THE UNEXPECTED EMBRACE OF EUROPA: CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY

by

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**Acknowledgements** ........................................................................................................... vii
**Summary** ............................................................................................................................... 11


**What are you going to read?** .................................................................................................. 13


**On universal but unenforceable rights: The limits of military intervention** ....................... 31

**The last standing pillar: Prevention** ...................................................................................... 40

**The prevention potential of the European Union: Its Neighbourhood Policy** .................... 45

**Seeing the ENP through critical lenses** ............................................................................... 46

**The conundrum of enlargement** .......................................................................................... 49

**T H E  P A R A D I G M  T H E  H E R I T A G E  O F  E U R O P A** ................................................................................................................................. 55

**The potential meanings of Europe** ....................................................................................... 55

**The physiographical myth** .................................................................................................. 63

**Europe in Antiquity** ............................................................................................................. 64

**Europe's forgotten sibling: Arab-Islamic contributions** ..................................................... 68

**The Russian shift of Europe's eastern frontier** .................................................................... 72

**Europe's emancipated other, Latin America** ..................................................................... 76

**The EU spills outside Europe** .............................................................................................. 90

**The incoherence of Europe's origins** ................................................................................ 91


**Growing pains** ..................................................................................................................... 96

**The ENP: Replicating the EU in the periphery** .................................................................. 110

**C A S E  S T U D I E S  T H E  F O R E I G N  P O L I C Y  O F  E N L A R G E M E N T** ..................................................................................................................... 115

**Far from overstretch** .......................................................................................................... 115

**Imperial geo-economic face-off along the eastern frontier** ............................................. 116

**Killing the EUropean dream to revive the EUropean dream** ......................................... 125

**The southern coast of the Roman Empire** ........................................................................ 136

**C O N C L U S I O N S  &  I M P L I C A T I O N S  T O W A R D S  A  W O R L D  G O V E R N M E N T** .......................................................... 147

**The Union's international ambitions** .................................................................................. 147

**B i b l i o g r a p h y** .................................................................................................................. 151
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For Rocio, who has always supported me

For my family, because they made sure I went to school
The unexpected embrace of Europa

Conflict resolution & the unintended consequences of the European Neighbourhood Policy

BY

RODRIGO BUENO LACY

Summary

The history of the European Union is a story of rebordering. This is no accident. Geopolitical assimilation is hardwired to the very essence of the EU project—which is a refined model of international organisation that emerged after previous historical experiments ended with ever more catastrophic consequences. The Union’s model relies on a process of imperial governance that seeks compliance in exchange for incentives. It starts with economic interdependence, goes through gradual identification and institutional rapprochement and ends with a geographical embrace. The novelty of this conflict resolution model is that, unlike traditional ones, it is not primarily based on coercion or threats but on an assertive self-righteousness buttressed by a powerful economic leverage. This approach allows the EU to overcome traditional obstacles for international governance—particularly national opposition—which have made previous models of international organisation unstable. Contrary to the mainstream belief—both in politics and scholarship—in this thesis I argue that the ENP is nothing but enlargement in disguise and that, if certain conditions remain, it will lead to the eventual absorption of the EU’s periphery, which could include Turkey, Morocco and Russia. I advance the idea that the EU has an inertia of its own which is likely to progress unless a relapse into xenophobia and nationalism takes place.
What are you going to read?
The thesis that I argue is straightforward: the European Union (EU) is the best conflict resolution model in today’s international system because of its particular potential to ward off the four crimes—genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing—that the international community has the responsibility to protect populations from and its overall potential to build up interdependence and thus stimulate international governance. Yet, the argumentative structure that I use to buttress this claim is fairly tortuous. Although the overarching topic is the responsibility to protect and, more specifically, conflict prevention, this work does not deal with them directly. Instead, it discusses the EU for the most part. Though such apparent mismatch could seem as the result of a poorly designed research, it is precisely the opposite. This sinuosity gives the overall argument a congruence that it would otherwise lack.

The argument can be summarized as follows. It begins by linking the international norm of the “responsibility to protect” with both the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the EU’s potential for further enlargement. This, in turn, leads the argument to question the validity of EU identity narratives and to point out the risk that the emergence of such an identity could entail. This critical deconstruction relieves the EU from the nuisance of loaded identity fictions and lays bare its basic structure: a conflict resolution model based on hierarchical non-coercive conditionality. The particularity of such model—whose main mechanisms are the enlargement process and the ENP—is that it leads to a kind of conflict prevention in the Union’s periphery that addresses the main issues that create propitious conditions for the four crimes to unfold (state weakness and illiberalism). Furthermore, this conflict resolution has unintended consequences in the form of gradual identification between the EU and its periphery that favours the eventual
enlargement of the Union’s club. This synthesis of the EU’s model is subsequently substantiated by three case studies that aim at showing that the EU’s use of this conflict resolution model all around its periphery is not only promoting the Union’s egoistic interests but also indirectly developing stronger and less illiberal states as well as inadvertently laying the foundations for future enlargements.

The insights that derive from this study are mainly three. First, the EU is neither a culturally nor a physiographically delimited project and has more room for enlargement than is usually granted. Second, the EU creates a type of interdependence that undermines exclusionary affiliations (such as nationalism), makes conflict progressively costlier, encourages the growth of international governance and is prone to periodical rebordering. Third, either the EU’s embrace of its own model or its replication by other international organisations could lead to a more successful generic framework to prevent conflicts and even become a prototype for a sprouting world government. The first path would require the Union to foster a less exclusionary collective affiliation than traditional nationalism by supporting a post-nationalist or cosmopolitan EU identity and to restrain itself from replicating nation-state constitutional and border patterns that could preclude further enlargements. The second path would involve other forms of international organisation, especially regional organisations, adopting the model of the EU by following its integration and conflict resolution example. The theory and its implications offer not only a reinterpretation of the EU that could help advance the progress of international organisation but also a foreign policy recommendation and, given certain conditions, a prediction about the limits of the EU.

The next chapter explains the methodology of this work by detailing how I gradually constructed the argumentative scaffolding that gives support to this thesis. It traces the process that moulded this research by recounting the circumstances and referencing the central works that stimulated the routes of thought that led to the formulation of my hypotheses. This section also presents the epistemological principles that I followed to gather the evidence and ensemble the argument. Although the reader can skip this chapter to experience a more fluid reading, this part is the scientific justification for this work.
The third chapter is the proper begin of the argument of this thesis. It explains why early and systematic conflict prevention is the most important phase of averting genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing. It shows how conflict prevention is linked to the ENP and the EU enlargement process and thus why the EU’s potential to enlarge is crucial for the Union’s model to serve as a prototype of conflict resolution. Without such potential, the conflict resolution model loses its advantages and relevance.

In the fourth chapter the reader will find a historical genealogy of the concept of Europe. The idea is to trace the transformation of this idea’s meaning—particularly with respect to Eastern Europe, North Africa, the Middle East and Latin America—, explain how it has been instrumentally manipulated throughout time with different political ends and map the geography that can claim a European heritage. This will demonstrate that the historico-geo-cultural concept of Europe is very different from the idea of Europe that has responded to determinate and often contradictory political projects such as the EU. Therefore, the idea of Europe is not a definite identity written in stone, which means that the Union could further manipulate it to accommodate an atypical arrange of countries that fall outside the current EUropean discourse. To sum up, the purpose is to demonstrate that Europe is not where we have been taught it is.

In the fifth chapter I will conduct a case study of previous enlargements to show that the naturalised way in which EU discourses portray the Union’s development is everything but natural. Unlike the teleological narratives that make sense of the Union as the natural culmination of European history, in light of its recent history the EU is everything but a predictable outcome. Next, I will lay out the Union’s model of conflict resolution to theoretically explain the Union’s historical process of rebordering since the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). By explaining how the EU works and why periodical rebordering keeps being a recurrent outcome I intend to show that the ENP is nothing but a more vague form of enlargement.

In the sixth chapter I will make an analysis of the EU’s foreign policy towards its periphery to show that it is implicitly considering enlargement among the
possible directions that its relation with countries such as Russia, Turkey and Morocco could take. The purpose is to show that the EU has crucial strategic long-term interests in each of these regions and that the Union is unintentionally replicating itself by trying to secure these interests through its conflict resolution mechanisms.

In the final chapter I will conclude by pointing to the implications that EUropean enlargement could have for global governance, conflict resolution and international politics by contributing to the formation of an incipient world state. Even if the Union would someday fall apart, what I try to stress is not the irreplaceable capacity of the EU to become the vehicle to promote the responsibility to protect or a foundation for a foetal world state but the supreme relevance of its international organisation and conflict resolution models. Independently of what happens to the EU, other forms of international organisation such as the United Nations (UN) and regional organisations like the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the African Union (AU), the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) could benefit from exploring the advantages of following the steps of the Union.

The evidence upon which I rely to support my argument is not new, but the way in which I systematise and interpret it is. This work aims at providing new insights into the way we think about the responsibility to protect, conflict prevention and the possibilities of both the EU and Europe’s borders. Overall, this amounts to a cross-disciplinary study that draws on Human Geography, International Relations and Conflict Resolution to show that the EU, contrary to common belief, can expand and play a role well beyond what has been imagined so far.
II

METHODOLOGY

EPISTEMOLOGICAL ANARCHISM & CAUSAL PLURALISM

How did I arrive to my hypothesis?

It would be naïve to deny that “The scientist, like any organism, is the product of a unique history. The practices which he finds most appropriate will depend in part upon this history” (Skinner, 1956, p. 233). My background in international relations led me to be interested in the responsibility to protect—an international conflict resolution norm whose content as well as societal and theoretical relevance are addressed in the next chapter. Most of the research on the responsibility to protect has focused on military intervention, post-conflict recovery but not so much on prevention. Being interested in this norm and knowing about this gap in the literature dealing with it was the first half of the process that led me to my research topic. The second half was a combination of interest and necessity.

Finding a topic for my master’s thesis in Human Geography with specialization in Europe involved combining my previous knowledge and interests with the subjects that my programme focused on. I thought that finding a relationship between the responsibility to protect and the EU that could be approached from a geographical perspective would be enthralling. That is the reason I started looking for information about this relation. It is important to emphasize that it was not a theoretical conundrum that led me to my topic as much as a suspicion that the themes that interested me could be related. Otherwise I had no reason to go in this direction. In this sense my research topic (the relationship between the EU and the responsibility to protect) was a gamble and I was not sure whether it would bring me somewhere at all. Then again, I believe that “The only principle that does not inhibit progress is: anything goes” (Feyerabend, 1993, pp. 5, 14-19).
The underlying methodology of this work is grounded on the epistemological anarchism formulated by Paul Feyerabend in his book *Against Method* (1971). Controversial as it may be, I find this approach to be no less scientific than any other but actually much more honest about the convoluted ways of scientific proceedings. In the end, "Successful research does not obey general standards; it relies now on one trick, now on another; the moves that advance it and the standards that define what counts as an advance are not always known to the movers" (Feyerabend, 1993, p. 1). I decided to reconcile my previous interests (studying the responsibility to protect) with my newly acquired interests and instrumental reasons (writing a master’s thesis about Human Geography with a focus on the EU) and this was the first step towards the following research.

What led me to explore the relationship between the EU and the responsibility to protect in the first place was neither a purely theoretical problem nor an empirical conundrum. There was no intuition to follow this path besides the mere instinct that a geopolitical body of such weight as the EU should have some kind of involvement in such a contemporarily relevant humanitarian framework as the responsibility to protect. As I learned about the EU I started looking for indications that could lead me to find out how it was related to the responsibility to protect, particularly with its conflict prevention side. While my awareness was tuned to be alert to any trace that could lead me to find out more about this relation, I found out about the ENP during a seminar that Sarah Wolff gave at Clingendael Institute in The Hague on the September 6th of 2010. Then I started to study the ENP because it seemed like a conflict resolution policy that was altering the character of a poor neighbourhood. Maybe, I thought, it could have some bearing on the issue I was considering. I focused on the ENP because I was looking for something like it.

As I learned by going through some of the ENP action plans and particularly through Romano Prodi’s speech, “A wider Europe: a proximity policy as the key to stability” (2002), the ENP clearly addressed conflict resolution but particularly conflict prevention measures that were aimed at developing stronger and more liberal states. This policy, I suspected, could be a way through which the EU was contributing to develop the responsibility to protect. So, I started to look for information
about how the Union was helping to strengthen and liberalise its periphery through the ENP. To my surprise, I learned that there was almost a consensus among scholars regarding the imperialistic attitude not only of the ENP but of the Union in general. This represented a problem to the theory I had just began to develop. How could an empire be beneficial to anyone? If anything, empires are known for their inclination to oppress and exploit those who they rule.

A crucial book I came across during my research on the imperialistic ways of the EU was Jan Zielonka’s *Europe as Empire: The Nature of the Enlarged European Union* (2006). I took various insights from it that turned out to be central to my argument. Zielonka’s conception of the EU, not as a traditional international organisation, a super-state or a modern empire but as a neo-mediaeval empire was revealing. According to him, one of the main characteristics of mediaeval empires was their flexibility to accommodate different peoples, cultures and legal provisions within the same governance framework. Unlike rigid modern nation-states, mediaeval empires subordinated uniformity to a conflict resolution model characterised by a constant shift of their borders. According to Zielonka, the EU was no different and, therefore, its enlargement was much more than a purely economic policy aimed at expanding markets or bringing together similar peoples: it was a geopolitical conflict resolution tool (Zielonka, 2008, p. 170). This made me wonder how much flexibility the EU actually allowed. After all, how much flexibility was needed to extend the borders of an empire that is trying to encompass countries within the same civilisation?

Apparently a lot, especially because the lower economic performances and questionable political institutions of incoming members create anxieties among old members. Probably the most important insight I acquired from Zielonka’s work regards the complexity of the EU’s conflict resolution model: it is an empire but does not act by means of coercion and its policies may neither carry the authority of morality nor serve the best interests of the countries it wants to dominate but still they submit to it voluntarily. The EU, so it seemed, was beneficial for the periphery it periodically incorporated not because of any altruistic intentions and not
in an idealistic manner but because its flexibility to integrate difference within the same governance framework.

As I found out through Zielonka’s view, even though Romania and Bulgaria’s accession to the EU was highly disputed because of their low levels of economic development, they still got in because enlargement is reciprocally beneficial for both old and new EU members. This excited my curiosity about past enlargements. Was this anxiety over the admission of new members a characteristic of recent enlargements or had it been there before? I investigated the path of previous EU accession processes and found that almost every single one of them since the ECSC was created has represented a very antagonistic confrontation. Historically, the outsiders’ intention to get into the EU has met with insiders’ objections, vetoes, refusals and delays. With this in mind, I started to realise two things. First, a shared European common ground seemed to be a recent invention at best and not the motor of the EUropean project. Second, the enlargement process and the ENP were not different policies but differentiated manifestations of the same pattern: a troubled but steady tendency towards enlargement aimed at solving conflicts in the frontiers of the Union. Then, it occurred to me that either some EU specialist or a scholar of conflict studies ought to have identified this connection before, so I started to research the relation between EU enlargement and conflict resolution.

In Gareth Evans’s book, *The Responsibility to Protect: Ending mass atrocity crimes once and for all* (2008), he briefly examines the relation between EU enlargement and the responsibility to protect. He praises the EU as probably the best conflict prevention prototype to handle the very difficulties the responsibility to protect is concerned with. I considered his opinion to be of substantial import because Evans is one of the top architects that devised this international norm at the UN in 2001 and has been one of its chief proponents ever since. Yet, he ultimately dismissed the EU’s ability to advance the responsibility to protect because of a paradigm that is almost uncontested within the literature dealing with EU enlargement: the “natural” confines of the EU project. In other words, almost no scholar believes that the borders of the EU will ever extend beyond Russia, North
Africa and probably neither Turkey. The recurrent arguments of these sceptic assessments cite not only the usual political and economic discrepancies but pay particular attention to insurmountable cultural differences. These reservations, however, assume that the EU is primarily a cultural project, which is clearly incompatible with Zielonka’s interpretation of the EU not as a cultural but rather as an economically driven geopolitical conflict resolution mechanism:

Countries such as Turkey, Serbia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia would obviously represent an even greater challenge, but then the interests at stake are also greater. This last wave of enlargement has proved that the Union is quite skilful and determined when it comes to protecting its most vital interests (Zielonka, 2008, p. 64).

However, the nearly ubiquitous conjecture that the Union is a cultural project or that culture is one of its necessary dimensions posed a problem. This made me realise that if I wanted to make a plausible case about the ability of the EU’s conflict resolution model to become an institutional blueprint to prevent mass atrocities and promote successful conflict resolution in general, first I had to debunk this belief. This task required the application of a critical eye to European identity and the puzzling idea of Europeanness. This is the justification for the fourth chapter of this work.

To undertake the deconstruction of Europeanness I was influenced by both my academic background and the political context of the Netherlands, where I conducted my research. I knew from my prior immigration courses that in the last ten years there has been a slow-paced but steady drift towards right-wing politics—particularly xenophobia and racism—in most EU countries. Geert Wilders in the Netherlands is one of the most strident examples. He has made Islamophobia a more or less accepted element of political rhetoric by playing on the fears of Dutch voters concerned with Muslim immigration (Biedermann, 2010), which in the Netherlands is perceived by many as violent and crime-prone because of its relation to the murders of prominent public figures and its association with terrorism, women’s oppression, honour crimes and higher rates of crime in general (Junger & Polder, 1992; Tonry, 1997; Veldhuis & Bakker, 2009). In his speeches and declarations, Wilders—as almost every populist politician—plays the “us” and “them” card
exaggeratedly. During a visit he paid to Washington D.C., for example, he stated that:

Our Western culture based on Christianity, Judaism and humanism is in every aspect better than the Islamic culture. Like the brave apostate Wafa Sultan said: it's a comparison between a culture of reason and a culture of barbarism (Keating, 2009).

I came to notice that this particular idea of a European common ground always highlighted the same historical epochs and was not only shared by xenophobic politicians across the EU but, disturbingly, also by the Union's itself.

Two articles helped me understand the role that the Union's ambition for a national-like identity played in its conflict resolution model. Henk van Houtum and Roos Pijper’s “The European Union as a Gated Community: The Two-faced Border and Immigration Regime of the EU” (2007) introduced me to the idea of the perils involved in the Union's effort to strive for a “complete” identity. Van Houtum’s “Human blacklisting: The global apartheid of the EU's external border regime” (2010) gave me an hint about the link between the suffering that immigrants have to endure while attempting to trespass the Union's borders in search for better lives and the incongruence of their mistreatment with the values that the EUropean project is supposed to stand for. This EU's attitudes of bashing and fighting immigration while searching for a pure identity reminded me of a phrase of Eric Hobsbawn's Nations and nationalism since 1780 (1990): “Nationalism requires too much belief in what is patently not so. As Renan said: ‘Getting its history wrong is part of being a nation.’ Historians are professionally obliged not to get it wrong or at least to make an effort not to do so” (Hobsbawm E. J., 1990, pp. 12-13).

This inspired me to question the veracity of what right-wing politicians and the EU recurrently present as the distinctive chapters of European history. To do this I followed the genealogical method outlined in Michel Foucault's essay “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” (1971). This was not an easy task because, as Foucault makes clear, “genealogy demands relentless erudition” (p. 77), and I knew I was short of it. However, this method attracted me powerfully because of the chaotic multiplicity of sources it advocated:
... genealogy retrieves an indispensable restraint: it must record the singularity of events outside of any monotonous finality; it must seek them in the most unpromising places, in what we tend to feel is without history—in sentiments, love, conscience, instincts; it must be sensitive to their recurrence, not in order to trace the gradual curve of their evolution, but to isolate the different scenes where they engaged in different roles.

However, if the genealogist refuses to extend his faith in metaphysics, if he listens to history, he finds that there is “something altogether different” behind things: not a timeless and essential secret, but the secret that they have no essence or that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms (Foucault, 1971, p. 78)

This notion that history is like a huge scattered puzzle of dissimilar pieces one has to put back together leads to look at information that usually is dismissed, such as past perceptions, words whose meanings have changed throughout time, everyday images people overlook because they take them for granted, slight nuances in speech, etc. I tried to look at these usually forgotten pieces of evidence during my deconstruction of Europeanness.

Departing from the high importance that current discourses about European identity concede to Christianity and the alleged incompatibility of Muslim immigrants and “Western culture”, I decided to look for information about the relation between Europe and Islam. Richard Bulliet’s The Case for Islamo-Christian Civilization (2004) was a very important work that led me to many others of the same nature. Bulliet’s argument is that, contrary to mainstream belief, there are no grounds to consider Islam and Christianity religions of different civilisations and rather the opposite is more historically accurate. Michael Wintle’s The Image of Europe: Visualizing Europe in Cartography and Iconography throughout the Ages (2009) was another relevant work that supported the argument about the mutation of the idea of Europe throughout the centuries. Additionally, an article of Luiza Bialasiewicz, “Spectres of Europe: Europe’s past, present, and future” (in press), gave me a clue about how the Union’s pursuit of a defined identity could run against its very own interests.

Now, one could argue that if I was chiefly interested in a theoretical conflict resolution model and not in the EU per se, I could have spared the time of analysing the Union’s capacity in particular and used that space and effort to focus on the
pure theoretical model instead. I believe this would have been unwise. The EU is an atypical conflict resolution model whose probability to be replicated can only be speculated upon—it may never happen again. What about comparing the EU’s model with that of other international organisations such as the UN? I succinctly address this topic in this work. However, comparing the Union, although feasible, seemed ill-advised because there is no other entity in the international system today that seems to be following its path (although theoretically there are some that could). Modern nation-states’ origins, functions and aspirations can be compared to distil abstractions that can be later used to make causal explanations that account for their individual variations. Unlike modern nation-states, nevertheless, the EU diverges so much from the geopolitical arrangements which it more closely resembles—i.e. federal states; international or regional organisations; and even mediaeval empires (which this work assumes to be the closest match)—that comparing it to, for example, the US, the UN, MERCOSUR or the Holy Roman Empire would be an analytically hopeless effort for the most part. In this respect, the EU is in a league of its own, both theoretically and empirically. What is more, what sense would it make to talk about the EU in purely abstract terms when it is a very concrete and, more importantly, unique geopolitical entity? Although focusing on the pure theoretical aspect of its conflict resolution model could undoubtedly yield a valuable study, taking into account its empirical aspect (especially when the theory and the empirical case refer to the same entity) has the additional benefit of offering practical foreign policy recommendations and predictions (Walt, 2005, pp. 27,31). In this regard, this study advocates a middle-range theory by drawing on both theory and a policy relevance to increase its explanatory power.

The conflict resolution model that I want to describe—i.e. the intuition that I have about the potential of the EU—is like the body of a heavily attired woman. In order to describe her silhouette first it is necessary to strip off the unnecessary petticoats and crinolines that disguise and give a deceptive impression of her true shape. Taking the image evoked by this simile, the Union’s conflict resolution’s superfluous garments that distort its true shape are the imagined perceptions of a
European cultural common ground that is clearly discernible within precisely delineated borders.

Having dissociated the Union’s conflict resolution model from a fictitious grandiose lineage, I could now concentrate on describing what I considered to be its essence: geopolitical conflict resolution with economic interdependence as its base of which the neighbourhood policy was an expression. This led me to Judith Kelley’s article, “New Wine in Old Wineskins: Promoting Political Reforms through the New European Neighbourhood Policy” (2006), whose basic thesis is that the ENP is being built upon the same framework as enlargement to such an extent that it does not even exclude altogether the possibility of further enlargement (Kelley, 2006, pp. 30-33). This prompted me ask: what if both the enlargement process and the ENP are basically the same policy? And what if they are not just related policies but a pattern that tends to rebordering? As Kelley’s article made clear, this was not an unheard opinion. Hence, I concluded, the ENP was a refined diversification of the Union’s main foreign policy instruments. Instead of offering a country either admission or rejection into the club, the EU decided to expand its options (especially after the premature accessions of Romania and Bulgaria) by creating a middle way. The basic idea behind the ENP is to avoid miscalculated accession deadlines and inescapable admission commitments. Yet, the bait of enlargement remains, although stated in the most ambiguous terms possible. This is the justification for the fifth chapter.

To research the soundness of this hypothesis (that enlargement is the recurrent outcome of the Union’s conflict resolution model and thus previous enlargement processes and the ENP are but two tonalities of the same spectrum), I decided to rely once again on the historical method I used in the previous chapter to disprove the myths of European heritage and identity. This time, however, I wanted to depart from the moment to which the history of the EU could be traced back, i.e. the foundation of the ECSC: “... to develop a new theory, we must first take a step back from the evidence and reconsider the problem of observation” (Feyerabend, 1993, p. 155). The purpose of this was to offer a reinterpretation of the EU model since its foundation and illustrate that the core of the EU’s conflict reso-
lution model was periodical rebordering. In this quest, three authors with whose ideas I got acquainted through my master programme’s lectures were very helpful. First, Stuart Elden’s “Alexander von Humboldt Lecture and Opening Lecture of the 2010/11 Master programme: ‘The Emergence of Territory’ ” (2010b) allowed me to unearth the conflict resolution model of the EU by thinking about the Union as a particular political technology. Rudolf Stichweh’s article, “Strangers in World Society – Indifference and Minimal Sympathy” (2004), helped me understand how the EU’s interdependence and blurry borders were replacing strangeness for otherness and thus smoothing animosities over among different nationalities that not long ago thought unkindly about each other. Finally, Olivier Kramsch’s “Along the Borgesian Frontier: Excavating the Neighbourhood of ‘Wider Europe’ ” (2011) suggested me the notion that the EU was entrapped in some kind of enlargement mindset—later I found this idea to be empirically supported in Frank Schimmelfennig’s “Entrapped again: The way to EU membership negotiations with Turkey” (2009).

As I mentioned before, as I learned about the ENP I became intrigued by both its similarity to the enlargement process and the EU’s readiness to deny this while being very ambiguous about the possibility of its neighbourhood policy leading to future enlargements. This raised a suspicion: why was the EU interested in formulating a policy in such oxymoronic terms? As I explained before, the reason could be to give itself more room for negotiation in the negotiations with its peripheral countries. There could be, however, a supplementary reason: maybe EU voters do not want more enlargements but the EU does. I came to this guess thanks to my previous knowledge of principal-agent theory as explained on a book I had read during my studies in international relations: Daniel Hawkins et al.’s *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations* (2006).

This hypothesis in particular relates to another fundamental methodological assumption of my work: causal pluralism or the belief that agency and structure are mutually constitutive. Contrary to causal monism, I believe that mechanical causation tends to produce interpretations of little explanatory power in the social sciences. The positivistic approach tries to explain social phenomena—which are
as inherently complex as the very societies that produce them—by reducing the horde of interrelated variables that cause them to a set of non-endogenous correlations. I consider this to be erroneous because the forces that interact to generate social processes and events are in fact endogenous or mutually constructed. Singling out some variables while ditching others creates neat correlations and easily understandable explanations that nonetheless have little relation to how the real world actually works and thus flawed theoretical models. Although theories need to leave out information in order to simplify the world, when they overdo this they mislay their very purpose: delivering understanding and explanation. But just what is the right amount of simplification? The same as constructivist scholars, I believe that at least both downward and upward causation must be taken into account, i.e. the views, intentions and aspirations of what roughly corresponds to “elites” and “masses”. Therefore, any simplification that does not take into account both of these causes has gone too far.

How is downward and upward causality taken into account? On the one hand, I suspected, because of the xenophobic rhetoric, multiculturalist frictions and the Union’s attempt to create a EUropean identity that excludes outsiders, voters in EU countries might be apprehensive about immigration and loss of identity, which they associate with enlargement. On the other hand, however, the EU foreign policy establishment—if I may call it that, even though it is but a lose arrangement of national leaders and EU institutions that is far from being firmly established—knows perfectly well that enlargement has been the most successful foreign policy tool of the EU:

The goal of accession is certainly the most powerful stimulus for reform we can think of. But why should a less ambitious goal not have some effect? A substantive and workable concept of proximity would have a positive effect. We have to be prepared to offer more than partnership and less than membership, without precluding the latter. So what would a proximity policy do for our old and new neighbours look like? (Prodi, 2002)

After having: 1) traced the relation between the responsibility to protect, conflict prevention and the ENP; 2) exposed the inconsistency of EU identity commonplaces and the conventional conception of Europeanness; 3) reinterpreted the his-
tory of the EU as a story of periodical rebordering in which the enlargement process and the ENP are but two manifestations of the same conflict resolution policy; and 4) laid out a detailed account of how the Union’s model of conflict resolution works, I decided to put my argument to the test through a foreign policy analysis.

If the EU is not a cultural project but a conflict resolution model (and, above all, a conflict prevention model) that can be used to promote the responsibility to protect—either by replicating it in other forms of international organisations or through the EU itself—then a foreign policy analysis ought to show that the EU is effectively trying to solve its conflicts with its periphery in a way that is promoting stronger states and liberalism as well as laying the foundations for potential future enlargements. To make this test as rigorous as possible, instead of focusing on Eastern Europe, whose eventual annexation to the Union is more or less expected, I decided to focus on a periphery that is critical for EU interests but whose possibility to become part of the Union’s club is almost uniformly discarded by scholars. The three cases that I take include two countries and one region: Russia, Turkey and North Africa. A further advantage to considering these cases is that they represent a proof of empirical falsification for this thesis because the probability that the EU will decide on the accession of such countries can be expected to come in not such a distant future. This is the justification for the sixth chapter.

Finally, as way of a conclusion, I thought that it would be interesting and logical to bring up yet another hypothesis that can be derived from the previous argumentation: what if the EU could expand without limits? Although this question certainly contradicts most scholarship on the limits of the EU and goes beyond the scope of this study, “Hypotheses contradicting well-confirmed theories give us evidence that cannot be obtained in any other way” (Feyerabend, 1993, p. 5). I took this idea from Alexander Wendt’s “Why a World State is Inevitable (2003), in which he considers that the EU to be the form of international organisation closest to a primitive world government.

I do not know whether this thesis could have followed many other equally valid paths to answer the same question. I suppose it could. However, the road that I chose is the one that seemed more valid to me according to my methodological
convictions and the evidence I found. There are probably many other arguments and a great deal of evidence that could have been incorporated to beef up the support for this thesis. Yet, I trust that the arguments that I have selected and the theory that I developed present a causal relationship to the reader that is logical and substantive enough to stand by itself.
THE PROBLEM
FROM THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT TO THE EUROPEAN UNION

On universal but unenforceable rights: The limits of military intervention

This research arose from an interest in the increasing importance of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which is a legal framework that has been developed in the UN since 2000 and was endorsed by the UN General Assembly in 2005. The concept relies on three conceptual pillars. The first brings up the idea that sovereignty entails a responsibility on the part of each state to protect its population from four appalling crimes: 1) genocide; 2) war crimes; 3) crimes against humanity; and 4) ethnic cleansing (“the four crimes” for short). The second and third pillars refer to the international community’s responsibility to: 1) assist states in meeting that duty; and 2) intervene by any means necessary whenever a state fails to meet its responsibility to protect (Evans, 2008).

The responsibility to protect is one of the most significant developments in the history of international organisation. On the one hand, its moral urgency could hardly be more justified in light of the horrifying suffering that millions of people around the world have to endure when such crimes are committed. On the other hand, this norm implies the beginning of the centralisation of coercion on a world scale due to the progress of international law and the decay of national sovereignty in favour of burgeoning supranational principles (Kunz, 1952, p. 695). It represents a move beyond internationalism and towards supra-nationalism which, in the distant future, could conduct to the formation of a world state. Unfortunately, the probability of success for the responsibility to protect seems fairly dim.

Considering the many humanitarian catastrophes of the last two decades in which states have spectacularly failed to protect—either by omission or incitement—their own populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing—e.g. Liberia, Somalia, Rwanda, Srebrenica, Kosovo, North Korea, Darfur, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Burma—it is safe to pre-
dict that the tendency of states defaulting on their obligation to protect their own populations from mass atrocities is likely to remain more or less common in the international system. In this sense, pillar one is sure to collapse because too many states cannot be trusted to meet this responsibility.

Due to the apparently insurmountable political, economic and logistical constraints that the international community faces to bring an efficient stop—i.e. fast and without killing large numbers of civilians—to these calamities, one can also confidently forecast that in the foreseeable future pillar three—the international community’s responsibility to override state sovereignty in order to halt mass atrocities—is not going to be a realistic option to effectively put an end to the four crimes either. Two recent events shed light on this problematic. First, the revolutions of 2011 in the Arab world have gloomily shown that not even the alignment of all the necessary stars in the international firmament are enough for successfully implementing the responsibility to protect. As US Defence Secretary Robert Gates lamented regarding NATO’s operation in Libya, despite wide political support and a textbook criminal government, “the mightiest military alliance in history is only 11 weeks into an operation against a poorly armed regime in a sparsely populated country—yet many allies are beginning to run short of munitions” (Gates, 2011). Although Libyan rebels eventually toppled their dictator with NATO’s support, this successful intervention to enforce the responsibility to protect should be seen as a fortunate exception rather than the rule—especially considering that an intimidating state-building process lies ahead. Second, the US adventures in Afghanistan and Iraq have been a failure despite the gigantic amount of international commitment that has been invested on them for over a decade. In spite of all the theory, in the practice nobody knows how to create a nation or build a state. For these reasons, pillar three—military intervention, post-conflict recovery as well as state and nation-building—is certain to fall apart too.

The antecedents of the responsibility to protect are to be found in the history of conflict resolution through international organisation. The idea goes back to the early 19th century when the latent instability in the Balkans already preoccupied European powers. After First World War, they decided to establish minority
rights protection in the region as a way of taming the nationalistic passions that threatened to set aflame the Balkans again as ethnic clashes escalated. To accomplish this task, European powers put the League of Nations in charge of supervising these rights.

However, the idea of minority rights backfired. Although its application was restricted to the Balkans, the concept was used by Germany to support ethnic Germans in central and Eastern Europe—who made up the largest ethnic minority in the region back then—and so allowed German nationalism to prosper beyond national borders. The Republic of Weimar wanted to universalise the minority protection framework of the League of Nations to protect ethnic Germans abroad, but the UK and the US refused because they did not want to be criticised for the mistreatment they tolerated of their own minorities. After Second World War, it was factually impossible to reintroduce minority rights’ protection because Stalin’s Soviet-occupied Europe would never agree to uphold it and, in any case, neither the US—still racially segregated—nor Britain—with its oppressive and racist colonial empire—were interested in universalizing minority rights. However, American public opinion as well as many countries around the world pushed for the recognition and protection of human rights, which the great powers reluctantly granted but only rhetorically, without providing any court or legal mechanism to guarantee their redress (Mazower, 2004).

The purpose of this brief account is to point to a common origin shared by the responsibility to protect regime and the minority rights’ protection framework. Seen from a historical perspective, the responsibility to protect represents the most recent attempt in a yet unsuccessful series of efforts to protect victims against the abuses of the nation state. The same as the minority rights framework, the responsibility to protect aims at modifying the concept of territory and sovereignty by demarcating the sovereign state’s legal boundaries to terrorise the population within its territory (Elden, 2010a).

However, it is crucial to remember that, just as the minority rights’ protections for the Balkans that the great powers refused to universalise, all subsequent attempts to delimit state’s sovereignty have always crashed against the states’ ab-
horrence to wilfully restrict their own sovereignty. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for example, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948, “was lauded by its supporters as ‘a beacon of hope for humanity’,” but “written off by several eminent international lawyers as little more than hot air” (Mazower, 2004, p. 396). The same judgement could be applied to the responsibility to protect. It is a norm but not hard law because the countries that could implement the mechanisms to enforce it are not interested in constraining their own foreign and domestic policies.

One could argue that despite of this apparent unwillingness, there is an emerging—even if untidy—arrangement of military conflict resolution composed of UN peacekeepers, NATO and major powers like France, the UK and the US, acting independently in some cases or with the UN’s authorisation in others. Discounting clear manipulations of the responsibility to protect—like the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 or Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 (Economist, 2009b)—how could we otherwise explain the US intervention in Somalia in 1993; NATO’s interventions in Srebrenica in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999 or France’s intervention in Côte d’Ivoire at the UN Secretary General’s request in 2011; as well as the 2011 intervention in Libya which had not only the Security Council’s blessing but also the Arab League’s backing and is being led by the US, the UK and France? True, mistakes have been made during these operations and they cannot be flaunted as role models of how the responsibility to protect should be carried out, but still they represent—it could be further argued in the same vein—clear evidence that this new norm is gaining traction. This is not the case.

First of all, citing only the cases where an international intervention has taken place involves a case selection bias. Even dismissing mass atrocities like Rwanda that happened surprisingly fast and was over before anyone could react, what about Darfur—a clear case of genocide—, the Israel/Palestine conflict—a clear case of ethnic cleansing and war crimes—or the Democratic Republic of the Congo—rife with daily war crimes and crimes against humanity? The problem faced by the responsibility to protect is the same that the enforceable but non-universal minority rights regime of the League of Nations and the universal but
non-enforceable human rights regime of the UN have confronted: there is an incompatibility between enforceability and universality when it comes to encroaching upon state sovereignty. It is possible to have either enforceable protection as long as it applies only to countries of little political weight in the international system or universal protection as long as there are no mechanisms to guarantee its enforcement. But it is not possible to have both enforceable and universal rights. A perfect example of this incompatibility is the International Criminal Court (ICC) which, behind its façade of universal jurisdiction, can be expected to indict leaders from weak countries such as Slobodan Milošević, Charles Taylor and Omar al-Bashir—all less than commendable fellows—but not George W. Bush, Tony Blair or Vladimir Putin—each with crowds of skeletons crammed in their cupboards.

It is not morally right, but in the absence of a world state this is the way international politics have, since ancient times, unceasingly validated the apothegm stating that “the dominant exact what they can and the weak concede what they must” (Thucydides, 2009, p. 302). This rule of thumb is institutionalised in the UN Security Council, the organ responsible for international peace and security (United Nations, 1945, ch. V), whose authorisation to implement the responsibility to protect is necessary. Unfortunately, as many humanitarian emergencies have made clear, its permanent members (the US, China, Russia, France and the UK) do not want to tie their foreign policies to military interventions that could compromise their own legitimacy, sovereignty, security or economic interests.

So, why not simply reform the Security Council? Exasperatingly, this naïve idea has been proposed ad nauseam (e.g. Paris, 1997, p. 58; Säve-Söderbergh & Nakamitsu-Lennartsson, 2002, p. 362; Monbiot, 2003; Pugh, 2004, pp. 51-54) even though from a coolheaded perspective it is clearly unfeasible. This does not mean that the UN is already as good as it can get—it is infamously corrupt (Ahlenius, 2010) and outstandingly inefficient when it comes to stopping mass atrocities (Barnett, 1997; De Waal, 2007)—because from a purely normative point of view it certainly should. Nor does it mean that it cannot be reformed but rather that this would prove impossible should one follow the unsophisticated proposals that have become popular even though they clearly ignore the history and purpose of the UN
and its relation to international security. If one really wants to improve the human condition and not just pay lip service to tired platitudes it is necessary to work “within the constraints of the world the way it is” (Desch, 2003, p. 417).

During its 66 years of existence the UN Charter has underwent only three amendments while “substantive and substantial reform has proved virtually impossible” (Weiss, 2003, p. 147). This should be no surprise. Contrary to the common belief according to which the UN was founded by wise and tireless internationalists interested in promoting the noble and high-minded values against the backdrop of the dismaying Nazi crimes (Mazower, 2004, p. 380),

When we turn back to the 1940s, warning bells should go off, for we find that commentators then expressed a more wary view of the new world organization than historians currently tend to. Indeed many left the founding conference at San Francisco in 1945 believing that the world body they were being asked to sign up to was shot through with hypocrisy. They saw its universalizing rhetoric of freedom and rights all too partial—a veil masking the consolidation of a great power directorate that was not as different from the Axis powers, in its imperious attitude to how the world’s weak and poor should be governed, as it should have been. Insiders discreetly confided not dissimilar views to each other or to the privacy of their diaries. For the British historian and civil servant Charles Webster, heavily involved in drafting the Charter, it was “an alliance of the Great Powers embedded in a universal organization,” and its key achievement was to have improved the machinery governing relations between the powers. Gladwyn Jebb, Webster’s superior, cynically praised the ability of his American colleagues to “dullude” human rights activists at San Francisco into thinking “that their objectives have been achieved in the present Charter” (Mazower, 2009, p. 7).

Placed in this context, it becomes evident that the Council’s purpose was not to maintain international peace and security, as the UN Charter so loftily states, but to maintain the kind of peace and security that suited the interests of its five permanent members—especially the most powerful among them, i.e. Russia and the US. Since its inception, the Council has provided a forum from which the world powers can check each other and work out their differences while presiding over world governance and, to some extent, be above the law—i.e. international law does not apply to the Council’s permanent members or their protégés (e.g. Israel) (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006, p. 3). This design was supposed to help the British keep their empire—in view of their declining power,— to project American
influence and values in a more assertive way; and to allow the Soviets keep their newly gained sphere of influence without interference (Mazower, 2004; 2009). What tends to be forgotten these days is that,

In fact, while the post-war rise of human rights can be told in the optimistic mode in part as the triumph of civilization over realpolitik and barbarism, it cannot, in justice, be fully explained unless we are aware that it was, at the same time, a triumph, and one imbued with its fair share of cynicism, for state interest too (Mazower, 2004, p. 381).

Making the Council more representative—as most proposals suggest—would imply a loss of power for its permanent members who, having the faculty to preclude such a reform from being carried through as well as no incentives for sharing their power—much less giving it up—will simply not allow it (Weiss, 2003, p. 151).

But what if the Council agrees upon the responsibility to protect as it did for the first time in Libya (Economist, 2011f)? This harmony cannot be counted upon for every situation and, as mentioned before, it should be regarded as the exception rather than the rule. The fact that a military intervention in Libya was in the interest of the US, France and the UK; and did not hurt the interests of Russia or China—who reluctantly allowed the intervention and withheld their vetoes until the Arab League gave its blessing (Economist, 2011f)—was an extraordinary coincidence. Against this backdrop, the responsibility to protect cannot aspire to become systematic, i.e. be applied to all the cases that would fit its criteria—at least not as long as its implementation depends on the Council’s authorisation and this organ keeps working as it does.

The intervention in Libya provides crucial lessons for future calls upon the international community’s responsibility to protect. First, providing mere aerial support as it was done during the first days of the Libya campaign to stop Gaddafi’s offensive against his people is already highly expensive (Defence Web, 2011; Norton-Taylor & Rogers, 2011) and does not guarantee success—which becomes particularly relevant in the middle of a financial crisis. Second, the combined forces of the US—the largest national economy and biggest military expender in the world—along with France and the UK—which together “account for nearly half of all military spending in the EU, half of the total number of armed forces and 70%
of military research and development” (The Guardian, 2010)—were able to defeat a besieged government with no significant military capabilities only after too many troubles and with the base support of an unusually efficient rebel army.

There are also logistical difficulties to be considered before undertaking a military intervention to save lives. Even if the political will and economic resources are given, there are complications that make military interventions risky ventures, most remarkably the reconciliation between military effectiveness and humanitarian law. In few words, it is hard to kill the bad guys without taking innocent lives in the attempt. Applying military force to violence-ridden situations is like performing a delicate surgery with a butcher’s knife instead of a scalpel. Even taking wilful misconduct—e.g. Israeli war crimes in Gaza at the end of 2008 (General Assembly, 2009)—and tactical recklessness—e.g. NATO bombings in Kosovo in 1999 (Chandler, 2006)—out of the equation, innocent civilians or insurgents fighting a ruthless government are likely to get killed during military operations because the scenarios in which military force is deployed are typically chaotic. If the history of past mass atrocities is any guide, more often than not the responsibility to protect is going to take place in densely populated areas where civilians and freedom fighters are not clearly distinguishable from governmental forces and murderous militias.

Preventing collateral damage, however, is not the only logistical problem. In the case of Libya, for example, where there is an insurgency fighting a government in clear breach of its responsibility to protect its population, it was unclear how to provide support to the rebels. How can one make sure that military assistance is given to the right kind of rebels in the first place? The insurgents are neither a homogeneous group nor have a clear and accountable leadership. Moreover, the countries that can provide weapons and military assistance are typically ex-colonial powers or current neo-imperial powers like EU members and the US. How can these countries provide the rebels with support without undermining their credibility and leadership? How can aid coming from ex-colonial powers prevent criminal governments from capitalizing on this international meddling by using it as an excuse to rally ‘round the flag against foreign invaders? These are open questions for which there are no answers.
On top of political, economic and logistical constraints there is an inherent catch to conflicts involving the four crimes that the responsibility to protect is devised to preclude: their “fractal” nature. The recurrent motives that lead a state to massacre its own population are state weakness (e.g. lack of the monopoly of violence and a frail economy) and illiberalism (e.g. no rule of law, corrupt security forces and a manipulated justice system). More problematic still, as the U.S.-led nation and state-building ventures in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown, is that not even a sustained support of massive military, diplomatic and economic resources can guarantee the success of such projects. No one knows how to build a state (Scott, 1998), less a liberal democratic one (Zakaria, 1997).

Political philosophy has many insights to offer in this respect (e.g. Olson, 1971) but these are a posteriori rather than a priori. The literature on good governance shows how many assumptions about what is necessary to build a minimally functioning state are full of theoretical mistakes (Grindle, 2004). No one has ever purposefully achieved the construction of a state following a preconceived plan. In fact, historical experience shows that “large-scale schemes to improve the human condition” have usually gone awry and had more or less terrible consequences (Scott, 1998). Post-conflict recovery is not the kind of state- and nation-building that required the genius of Bismarck to unify Germany or that of Cavour and Garibaldi to bring Italy together. In both of these cases there was already a well-established movement of either Pan-Germanism or Risorgimento, respectively, that political leaders could build their nationalist projects upon (Hobsbawm E. J., 1990). Contrastingly, in places where the responsibility to protect could be earnestly called for, the whole state and nation-building process has to begin almost from scratch—e.g. Somalia or the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Many such countries are stricken by widespread violence, misery, injustice and not only lack a sense of national unity but their inhabitants are full of bitter feelings hardened by the enduring memories of war and all too constant calamities (see: The U.S. Army Marine Corps, 2007). State and nation-building are long and turbulent historical processes that have happened throughout centuries (Elden, 2010b). Anyway, as the intervention in Iraq demonstrates, these post-conflict resolution undertakings are
prohibitively expensive and hence exceptional extravaganzas (Bilmes & Stiglitz, 2008) that cannot be counted upon in the future.

**The last standing pillar: Prevention**

In comparison to the conundrums associated with military intervention, prevention seems to be promising if just because “experience has constantly taught us that effective prevention is far less costly in blood and treasure than cure” (Evans, 2008, p. 79). However, the definition of prevention in itself is troubling. How far back should prevention go? Although Gareth Evans—one of the main architects of the responsibility to protect—rightly regards prevention as the most important aspect of this legal norm, his conception of prevention has three shortcomings.

First, Evans tends to conceive prevention in terms of a strong diplomatic reaction on the part of the international community just before the imminent degeneration of a conflict into a mayhem of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity or ethnic cleansing. This might be helpful, for clever mediation, credible threats or attractive incentives can stop a ruinous chain of events leading to the four crimes. However, as I already argued, the harmonious and speedy response of the Security Council cannot be counted upon to set off these mechanisms. Besides, the usual strategies that the international community has used to bring development to poor countries or to buy off dictatorships to make them undertake democratic reforms have been a miserable failure (Easterly, 2006). This is no dramatic exaggeration. “The typical African country received more than 15 percent of its income from foreign donors in the 1990s” and still “aid was not successful in reversing or halting the slide in growth of income per capita toward zero” (Ibid., p. 45). One of the most infamous examples is the 1994 famine in Ethiopia during which most of the international aid was seized by the rebels to buy weapons and build a Marxist political party (BBC, 2010).

The second mistake Evans makes is putting forward the classic jumbled and voluminous list of good governance policies that should be implemented in order to prevent the four crimes. However, the literature on conflict resolution shows
that providing efficient international assistance to governments that are likely to perpetrate any of the four heinous crimes involves highly expensive long-term commitments on the part of major economic powers and international organisations that are ultimately unrealistic. Although international commitment is probably the single most important variable that any post-conflict recovery theory needs to take into account, it is also one of the most neglected (Doyle, 2002).

Without enough international support key recovery reforms cannot be pursued—such as territorial arrangements; democratisation and electoral systems; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; security sector reform; good governance and human rights provisions; humanitarian and developmental aid and reconstruction; and negotiation and mediation (Grindle, 2004, p. 531). Institutions are costly and, therefore, demanding that poor countries adopt them without considering their priority first has enormous opportunity costs because most of them consist of long-term processes that need powerful and committed international sponsors and guarantors to unfold (Rothchild, 2002; Chesterman, 2004, p. 235). The crucial problem that many conflict resolution scholars fail to consider is that international commitment is temporary at best (Stedman, 1996, p. 373; Paris, 1997, p. 58; Lyons, 2002, p. 218). Therefore, most of these measures are but pipedreams.

Many authors—Evans included—propose long-term and very expensive solutions without considering or, worse still, even knowing the lack of commitment and resources for such undertakings (Sriram, 2001, p. 58; Putnam, 2002; Säve-Söderbergh & Nakamitsu-Lennartsson, 2002, p. 215; Chesterman, 2004, p. 210). They make calls for prodigal pursuits like electoral commissions; comprehensive security-sector reforms; international tribunals (Economist, 2010g); a liberal constitution and the rule of law to guarantee minority rights, transparency, accountability and due process (Barnes, 2001, p. 89; Chesterman, 2004, p. 225), a political culture of tolerance and compromise, free mass media, civil society organisations and an independent judiciary (Kumar, 1998, p. 215; Säve-Söderbergh & Nakamitsu-Lennartsson, 2002, p. 363). The simplistic leitmotiv behind these recommendations is sadly comic, for it could be summarised as: all poor, undeveloped and violent countries need to stop worrying about genocide, war crimes, crimes against hu-
humanity and ethnic cleansing is to grow all the institutions that rich, developed and peaceful countries already have. This inanity fails to provide the most important causal mechanisms explaining how rich, developed and peaceful countries became so in the first place. Furthermore, the money destined to this kind of long-term commitments is rather insufficient and could not possibly cover the cost of most of these measures, let alone all of them (General Assembly, 2010).

To make it worse, rich countries and international financial institutions (IFIs)—the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)—are not interested in funding most post-conflict recovery projects because usually they do not coincide with their interests. Donors are reluctant to fund indispensible but politically risky or economically unproductive projects like building prisons or paying local wages (Chesterman, 2004, p. 194). Instead they have been fond of promoting measures that attract foreign investors—from their own countries, of course—or that make top politicians gain recognition and prestige (Woodward, 2002, pp. 188-189; Chesterman, 2004, p. 172). This pettiness has even led the IFIs to coddle “awful gangsters who just call themselves a government” (Easterly, 2006, pp. 152-153) instead of facilitating post-conflict recovery.

Demobilization, demilitarization and reintegration (DDR) as well as security sector reforms (SSR) are good examples of how IFIs and recovery strategies contradict each other. Turning warring factions into political parties seems to be one of the most successful ways of re-channelling a country through a peaceful path in the long-term as shown by the experiences of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador and the Mozambican National Resistance party (RENAMO) (López-Pintor, 1997, p. 59; Kumar, 1998, p. 218; Lyons, 2002, pp. 216,227). Although such measures are considered crucial to peace-building, they need money transfers to develop, which are hard to obtain considering the interests behind IFIs (Smith, 2004). For DDR and SSR to make the transition from short to long-term strategies either more transfers or sustainable economic development are needed because without money former soldiers may take up arms again to make ends meet (López-Pintor, 1997; Woodward, 2002; Knight & Özerdem, 2004). Lack of coordination between international financial institutions
and peace-builders stems from a discordance between recovery’s necessities and donor countries’ foreign policy which in large part is shaped by domestic politics—especially when it involves intervention in other states (Gurevitch, 1978)—ultimately the dominant factor affecting how assistance is allocated and spent (Chesterman, 2004, pp. 183-203; Barakat & Zyck, 2009, p. 1081).

The third mistake that Evans makes is insisting on the paradigm of the UN as the main conflict resolution actor and expected implementer of the responsibility to protect. Although the UN is a landmark in the history of humanity, the EU is another watershed in the history of international organisation that has had a parallel development to the UN and whose implications for world governance could be at least as transcendental but have gone unnoticed. The Union might owe this remarkable neglect to two unfortunate perceptions, one external and other internal. On the one hand, the EU started as the uninspiring ECSC, which strikingly contrasts with the fanfare and high expectations found in the UN’s foundational documents and associated with it since its inception. On the other hand, in opposition to the UN’s overambitious grand global strategy—which has famously failed to live up to its rhetoric—the EU has suffered from a parochial awareness of itself. Together, these perceptions might have precluded the EU and others from envisioning the full extent of its potential.

And just what is the full extent of the EU’s potential? No one knows yet because the Union is an ongoing project. However, my intuition is that, if one looks at the conflict prevention toolbox that Evans believes it is necessary to draw upon in order to effectively avert mass atrocities, then the EU’s unparalleled capacity to successfully carry out these measures immediately stands out. To be fair, Evans seems to be aware of the Union’s capabilities. He mentions that “the establishment of the European Union has been perhaps the most effective structural conflict prevention measure in history, imposing a multitude of good governance disciplines not just on its existing members but on its aspiring ones” (Evans, 2008, p. 89). He goes further and states that,

Of all the regional organizations capable of helping make R2P a reality, the twenty-seven-member EU brings by far the greatest potential strengths. Not
only are its population size and wealth comparable to the United States, but it enjoys the status of being possibly the world’s most successful conflict prevention model, making by its very existence another war among its member states effectively impossible, and it has the capacity to apply leverage at both the soft- and hard-power ends of the policy response spectrum. (Evans, 2008, p. 183)

The prevention toolbox: Conflict prevention measures

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Source: (Evans, 2008, p. 87)

And yet, oddly, Evans does not elaborate on this idea. But why? Probably because Evans considers that the enlargement capacity of the Union has stopped or is nearly coming to an end. Although he notices that Chris Patten, an EU former commissioner for external relations, referred to the Union’s enlargement as “undeniably […] the Union’s most successful foreign policy instrument”, Evans identifies three main flaws in the EU model: 1) unsolved ethnic conflicts in the Balkans; 2) Turkey’s stagnated accession to the Union; and 3) problems to expand NATO into Macedonia, Ukraine and Georgia. Here Evans seems to identify the Russian sphere of influence—the Balkans and the Caucasus—and maybe Islam—i.e. Turkey—as the limits of the EU. In any case, Evans does not go deeper into this issue and moves away from the topic of enlargement to discuss the EU’s nascent foreign policy and foreign aid, civilian missions and the Union’s ability to impose sanctions or send military forces into conflict regions (Evans, 2008, pp. 183-188). In light of all the talk about the Union’s overstretch, Evans’ unspoken dismissal of the EU’s ca-
pacity to further exercise its conditionality through rebordering is understandable. This is one of the main paradigms that I try to discredit in this thesis.

Considering these caveats, to affirm—as I most certainly do—that the EU is a viable conflict resolution model to prevent mass atrocities, first I have to show that the prevalent idea that the Union’s enlargement has come to a halt or is approaching it is wrong. In this regard, I believe that a critical interpretation of the European Neighbourhood Policy can expose how deceptive the “overstretch” paradigm is and how much potential for conflict resolution and further enlargement is there still within the EU.

The prevention potential of the European Union: Its Neighbourhood Policy

What about the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)? It is clearly not an enlargement policy but indeed its replacement. The ENP was designed to make clear to the Union’s peripheral countries which are the limits of the club (Van Houtum & Pijpers, 2007). At least this seems to be the Union’s intention. However, if one takes a closer look at the ENP documents the complex and contradicting nature of the policy is revealed and the weakness and short-sightedness of the reasons that EU leaders adduce to exclude the possibility of further enlargement become noticeable.

In an attempt to create a perimeter of prosperity, stability and security (i.e. a buffer zone), the EU tries to reshape the institutions of its periphery so that it adheres more closely to the Union’s standards. The EU gets its periphery’s compliance through the use of conditionality, which implies offering economic incentives, diplomatic support, technical assistance and deeper cooperation in exchange for legal and institutional modernization, harmonization and reform. This might seem more like a strategy of governance than of conflict prevention but, in the end, governing is a sheer act of conflict management in itself, for it “has to reconcile the competing preferences of self-interested individuals in an institutionalized system of peaceful conflict resolution” (Kohler-Koch & Eising, 2005). Governance and con-
flict resolution are the same thing and thus the ENP is as much about one as about the other.

The truly intriguing thing about the ENP’s approach is the schizophrenia inherent to its formulation: “The level of ambition of the relationship depends on the extent to which these values are shared. The ENP remains distinct from the process of enlargement although it does not prejudge, for European neighbours, how their relationship with the EU may develop in future, in accordance with Treaty provisions” (European Commission, 2010b). In a nutshell, the ENP is not enlargement, but it might be.

What is the reason for this ambiguity? Conceivably that “The EU, as a ‘polity’ is still in its formative phase, and its very ‘nature’—not to mention its finalité politique—is still contested” (Kohler-Koch & Eising, 2005, p. 20). It looks as if the EU was trying to give itself some room for manoeuvre by articulating the ENP in a deliberately ambiguous way so that it can remain selective in the future regarding which countries the Union admits or rejects. The ENP, however, can be interpreted differently depending on the theoretical code that one uses to decipher it.

**Seeing the ENP through critical lenses**

From a Marxist point of view the ENP has the appearance of a predatory policy used by the EU bourgeoisie to concentrate property in a few hands (Marx & Engels, 2000 [1848], p. 17) by exploiting the “old” countries of Eastern Europe with underdeveloped capitalist systems, thereby bringing about cultural destruction, pillage and domination (Luxemburg, 1972 [1915], pp. 47-62). Drawing on Foucault (*Les mots et les choses*, 1966), one could add that the ENP creates a domination discourse that portrays the EU’s surroundings as inferior, underdeveloped and in need of a civilising mission (Kuus, 2004). This leads them to subliminally internalise the EU’s superior and benevolent role and their own inferior status in need of direction.

“Eurospeak”—the EU’s characteristic bureaucratic language—is a good example of the Union’s dominance through discursive techniques. A common concept in Eurospeak is “European standards”, which blends all the differences among
EU countries into an imagined common character. This is an exercise in cognitive dissonance and hypocritical self-righteousness that presents an idealized image of the Union and does away with its members nasty flaws. In addition, the ENP is an instrument of bio-politics (Foucault, Governmentality, 1991) because it contains provisions regarding the application of statistics as well as border and migration controls. Yet, it is worth asking whether the EU exerts such a sheer or concealed dominance as Marxist and Foucauldian approaches would respectively suggest.

A combined liberal-institutionalist and multi-level governance approach can help to tone down these fears. From this perspective it could be argued that the EU, instead of being a predator, plays an enabler or activator role because through the ENP—as with accession processes—tells its peripheral countries which reforms, legal instruments and regulations they should adopt (e.g. the acquis communautaire) and offers them economic rewards in exchange for compliance without exerting any coercion. The lack of either explicit or implicit coercion that the liberal-institutionalist approach suggests, although debatable, is crucial to nuance the EU’s dominance that can be derived from interpretations of Marxist and Foucauldian inspiration. The EU never imposes anything in the strict sense of the word (Kohler-Koch & Eising, 2005, p. 26) and its approach relies on interdependence, even if asymmetrical. In this sense, the ENP is more about guided cooperation than outright imposition. However, the Foucauldian scepticism with respect to underlying domination structures should be borne in mind because Eurospeaks is too strategically framed as to be dismissed as mere technical or diplomatic language.

The ENP could also be conceived as a cosmopolitan project because it promotes human rights and environmental law, which are considered the basis of a nascent cosmopolitanism (Held & McGrew, 2002, p. 313). The ENP, as the EU project in general, is cosmopolitan in yet another sense, for cosmopolitanism implies the particular kind of mobility that allows individuals to cross and re-cross borders. Importantly, this view about the relationship between borders and cosmopolitanism assumes not a vanishing of borders but their proliferation (Balibar, 2004, p. 109; Rumford, 2008, p. 53). To the extent that both the EU and the ENP replicate
borders they represent a cosmopolitan project. None the less, neither of them can be considered truly cosmopolitan because, as their sordid apartheid-like controls make clear (Van Houtum & Boedeltje, 2009), they are not based on the belief that all individuals have equal moral value and thus they do not meet the criteria of egalitarian individualism, principal recognition and impartial reasoning (Held & McGrew, 2002, p. 311).

By regrouping the previous theoretical deliberations one can start to dig out the shape of both the Union and its Neighbourhood Policy. From Marxist and Foucauldian distrustful cautions we can take that the EU seeks to establish dominance around its neighbourhood, although more in a cunning Foucauldian way than in an open Marxist fashion. The liberal-institutionalist and multi-level approaches complement that this dominance is exerted not through the use of coercion but through a Pavlovian dynamic of incentives that creates uneven interdependence. The cosmopolitan perspective adds that the Union has some cosmetic hints of cosmopolitanism but its affronts to human dignity run against central cosmopolitan tenets.

In addition, the idea that the EU exerts its dominance in an imperialistic manner has become widely accepted and almost indisputable—even within the EU (EUX.TV, 2007). What is unclear, however, is what kind of empire it is. Although the Union’s intentions are evidently far from being altruistic—as shown by the multitude of conditions it demands from its neighbours as well as the appalling way it treats immigration in the Mediterranean—what is troubling is that they are fostered in a way that seems very well-intentioned when compared to traditional empires. The Union has distanced itself from neo-Westphalian empires—e.g. British, American and Soviet—that wield power through “military impositions and containment” (Zielonka, 2006, p. 15). It is not what the EU wants but how it asks for it what makes all the difference.

Because of its flexible political constitution, fuzzy borders, hierarchical management of people and stimulated permeation of laws and governance designed to bring stability and control to an otherwise unstable and poor neighbourhood, the EU has been considered to fit the prototype of a neo-mediaeval empire
(Zielonka, 2006). Although more benevolent than previous imperial experiments, a familiar colonial reminiscence still pervades the EU. This is manifest in the ENP’s rhetoric, which matches what is known as “coloniality thinking”, a discursive paradigm that exerts dominance by negating recognition and difference or dismissing their significance (Mignolo, Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, subaltern knowledges and border thinking, 2000, p. 88). This is comprehensible given that “colonial history is a crucial component of the social imaginaries” of the EU countries that used to be empires not long ago (Böröcz, 2001, p. 13).

Considering these insights, maybe a combination of all the different theoretical vantage points can produce a sharper picture that captures the complexity they are trying to describe. Perhaps one could say that the EU is a neo-mediaeval empire that articulates Foucauldian discourses of cosmopolitanism—in the form of policies like the ENP—to promote Marxist practices of exploitation that nevertheless produce an asymmetrically beneficial interdependence.

The questions that arise from this insight are: Why must the EU stop somewhere? Why does it need an ENP in the first place? What are the constraints for peripheral EU countries from eventually becoming full members of the EU? What is the potential of the EU as an international organisation? Could the EU enlarge further? How much? What would be the implications if it did? These are the subordinate questions that I try to answer in this thesis to find an answer to my main question: is the Union the best conflict resolution model at hand to prevent genocides, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansings and promote international governance?

The conundrum of enlargement
Where will the EU stop? In 2001 the Economist considered this question “the ultimate issue of EU enlargement.” This was an understatement. It is the most important question for the entire EU project and its answer could have dramatic implications for the international system as a whole. In this thesis I argue that if certain conditions are met, the Union has the potential to expand beyond what have been
considered its possible borders so far and extend to the Middle East, North Africa and Russia.

At first glance this seems like a naïve and misinformed answer—at best. If anything, there seems to be plenty of evidence on the contrary. Turkey has been waiting almost half a century for an incorporation that never materialises. Morocco was refused accession into the European Economic Community (EEC) back in 1987 on the grounds that it is not a European country and therefore not entitled to apply for membership. Some even believe that this precedent has “categorically excluded this country’s prospect of accession” (Warning, 2006, p. 4) and arguably that of all other North African states. Russia is considered too big, too different and too difficult to absorb (Economist, 2001) and thus constitutes a natural limit to the Union’s eastern ambitions. However, I want to advance the idea that these perceptions are misleading and that the enlargement question to such places is far from being settled. The objections within the literature against the idea that the EU can expand to these places are mainly two.

The first contends that Europe is geographically and culturally demarcated and, by extension, so is the EU. According to this idea, Europe has developed in a clearly delimited space and possesses a distinct identity rooted in ancient Greece, both the Roman and Carolingian empires, Christianity, Renaissance and the Enlightenment. Neither the Middle East nor North Africa nor—disputably—Russia share this common ground and therefore do not belong to either Europe or the EU. Besides, the increasing support for xenophobic—mainly anti-Muslim—parties in the EU (e.g. France, the Netherlands, Finland, Italy, Hungary, Austria, the UK, Sweden and Germany) would make enlargements to less white and predominantly Muslim countries unthinkable.

The second objection claims that the Union is overstretched and too big to be governed. The premature accessions of Bulgaria and Romania are recurrently cited as the most striking examples of this exhaustion. Furthermore, the financial crisis has already shaken the Union to its core endangering the whole EU project (Economist, 2011k). Financially strained countries such as Greece are fuelling anti-EU sentiments by stirring the national passions of weak and strong economies
against each other. How could the Union include countries that would need transfers of money to harmonize their standards (i.e. structural and cohesion funds [see: European Union, 2011])—when the Union is in such financial stress? Anyhow, the ENP is a measure devised precisely to make clear that further enlargements are out of the question. As if all this was not enough, multiculturalism in the EU is already at bay. The immigration flows that would be expected from culturally different countries—particularly Muslim—as a result of the freedom of people should countries like Turkey be admitted into the Union would only make it worse and thus EU voters are never going to make it politically viable.

These arguments, I contend, are either plainly wrong or short-sighted. First, the objections about European identity are rooted in a misunderstanding of what this identity is. I want to stress the importance of distinguishing between the EU and Europe because this is the most obvious point of departure to deconstruct the bias within the current definition of the Europe (Boedeltje & Van Houtum, 2008). The EU is a historically recent development of international institutional engineering based on specific treaties and institutions, whereas Europe is a highly complex geo-cultural concept with a much longer history that encompasses countries that are not members of the Union—many of which can be found outside the modern conception of physiographical Europe. In this sense, Europe is a largely subjective notion whose definition can oscillate along a wide range of appreciations that are heavily influenced by historical, sociological and political factors. Although this distinction might seem unnecessarily pedantic, it is common for EU institutions and official documents as well as for many scholars to use “European” as the natural adjective deriving from the EU—either out of an assumed natural association or to avoid the problem of using an unfortunate adjective. This misleading language creates a distorted conception of the Union which reclaims for it a heritage, history and identity that are neither the sole property of its members nor restricted to what they consider to be Europe. Therefore, I consciously avoid the adjective “European” when referring to the EU and instead use the historically more sensitive term “EUropean”—which has been gaining ground in recent scholarship.
Second, the objections against the possibility of the Union’s further enlargement rest not only on a misconception of what Europe is but also of how and why enlargement works. To begin with, the EU is not too big to be governed and in fact its capacity to absorb many more countries has already been assessed (Emerson, Aydin, De Clerck-Sachsse, & Noutcheva, 2006). Besides, enlargement may even improve governance in the EU, for “it may even wind up being easier to take decisions in an expanded EU, because the sheer size of the Union will further underline the need for accommodation and compromise” (Zielonka, 2004, p. 27).

More importantly, I claim that conditional rebordering—the key to the Union’s success in terms of peace and prosperity—is hardwired to the EU’s model of governance and conflict resolution. Consequently, as long as there is conflict around the Union there will be the need for dealing with it and as a result enlargement will remain a possibility. The Arab revolutions, unstable illiberal regimes, immigration flows, people trafficking, energy supply, nuclear proliferation, organised crime and terrorist concerns taking place or coming from all around the Union are signs that there is going to be plenty of conflict resolution making in the EU’s future.

How does the EU model of conflict resolution work and why is enlargement closely intertwined with it? Contrary to popular belief, the EU is not destiny. The inertia of the Union’s rebordering does come from a spectacle of historical teleology in which the binding forces of a European common ground are struggling to bring European countries together. Nor is this process maintained by the goodwill of rich EU countries taking under their wing less developed countries to altruistically smooth their path to modernity. The EU is a very instrumental project of Realpolitik (Emery, 1915)—even if enlightened (Zielonka, 2004)—and not charity for the poor and needy periphery (Zielonka, 2006, pp. 74-78).

This has always been the case. Enlargement is profitable not only for the countries that are admitted into the EU but for its older members as well. The same applies for the ENP, which is nothing but a more cautious and refined form of enlargement, for it “is based on the same kind of positive conditionality underpinning the enlargement process” (Ferrero-Waldner, 2006)—even though many EU leaders, officials and scholars have been at pains to deny this. Thus, one cannot
exclude that the ENP might lead to further enlargements—as said before, not even the Union does. I am not implying that the Union will expand without limits because that would be a bold exercise in futurology. Instead, I suggest that the EU project is by no means restricted to physiographical Europe and I want to offer an alternative view to those who believe it is.
The potential meanings of Europe

In *Rethinking Europe: Social Theory and the Implications of Europeanization* (2005), Rumford and Delanty take upon the challenge of developing a theory of European society. Additionally to being useful, they claim, Europe should seek to become meaningful (p. 3). They devise a normative parameter according to which cosmopolitanism is not only the ideal meaning that European identity should aspire to but also the most likely outcome: “to be European is simply to recognise that one lives in a world that does not belong to a specific people” (p. 77). However, as the sustained drift to anti-immigration and Euro-sceptic politics is showing, every time more EUropean voters seem to challenge Rumford and Delanty’s cosmopolitan prospective.

In light of this, the Union’s society is facing two diverging roads towards meaningfulness: one that leads to the development of a national-like EU identity—or even a retreat into particular national identities—and another that leads to cosmopolitanism. The repercussions of the first can be assumed to be somewhat predictable—with all its catastrophic potential as past experiences of nationalist fervour bear out—but the consequences of the second might transform the EU into one of the most transcendent models of international organisation ever conceived and a prototype for post-national identities and loyalties.

What kind of EUropean identity is unfolding? Rumford and Delanty admit that a EUropean identity is in the making and therefore one can only speak of a nascent EUropean society. They argue—as others have (Agnew, 1994; Brenner, 2004, p. 76; Boedeltje & Van Houtum, 2008)—that Europeanisation is a novel process that cannot be studied through the same lens used to understand the dynamics of the nation state and so analyses of the EU relying on this paradigm are
misleading and of little use. They are right. Studies about the complex EU governance (Davoudi, 2003; 2005)—i.e. decision making and resource allocation processes—have shown that it significantly deviates from the traditional Westphalian model of the nation state and resembles more a neo-mediaeval empire (Zielonka, 2006) with multi-level governance. Examples of this kind of governance are policies like the European Development Perspective (EDP) (Davoudi, 2003), the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) for the European Employment Strategy (Davoudi, 2005, p. 438), and high-speed transnational infrastructures.

However, Rumford and Delanty are wrong in deriving from the EU’s atypical political shape that it cannot develop some sort of national identity. Their over-confidence in the Union’s capacity to develop a cosmopolitan identity relies on the idea that communications and connectedness are expanding the borders of societies across the world to such an extent that in some cases one could even speak of a world society (Stichweh, 2008). They, however, disregard influential political entities that still draw on the nation state paradigm to make sense of the EU, frame their discourses and formulate their policies. The EU Commission and anti-immigration political parties are such actors. They are rallying support for their own bureaucratic and political gains by promoting a kind of old fashioned nationalism for the Union that draws on typical nationalist tools such as “unifying symbols, or criteria of belonging in the particular history and geography of a territory” (Anderson J., 1995, p. 71). The organs in charge of European governance have been “Institutionalising a kind of European science-making through EU subsidies and research programmes, displaying manifest symbolic geopolitics through the construction of an anthem, a flag, a Europe day, common EURO-notes with invented ‘European-like’ buildings and bridges, common EURO-coins” (Boedeltje & Van Houtum, 2008, p. 362).

To be sure, Rumford and Delanty denounce the superficiality and historical invalidity of official “grand EU narratives” and recognise that identifying European society is inextricably bound to answering what European history truly is (2005, p. 4), which implies recognising that Europe is a “civilizational constellation” encompassing Judeo-Christian, Russian-Slavic and Islamic-Turkish heritages (Ibid., p. 36).
However, they miss to notice the perverse dynamic associated with the EU’s attempt to promote a common identity: it is undermining the potential emergence of a cosmopolitan EUropean identity and also, ironically, the very EU project.

The Union has been promoting a manipulated discourse about Europe that is now backfiring. According to this narrative, European common ground is said to lie in ancient Greece, the Roman and Carolingian empires, the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. It is conveniently and worryingly a self-righteous version of European history that tacitly extols its Christianity, whiteness, and intellectualism while varnishing its annoyingly complex parts (See: Mikkeli, 1998, pp. 195-209; Raento, et al., 2004, p. 937; Wintle, 2009). The essential but intricate episodes and actors that make Europe what it is today are forgotten in this plot: Egyptian influence on ancient Greece; Christianity’s Asian origins; the schism between the Catholic and Orthodox churches in the 12th century; mediaeval Jewish ghettos; the Crusades and the Inquisition; the massive Arab-Islamic influence in the Middle Ages’ science and the Renaissance; the Reformation and the ensuing clashes between Catholics and Protestants; the discovery of America and its determinant impact on European development, lifestyles and identities as well as the American continent’s forgotten status as a European frontier; the slave trade and oppression of colonialism in Africa and Asia; the world wars and the Jewish Holocaust.

EU numismatics tells this story of identity polishing through political geography (Hymans, 2004; Kaelberer, 2004; Raento, et al., 2004). Probably the best example can be found on the new design of 1 and 2 euro coins that were minted after the accession of Cyprus to the EU, where the European Commission moved the position of the island “hundreds of miles West” and erased Turkey from the map (Waterfield, 2008). A comparable incursion in creative storytelling on the part of Cyprus is displayed on a commemorative 5 euro coin that encircles both Cyprus’ and the EU with a ring encrusted with euro sign inscriptions to celebrate the country’s admission into the club. Here Cyprus’ proportions are magnified and the island is placed on the centre of the map while looking at the rest of the Union from a bird’s eye perspective. This distortion subtracts Cyprus from its inconvenient geographical position by detaching it from Turkey’s proximity and emphasizes the
bond that unites the island and the EU without the irritating visual interference of Anatolia. These are no isolated events but a cartographical practice in which the EU and its members have been specializing. Take Ceuta and Melilla, which the Union’s coins have always portrayed as islands by erasing the rest of the African continent in which they are embedded. Or take the French Guiana and Antilles—EU territories—, which the Union has geographically decon-
textualized by enclosing them into almost imperceptible squares on its banknotes (Kramsch O., forthcoming).

The extent to which these manipulated representations contribute to the formation of a EUropean identity is controversial. After all, who pays any attention to such small details in euro coins? Yet though, these examples denote an evident attempt on the part of the EU to define some kind of national identity that accepts the similar “other” and excludes the “stranger” (Stichweh, 2004). Independently of their effectiveness to shape a EUropean identity, coins and banknotes reveal the anxiousness
of the Union to exclude Africa and Anatolia from its visual narratives, as if trying to convey the message that the EU cannot extend to those spaces. Besides, the manipulated cartographic characterizations of Europe on the common side of the Union’s coins are not the only manipulative discourse. On their national sides, euro coins present human figures whose personal or allegorical status translates into public glory (Hewitt, 1995); cultural patrimony exalts might, wealth and heritage; state heraldry transmits the impression of origins and continuity; depictions of nature work as metaphors for power and purity or replace an either unexistent or shameful past; inscriptions promote mottos that praise freedom, equality, fraternity, unity and justice (Raento, et al., 2004).

I would like to elaborate on EU numismatics a little further because it represents a fertile field for the study of the Union’s embryonic identity. There is a controversy in the study of coins and banknotes between two contrasting points of view: the “state as legitimacy seeker” and the “state as pedagogue”. According to the first view (Hymans, 2004), numismatic iconography reflects the cultural Zeitgeist, which means that, instead of serving state interests by inculcating statist values upon the citizenry, states use money’s imagery to embrace “values in tune with ‘the spirit of times’”. According to the second view, however, “images printed on money support the production and maintenance of national narratives, thus helping to legitimize power structures in the finest tradition of ‘banal nationalism’ [...] controlled by political elites” (Raento, et al., 2004; p. 929). Although the first view provides some useful caveats to keep in mind when studying numismatic iconography—like taking into account the influence of stylistic and political fashions of the epoch—, as I have shown, the second view resonates louder with the development of EU numismatic imagery. The idea that nationalism is a state-led project promoted by state elites is also backed by theories on nationalism that explain how “the invention of tradition” (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983) supports the creation of “imagined communities” (Anderson B., 1983). Such project often reveals itself on maps, which are eminently political because they “have often been commissioned by governments, cartography is particularly tied up with the assertion of national unity (at the expense of diversity within), with the declaration of one state’s terri-
torial ambitions vis-à-vis another’s, and with the claims of empire” (Wintle, 2009). Not for nothing has cartography been a favoured tool of statecraft (Elden, 2010a).

Why is this important? Well, because “maps have the power to affect perceptions of power and space” (Wintle, 1999, p. 137), especially when they are so pervasive:

Euro bills and coins are the most concrete link to the EU for its citizens because they all deal with the same money daily—its presence is much more widespread and frequent than that of EU passports, its flag, anthem, or other EU symbols [...] One could even claim that coins are generally more efficient messengers than banknotes, because they reach a broader audience—even the most marginalized citizens and small children handle coins (Raento, et al., 2004, p. 932).

Taking this into account one can start to grasp the particular relevance of the Union’s coins, chiefly because the degree of cartographical manipulation that can be found among them is much more blatant than on banknotes. Yet, more relevant than the Union’s money manipulatory effects—which can be disputed—is what the story carried by them shows. There is a resolve on the part of the EU’s elites to create an aseptic cartographical dissection of EUrope that artificially isolates it from the rest of the world, especially from unfitting places like Africa and Anatolia, even if this entails a cartographical butchering of Europe’s history. But how pervasive is this discourse anyway? Pervasive enough for critical scholars to submit to it.

For example, a rhetorical but fundamental analytical mistake that Rumford and Delanty make—although it is common among many other scholars—is the failure to distinguish between the EU and Europe, either because they consider the distinction obvious, pedantic, tiresome or unimportant. Taking for granted the synonymity between the EU and Europe is an illustrative example of the powerful ways in which the EU’s discursive idea that it is the natural bearer of European heritage starts getting engraved and uncontested. Paradoxically, as recent political developments in EU countries are suggesting, the repercussions of the discourse popularized by the Union and carved on its money is backfiring on the Union’s project. Populist anti-immigrant parties—e.g. Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, Timo Soini in Finland, Marine le Pen in France, Thilo Sarrazin in Germany, Jimmie Akesson in Sweden, Heinz-Christian Strache in Austria, Umberto Bossi in Italy and
Pia Kjærgaard in Denmark—are capitalizing on EU discourses of Christianity, intellectualism and whiteness to rally support for programmes that include not only xenophobic but also anti-EU policies. This goes to show that the Union has not been working for whom it intended to.

What are the implications of this tendency for the European society? A society is made of “Cultural presuppositions and societal structures and processes by which social relations are constituted” (Rumford & Delanty, 2005, p. 1). This means that a society can be broken down into the assumptions people make about how other people will react to specific behavioural stimuli. In an effort to put flesh around the bones of its nascent political project, the EU has been nurturing certain narratives about a shared common ground among its member countries that aim at creating positive assumptions about each other and, by extension, about the Union’s institutions and policies.

The problem, however, with EU identity narratives is that they are based on an ahistorical reading of Europe’s history. Luiza Bialasiewicz has advanced the idea that the EU is fighting European history because it is a project built against its difficult past:

Russian political theorist Sergei Prozorov argued that ‘the profound philosophico-political implications’ of the “Europe past its past” discourse were only now being fully grasped and invoked as a new geopolitical discourse for (what he saw as) an emergent ‘European Empire’. To proclaim that the Other is history, he argued, ‘is to pronounce history itself as the Other. In this way, contemporary Europe becomes a profoundly a-historical, or even an anti-historical project, more eschatological than teleological. According to this logic, all history is recast as a primitive period of error, madness and violence, whose transcendence ushers in a new order of freedom, security and justice that marks a veritable end of history’ (Bialasiewicz, in press).

Drawing on the exhortation made by Jürgen Habermas, Étienne Balibar and Jacques Derrida to make an enlightened example out of Europe, capable of challenging essentialist geopolitical conceptions, “binary distinctions and high moral pronouncements” (Derrida, 2004), Bialasiewicz appears to suggest that this is not only an interesting but also a worrisome existential struggle. The philosophers’ appeal seems to warn that, should the EU develop an essentialist geopolitical conception of itself, it would risk falling into the same racist and nationalistic hubris that
led to the most shameful events of its past. A similar point has been made by other authors who contend that “there is no such thing as a complete, finite and perfect collective identity” and “to strive for such completion is dangerous and even potentially quasi-fascist” (Wintle, 2009) because:

The Self is never ready, never complete, never one, the desire for wholeness is intrinsically perpetual. We are and remain strangers to ourselves as Julia Kristeva famously has argued (Kristeva 1991). Perhaps the lesson is that we have to live with le manque of not being a completed and full Self. From that lack the Other can be engaged with trust, for s/he is not a category, and s/he also faces a lack of not being fulfilled, not being one. In doing so, maybe, just maybe we might find a way to live and dream with our eyes open (Van Houtum & Pijpers, 2007, pp. 306-307).

This preoccupation points to a close intertwine-ment of identity, geopolitics and historical discourses (Elden, 2010a, pp. 12-13) and how their interaction is shaping EUropean society. It also exposes a certain disregard for territory in the work of Rumford and Delanty because they overstate the potential of global forces to take society’s allegiance away from the nation state or, in this case, from the EU. What Rumford and Delanty seem to miss is that the EU “is inescapably spatial” (Richardson, 2006, p. 203) because its social models shape people’s access to a privileged amount of resources from welfare state provisions (Davoudi, 2005, p. 435) and as a result the EU society’s loyalty is inextricably bound to the territory which these benefits are dependent upon. For this reason it is analytically crucial for the study of EUropean society to bring territory back to the foreground as the ultimate locus of struggle (Elden, 2009, pp. xi-xxxii).

Territory is a historic-political development and thus it “is more than merely land, and goes beyond terrain [… it is] a political category: owned, distributed, mapped, calculated, bordered and controlled” (Elden, 2010a, p. 12). In this sense, territory is a political technology applied to manage scarce resources. Historically, such administration has come to rely on discourses of nation and identity that justify the exclusion of strangers. In the case of the EU, these strangers are immigrants trying to improve their quality of life as well as peripheral countries trying to benefit from the Union’s wealth by getting associated with its institutions—which is comprehensible given that the EU’s periphery and near abroad are
rife with corruption, political instability, widespread violence, authoritarianism, repression and even genocide.

It seems then that the unfolding of a EUropean cosmopolitan society depends on decoupling its identity from territory, which could be done by recognising the true extent of the whole European society. I propose that a way of doing this—among many others—is through a genealogy of Europe that unravels the true borders and forgotten frontiers of European culture and dusts off the possible boundaries of a project that tries to unify Europe as the Union does. My main claim is that the EU is going to become meaningful no matter what but the kind of meaning it develops will determine whether it will also be useful—in the sense of avoiding the nationalistic trap of the past. In this sense, I take upon the challenge of imagining a post-modernist map of Europe. This is the objective that I pursue in this chapter, not by focusing on EUropean society but rather on “European” society, i.e. on the heritage of Europe that, against the biased Union’s discourse, transcends physiographical Europe—which in is already problematic to define.

**The physiographical myth**

Where is Europe? According to the Encyclopædia Britannica “It is bordered by the Arctic Ocean, the Atlantic Ocean, and the Mediterranean, Black, and Caspian seas. The continent’s generally accepted eastern boundary runs along the Ural Mountains and the Emba (Zhem) River of Kazakhstan” (Berentsen, East, Poulsen, & Windley). It is within this geographical framework that a distinct European culture is ordinarily recognised, having the heritage of Greece, Rome, Christianity, the Carolingian Age, Renaissance and Enlightenment as its common ground (Pieterse, 1991, p. 3; Delanty, 1996, p. 93).

Both of these representations of Europe are wrong. Not only the apparent objectivity of the dispassionate physiographical description of Europe is hard to justify but its cultural definition is sheer “nineteenth century elite imperial myth formation” (Pieterse, 1991, p. 5). One might quote the words of an unapologetic British imperialist to illustrate this point:
This noble continent, comprising on the whole the fairest and the most cultivated regions of the earth; enjoying a temperate and equable climate, is the home of all the great parent races of the western world. It is the fountain of Christian faith and Christian ethics. It is the origin of most of the culture, arts, philosophy and science both of ancient and modern times (Churchill, 1946).

From a purely spatial perspective the division among Europe, Asia and Africa as different continents is troublesome at best and arbitrary at worst. On the one hand, the imaginary split between Europe and Asia by the Ural Mountains follows an unpersuasive logic (Dunn, 2010, p. 15) that invents a geographical discontinuity in the middle of an otherwise continuous space. On the other hand, the gap separating Africa from Europe across the Strait of Gibraltar is smaller (around 14 km) than the one separating continental Europe from Britain across the Strait of Dover (around 34 km) and still this island—not to speak of Ireland or Iceland—is readily assumed to be part of Europe. What is more, the Isthmus of Suez is a bridge uniting the three continents, which renders their conceptual partition even more problematic.

Through a human geographical lens the differentiation among the three continents fares even worse. There is nothing natural about borders (Zeller, 1933, 1936; Van Houtum, 2005). Take the Mediterranean and Red seas as an example, “Humans have been shuttling routinely back and forth across them for thousands of years [... so] the notion of [them] as a tripartite continental partition is not very useful in terms of human historical experience” (Dunn, 2010, p. 15). It would be more accurate to speak about Afroeurasia or, as Halford Mackinder suggested, the “World-Island” (1919, p. 81).

Europe in Antiquity

Against the previous arguments one could counter that accepting the existence of an overarching Afroeurasian common ground does not imply rejecting specific subcategories within it. To put it differently, even though one can trace geographical and social links as well as shared experiences between Europeans and Africans, that does not preclude, say, Germans from being more Greek, Roman and Chris-
tian and Moroccans from being more Berber, Arab and Muslim. However, as logically valid as this argument could seem, from a historical point of view it does not hold.

For ancient Greeks, conceiving the Mediterranean as the division between Europe and Africa would have meant a distortion of the very meaning of “Europe”. For them, Europe meant the land of the sunset (Andrews, 1969, p. 60), which “was to the North as well as to the South of the sea basin” and “bridged the Mediterranean” (Malmborg & Stråth, 2002, p. 1). Even today, the importance of the Mediterranean for the ancient Hellenic civilisation is acknowledged on Greek 1 cent as well as on Cypriot 10, 20 and 50 cent euro coins, which celebrate ships of their Classical antiquity.

Back then, Europe was not defined in opposition to Africa but in conjunction with it. Greeks conferred importance to the southern coast of the Mediterranean because of their admiration of Egyptian civilisation, which they saw—from Solon and Herodotus to Plato and Diodorus Siculus—as the origin of their art and culture—philosophy, alphabet, mythology, mathematics and medicine (Levin, 1964; Davis, 1979; Forrest, 1982; Newsome, 1983; Bernal, 1987; James, 2009). The Greek world was allured by the Orient “in every sense” and, although Aristotle divided the world into Hellas, Europe and
Asia, for him the two latter represented plain land classifications, not a nonexistence of Hellenic culture or an opposition to it (Burke, 1980, pp. 22-23; Delanty, 1996, p. 97). The importance of North Africa and the Middle East was not restricted to the ancient Greek civilisation, for the Roman Empire also “joined the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean sea” (Smith K., 2005, p. 769).

It might be instructive to recall that some of the most important cities for ancient Greece and Rome as well as for Christianity such as Antioch and Ephesus are located in modern Turkey. One of them, Alexandria, is in modern Egypt and another more conspicuous, Jerusalem, in modern Israel. Several Roman emperors were born in places that are found in today’s Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Turkey, Syria and Israel. The name of Tripoli, for example, was coined by the Romans and a nearby city, Leptis Magna, was the place of birth of the emperor Septimius Severus, who erected lavish public buildings there which still stand as some of the best preserved Roman ruins in the world (Birley, 2002). Christianity itself comes from Asia (Pieterse, 1991, p. 7) and it used to be the main religion in North Africa and many places in the Middle East before the Muslim conquests took place (Speel, 1960). Seven of the doctors of the Catholic Church came from what today corresponds to Syria, Egypt or, in the case of Augustine of Hippo, modern Algeria. Furthermore, Christianity still remains an important minority religion in these places and not only are there still large Orthodox Christian communities in Africa and the Middle East but the Christian roots of the Copts in Egypt, the Orthodox Christians in Ethiopia and Eritrea; and the Syriac Orthodox Christians in the Middle East are deeper than those of northern European countries where Christianization happened at a later stage.

On the contrary, many peoples and places which nowadays are considered to be indisputably European do not match the geography and sophistication that ancient Greeks and Romans associated with the concept of Europe but instead what they thought of as inhospitable territories and barbarian tribes (Sherwin-White, 1967; Jones, 1971; Hall, 1989; Delanty, 1996, p. 97). Countries like Germany have claimed an indisputable European identity since the Romantic reinterpretation of its origins in the 19th century appropriated the Greek, Roman and Christian
heritages, fantasising that their fusion with the pure and naturally moral ancient Germanic tribes conferred the German people an unmatched civilising capacity (Vick, 2003). This humble conception of their own Europeanness would not be kindly repaid by Antiquity’s conception of the Germans’ ancestors given that, “Although, for example, the Greeks and Romans, separated themselves from barbarians, they did not distinguish sharply between men and animals, but related them more closely on a continuum” (Seed, 1993, p. 636). Were not the barbarian and unchristian Goths and Vandals responsible for the sack of Rome in 410 A.D., decried by Christian writers like St. Jerome and Salvian (Mommsen, 1951; Hanson, 1972)? In this respect it might be helpful to recall that other “barbarians”, the unchristian forefathers of modern Scandinavians, catalysed the end of the Carolingian Empire with their raids around it (Barrett, 2008, p. 671). Moreover, Vikings and the lands they came from were not considered European until their mass conversions to Christianity in the 10th and 11th centuries:

The contemporary sources also tend to describe the Vikings as an alien element in Christian Europe, invoking a quasi-Agustinian contrast of good and evil and implicitly suggesting that no good men could have any dealings with them. Contemporary rulers took a different view of this and often, for example, entered into alliances with them against other Christian rulers or employed them as mercenaries [...] In many respects the Viking period marks Scandinavia’s becoming part of Europe...” (Lund, 1989, p. 45)

The study of mediaeval north European peoples might prove fruitful to elucidate the inconsistency of the EU identity myths: it may serve to judge more prudently the widely held perception that the Carolingian age was an era of European unity. The North Germanic inhabitants of physiographical Europe did not regard the Carolingian Empire as a source of cultural unity but rather as invaders trying to force an alien religion upon them:

Charlemagne’s cruelty and intolerance in the war against the Saxons never detracted from his popular image as a wise and benevolent sovereign. His actions also appear to cause no concern to some people today who see Charlemagne as an attractive symbol of European unity. If we take the Pagan point of view, however, Charlemagne appears to be the exemplar of religious intolerance, persecution and imperialism, the forefather not of European unity, but of some of the most problematic and shameful acts in European history. Charlemagne’s war against the Saxons set the tone for the
European Crusades and Inquisition, and paved the way for religious wars, persecutions and pogroms of the future (Strmiska, 2003, p. 64).

**Europe’s forgotten sibling: Arab-Islamic contributions**

Even though the modern idea of Europe would strike ancient Greeks and Romans as odd, there is an even bigger oversight within its definition. It is impossible to explain the concept of Europe without taking into account Arab-Islamic contributions to its development and vice versa. The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century (Haskins C., 1927) that laid the foundations for the later advancements in science, art and philosophy that took place in Europe came from the Arab-Islamic world—through the contributions of notable thinkers like Averroës (Ibn Rushd) and Avicenna (Ibn Sina)—and spread across the northern Mediterranean with Spain and Sicily as its vanishing points.

Multicultural centres of Islamo-Judeo-Christian intellectual production like Toledo in Spain—itself with a tradition of more than 800 years of Arab-Islamic influence that spans language, cuisine, art, architecture, spatial planning and phenotype—produced and diffused much of the knowledge that made possible the transition from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance. At the time, Arabic was the language of science and many crucial achievements can be traced back to Arab-Islamic influence, which was responsible for massive translations of key works from ancient Greek knowledge (e.g. Aristotle, Galen, Hippocrates and Euclid); the development of the inductive method, incipient scientific reasoning and primitive secular thought. Arab-Islamic contributions also comprise advancements in mathematics (e.g. Arabic numerals, analytical geometry, plane and spherical trigonometry)—especially through the works of Mohammed ibn Musa al-Khwarizmi, from whose name the word *algorithm* is derived—(Joseph, 1987; Anderson S., 1990); geography (map projections and navigation instruments like the astrolabe) (Jardine, 1996, pp. 350-366); alchemy and chemistry (e.g. gunpowder), medicine (e.g. surgical technique and procedures), music (lute-playing and troubadour songs), literature and philosophy (influences in Dante’s and Machiavelli’s work), manufacturing (glass, paper, woodblock printing), cuisine (pasta, sugar), econom-

... historians are well aware of the enormous contributions of Muslim thinkers to the pool of late Medieval philosophical and scientific thought that European Christians and Jews later drew upon to create the modern West [...] During this period, a cornucopia of stimuli from Muslim lands transformed many aspects of European life... (Bulliet, 2004, pp. 6,31)

This does not mean that Arabs and Muslims are but an extension of Europe but rather that they are intertwined with the history of Europe to such an extent that one is forced to speak of an Islamo-Christian civilisation (Bulliet, 2004). This strongly resonates with Mackinder's remark that “The northern and north-eastern shores of Africa for nearly four thousand miles are so intimately related with the opposite shores of Europe and Asia that the Sahara constitutes a far more effective break in social continuity than does the Mediterranean” (1919, pp. 83-84).

The mistake of overlooking that the Arab-Islamic world is part of European civilisation is not the exclusive dominion of anti-Muslim parties who intentionally exploit the myopic discourse of a European tradition rooted in Greece, Rome and Christianity but also of many academics. For example, the hackneyed structure of erudite scholarly works that explore the development of concepts and processes from antiquity to contemporary times, traditionally exclude from their tables of contents Arab-Islamic contributions.

A precaution here is necessary, for it would be a mistake to limit the Arab-Islamic influence on Europe to ancient contributions without taking into account how Islam is modifying the face of contemporary Europe. Whatever the anxieties towards Muslim immigrants from North Africa and Middle Eastern countries—ranging from justified preoccupations to blunt racism—a trend towards more religiously and racially plural societies seems irreversible in many European countries unless a very unlikely relapse into Nazi-like policies comes about. Negating ancient Arab-Islamic contributions to the identity of modern Europe might come either from pure ignorance or intentional ideological manipulation, but negating the present Arabic-Islamic presence and relevance is not only absurd but dangerous. It seems logical that many European countries that have traditionally defined them-
selves as mostly white are having anxieties about change, especially because of the old rooted Orientalist tradition in which “Europeanness” and civilisation are closely related to “whiteness” (Böröcz, 2001, p. 32). As way of comparison, it might be useful to point out that the same fears have taken place in the United States since the middle 19th century as successive waves of immigrants of Irish, Greek, Italian, Polish, Chinese, Jewish and now Mexican descent have once and again altered American society (Jaret, 1999).

A brief parenthesis is sensible here. European’s tendency to deny or deride Arab-Islamic influences is not different from the scorn for Judaism that was habitual in Europe before World War II and, to be fair, also in the US (Jacobson, 1998) and even Latin America (where it has existed and still remains in a mild form) (Schidlowsky, 2005). After the horrors of World War II’s Shoa, this anti-Semitism hurriedly vanished behind a sudden fog of collective oblivion that produced an act of rhetorical redemption in the form of what has become a politically correct commonplace: the “Judeo-Christian civilisation”:

From the 1950s onward, with the reality of the Holocaust and the ghastly consequences of European anti-Semitism ever more apparent, the term “Judeo-Christian civilization” steadily emerged from an obscure philosophical background—Nietzsche used “Judeo-Christian” scornfully in The Anti-Christ to characterize society’s failings—to become the perfect expression of a new feeling of inclusiveness toward Jews, and of a universal Christian repudiation of Nazi barbarism. We now use the phrase almost reflexively in our schoolbooks, our political rhetoric, and our presentation of ourselves to others around the world. The unquestioned acceptance of “Judeo-Christian civilization” as a synonym for “Western civilization” makes it clear that history is not destiny. No one with the least knowledge of the past two thousand years of relations between Christians and Jews can possibly miss the irony of linking in a single term two faith communities that decidedly did not get along during most of that period. One suspects that a heavenly poll of long-departed Jewish and Christian dignitaries would discover majorities in both camps expressing repugnance for the term (Bulliet, 2004, pp. 5-6).

As with Classical antiquity, the Union’s relation with Islam is exhibited in its coins. However, while countries draw on allusions to Greece and Rome to anchor their European pedigree to Classical antiquity, the references to Arab-Islamic heritage are like Freudian slips. The Union’s numismatic symbolism—as coins themselves—has two sides. The dialectic between their front and back epitomise the
struggle between the new European discourse and old national identities. The tension between these loyalties erratically betrays the contradictions between what the EU claims to be European heritage and what single countries deem to be their national culture—and, by extension, European heritage too. Spanish coins are probably the most interesting example. Two commemorative 2 euro coins speak of Spain’s uneasy relation with the narrative of European history promoted by the EU. One minted in 2010 features the Córdoba Mosque and another from 2011 shows La Alhambra, two of Spain’s most conspicuous architectural symbols of Berber-Islamic heritage. Spain finds difficult to deny its own Islamic heritage, especially because it likes bragging about it.

And what about a European background rooted in Christianity? Just as Islam and Judaism, Christianity is unquestionably European. However, to consider this religion as an indispensable component of current European identity, as if Christianity were a homogeneous, harmonious and even modern ideology, can only be
explained by a remarkable historical blackout. Considering Christianity as a necessary characteristic of today’s European identity constitutes an effort in historical obliviousness—to too great and too blatant not to be demagogic. Taken at face value, this absurdity would deny the prevalent footprint in EU countries of anticlerical, atheist and secular thinkers of the Renaissance, Enlightenment, Liberalism and Marxism who to a greater or lesser extent defined themselves and their philosophies against Christianity. It would also negate the bloody and constant clashes among Orthodox Christians, Catholics, Protestants and other religious faiths that have shaped Europe’s modernity. Furthermore, granting the EU property rights over Christianity would occlude the well-known fact that some of the Union’s members have the highest rates of atheism in the world; that the largest Christian populations are to be found outside the EU; that the Christian traditions of some African countries have deeper roots than some of the Union’s members; and that Christianity is a universal religion.

The previous arguments are all too well, it could be countered, but the idea of Europe that is promoted by the EU, however biased and historically abominable, is firmly engraved in the geographical imagination of too many people and cannot change, at least not any time soon. Not so, says history. Europe’s borders have experienced no less than three dramatic changes in the last three centuries that have displaced European borders by thousands of kilometres: 1) the emergence of the Russian empire; 2) the independence of the American continent; and 3) the 20th century’s decolonisation in Africa and Asia.

The Russian shift of Europe’s eastern frontier
Russia might differ in many ways from the EU—most notably because of its corrupt and authoritarian regime and loud-mouthed foreign policy—but still it would be unusual for someone to think of this country as being outside Europe. This has not always been the case. Three centuries ago Russia used to be beyond Europe. Before the development of modern cartography in the second half of the 15th century, the Don River and the Azov, Black, Marmara and Aegean seas along with the Nile and the Red Sea were thought of as forming a continuous line of water sepa-
rating Europe from Asia (Bassin, 1991, p. 2; Suárez, 1992, p. 7; Wintle, 1999, p. 139). The imagined proportions and locations of these water masses were exaggerated to the point that it was believed that the division between Europe and Asia was almost clear-cut. Mediaeval T-in-O maps depict this long-held fantasy.

In this traditional view of the world, everything beyond this line was Europe’s frontier (Delanty, 1996, p. 95). Accordingly, “Russia had no frontiers: for many centuries she herself was the frontier, the great open, defenceless dividing line between the settled communities of Europe and the nomadic barbarian invaders of the Asian steppes” (Szamuely, 1988, p. 13). Independently developing to the
east, Russia did not share the High Middle Ages, Protestant Reformation, Renaissance or Enlightenment with Western Europe, which (Gvosdev, 2006).

The transformation of Western Europe into a region of colonial, technologically advanced trading powers from the 16th century onwards attracted admiration and envy from the emerging Russian empire which, in an attempt to identify itself with Europe’s glory, went through a of rapid state-led Europeanisation in the early 18th century. Under the rule of Peter the Great, Russians started to abandon their traditional isolation and despise for Europeans—who were conventionally considered false Christians and derogatorily equated with Tartars, Moslems and Turks (Bassin, 1991, pp. 4-5). This contempt extended to Russians’ lack of enthusiasm for learning Latin, which derived from this language’s association with papal power and Catholicism (Okenfuss, 1995, p. 5). In a relentless effort to make his country look like Europe, Peter the Great explicitly acknowledged her superiority and infamously forced his nobles to adopt a European aspect and reorganised the country according to European patterns (Reinhard, 1964; Summer, 1973).

However, Russia’s transformation was not only material but also ideological. The fast changing discourse promoted by Peter the Great about Russian identity gradually removed Russians’ disdain for Europe from their traditional self-awareness. One of the most emblematic benchmarks of this shift occurred after Peter’s Grand Embassy to Europe, when he learned about the Julian and Gregorian calendars and decided to adopt the former to replace the Muscovite calendar in 1700, which “symbolically accepted the cultural imperialism of the West” (Okenfuss, 1995, p. 2). The Petrine historian, geographer and ethnographer Vasilii N. Tatishchev even devised a new way to think about Russia that made possible to conceive it as a natural part of Europe. He discredited the old partition between Europe and Asia portrayed by T-in-O maps and proposed the Ural Mountains as a more accurate border advancing the argument that it was a “more substantial geographical landmark” (Bassin, 1991, p. 7).

Tatishchev made Russia European by challenging the discourse of exclusion based on the old geographical border separating Europe from Asia. He moved the border about 1,300 km (roughly the same distance that exists between Barcelona
FIGURE 8 Russia as the frontier, Salviati Map, 1525
[75]
and Minsk) to the East and with this trick he managed to place Russia’s traditional core—the lands comprising the preeminent Tsardom of Moscuvy—within indisputable European space. This new division created affinity between imperial Russia and western European empires—which were characterized by a metropole and colonies—by creating a Russian metropole to the west of the Urals and its conquered territories to the east (Bassin, 1991). This process of redrawing the geographical imagination of Europe’s eastern border—because, in the end, Eastern Europe is a construct, for there is no clear geographical landmark to mark its beginning—responded to Peter’s necessity to identify Russia with the model he aspired to follow. During his rule, Russia went from being a fragmented frontier with no clear boundaries to being a European empire of gigantic proportions.

In less than a generation the conception of Russia changed dramatically. Why could the same not happen to other places of the world, especially those that have grounds to claim European identity? What about the American continent and, more particularly, Latin America? After all, the Americas used to be a European frontier.

*Europe’s emancipated other, Latin America*

The American continent was the first European periphery (Dussel, 1993) and, unlike the Orient, it used to be considered the extreme West and not its alterity, i.e. “difference within sameness” (Mignolo, 2000, p. 58). That seems to be forgotten now. Centuries of European colonisation gave Latin America a distinctive European character indelibly carved into many cultural features of its societies. The interaction between Europeans, American natives and African slaves created new fusions that are neither European nor American or African but something entirely unique. Despite all this diverse melange, European brushstrokes are readily recognisable across the Latin American cultural portrait spanning from geography—the Roman grid pattern combined with Renaissance urban planning can be found in most Latin American major city centres featuring Mannerist and Baroque cathedrals—to language—western European languages are the main national languages all across Latin America—to artistic, political and intellectual aspirations—Latin
American elites have traditionally studied in Europe and the US but looked particularly to the former as a role model.

I do not mean to say that Latin America is an imitation of Europe. In fact, Latin American nationalities either do not fully recognise or even look at their European heritage with some disdain. Such is the case of Mexico, whose national history—as taught in public schools and told by governmental propaganda—takes pride in its mostly archaeological pre-Columbian heritage while turning a blind eye to its much more tangible Spanish legacy. To some extent, this is an aspect that many Latin American national identities have in common because they have been constructed in opposition to European oppression as a result of their independencies from European colonial powers and clashes with them in the 19th and 20th centuries. Yet, although Latin American countries sometimes resort to rickety historical denials of their European inheritance, they manifestly possess a unique hybrid character that is neither European nor indigenous but still has undeniably European features. However, while the recognition of European influence across Latin American countries varies to a greater (e.g. Argentina) or lesser extent, in Europe the recognition of a common ground with Latin America is almost non-existent.

This is important because Latin America is “living” proof that not only ancient Rome but also other historical chapters flaunted by the EU’s institutions and right-wing politicians as typically European, namely the Renaissance and Enlightenment, are not so. Latin America shares an immense quantity of the culture and legacy that the EU prides itself on exclusively owning because both Latin America and Europe are elements of the same civilisation and the product of transculturation. Although “the Europeans persuaded themselves, from the middle of the seventeenth century, but above all during the eighteenth century, that in some way they had autoproduced themselves as a civilization” (Quijano, 2000, p. 552), what is now known as “Latin America” played a crucial role in Europe’s evolution and identity. The interaction between the Americas and Europe determinately changed each other. For Europe, the discovery of America transformed it far beyond recognition and precipitated modernity—much more decisively than the French Revolution or the Industrial Revolution ever did (Mignolo, 2005). The historical conversa-
tion between Europe and America marked the beginning of globalisation, modernity, Eurocentric capitalism and hegemonic Eurocentric domination relationships based on racism (Quijano, 2000).

Probably few things express the relationship between the development of European wealth and the discovery of America as clearly as food. The American continent became a kind of secret barn whose discovery radically increased the quality of life in Europe. The late introduction of American agricultural products in the 18th and 19th centuries not only enriched the flavours and variety of European cuisines but also represented a dramatic improvement for the European material means of subsistence. The cuisine of the Mediterranean basin would be unrecognisable without indigenous American agricultural products like tomatoes, chocolate and corn which are used extensively in Italian, French and Spanish cuisines (Long, 2003). More importantly, the introduction of the potato among lower European classes—especially Irish, English, Scottish, German and Russian—had a much bigger impact on the demographic explosions of the 18th and 19th centuries than the agricultural, technical or sanitary advancements of the time (Langer, 1963).

The emergence of the very notion of Europe is closely related to the discovery of America (Wintle, 1999) and the beginning of colonialism. The exploitation of American metals led to the monetization of the world market by Europeans, who since then started to control commercial traffic and to define themselves geoculturally in opposition to the peoples they dominated (Quijano, 2000, p. 538). The work of the Spanish philosopher Francisco de Vitoria is an example that shows how the encounter with American Indians dramatically changed Europe by encouraging the development of modern sovereignty theory and international law in the 16th century, thus challenging the supremacy of divine law and the Papacy (Anghie, 1996).

The work of Francisco the Vitoria is also embedded in the development of the idea of human rights which, over the last century, has become “the idea of our time” (Chandler, 2006) and one of the self-proclaimed quintessential characteristics of Europe. According to the Lisbon Treaty’s preamble, the EU draws inspiration “... from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe..."
(European Union, 2007, p. 10). Such humanism can be traced back to the discovery of the American continent in the 16th century and owes much to the contributions of exploited and tortured American Indians, mediaeval Spanish jurists and missionaries (Seed, 1993), New Spain’s mestizo and criollo thinkers (Montiel, 2005), Enlightenment philosophers and Latin American jurists of the 20th century (Carozza, 2003; Glendon, 2003). Paradoxically, this same humanism also owes much to the vicious Europeans that have made humanism possible: conquerors and colonisers; slave traders and imperialists; racist but prominent philosophers; influential scientific racists; and the prominent but exploitative or plainly racist statesmen to whom the post-war human rights regime is unreasonably attributed (Mazower, 2004; 2009).

What the complacent idea about the “humanist inheritance of Europe” hides is that it has been a response to Europe’s own crimes that has come from people in both sides of the Atlantic. It also obscures that the continuous upward resistance of the oppressed and their legacies has played as decisive a role in the formation of such humanist legacy as the European intellectual elites who are traditionally credited with it. The abuses and cruelty committed by Spanish conquistadores against American Indians existed in great numbers and were many times utterly horrifying. They sometimes included mutilation of hands and noses as well as cruelly ingenious ways of torture, terrorism and some Spanish conquerors even favoured the annihilation of Indians (Koffler, 1983). The unenlightened brutality to which its unfortunate native inhabitants were submitted testifies to the fact that the New World shared the Dark Ages with Europe.

The Europeans that conquered and colonised the Americas were essentially mediaeval men that brought with them their rough contemporary beliefs and systems of knowledge to the New World. Columbus enslaved and tortured the Indians of La Hispaniola and, as many other explorers of his time, saw the New World through a mediaeval prism: a paradisiacal cornucopia inhabited by mythic creatures, monsters and anthropomorphomorphic specimens. Spanish conquerors imagined their own adventures in the context of the romances of knight-errantly chivalry of the sort of Amadis de Gaula. They believed that their emperor and the pope were
the legitimate *rerum dominos*, the lords of the world, who conferred them the authority “to demand from Indian rulers their submission to the king”. These conquerors also assumed that the mediaeval practice of *derecho de lanzas* (law of spears) would grant them lordship over the peoples and lands they managed to subject (Weckmann, 1951). Although the discovery of America stirred the Renaissance in Europe, the enterprise in itself it was a very mediaeval endeavour.

The evangelisation of the pagan Indians was the moral justification behind the Spanish conquest (Marks, 1992, p. 25) of the Americas and thus the monastic orders played a crucial role in its early stages. The consequences of their deeds constitute an integral part of today’s Latin American national identities because they were the ones responsible for the spreading of the Spanish language and Christianity, which are determinant features of contemporary Latin America. The very prominent religious intolerance of Latin America is a direct heritage from the Spanish intolerance towards religious dissenters (Funari, 2006).

The success of the acculturation promoted by Christian missionaries was already evident in the 18th century. After less than two centuries of colonisation, Indians considered Christianity to be their own ancient practice and had adopted many typically Spanish traditions such as pilgrimages to sacred places, processions and a particularly fervent cult for the Virgin of Guadalupe. In the late 18th century, Indians in New Spain showed such a Christian zeal that religious and civil authorities, influenced by the rationalism in vogue during the Enlightenment, tried to restrain them and prohibit practices which a century ago would have been considered praiseworthy displays of piety (Gruzinski, 1985). It is worth noticing that this religious fervour reached such heights that by the beginnings of the 19th century a criollo Mexican priest, Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla, successfully used the Virgin of Guadalupe to rally the masses behind his exhorts for independence. Ironically, the same emancipatory religious vehemence that revolted against the Spaniards was the result of the Spaniards’ evangelisation that had pushed its way through fire and blood during the first years of colonisation.

In the early years of the Americas’ conquest, Fray Antonio Montesinos and the Dominicans on La Hispaniola started accusing the Spaniards of behaving bru-
tally towards the natives. This spurred a debate about the validity of the Spanish conquest, which had Christianisation as the foundation of its legitimacy. The Dominican friar Bartolomé de las Casas felt that these crimes were so horrendous that he made his life’s mission to defend the Indians and denounce the atrocities committed against them before the Spanish Crown. His defence of the Indians’ humanity can be considered the first antecedent of the human rights movement. Since Antiquity, the possession of a rational soul was the pre-condition to be considered human. This idea found its justification in Saint Augustin’s writings that considered the possession of rationality as the dividing line between men and animals. In the 13th century, Thomas Aquinas made the meaning of rationality dependant on the Christian faith by subordinating the recognition of humanity to the belief in Christ. Following this criterion, Spanish conquistadors presumed that rationality implied the natural capacity to recognise the obvious truth of the Christian faith and thus conversion. If Indians were capable of this rationality they were humans and should be converted, otherwise they were animals and could be exploited (Seed, 1993).

The exploitation and degradation of the Indians, both material and discursive, took its toll on two other social groups that somewhat identified with the oppressed and made them develop an identity crisis: criollos—born to European parents in American soil—and mestizos—the hybrid mix of Europeans and Indians. These castes took refuge in the American aboriginal side of their identity that Europeans despised and looked down upon. Unlike Indians, however, criollos and mestizos had the social and material means to challenge this oppression by redefining their own identity. They tended to exalt their “Indianity” to compensate for their unrecognised or demoted Europeanness. One of the most successful in accomplishing this was the Inca Garcilaso de la Vega—a mestizo born to an Inca princess and a Spanish captain—, a member of the Viceroyalty of Peru’s intellectual elite during the late 16th and early 17th centuries. His fascination with the Inca Empire along with his interest for the writings of Bartolomé de las Casas inspired him to write about this lost kingdom. His work contributed to change European’s mediaeval perception of the American continent as an Edenic place of mythologi-
cal animals and beasts and heavily influenced the Enlightenment’s intellectual elite. Francis Bacon was stimulated by De la Vega’s depiction of a radically new geography and humanity to formulate his epistemological revolution. Morelly, the founder of utopian socialism and leading intellectual source of Fourier and Proudhon was inspired by Garcilaso’s sketch of the Incas’ collective society. Montesquieu’s theories of ius gentium as well as cultural and civilisational relativism were informed by De la Vega’s description of Inca practices. Rousseau’s notion of the noble savage found its empirical example in De la Vega’s account of the Inca Empire’s dystopian fall at the hands of European conquerors. Diderot, Voltaire (a remarkably enthusiastic reader of De la Vega), Holbach, Godin, Feuillée, Pifon, Frezier, Margrave, Gage and La Condamine were among other Enlightenment thinkers and explorers moved by the Peruvian’s texts (Montiel, 2005).

The transculturation between Europe and the Americas was not limited to the philosophical realm but also left a more touchable geographical footmark that lasts to the present. It is important to stress that the Americas were colonised by Hispanic empires, which were among the most Latinised countries in Europe by virtue of the 700 hundred years they experienced under Roman rule. To put it in metaphorical terms, when men such as Christopher Columbus and conquistadors like Hernán Cortés and Francisco Pizarro first set foot on American soil, from their caravels and vessels disembarked not only 15th and 16th century Europeans but also the heritage of Greece, Rome, Christianity and the Middle Ages that they brought with them.

Christian missionaries in the New World tried to imitate Rome—which they considered the centre of Christianity and civilisation—in the distribution of buildings of the new colonies (Izquierdo Álvarez, 1993, pp. 94-95; Romero Galván, 1999, p. 29). If Spanish colonies were recognisable by their main squares, their neighbourhoods were recognisable by their parishes and convents, which in colonial times served as the providers of basic public services such as water supply, education and primitive banking activities (Izquierdo Álvarez, 1993, pp. 99-100). In Mexico, fortresses such as San Juan de Ulúa in Veracruz and the Fort of San Diego in Acapulco as well as fortified cities like San Francisco de Campeche are mediaeval
style buildings erected during the colonial period. In consort with a multitude of houses, churches, convents and chapels of Romanesque, Moorish, and Gothic style all around the country, these buildings attest to the transplantation of Spain’s architecture and urbanism of the Middle Ages to the Americas (Weckmann, 1951).

To summarise, the heritage of ancient Greece, the Roman Empire and Christianity was imposed upon Native American civilisations through geography and religion since the very first stages of Spanish colonisation. However, this imposition was not a process of acculturation—i.e. Indians adopting the Spanish ways—but transculturation—i.e. Indians and Spaniards influencing each other—which was both purposeful and unintended. Geographically, the Spanish colonisation of the Americas had three distinctive spatial features: 1) the new settlements were built upon the old Indian settlements (Romero Galván, 1999, p. 26); 2) these settlements were influenced by Renaissance ideals of urbanism (Kubler, 1942, p. 170) and practical considerations such as further expansion, control and defence (Halcón, 1998, p. 422); 3) monastic orders and their ideals about the ideal Christian city played a key role in the distribution of new buildings (Gonzalo Aizpuru, 1992, p. 367; Izquierdo Álvarez, 1993, pp. 94-95; Romero Galván, 1999, pp. 28-31).

The designs of the first cities founded by the Spaniards in the Americas recycled ancient Greek and Roman ideas about urban planning—arguably because at the time Spain was isolated from the urban developments that were taking place in other parts of Europe (Stanislawski, 1947). The use of urban directives in the Laws of the Indies taken from the Roman architectural theorist Vitruvius (1956) and the prevalence of the grid (or checkerboard) attest to these cities’ Roman heritage, which is a feature still visible in most Latin American cities today (Foster, 1960). The Spanish conquerors transported the heritage of Rome through the Atlantic Ocean and printed it on the Americas.

And yet, Latin American cities are not completely European either. Traces of their Indian past are still perceptible. The juxtaposition of Spanish urban projects over old Indian cities was a persistent pattern of Spanish settlements in the Americas. It was a testimonial of the crucial importance that the Indian cities had for the Spanish colonisers who modified them to their image while keeping the
symbolic geographical spaces upon which they were built. The idea behind this appropriation was to inherit the economic and political symbolism of the Aztec empire which they substituted and whose domination over other peoples they inherited. At the same time, Spanish colonisers wanted to take advantage of the local Indian populations whose labour they exploited for tributes, mining and construction (Halcón, 1998). Mexico City is probably the most conspicuous example of this geographical transculturation: built upon the former Tenochtitlan, the centre of the Aztec Empire became the centre of New Spain’s capital (Nelson, 1963, p. 75). Mexico City’s centre, which used to be home to the main ceremonial temple of the Aztecs, the Templo Mayor, and the houses of the Aztec emperor (tlatoani) Moctezuma, became the place of Mexico’s Cathedral and National Palace during the Spanish colony, thus conserving its character as the centre of civil and religious authority from Aztec times to our days.

As new influences arrived from Europe, Spanish colonies started to follow Renaissance “Italian theory of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries” that were impossible to implement in most parts of Europe but could be easily carried out in the Americas because of the vast amounts of space available and the lack of “obligation to preserve” the architecture and urbanism of conquered Indian civilisations. The ideas of Renaissance Italian urbanists such as Leone Battista Alberti and Antonio Averlino Filarete about large open spaces surrounded by public buildings were put into practice in the Spanish colonies (Kubler, 1942, pp. 169-170; Halcón, 1998). This is why the design of colonial cities in the Americas has been considered by some authors as the most important accomplishment of urban design in the XVI century (Benovolo, 1975). A rectangular main square (plaza mayor) surrounded by a church and public buildings was the characteristic layout of Spanish colonies in the Americas first built in Santo Domingo, La Habana, Guatemala and Mexico City (Halcón, 1998, pp. 421-422). Even today, Latin American cities can be identified—and identify themselves—by their plaza mayor (Izquierdo Álvarez, 1993, p. 99), which is a common Latin American feature from Lima’s Plaza de Armas to Mexico City’s characteristic Zócalo. The American continent was the place where Renaissance theories could be experimented upon.
The style of Spanish colonies in the Americas was not only influenced by ancient Roman and mediaeval urban plans but also by Christianity. The mendicant orders which immediately followed the Spanish conquest left an indelible footprint in urbanism. European architecture in the Americas began as a dream inasmuch as the designs of the buildings friars erected across the region relying on Indian labour were based on vague images that these members of the mendicant orders remembered from what they had seen in Spain or other parts of Europe (Fernández, 1986, p. 17). Afterwards, when specialized architects started to arrive to New Spain, Plateresque, Mannerism and Baroque styles left a noticeable trail in Mexican architecture—especially religious buildings—which features some of the most representative examples of this style (González Galván, 1961; Fernández, 1986, pp. 25-27). The design and construction of Spanish colonies in the Americas is a manifestation of European Renaissance in American space. The New World occupied the metaphorical function of a laboratory in which projects unrealisable in Europe could materialise.

To understand that Latin America is a European frontier is to undertake an exercise in critical geopolitics that challenges the historical and geographical constructs of Europe that have been promoted by the complacent vision of imperial political projects such as former European colonial empires and the EU. Latin America is proof that Europe, if anything, is not a space that can be defined by contiguous borders or a high degree of homogeneity. Still, some scholars keep attempting to pin down a minimal definition of Europeanness based on a narrow understanding of Europe's history. Michael Wintle, for example, an expert at how the idea of Europe has changed throughout centuries, tried to this and came to the conclusion that:

Most of Europe has a common ‘Indoeuropean’ linguistic heritage. In religion, Christianity’s role in Europe today has radically diminished, but its part in Europe’s past has been a defining one, and even now the influence of Christian Democrat parties in Europe should not be underestimated. Certainly in high culture — fine art and music — there is a richly varied but recognizably European tradition (Wintle, 2009, p. 9)
Yet, Europe is a sly beast that defies definitional domestication. If we take Wintle’s word at face value, we can see that the kind of basic Europeanness that he sees can be found all throughout Latin America too. After all, most Latin Americans speak an Indo-European language as a mother tongue—unlike Finns and Hungarians. They also have a strong Christian faith which has been as defining as in Europe—Christian missionaries evangelised American natives; the leading generals of the Mexican independence were Catholic priests and a mestizo virgin Mary is a major symbol of Mexican nationalism—and political platforms of Christian inspiration—from the Mexican National Action Party to the Christian Democratic Party of Chile—as well as the Catholic Church have played a prominent role in Latin American politics since the Conquest.

Besides, which fine art and music is supposed to be European? Does this mean that Germanic peoples and especially Scandinavians are not Europeans because they do not have the kind of Greek and Roman archaeological legacies that can be found in southern parts of Europe? Most classical music composers were of Austrian, German, Italian or Russian origin: does this mean that the rest of Europe is entitled to claim them? Is the beauty of the works created by Italian Renaissance artists more European than Italian, or even more Italian than Florentine or Venetian? And what about Spain, who was shut off from most of the Renaissance? Furthermore, there is a massive amount of Latin American fine art almost indistinguishable from the fine art made in the European continent or clearly influenced by it. Painting, sculpture, architecture, literature and music of ancient Roman, Romanesque, Mannerist and especially Baroque character can be found all throughout Latin America, which cannot be said of many countries within the boundaries of physiographical Europe or the rest of the world.

Except for the Spanish strain of thought known as Pan-Hispanism—that considers Spain and her former colonies as one civilisation united by language, common historical experiences and a shared cultural baggage—(Xirau, 1942), for the rest of the EU the Americas seem to have drifted away from the Occident. EU countries share Samuel Huntington’s view (1993) about Latin America as a civilisation in its own right, different from Western civilisation—as if it had arisen from
nowhere. Notwithstanding, as with the Berber-Islamic influence, Spanish EU coins show the problematic relation between Spanish and EU identities. The common side of Spanish 10, 20 and 50 cent euro coins displays Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra; and a commemorative 2 euro coin from 2005 shows Don Quixote de La Mancha. These images are the two archetypical symbols of Pan-Hispanism. If one accepts the premise that numismatic portrayals reinforce the represented figures’ significance on the collective memory of their nation (See: Raento, et al., 2004; and also: Billig, 1995; Pointon, 1998, pp. 233-235), then it is not a mere triviality that some of the most important symbols of Spanish identity happen to be, at the same time, the most evocative symbols of a bond that ties Spain to Latin America—and, as seen before, to the Arab-Islamic world. In this regard, Spain is like Europe’s last surviving relative from an almost extinct generation, keeping the old pictures of distant family and ancestors no one else in Europe would otherwise remember.

Probably the most incontestable evidence about the depth of European influence on Latin America is the region’s Islamo-Arab heritage that the Spaniards brought
with them. Although it is not very well known, the Moorish legacy that still pervades ornamentation, architectural form and open space throughout Latin America is a testimonial of the region’s Spanish heritage (Brooks Jeffery, 2003). Even though from a historical point of view this should not sound strange, for Spain was remarkably transformed by 800 years of Moorish colonisation, it does because Spanish nationalism is constructed in opposition to the Moors and European identities in general have tended to deny their Arab-Muslim influences. To some extent—although far from being a perfect analogy—Moors are to Spaniards and Europeans what Spaniards and Europeans are to most Latin Americans: their influence on the peoples they colonised and intermingled with is evident but unacknowledged. Arab-Muslim heritage, which in itself is a central component of European heritage—even if impressively underemphasized—, is probably the best proof that Europe left a profound footprint in the Americas and, paradoxically, that the Arab-Muslim heritage is part of Europe—especially of Spain.

One of the best examples of Spanish heritage of Muslim inspiration is the Royal Chapel of Cholula in Mexico. Its architectural tracing and interior, based on the Andalusian Mosque of Córdoba, is one the best examples of colonial architecture of Moorish inspiration that can be found in Latin America (Morales Padrón, 1992, p. 50; Castillo Palma, 2001, p. 207). Another example is the art of Azulejería (from the Arabic al zuālij), which was introduced to Spain by the Moors (Funari, 2006, p. 213) and became not only a symbol of cultural pride for Spain but also for Mexico. The techniques of Spanish ceramics from Talavera de la Reina were imported to New Spain by immigrant craftsmen who developed the art of Talavera of Puebla (Ruiz Gutiérrez, 2010, pp. 335-336). The Spanish language itself attests to Europe’s Muslim heritage, for it is a mixture of Arabic, Hebrew and Latin spoken in the Hispanic peninsula. From the 10th century until the expulsion of the Moors, Arabic was learned in Hispania as a learned language and left a trace of 8,000 words of Arabic in the Spanish language, many of which are still commonly used (Funari, 2006, p. 213). Latin America, through its predominant Hispanic heritage, attests to the massive European inheritance that Europe owes to the Arab-Muslim world.
FIGURE 11 Mosque of Córdoba, Spain

FIGURE 12 Royal Chapel of Cholula in Puebla, Mexico
The fact that Europeans can travel several thousand kilometres across the vast Atlantic Ocean to find themselves among whole nations sharing their mother tongue (Spanish, Portuguese, French and even Dutch), religion, history, architectonic styles and urban planning—even if with regional variations—and not even consider that these countries have their fair share of Europeanness is baffling, to put it mildly.

The EU spills outside Europe

The current accounts of European identity conceal is that the Union has not been confined to physiographical Europe for a long time:

What is being left out of the imaginary maps of the European Union is thus the condition that the current EU also stretches into Africa, South America, the Caribbean and the Indian Ocean, that its 'European' citizens inhabit the South Atlantic and the South Pacific, and that the EU neighbours by land countries such as Morocco and Brazil (Hansen, 2002, p. 489)

But these eccentric territories are not the only limbs that escape the physiographical body of the Union. Colonialism—like Arab-Islamic influence—is among the many chapters of European history that the EU expediently omits because it is out of tune with its propagandistic definition of European heritage. This stubborn and wilful amnesia has inspired hypocritical and calculatedly manipulative formulations like the first clause of the Lisbon Treaty's preamble: “DRAWING INSPIRATION from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law” (European Union, 2007, p. 10). It is hard not feel uneasy about the all-too convenient reinterpretation of history being done in these lines. It even seems somewhat distasteful when one recalls that France was waging war against Indochina “right at the time of the Schuman Declaration” and systematically torturing dissidents during the Algerian struggle for independence between 1954 and 1962 (Hansen, 2002, pp. 488-489).

Aside from the violence exerted by Europe against its colonies, the colonial experience links the EU with a geography beyond physiographical Europe. It is im-
important to remember that Algeria “officially and constitutionally, formed an integral part of metropolitan France” (Hansen, 2002, p. 487) and thus the Treaty of Rome incorporated Algeria into the European Economic Community (Ibid., p. 488). Hence, Africa was already part of the EU but, most importantly, it still is. Ceuta and Mellilla are Spanish territories and therefore also EU territories—although not part of its customs’ space (Ibid., p. 485). The Treaty of Rome used a veiled language to refer to these “overseas countries and territories”, some of which still form an integral part of or have close ties with some European countries (European Union, 1957, p. 4).

Yet, it could be argued that these extra-European territories are a bunch of more or less insignificant islands and enclaves with little territorial and political significance and therefore, even though it would be politically correct to include them into the EU’s definition and discourses, it is only logical to exclude them. However, the significance of these places resides not in their size or political weight in the international system but in what they represent. They are the remnants of a very European tendency to imperialism and colonisation that is far from extinct because it is embodied in the very model of the EU (Böröcz, 2001, p. 13).

The EU’s discourse, in spite of its obstinate attempts to reclaim the heritage of Europe, fails to recognise the places where Europe used to be and the transculturation generated by the interaction with these places and their inhabitants, i.e. they changed Europe as much as Europe changed them. The attempts of the Union to exert a monopoly on the heritage of Europe contradict its apparent anxiety to keep its project within physiographical Europe because, as Russia, the Arab-Muslim world, Latin America and many other former European colonies in Africa and Asia exemplify, Europe already belongs to the world (see: Kramsch O., 2011, p. 207).

The incoherence of Europe’s origins
The EU exploits distorted accounts of European history and identity because they are malleable abstractions that can be wrought in different ways depending on the
political end being pursued. However, as shown here, the historical, cultural and geographical grounds not to consider the Middle East, North Africa, Russia and even Latin America and other former European colonies as part of Europe are feeble. Even though the use of the concept of “Europe”—the same as “Asia” or “Africa”—makes sense for practical physiographical purposes to tell apart large portions of land, European identity is an ideologically exploited and politically aimed construct. This does not only mean that “Europe” is a biased concept but most importantly that it can be adapted to different contexts.

It should be noted that the previous genealogy is superficial and incomplete. Whole fascinating case studies could be conducted regarding the development of each of the hidden European frontiers that I have discussed. This section also overlooks former European colonies in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa because, unlike Latin America, I do not believe that collapsing them all into a single category to study their Europeanness would be analytically valid. To amend this flaw by giving each African or Asian former colony the fair amount it would need to be discussed would exceed the extension of this study. I am unapologetic about leaving out Eastern Europe because its Europeanness is not as controversial.

None the less, for all its faults this genealogy illustrates how Europe is neither where the EU says it is nor where it has historically been and much less where it could potentially be should both the EU and former European colonies decide to recognise their common ground. These contradictions and incoherence in the imaginary origins was what Michel Foucault found to be the main achievement of the genealogical process:

... if the genealogist refuses to extend his faith in metaphysics, if he listens to history, he finds that there is “something altogether different” behind things: not a timeless and essential secret, but the secret that they have no essence or that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms [...] History also teaches how to laugh at the solemnities of the origin (Foucault, 1971, pp. 78–79).

Hence, the ultimate goal of this genealogy is to show that the potential to find Europeanness outside the EU’s current borders is all but an obstacle for the Union to expand. Contrary to the discourse that explains the EU as the natural
successor of European history and culture, when compared against its historical background the Union reveals itself as everything but a natural consequence of European history. How did countries that were ferociously killing each other not 70 years ago—and long before for most of their history—suddenly came together and started to identify a common ground? As every previous enlargement has shown and now the Balkans are making clear, this was no one-time lucky strike. How is it possible that all the countries of the former Yugoslavia are expecting to become politically associated again by joining the EU (Economist, 2011g), when not a generation ago they tore each other apart in a genocidal war of entrenched nationalisms? The answer lies in the EU model.
From hate to love

Against the previous genealogy it could be argued that, in spite of all its alleged historical interest and validity, it poses no practical relevance for the current situation of the EU. It is—it could be dismissively criticized—an interesting tale with no political implications. Even accepting that the Middle East, North Africa, Russia and—why not?—even Latin America and other former colonies are part of the European heritage, the EU’s current members, for all the differences that exist among them, share a wider common ground with each other in the present than with any country in these other regions. So, from a historical perspective, the shared history, culture and mutual influences between the EU and, say, North Africa, may be massive, but currently that is of little political significance because nobody conceives it that way anymore and the differences between the two regions are striking. The history is there but the links are long gone.

The Arab-Muslim world parted ways with Europe centuries ago with the advent of Renaissance and European empires (Lewis, 2002; 2004); Russia’s frail Europeanness has hanged by a thread since the November revolution of 1917 and most Latin American independencies took place almost 200 years ago. EU countries are what it is left of the idea of Europe. The Union represents the core of Europe that has maintained a European identity throughout the centuries despite all historical vicissitudes. With this in mind, the fact that EUropean identity is a biased and politically manipulated construct is of little consequence. The Union may represent a small fraction of the whole geo-cultural idea of Europe but it is the only part that has maintained its Europeanness. This is what has made the EU possible and what keeps it together.
This critique would be wrong. Even though nowadays EU members are assumed to be natural partners predestined to get along—or just getting along for unknown reasons—this supposition forgets how difficult it was to bring the Union together and still is. Thus, the objective of this chapter is to show that each previous EU enlargement has been a painful process. This exercise aims at extracting a conclusion about how the EU model works by identifying the patterns that keep pushing the EU towards ever successive enlargements regardless of the obstacles that each one of them represents.

Growing pains
Schuman saw the rivalry between France and Germany as the highest obstacle in the way of a united Europe and proposed economic interdependence as the solution to this latent confrontation (Schuman, 1959). The establishment of the ECSC set off a mechanism of conflict resolution that might be the most successful model of international organisation ever conceived. To be sure, by “successful” I do not refer to the uncritical definitions that have been attributed to the EU such as “force for good” (Barbé & Johansson-Nogués, 2008) or “normative power” (Diez, 2005; Laïdi, 2005; Bachmann & Sidaway, 2009). Certainly the EU has too many flaws and the same egoistic and short-sighted interests that most countries do to be considered as such. Yet, the Union’s methods to promote its interests are abnormally different and it seems that the Union’s success comes not from the purity of its intentions but rather from the way in which it channels them.

In contrast to traditional imperial models of conflict resolution like those of Russia and the US, which rely heavily on coercion and little on incentives and interdependence, the EU’s model draws on institutional, economic, diplomatic and technical enticements to get compliance with its interests. The distinction is between soft and hard power (Nye, Jr., 1990). This does not mean that the EU is unable or unwilling to exert hard power but rather that it reserves it for a very specific kind of conflict resolution scenarios—specifically those requiring sanctions, humanitarian intervention or self-defence—in which it cooperates with more special-
ized actors for this kind of task such as the UN Security Council, NATO and the US—Kosovo in 1999 and Libya in 2011 are the best examples.

The Union’s approach has an interesting catch: it has unintended consequences both for itself and the countries whose obedience it seeks. The incentives that the EU offers generate gradual institutional rapprochement between itself and its periphery, which with time deepens economic and political interdependence—raising both the costs of conflict and the incentives for further cooperation. As times goes by, this interaction transforms strangeness into otherness (Stichweh, 2004). This is not an abstract philosophical reflection but a very recent historical experience. Although the Union’s discourse tries to naturalize its current configuration as the inevitable result of a shared culture there is nothing normal about it. Quite the contrary, if one looks at recent history the EU is a shocking outcome few would have bet upon. The following anthropomorphic maps provide a testimony of the dramatic transformation of the “perceptions of power and space” that have taken place in Europe during the last century (Wintle, 1999).
Figure 12
Empires stretching out

[98]
Figure 13
Animosities at the beginning of World War I
Figure 14
Not the best moment of European integration

[100]
"The iron ring around Germany: The disarmed Germany in the middle of neighbours armed for war"
The 19th century saw the consolidation of national identities which were constructed in violent opposition to each other. The Franco-Prussian war that made possible the unification of Germany is a good example. In the German case, the exacerbation of nationalistic tendencies led to the country’s distancing from “allegedly shallow rationalism and cosmopolitanism of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution through a historicist celebration of cultural particularism” (Brubaker, 1992, p. 1)—even though now Enlightenment is flaunted among the preeminent chapters of Europe’s shared history (Pieterse, 1991, p. 7). Not a century ago this nationalistic exacerbation culminated in the bloodiest wars the world has ever seen and for which, in Churchill’s words, “there is no parallel since the invasions of the Mongols in the fourteenth century and no equal at any time in human history” (1946).

So, what happened? How did the now leading EU countries go from feverishly killing each other to promoting closer integration? How the antagonistic geo-

![Figure 16](image)

“War is Prussia’s national industry”
political and nationalistic discourses from before the Second World War turned into the fraternal hubris espoused by the EU today? Forget the historicist lucubrations about the European heritage shared by the Arab-Muslim world, Russia, Latin America and former European colonies in Asia and Africa. In the recent past, not even current EU countries have been EUropean enough. It is enlightening to find out, for example, that “In a poll compiled in 1954, 51 percent of the French still considered that ‘the German people fundamentally like to wage wars,’ and barely 29 percent thought that a German-French alliance could work” (Servantie, 2007).

The Union has been reinventing itself constantly. EUropean integration is not an event that occurred once after the Second World War but a process that has been taking place over and over again as new members have been incorporated. The tensions between insiders and outsiders have not ceased ever since the ECSC was founded. It is now forgotten that back in the 1950s the extension of the EEC beyond the borders of “Little Europe” (West Germany, Italy, France, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) was regarded with aloofness by Scandinavian countries and the UK who were sceptical about European integration. At that time, the existence of “shared values” and traditions even among the countries that made up Little Europe were seriously called into question and considered a formidable obstacle in the way of deeper integration (Yalem, 1959).

Far from the current discourse that takes for granted the existence of the EU as an expected chapter of European history, in the 1950’s the sentiment surrounding the ECSC was one of hope on the possibility that “a dense railroad network, a cheap waterway transportation system and skilled manpower, all contribute substantially to the economic efficiency of this ‘most powerful industrial basin in the world which history has divided’ ” (Bebr, 1953, p. 5). The confidence in the project was undermined by “the lack of supranational identification among the Community’s population”, which—so was thought—could prevent the ECSC’s institutions from properly carrying out their supranational functions (Bebr, 1953, p. 38).

Today’s military pact between France and the UK (Economist, 2010f) as well as their joint intervention in Libya (Economist, 2011b) may seem like natural alliances between two EU member states. However, they look less natural when one
recalls France’s rejection of a European Defence Community in 1954—a major setback for the nascent project of political integration in Europe—or its opposition to Great Britain’s accession to the EEC twice during the 1960s (Hansen, 2002, p. 492). Moreover, Greece—the portentous cradle of democracy and European civilisation—was considered a danger for the West during the Cold War because of its inclination towards the Soviet Union and hostility towards the US and NATO (Dimitras, 1985). Not to speak of today’s calls for kicking Greece out of the EU because of its reckless use of the Union’s money (Conway, 2010; Economist, 2010b).

Spain and Portugal are other examples of current EU members formerly looked upon with disdain (Haas, 1961, p. 375). Both of them, with their dictatorial pasts, poor economic performances (Etzioni, 1963, p. 34; Redston, 1983) and ambiguous European identities, were considered a liability for the EEC and thus their attempts to join the Community were blocked several times before they were successful (Carothers, 1981)—even then it took 9 years for Spain to be admitted (Economist, 2010d). In the 1980s the French attempted to prevent or at least slow down Spain’s accession to the EEC while the Spanish socialists argued that “Spain’s ties to Latin America and the Arab world [had] an equal claim upon its national identity as those to Western Europe” and thus Spain should not precipitate into joining NATO or the EEC (Ibid., p. 298).

This brief historical account about the tensions that have existed among current EU members since the inception of the ECSC illustrates the hypocrisy of the EU’s discourse about “European identity” and unity. The EU is not a foretold prophecy. In this respect, it might be helpful to draw on the caution that “‘Traditions’ which appear or claim to be old are often quite recent in origin and sometimes invented” (Hobsbawm E., 1983). Even though the idea of European political unification has been floating around for centuries “until recently there has never existed widespread enthusiasm on the part of European intellectuals and political leaders for the idea” (Yalem, 1959, p. 50).

But let us forget about the UK, Greece, Spain and Portugal and get into the two most cited cases have caused the outcries of EU overstretch and created anxiety towards further enlargements. The accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007
was seen with much more apprehension than any other previous enlargement long before it happened and still it did (Zielonka, Europe as Empire: The Nature of the Enlarged European Union, 2006, pp. 44-64). This makes one wonder, why enlargement keeps being a recurrent outcome even though it has become such a painful process?

Up to this point I have explained that, although admitting new members into the EU has always been difficult it still keeps happening. Not going past this would amount to having identified a tendency pointing to a correlation between the EU and enlargement. So, now I want to focus on causality in order to link correlation with explanation. My aim is to provide insights into understanding why the EU model has an inertia of its own which inexorably leads to enlargement.

**Gradual osmosis through algorithmic rebordering**

The EU is a form of international organisation that concerns itself deeply with questions of territory (Elden, 2010a) and governmentality (Foucault, 1991) to the point of being supra-national in numerous areas. For this reason, the EU is eminently political, which means that it deals with governance and conflict resolution (Kohler-Koch & Eising, 2005, p. 21). The variety of conflict resolution promoted by the Union tends to periodical rebordering. First, it is important to point out—as I already have within the theoretical framework—that there is a growing consensus towards defining the EU as an empire (Böröcz, 2001) and that thinking about the Union as a neo-mediaeval empire is the theoretical model with the best explanatory power to understand how it works (Zielonka, 2006).

This empire came into being by the binding forces of mutually beneficial economic interdependence. The ECSC’s “primary and immediate aims” were purely economic (Bebr, 1953, p. 4) and, although this is sometimes portrayed as altruism, reciprocal economic attractiveness has played a very important role in the EU model's success. Proof of this are the benefits that Germany has reaped from the single currency,

Germany is rightly proud of its ability to control costs and keep on exporting. But it also needs to recognise that its success has been won in part at
the expense of its European neighbours. Germans like to believe that they made a huge sacrifice in giving up their beloved D-mark ten years ago, but they have in truth benefited more than anyone else from the euro. Almost half of Germany’s exports go to other euro-area countries that can no longer resort to devaluation to counter German competitiveness (Economist, 2010c).

That is why cohesion funds have been given to freshly admitted EU countries since 1994 as compensation for opening their markets, because their small economies do not need big transfers and therefore are not a burden for old and richer EU countries. In consequence, “Even a tiny sacrifice by the old richer members means a great deal for the new poorer members” (Zielonka, 2006, p. 77). There are other economic gains associated to the admission of new members like the accommodation of different economies within the EU which, far from being a disadvantage, has created a more efficient division of labour within it (Idem).

But understanding the economic rationale behind the EU model is not enough to capture its complexity. The EU has developed into a conflict resolution model that apart from exploiting economic opportunities also tries to remedy geopolitical disturbances in its periphery. As Zielonka argues, “The most fundamental dimension of this enlightened self-interest is not financial or economic, but political and geostrategic” (2004, p. 22). The 2004 enlargement was the most assertive display of this dimension through the leverage of the Union’s economic and political conditionality. It was an answer to the preoccupation that arose after Soviet control over the Union’s eastern border faded, where

The forces of anarchy, of retrograde interests, and even of organized crime seemed alarmingly strong. Old border disputes and sometimes-violent ethnic antagonisms reappeared. Even in relatively stable countries it was not clear which institutional solutions and regulatory frameworks would be adopted, who would conquer the emerging markets, and what kind of military alliances would emerge (Zielonka, 2004, p. 22)

Drawing on the same conditionality experiences that had successfully led to prior enlargements, the EU attempted to assert its dominance over its eastern border (Zielonka, 2006, p. 13). The Union offered economic and political incentives to the governments of these peripheral countries in exchange for their wilful replication of the Union’s laws and modes of governance within their territories, i.e. the
Copenhagen criteria and the acquis communautaire. In doing this, the EU proved that its design was effective, practically imperial and, most strikingly, peaceful.

The infusion of thousands of legal provisions and technical regulations involving institutional engineering and deep structural reforms is so pervasive, systematic and, even more important, mutually beneficial—though in an asymmetric way—and wilfully implemented that in the course of time it generates the unintended consequence of upgrading strangeness to otherness:

The social experience of strangeness must be distinguished from that of otherness. The otherness of another human being is an incontrovertible and hence a universal social experience. It is the absolute precondition for my experiencing myself as my Self in contradistinction to the otherness of another human being. It is only possible to speak of strangeness, in contrast, when the otherness of another human being is experienced as irritating or disturbing (Stichweh, 2004, p. 1).

As legal, institutional and regulatory harmonization penetrates the Union’s periphery, otherness supplants strangeness and the myth of EUropean identity is slowly redefined to accommodate within its narrative a periphery that gradually acquires the Union’s features and becomes more acceptable in its eyes. In this identification process, like a son resembling the father whom he looks up to, the periphery becomes a reinterpretation of the Union, similar but with individual particularities. The metaphor of the son is fruitful also in the opposite direction, for as the periphery grows ever more similar to its role model, the EU starts to look at it as its child in need of protection, which it gives in the form of rebordering. Unlike the father, however, the Union does not embrace its periphery out of disinterested love but to take advantage of it while giving something in return. In this sense—and to make a metaphor that draws on the Greek heritage that the Union is so fond of boasting about—the relation between the Union and its periphery is more like the mutually but asymmetrically beneficial relationship between the Greek erastes and eromenos (Sennett, 1994, pp. 35-52). This is the enlightened self-interest that Zielonka attributes to the EU and thoroughly defines (2006).

The Union’s conflict resolution model works in an algorithmic form. The stages which make up this self-replicating algorithm through which the EU’s embracing process unfolds are three: 1) problem in need of conflict resolution; 2) crea-
First of all, as I have explained before conflict resolution is a synonym for governance and is an inescapable reality. Conflict cannot be averted and here the famous aphorism stating that “If men were angels, no government would be necessary” (Madison & Hamilton, 1788) could be extrapolated to the international system and reformulated to say that “if states were angels, no international organisation would be necessary”. As Romano Prodi recognised, conflict is renewed every time the EU enlarges—which is paradoxical since enlargement was a form of solving previous conflicts in the first place—: “Each enlargement brings us new neighbours. In the past many of these neighbours ended up becoming candidates for accession themselves” (Prodi, 2002).

Interdependency—triggered by conditionality—creates and increasingly multiplies links between the EU and its periphery (e.g. border management, migration controls, customs harmonization, energy and transport infrastructure, information sharing to combat transnational crime and terrorism, etc.). This lays the foundations for mutual dependency and increases the costs of breaking that symbiosis—e.g. by waging war or leaving the association between the Union and its
periphery—as times goes by. But why is such dependency accepted even though it is asymmetrical and, to some extent, imposed? Because the trade-off offered by the EU’s conditionality reconciles the short-term political interests of politicians in the periphery’s countries with the long-term interests of the Union.

For one, the Union gives the governments of negotiating countries immediate access to a material and symbolical pool of resources that strengthen their political stance while ducking the risk of making them look as the Union’s puppets. The fact that the EU proposes and not imposes its conditions surrounds the whole negotiation process with a sense of ownership in the receiving countries. Instead of giving the impression that a greedy empire is violating their sovereignty, negotiating countries get the perception that they are negotiating on an equal basis with a superpower.

For another, the reforms that the EU demands from negotiating countries are flexible enough to allow them to implement such measures at their own pace and in their preferred sequence, thereby decoupling such restructurings from the political contingencies that could derail them. Since these reforms and their consequences fully develop in the long term allows politicians in negotiating countries to avoid the potential costs of carrying them out at once and gives them time to adapt to them.

Along with interdependence, identification unfolds gradually as the sustained interaction (e.g. epistemic communities, student exchange programmes, technical cooperation, etc.) and the transformation brought about by the economic and political rapprochement make the periphery look every time more like the EU and the Union perceive its periphery more as part of itself. The periphery harmonizes its procedures, regulations, laws and institutions with those of the Union and this starts blurring the divisions between them. Identification is then rhetorically expressed in the form of more nuanced “otherization” discourses (e.g. “they are not so different than us”). Increasing identification is used instrumentally by both the EU and its peripheral countries to make the case for incorporation into the Union.
Argumentative rationality is the vehicle through which identification is accomplished. It involves actors trying “to convince each other to change their causal or principled beliefs in order to reach a reasoned consensus about validity claims [...] Interests and identities are no longer fixed, but subject to interrogation and challenges and, thus, to change” (Risse, 2000, pp. 9-10). Argumentative rationality happens during the continuous dialogue between the EU and its periphery in which both engage each other to bargain questions of identity.

**The ENP: Replicating the EU in the periphery**

When the EU has used the previously explained model it has ended up enlarging and, since the ENP is but another manifestation of enlargement—or enlargement through other means—there is no reason to rule out the possibility of enlargement as its consequence. Here EU leaders and officials would cry foul and say that the ENP is not enlargement but instead a measure to prevent further rebordering and that is why this policy offers everything but institutions. However, there is an inherent ambiguity to the ENP that dates to its conception in 2002 when Romano Prodi articulated the idea in the following way: “We have to be prepared to offer more than partnership and less than membership, without precluding the latter” (Prodi, 2002). Why? Prodi himself answered this: “A proximity policy would not start with the promise of membership and it would not exclude eventual membership. This would do away with the problem of having to say ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to a country applying for membership at too early a stage” (Idem). In brief, the ambiguity is designed to make it easy for the EU to discriminate who can get in and who cannot without making any compromises and getting itself into a diplomatic mess.

The introductory clauses of the ENP action plans articulate this vagueness in a persistent rhetorical construction. The following fragment taken from the ENP Action Plan for Lebanon represents the template that is used for every single action plan—although with slight modifications—, the only thing that is different is the country’s name—which I took the liberty to replace for a generic label to show how it can fit any country (and indeed this “cut, paste and replace” was done for every action plan):
The level of ambition of the EU-[insert country’s name] relationship will depend on the degree of [insert country’s name] commitment to common values as well as its capacity to implement jointly agreed priorities, in compliance with international and European norms and principles. The pace of progress of the relationship will acknowledge fully [insert country name] efforts and concrete achievements in meeting those commitments (European Commission, 2007).

Even though further enlargement seems to be out of the question, the paradox is that the ENP is based exactly on the same framework used for enlargement (Kelley, 2006) and the way in which the EU deals with its periphery is inevitably hunted by enlargement (Kramsch O., 2011, p. 197). This is no surprise. It is a well-known fact among EUrocrats that enlargement has been by far the EU’s most powerful foreign policy tool in the past and with no alternatives in sight it will preserve this status in the future.

What is intriguing is that ENP objectives are supposed to be different even when its methods do not vary from those of enlargement. A possible explanation for the supposedly different objectives of the ENP is that they are the politically correct thing to say because “With anti-immigrant parties gaining ground, few governments are ready to open up to” North Africans immigrants (Economist, 2011c) and much less to whole Muslim or North African countries. Another plausible explanation is that EUrocrats and the Union’s national leaders actually believe that it is in fact possible to promote deep economic, institutional and political integration without bringing about enlargement.

Why does the EU have an ENP in the first place? Because it wants coordination with its neighbourhood to solve the threats that it perceives (e.g. terrorism, energy security, immigration, human rights violations, etc.). However, if the EU is so sure that it does not want ENP countries to join it, then why does it even give them the possibility of having an ambiguous path towards more integration with the Union? Because it knows that the carrot of possible membership is the most powerful foreign policy tool at its disposal.

Now, if history is any guide—and I believe it is—in the past these measures have led to the economic, political and social approximation of institutions and people in countries that now are member states of the EU. Why would it be any
different in the new periphery than in the old periphery? Well, maybe the most obvious answer could be: because the EU is not interested in incorporating these countries. Against this objection I have two reservations.

First, the EU is not a homogeneous block. When studying international organisations one must take into account agent-principal theory and the discrepancies between state leaders and the bureaucracies they delegate power to (Hawkins, et al., 2006). There are always unavoidable costs associated with delegation ("agency slack")—especially when the international organisation involves so many different interests, countries and bureaucrats as the EU does—in the form of institutions tending to escape the designs of their creators (Alvarez, 1995, p. 326). British imperialists, for example, intended the UN to become a vehicle to preserve their empire and yet it became a major force for decolonisation (Mazower, 2009).

Probably the most salient example of institutions shaking out the control of EU member states is the European Court of Justice (ECJ), “which was once politically weak and did not stray far from the interests of the European governments,” but “now has significant political authority and boldly rules against their interests” (Alter, 1998, p. 122). Institutions break free from state control as a result of a discrepancy of preferences between elected officials in member states and EU bureaucracies. In this sense, international organisations have their own free will. In part, this is due to the overwhelming task represented by institutional engineering which prevents designers from anticipating the path that their creations will follow. Besides, it is related to the bureaucrats’ agency that imprint their own visions on the workings of these organisations.

This agency slack not only affects the ECJ but also the enlargement process and the ENP. On the one hand, EU leaders may be wary of proposing enlargement, especially if they want to appeal to xenophobic constituencies. In contrast, EU bureaucrats need achievements to show off for and advance their careers. For EUrocrats, additional rebordering not only counts as a historical achievement but justifying it is relatively easy because its benefits can be substantial in economic and security terms. Incorporation of the periphery would be in the interest of the EU because of the perspective of new markets; extended buffer zones between it
and conflict areas; out-sourcing of problematic issues to the new periphery (e.g. buck-passing of immigration controls in southern countries like Spain, Italy and Malta could go farther to Morocco or the whole northern Africa, for example); increased EU resources, geopolitical reach and international influence (e.g. Turkey has the largest second army in NATO after the US and its annexation would grant the Union legitimate diplomatic or even military action in the Caucasus and Middle East, which are areas of energy and security concerns for the EU and the US, its main military ally); ease of demographic pressures (young and mainly low-skilled workers would support the welfare states of aging EU countries and revitalize their economies).

Second, even if nobody in the EU is interested in the periphery becoming part of the club, what about the periphery itself? The Union, contrary to what most EU maps lead us to believe with their depiction of the Union’s periphery as grey uncharted territory, does not act in a void but surrounded by thick geographical diversity filled with a very instrumental political agency. In other words, the EU is as concerned with its periphery as its periphery is with the EU. The Union might be trying to keep the periphery out but the periphery keeps trying to get in. As Karen Smith insightfully notes, “A southern enlargement is not beyond the realms of imagination, particularly of the imagination of those in the south. And how will the EU react if Lebanon or Morocco moves rapidly towards liberal democracy?” (Smith K., 2005, p. 769).

The ENP is a canny foreign policy strategy. It involves lumping together lofty ambitions and egoistic interests to make them indistinguishable and then wrapping them in a framework of nice words, idealism and good intentions. A good example of this is the section called “priorities for action” found in every ENP action plan. Here the EU proposes high-minded reforms that are in line with liberal-democratic ideals, political efficiency and sustainable development. However, very cunningly, among these praiseworthy goals the Union also inserts its most pressing concerns which reveal its true intentions. One can distinguish the proposals aimed at political correctness from the pressing concerns either through their degree of detail or because of the semantic mismatch between them. Moreover, the
crowd-pleasers seem to benefit the ENP country in question while the others are clearly in the Union’s interest. For example, the priorities for action in the ENP Action Plan for Morocco emphasize legislative reform, human rights, political dialogue and sustainable development along with combating terrorism, management of migration flows, transport sector development and energy infrastructure building (European Commission, 2004). Even though they are mixed up, through a content analysis the first group of objectives, articulated in a very general way, is distinguishable from the second group because of the latter’s higher technical detail.

In a few words, what I am trying to say is that the EU’s conflict resolution mechanism leads it to try to change its environment in a way that unintentionally changes the very Union through a process that can be conceived as an algorithm always ending up in periodical rebordering. Since I claim that this conflict resolution model is the same for both the enlargement process and the ENP, my theory is falsifiable in two cases: 1) if the EU admits a country that has not undergone the assimilation process; 2) if the EU does not admit a country that has successfully undergone the assimilation process (e.g. Turkey could be it).
Far from overstretch

The conflict resolution vigour of the EU has been revealed only recently. Its reciprocal attractiveness to both EU outsiders and insiders has proved to be outstanding—to say the least. Despite the controversial enlargements to Romania and Bulgaria; the mistake of admitting a divided Cyprus (Boedeltje, Kramsch, Van Houtum, & Plug, 2007) and in the middle of the Union’s worst financial and political crisis in all its existence, not only more countries want to join the Union but also to deepen their integration within it.

In the Balkans, the incorporation of Croatia to the Union is expected in 2013, Montenegro already enjoys candidate status and the arrest of Ratko Mladić has resumed accession negotiations between the EU and Serbia. Although Macedonia, Bosnia and Albania have a longer path to walk through before meeting the requirements to join the EU, it seems like a matter of time before all of the Balkans are integrated to the Union (Economist, 2011h). Even amidst the euro’s worst crisis Estonia just decided to join the monetary union (Economist, 2010k) and the IMF is galvanising the EU into deepening the single market to solve its financial woes (Economist, 2011m). Despite the near bankruptcy of Greece, the EU is too big to fail. The technical, economic and political costs that leaving the euro currency would imply for any country, poor or rich, would be much worse than any other course of action (Economist, 2010h).

The EU is even expanding on its concrete commitments abroad—which, as I will explain, eventually could lead to further enlargements. The revolutions in the Mediterranean Arab-Islamic world have shattered the agreements that the EU had with the authoritarian regimes to contain the massive flows of African immigrants intending to cross the Mediterranean in the hope of finding a better life in the EU.
The purpose of this chapter is to show: 1) that the EU has conflicts that need to be solved all around its periphery; 2) that the way it is going to solve them is by applying its conflict resolution model of benevolent imperial interdependence; 3) that the application of this conflict resolution model is likely to lead to further enlargements.

*Imperial geo-economic face-off along the eastern frontier*

There is an imperial stand-off taking place in the post-Soviet space between the Union’s innovative and Russia’s traditional models of conflict resolution. This competition spans not only EU-Russia relations but permeates through the Union’s relations with countries in the post-Soviet space, which are the periphery of both the Union and Russia. Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova and—to a lesser extent—also the Baltic and Balkan countries are all interconnected. They represent the terrains of confrontation between EUropean interdependence and Russian coercion.

The different foreign policies of the EU and Russia show the divergent approaches each one of them has. The basic difference is that Russia is threatening while the Union is not. This is the result of the different centres of gravity their power rest upon. The Union relies mostly on its quid pro quo interdependence and Russia on its military leverage. The Union tries to reproduce its practices (e.g. border controls) in the areas of its periphery that it considers to be strategic while Russia relies on the legacy of the Soviet Union networks that still link it to its periphery to legitimize its meddling in its neighbourhood. The EU’s imperial interference requires the consent of its periphery whereas Russia’s many times does not. This does not mean that the EU has necessarily better intentions from a moral standpoint but that its conflict resolution model is more sophisticated and allows for more ownership, negotiation and compromise than the blunt intimidation and aggressiveness avowed by traditional models of conflict resolution like the Russian—or the American, for that matter.

This imperial clash is the reason behind the main disputes between the Union and Russia, which broadly speaking fall down into two categories: organised
crime and energy security—which unsurprisingly are also the EU’s main concerns along its eastern frontier. The Soviet legacy of networks that lingers in the disputed territories as well as the EU’s energetic dependency on Russian gas give Russia legitimate concerns and political means to blackmail the Union.

Concerning organised crime, the existence of large ethnic Russian minorities is used by the Kremlin as a legitimate political excuse to interfere in the internal affairs of countries in the post-Soviet space. On the one hand, to increase the efficacy of this strategy Russia hands out Russian passports in its periphery to whoever wants to take them (Popescu, 2006, p. 5; Economist, 2008b). The diffusion of these documents aims at increasing the numbers of Russian minorities whose interests the Russian government can invoke to defend and gives Russia a de facto stake in the eastern enlargement processes of both the EU and NATO. On the other hand, the regions in post-Soviet territories inhabited predominantly by Russian minorities tend to be governed by former nomenklatura members—the Soviet elite—who welcome the Russian meddling without which they could retain neither their power nor the unlawful businesses that support it. This parasitical symbiosis between Russia and separatist regions in the post-Soviet space feeds on state weakness and organised crime, which in turn creates an unstable frontier for the Union.

Moldova is probably the best example of the threats created by the interdependence of Russia and the thuggish regimes it backs. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union the Moldovan separatist province of Transnistria has been supported by a permanent Russian military contingent whom the Russian government refuses to pull out (Ibid., p. 9). This is not only an obstacle in the way of Moldovan unity but also a permanent headache for the Union because Transnistria is the main hub for the trafficking of people, drugs, and weapons in the post-Soviet space (Idem). In this area pervasive corruption, authoritarianism and poverty fuel an industry dedicated to the smuggling of weapons, economic migrants and forced prostitution (El-Cherkeh, Stirbu, Lazaroiu, & Radu, 2004, pp. 70-83). To make it worse, the ex-Soviet military complex of Transnistria produces antitank grenade launchers, mobile rocket launchers, mortars, submachine guns and both anti-personnel and anti-
tank mines (Ciobanu, 2007, p. 5). Russia allows organised crime to prosper here with the intention of keeping a military outpost—and thus a geopolitical asset—in what it considers its lost sphere of influence (Peters & Bittner, 2006, p. 10). But exactly why does Russia consider impoverished and murky regions like Transnistria a geopolitical advantage? Because, although the EU does not represent a direct threat to Russia, NATO does (Russia’s Today Channel, 2008).

Russia does not oppose the EU. On the contrary, over half of Russians would welcome its country becoming part of the Union (Haider, 2009) and even Putin admitted that it is “quite possible” that Russia will join the euro someday (Armitstead, 2010). This does not mean that Russia is prepared to join the Union any time soon—its systemic corruption shows that it is clearly not (Economist, 2008; 2010e)—but that there is little animosity among the Russian population and its elites towards the EU. In contrast, however, NATO represents a traditional model of conflict resolution that threatens Russia’s supremacy in its own backyard not only militarily but also economically and politically.

NATO and the EU are not independent organisations. Although formally they are, in practice there is an overlap between them. After all, NATO’s 28 members are either EU members or candidates—in the cases of Turkey and Iceland—or potential candidates—Albania—with the exception of Norway and the US. Besides, Russia is the main threat that both NATO and the EU face to the east (Goldgeier, 2010, p. 9) and thus their enlargement processes are closely intertwined: “Had NATO not enlarged, the European Union likely would have delayed its own enlargement process, leaving central and eastern Europe insecure and vulnerable” (Ibid., p. 10). Countries in the post-Soviet space—especially in the Baltics (Economist, 2010i) and Poland (Zaborowski & Longhurst, 2003)—noticed (or assumed) this overlap between the EU and NATO and that perception was an important motivation behind their aspiration to join the Union—not least because they fear Russia’s belligerence and deem impossible a Russian attack on a EUropean country (Fierke & Wiener, 1999).

This practical convergence of interests between NATO and the EU is expressed in both organisations’ key documents. NATO’s most recent strategic blue-
print asserts that “NATO member states form a unique community of values, committed to the principles of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law” (NATO, 2010), which shows a clear affinity with the Union’s Copenhagen criteria:

Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union (European Council, 1993).

NATO and the EU are neither independent nor conflicting but complementary. Even though the Lisbon Treaty provides for the creation of a Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP), NATO and the EU share the same security concerns and have been adapting to benefit—or freeload—from each other’s comparative advantages, i.e. to specialize. NATO recognises the importance of this partnership:

An active and effective European Union contributes to the overall security of the Euro-Atlantic area. Therefore the EU is a unique and essential partner for NATO. The two organisations share a majority of members, and all members of both organisations share common values. NATO recognizes the importance of a stronger and more capable European defence. We welcome the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, which provides a framework for strengthening the EU’s capacities to address common security challenges (NATO, 2010).

From the Russian point of view, NATO’s expansion since the end of the Cold War has been a betrayal of its promise to Gorbachev not to expand a single inch and therefore part of the West’s quest to subdue Russia sooner or later (O’Loughlin & Kolossov, 1999, p. 9; Trenin, 2009, p. 8). Besides, NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999 showed this organisation’s willingness to use military force in Russia’s former sphere of influence without any regard for Russia’s interests or international law (O’Loughlin & Kolossov, 1999, p. 10). It is crucial to remember that at the time Russia was fighting Chechen separatists just as Milošević was fighting separatist Albanians and NATO’s intervention set a worrying precedent that could embolden Russia’s breakaway regions and delegitimise the Russian state (Felgenhauer, 2007). It is now forgotten, but in the prelude of NATO’s bombings in
Kosovo the stakes for European security seemed very high as Yeltsin and Gennady Seleznyov, the speaker of the Russian State Duma, issued declarations warning of a possible clash between Russia and the West that could reach world-war-like proportions and even involve nuclear weapons (Felgenhauer, 2007). Although it turned out to be a bluff, it showed the degree of Russian sensibility towards the intrusion in its former sphere of influence.

The fact that NATO’s invasion of Kosovo did not have the Security Council’s endorsement—and thus circumvented the Russian veto—highlighted Russia’s irrelevance and was perceived as a huge humiliation by the Kremlin (Arbatov, 2000; Felgenhauer, 2007). This affront was a seen wakeup call in Russia—later exacerbated by the foreign policy of George W. Bush that was locked in a Cold War mentality (Eland, 2000; Hadar, 2000; Harasymiw, 2010)—and explains the current mindset of Russia’s political class:

Unlike its Soviet predecessor, the current Russian leadership does not so much fear democracy (for which it has a lot of contempt) but the U.S. policies to promote it. Moreover, they suspect that the real objective of democracy promotion is to extend the Western sphere of influence in the CIS and to put pressure on the Russian leadership at home (Trenin, 2009, p. 15).

Because of this distrust towards NATO it should come as no surprise that “Russia’s top military interest in the neighbourhood […] is to prevent any of the CIS states from joining NATO or from hosting any new U.S. military bases” (Trenin, 2009, p. 14).

Russia has already made clear that it is not shy about flexing its muscle to preserve its supremacy over its immediate sphere of interests (Trenin, 2009), especially if challenged—even if indirectly—by NATO. Russia's all but explicit hints of attacking Ukraine—or at least pointing nuclear missiles at it—should it decide to join NATO in 2008 (Walsh, 2006; Finn, 2008) were the start of a series of reminders that Russia feels beleaguered by NATO. This was followed by Russia’s invasion of Georgia, which was not only a retaliation for Kosovo’s independence but also a way of reasserting its dominance over a neighbour whose army had been trained and equipped by the US (U.S. Department of Defense, 2002; Barry, 2008) and whose government was betting—wrongly—on American support (Economist,
The war in Georgia prompted both Poland and the Czech Republic to agree upon hosting an American anti-missile system which, in turn, provoked the Russians to react alarmed by stating that “any country involved in America’s missile defences made itself a legitimate target for nuclear attack” (Economist, 2008c). Later on, in 2009, Russia decided to cut off the gas supply to the Union in the middle of the winter claiming a dispute with Ukraine over gas prices, which not only served to emphasize the leverage Russia has on the EU but also the liability that Ukraine would represent should it join NATO because of its proximity to Russia.

Concerned by Russia’s swelling assertiveness NATO has made clear that its enlargement and defence plans are not directed against Russia:

NATO-Russia cooperation is of strategic importance as it contributes to creating a common space of peace, stability and security. NATO poses no threat to Russia. On the contrary: we want to see a true strategic partnership between NATO and Russia, and we will act accordingly, with the expectation of reciprocity from Russia (NATO, 2010)

This affability has been echoed by the Obama administration’s “reset policy” with Russia (Economist, 2011e). So, why does Russia fear the West’s submission even when the US and NATO have made clear that the organisation’s expansion is not intended to threaten it? Because even if NATO’s intentions are unthreatening its capabilities are not. Although it is clear that NATO has no interest in picking up a fight with Russia, Russian foreign policy derives its strength from bullying its neighbours. Having NATO at its doorstep would make more difficult and risky for Russia to throw its weight around its periphery because NATO’s conventional forces are far superior to Russia’s. Should NATO move into the Russian neighbourhood, Russia would find more difficult to achieve the most important aim of its foreign policy: getting economic prerogatives for its oil and gas companies by frightening its neighbours (Trenin, 2009, p. 15).

For example, in 2006 Russia cut off the gas supply to Lithuania’s Mazeikiu Nafta refinery—which cares for a large part of central and eastern Europe—“after a Russian company failed to obtain the energy infrastructure it coveted” (Baran, 2007, p. 133). Although by this time Lithuania was already a full member of both
the EU and NATO, the Baltic country does not share a border with the Russian hinterland—although it abuts Kaliningrad, the Russian enclave between Poland and Lithuania—and there is somewhat of a buffer zone represented by Latvia and Belarus. Should Ukraine—which shares a 2,063.04 km border with Russia—join NATO and the EU, it would be riskier for Russia to play the same card.

This is crucial because Russia’s internal and external power lies in its energetic leverage (Baran, 2007, p. 131). On the one hand, energy provides rent for the political elite—many of Gazprom’s shareholders and executives belong to the Russian political elite (Baran, 2007, p. 133)—and revenue for a country with a sclerotic economy—it makes up 20% of Russia’s federal budget (Gaillard, 2008). Energy income creates domestic support for Russia’s otherwise unloved oligarchical and authoritarian politicians by depicting them as efficient breadwinners. On the other hand, the EU’s ever increasing dependence on Russian energy—the source of 44.5% of the Union’s gas and 33.5% of its oil imports (European Commission, 2010c)—allows Russia to exert a big influence on the Union and be treated as an equal partner in the negotiations with it. This not only derives in economic concessions for the Russian state but also reflects well on its political class by allowing it to boast about preserving Russia’s superpower status (Inozemtsev, 2009, p. 2).

Since Gazprom is an extension of the Russian government and therefore has access to its military and security apparatus, Gazprom is capable of wielding hard power through the Russian military and diplomacy. If the 2006 and 2009 interruptions of gas flows to the Union showed that Russia has control over the transit countries (Belarus and Ukraine), the attack on Georgia in 2008 was a relatively subtle way of letting Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan—and the EU while at it—know that Russia is still the boss around the Caucasian and Caspian neighbourhood. This was no coincidence, for this region is involved in the EU-led Nabucco pipeline project which intends to bypass Russia and make the Union less dependent on its gas (Economist, 2008a). Unsurprisingly, “Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine—all crucial energy producers or transit countries—have each been subject to intimidation by Moscow” (Baran, 2007, p. 133).
Russia has been very active and successful in undermining the Nabucco project by making it economically and politically unfeasible—at least for now it has achieved a further delay until 2013 (Dempsey, 2011). Russia has taken advantage of the Union’s lack of unity in matters of energy security to strike deals with Serbia (an EU candidate), Slovenia, Bulgaria (Bierman, 2009), Hungary (EurActiv, 2009a), Greece (Grohmann, 2008) and Italy (Baran, 2007, p. 138) to build the “South Stream” pipeline, which would render the building of Nabucco economically unjustifiable. Besides, Russia has agreed with Azerbaijan (EurActiv, 2009b), Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan (Socor, 2008; Giuli, 2008) to take more of their gas and give them economic concessions in its own gas supply. The EU’s dependency on Russian gas is a crucial foreign policy matter in the future of the Union and its relation with Russia because the Union has no alternative in the foreseeable future to end it (Baran, 2007, p. 132).

As a consequence of Russia’s bellicose audacity not only the Union but also NATO distrust it and have reconsidered the benefits of extending their reach eastwards. Considering that the Union’s Security Strategy states that “Large-scale aggression against any Member State is now improbable” (European Union, 2003, p. 3), it is unlikely that neither the EU nor NATO would be willing gamble this comfort by stretching their borders to the unstable Russian orbit without having the certainty that such action will not escalate to a full-blown conflict with Russia. As a consequence, the Union will tiptoe towards further enlargements to the east for fear that a Russian aggression could expose the EU’s fragility and thus the military vulnerability of the whole Union project—which could embolden Russia to use its economic or military leverage with even more temerity.

However, this will not end the security concerns of the Union in its eastern border: organised crime and energy security. More than the problems in the post-Soviet space, the insuperable obstacle in the way of the EU’s successful conflict resolution along its eastern frontier is Russia. In light of this constantly looming conflict, if the Union wants to integrate Ukraine or Georgia one day—“to help ensure that no new dividing lines are drawn in Europe” (European Commission, 2005)—or end the Transnistria quarrel in Moldova, it will first have to lure Russia
into the club. Because military engagement is out of the question, the EU’s only option—excluding radical change within Russia—will be attempting to handle Russia with its conflict resolution model as it has done in previous enlargements and as it is doing in countries participating in the ENP. The successful approximation of Russia and the EU—which is not unimaginable considering the precedents of enlargement—could make Russia look more like the EU and so make its inclusion to the Union a feasible option. Considering the situation, it seems that there can be no further enlargement of the Union to the east unless Russia becomes an EU member itself. Bringing Russia closer to the Union would be a long-term perspective but one that is neither impossible nor undesirable.

Furthermore, why could the EU not follow its own example and propose the creation of a supranational authority for the management of energy between the EU and Russia? One could argue that Russia would not be the least interested in such a scheme because it is already the biggest gas producer in the world and the EU would not have much to chip in with in the first place. Maybe so, however, the Union has many other things to offer not the least of which are structural and cohesion funds as well as the massive technical cooperation that it can provide in many policy sectors to improve governance. One could further claim that those incentives would not be attractive enough for Russia. Well, maybe not, but if EUropean institutions are so unattractive to Russia, then why has it made free-visa travel for its citizens one of its main foreign policy priorities? Maybe the EU should trust more in its soft “power of attraction”, especially considering that for all its relative hard power, Russia remains a poor country with a Human Development Index (HDI) almost equal to that Albania or Bosnia and that the Union’s long-term alternative to deeper interdependence is a confrontational policy with an unstable Russian regime that feels every time more embattled.

To say that the EU will seek to attract Russia because it has no alternative and therefore that Russia could become a Union’s member in the distant future is of course a prediction. But this calculation is based on the assumption that the conflict between Russia and the EU is not going anywhere and on the insight that although Russia’s behavioural pattern tends to conflict while the Union’s behav-
ioural pattern tends to interdependence, Russia cannot afford solving its conflict with the EU by force because it does not have enough resources, whereas the EU can afford solving its conflict with Russia by promoting interdependence because it has the resources. This is a rational choice game theory based on the tendencies that both Russia and the EU have developed in its interaction with their respective peripheries and therefore a plausible outcome. However, there is yet another way in which the EU, using its conflict resolution model, could not only strengthen its hand vis-à-vis Russia but also give the Union’s project a whole new dimension. It would involve admitting Turkey into the Union.

*Killing the EUropean dream to revive the European dream*

According to mediaeval jurists, the king had two inextricably bound bodies, one natural and another politic. The first was his flesh and bones as well as all the passions, sickness and mortality to which they were subject. The second, referred to the royal metaphysical existence that embodied a timeless dignity and commanded power and obedience.

When death comes to the Body natural there is, argued the jurists, a mystical transference of the immortal Body politic to another corporal entity [...] The migration of the immortal part of kingship to another incarnation at the point of death was heralded by the famous cry, “The king is dead. Long live the king” (Johnson, 1967).

A similar dichotomy can be found in the concept of Europe. Like the king’s, Europe’s body politic is the lasting idea that there is something to be called “Europe”. Alternatively, Europe’s body natural corresponds to each historical period’s paradigmatic notion of Europe, which in ancient Greece meant a geographical area comprising both the northern and southern coasts of the Mediterranean and today has a rough equivalence with the EU.

Shaping the current paradigmatic definition of Europe, prominent politicians like Helmut Schmidt, Helmut Kohl, Wildfried Martens, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and currently Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel—not to mention the radical xenophobic politicians—have increasingly seen no place in the Union for countries like Turkey, at least not as a full member (Dahlman, 2004, p. 560). Even
if it does not seem obvious now, this idea is dangerous not only because it invites the hazards of nationalism and racism into the Union's project but because this tendency could extinguish the fragile fire that fuels the EU's power of attraction, which is the core of its peaceful conflict resolution model. In this sense, it is necessary to kill Europe's xenophobic and increasingly illiberal body natural to revive the worthy dream that began with the ECSC, which not only praised the virtues of interdependence over cultural kinship but also had laudable world aspirations. The admission of Turkey would be the best way to do this.

On the cultural dimension, granting Turkey EU membership would be recognition that European civilisation is not circumscribed to what is commonly known as physiographical Europe and that Islam is part of it (Dempsey, 2011). This would bring back to light the true foundations upon which the Union's success relies—i.e. interdependence and peaceful conflict resolution—and maybe even widen the perspective of European voters and leaders about the potential of the project they live in and steer. For these reasons, Turkey's accession would be a breath of fresh air to the EU, especially now that many of its countries are on the brink of pushing their political class to define the Union as an exclusively white and non-Muslim club. Turkey represents an opportunity to get rid of the xenophobic aspiration for an imaginary cultural and racial homogeneity that threatens with obscuring the benefits of interdependence and intercultural contact that have brought peace and integration to the Union.

The EU, the cliché goes, is the fruit of a project that has successfully bound the resources of antagonistic countries to render war among them materially impossible. As with all common places, however, its tedious repetitiveness has dulled its significance. The historical value of this reasoning stems from an unnatural awareness that needed a dreadful crisis like the Second World War to become politically feasible. It follows the ideological conviction that even chauvinistic nations hardened by atrocities committed against each other during recurrent wars can learn to coexist when they increase the material costs and political obstacles of waging war against each other.
This is not inconsequential. Traditional models of conflict resolution privilege a binary thinking that opposes “us” against “them”. This Manichaeism consolidates unnecessary antagonisms between peoples that are later reproduced on equally antagonistic domestic and foreign policies. A good example is the Cold War, during which distrust between the US and the Soviet Union along with misperceptions about each other’s intentions snowballed into the adoption of increasingly unfriendly policies of balancing such as buffer zones, military coups and proxy wars in third countries; as well as arms races and a build-up in nuclear deterrence (Shulman, 1987). The underlying rationale behind this confrontational model is that the “other” has to be contained because it cannot be conciliated with the “self”. Within this understanding, Russians and Americans, for example, are natural enemies and cannot befriend. They have essentialized identities engaged in perpetual conflict and therefore policies based on dialogue, rapprochement, negotiations and interdependence are not only useless but counterproductive. It is a zero-sum game where the gains of one party necessarily represent a loss for the other. As the remnant Cold War thinking in the US and Russia attests, this model does not solve conflicts, it only postpones them.

In contrast, the logic behind the EU’s unconventional model of conflict resolution is that the “other” and the “self” can identify with each other. German and French, for example, are contingent national identities that can be changed by interacting through supranational institutions where they cooperate to promote each other’s interests and gradually form a new common identity (e.g. EUROpean). This does not mean that national identities and existent antipathies are not real but that they are temporary socio-political constructs that can be altered. This model promotes policies that involve dialogue, rapprochement, negotiations and interdependence. As the economic, political and military stability among previously irreconcilable countries like Germany, France and the UK attests, this model does solve conflicts.

Yet though, proposals for creating buffer zones instead of interdependence in the periphery of the Union are emerging. Some have argued that Turkey should become a buffer zone for the EU (Bolkenstein, 2004), with certain privileges but
not all that would correspond to a full Union member, especially regarding the free mobility of workers. These proposals show that, for many, the EU’s foundational cliché has become empty rhetoric. They recommend exchanging the Union’s highly sophisticated model of international organisation and conflict resolution for the traditional version whose deficiencies have been exposed over and over as it has led to the recurrent outbreak of armed conflict or the threat of it.

This misunderstanding about the Union’s foundational advantage has been evident in the mindset of many Union’s leaders. Former French president Valéry Giscard d’Estaing said “that Turkey’s accession would mean ‘the end of the European Union’ ” (Dahlman, 2004, p. 560), which was echoed by former German chancellor Helmut Kohl who said that the Union is based on Christian principles (Müftüler-Bac, 1998, p. 240). Currently, French president Nicolas Sarkozy opposes Turkey’s accession on cultural and geographical grounds (Rose, 2007) and German chancellor Angela Merkel infamously backed away from the Union’s promise of accession by stating Turkey’s relation with the EU should be limited to a privileged partnership instead of full membership (Beste, Steinvorth, & Lindsey, 2010).

Not only do these attitudes show a deep ignorance about ancient and recent history but also a misperception of what the EU is all about. The Union may be described as an international organisation, an empire, a conflict resolution model, a supranational experiment but not as a cultural project and, even if it could, Turkey should be in it because it has been an inextricable part of Europe since ancient Greek antiquity. Not only was Istanbul the capital of the Roman Empire for twelve centuries (Hugg, 1999, p. 623), but the Ottoman Empire was considered a “European power […] deeply involved in European military and political affairs” (Quataert, 2005) and it—and later Turkey—shared since the 19th century the project of modernization with many other European countries. This included reforms such as checks on the monarch, centralization, secularisation and market reform (Dahlman, 2004, p. 555; see also: Faroqhi, et al., 1994; and: Goffman, 2004).

From a normative point of view, Turkey should join the Union not only because it would be a strong statement that Islam in general and Turkey in particular belong to Europe but also because Turkey is proof of the Union’s deep transforma-
tion capacity. In 1999 Turkey became a candidate for accession and, with the promise of membership at sight, Ankara’s government started an impressive harmonization process between 1999 and 2004 during which it adjusted its legal framework to meet the Copenhagen criteria, especially concerning human rights as well as liberal and democratic EU standards (Hale, 2011; Kalaycıoğlu, 2011).

Its main contents can be summarised as: the revision of the constitution so as to enhance freedoms of speech and association and the passage of a new Law of Associations; the enactment of new Criminal and Civil Codes; the complete abolition of the death penalty, and legal changes to facilitate the prosecution of public officials responsible for torture and maltreatment of prisoners; and the passage of legislation allowing broadcasting in languages other than Turkish, as a first step towards the recognition of Kurdish cultural rights (Hale, 2011, p. 325).

In 2004, accession negotiations were opened and soon put to a halt. The main reasons for this turn were government changes in France and Germany (Hale, 2011, p. 326) and the accession of Cyprus to the Union. The new governments of Sarkozy and Merkel opposed Turkish membership because it runs against the preferences of their electoral bases and so have blocked crucial negotiation chapters. Meanwhile, the conflict with Cyprus has been used as the politically correct excuse to keep Turkey out of the Union.

It has been argued that Turkey’s admission to the EU would be a risk because “Turkey is sometimes defending positions in clear contrast with those of the EU” (Andoura, 2005, p. 5). On the one hand this does not make much sense. The EU does not have a coherent foreign policy to begin with (Raines, 2011), not even—or maybe especially particularly—when it comes to decisive matters like energy policy, responsibility-to-protect interventions, bilateral relations with leaders from dictatorial or authoritarian countries (Bialasiewicz, 2011), immigration and asylum or even with respect to the sensitive issue of Israel and Palestine—to provide some examples. On the other hand, if Turkey is increasingly willing to practice a foreign policy that is in conflict with the Union’s is only because it feels cheated by it (Aktar, 2008).

The EU has been negotiating in bad faith with Turkey since this country approached membership in 2004. For one, the Union is asking Turkey to open its
ports to Cyprus even though it knows that in the eyes of Turkish voters this would be perceived as a betrayal by their government of the Turkish Cypriots. They are isolated in the north of Cyprus despite being the ones displaced by the Greek-backed Greek Cypriot coup of 1974 and in spite of having voted in favour of the island’s reunification in the referendum of 2004 (Do Céu Pinto, 2010, p. 89). Complying with this Union’s demand would not only be morally questionable but also politically absurd for any Turkish government. After all, admitting a divided Cyprus in 2004 without using the pre-accession leverage to pressure the Greek Cypriot side to end the island’s partition was a clear blunder on the Union’s part. For another, without giving Ankara any accession guarantees the EU is asking it to implement the most onerous chapters of the accession negotiations—especially the one concerning competition—that all previous candidate countries adopted only once they had a clear promise of membership. The Turkish government, of course, perceives that these unreasonable demands are a charade and it is not willing to give in to any of them before the Union makes a clear commitment regarding Turkey’s accession, which means agreeing upon a fixed date for it to happen no matter what or other assurance that makes the admission of Turkey inevitable (Economist, 2010d; Aktar, 2008).

However, what I am trying to prove in this thesis is not that the EU should enlarge but that its conflict resolution model will lead it to. I argue this not from a normative but from a realist position. If one takes into account the Union’s model as well as its strategic interests, the rejection of Turkey’s application would be an irrational decision on the Union’s side (Economist, 2009a). First, a fundamental assumption is that Turkey will hardly settle for anything less than full membership (Economist, 2010d), which has become especially relevant now that the increased Turkish economic and diplomatic stature has grown and is emboldening it to drift apart from the Union (Economist, 2010a). If the EU stubbornly delays Turkey’s accession it risks trading a crucial geopolitical ally for an assertive country with an independent foreign policy in areas that the Union itself considers security priorities (such as NATO cooperation, immigration, nuclear weapons and energy security).
After all the reforms that Turkey has done at the EU’s request, rejection, in
the best of cases, would be taken as diplomatic offense by Ankara and could stir a
Turkish confrontational foreign policy towards the Union. Even assuming that
Turkey’s response was well-tempered, its exclusion would mean that Nicosia will
remain the only divided EUropean capital and that the deadlocked conflict in Cy-
prus would become a recurrent cause of friction with Turkey (Hugg, 1999, pp. 634-
645)—unless change from within the island took place. Besides, Turkey’s exclusion
could endanger EUropean security by estranging a crucial NATO partner and exa-
cerbating the US as yet another proof of EUropeans’ lack of commitment to trans-
atlantic security (Dahlman, 2004, p. 572; Economist, 2010b; Sayarı, 2011). The refusal
to embrace Turkey would also compromise Union’s access to the energy-rich Cau-
casian and Caspian regions and so risk the viability of the Nabucco pipeline which
is necessary to achieve energetic independence from Russia (Do Céu Pinto, 2010, p.
96). Furthermore, by rejecting Turkey the Union would be giving up diplomatic
presence, border control and monitoring capacity over a conflict-ridden region
involving terrorism, nuclear weapons and energetic resources. Finally, leaving Tur-
key out of the EUropean project could be a major blow for the Union’s most pow-
erful foreign policy tools, namely enlargement and the ENP, by divesting them
from their major strength: the promise—even if only whispered—of eventual ac-
cession. This would undermine the very conflict resolution model of the Union.
Why would candidate or ENP countries comply with the Union’s demands and
burdens after losing their major incentive? And even if this incentive was offered to
them, how could they trust the EU after Turkey’s rejection?

The repercussions for the Union’s domestic politics would not be insignifi-
cant either. Turkey’s rejection would be the confirmation that the definition of
Europe as understood by the Union is white and non-Muslim. This could encour-
age xenophobic parties across the EU and alienate large EUropean-Muslim popula-
tions by sending them the message that their kind is not welcome (Dahlman, 2004,
p. 560). This signal could stoke the assimilation problems that Turkish and Muslim
migrants experience in countries like Germany and France, where the political
relevance of this issue has gained in importance.
To weigh up the ramifications that may arise from the fate of Turkey’s application is to realise not only that it is a highly complex case but most importantly that turning down Turkey’s candidacy would amount to what a specialized blog has even called “madness” (Economist, 2009a). Turkey’s enlargement negotiations might be being delayed in the expectation of better times. Maybe the end of the financial crisis will make EUropean voters less concerned about immigration and more tolerant towards the admission of Turkey, whose imaginary floods of immigrants cause much anxiety across the EU (McLaren, 2007; Servantie, 2007). Or maybe the wave of revolutions in the Arab-Islamic world will wash away the idea that Muslims are a threat and make Turkish membership more palatable for EUropean voters and leaders alike. Maybe not. However, the number and complexity of the snags surrounding Turkish accession leads one to ask why was did the EU admit this country’s candidacy in the first place? Some have argued that,

Given the fundamental problems of Turkish membership, the popular skepticism and the strong and persistent divisions among the member states are hardly surprising. Rather, it is puzzling that the EU has been able to agree on offering Turkey the concrete prospect of EU membership in 1999 and opening accession negotiations in 2005 (Schimmelfennig, 2009, p. 415).

What is astonishing then is not that Turkey’s accession process is following a rough path but that it is happening at all. This is the real mystery. Why admission negotiations were even started with Turkey in 2005? To answer this question we have to go back a few decades.

As part of the capitalist block’s strategy to buy Turkey into its sphere of influence, the EEC agreed to sign an Association Agreement with Ankara in 1963 that foresaw eventual membership once Turkey had complied with certain provisions regarding the gradual establishment of a customs union and economic reforms (Feld, 1965, p. 230; EEC & Turkey, 1963). This promise was made when the EEC was mainly conceived as an economic and not a political—much less a cultural—project, which explains why extending Turkey the prospect of membership was not a big deal back then. Because of this promise and Turkey’s progressive compliance, today the EU faces a normative institutional entrapment:
More precisely, it follows the entrapment hypothesis: Its fundamental community norms oblige the EU to consider all applications from European countries according to the same standards of liberal democracy. Turkey’s application could thus not be dismissed by reference to socioeconomic or cultural incompatibility. To the extent that Turkey complied with liberal-democratic norms, member states opposed to Turkish membership for economic or cultural reasons could not legitimately block the path to accession but were rhetorically entrapped (Schimmelfennig, 2009, p. 415).

According to this hypothesis, the EU cannot avoid advancing the accession negotiations with Turkey because it got itself into a rhetorical trap when it granted Turkey candidate status in 1999. The EU cannot back down from that commitment without losing legitimacy (Schimmelfennig, 2009, p. 429).

The rhetorical entrapment hypothesis is wrong. The Union has had plenty of opportunities to legitimately withdraw either the accession promise it made to Turkey in 1963 or the candidate status it granted it in 1999 and none the less it has not done it yet. Admission of a new member to the Union is decided by consensus, which implies an unavoidable conflict of preferences within the EU among elected leaders, national voters and unelected EU bureaucrats—which is especially pugnacious in this case—that has led to an impasse in which an approval of Turkey’s application cannot be agreed upon (Hugg, 1999, pp. 649-656). However, neither this gridlock nor the apparently unsolvable conflict among the EU, Cyprus and Turkey have been used as excuses to ditch Turkey’s candidacy.

On the Turkish side, EUropean indecision is pushing the Turkish government to react by showing that the Union has lost credibility and leverage in Turkey and that this could roll back a great deal of the created interdependence and even produce a backlash. This already seemed at the brink of happening when Turkey was excluded from the group of countries that could begin accession negotiations with the Union in the Luxembourg European Council meeting of 1997:

Former communist dictatorships Bulgaria and Romania would begin accession negotiations before long-time Western ally Turkey?

The discord erupted immediately. As the Summit ended, Turkey reacted strongly, rejecting the rhetoric as discriminatory, declaring that Turkey would “have no political dialogue with the European Union from now on,” and that relations with the EU would be based only on existing agreements. The Turkish government then threatened to withdraw its EU appli-
cation and even to annex northern Cyprus as a part of Turkey itself. Turkish officials also suggested a boycott or a selective tax on EU imports and possible renegotiation of the customs union. Prime Minister Yilmaz made clear his intention to reshape the country’s foreign policy, no longer interested in pleasing EU critics. Soon, the government “showed its intention to pursue political and trade ties independently of the EU by receiving Victor Chernomyrdin, the first Russian prime minister to visit Ankara.” The meeting produced a US$20 billion gas transmission deal, and one Turkish leader urged retaliation against the EU by establishing a joint market with Russia and other central Asian countries (Hugg, 1999, p. 652).

More recently, Turkey’s foreign policy has relied on the country’s economic and diplomatic strength that make it a “local diplomatic giant” to conduct a more independent foreign policy (Economist, 2010e). Along with Brazil, another middle power, Turkey tried to break a deal with Iran to solve the Persian country’s diplomatic confrontation with the US and the EU over its nuclear programme. Turkey has also denounced Israel’s crimes against the Palestinians and confronted them over the blockade of Gaza. Contrary to the hysterical outcries that see these bold moves as alarming signs of Turkey drifting away from “the West”, I believe that this strategy is designed to put pressure on the EU by showing it a preview of the kind of leverage that the CESDP would achieve or let go depending on the fate of Turkish EU membership. It is both a bait and a warning at the same time. However, as the recent establishment of a Turkish Ministry for EU Affairs shows, far from turning into the next Iran, Turkey’s priority is still EU membership.

These ups and downs show that just as the EU has missed the opportunities to back down on the promise of Turkish membership, so has Turkey refrained from its threats to part ways with the Union. They are bluffing each other in the hope of making the other yield to the other’s preferences. On the one hand, EU leaders want Turkey to accept the privileged partnership—i.e. everything but freedom of movement for workers—to beef up the CESDP without stirring their voters’ anxieties over Turkish immigration. Turkey, on the other hand, wants to speed up its accession by playing on the European fears of Muslim radicalisation and courting Russia. It is a game whose equilibrium is the eventual membership of Turkey to the EU.
Why? Because more than a rhetorical entrapment there is an interdependency entrapment. Turkey was offered candidate status in 1999 and access negotiations in 2004 not because an existing rhetorical straitjacket but because leaving Turkey out of the EUropean project would be by far the most careless and bizarre geopolitical mistake in the Union’s history. In this sense, the claim recently made by Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan and its Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu is not off the mark: the EU needs Turkey as much as Turkey needs the EU (Spiegel, 2011). Such are the perils of interdependence.

The Union granted Turkey candidate status not because it was rhetorically entrapped—although it was—but because to the EU Turkey is an irreplaceable asset for diplomatic, economic, political and geostrategic reasons and the bonds of interdependence between them have become too strong:

“To assert that the EU needs Turkey more than the other way round sets the wrong tone, making it sound as though the supplicant is Brussels, not Ankara” (Economist, 2010d). This may have been true in 1963 but not anymore. Turkey first became important for the EU as a strategic geopolitical partner during the Cold War, when the US made Anatolia a pillar of their containment policy and thus of EEC security (Erdoğdu, 2002; Sayarı, 2011, p. 253). This importance has not disappeared. The residues of a Cold War mentality in Russia along with its belligerent foreign policy; as well as the strategic significance that the Caucasus, Caspian Sea and Middle East regions have acquired for EU security have only increased Turkey’s relevance for the Union, not diminished it.

Turkey is crucial because its admission or rejection would change everything. This country’s relation with the Union is a paradigmatic case that confronts the Union’s best virtues against its worst vices. Because of its location and infrastructure Turkey represents a unique strategic asset in matters of oil and gas access as well as monitoring of nuclear weapons and unwanted migration; its young population represents a potential economic relief for greying Europe; its military capabilities would substantially strengthen Europe’s military capabilities; its Muslim faith would endow the EU with diplomatic legitimacy to deal with Islamic countries; and because of its democracy and liberalism Turkey is a model for Mus-
lim democracies around the world (Hugg, 1999, p. 625). This is particularly relevant now that many predominantly Muslim countries are freeing themselves from dictatorships. As if that were not enough, Turkish EU membership would change the whole EUropean discourse by forcing it to recognise Islam as part of European culture, history and the EU project. This would make the case for the possible future membership of other Muslim free-market democracies, which might flourish precisely in the southern Mediterranean coast—a region of critical importance for the Union.

Turkey’s accession represents a triangular dilemma amongst sweet geopolitical gains, sour domestic politics and hard integration realities. From a geopolitical perspective rejecting Turkey’s accession would amount to unthinkable foolishness. From the point of view of national politics, however, Turkey’s admission seems almost impossible to sell to voters right now. Finally, Turkey’s integration to EU institutions would change the face of the Union more than any previous enlargement has. Turkish membership would introduce a whole new package of problems to the Union. Its sheer size would give it “considerable blocking power” in both the EUropean Parliament and Council and its socioeconomic disparities along with its size would make it a recipient of expensive cohesion and structural funds; and the diffusion of its immigrants across the Union would raise confrontations. However, Turkey’s accession could revive the spirit of interdependence and supra-nationalism that has brought peace and development to the western part of Europe and kill the resurgent xenophobic anxieties that made it excruciatingly miserable not long ago. It sounds like a good trade-off and, in any case, Turkey’s accession is the most likely outcome.

**The southern coast of the Roman Empire**

In 1987, the EUropean Council considered that Europe does not extend below its Mediterranean coast and rejected King Hassan II’s submission arguing that Morocco is not a European country and therefore not eligible for membership. The Council referred to Article 49 of the Treaty on the European Community which states that, “Any European State which respects the principles set out in Article
6(1) may apply to become a member of the Union”. According to Article 6(1), “The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States (European Union, 2006). This raises an intriguing question. Why the European Council based its rejection of Morocco’s application on the grounds that it is not a European country instead of adducing that it does not meet the liberal and democratic criteria set out in article 6(1)?

There are many possible and equally plausible answers. Maybe it was a diplomatic way of saying that the economic gap between the EEC and Morocco was too big without bringing up Morocco’s undemocratic and illiberal features. It must also be noted that in 1987 the EEC was too busy with the recent accession of Spain and Portugal and with devising the establishment of a single currency and monetary union (Baun, 1995-1996, p. 608) to care about a country like Morocco that was clearly nowhere near meeting the necessary criteria to join the EEC. Be it as it may, the chief thing to bear in mind is that the EEC’s decision to deny Morocco’s application was an instrumental definition of “Europe” to solve a contingent problem, not an unchallengeable recognition of unsolvable differences. The Council dismissed Morocco’s application using European identity in the same manipulative way as “much of the history of European integration has been written in a propagandistic spirit by various enthusiasts of a united Europe” (Milward, 1993, p. 184). Yet, one could argue that the Council wanted to convey the forthright message that Morocco could not, under any circumstances, become an EU member. This is the strongest argument to affirm that Morocco can never be admitted into the EU. However, there are a number of reasons to believe that this snub to Morocco does not imply its permanent exclusion from the EU.

Even conceding that in 1987 the Council came to the conclusion that Morocco could never become part of the Union, it would be naïve to expect the Council to stick to its opinion independently of the changes that both the EU and Morocco undergo. I say this from a constructivist approach, departing from the fundamental premise that ideas are contingent social constructs shaped by the whimsical hands of time. This is what I have tried to validate in the previous chapters by
showing that the Union’s model has the capacity to transform the way whole
countries think about each other. The case of Turkey in particular should stand out
as proof that within the Union’s model there is much more than meets the eye.

Does a plainspoken rejection from the Council preclude a country from ever
becoming a Union’s member? Not by far—I contend. The previous chapters have
already addressed the artificiality of the limits Prodi set out for the EU when he
said that “The integration of the Balkans into the European Union will complete
the unification of the continent” (Prodi, 2002). The deconstruction of the idea of
Europe reveals that the confident certainty with which the European Council re-
jected Morocco’s application to join the EEC in 1987 was based on clear political
objectives rather than on an essentialist historical and cultural incompatibility.
This means that Morocco was not ripe enough to be considered for admission in
the past but might be in the future. Would the EU reject Morocco’s application
again should it become a democracy with a vibrant economy? What is at issue is
the way EU enlargement works. As I have suggested, the EU has a tendency to
enlarge or to inadvertently plant the seed of enlargement in order to solve conflicts
in its periphery—even if rebordering is not the intended initial purpose.

This is already happening in Morocco. For one, Moroccan officials are very
straightforward about their ambitions towards the EU. In 2006 former Moroccan
Prime Minister Driss Jettou expressed his country’s desire to become “the southern
rib of Europe”. The Union is not unresponsive to such ambitions. The then Euro-
pean Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy,
Benita Ferrero-Waldner, replied to this, “We already have a very, very close relation-
ship with Morocco, and we’re studying giving them even more advanced
status” (Vencat, 2006). What this shows is that, even if Morocco’s application to
the EU in 1987 was laughable, in less than 20 years the Union has visibly changed
its dismissiveness for ambiguity.

For another, through the ENP the Union is creating the kind of interde-
pendence with Morocco that reminds of previous enlargements. Although the pri-
orities of the EU in Morocco are mainly economic and energetic—political issues
are secondary except for the area of Justice and Home affairs— (Carafa &
Korhonen, 2008, p. 1), regime change is slowly taking place. The EU is cautious about fostering reforms to enhance democracy and respect for human rights, liberalising agricultural trade and mobility of persons; and getting involved in the Western Sahara (Emerson, 2008, p. 11). Political issues are very sensitive for the Moroccan government and so cannot be bluntly put in the ENP agenda because, unlike traditional models of conflict resolution, the EU model and therefore the ENP require compromise between two parts. Such mutual arrangement cannot take place if one of them, in this case the Union, brusquely pushes for regime change. Therein lies the subtlety of the EU model, it can provoke regime change without explicitly advocating it or directly trying to cause it. This creates a sentiment of ownership in peripheral countries by allowing them to think that reform and harmonization with the Union it is their own idea and not an imposition.

The most interesting part of the ENP is that its blending of political correctness with egoistic interests has unintended consequences. Here is where Morocco’s agency comes into play. If one looks at the last ENP Progress Report for Morocco from 2009 it becomes clear that the country is involved in a committed long term process of assimilating into the EU. The ENP towards Morocco is divided in six main reform chapters: 1) political; 2) economic and social; 3) trade and market regulations; 4) justice, liberty and security; 5) transport, energy, environment, information, research and development; 5) intercultural contact, education and health; and 6) financial cooperation (European Commission, 2010a).

In the political arena Morocco seems to be willing to implement reforms as long as they do not curtail the power of the ruling class. On the one hand, there has been progress in empowering civil society (Dimitrovova, 2009); increasing women’s rights and protections; the safeguard of cultural and linguistic rights, amendments that foster decentralisation; the establishment of an anti-corruption watchdog (*Instance centrale de prévention de la corruption*) and an Equity and Reconciliation Commission (*Ibid.*, p. 7); the drafting of laws to prevent child labour; an increase in education, justice and health budgets; and the signing of a cooperation agreement with EUROPOL to tackle terrorism.
On the other hand, Morocco appears to be selectively failing in implementing reforms that could eventually challenge the primacy of the political elite. Morocco is willing to adopt political modernisation and even liberal-democratic institutions as long as the monarchy can keep the tools to hold its grip on power in case of political struggle. That is why Morocco has not made any concessions regarding torture, lack of freedom of speech and the right of association; and it has refrained from signing the Rome statute of the International Criminal Court. Yet though, in the remaining 5 chapters of its ENP Action Plan Morocco is not opposing any resistance to the implementation of reforms and alignment with EU standards—even if its pace is sluggish and progress is far from being flawless.

In the economic and social field Morocco has launched the National Initiative of Human Development (*Initiative nationale de développement humain* [INDH]) to fight poverty, increased the work accident insurance and the family allowances, dialogue with unions and the International Labour Organization to improve work conditions, genre quotas and sustainable development.

In the trade and market areas, negotiations between Morocco and the EU are making slow but continuous progress in which Morocco is increasingly adopting regulations and promoting modernisation based on EU standards and practices. This involves customs, movement of goods, sanitary and phytosanitary issues, foreign investments, banking, liberalisation of services, the financial and fiscal sectors, competition policy, intellectual and industrial property protection, transparency in government contracts, governmental statistics, auditing, capital circulation and consumer protection, entrepreneurial policy, public finances and internal financial control. The progress in these sectors is mixed, advancing faster or slower depending on the case but the remarkable thing is that the progress is continuous.

Regarding justice and security, cooperation between Morocco and the EU has been characterized by regular information exchange over migration. Morocco is studying the establishment of a legal and institutional asylum framework and has adopted conventions and policies to fight organised crime, drug trafficking and
money laundering. There has also been progress in judicial and police cooperation between Morocco and the EU.

With respect to transportation, Morocco is adopting EU standards and investing in infrastructure to build and adjust roads, railways, airplanes and ports. Concerning energy and electricity production, Morocco is increasingly cooperating with the EU to guarantee energy security (especially regarding nuclear energy) and sustainable development by adopting UN regulations, investing in renewable energy sources and undertaking studies to foster climate change adaptation. Regarding information, Morocco is developing programmes to make available 3G technologies for PCs and fostering an information and communication technologies culture.

In its educational sector Morocco has extended mandatory education until the age of 15 and is trying to increase the numbers of students enrolled in schools. The country is also making reforms to allow young students and professionals to get training and professional experience and give them access to more cultural and educational opportunities.

As the ENP documents show, Morocco is undergoing a deep makeover to look every time more like the EU. Certainly this North African country does not show full compliance with all the demands coming from the Union. There has not been progress at all in some areas and in others the advancements have been slow or intermittent at best. As mentioned before, political liberties and the human rights protection of political dissidents have still a long way to go before they meet EU standards because the Moroccan ruling elite is not willing to make concessions that could undermine their power. However, what is amazing is neither that Morocco is failing or lagging behind in the pursuit of some specific objectives demanded by the Union nor that it has not been transformed overnight into a liberal democracy, but rather the decisiveness that it is showing to look as much as possible as the EU.

Morocco is following a resolute way towards “EU ropeanisation”. If this pattern continues, why would the EU refuse to reborder in order to include a periph-
eral country that had approximated the Union’s standards to such a degree that it resembles more a European member than an outsider—especially considering all the economic and geopolitical gains associated with admitting a new member? Moreover, as all previous enlargements show, how could the Union resist such an enlargement, not only in rhetorical and diplomatic but also in material terms? To talk merely about Morocco’s increasing dependency on European incentives misses a crucial element of the interdependency that the Union creates in its borders, its mutuality. Why is the Union interested in having an association with Morocco that looks so much like enlargement? Because apart from energy, the southern Mediterranean is the source of one of the Union’s main concerns, illegal immigration. Benita Ferrero-Waldner synthetized the way in which the EU tries to do stop immigration through the ENP:

We really want to make a reality for everyday citizen of the partner countries. But we want also to show to our own citizens that to having more stability, more prosperity, more security, can only be brought about if we are working together. Think of the migration. I mean, if we help our neighbourhood countries, then of course they will certainly rather want to stay in their own countries, create jobs there, get possibilities for really bringing up their families, instead of coming here. And therefore, for instance, the migration issue is very close linked to the issue of better trade relationships with these countries (EuroNews, 2007)

The ENP is a recognition that the Union’s interests are best served by supporting and guiding the development of its peripheral countries. It is an egoistic altruism driven by the same colonial self-righteousness condensed in the ethos of the *mission civilisatrice* that was the moral justification for previous European colonial empires, with the critical difference that it does not impose itself but asks for permission. And yet, this benevolent colonialism is more than sheer domination, for it has the potential of producing the unintended consequence of assimilating the colony into the metropole. I do not intend to dwell upon the moral implications of this model because I do not even know if it does more good than evil or whether its benefits outweigh the harms it produces. My point is that, even though the dependency is asymmetrical and not guided by the best moral intentions, the EU has ended up relying every time more on Morocco. On the one hand, the Spanish territories of Ceuta and Melilla embedded in northern Morocco have become

[142]
two of the most important beachheads of border controls to stop illegal immigration. On the other hand, the border between Morocco and Spain—and the Union—has been fading as the flows of capital, goods and filtered labour have increased (Ferrer-Gallardo, 2008).

The painful power of interdependence promoted by the EU model could hardly be more dramatically staged than in the case of Turkey’s admission process. A similar scenario seems to be unfolding in Morocco and, should Turkey join the EU, the eventual admission of Morocco to the Union—or any other neighbouring Muslim liberal democracy for that matter—would not be far-fetched, especially now that the door for reform has opened along North African borders.

**The Union’s historical responsibility**

As the interventions in Kosovo and Libya have exposed, the EU and NATO overlap according to the principle of functional differentiation or division of labour: NATO—i.e. the US for the most part—takes on the conventional military tasks while the EU specializes in security matters of a more civilian character (Koenig, 2010, pp. 25-26). Through NATO the EU has access to the US military capabilities and thus to what the largest military expenditure in the world can afford (SIPRI, 2010, p. 11)—especially the second largest stock of nuclear weapons after Russia (SIPRI, 2010, p. 16) and the biggest fleet of aircraft carriers (United States Navy, 2010).

On its own, the EU “has little capability to transport its troops across significant distances—more than 70 percent of European land forces cannot deploy” (Goldgeier, 2010, p. 14)—and lacks the stamina to remain involved for longer than a few months in a mission in its own borderlands that concerns its very own core interests (Economist, 2011). The fact that EU contributions to NATO are every time lower does not mean that the Union’s countries do not value the organisation or that it has lost its purpose but rather that they know they can freeload under the huge military umbrella provided by the US. But the US is not willing to undertake the missions that the EU requires to stop the flows of refugees
coming from Africa. Therefore, the Union cannot rely on the occasional responsibility-to-protect military intervention to put at ease its North African neighbours and will be forced to rely on its model of conflict resolution if it wants to make the southern Mediterranean a zone of prosperity, security and stability.

The Union’s degree of commitment in North Africa is likely to be enduring because the revolutions in its abutting Arab-Islamic countries removed the safety valves of immigration that were provided by autocratic regimes in northern Africa (Bialasiewicz, 2011). The Union noticed this immediately after the beginning of the Arab spring and its warships and planes rushed into the African Mediterranean coast, not to help Tunisians, Egyptians or Libyans “but to stop refugees and migrants from landing on European shores or to bring home EU nationals” (Economist, 2011a). This did not preclude thousands of Africans from fleeing to the EU and creating a refugee problem that produced a major crisis in the Schengen space. Since the governance cracks opened by the North African revolutionary earthquake are likely to remain open for a long time, the Union can have the certainty that instability in this strategic region of its periphery will be a constant threat to its security. My prediction, in this case, is that the EU will do what it does best and will use its peculiar model of conflict resolution to penetrate the convulsed North African region with its conditionality and standards of governance. To some extent, this is a proof of falsifiability that can corroborate or disprove my model. At least for now, the EU has realised that the situation in North Africa calls for its neo-imperial dominance and seems to be developing a more muscular version of the ENP for countries like Tunisia, Libya and Egypt (Emerson, 2011).

The recent revolutions in Muslim-Arabic countries represent a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity for EU leaders and bureaucrats as well as a rare historical chance for the Union. Since the terrorist attacks on New York, Islamic-inspired terrorism has fuelled a discourse of demonization against Muslims which at times seems to be acquiring a worrying pitch that brings to mind the hysterical racism displayed on the pages of Der Stürmer—the anti-Semite Nazi tabloid. Worried by increasing immigration from North Africa, this racist rhetoric is bringing a dangerous ideology out of the solitary confinement to which it was condemned after the
Second World War and releasing it into the public debate of EUropean countries from which it had been kept at bay for decades. This discourse portrays Muslims as genetically “undemocratisable” and immigrants from poor countries as disposable and deportable lives (Van Houtum H., 2010).

For these reasons, the EU faces a struggle with its own moral standing along its southern border. This resonates even louder given the prospective of the recent Arab uprisings. How would the EU react if its whole North African neighbourhood started to democratise? On the one hand, the collapse of the Tunisian, Egyptian and Libyan governments has cracked the dam that restricted African immigration (Bialasiewicz, 2011) and now thousands of immigrants are landing on the southern shores of the EU (Economist, 2011d). On the other hand, regime change in these countries represents both an opportunity to tackle radical political Islam and combat terrorism and a threat should Islamic fundamentalists “kidnap” the revolution as they did in Iran in 1979. In any case, the EU will have to expand and increase its conflict resolution mechanisms and efforts in northern Africa because not doing so would imply gambling the development of a chaotic periphery in which unwanted immigration, terrorism and rogue states threaten the EU’s comfort (Van Houtum & Pijpers, 2007). Returning to the topic of Turkey, its potential accession would enhance the Union’s ability to conduct responsibility to protect operations because Turkey has the second largest army in NATO after the US (Do Céu Pinto, 2010). Besides, Turkey’s Muslim identity and democratic credentials would endow the Union with the moral legitimacy to influence its North African neighbours and provide it with a blueprint to reconcile Islam with liberal values.
The Union’s international ambitions

The economic interdependence promoted by the EU is a seed first sown by the ECSC. The aftermath of the Second World War was the prelude for the foundation of two international organisations, the ECSC and the UN. The ECSC’s prosaic name and seemingly parochial objectives were understandably eclipsed by the grandiose project represented by the UN and its promise of international peace and security. It suffices to contrast the brief and sober Schumann Declaration against the commanding language of the UN Charter.

However, the EU is more than a regional organisation because its aims as professed in its founding documents have explicit world-wide ambitions. The first line of the Schuman Declaration states that “World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it” (Schuman, 1959, p. 1). In the same document Schuman goes further and envisions the building of a European federation as a contribution to civilisation’s peaceful relations not the least of whose aims would be the development of Africa (Idem). These proclamations could be readily dismissed as mere diplomatic grandiloquence if they were not a commonplace found throughout all of the Union’s key documents. From Rome to Lisbon, EU treaties reaffirm and expand on the Union’s commitment to universal objectives—many of which overlap with the most high-minded goals of the UN Charter.

Despite of what politicians and scholars could have envisioned back in the 1950s, nowadays the EU seems better equipped than the UN to make war “materially impossible” by tying the hands of its members and neighbours through increasing interdependence. As a result, the reach of the EU’s foreign policy has expanded constantly throughout the Union’s history. The Treaty of Rome shyly expresses the European Economic Community’s resolution to “strengthen peace and
liberty, and [call] upon the other peoples of Europe who share their ideal to join in their efforts” (European Union, 1957, p. 2). The Maastricht Treaty reinforces this spirit by establishing a common foreign and security policy that aims at preserving peace by strengthening international security, international cooperation, democracy and the rule of law; and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (European Union, 1992, p. 7). The Lisbon Treaty further extends the borders of these commitments by including conflict resolution, sustainable development and global governance (European Union, 2007, pp. 23-24).

The EU resembles a project of international organisation that has long been advocated. The idea of a federation of civilised states has been floating around since the beginnings of modern internationalist thinking that started to develop at the outset of the 20th century (e.g. Hobson, 1902). During World War II, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill devised a project for a league of Anglo-Saxon democracies to be set up in case Nazi Germany won the war (Mazower, No Enchanted Palace: The end of empire and the ideological origins of the United Nations, 2009). More recently, during the 2008 presidential campaign in America, John McCain proposed the establishment of a League of Democracies which—unlike the UN—would not aspire to universal membership but to bringing like-minded nations to work together when the UN failed to relieve human suffering (McCain, 2007).

For these reasons, the EU has the potential to become the blueprint to implement the most promising pillar of the responsibility to protect: prevention. In comparison to the UN, the EU has many advantages to prevent mass atrocities from happening. Most notably, the Union’s main asset when it comes to prevention is its model of conflict resolution that can avert mass atrocities—even though that is not its objective—by strengthening the institutional weaknesses that make states more likely to tolerate or incite crimes against their own populations. It is important to stress that these virtues are the result of the EUropean model of conflict resolution and not of EUropean countries in particular. This means that the model can be adopted, replicated and even improved by other regional organisations. Should this happen, a world of several “European Unions” could emerge and
create a more global, coherent and peaceful world governance than what exists today.

**The Union as a prototype for a world state**

At least from Dante Alighieri (1904 [1312?]) to Hugo De Groot (2001 [1625]) to Immanuel Kant (1903 [1795]), the idea of a world state has been floating around for centuries (Weiss, 2009). Although traditionally it has been associated with unrealistic idealism of scant empirical substance, the accelerated growth and refinement of international organisation during the last two centuries has gradually divested this idea of its implausibility. Nowadays, although still considered a fanciful prospective by some (Slaughter, 1997, p. 183; Slaughter, 2004, p. 8), others recognise not only the potential for a future world state (Weiss, 2009) but even its inevitability (Wendt, 2003). The preliminary form of such world state is commonly assumed to lie within the UN (Weiss, 2009), which is as understandable as it is misguided.

Drawing on Alexander Wendt’s work about the inevitability of a world state (2003) and his social theory of international politics (1992; 1999), the EU could be considered a self-organisation system that is already not far from meeting the requirements on a regional level to become a prototype for a world state (Wendt, 2003, p. 506). This is an idea that could be further researched. I have contended that conditional rebordering is hardwired to the EU’s model and that it has been the key to its success. Moreover, I have argued that the inertia of this model is the force behind recent enlargements, the ENP and future expansions that could, at least theoretically, eventually incorporate Turkey, Russia and even North African countries. I am not implying that the EU can expand without limits—especially if a proxy of EUropean nationalism or xenophobic passions keep gaining ground within the EUropean project. Should the Union take seriously the full implications of its model into consideration, it would realise that the strength of its foreign policy is mightier than it has dared to think.


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