discussions, a better understanding of the origins of this normative concept of the state is needed.

Milliken and Krause (2002: 4) explain that the role of the state as a security provider is created by both *"an unplanned process by which state elites offer security in return for extraction"*, and *"in this process of social contracting individuals give up their freedoms to*

live in a civil order that guarantees security". A social contract between the state (elite) and the civilians thus means that both actors have commitments towards each other in order to receive what is promised (security or extractions). When states are not able to live up to these promises, signs of fragility can become clear in the form of a challenge to the monopoly of violence, the state's inability or unwillingness to use force when necessary, or a too early resort to force because the state has no other means of enforcement. (Woodward, 2005: 2) According to this idea, a monopoly on violence is considered a critical function of the Weberian state; losing this monopoly means that the social contract between the state and its citizens is broken and its 'statehood' therefore becomes fragile. In this view the state is seen as the only solution to maintain political order.

This idea is challenged often in the academic fragile states debate. Namely, in many African countries (or fragile states in general), the form of political organization differs from the Weberian notion of statehood. (Milliken & Krause, 2005: 11-12) Especially when territories are controlled by militias or warlords, the Weberian definition can be problematic. (Peace, Security and Development Network, 2009: 6) Verheijen (2009), in her paper on monopolies on violence in Sub-Saharan Africa, describes that many states never had a monopoly on violence. The state is often not the provider of security, and traditionally even a source of insecurity. Verheijen explains this 'tradition' by opposing the Weberian state to the most common political order in Sub-Saharan Africa; neo-patrimonialism. A patrimonial system can be characterized by patronage networks and an unclear division between public and private social orders. The legitimacy of this system depends on reciprocity: *"the exchange of goods and services and the recognition of mutual responsibilities and dependencies between the ruled and dominated"*. (2009:1) This may sound like a social contract between the state and its citizens, but the 'ruled and dominated' do not necessarily, and most probably, have to be these two actors. Instead, these relations are between patrons and clients, whose mutual responsibilities are formalized in cultural rules instead of law, but they do co-exist with institutions that are. Accordingly, the state is not the only provider of security and goods. Legitimacy of both the formal and informal institutions is thus not based on the Weberian state functions, but on the services and resources that can be obtained via patron-client relationships. I will describe the consequences of this system for fragile states and their security situation in §1.4.

Irrespective of a different political order in most African fragile states, many policy efforts in Africa are still developed around this 'Western' notion of the state as being the provider of certain functions as security and wealth. I will discuss these focal points in fragile

states policies, and the normative concept of the state on which these policies are based, in the following segment.

§1.2 The relation between state-building, security and development

Definitions of fragile states emphasize the inadequate functioning of the state as the main cause of state fragility. Therefore policy remedies mainly focus on state-building to improve the security situation. (Van der Borgh, 2008) Ghani and Lockhart's (2008) ideas on how to 'fix' fragile states, demonstrate how state-building is addressed in fragile states policy programming. In their book *'Fixing Failed States'* they argue in favor of a strong, legitimate government that has a strong social contract with its citizens and the international community. They build this argument by describing ten state functions (such as ~re-creating~ a constitutional state, a monopoly on violence, investing in human capital and a liberal market economy) that a fragile state needs to perform to improve their overall security situation which will help regaining the trust of its citizens. This will eventually lead to a so-called "sovereignty dividend". This sovereignty dividend can only be achieved when all ten state functions are performed simultaneously. When one or more functions will not be performed effectively, a vicious circle of distrust and illegitimacy emerges; the so-called "sovereignty gap".

Obviously, the state's functions are based on the Weberian model of the state, and state-building is seen as a key solution to fragility. But as part of the social contract, the Weberian state is supposed to provide security and development as well; otherwise the "sovereignty gap" will emerge. The question is what are the consequences of this model of the state for fragile states policies? When it comes to *policy-programming*, policy efforts ~when following Ghani & Lockhart's argument~ need to focus on the whole of state functions to prevent a sovereignty gap. This argument can be considered one of the many theories that explain why policy efforts should focus on the whole of government. Although the specific state functions in such discussions differ in name and number, it seems to have resulted in a comprehensive approach in fragile states programming that considers security, state-building and development equally important fields of focus.

Even though security, state-building and development are considered as interconnected policy areas, the correlation between them is unclear. As Chandler (2007: 366) describes, there is little empirical evidence of a causal relation between these fields. Despite this fact, the relation is considered real to policy makers. As a result, the international community planned to increase the coordination, coherence and consistency of its

interventions, so all different communities connected to these policy areas (each with its own ideas and working methods) such as the humanitarian, human rights, development and security community, harmonize with each other and create policy coherence. To improve the effectiveness of their efforts, governments increasingly pursue such a comprehensive or 'whole of government' approach. (Peace, Security and Development Commission, 2009: 12) A similar approach is the so-called 3-D approach, which combines defence, diplomacy and development approaches. (Van der Borgh, 2008) Although such strategies seem useful for enhancing aid efficiency, they do have downsides. Rombouts (in: Peace, Security and Development Commission, 2009: 13) for instance, criticizes these approaches for existing more in theory than in practice, since *"most donors don't even have a coherent set of principles within their own development agencies"*. Their own interests often come first.

Moreover, the *idea* of a comprehensive framework that covers the domains of security, state-building and development, is based on certain Western values as the Weberian state that do not correspond to the actual priorities in fragile states. Considering that fragile states' governments are fragile for that very reason that they do not function properly, is the comprehensive framework with its dominant state-building approach not too state-centred? Or does a fragile state need just that to regain order? According to Woodward (2005: 4) states require financial health to create a stable environment. The institutions to regulate the economy do not necessarily have to be state institutions, but to secure this economy (e.g. property rights), state institutions *are* needed. Accordingly, Woodward concludes that states are necessary to security (and development). This view is similar to sociologist Etzioni's principle of 'Security First'. (In: van Middelkoop, 2008: 576) According to this principle, security is a prerequisite to development. A state is necessary to this security, so the state is a prerequisite (via the provision of security) to development. As said by Hout (2009: 1), the 'securitisation of development' has become a trend in the fragile states debate, which is preoccupied with creating conditions for stability. In §1.3 I will further elaborate on this idea. However, this theory does not explain why the state should be the necessary provider of this security. Probably, this state-centred approach of security (sector reform) is ~again~ reducible to the classic Weberian model, in which the state should have the monopoly over the means of violence. Collier's work (2002 and 2003) is also based on this principle, which he refers to as the 'conflict trap'. Conflict is considered negative development because it blocks economic progress, which causes grievances that result in renewed conflict. Collier therefore sees SSR missions as 'technical assistance' to get development starting again.

What these theories forget to mention, is that the state often is the primary source of violence. Frequently, there is widespread violence and looting by the state against its own citizens when the state becomes less able to guarantee security and is thus not respecting the social contract with its citizens. (Milliken & Krause, 2002: 16) But what are the consequences of using the comprehensive framework based on the Weberian state for the *implementation* of policy in fragile states? Despite the often violent role of the state, security efforts via the state still play an important role in fragile states efforts. Many efforts are put in strengthening government institutions that deal with security, like the army, police and the rule of law. Milliken and Krause (2002: 4) explain why these state-building efforts focus on the security sector by stating that *"institutions of organized violence have always ultimately been made to serve political interests, and thus to run with the state-making process, rather than undermining it"*. Again, it seems that the Weberian notion of the state has influenced the implementation of fragile states policies as well.

According to Woodward (2005) donors cannot just implement a certain policy framework, or a combination of several ~to the donor important~ fields of focus, in a certain context, particularly not in fragile states where there is such a diversity of issues per country. She believes that a proper research on the nature of a specific conflict or issue is needed *before* a policy can be developed and implemented. Woodward explains that it is usually the other way around; policy programs are often conceived as a blue-print that can be implemented in any context, not considering whether this policy is developed for that specific context. Consequently, the real needs of the fragile state's citizens might be ignored. This might especially be true when policy programs consider state-building, and thus the state, as the way to improve the overall situation of the population as well. The idea that the state serves its citizens is part of the Weberian notion of the state, so this idea might very well *not* suit fragile states' reality and can thus not be used just like that in developing new policies.

Woodward's critique that policies are not based on the reality in practice and therefore unimplementable corresponds partly to the reality of policy making. But even though it seems unimplementable, it is not. As Mosse (2004: 663) states, policy discourse is about *"mobilizing metaphors, whose vagueness and lack of conceptual precision is required to conceal ideological differences, to allow compromise and the enrolment of different interests, to build coalitions, to distribute agency and multiply criteria of success within project systems"*. Accordingly, ~what Mosse refers to as~ 'good policy' that legitimizes and mobilizes political support, is difficult to implement in practice. However, difficult does not mean impossible; Mosse explains that policy is supposed to be a compromising text, and the relation between

the different dimensions is *supposed* to be unclear in such a text. After agreeing with the policy ~when every party concerned identified its own interests in it~ the relation between the different elements will be negotiated in every situation in which the policy will be implemented. Besides, development actors also need to legitimize their work, so it is in their interest to *"conceal their own institutional practice"* behind policy models. In sum, policy does not only produce practice, but practice also produces policy; they are both social constructs that need each other to be sustainable. And with regard to its consequences for implementation: the policy on the ground will thus be developed on the ground, by the different parties involved in implementing the policy. In this way the policy program will adapt itself to every context and is thus not a framework that needs to be applied everywhere, regardless of the different situations on the ground.

§1.3 The security imperative

Since fragility is not something to be proud of, no government will probably label itself being a fragile state. Van der Borgh (2008: 1) therefore considers the term fragile state *"a typical 'donor label' that is not always appreciated by the countries to which it is applied"*. But why would donors 'invent' such a label and be willing to intervene and put funding into such a risky environment? Here the security imperative turns up. As I have described in the introduction, fragile states are considered a global security threat. According to Duffield (2007: 162), fragile states are considered a threat via the effects of their poverty on Western interests, such as global terrorist and criminal networks, refugee flows and asylum seekers. Fragile states policies therefore focus on effective development to prevent these effects and safeguard their interests. The increasing integration of security and development programmes in policy interventions is called the security-development nexus, and is often used as a motive for intervention. (Chandler, 2007) Cammack (in: Hout, 2009: 3-4) describes three types of definitions of fragility that illustrate this fear for insecurity: fragility in terms of 1) the functionality of states, where donors regard the weakness of the state as cause of crisis; 2) their outputs, where donors focus on the negative impacts at national, regional and international levels; and 3) their relationships with donors, where donors consider fragile states as difficult, unreliable partners. These definitions regard fragility mainly in relation to other states and negative implications they may bring to other ~Western~ actors; which explains why Van der Borgh (2008) considers 'fragile states' a typical donor definition. Besides, these definitions also show how fragile states are considered a global security risk and that they should therefore be strengthened, even though intervention is difficult.

Although the donor definitions of fragility can be useful in helping donors to focus on what and how they should intervene, it also raises the question if policies directed at fragile states have to be considered as sincere help or as donors pursuing their personal interests? Or, as Woodward (2005) describes it as being problematic: the security imperative brings along a negative connotation to the fragile states concept, shaped by historical events such as the US war on terror. Such events (for example the 9/11 attacks) triggered the idea that fragility can cause threats to Western interests. This changed the commitments to fragile states; donors realized that policies needed to be adjusted (for instance general budget support instead of fixed aid programmes) to encourage political commitment to poverty reduction and human security. (Peace, Security and Development Network, 2009: 5) Such changes as a result of historical reasons make critics worry whether the term is *"a pretext for intervention and, at the same time from the perspective of aid donors, the opposite - a reason for dismissal in this era of aid selectivity to support 'good governance' and to exclude those without"*. Woodward describes that the 'state failure' concept is therefore diplomatically avoided (for the same reason it is changed in 'state *fragility'*) by other international donors, to show that their assistance *is* sincere, and to avoid that their motives for intervention will be compared to the US 'excuse'.[3]

Even though international security seems to be the main reason for intervention; this does not automatically has to mean that intervention is an excuse or that it would not benefit the local population of a fragile state. The popularity of the fragile states debate also came with increasing international attention to human rights; to identify which actors are responsible for the protection of human rights. (Woodward, 2005) As I described in the Introduction, the Responsibility to Protect is especially intended for external actors to fill this responsibility-gap when the state itself is not protecting its population. People do want to stop humanitarian suffering and are hoping for development in fragile states. That this goes beyond the local populations' security and thus also prevents potential international insecurities can be seen as a means for the international system to secure its political order. (Milliken & Krause, 2002) Debates that question the motives for intervention focus mainly on donors' self-interests. However, self-interests do not necessarily have to be negative; it should also be mentioned that these interests may serve as an appealing factor for intervention and

[3] However, Woodward does not explain why aid donors would use the concept for dismissing countries that fail when it comes to good governance. I think Woodward is mixing up two different debates. The 'excuse for intervention' part relates to the negative connotation of the state failure concept, whereas the 'good governance' part seems to refer to the older debate that regards good governance as a prerequisite to development. In the fragile states debate this issue seems overtaken; good governance is not a prerequisite anymore, but still a goal.

may thus generate assistance (and financial input) into fragile states. Therefore, I believe it is more important to concentrate on what donors have to offer instead of why, and how they can contribute to fragile states (and their citizens' security). Thus, *donor* advantages should not be the point of focus, but the advantages for *fragile states* should be central. As such, the real needs of fragile states can be assessed, and donors can determine how to meet these interests.

In sum, if state institutions are the source of violence, or if they do not maintain order or provide basic services; then state-building might not be the first solution to think of. Perhaps states are not necessary to order and security and maybe there are other structures that *are* able to provide it. In any case, and here I do agree with Woodward, the focus should be less on imposing policy templates and more on what goals should be accomplished. In §1.5 I will discuss alternative approaches to the dominant focus on the state in providing security, but first I will explain the dominant security discourses and security challenges in fragile states policy programming.

§1.4 Understanding security in fragile states

As I just briefly mentioned, interventions in fragile states are not just the result of self-interests, but for a large part to actually improve the security of fragile states' citizens. The Responsibility to Protect is one of the outcomes of this idea, which is the result of a relatively new concept in development programming: human security. According to the Commission on Human Security (2003), human security involves a shift in the focus of security challenges; from the state to the security of people. Since the 1990's, not just the security of territorial borders or of governments, but rather human security became the norm for ensuring civilian security. The term human security was first used in 1994 by the UNDP and defined as *"the ability to pursue a wide range of choices in a safe environment (encompassing seven dimensions of security: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political)"*. (Boyd, 2005: 115) This 'pursuit of choices' is defined more clearly by the Commission on Human Security, that considers human security as connecting three types of freedom: 1) freedom from want, 2) freedom from fear, and 3) freedom to take action on one's own behalf. (2003: 10) This can be done via two strategies, protection and empowerment, which are considered mutually reinforcing. These strategies focus not only on the physical safety of people, but also on how people can secure and hold basic goods. (Gasper, 2005: 222)

Since human security has a people-centred focus on security it also addresses insecurities that are not considered state security threats. As Gasper (2005: 224) explains: *"only when based on the security of people, state security makes sense"*. Human rights

~*"rights that apply for every person because he/she is a human; with the principal aim to make people aware of what is wrong"* (Gasper, 2005: 231)~ and democratic principles are key in human security; concepts that donors often mention as priority goals of intervention. (Commission on Human Security, 2003) In sum, the human security discourse (with all its nuances of what the concept should or should not address, but which I will not discuss in my research) can be considered a way to get priorities in international policy making; a focus on basic *human* needs, security of the 'ordinary' people.

To improve civilian protection, the Commission on Human Security (2003) believes that both the norms as the mechanisms to protect civilians should be strengthened. This requires special attention to the protection of the most vulnerable, particularly women. However, as Hoogensen and Stuvøy (2006) argue, gender analysis shows that security concepts ~including the human security concept~ often do not address the security needs of the most vulnerable people. Especially the security needs of women are often overlooked in such mechanisms. In (post)conflict societies women are often the majority of the population, and moreover, victims of (sexual) gender based violence. (Boyd, 2005: 117) Still, they often have no significant role in conflict prevention or resolution and are excluded from reconstruction processes.

Obviously, gender is more than women's issues, it *"refers to the socially constructed roles and relationships between men and women"*. (Valasek, 2008) According to Valasek, a gender approach in SSR is needed because men and women have different security experiences and needs. Some forms of violence, for instance rape, are based on these differences, which is called gender based violence. The majority of victims of gender based violence are women and girls. But a gender approach is more than gender based violence; the gender concept is about (often unrecognized) relationships of power, which can inform security theory and matching interventions. By focusing on these power dynamics it will be easier to understand security and to realize that security is context-dependent. (Hoogensen & Stuvøy, 2006: 216-217)

Besides ~although I just argued that gender is about the relations between men *and* women~ policies and interventions also need to focus on women in particular. Namely, without understanding the differences between men and women in insecure environments, policy makers will develop homogeneous response strategies that do not address gender differences, and generally have the tendency to disadvantage women. (Thompson, 2006: 342-343) To include a gender approach in peace making efforts, the UN Security Council adopted

Resolution 1325.[4] It is the first resolution ever passed by the Security Council that specifically addresses the impacts of war on women, and women's contributions to conflict resolution and sustainable peace. It is important to mainstream this focus in post-conflict environments, because even when war is over violence often continues. Gender based (sexual) violence often increases after war, which I will show in Chapter 3 on the basis of Burundi.

Steenkamp (2005) explains why violence often does not decrease after peace accords. She argues that a 'culture of violence' is caused by the previous period of lasting violent conflict. This period creates a *'socially permissive environment in which violence can continue'*, even after the political conflict has ended. Several factors on national and international scales can cause and sustain a culture of violence, for instance the international proliferation of arms or divisive leaders on a national level. According to Allen (1999), to understand why this violence continues the central object of analysis should not be the violence itself, but the historical circumstances in which this endemic violence occurs. This analysis will possibly explain the causes of such violence. The focus of this historical analysis should be on the internal dynamics of 'spoils politics' of a country; the self-enriching character of the political elite which fosters corruption, ceasing to provide basic social services to the population, and ultimately, violent conflicts.

These explanations of why violence is still widespread in fragile states, corresponds to Verheijen's description of the violent character of neo-patrimonial fragile states in Sub-Saharan Africa, which I described in §1.2. Verheijen (2009) explains how the internal politics of patron-client relationships maintain an insecure environment. In these societies the state is considered a means to obtain resources, and when patrons are not able to provide these through the state they are sought via informal ways, often contributing to insecurity. Accordingly, this insecurity increases the need for people to find the protection of a patron, which in turn stimulates the patrons to use state resources for enabling protection and what undermines their 'legitimacy' of being state actors. This *"cycle of insecurity, protection and patronage […] reproduces the neo-patrimonial order"* as Erdmann and Engel conclude. (In: Verheijen, 2009: 3) Thus, those with state authority gain from insecurity. At the same time, patrons benefit from these state actors' behaviour, and will be asked by clients to provide security against these state actors. Both kinds of power holders thus benefit from insecurity, and thus from maintaining endemic violence; exactly as Allen claims.

[4] For the full text of this resolution, see http://www.peacewomen.org/un/sc/res1325.pdf

Besides, when these patrons have access to resources and use these for exchange in patron-client relationships, they can be considered legitimate to clients. Legitimate security should thus not necessarily be provided by state-actors, as the Weberian notion of the state claims. Also, since the main function of the state is to maintain insecurity via patronage networks, there are no incentives for establishing a monopoly on violence. (Verheijen, 2009: 5-6) In sum, in societies that are branded by endemic violence, insecurity affects all layers of the population. Accordingly, many people suffer *and* benefit from insecurity. This has resulted in an organizational network in which various actors, both state and non-state, maintain and provide security. In the next section I will elaborate on the diversity of security actors and how they relate to different approaches to SSR.

§1.5 Approaches to SSR

The principles of human security and the Responsibility to Protect, resulted in the general notion that public safety is a main priority; and if states do not provide this themselves, intervention forces should provide basic security to all members of these societies in the immediate term. (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001: 13) In the long term, this responsibility should be devolved to national actors and become locally owned. SSR can be seen as an important element of this transfer of responsibility. SSR thus needs both external support and local ownership, to make the social contract between the state and its citizens work again. But of what exactly should SSR be comprised to do so?

There is no consensus on the definition of SSR, but there is some convergence on the OECD/DAC definition: *"Security Sector Reform means the transformation of the 'security system' – which includes all actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions – working together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework."* (In: Valasek, 2008: 11) With *'all actors'* of the security system, the OECD means core security actors (civil authorities, the population and security personnel), management and oversight bodies, justice and the rule of law mechanisms, and non-state security forces. It believes that SSR programming should involve all these parties in order to empower national actors to address their particular priorities and needs.

By including different security actors, this definition does acknowledge that the state is not the sole provider of security. Although the OECD does not describe to what degree non-state security actors should be involved in SSR efforts, this definition seems to be based less on the Weberian notion of the state as the OECD's definition on fragile states (which I

described in §1.1). Many fragile states definitions consider a state monopoly on violence the only way to maintain order, irrespective of criticism concerning the state-centredness. To focus more on the principles of human security, I will compare the 'classic' state-centred SSR approach to the possibilities of alternative, more people-centred approaches to SSR.

A state or people-centred SSR approach?

According to the Dutch Minister of Defence Van Middelkoop (2008) ~who confirms with Collier's idea of SSR as technical assistance~ the goal of SSR is to put the security sector under political and democratic control of the state. He praises SSR as being a short-term intervention, of which ownership should be handed over to the state. (2008: 579) I believe that the idea that SSR is a short-term project, which can be devolved to the 'local' state easily, is too optimistic. This view seems too state-centred (and too Western) to work in fragile states. Firstly, because this view places state control over the efficiency of its functions. It seems to overestimate the local conditions. As Woodward (2005) concludes, external programs often demand too much from fragile governments, while these governments often do not have enough control, local capacity and resources to realize these demands, to deliver security, or to continue an imposed program. Let alone that it connects to the local environment and its political history and values in such a short-term intervention, and that it creates a feeling of ownership. As the Peace, Security and Development Network (2009: 16) observes, *"the essence of ownership has to do with people, but the tendency is to aggregate this concept to the higher level of national ownership. […] This has led to the reification of whole countries and governments into unitary actors, while failing to see that many forms of governance are not led by formal state actors"*.

Consequently, the second reason why Van Middelkoop's view on SSR is too state-centred, is because it seems to prioritize the state ~and its capacity-building~ over the security of its citizens. For instance, it considers the state necessary to security without taking into account if the state might be the violator itself. For that reason state security actors often have low legitimacy in the eyes of the people. (Verheijen, 2009: 2) But even if that is not the case, the absence of the state does not mean that there is chaos or insecurity. Duffield (2002) explains ~just as the quote of the Peace, Security and Development Network~ that non-state actors often have the capacity to provide substantial basic governance and security at local level. Due to the state-centred view, this is often unobserved. Baker and Scheye (2007: 519) therefore believe that SSR is not about how to build state institutions, but it should be about *"the quality and efficacy of the services received by the end-user"*. This involves taking into

account the real needs and demands of local people, in order that SSR programming can really become people-centred and locally-owned.

Thus, there is talk of a difference, or even tension, between the theory and practice of SSR programming. Baker and Scheye (2007) believe that this relation can be improved by adapting the principles of SSR programming towards a more people-centred focus. To do so, they suggest a multi-layered SSR policy without a state-centric bias that should make use of the already existing local 'supply and demand' of security service providers from which people can choose. This should result in a web of constitutional and social (both state- and non-state) practices where all power holders examine each other and the whole.

Obviously, this system has its pro's and con's, for instance it cannot work without public demand and willingness of the actors involved to be held accountable. But interdependency between the actors might also improve the state's accountability: if the state would control the non-state actors, the state might acquire more legitimacy. (Baker & Scheye, 2007: 520) On the other hand, non-state systems may deliver more sustainable services. Their values are based on the local culture, they are embedded in society, cost less and have a better physical accessibility than state services. Since they operate in the local context they know the local needs, and people come to them first for protection. Of course, non-state systems might involve risks like corruption and minority-neglect, but the same counts for public security systems. As I have described in the previous section, insecurity is a lucrative business for both state actors as patrons in neo-patrimonial fragile states. Using public resources for providing security to a client is considered normal, consequently state security sectors are also seen as a resource: they can be mobilized as patrons as well. (Verheijen, 2009: 4) Therefore, when donors put SSR efforts in state institutions, they reinforce the patrimonial order ~instead of building a Weberian state~ and it will be difficult to improve the security situation. (Verheijen, 2009: 6)

Besides, people in fragile states often do not expect much from state institutions. (Peace, Security and Development Network, 2009: 22) However, the co-existence of state and non-state actors that all perform state-like functions makes the difference between state and non-state actors unclear. They all, as Menkhaus describes (in: Peace, Security and Development Network, 2009: 15), shape and contest legitimacy and authority. Therefore people may choose which institution they consider most likely to serve them. People living in fragile states are thus not passive, but arrange what is needed ~especially security~ by whoever provides it. Accordingly, Chesterman concludes (in: Peace, Security and Development Network, 2009: 23) that there is thus no real vacuum of power. So Baker and

Scheye's idea that the quality of the services for the end-user is more important than institution-building should indeed be taken notice of in SSR policies to prevent putting efforts in institutions that are considered less legitimate or having less authority.

Considering all this, local security providers should be included more in SSR programming to assess the specific security needs and cultural ways to provide security in the local context. For donors it is however difficult to determine what 'institution' to support and how to include these co-existing models in their SSR programs as well. (Baker & Scheye, 2007; Woodward, 2005; Peace, Security and Development Network, 2009: 24)

SSR frameworks

The OECD/DAC based their definition of SSR on a couple of guidelines that can be considered a good example of the mixed objectives of external support *and* local ownership, and of a state *and* people-centred approach. They focus on democratic and civilian control of the security sector (e.g. by strengthening state-capacity) and on developing an effective and efficient security sector. To help implement the SSR guidelines, the OECD/DAC (2007b) created the *OECD/DAC Handbook on SSR*. This handbook focuses on three objectives that international actors should aim for to support partner countries: 1) "*the establishment of effective governance, oversight and accountability in the security system*", 2) "*the improvement of basic security and justice service delivery*"; and 3) "*the development of local leadership and ownership of the reform process*". These objectives give an impression of what exactly needs to be reformed in SSR. To do so, most literature and policy papers focus on strengthening a few key actors in SSR: the police, military and justice sector. This strengthening mostly concerns professionalization of the forces via improving material and human capacity, but the exact efforts depend on the context of the fragile state at stake.

One-fits-all strategies do not exist anymore, and with its guidelines the OECD/DAC shows that instead alignment, ownership and legitimacy are now recognized as essential for effective reforms. However, sets of principles and guidelines are often broad and leave much space for interpretation, so there will never be *one* toolbox. (Peace, Security and Development Network, 2009: 13-14)

Conclusions

This chapter showed that there are several discourses in fragile states and SSR programming. The normative concept of the state used in programming is dominated by state-building efforts to achieve security, although fragile states are often violent, do not take care of their

citizens and are not the sole security provider. As a result of the human security paradigm and the reality of diverse networks of security providers on the ground, alternatives to the state-centred SSR approach are sought; people or multi-layered SSR approaches. These approaches focus on the quality of the services instead of on building state institutions. In the next chapter I will zoom in on the possibilities of a gender sensitive SSR approach in Burundi, to further explore the field of human security in fragile contexts.

Chapter 2. SSR and fragile states: the Dutch proposal

The final policy note on the Dutch Fragile States Policy, called *'Veiligheid en ontwikkeling in fragiele staten: Strategie voor de Nederlandse inzet 2008-2011'* (Security and Development in Fragile States: Strategy for the Dutch Commitment in 2008-2011) describes the Dutch intervention strategies in Fragile States. (Koenders, 2008) In this chapter I will describe the main points of this strategy and analyze how it considers the issues of SSR and gender, and relate this strategy to the discussion in the previous chapter.

§2.1 Context and focus of the Dutch Fragile States Policy

In February 2007, Bert Koenders was appointed to the new ministerial post within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Minister of Development Cooperation. Coming from a rich political, international relations and –development background,[5] Koenders identified some important trends in development cooperation in an increasingly globalizing world. Discourses on human security and human rights, that show a universal set of principles, now needed to be placed on policy in order to be observed in practice. To begin with, the signing of the Millennium Declaration, which encloses the efforts for accomplishing the Millennium Development Goals (MDG's) by 2015, put the concept of poverty reduction back on the international political agenda. In addition, the 2005 Paris Declaration can be considered a milestone in arrangements on policy coherence between international actors. An increasing demand for results and accountability in development cooperation was the preamble for a political debate on the choices in Dutch development policy. This has brought about a more modest focus on the specific conditions of a country; it is now taken into consideration that countries often have limited capacity to implement certain efforts, and that some parties concerned might not be willing to cooperate in the implementation. This resulted in more realistic ambitions in intervention. To anticipate on the time it takes before investment results will show, the risks of longer-term investments or budget support should now be made clear. (Koenders, 2007b)

With regard to these changes in international development thinking, Koenders believes that "*globalization imposes a political repositioning and reorganization of development cooperation*".[6] In October 2007 ~with broad support of the cabinet~ Koenders explains his vision in a policy note called '*Een Zaak van Iedereen: investeren in ontwikkeling*

[5] http://www.minbuza.nl/binaries/pdf/os-subsidies/cv-minister-bert-koenders.pdf. Consulted on April 16, 2009.
[6] http://www.minbuza.nl/nl/ontwikkelingssamenwerking/watdoenwe,het-beleid-van-koenders/index.html. Consulted on April 16, 2009.

in een veranderende wereld' (Our Common Concern: Investing in Development in a Changing World). It this note, the MDG's are starting point for his vision on development cooperation. To accomplish these goals by 2015, Koenders suggests four policy intensifications, of which 'fragile states' ~as part of the Dutch partner countries regulation~ is called a top-priority. Fragile states are priority because these states are furthest behind in achieving the MDG's. Intensified cooperation might involve higher risks (such as more corruption) but the chances on positive results are also higher in these countries.[7] Further, the policy note describes how the 36 Dutch partner countries are subdivided into three different profiles which are: profile 1) Accelerated MDG Achievement; profile 2) Security and Development; and profile 3) Broad Relationship. The second profile 'Security and Development' covers nine countries, one of which is Burundi, and has *'fragility as blockade to poverty reduction'* as its main criteria. Its objective is creating essential preconditions ~key points are civilian security and improving government capacity and legitimacy~ to achieving the MDG's. (Koenders, 2007b)

Obviously, all three of these profiles are important, but the second profile needs even more attention. As I have described in Chapter 1, fragile states have persistent, complex problems which differ according to the nature of the issues, and interveners thus need fitting concepts and instruments to work effectively in these countries. Therefore, Foreign Affairs (together with Koenders and the Minister of Defence[8]) wrote its strategy *'Veiligheid en ontwikkeling in fragiele staten'*. In sum, the creation of the profile 'Security and Development' and its matching policy efforts can be seen as the starting point for the Fragile States Policy. In the next sections I will describe the most important characteristics of the Fragile States strategy and compare these to the main issues mentioned in literature, and how Foreign Affairs plan to implement their policy with regard to efforts in the field of SSR and gender.

§2.2 Main characteristics and discourse(s) of the Dutch proposal

According to the literature described in Chapter 1, several issues in the fragile states discussion play a key role in fragile states programming. These are the relation between the three dimensions in fragile states programming, a state- versus people-centred security

[7] http://www.minbuza.nl/nl/actueel/persberichten,2007/06/Kabinet-kiest-aandachtsgebieden-om-Millenniumdoele.html
Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), *Burundi: Human rights worsened in 2008 - report*, 21 April 2009, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/49f012b6c.html Consulted on August 9, 2009.
[8] http://www.minbuza.nl/nl/actueel/brievenparlement,2008/11/Kamerbrief-inzake-de-strategie--Veiligheid-en-ontw.html

approach, the contextual analysis and conceptual notion of the state in policy programming, and the inclusion of gender in SSR policies. In this section I will shortly elaborate on these issues and explore how they appear in the Dutch strategy paper, by comparing the main characteristics of the strategy with the main issues in literature.

The relation between state-building, security and development

The relation between state-building, security and development is often mentioned in fragile states discussions. (Ghani & Lockhart, 2008; Woodward, 2005; Di John, 2008) This discussion concerns the importance of each of the areas regarding the fragile states concept and its policy implications. Most researchers (e.g. Di John, 2008 and Woodward, 2005) consider security as a prerequisite to development and state-building; some believe that state-building is needed to achieve this security (Paris, 2001; Van der Borgh, 2008), while others (Ghani & Lockhart, 2008) believe that all dimensions should be approached simultaneously.

The main objectives of the Dutch Fragile States Policy are securing that governments can provide security to their people, developing a functioning legal system, observance of human rights and providing basic social services. (Koenders, 2008: 6-7) As I described in the previous chapter, most fragile states policies focus on the combination of security, state-building and development, a form of 'whole of government' or 3-D approaches are considered the answer to the different issues of fragile states. (Van der Borgh, 2008; Peace, Security and Development Commission 2009) The Dutch Foreign Affairs department responded to these calls for greater policy coherence in relation to fragile states by focusing its fragile states policy on this triad of dimensions: security (in their policy paper described as improving civilians' security), state-building (to contribute to a legitimate government with sufficient capacity), and development (to create a peace dividend). (Koenders, 2008: 7) Its approach contains a close cooperation and coordination between the three different fields and a simultaneous approach in order to mutually enforce each other. Although the causal relation between these policy areas is unclear, they are often real to policy-makers.

As I described before, most donors do not have a coherent vision within their own agencies. The cooperation of the three different ministries (Foreign Affairs, Development Cooperation and Defence) in contributing to fragile states programming could also mean three different contributions, each with its own priorities in the field of its own interests. Most fragile states policies have security overtones, with state-building as the primary means to achieve this. Development is often the preferred goal of intervention, but also used as a motive to safeguard donors' interests. (Duffield, 2007) The introduction of the strategy paper

explains the Dutch motive for intervention as coming from the point of view of human security, to achieve the MDG's, and also as *"enlightened self-interest to prevent international instability"* (Koenders, 2008: 3); and thus covers each of the three policy areas a little without explicitly naming a particular priority. Or ~as Mosse's theory (2004) on policy texts suggests~ are the relative relations between the three policy areas deliberately mentioned equally, in order that all actors involved agree with the text?

If different interests of the ministries result in a different prioritization, would their interpretation of the concept 'fragile state' and its causes (and solutions) also differ? When defining the term 'fragile state', the Dutch proposal (Koenders, 2008: 4) refers to the OECD which describes that *"states can be considered fragile when the government does not have the will and/or capacity to provide its citizens with the basic functions of poverty reduction, development, security and human rights"*. This argument explicitly names all three dimensions the Dutch strategy focuses on in its comprehensive approach. However, the paper does not explain why it follows this definition. Instead, it quotes Collier to describe what can cause fragility. The focus here is on the strong relationship between poverty and conflict, but the paper also points to Collier's conclusion that good governance can influence the economy just a little. Collier is an economist, so his conclusion might be for the benefit of a part of the policy, but it does not explain how economic efforts could be used to support fragile states. Actually, the quote does not say a word about how the relation between poverty and conflict, and between governance and the economy could be helpful in fragile states policies. This is confusing when it comes to the Dutch focus on its three dimensions: is their main concern security (conflict, and its influence on poverty), on state-building (good governance) or on development (which is influenced by both conflict and good governance); or is the strategy indeed influenced by the supposed correlation between the three dimensions in their comprehensive approach? The paper just quotes this particular fragment of Collier and does not comment on his vision in any way. I believe that this implies that the paper does not explicitly choose to prioritize any of the dimensions.

When it comes to the state-building dimension explained in the Dutch strategy, its focus is securing the constitutional state, which is considered being in danger. (Koenders, 2008: 9-11) Again, this statement is based on uncriticized literature, this time of Ghani and Lockhart. The strategy paper (2008: 10) quotes a fragment of their book that stresses the importance of a strong state and the ten state functions it should perform. It also describes that these state functions will lead to a so-called "sovereignty dividend". In Chapter 1 I have described that Ashraf and Ghani believe that this can only be achieved when all ten state

functions are performed simultaneously. However, this is not mentioned in the policy paper. In fact, the policy paper does not mention anything on how this framework is going to be used in Dutch policy programming, whether it agrees with their argument or the downsides it might have. That these downsides are missing in the strategy paper is most important: Ashraf and Ghani (in their book) explicitly warn for a "sovereignty gap" when one or more functions will not be performed effectively. So, considering that the Dutch strategy paper is including Ghani and Lockhart's theoretical framework, it is surprising that the risk of a sovereignty gap is left out. Following their way of reasoning, leaving out one of the three dimensions of the comprehensive approach might also be of risk. On the other hand, it could also be a strategy not to name the downsides of this strategy to keep a neutral position towards the three policy areas and their corresponding Ministries. Whether the paper included just those fragments of the literature that seem 'neutral' concerning these dimensions, might indeed be linked to Mosse's explanation that policy proposals should be considered as compromising texts.

The Dutch approach to security

As I have showed in Chapter 1, there are different ways to look at security: a state-centred or people-centred security approach, or a combination of these two. The classic Weberian model of the state does not count for fragile states, where states are often the violators themselves. In such situations there often are other (non-state) actors that *do* provide security. Non-state centred approaches therefore find the actual provider of minor importance, as long as the security of the people is provided. However, the state should feel responsible for the security of its citizens ~and thus restore the social contract with its citizens~, otherwise international actors might intervene, following the Responsibility to Protect Agreement. Accordingly, do the Dutch security efforts focus on a state or people-centred security approach? (Baker & Scheye, 2007)

Of the three dimensions that shape the Dutch Fragile States strategy, security is named first. This security particularly concerns the security of fragile states' citizens. The policy paper describes that this objective can be achieved foremost by peace-building, and after that by conflict prevention and contributing to stability and security. The paper describes that to achieve this starting point is that the state should have a responsible monopoly on violence. The principal way to do so is implementing programs in the field of SSR. (Koenders, 2008) SSR is named first of several ways of contributing to this, which the Dutch paper describes as enabling the military, police and judiciary to do their work and to safeguard democratic control of the security sector. As I described in Chapter 1, some authors (e.g. Collier, 2002; Di

John, 2008) believe this monopoly should indeed be the state's task, while others believe that this focus is too state-centred and overestimates the local capacities of fragile states. (Woodward, 2005) Baker and Scheye (2007) believe that it is not about building state institutions, but about the quality of the security services, and suggest a multi-layered SSR policy that includes both state- and non-state actors. They (just as the Commission on Human Security, 2003) believe that SSR should focus on the principles of human security and that public safety should therefore be the main aim.

The Dutch security efforts as described in the strategy paper aim at *"[…] improving the security of citizens. […] Starting point is that the state should regulate the violence in a responsible way, which is only possible if they have the will and capacity to maintain the constitutional state"*. (Koenders, 2008: 7) Further, it quotes an argument of Collier that says that SSR is a form of 'technical assistance' needed to provide the security sector with the monopoly on violence, as is believed the crux of good governance. (2008: 8) Consequently, it seems that there is a contradiction between its main people-centred aim and its more state-centred way to achieve this. But the Dutch strategy also aims at analysis and planning on both civil and military efforts. (2008: 17) By doing so the Dutch want to prevent that security will just be defined in military terms; instead they want it to be embedded in a functioning political system and constitutional state. To do so, the ministries involved play an important advising role by providing military, police and justice experts (such as the SSR-pool of the Ministry of Defence).

Further in the strategy paper, the Dutch approach to security becomes clearer. Here, it describes how NGO's can play a role in mediating between non-state actors and 'unwilling' governments. (Koenders, 2008: 14-15) The Dutch want to support the NGO's in doing so and cooperate with them, but also describe to be careful not to undermine the weak government's role. This argument seems to imply that the Dutch government has a state-centred approach ~since it attributes a key role to the state in maintaining order and not wanting to undermine them~ and leaves the people-centred approach to NGO's.

I believe that the Dutch strategy should pay more attention to these non-state actors, because the focus should be on the quality of the security service delivery; on how *actual* stability will be achieved, not on who provides it. The strategy paper does claim that the human security approach is important in the Dutch efforts, by expressing that a people-centred, locally owned approach comes first, and the focus should thus be more on the needs of the people. (Koenders, 2008: 18) However, it also describes (2008: 33) that political and financial interests usually decide what the international community's actions will be, instead

of the actual needs. To change its policy more in accordance with human security, the paper therefore states that the international efforts need a stronger coordination between international organisations, more attention to the local and regional conditions, more ownership, enough capacity and expertise to do so, and international leadership to lead all these efforts.

However, the paper uses a Weberian notion of the state; so the question is how this can be combined with a people-centred security approach? It appears that the Dutch strategy, just as the Peace, Security and Development Commission's observation which I described in Chapter 1, understands ownership not in terms of people, but on the level of national ownership. The fact that it focuses on the state in its security approach, and leaves cooperation with non-state actors to NGO's shows this. Perhaps, the Dutch strategy might not have taken notice of the fact that in fragile states people's security is often provided by non-state actors, who do respond to people's needs.

The integration of human security principles in fragile states policies means that civilian security became a main focus. As I described in Chapter 1, focusing on *all* people means that a specific focus on women, and more general on gender, is needed. However, the security dimension of the Dutch Fragile States strategy does not explicitly name gender. I believe gender is of particular importance in SSR programming, as I will argue in §2.4.

Fragile states policy programming: contextual and conceptual analysis

The contextual analysis preceding policy making plays a significant role in the fragile states debate. Several researchers, but particularly Woodward (2005), criticize fragile states programming for being developed without a proper research on the context in which it will be implemented. Woodward believes that a thorough analysis of the situation on the ground is needed first, so peoples needs become clear and policy can be developed in line with this context. According to her, the real needs of the people should be starting point for developing policy, instead of implementing a fixed framework in a random context.

As Verheijen (2009) and Hout (2009) describe, these frameworks often do not fit fragile state's form of political organization. The strategy paper obviously regards the Weberian notion of the state and the functions a state should perform according to this notion, as the solution to fragility. It does however claim to have a contextual approach; that the local political situation needs to be analyzed and that there are no blueprints for intervention. (Koenders, 2008:18) It says to base its approach on local experts and *information* (2008:19),

but it does not consider the possibility of other actors in *providing* governance or security, or the existence of another organizational system than the Weberian state in general. This shows that the Dutch strategy does ignore the specific context of fragile states and is thus not living up to its own claim to focus on local conditions.

It seems that the Dutch Fragile States strategy does not follow one direction, it focuses on the Weberian state *and* claim to focus on the local context and its security approach focuses mainly on the state but also claims to be people centred. It seems as if different, sometimes opposite, approaches are all included, but all just a little. Woodward's critique (2005) therefore is also applicable on the Dutch proposal: multiple fragments of literature are quoted in a pragmatic way, the Dutch opinions regarding these fragments are unclear, the link between theory and reality is vague, and in particular, it looks like the Fragile States Policy is not developed following a thorough research of each fragile state concerned. As Woodward states, policy should be developed according to research of the context, not the other way around. Could this policy proposal really lead to an effective fragile states policy? And what are the consequences for implementation?

Perhaps this vagueness is not coincidental, but ~as I described in Chapter 1 through Mosse's argument~ a strategy in itself. Obviously, vagueness does not work for policy coherence, but I can imagine vagueness is needed considering the Dutch comprehensive approach that involves different ministries with their own interests and means, in order to make them sign the proposal. In that way every disciplinary dimension can identify its own line of thinking and working in ~fragments of~ the methods and objectives described. Probably, the different actors involved will develop their part of the policy when they actually are on the ground.

§2.3 Dutch SSR and gender efforts in Burundi ~on paper~

In this section I will assess the Dutch SSR policy for Burundi to get a better understanding of the Dutch approach to security. In Chapter 3 I will analyze how these Dutch SSR efforts are implemented in Burundi, to see how these efforts relate to the Dutch Fragile States Policy on paper. Burundi is an important example in this case, because ~next to being one of the nine partner countries on the Dutch fragile states agenda, and that Burundi serves as a pilot regarding a better comprehensive approach within the European Union~ The Netherlands are in chair of the International Donor Consultation on SSR, which provides them with an interesting opportunity to take new initiatives regarding SSR efforts and to implement ~or at least to illustrate~ their plans on the security dimension as described in the policy paper.

Although the Dutch strategy paper does include a specific Burundi section (Koenders, 2008: 25-26) and describes that it focuses mainly on SSR, not much is written on specific Dutch SSR efforts in Burundi. Probably because the Dutch-Burundian efforts were still in the making at the time the strategy paper was published. The Dutch have been working on SSR in Burundi for several years ~but started with structural improvements to the security situation in 2008~[9] with its main challenges of decreasing regional instability and reforming the inadequate security apparatus. These efforts were on project-basis and included improving barracks, human rights training for the military, material support to the police and training for female police officers to deal with victims of sexual violence.[10] The Fragile States proposal describes that the Dutch can play a considerable role in SSR in Burundi even though they are a relatively small player; because it claims not to have any geopolitical ambitions and is therefore trusted more. It says that the Dutch are on good terms with the Burundian government. During my research in Burundi I was told that this relationship is the result of the Netherlands not having the same dominating history in the area as other key donors, like Belgium and France.[11]

In April 2009, the Dutch (Ministries of Development Cooperation, Foreign Affairs and Defence) signed an agreement with the Burundian government regarding a strategic cooperation to strengthen the military and police for multiple years. These efforts concern material support and training and advice by Dutch experts to contribute to the professionalization of the Burundian military and police.[12] Burundi is the only country within the Fragile States Policy for which such an integrated program is created. According to Minister Koenders the approach is working: people's trust in the police has increased from 36 to 51 percent in one year and 63 percent of the population says to feel safe in Burundi.[13] The source of these data is not mentioned in the article, so it is not clear on what kind of research these data are based, and whether it can be considered a valid and representative research. Besides, it is hard to tell whether the improvements are actually thanks to the Dutch efforts. Especially when it comes to an important issue of the Burundian insecurity: violence done to women, in particular by the security sector. As I said before, the Dutch strategy seems to

[9] www.minbuza.nl/nl/actueel/nieuwsberichten,2009/04/Samenwerking-op-gebied-van-veiligheid-met-Burundi.html. Consulted on April11, 2009.
[10] www.minbuza.nl/nl/actueel/nieuwsberichten,2009/04/Samenwerking-op-gebied-van-veiligheid-met-Burundi.html. Consulted on April11, 2009.
[11] Interview with Miriam Weimar, Dutch SSR-advisor at the Burundian Police. Conducted on July 28, 2008.
[12] The agreement also states that the military has to reduce its staff with ten thousand and the police with five thousand people.
[13] www.minbuza.nl/nl/actueel/nieuwsberichten,2009/04/Samenwerking-op-gebied-van-veiligheid-met-Burundi.html. Geraadpleegd op 11april 2009.

ignore the concept of gender in its SSR efforts. In the next section I will describe why I believe it should be included.

§2.4 Gender: the missing link

The security dimension described in the strategy paper, does not include gender in its policy programs. The only thing it points at is that *"..all groups in society, including women and children, should be involved in reintegration programs"*. In this way the paper does mention the security sector (reintegration programs) *and* women, but nothing is mentioned about the *relation* between the security sector and the security of women. In stead, the paper could have better quoted the Responsibility to Protect *all* members of society, which includes particular attention to women. As I described before, a gender approach is more than violence done to women, it is also central in human rights and human security, concepts that the Dutch want to intensify on.

The fact that gender is left out of the security efforts described in the policy paper is odd, because the Dutch do seem to acknowledge the problematic relation between security and gender in fragile states. Minister Koenders even considers the rights and security of women as one of its four policy priorities.[14] The policy paper does refer to the vulnerability of women, and even mentions them as victims of sexual violence, but further it only includes gender when it comes to the development dimension. It aims at development for men *and* women and states that women also have the right to profit from the effects of stability in their daily lives and should be involved in seeking solutions. The paper even acknowledges that women are often known best with the communities' needs and issues, and refers to the Worldbank's slogan "gender is smart economics". It further explains that the Dutch strive for socio-economic programs to promote an equal role for women, *"in accordance with the national strategy concerning UN Resolution 1325"*. (Koenders, 2008: 13)

This national strategy (that the policy paper refers to), called '*Op de bres voor Vrouwen, Vrede en Veiligheid'* (Taking a Stand for Women, Peace and Security), discusses the Dutch strategy to implement Resolution 1325. The Dutch do so because*"this resolution on women, peace and security acknowledges the disproportional effects of violent conflict to women, and calls for attention to the role of women in conflict-prevention and as participants in peace negotiations and socio-economic reconstruction."* (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken et al, 2007: 3) As this national strategy's title and content obviously reflect, it primarily

[14] http://www.minbuza.nl/nl/organisatie/bewindslieden/ministerkoenders/eenzaakvaniedereen

concerns women and security and in a much lesser respect women's economic development. This is just one of the reasons why I find it so striking that this resolution is not quoted in the security dimension of the Dutch Fragile States strategy.

Moreover, the Dutch do admit in their Fragile States strategy that they are looking for ways to include gender in SSR (Koenders, 2007: 13), but I believe that they have the knowledge to do so, but excluded it from the strategy. Namely, before writing the Fragile States strategy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2007) published a policy paper called *'Developing the security sector: security for whom, by whom? Security sector reform and gender.'* This paper is about the Dutch policy framework for SSR and questions how to include a gender perspective in SSR and thus to implement Resolution 1325. It believes the first requirement for reforms in SSR policy is to take account of the differences between men and women, because women need the most help, but are overlooked in SSR programs ~which in turn are over-represented by men~. The paper states that a gender perspective is needed for several reasons, of which: its impact on the well-being of women and the (social) development of their country, the implementation of the concept of human security, a democratic security sector and effective programs. The paper even claims that the Dutch are working on three themes to implement 1325 ~1) the involvement of women in the security sector, 2) a gender perspective in training security personnel; and 3) the protection of women~ particularly in fragile states. It continues by describing exactly what should be done in what segment of the security sector (police, military, justice, intelligence and even oversight bodies and civil society organizations) and concludes that the Dutch have potential to contribute to a gender-inclusive approach to SSR. The strategies and objectives described in this paper, correspond to literature on SSR and gender, like Valasek's SSR and Gender Toolkit for policy-makers, which again shows that Foreign Affairs seems to know of and agree with the international norms.

I believe I proved my point why gender should be included in SSR and why it should also be in the Dutch Fragile States Policy. The knowledge is available; which leaves us with the question what the consequences of not including it are? In the next chapter I will therefore look more into the security issues of Burundi and on the Dutch efforts in the Burundian context.

Chapter 3. Gender and insecurity in Burundi

§3.1 Dimensions of insecurity in Burundi

As described in the previous chapters, an important objective of the Dutch Fragile States Policy is implementing the concept of human security. The Responsibility to Protect all members of society is the starting point of the strategy's security dimension, which principally aims at improving the security of civilians. In this chapter I will elaborate on the present problems with relation to human security in Burundi. I will do so by describing three dimensions of insecurity: ethnic quota in past security sector reforms, the security sector itself, and domestic violence or more broadly endemic violence. Further on in this chapter I will argue why security efforts directed at insecurity in Burundi should pay extra attention to gender, which I will illustrate by several quotes from Burundian women.

Ethnic quota in past security sector reforms

Burundi's (recent) history is branded by ethnic conflicts between Hutus and Tutsis. Even though civil war is over now and ethnicity is not explicitly considered a problem anymore, peoples' insecurity is still partly fuelled by ethnic tensions. Since this tension is the result of multiple factors, both historically and present-day, I believe that first of all it is important to explain the role of ethnicity in Burundi's past civil war.

Historically, the Tutsis (fifteen percent of the population, as to 85 percent Hutus) have held power, dominated the educated society and monopolized the army. The two groups clashed due to a power struggle between Hutu and Tutsi political elites that wanted to secure access to economic resources through control of state power. This got extremely out of hand in the form of major massacres which took place in 1965, 1972, 1988 and 1993 (when at least 100.000 people were killed). (Havermans, 1999)

The occasion that led to this last massacre in 1993 is the starting point from where I will describe the impact of the role of ethnicity in Burundi's present insecure situation. In that year, the Burundi Democratic Front won the first democratic elections (since 1965) and in its campaign it emphasized the need to reform the army ~which was also the top priority of the Palipehutu, the first Hutu rebel movement~ and the police. The program of the Democratic Front included *"[…] to recruit officers from each district to make it easier for the public to identify with the police and address its unbalanced ethnic and regional composition."* (Nindorera, 2007: 7) The new President Ndadaye wanted to implement this program, but he was assassinated by elements of the army in 1993. This assassination triggered ethnic

massacres of Tutsis by Hutus that took revenge, while the Tutsi army in their turn killed and violently repressed Hutu civilians in revenge. Different rebel movements and the Hutu majority started to realize that the key to power was the control of the security forces and that they should therefore be controlled or to be reformed into professional forces. The Tutsi obviously did not want to give up their control over the security forces. (Havermans, 1999; Nindorera, 2007)

After a ceasefire between the warring parties, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi was signed in 2000. Amongst other things, it laid down the foundations for SSR by calling for an equal representation of Hutus and Tutsis in the security forces. Even though 85 percent of the population was assumed to be Hutu, not more than fifty percent of the security forces would be drawn from both ethnic groups. It also recommended that the forces should be professionalized in order to provide protection to all Burundians. To do so, the forces should receive training to learn to respect human rights. However, most of the Arusha reforms focused on implementing the ethnic quota. Even though the army is considered ethnically balanced since the end of 2006 (Banal & Scherrer, 2008: 37); according to Nindorera (2007: 11-12) no census has been organized (at the time of writing) to measure if the quotas are really implemented. This is important to mention, because it shows the controversy of ethnic quota, which are hard to measure to begin with,[15] but in particular it shows the perceived importance of maintaining the quota to the security of the population. After the ethnically-based mistreatment by the previous security forces, the people needed to regain trust in the security forces as being neutral security providers. (Nindorera, 2007) Moreover, these quotas were introduced to promote Hutu emancipation in the security forces after the Tutsi dominance. However, the Hutu were often ~and still are~ relatively uneducated (compared to the Tutsi), which makes it difficult to install qualified personnel. Uneducated or poorly educated security personnel are often considered as having the worst reputation regarding their respect for human rights, and women in particular.[16]

Next to these 'fair' power-sharing arrangements, the Arusha Agreement also stipulated that forty percent of the senior officers would be made up of the ruling party (CNDD/FDD), and it discussed the level of representation of Tutsi political parties in key government institutions. (Banal & Scherrer, 2008: 32) Thus, next to ethnic quota, the security forces were also reformed on the basis of political quota. At the time this was an important measure, since

[15] Especially in the case of Hutus and Tutsis in Burundi, because there is no consensus whether these 'labels' are real, invented or imagined. But this is another discussion too big to discuss in this research.
[16] According to several interviews I conducted in Burundi (July-August 2008), of which with General Generose.

the CNDD was mainly Hutu and could now function as a counterpart of the Tutsi dominance in the security forces. However, the static ethnic and political quotas on which the agreements are based result in some problematic consequences today.

Firstly, the quotas were especially designed to emancipate the Hutus after a period of repression; accordingly their feelings of insecurity are favored over that of the Tutsis nowadays. For instance, the integration of the security forces still worries some Tutsis. They believe that the authorities are planning to intimidate them, because several security service officers are still strongly associated with the CNDD. Accordingly, they do not feel equally represented. Whether their fear is realistic or not, the fact is that there has not been any census to measure if the quotas are really implemented. Ensuring this fifty-fifty ethnic balance thus remains a challenge. Therefore it is not surprising that recent research among civilians showed that the ethnic integration of the security forces still is an important factor in public confidence. (Nindorera, 2007)

Secondly, due to the ethnic and political quotas, the security forces (in particular the police) are still influenced by politicians ~Nindorera calls this the politization of security forces~, just like in times of conflict. Since security forces (or parts of them belonging to a specific ethnic group) are linked to certain politicians and political parties; ethnic tensions still influence the political climate in a negative way. This manifests itself in a strong distrust between political parties and the government.[17] However, as Nindorera (2007) states, depolitization of the security forces is difficult because agreements and laws concerning ethnic and political quotas are contradicting. Namely, according to the Arusha accords national security forces have to remain neutral, but at the same time positions in forces are based on political criteria. Until the time of writing (April 2009), this principle of neutrality caused a constant threat of insecurity due to many violent incidents between the government and the last remaining rebel movement, the Palipehutu-FNL. The movement refused to enter the political process, unless it could keep its name. The Palipehutu (*Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu,* Party for the Liberation of Hutu People) played an important role in the fight against Hutu repression, and therefore considers its name part of the party's identity. The constitution however prohibits ethnically based political parties, and the clashes with the government continued until recently. (Human Rights Watch, 2009)

After many attempted cease-fire agreements, the Palipehutu-FNL finally did register as a political party, last April 21. Since it lost its military branch, the FNL is approved access

[17] The same suspicion exists between the government and the media, since many journalists were arrested and harassed by members of the national security forces. (Banal & Scherrer, 2008)

to the political arena. Now that it is completely disarmed, a part (3500 people) will quickly integrate in the army and police. However, reports are circulating that still a remarkable amount of young combatants are yet to be demobilized who are not on the list. (Human Rights Watch, 2009) These reports warn for even more insecurity to civilians when these combatants will not be integrated. But they are not the main threat; in the next section I will further explain the role of the security sector in causing insecurity to civilians.

Role of the Security Sector

As described above, security forces have played a vital role in maintaining and executing the ruling party's power in times of conflict, and thus served the authorities instead of the civilians. Even though Burundi did implement the Arusha Accords in the sense that it established functioning security forces ~the *Forces de Défence Nationale* (FDN) and the *Police Nationale du Burundi* (PNB)~ it remains questionable whether they provide security to all people.

According to Nindorera's research on peoples confidence in the security forces (2007: 14-16), the public perception of the security services has improved. He conducted a survey based on 400 respondents of which fifty percent of the respondents said to have confidence in the FDN, ten percent did not have any confidence at all, and 41 percent said to have some confidence. The main reason for a positive opinion was a positive change in behaviour (sixteen percent of the respondents). As for confidence in the PNB, sixteen percent has no confidence what so ever, 36 percent is confident and 48 percent has some confidence. The main reason for confidence is police integration, and for not having confidence arbitrary arrest was cited most as the main reason. However, as these data show, there are still some serious problems. The army, police and intelligence services are characterized by corruption, lack of professionalism and acts of banditry; but what most concerns the civilian population is that the security services are responsible for human rights violations instead of protecting them. (Banal & Scherrer) According to the UN, the overall human rights situation detoriated in 2008. (IRIN, 2009) The report describes that in the first half of 2008, more than 4000 cases of human rights violations were committed by members of the security forces. Research (Nindorera, 2007) shows that twenty percent of the respondents identified security forces (fourteen percent chose the PNB, six percent the intelligence services) as the main group responsible for insecurity. The other groups that people could choose from included rebels, criminals and the military, which was named last. These violations vary from arbitrary and illegal arrests, to abuse, extrajudicial executions, torture, ill-treatment, firing without arrest,

rape and even killings. Impunity continues for these violations, as the justice system is very weak as well. Access to justice is difficult and corruption widespread. Communication between the justice sector and the police is bad, with the result that many cases remain unsolved. Besides, the legal framework does not mention the obligations of the police towards the population. It is lacking sanctions in the case that the police abuses citizens. (Nindorera, 2007: 23) (IRIN, 2009; ICTJ, 2008)

Abuse by members of the security sector makes it even harder to report a case of sexual abuse to the police. Usually, Burundian women do not openly talk about sensitive issues like these with men, let alone when it was an official that abused her. Besides, when women do report their cases, they are not allowed to bring someone with them to the hearings. This could bring about new risks of abuse, an incomplete report of the case due to a different interpretation of sensitive issues by men and women, or officers that often do not know how to take care of traumatized women. Therefore it is important that women can be heard by police*women*. However, there are only 500 women working for the PNB, of their total personnel of 20.000.[18]

The recruitment of more women seems impossible, since the force has to downsize with 5.000 personnel (and the army with 10.000 personnel, both for which Dutch development-money will be used).[19] The relation between wanting to achieve stability by strengthening the security sector and the idea of downsizing these forces seems contradicting. However, downsizing the personnel of the security sectors is generally considered necessary to reduce security sector-specific budgets, which is needed because these costs are often paid with money intended for, or needed more in other sectors of government finances, such as development. (Edmunds, 2001:8; Williams, 2000) Besides, the majority of the members of the Burundian forces lack adequate education, and educational programmes are unable to educate this amount of people. The limited budgets can thus best be used to train lesser actors more efficiently, and moreover: lesser uneducated security sector members, means lesser risks (because more control) of misbehaviour.

Reforming the PNB into a professional unit is important, because the police have a bad reputation amongst the population. Until 2004 Burundi did not have a national police force, but several small policing services. Nowadays, the police force is out on the streets in large numbers to respond as quickly as possible when needed. Citizens consider this

[18] According to General Generose, interview conducted on August 5, 2008.
[19] www.minbuza.nl Nieuwsbericht: "Samenwerking op gebied van veiligheid met Burundi" Minister Koenders, 11 april 2009.

proximity more as a security risk than as a means to protect them. Strangely, this is one of the reasons that the PNB is considered less capable in protecting civilians than the FDN, who are less visible in the streets. (Nindorera, 2007) Plus, the police are equipped with assault rifles from the former FAB (Forces armies Burundaises), which contributes to a loss of credibility to the population and causes fear amongst the people and security risks in case they might abuse them. (Banal & Scherrer, 2008) Being a newly established security service, the PNB is lacking material (such as light duty weapons, sticks, uniforms and means of transport) but also human resources. Besides, varying educational levels due to a background in one of the former, differing policing services or rebel movements makes it difficult to create a professional, coherent police sector. The working conditions are bad and salaries low, which might be one of the reasons for their acts of banditry and violence. But on the other hand, the police are aware of the low confidence amongst the population and say that they need more training to increase their respect for human rights. (Nindorera, 2007: 41) But what needs to change to let members of the security forces actually behave according to these principles? In the next 'dimension of insecurity' I will examine whether 'endemic violence' might explain this violent behaviour and what its consequences are.

Endemic violence

As described above, civilian insecurity still persists in the present-day Burundi, even though civil war is over. The end of war does not automatically mean the end of violence. Instead, the political and security situation still not reassure everyone and crime rates are even rising. The level of violence remains high, by armed men in uniform but also by civilians. About eighty percent of the Burundian households possess small arms, which partly explains why domestic violence is widespread. Violence against women particularly increased since the war has ended, especially rape. Impunity and inaction by the state remain major challenges. These enduring phenomena after violent conflict ~especially sexual violence and impunity~ are considered a breakdown in social norms and the reason that researchers (such as Allen, 1999) are speaking of endemic violence (also referred to as a 'culture of violence', for example by Steenkamp). (ICTJ, 2008; Human Rights Watch, 2009)

As I described in Chapter 1, Steenkamp (2005) argues that a 'culture of violence' is caused by the previous period of lasting violent conflict. She describes that this period created a 'socially permissive environment' that permits violence to continue, sustained by factors as the amount of arms people possess (which is partly a result of the international proliferation of arms), but also by moral ideas of violence as being 'normal'. As Allen (1999) argues, to

understand the causes of endemic violence in Burundi, we should analyze its history, especially the internal dynamics of 'spoils politics'. Perhaps, as Verheijen (2009) describes, these internal politics (of patron-client relationships) maintain the insecure environment to secure its own interests. In sum, both the international context of violence as its internal dynamics should be analyzed.

When analyzing the Burundian history, it would be interesting to find out what role the just identified 'dimensions of insecurity' played in this history and the ongoing violence today. As we have seen above, Burundi has known a long period of ethnic clashes, which was triggered by elites that wanted to secure their access to resources. This means two things: that Burundi indeed ~just like Allen and Verheijen argue~ knew a self-enriching elite that led to conflicts among the population, and that there were reasons to secure access to resources, of which scarcity. Both issues are still relevant: the political elite today are still corrupt and use the security forces for their own interests, as politicized security forces show. In times of war, the political elite misused ethnicity to mobilize people for their own gains and privileged civilians in exchange for their support. Nowadays this patron-client moral still seems to exist in the political arena and the security forces. The classical model of the police that provides protection to civilians did not exist; it went from an ethnically repressive force to a force that is still violating human rights.

Scarcity of cultivable land can be considered another trigger for conflict between civilians; but officials also try to profit. For example, such conflicts often happen between families, where one family has connections with an official that helps them (e.g. by making up reasons for arrest or renunciation of the land) to obtain ownership of the land in exchange for a share of the land or profit.[20] The Burundian economy relies heavily on this scarce land; it is based on a weather-dependent and land-absorbing coffee industry. Burundi is therefore dependent on import, and the majority of the population is trying to be self-sufficient.

Land scarcity also influences domestic violence. Burundi knows certain ~in our eyes discriminative~ laws regarding property and succession rights. Women have no succession rights and thus depend on their husbands for land, and parents have to divide their land between all their sons. The Burundian population is growing and the amount of land is splitting up continuously. Consequently, land is the subject of many (domestic) conflicts. People might violently express their grievances towards each other and officials, and officials might use their position for economic survival.

[20] These examples were told during my research in Burundi, by representatives from the human rights organization Ligue Iteka, which focuses on legal assistance to prisoners.

Another factor makes this 'informalized', endemic violence even worse, namely weapons. As I described above, the majority of the Burundian households contains weapons, approximately a hundred thousand small arms and grenades are still amongst the population. (Banal & Scherrer, 2008: 44) Obviously, these weapons are an aftermath of the civil war. But people did not always arm themselves. Back in 1998, during the civil war, the government even armed civilians to defend them against other (Hutu) civilians. But even after the war has ended, in 2007, there were reports that the ruling party handed out weapons to civilians. It seems that neither the government nor the citizens themselves have the feeling that the security forces provide them with security. Such feelings of insecurity make it even harder to disarm the population. People need to feel secure before they are willing to hand in their weapons, but on the other hand, the possession of weapons also causes insecurity. The government has started an awareness and 'arms for development' campaign in 2006 to make an end to this circle of insecurity, but at the time that this campaign was analyzed (2007) it did not prove to be successful because people still felt too insecure and wanted a higher compensation for their expensive weapons.[21] As Nindorera (2007:41) describes it *"the success of civilian disarmament depends on political will of the government, they should come up with a policy to disarm the people's hearts and minds"*.

When speaking of disarming people's hearts and minds, Nindorera illustrates the psychological consequences of war. The Burundian population has experienced ongoing violence for such a long period, that it became part of their everyday life. This might have influenced people's social norms in a way that they might seek solutions to grievances by using violence. I believe that this is the 'socially permissive environment' that Steenkamp (2005) describes. Even the government seems to be influenced by it, as it continues to urge amnesty for war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, despite UN opposition. (Human Rights Watch, 2009) One of the most typical forms of endemic violence in Burundi, that even increased after war, is sexual violence. In the next section I will describe the seriousness of this problem.

§3.2 Sexual violence in Burundi

In this section I will illustrate the present problems of sexual violence in Burundi. The most striking way to do so is by referring to the stories of victims of sexual violence I have spoken with in Burundi. These narratives on the micro level give a clear image of the problems that

[21] Compensation can not be financial; this would bring the risk of creating a trade in weapons. (Nindorera, 2007)

‘the ordinary people of the hills’[22] are facing, and what goes wrong and needs to be done on the macro level. The following short, tough story touches upon the different causes that all play a role in the phenomenon of sexual violence (and gender in general) in Burundi:

> Claire, 20: “I was raped at home in the middle of the night, by a group of thieves. I don’t know them and couldn’t see what they looked like, it was dark. They ran away. I don’t have enough prove to report it to the police, so I think reporting it is useless. But some women in my community sent me here, to Ligue Iteka.[23] I do trust the police, but they cannot help me without prove. However, there is a lot of corruption. Perpetrators can buy out the police, that happens often. […] The relation between men and women needs to change, but it depends on the situation back home, whether it is good or bad. I don’t have any idea what my rights are, or even a thing about laws in general. If I want to find out I have to consult an organization. Women’s organizations should visit every community to teach women about their rights. It does happen, but yet not enough.”

During the conversation with Claire (and other victims of sexual violence), I was most surprised by the openness, almost nonchalance, with which she told her story. My interpreter even asked me why I found it so difficult to formulate my questions; after all we were just talking everyday issues! The way Claire seemed to just describe the facts ~even though it seems such a sensitive matter, she seemed to worry more about the fact that it was to dark to see the perpetrators faces~ illustrates the frequent character of sexual violence, almost as if it became normal. It seems like it became part of her everyday life, which relates to the ‘culture of violence’ Steenkamp (2005) refers to.

Unfortunately, the current reality is that nineteen percent of the Burundian women have been victims of sexual violence, including rape. (ICTJ, 2008) The majority of these cases are committed by civilians. The police and justice system cannot protect them, and sometimes the police even violate women at the time they are reporting a case. This is one of the reasons why women are scared to report violations; but even if they do, cases often do not reach the court or a judgement. Besides, in Burundian culture the subject is sensitive and considered a women’s business. But there are not enough women in the position to settle cases of sexual violence. Moreover, the fear of ridicule, disbelief and abuse by the authorities *and* the community, make impunity a remaining challenge. Instead of justice, families often discuss the compensation for what happened outside the court, a method that is even supported by some officials.

[22] The majority of Burundians live in the rural, hilly country.
[23] Ligue Iteka is a human rights organization that provides medical and judicial assistance to victims of sexual violence.

Fact is that ~even if they want to~ it is difficult for officials to tackle impunity regarding sexual violence. The criminal justice system includes laws that secure this impunity; for instance it does not define sexual violence and rape as being crimes and penalties are therefore lacking or low. Although the government states that it wants to take action against sexual violence, a new criminal code that does define and punishes these crimes is still not implemented, and prevention and support to victims is still minimal. (IRIN, 2009; ICTJ, 2008; Human Rights Watch, 2009)

Gender and security

The issue of sexual violence can be put to the higher level of gender issues in general. As I described in Chapter 1, gender comprises far more issues than just sexual violence, and to effectively stop sexual violence, a policy needs to address the entire spectrum of gender issues. During my research in Burundi I experienced that women addressed sexual violence and gender in different ways, and consequently, that there are three important levels on which gender and security in Burundi could be addressed.[24] The first level comprises sexual violence and the role of the police and justice apparatus in it; which concerns the improvement of ~access to~ assistance to victims and the punishment of perpetrators. The second level is about the protection of women (and men) in general and elaborates on how civilian protection can be improved and what role the police can play in this. And the third level questions the 'cultural' differences between men and women; how can women become active participants in security matters, and how can the Burundian society be sensitized with regard to human rights (for *all* citizens, both men and women). I will refer to the narratives of Claire and another victim of sexual violence ~the mother of a 5-year old victim~ to show how these micro level experiences on the subject of sexual violence connect to each of these three levels of gender and security in Burundi.

Claire's story largely refers to the first level ~sexual violence and role of the police and justice apparatus~ since she describes sexual violence and the inaction following it almost as being customary; which mainly covers the 'culture of violence' argument just put forward. A similar manifestation of this argument is visible in the story of the mother of a 5-year old victim: *"My 5-year old daughter was promised fifty Burundian Franc ~you can't even buy sweets with such a small amount~ in exchange for 'something' that he wanted to do with her. She didn't know what he meant and was raped, but she never got the money. Back home, she*

[24] I identified and formulated these three levels together with Eveline Rooijmans, the Oxfam Novib lobbyist I went to Burundi with, with whom I wrote a policy briefing on these levels to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

told me that she didn't get 'the promised money'. I asked her why she would get money and found out that she was raped. By her uncle." The mother clearly expressed that she was shocked that someone would do something like that to her child; but she seemed less impressed that it was her daughter's uncle who did it. The way she told it gave me the idea that she was influenced by years of endemic violence, as if she was always prepared that anyone ~even family members~ could engage in such acts of violence.

Besides, Claire's ignorance of where to seek help and of formal procedures of reporting a case, shows that there is not enough done to inform people on their rights, or that they do not have access to this information. The mother shows the same ignorance: *"I think the courts try their best. I have no idea what his punishment will be, or if there are certain fixed penalties for rape. I think that perpetrators are not really punished by only doing time in jail. If it was up to me, I would want him to pay compensation until the time that she marries. At least enough money to pay for her food. If it turns out that my child is HIV-positive, I only want him dead or being killed. I know that the justice system does not work that way, but at least he should be locked up forever. I will never accept it if nothing happens, if he would just walk in the streets again"*. This quote shows that the mother is poorly informed concerning the legal system, and her last sentence seems to imply that she is scared that ~or at least not surprised if~ nothing will be done.

These low expectations of the police and justice system that Clair *("The police cannot help me without prove", "there is a lot of corruption"* and *"perpetrators can buy out the police."*) and the mother (*"I think the courts try their best"*) express, relate to the second approach: the protection of women (and men) in general. It seems that they do not expect that the police or court will protect them. Claire even went straight to a human rights organization instead of the police, which is not surprising considering the police's reputation. Irrespective of this, the mother does have confidence in the police ~*"I went straight ahead to the police. I trust the police; I rather go to them than to women in my community, they might not believe me. […] He is put on remand; the police need medical proof first before they can really arrest him. Just now, the rape is proved and we are here at Ligue Iteka to get judicial assistance."*~ it still seems that the police leave the communication with the court to the victims. Communication between the police and justice sector seems to be inadequate, just as their plan of action. This indicates that the state is not the effective provider of security, whereas non-state actors as human rights organizations are. This relates to what Verheijen (2009) and Duffield (2007) describe; the state is not the sole security provider, and other institutions often have more legitimacy. For SSR efforts this means that donors should analyze which actor

provides security best, and those actors should receive support. This is exactly what Baker and Scheye (2007) mean with their multi-layered SSR approach. However, it would be difficult for donors to determine which actors provide the best services, whether they provide these services equally amongst the population, whether these actors do not undermine other actors such as the state; or in other words: who they should support.

With regard to the third approach ~how to change the role of women to become active participants in security matters and sensitize the Burundian society~ both women seem to feel misunderstood and subordinated to men, and are looking for a place where they can express their issues. Both victims went to women's or human rights organizations, places with easy access, that provide help and where women feel understood. Claire explicitly expressed the need to know more about her rights. The mother on the other hand, still preferred the police over women in her community, who might not believe her. But she also explained their disbelief as follows: *"They might be scared to offend someone they know, especially a man, he might take revenge."* This is a typical illustration of the idea that women are not in the position to ~openly~ offend a man, not even when it concerns serious misbehaviour, and also of men being violent and punishing women. For this same reason, women also fear going to the police and court. Women's organizations indeed seem to be a workable alternative to seek help and in which they can learn more about their rights regarding security matters. They can thus be considered a better security service provider (at least for women) than state institutions.

Even though these narratives both concern sexual violence, it is clear that they also relate to all three of the dimensions of gender and security. Policies should thus not focus on sexual violence or improving the security sector alone, but on the entire spectrum of gender issues. When looking at the three theme's that the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs claims to work on to implement Resolution 1325, which I have described in §2.3, the same broad approach counts. It focuses on: 1) the involvement of women in the security sector; 2) a gender perspective in conflict prevention and training security personnel; and 3) the protection of women. These themes correspond to the three levels that I have identified (their first theme is similar to my third level; the second theme is a combination of my first and third level; and the third theme resembles my second level); although mine are adjusted to the Burundian context. Obviously, the gender perspective of the 1325-themes pays extra attention to women since it wants to attract attention to the overlooked position of women, but in contrast to my three levels these themes almost seem to exclude men from the process.

The first and third theme concern women alone, but their second theme does mention a more broad ‘gender perspective’. This perspective however focuses just on training the troops and other security personnel involved. Nothing is said about ordinary men and their sensitization on gender issues. As I described before, including them is important because to stop gender violations (which in general are committed by men, although not always on purpose) and impunity, all gender aspects, including sensitization on the different needs and equal rights between men and women, need to be included in policy making. To address the security of all Burundians, all people should therefore be involved in the sensitization process. Violence against women is not just a women’s business, but a problem of the entire Burundian society. In the next chapter I will therefore examine what is done in policies to fight issues of sexual violence and the other dimensions of insecurity regarding SSR and gender.

Chapter 4. Towards a Gender-Sensitive SSR Policy

§4.1 Dutch SSR and gender efforts in Burundi

After identifying the three most important dimensions of insecurity that threaten human security in Burundi, it is time to see what is done in Dutch policies to fight the insecurity coming from quota in past security sector reforms, misbehaviour of the security sector, and endemic violence. As described in Chapter 2, the Dutch SSR policy in Burundi focuses on strengthening the military (FDN) and the police (PNB) so that they become able to protect the population. Most (bilateral) efforts so far have been on project-basis and concern material support and training and advice by Dutch experts to contribute to the Burundian material and human capacity. Partly because these projects have been once-only and short term and because the Fragile States Policy (published in November 2008) is newly designed, the Dutch-Burundian efforts are still under construction and not much is written on structural SSR efforts in Burundi. However, policy papers concerning Dutch SSR efforts have two things in common: they often do not include the topic of gender, or they stress that they want to integrate gender in their SSR efforts but they do not know how. In any case, the following, current efforts as described in policy papers and as told by informants, give an idea of the Dutch SSR ~and gender~ efforts in Burundi.

Although most Dutch efforts so far have been on project basis, there is one important structural effort. To professionalize the Burundian army and police, the Dutch Ministry of Defence sent two SSR advisors to the Burundian Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Police, to work with the FDN and PNB. This is a unique effort, because the Dutch are the only country that has SSR advisors directly working for the Burundian army and police. One of the advisors is assigned the task of implementing a Strategic Plan into the FDN, the other is assigned the same task but then into the PNB.[25] The advisors are sent abroad for a term of six months. Both of their Strategic Plans fall within the scope of the Memorandum of Understanding, which is signed (in April 2009) by the Dutch and Burundian government with the goal to intensify cooperation within the security sector. Gender is not included in either of the Strategic Plans for the PNB and the FDN.[26] According to the SSR-advisor at the FDN, van Santvoord, the key objectives of the Strategic Plan are housing and a programme to prevent misbehaviour. This programme focuses on ethics for all militaries, and on leadership

[25] At the time of my research in Burundi, the SSR-advisor for the FDN was Roeland van Santvoord, (from the Dutch land forces) and Miriam Weimar (from the Dutch military police) worked for the PNB.
[26] Interviews with Roeland van Santvoord (August 6, 2008) and Miriam Weimar (July 28, 2008).

capacities for officers. However, van Santvoord says that material capacity is needed first, before training sessions can start. He believes that the main reason for a busy schedule at the moment is to prevent the military from troubling the population.[27] Van Santvoord's task is to further develop the education of staff members of the FDN; the actual implementation of the plan is up to others. Carrying out projects is not part of the advisors tasks. Still, a former SSR-advisor at the PNB tried to set up a project to improve the documentation on cases of sexual violence. However, it seemed that officials had a lack of knowledge on how to structure documentation, and many cases were not documented at all, what seemed to be one of the reasons for not prosecuting perpetrators and widespread impunity. Since many cases were not documented in the first place, the project was ended.

In addition to structural cooperation via SSR advisors, several short projects were implemented by the Dutch. Regarding the FDN, these projects included the reconstruction of military barracks and human rights training. When it comes to projects directed at the PNB, they were provided with twenty cars (equipped with radios) and policemen received motorcycle driving lessons.[28] Next to material improvements, several projects were directed at increasing human capacities. In 2006, twelve policewomen received a two-week training from two Dutch policewomen. The policewomen learned how to better defend themselves and how to handle cases of sexual violence. Afterwards, they should pass on their knowledge to other policewomen. Back then, there were already plans on continuation of the project to *all* policewomen and -men, but at the time of writing this has not happened yet[29]. There has also been a small project in self-defence for women directed at a diverse company of sixteen professionals of the security sector (from the Parliament, Ministries, the police and army). They were sent to the Netherlands for training and discussions. Only one of the participants was a woman.[30]

Multilateral efforts

In a more structural way, the Dutch are more involved in SSR and gender policy than described above, namely via multilateral efforts. As described in the Fragile States strategy (Koenders, 2008: 20), starting point of the Dutch efforts is *'multilateral if possible, bilateral if needed'*, because of its advantages regarding coordination, political weight, a guaranteed

[27] Interview with Roeland van Santvoord (conducted on August 6, 2008).
[28] www.minbuza.nl Nieuwsbericht: "Samenwerking op gebied van veiligheid met Burundi" Minister Koenders, 11 april 2009.
[29] Interview with Miriam Weimar, SSR advisor for the PNB. (conducted on July 28, 2008).
[30] Interview with Arthur Kibbelaar, conducted by IFP (a Swedish peace-building initiative) researcher Katja Svensson (on July 22, 2008).

structural policy for the long-term, and a share of the burden. An example of Dutch contributions to multilateral organizations are the Peace Building Commission (PBC) of the UN, and its Peace Building Fund (PBF). The PBC provides advice on integrated strategies, and has chosen Burundi as a country of focus. It assigned 35 million dollar to support government priorities for peace consolidation, of which SSR is one of its top priorities. (Powell, 2007: 11) The Netherlands contribute fifteen million euro to the PBF.[31] The PBF finances fifteen projects, which are usually proposed by the Burundian government together with BINUB (*Bureau Intégré des Nations Unie au Burundi*).

BINUB is the UN development support office, whose mandate includes 'advancing the process of SSR and to promote and defend human rights'. (Powell, 2007: 11) The Netherlands is one of the sixteen countries that take part in the BINUB mission.[32] Most UN organizations in Burundi, of which the UNDP and UNIFEM, are represented under BINUB.[33] They carry out several SSR initiatives that do include gender more prominently than the Dutch bilateral efforts. A good example of a project that combines both SSR and gender is BINUB and UNIFEM's project on 'gender focal points'. These focal points are a sort of complaint offices where women can report cases of sexual violence. Another effort that also includes gender is the BINUB and UNDP training (in October 2008) that was planned for top-level decision makers, to train them how to mainstream gender in SSR efforts. Accordingly, these decision makers are proposed to pass their knowledge on to lower levels.

Next to SSR and gender projects in general, there are also several additional projects especially directed at the police. UNIFEM for instance is supporting a project on trust in the police. It organizes meetings between women and the police, to regain trust in the police and inform women that they can safely report cases to the police.[34] Though unfortunately, the police might still be the violator. In that case, the Police Inspectorate is assigned the task to prosecute them. However, as described in Chapter 3, there is no criminal record system for the police to punish them; and the Inspectorate cannot do its work properly. Besides, the Inspectorate is composed of just six people, is lacking material capacity, and only accepts complaints coming from the police apparatus itself. At the time of my research in Burundi (July-August 2008), there were plans to connect a project of the Peace-building Fund to the Inspectorate. This project is planning a free complaint phone line, called 'telephone vert', in

[31] www.minbuza.nl
[32] The other countries are: Brazil, Denmark, Germany, Egypt, France, Great-Britain, India, Japan, Croatia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Rwanda, Tanzania, the Czech Republic and the United States. BINUB's mandate is extended twice until December 31, 2009. www.vredesmissies.nl
[33] Algemeen Ambtsbericht Burundi, 6 maart 2009. Minbuza, Den Haag.
[34] Interview with Christine, Commandante de l'Unite de Protecte des Mineures et des Moeurs. August 2008.

order to receive complaints from victims of violence committed by the police. To further address gender issues to the police, there are also plans to realize a Gender Unit at the PNB. According to Lele, the Chief Police Advisor of BINUB, the objective of the Gender Unit is the integration of gender at all levels, focusing on capacity building and sensitization of both men and women.[35]

These efforts sound promising, and it looks like the Dutch ~although indirectly~ do support gender more than in their bilateral policy. However, the above mentioned policy efforts are described from the donor's point of view and it would be interesting to see what actors in Burundi think of the choices made regarding the SSR policy, and the way in which it is implemented. In the next section I will therefore examine what they think of the Dutch (bilateral and multilateral) efforts, and whether these efforts are considered effective in practice.

§4.2 Policy in practice

The abovementioned projects seem to be practical efforts, that promote ownership ~by training the local population and improving their institutional capacity~ and, since the plans were put down on paper and the projects should have been started, should be showing some effect. However, whether these efforts look as good in practice as they do on paper, will be shown in this section by looking at whether these efforts are actually implemented, and at critical remarks concerning these efforts and their implementation made by several respondents during my research in Burundi. This research focused on sexual violence, so the respondents criticism mainly concerns in what way the efforts address sexual violence. However, this also includes how to protect and sensitize people, which provides insight into how effective the efforts in general are.

Gender focal points

When it comes to BINUB/UNIFEM's gender focal points; at the time of my research in Burundi these gender focal points existed in four provinces and should have been extended to six provinces at the end of 2008. Financial means however ~also for further extension over the entire country~ are lacking. Besides, according to Consilie, a researcher of Dushirehamwe,[36] many people in the communities were not familiar with the gender focal

[35] Interview with Agathe Lele, conducted on August 2, 2008.
[36] A Burundian network of women's groups.

points.[37] Consilie said that this is probably the result of a lack of material capacity, particularly cars and uniforms, which makes them hard to reach and to identify as being gender focal points. A spokesperson of Ligue Iteka[38] stated that the focal persons are often police, who are absent repeatedly because they have to bring perpetrators to the city, court or jail, and thus leave their post unattended. Also, the posts are often far away and thus hard to reach since traffic is expensive to most Burundians in the communities. Within the Ministries there are gender focal persons as well, which were trained two years earlier. In the meanwhile no updates or evaluations took place, which might have the effect that people do not know what to do with the knowledge thought to them or might have forgotten parts. This could also explain why the existence of gender focal points is unknown to many people.

Gender mainstreaming and sensitization

The same criticism can be given to the gender mainstreaming training to top-level decision makers provided by BINUB/UNDP. Decision-makers were *supposed* to pass on their knowledge to lower levels in society. According to Lele, there has never been a follow up for this project ~not even planned~ so it is hard to tell whether the newly achieved skills were actually passed on.[39] Besides, gender training sessions often last two days at the maximum, which is often perceived too short to learn enough.[40] Without helping the trainers to train others or at least evaluate what happened afterwards, a small-scale project like this one can hardly be sustainable and result in gender mainstreaming. If top decision-makers would not teach lower levels how to mainstream gender, lower levels might as well not have a reason to be accountable towards them; and without mutual accountability there probably will not be any gender mainstreaming at all.

Still, some respondents during my research in Burundi did notice a growing involvement of the decision-making level in gender sensitization and training.[41] As I described before in Chapter 1, gender does not only concern physical violence directed at women, but also the cultural constructed differences between men and women, and the different security needs of men and women. To stop gender based violence sensitization of men and women, that is to become aware of these differences *and* of equal rights, is necessary. When asking one of these decision-makers, Nshirimana, Chef de Cabinet du

[37] Interview conducted on August 1, 2008.
[38] A Burundian human rights organization. Interview conducted on July 31, 2008.
[39] Chief Police Advisor of BINUB. Interview conducted on August 2, 2008.
[40] According to Tracy Dexter from International Alert. Interview conducted on August 1, 2008.
[41] Of which Marie-Josée Kandanga from UNIFEM. Interview conducted on August 4, 2008.

Ministre de la Sécurité Publique,[42] he said not to have a survey of the training efforts, and that all international partners operate individually. The involvement thus does not seem to be coming from the level of national decision-makers. And since international efforts are too short and ad-hoc, there is still a lot to do to sensitize the population. According to a spokesperson of APRODH (a Burundian human rights organization), sensitization should be best done bottom-up instead of top-down.[43] Since it is a problem of many families, *they* should be sensitized, both men, women and children, and learn about their rights. To do so, gender experts are needed and jurists should be sensitized as well. Several respondents consider the sensitization of the justice sector a priority in order to contribute to a less violent culture and more equality between men and women in Burundi.[44]

SSR and gender efforts directed at the police

When it comes to SSR and gender efforts directed at involving the police; UNIFEM's meetings to support trust in the police seem to have good results. At least, when it concerns the feedback on these first meetings the communities were positive because it was the first time the police had a public conversation with the population and showed their involvement towards the disapproval of violations committed by the police.[45] Still, UNIFEM *preferred* to organize these meetings in every community, but the first meetings only covered a few, so it is not clear whether all communities are actually involved in this project. Moreover, it is unclear whether the meetings were a once-only effort or that there will be follow-ups. Since the public seems to react positive on having a dialogue with the police, follow-ups would probably further improve trust in the police.

A way to improve the prosecution of police men that violated the population (and particularly women) is to connect the complaint line (of the Peace Building Fund) directly to the Police Inspectorate. In this way perpetrators can be prosecuted instead of being transferred to another region, which happens often. When it comes to the feasibility of the phone line, at the time of my research there were negotiations with telephone companies to cover this number for free in at least five regions. Still, this initiative should be covered nationwide, but financing is lacking. The idea to make a direct connection to the Inspectorate was not part of

[42] Who Eveline Rooijmans interviewed on August 4, 2008.
[43] Interview with APRODH conducted on August 5, 2008.
[44] These include a spokesperson of League Iteka, interview conducted on July 31, 2008; and Christine, Commandante de l'Unite de Protecte des Mineures et des Moeurs, interview conducted on August 4, 2008.
[45] Interview with Marie-Josée Kandanga, UNIFEM. Interview conducted on August 4, 2008.

the PBF's project, but is supported by the Ministry of Public Security and others involved.[46] This and other gender related amendments still need to be put in the organizational script of the Inspectorate.

There is however some obscurity concerning the purpose of the phone line. General Générose of the Police Inspectorate said that she invented the idea, and that it is meant to report sexual violence (not necessarily committed by police), after which the 'sexual violence unit' then takes care of this violence. Further, she believes that a direct connection to the Inspectorate is not needed, because *"people can report violence directly, but then? To intervene immediately there are not enough means of transport"*. Here, she implies that the phone line would be a sort of alarm line[47] instead of a way to complain about the police. The idea of creating this phone line originated from the fact that the Inspectorate only takes care of complaints coming from the police apparatus itself, not from civilians. However, Générose implies that civilians are already able to complain to the Inspectorate. Its purpose should thus become clear in order that a direct connection to the Inspectorate can really help the complaining people and in prosecuting police perpetrators.

A Gender Unit at the police?

To further involve the police in gender issues, a Gender Unit was planned. According to the Chief Police Advisor of BINUB this unit already exists and its objective is to change the idea of gender; that it should sensitize men and women on all gender issues. However, detailed questions showed that she meant another unit, the *Unite Police des Mineurs et du Respect des Moeurs*, which is not really a separate unit and takes care of cases of (sexual) violence against women and children.[48] Considering the high amount of gender based violence this unit is extremely important, but it does not address the other objectives (e.g. sensitization) the Chief Police Advisor of BINUB mentions.

This different idea of what a gender unit is can be seen as a perfect example of a different view on the concept of gender in general. As I have described in Chapter 2, in Burundi the concept of gender is often mistaken for sexual violence alone and excludes all other themes of the gender-spectrum described in Chapter 3. This is problematic, because all gender issues should be addressed simultaneously (and not just sexual violence) in order to

[46] Interviews with Désiré Nshirimana (Chef de Cabinet du Ministre de la Sécurité Publique), General Générose (Vice Inspector of the Police Inspectorate), and Agathe Lele (Chief Police Advisor of BINUB). August 2008.
[47] Christine, Commandante de l'Unite de Protecte des Mineures et des Moeurs, also thought the line was made for that purpose and a direct connection would be useless without more cars.
[48] According to Consilie of Dushirehamwe. Interview conducted on August 1, 2008.

make a change. For that very reason ~according to BINUB~ the idea of a more general, all-embracing Gender Unit at the PNB was invented that not only takes care of cases of gender based sexual violence, but also cases as discrimination or domestic violence. It is unclear whether the objectives of this project are misunderstood ~and that this resulted in the Unite Police des Mineurs et du Respect des Moeurs~, or whether it is still planned to exist next to this 'sexual violence unit'. None of the informants could explain what the exact role and functions of this Gender Unit would be, and it is still unclear to me, but the interviews did show that both Burundi as the Dutch consider it essential to install such a unit to address the broad spectrum of gender issues as a whole. What is clear is that a Gender Unit at the police that works on the entire spectrum of gender does not exist so far.[49]

Besides, irrespective of whether this 'broad unit' will be realized or not, the existing Unite Police des Mineurs et du Respect des Moeurs should reconsider its personnel. As described earlier, Burundian women find it difficult to express themselves ~especially in sensitive cases like these~ towards men. The Unite Police des Mineurs et du Respect des Moeurs contains only thirteen women, out of the 86 people working there.[50] Perhaps involving a gender expert in this unit would be an interesting option to make its organizational structure more gender-sensitive. Besides, gender experts would also be useful in realizing a broader gender unit at the PNB that does live up to BINUB's objectives.

Gender and the Dutch Strategic Plans

Other than the multilateral efforts the Dutch are involved in, the Strategic Plans that the Dutch SSR advisors are working on, do not include gender at all. According to the SSR-advisor at the PNB,[51] gender should have been included from the very beginning of the planning and is difficult to include as yet. However, another project called the *Police de Proximité* (a project of the Peace Building Commission), which assesses how to improve police involvement in the communities, *is* included in the Strategic Plan of the PNB. This project that focuses on community policing, could be a possibility to integrate gender into its efforts, and thus also indirectly into the Strategic Plan of the PNB. When the Police de Proximité will indeed be more involved in communities, they could for instance act as gender focal points and deal with cases of gender based (sexual) violence; or they can provide information and advice concerning human rights and equal rights of men and women to the community. However,

[49] According to several respondents, of which Tracy Dexter of International Alert. Interview conducted on August 1, 2008.
[50] Interview with Christine, Commandante de l'Unite de Protecte des Mineures et des Moeurs. Interview conducted on August 4, 2008.
[51] At the time of my research (August 2008) in Burundi this was Miriam Weimar.

financial means and human capacity are yet lacking to implement the Police de Proximité project effectively *without* gender, so there probably is not enough money and human capacity to integrate gender in its objectives. Besides, its planning is also vague concerning the disarmament of the police men in the Police de Proximité project (they are supposed to carry just bats because they will work amongst the communities).

Additionally, according to Tracy Dexter,[52] the Belgians are the only donor that trains on the Police de Proximité. There thus needs to be a good coordination between them and the Dutch in order to integrate gender via the Police de Proximité project into the Dutch Strategic Plan efforts. Besides, since the Dutch SSR advisors are not allowed to implement projects, they might not be able to further work out the Police de Proximité concept in the Strategic Plan so that it does include gender. It might also be too time-consuming considering the six-month working term of the advisors.

Conclusions

This chapter has examined why and how the running projects on SSR and gender differ from their descriptions and objectives on paper. This gap between policy and practice became clear in the implementation of the Dutch efforts. The differences mainly seem to be the result of a lack of financial means, but a poor coordination with other donors as well as too brief and limited projects and training sessions without enough alignment with local actors about their needs, expectations and how to continue these efforts, probably results in less sustainable efforts. However, next to identifying the gaps, the respondents in my research ~which are largely local actors~ also exposed their ideas on how the Dutch and multilateral efforts can become more sustainable. They listed their ideas on how to improve the current efforts according to what they believe can be achieved on the short run to improve civilians' (and especially women's) security. Their number one priority is to attract more women to the police. The education of (present and future) women in the police should be improved, just as the educational level of the police in general (who need to become more specialized), and sensitization on gender issues in particular. This also counts for the justice sector; the penal code should be changed, police should be punished via a filing system and there need to be faster trials in cases of sexual violence. In both sectors, sensitization training should be intensified. In the next chapter I will further reflect on the possible gaps in policy and how the Dutch SSR and gender efforts in Burundi can become more effective.

[52] From International Alert. Interview conducted on August 1, 2008.

Conclusions and recommendations

Critical reflection on the Dutch SSR efforts in Burundi

As shown in the previous chapters, the Netherlands are involved in many different ways and projects to support SSR ~and to a lesser extent gender~ in Burundi. To assess whether the Dutch policy takes up the most important issues that affect human security, I will compare their efforts to the priorities in reforming the police and justice sector mentioned by the Burundian respondents in Chapter 4: more women in the police and the education and gender sensitization of the police and justice sector. I will also assess whether the efforts address the more general priorities that I have formulated in Chapter 3; the dimensions of insecurity in Burundi: 1) ethnic quota in past security sector reforms, 2) the security sector itself, and 3) endemic violence. Additionally, I will also compare the Dutch efforts to the OECD/DAC SSR guidelines ~which the Dutch endorse in their Fragile States Policy~ described in Chapter 1 and 2. These guidelines recommend three objectives that international actors should aim for: 1) the establishment of effective governance, oversight and accountability in the security system; 2) the improvement of basic security and justice delivery; and 3) the development of local leadership and ownership of the reform process.

By discussing the most important gaps or arguments and comparing these to these three levels of priorities, I will analyze whether the Dutch efforts are based on the dimensions of insecurity specific for Burundi ~one of the objectives of the Dutch Fragile States Policy is that policy should be made to match the specific characteristics of each partner country~ *and* on international SSR guidelines on foreign intervention in fragile states.

Sensitization & training of the security sector

As the Dutch efforts to support the security sector show, a substantial amount of the assistance is material, in the form of goods or money allocated for goods and infrastructure. Next to improving the sector's material capacity, these efforts might also make working for the security services more encouraging, or at least less tedious. Perhaps, this will influence the environment of endemic violence that the security forces are subjected to in a positive way. For instance, when the police experience that there is taken care of them, they will hopefully stop expressing their frustration towards the population. Next to material improvements, the forces also receive training to learn to deal with their behaviour, human rights and women. However, this form of sensitization needs to be implemented on a much bigger scale, than just to (high-level) security sector members, to reach all people that suffer from violations in any

way ~which in Burundi means almost everyone~ in order to be sustainable. Whether training does actually change people's behaviour is questionable. Years of endemic violence created (at least according to Allen, 1999 and Steenkamp, 2005) the socially permissive environment that influenced people's violent behaviour, so it probably takes another long period to change this environment and people's moral. Obviously, training and sensitization play a small role in changing it, but on the scale on which these efforts are implemented now the chances probably remain small.

To improve the reach, and hopefully effect of training on the 'culture of violence', training sessions need to involve more participants, which are also carefully selected depending on the topic of the training. For instance, they should also include police men from lower levels when discussing their behaviour; often they are the ones on the streets and thus closest to the population. Training sessions need follow-ups to stay up-to-date, and evaluation and assistance to guide people through the changes right after a training session has ended, particularly when they follow the train-the-trainers principle.

Next to the existing, thematic training projects, the general educational level of the police should be improved as well. According to Mrs. Lele,[53] there are not enough specializations within the PNB, which makes it hard to make promotion. This could result in demotivated police agents that have no prospects of a more challenging career or better salary; which might involve the risk that they seek these challenges outside the legal spheres. Besides, not all police are trained at all, but are integrated straight from, for example, a former rebel movement or a different (security) branch.[54] Such police members often do not know how to deal with cases of violence, how to behave themselves and how to treat victims. They might use force themselves, or are simply unable to protect the population; what both contributes to insecurity. Especially policewomen have a low educational level. Since more women are needed in the police because of their use in gender issues, more attention should be put in educating them on gender issues and risk management.[55]

Even though ethnicity does not seem to be a direct threat to security anymore, the differences in educational level between the Hutu and Tutsi working in the security sector (as described in Chapter 3) could also effect their behaviour. The historically underrepresented Hutu now occupy fifty percent of the positions in the security sector, as a result of the ethnic

[53] Chief Police Advisor, BINUB. Interview conducted on August 2, 2008.
[54] Interview with a spokesperson of Ligue Iteka, conducted on July 31, 2008.
[55] Interviews with APRODH (conducted on August 5, 2008); Christine, Commandante de l'Unite de Protecte des Mineures et des Moeurs (on August 4, 2008); and General Générose, Vice Inspector of the Police Inspectorate (on August 5, 2008).

quota. Due to the former suppressed position of the Hutu, their educational level is often lower than that of Tutsi (particularly of those Hutu who have been members of former rebel movements). This means that one half of the security sector's personnel is less educated than the other half. When the security sector is planning to maintain these ethnic quotas without equalizing the educational level of its personnel, an equal representation of Hutu and Tutsi is thus far from being equal. Training sessions (for instance to professionalize or sensitize the police) should therefore pay extra attention to training the lower levels.

Concerning sexual violence, training efforts directed at the police concentrate mainly on sensitizing them to improve their capabilities to protect women. These projects focus on sexual violence alone; the police learn how to treat victims, and how to provide direct assistance to victims of sexual violence. These efforts might have contributed to the fact that sexual violence committed by the police is decreasing while the numbers of sexual violence by civilians (and other forms of domestic violence) are increasing. However less, the police still do commit these crimes. Moreover, the fact is that the police today are not able to protect women from sexual violence committed by civilians. Sensitization efforts should thus focus more on 'ordinary' people in general, both women (not just victims, prevention should also play an important role) *and* men (not just police men). Addressing a 'culture of violence' needs a nationwide mentality-change.

All Dutch SSR efforts are of course supposed to improve people's security, both ad-hoc as structural initiatives, but these improvements seem to be a lengthy process. In the meanwhile, direct civilian protection is missing. Still, there are ways to contribute to security on the short-term as well. As a quick fix, Mrs. Kandanga of UNIFEM suggests to implement a zero-tolerance policy concerning sexual violence.[56] Since the perpetrators are often known, she believes it should not be too hard to punish them. Although prosecution often is the main problem ~but I will discuss the relation between the police and the justice sector later on~, there are faster ways to do so. Mrs. Kandanga suggests using the role of traditional leaders that often intervene in such cases, in a constructive way: they can be sensitized to give advice or socially exclude perpetrators. Another and in my opinion easier quick fix the Dutch could perform is, next to the material assistance (such as batons and uniforms) they are providing to the police, they could also provide storing space for their weapons, so the police can not take them home with them ~which does happen now~ and in that way prevents them from abusing

[56] Interview with Marie-Josée Kandanga, UNIFEM. Interview conducted on August 4, 2008.

civilians outside working hours.[57] Obviously, sexual and other forms of violence can also occur without weapons, but without service weapons the chance to use these will at least decline. Besides, trust in the ~professionalism of the~ police might improve when less violence is committed by using service weapons, and people might also feel safer to approach them.

Broadening the gender spectrum

As stated many times in this research, most efforts on gender concern sexual violence alone. What Burundians often seem to misunderstand, but what also seems to be forgotten in the Dutch efforts, is that gender includes more than just sexual violence. Gender in relation to security also means the protection of women *and* men in general; improving access to assistance for victims, and ending impunity. But also sensitizing all Burundians of their equal rights and changing the role of women to become active participants in security matters. This includes equal access to these services, so women can actually become the much needed policewomen. According to the Dutch Embassy,[58] women in Burundi *are* a main focus of the Dutch, and despite the ad-hoc projects it also expresses the need for a more systematic and comprehensive approach towards gender.

In Chapter 2 and 3, I referred to a policy paper of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2007) that examines how a gender perspective can be included in the Dutch SSR policy framework. This paper claims that the Netherlands are working on three themes to implement Resolution 1325 in fragile states: 1) the involvement of women in the security sector, 2) a gender perspective in training security personnel; and 3) the protection of women. The Dutch (bilateral and multilateral) efforts described in Chapter 4, do not seem ~at least not convincingly~ to be enough to achieve these three goals. None of the efforts address the involvement of women in the security sector; only a few brief training sessions on gender were organized for a limited amount of people. More women should enter the police after the recruitment stop is over (which, at the time of my research in Burundi, was said to last two years in order to finish the downsizing project). To do so, women should be motivated to join the police already. Since former female FNL rebels need to be integrated anyhow, they might as well join the PNB then.[59] As Mrs. Christine suggested, media campaigns or better housing

[57] According to Miriam Weimar the Dutch are postponing such storing projects, because they are waiting for the finishing of the census on how many weapons are exactly circulating amongst the police. However, in the meanwhile the risks of misuse prevail.
[58] Interview with Arthur Kibbelaar, conducted by IFP (a Swedish peace-building initiative) researcher Katja Svensson (at July 22, 2008).
[59] Interview with General Générose, Vice Inspector of the Police Inspectorate. Conducted on August 5, 2008.

facilities could make working at the police more appealing to women. [60] However, the respondents agree that the government should agree on integrating more women into the forces first. The Dutch could lobby to sensitize the government on this subject.

Regarding the protection of women; this is only partly assured by barracking the military, as well as by 'complaint' initiatives that have not enough capacity to either hear all cases (i.e. gender focal points) or actually deal with them (i.e. the Police Inspectorate). Besides, involving the police more closely into the communities (Police de Proximité) could also be a threat instead of a guarantee for people's security, especially when they are not properly trained or equipped. Moreover, not only the 1325 themes seem to exclude men in their gender-perspective (as I have showed in Chapter 3); the Dutch also exclude civilian men from their sensitization efforts. Gender experts are needed that know how to reach all people in sensitization efforts. According to Eveline Rooijmans,[61] Burundian civil society organizations have this gender expertise, however not on SSR level. This might be an opportunity to connect these two fields.

Justice & Accountability

Unlike the efforts put in strengthening the security forces, the Dutch SSR efforts do not include the justice apparatus at all. To stop impunity and make sure that cases do make it to the court, not just the police but the judiciary also needs to be strengthened. As described in Chapter 3, the penal code contains some contested laws (discriminatory towards women and an insufficient disciplinary system) which if changed, could improve the effectiveness of the police and military as well. The Dutch could at least lobby to encourage the Burundian government to adjust the penal code. Clear sanctions following (sexual) violence and training of jurists will not only stop impunity, it might also lead to more professionalized security forces that hold each other accountable in implementing the rule of law. However, the Dutch efforts seem to pay less attention to establishing oversight and accountability in the security sector; which should be part of the first objective of the OECD/DAC guidelines for international engagement. The following ineffective or lacking efforts show that the Dutch do not consider this part of the objective a key focus. Some efforts might however contribute to accountability, particularly training sessions directed at improving the police's behaviour and respect for human rights, which may lead to a better understanding of the police's obligations

[60] Commandante de l'Unite de Protecte des Mineures et des Moeurs. Interview conducted on August 4, 2008.
[61] The Oxfam Novib lobbyist with who I went to Burundi.

towards the public. After all, violence committed by the police has reduced, perhaps as a result of these efforts.

But accountability also means that members of the security sector can be held accountable when they *do* violate human rights. This implies that there have to be rules and mechanisms to respond to cases reported by civilians. Such oversight mechanisms are supported via Dutch multilateral efforts, namely the gender focal points and the Police Inspectorate, but they are not able to work effectively enough to prevent violent behaviour committed by the police. The gender focal points provide oversight by receiving complaints from the public, but they only work in a few districts of the country, are not very known by the public (because they do not wear a particular uniform, have remote posts or are not present on their posts), and do not have enough human and financial capacity. But most of all, there is no legal system attached to it to actually deal with these cases. Almost the same counts for the Police Inspectorate; if it did not lack human and material capacity it could play an important role in establishing and enforcing the rules that control the police's behaviour. Without enough resources and a disciplinary system the Inspectorate cannot prosecute perpetrators and thus improve its oversight capacity. Consequently, if the Dutch will assist the Inspectorate in their organizational structure ~which is planned~ the Inspectorate could become an effective oversight mechanism.

Not just the security or justice sector itself needs to be trained and sensitized; many 'ordinary people' are unfamiliar with the justice system as well. In particular, legal assistance to women is needed, because they are often illiterate, not informed of their rights and have a limited access to this sector. Other suggestions to help them are faster trials in cases of sexual violence, and more attorneys (at least financed) to join victims to hearings.[62]

There seem to be many ways to involve the justice sector into the Dutch SSR efforts. One of the Dutch SSR advisors, van Santvoord, notices a very easy entry-point: the Dutch Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Development Cooperation seem to have the disposal of a SSR-pool that is mostly occupied by jurists. Santvoord suggested that if they would be set to work in Burundi, the Dutch could help strengthening the justice sector as well.[63] Besides, the OECD/DAC Handbook on SSR warns donors explicitly not to focus their for SSR efforts on just a segment of the security sector; unlike the Dutch that focus on the police and military and not on the justice sector. According to the OECD/DAC (2007b: 24) this would *"undermine the adoption of a comprehensive approach and fragmentation of the system can*

[62] Interview with a spokesperson of Ligue Iteka. Interview conducted on July 31, 2008.
[63] Interview with Roeland van Santvoord, August 6, 2008.

prevent the establishment of a cohesive national policy framework". State security systems are part of the public sector in general, so it is important that they will be recognized like that in order to be part of efforts aiming at the public sector (reform) as well. In this way, the entire security sector will obviously benefit from such efforts, but also gain legitimacy as being actual state institutions that exist to serve the public. The Dutch Fragile States strategy expresses with its own comprehensive framework that it finds it important to follow a system-wide approach, so I wonder why it excludes the justice sector from its SSR efforts. These split efforts not only stop the Dutch from their own objective of a system-wide approach, but also that of the Burundian. Namely, according to Powell (2007: 22-23), the different agendas of all donors involved in SSR discouraged the Burundian government to establish a national SSR agenda themselves. Besides, the strategy paper also emphasized that the state should be the main security provider and that it has to do so in a neutral, accountable way. Accordingly, the Dutch efforts (and those of all the donors involved) could better support the *entire* security sector in order that it will be seen as a neutral public actor, instead of different sectors with differing loyalties and dependencies on donors.

Ownership

The Dutch Fragile States Policy states that international efforts should pay more attention to the local conditions and needs in order to implement a people-centred and locally owned approach. Ownership of the SSR planning and choices is needed in order to reform the actual local priorities. However, if the Dutch want to live up to their own objectives of paying more attention to local needs, they should pay more attention to including local priorities and actors in creating SSR policy. Like I just showed, the Dutch exclude the justice sector in their SSR efforts, although the analysis of the Burundian security situation showed that the justice sector does need strengthening in order to improve the effectiveness of the police as well. The same counts for gender; gender based violence is a key dimension of insecurity but it is not included in the Dutch SSR efforts. These examples show that the Dutch efforts do not anticipate on the Burundian needs.

According to the OECD/DAC guidelines *"reforms need to be shaped and driven by local actors in order to be implemented properly and sustained"*. (2007b: 32) To transfer the responsibility to protect the people, SSR efforts should be transferred to national actors in any case, so involving them from the start improves the chances that efforts can be sustained over time, both in terms of human and financial means. Professionalization of the security forces and technical and material support that include local actors and needs are thus important to a

proper devolution of the efforts. Of the Dutch SSR efforts that focus on professionalizing the police and military, the structural assistance regarding the SSR advisors' role to help the PNB and FDN implement Strategic Plans, seems to be the best Dutch example of a sustainable way to devolve ownership to the Burundians. However, the Dutch may question whether the six-month terms that the advisors are in the field contribute to a sustainable way of devolving knowledge. On the other hand, the (short) training sessions implemented by the Dutch are usually not shaped nor driven by local actors at all and therefore probably not effective in the long run.

The same counts for multilateral efforts like the Gender Unit; this idea is designed by donors and supposed to be driven by local actors, but there is neither enough tuning between the donors on what this unit should exactly do, not enough human and material capacity to put it into operation. This has resulted in obscurity whether this unit needs to be a newly designed institution or that it needs to be included in the Unite Police des Mineurs et du Respect des Moeurs or that this last unit should take on new tasks of gender sensitization. In the meanwhile, the Unite Police des Mineurs et du Respect des Moeurs has untrained, not gender-sensitized personnel, and in particular it is lacking female staff to deal with gender cases. This example shows how donors tend to 'invent' ideas on what they believe is needed in the local context, without analyzing whether this context has the capacities to create and maintain these efforts, whether similar institutions already exist, and whether local actors can be and want to be included in these ideas. Overall, the Dutch (and other donors) should thus ~just as fragile states programming critics as Woodward state~ focus more on the local needs and conditions *before* they design and implement policy, and involve local actors in these efforts from the beginning in order to deliver effective and sustainable reforms.

Conclusions

In this thesis policies directed at improving the security situation of fragile states are central. In connection with the everyday dimensions of insecurity in Burundi, I have focused on the priority needs to improve the security situation of all Burundian citizens, with particular attention to that of women. Following Van der Borgh (2008), Di John (2008), Milliken and Krause (2002), Woodward (2005) and Hout (2009), I explored the definitions of fragility and statehood. They mainly define fragile states as being based on the functionality of the state and the nature of their specific problems, but also as a donor definition coloured by personal donor agendas and Western notions of statehood and security. Therefore I did not only

concentrate on Burundi's security issues, but also on the issues on which the Dutch base their agenda and the efforts put in improving stability and security in Burundi.

Accordingly, state fragility knows many different forms because the issues of states differ as well. Insecurity however, especially due to the state's loss of the monopoly on violence, is seen as a common indicator of fragility. (Van der Borgh, 2008; Di John, 2008) At the same time insecurity is also a means for donors to intervene in fragile states. This 'securization of development' focuses on how to create conditions in fragile states that secure global stability and development, and thus see security in relation to other state's security. (Hout, 2009; Duffield, 2007) Whereas efforts that consider security a goal instead of prerequisite focus more on the internal situation, on how to improve civilian security. This last approach originated from a new 'paradigm' in development thinking which focuses on human rights, human security and the Responsibility to Protect.

Policies that support fragile states adopted both ways of thinking and focus primarily on improving security through state-building, which are both needed to foster development. Policy makers thus see states as necessary to providing security, even though the state itself often is the violator. SSR is therefore considered the main instrument in fragile states programming; to generate effective, accountable security forces which should be put under state control when it is able to do so. This state-centred SSR approach is the result of the normative concept of the state donors use, based on the Weberian state, according to which the state should have the monopoly on violence. However, fragile states are often not organized according to this model, but are based on patron-client relationships. (Verheijen, 2009) In such neo-patrimonial societies there is a broad network of state and non-state actors that provide security services. Critics of the state-centred SSR approach therefore believe that the focus should not be on building state-institutions but on the services that security providers deliver. After all, civilian security should be the goal of SSR, not building institutions that are considered illegitimate in the eyes of the population. Consequently, the approach should be people-centred instead of state-centred. International donors should thus focus on the real needs of the people and design their policy according to these needs, as opposed to adapting a 'readymade' policy. (Baker & Scheye, 2007; the Commission on Human Security, 2003; Woodward, 2005)

The Dutch Fragile States strategy is designed with reference to these ideas coming from the human security debate; its security approach focuses on civilian security, local needs and ownership. At least, that is what the proposal explains. However, the efforts described in it correspond to a state-centred approach, since it mainly focuses on security via institution-

building. Besides, if it would have been based on the security needs of the population, it would have included gender in its security dimension; since women in fragile states are considered the most vulnerable. The strategy paper thus claims to be people-centred but the efforts described are state-centred. Thus, there needs to be more attention to the interpretation of concepts as 'needs driven policy' and 'ownership' instead of just mentioning them in the policy proposal. This vagueness of the Dutch Fragile States strategy ~its inconsistent directions and fragments from differing literature~ means that the actual implementation is still open to interpretation; but moreover it is a strategy which is needed to get all actors on board. (Mosse, 2004)

However, this does not mean that the policy is not based on an analysis of a particular fragile state's issues, or that knowledge on how to implement the efforts in a given context is lacking. On the contrary, next to a short description in the policy proposal on what the Dutch strategy on SSR should look like, an entire policy paper dedicated to SSR and gender already exists. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007) This policy paper does include gender and has an overall more people-centred SSR approach compared to the Fragile States proposal. It refers to the OECD/DAC SSR guidelines, which implies that the Dutch are aware of the objectives they should aim for in intervention. Moreover, it shows that they have the potential to implement a gender-sensitive SSR approach.

The case of Burundi, with particular attention to gender and to the police, showed how the theory is implemented in practice. The main dimensions of insecurity in Burundi, especially the unprofessional security sector and the endemic (domestic and sexual) violence, and thus the priority needs when considering the people-centred focus of SSR are only included in the Dutch efforts in an incomplete way, such as ones-only training sessions and excluding civilians in sensitization efforts. Some vital SSR related fields are even ignored, such as gender and the justice sector. When the Dutch want to continue their structural cooperation with the Burundian government, and also live up to the foundations upon which the Fragile States Policy is based, they should adopt a more needs-based approach in both their bilateral as multilateral efforts. Next to financial and technical assistance, the efforts should focus more on training and sensitization of the *entire* security sector, the government and the civilians, especially on human rights and gender issues, in order to bring about sustainable, positive effects. These efforts need a more systematic and longer term commitment of donors and more donor coherence; in order that the Burundian government can develop the capacity to create its own national strategy framework so they can gain ownership over their own development processes.

In the Introduction of my thesis I described that I was wondering whether the Dutch would live up to their claims of improving the security situation in Burundi by paying attention to the local needs; which I interpreted as making an end to gender based violence. This curiosity arose from what I knew about Dutch fragile states efforts and insecurity in Burundi *before* this research: the Dutch put money in the security sector, and the security sector committed sexual violence against civilians. Back then, it seemed to me that the Dutch were indirectly contributing to these practices, and although I knew that these phenomena related to each other in a more complex way, it did seem to be problematic. Accordingly, I argued in favour of a gender-sensitive SSR approach.

Regarding the case of Burundi, the literature taught me that donors often base their agenda on dominant policy discourses. Not because they are blind for the situation on the ground, but because they need approval of all actors involved to implement their policy. The actual policy efforts would be negotiated on the ground. In this particular case, this did not result in joint SSR and gender efforts. Instead, the normative concept of the state used in the Dutch efforts resulted in a state-centred SSR approach; professionalizing these institutions should improve the security situation of the population. According to this top-down approach to security, endemic gender based violence would end when the security sector is able to protect the population. However, it seems that this approach is just shifting the problem: members of the security forces indeed commit less gender based violence, but the level of violence committed by civilians is increasing. State security forces will probably never become able to protect the population if not all members living in this socially permissive environment that maintains endemic violence, is involved in security efforts. Consequently, gender and security issues need to be addressed from the bottom-up as well, in order to achieve a nation-wide mentality change.

Recommendations

Finally, I propose some recommendations on how the Dutch could include gender into its SSR efforts in Burundi:

- Intensify, lengthen and repeat training and sensitization sessions directed at the police. These sessions need to focus especially on human rights and gender and should be directed more at lower levels of the police, because they are the least educated and closest to the population.
- More women are needed in the police. They should already be supported to join the police as soon as the recruitment stop is over. For instance via media campaigns. Until

then, former female FNL rebels can be integrated into the PNB. The educational level of women in the police, and of the police in general, needs to be improved.

- Sensitization efforts should also be directed at civilians, since domestic (gender based) violence is increasing. Men should also be reached in these efforts; gender is not just a women's issue, but a problem of the entire society. If necessary, use the knowledge of foreign gender experts.
- Provide storing space where the PNB can store its weapons after work. This should not wait until the census process is finished. It can decrease the chances on abuse in the immediate term.
- Include the justice sector in SSR efforts. It needs to be strengthened to improve the effectiveness of the police and to stop impunity. Lobby to encourage the Burundian government to change the penal code, which is discriminatory.
- Provide legal assistance, especially to women. More attorneys are needed to join victims of sexual violence to hearings.
- Strengthen oversight and accountability mechanisms in the security sector to promote the rule of law and improve public confidence in the security forces. Support initiatives that can become such mechanisms, such as the Police Inspectorate and gender focal points.
- Lengthen the six-month term of the SSR advisors. A longer training period is needed to learn more about the job, the country, language and issues. Expand their mandate by allowing them to implement projects.

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