THE EUROPEAN SELF-IMAGE AND IDENTITY IN RELATION TO THE WESTERN BALKANS

Master Thesis
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1. Introduction

“Conscious of its spiritual and moral heritage, the Union is founded on the indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity; it is based on the principles of democracy and the rule of law. It places the individual at the heart of its activities, by establishing the citizenship of the Union and by creating an area of freedom, security and justice. The Union contributes to the preservation and to the development of these common values while respecting the diversity of the cultures and traditions of the peoples of Europe as well as the national identities of the Member States and the organisation of their public authorities at national, regional and local levels; it seeks to promote balanced and sustainable development and ensures free movement of persons, goods, services and capital, and the freedom of establishment.” (European Communities (2000): Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, p. 8) The preamble of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union demonstrates the values and ideas on which the Union is founded and the member states agreed on. The Community tries to develop and promote this Self-image to the inside over years but it competes with the strong and traditional national identities and Self-images. The European Union thus struggles in this case to communicate a European identity and Self-image within its own territory.

With the Treaty of Lisbon agreed on in 2009 a new field was developed: the European foreign policy. “Finally, a strong majority of citizens also supports the creation of the position of an EU-Foreign Affairs Minister, thus accepting the idea of having a common foreign policy for the European Union. This is another sign that Europeans are willing to engage into further European integration by accepting a more political union.” (Secretariat General of the European Commission (2004): p. 33) Consequently, the evolving questions concerning a Self-image in relation with the outside world are how an agreement between the competing national identities and interests of the individual member states should be achieved. Additionally, how such a Self-image would look like and be communicated if the Union struggles to develop and communicate its Self already to the inside.

Therefore, the background of this research project consists of the difficulties to build up the European External Action Service (EEAS) and a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSDP) for the European Union like described in the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009. A new aspect in the Treaty is that it includes the field of foreign policy, which belongs to the so-called
“hard politics” and lies originally strictly in the hands of the member states of the European Union. This means a new level of integration for the European Union. But how the External Action Service should look is only defined in very vague terms in the Treaty of Lisbon. The same goes for the definition of a Self-image towards third countries and the behaviour and relationship towards them.

Through this new dimension on the European level a definition and ‘Verstehen’ in the sense of Max Weber of the European Self-image becomes more and more important, because a common representation to the outside is aspired. The formation of such a Self-image and representation needs to be in contrast to counterparts in order do define what the Self is and what it is not. In the context of this research project, the important counterparts are the Orient, the East and the Western Balkans as well as the United States and the NATO as the other international key players in the post-conflict area of Former Yugoslavia. Additionally, the construction of a foreign policy identity is influenced by the creation of an Other. Through the increasing impact of globalisation but also the fall of the Iron Curtain and the enlargement of the European Union old identity formations and old ‘Others’ disappeared and new ones emerged, what led to shifting borders and new representation forms. This also means that identities had to be constructed and re-constructed. New challenges occurred like illegal migration, terrorism or the climate change, which are characterised by their global dimension. All these new issues made it necessary to develop or construct new frameworks, identity formations and thus Selves and Others. As Baroness Catherine Ashton stated: “But it is no longer ‘our’ world – we have to adapt.” (July 2010 in Athens on the issue ‘Europe and the world’). These new phenomena compose new challenges for the integration system European Union but also for the European society.

The European Union reacted on these phenomena in different ways. One way was the Eastern Enlargement of the EU. But the main development has been the new treaty of 2009. The Treaty of Lisbon lifts the integration system to a higher level: it increases the meaning of the EU, gives new possibilities for the institutions but also increases the power of several organs and institutions of the EU. Additionally, the treaty composes a quasi ‘constitutional’ act and increases the meaning of a European identity and thus European Others. This background took me to the objective of this research project and constitutes also its social and societal relevance. This issue is narrowed down by the example of the Western Balkan. Especially, the recent conflicts in the region showed that a Common Foreign and Security Policy and
consequently, the European External Service for the European Union and thus a common image of the EU outward is necessary in order to achieve stability and security in Europe.

“The Union shall develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries, aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union and characterised by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation.“ (European Union (2007): p. 16) The ability to secure and stabilise the own backyard of the European Union namely the Western Balkans is inherent in this propose. Additionally, the Western Balkan states represent a special case: the recent conflict in this region made the EU aware that a common position to the outside has been necessary. Moreover, it was the first foreign and military mission of the EU. “[Jens Becker] cites the destruction of Yugoslavia during the 90s, a process in which a European Community preoccupied with its own economic and monetary union appeared powerless to react, as being key in the problematic development of a foreign and security policy at the EU level, where the EU is still ‘between globalisation and fragmentation’.” (Jens Becker (2008): p. 7) The EU is at the moment negotiating with these states about a possible membership. This case constitutes thus a framework for new policy fields and instruments for the EU. The awareness led to the creation of the European External Action Service and the common position on foreign, security and defence issues. This means for European societies that a rethinking of old frameworks, identities but also dichotomies becomes necessary in order to be able to act in a single way in the field of foreign and security policy. This is exactly the point where the project starts.

Problems result at this point from the disaccord of the involved actors. How should such a Self-image and thus the European External Action Service look like or in other words how should the foreign policy identity and consequently a common Self-image be defined in order to act in a single way and speak with one voice because it was not possible to act fast and proper in the recent crisis situations. The Treaty of Lisbon does not answer these questions because the treaty is very vague concerning this topic: “In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.” (European Union (2007): p. 13) The example of Article 2 of the Treaty shows that the definitions on how to interact with the world outside which always
includes a Self and an Other are kept in a general manner and no working methods are defined for the foreign policy field.

Besides that, the actors are involved in multiple identities and therefore Self-images. These aspects make it difficult to enable a common attitude out of this diversity. This means that the project context of this research project is inside the EU-services for foreign matters, the European Commission and the European Council respectively in order to bracket the issue of the European Self-image.

Tensions arise therefore because of four main issues. First, the question of identity must be solved. This means to define the role in the world and thus the Self-image of the EU. Second, the question of borders has to be settled. The actors involved must clarify the situation concerning questions like where does Europe end and what lies outside and what inside the European Union. Third, it is necessary to clear up the question of power. The European Union has to decide if it wants to be a Soft or Hard power, how it defines itself as a global power and how its role in the world should look like. Fourth, the question of integration is not clear. Tensions arise because the member states have to decide if they want to give up a great part of their national sovereignty in the field of foreign and security policy and how they want to handle that transformation. This also means to ask oneself, whether a deeper integration is wished and then how large the EU should get as well as if the EU wants to be a community of values or merely an economic community.

These problems must be solved in order to achieve the desired goals mentioned in the Lisbon Treaty and to be able to act in a single way. Otherwise, the European External Action Service is neither possible nor useful. At the moment the actors argue about possible solutions for these problems since the European External Action Service and the field of a European foreign and security policy are still under construction. Among the involved persons no consensus has been achieved so far and the Treaty of Lisbon as basis is very vague. Baroness Catherine Ashton, the current High-Representative of Foreign and Security Affairs, tries at the moment to give an adequate form to the service and to define her own role in the European Union.
1.1 Research Objectives

Consequently, it is possible to draw the following research objectives from this context. The research project will consist of various research approaches – Social Constructivism, Orientalism, Postcolonialism, Human and Regional Geography, Sociology, and Cultural Science – in order to examine the constructed Self-image of the EU at the moment also including the past of the European continent and its colonial heritage as well as the resulting behaviour outwards. In this way, I will investigate as one aspect the ‘Verstehen’ (understanding or comprehension) of its role in the world and the underlying Self-image of the European Union. The project is thus aiming at analysing the various constructions of imagined borders towards ‘Others’ and the ideas that lie behind these constructions as well as to explain their relations. This aim makes it necessary to include the approaches of Postcolonialism, Orientalism and Social Constructivism in order to identify the underlying ideas behind these ‘Others’, which have been constructed over centuries. For this purpose, I will use the example of the Western Balkan states in the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP). For the EU the Western Balkan states are composed of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia as well as Kosovo under UNSC Resolution 1244/99. I will leave out Croatia in this research project because it is at a higher level of relationship with the European Union and now as well had been granted the status of a candidate country for the Union. Kosovo under UNSC Resolution 1244/99 will also not be included because the country has no Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) signed yet and it is not a Self-governed state. Additionally, the status of Kosovo is not finally resolved yet. “The EU is ensuring that Kosovo benefits from the key instruments offered to the region. The opening of status discussions is a challenge for the entire region, and for the international community.” (Commission of the European Communities (2005): COM (2005) 561 final: p. 12) Even if Kosovo benefits from the instruments it is a special case and is therefore left out in order to achieve a more valid research result.

In this project the official position and Self-image of the EU or the European External Action Service towards these states will be analysed. Official documents, concerning for instance the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) as well as the Stability and Association Agreements (SAA), will be examined for constructed representations, images, ideas, ‘Verstehen’ and meanings. What matters especially here is the Self-image of the EU and the counterparts, which go with it. This is why
the focus lies on the operating of the EU-apparatus. Therefore, press statements of the EU
officials like Catherine Ashton will be included. The examination will be through a
qualitative content analysis with the help of categories. These categories consist of a list of
points of interest on the basis of the research questions. Scientific literature will be used as an
additional knowledge source. A special focus in the qualitative research lies on the official
documents in order to explain the discourse of border construction and identity formation
inside the EU institutions. From a cultural perspective it provides a better Self-understanding,
which makes it possible to find better ways to act and behave as well as it also reveals
possible failures. It is also necessary for an integration system to know the own values and
traditions. This also includes defining a cultural framework for the European Union. The
Self/Other dichotomy is seen as one part of this framework. The project is also crucial
because it sharpens the consciousness for the idea of Europe and it produces knowledge about
the European Union. In a way, it can be argued that this research project is important because
it examines the believed ‘best practices’ of the Union and tries to find out, if it is really valid
and practiced. The project is also crucial because it combines the cultural with the
geographical dimension in integration systems like the European Union and shows
additionally their relationship.

For the European Union examining the role of ‘imagined’ borders and the relationship to
‘Outsiders’ is crucial if it wants to act in a single way. Through a better Self-understanding this
will contribute to the building of the EEAS. The results help to define the role of Europe in
the world and the relationship to its neighbours, so the findings of this project should provide
a framework for a better understanding of a European identity. As a consequence, it can be
said that a broader understanding of the meaning of a European identity is necessary and this
project should contribute to that. Other integration systems worldwide can also benefit from
the findings because there is a trend towards integration. This means the different systems can
or must learn from each other and from their failures in the past.

The project has thus four main objectives: First, to extend and revise existing knowledge
about the representations and meanings of the European Union and its Self-image and mental
constructions respectively. Second, the examination of the social constructions inspired by the
approach of Alexander Wendt underlying the relations towards the Western Balkan states
from the perspective of the EU as part of its Self-image through the notion of Alter and Ego
in order to be able to analysis mental border constructions towards ‘Others’ and to define a
possible Self-image through the findings. In this way, it should be possible to come closer to a foreign policy identity of the Union. The third objective analyses the role the EU wants to play in the world, which is influenced inter alia by interests and structures or systems of power. Therefore, this project examines official documents of the EU to find the organisation of hierarchies inside such structures or systems of power like the one along West/East dichotomies. The approach of Edward Said’s Orientalism and also Postcolonialism should help to determine hierarchies and dichotomies in order to detect on which basis these are produced and reproduced. Forth, the findings should stimulate a further debate of the topic ‘What wants the EU to be now and in the future?’ and to enable a better ‘Verstehen’ of the EU-apparatus but also to strengthen the position of the EU towards other international organisations like the NATO or the UN and to contribute to an easier creation of the European External Action Service respectively by providing information and knowledge to the involved actors.

For these objectives new forms of identity constructions, frameworks and ‘Others’ must be defined in order to understand the behaviour of the involved politicians but also institutions. This project serves as a framework for defining how the EU constructs its Self-image and its role in the world as well as its relationship to ‘Outsiders’. This topic helps also to examine the role of ‘Others’ in international politics. And it can serve as a basis for the further promotion of the European identity. Additionally, it might help to find a piece of the puzzle in order to define an image of the world from a European perspective: Where are the borders of Europe? Where does it end? Is it an empire? The project should also provide a better understanding of conflicts in which the EU is involved.

1.2 Research Questions

At the beginning, I have to ask several general questions that define the perspective from which the research project is examined. Additionally, the answers on these questions build up a framework and function as brackets for the topic. They are the explanatory tools and help by the interpretation of the official documents of the EU. These questions should be the foundation for the key concepts that provide the indexes and registers for the examination. The general questions have thus to determine the theoretical foundation of the project: What are the key features of Social Constructivism, Orientalism and Postcolonialism?
What is necessary for the construction of Self and Other as well as identities in a general sense?

What are the instruments for the construction of imagined borders and hierarchies?

1.2.1 Primary Research Question

Through the findings of these general questions I will develop the instruments for answering the central research questions:

What causes and constructs the Self-image of the EU/the European External Action Service in the case of the Western Balkan states?

1.2.1 Sub-Questions

Of course I have to ask several sub-questions first in order to be able to answer the central questions and to determine the results. These sub-questions should be the guiding lines to the aim of the project to draw up a Self-image to the outside of the European Union:

What determines the Self-image?

What imagined borders are constructed towards the ‘Other’?

What ideas/images/constructions lie behind the Self-image?

What representations/narrations are used by the EU to present itself in the world?

What is the hierarchy/dichotomy behind the Self that is created through the construction of imagined borders?

These sub-questions should be answered through qualitative content analysis mainly of official positions and statements in documents or media that mirror the position of the EU towards the Western Balkan states.

2. Theoretical Framework

2.1 Social Constructivism

The so-called English-school influenced many constructivists. “It holds that the system of states is embedded in a society of states, which includes sets of values, rules, and institutions that are commonly accepted by states and which make it possible for the system of states to
function [...]” (J.G. Ruggie (1998): p. 11) Constructivism deals thus with issues of human consciousness. It examines the identities and interests of states in order to show that and how they are socially constructed. To construct something means that an object or subject becomes alive that otherwise would not exist. “Once constructed, each of these objects has a particular meaning and use within a context. They are social constructs in so far as their shape and form is imbued with social values, norms, and assumptions rather than being the product of purely individual thought or meaning.” (K. M. Fierke (2007): p. 168) Consequently, International politics is a world of making.

There are two basic tenets of constructivism. First, the ‘idealist’ approach that the structures of human association are constituted primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces. Second, the ‘structuralist’ approach that the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature.

Alexander Wendt argues “[t]he central thesis is that the meaning of power and the content of interest are largely a function of ideas.” (Alexander Wendt (1999): p. 96) In other words, the involved persons act on the foundation of beliefs they have about their environment and others, which tend to reproduce these ideas. This assumption can be underlined by the concept that social groups tend to define themselves on the foundation of a series of ideas to which members have a positive relationship. These ideas can be expressed directly in the discourse of the group members and in their means of interacting and communicating or indirectly through the use of common symbols, codes and signs. The function of such ideas is to define the social group as an entity, which is distinct from other groups. In this way, the members form an ‘imagined community’ that has as its foundation the belief that the members have something in common (Martin Marcussen and Klaus Roscher (2000): p. 327). Additionally, aggressions are directed to the outside and a unity can be formed in this way. This is also valid for the political life: Once a set of ideas about the political order was negotiated and agreed on, these ideas are likely to be institutionalised and embedded in the political culture. Consequently, processes of identity construction break the link between cultural raw material and political identities whereby cultural symbols are manipulated. Societies are consequently bounded by a social cognitive structure within which some discursive formations dominate and compete. These formations are constituted by identities. “A social cognitive structure establishes the boundaries of discourse within a society, including how individuals commonly think about themselves and others.” (Ted Hopf (2002): p. 6) These structures help to create order within society.
Material forces have also effects on the international life. “Even when properly stripped of their social content, in other words, brute material forces […] can still have independent effects, defining ‘for all actors the outer limits of feasible activity and the relative costs of pursuing various options that require physical activity.’ […] These effects interact with interests and culture to dispose social action and systems in certain directions and not others.” (Wendt (1999): p. 111) The effects these forces have on international relations are broad: certain outcomes are affected by the distribution of actor’s material capabilities and the composition of these materials has enabling effects through for instance geographical and natural resources. The relationship between material and ideas works up and downwards provided that the actors want to. Therefore, Wendt argues that interests are not brute material but constructed by ideas. This approach is opposite to the realist theory in which material forces constitute international relations.

Wendt goes on to examine what constitutes the interests that international actors represent. “Symbolic interactionists would argue that many of these goal-schemes or interests are constituted by identities, which are schemas about the Self. […] Like other schemas, motivational schemas are organised hierarchically within the Self and so not all are equally ‘salient’, […] which is important in trying to explain what someone will do in a particular situation.” (Wendt (1999): p. 122) These schemas are seen as knowledge structures that help to identify objects and events. The schemas are not given by human nature and mostly learned through socialisation. Consequently, the structure of a social system will contain three elements: material conditions, interests and ideas. These constitute an interdependent structure. Beliefs become a social structure of knowledge through interaction. This social structure can be described as socially shared knowledge or ‘culture’. The knowledge must be common to all actors and connected between individuals.

It is important to include the context of meaning that humans construct around interest and material forces. Alexander Wendt concludes “[…] that the meaning of the distribution of interests in international politics is constituted in important part by the distribution of interest, and that the content of interests are in turn constituted in important part by ideas. […] The claim is not that ideas are more important than power and interest […]. Power and interest are just as important and determining as before. The claim is rather that power and interest have the effects they do in virtue of the ideas that make them up.” (Wendt (1999): p. 135) These collective ideas are often inscribed in collective memories or myths, narratives, and traditions.
that constitute who a group is and how it relates to others. There is a strong historical link through the fact that narratives are not merely common beliefs, but are kept alive through an on-going process of socialization and ritual enactment by generations. It is this process that groups can maintain continuity and identity through time. Common knowledge thus affects behaviour and not the identities, so it has a causal effect. "In each case socially shared knowledge plays a key role in making interaction relatively predictable over time, generating homeostatic tendencies that stabilize social order. Culture, in short, tends to reproduce itself, and indeed must do so if it is to be culture at all." (Wendt (1999): p. 187) It is constantly in motion, even while it reproduces itself. It is an on-going accomplishment.

In culture, Others reinforce particular ways of thinking. "The terms of individuality refer to those properties of an agent’s constitution that are intrinsically dependent on culture, on the generalized Other. […] While this recognition is partly external, out there in the understanding of Others, it is also internal, in what Mead called the ‘Me’: the meanings an actor attributes to itself while taking the perspective of Others, while seeing itself as a social object. This willingness to define the Self by reference how Others see it is a key link in the chain by which culture constitutes agents [...].” (Wendt (1999): p. 182)

2.1.1 Social Constructivism and Identity

In the constructivist ontology of social life the structures of human association are primarily cultural rather than material phenomena and construct identities and interests. "In this ontology material forces still matter and people are still intentional actors, but the meaning of the former and the content of the latter depend largely on the shared ideas in which they are embedded, and as such culture is a condition of possibility for power and interest explanations." (Wendt (1999): p. 193) For instance, the ‘existence’ of a modern state, after Weber, lies in the fact that different actors are oriented to the belief that it exists or should exist. This behaviour and belief is accompanied by a representation of the members of this state as a collective ‘We’ and by a discourse about the rationale of political legitimacy that constitutes their collective identity as well as by collective memories that form a link to the state’s members in the past. These features are often written down in a Constitution or ‘Mission Statement’. “All of this commonly takes a narrative form, […] which means that the empirical study of state identities and their evolution over time will include a substantial element of discursive and intellectual history. […]” (Wendt (1999): p. 219)
Alexander Wendt argues that there are two kinds of ideas that influence the identity: the ideas kept by the Self and those held by the Other – identities can only be understood relationally. Identities are thus constructed by internal and external structures. The author differentiates four kinds of identities that can overlap.

First, there is the personal or corporate identity that is constituted by the self-organizing, homeostatic structures that make actor distinct entities. An individual can have only one such identity. Its material base, for instance a territory, determines the corporate identity. The identity must have a consciousness and memory of the Self as a separate locus of thought and activity (Wendt (1999): p. 225). Consequently, the state members must have a common narrative of themselves. “The state is a ‘group Self’ capable of group-level cognition. […] These ideas of the Self have an ‘auto-genetic’ quality, […] and as such […] corporate identities are constitutionally exogenous to Otherness.” (Wendt (1999): p. 225) In a postmodernist tradition Wendt goes on to argue that representing an actor as a separate being depends on producing and sustaining boundaries between Self and Other and looking at it that way corporate identities presupposes difference. The corporate identity constitutes a site or platform for other identities or identity forms.

Second, he describes type identities that refer to a social label like teenager etc. – they label characteristics. Actors can thus have multiple identities that are at the foundation intrinsic to actors. These identities stand for ‘regime types’ or ‘forms of state’. The content of these identities “[…] is given by more or less formal membership rules that define what counts as a type identity and orients the behaviour toward it. These rules vary culturally and historically.” (Wendt (1999): p. 226)

Third, role identities exist merely in relation to Others and they have a cultural dependency. For instance, a professor is only a professor because the definition is part of the collective knowledge. The relation to the Other is crucial because this internalisation of knowledge has the effect of a mirrored structure within the structure of the Self. “The sharing of expectations on which role identities depend is facilitated by the fact that many roles are institutionalized in social structures that pre-date particular situations.” (Wendt (1999): p. 227)

Fourth, there are collective identities that lead the relation between Self and Other to its logical conclusion identification. “Identification is a cognitive process in which the Self-Other
distinction becomes blurred and at the limit transcended altogether. Self is ‘categorized’ as Other.” (Wendt (1999): p. 229) This process is ordinarily issue-specific and seldom total, but this means always to extend the boundaries of the Self in order to include the Other.

According to Wendt, various interests that have their origin in corporate, type, role, and collective identities motivate the behaviour of states as actors. There are three national interests (identified by George and Keohane in Wendt (1999): p. 235): life, liberty, and property. Alexander Wendt adds a fourth – collective Self-esteem as a group’s need to feel good about it. It is meant by this that the underlying needs are similar to all states and have to be addressed if states want to reproduce themselves, but the form of them varies with other identities of the state. The key feature of collective Self-esteem is whether collective Self-images are positive or negative. These images depend in part on the relation to important Others, since it is by taking perspective of the Other that the Self sees itself. Negative Self-images incline to develop from the experience of disregard or humiliation by other states and because of that often occur in competitive international environments. "Since groups cannot long tolerate such images if they are to meet the Self-esteem needs of their members, they will compensate by Self-assertion and/or devaluation and aggression toward the Other.” (Wendt (1999): p. 236/37) Positive images show, however, mutual respect and cooperation. Consequently, interests are variables because the boundaries of the Self are itself a variable and not like territorial boundaries clear and constant. Their social learning can vary over time.

2.1.2 Social Constructivism and its Structures and Systems

Wendt then goes on to describe how these features affect the structure of international politics. “To say that structure is ‘social’ is to say, following Weber, that actors take each other ‘into account’ in choosing their action. This process is based on actors’ ideas about the nature and roles of Self and Other, and as such social structures are ‘distributions of ideas’ or ‘stocks of knowledge’. […] Some of these ideas are shared, others are private. Shared ideas make up the subset of social structure know as “culture” […]” (Wendt (1999): p. 249) This process should give meaning to power and content to interests that are important in the political culture of international relations. A key feature of any form of culture is its role structure. Actors use this structure for the configuration of the subject roles that shared ideas provide to its holders. These roles or positions establish the representations of Self and Other “as particular kinds of agents related in particular ways, which in turn constitute the logics
and reproduction requirements of distinct cultural systems [...]” (Wendt (1999): p. 257) The subject’s position is determined by the systemic culture in which a state is at a certain moment: in the Hobbesian culture it means the ‘enemy’, in the Lockean culture it is ‘rival’ and in the Kantian it becomes the ‘friend’. Each role involves a distinct orientation of the Self toward the Other with respect to the use of violence and thus material forces.

The Hobbesian culture is based on enmity that is in turn based on representations of the Other. The Other is represented as an actor who, first, does not recognize the right of the Self to exist as an autonomous being, and therefore will not willingly limit its violence towards the Self as a second feature (Wendt (1999): p. 260). “Enmity and rivalry both imply that the Other does not fully recognize the Self and therefore may act in a ‘revisionist’ fashion toward it, but the object of recognition and revisionism is different. An enemy does not recognize the right of the Self to exist as a free subject at all [...]. A rival, in contrast, is thought to recognize the Self’s right to life and liberty, therefore seeks to revise only its behaviour or property [...].” (Wendt (1999): p. 261) Enmity and rivalry impute to the Other aggressive intentions, but the enemies are unlimited in nature, the rivals are limited. The limitation is related on the degree of violence expected from the Other. “Real or imagined, if actors think enemies are real then they are real in their consequences.” (Wendt (1999): p. 262) These collective representations have a life and logic of their own. As soon as more and more members of a system represent each other as enemies a ‘tipping point’ is reached and then representations take over the logic of the system. “At this point actors start to think of enmity as a property of the system [...], and so feel compelled to represent all Others as enemies simply because they are parts of the system.” (Wendt (1999): p. 264) Consequently, the particular Other becomes the ‘generalised’ Other. It is important to note here that there exist not only multiple Others “[...] but multiple kinds of Others, such as ‘real others with whom we are currently involved; imagined others, including characters from our own past as well as from cultural narratives, historical others, and the generalized other.’ [...]” (Hopf (2002): p. 9) This indicates that a structure of collective beliefs and expectations is created that persists through time. Actors make attributions about Self and Other in conditions of positions within this structure of beliefs and expectations, rather than in terms of their actual qualities. The outcome is an underlying logic of interaction that has its foundation on what actors know about their position and role, rather than on what they know about each other. “The group seems like a bunch of autonomous individuals, but only because the members are in such a state of dedifferentiation that all they can know of the other is that he is the other, his
otherness constituting the threat that dedifferentiation defends against.” (Wendt (1999): p. 278) These structures and agents are effects of what people do and thus constitute processes or ‘accomplishments of practice’ that are not stable and constant.

Wendt understands the structure of international politics as culture, which enables him to explain change in the behaviour of agents and change within the structure. “Like other constructivists I think it is important to show how social facts are constituted by shared ideas because this may reveal new possibilities for change.” (Wendt (1999): p. 314) This includes the influence of identities and interests on the structure and actors and their reproduction. Wendt argues in interaction states are not only trying to get what they want. Moreover, they are trying to sustain the conceptions of Self and Other, which generate those interests. Agents are thus on-going effects of interaction because they are both caused and constituted by it (Wendt (1999): p. 316). Consequently, social boundaries of the Self are at stake in interaction and thus cooperating states can form a collective identity. These boundaries are translated into the political life. The so constituted political boundaries are also a geographical instrument of differentiation and they organise space. Political and social boundaries are artificial.

2.1.3 Social Constructivism and Social Practice

Wendt goes on to argue that there are two causal ways through which identities may evolve: natural and cultural selection. Natural selection can be described as ‘survival of the fittest’, but it is not about war of all against all, but about differential reproductive success of organisms. This selection involves a strong egoistic behaviour of states, but there is a low failing rate of modern states because of the mutual recognition of sovereignty. States thus recognize each other as having rights to life, liberty, and property and as a consequence limit their own aggression. Consequently, the meaning of natural selection decreases. In contrast, cultural selection “[…] is an evolutionary mechanism involving ‘the transmission of the determinants of behaviour from individual to individual, and thus from generation to generation, by social learning, imitation or some other similar process.’” (Wendt (1999): p. 324)

Imitation plays an important role in social practice. Identities and interest are produced by imitation when actors take up the Self-understanding of those whom they comprehend as ‘successful’. In this process imitation inclines towards developing a more homogeneous
population. Standards are thus always constituted by shared understandings that vary by cultural context.

Social learning as the second feature of cultural selection is of primary interest for Wendt. Identities and their comparable interests are learned and then reinforced as an answer to how actors are treated by significant Others. “This is known as the principle of […] ‘mirroring’ because it hypothesizes that actors come to see themselves as a reflection of how they think Others see […] them, in the ‘mirror’ of Others’ representations of the Self. […] Not all Others are equally significant, however, and so power and dependency relations play an important role in the story.” (Wendt (1999): p. 327)

In order to simplify Wendt assumes two actors: Ego and Alter. What they bring to their interaction, will affect its evolution – they have preconceived ideas of each other that assign roles and form the starting point for their interaction. “However, roles are internally related, so that by assigning one to the Self an actor at least implicitly assigns one to the Other.” (Wendt (1999): p. 329) There are two features of this process – ‘role-taking’ and ‘altercasting’. Role-taking includes choosing from available representations of the Self who one will be, and, consequently, what interests one wants to go after in interaction. Pre-existing shared understanding restrict significantly the process of role-taking. “By taking a particular role identity Ego is at the same time ‘casting’ Alter in a corresponding counter-role that makes Ego’s identity meaningful.” (Wendt (1999): p. 329) Consequently, one is for the other what the other is for oneself (Iver B. Neumann (1999): p. 17). There is a strained relation between the fact that the Other is what the Self is not, which implements an asymmetry of power. The Other’s or Alter’s being is entirely constituted by its exteriority and alterity. In situations where knowledge is shared, representations of Alter will be equivalent of how Alter comprises itself. On the foundation of their representations of Self and Other, Alter and Ego each develop a ‘definition of the situation’ and respond to it. Social learning is thus determined by power, meaning, and representation. Especially, power relations are crucial for the evolution of the relation between Alter and Ego because each side tries to get the Other to see things its way. “They do so by rewarding behaviours that support their definition of situation, and punishing those that do not. […] Given its context-specificity, however, having more power means Ego can induce Alter to change its definition of the situation more in light of Ego’s than vice-versa. In this light, then, as Karl Deutsch put it, power can be seen as ‘the ability to afford not to learn.’ […] The underlying logic here is the Self-fulfilling prophecy: by treating the Other as if he is supposed to respond a certain way Alter and Ego will
eventually learn shared ideas that generate those responses, and then by taking those ideas as their starting point they will tend to reproduce them in subsequent interactions.” (Wendt (1999): p. 331) In other words, if actors form a shared representation of themselves and the world then it becomes that way for them. Society is thus what people make of it.

The constructivist approach emphasizes that Ego’s ideas about the Alter are actively and ongoingly constitutive of Alter’s role vis-à-vis Ego. In interaction, who Alter is depends on who Ego thinks Alter is. The same can be said about Ego’s role identity, which is a result of Ego’s beliefs about Alter’s beliefs about Ego. “What this means is that in initially forming shared ideas about Self and Other through a learning process, and then in subsequently reinforcing those ideas causally through repeated interaction, Ego and Alter are at each stage jointly defining who each of them is.” (Wendt (1999): p. 335) Concluding, it can be said that the crucial feature of an internalised culture is that actors identify and have made the generalised Other part of their comprehension of Self. This is a collective identity that is of interest to preserve in order to keep their culture alive. The necessary condition of collective identity formation is “[…] namely redefining the boundaries of Self and Other so as to constitute a ‘common in-group identity’ or ‘we-feeling.’” (Wendt (1999): p. 338) This means also that the development of identities is a dialectic of actual and possible Selves in which the past plays a crucial role and is hard to overcome. Collective identities are seldom perfect or total.

Therefore, the background idea of Wendt is a dependent system. Wendt argues that it all comes down to the proposition that the ideas held by states are given meaning by the ideas which they share with other states thus the state cognition depends on states systemic culture (compare with Wendt (1999): p. 372). Concluding, this means for a state’s actor: “Every foreign policy decision maker is as much a member of the social cognitive structure that characterizes her society as any average citizen. Charged with the daily responsibility of understanding other states in world politics, she is most unlikely to be able to escape from this structure. Her understandings of these other states rely on her understandings of her own state’s Self. In large part, understandings of the Self are constructed domestically out of many identities that constitute the discursive formations that, in turn, make up the social cognitive structure of that society.” (Hopf (2002): p. 37)
2.1.4 Social Constructivism and International Relations as Culture

Finally, it can be said that Social Constructivism as Alexander Wendt argues defines International Relations as culture. He also contributes the social construction of the underlying ideas and interests. These ideas and interests are connected to the identity of the subject and thus to the Self and its counterpart the Other. Consequently, it explains the function of an Other in political action. In the case of the EU and her relationship towards the Western Balkan states, Social Constructivism shows how a set of ideas has been negotiated and agreed upon and how the outcomes are embedded in the political culture especially of the EU as the dominant power. The social ontology of Wendt focuses on the norms and shared understandings of legitimate behaviour. It explains how the European Union as an actor legitimates her behaviour.

For this research project the theory of Wendt serves as the political dimension in which the EU has to act. Additionally, it constitutes the theoretical basis for the project. Social Constructivism is linking up the importance of the construction of history as well as to the historical production and re-production of the ideas and interests. It helps to define the reasons behind the Self-image of the European Union. This construction is the link to the following chapter on Postcolonialism, Orientalism, and Balkanism because the images and ideas of the ‘Other’ have also history as their foundation. They are a product of historical processes and interactions. International Relations are a ‘world of making’. Self and Other or Alter and Ego coexist in a social relationship, which is imprinted through a discourse and mutually constituted. The boundaries of this discourse are set by a social cognitive structure within a society including how actors commonly think about themselves and others as Wendt argues. These structures help to create order. This approach has a lot in common with the one drawing from Orientalism, as the following chapter will show.

Alexander Wendt defines Alter and Ego as being on the same level and not as two hierarchical different subjects. He argues that actors create social facts by assigning functions to various spatial units. But the space in which international actors act is no container and there are hierarchies that are socially and historically constructed. They influence each other with their preconceived ideas. There are dominant actors and different levels of power distribution. These hierarchies draw boundaries and lines and determine the legitimate behaviour of actors. Additionally, social facts are also created through the process of identity construction. The construction of identities always involves the making of counterparts or
Others – in the case of Europe most often through assigning the Other with negative characteristics. Alexander Wendt includes also different kinds of identities: these types help to define the EU as one actor and the Balkan as one that is different from it. His approach can also explain the Self/Other or West/East dichotomy, but not the hierarchies that are developed and involved. This lacking is the reason for using theoretical concepts like Postcolonialism, Orientalism, and Balkanism in order to explain how such dividing ideas, concepts, images, and interests developed over time. The approach serves here as the link to history and thus identity. Consequently, Social Constructivism is for this project the foundation and explains why actors see their behaviour as legitimate and why ideas and interests of the Self and Other play such a crucial role. Postcolonialism, Orientalism and Balkanism show how the world of International Relations is influenced and imprinted by the historical constructed ideas, interests, and way of thoughts.

2.2 Postcolonialism and Orientalism

Postcolonialism is a description of a global condition after the period of colonialism and additionally of a discourse on these conditions. For Postcolonialism several techniques of power are crucial: One technique is to define modes of signification superior as well as the creation of ‘truths’ based on distinct modes of signification and forms of knowledge or representations. It also rejects ‘native essentialism’ and highlights the relations between freedom and politics (Techniques of power: Siba N. Grovogui (2007): p. 231).

Postcolonialism is concerned with the problems arising from creating images of the world outside as an area of unfreedom and/or insecurity and/or injustice. “[T]he key to postcolonial difference rests in the fact that the experience of the conquered and colonized contrast with those of the conquerors and colonizers.” (Grovogui (2007): p. 240) Consequently, it examines the creation of a divided world through postcolonial imaginations and images as well as representations.

The most important reference point for the emergence of a postcolonial theory is Edward W. Said’s book Orientalism. In Orientalism he developed the concept of a European idea of the Orient. He examines the Orient has a European invention that comprehends the Orient as a place of romance, exotic beings, haunting memories and landscapes, but these remarkable experiences disappeared during the mid 19th century.
Edward W. Said defined Orientalism as a way of coming to terms with the Orient that is based on the Orient’s special place in European experience. It is the place of Europe’s greatest and richest as well as oldest colonies. It can be comprehended as its source of civilization and languages as well as its cultural contestant. The Orient is one of Europe’s deepest and most occurring images of the Other. An Other is in this context the member of a dominated out-group, whose identity is considered lacking and who may be subject to discrimination by the in-group for instance through stereotypes etc. (J.-F. Staszak (2009): p. 43). But the features that are included are only those, which the actors consider themselves as significant. “[Hegel] refines the idea that by knowing the other, the Self has the power to give or withhold recognition, so as to be constituted as Self at the same time: “Each is for the other the middle term through which each mediates itself; and each is for himself, and for the other, an immediate being on its own accord, which at the same time is such only through this mediation. They recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another.” (Neumann (1999): p. 3)

Edward W. Said argues that the Orient has helped to define Europe and the West as its contrasting image, idea, personality, and experience – and this experience is not merely imaginative. “The Orient is an integral part of European material, civilization and culture.” (Edward W. Said (1979): p. 1)

2.2.1 Orientalism as Modes of Discourse

Consequently, Orientalism are modes of discourse that express and represent that part culturally and even ideologically through institutions, vocabulary, scholarships, and imaginary doctrines as well as even colonial styles and bureaucracies. The power to narrate is very important to culture but also Imperialism and Postcolonialism. Additionally, it is important to connect the structures of a narrative to the ideas, concepts, experiences from which it draws support (Said (1993): p. 79). Narrativity or story telling is also part of the Others – they are a constitutive part of story telling. “It is, of course, not the existence of difference and its depiction that is objectionable but how it is interpreted and harnessed in ideological models.” (Todorova (2009): p. 173) This interpretation is formed by the narration of the differences. The Others about whom the Self narrates and who tells stories about the Self are thus themselves story telling entities. They are the concerned audience of the stories narrated and in this way the Others constitute an active participant in the formation of
identities, interests, and power relations. “In order to find out whether a particular constitutive story is a valid description of us, it must first be tested in interaction with others. […] Confirmation of stories of Self cannot be given by just anybody, but only by those others whom the Self recognizes and respects as being kind with itself. […] To a state, the circle of major importance will therefore be made up of other states.” (Neumann (1999): p. 223) But stories of the Self are not stories of who ‘we’ really are but of what we are like.

Orientalism means several interdependent things. There is the academic designation that lives on through doctrines and theses about the Orient or the Oriental. Additionally, Orientalism has a more general meaning: It is a particular style of thought that has its foundation upon an ontological and epistemological distinction between the Orient and the Occident, East and West as the starting point. Edward Said argues that Orientalism – as a way of dealing with the Orient – is a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient. This idea makes it necessary to include Michel Foucault’s notion of discourse, because without examining the Orient as a discourse, it is not possible to understand the systematic discipline by which European culture was able to manage or produce the Orient in all its meanings during the post-enlightenment-period. Foucault understood discourse as systems of thought composed of ideas, attitudes, courses of action, beliefs and practices that systematically construct the subjects and the worlds of which they speak.

European culture gained in strength and identity by setting itself off against the Orient as a sort of surrogate and even underground Self. Self-definition is an activity practised by all cultures. This practice includes rhetoric, a set of occasions, and authorities as well as a familiarity of its own. In other words as Said points it out: “It is not merely there, just as the Occident itself is not just there either.” (Said (1979): p. 4) These two geographical entities thus support and in part reflect each other.

Consequently, the Orient is an idea with a history and tradition of thought, imagery and vocabulary that gives it reality and presence in and for the West. Edward W. Said uses Vico’s notion that “men make their history, that what they can know is what they have made, and extend it to geography: as both geographical and cultural entities […] such locales, regions, geographical sectors as ‘Orient’ and ‘Occident’ are man-made.” (Said (1979): p. 5) In this sense, the past and the present inform each other, each implies the other and both co-exist with the other. The way we formulate or represent the past gives form to our understandings
and views in the present (Said (1993): p. 2). “More important than the past itself, therefore, is its bearing upon cultural attitudes in the present.” (Said (1993): p. 18) But the Orient is not basically ideas with no corresponding reality – there were and are great cultures and nations with a brute reality in the Orient. Edward W. Said tries to deal with the internal consistency of Orientalism and its ideas about the Orient despite or beyond any correspondence with a ‘real’ Orient.

It is important in order to understand or study ideas, cultures, and histories to examine their force or configuration of power. The relationship of power between the Occident and the Orient is characterized by domination and varying degrees of a complex hegemony. “The Orient was Orientalized not only because it was to be discovered to be ‘Oriental’ in all those ways considered commonplace by an average nineteenth-century European, but also because it could be […] made Oriental.” (Said (1979): p. 5) Orientalism is thus according to Said a system of knowledge about the Orient or a created body of theory and practice. In other words, it is a symbol of European-Atlantic power over the Orient and not merely the discourse about the Orient itself.

Said uses Gramsci’s definition of hegemony in order to show what gives Orientalism durability and strength. For Gramsci hegemony is a form of cultural leadership in any non-totalitarian society in which certain cultural forms predominate over others. It is a concept for any understanding of cultural life in the industrial West. The result of this cultural hegemony is the long life and strength of Orientalism. In this way, Orientalism is never far from the idea of Europe, “[…] a collective notion identifying ‘us’ Europeans as against all ‘those’ non-Europeans, and indeed it can be argued that the major component in European culture is precisely what made that culture hegemonic both in and outside Europe: the idea of European identity as a superior one in comparison with all non-European peoples and cultures.” (Said (1979): p.7) The same goes for the hegemony of European ideas about the Orient: these ideas are dominated by European superiority versus Oriental backwardness. Orientalism depends for its strategy on this positional superiority, which allows the Westerner to keep the upper hand in a variety of possible relationships with the Orient. Culture is associated with the nation or state. It differentiates ‘us’ from ‘them’ with a certain degree of xenophobia. In this sense, culture becomes a source of identity and this in a rather combative one way (Said (1993): p. xiii).
2.2.2 Orientalism as a System of Knowledge

If Orientalism is regarded as a system of knowledge, there must be a distinction between pure and political knowledge. One reason is that no production of knowledge can ignore the author’s involvement as a human subject: he comes up against the Orient as a European or American first, as an individual second. Additionally, the interest in the Orient was to a certain extent political but it was the culture that created that interest. Said argues that Orientalism is “[…] a considerable dimension of modern political-intellectual culture, and as such has less to do with the Orient than it does with ‘our’ world. Because Orientalism is a cultural and a political fact, […] it can be shown that what is thought, said, or even done about the Orient follows (perhaps occurs within) certain distinct and intellectually knowable lines.” (Said (1979): p. 12) This includes the facts of textuality, because texts exist in contexts or intertextuality. For Orientalism this means to be governed by political imperialism.

A modern form of Orientalism followed in the post-colonial time, all forms of Orientalism, however, had and have in common a kind of intellectual authority and superiority over the Orient in Western culture. This authority must also be the subject of any description of Orientalism. “There is nothing mysterious or natural about authority. It is formed, irradiated, disseminated; it is instrumental, it is persuasive; it has status, it establishes canons of taste and value; it is virtually indistinguishable from certain ideas it dignifies as true, and from traditions, perceptions, and judgement it forms, transmits, reproduces. […] All these attributes of authority apply to Orientalism […].” (Said (1979): p.19)

It is very important to locate oneself vis-à-vis the Orient, because of previous knowledge of the Orient but also because Orientalism is determined by exteriority – the Orientalist can only be outside the Orient. The principal of this exteriority is of course representation like transforming Otherness into familiar figures. “The exteriority of the representation is always governed by some version of the truism that if the Orient could represent itself, it would; since it cannot, the representation does the job […]. ‘Sie können sich nicht vertreten, sie müssen vertreten werden,’ as Marx wrote […].” (Said (1979): p. 21) These representations rely upon institutions, traditions, conventions, agreed-upon codes, and not upon a distant Orient. Consequently, what is commonly circulated about the Orient and the Occident is not the truth but representations. “All cultures tend to make representations of foreign cultures the better to master or in some way control them. Yet not all cultures make representations of foreign cultures and in fact master or control them. This is the distinction […] of modern
Western cultures. [Western knowledge] developed and accentuated the essentialist positions in European culture proclaiming that Europeans should rule, non-Europeans be ruled. And Europeans did rule.” (Said (1993): p. 120) Thus representations of what lay beyond familiar boundaries came to confirm European power. Boundaries in this sense can be defined as dividing and separating rather than seeking distance. These kinds of boundaries have no life of their own and no material existence. They are a place of intercourse with the foreigner. The point of intercourse as well as dissociation develops a Self and an Other identity. In this way, boundaries are a manifestation of power relations and work as symbols in identity construction. At the same time, boundaries are characterised by spaces of uncertainty and security (David Newmann and Anssi Paasi (1998): p. 186). Boundaries can be seen as a dynamic set of discourses and practices. “Boundaries and their meaning are historical contingent, and they are part of the production and institutionalization of territories and territoriality […].” (Newmann and Paasi (1998): p. 187)

For Edward W. Said the ‘scope of Orientalism’ in its history as well as in its presence comprises two dominating themes: knowledge and power. The British Orientalism, for example, understood knowledge as the examination of a civilization from its origins to its prime to its decline. The object of such knowledge is a fact, which, if it develops, changes or otherwise transforms itself is fundamentally, even ontologically stable. “To have such knowledge of such a thing is to dominate it, to have authority over it. And authority here means for ‘us’ to deny autonomy to ‘it’ – the Oriental country – since we know it and it exists, in a sense, as we know it.” (Said (1979): p. 32) In this way, the Orient is not allowed to speak for itself. Indeed, in the British tradition of Orientalism Britain was exporting its very best to the countries of the Orient. It was even believed that these countries could not have Self-government. The oriental population cannot speak for themselves, because it is already evident: “that they are a subject race, dominated by a race that knows them and what is good for them better than they could possibly know themselves.” (Said (1979): p. 35) Knowledge of the Orient makes their management easy and profitable and gives additionally power. In this vein, more power requires more knowledge. Thus, a dialectic of information and control develops.
2.2.3 Orientalism and Dichotomies

In the British Orientalism thought the Oriental mind is comprised by inaccuracy, so they became human material. In opposition, the European mind is characterized by reasoning. Consequently, the crime was that the Oriental was an Oriental, and it is a sign of how commonly acceptable such thinking was. Orientalism, has been said, is a rationalization of colonial rule. Said argues that colonial rule was justified instead in advance by Orientalism. “Men have always divided the world up into regions having either real or imagined distinction from each other. The absolute demarcation between East and West […] had been years, even centuries, in the making.” (Said (1979): p. 39) A fundamental ontological distinction was created between the West and the rest of the world; the geographical and cultural boundaries between the West and its non-Western peripheries are strongly felt and perceived that one may think these boundaries are absolute (Said (1993): p. 129).

By building up such a demarcation, two principal elements in the relation East/West have occurred since the 18th century: First, there was a development of growing systematic knowledge in Europe about the Orient. Second, Europe was always in a position of strength or domination. In this way, the Western view of strong versus weak developed. “Knowledge of the Orient, because generated out of strength, in a sense creates the Orient, the Oriental, and his world. […] The point is […] the Oriental is contained and represented by dominating frameworks.” (Said (1979): p. 40) Edward W. Said goes on to examine where these frameworks come from. There was the assumption that the Orient was in need of corrective study by the West. This is also a sign for the belief that analysing the Orient is an exercise of cultural strength. The presumption was reinforced by the certain knowledge that Europe or the West commanded the vastly greater part of the earth. Orientalism was understood as a kind of intellectual power, as an archive of information commonly held, which is bound together by a series of ideas and a unifying set of values proven to be effective, but these ideas also influenced also the Orientals. Consequently, Orientalism became a set of constraints upon and limitations of thought. "For Orientalism was ultimately a political vision of reality whose structure promoted the difference between the familiar (Europe, the West, ‘us’) and the strange (the Orient, the East, ‘them’). This vision in a sense created and then served the two worlds thus conceived. […] The vision and material reality propped each other up, kept each other going. A certain freedom of intercourse was always the Westerner’s privileged; because it was the stronger culture […].” (Said (1979): p. 43) In this way, the European culture could give shape and meaning to the Oriental discourse. Orientalism is thus a form of thought for
dealing with the foreign, but this form channels thought into a West or an East compartment. The sense of Western power over the Orient is taken for granted as having the status of scientific truth. Both the traditionalist and the contemporary Orientalist conceive of the difference between cultures, initially, as creating a battlefront that separates them, and then, as inviting the West to control, contain, and otherwise govern the Other through knowledge and power.

This strong dichotomy requires a relationship between knowledge and geography. “Just as one of us is outside or beyond geography, none of us is completely free from the struggle over geography. That struggle is complex and interesting because it is not only about soldiers and cannons but also about ideas, about forms, about images and imaginings.” (Said (1993): p. 6) In order to examine this relation Edward Said uses Claude Lévi-Strauss’ so called science of the concrete. Lévi-Strauss argues that the mind requires order, which is achieved by discriminating and taking note of everything and give it a place. “The specific categories and the myths connected with them can also serve to organize space, and the classificatory system is then extended on a territorial and geographical basis.” (Claude Lévi-Strauss (1966): p. 165) These classifications make it possible to define the status of persons within the group and to expand the group beyond its traditional confines. In doing so, human beings give things some role to play in the economy of objects and identities that make up a framework. The way the distinctions between things are seen is created by a degree of purely arbitrary: “[…] this universal practice of designation in one’s mind a familiar space beyond ‘ours’ which is ‘theirs’ is a way of making geographical distinctions that can be entirely arbitrary.” (Said (1979): p. 54) For this practice it is enough for the West to set up such boundaries in their minds – their territory and mentality are designated as different form ‘ours’. The construction of boundaries takes place through narrativity. Groups use boundaries as a means of securing sociospatial and ethnic homogeneity (Newman and Paasi (1998): p. 195). It is a form of socialization narratives in which boundaries are responsible for creating the Self and the Other. The mobilizing power of images and traditions plays a crucial role here. The imaginative geography of ‘our land-barbarian land’ does not require that the barbarians acknowledge this dichotomy. “The geographical boundaries accompany the social, ethnic, and cultural ones in expected ways. […] All kind of suppositions, associations, and fictions appear to crowd the unfamiliar space outside one’s own.” (Said (1979): p. 5)
Almost from the earliest times, for Europe the Orient was more than what was empirically known about it. Europe is in the position to articulate the Orient. In this way, the otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries is constituted, animated and represented. Additionally, to articulate the Orient is more than political imperialism it is also what Goldsworthy called an ‘imperialism of imagination’. Goldsworthy argues that this concept shows how an area can be used as an object of the dominant culture’s need for a dialogue with itself. “She suggests ‘the same methodology could be observed with particular clarity in south-east Europe in view of the virtual absence of fully-fledged conventional imperialism.’” (Fleming (2000): p. 1223) The language of Orientalism still remains in force in this way and the discourse of power did thus not disappear along with colonialism.

Through literature, poems, and scientific works lenses are developed through which the Orient is experienced and additionally they shape the language, perception, and form of the encounter between East and West. “For there is no doubt that imaginative geography and history help the mind to intensify its own sense of itself by dramatizing the distance and difference between what is close to it and what is far away.” (Said (1979): p. 55) These categories are instruments of controlling what seems to be a threat to established view of things, so if there is something radically new the response is often conservative and defensive. Orientalism is after Edward W. Said a form of radical realism. By this, he means that it is considered to be reality. “Psychologically, Orientalism is a form of paranoia, knowledge of another kind, say, form ordinary historical knowledge.” (Said (1979): p. 72) This is also a result of imaginative geography and of the boundaries it draws. These boundaries, like the line between East and West, made a certain constant impression upon Europe. The Orient and especially the Islam are always represented as outsiders having a special role to play inside Europe. “For much of its history, then, Orientalism carries within a stamp of a problematic European attitude towards Islam, […]. Doubtless Islam was a real provocation in many ways. It lay uneasily close to Christianity, geographically and culturally.” (Said (1979): p. 74)

During the 19th and 20th centuries Orientalism overrode the Orient and there is a great likelihood that ideas about the Orient can be put to political use. The closeness between politics and Orientalism increased. The whole Orient is made into a general object. In this way, it can serve as an illustration of a particular form of eccentricity. “The scope of Orientalism exactly matched the scope of empire, and it was this absolute unanimity between the two that provoked the only crisis in the history of Western thought about and dealings
with the Orient.” (Said (1979): p. 104) With the oriental countries gaining their independence, the ‘old’ Orientalism faced a challenge. But still the outcome is that the West regards the Orient as something whose existence is not only displayed but has remained fixed in time and place for the West.

There is a way of thought and thus discourse outside of history that can be found in Said’s Orientalism: “So impressive have the descriptive and textual successes of Orientalism been that entire periods of the Orient’s cultural, political, and social history are considered mere responses to the West. The West is the actor, the Orient a passive reactor. The West is the spectator, the judge and the jury, of every facet of Oriental behaviour.” (Said (1979): p. 108) Said goes on to argue that Orientalism itself was a product of political forces and activities. His contention is that Orientalism is fundamentally a political doctrine willed over the Orient because the Orient was in a weaker position than the West, which merged the Orient’s otherness with its weakness (Said (1979): p. 204). “Orientalism staked its existence, not upon its openness, its receptivity to the Orient, but rather on its internal, repetitious consistency about its constitutive will-to-power over the Orient. In such a way Orientalism was able to survive revolutions, world wars, and the literal dismemberment of empires.” (Said (1979): p. 222)

The construction of identity involves always the construction of counterparts and Others whose actuality is subject to uninterrupted interpretation and re-interpretation of their difference from ‘us’. This process is called Othering: it consists of applying a principle that allows to be classified into two hierarchical groups. “Identity and alterity (otherness) clearly exist in a symbiotic relationship, and their most sharply defined characteristics are best articulated by at this border encounter.” (Todorova (2009): p. 197) The Self produces one or more Others, setting itself apart and giving itself an identity. In this way, a difference is transformed into Otherness by creating a Self and an Other. “Otherness and identity are two inseparable sides of the same coin. The Other only exists relative to the Self, and vice versa.” (Staszak: (2009): p. 43) The asymmetry in power relations is crucial to the construction of Otherness. Consequently, Otherness is defined as the characteristics of the Other that are the result of a discursive process by which a dominant Self constructs several dominated Others by stigmatizing a difference that can be real or imagined as a realm of discourse. Each era and society re-creates its Others. “Far from a static thing then, identity of Self or of ‘other’ is a much worked-over historical, social, intellectual, and political process that takes place as a
contest involving individuals and institutions in all societies.” (Said (1979): p. 332) The construction of identity is bound up with the tendency of power and powerlessness in each society.

Orientalism is thus a product of certain political forces and activities. Edward W. Said summarises that Orientalism is basically a political doctrine willed over the Orient because the Orient was weaker than the West, which highlights the Orient’s difference with its weakness. Concluding, Orientalism has three tenets: “[…] the existence of separate, unequal, and hierarchical spheres of civilizations; […] the need to maintain the boundaries between them by defending the Western civilization’s goods or values against corrupt ones without; and […] the necessity for moderate or secular [out-groups] to join the West in introducing progressive values in their region.” (Grovogui (2007): p. 238)

2.3 Balkanism

In the same way as the Orient and Orientalism, the Balkans and thus Balkanism were invented as one quote of Hermann Keyserling shows: “Si les Balcans n’existaient pas, il faudrait les inventer.” (Maria Todorova (2009): p. 116) Orientalism is often used to explain Balkanism. One reason for the need to use the Orientalist model is the absence of an academic tradition of Balkanism. But it must be stressed that they are not the same thing. “Its greatest value, in the final analysis, may not lie in any interpretive contribution to Balkan study per se, but rather in the possibility that through testing […] Said’s model, Balkan historiography will be brought into dialogue with other, more established and dominant fields.” (K.E. Fleming (2000): p. 1120) The connection or linkage with Orientalism is not clear at first glance. There is no colonial legacy of Europe in this region and Balkanism developed independent of Orientalism, in part, because the Balkan has been understood geopolitically different from the Orient. Additionally, the Balkan is in Europe, dominated by white people and predominantly Christian. But Balkanism is also constructed or imagined from the outside like Orientalism. Europe’s history with the Balkans is not comparable with the imperial heritage with the Orient, but it can also serve as an example for ‘imperialism of imagination’.
2.3.1 The Balkans as Europe’s Other

Not only the Orient but also the Balkans served and still serve as an image of the Other – most often as a contrasting and negative image. “‘Balkanization’ not only had come to denote the parcelization of large and viable political unity but also had become a synonym for a reversion to the tribal, the backward, the primitive, the barbarian.” (Todorova (1994): p. 453)

In this way, the Balkans are settled at a lower civilization level than Europe. This is connected to the belief in the superiority of the European civilization over barbority and backwardness. The Balkans are so paired in opposition to Europe or the West and become the Other of Western civilization. The Balkans – and in the same way the Orient – have served as the counterpart of negative characteristics against which a positive Self-image of the European or the West has been constructed. It is the anti-civilization or the alter ego of the West.

Consequently, Balkanism is a mode of discourse like Orientalism that expresses and represents that part culturally and even ideologically through institutions, vocabulary, scholarships, and imaginary doctrines as well as even colonial styles and bureaucracies.

The image and discourse of the Balkans, set in general terms around World War I, has also been reconstructed almost without change over the next decades and can thus be described as discourse. These constructions of the Balkans are characterized by the Turkish word Balkan meaning ‘mountain’. In this case, Balkan is referring to the east-west mountain range that cuts across Bulgaria – Stara Planina. Following the argumentation of Derrida that there can never be a coincidence between word and thing or thought. Maria Todorova argues that it is predictable that the signifier ‘Balkan’ would be detached from its original and from signified with which it has a relation. This is a parallel process: “[…] at the same time that ‘Balkan’ was being accepted and widely used as geographic signifier, it was already becoming saturated with social and cultural meaning that expanded its signified far beyond its immediate and concrete meaning.” (Todorova (2009): p. 21)

Consequently, the most important notion and word that had its origin in the word ‘Balkan’ is ‘Balkanisation’. Its political connotation emerged by the end of the nineteenth century in order to designate the states that had emerged out of the Ottoman Empire. For instance, the journalist Paul Scott Mowrer specified in 1921 the term ‘Balkanisation’ like this: “[…] the creation, in a region of hopelessly mixed races, of a medley of small states with more or less backward populations, economically and financially weak, covetous, intriguing, afraid, a continual prey to the machinations of the great powers, and to the violent prompting of their own passions.”
This quote shows how the element of foreign interference in the affairs of small countries influenced the writer as Todorova argues in a pervasive way. In this way, Balkanisation became synonymous with the geopolitical instability of this fragmented area. In this way, the geographic designation goes hand in hand with a simultaneous invention of the region – these two processes are inseparable. “From a historical viewpoint, the Balkan space corresponds to the area of Europe that has been culturally impregnated by the Ottoman domination. References to the Ottoman past appeared at the end of the nineteenth century when wars arose between local peoples seeking to establish their territories in areas left by the withdrawal of the Ottoman occupation.” (V. Rey and O. Groza (2009): p. 265) During the Balkan wars and World War I the term Balkanisation emerged again and was connected with a negative image for the area, which was accompanied by the central feature of violence. “Western Europeans had always proclaimed horror at apparently ‘eastern’ barbarities, especially impaling.” (Todorova (1994): p. 474) One of the prominent examples of that time is the transformation of the historical Vlad Țepeș into the figure of Dracula. In this way, violence became the leitmotiv of the Balkans (Todorova (2009): p. 122). The most interesting fact about the leitmotiv is that it has last over centuries: “It seems as if the mountaineers of the seventeenth century have reentered the political stage of the late twentieth unmarked by any change. What is at stake is the specific character of the perpetrated violence.” (Todorova (2009): p. 137)

All these historical examples show that Balkanisation and Balkanism can be defined as discourse in the way Foucault defined it. Moreover, Maria Todorova argues that the Balkanism could be treated not only as a specific discourse but also as the most persistent “mental map” in which information about the Balkans is placed (Todorova (2009): p. 192). Consequently, there are obvious similarities between Balkanism and Orientalism: They are both discursive formations and serve as a powerful metaphor. “Introducing the notion of ‘nesting orientalism’, Milaca Basic-Hayden prefers to treat the discourse involving the Balkans as a variation of Orientalism because ‘it is the manner of perpetuation of the underlying logic…that makes Balkanism and Orientalism variant forms of the same kind.’” (Todorova (2009): p. 11) The main differences between the two notions lie in the geographic and historical concreteness of the Balkans versus the symbolic and metaphoric concept of the Orient as Maria Todorova argues (Todorova (2009): p. 194). Oriental was most often used “[…] to stand for filth, passivity, unreliability, misogyny, propensity for intrigue, insincerity, opportunism, laziness, superstitiousness, lethargy, sluggishness, inefficiency, incompetent
bureaucracy. ‘Balkan’, while overlapping with ‘Oriental’, had additional characteristics as cruelty, boorishness, instability, and unpredictability. Both categories were used against the concept of Europe symbolizing cleanliness, order, Self-control, strength of character, sense of law, justice, efficient administration, in a word, ‘the culturally higher stage of development which also ennobles human behaviour.’ […]” (Todorova (2009): p. 119)

Todorova argues that the comparison of the Balkans with the East enforced the feeling of alienness and emphasized the oriental nature of the Balkans (Todorova (2009): p. 118). This argument can be underlined by Fleming’s examination of Eastern Europe. He argues that its position within Europe but at the same time not fully European called for such notions as backwardness and development to mediate between the poles of civilization and barbarism. “The predominant European perspective of the Balkans has been described as a form of Orientalism, part of a dichotomy between the rational and enlightened West and the feminine, passionnal and irrational Orient. […] For some commentators, the Western Balkans continues to be constructed as an ‘Other’ towards which European identity is constantly redefined.” (Roberto Belloni (2009): p. 34) It might be better described as not yet Europe or not quite European. Fleming even argues that Eastern Europe and the Orient provided the West in the eighteenth century with its first model of underdevelopment in order to set itself off as more civilised and developed – a notion that is now applied all over the world (Fleming (2000): p. 1230). “Thus, the key change in the European approach involved a shift from a view of the region as irremediably alien, leading to a policy containment, to a view that stressed the common heritage and interlocked future between the two areas. Ultimately, this leads to a policy of inclusion/integration.” (Belloni (2009): p. 10)

These European ideas are also easily to trace in Balkanism: “Geographically inextricable from Europe, yet culturally constructed as ‘Other’, the Balkans became, in time, the object of a number of externalized political, ideological and cultural frustrations and have served as a repository of negative characteristics against which a positive and Self-congratulatory image of the ‘European’ and ‘the west’ has been constructed.” (Todorova (1994): p. 455) Such concepts are also called Ethnocentrisms, which can be described as the propensity of a group to consider its members and values as superior to the members and values of other groups (Staszak (2009): p. 43). “[…] Agnes Heller maintained that ‘the recognition of the accomplishment of others has always been part and parcel of the European identity,’ that ‘the myth of Occident and Orient is not a juxtaposition of civilization with barbarism but rather of
one civilization with another,’ and that ‘European (Western) cultural identity has been
conceived as both ethnocentric and anti-ethnocentric.’” (cited in: Todorova (2009): p. 189)

This way of thought can also be traced in Balkanism. Authority and superiority accompany
the relationship to the Balkans in the same manner as in the case of the Orient. The
classification that is the outcome of this can be seen as a fundamental principle of the imperial
discourse. Todorova argues that it also releases the ‘the civilized world’ from any
responsibility that it might otherwise bestow on more ‘reasonable’ people (Todorova (2009):
p. 185). “When confronted ‘with the demand of modernization for a sophisticated system of
law and political representation, it merely collapses into tyranny; […] moreover, this is an
‘oriental’ tyranny which entails intrinsic passivity, incompatible with initiative and

European culture thus gained in strength and identity by setting itself off against the Balkans
as a sort of surrogate and even underground Self. This process can be traced in the case of the
Western Balkans: “The scale of the differences between West and East in the Ottoman period
is widely considered to be the reason for the present lack of development of the peninsula; the
front line between two civilizations is seen as having acted as a barrier, retarding the diffusion
of the innovations of the modern world initiated by Western Europe.” (Rey and Groza (2009):
p. 270) This historical example is still valid today in order to deal with differences. An
example for such a framework of meaning and order is according to Maria Todorova the
discovery of the Balkans. It falls within the general rubric of how people deal with difference.
She uses the term ‘nomos-building activity’ for describing the human attempt to give meaning
and order to the world involving the process of typification, which confers knowability and

Religious stereotypes are the most long-lasting categorisations. This form of classification can
also be found in the case of the Balkans. “According to the British journalist Harry de Windt,
they are between the Adriatic and the Black sea, in which such nation states as Bulgaria,
Romania, Serbia and Montenegro put pressure on a weakened Ottoman Empire, became the
‘wild’, i.e. uncivilised, Europe. Among the most long-lasting stereotypes are also religious
moments: the tensions between Roman-Catholic and Greek-Orthodox Christianity on the one
side and between Christianity and Islam on the other.” (Becker (2008): p. 8)
There is another parallel between Balkanism and Orientalism: It seems like historians construct a discourse about the Balkans as a geographical and cultural entity that is located outside historical time. The Balkan was never an entity as such (Todorova (1994): p. 460). There was and is still no agreement about the extent of the area Balkans “[…] but there has never been much disagreement about its non-European character or its intention to Europeanise itself: both were always taken for granted […]. After the Age of Enlightenment, the Balkans was perceived as at once near (geographically) and far (culturally).” (Božidar Jezernik (2007): p. 3) In Western narration that area is often represented like a journey back in time or like a remaining of the past. In this way, this geographical term is loaded negatively with associations like filth, passivity, untrustworthiness or opportunism. Jezernik even argues that ”[i]n the Balkan languages themselves, the term Balkan soon became a synonym for lack of civilisation and for backwardness.” (Jezernik (2007): p. 3) In order to define themselves as civilised Europeans differentiated between civilised people and barbarians on the other hand. For that purpose, an opposite was needed and the Balkans served as the Other in this case for centuries. They represented “the ‘otherness of our ourness’ and what Europeans had been but were no longer allowed to be (Jezernik (2007): p. 4). The Balkans thus served as a mirror for the level of civilization of the Europeans themselves. Balkanism is also a product of political forces and activities. It is an instrument that is used to highlight the unique position of the West. It serves as well as the Orient as a mirror to show the Western civilization as the dominant and stronger one in comparison. Todorova argues that there is a Western European syndrome “to conceive of the entire Euro-Asian land mass as four Easts (Near, Middle, Far, and Eastern Europe) and only one West, itself.” (Todorova (2009: p. 141)

Consequently, Balkanism is a system of representation and knowledge but it differs historically, geographically, and culturally from Orientalism. Orientalism and Balkanism are definitely not the same thing, though they certainly are mutually illuminating categories.” (Fleming (2000): p. 1232)

2.4 Key Concepts

This research project lies at the crossroads between different research traditions, drawing at the theoretical and methodological levels from Postcolonialism, Orientalism, Balkanism, Human Geography, Cultural Studies, and Social Constructivism. In order to be able to answer the research question, I draw the following research perspectives from the above-defined theoretical framework. I will use three perspectives that are interlinked in a relationship: one
that explains the underlying ideas/images/constructions and the representation/narrations that have their origin in the ideas etc. One, that examines the involved boundary constructions towards the ‘Other’ and one that examines the hierarchies and dichotomies that play a role in this context. These perspectives should help to examine the European Self-image in the field of foreign and security policy by the example of the Western Balkan states.

2.4.1 Social Constructions

The following elements and key concepts of the theories should contribute answering these sub-research questions: What ideas/images/constructions lie behind the Self-image? What kind of representations and narrations uses the EU to present itself in the world?

| Creating images | The world outside as an area of unfreedom and/or insecurity and/or injustice, imaginary geography of our land-barbarian land, a synonym for a reversion of the tribal, the backward, the primitive, the barbarian, imagined from the outside (‘imperialism of imagination’)
|---|---|
| The Orient/the Balkans as a contrasting image, idea, personality and experience | Europe and the West defined themselves through these concepts; gained in strength and identity by setting themselves off against the Orient as a sort of surrogate Self, counterparts of negative characteristics vis-à-vis a positive Self-image of Europe: powerful metaphor
<p>| Orientalism as a discourse about the Orient and particular style of thought | As systems of thoughts and knowledge composed of ideas, attitudes, courses of action, beliefs and practices that systematically construct subjects and the world of which they speak; ontological and epistemological distinction between the Orient and the Occident, East and West; Orientalism as a form of thought for dealing with the Orient (channelled into a West and...|</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Balkanism as a discourse about the Balkan</strong> (Balkanism)</th>
<th>Constructed almost without change over decades accompanied by the central features of violence and backwardness, loaded by negative associations, constructed by historians like being outside historical time or like a journey back in time, system of representation and knowledge, but it differs historically, geographically and culturally from Orientalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>“Men make their history”</strong> (Orientalism/Sociology)</td>
<td>How the past is formulated or represented gives form to our understanding and views in the present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Geographic designation and invention</strong> (Balkanism)</td>
<td>These processes go hand in hand for the concerned region, in this way Balkanisation became synonymous with the geopolitical instability of the area and can be treated like a mental map, the invention shows how people deal with difference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Representation</strong> (Orientalism/Sociology/Balkanism)</td>
<td>Assumption that the Orient could not represent itself; cultures tend to make representations of foreign cultures to better master/control them, representations beyond familiar boundaries confirm European power; Balkan/Orient as the ‘otherness of ourness’, serve as a mirror for the level of civilization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social constructions in policy</strong> (Social Constructivism)</td>
<td>An object/subject becomes alive that otherwise would not exist, international politics is a world of making in which agents are constituted by culture and the willingness to define the Self by reference how Others see it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social cognitive structure</strong> (Social)</td>
<td>Involved persons act on the foundation of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constructivism/Sociology</strong></td>
<td>beliefs, within the structure some discursive formations dominate and compete, formations are constituted by identities, the structure helps to create order within society and interests are constructed by ideas</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Social structure of knowledge</strong> (Social Constructivism)</td>
<td>Help to identify objects and events, mostly learned through socialisation, contains three elements: material conditions, interest (for both the context of meaning is important) and ideas (collective ideas inscribed in collective memories, narratives and traditions, they constitute who a group is and how it relates to others), the social structure can be described as culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Role structure of a culture</strong> (Social Constructivism)</td>
<td>Actors use it for the configuration of the subject roles that shared ideas provide to its holders. This establishes the representation of Self and Other, the outcome is a logic of interaction that has its basis on what actors know about their role, rather on what they know about each other and their actual qualities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interests</strong> of international policy actors (Social Constructivism)</td>
<td>Life, liberty, property, and self-esteem (key feature: whether Self-images are positive or negative, which depends in part on the relation to Others, since it is by taking the perspective of the Other that the Self sees itself)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Ego and Alter** as actors | Have preconceived ideas of each other that assign roles and form the starting point for their interaction, power relations are crucial for the relation of Ego and Alter  
  • Role-taking: includes choosing from available representations of the Self and |
what interests one wants to go after in interaction  
- Altercasting: by taking a role identity  
  Ego is at the same time casting Alter in a corresponding counter-role that makes Ego’s identity meaningful

### 2.4.2 Boundaries and Determinations

This part of the research perspective should help to answer the following sub-questions in order to be able to answer the main research question: What determines the Self-image? What imagined borders are constructed towards the Other?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Boundaries</strong> (Orientalism/Sociology/Human Geography)</th>
<th>Dividing and separating, place of intercourse with the foreign, geographical/cultural boundaries between the West and non-Western peripheries are strong and nearly absolute, in order to define themselves as civilised Europeans boundaries are drawn, the space beyond familiar boundaries is constituted, animated and represented through narrativity and thus confirm European power, enough to set up such boundaries mentally</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Narrativity</strong> (Orientalism/Cultural Science)</td>
<td>Construction of boundaries takes place through narrativity, it is responsible for creating the Self and the Other; images and traditions play a crucial role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Identity construction</strong> (Orientalism/Cultural Science/Sociology)</td>
<td>Involves always the construction of counterparts and Others, process of Othering into hierarchical groups (existence of separate, unequal, hierarchical spheres of civilizations) by setting themselves off</td>
</tr>
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against the Other as a sort of surrogate Self and then gaining in strength and identity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Identity</strong> (Social Constructivism/Balkanism)</th>
<th>Can only be understood relationally, the following identities overlap and interests have their origin in them, understandings of the Self are constructed out of many identities that constitute the discursive formations and make up the social cognitive structure of society, identity and otherness exist in a symbiotic relationship</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>• Personal/corporate identity</strong></td>
<td>The members of a group must have a common narrative of themselves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>• Type identity</strong></td>
<td>Labels characteristics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>• Role identity</strong></td>
<td>Exists merely in relation to Others and have a cultural dependency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>• Collective identity</strong></td>
<td>Leads the relation between Self and Other to its logical conclusion namely identification; social boundaries of the Self are at stake in interaction and form the collective identity; has the interest to keep the culture alive, necessary condition is redefining the boundaries of Self and Other to constitute a ‘we-feeling’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Construction of identities via cultural selection** (Social Constructivism)  
- Imitation: identities and interest are produced by imitation when actors take up the Self-understanding of those who are “successful”
- Social learning: identities and interest are learned and reinforced as an answer to how actors are treated by significant Others, determined by power, meaning and representation
2.4.3 Hierarchies and Dichotomies

These features drawn from the theoretical foundation should help to find an answer to the following research questions: What is the hierarchy/dichotomy behind the Self? What dichotomies are created through the construction of imagined borders?

| Techniques of power (Postcolonialism) | • Modes of signification superior  
| | • Creation of truths based on modes of signification and representation  
| | • Rejection of ‘native essentialism’  
| | • Highlighting the relations between freedom and politics  
| The Orient as one of Europe’s images of the Other (Orientalism) | The Other is defined in this context as a dominated out-group, whose identity is considered lacking  
| Western style in relation to the Orient/the Balkan (Orientalism/Balkanism) | Domination, restructuring, having authority over the Orient, used as an object of the dominant culture’s need for a dialogue with itself, showing the culturally higher stage of development  
| Authority (Orientalism) | Means for ‘us’ to deny autonomy to ‘it’, the West is the actor, the Orient the passive reactor (necessity for introducing progressive values in the Other’s region)  
| Dominating theme: power (Orientalism/Social Constructivism) | The relationship of power between the Occident and the Orient is characterized by domination and a hegemony (cultural leadership in which certain cultural forms predominate over others), Europe was always in a position of strength also cultural; asymmetry in power relations is crucial to the construction of Otherness, power as the ability to afford not to learn  
| Dominating theme: knowledge (Orientalism) | To have knowledge of something is to dominate it and to have authority over it;  

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knowledge makes the management of the
Other easy and gives power (dialectic of
information and control); systematic
knowledge about the Orient

| Superiority (Orientalism/Balkanism) | • Idea of European identity as superior in comparison with non-European cultures
• European superiority vs. Oriental or Balkan’s backwardness
• Intellectual authority and superiority
• Orient/Balkan are thus settled at a lower level of civilization and paired in opposition to Europe/the West
• Counterpart of negative characteristics against a positive Self-image of Europe |

3. Self-image and Identity of the EU vis-à-vis Western Balkans (Social Constructions)


There is an ambivalence of Europe as early as the ancient Greek talked about Europe: “[…] ‘good’ Homer tells us about the ambivalence of origins, and especially about the ambivalent origin of what later became to known as Europe. Judged in terms of that later history, beautiful Europe was by no means native or indigenous to European culture; rather, reared in the ‘Oriental’ costumes of the Near East, she was forcefully abducted by a conquering hero and only later domesticated or ‘naturalized’ in her own surroundings. No other continent on earth […] has a similarly intriguing story about its origins; nowhere else is there such an explicit reference to the interlacing of identity and difference, inside and outside, familiarity and strangeness – an interlacing constitutive of the very beginnings of the continent.” (Fred Dallmayr (2002): p. 75)

In order to show how the Self-image in external affairs of the European Union developed I will also include the origins and history of the myth ‘Europe’ and how the discourse about the
European continent developed in relation to the Western Balkans. This examination includes also Europe’s counterparts, images and ideas as well as Eurocentrism. The Western Balkans are of special interest for this research project because the conflict in this area in the 1990s is one starting point for the building up of an external action service of the EU and the attempt to bring security, stability and lasting peace to the Balkan area through accession into the European Union.

The overall strategy for the Balkans was expressed in the European Council Conclusion in February 1996. It stated clearly that the establishment of contractual relations depends on the willingness of the countries of the Balkan to work on their performances in the area of good governance norms. Consequently, conditions for assistance were to accept the principals of free market and the development of good relations to their neighbours. “The failures of the 1990s policies, the Kosovo crisis and the need to stabilise the Balkans urged the international community to elaborate a more comprehensive approach which was not only reactive to crisis, but had a long term perspective […]“ (Panebianco and Rossi (2004): p. 5) This approach was adopted in June 1999 in the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (SAP). The pact was completed with the Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAA). The aim of these agreements consists of assistance in the process of transition towards European values as well as structures in order to achieve peace and stability. The Stabilisation and Association process includes five countries of southeast Europe – namely Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. This process is designed to bring stability to the region by integrating each country into European structures and by offering them the prospect of future EU membership. The agreements are developed in order to draw countries closer to the EU by providing rights and obligations and mechanisms for working together in areas of mutual interest. The EU’s offer of an eventual EU membership and of the status of potential candidate should help to improve the climate for the development in areas like human rights or the democratic performance.

Examining the European Self-image in the field of foreign and security policy by the example of the Western Balkan states is the central goal of this research project. The analysis is divided in three parts that answer the sub-questions in order to reach conclusions on the European Self.
The first part is designed to answer the following sub-question: What ideas, images as well as constructions lie behind the Self-image of the European Union?

In the construction of a Self-image the creation and construction of images is crucial. Through the process of creating images the world outside becomes an area of unfreedom and insecurity as well as injustice – mostly characterised by labels like backward, primitive or barbarian. In the European security strategy of 2003, which is called “A secure Europe in a better world”, the EU remarks “Europe still faces threats and challenges. The outbreak of conflict in the Balkans was a reminder that war has not disappeared from our continent.” (Communication department of the European Commission (2003): A secure Europe in a better world, p. 1) This quotation shows the outcome of the process of creating images: an image that is dominated by the idea that the world outside is an area of war, unfreedom and insecurity as well as threats. In this way, war becomes a synonym for backward and barbarian.

Such images can be found in the Stabilisation and Association Agreement of Serbia, Albania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In view of the European Union the countries of the Western Balkans need urgently contribution to the political, economic and institutional stabilisation as well as the development of civil society and democratisation, institution building but particularly in the area of justice, freedom and security. “[The SAAs] are ambitious, demanding agreements, which have at their core the basic principles which underpin membership of the Union. The SAAs require respect for democratic principles, human rights and the rule of law; they foresee the establishment of a free trade area with the EU […].” (Commission of the European Communities (2002): COM (2002) 163 final, p. 4) These are all features, which can be associated which the above-mentioned attributes, which are created in the process of constructing images. In the EU-Western Balkan discourse two main themes occur continuously: human rights and democratic values. These themes might be called the formula or key strategy of the EU to support and export stability, peace and security but the armed conflicts in the 1990s might also play a role in this discourse. “In all official documents, the EU makes extensive use of ‘declaratory measures’ […] to export EU norms, values and principles. The discourse and normative analysis reveal a strong EU political commitment to deal with cooperation in the political, economic and social fields by transposing its own experience of political and economic development.” (Panebianco and Rossi (2004): p. 7) The EU is often called a civil or soft power, even if its leaders are increasingly explicit about the fact that the EU’s soft initiatives have also the goal to protect Europe from so-called hard

Economic development in the direction of market economy is also an essential part in the process defined by the EU. Market economy and the free trade area are core elements of the European Self-understanding. Consequently, a transition from centrally planned to functioning market economies is required (Commission of the European Communities (2003): COM (2003) 285 final: p. 5). In the European understanding a centrally planned economy is associated with backwardness and a lower level of civilization but also with violence. This image was created during the years of the Cold War in which one of the strongest images of the Other was constructed. The East-West dichotomy has been remarkably tense in the context of shifting political and cultural contexts. “Noch immer, und es handelt sich tatsächlich um ein >>noch immer<< seit der Aufklärung, wird bis zu einem gewissen Grad auf Teile Ostmittel-, Ost- und Südosteuropas >>herabgesehen<<. Begründet wird dies häufig damit, dass die ehemals sozialistischen Länder einen nicht unerheblichen Modernisierungsrückstand aufzuholen hätten […].” (Schmale (2008): p. 144) Despite the end of the Cold War, this dichotomy has remained embedded in geographical imaginations.

Within the EU the East is still viewed as a source of crime, unwanted immigration, political instability, and violent nationalism. “Indeed, East, Orient, Balkans, Asia, and even Russia have all served as spatial representations of the other in Western thought.” (Hagen (2003): p. 493) It would be also possible to look at Europe in terms of North and South, but the East-West discourse still casts a shadow over such thought. Consequently, the geopolitics of naming is still dominated by the old terms and these ideas are extended on the idea of Europe and its relation to the post-communist states.

Political dialogue and cooperation is also an area in which the Western Balkan states are viewed as backward whereas the European Union as a construct is defined as the key player. This construction is not only observable at the institutional level but also at the level of the European citizens. In a Eurobarometer survey about the future of Europe the interviewees were asked to spontaneously state what the words European Union evoked for them. The majority (22 %) answered cooperation and unity (Directorate General Communication (2006): p. 19). This Self-understanding has its origin in the belief that cooperation and dialogue are instruments that led to the overcoming of the tragedies of the 20th century (Council of the European Union (2007): SAA Serbia, p. 16). The High Representative Catherine Ashton and
also the EU Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy Stefan Füle use this powerful image in their press statements. The statement of the two EU officials on the occasion of the 15th commemoration of Srebrenica is an example for that metaphor: “The European experience of the past six decades proves that a joint perspective can heal many wounds and create conditions for prosperity and a better future. Gradual reconciliation can open new ways.” (Catherine Ashton and Stefan Füle (2010): p. 1) Consequently, the EU’s main objective for the Western Balkans is to create a situation where military conflict is unthinkable in order to expand to the region the area of peace, stability, prosperity and freedom that was established already in the European Union (EurActive (2007): p. 1).

Moreover, without the Other or the Western Balkans the Self in this case Europe cannot know itself nor its environment when meaning evolves in discourse because consciousnesses meet. The relationship between Self and Other is determined by historicity and the ideas behind the Self-understanding. In political cooperation like in Europe, the collective Self will try to make these ideas the basis for institutionalisation. The collective Self is thus predicated by certain political ideas. “Since region building can be seen as a kind of identity politics, in which participants try to forge an identity, it unavoidably involves accentuating similarities between Self and other. […] Group identity is not conceivable without an other from which the Self can be differentiated.” (Neumann (1999): p. 148) In other words, this process can be described as Self-stereotyping. Additionally, it is in the interest of the European Union to share that experience of regional cooperation and integration (Commission of the European Communities (2002): COM (2002) 163 final, p. 11). Moreover, it strengthens the position of the Union on the international scene. This especially includes Human Rights in the form of the right to return for all refugees and internally displaced persons, which are additionally images that imply violence (Council of the European Union (2007): SAA Montenegro, p. 6). The belief that cooperation and dialogue is the best practice and only form of governance is reinforced by statements like close cooperation is aimed at “[…] contributing to the development and growth potential of Serbia” (Council of the European Union (2007): SAA Serbia, p. 89). Europe is recognizing the potential of the countries but at the same time it is clear that they are not on the same level yet and thus need closer cooperation with their neighbouring countries and the member states of the EU in order to move forward.

Additionally, political dialogue is in the Agreement defined as a means to promote “[…] gradual rapprochement with the European Union […]” (Council of the European Union
(2007): SAA Albania, p. 12). Such statements can be understood as synonyms for a reversion of the backward that is imagined from the outside and thus can be defined as ‘imperialism of imagination’ like Goldsworthy described it. Goldsworthy argues that this form of imagination shows a region can be used as an object of the dominant culture’s need for a dialogue with itself (Fleming (2000): p. 1223). This form of imperialism is inherent in the discourse of enlargement, which includes especially the features of cooperation and dialogue besides democratic principles and market economy etc. Bo Stråth even argues that the enlargement discourse of the European Union is a reworking of the white man’s burden discourse. He describes the applicants for membership in the EU as sitting in a waiting room. “If they behave correctly they will be rewarded in due time. Correct behaviour means letting loose the forces of the market which, after a difficult period of catharsis, will produce a Western-style, healthy economy and a civil society.” (Bo Stråth (2000): p. 419) The message behind this discourse is easy: the backwardness of the applicants is responsible that it will take time to achieve the level of the West but through the education of the West it is possible. In this way, the European Union tries to replicate its norms through enlargement to neighbouring third countries by development aid and particularly through the Europeanisation of most of the European continent. Besides, EU enlargement is dependent on democratic support in applicant states. Liam O’Dowd argues that this is a process infinitely preferable to invasion and conquest, because the EU demands that applicant states meet democratic criteria, although the European Union suffers from a severe democratic deficit (Liam O’Dowd (2003): p. 30). In all SAAs fighting organised crime, money laundering and drugs is especially highlighted besides the other elements of justice, freedom and security – visa and border control, asylum and migration, police as well as terrorism. Moreover, Europe is characterised to be a prime target for organised crime, which constructs an internal threat to European security and their open societies, which is imposed from the outside world of insecurity and unfreedom (Communication department of the European Commission (2003): A secure Europe in a better world, p. 4).

From the perspective of the EU the Western Balkans are characterised to be a centre of organised crime. In this way, an image of violence is drawn which also involves the belief that the societies in the region are infiltrated by organised crime structures and “[f]ailure to address these issues is incompatible with integration into EU structures.” (Commission of the European Communities (2003): SEC (2003) 340, p. 3) Especially, in this area the independence of the judiciary and improvement of its efficiency are crucial. This imagination – even true in part— can be defined as a form of imperialism that is imagined and constructed
from the outside. The aquis communitaire and values, ideas and tradition of Europe are imposed upon the Western Balkan states. Such constructions are only possible because the states of Western Balkans are still described as states that are not Self-sustaining despite any ambition to accede to the European Union (Commission of the European Communities (2003): SEC (2003) 340, p. 3). This can also be analysed in the Stabilisation and Association reports: “The signature of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) in April 2001 […] was an important step in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’s efforts to move closer to the EU. But careful, thorough implementation of these obligations will be the only real indicator of progress. However, political crisis has slowed down the process of institutional and legislative change which is necessary if the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is to come closer to European structures.” (Commission of the European Communities (2003): SEC (2003) 340, p. 3) The implemented backwardness in this statement leads to a form of imagined imperialism, which must lead to action from the outside. This assumption can be underlined by a statement of Herman van Rompuy, President of the European Council, following his visit to Bosnia and Herzegovina in October 2010. He claimed that the people of the country deserve swift and decisive action and that they deserve progress, prosperity and the perspective of a better future. Additionally, he underlines that there is no alternative to the European perspective in order to realise this vision for Bosnia (Herman van Rompuy (2010): p. 2).

In fact it can be argued that only if conflict or violent situations occur the countries of the Western Balkans are of interest to the international community as well as to the EU. “While the recent history of the Western Balkans has been characterized by extremely violent conflict […] it has also been the site of significant international involvement. Because of the events of the 1990s, the Western Balkans has received a great deal of international attention and involvement.” (Grillot, D’Erman and Cruise (2007): p. 17) Especially, after the attacks of 9/11 the attention of the international community switched to other regions of conflict and violence like Afghanistan.

The Orient and the Western Balkans are in the European perspective and tradition constructed as a contrasting image, idea, personality and experience. Europe and the West defined themselves through concepts of the Orient but also of the Balkans and gained in strength and identity by setting themselves off against the Orient as a sort of surrogate Self. In this way, counterparts of negative characteristics vis-à-vis a positive Self-image of Europe developed.
The counterparts constitute a powerful metaphor. These concepts can still be traced in remarks of EU officials like Herman van Rompuy: “I firmly believe the EU’s weight and credibility begins in its immediate neighbourhood. Europe is committed to a European perspective of the Western Balkans. Europe does a lot of efforts to support the Western Balkans. Technical and financial assistance for the region is over 2 billion Euros from 2010 to 2012. A lot of efforts are also done by the countries.” (Herman van Rompuy (2010): p. 1) Through assuring its own weight and thus power van Rompuy sets the EU off against the Western Balkans as a surrogate Self that has the positive Self-image of a supporter and the one that is at a higher level of civilization and thus can provide technical and financial assistance. In this way, the counterpart is equipped with negative characteristics like backwardness or poorness.

Orientalism is defined by Edward Said as a discourse about the Orient and a particular style of thought. Systems of thoughts and knowledge composed of ideas, attitudes, courses of action, beliefs, and practices that systematically construct subjects and the world of which they speak are significant for contrasting images etc. about the Orient and thus the Balkans. In the Stabilisation and Association Agreements with all the countries of the region such a system can also be traced like in this quote: “Bearing in mind the commitment of Serbia to approximate its legislation in the relevant sectors to that of the Community, and to effectively implement it […]” (Council of the European Union (2007): SAA Serbia, p. 7) This shows the ontological and epistemological distinction between the Orient and the Occident, East and West whereas the West is in the position to demand change from the East and adjustment to its aquis communitaire. Consequently, this distinction can be defined, as Edward Said points out, as a form of thought for dealing with the Orient, which is channelled into a West and East compartment.

Balkanism is the discourse about the Balkan from the European perspective that differs in parts from Orientalism especially in terms of historicity. The discourse about the Balkan is characterised by the central features of violence and backwardness, loaded by negative associations and additionally constructed like being outside historical time. “The Western Balkans is a particular challenge for the EU. Enlargement policy needs to demonstrate its power of transformation in a region where states are weak and societies divided.” (Commission of the European Communities (2005): COM (2005) 561 final, p. 2) Traces of this discourse can be found for instance in the SAA of Serbia as well as in the SAAs of the
other four countries. The document starts with the assumption that Serbia has to strengthen and develop almost all central features and obligation in order to become a member state of the European Union especially in the area of justice, freedom and security (Council of the European Union (2007): SAA Serbia, p. 5). Particularly, organised crime is such an area.

The Western Balkan states have undergone a great transition during the past decade, but still in the SAA of Serbia as well as in the ones of the other Western Balkan countries it is for example stated, that a “new climate for economic relations” (Council of the European Union (2007): SAA Serbia, p. 7) is necessary. The discourse also includes illegal migration and rights of persons belonging to national minorities as an image of violence and backwardness. In this way, migration is associated to be a threat to the prosperity, stability and security of the Union. The region is also drawn as a centre or gateway for such migration flows as mentioned in the report about Albania’s efforts in the transition process: “Albania is both a source and a transit centre for trafficking in human beings.” (Commission of the European Communities (2001): COM (2001) 300 final, p. 7) Moreover, the states of the region are seen to be not yet able to manage such migration flows – their instruments and efforts are considered to be lacking and thus to be backward. Additionally, the discourse implements that the countries of the Western Balkans are not in a condition to treat persons belonging to national minorities in a civilised way.

The image of violence can be traced in earlier reports from the Commission: “Every country is now a democracy. […] But that progress has not been without setbacks. The resurgence of violence in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia shows the fragility of the region, and how easily parts of it can slip back into crisis.” (Commission of the European Communities (2002): COM (2002) 163 final, p. 4) This discourse has remained over the years until today.

‘Men make their history’ and formulate the past through narrativity and constructions. This process in turn informs the presence. “The break up of the former Yugoslavia, accompanied by years of war and repression, has left behind a highly fragmented region. […] This makes for a region of formidable complexity. War added to enormous economic and social transition problems in most parts of the region.” (Commission of the European Communities (2002): COM (2002) 163 final, p. 5) This formulation of the past led to the present views and understandings of the region. The EU also remarks that there have been improvements “despite the unpromising background” (Commission of the European Communities (2002): COM (2002) 163 final, p. 5). The identity of the European Union is in part founded on the understanding that the overcoming of the legacy of the World War II is landmark for the
European concept and thus authorizes to bring integration and cooperation as well as the European values to other parts of the world. This can also be observed in the SAA of Serbia, where it is stated, that the profit lies for Serbia “[…] in the establishment and consolidation of a stable European order based on cooperation, of which the European Union is a mainstay […]” (Council of the European Union (2007): SAA Serbia, p. 5). This quotation clearly shows how men make their history through representing the past and how these views shape the understandings of the present. The same statement can be found in all Stabilisation and Association Agreements with the Western Balkan states.

The Stabilisation and Association Report for the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia of 2002 includes in its executive summary that ”[i]n 2001 the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia faced the most serious political and security crisis in its history. […] The economic situation deteriorated during 2001, largely as a result of the security crisis.” (Commission of the European Communities (2002): SEC (2002) 342, p. 3) In this way, the past is formulated in negative terms, which influences the understanding and views of the EU in the presence – thus the negative characterisation of the country but also of the region remain stable. The EU can maintain the positive understanding of itself through this formulation of the past. The same applies to a statement about the murder of the Serbian Prime Minister, Zoran Djindjic, who was committed to the development of a Serbian state that goes in line with the European perspective. “This crime is a reminder of the difficult legacy of the past and also of the need to continue the Government’s work on stabilisation, democratisation and reform at an unabated pace.” (Commission of the European Communities (2002): COM (2002) 163 final, p. 2) In spite of the achieved elements in the process, the image of the past remains alive and the present views are reinforced. The reforms that the countries have to undertake are viewed to allow moving the countries away from the past to reconcile differences and to rebuild trust in order to be able to focus on improving their citizens’ life and bringing them closer towards the EU (Commission of the European Communities (2005): COM (2004) 202 final, p. 7). Consequently, the past remains negative and loads the present also with negativity in terms of a lower level of civilization and backwardness.

The EU also uses the representation of the past to assure herself that her work, best practice and aquis communitaire, which was implemented in the region leads to a better presence and thus future – the positive Self-image is thus reinforced. The application for membership of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is such an example. It is viewed as part of historic processes, in which the countries of the region concerned are overcoming the political crisis.
in their region and orienting themselves to join the area of peace, stability, and prosperity created by the EU (Commission of the European Communities (2005): COM (2005) 562 final, p. 2).

Geographic designation and invention often show how collective entities deal with the difference between the Self and the Other. In the case of Europe several Others and thus geographical tags were constructed. Europe’s main Other besides ‘the Orient’ is indeed ‘the East’. The image of ‘the East’ as the Other is constantly produced and re-produced in order to represent European identities and consequently, the use of ‘the East’ is a general practice in identity formation. “Indeed, this structural feature of applicant rhetoric is a very good illustration of how geographical tags such as ‘east’ are not only a question of compass needles but are constituted in political terms. It is firmly grounded in a historical trajectory where ‘west’ is seen as dynamic, whereas ‘east’ is seen as stagnant.” (Neumann (2001): p. 153) The own reflection of the West in the Eastern mirror served in this way to reinforce the Western vision of democracy, peace, welfare, and rule of law. This process of territorialisation of space means in this context to assign identities for collective subjects within a certain framework of power or in other words to categorise human beings (Etienne Balibar (2004): p. 4).

In chapter two I explained that the act of naming is crucial to shape the rhetoric and practice of International Relations. It defines and re-defines Europe’s imagined geography. After the Balkan Wars in the 1990s a new politically correct designation developed: Western Balkans. Western Balkan still stands for a problematic zone, but the rest of the Balkan like Bulgaria are exempt from this designation. The Western Balkans thus remains the Other that is different from the new member states of the European Union. The mirror for the Self-images was adjusted new in adapting the new context of the time after the conflict. Consequently, “Balkanism has not disappeared, but has shifted, for the time being, from the centre stage of politics.” (Todorova (2009: p. 192) Additionally, the imagined boundaries were drawn differently. In the post-Yugoslavian regions it is necessary to reappraise the war crimes of the 1990s. But not all political tendencies accept this necessity. The instrument of mental mapping is characterised by association and comparison. Mapping is thus a discursive process that is influenced by power. The power to map is a strong instrument in International Relations and political struggles. “Making associations among the lands of Eastern Europe meant intellectually combining them into a coherent whole. The comparison with the lands of Western Europe then established the division.” (Stråth (2000): p. 415) The processes of
geographic designation and invention as well as mental mapping go hand in hand for the concerned region. In this way, Balkanisation became synonymous with the geopolitical instability of the area and can be treated like a mental map. The invention of regions shows how people deal with difference. The EU for example states in one of her reports that South East Europe faces an enormous range of problems (Commission of the European Communities (2002): COM (2002) 163 final, p. 9). Through such statements and formulations the countries of that area are seen as being one space. The states of the Western Balkans have all an individual agreement but there are findings within the SAAs that make it possible to conclude that the European Union understands the area as one region of instability:

“Considering the commitment of the Parties to contribute by all means to the political, economic and institutional stabilisation in Montenegro as well as in the region […]” (Council of the European Union (2007): SAA Montenegro, p. 6)

The individual countries understand themselves not as one region that has grown together – even if the EU treats the region as one space. This treatment can be observed in remarks like that: “Trade is growing steadily if unevenly across the region but intra regional trade remains disappointingly low […]” (Commission of the European Communities (2002): COM (2002) 163 final, p. 5) As regards trade in particular, the Western Balkan states refuse to cooperate with each other without pressure from the outside thus the EU tries to bring them closer together through regional cooperation programmes. Another example for such an understanding is the following remark: “The unification of Europe will not be complete until it includes its south-eastern part.” (Commission of the European Communities (2002): COM (2002) 163 final, p. 4) In another council conclusion on Western Balkans it is stated that Serbia is part of the European family (Council of the European Union (2008): Council Conclusion on the Western Balkans, p. 2). This can also be defined as the geographic designation as well as invention of belonging to Europe. The geographic designation and invention is needed in the process of making the Selves, which is dependent on available identities and a path dependent process, because it has to choose from a number of previously negotiated identities like the image of ‘the East’, in order to be plausible and credible. Through such processes a moral and imagined geography evolved. Imagined geography can be comprised as means of perceiving spaces and places, and the relation between them.

“Gleichwohl hat jedes politische System eine räumliche Dimension und verlangt nach einer Grenze, die die Reichweite politischer Herrschaft markiert und die den Austausch mit seiner Umwelt reguliert.” (Raimund Krämer (2005): p. 6) Imagined geography can be described as complex sets of cultural and political practices and ideas, which are defined spatially and
which draws boundaries that are constituted in the political context. These boundaries and imagined geographies are obviously necessary to define the Self. Special about this kind of geography is the fact that it may be even directly contradictory to accepted geographical facts. “This discourse of naming then reflects social and political relations of power and knowledge, in addition to territorial control. […] A critical examination of the language used in geopolitical rhetoric offers a powerful interrogative tool for exploring the hidden assumptions helping to shape our imagined geographies and the practices and policies that result from them.” (Hagen (2003): p. 491) The act of naming can be perceived as a common strategy that is used to shape the rhetoric and practice of international relations and is an essential tool for defining and re-defining Europe’s imagined geography. In this case, the term ‘imagined’ must be understood as having real consequences for international relations and people’s life. The geopolitics of naming has played and still plays a crucial role in framing discussions and discourses. J. Hagen even argues that Europe as such can be seen as a speech act: it is talked and written into existence (Hagen (2003): p. 491-492). The same argument is valid for the Western Balkans – the region is talked into existence mainly by the outside – in this case the international community and especially the European Union. “In a focus of European attention today is the Western Balkans, specific economic-geopolitical entity imaged by EU in order to speed up EU accession. […] That image does not have any geopolitical similarity in history. The only criteria Western Balkans is related to is pragmatic necessity to gather countries of similar development in order to facilitate enlargement policy.” (Milos Solaja (2009): p. 118)

Representation in this case involves the assumption that the Orient as well as the Balkans could not represent itself. Cultures tend to make representations of foreign cultures to better master or control them. These representations beyond familiar boundaries confirm European power and the Balkan as well as the Orient become the ‘otherness of ourness’ and serve as a mirror for the level of civilization of Europe. Especially, the SAA reports show such a representation. The report of Macedonia of the year 2002, for instance, includes in every chapter a short description of the state of affairs in the country, which are mostly insufficient according to the European Union. Keeping in mind that the Commission published the report, this representation is made from the outside. In this way, the autonomy of the country to represent itself is denied. The EU represents this foreign culture in order to better master the country and moreover to confirm its own power to implement its aquis communautaire in the region. Consequently, the negative representation demonstrates the “otherness of ourness”.

Such representations are constructed like this: "The institutions of the country demonstrated important weaknesses in relations to the basic principles of democracy and the rule of law which must now be addressed. In particular International agreements, Laws and Regulations, once signed or adopted should be respected." (Commission of the European Communities (2002): SEC (2002) 342, p. 4) The EU clearly demands the addressing of several democratic principles. In this way, she confirms her power. Additionally, the Western Balkans’ states of affairs clearly serve as a mirror for the own level of civilization.

In the social constructions in policy an object or subject becomes alive that otherwise would not exist. In this way, international politics is a world of making in which agents are constituted by culture and the willingness to define the Self by reference how Others see it. Such an object is for example the respect for democratic principles and human rights as proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other fundamental Acts as they “[…] shall form the basis of the domestic and external policies of the Parties and constitute essential elements of this Agreement.” (Council of the European Union (2007): SAA Montenegro, p. 12) These Declarations and Final Acts are an essential feature of the culture of international politics and how the Self of the EU is defined. This process takes place in relation to how Others see the Self. Part of this world of making is also the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The full cooperation with ICTY is a condition, which is not negotiable. The ICTY is an object that comes alive through International Politics in order to define the Self in line with the above-mentioned values and beliefs. The ICTY has no formal power and is thus only alive as an object because of the world of making of the international community.

Another example for such an object is the following article in the SAAs: “Regional cooperation and compliance with recognised international standards in combating organised crime shall be promoted.” (Council of the European Union (2007): SAA Albania, p. 81) Such international standards are an object that became alive in order to constitute the culture of international politics.

The social cognitive structure helps to create order within societies and interests are also constructed by ideas. The involved persons act on the basis of these ideas and beliefs. For the European Union such ideas and beliefs are for instance political and economic freedom, human rights, the rule of law, and democratic principles. This means if Serbia, Albania, the former Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina want to be part of
international politics and thus of the EU they have to act on the basis of these ideas and beliefs.

The world of international politics always involves a social structure of knowledge according to the work of Alexander Wendt. In fact, the Stabilisation and Association Agreements with Serbia, Albania, the former Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina are marked by a social structure of knowledge, which contains on the one hand material conditions, interests and ideas. The material conditions are economic relations and the resulting benefits and financial assistance in the case of the EU. The interests would be lasting stability, peace and prosperity on the other hand. Moreover, the ideas that lie within such an agreement can be described as the values that form the background of the EU: Human Rights, Democratic Principles, and Market Economy. But also the idea that Serbia, Albania, the former Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina and the EU have strong links and share these values – as stated in the introduction of the SAAs: “Considering the strong links between the Parties and the values that they share, their desire to strengthen those links and establish a close and lasting relationship based on reciprocity and mutual interest, which should allow Serbia to further strengthen and extend its relations with the Community and its Member States [...]” (Council of the European Union (2007): SAA Serbia, p. 4)

International politics include a role structure of a culture. The outcome of this structure is marked by a logic of interaction, which establishes the representation of Self and Other. This logic is not characterized by the actual knowledge of the actors about each other rather on what actors know about their role. Such a logic can be traced for example in the SAA with Serbia, in which it is made clear that the EU has the role of contributing to the economic reforms of Serbia rather than the other way around (Council of the European Union (2007): SAA Serbia, p. 6). This logic of interaction can be found in all SAAs – especially, the statement that integration into the European Union is depending on the individual reform progress and merit of the Western Balkan countries shows clearly what both sides know about their role (Council of the European Union (2007): SAA Serbia, p. 8). The EU believes it has the role for demanding transformation of its counterpart whereas the role of the Balkans is characterized by following these demands. It is also clear that the countries in the Balkan region have to act according to this assigned role if they want to become a part of the economic, political and social welfare the Union is promising. “It is imperative that the
country shows its commitment to implement its agreements with the EU by respecting the relevant deadlines. Successful implementation of the SAA, notably regarding regional co-operation, will be one of the main conditions for the full integration of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia into the political and economic mainstream of Europe.” (Commission of the European Communities (2002): SEC (2002) 342, p. 19) During an interaction the EU is in the position to judge whether an action is positive or negative for the future of the region. Moreover, due to the EU and NATO partnership both are in the position in the role structure to bring an end to the conflict and stabilise the region. In this way, the logic of interaction follows the assumption that “NATO’s effective military presence and the EU’s increased engagement have contributed to strengthening regional security and continue to do so.” (Communication department of the European Commission (2003): 11605/03Presse218, p. 2)

In all examples the assigned role in the cultural structure of the Western Balkan states remains insignificant and dominated.

International policy actors act in global politics on the foundation of interests that are defined before the actual interaction takes place. “Considering the European Union’s readiness to integrate Serbia to the fullest possible extent into the political and economic mainstream of Europe […]” (Council of the European Union (2007): SAA Serbia, p. 5) in order to secure life, liberty, property, and self-esteem of the European Union. Especially, these interests are reinforced by the demand of the EU that Serbia has to commit to free trade and has to follow the obligation arising out of membership of the World Trade Organisation. The key feature here is that the Self-image is positive because it depends in part on the relation to the Other, since it is by taking the perspective of the Other that the Self sees itself. From the perspective of Serbia, Albania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina the EU is the largest trade partner and thus is characterized by economic but also social wellbeing and is thus positively loaded. “The Community and Serbia shall establish a close cooperation aimed at contributing to the development and growth potential of Serbia. Such cooperation shall strengthen existing economic links on the widest possible foundation, to the benefit of both Parties.” (Council of the European Union (2007): SAA Serbia, p. 89) Such statements underline clearly how the EU is advocating her interests in securing her own model of life and liberty through protecting her property and Self-esteem. This should be ensured by the ultimate goal to integrate these countries into the European Union. The path is also strengthened by the actual citizens of the Union, of which two-thirds
(67 %) in an Eurobarometer survey on enlargement confirmed that enlargement ensures peace and stability on the European continent (Directorate General Enlargement (2006): p. 30). Besides the economic interest, the European Union has a strong interest in the stabilisation of the region in order to achieve lasting peace and security at its peripheries taking into account the Common Foreign and Security Policy. This defined policy can also be regarded as positively loaded from the outside. This strategy also involves the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which the EU regards as the “[…] most serious threats to international stability and security.” (Council of the European Union (2007): SAA Serbia, p. 12) In this way, the Union tries to secure her life, liberty, property, and Self-esteem. The EU has a strong interest to build up secure and stable as well as controlled borders at its periphery in order to secure her own stability. In this context, the Western Balkan states need to reinforce their efforts to prevent illegal immigration, money laundering, terrorism, illicit drugs or other illegal activities that cross borders. At the same time, it is possible to develop a positive Self-image through such an assumed backwardness that is often combined with images of threat. “It is in the European interest that countries on our borders are well-governed. Neighbours who are engaged in violent conflict, weak states where organised crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth on its borders all pose problems for Europe.” (Communication department of the European Commission (2003): A secure Europe in a better world, p. 7) This concept of internal security cannot exist without such an external dimension. Consequently, the European Union has to represent her interests in the Western Balkans. The Economist argued: “Despite resistance in some quarters, EU policy-makers seem to have decided that it is better to have these countries inside the club rather than causing trouble outside.” (Geoffrey Pridham (2008): p. 63) This argument can be underlined by taking a closer look at the map: After the joining of Romania and Bulgaria, the remaining countries in that area are encircled by the EU and their stability gets even more important. “Die Kernzone ist an der Entwicklung der Peripherie interessiert, denn die äußeren Regionen haben die Aufgabe, die prosperierende Kernzone der Europäischen Union von externen Störungen abzuschirmen.” (Susanne Heeg and Jürgen Oßenbrügge (2005): p. 187) In this way, the Western Balkans became a buffer zone for the EU. Their stability and security is of special interest for the prosperity of the core of the European Union. Commissioner Patten also follows this argumentation line when stating “either Europe exports stability to the Balkans or the Balkans export instability to the rest of Europe” (Pridham (2008): p. 68). Consequently, the EU recognized that the Balkans couldn’t be outside of Europe anymore. The EU’s offer also required a transformation of Europe’s own thought and of the European
perception of its Other. This process started after the wars in Bosnia and Herzegovina because it became clear that it is not enough to develop a policy aiming at economic reconstruction or political reform. It is also necessary to give the prospect of full membership in order to achieve lasting stability and peace as well as security but also prosperity to that region. “Emerging from the post war context, the Process’ main ambition was to assure Balkan countries with stability and security and in particular <<it should try to contribute to reducing the tensions arising from the conflict and preventing a resumption of hostilities, promote a better understanding that is in the interest of each party to cooperate rather than to try systematically to put obstacles in the way of any undertaking by a neighbour, contribute to restoring confidence and dialogue, and overcome ethnic divisions and hatreds>> […]“. (Panebianco and Rossi (2004): p. 4)

The EU has also a strong interest to play her full role on the international stage and the European Council seeks to provide it with all necessary means and capabilities (European Council (2000): p. 17). The Union defines her foreign policy credibility in international politics through the consolidation of their achievements in the Balkans. “A failure to resolve the crisis earlier in the nineties, coupled with the fact that it was practically impossible to gain global political significance without the ability to ensure stability in its own backyard, gave EU no other option but to try investing resources and know-how into it.” (Sandro Knezovic (2009): p. 95) But at the same time European integration is offered to the countries in order to have an exit strategy for the massive political and military presence in the region as well as for the development of stable democratic states. Moreover, the international community turned its focus away from the former greatest global crises to new events of crises. The EU is now taking over the international stabilisation forces in the region in order to prove that it is able to ensure stability and security in its own backyard. Consequently, it can be said “[…] it is not wrong to point out that the EU can only be a global actor if the Union can enhance its power in the Balkans. The US influence still persists could be seen in January 2008 when US diplomats urged representatives of the EU to recognise the independence of Kosovo after declaration.” (Becker (2008): p. 15)

The conflict in the Western Balkan area changed the perspective of the common EU foreign policy. The deficiencies and deplorable state of affairs within the Union were uncovered. It unravelled the lack of cohesion among the member states. The reasons are quite clear: “European institutions lacked the military capability for conflict intervention. European institutions failed to address the evolving crisis of the 1990s. In part, this failure has been of a military nature, and in part it reflected the lack of political cohesion among key
international/European actors [...].” (Belloni (2009): p. 4) Additionally, it can be argued that the EU lacked the political unity and the experience as well as the expertise especially in foreign policy but also the military capacity to address the conflict in the Balkan region in the middle of its continent. Consequently, the EU decided to tie her forces together in the external action service in order to be able to act in a more efficient way. Jens Becker formulates this process as steaming out of a crisis of legitimization, in which the EU was unable to speak with one voice and powerless to act in the first military conflict after World War II occurring at the heart of its continent. Additionally, a common Foreign and Security policy was not on top of the political agenda. Indeed, the focus was on common market and free trade policies as well as the monetary union (Becker (2008): p. 11).

Ego and Alter have preconceived ideas of each other that assign roles and form the starting point for their interaction. Power relations are crucial for the relation of Ego and Alter. This process is featured by role-taking, which includes choosing from available representations of the Self, and what interests one wants to go after in interaction. Additionally, altercasting takes place by taking a role identity. Ego is at the same time casting Alter in a corresponding counter-role that makes Ego’s identity meaningful. This interrelated process can be analysed in the SAAs of all countries of the Western Balkan region. The EU as Ego in this case chooses the representation of the Self, which can be described as the one of a teacher who itself can afford not to learn. “Security community emerges following a process of teaching and learning, and international organizations [like the EU] play a significant role in the process.” (Grillot, D’Erman and Cruise (2007): p. 13) The areas in which the Western Balkan states have to learn are mirroring the interests of the EU like economic and institutional stability. The concerned countries are altercasted in the role of a student, who has to learn the aquis communitaire like the rule of law and the other core principles of European Self-understanding.

This form of Ego and Alter as actors can also be observed in other parts of the Agreements. Article 8 of the Agreement with Serbia says that a Stabilisation and Association Council (SAC) “[…] shall regularly review, as a rule on an annual basis, the implementation of this Agreement and the adoption and implementation by Serbia of legal, administrative, institutional and economic reforms. […] On the basis of this review, the SAC will issue recommendations and may take decisions.” (Council of the European Union (2007): SAA Serbia, p. 14) In this way, Serbia is altercasted by the EU in the counter-role of the observed. The power relation of Ego and Alter as a crucial part of their relationship is thus defined: the
EU as the observer and the countries of the Western Balkans as the observed. This relation is reinforced by the fact that no mechanisms are defined, which review regularly the efforts of the Union. Consequently, the European Union chooses from the available representations of the Self. This Self-representation can be observed just at the beginning of the negotiations of the SAA: “Taking all of these factors into account, the Commission considers that Albania is not yet in the position to meet the obligations of a Stabilisation and Association Agreement.” (Commission of the European Communities (2001): COM (2001) 300 final, p. 8)

4. Self-image and Identity of the EU vis-à-vis Western Balkans (Boundaries and Determinations)

The second part of this analysis is designed to answer sub questions concerning the determination of the Self-image and which imagined borders are inherent in this determination.

As I described in the theory chapter geographical and cultural boundaries between the West and non-Western peripheries are strong and nearly absolute. They are constructed in order to define themselves as civilised Europeans. “Historically, the idea of a European civilization had three ‘Others’ in particular: the Orient, America and Eastern Europe. In the mirrors of these Others Self-images emerged. The construction of the Others and these Self-images was an interactive process of xeno- and autostereotyping, which, of course, had less to do with the Other, as it ‘really was’, and much more to do with the projection of a European mentality.” (Stråth (2000): p. 410)

For this research project the most relevant of these Others besides the Orient is the concept of Western and Eastern Europe. This concept developed as one of demarcation with respect to the Enlightenment. The idea of Europe as a unity can be seen as belonging to the Enlightenment project. The philosophers of the Enlightenment established ‘Western Europe’ as the seat of civilization and invented as it complementary other ‘Eastern Europe’. This invention of ‘the East’ can be seen as a tool to turn ‘time into space’. “Travelling from West to East was like travelling back in time. Within this framework, the West became advanced and modern, while the East remained primitive and pre-modern. By the end of the Enlightenment, the idea of the West had come to represent progress, liberty, civilization, and Europe itself, while the East was identified with backwardness, despotism, barbarity, Asia, and the Orient.” (Hagen (2003): p. 492) The image of the East is also crucial in connection with the Western Balkan states because the concept of the Balkans and the one of the East
were and are often equated. Both concepts served as a metaphor for the lack of civilization in comparison with the European continent. Todorova argues that Nationalism supports this metaphor. “Not only was racial mixture conducive to disorder, racial impurity was disorder. ‘The confused experiences and training of the races and states of the Balkans’ was explained with their particular ‘stage of civilization.’ In the words of a British diplomat: ‘Nationalism in Eastern Europe is naturally more prone to warlike expression than in Western Europe, for it is in a earlier stage of development.’” (Todorova (2009): p. 128) This manner can also be traced in the SAA documents like the one of Serbia in which the parties most of all want to strengthen the national and regional security, which can be seen as one feature of a civilised society living in a stable order. “Security is a precondition for development. Conflict not only destroys infrastructure, including social infrastructure; it also encourages criminality, deters investment and makes normal economic activity impossible. A number of countries and regions are caught in a cycle of conflict, insecurity and poverty.”

Communication department of the European Commission (2003): A secure Europe in a better world, p. 2)

Consequently, opposition pairs like security versus insecurity and development versus underdevelopment are created and boundaries between the West and also non-Western peripheries become firmly established. In this way, the space beyond familiar boundaries is constituted, animated and represented through narrativity and thus confirms European power. It is enough to set up such boundaries mentally. The demand of the EU that Serbia and the other countries of that region adjust their legislation in the relevant sectors to that of the Community is an example for drawing boundaries in this way (Council of the European Union (2007): SAA Serbia, p. 7). Another example for such a boundary is the assumption of the EU that sees herself at a higher level of civilization and that only the countries of the Western Balkans have to bring merits. This can be transferred to several areas of interest of the EU like justice, freedom or security. “[T]he countries of the region still have a long road ahead before they reach EU levels of democratic stability and socio-economic development. The task of integrating the countries of the region into European structures remains a vast and long term undertaking.” (Commission of the European Communities (2002): COM (2002) 163 final, p.6)

The way in which review mechanisms are set up shows how such boundaries are drawn. The EU has the role and Self-understanding of an observer. Consequently, Serbia in its role as the observed constitutes through these mental boundaries a mirror in order to define the Union’s member states as civilised Europeans, which are at a higher level of civilization and thus have not to be observed. The same dichotomy and boundaries are applied in the relation between
West and non-Western peripheries. The Western Balkans in the Self-understanding of the European Union can thus be counted to the non-Western peripheries.

The construction of boundaries takes place through narrativity. This process is responsible for creating the Self and the Other whereby images and traditions play a crucial role. The narrativity in the case of the EU in relation with the Western Balkan states is marked by images and traditions that are related to stability, prosperity, and security as well as justice. These areas can be traced in all SAAs and other documents – through these elements boundaries and differences are drawn and thus the Self and the Other are created. In the words of the agreement in the chapter about justice, freedom and security: “In their cooperation on justice and home affairs the Parties shall attach particular importance to the consolidation of the rule of law, and the reinforcement of institutions at all levels in the areas of administration in general and law enforcement and the administration in particular. Cooperation shall notably aim at strengthening the independence of the judiciary and improving its efficiency, improving the functioning of the police and other law enforcement bodies, providing adequate training and fighting corruption and organised crime.” (Council of the European Union (2007): SAA Albania, p. 74) The narrativity used in this context is characterised by words that label backwardness, primitiveness and a lower level of development and civilization. In this way, boundaries towards the Other are drawn through the image of backwardness. This image and its narrativity can be defined as traditional because it did not change of decades.

The real cultural divide was and is between rich and poor. Rich in this sense is accompanied by Christian faith and Capitalism as Samuel Huntington argues as cited in Todorova’s book: “‘Our western civilization has both a moral and a material basis: it is both an ethical and an economic system: its strength of accumulated civic experience equivalent in some respects to Christianity, and of accumulated prosperity expressed in some of its forms as Capital.’”

[...]here was nothing European in the Balkans, because ‘civilization cannot exist without both such ethical and economic components, and both of them were impossible under the unholy alliance between Orthodox obscurantism and Asiatic autocracy.’” (Todorova (2009): p. 132)

Identity construction always involves the construction of counterparts and Others. This process can be defined as Othering into hierarchical groups (existence of separate, unequal, hierarchical spheres of civilizations) by setting themselves off against the Other as a sort of surrogate Self and then gaining in strength and identity. The identity construction of the EU is
also defined by such a process: The EU has a surrogate Self that is able to set itself off the
Other which is considered lacking identity and thus needs civilization. All Western Balkan
countries are not on the same level of civilization as the rest of Europe in terms of regional
peace and stability, the development of good neighbourly relations, human rights respect and
protection of minorities as well as in economic terms (Council of the European Union (2007):
SAA Serbia, p. 13). Especially, the fight against corruption and organised crime is used as a
symbol and image for such a construction. The Other is thus in a sphere that is separate,
equal and on a lower level of civilization.
The construction of a European identity in general is a process that sets up hierarchical groups
and constructs counterparts and Others. Consequently, a European identity is a political
project. In 1973 the European Community for the first time officially paid attention to a
European identity. “A European identity was seen not only as the instrument to save the
national economies over into new arrangements, but also to save the place of Europe in a
reconstructed international order, as the hierarchical demarcation of Europe’s Others in the
document in 1973 demonstrates [...].“ (Stråth (2000): p. 402) This political decision to set up
a European identity can be seen as an attempt to re-establish an international order with a
central role for Europe. This course of action is a way to deal with the dark side of history of
Europe with two world wars and to highlight the role of a common civilization as the
European Communities stated: “[b]ut they have overcome their past enmities and have
decided that unity is a basic European necessity to ensure the survival of the civilization
which they have in common.” (European Communities (1973): p. 2) In this way, the memory
of the Holocaust also became part of the European identity policy. This memory is also part
of the ‘Verstehen’ of a civilising mission of the EU. In the words of Robert Kagan, the
Europeans left the Hobbsian world of lawlessness and entered the Kantian world of peace
(Schmale (2008): p. 26). Back in 1973 the heads of the governments defined thus the one
European identity namely in foreign policy terms in order to be able to speak with one voice
in order to make itself heard and play its proper role in the world (European Communities
(1973): p. 3). They also proposed to constantly undertake the definition of their identity in
relation to other countries or groups of countries. “Dieser Schritt folgte ebenso der Logik der
politischen Einheit und machte die enge Verbindung zwischen Einheit und Identität überaus
deutlich, ohne das eine und das andere herstellen zu können.” (Schmale (2008): p. 25) At the
same time, this means a fortification of the perimeter wall against the Others, those who do
not belong to Europe even if there is a process going on towards a single market without
internal frontiers. The declaration comments that the Union is open to other countries that
share the same ideals and objectives. Additionally, ‘United in diversity’ became the key phrase for European identity through highlighting the diversity of cultures as the originality and own dynamism of that identity (Stråth (2000): p. 21). The nine member countries back in 1973 also stated that they have the same attitudes based on building up a society which measures up the needs of the individual, defending the principles of representative democracy, of the rule of law, of social justice and of respect for human rights. They defined these elements as fundamental for a European identity (European Communities (1973): p. 2). Identities can only be understood relationally thus the following identities overlap and interests have their origin in them. Understandings of the Self are constructed out of many identities that constitute the discursive formations and make up the social cognitive structure of society. Consequently, identity and otherness exist in a symbiotic relationship.

Consequently, all identity formation has to take place in reaction to an external, non-European Other. In this interaction – with the non-European environment – the European and thus EU Self-image emerged. But a European identity is always multidimensional and hybrid; it is neither exclusive as collective or as individual identity. A European identity exists only in addition to other identities like the individual national identities of the member states of the EU. “What this begins to suggest is that a collective Self marks itself off from its others by a number of what anthropologist following Fredrik Barth call ‘diacritica’.” (Neumann (2001): p. 143) For instance, in all Treaties of the European Union is written down what diacritica member states must have: they have to be democratic and they have to be European. These features are the two explicit criteria and additionally the prerequisites for being taken seriously.

In the end the Western Balkans are of importance for the European Union and its security and prosperity as well as Europe’s identity. Especially, the 1990s conflict showed their significance: “Sharpened the feelings for good and evil, for ‘us’ (that share emotions) and ‘them’ (the feelings of others), for power and weakness, for knowledge and ignorance. As a European-Atlantic war, they led Europe to the border of its morality, solidarity, power and Self-knowledge.” (Becker (2008): p. 14) Jens Becker argues European unity continues at war. In the sense that the contours of a European identity become visible and show the values and norms for which the European societies stand and consequently which belong to the continent.

The personal and corporate identity of a community is important to determine the Self-image. The members of a group must have a common narrative of themselves. One example of such
a narrative is the commitment to foster cooperation and good neighbourly relations. The narrative is thus that “this commitment constitutes the key factor in the development of the relations and cooperation between the Parties and thus contributes to regional stability.” (Council of the European Union (2007): SAA Serbia, p. 13) The narrative of cooperation is one of the main narratives the European Union uses to describe itself and the Western Balkan countries also start to use this narrative. Moreover, when integration had lost its power European identity is mobilised in the European discourse in order to reinforce the common narrative of them. Identity means sameness that is why it is a mobilising power for regional integration. But this can only make sense as a belief, a myth, or an identification with something – as the projection of the ego to something else and the symbolic representation of it. The European discourse is translated into a political and ideological project. In other words, if Europe should have a meaning, it must be a political programme (White (2000): p. 14).

Type identities label characteristics of the actors in international politics. For example, the EU labels itself with the following characteristics in conflict prevention, which it sees as one of its core duties in the Western Balkans. “The EU’s strength in conflict prevention continues to lie in its capacity to address the different facets of this challenging and broad task in a comprehensive way by pooling the wide array of EU instruments (soft tools), particularly preventive diplomacy, development policies and assistance, support to strengthening democratic institutions and the rule of law, promoting reconciliation and dialogue, and the build up of institutional and national capacities on conflict prevention.” (Council of the European Union (2010): p. 40) Through such labelling the Union draws boundaries and implements that the countries concerned are lacking such characteristics. Additionally, the type identity of being a soft power is constructed with soft tools.

Role identities exist merely in relation to Others and have a cultural dependency. Following the assumption that peace, stability or the development of good neighbourly relations are part of the Self-understanding of the EU and have thus a cultural dependency, it can be argued that the role identity of Serbia for instance exists only because of its relation to the EU. Without such a relationship it would be likely that the countries would follow other dependencies. The EU as the Self in this case has the role identity of the observer and donator, which would not exist without the relation to the ‘Other’ or rather the Western Balkan states.
In the case of the Western Balkans the Union is keen to define its role towards the other international players in the region – especially towards the United States of America. It repeats to assure its commitment and determination to play a leading role in the region and thus in the Stability pact (European Council (2000): p. 14).

Collective identities lead the relation between Self and Other to its logical conclusion identification. Social boundaries of the Self are at stake in interaction and form the collective identity. It is important to preserve such identities in order to keep the culture alive. The necessary condition is redefining the boundaries of Self and Other to constitute a ‘we-feeling’. For the EU collective identities are formed through the level of achievement in several areas like human rights, democratic principles, rule of law, regional cooperation, and good neighbourly relations or market economy principles.

If Europe is a discourse or exists only in discourse, it is important to show how discourse creates identities. Individuals and groups act on the foundation of what they regard as their identities and thus they aspire to have identities (White (2000): p. 70). The idea of an identity is always a construct of different pieces and fragmentations – features must be invented and others must be forgotten in order to make the cultural community plausible, which is needed for the authorisation of the political community. “Eingrenzungs- und Ausgrenzungsdiskurse waren stets ein konstitutives Moment politischer Kommunikation. Die gegenwärtigen Politiken von Identität und Differenz bewegen sich also entlang durchaus bekannter Strategien der Inklusion und Exklusion […] die allerdings im Entwurf eines (positiven) <<Wir>>, das gegenüber (negativen) <<Anderen>> abgesetzt wird, eine neue Flexibilität und Dynamik zeigen; wer zu <<uns>> und wer zu den <<Anderen>> gehört […]” (Rainer Bauböck, Monika Mokre, Gilbert Weiss (2003): p. 13) These processes lead to increased dichotomies and fragmentations. To form an ‘in-group’ must necessarily implicate the dissociation to several ‘out-groups’. This demarcation is an active and on-going process in the formation of identity. In this way, social boundaries evolve over time. Anything may be inscribed as a relevant marker for social or political boundaries. This is the Janus head of every distinction, which is always characterised by inclusion and exclusion. These diacritica most often involve matters of language, history, and religion etc. and are thus culturally constructed. “[…B]oundaries are thus one part of discursive landscape of social power, control and governance, which extends itself into the whole society and which is produced and reproduced in various social and cultural practices.” (Newmann and Paasi (1998): p. 196)

Self-categorisation or Self-stereotyping is also part of this process and is responsible for the
formation of groups. Consequently, the insiders of a group are in a relation of peace, order, and government to each other whereas the relationship to outsiders is characterised by war or plunder, except agreements were made (Neumann (1999): p. 7).

The construction of identities international politics takes place through a process of cultural selection. Cultural selection is according to Wendt characterised by imitation in which identities and interests are produced by imitation when actors take up the Self-understanding of those who are ‘successful’. Secondly, it is marked by social learning through which identities and interests are learned and reinforced as an answer to how actors are treated by significant Others. This process is determined by power, meaning, and representation. Imitation and social learning can be observed for example in the SAA of Serbia in which the country commits itself to approximate its legislation with that of the Community and effectively implement it. There are several other areas in which the same manner can be observed like regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations or justice as key features of European Self-understanding. In this way, Serbia adapts the Self-understanding of those who are ‘successful’ without comparing it to its own experiences and understandings.

5. Self-image and Identity of the EU vis-à-vis Western Balkans (Hierarchies and Dichotomies)

The third part of this analysis is constituted to answer the following sub-questions: What are the hierarchies and dichotomies behind the Self? It concentrates especially on questions of authority and superiority.

The Orient constitutes one of Europe’s most occurring images of the Other. The Other is defined in this context as a dominated out-group, whose identity is considered lacking. This process of Othering can be observed in the SAAs. Especially, the area of justice, freedom, and security and the attached values and ideas play a crucial role in this context. The EU is in a position to define these countries as her Other, because it is in the more powerful position and can consider the identity of these countries as lacking – lacking of values like the rule of law or democratic principles. High levels of corruption and organised crime reinforce this assumption. These findings can be underlined by articles in the SAAs that state: “Cooperation shall notably aim at strengthening the independence of judiciary and improving its efficiency, improving the functioning of the police and other law enforcement bodies, providing adequate
training and fighting corruption and organised crime.” (Council of the European Union (2007): SAA Serbia, p. 81)

The overcoming of the heritage of the Second World War and its nationalist rhetoric is a key element in the Self-understanding and the identity of the European Union. To accuse such a rhetoric in the Western Balkans especially in Serbia and Bosnia Herzegovina leads also to the process of Othering by defining the identity of these countries as lacking in terms of the used political rhetoric and thus behaviour. This discourse is influenced by highlighting the relations between freedom and politics as defined in Postcolonialism as one technique of power. “In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina the Council, in June 2009, underlined the need for the leadership to engage constructively in the political process and to refrain from nationalistic rhetoric. In December it reiterated its concerns regarding political development called on Bosnia and Herzegovina to urgently speed up key reforms.” (Council of the European Union (2010): p. 18) This lacking of identity also includes fragmentation and divisions along ethnic lines, which are incompatible with the European perspective (Communication department of the European Commission (2003): 10229/03Presse163, p. 3).

It is difficult to examine the question why such dichotomies and beliefs in lacking of identities are so long living even when the context is changing. Iver B. Neumann argues that where practice in the political field is concerned in order to achieve effectiveness even when the political context is changing, one cannot put the Self under erasure but one must have what he calls an ‘as if’ story to tell about it. There is thus a struggle to deny the impossibility of having a context-traversing identity, which is part of contemporary political life. “Without an ‘as if’ story to tell about the Self of the human collective whose identity they wanted to represent, they were politically inefficient.” (Neumann (1999): p. 215) The case of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 1990s is one example for such an ‘as if’ story. The nationalist essentialist stories of Self began to dominate. The only effective political counterstrategy for the involved international actors was to be found in the representation on an alternative story of the Self – the ‘as if’ story – stressed that different ethnic groups had always lived together peacefully and that splitting up this framework would be a break with the tradition in that region (Neumann (1999): p. 215). This example also clearly shows that the making of Selves is a process of narrativity in the identity formation whereby several identities have been negotiated in particular contexts and then bound together in one story.

The Western style is characterised by domination, restructuring and having authority over the Orient or the Balkans, which is used as an object of the dominant culture’s need for a
dialogue with itself and shows the culturally higher stage of development. The rejection of ‘native essentialism’ is one technique of power that is related to the Western style. Charles Taylor argues that Western ideas of the Self can be found along three dimensions: “There is, first, the idea of obligation of others. Second, there is the idea that there exists an ideal, a fully fledged goal, a pregiven narrative into which the fullness of a Self’s biography should fall. […] The third dimension is the idea of presentation of Self.” (Neumann (1999): p. 10)

Catherine Ashton, the EU High Representative of Foreign Affairs, gave an example of this Western style in one of her speeches named “Europe and the world” in 2010: “In many respects the rise of the new powers is the outcome of a victory of our model of open markets and, we hope, of increasingly open societies. It is perhaps in a way the triumph of Western values and principles, not of their decline.” (Ashton (2010): Press release Speech/10/378, p. 3)

In a semantic way, the Western style is observable in the Stabilisation and Association Agreements. In all Agreements the EU is named first, which implements domination. It is the EU that has a relationship with the Western Balkan countries and not the other way around, which is semantically underlined. It is the EU that sets the policy framework in order to restructure the region. It is the EU that is ready to integrate for example Albania (Council of the European Union (2007): SAA Albania, p. 7). Additionally, the countries of the Western Balkans shall gradually achieve ‘European standardisation’ (Council of the European Union (2007): SAA Albania, p. 7) and they should follow “the harmonised Community methods and procedures” (Council of the European Union (2007): SAA Albania, p. 7). This form of dominating is related to the notion of Eurocentrism, which always entails a form of superiority. Eurocentrism is defined as the paradigm that European culture carries within itself exceptional internal characteristics that allowed Europe to replace all other cultures through its own rationality. In this way Europe could always constitute itself as centre over a growing periphery. This development was favoured by the colonial rule over the ‘New World’ and is also characterised by a “[...] deeper spiritual, even metaphysical connotation, in the sense that Europe has traditionally also donned the mantle of a ‘spiritual heading’, signalling at once ‘a project, task, or infinite (that is to say universal) idea.’ In doing so, Europe has mingled its Self-image with that of a global advancement, with ‘a heading for world civilization or human culture in general.’ [...]The notion of Europe’s ‘heading’ also comprises the idea of Europe’s civilizing mission, of its role as commanding ruler or ‘captain’.” (Dallmayr (2002): p. 78) This role is supported by a way of thought that was developed after the overcoming of two world wars and the reaching of a continuous peace on
the European continent. To spread this peaceful cohabitation is seen as a new task for the European nations. “Die Übertragung des europäischen Wunders auf den Rest der Welt ist zu Europas neuer mission civilisatrice geworden.” (Schmale (2008): p. 27) In taking this position, Europe has tended to assist strategies of Europeanization of the world-strategies exhibiting a combination of arrogance and ignorance in relation to non-Western civilizations. This image of Europe as a cultural value is linked to and supports the idea and concept of civilization. Moreover, Europe became the home of civilization and in opposition the Other is determined by its lack of civilization. “It immediately becomes apparent that among all of the cultures of the world, ‘Europe’ is considered to be among the relatively few that are conceived to belong to ‘history’, which is to say, to have a history rather than to be either pre-historical, non-historical or ahistorical.” (Hayden White (2000): p. 77) Consequently, it is the EU that uses the region to come into dialogue with itself in order to reinsurance its culturally higher stage of development.

The SAA reports also include such Western style. Especially, the field of Human Rights is understood to be merely a Western or European achievement. The EU thus has the Self-understanding to be at a higher stage of development in terms of culture. Consequently, it tries to dominate, restructure and have authority over the Western Balkan states: “However, progress is needed to introduce higher standards in the protection of human rights for minorities as well as cultural or other social rights. It is absolutely necessary that the authorities pursue a comprehensive and efficient policy in this area and show zero-tolerance for any human rights abuse.” (Commission of the European Communities (2002): SEC (2002) 342, p. 9) Such Self-understanding makes it also possible to set up priority areas, which need attention in the next 12 months, which are formulated one-sidedly (Commission of the European Communities (2002): SEC (2002) 342, p. 13).

Authority means for ‘us’ to deny autonomy to ‘it’. In this way, the West is the actor and the Orient but also the Balkans are the passive reactor, which is necessary for introducing progressive values in the Other’s region. The Article about political dialogue in the Stabilisation and Association Agreements is one example of such authority. The dialogue is intended to promote in particular democratic principles in order to achieve a gradual rapprochement with the European Union as well as increasing convergence of positions and common views but also regional cooperation and the development of good neighbourly relations (Council of the European Union (2007): SAA Serbia, p. 16). It is important to note that for example only in Serbia such promotion is needed, so the Balkans become the passive
reactor to demands of the West or rather the EU as the actor make. In this way, the EU as the actor is able to introduce progressive values in the Western Balkan’s region like the above-mentioned, because such transformation mostly takes place along the lines of EU strategies. This argument can be underlined by the finding that in every SAA the concerned country is the one that shall start, initiate, pursue or foster issues and not the EU. In this way, Serbia for instance has to react passively whereas the Union actively demands in which way, what and when something has to be done. In the council regulation on certain procedures for applying the SAA for Bosnia and Herzegovina the Commission of the EU is already in the position to “[…] decide whether such practice is compatible with the Agreement.” (Council of the European Union (2008): Council Regulation (EC) No 594/2008, p. 7) This authority can be still observed at the end of the SAA process like in the case of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. It is the EU that grants the status of candidate country. “This status is a political recognition of a closer relationship between the EU and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on its way towards membership.” (Commission of the European Communities (2005): COM (2005) 562 final, p. 7) Such way of acting clearly shows that the EU sees herself in the role of the actor and additionally denies autonomy in making decision to the Western Balkan states.

Another form of authority is connected with having responsibility and giving aid. The EU has the feeling of having responsibility for the region of the Western Balkans but also for other regions in the world. “The EU is inevitably a global player…it should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world.” (Communication department of the European Commission (2003): A secure Europe in a better world, p. 1) Underlying this statement is the belief that such responsibility also means greater political weight in world politics. This Self-understanding implements that the countries are not in the position to have responsibility for them and thus are not able to help themselves alone. The understanding that the only possible way to achieve a stable and secure region is the European perspective underlines this assumption. “In 2000, following a decade of turmoil in the Balkans, European leaders decided that the route to stability in the region was through steadily closer association with the EU and the clear prospect of membership.” (Commission of the European Communities (2002): COM (2002) 163 final, p. 3) This is the defined way to lasting peace and stability. Additionally, the EU sees its responsibility in ensuring security, stability, and prosperity for their own citizens. European leaders decided that the European perspective of the Western Balkan countries is the only possible way for the countries and thus took responsibility. In a press statement before her visit to Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2010 the
High Representative Catherine Ashton expressed this responsibility like this: “The EU mission remains essential for the long term development of security and rule of law through the Western Balkans. With more than five thousand people working on the ground the missions provide much needed assistance and reassurance in these crucial areas and function as catalysts for reform.” (Ashton (2010): A 20/10, p. 2) In this way, she denied autonomy for the Western Balkans and the EU became the actor and the region the passive reactor. This is the first step to introduce the values of the European Union and thus its Self-understanding in the area. Additionally, “[t]here will be a need to provide ongoing support to Albania [as an example] throughout the negotiating and transition periods, particularly with a view to strengthening administrative capacity.” (Commission of the European Communities (2001): COM (2001) 300 final, p. 8) The EU focuses its international role and develops its external relations by a wide range of initiatives reflecting the EU common values and norms. These values and norms are also valid for further enlargement attempts. “The EU tends to export to its neighbour countries EU norms and models, including democratic values and practices, rule of law, human rights standards and political dialogue – which all together constitute the good governance norms.” (Stefania Panebianco and Rosa Rossi (2004): p. 2) This manner can also be observed in the Western Balkan states – even if one considers that the EU is not the only player in this area: many international actors are involved in this post-conflict environment like the NATO or the United States as well as several non-governmental organisations (NGO). “The EU integration programme is a major westernisation programme (and promise) intended to attain economic wealth, social integration, stability and political participation. In other words: after the ‘post-Cold-War Balkan chaos’ […] a ‘process of civilisation’ (or westernised modernisation) is required to civilise an uncivilised region.” (Becker (2008): p. 24)

In international politics the dominating theme power is crucial. The relationship of power between the Occident and the Orient is characterized by domination and hegemony. Europe was always in a position of strength also in cultural terms, which influences the identity of Europe. The discourse about the European identity is related to the construction of the idea of ‘Europe’. This construction has been a pluralistic undertaking whereby various cultural and ideological interpretations have been promoted, negotiated, and imposed. The idea of ‘Europe’ is underlined by the central position that certain cultures and sciences dominate, which is a core element to the ‘cultural imperialism thesis’, which contains a complicated, ambiguous and contradictory set of ideas. “In fact ‘cultural imperialism’ gathers in a number
of fairly discrete discourses of domination: of America over Europe, of the ‘West over the rest’ of the world, of the core over the periphery, of the modern world over the fast-disappearing traditional one, of capitalism over more or less everything and everyone.” (John Tomlinson (1999): p. 80)

This form of cultural imperialism can be observed in the relation towards the Western Balkan states. Asymmetry in power relations is crucial to the construction of Otherness, which also implements that power is the ability to afford not to learn. The documents concerning the SAAs of the Western Balkan countries are a good example for this theme. The EU is in the position of domination and hegemony, which makes it possible to demand the concerned countries to learn while at the same time remaining herself the same. This can be observed in the aims of all Stabilisation and Association Agreements: in all cases the Western Balkan countries need contribution, support, or promotion as well as fostering in areas like democratic principles, rule of law, stability, cooperation, or market economy which implements that all countries have to learn and are not on the same level as the EU (Council of the European Union (2007): SAA Serbia, p. 10). The Union is thus in the position to afford not to learn. The former High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana highlighted the dominant and unique position of Europe towards the Balkan states after the conflicts in the 1990’s. “According to Solana, the European states’ capacity to overcome their own narrow national Self-interest gives the EU a unique advantage in its ability to export freedom, democracy and good governance.” (Belloni (2009): p. 16) This statement shows that despite the rhetoric of partnership the approach of the EU is top-down. This approach makes the Western Balkans again the consignee of schemes emerged elsewhere. But it also underlines the argument that it would be harder for non-democrats in and out of the armed forces to take over the states apparatus if these states were integrated in European structures (Neumann (2001): p. 154). This argument has its origin in the experiences in Europe after World War II and the overcoming of century old hostilities.

The second dominating theme in international policy is knowledge. To have knowledge of something is to dominate it and to have authority over it, which makes the management of the Other easy and gives power. It is a form of systematic knowledge about the Orient or the Balkan. The aims of the SAAs are marked by the assumption that the EU has the knowledge of best practice which implements that the Union has authority over the Other in this case the Western Balkan states. They can only passively react to the demands, which are based on such knowledge. The EU in this context has the knowledge how a functioning, stable and
secure state has to look like. “The aim is to help these countries to become viable, functioning states at the same time as they align their legal and economic systems with those of the EU.” (Commission of the European Communities (2002): COM (2002) 163 final, p. 7) This process has to include elements like political, economic, and institutional stabilisation which can be achieved through the development of civil society and democratisation, institution building and public administration reform, regional trade integration and enhanced economic cooperation, as well as through cooperation in a wide range of areas, particularly in justice and home affairs, and the strengthening of national and regional security. Additionally, the Union writes in the Agreement that it wants “[…] to provide decisive support for the implementation of reform and to use all available instruments of cooperation and technical, financial and economic assistance […]” (Council of the European Union (2007): SAA Albania, p. 6). The management of the Other through such agreements becomes easier and gives power. This also includes a systematic knowledge about the Balkans namely their lack of civilization and backwardness and thus lack of identity. The European continent gains power and authority mostly through knowledge besides its economic power. This knowledge not only makes it easier to master and control third countries like the ones in the Western Balkans, it also reassures a positive Self-image of the EU. The knowledge that there is no other way to reach the same civilised level plays a crucial role here. “The European Union and Member States have intervened to help deal with regional conflicts and to put failed states back on their feet, including in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and in the DRC. Restoring good government to the Balkans, fostering democracy and enabling the authorities there to tackle organised crime is one of the most effective ways of dealing with organised crime within the EU.” (Communication department of the European Commission (2003): A secure Europe in a better world, p. 6) This form of knowledge and the use of it clearly shows how the European myth of its superiority over all other cultures by virtue of its achievements in science. Europe feels authorised to evaluate all other cultures as valueless or not by virtue of its acceptance of Western science as the sole paradigm of civilized knowledge production (White (2000): p. 79). The citizens of the European Union underlined such a concept in a Eurobarometer survey on cultural values in 2007: A majority of Europeans (67 %) see their continent as being ‘the continent of culture’ (Directorate General Education and Culture (2007): Special EUROBAROMETER Cultural Values, p. 61). In this way, science became something that is supposed to be uniquely European. It differentiates Europe from all other cultures and civilizations. Consequently, in the discourse of Europe, other civilizations can only achieve modes and means of knowledge
production through adopting Western science as their paradigm and then become fully
civilized. This uniqueness of historicity, science and civilization characterises the European
identity. The image of Europe evolves through the power of ideas that are provided by
intellectual and political elites – some of these ideas are more resonant than others. “Such
ideas constitute knowledge structures and belief systems (‘reality’, ‘truth’), which take form
in the name of science and religion. Once these knowledge structures, or epistemes, are
established, they tend to be relatively uncontested.” (Stråth (2000): p. 24)

Superiority in this context is the idea of European identity as superior in comparison with
non-European cultures. This involves one technique of power related to Postcolonialism,
which involves modes of signification superior and the creation of truths based on modes of
signification and representation. This can be observed in the form that the European
superiority is the counterpart to the Orient’s or Balkan’s backwardness. This also includes an
intellectual authority and superiority. In this way, the Orient and Balkan are settled at a lower
level of civilization and paired in opposition to Europe or the West. Counterparts of negative
characteristics stand against a positive Self-image of Europe. Important for this process of
constructing boundaries through superiority is how this external differentiation between Self
and Other is executed. In the case of Europe this differentiation often takes place trough
stating moral superiority. The question of a European identity is related to what image of
Europe is produced and re-produced and how the demarcation between Self and Other is
shaped. The framework of differentiation is thus constituted by terms like civilized versus
barbarian, democratic versus authoritarian, West versus East or even in terms of ethnicity.

“Identity requires difference in order to be, and it converts difference into otherness in order
to secure its own self-certainty.” (Neumann (1999): p. 207) These terms create the difference
in identity formation. After the Cold War a new wave of utilizing Balkanisation emerged. The
outcome of this wave was a ‘strategic downgrading of the Balkans in the East-West relations’
and the competing attempts of separate Eastern European nations to enter the privileged
economic or security clubs of the West (Todorova (2009): p. 136). This process coincided
with the violent destruction of Yugoslavia. “The Balkans are usually reported to the outside
world only in time of terror and trouble; the rest of the time they are scornfully ignored.”

Superiority is often defined in terms of rich versus poor. The officials of the European Union
like Javier Solana frequently highlight that the Union is producing a quarter of the world’s
GDP and is thus a global player (General Secretariat of the Council (2003): p. 9). A positive
Self-image of the EU can be also constructed in such terms. The EU is able to give financial assistance through the Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation (CARDS) programme, which includes a strategic approach by underpinning the objectives and mechanisms of the Stabilisation and Association Process. It is in the context of the Western Balkans the largest donor in the region and it is even stated in the Agreement with Serbia: "Community aid is conditional on further progress in satisfying the Copenhagen criteria and in particular progress in meeting the specific priorities of the European Partnership.” (Council of the European Union (2007): SAA Serbia, p. 107) This implements an intellectual authority and superiority over these states.

This form of superiority can also be analysed in a more general sense: “Recognising that Albania needs a European perspective and that the prospect of one day becoming a Member State of the EU can be a powerful motor for change in support of Albania’s own process of reform and development […]” (Commission of the European Communities (2001): COM (2001) 300 final, p. 6) The European perspective as the only way out of the backwardness implements an intellectual authority but also superiority. This argument can be underlined by the finding that the EU often uses words like upgrade, progress, improvement, and concerning the characterisation of her counterpart’s weakness, poor, or insufficient. That form of superiority is intertwined with the belief that the EU remains an anchor of stability and that enlargement has spread democracy and prosperity across the European continent. Enlargement is thus a powerful policy tool of the EU. Consequently, “[t]he Balkans are changing for the better.” (Communication department of the European Commission (2008): S407/08, p. 1)

6. Conclusion

The present Master Thesis is set out to verify the question what causes and constructs the Self-image of the EU/the European External Action Service in the case of the Western Balkan states. The analysis showed that the EU constructs an overall Self-image, which has the principle features of regional cooperation, imagined geography, interventionism and involves a discourse of having responsibility. Imagined geography involves in this case the grouping together of the concerned countries, which is a tendency the European Union uses frequently and which is inherent in the discourse of the experiences since World War II. This goes hand in hand with the simultaneous invention of the region. But most countries in the Western Balkans feel that they have little in common. This is underlined by a SAA report, which
concludes that regional trade is lacking and not forced. The discourse of experience during the 20th century also includes the belief in regional cooperation. Interventionism and the discourse of having responsibility are based on the experience of being the colonial ruler over centuries. In general, the European Self-image and identity is based on values and ideas that were agreed upon commonly: universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity. These lead to the principles of democracy and the rule of law as well as principle of market economy.

In relation with the Western Balkan images are created that construct at its core the region as backward, primitive, violent and insecure. In the SAAs the EU constantly reminds the conflicts and wars in the Western Balkans and its heritage. The need to develop in all political, economical and societal sectors is combined with this image. All this implements a lower level of civilization and thus an image of backwardness, which is necessary for the construction of identities in the process of Othering into hierarchical groups. The EU defines herself as the key player whereas the Western Balkan states have to develop in areas like political dialogue and cooperation. This weakness of the countries is described in detail in all examined documents and statements. The narrativity that is used in this context is also dominated by such images and is storied like that over decades – even if the actual political situation in the region changed. This is why the European Self in this context uses ‘as if’ stories like Neumann defined it. In this way, the Western Balkan can remain the same casted in the role of the contrasting Other and not yet European but at the same time being European. This also calls for notions like backwardness and development to mediate between civilization and barbarism.

Especially, images of insecurity and unfreedom are created and re-created. This is also necessary because the crisis situation in the Western Balkans led to a stronger European policy engagement. The founding of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in 1999 and the following ESDP missions “[…] were initially the result of an ‘external shock’, namely the crisis in the Balkans. […] ‘The first line of defense, therefore, often lies outside Europe.’ Against this background, the European Union has built up a large set of capacities in crisis management and conflict prevention, which includes military as well as civilian components.” (Mathias Vogel (2010): p. 2) The SAAs are consequently an example for the pulling together of the member states due to diplomatic failures and inadequate reactions to this crisis situation for example through the creation of images. Additionally, the EU demands
for a resolute fighting against corruption and other areas of organised crime, which creates again an image of the countries as an area of unfreedom, injustice and insecurity that constitutes a threat to the security of the European Union. In this way, the EU tries to impose its own values and ideas as well as principles, with which its members have a positive relationship in an imperial way on the Western Balkan states. These contrasting images, ideas, personality and experience lead to a strengthening of Europe and its identity by setting itself of the Balkans as a superior Self like Edward Said described it in Orientalism. Additionally, it reinforces the feeling of being an entity. This is also the reason for the strong engagement of the European Union in the region. Edward Said’s definition of Orientalism as a discourse includes West and East counterparts in order to define a form for dealing with the Orient. Even if Balkanism differs in some aspects such a form of dealing with the Balkans can be traced in the SAAs, which is dominated by demanding change from the East whereas the West can remain the same. Like Orientalism also Balkanism is a discourse. Balkanism is characterised by violence and backwardness. This discourse can still be traced in the recent documents and statements of the EU like being outside historical time. The findings of the analysis clearly show that especially the recent conflicts in the region reinforced this discourse. This discourse is assured by a formulation of the Western Balkans’ past that led to the present views and understandings of the region as violent and backward. Additionally, the narrativity of the European past also influences the present views on the region. Especially, the overcoming of the legacy and animosities of the 20th century is such a strong metaphor of the past and for this reason often narrated. This is inscribed in the collective memory of the European continent. “The adoption of the SP [Stabilisation Process] at the EU Ministerial Summit in Cologne (10 June 1999) and its ‘official’ launch with the first SP summit in Sarajevo (July 1999) was hailed as the first genuine attempt to ‘Europeanise’ and ‘de-Balkanise’ the Balkans. […] Essentially, it is an attempt to rectify the ‘mistakes’ of both the CFSP and the haphazard involvement of other extra-regional actors in the Balkans.” (Kavalski (2003): p. 202)

The European Union deals with the Western Balkan states through a process of geographic designation and invention in order to better manage and control the region. This framework helps to deal with differences. Even if all countries have their own Stabilisation and Association Agreement, these do not differ significantly: The region is always represented as a region of instability. In this way, a mental map is constructed which is dominated by instability and security. But the countries understand themselves not as one area that has
grown together, which has its source in the nationalistic past and the recent conflicts. This led to mistrust and sceptic of credibility between the countries. Such processes also include representation, which the EU takes care of for the states in the Western Balkans. The findings show that the EU officials use the Western Balkans to ensure the European power through the mirroring of the level of civilization. In this way, the Union denies autonomy to the Western Balkans. Additionally, such representations conceal the own failures and deplorable state of affaires. This always involves a role structure of culture: The Union is clearly in the role to demand transformation whereas its counterpart has to act according to these demands and the assigned role if it wants to become a part of the European family. This also includes the judging whether a situation is positive or negative for the forthcoming of the region. In this way, Ego in this context the EU is casted in the role of a teacher, which is in the position to afford not to learn whereas Alter or the Western Balkans is casted in the role of a student that is not on the same level of power and knowledge and needs to learn the aquis communitaire and European standards. In doing so, the European Union loads its own identity with meaning. The areas in which the countries have to learn are strongly connected to the interest of the EU as an international actor but also for its domestic credibility. Catherine Ashton formulates that like this: “The job at hand is quite enormous, for the demands on Europe to play a distinctive international role are growing.” (Ashton (2010): Press release Speech/10/378, p. 2) The power relation of Ego and Alter is defined in terms of opposite pairs like teacher and student as well as observer and observed. Such a designation is an exercise of cultural strength from the EU. This process is reinforced by cultural selection like Wendt describes it, which involves always imitation and social learning from those who are considered to be successful – in this context it is the Self-image of being successful of the EU. In this way, social and political boundaries are defined. These boundaries are reinforced by geographical designations like West and non-West peripheries or West and East. These mental borders clearly serve as a confirmation of European power. Such borders are frequently used to mirror the own level of civilization in order to overcome the own failures and backwardness and additionally to be able to deal with differences. The collective identity reinforces and leads to the relation of these counterparts and thus of Self and Other. Additionally, the process of creating boundaries and collective identities are intertwined. These processes form the targeted ‘we-feeling’ that the EU needs for her legitimization. Such findings also show how social learning and social action as well as cultural selection influence the behaviour of the apparatus EU. The analysis underlined also that it is possible to use the Ego/Alter configuration. With this term Sigmund Freud originally described
individual psychological states. Wendt uses this configuration also for nation-states. The danger in this transformation lies in the fact that collectives constitute states and thus must have the same Ego. I argue after my analysis that this transformation to another level is possible and useful because state actors as individuals bring into an interaction their individual psychological states. Through social action and learning but also cultural selection the Ego of a nation state is constituted. Additionally, Ego and Alter are constructed, negotiated and produced through ideas, beliefs but also traditions, norms or rules in the same way by individual actors as well as state actors or EU officials. The result of this construction or negotiation is often written down in preambles or constitutions as well as symbols. I even argue that it is not possible to have a collective without having the same Ego. A collective like a nation state defines itself through common grounds. For such a common ground it is necessary to recognize that a common identity is constituted by several identities that overlap and have different sources – like in the context of an individual actor. States consist of individuals, which form identities through social actions and constructions. For this reason a state needs an Ego to function. International relations are a world of making. Like individuals state actors act in a social cognitive structure. They are an on-going effect of interaction. All actors in the context of international relations have preconceived ideas of each other like individuals. The assigning of roles as the starting point of interaction takes place in the same manner also on the individual level. I argue space is no container and through this fact state actors can form Ego/Alter configurations like individuals in order to assign functions to various spatial units.

The European Self-image is dominated by the theme to be superior, which forms the counterpart to the backwardness of the Balkans or other regions in the world. The positive Self-image of Europe as well as of the West is formed through intellectual authority and superiority. This superiority is also involved in the process of building the European External Action Service. Baroness Catherine Ashton assures in her speeches the superiority and authority as well as powers like this: “The European Union and the Member-States have an impressive array of instruments, resources, relationships and expertise to help build a better, more stable world. Now we need to bring all this together, to forge joined up strategies and maximise our impact on the ground. Particularly in the troubled parts of the world where our action matters the most. […] My vision for the EEAS is one which ensures that when we speak, our voice is heard. And when we engage, our actions make the difference.” (Ashton (2010): Speech A127/10, p. 2) The European perspective offered to the Western Balkans is an
example of such superiority: it is in the words of European leaders the only way out of the negative characteristic backwardness. Additionally, the best way to achieve this is defined by these leaders out of their constructed superior position and then imposed on the concerned countries. This process of superiority is reinforced by the belief and idea of being the cradle of science, human rights, and most important of civilization. Through assuring this superiority in areas like the Western Balkans the EU can keep up this Self-image and strength of the European culture. For this purpose, an opposite was needed and the Western Balkans is one of these counterparts.

“The European Union, in general, is keen on promoting experience. Although no other region of the world has achieved the EU’s intensity of integration until now, it seems obvious that the importance of the regional approach to security problems will increase more and more in the coming years.” (Mathias Vogel (2010): p. 2) The European integration in conclusion is thus constructed in such positivistic discourse that it is possible for the EU to characterize herself as a superior entity even over nation states. The experience is one of the strongest narratives that are employed by the Europe in order to construct and re-construct its corporate identity. This discourse includes also a rhetoric affirming that the EU international policy represents a new way in world politics, which tries to overcome Self-help and also hard power politics through combining the right amount of interests, financial assistance and also respect for national identities. The discourse of integration also involves the feature of having responsibility. The EU uses this feature to legitimate itself as superior by characterising its counterparts as being not well-governed and in need of an identity which includes its liberal values and traditions. Consequently, the EU characterises itself as a modern soft power that needs to look after the countries around it or in this case in the middle of its continent. Consequently, it is the Union that has authority over the concerned states. This also involves the enlargement to these countries. “The enlargement policy it is about pulling our weight on the world stage. It enables the European Union to meet the challenges of a shifting, multipolar world, in which we need to continue projecting our values and interests beyond our borders. A Union that builds cooperation between former rivals, while upholding the highest standards of human rights, will maintain the magnetic soft power needed to shape the world around it.” (Stefan Füle (2010): p. 2) But like Kavalski argues that the long-term priority of the EU to enlarge the Union successfully and to develop a policy of cooperation with the new neighbours clashes with the objective of promoting broad regional cooperation under the SAP’s mechanism in the Western Balkans because it is perceived as our neighbourhood rather
than their neighbourhood. “The recognition of the future enlargement into the region, allows the EU to influence the relations between the western Balkan states through its power of attraction. It is in this context that the EU places its emphasis on contractual conditionality (learning from its experience with the CEE states) rather than regionality [...].” (Kavalski (2003): p. 208)

Additionally, it is a strategy for the withdrawal of the massive political and military presence of the Union. Consequently, such a characterisation of the Self leads to the assumption that the EU as the one having responsibility should direct the development in the concerned area. This characterisation requires a process of Othering in which the Other’s identity is considered to be lacking and in which asymmetries of power are crucial.

“Therefore, the ‘carrot’ of accession provides the incentives for following the ‘sticks’ of appropriate policy-behaviour, one of which is that the western Balkan countries ‘establish normal relationships between themselves’. To facilitate the introduction of normality, the SAP employs two mechanisms for conditioning the western Balkan states: bilateral and regional. [...] The reasoning for this strategy is that ‘EU’s own experience of the benefits of regional cooperation lead it to believe that the western Balkans will benefit significantly from closer co-operation’.” (Kavalski (2003): p. 204) This take it or leave it rhetoric is often employed by the EU as the findings of the analysis showed. This rhetoric seems not to differ much from century-old power politics, which do not include the concerns and preferences of the involved agreement partners. Additionally, the perspective of eventual membership guarantees the EU involvement in the region for a long time. However, the carrot of EU membership has not yet proven powerful enough to transform the societies of the Western Balkans as it can be concluded by the findings in the annual SAA reports, which do not differ considerably over the years. This can be compared with the definition of the Orient by Said as one of Europe’s images of the Other, because the EU is in the dominant position and can thus consider the Western Balkans identities as lacking. This also includes a Western style of thought and discourse that is put on the region. “Altogether, the western Balkans have a profound importance for the European Union and its security and economic prosperity, and also for Europe’s identity. In particular the Bosnian and the Kosovo wars: Sharpened the feelings for good and evil, for ‘us’ (that share emotions) and ‘them’ (the feelings of others), for power and weakness, for knowledge and ignorance. As a European-Atlantic war, they led Europe to the border of its morality, solidarity, power and Self-knowledge. [...]” (Becker
In this way, the European continent is able to enter into a dialogue with itself and assure its own culturally higher stage of development, which is necessary to re-gain strength and weight in global politics after the breakdown of its colonies and consequently its power in the world. Therefore, Europe tries to dominate, restructure and to have authority over the Western Balkan area. This feeling of having authority also means to deny autonomy to the countries in order to stay the actor whereas the Western Balkan states are the passive reactor. This process is also necessary to introduce progressive values in the region like democratic principles, rule of law or market economic principles. Authority always means to have knowledge of something and this systematic knowledge is repeatedly employed to be able to dominate the Western Balkans.

“This indicates a shift of perception on behalf of the EU that the Balkans no longer represents a ‘distant’ abroad, but rather an immediate neighbourhood, whose instability affects the stability and security of the EU itself.” (Kavalski (2003): p. 209) In this way, the European Self-image gets tied up to issues of security and the fear that external unfreedom and insecurity could be a threat for the whole European project of integration. This form of creating threats can be seen as a feature of creating an inside-outside distinction, which is necessary for policy actors and their identity. In this way, the EU casts the outsider as an object of its foreign policy, which includes a Self and Other hierarchy. To bring long lasting stability and peace to the region is one of the strongest interests of the Union in the Balkans because the EU wants to ensure that no threat is posed from the outside to its own territory and it wants to prove that it is able to bring these features to its backyard. Stefan Füle, European Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy stated in his speech ‘Enlargement at the heart of Europe’ in November 2010 that Enlargement matters because it reinforces peace and stability in Europe. “Our enlargement policy shows how we can turn serious challenges on our doorstep into opportunities for a more secure and prosperous Europe.” (Füle (2010): p. 2) Another strong interest is tied up to market economy and a Free Trade zone. The EU is interested in remaining the largest trade partner of the region and to increase its economic weight through trade with the Western Balkans. This ensures that its political weight in economic issues is recognized and grows.

The type identity can be best defined in the words of Catherine Asthon: “I describe the EU at its heart, as a giant conflict resolution machine that enables the member-states to tackle cross-border problems on the basis of agreed rules. As it happens, it is also a pretty good description
of what global governance should be all about.” (Ashton (2010): Press release Speech/10/378, p. 3) This is also a contrasting Self-image: The EU is engaged in the Western Balkans because of its diplomacy, military and political failures in the context of the conflict in the 1990s but defines itself at the same time as being a giant conflict resolution machine.

Concluding, it became clear through this analysis that the Western Balkans are necessary for the development of a European Self-image and a success of its EEAS as well as foreign policy. The Western Balkans are thus the playground for defining and testing a European foreign policy Self-image. Additionally, it is important for the aspired international role the EU wants to play and sees at its heritage. For this purpose, it must prove its credibility in the Western Balkans and other troubled regions in the world.
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