FOOD AID IN SOMALIA

Security challenges for WFP and CARE
With handing in this thesis, as final part of the Master program ‘Conflicts, territories and identities’, great years of studying in Maastricht, Berkeley, and Nijmegen come to an end. In September 2008, I came to Nijmegen for the first day of classes with the strong conviction that Nijmegen would never exceed my study time in Maastricht and Berkeley. Within few weeks, I changed my mind. From the start, I enjoyed my courses because they were not only interesting, they also turned out to be fun, interactive and useful. Months of hard work surmounted in an educating and very enjoyable two-day peace negotiations game on Iraq. A week later we left for a Bosnia I Herzegovina study trip that proved to be an excellent opportunity to put in practice what I had learned during the past few years.

The second part of the Master program was doing an internship followed by writing a master thesis. I did my internship for the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the humanitarian aid division (department of human rights, good governance and humanitarian aid) which was a great and informative experience. It is with this internship that my interest in humanitarian aid in Somalia arose which laid the base for my master thesis. There are several people I would like to thank for their support and encouragement in this last phase of my studies. First of all I would like to thank my thesis supervisor Dr. M. van Leeuwen who supported me through all phases of thesis writing. I appreciated his flexibility with which we discussed many topics by phone, email or even in The Hague. His quick responses and constructive criticism have contributed to the quality of this thesis. Secondly, I would like to thank my parents who were always there for me and who showed a never-ending patience for my ambitions during the past 8 years. I would like to specially thank my mother for the last couple of weeks in which she helped me structure my thoughts and edit my thesis. Last but definitely not least, I would like to thank my (former) colleagues, my fellow students and my friends for their support and motivating words. A special thanks goes to Magali who helped me out with the graphic design of this thesis. Thank you all!

Inka Kreutzberger

The Hague, 20 October 2010
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<td>ALNAP</td>
<td>Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>CARE</td>
<td>Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere</td>
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<td>ECB</td>
<td>Emergency Capacity Building</td>
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<td>EDP</td>
<td>Extended delivery point</td>
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<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations</td>
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<td>FDP</td>
<td>Final distribution points</td>
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<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade</td>
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<td>HAP</td>
<td>Humanitarian Accountability Partnership</td>
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<td>IASC</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Standing Committee</td>
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<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<td>IHL</td>
<td>International Humanitarian Law</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<td>MOSS</td>
<td>Minimum Operating Security Standards</td>
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<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standard Operating Procedure</td>
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<td>SU</td>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
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<td>TFG</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Government (of Somalia)</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNDSS</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Safety and Security</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNHAS</td>
<td>United Nations Humanitarian Air Service</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<td>US(A)</td>
<td>United States (of America)</td>
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1. INTRODUCTION

‘Somalia Food Aid Bypasses Needy, U.N. Study Says’ and was breaking news when published by the New York Times on March 9, 2010. The report concludes that humanitarian operations in Somalia are seriously obstructed in various ways because of the dangerous operating environment. It is one of multiple reports on how security threats on humanitarian personnel and aid cargo hamper the effective delivery of food aid in Somalia. Diversion, fraud and taxation of aid cargo but also kidnapping and killing of aid personnel are just a few examples of security threats with which aid organizations have to deal in Somalia (Jaspars, 2000).

In general, there are various strategies commonly used by humanitarian agencies for coping with these security risks in complex emergencies. Some organizations opt for suspending or retreating from further aid distributions in specific areas. Other organizations choose to broker deals in order to secure aid delivery to the most vulnerable people (Abild, 2009). This also becomes apparent in the case of Somalia where CARE and WFP, the two largest food aid agencies, have adopted different strategies. In 2008 CARE decided to suspend all activities in Central and Southern Somalia. WFP on the other hand decided to continue most operations in this region. The trade-off that has to be made between serving beneficiaries and ensuring safety of personnel from risks, and cargo from malpractices is a delicate practice because both strategies have consequences. By suspending operations, people are left behind without food aid. On the other hand, in Somalia, the continuation of operations can have very aggravating outcomes for the conflict in terms of economics, politics, and violence as aid commodities are part of the conflict dynamics (Jaspars, 2000). Increasing numbers of allegations on the account of WFP like ‘as much as half the food aid sent to Somalia is diverted from needy people to a web of corrupt contractors, radical Islamist militants and local United Nations staff members’ can eventually harm humanitarian food aid in Somalia (New York Times, 2010). Whether this claim is accurate or not, dealing with security risks is part of the day-to-day reality of all aid organizations present in Somalia (Stoddard et al., 2006).

The differences between WFP and CARE in coping with security risks and what that means for the effective delivery of food aid in Somalia are the main topics of this research. Before introducing the research question(s) and methodology, this introductory chapter will first give a background overview of events that have led to the unique conflict situation of Somalia where food aid operations are heavily influenced by the dynamics of war.

1 The United Nations (UN) study in question is a report written by the Monitoring Group for Somalia that was primarily responsible for the investigation of arms embargo violations. The mandate, however, was expanded in a later stage so that the investigation would also include security and humanitarian affairs (Gentleman & MacFarquhar, 2010).
1.1 Background of Somalia’s complex emergency and its relation to food aid distribution

Decades of colonialism, harsh repression, state collapse and civil war have impaired and changed Somali societal structure profoundly. In the resulting absence of any form of public and societal trust, amidst violence and competition over economic and political resources, warring parties make use of everything in their power to protect their personal interests (Menkhaus, 2007; Samatar, 2007). For most warlords, business men and clan militias, a functioning national government means a loss of personal gain. Therefore, maintaining and controlling current economic, political and military power divisions are an important motivation to obstruct peace and reconciliation processes (Macrea & Leader, 2000; Menkhaus, 2006/07; Samatar, 2007). As such, humanitarian operations have become caught in a political deadlock. Understanding the security problems experienced by humanitarian organizations requires an analysis of the various factors responsible for initiating, fuelling and maintaining the violent conflict (World Bank, 2005).

1.1.1 Politics and economics

As in many postcolonial, African states, the legacy from foreign occupation have had negative influences on the Somali region. In her article, Bestemans mentions the consequences of the artificial division of Somali territory under British, Italian and Ethiopian ruling that had ruptured the centuries old traditions of pastoral life. The shifting of borders forcefully modified the essential base for pastoralists who depend on large grazing lands and support from reciprocal relationships such as family and clan linkages. The artificial boundaries led to inaccessibility of traditional travelling routes and grazing lands, it tore apart family and clan linkages and underlined the differences in colonial ruling, political systems and languages. Even in postcolonial times when the northern part (former British colony) and the southern part (former Italian colony) had been brought together, while some parts of the former Somali territory were still cut off from Somalia (such as the Ogaden territory that now belongs to Ethiopia), differences and tensions between the parts do still exist (Besteman, 1996).

Although colonialism has substantially influenced the Somali society by disrupting its social structures, it was the manipulative post-colonial government of Siyad Barre that destroyed the basis for a functioning society (Samatar, 2010; World Bank, 2005). After a brief period of nine years in which a parliamentary democracy ruled postcolonial Somalia, army officer Siyad Barre began its oppressive ruling in 1969 after a successfully led coup (Besteman, 1996, p. 581). The manipulation of clan identities and relationships for political and economic ends can be identified as one of the most important spoiling causes of the escalation of violent conflict. Bestemans describes how Barre’s political strategy fuelled strong animosities between the major clans with his divide-and-rule tactics and thereby aggravated the already growing public distrust in the government. Potential threats against his regime such as political opponents, rival clans or critical individuals (academia, journalists) were removed which triggered and strengthened resistance against his government even more. The northern Somali territory of among others Somaliland and Puntland, for example, was dominated by the largest clan, the Isaaq, and, due to their political and economic superiority over Barre’s authority, suffered from continuing marginalization and serious violent attacks. Eventually the tensions caused social upheaval and even led to violent conflict between the northern regions and Barre’s government-dominated area in the south (Besteman, 1996). Creating strong clan identities and emphasizing the differences between them, has resulted in competition over power and legitimization. Especially in combination with the spread of fear for social, economic and political marginalization, mobilization and militarization became necessary for protection and thus security.

In addition, external actors were important in fuelling tensions and conflict during Barre’s regime and afterwards. Moreover, the shifting of foreign interests and the often contradictory and poorly executed international interventions have harmed collective trust in foreign motivations and actions. Neighbouring countries such as Eritrea and Ethiopia for example attempted to exert and extend their influences in Somalia just as cross-border
clans rivalled for power and territories. With the start of the Cold War, Somalia’s societal structure came under pressure as it had become one of the centre points of focus for proxy wars initiated by the Cold War superpowers. Somalia allied with the Soviet Union (SU) for a reasonable time but during the Ogaden war in 1977-78, the SU switched sides and backed Ethiopia with arms supplies and aid, forcing the United States (US) to take a stand in the matter in order to preserve its strategic position (and the bipolar balance) in the region. The US allied with the Somali government by providing large volumes of economic and military support. Foreign economic and military aid mounted up to an estimated 7.4 billion US Dollars (Menkhaus, 1997). Somali institutions could not cope with the influx of foreign (financial) aid and soon the US and its allies were funding a corruptive, patronage system that heralded the beginning of the deterioration of state institutions.

Another important factor in escalating the conflict that has been repeatedly discussed by various authors has been the deterioration of the (resource) economy (Menkhaus, 2006/07; Samatar, 2007; World Bank 2007). Menkhaus explains how at the end of the Cold War, the interest in Somalia faded away, leaving behind a war torn and divided country, giving free passage for those who sought personal enrichment and power at all costs. The accumulating reports of severe human rights abuses could no longer be ignored by the international community; therefore Western donors froze foreign aid funds flowing into Somalia. As the Somali government relied majorly on external funding, the government was left behind with barely any economic resources. This gave the final blow to the already severely weakened state institutions and societal structures. In 1991 Barre’s government fell and the Central and Southern part degenerated into ‘an economy of plunder’ (Menkhaus, 2006/07, p. 80). Warfare over resources and power devastated the country and deepened its lawlessness and impunity. The war waged by rivalling clans and warlords was simplified by the widespread availability of small arms imported from abroad as leftovers from the Cold War (World Bank, 2005). Moreover, due to the economic and financial crisis, food prices continue to be very high while remittances from the Somali Diaspora have dropped sharply in the past years (Alertnet, 2009). The insecurity of basic living conditions pushes Somali people to extreme and violent acts such as piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Aaden thereby destabilizing the internal and regional stability even more.

The last factor important for the escalation and continuation of the conflict has been the absence or lack of government structures. The collapse of the central state gave free passage for (clan-based) war lords, business men and ideology-based militias to fight out their struggle for control and power (Menkhaus, 2006/07; World Bank, 2005). The shifting alliances of unaccountable leaders and the use of force and violence in stead of political means to establish their goals were typical for the complex relationships between warring parties. The lack of national rule of law or any form of social protection as a consequence of absent national institutions facilitated the use of violence. The spreading violence for example and the manipulation of the food security situation have been important war strategies with as goal to acquire legitimacy and power over communities (Macrea, 1998). Violence combined with unfavourable environmental changes had led to the (forced) displacement of farmers and pastoralists resulting in stagnating food production. The food vulnerability that resulted from this became even more instable there where warlords and their militias looted and plundered remaining (farming) villages. Structural food insecurity also originated from warring parties destroying agricultural production means such as water supplies, cattle and tools to ‘cut off’ food supplies and undermine the ability of people to produce their own food in areas they wished to bring under their spheres of influence’ (Bestemans, 1996, p. 582).

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7 Also in May 1991 the north-western part of Somalia (which corresponds roughly with the former British colony) seceded away from the central government in Mogadishu and declared itself independent as the “the Republic of Somaliland” (Menkhaus, 2006/07). Since then, it has developed into a relatively stable, safe and economically developing region in strong contrast to the central and southern part of Somalia. Despite its declared independence, the Republic of Somaliland has not yet been officially recognised by the international community (Menkhaus, 2006/07; World Bank, 2005).
More than ten years later, it seems that not much has changed with respect to the peace process or the formation of a functional government, its belonging state institutions and a civil society. The latest attempt to establish a functional government is the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) that was formed in 2004 with the backing of the African Union (AU), US and UN in Kenya. First in 2006, the TFG could set foot on Somali soil due to security threats posed to its constituting members (Hanson & Kaplan, 2008). The instalment of an authority that has no apparent legitimacy under the majority of its civilians clearly did not improve the situation in Somalia. Since the arrival of the TFG in Mogadishu, many Somali civilians have again become trapped in a violent battle over political and economic power now in the form of TFG troops fighting clan militias, warlords and Islamic opponents such as Al Shabaab (Menkhaus, 2007).

In response to the quasi statelessness and (political/economic) insecurity, Somali’s have created their own narrow geographic areas of control and stability. Clans for example have installed and managed local Sharia courts as well as local municipalities providing various levels of rule of law and security (Menkhaus, 2006/07; Samatar, 2007; World Bank 2007). This is essential to the understanding of the difficulties that aid agencies are currently experiencing in the humanitarian crisis in Somalia with respect to the secure delivery of food aid. The mutual distrust between clans, the eroded confidence in a national government and the reluctance towards international intermingling makes it very difficult for Somali’s in this violent conflict to support state building activities and thus, peace and reconstruction processes (Barakat, 2005; Samatar, 2007). On the basis of the articles I have read and the interviews I have conducted, it seems that maintaining and controlling the status quo of economic, political and military power divisions is crucial for (warring) parties in Somalia. It does not only preserve personal and/or clan interests but it also provides some forms of stability in the form of safety and rule of law which was not self-evident in Somalia in the past decennia (Menkhaus, 2006/07; World Bank 2007).

1.1.2 Humanitarian aid

In this situation of political deadlock in Somali’s conflict, where the needs of civilians are high, delivering humanitarian aid is difficult. Not only do aid workers find themselves in the midst of warring factions, but they also influence conflict dynamics by delivering food aid. The fact that external forces such as aid influxes influence the internal conflict in one way or another can be perceived as an endangerment of the status quo (Leader, 2000). Warring parties in Somalia pose security threats upon aid personnel and cargo as a tool to uphold control over the situation. Even though humanitarian aid operations in Somalia have been marked over time by similar security dilemmas, the operating context for aid agencies has changed. In the 1990s aid operations were largely influenced by foreign military interventions whereas aid operations today are characterised by the quasi absence of any international interference.

During the 1990s, when violence and societal chaos reached its peak, several United Nations (UN) and US led missions were undertaken to establish a secure environment for humanitarian assistance for those trapped in civil war and famine, and in a later stage to restore peace and stability (UNISOM, 1997 & 2003). Unfortunately, the military intervention rather harmed the humanitarian operations by jeopardizing its notions of impartiality and neutrality. In the 1990’s the cooperation between international military forces and aid agencies blurred the interpretation by Somali’s of the intentions of humanitarians. This was the result of military explanations that justified their interference on the basis of the humanitarian imperative that was partly used to mask the true, conventional, motives of power and security (Leader, 2000). The failed interventions fuelled the conflict and resulted in an urban war in and around Mogadishu that received worldwide media attention after 18 soldiers of the US forces were dragged through the streets of Mogadishu (de Waal, 2003/2004).

More than a decade later, the needs for humanitarian food aid are still high in Somalia. Civilians suffer from land expropriation and/or occupation, looting of all public and private commodities (such as cattle), from harsh
violence (rape, mutilations), severe human rights violations (atrocities), and from the plundering and destruction of cities such as Mogadishu (Bestemans, 1996). The violence and the food insecurity have led to widespread internal population displacement and created an extremely vulnerable population. As a result, Somalia has supposedly become one of the worst humanitarian crises of the world where an estimated 3.2 million people are in need of emergency livelihood and life-saving assistance (AlertNet, 2010; DESA, 2010; OCHA, 2010). From these 3.2 million people that face severe food insecurity, almost all are located in Central and Southern Somalia; 1.25 million people come from rural regions that have been affected by drought, 580,000 people from urban settings who struggle with very high prices of food and non-food items, and 1.39 million people that are classified as internally displaced people (IDPs) fleeing from the violent conflict (WFP, 2010c, p. 4). Unfortunately, Somalia only receives a relative small percentage of overall aid and attention when compared to other complex emergencies like Sudan and Afghanistan (UN CAP, 2010). Large scale aid operations have been designed for Somalia but only partly been implemented due to the security threats posed upon humanitarian operations by various warring parties. It has resulted in shrinking and irregular humanitarian access in the central and southern regions where needs are highest (Abild, 2009). Specific difficulties with which humanitarian agencies have to deal are for example diversion of food aid commodities, demands for security payments and kidnapping of staff (Jaspars, 2000).

Even though needs for aid are high, there are certain standards within humanitarianism along which many humanitarian organizations strive to operate. In fact, most humanitarian organizations operate along the line of four basic humanitarian principles (humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence) once designed by Henry Dunant and thereafter institutionalized into by the ICRC (Pictet, 1979). Leader points out that the humanitarian principles are an agreement between warring parties and humanitarian organizations where the former agrees to respect humanitarian principles and the latter agrees to not interfere in the conflict. The agreement is basically a green card for helping victims from violent battle no matter who they are or what they stand for, in return for no intermingling or interference in the conflict from those who provide aid.

In today’s conflicts though, the practical implementation of these humanitarian principles are more complicated as the conditions, under which the terms of agreement were created, have changed substantially. Humanitarian organizations have to deal with the difficulties of operating in accordance with the humanitarian principles while the environments in which they operate seem not respect these same principles anymore (Leader, 2000). In Somalia, this basically means that humanitarian organizations design operations that are impartial, neutral and independent while warring parties cannot guarantee the secure implementation of these operations even though this is part of the idea behind International Humanitarian Law in which these principles have been incorporated (Stoddard, et al., 2006).

To cope with and respond to these security concerns, humanitarian organizations can basically choose between two extremes; retreat until humanitarian principles can be respected by all involved actors or proceed to reach the most vulnerable people while (partly) neglecting the humanitarian principles (Leader, 2000). Most organizations choose for a middle way and try to find a balance between reaching the most vulnerable people and minimizing the harmful consequences of aid (by respecting the humanitarian principles). The theoretical debate on this so called “principles versus pragmatism” balance is extensive.

For humanitarian organizations such as the WFP and CARE, it means that careful considerations must be made on how to deal with these security dilemmas, especially when humanitarian needs are high.
1.2 Defining the central goal and the research question

I have chosen for WFP and CARE because they have been, and WFP still is, the largest food aid distributors in Central and Southern Somalia. Although both have specialised in the delivery of food aid in complex emergencies, their approaches in the field are quite divergent. Their security strategies, that have been designed to cope with these security issues, are also very different in nature and have distinct outcomes for the delivery of food aid.

This research thus serves one encompassing purpose of adding to the knowledge mapping of how humanitarian organizations deal with security hazards in the field by a) researching the security hazards WFP and CARE experience in food aid distribution logistics in Somalia, by b) analyzing what decisions both organizations make in the very insecure operating environment of Somalia and what influence this has on aid and c) what the decisions made in practice tell us about the theoretical debate of principled versus a pragmatic approach and about the humanitarian system in general. Hence, my research question is:

In how far do WFP and CARE find a balance between principles and pragmatism in responding to security threats to personnel and cargo in food aid distribution operations in Somalia?

During my research, it has become clear to me that there are several themes that are important to elaborate upon in order to answer my research question. Therefore I have developed a couple of sub questions that will help establishing a thorough answer to the research question.

My sub questions are as following:

1. In how far has the changing notion of humanitarianism influenced the strategies taken by humanitarian organizations in complex emergencies?

2. In what way has constructed food insecurity in Somalia influenced the secure delivery of food aid?
   - How did food insecurity develop in Somalia?
   - How is food insecurity related to security threats targeting food aid personnel and cargo?

3. How do WFP and CARE respond to these security risks?
   - What are the most important security hazards that WFP and CARE experience in food aid transportation and distribution logistics within Somalia?
   - What are motivations for warring parties to obstruct or harm food aid operations?
   - What does it mean for aid delivered in the field?

4. What do the findings of this research tell us about balancing principles versus pragmatism and how does this relate to humanitarian aid in general?
1.3 Relevance

Societal
The past few years, reports on growing incidences of security risks for aid personnel and the difficulties in safeguarding aid cargo have accumulated for certain countries among which is Somalia (Stoddard, et al., 2006). In practice this has led to decreasing humanitarian space and thus to lower levels of aid delivered in Central and Southern Somalia while needs have increased (OCHA, 2010). This research aims to explore the difficulties experienced by humanitarian organizations in responding to security risks of food aid personnel and cargo in Somalia. It is important to analyze these difficulties and its context to eventually be able to improve the secure delivery of food aid in Somalia in a way that has the least influences on the violent conflict and thereby contributes to the food security.

I am aware of the fact that this research is only a very small building stone towards the bigger picture on how to deal with the new limits of war while providing effective humanitarian aid. This “bigger picture” is crucial for society in the sense that combining the theoretical debate and the day-to-day realities can lead to modified aid policies that add to more effective, efficient and consistent aid responses in complex emergencies.

Scientific
The literature existing in the field of humanitarian affairs is substantial and interesting but sometimes also a bit confusing due to the complexity of humanitarianism. The literature that is relevant for the topic of this thesis focuses primarily on three issues: 1) on the security threats experienced by aid personnel in the field, 2) on the different security strategies that might improve the safe delivery of humanitarian aid and 3) on the theoretical debate on principles versus pragmatism. In order to understand the differences between security strategies of organizations such as CARE and WFP and the distinct outcomes on the delivery of aid, it is necessary to combine these three issues and analyze their interrelation. Humanitarian organizations design strategies and operations based on the theoretical frameworks of humanitarianism. At the same time though, this theoretical framework and the interpretations of some of its concepts are influenced by their practical, day-to-day context. My research aims to explore this interrelation of practice and theory and look at what it means for aid and humanitarianism in general.

1.4 Methodology

The topic of this thesis is the result of a 5-month internship that I have done at the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. During my stay I was responsible for evaluating proposals, monitoring reports and final assessment reports on humanitarian aid programs of various UN Organizations and NGO's. One of the most important themes for evaluating these reports was how humanitarian principles were put into practice. As I joined the emergency meetings on Sudan after the International Criminal Court (ICC) had issued an arrest warrant for President Omar al-Bashir, I became interested in how humanitarian ethics are very difficult to uphold in crises where security risks for humanitarian organizations are part of the day-to-day experiences. Since then I had various discussions with my colleagues on Somalia that proved to also be a very difficult country for humanitarians to operate. Somalia’s dangerous context for humanitarians today is primarily caused by the lack of functioning government institutions and by the important role the manipulation of food plays in the conflict. The information based on informal discussions, internal documents on Sudan, Somalia and humanitarian principles and the access to various humanitarian networks laid down the basis for my literature research and interviews in a later stage.

The research is a case study on security threats experienced by humanitarian agencies in the violent conflict of Somalia. A case study is the most appropriate form of research for this topic because it will help me to explore...
the contextual settings of insecurity in the food aid sector that includes many interrelated dynamics for which researching the depth is more important than breadth and quantity. Within this case study I will pay closer attention to WFP and CARE in chapter four to illustrate the practicalities with which these organizations have to deal in Somalia with respect to security dilemmas. I chose WFP and CARE because their security strategies in the field are very different. In this way I can compare both cases and explore their differences. Even though it is not possible to make generalizations based upon the research of one case study, the qualitative information that will be gathered during this in-depth investigation will provide the reader of a sharper understanding of the topic of research as well as that it might help to generate further hypotheses for future research.

In order to investigate my research question as thorough as possible, I have made use of different types of information sources. The first information source exists of literature. I have used primary literature and secondary sources in the form of academic books, articles, working papers (primary literature) and newspaper articles, country specific files from governmental sources and topic/geographic maps (secondary sources). On several occasions it was important to incorporate statistics for which I used official databases from UN or UN-related organizations and the World Bank. For the empirical part I have also made extensive use of diverse official websites such as the website of the UN, CARE, WFP, Reliefweb, Alertnet and IRIN.

Secondly, I have made use of interviews as an information source. Although interviews with WFP and CARE personnel in Somalia/Kenya were essential to explore the difficulties experienced in the field and the coping mechanisms they have developed, the willingness to participate was limited. I addressed several persons who did respond but made clear that they could not help me further due to the sensitivity of the topic. Therefore this thesis has a serious shortage of empirical data which has resulted in the fact that the majority of the research is based upon primary and secondary literature. Despite the difficulties with finding interviewees prepared to discuss the topic of my thesis, I have conducted five useful interviews that gave me more insights and in some cases confirmed my observations and conclusions. I chose these persons primarily because of their function and/or expertise on this topic. The interviews were all semi-structured and focused on the topics of expertise of the interviewees:

- The first interview was face-to-face with Ewout van Galen from OXFAM Netherlands who is specialized on humanitarian aid in Somalia. It was an explorative and unofficial interview mainly to widen my understanding on humanitarian action in Somalia.
- The second interview also took place face-to-face with Arthur Molenaar, a specialist on Somalia, from CARE Netherlands. This interview had a similar purpose as my first interview and introduced me to CARE’s relation with Somalia.
- The third interview was conducted via Skype with David Gilmour, CARE’s Country Director for Somalia and South Sudan, who is stationed in Nairobi, Kenya. In the interview we discussed issues related to the role of humanitarian ethics in their security strategies, the limitations of providing aid in dangerous environments and topics related to the motivations of warring parties for obstructing food aid operations.
- The fourth interview took place via Skype chat due to technical issues with Skype phoning. It was conducted with CARE’s Safety & Security Advisor for Somalia and South Sudan and focused more on the security strategies CARE has implemented in the time they were still present in Southern and Central Somalia.
- The fifth interview took place in first instance via Gmail chat. However, electricity broke down in Nairobi and we had to continue our conversation via email in the days after. I discussed various issues with CARE Somalia’s advocacy adviser. The conversation we had focused on CARE’s former activities in Somalia and the threats it has experienced in the 1990s. She also provided me from visual materials and various literature suggestions.

There are several biases and limitations intrinsic to Master theses in general of which my thesis is not an exception. Due to time constraints and to the fact that there was no possibility to do field research, argumentations are first and foremost based upon academic articles and books. Although several interviews
have been conducted, these cannot be used to establish a statistically relevant claim. Due to the fact that I have interviewed four persons from CARE will influence my research. Secondly, theses focus on just a minor part of a maybe larger problem resulting in the partial analyses that cannot account deeper-lying structures and problems. A third limitation specifically for my thesis was the type of literature available. Much literature focused on principles versus pragmatism debates, methods to improve good humanitarianism and on security risks faced by humanitarian personnel. Less or actually almost no information was available (to the public at least) on aid diversions, looting and taxations which brings me to the last relevant limitation of this thesis namely the sensitivity of my topic. Due to the sensitivity of my research, various documents and information sources I tried to access were not open to the public. Therefore there might have been left out interesting observations, conclusions or misunderstanding that exist but that are not published. The biases must be acknowledged and taken serious.

1.5 Outline of the thesis

The chapters of this thesis largely follow the sub questions as identified above. The following chapter will explore humanitarianism by analysing the concepts and root causes that have shaped and developed the complex humanitarian system as we know it today. It shows first of all how humanitarianism has often been a tool for social containment rather than one of altruistic motivations. Secondly, it will demonstrate that the way how humanitarian agencies operate in complex emergencies as well as the way in which humanitarian organizations analyze difficulties, such as security risks, depends on the ‘Zeitgeist’ by which the humanitarian system is influenced and interpreted.

Chapter three addresses the relationship between a vulnerable food security situation and the role of food aid in Somalia’s war. It will also look at the relation between food aid as a factor in the conflict and the increasing number of security threats and attacks on aid personnel and cargo experience by WFP and CARE. Furthermore this chapter will attempt to analyze the different security threats within food aid distribution logistics and the reasons of why they occur. It will demonstrate that security threats are well considerably posed upon aid organizations and that motivations go beyond those commonly suggested short term economic gains.

Chapter four will focus on combining the theoretical structures with the day-to-day experiences of humanitarian agencies that will be illustrated by the cases of WFP and CARE. It will also discuss what differences there are between both, what that implies for the effective delivery of food aid in Somalia and what it means for the humanitarian system as such.

In chapter five I will present the main conclusions of this thesis and end with some final thoughts on my research in which I will offer several recommendations for further research.
Several developments have shaped the humanitarian system rigorously in the last century. Due to the fact that the humanitarian system as we know it now is a relatively young, still developing phenomenon, its changing dynamics have had many consequences for the people to whom humanitarian aid is lifesaving. To be able to understand today’s difficulties concerning humanitarian aid and those related to food aid in Somalia specifically, it is important to first grasp how the humanitarian system has developed.

In this chapter I will describe the historic events and dynamics that were imperative for the changing shape of the humanitarian system. Crucial in this were: the changing influence of spirituality/religion, economic and social developments, and events of war and underdevelopment (Barnett & Weiss, 2008). I will briefly mention how they have influenced the purpose and scope of humanitarianism and highlight the related difficulties. The chapter will end with a short description that positions today’s security threats in perspective.

2.1 Shaping contemporary humanitarianism

There is no one clear timeline of the historical accounts that have shaped the contemporary humanitarian system. Even the meaning of the word/concept itself has been subject to change over time. Nevertheless, it is possible to distinguish important events or influences that have affected humanitarianism. There are two important observations that can be drawn from humanitarian history; firstly, the humanitarian system is influenced by the political context of its times. Secondly, the purpose of humanitarianism within society has changed over time and did not sprung from purely altruistic motivations. Until the end of the Cold War it has been served first and foremost as a tool of social containment. Thereafter, altruistic and development motivations became the primary reasons for expanding and developing the humanitarian system.

2.1.1 Historical origins of the humanitarian principles

Spirituality / Religion
The first serious preconditions for today’s humanitarianism were set through evolving religious influences (Walker & Maxwell, 2009). Christianity teaches certain doctrines such as sanctity of human life and that of universal brotherhood, which, in the early stage of Christianity, dictated to uphold humanitarian values (the Church as provider for the needy) only to those who were considered Christian. With the evolution of
Christianity, humanitarian values developed within the social context and became widespread. For over a thousand years the Catholic Church organized large scale charity in Europe until faith in its charitable intentions faded away. In that time, charity was the typical business of the ruling elite. The Protestant Reformation however gave rise to a more structural meaning of charity by linking it to a new social order. In this new order every person became responsible for ensuring the well being of its fellow people for example by means of charitable acts (Walker & Maxwell, 2009). This concept, introduced by Protestantism, laid down the essential fundaments that are the basis of existence for many of today’s NGO’s.

Also Islam has been and still is important for the development of the contemporary humanitarian system (Abuarqub & Phillips, 2009). Acts of humanitarianism are essential elements within Islam to ensure basic living standards for all its citizens. Islamic charitable acts can be categorised as either obligatory or voluntarily (Walker & Maxwell, 2009; Abuarqub & Phillips, 2009). Kraffes explains that the former is institutionalised in the Islam as the third pillar Zakat (giving of alms) of five pillars along which a good Muslim lives his or her life 1. Zakat encompasses a self imposed, regular tax on income were distributed to the poor and needy, to orphans, to refugees, to debtors and also to students and travellers. The voluntary acts of humanitarianism are known as sadaqah where Muslims can contribute any amount at any time 2. The basic assumption that underlies the concepts of zakat and sadaqah is that the Islam ‘has established a system allowing sins to be erased by performing humanitarian acts’ (Kraffes, 2005, p.329). Acts of humanitarianism are undertaken to, among others, obtain approval and satisfaction from God which is repeatedly stated in the various Quranic texts (Kraffes, 2005; Abuarqub & Phillips, 2009).

On the basis of historic accounts it seems that charitable or humanitarian acts have been seldom altruistic in nature. They have been rather used as means to an end, namely maintaining or enhancing (personal) legitimacy or establishing personal (divine) wellbeing. Thus, spirituality/religion gave rise to the important values underlying the concept of humanitarianism and, in a later stage, to the spread and institutionalization of humanitarianism in society.

The rise of global economics and politics
It was not before the nineteenth century that humanitarianism developed in a way that resembles today’s humanitarian system. The global economic and political structure changed profoundly due to the onset of globalization and it led to disturbances in society (Rietbergen, 2005). In order to contain social unrest, government-related institutions developed humanitarian structures that helped restructuring society and downplay public grievances (Walker, 2008).

Rietbergen describes how the process of early globalization started to advance in the beginning of the eighteenth century. Strong economic developments supervised by a very conservative, small governing elite, led to large social divisions and eventually in social upheaval. It became unavoidable to enhance these economic developments without calling for adequate societal changes in order to avoid popular revolt. The French Revolution in 1789 functioned as a catalyst for (social-cultural) modernization and was followed by a second, somewhat different type of, revolution, namely the Industrial Revolution (1780-1830). These economic, political and social changes stirred up society in the 19th century and asked for adequate social responses (Barnett & Weiss, 2008). Humanitarianism in the wider sense of its meaning was closely related to social reform at

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1 The five pillars of Islam are comprised of Shahadah (profession of faith), Salat (prayers), Zakat (giving of alms), Sawm (fasting) and Hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca) and are all equally important (Walker & Maxwell, 2009).

2 A well known form of sadaqah is waqf. The concept of waqf actually already existed in pre-Islamic times and is ‘equivalent to a charitable foundation that funds purchases of land and buildings for charitable purposes’ such as hospitals, orphanages, cemeteries, bridges, irrigation systems and other public services (Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2009).
a national level that sought ways to respond to these numerous societal changes. It also sought ways to institutionalize these social reforms in society and at an international level (Callhoun, 2008). In accordance to the observation made in relation to early forms of humanitarian acts, humanitarianism in the 18th and 19th century also resulted primarily from an agenda of containment in terms of avoiding social unrest as ‘relief works not only sought to put the laboring poor back to work, but were seen as opportunities to encourage discipline and obedience to authority within the confines of the controlled relief camps’ (Walker, 2008, p. 2). A couple of years later, 1845-49, the last great western European famine spread over Ireland. The already politically marginalized catholic Irish were hit hard when their only crop they could grow (potatoes) was infected by a fungus. The population first had to experience extreme mass starvation before the British government eventually decided to intervene in order to prevent Irish rebellion (Walker, 2008, p. 2). A typical case where an act of containment was covered by moral considerations.

While social containment remained to be the primary purpose for humanitarian aid, the humanitarian structure and scope changed profoundly as a consequence of multiple wars raging through [parts of] Europe.

2.1.2 Henry Dunant: the founder of humanitarian principles

Walker and Maxwell highlight how the town of Solferino, Italy, was the stage for a ferocious battle between the French and Austrian armies in 1859 that left an estimated 40,000 soldiers behind without any medical care. A Swiss witness of the battle, Jean Henri Dunant, was shocked and collected an army of Italian women (who were, like him, neutral in the conflict with respect to national background) to volunteer in taking care of the wounded. His response to the humanitarian crisis is remarkable because of the neutral position he took in the battle, the impartial way in which the wounded were taken care as well as the way in which he negotiated humanitarian access and lastly because of the voluntary character with which Dunant organized the large aid operation. Dunant took a leading position in the formation of official aid structures and humanitarian laws. It took several years before his experiences had turned into the emergence of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the creation of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), in which military behavior in times of war is codified, and from this, the formation of the basic humanitarian principles for good humanitarian practices (Walker & Maxwell, 2009).

These humanitarian principles are an agreement between warring parties and humanitarian organizations where the former agrees to respect humanitarian principles and the latter agrees to not interfere in the conflict (Leader, 2000, p.12). The principle of humanity has been founded ‘to prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found’ (IFRC, 2009). For this principle to work, in a world with finite resources and conflicting agenda’s, the principle of impartiality was formulated. The principle of impartiality encapsulated two concepts: 1) suffering is addressed without discrimination (nationality, race, religion, class, political opinions) and 2) priority is given to the most urgent cases of need (based on severity and urgency) as resources are finite (Walker & Maxwell, 2009). To comply with both principles, two operational principles have evolved: neutrality and independence. The principle of neutrality states that humanitarians should be motivated only by desire to alleviate suffering in order to maximize humanitarian access. The principle of independence underlines the importance for humanitarian organizations to make independent decisions, free from undue coercion, basically meaning that humanitarians should dissociate themselves from for example political agendas (Walker & Maxwell, 2009).

The core idea behind these principles was basically that war has limits (as has been outlined by International Humanitarian Law). Determining these limits though is highly political and thus reflects the politics of its time (Leader, 2000). The principles have been crucial to the evolution of humanitarianism and are key to the existence of today’s humanitarian agencies and their operations. They have also been however, subject of many debates as will become clear in the remainder of this chapter.
2.1.3 The 20th century: turbulent times marked by warfare

Both World Wars at the beginning of the century and the Cold War called for drastic changes in the international political and military structure that would focus on mutual understanding and cooperation rather than on warfare. Humanitarianism changed during this period from being designed and used by governments to a relative independent system that started to evolve at the end of the Cold War.

A devastating World War I heralded the 20th century (Taubenberger & Morens, 2006). Europe suffered tremendously and displayed mass starvation and mass migration with only several decades to recover before an even more horrendous war took place, World War II. The grandness of human suffering in combination with a devastated economic and political system in Europe and elsewhere, asked in the first place for large scale aid distributions to Europe. The delivery of aid was used to stabilize peace and ensure economic revival to balance out new sources for future wars. Soon, the formation of innovative and strong security politics and the institutionalisation of protection rules for civilians were essential in order to avoid future human suffering on such large scale. Hence, the creation of the United Nations (UN) that was founded in 1945 after the Second World War by ‘51 countries committed to maintaining international peace and security, developing friendly relations among nations and promoting social progress, better living standards and human rights’ (United Nations, 2010). With the end of the Second World War, the Cold War commenced. The power politics during the Cold War between the United States (US) and the former Soviet Union (SU) had great consequences on international politics and especially on international security. Even though proxy wars, orchestrated by the US and the former SU, devastated entire political and economic structures in countries such as Afghanistan and Somalia, the United Nations and many (I)NGO’s also operated along these political lines of the Cold War (Fleshman, 2006). Humanitarian aid in geopolitical interesting areas was used by both superpowers to build and reward alliances as well as to punish opponents. As state sovereignty was a primary condition for international politics during that time, the United Nations and many (I)NGO’s were dependent on involved governments to operate (Shearer, 2001). In those regions that were of less interest due to their relative geopolitical unimportance in Cold War dynamics, humanitarian needs were not or not sufficiently addressed.

Obviously the political (ab)use of humanitarian action during the Cold War seriously damaged humanitarianism and its work as it stood far from the independence and neutral principles it had conformed to (Duffield, 2000). Humanitarian action had again been first and foremost a political tool for stabilization. In some cases one might even say it has been used as a war tool. The structure of humanitarianism at the end of the Cold War was developing away from strong governmental control into a structure in which humanitarian agencies were more organized and independent (Chandler, 2001).

2.2 Humanitarian aid towards the 21st century

Due to decolonization and the speeding of globalization processes in the last decades of the twentieth century, profound changes have taken place in the dynamics of war that called for new international peace and security responses (Duffield, 2000). The consequences for humanitarianism in the struggle of dealing with the “new” wars are primarily defined by the growth in scope and number of the humanitarian system and its changed purpose from social containment to development in combination with altruistic concerns.

2.2.1 Post-Cold War dynamics

With the end of the Cold War, the disintegration of totalitarian empires became reality. The downfall of the bipolar power system between the Soviet Union and the US left many countries war torn and without any
reconstruction and reconciliation schemes behind. Several of their former allies had lost their strategic military and political importance and were now left behind in chaos without the standards of aid, support and governance that they had received and experienced during the Cold War (Leader, 2000). At the same time, the strive for independence from foreign occupation led to decolonization in Africa and Asia, leaving behind exploited countries with lacking political and economic governing structures and often accompanied with strong institutionalised ethnic inequalities (van der Haar, 2008). The only option for many of these countries to recover from the economic malaise and to participate in the world economy was under the neo liberal conditions, set by international financial institutions. This meant, among others, that they had to cut state welfare bureaucracies and thus, that they could not invest in social support structures that, in times where poverty, unemployment and lack of governance peaked, was reason for civil strife over resources (Trist, 2007).

Leader describes how this governance vacuum was rapidly filled by a large number of aid agencies. Ever since, an uncontrolled proliferation of a variety of (I)NGO’s has been taking place. Slowly the notion of state sovereignty became less strict and aid agencies experienced great freedom to operate. In some former client states they were even expected to include government services in addition to providing aid. This gave humanitarian organizations two new tasks: as de facto political actors and as substitute providers of state welfare. Especially because developed countries were reluctant to commit themselves to complex political and diplomatic methods to help establish decent development structures in the post-Cold War countries and rather (ab)used aid instead (Leader, 2000).

These direct post-Cold War happenings had not only created very vulnerable, underdeveloped states that became flooded with uncoordinated aid initiatives, but it also heralded a new era in warfare where internal violent conflict became prevalent as opposed to state-to-state wars. The way in which the changing dynamics of conflict were interpreted and reacted upon by the international community was very important for the shape of today’s humanitarian structure because of two factors: firstly, no government or organization knew how to respond to the new war strategies used in these conflicts. Secondly, the international community had eventually put forward development as a solution to regional instability in the place of conventional diplomatic or military solutions (Chandler, 2001).

The changing nature of violent conflict

Whereas nation state armies controlled warfare until the end of the Cold War, the post-Cold War era was marked by violent conflicts with an increasingly complex framework of warring parties, national government (forces) and multinational military forces. The intrinsic features of violent conflicts of the 1990s and thereafter, are not compatible with the rules of war as determined in the International Humanitarian Law which serves as basis to the humanitarian principles. Based on this, it implies that the humanitarian system seems to be situated in an agreement that is not automatically supported anymore by all sides (Leader, 2000). There are several features of the contemporary form of violent conflict relevant for this thesis.

In the first place, violent conflicts are often marked by the (partial) absence of a transparent, functioning government that is capable of serving and protecting its civilians (Kaldor, 2001; Samatar, 2007; Shearer, 2000). The conflict is in stead partly ruled by warring parties that only show minor accountability to their citizens in contrast to governments who still need to be accountable to both their soldiers and their citizens (Leader, 2000). These conflicts have become unpredictable as they are commonly perceived as abnormal, perverse events that take place when development has failed, the state economy has declined and mass unemployment prevails under (“angry”) young men cohorts (Cramer, 2006). The distinction then between combatants, non-combatants, criminals, police, mercenaries and regular, state soldiers becomes very difficult as societal structures are breaking down all parties involved have different motives, goals and strategies so that conflict analysis becomes very difficult (Kaldor, 2001).
The lack of civil protection makes civilians prone to mass manipulation which is the second feature of contemporary violent conflicts (Kaldor, 2001). Warring parties increase legitimacy or at least recognition for their (local) power through exercising political and physical control over civilians either by capturing the hearts and minds of the people or by sowing fear and hatred (Kaldor, 2001). One of the common methods is ‘expulsion of populations’ through various means such as mass killing, forcible resettlement as well as a range of political, psychological and economic techniques of intimidation’ (Kaldor, 2001, p. 8).

Finally, in addition to the already blurred lines internally, external factors often intermingle into the conflict obscuring the true causes and conflict’s dynamics thereby “upgrading” potential national conflicts into regional or international ones due to spillover effects (Menkhaus, 2006/07). Besides direct involvement of external parties, involvement can also come in the form of financial resources flowing into a conflict. In these conflicts for example, warring parties are highly dependent on external resources such as revenues from the black market through large scale illegal trade of weapons and valuable commodities such as gems, oil and drugs, by posing taxations on for example humanitarian aid flows and through large flows of remittances (Shearer, 2000).

Humanitarian responses to the new character of violent conflict

Both international governments and humanitarian organizations were struggling with how to respond to these new dynamics of conflict. In the period after the end of the Cold War, humanitarian organizations acted independent from much international political interference. The humanitarian system focused on the countries that were left behind by the former superpowers and enjoyed great freedom in their operations especially now the importance of state sovereignty had decreased. This did not mean however that no military foreign intervention took place, on the contrary. Military interventions by either single states or in joint state formations did take place in countries that were either economically or politically relevant or because of public pressure (Duffield, 2000). The latter became an important factor to foreign politics as expanded media coverage of human sufferings, also known as the CNN-effect, exposed gross and severe human rights violations in order to increase public pressure for political attention (Barnett & Weiss, 2008).

In the early 1990s large scale multinational military interventions / peace enforcement operations under the flag of the United Nations or NATO were undertaken regularly but too often failed in dealing with violent conflicts. These multi-national interventions seemed to be inadequately prepared and educated for situations in which civilians became the deliberate target as part of the war strategy, human rights violations took place on large scale and where battles were marked by a diffuse structure of opponents without a functioning government. After serious defeats such as in Somalia in 1993 and in Kosovo in 1999, the international community became reluctant to intervene and stop violent conflicts (Barnett & Snyder, 2008).

One important aspect of military interventions with respect to the humanitarian system in the 1990s was the wide use of the concept ‘humanitarian’. Although military intervention used the humanitarian imperative to justify their interference, it has often been (ab)used to mask the true, conventional, motives of power and security (Leader, 2000). Many humanitarians therefore felt that the blurred language use of ‘humanitarian’ endangered the way humanitarian organizations were perceived in conflict areas. The reason behind this was that it was not obvious enough in how far state intervention (non-neutral and often non-impartial) was related to humanitarian action (that clearly depends on their independent and neutral principles for humanitarian access). In 1992 for example the US in cooperation with the UN announced its plans to intervene in the Somali conflict with a multinational force with as primary goal to safeguard humanitarian aid logistics (Menkhaus, 2006/07). Even though there were considerations against humanitarian, military intervention, humanitarian needs were perceived to be so high, that it deemed necessary to intervene. The United Nations Security Council Resolution 794 includes two paragraphs important to the core of the mandate of the intervening forces in Somalia:
2. Demands that all parties, movements and factions in Somalia take all measures necessary to facilitate the efforts of the United Nations, its specialized agencies and humanitarian organizations to provide urgent humanitarian assistance to the affected population in Somalia:

3. Also demands that all parties, movements and factions in Somalia take all measures necessary to ensure the safety of United Nations and all other personnel engaged in the delivery of humanitarian assistance, including the military forces to be established pursuant to the authorization given in paragraph 10 below:

Source: UNSC Resolution S/RES/794 (1992)

This quote in first instance demands humanitarian access for the effective delivery of humanitarian aid. In the second part of the quote though, it equalizes the UN military forces with humanitarian agencies by stating that both should be respected and safeguarded to guarantee the common goal of providing aid. In this way, it can be interpreted that the military and humanitarians are on the same side, and thus that humanitarians violate the notion of neutrality. Furthermore these quotes show how humanitarian access is not the result of a negotiation or a shared decision but is forced upon Somali’s various actors/parties.

Supporting and publishing a mandate such as mentioned in the UNSC Resolution 794 has damaged the neutral position of humanitarian organizations in Somalia as well as its public image of neutrality and independency in general which on its turn may have many consequences for further operations in the field. Providing aid to civilians for example may be perceived as a political rather than a humanitarian act and thus be perceived as a threat to the existence of a warring party or the power status quo. Warring parties may answer on their turn by posing threats/actual violence to humanitarian workers thereby limiting humanitarian access.

With the drop in military intervention and the rising awareness of the difficulties related to a public connection between the military and the humanitarian system, humanitarian organizations acknowledged the importance of their humanitarian principles despite the difficult implementation of these principles in practice. This becomes clear in the ethical debates that started to take place with the genocides and mass atrocities of the 1990s (Walker & Maxwell, 2009). The genocides of the 1990s offered a very difficult dilemma for humanitarian organizations; can one keep its neutrality and impartiality in violent conflicts in which large groups of the population are victim of genocide? Can impartiality, in conflicts where gross human rights violations take place, mean targeting a specific, weak group where aid is provided impartially to its constituting individuals? Or should one provide aid based to whomever it needs even if this means delivering food aid to genocidaires? Should humanitarians speak up and thereby breaking away from the notion of neutrality?

Humanitarians were forced to reconsider the concept of humanitarianism and had to re-evaluate the humanitarian political, power and ethical system in a profound way just as the international community had to adjust its international peace and security strategies (Barnett & Weiss, 2008).

International security and humanitarian aid
The common paradigm on the origins of civil war/violent conflicts considers poverty and underdevelopment as the primary causes of many violent conflicts and thus believes that development is an important condition for international security. This is named as the development-security complex (Duffield, 2000). The paradigm has changed the role and purpose of humanitarianism in the sense that it has increasingly become a tool in foreign politics thereby replacing diplomatic, political or military methods (Duffield, 2000; Shearer, 2000).

Geopolitical changes have led to a divided world of developed, semi-developed and underdeveloped regions where ‘underdevelopment is considered a threat to international security because it can fuel drug [or other illegal commodities] trafficking, the spread of terrorism and increased refugee flows’ (Curtis, 2001, p.5). In combination
with internal factors such as greed, grievances, socially constructed ethnic hatred, any form of marginalization, lacking governance (and failing institutions) and political deadlock, underdevelopment can increase tensions over resources and power (van der Haar, 2008). Conventional intervention strategies seem not to be adequate enough to cope with the complex emergencies’ problems and its repeated failures have made it difficult for politicians to continue raising financial and political will for intervention. The focus of intervention therefore, shifted from conventional methods to new strategies that attack the root causes of contemporary conflict, namely underdevelopment (Leader, 2000). Duffield and Chandler indeed suggest that the new international security agenda focuses on development as a tool for peace and stability (Duffield, 2000; Chandler, 2001). The strong continuum between humanitarian action, early recovery and long term development aid makes it difficult for politicians and aid workers to address factors of underdevelopment. Some emergency phases for example last for years, which means in practice that some humanitarian operations almost resemble early recovery or development programs. This makes humanitarian aid an important factor in the development-security complex.

As a consequence, a growing pressure arose to improve humanitarian aid in a way that it would support the wider international peace and security philosophy of sustainable development, or at least would not undermine development. Even, if this is not always in line with the humanitarian imperative (Duffield, 2000; Curtis, 2001). Aid for example was increasingly blamed for only dealing with symptoms, rather than with the underlying causes. It has also been accused of undermining long-term development due to dependency on foreign aid, suppressing local initiative and distorting local markets. The fact that long-term development can be disturbed by humanitarianism might have consequences for long term reconstruction and thus, stability in a post-conflict state (Duffield, 2000; Shearer, 2000).

A second important consequence, noted by Stein, from the emerging development-security complex is that donor governments are strongly involved in aid matters. Donor government’s involvement is related to political decisions but most and for all related to funding issues. “Northern” states used to be involved in for example bilateral funding mechanisms but with the withdrawal of states from “service deliverance”, bilateral funding or other forms of assistance in relation to complex emergencies have been minimized and are now almost exclusively channelled through humanitarian organizations meaning that states have became donors (Stein, 2008). Humanitarian organizations therefore have become more dependent on donor governments for their programs and operations.

In the contemporary political setting where humanitarianism has become important for facilitating development initiatives, the strengthened involvement of politicians in aid matters have offered multiple problems in providing effective, good and principled humanitarian aid. These problems are related to the fact that humanitarian organizations have to find a way in coping with both their increased dependency on donor governments and the fact that their operating environments have become hostile to humanitarians. Before I will elaborate on the latter, I will highlight two difficulties that are related to the former.

One of the most important difficulties that humanitarians have to deal with in this new setting is related to accountability. Although humanitarians should in principle be accountable to those whom they serve, accountability to those who finance the organizations and their operations is in practice ranked more important (King, 2005). Being preoccupied with accountability matters means monitoring, reporting, evaluating and presenting back results from the processes and outcomes of aid operations to the nationally headquartered humanitarian aid organizations (often located in Western countries) as well as to their donor governments directly (Hammond, 2008). The different standards of monitoring and reporting, the lack of coordination schemes and the lack of financial and physical means within aid organizations have created a form of accountability that actually offers few insights. It therefore seldom offers ‘an opportunity to learn (and experiment) and to widen the conversation about politics, power and ethics that define humanitarian space’ (Stein, 2008, p.142).
The second difficulty is about the humanitarian system as such. Due to the important position that humanitarianism has been given in international politics, the number of humanitarian agencies has rapidly proliferated. The lack of overarching supervision and coordination mechanisms has therefore led to thwarted responses to exacerbating humanitarian situations. Barnett and Schneider point out that ‘the recognition that states, international organizations and NGO’s need to coordinate their strategies in order to avoid working at cross purposes, undermining each other’s actions, creating inefficiencies, and having inferior outcomes’ has led to the overall urge by all actors involved for coordination, coherence and integration (Barnett & Schnyder, 2008, p.170).

These two difficulties, among others, have led to the development of several initiatives such as standards and codes of conduct with as goal to improve the performance of humanitarian agencies. Two of these initiatives have been accepted by a large number of humanitarian organizations and are now commonly used: the Code of Conduct and the SPHERE standards (Walker & Maxwell, 2009). Both initiatives are the result of extensive research, experience and cooperation of many large humanitarian agencies and specialists. The Code of Conduct seeks to guard standards of behavior by humanitarian agencies and their staff. It also seeks to improve performance while minimizing the harming effects of aid on affected communities. The SPHERE Standards can be seen as a next step in improving performance as it has formulated more specifically a set of universal minimum standards for quality and quantity of aid (The Sphere Project, 2004). It is based on both the original humanitarian principles and the Code of Conduct. With these standards, humanitarian organizations strive to be working along the principles of humanity, impartiality, independence and neutrality as good as possible and with a better defined set of standards on how to operate and thus with improved aid outcomes.

So far, it has become clear that the consequences of the changed nature of conflict have had many implications for international peace and security strategies. Now humanitarianism has become part of the development-security complex philosophy, the humanitarian system has adjusted its practices and operating standards to the new situation while upholding the humanitarian principles and values as best as possible. These sets of standards are necessary to streamline the variety among humanitarian operations in the field with as goal to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of aid operations. There are still many difficulties in the field however that limit the delivery of humanitarian aid. One of these problems is the security risks for aid personnel and for aid cargo with which humanitarian organizations have to deal especially within the food aid sector (Stoddard, Harmer & Haver, 2006).

2.2.2 Today’s security risks in humanitarian aid

Unfortunately it is part of the day-to-day realities for many humanitarian organizations that aid personnel are subject to abductions, deliberate injuries, kidnapping, threats and intimidation and even assassinations/homicide (LeBillon, 2000). Safety of aid supplies cargo is another important issue at stake for humanitarians in complex emergencies. Food aid transportation logistics is vulnerable to, among others, piracy and armed robbery at sea (which at the moment takes place regularly in the Gulf of Aden close to Somalia), diversion and looting of supplies, and “fraud” in the form of protection money and taxation of supplies on the route (LeBillon, 2000).

International Humanitarian Law (IHL) implies that both warring parties and the humanitarian organizations respect certain rules to ensure safe delivery of aid to local civilians. For humanitarians this means in practice that they serve the humanity imperative while ensuring impartiality in the sense that it, among others, sees to objective assessments of needs and includes the social and political vulnerable people in targeted communities. They also have to ensure their neutrality by working with accountable parties without taking sides and ensure independent supervision, regular and accurate monitoring and reporting (Jaspars, 2000, p. 31). For warring parties this would mean to let humanitarians do their job in return for attempting to not become involved in the conflict.
However, in today’s violent conflicts the notion of “rules of engagement” is under severe stress. Humanitarian organizations cannot fulfil their commitments to a purely principled approach and warring parties seem to lack respect for these “rules of engagement” in the sense that safety of personnel and cargo cannot be guaranteed anymore (Leader, 2000). Hence, the environment in which aid organizations can operate according to the humanitarian principles (humanitarian space), has deteriorated due to severe safety concerns.

In practice this means that cargo does not reach the intended beneficiaries, only partial or it can end up with those people who actually might have a lesser need for aid than others. It also means that humanitarian organizations have to either secure their operation in one way or another, or that they are forced to suspend their activities or retreat (Leader & Macrea, 2000). The prominent question that arises from this situation is: how can humanitarian organizations operate along humanitarian principles in an environment where belligerents appear to have rejected the very notion that war has limits and have become spoilers to effective humanitarian aid? As has been outlined in the above subchapters, solutions have come in the form of new, more specified principles, Codes of Conduct, accountability and performance evaluations, but also in the form of cooperation. Cooperation between humanitarian agencies and private security firms or the military, or increasingly with local personnel are just a few examples (Jaspars, 2008).

This is a crucial observation because it means that there is a strong belief in improving the effectiveness of humanitarian aid by strengthening a principled approach for their operations (Leader, 2000). It also implies that strengthening a principled approach is based upon narrowing down the variety of interpretations on how the humanitarian principles have to be implemented in their programs and operations.

The fact that humanitarian aid has become part of the development-security complex strategy has changed its purpose, scope and organizational operating structure as described above. There are, however, new interpretations on the origins of conflict that offer a different explanation for conflict and also highlight factors behind security risks that remain unaddressed as long as international politics hold on to the development-security complex paradigm.

2.2.3 A new perspective on conflict

Leader touches upon a new perspective in his article that ‘promotes an understanding of conflict that sees it (conflict) not as temporary deviation from an inevitable path, or as irrational barbarism, but as the result of adaptation by rulers in the South to the process of globalization and post-Cold War diplomatic and security adjustments’ (Leader, 2000, p. 12). Whereas the common paradigm mostly focuses on conflict in terms of underdevelopment, the new perspective of conflict recognizes the importance of including a political dimension to the nature of conflict.

The world population as a total is expected to grow with 2.6 billion people according to the United Nations, levelling off around 9.1 billion people in the world by 2050 (UN, 2005, p. 1). This is an enormous capacity challenge on the global political and economic structures that exist. Greig, Hulme and Turner argue that economic and financial developments for example have led to dramatic improvement for many nations. National boundaries have become more flexible, trans-national companies own the largest industries and technological innovations are large in number and quality. Production flourished and trade has boomed to all corners of the world. Nevertheless, despite the enormous economic improvements, long term problems arose within the changing global structures that caused increasing poverty, inequality and environmental degradation. The rise of very powerful economic actors, such as trans-national corporations, has changed the balance of power within the international system. States rely increasingly on the support of the economic enterprise’s lobby so that politics and economics are more interdependent than ever before. It is striking how poverty has increased in many parts...
of the world despite the growing world economy and aid industries. Inequality showed similar trends. Inequality between developed and developing countries has not really improved which is contrary to what the neo liberal assumptions of capitalism suggest. It might have even deepened the problem because it has made both poverty and inequality a structural condition that blocks many forms of development in third world countries (Greig, et al., 2007).

The core idea of this new perspective suggests that the new patterns of international trade, economics and politics seem to exclude the (newly independent) “Southern” countries (Leader, 2000). This exclusion leads to structural inequality between the “North” and the “South”. In combination with an ever growing population especially in the “South” and weak governmental institutions, this leads to struggle over access to resources that can escalate into violent conflicts (Homer-Dixon & Blitt, 1998). The new perspective also implicates that means that war can be seen as a continuation of economics and politics by other means to adapt to the global system in which Southern states indeed have a structural, much lower status in trade, economics, and (security) politics (Leader, 2002). Leader notes for example that the international grey market can be seen as a basic survival strategy to the structural inequality. If this is indeed correct, humanitarian operations can be interpreted as a threat to these survival strategies by a) interfering in regional, national and local economic and political power balances b) by undermining the respect and power of community leaders and c) by displaying the illegality of local trade structures.

In this perspective, controlling war dynamics is important for survival or at least for some form of stability. This is an important observation because if warring parties interpret humanitarian aid as potential threat to their economic and political status quo, targeting humanitarian aid and cargo then becomes understandable. This implies that the difficulties humanitarians experienced with respect to security of personnel and cargo are, at least, partly caused by factors that go beyond underdevelopment matters. The fact that humanitarian security strategies are primarily based on principled approaches with as goal to improve humanitarian access may therefore not be adequate enough to deal with this situation. In today’s conflict of Somalia, warring parties have other interests than only non-interference by humanitarian agencies.

2.3 Recapitulation

The first core objective of this chapter was to demonstrate that the purpose that humanitarianism serves and the way in which the humanitarian system is shaped depends on the “Zeitgeist” of its time. The fact that it is a social construct signifies that there are no rigid frameworks and concepts that can only be interpreted in one way but that it is flexible within its contextual limits. This has been illuminated by various historic events that reflected important changes within the humanitarian system. The second core objective of this chapter was to show, that despite the fact that humanitarianism seems to be based on altruistic concerns and is accordingly conceptualized and institutionalized, it has primarily served political goals. Its purpose changed over time from being first and foremost a tool for social containment towards a tool for development. The third core objective of this chapter was to demonstrate how the changing dynamics of conflict have had important consequences for humanitarianism and the conditions under which humanitarian agencies nowadays have to operate. In this new type of conflict, belligerent do no respect the rules of engagement anymore as laid down by IHL, which has made it difficult for humanitarian agencies to operate in a principled way. The implications for this research of the above mentioned conclusions are:

• The fact that there is no strict interpretation of or framework for the humanitarian system indicates that finding a balance between principles and pragmatism in operating strategies is dependent on the humanitarian agencies. For Somalia this means that even though humanitarian operations are strongly influenced and limited by the fact that they have become part of the wider international peace and security strategies,
humanitarian organizations do have moving space in balancing out principles and pragmatism as best as possible within their scope. In this thesis I will argue that in Somalia food aid and security threats are part of the war strategy which makes it very difficult to find a balance between a principled and a pragmatist approach.

- Humanitarianism has often been used as a political tool in history. This thesis will show that some belligerents indeed interpret humanitarianism as a tool of the West to spread their norms, values and influence. The following chapter will demonstrate the consequences this has for the way humanitarian agencies are treated in conflict settings.

- Humanitarians have to operate within their grid, so that even though actual situations may be different than as they are interpreted from the development-security perspective, it is difficult to act outside the grid. I will show that due to the fact that humanitarians have to stick to certain operating norms and values, humanitarian access will remain volatile and dependent on the will of warring parties.

This chapter thus has made clear why in general there are differences between the ways in which humanitarian organizations operate and the way in which humanitarianism can be interpreted. The following chapter will more specifically look at how two important dynamics of the Somali conflict, food aid and security threats, make it very difficult for humanitarian organizations to act within their grid and balance out principles and pragmatism in relation to the insecurity of aid operations. This is not only because of the fact that food aid is partially incorporated in the war dynamics but also because warring parties do have different interpretations of the role of humanitarian aid than Western actors.
3. FOOD AID IN SOMALIA

Since the beginning of the conflict, different parts of Somalia have struggled with serious food insecurity. Food insecurity has been both a cause for and a consequence of violence depending on the specific context. In food insecure situations, food commodities become valuable assets and therefore are relative effective as a tool for civil warfare. The international community tends to react rapidly with widespread deliveries of food aid to safe people from starvation. In Somalia the delivery of food aid has two sides. At one hand, food operations have saved many civilians from starvation. On the other hand, food aid responses inject food commodities into the violent conflict which results in that these food aid commodities become directly part of the conflict one way or another. As food aid assistance has become a highly valued commodity in Somalia, warring parties take it as an opportunity to influence the dynamics of the conflict. This causes tensions between belligerents and humanitarians as the latter strives to deliver food aid to those in need and to no one else. Warring parties therefore seem to use security threats on humanitarian agencies as a tool to control the flow of food aid into the conflict. This explains the sharp increase of security threats targeting aid personnel and cargo in Somalia. So far, humanitarian organizations such as WFP and CARE still struggle in responding adequately to these security risks within the food aid sector.

In this chapter I will first describe that food aid is important to belligerents primarily as a consequence of the fact that food commodities in Somalia are in general a war tool to manipulate conflict dynamics. I will also look at the relation between food aid as a factor in the conflict and the increasing number of security threats and attacks that have become part of the day-to-day reality of humanitarian agencies. The chapter will limits itself to security threats targeting personnel and cargo within food aid transportation logistics in Somalia which means that threats such as piracy in the Gulf of Aden are not included in the analysis.

3.1 Food security and violent conflict

Water and food are the basic commodities essential for all human beings to survive and, under specific conditions, it can become so valuable that it can be used as a tool for power (in conflict).
Today’s consensus on what food insecurity is goes beyond the concept of absolute scarcity as suggested by Malthus. It is rather about relative scarcity of food which implies that there are difficulties for example with distributing food or with access to food as argued by famine theorist Armatya Sen (Homer-Dixon & Blitt, 1998; Edkins, 2002). Baru and Deubel build forth on this concept and describe that food insecurity can be explained as a process rooted in long term social, economic and political inequalities that can be exacerbated by severe violent conflict or natural disasters. This view offers new insights on how food has become such a valuable commodity in Somalia’s violent conflict and, as a result, has become subject to rivalry and power struggles. According to these authors, food security is a multidimensional phenomenon in which socio-political dynamics are important factors that can complicate the ‘availability of food resources, the access to food resources, sufficient consumption of food and the appropriate utilization of food in a sanitary and nutritious manner’; food security cannot be assured without all four elements (Baro & Deubel, 2006, p.526). This means in fact that food vulnerability can be manipulated into a constructed famine or food shortage (Shipton, 1990). In Somalia, the food security situation has been primarily influenced by environmental, economic and political factors.

The following paragraphs will elaborate upon these three factors and look in what way they have contributed to the fact that food aid has become pivotal in Somalia’s conflict.

### 3.1.1 Environmental factors

Acute absolute food shortages are still primarily caused by climate and weather patterns in combination with the unsustainable use of the environment and natural resources (Homer-Dixon & Blitt, 1998). Unusual long periods of drought in the past years have had devastating effects on livestock assets and agriculture in especially Central and South Somalia (UNNU, 2010). Not only can droughts lead to acute food shortages, it might also lead to long term problems that are related to the unsustainable use of land and water. In combination with wasteful extraction of resources and intensive agriculture it will lead to exhausted land that becomes vulnerable to uncontrolled salinization, desertification and erosion (Hemrich, 2003, p.4/5). Farmers therefore, will have to look for new arable land and will have to migrate and for example deforest new land slides. This means that besides short term absolute shortages, continuing droughts on the long term, in combination with unsustainable production processes, can lead to chronic poverty and migration (LeBillon, 2001). Furthermore, Somalia has multiple crop cycles and usually pastoralist have to move to accommodate to changing seasons and weather patterns (Chander & Shear, 2009). In situations though of violent conflict, moving communities that arrive in new areas where competition over resources and power is already high, might result in social tensions or exacerbating violence (Homer-Dixon & Blitt, 1998).

### 3.1.2 Economic downfall

In short, environmental forces indeed have important influences on the availability of food. Somalia’s food insecurity however is largely not marked by long lasting absolute shortages. Economic malaise and violent conflict are factors though, that have a strong influence on the vulnerability of the food security situation.

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1 In the early twentieth century, Malthusians claimed for example that as populations grow exponential and subsistence levels at an arithmetic ratio, populations grow faster than subsistence levels. It would then be inevitable for populations to remain ‘unchecked’. Natural disaster, conflict and decreasing living standards would make sure eventually that there is a balance between population growth and subsistence levels (Malthus, 1960).
Poverty has worsened in Somalia due to the global financial crisis that has led the world into deep economic recession. Poverty has negative implications for food security in Somalia not because it directly influences the volume of food on the market but rather because it substantially decreases the access people have to food. Both the drop of remittances sent to Somalia and the increase in world food prices are essential to demonstrate how poverty influences food security in Somalia.

An immediate consequence of the world economic crises has been the sharp fall of remittances (by 25%) that is usually sent by diaspora to Somalia (CAP, 2010). Remittances compose an important share of people’s income (especially from those who live in urban settings) and are key to household food and livestock security (Paarlberg, 2000). The relation between food insecurity and increasing world food prices is somewhat more complex. The years 2007 and 2008 were known for their skyrocketing food prices everywhere on the world food market that drove millions of people into poverty, especially in urban areas of developing countries (The Economist, 2009). The Economist suggests that the rise and fall of world food prices are closely related to oil prices. The sharp increase in oil prices for example resulted in oil being more expensive than biofuel which increased the incentive for farmers to sell maize for biofuel. As a consequence, food supplies decreased substantially thereby pushing up world food prices for among others maize even higher (The Economist, 2009). Higher food prices then in combination with a drop in income from remittances lower the possibilities to access sufficient food. This means that the world economic downfall threatens the food security situation in Somalia.

Still, absolute shortages and lack of access do not automatically generate famine. Somalia displays one other, crucial force that has enabled situations of food insecurity to become constructed famines: the dynamics of violent conflict itself.

3.1.3 Conflict politics: the manipulation of food security

Acknowledging the importance of food for life, manipulating the availability of, or access to food gives power over people. There are three ways in which food can be manipulated as shown in Box 3.1. Both provision and commission are primary strategies used today in the manipulation of food security in Somalia. Barre’s regime laid down the foundations for the manipulation of food security by using it as a tool to contain social upraises against his regime. Today’s security threats are related though to the current conflict where the manipulation of food security serves as tool to influence conflict dynamics.

In South and Central Somalia, it has become a common war strategy to construct food scarcity in order to be able to manipulate the crowd and thus influence the power balances within the conflict. Somalia’s complex emergency is characterized by its extreme lack of rule of law, meaning that there is (almost) no overarching governance structure capable of offering protection and justice to its citizens (World Bank, 2009). Amidst the lawlessness and violence, militias, Islamic extremists, rivaling clans, external parties and the TFG troops fight for their own goals. They are mostly driven by their strive for economic and political power in an atmosphere of suspicion, domination, and terror. From this chaos, new opportunities arose for local (business) men, warlords, and other warring parties who profited from criminal activities such as illegal weapons and drugs trade, land conquest and exploitation of aid resources (Gundel, 2006). The presence of these warring parties in the conflict without any form of effective governance has had substantial influences on the food security situation. Warring parties have an interest in a) acquiring legitimacy and power over communities and b) in controlling the status quo of the conflict at all means in order to protect their businesses and profit (Menkhaus, 2006/07; World Bank 2007). One of the main strategies used in Somalia in doing so is to manipulate the access to food commodities through means of violence and destruction.
Box 3.1 - Food as a Weapon in War

Macrea identifies three ways in which food can be used as weapon in war: omission, provision and commission. Following the assumption made by IHL that governments are in principle responsible for safeguarding food security to all civilians, omission then basically means that food is misused as a consequence of failed governance in a state.

Provision includes the selective provision, or, the selective withholding, of food supplies to communities in order to either motivate/force certain communities to leave or to attract others in order to mobilize support and strengthen one’s power base.

Commission exhibits the most abusive form of food as a weapon in conflict. In violent conflicts where overall governance structures are absent, warring parties tend to disrupt food security profoundly in such an artificial way that it even blocks and undermines arising coping mechanism of communities to secure food supplies (Macrea, 1998). Attacks on the means of production and procurement disrupt the entire food system (Gundel, 2006).

Basically warring parties construct food scarcity by destroying the production base of food (commission) or regulate the access to available stock piles of food (provision). In Somalia, common methods of eroding any form of production are destroying livestock (for example by massacring all animals), devastate agriculture (for example by burning or pillaging all seeds and crops), systematically wreck local markets and contaminate fields and water wells (Besteman, 1996). The direct consequence of this is that it leads to increased vulnerability of agricultural and pastoral life to other external shocks such as environmental changes (Jaspars & Maxwell, 2008). In most cases in Somalia though, it has even led to forced migrations in the form of large flows of IDP’s and refugees. IDP’s in Somalia as of January 2010 have mounted up to 1.400.000 persons mainly fleeing from Mogadishu to surrounding provinces in South and Central Somalia (UNHCR, 2010a). Food insecurity is deepened by the fact that IDP’s are often isolated from their family and clan ties that, in Somalia, actually represent a social welfare system for its constituents (Jaspers & Maxwell, 2008). In cases of food insecurity, family or clan affiliation might be the only way to safeguard access to food. Isolation in Somalia therefore means to lose any form of clan protection and thus, a loss of economic support.

By regulating available stock piles of food, warring parties aim for exactly the opposite. They try to control war dynamics by ensuring access to food supplies for certain groups. By providing them of security and food, warring parties increase their own legitimacy and power over these groups. Next to that, it makes people dependent which increases the power base in the region and it makes it easier for warring parties to for example recruit “soldiers” or to use displaced and malnourished people to attract humanitarian aid and media (LeBillon, 2000).

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2 The total number of Somali refugees fleeing to neighboring countries mounts up to 560,716. The top three receiving countries in the region are Kenya (309,107 persons), Yemen (161,468) and Ethiopia (59,010) (UNHCR, 2010a).

3 Generations of young Somali’s that have grown up amidst militarization, violence and competition for power and resources, are attracted to these warring parties. By aligning with them, they hope to personally benefit from the war economy that is sustained by warlords and other warring parties (Besteman, 1996).
3.1.4 From food insecurity to food aid abuse

The construction of food scarcity was possible due to the fact that 80% of the population is dependent on agricultural or pastoral livelihoods so that shocks such as conflict, economic malaise and changing weather patterns can have immense consequences for the vulnerability of food security (FAO, 2010). Extreme violence and targeted destruction of livestock and agriculture force ordinary civilians into full submission so that those who have acquired power largely through terror and food security manipulation can play out their power struggle. These power struggles though are very unpredictable and dynamic as no relationships, ties, partnerships or agreements can be held because food is important enough to cheat and to kill.

It is in this situation that food aid is distributed with as objective to serve those people that have the highest needs. The main authorities of a country, usually the national government, have a clear responsibility in ensuring the survival and wellbeing of its civilians, including the distribution of food aid when needed. International Humanitarian Law however clearly states that in absence of such an authority, the government is obliged to allow humanitarian relief agencies to takeover this responsibility (Abild, 2009). In a country like Somalia, where the government seems not to be a recognized authority nor is capable of protecting its civilians, delivering food aid becomes very problematic. For warring parties namely, is the manipulation of food security a day-to-day practice and part of their war strategy to control the crowd. This means that warring parties also try to get hold on food aid flows because otherwise it possibly threatens their position in the conflict.

The consequences of food aid standing in the frontline of attention are multiple and diverse. The most important one is related to the security of distribution logistics. Security threats and attacks posed on aid personnel and cargo have increased rapidly in the last few year. The following subchapter will point out the most common forms of security threats or attacks experienced by personnel or posed on cargo. In addition to that I will elaborate further on the relation between food insecurity, food aid and security threats to distribution logistics by looking at the exact reasons behind these security issues.

3.2 Security threats targeting food aid personnel, convoys and cargo

Food has become a new tool in contemporary warfare as it can be manipulated in such a way that situations of food security can turn into full blown, carefully constructed food emergencies. In such a situation, populations and international organizations can be positioned strategically to serve the never-ending goal of maximizing economic and political power. The (violent) targeting of aid workers, aid convoys and cargo in the food aid sector is an important way in positioning external influences to the conflict (Macrea, 1998).

There are different types of threats to aid personnel, convoys and cargo with various, sometimes multiple motives. Threats or actual acts of violence come in the form of ambushes, armed incursion, kidnappings, landmines, individual attacks and assassinations that intimidate, wound, kill, molest, or rob aid workers (Jaspars, 2000; Van Brabant, 2000; VOICE, 2009). Stoddard et al. states that the number of attacks on aid workers in the three most dangerous countries where humanitarian aid is delivered (Sudan, Afghanistan and Somalia) has risen sharply in the last couple of years. Overall global statistics on security threats / attacks though have not increased and in many cases have even decreased 4 (Stoddard & Harmer, 2010; VOICE, 2009).

4 Until recently, international aid workers in Somalia were targeted more often than national/local aid workers. However, there has been a significant increase of attacks on locally hired (national) aid workers. National staff has been increasingly employed by international agencies to replace international aid workers in situations where it is not possible for them to operate in a sufficiently safe environment (Stoddard & Harmer, 2010; VOICE, 2009).
Jaspars and Von Brabant name various common forms of how cargo is abused/threatened by warring parties in Somalia (an overview is given in Table 3.1). Besides ordinary acts of theft, large scale looting and pillaging are real problems for aid organizations. The organised and violent appropriation of large quantities of food from convoys by local authorities or militia take regularly place at roadblocks, unofficial checkpoints, ports and storages. Another form of the illegitimate use of cargo is when powerful individuals within communities or within agencies, take shares larger than their entitlements (diversion). A common strategy is also to impose a levy on cargo which is called taxation (Le Billon, 2000). Furthermore warring parties can obligate agencies to behave according to their rules and will by issuing threats and by imposing regulations on, for instance, staff, housing and transportation (Jaspars, 2000; Von Brabant, 2000). A good illustration of the latter can be found in appendix 1. In this statement made by Al-Shabaab in 2009, it has published its demands and conditions under which (humanitarian) organizations have to operate. These terms are not only related to specific behavioral rules; point 11. points out the financial fee that is required for humanitarian access. Often do international aid organizations in return receive armed protection during transportation or are assured to have free and safe access to the communities in need (LeBillon, 2000, p.15). For the international aid agencies, these checks and collection points mean overall higher transportation and time costs as procedures tend to take up significant time for negotiations and safety clearances.

Basically there are three broad categories of reasons behind threatening aid personnel; economic, political and ideological reasons. Although threatening humanitarian operations can be a very lucrative business, it seems that increasingly political and ideological motivations play a role in this matter.

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**TABLE 3.1 - SECURITY THREATS TO FOOD AID DISTRIBUTION LOGISTICS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THREAT</th>
<th>ACTIVITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Theft</td>
<td>Taking food without consent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Looting and pillage</td>
<td>Organised and violent appropriation of large quantities of food.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxation</td>
<td>(Un)imposed levy by warring parties or authorities in return for providing security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversion</td>
<td>Powerful individuals within communities or within agencies, taking shares larger than their entitlements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coercion/extortion</td>
<td>Warring parties forcing agencies to act according to their will by issuing threats and by imposing regulations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table based on the data published in article of Jaspars, 2000, p. 18

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3 There is one form of taxation that is used very often by warring parties to profit from aid transportations through their territories; lucrative procurement contracts to which humanitarian organizations are forced (Le Billon, 2000).
3.2.1 Economic reasons

Economic reasons are primarily focused on increasing individual well being and accumulating resources to wage war. Ordinary civilians for example use small scale looting and diversion practices to start little businesses by selling aid commodities. The goal is to also profit from the large scale aid businesses that flood the country (Jaspars 2000). There are also those whose primary motivation is to ensure food for their own families because, due to one reason or another, they are not perceived as being needy enough to become denoted as aid recipient (Jaspar, 2000).

For warring parties economic reasons are rather related to the safeguarding or improving of their acquired position in the conflict. Waging war is costly, especially now external funds are limited. In South and Central Somalia food aid convoys are subject to local conflict settings and conditions and therefore vulnerable for large scale organized attacks and threats by local clans and militias. Looting of cargo and imposing roadblocks, unofficial checkpoints and taxation, are primarily meant to collect funds. In this way they finance their extensive patronage system on which warlords/warring parties rely (Jaspars, 2000). Warring parties might also use relief resources to feed, treat, communicate with their militias and to buy strategic goods such as arms and fuel (LeBillon, 2000).

Economic reasons are still important in explaining why warring parties and also individuals attack or threaten aid cargo and personnel. Stoddard, et al. however notes that security threats posed against aid organizations today are increasingly ideological and political in nature.

3.2.2 Political reasons

Political reasons include those acts of violence such as attacking personnel and/or blocking convoys to either deliver aid to certain groups or to exclude other groups from aid. Just as with the manipulation of “ordinary” food commodities, including or excluding certain parts of the population might strengthen or uphold the status quo of economic and political power in the conflict (Gundel, 2006). In this case it is not about aid as such, but about the possible influence it might have on war dynamics. The influx of food aid then could lead to a rise of food commodities in certain parts which gives local belligerents a tool to further manipulate and profit from the food security situation. Jaspars’ research concludes for example that local leaders divert portions of food aid to strengthen their position and status within society as they divide the food aid in return for political support of the recipients (Jaspars, 2000). Or, as happened in Somalia with Al Shabaab, warring parties force all organizations out of their domain to assert (in public) authority after which they let the organizations return by letting them sign agreements with regards to security and operations. This is a way to gain legitimacy within their communities for their authority (Abild, 2000). Security risks may also be the result of belligerent feeling threatened in their legitimacy and power base by the arrival of external organizations. Providing high valued food commodities for example can be perceived as interfering in internal political affairs or undermining the respect and power of community leaders (VOICE, 2009).

3.2.3 Ideological reasons

Until recently, it was generally thought that warring parties attack aid personnel and cargo because they are confused in the sense that differing between humanitarian aid organizations and other international actors seemed to be too difficult. However, reality might be entirely different as in fact heavy violence is a way to global, public attention from media, policy makers and the public (Barnett & Weiss, 2008). This implies that warring parties know exactly who is a humanitarian and who is not. Then violence targeting aid personnel and attacks is
for instance about drawing political attention for their case. An increasingly used tactic is for example kidnapping followed by ransom demands. This is, according to UNHCR, a major obstacle in providing food aid in Somalia. Warring parties kidnap international staff because they have proven to be very valuable in terms of ransom and heighten the chance on attention due to large visibility in the international arena (VOICE, 2009; Stoddard & Harmer, 2010).

Ideological reasons also refer to acts of violence that are the result of the perceived alliance to or participation in (Western) enemy political and military agenda’s (Stoddard et al., 2006). Humanitarians in that sense have become proxy targets for those who seek to fight Western powers through sowing fear and instability (Stoddard & Harmer, 2010). This is a plausible explanation of why local aid personnel are being targeted because they are perceived as collaborators of the West. Since the US changed its foreign security policies after 9/11, signs of political and religious polarization became apparent in many states such as Somalia which played part in attacking Western organizations (Gilmour, 2010; Stoddard et al., 2006). NGO’s that make up the overarching network Voluntary Organizations in Cooperation in Emergencies (VOICE) confirm this line of reasoning by stating that attacks on aid workers take place not only because of economic gain and political attention but also because the work and advocacy activities of the organization itself as they are themselves perceived as active partners and implementers of Western agenda’s. This is even more applicable to UN organizations because the UN in Somalia is often perceived to be part of the wider international political system, more than independent NGO’s (Stoddard et al., 2006). By attacking those who support Western agenda’s, warring parties intend to increase the local support base for their activities and own agenda (VOICE, 2009).

3.3 Recapitulation

It is unique to Somalia that food aid plays such a public role in war. This chapter has looked at the dynamics behind food insecurity in Somalia and at how and why food aid has become part of a war strategy. The fact that food security can be manipulated makes food commodities and thus large scale food aid operations an effective war tool. Next to profiting economically, safeguarding the status quo seems to be an important goal for belligerents. Political reasons represent a direct way to accomplish this by regulating aid flows. Ideological reasons though seem to also stem from the idea that external actors such as humanitarians may threaten their modes of existence as explained in chapter 2.2.3.

Somalia seems to experience many forms of security risks for aid personnel and convoys. The question then is how humanitarian organizations deal with it in a most balanced out way between a certain degree of pragmatism to act according to the humanitarian imperative while operating as principled as possible in order to limit negative outcomes of food aid. The following chapter will look at both WFP and CARE with respect to their operations in Somalia and the way in which they seem to cope with security issues concerning their personnel and cargo. The security threats have forced these organizations to deviate from their ‘usual’ way of distributing food aid and from their coping mechanisms towards difficulties that are commonly experienced in complex emergencies. Chapter four will also look at combining the theoretical frameworks with the day-to-day experiences of both WFP and CARE and discuss what differences there are between both, what that implies for the effective delivery of food aid in Somalia and what it means for the humanitarian system.
4. SECURITY STRATEGIES AND HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES; WFP AND CARE

As has been extensively described in this thesis, one of the primary challenges for humanitarians in Somalia is to react adequately to security risks common in the food aid distribution sector. As laid down by IHL to which humanitarian agencies conform, solving security problems and thus increasing humanitarian access requires negotiations with the other parties to determine the terms of operating/involvement (Leader, 2000; Leader & Macrea, 2000). Security strategies therefore seem to focus on strengthening the bargaining position of aid agencies by a) defining a certain standard for principled approaches and b) by promoting an in-depth understanding of the context. In this chapter I will show that humanitarian agencies such as WFP and CARE indeed attempt to operate in a principled way as proposed by contemporary humanitarianism but that their strategies vary due to the fact that there is no strict interpretation of or framework for humanitarianism.

I will first provide an overview of suggestions that are commonly proposed by scholars and humanitarians on how to improve humanitarian access while upholding the humanitarian principles. They seem to agree to a large extent on the steps that have to be taken to support humanitarian organizations in responding to the security threats in the best way as possible. I will analyze the proposed strategies and look at how they are can improve humanitarian access. On the basis of two (humanitarian) organizations that are present in Somalia, WFP and CARE, I will illustrate what this means in practice. I will briefly introduce WFP and CARE and, analyze and compare their security strategies. I will also look in how far their strategies correspond with the common suggestions made, to be able to discuss in how far both organizations have succeeded in finding a principled approach given the context. The analysis will include a brief description of how its’ strategies have influenced humanitarian aid in Somalia.
4.1 Common humanitarian responses to high insecurity of emergency operations

In recent years, much research and debate has taken place on the topic of security risks in humanitarian aid operations. Scholars, humanitarians, and politicians have come up with a couple of topics/suggestions that are important in improving security for aid personnel and cargo in the dangerous operating settings. I will first discuss therefore how humanitarian organizations in general seem to deal with security threats.

It looks like the proposed strategies are all related to two cross-cutting themes that help strengthen the (collective) bargaining position of humanitarian agencies in negotiations over humanitarian access. The first theme concentrates on suggestions that narrow down the wide spectrum of interpretations of good humanitarianism to a certain set of standards. A wide variety of, and flexibility in operating principles and standards means that humanitarian organizations can make case-to-case decisions and deals with warring parties. The major drawback of this is that it weakens the individual bargaining position of agencies. If humanitarian organizations are not willing to fulfill the demand of belligerents, the latter will easily decide to stop negotiations and turn to other humanitarian agencies to which the demands do not exceed acceptable limits. Agencies therefore might become more likely to adjust to the situation and demands of warring parties in order to be able to operate; thereby possibly compromising the humanitarian and its own organizational principles. Therefore it is important to streamline and strengthen standards at an organizational as well inter-agency level. In that way the collective bargaining position is strengthened and practitioners in the field will know more precisely where the limits of operating are. Important factors to succeed in the above are for example the grounding of certain standards and frameworks for humanitarian operations and to define a bottom line of limitations beyond which an organization will not operate (Leader, 2000; Stoddard et al., 2006).

The second theme rather emphasizes the importance of in-depth understanding of the context. Establishing a discussion arena in which as much as possible information and knowledge is present is important as a base for negotiating humanitarian access. Important factors to succeed are for instance improving access to information and the development of individual human skills (Leader, 2000; Stoddard et al., 2006). During my research on the proposed strategies, I noticed that humanitarian agencies develop security strategies at different levels. Therefore, I will analyze the variety of ideas, initiatives and actions that have been suggested by humanitarians and scholars, on the basis of three levels: the system, organizational and field/operational levels.

With the system level I mean the activities and strategies that are developed and implemented between humanitarian agencies, or in cooperation with for instance other organizations, networks or political bodies. Humanitarian agencies acknowledge that cooperation and coordination in the humanitarian sector can improve their collective bargaining position substantially. Proposed strategies on this level mainly focus on information sharing and the development of knowledge. Information and skills exchange not only benefit the collective bargaining position but also strengthen strategies taken at the organizational level.

At the organizational level activities are primarily related to the development of employees’ skills and knowledge, and to the accumulation of experiences and field knowledge. They also refer to the internal strengthening and frameworking of operating principles and standards. At the operational level, I refer to the strategies that humanitarians turn to in the field to directly facilitate operations and the implementations of programs.

I will look at what strategies are in general taken at each level and also investigate in how far or what way they can strengthen the bargaining position of an humanitarian agency. I will start with strategies that can be taken at the system level, at the organizational level and last but not least in the field (operational). It must be clear that the suggestions/ideas will only briefly be mentioned as far as it is relevant for this thesis meaning that there will be no further analysis on the usefulness of these suggested (partial) solutions.
4.1.1 The system level

The creation of information systems and the fact that humanitarians are slowly starting to debate, share information and communicate in difficult situations implies that the necessity for cooperation and coordination has been recognised by humanitarian actors to be crucial in the field. Cooperation and coordination is facilitated by the development of information sharing mechanisms and the development of standards and codes.

Information sharing
There are various initiatives that attempt to install overarching mechanisms such as the Interaction’s Security Advisory Group (SAG) for INGO’s and the UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS). Unfortunately, these initiatives have not yet led to full blown information systems due to funding difficulties and general lack of support, (Stoddard et al., 2006). There are also networks such as the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP), that offer important platforms to improve information sharing and the accumulation of knowledge. Debate and dialogue are important activities of networks/platforms that are not only used for inter-agency cooperation but also for discussions with donors, hosting governments, civil society organizations and belligerents (Stoddard & Harmer, 2010; Gilmour, 2010).

Standards and Codes
The creation of the Code of Conduct and the SPHERE standards, as discussed in chapter 2.2.1, are crucial for streamlining and upholding minimum standards for quality and quantity. It offers agencies a backbone for the development of operating principles, programs and operations. It is also meant to improve efficiency and effectiveness in the humanitarian system by providing tools to order needs according to aid sector, to assess needs and to divide the work (The Sphere Project, 2004; Walker & Maxwell, 2009).

Analysis
The knowledge pool is relevant to recognise and anticipate on potential dangerous settings or conditions, to identify and interpret changing (conflict) dynamics and to investigate security incidences (Stoddard et al., 2006). Furthermore, having sufficient information and understanding of the context is also relevant for the design and planning of specific programs and the streamlining of humanitarian standards and principles.

The more information aid agencies possess, the better they can incorporate right and clear measures into their programs that prepares the aid worker for the field. A good knowledge base thus helps agencies to prepare but also to strengthen their position in negotiating processes where up-to-date information is crucial to make arrangements on for example transportation deals through unsafe regions. Narrowing down the variety among humanitarian performances is the main purposes of cooperation networks for Standards and Codes. By collectively set standards and cooperate and coordinate aid, the negotiation position for humanitarians substantially improves.

4.1.2 The organizational level

Security strategies at the organizational level are first and foremost occupied with strengthening and standardising the corporate structure. Common suggestions are the development of internal operating principles/mechanisms and adequate human resource management (Barnett & Weiss, 2008).

Internal operating principles
It is essential that organizations are actively involved in evaluating who they are, so that it is clear to all employees what the exact meaning is of for example their mandate, operating principles, standard operating procedures and organizational norms and values (Van Brabant, 2000). In addition, organizations will have to research and identify the contextual setting of today’s complex emergencies and its relation to their organizational identity.
Furthermore the agency will have to should what trade offs it is willing and capable of to make in unexpected situations. Therefore it is important that organizations for example design monitoring, reporting and accounting mechanisms with as goal to evaluate, adjust and strengthen the programs, operations and approaches of the agency (Barnett & Weiss, 2008). It can thereby on the long term establish a clear framework of standards to which the agency conforms. This is important for a) the concept of stability within the humanitarian system and b) for the bargaining position of an agency when negotiating over humanitarian access.

**Adequate human resource management**

Human resource management especially in relation to security risks is crucial to improve successful security strategies in the field. Preparing employees for potential insecure situations and supporting them with all means possible during their operations is part of human resource strategies (Stoddard & Harmer, 2010). The preparation trajectory should at least exist of trainings that focus on internal organizational principles and on awareness, knowledge and crisis survival practices in high risk areas. It might also focus on personal competences and group competences to improve team work under harsh circumstances (Van Brabant, 2000). In any case, being prepared as much as possible for possible risks improves the ways in which personnel can cope with sudden risks arising in violent conflicts (CAP, 2010). This means in practice that employees in very insecure operations should be experienced, highly trained and have substantial knowledge about the regional socio-economic and political settings which is often not the case (Abild, 2009; Jaspars, 2000; Stoddard et al., 2006). To ameliorate training trajectories and supporting systems for personnel in the field, but also to evaluate overall security management it is necessary to monitor and report back results from the field to the head quarters and managing departments as mentioned above.

**Analysis**

By defining, clarifying and incorporating internal operating principles into the day-to-day work of a humanitarian agency, it might become easier to draw a bottom line of limitations beyond which an organization will not operate. This can be crucial for improving humanitarian access in the sense that an organization must be clear and transparent in pronouncing to what points it is willing to negotiate. This is valid not only on corporate level but also in the field on personal level. Furthermore, thinking about bottom lines forces aid agencies to define what humanitarian and operating principles mean for the organization and how to deal with it in the field. It may help agencies in that sense to stick to their proclaimed bottom line and thus, to narrow down shifting interpretations of humanitarianism and to define a set of standards for a principled approach. Both clarity and transparency also seem to strengthen organizations in their bargaining position towards donor governments and warring parties by narrowing down the potential for ad hoc, corrupting or contradictory measurements that might harm the delivery of aid in the field.

Clarifying the bottom line as well as its practical implications is clearly the main focus of adequate human resource management that addresses training, preparations and content-wise knowledge on the individual level. It is mostly relevant for the direct safety and coping skills of employees operating in the field who have to deal with ad hoc threats. Improved human skills and knowledge are an important part on which the in-depth contextual understanding rests.

**4.1.3. The operational level**

In the field, the situation may be entirely different as anticipated upon beforehand as war dynamics changed unexpectedly. Even with good preparations on both the system and organizational level, the operational level is very volatile to changes. Nevertheless there are a variety of ideas, initiatives and actions that can be administered to improve security. Van Brabant identifies three security strategies that humanitarian organizations can take in the field: acceptance, protection and deterrence. These strategies can be seen as the result of decisions and
strategies taken at both the system and organizational level. All three strategies offer useful tools to deal with insecurity depending on the operating environment, the types of security risks and the internal principles the humanitarian organization’s hold on to.

Acceptance
This security strategy basically attempts to decrease security risks for aid operations by increasing acceptance among the communities for their programs and presence. Important then is to actively engage in establishing understanding, relationships and to have community based programs in which the local civilians can participate. Although it is a lengthy and costly approach, the benefits may be large when acceptance can be maintained (Van Brabant, 2000). However, even with acceptance of the communities, changing dynamics of conflict for example through switching affiliations with clans, or warring parties may entirely change the security situation again. In order to anticipate upon these changes it might be wise to also take protective measures in severe insecurity situations.

Protection
The protection security strategy focuses on reducing the vulnerability of the organizations without directly addressing the threats (Van Brabant, 2000). Humanitarian organizations can for example choose to operate under very low visibility or through the use of remote management of their programs so that operations can be continued by local actors but under the supervision of international staff residing elsewhere (Abild, 2009). In addition, protective methods also include reduced exposure which means that there are curfews, no-go zones, or even staff evacuations but also that organizations can decide to hire local protection for compounds and storage warehouses, or that they suspend/terminate programs and operations (Van Brabant, 2000).

Deterrence
Security strategies based upon counter-threatening a threat include all forms of sanctions and the use of military or private security offensive/defensive forces. It also includes lesser forms of counter-forces such as the use of armed guards and vehicle and convoy safety procedures (Abild, 2009). Deterrence is used mostly when there is large scale suffering and no humanitarian access such as was the case in specific occasions during the Yugoslavia war, in Afghanistan and in the early years of the Somali conflict. It might serve the humanitarian imperative on the short term. However on the long term it can have serious implications for future humanitarian operations as has been extensively discussed in chapter two of this thesis (Van Brabant, 2000; Stoddard et al., 2006).

Analysis
Fact is that security strategies in the field are of uppermost importance to secure aid operations. In practice, these strategies are not mutually exclusive and combining one with another might lead to improved operating security and thus to improved deliveries of food aid.

The strategies taken on the operational level are already the result of choices made on the system and organizational level. These strategies highlight the decisions made on how far an agency is willing to negotiate and where the limits of operating and negotiating are. It reflects in how far a humanitarian organization aims to operate according to the principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality and in how far it has succeeded in this. There might be switches between or combinations of strategies as a consequence of either calculated decision making or ad hoc decision making. This is relevant for the possible delivery of aid. Taking it to its extremes, calculated decision-making represents an in-depth understanding of the context that strengthens the bargaining position because it is clear to both the agency and warring parties what is negotiable and what is not, and thus, what the consequences may be for the delivery of aid. Ad hoc decision making represents the opposite and gives space to vague, unclear and contradictory strategies that can be easily manipulated by warring parties and agencies. This may result in unstable alliances and/or agreements on aid delivery. The latter makes it hard
to provide one common humanitarian answer that safeguards the value of humanitarian principles and that guards efficient and effective delivery of humanitarian aid.

The in-depth understanding of the context is crucial to all security strategies. Knowing the context, the dynamics, the history and the stakes involved for the various parties, help to decide what strategy suits best to the context and the agencies’ norms and values. The personal acquired skills, experience and knowledge will help individual aid workers to make the right decisions in difficult situations and will add value to the trust among negotiating parties.

Both in-depth understanding of the context and the framing of a standard guideline for principled approaches will add to the establishment of a more stable, transparent and trustworthy humanitarian position in the negotiation processes on humanitarian access. Due to the fact that the IHL is an agreement by both sides on the terms of engagement, the improvement of the bargaining position by humanitarian agencies can thus result in the improved delivery of humanitarian aid. In theory, the above suggested ideas, mechanisms and strategies might indeed strengthen principled approaches within security strategies. In reality though, it is a difficult process. Frameworks and standards for principled action exist but are still far from consistent and all-inclusive. More advanced information systems and knowledge bases have evolved over time but are still far from being useful and complete. Both the examples of WFP and CARE will illustrate that this is also the case for Somalia.

4.2 World Food Program in Somalia

Despite the difficulties and threats surrounding the transportation and distribution of food aid in Somalia, various (large) NGO’s and UN organizations were able to stay and continue their operations. Others have suspended their programs and either replaced them by different ones or in different areas, or have decided to pull back. One of the few organizations that stayed over the past decades is the UN World Food Program (WFP) (Jaspars, 2000).

The WFP is the frontline organization of the UN in the fight against hunger that aims to provide food assistance to more than 90 million people in 73 countries in 2010 (WFP, 2010). It is recognized as the single world expert in addressing hunger not only by responding to emergencies but also by developing strategies and programs to prevent hunger, to reduce dependency on aid and to decrease vulnerability to external shocks. While the strategic objectives (see Box 4.1) are leading in the design of country programs, the rapid changing global context in which WFP operates forces WFP to continuously assess its approaches and prioritize strategic objectives and core

**BOX 4.1 - WFP STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES 2008 - 2011**

In the following years WFP strives for and focuses on five strategic objectives:

- Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies
- Prepare for emergencies
- Restore and rebuild lives after emergencies
- Reduce chronic hunger and under nutrition everywhere
- Strengthen the capacity of countries to reduce hunger

*Source: WFP Strategic Plan 2008 – 2011, p.1*
operating principles (see appendix 2-I) according to specific needs and to the possibilities to successfully deliver. In line with the developments in the humanitarian structure over the past ten years that have been mentioned in chapter two, WFP emphasizes the importance of coordination and cooperation and therefore is leading in developing initiatives within the humanitarian community to improve the effective delivery of aid. One of these initiatives has become an important tool in complex emergencies, the so called Cluster Approach.

The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), the primary overarching structure / committee for inter-agency coordination of humanitarian assistance, introduced the Cluster Approach in 2005 ¹. Since then, it embraces the activities of the ‘designated global cluster leads to support the humanitarian community and national authorities for the coordination and delivery of life-saving humanitarian assistance to communities in crisis’ (LogCluster, 2010). WFP has been appointed as global lead of the Logistics Cluster meaning that it ensures coordination and cooperation in various operations or activities such as information sharing, infrastructure assessment, transport, storage, port and corridor coordination, customs, equipment supplier information and commodity tracking (LogCluster, 2010). This Cluster is very important in Somalia because its activities are crucial in supporting security mechanisms in the transportation logistics of humanitarian operations.

As identified in appendix 2-II, WFP’s country program in Somalia is based on two kinds of operations namely special operations and emergency operations. Over the past few years, five programs have been implemented in Somalia independently from those programs and/or activities that are the result of its cooperation with other UN organizations of NGO networks; four are single-country Special Operations (designed to support the Emergency Operations) and one an Emergency Operation (concerned with implementing WFP’s strategic objectives) named “Food Aid for Emergency Relief and Protection of Livelihoods”. Appendix 2-III briefly highlights the core objectives of these five programs.

The following paragraphs will elaborate on further activities in which WFP is involved specifically in Somalia and the strategies it applies to cope with the dangerous operating environment.

4.2.1 Operational realities

From various documents related to WFP’s budgetary revisions made since 2009, it becomes clear that WFP, despite its ambitious targets and objectives as put forward in its Strategic Plan 2008-2011, is primarily involved in the delivery of direct food distributions and emergency nutrition assistance in order to ensure adequate food consumption for the most vulnerable Somali’s (WFP, 2010c). Until March 2010 WFP reached about 2 million beneficiaries per month after which the number dropped in April-June 2010 to 1.9 million beneficiaries due to the deteriorating security situation in those areas dominated by the militias of Al-Shabaab (WFP, 2010c). The necessity of the four special operations implemented in Somalia by WFP to enlarge humanitarian access clearly shows the difficulties WFP faces with regards to the security threats and the lacking humanitarian access. The sharp rise in violent attacks or threats targeting specifically WFP personnel and aid convoys, and the imposition of unacceptable demands by warring parties have severely hindered the transportation of food cargo and thus, effective delivery of aid goods to its recipients (WFP Operations, 2010).

¹ The Cluster approach is established to bring more routine and professionalism in the coordination among UN agencies and partners to improve humanitarian response capacity in various sectors such as Logistics, Emergency Shelter and Health (OCHA, 2006).
Aid workers face high personal risk to assist vulnerable Somali populations. Since 2009, WFP has observed escalating threats against staff in general, but specifically arrests and harassment of national staff, as well as unacceptable demands posed by armed groups. Both the rising threats and attacks on aid personnel and convoys and the imposition of various unacceptable demands from armed groups on humanitarian operations, have made it virtually impossible for the WFP to continue reaching up to one million people in need in Southern Somalia.

In January 2010, WFP was forced to suspend the delivery of food assistance in Southern Somalia leaving behind 625,000 people without any emergency food support (WFP, 2010d, p. 5). On February, 28th, Al Shabaab issued a press statement in which was states that it banned all WFP operations inside Somalia. According to the Al Shabaab statement, ‘any Somali person contracted or working with WFP was instructed to terminate their contract immediately’ (UNNI, 2010, p.1). WFP has no intention to change its current operations in Southern and Central Somalia but they will be further delayed in the planned food aid distributions in Southern Somalia, particularly in the Algooye Corridor where needs are becoming increasingly pressing. Especially now severe violence recently has initiated a new flow of IDP’s that, according to UNHCR, have mounted up to 23.100 civilians fleeing the dangerous parts of Mogadishu in July 2010 only (OCHA WHB, 2010). The day after the statement was issued Al Shabaab took control of WFP compounds and warehouses in different cities/locations.

Clearly, WFP has been forced to adjust its strategies continuously to its surrounding environment and experiments on measures that can be taken to increase the security for its operations. Strategies designed to cope with the severe insecurity in food aid distribution logistics have been developed not only by WFP but also by supporting organizations such as the Organization for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). WFP (in cooperation with organizations like OCHA) has taken the following measures and strategies in Somalia to improve their operational capabilities in this violent environment. Please take note though that this information is taken from publicly available sources. It is very probable that there are various other strategies and decision making mechanisms that have been developed but not made public due to safety concerns.

At the systemic level, WFP has been actively involved in intensifying cooperation and coordination through:

- The establishment of cooperative relationships with various organizations in order to
  a) improve information sharing mechanisms, b) to collectively set operating standards, and c) to ensure consistency in approach and in the division of responsibilities between the various UN organizations and (I)NGO’s (Jaspars, 2000; WFP, 2010d). WFP has been collaborating with the Designated Official and the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) in drawing up the Minimum Operating Security Standards (WFP, 2010d). Additionally WFP engaged itself in partnerships with other UN organizations, (I)NGO’s, national / local authorities and the private sector in order to achieve its mission (WFP, 2008). It also focussed on more cooperation and coordination with for example the Logistical Cluster in intensifying and spreading its activities and on closely working together with IASC on the mapping of the security environment. WFP also cooperates with the UN Humanitarian Air Service in preparing a reliable air bridge for both food aid transportation and security / medical evacuations in case of emergencies (WFP Logistics, 2010).

At the organizational level, WFP designs strategies that focus on the accumulation of human skills in the field through:

- The strengthening of its base on the ground by improving the knowledge and skills base of personnel. WFP for example trains staff in safety matters and also employs qualified and experienced staff who will be capable to make difficult decisions on a regular base. Experience and confidence are evaluated by WFP as very important factors in the decision making process in conflict situations (Jaspar, 2000). Further it conducts regular security risk assessments to protect staff and it has increased and intensified capacity on the ground by opening more and improved units for immediate deployment (WFP, 2010b). WFP has also been designing and implementing an innovative security model ‘involving an enhanced security presence on the
ground with community liaison to ensure that the food reaches vulnerable populations' (WFP, 2010b).
However it does not become clear in WFP documents what this security model exactly is and how it can
improve security in violent environments.

At an operational level, WFP Somalia is first and foremost preoccupied with optimizing its transportation
logistics by:

- **Ensuring safe passage for aid convoys by adjusting its logistical process.** The transportation
  of cargo to Somalia takes place for 90% over sea. Mogadishu is the preferred port and thus the transportation
  hub where shippings arrive and are further transported over roads where possible or by air 2. Due to insecurities
  in and around Mogadishu there are several alternatives to Mogadishu port along the coast as well as
  alternative routes over land. Inside Somalia, cargo is transported by commercial Somali transport companies
  that are employed to distribute food aid assistance over land through established WFP contracting procedures.
  In Central and Southern Somalia the convoys are being escorted by armed guards being compiled of men
  from their own clan territory (Chander & Shear, 2009). This means in practise that where clan lines border,
  there is a change of guards along these clan lines. It is evaluated positively especially because subcontracts
  need to be established as well along class lines because business partnerships are a necessity to uphold food
  aid transportation throughout the country. WFP has chosen for this option because local Somali’s are familiar
  with their surroundings, the infrastructure, possible security threats and the local populations. It also helps to
  strengthen and further develop infrastructure and transport industries (LogCluster, 2007). WFP has made strict
  insurance regulations in their contracts with local transport firms basically stating that the firm is responsible
  for all losses. In order to improve the services and spread the risk, WFP is occupied with widening the pool of
  transportation firms (Chander & Shear, 2009).

- **Making convoys less vulnerable to attacks by increasing its flexibility in transportation.** WFP for
  example plans convoys with fewer trucks so that they are mobile in dangerous situations and can transport
  cargo much faster (WFP Logistics, 2010). WFP also narrows down the chances for attack by announcing
  in public that it has installed tracking systems for its cargo. It for example equips its cargo with commodity
  tracking systems while being transported but also when stored in warehouses (Chander & Shear, 2009;
  WFP Logistics, 2010).

4.2.2 Analysis on WFP in Somalia

Even though WFP’s operations are currently under scrutiny, is has been successful in the delivery of food aid
to millions of Somali’s in the past decades. While there might have been regular occasions of diverted, looted,
taxed food convoys, WFP has made its decisions to continue most of their operations. Whether it is a truly
balanced out strategy, or rather a strategy that has evolved due to the mere adjustment and coping mechanisms
that have been put in place, might not become entirely clear from only a literature review.

Security management within the UN system is complex and diffuse. It seems that various initiatives and
departments exist for the enhancement of security that serve all UN institutions whereas within the context
of Somalia other initiatives exist that rather serve all agencies present in Somalia. In addition to this,
WFP is developing a security management strategy itself. Although plans and initiatives arise to seriously create
a profound WFP security management system in which measures are taken on system, organizational and
operational level, it is first in its early developmental stage (Jaspars, 2000).

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2 Cargo is distributed via 16 extended delivery points (EDPs) located throughout Somalia to the approximately 2,500 final distribution points (FDPs) (WFP Logistics,
2010). All operations are supervised by WFP headquarters located in Nairobi, Kenya and its nine Somali sub-offices located in: Baidoa, Beletwein, Berbera, Bossaso,
Garowe, Hargeisa, Merca, Mogadishu and Wajid (WFP Somalia, 2010).
WFP is definitely on the front line of improving cooperation and coordination. Due to its position as lead in the Logistics Cluster and being co-lead in the Cluster of Telecommunications and its involvement in various cooperation mechanisms show a clear urge to improve security by institutionalizing information sharing, knowledge exchanges, cooperation and coordination. In addition, there are several developments with respect to strengthening operating principles, designing better training and educating modules to improve the quality of staff in the field and to extensive monitoring and accounting systems. It is difficult to deduce from the literature in how far these initiatives have evolved and really applied to contemporary situations in Somalia. Whether this is because of a lack of data in general or because of the fact that this information is not readily available to the public is not entirely clear. Both the developments on the systemic and organizational level are important. They are however not very different than those of other UN organizations or (I)NGO’s with respect to the adherence to and compliance with for instance the Code of Conduct and SPHERE standards. It gets interesting when looking at the decision made and measures taken in the field and thus the security strategies WFP takes directly to influence the safe delivery of food aid.

It then becomes clear that WFP is an organization that fully investigates all possibilities to continue transportation and distribution even though security risks for cargo and personnel may become very high and real. In terms of the common security strategies that have been discussed in chapter 4.1.3, WFP adheres mostly towards strategies of deterrence supported by strategies of protection. Its deterrence strategies do not automatically imply that they hire private security companies or cooperate with the military, but it has had periods in which it did so. In the last couple of years it looks like WFP has been primarily involved in securing its convoys by hiring local armed guards and trucking companies of the leading clans in those regions where it operates. Protection strategies are primarily characterized by its tracking systems for cargo, the search for alternative transportation routes and the modification of their usual ways of transportation. It is further characterized by the increase and intensification of capacity on the ground and the cooperation with (local) organizations. However, it has also suspended some of its operations in the beginning of 2010. It does not become entirely clear to me whether this was a necessity, or a strategic step to make a statement to members of Al Shabaab to point out that deals can be made but not without limitations.

Overall, when relating these observations back to the common suggestions on how to improve humanitarian access, it seems that WFP attempts to improve an in-depth understanding of the context as well as conforms to the set of frameworks and standards to improve stability and consistency within the humanitarian system. However, it also seems that on the ground the practical implications of the latter still can be very different from a strict principled approach.

It seems that WFP’s security strategies are still in a developing stage implying that decisions in the field are made rather upon a case-to-case basis. I have noticed that WFP is closely involved with improving and developing principled security strategies at the system and organizational levels. However, at the operational level where it has to react instantly to security threats, WFP chooses for a more pragmatic approach even though it adheres in the field to the standards and frameworks designed to improve a principled approach. The degree to which it does though, and in what format, varies among organizations. This is possible because a) there is no overarching structure that has the power to control humanitarian organizations and b) because it is intrinsic to the humanitarian system that there is no strict interpretation or framework of humanitarianism as explained in chapter two. It is an important observation that at the three levels different considerations are made with respect to principles versus pragmatist approaches in their security strategies.

Therefore, the pragmatic approach to me does not mean that humanitarian principles are less relevant, it only means that the balance between the principles is skewed towards the humanitarian imperative. As the core operating principles of humanitarian actions are neutrality and impartiality, the fact that the humanity principle is valued as more important than neutrality or impartiality principles, is denoted as a pragmatic approach.
(Leader, 2000; Jaspars, 2000). From the analysis above, I have concluded that WFP in this sense adheres to a more pragmatic approach because of the three points:

- Non-interference lies at the basis of IHL according to Leader and thus determines to a certain extent in how far approaches are principled or not. The fact that food has come to play such a crucial role in the conflict dynamics means that merely supplying food aid influences war dynamics one way or the other. This implies that WFP has become an active actor in the violent conflict. This harms the idea of non-interference because first of all, influencing conflict dynamics cannot be neutral or impartial due to the fact that warring parties are in control of the food security situation. Secondly, brokering deals with local authorities over safeguarding transportation logistics can be beneficial for the region and inter-regional/clan cooperation but it is also a slippery slope. I might also harm for example inter-clan relations or opportunities for the TFG or future governments to build up a credible security sector. This again is not in line with IHL.

- The fact that WFP has opted for a deterrence strategy to deal with security risks is in itself in contrast with the idea behind IHL and humanitarian principles. First of all, involving armed protection harms the very idea of being a humanitarian agency and quickly become confused with or perceived as an armed party in the conflict. Secondly, the practicalities of involving local/regional/private armed guards can be very difficult and can fuel the conflict.

- WFP Somalia is present though in many parts of the Southern and Central regions and is helping millions of Somali’s. In this respect it reflects the core purpose behind humanitarianism where it attempts ‘to prevent and alleviate human suffering’ (IFRC, 2009). If WFP decides not to respond to an emergency this has (psychological) consequences for the decisions of other aid organizations in whether or not they decide to deploy because it is the single largest food aid distributor and the largest noncommercial logistic transporter in the world. It can also have far reaching consequences for those Somali’s who are excluded from food by warring parties or are living in IDP / refugee camps. In this respect WFP approaches its difficulties in relation to security risks in a very visible pragmatic way. I have added “visible” in the last sentence because it is very probable that there are many other humanitarian organizations that in practice do the same but covertly in order to avoid debate on good humanitarian practices and difficulties with donors.

Taking the relative pragmatic approach implies several things; 1) WFP believes that in a situation where food aid has become part of the war strategy, a pragmatic approach is the least harming option for aid recipients and the conflict 2) that the cost-benefit analysis is acceptable and 3) that WFP has become a negotiating partner in the Somali conflict. It also means that WFP is involved in negotiations over access and safety and will have to pay a certain price for it. Although this is largely denied by WFP, especially in reaction to the report published by the Monitoring Group for Somalia in March 2010, cooperating and doing businesses with any type of business in Somalia, means cooperating and brokering deals with warring parties. The questions is then not whether it occurs but to what extent it is acceptable and how to minimize it (Jaspars, 2000).

In short, taking a pragmatic approach in dealing with security threats targeting aid personnel and cargo in Somali’s complex emergency, has led to the (partially) continued food aid distributions. It has thereby also brought its operations to be close to the edge of what is accepted in the humanitarian system of today. This is almost the opposite of what CARE decided to do in the Somali context.

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1 A good example of building a reasonable effective security sector has been the case of Somaliland with the installment of, for instance, the Special Protection Unit (Gundel, 2006).

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4.3 CARE in Somalia

The history of CARE goes back much further than many of the UN organizations. In the aftermath of World War II, Europe was devastated and was pulled out of misery due to the large aid flows coming from the United States. One of these organizations collecting aid for post-WW II Europe was the “Cooperative for American Remittances to Europe” (nowadays CARE stands for Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere) that in the past sixty years has grown into one of the largest NGO’s in the world (Walker & Maxwell, 2009). CARE has evolved in accordance with the developments the humanitarian system in general has undergone in the past decades. Today’s development-security thinking, still the leading view in international politics on insecurity, also filters through CARE’s vision and strategic objectives that have been adjusted and refocused over time. It now strives to reduce poverty and injustice, and to promote dignity by aiming to attack its root causes embedded in complex social processes as opposed to only bringing remedies (CARE International, 2010). It attempts to do so by promoting sustainable humanitarianism meaning that it for example has developed its own core program principles (see appendix 3.II) and project standards to ensure effectiveness, quality and sustainability of aid assistance (CARE International, 2010).

Furthermore, CARE underlines the importance of upholding the Code of Conduct and the humanitarian principles. CARE’s emergency mandate for instance requires strict adherence to its principles that, among other, lays out that it works ‘independently of political, commercial, military, or religious objectives and promotes the protection of humanitarian space’ (CARE International, 2010). This is supported by its strategic objectives, outlined in Box 4.2, that clearly emphasize the aim of strengthening organizational skills and knowledge, and of connecting to and building further on an overarching structure of humanitarian cooperation, coordination and knowledge sharing in order to improve humanitarian assistance (CARE International, 2010). It has therefore joined several important humanitarian networks such as the Sphere Project, the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership International (HAP), Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP) and Emergency Capacity Building Project (ECB) \(^5\). Before 2008, CARE Somalia run operations in various sectors such as education, WASH and emergency preparedness and response. Then, CARE’s emphasis on organizational and humanitarian principles led to the difficult decision of suspending food aid distributions and terminate all operations.

**BOX 4.2 - CARE SIX STRATEGIC DIRECTIONS:**

1. Build capacity to respond to disasters
2. Global advocacy
3. Organisational evolution
4. Information and knowledge management
5. Build shared expertise in key areas of competence
6. Strengthen governance & decision-making processes

Appendix 3.I offers the extensive version of CARE’s strategic objectives.

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\(^4\) The CARE International confederation exists of 12 member organizations that operate in more than 70 countries all over the globe.

\(^5\) One of the core strategic imperatives of CARE projects is the formation of partnerships. At all levels, local, national and multinational, in the world CARE has established partnerships and alliances to successfully implement their projects.
4.3.1 Operational realities

The following paragraphs are based to a large extent upon the information obtained from the interviews I have conducted with CARE employees.

CARE began delivering emergency relief in 1981 to refugees in Somalia under a tripartite agreement signed with UNHCR and the Somali National Refugee Commission which lasted to the early 1990s (CARE, 2010c). In the 1990s it had to suspend its activities various times as a consequence of intensified security threats. Mogadishu in the 1990s resembled anarchy and amidst waging war, militias were mostly interested in goods and money. This resulted in the looting and taxation of cargo which, at that time, was the primary threat to aid agencies rather than kidnapping or killing of aid workers. CARE went back to Somalia in 1998. A decade later however, in 2008, CARE was forced once more to suspend all its activities in Southern and Central Somalia (CARE, 2010c). It remained present and active though in Somaliland and Puntland among others in the sector of emergency preparedness (see appendix 3.III).

The level and nature of threat in 2008 was totally different though than in 1998. The primary focus of targeting shifted from cargo towards personnel. Whereas security threats in the 1990s were primarily motivated by economic gain, security risks a decade later had an ideological angle to it. The consequences of a direct, public threat against CARE by an extremist Islamic group were substantial; CARE had to close down 6 sub offices in Southern and Central Somalia, suspend its activities, and prematurely terminate its contracts with partner NGO’s and contractors. Six months prior to this decision one of CARE’s staff was abducted by the same Islamic extremist group. The threats were not only posed upon CARE, but also upon a number of other NGOs, the UNDP and WFP. In the same year, several UN and NGO agencies had staff killed or kidnapped.

CARE’s decision to pull out of Central and South Somalia had been the result of several considerations and measures taken that make up its overall security strategy for Somalia. As has been described at the beginning of the chapter, dealing with security dilemmas requires negotiations with as goal to determine the terms of engagement. I noted that the bargaining position in these negotiations on humanitarian access can be strengthened by defining a standard for principled action as well as by ensuring an in-depth understanding on the situation. Even though CARE’s negotiations and conversations for humanitarian access have not led to the wished humanitarian access, its security strategy resemble those suggested by common scholars and humanitarians.

At the system level, CARE’s primary focus has been its involvement with partner organizations and the establishment of cooperation mechanisms:

• It initiated and/or promoted initiatives focussing on cooperation and coordination with among others, (UN) organizations, NGO’s and networks to improve the effective and secure delivery of aid and security (CARE International, 2010). A good example is the inter-agency Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in Somalia that has been signed by CARE, ICRC and WFP which includes the division of labour in order to avoid overlapping, confusion, competition and conflict (Gundel, 2006). Furthermore CARE is involved in various NGO networks that collectively gather information as well as exchange knowledge. The most important network in that region is the Somalia NGO Consortium under which the NGO Safety and Security Program operates. The latter seeks or supports consensus on strategies or positions that enhance/safeguard the safety and security of its own and other staff. Strategies may include joint advocacy and information sharing. With its strong participation in and adherence to cooperative initiatives like the Codes of Conduct, CARE continuously shapes its interpretation and limitations of humanitarianism.
At the organizational level, CARE is first and foremost preoccupied with the development and implementation of a consistent set of operational standards and frameworks in order to a) promote a stable base for humanitarian action, b) highlight its moving space within the grid of the humanitarian system and thus, c) to clarify the negotiation space with warring parties.

- **One of the guidelines CARE has developed to ensure staff safety in the field is the International Safety and Security Principles** (see appendix 3.IV). These principles emphasize not only the necessity for strict compliance and accountability of the principles in their programs and operations but they also highlight the importance to train, support and equip staff in difficult situations. CARE has also developed an in-house handbook “CARE Safety & Security Handbook” (2004) which guides management and staff. Beyond that each office must develop a Security Plan that includes Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) to guide that particular office’s operations as well as developing contingency plans which guide incident response and management. On the basis of these aforementioned principles and standards, CARE has proclaimed a bottom line of operating beyond which it will not continue to operate. CARE has, among others, prioritized the importance of security for its employees over the delivery of aid. Serious security threats targeting staff are outside the limits of what is acceptable to continue operations. Especially, in Somalia where the deliberate targeting of humanitarian staff in 2008 was relative high.

- **Another important factor of CARE’s security strategies is related to education, communication and information.** As aforementioned in the introductory paragraph, CARE focuses on increasing its employees’ skills and knowledge but also focuses on the general improvement of access to information and the exchange of experiences, skills and knowledge within the humanitarian system.

Different considerations and measures were made or taken at the operational level in 2008. CARE was primarily engaged in negotiating for access and thereby drawing its bottom line for operating:

- **Under the pressure of serious security treats, CARE acted along the line of the strict (internal) guidelines and principles it has installed for operating in a principled way.** Therefore negotiations and dialogue were possible to a certain point beyond which warring parties crossed the preset limitations. Nevertheless, it was a difficult decision to pull back because a trade off had to be made between not addressing the needs of 1 million beneficiaries or further endangering the lives of employees. Before having made the decision of retreat, CARE seriously investigated possible solutions by, among others, having dialogues with all parties involved: within CARE itself, within the NGO community, with partner organizations, local authorities and also with the warring/armed opposition group parties on both local and senior level. This was a difficult challenge as some parties are on the terrorist list of the international community which basically means that donors cannot support humanitarian organizations that cooperate/negotiate with them. Perceptions of aid agencies are critical and it is a continuous “walk on a tight rope” to ensure that all parties see CARE as neutral and impartial. For example if there are negotiations with Al-Shabaab it can be perceived by the TFG as supporting Al-Shabaab; it is very difficult for an humanitarian organization to be perceived as a party that has no political considerations.

- **CARE has not only clearly drawn its bottom line for personnel but also for its cargo.** With respect to cargo, accounts of malpractices as looting/taxation have not been the case so far for CARE in Somalia due to the close cooperation with local partners. A couple of years ago for example, there were about 400 checkpoints for convoys that required negotiating by all aid agencies when delivering cargo across the country. Local partners and clan elders had a vested interest that cargo reached their beneficiaries as planned. This was closely monitored by CARE and accountability was high. In cases of anything being lost, the contracted local partners were hold responsible and were expected to replace it. If this would not have been the case, and clear malpractices would be suspected, programs/operations would be suspended.
4.3.2 Analysis on CARE in Somalia

The past years, CARE has made substantial progress in the formation of its security management protocols. It gradually has entrenched security into the process right from proposal stage, project design right through to the implementation stage.

From the above mentioned strategies and on the basis of my interviews can be deducted that CARE’s main focus is to strengthen its bargaining position in the negotiation processes over humanitarian access. In one of my interviews it came clear that in order to improve the basis for negotiation, CARE finds it necessary to focus and, if possible, to cooperate on; more information sharing, increased transparency, better contextual analyses and collective decision-making and collective actions. This opinion reflects the strategies taken by CARE that strive for an in-depth understanding of the context and narrowed down set of standards for humanitarian action. It is involved in many networks, committees and research initiatives and places information sharing and cooperation high on the ladder of its preferences. It also strongly emphasizes the fact that it only operates there where there are no other organizations occupied with the same to ensure efficiency in the system.

CARE’s strength of security programming seems to be at the organizational level. As all agencies have different interpretations of humanitarian principles and have different operational modalities, it is difficult to cooperate for better access. CARE therefore underlines the importance of developing, shaping and implementing core programme principles, project standards and key objectives in its project planning so that it strengthens its own position in the negotiation process. In addition, it has developed a security handbook and installed the general “CARE International Safety and Security Principles” for its operations in order to, among others, guide employees in the field. Consequently, the education and training of its staff members incorporates the development of skills and competences and also supports staff in carrying out the organization’s principles and objectives. The fact that CARE has managed to successfully set standards and train its staff accordingly clearly results in the security strategy it enhances on the ground and the bottom line of operating it has proclaimed for operating in Somalia.

On the ground in Somalia, acceptance strategies lie at the base of CARE’s activities in the world. CARE operates primarily in partnerships and emphasizes the importance of having dialogues and negotiations with the involved parties. The importance of safeguarding personnel and cargo while avoiding deterrence strategies points out the bottom line for CARE of operating. Warring parties have repeatedly acted beyond this line which explains why CARE is not operational anymore in Southern and Central Somalia. In the light of Von Brabant’s theory on security strategies, the fact that CARE has suspended its operations can be seen as a strong protective measure that offers a last resort when acceptance strategies and softer protection strategies (such as employing less international staff) seem not to work. This strict adherence of CARE to its preset standards and principles has not always been the case. In the 1990s, CARE used a mixture of all security strategies (thus, also stronger protection and deterrence strategies) since communal acceptance had eroded somewhat due to changing perceptions locally and globally. Deterrence strategies used by CARE were mostly soft in nature and were characterised by the hiring of local armed guards for compounds.

CARE’s current security strategies are thus the result of a clear set of operating standards and a relative in-depth understanding of the conflict dynamics that has led to the fortification of its bargaining position. Even though warring parties have not substantially widened humanitarian access, this does not mean that CARE has failed in negotiating. CARE has put great efforts in creating a stable and transparent principled approach as required by IHL.
CARE has also been strongly engaged with developing security strategies on all levels with as goal to improve the security of personnel and cargo in the field and enable the safe delivery of aid. Despite that CARE is not present anymore in Southern and Central Somalia, the motivations, considerations and strategies that have led to the decisions to suspend operations in 2008 are important to this thesis. To me, the security strategies CARE develops are principled in nature, especially when compared with WFP, because of the following points:

- The fact that CARE’s security strategies seem to respect and act in accordance with neutrality and impartiality, implies that CARE believes that a principled approach is least harmful for Somali’s because of the possible outcomes the delivery of food aid may have for conflict dynamics. CARE faces situations in Somalia in which security threats posed upon personnel (or cargo) are real and humanitarian and operational principles cannot be upheld without compromising their practical implications. Although securing staff and cargo is very important to the organization, it is not at the cost of using strong deterrence strategies which, in the case of Southern and Central Somalia, has led to the suspension of all its activities. The use of armed protection for example to protect staff from attacks is not within CARE’s acceptable limits because it harms the very idea of being a humanitarian agency and can become perceived as an armed party in the conflict or even fuel the conflict.

- Furthermore, the fact that food aid plays a role in conflict dynamics can also quickly turn humanitarian operations into parties involved in the war dynamics. In conflict settings negotiations are a common tool to re-establish terms of engagement on both sides so that warring parties grant humanitarian access on the condition that humanitarian organizations do not interfere in the conflict. It has become clear that CARE in this situation would have a fairly good negotiation position. The situation in Somalia however is more complex due to the role that food aid plays in the conflict. It instantly implies that bargaining deals with warring parties on transportation logistics and humanitarian access within the food aid sector means becoming involved in the conflict. This is a decision that can be interpreted as harming neutrality and impartiality, especially because in Somalia the terms of agreement involve direct/indirect financial transactions that influence war dynamics.

- CARE is involved in various political and social arena’s in which it actively develops and promotes standards and working frameworks for principled approaches. It seems to be an important part of the identity of CARE to also uphold these standards and norms and values in practice. For me this is an important observation that expresses the believe CARE has in humanitarian principles as most crucial for the effective delivery of aid, even in insecure settings.

Taking the relative principled approach implies several things; 1) suspending operations have left behind around 1 million Somali’s without food aid and, 2) taking the principled approach has seemingly not led to significant consequences for conflict dynamics nor on the food security situation in Somalia. In general, suspending operations would result in aid recipients being left behind without aid possibly worsening the food insecurity. In this case though, WFP has taken over the care for these 1 million Somali’s (Jaspars, 2000).

4.4 Discussion

This chapter has offered us so far an overview and analysis of commonly suggested strategies that can be taken to improve security of aid personnel and cargo in the field. It has also analysed the strategies taken of WFP and CARE in Somalia to illustrate what organizations in practice do. I have summarised the most important findings in Table 4.1.

There are several observations that can be deducted from comparing both CARE and WFP with each other and with the suggested general strategies.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Common humanitarian responses</th>
<th>WFP</th>
<th>CARE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>System level</strong></td>
<td>Information sharing</td>
<td>Cooperative relationships to:</td>
<td>Cooperative relationships to:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Standards and Codes</td>
<td>• share information</td>
<td>• share information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• collectively set operating standards</td>
<td>• collectively set operating standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Codes of Conduct &amp; SPHERE Standards</td>
<td>• collective action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organizational level</strong></td>
<td>Internal operating principles</td>
<td>Monitoring, reporting and accounting systems</td>
<td>Develop security guidelines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Adequate human resource</td>
<td>Improving knowledge and skills base of personnel</td>
<td>Bottom line/limitations for operating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>management</td>
<td></td>
<td>Education, training personnel on security and standards &amp; principles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Operational level</strong></td>
<td>Acceptance</td>
<td>Cooperation with (local) organizations</td>
<td>Strict (internal) guidelines and principles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>Bargaining deals with warring parties</td>
<td>Negotiations and dialogue with as limitation bottom lines</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Adjusting logistical &amp; transportation processes</td>
<td>Employing less staff on the ground</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deterrence</td>
<td>Suspension of specific operations in Central and Southern Somalia</td>
<td>Suspension of all operations in Southern and Central Somalia</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hiring local armed guards for convoys</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Armed local trucking companies for transportation</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Continued delivery of Food Aid</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Firstly, it is an important observation that at the three levels, different considerations can be made with respect to principles versus pragmatist approaches in their security strategies. WFP seems to adhere to a principled approach when developing its strategies on the system and organizational level. In the field however, it chooses to adapt a more pragmatist approach. To me this implies that WFP values a principled approach but that it has also acknowledged the fact that in the field a principled approach might not be the solution to security threats. It seems that the strategies WFP takes in the field are somewhat flexible due to the moving space that results from the decisions made on the organizational and system level. This way it can be interpreted as if WFP is exploring the new international politics and conflict settings with as goal to reshape and adjust humanitarianism. For WFP it has already become clear that taking a pragmatist approach has (long term) consequences for its image due to its role in the conflict. The increasing number of allegations, reports and debate on the consequences of continuing food aid in Somalia are mounting up and clearly ask for serious considerations on what continued deliveries of aid have for consequences for its recipients and for the conflict. CARE on the other hand has chosen to keep up the line it has put forward at the organizational level. The table implies that there is less flexibility than WFP has on the operational level to adjust strategies and take pragmatic approaches. To me it indicates that CARE continues to focus on the value of principles even though it acknowledges that the political context in which humanitarianism is now located, has changed. CARE is thus aware of the fact that the resulting tradeoffs that have to be made may possibly worsen food insecurity for the purpose of upholding humanitarian principles and safeguard personnel.

Secondly, the focus on strategies that WFP and CARE have taken per level varies even though these strategies all seem to lie within the limits of the general suggestions made. The strategies have been largely the result of the perspective that a principled approach is essential to widen humanitarian access. Based on my research however, it looks like warring parties in Somalia seem not to care whether a humanitarian agency takes a more principled or pragmatist approach in their operations. It gives the impression that to them it is more important to control and profit from external influences to the conflict and that they do so by (ab)using the grid in which humanitarians are situated. The fact that humanitarian organizations operate on the basis of negotiated access, gives opportunities to belligerents to determine their conditions. In this sense, the fact that there is no strict interpretation or framework for principled approaches means that warring parties may always find agencies that are willing to compromise certain standards for access, as long as the demands are within certain limits. An interesting question is then what warring parties would do if all agencies would stick to the same bottom line and principled approaches, and decide to only operate under the same conditions.

Would warring parties then give in on the negotiations and could a new agreement on the terms of operating evolve from that? How would such an agreement look like and what effects would it have on the delivery of aid and on the conflict? Then it would also imply that warring parties recognize humanitarian aid as important in the conflict. Besides profiting from aid in an economic way, a possible explanation for this could be the fact that warring parties otherwise will have to look for alternative ways a) to gain international attention and b) to canalize their aversion or protest to the West.

Fact is however, that such a collective bargaining position is unlikely to evolve. Organizations differ in the way how they value certain strategies and to what extent these strategies are within (financial) capabilities of the agency. For the humanitarian system as such, this may signify that, even though full information and knowledge are available, and standards for interpreting and implementing principles are set, it continues to be very difficult to establish a collective bargaining basis. Negotiations will therefore probably remain a rather individual process where improving access depends for to a high degree on the demands of warring parties. For the delivery of aid in conflicts like Somalia this entails that it continues to be an unstable process dependent on the conditions warring parties might install. It is difficult to conclude what consequences this has for the food security. It is possible that food commodities will benefit Somali’s one way or another. It might also fuel conflict by introducing commodities that are desired by many parties. Not delivering aid however may disrupt today’s coping
mechanisms in upholding certain standards of food availability in specific regions and thus, result in worsened food insecurity.

This is an important contradiction within humanitarianism that makes it very difficult for agencies to improve humanitarian access. At one hand standardization is necessary to improve the position of humanitarians in the negotiation process on access. At the other hand it is an intrinsic characteristic of the humanitarian system that there is no overarching supervising organ that sets (operating) rules and that has the means to sanction those who do not stick to these rules. In addition, the nature and specialties of organizations, but also the operating contexts differ in such a way that standardization seems to be quasi impossible.

Nevertheless, attempting to develop and improve the concept and purpose of the humanitarian system will probably offer new insights for politicians, scholars and scientists in dealing with the security challenges of today’s conflicts.

4.5 Recapitulation

Improving humanitarian access and thus, minimizing security risks, is key to the continuation of food aid in Somalia. According to the common interpretation of IHL, the renegotiation of the terms of engagement lies at the basis of humanitarian access. Humanitarians can strengthen their bargaining base by defining a certain standard for principled approaches and by having an in-depth understanding of the context. Both WFP and CARE have developed strategies that include suggestions and ideas that are commonly used within the humanitarian system to strengthen their negotiation base. However the practical execution of these strategies differ and has resulted in diverging responses towards the security threats posed upon them. The fact that there is no strict interpretation of or framework for humanitarianism explains the difference in the prioritization of principles. I can conclude therefore that humanitarian ethics do play an important role in the development of security strategies even though WFP has adopted a relative pragmatic approach and CARE a relative principled approach.
5. CONCLUSIONS AND FINAL THOUGHTS

In this thesis I have explored the humanitarian situation in Central and Southern Somalia where security problems pose a serious threat to the delivery of food aid. Those security threats are the result of complex conflict dynamics. Mutual distrust between clans, eroded confidence in a national government and the reluctance towards international intermingling have resulted in a situation of insecurity. In this situation maintaining and controlling the status quo of economic, political and military power divisions is crucial for (warring) parties. A common tool to influence the power balances between warring parties is to manipulate the food security situation. This has given significant value to food aid commodities in the conflict. Consequently, warring parties are interested in influencing these flows of food aid.

Humanitarian organizations on the other hand hold on to four humanitarian principles (humanity, neutrality, impartiality, independence) that stem from a long history of humanitarianism. These principles, as laid down in International Humanitarian Law (IHL), are the basis for negotiating humanitarian access. Humanitarian agencies therefore strive to deliver aid that has the least impact on conflict dynamics. The current situation however has changed substantially with respect to access because warring parties attempt to control flows of food aid. They pose additional conditions on humanitarians that are for most agencies beyond what is acceptable within the humanitarian grid. The tension that arises from this discrepancy of interests results in skewed power relationships between warring parties and humanitarian organizations where the former uses security threats to exercise power over the latter. In such a situation where warring parties do not respect IHL, humanitarian organizations that seek to uphold the humanitarian principles, have to carefully consider how to cope with these security dilemmas. Hence, my research question was:

“In how far do WFP and CARE find a balance between principles and pragmatism in responding to security threats to personnel and cargo in food aid distribution operations in Somalia?”

To respond adequately to this question, I have looked at various factors that were important to analyze the current situation of insecurity for food operations in Somalia. These factors correspond with the four sub questions that are answered in the chapters.
1. **In how far has the changing notion of humanitarianism influenced the strategies taken by humanitarian organizations in complex emergencies?**

The historical overview of the humanitarian system in chapter two has shown that the shape and concept of humanitarianism has evolved over time. Religion, economic and social developments, including war and underdevelopment, have profoundly changed society and thereby determined the ‘Zeitgeist’ by which the humanitarian system was influenced. The basis of today’s concept of humanitarianism is the establishment of terms of engagement for both warring parties and humanitarians in the field. The major idea is that humanitarian access in a conflict should be negotiated. The agreements include that humanitarians must remain neutral, impartial and independent in return for access to serve those in need. With the end of the Cold War however, the nature of conflict changed profoundly. The new challenges and opportunities that arose from the new conflicts changed the interest of warring parties in IHL. Belligerents seem to no longer be interested in fully respecting the terms of engagement. This means that in violent conflicts such as Somalia tradeoffs have to be made between principles when they cannot all be equally uphold anymore. To indeed make this tradeoff has proven to be very difficult. The interpretations of what the principles exactly signify and how they should be implemented in today’s operating environment vary among agencies, even though they have been conceptualized and institutionalized. The fact that there is no strict interpretation of or framework for the humanitarian system indicates that finding a balance between principles and pragmatism in operating strategies is dependent on the humanitarian agencies. In Somalia it seems that finding this balance depends on how far agencies are willing to go to protect staff and thus continue to deliver aid, possibly at the cost of compromising neutrality and impartiality.

2. **In what way has constructed food insecurity in Somalia influenced the secure delivery of food aid?**

In chapter three the relation between constructed food insecurity and the insecurity hampering humanitarian operations is displayed. Belligerents manipulate food security to the extent that it undermines or blocks coping mechanisms that secure food supplies in times of absolute scarcity and temporary lowered access to food. The inclusion or exclusion of certain parts of the population to access food supplies, strengthen or uphold the status quo of economic and political power in the conflict. In a country like Somalia, the manipulation of food security is a day-to-day practice and part of their war strategy. The large influx of food aid therefore may threaten their position in the conflict. For this reason, warring parties try to get direct hold on food aid flows by means of posing security threats on aid personnel and cargo to impose their operating conditions. Common threats experienced by WFP and CARE are for example the diversion and taxation of cargo, and the kidnapping or harassment of personnel. Thus, warring parties profit economically and politically from the strong position they have in relation to humanitarian agencies.

Security threats however are also indirectly based on the fact that warring parties want to control the internal situation. Chapter two touches upon the fact that that conflict can be seen as “a continuation of economics and politics by other means to adapt to the global system in which Southern states have a structural, much lower status in trade, economics, and (security) politics”. Form this perspective, humanitarian organizations can be perceived as essential threat to their survival mechanisms. Those who seek to defend this and fight Western powers see humanitarian agencies as proxy targets. These more ideological reasons have increasingly led to warring parties attacking / threatening humanitarian operations. In addition, posing security threats on humanitarians arouses and increases international attention.
3. How do WFP and CARE respond to these security risks?

Both WFP and CARE have to cope with security threats that inhibit the safe delivery of food aid. Both organizations were forced to make a trade-off between delivering food aid and thus, serve the humanitarian imperative, or suspending all activities in order to uphold neutrality and impartiality. It is at the same time a consideration of how far an agency is willing to go in protecting staff and cargo to provide food aid.

Chapter four offered a general framework in which common suggestions from scholars, humanitarians and politicians for security strategies were structured. The framework exists of three levels that broadly correspond to strategies taken on 1) the level of cooperation between humanitarian agencies, or in cooperation with other actors (system level), 2) the organizational level and 3) on the operational level. The proposed strategies focus in essence on strengthening the bargaining position in the negotiation process with warring parties. Therefore two cross cutting themes of the proposed strategies were the in-depth understanding of the violent context and the streamlining of standards for principled approaches. I used the two specific cases, WFP and CARE, to analyze in how far their security strategies corresponded with those suggested in the general framework and compared them with each other.

An important observation was that the focus on strategies WFP and CARE have taken all seem to lie within the limits of the general suggestions made, but that at the three levels different consideration are made between a more principled or pragmatist approach. WFP focuses on principled approaches in the system and organizational level just like CARE, but on the operational level WFP diverges from CARE and takes a pragmatic approach in its strategies.

WFP thus takes a more pragmatist approach in the operational setting of Somalia meaning that 1) the humanity principle in this setting is prioritized to a certain extent over neutrality and impartiality and 2) that therefore securing personnel and cargo compromise neutrality and impartiality within acceptable levels defined by WFP. This has led to the (partially) continued distribution of food aid. It has thereby also brought its operations to be close to the edge of what is accepted in the humanitarian system of today. CARE has taken a more principled approach in the operational setting of Somalia meaning 1) it prioritized the operating principles of neutrality and impartiality within acceptable levels and 2) that securing personnel and cargo cannot be at the cost of compromising neutrality and impartiality. This has resulted in the suspension of all CARE food aid programs.

4. What do the findings of this research tell us about balancing principles versus pragmatism and how does this relate to humanitarian aid in general?

Firstly, the scheme that has been presented in chapter four clearly shows how the decisions made and strategies taken at the system and organizational level have influenced the approach in the field. WFP seems to have more moving space within the humanitarian grid to explore the limits of negotiating. CARE on the other hand seems to impose strict adherence to a principled approach on all levels. Both organizations are situated within the humanitarian grid and are situated in the same Somali setting while experiencing very similar difficulties. The large difference in security strategies indicates that there may be internal factors that cause the diversity between them. A possible factor could be the interest that stakeholders have in the organization and its performance. Another possible factor can be the internal organizational structure of that prescribes the strictness of internal operational principles. The size and the degree of dependency might also play a role in deciding upon strategies just as leadership within an organization.

Secondly, chapter four points out that, in a situation where food aid plays an important role in the conflict dynamics, principled approaches are then effective in negotiating humanitarian access when the collective is
large enough. In that case, assuming that food aid still is needed for saving lives, warring parties cannot find replacement for those organizations that otherwise decide not to operate. In reality however, it is very difficult to cooperate and streamline the differences within the humanitarian system/grid because 1) the intrinsic characteristic to the humanitarian system is the fact that there is no strict interpretation, supervising organ of or framework for humanitarianism and 2) because there are other, internal factors in an organization that influence the decision making on security strategies. This implies then that warring parties are not interested in whether a particular organization takes a more principled or pragmatist approach on the ground, as long as they can control overall humanitarian access. This attitude is possible exactly because of the fact that there is no collective approach within the humanitarian system. As soon as CARE decides to leave, WFP takes over its operations. The situation then for warring parties does not tangibly change. Even “better”, forcing out humanitarian organizations possibly increase the international attention for their cause.

From both findings, we can conclude that WFP and CARE are deeply involved in attempting to uphold humanitarian principles in their security strategies. We can also conclude that within the grid in which humanitarians are situated, there is moving space for organizations to balance out a principled versus pragmatist approach in responding to security threats to personnel and cargo in food aid distribution operations in Somalia. Furthermore we can state that the debate is far from ending and that more debate and research on the dynamics behind principles versus pragmatist approaches might elucidate the still existing large differences among organizations. Humanitarian agencies, scholars and politicians should continue their negotiation processes, investigate the possible terms of engagement, strengthen their bargaining position and most importantly, keep on developing the concept, notion and practicalities of the humanitarian system. This is necessary to continue to ensure live saving aid to those in need as much as possible.

This research aimed to explore the difficulties experienced by humanitarian organizations in responding to security risks of food aid personnel and cargo in Somalia. The conclusions drawn in this thesis have made clear what the challenges and contradiction are for improving the secure delivery of food aid in Somalia and thereby contribute to the food security situation. These challenges and contradiction relate to the intrinsic character of the humanitarian system in which standards are a necessity for improving humanitarian access while it is in practice quasi impossible to streamline organizations when there is no strict framework or supervising organ. This research has tried to synthesize the topics that are commonly dealt with separately in the literature. These three topics were 1) security threats experienced by aid personnel in the field, 2) different security strategies that might improve the safe delivery of humanitarian aid and 3) the theoretical debate on principles versus pragmatism. By combining them, this thesis was able to explore the security situation and both the cases WFP and CARE from various sides and perspectives that eventually strengthened and complemented the in- depth understanding of security threats in the food aid sector in Somali’s conflict.

I chose to conduct my research by using two cases that responded differently to the security threats experienced on the ground. The choice of Somalia offered me the chance to research a situation that is still ongoing and for which it is still relevant to increase public awareness for the humanitarian situation. On the other hand this was exactly the reason for the lack of empirical data. The delicacy of the topic caused the reluctance of various employees of WFP and CARE to participate in a semi-structured interview. Some of my interviewees were very willing to help me by participating in interviews or to send me relevant documents but rather be not named in my thesis which I respected. The use of interviews turned out to be a very good source for field-information on the practicalities of directly coping with security threats. Especially because the interviewees I had contacted were all specialists on this topic. Nevertheless, I have conducted four interviews with CARE employees and none with WFP employees which is a strong limitation to the empirical information I have on WFP on the ground in Somalia.
Many topics have been addressed in this thesis which is at one hand a strong characteristic of an explorative study but also has its drawbacks. By shortly introducing various concepts without extensively discussing them might have lead to a partial understanding of all elements and dynamics involved. The thesis also attempted to illustrate the actual difficulties in Somalia by introducing WFP and CARE with as goal to demonstrate the clear differences in approach while at the same time being so closely related to each other. I think that the potential for better understanding of the situation lies in comparing and exploring more organizations. This may improve the understanding of the dynamics and decisions made behind the balancing of principles and pragmatism in security strategies.

Recommendation 1: Investigate more humanitarian organizations, present in Somalia, that operate within the food sector and in other sectors in order to deepen the understanding on and the context of the relation between food aid as war tool and security threats.

Furthermore, based on the conclusion that coordination and cooperation both seem to be important for strengthening the collective negotiation position for improving humanitarian access, it would be interesting to research the humanitarian sector in Somalia as such.

Recommendation 2: Explore levels of coordination and cooperation within the humanitarian sector in Somalia and investigate what influences this has on improving humanitarian access.

In the second chapter I have given a selection of serious difficulties humanitarians face today that result from the position and role the humanitarian system has in contemporary international politics. The selection focused on the relationship between donor governments, warring parties and humanitarian agencies. It would be interesting to elaborate also on the difficulties in practice that humanitarians experience in relation to civilians. Civilians are quickly victimized and in relation to Somalia I have not encountered literature that relates civilians to security threats in the food aid sector. This is remarkable because warring parties do need some form of popular base for their legitimacy. This would imply that civilians support warring parties in their strategies. It could also imply that there is no form of civil society strong enough to provide a counterbalance to warring parties.

Recommendation 3: Investigate the role civilians play in the relation between the conflict, food aid and the security threats. This might include research on civil society initiatives that promote humanitarian access.

In my third chapter I highlighted the most important motivations of warring parties that might have led to the increased insecurity for humanitarians in Somalia. In the literature as well as from my interviews I observed that there are many ideas, opinions and possible explanations for both economic and political motivations. There seems to be a lack of empirical data though and even though it might be hard to investigate, it might offer valuable insights to the problem and maybe even information for better and more balanced out negotiations between warring parties and humanitarians.

Recommendation 4: Explore the relationship between warring parties and humanitarian agencies further and analyse the content, origins and dynamics of motivations that warring parties have to threaten humanitarian personnel and cargo.

In the fourth chapter I demonstrated that humanitarian agencies aim to include a balanced out approach between principles and pragmatism that, even though it varies among agencies, is one of the things humanitarians can do within their grid to improve humanitarian access. Furthermore the chapter highlighted on the basis of their choices in security strategies why WFP seems to be more pragmatic in nature in contrast to
CARE. The research however was not able to investigate why these choices have been made. This might provide very valuable insights that go beyond this thesis’ observation that the humanitarian system facilitates diversity of interpretations, in a way that it might explain the actual differences.

**Recommendation 5:** Conduct in-depth, specialised researches on factors that influence decision making processes within a humanitarian organization that determine the principled-pragmatist scope of operating strategies.

Although there have been limitations to this research, I do think that it offers a small contribution to the understanding of food aid difficulties in Somalia. Especially, in times where the relation between humanitarianism and violent conflict is not yet fully investigated while tensions between states like Somalia and western states continue to rise.


Islamic Relief Worldwide (2009). *Islamic relief is dedicated to alleviating poverty and suffering of the world’s poorest people.* Retrieved from http://www.islamic-relief.com


The Sphere Project, 2004. *Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response*. Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR) and InterAction with VOICE and ICVA.


Maps

Photos
World Food Program / Peter Smerdon

Graphic Design
Magali de Walick / http://www.magali.dewalick.nl
Appendix 1.
Conditions of Al Shabaab

The following conditions should be filled before the organization starts operating in the region:

The Organization-
1. Should inform Shabaab liaisons office, before implementing any project, so it be shown where is the right place to implement.
2. Should expands it programs to other areas, where it not operating at the moment.
3. Should distance itself from anything that will interfere with the Islamic religion like; preaching Christianity, promoting secularism, democracy and anything that is opposite to the Islamic teaching.
4. Should distance itself from anything that will affect the good Islamic culture like;
   (a) bringing and use of alcohol
   (b) promotion of adultery and establishing of women groups/Organizations
   (c) bringing films of whatever type
   (d) uses of public holidays as Saturdays and Sundays
   (e) celebration of national days i.e. Happy New Year, World’s Aids Day, World’s Women Day, World Teachers Day and anything that will bring about the association of women and men in one place.
5. Should remove employed women from jobs and instead employ men in their positions. Women are not allowed to work except, in Hospitals, MCH’s and other health sites. Women employed in other places should remove from their jobs and replaced with men within (3) three months.
6. Should not at any time inform/relay/transfer any information business between the organization and the regional Islamic administration of Bay and Bakol to any other place or thing.(Should be between us).
7. Should distance from anything that can bring about insecurity. i.e.
   a) Creating Conflict between local administration and the community
   b) Creating Conflict between tribes and all other parts of the community
   c) Raising prices of money exchange and cause of inflation
8. Should not bring food, when the farmers are harvesting their crops, if the organization is dealing Food projects.
9. Should not raise their flag or symbol at their offices and vehicles. The ones that have it should be rubbed or removed.
10. Should not share office and employees with other organizations (Should have its office and employees independently).
11. Should pay an amount of $ 20,000.00 (Twenty thousand) dollars in every (6) months once. The amount paid will be used for the security of Bay and Bakol and registration of the organization. The payment will be made within (1) one month, starting from 4/11/09.

Source: I received this document from one of my CARE Somalia contacts who wishes to remain anonymous.
Appendix 2.
World Food Program – Background Information

I. WFP’s core (operating) principles

1. Carried out in conformity with humanitarian principles, and therefore in ways that contribute to the safety and dignity of affected populations and good humanitarian donorship;

2. As sustainable, efficient, effective, demand driven and developmentally beneficial as possible;

3. Responsive to the principles related to the right to food, and based on the practical wisdom and needs of local populations wherever possible;

4. As targeted and connected as possible to the needs of the most vulnerable and to national government priorities, programmes and strategies;

5. Based on a preventive approach, tackling whenever possible the root causes of hunger and vulnerability arising from natural and human-induced disasters as well as economic shocks;

6. As innovative and accountable as possible, making use of best practices and knowledge, and enhanced by a continued process of evaluation;

7. Innovative in promoting and assuring the nutritional dimension of food assistance, recognizing that hunger and under-nutrition are major determinants of mortality, economic growth and prosperity, and also key aspects of the intergenerational cycle of hunger;

8. Mindful of the powerful link between gender and hunger: WFP will continue working at programme, institutional and inter-agency levels to ensure gender sensitivity and equality in all its efforts; and

9. Designed and implemented to ensure the coherent and optimal use of overall resources, including through partnerships and hand-over to communities, governments, non-governmental organizations, or other United Nations agencies whenever they can meet the short- and long-term needs of the hungry poor more effectively and efficiently.

Source: WFP Strategic Plan 2008 – 2011, p. 7
II. The organizational structure of the World Food Programme’s activities in Somalia

Source: WFP, 2010
III. WFP's operations in Somalia are:

Emergency Rehabilitation Work for Mogadishu and Kismayo Ports, and Targeted Emergency Road Rehabilitation for Key Main Supply Routes in South Somalia, in Direct Support of the Provision of Emergency Humanitarian Food Aid  
(Special Operations)  
- This program has started on 15.02.2007 and will last to at least 31.12.2011  
- Its main purpose is to improve infrastructure to streamline the delivery of humanitarian shipments and facilitate easier and less costly transportation routes at the main supply routes in South Somalia.

Humanitarian Air Service in Support of Relief Operations in Somalia  
(Special Operations)  
- This program started on 01.12 2007 and ended at 31.07.2009  
- Due to the severe violence taking place in mainly Central and South Somalia, the main purpose of this program was to continue humanitarian aid transportation from the point where transportation on land was not possible anymore with respect to security of aid personnel and cargo. Additionally, this program was implemented to ensure aircraft capacity in order to be able to perform medical and security evacuations to Kenya.

Emergency Telecommunications Cluster Roll-out  
(Special Operations)  
- This program started on 01.01.2008 and was extended to 31.12.2009  
- It was a project targeting 16 countries all over the world that aimed to improve the predictability and infrastructure of security telecommunication services in times of emergencies by increasing and build in-country capacity with as goal to improve humanitarian response by facilitating information flows.

Targeted Augmentation of Security Requirements in Somalia Vital to the Continuity of Relief Assistance  
(Special Operations)  
- This program started on 01.12.2008 and ended on 28.02.2009  
- This program was designed to quickly enhance security support capabilities in a short period in order to enable programs to continue, which translated into a continued distribution of humanitarian aid and improve staff security.

Food Aid for Emergency Relief and Protection of Livelihoods  
(Emergency Operations)  
- This program started on 01.04.2009 and has been extended to 31.03.2011  
- This program was launched to respond to the decreasing humanitarian situation in Somalia in which the number of IDP’s has increased rapidly and the food security situation has deteriorated significantly.
Appendix 3.
CARE – Background Information

I. CARE six strategic directions

1. Build capacity to respond to disasters
   Goal: to respond more effectively and comprehensively to humanitarian emergencies worldwide and thereby to increase the scope and impact of CI’s emergency programmes, as well as to strengthen donor funding and CI’s profile.

2. Global advocacy
   Goal: to become more effective in joint advocacy around policy-related causes of poverty and humanitarian suffering.

3. Organisational evolution
   Goal: to allow CI to achieve greater impact and legitimacy by causing it to become more diverse, relevant and accountable to the people it serves.

4. Information and knowledge management
   Goal: to become more effective in knowledge and information management, thus allowing CI to leverage its scale in ways that increase organisational accountability, learning and relevance and, ultimately, programme impact.

5. Build shared expertise in key areas of competence
   Goal: to build shared expertise in selected programme areas, in order to strengthen CI member and country office operations, and thereby their impact on the causes and consequences of poverty.

6. Strengthen governance & decision-making processes
   Goal: to strengthen further CI’s governance and management in a way that will help to create the organizational conditions needed to ensure success in strategic directions 1 to 5.

Source: CARE International, 2010
II. CARE Core Programme Principles

Principle 1: Promote empowerment
“We stand in solidarity with poor and marginalized people, and support their efforts to take control of their own lives and realise their rights, responsibilities and aspirations. We ensure that those people who are affected are involved in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of our work. “

Principle 2: Work in partnership with others
“We work with others to maximise the impact of our work, building alliances and partnerships with those who take similar or complementary approaches, are able to work on a larger scale, and/or who have responsibility to fulfil rights and alleviate poverty through policy change and enforcement. “

Principle 3: Ensure accountability and promote responsibility
“We seek to be held accountable to poor and marginalized people whose rights are denied. We identify those with an obligation toward poor and marginalized people, and support and encourage their efforts to fulfil their responsibilities. “

Principle 4: Address discrimination
“In our programmes and offices we oppose discrimination and the denial of rights based on sex, race, nationality, ethnicity, class, religion, age, physical ability, caste, opinion or sexual orientation. “

Principle 5: Promote the non-violent resolution of conflicts
“We promote just and non-violent means for preventing and resolving conflicts, noting that such conflicts contribute to poverty and the denial of rights. “

Principle 6: Seek sustainable results
“We working to identify and address underlying causes of poverty and rights denial, we develop and use approaches that ensure our work results in lasting and fundamental improvements in the lives of the poor and marginalized with whom we work. “

Source: CARE International, 2010
III. CARE’s Operations

CARE has developed a variety of projects in more than 72 countries. Its operations are both humanitarian as well as developmental in nature. The CARE Topography Report 2009 indicates that for 2009, its operations were 73% development programmes and 27% Emergency Response programs. In the radial diagram below, the various sectors in which CARE operates are schematically outlined. The yellow circles represent the three sectors in which there are ongoing activities in Somalia (Somaliland & Puntland) in 2010.

The organizational structure of CARE’s activities in Somalia
CARE International Safety and Security Principles

**Principle 1:** All CARE International Confederation Members will hold themselves accountable for maintaining and respecting the CARE International Safety and Security principles through their policies, protocols and procedures.

**Principle 2:** Safety and security is everyone’s responsibility within CARE International through full compliance and accountability.

**Principle 3:** Program and program support decisions must be informed by appropriate safety and security considerations at all levels.

**Principle 4:** There must be clear lines of authority and decision-making mechanisms that underpin safety and security.

**Principle 5:** All CARE International Confederation Members will comply with the Minimal Operating Security Standards (MOSS).

**Principle 6:** CARE staff will be equipped, trained and supported in the area of safety and security, appropriate for the safety and security conditions of their assignment.

*Source: CARE International, 2010*

*Note: CARE’s minimal operating security standards are founded upon all CARE policy and operating standards, principles, and procedures with respect to safety and security considerations.*
Appendix 4.
Interview model for CARE

Personal information

1. Since when are you an employee of CARE?
2. For how long have you been working on the position you are currently working at?
3. Can you describe your tasks, duties and current position/job at CARE?

Security threats & Food Aid

Somalia has supposedly become one of the worst humanitarian crises of the world where an estimated 3.2 million people are in need of emergency assistance. Violence and food insecurity have led to widespread internal population displacement and created an extremely vulnerable population. Responding to the serious humanitarian crisis has been very difficult in Somalia as the operating environment for humanitarian organizations is very dangerous due to the security threats/risks posed on aid personnel and cargo by various warring parties (whether these are militias, clans, warlords, or other types of armed parties) and their supporters.

There are different types of security threats/risks posed by warring parties in a complex emergency that can be identified broadly into two categories: intentional and unintentional targeting. The focus of this thesis is on intentional targeting such as killing, kidnapping, wounding of aid personnel and looting, taxation, diversion, control of food aid distribution channels/logistics.

4. What types of (intentional) security threats to CARE personnel occur in Somali’s complex emergency?
   (Please describe the threats/risks in more detail along with one or two examples)
   a. Which two of these threats/risks are perceived as most threatening to the distribution of food aid?
   b. What is the incidence of both types of threats/risks?
   c. Who is behind the threat or posing the risk (clans, militias, warlords, etc.)?

5. What are the two major security threats to CARE food aid distribution logistics in Somalia according to you?
   (Please describe the threats/risks in more detail along with one or two examples)
   a. Which two of these threats/risks are perceived as most threatening to the distribution of food aid?
   b. What is the incidence of both types of threats/risks?
   c. Who is behind the threat or posing the risk (clans, militias, mercenaries)?

6. How do you think that the food insecurity has come about in the first place?

7. What do you think are important reasons for warring parties to harm effective food aid distribution through the deliberate targeting of aid personnel and cargo? Or, differently said, with what goal do these parties use violence threats or acts on food aid distribution operations (personnel and cargo)? (Please elaborate on your answer)
Strategies to cope with or deal with security threats/risks

Every organization has operating guidelines, response strategies and so on to react on security threats/risks or at least deal with them in order to ensure effective humanitarian aid. The following questions are related to the ways in which CARE responds to these kinds of threats/risks.

8. What measures/strategies does CARE take to cope or deal with the threats/risks in the field that are related to the safety of CARE personnel?
   a. Can you also give an example of a situation related to the safety of CARE personnel in Somalia and the measures or strategies that have been taken?
   b. Did these measures/strategies indeed improve the safety of the personnel in this specific example?
   c. How has this influenced the delivery of food aid?

9. What measures/strategies does CARE take to cope or deal with the threats/risks in the field that are related to the safety of CARE food aid cargo?
   a. Can you also give an example of a situation related to the safety of CARE food aid cargo in Somalia and the measures or strategies that have been taken?
   b. Did these measures/strategies indeed improve the safety of the cargo in this specific example?
   c. How has this influenced the delivery of food aid?

10. Can a learning curve be identified within CARE in the way they have reacted on these security hazards since the start of their operations in Somalia?
    a. Do you have suggestions on how the operating environment can be improved in order to ensure safety for personnel and cargo and thus to be able to provide unhindered food aid to its recipients?

11. In how do you think that the concept of humanitarian principles is useful for securing effective and good food aid distribution in the complex emergency of Somalia? Might there be limits to its current interpretation? Is there an alternative way of interpreting or applying these principles in the field?