The core of European military cooperation or a paper tiger?
A case study research into the participation incentives of the Dutch led European Union Battlegroup 2011/1

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The core of European military cooperation or a paper tiger?

A case study research into the participation incentives of the Dutch led European Union Battlegroup 2011/1

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Cover image: European Battlegroup 2011/1 badge worn on Dutch army combat uniform. Courtesy of AVDD, Dutch Ministry of Defence
Science always begins and ends with problems

Sir Karl Popper (1902-1994)
Acknowledgments .................................................................................................................................................. viii

List of acronyms and abbreviations ............................................................................................................................ ix

Executive summary ...................................................................................................................................................... xi

Chapter 1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 12

1.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................................... 12
1.2 Research problem .......................................................................................................................................... 13
1.3 Research question ........................................................................................................................................ 14
1.4 Theoretical framework ................................................................................................................................. 14
1.5 Hypotheses and sub questions ...................................................................................................................... 16
1.6 Central goal ................................................................................................................................................... 16
1.7 Conceptualization ....................................................................................................................................... 17
1.8 Social and scientific relevance ..................................................................................................................... 17
1.9 Research design and research strategy ......................................................................................................... 19
1.10 Data gathering ........................................................................................................................................... 19
1.11 Outline of the thesis .................................................................................................................................... 20
1.12 Validity ....................................................................................................................................................... 21
1.13 Limitations ................................................................................................................................................... 22

Chapter 2 The origins of the EU Battlegroup ....................................................................................................... 23

2.1 The EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) ............................................................................. 23
2.2 The development of military cooperation ..................................................................................................... 24
2.3 The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) .................................................................................. 26
  2.3.1 The Nice Treaty (2000) ............................................................................................................................ 27
  2.3.2 Helsinki Headline Goal (2003) .............................................................................................................. 27
2.4 Operation Artemis ......................................................................................................................................... 28
2.5 Headline Goal 2010 ..................................................................................................................................... 30
2.6 The Battlegroup Concept ............................................................................................................................. 31
  2.6.1 Force composition ................................................................................................................................. 32
  2.6.2 Headquarters ......................................................................................................................................... 33
  2.6.3 Certification, training and costs ............................................................................................................. 34
2.7 Missions and scenarios ................................................................................................................................. 36
2.8 The Catalogues ........................................................................................................................................... 37
2.9 The Nordic Battlegroup ............................................................................................................................... 38
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Nijmegen, January 2012
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AO</td>
<td>Area of Operations</td>
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<td>AMB</td>
<td>Air Mobile Brigade</td>
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<td>AVDD</td>
<td>AudioVisuele Dienst Defensie</td>
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<td>BC</td>
<td>Battlegroup Concept</td>
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<td>C2</td>
<td>Command and Control</td>
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<td>C3</td>
<td>Command, Control and Communications</td>
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<td>CDP</td>
<td>Capabilities Development Plan</td>
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<td>CER</td>
<td>Centre for European Reform</td>
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<td>CFE</td>
<td>Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe</td>
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<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil Military Cooperation</td>
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<td>CMC</td>
<td>Crisis Management Concept</td>
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<td>CPX</td>
<td>Command Post Exercise</td>
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<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>DEU</td>
<td>Deutschland</td>
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<td>EMU</td>
<td>Economic and Monetary Union</td>
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<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>ESS</td>
<td>European Security Strategy</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EUBG</td>
<td>European Union Battle Group</td>
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<td>EUISS</td>
<td>European Union Institute for Security Studies</td>
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<td>EUMC</td>
<td>European Union Military Committee</td>
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<td>EUMS</td>
<td>European Union Military Staff</td>
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<td>Eurofor</td>
<td>European Rapid Operational Force</td>
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<td>FHQ</td>
<td>Force Headquarters</td>
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<td>FIN</td>
<td>Finland</td>
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<td>FN</td>
<td>Framework Nation</td>
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<td>FTX</td>
<td>Field Training Exercise</td>
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<td>GAERC</td>
<td>General Affairs and External Relations Council</td>
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<td>HG 2003</td>
<td>Headline Goal 2003</td>
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<td>HHG 2010</td>
<td>Helsinki Headline Goal 2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarter</td>
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<tr>
<td>IISS</td>
<td>International Institute for Strategic Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRT</td>
<td>International Regime Theory</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISTAR</td>
<td>Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance</td>
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<tr>
<td>JOA</td>
<td>Joint Area of Operations</td>
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<td>MC</td>
<td>Military Committee</td>
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<td>MCC</td>
<td>Military Capabilities Conference</td>
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<td>Mechbrig</td>
<td>Mechanized Brigade</td>
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<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NBG</td>
<td>Nordic Battlegroup</td>
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<td>NL</td>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
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<td>NLT</td>
<td>Necessary Launch Time</td>
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<td>NRF</td>
<td>NATO Response Force</td>
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<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>OHQ</td>
<td>Operational Headquarters</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>PD</td>
<td>Prisoner’s Dilemma</td>
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<td>PfP</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
<td>Political and Security Committee</td>
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<td>RNLA</td>
<td>Royal Netherlands Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>SG/HR</td>
<td>Secretary General/High Representative</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>TEU</td>
<td>Treaty on the European Union</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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<td>WPU</td>
<td>Water Purification Unit</td>
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Executive summary

This research aimed to provide insight in the reasons for participation of Austria, Germany, Lithuania, Finland and the Netherlands to the Dutch led European Union Battlegroup (EU BG) of the first half of 2011. The European Battlegroup is a rapid response force of the European Union and is formed by a number of European Union countries, who are on a standby cycle every six months.

The research was carried out by using International Regime Theory which uses three distinct approaches that resemble the three core streams in the field of international relations: realism, which sees power relations as a key variable, neoliberalism, where the analysis is based on a constellation of interests and cognitivism, which puts an emphasis on identities and knowledge.

By testing three hypotheses and making use of the power-based, interest-based and knowledge-based approaches of International Regime Theory, the different incentives of the countries were identified. The interest-based approach showed the most explanatory power of the three approaches, based on empirical evidence and key-person interviews, although the other approaches also provided valuable information on the participation incentives.

In short, for all the countries strengthening the role of the European Union as crisis-management actor and a further development of the CSDP were considered as the primary reasons for their participation. For Lithuania and Finland, interestingly, fear of Russia and its foreign policy are a reason to participate in the Battlegroup and to become stronger embedded in the military branch of the European Union. For Austria, taking part in multinational cooperation frameworks and show their commitment to a further European integration were the main reasons for participation whereas for the Netherlands and Germany, support for the European Union and international rule of law in general were considered reasons for participation. Being lead nation, the Dutch could fill in the details of this Battlegroup, allowing them to train their own troops more efficiently. Germany is looking to expand its position within the European Union and a stronger participation in the CSDP is informally being requested of them by the other European states.

Keywords:
European Battlegroup, European Union, Defence, Military, Royal Netherlands Army, 2011
1.1 Introduction

The European Union (EU) developed the European Union Battlegroup (EU BG) to act as a rapid response force dedicated to crisis management on a small scale (DeJong, 2009). The EU BGs consists roughly of about 1500 personnel in its generic form, depending on its mission. It is based on a mechanized battalion-sized force, reinforced with combat support and combat service support elements (European Union, 2009). These Battlegroups can be used for the full range of tasks and missions listed in Article 43 of the Treaty on the European Union and those in the European Security Strategy in areas outside the EU. Operations of the EU BG are normally conducted under auspice of a resolution of the United Nations Security Council, although some missions, like the evacuation of EU citizens, can be undertaken outside this framework (WEU Assembly, 2009).

The EU BG will be on standby for a period of six months in which it will serve as an „initial entry-unit“. This means that it will be the first to arrive in crisis-situations that pose a threat to European civilians or interests abroad (RNLA, 2010: 9). The concept of the Battlegroups set-up is based on multinational cooperation and can be formed by a framework nation or by a multinational coalition of member states. In any case, interoperability and military effectiveness will be key criteria (ibid.). A Battlegroup is associated with a deployable force headquarters and certain operational and strategic „enablers“, such as strategic lift and logistics. Member states may also contribute with niche capabilities, providing specific elements with added value to the Battlegroups. The Battlegroups are on standby for a period of six-month and should be sustainable and self-sufficient for 30 days. This should be extendable to 120 days if re-supplied appropriately (ibid.).

By creating the Battlegroup Concept, EU member states tried to accomplish two different objectives. The first was to transform national armed forces and the second goal was to let the European Union engage in military operations without being dependant on the NATO structure (Major & Mölling, 2011: 5). It provides the EU with a specific rapid response tool that can contribute to a more coherent and more capable European Union. The concept enables the EU to respond rapidly to emerging crises with military means, by making use of the Battlegroup means. Another aspect of the Battlegroup Concept is the potential expansion of long-range deployments for the armed forces of member states. Furthermore, the concept emphasizes the need for a more accelerated decision-making. The bodies of the EU
need to be ready for this but next to that, the national decision-making processes also need to be synchronized to the set timelines (ibid.). As can be concluded, the concept of a European Battlegroup can be used as a catalyst to improve and enhance military cooperation and knowledge between member states. This intensified exchange of information contributes further to a more coherent EU (Hamelink, 2005: 11). The EU BG sees itself confronted with numerous problems. Ever since the start of the EU BG concept, -following the Helsinki Headline Goal 2003- the Battlegroup Concept has not been put into use, despite the fact that the EU has conducted a number of civilian and military crisis management operation and member states have invested significantly to build their capabilities (IISS, 2010: 104). According to Tommi Koivula, there have been occasional signs of frustration with participating countries because of the inactivity of this standby instrument (Koivula, 2010: 110).

1.2 Research problem
From January 1, 2011 to July 1, 2011 the EU BG 2011/1 was on standby under Dutch supervision. The Dutch provided around 1.200 soldiers, coming from their 13th Mechanized Brigade (13 Mechbrig) and 11th Air Mobile Brigade (11 AMB). The Dutch Brigadier General Van der Laan of 13 Mechbrig was the commander of the BG and his staff also formed the staff of the Battlegroup. The entire BG consisted of about 2.350 soldiers and constituted next to the Dutch; German, Finnish, Lithuanian and Austrian forces, all with their own specific units and qualities (RNLA, 2010: 9).

The Battlegroup Concept in general raises multiple -particularly military questions- concerning the coordination of its multinational composition, the degree of multinational cooperation or the challenge of inter-operational capabilities of the different armed forces. Some authors even argue that an important cause of discrepancy between the military cooperation and political ambitions of the EU BG can be traced back to shortcomings in the field of strategic transport and certain categories of armament, the so called „strategic lift capability” (Homan & Van Staden, 2003). The core problem for the EU”s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) will be whether the EU will be able to implement the EU BG concept in these times of limited financial resources (EurActiv, 2010). As the foregoing source mentions, budgetary decisions can play a large role in taking part in a multinational Battlegroup like the EU BG. Next to this, all participating countries of this EU BG have been
active in the war in Afghanistan, which has drawn a bill on men and material of their armed forces. Furthermore, not only the Dutch armed forces but also the German\textsuperscript{1}, Austrian\textsuperscript{2}, Lithuanian\textsuperscript{3} and Finnish\textsuperscript{4} forces see themselves confronted with large (future) cutbacks. This raises the question why participation in an EU BG is so important for them, what is their motivation to participate and what do they expect to gain from it? Since it is clear that not only the Dutch military suffers from cutbacks but the other countries have to cope with the same problem as well and provided with the fact that the countries have gained experience in recent multinational military operations, surprisingly little is known about how nations determine their commitments and the kinds of constraints on contributions that are at work (Giegerich, 2008: 11).

Since the EU has provided its countries with an economic internal market and political guidance by means of the EU parliament and EU Commission it would be interesting to identify the reasons for military cooperation within the European Union. It will be intriguing to find out why these specific countries are willing to participate in this Battlegroup: What is their drive in terms of political, social and economic factors based on a domestic and international point of view? What is the pressure in terms of security threats? And what does this mean in their relation to other countries and international organizations such as NATO, the EU and the UN (Giegerich, 2008: 11). This leads to the following research question:

1.3 Research question

*What are the incentives of the different countries to participate in the EU BG 2011/1 based on International Regime Theory?*

1.4 Theoretical framework

According to the Finnish scholar Thomas Forsberg (2010), the little theoretical work that exists on the topic of European defence is either pre-dating the period the emergence of the ESDP (see Van Staden, 1994; Larsen, 1998) or misses the link with existing theoretical debates (Forsberg, 2010: 1-2). The need to link the field of international relations theory and European integration studies has been recognized by a number of scholars, yet there is not

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{1} See for instance http://www.armedforces-int.com/news/german-military-defence-cuts-proposed.html. \\
\textsuperscript{2} http://communities.canada.com/ottawacitizen/blogs/defencewatch/archive/2011/01/03/more-than-500-tanks-and-armoured-vehicles-to-be-scrapped.aspx \\
\textsuperscript{4} Finnish defense cutbacks found on http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?c=EUR&s=TOP&i=5492144.}
much theory on the defence dimension of the European Union (Forsberg, 2010: 2). A problem that arises when studying European militarization, is that major influential integration theories cannot be used. This has to do with the fact that when these theories were developed, the EU did not had any military dimension (Ojanen, 2002: 6 in Forsberg, 2010). Forsberg furthermore acknowledges the fact that “there is no single theory capable of explaining all aspects of European integration” (2010: 6). He argues that one should continue to develop propositions that can link theoretically plausible statements to the own understanding of actors on the reason for their behavior and outcomes of that specific behavior (Forsberg, 2010: 7).

In order to address this flaw in studying European militarization and to answer the reason what the incentives are of the different countries to participate in the EU BG 2011/1, I will use International Regime Theory (IRT) set forth by Andreas Haasenclever, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger in their book „Theories of International Regimes“ (1997) as theoretical framework for this thesis. Its core assumption is that cooperation is possible, albeit under strict conditions (Haasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1997). International Regime Theory (IRT) deals with international cooperation in the field of international relations. It uses the different schools of thought of realists, neoliberals and constructivist in explaining important factors for cooperation. According to the explanatory variables that this theory emphasizes, they may be classified as power-based, interest-based and knowledge-based approaches (Haasenclever et al., 1997: 1). Within regime theory the realist focus lies on power relations, the neoliberal focus on a „constellation of interests“ (1997: 1-2), whereas the cognitive or constructivist approach focuses on knowledge dynamics, communication and identities. Constructivism offers an alternative understanding to central dynamics in the field of international relations like balance of power, the relationship between state identity and interests and the prospect of change in world politics (Hopf, 1998: 172 in Søndena, 2008: 15). The three theories of international relations that will be used in this thesis differ in their view on the structure of international cooperation and provide different arguments for international cooperation, a reason to use this specific theory to identify the state’s incentives.

In this thesis I will investigate to what extent the different approaches of this theory can explain the incentives for participation of the countries and hopefully enhance understanding of cooperation in the military domain of the EU BG 2011/1 and possibly other multinational military cooperation frameworks.

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5 Forsberg here points to, (amongst others) Kelstrup- Williams, 2000; Pollack, 2001 and Rosamund, 2002.
1.5 Hypotheses and sub questions

In this research the following hypotheses, derived from International Regime Theory’s different approaches to cooperation will be tested in order to answer the research question.

**H1:** The participating countries in the European Battlegroup 2011/1 hold common national interests.

**H2:** Following the power-based approach of International Regime Theory, countries that participate in the EU BG 2011/1 do this to increase their relative gains

**H3:** For the countries participating in the European Battlegroup 2011/1 we can see a shared strategic culture among the participants

Additionally, in order to answer the main research question the following sub questions will also be addressed in this thesis

1. What is the historical background of the European Battlegroup within the European Union?
2. What are the aims and purposes of the European Battlegroup?
3. What are the characteristics of International Regime Theory?
4. What do the different countries participate to this Battlegroup? And why with these specific units?
5. Which approach of International Regime Theory provides the most powerful explanation for the participation of the specific member states?

1.6 Central goal

The goal of this research is to provide insight in the reasons of cooperation from the countries that participate in the EU BG 2011/1. This will provide information on the reasons of military cooperation within the EU. To investigate the reasons why countries participate in this EU BG, three different, hypotheses have been formed that to correspond with the core assumptions of the three previous listed central assumptions of International Regime Theory.
1.7 Conceptualization

The overall theoretical framework can be captured in the following conceptual scheme:

![Conceptual scheme International Regime Theory](image)

The three approaches of IRT are central in this theory and will be used to examine the incentives of participation of the different countries as can be seen on the right side of the figure. Each hypothesis will be tested for each country separately, in order to ensure a balanced and valid outcome.

1.8 Social and scientific relevance

With the threats of failing states and terrorism to the Western world, its countries are searching for means to protect and defend their population and interests within as well as outside Europe. Many states, particularly those in Europe are in the process of reorienting their armed forces from a primary focus on the defence of its national territory or that of an ally to a greater emphasis on the projection of armed forces overseas, for crisis-management
operations (Giegerich, 2008: 8). This thesis can contribute to a better understanding of the different factors that participating countries face in committing themselves to conduct multinational operations.

The social relevance of this research can be seen in the outcome of the different approaches of the participating countries. It can help in aligning future multinational cooperation of countries and can provide insight in the incentives of a number of European countries to participate in military coalitions. The knowledge generated with this research can contribute to a better understanding of multinational coalitions and their objectives. In confronting the EUBG with the NRF one can argue on their existence. This research offers an extensive insight in the EU BG as the European Union’s military apparatus and as such will be interesting for scholars and students researching the EU’s military domain. The research can also point to reasons for military cooperation of European Union states, derived from based on its domestic politics and culture. That way, certain state behaviour in the international community can then be placed against the right background.

The current state of scientific research on the European Battlegroup is very minimal. Relatively little analytical work on the concept of the EU BG has been conducted that is openly available, for instance for discussion or to use as a theoretical starting point (Granholm & Jonson, 2006: 2). As Granholm and Johnson point out, this deficit is slowly being addressed (ibid.). Most of the research has been done on the concept of the EU BG (De Jong, 2006; Granholm & Jonson, 2006; Hamelink, 2005), a comparison of the role of the EU BG and the NRF (Del Favero, 2009; Domínquez, 2009) or on specific Battlegroups, e.g. the Swedish BG (Hansen, 2005). In this context, no research has been carried out that makes use of International Regime Theory to explain military cooperation, for instance in the European Union. Furthermore, there has not been conducted any qualitative research on the specific contribution and underlying reasons of contribution of participating countries.

By exploring the European Battlegroup Concept, this thesis aims to contribute to existing knowledge on multinational military cooperation and hopefully fill up the lack of knowledge on the topic, especially on the topic of European military cooperation. Making use of International Regime Theory this research also aims to provide insight in the intentions of the different countries to participate in the EU BG. This could help assess their interest in other means of military interoperability with European partners. The research could also enhance the understanding of international state behavior and shed a new light on their incentives to participate in international organizations or multinational regimes.
1.9 Research design and research strategy

In this research I will use the case study research as a research strategy. In the social sciences there are many different definitions of case study research being used, with the most familiar one probably being Yin’s definition of a case study as „an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within it’s real-live context” (Yin, 2003: 13, cf. Vennix, 2007: 140). However, this can be considered as a rather broad and vague conceptualization of the case study in general. The aim of the use of a case study in this research is to test the theoretical framework set out in this research. The reason that the case study method is the most suitable research design in this research can be found in the fact that testing the theoretical framework requires in-depth investigations in the preference-formation process that occurs within the participating states (Alons, 2010: 41). The case study research seems the appropriate research design for this research since it is a design typically connected with qualitative research. A characteristic of case-study research is for instance the use of different forms of empirical evidence. A certain case is being studied in detail and from multiple angles (Vennix, 2007: 142). Another function of case-study research is to explore certain phenomena „in-depth” (ibid.). Often the strongest defense of a case study as a research design is its quasi-experimental nature. According to John Gerring (2007) this is because the experimental idea can be better approximated within a small number of closely related cases, or by a single case observed over time, than by a large sample of heterogeneous units (Gerring, 2007: 12).

A large-N study would be less appropriate for this particular research since, in contrast to case studies, it offers insufficient information about why certain factors lead to particular preferences or ambitions in the case of participation in the Battlegroup. Unlike case studies, large-N studies offer insufficient information about such processes and do not provide the possibilities for a scrutinizing analysis (Alons, 2010: 42).

A problem with performing case study research is the possibility of spuriousness. This can occur when the observed congruence of the cause C and effect E are caused by a third factor Z (George and Bennet, 2004: 185). This problem can be addressed by applying the method of process tracing which „attempts to identify the intervening causal process between independent variables and the outcome of the dependant variable” (George & Bennet 2004: 206). According to Yin (2003) this can help to assess whether the consistency is spurious of causal to enhance the internal validity (Yin, 2003: 36).

1.10 Data gathering

From February 14, 2011 to July 1, 2011 the research for this thesis was conducted as part of
an internship at the Royal Dutch Army Command in Utrecht, the Netherlands. The internship provided access to certain key-persons, insights in the EU BG *modus operandi* and knowledge of international military cooperation. Most of the interviews were held in The Hague or by phone with the different military attachés and people from abroad, next to a questionnaire sent by e-mail. All the conversations were recorded in order to prevent misinterpretation of the information derived from the interviews.

The different interviews were all semi-structured, which allowed new questions to be brought up while the interview took place. I tried to contact as many key persons from the different participating member states as possible, as well as experts on this topic, but not all persons could be found willing or able to cooperate. The emphasis was put on military attachés of the participating countries in the Netherlands, due to limitations in time and funding for this research. The reasons to choose for this specific target group were based on their knowledge of both the military, political and social characteristics of the countries. Next to the attachés, I was also able to speak to the commander of the Battlegroup, BGen van der Laan and the Austrian contingent commander and EU BG staff officer commander Lt-Col Loschek. Furthermore, Dutch staff officers concerned with international military cooperation and the preparation of the standby phase were interviewed as well as a subject matter expert from the Dutch ministry of foreign affairs. A full list of interviewees can be found in Appendix III. Interestingly, Austrian officials were very willing to cooperate, as well as the Dutch officials and officers. German officials were more reluctant to participate in an interview or to answer the questionnaire. This has had some implications for the validity of the sections on the German incentives, but was solved to a certain extent by the amount of scientific information available on Germany and its possible incentives.

Next to the interviews I also used triangulation of sources by making use of official documents from the different governments and European institutions. Whitepapers and documents of the different ministries, parliaments and ministries of defense were used next to literature and news articles to provide the framework of this thesis.

### 1.11 Outline of the thesis

This chapter saw the introduction of the general scientific framework of the thesis, with the central question, sub question, hypotheses and research design. The second chapter will go in-depth on the origin of the European Battlegroup and will focus on the ESDP and CFSP, the Helsinki Headline Goals and the Battlegroup Concept. The third chapter will elaborate the theory used in this thesis; International Regime Theory. It will pay attention to its three very
distinctive approaches. The fourth chapter will focus on the European Battlegroup 2011/1 and its characteristics and will test the three hypotheses on the participating countries of the EU BG 2011/1 to gain insight in their participation incentives. The fifth and final chapter will hold the conclusion, reflection on the research carried out and will end with recommendations for future research.

1.12 Validity
In the field of social sciences, certain knowledge does not exist (Popper, 1996). According to Lieshout (1993: 16) certain knowledge is absent since individuals decide which indicators within a theory are seen as causes or as consequences. This assumption holds that an indefinite number of acknowledgment of a theory will not predict that a phenomenon will happen again in the future. On the contrary, just one observation is enough to adjust or even reject a theory (Vennix, 2007).

By using the three different approaches of IRT, one can make a conclusion on which approach holds the most explanatory power to explain the participation incentives of the different countries. This does not mean that the other approaches, who explain less should be rejected, since a theory cannot be rejected by a single test (Kuhn, 1979: 131-135). In order to guarantee the validity of the research units, the conclusions need to be replicable in like-wise situations, e.g. military cooperation in other EU BG’s or military alliances. Since this research has a rather limited scope and only aims at one Battlegroup, more research has to be done to meet this demand. In order to upkeep the content validity of this research it is important that the operationalization of concepts is carried out with the greatest care (Vennix, 2007: 198).

Concerning the conclusion in the fifth chapter: if one of the three approaches used in this research provides a good way to explain the countries incentives it does not mean that the other approaches need to be rejected as untrue. If the first hypothesis will be rejected this will mean that the interest-based approach of IRT is not sufficient in explaining the participation incentives of the different countries. If the second power-based approach will be rejected it holds the same conclusion of not being sufficient in addressing the participation incentives. This will also be true for the third hypothesis concerning the knowledge-based approach. This means that more research will have to be conducted to explain the reasons why countries participate by making use of additional scientific theories.
1.13 Limitations

This research presumes basic knowledge and understanding of the institutions and operations of the European Union, since explaining what the European Union does, how it does it and what its effects are can be considered as one of the most "daunting" challenges facing the discipline of political science (Peterson, 2002: 3).

This research will not touch the problems concerning the EU BG in general as put forth by a number of scholars. For a detailed account of the operational and political challenges the BG concept faces, I would refer to Colonel Robert W. DeJong’s article, a very interesting and detailed research paper concerning operational and political challenges for the European Battlegroup.

The case study presented in this research is limited in its scope since it holds a focus on the incentives of the member states of the EU BG 2011/1. This means that not all findings can be extrapolated to other Battlegroups. However, a general base may be found to explain common incentives on participation and cooperation within the military domain of the EU. The motivation for this limitation can be found in the fact that conducting interviews (to enhance the knowledge on participation incentives) is very time-consuming and depends on the willingness of certain key-persons.

Research in other countries stretched beyond the scope and financial limits of this research, but could be replaced by consulting foreign officials in Brussels and by using questionnaires and telephonic interviews to consult other key-persons, next to face-to-face interviews with different experts from the ministries of foreign affairs, policy institutes and high ranking military officials of the different countries.
The European Union can be considered as a major player in world politics. It provides the United Nations (UN) with about 40 percent of its budget and is the largest contributor of aid and economic assistance in the world (Kerttunen, Koivolo and Jeppson, 2005: 18). Next to economic cooperation the member states of the European Union also cooperate in the field of foreign affairs and security and defense. Regarding military operations, the second pillar of the EU, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) (formerly known as the European Security and Defence Policy or ESDP) both play an important role. Although the EU was capable of formulating a consistent policy regarding arms bans and the recognition of new states, it could not put an end to the conflicts in the former Yugoslavic Republic. This contributed to the idea that the European Union should form their own rapid-response force to engage timely in future conflicts (Dover, 2007: 268-269).

This second chapter will form the introduction to the European Union’s cooperation in these fields and will provide information on its history and background. Next to this the Battlegroup Concept (BC) will be explained in more detail, with information on its international character, size and organization. Also, information will be given on the Nordic counterpart of the EU BG: the Nordic Battlegroup, operational at the same time as the EU BG 2011/1. The chapter will close with a short summary of the above-mentioned topics.

2.1 The EU and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)

In 1992 the European Council agreed upon a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the Dutch city of Maastricht which formed the second, intergovernmental, pillar in the European Union. It also paved the way for European Union cooperation in defence matters (Dover, 2007: 240-244). The intergovernmental character of this CFSP meant that there was little input from the European Commission and European Parliament. Its decision-making framework rested on a unanimous voting system in the EU Council which gave each government the ability to veto any policy-initiative or operation. This in turn led to

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Koivula et al. (2005), acknowledge that the term Battlegroup can raise some eyebrows among those that are not accustomed to military terms. He mentions that a taskforce or a Battlegroup in this respect means a semi-permanent grouping of units, usually companies, under one commander with the purpose of carrying out a specific operation or sequence of a larger campaign. As he points out an EU Battlegroup forms the combination of different branches. It means that the BG consists of a mechanised (infantry) battalion of about 3-4 companies strengthened with support units like engineers, air-defence or fire-support companies and combat service support units like medical assistance, construction and maintenance (2005: 29).
conservative policy outputs (Howorth, 2011).

The European Parliament has to be informed on all policies and initiatives conducted under CFSP. The „keeping out” of the latter was done to ensure that member states would be predominant in the policy-area (Dover, 2007: 241). As Robert Dover sets forth, the enactment of the Maastricht Treaty or the „Treaty on the European Union” (TEU) as it is also referred to, bounded the member states to work more closely together (2007: 242). The TEU also stated that the EU should work towards the creation of a common defence policy and eventually towards a common defence (Dover, 2007: 242). These events can be seen as the beginning of the development of a European Security and Defence Policy.

2.2 The development of military cooperation

The relationship with NATO is of crucial importance for the defence policy of the European Union. Basic rule of the EU policy is that it must not harm the functioning of NATO and with that, the relationship between Europe and the United States (Dover, 2007: 269). Experiences in Bosnia and its stand on the conflict in Kosovo made clear that Europe was not able to handle security problems „next to its doorstep” and that it was highly dependent on American military and diplomatic means (Stadelmaier, 2009: 40). Under pressure of the Americans, who did not wanted to pay the „European security bill” anymore (Howard, 2004 in Stadelmaier, 2009: 40). British experts admitted that Europe could not always rely on American will and support in crisis-situations like Bosnia (Tams, 1999: 94-95 in Stadelmaier, 2009: 40). To secure engagement of the United States in NATO and European affairs, the European Union needed to bolster up its own ability to handle minor security threats to its territory. Since no state could provide the means to do this alone, cooperation of the European member states would be the best approach (Stadelmaier, 2009: 41). Britain and France were considered as the lead players and gave the project a better chance of success, since they portrayed themselves as the hard-power players in Europe (Deighton, 2002: 725).

The real process of the gradual militarization of the European Union started in France in 1998 at the St Malo Declaration (Dover: 2007: 244). It opened the way for a new phase in European foreign policy cooperation that would involve the emergence of a defence policy for the EU. The St Malo Declaration can be seen as the foundation of the Helsinki Headline Goal 2003. The call for a more closely military cooperation in Europe came surprisingly enough from the British. The main issue of the St Malo process was the development of a single currency, which the UK government found impossible to support (Dover, 2007: 244). To maintain a dominant place within the EU, the UK needed to respond on other terrains.
According to Stadelmaier (2009), the UK had aspirations of a leading role in the Union to extend their influence on the diverse policy areas. When this did not work out in the case of the European Monetary Union (EMU) they tried their best to lead further European cooperation in another field. In order to influence policies the British needed to take on a prominent role. A leading role in this area would assure the UK of enough attention and influence, since they already had credible capabilities in the security area (Stadelmaier, 2009: 241). A problem that the British faced was aligning the other member states, especially Germany and France for their cause. As the least transatlantic country of any of the EU member states, the French were surprised to be approached by the British to advance an EU-based security solution (Howarth, 2000 in Dover, 2007: 244). The agreement demonstrated the influence of the United Kingdom, France and Germany over large security initiatives in Europe. The German government was more than willing to lend its support, as it was convinced that the ESDP would not undermine the transatlantic alliance with the United States of which Germany was seen as its closest European ally in the late 1990s (Dover, 2007 244-245).

However, during the preparation phase for the war in Iraq in 2003, the positions of the member states were scattered. Great-Britain, Spain and Italy chose the side of the United States whereas France and Germany were opponents of the war. This showed the importance of an agreement on actions for member states of the EU, especially in case of influential member states. It also pointed out to the ever-present importance of the EU-US relation (Verbeek, 2007: 269). After 9/11 the European Union attempted to respond to security threats by constructing a European Security Strategy (ESS) in December 2003, which was seen as a reply to the 2002 American National Security Strategy (Dover, 2007: 249). The ESS covered all kinds of threats to the EU: terrorism, proliferation of WMD’s, failed states, regional conflict and organized crime. The ESS further expanded the tasks as set forth in the CSDP and the Treaty of Lisbon (or Reform Treaty). It was drafted by Secretary-General/High Representative of the UN, Javier Solana in an effort to show that the EU could be a strategic actor. The ESS can be considered crucial to an understanding of the purpose and mission of an EU military force (Andersson, 2006: 15). Its importance for the EU should not be underestimated since: “Any military action of the European Union will be based on the general vision of the EU’s role in the world as outlined in the ESS” (Ortega, 2005 in Andersson, 2006: 15).
2.3 The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)\textsuperscript{7}

The ESDP proposals were amended and adapted through several meetings of the European Council in Cologne (1999), Helsinki (1999) and Sintra (2000) (Dover, 2007: 245). The importance of these meetings was found in what would become the so called „Petersberg tasks” (Article 17.2 of the Treaty on European Union) and a Headline Goal for the EU (Dover, 2007: 245). The ESDP was created in 1999 to strengthen the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, and at times has been called Europe’s military revolution (Andréani et al., 2001 in Deighton, 2002: 719).

The tasks of the ESDP are defined by the so called „Petersberg tasks”, which were drawn up in 1992 within the framework of the Western European Union (WEU) and were later incorporated in the TEU by revisions at the EU summit in Amsterdam of 1997 (Giegerich, 2008: 15). As Bastian Giegerich sets forth, the Petersberg tasks cover humanitarian and rescue operations, peacekeeping and crisis-management tasks including peace-making conducted by military forces (Giegerich, 2008: 15-16). The inclusion of the Petersberg tasks in the ESDP supports the idea that the ESDP can be seen as a product of the inability of the European Union to deal with peacekeeping and peace-enforcing operations like the civil war in Yugoslavia\textsuperscript{8} and the realization that threats to the EU in the medium to long term will come from non-state military actors (Dover, 2007; Smith, 2001 in Dover, 2007: 46).

As of 1999 at the Cologne European Council, crisis management was seen as the most important element (Dover, 2007: 245). The ESDP consisted of three different elements: military crisis-management, civilian crisis-management and conflict-prevention. Subsequent European councils refocused their efforts on the assets that the EU had made available. This resulted in allowing it to conduct autonomous actions. The military dimension of the ESDP was introduced in Helsinki in 1999 and was further developed at the Nice 2001 European Council. To make the ESDP possible in practical terms, institutional steps had to be taken. The Cologne summit of 1999 saw the establishment of the Political and Security Committee (PSC) by the European Council, consisting of member states’ ambassadors to „manage” the CFSP and EDSP on a more daily basis (Andersson, 2006: 12).

\textsuperscript{7} The Treaty of Lisbon (2007, entered force in 2009) renamed the ESDP to CSDP. Therefore, sources before 2007/2009 speak of the ESDP whereas more recent sources speak of the CSDP.

\textsuperscript{8} The war in Yugoslavia made clear that the EU lacked the tools to adequately deal with this kind of conflict nor did it result in indications on how to act might a similar crisis occur. However, it did show that cooperation of France and the UK was possible without diplomatic conflict. This would prove to be an important fact for the gradual militarization of the EU (Dover, 2007: 246).
2.3.1 The Nice Treaty (2000)

According to Robert Dover, the negotiations for the ESDP largely took place outside formal EU negotiating frameworks to avoid the input and interference of EU Commission officials and members of the European Parliament. Due to the success of previous Councils (Cologne, Helsinki and Sintra) and the Nice Treaty negotiations of 2000, the final negotiations were quickly conducted (Dover, 2007: 246). The Nice Treaty gave power to the Commission to ensure that actions conducted by the EU are in line with the objectives of the national governments. This was done to provide stability and to restore the political and economic situation to contribute to peace. Although it does bring the CFSP „closer” to Brussels, it can be seen as reaffirming the primacy of the member governments in this field. The right for individual governments to veto remained and they were allowed to hold on to their independent defence policies (Dover, 2007: 246-247). The Lisbon Treaty brought the ESDP and CFSP together within a new named overarching policy: the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The CDSP demanded that that all of its member-governments improved their military capabilities to meet the demands that were made in the so called „Capabilities Catalogue” (Dover, 2007: 247).

2.3.2 Helsinki Headline Goal (2003)

The decision to establish the ESDP led to a discussion about the state of military capabilities of the EU (Andersson, 2006: 12). Current and recent EU crisis-management ambitions are provided by various „Headline Goals” that have been adopted as planning targets by EU member states since 1999 (Giegerich, 2008: 16). The Helsinki Headline Goal (HHG 2003) originated in 1999 can be seen as a firm step forward for the ESDP. In June 1999, EU governments agreed that the Union needed to have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crisis without prejudice to actions by NATO (Council of the EU, 1999: 1). With this ambition, member states committed themselves to be able “to deploy and sustain forces capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks as set out in the Amsterdam Treaty” (Hagman, 2002: 21). The EU should be able to deploy roughly 60,000 troops within two months notice by 2003 (Deighton, 2002: 1). These forces should be self-supporting with

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9 These tasks were named after the Hotel Petersberg in Bonn where in 1992 a summit of the Western European Union (WEU) was held. These tasks were incorporated in the Treaty on the European Union during the European summit in Amsterdam of 1997. They consist of humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, which includes peacemaking through the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (Archer, 2000: 110; Deighton, 2002: 719).
the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics and other combat support services (Lindley-French, 2005: 3). Rapid response was identified as an important aspect of EU crisis management capabilities; the HHG assigned its members with the task of being capable to provide rapid response forces at a high readiness-level. This cleared the way for an EU Military Rapid Response Concept (European Union, 2009a: 2). At the time that HG 2003 was defined, the EU had not yet developed its own scenarios.

This meant that its strategic-planning assumptions including the planning of mutual operations were underdeveloped (Giegerich, 2008: 16). The EU was still very focused on large scale operation in and around Europe at this stage, what could very well be a consequence of the Kosovo crisis of 1999 (2008: 17). As Andersson (2006: 14) points out, the HHG made clear that it should not be regarded as a start of the formation of an EU army. An EU-led force mobilized in response to a crisis would only last for the duration of the crisis. Problems concerning the „voluntary” commitments of the member states’ contribution appeared quickly since they had the ability to decide whether, when and how to contribute troops (Andersson, 2006: 14). The available capabilities were documented by the EU member states in three catalogues; the *Headline Goal Catalogue* (goals for the number of troops and capabilities), the *Headline Force Catalogue* (list of currently available forces), the *Headline Progress Catalogue* (how to meet the differences between goals and currently available forces). The role of these catalogues was to identify gaps in key-capabilities such as strategic lift and support-actions. Nevertheless its capabilities problems, at the 2001 Laeken meeting the council declared the EU to be „military operational”. Although the Helsinki Catalogues constituted merely a paper-list of units and resources without the guarantee that troops would be trained and be ready for a possible deployment when an actual crisis would present itself (Andersson, 2006: 14).

### 2.4 Operation Artemis

From 2003 onwards the EU became more active in the prevention of conflicts, by launching more than fifteen civilian mission and five military peacekeeping missions (DeJong, 2009: 4; WEU, 2009a) After a request by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Operation Artemis was launched in June 2003 to stabilize the security conditions in parts of the Ituri region in the Democratic Republic of Congo. EU-personnel were assembled with the expectation to remain there for a period of three months. The EU-deployment gave the UN time to expand its numbers on the ground and pass a Chapter VII mandate (Lindstrom, 2007: 10). It was the EU’s first autonomous military operation, without NATO involvement and the first operation

-28-
to take place outside of Europe and under auspice of chapter VII of the UN Charter (Ulriksen et al. 2004: 508 in Andersson, 2006: 9).

Table 1: Summary of the Operation Artemis deployment schedule (2003)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 10</td>
<td>Request by UN Secretary Kofi Annan to President Jacques Chirac regarding a possible deployment to Bunia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 19</td>
<td>GAERC tasks SG/HR Solana to initiate a Crisis Management Concept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 30</td>
<td>UNSC Resolution 1484 authorizes the deployment of interim emergency multinational force Bunia until 1 September 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 5</td>
<td>EU Council Joint Action – authorising Operation Artemis and approving logistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 6</td>
<td>First elements arrive in the AO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 12</td>
<td>EU Council decision approves operation plan and launch of Operation Artemis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 6</td>
<td>Operation Artemis reaches full deployment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(source: Lindstrom, 2007)

As can be seen in the table above, the political-strategic parameters of the operation began on May 19, 2003 at the specific request of the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC). The Joint Action was adopted on June 5, launching the operation. The EU went from a Crisis Management Concept (CMC) to a council decision to launch the operation in less then three weeks. The deployment time of EU forces after the start of the operation took about twenty days. The demonstrated ability to deploy quickly and the successful outcome of the operation gave EU policymakers confidence that the EU could perform rapid response missions by using framework nations (Lindstrom, 2007: 11). It also showed the successful ability to operate with a small force at a significant distance from Brussels and demonstrated the need to further develop the EU’s rapid response capabilities. It became a reference model for the development of a new Battlegroup-sized rapid response capability (Factsheet EU BG, 2009). That the outcome of Operation Artemis was received positively can be seen in the final declaration of the Franco-British Summit in London of November 24, 2003. The declaration described ways to strengthen the European cooperation in the fields of security and defence.
The declaration stated that Britain and France were in favour of a new initiative, in which the EU would focus on the development of its rapid reaction capabilities. This would enhance its ability to support the UN in short-term crisis management situations. Both countries further agreed: “to continue to work together on strengthening the EU’s effective military capability, including the development of further capability goals, the establishment of the EU Agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments” (Missiroli, 2003: 280-281). The declaration also called for “Battlegroup size forces” consisting of around 1500 men, offered by a single nation or through a multinational or framework nation force package and that could be deployed at request of the UN (Lindstrom, 2007: 11).

On the 10th of February 2004, the UK, Germany and France unveiled their next ideas on a Battlegroup Concept. The idea was consistent with the final declaration but was sharpened on a few points. It stated that the forces should be „tailored rapidly for specific missions” and that the primary focus of the Battlegroup should be on „bridging operations” which meant that it should focus on sustaining operations until relieved by UN peacekeepers or regional organisations acting under UN-mandate. This would imply that they would be operational and self-supporting for 30 days extendable to at least 120 days (EUISS, 2005: 13).

2.5 Headline Goal 2010

Following the adoption of the European Security Strategy in December 2003, the European Union decided to set a new Headline Goal. (EU, 2009b: 1; Giegerich, 2008: 17). The EU Council acknowledged that although the HHG 2003 was formally met, its capabilities remained somewhat limited. The difference between the HHG 2003 and HG 2010 could be found in their focus. Whereas the HHG 2003 focuses more on numbers, the HG 2010 focuses more on „quality rather than quantity” (Giegerich, 2008: 17). Through the HHG 2003, the member states decided to commit themselves to be able to respond with rapid and decisive action by 2010 (Council of the European Union, 2004b: 1). Central element of the new Headline Goal was the creation of the so called EU-Battlegroup. In 2004, the HG 2010 aimed for the completion of the development of rapidly deployable Battlegroups, including strategic-lift capability. The HG 2010 emphasized the ability of the EU to sustain several operations simultaneously and at different levels of engagement.

The focus was put on interoperability, deployability and sustainability, selected as the core of the member states” policy (Headline Goal, 2010). Within this context, and based on a French-British-German initiative, the EU Military Staff (EUMS) developed the Battlegroup Concept,
which was agreed by the EU Military Committee (EUMC) in June 2004. The proposal of February 2004 made by Germany, France and the UK contained very specific proposals concerning missions, sustainability, command and control (C2) and deployability. It can be seen as a base for the EU BG concept and was accepted with enthusiasm by the other member states (Lindstrom, 2007: 12). In April 2004, the defence ministers of the EU member states approved the establishment of different Battlegroups, starting 2007. By November 2004 the EU member states made their initial pledge to the establishment of European Battlegroups (ibid.). Since then, the work has been taken forward, based on an agreed road map. These efforts resulted in the delivery of one single Battlegroup Concept document the in October 2006 (EU, 2009a).

2.6 The Battlegroup Concept

The Battlegroups were used as a new approach to the principle of „force packaging” and designed to enhance the EU’s rapid reaction capacity (Lindley-French, 2005: 2). Although, in order to make sure that the burden of a rapid-response action through the European Union would not only be shared by the same countries, the Battlegroups were designed to act as a „catalyst” for reforms in the field of defence in countries who where less experienced in expeditionary operations, to ensure their contribution. (Messervy-Whiting and Williams, 2007: 4).

The word „Battlegroup” is likely to be interpreted in different terms (Lindstrom, 2007: 13; Koivula et al., 2005: 29), therefore the following definition of the European Battlegroup will be used: “the minimal military effective, credible, rapidly deployable, coherent force package capable of stand alone operations, or for the initial phase of larger operations” (Hamelink, 2005: 8-9). It consists of a multinational force package and its tasks could be performed by a single Framework Nation (FN) or by a multinational coalition. The European Union has deemed interoperability and military effectiveness as key-criteria, which is reflected in the Battlegroup Concept. (EU, 2009a: 2). A BG is linked to a deployable force headquarters and pre-identified operational and strategic enablers, like strategic lift and logistics support. Member states may also contribute with niche capabilities to the

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10 The Military Committee is made up of chiefs of defence and other military representatives of member states. Its function is to provide direction to the EUMS and gave military advice to the Political and Security Committee (PSC), which also has a major role in crisis-management planning. The EUMS – whose personnel are mostly sent from its member states- performs three main functions: warning, situation assessment and strategic planning for crisis management tasks (as laid out in the TEU). The EUMS works under the direction of the Military Committee, it is organises as department of the Council secretariat (cf. Giegerich, 2008: 89). The PSC, EUMC and EUMS are considered to be the permanent political and military structures for an operational EU defence policy (cf. Andersson, 2006: 13).
Battlegroups. The standby period for a Battlegroup is six-month and its position should be sustainable for a period of 30 days, with the timeframe extendable to 120 days when re-supplied appropriately (illustrated by figure 2 below) (EU, 2009a: 2).

Figure 2: Battlegroup timeline (source: EU, 2009a: 2)

The ambition of the EU is to decide on the launching of an operation within five days of the approval of the Crisis Management Concept (CMC) by the European Council. The goal is then to demand that the forces begin to implement their mission in the Area of Operations (AO) no later then ten days after the EU”s decision to start (EU, 2009a: 2). To be able to respond so quickly, the EU BG will be held at a high-readiness state of 5-10 days. This ambitious time schedule will not only put pressure on the decision-making bodies in the EU, but could also be constrained by the necessary agreement of the member states (Hamelink, 2005: 9).

2.6.1 Force composition
The generic composition of an EU BG is approximately around 1,500 troops. It is based on a combined arms, battalion-sized force package with combat support and combat service support. A „standard” EU BG will include headquarters staff, three infantry companies and support personnel. This may include mechanized infantry, fire support units and medical facilities (Lindstrom, 2007: 15). By combining these different categories, an EU BG can operate independently and take on various tasks. Since BG structures are not fixed, all BG’s have different compositions. Participating countries are flexible on its assembly and its features (Lindstrom, 2007: 15).

Formation of the Battlegroups is done from within the member states. This „bottom-up” approach is typical for the kind of decision making in the European Union where much is decided following initiatives of one of the member states and a central control is lacking (Querido and Van den Brink, 2005: 337). Member state participation is being decided at the
so called Battlegroup Co-ordination Conferences (BGCC) which are held twice a year. EU members indicate the composition of their potential contribution and the timeframe on which they could be placed on standby. This way, in theory a constant flux of BG’s would be guaranteed. The member states that offer a contribution to an EU BG are then held responsible for generating the forces for the whole BG package including its operational and strategic enablers. This part is mostly done on a multinational basis with their BG partners, outside the EU’s influence (Lindstrom 2007: 16). Next to the Battlegroups advanced and complementary sphere of military units, a number of countries provide the Battlegroups witch so called „niche capabilities” like medical groups (Cyprus), water purification units (Lithuania), Sea Lift Coordination Centre (Greece) and additional HQ and command structures (France) (Lombardi, 2007: 151).

2.6.2 Headquarters
The EU’s Command and Control (C2) concept assumes that the EU military chain of command contains three headquarter-levels: an operational headquarters, a force headquarters and component headquarters (Lindstrom, 2007: 22). This is illustrated in Figure 3 on the following page. Figure 4 illustrates the different levels for each headquarters. The Operational Headquarters (OHQ) is concerned with the execution of an ESDP operation at the strategic level and charged with the general oversight of the Battlegroup Process and the generation of operational and strategic enablers (Messervy-Whiting and Williams, 2007: 5). With support from an active headquarter and dedicated support from EU member states it should be ready for planning within five days (Lindstrom, 2007: 22).

As Lindstrom continues, most EU BGs have identified their preferences for a specific OHQ, - currently five11- following agreements in the Helsinki Headline Goal 2010. In a normal situation the OHQ is housed by a staff of eight, whereas in a crisis situation it can house around eighty staff members (ibid.). The Force Headquarters functions as the base of operations, providing command and control over the ground troops. Its size varies with the needs of the BG, but according to Lindstrom: “it is likely to number slightly under 100 personnel” (Lindstrom, 2007: 22). At the tactical level, there may be a Component Headquarters to accommodate component commanders of strategic assets like air-support and Special Forces. This is illustrated in the following figures:

11 These operational headquarters are located in Mont Valérien, (France) Northwood, (United Kingdom), Potsdam, (Germany), Rome (Italy) and a Greek OHQ in Larissa (European Union External Action website, 2011).
6.3 Certification, training and costs

To reach the standby-status, an EU BG needs to be certified first, according to predetermined criteria. Participating nations are responsible for providing the promised assets and capabilities. Although certification remains a national responsibility of the contributing member states, the EU Military Committee, assisted by the Military Staff of the EU, monitors the Battlegroup certification following strict EU-agreed guidelines (EU, 2009a). This will determine if a Battlegroup can successfully meet the criteria as set out in the Petersberg tasks and the Headline Goal 2010 (Lindstrom, 2007: 27). The certification process allows the military planners to evaluate if the assigned troops have the required equipment and training to fulfil the EU BG’s mission objectives (Hamelink, 2006 in Lindstrom 2007: 24).
At a general level, the European Union has put together nine categories of standards, criteria and recommendations for the EU BGs:

1. Availability
2. Flexibility
3. Employability
4. Deployability
5. Readiness
6. Connectivity
7. Flexibility
8. Medical force protection
9. Interoperability

In a multinational BG, the contributing member states are responsible for the defining and ensuring of certifiable standards for its units. They are free to shape the training according to their needs as long as its leads to a successful certification (Lindstrom, 2007: 25). It is then up to the Framework Nation to certify the EUBG as a whole. It is furthermore recommended that EU BG contributors rely on NATO standards and criteria in order to promote the interoperability between the different units (ibid.). This maximizes flexibility. Contributing countries can rely on standards on which they are familiar with, next to the possible (gradual) creation of „best practices” due to the comparison of their experiences during the certification process. Another advantage of those common standards is that articulate a shared interpretation of the required skills and equipment for the Battlegroup (Cameron, Messery-Whiting and Williams, 2007: 7). Training is considered as a key requirement for the Battlegroups. Member states conduct a series of exercises in order to prepare themselves for their standby period.

Possible drawbacks of this somewhat flexible approach of the EU BGs are also identified by Lindstrom (2007). He points out to different approaches in Command, Control and Communications (C3) between the countries and points out that the cooperation involves little multilateral dialogue and remains very national in its approach (Lindstrom, 2007: 27-28). He also points to the possible surfacing of so called „credibility gaps”; a lack of transparency between the different countries regarding the preparedness of their different promised units can harm the credibility of the specific BG and the concept of the EU BG in general (2007: 28). Also, as Lindstrom points out, the current EU BG system lacks EU-led exercises, which can lead countries to opt for national solutions (ibid.).

Military operations that involve an EU BG fall under CSDP operations. The common costs of such a mission would then be administered among the participating states using the
Athena mechanism. Other costs, as Lindstrom notes (troop transport costs from the participating country to the area of operations) will be the responsibility of contributors: „costs lie where they fall” (2007: 25). The more personnel and equipment a country contributes, the higher its costs for the operation will be. The Swedish authorities calculated afterwards that their contributions to the Nordic BG from 2005-2008 were very costly, approximately € 240 million (Kerttunen et al., 2005). A number of those costs that would have been made after all, for instance to provide basic training of its troops. The costs associated with the standby period were € 38 million, which was considered as being very costly (Lindstrom, 2007: 26).

2.7 Missions and scenarios
An EU BG needs to respond rapidly and with decisive action in the event of a mission following the Petersberg tasks as well as the tasks outlined in the European Security Strategy (ESS). Both are listed in the table below.

Table 2: ESDP/CSDP tasks and missions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Petersberg tasks</th>
<th>European Security Strategy Tasks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian and rescue tasks</td>
<td>Joint disarmament operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
<td>Support for third countries in combating terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform (SSR) operations as part of broader institution building</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(source: Lindstrom, 2007: 17)

As can be concluded out of table 2, the scope of the missions can differ in range. Although the EU BG should be capable to perform all the above mentioned tasks, given its limited size and force it would be most useful in tasks of limited duration and intensity. The BG’s can be self-supporting for 30 days, and with proper resupplying even 120 days (Lindstrom, 2007: 17).

Based on the 2005 Requirements Catalogue five potential missions have been identified, which in turn are based to cover the whole range of the Headline Goal 2010. In themselves, Headline Goals do not indicate precise levels of ambition because they do not give details on the envisaged upcoming missions. The EUMS is in charge of the military

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12 Common costs can be found amongst others in the upkeep of the headquarters (HQ, FHQ, OHQ) and transport costs, administration, communication and medical services. For more detailed information see Annex III-A of the Council of the European Union on the Athena Mechanism.
planning, which takes place under supervision of the EU Military Committee (Giegerich, 2008: 19). The capabilities process begins with scenarios of possible actions. Each scenario involves different assumptions about strategic-planning variables; amongst others the distance from Brussels, the time required to reach full operating capability, the duration of the mission and arrangements on rotations of personnel differ. The EU uses five illustrative scenarios for military crisis-management planning as summed up extensively and in detail by Bastian Giegerich in his book „European military crisis management“ (2008). Although the Battlegroups are designed to operate independently of organisations such as NATO, there is also room for cooperation with other multilateral institutions depending on the tasks the EU BG has to carry out (Chappell, 2009: 426). An outline of these different scenarios can be found in Appendix I.

2.8 The Catalogues

Based on the scenarios, military options were developed to deal with the crises. These options led to a planning framework which in turn led to a detailed list of the capabilities that were needed. From this point, so called „generic force packages“ were developed that identified the type of force groupings that would be required to counter the crises (EU, 2009b: 2). This resulted in a list of reference units, put together in a Requirements Catalogue that described the actual type of units, resources and assets in more detail (ibid.).

The next step is taken by the member states. The EU would ask them to what extent they could offer assets and resources to meet the requirements as set out in its force requirement. To complement this a Headline Goal questionnaire was sent to the member states, together with a scrutinising handbook and methodology which would enable them to self-assess their contributions (EU, 2009b: 2). To clarify the capacity of the offered abilities by the Member States, a clarification dialogue was held with the EU Military Staff (EUMS). This resulted in the compilation of the EU Force Catalogue which describes both quantitatively and qualitatively the military capabilities that the Member States will have available (EU, 2009b: 2-3). The process is made visible in the figure on the following page:
Additional contributions made by non-European NATO members and other EU-candidate countries are collected in a supplement to the Force Catalogue. They will be taken into account in managing any shortfalls in the capability of the Battlegroup. This Force Catalogue provides the basis in identifying shortfalls and the potential operational risk that this takes with it. This analysis results in the Progress Catalogue, which is used to recommend the member states on any shortfalls. Recommendations are of key-importance for the Capabilities Development Plan (CDP) drawn up by the Member States and the EUMC. The CDP aims at providing member states with information that could assist them in: “Facilitating their decision-making in the context of national capability choices, stimulate their cooperation and facilitate the launching of new joint programmes” (EU, 2009b: 3). It is created by and for the member states and takes into consideration the consequences of the Headline Goal 2010, the estimated requirements of capabilities in the year 2025, lessons learned and current plans and programmes of the member states (ibid.).

2.9 The Nordic Battlegroup

During the Military Capabilities Conference (MCC) in Brussels of November 2004, the Scandinavian countries of Sweden, Finland and Norway declared that they would establish their own multinational Battlegroup, based on the EU Battlegroup Concept and in effect from July 2008, followed shortly by Estonia as member of this BG (Andersson, 2006: 37).

It was called the Nordic Battlegroup (NBG) and can be seen as a specific regional-oriented BG like its more southern-oriented BG counterpart EUROFOR in contrast to the more „central“ EU BG. Sweden would be the first Framework Nation (FN) of the NBG, and as such assumed responsibility for the organization.

The NBG differs from other BG’s because it consists mostly of smaller EU member
states and even a non-EU Member State is involved as participant, Norway (Andersson, 2006: 37). It exists on a permanent basis and involves a number of non-aligned countries (WEU, 2007: 10). In accordance with the EU BG, the NBG consists of a mechanised infantry battalion with tactical and strategic support units and is on standby for six months just like the EU BG.

In the first half of 2011, Sweden will once again form the framework nation of the NBG and will be accompanied by Finland, Norway, Estonia and Ireland (IISS, 2010: 105). In their standby period both commanders have had intensive contact on issues at hand and visited each others exercises and staffs on a regular basis. Information-sharing and planning cooperation between both BG’s assisted the cooperation between the countries concerned in the Battlegroups (Kamerstuk nr. 150 2010; Van der Laan, personal communication, April 2011).

2.10 The NATO Response Force and its relation to the EU BG
Addressing the characteristics of the EU BG would not be complete without going more into detail on the NATO and its NATO Response Force (NRF), considering that out of the twenty-seven members of the EU, twenty-one are NATO members (Del Favero, 2009: iv).

Starting from 1999, the EU and NATO have developed a closer strategic partnership, of which its necessity was confirmed by the events of 9/11 (Del Favero, 2009: 13). According to Rob Querido and Jan van den Brink, rapid deployment is considered as a condition sine qua non for a timely and successful reaction to a crisis (2005: 336). Both NATO and the EU have acknowledged that their rapid deployment capacity needs to be reinforced (Querido and Van den Brink, 2005: 335). If NATO chooses to opt out of a possible operation, the EU can send its Battlegroup and following the Berlin Plus Agreement, can make use of NATO means or capacities (ibid).

There are some commentators who argue that with the Battlegroup Concept, the EU is trying to duplicate the NRF. In a way, both have the same goal in mind: they aim to address crises by sending in rapid response forces, but as Franco Del Favero (2009: 33) notes: “although the means are similar, the ends are different”. Similar is the reaction of Querido and Van den Brink, who note: “The EU Battlegroups and the NRF should be considered complementary to each other, which is best expressed by explaining the differences and the similarities between the two” (Querido and Van den Brink, 2005: 336).
Where the NRF covers the whole spectrum of military operations; crisis-management, counter-terrorism and collective defence following article 5, the EU BG is only focussed on the Petersberg tasks, Berlin Plus Agreement and the tasks mentioned in the ESS. The main focus of the NRF can be summarized as: “(…) transforming the European NATO allies” ability to participate in high intensity warfare operations rather than contribute to peace support operations” (Granholm & Jonson, 2006: 12). EU Battlegroups can be used in low as well as in high intensity conflicts, taken into account its limited size. Also, due to the lack of an American connotation, - which the NRF does have - it can be used in areas where an American military presence is not considered to be positive for handling the crisis.

The EU BG and NRF do share a common operational concept: they can be considered as modular forces as well as expeditionary forces (Del Favero, 2009: 43) but also show differences in size, capabilities and composition (Del Favero, 2009: 43-44). For instance: the land component of the NRF is the equivalent of a brigade-size manoeuvre unit whereas a Battlegroup consists of a third of that size since it is based on a mechanized infantry battalion (Granholm and Jonson, 2006: 12).

Taking part in an EU BG or the NRF requires almost identical operational skills and both concepts do improve multinational cooperation without sacrificing military effectiveness (Querido and Van den Brink, 2005: 336). EU BG standards will be mostly similar to the standards of the NRF, which means that for training purposes of the different involved countries no differentiation has to be made regarding planning and capacities for the EU BG or the NRF. Also, preparation and readiness of NRF and EU BG troops remains a national responsibility (2005: 336). As Niklas Granholm and Pål Jonson argue, the EU BG is more a „land-centric“ formation than the NRF and although the NRF has a longer deployment time (5-30 days) compared to the Battlegroup, it is considered more robust because it can rely on US support and is thus better equipped to handle the more „demanding” operations (Granholm and Johnson, 2006: 12).

The NATO and the EU have identified similar shortfalls in the area of crisis management during their capability development processes (EU, 2009b: 6). To exchange information on requirements common for both the EU BG as NATO the EU-NATO Capability Group has been set up. To enhance the understanding of their common goal and to tackle common shortfalls, the European Council approved the forwarding of the Progress Catalogue 2007, the Force Catalogue 2009 and other key-documents to NATO. This was done to enhance the transparency of the EUBG, but also for reciprocity purposes (EU, 2009b: 6).
2.11 Summary

This chapter has given an introduction to the EU BG concept and has answered two sub questions mentioned earlier in the introduction. With regards to the sub question, the chapter has sketched the historical background of the European Battlegroup within the European Union by starting from the European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) which paved the way for cooperation in the field of defence matters in the European Union. As the experience in Bosnia and the conflict in Kosovo made clear, Europe was not able to handle security problems “next to its door-step” and was dependent of American military and diplomatic means. To secure engagement of the US, in NATO and in European affairs, the European Union needed to bolster up its own ability to handle “minor” security threats to its territory. Since no state could provide the means to do this alone, cooperation of the European member states would be the best approach. Britain and France were the lead players in the process and gave the project a better chance of success.

Following the St. Malo Declaration, the development of the European Security Strategy (ESS), the ESDP and the Petersberg tasks military cooperation in the EU got shape. As a result of that, the Lisbon Treaty brought the ESDP and CFSP together within a new named overarching policy called the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The CSDP demanded that that all its member-governments improved their military capabilities to meet the demands that were made in the so called „Capabilities Catalogue”. The different member states governments agreed in June 1999 that the EU should develop military capacity for autonomous action. With this ambition the EU member states committed themselves by the year of 2003 to be able to fulfill the defined Petersberg tasks.

The outcome of Operation Artemis in 2003 was very positive for the EU. As the first autonomous conducted military EU mission, it made the EU member states more determined to develop their own military response force. Subsequently, a declaration by France, Germany and the UK followed, calling for „Battlegroup size forces” consisting of around 1500 men personnel of land forces, that should be offered by a single nation or through a multinational or framework nation force package that should be deployed by request of the UN

Following the adoption of the European Security Strategy in December 2003, the European Union decided to set a new Headline Goal. Central element of the new Headline Goal was the creation of the so called EU-Battlegroup. In 2004, the HG 2010 aimed for the completion of the development of rapidly deployable Battlegroups, including strategic-lift capability. The HG 2010 emphasized the ability of the EU to sustain several operations simultaneously and at different levels of engagement. Its focus lies on concepts of
interoperability, deployability and sustainability of the designated forces. Within this context, and based on a French/British/German initiative, the EU Military Staff (EUMS) developed the Battlegroup Concept, which was agreed by the EU Military Committee (EUMC) in June 2004.

In order to provide an answer the second sub question, the aims and purposes of the EU BG were described in this chapter. Briefly summarized, an EU BG can be defined as: “the minimum military effective, credible, rapidly deployable, coherent force package capable of stand alone operations or for the initial phase of larger operations”. It is linked to a deployable force headquarters and pre-identified operational and strategic enablers, like strategic lift and logistics support. Member States can also contribute with niche capabilities to the Battlegroups. The standby period for a Battlegroup is six months and its position should be sustainable for a period of 30 days, extendable to 120 days. It consists mostly of different contributing member states and is lead by a framework- or lead-nation. It is composed of approximately 1,500 troops and based on a combination of arms. It is built-up as a battalion-sized force package with combat support and combat service support. The aim is to provide the EU with an autonomous military face and rapid response capabilities. Concerning its tasks, it should be able to fulfil the tasks set out in the Petersberg tasks and the European Security Strategy.

Next to the answering of these sub questions additional information has been provided to give a complete image of the EU BG and its international surrounding. It encompassed the tasks and capabilities and the relation with the NATO Response Force as more general information on the Nordic Battlegroup and the scenario’s envisaged for the Battlegroup.

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13 The term „framework- or lead-nation” is defined as the participant which assumes the overall responsibility under the MoU (Memorandum of Understanding) and its subordinate arrangements for providing support to and co-coordinating the BG activities (EUMC, 2010: 3).
Chapter 3 International Regime Theory

In this chapter the theoretical framework of the thesis will be explained in more detail by exploring the three different “schools of thought” of International Regime Theory (IRT). A clear understanding of this theory is required to make sense of its applicability and the limits of the theory for this particular research. I will start with a definition of IRT and explain why it should be used in this research. Next, the three approaches of the theory will be explained in more detail after which the concepts used in the hypotheses will be operationalized in the introduction.

3.1 Introduction

Although there is much academic literature on the European Union, little of it can be considered theoretical (Peterson, 2001). Mostly it consists of journalistic accounts of recent developments, descriptions of institutions (Eatwell, 1997: 245 in Peterson, 2001: 2). The Swedish scholar Tuomas Forsberg (2010: 1) further acknowledges that the theoretical work that exists on the concept of European defense either pre-dates the emergence of the ESDP (van Staaden, 1994; Larssen 1998 in Forsberg, 2010). As Richard Guthrie (2010) notes, there are a number of commonalities between theories that relate to European Union development or integration theory and regime theory. For instance, both deal with interested parties that come together in circumstances in which they believe a coordinated action or reaction is more preferable than an action of a state on an individual basis (Guthrie, 2010: 2).

From the end of the 1970s, international regimes emerged as a focus of empirical research and theoretical debate within international relations (Haggard and Simmons, 1987: 1). John Ruggie introduced the concept of international regimes in international relations studies which marked a significant change in the study of international operations, since it changed the exclusive focus on formal international organizations (Keohane, 2005: 57).

According to Guthrie, the literature in the field of international relations on the subject of international regimes can be seen as a reflection of the diversity of international relations theories. The approaches range from realist state-centric approaches that dismiss international regimes in exercising influence on state-behavior to neoliberal approaches which sees the creation of regimes as a demonstration of rational choice and self-interest, to approaches with a more constructivist point of view, which explains compliance with regimes through norms and rule-following (Guthrie, 2010: 3). Cooperation between nation-states has always been a point of discussion between political scientists (Jervis, 1999: 42). The dominant (realism)
view of the international system is a view of anarchy. States are considered rational actors in a "self-help" system that have to follow their own interests to survive. Regimes then come into existence to overcome collective goods dilemma’s by coordinating the behaviors of individual states (Goldstein and Pevehouse, 2010: 68).

International Regime Theory can be used in order to explain the incentives of countries to cooperate in security matters. Since the specific changing cooperation of parties within the EU BG cannot be described in terms of full-fledged military alliances like NATO cooperation (Goldstein and Pevehouse: 2010: 51), it will be important to start this chapter with explaining why IRT is selected as theory in explaining the cooperation of the different countries. As Breckinridge (1997) notes in his article "Reassessing regimes - The international regime aspects of the European Union", regardless of what type of institution the European Union is, there is a regime associated with it (1997: 173). He acknowledges the fact that the European Union has both regime and organizational aspects (1997: 174). In my view, and as explanation for the theoretical lens of this research, the concept of the EU BG can be seen as a so called "regime aspect" of the EU (Breckinridge, 1997: 180-181). He concludes by stating that regime analysis is appropriate for studying the European Union and the influence it has on states (1997: 186).

3.2 Definition of regimes and regime theories

The term regime itself was borrowed from domestic politics, where it is used to refer to an existing governmental or constitutional order. In the international context, where an overarching central authority is lacking, the rules are voluntarily established by states to provide a certain degree of order in their relations (Keohane, 2005: 131). Regime theory has long ago addressed the question how cooperation could not only be achieved but also sustained in a world that is divided in sovereign nation states (Neumayer, 2001: 122). The use of IRT as means of researching the incentives of the different countries participating in the EUBG 2011/1 is helpful in order to identify the different countries reasoning for participation. With the rising complexity of the world, it is becoming more important for nation states to find ways to cooperate. The study of international regimes has given political scientists the hope of finding explanations for regime formation, change and decay and to explain cooperation in an increasing complex and interdependent world (Hercl, 1994: 5). Different definitions on regimes exist, at least four have been proposed over the last fifteen years (Hercl, 1994: 10), but the most influential one was put forth by the American Stephan D. Krasner in a special issue of the journal International Organization in 1982. Amongst
International regimes are defined as principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, [and] rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or postscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice (Krasner, 1982b: 186).

The Krasner definition has been acknowledged as „classic and famously vague“ (Radoslav et al. in Guthrie, 2010: 4). According to the Norwegian scholar Dag Harald Claes, several authors have tried to modify and clarify Krasner’s definition, giving different interpretations and meanings to the concept of international regimes (Claes, 1999: 1). Claes considers international regimes to be a subgroup of international institutions, of which international organizations can be seen as a more formal sub-class:

If you start from the regime tradition one would say that regimes cannot be accompanied by organizations; if you start from the international organization tradition, one is inclined to stat that organizations can include regimes” (Claes, 1999: 1).

A more specific definition sees regimes as multilateral agreements between nation states within a given issue area (Haggard and Simmons, 1987: 495). Richard Guthrie notes that it would be erroneous to assume that there is but one regime theory. Certain authors share the view that Keohane’s functional theory or the neoliberal institutionalism equates regime theory (Haasenclever et al. 1997: 248). Others see the studying of regime more as the field of regime analysis than an area of study based on a coherent body of regime theory (Guthrie, 2010: 7). The Swiss-Canadian Thomas Bernauer goes even further by arguing that regime analysis is better understood as a conceptual framework that needs to be „filled” with theories (Bernauer, 1993: 10). He further notes that most studies of international regimes use different approaches, originated from the social sciences like; structural approaches (e.g. hegemonic stability theory), game theory, public choice theory, functional theory and cognitive approaches. None of these theories should \textit{a priori} be regarded as superior to other theories as he notes: “Every theory has particular strengths and weaknesses in terms of selecting, organizing and relating the information we observe in reality” (Bernauer, 1993: 10).

In essence, international regimes are considered as institutions that carry explicit rules on which the governments have agreed and that lead to particular issues in the sphere of
international relations (Rittberger 1993: 28-29 in Hercl, 1994: 7). The scope of regimes corresponds most of the time with certain issue areas. Since governments establish regimes in order to deal with problems that they regard closely linked, the best approach is to cooperate and work together on that specific field (Keohane, 2005: 61).

To define theories of international regimes, the work written by Andreas Haasenclever, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger (1997) titled „Theories of International Regimes“ will be used as starting point since it provides a good overview on the different schools of thought within the theory. As a meta-theory IRT uses many other theories of international relations in proving its point. Haasenclever et al. identify three approaches; interest-based, power-based and knowledge-based theories in order to explain the origins of regimes and their influence.

3.3 Interest-based approach of International Regime Theory
The interest-based approach can be regarded as the backbone of regime theory. It has come to represent the mainstream approach in analyzing international regimes and is used by the power-based and knowledge-based approaches to mark their own positions (Haasenclever et al. 2004: 23). A point of agreement between interest-based and power-based approaches lies in the meta-theoretical tenet holding the assumption that: “States are self interested goal seeking actors whose behavior can be accounted for in term of the maximization of individual utility” (Haasenclever et al., 2004: 23). The question what they get in return is more interesting than the question what other countries think of their behavior within the regime. This means that states will evaluate possible cooperation in terms of gain for the state itself. On the other hand, although hegemony may be crucial in establishing regimes, as realists argue, hegemony is not necessary for maintaining them. Once their expectations converge around the rules (and norms) of the regime, the actors realize that it is in their best interest (Goldstein and Pevehouse, 2010: 68). The neoliberal thinker Robert Keohane acknowledges the role of a hegemon in regime formation, but argues that a regime can also be formed without a hegemon (Keohane, 1984: 100). He also makes clear that a contractualist theory of regimes has an important precondition: the states that are active in the issue area need to share common interests that can only be realized through cooperation (Keohane, 2005: 78). State-interest can be identified by their foreign policy which in turn is fostered by interests based on calculations of advantage. Its primary focus is on situations where their interests can only be achieved through institutionalized cooperation (Claes, 1999: 2). Keohane acknowledges the fact that states are considered as crucial actors in world politics and that international anarchy
has an important influence on their interactions and their ability to cooperate (Keohane, 1984: 25; Axelrod and Keohane, 1986: 226 in Haasenclever et al., 1997: 28). Haasenclever et al. describe the theory of Keohane as one of the most elaborate theories of international regimes to date, of which the influence was so strong that it observers repeatedly were led to equate Keohane’s approach with regime theory (Haasenclever et al., 2004: 27-29). The theory tries to tackle a number of realist assumptions concerning state cooperation like the uncertainty about the future world and the preferences of other actors as well as the possibility that other actors would entail optimistic behavior (Claes, 1999: 4). Keohane (2005) outlines the role of regimes as:

The principle and rules of a regime reduce the range of expected behavior, uncertainty declines, and as information becomes more widely available, the asymmetry of its distribution is likely to lessen. Regimes provide standards of behavior against which performance can be measured (Keohane: 2005: 97).

According to Hercl (1993: 46) the basic premise of the interest-based approach arises from the interaction of self-interested parties who want to coordinate their behavior in certain areas in order to receive joint gains. This adds up to the focus of the interest-based approach on self-interested rational agents. Interest-based approaches stress that cooperation can be possible without hegemony of a specific actor as a „convergence of expectations“ can come into action. They believe that realists neglect the shared interests of states. Regimes can facilitate cooperation by providing information and establishing linkages between countries (Axelrod and Keohane, 1993). Collective action problems could be dealt with through the same cooperation of states. Regimes could provide useful for member states in terms of providing more stable expectations on the behavior of other states and by reducing transaction costs (Keohane, 2005: 89-90; Jervis, 1999: 47). Once a regime has been established, costs for dealing with additional issues will be lower (Keohane, 2005: 90).

Keohane also makes clear that a contractualist theory of regimes has an important precondition: the states that are active in the issue area need to share common interests that can only be realized through cooperation (Haasenclever et al., 1997: 30). Neoliberals use the well known „Prisoner’s Dilemma game“ (PD)\textsuperscript{14} to illustrate their assumption that cooperation

\textsuperscript{14} The basic structure of the situation revolves on two prisoners (from whose dilemma the game derived its name) that are trapped. They are held in custody on the charge of two offences that they are being suspected of having committed together. The one is charged with a minor offence like shoplifting whereas the other is accused of a more serious charge of an armed robbery. Unfortunately the prosecutor has trouble providing conclusive evidence of their guilt in the latter case and decides to offer them both a deal: If he confesses the joint
is possible. In short, each actor can gain by individually defection but both lose when both choose to defect. Translated to the international community, states can also often have a mix of conflicting and mutual interests (Goldstein and Pevehouse, 2010: 66-67). If the game is played over and over again (which depicts the international community where states frequently interact) the problem can be resolved because a “tit for tat” reciprocity comes into action that can bring out mutual cooperation, since the other player now concludes that defection will only lead to more defection in the future (Haasenclever et al., 1997: 31-32; Goldstein and Pevehouse, 2010: 67). Following the PD, Keohane makes a distinction between harmony and cooperation since both do not point to the same concept. Harmony requires a complete identity of interests where cooperation can only take place in situations that contain a mixture of conflicting and complementary interests (Haasenclever et al, 1997: 32).

Cooperation is seen as a mutual adjustment of states’ result of policy coordination (Keohane 1984: 52) so the interests remain the same, but only the policies will be adjusted. States may still believe that they are „locked” in a Prisoner’s Dilemma, but thanks to the regime, mutual cooperation has become feasible even for egoistic utility maximizing parties (Haasenclever et al., 1997: 32-33). Regimes facilitate cooperation just by providing states with information or by reducing their information costs (Keohane, 1984: 245). Monitoring arrangements make it easier for states to cooperate since it provides information on the other state’s stand and compliance.

International regimes are created to help states or actors with mutual beneficiary agreements that can help them to fulfill their interests, that otherwise could not be fulfilled. Actors thus act in self-interest, because they prefer jointly accessible outcomes. It is in their interest to establish arrangements to shape their behavior and to allow expectations of other actors to converge, which in turn solves the dilemmas of independent decision making (Keohane, 2005-85-88). In order to measure interest-based incentives of the different countries, the foreign policy of the different countries will be assessed and complemented with information provided by the interviews with certain key-figures and scientific literature.

robery, he will go free, whereas his accomplice, in case of continuous denial of his participation will have to go to jail for both offences. In the case where both decide to confess, only the punishment for the theft will be remitted to them. The dilemma results from the fact that each prisoner has strong incentives to accept the offer of the prosecution since it is the best choice regardless of the decision made by the other one, while at the same time a mutual confession would lead to a more stricter penalty (serving the time for armed robbery) than the one the prosecution would have been able to achieve (penalty for shoplifting) if both refused to confess (Haasenclever et al., 1997: 31). Although the PD’s is illustrated with different examples, the core is that it is wiser for both prisoners to keep silent, but since they both are selfish, they only think of their own advantage. Since they do not know what the other will do, which potentially could make him worse-off.
on the policies of the participating countries. This will be sufficient to explore the incentives of countries to participate and search for reoccurring motives within the different countries. In order to investigate the interest-based/neoliberal assumptions on state behaviour and cooperation I will test the following hypothesis:

**H1: The countries participating in the European Battlegroup 2011/1 have common national interests.**

![Figure 6: Interest-based approach hypothesis conceptual model](image)

### 3.4 Operationalization of interest-based hypothesis

Analyzing the interests a country holds defines not only the important actors but also certain implications of their foreign policy (Wilhelm, 2006). As Feichtinger notes, interests are based on the long-term aims of a political community (2010: 86). To realize these overall goals, strategies can be used in a more direct way (legal documents) or in a indirect way (speeches of representatives, decision makers) but can all be comprehended indirectly through the interpretation of its behavior or actions (Feichtinger, 2010: 86-87). **National interest** will be defined here as: *the fundamental objective of every nation to secure its (vital) interests while maintaining its own standards and values* (Netherlands Defense Staff, 2005). State interests encompass its security and survival of the state in strict security means, but can also be explained in terms of mutual training purposes, interoperability or military cooperation due to the high costs involved.

Following Tom Lansford and Blagovest Tashev, national interests determine the foreign and security policy of a nation by establishing a framework of policy options and priorities (2005: xii). The hypothesis will test if there are interests that all the participating countries hold in terms of security and defense and if there are other mutual interests that attribute in answering the central research question.

In order to discern these interests the European Security Strategy (ESS 2003) and the 2008 European Security Report of the European Union will also be assessed. Next to this the foreign policies of the different countries on related military and security issues and defence
white papers will be used to identify mutual concerns or overlapping interests. By using the information obtained through interviews with country officials and independent officials possible reasons why countries participate in this Battlegroup will be explained.

3.5 Power-based approach of International Regime Theory

Realist theories emphasize the capabilities in relative power as holding a central explanatory value (Haasenclever et al., 1997: 84). According to realists, power is a relative concept. Taken into account the anarchical nature of the international system, any gain in power by one state forms a threat to other states (Rousseau, 1999: 3). Furthermore, states also care about how well their competitors (other states) do, based on concerns of survival and independence (Haasenclever et al., 1997: 84).

Regimes mitigate the effects of international anarchy for states by aiding in the decentralized enforcement of agreements (Milner, 1993: 475). More than neoliberals, realists stress the importance of power for regimes (Haasenclever et al., 1997: 26). Both share a commitment to rationalism, which portrays states as self-interested goal-seeking actors whose behavior can be seen in terms of the maximization of individual utility (1997: 23).

Stephan Krasner and Joseph Grieco both take a critical stand towards neoliberals. In their opinion the common emphasis on relative power capabilities is undervalued in neoliberal regime arguments (Haasenclever et al., 1997: 85). According to Viotti and Kauppi who argue that although a number of realists are dismissive of international regimes and organizations, most of them accepts Krasner’s view that regimes help states to avoid uncoordinated action and in some cases can actually act as a source of power for weaker states (Viotti and Kauppi, 1991: 363).

In order to measure the power-based approach, realist theories of regimes emphasize relative gains as a central explanatory variable and stress the state’s sensitivity to distributional aspects of cooperation and regimes (Haasenclever et al., 1997: 84). As such, the focus lies in the distribution of power and the presence of an authority or hegemon in the regime.

The theory that is most prominent in the power-based school is the theory of hegemonic stability (Claes, 1999: 4; Haasenclever et al., 1997: 84). Duncan Snidal expresses this theory by stating that the presence of a single, strong dominant actor in international politics leads to collective desirable outcomes for all states (Snidal, 1985: 579). Snidal makes
a distinction between coercive and benevolent hegemons (1985: 285-290) A benevolent hegemon provides the collective good all by itself, while the other states act as free riders.\(^{15}\) A coercive hegemon uses its power to force others to contribute to the cause. Since the composition of the EU BG changes every six months and is limited to European countries, it can be argued that there is no real hegemon present in this specific case, although on the other side, the framework nation with its power and rule-enforcing behavior can to a certain extent be seen as one. This assumption is reinforced by Haasenclever et al. who argue that regime theory could be portrayed and, to a certain extent, has been developed as alternative to the hegemonic stability theory and the implication it holds towards international cooperation (1997: 86). The theory of hegemonic stability links international regimes to the existence of a dominant state in the issue-area and aims to explain when and why international regimes emerge and are effective in the sense that states follow its policies (Haasenclever et al., 1997: 86). Due to the short period of the standby phase and the fact that the EU Battlegroups forms a small part of the CSDP, it can be argued that there is no hegemon in the sphere of the Battlegroup participation, the reason why the hegemonic stability theory will not be used in this thesis.

In addition, power-based theories list a number of other aspects that need to be taken into account when regime formation is being researched. Hercl notes that this includes but is not exclusive to the balance of power between different nations and the ideological outlook of potential regime members (Hercl, 1993: 8). For instance, according to Krasner, actors that have limited national capabilities may use the regime as a source of power (1982a: 506).

Duncan Snidal’s critique on the hegemonic stability theory is powerful. The assumption that regimes are neither created not maintained unless there is hegemonic leadership in the issue-area is not tenable, various regimes can be identified with the absence of a hegemon (1985: 598-612 in Haasenclever et al., 1997: 100-103). As aforementioned, an emphasis is put on relative gains as central explanatory variable in this case. In situations where states are engaged in cooperation with other states, their decisions will not only depend on what they are doing, but also on the (expected) pay-offs of the cooperation for their partner countries (Haasenclever et al., 1997: 116). Or as Kenneth Waltz puts it:

\(^{15}\) Free riders are those who consume a resource without paying for it, or pay less than the full cost of its production. The problem of free riding is usually considered to be an economic problem. Its name is derived from an example based on public transportation use without paying the requested fare costs. If too many people do this, the company will make less profit which in turn will lead to less public transportation.
When faced with the possibility of cooperating for mutual gains, states that feel insecure must ask how the gain will be divided. They are compelled to ask not „Will both of us gain?“ but „Who will gain more?“ If an expected gain is to be divided, say, in the ratio of two to one, one state may use its disproportionate gain to implement a policy intended to damage or destroy the other (Waltz, 1979:105).

Realists argue that due to the general insecurity of the international system and its anarchy, states not only worry about how well they perform themselves (absolute gains) but also how well they do compared to other states (relative gains) (Gilpin, 1975: 36; Snidal, 1991: 703). According to Peter Liberman, the theoretical analysis of relative gains in the literature has shown that the sensibility of relative gains is affected by the political-military relationship between the involved states, the offense-defense balance and the structure of the international system (Liberman, 1996: 148).

States that gain disproportionate in comparison to the gains of other states may prove to be a (future) threat to their cooperative partners (Snidal, 1991: 703). Snidal continues by stating that this hypothesis is applicable to cooperation in the field of economy as well as that of security (ibid.). The scholar Joseph Grieco calls this the „relative gains-problem“ and defines it as follows:

A state will decline to join, will leave, or will sharply limit its commitment to a cooperative arrangement if it believes that partners are achieving, or are likely to achieve, disproportionate gains as a result of their endeavor (Grieco, 1988: 603).

Grieco’s (1988, 1990) main conclusion is that states are mostly concerned about relative gains, which makes cooperation between states less likely, but not impossible. He later states that states will only cooperate if this results in a balanced distribution of gains, or in his words: „if the agreement roughly maintains pre-cooperation balances of capabilities“ (Grieco, 1990: 47). According to Duncan Snidal, common interests that are created with the prospect of joint absolute gains become conflictual when relative comparisons are introduced (Snidal, 1991: 703-704). To continue he notes that to the extent that goals such as status, prestige or winning provides a motivation for states, relative gains can be considered as a basic element of their preference (Snidal, 1991: 714).

Based on this theoretical section the following hypothesis can be set up:
**H2:** Following the power-based approach of International Regime Theory, countries that participate in the EU BG 2011/1 do this to increase their relative gains

This can be conceptualized by means of the following conceptual model:

![Diagram of Participation and Relative Gains](image)

**Figure 7:** Power-based approach hypothesis conceptual model

### 3.6 Operationalization of the power-based hypothesis

The concept of *relative gains* is a well-known concept in the field of international relations and can best be defined as the advantages of a state in comparison to the advantages for another state (Snidal, 1991). In short, the hypothesis states that the countries will participate in this cooperation to enhance their relative gains. Is this something that is also visible within this pool of countries or are they not concerned with relative gains?

In order to test this hypothesis with qualitative means, the participation in terms of men and material of the countries will be explained and by making use of the information derived from interviews the question why the countries sent these specific units will be answered. Next to this, their involvement in previous and future Battlegroups will be assessed in order to have a full and complete image of their dedication – in the form of men and material – for the EU BG concept in general. To complement the findings and triangulate the sources, interviews will be conducted with key-persons in order to discover their power-related incentives.

### 3.7 The knowledge-based hypothesis

Knowledge and ideas are considered as the foremost explanatory variables. Within this approach, it focuses on how causal and normative beliefs form perceptions of international problems and as such demand the action of regimes. The behavior of actors is, opposite to power-based and interest-based approaches not shaped by material interest but by their role in society (Haasenlever et al., 1997: 137). As such, it fills up an important theoretical gap by its explanation of preference and interest formation (Haasenlever et al., 1996: 206). Scholars associated with this school of thought have been critical of both realists and neoliberalism
perspectives. Cognitive theorists (constructivists) argue that state interest is often not given but created (Viotti and Kauppi, 2010: 132). This assumption leads to an emphasis on normative and causal beliefs of decision makers in explaining preferences and interest formation. As such, cognition theorists demonstrate that states can redefine their interests without any shift in the overall power-system and that they use regimes and institutions as a way to lock in to their advantage the learning process that has occurred (Viotti and Kauppi, ibid.).

Haasenclever et al. differentiate the knowledge based approach in weak cognitivism and strong cognitivism (1997: 136). Weak cognitivists argue that the demand for regimes in international relations depends on the way actors look at international problems, which in part is being produced by their normative and casual belief, which in turn are considered partially independent of the distribution of power and wealth (1997: 137). They are comfortable with a conceptualization of states as „rational utility-maximizers“, in the case that the perception of utility depends on knowledge that is irreducible material structures. Knowledge has to be an autonomous variable (1997: 137). Differencing from weak cognitivism, strong cognitivism is in favor of an alternative rather than a supplement about regimes: knowledge has to be appreciated as operating on a more fundamental level, constituting states and enabling them to engage in power games and so called cooperative ventures. Strong cognitivists argue that the concept of knowledge holds shared understandings that shape the role of identities of states. In sum, they propose a sociological turn in the study of international regimes (1997: 137).

International regimes are embedded in the structure of international society which holds that states are not free to ignore the commitments that this bears with it, without paying a price. A certain focus on self-interest will not explain regime maintenance, as regimes have more than a regulative function that require states to behave in accordance with certain rules and norms that creates a common social world that interprets the meaning of international behavior (Viotti and Kauppi, 2010: 133). The view of regimes can be placed in the broader social constructivist approach to international relations. In terms of regimes, it logically follows that rule-governed cooperation can, over time, lead actors to change their beliefs about their identity and their relation to the rest of the world (2010: 133). Constructivist analysis of regimes would concentrate on how expectations produced by state behavior have an effect on identity and interests (Søndenaa, 2008: 27; Wendt, 1992: 417). Constructivists further argue that the demand for regime depends on the perception that actors hold in regard to international problems that are in part produced by their causal and normative beliefs (Wendt, 1994: 389). Regimes comprise understandings shared by its members. Not only do
they prescribe certain actions in defined circumstances but they also serve as points of reference to determinate and assess individual behavior. As a consequence of that, international regimes can be conceptualized as shared understandings and principles of desirable and acceptable forms of social behavior (Haasenclever et al., 1997: 163).

Central for understanding the constructivist world view is the central assumption that world politics are “socially constructed” which is supported by the claim that the structures of international politics are social rather than material, and that these structures shape the identities and interest of actors, rather than only their behavior (Wendt, 1995: 71). Next to this, states are considered as the principal unit of analysis and their identities and interests are constructed by these social structures rather than based on domestic politics or human nature (Wendt, 1994: 385). When using a constructivist view on cooperation, the primary question would be how the expectations that are produced by behavior would affect the interests and identities of the different parties. It concentrates on how expectations produced by behavior affect interests and identities.

The cooperation of different parties can at the same time be considered as a reconstruction of their interests in terms of shared commitments to social norms (Fierke, 2007: 170; Wendt, 1992: 417). This will eventually tend to transform to a positive interdependence of outcomes in collective interest within the issue area. Haasenclever et al. focus on Alexander Wendt’s (1994) article “Collective identity formation and the international state” where Wendt argues that the demand for regime depends on the perception of actors of international problems which is produced by a synthesis of their causal and normative beliefs (Wendt, 1994: 389; Haasenclever et al., 1997: 137). As such, according to the constructivist theory, a security dilemma is conceived as a social structure that is composed of understandings in which states are so distrustful of one another that they make the worst assumptions about the incentives of others. In this sense it differs from the realist definition that sees a security dilemma arising when one state feels threatened when the other state enhances its security (Glaser, 2010: 56). On the other hand, a security community is seen as a community composed of shared knowledge in which states trust each other to resolve theirs disputes without war (Wendt, 1995: 73). In sum, international regimes can be conceptualised as principles and shared understandings of desirable and acceptable forms of social behaviour (Kratochwil and Ruggie, 1986: 764 in Haasenclever et al., 1997: 163). Wendt warns that the transformation of identity and interest face two important constrains. First, the process is incremental and slow due to the process of realizing joint gains within a relatively stable context. A second constraint is formed by the assumption that the evolution
of cooperation presupposes that actors do not identify negatively with each other; distrust and antipathy would further complicate cooperation (Wendt, 1992: 418). In order to provide indicators to identify the different beliefs and perceptions concerning the EUBG 2011/1 of the participating countries in line with the cognitive approach, it is necessary that the interests and identities of the different countries coincide to a certain extent.

To identify the way in which these are shared or rejected by the countries their strategic culture will be assessed and discussed. Strategic culture can be defined as the beliefs, attitudes and norms towards the use of force, held by a security community which has had a „unique historical experience“ (Gray, 1999: 51-52 in Chappell, 2009: 419). Important with this concept is the way in which historical experiences and memories are interpreted. Since this differs from one country to the next, a strategic culture is distinctive to the society that holds it (Duffield, 1998: 23; Gray, 1999: 51 in Chappell, 2009: 419). The strategic culture passes on through generations which ensures that historical experiences become embedded in society over a period of time, making it stable (Wendt, 1999: 163). As Laura Chappell notes, since EU member states have decided upon political documents and military concepts, it is very relevant to compare the views of the different countries involved in the EUBG 2011/1 and their norms and knowledge on the use of force, which can be traced back to their strategic culture. Also, expert interviews will be used for additional information and to have insight from within the specific country or from an expert on the specific topic. Following this approach, the following hypothesis has been set up:

**H3:** For the countries participating in the European Battlegroup 2011/1 we should see a shared strategic culture among the participants

![Figure 8: Knowledge-based approach hypothesis conceptual model](image)

### 3.8 Operationalization of the knowledge-based hypothesis

Findings will concern the mutual influencing of countries in their appreciation for European defence cooperation and the results of shared norms and beliefs in their strategic culture. To assess the hypothesis the strategic culture has to be explained for the different participating
countries. The use of the concept of strategic culture is based on the assumption that not only rational factors provide a state’s security and defence policy and that it therefore can be conceived in a constructivist tradition (Lantis, 2005 in Jonas and Von Ondarza, 2010: 3; Wendt, 1994: 385). A more precise definition is presented by the American scholar Thomas. G. Mahnken:

Strategic culture is that set of shared beliefs, assumptions, and modes of behavior, derived from common experiences and accepted narratives (both oral and written), that shape collective identity and relationships to other groups, and which determine appropriate ends and means for achieving security objectives (Mahnken, 2010: 4).

The strategic culture of the different countries will be investigated and used in order to answer the third hypothesis to show its importance in order to explain the participation incentives. This thesis will not touch the extensive debate of the existence of a „European identity” but will only search for common factors in the countries identity; shared ideas on the use of military force, common threats etc. By using this concept as an assessment of the identities of the different countries, a better understanding of their identities can be identified which in turn can provide vital information on their stands towards military cooperation, not only for the EUBG 2011/1 but also on a wider scale.

3.9 Summary

This chapter included the theoretical part of the research. The theoretical outlines of International Regime Theory have been presented and operationalized. Indicators have been determined in order to assess the incentives of the participating countries in three different ways to be sure that all possible identifiable incentives will be identified. The theoretical grounding of the above-mentioned approaches will help to identify the main reasons for countries to participate in the EU BG 2011/1 which will be done in the next chapter using literature on the different countries and interests and the information provided by interviewing key-persons and experts.

The chapter has answered the third sub-question by providing information on International Regime Theory and the interest-based, power-based and knowledge-based approach of which it is composed. All three parts have been introduced and elaborated. Next to that three hypotheses were put down and conceptualized in order to provide a useful framework to introduce the empirical part of the research.
Chapter 4  The European Battlegroup 2011/1

This chapter will provide a detailed account of the different countries that make up the EU BG 2011/1 and their reasons for participation. For all countries involved in the EU BG 2011/1 the three hypotheses will be tested. This chapter will also address the experiences of the different countries with European military cooperation and cooperation incentives as well as historical, economical and military motives that may be found in their political and military apparatus. The sub question that focuses on which units participate and why the countries chose for these specific units will also be answered.

4.1 Introduction

The designated units for the Battlegroup prepare themselves through national, as well as international exercises\(^\text{16}\) with other countries from the EU BG 2011/1. These exercises take place both in advance and during the standby period of and ends with the certification of the Battlegroup. As mentioned by De Jong (2006) contrary to the Germans, the Dutch do not have a headquarters that is capable to be used as a FHQ, the reason why the German one is used, although the Netherlands were lead nation. The participating countries also stated that they would prefer that the OHQ of the European Battlegroup would be situated in Potsdam, Germany (Tweede Kamer, 2010). The Dutch preferred a „lean” approach to the BG, which meant that they contributed with as many organic units as possible in terms of material and personnel to make sure that they also qualified for their goals as set out in the countries operations and training (O&T) models.

All the participating countries are stable democracies with high levels of income and development, compared to global standards. All of the countries are dependant on international trade. Not all countries are member of NATO (Finland, Austria) but of course all are member of the European Union (Giegerich, 2008: 59). This could prove interesting in order to explain their reasons for contribution. According to Giegerich, the availability of military means, the character of a state’s security culture and limits for action based on decision making processes and public opinion have the most important influences on state action. He continues with explaining that none of these factors alone can explain the outcomes, they must be seen as interrelated and can only develop their explanatory power in

\(^{16}\) These exercises, „European Rhino 1” and „European Rhino 2” were named after the rhinoceros logo of the core of the Battlegroup, the Dutch 13\(^{th}\) Mechanized Brigade. Both exercises where Field Training Exercises (FTX) held before and during the standby-phase in order to test the interoperability of the different units and commanders. In order to train the staff a CPX (Command Post Exercise) was conducted as well.
conjunction with each other (Giegerich, 2008: 59).

Theo van den Doel of the Netherlands Institute of Foreign Relations „Clingendael” notes that political cohesion between participating countries in these kind of multinational coalitions is of the utmost importance (Van den Doel, 2004: 22). Since the participating countries are performing military operations for the EU, it is important for them to hold the same ideas on foreign and security standpoints. This can be used as criteria for political and military cooperation based on the standpoints of the different countries, the way their bilateral relations have been developed and their common expertise and experience when taking part in multinational defence cooperation (ibid.).

The following sections of this chapter will provide information on the different countries that participate in the European Battlegroup 2011/1 and will test the hypotheses as set out in the introduction of this thesis in order to identify if there are different reasons for participation on the EU BG.

4.2 Hypothesis 1: Interest–based incentives
As already put forth in the previous chapter, this first hypothesis will be tested by providing the incentives of the different participating countries on a political-strategic level.

H1: The participating countries in the European Battlegroup 2011/1 hold common national interests.

This hypothesis will be tested by analyzing foreign policies and defence white papers of the participating countries, listed in alphabetical order. Next to that, the European Security Strategy will be analyzed in which interests and threats for and to the European Union have been drawn up. This will serve as a tool to summarize mutual interests for the participating countries. The following section will feature the policies of the participating countries, but will start with explaining the European Security Strategy (2003) document and the European Union Security Strategy Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy (2008) which specifies additional threats and objectives for Europe’s security agenda.

4.2.1 The European Security Strategy 2003-2008
Drafted under the guidance of Javier Solana, High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy it was meant to define the security threats faced by the European Union (EUISS, 2009: 14). This strategy document was important for the future development of the
CSDP. Approved by the European Council in 2003 it was based on the analysis of threats to the countries of the European Union and its inhabitants. It formulated a number of goals, instruments and principle for actions of the European Union. Security threats and challenges still face Europe as the conflict in the Balkans made clear. Due to an increasing convergence of interests of the European countries and the strengthening of mutual solidarity between the countries, the European Union is being shaped as an “credible and effective actor” (European Council, 2003: 1).

The document summarized a number of threats, both global and EU-specific. As a global threat, competition for natural resources (mostly water) under influence of global warming could create migration and turbulence in various regions of the world. For Europe, dependency on energy is a special concern. Already fifty percent of energy consumption today is being imported, with an expected rise to seventy percent around 2030 (European Council, 2003: 3). Terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD’s), regional conflicts, state failure and problems associated with organised crime are seen as key-threats for European countries (European Council, 2003: 3-5). In order to defend the European security and to promote its values, the European Union defined three strategic objectives. The first objective was addressing the threat by implementing policies against proliferation, taking steps to stop terrorist financing and using military interventions to stop regional conflicts (2003: 6). The next objective was based on „building security in its neighbourhood”: having well-governed countries on its borders would bring stability and security to the EU. This also means securing stronger economical and political ties with countries in the East and on the borders of the Mediterranean since they can become a neighbouring region in the future (2003: 7-8). The final objective of the European Union to counter its threats is based on developing a stronger international society with good functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order (European Council, 2003: 9). Emphasis here is put on the role of international organizations (WTO, IMF) and the transatlantic relationship next to contributing to better governance for countries outside the European Union (2003: 9-10).

In the 2008 EU document titled „Providing Security in a Changing World“ the European Union’s active stand on these topics was further reinforced and new threats (cyber warfare) were recognized. The document called for a strengthening of European co-ordination and a more strategic way of decision-making (European Council, 2008: 9). A report by the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) on the European Security Strategy 2003-2008 argued that despite some reservations, the ESS 2003 was seen as a very important
document for the European Union and its member states in terms of a European vision on the world and its threats (EUISS, 2009: 54). Since 2003 the threats for the European countries have expanded with questions on cyberspace security, climate change, energy security and the growing assertiveness of Russia (following the 2008 Russia-Georgian war) (EUISS, 2009: 54). Tomas Valasek, director of the section Foreign Policy and Defence at the Centre for European Reform (CER) argues that Russia could become a threat to the European countries. Its military and economic revival and a growth of its “aggressive” nationalism have made clear that its influence and power should not be overlooked. He states that Russia could be seen as the new security risk for the European countries (Valasek, 2007).

Aforementioned, a number of threats and challenges have been acknowledged for the countries of the European Union of which the European Strategy documents successfully defined a joint European threat perception (Jonas and Von Odarza, 2010: 5). However, the Dutch scholars Margriet Drent, Wouter Hagemeijer and Kees Homan rightly note, that the ESS 2003, as core document of the European Security Strategy lacks a definition of the vital interests of the European Union as well as the threats and challenges it faces (Drent, Hagemeijer and Homan, 2011: 6). As we can see a number of threats have been identified by the European Union although a definition of vital European interests remains largely unidentified.

The following section will provide information on the interests, as identified in the foreign policy and other documents of the participating countries of the EU BG 2011/1.

4.2.2 Austria

Austria’s foreign policy is based on neutrality in international affairs from 1955 onwards, although this changed in a more flexible interpretation after the end of the Cold War (Hirose, 1997: 213). However, the last decade it started to reassess the definition of its neutrality by granting rights for NATO flights over its territory to attack locations in Iraq and Libya (U.S. Department of State, 2011a). After joining the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP), Austria participated in peacekeeping missions in Kosovo and Bosnia (ibid.). The Japanese scholar Yoshikazu Hirose describes how the focus of Austrian foreign policy leaned very much towards integration in Western Europe (Hirose, 1997: 214).

Austrian interests still involve countries of Central and Eastern Europe mostly based on economic and security factors (ibid.). The Austrian Foreign Ministry defines a number of priorities in its foreign policy which are based on strengthening the role of the EU as an international player, a more in-depth CFSP and further development of the CSDP (Austrian
Foreign Ministry, 2011). This is also considered as one of the primary reasons for Austria to contribute to the EU BG with men and material (Vullinghs, personal communication, May 2011). Also, an intensification of its neighborhood policies and an emphasis on human rights and international law are goals in its foreign policy (ibid.). As Hirose further notes, the Austrian foreign policy fits the profile of the strategy of a small industrialized state, which means that they are likely to be regarded as equal partners in international and multilateral coalitions (Hirose, 1997: 212). Austria has traditionally been active in „bridge-building to the east”, increasing contacts at all levels with Eastern and Central European countries. It has identified the Black Sea region and countries along the Danube River as additional focus areas of its foreign policy (U.S. Department of State, 2011a; Austrian Foreign Ministry, 2011).

In sum, Austrian foreign policy can be regarded as centered on a „secured neighborhood” which explains its focus on Eastern and Central European states. It also aims to expand the role of the European Union as actor in the security field, hence its contribution to the European Battlegroup. Since Austria is not a member of NATO, that can explain their emphasis on the role of the European Union.

4.2.3 Finland

Finland’s foreign policy is based on strengthening its international influence and state security, promoting the interests of the country and increasing international cooperation (Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011). The European Union is considered as an important framework for the Finnish security and defence policy. According to the Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2004, the goal of Finland is to strengthen the EU’s role as international actor and as a security community (Finnish Prime Minister’s Office, 2004: 79).

According to the Finnish Lieutenant-Colonel Mika Kerttunen, the Finnish government is very pleased that all the member states are contributing or are willing to contribute to the Battlegroup Concept, because Finland wants to participate fully in the development and implementation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), now the CSDP (Tiilikainen, 2006: 53). Characteristics of its foreign policy are the high degree of internationalization of its external agenda, based on a legitimizing role of the United Nations and an emphasis on participation in multilateral organizations like NATO (PfP) and the EU (since 1995) (Herolf, 2009: 32; U.S. Department of State, 2011b). The Finnish security policy is thus rather dualistic. It focuses both on the United States as well as on Europe. For Finland, defence of its national territory holds the highest importance, followed by participation in
international crisis management operations. It is widely understood that international participation supports the development of the credibility and the overall interoperability of national defence (Finnish Security and Defence Policy, 2004: 95).

It is important for Finland to develop good relations with Russia and its neighboring countries. Finland realized that it has to live in peace with Russia and therefore does not want to take any action that Russia might interpret as a threat to their security (US Department of State, 2011b). Finnish foreign policy cannot be considered as strictly neutral anymore, but it does aim at keeping Russia satisfied (personal communication, P. Teeuw, May 2011). Although they acknowledge that „Russia [still] represents both a challenge and an opportunity [to Finland]” as stated in a speech delivered by Finnish Foreign Minister Ilkka Kanerva in 2007 (Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007). This could serve as an explanation for their non-participation as full-fledged NATO member, since that would be seen as a sign of public distrust of Russia. But acting as military as possible in the European Union can be explained better politically then taking part in NATO.

Summarized, Finnish national interests are based on a growing international presence, in order to be more visible concerning international affairs. It tries to do this by strengthening the EU’s role as international actor and puts emphasis on participation within the European Union. Furthermore, unlike some other participating countries its national defense remains a priority for the Fins, this due to their (previously) troublesome relationship with Russia.

4.2.4 Germany

European integration lies at the heart of German foreign policy. Germany has been a great advocate of integration in political and economic fields and of defence cooperation among Western European countries (U.S. Department of State, 2011c). Furthermore, the German foreign policy is very broad-based: political, economic, ecological, social and cultural conditions and developments are all taken into account in order to form a stable foreign policy (Bundesregierung, 2011). Although Germany is considered as a safe country, a number of risks and threats have been identified such as terrorism, organized crime, dependency on energy and raw materials, WMD’s proliferation and arms build-up, regional conflicts, failing states, migration, pandemics and diseases (Shockenhoff, 2008: 1).

In the Gemeinsame Sicherheit und Zukunft der Bundeswehr document (Common security and the future of the army) issued in 2000, the security challenges for Germany were analyzed (Martinsen, 2003: 171). One of its most important recommendations was to accelerate and improve the defence capabilities of the European Union, which formed a
departure from the traditional emphasis on NATO for German security (Martinsen, 2010: 171). The German security policy is now largely defined by the European Union. Germany is seen as one of the driving forces behind European integration in different policy fields, increased European foreign policy coordination, and the development of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). According to Paul Belkin, European affairs analyst of the U.S. Congressional Research Service, German support for the ESDP rose when it was clear that the EU was unable to respond to conflicts in the Balkans in the 1990s and has grown even further after the attacks of 9/11 (Belkin, 2009: 10). Its foreign policy is marked by a desire of a stronger and more capable Europe, with NATO as foundation for European security (Belkin, 2009: 4).

The CFSP and the CSDP are becoming more and more important to Germany and in developing its relation with NATO members and the United States (Federal Foreign Office, 2009, 11). In terms of the ESDP, Germany is a strong supporter of the pooling of defense resources and cooperation to counter security threats. As such, Germany is a big advocate of the EU BG concept (Belkin, 2009: 9-10) and saw the ESDP as a decisive step towards an enhanced security capacity of the European Union (Struck, 2003: 10). But Germany does remain a great advocate of NATO and its European-American relationship. In the Defence Policy Guidelines of 2003 NATO is still regarded as „the cornerstone“ of German security (Struck, 2003: 10).

In terms of national interests, following Paul Belkin, energy considerations have previously been treated as different from Germany’s foreign and security policy. However, he argues that: “Energy security goals are playing an increasingly important role in German foreign policy, particularly towards Russia and within the European Union” (Belkin, 2009: 4). According to Kare Dahle Martinsen, associate professor of the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, Germany is considered as one of the world’s leading export nations (Martinsen, 2010: 162). Its dependency on its open trade routes, especially for oil and gas, are mentioned several times as a potential weak point in the Defence Policy 2006 (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 2006: 27, 47, 61-64) and hence can be regarded as a national interest of Germany to secure these routes. Belkin further argues that these closer bilateral relations are seen by some analysts as a disbanding of European unity in foreign and security policy matters while Germany continues to prioritize relations with Russia, due to the fact that it is its largest trading partner and is dependable of Russia for a vast amount of its gas and oil needs (Belkin, 2009: 8). Preceding White Books focused mostly on peace, democracy and cooperation with other countries. In the 2006 white book, emphasis was put on German
participation in combat operations abroad and the deployment of the Bundeswehr to secure raw materials and energy supplies (Martinsen, 2010: 161). Andreas Shockenhoff even argues for a German national energy and raw materials strategy to counter these problems (2008: 5).

According to Christian Hacke, Germany under Angela Merkel seeks more and more responsibility in security matters and a return in the role of mediator (Hacke, 2008: 1). Germany pursues a foreign and security policy that is focused on intra and inter-state conflict prevention and settlement, crisis intervention and stabilization (Belkin, 2009: 4). Next to that, it also holds goals, similar to other EU members, to reduce international terrorism and to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD’s). Belkin, further notes that the Germans want to pursue those goals following international laws and with respect for human rights (2009: 4).

A short outline of the German foreign policy shows that it is primarily concerned with expanding European military capabilities and European integration and its role in both fields. As one the key-players in the European Union, Germany advocates a strong Europe. Furthermore, on a more national level its foreign policy aims to improve the German international position and influence, as a concerned key-player in international affairs.

4.2.5 Lithuania

The Lithuanian Defence Policy 2002 is part of the National Security Policy which aims to develop the international security environment, identify Lithuania’s national interests, risks threats and resources (Statkevičūtė, 2002: 13) and contribute to international stability and peace in order to ensure deterrence from an armed attack and ensure a reliable defence in case of armed aggression (Lithuanian Ministry of Defence, 2011). Before this document, the Lithuanian foreign policy was based on the 1996 document named „Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Basics of National Security“ which formed the starting point for a security strategy. However, as a normative document it did not clearly identify Lithuania’s national interests (Statkevičūtė, 2002: 13). Based on the National Security Strategy a number of vital and primary Lithuanian interests can be discerned, being sovereignty, democratic constitutional order, respect and protection of human rights, property of the state and shaping the security environment (Statkevičūtė, 2002: 14). As Šešelgytė (2010) notes, Lithuania is aware of the significance of energy security, for which they turn to the European Union to respond to this threat. Russia is seen as a threat to their energy security and as threat to the energy security of other European nations (Šešelgytė, 2010: 39).

Lithuania’s Key Foreign Policy Document (2008), another key document for its
foreign policy is based on a strong presence within the European Union, as one of the main ways of ensuring national security for Lithuania and to expand its influence (Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008). Next to this, its foreign policy also focuses on protection of its country and the region from an expansionist Russia, next to an emphasis on eastern EU enlargement (U.S. Department of State, 2011d). Very importantly, a common EU energy policy and connection of Lithuanian energy and transport with West-European networks. For Lithuania, its defence policy concentrates on a reliable defence and a secure and stable environment. This is done by keeping close links with NATO and European security relationships (Baltic Security and Defence Review, 2008: 277).

Lithuania maintains an active involvement in the CSDP, supporting development of civil and military capabilities and participated in the EU BG of 2010/1 together with Germany, Poland, Slovakia and Latvia (2008: 280). The objectives of Lithuania’s defence policy are based on an effective fulfillment of the functions of the National Defense System during times of peace, ensure readiness in terms of defense, including mobilization and instruction of citizens, to participate in multinational operations and maintain readiness in order to respond to non-military threats in assistance of state and municipal agencies (Lithuanian Ministry of Defence, 2011).

Lithuanian security policy revolves mostly on its NATO membership (Tromer, 2006: 379). However, the Lithuanian National Security Strategy (2002) states that Lithuania, as EU-member state considers the European Union to be an important guarantee for its own security, but also for European stability in general. (Tromer, 2006: 379). Next to NATO, the EU, the UN and the OSCE are all mentioned as organizations that constitute involvement to Lithuania’s international stand. In order to show that it is concerned with collective security, Lithuania participated in military operations in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan (Šešelgytė, 2010: 35), to give meaning to the concept of promoting democratic values and supporting freedom from aggression as part of its foreign policy (2010: 36).

As a committed EU member it fully supports the development of the CSDP of which they deem the EU BG as one of its key instruments (personal communication, J. Patasius, April 2011). Furthermore, its goal is an active participation in the EU CFSP and to further develop the CSDP as indicated after the outcome of the Helsinki summit in 1999, in which Lithuania indicated its possible contribution to EU-led crisis management operations (Lithuanian Parliament, 2005). However, Margarita Šešelgytė (2010) notes that Lithuania only supports the CSDP as long as it does not pose a challenge or threat to the role of NATO (2010: 39).
Summarized, Lithuanian foreign policy is mostly security based. Closer ties with NATO and EU are regarded as essential for their security, while they still regard Russia as a threat. The latter is seen as a helpful drive for their national security and a way to gain more influence in the European Union. As a small country it is in their interest to take part in a „security community” like the European Union, and strengthen the CFSP/CSDP which can have positive consequences for Lithuania’s foreign policy but can also serve as a bridge for European CSDP ambitions to expand to the eastern part of Europe.

4.2.6 The Netherlands

Although a small country, the Netherlands are a regular participant in international affairs. The promotion of international law and peace is one the constants of Dutch foreign policy (Andeweg and Irwin, 2005: 216; Korteweg, 2011: 235) and forms an official goal of its foreign policy (Andeweg and Irwin, 2005: 215). The main aim of Dutch foreign and security policy is to promote international rule of law and have a secured state (Verhagen, 2008: 509). As a trade economy, the Dutch are best served by a stable international society, while the promotion of international rule of law and human rights are reflected in the Dutch support for and participation in peacekeeping and peace-enforcing missions and by providing aid to developing countries (Andeweg and Irwin, 2005: 215; U.S. Department of State, 2011 e).

After the Second World War the failure of neutrality as security strategy was recognized by the Dutch political elite (Andeweg and Irwin, 2005: 206). By pursuing a so called „double strategy”, supporting both NATO as well as European integration (Rood, 2010: 9), the Dutch got firmly embedded in both organizations. They are actively involved in the CSDP through their participation in the EU BGs, although the primacy of Atlantic cooperation prevails according to Jan Rood, director of the Clingendael Institute for International Relations (Rood, 2009: 71). The willingness to respond swiftly to crisis situations anywhere in the world is one of the main reasons for the Netherlands to be active in the European Battlegroup. As already mentioned, being an importing- and exporting country the Dutch benefit of international stability, which clarifies why the country has pursued such an active security policy (Netherlands Defence Staff, 2005: 35).

The former Dutch Prime Minister Maxime Verhagen made clear that the Netherlands needed to invest more in European defense matters in order for Europe to act independently as military actor (Verhagen, 2008: 511). The world needed more military capacity and an improvement of European (and Dutch) military power would also have clear benefits for NATO and their operations (ibid.). A further reinforcement of the CSDP and with that, the
role of the European Union as military actor are seen as very valuable to the Netherlands, which is considered one of the primary reasons to contribute to the EU high-readiness capability in the form of the EU battle groups (Netherlands Defense Staff, 2005: 35). By further developing the CSDP, the European commitment towards NATO is also strengthened, sharing the burden more evenly and ultimately paving the way for more cohesion and dialogue between the two organizations (Defence budget, 2005: 4-7 in Netherlands Defense Staff, 2005: 37).

In sum, the Dutch foreign policy is based on reinforcing international rule of law, strengthening the international position of the European Union in general and in particular its military position in the world by means of contributing to the CSDP. A reinforcement of the CSDP would also serve the interest of NATO. Furthermore, the Dutch are very keen on playing a role in international organizations and on the international stage. The threats and challenges identified in the European Security Strategy are also of importance for the Netherlands. As a trading country they are best served with stability in the world, hence their support of international institutions and rule of law.

4.3 Sub conclusion Interest-based hypothesis

It is clear that the participating countries share common interests, a reason why the hypothesis can be provisionally accepted for the time being but only limited to these specific countries at this given time. When we take a closer look at the overarching European foreign policy, a number of threats coincide with the individual threats presented by the participating countries in their white books or foreign policy documents. These are threats like terrorism, the proliferation of WMD’s and the fear of regional conflicts. After investigating the different policy documents and conducting interviews it seems that all the participating countries mention these threats, albeit not all of them specifically in their policy documents.

Interesting to see is that Finland and Lithuania still see Russia as a threat to their sovereignty and state interests. Both countries clearly regard participation in the Battlegroup Concept as a reinforcement of their influence in the European Union and as a contribution to strengthen the role of the EU as international actor. Furthermore, based on their foreign policy and defence documents Lithuania and Finland both show great concerns for their national sovereignty and defence. Finland also puts emphasis on their will to participate in the field of international security, which is very well visible with their contributions at the same time to both the EU Battlegroup as well as to the Nordic Battlegroup.

For Austria, their general interests are a focus on the security in Eastern Europe
(something they have in common with Lithuania) and a strong support for an expanding role of the EU in security affairs. This can be explained by their neutrality stand, their non-membership of NATO (only PfP) and their focus on the UN and its norms and values.

Germany on the other hand is more interested in expanding the military capabilities of the EU, expanding the integration of the EU in the field of security and to have influence in forging a stronger Europe. They are explicit advocates of the pooling and sharing of material, in order to cope with defence cutbacks which are omnipresent in the European countries. A thing that they hold in common with Lithuania is that both countries hold concerns for their energy resources. Taking into account their geographical situation and the dependency on Russia for the transit of its energy, these are things for them to be thoughtful of. Another incentive both countries and the Netherlands, hold in common is their dependency on trade. For the three countries, a safe and secure Europe, but also a secure world is vital for their economic position.

For the Netherlands, as well as for Austria, promotion of international law and peace are a strong incentive to participate and to be active within the CSDP. They are also strong supporters for a reinforcement of the EU in that direction, notably towards the CSDP. This would also have its benefits for NATO in which the Netherlands are also very active.

4.4 Hypothesis 2: Power–based incentives

In the following section the power-based hypothesis will be tested by making use of the power based indicators of the participating countries. I will also take a closer look at the contribution of the different countries and will go more in-depth in their considerations in terms of military objectives to participate. This section aims to answer the sub question that deals with the question why the countries sent in these specific troops. The hypothesis derived from the power-based approach of IRT will be the following:

\[ H2: \text{Based on the power-based approach, we should see that the countries that participate in the EU BG 2011/1 do so to increase their relative gains.} \]

4.4.1 Austria

By taking part in the European Battlegroup shows the Austrian commitment towards the military structure of the European Union. By taking part in a multinational BG, smaller European states like Austria, can also contribute men and resources (Fischer, 2009). Already in 2004, Austria’s \textit{Nationale Sicherheitsrat} (National Security Council) researched the
possibilities the EU BG could offer them. This resulted in the intention to participate, which in 2007 led to the formal wish to participate in the EU BG 2011/1 and another participation in the EUBG 2012/2, with an even bigger Austrian contribution in terms of men and material.

For the 2011/1 Battlegroup the Austrian contribution was based on an infantry battalion and personnel for the Battlegroup staff (Fischer, 2009). The contribution to the EU BG 2011/1 was the first time for Austria to participate in the Battlegroup Concept (Austrian Foreign Ministry, 2011). Participation to this specific Battlegroup was based on the knowledge of Germany and the Netherlands as experienced partners (personal communication, H. Brandtner, May 2011). In Afghanistan there is already cooperation between the German and Austrian contingents as well as scheduled cooperation in future Battlegroups (see appendix II). Due to language and proximity reasons, cooperation with an experienced country as Germany can be considered beneficial and acts as an extra stimulating factor for Austria to participate.

Its participation to the EU BG consisted of a company of armoured infantry made up of soldiers from the Jägerbataillons 17 and 19, and their Pandur armoured personal carriers. The reason to send these units was made on their availability and their training schedule. The troops also performed logistics and staff duties (Austrian Army, 2010; 2011). Following out-of-area peacekeeping missions and humanitarian operations the Austrian army has maintained good levels of multinational interoperability (O’Reilly, 2010: 32).

Austria expects to gain from its participation in several domains. With its participation it aims to improve its bilateral relations with the participating countries, improve its interoperability by cooperating with foreign military units (which can be seen as a key component in achieving an effective operation) and to gain or enlarge their experience in rapid response operations (personal communication, A. Loschek, April 2011). The latter is visible in the fact that Austria contributed a number of staff officers and a specific liaison-officer who served in the Battlegroup staff during the whole standby-period. This way, staff elements will also benefit from the cooperation within the Battlegroup. Furthermore, Austria will be participating in 2012 and possibly in 2015/2016 (personal communication, P. van den Kerkhoff and J. Meijer, June 2011).

17 It is scheduled that Austria will also participate in the EU BG 2012/2 together with Germany (lead nation), the Czech Republic, Ireland, Croatia and Macedonia (Austrian Foreign Ministry, 2011).
4.4.2 Finland

In a somewhat similar research as this one that dealt with the participation of Norway in the CSDP, the Norwegian scholar Pernille Rieker argued that: “participation [in the case of Norway] is seen as more important than the degree of political influence participation gives” (Rieker, 2006: 292). Something similar can also be said for the Finns. The choice to cooperate in a European Battlegroup next to the Nordic Battlegroup can best be seen as a way of safeguarding Finnish and European ties in terms of military and political cooperation. By enhancing their ties with the EU and the CSDP they can avoid marginalisation in a new European security context (personal communication, P. Teeuw, May 2011). From the military point of view, Finnish participation in 2007 was seen as a way for its forces to maintain their competence and to ensure that their relevance as security policy instrument (Granholm & Jonson, 2006: 16).

In the 2011/1 Battlegroup the Finnish contribution consisted of a 110-men strong commando unit from its Utti Jaeger Regiment and several Finnish Defence Force personnel and reservists (Finnish Defence Forces, 2011). Finland indicated that it developed a number of new capabilities thanks to the multilateral cooperation and the held FTX’s\(^{18}\) (ibid.). The Finnish armed forces are based on a small professional core. However, it can rely on almost 300,000 mobilizable reservists (IISS, 2010: 182). Since being on standby for two Battlegroups is a very costly matter, the reason to send Special Forces can be explained in terms of cost effectiveness. Instead of using conscripts, who have to be “activated” and are more expensive than on standby, it is less costly to use regular personnel like the special forces members (personal communication, P. Teeuw, May 2011).

In a 2006 article by Niklas Granholm and Pål Jonson, titled „EU-Battlegroups in Context: Underlying Dynamics, Military and Political Challenges“ different factors that shaped Finnish participation in the 2007 Battlegroup were addressed. It was deemed important for Finland to participate in a BG in which the EU member states were also NATO members (Granholm & Jonson, 2006: 18). This would provide Finland with information on the development of the NRF and its exercises as well as keeping an open door to future participation (Granholm & Jonson, 2006: 18-23). Finland shows signs of relative gain concerns. The fear of being marginalised in European security politics and the fact that they were participating in two Battlegroups at the same times, gives rise to the idea that they were afraid of being left out in ongoing multilateral

\(^{18}\) The article spoke of capabilities such as independent air control, a concept for moral support, NH transport helicopter transfer procedures and a tactical logistics concept for theatre troops.
cooperation of other countries. To that extent, Finland might not be concerned of what other countries gain from participating but that they would not receive any gains within the CSDP or maybe even in the bigger frame of multilateral military cooperation if they would not participate. This follows logically from Krasner’s assumption that actors who have limited national capabilities may use the participation in a regime as a source of power (Krasner, 1982a: 506).

4.4.3 Germany

For Germany, the establishment of multinational Battlegroups can be seen as an extension of their decade-long policy of improving multilateralism in its defence policy (Ebbut and O’Halloran, 2010: 260). A keystone for German participation is formed by this „reflective multilateralism“ which entails that working together with international institutions and partner countries next to working in a multilateral context is seen as very important by the policy-makers (Chappell, 2009: 425). The German contribution to the EU BG 2011/1 consisted of about 950 men and women. With this contribution, Germany formed the logistic and medical core of the Battlegroup and manned the OHQ (Schilling, 2011). On the question why Germany does not have its own Battlegroup (like the UK and France) the answer is based on their role as „facilitator“. That way, new or smaller member states can still participate in the Battlegroup Concept even with a small number of troops (O’Reilly, 2010: 269). An alternative explanation can be sought in the German strategic culture and the number of restraining factors for a fully German Battlegroup based on history, national caveats and the need for parliamentary approval (O’Reilly, 2010: 277). Next to that, it appears that Germany is unhappy to take up those tasks on their own and has a strong preference for coalitions.

Germany and the Netherlands share a history of military cooperation as can be seen in their mutual 1st German/Netherlands Corps in Münster and their cooperation in Afghanistan. This shared history can be considered as a prime reason for Germany as lead nation to cooperate with the Netherlands and Finland in the first ever Battlegroup of 2007/1 (O’Reilly, 2010: 271). Germany has been a strong supporter of the Battlegroup Concept and has provided a number of large troop contingents over the years (Major & Mölling, 2011: 13; O’Reilly, 2010: 24). As Claudia Major and Christian Mölling argue, by participating in the Battlegroup Concept, an extra incentive and justification was found to further transform the Bundeswehr from territorial defence army to a crisis management force (Major & Mölling, 2011: 13).

Taken together, as one the biggest countries in Europe and an advocate of European
cooperation and integration, Germany has been active in a Battlegroup almost every year and will participate in upcoming Battlegroups. To that extent, maintaining their power-position by participating in the Battlegroup can also be perceived as their way of contributing to the European ideal and showing other nations that with their steady contribution they are a strong and reliable supporter of European cooperation in the security field (personal communication, S. Halberstadt, April 2011). So, an argument for German participation, next to the actual training and strengthening of the interoperability between the member states can also be found in its visibility in European security affairs towards other countries. The German power-based motives also show a sign of maintaining or even expanding their influence with their continuous participation. In that way, their participation might be interpreted as being concerned with their position in the European Union. This does not qualify as being concerned with relative gains.

4.4.4 Lithuania

The full-scale character of defence means that Lithuania has armed protection of the national armed forces as well as those of NATO allies, that national resources are intended for national defence, and that every citizen of Lithuania and the entire nation shall resist in every way defined as legitimate by the international law (Baltic Security and Defence Review, 2008). Following Article 5 of the NATO, Lithuania’s defence is a collective defence of all the NATO members, which entails that Lithuania is committed to treat a threat to any of NATO states as a threat to itself. Cyber attacks on Estonia in 2007 were a strong signal for Lithuania to further develop and revision its security and to maintain and improve ties with the EU and NATO (Baltic Security and Defence Review, 2008: 279). Russian suspending of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) in 2007, as a reaction to plans of the United States to place a missile defence system in Poland and the Czech Republic undermined the control of conventional arms regime in Europe and diminished Lithuanian confidence in the region (BBC, 2007).

The Lithuanian assets for the EU BG 2011/1 consisted of a Water Purification Unit (WPU) and a maximum of 25 servicemen. In August 2006, Lithuania and the Netherlands signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on logistic cooperation, which developed into an agreement in 2008 based on joint training and exchanging of experience (Lithuanian Ministry of Defence, 2009). Compared to the other countries, their participation in terms of

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19 See the BBC article “The cyber raiders hitting Estonia” on http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6665195.stm.
men and material is thus very limited. During the standby period the unit remained in Lithuania, albeit in a state of high-readiness in order to join a possible multinational operation of the EU when requested (Lithuanian Ministry of Defence, 2010).

The specific WPU is capable of processing 400 m³ and storing 200m³ of drinking water, and can be used in combat situations and to support partner states. It is the second time that Lithuania is active in the standby period of an EU BG. In the first half of 2010, Lithuania assisted with 130 troops of a mechanised infantry battalion for EU BG 2010/1 (ibid.). Following the information derived from a number of sources, with its contribution to the EU BG 2011/1, Lithuania expects to gain experience in operating in a higher echelon, next to the fact the standby-mission and the possible usage forms a good opportunity to test the WPU-unit capabilities (personal communication, J. Patasius, April 2011).

Especially Lithuania is struck heavily by the economic crisis. With budget cuts of nine percent in 2009 and thirty-six percent in 2010 (IISS, 2010: 115). As a result defence spending will go down and it is likely that Lithuanian contributions to any future Battlegroup will be rather modest in size, if participating. Arūnas Molis (2006) provided a number of reasons why Lithuania was interested in participating in ESDP activities, like the European Battlegroup. Firstly, participating in a Battlegroup can serve as an impulse to reform its defence apparatus and create more capable forces (Molis, 2006: 96). Secondly, being involved in the ESDP can grant them access to states that are considered priorities in Lithuanian foreign policy (ibid.). Thirdly, cooperation of Lithuania as a country at the eastern border of the European Union can help to promote cooperation with Russia (Molis, 2006: 96).

Despite the above-mentioned arguments, taken into account its small composition, it is clear that, although Lithuania contributes with a niche capability its participation cannot be seen in the light of power projection or as a display of state power. Its dedicated unit did not took part in Field Training Exercises (FTX) conducted by the other participating countries, which could be interpreted as a lack of commitment to the EU BG 2011/1 but could also be seen as the outcome of internal deliberation (cost-effectiveness) on the Lithuanian side. However, the fact that Lithuania is willing to participate shows its involvement in the European Union’s military policy. Here the assumptions of Stephan Krasner are also relevant, as mentioned in the power-based approach section concerning Finland, for Lithuania, participation in the Battlegroup Concept can be regarded as a source of power.
4.4.5 The Netherlands

The Dutch are acquainted with the Battlegroup Concept since they already participated in an EU BG in the first half of 2007 (DEU/NL/FIN) and in the first half of 2010 when they participated in a bilateral EU BG, together with the United Kingdom (Tweede Kamer, 2010). The agreement to be lead nation in 2011 was made with the Germans, who were lead nation in 2007. The use of the Battlegroup Concept is seen by the Dutch as an important way to cooperate with its key military partners, Germany and the United Kingdom (Querido and Van den Brink, 2005: 338). This has a number of reasons. First of all, the long lasting and successful military cooperation with these countries provides an excellent base for future cooperation within a Battlegroup. As a result, preparation time would be shorter and from a political point of view, cooperation with these partners is desirable. The latter is in line with the Dutch desire to reinforce the international cooperation and the sharing of political and military risks with larger partner countries. Finally, retention of operational effectiveness is key. There has to be enough confidence between the partners to form, offer and use their European Battlegroups (Querido and Van den Brink, 2005: 338). As framework nation, the Dutch hold a leading role in this Battlegroup which means that they provided a Force Commander (Operational Commander) and between ten and twenty staff officers plus additional units for the Operational Headquarters (OHQ) and the build-up and maintaining of a Force Headquarters (FHQ). They also contributed staff-elements of an infantry battalion, an airmobile infantry company (12e Regiment van Heutsz) and elements of the 13th Mechanized Brigade to the Battlegroup (Dutch Ministry of Defence, 2011b). They also attributed to the BG with an ISTAR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance)-unit, military police units, engineers, logistic units and CIMIC (Civil Military Cooperation) personnel. The Dutch contribution to the EU BG has the size of approximately 1,200 of the 2,350 personnel overall and can therefore be counted as the largest contributor (Tweede Kamer, 2010).

The policy of the Dutch government aims at a large international role and surely within Europe. It is seen as an unwritten law that the more (military) means a country provides to an international organisation, the greater its influence becomes. This is not only true for NATO, but also for the European Union (De Jong, 2006: 6). Since Battlegroups are intended for crisis situations it is not clear beforehand under what circumstances the EU BG will be deployed in the case of a crisis. Due to this fact, nothing can be said about the mission mandate. A possible use of the BG by the European Union has to be decided over by the European Council. This means that the Dutch government has influence on the means of
deployment and the decision-making process. To this extent, it is necessary that the parliament is informed not only in case of a possible deployment, but also during the process of international talks and decision making (Dutch Ministry of Defence, 2011a).

From the start of the Battlegroup Concept, the Netherlands have been an enthusiastic supporter; since the concept follows the Dutch strive for an expeditionary, rapid deployable force (Querido and Van den Brink, 2005: 337-338). Next to that, according to the Dutch Minister of Defence, Henk Kamp in 2004, it is also seen by the Dutch as a way to contribute to the EU and NATO with high-quality capacities and to promote and improve the effective interoperability of European defence efforts (Tweede Kamer, 2004). Bastian Giegerich also notes that in his view the Netherlands are capable of conducting the more demanding operations of the Petersberg tasks (Giegerich, 2008: 60). The Dutch also view the Battlegroup Concept as a way to promote interoperability between its participants and to stimulate (personal communication, R. van der Pluijm, June 2011). According to Dutch military officials a positive thing of standby missions is that they are very useful for the Education and Training model of the armed forces. Especially the activities during the standby-period concerning the EU BG 2011/1 can be used for „active recuperation” after their participation for ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) in Afghanistan (personal communication, M. van der Laan, April 2011).

Summarized, specific gains for the Dutch can be found in staff training on brigade level, something the Dutch lack due to their army size (personal communication, J. Evertse, May 2011). Also, by participating as lead nation, the Dutch can take matters in to their own hands. It took extra work in terms of safeguarding the readiness of the entire Battlegroup and providing the overall framework in which the cooperation and exercises could take place. It showed that they took their responsibilities for European military cooperation seriously. By their continuous efforts for the Battlegroup, their participation can be interpreted as being concerned with their position in the European Union and as such shows no signs of relative gains concerns. In that way, next to the German participation, the Dutch participation can be interpreted as willing to maintain the status quo in the European Union. With its participation it showed its support for the security of Europe and maintained or even improved its influence in this field. Relative gain concerns are not visible in their incentives.

4.5 Conclusion power-based hypothesis

After having assessed the power-based incentives of the participating countries the second hypothesis cannot be accepted for all the countries, based on the operationalization. Austria’s
incentives are not based on relative gain concerns but more on their commitment for European security and stability. However, this lies different for Finland. Its incentives to participate are partly based on relative gain concerns. For Finland, the fear of being marginalised in European security politics and their participations in two Battlegroups gives rise to the idea that relative gains are important to them. It appears that Finland is not that much concerned what other countries gain from participating, but concerned that they would not receive any gains within the CSDP when choosing not to participate. The hypothesis can thus be accepted in the case of Finland. For both Finland and Lithuania participating in the European Battlegroup can be considered as a form of power. They show their commitment to European security and train their units and staff officers in an international environment.

Germany and the Netherlands share somewhat the same incentives to participate. Next to the aforementioned training possibilities, Germany’s contribution can be seen in the light of maintaining their power-position in Europe by participating in the Battlegroup as a way of contributing to the European ideal and showing other nations that they are a strong and reliable supporter of European cooperation. With their continuous participation they aim to broaden their knowledge and influence in this specific field.

With their participation as lead nation, the Dutch can model this specific Battlegroup. By acting as lead nation, they showed that they took their responsibilities for European military cooperation seriously.

It cannot be demonstrated that the countries are all concerned with relative gain motives in their incentives of participating in the European Battlegroup 2011/1. The different countries are focused on learning from their cooperation with the other countries and to train their staff-officers. Since the composition of the EU BG changes every six months, every new Battlegroup forms a new combination of states. As such, the potential power linked with participation seems rather limited. The power-based hypothesis based on realism cannot explain the precise reasons why these countries cooperate and participate. Realism cannot explain that these specific countries do not have relative gain concerns, duo to the institutionalized character of the CSDP. The countries have shown confidence in cooperating in this field and confidence in each others intentions. Therefore, the possible constraints of relative gain concerns that could arise when cooperating have been reduced, the reason why the hypothesis can only be accepted for Finland.
4.6 Hypothesis 3: Knowledge-based hypothesis

Countries have different approaches to the use of armed force. This is largely determined by its historical experience as Bastian Giegerich notes (2008: 66). Two other German scholars, Alexandra Jonas and Nicolai von Ondarza, underline the importance of history but also add indicators such as culture, geography, political experiences and their self-conception of security and defence actors to the analysis (Jones and Von Ondarza, 2010: 2). As both authors acknowledge, these factors are not likely to change quickly, although they can shift through experience and learning in an European context (Meyer, 2005 in Jonas and Von Ondarza, 2010: 2-3).

States hold different views about the value of autonomy and cooperation as basis for security and defence policy. According to Christoph Meyer, the interventions in Kosovo and Iraq have created identified norms for the European countries. They led to a maximum restraint on the use of force against civilian targets and a preference to use non-military means first (Meyer, 2001: 544). Moreover, the countries hold different ideas on the purpose of the military, where some countries focus on territorial defence others focus on force projection. States also vary in the emphasis they put on the role of military force as a foreign policy tool and differ on their preferred arena for cooperation, NATO or EU (Jones and Von Ondarza, 2010: 2-3). A country’s strategic culture can form an obstacle to high level performance in military crisis-management missions when they have opposite interests, for instance when favouring military over civilian foreign policy tools or autonomy and self-reliance over international cooperation and burden sharing (Giegerich, 2008:66).

In the European Security Strategy (ESS) of 2003 the European Union identified a number of risks and threats that need to be addressed. Large scale aggression against member states seems very unlikely but threats from terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, organized crime and state failures are more likely to occur and effect the European Union and its inhabitants (Kerttunen, 2010b: 128). These challenges set the demand for a general development of European defence policies and an alignment of their armies as well as the development of the Battlegroup Concept (Kerttunen, 2010b: 128).

This section of the thesis will assess the different strategic cultures of the countries that participate in the EU BG 2011/1 in order to test the third hypothesis, restated below:

**H3: For the countries participating in the European Battlegroup 2011/1 we can see a shared strategic culture among the participants**
The concept of strategic culture is used to show how national security and defence policies have their origin in “norms, beliefs and ideas about the appropriate use of force” (Heiselberg, 2003 in Meyer, 2001: 523). Laura Chappell notes that analysis of the incentives by use of strategic culture is salient through its focus on „when, where and how force is used“ (2009: 418). In the current debate on the European culture, a number of authors argue that the difference between the different European countries are large and persistent (cf. Lindly-French, 2002), while others put emphasis on dynamics that point to a process of convergence to a European strategic culture (Cornish and Edwards, 2001; Howorth, 2002 in Meyer, 2001: 524). Following Christoph Meyer, the national policy choices of countries are shaped by their collective strategic cultures, which in turn are the result of the countries historical experiences (Meyer, 2001: 525).

The following sections will analyse the strategic cultures of the different countries in which their norms, beliefs and ideas in security and defence matters are expressed. This will help to further analyze the backgrounds and identity of the participating countries and show the role norms play for them.

4.6.1 Strategic culture of Austria

The Austrian strategic culture is centred on the idea of neutrality, which is firmly embedded in its national identity (Meyer, 2005: 545). This can be explained by looking at the Austrian history: in 1955 neutrality brought independence to a reunified Austria that was divided into four occupied zones after the Second World War. In order to not share the same fate as Germany, which suffered from partition, Austria chose for neutrality in order to regain its sovereignty. Neutrality was seen as valuable since it implied stability for Austria (Giegerich, 2008: 67). Austria’s history is best characterised by discontinuity: considered a great power in the First World War, incorporated in the German Third Reich in 1938 and occupied by Allied powers from 1945 to 1955, its strategic culture underwent numerous changes and adaptations. After this period, neutrality was highly valued (Giegerich, 2008: 67). These discontinuities of the state had their repercussions on the role of the country’s military apparatus of which the public has grown distracted. Giegerich also notes that in the case of Austria, being on the losing side in two World Wars gave them the image of being weak and unable to win wars (ibid.).

The consequence of this attitude resulted in a shift towards a more active foreign policy where Austria offered its services as mediator and broker to other states. With this approach, the country safeguarded its neutrality and security, since it established itself as a
player in the security field. After accessing the EU in 1995, constitutional amendments between 1997 and 2001 gradually eroded the meaning of neutrality which in turn enabled Austria to take part in the Petersberg tasks (Giegerich, 2008: 68).

The Austrian strategic culture thus creates obstacles to high performance in crisis-management missions because its non-alignment can have a residual effect on strategic thinking, which puts more emphasis on civilian and diplomatic means, rather than military. The use of force as Meyer describes it, is only used as a last resort and even then with restraint (Meyer, 2001: 529). It also results in a low estimation of the value of force projection, particularly if it involves combat (Giegerich, 2008: 68).

4.6.2 Strategic culture of Finland

After the different strategic choices Finland made in the Second World War, its position during the Cold War period was characterized by neutrality, albeit more instrumental than ideological (Tiilikainen, 2006: 52). It enabled Finland to move more freely in the international system and to deepen and broaden its involvement in international security cooperation (Möttölä, 2001: 99). Changes in Finnish policy followed after the collapse of the Soviet-Union and Finland’s accession to the European Union (1992). Its neutrality made way for a new policy of integration in the European Union (Tiilikainen, ibid.). According to the same author, Finnish integration motives are based on an interest in European political security and the expectation that other member states would help Finland in for instance, the case of Russian threat (Tiilikainen, 2006: 53).

As Kari Möttölä argues, Finland was quickly ready to let go of its neutrality policy. Seen primarily as instrumental policy to secure its interests, it did not became an element of its identity nor was it based on a legal foundation. It did however found popular support among its population being identified with a successful foreign policy during previous years (Möttölä, 2001: 104).

Due to the expansion of multilateral cooperation within security frameworks like the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the EU and the influence it had on Finland a shift from bilateralism to multilateralism in world affairs took place (Möttölä, ibid.). According to Möttölä, the European Union represented an identity factor for Finland: “By providing the context both value-based and strategic operational argumentation in the formulation and conduct of the Finnish foreign and security policy” (Möttölä, 2001: 108). For Finland, EU membership contributed to its engagement in ideational politics, with a special emphasis on human rights, being a priority in its foreign policy (Finnish Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, 2006; Möttölä, 2001: 108). For instance, the Finnish President Halonen emphasized that a mandate by the United Nations (UN) needs to be provided before a Battlegroup could be deployed (Granholm and Jonson, 2006: 15). This serves as an example of the importance Finland puts on international norms and the legitimacy of Battlegroup actions. This is also apparent in the emphasis Finland puts on the freedom of choice as a guiding principle of the right for countries to choose and change their security arrangements. In this context, Finland has been busy preventing transitions or dangers for the regional stability that could form a threat to that principle, like an assertive enlargement policy by NATO, which could provoke Russia (Möttölä, 2001: 121).

According to Christoph Meyer, Finland does not favor military action. It only considers military force to be a last resort, for instance as defence against threats to its homeland and not to promote values or beliefs abroad (Meyer, 2001: 529). To conclude, Finland shows a strong tendency towards internationalism, putting emphasis on the importance of rules and principles of international law and institutions like the United Nations. The latter is regarded essential to legitimize peacekeeping operations and humanitarian interventions (Miles, 2011: 78). The Nordic political discourse favours international crisis management with an active participation and holds, as already mentioned, a primary role for the UN in general terms (ibid.).

4.6.3 Strategic culture of Germany
The strategic culture of Germany has often been characterised as a so called „culture of restraint” or in German „Kultur der Zurückhaltung”. Interestingly, where most countries refer positively to past military achievements, the German strategic culture is based on a rejection of its past (Chappell, 2009: 424; Duffield, 1994: 179). The consequences of the Second World War and Germany’s militaristic behaviour in the preceding decades made Germany reluctant to use their military as a foreign-policy tool (Giegerich, 2008: 66). German national identity soon became linked to European integration and NATO as these organisations provided the possibility of integration into Western Europe. During the Cold War the Bundeswehr played an important role in the deterrence of Soviet troops with conventional forces. After the decline of the Warsaw Pact, it was not necessarily anymore to have big standing armies and NATO countries soon adapted to these new conditions by reducing their armed forces, dismissal of military service (drafting) and putting more focus on foreign interventions (Stöger and Rolofs, 2010: 2). As a strong supporter of a European Security and Defence Policy, in 2009 renamed to CSDP, Germany encourages other EU member states to pool their
defense resources and cooperate to counter emerging security threats (Belkin, 2009: 9).

This also put emphasis on the German desire to work in a multinational framework and within international law to demonstrate its image of reliability and predictability in foreign policy (Chappell, 2009: 421). In their early 1990’s a debate started in Germany on the future of their foreign relations and security role in the international society, especially focused on the question on the legitimacy of military interventions in foreign countries by the Bundeswehr (Stöger and Rolofs, 2010: 2-3). The outcome of the debate in 1994 was that German participation in military interventions (as part of multinational organisations) was not against the German constitution, after which they participated in IFOR and SFOR missions in Bosnia (Stöger and Rolofs, 2010: 3). As Jochen Stöger and Oliver Rolofs note, the German behaviour featured cautiousness and restraint since they were monitored by the outside world (2010: 3). Since the 1990’s there has been a noticeable shift in the nature of the military tasks for Germany. Its army was previously more oriented on defending their territory but now shifted towards a focus on international conflict prevention and crisis control. Laura Chappell argues that “the type of missions that the EU BG will undertake will not represent an insurmountable political obstacle to Germany” (Chappell, 2009: 425). For countries that have restrictions on the use of force such as Germany, participation in the BG appears feasible. In the case of Germany, a UN mandate is almost a prerequisite for action although there is a small possibility to act without it, or „interpret” the mandate more widely (Chappell, 2009: 426). German politicians and the German public generally express strong opposition to international action that is not sanctioned by a United Nations mandate, or that appears to violate human rights standards and international law. The German law forbids unilateral deployment of German troops, and requires parliamentary approval for all troop deployments (Belkin, 2009: 4).

Possible missions of the EU that will take place on the European continent are considered in the interest of Germany, which is not so obvious for a mission in for instance Africa. According to Chappell, Germany’s security and defence elites were originally concerned that the Battlegroup Concept would only be used in Africa, which reflected their fear of taking part in a tool to handle colonial responsibilities. As a result, the concept refocused so that it could be used for all crises and conflicts (Chappell, 2009: 428). Germany would prefer the ESDP to operate primarily in Europe and Eurasia, as made clear by their and the UK’s rejection to a Battlegroup deployment in Congo (2008) (Chappell, 2009: 429). This came forth from the German reluctance to engage troops in Africa (Menon, 2009: 236 in Chappell, 2009: 429). Interestingly, German decision makers are still wary on the use of
force, so their missions need to have a humanitarian element (Chappell, 2009: 427).

A reason for the German aversion to the use of military force was reinforced by the Allied occupation and the fear that Germany could become the battlefield in case of a nuclear war between the West and the Soviet Union. With the use of conscripts, Germany has a strong civil as well as military component in combination with a Bundeswehr whose actions are defined carefully by the constitution. Since the end of the Cold War, Germany has increased its participation in military crisis management missions, although it did not halt its reluctance to military action, taken into account the domestic debates on this topic (Giegerich, 2008: 67). For Germany, domestic (parliamentary and public opinion) and international (United Nations and other states) endorsement is vital before they resort to the use of force (Meyer, 2001: 531).

The German strategic culture according to Giegerich favours territorial-defence over force projection and the use of civilian over military means. He also notes that it is not clear whether Germany should be seen as more Atlanticist or Europeanist. According to other sources he concludes that Germany prefers to stay more or less equally close to the collective defence of NATO and the CSDP (Giegerich, 2008: 67).

4.6.4 Strategic culture of Lithuania

The Lithuanian strategic culture is a result of the long history of the country, but foremost a result of almost two decades of independence (Urbelis, 2007: 195). Geopolitical considerations dominated for a long time the debate over Lithuania’s security issues (Šešelgytė, 2010: 30). Being occupied and incorporated by the Soviets in 1940, Lithuania regained its independence from Russia in 1990 (Miniotaite, 2000: 23). As a consequence, Lithuania had to redefine its identity and define their position in the international community. Being afraid to not be taken serious or to be left „on the wrong side of the iron curtain” Lithuania considered several foreign policy options (Šešelgytė, 2010: 27). During its first years of independence, popular belief was based on the general idea of a hostile Russia, who wanted to re-establish its control over the Baltic States. The Lithuanian identity was created by taken distance from Russian traditions and putting emphasis on shared and common European values, also seen in its security and defense policy, which reflects a “clear and unambiguous identification with the West” (Urbelis, 2007: 195).

20 At the end of 2011, Germany will suspend its conscript structure. It has lasted for 54 years, supplying more than 8.9 million conscripts over the years. Germany wants to continue to a more professional army to streamline itself for future foreign missions.
History has shown that the Baltic States do not have the power to protect and defend their national security and sovereignty, therefore its defence needed to be set within an international security institution (Bajarnas, 1995: 11). For this reason, Lithuania has always regarded participation in the NATO as their most important security guarantee, guided by strong US-Lithuanian ties (Molis, 2006: 88-89). Due to the NATO-US relations as a counterweight to Russia as regional hegemon, Lithuania (and the other Baltic States) emphasized that the ESDP should be regarded complementary to its NATO participation (Molis, 2006: 88). According to Arunas Molis, Lithuania does keeps in mind that the US will not always participate in Europe, a reason for them to also integrate in the ESDP as a European security structure (Molis, 2006: 95-96). Elzbieta Tromer argues that the joining of the EU and NATO was based on the motivation to avoid a repetition of the period of 1940-1944 when the faith of the Baltic States was decided over their heads (Tromer, 2006: 390), but also that their interest in the ESDP is „lukewarm” since the EU only holds limited military capability opposite to NATO which can rely on the US for strength and leadership (Tromer, 2006: 364).

By becoming a member of the European Union, Lithuania needed to formulate its position on related security issues. In the words of Margarita Šešelgytė: “Kantian values - democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and rule of law, became inherent in the Lithuanian institutional framework” (Šešelgytė, 2010: 28-29). However, she also noted that the heritage Lithuania was left with due to its inclusion in Soviet ideology was in stark contradiction with those same Kantian values (2010: 29). A legacy of Soviet occupation for Lithuania resulted in a strong form of elitism in external security issues, making it exclusive to „high politics” instead of an issue for the society to be involved with (Šešelgytė, 2010: 29). This elitism created tunnel vision within the government and public opinion since it lacked public interest and controversial public debate, exemplified by the fact that all Lithuanian parties supported the increase of military expenditures and NATO integration (Moller, 2002 in Urbelis, 2007: 196) as well as high-intensity war fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan (Urbelis, 2007: 202). As Vaidotas Urbelis observes, political consensus is a dominant feature of the Lithuanian security discourse, in stark contrast to the political situation in other European countries, and therefore can be seen as a result of the strong elitism in Lithuania (Urbelis, 2007: 197). Urbelis and Tromer agree that the main features of Lithuanian strategic culture are its elitism, militarization, political consensus and state domination of the security and defense discourse (Urbelis, 2007: 200).
4.6.5  Strategic culture of the Netherlands

Interestingly, although the Netherlands are a small country with a relative small but well trained and well equipped military (Ebbut and O’Halloran, 2006) it holds both the capacity and the political will to participate in high-scale military operations (Korteweg, 2011: 245).

During the Great War, they used neutrality as a foreign policy instrument (Abbenhuis, 2006: 24). During the Second World War, the Netherlands were invaded and occupied by the Germans. Being one of the first NATO countries during the Cold War, the role of the Dutch military as instrument of state power was reassessed after the end of the Cold War (Korteweg, 2011: 215).

Since there was no longer a Soviet threat after the Cold War, the government decided to use the army to strengthen the international rule of law, contributing to the Dutch ambition to actively shape international relations in Europe (Korteweg, 2011: 216). For the Dutch, European integration was used to promote its security by participating in „transnational structures” and taking part in multilateral cooperation structures (Korteweg, 2011: 223).21

Quoting the Dutch scholar Rem Korteweg:

“The Dutch international legal tradition offered a suitable framework for playing a strong role in its promotion and thereby to enhance the Netherlands” influence internationally. [It makes use of] the military as a peacekeeping force to support international stability, or as one element within a broader pallet of national instruments to set the conditions for reconstruction and stability” (Korteweg, 2011: 300).

As already mentioned in the interest-based section on Dutch foreign policy, Dutch security interests are very much focused on stability. As a consequence, multilateralism is seen as holding numerous advantages for the Netherlands (Korteweg, 2011: 223-224). Martha Finnemore describes multilateralism as a source of power since it can help the Netherlands to get involved in military interventions and provides them with an important voice regarding the rules concerned with multilateral actions (Finnemore, 2004: 20). According to Korteweg, a specific character of the Dutch strategic culture, based on its geopolitical position, international legal tradition, maritime orientation and history is that the Netherlands holds both a European as an Atlanticist focus which allows them to play the role of „bridge-builder” in the international community (2011: 233).

21 The Netherlands are active in a number of multinational frameworks such as the UK/NL Amphibious Force, the German-Dutch 1 GE/NL Corps and the EATC (European Air Transportation Command). Next to that, they are a regular supplier of men and material to the European Battlegroup and the NATO Response Force (Korteweg, 2011: 223)
By performing peace and high-intensity missions, the Dutch security policy stand is accepted by both Atlanticists as Europeans (Korteweg, 2011: 300). It has made clear that the Dutch can be considered a reliable partner, which in turn allows the Netherlands to increase its international position (Korteweg, 2011: 300). The Netherlands used an active policy to promote Western liberal values throughout its modern history (2011: 232). Creating stability was seen as an objective, since it economic relations would take benefit of a stable international community as well (2011: 300). This has also led the Dutch to continue and improve its position as prosecutor of international law, emphasizing the origin of Hugo Grotius and the role of The Hague as legal capital of the world (2011: 234).

As Korteweg continues, the relevance of small powers such as the Netherlands is measured by its willingness to participate or join forces with its major allies (ibid.). He summarizes the Dutch strategic culture as consisting of two elements: the first element is based on the drive to support international rule of law which reflects the security interests of the country. The second element is the use of the military as political instrument to demonstrate the country’s relevance in international affairs (2011: 300). This was made clear by participating military in multilateral coalition operations, where the Netherlands demonstrated its international presence allowing them to have an important voice in European security institutions and to increase its political credit (Korteweg, 2011: 245).

4.7 Conclusion knowledge-based hypothesis

The previous paragraphs have provided a brief oversight of the strategic cultures of the participating countries. The hypothesis that the participating states share a common strategic culture needs to be rejected as it is clear from the aforementioned elaborations of the different strategic cultures that some similarities do occur, but there are more differences between the different countries than resemblances.

So we cannot speak of a shared common strategic culture. For instance, Finland and Austria both came from a neutral stand in international relations, but took other directions. Austria has emphasized its support for norms and values and has assumed the role of mediator in conflicts whereas Finland follows a more active military path next to emphasizing its support for the freedom of choice and emphasis on human rights. Interesting to see is that Finland and Lithuania still struggle with their relationship towards Russia and being located at the border of the European Union, they regard Russia as a possible threat to their sovereignty and foreign relations which partly forms an explanation for their participation in the Battlegroup. Both countries are looking for integration in EU politics, especially concerning
security matters. Lithuania sees NATO more as a security guarantee than its participation in the CSDP and the European Battlegroup.

Germany and the Netherlands are at ease with both NATO and EU involvement. These two countries are especially keen on working together in multinational frameworks to enhance the European integration. For the Netherlands, this also has to do with the promotion of security and the desire of being visible in international affairs, next to the fact that multinational cooperation is based on a UN-mandate. Broad consensus next to the promotion of international law also forms a very important feature. The latter is also in line with the German culture of restraint in military actions.

Something else that comes forth from the strategic cultures of the different countries is the different views regarding the use of violence. For Germany and Austria, and to a certain extent also for Finland, military intervention is not regarded as an important structure in its security policy. For the Netherlands, both peace- and high intensity missions have been part of its history, linked to the promotion of the international rule of law. An exception to this forms Lithuania which does not have to be accountable for its military actions due to its strong elitism.

Although the participating countries show a strong commitment to international values and the rule of law, have to a certain extent shared ideas and give rise to the idea that they are all in a way concerned with European integration. That being said, it is clear that due to different paths and histories one cannot speak of a shared strategic culture for these five participating countries although there are a number of similarities to be found.

4.8 Summary

This chapter has tested the three different hypotheses, based on the three approaches of International Regime Theory. As this point, one can conclude that although at first sight, the reasons for cooperation look very similar, the countries appear to have different incentives to participate. The results will be summarized and discussed in-depth in the next and final chapter. The sub question that dealt with the question why these specific units were selected by the countries was also discussed in this chapter. The contributions of the different countries were discussed in the sections of this chapter. As came forth from the information provided by the interviewees and secondary sources, the reasons to send these specific units were mostly based on their training schedule, involved participation costs and specific capacities.
Chapter 5: Conclusion

5.1 Conclusion

This final chapter will answer the main question of this thesis: *What are the incentives of the different countries to participate in the EUBG 2011/1 based on International Regime Theory?*

The information gathered during this research as well as its analysis will be used to answer the research question. The second part of this chapter will present recommendations for further research, reflections on the research and policy recommendations and a discussion of the difficulties - both political as financial - that surround the Battlegroup Concept. Looking back at the standby period of the Battlegroup, one cannot go by without paying any notion to the events in Libya and the discussion on the role of the European Battlegroup. Hence, this will also be discussed in the final section of the chapter.

In order to answer the research question three hypotheses have been set up, corresponding with the three approaches of International Regime Theory in order to direct the possible incentives of the different countries. It appears that the interest-based approach holds the most explanatory power, although this does not mean that the other approaches have to be rejected or did not provided valuable insights. After the operationalization and empirical research of the two other approaches their hypotheses could not be accepted.

In the following section I will use the information derived from the different approaches and the testing of the hypothesis to explain the participating incentives of the different countries. The findings have been put in a table:

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Interest in Eastern Europe</th>
<th>Strengthening the role of the EU</th>
<th>Further developing the CSDP</th>
<th>Participation in international organizations</th>
<th>National Defense</th>
<th>Expand role as mediator in conflicts</th>
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<td>Austria</td>
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<td>Germany</td>
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<td>The Netherlands</td>
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*Table 3: Findings of the interest-based approach*
As can be concluded from the table, the interest-based approach seems to be highly salient in explaining the reasons of participation for the different countries. All countries share to a certain extent the same incentives to participate in this Battlegroup. The strengthening of the European Union as an international player in the field of crisis management as well as a further development of the CSDP can be considered the main reasons for the countries to participate. A number of countries also acknowledge that their participation can be seen in the light of a further investment in their security and that of other countries by participating in international organizations. It makes clear that strengthening the European Union and further developing the CSDP are the main incentives of the countries to participate. Due to the small part the European Battlegroup plays in the CSDP, participation cannot be used as a leverage in other fields of the European Union. It does provide a better understanding and closer cooperation in certain fields with other countries, due to shorter lines of communication.

The following sections will provide more in-depth information on the specific incentives for the individual countries.

First of all, the considerations of the countries that participated in this Battlegroup were based on a number of mutual agreements made in the past. The Netherlands and Finland participated in the German led Battlegroup of 2007/1. Germany and the Netherlands agreed to switch roles a few years later, which resulted in the Dutch-German core of the 2011/1 Battlegroup. For Austria, this provided the perfect opportunity to take part in this segment of the CSDP and cooperate with experienced NATO countries and one of its closest neighbour and allies: Germany. Finland already participated in the 2007 Battlegroup, so this provided a good way to prolong its cooperation and show its support for the CSDP by participating in two Battlegroups. For Lithuania, as newcomer, cooperation with such experienced partners provided a strong foundation for a strengthened cooperation in European military and security politics.

Based on the theoretical framework, incentives could be traced down based to the interests and foreign policies of the countries, gains and power-based assumptions and strategic culture. Findings of the interest-based approach, which can be seen as neoliberal theory in the field of international relations showed that the participating countries in the EU BG 2011/1 shared a number of common interests. An interesting fact here is that it appears that Lithuania and Finland both remain fearful of Russia and its foreign policy, which they consider as a possible threat to their states and sovereignty. As became clear, both countries used their participation in the Battlegroup to reinforce their influence in the CSDP of the European Union and as a way to become more strongly embedded in the field of European
security. These reasons for participation are not visible in the incentives of the other countries and can be considered as an interesting geopolitical development.

For Austria, its interest to participate is based on attempts to promote a more secure Eastern Europe and a stronger support for an expanding role of the European Union in terms of security affairs, especially for this region. The Austrian position is based on their neutrality in international affairs, their non-membership of NATO and their strong belief in norms and values as set up by the United Nations.

Germany shows interest in an expansion of the military capabilities of the European Union, and feels itself somewhat obligated to participate as one of the biggest and powerful European member states. It feels the pressure of other countries, perhaps now even more then ever, to pursue an active role in European crisis management. The Netherlands in turn, are more focussed on the promotion of international law and peace and are considered a strong advocate of an active stand within the CSDP. For Finland, participation in the Battlegroup Concept (as part of the CSDP) can be seen as a way to avoid being left out in the European security context. So their participation can be seen to avoid the risk of being sidelined. On the other side, participation in the Battlegroup Concept can also be regarded as a form of „path dependency” in their involvement in the CSDP to take an active stand within the international community. For all the countries that participate, working together and learning from each other’s ways of thinking is seen as highly relevant and as very important.

Many states in the European Union are former enemies who have learned to cooperate over time. Their relations can be seen as a result of historical processes and interaction. As a result, the participating countries do not distrust each other, as predicted by the power-based or realist approach. Taken into account the changing character of the cooperation between participating countries due to the six-month cycle, the potential power linked to participation in a Battlegroup seems rather limited. Since the power-based approach cannot explain the cooperation of the different countries and the fact that they are not concerned of relative gains, the interest-bases approach holds more explanatory power. It is conceivable that because of the confidence that exists between the European member states, the constraints of cooperation by relative gains have lessened, putting a focus on absolute gains like common training and burden sharing, both highly beneficial for the participating countries.

Applied to the their incentives to participate in the Battlegroup 2011/1, all countries have confirmed their interest in security matters, both within Europe as well as concerning European interests outside Europe. At the same time it can be argued that it is in the interest to train their troops and to reinforce the power of the European Union as an actor in this field.
The participating countries can gain individually by cooperating (reducing their training costs) and learn from the collaboration with other countries and to use these insights for purposes of their own next to improving the multinational relations with these countries.

Considering the knowledge-based approach, these participating countries do not share a common strategic culture which might be able to explain their reasons for participation. Due to different paths and histories one cannot speak of a shared strategic culture. Finland and Austria for instance are both neutral countries but decided to express this in other ways. Germany and the Netherlands are at ease with participation within NATO and the EU whereas other countries hold a stronger focus on one of these organizations.

Turning to the question whether International Regime Theory is valuable when examining regime formation among small to mid-range powers the answer is yes. It has provided a sound framework to investigate the countries incentives to participate. The different explanations provided by the different approaches do not have to be mutually exclusive. If one of the three approaches (and linked to that, one of the three theories of international relations) holds the most explanatory power, this does not mean that the other ones have to be rejected. As can be concluded, the incentive for being involved in the European Battlegroup Concept and specifically the European Battlegroup 2011/1 differs between the participating countries. The interest-based approach can be considered as the approach with the largest explanatory power in comparison to the two other approaches. It is interesting to see that the countries despite certain similarities for the most part have different strategic cultures and as a consequence of that have different reasons to participate. Based on historical and political decisions that formed the foreign policy and national ambitions and goals of these countries.

5.2 Discussion on the use of the Battlegroup Concept

Battlegroup missions have to deal with severe time constraints, which puts extra emphasis on the importance of a good cooperation between the different countries. Due to its multilateral character, there are both political and military levels and stakeholders active.

Granholm and Johnson (2006) point out that the EU BG can have different meanings for different countries. For a medium-sized European country like Germany, Austria or the Netherlands, they point out that consequences of participation in the EU BG can have influence on their commitments to NATO and the corresponding resources. Their defence budgets have seen a decline after the Cold War (and even a further decline the past few years due to the economic crisis), both are lacking the means for strategic lift which makes a
pooling of resources necessary (2006: 25). As Granholm and Johnson continue, they note that although the string of countries (medium-sized) can provide a nationally led EU BG it is in most cases not within their means. They conclude by noting that a role as framework nation is possibly the highest that these countries can afford without putting to much strain on their national defence apparatus. This is the case for both the Netherlands and Germany, both countries have been lead nation of a Battlegroup.

For the smaller nations in this research like Finland and Lithuania (although it can be applied to a number of smaller states, Baltic States and new EU member states) different incentives are important. These countries are concerned of threats to their sovereignty, based on their geography and history (Granholm and Jonson, 2006: 25). In terms of participation, contributions up to the size of a company form the limit for them, due to the rotation in other peace-operations or crisis-management operations (2006: 25). This requires a good planning and a trade-off between ambitions and resources. Another concern identified by both authors is the fact that participation in the European Battlegroup, would be to costly in terms of men and resources to uphold a decent territorial defence (Granholm and Johnson, 2006: 25). Developments in Russia are considered as the background factor for these reflections (ibid.).

When a country decides to deploy troops as part of a multinational operation, the decision is almost always made at the national level. Each country has its own legal and constitutional framework within which approval to the mission is given in a formal way (Giegerich, 2008: 76). In many European countries, troops may only be deployed after parliamentary approval and parliaments can also choose to withdraw troops. The fact that each country has different processes and internal checks on action and that policies and governments are subject to change introduces uncertainty to the multinational cooperation (Giegerich, 2008: 76). In Austria, Germany, Lithuania and the Netherlands prior approval from parliament is necessary to deploy forces (Giegerich, 2008: 77).

5.2.1 Political and financial matters

As we have seen throughout this research, countries have different ideas on where and when a Battlegroup should be deployed. According to Laura Chappell, the Battlegroup Concept is widely supported under EU member states (Chappell, 2009). Often, governments place restrictions on the activities of their forces for international missions. This is done to assure that their forces will not be used by the commander to undertake activities for which they are not trained or equipped for (Giegerich, 2008: 49). However, practice shows that such caveats are also used to ensure that the troops do not participate in activities that might be considered
as controversial at home. These caveats are not usually published but much is known about how they have been used in recent years (2008: 49-50).

Examples of possible caveats are the prevention of moving in troops to areas where the fighting is fierce, other countries do not let their troops initiate combat missions where others where only able to operate during daylight. But there were also examples where only a combination of certain armored vehicles was allowed to be deployed. Giegerich illustrates that some countries even reserved several days to decide whether or not to allow units to deploy beyond their area of operations, which prevented a rapid response (Gigerich, 2008: 50).

Caveats are most often declared at the time when countries make their forces available, but there is also the possibility of so called „undeclared caveats”. As Giegerich notes, national-contingent commanders are always able to prevent their forces from being used if they think that it might goes against the instructions of their political overseers. The problem of these caveats is that they are quite damaging since they only become visible when a possible problems arises (Giegerich, 2008: 51).

Not only political factors, but also financial matters can form a constraint to action when deciding on a mission (Chappell, 2009: 429). In the case of the Battlegroup this is specifically related to getting the BG in time to the area of operations. Due to the strict time (5-10 days) for deployment, this will most surely encompass strategic lift capability.

The EU as a whole suffers from a lack of strategic airlift, which is essential in order to deploy the BG. Not only do there need to be enough planes to carry the men and material, conditions on the ground also need to be taken into consideration (Lindstrom, 2007: 33-34). Is for instance the runway long enough for large planes and what is the distance to the area of operations? These kinds of questions remain highly relevant.

Considering the costs involved, the question remains whether the participating countries will be prepared to participate in a mission and wanting to share the costs. Most costs are funded through the „Athena principle” which implies that „costs lie where they fall” which means that member states contribute depending on their gross national income (Chappell, 2009: 430).

As mentioned briefly in the introduction, the standby costs for a Battlegroup can get very high. In the case of Sweden, lead nation for the Nordic Battlegroup in 2008, Wade Jacoby and Christopher Jones argue that the costs accompanied with a possible deployment

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22 See also Robert W. DeJong Missions and challenges of the European Battlegroups (2009), for an oversight of the political and operational challenges
where the most important hurdle (Jacoby and Jones, 2008: 332). Following new rules, transport costs will not longer be seen as common which could have important implications for poorer participating countries since they will have to pay transport costs themselves, which could mean that countries that are politically willing and able to contribute and deploy their troops cannot do this because of financial constraints.

5.2.2 Why haven’t they been deployed?

To this day, no European Battlegroup has been put into use. As a result, a number of countries question the effectiveness and necessity of the Battlegroup Concept (Parrein, 2010: 8). This can be seen in the declining willingness of states to allocate troops for a Battlegroup. As a result of that, the slots in Battlegroup roster (see appendix II) remain open for a longer period (Parrein, 2010: 8-9; Lindstrom, 2007: 46-48). According to Graham Messervy-Whiting and Tim Williams, both scholars of the Royal United Service Institute, the most effective solution to achieving a balanced and consistent roster for the Battlegroup would be to develop a centralised process with cooperation from the EU Military Committee. The EUMS would then be tasked with the responsibility of declaring each Battlegroup as operational (Messervy-Whiting and Williams, 2007: 2). According to the Dutch defense specialist Kees Homan of the Clingendael Institute, there are two main reasons why the EU Battlegroup has not been put into use. Firstly, the participating countries have their obligations to ISAF and the NATO Response Force. Secondly, the costs concerned with training, readiness and deployment of a Battlegroup need to come from the country itself, which serves as a restraining factor for many participants.

Following Kerttunen (2010a), there are a number of other explanations why not one Battlegroup has been deployed, besides political problems or the lack of trained troops (2010a: 146). This has to do with societal and identity-based reluctance of member states to actually deploy the Battlegroup, something not easily supported by small countries or countries that focus more on their territorial defence and for countries that see the EU more as a civil crisis management institution (ibid.). Although plans were made to put the EU BG into use, for example to monitor the cease-fire between Hezbollah and Israel in 2006 and the election process in the Democratic Republic of Congo in that same year, slow decision-making put a hold on a rapid deployment (Homan, 2011: 19). The problem is that if one country has it doubts on a deployment or is against, the Battlegroup will not be deployed.
5.3 Libya

Although not entirely the scope of this research but due to the changing character of the political situation in the Middle East, some things need to be said in the relation to the events in Libya and the non-deployment of the European Battlegroup.

Confronted with reality in 2011 and the implications of the so called „Arab Spring” numerous sources point to Germany for the reluctance in taking a stand in the conflict and for not using the EU BG in this event. The Battlegroup was passed by an ad-hoc coalition of NATO members and was sidelined as a result.

On 1 April 2011, the Council decided on the „EUFOR Libya” European Union military operation to support humanitarian assistance operations. Rear Admiral Claudio Gaudiosi was appointed as EU operation commander, the operational headquarters in Rome was activated (Toussas, 2011). By taking part in a Battlegroup mission, Germany had the chance to improve its position amongst its allies. The decision to not take part in the voting of the UN-security council concerning a „no-fly zone” in Libya unleashed a storm of criticism (NRC Handelsblad, 2011). According to the German newspaper Die Welt, the reason that the German administration decided not to vote concerning the no-fly zone had to do with the fear that because of the dynamic nature that these operations have, it would be inevitable to send ground troops (Die Welt, 2011a; 2011b). Although Germany decided to withhold their vote in the General Assembly meeting, they remained advocates of the protection of humanitarian resources by military means. According to Die Welt this policy choice was based on „damage control” to compensate the damage done to their reputation by the non-voting which in turn was probably influenced by local elections In other words, the German government shows behaviour, described by Die Welt as: “overcompensation” (Die Welt, 2011a, 2011b).

On the other hand, according to the Atlantic Council, a US-based think tank, the Netherlands were reluctant to deploy the Battlegroup due to the massive upcoming cutbacks in their defense budget, where Germany would only participate when there would come an official request by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) (Benitez, 2011). This short assessment of Libya makes clear that actually deploying the Battlegroup will remain a difficult thing. Therefore, a vicious circle remains. Not deploying a Battlegroup will eventually damage the EU BG reputation, which will mean that it will be harder to find countries willing to participate. An actual deployment of any Battlegroup will depend of course on the situation, but not only does there needs to be an official request from the UN, there also needs to be consensus between the 27 member states of the EU before one can actually be sent to the area of operations. All in all, there lies a long
and bumpy road ahead for the Battlegroup Concept.

It remains speculation if things would have turned out differently if the HELBROC Battlegroup, which consists of a number of countries situated in the area would have been on standby. There would probably have been more pressure on the EU to deploy that Battlegroup, due to their proximity to the conflict and the influx of refugees from the conflict, which brings the conflict closer to home.

5.4 Recommendations for further research

Future research could focus on the incentives of other countries, both members of the EU as non-members to participate in the European Battlegroup Concept. This could result in newly-formed coalitions within the Battlegroup Concept as countries might hold the same or entirely different incentives to participate. It could also discuss the capacities of the EU BG in general. Do they need such a strong military approach or would it be better to include civilian means? This would of course pose a significant change for possible deployments. The reasons to decide not to deploy the Battlegroup to Libya can also be considered a topic for future research. A possible deployment could have provided a valuable test to the Battlegroup Concept in general. It could also have made clear if the expected strategic lift difficulties would pose a restraining factor. It will be interesting to research this more in-depth after an actual deployment. Finally, it will also be interesting to investigate the following: Taking into account the contemporary choice for more ad-hoc coalitions (e.g. Iraq, Libya), will this pose a threat to the more institutionalized cooperation of for instance the European Battlegroup?

5.5 Policy recommendations

To prevent the European Battlegroup from becoming a paper tiger, certain actions need to be made. Recommendations include a better transfer of knowledge between the different Battlegroups so that pitfalls can be prevented. A further investigation of a pool of experienced and less experiences countries that form one Battlegroup need to be made, to improve the quality and overall support for crisis management missions. Following the Athena Mechanism, the standby costs could be financed from a mutual fund, thereby putting fewer restraints on countries that want to participate or be lead nation. All countries of the European Union need to be obligated to participate in the Battlegroup Concept. If the standby period would be changed from a half year to a full year, much more could be achieved in terms of preparation, cooperation and common exercises. This would benefit the integration of the different armed forces. Last but not least, it would be wise to include a civil branch within the
Battlegroup Concept to be able to perform other kind of operations. That way the Battlegroup can be used in different ways and allows it to reinforce its reason for existence next to the NRF, which operates on a higher violence level. In this time of ad-hoc coalitions, it will be doubtful if the Battlegroup will ever be deployed for its initial task.

5.6 Reflection

This section of the thesis will reflect on the used theory and methods. The difficulty with such a contemporary subject is that a lot of information was not yet available and the fact that findings could prove to be different in hindsight. For one, the choice for regime theory as guiding theory for research on the incentives of the different countries provided me with a number of difficulties due to the unfamiliarity with the theory. It took valuable time to work out a sound theoretical framework and it was interesting to apply a new theory, although very much based on the existing tracks of international relations theory. In retrospective, it would probably have been wise to stick to these theories instead of making use of International Regime Theory. Considering the explanations IRT brought up regarding the participation incentives of the different countries it was no surprise that the power-based approach did not had much explanatory-power. But what was interesting was that there was a noticeable difference in the reasons of participating for Finland and Lithuania opposed to Germany and the Netherlands. It was difficult to make a sound operationalization of the power-based approach, something that might be done better in future research. Regarding the interest-based approach, IRT does not provide any information on so called „bureaucratic politics” which means that it is not always clear why certain policy decisions were made that way. Perhaps a stronger assessment of bureau-politics in the participating countries could have made the research more robust.

The section on the strategic culture provided some difficulties since there was no clear image of what a specific strategic culture entails. Especially for the Netherlands and Austria, there were almost no sources on which I could rely, which resulted in a lengthy but interesting process to complete that section. But it helped to place certain state behaviour in the international community against the right background. More and diverse interviews could have been conducted, especially on the German sections. The fact that this did not happen had to due with some constraints in getting into touch with the right persons. On the other hand, the interviews that were held provided me with an insight in the different phases and levels of the Battlegroup standby-phase and the preparatory process and were mostly used as background information. Conducting the interviews with key-persons to supplement the
information derived through other sources was very helpful for me. Not only did it required perseverance to speak to the right person or to get decisive answers to the questions asked, but it also taught how to conduct an interview using certain interview techniques.

A problem with the theory was that the incentives of countries need to be placed in the three approaches. A problem within the research framework was to place cost-effectiveness considerations as a reason to participate within the different approaches. It can be argued that cost-effectiveness can play an imported role, although due to the fact that the Battlegroup has never been deployed and remains costly to be on standby, this incentive might be reconsidered. Although the theory does says something on transaction costs, other costs or economic considerations are not considered to be the scope of the theory.

This thesis has contributed to a better understanding of the Battlegroup Concept and the reasons of the different countries to participate. It has made clear that even within the European Union there are different reasons for the countries to participate. As a consequence this thesis can be regarded as having an added value to the current scientific knowledge on this topic. The knowledge that this research has generated can contribute to a better understanding of multinational coalitions and their objectives. The research has offered an extensive insight in the EU BG and therefore will be interesting for scholars and students that are interested in the EU”s military domain. Referring to the title of this thesis, one cannot go by the fact that the Battlegroup remains a paper tiger for now. Only a deployment can decide whether it can be seen as the core of European military cooperation and prove the critics wrong.
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-99-


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-112-


Appendix I: Possible Battlegroup scenarios

Separation of parties by force
This scenario involves combat-forces undertaking crisis-management tasks including peacemaking. These activities are situated in the upper end of the Petersberg-tasks. The planning assumptions are that the theatre of operations would be up to 10,000km from Brussels and that it would take at least 60 days to establish Full Operational Capability (FOC). This reaction time implies that theatre entry elements would be deployed within a shorter timeframe. Since the assumption is that this deployment will last up to six months means that a rotation of forces is not required, although it is also assumed that a mission to separate parties by force would be followed by a stabilisation and reconstruction (S&R) mission on a smaller scale.

Stabilisation, Reconstruction and Military Assistance to Third Countries
This specific scenario covers the fields of peacekeeping, election monitoring, institution building, security sector reform (SSR) and support to terrorism combating of third countries. The planning assumption is that the mission would be conducted up to 10,000km from Brussels, although a 4,000km version has also been planned. FOC is to be reached within 90 days, and the assumption is that the mission would be sustained for a period of at least two years and as such, requiring several rotations of personnel.

Conflict Prevention
The topic of conflict prevention deals with preventive engagements, preventive deployments and embargo, counter-proliferation and joint disarmament operations. These kinds of operations would take place up to 10,000km from Brussels and the FOC would be reached within 60 days of the launch-decision. These operations are assumed to last for one year, which will require the rotation of forces.

Evacuation Operations in a Non-permissive Environment
This scenario deals with the possibility of the evacuation of non-combatants. These operations are deemed as one of the most important ones -since lives of EU citizens are at stake- which explains why member states will always want to be able to conduct such operations. For the same reason, versions have been planned for up to ranging 10,000km and even up to 15,000km from Brussels. Considering the importance of rapid reaction in evacuation
operations, which translates in the planning assumption that initial operation capability would be reached within ten days after the decision to launch a mission. Depending on the circumstances, the duration of this scenario is expected to be short, not more than four months, so troop rotation would not be needed. Further assumptions are that the mission would be needed to evacuate a number of non-combatants ranging from 2,000 and 10,000.

Assistance to Humanitarian Operations
The final scenario covers management of the consequences of disasters and the prevention of atrocities. Like the former scenario, planning assumptions are that it will be conducted at a distance of up to 10,000/15,000km from Brussels. In this case the initial operation capability would need to be reached within ten days after the launch decision. Humanitarian operations are not expected to require a rotation and have an expected duration of up to six months. These operations are expected to deal with numbers between 75,000 and 100,000 evacuees and refugees. As should be mentioned, these scenarios are not mutually exclusive. It could very well be that a possible operation entails different factors of different scenarios.

# Appendix II: EU Battlegroups roster 2005-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Semester*</th>
<th>Lead Nation</th>
<th>Contributing Nation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
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<td><strong>Germany</strong></td>
<td><strong>Germany</strong>, France</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Spain</td>
<td>Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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</tr>
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<td><strong>Finland, Germany, Netherlands</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>France, Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Italy, Hungary, Slovenia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Greece, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Romania</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>France, Spain, <strong>Germany</strong>, Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td><strong>Germany</strong></td>
<td>Belgium, France, <strong>Germany</strong>, Luxembourg, Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Romania</td>
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<td>Czech Republic, Slovakia</td>
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<td>Belgium, France, Luxembourg</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010</td>
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<td><strong>Germany</strong>, Latvia, <strong>Lithuania</strong>, Poland, Slovakia</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Country</td>
<td>Members</td>
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<td>-----------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Bulgaria, Greece, Cyprus, Romania (HELBROC)</td>
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<td>France, Italy, Portugal and Spain</td>
<td></td>
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<td>France, Belgium and Luxembourg</td>
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<td>Vacant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Sweden, UK</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Vacant</td>
<td>To be determined</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*1= January-June
*2=July-December
Appendix III: List of interviewees

Brandtner, H., Col. Aide-de-camp of the Austrian Military Attaché to the Netherlands. [Phone interview]. May 2011.


Kerkhoff, van den, P., Major. Staff officer Education and Training, Royal Dutch Army Central Staff. The Hague, June 2011.

Laan, van der, M., BGen. Commander European Battlegroup 2011/1. Oirschot, April 2011

Loschek, A., Col. Liaison-Officer of the Austrian Bundeswehr. Dedicated to the staff of the European Battlegroup and commander of the Austrian contingent for the EU BG 2011/1. Oirschot, April 2011.

Meijer, J., Lt-Col. Staff-Officer Readiness, Royal Dutch Army Central Staff. The Hague, June 2011.


