ENP, a European Neo-colonial Partnership?
A study on the European Neighbourhood Policy in regard to the development of the Arab Spring in Tunisia and Algeria
ENP, a European Neo-colonial Partnership? A study on the European Neighbourhood Policy in regard to the development of the Arab Spring in Tunisia and Algeria

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Für meine Eltern,
die mich immer unterstützt haben meinen eigenen Weg zu gehen.
Summary
This master thesis analyses the foreign policy of the European Union (EU) across the Mediterranean Sea. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) forms the framework for the partnerships the Union has with its neighbouring countries. Because of the nature of the Union and its approach towards former colonies of EU member states, the approach of the Neighbourhood Policy is criticised for being neo-colonial (Boedeltje & Van Houtum, 2008).

To see whether and to what extent this is the case the second chapter will elaborate on the theoretical aspects of colonial legacies. These include the aspects of Said's book “Orientalism” (Said, 1979, pp. 300-301), which look at the difference created between the ‘East’ and the ‘West, abstractions of presentation and the (self-)definition of the actors, as well as whether the ‘Orient’ needs to be feared or to be controlled. Additionally to these main aspects the concepts of the construction of the ‘other’ and the construction of the border space were taken into account.

To frame the analysis the third chapter introduces the methodological framework. The execution of the analysis was framed by Ideologiekritik and discourse analysis. Ideologiekritik looks at the materialisation of social relations, whereas discourse analysis looks at power structures though the production of meaning. Furthermore this chapter describes the choice and use of the data as well as the framework of the analysis.

The fourth chapter outlines the general background of European foreign policy, especially across the Mediterranean, and the historical background of the European Neighbourhood Policy. In the second part of the analysis a first analysis of the Neighbourhood Policy is made, which also regards the strategy of the policy before and after the developments of the Arab Spring.

To elaborate the European framework of foreign policy in more detail two case studies were chosen: the European approach towards Tunisia and Algeria, which are described in chapter five and six. Both countries have responded differently to the approach of the EU. The uprisings during the Arab Spring in 2011 have not changed the EU approach fundamentally, but might be a window of opportunity for closer cooperation. However, it is not possible to forecast future developments, because of the relatively young and different developments that are currently taking place within the Southern neighbours of the Union. Tunisia is in the process of changing its political system completely, whereas in Algeria it seems to be a more gradual political change through reforms.

The synthesis and the conclusion show that through the representation of the Union and its partner countries within the Union’s documents the main goal is the plan for a secure and stable border region. This does not hinder the Union to present itself as the ‘superior’ partner. Within these last chapters it is shown that the Union has a neo-colonial ideology towards its neighbouring countries. The Union has created a neo-colonial partnership with the ENP and at the moment this leads to the construction of a heterogeneous border space.
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1. Introduction Across the Mediterranean

All geopolitical relationships have a historical background and are contested, as is especially shown by the relationship between Europe and the Arab world: The empires of these geographical entities have been disputing common geographical space for centuries (Hourani, 2005, pp. 299-301). For example, the Ottoman Empire has ruled over large parts of what is now known as the Middle East, and even some parts of North Africa and Eastern Europe (Hourani, 2005). The period of colonisation also had a major influence, as colonial rulers tried to spread ‘Western’ norms and values. In this period France, which is now a member of the European Union, was ruling over most parts of the Maghreb region, where nowadays Algeria and Tunisia are located in, as well as other regions of the world (Meredith, 2009). These former regimes changed, so did their boundaries. Since the unification of Germany in 1990 (Schubert & Klein, 2006), the internal European borders are relatively fixed and since de-colonisation (Meredith, 2009) the Arab borders can be regarded as stable as well.

Even though territorial boundaries are fixed and nation states are of importance, the supranational federation of at the moment 27 European countries, the European Union (EU) has become an important international actor (Delanty & Rumford, 2005; Zielonka, 2007). The Unions relation towards its immediate neighbours is politically relevant. Therefore, the Union has developed the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) to deal with its immediate geographical surrounding, with the goal to create a stable and secure border region. Formerly the southern neighbours were under European colonial rule. Now, there is the discussion whether and to what extent the Unions influence beyond its borders includes legacies of colonialism (Boedeltje & Van Houtum, 2008).

Since the enlargement of 2004, the Union has to deal with a ‘new’ neighbourhood, consisting of Eastern and Southern neighbour countries. The countries in the South almost all share the Mediterranean as border space with the EU and have an Arab heritage. However, most of them participate within the ENP project, but not all to the same extent. Whereas the governments of Libya and Algeria are sceptical of the European influence beyond its own borders, Tunisia and Morocco embrace the economic advantages provided through the Neighbourhood project. To understand the relationship between the European Union towards its Southern neighbours the case studies of the ENP relation of Tunisia and of Algeria will be analysed. Additionally to the challenge of the Neighbourhood Policy, the recent developments of the Arab Spring need to be taken into account by looking at the EU relation across the Mediterranean. The Arab Spring consisted of uprisings against the regimes within the Arab world starting in spring 2011 and changed some political systems in the Maghreb region, but its effects are still present in the Arab countries, for example in the on-going civil war in Syria and the elections following the change of the political system in Tunisia.

1.1 European border space

As said above, the European Union has become an important international actor, even though within the Union the nation states are still present (Delanty & Rumford, 2005). The influence of
the EU does not only affect its internal spatial and political order, but also tries to deal with the external differences. Therefore, the Union has set up the European Neighbourhood Policy:

The policy emerged out of the need on how to deal with the Union’s new neighbours after the enlargement of 2004. During the negotiations for accession around 1998, the member states discussed their “proximity policy” (see also: Kuus, 2011; Smith & Webber, 2008; Tulmets, 2008, p. 113). From these discussions, the communication “Wider Europe – Neighbourhood” (Commission of the European Communities, 2003a) was defined in 2003 and in 2004, the European Neighbourhood Policy was developed (European Commission, nd.). The policy is set up with the aim to have no “new dividing lines in Europe and to promote stability and prosperity within and beyond the new borders of the Union” and to create “a ring of friends”, thus not members, “with whom the EU enjoys close, peaceful and co-operative relations” (Commission of the European Communities, 2003a, p. 4). To ensure this the EU offers its partner countries economic advantages, like free trade and investment offers, as well as an improved political dialogue and help with establishing social policy (Commission of the European Communities, 2006a, p. 2; Noutcheva & Aydin-Düzgit, 2012). This offers the Union a strategy of foreign policy towards its neighbouring states, which are not likely to become members of the EU (Sarto & Schumacher, 2005). The Neighbourhood Policy presents a tool of mediation and structuring of the physical surrounding of the Union and is directed towards the Southern and Eastern neighbours of the Union. The approach of the EU towards its Arab neighbours, the ENP is criticised for having a neo-colonial notion, as it is stimulated through economic advantages and social development towards the EU-neighbouring countries and therewith includes a projected superiority of the Union (Sarto & Schumacher, 2005). This critique will be employed in this research, especially regarding the relation of the Union across the Mediterranean, the Southern neighbours of the Union, because of the colonial history between the member states and the partner countries, as well as the recent development during the Arab Spring. It will be analysed whether and to what extent the European Union still has a neo-colonial ideology.

1.2 Arab Spring
Throughout 2011, the Arab Spring was the term to describe the revolutions and uprisings in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, but also in other Arab countries. Partly, these are still taking place, for example in Syria (ZEIT ONLINE, 2012). These uprisings started in Tunisia, when Mohamed Bouazizi put himself on fire on 17 December 2010 (Al Yafai, 2011; Asseburg, 2011; Eltahawy, 2011; Pillar, 2011). The self-immolation of Bouazizi inspired uprisings and revolts, which forced the Tunisian president to leave the country in January 2011 and inspired the revolutions all over the Arab world.

Most of the Arab states are currently undergoing political reforms or, in the case of Tunisia and Egypt, even change towards a different political system (Gurdian, 2011). These uprisings and revolutions force the EU to adjust its plans regarding their southern neighbours; as most of its negotiation partners, the former governments, were overthrown. In the past, the developments of revolutions were not always peaceful, and the outcome can lead to dysfunctional institutions and corrupt (political) systems (Emerson, 2011). So a close look towards these present developments is relevant. These processes can have major effects on the politics and economy of
the Maghreb, the region of the North-West of Africa, as well a possible spread effect for surrounding Arab and African countries. Even though the term ‘Arab Spring’ covers all the protests and revolutions going on in the Arab world, these developments are still very diverse and different in every country:

“How the complicated process of establishing a new political order will play out in each country, and the country-by-country differences in how it has played out so far, reflect differences in institutions and the distribution of power that predate any of the revolts.” (Pillar, 2011, p. 11)

This research focuses on countries in the Maghreb, especially on Tunisia and Algeria because these were countries where the uprisings of the Arab Spring took place from the early beginning of these uprisings. Even though, the developments of Arab Spring led to different outcomes and effects in these countries. These countries were less in the spotlight of European media, as their revolutions and uprisings are regarded as over and they are already in the process of changing their political system. The revolution in Tunisia (Mhenni, 2011) and the reforms in Algeria (Shaykh, 2011) changed the political systems mostly without help from external actors. Both states participate in the ENP project, but are on different levels of development in this partnership (European Commission, nd.). Whereas Tunisia has a policy accord with the EU, Algeria has not agreed on an accord with the EU yet. There is no blueprint on how these developments will turn out, “[b]ut regardless of how the transformation process starts, democratisation in Arab countries will take time, probably a lot of time” (Pillar, 2011, p. 16). The effects of the protests of the Arab world will take time, but in the meantime external actors, like the United States or the EU, can try to influence its outcomes. As some are frightened of religious Muslim groups coming into power (Cannistraro, 2011). Others have forecasted instability before the happenings of Arab Spring (Bunzel, 2011; Colombo, 2010). For the European Union, the Arab Spring can provide a window of opportunity for EU foreign policy and a possibility to influence its geographical neighbours towards implementing (European) values and their political systems.

1.3 Research objectives
The central goal of the research is the analysis of the recent changes of the European Neighbourhood Policies in regard to the Arab revolutions in Algeria and Tunisia. The analysis will focus on the documents of the EU and the language used within these documents to examine in which way the EU describes their relation towards Tunisia and Algeria. It will be evaluated to what extent the European Union still has a neo-colonial perspective.

To achieve this goal the power relations and discourses presented in the documents of the European Neighbourhood Policy will be analysed. Also, EU policy documents directed towards Tunisia and Algeria will be part of this analysis, as these are the chosen case studies. This research will be done according to the methodology of discourse analysis, which looks at “how language is used in certain contexts” (Rapley, 2007, p. 2) and ‘Ideologiekritik’, which is the German predecessor of discourse analysis. It examines the manifestation of (power) relations
more closely by regarding the “non-cognitive beliefs which are masquerading as cognitive” (Geuss, 1981, p. 31). These methods are chosen as they provide the possibility to look at the production of the meanings, the materialisation of power relation and discourses within these reality presented by the documents.

Therefore the main and sub questions within this research are:

1. **How does the (geopolitical) relationship between the European Union and the Arab world, in particular Tunisia and Algeria, develop during the Arab Spring?**

   a) **What were the main focus points of the ENP before the Arab Spring?**

   b) **What are the main changes of the external policies of the EU during (and after) the uprisings in the Arab world?**

2. **To what extent is there a neo-colonial ideology present in the official policy documents of the EU and the language these use?**

1.4 **Structure**

This thesis is structured in eight chapters. Chapter two will outline the theoretical framework of colonial legacies, which will also regard the aspect of the construction of the ‘other’ and geographical orders and borders. Chapter three will outline the practical issues of this research, the methodology, which is based on Ideologiekritik and discourse analysis. The next chapter is split in two sections: first a short general outline of the European foreign policy and then an analysis of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Chapter five includes the first case study and looks at the development of the ENP towards Tunisia. The following chapter regards the second case study, Algeria and its developments towards the EU and the ENP. Chapter seven is a synthesis in between the analysis of the ENP and the two case studies regarding the theoretical framework, which is followed by the conclusion of this thesis, as well as further suggestions.
2. Theoretical framework Colonial legacies

In this chapter the theoretical background for this thesis will be outlined. As the title says it will look at the legacies of colonial rule, which are nowadays described as post- and neo-colonialism. The discourse of neo-colonialism is argued to be still present in the relationship between Europe, for instance in its bilateral agreements towards its neighbouring countries. Through the conditionality implied in the European Neighbourhood Policy the EU is pressing political development in a direction of its own choice. The rewards of this partnership need to be enough to compensate for the loss of power of the countries which participate in the EN project (Noutcheva & Aydin-Düzgit, 2012). The accepted loss of power in exchange for economic advantages is not approved by all neighbouring countries of the EU: For example has Algeria not yet signed an Action Plan with the EU, which would present the legal framework of their relation according to the aspects of the ENP; whereas Tunisia is on the path towards offered European economic advantages. In the analysis this will be looked at in more depth. This chapter will first explain the idea behind colonial practices, before outlining the difference between post- and neo-colonialism. Subsequently the current implications of neo-colonialism will be explained, with the focus on the construction of ‘othering’ and the structuring of borders and neo-colonial ordering.

2.1 Colonial practices

“In those experiences I discerned an intimate, perhaps even the most intimate, and rich relationship between Occident and Orient. Those experiences were part of a much wider European or Western relationship with the Orient, but what seems to have influenced the Orient most was fairly constant sense of confrontation felt by Westerners dealing with the East. The boundary notion of East and West, the varying degrees of projected inferiority and strength, the range of work done, the kinds of features ascribed to the Orient: all these testify to a willed imaginative and geographic division made between East and West, and lived through during many centuries.” (Said, 1979, p. 201)

Neo- and post-colonialism deal with the legacies of colonialism. This is described as “the analysis of [the] relationship between culture, domination, and resistance” (Aitken & Valentine, 2006, p. 147) of the former colonial powers, nowadays the Western world, and the (or their) representation of the former dependent colonised countries, the East. Before it is possible to outline the legacies, first the practices of colonialism need to be clear: “Colonisation is the expansive form of a people: it is its power of reproduction: it is its enlargement and its multiplication through space: it is the subjection of the universe or a vast part of it to that people’s language, customs, ideas and laws” (Leroy-Beaulieu, around 1880: in Said, 1979, p. 219). Colonisation was not only imperial territorial expansion of the European empires, but it also created an intercultural space of exchange (Bueno Lacy, forthcoming; Mignolo, 2000). The colonial imperial power of European countries “combines a strong sense of the particularity of European culture with a strong claim to the universality of these values” (Aitken & Valentine, 2006, p. 149). The projected superiority of Europe (Huntington, 1996; Said, 1979, p. 201) shaped the picture created of the ‘other’, the colonised (also known as the East or the Orient). With the process of de-colonisation starting around 1960 (Meredith, 2009) the rule of the European empires diminished and the former colonies became independent. But some colonial
legacies, like the representation of the ‘other’, on which will be elaborated further on, are still present nowadays. Post- and neo-colonial theory tries to reveal these legacies and their implications. The process of ‘decolonising the mind’ needs to challenge the “self-image of the west as a self-determining, self-contained entity which is the unique origin of a universalizing history and culture” (Aitken & Valentine, 2006, p. 153).

To legitimate colonisation, the colonial rulers had several practices. One of them was the differentiation of themselves from the ones under their rule. The colonised were linked to “elements in Western society (delinquents, the insane, women, the poor) having in common an identity best described as lamentably alien” (Said, 1979, p. 207). Through the description of the colonised as “lamentably alien”, they were in need to be controlled, according to the coloniser. Not only this differentiation was crucial, but the colonised were also not allowed to define or shape the presentation of themselves. Said (1979, pp. 300-301) identifies these aspects of colonalist practices in his book “Orientalism”:

1. Absolute and systematic difference between East and West.
2. Abstractions about the Orient are always preferable “to direct evidence drawn from modern Oriental realities”.
3. The Orient is incapable of defining itself.
4. The Orient has either to be feared or to be controlled.

The representation of the Orient, the East, is thus based on a dichotomy, which is preferred to be abstract rather than taken from reality. The aspect of conditionality the EU set up to influence the politics of its neighbouring countries can be compared according to these points. To what extent these concepts are still (indirectly) visible and whether there is still a “structural dominance” of the European Union will be part of the analysis. In the next part the difference between the terms post-colonial and neo-colonial will be elaborated and afterwards the construction of ‘othering’, for structuring and administrative purposes, and the implications of (b-)ordering principles will be outlined.

### 2.1.1 Post-colonial and neo-colonial

As described above post- and neo-colonialism deal with the relationship of culture, domination and resistance of the former colonisers and colonised. Even though the decades of colonialism are regarded over, the terms post- and neo-colonialism suggest that the legacies of colonialism are still present. To prevent confusion of the terms, this part will elaborate in the terms. Shohat (1992) argues that:

“The term "post-colonial" carries with it the implication that colonialism is now a matter of the past, undermining colonialism’s economic, political, and cultural deformative-traces in the present. The "post-colonial" inadvertently glosses over the fact that global hegemony, even in the post-cold war era, persists in forms other than overt colonial rule.” (Shohat, 1992, p. 105)
According to Shohat the term “post-colonialism” implies that the matters related to it are in the past. She also criticises that as we are now living in the period after colonialism “post-colonial” could become a term to neutralise the geopolitical relationships of the past (Shohat, 1992, p. 103). The difficult, but significant, relationship of for example Algeria and France could be historically neutralised for both sides by using only the term ‘post-colonialism’, even though there was a brutal struggle for independence in Algeria. To prevent this neutralisation of the relationship from happening, she emphasises the connection of the term ‘post-colonial’ with other terms like ‘imperialism’ and ‘neo-colonialism’.

‘Imperialism’ has its focus more on the territorial expansion of the (colonial) empires, hence a more territorial and geographical implication. Whereas the “‘neo-colonial’, like the ‘post-colonial’ also suggests continuities and discontinuities, but its emphasis is on the new modes and forms of the old colonialist practices, not on a ‘beyond’” (Shohat, 1992, p. 106). The main difference between post-colonialism and neo-colonialism seems to be the focus on either what is beyond colonialism, thus the (still) present structures of colonialism, which is the main idea of post-colonialism; or a focus on the new forms and modes which emerged through and after colonialism as main idea of neo-colonialism. These concepts do not seem to be so far away from each other and both are relevant to analyse the legacies of colonialism. In this thesis the term neo-colonialism will be used to relate to address the legacies and new perceptions of colonial influence.

2.2 Neo-colonial practices
The reign of colonisation was legitimised by the European powers, at the time being, through the representation of their culture as superior to others, which gave them the position to bring ‘civilisation’ towards the subaltern rest of the world (Huntington, 1996). The colonial discourse is a “‘scientific’ fabrication of new representations of self and world that would provide alibis for domination, exploitation, and epistemic violation entailed by the establishment of colony and empire” (Spivak, 1999, p. 7). Neo-colonialism, as described above, deals with the legacies, but also with new emerging patterns of colonialist practices. An important part of colonialism was the representation of the colonised, the “oriental”, the “other”. Of all the legacies of colonialism this thesis will in particular look at two aspects: the colonial differentiation, or colonial ‘othering’, and the practices of (re-)structuring border space.

2.2.1 Colonial ‘othering’
“Colonial expansion produced or promised not only political and economic expansion, but also the opportunity to cultivate and impose a universal identity and a complementary value system, an enterprise reinforced by binary oppositions such as reason versus unreason, advanced versus primitive, and masculine versus feminine.” (Wurgaft, 1995, p. 80)

Following the aspects of Said, most of them address the differentiation and abstraction of the colonised. This differentiation can be regarded as a process of ‘othering’. Gurevitch (1988) argues that the process of ‘othering’ is engendered by irritation and disturbance through possible miscommunication, creating an obstacle for mutual understanding. Looking at the time
of colonial rule, this miscommunication lead to the representation of the colonised as underdeveloped, and as “lamentably alien”, as Said described it above. It was also strongly related to structural domination (Talpade Mohanty, 1988, p. 196). The colonial powers had no intention of sharing the power of representation, or the knowledge of construction, as Bhaba calls it (1983). To possibly overcome the barrier of misunderstandings and create a basis of equal communication, was never an issue for ruling class of colonisers. They made a selective choice of presenting the colonised as less worthy; otherwise their legitimate ground for ruling would have been taken away. The experience of the ‘other’ can be influenced by strong selectivity and was especially present during colonial rule and the choices of creating the ‘other’, the colonised; the East or Orient, as Said would call it (Said, 1979, p. 59). It is possible to perceive something as different, but selectively prefer to experience it as strange, because the perceiver is bothered and/or irritated by the experienced (Stichweh, 2004). The colonialist differentiation was a structural selective ‘othering’ according to place of birth, race and culture for the purpose of structural domination.

“If the project of Imperialism is violently to put together the episteme that will “mean” (for others) and “know” (for the self) the colonial subject as history’s nearly-selved other, the example of these deletions indicate explicitly what is always implicit: that meaning/knowledge intersects power.” (Spivak, 1999, p. 215)

Spivak shows clearly that through selective ‘othering’, the differentiation of coloniser and colonised, and the abstraction of the colonised, the knowledge and meaning about them creates power structures of domination over them. The objective of colonialism was to create a structure and system for administration on the basis of racial origin (Bhaba, 1983, p. 23). The knowledge of construction was denied to the colonised and therewith lay the power of representation with the superior colonisers (Bhaba, 1983, p. 30). Through representation the underlying power structures become visible: The “spontaneous effect of the ‘evidence of the visible’” (Abbott, in: Bhaba, 1983, pp. 31-32), the visible made difference between the colonisers and the colonised, the colonisers authorised and legitimised the discrimination of the colonised, the ‘other’. This legitimised and authorised discrimination which was created for the objective of administration and structuring, is also an explanatory construct, which “implies a relation of structural domination, and a discursive or political suppression of the heterogeneity of the subject(s) in question” (Talpade Mohanty, 1988, p. 196).

This process of structural and selective ‘othering’ did not only have the effect of administration, but it created also the identity of the coloniser. Through the comparison with the ‘other’, the colonised, the coloniser could create an image of his own culture and identity. The identity of a culture depends on the comparison with other cultures: “The understanding of one’s own culture comes through otherness, through the discovery of who we are in confrontation with otherness” (Hanđerek, 2008, p. 105). Culture, in this case, is a shared framework of meaning, a social system, a set of how to act and think the language of a culture and common ideas about how to live with common ways of experiencing a problem. As Spivak says: “The coloniser constructs himself as he constructs the colonised” (Spivak, 1999, p. 203). Identity and culture are social constructs, which depend on several dynamic features, including images of history, spatial identity, group identity and personal identities (Van Assche, 2004). Van Assche also says
that it is possible to have more than one identity (Van Assche, 2004, p. 167). The encounter of the ‘other’ depends on the definition of one’s own identity. The own identity needs to regard whether its focus lies on diversity, and the recognition of the ‘other’, or on division, the negation of the existence of ‘otherness’ (Hardt & Negri, 2000, pp. 192-195; Petersoo, 2007). Therefore, the colonial powers needed to create the ‘other’ in order to shape their own identity. Bhaba (1983) argues that the ambiguity of the colonial discourse and the inherent identities are based on the concept of ‘fixity of the other’. This ‘fixity’ is a “paradoxical mode of representation: it connotes rigidity and an unchanging order as well as disorder, degeneracy and daemonic repetition” (Bhaba, 1983, p. 18). Wurgaft argues that the “need [to] forge viable western identities” was the outset of colonialism all along (1995, p. 80).

After de-colonisation there was no more possibility of heterogenic ‘othering’, but the conceptual world order of the West and the East, the Orient, is still in use nowadays. In colonial times, the West consisted of the European (state) powers. In and during pre-cold war times, the world was divided into three categories: the competitors consisting of the First and the Second world; were the First world consisted of the West: USA, Canada and West-Europe, the Second World was the Soviet Union and its satellite countries, and the Third world: all the other countries which belonged neither to the First nor to the Second world, mostly development countries (Nations Online, nd; Worsley, 1984). Since the fall of the Berlin wall, this categorisation cannot be used any longer. Also the division between East and West is out of date and not that clear any more (Spivak, 1999, pp. 2-3; Worsley, 1984, p. 306). Despite the misspecification of the West, the term is still used (e.g. Huntington, 1996; Said, 1979; Spivak, 1999; Tessler, 2003). This is one of the colonial legacies, which has the effect that also the “West” is still seen as superior. According to Huntington, the core values of Western civilisation consist of the “Western values of democracy, free markets, limited government, separation of church and state, human rights, individualism, and the rule of law, and should embody these values in their institutions” (Huntington, 1996, p. 40). The export of these values to some legitimates and defines the superiority of the “West”. The present misrepresentation of the West (and therewith also indirectly the East) does not hinder the stereo-typification of the images connected to these. The power of representation is still a used legacy concerning the relation of the global North (what could be a possible image of the West) and the global South (what would then be the image of the ‘other’, the East). Other possible concepts include the relationship between the European Union, representing sometimes a part of the West, and its neighbouring countries, as the ‘others’, the East. This shows that the dichotomisation of the East and West is applicable whenever there are cultural, economic and/or political differences between geographical regions included. To resolve the misrepresentations between the colonised and the coloniser, the French writer born in Algeria, Albert Camus, suggested to properly seeing the ‘other’ as a way out (Kramsch, 2010). For him it was mostly a way out of the battle for independence between Algeria and France, but it can be applicable to neo-colonialist practices in general. For Camus seeing and understanding the other (voir l’autre) “can give meaning to combat, and perhaps also render it unnecessary” (Camus, 1965, in: Kramsch, 2010, p. 111).

With decolonisation the former colonised received the power of construction, to adjust the abstract differentiated images about themselves, but these were not always as successful. The former colonised were still not seen properly, as Camus suggested. As described above the
discourse of the old world order has not changed and its implications, such as the discrimination and the structural domination, are still present. With decolonisation, the colonisers left their former territories, but within the now free countries, the Cold War dispute, the struggles for independence and civil wars made it difficult to create their own knowledge of construction. Léopold Sédar Senghor and Aimé Césaire (in: Thompson, 2002, p. 143) created the Negritude movement, which is meant as an inspiration to create a meaningful perspective of African life (Thompson, 2002). They argue that there are three main focus points on why, at least African countries were not successful in emancipating themselves from the (post-) colonial influences in the seventies. The focus points of the Negritude movement were: “accusations of a neocolonialist (economic) presence in Africa; the "language problem" and African languages in literature; and the demand for multiculturalism in school curricula” (Thompson, 2002, p. 143). Even though the Negritude movement was trying to increase the right for self-construction, this movement was criticised for staying "within a pre-set system of Eurocentric intellectual analysis both of man and society" (Soyinka, in: Thompson, 2002). So, even counter movements are criticised of including legacies of colonial rule and have difficulties of moving away from the concepts of colonialism. This was one of many reasons why the former colonised could not yet change the representation of their abstract and differentiated image and therefore (for now) remain represented as the ‘other’.

2.2.2 Bordering- Ordering

“Boundaries have been a key category in political geography and political science since the 19th century, but it was above all the collapse of the East West divide at the beginning of the 1990s that gave rise to a new interest in political boundaries.” (Paasi, 2005, p. 17)

Borders and boundaries, as controlling and identification system of the territorial unit of the nation state, are a historical product (Paasi, 1996). Taking into account the aspects of Said regarding colonialism (and the effects after colonialism), which are introduced above, the spatial implications of these aspects are of importance as well. Especially the aspect regarding the Orient, the ‘other’, as either to be feared or to be controlled, is very interesting, as colonial rule was mostly connected to the control over territory and imperialism. Decolonisation logically was therewith also the re-bordering of the world map. This shows how borders are not fixed and can change through for example geopolitical struggles (Bauman, 2007).

The interest in borders, re-bordering and boundaries is closely related to the spatial turn, which gave particular attention to space as a “frame of reference” (Werlen, 2005). The historical relation with space (Schlögel, 2009), but also the relation of space and identity (Paasi, 2005, p. 18) became important. The border as an outcome of historical processes and practices of boundary drawing are part of social actions and are strongly related to the process of ‘othering’: Through borders the ‘us’ and the ‘other’ gets produced (Paasi, 2005, p. 18). Bordering (and re-bordering) is the exclusion of the ‘other’, which is outside the territory or behind the border, and the “spread of the self-universalisation”, which is used to naturalise power (Böröcz, 2001, p. 8; Kuus, 2004). The position of states is important in this, as they have the position of administration and governance of these borders. As Paasi describes it:
“States are in a crucial position in the production and reproduction of expressions of territoriality and various forms of inclusion/exclusion, and social and cultural boundaries are usually important in this.” (Paasi, 2005, p. 20)

The challenge is to identify the socio-spatial construction of inclusion and exclusion (Paasi, 2005, p. 28). To identify these construction(s) it is necessary to define borders. According to van Houtum, Kramsch and Zierhofer (2005, p. 3) the territorial border (and order) is “a normative idea, a belief in the existence and continuity of a territorial binding and differentiated power that only becomes concrete, objectified and real in our everyday social practices”. The border is an administrative legal fact, which produces a safe interior and orders (or limits) the access of the exterior. Thus the border orders the inside and the outside and filters who belongs on which side of the border. The social construct of drawing boundaries is not only a normative idea lived through everyday spatial practices, but it is also made visible on maps. Maps of state boundaries represent the inside, the territory and identity of the (nation) state and the frontiers of that territory, the outside, the ‘other’ identity. These representations on maps are also representations of meanings (Paasi, 2005, p. 23). In a post-modern flexible world the dichotomous thinking of ‘us’ (the inside) and the ‘other’ (the outside) needs to be rethought (Bauman, 2007; Castells, 2010). Borders and their ordering relations are not dichotomous any longer. For example the internal borders of the European Union are open for free trade of people and services (Delanty & Rumford, 2005, p. 130), therefore the discourse of inclusion and exclusion has shifted. The Schengen Agreement is more an ordering principle than a bordering principle. The former internal Schengen borders now shift towards the outside of the Schengen space and therewith re-order the Schengen border space (Rumford, 2008). Not only are there re-ordering principles regarding the Schengen space, but the European Union has through the partnerships also transferred the dichotomous border of in- and exclusion into a new ordering system, a system of degrees of ordering and ‘othering’. The member states of the EU have, through their relations with their former colonies, created a new categorisation of ‘othering’ (Bőröcz, 2001). The content depends on the changing relationship and is from country to country varied. Algeria, for example, had a brutal struggle for independence and consequently Algeria’s relations with France, its former coloniser, are not the friendliest. Whereas Senegal did not want to become independent, because they were afraid of missing out on economic benefits; its relation with its former coloniser, France, is better. Senegal is not part of the European Neighbourhood Project, but almost the same is true for Tunisia, also a former French colony, and participating within the ENP.

The new world (b-)orders are not as easily definable any longer as they were in the high days of the nation states, but nowadays there needs to be attention for the different categories of bordering, ordering and ‘othering’ principles we are dealing with (Kuus, 2004).

2.3 Theoretical implications
The construction of border spaces is closely related to the construction of the ‘other’. The knowledge of construction, and therewith the construction of the ‘other’, is often still related to geopolitical power relations, which are still mostly dominated by developed countries. The
aspects consisting the colonial legacies, which are presented by Said, are by taking a closer look, included in the aspects of ‘othering’ and (b-)ordering. Especially Said’s fourth point, that the Orient either needs to be feared or to be controlled, is present within the aspect of (b-)ordering. Through its geographical aspect, the border, as well as its function of inclusion and exclusion, and the categorisation into the known and the less known; it represents the spatial area, which needs to be feared or to be controlled.

The aspects that make part of the process of ‘othering’, inter alia the irritation and disturbance felt/created through the perception of ‘others’, the knowledge of construction, which facilitates structural domination and the construction of the self, can all be found and connected to the first three points of Said. The irritation and disturbance of the perception of the ‘other’ enabled the selectivity of the ‘othering’-process. This is strongly connected with the first point that regards the absolute and systematic difference of the ‘Oriental’. Also the second aspect of Said, abstractions are preferable to the reality, connects to the selectivity and the creation of the disturbed perception of the ‘other’. This aspect is strongly connected to Said’s aspect that the Orient is incapable of defining itself, which is also directly and indirectly connected to the knowledge of construction. As a consequence, these concepts lead, together with and through the knowledge of construction, towards structural domination. Through the ability to define the ‘other’, and to follow the points of Said, the colonisers were also able to define themselves, by pointing at and creating what they were not.

In the analysis therefore this thesis will look at the concepts of the ordering and bordering constructs in this more post-modern world, as well as the implications for the knowledge of construction and the process of ‘othering’ with keeping in mind the possible neo-colonialist visions and the points of Said, as these are interrelated. In the next chapter the methodology for this thesis will be outlined, and afterwards the analysis will be made according to the aspects described above.
3. **Methodology Ideology and Discourse analysis**

“In the end, qualitative work is a political project around the transformation of meaning.”  
(Leonardo & Allen, 2008)

This research is qualitative as this offers a better understanding of the underlying ideologies and meanings the European Union directly and/or indirectly (re-)presents in its documents. As far as it concerns qualitative research there are manifold sources on how to do qualitative research (just to name a few: Boeije, 2005; Flick, 2009; Mason, 2002; Ritchie & Lewis, 2003). What most of them have in common is the focus on the underlying meaning of things, an overall research perspective and a frame of reference of the research target (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003, p. 3). On the one hand, it can be quite a challenge to find a way through this literature and how to actually do your own research. On the other hand, this offers the opportunity of an open approach, which might discover new findings, as it is not bound to the same structures as earlier research. However, it is often criticised that qualitative research methods comprise drawbacks, like for example partiality: because the research can only cover a limited part of the research object, another example is that the research will not be objective, as the researcher can never be completely objective (Leonardo & Allen, 2008). These drawbacks can also be seen in a different light. As it is very difficult to understand and analyse all components of a research object, partiality can deliver clearer insights in at least a part of the research object and it can cover the researched part in depth. As described above, the researcher can never be completely objective; therefore the acceptance of this fact offers the opportunity to actually uncover the utopia of objectivity.

The qualitative approach is chosen as its methods focus on the most important things which will be part of the analysis of this research: the underlying meanings and discourses, and their effects for social relations. To discover the ideology and discourses behind the political project of the European Neighbourhood Policy, Ideologiekritik and discourse analysis will be used. These will be briefly outlined in this chapter. Afterwards the data which will be part of the analysis will be outlined as well as the steps of analysis.

3.1 Ideologiekritik

“Ideology includes multiple responses to social relations of domination, sometimes distorting an accurate understanding of them and sometimes penetrating their structures” (Leonardo & Allen, 2008)

To be able to know what the critique of ideology is about, first we need to know what ideology itself actually is. As described above there are multiple sources on how to do qualitative research, the same can be said for the definitions available of ideology (Olwig, 2009, p. 288). The best definition within the context of this research is defined by Leonardo and Allen above. Ideology is not only the response towards social relation and domination, but it manifests itself in the materialisation of these social relations. These can be for example manifestations in government institutions to organise the social relations of the people living within their space of influence. The European Union also is such an institution: it is a materialisation of social relations on an even larger scale. To have the power to organise social life, these institutions use
certain concepts and meanings. These are produced and created by the institution and provide a certain (their) perspective of how the world should be. The effects of ideology can be seen as being the perspective of something or someone of the world and this influences their political practices and therewith can be highly influential for (political) domination, like Geuss argues: “[a]n ideology is a world-picture which stabilizes or legitimises domination” (Geuss, 1981, p. 31).

Within its approach, Ideologiekritik sees the produced concepts and meanings as the outward signs of material relations (Leonardo & Allen, 2008). This means that through these it is possible to see subjectivities, which represent an ideological struggle (Leonardo & Allen, 2008). Therewith ideology as “a material entity of social relations” (Leonardo & Allen, 2008) becomes visible. This relationship between ideational and material realm was mentioned also by Marx and Engels, who lay out the theoretical basis for Communism. They did not only see it as a simple abstraction, but as the product of political practice (Olwig, 2009, p. 290). This research will not dive into the theoretical concept of Communism, but agrees on the implications of ideologies for political practices. Ideology is also used as a synonym for the perspective of the world, or in other words the world-view (Olwig, 2009, p. 289).

Within the productions of the institutions, the policy documents represent the link between their structures, and their perspective, which is already ideology, but also the views on domination and (political) practice becomes more visible. In the following analysis (chapter 4, 5 and 6) this research will therefore focus on the leading concepts present in the documents produced by the European Union, the language used within these documents and the function of the documents, to see how and whether the Union uses its ideology to influence political relations. According to a post-structuralist view ideology is constructed “out of discourse, not as a coherent system, but rather as one that is characterized by contention amongst discourses” (Leonardo & Allen, 2008). This aspect of discourse(s) and its analysis will be part of the next section.

3.2 Discourse Analysis
To deepen the framework of Ideologiekritik, discourse analysis is used as well. Ideologiekritik historically seen is the predecessor of discourse analysis. Within the methodological concept of this thesis it will be complemented by discourse analysis. Basically both methods build upon the same concept, the production of meaning. Whereas Ideologiekritik sets its focus on the meanings of the construction of social relations, the concept of discourse, as this research sees it, is best described as the analysis of power (structures) through these productions of meanings.

In order to be able to perceive these power structures, the objects of power, as in this sense are also objects of knowledge: Michel Foucault bound the terms of knowledge and power together, as there is no relationship of power possible without a field of knowledge, nor is it possible to have knowledge without a power relation (Berg, 2009, p. 215).

“...in every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organized and redistributed by a certain number of procedures whose role is to ward off its powers...
and dangers, to gain mastery over its chance events, to evade its ponderous, formidable materiality” (Michel Foucault, 1984, in: Berg, 2009, p. 215)

As in Ideologiekritik, discourse analysis, as in the quote of Foucault, looks at the materialisation of the production of meanings, to understand the underlying structures of power and knowledge. The production of meaning can be regarded as the production of discourse, as both are produced and are presented in the materialisation of social relations. In order to show the power relations of these relations, discourse analysis looks at the use and practice of language: Discourse is “how linguistic and other elements are combined to shape and delineate particular objects of knowledge” (Cresswell, 2009, p. 211). These objects of knowledge are frameworks of meaning, thus discourses, which through language establish, re-produce and support power-relations (Belina & Dzudzek, 2009; Cresswell, 2009). The accessibility towards the formation and re-production of discourses has impact on who is in power (Berg, 2009) and according to Belina and Dzudzek (2009) the social context of the discursive practices can be of important influence.

The discourses or frameworks of meaning are socially constructed by the ones in power and depend on their social context. An example of these discursive practices of social constructs is the concept of the nation (state) and in the past the power relations of colonialism. The discursive practice focuses on the one hand on the formation of a ‘we’, for example in television, national holidays etc., on the other hand it is also based on the practice of exclusion of for example when the Belgian speaker in Belgian radio station speaks about the success of Belgian athletes and addresses these athletes as “onze landgenoten” (our countrymen), this might provide a connection for fellow Belgians towards “their” athletes, but if someone from another country listens to this programme he/she will feel excluded. Through the constant repetition of these linguistic practices, they become social reality and “the standard for objective reality” (Berger & Pullberg, in: Belina & Dzudzek, 2009, p. 134).

3.3 Data and Description of Analysis

As described above this thesis uses qualitative methods as this can put the European policies into a particular context (Mason, 2002, p. 1) and take into account the current situation of the Arab states: Tunisia and Algeria. The theory and the methodology need to be adapted according to the objects which are part to be analysed (Pleijter, 2006). These will be the official documents of the European Union (EU). The aim of this research is to understand the actions of agents, in this case the EU and the structures produced. These may not be always directly observable. Therefore this research examines the documents available which describe the actions and structures of the EU (Scott, 1990, p. 2). Hence it will be looked at policy documents and their contexts. In the context of Ideologiekritik and discourse analysis it will regard how these documents (re-)present reality through language (Henning, 2004). The function and language of these documents is in the main focus of this research. The documents chosen for the analysis will be outlined in the next section and afterwards the data analysis will be elaborated.
3.3.1 Data Archive

Documents can be seen both as a resource and as a topic of social research (Scott, 1990, p. 36): documents as research foremost look at the content of the texts of the documents, whereas documents as topic of the research also look at the nature of the document and regard it as a social product (Scott, 1990, p. 37). This study looks critically at the language of the documents, but also at the underlying contexts and ideologies. This does not only include the internal meaning of the text, but also at the external discourses, regarding for example: its authenticity, the understanding of the texts and the construction, representation and the development of the source (Szalay, 1983, pp. 98-101). To facilitate the analysis, a digital data archive was developed.

This archive contains official documents of the European Union, regarding the European Neighbourhood Programme and the Union’s external relations with Algeria and Tunisia. By this the accessibility of the documents needs to be taken into account, as some of these might only be for internal use and difficult to acquire (Rapley, 2007, pp. 14-16; Scott, 1990, pp. 16-17) and some of these documents are only available in French. Most of the documents are accessible through the website of the European Commission (European Commission, nd.) and the website of the European External Action Service (European Union, 1995-2011). As the ENP was developed in 2004, only documents from that point onwards were added to the archive, with some exceptions. For example the first strategy paper of the ENP was from 2003. The analysed documents are mostly in English with one exception, because there was no adequate English version of it. Therefore also one French document was analysed.

In table 1 there is a list of data in the archive. The documents are split into three topics: general information about the European Neighbourhood Policy, information about the relation between the European Union and Algeria and information about the relation between the European Union and Tunisia.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ENP general (6)</th>
<th>Algeria (8)</th>
<th>Tunisia (18)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategy papers (5)</td>
<td>Official documents ¹ (3)</td>
<td>Official documents (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication (1)</td>
<td>Press releases &amp; Statements (5)</td>
<td>Press releases &amp; Statements (15)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Table 1 List of data

As it concerns the documents of the European Neighbourhood Policy; there are 5 strategy papers, which will give insights into the development of the ENP in general. The communication is a 17 pages document addressing the “Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean” (European Commission & High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2011b). The official documents concerning Tunisia include the Action Plan of May 2004, the Progress report of 2006 and the Strategy Paper 2007 - 2013 & National Indicative Programme (Nip) 2007 - 2010 for Tunisia. The Press releases and Statements were used to get the immediate response from the Union during and after the Arab Spring. There was less information available about the EU-Algeria relation, because this relation is not as close and more difficult than the one between other partner countries of the Union (Darbouche & Dennison, 2011; Morisse-Schilbach, 2007). In the end also three official documents were chosen. These include the Association Agreement of 2005, the

¹ One in French
The analysis of the documents was done with the help of Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Weft QDA. This programme was chosen, because of its free online availability and the possibility to analyse the documents outside the environment of the University. The actual progress of the analysis is iterative and flexible, but to have at least a general outline, some steps were taken as frame of reference. This is based on the method of ‘constant comparison’ (Wester, in: Boeije, 2005, p. 75) and the model which is used includes two different phases:

- Exploration phase (spotting the concepts)
- Specification phase (development of the concepts)

There was an exploration phase of what concepts actually were present within the documents and what was to be expected for parts of the chapter 4 (the general analysis of the ENP), and chapter 5 and 6, (the case studies Tunisia and Algeria). After reading the first pages of the documents than the coding concepts were specified. For example, for the analysis of the ENP the first concepts included aspects regarding the EU (in general, the history, the self-representation), the European Neighbourhood Policy (the representation, history and structure of the ENP, and the division in the East and West of the policy), than there was an aspect regarding inclusion (looking at the internal coherence of the Union and the partial integration of the neighbouring countries) and an aspect regarding exclusion (looking at the boundaries and their description, border control, and the description of the differences between the Union and the neighbouring countries). This coding scheme however included too many codes and was therewith quiet chaotic. It was based on knowledge from secondary sources and content from the documents. The codes changed towards a more ordered concept in the specification phase, according to the main lines, which will be described in the further text. Within the specification phase the coding schemes were re-thought. By doing this the theoretical framework described in chapter 2, especially the aspects of Said, of ‘othering’ and (b-)ordering, were kept in mind. The coding schemes after the specification phase, even though slightly adapted according to the separate analyses, always included the following codes:

- Knowledge of construction/ ‘othering’
  - Presentation EU
  - Presentation others
  - Partnership(-s)
- Ordering /Bordering
  - Inclusion
  - Exclusion
  - Border control
- Said’s aspects of neo-colonialism
For each of the chapters there were two separate analyses, one which looked at the situation before the Arab Spring and the second one analysing the changes which happened after the Arab Spring. All were connected to the main coding scheme.

A disadvantage of the analysis of only documents was that it was not always visible whether these represented reality or only how reality should look like (Szalay, 1983). This was quiet confusing and ‘going native’, as will be described in the next section, was not helpful to distinguish between the ideology and the practice of the ENP. By all this it needs to be taken account that the documents present the perspective of the policy makers of the European Union.

3.3.3 Reflection of Analysis
Regarding the aspect of ‘de-colonising’ the mind, the same can be stated for my experiences during the research. Most of the analysis was written and the data was collected during an internship at the Centre for European Policy Studies at Brussels. Being part of the European Community and involved in the data compilation of a newsletter, called the European Neighbourhood Watch, has been on the one hand immensely important and helpful for the data collection of this research. On the other hand, being located in Brussels, it blurred my critical reflection towards the EU documents. ‘Going native’ within the European Community has been helpful, but looking back, the language used in Brussels is less EU critical than in the academic sphere. Fortunately, I was able to review everything from the distance and to re-write my findings. The process of ‘de-Europeanise’ or ‘de-Brusselise’ my mind gave me the possibility to re-think my findings and my conclusion.

3.4 Methodological implications
The theoretical implications of neo-colonialist practices and the aspects of ‘othering’ and (b-)ordering can be analysed by using the methods of Ideologiekritik and discourse analysis. In fact, assessing the underlying ideological structures can make the remaining legacies of colonialism visible. Discourse analysis is the tool to make these underlying structures detectable by looking at the language used within the EU documents. Therefore the steps of the analysis are outlined above and were performed according to the main coding scheme above. The following chapters will focus on the findings and outline the happenings surrounding the ENP and the developments of the Arab Spring.
4. Outline European Neighbourhood Policy

Before this thesis can focus on the analysis of the European Neighbourhood Policy, it will briefly introduce the foreign policy of the Union and the Euro-Med project, which are both of influence for the Neighbourhood Policy. Afterwards it will briefly introduce the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and then in the second part analyse it. In the third part the response of the EU towards the Arab Spring will be addressed. The chapter will finish with a short conclusion.

4.1 European foreign policy

The shared common market of the European countries, which was established through the European Community, also increased the need for a shared responsibility in handling the external (trade) relations. With the emergence of the enlarged European Union as a collective of integrated nation states, the shared responsibility to handle foreign relations grew even more (Maull, 2005). The Union emerged from the plans to create a “forum for an independent international voice for Western Europe” (Casier & Vanhoonacker, 2007, p. 3). However the complex institutions of the Union, which is foremost a network of member states, makes it difficult to locate power and sometimes even unity. Especially with regard to foreign policy unity within the Union is a sensitive topic. European foreign policy is still immensely depending on the decisions of the member states (Casier & Vanhoonacker, 2007). The most recent example of disagreement within the member states is the position of Germany towards Libya during the Arab Spring, were Germany abstained from a vote on a non-flight zone over Libya (Weiland & Nelles, 2011).

Since 1992, the EU has been developing a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) under the Treaty of Maastricht (European Communities, 2007). Other important aspects regarding foreign policy are trade and economic relations with non-EU member states (Louis, 2007). Even though the foreign policy is fragmented and depends on coherent member state decisions, the Union has the goal “to spread the advantages of open markets, economic growth and a political system based on social responsibility and democracy” (European Communities, 2007, p. 4). Maull (2005, p. 777) describes the Union neither as a great power nor a quasi-state, but as a post-modern actor. This post-modern actor had several foreign policies towards its neighbours. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the European Neighbourhood Policy are the ones most important for this thesis, as they are directed across the Unions southern border.

4.1.1 Euro-Mediterranean Policies

Before the existence of the Neighbourhood Policy the Union already had a multilateral approach towards the Mediterranean region, also known as the Barcelona Process. As this region is geographically close to the borders of Europe, it was creating a risk, regarding possible spill-over effects such as political instability, terrorism and illegal migration (Gavin, 2005). Especially Spain, France and Italy were interested in political relationships within the Mediterranean region (Gomez, 2003). In 1995, the Barcelona process started, which formed the basis for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). It derived out of the acknowledgement that there might be benefits in a common management of the problems surrounding the Mediterranean (Gomez, 2003, p. 69). The EMP was re-launched under the name ‘Union for the Mediterranean’
On the one hand, the policies towards the South have been described as a “valuable system/institutional advance in Euromed relations” (Emerson & Noutcheva, 2005, p. 95) and it “remains a cornerstone for the EU’s interaction with its southern neighbours” (Commission of the European Communities, 2007, p. 3). On the other hand it is criticised as not being “a sufficient driving force” (Emerson & Noutcheva, 2005, p. 95) and that the “true goal was to reinforce authoritarian regimes in the Mediterranean in order to preserve regional security” (Warning, 2006) and to control illegal migration (Bialasiewicz et al., 2009). The means of the policies towards the South were mostly based on economic possibilities and not on conditionality (Gavin, 2005) “and might be explained as the product of member states’ need to maximize the commercial advantages of producers in Mediterranean markets and improve the management of their economic relationships with the partner countries” (Gomez, 2003, p. 102). Since the emergence of the Neighbourhood Policy the policies towards the Southern neighbours are part of it. This is seen as advantage by some (Emerson & Noutcheva, 2005). The Neighbourhood Policy will be outlined in more detail in the next section.

4.1.2 European Neighbourhood Policy

“The European Community has been remarkably successful with this alternative mode of interstate governance: not only has it succeeded in abolishing war within Europe, probably for good, it has created a way of life marked by individual freedom, prosperity and civility for its people, and has even begun to project stability, liberal democracy and prosperity beyond its own realm.”(Maull, 2005, p. 778)

Even though the Union states that “enlargement is an ongoing process” and that “the Union is open to any European country which is democratic, runs a market economy and can handle the rights and obligations of membership” (European Communities, 2007, p. 20), it is currently looking for an alternative way how to deal with neighbouring countries, which they will not accept as members (Delanty & Rumford, 2005). This alternative way can be the European Neighbourhood Policy. As Maull states above, the Union has been successful in creating peace within Europe and now is projecting stability and security beyond its borders. Smith and Webber (2008) argue that the Neighbourhood policy developed, because the Union experienced ‘enlargement fatigue’. Therefore the ENP provided a new framework for regional stabilisation at the borders of the Union. The ENP is a mix of interest of the EU foreign policy, which includes

These are: Albania, Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey.
trade and economy, member state interest as well as security issue and forms a significant part of the external relations of the EU towards its geographical neighbours.

Currently, 16 countries participate in the EN project (European Commission & High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2011a). These are divided in the Southern and the Eastern neighbourhood. The countries in the South are: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Occupied Palestine Territory, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan; and in the East: Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia (European Commission, nd.). The ENP focuses on several key aspects: political dialogue and reform, trade and measures, justice and home affairs, energy, transport, information society, environment, research and innovation, and social policy (Commission of the European Communities, 2004a). The approach towards the Eastern and the Southern neighbourhood is based on the same principles, but differ in regard to the regional approach the Union offers to its partner countries, such as the Eastern Partnership and the Union for the Mediterranean. Whereas the Eastern partner countries are more likely to be accepted as a member to the EU in the future, the Southern countries will probably, due to cultural differences between European and non-European, never get accepted as EU member. As this thesis will look across the Mediterranean, it will regard at the European foreign policy with a perspective towards the South. To bring the policy into action, the Commission has decided on two phases: first to outline and initiate the policy and second to implement the Neighbourhood instrument after 2007. The financial plans of the Neighbourhood policy are also outlined according to these. With the developments of Arab Spring the communication “A new response to a changing Neighbourhood” was published to address the new situation in the geographical surrounding of the Union.

The practical implementation of the ENP is made through bilateral Action Plans with their partner countries. These build upon existing economic agreements, which are used as pre-condition for the further negotiation of bilateral agreements (Commission of the European Communities, 2003a; Tulmets, 2008, p. 115). The Action Plans are the key element of the ENP and within them the mutual agreed goals are defined and every plan “spells out the planned economic and political reforms with short and medium term priorities” (ENPI info centre, nd.). Each Action Plan differs “in order to take account of the great differences between partner countries’ situations” (Commission of the European Communities, 2006a, p. 5), but in general it covers political dialogue and reform, economic and social cooperation and development, trade related issues, market and regulatory reform, cooperation on justice, liberty and security, sectoral issues including transport, energy, information society, environment, research and development and people-to-people contacts, civil society, education and public health (ENPI info centre, nd.). Apart from Algeria, Belarus, Libya and Syria all neighbouring partner countries have signed Action Plans (Commission of the European Communities, 2004b).

The first allocation of EN project funding is addressed in a communication of the Commission, which outlines the issue of allocating external and internal resources for the EN project, as well as to create the two phases of the project described above (Commission of the European Communities, 2003b). The Commission deals with the funding and the future proposal for funding of the EN project. This is also outlined in the follow up documents (Commission of the
European Communities, 2004b; European Commission, 2011c). The European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument developed towards an umbrella instrument for the existing geographical and thematic programmes, as well as new projects (Commission of the European Communities, 2004b). In 2011 the European Commission proposed the funding of €18 billion for the period 2014-2020 (European Commission, 2011c, p. 8).

**4.2 Analysis ENP**

Whereas some authors are still arguing about the nature of the European Union, for example whether it is a kind of empire or not (Paasi, 2001; Walters, 2004; Zielonka, 2007) others criticise it for spreading ‘Europeanisation’ (Clark & Jones, 2008), this part will analyse the ENP by looking at the images the Union constructs of itself and others and how this affects its Southern border space. Therefore documents of the European Union are analysed. The analysis for the next two sections foremost included the EU’s five strategy papers of the Neighbourhood Policy, available on the ENP website (European Commission, nd.). These documents describe the main priorities and directions of the policy:

5. A new response to a changing Neighbourhood (2011)

**4.2.1 A European construction**

“‘Europe’ is a concept in constant flux, defined by what groups of people think it is at any given time” (Wintle, 1999, p. 138)

What the quote of Wintle shows is that Europe’s identity constantly changes and depends on its representations. The last major change of the Union was the enlargement of 2004, when ten new countries joined the Union. This enlargement has been an opportunity for a common foreign policy with a European perspective towards the ‘new’ acknowledged neighbours of the Union. The goal of the ENP, the creation of a ‘Wider Europe’, is to deal with the ‘new’ neighbours of the Union, the new configuration of the household of the EU and the layout of the territory (Chourou, 2008). Geographically seen these neighbours are not so ‘new’. The change of perspective through the enlargement of the EU is what is new, but actually some of the Mediterranean states have already been a neighbour of the Union since the accession of Greece in 1981 and Portugal and Spain in 1986. Historically seen, the ENP is just a different political perspective for (some) ‘old’ neighbours in the Mediterranean.

The European Neighbourhood Policy is created within the Union and has a very Euro-centric viewpoint. This is especially visible in the presentation of the Union itself in the documents of the ENP. One example the emphasis is on what the Union already has achieved and now wants
to offer its neighbours as well; like economic development, peace and stability, for example through taking more effort in conflict resolution: “Given the EU’s history of peace and stability through regional integration, the EU has added value to bring to the efforts of individual Member States and must be prepared to assume a greater role in the resolution of conflicts in the neighbourhood” (Commission of the European Communities, 2007, p. 7). The focus here is first on the achievements of the Union, which in this case are peace and stability; and then describe what the Union can mean for its neighbours by promoting these achievements towards the neighbourhood. Other examples focus on economic achievements of the Union and the economic development they can promote in the neighbourhood (Commission of the European Communities, 2006a) and the promotion of democracy and human rights (Commission of the European Communities, 2004a). Through the emphasis on what the Union can offer its neighbours, it is also constructing itself as a political actor who already achieved the key aspects of the programme they are promoting. The EU is presenting itself a possible big brother for their immediate surroundings, which is not per se older, but certainly wiser.

To be able to present itself as the bigger, wiser brother for the neighbouring countries the Union needs to have a certain inner coherence. To create and present this, it is stressed within the documents for the ENP that the integration of the elements of the programmes and the sharing of information and best practice “will enhance the image of the Union as a whole” (Commission of the European Communities, 2006a, p. 7). Sentences like these are not massively found within the documents, but indirectly there are indications addressing the image of the Union itself. Within the documents the cooperation between all the members and actors of the system of the Union are addressed to work “even more closely” together (Commission of the European Communities, 2007, p. 11). Even though indirectly, this lays out the need and the attempt to create an inner coherence of the Union.

As the construction of the self also includes the construction of an ‘other’; within the ENP documents an indirect superiority of the Union is presented. To achieve the goal of having no “dividing lines” within the border region, the Union needs to tackle what the Commission calls in its communications the “development gap” (Commission of the European Communities, 2007, p. 10), which in another communication is described as “wealth gap” or “prosperity gap” (Commission of the European Communities, 2003a, pp. 13, 19). Even though the documents use different aspects, they always use the term “gap” to describe the difference between the Union and the neighbouring countries. Therewith the Commission presents the Union as more developed than its partner countries and legitimises the need to develop policies for its immediate surroundings, thus beyond its own territory. This construction of the Union as superior within the Union’s documents is also addressed as ‘level of asymmetry’ in the EU neighbourhood relations. The Commission is aware of this asymmetry in the geopolitical (power) relation between the Union and its partners. The European Commission addressed this asymmetry as inherent to its policy. In regards to the Free Trade Agreements, which are part of the ENP, is stated:

“Such deep and comprehensive FTAs will need to be tailored and sequenced carefully to take account of each partner country's economic circumstances and state of development, including a certain level of asymmetry if appropriate. In the light of their
complexity and ambitiousness, deep FTAs are medium-term and for some ENP countries even long-term objectives.” (Commission of the European Communities, 2006a, p. 5 emphasis added)

The reality the documents represent is a discourse of the partner countries as less developed, in need for someone to help them, and therewith making the neighbourhood inferior to the (political) power of the Union. The example of the convergence of economic and agricultural products already also outlines this indirect superior self-perception of the Union, and therefore everything needs to be adjusted to EU standards, like for example the “sanitary and phytosanitary” standards and the “control of animal and plant diseases” (Commission of the European Communities, 2004a, p. 15). The convergence of the standards is a condition for the neighbouring countries to actually be able to have access towards the European market. The question here would be in how far it is legitimate for the Union to pose these conditions, which concerns the intervention in state sovereignty? However, the created discourse of the documents sets it as a moral obligation, “a duty” “to reduce poverty and create an area of shared prosperity” within its neighbourhood: the “EU should act to reinforce and unite its existing neighbourhood policy” (Commission of the European Communities, 2003a, pp. 3, 9). This then for them also includes the inherent intervention in partner state sovereignty. The presentation of the Union and the neighbouring countries will be further elaborated within the case studies at the examples of Tunisia and Algeria.

In order to achieve the goal of the ENP to have no dividing lines and to reduce poverty the Union has developed several instruments, but these are not unlimited (Smith & Webber, 2008, p. 80) and mostly based on incentives, connected to conditions. These are mostly legitimised through the discourse of the Union as a superior partner, but also through the focus of the geographical proximity, to have security and stability within the shared border region. The communication of the Commission from 2003, the first strategy paper, stresses the “opportunities and challenges” the physical proximity provides and that it is “increasingly clear that the EU shares an important set of mutual interest with each of its neighbours” (Commission of the European Communities, 2003a, p. 6). This completes the discourse of legitimisation of the presented importance of the ENP. However to realise the actual partnership the Union uses incentives to promote and steer its policy need to be enough to compensate for the loss of power and popularity of the governments of the partner countries (Noutcheva & Aydin-Düzgit, 2012). These incentives are the materialisation of the relationship(s). An example of an incentive is the “common regulatory basis and similar degree of market access” (Commission of the European Communities, 2006a, p. 5), which is bound to the conditionality of strengthening administrative capacity. In the beginning of the project participation was foremost on a voluntary basis and encouraged by soft measures. The Commission even stated: “The Union does not seek to impose priorities or conditions to its partners” in the communication of 2004 (Commission of the European Communities, 2004a, p. 8). Whereas, in the same document the Commission also stresses the importance of a set of “priorities”, which should be covered in the individual Action Plans. It is interesting to see that on the one hand the Union stresses that they are not working with impositions, but on the other hand bind their offers to commitments of their partners. One example is in the communication of 2003, which wants to “anchor the EU’s offer of concrete benefits and preferential relations within a differentiated framework”, which is related to the
“progress made by the partner countries in political and economic reform” (Commission of the European Communities, 2003a, p. 9). Another example to describe the conditions the Union attaches to its offers relates to the issue of mobility and border control. The commission binds the possibility for more mobility between the Union and its partners, with the need to strengthen the border security and fight illegal migration:

“Obviously, mobility can only develop in a secure environment, and security improvements will help to create the conditions for greater mobility. The promotion of mobility will go hand in hand with the commitment of our partners to increase security and justice and fight illegal migration, with efforts to strengthen our neighbours’ capacity to deal with migratory flows to their countries, and with the security of documents.” (Commission of the European Communities, 2007, p. 5)

The created discourse of the Union as superior enables the legitimacy of the conditions added to the ENP. These constructions however also include a certain ambiguity: On the one hand it offers at least partial (economic and political) inclusion, although bound to conditionality; whereas on the other hand the Union does not offer membership, which would mean complete integration, to its partner countries even though they need to adjust to European rules. Walters describes this ambiguity as European dis-integration (Walters, 2004, p. 688).

The incentives and conditions are the materialisation of the relation between the actors, and therewith the underlying ideology. To what extent the relations of the Union are formed will be further analysed within the case studies. Also, to what extent the exclusion takes places in the European Neighbourhood border region will be part of the next section.

4.2.2 ENP spatial implications
The geographical proximity between the partner countries and the European Union, according to the Union “calls for further efforts to encourage cross-border and trans-national cooperation and development” (Commission of the European Communities, 2003a, p. 14). The EU is afraid of possible negative spread effects of insecurity, instability and terror and therefore addresses the “burden-sharing and joint responsibility” of a “shared neighbourhood” (Commission of the European Communities, 2003a). In this quote the Union addresses the “shared neighbourhood” not as a shared neighbourhood with its partner countries, but as a shared neighbourhood of the European Union. Therewith the language of the document stresses the need for European coherence within the Union, to create a stronger ‘we’. The neighbourhood of the Union does not only include the periphery member states, but mostly the neighbouring countries outside the Union, the external borders of the Union. The EU needs to promote reforms on “both sides of the boundary lines” to foster “convergence between political, economic and legal systems, enabling greater social inclusion and contributing to confidence building” (Commission of the European Communities, 2007, p. 12); to achieve the goal of the ENP, the “area of shared prosperity and values” (Commission of the European Communities, 2003a, p. 6), the Union needs to act beyond its border, or “behind the border” (Commission of the European Communities, 2006a, pp. 4,5). This involvement beyond the own borders is mostly done through the means of incentives and conditionality as described above. In this section the focus
will be on the implications of the EN policy for the ordering of the border region of the neighbourhood.

The Union tries to secure its borders, not only from the inside, but also through increased external border security, through its neighbours. The ENP documents present the need for more efficient border management especially with the focus on tackling illegal immigration (for example: Commission of the European Communities, 2003a, p. 6; Commission of the European Communities, 2006a, p. 6; 2007, p. 5). As an incentive for better border security the documents of the Union offer its partners partial integration into the economic market of the EU, for example through Free Trade Agreements (Commission of the European Communities, 2006a, p. 6) and possible facilitation of border crossing, but of course only at a secure border (Commission of the European Communities, 2003a, p. 11; 2004a). Through these documents the ENP documents create a discourse of non EU-members, outsiders, which still need to comply to European internal standards and export EU internal law (Kuus, 2011). Within this cross-border discourse the Union makes sure that a clear division remains between member states of the Union and the partner countries of the ENP. The EU documents state clearly that:

“The aim of the new Neighbourhood Policy is therefore to provide a framework for the development of a new relationship which would not, in the medium-term, include a perspective of membership or a role in the Union’s institutions. A response to the practical issues posed by proximity and neighbourhood should be seen as separate from the question of EU accession.” (Commission of the European Communities, 2003a, p. 5)

On the one hand the borders of the EU therewith are represented as a clear divide between member states and partner countries, which creates a discourse of a European ‘us’ and the ‘other’. With the ‘us’ being the member states and the partners being the ‘other’. On the other hand the Union also states that the “new external border is not a barrier” and the EU and its partner countries “have a common interest” (Commission of the European Communities, 2003a). This does create a discourse of partial inclusion of the EU partners. Besides the name of the policy clearly addresses that the partner countries are neighbours and it stresses the geographical proximity towards them, and therewith creates a new categorisation and discourse of the ‘other’. With the European Neighbourhood Policy the Union creates a discourse of orders around its border region by dividing its geographical surrounding into several categories of ‘others’: We have the members of the Union as belonging towards the ‘us’, the neighbours of the Union, who participate in the ENP as the closer ‘other’, and all the rest of the world as the less important ‘other’. Of course, this does exclude the possible new members of the EU, which belong into a category in between member and partner of the EU, as the “ENP remains distinct from the process of EU enlargement” (Commission of the European Communities, 2006a, p. 13).

4.3 Response to the Arab Spring - Reviewed ENP
Before the start of the Arab Spring in the beginning of 2011, the Union’s documents stressed the need “to be more active, and more present, in regional or multilateral conflict-resolution
mechanisms and in peace-monitoring or peace-keeping efforts” (Commission of the European Communities, 2006a, p. 4). Therewith the documents made the promise to intervene in conflicts, which take place close to its borders. During the Arab Spring, the Union was missing coherence of action to address the revolutions and protests (Schumacher, 2011, p. 115). Even though in the communication as response to the Arab Spring they stated that the “EU response to the changes taking place in the region needs to be more focused, innovative and ambitious, addressing the needs of the people and the realities on the ground” (European Commission & High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2011b, p. 5). The response of the Union was hesitating, because of divided opinions of the member states (Schumacher, 2011). To review and analyse the reactions and responses towards the developments of Arab Spring, two documents were in the focus of analysis. This was the strategy paper of the ENP from May 2011 (European Commission & High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2011a) and a communication from the European Commission and the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy from March 2011 (2011b).

In the communications of the Commission and the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy it is remarkable that even though in the press releases (European Commission, 2011a, 2011b) the Union uses the term “Arab Spring”, but does not use it in the communications. Instead they refer to the “momentous changes”, “recent events” or “developments” “currently on-going in the Southern Mediterranean region” (European Commission & High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2011a, 2011b). “The dramatic events unfolding in the region” (European Commission & High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2011b, p. 11) are thus addressed through several designations, but are not directly identified as “Arab Spring” or effects of it within the communications. This might be of careful consideration of the Union to not address “Arab Spring” or to not use the same terms as the press. It does however represent the actions of the uprisings and revolutions in a different image, which seems less mainstream and more political correct, by not using a term, which is influenced by the media. On the one hand “Arab Spring” is the term which is used for the Arab revolutions and also used in the press releases of the Union, on the other hand it is used quite frequently, even though the uprisings have been of different impact and different success (Biscop, Balfour, & Emerson, 2012). So within their communications, a possibility that the Union uses different terms can be the connotations of it, and by sticking to terms like “recent events” the connotation is rather neutral and less politically loaded. Within the rather short press releases, these issues seem to be of less importance.

The approach towards the Neighbourhood of the Union after the beginning of the revolutions and uprisings in the Arab world, according to the documents changes the focus of its discourse towards more building of “deep democracy”, and economic development and support is now on the second place, and not on the first place any more, like it was in the communication of 2006 (Commission of the European Communities, 2006a). Another important new focus point within the documents is the new approach of the inclusion of Civil Society Organisations. This new focus is legitimised by the EU because a “thriving civil society empowers citizens to express their concerns, contribute to policy-making and hold governments to account” (European
The change of focus is the most obvious by the new term “deep democracy”. Whereas before the Arab Spring only the term “democracy” was mentioned, now the discourse changed towards “deep democracy”. It seems as if after the Arab Spring the documents need to put additional emphasis on democracy and therefore call it “deep democracy”. The documents present a strengthening of the approach of the Union, especially on democracy promotion.

Regarding the issue of border control, it is still a main concern of the Union. The documents state that the “ENP aims to develop a mutually beneficial approach where economic development in partner countries and in the EU, well-managed legal migration, capacity-building on border management, asylum and effective law-enforcement co-operation go hand in hand” (European Commission & High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2011a, p. 11). Through the instability of the region, border management might even be a greater concern, regarding a spill-over of illegal migrants and refugees coming to the EU. In the communication from March it is stated several times that border security needs to be provided and improved; 25 million Euros were added to the External Borders Fund and European Refugee Fund (European Commission & High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2011b, p. 3).

In the beginning of the ENP, the documents of the EU describe the refusal of conditionality as a possible tool (Commission of the European Communities, 2004a); in 2011, a document clearly states that “increased EU support to its neighbours is conditional” (European Commission & High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2011a, p. 3). In contrary to the earlier versions, according to documents the new ENP approach builds on more conditionality, also defined as the “more for more” principle (European Commission, 2011a, p. 1). This includes that countries who are willing to “go further and faster with reforms will be able to count on greater support from the EU” (European Commission & High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2011b, p. 6). This is presented as an opportunity for the Union to relocate their support if partner countries do not follow reforms. It is a question whether this approach will be successful. This approach is legitimised through the explanation that a “more continuous and more intimate political dialogue is key to establish the confidence and trust required to tackle our common challenges” (European Commission & High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2011a, p. 18). Through this stricter approach it seems as the Union looks for greater impact in its neighbourhood. Whether and how much impact the Union can achieve beyond its borders will be seen in the future.

Besides the effect of the “more for more” approach, the ENP documents focus less on the regional approach, but focus more on the development in the different countries. The “ring of friends” gets blurred through the increased differentiation the Union creates through the “more for more” principle. The “stricter conditionality and incentives for best performers, reflecting the ambition of each partnership” according to the communication should be “increasingly policy-driven and provide for increased differentiation” which should lead to greater flexibility (European Commission & High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2011a). The geographical neighbourhood of the Union with this approach
focuses less on a coherent “ring of friends” and seems to create a more incoherent buffer zone. In this zone are on the one hand countries who are eager to participate in the ENP, like Tunisia or Morocco, but on the other hand there are countries like Algeria, which only develop slowly towards an increased partnership with the Union, and after the development of Arab Spring there are also countries whose political future remains unclear, like Libya, Egypt and Syria. Through the choice of the countries and the implementation of the “more for more” principle the plan towards creating a ring of friends now seems to develop more in the direction of a rag rug, a very diverse neighbourhood.

In 2006 the communication still stated that “if the ENP cannot contribute to addressing conflicts in the region, it will have failed in one of its key purposes” (Commission of the European Communities, 2006a, p. 9). In regard to the on-going conflict in Syria one might be able to state that the ENP has failed in its purpose.

4.4 ENP implications
The European Neighbourhood Policy is an instrument for the EU to order and to address its immediate surroundings. Therewith it manifests the power relations from the Union towards its neighbours, but only from a European perspective. The instrument creates an ambiguous European border zone, through the partial integration, but the denial of complete inclusion. Regarding the spatial implications the Neighbourhood Policy creates several categories of not-EU members.

The effects of the Arab Spring, according to the analysis above, on the first view did not change a lot from the former approach of the Union. The only difference which might be of importance is the increased emphasis on “deep democracy”, whereas before there has been more success through providing economic advantages. This does slightly increase the key aspect of fear or control of the neighbourhood. Through the increased differentiability of the “more for more” principle there might be the need for more differentiated categorisation. This approach did not change the definitive goal of the ENP, to create security and stability in the immediate surroundings of the Union. Also, the conditionality of convergence towards European standards and system(s) included within the ENP does indirectly include a superior European ideology, which reminds, at least to a certain extent, of (neo-) colonial legacy.

It is not clear how the neighbouring states perceive this policy, as the analysis of this aspect would surpass the boundaries of a master thesis. The following chapters will analyse two cases of the Neighbourhood Policy, the relation of the Union towards Tunisia and Algeria; regarding as well the developments of Arab Spring.
5. Case study Tunisia

In this chapter first there will be a short introduction into the history of Tunisia. Afterwards the relationship between the EU and Tunisia until the beginning of 2011 will be outlined. The next section will describe the development of the Jasmine Revolution, as the happenings of Arab Spring are called in Tunisia. This will be followed by the analysis of the changes the Jasmine Revolution had on the EU Tunisia relationship.

5.1 Tunisia before the Arab Spring

The history of Tunisia is closely connected to the Mediterranean. In the Antique, it has been ruled by the Romans and in the Middle Ages by the Arabs, it was conquered by Spain and finally assimilated by the Ottoman Empire in the 16th century (U.S. Department of State, n.d.). From 1881 it was under French protectorate until 1956. During this period the French controlled the foreign affairs of the country, but they let the Tunisian monarch, the Bey, handle internal affairs (Meredith, 2009, p. 49).

Whereas in Algeria there has been a brutal fight for independence; Tunisia and Morocco were seen by France as “ultimately dispensable” and received autonomy (Meredith, 2009, p. 51). The leader of the independence movement Habib Bourguiba, declared that Tunisia would be a republic and therewith abolished the rule of the Bey in 1957. He created a one-party system and focussed on economic and social development, foremost education and the status of women, and therewith created a steady economy and social progress, especially high literacy (U.S. Department of State, n.d.). After a military coup, Bourguiba was superseded by Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in 1987; who followed the same political strategies as his predecessor. Ben Ali had been interior and prime minister within the Bourguiba regime (Al Yafai, 2011). However, also under Ben Ali political freedom remained limited and a corrupt one party system remained. Even though Tunisia has always been economically closely linked to Europe and the Union, economic inequality grew in the country, which finally led to the beginning of Arab Spring. This will be outlined in 5.3, but first the EU Tunisia relation will be analysed.

5.2 EN Policy with Tunisia

After decolonisation from France, Tunisia started its relations towards the EU (at that time its predecessor, the European Community) in 1969, when both sides introduced a trade agreement. This was followed by a cooperation agreement in 1976. Since 1979, there is a EU delegation in Tunis (European External Action Service, nd.). The European Union and Tunisia increased their foreign relations with an Association Agreement which entered into force in 1998 (European Commission, 2012b; European Communities, 1998). Before that Tunisia has been the first country signing the Barcelona agreement in 1995 (Morisse-Schilbach, 2007). With the start of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) Programme, Tunisia was one of the first countries to participate.

For the analysis of the relationship between the Union and Tunisia three documents were used. These documents describe the progress of the EU-Tunisia relation from a European perspective,
as all documents are written by EU policy makers. To what extent this is visible will be outlined in the upcoming text. The documents which were used are:

- Action Plan May 2004
- Progress report 2006

These documents were chosen because they are part of the ENP and represent broadly the EU-Tunisia relation before the Arab Spring. The Action Plan outlines the first ideas and the agenda the EU for the first three to five years of the EN project towards Tunisia (European Commission, 2004b). The Progress Report of 2006 describes how the Union perceives progress or regress in the implementation of the Action Plan (Commission of the European Communities, 2006b). The National Indicative Programme is the response on the progress report and outlines the agenda and financial priorities for 2007 until 2010 (European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, nd.).

The overall assessment of the relationship between the EU and Tunisia is described in the Action Plan as follows:

“The European Union and Tunisia are determined to seize this opportunity in order to strengthen the ties between them and promote stability, security and prosperity on the basis of a partnership based on solidarity and common interests.” (European Commission, 2004b, p. 1)

These are the same principles the EU defines in the plans of the ENP and it already shows the European outlook of the policy. This presents the European superiority as it regards the main ideas of the policy, which is developed by the EU without regarding the future participating states. Participating states can adapt the plans, but this is only mentioned in smaller sentences, whereas the importance of the implementation of the EU objectives has a major part in all of the three documents. On the second page of the Action Plan it is stated that: “The Action Plan, which by virtue of its flexibility can be adapted to Tunisia's needs and specificities [...]” (European Commission, 2004b, p. 2), but this is almost the only sentence on the whole page which mentions the possibility for adaptation of the Tunisian government apart from the very general sentences which explain the cooperation between EU and Tunisia. This gives the impression as if the Action Plan is made by the EU and provides a set of possibilities for the Union’s relation with Tunisia; which to a certain extent do not need to be implemented by Tunisia and can be adjusted, according to the wishes and needs of the partner country. This makes the degree of implementation of the first outline of the agreements unclear. The document of the EU constructs a possible adjustment, but furthermore focuses more on the needs and wishes of the Union self. In comparison to other Action Plans, for example the one for Morocco (European Commission, 2004a), the first page is actually almost the same, in parts of the Action Plans it seems as if only the country names are exchanged. The relation the EU has with its neighbouring countries does not seem as differentiated as the Union likes to describe.
Tunisia is presented as a neutral, but willing partner to participate within the ENP project according to the Action Plan. Not only are the EU and Tunisia determined to seize the opportunity of the ENP, like above, but they also want “to give a new dimension to every aspect of the Association Agreement through the deepening of their political, economic, social, cultural and scientific ties and cooperation on security and environmental questions” (European Commission, 2004b, p. 1). One needs to keep in mind that the document represents the viewpoint of the European Union, and therewith how the EU and its policy makers see Tunisia. The almost template sentences of the Action Plan present Tunisia as having a positive view towards the participation in the ENP. The Action Plan also outlines the possibilities Tunisia will be provided with through the Action Plan. These stretch from “speeding up the process of opening and modernising the Tunisian economy” by keeping the balance of “sustainable socio-economic development” (European Commission, 2004b, p. 2) and the reinforcement of “the strategic foundation” of Tunisia through the ENP (European Commission, 2004b, p. 1). Within the NIP the same image of Tunisia as willing partner to participate within the ENP project is presented, for example it states that “Tunisia wants greater EU involvement in financing intra-Maghreb projects” (European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, nd., p. 11). The only indirect doubt within the documents is that the response of Tunisia is that the country “has indicated its support for the Commission’s suggestion” (European Commission, 2004b, p. 3). Regarding the Action Plan for now as main reference, the EU within its documents presents Tunisia as a willing partner within the top-down plan of the ENP. This constructs Tunisia as willing partner for the ENP Instrument and it is (within these documents) not visible which stance Tunisia has towards the ENP.

The (b-)ordering of the ENP, described above in chapter 4.2.2, already outlines the ambiguities of the bordering and ordering effects of the ENP. On the one hand the neighbouring countries are not going to be allowed to become EU members, on the other hand they have the possibility to partially integrate into some of the EU structures (for example through facilitated trade agreements). This ambiguity of partial inclusion is also visible at the EU Tunisia relation. On the one hand the EU describes the possibilities as opportunities for the countries participating in the ENP:

“In addition to technical and financial aid, the ENP provides a number of opportunities to support implementation of the NAP [European Neighbourhood Policy Action Plan], such as business openings, access to the single market, participation in certain Community programmes and Community agencies, and the possibility of attending TAIEX seminars.” (European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, nd., p. 14)

On the other hand in order to get these opportunities Tunisia must comply with EU standards, regarding for example trade, industrial goods and legislation (European Commission, 2004b). The sentence “bring national standards into line with EU and international standards” (European Commission, 2004b, p. 11) is often visible in this or a slightly different version within the Action Plan and the NIP. The above mentioned opportunities the EU provides towards Tunisia clearly are the incentives the EU is working with to attract countries to participate within the EN project. Therefore the EU offers the “prospect of moving beyond the existing relationship to a significant degree of integration, including offering Tunisia a stake in the
internal market and the possibility of participating progressively in key aspects of EU policies and programmes” (European Commission, 2004b, p. 2).

Taking into account the ordering and spatial implications of this policy, the documents suggest that the EU tries to attract countries towards its structural modes, mostly increase its standards, including standards of living, without offering full integration/inclusion. Through this the EU can indirectly influence the structures and order its immediate surroundings, but it is also limited if the partner countries do not comply according to the EU plans nor agree on the European conditionality, or even ignore the EU plans. When it concerns Tunisia, it is described as if it is willing to partially commit itself towards the Union, but when it concerns the progress report it seems as if Tunisia is choosing its own pace, especially regarding the issues they have with the government priorities.

For the actual manifestation of the relationship the Union uses the Action Plans: for the implementation of these has created five subcommittees on: economic dialogue, agriculture and fisheries, transport, environment and energy, research and innovation, customs cooperation (Commission of the European Communities, 2006b, p. 1). The Progress Report of 2006 describes which implementations are successful and which are not. Also in this report there the relationship between the Union and Tunisia gets presented as close and the goals of both actors as not that far away from each other: “there is a high degree of cohesion between the Action Plan and Tunisia’s own priorities” (Commission of the European Communities, 2006b, p. 2). It is interesting to see that first the report states that the priorities are not that different, whereas the report describes in the close description that especially as it concerns democracy and human rights there has not been made that much progress. The first of the key aspects of the Action Plan is the promotion of democracy and human rights. The second aspect addresses the enhancement of political dialogue. At the third place comes the attraction of foreign direct investment. The step towards a more democratic political system is clearly of high importance to the EU. In comparison to the Association Agreement (European Communities, 1998), which only addresses the framework of political dialogue, which does not enter in the aspect of democracy and/or human rights promotion, but instead continues with the framework for trade relations.

The overall assessment of the EU regarding its relation towards Tunisia and the implementation of the ENP is described as “good progress” which is “made on most of the economic and social reforms and the sector-specific measures indicated in the Action Plan” (Commission of the European Communities, 2006b, p. 1). On the political front, the report describes “less progress”, but warns for the challenge of growing unemployment among young graduates and “the social unrest and migration which it generates”. These can be the first signs indicating the developments of the Arab Spring and they are not only present in the overall assessment. Also by regarding the detailed parts of the report, it states that there is only limited freedom of press: Journalists in written and electronic press face obstacles; relations to improve Human Rights “continue to be problematic”; the progress on democracy and rule of law is present, but consists mostly of members of the ruling party (the Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique) and therewith its possible success remains questionable (Commission of the European Communities, 2006b). The most progress Tunisia has made with the regards to trade
dismantling and free movement of goods, but also in the economic and trade framework work has yet to be done, according to the report.

The first description of overall good process seems to be very optimistic of the Union. It seems as if the Union wants to construct and present a better partnership than it currently is. There is secondary literature which outlines the EU Tunisia relationship as less favourable as presented by the EU (Bicchi, 2010; Durac & Cavatorta, 2009; Morisse-Schilbach, 2007). Regarding the issues where Tunisia has made less or no progress one can already see the indicators which later have led to the outbreak of the Arab Spring. This poses the question whether the European Union should have contributed or intervened more to pressure Tunisia towards implementing more democracy promotion, instead of making deals with Ben Ali or if the EU is even allowed to intervene that much beyond its own borders while trying to influence the state sovereignty of others?

The EU as a normative power in the first document, the Action Plan (European Commission, 2004b), tries to create a close relationship with its neighbour Tunisia. The document has a very European viewpoint and only in fractions it addresses the wishes and goal of the partner country Tunisia. With the implementation of the ENP goals, the progress report states that there is no progress as it concerns the aspect of democratisation and human rights, but there is progress concerning trade and economic relations (Bicchi, 2010; Commission of the European Communities, 2006b; Holm, Malmvig, & Fabrizio, 2011). In the National Indicative Programme the agenda and financial priorities for 2007 until 2010 are outlined (European Commission, 2012c; European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, nd.), but also that document does focus more on the economic relationship, rather than the process of political change.

The image the documents represent of the EU Tunisia relationship seems to be developing with overall good progress and a focus on development. Therefore the European documents represent Tunisia as a willing partner for the Union. The next section will outline the happenings of the Arab Spring in Tunisia.

5.3 Tunisia’s Jasmine Revolution
As described above the situation of Tunisia did not change much with the start of the ENP. Especially the lack of political freedom and the growing unemployment for educated young people were the starting points of the developments of the Arab Spring (Asseburg, 2011). Even though these aspects are already mentioned in the ENP documents above, nobody thought that the leaders of Tunisia and the other Arab countries would fall so quickly. But there were signs that something would happen, it was just a matter of where and when (Colombo, 2010).

As described in the introduction, the Arab Spring started when Mohamed Bouazizi put himself on fire on 17 December 2010 in Tunisia (Al Yafai, 2011; Asseburg, 2011; Eltahawy, 2011; Pillar, 2011). Even though ‘Arab Spring’ is the name for the movements across the Arab countries, Pillar (2011, p. 5) argues that the outcome for every country is different and that even the several revolts (and revolutions) are of a different kind. In Tunisia the refusal of a military officer helped
to overthrow Ben Ali, who fled the country almost a month after Bouazizi’s self-immolation (Cody & Warwick, 2011).

The situation of Tunisia after the revolution is described as impatient, concerned, but somehow optimistic (Melzer, 2011, p. 20). The impatience can be seen as well as in political as well as in the social sphere. For most Tunisians the process of political process is too slow; they are afraid of political and economic destabilisation. Social impatience mostly relates to the unemployment and the low salaries of the ones employed. The post-revolution situation is accompanied by strikes and by provocation and minor unrest (Melzer, 2011, pp. 20-21). Even though the impatience and concerns, Melzer (2011, p. 26) states that one needs to be optimistic about Tunisia, as it is a country which has the best prerequisites possible for democratic change: a mostly homogeneous society, which is well educated and traditionally oriented towards consensus; there is an engaged and well educated elite and a broad middle class, which can stabilise politically and socially; in most parts of the country there is good infrastructure as well as good economic facilities, from which recuperation is suspected in 2012.

Within one year Tunisians have elected their own temporary government and disbanded Ben Ali’s police (France24, 2012d). Even though there is still unrest and high unemployment, the Tunisians are aware of the democratic transition they have made possible within their country (France24, 2012c, 2012d). This is also visible in the changing political process, which is still going on. According to France24 parliamentary elections are to be expected around March of 2013 (France24, 2012b).

5.4 Effects of the Jasmine Revolution

Within the EU documents described above, there were already signs of the outbreak of the Jasmine Revolution, like the high rates of unemployment and the lack of political freedom, but still the development came as a surprise to almost everybody (Eltahawy, 2011). In May 2010, about six months before the self-immolation of Bouazizi, the Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Stefan Füle still wanted to get involved into closer relations with Tunisia:

“Tunisia and the EU have strong links. I am convinced that we can do more to develop our bilateral relations with the help of a number of positive factors, in particular the stability enjoyed by the region. My intention is to give new impetus to our relations by building on the mutual confidence and understanding between us in order to embark on a constructive, ambitious and forward-looking dialogue.” (European Union, 2010, p. 1)

The EU was ready to provide Tunisia an ‘advanced status’ in their foreign relations (Holm, et al., 2011, p. 1). Whether the EU did not see the signs, or did not want to see the signs in order to profit from the “stability enjoyed by the region” as Füle states above is unclear. Even though the Union defined democracy promotion as one of the key aspects of the ENP, they were not eager to destabilise the region; in order to prevent mass migration to Europe and/or because they fear Islamisation (euobserver.com, 2012; Holm, et al., 2011). For the analysis of the effects of the Jasmine revolution on the EU Tunisia relations 15 press releases of the Union were analysed.
With the beginning of the uprisings in Tunisia the Union first was concerned about the happenings and unsure of how to act; at least there was little attention from the representatives of the Union. Soon after the revolution was over, the European Commission augmented financial aid for Tunisia (up to EUR 400 million) and (re-)started the dialogue on migration, mobility and security (European Commission, 2012b). In their paper Biscop, Balfour and Emerson (2012) ask the question whether the Arab Spring can provide a springboard for EU foreign policy; regarding the case of the ENP and the Jasmine revolution in Tunisia this might be possible.

The first responses of the Union towards the revolution were concern. In a press release of January 2011, the EU High Representative Catherine Ashton and Commissioner Stefan Füle state their worries about the “events that have been taking place in Tunisia in recent days” (European Union, 2011f, p. 1). They do not define the events directly as revolts and demonstrations going on, but rather they prefer to focus on normative consequence and address their sympathy for the victims: “In particular, we deplore the violence and the death of civilians” (European Union, 2011f, p. 1). Soon after the demonstration and violence decreased, the EU filled in its role as promoter of democracy and human rights, like Catherine Ashton said in February 2011: “We want to be Tunisia’s strongest ally in their move towards democracy” (European Union, 2011b, p. 2). The support of the Union was expressed in the offer for better border control in March (European Union, 2011e, p. 1) and the appreciation of the Union as Tunisia proposed male-female parity for their upcoming elections in April (European Union, 2011h, p. 1). In July 2011, Catherine Ashton appreciates the ratification of Tunisia of the Rome statute of the International Criminal Court: “This important step is a clear signal of Tunisia’s willingness to further open its human rights records to the scrutiny of the relevant international mechanisms, and to ensure full respect of human rights, while the country continues its efforts towards democracy. I am confident that it will contribute to deepening of our bilateral relations.” (European Union, 2011g, p. 1). The elections in September of 2011 in Tunisia, according to the EU, represented “an historical moment in the transition process of Tunisia towards democracy. For the first time, Tunisian citizens will have the opportunity to freely choose their representatives” (European Commission, 2011b, p. 1). Through all these documents the Union focuses on the norms and values, which are key aspect of the Neighbourhood Policy. The emphasis on these values does not only show the picture the EU has of the progress of Tunisia, but does also represent the Union and its ‘normative power’: Through presenting the progress Tunisia makes and by laying the emphasis on norms and values the Union is promoting; the Union presents itself being an important defender of these.

The self-representation of the Union is clear, but their image of Tunisia is influenced by the EU’s promotion of the key aspects of the ENP. All the representations of Tunisia are within the fuzzy concept of democracy promotion after the fall of Ben Ali and the partnership the Union has with Tunisia. The EU represents Tunisia, even at that time it had no clear government, as a partner, whom they expect to meet “the ambitions and expectations placed in our relationship” (European Union, 2011f, p. 1). Their relationship is described as based on “a strong dialogue and broad cooperation” and “a process of strengthening bilateral relations on a wide range of issues” (European Union, 2011f, p. 1). Another example of the emphasis of their partnership is present
in a memo of September 2011, which stresses that Tunisia was the first Mediterranean country signing an Association Agreement with the EU (European Union, 2011c, p. 1). Overall there is put much hope on the transition towards democracy and the respect for Human Rights. Tunisia is represented as a country which is eager for democratic transformation and with many ambitions, like here:

“The high level of education of its people and its efficient administrative structures are particularly important assets. They will help to ensure the successful transition to a state based on democratic principles, the rule of law and respect for human rights.” (European Union, 2011e, p. 1)

Commissioner Füle found it “reassuring that Tunisia has set for itself a vision of reform and modernisation” (European Union, 2011i, p. 2). With these representations of Tunisia and the EU, the Union owns the knowledge of construction, but as this thesis only focuses on the EU documents it is beyond its boundaries to see how Tunisia perceives this partnership. After the emancipation of Tunisia through the Jasmine Revolution one might assume that Tunisia has the power to construct an image as well/ is able to represent itself.

After the first concerns about the normative key aspects of the European Neighbourhood Project were over, the EU started to take the “opportunity to strengthen the partnership between Tunisia and the European Union on the basis of an affirmation of democracy and economic and social reform” (European Union, 2011a, p. 3). The strengthening of the partnership started again in September 2011, when the EU-Tunisia Task Force was set up to “better understand and identify the challenges and needs of Tunisia in its democratic transition process. It aims to coordinate more efficiently the support of the international community and accelerate and better target the support of the EU, with a particular focus on short term measures and initiatives” (Tunisia – European Union Task Force, 2011, p. 1). Through this the Union wants to (partially) integrate Tunisia towards some systems of the Union. According to Füle the Union wants to send “a signal to the world and to business that we trust Tunisia ability to become a close and important partner of the EU in our neighbourhood, a country that is closely integrated with the EU” (European Union, 2011i, p. 2). Tunisia is thus already partially integrated and included in the EU system(s).

This inclusion has not been the case at the beginning of 2011, when the revolution was still going on. Then there was only the emphasis of the close relationship between EU and Tunisia. Also is the description of the Union as normative power not only the self-description and creation of the Union as such, but it excludes Tunisia as a country which does not yet have these normative values and it is indirectly implied that Tunisia yet has to achieve the level of normative power the EU has. The EU calls therefore in the beginning of the revolution “on Tunisian authorities to investigate the recent events and provide further information about them, and on all parties to engage in dialogue with a view to finding solutions to the problems raised by demonstrators” (European Union, 2011f, p. 1).
5.5 ENP Tunisia implications

The documents of the Union describe Tunisia as a rather willing partner of the EN process, but whether Tunisia really wants to participate will be seen within the next years when the political system and government of Tunisia has developed after the Arab Spring and then the implementation of the ENP will be visible. Within the documents of the ENP the neo-colonial ideology becomes visible, even though the practices are less neo-colonial. It is visible that the EU is presented as superior towards Tunisia, for example in the adjustment of the Tunisian system, rather than an integration of the Tunisian system into the European structures. Also, as it regards the developments of the revolution, the European officials focus on the norms and values, which are not (yet) present within Tunisia. Therewith the Union represents itself as superior to Tunisia and it tries to impose its structures and values upon a country, which is beyond the borders of the Union. Even though, the documents Ashton stresses that the actual process of reform is up to the Tunisian people: “But let me be absolutely clear: the future of this country lies firmly in the hands of the Tunisian people” (European Union, 2011b, p. 2). This depends on whether the Union still is willing to help Tunisia, when the country is developing not conform to European expectations. Therefore, whether the revolution in Tunisia will be an Arab Springboard for the EU will be something which cannot yet be concluded.
6. Case study Algeria
This chapter will first present a short outline of Algeria’s history. Afterwards the relation between Algeria and the EU will be analysed. Then the effects of the developments of Arab Spring in Algeria will be described. This will be followed by the analysis these effects have (had) on the EU Algeria relations.

6.1 Algeria’s history
Algeria is a geographical neighbour of Tunisia, therefore it shares a similar history in regard to the Antique, where there has been Roman, Arab and Berber rule and afterwards it was partly integrated into the Ottoman Empire. Unlike Tunisia, Algeria’s past in regard to colonial rule includes major presence of France as colonial power and a brutal struggle for independence. France has ruled over Algerian territory for more than 130 years. During these, France had the total power on politics, commerce, agriculture and employment and the position of the Algerian population was subservient (Meredith, 2009, p. 45). In 1954 the struggle for independence started with terrorist attacks and transformed into a brutal war. France wanted to hold on to Algeria, because of the natural resources found and the high number of French people living within the Algerian territory. Even though, violence spread in the Maghreb region. In 1958, French command declared themselves the winner, because the resistance was broken and the attacks on the French military decreased. However, due to a vacuum in government leadership in France at that time, Algeria was abandoned by the French military in May of 1958: “Algiers was left without a governor-general; Paris still had no government” (Meredith, 2009, p. 56).

After gaining officially independence in 1962, Algeria has been a dictatorship for 26 years with a “monopoly on public life” (Meredith, 2009, p. 447). With the approval of the military, Bouteflika came to power in 1999, after the country had gone through a period of socialist rule, ‘Arabisation’ and civil war (BBC, 2012b; Meredith, 2009, pp. 447-461). Bouteflika is still president, and since 2008, also the head of government (CIA Factbook, nd.). The developments of the Arab Spring have not yet changed his position.

6.2 EU-Algeria relations
The relation between Europe (the European Community) and Algeria started when Algeria was still ruled by the French in 1957. It started with granting Algeria trade benefits (Darbouche, 2008, p. 373). These benefits were kept after independence, but were suspended in 1965, due to pressure from inside the European Community and a coup d’état in Algeria. Due to several disagreements there was no approximation until 1976, when both sides signed a cooperation agreement (Darbouche, 2008). In 1992, the European Community had the idea of a closer relationship with the countries in the Maghreb; which had just set up the ‘Union du Maghreb Arabe’ (UMA). This European rapprochement finally was directed towards all neighbouring countries of the Mediterranean, but according to Darbouche (2008) was not very successful in Algeria:

“While its neighbouring countries were actively trying to draw political and economic dividends from the EC/EU’s policy initiatives, it soon became clear that Algeria, by
contrast, was unable to do more than just renew the protocols of its financial and technical cooperation with the EC. It was not until the Barcelona conference of 1995 that the country’s approach towards the EU became a little more purposive” (Darbouche, 2008, p. 374).

The Barcelona process provided an opportunity for Algeria, but was suspended because Algeria failed to convince its European partner to include anti-terrorist policies. After 9/11 the Association Agreement was created and replaced the cooperation agreement in 2005. Algeria is more independent from the EU than other Mediterranean countries, because of its gas and oil reserves (CIA Factbook, nd.; Morisse-Schilbach, 2007). This provides the country with a different position than the one from for example its neighbours Tunisia and Morocco, who depend on trade with the EU.

For the analysis of the EU Algeria relations three documents were analysed. These are:

- Association Agreement 2005
- A publication of the European Delegation: “Union Européenne- Algérie 30 ans de coopérations 1979-2009” (in French, as there was no comparable document available in English)

The Association Agreement was chosen, because it currently represents the EU-Algeria relationship was signed in 2002 and entered force in 2005 (European Union External Action, nd.; Official Journal of the European Union, 2005). This Agreement consists of 227 pages including 8 main focus points and 44 Protocol Articles (Official Journal of the European Union, 2005). The Association Agreement mainly focuses on economic and trade relations. For the analysis a selection was made of only the first 25 pages. The document including the Country Strategy Paper (CSP) and National Indicative Programme (NIP) was chosen, as it outlines the plans of the Union for Algeria. The last document was chosen as it outlines the relationship between the EU and Algeria from a European perspective. It is the only document which is in French, as there was no English equivalent. An important difference towards the documents for the analysis of Tunisia is that in the first two chosen documents the interests of Tunisia are directly addressed and also that copies of the documents were sent to Algerian authorities (European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, nd).

Regarding the EU Algeria partnership, the documents describe that the European perspective has the goal to establish sustainable conditions for a relationship, which serves the mutual interests and takes into account the expectations of Algeria (Bacza, 2009, p. 11). During the talks of the cooperation agreement the EU Algeria relation has been described as remaining at a “formal level” (Bacza, 2009, p. 21). The overall relationship is described as being reinvigorated, as the partners have convergent visions and as relevant because of the shared history and the shared geographical space (Bacza, 2009, p. 9). European perspective on the relationship with Algeria is presented as rather hopeful and describes the relation not enthusiastically, but rather neutral. The Union identifies Algeria as a key actor for their relations with Africa and the
Maghreb (Bacza, 2009, p. 11). However, due to historical divergence Algeria remains the last country bordering the Mediterranean not to have signed an Action Plan with the Union (Darbouche, 2008; Kramsch, 2011). In addition, the negotiations of the Agreement are described as “particularly thorny, its implementation relatively slow and its overall results notably modest” (Darbouche, 2008, p. 373). It seems as if the documents of the Union want to present the relationship as converging instead of diverging.

Within the EU documents the EU Algeria relationship is not described as “thorny” as the negotiations for the Association Agreement. Even though the documents analysed mostly focus on the more recent history between the actors, they mostly only address Algeria’s history as “a decade of terrorism” (European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, nd, pp. 0,6,17) and Algeria as “a country where the State’s authority has deteriorated in the wake of the wave of terrorism” (European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, nd, p. 6). The history of “terrorism” legitimises the support the Union is offering to Algeria, which “is needed now more than ever in this transitional phase of much structural change in the economy” (European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, nd, p. 17). The country is presented as emerging out of an uncertain past, but described as currently political stable (European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, nd). The people in Algeria are described as “anxious to see not only economic growth and employment, but also an improvement in basic services, greater equality and good governance” (European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, nd, p. 0). Therefore Algeria is engaging in a process of reform and modernisation (Bacza, 2009). The documents describe Algeria as country coming out of a difficult past, but now willing and eager for modernisation and reform. Of course, within these documents the Union offers its support to Algeria to implement this transition.

With the offer of support the Union can represent itself as ‘normative power’. This is achieved mainly through the goals and objectives it defines in its documents for its relation with Algeria. The EU objectives focus on “(i) human rights (democracy, governance, justice and security); (ii) sustainable economic reforms (employment and growth) and (iii) Millennium Development Goals relating to education” (European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, nd, p. 18). By setting the focus on human rights, democracy and justice, before mentioning the economic reforms the Union represents its focus on especially the values of human rights and democracy. To enforce its image as ‘normative power’ the priorities of the objective of the EU’s strategy for 2007-2013 (European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, nd, p. 18) first address “political reforms in the areas of democracy and human rights, the rule of law and good governance”, then they address the justice system, which needs to be reformed and “the management of migratory flows plus the fight against organised crime, money laundering and terrorism” but there is the stress again on the “upholding [of] human rights”. It is only the third point, which addresses economic aspects. Interestingly is the aspect of migratory flows, which is put in between the reforms of the justice system and the fight against terrorism and present in almost all documents relating to ENP South. Since the 2000’s, migration patterns in Algeria have changed (Di Bartolomeo, Jaulin, & Perrin, 2010, p. 9; European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, nd). First, because of unemployment and the political insecurity in Algeria out-migration has increased. Second, there is more and more immigration from foreign investors and Sub-Saharan migrants. Third, migration towards Europe has increased
considerably. Therefore the “main objective of the new Algerian migration policy is to control irregular migration, rather than to protect foreign workers in Algeria or to improve the employment of Algerians abroad. This choice can be explained by the pressure exerted by the EU on Algeria, by the supposed links between smuggling networks and terrorist organizations, and by the indignation of the public confronted by the drama of the harragas [illegal African migrants]” (Di Bartolomeo, et al., 2010, p. 9). That the EU addresses the control of migratory flows under the same bullet point as the reform of the justice system can be indirect pressure from the EU towards Algeria to increase border control and to not allow ‘terrorists’ to cross the Mediterranean. The increased control of the borders is also described as a conditionality of the ENP in chapter 4.2.1.

Its geographical position as the largest country in Africa (CIA Factbook, nd.) and also its natural resources (Darbouche, 2010; Morisse-Schilbach, 2007) allow Algeria to be more resistant against external influence. Within the neighbourhood of the Union, Algeria’s resources are of importance: It has the world’s 10th largest gas reserves and the world’s 16th largest oil reserves (CIA Factbook, nd.). The EU is interested in the gas and oil reserves of Algeria, to be more independent from Russian energy (EurActiv.com, 2012). However, within the Association Agreement the EU did not pay enough attention towards energy, there is only one article focusing on this aspect, which is formulated rather general. It is stated that “the aims of cooperation in the energy and mining sectors shall be: (a) institutional, legislative and regulatory upgrading to ensure that activities are regulated and investment promoted; (b) technical and technological upgrading to prepare energy and mining companies for the requirements of the market economy and competition; (c) the development of partnerships between European and Algerian companies in the activities of exploration, production, processing, distribution and services in the energy and mining sectors.” (Official Journal of the European Union, 2005, p. 17). Due to the geographic proximity and the pioneering role of Algeria in liquefied natural gas (LNG) there is an interdependence in energy security, also because Algeria needs foreign capital to invest in its energy network (Darbouche, 2010). This is partly present within the short paragraph within the Association Agreement. However, the approach towards an EU-Algeria strategic energy cooperation failed due to a bureaucratic and narrow view from the EU and the elusive commitment of EU member states and institutions (Darbouche, 2009, 2010). The integration of Algeria’s energy resources within the European neighbourhood border space so far thus failed, mostly because Algeria wanted to remain independent from European conditionality and because it does not depend on the EU as a buyer of its resources, as China and other countries are also interested in its resources. The overall strategic response of the Union to include Algeria through other means of the ENP are described as the objective “of a high degree of economic integration through gradual integration with the internal market and a strengthening of political, cultural and social cooperation in particular” (Official Journal of the European Union, 2005), but therefore Algeria has to reform its political and justice system, diversify the economic market, and implement other objectives. Until 2010 these reforms were not implemented yet. Due to historical discrepancy, as it concerns the EU’s plans to include Algeria into its policies and Algeria’s will to remain independent, the inclusion of Algeria to participate within into the Neighbourhood Policy as a full partner was not successful before the beginning of the Arab Spring in 2011. The next section will outline the response of Bouteflika towards the uprisings of the Arab Spring.
6.3 Algeria’s response to the Arab Spring

Like in Tunisia and Egypt, in Algeria there have been demonstrations and rallies in the beginning of 2011. The demonstrators were mostly members of opposition parties and human rights activists inspired by the happenings in Tunisia and Egypt (BBC, 2011a, 2011b). The protestors addressed the limited political freedom and the severe living conditions in Algeria, inter alia high food prices. However, the protests were not as massive and effective as in the other countries. As a newspaper title says: “No Arab Spring for Algeria, only scars of the past” (Biedermann, 2011), which outlines that Arab Spring, at least immense protests, did not really take place in Algeria. The uprisings in February were not successful in changing the political system and the violence of Algeria’s past is often used as explanation for the failure of the Arab Spring in Algeria (BBC, 2011c; Biedermann, 2011).

The government of Algeria banned large rallies in February (BBC, 2011b) and furthermore let the police disrupt the rallies (BBC, 2011c). At the same time Bouteflika promised ambitious political reforms (BBC, 2011d), lifted the state of emergency, which had been in force for 19 years (BBC, 2011a), and finally he introduced food subsidies and increased the salaries of civil servants (BBC, 2011d). To what extent the focus of the Algerian media on the brutal effects of the struggle in Libya has influenced the Algerians is not clear (BBC, 2011d). With these promises Bouteflika could prevent his government from being overthrown and he still is president.

The political reforms he introduced took its first steps with the parliamentary elections in May 2012. The observer mission of the European Union said “elections took place in an atmosphere of calm efficiency, though it did not describe them as free and fair” (France24, 2012a). The new parliament is supposed to implement further reforms, among other things to rewrite the constitution.

6.4 EU-Algeria post Arab Spring

The partnership of the Union and Algeria improved after Bouteflika announced his political reforms, which were his response to the uprisings in his countries following the protests of the Arab Spring. In December 2011, Algeria announced exploratory talks with the EU to elaborate an Action Plan (Commission européenne - Communiqué de presse, 2012, p. 1). The Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy Štefan Füle stressed the importance of the reform changes before visiting Algier in March 2012. According to him: “Since my last visit in May 2011, the relations between Algeria and the EU made important progress” as it regards the implementation of reforms (Commission européenne - Communiqué de presse, 2012, p. 1). For this section five press releases from the European Union from 2011 and 2012 were analysed to see whether the effects of the Arab Spring had affected the EU Algeria relation. Even though the Arab Spring did not really spread in Algeria, to answer the question of Biscop, Balfour and Emerson (2012), whether the Arab Spring present a springboard for European foreign policy, the reforms afterwards surely provided a springboard for the European Neighbourhood Policy in Algeria.
Algeria and the EU increased their efforts in the partnership. Commissioner Stefan Füle agreed with Abdelkader Messahel, the Deputy Foreign Minister of Algeria, “that Algeria and the European Union have a mutual interest in the intensification of our cooperation in order to face the new challenges of instability, poverty and arms proliferation in the Sahel region” (European Commission, 2011d, p. 1). The parliamentary elections of Algeria, the first step towards the promised reforms, were observed by an EU mission. This was the first time that Algeria invited EU officials to observe its elections (European Commission, 2012a, p. 4). Within the documents it is described that “Algeria’s invitation to the EU to observe these elections is a mark of trust and engagement” (European Union, 2012, p. 1). However there is new ‘trust and engagement’ between the partners, they also present the elections as being hold in “a peaceful and orderly atmosphere” and “a step forward in the reform process which started in April 2011” (European Union, 2012, p. 1). Nonetheless, there has been doubt about the freedom and fairness of the election process (BBC, 2012a; France24, 2012a).

After the spring of 2011, the representation the Union provides in its publications of Algeria does not differ significantly from the image the Union was presenting before the Arab Spring. The focus of the documents is now less on the difficult past, the “decade of terrorism”, but more on the reforms the Algerian government has planned. It is for example stated in one of the documents that: “Following developments related to the Arab Spring and internal social and political unrest, the Algerian authorities lifted the state of emergency (in force since 1992) in February 2011” and “[t]hereafter, on 15 April 2011, President Bouteflika announced a programme of political reforms. This led to the adoption of a package of laws covering: the electoral code, participation of women in elected assemblies, associations, media, political parties, decentralisation and the incompatibility between political mandates. A revision of the Constitution is expected to take place after the 10 May 2012 legislative elections” (European Commission, 2012a, p. 1). Even though there is slight criticism present within the document, concerning the bill on association and the restriction of Non-governmental organisations, but within the same document relating towards the election process, which fairness as described above is doubtful, the documents indicate that the Union is “acknowledging positive developments” (European Commission, 2012a, p. 1). The overall picture of Algeria, which the Union is creating within its documents, is more positive than the picture it had of Algeria before the Arab Spring. It seems as if the developments of the Arab Spring, even though they had no major political impact in Algeria, changed the image the Union has about the political future of the country towards a more hopeful and positive one. This is a consequence of the will of Algeria for political reform and elections, which will be elaborated in detail later on.

The self-representation of the Union does not differ significantly either from the representation before the Arab Spring. In the more recent documents there is more focus on the commitment of the Union towards its partnership with Algeria and the Union presents the help it has provided to Algeria. Within the document of May 2012 it is stated that: “The EU is fully committed to continuing an open, comprehensive and constructive dialogue with Algeria in order to further strengthen the partnership” (European Union, 2012, p. 1). The publication of the Union of March 2012 is also titled: “EU-Algeria: A new stage of more intense cooperation” (Commission européenne - Communiqué de presse, 2012, p. 1). Within that publication Commissioner Füle describes the purpose of its planned visit to Algeria a few days later, which is the “European
support for the reforms” and also the “strengthening of the bilateral cooperation” (Commission européenne - Communiqué de presse, 2012, p. 1). Apart from the stronger commitment presented by the Union it also represents its ‘normative’ issues. For example Füle welcomes the increase in women’s rights and he and the High Representative Catherine Ashton strongly condemn terrorist attacks on a military academy in August 2011: “We strongly condemn this act of terror and extend our solidarity to the Algerian people and in particular to the friends and families of the victims. Violence will be defeated and will not succeed in stopping Algeria on its path towards reforms. The EU is ready to develop further its cooperation with Algeria to support the reform agenda”(European Union, 2011d, p. 1). In the last sentence again the EU documents stress the Unions commitment and hopes for the future developments of Algeria. Even though the Unions documents suggest that there is a positive outlook on its relation with Algeria; there is not yet a democratic system and also the respect for the rule of law, as the elections have shown is still in development in Algeria. The question appears to what extend the Union can make commitments towards a government which is not yet following the most important aspects of the ENP, democracy and human rights? The Union seems to answer the question diplomatically: “The EU looks forward to the newly elected Parliament taking forward the reform process based on democratic principles and the respect for human rights and the rule of law” (European Union, 2012, p. 1).

The spatial implications of the closer cooperation of the EU and Algeria are not that directly visible within the documents. However, the closer cooperation could make the European Southern border space more homogeneous, if Algeria will sign the Action Plan and if there are no unexpected developments in the other states at the southern border of the Union. Algeria is one of the key actors for the EU in Africa, as described above, but especially within the Maghreb. According to the Union its relation towards Algeria is presented as economically interdependent: “The EU is the first trading partner of Algeria with total trade amounting to approximately EUR 44.7 billion in 2011. The EU is Algeria’s major source of imports and is its largest market for exports with an average share of 50% for total trade. Algeria occupies rank number 12 and 20 in EU’s imports and exports respectively, and 14 among the EU’s major trade partners, covering 1.4% of EU total trade in 2011. Bilateral total trade grew up by 13.75% since 2009” (European Commission, 2012a, p. 2). The presentation of the economic relation shows the importance of the relationship between the two actors, but as the description of the history of the relation has shown, this quote does not represent the independence which the Algerian government wanted to hold on to in the past.

6.5 ENP Algeria implications
Taking into account secondary sources is the relationship between the EU and Algeria more problematic than described in the documents of the Union. As a consequence that Algeria has direct access, and saying over the content of the Unions documents the Unions ideology, in comparison with the Tunisian documents is less present. This might be, because Algeria is less depending on the EU, as it has natural resources (Morisse-Schilbach, 2007). Because of this, the introduction of the “more for more” approach might especially in a country like Algeria be fruitful, as the Union can adapt its support according to the progress made within and the extent of the relations with the country. Regarding the increased partnership and the developing
inclusion of Algeria into the by the Union favoured neighbourhood programme, does make the European border space wider, and provides the possibility of more influence of the Union beyond its border. However, it not clear on which of the “more for more” principles the Union and Algeria will focus, but for now it seems as if the developments of the Arab Spring provided a springboard for the relations between the EU and Algeria.
7. Synthesis A European construction
Within the analysis above it has been tried to unveil the ideology and the approach of the European Union towards its southern neighbours. To be able to address the ideology of the European Union towards its southern neighbours, the materialisations of the power relation(s) were analysed: Some of the documents represent the legal framework of their relationship, such as the Association Agreement and the Action Plan. By looking at the documents the focus lay on the aspects from the theoretical framework, mainly neo-colonialism, the knowledge of construction and the spatial implications. In this chapter the synthesis, will bring together the analysis with the theoretical framework, regarding the aspects of neo-colonialism, as well as the knowledge of construction and the issue of the spatial aspect of order and border.

7.1 Neo-colonialist ideology
To review whether the EU has a neo-colonial ideology in its foreign affairs approach, this first part will go through the aspects of Said by regarding the ENP documents. Afterwards the EU perspective will also be regarded by looking at the examples of ‘othering’ and (b-)ordering, which are connected to the aspects of Said. First, we will review the aspects Said identifies as key aspects in his book “Orientalism” (Said, 1979), which are: an absolute and systematic difference between East and West, abstractions about the Orient are always preferable “to direct evidence drawn from modern Oriental realities”, the Orient is incapable of defining itself and that the Orient has either to be feared or to be controlled.

The aspect of ‘self-representation’ of the West, is not part of Said’s points, but will be addressed in the next section, regarding ‘othering’ and the knowledge of construction. Looking at the construction the Union creates of itself and its neighbours (and their categorisation) through the ENP (as is described in chapter 4.2.2) it is possible to say that Said’s aspects are present. Even though this only represents the European perspective.

Regarding the aspect of the absolute and systematic difference, there is a discourse of ordering including the ‘us’ (the Union) and the ‘others’. However, there are now several categories of ‘others’; this is partly due to the partial integration of the ENP countries into the European systems. By looking at the case studies, there is no visibility of an absolute difference. The partial inclusion of the partner countries into the systems of the EU shows that the absolute difference is contemporary no longer applicable. Systematic differences are presented, especially regarding the normative values of the Union, which are especially shown within the reactions of EU officials towards the Jasmine revolution in Tunisia. Concerning the case of Algeria the focus is more on the development of the increased relation with the Union after the Arab Spring of 2011. What is interesting is that through the slightly different approach and the different level of their relationship, the Union even creates a (systematic) difference between its partner countries. This might even increase through the implementation of the “more for more” principle.

To answer the point of the abstraction of the Orient, there would have been the need for deeper analysis of also the perspective of the partner countries, but this would be outside the boundaries of a master thesis, but it is a suggestion for further research. However the European
descriptions give insights in how the Union sees its neighbours. There is a lot of focus on what is not according to European standards within the partner countries and what needs to be adjusted according to EU rules. For example, the sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards need to be modified according to EU rules, because this is a condition for Free Trade Agreements with the Union. This pre-condition is made by the EU without even considering what the partner countries are willing to implement. This missing consideration is also visible within the documents regarding Tunisia, where nowhere it is mentioned whether Tunisia’s government would like to modify something within the agreements. This in comparison is present within the documents of the EU towards Algeria, where it is often stated that the Algerian government will receive a copy of the documents. So, in that case if the descriptions about Algeria would be too abstract Algeria’s government would probably intervene.

The aspect concerning the self-representation is difficult to answer, because the perspective of the partner countries was not part of this research. Further research would be required to be able to answer this question, but so far no evidence has been found that the partner countries are incapable of defining themselves. Especially with the developments of Arab Spring and the elections, which were results of these developments, show that the partner countries are capable of defining themselves. However, taking into the account to what extent the Union allows these countries to represent themselves within their documents, it seems as if the Union still prefers to describe ‘them’ and their structures through a European lens. This is strongly connected to the aspect of abstraction above. Within the documents there is no focus on the actual systems present within Tunisia and Algeria, but there is a presentation of what is different to EU standards and norms. The imposition of EU rules and standards, as described above and through outlining the conditions for the partnership before actually talking to the possible partners, by outlining the ENP before actually talking to the ‘new’ neighbours in 2003 and 2004, presents the Unions superiority. This re-presentation for the Union legitimises the adjustment of the systems and standards of their partners, rather than a modification of EU standards. Here, the question needs to be asked whether the Union regards its partner countries as equal.

The last point, regarding either controlling or fearing of the Orient, can be seen as the main goal of the ENP: a more stable and secure neighbourhood. It is not completely clear what the Union actually means with this goal. The Union does not directly undermine state sovereignty, but it is trying to influence its neighbourhood through partial integration, bound to conditionality. This shows an indirect wish to have at least some control over the neighbourhood and a fear possible of negative spread effects. However the possibility to control the neighbourhood depends on the willingness of the partner countries to participate within the ENP. The intervention beyond the own borders, which seems to be necessary to achieve the goal of the ENP, reminds of imperialism, but this aspect will be outlined in one of the following sections, which regards the bordering and ordering of the neighbourhood.

Regarding the aspects described within the documents of the European Neighbourhood Policy, the ideology of the Union still bears neo-colonial aspects. Hereby, one needs to differentiate between the ideology of the documents and the actual practice and implementation of the foreign policy of the Union. The language of the documents still suggests a feeling of superiority of the EU towards its partner countries. However, the participation remains voluntary and if the
partners do not agree with the conditions, they do not participate, like the examples of Algeria and Libya show. The next sections will outline the neo-colonial ideology of the ENP at the examples and theoretical aspects of ‘othering’ and the knowledge of construction and the ordering and bordering of the neighbourhood of the Union.

7.1.1 Knowledge of construction
As described above, the neighbouring countries of the Union can be partially included into at least some systems of the EU. This inclusion is bound to conditionality, which is inherent to the ENP. The inclusion does foremost focus on economic and trade aspects. Through this the neighbours of the Union remain partially excluded and represented as different, as the ‘other’.

Total inclusion of the ‘other’ is not possible due to the geographical positioning of the partner countries and the limitation of the Union for only European countries. As shown above there is no absolute difference any longer, but the systematic difference is still (re-)presented by the documents of the Union. As part of the ideology of the materialisation of the social life, the construction of the representation of the actors is a central aspect. The knowledge of construction which is mentioned in the theoretical context determines the power structures and therewith the materialisation of the (social) relations.

Interestingly, the Union did not provide a deep description of its partners, but that through the documents the Union represents itself. The self-representation focused foremost on the image the Union wants to present, with a focus on shared norms and values. This was especially stressed especially by showing what the partner countries are missing, like the example of the rule of law and freedom of press in Tunisia and Algeria. This self-representation and the description of the differences of the ‘other’ are part of a neo-colonialist ideology. As is described in the theoretical framework, Wurgaft (1995) identified the creation of the own identity, the identity of the colonisers, as the outset of colonialism all along. It can be argued that the Union still has a neo-colonialist perspective. It shows that the Union still has a certain amount of power and superiority: The power of representation, which is inherent to the knowledge of construction. In colonialism, the latter was used to differentiate between coloniser and colonised, just as the Union distinguishes between member and partner countries. The practices used by the Union are more differentiated than the colonial practices of ‘othering’, this will be further outlined in the next section regarding the ordering and bordering of the surrounding of the Union.

Still the knowledge of construction affects the meaning for the ‘others’ and the knowledge of the self. In colonial times these practices were used for administration and the creation of identity. Nowadays, this is less focused on administration within the imperial borders, but used for the ordering and a tool for intervention beyond the borders and beyond the sovereignty of the Union. The systems, structures and values of the partner countries need to be modified according to European rules. The ‘other’, the partners of the Union need to become more like members of the Union, even though they probably never will be accepted as a member. This is shown by the example of the sanitary standards, but also the convergence of the economy.
towards European standards. However, through focusing on what the EU has, and the ‘others’ do not, the Union can represent itself as a normative power.

Within the documents the knowledge of the self mostly focuses on the representation of a coherent Union, even though the member states do not always agree with each other. The presentation of the Union as a coherent actor seems to be possible while comparing the Union with its neighbouring countries. This needs to represent more unity within the Union than in its neighbourhood (and within the government of its neighbouring countries). This was made possible by stressing especially the description of the normative values present within the Union, like for example democracy and gender equality.

7.1.1.1 Construction of the ‘others’: Tunisia & Algeria
For the creation of the image and coherence of the Union, there is the need for the representation of the ‘other’. In this case the representation of Tunisia and Algeria. Both countries cannot be compared directly as they are too different. Even though they are geographical neighbours in the Maghreb, their histories and political development over the last decades differs a lot.

However, the Union’s documents describe both partners as relatively neutral and most of the time indirectly as willing to implement the EU proposals. This gives the impression that the Union knows the outcome and can steer the development for the future. For the Union’s partner countries this means more integration, even though only to a certain extent, into the structure of the Union. As this inclusion is only partial, there will remain a certain extent of exclusion as well. From the documents it seems as if Tunisia was more integrated in the structures of the Union than Algeria, which due to its former socialist government tried to isolate itself from external influence. It is still not foreseeable what the developments of Arab Spring will change in these relations. For now it seems as if the path for Tunisia will depend more on EU expertise with regards to developing democracy, as the documents suggest. For Algeria, the documents suggest a development towards closer agreements with the EU.

These representations suggest that there is a less dichotomous view nowadays. Compared to the strong East/West divide Said described. It seems as if the EU has a perception of the ‘other’ and as the participation within the EN project is voluntary, acknowledges the state sovereignty of its neighbours. To end the war between Algeria and France Camus gave the advice to ‘voir l’autre’, to see each other properly. It seems as within the ENP the Union sees the ‘other’, its neighbouring countries.

Even though the Union sees the ‘other’, it still uses the knowledge of construction as a tool to shape its own identity and administer (as far as possible) its immediate geographical surrounding. Now, the administration of the ‘other’ is not made according to racial origin, but the Union is ordering its surrounding according to geographical proximity as the next section will show.
7.1.2 Bordering and Ordering of the Neighbourhood

“Those who were neighbours became family members, and those who were strangers became neighbours, thereby changing the features of the original household (the EU) and of the layout of the territory in its new configuration.” (Chourou, 2008, p. 6)

As described above the Union needs to deal with internal ambiguities, this is also concerning harmonisation of its space, the re-bordering and ordering of the internal and external border space (Delanty & Rumford, 2005). The harmonisation of the internal border space in this context is only represented by the documents of the Union self, which tries to present a coherent opinion of the member states as it regards its foreign policy towards the neighbouring states, which was already outlined above.

Of more interest for the spatiality of the border space is the partial integration of the participating neighbourhood countries. This influences the socio-spatial power relations and the materialisation it; in regard to the main goal of the ENP, the creation of “a new zone of prosperity” (Commission of the European Communities, 2003a; Delanty & Rumford, 2005). However, this relatively ‘new’ border space for the Union can also be seen as “integration without enlargement” (Delanty & Rumford, 2005, p. 127). The ENP offers the partner countries partial inclusion into the EU structures and systems (for example through free trade agreements), but on the other hand are, at least the southern Neighbourhood countries excluded, as it is very unlikely that they will ever become an EU member state. This differentiation is needed by the Union to create its own identity by comparing itself with the ‘others’, in this case its geographical neighbourhood. Through this comparison the Union can show that its own system, as well as its norms and values are more cultivated and superior. However, border space is not dichotomous any longer; this is already described above at the example of the Schengen area, but also the partial integration of neighbouring EU countries into EU systems creates a more diverse border area. Therefore the spatial area of the Mediterranean was described as less dividing, but as “a zone of (potentially) unstable countries: the new borderlands of the EU” (Batt, in: Delanty & Rumford, 2005, p. 131).

The new EU borderlands can also be regarded as new categories of ordering the external EU border space. The categories can be found on the map on the official website of the EN project (see picture 1). The colours used for this map, which present the EU members (in dark blue), possible new members of the EU (in light blue) and the partner countries of the neighbourhood (in green) present the meaning of on the one hand the difference of the EU members and its partners, but on the other hand also that these are the

![Picture 2: Map of the EU and the ENP](image)
countries that constitute the neighbourhood. Kramsch (2011, p. 204) criticised this map for constructing an utopian view of the border space, which does not show the heterogeneity of the bilateral agreements with partners of the EU. With the upcoming “more for more” principle of the ENP and the still on-going effects of the Arab Spring, foremost in Syria, this critique might even be more relevant. Additionally, the map of the ENP (picture 1) does not present European countries that are not EU members, the territory of Switzerland, Norway and others are represented with a shade of light yellow, which is almost not visible any more, as if these countries are out of the concept and therefore fall of the map. Through the colouring of the map the degrees of ordering in the EU and its neighbourhood are made visible, even though would be more possible for concrete ordering, for example according to the bilateral agreement of the EN partners or the inclusion of non-EU members or according to the borders of the Schengen agreement.

8. Conclusion Towards a new (b-)order construct
To be able to answer the question whether the ENP is a neo-colonial partnership, this thesis has been looking at the policy documents of the European Neighbourhood Policy especially towards Algeria and Tunisia. Whereas the partnership itself seems not to be neo-colonial, as it bases on voluntary participation and on individual bilateral agreements, which seem to be negotiated on an equal basis. However, the ideologies present within the policy documents of the Union still express a certain neo-coloniality; according to the discourse analysis and the theoretical aspects of Said, which are described in detail in the synthesis above.

To answer the research questions, first we will review them. These were:

1. How does the (geopolitical) relationship between the European Union and the Arab world, in particular Tunisia and Algeria, develop during the Arab Spring?
   a) What were the main focus points of the ENP before the Arab Spring?
   b) What are the main changes of the external policies of the EU during (and after) the uprisings in the Arab world?

2. To what extent is there a neo-colonial ideology present in the official policy documents of the EU and the language these use?

The development of the geopolitical relationship regarded first and foremost the aspect of stability and security. This was supposed to be achieved through the European Neighbourhood Policy, which included economic and social conditions. These should develop according to the first plans of the Union, and establish rule of law and therewith more security and stability. The aspect of stability nowadays also includes energy supply for the Union. These plans did not get through; especially when through the Arab Spring rapid changes were introduced in the (Southern) neighbourhood. It is not yet clear whether these changes will forge more stability or instability in the long term. The Union is therefore eager to support the countries in their
transition towards the system of democracy. This is visible in the various papers and Action Plans the Union has published as responses to the Arab Spring which are described above. The most recent one addressing the issue of Human Rights and democracy (EEAS, 2012).

Regarding the development of the case studies, the Union’s relation with Tunisia was less affected by the past, where French colonial rule ended peacefully and the country remained relatively politically stable after decolonisation. Algeria in comparison was deeply affected by the effects of French colonial rule and a brutal struggle for independence as well as political instability after decolonisation. The histories of these countries also influence their approach and relation towards the European Union: Tunisia is economically depending on trade and economic relation with the Union; whereas Algeria went through a period of socialism, in which the country wanted to be as independent from others as possible. This difference in relation towards the Union is visible within the documents as well. As the relation of the Union is outlined within legal documents which describe the partnership it is relatively easy to trace the differences. First of all it is quite obvious, as Algeria does not yet have an Action Plan with the Union under the ENP, whereas Tunisia and the Union have already outlined the Action Plan in 2004. As a result of the missing Action Plan with Algeria the Union did not publish a progress report on its relations with Algeria.

The main focus points of the ENP before the Arab Spring are outlined in the key aspects, also described in chapter 4. These include: political dialogue and reform, trade and measures, justice and home affairs, energy, transport, information society, environment, research and innovation, and social policy. In practice, for example in Tunisia the focus was foremost on the economic relation rather than political dialogue. Even though there was less cooperation with Algeria, the focus of this relation also was more economically. After the Arab Spring the Union document rearranged the focus of the ENP on democracy again, but now named it “deep democracy” and adjusted the ENP with the “more for more” principle. The geopolitical relation of the Union towards the Arab world did not change in its general approach towards its Southern neighbours. The ENP still is the instrument which organises the bilateral relations. Tunisia, according to the documents, profits from the new “more for more” principle. However, Tunisia is still in the process of building a political system and even if for now it seems to be stable the future is unclear. Algeria, the other case study, did not really see an “Arab Spring”, but the government enabled reforms and elections, which seem to develop towards democracy. Through the implementation of these reforms the relation between Algeria and the Union are presented as improving increasingly within the Union’s documents. As part of the recent political developments in Algeria and Algeria’s willingness to show positive development, they are now opening up to increase their relation with the Union, which is visible in the talks on a EU-Algeria Action Plan.

By showing the differences between its neighbourhood and itself the Union is trying to construct its own identity through its foreign policy documents. This is a tool which was used during colonial times. The knowledge of construction seems to be still relevant. Therewith the Union does not only describe itself, but structures its internal and external border region. In the representations within the documents the Union has a coherent inner structure on which all member states agree. The immediate surrounding gets ordered by European ambiguity: the
partial integration of ENP partner countries into some EU systems, but these cannot expect to become complete members. The Union is ordering its surrounding not to the dichotomous ‘we’ and the ‘other’, but into several categories reaching from member to accession country, which are more or less included into the Unions structures. Then there are the partner countries of the ENP, the ring of friends, which is already only partially integrated and cannot hope for accession. These are partially ‘others’, whereas countries outside these categories are the ‘others’. They are (mostly) not directly addressed by EU policies. However, this construction is not as homogeneous as it seems. Not all accession countries develop with the same paste, like for example there is the discussion whether Turkey will ever become an EU member. Also do not all the partner countries of the ENP participate to the same extent, as Algeria has shown in the past. The current “more for more” principle seems to increase the heterogeneity of the neighbourhood even more. The construction of the ‘other’ within the Unions neighbourhood seems to become a rag rug instead of a clear ordering of the border space.

To put it in a nutshell, the ENP has a neo-colonial ideology behind it as a motive to get involved beyond its own borders. Through, or maybe as a consequence of, the neo-colonial ideology of the Union towards its neighbouring countries, the Union wants to cultivate and develop its neighbours, to achieve the goal of a secure and stable border region. The means to achieve this development, the cultivation towards the structures and systems, which the Union suggests for its neighbouring countries, are described within the documents from a European perception of these structures and systems, as well as from their perception of norms and values. It uses concepts which were also used during the high times of colonialism. Through using these concepts the Union creates a heterogeneous rag rug of its immediate surroundings.

8.1 Suggestions
This thesis shows that the EU has still an indirect superior neo-colonial ideology behind its foreign policy. However, there have been aspects surrounding this topic which to include would have crossed the limits and possibilities of this master thesis. However, these aspects would definitely be suggestions for further research: First of all the inclusion of the perspective of the neighbouring countries of the Union and their reactions towards the ENP would be very interesting and provide a more complete picture of the ENP. Secondly, to provide this research with more depth would also regard the practice(s) of the ENP, the actual execution of the policy, and create a more detailed picture of the ENP. The last recommendation would regard the discussion to what extent the norms and values of the European Union, which are seen by the Union as universal, actually are universal or only European. Following upon that discussion the implementation of these norms and values could be researched as well.
Literature:

Pictures:

- Picture on front page retrieved from http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_tAjDC54H3jw/S_EJqWDVSZI/AAAAAAAAb8/q-V3qX2hga4/s1600/eu-foreignpolicy.jpg, last visited 11 July 2012
- Picture 1: Map of the EU and the ENP retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/index_en.htm, last visited 02 March 2012


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