RUSSIAN ANTI-TERROR POLICY:
THE EFFECTS OF 9-11, THE “GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR” AND THE COLLECTIVE SECURITY SYSTEM

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Executive summary

Since the attacks of 11 September 2001 (9/11), a new security challenge has arisen: no longer are the nations solely threatened by inter-state conflicts over territory and global dominance. Due to globalization, the widening gap between various cultures, the ending of the Cold War and the consequent growing threat of the acquisition of WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction) and other far-reaching changes in the international arena, the threats of terrorism and intra-state warfare have increased, and so has their threat to the global security.

For some, these changes are intertwined with the attacks of 9/11. By many it is believed that the world has changed since then. New global threat assessments were made by the nations and its collective security system, new enemies created, and new wars waged. Soon, a global war was proclaimed against the responsible terrorists and the “axis of evil”.

It is an understatement to say that the attacks of 9/11 had great geographical and political implications for the international system. The “global war on terror” was accompanied by the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, the States that were aiding and abetting the terrorists, or as Bush would recall numerous times, the “axis of evil”. All of this took place under the veil of the newly developed concept of “humanitarian intervention”. The once highly acclaimed globalization underwent some limitations regarding the movement of goods and persons due to the development of international terrorism globalization made place for the “global war on terror”. On the other hand, the Bush administration set forth an aggressive direction in its foreign policy, by launching pre-emptive wars and by violating the international norms and treaties. The attacks of 9/11 and the proclamation of the “global war on terror” saw the revival of the idea of the collective security system and the construction of a new world enemy to the Western society, very much in line with the Cold war era.

The world was changing in a quick pace, but was this also evident for one of the most important allies in the “global war on terror”, the Russian Federation?

This research set outs to find an answer to my main question, namely whether an actual change did occur in the Russian anti-terrorism policy after the attacks of 11 September 2001, in the light of the “global war on terror” and the “new” collective security system?

My thesis has concentrated on elaborating this question by conducting an extensive literary research and an analysis of speeches, public documents, national laws and security concepts in order to understand how the attacks of 9/11, the consequent proclamation of the “global war on terror” and the changes in the collective security system have had any influence on the Russian Federation and specifically on the Russian anti-terror policy.

Russia has had, in a similar way, just like the United States, its own share of the terrorist threat. As a matter of fact, it were the apartment bombings in Moscow in 1999 that were the direct cause for the commencement of the second Chechen campaign by the then newly elected President Putin, who was very quick to make an (international) connection between the international terrorism and Chechen separatism (or terrorism, in the terminology employed by the Russian government), long before the attacks of 9/11 and the commencement of the war against transnational terrorism.

While one may wonder why such a connection was made by Putin- to some this may be evident, namely to justify the bloody and human rights violating war in Chechnya before the national and international public – the connection would become the turning point for Putin and his Western-oriented policy in the aftermath of the attacks of 9/11; for the first time in history Russia joined the United States and its allies in the war against transnational terrorism. By rhetorically drawing
parallels between transnational terrorism and the Chechen fighters, the international fight against transnational terrorism and the Russian fight against Chechen separatism, the second Chechen campaign gained an international connotation and acknowledgement before the national and international public - the same public, which once strongly opposed the Russian far-reaching intervention in Chechnya.

As for the collective security system, the attacks of 9/11 and the international coalition against transnational terrorism created a new opportunity for Putin to continue the pro-Western course that was set forth by his predecessor, President Yeltsin. The pro-Western course did not only surprise the West but at the same time made enemies within the Russian elite, especially with the communists who held to their classical Cold war division of the international system.

By allying with the West in the global war on terrorism - as part of the international coalition under the collective security system – the Russian authorities could once again demonstrate that Russia was a great power with which the world had to reckon with and without which the international coalition could not be successful. At the same time it created opportunities to justify the brutal second campaign (read: the anti-terror regime) in Chechnya in front of the international society. However, the commencement of the war in Iraq halted the pro-Western direction set forth by the Russian authorities. Due to the fear of a growing American unilaterism and fear of a loss of power, the Russian authorities swiftly changed their direction (again), now more than ever pushing upon the creation of a multipolar counter balance to halt the American overtake. The ambivalent nature of the Russian foreign policy served a sole goal, namely to retain its superpower position at any costs (something that would become even more evident while analysing the Russian National Security Strategy).

At the national level the effects of the attacks of 9-11, the “global war on terror” and the collective security system were not that evident- at least not directly. In analysing the two pillars of the Russian anti-terror policy, the Federal Law on “Combatting Terrorism” (1998 and 2006), the National Security Concept (1997 & 2000) and the National Security Strategy (2009), it became evident that none of the abovementioned phenomena and concepts had any direct effect on these two pillars of the Russian anti-terror policy. The analysis demonstrated that, although rhetorically the Russian government did recall the attacks of 9/11 and the changes in the international arena since then as one of the reasons to adjust the NSC and the Federal Law, it was only after the Beslan hostage taking in 2004 (and here we skip the Nord-Ost theatre hostage taking in 2002, for it had no significant effect on the Russian anti-terror policy as such) that forced the Russian authorities to rethink their anti-terror policy, especially their legislation and administration in that sphere.

The weak coordination, the lack of a central organ dealing with the anti-terrorist operations and a legal ground for a military action, demonstrated that changes had to be made for the anti-terror policy to be effective. And most importantly, the emphasis on the importance of terrorism or the threat thereof on the national security had to be stepped up – not only on paper, but also in practice. However, no fundamental change occurred, only minor adjustments to make the execution of the anti-terror policy more far-reaching and legal – and although in line with the events in the aftermath of the attacks of 9/11, clearly the consequences of the hostage takings and the growing impatience on the side of the Russian public was the direct cause to do so. The main line regarding the national security threat stayed the same: the emphasis remained on the external threat, not only ignoring the more destabilizing threat of terrorism, but also in contradiction to the rhetorical declarations in the international arena of collaboration and acknowledgement of a common enemy.
Concluding, one may say that although rhetorically the Russian authorities had made or tried to make changes on the national as well as on the international level, in reality little changed; the *classical* mind-set of “fighting terrorism with terror” and “exploit all the available possibilities to become a superpower” stayed the same.
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1. Introduction

On 11 September 2001, nineteen Al-Qaeda members operating in four teams hijacked four airplanes, crashing two of them into the World Trade Centre (WTC) in New York, the third into the Pentagon close to Washington, DC and the fourth in Shanksville, Pennsylvania. The casualties of these terrorist attacks were enormous: 2,998 people were killed. The economic losses were no less: lower Manhattan lost 30% of its office space and the material damage was estimated to be 22.7 billion dollars; that is loss in property in and around the WTC. Two weeks later, the Dow Jones lost 15% of its value, according to Rose et al. the United States lost 80% in gross domestic product (GDP) due to the attacks of 9/11. The subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq entailed a great deal of expenses for the U.S. budget: according to the Center for Defense Information, the war in Afghanistan cost the U.S. budget in 2001 and 2002 approximately 33.8 billion dollars; in 2010 the combined wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were estimated to comprise roughly 1,291.5 billion dollars of the U.S. budget.

The events of 9/11 opened up a whirlwind full of discussions regarding the threat of global terrorism. By many, the attacks were perceived as the starting point of “the new era of terrorism”. Although terrorism is not a recent phenomenon, it took eventually the attacks of September 11, 2001, for terrorism to gain worldwide attention. Already during the French Revolution in the 18th century and the nationalist movements of anarchist and ethno-nationalist groups during the 19th and 20th centuries, terror was employed as a tool to achieve political objectives. Such were the calculated terror attacks committed by the Irish IRA, Basque ETA or Palestinian PFLP in their fight for recognition and independence. It did not take long for terrorist activities to spill over onto the international arena and the so-called transnational terrorism to emerge. Terrorism was no longer solely a domestic threat but a threat with one or more international components. Whether to strike a target in a foreign country, to have connections with other foreign terrorist organizations or to receive financial support from abroad: globalization and technical advances made terrorism borderless.

Nine days after the attacks, on 20 September 2001, then President of the United States George W. Bush addressed the U.S. Congress with one of the most important speeches after the Cold War. In his speech, Bush declared war on terrorism, placing an ultimatum before the nations in the world: whether to ally with the United States in the “war on terror” or to become the enemy of democracy and civilization; “Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists”, he said. Never before in human history had a President made such a declaration – an ultimatum – that had such far-reaching consequences for the international community and its nation states as the U.S. Congressional speech of 20 September 2001. In the wake of the attacks of 9/11, the U.S. government constructed a new universal enemy in the face of terrorism that was willing and able to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and kill as many people as possible, to plan and execute complex terrorist attacks, all in the name of a radical ideology. The proclamation of a war against the global enemy did not only

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5http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0933935.html
result in the adoption and re-examination of (new) laws and international agreements on the fight against (transnational) terrorism, but also in a stronger inter-state collaboration between different nation states, especially between the United States and the Russian Federation. The international coalition was welcomed by the international community as a turning point in the international system – and perceived as a refreshing wind in the collective security system, which practically did not exist after the Cold War. These changes gained even more weight after the decision of the Russian government to reclaim its role in the collective security system as one of the leading forces in the global war on terror. It was the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, who was the first foreign President to condole George W. Bush after the attacks of 9/11. The Russian government publically proclaimed its support to the United States and for the first time after the Cold War the Russian government reached out its hand of alliance by releasing Russia’s territory of interest for the benefits of the greater good of the collective security and the global war on terror.

After the attacks of 9/11, the Russian government played an important role in the building of an international coalition under the pretext of the global war on terror. Putin was the first foreign President to condole Bush after the attacks of 9/11. He sent him a telegram, in which he uttered his feelings of “anger and indignation” against the “series of barbaric terrorist acts directed against innocent people”. He addressed his people in a television speech, stating that the attacks were “an unprecedented act of aggression on the part of the international terrorism”, an event that “goes beyond the national borders”. Terrorism was “a plague of the 21st century” and “Russia knows at first hand what terrorism is”. In his televised speech Putin made a connection between the attacks of 9/11, which were directed against the United States, and the transnational impact they had on all the nations of the world. According to Putin, the attacks of 9/11 were a “challenge to the whole humanity, at least to civilized humanity”. Remarkably the same wordings were uttered by Bush early on during his speech before Congress on 20 September 2001: “Enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country. Its goal is to remake the world and impose its radical believe on people everywhere. Our war on terror begins with Al-Qaeda but it does not stop there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been stopped and defeated. Every nation, in every region, has a decision to make. Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists. This is the world’s fight. We ask every nation to join us”.

The proclamation by George W. Bush, “Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists”, left no confusion; you were either on the side of civilization or on the side of the terrorists. And on whose side the Russian government was allying became quickly evident: “we entirely and fully share and experience your pain. We support you”. Two weeks later, Putin made clear to the international community just how serious his intentions were. He outlined the measures the Russian government would adopt to aid the international coalition in its fight against transnational terrorism. The Russian government dedicated itself to provide the international coalition with a supply of intelligence about the whereabouts of the international terrorists and make the Russian airspace available for the international coalition flights in support of anti-terrorist operations. It even accepted the establishment

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8 Ibid. Also mentioned in O’Loughlin, J., G.O. Tuathail & V. Kolossov (2004), A ‘Risky Westward Turn?’ Putin’s 9-11 Script and Ordinary Russians, Europe-Asia Studies, 56, 1, p. 3.
10 Ibid.
of American and allies’ bases in Central Asia, the Russian territory of interest, all in the light of the so-called “global war on terror” and a collective response to the threat.\textsuperscript{11} The new geopolitical strategy of the Russian government made a turn into a Western direction. Opinions differed whether this was a sudden foreign policy change enabled by Putin, or merely a continuation of the foreign policy line that was set forth by Gorbachev and Yeltsin after the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, in the eyes of the public the attacks of 9/11 had a tremendous impact on the international system. And the actions envisioned by Putin, in the light of the “global war on terror” and the international coalition, addressed this public perception.

In the six months following the attacks of 9/11, Putin tried to represent the attacks and the subsequent war on terror in the light of Russia’s own war in Chechnya. This was done by, among others, elevating the war in Chechnya and the fight against the insurgencies in the Northern Caucasus to the level of the global war on terror. This connection was made by Putin not only in his speeches in the wake of 9/11, but also afterwards when he addressed the problems surrounding the Chechen conflict to the international public. The “new era of terrorism” and the subsequent “global war on terror” enabled Putin to connect the new universal enemy to the Chechen rebels that were trying to create an Islamic caliphate on Russian soil. Much alike, Bush tried to make a connection between the international terrorists of 9/11 and the new radical Islamic movements that wanted to reshape the world, the Taliban in Afghanistan and later the “axis of evil” that sponsored and harboured the terrorists. Here, both Presidents created an enemy for their own political purposes. For the American government these were the Taliban in Afghanistan and other countries harbouring or aiding terrorists, the “axis of evil”. For the Russian government, the attacks of 9/11 offered a new opportunity to represent the war in Chechnya and the insurgency movements in the Northern Caucasus as part of international terrorism. By internationalizing the conflict in Chechnya and in other parts of the Northern Caucasus, the Russian counter-insurgency measures gained legitimacy before the international community, whereas they were previously strongly condemned by that same international community.

On the one hand there were those barbaric terrorists that threatened the world order and civilization, and on the other hand the civilized humanities, fighting these barbaric terrorists. The civilized humanities were all united in the international coalition, fighting side by side under the collective security system. By proclaiming his support for the international community in the war on terror, Putin relocated Russia within the Western hemisphere as a civilized power, fighting the global war on terror side by side to the United States and its Western allies under an international coalition. However, were these public gestures on the side of the Russian government true in their meaning or simply just a façade of change with different underlying motives, not visible to the naked eye of the public?

In line with the above-mentioned, the main issue of my thesis will be the analysis of the relationship between the attacks of 9/11, the “global war on terror”, the collective security system and the Russian national and foreign policy as part of the Russian anti-terror policy. And specifically, the question whether such a relationship does exist or has existed in such a decisive manner as it has been for the United States, the European Union and other countries that were willing to ally next to one another in the fight against transnational terrorism.

The main question of my thesis is therefore:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{11} O’Loughlin, Tuathail &Kolossov (2004), A ‘Risky Westward Turn?’ Putin’s 9-11 Script and Ordinary Russians, \textit{Europe-Asia Studies}, 56, 1, p. 3.
\end{itemize}
“Did an actual change occur in the Russian anti-terrorism policy after the attacks of 11 September 2001, in the light of the “global war on terror” and the “new” collective security system?”

The goal of this research is to provide a better understanding in whether and how the far-reaching events that had great geographical and political implications, may have effected or influenced the domestic and foreign policy of a country that was willing to join the global fight against terror, and aligned itself with the victimized state very publically. As much research has already been done on the attacks of 9/11 and their influence on the U.S. foreign policy and the policy of other Western states (and the international system in general), I found it very interesting to find out whether the same effects were detectable in the Russian domestic and foreign policy. Due to my background and the general interest in the Russian security policy, I found it very intriguing to observe how quick the Russian government was to ally itself with the Western states in the “global war on terror” and its public demonstration of affection towards the former enemy, the United States, and vice versa. Surely, there was more behind the Western-oriented policy of Putin that was not visible to the naked eye of the public.

The attacks of 9/11 demonstrated which negative implications globalization and the ‘weakening’ of territorial borders could have, if employed by wrongdoers. At the same time, the attacks and the ensuing “global war on terror” gave rise for the liberals among us to perceive it as the revival of the Utopian new world order; a new world order wherein the nation states were willing to cooperate with one another against a common enemy. A new world order wherein democracy, peace and far-reaching inter-state collaboration became the norm of the present day international system. Under the pretext of the “global war on terror”, even the Russian Federation was willing to give up its territory of interest to the United States – something many critics would find unthinkable prior to the attacks of 9/11.

However, the aftermath of the international cooperation would demonstrate that the full scale collaboration in line with the collective security system was nothing more than a scheme to realize a foreign and domestic political agenda. Both the Russian Federation and the United States have employed the attacks of 9/11 and the “global war on terror” to promote and realize their political agenda – for the Russian Federation it has been its strive for the international acknowledgement of its importance in international politics (after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of China and the United States) in order to regain political power within the international system and on the other hand to justify their civil war in Chechnya.

1.2 Societal relevance of the thesis

The societal relevance of the thesis may be measured on different levels. First of all, it can be measured on the level of terrorism and terrorist organizations. Secondly, on the governmental level of a country that is under the attack and on the level of the society itself.

Terrorism is a tool, an instrument employed by terrorist organizations (people) or governmental structures to achieve a certain political objective. On itself terrorism is a phenomenon that tries to achieve this political objective by inflicting “enough pain on the opposing society to overwhelm their interest in resisting terrorist demands and to cause either their government to concede or the
population to revolt against the government.” Terrorist targets may be economic or military; however, their aim is not only to destroy that specific target but to convince the opposing society that they are vulnerable to terrorist attacks in the future and in that way compel them to press their government to give in to their political demands.

And here the dynamic or the relationship between terrorism (and terrorist organizations) and the society becomes apparent. Although the aim of terrorism may be of political nature, the employed instrument is societal, and to be more accurate; the society itself is the instrument. It is terrorism that tries to inflict pain on the society with the objective that the society will compel its government to concede on terrorist’s political demands. When we encode this dynamic in a figure, it looks as following:

A notorious example of this negative relationship between terrorism and the society are the attacks of September 11, 2001, on U.S. civilians with the aim to compel the U.S. government to withdraw its troops from the “occupied” territories. Or the attacks carried out by IRA or PLO against the civilians with the aim to achieve certain political objectives. In most cases terrorist attacks target the civilians with the direct aim to harm them and thus to force them to pressure their government to concede with their demands. In the long run such terrorist attacks on the civilians have the aim to make the society (and the government) fearful for a future terrorist attack, for there is no greater punishment than a society that lives in fear every day.

On the governmental level, the dynamic between the government and the society is visible in the measures the government adopts to prevent terrorist attacks, or to eliminate the threat of a terrorist attack.

Many of such security measures may affect the society in a negative manner, especially when such anti-terrorism security measures may result in the loss of civil liberties. Countries that believe they are threatened by acts of terrorism may execute certain measures such as intercepts, wiretapping, or other far-reaching and human rights violating measures that may put the established civil liberties to a test - all in the fight against terrorism. Therefore, a great dilemma enfolds for the government when it has to choose between the protection of the wellbeing of the society, or the protection of the human rights and civil liberties the same society enjoys. In many cases the dilemma is solved in favour of the wellbeing of the society, resulting in the violation of the human rights and civil liberties.

Another danger of the employment of anti-terrorism security measures is that less democratic countries may use such measures to suppress legitimate dissident groups by categorizing them as terrorist.

The dynamic between the security measures and the society is negative. And although one may say that the security measures are intended to be beneficial for the society, since they are adopted to protect them against a possible or an actual terrorist threat, in most cases the same measures have demonstrated to be harmful to the affected society. When we put this in a figure, the dynamic may look as follows

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14 Ibid., pp. 19.
A famous example of such a negative dynamic is the American prison facility Guantanamo Bay. The prisoners of Guantanamo Bay consist of people suspected to have played a role in the attacks of 9/11 and who have been captured by the American forces. The facility and American government sustaining it have received worldwide criticism due to the treatment of the captives. Without an official status, a legal trial, a foresight to the near future, the human and civil liberties of the captives have been violated on a systematic basis. Another example is the Patriot Act, adopted by the United States in the wake of the attacks of 9/11. The Patriot Act provides the American government with a far reaching mandate to collect information, to act or to execute certain measures with the aim to prevent a terrorist attack. Such measures include among others wiretapping, interception of internet messages, e-mails etc. The Patriot Act received a lot of criticism due to its violation of human rights and civil liberties, and especially the right to privacy.

On basis of the above mentioned, one may state that the society may be affected negatively by the actions of both terrorism and government. The negative dynamic between terrorism, the governmental security measures and the society may be illustrated as following:

Here the correlation between terrorism, security measures and the society becomes apparent. Terrorism has the aim the harm the society. The government may adopt far reaching security measures to protect the society against a terrorist attacks. But the same security measures may result in the violation of the human rights and the civil liberties of the society.

However, it is worth mentioning that besides the cited dynamics between terrorism, security measures and the society, the society has suffered physically as well as mentally due to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, as due to the consequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as part of the global war against terrorism. Here one may think about the direct victims of these events as well as the indirect victims such as family members or the descendants. Indirectly, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 have affected the world society as a whole. The demonstrated professionalism by the terrorist organizations, the rise of the number of successful terrorist attacks, casualties and their brutality – all of these factors created a fearful world and a fearful society.

The societal relevance of this thesis is also apparent when one looks into the dynamic between the actions of the Russian government after the attacks of 9/11, the Nord-Ost and Beslan hostage taking
and Chechen separatism. With the aim to receive an approval from the international society and to realize a Western U-turn in his foreign policy, Putin used the attacks of 9/11 to draw a link between international terrorism and Chechen separatism. While beforehand the international society perceived Chechen rebels to be legitimate freedom fighters, after many statements made by Putin where he compared the Chechen rebels and Chechen separatism to international terrorists and international terrorism, the once legitimate Chechen separatism was perceived to be consisting out of terrorists having links to international terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda. The comparison made by Putin and the denunciation of its legitimate status by the international society, had a negative impact on the Chechen society and its struggle for independence. Without the international approval and backing, the Chechen society fighting the Russian occupation was left to its fate.

And until this day the Chechen society suffers under the stigma of terrorists and terrorism, created by Putin in the wake of 9/11.

Thus, on the grounds of the abovementioned we may conclude that the relation between the attacks of 9/11, the subsequent “war on terror”, the anti-terrorism security measures and the society is apparent. Whether this relationship comes to the surface due to the imposed limitations on the human rights and civil liberties of the society, or the stigma under which the society is suffering – it is more than clear that the relation between these four elements exists.

1.3 Scientific relevance of the thesis

Due to my judicial background and my interest in conflicts, international relations, geopolitics and the dynamic between them, I found myself compelled to write a thesis that would combine all of the above mentioned disciplines.

Subsequently, a practical difficulty arose: how to find a subject that would touch all of the above mentioned disciplines?

The search was short lived, as it came to my attention that this could be achieved by dedicating the thesis on a subject that has affected almost every aspect of our everyday life, namely the attacks of 9/11. By drawing a relation to the Russian Federation, and specifically the Russian anti-terror policy, I could give the thesis a sort of ‘personal touch’ due to my Russian background.

Being originally from the Russian Federation and informed regarding the Russian anti-terror policy, I found it very interesting to analyse whether a relationship existed between the ‘everything changing attacks of 9/11’ and the Russian anti-terror policy, and if such relationship did exist, how this relationship looked like.

It has already been determined that the attacks of 11 September 2001 and their aftermath have had a great impact on international politics, that the attacks entailed great geographical and political implications and changed the world in almost every aspect. The attacks of 9/11 once again underlined the critical geopolitical discourse, namely that geopolitics is no longer determined by territorial boundaries: the new enemy (read: international terrorists) did not belong to a specific territory or a population, globalization made the transport and acquisition of technology or weapons by terrorist possible and changed their organizational structure. The attacks clearly demonstrated that the geopolitical discourse is no longer led by sole territorial thinking.

It is therefore needless to say that the events of 9/11, the following “global war on terror” and the collaboration under the collective security system have changed our world: due to the shift and weakening of borders as a result of the military invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the following
migration flow of refugees to the bordering countries, the Western perception of the Eastern world, culture and Islamic religion. In line with the above mentioned, the thesis will try to elaborate the scope of the effects such events have had (and may have in the future). And more importantly, whether the attacks of 9/11 and the constructed ‘war on terror’ could have in any way affected the Russian domestic anti-terror policy: the domestic policy of a country that was not directly affected by the events. As an international law graduate, for me it was interesting to analyse the legislative part of the Russian anti-terror policy (the *Federal Law on Combatting Terrorism*, the *National Security Concept* and *Strategy*) in relation to the attacks of 9/11 and the ‘war on terror’.

Secondly, this thesis will contribute to the existing critical geopolitical discourse on the subject of official discourses and more specifically their exploitation by political elites to change public perceptions and opinions. When analysing the anti-terror policy of the Russian Federation in combination with official discourses by governmental bodies in the aftermath of the events following the attacks of 9/11 2001, this becomes more than evident. It did not take long for Putin to take advantage of the arisen opportunity: to rhetorically present the attacks of 9/11 and the “global war on terror” in such a way that soon afterwards the international public and officials would change their opinions on the conflict in Chechnya and the Russian anti-terror policy in Caucasus.

Thus, in line with critical geopolitics, the thesis will demonstrate how the Russian authorities used the available tools to manipulate the public opinion regarding the second Chechen campaign both on a national as well as an international level through narratives uttered by Putin and other Russian politicians.

Thirdly, the thesis may add to the discussion regarding the question which of the leading theories on international relations may describe the behaviour of states within the international system. Many believed that the events of 9/11 and their aftermath heralded a new world order of international and trans-border cooperation. The ‘new world order’ demonstrated that international organizations, such as the United Nations, and international constructions, such as the collective security system, could function alongside states, and even be the line wire within the international politics. And more specifically, the institutional peace theory, which argues that long-term (international) interests can be pursued over short-term interests (read: one’s own political agenda). For the first time in history, the attacks of 9/11, the proclamation of the “global war on terror” and the consequent cooperation between different nation states demonstrated that this was the case more than ever. Contrary to the realist perception, such liberal constructions were not a waste of time – but a new reality.

However, this perception was short lived – as demonstrated by the subsequent unilaterism on the side of the United States and the Russia foreign policy of *Realpolitik*, which was driven by self-interest, the aim to achieve political dominance and prestige, and the acknowledgement that the Chechen separatism was in reality part of international terrorism. Something that looked so promising in the aftermath of 9/11 changed drastically when the United States invaded Iraq. The behaviour of the Russian Federation during the Iraq invasion demonstrated that its foreign policy was driven by traditional perceptions and believes and that even in the 21st century *Realpolitik* and the principles of self-interest, balance of power and security dilemma play an important role in foreign policies.

The theory of Robert O. Keohane may explain this ambivalent nature of Russian foreign policy in the aftermath of 9/11. As states are driven by a mutual interest to cooperate with other states, this mutual interest may fade away leading to defection from the international cooperation. In case of the Russian
foreign policy in the aftermath of the attacks of 9/11, the Russian foreign policy was driven by the interests derived from the principles of realism, and the initial means to achieve was the liberal principle of international cooperation. When the liberal tools (read: cooperation) were not able to achieve the interest, the Russian authorities chose the employment of realist tools (read: counterbalancing power with China).

1.4 Methodology

1.4.1 Qualitative approach
Aitken and Valentine make a distinction between five research methods, namely quantitative and qualitative methodology, GIS, people centred methodology, deconstruction and discourse analysis and mixed methodology. My thesis is based on qualitative approach. According to Kim England qualitative research approach focuses on the question “why”, including interpretative and meaning centred techniques, such as textual analysis, oral methods and participant observation. Through analysis of selected data such as books, articles, documents, reports (textual analysis), I will try to answer the main question of my thesis:

“Did an actual change occur in the Russian anti-terrorism policy after the attacks of 11 September 2001, in the light of the “global war on terror” and the “new” collective security system?”

Consequently, to help me answer my central question, I have formulated following sub questions and subdivided them into separate Chapters. Each Chapter provides an answer to the sub question posed in that certain Chapter:

- How did the Russian authorities react following the attacks of 9/11 and the proclamations made by George W. Bush regarding the “global war on terror”?
- How was the Russian policy affected by the cooperation under the collective security system, following the attacks of 9/11?
- Did the attacks of 9/11 and the “global war on terror” affect the Russian national anti-terror policy?

During my research I have analysed various data regarding the subject(s) of my thesis, which I was able to collect though governmental documents, articles, media outlets, books and reports. With the aim to find out whether and how far the attacks of 9/11 have had an impact on the Russian anti-terrorism policy in the light of the consequent “global war on terror” and the international cooperation under the collective security system.

While writing my thesis I have relied on desk research as my research strategy. According to Verschuren and Doorewaard, desk research is categorized by the “use of existing material”, the “absence of a direct contact with the research object”, and looking at the material being used from “a different perspective”. In line with the abovementioned, my writing relied on information collected from data that has already been produced by scholars and other writers. There was no direct contact with the subject(s) of my thesis, and I was able to approach the collected material from a subjective point of view. The research strategy for my thesis has therefore relied on the existing literature on the

abovementioned subjects, and follows the variant of literature survey. The literature survey comprised of a collection of various literature sources, views and theories on the subject of the Russian anti-terror policy, the attacks of 9/11, the “global war on terror”, and international cooperation under the collective security system. By doing so I have tried to collect as many data (literature) as possible in order to find an answer to my main question, whether the attacks of 9/11, the “global war on terror” and international cooperation have had an effect on the Russian anti-terror policy.

Why qualitative approach? The choice for a qualitative approach was easy to make, and actually the only choice that could be made, due to the fact that most data available on the subject is composed out of literature and documentation that has been produced over time. Just as with other research methods, there are some advantages and disadvantages linked to the qualitative research approach. As mentioned by Verschuren and Doorewaard, first of all, qualitative research makes an in-depth examination possible due to the accessibility of a wide range of data. Because one is not limited to a certain approach, he/she may capture historical and social changes regarding the subject. During my research I came across a great variety of information (material) on my thesis’ subject(s), giving me space to capture certain changes in legislation and policies, and thus enabling me to distil the information necessary to write my thesis. The second advantage of qualitative approach is that one may interpret the available data subjectively by extracting only the information necessary for the research. In case of my thesis this has been proficient, for the subject of the thesis is of a political nature, a political concept and development that can only be researched through the analysis of textual data, whereby subjective interpretation takes place. As for the disadvantages linked to qualitative research, the fact that qualitative research approach is based on existing data, leaves little room for an individual investigation, for one has to rely on the available data, which has already been developed by others. However, during my research I was not affected by this disadvantage since the available material made an individual investigation impossible.

The same argumentation is applicable to desk research. Since desk research relies on existing literature and documentation, the writer relies in his/her analysis on the existing data whereby an individual investigation does not take place as such. The writer merely relies on the existing data to conduct a certain research or to develop a certain theory. However, the advantage of a desk research is that the writer has an access to a wide range of various reliable data from which he/she may distal necessary information.

I have taken the following steps to conduct the desk research more efficiently, a research framework

1. The first step has been to collect as much as possible relevant data regarding the attacks of 9/11, the “global war on terror”, international cooperation under the collective security system in relation to Russian anti-terrorism policy (Russian foreign and domestic policy).
   The research material that I have used during the writing process of my thesis exists out of collected data such as documents, articles and books (literature and internet), legislation (documents) and newspapers (media). Bibliography on p. 82 enumerates more specifically the research material I relied on during my research and writing process.
2. The second step has been to categorize the acquired data into different subjects, which eventually have been divided into different chapters per subject;
   Each chapter has a specific subject correlating with the main question (global war on terror, collective security system and the Russian anti-terrorism policy, a conclusion);
3. The third step was to analyse the available data and try to incorporate them into chapters;
4. The fourth step was to analyse the newly acquired data and knowledge to answer the various sub-questions;
5. The final step has been to answer the main question on the basis of the acquired data, knowledge and answers to the various sub-questions.

By following the above mentioned steps, the collected data have been analysed and employed in the qualitative research approach regarding the question whether the attacks of 11 September 2001, and the “global war on terror” and the collective security system have in any way influenced the Russian anti-terror policy. This process looks as following if putting it in a figure:
1.4.2 The research objective

While writing a thesis it is of importance to specify what your research objective is, or in other words, the scope of your research, in order to contribute towards the solution of a problem or to the development of a theory.

In line with the above mentioned and with a view on my subject, my first research objective is to contribute to the existing debate regarding the question whether, and if so how, the attacks of 9/11 and the consequent global war on terror have affected international politics. Since most of the research has focused its attention on countries that have been affected directly by these events (United States, United Kingdom etc.), my thesis will concentrate on the Russian Federation and more specifically on its foreign and domestic anti-terror policy.

By analysing the available data, I have tried to elaborate whether and how the attacks of 9/11 and the consequent global war on terror and international cooperation may have affected the Russian Federation. First of all, I have analysed the Russian official discourse in the aftermath of 9/11 (by making a comparison between the official discourse prior to and after the attacks) to demonstrate how the Russian government exploited the attacks of 9/11 and the global war on terror to realize its own political agenda (Chapter 3 – the relationship between the attacks of 9/11 & global war on terror and the Russian policy). Secondly, I have tried to elaborate how international cooperation under the collective security system may have affected the Russian foreign policy. In the same manner as with the attacks of 9/11 and the global war on terror, international cooperation was used by the Russian authorities to realize their own political agenda (Chapter 4 – the relationship between international cooperation and the Russian foreign policy). Finally, I have elaborated more specifically how the attacks of 9/11 may have affected the domestic side of the Russian anti-terror policy. Here, the Federal Law on Combatting Terrorism and the National Security Concept and Strategy were revised as a direct consequence of the Nord-Ost and Beslan hostage taking and indirectly due to the attacks of 9/11 (Chapter 5- the relationship between the attacks of 9/11 and the Federal Law on Combatting Terrorism and National Security Concept and Strategy).

My second research objective is to contribute to the existing discourse of critical geopolitics on the ‘official’ discourses, and how they can be employed by political elites in order to change the public opinion in their advantage.

Therefore Chapter 3 has analysed the Russian official discourse in relation to the anti-terror policy prior and after the attacks of 9/11. The Russian official discourse in the aftermath of 9/11 may be perceived by some as the initial step in the process of the internationalization of the war in Chechnya. The attacks of 9/11 were taken up by the Russian governmental bodies to dehumanize the Chechen rebels into terrorists and to internationalize the war in Chechnya - that is to proclaim that Chechen separatism is part of an international terror network. By doing so the Russian governmental bodies tried to change the public opinion regarding Chechen separatism and thereby to justify their unfavourable so-called second Chechen campaign. In order to achieve this objective, the Russian government employed the parallelization of symbols, metaphors, differentiations (us vs. them), heroization and other tools in public and official discourses.

My third research objective is to contribute to the discussion on the question which of the leading disciplines may explain the behaviour of a state in international politics. The conduct of the Russian foreign and domestic policy as part of its general anti-terror policy is of an ambivalent nature. It is the discipline of realism according to which the Russian government constructs its policy. This is
demonstrated by the sudden change from the Western oriented foreign policy of the Russian government after the attacks of 9/11 into the counterbalancing foreign policy after the invasion of Iraq in 2003. This sudden change in foreign policy is attributed to the fear of growing American unilaterism, NATO’s expansionism and the inability of Russia to regain its former political power through international cooperation with the Western coalition. It were the *Realpolitik* elements such as political power, self-preservation and interest that drove the Russian government to cooperate with the Western coalition under the collective security system after the attacks of 9/11 and it were the same arguments that drove the Russian government to counterbalance America and NATO with China, India and CIS countries. Consequently, Chapter 4 which is covering this subject shall demonstrate that it is the theory of Keohane that may explain the ambivalent nature of Russian foreign policy and not the liberal theory of the collective security system. To understand this ambivalent nature of the Russian foreign policy, Chapter 4 analysed available data on the subject. Thereby, a comparison has been drawn between the actions on the side of the Russian government in its foreign policy prior to and after the invasion of Iraq in 2003.
2. The Conceptual Framework

The Congressional speech of George W. Bush on 20 September 2001 and the statements of Vladimir Putin suggested that everything had changed since the attacks of 11 September 2001: this was true, as it was also true that the attacks of 9/11 entailed great changes in the phenomenon of terrorism itself.

First of all, the attacks of 9/11 were conducted by a religious-based movement, while beforehand most of the terrorist attacks were conducted by ethno-nationalist groups. Secondly, prior to the attacks of 9/11, no terrorist attack had ever resulted in more than 500 casualties, while the attacks of 9/11 exceeded that number six-fold.

Overall, the attacks demonstrated that international terrorists were able to execute a very well organized terrorist act on the soil of the United States, the most powerful state in the world. Moreover, the investigation conducted in the wake of the attacks confirmed the fears of the international community, namely that the international terrorists were willing and able to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Although it has never been proved that terrorists are in fact able to acquire weapons of mass destruction, and such proposition has been doubted by many, people remain fearful they will eventually, due to the collapse of Soviet Union, globalization and thus a greater accessibility to the necessary technology to produce them.\(^{18}\)

After the attacks of 9/11, it was believed that a “new era” in terrorism had emerged: a new universal threat, unlimited by borders and able to attain the weapons of mass destruction – the ultimate fruit of globalization.

However, before elaborating more specifically on the relationship between the attacks of 9/11 and the Russian anti-terror policy, I would like to acquaint the reader with the concept of terrorism, how this concept has evolved over time and what exactly the phenomenon of ‘transnational terrorism’ entails.

2.1 What is terrorism?

Let us first analyse what exactly terrorism is. According to the dictionary at [www.dictionary.com](http://www.dictionary.com), the word terrorism may be defined as “the use of violence and threats to intimidate or coerce, especially for political purposes”, “the state of fear and submissions produced by terrorism or terrorization”, or as “a terrorististic method of governing or of resisting a government”. According to the dictionary at [www.thefreedictionary.com](http://www.thefreedictionary.com), terrorism is a “systematic use of violence and intimidation to achieve some goal”, “the act of terrorizing”, “the state of being terrorized”, “a method of government or of resisting government involving domination of coercion by various forms of intimidation, as bombing or kidnapping” or “the state of fear and terror so produced”. Schmid and Jongman, who made an inquiry in 1988 into the amount of definitions on terrorism, concluded that at the time of the inquiry there were 109 definitions on terrorism, covering 22 different definitional elements. The many and various proposed definitions on terrorism are characteristic of the problem of defining terrorism, for that problem is great and has for a long time (and still does) obsessed many scholars, governments and international institutions that had the nerve to challenge it. The problem lies in a simple but very problematic difficulty to define the concept of terrorism that has its roots in the dynamic nature of the concept and in the disagreement between the different states (on the international level), different organisations (on a domestic level) and different scholars (on a scientific level) on the question which elements the definition of terrorism should encompass or not. While there

is somewhat of a homogeneity on the domestic level regarding the problematic case of defining terrorism, at the international level homogeneity is far to seek.

At the international level, for a long time there has been a debate concerning the question which elements the definition of terrorism should or should not encompass, and more specifically the question regarding the inclusion or the exclusion of moral justifiable combatants and state terrorism under its scope. Ever since, the debate has formed an obstacle to the development of a uniform definition of terrorism. Some scholars and states are of the opinion that a universal definition of terrorism should not be as such that it would condemn the legitimate struggle of a population and its use of violence for political reasons. On the other hand, opinions differ whether state terrorism should be included under the scope of the definition, for it is feared that any of their future actions resulting in violence against the population could be regarded as state terrorism, leading to international responsibility. While developing a universal definition on terrorism, these issues could be addressed by the inclusion of a provision that would specifically exempt the issues of morally justifiable freedom fighters and state terrorism from the definition. Nevertheless, even if such a definition would be developed, the question remains how other states can be coerced to agree to the definition if they are in favour of the explicit inclusion of the notion of freedom fighters and state terrorism under the definition’s scope? Moreover, the dynamic nature of terrorism is another impediment that has to be circumvented when defining terrorism.

The dynamic nature of terrorism lies in the fact that terrorism has changed and adapted itself over time. While in the 1970’s and 1980’s terrorism was synonymous to airplane hijackings (the first El Al flight was hijacked in 1968) and hostage takings (the Munich Hostage crisis in 1972 and the Iran Hostage crisis in 1979), by the 1980’s and 1990’s terrorism became a synonym for car bombings and assassinations, executed by ETA and IRA. After each terrorist act, enforcement measures were adopted forcing the terrorist organizations to turn to other means to achieve their goal. Hence, the dynamic nature of terrorism or the evolving modus operandi as a means to survive.

The international demand to develop a definition of terrorism with a specific scope and in accordance with the principle of the so-called nullum poena sine lege- rule may have posed another difficulty in the process. The idea behind a specific definition is that such a definition will not be liable for misunderstandings, different interpretations and abuses for political aims – a problem very common to broad definitions in international law. However, to develop a specific definition for a phenomenon encompassing “plural characteristics” such as ideological, political and emotional elements has been very difficult, if not almost impossible. Nevertheless, the impediments did not prevent the adoption of sectoral conventions that covered specific terrorist acts such as the Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts on Board Aircraft, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against

the Safety of Civil Aviation\textsuperscript{22} or the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages\textsuperscript{23}. Sectoral conventions define and criminalize certain types of terrorist acts without defining terrorism as such. The idea behind sectoral conventions may have been that by defining different types of terrorist acts, the need to develop a single and uniform definition of terrorism in an all-encompassing international convention, could be avoided. The sectoral approach filled a void, which was the result of the inability to universally define terrorism.

The attacks of 9/11 were a great boost for international institutions such as the European Union and the United Nations to develop a uniform definition of (international) terrorism in order to make the global fights against terrorism more effective. To fight international terrorism more effectively, the states have to cooperate with one another, and no cooperation can be effective as long as there is no uniformity among the states on the question what terrorism is.\textsuperscript{24} (How can one fight a phenomenon, when one does not know what it is?) Already in 1937 the predecessor of the United Nations, the League of Nations, developed a definition of terrorism in the \textit{Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism}.\textsuperscript{25} Article 1.1 of this Convention defined acts of terrorism as “criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons or a group of persons or the general public”. Article 2 included activities that could be regarded as terrorist within the meaning of article 1, such as “a wilful act causing death or grievous bodily harm or loss of liberty”, “a wilful destruction or damage to public property”, a “wilful act calculated to endanger the lives of members of the public”, or “the manufacture or possession of arms a.o. with the view to the commission of an offence”.

In 1994 the United Nations adopted a non-binding \textit{United Nations Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism}.\textsuperscript{26} In 2004 the United Nations adopted the \textit{United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566}.\textsuperscript{27} The \textit{United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566} defines terrorism as “criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or takings of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature”.

Since 2000 (the negotiations are still continuing) the United Nations has negotiated the adoption of an international convention, the \textit{Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism}, which would encode and criminalize terrorism on a universal level. The UN Comprehensive Convention states the following regarding the definition on terrorism:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{24} Deutsch, J. (1997), Terrorism, \textit{Foreign Policy}, 108, pp. 20-21.
  \item \textsuperscript{26} United Nations General Assembly (1994), \textit{Declaration on Measures to Prevent International Terrorism}, A/RES/49/60, December 9, 1994.
  \item \textsuperscript{27} United Nations Security Council (2004), \textit{Resolution 1566}, October 8, 2004.
\end{itemize}
“any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that person, by any means, unlawfully and intentionally, causes: (a) death or serious bodily injury to any person; or (b) serious damage to public or private property, including a place of public use, a State or government facility, a public transportation system, an infrastructure facility or the environment; or (c) damage to property, places, facilities, or systems referred to in paragraph 1 (b) of this article, resulting or likely to result in major economic loss, when the purpose of the conduct, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act”.

However, some states were not and are not willing to adopt such a definition on terrorism, because of different arguments. First, according to some states the definition does not make clear whether liberation movements would also fall under the wording of the UN Comprehensive Convention’s definition of terrorism. The broad wording of the definition does not make clear whether people fighting against a dictatorial regime are also regarded as terrorists. In that case, many countries that support such self-determination movements are not willing to adopt a definition that would regard such groups as terrorists. Secondly, there is the question regarding state terrorism and whether such a broad definition would make state terrorism punishable under the definition of the UN Comprehensive Convention.28

As mentioned before, the attacks of September 11, 2001, demonstrated once again that there was a need to develop a single and uniform definition of terrorism. The binding United Nations Security Council Resolution 137329 was adopted on September 28, 2001, calling upon all states to share their knowledge regarding terrorist groups and to assist in the combat of international terrorism. Also, Resolution 1373 called upon the states to adjust their national law in order to make the ratification possible of the international convention on terrorism and terrorist acts. At the same time a Security Council’s Counter Terrorism Committee was established under Resolution 1373, to monitor the compliance of the states to the provisions of Resolution 1373. On January 10, 2002 the Russian government translated Resolution 1373 into Russian and enacted Resolution 1373 as a law by the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation no. 6 on January 10, 2002, as Measures Towards the Implementation of the UN Security. Yet, even such a drastic and binding response (read: Resolution 1373) could not achieve what has been tried to establish since 1937, an international definition of terrorism.

The legislation of the European Union has also been affected by the aftermath of the attacks of 9/11. Already in 1992 the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) had incorporated articles that functioned as a legal basis for an action of the European Union regarding terrorism.30 Article 29 TEU implies the importance of the fight against terrorism and states that the European Union’s objective shall be the area of freedom, security and justice by the development of a common action among the Member States in the fields of justice and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. This general objective shall be achieved particularly by combatting terrorism. At an extraordinary meeting on September 21, 2001, the European Council pointed out the necessity of the development of a definition on terrorism. In that light, the European Council gave the Justice and Home Affairs Council the instructions to develop an

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agreement on terrorism.\textsuperscript{31} On June 13, 2002, the Framework Decision on Combatting Terrorism was adopted by the European Council. The aim of the Framework Decision is to provide a single, uniform and legal framework to combat and to prosecute terrorist offences and terrorism. By adopting the Framework Decision on basis of articles 2(2), 29 and 31, 1(e) of TEU, the European Union met the needs in the light of its role within the United Nations, namely in light of Resolution 1373 (2001). As mentioned previously, Resolution 1373 of the United Nations called upon the states to adjust their national law in order to ratify the international convention on terrorism and terrorist acts.\textsuperscript{32}

Despite the many efforts on the international level and the development many sectoral and regional conventions on terrorism, no universal document has been adopted so far that could define terrorism as such. For although a universal definition does exist in the form of UN Comprehensive Convention – the differing opinions and the unwillingness to bind oneself to such a broad definition may halt the process of adoption for a very long period of time.

\textbf{2.2 Russia and the definition of terrorism}

And how is terrorism defined by the Russian legislation?

The development of the Russian legislation on terrorism and counter-terrorism actions went hand in hand with the evolvement of the Chechen resistance and the threat of terrorism in the Northern Caucasus and other parts of the Russian Federation.

In June, 1996, the Duma adopted Article 205, paragraph 1 in the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation\textsuperscript{33} (hereafter: Criminal Code), covering the elements that constitute terrorism. By that time the second Chechen war was still going on and the hostage crises in Budennovsk (1995) and Kizlyar-Pervomayskoe (January 1996) had already taken place, demonstrating that the Chechen rebels were willing and able to execute politically motivated terrorist acts on Russian soil, bringing the Chechen war to the footsteps of the Russian population. Article 205, paragraph 1 was the first article to address this issue within the Russian legislation, defining terrorism or a terrorist act as:

\begin{quote}
the perpetration of an explosion, arson, or any other action endangering the lives of people, causing sizable property damage, or entailing other socially dangerous consequences, if these actions have been committed for the purpose of violating public security, frightening the population, or exerting influence on decision-making by governmental bodies, and also the threat of committing said actions for the same ends
\end{quote}

According to Article 205, paragraph 1 an act is categorized as terrorism or a terrorist act if it fulfils the objective and the subjective criteria. The objective criterion of the definition is the presence or the perpetration of an explosion, arson or any other action that may result in endangering the lives of people, cause sizable property damage or entail other socially dangerous consequences. The subjective criterion of the definition is that the acts are committed with the purpose of violating public security, frightening the population or exerting influence on decision-making by governmental bodies or a threat thereof. When comparing Article 205, paragraph 1 of the Criminal Code to the nullum poena

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sine lege rule, the wording employed by Article 205, paragraph 1 deems to be vague and abstract, not precise or exhaustive and thus liable to different interpretations. The employment of such an abstract and imprecise wording - “socially dangerous consequences”, “any other action” – may result in differing opinions and misunderstandings on the question what may constitute or not a “socially dangerous consequences” or “any other action”. The wide range of Article 205, paragraph 1 makes it possible for any act to be categorized as terrorism if it has any dangerous consequences on the society, for example the morally justifiable struggle for independence or political opponents. By categorizing them as terrorists both are delegitimized before the public.

According to Bruce Hoffman, terrorism consists out of common key characteristics, namely the political aim, violence or a threat thereof, far-reaching psychological repercussions, conducted by an organization or by a sub-national or non-state entity. Article 205, paragraph 1 of the Criminal Code encompasses all of the characteristic criteria; however, remarkably it does not address the issue regarding the perpetration of a terrorist act. By not addressing this issue, a state action could also be categorized under Article 205, paragraph 1, if it fulfils the objective and subjective criteria. Another striking thing about Article 205, paragraph 1, is that it simultaneously encodes the penalty for committing the act of terrorism by the deprivation of liberty for the term of 8 to 12 years, leaving little room for judicial discretion on this issue.

In 1998 the Russian government adopted a Federal Law on “Counteraction of Terrorism” (hereafter: Federal Law) which became the main legal pillar of Russian legal anti-terrorist measures, in addition to Article 205, paragraph 1 of the Criminal Code. The Federal Law defines three different notions separately; terrorism, terrorist activity, and terrorist act. Article 3, paragraph 1, defines terrorism as following “the ideology of violence and the practice of influencing the adoption of a decision by state power bodies, local self-government bodies or international organisations connected with frightening the population and (or) other forms of unlawful violent actions”. Article 3, paragraph 2 defines terrorist activity as follows:

“a terrorist activity shall mean activity including the following: a) arranging, planning, preparing, financing and implementing an act of terrorism; b) instigation of an act of terrorism; c) establishment of an unlawful armed unit, criminal association (criminal organization) or an organized group for the implementation of an act of terrorism, as well as participation in such a structure; d) recruiting, arming, training and using terrorists; e) informational or other assistance to planning, preparing or implementing an act of terrorism; f) popularization of terrorist ideas, dissemination of materials or information urging terrorist activities, substantiating or justifying the necessity of the exercise of such activity”.

And in Article 3, paragraph 3 it defines a terrorist act as:

“making an explosion, arson or other actions connected with frightening the population and posing the risk of loss of life, of causing considerable damage to property or the onset of an ecological catastrophe, as well as other especially grave consequences, for the purpose of unlawful influence upon the adoption of a decision by state power bodies, local self-

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government bodies or international organizations, as well as the threat of committing the said actions for the same purpose”.

While reading the Federal Law, there are certain characteristics that are very striking; namely, that the Federal Law defines terrorism in Article 3, paragraph 1 as a politically motivated ideology, which employs violence with the aim of psychological repercussion and that in contrast to Article 205, paragraph 1 of the Criminal Code, the Federal Law differentiates between terrorism, a terrorist activity and a terrorist act as such. It is striking that the Russian legislation found it necessary to identify terrorism as a violent ideology. Especially when one bears in mind that many perceive ideology as being similar to a religion, and with the current negative perception of Islam, as being a violent religion or an ideology behind the terrorist attacks in Russian Federation, it is very surprising that the Russian authorities found themselves to be inclined to employ such a terminology. Thereby (in)directly placing an ideology (read: religion) as the driving force behind terrorism.

Article 3 of the Federal Law encompasses all the above mentioned characteristics of terrorism described by Bruce Hoffman: political aim is mentioned in Article 3, paragraph 1, violence or threat of violence is mentioned in Article 3, paragraph 1 and 2 and far-reaching psychological repercussions are mentioned in Article 3, paragraph 1. Surprisingly, Article 3 does not mention which actor may be held responsible for a terrorist act leaving room for differing interpretations on this matter. Compared to Article 205, paragraph 1 of the Criminal Code, Article 3 of the Federal Law is more precise in comparison to Article 205, paragraph 1 but at the same time both Articles are very similar in general lines of their description.

As mentioned in the previous Chapter 2.1, Russia was one of the few nations to adopt the UN Resolution 1373 into its national legislation. By Decree of the President of the Russian Federation no. 6 of January 10, 2002 on measures towards the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 1373 of September 28, 2001 the Russian President established a legal document according to which the federal state and its authoritarian bodies committed themselves to counter the threats to international peace and security created by the acts of terrorism, and to exchange information with foreign authoritarian bodies to achieve this goal. By adopting a UN Resolution into its national legislation, the Russian government demonstrated, as part of its U-turn in the Western direction, its readiness to serve international peace and security after the attacks of 9/11.

2.3 Transnational terrorism

As to the issue of transnational terrorism: transnational terrorism is one of the aspects of terrorism. While earlier terrorism was considered to be a domestic threat, several events starting in 1970’s gave rise to the development of transnational terrorism – a terrorist threat with one or more international components. Whether to strike a target in a foreign country, to have connections with other foreign terrorist organizations or receive financial support from abroad - due to globalization, terrorism was no longer limited by the established territorial borders. One of the first forms of transnational terrorism was the hijacking of airplanes; a terrorist tool that was occasionally used by ethno-nationalist groups to gain media attention for the cause. In 1968 an El Al Flight headed to Tel Aviv was hijacked by the Palestinian PFLP. While hijacking of airplanes was one of the first trademarks of transnational terrorism, other transnational terrorist actions, such as the hostage crisis at the Olympic Games in 1972 in Munich and the hostage taking of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran from 1979 to 1981, soon followed.
Yet, it was not until the rise of the ideological terrorism, *jihadism*, that international terrorism took the world in its grip.

Around the 1980’s the world saw a rise in the ideological terrorism in the form of *jihad*. *Jihadism*, a movement of armed jihad with the goal of protecting Islam from Western influences, replaced ethno-nationalism as the prominent force behind terrorism. The rise of *jihadism* has been blamed on the Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan – it was a response to the rising fear that the Islamic traditions and religion were endangered by the Western civilization and values. The economic grievance inflamed those fears. Between 1979 and 1983, *jihadism* became a “transnational phenomenon stretching from Algeria to Afghanistan”\(^{36}\). It employed the ideology of Islam as the territoriality transcending umbrella, uniting people all over the world. However, in most cases the movements operating under that umbrella have had a political agenda. This is true for PLO, Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah as well as other movements fighting under this Islamic umbrella. In Egypt, Syria, Saudi-Arabia and Lebanon movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Hezbollah carried out guerrilla and terrorist attacks against dictatorial and Western backed Middle-Eastern regimes.\(^{37}\) In some cases such groups carried out attacks to achieve ethno-nationalist goals. For example, while Hezbollah struggled to diminish Western influence in Lebanon it was also a great supporter of the Palestinian cause, carrying out many terrorist attacks against Israel. In Afghanistan you had the mujahedeen, who at on the one hand struggled for the introduction of pure and fundamental Islam in Afghanistan and on the other hand fought against the Soviet troops to enforce their withdrawal from Afghanistan. It was in Afghanistan where Osama bin Laden came to the forefront of terrorism and it would be there, where Osama bin Laden would turn from an anti-communist warrior into an international terrorist. It would be Osama bin Laden and his organization Al-Qaeda which would carry out the most horrific international terrorist attacks.

In 1998 the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were bombed, and in October, 2000, *U.S.S. Cole* was bombed in Yemen by Al-Qaeda. Eventually, it were the attacks of September 11, 2001, on the Twin Towers in New York, the Pentagon in Virginia and on Shanksville, Pennsylvania, that received worldwide attention and introduced transnational terrorism to a wider audience. More than ever before, a clear definition of terrorism was required and more than ever different states were willing to co-operate on the political, military and judicial level in the global fight against terrorism. On September 20, 2001, the global war against terror was officially declared by President of the United States, George W. Bush, “This is the world’s fight. This is civilization’s fight. This is the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom. We ask every nation to join us”\(^{38}\)

### 2.4 Conclusion

What we may conclude is that despite the many efforts at an international level (the *UN Comprehensive Convention*) and the development of regional (European Union’s *Framework Decision*) and sectoral conventions on terrorism, there is no single and universal concept to explain terrorism as such. And as long as such a universal definition is not developed, it will be difficult for the international collaboration to fight transnational terrorism effectively.

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37 Ibid., pp. 290-292.
As for transnational terrorism and the developments regarding the structure, the ideology and other aspects of terrorism, we may agree that they all have been the fruit of globalization process. The weakening of territorial boundaries and the shrinking world, the boundaries transcending technical advances such as internet and the collapse of the Soviet Union, made these developments possible. As boundaries have eroded and countries have become more and more interdependent, so have the enemies changed; no longer spatially bounded but globally operating.

In Chapter 3 I will elaborate how the Russian authorities responded to the attacks of 9/11 and the consequent unilateral proclamation by George W. Bush of a global war against terrorism. More specifically, the following Chapter shall focus on the dehumanization and internationalization of the Chechen conflict by the Russian authorities through official narratives. The attacks of 9/11 and the global war on terror were just a convenient opportunity to change the public’s opinion regarding the Russo-Chechen war. Chapter 3 shall focus on answering the following sub-question, ‘How did the Russian authorities react following the attacks of 9/11 and the proclamation by George W. Bush of a ‘global war on terror’?’
3. Rhetorical manipulation of the Chechen conflict by Russian Federation

The first step in the so-called ‘justification programme’ of the second Chechen campaign took place on the rhetorical level. The Russian President Putin used rhetorical symbols, metaphors and statements to demonstrate that the attacks of 9/11indeed had great implications the Russian authorities could relate to. The Russian population had also suffered on the hands of international terrorism, which operated in the separatist republic of Chechnya and was capable to carry out attacks on the Russian territory. Just like the United States, so has Russia been attacked in its heart by the terrorist attacks among others in 1999 when the apartment bombing were carried out in the centre of Moscow.

In this Chapter I will try to answer the following sub question, ‘How did the Russian authorities react following the attacks of 9-11 and the proclamation by George W. Bush of a ‘global war on terror’?

3.1 Introduction

Geopolitics is a discipline that studies the influence of geography, culture, demography on the international relations and the foreign policy of a country. The foundations for the discipline were laid by Friedrich Ratzel and Rudolf Kjellen. Friedrich Ratzel was a proponent of Darwinism and added biological connotations to geopolitics. He argued that the state (as it representing the nations living within it) is a living organism that needs space and territory to grow, like an organism does (Lebensraum). Borders were merely the temporary stops in their movements. The term Lebensraum was later on adopted by a German general Karel Haushofer and soon, the theory behind Lebensraum became a slogan of the Nazi regime, which they used to justify the on-going conquests. From then on geopolitics was associated with the Nazi’s foreign policy of expansionism.39

During the Second World War, the interest in geopolitics would diminish due to the turn the Nazi regime would take. However, it would soon be revived by Henry Kissinger during the Cold War, who would use geopolitics to elaborate the realm of international system, the balance of power and the instinct of self-preservation. Ever since, the term geopolitics became very popular in various spheres and is perceived to be a discourse “about world politics with a particular emphasis on state competition and the geographical dimensions of power”.40

Since the 1980’s, an academic and critical reaction to classical geopolitics arose. Critical geopolitics is criticism of the conventional conception of geopolitics, a discipline that critically tries to analyse the discourses that are the constituents of geopolitics, or in other words the discourses (meanings, metaphors, statements, narratives, symbols etc.) influenced by history, culture, economy and politics that construct a certain representation of the world. It is a discipline that tries to interpret events and give them a meaning.

According to Geraoid O. Tuathail one of the goals of critical geopolitics is to broaden the understandings of geopolitics beyond elitist conceptions, to demonstrate that the geopolitical discourses articulated by the elite men at the centre of state power, are constructed on the basis of historical, cultural and geographical experiences.41

40 Ibid.
41 Ibid., pp. 7.
In contrast to what has been believed previously, geopolitics cannot be viewed through objective spectaculars, as narratives surrounding it are mere constructions of certain representations, which can only be viewed from a subjective point of view. This geopolitical expression may take place publically though narratives expressed by politicians in the actual practice of foreign policy, or the so-called ‘practical geopolitics’.

In this chapter it will be demonstrated how certain narratives uttered by Putin in the wake of the 9/11 attacks served as an instrument for the Russian authorities to represent the position of the Russian Federation as that of a fellow nation state affected by international terrorism, in reality the narrative was a tool for the Russian authorities to represent the Chechen problematic in a different light before the national and international public - to construct a certain perception on the Chechen problematic and to manipulate the public’s opinion. At the same time the narrative was a tool for Putin to set the first fundamental rhetorical steps into the Western direction.

3.2 The first steps of manipulation

As I have mentioned previously, this chapter shall encompass a review of statements made by Putin in the wake of the attacks of 9/11. The analysis will serve as a tool to understand better how the Russian authorities were able to change the international opinion regarding the Chechen conflict, and set their first steps into the Western direction in their foreign policy. As such, my thesis will rely on work, which has been previously produced by scholars on this subject. Already, scholars such as Souleimanov & Ditrych have provided for a critical reading of discourses that tried to sell the Chechen conflict to the international public as the “battlefield of jihad”. Also O’Loughlin, Geraroid O. Tuathail and Kolossov have previously deconstructed the Russian rhetoric as a means to represent the events of 9/11 as “global Chechnya” and to enable the Russian authorities to relocate their position within the West. As well as J. Russell who has described in his work how the Russian authorities have tried to “demonize” the Chechen population before and after the events of 9/11. Hence, Chapter 3 will rely on the discourses analysis already produced by the above mentioned writers, as well as my own input. I believe that it is important, and in line with the teachings of critical geopolitics, to first understand how the Russian rhetorics were able to affect the international input regarding the Chechen conflict and make it sallow after the events of 9/11. Secondly, how the Russian authorities were, rhetorically, able to represent their country as a democratic and a Western state – and a reliable partner in the “global war on terror”. Therefore, before going any further let us first understand which steps the Russian authorities were taking from the exterior perspective.

As the “new era of terrorism” made its entrance, so did the worldwide fear of terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction and their willingness to kill many civilians. A universal threat emerged in the face of a new terrorist environment. It was the speech of George W. Bush that for the first time

42 Ibid., pp. 9.
introduced the terminology of the “war on terror”. The nation states were given an ultimatum whether to ally with the U.S. government against the universal threat of terrorism, or to ally with the terrorists. Although the attacks of 9/11 were targeted against the U.S. government, Bush quickly made a connection between the attacks of 9/11 against the United States and an attack against the global values of democracy and civilization. This was done in his Congressional Speech of 20 September 2001:

“Enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country. Its goal is to remake the world and impose its radical believe on people everywhere. Our war on terror begins with Al-Qaeda but it does not stop there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been stopped and defeated. Every nation, in every region, has a decision to make. Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists. This is the world’s fight. This is the civilization’s fight. We ask every nation to join us”.

The chosen terminology “war” elevated the international terrorists to the level of legitimate combatants. By making a connection between the international terrorists behind 9/11, Afghanistan (a territory), a population, a government and an ideology, Bush gave an identity to the international terrorists. By doing so, indirectly, Bush constructed the necessary requirements to start a global war against transnational terrorism.

Bush presented the United States as the leading state of the ‘free world’ in a war against ‘tyranny’, ‘evil’ and the ‘axis of evil’ in connection to the ‘hostile’ states of Afghanistan, Iraq and North-Korea. Unilateral actions on the side of the United States backed by the alliance, the (humanitarian) invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq unauthorized by the United Nations, reinforced the ‘most-powerful-state’ position of the United States in the international system.

When the “global war against terrorism” was proclaimed, it did not take long for Putin to draw parallels between the universal enemy number one, the international terrorists, and the freedom fighters they were fighting in Chechnya and the Northern Caucasus. By doing so, the Russian President did not only try to justify the second military campaign against the separatist republic of Chechnya, but also to lay a fundamental basis for a Western oriented fundamental policy, which Putin was more than ever eager to continue in the footsteps of Gorbachev and Yeltsin.

By that time, the second Chechen campaign was an unpopular subject in the Western media. The human rights violations in Chechnya were severely criticized by the Council of Europe and the OSCE. On 16 June 2001, during a meeting in Ljubljana, George W. Bush even pointed out to the “differences on Chechnya” between the Russian and U.S. governments, the difference between the West and Russia on this issue. The many human rights violations as part of the Russian counter-insurgency measures and the high casualties rate among the Russian soldiers, were taking its toll. On 6 April 2001, Le Monde reported that since the launch of the second campaign in Chechnya in October 1999, the opposition among the public reached an all-time high: 46.4% of the Russian population opposed Moscow’s Chechen policy.

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48 Russell (2005), pp. 110.
Having used the conflict in Chechnya as a “springboard to power”, according to J. Russell, Vladimir Putin’s political career was directly tied to the newly revived Chechen conflict in the form of a counter-terrorist operation: the attacks of August 1999 in Dagestan by the radical Islamic military fraction of the Chechen resistance, although strongly condemned by the then Chechen President Maskhadov, and the subsequent apartment bombings in September 1999 in Moscow, heightened the fears among the ethnic Russian population that a “clash of civilizations” was taking place on the Russian soil.49

3.2.1 The narrative before the national public (prior to 9/11)
Already prior to the “global war on terror” Putin tried to exploit the fear of the ‘Islamic threat’ by drawing a link between the Chechen rebels and (international) terrorists. This took place very publically and through different discourses.

- Placing the Chechen cause in a different light before the national public
For example, on 19 November 1999 he ordered the media to refer to the Chechen rebels as terrorists in their reports50, and stated that the West was not only underestimating “the plague of the 21st century” but also ignoring the existence of “an arc of Islamic fundamentalism from Kosovo to Philippines”.51

In my opinion, by employing the abovementioned metaphor such as “plague” in his statement to refer to the Chechen rebels, Putin did not only represent the Chechen fight for independence as a decease before the public, but also the Chechen fighters to be part of this plague under which the Russian population has been suffering. By drawing a link between the Chechen separatism and Islamic fundamentalism in Kosovo and Philippines, Putin represented the Chechen war for independence as a fundamental war based on a foreign ideology rather than a (legitimate) politically motivated struggle for independence. By doing so, he demonstrated to the national (and international) public that the Chechen fight for independence was not truly a fight for independence, but a fight to install (foreign) Islamic fundamentalism, with the aim to diminish the national sympathy for the Chechen cause. The national public was manipulated to believe that there was an international involvement within the Chechen rebellion, a factor they believed would compel the national public to back the second Chechen campaign and Putin’s administration.

The same has been argued by Souleumanov & Ditrych, namely that the Russian authorities have tried to ‘dehumanize’ and ‘internationalize’ the Chechen fight for independence by portraying the fight to be part of the global fight against jihad and pointing to the financial support from the Middle East as well as the presence of international terrorist among the Chechen rebels.52 Also J. Russell has argued that Putin was more than eager to represent the Russo-Chechen war as a struggle against Islamic terrorism, due to the fact that his political career depended on the Russo-Chechen war, thereby adding international connotation to the Chechen fight for independence as a means to ensure further national support.53

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49 Ibid., pp. 105-107.
50 Ibid., pp. 108.
Subsequently, on 6 July 2000, Putin stated: “We are witnessing today the formation of a fundamentalist international, a sort of arc of instability extending from the Philippines to Kosovo”\(^54\). And “Europe should be grateful to us and offer its appreciation for our fight against terrorism even if we are, unfortunately, waging it on our own”\(^55\). (We should bear in mind that by that time, one of the Chechen’s military leaders, Shamil Basayev, was turning to Islamic fundamentalism and the Jordanian born Emir Khattab was rising in ranks).

As it has been mentioned above by J. Russell, Souleimanov & Ditrych, by drawing a link between Chechen separatism and the terminology of “fundamentalist international”, Putin reiterated the international connotation of the Chechen separatism. In my opinion, the wordings “fight against terrorism” elevated the second Chechen campaign to a legitimate warfare, a sort of ‘carte blanche’ to justify the very much criticized war (the same way Bush would later employ the wording ‘war’ to justify the invasions in Afghanistan and Iraq).

As for the comparison made by Putin between the Chechen separatism and ‘terrorism’: ‘terrorism’ is a very negative concept, a concept very different compared to ‘freedom fight’, ‘rebellion’, ‘separatism’ or ‘fight for freedom/independence’. I believe that by employing the word ‘terrorism’ while addressing the Chechen cause, Putin presented the Chechen cause in a very negative light. In general, there is a tendency to back the underdog, to sympathize with people fighting for freedom, this was something that stood in the way for Putin; the public sympathy with Chechen separatism. By depicting the Chechen cause as a cause of ‘terrorism’, a foreign ideology (Islamic fundamentalism) and an overall plague, Putin tried to eliminate the present factors, which enabled the national public to sympathize with the Chechen cause.

- **Heroization of Russian second Chechen campaign**

On another hand, by stating that “Europe should be grateful to us and offer its appreciation for our fight against terrorism even if we are, unfortunately, waging it on our own”, Putin represented the Chechen campaign in another light: it represented the Russian campaign as a fight to protect Western (European) values, putting thereby the Russian authorities into a heroic light. It was Russia that took up the difficult task to fight international terrorism even though the same phenomenon posed an eminent danger for the Western society. Was this a narrative that would be the indication of the Russian policy direction into the Western policy?

Thus, we may conclude that Putin tried to justify his criticized second Chechen campaign before the national public through various narratives.

This was achieved by first of all “dehumanizing”\(^56\) the Chechen rebels by for example employing metaphors such as ‘plague’ (a destructive influx\(^57\)) and ‘terrorism’ (encompassing negative moral and political connotations) instead of legitimate freedom fighters when addressing them.

Secondly, by adding a ‘foreign’ (Islamic fundamentalism) and ‘international’ connotation to the Chechen separatism. For any nation any foreign or international involvement within their domestic policy would have been a threat, even more for a nation raised during communism under the constant fear to be attacked by Western states. The fear would be a push in the public’s back to endorse Putin’s policy in Chechnya.

And as last, by representing the actions of the Russian authorities in a heroic light, actions for which Europe should be grateful for.

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\(^54\)Ibid., pp. 109.

\(^55\)Ibid.


\(^57\)http://www.thefreedictionary.com/plague
By the year 2000 the war in Chechnya was portrayed by the Russian authorities as a counter-terrorist operation to fight the fundamentalist terrorists. However, this portrayal was not limited to a sole rhetorical proclamation, for soon after the commencement of the second Chechen campaign, the Chechen territory was officially elevated to the “zone of a counter-terrorism operation”. And to sell this counter-terrorist operation to the Russian public, which by that time was getting tired of the ongoing continuation of the brutal second Chechen conflict, it was important for the Russian government to forge a link between the Chechen rebels and the publicly feared Islamic fundamentalism threatening the Russian societal pillars (and the pillars of other civilizations). According to J. Russell, the demonization of Chechens had positive results as among the Russians fear for Caucasians rose and the Chechen problematic was recognized to be a major issue for the Russian Federation.58

By drawing a link between the rising Islamic fundamentalism and the Chechen rebels and (international) terrorism, the first public steps of the internationalization of the Chechen conflict began. And although on the national level the rhetorical manipulation did have some positive results for Putin administration, on international level the international society was still not convinced. In June 2001 President Bush expressed to have “differences on Chechnya” with President Putin.59 And by 2002 the Danish government still did not feel to be compelled to extradite Ahmed Zakayev.60 However, the attacks of 11 September 2001 and the subsequent war against transnational terrorism were a convenient opportunity for Putin to secure a greater support among the international society.

3.2.2 The narrative before the international public (after 9/11)

The attacks of 9/11 were received by the Russian government as a convenient opportunity: they could not only help Putin to portray the counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya to be a component of the global fight against (international) terrorism61, as J. Russell has argued, but at the same time transform Russia into a Western state next to the European and United States, defending the Western values against the Islamic threat in form of transnational terrorism.62

- Symbolic parallelization

It did not take long for President Putin to exploit the emerging opportunity to its fullest potential and construct a link between the Chechen rebels and transnational terrorism, this time on an international level. Immediately after the attacks of 9/11, the images of the attacks were conceptualized in the light of the Russo-Chechen war, and Putin did so by the employment of symbols, metaphors and very uncommon harsh statements for a political figure, let alone a President of a powerful state.

For example, it was mentioned by O’Loughlin, Tuathail and Kolossov that during a meeting with the European Union, Putin stated that the attacks of 9/11 bared a great resemblance to the bombings of Moscow apartments in 1999 and to have discovered plans among the rebels to crash civilian airplanes

58Russell (2005), pp. 112.
60Ibid., pp. 1204.
61Russell (2005), pp. 110.
Also during a meeting on 17 September 2001, Putin draw a comparison between the attacks of 9/11 and the committed atrocities during the Nazi regime.\(^{63}\)

According to O’Loughlin, Tuathail and Kolossov, during those meetings, Putin was employing a “situation description” or “ways in which the events are rendered meaningful…involve analogical reasoning”.\(^{64}\) However, I also do believe that the drawn comparison by Putin is an example of symbolic parallelization. For the United States the attacks of 9/11 symbolize an attack against their values, people, their state and the civilized world; they would eventually prompt the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. In the same manner the apartment bombings in Moscow (1999) were depicted by the Russian authorities to be an attack against the Russian state and population; the Moscow apartment bombings would eventually initiate the second Chechen campaign in 1999. As for the Nazi regime: both the United States and the Russian Federation have perceived the Nazi regime as a threat to the civilization. However, in comparison to the United States, the Russian Federation is of the opinion that it has been the sole rescuer of the civilization from Nazism and that it was the only state that had sacrificed so much (casualties) to do so.

Thus, by parallelizing the symbols of the attacks of 9/11 and the apartment bombings in Moscow, Putin did not only try to manipulate the international opinion regarding the Chechen cause, but also internationalize and elevate it to the level of the “global war on terror”. By comparing the attacks of 9/11 with the atrocities during the Nazi regime, Putin demonstrated Russia to be willing to make the same sacrifices as it has before in order to save the civilization from international terrorism, indirectly putting themselves as one of the coalition states against international terrorism. Moreover, according to O’Loughlin, Tuathail and Kolossov the comparison drawn by Putin between the attacks of 9/11 and Nazi atrocities were an analogy of Russo-American collaboration during the World War II against a common enemy.\(^{65}\)

\[\text{Us vs. them - narrative}\]

Secondly, both Putin and Bush divided the terrorists and those fighting them into two categories. The terrorists were “barbarians”\(^{66}\) while the people fighting them were “civilized humanities”\(^{67}\): it was a struggle of ‘them’ against ‘us’. By allying next to each other as “civilized humanities” against the “barbaric” terrorists, George W. Bush justified his war on terror and invasions in other sovereignties while Putin once again tried to justify his own war in Chechnya and reinforce his place next to the Western states fighting the war on terror.

This was once again reiterated when the Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov stated “we are both victims already, both the United States and Russia” and Putin stated “we have a common foe, the common foe being international terrorism”.\(^{68}\) Here, a deeper relationship was drawn between the United States (West) and the Russian Federation in the light of the fights against transnational terrorism – both countries were the victims of a “common foe”, thereby indirectly placing Russia in a Western hemisphere. According to O’Loughlin, Tuathail and Kolossov, the abovementioned statements and wordings formed a common identity between Russia and the United States and a division between

\(^{63}\)O’Loughlin, Tuathail & Kolossov, pp. 7.
\(^{64}\)Ibid.
\(^{65}\)Ibid.
\(^{66}\)Ibid, pp. 9.
\(^{67}\)Ibid.
civilization and barbarism. At the same time the Russian rhetoric was perceived to be a new phase in the relationship between the United States and Russia, as it placed Russia within the West.  

- **Placing the Chechen cause in a different light before the international public**

As it has already been mentioned in sub Chapter 3.2.1, Putin employed metaphors such as “plague” to place the Chechen cause in a bad light before the national public. It is worth mentioning that the same tactic was used by both George W. Bush and Putin in the wake of the attacks of 9/11. For example, it is mentioned by O’Loughlin, Tuathail and Kolossov that both Presidents used negative metaphors such as “parasites” (Bush) or “viruses” (Putin), when addressing the terrorists c.q. Chechen rebels, to dehumanize them and justify the military campaigns against them before the international public. For Putin the metaphors were a tool to place the Chechen cause and Chechen rebels in the same category as international terrorism and international terrorists behind the attacks of 9/11; to demonstrate that it was not independence the Chechens were fighting for but the foreign Islamic fundamentalism, just like the international terrorists.

The representation of the Chechen cause was also enabled by the ‘borderless nature of international terrorism. Both Presidents emphasized the globalized borderless nature of the transnational terrorism threats. Putin declared that the terrorist act of 11 September “goes beyond the national borders” and Bush stated on his part that “terrorists have no borders”. Transnational terrorism became a challenge to all the nation states and could only be addressed by an international coalition. Both presidents agreed that terrorism is not limited by territorial or national boundaries. The discourse of both presidents presented the attacks of 9/11 as a part of the international terrorism, and in line with Putin’s rhetorics that the attacks of 9/11 were the “global Chechnya”, thereby representing the fight against Chechen terrorists an aspect of the “global war on terror”. The Russian government proclaimed that Chechnya was the battlefield of international jihad, due to the funding from abroad, the presence of the ideology of Islamic fundamentalism and international combatants among the Chechen rebels. Something Putin warned the international society for in his previous statements: “Russia is really standing at the forefront of the war against international terrorism”. The discourse of the borderless nature of terrorism enabled Putin not only to justify Russia’s own military campaign in Chechnya, but to present the Russian government not different from others, i.e. the American and European governments fighting transnational terrorism.

Eventually, Putin would connect the attacks of 9/11, to Chechnya – the same way Bush administration would connect the attacks to Afghanistan, Iraq and other rogue states.

Eventually, Putin’s swift strategy to represent Chechnya as a problem of transnational terrorism and not a war for independence became successful. By late September 2001, German Chancellor Schroder stated during the EU-Russia summit “as regards Chechnya, there will be and must be a more differentiated evaluation in world opinion”. Even Bush administration would support Putin’s

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70 Ibid, pp. 8-10.
71 Ibid, pp. 10.
72 Ibid, pp. 7.
proclamations by calling upon the Chechen fighters to “cut their ties to international terrorist groups” and to “believe there is some al-Qaeda folks in Chechnya”.  

After the hostage taking in Beslan in 2004, the internationalization of the Chechen conflict was completed: in 2004 for the first time in history the Russian Federation asked for an extraordinary session of the United Nations’ Security Council, where Russian authorities asked for an unqualified condemnation of the hostage taking and the adoption of a resolution, which acknowledged that the Chechen conflict was a part of international terrorism.

3.3 Conclusion

On basis of the above mentioned, the first sub question, namely ‘How did the Russian authorities react following the attacks of 9/11 and the proclamation by George W. Bush of a ‘global war on terror’? can be answered as follows. As has already been elaborated extensively in this Chapter, the Russian authorities exploited the attacks of 9/1 to draw parallels with their own terrorist problematic by employing symbols and negative metaphors in order to demonstrate that their fight in the separatist Republic of Chechnya was part of the international war against terrorism; a justification ground for the criticized second Chechen campaign before the national and international public. On the other hand, the Russian authorities were able to place themselves next to the Western states protecting the civilization against international terrorists c.q. Chechen terrorists.

The attacks of 9/11 were an arisen opportunity for Putin to attain three political goals: (1) to present the second Chechen campaign in a different light before the national and international public, (2) to manipulate public’s opinion regarding the second Chechen campaign and attain a free hand, (3) to demonstrate that the Russian foreign policy was changing its course into a Western direction and could be a reliable partner of the coalition. Consequently, the following tools were used by Putin in the course of the events to achieve the abovementioned political goals: public narratives, metaphors and symbols.

Critical geopolitics argues that the public discourse cannot be viewed from an objective point of view, for political leaders employ discourses to pursue a certain political agenda. It is a rhetorical construction that is influenced by various spheres and may be part of a foreign policy. In case of Russia, Chapter 3 has demonstrated that this is no less evident for the Russian authorities. By employing negative metaphors when addressing the Chechen separatism, they successfully dehumanized the Chechen freedom fighters in front of the national public.

By placing them in the same category as international terrorists, Putin added an international dimension to the Chechen conflict, something he had already tried (unsuccessfully) long before the attacks. At the same time he was able to “dehumanize” the Chechen rebels before the international public by comparing them to the international terrorists and employing negative metaphors (such as “plague” and “viruses”) when addressing them. Once perceived as freedom fighters fighting against the overwhelming power, after Putin’s statements following the attacks of 9/11, Chechen separatists were no longer perceived to be legitimate freedom fighters but part of the international terrorist network; the new enemy against which the Western states allied in the global war. Putin was able to

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77 De Haas, M. (2005a), A Decade of Terrorism in Russia, The Officer, 18, 3, pp. 29.
demonstrate that Russia suffered just like the Western states on the hands of the same enemy, placing itself side by side to the United States; an indirect shift of the Russian foreign policy into the Western direction.

In Chapter 4 I will elaborate more specifically the theoretical framework behind the international cooperation under the collective security system and whether the collective security system may be able to explain the ambivalent nature of Russian foreign policy following the attacks of 9/11 and their aftermath. Chapter 4 shall focus on answering the following sub question, ‘How was the Russian policy affected by the cooperation under the collective security system, following the attacks of 11 September 2001’.
4. Collective Security System

The attacks of 9/11 changed the geopolitical discourse regarding the collective security system, or so it was believed. Under the pretext of the collective security system’s principle of ‘an attack against one member state, is an attack against all member states’, the United States called upon the international community to cooperate with one another in the “global war on terror”. Once again, the United States took upon it the role of the fore fighter of the free world. Already under President Truman the so-called ‘Truman Doctrine’ (1947) was adopted, wherein Truman pledged to provide the “free peoples of the world” with American support against any pressure from outside. By many his Congressional speech of 12 March 1947 was perceived as the commencement of the Cold War.79

The response to Bush’s call for mobilization was unprecedented! Not only did security organizations such as NATO and the United Nations respond, even individual nation states were willing to ally with the United States against the transnational enemy. The collective security system experienced a new revival as never seen before. It gained a new meaning in the international system, a meaning of importance and accountability.

During the Cold War the collective security system entered a stalemate, a geopolitical status quo, demonstrating that it was not capable to maintain peace and security, to function properly, when the world’s greatest players opposed each other. The international system and geopolitics experienced a new development, a bipolar division of the international system. The bipolar division under the balance of power, made the collective security system redundant.

Even the post-Cold War era could not revive the collective security system. After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the globalization of financial and trade markets, the world underwent drastic changes. Nobody knew what the future would bring, and many men speculated and some even wondered whether the “end of history”80 had come upon us. These changes were not only associated with developments such as globalization and interdependence, but also with the rise of intra-state conflicts and the decline of inter-state conflict– a development the institutions of the collective security system were not able to address properly. Soon a debate arose on the question whether such institutions (read: the United Nations) were effective. Was a political institution able to attain such high idealistic goals of ‘lasting peace’ when its most important body had five powerful member states, all vetoing against one another?

The Cold War geopolitical status quo and the post-Cold War veto power debate once again demonstrated that the utopian scheme of the collective security system was an unattainable ideal.

The swift mobilization of the nation states directly after the attacks of 9/11, was seen as a revival of the collective security system - the collective security system was there to reckon with, and there to stay. The collective security system could unite all member states, including the opposing foes the United States and Russian Federation, in the light of the global war on transnational terrorism. By George W. Bush, the global war on terror was presented as a war that could only be resolved through transnational cooperation.

79President H.S. Truman’s address before a joint session of the Congress, 12 March, 1947, on: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/trudoc.asp
In this Chapter I will try to explain the reaction of the Russian Federation in the light of the global war on terror and demonstrate that sometimes the aims of political bodies do not always meet the harsh reality and the state’s goal to achieve political power. As in many other cases, the rhetoric uttered by Putin was not executed in practice. The once as dramatic perceived shift in Russian foreign policy into a Western direction under the collective security system, was quickly halted in 2005, when the Russian authorities realized that what they were aiming to achieve would not be attainable as long as American unilaterism would not meet any counter action.

In addition to elaborating a theoretical and analytical framework on the US-Russo cooperation in the aftermath of the attacks of 9/11, this Chapter will try to answer the second sub-question: “How was the Russian policy affected by the cooperation under the collective security system, following the attacks of 11 September 2001?” But before doing so, let me first elaborate a theoretical framework on the collective security system.

4.1 Theoretical framework behind the collective security system

The collective security system is an idea based on the international rule of law that prohibits aggression by one member state against another, and thereby abolishes war as an instrument of national policy. In short, it is “an institutionalized universal or regional system in which States have agreed by treaty to meet any act of aggression or other illegal use of force resorted to by a member State of the system”.\textsuperscript{81} It is a kind of ‘Leviathan’ among the individual nation states, a liberal ideal that has its roots in Enlightenment, when philosophers tried to end the raging conflicts and bloodshed.

According to the theory of liberalism, international relations or the foreign policy of a state may both be explained by domestic institutions, actors and properties, or the so-called “inside-out” variables. Among others, liberalism has laid the fundaments for Emanuel Kant’s ‘democratic peace’, the proposition that argues that there can only be peace between democratic states because of the electoral responsibility.\textsuperscript{82} The First and Second World War demonstrated that the discipline of realism was the most suitable to explain the international system and state actions at that time, and thus for a long time the liberal approaches to international relations were regarded as utopian. However, this changed after the 1970’s: the rise of supranational organizations such as the European Community (later: European Union), the United Nations and NATO due to globalization and democratization, were all in accordance with Kant’s theory of ‘democratic peace’.\textsuperscript{83}

The collective security system has its roots in liberalism, and more specifically neoliberalism. Its reasoning is that any military action, or a war, may be prohibited if solid principles and rules are laid down to which the participating states have to agree and live by. In contrast to the international system of the balance of power, the collective security system does not approve of military action as a means to achieve a geopolitical balance. In fact, the collective security system is a liberal response to


\textsuperscript{83} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 91.
the principles of Realpolitik, a stand against the struggle between the states in their effort to achieve the ultimate power within the international system.

According to Blin and Marin, the collective security system is based on four principles:

- the “pre-eminence of the state as a rational player”;
- the “inviolability of state sovereignty, it is absolute and inviolable”;
- the “narrow view of the concept of security” and
- the “perception of international relations favouring the (geo)political dimension”. 84

The Enlightenment ideals of lasting peace were developed further by Woodrow Wilson, the 28th President of the United States, by laying the foundations for the establishment of the League of Nations in 1919, the predecessor of the United Nations. According to Wilson, “The balance of power is the great game now forever discredited. It is the old and evil order that prevailed before this war. The balance of power is a thing that we can do without in the future”.85

The First World War (1914-1918) was an important instigator of the establishment of the League of Nations. The war was blamed on the idea of the balance of power that protected the Westphalia principle of state sovereignty. In the system of balance of power, war is permissible to preserve independence. And although President Wilson believed that sovereignty could not be abolished, he believed that institutions could be established that would see upon democratic values and procedures that could be applied at an international level.86 After the First World War, a realization came about to develop international institutions that could prevent war and sustain peace. The establishment of the League of Nations was therefore the result of the longstanding efforts to reduce the effects of war by adopting new rules of humanitarian law. The horrific events of the First World War demonstrated to the international community that there was a great necessity for such an international order.

The collective security system is founded on two main concepts: sovereignty and international law. As it has been mentioned by Blin and Marin, state sovereignty is an absolute concept. In theory it can only be limited if a state agrees willingly to sign a treaty whereby it agrees to limit its sovereignty by allowing the international community to infringe its sovereignty in the name of collective security system and international law.87

The League of Nations, and the current United Nations, are both based on such a treaty: the Covenant of the League of Nations respectively the Charter of the United Nations.

Article 16 of the Covenant provides that war is an illegitimate instrument of policy, except for individual or collective defence. The Charter of the United Nations prohibits the use of force against the territorial integrity and sovereignty under its Article 2(4). However, just like the Covenant of the League of Nations, it secures in its article 51 the right of the individual and collective defence in case of an armed attack. It is driven by a dialectic nature of contradictions. On one hand there are Articles 2(4) and 2(7) of the UN Charter that provide for the preservation of territorial integrity, political independence and sovereignty. And on the other hand, the collective security system is burdened with the responsibility to maintain peace and security – in other words, to impose a social order, infringing the same protected principles of territorial integrity and sovereignty.

86 Nye Jr. (2009), pp. 89.
87 Ibid., pp. 90-91.
Due to some weaknesses, among others the unwillingness of the United States to participate in the League of Nations and the inability to protect the weaker states against the aggression of more powerful states (read: the dispute between Italy and Ethiopia), the League of Nations was unable to prevent one of the most horrific wars: the Second World War and would be abolished in 1939. It would take the horrors of the Second World War to establish a second collective security institution (1945), the United Nations, an institution designed to prevent another war on such a great scale.

However, during the Cold War the status quo between the most powerful states, the United States and the Soviet Union, resulted in the paralysation of the collective security system due to the balance of power regime and the entrance of the international system in the geopolitical stalemate. Due to the Cold War and a new bipolar division of the international system, the world experienced a somewhat peaceful time during which the two opposing superpowers and their ideologies maintained a geopolitical stability. In that period, the United Nations became a superfluous institution due to the bipolar balance. And it stayed that way during the entire Cold War era.

When one would think ‘this is it’, the world experienced even greater geopolitical changes by the sudden end of the Cold War: the last dividing border between capitalism and communism was abolished by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. The far-reaching interdependence between states and people, the globalization of trade and financial markets, the collapse of the Soviet Union and independence of satellite states were all hailed as the new concepts of a ‘new world order’. However, it was questioned by many how exactly this ‘new world order’ would look like.

It was about the same time that the discourse of critical geopolitics came to be. Critical geopolitics was the fruit of the post-Cold War changes the world was experiencing during and after the 1980’s. It started to question and to criticize the conventional theories of traditional geopolitics. Once developed by Friedrich Ratzel and Rudolf Kjellen, the concept of geopolitics was redefined by Henry Kissinger in 1970 as a discipline of Realpolitik ruled by principles of the balance of power and the security dilemma.

The post-Cold War changes demonstrated that the fundamentals of Realpolitik were fading away, as were the borders, frontlines and other limitations. As the old ideological models faded away, new paths, explorations and disciplines arose to explain and to understand these sudden changes. The most important question was how the international system should be defined in the post-Cold War era.

Eventually, it would take the attacks of 11 September 2001 to finally redefine the international system as the ‘new world order’. The attacks of 9/11 became the liaison between the ‘old’ post-Cold War era and the ‘new world order’. This ‘new world order’ was marked by two concepts, American unilaterism and far-reaching international cooperation under the collective security system.

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4.2 An unprecedented response

After the attacks of 11 September 2001, international relations scholars called to develop a new approach to terrorism, and to change the existing discourse. Before the attacks, international terrorism has been a second-order foreign policy issue, a phenomenon most of the states did not recognize as a legitimate threat to their security. However, as the attacks of 9/11 had demonstrated over which capabilities the international terror network possessed, international terrorism soon was recognized as a major threat to national and international security. This acknowledgement was not the sole consequence of the fear that international terrorist organizations were able to acquire weapons of mass destruction, or that they could kill so many innocent people, although these motives did play an important role. More or less, it was due to the nature of terrorism, the inability to predict when or where such a terrorist act could occur, the continuing presence of such a constant threat, the ideology behind it and its borderless nature.

The attacks of 9/11 did not only reorganize the domestic policy of the United States, the country that had been directly affected by the attacks. At an international level, international institutions such as the European Union, NATO and the United Nations elevated the topic of international terrorism in their agenda to a top priority, and started to develop expansive counter-terrorism policies based on international cooperation. As already mentioned in Chapter 2, in order to fight international terrorism properly, the European Union and United Nations started to develop a universal counter-terrorism agreement and obligations, and most importantly a universal description of the phenomenon.

The attacks of 9/11 initiated an outburst of solidarity with the United States from various countries and a sense that the collective security was under attack; the attacks against the United States were an attack against all. For the first time, there was an international consensus against terrorism.

The response to the attacks of 9/11 was unprecedented. Under the flag of the collective security system, NATO and the United Nations were called upon to aid the United States in the “global war on terror”, contributing in a great way during the subsequent war in Afghanistan against the Taliban. For the first time, Article 5 of the Washington Treaty (jo. Article 51 of the UN-Charter) was invoked by NATO on 12 September 2001, according to the collective defense principle “an attack against one member state is an attack against all member states”. The United Nations’ Security Council adopted a resolution imposing counter-terrorism obligations on the member states. It would also be the first time for Australia to invoke Article 4 of the ANZUS treaty, a security treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States. Even far-reaching coalitions were established among the nation states. Never in history has there been such a diverse coalition, which included among others the NATO allies, Japan, Australia, China, Russia, Pakistan and India. The United Kingdom, Australia and Canada committed to contribute military forces for the operations against Osama bin Laden and the Taliban in Afghanistan. France, Italy and Germany committed to contribute military support to a peace stabilization mission in Afghanistan, even the Russian authorities committed themselves to allow the United States to acquire military bases in their ‘territory of interest’, in Central Asia, to make air strikes on Afghanistan possible. Under the flag of NATO-ISAF a total amount of 130.760 soldiers were in the end to be deployed in Afghanistan. In addition to the United States, the United Kingdom and Germany deployed 4.998 troops, France 3.935, Italy 3.918, Poland 2.580 and Australia 1.550—all under the pretext of the “global war on terror”. 89

The unprecedented coalition between different states in the fight against transnational terrorism was a refreshing wind in the post-Cold War era, especially the collaboration between the United States and its adversary, the Russian Federation. Was this how the post-Cold War ‘new world’ would be characterized?

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the international system heralded a new power division. The great power disparity with other countries resulted in the United States becoming the most powerful of them all. At that time many scholars believed that the international system was entering a unipolar moment: in 1990 Japan went into an economic decline, Germany stagnated, the Soviet Union ceased to exist, Russia had to deal with internal turmoil, the European Union set its sights on integration and China had a long way to go to ever be able to compete for power with the United States. While major states went into decline, the United States became dominant on the economic, military, diplomatic and technological levels. The unilateral moment of the United States became for the first time evident when it withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol and the Biological Weapons Convention - a unilateral act on the side of the new superpower. The unilateral stand of the United States in the international system was not a new development in its foreign policy. For a long time the United States’ foreign policy has been marked by isolationism; during the Second World War it would take the attacks on Pearl Harbor and the declaration of war by Nazi Germany against the United States, for the United States to join the alliance. This changed in 1947 when Truman adopted the ‘Truman Doctrine’ and set forth a new ‘unilateral’ direction in the United States’ foreign policy, by pronouncing his country the leader of the ‘free world and the free people’. When in the aftermath of the attacks George W. Bush declared a global war on terror and called upon the states to join him in this fight, many wondered whether this was a new multilateral path of United States’ foreign policy.

Soon it became evident that the attacks were just an opportunity for the United States to once again demonstrate its supremacy in the international system by taking many unilateral actions. According to Stepanova, “The new focus on fighting terrorism … further certified U.S. global domination and reinforced unilateral trends in U.S. foreign policy.” The attacks of 9/11 reinforced the dominance of the United States in different ways. By waging a war against Afghanistan the United States demonstrated its military supremacy by destroying a “fanatical regime” within weeks after being attacked. It demonstrated United States’ “recuperative powers” while the American economy began to recover within days after the attacks, and also its capability to ally so many states behind them in the fight against their enemy. American unilaterism has consequently been demonstrated by the American “with-us-or-against-us” ultimatum that permits arbitrary application of American power everywhere, the pre-emptive attack on any enemy state which violates the traditional principles of just war, and the possibility of a regime change in a hostile country which threatens the post-Westphalian international practice. The single handed proclamation of the “global war on terror” by Bush was a unilateral action on its own. All in all, although it seemed that the United States invoked the principles of the collective security system to unite the nation states behind them in the global fight against transnational terrorism for the sake of international peace and

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91 President H.S. Truman’s address before a joint session of the Congress, 12 March, 1947, on: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/trudoc.asp
93 Krauthammer (2004), pp. 16-17.
security, in reality it employed these principles to legitimize the execution of the unilateral actions under the pretext of the “global war on terror” and its supremacy in the international system. A ‘simple’ tool to justify their political agenda.

The United States exploited the collective security principles to legitimize its unilateral actions, just like the Russian Federation perceived the realignment behind the international coalition against transnational terrorism as an opportunity to change its geopolitical foreign policy and legitimize the by many perceived unjust war in Chechnya.

4.2.1 The collective security system from the Russian perspective

The international collective security system that was revived after the attacks of 9/11 was employed by the Russian authorities as a tool to achieve certain political goals. First of all, the collaboration was a tool to legitimize and realize the U-turn of the Russian foreign policy into the Western direction and to legitimize their second campaign in the Chechen Republic.94 And as last, through such collaboration Russian authorities were hoping to attain or retain the status of a powerful state within the international system.95

The foreign policy of the Russian administration looked very different than it did in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, until 1993, the Communist party lost its power to the democrats as the Democratic Party launched a drastic capitalist reform and turned its foreign policy into an overtly pro-Western direction. However, the pro-Western direction of the foreign policy received criticism from the elite (who still perceived the American rise as a great threat to their sovereignty) and soon the state of mutual mistrust emerged in the late 1990’s, resulting in an anti-American and a multipolar foreign policy.96

The attacks of 9/11 changed the geopolitical policy of the Russian government to a great extent. It was expected that Russia would oppose the American “war on terror”; however, instead Russia aligned itself with the United States. The Russian administration did so by very publically denouncing the terrorist attacks and placing itself next to the United States in the ‘global war on terror’.

In the wake of the attacks of 9/11, as demonstrated in Chapter 3, the Russian government tried to represent Russia as a fellow Western, a civilized state, fighting (international) terrorism in the Chechen separatist Republic. As mentioned by Ambrosio, the new Russian geopolitical thinking was expressed by Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov when he declared that the effects of 9/11 “went far beyond the borders of the United States”, that “the international terrorism was a challenge to all civilized humanity”,97 and by Putin who stated that Russia and the United States were fighting a “common foe”,98 very much alike Bush during his Congressional Speech of 20 September 2001. To challenge this global threat “Russia is firmly set to go down the road of forming new strategic frames of relations between our countries”.99 According to former Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov, “The world should be

96 Ibid., pp. 1193-1194.
97 Ibid., pp. 1189.
resolved to - cooperatively and in solidarity - act very decisively against terrorism. We discussed with
the president of the United States specific steps geared toward this.\textsuperscript{100}

According to Ambrosio, “Russia emerged as one of the strongest supporters” of the “global war on
terror”; it publicly endorsed the war in Afghanistan, accepted the U.S. involvement in the anti-
terrorist activities in the Caucasus by tolerating the deployment of U.S. troops in Georgia to fight the
Chechen rebels, and established a NATO-Russia Council in May 2002.\textsuperscript{101} Also, it was willing to
release its ‘territory of interest’ to make the war in Afghanistan more effective. It appeared that the
relationship between Russia and the United States was closer than ever. For the first time since the end
of the Cold War both countries cooperated with each other because of the existing need to counter a
universal security threat of international terrorism.

The Russian participation in the collaboration under the collective security system was also in line
with Russia’s national interest to improve the relationship with the West as to attain a more central
position in the international system and retain its status of a great power\textsuperscript{102} Since American unilaterism
grew and NATO started to dominate the Euro-Atlantic region, only the alignment with the Western
society could help the Russian Federation to retain its status in the international system, or what has
been left of it after the collapse of the Soviet Union. By actively participating in the anti-global
terrorism collaboration under the collective security system, Russian authorities could make Russia
useful for the international community. Moreover, the Russian authorities would be able to position
themselves as a reliable and necessary partner for the West – a necessary actor in the international
system.\textsuperscript{103}

On the other hand, the Russian authorities hoped that by collaborating with Western states in a
coalition against international terrorism, the international society would fully legitimize the second
campaign in the Chechen Republic.

Thus, the participation under the collective security system provided Putin with an unexpected
opportunity to transform the inferior position of the Russian Federation within the international system
to that of an equal partner. To reclaim its international “prestige”\textsuperscript{104} and the status of a civilized and
democratic state (something it unsuccessfully tried after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991), and
to change the Western perception regarding the second Chechen campaign.

In practice this resulted in on the one hand a far-reaching collaboration between the United States and
the Russian Federation, and on the other hand the rhetorical underlining of their shared faith and
understanding under the threat of international terrorism, something that has been described
elaborately in Chapter 3. An example of such rhetorical efforts to underline the cooperation and shared
faith under international terrorism was among others when Putin stated that “Russia was rooted in
European values” and that “Russia would not be against NATO’s expansion to the east”.\textsuperscript{105} As well as
a statement by former Foreign Minister Ivanov, when he “pledged to work cooperatively and in
solidarity with a U.S. counter terror campaign” and “promising to lend his nation’s support”.\textsuperscript{106}

\textsuperscript{100} Associated Press, 19 September, 2001 (A. Usher: Foreign Minister Pledges Russian Cooperation Against
Terrorism).
\textsuperscript{101} Ambrosio (2005), pp. 1189.
\textsuperscript{102} Ibid., pp.1200-1201.
\textsuperscript{103} Stepanova (2002), pp. 2.
\textsuperscript{104} Arbatova (2002), pp. 157.
\textsuperscript{105} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{106} Associated Press, 19 September, 2001 (A. Usher: Foreign Minister Pledges Russian Cooperation Against
Terrorism).
As for the “most vivid manifestation” of Russian collaboration with the West, it has been Russia’s cooperation with the United States during the US operation in Afghanistan. Russia played an important role in supplying the coalition with information and other means during its anti-terrorist campaign in Afghanistan. Among others, Russian intelligence services shared their intelligence regarding the anti-terrorism operations and agreed in February 2002 with the United Nations, to expand the anti-terrorism cooperation within the United Nation’s framework, the OSCE and NATO. Moreover, in May 2002 a U.S.-Russia Working Group on Combating Terrorism was established and in July 2002, during the meeting of the Working Group, the representatives of both nations discussed the possibilities to cooperate in the fight against terrorism “from Chechnya to Kashmir”, and made consultations to address the issues of combating nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.

The far-reaching cooperation between the United States and the Russian Federation was addressed at various Joint Statements. For example, in a Joint Statement on October 21, 2001 both Presidents stated the following on their collaboration against terrorism. Both the Presidents condemned terrorism and stated that 9/11 was a crime against humanity. They also stated that terrorism does not only threaten the security of the United States and Russia, but of the entire international community, peace and security. And that the fight against terrorism requires unity of the international community and the “full use of the United Nations and other international organizations”. During the Joint Statement, both Presidents called upon all states “to join a global coalition to defeat international terrorism”. According to President Bush and Putin, the cooperation between Russia and the United State is a “critical element in the global effort against terrorism”.

At a Joint Statement on November 14, 2001 both Presidents underlined the close relationship between the United States and the Russian Federation. Among others, they stated both the United States and Russia “are embarked on a new relationship founded on the values of democracy” and that they are determined to cooperate with each other and international organizations to “promote security, economic well-being and a free world”. And since there are threats, which endanger the security of both the countries and the world, they call for “the creation of a new strategic framework to ensure the mutual security of the United States and Russia, and the world community”.

Although the official discourse of both parties has been that the cooperation was necessary to reassure the national as well as international security, in reality it was a strategy to exploit the changed discourse on international terrorism as a means to realize their own political agenda.

As already mentioned, for the United States this has been the demonstration of United States’ capabilities on the international arena and a reaffirmation of their geopolitical course of unilaterism. More importantly for the Russian Federation it has been a tool first of all to realize the Western direction of its foreign policy, and make it believable before the international public and to reestablish its powerful position within the international system, as a means to protect its national security and sovereignty. By allying with the United States in the “global war on terror”, Russia could demonstrate its great power and that it was a country to reckon with - an indispensable agent in the development of a new global security regime. It could demand concessions, a more active supportive role in

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108 Ibid.
109 Joint Statement on Counterterrorism by the President of the United States and the President of Russia (Shanghai), 21 October, 2001, on: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/sept11/us_russian_statement.asp
NATO (Russian Federation is a cooperating state with NATO) and most importantly “a free hand in Chechnya”.

Moreover, by means of cooperation Putin was able to parallelize the global war against international terrorism and the war in Chechnya as a means to justify the far-reaching second Chechen campaign. It was a strategy Putin tried to exploit already prior to the attacks of 9/11, when he tried to convince Clinton’s administration to aid them to capture Osama bin Laden and to forge an international coalition against transnational terrorism.

4.2.2 The war in Iraq

However, the new geopolitical course of the Russian foreign policy came to a halt after the US invasion of Iraq. The plans of the US administration to invade Iraq, the proclamation of pre-emptive attacks and regime changes in hostile states, as part of American expansionism and continuing unilateralism, were perceived by many as aggression on the side of the United States. If Russia believed that it could influence the American geopolitical discourse, and the international system in general by joining the coalition, it soon realized that this was not the case.

Moreover, according to Arbatova it became evident that the United States did not make a great “effort to involve Russia” in its actions surrounding the war on terror on full-time basis and the Russo-American cooperation was very much limited and selective. This meant that the Russian authorities were only involved by the US administration when such an involvement was necessary. No concessions were made by the United States on NATO’s expansion to the east. The United States were not interested in cutting their nuclear arms and no military interaction had been promoted in Central Asia, as had been discussed. And many of the US-Russia agreements contained uncertainties and had “been built around the US position”.

Instead of allying with the United States, now Russia realized that in order to achieve the great power status and influence it was hoping for it had to oppose the unilateral discourse of the United States and form alliances with other upcoming powerful states to counterbalance it. After all, such dominance in the international system on the side of the United States would reduce Russia into a minor power, whose interests could be disregarded. As mentioned by Ambrosio, Russia hoped that it could increase its influence in the international system by allying with the United States. However, when Russia realized that this would not happen, the Russian government was called upon to follow multilateralism and alliances with other states in its foreign policy. Soon, Russia joined the forces with Germany and France to forge a coalition against American aggression. Putin supported France and Germany in the UN Security Council, by threatening the use of veto and employing the division within the UN Security Council as a tool to strengthen its position regarding the United States.

The Russian stand against American unilaterism and its bid to create a multipolar counterbalancing power became even more apparent with the adoption of the modified version of the National Security

112 Ibid., pp. 1195.
115 Ibid., pp. 162.
Strategy\textsuperscript{118}(2009) and Foreign Policy Concept\textsuperscript{119}(2008). The National Security Strategy perceived the expansion of NATO and the unilateral course of the United States to be a great threat to Russian security, and the achievement of the status of a great power in the international system as the main goal\textsuperscript{120} The Foreign Policy Concept put a greater emphasis on the intensification of ties with China and India as a counter balancing power against American unilaterism. At the same time, the Russian authorities put a greater emphasis on strengthening the relations with CIS states as the ‘territory of interest’ in an effort to diminish American influence there.\textsuperscript{121} The ambivalent nature of the Russian policy, which became apparent after the attacks of 9/11 was apparently serving one goal and one goal only: to regain its former elite status in the international arena.

4.3 The attacks of 9/11 and the principle of collective security system vs. Robert O. Keohane

For the United States the attacks of 9/11 were an opportunity to demonstrate over which capabilities it possessed, to show once and for all why it was the most powerful state in the world. Unilateral actions (unilaterism) on the side of the United States and its allies soon followed, as invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq began to enfold. These terrorist attacks of 9/11 became meaningful for Bush; by depicting the terrorist attacks of 9/11 as an attack against the universal principles and values of democracy and freedom, Bush was able to present the attacks of 9/11 as a declaration of war against the civilization c.q. the United States, and call upon states to join him in the global war against terrorism. Soon Bush would construct a downscaled geopolitical world of ‘good’ vs. ‘evil’, by stating: “This is the world’s fight. This is civilization’s fight. This is the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom”.\textsuperscript{122} Here, the American geopolitical course was presented to be that of unilaterism, simplifying polarization and moral absolutism.\textsuperscript{123}

On the other hand, the proclamation of a global war on terror saw a revival of the collective security system. Instead of fighting one another, or each other’s ideologies, the individual nation states were voluntarily cooperating with each other to fight transnational terrorism. Something the horrors of the World War could not achieve, was achieved by an invisible threat of transnational terrorism. This development of collective cooperation against a common enemy fitted well within the liberal theory of rational actors (states) cooperating with each other to attain the goal of lasting peace, setting aside their national interests for the transnational ones. The cooperation was a response to Bush’s famous call for mobilization before the Congress,

“Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbour or support terrorism will be


\textsuperscript{120} De Haas, M. (2009), Medvedev’s Security Policy: A Provision Assessment, Russian Analytical Digest, 62, pp. 3.

\textsuperscript{121} De Haas (2009), pp. 2.


\textsuperscript{123} Tuathail, Dalby and Routledge (2008), pp. 125.
regarded by the United States as a hostile regime".\textsuperscript{124} According to the theory of Robert O. Keohane cooperation can exist as long as there is a common interest,

> “Intergovernmental cooperation takes place when the policies actually followed by one government are regarded by its partners as facilitating realization of their own objectives, as the result of a process of policy coordination”.\textsuperscript{125}

Just like the intergovernmental cooperation in the aftermath of the attacks of 9/11 and the unilateral declaration of the global war on terror, “Cooperation should not be viewed as the absence of conflict, but rather as a reaction to conflict or potential conflict. Without the spectre of conflict, there is no need to cooperate”.\textsuperscript{126} According to Keohane, even in an anarchic system of self-help and sovereignty (realism), cooperation is possible when a mutual interest to do so is present. However, as easy as cooperation based on mutual interest can take place, the more easily such cooperation can fail or be dissolved when the interest of state involved is incompatible with the interests of the other states. This discord could be a natural result of the characteristics of the actors.\textsuperscript{127}

As Keohane has argued, “Both players can benefit from mutual cooperation, but each can gain more from double-crossing the other one- that is, from defection”\textsuperscript{128}, when such defection is lucrative for the party. And this has been the case for the Russian position under the collective security system after the attacks of 9/11.

### 4.3.1 Russian ambivalent foreign policy after 9/11 & the theory of Robert O. Keohane

When we apply the theory of Keohane to Russia in the aftermath of the attack of 9/11, we may conclude the following:

The Russian actions in the aftermath of the attacks of 9/11 demonstrated that although the liberal ideals of peace and security were presented as the fundamental grounds for the cooperation under the collective security system, in reality it were the Realist assumptions of egoism and self-interest that outweighed the interest of universal peace, security and prosperity c.q. liberalism.

Just like Keohane has argued above, even in Realpolitik (where realism prevails) cooperation can take place as long as mutual interests between the actors are present. For the Russian authorities the main interests to collaborate with the United States and other Western allies were, to put it very simple, the aim of Putin’s administration to retain (or attain) the status of a super state\textsuperscript{129}, as argued by Ambrosio, to realize the Western direction of Russian foreign policy, and to justify and gain an international acknowledgment for its much criticized second Chechen campaign\textsuperscript{130}, as mentioned in Chapter 3. Thus, for the Russian authorities, the cooperation under the collective security system was a strategic choice to realize these political agenda points (Figure 1).

\textsuperscript{126} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 54.
\textsuperscript{127} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 65.
\textsuperscript{128} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 67.
\textsuperscript{129} Ambrosio, (2005), pp. 1196.
\textsuperscript{130} Arbatova (2002), pp. 157.
However, in 2003 it became apparent for the Russian authorities that they would gain more if they would double-cross the transnational cooperation under the collective security system. As for many other collaborating states, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 became a breaking point for the transnational collaboration under the collective security system. The initial outburst of international solidarity that was generated in the aftermath of the attacks of 9/11 soon changed as the decision to invade Iraq introduced disagreement.\textsuperscript{131} For the Russian authorities it became apparent that their foreign policy turn into the Western direction did not result in a greater influence in the international system. Quite the contrary, the American geopolitical unilaterism became even more evident when it decided unilaterally and without the United Nation’s permission to invade Iraq.\textsuperscript{132} As mentioned by Ambrosio, in the aftermath of the dispute regarding Iraq, the Russian authorities realized that American unilaterism would not allow for Russia to attain its “great power status”.\textsuperscript{133} For the Russian authorities it became evident that in order to regain its former influence in the international system (as it did during the Soviet times), it had to form alliances with other upcoming powerful states, to counterbalance the American unilaterism, to concentrate more on the economic leverage it possessed and to cooperate with other states that could be deemed as (possible) major players in the international arena.\textsuperscript{134} And since by that time the second Chechen campaign was already acknowledged by the international community to be part of the global struggle against transnational terrorism, that goal became less important. To realize its main interest, the Russian authorities started to focus its foreign policy on other ‘means’, such as cooperation with other powerful states such as China, Iran and CIS countries to regain and sustain influence on the ‘territory of interest’, or to employ the economic

\textsuperscript{131} Ambrosio (2005), pp. 1190.
\textsuperscript{132}Ibid., pp. 1205.
\textsuperscript{133}Ibid., pp. 1200-1201.
\textsuperscript{134}Ibid., pp. 1202-1203.
leverage such as gas distribution – the Russian National Security Strategy of 2009 would include these interest as some of its main goals.

Figure 2

To retain the status of a super power (interest)

Unable to achieve the interest

Defection from international cooperation due to growing American unilaterism

Search for other means to realize the political agenda

Cooperation with other states (upcoming powers) such as China and Iran to counterbalance American unilaterism

More emphasis in policy on economic leverage, for example gas distribution to the European Union and Ukraine

Cooperation with CIS countries to regain and sustain the territory of interest and to diminish the U.S. influence

Cooperation with France and Germany in UN against American plans in Iraq

Keohane’s argumentation that cooperation may fail when the interest of a state is no longer compatible with the interest of other states, and a state may gain more from double-crossing the cooperation – can be applied to Russian ambivalent foreign policy following the attacks of 9/11. In Russian case, the main interest to gain the super power status was incompatible with American interest of unilaterism, therefore, the collaboration between Russian and the United States under the pretext of collective security system failed. Russia realized that it would gain more if it would cooperate with other upcoming super states and counterbalance American power. Therefore, double-crossing Russo-American cooperation became more profitable for Russian than the collaboration itself (Figure 2).

4.3.2 The Russian foreign policy from Realism-perspective

The underlying reasoning of Russian foreign policy, and its ambivalent nature as demonstrated by the theory of Keohane, can be the best explained from a (structural) realist point of view. According to the principles of structural realism, due to the anarchic nature of the international system, states try to become powerful to protect their sovereignty against a possible attack (security dilemma). Thus, states want power for diverging reasons.135 According to Mearsheimer, one of such reasons is the anarchic nature of the international system and the circumstance that states never know how powerful other states are and what their intention is. Because states are “rational actors” and their main goal is to survive as there is no centralized authority to oversee the working of the international system, the best way to ensure your survival is to maximize your power.136 When we compare this to the Russian

136Ibid., pp. 73-74.
foreign policy since 2001, we may observe that the main driving force behind its Western oriented policy has been its aim to regain (part of) its influence in the international system and its status of a super power, which it had lost after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Power and influence in the international system has been its main goal underlying the collaboration with other states. As a result, exploitation of the available means (read: ‘global war on terror’ and international collaboration) soon followed. When power and influence could not be realized through Western oriented foreign policy, Russia switched to other means to do so and in this case it was among others the exploitation of economic leverage and cooperation with other rising powerful states.

On the other hand Realists believe in the principle of balance of power. When such power distribution is unbalanced, states may undertake actions to balance the international system. This could partially explain the sudden shift observed after 2003 in the Russian foreign policy, a shift into the conservative anti-American policy, and mainly the cooperation with CIS countries, China and Iran in order to diminish American influence there and to counter balance American power in the international system. The invasion of Iraq demonstrated the far-reaching American unilaterism and their unwillingness to diminish their unilateral actions and power within the international system. As a result the balance of power shifted towards the United States. By such cooperation, involving states tried to limit American unilaterism by forging a counter balancing power. According to Ambrosio, the discussions to establish global multipolar system increased among the Russian politicians after invasion of Iraq in 2003.137

4.3.3 Conclusion

Thus, one may conclude that in the aftermath of the attacks of 9/11, as well as after the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Russian authorities were driven by interests and goals of Realism and conventional nature; to attain power in the anarchic international system as a means to secure and protect Russian sovereignty and to counter balance American unilaterism (balance of power). For the Russian authorities, the cooperation under the collective security system in a global war against transnational terrorism was a strategic choice, a means to regain influence in the international system and a status of a super power, as well as a justification ground for the second Chechen campaign. The chosen strategy was a Western oriented policy. However, once the Russian authorities realized that they would not be able to realize their main goals through this new foreign policy strategy, they turned to other means such as cooperation with other upcoming super states. While cooperating with Western allies against transnational terrorism in hope to regain the super power status and increase its influence in the international system, the invasion in Iraq demonstrated the growing and far-reaching American unilaterism. To diminish American unilaterism and to increase its influence in the international system, the Russian authorities had to cooperate with other upcoming powerful states. As has been demonstrated by Figure 1 and Figure 2 the ambivalent nature of the Russian foreign policy in the aftermath of 9/11 can be explained by the theory of Robert O. Keohane, namely that collaboration in Realpolitik can take place as long as a mutual interest to do so is present. In my opinion, after the invasion of Iraq in 2003 the interest (to become a powerful state and increase its influence in the international system) of the Russian authorities to cooperate under the collective security system was incompatible with the interest of the United States (to increase its unilaterism in the international system). Since both interests were incompatible, and no mutual interest to cooperate was present, the Russo-American cooperation failed and the Russian authorities sought for other tools to realize their goal. Thus, the shift in interest and cooperation after the invasion of Iraq was the result of realisation by the Russian authorities of their inability to realize their main goal through the chosen

137 Ambrosio (2005), pp. 1203.
strategy. And since by that time the international society had already acknowledged Chechen separatism to be part of global international terrorism, no underlying reasoning was present for the Russian authorities to continue this cooperation under the collective security system.

### 4.4 Conclusion

When we compare the theoretical framework of Chapter 4.1 and the review of Russian foreign policy in consequent Chapters, we may conclude that the new discourse regarding terrorism has been exploited by the Russian Federation, as a means to realize its political agenda. The following conclusion can be extracted from the abovementioned material and findings of among others, Ambrosio, Serpatova and Arbatova.

In the aftermath of the attacks of 9/11, international society changed its discourse regarding terrorism. While beforehand terrorism was regarded as a ‘far away’ threat by the international community, the attacks of 9/11 drastically changed this perception: the attacks demonstrated that international terrorism was a force to reckon with, a force that could inflict serious harm to one of the most powerful states in the world and a threat to the international security.

Under the threat of international terrorism, an international coalition was formed to fight international terrorism more effectively. The states realized that in order to protect the international security and their national security, they had to cooperate with one another. The mutual interest to protect the international and national security took the upper hand in Realpolitik. As Keohane has argued, cooperation between states can take place, even in an international system of realism, as long as a mutual interest exists. However, when the interest to cooperate is incompatible between the states – cooperation may fail and a state may choose to double-cross the cooperation. The actions on the side of the United States and the Russian Federation in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, demonstrated that this was very much true in their case.

The most remarkable international cooperation in the aftermath of the attacks was that between the United States and the Russian Federation. For the first time in history, the Russian Federation was willing to make drastic concessions to accommodate the US-Russo collaboration by among others providing the United States with the necessary intelligence and accommodation to enable them to execute military actions in Afghanistan. In numerous Statements, Putin declared his support to the United States and its allies in the fight against global terror, even agreements were formulated on issues both countries disagreed on. The US-Russo collaboration went even so far that the Russian authorities were willing to allow the United States to execute Western influence in their ‘territory of interest’. While on the surface this collaboration did take place on basis of protection of international security and the fundaments of the civilization, in reality the collaboration was the result of both countries’ aspirations to realize their political agendas. For the United States this was the demonstration of its power, dominance, and the enforcements of its geopolitical course. For the Russian Federation it was the realization of the new geopolitical discourse into the Western direction, to regain its lost status of a powerful state, the Soviet Union prestige and last but not least, to justify the war in Chechnya.

For both countries the mutual interest to cooperate was present and in both cases the mutual interest was characterized by a Realpolitik agenda, which is power and self-interest. Although in some cases
cooperation did take place based on liberalist principles of universal security and the protection of values, such as democracy and freedom, the reasoning behind the collaboration of the United States and more importantly the Russian Federation may be best explained from a realist point of view. In the case of Russia this was very simple: it believed that by making themselves important and indispensable in the global war against terror, it would be able to regain its lost status of a great and indispensable power in the international system. Moreover, by allying themselves with the United States and its allies and by moving its foreign policy into the Western direction, it could demonstrate that it is indeed a democratic nation state the international system can no longer disregard. On the other hand, the collaboration and the parallelization of the attacks of 9/11 with the Chechen war could give the Russian authorities a free hand in their fight against their own terrorism in the Chechen republic.

The American plans to invade Iraq became a breaking point for the relationship between the United States and the Russian Federation under the collective security system. Once it became evident for the Russian authorities that their goal to regain their status would not be realized as long as the unilateral geopolitical course of the United States was present, the Russian authorities did not hesitate to turn their Western oriented foreign policy into the East. In the aftermath of Bush’s declaration of a global war on terror and the international coalition to fight this threat, the US administration was hesitant to accept the Russian Federation as an equal and a serious ally in the global war. As has been mentioned previously, the cooperation between the United States and the Russian Federation was very limited and selective. No concessions were made on the side of the United States or NATO in the Russian direction, and none of the agreements and topics discussed were executed properly. The consequent war in Iraq which the Russian authorities very much resented became the final breaking point in the post-9/11 US-Russo relationship. And while the initial goal to regain political power in the international system (read: status) remained an important political agenda point for the Russian authorities, the interest to cooperate within the Western coalition as a means to achieve it, was gone. As a result the mutual interest to cooperate was not present after the invasion in Iraq, since it became evident for the Russian authorities that they would not be able to achieve their main goal through international cooperation under the collective security system. As argued by Keohane, the realist interests of both the Russian Federation and the United States (power, self-preservation and self-interest) became incompatible with one another. As a result, the Russian authorities choose to double-cross the cooperation by forming alliance with other growing super states to counter balance the American unilaterism; they tried to forge a counterbalancing power with China in the international system against American unilaterism, expand their sphere of influence in the CIS region, forge a coalition with France and Germany in the United Nations against American aggression and reinforce the economic leverage in the international arena.

Thus, on the basis of the above mentioned, we may answer the second sub-question as follows, “How was the Russian policy affected by the cooperation under the collective security system, following the attacks of 11 September 2001?” Although on the surface it did appear that the Russian foreign policy was affected by the international cooperation, in reality the international cooperation was merely a tool for the Russian authorities to realize their goals.

Prior to the invasion of Iraq and after the attacks of 11 September 2001, the Russian foreign policy took a drastic turn into the Western direction. Already during the presidencies of Gorbachev and Yeltsin, the Russian authorities tried to turn the foreign policy into a Western direction, however the turn did not receive the expected reaction, neither from the Western societies, nor from the Russian
elite. So when the attacks of 9/11 took place, they were approached by the Russian authorities as a tool to make the turn into the Western direction more effective, and subsequently the realization of their goals. The international collaboration in the aftermath of the global war on terror and the Russian coalition with the Western states to fight international terrorism was a strategy for the Russian authorities to regain political power in the international system, and to justify the war in Chechnya.

As it became evident for the Russian authorities that they would not be able to realize their goals through international cooperation, they changed their strategy into among others forging a counter balancing power with upcoming powerful states against American unilateralism. And although it may have appeared that the Russian authorities’ actions were based on the ideal of the protection of universal security and fundamental principles of democracy and freedom, in reality they were based on the principles of realism; national self-interest, balance of power and the security dilemma.

In the following Chapter I will elaborate more specifically on the effects the attacks of 9/11 and the global war on terror had on the domestic side of the Russian anti-terror policy. Due to the fact that the Russian national anti-terrorist policy is based on two legal documents, the *Federal Law on Combatting Terrorism* and the *National Security Concept/National Security Strategy*, Chapter 5 will include judicial analysis, very much like Chapter 2. Chapter 5 focuses on answering the following sub-question; *Did the attacks of 11 September and the ’global war on terror’ affect the Russian national anti-terror policy?*

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5. Russian Anti-Terror Policy

At the dawn of the commencement of the second Chechen campaign in 1999, Putin was elected as the new president. The newly elected President entered the second Chechen campaign with the establishment of an anti-terrorism regime in the Chechen Republic.

Chechen separatism was no longer perceived as a fight for independence. Rather, after the invasion of neighboring Dagestan and the Moscow apartment bombings in 1999, the Russian authorities declared Chechnya to be a breeding ground for terrorism. It did not take long for the Russian authorities to cease the unveiled opportunity and to invade Chechnya. The establishment of the official anti-terror regime on Chechen soil, or officially called a “zone of counter-terrorism operation”, soon followed. This far-reaching and human rights violating regime would include “effective” anti-terrorism measures such as arbitrary arrests, roadblock controls, enforced disappearances, curfews and many other human rights violating tools to fight terrorism – once legitimate separatism – properly.

By 2009, the anti-terrorism regime in the Chechen Republic was officially proclaimed to be successfully completed by the Russian authorities. “Chechenisation” under the totalitarian regime of Chechen President Kadyrov soon followed.

In this Chapter I will try to review whether the attacks of 9/11 and the global war on terror have had an effect on the domestic aspect of the Russian anti-terror policy. Therefore, in this Chapter I will address the following sub-question, namely “Did the attacks of 11 September and the global war on terror affect the Russian national anti-terror policy?”

5.1 Introduction

Since the commencement of the second Chechen campaign, a new wave of terrorist violence and insurgency engulfed the country in the early 2000’s. In response to these attacks, Russian authorities adopted various anti-terrorism legislations, established and modified institutions responsible for combating terrorism and streamlined the leadership and conduct of anti-terrorist operations. These tools had been the main fundaments for the Russian authorities to fight the Chechen separatism in disguise of a full scaled anti-terror operation. Already previously, the Russian media were ordered by the Russian authorities to refer to the Chechen rebels as terrorists – a first step in the manipulation process of the public regarding Chechen separatism and Chechen fighters. The second step was the subsequent installment of the “zone of counter-terrorist operation”. By doing so, the Russian authorities once again were able to demonstrate that Chechen separatism was not a legitimate fight for independence, but merely an illegitimate terrorist war.

The anti-terrorism policy of the Russian Federation has been much criticized by the international community due to the continuing human rights violations during the conduct of these anti-terrorism operations, also for its excessiveness, poor coordination of the organizational basis and the absence of “a comprehensive anti-terrorism strategy” that among others would encompass a long-term preemptive solution proposition to fight the root causes behind the terrorist attacks.

140 Ibid.
The Russian development of anti-terrorism legislation and an institutional framework has followed by a footstep the development of the terrorist attacks on Russian soil: as terrorist attacks continued to evolve, the Russian legislation and institutional frameworks on terrorism did as well.

In 1998 a Federal Law “On Combatting Terrorism”(hereafter: the Federal Law) was adopted. The Federal Law is the most important legislative pillar of the Russian anti-terrorism policy. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the Federal Law did not only define terrorist activities as such, it also set out the legal regime of the anti-terrorism operations and defined the organizational basis of anti-terrorism policy under the execution of Russian governmental organs, such as the Federal Security Service (FSB) and the Ministry of Interior (MVD), as the prime agencies responsible for the anti-terror operations. In 2006, the Federal Law was replaced by a new version, due to the developments in the anti-terror policy.

Another Russian high profile document dealing with the Russian security threats and the framework to address them, is the National Security Concept (hereafter: NSC), which had been adopted by President Yeltsin in 1997 and revised by Putin in 2000 and President Medvedev in 2009. The NSC is an overarching security document on the basis of which the Russian anti-terror policy is executed.

The extensive legislative and institutional initiatives and reforms demonstrated “the Russian desire to learn from its experiences” and their commitment to address terrorism more effectively, according to Omelicheva. Despite the changes and developments executed and proposed by the Russian authorities regarding the anti-terrorism policy, the basic principles to address the security threats in Russia, have remained the same. And although the main driving force behind the development and evolvement of these legal and institutional framework documents has been the development of the terrorism environment on Russian soil, one may wonder whether the attacks of 9/11 and the proclamation of the “global war on terror” (or the development of transnational terrorism) had any influence on these transformations. Especially, when one considers that the Russian authorities were very eager to proclaim their support to the West against the common enemy.

5.2 The Federal Law on “Combatting Terrorism”

5.2.1 The Federal Law on “Combatting Terrorism” – content
The development of the Russian legislation regarding anti-terror policy went hand in hand with the evolvement of the Chechen resistance and the threat of terrorist attacks on Russian soil. In 1998 the Russian authorities adopted the Federal Law on “Combatting Terrorism”, a year prior to the second Chechen campaign. The Federal Law(1998) became the main legal pillar of the Russian anti-terror policy, especially during the establishment of the “zone of the counter-terrorism operation” in Chechnya in 1999. The proclamation of an anti-terror regime on the soil of the Chechen Republic did not only provide the Russian government with far-reaching competences to fight the alleged terrorists, the newly adopted Federal Law (1998), on basis of which the anti-terror operation was executed in Chechnya, provided the Russian authorities with a legitimate ground to do so.

141 Ibid.
This legal pillar in the form of the Federal Law (1998) does not only define terrorism, terrorist activities and a terrorist act separately in Article 3, the Federal Law also clarifies the legal regime within which the anti-terrorist operations are carried out. It describes the organizational regime of the anti-terrorism operations. As such, Article 1 of the Federal Law sets out the legal basis for the fight against terrorism, placing the FSB and the MVD as the agencies mainly responsible for the Russian anti-terrorism operations. According to Article 6 the agencies responsible for the anti-terrorism operations are among other the FSB, MVD and the Ministry of Defence. Article 5 sets out the aims of the fight against terrorism, such as to protect society and to prevent or uncover the consequences of terrorism. Article 6 also elaborates the mandate of the federal anti-terrorist commission, such as the elaboration of the basic principles of state policy on terrorism of the Russian Federation, the collection and analysis of information regarding terrorism in the Russian Federation, the coordination of the activity of federal organs engaged in the fight against terrorism, and elaboration of proposals on improving the Russian legislation in the sphere of the fight against terrorism. Furthermore, Article 7 describes the competences of the entities engaged in the fight, such as preventing and uncovering terrorist acts. Article 10 and the consequent articles deal with the anti-terror operations on a more specific level. Article 10 describes the control of counter-terrorism operations and that the operational staff of such an operation may be headed by a FSB representative or a MoD representative. Article 12, for example, describes the regulations regarding the leadership of such anti-terrorist operations, which can be the chair of the anti-terrorism commission or a person appointed by the President of the Russian Federation.

A very important aspect of the anti-terror operation is the limitation of human rights and civil liberties, encoded in Article 13. Article 13 of the Federal Law (1998) describes the legal regime during the anti-terrorist operation. As such, it provides the Russian authorities responsible for the anti-terror operation with a justification ground not to comply with the international principles of human rights protection during an anti-terror operation. By proclaiming the Chechen Republic to be the territory of anti-terrorist operation and relying on the Federal Law (1998) and especially Article 13, the Russian authorities took up the opportunity to conduct a very far-reaching and human rights violating operation.

The vagueness and the overall abstractness are present in almost every article of the Federal Law – leaving a great space for misunderstandings and various interpretations. The Federal Law (1998) fails not only to describe the functions and the leadership position of a counter-terrorist operation properly, or even what exactly the competences of the respective agencies are; in fact, it does not even describe how a zone of a counter-terrorist operation is determined. It even states bluntly that human rights and liberties are to be violated with no mentioning of any accountability or responsibility. The Federal Law of 1998 very much reflected the vague times wherein the Russian Federation found itself two years after the ending of the bloody Chechen war. In the times of the economic downfall, the revival of organized crime and the almost state anarchy, the vagueness and abstractness was the day to day reality for the Russian Federation and its population. Later on, during the second Chechen campaign, the vague and abstract Federal Law would become a useful tool for the Russian authorities to employ all means necessary, and de facto the Federal Law was a carte blanche for the Russian authorities to do as they pleased and how they pleased, to fight the so-called Chechen terrorists in the Chechen Republic.
5.2.2 The Nord-Ost theatre hostage taking (2002)

The overall legal vagueness of the Federal Law of 1998 reflected itself in practice, or in other words on the ground. In practice the troops of FSB, MVD and military forces from other ministries were all employed in the anti-terror operations on the ground as part of the Combined Group of Forces. To carry out specific anti-terror operations, the FSB and MVD created their own special task forces that were responsible for the execution of these specific anti-terror operations. With no agencies burdened with the control of these special task forces, the “lack of oversight” and “the impunity of the militants and the special task forces”, the anti-terror operations in Chechnya resulted in the brutal and far-reaching employment of military force against the population, refugees and other non-combatants.143

When the second Chechen campaign made its entrance in 1999, so did the evolvement of terrorism on Russian soil. It was the hostage taking in the Nord-Ost theatre in 2002 and its dramatic ending, that resulted in the perception by Russian officials that the “legal system lacked a normative basis for an effective fight against terrorism”.144 Revision of the existing legislation on terrorism and adoption of new legal documents regarding the matter were necessary, if not required. The Minister of Defence proposed to amend the legal documents as to include the intensification of the involvement of the Russian military forces against the terrorists and the readiness of the Russian Federation to fight terrorists outside the Russian Federation.145 The last proposition could have been the result of the developments in the international community, namely the recent attacks of 9/11, the consequent “global war on terror”, and the rhetorical effort to internationalise the Chechen conflict on an international arena, but in this case in legislation. It could also have been a subtle way to put international connotations to the Russian anti-terror policy and a manner to demonstrate to the international community that transnational terrorism is also a threat to Russian national security. However, one should bear in mind that already prior to the attacks of 9/11 and the “global war on terror”, Putin made a connection between the Chechen fight and international terrorism, as it was recalled in an interview in Paris Match, stating: “We are witnessing today the formation of a fundamentalist international, a sort of arc of instability extending from the Philippines to Kosovo”146. And: “Europe should be grateful to us and offer its appreciation for our fight against terrorism even if we are, unfortunately, waging it on our own”147.

In June 2001, this link would be reiterated by Bush when he stated: “There are some Al-Qaeda folks in Chechnya”148. It is questionable whether the proposal for such an inclusion was the result of the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and another way for Putin to make his campaign in Chechnya legitimate before the international and Russian public, or merely the result of the Russian perception that such a connection did exist in relation to the Chechen fighters. One thing is certain, the proposition by Putin lacked in every aspect the approval of international standards, or in other words it was very much in violation of the existing international law. On the other hand, by that time Russia had already learned from the actions on the side of the United States and NATO that an infringement of the standards of

144 De Haas (2005b), pp. 9.
145 Ibid, pp. 10.
international law (read: Kosovo) was permittable if rhetorically the respective subject was made favourable to the international community. Terrorism was such favourable subject.

As for the proposal to intensify the involvement of the military forces: it once again demonstrated the low level of knowledge of the Russian authorities, or the unwillingness to understand, that fighting terrorism by sole military force is not the proper, let alone effective, way to fight or prevent it.

5.2.3 The Beslan hostage taking (2004)

The inability to fight terrorism effectively became even clearer after the second hostage taking in Beslan, in 2004. After the hostage taking in Beslan and its dramatic end, just like after the Nord-Ost hostage taking, the same kind of announcements of revision and adoption of legislation were made by Putin.149 The Beslan hostage taking demonstrated that the measures proposed in 2002 by Putin were not sufficient to fight terrorism effectively, or simply, were not executed as promised by the Russian authorities. Eventually, in 2006 a new Federal Law(2006)150 was adopted by Putin, replacing the original version with the aim to streamline the changes in the leadership and the conduct of anti-terror operations. One of the main changes in the Federal Law (2006) was the specific inclusion of the employment of military forces to conduct anti-terrorism operations inside and outside the territory of the Russian Federation. The specific inclusion of the military forces as an agency dealing with the anti-terrorism operations is in line with previous statements made by Putin that the inclusion of a provision on intensification of the involvement of the military forces was necessary to fight terrorism effectively. This promise was made in response to the dramatic ending of the Nord-Ost and Beslan hostage takings due to the lack of oversight, coordination and the legal basis to employ the military forces effectively during such large scale and specific terrorist operations. The uncoordinated storming of the school, the lack of a legal basis to employ the military forces, the miscommunication between the leadership of the operation, the military forces, and the local authorities, were the main reasons for such a dramatic ending.

Thus, in compliance with the proposals, the current Article 6 of the new Federal Law (2006) mentions specifically that the employment of the armed forces is allowed in the struggle against terrorism, whereby Article 7 and Article 10 specify that among others armed forces may be employed against terrorist attacks where airplanes are used as the weapons of choice, or to suppress terrorist activities outside the territory of the Russian Federation. Articles 6, 7 and 10 are a new development in the Russian anti-terrorism legislation, in that sense that they were not included in previous Federal Law(1998). The specific mentioning of terrorist attacks by airplanes in Article 7 may be perceived as a (in)direct derogation from the attacks of 9/11 where the terrorist attacks against the United States were carried out by airplanes. However, at the same time the inclusion of Article 7 in the new Federal Law(2006) could also have been the result of the two terrorist attacks on Russian airplanes in 2004; therefore it is not evident which of the abovementioned events was the direct or indirect cause for the adoption of Article 7 in the Federal Law(2006).

As for the inclusion of Article 10, there are no arguments as such to identify why exactly this provision was adopted: was it the result of the “global war on terror”, the internationalization of the Chechen conflict in front of the international leaders, or simply because of the perceived connection between the Chechen fighters and transnational terrorism? One thing is clear; the content of Article 10

149 De Haas (2005b), pp. 11.
is very much in violation of the principles of international law, such as the right to sovereignty and independence. Although speculation was and is still present regarding the claim that many terrorist attacks by the Chechen separatists were funded by foreign forces, no evidence as such has ever been presented by the Russian authorities to back up this assumption to the public.\textsuperscript{151} This connection has remained solely on a rhetorical level, or mentioned by Putin previously and acknowledged later by Bush but never demonstrated as such.

The content of Article 10 makes it possible for the Russian authorities to place and employ Russian armed forces against terrorism in a territory outside the Russian Federation. It is difficult to deduce, due to the imprecise wording of this article, on the basis of which grounds such a decision is made by the Russian authorities, which limitations are set to Article 10 or how the organization of the conduct under Article 10 should be carried out. The vagueness of Article 10 may lead to various misconceptions and it leaves one wondering whether Article 10 is a simple justification ground for the employment of Russian forces in collaboration with other countries under the collective security system or a more serious justification ground for an invasion of a country under the premises of fighting terrorism.

Overall, the inclusions of Articles 7 and 10 in the new \textit{Federal Law} are very much in line with the attacks of 9/11, the consequent “global war on terror” and the Russian stand on these matters, namely the parallel with the Chechen conflict, or more specifically the efforts by the Russian authorities to display parallels between the attacks of 9/11 and the “global war on terror” and their own anti-terror operations in Chechnya and the Northern Caucasus.

The same could be said regarding Article 4 on international cooperation in the fight against terrorism. The fact that the same provision was already included in the \textit{Federal Law}(1998), demonstrates that the provision in itself was not a new development such as Articles 6, 7 and 10; nevertheless, it has been very much in line with the previously mentioned stand of the Russian authorities on the “global war on terror” and Putin’s statement that the Russian authorities had single handily been fighting the war against international terrorism prior to the attacks of 9/11. Simultaneously, and in the light of Chapter 4, Article 4 demonstrates that prior to the attacks of 9/11 the Russian government was willing to cooperate with other nation states against international terrorism. Evidently, the collaborative and Western course of the Russian policy in the wake of the attacks of 9/11 is not a new development for the Russian foreign policy regarding terrorism – it was already set by Yeltsin in 1998. Nevertheless, in general terms, the new \textit{Federal Law}(2006) does not demonstrate any far-reaching differences in comparison to the previous \textit{Federal Law} (1998).

The more specific legislation regarding the conduct of an anti-terrorist operation is encoded in Articles 11-17. Article 11 encodes the legal regime of the anti-terrorist operation, thereby allowing the suspension of human rights and civil liberties during the conduct of anti-terrorist operations. Just like the \textit{Federal Law} of 1998, so does the \textit{Federal Law} of 2006 pose far-reaching restrictions on human rights and civil liberties during the conduct of anti-terror operations, among others this is laid down in Article 11. Article 12 encodes the terms of conducting the anti-terrorist operation, Article 13 encodes the direction of anti-terrorist operation, Article 15 encodes which forces and facilities may conduct an anti-terrorist operation while Article 17 sets the conditions for the termination of an anti-terrorist operation.

The provisions regarding the anti-terrorist operation are very broad and vague leaving room for different interpretations. For example, Article 12 sub 2 and 3 encode regulations on the question who may direct an anti-terrorist operation. However, the content of Article 12 is so vague, imprecise and

broad that it remains questionable who exactly may direct an anti-terrorist operation and on which basis the head of anti-terrorist operation is chosen:

Article 11

“2. A decision to conduct an antiterrorist operation and to terminate it shall be rendered by the head of the federal executive body in charge of security or, on the instructions thereof, by another official of the federal executive body in charge of security, or by the head of a territorial agency of the federal executive body in charge of security, if not decided otherwise by the head of the federal executive body in charge of security.

3. Where considerable forces and facilities are required for conducting an antiterrorist operation and it is to be conducted on the territory with a large number of residents, the head of the federal executive body in charge of security shall notify of establishing the legal regime of an antiterrorist operation and of the territory where it is to be conducted, the President of the Russian Federation, the Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation, the Chairman of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, the Chairman of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation and, if necessary, other officials.”

At the same time provisions on the limitation of the territory or the time period within which the anti-terror operation shall be conducted, are not incorporated in the Federal Law (2006), resulting in the disposition over a very far-reaching power over the conduct of the anti-terror operations in the hands of the responsible agencies, leaving the agencies responsible for an anti-terrorist operation with a mandate with almost no limitations.

5.2.4 Conclusion

All in all, one may conclude that rhetorically and in practice the hostage takings of Nord-Ost and Beslan had been the direct cause for the revision of the main legal pillar of the anti-terror policy in the Russian Federation. Still, one may question whether an actual revision of the Federal Law has been carried out, for no drastic changes as such can be traced in the Federal Law of 2006 and the basic legislative principles on anti-terrorism policy have remained the same: the overall vagueness regarding the conduct, the content of the anti-terror operations, the leadership and the responsible agencies, remains, as well as the perception that terrorism can only be fought by repression (read: the employment of the blunt force of the military forces).

However, in contrast to Federal Law (1998), Article 6, the Federal Law (2006) does not enumerate the agencies responsible with the fight against terrorism. The specific inclusion of Articles 7 and 10 in Federal Law (2006), although very much in violation of international law (Article 10), may be a “subtle” demonstration of the new reality that has been brought upon the international system after the attacks of 9/11 and the “global war on terror”. However, this is questionable since no official documentation exists that may confirm this. In contrast to the Federal Law (1998), the Federal Law (2006) does encode more specific regulations regarding the anti-terrorist operations in Article 11-17, however just like most of the Federal Law regulations, also these regulations are vague and may lead to misconceptions and different interpretations. More importantly, they do not explain the extent of the mandate during the anti-terrorist operations; whether a limitation exists on the territory, the time-period during which the anti-terrorist operations may be conducted or any form of accountability with respect to violations of the human rights and liberties as encoded in Article 11.

Nevertheless, it may be evident that the additions to the Federal Law (2006) have served the purpose to provide the Russian authorities with a greater and a more far-reaching mandate in the anti-terrorist operations. Here we may think about a specific judicial ground for the employment of military forces.
to fight terrorism, the justification of violation of human rights and liberties during anti-terrorist operations, and no encoded limitations on the time period or the territory of the anti-terrorist operation.

5.3 The National Security Concept

The National Security Concept is a blueprint for the Russian authorities regarding the international and internal threats that may destabilize the Russian national security, and the measures that the Russian authorities are going to undertake to effectively address these threats.

5.3.1 Introducing the Russian National Security Concept

The first National Security Concept (hereafter: NSC) was adopted in 1997 under the presidency of Yeltsin. It was a blueprint that included views of different national organs regarding the national and international threat to the Russian national security, thereby setting out the direction the Russian authorities would pursue to address these internal and external threats to the Russian national security of the individual, society and the state. The NSC (1997) was modified in 2000 by Putin, in the aftermath of the commencement of the second Chechen campaign in 1999 and the revival and development of the terrorist environment.

The revision of NSC (1997) did not reflect the internal situation of the Russian Federation at that time, at least not as it was hoped for by many. Instead of addressing the problematic surrounding the internal conflict in Chechnya and the terrorist attacks on Russian soil, especially how to address them preemptively on a long-term basis, NSC (2000) put a lot of emphasis on the foreign based large scale threat of the destabilizing nature that could realistically threaten the Russian security, such as the dominance of the Western states in the international arena under the leadership of the United States and the desire of other states and organizations to diminish the power and influence of the Russian Federation in the international arena. The inferiorly placed internal destabilizing factors in NSC (2000), such as the Chechen problematic, economic downfall and organized crime, demonstrated that even in 2000 the Russian authorities were more fixed on traditional threats emanating from the nemesis in the West and the establishment of Russian superiority in the international community, instead of concentrating on the internal threats, which were actually of a greater destabilizing nature to the national security of the Russian Federation. Especially, when one considers that it was in 1999 when Putin proclaimed separatist Chechnya to be a “zone of counter-terrorism operation” during the outbreak of the second Chechen campaign.

Thus, according to NSC (2000), the threats to the Russian security may be categorized as following;

- the threat of disintegration of the economy, such as “contradiction in the gross domestic products” and “reduced investment and innovation”,
- the threat of criminalization, such as the growth in organized crime;
- the threats in an international sphere, such as “the desire of some states to diminish the role of existing mechanisms for ensuring international security” (UN and OSCE), the desire of some

153 Russia’s National Security Concept, approved by decree of the President, 10 January, 2000, no. 24, on: http://www.armscontrol.org/print/598.
154 Ibid, pp. 3.
states to weaken Russian influence in the world, NATO’s “practice of using military force outside its zone of responsibility and without UN’s sanction”.  

Consequently NSC (2000) sets out the following tasks for the Russian agencies to ensure the security of the Russian Federation:

- First of all, the socio-economic problems should be handled by the strengthening of the central authority, instead of tackling the root causes behind the socio-economic underdevelopment. For example, NSC (2000) states that to ensure the security of the Russian Federation among others “the state regulation in the economy should be strengthened”;  
- Second, in order to fight crime in the Russian Federation more effectively, a priority should be made to develop “a system of effective social preventive measures” and to develop “a comprehensive system for the protection of individuals, society and state against criminality”;  
- Third, the Russian foreign policy should be redesigned to “strengthen the mechanisms” of the UN Security Council, to “pursue a more active foreign policy direction”, develop relations with CIS-countries and “ensure Russia’s full involvement in global and regional economic and political structures”;  
- Further, to ensure Russian military security, NSC (2000) set forth the importance to” possess nuclear forces that are capable to guarantee to inflict the desired damage”, an “effective collaboration” with CIS-member states, and the need “to have a military presence in strategically important regions”.  

Overall, NSC (2000) puts a lot of emphasis on the traditional threats to the Russian security and the measures on how to address them effectively. By perceiving international threats such as unilateralism by the United States/ NATO and the fear of states aiming at diminishing Russian power in the international community as the most important threats to the Russian security, NSC (2000) demonstrated that around the year 2000 the Russian government was still under the influence of realistic thinking. For example, the NSC (2000) covers two pages on the question which measures the Russian authorities should undertake to tackle the foreign threat to the Russian security. In comparison, the NSC (2000) covers half a page on the question which measures the Russian authorities should undertake to solve the national threats to the Russian stability such as the economic and criminal problematic.

Regarding the Chechen problematic and terrorism, the NSC (2000) does not mention how these issues could be solved by the Russian authorities. It merely states that transnational terrorism is a threat to the world stability and that the Russian authorities should collaborate on an international level to fight international terrorism. A very surprising observation when one bears in mind that in 2000, the second Chechen campaign was at its prime and the Moscow apartment bombings were already carried out in 1999. Perhaps this was the result of Russian policy, or choice, not to perceive Chechen separatism and terrorism as a legitimate threat to the Russian security but instead an inferior problematic the Russian authorities had to deal with.

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155 Ibid, pp. 4.  
156 Ibid, pp. 6.  
159 Ibid, pp. 7.  
159 Ibid, pp. 8.
5.3.2 Nord-Ost theatre hostage taking

By many, the hostage taking of Nord-Ost theatre in October 2002 in Moscow was perceived as the Russian version of the attacks of 11 September 2001. During the dramatic storming of the theatre, many people were killed by the Russian forces. The dramatic unfolding of the hostage taking and the public criticism of the conduct by the Russian authorities, were an important setback for the Russian authorities, and especially Putin. As a result, on 29 October 2002, Putin instructed his ministers - officially - to draft a revision of NSC (2000) and other legal documents covering the issue of terrorism.

As mentioned in Chapter 5.2.2., the first proposal suggested that the revised NSC should include a greater “intensification of the involvement of the armed forces of the Russian Federation” in the fight against terrorism. The second proposal suggested that a clearer assessment should be made of the national security threats and a plan to address them effectively. The third proposal suggested that the Russian Federation should be made ready to act against terrorists and their sponsors abroad. As for the fourth proposal, it was suggested by other politicians that a single security organ should be developed that would be “in command of the anti-terror policy” and “would lead all the security organs involved” in the fight against terrorism.160 In short, the revised NSC should include a greater emphasis on the internal threats in comparison to NSC (2000), most importantly the threat stemming from terrorism. As well as the conviction that the power struggle among security organs should make room for a single command by an umbrella agency.161

The proposed adjustments to NSC (2000) were all part of an overall proposal by Putin to revise the main legal documents regarding terrorism and the anti-terror policy. And although the proposed revisions were already included in NSC (2000), their official recall by Putin meant that they had to be seriously “stepped up”, according to De Haas.162

It may be evident that the first and fourth revisions, wherein it is emphasized to intensify the involvement of Russian armed forces in the fight against terrorism c.q. the establishment of a single organ in command of an anti-terror operation, are the direct result of the Nord-Ost hostage taking. During the anti-terrorist operation in Nord-Ost various responsible agencies acted separately and incoherently, resulting in much criticism and the opinion that in future this could be prevented by establishing a single organ commanding such anti-terrorist operations. The involvement of the military forces of “spetznas” during the anti-terror operation in Nord-Ost with no legal ground to do so, has also led to criticism and the perception that a specific regulation should be developed on this issue.

The same may be said regarding the second proposed revision, to make a clear assessment of national threats to the Russian security. It may have been the result of the rising concerns regarding terrorism as a threat stemming from Russia itself, which by that time was already parallelized with transnational terrorism and the “global war on terror”. With the public outrage, the Russian authorities were no longer allowed to perceive terrorism as a second place threat to the Russian national security. It was forced to revisit and rethink the traditional political thinking, as to please the public outcry for change in for a more effective anti-terror policy.

As for the third proposal to make Russia ready to act outside its territory, one could state that it was the (in)direct result of the attacks of 9/11 and the “global war on terror”. Although a lot already has been said in the previous Chapter for and against this assumption, the conclusion stays the same,

162 De Haas (2005b), pp. 11.
namely that the inclusion of the third adjustment is very much in line with the events following the attacks of 9/11 and the Russian position on this matter.

However, none of these proposals were ever realized. The NSC (2000) stayed in force, unrevised, even after the new world order came upon and the Nord-Ost hostage taking had taken place. Eventually, it would take the Beslan hostage taking and a public outcry before a revision of NSC (2000) would be realized.

5.3.3 Beslan hostage taking

Prior to the Beslan hostage taking in September 2004, bombs exploded in a Moscow metro station and on board of two Russian airliners. After the Beslan hostage taking, the response of the Russian authorities was the same as after the Nord-Ost hostage taking: the anti-terror legislation and other documentation would be revised, and attacks would be carried out on terrorists abroad. Putin ordered the creation of the Southern Federal District that would “coordinate the anti-terror activities of all security agencies” dealing with the threat of terrorism.163

On 29 October 2002 Putin instructed his ministers to revise the original NSC (2000) and on 29 September 2004, it was decided by the Russian officials that NSC (2000) would be reviewed “in the light of the war against international terrorism”. It was noted among others that NSC (2000) did not represent the new world order properly since NSC (2000) was adopted prior to the attacks of 9/11.164

It was observed by De Haas that during these statements regarding the revision of NSC (2000) in 2004, it was not mentioned by the Russian officials that already in 2002 Putin had ordered to revise NSC (2000).165 One may assume therefore that the proclamations of Putin in 2002 were purely rhetorically, for no revision as such was conducted. Here, the ambivalent nature of the Russian policy becomes apparent: in the international arena Putin was rhetorically proclaiming to be waging a war against transnational terrorism on Chechen soil and willing to ally with the Western states to conduct an effective battle against (transnational) terrorism on the hands of which Russia was also suffering. In reality the Russian authorities neglected to modify the security documents in 2002 and to elevate the primacy of the fight against (transnational) terrorism on their national agenda, let alone to revise the primacy of international threat in the form of American unilaterism and put more emphasis on the internal destabilizing threats. This was done only after the Beslan hostage taking in 2004, when the Russian authorities had no option left than to modify the security documents and to demonstrate to the public that they did regard terrorism to be a serious threat to the Russian security. On 1 February 2005, the Russian official Ivanov, at that time Ivanov was the Russian foreign minister, recalled that the revised NSC would put more emphasis on the internal problematic threatening the security of the Russian Federation, since the Beslan hostage taking demonstrated the existing legislation was not sufficient.166

On the basis of the statements made by Ivanov one could assume that the attacks of 9/11, and the “global war on terror” had a direct implication on the plans to revise NSC (2000); however, although Ivanov did mention the attacks of 9/11, and the consequent change in world politics as an important event that had to be included in a new revised NSC(2000), both proposed revisions in 2002 and 2004 were the direct consequence of the hostage takings in Nord-Ost and Beslan. It were the hostage

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163 De Haas (2005b), pp. 11.
164 De Haas (2005a), pp. 29.
166 De Haas (2005a), pp. 29.
takings of the Nord-Ost theatre and Beslan which resulted in the official proclamations by the Russian
President and other officials to revise the legal documents on the fight against terror—a trigger: and not
the attacks of 9/11 or the “global war on terror”. The attacks of 9/11, the “global war on terror” and
the weakened position of the U.S. in the wake of the invasion of Iraq, the expansion of EU and NATO,
the war on South Ossetia in 2008— if anything - all had indirectly affected the Russian position in the
international arena, therefore the NSC(2000) had to be adapted. In 2004, preparations to do so began.
However, not much was done to NSC(2000) due to the existing resistance by different opposing
ministries. The work on NSC(2000) was resumed by Medvedev in 2008.167

5.3.4 National Security Strategy
Finally, on 12 May 2009 a new National Security Strategy (hereafter: NSS)168 was adopted by
President Medvedev. NSS (2009) set out the Russian national strategy regarding the security matters
until the year 2020. Just like the NSC of 1997 and 2000, the NSS outlines the current threats to Russian
security and Russia’s security priorities. NSS (2009) is a very vague and contradictory document that is
a continuity of the previously set out strategies; at the same time NSS (2009) does include some new
elements. Yet, it seems that neither the attacks of 9/11 nor the changes in the collective security
system or the “global war on terror” can be detected in NSS (2009).

The NSS (2009) perceives the following trends and events as dangerous to the Russian national
security:
- According to NSS (2009) the threat to the international security rises from globalization and
interdependence and the consequent rise of new economic growth centers and political
influences; a new geopolitical situation. As such there is a trend to solve problems by seeking
solutions “on a regional basis, without the participation of non-regional powers”. There is an
increased orientation towards NATO, the occurrence of one-sided use of force in international
relations, “the threat of proliferation of WMA and their use by terrorists”;169
- The threat to national security in the form of national defense/the military security exists
among others out of the “policies of leading foreign countries which are directed to achieve
superiority in the military sphere”, the “development of high technology means to conduct an
armed warfare” and the “departure from agreements on arms limitations”;170
- The threats to the national security of the state and public security exist out of among others
the investigation by foreign special services directed against the Russian security (espionage),
“the activity of terrorist organizations directed against the Russian constitution”, the
activity of nationalist, religious etc. groups directed to harm the Russian national unity
and “the activity of transnational criminal organizations”;171
- The threat to the national security in the form of a threat to the quality of life of the Russian
citizens such as a financial crisis and “competition over raw materials”;172
- The threat to the national security in the sphere of economy, such as “loss of control over
national resources”, “unequal development of regions,” corruption etc;173

168 National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation to 2020, approved by decree of the President, 12 May,
2009, no. 537, on: http://rustrans.wikidot.com
169 Ibid, pp. 3.
170 Ibid, pp. 7.
172 Ibid, pp. 11.
- The threat to the national security in the sphere of science and technology, such as “dependence on imported” technology and low development of innovation on Russian soil;\textsuperscript{174}
- The threat to the national security in the sphere of healthcare, is among others the “low effectiveness of the medical insurance system and the low quality of healthcare specialists”;\textsuperscript{175}
- The threat to the national security in the sphere of culture, such as “unlawful infringement of cultural objects” or the propaganda of racial intolerance;\textsuperscript{176}

The NSS (2009) presents the following measures the Russian authorities will try to realize, to protect the Russian security against the abovementioned national and international threats:
- To counterbalance the threat to international security, the Russian authorities shall among others execute foreign policy including a “new arms race”. It will “increase its interaction” with among others China, India and Brazil, a “multilateral cooperation” with CIS countries, “strengthen the cooperation with the European Union”, develop relations with NATO and “build a partnership with the United States on basis of shared interests”.\textsuperscript{177} The NSS (2009) puts an emphasis on the circumstance that the international system had “transitioned from opposing blocs to the principles” of multilateral relations;\textsuperscript{178}
- To improve national defense the Russian authorities shall develop among others a “system of military-patriotic education of Russian citizens”, “improve the military organization and defense potential”, develop “a new profile for the Armed Forces” and “improve the combat training”;\textsuperscript{179}
- To protect the Russian national security in the sphere of state and public security the Russian authorities shall among others “reinforce the role of state as a guarantor of the security of individuals”, increase of the effectiveness of “law-enforcement organs”, the “improvement of regulation against criminality, terrorism and corruption”. It will also develop “a single state system for the prevention of criminality and other acts”;\textsuperscript{180}
- To improve the quality of life of the Russian citizens, the NSS (2009) among others proposes to “reduce crime, corruption and drug addiction”. It shall try to develop “a socio-political stability”, improve the human rights protection and the “accessibility for medication”;\textsuperscript{181}
- To improve the economy, the Russian authorities shall enhance the structures of import and export, develop “a national system of innovation” and enhance the economic growth of the Russian Federation;\textsuperscript{182}
- To improve the development of science and technology, the Russian authorities shall among others “develop scientific-technical organizations”, enhance the “level of education” of the population, “create a network of federal universities that would ensure the training of specialists to work in science and education” and develop the “participation of Russian scientific educational organizations in global research projects”;\textsuperscript{183}
- To improve the healthcare, the Russian authorities shall ensure the effectiveness of state regulation “by standardizing, licensing, and certifying the medical services”. By “formulating
the national programs for the treatment of socially significant diseases’, and by “developing uniform approaches to diagnosis treatment and the rehabilitation of patients”;

- To counteract the threats to Russian cultural interest, the Russian authorities shall “enhance the state regulation intended to support and develop national culture” and develop the “international and interregional cultural” relations;

Further, the NSS (2009) states that in order to realize a strategic stability, the Russian authorities should develop an active foreign policy and seek agreements, common interests, and partnerships with other states. More importantly, the Russian authorities should achieve this stability by bilateral/multilateral agreements on the reduction of arms, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and other WMA. Just like NSC (1997) and NSC (2000), NSS(2009) puts a greater focus on external threats instead of the internal ones. It still perceives the American unilaterism, NATO’s expansionism and other countries’ foreign policy to achieve military supremacy, as the most important threat to Russian national security. NSS (2009) does propose a greater cooperation with NATO and the United States; however, cooperation with NATO and the United States must be based on equality and shared interests. Quite ambivalent, since on the one hand American and NATO actions are threatening Russian security, but on the other hand to limited cooperation with the same state and organization is proposed. In NSC (2000) such cooperation was not mentioned. Therefore, one may conclude that the proposal in NSS (2009) is derived from the cooperation under the collective security system following the attacks of 9/11. As for the precondition of a shared interest, I have already mentioned in Chapter 4 that I believe that after the invasion of Iraq the interests of the United States and Russia were incompatible, leading to the inability to cooperate under the collective security system. The fact that NSS (2009) preconditions the presence of a shared interest to cooperate with the United States, reemphasizes my perception.

More importantly, in contrast to NSC (2000), NSS (2009) puts a greater emphasis on tackling national issues such as the poor healthcare of the Russian population, the possible risks to the Russian economy, culture, science and technology and the security of state and public. However, it is more than surprising to determine that in contrast to what has been stated by the Russian officials regarding the revision of NSC (2000) in the light of the Nord-Ost, Beslan hostage taking and the attacks of 9/11, the revised NSS (2009) does not put any emphasis on tackling the problematic surrounding the terrorist attacks carried out on the Russian soil, the transnational terrorism, “global war on terror” or the cooperation to fight international terrorism. The only time the NSS (2009) does mention terrorism and international cooperation it refers to it very swiftly; it refers to terrorism as one of the many threats to the state and public security and proposes to resolve it by reinforcing the role of the state, the law and regulations handling this problem. Furthermore, the NSS (2009) does not propose any specific solutions to solve the problem of terrorism (here we may think about tackling the root causes in economic, political and social spheres that may compel people or groups to commit acts of terror), it simply proposes for very abstract and broad (read: superficial) solutions without any further explanation on how and by whom the solutions will be carried out. A very surprising statement when one realizes that it were the Nord-Ost and Beslan hostage takings which directly prompted the revision of NSC (2000). As for 9/11, no mentioning as such is made of these events in NSS (2009). Therefore, once again the ambivalent nature of the Russian policy is apparent; on the one hand referring to events

184Ibid, pp. 15-16.
185Ibid, pp. 16.
186Ibid, pp. 18.
and stating that these events have prompted the authorities to revise certain documents, and on the other hand no revision as such of these documents became apparent.

When referring to cooperation with other states NSS (2009) does not do this in the light of transnational terrorism but as a means to counterbalance the international threat to Russia’s security and to enhance the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Moreover, it says nothing on the Chechen problematic and other North-Caucasus Republics, the insurgencies occurring there or the measures, which the Russian authorities has to undertake to counteract this threat to the Russian national security. Here again, the ambivalent nature of the Russian policy is apparent: the rhetorical statements of change are not realized in practice.

It is apparent that NSS(2009) follows the traditional Russian perception of world politics. For example, NSS states that Russia is mainly concerned by the dangers posed by the unilateral actions of foreign states and NATO’s expansionism. It strives to transform Russia into a world leader regarding the global affairs. To counterbalance the international and national threats, NSS (2009) emphasizes the need to intensify the ties with CIS states, to increase Russia’s military power and the cooperation with emerging super powers China, Brazil and India.

Conclusively, the following may be remarked regarding the revised NSS (2009). First of all, in the area of socio-economic development, NSS (2009) puts a stronger emphasis on the threat in the field of economy, healthcare, culture, state and public security and enhancing these security fields by improving the quality of life of Russian citizen and by reducing their social and economic inequality. Although such elements had already been mentioned in the previous NSC (2000), in contrast to that, the NSS (2009) covers this issue more extensively. It puts much more emphasis on the question how the socio-economic problematic could be resolved, thereby elevating the socio-economic problematic to a higher priority. This is very much in line with the previous statement made by Ivanov, that the new NSC should put more emphasis on socio-economic development. Unfortunately, the socio-economic development is not linked to the fight against terrorism but to the protection of Russia’s national security in that field and to regain the super power position in the international community. Thereby the Russian authorities fail to recognize the importance of the link between terrorism and the socio-economic problematic.

Secondly, although in 2002 and 2004 Putin and Ivanov declared that the legislation would put more emphasis on the fight against terrorism, due to the hostage takings in 2002 and 2004 and a new world order following the attacks of 9/11, in reality the NSS(2009) does not allocate such primacy to the threat of terrorism. The threat posed by foreign intelligence services occupies the first place position regarding the threats of a non-military nature, even more than terrorism, radicalism, separatism, xenophobia etc. Just like the previous concepts, the threat of terrorism to the Russian security has a second place importance; neither NSC(2000) nor NSS(2009) puts the same emphasis on transnational terrorism. It is contradictory with the rhetoric of Russian authorities in the aftermath of the attacks of 9/11, wherein the fight against transnational terrorism was recognized as Russia’s own fight against terrorism. This makes one again wonder whether the rhetoric was in reality just a rhetoric to legalize certain actions in Chechnya and the Northern Caucasus, instead of actual Russian policy in that matter, as nothing in NSS(2009) demonstrated that this was the case.

Thirdly, just like the previous security documents, NSS(2009) follows the traditional realist thinking regarding international relations. However, in contrast to NSC (2000), the NSS(2009) is more diplomatic and less confrontational. NSS(2009) believes in the threat of a confrontation between Russia and the West and is very ambivalent on this subject. It still perceives US supremacy and
NATO’s enlargement as important threats to Russia’s security interest and seeks to counterbalance this threat through multilateral cooperation. It also perceives the strengthening of state apparatus and the military forces as an important measure to ensure the Russian national security. This is very much in line with the Russian foreign policy after the invasion of Iraq: prior to the invasion of Iraq, the Russian authorities were more than willing to cooperate with the Western states as part of their new foreign policy direction. After the invasion of Iraq, the Russian authorities started to seek multipolarity as a means to counterbalance American unilaterism. This is very much in line with Russia’s goal number one: to once again become a super power at the international level.

Lastly, despite their fears for NATO’s expansion and American unilaterism, Russia remains open to cooperation with the United States and NATO but would at the same time prefer a military and security alliance that would manage operations under the UN Security Council or the OSCE.187 As for the relationship with the United States, NSC (2000) considered the United States as a power that aims for supremacy through unilateral military action. In NSS (2009) Russian authorities try to promote a better relationship with the U.S. administration. However they do condition it to the presence of a shared interest and on the terms of an equal partnership. At the same time “the American military potential and missile defense system developments, are considered to be a threat to the Russian national security.”188 As a consequence, Russia sets out in the NSS (2009) a determination to seek a multipolar international system, based on the cooperation with China and India, which would strengthen Russia’s influence. Therefore, strategic cooperation with China and India – the upcoming superpowers - is more important, especially in the effort to establish a counterbalance to the American unipolarity in the form of a multipolar system. This very much reflects the Russian foreign policy in the aftermath of terrorist attacks and after the invasion of Iraq in 2003. All with the aim to strengthen Russian influence in the international political arena.

All in all the most important goal of the Russian authorities did not change over time and since NSC 2000 – namely, to strengthen Russian position as a great world power.

5.4 Conclusion

The Russian national anti-terror policy is based on two separate legal documents, the legal pillar in form of the Federal Law (2006) and the National Security Strategy (2009). Both documents have been modified over time, to make the fight against terrorism in the Russian Federation more effective. They have been used by the Russian authorities as a legal justification ground for the anti-terrorist operation in the separatist Chechen Republic.

The Federal Law does not only define terrorism according to the Russian standards, but it also sets out the organizational and legal regimes of the anti-terrorist operations. In contrast to the Federal Law, the National Security Concept and the National Security Strategy are concepts that describe the governmental views on the national and international threats to the Russian security. At the same time they propose certain measures to tackle these issues and protect the Russian national interest against the national and international threats. Following the evolvement of terrorism on Russian and foreign soil the Federal Law (1998) was revised in 2006 and the NSC (2000) in 2009. Eventually, it would take

188 Ibid., pp. 4-5.
a long time before the rhetorical promises of revision, in 2002 and 2004, would be executed in reality, in 2006 and 2009.

The revisions were the direct result of the Nord-Ost (2002) and Beslan (2004) hostage takings and an indirect result of the development of the international terrorism. After the Nord-Ost hostage takings, Putin stated that the legal system regarding terrorism lacked a normative basis for an effective fight against terrorism and the revision of the concerning legal pillars was necessary. Among others it was proposed by Putin to include in the Federal Law (1998) the readiness of the Russian forces to fight terrorism in foreign countries and a greater involvement of the Russian military forces in the fight against terrorism. The proposed inclusions could be attributed to the emerged new world order following the attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent international cooperation against transnational terrorism. On the other hand, it could be claimed that the proposed revisions were a means for the Russian authorities to demonstrate that they also were suffering from transnational terrorism, who among others were operating in the separatist Chechen Republic. It is not evident which argumentation was underlying to the proposed revisions. After the Beslan hostage taking, Putin once again proclaimed that it was necessary to revise the legislation concerning the fight against terrorism. In practice the proposed revisions would not be executed directly; eventually, it would be 2006 and the public outcry, which would push the Russian government to revise the Federal Law in 2006.

The newly included Article 7 mentions terrorist attacks carried out by airplanes, Article 10 allows the concerning authorities to fight terrorist act outside the territory of the Russian Federation, Article 6 puts an emphasis at employing the Russian military forces in the fight against terrorism and Articles 11-17 provide for more specific regulations regarding the anti-terrorist operations. Both Articles 7 and 10 may be the result of the attacks of 9/11 and the “global war on terror”. However, this has not been mentioned by the Russian authorities explicitly. In reality, the revised Federal Law (2006) was the direct consequence of the terrorist attacks on the Russian soil and the public outcry for a change. The content of the Federal Law (2006) does not demonstrate any far reaching changes in comparison to the original Federal Law (1998). The Federal Law (2006) provides for a legal basis to employ the military forces in the fight against terrorism, and this was necessary since they were already employing the military forces during the anti-terrorist operation in the Chechen Republic without a legal basis. As for the Federal Law (2006) in general; the new inclusions and revisions were only realized to enhance and enlarge the mandate of the Russian agencies fighting terrorism. This is evident when one reviews the regulations regarding the anti-terrorist operations; they do not mention any limitations and are very broad in content.

The NSC(1997 & 2000) and the NSS (2009) underwent the same revisions as a result of the developments of terrorism on Russian soil. After the commencement of the second Chechen campaign in 1999, in 2000 the NSC (1997) was revised by Putin. The revisions did not reflect the Russian national turmoil, since the NSC (2000) focused much of its concentration on external threats stemming from the US dominance in the international system and NATO’s expansion instead of concentrating on internal threats of separatism, nationalism and terrorism to the Russian national security. For the most part, the NSC (2000) reflected the Russian traditional perceptions of the international system, the threats to the Russian security and the means to eliminate them.

After the Nord-Ost hostage taking in 2002, Putin instructed his ministers to revise the NSC (2000) with the following adaptations, among others to intensify the involvement of the armed forces to fight terrorism, to make a greater assessment of the national threat and make Russia ready to act against terrorism abroad. Although most of the proposed revisions were the direct result of Nord-Ost hostage taking, the inclusion of the Russian fight against terrorism abroad may have been the result of the
attacks of 9/11 and the international cooperation in the light of the “global war on terror”. In reality, the proposed revisions were already included in the NSC (2000), but Putin’s recalling meant that they had to be stepped up by the authorities and elevated to a higher level of importance. However, following the Nord-Ost hostage taking and the attacks of 9/11, no actual revisions were made to the NSC (2000).

After the Beslan hostage taking in 2004, Putin made the same kinds of proclamations as after the Nord-Ost hostage taking. The public outrage over the conduct of the Russian authorities during the Beslan hostage taking pushed Putin to proclaim revisions concerning the legal document on terrorism, and more specifically to propose the creation of a single Southern Federal District coordinating the anti-terrorist operations and a mandate to fight terrorists abroad. According to Ivanov, the revision of NSC (2000) was also necessary since it did not reflect the new reality of the international community following the attacks of 9/11.

Eventually, it was Medvedev and the year 2009 when the NSC (2000) was revised. Nevertheless, no drastic change as such was detectable in revised NSS (2009). In line with the NSS (1998 and 2000), the NSS (2009) focuses its main attention on traditional external threats such as the dominance of the United States, NATO’s expansion and the policy of other countries to attain supremacy in the international community. In the same manner, NSS (2009) proposes realistic measures to counterbalance these international threats to the Russian security, such as cooperation with China, India, Brazil, EU and CIS countries, as well as a greater emphasis on strengthening the military power. Although the NSS (2009) does mention cooperation with the United States and NATO to improve Russian security, the proposed cooperation is very limited and has to fulfill certain conditions (equality and shared interest) if it is going to take place.

The NSS’ greater focus on the internal threats such as poor healthcare, financial crisis, threat to the state and public security is a positive development when compared to NSC (2000). However, the focus is so limited and the proposed solutions are so imprecise and vague, that the positive development is diminished into a non-development. And since no mentioning is made regarding the problematic in Northern Caucasus (Chechnya and Ingushetia) nor regarding (transnational) terrorism, it remains very speculative in how far the NSS (2009) represent the Russian reality.

One could argue that the transformation of NSC (2000) into NSS (2009) has been reflective of the ambivalent nature of the Russian foreign policy; on one hand revisions were proclaimed by Putin and Ivanov due to changes in the national and international terrorist conduct, but on the other hand in practice the revisions did not include any changes – the revised documents were merely a reflection of the Russian traditional positioning in the international system.

To finally answer the sub question, “Did the attacks of 11 September and the global war on terror affect the domestic aspect of the Russian anti-terror policy?” I may conclude that it remains very speculative whether the attacks of 9/11 and the “global war on terror” have entailed any influence on the Russian national anti-terror policy. While after the Beslan hostage taking in 2004 Ivanov did mention the importance to revise the NSC (2000) due to the global war on terror, it would be under Medvedev and in the year 2009 before the NSC (2000) would be revised into the NSS (2009), merely five years after the statement of Ivanov. If anything, the decision on the side of the Russian authorities to revise the NSC (2000) was the result of the public outrage following the Nord-Ost and Beslan hostage takings.
The revised NSS (2009) did not include any drastic changes compared to NSC (2000). For the greatest part, the focus of NSS remained on traditional external threats instead of the internal ones. Moreover, no specific references were made relating to the threat of (transnational) terrorism, the “global war on terror” and the cooperation under the collective security system. Although NSS (2009) does mention collaboration with the United States and NATO very swiftly, the proposed collaboration is limited to specific conditions and is concentrated on the proliferation of WMA, therefore it remains very speculative whether this was done in the light of the “global war on terror” or merely to strengthen the ties in sake of the Russian security.

It must therefore be concluded that the revised NSC (2009) has been the direct result of the Nost-Ost and Beslan hostage takings and not 9/11, the “global war on terror” or the cooperation under the collective security system. The same applies for the Federal Law (2006). While one may argue that for example the additions of Article 10 (mandate to the Russian armed forces to fight terrorist acts abroad) and Article 7 (terrorist attacks carried out by airplanes) may be attributed to the “global war on terror”, this argumentation remains speculative since no such mentioning has been done by the Russian authorities. In general, the additions of the Federal Law (2006) were the result of the Nord-Ost and Beslan hostage taking – since these events were taken up by the Russian authorities as the main reason to revise the Federal Law (1998).

Overall, both the Federal Law, the National Security Concept and National Security Strategy have been the basis for the Russian national anti-terror policy. Especially the Federal Law which has been exploited by the Russian authorities as a legal justification ground in their anti-terrorist operation in the Chechen republic as part of the second Chechen campaign after 1999.

The following and final Chapter shall draw a conclusion on the basis of the acquired findings, and answer the main question of this thesis, namely “Did an actual change occur in the Russian anti-terrorism policy after the attacks of 11 September 2001, in the light of the “global war on terror” and the “new” collective security system?”
6 Conclusion

The world changed after the attacks of 11 September 2001, not just the international community. The attacks had a far-reaching impact on all the aspects of the global community; it created a gap between different nations and believes, it led to invasions and wars and most of all, it led to important developments in the international arena.

First of all, a new concept made its entrance in international politics. Although not new in terminology, for the first time the international community perceived transnational terrorism to be a threat to the global society. This change in international politics and the international community became evident when George W. Bush unilaterally proclaimed the dawn of a new era, a new enemy in the form of transnational terrorism and the commencement of a “global war on terror”. The shift in the international political system was of great magnitude: no longer were states perceived as great threat to the global security, but an entity that had evolved itself into an organized, transnational organization backed by a fanatical ideology and capable to acquire weapons of mass destruction. As a war against terrorism was proclaimed by Bush, it did not take long for allies to rise, and to join the battle, perceived by many as the West c.q. “civilization” against international terrorists c.q. “barbarians”.

6.1 The parallelization of international terrorism with Chechen separatism

At the backdrop of these events, a war was waging in the Russian Republic of Chechnya – a second Chechen campaign, which by 1999 was declared by Putin to be an anti-terror operation. The accompanying human rights violations were a thorn in the eye of the international community, as well as for Putin. Human rights organizations and political leaders held Putin accountable for the brutal and blood shedding anti-terror campaign in the Republic of Chechnya, and by 2000 the opposition among the Russian population against the governmental policy in Chechnya grew to almost 50%. All looked grim for Putin who had been voted to power due to his promise to find the proper solution for the Chechen problematic. The attacks of 11 September 2001 and the “global war on terror” were an escape route for the Russian authorities to justify their brutal second campaign before the national and international public. As demonstrated in Chapter 3, the rhetorical parallelization of international terrorism with Chechen separatism or the so-called “internationalization” of the Chechen conflict was a very effective strategy of the Russian authorities: it offered the Russian government a free hand of conduct against the Chechen problematic, or as the Russian authorities would refer, “the Russian struggle against transnational terrorism”. By employing symbols, metaphors and official narratives as a means to connect international terrorism to Chechen separatism, Russian authorities tried to demonstrate that Chechen separatism was not a legitimate struggle for independence but simply a branch of international terrorism against which the Russian authorities were waging a war on their own, just like the international community was collectively waging a war against international terrorism. The parallelization and internationalization of the Chechen conflict would turn out to be a very effective tool for the Russian authorities, for it would not take long before the international community would acknowledge the Russian fight in Chechnya to be part of the global war against international terrorism.
6.2 The international coalition against international terrorism (global war on terror)

At the same time, the attacks of 9/11 had a great impact on the collective security system, or so it was believed. The collective security system has been developed with the aim to on one hand establish an international regime that sees upon that the participating states comply with the prohibition of aggression among each other, and on the other hand to abolish war as an instrument of national and international policy. The collective security system is a liberal response to the discipline of realism, wherein self-interest and self-preservation in an anarchic world outweighs the global interests of peace, security and prospect. The commencement of the Second World War, the “status quo” during the Cold War and the various inter and intrastate wars were by many perceived as a sign that the collective security system was a utopian ideal, unable to sustain in the realist world.

The attacks of 9/11, the “global war on terror” and the established international coalition between different nation states to fight transnational terrorism, demonstrated that not all was lost for the collective security system ideal. Even Russia was willing to join the international coalition, led by the United States, to fight transnational terrorism. As demonstrated in Chapter 4, the Russo-American collaboration went even so far as to allow the United States and NATO to use the Russian “territory of interest”, to enable the Western forces to conduct airstrikes on Afghan territory. The Western-oriented foreign policy of the Russian government was a great surprise for the international public. Already prior to the attacks of 9/11, the Russian authorities tried to set about their foreign policy into the Western direction. However, their effort was not fruitful since they were not taken serious by the Western states. When Putin came to power, one of his political agenda points was to enforce the relations with the Western states and to realize the Western orientation of Russian foreign policy. The logic behind these aspirations was the perception that by doing so the Russian Federation would be able to regain its former political power in the international system, if it would be able to present itself as an equal to Western states. Therefore, the attacks of 9/11 and the international collaboration were an opportunity for Putin to once again demonstrate that Russia was a superpower to be reckoned with, that it could stand on the same pedestal as the Western c.q. democratic states, and that Russia did matter for the wellbeing of the international system. On the other hand, the international collaboration against transnational terrorism and the simultaneous parallelization of Chechen separatism with international terrorism, could give the Russian authorities a free hand in their anti-terror operation in Chechnya.

On the surface the international coalition against international system looked very promising. It was a new starting point of the newly revived collective security system. Finally, the liberal ideals of global peace, democracy and prosperity were no longer perceived to be utopian, as the international coalition against international terrorism had demonstrated. Under the leadership of the United States, countries such as the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Russia were collaborating under the international coalition in the sake of international peace and security. And although in general the international coalition fighting international terrorism could be explained from the collective security system point of view, it were not the liberal ideals of global security, democracy and peace that drove the Russian authorities to cooperate with the Western states. It were the characteristics of realism such as self-interest, self-preservation and political power that were the breaking point for the Russian authorities to collaborate with the United States and its allies against international terrorism. Therefore, the Russian participation in the international coalition cannot be explained properly by liberal theory of collective security system since the Russian participation was not driven by the characteristic elements of the collective security system. Rather it was driven by the traditional perceptions of Realpolitik.
It did not take long for the international coalition and more specifically the Russo-American collaboration, to crumble down. For the Russian authorities the war in Iraq was another demonstration of American unilaterism. Moreover, it seemed that the American government did not take the Russian participation serious, since the Russo-American collaboration was limited to a selective cooperation, no concessions were made by the United States on NATO’s expansion and the many of the Russo-American agreements were not realized on the American side.

As a reaction to the growing American unilaterism, the inability of the Russian authorities to transform their country into a political superpower through international collaboration and Western oriented foreign policy, the pressure from the traditional political elite – all resulted in a drastic change in the Russian foreign policy; the U-turn from the Western orientation and international collaboration into multilateral cooperation with the upcoming superpowers such as China, India and evil regimes such as Iran, to counterbalance the American unilaterism and NATO’s expansion.

In my opinion the Russian ambivalent foreign policy may be explained if one applies the theory of Robert O. Keohane, which theorizes that a state may be willing to cooperate with another state when an interest to do so is present. In such circumstances, and in contrast to the liberal perspective, such cooperation can even take place in Realpolitik, as long as the mutual interest to cooperate is present. The Russian example demonstrates that such an interest does not necessarily has to revolve around the liberal ideals of global peace and security, and may even stem from traditional realist perspectives such as self-interest and self-preservation. Thus, the liberal ideals of global peace and security do not necessarily have to be a precondition for cooperation between states to take place. In the same manner, once the motive behind the cooperation has changed so may the interest to cooperate. Just like Keohane theorizes, the Russian interest to cooperate faded away since the Russian authorities were unable to regain political power through participation in the international coalition and it became evident that the United States would continue their unilaterism, the Russian authorities defected from the cooperation and turned to other means to achieve their goal political power.

One may conclude that that the proclamation of the global war on terror and the consequent international coalition were exploited by the Russian authorities to realize their own political agenda. On the one hand the Russian authorities employed official narratives in combination with the global war on terror, to change the public’s perception regarding the war in Chechnya by dehumanizing and internationalizing the Chechen separatism to the level of international terrorism. On the other hand, the Russian authorities used the international coalition under the collective security system as an instrument to demonstrate their Western oriented foreign policy – a strategy applied to regain political power, importance and prestige in the international system. This strategy became even more evident, when the Russian authorities changed their foreign policy into a multilateral collaboration once it became evident that the realization of their political agenda would not be possible through international cooperation.
6.3 The national anti-terror policy

Although the attacks of 11 September 2001 and the “global war on terror” were exploited by the Russian authorities to fulfill their own political agenda, neither the attacks of 9/11 nor the consequent “global war on terror” had a direct effect on the Federal Law or the NSS (later NSC) as such.

Chapter 5 has demonstrated that although it may be speculated that the inclusion of Articles 6, 7 or 10 of the Federal Law was an indirect result of the abovementioned events, specifically Article 7 (terrorist attacks by airplanes) and Article 10 (terrorist activities outside the Russian Federation), the fact that this was never acknowledged by the Russian authorities, that Russia had suffered also on the hands of airplane attacks and Putin had made a comparison between international terrorism and Chechen separatism already prior to the attacks, may refute this speculation. In reality, the revised Federal Law (2006) was the result of the terrorist attacks on Russian soil in Nord-Ost (2002) and Beslan (2004). In comparison to the Federal Law (1998), the Federal Law (2006) provides for a legal basis to employ military forces in the fights against (transnational) terrorism and new specific inclusions regarding the anti-terror operations.

Just like the Russian foreign security policy, the National Security Concept (NSC) and National Security Strategy (NSS) are of an ambivalent nature. The in NSC (2000) and NSS (2009) do mention collaboration with China and India to develop a multipolar power to counterbalance American unilaterism, the dissatisfaction with NATO’s expansion and the emphasis on a more intense collaboration with CIS member states, are very much in contradiction with the rhetorical declarations made by the Russian authorities after the attacks of 9/11 - the declarations of cooperation and alignment with the West in the fight against terrorism – and in compliance with the drastic change of Russian foreign policy after the invasion of Iraq in 2003, all in the light of Russian traditional thinking.

In the wake of the attacks of 9/11 and the Nord-Ost and Beslan hostage takings the Russian officials proposed to revise NSC (2000); it was proposed among others to create a single unit in charge of the anti-terrorist operations, to include a higher awareness for the internal security threat and to provide the Russian military forces with a mandate to fight terrorism abroad. However, the content of NSS (2009) has once again demonstrated the ambivalent nature of the Russian policy. The NSS (2009) does not mention (transnational) terrorism nor does it mention cooperation with Western states under the collective security system. Although NSS (2009) does put a greater focus on internal issues, the covering is very limited and does not say anything on Chechen and Northern Caucasus problematic or terrorism – issues of destabilizing nature to the Russian security. Moreover, very much in line with NSC (2000), NSS (2009) does not leave the Russian traditional threat perception. It may therefore be concluded that because the NSS (2009) does not include any references to the international terrorism or cooperation under collective security system, and because NSC (2000) had been revised in 2009 (8 years after 9/11), that the revision has been the direct result of the Beslan hostage taking and the consequent public outcry for change rather than the attacks of 9/11 or the “global war on terror”.

All in all, one may conclude that the revisions of the Federal Law (2006) and National Security Strategy (2009) were the direct result of the terrorist attacks on Russian soil, namely the Nord-Ost (2002) and Beslan (2004) hostage takings. And while one may wonder whether the attacks of 9/11 and the “global war on terror” may have had an effect on the Federal Law (Articles 7 and 10) and the NSS (2009) (the declarations made by Ivanov in 2004), it cannot be said by certainty while no official acknowledgement exists on this matter.
6.4 The main question

On basis of the above mentioned, the main question of this thesis, namely “Did an actual change occur in the Russian anti-terrorism policy after the attacks of 11 September 2001, in the light of the “global war on terror” and the “new” collective security system?” may be answered as following.

Here we must divide the concept of anti-terrorist policy into the foreign and national anti-terror policy, since the Russian authorities how executed the policy on both levels.

When we look to the Russian foreign policy in the aftermath of the attacks of 9/11 we may conclude that neither the attacks of 9/11, “the global war on terror”, nor the international cooperation have had a direct effect as such on Russian foreign policy. Rather, these events were used by the Russian authorities in their strategy to regain political power, importance and prestige in the international system on the one hand, and acknowledgment of the just war in Chechnya at the other. The attacks of 9/11 and the “global war on terror” were exploited as symbols and metaphors to internationalize and thus to justify the war in Chechnya before the international public. At the same time the international coalition against international terrorism was exploited by the authorities to realize the Western-oriented direction. In the eyes of the Russian authorities a necessary move, since they believed that through such cooperation with the Western states and especially the United States, they would be able to regain political power, diminish American unilateralism and regain their former political prestige. And although in this sense a change did occur in the Russian foreign policy, a change into the Western direction, this change was already set forth by the Russian authorities prior to the attacks of 9/11. Moreover, the Western orientation was short lived: when the Russian authorities realized they would be unable to realize their political goals through international cooperation, the Russian authorities oriented their foreign policy into multilateralism, cooperating with upcoming states to counterbalance the American unilateralism.

On the national level, it seems that the attacks of 9/11 and the “global war on terror” may have affected the legislation on terrorism. However, it is not clear whether this has been the case in reality. Although for example rhetorically Ivanov did mention the “global war on terror” and the attacks of 9/11 as important events, which had to be taken into account when revising the NSC (2000), in reality it were the Nord- Ost and Beslan hostage takings which would prompt the eventual revision in 2009 of the NSC. The newly adopted NSS (2009) did not demonstrate any effects of the attacks of 9/11 or the global war on terror in its content, since it focused its attention on large scale threats such as NATO’s expansion and American unilateralism, placing threats such international and domestic terrorism on an inferior level.

The attacks of 9/11 and the “global war on terror” may have had a greater effect on the revised Federal Law (2006). However, since there is no official record to acknowledge this, it is speculative to assume that the added Articles 6, 7 and 10 may have been the result of the attacks of 11 September and the global war on terror. In reality the newly adopted Federal Law (2006) made the anti-terror operation in Chechnya more effective and just by providing the military force with a mandate to participate in the anti-terror operations (Article 6). In the similar way as the National Security Concept and National Security Strategy, the revision of the Federal Law in 2006 has been the direct result of Nord-Ost and Beslan hostage takings.

All in all, the thesis has shown that the attacks of 9/11 and their aftermath were just convenient opportunities for the Russian authorities to realize their foreign and domestic political agenda. It was a strategy employed by the Russian authorities to on the one hand regain political power, influence and
prestige at the international level, and on the other hand a *carte blanche* for the brutal anti-terror campaign in the separatist Republic of Chechnya. If anything, it has been shown that even today the Russian political agenda is driven by traditional perceptions of power, self-interest and self-preservation. And although for a while it did seem that the global interests such as peace, democracy and security were becoming the driving principles of the new world order, in reality they were employed as tools in a strategy driven by traditional interests of *Realpolitik*. 
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