NATIONALISM AND PUBLIC OPINION ON EU INTEGRATION: 
THE CASE OF SERBIA

Eline Berghuis- van Westering
May 2012
Photos on the title page:

1. A man holding a sign which reads: ‘We don’t want into EU’, during a protest against Serbia’s EU integration on 11 October 2011. A few days before the European Commission announced they would postpone the decision of whether Serbia would be granted candidacy, conditioning Serbia first to make more progress in the dialogue with Kosovo.

2. Former Serbian President Boris Tadic together with European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso at a press conference after talks in Brussels on 28 February 2012. A few days later Serbia received the news they were granted EU candidacy.
Preface

This thesis has been written as part of the master specialisation programme ‘Conflicts, Territories, and Identities’ of Human Geography at the Radboud University of Nijmegen.

The first exploratory phase of my thesis took place in Belgrade, where I conducted a three month internship from April till July 2011 at the Netherlands Embassy. Through this internship and the people I met here, I was able to get familiar with Serbia and learn a lot about the dynamics in this country. I thank the Embassy staff, and in particular my supervisors Tsjeard Hoekstra and Laurent Stokvis, for the instructive and wonderful time I was able to have here.

Back in the Netherlands, the actual writing started, which was not always an easy task. I thank my friends who supported me in this process through their listening, encouragement and sometimes just a simple coffee- or lunch break. I also thank my supervisor Willemijn Verkoren, without whom I would not have been able to deliver such a consistent research. Thank you for your clear and constructive comments and rapid responses.

The finishing of my thesis also marks the end of my period as a student. I am thankful for having had the opportunity to study and develop myself inside and outside the university. I thank my parents who have always supported me in this – not only with financial means. Above all, I thank Dion, who even became my husband during the writing of this thesis. You have witnessed my ups and downs through all of this and I know you must be almost as relieved as I am, that I finished this thesis today. Thank you for your patience, advice and encouragement.

Eline Berghuis- van Westering
Utrecht, 29 May 2012
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<tr>
<td>DS</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
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<td>DSS</td>
<td>Democratic Party of Serbia</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>ICTY</td>
<td>International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo Force</td>
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<td>KLA</td>
<td>Kosovo Liberation Army</td>
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<td>LDP</td>
<td>Liberal Democratic Party</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<td>SAA</td>
<td>Stabilization and Association Agreement</td>
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<td>SAP</td>
<td>Stabilization and Association Process</td>
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<td>SEIO</td>
<td>Serbian European Integration Office</td>
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<td>SNS</td>
<td>Serbian Progressive Party</td>
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<td>SPC</td>
<td>Serbian Orthodox Church</td>
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<td>SPS</td>
<td>Socialist Party of Serbia</td>
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<td>SRS</td>
<td>Serbian Radical Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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Executive summary

The EU is at the centre of attention currently. While there are debates about the future of Europe and the dismissal of countries out of the Eurozone, there are also countries on their way to becoming a new member of the EU. Serbia is one of these countries. Little more than a decade ago this country was still caught in a disastrous conflict which resulted in an isolated position within the international community. In 2000 the nationalistic rule of Milošević came to an end and the new government immediately initiated a restoration of Serbia in Europe. Serbia was granted the official candidate status in March this year.

In literature we find that there is problematic relation between nationalism and a positive public opinion on European integration. First, a strong position of nationalism in the country does not allow people to identify with anything other than their nation, thus also not with Europe. Second, nationalism wants to protect the sovereignty of a country and does not approve the transfer of authority to another level, such as the EU. Given the history of Serbia with nationalism I wanted to test these theories with the case of Serbia’s EU integration, by a) assessing the importance of nationalism in Serbia nowadays and b) by studying the effect nationalism had on the politics and public opinion with regard to European integration.

The case study shows that there are factors in the Serbian society which have slowed down the integration process. The conditions that are set by the EU, especially with regard to Kosovo and cooperation with the ICTY, have faced opposition in the country. The pro-European government therefore had to find strategies to balance between the conservative forces in the country and the demands of the EU. They adopted a strategy in which they have separated the affective and utilitarian dimension of becoming European. They have downplayed the first and emphasized the second. Among the public we see the same division being made. A large part of the population dislikes and distrusts the EU because they feel treated unjustly by them. On the other hand, people want Serbia to become a member of the EU because they expect that this will be beneficiary for their country as a whole and will improve their personal economic situation.

I conclude that the nationalistic sentiments that are present in Serbia at the moment, do influence the process of EU integration. I have not found evidence that the reason for this is the impossibility to develop a European identity due to a strong attachment to the national identity. In Serbia it is influenced mostly by the threat they perceive to national sovereignty and territorial integrity, especially with regard to Kosovo. On the other hand we have observed that utilitarian arguments have a strong influence on people’s public opinion on European integration.
Chapter 1: Introduction

Serbia is in the phase of a transition. After the wars following the breakup of Yugoslavia and the fall of the Milošević regime, the country is now making steps on the road towards EU accession. Since 2000 the country has been pursuing EU membership, but only recently it was recognized as an official candidate country. The recognition of Serbia as a candidate state will not self-evidently mean accession, as we have seen with Turkey, for example. Far-reaching reforms must be undergone by candidate countries to become stable democracies and prosperous market economies. The EU views enlargement as an opportunity, and one of its most powerful policy tools, to help in the transformation of the countries involved, extending peace, stability, prosperity, democracy, human rights and the rule of law throughout Europe (European Commission; 2008). Such an extensive process requires a substantial amount of support and commitment of the political elite as well as the general public in a country.

The transformative process in Serbia, which influences political, social, economical and legislative aspects, was and is not supported by everyone in the country. Compared to neighboring country Croatia, Serbia is making slow progress. Still part of the society voices a strong nationalistic attitude. The fight to retain Kosovo as an integral part of Serbia is the most visible aspect of the nationalistic attitude that is still present. Now that Serbia has transferred all of its suspected war criminals to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague, normalization of the relation between Serbia and Kosovo is the most important criterion for the EU member states. In the governmental and presidential elections in Serbia, which were held in May 2012, Kosovo was an important topic. During the campaigns, Tadic had to defend the strategy his government has followed the last years, which was characterized by the slogan ‘both Kosovo and Europe’. It took careful balancing for them the last years to satisfy both the EU by having a constructive attitude towards Kosovo, as well as the population by insuring them that they will not give up Kosovo. Tadic’ party, the DS, remained the biggest in the governmental elections but Nikolic, of the SNS, has won the presidential elections.

The polls conducted amongst the population give an indication of the popular support for EU integration. In the last year these polls show that approximately half of the population supports EU membership of Serbia, while one-third would vote against it and the rest would abstain (Barlovac, 2011b; SEIO, 2012). In June 2011 the lowest level of support since 2000 was measured. In the public debate in Serbia several reasons have been mentioned for this. Milica Delevic, director of the European Integration Office, blames it on the difficult economic situation both Serbia and the EU are currently in (Delevic, 2011). Others have argued that people are getting tired ‘of the promises ‘about the European future’ and the unfulfilled expectations. They feel that even though Serbia has fulfilled all demands, it keeps being faced with new conditions every time (Simic, 2011). A third reason for the low support which is put forward, is the negative attitude of the population towards NATO. This is induced by the NATO bombings of Belgrade in 1999, and the connection the population makes between the EU and NATO (Simic, 2011). A last mentioned reason for the latest drop
of support is the unrest in northern Kosovo, where since July tensions have been high. Kosovo Serbs have been manning barricades in protest against the deployment of Kosovo officials on the border with Serbia. This led to clashes between Serbs, Albanians and KFOR peacekeepers. People are afraid that the European road means giving up Kosovo as an integral part of Serbia. Although this is not the demand of the EU, the political elite is not able to alter this view (Barlovac, 2011b). The EU support in Serbia thus seems not only related with practical and instrumental considerations, but also with historical memories and nationalist sentiments: In this research I will study this relationship. Why does Serbia relate to the EU the way it does and what role does nationalism play in this?

1.1 Research goal and questions

This research has the aim to further develop the theory on the relation between nationalism, public opinion and European integration. In order to do so I have conducted a case study on Serbia’s process of EU integration. I will deal with the choice for this specific case later on. First I will discuss the research goal and question. I have formulated the goal of this research as following:

Improve the knowledge of the relationship between public opinion on European integration and nationalism; a) by providing an overview of the existing theory regarding the influence of nationalism on the public opinion on European integration, and b) by further developing this theory by studying the case of Serbia’s process towards EU integration.

Following the central goal of this research, I formulated the main research question: What is the influence of nationalism on public opinion on EU integration? And how does nationalism affect Serbia’s process towards EU integration?

This research question will be answered with the help of the following sub questions:

- What is the meaning and importance of nationalism for people?
- What factors play a role in public opinion on European integration?
- How can we characterize Serbian nationalism?
- What is the general opinion on European integration in Serbia?
- Which determinants are relevant in the explanation of the public opinion on European integration in Serbia?
- What is the role of domestic politics in the formation of the public opinion on European integration in Serbia?
- What role does nationalism play in the European integration process and in the public opinion on European integration in Serbia?
1.2 Relevance

Societal relevance

The idea of a European project came into being after the Second World War. European integration and cooperation was seen as the only possible solution to put an end to the competitive nationalism that led to two wars. ‘According to Europe’s founding myth, a new commonality, beginning with a European common market, respect for democratic institutions, human rights, and the rule of law, would define the European project (Motha, 2010).’ Currently the European project is under threat. The economic crisis caused uncertainty and doubts about the feasibility of a stable common European market. The trust in Europe declines and people are starting to show more nationalistic attitudes. The populist sentiments that were voiced in reaction to the Greek Emergency Liquidity Assistance characterized these attitudes. Many people feel that the Greek should solve their own problems or step out of the Eurozone, the money of the ordinary tax payer should not be used to help them. In the Netherlands, 63% of the population was against European support for Greece (Novum, 2011).

Nationalistic parties are growing in Europe. These parties place great emphasis on the interest of the own nation. Stopping the influx of migrants and a preservation of the culture and identity, are important and characterizing views of these parties. This leads to tensions and negative attitudes towards out-groups, such as immigrants. The popularity of these parties already has consequences for the political situation within countries and it may lead to severe changes within the European Union as well. For most of these parties the focus on the own nation also means that they want to reduce the power of Europe. Both the European Union and nationalism, and their interplay, are currently topics of discussion. Creating a better understanding of these topics is thus highly relevant.

Accession to the EU and the deep changes this causes within a country is a process which is relevant to study. Serbia certainly will not be the last country applying for EU candidacy. Therefore, studying this case can be useful for future accession debates. What is the power of EU accession, and what are its limitations in a post-conflict country where nationalism is still so present? Such an analysis is of interest to anyone working in the field of the EU and EU accession and for those working with or in the political and societal structures of Serbia. With the upcoming elections in Serbia, this thesis will provide a deeper understanding of the campaigns of the political parties and the choices that the public will make.

Scientific relevance

This research first of all gives us a better understanding of the European integration process in Serbia and Serbia’s attitude towards the EU. By doing this case study I also had the opportunity to test several existing theories with regard to nationalism and public opinion on EU integration. This has led to new knowledge and insights on the interaction between nationalism, public opinion and European integration.

Looking at the studies of public opinion on Europe and European integration, two sets of theories seem prominent. The first set of theories focuses on the citizen as a rational
actor whose choice pro or against European integration is largely based on instrumental considerations. People will have a positive attitude towards the European Union when they perceive that they individually or as a country will benefit from this (McLaren, 2004, pp. 903-904). The core assumption in the other set of theories is that the preference of people is driven by group attachments. The way they identify with their own country, influences their attitude towards the European Union: ‘To understand how the public views European integration, one needs to consider how individuals frame their national identity’ (Hooghe & Marks, 2004). Research on which of these two sets of theories is best able to explain people’s attitudes towards European integration, shows varying results and do not provide us with a clear answer. Arguments of both these sets of theories will be discussed in my thesis. I will look at the relevance of the determinants of public opinion on EU integration for my case. Some of the determinants are based on instrumental considerations and others are based on the idea that group attachment plays an important role in the public opinion on EU integration.

Smith (1992, 1993) argues that national and European identities are in competition and that it is unlikely that a European identity will replace the national identity. According to him the emotional commitment for one’s nation will always be more important than the identification with Europe, because this identification lacks deeply rooted rituals and ceremonies. However, most others (Habermas, 2001; Ruiz Jiménez, Górniaik, Kosic, Kiss, & Kandulla, 2004) argue that national and European identities are compatible because they are based on different kinds of identification. Factors, such as the presence of a public debate over Europe (Duchesne & Frognier, 2007) and the way Europe is constructed and portrayed within a country (Hansen & Waever, 2002), influence the relationship between national and European identity. In my case study I will therefore also pay attention to the role of domestic politics and the political elite. Because different relationships are assumed and measured between national identity and European identity it is hard to make universal claims. Therefore, in-depth studies of this relationship within a country, such as I propose to do on Serbia, are meaningful in creating a better understanding and adding something to the existing knowledge.

In countries with a strong national pride it is harder for a European identity to develop. This is because ‘nationalism claims that the nation should take primacy over all the other forms of social identification’ (Cinpoes, 2008, p. 11). The presence of a strong nationalist ideology will leave less room for identification with other groups than the own nation and does not favor the presence of another authority in their state. Therefore identification with Europe is less likely to develop in countries where people on a large scale support a strong nationalist ideology (Cinpoes, 2008; Duchesne & Frognier, 2007; Ruiz Jiménez, et al., 2004). Others have put this conclusion in perspective. They argue that there are different forms of nationalism and that not all kinds of nationalism obstruct European integration (Csergo & Goldgeier, 2004; Hooghe & Marks, 2004). The literature shows that nationalism can play an important role in the process of EU integration. However, how it influences the process can only be understood by doing an in-depth study of how
nationalism is constructed and mobilized within a country. This is precisely what I aim to do in this research.

1.3 Case study Serbia

The selection of Serbia as my case study has multiple reasons. Because I wanted to expand the knowledge on the influence of nationalism in European integration, I had to choose a country in which both concepts played or had played a role. Serbia is probably the most well-known, out of all former Yugoslavian countries, for its virulent nationalism during the rule of Milosevic. During this time the country had an isolated position in the international community, except from their connection with Russia. They have been heavily sanctioned by European countries through the EU and NATO. And now, little more than a decade later, this country is on its way to EU accession. Precisely this extreme contradiction puzzled me and made me wonder to what extent nationalism still played a role in the society and in the process of EU integration. In addition, I had the opportunity to do an internship at the Netherlands Embassy in Belgrade from April till July 2011. During this time I have had the opportunity to learn a lot about the political dynamics and the European integration process in Serbia. The choice for Serbia therefore also became a very practical one.

The case of Serbia is very interesting, but also has its limitations. The extreme character of nationalism in this country makes it maybe less representative and generalizable. I will keep this in mind when I draw conclusions from this case. The analysis and conclusions of this case nonetheless can be useful for future studies in the field of nationalism and Europeanization. The insights can lead to new hypotheses that can be tested.

1.4 Methodology

The goal of this research is to add something to the existing literature on the relationship between nationalism, public opinion and support for EU integration within a candidate country. This kind of fundamental research aims at developing new theory or aims at filling a gap in existing theory. It is different from practical research in that its main goal is not trying to contribute directly to an intervention in an existing practical situation, although it can be used by people working in practice (Verschuren & Doornewaard, 2005, pp. 33-36). More specifically I conducted a research that is typified as theory testing. In the theoretical chapter I will discuss the theory with regard to nationalism, public opinion and European integration and I formulate several hypotheses. These hypotheses will be tested in the second part, my case study. I will judge how relevant these theories are for the explanation of my case.

A case study is thus the overall method I use in this thesis. With this case study I will be able to provide new insights for the theories I formulated in the theoretical chapter. An important characteristic of a case study is the small amount of research units, one in my case. The case study method gives me the opportunity to focus on one case and create an in-depth
picture of Serbia’s process of EU integration. The creation of such an integral picture is one of the strengths of a case study (Yin, 1984). This has the consequence that the research will focus more on deepness than on wideness (Verschuren & Doornewaard, 2005, p. 170).

The data I have gathered for my research largely come from conducting a literature review. A literature review is a useful method to give an overview of the existing knowledge of a specific subject (Verschuren & Doornewaard, 2005, p. 185). In my case, I will use it to provide an overview of the theories on the relationship between nationalism, public opinion and EU integration. Also for my case study I have used a literature review, based on the available literature on nationalism and EU integration in Serbia. My choice for a literature review and desk research partly derives from the limited time I had in Serbia to gather data. On the other hand, it is also a legitimate decision because of the amount of literature which is present on the relationship between European integration and national identity.

During my time in Belgrade, April to July 2011, I have conducted four semi-structured interviews with people who work as a journalist, a politician or with an NGO. These people were very well informed about the situation in Serbia, although their perspectives differed of course. Occasionally I have used their perspectives to illustrate what I’m writing. Most of all, I used these interviews to explore the topic of nationalism and EU integration in Serbia in the initial phase of my thesis.

Besides academic literature I have also used data from other sources; such as newspaper articles, reports and statistics. Some of this material is available on the internet, other material I have gathered during my stay in Belgrade. At the Embassy we daily received digital newspapers with translated articles from the Serbian newspapers. The names of these newspapers are VIP and BETA.

1.5 Outline of the thesis

In the first part of this thesis I will build the theoretical basis for my case study. I will focus on the three main themes of my thesis, which subsequently are: nationalism, European integration and public opinion. I will provide an overview of what there can be found in the literature on these three themes and their interplay. From this part I will extract the guiding questions and hypotheses for my case study. Leading will be the theories on the determinants of public opinion on EU integration: The utilitarian thesis, domestic politics, social/national identity and nationalism.

The second part consists of the case study and conclusion. The first part of my case study I will use to zoom in on Serbia. I will start with describing the (recent) history, the current economic situation and the political landscape of Serbia. Then I will turn to Serbian nationalism. I will look at the role nationalism has played during the wars that followed the collapse of Yugoslavia. After that I will turn to the role of nationalism in the current society. I will be looking at the Serbian Radical Party, its rhetoric and its supporters. I will also give more insight in the current dynamics between Kosovo and Serbia, in which the presence of nationalistic attitudes is still most visible. Then I will asses Serbia’s integration into the
European Union. I will describe the steps the country has taken so far and the political dynamics surrounding this. I will pay special attention to cooperation with the ICTY and the relation with Kosovo in this, since these have been the biggest stumbling blocks for Serbia on its way to accession. Then I will take a closer look at the political elite, the way they frame Serbia’s integration and use the concept of national identity in this. In the last part of my case study I will look at the public opinion on European integration in Serbia and try to create a deeper understanding of this opinion. In the conclusion I will answer my research question and the sub questions that have followed from this.
Chapter 2: Theoretical background on nationalism and EU integration

2.1 European integration

The EU views enlargement as an opportunity, and one of its most powerful policy tools, to help in the transformation of the countries involved, extending peace, stability, prosperity, democracy, human rights and the rule of law throughout Europe (European-Commission, 2008). Serbia is now an official candidate state and on its way to eventually become a member state. In this paragraph I will elaborate on the enlargement policy of the European Union and take a closer look at what this means for a country in order to get a better understanding of the process Serbia as a country is going through at the moment.

2.1.1 Goal and history of European enlargement

The idea of a European project came into being after the Second World War. It started out in 1952 as a collaboration between six states - Belgium, France, Italy, The Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands -, which was known as the European Coal and Steel Community. European integration and cooperation was seen as the only possible solution to put an end to the competitive nationalism that led to two wars. ‘According to Europe's founding myth, a new commonality, beginning with a European common market, respect for democratic institutions, human rights, and the rule of law, would define the European project (Motha, 2010).’ At the start, the cooperation was mainly economic. Together the states wanted to create favorable conditions for economic growth and recovery after the Second World War. It was expected that the economic growth and interdependence would contribute to peace and stability in Europe.

This kind of reasoning for a large part corresponds with the integration theory of Ernst B. Haas (1958). He defines political integration as ‘the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states’ (Haas, 1958, p. 16). His idea was thus that actors within a country would see the instrumental benefits of European integration and consequently would shift (part of) their loyalties to a supranational level. He argued that these shifted loyalties would lead to the creation of a European identity. However, he did not see this as zero-sum. He argued that an increased European identity would not automatically mean a decline in the significance of nationalism and the nation state.

In the years after 1952, the objectives were expanded and other economic sectors were included. This resulted in the formation of the European Community (EC) in 1967. In the early 90’s an important step was taken by the leaders of the countries by signing the Maastricht Treaty, which established the European Union. ‘It is a major EU milestone, setting clear rules for the future single currency as well as for foreign and security policy and closer cooperation in justice and home affairs (European-Commission, 2012).’ According to Hooghe and Marks (2008) this has also changed the process of EU integration. ‘With the Maastricht
Accord of 1991, decision making in European integration entered the contentious world of party competition, elections and referendums (p. 7). European integration used to be a topic which did only involve elites, and not the general public. The issue of integration was not important to the public and therefore it was not part of the political competition. Since 1991, when the first referendums on the European Union took place, the attention and awareness amongst the general population has increased. The referenda in Denmark, where the Maastricht Accord was rejected, and France, where it was almost rejected, demonstrated the gap between the elite and the public. Now the public had a direct influence on the process of EU integration, the elite had to start informing and involving them. Analysis shows that the EU is more often mentioned in the media, policy statements and political campaigns and that there have been more protests on the EU since the second half of the 1990s. The topic of integration became more tightly linked to domestic politics and therefore also more politicized. Parties worry about the public opinion because they need the support of citizens to ratify treaties and also because their electoral support partly depends on their European policies. Through several studies it became clear that for the general population not only economic concerns, but identity played a very important role in their judgment on EU integration (Hooghe & Marks, 2008). I will elaborate on this in the next chapters.

In 1995 three new members joined the EU and the Schengen Agreement went into effect in seven countries, which allowed people to travel between those countries without any border controls. Agreement on future enlargement was found in 2000 with the Nice Treaty. This Treaty set out the necessary changes to deal with an enlarged Union, and it set a limit for enlargement of 27 member states.

A new constitutional treaty came to vote among the citizens of the Union's member states in 2004. This constitution with new voting rules and changes in the governing bodies, was rejected in France and the Netherlands. The concerns of the population in those two countries were besides to financial considerations, also tied to the concerns of future enlargement. In 2004 ten, mainly Eastern European, states joined the European Union. This enlargement was seen as a reunification of Eastern and Western Europe, after decades of division. Besides positive voices, some also argue that this major enlargement has caused an effect known as ‘enlargement fatigue’. This trend shows a hesitancy and more negative attitude towards the integration of more countries in the EU. Citizens, and increasingly more decision makers, in member states are not convinced that enlargement will be beneficiary for both the Union and for themselves (Sadowski & Mus, 2008, p. 21). In 2007 the last enlargement took place, integrating Bulgaria and Romania. This raised the number of member states to 27, and the population of the EU to over 492 million inhabitants. The latest development in the policy of the EU was the Treaty of Lisbon, which came into force in 2009. This treaty has to deal with the growth and expansion of the Union. It was the second attempt, after the rejected constitutional treaty, to make the EU more transparent, efficient and democratic, after the rejected constitution.
2.1.2 Accession procedure and criteria

Entering the EU is a lengthy procedure with far-reaching consequences. It usually starts with a country signing an association agreement, after which a country will be assisted by the EU in order to prepare for candidacy. After that, a countries application for membership follows. ‘Any European country which respects the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law may apply to become a member of the Union (European-Commission, 2008)’. This is stipulated further in article 49 of the Treaty on the European Union. In 1993 these conditions were expanded with the Copenhagen criteria: ‘Membership requires that candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. Membership presupposes the candidate’s ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union (European-Commission, 2008).’ The European Commission will give an official opinion on the countries application for membership. If the countries application is accepted, it is recognized as an official candidate. The Commission also rules on whether the country will get a date for the opening of the negotiations. In some cases the recognition as a candidate and the opening of the negotiations is not at the same moment.

For the Western Balkans an extra framework is designed, which is dealing with the specific post- conflict and post- communist circumstances in the region: The Stabilization and Association Process (SAP). This region specific approach holds an agreement between the EU and Balkan states in order to: Stabilize the countries and assist them in becoming a market economy, promote regional cooperation, promote cooperation with international judicial authorities and cooperate in the area of justice, security and freedom (Sadowski & Mus, 2008).

The negotiations with a country are based on the thirty-five chapters of the acquis communautaire. The acquis contains all the legislation and national policies which have to be adopted by a candidate country. For each country there is a framework, based on a detailed examination known as screening, in which the exact requirements per chapter are specified. Before the negotiations on a specific chapter can be opened, the Commission has to be convinced that a country has met the opening benchmarks, or criteria. Therefore not all chapters are opened simultaneously in most cases. The candidate country generates a National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis in which it sets out the plans, timetables and costs for the adoption of all legislation set out in the acquis. When a country fulfills all conditions and all member states are satisfied, the negotiations will be closed. Until that time all chapters can only be provisionally closed and can be reopened at any time. After this a Draft Accession Treaty is created, which has to be supported by the Council, the Commission, the European Parliament and the member states representatives. If so, the Treaty will be ratified by the candidate state and the member states and the country becomes
recognized as an acceding state. Soon as the ratification process is completed, the country is an official member state.

Currently there are five candidate countries for EU membership (Montenegro, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Iceland and Serbia), and four potential candidates (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Kosovo under UNSC Resolution 1244/99). Croatia is an acceding country. (European-Commission, 2012).

2.1.3 Conditionality

The strategy used by the European Union during the enlargement process is described in literature as democratic conditionality (Schimmelfennig, Engert, & Knobel, 2003) or positive conditionality (Veebel, 2009). This strategy is based on granting or withholding rewards, in order to punish an actor for undesirable behavior and rewarding him for good behavior. The idea is that ‘after a certain time, the actors subjected to reinforcement will stick to pro-social behavior in order to avoid punishment and continue to be rewarded’ (Schimmelfennig, et al., 2003, p. 496). This way of conditioning was already used after World War II by the World Bank and the IMF and later also in development cooperation and post-colonial relations.

During the integration process the EU works with two kinds of rewards. The first is assistance, technical or financial, to become a market economy. The second rewards consists of institutional ties, such as trade and association agreements, more inclusion in the EU market and in the end full membership. How well this conditionality strategy works, for the most part depends on the domestic political conditions in a country. In states with a nationalist or authoritarian government, the impact of the EU on domestic changes is minor. By contrast, the influence of the EU in countries with a liberal democratic government, or where the liberal forces are on the rise, is significant. (Sedelmeier, 2006). By some countries the positive conditionality strategy, or golden carrot as it is sometimes referred to, is seen as a neo-colonialist conspiracy, because it seems that the EU is more concerned with the interest of the member states than it is with actually helping or supporting the candidate states (Veebel, 2009, p. 228). And of course, EU enlargement is not a pro-deo project. Unless the EU thinks they can benefit from it in some way, they will not accept new member states. They are selective and want new members to comply with their rules. Another point of criticism on the conditionality model is that the outcomes and results are not evaluated by a neutral actor and that it lacks clear guidelines on when a country receives the rewards. In the end, the integration process is not only about meeting the criteria, but it has also a political character with an important role for the government representatives of the member states (Sadowski & Mus, 2008).

2.1.4 Conclusion

This section has given us more insight in the procedure of EU integration and what this means for a country. This provides us with a context when looking at the case study of Serbia. What is interesting is that although identification with Europe appears to be an
important determinant for support of European integration, as we will see later on in this chapter, this aspect is not mentioned in the formal documents of the European Union. In political debates within the member states the identity question does play an important role. Debates over the accession of Turkey probably best illustrate this. Most of these debates are not about Turkey’s compliance with EU legislation or about the economy. They are focused on the geography, culture and religion of Turkey. Apparently there exists some idea of what belongs to Europe and what a European culture looks like, but there is no such thing as a definition of a European identity. So we may conclude that there is a discrepancy between EU policies’ lack of attention to identity and the important role identity actually plays in accession procedures. To elaborate on this I will now turn to the concept of identity.

2.2 Identity

Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) can help us explain why group membership and identity, for example the national identity, are important to people and how this influences the relation with people belonging to different groups. According to this theory people tend to have a stronger association with groups that have a positive impact on our self-confidence and that people are inclined to evaluate the groups to which they belong more positively than groups in which they have no part. This results in favoritism of the own group, the ingroup, and prejudice or discrimination towards others, the outgroup. The social identity theory contains four interrelated concepts: social identity, social categorization, social comparison and psychological group distinctiveness (Coenders, 2001), which I will discuss here.

A distinction can be made between different types of identities. The two most important are the personal and social identity. Personal identity is predominantly shaped by personal characteristics and traits that the individual possesses (Tajfel, 1981). The identity of a person is also shaped and influenced by the groups he or she belongs to, the social identity. Tajfel defines social identity as follows: ‘That part of an individual’s self concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a group (or groups) together with the value and the emotional significance attached to the membership (Tajfel, 1981, p. 255).’ The social identity will generally comprise multiple memberships. For example, someone can be a neighbor, a grandfather, a retired architect and a swimmer. These identities are constructed, flexible, and the importance of the identities is subject to change (Sen, 2006). Which identifications are important dependents on the social context. Thus, the identity of a retired architect does most of the time matter less when he is playing with his grandchildren. The social context includes not only the immediate social environment, but also historical, economic and political conditions and developments.

Identity formation takes place through ascription and self-ascription. Ascription is the categorization that outsiders use to group people based on their alleged origin. This often is based on appearance. Self-ascription is the description that people themselves use to indicate to what (ethnic or national) group they belong. Their own values, rules and goals play a more important role in this. These two forms of ascription influence each other.
According to social identity theory, both ascription and self-ascription are important in defining a group. Individuals must be aware of their own membership of the group and they must be viewed by others as being a member of the group (Tajfel, 1982, p. 2).

Membership of a group can positively or negatively contribute to someone’s self image. Because individuals are always looking for a positive evaluation of themselves, they will strive for a positive difference between their ingroup and relevant outgroups (Chryssochoou, 2004, pp. 132-133). This process is defined as social categorization: ‘The process of bringing together social objects or events in groups which are equivalent with regard to an individual’s actions, intentions and system of beliefs (Tajfel, 1981, p. 254)’. Categorization is a cognitive process people use in their daily life. We need it to organize and simplify to complex social environment and the information that comes to us (Allport, 1954). Social categorization is also used by individuals to rank themselves within society. This ranking is based on comparison with other individuals and groups.

A social identity is formed, and gets its value, through comparison with others. ‘The characteristics of one’s group as a whole (such as its status, its richness or poverty, its skin color or its ability to reach it aims) achieve most of their significance in relation to perceived differences from other groups and the value connotation of these differences […] the definition of a group (national, racial or any other) makes no sense unless there are other groups around’ (Tajfel, 1981, p. 258).’ A positive social identity is established by a favorable comparison between one’s own group and another group. The central thesis of the social identity theory is that individuals strive for a positive difference in comparison with other groups (Coenders, 2001, p. 22). This pursuit of a positive difference has implications for the behavior between groups and leads to ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation. Ingroup favoritism is the tendency to place one’s own group above the outgroup. Positive characteristics are ascribed to the ingroup and negative characteristics to the outgroup. Outgroup derogation describes the tendency to develop negative attitudes and behavior toward outgroups. This takes place through (negative) stereotyping, the formation of social representations of groups that help people to transform an unfamiliar social context into a familiar one and to coordinate social behavior (Chryssochoou, 2004, p. 44)’. This process helps to order the social world and also justifies a negative attitude or behavior towards other groups. Discrimination, exclusion and prejudice can be the consequences of this. Outgroups can be ethnic groups or nations. I will now turn to an explanation of those two categorical identities.

**Ethnic and national identity**

The definition I will use to mark the distinction between ethnic groups and nations, comes from Danforth (1995). He defines nations as ‘large, politicized ethnic groups associated with specific territories over which they seek a degree of autonomy. Nations, as opposed to ethnic groups, in other words, are people who exercise, or hope to exercise sovereignty over a given territory (Danforth, 1995, p. 14).’ Not all ethnic groups long for an independent and sovereign state, nations do. Their aspiration is to create a nation-state, that is, a state in which the political boundaries coincide with the cultural boundaries. The similarity between
nationality and ethnicity is that they both refer to ‘aspects of relationships between groups which consider themselves, and are regarded by others, as being culturally distinctive’ (Eriksen, 2002, p. 4). They are both categorical identities which are constructed and flexible. I will now further zoom in on the concept of the nation and its corresponding principle: nationalism.

2.3 Nations and nationalism

Nationalism is one of the main concepts of my thesis. Therefore I will use this paragraph to explore what nationalism is and how it can motivate individuals in their decision making. First I will start by looking at the origin of the nation. Why do they exist? And what is the relation between the nation and nationalism? Finally, I will focus on the power of nationalism and its importance as a form of identification for people. Why and how can nationalism influence the (political) choices individuals make?

2.3.1 The origin of nations and nationalism

‘The more we learn about the emergence of nations and about the origins and the development of nationalism, the less credible is the nationalist image of nations as homogeneous, natural, and continuous communities of fate and descent. Yet, it is precisely this image that nurtures the unique power of nationalism (Tamir, 1995, p. 420).’

Smith (1986), Gellner (1983) and Anderson (1983) all three have different views on the origin of the nation. I will use their views to highlight different aspects of the nation. Smith is the representative of the ethnocentric approach. He argues that all nations have some kind of pre-modern roots. His definition of a nation is a ‘named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members (Smith, 1986, p. 14)’. Ethnies, he calls the communities who share these characteristics. He says that the nation itself is a modern construct, but that it has its roots in a pre-modern era and in pre-modern cultures. The core of the ethnie has remained the same and continued through history. The shared history, myths, symbols and values are the core of the nation for Smith, which make it so powerful. That is also why Smith argues there will never emerge a united European identity. The identification with the nation will always be stronger because the EU lacks the shared cultural core with distinct common characteristics that is so important for the nation.

Noteworthy, is that Smith does not explain is why some ethnies develop into nations, since it seems to be that there are far more ethnies than states.

Gellner’s view on the origin of the nation differs from Smith’s view. In his definition of the nation, Gellner emphasizes two aspects, the cultural and the voluntary aspect. The first aspect is a shared culture; a common culture, meanings and understandings is needed amongst a group. The second is the recognition of two people as belonging to the same
nation; ‘two men are of the same nation if and only if they recognize each other as belonging to the same nation’ (p. 6). The birth of the nation, according to him, is the necessary consequence of changing social conditions in the period of modernization. That is, the transition from an agrarian social order to an industrial order during the 19th century. After the period of foraging and agriculture, mankind passed to a scientific and industrial society. In this stage a need for homogenization emerged. Mass production demanded that people from different cultural backgrounds could communicate and understand each other to produce better and faster. From that a shared and homogeneous culture developed through which these people could work together. Similarity of culture became the basic social bond and being part of this culture was the precondition of political, economic and social citizenship. The strife for unification of the political and national unit, which is the aim of nationalists, is what made nations emerge. ‘Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist (Gellner, 1964, p. 168). He thus disagrees with Smith that ethnic groups from premodern times form the root of nations.

Anderson agrees with Gellner that nations and nationalism are not universal and that they have not always existed. However, they have a different emphasis. Gellner focuses on political and organizational aspects of the nation in the transition to a modern society. Anderson is more interested in the meaning and importance of the national identity for people. What does it mean that people feel attached to a nation and what can be the consequences? Anderson defines the nation as ‘an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign (Anderson; 1991:6)’. It is imagined because members of a nation will never meet most of their fellow nationals, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion. It is based on the perception and feelings of members of the nation and the image they sustain. It is limited because it has boundaries; there is no nation that will include all the people living on this earth. The nation is seen as sovereign, because they want to be independent and not be ruled by any other party. Therefore all nations dream of being free, with a sovereign state as the ultimate goal they want to accomplish. And, maybe most important, it is a community. ‘Regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings’ (Anderson; 1991:6-7). This, for Anderson, is the core of the nation. This fraternity and comradeship are so important that people are even willing to die for it. Or in my case, maybe instruct people to make certain political choices.

For Anderson nationalism has closer links with kinship and religion then with ideologies. The most important aspect of nationalism, according to him, is that it constitutes the experience of belonging together. All religions seek and provide answers to questions such as, why are we here; why do bad things happen to us? People will always seek for answers to those questions and religion for a long time provided the answers. During and after the century of Enlightenment, and the decline of the importance of religion, people had to find new answers and a new identification. Through identification with their nation and the struggle for sovereignty, nationalism was able to give people a new fate and give people
the same sense of belonging as they once found in religion. In this sense nationalism offers security and a feeling of continuity to people (Calhoun, 1993).

Language has been an important factor during the rise of nationalism and still is an important aspect of many nationalist movements. Anderson describes how the standardization of language was part of shaping the imagined political community. A standard and shared language became used in administration and schooling. This was an important factor in forging nations out of what first was a very diverse group of people with different dialects. It also created a boundary between one nation and the other. The creation of a common language was facilitated by the rise of print-capitalism. This development made it easier and cheaper to spread the printed word and allowed ‘a potentially unlimited number of persons to have access to identical information without direct contact with the originator (Eriksen, 2002, p. 105)’. This made it possible to connect people on a large scale without having face to face contact. People knew they read the same newspapers and the same novels as other people in their nation and through this they experienced a commonality. Language has not only been important for the rise of nations, but also for the mobilization of nationalist sentiments. Language is an important characteristic of the nation, which differentiates it from other nations. Through language and the use of media it is also possible for elites to reproduce and strengthen nationalist sentiments. During the war in Yugoslavia, the government of Milošević controlled the media. They used it to promote Serbian nationalism and to create feelings of xenophobia towards the Croats and Albanians. They were portrayed as people of less value, evil and a threat to the Serbian nation.

The view of Smith highlights the shared aspects of the nation. For him this is the basis of a nation. For Gellner and Anderson, nations have derived out of a necessity in a changing modern era. Gellner places more emphasis on the fact that people have constructed the nation and that it is not a natural, but a man-made, phenomenon. For Anderson, the community aspect of the nation is the most important; the fact that this form of identity is able to bring people together and let them experience a form of togetherness on such a large scale. Nationalism then is the ideological construction that forges a link between the nation and the state. In the eyes of the nation, the nation-state is the power structure that is best suited to fit the needs of the population. I will use the definition of Gellner to define what I mean with nationalism: ‘Nationalism is primarily a political principle which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent (Gellner, 1983, p. 1)’. Nationalists will often portray their nation like it has always been there and that it is natural that they wish to live with their own kind and that have the right to claim a given territory. Nationalists claim that certain similarities should count as the definition for the political community. In their eyes the nation is a fact of nature, and not a product of human activity. These images are often underpinned by historical myths, which define who belongs to Us en who belongs to Them (Eriksen, 2002). The idea of a nation-state has shown to be problematic, because in reality there is no place in the world where the boundaries of the state and nation exactly match. Under normal circumstances this might be insignificant and harmless, but it has the potential to create conflict between groups.
2.3.2 The power of nationalism

Unfortunately, the power of nationalism became very clear in Yugoslavia during the early 1990s. Ethnic and national attachments have somehow driven people to use violence and kill their neighbors. The terms ethnic and national attachments or identification will overlap in this section, as they are interconnected. As described, identification with the nation particularly refers to a group with the aspiration to live in a territory where the boundaries of the nation are the same as the boundaries of the state. How can nationalism lead to such a disastrous conflict? Oberschall (2000b) describes three important schools on how ethnic and nationalist identities can lead to conflict. He uses Yugoslavia as a case study from which he tries to explain ‘the spread and support for xenophobic nationalism and ethnic violence among people among people who had lived cooperatively for thirty-five years’ (p. 982). To do so he differentiates between three schools of ethnicity, which from their own viewpoint analyze how ethnicity can lead to violence. A fourth view Oberschall adds focuses on the role of circumstances and what happens to ethnic identity when people fear for their security.

The first way to explain the outbreak of violence in Yugoslavia is from a primordial stance. The primordial analysis is based on the presumption that ethnicity or nation-hood are fixed and given positions. The described position of Smith on the origin of nations has close links to this kind of reasoning. Primordialists see ethnicity and nationality as fixed, essential and created by a blood band. The national community is created by the share of irrational bonds based on kinship, blood, race, language, religion, social practices and culture. Because the ethnic or national identity is acquired by birth you cannot choose and change it. From the primordialists view on ethnicity we could argue that a conflict simply is an almost inevitable consequence of the ethnic differences between groups. Kaplan (1993) is a promoter of this view in his famous work ‘Balkan ghosts’. He argues that hostility, mistrust and hatred were just below the surface in communist Yugoslavia. These feelings are always present between ethnic groups and can be triggered by competition or fear. Once triggered, it results in a spiral of violence and aggression.

The second view is the instrumentalist view, in which the elite and political leaders of a nation play an important role. The instrumentalist argues that ‘ethnic sentiments and loyalties are manipulated by political leaders and intellectuals for political ends, such as state creation’ (Oberschall, 2000b, p. 983). This means that ethnic and nationalist identification is present and of importance, but that this will only lead to conflict if they are manipulated and used. Ethnic manipulation is thus a conscious action by which leaders influence their citizens by an appeal and use of ethnic symbols. In the former Yugoslavia this view can help us to describe the actions of Milošević. His goal was to create a Greater Serbia and he used language and symbols of importance for the Serbs to mobilize them in his fight. Although the elite indeed have mobilized people based on their ethnic background, this does not provide us with an explanation why people would respond to this. What made them receptive and why were they willing to fight? This question remains unanswered in the instrumentalist view.
Thirdly, Oberschall describes the constructivist view. Their focus is on the social processes of maintaining boundaries that people themselves recognize as ethnic. It is not so much about specific characteristics or traits that a person has or has not, but far more in the acceptance of the group to give a person access or not to their ethnic group. These entry codes are socially constructed, and change from time to time. For the constructivists ethnicity is a constructed phenomena and a product of social interaction. Ethnicity is essentially an aspect of a relationship, not a property of a group. This corresponds with the social identity theory which I have described in the previous section. It is created through social contact with others and always constituted in relation to the Other (Eriksen, 2002).

Going back to the works of Smith, Gellner and Anderson on nationalism, we see that their views show great similarities with the three schools of ethnicity. The way Smith describes the nation is closely linked to the primordialist view, although he acknowledges that nations cannot be seen as natural. He does however argue that they are rooted in ancient history (Calhoun, 1993, p. 227). Gellner and Anderson claim the opposite. According to them the biggest misconception with regard to states, nations and nationalism, is that they are universal and that they have always been there. In their argumentation they both emphasize the constructed and man-made nature of the nation, affiliating with the constructivist school. Gellner’s argument also shows elements of the instrumentalist school, since he emphasizes the role of the elite in the rise of nations and nationalism during the time of modernization.

Oberschall also looks at the role of circumstances to explain how ethnic identities can lead to violence. He describes how people started to experience fear and insecurity during the breakup of Yugoslavia and how this influenced the ethnic relations (Oberschall, 2000b). ‘The emotion that poisons ethnic relations is fear: fear of extinction as a group, fear of assimilation, fear of domination by another group and fear for one’s life and property (2000a, p. 990).’ This fear led to an arms race between the ethnic groups because they feel that is the only way to protect themselves. This is called the security dilemma. Not ethnic hatred, but fear and insecurity are the driving motivation of the violence. Ignatieff (1998: 34-71) also describes how according to him fear and paranoia can cause a war. He describes a causative order which starts with the collapse of the state. Suddenly people begin to fear for their safety because they no longer have the trust that the state can or will protect them. Their national identity becomes more and more important to them because ‘the only answer to the question, ‘Who will protect me now?’, becomes ‘my own people’” (Ignattief, 1998, p. 45). The strong sense of belonging to one’s own group excludes sympathy for the other group and can even make it impossible to view them as human beings. Taking Yugoslavia as an example; neighbors turned into a person with only one identity, Serb or Croat, not a neighbor, someone’s son or a friend anymore. Lake and Rothchild (1996: 41-75) argue that it is fear for the future and the feeling of insecurity that trigger the ethnic tensions. If a state becomes unstable people begin to fear for their security and a competition for resources stirs up. This competition can become a struggle not only between individuals, but when organized, a struggle between groups. They unify because of what they perceive as external threats and a shared identity arises. Information failure, problems of credible commitment between groups and the security dilemma, ‘create the instable social foundations from which
ethnic conflict arises’ (Lake and Rothchild, 1996: 46). Political entrepreneurs within the group built on and magnify the formed shared identity by referring to political memories and myth. This way the polarization within the society enlarges.

2.3.3 Conclusion

Following Gellner and Anderson, I argue that nationalism forms a strong idea on how the state should be organized and is able to give people a strong sense of community. Nationalism is based on the idea that the boundaries of the nation should correspond with the boundaries of the state. The nation forms a community of people, based on their own perceptions and feelings of who belongs to the community and who not, whose goal it is to live in a sovereign state. I look at the nation and nationalism as socially constructed phenomena. This means that identification with the nation can be more or less important to people. There are different aspects which influence this. Fear and insecurity can harden the boundaries between groups. Consequently it is possible for elites to manipulate the population on the basis of their identity.

Therefore, given the relative stable situation in Serbia at the moment, I expect that identification with the nation, and nationalism, will be less important for people and thus also have a relatively low impact on the way they think about European integration. In my case study I will test this theory. I will look at the importance and meaning of nationalism for the Serbs in the current context. In this, I will also pay attention to the role of the political elite.

2.4 Nationalist parties and EU integration

In the paragraphs above I have dealt with both European integration and nationalism. I will now bring those concepts together and start by looking at the role of domestic actors, especially nationalist actors, in European enlargement. How do they see the European Union and how do they present it to their followers?

2.4.1 The influence of domestic politics

A strong attachment to one’s national identity does not automatically lead to opposition of European integration. What the implications are of someone’s identity depends on how this identity is constructed and mobilized by political actors. ‘Connections between national identity, cultural and economic insecurity and issues such as EU enlargement cannot be induced directly from experience, but have to be constructed (Hooghe & Marks, 2008, p. 13).’ EU enlargement is a complex process. Most people do not have enough experience or knowledge to base their own opinion on. Political parties therefore can have a strong influence on this construction of a person’s opinion on EU enlargement. If they frame that the affection for the country and institutions as incompatible with EU integration, the public will be likely to adopt this way of thinking. This was confirmed by Edwards and de Vries
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(2009) who found that when an identity is framed as exclusively national by a right-wing extremist party, the level of Euroscepticism increases. ‘The stronger the radical right party in a country, the more intensely individuals with exclusive identities oppose European integration (Hooghe & Marks, 2008, p. 13)’. It also appears that in countries with a political elite which is divided on the issue of EU integration, it is more likely that the national identity will be presented as incompatible with EU integration. Contrary, when the political elite as a whole is supportive of EU integration, national identity will be positively associated with support for EU integration (Hooghe & Marks, 2004). We have to be a little bit careful with such causal conclusions of course. Because we cannot be certain that it does not work the other way around, namely that the public opinion influences the position of the political parties. Most likely is that they are interconnected and influence each other. These findings at least seem to show that public opinion on European integration is interrelated with domestic politics.

On the far left and on the far right side of the political spectrum we find political parties which often oppose European integration or further enlargement. This has also been presented as the inverted U-curve, which indicates that the parties in the middle of the political spectrum often favor European integration, whereas the parties at the ends mostly oppose it. Their opposition, however, is based on different arguments. Extreme left-wing parties concentrate on the negative consequences for the welfare system and respond to the economic insecurities of their voters. On the extreme right spectrum parties focus mostly on the protection of national sovereignty and they mobilize people by highlighting a threat of the national identity. (De Vries & Edwards, 2009)

2.4.2 Nationalist strategies

All nationalisms have in common that they seek ‘some kind of institutional self-government on a nationally defined homeland’ (Csergo & Goldgeier, 2004, p. 23). However, the pursuit of this goal can take on very different forms. In the 1990s we witnessed the devastating consequences of Milošević’s nationalistic policy to create a Greater Serbia with only ethnic Serbs, but not everywhere nationalism takes on such extreme forms. There is variety in how nationalisms manifest themselves, also in relation to the European Union. Csergo and Goldeier (2004) therefore describe and compare four types of nationalism and their views of the European Union: traditional, substate, transsovereign, and protectionist.

They define traditional nationalism as the nation-state approach: ‘The political strategy that emerged in Europe to create and reproduce congruence between the political and cultural boundaries of the nation- in other words, to form a territorially sovereign, cultural homogeneous nation-state (2004, p. 24)’. In some European states, mostly the countries that emerged out of the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, the traditional nation-state approach was still virulent. That meant that the political elite in those countries focused on the cultural definitions of the nation and pursued cultural assimilation. Under the pressure of the EU and the demands of the **acquis communautaire**, most of those countries have now also adopted laws that deal with
the minorities in their countries. They have placed EU membership before the goal of creating cultural homogeneity. In their strategy to pursue membership, they present the EU as an alliance of states and not as an integrated culture. This way the state sovereignty is upheld while pursuing to join the European Union. In Serbia and Slovakia the integration process has been slower than in the other post-communist countries. The traditional nationalism remained to be more virulent here than in the other states. In the second chapter of my thesis I will look in to this further.

Substate nationalism is the nationalism that typifies the strategy of groups and communities that claim a historical homeland, but who do not have their own state. Those groups consider themselves as the rightful owners of this land because of the historical ties they have with it. Often there is more than one community who claim the same land. They however do not seek independent statehood, as traditional nationalist would do. Their goal is greater self-government. In Western Europe Catalonia and Flanders are examples of regions where substate nationalism is virulent. These nationalist groups tend to see the European Union as an opportunity through which they can achieve greater self-government and as a defender of their rights. They expect that membership of the EU ‘will weaken the authority of the central state government and allow the regions greater pursuit of their nationalist agendas’ (2004, p. 26).

The third type of nationalist strategies that Csergo and Goldeier describe is transsovereign nationalism. This type of nationalism shares the emphasis of traditional nationalism on the nation as being the unit through which political organization should take place. The nations however that seek transsovereign nationalism do not pursue border changes. Changing the borders is a strategy that is avoided by all means within Europe. The impact and cost of border changes are too high. So instead of pursuing this, the transsovereign nationalist seeks the creation of ‘institutions that maintain and reproduce the nation across existing state borders’ (2004, p. 26). Through certain policies the country wants to strengthen and support people from their nation who live in different countries. This kind of nationalism is also in favor of entering the European Union, because they expect to have better access to their nationals when they take place in this cooperative network together with their neighboring countries. Hungary is a good example of a country which has formulated a strategy to stay connected with the three million Hungarians living outside of Hungary’s borders.

Protectionist nationalism is focused on preserving the national culture. Such nationalism can be observed by majority groups who experience a threat from a growing minority. We see this kind of nationalism in Western European states in which the demographics have changed heavily through immigration in the last decades. These protectionist nationalists are usually in favor of the free market principle of the Union, but they start to be more skeptic now that the Union is growing and in their eyes starts to incorporate nations that are culturally different from current members. The Partij van de Vrijheid (PVV) in the Netherlands is an example of protectionist nationalism. They recently launched a website on which people could state their complaints about people from Eastern
Europe who are now working and living in the Netherlands because of the European agreements on free movement of people and labor within the Union.

2.4.3 Conclusion

As we have seen, political parties and elites can play an important role in the shaping of a public opinion on European integration. Important is how they construct and mobilize national identity and how they portray European integration. I therefore conclude that public opinion on European integration is interrelated with domestic politics. This is another theory I will test in my case study.

We have also seen that there are different types of nationalism and that not all of them are against European integration, some of them even use it as a vehicle to reach their aims. The goals of traditional nationalism conflict the most with European integration. Serbia is known for this traditional nationalism during the Milošević regime. Now that Yugoslavia is broken up in separate states, transsovereign nationalism has also become more relevant. The Serbs use different strategies to strengthen their connection with the Serbs living outside the territory of Serbia, in for example Montenegro, Republika Srpska or Kosovo. In my case study, I will reflect on the type of nationalist strategies that are used in Serbia nowadays.

2.5 Public opinion on European integration

In this last paragraph of my theoretical chapter I will focus on public opinion on European integration and the factors I found in the literature which are able to influence this public opinion. On January 22\textsuperscript{nd} of this year the population of Croatia had the chance to give their opinion on the EU membership of their country; 66% voted in favor. However, with 44%, the turnout of the referendum was relatively low. The accession agreement with Croatia was signed in December 2011 and after a few weeks of campaigning the Croats were now asked whether they supported their countries EU bid. All the political parties were pro EU membership, but there were several action groups and initiatives which campaigned against. In such a referendum peoples opinion has a direct influence on the continuation of the process of EU integration. Serbia is not in this stage yet, but people do have the possibility to vote for a pro-European government and thus at least have an indirect influence.

I define public support as ‘the attitudes held by the public which bear the potential to translate into implicit or explicit consent towards a particular policy or polity (Sigalas, 2010, p. 1343)’. In relation to the topic of my thesis, public opinion refers to whether the population of a (potential) candidate state, Serbia in my case, supports their countries membership of the European Union. Most of the research in this area focuses on (West European) member states and their attitude pro or against further integration. However, lately some research has focused on candidate states and the public opinion in these countries. Three sets of theories prevail as to what are the most important determinants for EU integration support: utilitarianism, domestic politics and social identity (Elgün & Tillman, 2007). The importance of nationalism for the public opinion on EU integration in research is often dealt with as an extreme form of identification with the nation and therefore integrated in the theories on
social identity. Given the relevance of this theory for my thesis, I will deal with this as a separate determinant.

2.5.1 Determinants of support for European integration

According to the utilitarian thesis people will base their opinion on European integration on the economic benefits they will receive through the European membership of their country. This theory thus focuses on the citizen as a rational actor whose choice pro or against European integration is largely based on instrumental considerations. People will have a positive attitude towards the European Union when they perceive that they individually or as a country will benefit from this (McLaren, 2004, pp. 903-904). Factors that play a role in this are the economic performance of a country and the EU, trade possibilities and the ability of a person to adapt to and gain from market liberalization (Tanaseoiu & Colonescu, 2008). Through empirical analysis it has been found that ‘those individuals who benefit personally are also more supportive of the integration project (C. J. Anderson & Reichert, 1996, p. 231)’. Depending on their educational level and occupation some people are likely to benefit more of EU integration than others, the human capital hypothesis. The higher the level of human capital of a person, the more likely they are to support European integration. In their research Elgün and Tillman (2007) find no prove that this also plays a direct role in candidate countries. They observe a different mechanism at work; the level of exposure to the economic consequences of EU membership. The effect of the utilitarian benefits will play an insignificant role as long as people have no experience with the economic consequences. They argue that the public opinion is dynamic and subject to change as a country goes through the accession process. Linking their opinion on European membership to their personal finances will only start to play a role when their country has taken significant steps on the road to EU accession and they gain experience with the economic benefits.

With regard to domestic politics as a determinant of support for European integration, there are two lines of argument. The first theory is that the level of support is positively related to the level of satisfaction with, and trust in, a countries regime. The average citizens understanding and knowledge of the EU is limited. Therefore, ‘individuals simply translate their attitudes about the domestic political system to the European level’ (Elgün & Tillman, 2007, p. 393). So, when people positively evaluate their own leadership and they are pro European integration, it is likely that people will trust and follow them. However, there has also been found prove for the opposite perspective. When there is a low degree of support for the sitting government, people will be more likely to support EU integration. In that case, people believe that the supranational governance of the EU will have a positive impact on the national government. This was the case with Bulgaria for example, where the population expected that EU membership would lower corruption, change mentalities for the better and improve the judicial system (Tanaseoiu & Colonescu, 2008). Research conducted among member- and candidate states show inconsistent results with regard to this theory.
The third set of theories that provides us with an explanation why people will vote for or against European membership is the set of theories on social identity. There are different theories on how identity influences attitudes towards the EU. A general assumption is that the presence of a European identity will lead to a more positive attitude towards the EU. Smith (1992, 1993) argues that national and European identities are in competition and that it is unlikely that a European identity will replace the national identity. According to him the emotional commitment for one’s nation will always be more important than the identification with Europe, because this identification lacks deeply rooted rituals and ceremonies. However, most others (Habermas, 2001; Ruiz Jiménez, et al., 2004) argue that national and European identities are compatible because they are based on different kinds of identification. Factors, such as the presence of a public debate over Europe (Duchesne & Frognier, 2007) and the way Europe is constructed and portrayed within a country (Hansen & Waever, 2002), influence the relationship between national and European identity. Because different relationships are assumed and measured between national identity and European identity it is hard to make universal claims. Therefore, in-depth studies of this relationship within a country, such as I propose to do on Serbia, are meaningful in creating a better understanding and adding something to the existing knowledge.

The fourth determinant for support of EU integration is the presence or absence of nationalism in society. Because although I agree with the majority of researchers that national and European identification are compatible, most research shows that nationalism is not compatible with European identification. It is possible for people to identify both with their own nation, as with the European Union. But nationalism can cause a barrier because it ‘claims that the nation should take primacy over all the other forms of social identification. On that basis, nationalism is able to command allegiance and loyalty against anything that could threaten (or be seen as threatening) the nation (national sovereignty) (Cinpoes, 2008, p. 11)’. It is thus the specific claim of national sovereignty within nationalism, which also is emphasized in the definition of Anderson, which functions as a barrier for the development of a European identity. In addition to that, in general people who highly value the sovereignty of their nation, will not favor transferring part of their countries authority to a supranational level: ‘strong identification with an in-group or hostility towards members of outside groups will reduce one’s support for policies that increase levels of political and economic integration with other societies’ (Elgün & Tillman, 2007, p. 394). This relationship is demonstrated for example in a research on attitudes towards the Euro. European identity moderated the relationship between nationalism and attitudes towards the Euro. The presence of nationalism had a negative effect on identification with Europe. And a lower degree of identification with Europe led to a more negative attitude towards the Euro (Meier-Pesti & Kirchler, 2003, p. 693). Also, (Elgün & Tillman, 2007, p. 394).

Some empirical analysis have also been carried out with regard to this relation with data from the Eurobarometer. In these studies people’s identification with the nation and the European Union is measured through a questionnaire. It was found that in countries with a strong feeling of national pride and attachment to national sovereignty, there was less compatibility between national and European identification (Ruiz Jiménez, et al., 2004).
is for example the case in Greece and Great Britain. Duchesne and Frognier (2007) focus on the role of national pride in the formation of a European identity. They found that national pride not necessarily has to be an obstacle for identification with Europe, this is only the case when they are seen by people as two groups which are competing. When people experience the EU as a growing power which poses a threat to the sovereign political community, the elites and mass media have a strong influence on people’s opinion on Europe. ‘When the public debate is focused on the EC, because of European elections, ratification of treaties or the introduction of the Euro, a strong national pride seems to hamper the growth of identification with Europe (Duchesne & Frognier, 2007, p. 6).’ This is not the case when Europe is not the topic of the daily debate, then national pride and European identification seem to be rather independent factors. The way Europe is portrayed and debated on thus has an influence on nationalism and public opinion. This is important to pay attention to in my case study.

2.5.2 Conclusion

It appears fruitless to seek for one determinant that can explain why people will vote pro or against European integration. The three determinants described above, all add to the understanding of the public opinion on European integration. Therefore I will look at all four determinants in order to evaluate to what extent they influence the public opinion in Serbia at the moment. The focus of my thesis is the influence of nationalism on the public opinion. This influence probably plays the biggest role in the theories on domestic politics and social identity. However, I will have to take into account that utilitarian arguments also play an important role in one’s public opinion and that this might be an alternative explanation in case nationalism appears to have only little or no effect. A gap in the literature on this topic is information on whether there are determinants which are more or less relevant when it is a post-conflict country which is joining the European Union. I have not been able to find any specific knowledge on this relation in the literature.

2.6 Conclusion chapter 2

In this chapter I have given a theoretical overview of the main concepts in my thesis. It has given more insight in the meaning of those concepts and also provided us with a framework for the analysis of my case study. I have concluded that the nation and nationalism are social constructions. They are man-made, as opposed to given and natural, and they are subject to change. The importance of national identity and nationalism can change through time and circumstances. We have seen that fear and insecurity causes a stronger identification with the nation. Also, political actors can use this to mobilize the population for their own goals. I will test this theory in my case study. I expect that nationalism has a relatively low importance, given the quite stable situation in Serbia. Furthermore, I have found that there is a relation between domestic politics and public opinion on European integration. I will also test this theory by assessing the importance of the political elite in the formation of the public opinion.
in Serbia. In the last paragraph I stated different determinants which could play a role in the formation of an opinion on European integration. I will test those theories and see how relevant they are in the case of Serbia.
Chapter 3: Serbian nationalism

3.1 Preview of the case study

The theoretical framework I built in the previous chapter will be my guideline in analyzing nationalism and the European integration process in Serbia. In order to study the influence of nationalism on the public opinion of European integration, Serbia presents us with an interesting case. After the nationalistic regime of Milošević, Serbia has chosen the new path of EU accession. This process, however, did not go as smooth as in neighboring country Croatia. The country was very divided as to whether they should integrate into Europe or not. Especially with regard to ICTY cooperation and Kosovo, it became visible that there were still conservative elements in society which did not want to comply with the conditions of the EU. Also the public has shown differing degrees of enthusiasm for European integration. Especially in the last years the public support has diminished. The question is what influences the public opinion of people. Do nationalist sentiments play a role in this? This comprehensive case study can provide us with a better understanding of the relation between nationalism, public opinion and European integration. The case study will consist of three chapters.

In the first chapter I will introduce Serbia as a country. In order to understand the nationalistic sentiments that are present in the society nowadays, I will shortly describe the role nationalism played during the wars during the break-up of Yugoslavia. Based on my theoretical conclusions I will look at national identity and nationalism as socially constructed phenomena. I will look at how nationalism is constructed and what meaning it has for the Serbs. I agree with Oberschall that the elite as well as circumstances can have great influence on the development of nationalism. In the case study I will pay specific attention to the role Kosovo plays in the nationalistic rhetoric.

In the second chapter I will turn to the European integration process of Serbia. I will give a description of where they stand at this moment and the dynamics surrounding the process. Here special attention has to be paid to the cooperation with the ICTY and Kosovo, since these have been topics in which the EU has used their strategy of conditionality and which have had a great influence on the progress of Serbia. As for the role of the political elite, I have concluded that the way they frame national identity and European integration influences the public opinion. Therefore I will describe how the political elite has portrayed European integration. Following the article of Csergo and Goldgeier (2004), I will look at the strategies used by the nationalist with regard to European integration and identify which strategie(s) are used in Serbia.

The last chapter focuses on the public opinion with regard to European integration in Serbia. I will present an overall picture of the public opinion and further zoom in on the different determinants described in this chapter: the utilitarian thesis, domestic politics, social/national identity and nationalism. I use these determinants and theories to highlight different aspects of the public opinion. In the conclusion I will look at the significance of each determinant for my case.
3.2 Introduction Serbia

In this chapter I will describe the (recent) history, the current economic situation and the political landscape of Serbia. After that I will turn to Serbian nationalism. I will look at the role nationalism has played during the wars that followed the collapse of Yugoslavia. Then I will turn to the role of nationalism in the current society. Given the constructed and changing nature of nationalism, it is impossible to present a blue print of what Serbian nationalism is in this chapter. I will however highlight some of the main characteristics, especially those which seem relevant in relation to European integration. The Serbian Radical Party, the most anti European party in Serbia, therefore presents us with an interesting case. Studying their ideology helps us to understand why Serbian nationalism, in the eyes of the nationalists themselves, is not compatible with European integration. I will therefore pay attention to the rhetoric and supporters of this party. I will also give more insight in the importance of Kosovo for Serbia. In the debates and ideas surrounding this province or state, nationalistic attitudes are very much at the forefront.

The Republic of Serbia: A country of a little more than seven million people in the middle of the Balkan region, bordering seven other countries. The capital is Belgrade where about one million people live. There are a few small minority groups, the biggest being the Hungarians with 3.9%. 85% of the population is Serbian Orthodox. The country takes the 59th place (out of 189) in the Human Development Index (UNDP, 2011). The economy of Serbia is weak and the unemployment rate is high. Corruption and a poor functioning rule of law are on the main issues the government is struggling with (Stanislawski, 2008).

3.2.1 Historical description

Giving a short overview of Serbia’s long, complicated and contested history is not an easy task. The information here is incomplete but complete enough to serve the goal of my thesis. The history of Serbia still plays an important role in today’s narratives and language. Serbia’s territory has always been at the border between East and West, and has known a lot of changes in rulers. In 1389 a battle takes place, which is still very present in the minds of the Serbs. The battle takes place in Kosovo Polje, a few miles from Pristina. The Serbs, under the command of Prince Lazar, were defeated by the Turks and the Serbian territory is absorbed by the Ottoman Empire. The battle of Kosovo Polje endures in the consciousness of the Serb people as the pivotal event of their history. For them, this battle brought disaster to the Serbian state, it took away their independence and ushered them into a long period of slavery under the Turks. ‘They were banished from a land which was the repository of all the most precious things they have created in their history (Helsinki-Committee, 2004, p. 3)’.

After five centuries, Serbia again becomes an independent state in 1878. The Turkish rule has left some visible traces (religion, architecture, food and traditional clothing) in Bosnia and Kosovo, but not so much in Serbia. In the beginning of the twentieth century, Serbia is invaded by the Austro-Hungarian Empire. They hold Serbia responsible for the death of Prince Ferdinand in Sarajevo. At the end of World War I, a Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes is formed, which later becomes the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The Serbs
have a leading role in this state, which causes tensions with the Croats within the Kingdom. During World War II, Yugoslavia becomes occupied by Germany. Their occupation was welcomed by the Croats, who saw the Germans as their liberators. Croat extremists (Ustaše) commit horrible crimes during this period, against everything that is not Catholic and Croat. Approximately half a million people die (Pesic, 1998).

In 1945, Josip Broz Tito wins the elections and he constitutes the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The federation contains six republics; Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia and Serbia. The republics for a large part kept their autonomy. Only foreign politics, economy, rule of law and defense were centrally organized from Belgrade. In 1974 the Serbian provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina, where large groups of minorities lived, also become autonomous provinces. Tito’s policy was designed to suit the differences between the republics and to create a balance of power between them. He dies in 1980, which led to increased tensions and growing differences between the republics (BBC, 2012).

In 1986 Slobodan Milošević was elected as the chairman of the ruling Communist Party in Serbia. He propagates a strongly nationalistic party program and gets elected as the President of Serbia. Six centuries after the battle of Kosovo Polje, Milošević returns to this battle ground. The Serbs in the Kosovo region are facing difficulties and oppression from the majority Albanian community. Milošević there tells the Serbs that no-one would ever be allowed to beat them. The speech comes seen as a rallying cry for Serb nationalism. In that year, Serb forces occupy Kosovo and the autonomy of Vojvodina is made undone (BBC, 2012).

In the following years, Yugoslavia starts to fall apart. By 1992 Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia & Herzegovina and Macedonia have seceded and Serbia and Montenegro become the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, but not without violence. The Serb minority in the Croatian Krajina region oppose secession. Backed by Belgrade, they declare their own independent Republic of Serbian Krajina. Heavy fighting takes place between the Croat and Serbian troops. This also has its impact on the neighboring and multicultural country Bosnia & Herzegovina.Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić, again backed by Belgrade, lead the Bosnian Serbs in their battle against an independent Bosnian state. They strive for unification of all Serbs in a Greater Serbian empire. War breaks out between the Bosnian (Muslim), Croat and Serb populations. On both sides there are attempts to create ethnically pure states through ethnic cleansing. The international community imposes sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In 1994, the Muslims and Croats sign an accord and join in the Muslim-Croat Federation. A year later, Croatia is able to recapture the Krajina region in a short war. Serbia slowly sees their dream of a Greater Serbia disappear. In that same year, the Bosnian Serbs capture the UN protected enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa and execute thousands of Muslim man and boys. In August 1995, after a bloodbath in Sarajevo, the international community intervenes with the bombing of Serbian targets in Sarajevo. In November 1995, the Dayton accords bring an end to the Bosnian war and the sanctions on Serbia are lifted. The Dayton accords envisage the establishment of an independent state,
consisting of a Bosnian Muslim-Croat entity and a Bosnian Serb entity (Republika Srpska), both about the same size (Pesic, 1998).

Meanwhile, tensions between the Albanian majority (90% of a population of approximately two million) and the Serb minority in Kosovo rise. In 1997 the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) starts to carry out attacks on Yugoslavian government officials and ethnic Albanians who are loyal to the government. This radical group strives for a Greater Albania and wants autonomy from Yugoslavia. The Serbs carry out counterattacks and violence escalates in the years to follow. Despite of the heavy involvement of the international community, a peaceful solution is not found. In 1999 the Serb parliament rejects NATO demands to send peacekeeping troops and a plan for autonomy for Kosovo. In March, NATO then starts its air strikes against Yugoslavia. In June the Kumanovo Treaty was signed; Serbia would withdraw completely from Kosovo and the NATO bombings would stop. The UN adopts UN Security Council Resolution 1244 through which Kosovo becomes UN protectorate but remains de jure part of Serbia (Helsinki-Committee, 2004).

Milošević won the elections in 2000 against Vojislav Koštunica, but they proved to be fraudulent. Mass street demonstrations ensued and protesters stormed the parliament. On October 5th, Milošević was forced to step down. Half a year later he was arrested and extradited to The Hague for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). He was charged with acts of genocide and war crimes. Milošević died in his cell in 2006 (Helsinki-Committee, 2004).

After the parliamentary elections in 2000, Serbia’s democratic government, led by Prime Minister Djindjic, committed itself to the European integration process in 2001. This was an important turn in Serbia’s foreign policy and marked a break with the Milošević-era of isolation. People were optimistic, the fall of the Milošević regime and the new ruling DOS coalition (Democratic Opposition of Serbia) were seen as a sign of radical change and hope for the future. (Teokarevic, 2011, p. 59) The assassination of Djindjic in 2003 by a commander of a special police unit put a temporary stop to the progress in Serbia. And also after 2000 territorial difficulties appeared for Serbia as the dissolution of Yugoslavia continued. In 2006 Montenegro votes in a referendum to separate from Serbia and declares its independence from Serbia. Two years later, Kosovo also declares itself independent. A majority of the international community has accepted Kosovo’s independence. The Serbian government does not. They remain to deal with Kosovo as if it is an internal part of the country. I will return to the importance and consequences of this later on.

3.2.2 Current situation

The current Serbian government was elected in July 2008 and is comprised of a coalition dominated by the Democratic Party (DS) and the Socialist Party (SPS- Milošević’s former party). Boris Tadic (DS) is the President. During the election in 2008 the most important parties were the Democratic Party, the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) and the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS). The DS presented itself as the ‘civic option’, promoting reforms and EU integration. The SRS is the nationalist party, which strongly opposes EU integration and
NATO membership. This party is officially still led by Vojislav Šešelj, who is indicted in the ICTY for war crimes. The DSS, led by Koštunica, presented a national and democratic option in between the two parties. In the autumn of 2008, this political landscape changed, when Tomislav Nikolic decided to break with the SRS and create a new party, the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS). With this party Nikolic suddenly positioned himself as Pro-European and thus distanced himself from the radicals (Teokarevic, 2011). The SNS soon gained popularity and Nikolic unexpectedly won the presidential election this spring. Together with the DS, which won the governmental elections, they are now the biggest party in Serbia. Nikolic sudden turn from a prominent member of the SRS to a pro-European leader, makes people skeptical about his real intentions. Some see it just as a move to gain popularity and are afraid he is less willing to adopt the EU conditions. We will have to see how this turns out in the coming months.

In contrast with the optimism which followed the arrest of Milošević, ‘there is a widespread pessimism and disillusionment which can be seen in every aspect of public live (Teokarevic, 2011, p. 59)’. The wars in the 90’s, the isolation and the sanctions imposed on Serbia and the global economic crisis, have led to a deep economic crisis and a significant drop in the living standards of the majority of the population. Some people are nostalgic and dream of going back to the Tito era of a communist Yugoslavia in which they experienced economic prosperity and freedom of movement. The inflation rate in Serbia is extremely high, about 20% of the population is unemployed and the average monthly income is the lowest of the entire region (CIA, 2012). With roughly 50% of the youth being unemployed, which causes a brain drain amongst the higher educated students (Djurovic, 2012). A small group of wealthy and influential tycoons possesses a large amount of Serbia’s riches. The government has not been able to find an effective strategy to deal with these pressing issues.

Besides the negativity with regard to the economy, there also seems to be disappointment with the democratic rulers amongst the population. People have lost the trust in the political system and the leaders are seen as untrustworthy and greedy (VIP, 2011e). A poll conducted in 2011 amongst 1300 students from 27 state universities, showed that 53 percent of students do not trust a single institution in the state. Only 2.9 percent of the students trusts the Serbian government, 1.9 percent the parliament en 3 percent the Serbian president. The more trustworthy institution according to the are the Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC) with 15.3 percent and the army with 10.5 percent (VIP, 2011d). With regard to the EU, polls showed that people for a long time were afraid they would become the new Turkey. They feared that the EU would keep imposing new conditions on Serbia without getting the actual results. Possibly the fact that Serbia has been granted candidacy, has changed this attitude. Unfortunately no polls are available yet. ‘After 11 years of transition and three years of economic crisis, it looks like the Serbian public is tired of the promises ‘about the European future’ and the unfulfilled expectations (VIP, 2011c)’. This is also blamed on the ruling party’s abuse of the European idea by some critics. In the elections many promises are made on what perspectives and wealth the EU integration will bring. The failure to translate this into reality causes a so called accession fatigue amongst the
population (Barlovac, 2011c). I will elaborate on this issue in the chapter about public opinion.

3.3 Serbian nationalism during the conflict

In the theoretical framework I concluded that national identity and nationalism are socially constructed phenomena. People have different social identities, their nationality being one of them. Identity is important to people because it shapes their self-image. Fear and insecurity can harden the boundaries between groups and make it possible for elites to manipulate the population on the basis of their identities. I will now describe how this theory has played out in the reality of the dissolution of Yugoslavia.

The communist federation of Yugoslavia was a carefully designed system to accommodate the differences between the ethnic nations. Balancing between the interests of the nations was difficult but necessary in order to not let the idea arise that one group was favored over the other. The paradox of this federal system was that on the one hand, the communist ideology did not accept the idea of nations. According to this doctrine, nations were a capitalist invention and their importance had to be diminished through the new common identity of the proletariat. On the other hand, the state structure was actually based on the power sharing of the nations and thus on an ethno-national idea. This federal arrangement was expressed in the Soviet formula, “national in form, socialist in content” (Pesic, 1998, p. 9). In the decision making this meant that issues almost always became “nationalized” and thus also led to national confrontations. There was not one nation that was able to dominate the state by its numbers. However, ‘since the founding of Yugoslavia, two distinct nationalist policies have struggled for primacy in the debate over the country’s political future: Croatian separatism striving for an independent state and Serbian centralism striving to preserve the common Yugoslav state under its dominion (1998, p. 8).’ For the Serbs, who had the members of their nation spread out over the entire Yugoslavian territory, the communist state was the solution for their national problem. Their political boundaries coincided with their cultural boundaries and all Serbs lived together in one state.

There was a general atmosphere of resentment amongst all the Balkan nations. They almost all had experienced some form of threat or aggression during one historical period or another. ‘The region’s history has witnessed successive campaigns for “Greater Serbia”, “Greater Croatia”, “Greater Albania”, “Greater Bulgaria”, “Greater Macedonia”, and “Greater Greece” (1998, p. 2).’ The League of Communists of Yugoslavia, the leadership of the state with Tito as the absolute leader, acted as the arbitrator to deal with the national conflicts within Yugoslavia. Through the actions of the League and Tito in order to maintain a balance of power almost all the national groups had felt unjustly treated at some point. This was especially the case with Serbia. In the 1974 constitution Serbia had a different position than the other republics, because its territory contained two autonomous provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina. Serbia therefore was not a sovereign negotiation partner like the other republics and the two provinces had the right to veto any change in the Serbian constitution. Efforts were made by Serbia to resolve this constitutional problem in the years
to follow, but without much success (Oberschall, 2000b, p. 992; Pesic, 1998, p. 15). This of
course frustrated the Serbian leadership.

In 1980 Tito dies. He was seen as the supreme arbiter and the only one being capable
of holding together Yugoslavia. His death provided the opportunity for the rise of ethno-
nationalism. In 1981 there is an out-break of nationalist demonstrations amongst the ethnic
Albanian population in Kosovo. The Serbian leadership used these demonstrations to
strengthen their arguments for a change in the constitution. ‘The Serbian Communist party
redefined Kosovo as an ethnic threat, tapping national myths surrounding Kosovo and the
history of the great Serbian medieval state. The federal government tolerated Serbia’s ethnic
reaction (Pesic, 1998, p. 16).’ The Serbian leadership wanted to regain control over Kosovo
territory and used the demonstrations and stories of oppression of Serbs by Albanians to
reinforce their story. In order to stop the “ethnic cleansing of Serbs”, the Serbian domination
had to be restored. A series of mass rallies took place, which all culminated in the speech of
Milošević on the battlefield of Kosovo on June 28, 1989. Half a million people were gathered
on the same place where Prince Lazar had fought against the Ottomans six hundred years
earlier. Lazars fight against the Ottomans and his death were seen as heroism. He died to
protect Serbia and the Orthodox Christianity. A form of protectionism also followed from his
death, the Serbs would not be defeated again (Di Lellio, 2009, p. 375). Milošević’s speech
successfully built upon these elements of Kosovo’s mythology. He stated that Serbia was
ready to take up the battle for the freedom and reunification of the Serbs. Yugoslavia and its
communist system weakened and the Serbian political and cultural elite started to fear that
this would destroy the fundamental Serbian goal, that all Serbs would live in one state. A
solution had to be found for this problem of the Serbian diaspora. The mobilization of the
Serbian diaspora in Croatia was started. Newspaper articles were published saying that the
situation of the Serbs in Croatia was even worse than in Kosovo. The Serbian nation became
redefined and depicted as an endangered species that needed to protect itself.

Memories of the atrocities the Serbs had suffered in World War II and the Ottoman
Empire were brought back and reignited the fear for the Croats and Albanians, or the Ustaše
and Muslims as they were named. Serbia presented itself as a victim, which was defending it
against the enemies who tried to destroy the nation. This narrative justified the violent acts
of the Serbs. (Bakić, 2009; Subotic, 2011) It provided the ‘conservative Serbian leadership
with a convenient taxonomy of real and fabricated Serbian grievances against Yugoslavia’s
other nations. By constantly returning to this repertoire of current historical wrongs, the
Serbian leadership was able to keep nationalist passions running high (Pesic, 1998, p. 18).’
This Serbian leadership consisted not only of politicians, but also of the Serbian intelligentsia
and the Serbian Orthodox Church, which had and has a prominent role in society. Further,
all media were controlled and used by the political elite to reinforce this picture. The news
became falsified and patriotic. It was impossible for people to check whether what they saw
was the truth. Because of the endless repetition and the fear they experienced people started
to believe it and act upon it. Through the election campaign in 1990 people were exposed
even more intensely to the bigotry, hatred and misinformation about the other nations.
(Oberschall, 2000b)
It is hard to explain exactly why the elite felt the need to bring back old atrocities and to present Serbia as a victim. It is too easy to say that their actions were purely instrumental to justify their political goals. So many people were involved that it seems reasonable to argue that at least some part of the political and religious elite were convinced that the Serbian nation was under threat and that they had to act in order to protect themselves and their citizens. The surrounding states also responded to the actions taken by Serbia with their own measures, which further increased the feelings of insecurity. And although the elite and media played an important role in the spread of nationalism, the question remains why people believed it and let themselves be mobilized. I have also reflected on this in the theoretical framework. When people experience fear and insecurity, which in this case could have been caused by actual threat and violence around them but also by the state structures that were unstable, the national identity of people can become more important. Oberschall (2000b) also analyzed why people let themselves be convinced and mobilized by the elite in Serbia. Why did people believe in the exaggerations presented in speeches and in the media? And why did such a large part of the population get involved in the grass-root ethnic actions? The answer he finds is that the Serbs had two frames through which they looked at the nations surrounding them, a normal frame and a crisis frame. The normal frame was for times of peace. In these periods the relations between the different ethnic groups were cooperative and neighborly. The national identity had little relevance for people and did not influence their contact with others. The crisis frame of the people in Yugoslavia was shaped through the collective memories of war, ethnic atrocities and brutality, stories which were anchored in family history. (Oberschall, 2000b, p. 998) Through the unrest in Kosovo, Milošević was able to awake this crisis frame again. Fear and insecurity caused people to go back to this old frame again and the people turned to the pattern of national identification again. This did not happen only in Serbia, but also in the other national groups. Thus, leaders like Milošević, Tudjman and Karadžić did not invent the crisis frame; they only had to activate it. ‘Fear and the crisis frame provided opportunities for nationalists to mobilize huge ethnic constituency, get themselves elected to office and organize aggressive actions against moderates and other ethnics (Oberschall, 2000b, p. 992)’. Once the violence had started the myths about the others and the memories of past atrocities all became real.

3.4 Serbian nationalism nowadays

One of the persons I interviewed during my time in Belgrade told me: ‘One of the biggest problems in Serbian politics is that there has never been a clean break with the past, with the ideology of Milošević’. Of course the violence and the mobilization of violence have stopped, but is it true that the idea of a Greater Serbia is still alive in politics? And to what extent is this still relevant to the general population? These are the questions I will try to answer here.

During the governance of Koštunica’s Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) a non-violent continuation of the nationalist project of Milošević can be observed. People who had high positions during the Milošević regime and who were on the EU visa-ban list were appointed to government positions again. Laws became adopted that should protect Serbia’s ownership
of Kosovo. And ‘a DSS campaign letter explicitly stated in 2006 that the removal of Milošević “did not represent a revolution or an overthrow, but rather a continuation” (Di Lellio, 2009, p. 378)’. The attitude that Serbia was the victim of crimes committed against them, and not by them, continued. The DSS during this period often sided with the Serbian Radical Party (SRS), which had won one third of the votes during the elections in January 2007 (Teokarevic, 2011). The presidential candidate of the SRS, Tomislav Nikolic, lost the presidential elections of 2008 from Boris Tadic with just 100,000 votes. After Nikolic decided to break with the SRS, the popularity of the party has gone downhill. However, its popularity four years ago, the current popularity of its former leader Nikolic and the anti-European stance of this party, give us reason to take a closer look at the ideology and supporters.

Extreme right in Serbia – the Serbian Radical Party
The SRS can be identified as an extreme right party. Most of the characteristics of other extreme right parties in Europe also apply to the SRS: extreme racism and/ or nationalism; authoritarianism; anti-Semitism; Islamophobia; antiliberalism; xenophobia; antiglobalism; anti-Americanism; homophobia and admiration for fascist and right-authoritarian regimes (Bakić, 2009). Those characteristics become evident in the speeches of the Radicals. During a rally following the arrest of Ratko Mladić for example, they spoke about their commitment towards a Greater Serbia including Kosovo, Montenegro and parts of Bosnia and Croatia. They recalled the memory of Prince Lazar who, according to them, died a martyr death to protect the Serbian Kingdom in 1389. Tadic, but also Nikolic, were seen as traitors for extraditing Mladić to the ICTY (VIP, 2011b). The nationalist also clearly oppose the Serbian membership in NATO and the European Union. The Euroscepticism does not take the form of hostility to Europe as such, ‘but towards any kind of federalism within the EU that could endanger the nations and nation-states of Europe (Bakić, 2009, p. 199)’. The position of the SRS towards NATO is heavily influenced by the role of NATO during the Kosovo war and the bombings which had to stop Milošević. At some sights in Belgrade the effects of those bombings are still visible. America is seen as the evil force behind NATO. Šešelj wrote in 2000: ‘Regarding us, the Serbs, we have to decide to what major power we shall ally ourselves in the process of integration. We have two options before us- to join the powers whose main aims and interests are to destroy us or to join those powers that want us to survive and defend our state and nation. … We exactly know which power want to destroy us. That is America (Šešelj, 2000, p. 32).’ The powers that are indicated as friends of Serbia are China and Russia.

I have given a description of the ideology of the extreme nationalists in Serbia. In times of the war this has led to the conquering of regions like the Krajina and to banishing of ethnic and religious minorities of the territory. Actual acts of violence and racism are now limited to frustrated individuals or extremist organizations. The SRS has altered its rhetoric after the indictment of Šešelj. When Nikolic took over the role of party leader the image became more moderate. The idea of a Greater Serbia stayed in their program, but they insisted that they would only fight for this by political means. The party program became
also more focused on the daily needs of the voters: jobs, free services of the state and good infrastructure (Beta-Weekly, 2008). The voters of the SRS resemble the average supporter of extreme-right parties in general: ‘Most of them are below average educated males, either unemployed or relying on routine manual labour, live in the suburbs of big cities or in small towns, and perceive a strong ethnic threat (Bakić, 2009, p. 194).’ Especially in the border regions, the ethnic threat plays a role in the political preferences of the population. In the regions that border Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, people perceive the most threat from other ethnic groups. A party which promises to protect their own ethnic group is therefore a logical choice for them. A research in 2005 amongst SRS supporters showed that there is a great disappointment in the political and economic circumstances in Serbia amongst the voters. They see themselves as the losers in the social transformation process that has started with the fall of the Milošević regime. As unskilled or unemployed workers they are hit extremely hard in the transformations towards a market-economy and in the economic crisis. The radicals promise easy and quick-fix solutions for these complex problems (Bakić, 2009). Tim Judah gives a nice illustration on how the economic circumstances motivate people to vote for the Radicals:

Take my old Serbian friend, Mosa. “Tadic is honest,” he says, “but those around him - thieves!” Whether that accusation is true or not, it is an inescapable fact that many around Tadic have done rather well in business since 2000. The problem is that Mosa has not and he resents that. In fact, he is not doing that badly. He used to have a chugging old car, which he said he could not afford to replace. Now he has a nice new one. So things are better? “No, they are worse than ever,” he says. “I have to pay the bank back for the loan on the car.” The result is that, furious at this indignity of having to borrow money, he votes for the nationalists. He does not care much about Kosovo or Bosnia, but he does know that the Radicals are in opposition and thinks that maybe things would be better if they were in power (Judah, 2008).

The SRS has seen a serious decline in its support after 2008, especially after Nikolic started his own party. During the latest rally the SRS organized after the arrest of Ratko Mladić the turn-out of 10,000 people was disappointing, compared to similar events in the past. The eruption of violence was limited and most of the protesters were actually ‘young hotheads’ and hooligans without any political motive (MacDowall, 2011).

Nationalism and the Serbian Orthodox Church

Another important element in the nationalist ideology is its connection with the Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC). This variant of the Christian faith is seen as a very important characteristic of the Serbian nation, which has always brought cohesion and unification. We clearly see the primordial aspect of nationalism coming back in the ideas of the century-old unity between the nation and the Orthodox faith: ‘Attitudes toward the national state have always been the acid test for distinguishing between honour and dishonour, patriotism and treason, faith and conversion […] National unity has always been grounded for more than a millennium in religious unity … even from prehistoric times (Šešelj, 2002).’ The nationalist
see their faith as something that others, the Ottomans and the Croatian ‘Ustaše’, have tried to take away from them and that they need to protect. The fact that they have been able to preserve it of course strengthens their ideology. The connection between nationalism and Orthodox Christianity causes a hostile attitude amongst nationalists towards the Islam and Catholicism, the last is seen as a less worthy kind of Christianity. Muslims who speak the same language as the Serbs are seen as traitors to religion and nation. They have let themselves be converted by the Ottomans and did not protect their religion (Bakić, 2009).

The Serbian Orthodox Church plays an important role in the Serbian society. They have an important influence, culturally and politically. Nationalism, state politics and religion are highly intertwined and the separation between church and state is rather vague. Drezgić describes this with the term, ‘religious nationalism’. This is also one of the issues in which Serbia finds an ally in Russia, where the Orthodox Church also plays an important role in the political life (Drezgić, 2010).

One of the aspects in the Serbian society, which is heavily influenced by the role of the Church, is the attitude towards the LGBT community. The case of the Pride Parade which took place in Belgrade in 2010 is a good illustration of these anti-Western attitudes and the actors involved. A large part of the Serbian population is homophobic and different sexual orientations are seen as unacceptable and treated like an illness (Helsinki-Committee, 2011, p. 56). The organizers of the Pride Parade received numerous threats and were warned through graffiti’s on walls in Belgrade, on websites and Facebook that they could expect violence when they would continue with the organization of the Parade. The SPC openly opposed the gay parade and ‘the right to publicly manifest one’s sexual orientation or any other personal preference, especially if it infringes the right of citizens to privacy and family life (Helsinki-Committee, 2011, p. 49)’. Extreme right organizations, such as Obraz, openly threatened supporters of the Parade, with quotes as ‘We’ll be waiting for you’. A poll conducted by CeSID (Centre for Free Elections and Democracy), showed that 56% of the respondents considered homosexuality as a threat to society, 5% is ready to use violence against homosexuals and 20% would approve this kind of violence (Helsinki-Committee, 2011, p. 48). The state provided the security to let the Parade take place. 5600 police officers were on the streets to prevent violence. Unfortunately, they were not capable to prevent all violence, and riots erupted on a large scale. 120 people were injured, of which 80 were police officers. There were roughly 6000 perpetrators, most of them were young people and football hooligans. This is the same type of group which was involved in the attack on the US Embassy following the independence of Kosovo. It is speculated that besides extremist organizations, also political parties are involved in the mobilization and organization of the hooligans. At least in case of this Pride Parade, the Orthodox Church supported the actions ideologically. They officially condemned the violence, but at the same time representatives of the church were seen between the hooligans and the St. Marko’s Church served as a gathering place for the rioters during the day. As for the political parties, the DSS, SNS, SRS are mentioned as mobilizing forces behind the demonstrations. During the riots the offices of the governing Democratic Party and the Socialist Party were attacked. Analyst say the demonstrations and riots during the Parade were not only targeted against the LGBT
community, but also against the pro-European orientation of the government and the progressive new route Serbia was taking (Helsinki-Committee, 2011).

The Kosovo myth and victimization of Serbia

In the paragraph on the history of Serbia, I already described the special relation Serbia has with Kosovo. The Kosovo myth is still important in the current political situation. With the pressure of the EU to find a solution for Kosovo before Serbia can enter the Union, Kosovo is a hot topic. Because of these discussions the nationalist sentiment is still very pronounced today (Lazić & Vuletić, 2009). The Kosovo myth is about borders and about sacrifice; the Serbs have sacrificed themselves to protect the Christian society, and therefore the civilized world. The speech of Koštunica on 21 Februari 2008, after Kosovo’s declaration of independence, gives an insight in the emotional attachment and identification that is felt with Kosovo:

‘Kosovo- that’s Serbia’s first name. Kosovo belongs to Serbia. Kosovo belongs to the Serbian people. That’s how it has been for ever. That’s how it’s going to be forever. There is no force, no threat, and no punishment big and hideous enough for any Serb, at any time, to say anything different but, Kosovo is Serbia! Never will anyone hear from us that … the place where we were born is not ours; we and our state and our church and everything that makes us what we are today! If we as Serbs renounce Serbianhood, our origin, our Kosovo, our ancestors and our history- then, who are we Serbs? What is our name then? (Tanjug, 2008)’

With the exception of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) all the larger political parties take the same stance: Kosovo belongs to Serbia and we do not accept its independence. It is most often portrayed as that for the Serbs, giving up Kosovo would mean giving up part of their identity. The myth of Prince Lazar, the century old monastries, the small Serbian minority living in the North of Kosovo; these are the elements that are brought up in the emotional and nationalistic speeches and statements with regard to Kosovo. A poll conducted in 2010 shows that 73.1% of the population indicates that they want Kosovo to remain part of Serbia. The poll also shows that 62.3% is not willing to take up arms for this (Gallup, 2010).

It is too easy to label the strive to preserve Kosovo as only a signal that the old nationalism of the Milošević era is still present in the country. ‘The Serb reaction is not quite as uniform as it may initially appear, nor it is based purely on irrational reactions and historical and national mythology (Obradovic, 2008)’. The reactions to the declaration of independence from Kosovo does not only stem from the concerns about the fate of Kosovo, but also from a perceived mistreatment of Serbia by the international community and a sense of injustice. For most people the idea of Kosovo as ‘the heart of Serbia’ is not the main reason why they protest against its independence. They strongly feel that they have been treated unjustly by the US and the EU. Obradovic (2008) describes the two dominant discourses on this topic as the emotional and the pragmatic. The emotional discourse is voiced by parties such as the DSS and nowadays also the SNS. They dwell on the beliefs which are popular amongst a large section of the population that there is a conspiracy of the West against...
Serbia. They identify outside actors as the ones responsible for the deprived situation of Serbia. This image of Serbia as a victim, first because of the actions by their neighboring countries and now because of the actions of the international community, is strong in the popular opinion. They especially feel unjustly treated by the international community, by NATO and the European Union. The acknowledgement of Kosovo’s independence by most EU countries leads them to believe that Serbia is always seen as the bad-guy and will always be blamed by the international community. Studies show that a large part of the population refuses to believe that Serbs actually have committed war crimes. They have the feeling that the ICTY and the EU are biased and that heavier burdens are placed on the Serbs than on any other country (Subotic, 2011). I will elaborate on this in the following chapters on the public opinion of Serbia’s EU integration. The pragmatic discourse is embodied in the DS and Tadic, which focus more on the legality of Kosovo’s independence and emphasize the territorial integrity of the Republic of Serbia. This is less appealing to the population and therefore he is also trying to balance between the popular opinion and his diplomatic role as a statesman.

3.5 Conclusions chapter 3

In this chapter I have introduced my case, Serbia, and I have dealt with the role of nationalism in former and contemporary Serbia.

In the theoretical chapter I looked at three influential approaches with regard to nationalism. Smith, in his definition of a nation, emphasizes the shared history, myths and symbols as the core of the nation. We have seen that the battle of Kosovo Polje has an important place in the Serbian history and nation. Today, references are still made to this battle and graffiti’s can be found of the number 1389. However, this history is not a static fact. It is given meaning and importance through the action and speech of people. Nowadays Prince Lazar is a symbol of heroism and sacrifice. For some the battle has become the reason that they do not want to give up Kosovo. This constructed and changing nature of the nation and nationalism is emphasized in the definitions of Gellner and Anderson. The latter sees the nation as an imagined community which is conceived as a comradeship and fraternity. What is interesting is that Anderson describes the development of the nation as substitute for religion. In Serbia religion still is a very influential part of nationalism. The Serbian Orthodox Church is seen as the element in Serbian history that has been constant and which has been the carrier of the Serbian culture through time. Gellner also looks at the political and organizational aspects of the nation and the role of the elites in this. Nationalism in his definition is the political principle that the national and the political unit should be congruent. During the wars following the dissolution of Yugoslavia, this principle was followed in his extreme form in order to create a Greater Serbia. Nowadays, there are only few people who support this, let alone fight for this.

The social identity of people consists of multiple kinds of identification, which can differ and change in importance. Identification with Serbia and the Serbian nation can be part of the social identity of Serbs. The importance this has can differ per person, but also change through time. Circumstances such as demographic changes, scarcity of goods, state
breakdown or conflict can cause such change and also a hardening of the boundaries between groups. This can eventually lead to exclusion, discrimination and even violence. Leaders can use and manipulate the feelings of insecurity. The interplay between the history in the region, the fears and insecurity amongst the Serbian population, together with the actions of political leaders has played an important role in the outbreak of violence in the former Yugoslavia. The frame which people used to think about and look at their own nation and the surrounding nations, evolved from a normal frame into a crisis frame. In this crisis frame nationalism was able to become extreme and violent. I argue that Serbia has returned to its normal frame, in which nationalism still exists but not in the extreme form it had during the rule of Milošević.

Given the constructed and changing meaning of nationalism it is hard to give any hard numbers about the support of nationalism. What is clear is that much has changed since the 90’s. There are no parties which are openly mobilizing violence and people for the goal of creating a Greater Serbia, like Milošević did. The speeches of Koštunica around the declaration of independence of Kosovo did show similarities with the rhetoric of Milošević (Obradovic, 2008). But the Serbs are cautious and critical and do not want to return to the violence of the 90’s. If people could choose between a job and money versus Greater Serbia, the large majority will choose the first. The relative low turn-out at the demonstrations following the capture of Mladić, can be seen as a sign that more people are turning away from the past and want to focus on the future. Hooligans and supporters of extreme-right organizations cause turmoil and unrest during demonstrations. They however are not representative for the ordinary Serb.

Votes for more nationalistic parties, such as the SRS, DSS and to some extent the SNS, or the rallies that have taken place, are rarely only about the historic attachment to Kosovo, or the heroism of the ICTY indictees. With these actions, people also show their disappointment in the government and frustration with the economy. The motives to support more nationalistic politicians are therefore not as homogene as they appear in first instance. The economic situation is Serbia is bad and people have been promised change and improvement since 2000. They blame their own government, but also the EU and US for this. A broadly shared sentiment among the Serbian society is the feeling that they are victims of Western and anti-Serbian measures. Looking at the social identity theory I dealt with in the previous chapter, this is not such a strange reaction. In order to get a positive self evaluation people often diminish their own role and faults and blame others for the situation they are in.
Chapter 4: Serbia’s EU integration

In this chapter I will assess Serbia’s integration into the European Union. I will describe the steps the country has taken so far and the political dynamics surrounding this. I will pay special attention to cooperation with the ICTY and the relation with Kosovo in this, since these have been the biggest stumbling blocks for Serbia on its way to accession. Then I will take a closer look at the role of the political elite in framing Serbia’s integration. In the first chapter I already discussed the importance of how the elite constructs and mobilizes national identity and how they portray European integration, so I will create a deeper understanding of this.

4.1 Steps towards accession

Not only the Serbs reacted full of optimism and enthusiasm to the capture of Milošević in 2000. Also the international community immediately rewarded Serbia for its action. It led to a radical change in the policy the EU had adopted towards Serbia. The EU lifted its economic sanctions, offered a trade-agreement and promised Serbia billions of dollars of reconstruction aid in the following years. ‘In November 2000, only a month after Milošević’s deposing, the EU officially endorsed the Stabilization and Association Process for Serbia and other countries of the Western Balkans (Subotic, 2010, p. 599).’ The ruling democratic coalition, headed by Prime Minister Djindjić, adopted a foreign policy that was focused on accession to the EU. Serbia had to become a democratic and open society:

‘We want European structures and standards to become part of our society; and for our state to become an equal member of the European community of states. Our task is to affirm European values everywhere we act, and to prepare the country for a true European integration (Kostovicova, 2004, pp. 24-25).’

The assassination of Djindjić in March 2003 led to a significant drop in progress towards integration. Košćunica was not as committed to Europeanization, and especially cooperation with the ICTY, as his predecessor. As a consequence the negotiations on the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) were suspended in May 2006. The situation was further complicated by the deterring relation between Serbia and Montenegro. A year after the suspension, the dialogue between Serbia and the EU was reopened. Serbia had signed the Action Plan on cooperation with the ICTY and created the National Security Council, which supervises the activity of the secret services.

In 2008, the SAA is signed by Tadic and ratified by the pro-European majority in the Serbian parliament. The DSS voted against; they argued that the issue of Kosovo should be discussed and secured first, because taking further steps towards the EU would indirectly mean recognition of Kosovo’s declared independence (B92, 2008). The SRS abstained from voting, although they were clear on not supporting EU integration. Around the same time Nikolic broke with the SRS and made a U-turn and became pro-Europe. Also the SPS, the Socialist party of Milošević, had adopted a pro-European identity. At that time thus, the
majority of the political parties had a clear pro-European vision. However, the SAA would not come into force until it was ratified by all European countries. The Netherlands obstructed this ratification process by conditioning their ratification upon full cooperation with the ICTY, which meant the indictment of Goran Hadzic and Ratko Mladić. It was only in February of this year, after both men were captured, that the Netherlands ratified the SAA. In the mean time other instruments were used to prevent the discouragement of the Serbian population and government. Serbia was granted a visa-free regime for Serbian citizens traveling to the Schengen area and an Interim Agreement on Trade, which was specially designed for Serbia and provided it with trade and custom privileges (Stanislawski, 2008; Teokarevic, 2011). In 2009 Serbia officially applied for EU membership. Besides reforms and ICTY cooperation, another major theme has been neighborly relations. The political relations with Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina have seen significant improvement over the years. There is regional cooperation of judiciaries and police departments to fight crime and corruption. Tadic has also taken steps towards reconciliation by visiting the countries, meeting the presidents and passing a resolution that condemns the genocide in Srebrenica. The relation with Kosovo has caused more problems, as I will deal with later. It was only after an agreement was reached in the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia, that the European Council was willing to grant Serbia the official candidate status for EU membership on the first of March 2012. They have not been given a date to begin accession talks.

4.2 ICTY cooperation and Kosovo

Serbia has been lagging behind on its road to accession compared with the other Yugoslav countries. The main reasons for this were not the technical reforms that were needed - in for example public administration, police, and judiciary - but far more the political conditions which were stipulated in the Copenhagen criteria. These include good neighborly relations, regional cooperation and respect for international obligations, which came down to cooperation with the ICTY. It have been these goals that have cost Serbia a great amount of time in their way to accession. Over the course of the last decade there has not been real commitment and enthusiasm to cooperate with the ICTY. The attitude of the government has alternated between showing no cooperation at all, because of ‘the alleged lack of impartiality of the ICTY and of the EU towards Serbia (Teokarevic, 2011, p. 72)’, and cooperating half-hearted because they were pressured to do so.

ICTY cooperation

In 2006 the accession negotiations were stalled because Serbia was not showing enough effort and willingness in their cooperation with The Hague. Reports are written periodically by the ICTY prosecutor, which evaluate Serbia’s cooperation. These reports are send to Brussels and provide an important guideline in their decision on the process of EU membership, but also on financial aid, investments and trade assets. ’Because cooperation with the ICTY was a measurable indicator – the number of suspects arrested and transferred
to The Hague and the number of documents and testimonies sent could all be classified, systematized, and easily counted – it soon became the major, if not the only, EU measurement of how far along Serbia was in adopting the idea of addressing crimes from its recent past (Subotic, 2010, p. 600). In their approach of conditionality, the EU used both the “carrot” and the “stick”. Delivering suspects of war crimes to The Hague has often led to direct rewards and signs of deficient cooperation have led to suspensions of negotiations and decisions. The effectiveness of this strategy is debated. On the one hand it seems clear that without the pressure of the EU, not all suspects would have been arrested and transferred to The Hague. It thus can be seen as a success for international justice (Teokarevic, 2011). On the other hand, the question remains whether the extradition of Serbian suspects actually indicates the readiness of Serbia to deal with its past and has gone to actual deep transformations. Subotić (2010) is critical at this point. She argues that the “trade-in character” has given the Serbian elite the opportunity to actually not deal with the past and delegitimize nationalist ideologies. It provided the elite with a strategy to sell the extraditions to the public ‘as a purely benefits-driven arrangement that would not require politics or ideology to change (p. 612)’. Therefore actual debates on the possible guilt of these indictees have never taken place. It could be an explanation as to why still 50 percent of the Serbian population still thinks that Mladić and Karadžić are not responsible for the war crimes for which they were charged (Ristic, 2012). The way Croatia and Serbia have dealt with this matter has been very different. Croatia cooperated with the ICTY because they saw it as their obligation as a European country and wanted to respect the rule of law. The elites there presented it as part of their social norms and culture. The Serbian elites ‘cooperated because they felt coerced and bullied’ (Subotic, 2011, p. 325). They presented it as something that had to be done in order to avoid international punishment.

Looking at the moments at which key arrests have been made, the idea of using the arrests as a political instrument can hardly be neglected. In 2005 Koštunica adopted the strategy of “voluntary surrenders”. This strategy, which was also used in Croatia, guaranteed the suspects that surrendered voluntarily that they could return to Serbia while they were on bail and that their families would get financial assistance. With the help of the Serbian Orthodox Church and media offenses, the surrenders became framed as a patriotic act and not so much as acts of justice. It led to the surrender of three generals who were awarded with send-off meetings with representatives from the church and government. This way it could be sold to the domestic public while at the same time also satisfying the international community. At that time, Serbia needed to secure their position in the status negotiations on Montenegro and Kosovo. In 2008 the new government made a clear signal that they differed from their predecessors by arresting Karadžić when they were two months in power. This of course immediately led to a more positive attitude of the EU towards Serbia. The arrest of Mladić however needed some time. Precisely at the moment when the EU was making a decision on the potential candidate status of Serbia, Mladić was arrested. Although openly rejected by the Serbian government, the circumstances under which Mladić was arrested do seem to signal towards a strategic plan. The fact that Mladić, as the most wanted fugitive within Serbia for years, was found in a relative’s home in Northern Serbia...
while not having a false identity suggests that there were elements within the Serbian government that were protecting Mladić. It also suggests that Mladić’s transfer occurred within the context of [...] some form of bargaining between Belgrade, Brussels and The Hague (Arnold, 2012).’ Unfortunately for Serbia, the arrest of Mladić did not automatically lead to the candidate status. First, the EU wanted to see results in another pressing issue, the dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo.

Kosovo

Tadić won his elections in 2008 with the slogan “both Kosovo and Europe”, clearly setting the two priorities for his government; getting the candidate status and protecting Serbia’s territorial integrity. The relation between Serbia and Kosovo is also a priority for the EU, but they have a different reason for this. The EU does not want to bring a new conflict into their borders, afraid that this will destabilize the union as a whole. Therefore their demand is that Kosovo and Serbia together work out a solution. Kosovo and Serbia agreed to participate in the EU facilitated dialogue, which started in March 2011. The dialogue was intended to focus on technical issues, which would improve the situation especially for people living in the border region. Examples of the discussed topics were freedom of movement for citizens, recognition of diplomas and number plates. The public discourse however, soon became focused on the differences in the position on status. Partition of Kosovo was discussed by politicians, in which case the Serb-dominated Northern Kosovo would become part of Serbia. With later the added possibility of giving the Albanian-dominated Preshevo valley in the South of Serbia to Kosovo (Hoogenboom, 2011). The nationalist rhetoric and emotional attachment to Kosovo was regularly voiced in these discussions. Deputy Prime Minister and Interior Minister Ivica Dacic left the official government policy line and more than once made provocative statements. In May 2011 he said: ‘We are slowly losing Kosovo, if we fail to do something. Our situation is daily becoming more and more unfavorable. The UN Security Council Resolution 1244 is, it turns out, a scam. While we respected Constitution and international law, some countries of the international community recognized Kosovo’s independence behind our backs (VIP, 2011a).’ And in November: ‘Kosovo Prime Minister Hashim Thaci needs to know that by attacking Serbs in Kosovo he is also attacking Belgrade […]. We should go to war over Kosovo if necessary (Press, 2011)’. Each agreement that was reached by the negotiators of Pristina and Belgrade was subject to renewed discussions on the status of Kosovo. The opposition parties used these steps to prove that the sitting government was only interested in EU membership and that they were no longer taking care of the Serbian interest (Barlovac, 2011a).

The situation between Kosovo and Serbia escalated in the summer of 2011. Kosovo had deployed its Customs to two border crossings with Serbia to enforce the ban on goods from Serbia. This angered the local Serbs living in the North of Kosovo. It led to rioting, the demolishing of a border post and the killing of a Kosovar policeman. Both Kfor and NATO stepped in to guard the border after the unrest. This clash put a temporary halt on the dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina. The EU commission therefore also postponed its decision on Serbia’s candidacy. They first wanted the parties to resume the dialogue, which
they did at the end of November. In February an agreement was reached on the international representation of Kosovo, which had been one of the most difficult issues during the negotiations. The EU praised the deal and affirmed that Serbia had now removed a second and important obstacle. The EU commission in March decided to grant Serbia the candidate status. Although the parties have made an important step forward through the dialogue, still a permanent resolution for Northern Kosovo has not been found.

The Kosovo issue is used on the Serbian side as well as on the European side to get results from the other party. Tadic warned the EU that Serbia, and the Western Balkans alongside it, ‘could once again sink into the darkness of nationalism and tolerance’ if the EU would delay and put new conditions for EU membership (B92, 2011). The international community feared that the nationalists would have won the elections if Serbia would not have been granted candidacy status in March. The EU is aware of such dynamics and has also made strategic decision in the process to strengthen the pro-European forces in Serbia (Subotic, 2010). They do not want to bring a new conflict in their “backyard”, but on the other hand they are aware that they could diminish the chances of a new conflict breaking out by keeping Serbia on the EU track.

That almost all European countries have supported the independence of Kosovo has not made European integration more popular in Serbia. ‘The prospect of losing Kosovo was deeply felt and widely perceived as a profound blow to Serbian identity and the Serbian state (Subotic, 2011, p. 325).’ The sense of loss and betrayal was shared amongst all political parties and angered the elite and the population. This only further strengthened the view of the Serbs that they were not treated fairly. The issue of Kosovo became very much conflated with the process of EU integration in the minds of the Serbs. For them EU membership of Serbia translates into the renunciation of Kosovo, since almost the entire Union agrees that Kosovo is no longer an integral part of Serbia. The EU has actually not set the acceptation of Kosovo as an independent state as an official condition for Serbia’s accession. On the other hand, the Copenhagen criteria require a normalization of relations with neighboring countries. And the question of Kosovo is taken into account when the European Commission formulates its opinion on Serbia’s eligibility for candidate status. It is not strange that this difference is not very clear to the ordinary Serb. So, although Kosovo recognition is not an official precondition for Serbia’s EU integration, it certainly influences Serbia’s relation with Europe and its attitude towards integration (Stanislawski, 2008).

4.3 The elite’s framing of EU integration

Except for their partnership with Russia, Serbia was in a very isolated position during the 90’s. The policy of Milošević was targeted against the EU, the US and NATO and they were depicted as the enemy. When the new Democratic elite came to power after 2000 they had to break with this narrative and create a new one in order to legitimize their direction towards Europe. Kostovicova (2004) calls this process ‘symbolic spatial repositioning’. The new narrative should make clear that Serbia had a righteous, and even central, place in Europe, ‘underpinned by invoking the European character of their national political, historical and
cultural heritage (p. 24). This process has not only take place in Serbia, but also in other East Central European countries that made a sudden shift after the fall of communism. The EU provided an attractive opportunity, economically (because it meant accession to the European market economy and investments and donations), politically (because the clear goal of working towards accession gave them direction and a break with the past) and culturally (because it meant adopting the Western value system) (Lazić & Vuletić, 2009).

There are two dimensions of being, or becoming, European; the utilitarian dimension and the affective dimension (Ristić, 2007). The utilitarian dimension emphasizes the economical benefits for Serbia as a member of the European Union. The affective dimension stresses the position of Serbia as a nation-state which emotionally identifies and is in solidarity with Europe. These two dimensions reflect what has been also called Europe-as-EU, emphasizing the procedural/institutional aspects of Europe and Europe-as-identity, focusing on the experiential/cultural aspects.

In the direction chosen by Djinjić after the fall of Milošević, we see that the two dimensions of being European, Europe-as-EU and Europe-as-identity, both had their place. His position found resistance, especially in the more conservative circles, which were very critical on the cooperation with international justice institutions and the extradition of Milošević. They were afraid that their national legacy would vanish and portrayed themselves as the patriotic force. After the assassination of Djinjić, Koštunica, one of the conservatives, came to power. He separated the two dimensions of being European in his policy. As we have seen, he rejected the unconditional cooperation with the ICTY which was very much intertwined with the meaning of Europe-as-identity. He endorsed the institutional process, but rejected the norms and values of Europe. This led to a very mixed message; they blamed the EU for anti-Serbian policies and at the same time they still wanted to become a member of the Union. This ambivalent message has continued throughout the years and plays a very important role in the way the elite constructs Europe. ‘Europe was imagined as taking something away – territory (Kosovo), national pride (the humiliation of losing the Balkan wars), collective memory of the past (by writing a new historical transcript at The Hague) (Subotic, 2011, p. 321).’ Interestingly enough, the Kosovo myth both legitimized Serbia’s belonging to Europe, while at the same time gives reason to denounce Europe. In the speeches of church and government representatives in 2008 we see that Kosovo is depicted as the place where the Serbs have protected Europe and the Christian civilization, which has made Serbia ‘more European than Europeans themselves (Di Lellio, 2009, p. 379)’. On the other hand Europe is blamed for making the wrong decision in accepting Kosovo’s independence.

Besides this present image of Serbia as a victim and Europe as a bully, two other factors can be indicated which have shaped the way Europe is framed by the elite. Firstly, there are people from the old regime from Milošević’s rule that are still in power nowadays. They are in politics, intelligentsia, church and military, and they do not wish for anything to change. This is considered a powerful force which still has an influence on decisions made in Serbia. These people have no interest in the influence of the European Union in their country. For some of them because it will mean that their power will diminish, others actively block
transitional justice projects because they have been involved in inciting or conducting crimes (Subotic, 2010). Another important aspect is the close ties Serbia has with Russia. This is brought up every now and then by the Serbian elite as an alternative for EU integration. There is a strong cultural connection between those countries through the ‘loyalty to the Russian Orthodox brothers and a long-practices politics of populist authoritarianism (Di Lellio, 2009, p. 376)’ in both countries. And Russia is not pushing for cooperation with the ICTY and the independence of Kosovo. This makes Russia an interesting alternative for the Serb conservatives. Russia is often pictured as a friend and Europe as a foe, as becomes clear in the following statement by Nikolic: ‘It would be ideal if we could be with both Russia and the EU, but these two unions are very different. EU only blackmails, humiliates, seizes our territory, while Russia helps (Subotic, 2011).’ Looking at it from the affective dimension, Serbia easier identifies with Russia than with Europe. From a utilitarian perspective Russia is not a better alternative, given that the lion’s share of Serbia’s foreign trade is with the EU and the EU has been investing far more than Russia in funds and donations.

These three dimensions, the victimization of Serbia, the power of the old regime and the special ties with Russia, together lead to what Subotic (2011) calls identity divergence with regard to the process of Europeanization. This ‘is a mechanism by which domestic coalitions resist norms and rules of Europeanization and instead define the national community in contrast to Europe (p. 310)’. According to her this mechanism explains why Serbia’s EU candidacy derailed and takes so much time compared to for example Croatia. When the identification with Europe and the European idea is less contested, the country has the possibility of going through the process of adopting EU rules much faster. In Serbia it lacks such a shared European idea and the European picture that is presented is not that positive.

A research was conducted by Lazić and Vuletić (2009) to compare the EU orientation, as opposed to a nation-state orientation, amongst the Serbian political (n=80) and economic elite (n=40). The questions were not so much related with identification with Europe or the nation-state, but more with the preferences on practical issues, such as whether or not the power of the European Parliament should be strengthened or whether they had a preference for a national or single European army. On the basis of these questions they developed an index which indicated whether people were more oriented towards Europe or the nation-state. With interpreting such research we have to keep in mind that the preferences of people are often not so black and white and they can be overlapping. Lazić and Vuletić (2009) found that of the Serbian political elite, 68,8% had a pro-European orientation and 97,5% of the economic elite. None of the people in the economic elite group said they were oriented towards the nation-state, as opposed to 15% of the political elite. Expected is that the pro-European attitude of the economic elite can be explained by the early economic and trade benefits they experience from EU membership. Politicians also have to be more sensitive to the public opinion. Orientation towards the EU is strongly connected to the affiliation with a political party. As expected, the parties on the far-right of the political spectrum have the least pro-European attitude and expressed the greatest support for the nation-state. It appears that EU orientation is also connected to the level of education of the respondents.
The higher educated a person is, the more likely he or she is to support EU membership. This confirms the description I have given of the composition of the supporters of the SRS. Gender, religious affiliation and experience in a European country through work or studies did not show any significant correlation with an orientation towards the EU or nation-state. Through comparison with other countries, Lazić and Vuletić (2009) also look at the impact of ‘endangered sovereignty’ on the nation-state orientation. In Serbia they such an endangered sovereignty is experiences because of the secessionist threat of Kosovo. Their hypothesis is confirmed that indeed this threat increases nation-state orientation and decreases pro-EU attitudes. They also find that compared to other countries ‘the Serbian elite has the most divided opinion on the issue of support for the EU as opposed to the nation state (p. 996)’. This confirms the idea that there is a real split in the Serbian society between conservatives and reformers, which are both a strong force. For Tadic as the President this means that he constantly has to balance between those two competing blocks. On the one hand, he needs to satisfy the EU in order to progress in the integration process, on the other hand he cannot be too progressive because that will lead to too much opposition from the conservative forces.

This dynamic was present in the campaigns leading up to the elections on May 6th. The rhetoric of the nationalist parties in the election campaign was that Tadic was willing to trade Kosovo for EU membership. This of course led to a reaction from Tadic and the DS, in which they firmly stated that they would never give up Kosovo. ‘We will not recognize Kosovo, I am still the President today and tomorrow (B92, 2012a)’. Nikolic stated during his campaigning that Serbia has ‘two doors’, one to the West and one to the East, the EU and Russia. He said not to ‘anger the EU unless faced with impossible conditions (B92, 2012b)’. The parliamentary elections were won by the DS, but the presidential elections on May 20 are won by Nikolic. It is hard to predict what this will do to the European path in the upcoming years.

4.4 Conclusion chapter 4

Political integration into the European Union means that a country shifts ‘their loyalties, expectations and political activities to a new centre (Haas, 1958).’ Consequently this integration is not just about meeting the technical demands, but also about changes in the political character and culture of a country. The EU uses conditionality as a tool to lead countries through this process and pressure them to comply with certain rules. This has played a big role in Serbia, where member states have set clear goals with regard to ICTY cooperation and cooperation with Kosovo. Especially those political requirements from the Copenhagen criteria have caused difficulties in the accession process of Serbia.

In my theoretical chapter I concluded that political actors play an important role in the construction of how people within a country look at and value the EU. In this chapter I have dealt with the accession process and the specific role of the political elite in this in Serbia. The position of extreme right with regard to Europe in Serbia seems to be compatible with the position that is taken often by extreme right parties, as was found by De Vries and Edwards (2009). They see and present Europe as a threat to the national sovereignty and
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national identity. This is also what Csergo and Goldgeier (2004) described as the strategy that fits a traditional nationalism. Traditional nationalism, as it manifested itself in Serbia during the conflict, is conflicting with European integration because it poses a threat to the sovereignty and cultural homogeneity of the state. This attitude towards Europe was strong during the government of Koštunica. Nowadays it is still heard in the DSS and SRS.

Csergo and Goldeier also describe that in order to pursue EU integration in the countries with a stronger traditional nationalism, the elite has to take a more instrumental approach in which they do not present Europe as an integrated culture but as an alliance of states. This is typical for the way the government has presented the political conditions of the Copenhagen criteria to the public. ICTY cooperation and Kosovo, have been presented to the public as purely benefit-driven arrangements ‘that would not require politics or ideology to change (Subotic, 2010, p. 612)’. Both ICTY cooperation and Kosovo have caused a slow-down in the EU integration process. The moments on which Serbia delivered were chosen strategically, which emphasized the trade-in character. This way they have been able to balance between the EU requirements and the more nationalistic sentiments in the country (Mladić is hero and Kosovo must remain part of Serbia). In this chapter I have also described this as the two dimensions of becoming part of Europe; the utilitarian dimension and the affective dimension, also described as Europe-as-EU and Europe-as-identity (Kostovicova, 2004; Ristić, 2007). Politicians in Serbia have separated those two dimensions, which has obstructed a full transformation in Serbia. Hence the political conditions which were related with Europe-as-identity have caused problems during the accession procedure. The elite has been able to frame those requirements as formal obligations which would eventually be beneficiary for Serbia. In this frame, Europe has been presented as an unfair bully. The remaining strength of the old regime in politics and the special ties with Russia have been two other factors which slowed down EU integration.
Chapter 5: Public opinion on European integration in Serbia

In this chapter I will look at how the public so far has been responding to Serbia’s EU integration. Here I will test the four hypotheses that follow from the four theories on what determines public opinion on EU integration: the utilitarian thesis, domestic politics, social/national identity and nationalism. I will look if there can be, and to what extent, found evidence for those four theories in the case of Serbia. A conclusion on the role nationalism plays in the public opinion on Serbian EU integration will follow from this chapter.

5.1 Public opinion on EU integration

In the second chapter I dealt with the theoretical side of public opinion on European integration. Here I defined public support as ‘the attitudes held by the public which bear the potential to translate into implicit or explicit consent towards a particular policy or polity (Sigalas, 2010, p. 1343)’. At this moment the Serbian population does not have an official say in the question whether they supported the EU accession of their country. However, the public does choose the government in the elections. And as we have seen, there are clear distinctions in how the parties in Serbia look at EU accession. Hence, the public has the power to choose for an anti-European government. Also, support for EU accession has impact on how fast new rules and legislation becomes adopted and implemented within a society. Countries can choose to have a referendum on the issue of EU accession, as we recently saw in Croatia. Normally this will be done in a later stage of the accession procedure as Serbia is in at the moment. The Serbian European Integration Office (SEIO) periodically conducts public polls on the European integration process and the reforms. The latest poll is from December 2011. The EU at that time had just decided to postpone their decision on Serbian candidacy until March. 1031 People were interviewed within their household. A few of the key findings of that poll:

Around half of the people interviewed (51%) said they would support EU integration if there would be organized a referendum tomorrow. This is almost the lowest percentage of support that has been measured since 2002. The lowest level of support was 46% in 2011. In December 33% indicated that they would vote against EU integration. This number has fluctuated between 19% and 37%. In the latest poll, 18% would abstain from voting. When the question was asked why people would vote against integration, the three most given answers were: ‘nothing good/ more damage than benefit’, ‘blackmail, conditioning, pressure’, ‘no interest/ not the best solution/ no perspective’. The most given responses as to what people’s opinion on the European Union was were: ‘more employment opportunities’, ‘path to a better future for the youth’, ‘possibility to travel throughout the European Union’. Some of the fears that were expressed mostly: ‘more problems for domestic farmers’, ‘it will cost Serbia too much money’, ‘loss of national identity and culture’. 38% of the interviewed think that integration will lead to a better life and new jobs in Serbia. 40% thinks that the policy of conditioning and blackmailing by the EU is hampering Serbia’s accession. 18% thinks this is because their authorities are incompetent and 8% thinks it is because they fail to
fulfill the international obligations. When people are asked to indicate what the conditions for membership are for Serbia, 70% of the people answered ‘Kosovo’. Then ‘cooperation with the ICTY’ follows with only 13%. The large majority of the people interviewed indicate that regardless of EU accession the issue of Kosovo should be solved (75%) and that the required reforms should be implemented (85%). Also interesting is what people think have been the biggest donors in Serbia since 2000, Russia takes the first place, followed by Japan and then the EU. The actual data show that the EU has been investing far more than Russia or Japan (SEIO, 2012). The Center for Democracy more regularly conducts a poll on EU support than SEIO. They found that the level of support increased with 3% since the EU Commission has granted Serbia its candidate status, currently amounting to 54.2%.

As we can observe in these figures, people are divided on the question whether Serbia should join the EU or not. The same trend as in the political elite can be observed for the general population. People seem to distinguish between Europe-as-identity and Europe-as-EU (Kostovicova, 2004). This means that on the one hand people have a negative attitude towards the EU, stemming mostly from the conditioning and blackmailing that is experienced as anti-Serbian. On the other hand, ‘the idea that EU membership is vitally important for the long-term economic and political interests of the country (in particular for economic growth and political stability) still rings true for the vast majority of the Serbian population (Lazić & Vuletić, 2009, p. 990)’. At the time of the latest poll especially Kosovo was an important issue, influenced by the unrest at the border between Kosovo and Serbia in the summer of 2011. The question whether Serbia should join the EU even if that would mean the secession of Kosovo has been debated many times. The rhetoric used in these discussions fuel the nationalist sentiment and has given European integration a bad name. For the public it often is not clear what exactly the EU conditions from Serbia and the image is created that it would mean giving up Kosovo (Barlovac, 2011b). ‘Whenever Kosovo and its connection to further progress in [Serbia’s] European integration is mentioned, it provokes negative reactions among Serbian citizens (Milovanovic, 2012)’. Also the cooperation with the ICTY has played an important role in how the EU is looked at. The OSCE recently conducted a survey amongst 1407 people over the age of 16 on the issue of transitional justice. It appeared that 70% of the Serbs have negative attitudes towards the ICTY and 50% of the population thinks that Karadžić and Mladić are not responsible for the crimes they are charged with. Dusan Ignjatovic, Director of the Serbian Government office for cooperation with the ICTY, said: ‘It is easier to believe that the ICTY is an anti Serbian court rather than that Serbs committed serious crimes in the conflicts in the 90s’. This is also supported by the lack of information people have about the ICTY trials. Often the trials where a Serb is the defendant are covered in the media, but not the trials with for example a Croat indictee (Ristic, 2012).

People first and foremost blame the EU policies of conditioning and blackmailing for the fact that Serbia’s integration has been stalling. This is the idea that they are treated unfairly and that the EU will keep giving more difficult conditions. The general disappointment about unfulfilled expectations has been called accession fatigue. For instance, this attitude became visible after the capture of Mladić (VIP, 2011c). The EU, and
especially the countries that not had ratified the SAA, had been emphasizing that Mladić should be captured before Serbia could move on in the accession procedure. The expectations of the Serbian public were thus very high when Mladić was captured and got extradited to The Hague. There was enthusiasm amongst the EU representatives about the capture of Mladić, but they also added that the last indictee, Hadzic, should be captured and transferred and that the dialogue with Pristina also played an important role in their decision making. Teokarevic (2011) argues that this accession fatigue is just as specific for Serbia as it is for people in other countries in the ‘EU waiting room’. ‘They feel that they have sacrificed too much, believing in more or less empty promises that the EU is just around the corner and that it will turn the present hell on earth into paradise. And they blame both the Union and domestic EU proponents for this disappointment. The current crisis in the Eurozone and the insecurity about the survival of the EU add to the cynicism of people. Their expectations have been betrayed, which is why they have either become extremely skeptical about EU membership or turned completely against it (p. 75).’ Unfortunately SEIO has not yet conducted another poll on people’s attitude towards the EU after Serbia has become a candidate state.

5.2 Determinants of support

I will now turn to the explanation of what determines the public opinion on EU integration in Serbia. The hypotheses I formulated in the first chapter will be my guideline for this. As we will see, it was harder to find evidence for some of the hypotheses than for others, due to the limited information I had.

5.2.1 Utilitarian thesis

In short the utilitarian thesis argues that people will base their opinion on the benefits they perceive from European integration. This has to do with the economic performance of a country and the EU, trade possibilities and the ability of a person to adapt to and gain from market liberalization (Tanasoiu & Colonescu, 2008). People who benefit personally from the integration will be most supportive. People with a lower level of education and occupation are less likely to benefit from EU integration and therefore will also be less supportive. Further, Elgün and Tillman (2007) found that the level of exposure to the economic consequences of EU membership plays a critical role in the support for integration in candidate countries. They think that the utilitarian thesis will not have much effect on the public opinion as long as people have not personally experienced how they benefit from it. With regard to Serbia some observations can be made which seem to confirm these theories.

There is no doubt that the economy and people’s financial situation are important in Serbia. When asked what the biggest problem was their country was facing, 58% of the respondents indicated that this was the unemployment, followed by 25% that indicated corruption was the biggest problem. Only 4% of the respondents said that Kosovo was the biggest problem for Serbia. Also when looking at the benefits people expect from EU
membership, utilitarian reasons are most prominent. They expect more jobs, a better future for the youth and travel opportunities within the EU. The lower strata of the population and people in rural areas are less supportive of EU integration. In the Balkan Monitor (Gallup, 2010) we see that people with a primary education level and those living in rural areas are less likely to vote for European integration in a referendum and consider European integration less as a good thing, than people with a tertiary education and those living in a large city. In addition to that, there are however some markers which do seem to indicate that there is more opposition to European integration in the lower strata of the population. Pešić (2006) conducted a research focused on peoples opinion not specifically on EU integration, but on post-socialist transformation in general in Serbia. She confirmed the thesis that the lower strata were more opposed to such change. ‘It seems that the uneducated population, residents of villages, agricultural workers and retired persons were not at all exposed to the modernizing influences of political democratization and the market economy […], which makes them strong opponents of further modernization (p. 305).’ We have also seen that the supporters of the SRS, the most anti-European party, are educated below average and either unemployed or relying on routine manual (Bakić, 2009). Further, we saw that, although being a small group of 40 respondents, the economic elite has a strong pro-Europe orientation (Lazić & Vuletić, 2009). This is the group that will benefit from EU integration the soonest and is probably also most informed about the benefits. As a whole, I therefore do think that it is very plausible that economic benefits, whether they are expected or already experienced through trade agreements or EU funds and subsidies, do influence the support of EU integration. Given that the large part of the population is very uninformed about what the EU does or can do, it is likely that once Serbia has moved further in the integration process and the benefits become more visible to all layers of society, this will increase the level of support in the society.

5.2.2 Domestic politics

With regard to the influence of domestic politics on the public opinion on European integration, there are two somewhat contradictory arguments. On the one hand it is argued that people will follow their domestic leadership because they are not well informed enough themselves to make a decision on whether to support integration or not. On the other hand evidence has been found that people will support EU membership if they have little trust in the government, because they assume that the supranational governance of the EU will be able to change the national governance.

There is a lot of dissatisfaction and disappointment in the government. As a poll amongst university students showed, only 2.9% has trust in the Serbian government (VIP, 2011d). Besides the EU, they blame the government for not being capable of guiding Serbia through the accession process. After the Democratic Party has been in power for twelve years people do not perceive any real changes and improvements in their living conditions. They still see a lot of poverty and corruption which the government has not been able to tackle. In the election campaigns big promises were made with regard to the benefits for
Serbia when they would progress in the accession procedure. People have not seen these promises been translated into reality. ‘Often they [the authorities] have talked about grants of billions of Euros, so people imagined the EU was a giant cash dispenser from which Serbia would receive funds regardless of what it does … Many Serbs got fed up with the idea of the EU after the lavish promises made in elections about new jobs and new money failed to translate into reality (Barlovac, 2011c).’ So as for the first theoretical argument, it seems to be the case that people indeed were following the government in the first place in their reasoning about EU support. However, the trust has diminished to such an extent that it does not seem to be the case that the Serbian public relies on their governments’ opinion anymore. We have also seen that the political parties in Serbia are so much divided on the topic of EU integration that they not provide the public with an unambiguous answer on the question whether to support accession or not. As for the second theoretical argument, not much evidence can be found to support that argument. This argument presupposes a trust in the institutional power of the EU that does not seem to be present in Serbia. A large part of the population sees the EU as an institution that uses blackmailing and conditioning against their country. This does not correspond with the idea of a trustworthy institution that people would like to have too much authority in their country. On the other hand, people evaluate the reforms required by the EU as positive and necessary; 85% of the surveyed believe that the reforms should not be implemented by the EU, but for creating better living conditions in Serbia (Beta-Weekly, 2011). Even if they would not become a member of the EU, they would like for those anti-corruption measures and judicial reforms to take place.

5.2.3 Social identity

From the theories on social identity, I concluded that identification with the nation or with Europe is not a zero-sum calculation. The identifications are compatible and identification with the nation does not necessarily mean that there is less strong identification with Europe. But, it is found that a stronger identification with Europe will lead to a more positive attitude towards European integration. To what extent can this European identity be found in Serbia?

In the poll of SEIO in June 2011 they measured the social identification of people with different identities. 45% of the population indicated that they felt mostly like a citizen of Serbia and only 7% said they felt mostly like a citizen of Europe. Serbia’s national identity is characterized by two relative opposites (Ristić, 2007). On the one hand Serbia is seen as a western European country with a western culture. ‘This identity is closely linked to liberal values, it has a strong urban identification and does not see the nation in the foreground, but the citizen (p. 190).’ On the other hand, there is the identity that is more related to the culture and traditional values of Russia. Geographically Serbia is seen as part of Europe, but not ideologically. ‘It sets collectivism before individual responsibility and underlines the orthodox/Slavic heritage. It further has a rather distance attitude towards the West and liberal values, and finds its primarily identification in the Serbian nation (p. 190).’ This part of the Serbian identity is strongly influenced by the Serbian Orthodox Church. During the Ottoman rule Serbia disappeared as a state and the church is seen as the only pillar that has
been able to preserve some of the Serbian culture through these centuries. It therefore had and has a strong influence on the national identity. The fact that Serbia has always been at the brink between the East and the West has shaped its dual national identity. Serbia’s rulers have changed many times; sometimes they were closer to the West and sometimes closer to the East. This switching between ideological systems is an important reason for its ‘split identity’. We still see it clearly in the actions Serbia takes on the international level that they seek cooperation with Europe, but also still want to preserve their relation with Russia. To some extent Serbia thus identifies with Europe, but it also has another strong identification. Ristić (2007) therefore argues that as long as Serbia will not overcome its dichotomy and will not act as a unified state, it will not take the fastest track to the EU.

5.2.4 Nationalism

Identification with the EU and with the nation can take place at the same time. However, for nationalist the nation is the highest form of identification which takes primacy over all other forms of identification. Therefore, nationalism presents an obstacle for European integration because it threatens, or can be seen as a threat, the national sovereignty of a state. If people highly value the sovereignty of the nation they will not favor the transfer of their loyalties to a supranational level (Cinpoes, 2008; Elgün & Tillman, 2007).

There are a few specific topics which I have dealt with in the previous chapters, in which we see that Serbia is not supportive of the transfer of authority. In particular with the question of Kosovo this plays an important role. They see Europe literally as a threat to their national sovereignty, since almost entire Europe has acknowledged Kosovo as an independent state. In the public debate the Serbian interest with regard to Kosovo is presented as opposed to the European interest. It is precisely in the case of such competition that there is less room for a European identity to develop and thus also for a more positive attitude towards integration to develop (Duchesne & Frognier, 2007). Also the cooperation of the ICTY can be seen as a transfer of authority to a supranational level. It is not very well understood amongst the public why these people should be trialed outside their own country and they feel that the ICTY is biased against the Serbs. These elements are effectively mobilized and used by the less pro-European parties. They emphasize precisely this that Serbia is giving up too much in the process of EU integration. That is why people indicate that the EU is blackmailing Serbia and why 70% of the population has a negative attitude towards the EU. On the other hand, the question remains whether this negative perception of the EU would actually translate into a ‘no’ in a referendum on EU integration. Right after the NATO bombings in Serbia a survey was carries out which showed that ‘on the one hand people blamed ‘the West’ for their anti-Serbian policies, while on the other hand they expressed the wish to join the EU as soon as possible (Lazić & Vuletić, 2009, p. 989)’. This goes back to what I earlier touched on, the Europe-as-identity and the Europe-as-EU. It is possible for people to dislike the first, but still be in favor of the second.
5.3 Conclusions

Integration into the European Union is not just a matter of the political elite. Hooghe and Marks (2008) describe that also the public has become more and more involved in this process. EU integration has become politicized. We see this dynamic in Serbia, where EU integration was one of the debated issues during the election campaigns this spring. People perceive certain benefits from EU integration, but they also have concerns. In this chapter I presented a general overview of how people look at EU integration in Serbia and I have tried to find the reasons why people would be pro or against EU integration. I have done this on the basis of the four determinants of EU support I described in the second chapter. From this a general conclusion can be drawn as to whether or not certain determinants seem to play a role in Serbia.

Utilitarian thesis: We have seen that utilitarian arguments are an important reason for people to support EU integration. They expect economic benefits from integration into the EU. Especially groups that are likely to benefit soon from EU integration, or already benefit, are more supportive of integration. Domestic politics: Not very strong evidence has been found for either of the two hypotheses with regard to domestic politics. There is a low trust in the EU, but also in the political elite. People are thus not likely to trust completely either one of these actors in the formation of their opinion on integration. Social identity: The split character of Serbia’s national identity does not facilitate a quick transition into the European Union. However, the fact that people also identify with Russia and the Orthodox Church does not mean that they are against Europe. Multiple forms of identification are possible. Nationalism: My conclusion is that a strong attachment to national sovereignty, which is characteristic for nationalism, does create an obstacle for people. Especially Kosovo and the ICTY, have given Europe a bad name in Serbia. Thus, we see that the idea of Europe-as-EU, with its benefits and regulations, is attractive to people and is an important reason for EU integration support. The split domestic identity and nationalistic sentiments are both related to Europe-as-EU and those aspects present an obstacle for people to support EU integration. The political elite plays an important role in the perception people have of the European Union.
Chapter 6: Conclusions and recommendation

In this last chapter I will formulate a final answer to the two central questions of this thesis: What is the influence of nationalism on public opinion on EU integration? And how does nationalism affect Serbia’s process towards EU integration?

What is the influence of nationalism on public opinion on EU integration?
Nationalism holds that the political and the national unit are congruent. This means that a nation wants to have authority over their own territory. This potentially conflicts with the idea of the European Union, in which states have to transfer part of their loyalty and power to another centre outside of their state. Nationalism is therefore likely to conflict with European integration. However, we have seen that there are different forms of nationalism, which not all conflict in the way this traditional nationalism does. Another argument which is given for the incompatibility of nationalism with European integration, is the strong identification with one’s nation. Some have argued that for nationalists, the identification with the nation is so strong that they will not be able to develop a European identity. I have argued that identities are constructed and that they change over time. Identification with the nation does not rule out identification with Europe, since identities are not static and can overlap.

Also, we have seen that there are multiple factors which influence a person’s opinion on European integration. Identity and nationalistic sentiments are two of them, but I have also indicated that utilitarian arguments and domestic politics can influence the public opinion. Especially the benefits that a person perceives from EU membership, for him or her individually or the country as a whole, are important in the formation of a person’s opinion. Furthermore, the political elite in a country has a strong influence on how people value EU membership. Since EU integration is such a complex process, people will look at the opinions of others to define their own opinion. As such, politicians, nationalistic or not, are able to frame the EU and EU integration.

How does nationalism affect Serbia’s process towards EU integration?
The nationalism that is present in the Serbian society today, is very different than the nationalism that could be observed during the rule of Milošević. Nikolic, who is a former party member of the SRS, is chosen in the latest elections as the new president of Serbia. He claims to be pro-European, but is also more directed towards Russia and more hard lined on the issue of Kosovo than his predecessor Tadic. This election result should however not be interpreted as the return of nationalism in Serbia. People have voted for Nikolic mainly because they were disappointed in the last government and want change. The last government is blamed especially for the difficult economic circumstances in Serbia.

There are still nationalistic sentiments to be found amongst the population and it is my conclusion that these do influence the process of EU integration. In the last years we have seen that Serbia has struggled with two specific requirements set by the EU; cooperation with the ICTY and developing good neighborly relations with Kosovo. Especially during the rule of Koštunica, cooperation with the ICTY has stalled and Kosovo is still a highly
The politicized issue. As a consequence the ruling elite is balancing between the EU requirements and the nationalist sentiments within the country and their electorate. This has slowed down the integration process. They adopted a strategy in which they have separated the two dimensions of Europe, Europe-as-EU and Europe-as-identity. The requirements are fulfilled first and foremost because they have to do so and not because they are willing to bring radical change in the country. This way the politicians are able to blame the EU for the unpopular decisions they have to take. Also amongst the population we see a difference being made between the affective and the utilitarian dimension of EU integration. Most people do not have a positive opinion about the European Union, but they do want to be part of it because it can bring them economic prosperity. Thus, a certain degree of nationalism does slow down the EU integration process in Serbia, but the utilitarian benefits are such a strong incentive that it does not completely stop the integration of Serbia in the European Union.

Reflection on theory

It was the goal of my thesis to add something to the existing literature on nationalism, public opinion and European integration. I have tested some of the theories on these issues in my case study.

First of all, I tested the constructed and changing nature of nationalism. We have seen that identification with the nation was extremely important for people during the dissolution of Yugoslavia. It had an huge impact on how people thought and acted. In my thesis I have defined this in terms of Oberschall’s ‘crisis frame’. It was my expectations that, given the relatively stable situation in Serbia at the moment, nationalism would play a less significant role in society and in the lives of people. We indeed have seen that national identification and nationalism have changed substantially compared to the 90’s. They have returned to the ‘normal frame’ in which national identification and nationalism do play role, but not in the extreme way they did during the conflict.

The significant role domestic politics play in the formation of public opinion on EU integration is also confirmed in the Serbian case, as stated above. The political elite has the ability to frame issues and influence the public. However, we have also observed the opposite relation. The speeches and acts of politicians are influenced by what they observe amongst their electorate. The actions of Tadic’s government with regard to EU integration have been interpreted as a way to balance between the demands of the EU and the voice of the public. This side has got little attention in the literature I used.

Finally the most important theory I have tested in this thesis was the influence of nationalism on public opinion European integration and the possible alternative determinants. The problematic relation between nationalism and a positive public opinion on European integration consists of two elements. Firstly, a strong position of nationalism in the country does not allow people to identify with anything other than their nation, thus also not with Europe. Secondly, nationalism wants to protect the sovereignty of a country and does not approve the transfer of authority to another level, such as the EU. I conclude that the nationalistic sentiments that are present in Serbia at the moment, do influence the process of EU integration. I have not found evidence that the reason for this is the impossibility to
develop a European identity due to a strong attachment to the national identity. In Serbia it is influenced mostly by the threat they perceive to national sovereignty and territorial integrity, especially with regard to Kosovo. I thus found that the theory on the relation between nationalism, public opinion and EU integration is partially confirmed and is partially relevant in explaining my case. Looking at the alternative determinants, I found that utilitarian arguments have a strong influence on people’s public opinion on European integration. I therefore consider this theory highly relevant for the explanation of my case.

Limitations
The most obvious limitation of this research is that it only entails one case, Serbia. This has the consequence that the conclusions may not be representative for other cases and can hardly be generalized. The relation between nationalism, public opinion and European integration as I presented it, might only be applied on Serbia and not on other countries. Nevertheless, it has been my goal from the start to provide an in-depth study of Serbia and to analyze to what extent the theory would apply to this case. The conclusions of this research should therefore also be seen in this way.

Another limitation of this research is the limited amount of data gathered in Serbia. I write about the Serbian population without having consulted them directly in any way. I have used other sources to overcome this limitation, such as academic literature, supplemented with newspaper articles and the information from several conducted polls in Serbia. However, I would have been able to make a stronger case if I could have underpinned it with my own observations and data collection amongst the Serbian population.

Recommendations
This thesis gives a few directions for future research. As said above, a limitation of my research is that I have not been able to conduct a research in the field. The consequence is that I had to make mostly general comments on the population of Serbia. The differences and nuances within this group have not been studied in this thesis. This would however be an interesting direction for further research. It is very well possible that certain determinants are more relevant to certain parts of the population, for example the people with a higher education or people that have experienced the conflicts in the 90’s and those who have not. Next, such research could also focus more on the interplay between the different determinants, since this is a matter I barely touched upon. Further, what is striking in the case of Serbia is the split that is made between the affective and utilitarian dimension of becoming European. Further research should clarify whether this is a dynamic which is specific for Serbia or which can also be found in other countries acceding the European Union.

Whether it is a dynamic present in other countries, or just in Serbia, for the EU it is a relevant dynamic. This case has shown that the conditions set by the EU do not necessarily lead to a deeper change in society. For example, the fact that all war suspects have been extradited to the ICTY does not mean that the attitude of the population has also changed with regard to the crimes committed. Other actions are apparently necessary for this to take
The EU has to be aware of this possible discrepancy and should reflect on their strategies.

I finish this thesis in a remarkable period for Serbia. At this moment it is not exactly clear what road their new president will follow and which consequences this will have for their accession process. Nikolic seems less ready to make concessions with regard to Kosovo compared to Tadic. We will thus have to see what this will do to the formulated agreements and cooperation between Serbia and Kosovo. This will also have its effect on the way the EU will deal with Serbia. In autumn of this year the EU is set to rule on whether Serbia will be given a date for the opening of negotiations. Given this turbulent phase, it would be interesting to continue monitoring this case. The deeper understanding I have given of the accession process in Serbia so far, will also be useful to get a sense of how potential new developments can be understood.
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