Euregio Karelia - Multiple Political-Territorial Levels, Multiple Territorial Logics

A comparative analysis of the territorial logics of the overlapping political-territorial levels in Euregio Karelia and their effect on the development of Euregio Karelia
Colophon

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Abstract
In this research the territorial logics of the different border producing actors involved in cooperation across the EU-Finnish-Russian border, from the supranational to the subnational, are analysed. At the basis of this research is the reterritorialization of European space. The traditional sovereignty based nation-state model is challenged from above by the formation of the EU, and from below through the formation of Euregio’s.

Initially the EU predominantly focused on the internal situation. Now, the EU increasingly becomes a geopolitical power with its own foreign policies and cooperation policies, challenging the nation-state from above. Previously, the nation-state had a monopoly on foreign policy and cooperation with the 'other' side. Through the formation of Euregio’s, the subnational level becomes involved in cooperation with the 'foreign'. The subnational level has its own foreign policies, challenging the territorial logic of the nation-state from below.

The border between Finland and Russia became with Finland’s accession to the EU also the external border of the EU. On this EU-Finnish-Russian border Euregio Karelia was developed in 2000. This has created a complex multi-level (border) governance structures with different territorial levels of political action, or political-territorial levels, involved in cooperation across the border, hence involved in border production. These different political-territorial levels and their policies have a territorial underpinning, a territorial logic. With different ideas about the permeability of the border, creating different insides and outsides in different spheres of social action.

The Euregio Karelia forms a territory where different political-territorial levels meet and overlap. It formed a prism for this research to see how the territorial logics of the EU, Finland, Russia, the Finnish regions and the Republic of Karelia relate and affect the development of Euregio Karelia into an integrated cross-border region. The analysis of the territorial logics is structured around the five dimensions of the territorial logic: the economic, the cultural, the political-territorial, the governance and legal dimension.

In the EU logic the security discourse prevails over the economic integrationist discourse that dominated European politics till the last enlargement round. Within the security discourse there is a tension between ‘security through inclusion’ and ‘security through exclusion’. The ‘security through inclusion’ discourse and its cooperation tendencies with Russia are undermined “by the re-problematisation of the EU-Russian border as a line of exclusion from the area of ‘freedom, security and justice’” (Prozorov 2004: 15).

The logic of various EU cooperation policies and other border confirming policies conflicts with the logic of Euregio’s. Now the EU is "one the major disruptive forces that cross-border reterritorialization has to overcome” (Popescu 2008: 432). It contradicts with the EU's ambition to advance regional integration across its EU external border (Prozorov 2006: 134).

The regional policies like the ND and Euregio Karelia are subordinated to the broader geopolicies like ENP and EU-Russian relation (Sasse 2008). The centralizing tendencies in EU border policies are disruptive for the formation of Euregio Karelia as an integrated cross-border region at the edge of the EU territory. These centralizing tendencies in e.g. the ENP are informed by the security perspective of the EU. However these regional policies and cross-border cooperation (CBC) can only flourish if the threat perceptions are de-emphasized (Scott 2005: 446). If the security discourse keeps to dominate EU foreign (cooperation) policies, it is unrealistic Euregio Karelia will develop into an integrated cross-border space.

Like the EU, Finnish cooperation policies are subordinated to the broader geopolicies
regarding the Finnish approach to Russia. At first sight the territorial logic of Finland seems to be 'inclusivish'. Finland participates in many supranational and regional international cooperations, implying a logic of shared institutions, governance and sovereignty. However, the institutional thickness of most of these cooperations, other than EU, remains limited as is their political weight, making their impact on the sovereignty of the nation-state more a theoretical assumption than something that can be concluded in the world around us. I tend to see these political cooperations more as political fora than political-territorial levels of concrete action.

Finland maintains a relative hard border with Russia, especially through Schengen. This can be explained through the dominant security discourse on Russia. The threat perceptions of Russia imply a relative strict border with a strong barrier function. CBC can only flourish if the threat perceptions are de-emphasized (Scott 2005: 446). The independence of the subnational level is limited through the insistence on the equal participation of the national level. The insistence on a strict border through the maintaining of a strict visa regime the development of day-to-day border crossings remain difficult as is more economic cooperation.

A point of critique concerning the national level in Finland (and Russia) for the development of Euregio Karelia is its marginal role in national politics and policies. If Euregio Karelia is meant to be a success story, first and all it should be prioritized. Finland does not provide much support, resources or legitimacy.

In Russia the reaffirmation of sovereignty, and problematisation of regionalization of (border) policies form poor preconditions for development of the Euregio. The dominant self-exclusive discourse implies a border confirming tendency. On the other hand economic cooperation with the EU-side is vital for its economic development. This explains the emphasis on the reciprocal abolishing of visa regimes.

Border wise there is a duality in Russian views on its borders and integration with the EU. First there is strong modernistic approach, with emphasis on strict territorial control and an indisputable link between the state and territory and a strong national identity, at least with the ruling elite. Second, Russia worries about a possible loss of identity and fears disintegrative processes that might follow with regionalization of policies and EU integration. This approach prevails over postmodernist tendencies where border control is becoming less important and visa-free travel is desired (Joenniemie 2008: 155).

Looking from a comprehensive perspective towards Euregio Karelia, also the regions that constitute Euregio Karelia do not match the logic of such an integrated cross-border region. The Karelian Republic is more open for the development of an open integrated borderland in the EU-Finnish-Russian borderland than the Finnish regions. It is in its own interest. The thought that the economic development of the Finnish regions is not thought to come out of the Republic of Karelia is crucial for the Finnish region's logic. A more open border is promoted, such as an easing of the Schengen criteria, but a complete abolishing of the border certainly not. Maybe not so much on the political level, but at least on the societal level the threat perception towards Russia is also in the Finnish regions still present.

The logics and interests of the political-territorial levels that meet in Euregio Karelia and affect it development conflict with each other and the territorial logic of an integrated cross-border region. Even from the Finnish regions and the Republic of Karelia that founded it. This makes the preconditions for the development of Euregio Karelia in an integrated border region poor.
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<tr>
<td>CBC</td>
<td>Cross-Border Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ERDF</td>
<td>European Regional Development Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBR</td>
<td>Cross-Border Region</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESS</td>
<td>European Security Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CES</td>
<td>Common Economic Space</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>FMFA</td>
<td>Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMECON</td>
<td>Council for Mutual Economic Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>FPMO</td>
<td>Finnish Prime Minister Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSES</td>
<td>Common Space of External Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>JHA</td>
<td>Justice and Home Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSFSJ</td>
<td>Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>JMA</td>
<td>Joint Managing Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSRE</td>
<td>Common Space of Research and Education</td>
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<td>JMC</td>
<td>Joint Monitoring Committee</td>
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<td>DG FSJ</td>
<td>Directorate General Freedom, Security and Justice</td>
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<td>JSC</td>
<td>Joint Selection Committee</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<td>ND</td>
<td>Northern Dimension</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEA</td>
<td>European Economic Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCA</td>
<td>Partnership and Cooperation Agreement</td>
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<td>EFTA</td>
<td>European Free Trade Association</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>EGTC</td>
<td>European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation</td>
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<td>WWI</td>
<td>First World War</td>
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<tr>
<td>ENP</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood Policy</td>
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<td>ENPI</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument</td>
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<td>WWII</td>
<td>Second World War</td>
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Preface

With the writing of this preface, the writing process of my master thesis has almost come to an end. This process has been challenging, interesting, frustrating at times and instructive. Without the help and support of many it would have been more difficult.

The different courses of the master program ‘Human Geography, Europe: Borders, Identities & Governance’ introduced interesting subjects, but it were the courses ‘Geopolitics of Borders’ and ‘Cross-Border Governance’ that caught my attention. Especially questions around the (development of the) EU external border and the conflicting logic of this border is to my very interest.

I would like to thank Dr. Olivier Kramsch who taught these courses with much enthusiasm. It was also him who brought up the idea to do my research at the Karelian Institute. This has been a great experience and I can recommend it to anyone. Furthermore as my thesis supervisor Dr. Olivier Kramsch has given me valuable advice on setting up this research. He kept a supportive attitude during the whole process. For this I owe him much thanks.

This research would have been impossible without the support from the Karelian Institute. I would like to thank all my colleagues for making my internship a really pleasant, interesting and joyful time. Special thanks to Joni Virkkunen, my supervisor from the Karelian Institute, Illka Liikanen and James Scott for showing me around Joensuu and Viborg and for their useful comments and discussions.

Last, but not least, I am grateful for the support of my friends and family. The process of writing this master thesis has been difficult at times. Without their support and understanding it would have been much harder. I sincerely thank them for their support during all of my studies and making it the time of my life.

Enjoy reading!

Simon Sturm
Chapter 1 - Introduction

Background of Research

Challenging the nation-state: from above & below

The territorial organization of the European continent is in a constant process of change. The 'traditional' nation-state model, characterised by sovereign states with clear delineated borders developed since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. This treaty established the exclusive link between the nation-state and the national territory (Agnew 1994, Anderson 2001, Kolossov 2004).

European states exported this spatial model of territorial organisation to the rest of the world. A spatial model was forced onto territories and societies that did not know this spatial organisation before. Borders were drawn, sometimes by using astrological lines and nothing more than a measuring staff and a map. This created some remarkable situations that still affect the lives of people up to today.

This also shows that borders, that separate territories, are not natural, they are human inventions, constructed in the minds of people that however become reality and organize our lives to a great extent (Paasi 1998, Newman & Paasi 1998). Another example is the 'myth' of the European continent. Paul Valéry described Europe as 'a little promontory on the Asian continent' (Valéry, 1962: 31 in Delanty & Rumford 2005: 34). However in the minds of people the 'myth' of Europe as a continent, separate from Asia, continues to remain the dominant discourse. Despite the fact that no one can tell where Asia ends and Europe begins. It is however not to say that it is a myth, hence not important. Much of people's lives is strongly bound to territories (regions, states, continents) and the borders that separate them from each other.

The world as we know it is built of 'territorial containers'. Almost every piece of land is part of the sovereign territory of a state (Newman & Paasi 1998: 197). This is what John Agnew (1994) calls the territorial trap, where the nation state is seen as the "exclusive 'container' of economic, political, social and cultural space" (Van Houtum & Scott 2005: 13). Processes of globalization, EUnization and regionalization challenge the historical territorial organization of European space in sovereign nation-states.

The traditional territorial organization in sovereign nation-states is challenged from above by the forming of the European Union (EU). Some of the sovereign power previously located at the national-territorial level, is pooled in 'Brussels'. Member-states share some of their sovereignty implying a loss of sovereignty of the individual member states. The EU takes over some of the tasks previously located at the national level. Next to, or above, the nation-state a new supranational territorial level is established, forming a new territory that overlaps with the nation-state territory. This profoundly changes the spatial organization of Europe. This process is called 'reterritorialization' of European space, in which tasks are relocated from one level to an other level (Paasi 1996, Popescu 2008).

Territories are tightly linked to borders. Territories are defined by their borders, they bound a certain territory by excluding a territory. Because of the link between borders and territories the reterritorialization simultaneously changes the meaning of borders (Popescu 2008, Paasi 1996, Mahmadou & Van der Wusten 2008, Murphy 2008).

In the traditional nation-state model, borders are relative clear delineated lines of inclusion and exclusion. With the formation of the EU and the Single Market a space of freedom of
movement of goods, people, capital and services was developed. Changing the meaning of the internal borders significantly. The barrier function of the border has been lowered significantly. At the same time the EU external border was developed, to secure this space of freedom, security and justice. The EU became one of the most important border producing actors.

Initially the EU predominantly focused on its internal space. In the past two decades the EU’s attention shifted to its near abroad. Following Paasi (1999) I understand foreign policies as a form of border governance and part of border (re)production. With its own foreign policies and cooperation policies the EU inherently becomes involved in border governance and border production. Through the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and formation of Schengenland the EU affects the meaning and permeability of the border. The EU external border is formed, that borders the EU territory from its neighbours.

At first sight the EU policies regarding its neighbouring area and external border seems to be conflictual. On the one hand it wants to develop a hard-to-cross-border with strict visa regulations, on the other hand it wants to develop a permeable border and develop a space of close cooperation and interaction. This tension has created a complex account of borders in Europe. The EU external border becomes more differentiated and can vary in scope and tightness. Its security border, for example, are harder than its economic, telecommunication and education borders (Delanty & Rumford 2006: 130).

The EU territory is not singular and clear cut. Different ‘European’ policies exist with different members. A multi-level governance structure comes into being, creating a complex multitude of overlapping spaces (see figure 1) (Mahmadou & Van der Wusten: 2002).

Not only is the nation-state model challenged from above, but also from below. Processes of decentralization and regionalism make regions become more independent of the national level. They form a territorial level below, but not inherently subordinated to, the national level; the subnational level. This challenges the exclusive sovereignty of the nation-state.

Increasingly, the subnational level cooperate with other regional authorities from other states, independently from the national level. They have their own 'foreign affairs' on a regional level. They take part in cross-border cooperation (CBC), which is "a more or less institutionalized collaboration between contiguous subnational authorities across national borders" (Perkmann 2003: 156).

They not only challenge the sovereignty based nation-state model by an increased independence. They also form cross-border regions (CBRs), territorial units "that comprises contiguous sub-national units from two or more nation states" (Perkmann 2007: 254). These new territorial units, in Europe often in the form of Euregio’s, are new kinds of territories that cross the state border and challenge the position of the nation-state and the meaning of the border (Popescu 2008). These cooperation policies of the subnational level are a form foreign policies, traditionally a field of national concern (Paasi 1996, 1999).

Euregio’s were fist developed on the internal borders of the EU as regional initiatives following a bottom-up approach. Since the 1990s they were also developed on the external border of the EU as pre-enlargement projects. They were 'pilot projects' for further integration of the new member states in the EU and therefore strongly supported by the EU. Since the 2000s they are also established on the EU external border, between EU and non-EU territories, which will not enter the EU within short and medium term (Cronberg 2003a, Prozorov 2004, Popescu 2008).
Central in this research is the understanding that territorial levels of political action and cooperation, or political-territorial levels, have a territorial underpinning, a territorial logic (Popescu 2008: 418). The EU has emerged as a new political-territorial level with its own foreign policies and a certain idea about the permeability of the border. Including and excluding certain territories in certain fields of social action. Following David Harvey (2004) I understand the territorial logic is "about trying to maintain the health and well-being of a particular place and sovereign power". They can have different interests, hence, they can be in conflict with each other.

*Figure 1 - Overlapping spaces in Europe*

There is significant understanding that Euregio's are not able to seriously challenge the traditional borders induced nation-state territorial logic and change the territorial organization of European space. However the very formation of these political-territorial units across state borders shows the emergence of the process of reterritorialization of European space. In Euregio's, national authorities put together parts of their national territory to form a cross-border region. "They implicitly endorse a new, separate territorial configuration that is beyond the exclusive sovereign reach of any single national government" (Popescu 2008: 422). When the national authorities develop these new institutions they "exercise authority and power, as tenuous as that might be, beyond state borders. In essence, the territory of Euroregions represents more than the sum of nation-state territories that compose it, and cross-border institutions are more than the sum of national administrations forming them" (Popescu 2008: 422).

In Euregios on the EU external border, the supranational, national and subnational levels overlap taking part in cooperation across the border. At first sight, the territorial logic of the
different political-territorial levels seem to be different. They have different ideas about the permeability of the borders; the EU on the one hand wants open borders with its neighbours and create a space of cooperation and interaction across its judicial border and on the other hand closed borders are remained through Schengen; the traditional nation-state logic is border induced with exclusive right on power on its territory; the subnational territories that take part in CBC and CBRs seems to favour an open border, creating a new space of cooperation across the state-border, abolishing the border in a way.

The aim of this research is to analyse the territorial logic of the different political-territorial levels that overlap in cross-border spaces to see how the different territorial logics of the different political-territorial levels relate. Following the research of Popescu (2008) Euregio’s are a prism through which to study the reterritorialization of EU space. The theoretical territorial logic of Euregio’s, following a comprehensive approach, forms the prism for this comparative analysis. Popescu (2008) differentiates five interrelated dimensions of the territorial logic:

- the legal dimension
- the political-territorial dimension,
- the economic dimension,
- the cultural dimension, and
- the governance dimension

These five dimensions provide a framework to analyse the territorial logics of the supra, sub and national political-territorial levels or actors in CBRs. I will look at the Euregio Karelia on the EU-Finnish-Russian border and see how the nexus between the different levels plays out in this complex multi-level (border) governance structure and how they affect the permeability of the border.

**Euregio Karelia**

Euregio Karelia is a CBR located on the Finnish-Russian border which is also the external border of the EU. Euregio Karelia, founded in 2000, was the first Euregio formed with Russia. It is constituted by three Finnish regions, North-Karelia, Kainuu, Oulu Region (also known as Northern-Ostrobothnia) and the Russian Republic of Karelia (see figure 2).

Due to changes in the last two decades, the Finnish-Russian border is now gradually opening. Instead of only being a barrier between two nation-states it is gradually developing into an area of contact and cross-border interaction and cooperation (Cronberg 2003a, Liikanen et al. 2007). The Euregio Karelia is part of this process and developed with the idea to enhance CBC between the Republic of Karelia and three Finnish provinces on the Finnish-Russian border. The Euregio Karelia was founded to create a long term cross-border institute that could act as middle between supranational, national, regional and local patterns of action (Liikanen 2004).

In Euregio Karelia different political-territorial levels overlap, their territorial logics possibly conflict with different ideas about the permeability of the border. The political-territorial

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2 The research of Gabriel Popescu forms an important framework for this research. In his article (2008) he analysis the conflicting territorial logics of different actors in the Euregio’s established in the Romanian-Ukrainian-Moldovan borderlands. The analytical approach was not clear to me in his article. Therefore I contacted him by e-mail to ask question on this issue. I thank him for his advice.
levels I differentiate in this analysis are the EU, Finland, the Russian Federation (from here on: Russia), the Finnish regions and the Republic of Karelia.

Developing Euregio Karelia into an integrated CBR involves a shift of powers from the (supra)national level to the subnational level. This is a direct challenge on the sovereignty of both Russia as Finland, and in a way also that of the EU. They exercise power and authority beyond the judicial borders. In this research the question is to what extent the different political-territorial levels want or, for the ‘higher’ supranational and national level, allow the Euregio Karelia to develop into an integrated CBR.

**Research Question**

In relation to the aim of the research and the research area the following research question has been formulated:

*What are the territorial logics of the different political-territorial levels that overlap in Euregio Karelia, and to what extent do they affect the development of Euregio Karelia into an integrated cross-border region?*

**Societal relevance**

Most of our ideas about the world around us have a territorial underpinning. Tensions between groups of people often have to do with territory and borders. With this research I try to show that territories and there borders are not natural, that they are human inventions, hence no exclusive rights on a certain territory exist.

This research shows that the territorial organization of space in the current nation-state model is not the only way to organize space and societies. The existence of nation-states is not natural, as it is sometimes seen, but that it is just one of the ways to organize space and certainly not always the best. Hopefully this will open our eyes so that we can look from a different perspective towards spatial organisation and borders, which for a great deal organize our lives and thoughts. I try to show that 'our land' only exists because of 'our minds'.

More practically, the outcomes of this research will have added value for the political debate about the EU external border and how to deal with this border. This research sheds a light on the implications of the different border policies of different political-territorial levels on the formation of Euregio Karelia. The outcomes can be taken into account when developing new policies regarding Euregio Karelia. It will also serve the interest of other CBC-projects between the EU and Russia and between the EU and other neighbours participating in the ENP.

For the Euregio, this research will provide answers for the local politics on the Finnish-Russian border. This research shows why development of the Euregio is slow. It sheds a light on the positions of the different actors involved in Euregio Karelia. These findings can be taken into account in developing new policies for the Euregio Karelia.

**Scientific relevance**

The territorial underpinning of CBC is, unfortunately, not well researched and analysed (Popescu 2008: 419). The role played by territoriality and territorial politics of different political-territorial levels in the development of Euregio’s has not been explored in great detail. For example, in the discussion on the EU external border in border studies there is much attention for the role of the EU and the ENP on this border. It is widely agreed that the
EU is one of the most important border producing actors on this border, and that the EU border policy is not singular and clear cut, but as creating different insides and outsides etc. There is however, little empirical research available on the role of other border producing actors on the external border of the EU and how they relate to each other.

As mentioned, the role of Euregio’s in society and their political ‘weight’ remains limited. This research helps to shed a light on the underlying causes. The outcomes of this research will improve the knowledge of the territorial underpinning of reterritorialization of European space. This will deepen the discussion about the reterritorialization of EU space. It will serve the scientific debate because it combines both the questions of the conflicting discourses of the EU as the question of what the role of the other border producing actors are on the EU external border.

**Figure 2 - Euregio Karelia geographical area**

Source: INTERACT website

**Structure of report**

In this chapter the background of the research has been introduced. In the following chapter the theoretical concepts used in this research will be explained. In the third chapter the historical and geopolitical context of the Finnish-Russian border and the socio-economic context of the Euregio will be introduced. Next, the methodological and analytical approach will be explained, to finally come to the analytical part of this research. In the analysis the different territorial logics will be explained and analysed in order to answer the research question in the conclusion.
Chapter 2 - Theoretical Framework

In this chapter the key theoretical concepts used in this study are introduced. Central in this study are the concepts of territory, territoriality and borders. In the nation-state model there is an exclusive link between territory, sovereignty, power and borders (Agnew 1994). Borders bound a certain territory, demarcating if from the surrounding territories. This research is about changing territorial organization, hence changing and shifting borders. The forming of new political-territorial levels like Euregio's and the EU challenge the border induced nation-state logic.

Before the main theoretical concepts are introduced, first an overview of the historical development of border studies and the understanding of borders and territories will be given. The contemporary understanding and discussion on borders, border issues and reterritorialization cannot be understood without knowing the historical context and historical development of these concepts. Like the border itself, the understanding of border is historical contingent. This overview of border studies will also help to posit this research in the broader field of border studies. The focus is on political state borders in Europe.

Overview border studies

The concept of border is ambiguous and complex, it has several, but related meanings. For example the Dutch word ‘grens’ has several meanings. In English these meanings know a more specific term. We can speak about ‘borders’, ‘boundaries’, ‘edges’, ‘frontiers’ depending on the context we are referring to is a precise line of demarcation, to a margin where an area ends and another begins (see Walters 2004, Kolossov 2004). These words are used fairly interchangeably. No matter what they are called, all borders “create compartments within which some are included and many excluded” (Newman 2003: 277). The approaches to borders changed over time. I will give a chronological overview of border studies. Predominantly the articles of Kolossov (2005) and Newman (2006a, 2006b) are used.

Traditional approach

Traditionally border studies are practised by political geographers and focused on the national and international territorial and political level (Kolossov 2005: 619). In the late 19th century up to the first half of the 20th century border studies was characterized by its descriptive approach. It was about categorizing and typologizing borders and boundaries. Numerous categories and typologies were developed, “which reflected the way they had been demarcated and delimited and, to a lesser extent, the nature of the borders as ‘open’ or ‘closed’ reflecting the nature of political relations between neighbouring countries (Newman 2006a: 174). Research focused on the descriptive analysis of borders, their location and the political and historical processes that lead to their demarcation (Newman 2006a: 173).

Borders were seen as static lines drawn on maps and their change was pure a result of the constant reterritorialization caused by war, peace and negotiations. They were just geographical outcomes of political power, and “were there to be described and categorized” (Newman 2006a: 177). With European expansion this territorial model was exported throughout the globe.

In the first half of the 20th century, border studies became politically engaged. Influential thinkers like Haushofer, Vidal de la Blache and Ratzinger had considerable impact on the political climate at the time. It was the time of the evolution theory and social Darwinism. By some, borders and territories (or nations) were experienced as organisms growing to the
expense of others. The laws of nature were thought to apply for states as well. These ideas proofed influential and had considerable impact on the political philosophy at the time. For example ideas of Ratzinger and Haushofer were part of the Nazi-ideology.

**Functional approach**

After the second world war the discipline of border studies was marked, because of its link to the Nazi-ideology. Consequently border studies was not a big area of research. In the 1960s border scholars began to focus more on the functions of borders and the ease with they could be crossed (Newman 2006a: 177). It was recognized that different levels of contact and separation between two sides of the border existed (Newman & Paasi 1998: 189).

Much attention was paid to the functions of border and to the political and territorial factors that determine them (Kolossov 2005: 611). It was the first time that research was carried out on the cross-border flows of people, capital and goods, CBC and the permeability of borders. Models of cross-border interactions at different spatial levels and typologies of cross-border flows were developed. The deterministic approach was gradually put aside. Borders were no longer seen as static lines of demarcation but more as multidimensional and highly dynamic social phenomena (Kolossov 2005: 611).

It was now understood that borders were social constructions as they were all formed by people “using natural features as convenient points of demarcation where it served their purposes, but avoiding such features as and where political or economic preferences dictated” (Newman 2006a: 174). Within this functional approach it is assumed borders have an impact on the borderland. There is a strong correlation between the level of integration of borderlands and the openness of the border (Newman 2006a: 174).

**Political approach**

In the 1970s a more political approach to borders was developed, mainly used by political scientists (Kolossov 2005: 612). They focused on the relation of International Relations and the functions of state borders. Kolossov (2005: 612-613) distinguishes three different discourses within this approach. The ‘realistic discourse’, saw the state as the most important power container in the international world. The ‘liberal discourse’, was mainly informed by the economic and globalization discourse. It was recognized that states were not the only political actors, and that the “principal function of state boundaries is to connect neighbours and to enable various international interactions” (p. 612). Therefore it was seen as a necessity to annihilate border conflicts and develop CBC. The ‘global discourse’, like the name suggests, focuses on international networks that connect all kinds of economic and political actors. In these networks both state and non-state actors are connected, and gradually state borders are transformed into virtual lines, basically non-existing. This does not mean, however, that a borderless world will arise. In stead state borders will be replaced by economic, cultural and other kind of borders.

**The postmodern turn**

In the 1980s postmodern approaches to borders were adopted. This evoked a renaissance of border studies, characterized by the crossing of borders between different academic disciplines. It developed an interdisciplinary character, and brings together scientists from different backgrounds – geography, political science, international relations, sociology, anthropology, history, law and economics (Kolossov 2005, Newman 2006).

Paradoxically, the development of border studies developed simultaneous with the rise of the globalization discourse, in which a ‘borderless world’ was envisioned. With the development
of global networks and flows of trade, transnational corporations and international production lines borders appeared to disappear. However, at the same time with the break up of the Soviet Union, the break up of Yugoslavia, the forming of an EU border, many borders changed and new borders were formed. Functions of borders changed and borders were relocated, under influence of globalization and political and economic integration. In the postmodern approaches traditional methods of border studies are combined with new approaches to borders (Newman 2006a, Newman & Paasi 1998, Kolosssov 2005).

Several postmodern approaches to borders exist. Here I will shortly explain the different postmodern approaches, as they are distinguished by Kolosssov (2005). First, the linking of the world system theory and the theory of territorial identities. Within the world system theory, the world territory is understood as being divided in three different kind of territories; those in the center, the semi-periphery and in the periphery. This approach combines analysis of the role of a border in the world system of borders at different territorial levels, from global to the local (Kolosssov 2005: 613).

This field of study blossomed in the 1990s with a rapid change of borders, growth of cross-border flows and an increasing influence of supranational actor. It is seen as these developments challenge the nation-state model, traditional state functions are upscaled and downscaled to regional and international/supranational organizations. It is understood that no country can be completely isolated from the rest of world and its neighbours. The most isolated countries in the world, like North Korea and Myanmar, have some kind of bilateral relations with neighbouring countries (Kolosssov 2005: 614).

The second big achievement of this approach was the connection of borders and identities. “The importance of the boundary in the everyday life of people cannot be understood without an analysis of its role in social consciousness and the people’s self-identification with territories at various levels (countries, regions, localities)” (Kolosssov 2005: 614). One of the leading geographers in this field is Ansi Paasi. Important for this research is nationalism and the hypotheses of Harvey who sees nationalism as a territorial ideology and the basis of state building, “nationalism always supposes the struggle for territory or the defence of rights to it” (Kolosssov 2005: 614). The attitude of people and the political elite to the border, is influenced and formed by social representations with its culture, state security, perceived or real external threats, historical myths and stereotypes (Kolosssov 2005: 614).

Identity is understood to be closely related to the functions of the state. The state is “a political territorial unit with strictly delimited boundaries recognized by the international community, and within which the populations has a specific identity. It is shaped, as a rule, by the state itself and by the nationalist political elite” (Kolosssov 2005: 615). Borders are one of the most important elements of (national, regional, local) identity, both political and ethnic. You could say that if there is no political identity, there are no stable borders, territory or state (Kolosssov 2005: 615).

Traditionally border studies looked at state borders from a national perspective. With the adoption of postmodern approaches the interest in the role of the local grew. Local territorial communities are not simply subordinated to the state government but have a substantial influence themselves on the border regime, the identity and the perception of borders. Hence they are seen as an important border producing actor. Along with the postmodern turn the gap between the study of political borders and other kind of borders was overcome. It was accepted that all borders are designed to separate space controlled by people who limit the rights of those who do not belong to this group (Kolosssov 2005).
The second postmodern approach distinguished by Kolossov (2005: 618) is the geopolitical approach. This approach focuses on the impact of globalization on and integration of political borders. Under the impact of globalization and integration the functions of borders are redistributed among different types and levels of borders. For example in the EU, and especially in the Schengen-territory, the barrier function of the national borders is relocated at the external border of the EU/Schengen territory, for example on the Finnish-Russian border. This relocation of border functions are often called processes of 'de-territorialisation' and 're-territorialisation'.

Within the geopolitical approach, there is a second field of research; the research on borders from a security perspective. One of the basic functions of borders is to secure a certain space, therefore borders are always tightly linked to security issues. For example, national borders are closely related to questions of national security and the defence from external threats (Kolossov 2005: 620).

Three aspects can be distinguished of the traditional understanding of the role of state borders in national security (Kolossov 2005: 621-622). First, and the most obvious maybe, the prevention of military threats. This is why border areas are often militarized and strictly controlled. It is not solely about the ‘real’ threat, but more about the perceived threat. Second, to control and regulate the influx of people, goods etc. and prevent the influx of the unwanted. Third, the basic job of a state is understood to protect its citizens and territory, therefore the border is seen as security fence. It is not so much about the actual or ‘real’ threats, but more about the perceived threats.

Gradually the perception of threats to national and regional security is changing. Nowadays, it is understood that it is simply impossible to deal with the new problems solely by traditional ‘hard’ security methods. The use of these hard security methods in border control, strengthening the barrier, harm the society and economy. It is close CBC that will bring positive results, the so called ‘soft’ security methods (Kolossov 2005: 632). This shift in approach created a regional dimension. The understanding that governments should promote CBC and integrate the borderlands is rising. It is thought to provide security for both the borderlands as the territory it is supposed to secure.

Pragmatically, these postmodern views on border security are hard to follow in the ‘real world’. Traditional views of border security are rooted in the human minds, national politics and narratives of nation building. And as previously mentioned, the worlds territory is organized according to the nation-state system where the world is divided into territories on which the state-authorities have sovereign power. The traditional state-system with its defined borders is historically tingly linked to and embedded in the societal, economical and political organization of space, making it difficult to change. It is now about finding a balance between the needs for ‘hard’ border security, CBC and the interests of the different actors from different levels involved in the border (Kolossov 2005: 624).

The third approach in postmodern border studies is the understanding of borders as social constructions (Kolossov 2005: 624). It is understood that borders are produced and reproduced by and in the minds of peoples trough all kinds of narratives. To understand the border, you need to understand and deconstruct the narratives that construct it. It is these narratives that have become an important subject in border studies.

In the 2000s the policy-practice-perception approach was created. The border is understood not solely a formal legal institution of the nation-state, but is “a product of social practice,
the result of a long historical and geopolitical development, and an important symbolic marker of ethnic and political identity” (Kolossov 2005: 625).

**Theoretical concepts**

In this research I do not strictly adopt one of the approaches. I use concepts of different approaches. I understand the border as complex multitude of different levels. Being both local, national and supranational. Under influence of reterritorialization processes, like the formation of an Euregio across the EU external border, the political-territorial organization, hence their borders, changes. I understand these territories and their borders as social constructs. They are constructed in the minds of people, they do not exist in reality. However they become very real and have serious consequences for daily-life, identity and perception of themselves and others.

My understanding of borders and territories as socially constructed is situated in the broader philosophical field of social constructivism. I will shortly elaborate on social constructivism to shed a light on the epistemological and ontological standpoints of this research.

**Social constructivism**

Social constructivism was developed by the Soviet scientist Lev Vygotsky. The basic idea of social constructivism is that there is a reality. This reality can, however, never be known, “we can only know about it in a personal and subjective way” (Tobin & Tippins 1993: 3). The social world, where we live in, does not exist “independent of the thoughts and ideas of the people involved in it. It is not an external reality whose laws can be discovered by scientific research and explained by scientific theory as positivists and behaviourists argue” (Jackson & Sorensen 2006: 164). There are no natural laws in the social world, and therefore research should not focus on finding these laws (UC Berkeley website).

Following this perspective it is not an aim of this research to find an absolute truth that can be generalized across the world. Constructivism is more concerned with the knowers constructing ‘viable knowledge’, “that is, knowledge that enables an individual to pursue goals in the multiple contexts in which actions occur” (Tobin & Tippins 1993: 4). Important in this concept is that not any construction is as viable as another. That is because of the social component of knowledge, that is, “that knowledge must be viable not only personally, but also in the social contexts in which actions are to occur” (Tobin & Tippins 1993: 5). "To the constructivists, concepts, models, theories, and so on are viable if they prove adequate in the contexts in which they were created" (Von Glaserfeld 1995). Researchers, therefore, can make truth claims about the research object. These truth claims are, however, not the absolute truth and “are contingent and partial interpretations of a complex world” (Price and Reus-Smit 1998: 272 in Jackson & Sorensen 2006: 166).

But what is this social world? This world is formed by part physical and part not-physical entities. “But it is the ideas and beliefs concerning those entities which are most important: what those entities signify in the minds of people” (Jackson & Sorensen 2006: 166). These ideas are “mental constructs held by individuals, sets of distinctive beliefs, principles and attitudes that provide broad orientations for behaviour and policy” (Tannenwald 2005: 15 in Jackson & Sorensen 2006: 166). They only matter and become important if they are shared by a large group of people. Ligovsky (1978: 39) gives a good example of how these ideas and beliefs, or perceptions, give meaning to physical objects. Without, the object would be ‘meaningless’.
"A special feature of human perception...is the perception of real objects...I do not see the world simply in colour and shape but also as a world with sense and meaning. I do not merely see something round and black with two hands; I see a clock..."

The Finnish geographer Anssi Paasi was among the first who introduced social constructivism to border studies. He understands borders as “symbols, discourses and institutions that interpenetrate all realms of society and that exist everywhere in society, not only at the formal boundary of national sovereignty” (Van Houtum & Scott 2005: 12). It is now widely agreed in border studies that (state) borders are not just located at the edge of a territory but are dispersed everywhere in the territory, for example international airports in the center of a territory (see Balibar 2004, 2009, Ferrero-Gallardo 2007).

Borders, like territories and identities, are social, political and economic constructs, they do not exist outside of human perception. "They exist at first perhaps in the naming, strategic definitions and proclamations of politicians, foreign policy experts and researchers, and may then be gradually transformed into a set of social (political, economic and administrative) practices and discourses, which for their part may have an effect on how we act in different situations and how we interpret and organize the mosaic of places, regions and borders that surround us” (Paasi 2000: 88). These constructions are understood as historically contingent (Paasi 1998, 2000, Balibar 2004).

This must be seen in the wider movement in social sciences to see space and place as historically contingent. They come to existence in relation to the wider world (lecture Massey 20093). Ideas about the border from the past, are still part of present border construction. Some ideas play a larger role than others. For example the European state model that finds its origin in the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. It formed the bases for dividing space in sovereign territories. This model was exported to the rest of the world and can be seen as the territorial model of the world and the basis for all kinds of social practices and discourses that influence our behaviour and ideas about our surrounding world. For example national identities, find their root in the existence of a national territory with a clear delineated border that separates the 'home' from the 'foreign'. These mental constructs are however very powerful and affect our lives to a great extent. But they are not natural, they do not exist outside of human perception and are constructed through narratives, education, media etc.

Following Popescu (2008) and Paasi (1998) I see borders as discursively constructed. Borders are not mirror-like reflections of the physical and cultural landscapes of territories, instead they are human constructions made to legitimate distinctions between them. "Borders embody a variety of contradictions and conflicts that are the result of the arbitrary circumstances of boundary making. They render visible the power emerging from social and spatial relation” (Paasi 1998: 420). I would like to note that however borders are social constructions and can change they are very real. "However entities are formed out of processes, and are human constructions, that doesn't mean that entities are gone. Biology learns us that the body is formed out of molecular processes, that doesn't mean, however, that we do not understand the body as an entity anymore. The body is still really there” (Massey 2009).

Key in constructing these social constructs is the process of 'othering'. Through this process, a social construct is produced and reproduced as being different from the other. In relation to territories and borders, othering is about including and excluding creating insides and

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3 Lecture of Doreen Massey. Presented at the 6th ETMU Conference at the University of Joensuu (now: University of Eastern Finland), Finland at 23/10/2009.
outsides (Balibar 2004). The notions of interior and exterior, the 'home' and the 'foreign' form the basis of border construction (Balibar 2004: 5). Borders exclude some territories out and include some territories in. This process of othering borders will always exist as we always exclude some things, or like Balibar says: "boundaries will be inevitable; by defining things we exclude things and draw boundaries".

Othering is tightly linked to identity. The identity discourse, 'we are not Russian, not Swedish, we are Finns', is formed by politicians, media, education and mass culture (Kolossov 2005: 49). Kollossov gives a good example of this:

"for the post-Communist governments of Central and East-Europe, it was important to represent their boundaries as limits between the West and the East; first, at the global level, as boundaries of Europe; next, at the macro-regional level, as the 'historical, native' boundaries of their ethnic groups; and finally, by way of contrast, at the local level, the result of wise though painful compromises in the name of international stability” (Kollossov 2005: 625).

Identities are tightly linked to borders. Borders are an important part of identity. However borders can also be disruptive for groups with a shared identity living on different sides of a border, for example the Kurds. In their perspective the border must be relocated to unite all Kurds in a single territorial entity, Kurdistan. Their logic conflicts with those of the state authorities.

**Functions of border**

In the overview of border studies some functions of borders were briefly mentioned; e.g. lines of inclusion and exclusion and makers for identity. I understand borders as having different function, using the framework developed by O'Dowd (2003). He distinguishes four different function of borders; borders as a barrier, a bridge, as resources and as symbols of identity. All borders simultaneously serve these four functions, however some can appear more relevant than the other, dependent on the context (O'Dowd 2003).

Traditionally the function of the border was to serve as barrier to protect what is inside by excluding what originates from the outside (Newman 2006b). It is the most basic function of a state, to protect its citizens from any harm and secure the state territory (Behr 2008: 359). This is why borders and borderlands are often heavily militarized, to prevent that any neighbour from taking over the country by using military force. Border policies are therefore also tightly linked to security issues and security policies (O'Dowd 2003, Behr 2008).

The border creates a barrier that separates a space, and prevents free movement. Basically it function is to prevent the influx of the 'unwanted' goods, capital, people etc. It is there where people, capital, products and services are hindered in free movement and interaction. This view of the border, as an economic barrier, became dominant with the rise of the neo-liberal thinking and the Single Market discourse (O'Dowd & Van Houtum 2003).

The objectives of the founders of the European Economic Community were based on political and security objectives. To prevent a new World War on the European continent. The forming of an internal market was seen as one of the means to establish these objectives. With the rise of neo-liberal thinking in the 1980s the economic integration became much more of an objective itself. The forming of the Single Market and the European Monetary Union were now at the core of the European Union. State borders were seen as barriers for the free flow of capital, goods, services and persons. These barriers had to be overcome in order for the EU to compete on the 'global market'. Economic policies became the core of as
well state policies and EU policies. The Single Market would improve the competitiveness of
the member states and reduce transactions and transportation costs (O’Dowd & Van
Houtum 2003: 19-20). In this discourse borders are seen as market distortions, disrupting
flows of capital, goods, services and people.

The height of the barrier is however not always the same, because it is ‘selective permeable’. By this I mean that borders cannot be crossed as easily by everyone and everything (Anderson 2001, O’Dowd 2003, Dimitrova 2008). The barrier effect of the border is flexible on the ‘open-closed continuum’. On the external EU border the question is, what should and should not be allowed to cross the border (Anderson et al. 2003).

Linked to the semi-permeability of borders I like to see the EU external border as a firewall, a metaphor explained by Walters (2006: 151-152). In the digital world, a firewall regulates the connection between a computer and the wider network for example the Internet. It functions like a kind of traffic control. It controls the information flow, that is constantly leaving and entering the computer. These flows of information are registered and unwanted potentially harmful data (viruses, spam; illegal migrants, terrorists etc.) are blocked and even quarantined. It is there to provide safe interiors and a high level of trust, so the computer can be safely used for all kinds of tasks and businesses. Also it should prevent the interior to be infiltrated and turned into a place for illegal operations, like hackers, or in case of a territory, terrorism (Walters 2006: 151-152). This metaphor counters the metaphors of a gated community and a fortress Europe where the border is pictured as impenetrable. Rather it is semi-permeable with different levels of permeability in different spheres of social action (Anderson et al. 2003, O’Dowd 2003).

Second, borders also function as a bridge, meaning “the mechanisms through which borders can provide the point of contact and transition between the ‘others’” (Newman 2006b: 150). With cooperation between the two sides of the border, the border serves as a bridge for both sides of the border. In the EU, if the Single Market wanted to fully develop the bridge or gateway function of state borders had to be improved. The EU external border besides a barrier, can also become a bridge for further cooperation and partnership allowing two neighbouring regions to interact. However without the barrier function there is no bridge function.

Third, in border areas often different legal and illegal activities exist because of the border. Think about smuggling people, drugs, alcohol etc, but as well cross-border shopping because of price difference between both sides of the border. These activities only exist there because of the border. Without the dividing border they would have no reason to exist there, the border is the raison d’être of these activities (O’Dowd 2003: 25). The border serves as a resource for these activities.

Fourth, as mentioned before, borders are important symbols for identities. This can be clearly seen in the case of state borders, where the border is seen as the edge of the national territory and identity. The construction of collective territorial identity "is not generated naturally but is achieved through the inscription of boundaries by exploiting us-versus-them type discourse" (Popescu 2008: 420). Following O’Dowd (2003: 27) they stand for both integration and difference, implying processes of homogenization within the border and differentiation from the ‘other’ outside. The (political) identity is really important for the very existence of a state, "if there is no stable political identity, there are no stable boundaries, territory, no stable state, or political unit in general" (Kolossov 2005: 625).
**Territoriality**

The complexity and construction of border and their functions have been discussed. Territorial entities exist because of their borders, they are constructed through their borders. Based on Sack (1986) James Anderson (2001: 19) defines territoriality as “a particular mode of social organisation and enforcement which operates by controlling access into and out of specified geographical area. “It classifies, communicates and controls by drawing borders assigning things to particular spaces [creating insides and outsides] and regulating cross-border movements and access into and/or out of specified areas” (Anderson et al. 2003: 6, emphasis added). It is just like a border a social construction inherently arbitrary and conflictual and subject to change.

Traditionally state sovereignty was (and still is) tightly linked to the national territory. But now the world, where borders were understood merely as concrete, empirical manifestations of state sovereignty no longer exist. This is called by Agnew (1994) the ‘territorial trap’, where the nation state is seen as “exclusive ‘container’ of economic, political, social and cultural space” (Van Houtum & Scott 2005: 13).

Modern thinking in especially International Relations relies on three geographical assumptions (Agnew 1994: 53); states as fixed units of sovereign space, polarity between the home and the foreign and states as containers of societies. But “even when rule is territorial and fixed, territory does not necessarily entail the practices of total mutual exclusion...indeed, depending on the nature of the geopolitical order of any particular period, territoriality had been ‘unbundled’ by all kinds of formal agreements and informal practices, such as common markets, military alliance, monetary and trading regimes etc.”(Agnew 1994: 53).

To the expense of the nation-state, the sub- and supranational level have gained power. Processes of restructuring territorial forms of organization of social relations are taking place all the time and on all spatial scales (Paasi 2000, Popescu 2008). For example the modern territoriality discourse, based on independent sovereign states, was a transition from other forms of social spatial organizations like the empire, the feudal system or the city state (Badie 1995 in Perkmann 2007: 257). Or, more recently, the formation of Euregio’s across state borders, that is part of the “uncoupling of state sovereignty and territory” (Popescu 2008: 419).

**Changing European Space**

From the theoretical reflections on borders and territories, we now zoom in on the changing political-territorial organization of European space. In the introductory chapter it was introduced that the nation-state is challenged from above and below. This will be explained in more detail with a focus on the EU external border.

**Multi-level (border) governance**

In a globalizing world with increasing connections between all kind of territorial levels all over the world the notions of interior and exterior are no longer completely separable (Balibar 2009: 210). This accounts for the European continent where the forming of the EU caused a reorganization of space, changing traditional notions of territoriality and sovereignty. These notions of interior and exterior, what is inside and what is outside, are at the centre of the border (re)production and representation, "undergo a veritable earthquake" to speak with Balibar (2004: 5). The “boundedness of the nation-state (if it ever existed in any absolute manner to begin with) is being worn down by transnational flows and changing social practices” (Van Houtum & Scott 2005: 14).
The forming of the Single Market was seen by many as a first step to the forming of a political union. It was a direct challenge on state borders as the 'natural' territorial limits of the state. From below, the forming of CBRs would reduce the nation states' monopoly of control in border regions (O'Dowd 2003: 22).

This changing socio-spatial organization of the EU space caused the emergence of multi-level governance structure (Häkli 1998, Mamadouh & Van der Wusten 2008: 22) and changed the geographical distribution of power (Murphy 2008: 10). Simultaneously with the emergence of a new political and governance level with the upcoming of the EU, new relations between levels developed. These processes challenge the traditional sovereign power of the state.

This multi-level governance structure is well visible in border governance. Because of the link between territory and borders, reterritorialization means also shifting and changing meanings of borders and change of border governance. For example on the Finnish-Russian border, where the EU is nowadays the most important bordering actor (Eskelinen et al. 1999). At the same time local actors become more important in the border governance, because of the increased cross-border connections and CBC initiatives, subnational authorities become involved in border governance, with their own 'foreign policies'. Off course the national authorities are still important in the border governance, it is just that their monopoly on border governance is challenged (Popescu 2008).

For the Finnish-Russian border the setting of the EU external border implied that two different and meaningful territorial lines were juxtaposed (Ferrer-Gallardo 2006). It has not erased the Finnish-Russian border. Instead the EU-Russian border and Finnish-Russian border mixed, generating a "non-dissolved two-folded amalgam containing: the border between two ‘trapped territories’ on the one hand, and the perimeter of a ‘post-national’ territorial unit- understood as a supranational territorial container – on the other” (Ferrer-Gallardo 2006: 7).

An important part of this process is the Europeanization of national policies (Faist & Ette 2007). An increasing number of national policies are changed and synchronized to create more Unitarian policies making it easier to cooperate. For example the synchronizing of immigration policies and related visa policies by the Schengen countries to make it possible to abolish the internal border (control). With this Europeanization some of the power that was traditionally situated at the national level is now up scaled to the EU level. This integration is not just led from above by 'Brussels', it is initiated and shaped by and in the member states (Van Houtum 2003: 38).

**Cross-border regions**

Through the development of Euregio’s cross-border contacts are developed and institutionalised on the subnational level. This challenges the traditional position of the central authorities. They loose their monopoly on cross-border contacts. Some of the power of the central authorities is now, deliberately or not, downscaled to lower levels of government.

Loosely defined a CBR is a "bounded territorial unit composed of the territories of authorities participating in a CBC initiative" (Perkmann 2003: 157). Different approaches exist for defining a CBR. The functional approach sees a CBR predominantly based functional interdependency. They are "territorial units characterized by a high density of internal interactions compared to the level of interactions outside" (Perkmann 2003: 156-157). This approach is criticized by some because "a cross-border region is not only an ‘action space’ but also an action unit" (Schmitt-Egner, 1998: 37 in Perkmann 2003: 157). For example
Raich follows this comprehensive approach and defines a CBR as a territorial unit "that has historical, socio-economic and cultural commonalities, as well as, at least tentatively, its own regional identity and autonomous [political and social] institutions and therefore claims an autonomous definition of its needs and interests which it is capable to articulate and defend" (Raich, 1995: 25 in Perkmann 2003: 157). In this research, this comprehensive approach is followed.

There are different types of CBRs. They vary in scale and cooperation intensity (see table 1). Euregio's have the form of integrated micro-CBRs. The first Euregio was established in 1958 on the Dutch-German border (Perkmann 2003). Since then Euregio's have been developed throughout Europe. During the 1990s CBC was an important part of EU regional policy (Popescu 2008: 423).

The formation of Euregio's used to follow a bottom-up approach. From the 1990s on the EU became an active promoter of Euregio's. The EU envisioned Euregio's as a territorial framework where the future Eastern European member states would prepare for EU membership. In this way the EU space was extended to the east, before the actual membership (Popescu 2008: 424).

Theoretically, Euregio's challenge the border producing practices of the nation-state and the EU. CBC traditionally was the field of the national administrations, now regional actors cross borders as independent actors (Cronberg 2000: 174). Euregio's form a new political-territorial level in the multi-level governance structure of and across the EU external border, where the divide between the inside and outside, the domestic and foreign policies, blurs. For example, in Finland the question rose with the forming of the Euregio Karelia whether it was a matter for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or for the Ministry of the Interior (Cronberg 2000: 174).

CBRs "modify and transform spatial identity and undermine the territorial integrity of all parties", they "represent a new spatiality" (Delanty & Rumford 2005: 133). In Euregio's subnational, national and supranational levels come together (Hakli & Kaplan 2002). Creating a space in which "older territorial arrangements are being dissolved yet co-exist with provisional and shifting orderings of space" (Delanty & Rumford 2005: 133).

**Table 1 - Types of CBRs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographical scope</th>
<th>Small</th>
<th>Large</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>High cooperation intensity</strong></td>
<td>Integrated Micro-CBRs</td>
<td>Scandinavian Groupings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low cooperation intensity</strong></td>
<td>Emerging Micro-CBRs</td>
<td>Working Communities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Perkmann 2003

The conditions for CBC and Euregio's on the internal borders are relatively more simple on the external borders of the EU (Cronberg 2000: 172). The Euregio Karelia has to work in the "interplay between different spatial levels and mediate between European, national and regional interests and aspirations connected to the border" (Liikanen en Virtanen 2006: 128).
The external border of the EU is a relatively closed border, unlike the internal borders of the EU.

**Territorial logic**

In short, both the EU and CBRs challenge the nation-state model. Territories and their borders are social constructs, arbitrary and conflictual and in a constant process of change. With the rise of multi-level governance more actors, or political-territorial levels, are involved in this border construction. Think about the supra-, sub- and national level, but also other civil society organisations like NGO’s and multinationals etc. In this research the focus is on the supra-, sub-, and national authorities.

Following Anssi Paasi I argue that there are multiple territorialities, rather than a single state territoriality where the Euregio is one of them. Euregio Karelia "is a new kind of cross-border regional territoriality making state borders 'softer'. It redefines the divide between foreign and domestic policy. Thus also regions, not only states, may have a 'foreign' policy" (Cronberg 2000: 181).

Following Popescu (2008) I understand these actors have ideas about the (selective) permeability of the border, different ideas of the interior and exterior. They all have a 'territorial logic', with different territorial strategies making territorial ‘claims’, including some territories in and some territories out in different spheres of social action (Paasi 2000: 97). These actors are informed by different discourses and have different interests, hence different territorial logics can be present (Harvey 2004).

The different territorialities in different spheres of social action are dynamic. For example Shengenland includes Norway and Switzerland, who are not members of the EU and at the same time the United Kingdom (UK) and Ireland are members of the EU but are not part of Shengenland. The EU’s territoriality, or territorialities, is therefore much less fixed than those of modern states (Fritsch 2009). Territorialities and borders are flexible and can vary in scope and tightness (Rumford 2006). Speaking with Balibar, Europe is multiple and "borders are being both multiplied, and reduced in their localization and their function, they are being thinned out and doubled by the quantitative relation between ‘border’ and territory’ is being inverted” (Balibar 1998: 220).

The territorial logic of Euregio’s involves territorial delineation across national borders where new types of political spaces are constructed that overcome, and conflict with, the territorial logics of the nation state. National (and EU) governments cannot allow the border regions to follow special rules "without compromising the theoretical model of the territorial container that the nation-state follows" (Popescu 2008: 431). From the perspective of territoriality, when a nation-state authorises the regional level to act independent beyond the state border means that the central government is either losing control and accepts the involvement of a foreign government on its territory or it tries to expand the national law or territory to the territory of an other state (Committee of the Regions 2007: 17).

The conflicting logic of the EU policies regarding its external border seems even more complex. On the one hand it has a nation-state like territorial logic with hard borders, on the other hand its supports a soft external border and a reterritorialization of the EU space, with strong Euregio’s on its external border (Rumford 2006, Walters 2006, Popescu 2008).

Using the framework of Popescu (2008), I differentiate five interrelated dimensions of the territorial logics. In this research the territorial logic of the Euregio is central and serves as
the frame through which the logics of the different political-territorial levels that overlap in Euregio Karelia are analysed.

The economic dimension

Border areas are often characterized by their economic peripheral status because they are located relatively far from the national economic core. The development of cross-border spaces has the possibility for economic development of the border areas. It creates cross-border contacts and flows across the border. Often the development of a territory or space is linked to mutual economic interests. A relative open border is needed for fruitful economic cooperation.

The cultural dimension

An important function of territories and borders is their symbolic meaning. Especially in the Westphalian nation state system, national borders are an important part of the national identity and loaded with symbols about the 'home' and the 'foreign'. Euregio’s have the potential to overcome this distinction. On the other hand, for a territorial unit an (political) identity is really important for the very existence of a territory. "If there is no stable political identity, there are no stable boundaries, territory, no stable state, or political unit in general" (Kolossov 2005: 625). To develop a (cross-border) territory there has to be some form of shared or common identity.

The political-territorial dimension

The establishing of Euregio’s as true cross-border spaces, involves territorial delineation across national and supranational borders, here the Finnish and the EU border, and would involve the establishment of new types of political spaces that are created beyond the territorial logic of the nation-state and a high level of political cooperation and some form of political autonomy, meaning some form of independent decision making (Raich 1995: 25 in Perkmann 2003: 157).

The governance dimension

Tightly linked to the political-territorial dimension is the governance dimension, the establishment of institutions crossing the border. Reterritorialization involves the relocation of governance functions, and "a new scale can only be efficacious if it gains a sufficient degree of institutional thickness (Jessop 2002: 29 in Perkmann 2007: 256).
"Institutionalisation of a region refers to the process through which various territorial units are produced and manifest themselves in various social and cultural practices such as politics, economy and administration which in turn will be produced and reproduced consciously or unconsciously by people" (Paasi 1996: 32).

The legal dimension

To develop meaningful cross-border spaces there should be a sufficient legal basis that regulates and provides a platform for CBC on a subnational level. National laws end at the state border and international laws regulate bilateral state relations on a state level which is based on sovereignty of the states involved. This poses structural problems for the formation of meaningful Euregio's. Following Raich (in Perkmann 2003) a certain level of legal exemptions is desired, for example of visa regulations or transport regulations.
In this chapter the main theoretical concepts of territoriality, borders and territorial logic have been introduced that form the theoretical framework for this research. In the following chapter the research area will be introduced.
Chapter 3 - Setting the scene: introducing the EU-Finnish-Russian border

In the following chapter I introduce research area. First I give a short historical background of the Finnish-Russian region to understand the historical and geopolitical complexity in which the Euregio Karelia is situated and has to operate in. To understand the border of today, we (also) have to look at the historical development of the border. I show that the Finnish-Russian border is a complex border with different meanings shaped by deterritorialization and reterritorialization processes. These different discourses affect and are affected by the actors involved in CBC (Paasi 1999). The focus is on the changing role of the border and the shifting position on the open-closed continuum. Second I will sketch the socio-economic context. Third, I will introduce the Euregio Karelia more in detail, with a focus on the governing structure.

Geography of the border

The Euregio Karelia is situated in the Finnish-Russian borderland (see figure 2). The total Finnish-Russian border is more than 1300 kilometres long of which 700 km belongs to the territory of Euregio Karelia (Boykova et al. 2004:75). The largest city nearby is St. Petersburg, situated approximately 150 km from the border. The borderland is sparsely populated. The regions situated on the southern part of the border are the most populated ones.

Historical & geopolitical context of the border areas

Shifting border between Russia and Sweden

The present border has had its present shape since the Second World War (WWII). In history the current border areas were both part of the Swedish and the Russian Empire. In figure 3 the shifting border is pictured. The first border between the two empires was defined by the Treaty of Nöteburg in 1323. This border was however not a strict line of demarcation it loosely marked areas of interest. Eventually the border developed into a religious border, between the Eastern Orthodox Church and the Church of Rome, which it still is till today (Karelian Institute 2003: 5).

With the Treaty of Teusine, in 1595, the basic principles of the nation-state, the exclusive link between territory sovereignty and power, were introduced to the area. The border was loosely demarcated along the religious border. It had more the form of a border zone rather than a line of demarcation. In 1617 the border shifted eastwards again, and the seized territory was 'Fininized' due to the settlement of Finns. This territory was lost again to Russia in 1721 (Karelian Institute 2003, Liikanen et al. 2007).

Finnish Independence

In 1809, Finland was concurred by Russia and got the status of a Grand Duchy, and received (for the first time) a great deal of autonomy, with its own religious organizations, laws and administrative structures (Karelian Institute 2003: 7). The Tsar of Russia was the head of state, the Grand Duchy. The border was relatively open and there was a lively traffic between the Finnish territory and the Russian territory, especially with St. Petersburg, the Russian capital at the time (Kämäräinen et al. 2004: 99). In the south, ethnic Finns lived on both sides of the border, and the border wasn't experienced as a barrier (Kämäräinen et al. 2004: 99). In the north, the border was more a religious border between Lutheran Finns and Orthodox Karelians (Karelian Institute 2003: 7).
In the 19th and 20th century, like in the rest of Europe, there was a great tendency of active nation building. In this process, the borders of Finland were increasingly represented as borders of a separate political entity, separate from the Russian Empire it formally belonged to (Paasi 1999, Karelian Institute 2003). This tendency eventually led to a call for national autonomy and finally national sovereignty and the forming of an own independent sovereign nation-state.

In 1917, the First World War (WWI) ended at the eastern front. During the Russian revolution in 1917, Finland declared its independence in December, which was recognised by the new Soviet authorities in January 1918. In the interbellum relations between Finland and the USSR were characterized by suspicion and hostility (Eskelinen et al. 1999). Despite tensions, soon after independence trade connections between both sides of the border were re-established. Mainly cheap timber was exported from Russian Karelia to Finland, to keep the Finnish saw mills running and restart the flow of foreign currency, which Russia was in desperate need for (Kämäräinen et al. 2004: 100).

The border ran through the ethnic region Karelia. The Karelians are historically and culturally strongly connected to the Finns. In Finland, there was a great tendency to redefine the border on ethnic grounds by uniting the Finns and the Karelians in one Finnish state. The Finnish government signed the Peace Treaty of Tartu, in which the location of the new border was agreed, only in 1920, because it wanted to take advantage of the unstable Soviet state and reconquer the Soviet part of Karelia. However the Finnish army proofed to be unsuccessful and had to withdraw, which was felt this as a shame and caused the rise of anti-Russian movements in the interbellum (Kämäräinen et al. 2004, Karelian Institute 2003).

In response of Finnish claims for Karelian autonomy, the Soviet authorities decided to create a new kind of ethnically defined territory, the Karelian Soviet Republic (Karelian Institute 2003: 8). In the end of the 1930s, bilateral relations were at the lowest point in history. This finally resulted in the Winter War in the end of 1939 (Kämäräinen et al. 2004: 100-101).

**Fighting for Karelia**

During WWII, two wars were fought between the USSR and Finland. The dispute leading to the Winter War, was much of a border dispute. According to the Soviets, the border, which was located on the Karelian Isthmus only 32 kilometres from Leningrad (present St. Petersburg), had to be relocated in order to safeguard Leningrad. The Soviets wanted to relocate the border so that Leningrad would be at least 70 kilometres away from the border. A second objective for the war was the aim establish a communist regime in Finland (Liikanen et al. 2007: 26).

The territorial claims would be paid by giving Finland a territory which was twice the size of the claimed territory. The Finnish government rejected all territorial claim. The USSR reacted with a war against Finland. Other powers did not come to Finland's aid, as they did not want to risk a war against the USSR (Kämäräinen et al. 2004: 103-104).

During the war the Finnish army withstood the Red Army for a long time, much linger than could be expected when looked at the numbers of troops, artillery, planes etc. The Red Army well outnumbered the Finnish army in all possible fields. Finally, the Red Army proofed successful when Finnish resources dried up and a Peace Treaty was signed in Moscow on 12 March 1940. The Soviets saw almost all territorial demands realised and Finland lost a large part of Finnish Karelia. During and after the war almost 400,000 Karelians had to move and
be resettled in other parts of Finland (Paasi 1996, Eskelinen et al. 1999, Kämäräinen et al. 2004: 103-104).

This caused the rise of anti-Soviet resentment in Finland. The German attack on Russia was seen as a unique opportunity for Finland to get the lost territory back. So it declared war against the USSR, the Continuation War (1941-1944). In the first months Finnish troops managed to reconquer the lost territories, followed by a two and a half year standstill. While the German troops were unsuccessful in their invasion of the USSR and the capturing of Stalingrad the Finnish political and military elites realised that Germany maybe wasn't able to defeat the Red Army and that Finland had to sign a peace treaty with the USSR independently (Kämäräinen et al. 2004: 105).

However Finland cooperated with Germany against one of the allied powers, the US and UK were inconclusive in their position towards Finland, because on the one hand the goal of Finland, to survive as an independent democratic nation and prevent Communist invasion, was respected. On the other hand the USSR was an important ally of the UK and US to fight Nazi Germany, so Finland was also an enemy. There were very few hostilities between UK and Finland. The US did not officially declare war against Finland. (Kämäräinen et al. 2004: 105).

In the final Soviet attack, Soviet troops reconquered all lost territories. In September 1944 a cease-fire was agreed. Finland was not, like other German Allies, occupied by allied forces but controlled by a (Soviet-led) Allied Control Commission to overlook the implementation of the truce (Liikanen et al. 2007: 26)). In the Paris Peace Treaty signed in 1947 the 1940 borders were restored. Finland lost almost all its territory on the Karelian Isthmus. Some Finnish civil society organizations, for example the Karelian Association, are still lobbying for a reunification of the lost Karelian territories (see Karelian Association website). However, in bilateral contacts between Russia and Finland the 'Karelian Issue' is not much of an issue anymore (Eskelinen et al. 1999).

**The post-WWII situation**

The 'Treaty of friendship, co-operation and mutual help between Finland and the USSR', signed in 1948 based the new relationship between the two former rivals (Kämäräinen et al. 2004: 105-106). "It defined the basic line of Finland's international status not only in regard to the Soviet Union, but to the Western countries as well" (Liikanen et al. 2007: 27). A significant difference with the East European Soviet satellite states, was the lack of military co-operation between Finland and the USSR.

Finnish foreign policy at the time, was characterized by its 'neutrality'. Formerly, it placed Finland out of the two rivalling blocs, and formed a sort of grey zone, but in practice it was very much under influence of the USSR. This kind of politics, has become to be known as 'Finlandization', in which Finland remained a sovereign state, however its foreign policy was directed at not to challenge the USSR (Paasi 1996, Eskelinen et al. 1999). Finland was seen by many part of the Eastern hemisphere. This should, however, not be exaggerated because Finland was still a capitalist democracy. During the Cold War it increased its outlook towards the West. This tendency was strongly affected by the closed border the USSR and Finland. In order to sustain economic growth, economic connections had to be established with the West (Karelian Institute 2003).

One of the best examples of its ambivalent geopolitical position is that Finland joined both the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), formed by the Western European capitalist
countries, and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) formed by the Socialist countries (Liikanen et al. 2007: 28).

Border wise, the Finnish-Russian border was a border between two ideologies, capitalism and communism, the West and the East. It was a closed border, especially from a subnational perspective (Liikanen et al. 2007: 29). Border crossings were difficult and subject to tight visa regulations. It served as an effective barrier to CBC (Eskelinen et al. 1999). Contacts between the USSR and Finland were taking place, at the national level in bilateral agreements (Eskelinen et al. 1999). There were only a couple of public crossing points (Kämäräinen et al. 2004).

From 1985 on, the border somewhat softened. Gorbatsjovs new politics of perestroika and glasnost eased the relation and tension between the USSR and the West. However, the real turn around was the collapse of the USSR in 1990 to develop cross-border contacts on the subnational level (Paasi 1999, Eskelinen et al. 1999, Karelian Institute 2003). A good example for the de-politicization of the border was the improvement of border-crossing facilities. Where there were only a few public border-crossing points during the Cold War, several new have been established since. Also the abolition of travel restrictions and cooperation programmes aiming at strengthening cross-border links are good examples of the changing nature of the border (Karelian Institute 2003, Liikanen et al. 2007).

After the break up of the USSR, Finland and the new Russian Federation signed a new agreement to replace the 'Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance'. Several agreements were signed on cultural, educational and scientific co-operation, and also on co-operation with the Murmansk region, Republic of Karelia and St. Petersburg (Liikanen et al. 2007: 30).

**Europeanization of the border**

Finnish application for EU membership in 1992 and the accession to the Union in 1995, changed the nature of the border considerably. The Finnish-Russian border became the external border of the EU and the first land border between the EU and Russia (Paasi 1999, Karelian Institute 2003). The relation between Russia and Finland was now carried out on two levels, through a 'normal' bilateral relationship and through the EU-Russian relation. Russian policies towards Finland were reformulated in relation to Russian policies towards the EU and Finnish policies towards Russia were reformulated in relation to EU policies towards Russia (Liikanen et al. 2007: 30, Prozorov 2004). The EU became the most powerful actor in the power play in the Finnish-Russian borderland (Paasi 1999, Eskelinen et al. 1999).

**Socio-Economic context of the Finnish-Russian border regions**

**Territory & Demographics**

**National**

Finland and Russia are quite unequal on some key characteristics. To start with, Finland is a relative small Nordic-type welfare state with 5.3 million inhabitants. Russia, is an enormous country, from a territorial perspective, with 144 million inhabitants. Russia is a former superpower, and to some becoming one again (Prozorov 2004, Reut & Averre 2003), with huge oil and gas resources. Finland is outnumbered by Russia looking at size of its territory and inhabitants (Liikanen et al. 2007: 40).
The total territory of Euregio Karelia is about 263,7000 km$^2$, of which the Republic of Karelia covers about 180,500 km$^2$ (Boykova et al. 2004: 76). The three Finnish regions in Euregio Karelia cover about 25% of the total Finnish territory, but only 12% of the total population lives there and this is still declining. The Republic of Karelia covers roughly 1 percent of the total area of the Russian Federation, and habits about 0.5 percent of the total population. The population of the Euregio Karelia is approximately 1.3 million people, of which around
700,000 people live in the Republic of Karelia (Boykova et al. 2004) and about 630,000 in the Finnish regions (Finstat 2009). The largest cities are Oulu, Joensuu and Kajaani on the Finnish side and Petrozavodsk in the Republic of Karelia.

Since the 1960s the demographics of Eastern Finland changed significantly, especially in the rural areas the population decreased significantly. Simultaneously the settlement pattern changed. Most of the population now lives in urban regions of about 30,000-100,000 inhabitants. The already sparsely populated rural areas, have become even more sparsely populated. The Republic of Karelia is suffering from population decline, in a similar fashion as Eastern Finland (Liikanen et al. 2007). The settlement pattern did not change that much. Already in the soviet time most of the people lived in 'urban' regions. Housing was coordinated by the state. This coordination caused the relative concentration of the population.

Economy

National

From a Finnish perspective, Russia's role as an economic partner changed in the turbulent history. During the Grand Duchy period, Russia was Finland's most important trading partner. It accounted for about 40-50 percent of its total trade (Liikanen et al. 2007: 40). After Finnish independence this lively trade came to an almost complete standstill. After WWII, despite the closed border, the USSR accounted for up to 25 percent of its exports and imports. In the 1980s this lively trade came to a halt which was an important part for the economic crisis in Finland in the early 1990s. The Finnish economy recovered remarkably soon, however Russia did not have an important share in this economic revival. Finland developed in a modern western knowledge based economy, with high-tech companies like Nokia. After the break up of the USSR, economic links were re-established and Russia accounts now for about 10 percent of Finland's exports (Liikanen et al. 2007: 40-41).

The Russian economy developed in a different fashion after the break up of the Soviet Union. From the break up in 1991 till 1998 the GDP of the Russian Federation declined by 43 percent (Karelian Institute 2003: 23). After the Ruble crises in 1998, the economy grew rapidly, mainly because of oil and gas exports and the rising oil and gas prices. About three percent of Russia's total trade is with Finland, making Finland the tenth trading partner (Liikanen et al. 2007: 41-42).

From a transit traffic perspective, Finland is of significant importance for Russia. About 25 percent of the value of Russia's import goes through Finland, and about four percent of Russia's export is transported through Finland (Liikanen et al. 2007: 45). However this goes mainly through border crossing points in the South of Finland and not through crossing points situated in the Euregio. Generally speaking from an economic perspective, Russia is more important for Finland than Finland for Russia.

Euregional

Historically Eastern Finland's economy is based on the production and use of timber. The economy has decreased considerably over the last years. It is still highly dependent on the forest sector and forest related sectors, other forms of industry are lacking. Because of the welfare state the socio-economic changes were cushioned. The national government actively supported regional development, for example by maintaining and improving educational, social and health service systems. In the present situation, the share of public services in the economic structure is particularly high in peripheral areas like Eastern Finland. Also Eastern Finland could profit for the EU regional policies and received lots of EU funding (Liikanen et
al. 2007). However, the GDP per capita and unemployment rates are still relatively high, compared to the national average (see table 2 and 3).

For the Finnish regions, the Russian share in exports is even lower than for national Finland. This has to do with the traditional orientation of the Eastern Finland economy on the West. However the Karelian Republic becomes of greater importance for the growth of the Euregional economy. The Eastern Finnish pulp and paper industry is highly dependent on the import of Russian/ Karelian Republic round wood (Karelian Institute 2003: 25)

In the Republic of Karelia the presence of the border has had a considerable impact on the Republic's economy. The Republic's economy was and is mainly based on the export of low-value-added products, like round wood, aluminium, paper, cellulose and ferrous metals (Liikanen et al. 2007: 50). This resource-export based path is not favourable in terms of a long term sustainable economy. The Karelian government tried to protect the timber resources and distributed the available timber amongst the local entrepreneurs to prevent the export of unprocessed wood. This proofed to be unsuccessful, so it shifted the focus on stimulating inward investments into higher-value-added industries, which would support employment in the region (Liikanen et al. 2007).

Table 2 - GDP per capita Finnish regions compared to the national level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GDP per capita (%)</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Finland 100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Karelia 72,9</td>
<td>72,9</td>
<td>71,7</td>
<td>70,0</td>
<td>73,6</td>
<td>73,9</td>
<td>73,2</td>
<td>74,1</td>
<td>72,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kainuu 64,7</td>
<td>64,7</td>
<td>68,0</td>
<td>68,2</td>
<td>68,6</td>
<td>69,1</td>
<td>66,9</td>
<td>70,0</td>
<td>71,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oulu Region 87,1</td>
<td>87,1</td>
<td>80,3</td>
<td>88,4</td>
<td>92,1</td>
<td>92,1</td>
<td>91,0</td>
<td>68,4</td>
<td>89,1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Finstat 2009

Table 3 - Unemployment Finnish regions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unemployment rate (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Finland 8,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Karelia 13,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oulu Region 10,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kainuu 9,3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Finstat 2009

Unemployment rate in 2008, was officially 2.1 percent and estimated 8.4 percent (Karelian Science Center, University of Joensuu 2009: 5).

Because of geographic proximity Eastern Finland and the Republic of Karelia profit from the increased day-trips. Both Finnish and Russian cities, situated close to the border and (more important) border crossing points, profit from the increased tourism and day-trips for shopping etc. Outsourcing forms of production form Finland to the Republic of Karelia is still very limited (Liikanen et al. 2007).
As a concluding remark, the Euregio is characterised by considerable asymmetries across the border. To put it into perspective, the asymmetry between the standards of living between the border regions is larger than the difference than on the US-Mexican border (Paasi 1999: 674). It is still a border between two completely different societies, with Russia still being in transition and Finland as a welfare state (Paasi 1999: 674).

On the one hand, this can be an opportunity (border as bridge and resource) for developing cross-border linkages (Liikanen et al. 2007: 54). For example differences in prices of wood related products can boost trade in the dominant forest sector. On the other hand, they can be a barrier (border as barrier) for developing these cross-border ties. For example because of the large asymmetries in economic institutions or level of education.

**Cross-border traffic**

**National**

Because the border between the USSR and Finland was a source of conflicts and disputes CBC and contact across the border was rather limited, during most of the 20th century and strictly situated on the national level. Finland accession to the EU led to an increased cross-border contacts and development of CBC (Boykova et al. 2004: 77)

Cross-border traffic increased rapidly since the break up of the USSR. The number of border crossings was 1.3 million in 1991 and 7.7 million in 2008 (Liikanen et al. 2007: 42, Finnish Border Guard 2009 ). The opening of new border crossing points has significantly contributed to this trend. The number of Russian passenger increased over the years and surpassed the number of Finnish passengers, in 1991 the Russian share was about 32 percent, this developed in 2008 to 68 percent (Liikanen et al. 2007: 42, Finnish Border Guard 2009). Most of the passengers are on day-trips, for shopping and shuttle trade (Liikanen et al. 2007: 43).

Migration between Finland and Russia is relatively small, net migration from Russia to Finland has been about 2000 people per year, however it can have considerable impact in border regions (Liikanen et al. 2007: 43).

**Euregional**

There are four public border crossing points in the Euregio. Most of the border crossings take place in the south where the biggest border crossing points are located. The biggest being Niirala-Värtislä and Vartius-Lyttä (Karelian Institute 2003: 28). "In 2006, there were a total of 1 434 463 crossings in the international border-crossing points...The number of border-crossings has increased in the past few years. Of the international border-crossing points, the trend has been especially favourable at Niirala so it was justifiable to open it for 24-hour traffic. A new international border-crossing point in Kuusamo – Suoperä was opened for traffic in 2006. The increase in the number of crossings is also reflected e.g. in statistics showing overnight accommodation on the Finnish side of the border. The number of nights spent by Russians in the three regions of the programme area has increased - most prominently in Kainuu." (Euregio Karelia 2008: 12).

**Constructing Euregio Karelia**

The initiative for forming Euregio Karelia came from the Karelian Republic government. The aim of the forming of the Euregio was to create an 'umbrella project' for more efficient utilisation of the opportunities in the peripheral Finnish-Russian border area (Prozorov 2004, Boykova et al. 2004). In February 2000 the formation was official and confirmed by signing the founding documents. The government of the Republic of Karelia signed and approved
the 'Program of cross-border cooperation of the Republic of Karelia for 2002-2006' and the Finnish national government and EU approved the INTERREG III A Karelia Programme. The first common programme of the Euregio, 'Our Common Border', was launched later in 2000. The European Commission (EC) made its support clear through the development of the TACIS programme 'Euregio Karelia - as a tool for civil society'.

It was the first Euregio on the EU external border, "it was seen as a pilot project for future joint administrative structures between the EU and Russian regional authorities" (Liikanen & Virtanen 2006: 126). To create a long term cross-border institute that could act as middle between supranational, national and subnational patterns of action (Liikanen 2004). It was also seen as a pilot for future joint administrative structures between the EU and Russian authorities. The high barrier effect of the border makes it a really interesting region and completely different from Euregio's on the internal border of the EU (Boykova et al. 2004).

Like the Euregio Karelia states: "Euregio Karelia can be seen as a continuous process, in which co-operation aiming at a joint goal takes place on a concrete level on both sides of the border. The framework has as its objectives the facilitation of interaction across the border, the increase of welfare on both sides of the border, and the promotion and realisation of democracy. Increasing of welfare is closely connected to the improvement of preconditions for economic co-operation, to the increase in cultural co-operation, to research, training and teaching - to co-operation between enterprises, organisations and citizens" (Euregio Karelia 2003 in Boykova et al. 2004: 74).

Before the Euregio Karelia was founded other cross border initiatives took place. European and Finnish national-level policies have been the main driving force organizing and guiding CBC between Finland and Russia (Scott & Matzeit 2006). These initiatives were funded through the INTERREG and TACIS programmes, which have become an important part of promoting cross-border interaction. From 2007 on the INTERREG and TACIS funding programmes have been replaced by the ENPI. For the Euregio Karelia this programme is the Karelia ENPI CBC Programme.

The Karelia ENPI CBC Programme structures the implementation and coordination of the funding. It builds on former 'Euregio Karelia Neighbourhood Programme' and 'Our Common Border' programme. In this research I consider the Karelia ENPI CBC Programme as similar to the Euregio Karelia, because it is the same geographical area and it is constituted by the same regional councils as the Karelia ENPI CBC Programme. The programme document is written by the regions themselves and will be implemented by the regions themselves. I understand the governance structure of the ENPI CBC Programme as the structure of the Euregio Karelia.

**The objectives**

Tarja Cronberg, one of the initiators of the Euregio says the "objective is to improve the living conditions of people on both sides of the border" (Cronberg 2000: 179). 'Healing the scars of wars' was an important aspect of the Euregio formation (Prozorov 2004: 12). In the ENPI CBC programme more concrete objectives are formulated:

"The main objective of the Karelia ENPI CBC Programme is to increase well-being in the programme area through cross-border cooperation. To achieve this goal, the objective is to strengthen strategic guidance for programme implementation and to pursue concrete cross-border results and visible impacts on strategically important fields of activity." (Euregio Karelia 2008: 19).
Two priorities are formulated in relation to the general ENPI objectives.

- **Economic Development**

  This "includes activities in support to cross-border economic development. This corresponds to the Commission’s objective Economic and Social Development. However, in the Karelia ENPI CBC Programme social development issues have been included in the Priority 2 – not in the same priority as economic development. Priority 1 also includes activities that foster efficient and secure borders" (Euregio Karelia 2008: 19).

- **Quality of Life**

  This "concentrates on issues improving the quality of life and mostly builds on issues such as health, pleasant and clean environment, functional and practical structure of society and services (including cultural services). Activities included in Priority 2 address parts of the Commission’s objectives Common Challenges and People to People and partly also the social development part of the Commission’s Priority 1 Economic and Social Development" (Euregio Karelia 2008: 19-20).

**The structure of the Euregio**

The Euregio Karelia management (the Karelia ENPI CBC Programme management) "is based on full equality and partnership between the participating countries. This is reflected in the composition and designation of the programme bodies and the selection of consensual decision making as a general rule" (Euregio Karelia 2008: 5).

**Joint Managing Authority (JMA)**

The JMA is responsible for implementation of the programme in accordance with the structural fund regulations and makes payments to the projects to be funded through the programme. Both functions are filled in by the Council of the Oulu Region.

**The Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC)**

The JMC consists of two central government representatives and three regional level representatives from both countries participating in the programme. For Finland the Ministry for Foreign Affairs is the coordinating ministry and is represented in the JMC. For Russia this is the Ministry of Regional Development/Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The JMC takes its decisions according to the unanimity principle. The JMC will be chaired and co-chaired by a national government representative on the basis of annual rotation.

**Joint Selection Committee (JSC)**

The JSC "is a body in charge of the evaluation and selection of received project proposals" (Euregio Karelia 2008: 42). It consists of five representatives from each country. The members represent national, regional and local level organisations from the Karelia Republic and the Finnish regions included in the programme area". The JSC is responsible for selecting the projects that will be funded from the programme. Decisions are made according to the consensus principle. If one of the members does not agree with a proposal, it will considered rejected.
The Euregio is more than a mix of governments. Civil society organisations like trade unions, commercial and industrial chambers which frequently play a main role in economic cooperation and development also participate in the Euregio (Boykova et al 2004: 73-74). The funding for the Karelia ENPI CBC Programme/ Euregio Karelia comes from the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). Funding from ENPI may be used on both sides of the border. The ENPI programme is based on national co-financing.

In this chapter the historical and geopolitical complexity has been introduced and explained. It is clear that the Euregio Karelia has to work across a historically and geopolitically complex border, making the development of an integrated CBR relatively difficult. Also the socio-economic context of the Euregio has been explained and the development and structure of the Euregio. In the following chapter the methodological and analytical approach of this research will be explained.
Chapter 4 - Methodology

In the preceding chapters, the theoretical concepts and research area have been introduced. In this chapter the methodological and analytical approach used in this research will be explained. First the general analytical approach is explained. Second the methods and data used in the analysis are explained per political-territorial level. Third, the sub questions will be formulated in relation to the five interrelated dimensions of the territorial logic.

Analytical approach

The aim of this research is to find out how the territorial logics of the different border producing actors on the EU external border relate and affect the development of Euregio Karelia into an integrated border region. Euregio Karelia is a space where different political-territorial levels meet and overlap, from the supranational to the subnational level. In this research I differentiate the following political-territorial levels as actors that affect the development of Euregio Karelia:

- the supranational level: the EU,
- the national level: Finland and Russia, and the
- subnational level: the Finnish regions (North Karelia, Kainuu and Oulu region) and the Republic of Karelia.

Following Prozorov (2006: 21) I approach conflict “as an interface of policy discourses, in which the subject-positions of the parties are incompatible”. The subject here is the border between the EU, Finland and Russia that divides Euregio Karelia. Therefore I look at different border policies of the different levels. I consider border policies here as policies that affect the location and permeability of the border. Following Paasi (1999) foreign policies, are forms of border policies, they affect border production and the permeability of the border.

To analyse the different positions and territorial underpinning of the political-territorial levels that meet in Euregio Karelia I will analyse different policies of the different political-territorial levels. I use the policy concept used in the EXLINEA project and report on the EU external border. Policies “are official (e.g. political) frameworks and norms that govern border permeability and give direction to CBC by defining priorities, formal incentive structures as well as restrictions" (Scott & Matzeit 2006: 25).

Finland, Russia and the EU do not have specific policies concerning the Euregio Karelia, in which its objectives for it are formulated. Therefore we have to look at the overarching CBC policies. However, CBC policy is just one of the policies affecting the permeability of the border and the formation of a cross-border space in Euregio Karelia. CBC is part of wider cooperation with the ‘other’. Cooperation with the ‘other’ cannot be seen apart from broader geopolitical relations between the EU, Russia and Finland (Fritsch 2009: 11).

In case of the EU, for example the Common Spaces program, the ENP and the EU’s European Security Strategy (ESS) affect the permeability of the EU-Finnish-Russian border. CBC and Euregio’s are both part of, and mentioned in, these policies as it is affected by these policies. Hence these policies express a territorial logic concerning Euregio Karelia and the EU-Finnish-Russian border.

In short, to analyse the territorial logic of the different political-territorial levels we have to look at foreign policy (border producing policies) that affect the permeability of the EU-Finnish-Russian border, hence the development of an integrated border region. To limit this research the focus is on cooperation policies between different sides of the border. However
also other border producing policies, territorial strategies and geopolitical visions of the different actors that affect the forming of an integrated cross-border space in Euregio Karelia and the permeability of the EU-Finnish-Russian border are taken into account.

Analysis

In general, the focus is on cooperation policies that affect the permeability of the EU-Finnish-Russian border and affect the formation of a common cross-border space in Euregio Karelia. For the analysis of these policy frameworks I look at the relevant documents in which the different policies are expressed. Representatives from the different actors were asked to fill in a semi-standardised questionnaires with more concrete questions about Euregio Karelia and were later interviewed by telephone. To further contextualise these policies and understand the territorial strategies and geopolitical visions of the different political-territorial levels and understand the discourses behind it, I look at relevant scholarly literature.

To understand the difference between official rhetoric from the policy documents and practise and put the different statements and policies of the actors into perspective I discussed my findings with researchers from the Karelian Institute and organised a discussion with several experts from the Karelian Institute who conducted research on cross-border issues and Euregio Karelia before. The analysis is structured around the differentiated political-territorial levels. Now the analysis per level is explained, including the introduction of the different policy frameworks.

**Supranational**

The EU's strategy towards Russia is based on "the Common Spaces as the defining expression of EU policy towards the Russian Federation, the wider EU Neighbourhood Policy, the EU Security Strategy and its development objectives" (EC 2007b: 4). These three frameworks form the main strategy from the EU on Russia. The Northern Dimension (ND) forms a different framework for EU-Russian relation in which also Finland participates on an equal basis.

The ENP, Common Spaces and the ESS and ND are directed at a higher level than Euregio Karelia. But they affect the development of Euregio Karelia considerably. On a lower level I zoom in on the EU's CBC policy, mainly expressed through the ENPI CBC Programme. Also a representative from EuropeAid was interviewed and filled in a questionnaire. EuropeAid is the EC's office responsible for the Karelia ENPI CBC Programme in Euregio Karelia.

The document analysis is combined with literature research and discussions with researchers from the Karelian Institute to put the different policies into perspective and understand the underlying discourses. The different policy frameworks will be shortly introduced.

**ENP & Common Spaces**

In 2003 the EU launched its Wider Europe Initiative, later formalised in the European Neighbourhood Policy. Before there wasn't a comprehensive policy to those neighbouring countries without a prospect of membership in the near future, for example Russia. With the enlargement in 2004 these countries became the new neighbours of the EU. The EU needed a comprehensive approach to target its new neighbourhood "to establish a coherent basis for political stability and economic growth within its immediate regional surroundings" (Scott 2005: 430). It compromises a vast geographical area and incorporates a wide diversity of countries (see figure 4).

The basic idea behind the ENP is that a political and economical stable and friendly
neighbourhood will bring security and prosperity to the EU. Like it is mentioned in the European Security Strategy (in: EC 2004: 6), the ENP will "make a particular contribution to stability and good governance in our immediate neighbourhood [and] to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations". With the ENP the EU is "emerging as a foreign policy actor able to act beyond the dichotomy of accession/non-accession" (Lynch 2005: 33).

Figure 4 - ENP geographical area

The objective is "to avoid drawing new dividing lines in Europe and to promote stability and prosperity within and beyond the new borders of the Union" (EC 2003: 4). It is a form of partnership between the EU and its neighbours in which "the EU should aim to develop a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood - a 'ring of friends' - with whom the EU enjoys close, peaceful and co-operative relations" (EC 2003: 4). "The privileged relationship with neighbours will build on mutual commitment to common values principally within the fields of the rule of law, good governance, the respect for human rights, including minority rights, the promotion of good neighbourly relations, and the principles of market economy and sustainable development" (EC 2004: 3). "In return for concrete progress demonstrating shared values and effective implementation of political, economic and institutional reforms, including in aligning legislation with the acquis, the EU's neighbourhood should benefit from the prospect of closer economic integration with the EU" (EC 2003: 4).
The ENP is a framework for partnership between the EU and those direct neighbours who do not have prospect on future membership, to "assure the security and prosperity of the entire region by offering structural aid and enhanced political cooperation to address challenges arising from economic and political disparities between the EU and its neighbours" (Popescu 2008: 424).

One of its characteristics is that it follows a differentiated multi-lateral approach (Hayhem & Copsey 2005: 3). Multilateral in the way that the overarching principles apply to all associated countries. These principles draw for a large part on the 'acquis communautaire', the whole of EU laws and treaties developed in history, and the 'Copenhagen criteria', meaning the enlargement criteria agreed in Copenhagen in 2002 (Lavenex 2005). Bilateral in the way that the EU encounters and negotiates with the ENP countries individually rather than targeting them as a group (Hayhem & Copsey 2005: 3, Scott 2005: 534). With each country a single Action Plan is agreed, based on the country's context, however much of the Action Plans are similar.

Russia chose not to take part in the ENP. During the Putin presidency, the Russian government advocated a more state-centred politics, meaning a "re-centralization of federal relations and restoration of 'the power vertical'" (Liikanen et al. 2007: 100). This new approach resulted in Russia's refusal to work within the ENP framework, in which Russia would be treated as a 'regular' neighbour. It demanded a more 'equal' relation with the EU, described as a 'strategic partnership' (Prozorov 2004, Liikanen et al. 2007).

As an alternative, the EU and Russia confirmed their commitment to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement signed in 1997 and further strengthened it through the creation of four common spaces of:

- Economy,
- Freedom, Security and Justice,
- External security, and
- Research, Education and Culture

In 2005 Russia and the EU agreed the Road Maps for these Common Spaces, they "set out shared objectives for EU-Russian relations, as well as the actions necessary to make these objectives a reality, and determine the agenda for medium-term co-operation between the EU and Russia" (Liikanen et al. 2007: 101). However, these Road Maps are not that different from the ENP Action Plans, besides the naming, and are based on the acquis communautaire (Fritsch 2009)

**European Security Strategy**

As mentioned before, borders and cooperation with border regions have often to do with security issues. The EU's security strategy is relatively young. However with the increasing integration of the EU, it becomes more actively involved in external relations and security issues. The ESS is one of the main documents in which this strategy is explained.

The ESS was approved by the European Council held in Brussels in December 2003 and drafted under the responsibilities of the EU High Representative at the time Javier Solana. "It identifies the global challenges and key threats to the security of the Union and clarifies its strategic objectives in dealing with them, such as building security in the EU's neighbourhood and promoting an international order based on effective multilateralism. It also assesses the policy implications that these objectives have for Europe" (EUROPA website).
### Northern Dimension

An other EU policy framework, through which Russia, Finland and the EU cooperate is the ND. This policy framework was first initiated by the Finnish government in the 1990s and was adopted as an EU policy in 1997. It covers a large geographical area, the European Arctic and Sub-Arctic areas and the countries around the Baltic Sea and includes Northwest Russia (see figure 5). It is a cooperation between four partners, the EU, Norway, Russia and Iceland based on an equal relation.

After the end of the Cold War, the Finnish government saw a new opportunity for political dialogue, based on Northern regionality rather than the East-West divide. The ND could serve as a framework to address special regional development challenges in Europe's North. For the EU a Northern regional cooperation initiative was seen as necessary, because the Northern region "is of particular significance to the EU... because of its direct geographical link to Russia and therefore is important for cooperation and communication between the EU and Russia" (Liikanen & Virtanen 2006: 118).

![Figure 5 - Northern Dimension geographical area](source: EC delegation to Russia website)

The first and the second Action Plan focused on four priority sectors; care of environmental issues, nuclear safety, the fight against organised crime and special questions of the Kaliningrad Region. During the Finnish EU presidency, in 2006, the Northern Dimension has been revised and a new Northern Dimension Policy Document was agreed by the parties involved.

"The Northern Dimension policy will aim at providing a common framework for the promotion of dialogue and concrete cooperation, strengthening stability, well being and intensified economic cooperation, promotion of economic integration and competitiveness and sustainable development in Northern Europe" (ND Policy Framework Document 2006: 3).
It is mostly directed at Northwest Russia and developing Northwest Russia towards northern standards. Several key priority themes for dialogue and cooperation under the Northern Dimension have been identified, including (ND Policy Framework Document 2006: 5):

- Economic cooperation
- Freedom, Security and Justice
- External security
- Research, education and culture
- Environment, nuclear safety and natural resources
- Social welfare and health care

One of the main characteristics is that is a policy without institutions and independent funding. EU funding is directed through the ENPI Programme.

**Schengen**

With the forming of a common Schengenland, the Finnish border regime was reformulated and synchronised according to the terms of Schengen regulations. Schengenland is a territory in which the free movement of persons is ensured and has been one of the big steps in completion of the Four Freedoms. In this territory the members agreed common visa regulations, asylum request, border controls etc. Meaning that individual member states gave up some of their sovereignty.

The external borders became the only barrier for entering this zone of free travel and required a hard border to prevent the influx of the 'unwanted'. For several new member states this meant a serious challenge for existing CBC initiatives and trade, for example in the Polish-Ukrainian borderland (see Kramsch et al. 2004: 16). For the EU-Finnish-Russian border the effect was much less significant, because the Schengen-requirements did not differ much from the previous situation (Liikanen et al. 2007).

The signing of the Schengen agreement increased the Europeanization of the border and made it even more complex (and therefore more interesting). New forms of regional cooperation had to be developed where supranational (EU), national and regional legislation and policies had to be combined (Karelian Institute 2003).

Through Schengen a relative hard border is created. It is one of the most powerful border producing policies at work on the EU-Finnish-Russian border. It is not a cooperation policy, but does affect cooperation between both sides of the border and the permeability of the border.

**EU's CBC Policy**

The Europeanization of the border and the simultaneous regionalization, like the forming of Euregio Karelia, implied that the CBC policies had to be restructured in terms of European integration and EU politics and policies (Paasi 1999, Karelian Institute 2003). The EU is one of the biggest motors and promoters of CBC, also across the external border. I will shortly discuss the different CBC policies.

In case of CBC "the EU have pursued two strategic aims: one internal and one external" (Liikanen et al. (2007: 31). Internal in the way that it promoted socio-economic cohesion in the EU to fulfil the desired integrated Union. To make this happen, the EU funded all kinds of projects for the promotion of interregional cohesion and co-operation and regional economic development. The INTERREG Community Initiative was here the main source of EU funding.
External, it tried to influence the development in order to ensure that the external neighbourhood remained stable and friendly. To Russia and other CIS countries, the TACIS Programme was the main instrument.

INTERREG/EGTC

INTERREG was launched in 1989 and is funded through the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). In 2007 it was reformulated in the European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC), bringing together different territorial cooperation instruments like INTERREG and ESPON. "Unlike the structures which governed this kind of cooperation before 2007, the EGTC is a legal entity and as such, will enable regional and local authorities and other public bodies from different member states, to set up cooperation groupings with a legal personality" (EGTC website). It provides a legal framework, in which both subnational and national actors can cooperate as fully fledged stakeholders (Committee of the Regions 2007: 10). Thus "the EGTC will thus be a legal entity under Community law, and not a legal entity defined by a national legal system to which subnational authorities governed by a foreign legal system are allowed access by an international instrument" (Committee of the Regions 2007: 49).

Like INTERREG it is divided in three strands (EGTC website):

- Strand A : cross-border cooperation
  For Cross-border cooperation along internal EU borders

- Strand B: transnational cooperation
  Involving national, regional and local authorities aims to promote better integration within the Union through the formation of large groups of European regions.

- Strand C : interregional cooperation

TACIS

The TACIS Programme was launched in 1991. It was directed at the CIS countries to provide support for the transition processes. During the 1990s it developed more into an EU policy towards Russia. The TACIS programme and its funding is mostly directed at support of Russia by the transfer of know-how, not so much on direct investment (Cronberg 2003a: 6). They dealt in general with (Cronberg 2003a: 7):

- institutional, legal administrative reform
- private sector and economic development
- consequences of changes in society, infra-structure networks,
- environmental protection

A part of the TACIS funding was specially directed at CBC, the TACIS CBC Programme, which started in 1996. Problems for CBC on the external border of the EU, like in Euregio Karelia, was that INTERREG funding could only be used for funding activities on the EU side and TACIS only on the Russian side. These practical problems were solved by the introduction of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) in 2004, part of the ENP. However Russia does not take part in the ENP, Programmes under the PCA and the development of the Common Spaces are funded through ENPI.
ENPI

ENPI unites all previous EU funds, that were established to finance CBC under the ENP and PCA/Common Spaces Programmes. Of the total ENPI budget for the period 2007-2013 over 1.1 billion will be directed at CBC (see figure 6 and 7 for the geographical area of ENPI CBC) (EC 2007). Euregio's have an important role in supporting CBC across the EU external border (Popescu 2008: 424).

The two main objectives of the ENPI are promoting economic cooperation between EU and partner countries, and addressing the specific opportunities and challenges of the space of proximity (Balfour & Rotta 2005: 18). The biggest change compared to the previous policy is that the barrier between the foreign and interior policy domain is overcome. ENPI provides a legal basis for this change and improved the position of the subnational actors. Subnational actors are actively involved in the preparation, implementation and monitoring of the programmes and projects (Balfour & Rotta 2005: 18).
Four objectives have been formulated in the ENPI CBC Strategy Paper (EC 2007: 5)

- promote economic and social development in regions on both sides of the border,
- address common challenges, in fields such as environment, public health and the prevention of and fight against organised crime,
- ensure efficient and secure borders, and
- promote local cross-border “people-to-people” actions.

National - Finland

Finland does not have a specific policy directed at Euregio Karelia, it is part of wider policy frameworks on cooperation with (Northwest-). Different frameworks are present in the Finnish strategy on Russia and the Republic of Karelia. The Finnish Security and Defence Policy, the ND and the Neighbouring Area Cooperation are the main policy frameworks affecting cooperation with Russia and the permeability of the border. Besides these policy frameworks several speeches are analysed from high ranking officials from the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Also one person of the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs filled in a questionnaire and was later interviewed by telephone.

Figure 7 - ENPI CBC Sea Basin Programmes geographical area

Source: RCBI website
The Finnish security strategy is mainly directed at Russia and remains an important factor in Finnish relation with Russia. This strategy is expressed in its Security and Defence Policy. The Finnish Neighbouring Area Cooperation is the main policy for cooperation with the Republic of Karelia and the rest of North-West Russia. It is the Finnish equivalent of the ENP and ENPI CBC. To put the policy frameworks in perspective and find the discourses behind it and find more on Finland's CBC policy and territorial strategies towards Russia, the policy analysis is combined with literature research.

**National - Russia**

Russia is the subject of cooperation and development policies of the EU and Finland. The EU and Finland set up cooperation and development programmes and finance projects in Russia, not the other way around. Russia does not have concrete CBC policies of its own, however the faith of CBC projects like the Euregio Karelia depends on Russia's (Cronberg 2000). The territorial logic of Russia regarding Euregio Karelia must be more understood in the way that how supportive is the Russian government towards these cooperation and development programmes of the EU and Finland. The level of support is dynamic and affected by the complex geopolitical relation between Russia and the EU and Finland, which the Euregio is part of.

The development of the 'Common Spaces' is the most important program in Russian-EU cooperation. As mentioned Russia did not want to take part in the ENP and asked for a more equal 'strategic partnership', stressing its own geopolitical importance and power. The Common Spaces program is, however, based on the acquis, so predominantly expresses an EU logic. Hence, it cannot be seen as expressing the Russian logic. In stead, Russia's position in the Northern Dimension and the Common Spaces program is analysed.

The domestic situation in Russia is as important as its external relations for the position of the Russian Federal authorities towards CBC and Euregio Karelia. The internal situation in Russia has a very important role to play on how things happen on the outside. The post-soviet transition affects the position of the Republic of Karelia in the Russian Federation and affects the autonomy of the Republic of Karelia in (the development of) cooperation with Finland. Because no concrete policies exist and/or could be found in English, I rely on scholarly literature research concerning the internal situation in Russia, the Russian territorial strategy towards the EU, Finland and CBC and its (changing) geopolitical vision to analyse the Russian territorial logic in Euregio Karelia.

**Subnational**

The Karelia ENPI CBC programme document is the main policy document of the Euregio. This document is formulated in cooperation with the EU and the overarching ENPI CBC Programme and the national governments. The logic expressed in this document does not equal the logic of the subnational actors automatically, because it is written in cooperation with national governments and the EU.

No concrete extensive policy documents on cooperation with respectively the Finnish regions and the Republic of Karelia, of the individual Finnish Regions or Republic of Karelia could be found in English. Discussions with experts from the Karelian Institute, interviews with representatives from North Karelia and the JMA, websites from the regional authorities involved and literature research are used to analyse the territorial logic of the Euregio and the differences between the Finnish regions and the Republic of Karelia.
**Analytical sub questions**

The analysis is structured around the five differentiated dimensions of the territorial logic. The theoretical territorial logic of an Euregio, following the comprehensive approach, forms the prism to look at the different actors. In relation to these dimensions five sub questions have been formulated.

**The economic dimension**

Economic cooperation is one of the main interests for development of a CBR. Economic cooperation with the other side has the potential for regions to tackle their often poor economic situation, being located far away from the centre. Economic cooperation gives border regions the possibility for regional development. A lively economic cooperation implies a relative open border. This research is limited to the question; to what extent do the actors consider economic cooperation in Euregio Karelia important and provide resources for it?

**The cultural dimension**

Without a political identity their is no stable political entity or territory (Kolossov 2005). Following the comprehensive approach to CBRs some form of shared identity is crucial for the development of an integrated CBR or cross-border entity. To what extent do the actors consider some form of a shared identity important for the development of Euregio Karelia and try to develop this?

**The political-territorial dimension**

The establishing of Euregio’s as true cross-border spaces, involves territorial delineation across national and supranational borders, here the Finnish and the EU border, and would involve the establishment of new types of political spaces that are created beyond the territorial logic of the nation-state and a high level of political cooperation and political ‘autonomy’, meaning some form of independent decision making (Raich 1995: 25 in Perkmann 2003: 157). To what extent do the different actors in the Euregio Karelia promote some form of independent decision making for the Finnish regions and the Republic of Karelia?

**The governance dimension**

Strongly related to the political-territorial and legal dimension is the governance dimension, the establishment of institutions crossing the border. Reterritorialization involves the relocation of governance functions, and "a new scale can only be efficacious if it gains a sufficient degree of institutional thickness (Jessop 2002: 29 in Perkmann 2007: 256). Important is the political support to provide resources and legitimacy for the formation of a cross-border space (Perkmann 2007: 256). A CBR, here Euregio Karelia, needs autonomous [political and social] institutions (Raich 1995: 25 in Perkmann 2003: 157). To what extent do the actors promote the development of common institutions and sharing of institutions with the other 'side'?

**The legal dimension**

To develop meaningful CBC and develop Euregio Karelia into a meaningful territorial entity there should be a sufficient legal basis that regulates CBC and provide a platform for CBC on
a regional level. Also a certain level of legal exemptions is desired, for example of visa regulations or transport regulations.

To develop meaningful CBC and develop Euregio Karelia into a meaningful territorial entity there should be a sufficient legal base that regulates CBC and provides a platform for CBC on a subnational level. A relative open border is needed for fruitful CBC and some form of exemptions from national regulations regarding e.g. border crossings are necessary to make cross-border interaction easier. A visa free regime is the best illustrative example of the formation of an integrated space. If people can travel without many restrictions, the border becomes insignificant.

This research is limited to the question; to what extent do the actors want or allow exemptions from national regulations (including visa regulations) in and for Euregio Karelia?

In this chapter the analytical approach and methods have been explained and the analytical sub questions have been formulated. In the next chapter the different texts, interviews, documents, literature etc. will be analysed to find out what the different territorial logics are of the different political-territorial levels participating in and affecting the development of Euregio Karelia.
Chapter 5 - Analysis

In the following chapter the territorial logics of the differentiated actors will be analysed. The analysis is structured around the differentiated political-territorial levels. In the analysis I zoom in from the supranational level to the subnational level. First the EU logic will be analysed, second the Finnish, third the Russian, and finally the logic of the subnational actors, including the differences between the Republic of Karelia and the Finnish regions.

Supranational - EU Strategy on Russia

The EU’s territorial logic is a the very base of this research. The seemingly conflicting logic of the EU concerning its external border and neighbouring countries initiated this research. The EU is nowadays the most powerful actor on the EU-Finnish-Russian border and therefore one of the most important actor that affects the development of the Euregio Karelia in an integrated border region (Eskelinen et al. 1999, Paasi 1996, 1999).

In the analysis the EU strategy on Russia is central. The EU’s strategy towards Russia is based on "the Common Spaces as the defining expression of EU policy towards the Russian federation, the wider EU Neighbourhood Policy, the EU Security Strategy and its development objectives" (EC 2007b: 4). It is interesting that the ND is not mentioned as part of the strategy on Russia. Despite being an officially adopted EU policy framework.

First the EU strategy on Russia policies will be analysed, including the EU’s CBC policy. Next the Schengen policy and the ND policy will be analysed. Finally the EU’s territorial logic, using the framework of the five differentiated dimensions, will be concluded.

European Security Strategy

The key threats to the EU’s security are considered terrorism, as both a target as a base; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; regional conflicts, those can lead to extremism, terrorism and state failure and provides opportunities for organised crime; failed state, poor governance, like corruption, weak institutions and civilian conflicts damage states from inside out; organised crime, Europe is a target for organised crime, this has an external dimension that form a serious threat to the Unions security (European Council 2003: 3). These treats are seen as emanating from the outside. Making it necessary to relocate the defence outside of the de jure EU border:

"With the new threats, the first line of defence will often be abroad...Conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early" (European Council 2003: 7).

From the European security perspective a stable and secure neighbourhood is vital for the EU’s own security and stability.

"Even in an era of globalisation, geography is still important. It is in the European interest that countries on our borders are well-governed. Neighbours who are engaged in violent conflict, weak states where organised crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth on its border all post problems for Europe"[authors underlining] (European Council 2003: 7-8).

The focus on good governance, rule of law, human rights is part of this security perspective. The main reason for these focus area's is that secure and well-governed countries are seen as providing security and stability to the EU:
"A world seen as offering justice and opportunity for everyone will be more secure for the European Union and its citizens" (European Council 2003: 10).

Cooperation and (partial) integration of the neighbouring areas in the EU are seen as contributing to the EU's security. The objectives of the ESS are embedded in the ENP and Common Spaces. These policies are directed at creating a stable and secure neighbourhood as explained in the previous chapter. This is also clearly formulated in the ESS:

"Our task is to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the border of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations" (European Council 2003: 8).

This is a paradox, however, because "the integration of acceding states increases our security but also brings the EU closer to troubled areas" (European Council 2003: 8).

From this security perspective trade and economic development policies, including CBC, are seen "as powerful tools for promoting reform...Contributing to better governance through assistance programmes, conditionality and targeted trade measures remains an important feature in our policy that we should further reinforce" (European Council 2003: 10).

**ENP**

In the previous chapter the objectives of the ENP have been explained. Here a more critical approach is taken to find the underlying discourses. In the ENP two main themes are present; security issues and market issues (see Scott 2005, Lavenex 2005, Barysch 2005, Liikanen & Virtanen 2006, Aalto 2006, Bonvicini 2006, Joenniemie 2008, Browning & Joenniemie 2008).

**Security**

The ENP objectives are strongly linked to the goals of the ESS. The ENP "attempts to translate this objective into a coherent EU-wide policy approach. The ENP expresses several related security concerns of the member states and the EU as a whole...The ENP actively links the EU's internal and external security concerns and cuts across the EU's pillar structure" (Sasse 2008: 295-296).

The concept of security is not bounded to hard security and military issues. It includes both 'hard security' and 'soft security' (Liikanen & Virtanen 2006: 117). This is part of the 'new security paradigm' developed after the end of the Cold War in the 1990s. None of the neighbours can be classified as a military threat to the EU.

"Security is understood as multidimensional" (lecture Zwitter 2010). It involves all kind of risks on different levels. From drugs and crime threats to the functioning of a governance system and environmental pollution (Lavenex 2005: 126). Security has to be achieved through cooperation in different fields rather than through just hard security measures and strict border control (Scott 2005: 436). It is a cross-pillar security policy (Sasse 2008: 298).

The security perspective of the ENP explains the emphasis on cooperation in the field of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). In this field, the first line of defence is put outside of the EU, in the neighbouring countries. This externalisation has two dimensions (Lavenex 2005: 128); the export of EU policies and concepts in fields of migration control, border security; and the signing of bilateral agreements in which cooperation of neighbouring countries is ensured.

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4 Lecture from Dr. Andrej Zwitter at the Conference on European Security in Groningen at 17/04/2010
For example, illegal migrants are sent back to the neighbouring country from which they crossed the EU border. Neighbouring countries have become responsible for the prevention of illegal migration to the EU, putting the EU migration border outside of the *de jure* EU border.

In general, the EU tends to see its outside as a source of instability and insecurity (Browning & Joenniemie 2008: 524). In order to overcome this external threat it follows a strategy to expand the EU values, economic system and governance system beyond its external border.

**Market issues**

One of the pillars of the EU, is the (development of the) Single Market. The enlargement round of 2004/2007 was strongly informed by a neo-liberal discourse aiming at a larger European Market, that would boost European economy. The larger the Single Market, the larger the EU economy and economic growth would be. Economic growth is a priority for the EU. It is considered "a foundation for wealth and social cohesion" (Köppen 2009: 46).

The ENP is a substitute for actual membership, hence further enlargement of the Single Market. In initial ENP proposals the ENP countries were offered "the prospect of a stake in the EU's internal market" and "further integration and liberalization to promote the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital" in return for implementation of important parts of the acquis communautaire and EU (market) values (Vahl 2006: 58). "If a country has reached this level, it has come as close to the Union as it can be without being a member" (EC 2003: 10), "sharing everything but institutions" (speech Prodi 2002). This model is similar to that of the European Economic Area (EEA) (Sasse 2008: 301).

Revolutionary was that it included the freedom of movement of people. This implied a strong blurring of the border between the EU and ENP countries. This proved to be unacceptable for the EU (member states). Hence, the freedom of movement of people was left out of the final ENP proposals (Sasse 2008: 301). In practice, economic cooperation has been scaled down to cooperation that is nothing like the EEA (Vahl 2006: 58).

In the analysis of the ESS it was shown, market issues and economic cooperation form an important part of the EU's security strategy. Through closer economic cooperation and reduction of the gap in living standards that exists between the EU and its neighbouring countries a more stable and secure neighbourhood would develop. Following this perspective, creating interdependencies between the EU and its neighbourhood is key to providing EU's security, stability and development (Delanty & Rumford 2005: 128, Lavenex 2005). Through the ENP interdependence of economic, political, economical, social and cultural issues is established (Scott 2005: 436).

The concept of conditionality is central in this context (Sasse 2008, Delanty & Rumford 2005, Popescu 2008, Balibar 2004). The ENP is based on the promise to advance political and economic relations (ultimately to expand the internal space of the four freedoms) with the neighbouring countries *if* internal reforms are implemented (based on EU values and the acquis). It is a system of sticks and carrots in which neighbouring countries are rewarded for good behaviour and punished "if neighbours' commitments are not met" (European Commission 2004b: 3 in Joenniemie 2008: 533) (Joenniemie 2008: 532, Berg & Ehin 2006: 60).

Economic and legal reforms vary in scope and intensity. ENP partner states are rewarded with different levels of access to the EU's Single Market (Sasse 2008: 301). Consequently, some states will integrate to a larger extent than other ENP partner countries. The individual
Action Plans provide the basis upon which their performance and commitment can be evaluated. It is a powerful tool to extend (parts of) the acquis to the ENP partner countries (Joenniemie 2008: 533).

A widely shared point of critique on the ENP is, or like Bonvicini (2006: 24) calls it, its 'main innovation'; that is a universalising, one size fits all policy (see: Balibar 2004, Scott 2005, Aalto 2006, Bonvicini 2006, Popescu 2008, Browning & Joenniemie 2008). The ENP is universalising in the sense that its emphasis is on standardization and approximation to the EU standards. Other regional policies do exist, like the ND and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, however these are subordinated to the broader geopolitical EU strategy, like the Schengen border regime and the ENP (Sasse 2008: 302).

Following Scott (2005: 440-441) a discourse of threat is at the core of the EU's neighbourhood cooperation policies. This reflects itself in the border management. Efficient and secure common borders through shared management is seen as providing security. Following the EU's security perspective the universalising tendency is necessary in the way that with a single external border, the border can be managed in a common European fashion. This relocates the power from the national government to Brussels (Prozorov 2004, 2006, Popescu 2008, Browning & Joenniemie 2008).

An other widely shared point of critique is the ENP's bilateral approach. According to the EU this gives the EU the opportunity to tailor cooperation to the countries context (Browning & Joenniemie 2008: 534). According to critics, it is much in the EU's own interest to negotiate on a bilateral basis rather than following a multilateral or regional approach. A bilateral approach stresses the power asymmetries between the EU and its demographical, geographical and economical weak(er) neighbours (Vahl 2006: 56, Browning & Joenniemie 2008: 534).

This is in sharp contrast to the expressed preference for multilateralism and regionalism, based on equality. Following Vahl (2006: 56) I understand this emphasis on multilateralism and regionalism more as 'political window dressing'. For example, Russia was in favour of such a multilateral approach. But the EU feared that Russia would act as a leader of the Eastern neighbours and would try to dominate this region and relationship. This partly caused the de-emphasis on a multilateral approach (Browning & Joenniemie 2008: 536).

The EU follows a security perspective in the ENP. Market issues are important, but the opening up of the market demands relative open borders like in the EU. Economic cooperation demands relative open borders, making them more fuzzy. But "an open Union with fuzzy borders is not taken to be equal to a secure one" (Joenniemie 2008: 170). The discourse of threat affects the permeability of the border, it demands unambiguous lines (Browning & Joenniemie 2008, Joenniemie 2008). I tend to see the ENP as a security based policy, where security issues prevail over market issues and in which economic cooperation is predominantly seen from a security perspective.

**The Common Spaces**

The Common Spaces program is the most important cooperation policy of EU-Russian cooperation. It was developed because Russia opted out of the ENP. However, the overriding objectives remained the base for EU-Russia cooperation (see EC 2007b: 6). Hence, the critique on the ENP described above is often relevant for the Common Spaces as well. The analysis of the Common Spaces is structured around the four Common Spaces that are developed between the EU and Russia. The position of CBC and other forms of regional cooperation in the Common Spaces programme will also be briefly mentioned.
"The main interests of the EU in Russia lie in fostering the political and economic stability of the Federation; in maintaining a stable supply of energy; in further co-operation in the fields of justice and home affairs, the environment and nuclear safety in order to combat 'soft' security threats; and in stepping up cooperation with Russia in the Southern Caucasus and the Western NIS for the geopolitical stability of the CIS region" (EC 2007b: 4).

**Common Economic Space (CES)**

The focus of the development of a CES is on energy, environmental issues and infrastructure (EC 2007b: 16). Before the agreement on the development of the Common Spaces, the development of a Common European Economic Space was agreed in 2001 (Aalto 2006: 119). In this free trade area, the four freedoms of the single market were offered. In practice it was more a partial inclusion of Russia in the EU's single market, without any rights for Russia to be involved in the decision-making (Aalto 2006: 119). Similar to the ENP, this objective has been scaled down to:

"The objective of the Common Economic Space is the establishment of an open and integrated market between the EU and Russia" [authors underlining] (EC 2007b: 5).

Despite its inclusive suggestion, the 'Common Economic Space' falls short of a free market like the EEA (Barysch 2005, Vahl 2006). Both the EU and Russia still use trade restrictions, like quota and trade tariffs, to protect their own interests. For example the EU introduced trade restrictions on textile imports, and food sales from Russia. The EU insisted it were not protectionist measures and highlighted that Russia had been granted the lowest available EU tariff on Russian goods (Barysch 2005: 118).

The main themes coming back in the road map for the development for a CES is the harmonisation of standards and legislation (see Road Maps, Barysch 2005: 121). This must be understood as the adoption of the EU standards by Russia. For example:

"Promotion of cooperation and participation of the Russian bodies in the European standardisation, accreditation and metrology organisations" (Road Maps: 2).

The European commission is an active participant in the approximation of Russian legislation to the acquis communautaire: "the new law, to which the Commission provided significant input, approximates Russian legislation to aspects of the acquis on competition" (EC 2009: 17).

In the Road Map for the CES much attention is paid to the legislation and judicial problems that exist in Russia to improve opportunities for economic operators. Like the competition legislation systems (p. 6), transparent investment climate (p. 7), corruption (p. 7) etc. These problems have to be overcome, in that way that they are approximated to the EU standards. However "although the Russian side has sent a consistent message that they wish to align their technical regulation and standards with the EU system, in practice there has not been any real progress over the last 3 years" (EC 2009: 7).

The emphasis on economic cooperation is informed by the large level of economic interdependence. Russia is the EU's fifth trading partner, while the EU accounts for Russia as the main trading partner (EC 2007: 10). This includes cooperation in energy, which is a priority for the EU. Because the EU is highly dependent on Russia for its energy supplies and Russia is dependent on the EU for much of its imports. EU access to Russia's enormous gas and oil resources is vital for the EU's economic development (Aalto 2006: 47).
The EU imports about 25 percent of its total oil and gas consumption from Russia (EC 2007a: 10). The energy dependency was an important reason for the EU to accept Russia’s negative stance to the ENP and to develop a 'strategic partnership' with Russia outside of the ENP framework, resulting in the development of the Common Spaces. Russia is too important for the EU to let down (Liikanen et al. 2007: 103). A stable supply of energy is considered necessary for a stable economy and society (Aalto 2006: 47).

Cooperation in the field of nuclear energy focuses mainly on nuclear safety and nuclear security (see Road Maps: 16). The risk of a nuclear fall out from one of the Russian nuclear power plants is a real threat, therefore the "EU continues to push for the replacement of the first generation of Russian nuclear plants and for emphasis on other forms of energy. The EU is pressing for greater dialogue on nuclear safety issues" (EC 2007b: 11). Nuclear pollution is just one of the possible environmental problems that can affect EU. Cooperation in the field of environmental policies is considered as important, because "Russian environmental policy and problems have a direct impact on EU member states and candidate countries" (EC 2007b: 14).

The improvement of customs cooperation and improving border crossing facilities and other infrastructural project that increase the accessibility of Russia are promoted by the EU (see EC 2009: 15-16). The priorities in this field of cooperation are a reform of Russian customs legislation and procedures, development of border crossing infrastructure and cooperation in the field of exchange of customs information (EC 2009: 15). The objective is to improve accessibility from EU to Russia. The main problems experienced in the field of accessibility and border-crossings are problems on the Russian side:

"The main reasons for this border congestion are the rapid growth in the volume of bilateral EU Russia trade, insufficient infrastructure at some border crossings and burdensome procedures and inefficient customs clearance on the Russian side" (EC 2009: 15).

It is considered an important task of the EU to improve the investment climate and create a space of investment outside of the EU (EC 2009: 13). Good governance, improving the rule of law and fighting corruption are not (only) mentioned as being part of the security strategy but from a market perspective, as an improvement of the business climate in Russia. However, a common space for economics and business can only arise "within a context free of terrorist threat, organised crime and corruption" (EC 2007b: 5). CBC is briefly mentioned as part of the development of a CES. However it is not elaborated on what its role could be in the development.

**Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice (CSFSJ)**

The objective of the CSFSJ is "to facilitate ease of movement between the EU and Russia, in particular for business, travel and tourist within a context free of terrorist threat, organised crime and corruption" (EC 2007b: 5). The focus is on border management and (illegal) migration issues and to tackle terrorism and other forms of organized crime. Russia is nowadays a country of origin, transit and destination for (illegal) migrants (see EC 2007b: 9). The fields of security and migration are two themes in the road maps where it is explicitly mentioned to develop legislation, for example:

"develop an appropriate legislative framework related to migration management" (EC 2007b: 25).
In the field of security, extensive cooperation is explicitly mentioned, unlike other fields of cooperation in the fight against terrorism. The EU wants to "cooperate fully in the fight against terrorism" (EC 2007b: 26).

Similar to the ENP, security issues lie at the basis of EU-Russian cooperation. Cooperation in JHA is high at the agenda. In the case of justice the objective is "to contribute to the efficiency of the judicial system in EU member states and Russia and to the independence of the judiciary, and to develop judicial cooperation between EU and Russia" (p. 32).

CBC is not explicitly mentioned as being part of the development of the CSFSJ.

**The Common Space of External Security (CSES)**

With the development of the CSES key threats of today, such as terrorism, non proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and potential regional and local conflicts have to be prevented (see Road Maps: 35). The EU is mainly concerned with the prevention of conflicts on its borders:

"They will give particular attention to securing international stability, including in the regions adjacent to the EU and Russian borders" (Road Maps: 35).

The EU sees here a relative large role for CBC and Euregio's. It is the only Common Space where an explicit role for CBC and regional cooperation is mentioned:

"The EU and Russia recognize that processes of regional cooperation and integration in which they participate and which are based on the sovereign decisions of States, play an important role in strengthening security and stability" [authors underlining] (Road Maps: 35).

Other factors hinder the integration in the field of external security. Russia seems to prefer a wait-and-see attitude (Aalto 2006: 124). The EU questions Russia's approach in for example Chechnya and Georgia. And both Russia and the EU consider the USA is an important actor in the field of external security. They look at the USA for the development of security policies rather than to each other (Aalto 2006: 124).

**The Common Space of Research and Education, Including Cultural Aspects (CSRE)**

"For the Common Space on Research, Education and Culture, the objective is to create and reinforce bonds between the EU and Russian research and education communities and to build on a shared cultural and intellectual heritage" (EC 2007b: 5).

The EU takes here a market perspective. The main reason for the educational and research cooperation is strengthening of economy, not so much about cultural or intellectual development:

"Capitalize on the strong EU and Russian intellectual heritage and knowledge capital to promote economic growth involving civil society of the EU and Russia and strengthening of competitiveness of economies in Russia and the EU" [authors underlining] (Road Maps: 45).

The EU wants to export its European identity and values to Russia. The 'common identity' it promotes must be based on European (EU) values:
"To strengthen and enhance the European identity on the basis of common values, including freedom of expression, democratic functioning of the media, respect of human rights including the rights of persons belonging to minorities and promotion of cultural and linguistic diversity as a basis of vitality of civil society in Europe without dividing lines" (Road Maps: 52).

This field of cooperation is maybe the most inclusive one of the four common spaces. However, cooperation in this field will not define the EU-Russia relationship (Aalto 2006: 125). It is of relative low impact on the wider EU-Russia relation.

**Concluding the Common Spaces**

The emphasis in the Common Spaces is "clearly put on more practical - and minimalist - aspects of EU-Russian relations: how to protect and advance the EU's economic interests in Russia and safeguard Europe from soft security threats emanating from Russia" (Liikanen et al. 2007: 102-103). Clearly EU policies on Russia, like the ENP, are based on market and security issues (Barysch 2005, Aalto 2006, Liikanen et al. 2007, Browning & Joenniemie 2008).

Following Aalto (2006: 119), the CES is the most important aspect of the EU-Russia strategic partnership. It is not the most convincing argument, but in both the Road Maps and the Progress report, the text about the CES makes up about three quarters of the texts. It does say something about the EU's interest in economic cooperation with Russia.

As we have learned from the ENP and the ESS, the emphasis on economic cooperation is both informed by security issues and market issues. With standardisation, fighting corruption, improving the rule of law and improving transportation facilities, the EU tries to expand its market to Russia and tries to improve the business climate for EU businesses. Also cooperation in the field of energy is considered as very important by the EU.

From a security perspective, there is no threat for a military invasion by Russia. The tackling of 'soft' security threats, like organised crime, illegal migration, environmental issues including nuclear safety, is seen as important for the security of the EU. From this perspective, economic cooperation and development is both an objective in itself and a tool to target soft security threats.

Different from the ENP the focus is directed more at economic cooperation. There is also more emphasis on improving the business climate in Russia, rather than looking at economic cooperation from a security perspective only.

Russia is more equal to the EU and the principle of conditionality is less effective. Russia is too big and powerful to influence. The asymmetric power relation characteristic for the relation of the EU and the ENP partner states is missing in the EU-Russia relation. But a close relation with Russia is seen as vital for the EU's security:

"We should continue to work for closer relations with Russia, a major factor in our security and prosperity" (European Council 2003: 14)

However, according to the EU, the development of the Common Spaces still lacks any concrete measures. More dialogue and contacts have continued, but no concrete achievements were reported (EC 2009: 2)
EU's CBC Policy

In the analysis and discussion of the ENP and Strategy on Russia the role of CBC in the respective documents was shortly mentioned. Now I zoom in more concretely on the EU's CBC policy, including the overlap and conflict with the policies discussed above.

The ENPI CBC Program is one of the main tools from the EU to promote and support CBC initiatives. It has "an essential role to play, distinct from other forms of cooperation by virtue of operating for the benefit of both sides of the EU's external border" in the ENP and Strategic Partnership with Russia (EC 2007a: 5). The programme was first introduced in the Wider Europe document (see EC 2003a).

The rhetoric on the importance of CBC for regional development and 'preventing new dividing lines', in the Road Maps for the Common Spaces is quite disorienting. Careful reading shows there is only a very limited role expressed for CBC. Only in the CSES a specific role for CBC and regional cooperation was formulated:

"The EU and Russia recognize that processes of regional cooperation and integration in which they participate and which are based on the sovereign decisions of States, play an important role in strengthening security and stability." [authors underlining] (Road Maps: 35).

The role of CBC in the ESS was more clearly formulated. It is a tool in providing a secure and stable neighbourhood. Stable and economically well developed border regions are seen as providing security to the EU. In the ENPI CBC Programme a more regional development perspective is visible:

"CBC is certainly an important means of addressing this, helping enhance economic and social links over borders as they now exist, by supporting co-operation and economic integration between regions" (EC 2007a: 8).

This regional (economic) development perspective on CBC aims at decreasing the economic asymmetries across the border in order to prevent the influx of illegal migrants and goods and increase the stability and security on the border.

"Joint development strategies may help in addressing these disparities and assist in dealing with their most visible effects, such as the increase in legal and illegal, temporary and permanent migration flows, as well as organised crime" (EC 2007a: 10)

However also this regional development perspective is informed by the dominant security discourse:

"Integrated and sustainable regional development in the border regions is essential in helping to promote prosperity, stability and security on the EU's external borders" (EC 2007a: 15).

Part of this security perspective is the tackling of soft security threats through CBC. One of the core objectives of the ENPI CBC Programme is the tackling of environmental issues like water pollution and nuclear pollution that spread irrespective of state borders. But also public health issues like the spread of TB and HIV-Aids are (soft) security threats to the EU territory. CBC in the field of healthcare can help to prevent the expansion of these problem. Finally to prevent the expansion to EU territory (EC 2007a,b).
A similar soft security threat is organised crime. The fight against organised crime is mentioned as a "key cross-border challenge" (EC 2007b: 10). CBC is complementing the cooperation at the national level. Hence, it becomes an integral part of the security strategy:

"A close cooperation at the local and regional level between law-enforcement bodies on both sides of the EU's external borders will be a valuable complement to cooperation at the national level" (EC 2007b: 10).

An explicit role for CBC the development of upgrading border-crossing facilities and improvement of border management (see EC 2007a: 10). This is connected to the ENP and Common Spaces goal of improving border-crossing facilities and transport cooperation. The improvement of the quality of border-crossing facilities and procedures need to "provide security and be effective with respect to illegal migration and organised crime" (EC 2007a: 16).

The role of borders is seen as twofold, as "facilitating movement of goods and people" and "they need to provide security and be effective with respect to illegal migration and organised crime" (EC representative). The security perspective prevails over the cross-border mobility. It is a conditional relation. If the border crossing facility and border crossing procedures are efficient and secure, than the border management regime can become less strict. This will "contribute to wider economic and social objectives beyond the adjacent border regions" (EC 2007a: 16).

A common identity is not part of the EU CBC strategy. It is not understood as necessary for the development of Euregio Karelia: "Creating common identity is not the major task of the CBC programmes...the primary aim of the CBC programmes as such is to help the local population(s) to overcome the disadvantages of their often peripheral location, frequent economic and social underdevelopment of the bordering regions, as well as to serve in 'building bridges' instead of creating the new barriers on the external border of the EU" (EC representative).

On the internal borders the development of a 'shared border' and 'shared border governance' on a subnational level is certainly an objective. With the EGTC this has come close; "where the central authorities agree to transmit a part of their competencies to the local authorities who create joint structures managing a special topic/aspect of sovereign governing on a clearly defined territory" (EC representative). This requires special changes in the national legislations "which we [the EC] don't expect from the Russian partner for the time being" so the EC "concentrate[s] on animating the practical cooperation on the local level and not plan establishment of any subnational or supranational bodies" (EC representative).

Shared governance across the EU-Finnish-Russian border is mentioned by the EC representative as a long term objective for Euregio Karelia. More independent regional authorities are seen as improving the possibilities for efficient CBC. Political power should be more in the hands of the local, rather than being located on the national level. Because "more autonomous and competent regional/local authorities are more keen to use CBC and are better prepared to fully use this tool of cooperation" (EC representative).

There is some level of shared governance in Euregio Karelia. In the Karelia ENPI CBC Programme the EU agreed on shared decision making and shared budget control. However, the EU hesitated a long time to grant this right to the Russians. The EU did not want Russian control over EU funds. The signing of the ENPI programme was delayed because of "Russia's
Insistence on a reciprocal framework for financial cooperation" (EC 2009: 4). Finally, this reciprocal principle was incorporated in the program and now a shared control over EU funds in Euregio Karelia exists. Before the institutionalisation of Russian participation in the funding and decision making process in Euregio Karelia, the line of exclusion was drawn within the Euregio Karelia (Prozorov 2006: 30).

In essence CBC represents a network approach to governance, where multiple governance levels from both sides of the border cooperate “aimed at building institutions of governance able to organize social life in a transborder regional context” (Popescu 2008: 421). But CBC practices of the EU still have an intergovernmental character between bounded territorial units (Dimitrova 2008: 64). Despite the EU allowed limited shared governance in the Karelia ENPI CBC Program it falls short of the development of a common space with shared governance, administrative and budgetary capacities (Prozorov 2006: 30).

From a 'Europe of the Regions' to a security perspective
CBC is, indisputable, a tool in the EU's security strategy. Stable, well-governed border regions and efficient and secure border crossings help to provide to the security of the EU as a whole. This security perspective represents a break with the 'Europe of the Regions' discourse from the 1980s and early 1990s.

CBC and CBRs were an integral part of the EU's regional policy. Euregio's were promoted as a model for European integration in order to reduce tensions between countries and decrease regional economic asymmetries (Popescu 2008: 419). On the Eastern border they served as territorial framework in which new member states would prepare for EU membership (Popescu 2008: 424). With the enlargement rounds of 2004 and 2007, this function of Euregio's changed. The EU's neighbourhood policy, the ENP and the Common Spaces in case of Russia, now serves as a substitute to enlargement. It is 'a membership without institutions'.

Euregio's were set up everywhere at EU's internal and external borders. Euregio Karelia served as a model for the development of CBC operations elsewhere on the EU external border (see EC 2003: 6). CBRs had an important function in the 'Europe of the Regions' discourse, in which a new kind of (European) territorial organisation was envisioned (Popescu 2008: 433, Scott 2005).

The successful development of the Single Market and the strengthening of the regional level, was thought to undermine the position and sovereignty of the nation-state. Member states would be too small to compete in an ever globalising world, and too big for 'cultural identification' (Anderson 1995: 83). Powerful subnational governments were promoted, envisioning the EU as a decentralized federation of regions (Anderson 1995: 85). Both seemed to undermine the position of the nation-state. The regions would act, together with the supranational level, as a new kind of political-territorial organization.

A rather normative idea about regions dominated this discourse. The suggestion is made that regions are good, flexible, economically efficient in themselves and small enough for identity politics in contrast to the large, bureaucratic and looming nation-states (OpenLearn).

A second reason for the EU's emphasize on regionalism and the importance of regions was its legitimacy crisis. In the 'Europe of the Regions' discourse regional identity was linked to a European identity, legitimising both the regions and the EU. A 'Europe of the Regions' would increase the independence of the 'small and idyllic' regions. At the same time the European
The project was legitimised as the link suggested a more democratic and less centralized EU (OpenLearn).

Consequently the Europe of Regions discourse was picked up by the regional authorities (OpenLearn). It implies an increase in political power for the regional authorities and an increase of the budget through the EU's regional development funds. The forming of CBRs was part of this process. The founders of Euregio Karelia were inspired by this discourse and envisioned Euregio Karelia as a new kind of political territorial organization where several subnational actors would cooperate in limited policy fields (see Cronberg 2003a, 2003b).

Gradually, this Europe of the Regions discourse was replaced by a security discourse or a threat discourse as Scott (2005) calls it. CBC and security issues are now seen as closely related. CBC has become a security instrument rather than a tool for regional development and part of changing Europe. The EU tends to see its outside as a source of insecurity. This calls for the securitisation of the EU's external border. However, CBC can only flourish if the threat perceptions are de-emphasised (Scott 2005: 446).

The universalising tendencies of the ENP and Common Spaces to its borders limit the development of grass root projects across the EU external border (Joenniemie 2008: 170). “Regionalist measures are seen as endangering the EU's credibility and ability to design and implement more general, all-encompassing policies” (Joenniemie 2008: 170). This is a direct challenge of the development of grass root projects, like Euregio Karelia. The EU's strategy on Russia does not take account of the specific needs and problems of the Euregio Karelia space (Aalto 2006: 125). Regional cooperation is seen as creating fuzzy borders and identities. “The EU fails to make the most of the regional integration prospects. It fails to think in regional terms” (Joenniemie 2008: 154).

**Schengen**

"Following the signature of the Visa Facilitation Agreement in 2006, visa dialogue will continue in order to examine the conditions for a mutual visa-free travel regime as a long-term perspective" (EC 2007a: 23).

This quote shows that a visa free regime between the EU and Russia will not be developed in the short and medium-term future. It is not in the EU's interest, and is thought to involve security risks. This is, of course, a challenge for the development of a CBR across the Schengen border. Fruitful CBC requires a relatively high mobility level between both sides of the border. A visa free regime is the best illustrative example of the formation of an integrated space. If people can travel without many restrictions, the border becomes insignificant.

Present, the gates of the EU-Finnish-Russian border are opened in a semi-permeable fashion, for selected groups only. This can create "deeper socioeconomic gaps and fractions across already dividing European Neighbourhood societies" (Dimitrova 2008: 60). For example the introduction of the 'blue card' the EU's equivalent of the US 'green card' serves the demand for skilled migrants in the EU. Unskilled migrants are being kept out. For Russian businessmen, researchers and other groups that serve the EU's interest are allowed in and get visa, and especially long term visa, fairly easy (Liikanen et al. 2007).

For some of these groups the introduction of a single Schengen visa, considerably eased the travel (Liikanen et al. 2007: 76). Because with for example a Finnish visa they now can travel to all Schengen countries. In stead of the need to apply for a visa for each country
separately. In this way Schengen "has opened up Europe to Russians" (Liikanen et al. 2007: 76).

However, on the other hand Liikanen et al. (2007) show in their research, on the perception of the visa regime by Russian and Finnish experts, that about one third of the Russian interviewees regarded Schengen as disadvantageous. Mainly because of the high prices and time consuming procedures for the visa application. Others say that in practice a visa-free regime for Russians already exists, because all Russia visa applications are approved (Liikanen et al: 2007: 69).

Following Dimitrova (2008: 60) the opening and softening of the EU external border "seem to serve the interest of elite groups" (p. 60). As is argued by Liikanen et al. (2007) for some it is easy to get a (long term) Finnish visa. For most locals in Russian Karelia it is not possible to get a long term visa and/or it is too expensive to apply for a one-time visa for each visit. Each time about €35,-. The visa application takes around two weeks for Karelians. Consequently, border crossings have to be planned weeks in advance. This is a real barrier for the mobility of people in Russian Karelia and day-to-day cross-border contacts.

The strict visa regime has to do with controlling access into and out of the EU. Because of Schengen, something or someone once inside can travel without restrictions within the Schengen zone. A strict visa regime and border control gives the EU the opportunity, or at least the suggestion, to control and limit the access to the EU. "Nowhere is the threat discourse more evident than in reference to borders and their management" (Scott 2005: 441). The EU's persistence on the visa regime and other Schengen regulations in relation to Russia show that, besides the rhetoric, the forming of a Common Space between Russia and the EU is far away.

The EU's insistence on uniformity of application procedures, contradicts the EU logic of building CBRs across the Schengen border (Joenniemie 2008: 160). "The insistence on a tight Schengen regime, is in fact a rebordering process of the clear line of exclusion from the area of freedom, security and justice. "It is a very disruptive process for those initiatives that try to break down the border" (Prozorov 2006: 29). "The insistence of the EU on the uniformity of the rules of the Schengen Agreement for all Russian regions contradicts its own ambition of fostering regional integration across the formerly contested borderlands" (Prozorov 2006: 134)

ND
The ND forms a different framework in which Russia and the EU cooperate. The approach and perspective of the ND is, however, rather different than that of other border policy frameworks of the EU discussed above. This is both a strength and a weakness of the ND.

Important to remember is that the ND was initiated by Finland and only later adopted by the EU as an EU policy. It builds upon the relative unproblematic cooperation Europe's north before the enlargement of the EU to the North. The emphasize was on overcoming the East/West division that so long divided Europe's North (Browning & Joenniemie 2008: 542). I would like to state again that the ND is not mentioned as an integral part of the EU's strategy towards Russia, despite it has been adopted as an official EU policy framework.

The ND framework shows some similarities with the ENP and Common Spaces. The ND was adopted as an EU policy and now is a "regional expression of the Common Spaces EU/Russia" (EC 2006: 3). For example the overarching objective of the ENP (preventing new dividing lines) is embedded in the ND:
"It [The ND] will help to ensure that no dividing lines are established in the North of Europe" [authors emphasize] (EC 2006: 1).

Also the priority sectors (Economic Cooperation; Freedom, Security and Justice; External Security; Research, Education and Culture; Environment, Nuclear Safety and Natural Resources and Social Welfare and Health Care (see EC 2006: 5)) overlap to a great extent with the priority sectors of the ENP/Common Spaces/ESS.

Despite some similarities, the general approach of the ND, or EU in the ND to be precise, towards Russia is rather different than in the Common Spaces. One of the key characteristics of the ND is its multilateral approach based on regionalism and on some kind of shared identity of 'northerness'. Key in this multilateral approach is that it is based on equality of the partner countries (EC 2006, Cronberg 2003a, Joenniemie 2008, Browning & Joenniemie 2008). The emphasis is on commonalities and equality rather than assymetries:

"The Northern Dimension policy will seek complementarity among its partners and participants" [authors underlining] (EC 2006: 3).

Important in this context is the absence of key ENP principles of conditionality and bilateralism that accentuate the asymmetric power relation between the EU and the neighbouring countries. Without these principles there is more space for dialogue between the partner countries and other participating institutions. This makes it much more an equal and inclusive policy (Tassinari 2005 in Joenniemie 2008).

In the ND not only national governments and the EU participate as equal partners, also other regional councils like BEAC, CBSS, NCM and the AC and other institutions active in the North participate (see EC 2006: 1-2). The participation of regional councils is characteristic for the ND and its regional approach. Key for the emphasis on regional councils and other (trans)subnational actors is the principle of subsidiarity:

"The Northern Dimension policy will be characterised by transparency and openness towards all its actors and will take due regard of the subsidiarity principle" (EC 2006: 3).

This de-centralising tendency evokes that the local becomes more important, hence the core is losing its dominance. The ND provides the opportunity to target problems in its context and come up with a tailored set of solutions. It gives the opportunity to better raise the specific problems of the Northern regions (Liikanen & Virtanen 2006: 118).

The ND is, off course, directed at Europe's northern hemisphere. However the focus is "increasingly on North West Russia...with its specific challenges and opportunities for the whole Northern Dimension" (EC 2006: 1). It is a joint policy to target those problems that affect all (or many) of the partners participating in the ND.

Like other EU cooperation policies with Russia, the ND is (partly) security based. However, the ND's security perspective is slightly different than other EU policies. The emphasis is on common soft security threats like environmental and nuclear safety, crime prevention and minority rights (Scott 2005: 441) rather than only (possible) threats for the EU, like in the ENP. The ND is mainly strong in addressing environmental issues including nuclear safety.

Subnational cooperation and CBC is explicitly promoted by the ND, and mentioned many times. Different than in the Common Spaces Road Maps. It is a "cross-cutting theme" (Road Maps: 4). For example:
"The Northern Dimension policy framework will focus on areas of cooperation where a regional and sub-regional emphasis brings added value" [authors underlining] (Road Maps: 3).

A relative large role for CBC is foreseen in the field of regional development. CBC provides an opportunity and a tool for regions to boost their regional (economic) development:

"The Northern Dimension will support subnational and governmental cross-border and transboundary cooperation as one of the instruments for promoting regional development" (EC 2006: 4)

A major point of critique on the ND is that it does not have independent funding and institutions, making it a 'toothless tiger' (Joenniemie 2008). Sometimes it looks like nothing more than a political forum to show the participants good will rather than a forum for real practice and development of Europe's North.

The different approach of the ND is challenged through the use of ENPI, as the main source of funding. Because ENP principles (conditionality etc.) are likely to apply for the ND as well (Browning & Joenniemie 2008). This is part of the wider tendency in Europe's North, where, with the ENP/Common Spaces, it increasingly becomes conditioned by the challenges faced in other places of the neighbourhood, "and the general EU's desire for more 'joint', 'coherent' and 'consolidated' policies in the post-enlargement situation" (Browning & Joenniemie 2008: 543). The EU feared Russian dominance in the eastern neighbourhood (e.g. Belarus, Ukraine, Caucasus). This strikes back at the ND, while cooperation in the ND and the European North has been relatively unproblematic and fruitful.

In the ND the position of the EU is downgraded to one of the partners (Browning & Joenniemie 2008). Consequently, the EU puts less emphasis on the ND as an integral part of the EU's external affairs and relationship with Russia, despite being a 'permanent policy' (Browning & Joenniemie 2008). Within the ND framework it is much harder for the EU to make Russia adopt EU norms and values (Browning & Joenniemie 2008).

Border wise, the ND's logic is about debordering, however not in the same fashion as the integration and formation of the EU. It is less based on the neo-liberal discourse, and the creation of a Single Market. The emphasize is on addressing common challenges in the environment, transport, welfare etc. It is not an objective to abolish state borders, but the borders between the people, the societies. Following the ND approach, borders "fade in significance thereby turning them into administrative rather than statist borders" (Joenniemie 2002: 49). From an identity perspective, it emphasizes a common shared identity of northernness and promotes the strengthening of such an identity.

In general the ND takes a more postmodern approach, based on regionality and commonalities. The focus is on common challenges, like environmental pollution, including nuclear safety and a good infrastructural connection. The ND represents a postmodern neomedievalist geopolitics (Browning & Joenniemie 2008: 541). The dynamics in the ND show an emphasis on a polycentric EU, a 'Europe of Olympic Rings', based on regionality and northernness.

Border wise, it allows borders to become more fuzzy, without questioning the sovereignty of the partner countries (Joenniemie 2008). The ND incorporates a de-centralisation of governance, underlined by the subsidiarity principle. From a governance perspective, it is an innovative and revolutionary policy framework changing the political-territorial organisation
of Europe or at least Northern Europe. The ND implies a redistribution of power from the centre to the periphery. The gradual decentralisation of governance creates a multiplicity of governance structures, actors have multiple identities in different policy-networks that overlap (Browning 2001: 17).

The EU, however, is not the only actor, and loses its dominant position in relation to participating countries and other (regional) partners. The ND "does not represent the voice of the core [the EU/Brussels] but stands out as a proactive move with the margins speaking and contributing to a visualisation of the Union that strengthens images of a 'Europe of the Olympic rings'" (Joenniemie 2002: 51). Consequently, with the ND the EU does not have full control over the integration of Russia into the EU. From a modernistic perspective this can be rather threatening for the EU (Browning & Joenniemie 2008).

Multiple geopolitical strategies

The EU's neighbourhood policies equals spatial politics (Delanty & Rumford 2005: 127). They are based on geographic proximity. With the ENP a new spatial vocabulary was developed, with concepts of 'proximity politics', 'wider Europe', 'ring of friends' and 'borderlands' (Delanty & Rumford 2005: 127). Two themes come back in the policies; security and market issues.

The (partial) inclusion of Russia and Neighbours in the EU space represents a blurring of the EU's external border (Delanty & Rumford 2005: 127). From a security perspective, hard rigid borders can also be a source of potential instability. The key to a secure EU is not to create impermeable borders, but to partially increase the permeability of borders (Delanty & Rumsford 2005: 130).

The ENP and Strategic Partnership with Russia are an attempt of the EU to reinvent its borders and create a space outside of its de jure border that is stable, secure and friendly (Dimitrova 2008: 54). By this a zone of interaction is created across the Unions external border. On the other hand, there are border confirming tendencies. Following Dimitrova (2008: 53) the emphasis has been on the border confirming tendency rather than the border transcending.

Different approaches, or geopolitical models, are visible in the EU strategies on its borders and neighbourhood. Three main approaches, with different border strategies, can be differentiated; a Westphalian approach, Europe as an empire, and a neomedieval Europe (see figure 8) (Browning & Joenniemie 2008, Popescu 2008, Joenniemie 2008, Scott 2005, Dimitrova 2008, Lavenex 2005).

The Westphalian model depicts the EU as having the characteristics of a nation-state. Sovereignty shifts from the member states to the EC in Brussels. Political power is concentrated in the centre, in Brussels, but is applied evenly across the territory up to the border (Browning & Joenniemie 2008: 522). This desires relative hard and clear delineated borders, with clear insides and outsides. The EU as a 'super state' or like a 'Fortress' are often used as a metaphor.

The imperial model "depicts EU governance in terms of a series of concentric circles. Power, here, is understood as located at the centre in Brussels and dispersed outwards in varying, multilayered and declining degrees” (Browning & Joenniemie 2008: 523). Border wise, it means more fuzzy borders.
The neomedieval, or network-based approach, depicts power in Europe as dispersed in a radical fashion. “With power no longer fixed on a single centre in Brussels, but as being far more regionalized and corresponding to logics of transnationalism and network governance, depending on the particular issues at play” (Browning & Joenniemie 2008: 525). It is a politics of dimensionality. (Geo)political power is dispersed around many centres, rather than in one dominant core, here Brussels (Scott 2005). A 'Europe of Olympic Rings' is often used as metaphor.

Figure 8 - Geopolitical models

I argue, all approaches are present in the EU strategies at the same time. A simple explanation for this conflicting approaches is that member states and EU institutions have different interests and perspectives in the neighbourhood and its borders (Browning & Joenniemie 2008: 544).

Schengen is the best example of the EU following a Westphalian approach. With the Schengen agreement, the border between the EU and its neighbours is set in clear terms, with strict control on the access to the EU. I consider border mobility and border permeability as one of the most important variables of the EU's territorial logic in Euregio Karelia. Despite the rhetoric on 'common values' and 'shared governance', without a relative
high permeability of the border no well developed CBC or CBR can be developed across the EU border.

This model can be easily criticized, because of the intergovernmental nature of the Union. Also after the signing of the Lisbon treaty, national governments and parliaments have gained more power. All policies and treaties have to be ratified by the individual parliaments. States are still the main actors in the ENP framework (Dimitrova 2008: 65). Some say a Westphalian approach can be rather dangerous for the EU. Because hard exclusionary borders can risk destabilizing the neighbourhood (Dimitrova 2008: 65).

With both the ENP and Common Spaces the EU wants to bring stability and security throughout Europe. This has "provided the EU with both moral and identity prerogatives to try and organize the space beyond its borders and to spread 'European values' to those on the outside" (Browning & Joenniemie 524). The EU expands its space of freedom and security outside its de jure borders. European values and standards (the acquis) are the norm. Through the principle of conditionality this is forced on to the neighbouring countries. Without the approximation of the national laws to the acquis no benefits will be acquired. This system of carrots and sticks is characteristic for the EU's strategy.

The EU wants to protect itself and "extend its influence into its Neighbourhood" (Dimitrova 2008: 65). Though 'soft imperialism', like negotiations, persuasion and cooperation the EU tries to influence its near abroad (Dimitrova 2008: 65). A characteristic of an empire is that it sustains different levels of influence with neighbouring countries. The ENP accentuates the asymmetric relations amongst and between neighbouring states. This allows the EU to exert its rule in particular zones of interest (Dimitrova 2008: 59).

Through the ENP, Common Spaces, ND and ENPI CBC the EU cooperates with its neighbours on different levels. Networks are build across the border. The rationale of breaking down the borders and integration is also part of the EU strategy. Borders become a place of exchange and interaction (Dimitrova 2008: 63). A neomedieval Europe can be seen in the emphasis on cooperation, shared governance and the promotion of CBRs. The idea of a 'Europe of the Regions' and the ND are similar to this neomedieval geopolitical model. It envisions a Europe, where political power is not located at the centre but located in the regions and dispersed across space.

Other neomedieval tendencies in EU policy are visible in the fact that EU governance already has 'multiple tiers', meaning that power is dispersed between the subnational, national and supranational levels (Joenniemie 2008: 150). The legal sovereignty is located at different levels, sometimes at the national and sometimes at the supranational level. Therefore shared governance, is not seen as representing a treat to the EU (Joenniemie 2008: 150). At least not in the internal space of the EU.

Politics of Inclusion vs. Politics of Exclusion

The EU's neighbourhood strategy is rather fuzzy and difficult to explain from one of these theoretical models (Scott 2005). All territorial approaches are visible at the same time at different points at the border (Browning & Joenniemie 2008, Popescu 2008). What has become clear from the analysis is that in the EU's strategy on Russia, two different strategies emerge (Lavenex 2005: 129). A protective one, and an inclusionary one. The former focuses on the control of threats to the EU's security. This demands relative 'hard' borders. The latter, seeks to include the neighbourhood, and create a space of cooperation across the EU's de jure external border.
In table 4 politics of exclusion and inclusion are compared on three variables. I will use this table to analyse the dominant approach the EU takes. “It is assumed that the relative weight of each strategy will depend on the institutional set-up of cooperation and the logic of action adopted by the participating actors” (Lavenex 2005: 130).

The focus of the ENP is predominantly on (soft) security issues. The fight against organised crime and illegal migration are core objectives of the ENP. It is thought to provide security for the EU as a whole. Border governance and control is strongly institutionalised through Schengen. With Schengen a strict control over access into the EU is maintained.

The ENP and Common Spaces are a long term and formalised project, but the institutional thickness of the cooperation is limited. Especially in the ENP the asymmetric relation between the EU and its neighbours is emphasised through the principle of conditionality and the bilateral relationship. In general, however, EU-Russia cooperation does not involve other organisations than the high government authorities. Cooperation in the ENP is based on conditionality. Consequently, the ENP is more an exclusionary policy, with some inclusive tendencies.

The approach to Russia is somewhat different. It is more focused on economic cooperation. Russia is in other fields too big and powerful to influence. Economic cooperation is in the interest of both parties. On the other hand, economic cooperation is indisputable part of the EU’s security strategy, exporting European values and creating a space beyond the EU external border based on security and stability. Also the fight against organised crime and illegal migration are top priorities in the Common Spaces.

The insistence on a strict border implies a selective participation in cooperation with Russia. Economic cooperation is promoted, however a common economic space of something like the EEA is not developed. This implies a dominant position of the security perspective on EU-Russian cooperation. It is a strategic cooperation, because a stable and secure neighbourhood is understood to provide security and stability to the EU as a whole.

Economic cooperation is part of the 'security through inclusion' approach. The creation of a hard border, with ‘sharp edges’, risk the deepening of asymmetries between the EU and its neighbours. This could turn out eventually as a security threat for the Unions own security and stability. It takes the perspective that "the costs of defending the EU from unstable states in its neighbourhood would be much higher than those of promoting prosperity and security beyond its borders" (Lavenex 2005: 129).

The idea of the ENP and Common Spaces is a "sense of inclusion and belonging to a working political community despite the fact that direct membership is not an immediate or probable option for several states that consider themselves very close to the EU" (Scott 2005: 430). It is an alternative to enlargement. Despite the idea, or rhetoric, to avoid new political division and dividing lines in Europe, "new visa regimes and other restrictions of cross-border interaction threaten to exacerbate development gaps between the EU-25 and non EU-states" (Scott 2005: 430).

The EU’s CBC policy and the ND follow a more holistic approach. Through CBC the root causes of illegal migration and crime are fought. The ND and CBC policy are characterised by a more equal relation where interests of both sides of the border are taken into account and includes the participation of civil-society organisations. It is more a multi-level governance structure where the supranational, the national and subnational level work together. It is also not based on the principle of conditionality but more on the principle of subsidiarity.
The EU's CBC policy and ND are more inclusive, but are clearly subordinated to the more high-level and exclusive policies of ENP, Common Spaces and Schengen. This limits their political weight and impact on the EU's territorial logic and the (changing) meaning of the border.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Substantive focus</th>
<th>Selective approach:</th>
<th>Holistic approach:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Focus on security: strict borders, fighting illegal immigration and organised crime</td>
<td>Balance between freedom, security and justice; fight against root causes of illegal migration and crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Predominance of member states' interests</td>
<td>Balance between the interests of the EU as a whole and those of its neighbours</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Institutional form | Ad hoc cooperation, informality, short term orientation | Long-term planning, formal relations, supranational. |
|                   | Selective participation with dominance of (member states') interior ministry officials, tendency towards unilateralism | More pluralistic participation, including foreign affairs officials, European institutions, international organisations and possibly civil society, multilateralism |

| Logics of action | Strategic, utility maximising rationality | More rule-oriented, communicative rationality |
|                 | Cooperation by conditionality | Cooperation by persuasion and learning |

Source: Lavenex 2005

Following Browning (2001) I argue that the EU is prioritizing internal security over external security. The EU tends to see its outside as something unsecure and unstable, hence a possible threat to the EU's internal stability and security. The EU therefore tends to understand its outside in a rather modernistic way. It leads eventually to a 'reification of the 'Self' and the negative characterization of the 'Other'. "The security of the insiders and those on the outside is disconnected by claiming that the outsiders have to sort out their own problems" (Joenniemie 2008: 154).

**Concluding the EU's territorial logic**

The conclusion of the EU's territorial logic is structured around the five dimensions and the related sub questions. The EU cooperates with Russia through several frameworks on different levels, like the ENP, Common Spaces, ND, and ENPI CBC. Schengen is not a cooperation policy but does affect the border permeability considerably and therefore affects the development of Euregio Karelia. In the cooperation policy frameworks market issues and (soft) security issues are dominant. Security issues dominate the present cooperation policies with the EU's neighbourhood. There is a tension between 'security through inclusion' and 'security through exclusion'.

Regional cooperations like the ND and Euregio Karelia are subordinated to the EU's strategy to Russia (Sasse 2008). For the ND, its lack of institutions and independent funding make it a relative weak framework. This limits its impact on the EU's territorial logic and meaning of
The development of a CES is the most important of the four Common Spaces to be developed between the EU and Russia. The EU tries to expand its market to Russia. However, the CES falls short of something like the EEA. There is no free movement of goods and services across the EU-Finnish-Russian border. For the development of a common economic space, a high level of border mobility is necessary. Goods and services need to be exported and imported without many restrictions.

In the Common Spaces and in the Karelia ENPI CBC Programme the improving of border-crossing infrastructure is a priority. On the other hand, however, trade restrictions are kept in place and no freedom of movement of people, goods, services and capital is accepted. Especially for small and medium enterprises, like most companies in Euregio Karelia, trade barriers are disruptive for the development of day-to-day economic interaction. A strict border is maintained.

Economic cooperation and CBC are part of the 'security through inclusion' discourse, being a tool in the EU's security strategy. It follows the perspective that "the costs of defending the EU from unstable states in its neighbourhood would be much higher than those of promoting prosperity and security beyond its borders" (Lavenex 2005: 129). Especially in the ESS, the security perspective on CBC is clearly expressed.

On the level of CBC and Euregio Karelia, a security discourse gradually replaced the 'Europe of the Regions' discourse. Euregio Karelia is now more a tool within the security strategy in which stable and secure borders and border regions are important. The soft security treats emanating from the Republic of Karelia and the security of the border are at the centre, not the economic development of the border regions or the development of an integrated CBR as a new kind of space of political action. The exclusionary logic prevails over the
inclusionary logic. This considerably affects the preconditions for economic cooperation in Euregio Karelia.

From an identity perspective, the development of a common European identity between Russia and EU is not a priority of the EU. If it is mentioned at all, it is mentioned in a rather imperial fashion, where Russia has to adopt a European identity based on EU values and norms. For Euregio Karelia it is also not mentioned as a priority nor necessary.

Shared governance, with common institutions is at the bases of the EU. However the EU is reluctant about sharing institutions and equal decision making with its neighbours. Shared institutions requires an equal relation. Within the ENP shared political power, and institutions is not advocated. Especially the bilateral approach and the principle of conditionality accentuate the asymmetric relation between the EU and its neighbouring countries. It is in the EU's interest to maintain this kind of relationship. A common space of shared governance with shared institutions and political power is not likely to develop within the short and medium-term future.

Towards Russia the EU takes a slightly different approach. But only because Russia opted out of the ENP framework and demanded a more equal footing. However, also the institutional thickness of EU-Russia cooperation remains limited. It remains a political cooperation without shared governance and institutions. Sometimes it looks more like a political forum than a cooperation of concrete action.

Important in this context is the mandate of the EU. Shared governance and shared institutions requires the signing of treaties between Russia and the EU. These treaties have to be ratified by all of the 27 sovereign member states. Some countries, like Poland and the Baltic states still experience Russia as a serious threat to their territory and sovereignty and are very reluctant to accept any political involvement from Russia. Through ENPI CBC, the EU does provide a small legal basis for CBC in Euregio Karelia. But CBC remains mostly based on national legislation.

Within the EU’s CBC strategy the objective is to develop shared governance. With the EGTC, shared governance and independence of Euregio’s has improved. More independent subnational authorities are considered more prepared to use CBC. On the external border this is, however, not likely to develop in the short and medium term future. In Euregio Karelia, the EU was already reluctant to allow Russian and Karelian authorities equal rights in budget control and the development of the programme. Through the use of ENPI CBC and rules that apply for it the independence of Euregio Karelia is limited: ‘he who pays the piper calls the tune’.

Schengen is a very powerful institution and the best example of ‘security through exclusion’. Through Schengen a hard EU-Finnish-Russian border in Euregio Karelia is maintained, creating a clear line of exclusion. Only if it is in the EU's interest, borders are (partially) opened. The insistence on Schengen makes the EU's logic rather exclusive towards its neighbours. This is disruptive for the formation of Euregio Karelia. Frequent border crossings in Euregio Karelia remain difficult, because of the high visa prices and time consuming procedures. On other issues, the EU as a political entity, has limited legislative power.

Based on Lavenex (2005) the EU follows a more inclusive approach towards Russia than towards the ENP partner countries, but is still more exclusive than inclusive. Russia has a position of a close-outsider (“an entity behind the outer border engaged in a number of cooperative endeavours but deprived of a legitimate voice as to intra-EU affairs” (Joenniemie
2008: 148)) rather than a semi-insider ("a non-member, yet partially included and thereby also furnished with a legitimate voice in the intra-EU dialogue" (Joenniemie 2008: 148)).

The EU has been the driving force behind the formation of Euregio's and the reconfiguration of the political territorial organization of European space. The EU is however also struggling itself with the question of sovereignty. Several trends have been discovered in the EU policy frameworks, in which different forms of territorial organization are present (see also Joenniemie 2002). As a concluding remark, the EU is stepping it the territorial trap (Browning 2001: 16). Internally, the EU is developing into a postmodern entity, with its policies directing at the abolition of internal borders. Externally, the EU is border confirming and follows a rather modern discourse. The emerging paradox is that the EU can only develop into a postmodern entity if a modernistic approach is taken towards the surrounding space.

National - Finland

Historically, Finland has a particular relation with Russia. This affects Finland's strategy on Russia up till today. Old experiences are deeply rooted in emotions and values and affect the thoughts of the ruling elite (Nokkala 2008: 88). There is still a tendency in Finnish society and politics not to offend Russia. Russia is widely characterized as a neighbour with which Finland has a special relationship (Nokkala 2008: 87). "Russia is considered an important neighbour, a prominent actor in public discussion and a significant object of Finland's security and defence policy" (Nokkala 2008: 87). The Finnish Security and Defence Policy, the ND and Neighbouring Area Cooperation are the main policies regarding its cooperation policy with and on Russia.

Analysis

"Finland's foreign and security policy is based on good bilateral relations, exerting a strong influence in the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union, effective multilateral cooperation and credible national defence" (FPMO 2007: 8)

A traditional security discourse is relatively dominant in Finland's foreign and security policy (Nokkala 2008: 85). The defence establishment has an important role in the direction of that policy (Nokkala 2008: 73). The Cold War security discourse is still present in Finnish foreign policy and policy on Russia. Some high ranking officials in the Defence ministry mention Russia 'as the only factor' in Finnish security and defence policy (see Nokkala 2008: 88). Overall Russia is considered as different, relatively unpredictable and a 'threat' (Nokkala 2008: 91).

Two approaches can be differentiated in the 'Russia as a threat' discourse (Nokkala 2008: 92). First the approach, that Russia does not want to threaten Finland. Because Russia does not show any will or intentions to attack Finland. This 'no-threat scenario' becomes more widespread in Finnish government. However, Finland refused to rule out a traditional land and sea invasion by Russian armed forces in the National Security and Defence Policy (Aalto 2006: 124). The second approach follows that Russia is the 'only military threat' for Finland. Russia is usually considered as a potential threat even if it is not always a military threat (Nokkala 2008: 92). It includes soft security threats, of which nuclear safety and environmental pollution are the most pressing (see FPMO 2007, FPMO 2009).

In 1995, Finland joined the EU. Part of the decision to joint the EU was its security perspective. "EU membership is an important security policy choice for Finland because the EU member states are united by a strong sense of unity" (FPMO 2009: 10). The EU provides
Finland a "political, economic and military framework security that improves Finland's position" (high ranking Finnish defence official in Nokkala 2008: 84).

Unlike most EU member states, Finland is not a NATO member. It always stayed out of NATO, because it would have been a major provocation to Russia during the Cold War. In public opinion there is still no majority to join NATO (Nokkala 2008: 77). NATO membership is thought to possibly have serious negative consequences for the bilateral relation between Finland and Russia. But possible membership is kept open. Finland does seek for more cooperation with NATO and is, like Sweden, a partner country (Speech Kanerva 2007).

As a substitute to NATO membership, Finland puts emphasis on the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). It is a "basic element in Finland's line of action in foreign and security policy" (Möttölä 2008: 56). EU membership is considered as "protection based on mutual solidarity, and the outcomes of the CFSP [Common Foreign and Security Policy] provide direct and milieu benefits for Finland's security and welfare" (Möttölä 2008: 56-57). The minister of foreign affairs at the time firmly stated at a speech at the National Defence Association at the University of Helsinki in November 2007 that "The EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy must be developed without prejudices" (Speech Kanerva 2007).

At the same time, however, a strong bilateral relation with Russia maintains to be important for Finland. This is what Möttölä (2008: 57) calls the security dilemma of Finland. After the accession to the EU a debate about the necessity of this bilateral relation originated. Because Finland now adopted the EU's common policy on Russia. It was concluded that a bilateral relation was necessary, because of Russia's importance for Finland (Möttölä 2008: 58). This contributed to the present "rational of a security policy solution based on military non-alliance and calling for an effective bilateral eastern policy parallel with, and complementary to, that of the common EU policy" (Möttölä 2008: 58).

It does not come as a surprise that strict border control is maintained in line with Schengen regulations by Finland. Like other member states, Finland considers visa and border control as fundamental for the national stability and security. Finland is an active participant in the development of FRONTEX, the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the EU (FPMO 2009: 132)

Border control focuses on the Finnish-Russian border and its functioning, and especially on the Southeast part of the border, where the main international border crossings are located (see FPMO 2009: 93). "Smooth and safe border crossings" must be guaranteed, together with a "credible surveillance capability" (FPMO 2009: 93).

Russia is restructuring its border control. It cuts down on border control personnel and border guard stations have been closed on the Finnish-Russian border. "Hence, the Russian border control system is now more easily permeable". Consequently, "the requirements for Finnish border control and management of border situations are increasing" (FPMO 2009: 68). In short, the Finnish-Russian border is firmly controlled and a relative hard border is maintained. Also the abolition of visa or changing of visa requirements and procedures is not an objective for the Finnish government, which is disruptive for frequent border crossings in Euregio Karelia (see FMFA 2004, 2009, FPMO 2009, Möttölä 2008).

Economically, Russia becomes more important for Finland, especially St. Petersburg and the Leningrad region. It opens new possibilities for the development of trade and transport links (FPMO 2007: 43). Transport cooperation and cooperation in border efficiency is part of increasing the accessibility of Russia (see FPMO 2007: 19, 34). However, cooperation in the
field of transport and border crossing facilities is not directed at the part of the border where the Finnish regions border the Republic of Karelia. But at the South of Finland, the main connection between Helsinki area and St. Petersburg and Leningrad region.

Part of the economic cooperation is the ensuring of a stable supply of energy. Finland imports about half of its demand of fossil fuels from Russia. Finland directs much of its energy policy towards Russia through the EU. Through the EU, Finland is more powerful in its relation with Russia. Therefore Finland is an active participant in the energy discussion in the EU with Russia (FPMO 2009).

Europe's North has a relative long track record of multilateral and cross-border cooperation. Finland takes part in several multilateral and multilevel cooperation in which governments and organisations from different levels cooperate. For example, Finland is the founder of the ND, which territorial logic has already been explained. It provides Finland a framework to cooperate with Russia and the other partners on an equal basis. This is important for Finland, because it is a relative small country with limited geopolitical power compared to Russia and the EU. With the ND Finland manages to put national issues on the international agenda (Vahl 2006). It creates an atmosphere of equality and cooperation in a postmodern fashion. This "multiperspectival reconstruction of the political space displaces the strict divide between the domestic and the international, characteristic of the discourse of sovereign statehood" (Prozorov 2004: 1).

The emphasis on the ND must be more understood from the unequal geopolitical relationship between Finland and Russia. The ND provides Finland a platform on which it can address issues (like environmental pollution and nuclear safety in Russia) on an equal basis in a somewhat depoliticized manner (Joenniemie 2008, Popescu 2008). This provides Finland an opportunity to influence Russia. It compliments the bilateral relationship with Russia and EU policy on Russia through which Finland maintains its relationship with Russia.

CBC with Russia is directed through Finland's 'Neighbouring Area Cooperation'. This is "an element of Finland's foreign and security policy", and "supports the strategic partnership between the EU and Russia, the policy for the Northern Dimension (ND) and the ND partnerships themselves as well as supporting the activities of the regional councils in the North of Europe" (FMFA 2009: 1). It can be considered as the Finnish equivalent of ENPI. Following Finland’s multilateral and multilevel cooperation perspective, the Neighbouring Area Cooperation promotes "the preconditions for cooperation between public authorities, the business community and citizens in the neighbouring areas" (FMFA 2009: 2).

CBC is part of the comprehensive strategic planning. It is an "instrument in the Finnish foreign policy toolkit" (FMFA representative). The representative from the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs follows a security perspective on CBC "the general goals of cross-border cooperation with Russia include the promotion of security and stability element". CBC is mainly directed at soft security threats. "Finnish Russian bilateral neighbouring area cooperation is to encounter and tackle threats related to environment, nuclear security and spread of infectious diseases" (see also FMFA 2004, 2009).

Regional development is "more an operational goal" in order to create this security (FMFA representative). So like the EU, Finland's neighbourhood strategy, is part of the Finnish security strategy and border security:

"Stable social and economic development in Finland's neighbouring areas is important. Support for this development, including prevention of new security threats and control of
related risks is in our common interest... Finland's foreign and security policy objectives are pursued through neighbouring area cooperation” (FMFA 2004: 3)

Similar to the EU, Finland considers good governance, promotion of democracy and respect for human rights etc. important and, mentioned as part of the security strategy (see FMFA 2009b: 74). However, the feeling that “Finland manages, even if the democratic development [in Russia] would not advance as wished” dominates (Nokkala 2008: 89).

Finland follows a multilateral approach in its Neighbouring Area Cooperation including “multilateral regional cooperation” based on equality (FMFA 2009: 5). "Equality means equal participation in planning and implementation and most importantly equal participation in decision making” (Speech Väyrynen 2007). Finland promotes the development of multilateral and multilevel governance structures, in which not only national authorities, but as well regional, local level authorities and civil-society organisations participate "into [an] ordinary collaboration between various authorities, organizations and regional actors” (FMFA 2004: 5). Cooperation between regional and local authorities and other people-to-people contacts are promoted.

Surprisingly, Finland does not promote a cooperation in which subnational actors act relatively independent from the national level. "It [CBC] means equal participation of the central government” (Speech Väyrynen 2007). Also because cooperation is based on national law, national involvement is understood to be necessary.

In all the documents and speeches analysed, Euregio Karelia is not mentioned specifically (see FMFA 2004, 2009, FPMO 2009, Kanerva 2007). In discussions with experts from the Karelian Institute and the interview with the representative from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs it became clear that, at least, on the national level, Euregio Karelia plays marginal role in the Finnish strategy on Russia.

From an identity perspective, in the public debate there is still some negative resentment of Russia. The Karelian question is kept alive by some CSO's, however is not present on the official level. The Finnish national identity is strong and a common identity with the Republic of Karelia is certainly not an objective. However, a Karelian identity is mentioned as a connection between the Finns and Karelians (Cronberg 2003a,b, Prozorov 2004). This is however not part of an identity politics from Finland to get the seized territories back from Russia or for the development of a cross-border space in Euregio Karelia.

**Concluding Finland’s territorial logic**

As a nation-state a Westphalian logic is, off-course, embedded in Finnish approach to its neighbouring area. Finland’s main foreign, security and defence policy objectives are safeguarding the country's independence and promoting the security, well-being and core values of its population including territorial integrity (FMFA 2009b: 94).

Compared to the EU, the emphasis in cooperation with Russia is put less on economic cooperation. This can be explained from history. Because of the closed border, economic links were established with the West. This limits Russia's share in Finnish economy up to today. Finland is mainly concerned with possible security threats emanating from Russia, both military and soft security threats like nuclear pollution and the spread of infectious diseases. A traditional security discourse, in which Russia is seen as a possible military threat is dominant in the Finnish policy to Russia.
Finland combines a multilateral and bilateral approach in its approach to Russia. This is mainly informed by the dominant security discourse. It follows a multilateral approach through the EU, the ND and neighbouring area cooperation (CBC). At the same time, Finland cherishes its bilateral relation with Russia, mainly informed by security issues.

An explanation for the emphasis on multilateral cooperation is the relative large asymmetries that exist between Finland and Russia. Russia is a vast country and a geopolitical superpower with a population that well outnumbers Finland. Multilateral cooperation and shared governance, through both the ND and the EU provides Finland a framework to cooperate with Russia on a more equal basis. From this perspective, the Finnish emphasis on multilateral cooperation is not informed by the formation of a postmodern society in Europe's North, but by the traditional security discourse. This can also be seen in the (partly) security based decision to join the EU and the Finnish emphasize on the CFSP. Where the EU provides safety for the EU. Following Popescu (2008: 432) it provides Finland a framework to address the limits of its territoriality.

Border wise, Finland holds to strict border controls on the EU-Finnish-Russian border. Of course it is obliged to because of the Schengen agreement, but Finland does not show any intentions to lower the fences. The (partial) abolishing of visa requirements and visa procedures is not likely to happen in the short and medium term future. This is disruptive for daily cross-border mobility and contacts in Euregio Karelia and the development of a common economic space. This conflicts with the objective of CBC which "not to abolish the border, but at least soften the negative impacts of the physical border that are hindering the people-to-people contacts" (FMFA representative). A common space of freedom of movement is not an objective of Finland.

The neighbouring area cooperation is mainly directed at the fight of the root causes of soft security threats in the Republic of Karelia. Regional development is not an objective on itself, but a tool in the security strategy. However, the role of CBC in Finnish cooperation with Russia is limited. For me it was remarkable that Euregio Karelia was not specifically mentioned in any of the policy documents or speeches. It came to me as a surprise that Euregio Karelia has a relative marginal role in Finnish cooperation politics. Cooperation with Russia is mainly directed at St. Petersburg and the Leningrad region, not at the Republic of Karelia.

Unlike the regional shared governance suggestion of the ND, the national government keeps strict control over governance in Euregio Karelia. Finland promotes cooperation between the Republic of Karelia and Finnish border regions, and the development of the programme by the subnational actors themselves. However the national government desires equal involvement of the national level. This can also be seen in the institutionalisation of the ENPI CBC Programme, where representatives of the national government are not only part of the JMC but also chair it (bi-annually). A high level of independence of the Finnish regions in Euregio Karelia is not accepted.

About the legal dimension of Finnish policy on Russia not much was found other than the visa regulations. According to the representative from the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs trade restrictions across the border are a matter for the EC. Therefore problems in trade regulation, experienced in Euregio Karelia, are difficult for the Finnish government to solve. The main finding is that no legal exemptions for Euregio Karelia exist or are prepared.

The paradox of Euregio's for national governments as explained by Popescu (2008) is also visible in Finland Governments balance between the benefits of the Euregio's for the border
regions and the interests and territorial integrity of the state. To function and develop fully, Euregio’s need a certain level of exemption from national regulations. But nation-states “cannot allow their borderlands to follow special rules without compromising the theoretical model of the territorial container that the nation-state follows” (Popescu 2008: 431).

Following Popescu (2008: 432) the ND and to a less extent also Euregio Karelia provide Finland a framework to address the limits of the nation-state territoriality and not as possible ‘integrated territorial units of economics, political and social life’. With this I mean that regional cooperations (like Euregio Karelia and the ND) complement Finnish politics, to address big problems as a relative small state with limited geopolitical power. In order to put these on the geopolitical agenda it has to cooperate and is willing to share governance and give up some of its sovereignty.

**National — Russia**

The territorial logic of Russia in Euregio Karelia was relatively difficult to analyse, no concrete neighbourhood cooperation policy exists and no other border producing policy documents could be found in English. Therefore I rely on literature research on the geopolitical vision of Russia, its relation to the EU and the Republic of Karelia. I will zoom in more concretely on the position of the Republic of Karelia in the Russian Federation and how Russia approaches CBC, CBRs and other forms of regional cooperation. The analyses is loosely structured around the five dimension of the territorial logic.

For Russia, the Finnish-Russian border is "the most peaceful border that Russia has anywhere" (Russian Council on Foreign and Defence Policy in Aalto 2006: 131). The bilateral relation between Russia and Finland is considered as good and stable. Since Finland joined the EU in 1995, the bilateral relation between Russia and Finland was considered as less important by Russia. The emphasis is on the bilateral relation with the EU, because Russia approaches the EU as one.

**Analysis**

Much of the EU-Russian relation has already been explained. Economically, Russia and the EU are interdependent. The EU is Russia’s most important business partner. The EU accounts for about 50 percent of its external trade and two third of its oil and gas exports (Barysch 2005: 116). For Russia’s Northwest these figures are even larger (Aalto 2006).

For Russia, economic cooperation with the EU is important. It wants better access to the EU market, especially for non-energy goods (Aalto 2006: 117). It experiences several problems because of trade restriction in some markets and the different quality standards in the EU and Russia. Russia is competitive in some markets, like textile industry and steel production. It is in these sectors that the EU erected trade barriers, e.g. quota on steel imports from Russia. Russia is, of course, lobbying to lower the trade barriers. On the other hand, however, Russia poses trade restrictions itself. For example in the, for Finland and Republic of Karelia very important forest industry.

The Common Spaces have been explained before and will not be discussed again. Russia is in general in favour of the Common Spaces. But a common critique in Russia on this part of the EU-Russia relations is that the Road Maps lack a detailed program and specific timetables (Sergounin 2006: 125). The extent of the partnership with the EU was considered not far enough. The Common Spaces and Road Maps are "more like a declaration of intentions" (Sergounin 2006: 125) and lack concreteness especially in the field of the development of a
visa-free regime. One of the main fields of interest for Russia. A further development of the four freedoms is desired.

The inclusive approach of Russia with the Common Spaces is part of the inclusive liberal discourse that dominated Russian foreign policy in the 1990s and early 2000s. The Russia bureaucratic elite at the time considered the Soviet era "an unfortunate distortion in Russia's centuries-old mission to approach the West" (Aalto 2006: 126). Russia was an undifferentiated part of the West and Europe and had been excluded in the 20th century (Aalto 2006: 127 - 128).

In the 2000s the inclusive approach was replaced by a more exclusive approach. Prozorov (2007: 310) distinguishes two themes in the Russia relation to the EU: "the Russian problematisation of its exclusion from Europe in the EU's administrative practices and the reassertion by Russia of its sovereign subjectivity through a policy of 'self-exclusion' from the European political and normative space". The 'key point of diffraction' is the hierarchical inclusion by the EU (Prozorov 2007: 325).

The 'exclusion from Europe' theme is strongly informed by the expansion of the Schengen regime with the 2004 enlargement round. Before, relative loose visa regimes existed between Russia and new member states. For Russia, a visa-free regime is one of the main issues in the development of a strategic partnership and the development of the Common Spaces with the EU (Aalto 2006, Prozorov 2007, Barysch 2005: 115). It is particularly a problem for Kalingrad, being an island in Schengland. The 'Kalingrad issue' used to play crucial role in the Russia-EU relation, but after 2003 this role has become less important (Aalto 2006).

The main issue was and is that after the enlargement of the EU in 2004, including the expansion of the Schengen territory to the new member states, Kalingrad became an island in Schengenland. Without a Schengen visa citizens from Kalingrad could not travel to other parts of Russia, because they would have to cross Schengen territory (Lithuania). The EU was unwilling to grant Kalingrad citizens visa free travel. It remained a political hot topic. Consensus was agreed, and now people from Kalingrad can travel with special Transit Documents between Russia and Kalingrad across Lithuanian territory (Konenkov 2004, Aalto 2006).

However the visa issue was not removed from the political agenda after settling the Kalingrad issue. The visa issue had already developed in Russia "into an identity conflict whereby Russia becomes the only 'non-European' European country" (Prozorov 2007: 311). Other issues like the conflictual positions of the EU and Russia in for example, Kosovo, Chechnya, Russian federal reforms, the Yukos case and the revolutions in post-soviet states like Ukraine and Georgia were part of the development of the Russian political discourse (Sergounin 2006).

The problems with the Schengen visa regime is central for Russia in the EU-Russian relations. In 2002, the ruling president Putin, proposed the reciprocal abolition of visa regimes between Russia and the EU (Prozorov 2007: 312). Implying a rather inclusive approach to the EU. The argument of the EU that visa are a pure technical issue, as nearly all applications are approved and that the freedom of movement of people depends only on the efficient operation of visa services is not accepted (Prozorov 2007: 312). Russia perceives it as a climate of suspicion and alienation (Yegorov in Prozorov 2007: 312). Even by the most liberal and pro-European politicians in Russia the visa problem is is essential for the EU Russian relation: "nothing jeopardises our relations as much as the visa problem"
It is not likely that the EU will abolish its strict visa regime for Russians. The visa problem in this way becomes a symbol for the other exclusionary practices of the EU. "All concrete exclusionary practices of the EU serve to materialise the already perceived symbolic exclusion, while all ideological or value discord is in the final instance a symbolic equivalent of a visa threshold" (Prozorov 2007: 315).

A feeling of hierarchical inclusion, the understanding that Russia is 'included' in the EU in a subordinated and disadvantageous modality becomes apparent (Prozorov 2007: 317). Russia is excluded in most areas, but included in those fields of interest of the EU e.g. energy sector. It is the asymmetric relation with the EU that grounds this perspective. This understanding evoked a shift in Russian political discourse. "We do not need to rush to the EU, as if only membership in this organisation delimits Europeans from non-Europeans" (Rogozin's 2004d in Prozorov 2007: 318). It caused a shift to politics of non-alignment and self-exclusion (Trenin 2009: 142, Prozorov 2007, Aalto 2006).

This shift is partly informed by an identity conflict between the EU and Russia. In which Russia is understood as the true Europe and not the EU. This demonstrates the shift from the problematisation of exclusion to the logic of self-exclusion (Prozorov 2007: 318). A "move from the initial endorsement of integration through the problematisation of EU's exclusionary policies or the hierarchical nature of the offered inclusion to the disillusioned abandonment of the integrationist ideal in the reaffirmation of sovereignty" (Prozorov 2007: 325).

The 'self-exclusion' theme is informed by the experienced 'unequal' relation between EU and Russia. As mentioned before, Russia opted out of the ENP framework because of the unequal relation and asymmetric nature of the inclusive approach of EU policies (Prozorov 2007: 319). "It leaves almost no room for Russia in setting the bilateral co-operative agenda" (Sergounin 2006: 123). The scale of EU-Russia cooperation and its importance are much larger than those with other ENP countries like Ukraine or Libya. It was not understood why Russia should be treated in a similar fashion as those countries (Sergounin 2006: 123).

The move to a self-exclusionary logic is an effect of the EU policy and logic on Russia. Of the contradiction in the EU logic. The EU draws its line of exclusion in the middle of its integration programmes like the Common Spaces and the ND. The self-exclusionary logic is a rejection of association with the EU, not of cooperation (Aalto 2006: 143).

Often heard is that the liberal discourse declined national values like patriotism and morality and adopted Western consumerist values. With the self-exclusive discourse a rise of indifference towards the West rises, the price of integration would be too high (Prozorov 2007: 320). Russia defines itself as the other of Europe (Prozorov 2007: 326):

"It is strange that a country with a millennium-old culture, the most literate country in the world, suddenly became so stupid, opened its mouth and started waiting for what the West may have to say about us and what it shall recommend. It is time to look at the West with greater indifference: it is not a teacher and we are not pupils" (Rogozin 2004d in Prozorov 2007: 323).

"The unwillingness of the European bureaucrats to make even a minimal step towards our possible accession must be viewed as a blessing that liberates us from a poignant and fruitless temptation" (Baunov 2003a in Prozorov 2007: 319).
The 'reconstitution of the state' was an important objective during the Putin presidency and part of the shift to a self-exclusionary logic and the 'reaffirmation of sovereignty'. Urnov (2006: 103-104) concludes that the dominant geopolitical visions of Russia is that Russia has to be restored as a global superpower and that Russia has no friends. Both East (China, India) and West (EU, USA) cannot be trusted, because a strong Russia is not in their interest. Therefore a multi-polar world is a precondition for the Russian revival as a global power. Russia's vast oil and gas resources and military technologies are two tools to influence this. In this multi-polar world Russia should not align itself with other countries. It should take a position in between the West (EU and USA) and the emerging East (China and India).

Putin restored the centralised state that is sovereignty based. It treats its territory in a similar fashion, without exemptions or different strategies for different regions. This can also be seen in the fact that Russia favours uniform EU policies that treat the Russia territory in a similar fashion, not in a regionalized setting. This could risk differentiation within Russia (Joenniemie 2008: 149). It would risk the further destabilization and possible disintegration of the internal situation (Joenniemie 2008: 156).

Putin restored central power in Moscow. The Yeltsin's presidency in the 1990s was characterised by the power struggle between the centre and the regions. Putin reformed the relation between the federal government and the regions. Like the "abolition of individual treaties between the centre and regions, stripping regional governors of their automatic seats in the Federation Council - the upper chamber of the Russian Parliament - and the 2004 law on the president's right to appoint regional governors" (Aalto 2006: 123). This changed the relation between the federal centre in Moscow and the regions. The power was restored in Moscow.

During the Putin presidency the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Republic of Karelia was abolished, restoring the Russian federal power in Moscow. This makes the position of the Republic of Karelia and Euregio Karelia rather difficult. Despite that regional and local cooperation with Finland has been unproblematic and that the Russian-Finnish border is very stable (Joenniemie 2008: 156)

Regionalization and fuzzy borders are perceived negatively and possibly disruptive for the Russian state (Joenniemie 2008: 156). Because large parts of the Russian border are unstable (e.g. in the Caucasus) challenging the Russian state from within. Further regionalization would open Pandora's box if special exemptions would be allowed for the Republic of Karelia. Hence, shared sovereignty and political power is seen as problematic (Joenniemie 2008: 150). The centralising and universalising tendencies in Russian politics undermine the development of grass root projects like the Euregio Karelia (Sergounin 2006: 126).

In Russian federal politics there is a general hesitation regarding Euregio's. Because their results are modest. They are "reduced to what common Russians call 'bureaucratic tourism' i.e., exchanges between municipal officials, and with rare exception do not promote economic cooperation and horizontal links at the people-to-people or NGO levels" (Sergounin 2006: 131). The creation of the four freedoms should be at the centre of the Euregio's. This is not the case (idem: 132). This is connected to the discussion of the visa regime.

However, Russia, on its turn, does not establish a solid legal basis for (economic) CBC in Euregio Karelia. For Moscow, CBC is not a priority. It is regarded as 'low politics'. The
centralization tendencies seen lately in Russia are disruptive for the creation of local CBC initiatives. The optimism present in the 1990s regarding CBC and other forms of regional cooperation has tempered (Konenkov 2004: 25).

Important for the development of CBC and other cross-border links is the Law on the State Border, signed in 1993. It sets a special security regime along the state border. This regime limits access to the border zone, and various other kinds of activities in this zone are prohibited. Foreigners must have permission of the Federal Security Service. These regulations do not concern travellers (Liikanen et al. 2007: 36).

The width of the border zone varied in the past decades from 50 to 200 km. The Law on the State Border initially authorized subnational authorities to set the limits of the border zone themselves, which usually was around 5 km. In 2004 the law was changed, and now the Federal Security Service became responsible to set these limits. This zone of limitation, depending on the location of the border, differs from 10 to 100 km. (Internal) Security is very important for Russia in their border policies (Liikanen et al. 2007: 36).

It does not come as a surprise that Russia, after some scepticism, welcomed the ND (Aalto 2006: 135). The ND is perceived as a more equal framework for Russia-EU cooperation. However the ND does not have the ability to cover the total Russia-EU relation. The ND is understood in the context of regional cooperation, not in the context of the EU-Russian strategic partnership. It is considered insufficient and lacks any concrete implementation.

All in all, it has a relative low status in Russia. For example, the ND is hardly ever mentioned in speeches of the president and foreign ministers on EU-Russian relations and Russian foreign policy (Aalto 2006: 136). Russia discredits Finnish and EU’s emphasize on environmental and nuclear pollution. "In the midst of Russia’s transition problems, addressing environmental problems had become perceived as not so pressing" (Aalto 2006: 137).

Compared to the EU and Finland, the external security perspective is not as dominant in the Russian logic. Russia is a big security actor, but does not consider the EU or Finland as a military threat. Russia considers the EU a civilian power not a military one (Joenniemie 2008). The internal security is of greater concern for the Federal authorities.

The Karelian Question is not on the agenda. Russia denies the existence of the question in the first place. And as explained before it does not play a role in Russian-Finnish relation in general and the Euregio Karelia specific.

**Concluding Russia’s territorial logic**

The focus of Russia is on the reform of Russia and re-establishing the central state. Euregio Karelia is not (high) on the agenda for Russia, as is CBC in general. No concrete policy on CBC or Euregio Karelia exists. The position of Russia towards Euregio Karelia has to be derived from the geopolitical vision of Russia, its approach to the EU, Finland the Republic of Karelia.

Russia approaches the EU as a single entity, hence Russia does not consider an active bilateral relation with Finland important. However, its bilateral relationship with Finland is good and stable, the Russian-Finnish border is the most stable and friendly border it has.
The geopolitical vision of Russia changed over the past twenty years. From an inclusive liberal approach to a more self-exclusive approach. Russia wants to restore its role as a superpower in a multi-polar world. Cooperation with the EU through the Common Spaces and the development of a strategic partnership becomes less important. Russia is unwilling to align itself unconditionally to the EU and adopt EU standards and values. Like Putin argues that the EU must "accept us as we are, treat us as equals, and establish cooperation based on mutual interests" (in Trenin 2009: 142). The EU is considered to include Russia only in those areas which are of interest for the EU. This tension makes Russia to reassess its relation with the EU.

The domestic political organization changed, especially during the Putin presidency. The power is redistributed from the regions to the centre. A clear example is the abolishing of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Karelia. The Russian federal government increases its power monopoly. No exemptions are made. Also not for the stable Republic of Karelia. It is considered a risk of opening the door for other republics and unstable border regions that call for more autonomy. This could be disruptive for the Russian state. For Euregio Karelia the centralizing tendencies and universal approach of its borders and border regions is rather disruptive.

It is a restoration of the power vertical (Liikanen et al. 2007: 100). Contemporary Russia seeks a more selective introduction of the European values, like democratic values, human rights, rule of law and good governance. The changing political vision of Russia includes the reaffirmation of sovereignty (Prozorov 2007: 325). Shared sovereignty and political power is seen as problematic (Joenniemie 2008: 150). On the other hand, the central Russian authorities demanded an equal relation and equal participation in the Euregio Karelia management and governance. This implies a limited level of shared sovereignty and political power. However, this must be seen from the perspective of equal participation in EU projects and EU integration rather than sharing sovereignty. The equal relation in management and budget control is not considered a threat to Russian sovereignty.

The self-exclusive approach of Russian geopolitics is partly an identity question. In the 1990s a common European identity was envisioned. Russia considered itself an indisputable part of Europe and as having European identity. However, what this European identity was and is, is defined differently. With an increased focus on Russian state building, Russian identity is perceived distinct from the EU identity not from the European identity. It considers itself as a founder of European identity. Following this perspective I understand that the development of a common identity in Euregio Karelia is not an objective for Russia.

For Russia, economic cooperation with the EU and Finland is important. The EU is Russia's biggest trading partner. Russia wants better access to the EU market, especially for non-energy goods (Aalto 2006: 117). It experiences several problems because of trade restriction is some markets and the different quality standards in the EU and Russia. On the other hand, however, Russia poses trade restrictions itself, for example in the, for Euregio Karelia, very important forest industry.

Euregio Karelia and CBC in general is not a priority for Russia. The centralizing tendencies also prevent the development of exemptions for the Republic of Karelia. This includes the development of a sufficient legal basis for CBC. However, different from the EU and Finland a visa-free travel regime is promoted. This is, of course, not because of Euregio Karelia. But it does imply an inclusive approach. Visa-free travel is one of the main objectives, if not the main, in cooperation with the EU. The denial of this offer offends Russia and caused the shift to a self-exclusive approach and the reaffirmation of sovereignty. Hence, making the
circumstances for the development of Euregio Karelia as an integrated border region across the EU-Finnish-Russian border even more difficult.

Border wise there is a duality in Russian views on its borders and integration with the EU. First there is strong modernistic approach, with emphasis on strict territorial control and an indisputable link between the state and territory and a strong national identity, at least with the ruling elite. Second, Russia worries about a possible loss of identity and fears disintegrative processes that might follow with regionalization of policies and EU integration. This approach prevails over postmodernistic tendencies where border control is becoming less important and visa-free travel is desired (Joenniemie 2008: 155).

Subnational
In essence Euregio Karelia is a grass root project. A cooperation between three Finnish regions and the Republic of Karelia. Cooperation on this level takes more a practical and pragmatic approach than cooperation at a higher level. The cooperation itself is at the centre, not the effects on and for wider EU, Finnish or Russian geopolitics and border policies. However being a grass root project, Euregio Karelia knows a mix between a top-down and bottom-up approach (see EK 2008: 20-21). Being both an EU project and a local project.

The Karelia ENPI CBC programme document is the main document of the Euregio. This document is formulated in cooperation with the EU and the overarching ENPI CBC Programme and the national governments. The logic expressed in this document does not equal the logic of the subnational actors automatically. Because it is written by the mix of several actors.

Discussions with experts from the Karelian Institute, interviews with representatives from North Karelia and of the JMA, websites from the regions involved and literature research will be used to analyse the territorial logic of the Euregio and the differences between the Finnish regions and the Republic of Karelia. First the logic of the Euregio will be analysed and later the differences between the Finnish regions and the Republic of Karelia will be analysed. The analysis is loosely structured around the five dimensions.

Analysis
Euregio Karelia
The main objective of the Euregio Karelia "to increase well-being in the programme area through cross-border cooperation" (EK 2008: 5). The idea of the programme is that of a bottom-up approach, in which the local and regional stakeholders are the initiators of initiatives in the field of CBC (EK 2008: 5). With "strategical guiding" of national and supranational level (the top-down approach). It remains unclear what this 'strategical guiding' means.

The governance structure of Euregio Karelia changed since its founding in 2000. One of the main problems experienced in CBC and governing Euregio Karelia was the unequal control over the budget and management. In the present programme, there is a common funding procedure, where the funding can be used on both Russian as Finnish territory and shared management.

The present programme and governance structure in Euregio Karelia has been a step forward in developing a common space. "It is one of the biggest improvements experienced by the subnational level in the new programme" (representative North Karelia). It means that the "management of the programme is based on full equality and partnership between
the participating countries” (EK 2008: 6). This is a “new step in improving the opportunities for real cross-border cooperation across the external border” (EK 2008: 7).

The governance structure has become more equal. But because the Euregio is an umbrella project it means that unlike the programme structure, asymmetric governance in projects under the project are not resolved. "So however the Euregio itself is based on intersubjectivity and equality between partners, in CBC projects under the umbrella, this can be different" (Prozorov 2006: 134).

Köppen (2009: 48) in his research on the Euregio Karelia concludes that there is a "genuine will to cooperate on the institutional and economic level". For an Euregio the political will is vital for its development. Because of the lack of a solid legal base and institutional thickness there is not much more than this political will to develop cooperation. There is certainly a will to pursue a long-term sustainable cooperation (see also EK 2008: 21).

A point of critique is that there is not much more than this political will from the subnational authorities. In order to get the joint management on a regional level operate without problems, both sides need to be committed, Finland, Russia and the EU. About this the JMA representative mentioned that "in Russia the situation may be a bit more complicated...the national level is needed to create necessary precondition for the regional level cooperation".

However not only the Russian policies (or the lack of policies) are criticized. The centralizing tendencies of both EU and Russian policies are a problem for the Euregio. Both interviewees mentioned that these policies loose the local context. Often the Georgian conflict and its effect on the Euregio was mentioned. This conflict caused a troubleing of the EU-Russia relation which affected the delay of the signing of the Karelia ENPI CBC Programme (JMA representative). This shows that Euregio's are part of wider geopolitics and that they are affected by the wider geopolitical situation. Despite the unproblematic cooperation on the Finnish-Russian border and being a grass root project, without any geopolitical aspirations. For the Euregio CBC is "a complementing instrument for the regional development" (EK 2008: 20). The Euregio "builds primarily on economic cooperation activities" (EK 2008: 22). There is a strong emphasis on economic cooperation and economic development. "Positive economic development creates a firm foundations to increase well-being", however, "it only forms one part of the whole picture. Issues such as health, pleasant and clean environment, functional and practical structure of society and services (including cultural services) increase the well-being effectively as well. In these particular issues added value can be reached through cross-border cooperation and in this way it is possible to strongly support the main objective of the programme" (EK 2008: 25).

One of the main problems experienced for developing economic cooperation across the border and economic development in the region is the lack of fluent transport connections (JMA representative & Euregio Karelia 2008). "It is important that goods and passenger traffic by road and rail be developed functionally in the programme are" (EK 2008: 22). Intensive cross-border contact is difficult because of the limited number of border crossing points (Cronberg 2003b: 234). "Biggest barriers in the trade concern mostly the customs and border crossings. Problems on the border reduce the interest to trade to Russia" (JMA representative).

The Euregio Karelia itself and the subnational authorities that constitute it have limited financial resources and are unable to develop functional infrastructure, like roads, rail and border crossing facilities. Infrastructure and border authorities are a national question. "The only thing the Euregio Karelia can do is identify the issues that can be influenced locally" (EK 2008: 23).

It does not come as a surprise that Schengen is mentioned as one of the main barriers experienced by the subnational level. Despite EU rhetoric, concrete CBC and Cross-border
trade is plagued by administrative divides, like visa and trade regulations (Cronberg 2003b: 234). On the question to the representative from North Karelia on the impact of Schengen on the Euregio, she answered quickly and firmly: "Of course border crossing formalities, visas and customs hinder cooperation". However, a complete abolishing of visa is not an objective for the Finnish Regions. The solution must be found more in the field of easing the visa procedures and border crossings, for example a shorter application procedure. The Republic of Karelia follows more the Russian line of thinking. For the Republic of Karelia cooperation with Finland is thought to be vital for the economic and societal development. Following this rationale, the easing of the visa regime and/or abolishing would be welcomed by the Republic.

Economic cooperation in the Euregio is predominantly a one way direction (Köppen 2009: 47). It is investment from Finland to Russia. The main problems "are still related to the very difficult and somewhat unclear position of foreign enterprises in Russia. Russian law, courts and administrative units appear to be a rather unreliable and unpredictable factor, making investments in the country still a game of chance" (Köppen 2009: 47). Investment from Finnish regions in the Republic of Karelia is still relatively low. Of course this also affected by the relative weak economic position of the Finnish regions in Finland.

There is relative low level of economic interdependency (Köppen 2009), one of the preconditions for economic cooperation to develop. Only in the field of round wood imports, there is significant interest from Finnish companies in the Republic of Karelia. Because of the poor situation in the Republic of Karelia, the export market for Finnish companies in the Republic of Karelia is limited. Most Finnish products are simply too expensive for Karelians.

The most promising sector for economic cooperation is the forest sector. It is the largest sector in the regional economy on both sides of the border. But cooperation in the forest sector is still underdeveloped (JMA representative). However concrete action is now under way from the Euregio. "In 2011 a thematic call on forest sector cooperation will be launched and big expectations have been loaded on that. This gives the regional level a possibility to open new innovative possibilities for the cooperation" (JMA representative).

Also cross-border shopping could be a promising field of developing cross-border contacts. But cross-border shopping remains difficult in the Euregio. Distances are large, this makes frequent cross-border interaction on a societal, non-business related level, relatively difficult. As are physical and infrastructural issues, visa regulations and time consuming border crossings. For example a trip by car from Joensuu (largest city in North Karelia) to Petrozovodsk (capital of Republic of Karelia) takes about eight or nine hours. Also the language barrier remains a barrier for CBC and daily contacts across the border (Köppen 2009: 48).

For the initiators of the Euregio, Cronberg and Schlyamin, the common cultural heritage was of great importance (see Cronberg 2003b: 235). This seems to have changed. A shared identity and history is not mentioned as an objective or important in the Karelia ENPI CBC nor by the interviewees. For example by the JMA representative stated:

"I wouldn't talk about common identity. Finnish people have their strong own identity as well as Russians. I think we must talk more about cultural diversity and our ability to accept different cultures - and also ability to cooperate with other cultures and this way create new possibilities for the regional development".

Still some negative resentment between Finland and Russia exist on a people-to-people level. On the official level this is not present and history does not play a role. But mentalities are changing (Likkanen et al. 2007, Joenniemie 2008, Cronberg 2003b) and stereotypes changed on both sides of the borders (Cronberg 2003b: 228). Much has to do with feelings about (un)security, which can be explained from history, as the borders has been highly
militarized and framed and represented by security-oriented approaches (Joenniemie 2008: 162).

Both Finland and the EU understand the Euregio as part of their security strategy. The subnational actors do understand the importance of security and the possible role for the Euregio in this context, mainly regarding 'soft-security' issues. But it is not a matter for the subnational actors themselves (Cronberg 2003b: 236). “Security, seen in terms of threats to national survival is not part of cross-border activities. Trust building across the border, through cooperation and interaction in small projects on the local level, builds, however, microstructures for the future” (Cronberg 2003b: 236)

The Republic of Karelia

In the 1990s the Republic of Karelia gained more power. The Karelian Republic enhanced regional autonomy in foreign relations (Prozorov 2004: 1). Despite the sovereign status acquired with the declaration of sovereignty in 1991 and the Federation treaty with Moscow in 1992, in practice it did not have an independent internal or external policy (Prozorov 2004: 5). However, because of its friendly relation with Moscow, without any separatist tendencies like in other Russian Republics, it was permitted to develop an own policy agenda in cooperation with Finland and other Northern European countries (Prozorov 2004: 5).

The Republic's position towards Finland and the Finnish border regions is two fold (see Prozorov 2004, Joenniemie 2006). "On the one hand, the federal 'anti-revisionist' policy line has been strongly maintained and annoyance has been expressed with the advocates of restitution in Finland. On the other hand, the Republic has prioritised and made active efforts to develop cooperative relations with Finland, both bilaterally and (increasingly) in the framework of the EU programmes of TACIS and in the wider network of transnational regional arrangements such as BEAR and CBSS (Prozorov 2004: 7).

The Karelian Republic opposes to any kind of border problematisation (Prozorov 2004: 8). The problematisation of the border is understood to be a problem for the development of cooperation with Finland. Also if this is in favour of the Russian position. CBC and Euregio Karelia are part of the deproblematisation of the border, forcing the revisionist and anti-revisionist agenda from the political and societal agenda (see Prozorov 2004: 8-9).

The Karelian Republic is an active participant in international cooperation. It participates in several regional arrangements in Europe's North, like the ND and Euregio Karelia. Cooperation with Finland is prioritized by the Karelian authorities (Prozorov 2004:6, Joenniemie 2006: 137, Köppen 2009). In this context CBC is not considered an objective in itself but an "important instrument in solving the socio-economic problems of border territories and the development of mutual understanding between our countries the subregional level" (Kantanandov 2003e in Prozorov 2004: 6). A stable and friendly border and CBC are seen as a 'key issue' for the wealth of the Republic (Shlyamin 2006: 141 in Köppen 2009: 43).

It is way "to counter the threat of exclusion or peripheralization of Russian regions” (Averre 2002: 39). Cooperation with Finland gives the Republic the opportunity to become part of a larger regional economic system. "The Euroregion is a way to gradually overcome the gap in living standards between each side of the state border”(Shlyamin 2003: 6). This explains why the economic international cooperation is considered the most important by the Karelian Republic.
Cooperation in the forest sector remains a difficult issue. Wood export is important for the Republics economy. The government of the Republic tries to improve export conditions. However, in relation to the forest sector it is relatively restrictive. It is afraid that foreign (mainly Finnish) logging companies cut all forest resources without anything coming back in return in terms of jobs or economic growth. Because most of the export is unprocessed round wood. Therefore "the government makes and will make efforts to reduce export of unprocessed timber and to increase export of sawn timber, paper and cellulose" (RK 1999).

Besides economic and societal development the emphasis is on a burden for CBC; customs and border crossing procedures and facilities. "The perfection of the border and customs infrastructure" and "promotion of transit corridor projects" are mentioned on the website as one of the priorities of the Republic of Karelia (Republic of Karelia website).

Critique from the Republic on the federal level is mainly based on the lack of cooperation in the development of Euregio Karelia. The federal Russian government lacks a strategy of developing CBRs and CBC. And its position towards international initiatives of Russian Republics remains unclear. Even for the stable and friendly Republic of Karelia. It does not provide a solid legal base for the development of CBC in Euregio Karelia (see RK 1999). Critique on Euregio Karelia in the Republic highlights the lack of foundation in society and economy of the Euregio (Reut 2009). It remains mostly a political forum.

Security wise the Republic does not perceive any military threat to territory from EU (Averre 2002: 27). Threats to the Republic's security are perceived to come from the inside. CBC only helps to challenge these threats (Averre 2002: 28).

The Finnish Regions

The Finnish regions envision themselves as a gateway to Russia (Cronberg 2003b: 229). But their geographical location is less advantageous as is suggested by the regions. Finnish regions in Euregio Karelia are situated north of the main transit corridors between the economic centre St. Petersburg and Southern Finland. So traffic and trade between Finland and Russia is situated south of the Finnish regions.

International development is seen as crucial by the regions for the regions' development. "To ensure the successful development of the region it is vital to constantly improve and further develop the preconditions for internationality development within the region. A competitive international operational environment offers actors of different levels of abilities to interact, network and further develop their skills and activities. This also aids the creation of a multi-cultural living environment" (North Karelia vision 2010, website North Karelia). International cooperation does not only mean cooperation with Russia and the Karelian Republic, but more cooperation with other European countries. There is a relative low level of economic interdependency between the Finnish Regions and the Republic of Karelia. The economy of the Finnish Regions is more directed at the domestic market and other EU countries.

From the interview, talks with experts from the Karelia Institute and literature the main problems in developing CBC in Euregio Karelia for Finnish regions are: visa regulations, lack of infrastructure, difficult border crossing, bureaucracy for funding of projects and corruption in the Republic of Karelia and other problems like, difference in language and working attitude, and mentality of separated spaces.

For Finnish regions, cooperation with the Republic of Karelia is not thought to solve the problems experienced in the Finnish regions like the demographic and economic crisis (Köppen 2009). For the Republic of Karelia the Euregio and other international cooperation
seem to be more important. Because of the lack of economic interdependency, economic development of the regions is not thought to come out of (cooperation with) the Republic of Karelia.

The Finnish Regions remain tightly linked to the national level and do not in any way want to loosen that. "If only because their membership in the Euregio does not entail any changes in their structures of governance, which are exported to Russia, not the other way round (Prozorov 2006: 136). It is the Finnish regions, the EU side of the Euregio, who integrate the Republic of Karelia in the EU, without itself being integrated anywhere. Integration within Russia is out of the question (Prozorov 2006: 136)."

**Concluding the subnational territorial logic**

The Euregio is formed within the 'Europe of the regions' discourse. Implying a logic of 'regionality' and 'neo-medievalism'. With a different idea about the territorial organization than a sovereignty based logic (Joenniemie 2002). In essence CBC represents a network approach to governance, where multiple governance levels from both sides of the border cooperate “aimed at building institutions of governance able to organize social life in a transborder regional context” (Popescu 2008: 421).

In practice the Euregio Karelia is far away from reaching this territorial organization. Not the least because the logics of both the Finnish regions and the Republic of Karelia do not overlap and are not similar to those of a integrated border region. It seems more to be a political forum and a tool to get funding.

Preconditions for economic cooperation remain difficult. The low level of economic interdependency, remote location, large distances, low level of economic activity and lack of physical and infrastructure make economic cooperation difficult. There is a political will to overcome these problems, but both the Finnish regions and the Republic of Karelia do not have the power and (financial) resources to turn this around.

In general, the Republic of Karelia promotes cooperation with Finland more than the other way around. For the Republic of Karelia CBC and other forms of international cooperation are thought to provide a base for further regional economic and societal development. Following this rationale it is not surprising that the Republic of Karelia follows the Russian line of thinking concerning visa regulations. A reciprocal abolishing of the visa regime is promoted. On the other hand, the Republic of Karelia keeps trade restrictions in play for the for the Finnish regions in the field of round wood export to protect its own forest industry. But in general, the Republic of Karelia promotes the opening of the border in the field of economic cooperation.

Following Prozorov (2006), the consequent silencing of the border issue and restitution claims implies an integrationist and inclusive logic “which prioritises international cooperation and institutionalization over securing the inviolability of territorial borders” (p. 130).

For the Finnish regions economic cooperation with the Republic of Karelia is less important. The share of the Republic of Karelia in the economy of the Finnish regions is small, economic development is not thought to come out of the Republic of Karelia. No clear indications were found that the Finnish regions wanted to open the economic border. Because of the low level of economic links and interdependency it is not in the immediate Finnish regions interest. In case of visa regulation, the Finnish regions promote an easing of the visa regime, but not a complete abolishing, hence lowering the barrier function of the border.
On legal issues other than visa regulations, the position of the subnational authorities remains unclear. The subnational authorities from both sides of the border have no or very limited legislative power, especially regarding cross-border activities. Both the Finnish regions and the Republic of Karelia do not actively lobby for legal exemptions from national regulations.

From a governance perspective, since the new Karelia ENPI CBC Programme there is a higher level of shared governance and decision making. This was one of the main problems experienced by the regional authorities from both sides of the border. There is a sufficient level of political will for cooperation but the base in society for the development of Euregio Karelia is missing. The low institutional thickness and lack of political power make it more a political forum than a new political-territorial level of concrete action. On the one hand, this is because the national and supranational levels do not allow the Euregio to become more independent. On the other hand, also the Finnish regions and Republic of Karelia do not want the Euregio Karelia to be more independent.

For the initiators of Euregio Karelia a shared identity and the common cultural heritage was considered important. These would provide a base for the further development of the Euregio. This perspective is gradually put a side. The development of a shared identity is certainly not an objective for the subnational authorities. Both Finnish and Russian identity is strong. There is some form of a shared identity on the political level, of being part of Euregio Karelia. However, this is certainly not experienced the same across the Euregio Karelia. In the research by Liikanen et al. (2007: 81) where 40 percent of the Russian respondents answered positively on the question: 'do you feel that you belong to a cross-border region?'. None of the Finnish respondents expressed such a belief.

"The authority of a Euregio stems from the regional administration's will to cooperate with a neighbour and from that the future of two adjacent areas is not separate from each other" (Cronberg 2003b: 228). Following this approach, Euregio is certainly on the right way to establish a new kind of spatial entity in Euregio Karelia.

From my perspective, basic preconditions for fruitful CBC are trust, motivation and dedicated decision makers and opinion leaders. Not only in politics but also in society (Köppen 2009: 43). Following this perspective, Euregio Karelia remains underdeveloped. In society there is no mutual trust, still some negative resentment between two sides of the border is present. Especially from the Finnish regions motivation for cooperation with the Republic of Karelia remains limited. In politics there are some dedicated decision makers, but decision making is slow and the independency of the Euregio limited. Euregio Karelia is not known among the public. In regional politics the Euregio does play a role, however a small one. Mainly because of some motivated politicians like Cronberg and Schlyamin. The political integration is further developed than societal integration (Köppen 2009: 51).

The officials from the Republic of Karelia put more emphasis on neighbourhood cooperation than those in the Finnish regions. Because it is more in the Karelian Republic's interest than that of the Finnish regions. In general the Republic of Karelia has a more inclusive logic than the Finnish regions. But it remains a political cooperation from a modest level. It is certainly not an integrated borderland. Preconditions for increased cooperation on a political level are present, but on a societal and economic level not.
Chapter 6 - Conclusion

In this research the territorial logics of the different border producing actors involved in cooperation across the EU-Finnish-Russian border, from the supranational level to the subnational level, have been analysed. At the basis of this research is the reterritorialization of European space. The traditional nation-state model is challenged from above by the formation of a supranational organization, the EU, and from below through the formation of Euregio’s.

Initially the EU predominantly focused on the internal situation, for example the development of the Single Market. Now, the EU increasingly becomes a geopolitical power with its own foreign policies and cooperation policies, challenging the nation-state from above. Previously, the nation-state had a monopoly on foreign policy and cooperation with the 'other' side. Through the formation of Euregio’s, the subnational level becomes involved in cooperation with the 'foreign'. The subnational level has its own foreign policies, challenging the sovereignty based logic of the nation-state from below.

The border between Finland and Russia became with Finland’s accession to the EU also the external border of the EU. Across this EU-Finnish-Russian border Euregio Karelia was founded in 2000. This has created a complex multi-level (border) governance structures with different territorial levels of political action, or political-territorial levels, involved in cooperation across the border, hence involved in border production. These different political-territorial levels and their policies have a territorial underpinning, a territorial logic. With different ideas about the permeability of the border, creating different insides and outsides in different spheres of social action. The Euregio Karelia forms a territory where different political-territorial levels meet and overlap. It formed the prism for this research to study the reterritorialization of European space.

Per actor, cooperation policies have been analysed using policy documents, literature research, questionnaires and interviews. Also several other border producing policies and the geopolitical visions that affect the border permeability of the EU-Finnish-Russian border have been analysed. The five differentiated dimensions of the territorial logic formed the prism to analyse the territorial logics of the different political-territorial levels, or actors, that affect the development of Euregio Karelia. The theoretical territorial logic, following a comprehensive approach on CBRs, formed the prism for the analysis to see how the different territorial logics relate and affect the development of Euregio Karelia.

In this conclusion first, the territorial logics of the different actors will be concluded in relation to the main research question. Second, I will broaden the discussion and discuss other findings of this research about the reterritorialization of European space and the EU external border and reflect on some of the theoretical concepts used in this study and border studies in general. Also some recommendations for further research will be formulated.

The first part of the conclusion is structured around the five dimensions. Per dimension the territorial logics of the differentiated political-territorial levels will be discussed. In table 5 the different positions of the differentiated political-territorial levels are summarized per dimension of the territorial logic.

Economic dimension
Euregio Karelia is, like many border areas, characterized by its economic peripheral status. The development of cross-border spaces has the possibility for economic development of the
border areas. Economic cooperation is one of the main interests for development of a CBR. A lively economic cooperation implies a relative open border. This research is limited to the question; to what extent do the actors consider economic cooperation in Euregio Karelia important and provide resources for it?

The emphasis in the EU's strategy on Russia is on economic cooperation, informed by the economic interdependencies and energy dependency and security issues. The development of a CES is the most important of the four Common Spaces to be developed between the EU and Russia. The EU tries to expand its market to Russia. However, the CES falls short of something like the EEA. There is no free movement of people, goods and services across the EU-Finnish-Russian border. It is certainly not an expansion of the Single Market.

For the development of a 'common economic space', a high level of border mobility is necessary. Other than the improvement of border-crossing facilities and procedures this is not a priority in the Common Spaces or on a subnational level in the (Karelia) ENPI CBC Programme. An open economic border like those in the internal space of the EU or like its borders with EEA partner countries is not likely to develop. This is informed by the dominant security perspective which tends to see Russia as a source of instability and insecurity.

Economic cooperation is part of the 'security through inclusion' discourse. It is a tool in the EU’s security strategy. Well developed border areas are thought to be more stable and secure. It follows the perspective that "the costs of defending the EU from unstable states in its neighbourhood would be much higher than those of promoting prosperity and security beyond its borders" (Lavenex 2005: 129). Based on Lavenex (2005, see table 4) the EU approach to Russia is more exclusive than inclusive. These border confirming tendencies form poor preconditions for the development of extensive economic cooperation in Euregio Karelia. Lively economic cooperation on all levels can only flourish if the threat perceptions are de-emphasized (Scott 2005: 446)

Compared to the EU, Finland puts less emphasis on economic cooperation with Russia. This can be explained from history. Because of the closed border, economic links were established with the West. This limits Russia's share in Finnish economy up to today. Finland is mainly concerned with possible security threats emanating from Russia, both military and soft security threats like environmental and nuclear pollution and the spread of infectious diseases. A traditional security discourse, in which Russia is seen as a threat is still dominant in the Finnish policy to Russia.

This considerably affects the meaning and permeability of the border and strengthens the barrier function. Border security is considered very important. In case of trade barriers, EU rules and regulations apply. However no indication was found that Finland had a different view on these regulations.

The emphasis in the field of border crossing infrastructure and procedures is clearly put on the border crossings situated south of the Finnish regions that are part of Euregio Karelia. Because that is where the main routes between Finland and St. Petersburg and Leningrad region are situated. In Euregio Karelia the number of border crossings remain limited and less emphasis is put on improving border crossing facilities. This is unfavourable for the development of intensive economic cooperation in Euregio Karelia.

Similar to the EU, Finland takes a security perspective on economic cooperation on the subnational level in stead of a more regional development perspective, stressing the threat perceptions. No special policies or other kind of exemptions are developed to improve the
economic cooperation in Euregio Karelia. In general, the Euregio Karelia plays a marginal role in Finnish cooperation policies with Russia and the Republic of Karelia.

For Russia, economic cooperation with the EU and Finland is important. The EU is Russia's most important trading partner. It wants better access to the EU market, especially for non-energy goods (Aalto 2006: 117). It experiences several problems because of trade restriction in some markets and the different quality standards in the EU and Russia. On the other hand, however, Russia poses trade restrictions itself, for example in the, for Finland and Republic of Karelia, very important forest industry. Also the reciprocal abolishing of the visa regime is promoted implying a relative open border.

But other preconditions like the stability and security of the business climate remain difficult. Especially for small and medium enterprises, who do not have the financial resources and (political) network needed. In this way, Russia is self-excluding itself from the EU.

For the Republic of Karelia economic cooperation with the Finnish regions is much more important than the other way around. The Karelian Republic considers economic cooperation vital for its political and societal development. On the other hand, the Republic of Karelia keeps trade restrictions in play for the for the Finnish regions in the field of round wood export to protect its own forest industry. But in general, the Republic of Karelia promotes the opening of the border in the field of economic cooperation

However economic cooperation remains a one way direction, investment from Finland to the Republic. And preconditions for economic cooperation, like distances, number of border crossings and business security, remain difficult. There is a political will to overcome these problems, but especially from the Finnish side the willingness in society to cooperate with the Karelian Republic remains low. Mainly because of the lack of economic interdependency and poor Russian business climate. Economic development of the regions is not thought to come out of the Republic of Karelia.

Cultural dimension
An important function of territories and borders is their symbolic meaning. Especially in the Westphalian nation state system, national borders are an important part of the national identity and loaded with symbols about the 'home' and the 'foreign'. Euregio's have the potential to overcome this distinction. On the other hand, for a territorial unit an (political) identity is really important for the very existence of a territory. "If there is no stable political identity, there are no stable boundaries, territory, no stable state, or political unit in general" (Kolossov 2005: 49-50). Following the comprehensive approach to CBRs a sort of shared identity is crucial for the development of an integrated CBR or cross-border entity. To what extent do the actors consider some form of a shared identity important for the development of Euregio Karelia?

This question can be answered briefly. It is not an objective of one of the actors on the subnational level, not even from the subnational actors involved in Euregio Karelia. On a higher level both Russia and the EU promoted a 'European identity' however what this identity is, was part of a discussion. With the self-excluding approach and reaffirmation of sovereignty in Russia, Russia defines itself more as different from the EU. The EU follows a more imperialistic approach in its identity politics, in which a European identity is spread to its neighbourhood based on EU norms and values.

Off course an identity is difficult to create in Euregio Karelia, because it is not embedded in society. Most people do not even know about it. It is certainly not a 'hot topic' in the regional
political and societal debate, if it is a topic at all. From the interviews and talks with experts it became clear that on the political level some form of shared identity or shared interest is present. But this is solely on the political or official level. The Euregio Karelia lacks embedding in society and the daily life in the regions. The common history that could form as a base for a shared identity is presently more a weakness than a strength and opportunity for the development of a shared identity.

**Political-territorial and governance dimension**

The establishing of Euregio's as true cross-border spaces, involves territorial delineation across national and supranational borders, here the Finnish and the EU border, and would involve the establishment of new types of political spaces that are created beyond the territorial logic of the nation-state and a high level of political cooperation and political 'autonomy', meaning some form of independent decision making (Raich 1995: 25 in Perkmann 2003: 157). In this research the question was asked to what extent the actors want the subnational authorities to have some form of independent decision making. This is tightly linked to the governance dimension and the establishing of institutions.

Reterritorialization involves the relocation of governance functions, and "a new scale can only be efficacious if it gains a sufficient degree of institutional thickness (Jessop 2002 : 29 in Perkmann 2007: 256). Important is the political support to provide resources and legitimacy for the formation of a cross-border space (Perkmann 2007: 256). A CBR, here Euregio Karelia, needs autonomous [political and social] institutions (Raich, 1995: 25 in Perkmann 2003: 157). To what extent do the actors promote the development of common institutions and sharing of institutions with the other 'side'? Because of the close link between the political-territorial dimension and the governance dimension the conclusion around these dimensions is combined.

In general, the institutional thickness of the Euregio remains limited. It is more a political forum than an integrated political entity with shared institution and a high level of political cooperation at the subnational level. At the subnational level there is the political will to cooperate intensively. However, also on the subnational level it is certainly not an objective to become a sort of independent region. Before the Karelia ENPI CBC programme, the unequal relation in decision making and budget control was felt as a burden for the development of Euregio Karelia. Not much could be found on the position of the subnational authorities on the question on independent decision making. The new governance structure in the Karelia ENPI CBC Program is considered sufficient. It is understood that without the national level involved, (the development of) CBC would be even more difficult.

Basic preconditions for fruitful CBC are trust, motivation and dedicated decision makers and opinion leader. Not only in politics but also in society (Köppen 2009: 43). Following this perspective, Euregio Karelia remains underdeveloped. For the Republic of Karelia cooperation with Finland and the Finnish regions is considered vital for the Republic's development. Following Prozorov (2006: 130) the Republic considers the institutionalization of cooperation important, more important than "securing the inviolability" of the border. In the interviews with Finnish representatives and talks with experts from the Karelian Institute it became clear that this is less the case in the Finnish regions. The interest in cooperation with the Republic of Karelia is less compared to the Republic of Karelia, and like the national Finland perspective on Russia, a security perspective is present. By way of conclusion an increased institutionalisation of the Euregio is not in the immediate Finnish region's interest, hence not promoted.
Table 5 - Overview of the territorial logics

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<th>Economic</th>
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<th>Finland</th>
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<td>• Economic cooperation with Russia important.</td>
<td>• Low level of economic interdependency.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• EU wants to expand its business market to Russia.</td>
<td>• Economic cooperation focuses on border crossing infrastructure located on the southern part of the border.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• CES most important of four Common Spaces. Unlike its inclusive suggestion it falls short of the EEA and no free movement of people, goods services and capital is allowed.</td>
<td>• EK: economic cooperation with Russia on subnational level mainly seen from a security perspective, not from a regional development perspective.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <strong>EK</strong>: economic cooperation is one of the objectives of its CBC policy. Mainly seen from a security perspective.</td>
<td>• <strong>EK</strong>: no exemptions for Finnish regions in case of economic cooperation with the Republic of Karelia.</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cultural</th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>Finland</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• A European identity is promoted, based on EU norms and values.</td>
<td>• Finnish identity is very strong.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <strong>EK</strong>: no emphasis on the development of a common identity in Euregio Karelia.</td>
<td>• EK: A common identity with Russia is not an objective of cooperation policies including CBC policies.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Political-territorial</th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>Finland</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Level of political cooperation with Russia remains limited.</td>
<td>• Finland in favour of international cooperation.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Through bilateral approach and principle of conditionality in ENP political cooperation remains a one way relationship.</td>
<td>• Mix of a bilateral and multilateral approach towards Russia.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <strong>EK</strong>: ENPI CBC based on equal relation of subnational level.</td>
<td>• Political cooperation with Russia focuses on soft-security issues.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• <strong>EK</strong>: the use of ENPI funding limits the autonomy of the subnational level.</td>
<td>• Internal political cooperations means to address the limits of the nation-state territoriality.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• <strong>EK</strong>: Finland promotes equality of different levels, including an equal vote for the national level. Limits independence of subnational level.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Governance</th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>Finland</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Institutional thickness of cooperation with Russia remains limited.</td>
<td>• Willing to share some of its sovereignty in international cooperation in shared institutions. But institutional thickness of cooperations with Russia remains limited.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Both ENP, Common Spaces, ND are cooperations without strong institutions.</td>
<td>• <strong>EK</strong>: Willing to share institutions, but only with equal participation of the national level.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• <strong>EK</strong>: EU accepted equal governance structure</td>
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<tr>
<th>Legal</th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>Finland</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Limited legislative power. Trade barriers remain.</td>
<td>• No legal exemptions for Euregio Karelia.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Visa: strict Schengen border is maintained.</td>
<td>• Visa: strict Schengen border is maintained.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Finnish Regions</td>
<td>Republic of Karelia</td>
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<tr>
<td>• EU is Russia’s most important business partner.</td>
<td>• Economic interdependency with Republic of Karelia low.</td>
<td>• Economic cooperation with 'EU-side' vital for economic and societal development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Russia wants better access to EU market, especially for non-energy goods.</td>
<td>• Low level of investment in Republic of Karelia.</td>
<td>• Economic cooperation most important field of international cooperation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Russia keeps trade restrictions in play.</td>
<td>• Economic development of the regions is not thought to come out of cooperation with the Republic of Karelia.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <strong>EK:</strong> no specific CBC policy exists. No active promotion of economic cooperation, nor resources provided.</td>
<td>• On the political level some form of 'Euregio Karelianness'.</td>
<td>• On the political level some form of 'Euregio Karelianness'. More than in the Finnish regions.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Development of a common identity is not an objective..</td>
<td>• Development of a common identity is not an objective.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• European identity promoted. Conflict with EU what this identity is.</td>
<td>• Political will for high level of cooperation.</td>
<td>• Political will for high level of cooperation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• With shift to self-exclusive approach Russia highlights its own identity distinct from the EU.</td>
<td>• No plea for more independence</td>
<td>• Political cooperation is considered vital for the economic and societal development of the Republic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <strong>EK:</strong> Russia promotes equality of different levels, including an equal vote for the national level. Limits independence of subnational level. This limits independence of the subnational level.</td>
<td>• Political cooperation is considered vital for the economic and societal development of the Republic.</td>
<td>• No plea for more independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Centralizing tendencies in Russia includes the reaffirmation of sovereignty.</td>
<td>• No immediate interest in increased institutionalization of cooperation.</td>
<td>• Equal relation of Russian side promoted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Shared sovereignty is seen as problematic.</td>
<td>• New governance structure in Karelia ENPI CBC Program considered sufficient.</td>
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<td>• Political will for high level of cooperation.</td>
<td>• Political cooperation is considered vital for the economic and societal development of the Republic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Centralizing tendencies in internal governance. The political power has been restored in the centre.</td>
<td>• New governance structure in Karelia ENPI CBC Program considered sufficient.</td>
<td>• No plea for more independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The reaffirmation of sovereignty makes the sharing of institutions more difficult. Russia seeks a more independent role in world politics.</td>
<td>• Equal relation of Russian side promoted.</td>
<td>• New governance structure in Karelia ENPI CBC Program considered sufficient.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <strong>EK:</strong> Willing to share institutions, but only with equal participation of the national level.</td>
<td>• No immediate interest in increased institutionalization of cooperation.</td>
<td>• Equal relation of Russian side promoted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• No legal exemptions for EK. Because of destabilizing risk.</td>
<td>• New governance structure in Karelia ENPI CBC Program considered sufficient.</td>
<td>• New governance structure in Karelia ENPI CBC Program considered sufficient.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Visa: reciprocal abolishing of visa regimes promoted.</td>
<td>• CBC based on national laws, no independent legislative power.</td>
<td>• CBC based on national laws, no independent legislative power.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Visa: on the political level an easing of the Schengen regime is promoted. Not a complete abolishing of the Schengen regime.</td>
<td>• Visa: reciprocal abolishing of visa regimes promoted.</td>
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Shared governance, political cooperation with common institutions is at the bases of the EU. However the EU is reluctant about sharing institutions and equal decision making with its neighbours. Shared institutions requires an equal relation. The ENP does not include a high level of political cooperation nor shared institution; it is EU "membership without institutions". Especially the bilateral approach and the principle of conditionality accentuate the asymmetric relation between the EU and its neighbouring countries. It is in the EU's interest to maintain this kind of relationship. A space with shared institutions and a high level of political cooperation between the EU and its neighbourhood is not likely to develop in the short and medium term future.

Towards Russia the EU takes a slightly different approach. But only because Russia opted out of the ENP framework and demanded a more equal footing. However, also with Russia institutions are neither shared nor a high level of political cooperation is present. The Common Spaces remains more a political forum without shared governance and institutions or like the Russian's call it a 'declaration of intentions' without concrete results (Sergounin 2006: 125).

On the level of Euregio Karelia, the EU has become a little more inclusive with accepting the equal governance structure proposed by the subnational level. The principle of equality is embedded in the ENPI CBC programme. However, because most of the funding is directed through ENPI, the regulations of ENPI apply for the Euregio. This limits the autonomy of the subnational authorities in the decision making process and budget control to a great extent. 'He who pays the piper calls the tune'.

Finland follows both a multilateral and bilateral approach to Russia, informed by the dominant security discourse. It is an active participant in the EU, it founded the ND and takes part in several other regional cooperation arrangements. Finland seems to be in favour of regional political cooperation and sharing of institutions. Following Popescu (2008: 432) these political cooperations like the EU, ND and to a lesser extent also Euregio Karelia provide Finland a framework to address the limits of the nation-state territoriality and not as 'integrated territorial units of economics, political and social life' (Popescu 2008: 432).

With this I mean that regional cooperations (like Euregio Karelia and the ND) complement Finnish politics, to address big problems as a relative small state with limited geopolitical power. In order to put these on the geopolitical agenda it has to cooperate and is willing to share governance and give up some of its sovereignty. More specific on CBC and Euregio Karelia. No independent decision making is granted to the subnational authorities. The Finnish national authorities demand an equal voice of the national level in subnational cooperation arrangements, limiting the independence of the subnational level. Euregio Karelia plays a marginal role in Finnish politics and the Finnish authorities only provide limited resources, political support and legitimacy.

In Russia there is a centralizing tendency concerning the territorial organization of governance. During the Putin presidency the power has been restored in the centre. The changing political vision of Russia includes the reaffirmation of sovereignty (Prozorov 2007: 325). Shared sovereignty and governance is seen as problematic (Joenniemie 2008: 150).

On the other hand, the central Russian authorities demanded an equal relation and equal participation in the Euregio Karelia management and governance. This implies a limited level of shared sovereignty and political power. However, this must be seen from the perspective of equal participation in EU projects and EU integration rather than sharing sovereignty. The impact of Euregio Karelia, in its present organisation, on the loss of sovereignty in Russia is
only theoretical. Hence an equal relation in management and budget control is not a threat to Russian sovereignty. This does limit the independence of the subnational level. In general the Russian authorities do not consider Euregio Karelia an important project. They provide the Euregio with small resources, political support and legitimacy.

Legal dimension

To develop meaningful CBC and develop Euregio Karelia into a meaningful territorial entity there should be a sufficient legal base that regulates CBC and provides a platform for CBC on a subnational level. Exemptions from national regulations regarding e.g. border crossings are necessary to make cross-border flows easier. To what extent do the actors want or allow exemptions from national regulations (including visa regulations) in Euregio Karelia?

CBC is based on national laws, here those of Russia and Finland. Both the EU as the subnational actors have no or limited legislative power. It is the interstate relations that forms the basic framework for CBC (Liikanen & Virtanen 2006: 128). Trade regulations, however, are, in case of Finland, often directed from above, from the EU. The main finding is that both Finland and Russia do not want to develop legal exemptions from national laws for Euregio Karelia.

In Russia the centralizing tendencies and problems on other parts of the Russian border are the main explanation for this position. Despite the EU-Finnish-Russian border being the most friendly and stable it has. It is not in Russia’s interest to develop these exemptions. The negative affects, e.g. the rise of secessionism or call for more autonomy in other parts of Russia that risk the disintegration of the Russian Federation, are a bigger concern than the possible positive effects for the Republic of Karelia. No special CBC policy exist nor a special legal base to regulate CBC on a subnational level.

In Finland it is also not an objective to create a special set of regulations for the Euregio Karelia and the Finnish regions. In general, the Euregio plays a marginal role in Finnish foreign politics and approach to Russia. But also in other regional cooperations between Finland and Russia no legal exemptions are developed. Historically, Finland knows a relative strong centralized state and Finnish regions are relatively weak levels of political actions. Legal exemptions would be a challenge for the centralized state, hence undesirable.

On legal issues other than visa regulations, the position of the subnational authorities remains unclear. The subnational authorities from both sides of the border have no or very limited legislative power, especially regarding cross-border activities. Both the Finnish regions and the Republic of Karelia do not actively lobby for legal exemptions from national regulations.

Visa regulations and other border crossing procedures are a burden for the development of an integrated Euregio. Visa regulations are one of the best examples of the border as a barrier. It limits free movement in a space. In this field many, sometimes surprising, differences between the several actors have been found.

The EU tends to see its outside as a source of insecurity and instability. A security discourse is dominant in the EU’s approach to its neighbourhood. This can also be seen in its CBC policy. It considers CBC as an important part of its security strategy. A strict Schengen border with Russia is maintained. And no sign of a lowering of the fences is visible in the EU approach to Russia. A strict visa regime is thought to provide the necessary security to the EU.
Finland follows the EU’s line of thinking. Finland tends to see Russia as a source of insecurity, not only as a source of soft security threats but also as a possible military threat. For Finland, CBC is also part of the security strategy, in the field of tackling soft security threats. Following this security perspective visa and border control are rational choices.

Surprisingly, considering the self-exclusionary discourse in Russia, Russia does advocate a reciprocal abolishing of the visa regimes. This is at the top of the agenda for Russia’s approach to the EU up to today. The EU rejection of this proposal is one of the main reasons for the shift in Russian thinking from a liberal discourse to a self-exclusionary approach to the EU. It became a symbol of the experienced hierarchical inclusion of Russia in those area’s that are in the EU’s interest.

On the subnational level, The Karelian authorities tend to see Finland and the Finnish regions as the main source of (potential) economic development. International cooperation is considered vital for the Republic’s economic and societal development. Consequently, an easy-to-cross border is promoted, including the abolishing of the visa regime. For the Finnish regions, the role, or share, for the Republic of Karelia in the economic and societal development is limited. The visa regime is considered a burden for the development of Euregio Karelia and fruitful CBC. But at least on the societal level the Karelian Republic and Russia are considered a source of insecurity. Therefore a visa regime has to maintained, but an easing of the visa regime is promoted, especially on the political level.

As a general conclusion concerning the legal dimension, no legal exemptions are developed for Euregio Karelia nor actively lobbied for by the subnational level. In the case of visa regulations, the Russian side of the border is more inclusive compared to the EU side. The lack of a solid basis for CBC and Euregio Karelia make development of the Euregio difficult. The political weight of the Euregio would improve if the Euregio would get a solid legal base, if it would be legally institutionalised. Now it depends more on the good will of the different political-territorial levels involved.

“Despite the declaration of noble goals, the implementation of the project to create a Karelia Euroregion cannot be considered successful. This proves that in forming an international regional association all details of the initiative must first be worked out in legal terms. This step is doubly important when the matter essentially involves assigning special status to a territory” (Reut 2009: 87).

Border wise, in the EU the security discourse prevails over the economic integrationist discourse based on market issues that dominated European politics till the last enlargement round. Within the security discourse there is a tension between ‘security through inclusion’ and ‘security through exclusion’. The ‘security through inclusion’ discourse and its cooperation tendencies with Russia are undermined “by the re-problematisation of the EU-Russian border as a line of exclusion from the area of ‘freedom, security and justice’” (Prozorov 2004: 15).

The logic of various EU cooperation policies and other border confirming policies conflicts with the logic of Euregio’s. Now the EU is “one the major disruptive forces that cross-border reterritorialization has to overcome” (Popescu 2008: 432). Especially the insistence on Schengen limits the possibilities for cross-border flows and the development of Euregio Karelia. It contradicts with the EU's ambition to advance regional integration across its EU external border (Prozorov 2006: 134).
The regional policies like the ND and Euregio Karelia are subordinated to the broader geopolitics like ENP and EU-Russian relation (Sasse 2008). The centralizing tendencies in EU border policies are disruptive for the formation of Euregio Karelia as an integrated CBR at the edge of the EU territory. These centralizing tendencies in e.g. the ENP are informed by the security perspective of the EU. However these regional policies and CBC can only flourish if the threat perceptions are de-emphasized (Scott 2005: 446). If the security discourse keeps to dominate EU foreign (cooperation) policies, it is unrealistic Euregio Karelia will develop into an integrated cross-border space.

Like the EU, Finnish cooperation policies are subordinated to the broader geopolitics regarding the Finnish approach to Russia. At first sight the territorial logic of Finland seems to be 'inclusivish'. Finland participates in many supranational and regional international cooperations, implying a logic of shared institutions, governance and sovereignty. However, the institutional thickness of most of these cooperations, other than EU, remains limited as is their political weight, making their impact on the sovereignty of the nation-state more a theoretical assumption than something that can be concluded in the world around us. I tend to see these political cooperations more as political fora than political-territorial levels of concrete action.

Finland maintains a relative hard border with Russia, especially through Schengen. This can be explained through the dominant security discourse on Russia. The threat perceptions of Russia imply a relative strict border with a strong barrier function. CBC can only flourish if the threat perceptions are de-emphasized (Scott 2005: 446). The independence of the subnational level is limited through the insistence on the equal participation of the national level. The insistence on a strict border through the maintaining of a strict visa regime the development of day-to-day border crossings remain difficult as is more economic cooperation.

A point of critique concerning the national level in Finland for the development of Euregio Karelia is its marginal role in national politics and policies. If Euregio Karelia is meant to be a success story, first and for all it should be prioritized. Finland provides the Euregio Karelia with very limited political support, resources and legitimacy.

In Russia the reaffirmation of sovereignty, and problematisation of regionalization of (border) policies form poor preconditions for development of the Euregio. The dominant self-exclusive discourse implies a border confirming tendency. On the other hand economic cooperation with the EU-side is vital for its economic development. This explains the emphasis on easing the border crossings including the reciprocal abolishing of visa regimes.

Border wise there is a duality in Russian views on its borders and integration with the EU. First there is strong modernistic approach, with emphasis on strict territorial control and an indisputable link between the state and territory and a strong national identity, at least with the ruling elite. Second, Russia worries about a possible loss of identity and fears disintegrative processes that might follow with regionalization of policies and EU integration. This approach prevails over postmodernist tendencies where border control is becoming less important and visa-free travel is desired (Joenniemie 2008: 155). This position provides very poor preconditions for the development of Euregio Karelia.

Looking from a comprehensive perspective towards Euregio Karelia, also the regions that constitute Euregio Karelia do not match the logic of such an integrated CBR. The Karelian Republic is more open for the development of an open integrated borderland in the EU-Finnish-Russian borderland than the Finnish regions. It is in its own interest. I consider the
thought that the economic development of the Finnish regions is not thought to come out of the Republic of Karelia crucial for the Finnish region's logic. A more open border is promoted, such as an easing of the Schengen criteria, but a complete abolishing of the border certainly not. Maybe not so much on the political level, but at least on the societal level the threat perception towards Russia is also in the Finnish regions still present.

Problems concerning the development of Euregio Karelia are similar to that of the EU. The problem with the EU is that it does not have an unambiguous goal. It is an identity question. If the EU wants to represent and act like a power it needs a political mandate of its citizens. There is no mandate nor an EU identity. This is because there is no shared public interests but a collection of different interests. It is a problem of scale and identity. The goals and interests of the EU are so diverse that identification with the EU is hardly possible. To create a common interest, goals are so broadly formulated, e.g. 'war against terrorism', that they loose meaning. The broader the goals the larger the distance to its citizen. As Kant said, a world government, here EU, is considered by most people as meaningless, inefficient and far away. The highest possibility for Kant is a political community with several cooperating states. In the EU, there is no collective enemy, except maybe the EU itself. Without a shared goal, interest or fear, people will be less likely to unite themselves. As long as this shared goal, or identity, remains unclear the EU will not develop into something more than a political community of cooperating states (Wijnberg & Jensen 2010).

This applies to Euregio Karelia in so far that there is no clear political mandate, nor directly from its citizens nor from the national supranational level. There is also no clear shared identity or interest. The logics and interests of the different political-territorial levels that meet in Euregio Karelia are different, even from the Finnish regions and the Republic of Karelia that founded it. This makes the preconditions for the development of Euregio Karelia in an integrated border region poor.

The research of Gabriel Popescu formed an important framework for this research. In his research on the territorial logic of Euregio's on the EU external border he concluded that the Euregio's were part of the national logic, creating a geopolitics of Euroregions. In Euregio Karelia, it is more a mix between a grass-root project and the EU. It is not part of the national (geo)politics. It plays a marginal role in national politics on both sides of the border. The question arises how this is in other Euregio's across the EU external border. It would be interesting to see how differences in support from the national level affect the development of Euregio's.

Central in this research is the reterritorialization of European space and how the nation-state was challenged from above and below. Different from some postmodern approaches I conclude that the role of the Euregio in this process remains more a theoretical assumption, at least on the EU-Finnish-Russian border. Within these approaches it is assumed that the local has a substantial influence on the border regime. At least in Euregio Karelia and this part of the EU external border this is not the case. Clearly these regional policies and cooperations are subordinated to the higher level border producing policies. They are now sometimes nothing more than 'political window dressing'.

For example Joenniemie (2002) concludes that the Euregio Karelia "tend to multiply authorities and identities in modes that overflow sovereignty" to an extent that the logic of sovereignty becomes one among many realities. This research shows that in daily life the Euregio Karelia does not form a new transnational space of political and social action. At least it does not have any, or only very limited, concrete implications for the territorial organization of social and political action. The Euregio remains relatively weak and
insignificant regarding the regulatory capacities. This makes it difficult to speak about Euregio Karelia in terms of a new transnational space that exists next to the national and supranational spaces.

New research is needed to put these findings in perspective. The question arises, looking at the EU logic, if Euregio’s can develop into new transnational spaces anywhere at the EU external border. The changing geopolitical vision of the EU in which security issues seem to prevail over the economic integrationist logic needs more in-depth research. Differently put, what the consequences are of the emerging paradox that the EU can only develop into a postmodern entity if a modernistic approach is taken towards the surrounding space (Browning 2001). A wider empirical research on the permeability of the border and its affects on cross-border initiatives and cross-border flows is necessary, to understand the consequences of this shift in EU thinking for the future of cooperations across the EU external border.

Also new and more in-depth research is necessary to the forming of Euregio’s in general. In this research the possibilities to analyse the subnational level were limited. Because of language problems and limited resources it was difficult to study the political debate around the Euregio Karelia in-depth. Further research on the interests of the subnational authorities and societies in cooperation between both sides is necessary to indentify where mutual interests exists and in which spheres of political and social action Euregio Karelia can become significant. This would also improve the mandate of the Euregio and its embedding in society.
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Video