Post-National Citizenship: the Paradox

A Somali Case Study

By

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To Jiddu Krishnamurti

‘When you call yourself an Indian or a Muslim or a Christian or a European, or anything else, you are being violent.
Do you see why this is violent?
It is violent because you are separating yourself from the rest of mankind...
When you separate yourself by belief, by nationality, by tradition, it breeds violence...
So a man who is seeking to understand violence does not belong to any country, to any religion, to any political party or partial system;
he is concerned with the total understanding of humankind…’

& Jalal ad-Din Rumi

‘I am neither Christian, nor Jew, nor Parsi, nor Moslem...
I am not of the East, nor of the West, nor of the land, nor of the sea…
I am not of earth, nor of water, nor of air, nor of fire...
I am not of the spheres, nor of the dust, nor of existence, nor of entity...
I am not of India, nor of China, nor of Bulgaria, nor of Arabia...
I am not of this world, nor of the next, nor of Paradise, nor of hell...
I am not of Adam, nor of Eve, nor of Eden and Gardens...
My place is the Placeless, my trace is the Traceless...
This neither body nor soul, for I belong to the Soul of the Beloved…’

My sources of inspiration…
Preface

This writing is the result of my final challenge during my master studies Human Geography – Globalization, Migration and Development. During one of the ‘Preparing the master thesis’ courses, dr. K. Varro told us that planning and conducting research is a ‘reiterative process’. In retrospect, this is how I would summarize my own research in a pair of words. As a matter of fact, this writing is the result of my third research proposal. Cliché as it may sound, I am happy about how things worked out the way they did. The literature that I have studied, the HIRDA internship, the symposia that I have visited, the women that I have interviewed and the people that I have met during this process, all together became a valuable and inspiring experience to me.

First of all I would like to thank my supervisor Lothar Smith for his patience, support and rich feedback. His passion, enthusiasm and extensive knowledge on his field are very inspiring to me. Additionally, I would like to thank Fatumo Farah, for giving me the opportunity to learn at HIRDA. I would also like to thank the other women that I have met at HIRDA, who have made my experience at HIRDA a fun one: Diede, Charleen, Benthe, Faisa, Asha and Helena. Of course I would also like to thank the women that I have interviewed, for trusting me to share their personal stories with me. Furthermore, I would like to thank my lovely sister Berdien, my best friend Lejla and my sweet Dino, for their support and the fun times we had during this process. I would also like to thank my new good friend Ineke, for her support and for being a source of inspiration.

The fellow students, as well as the passionate teachers, inspiring guest speakers and literature that I had to read, really made these master studies a great experience.

I hope that you as a reader will enjoy my thesis.

José Muller
Executive summary

A nation-state can be defined as a named human population sharing an historic territory, a common culture and common legal rights and duties for all members. Being a citizen depends on membership in a certain national community and since the power of nation-states derives from the people it is vital to define who belongs to these people (Smith, 1991, in Castles & Miller, 2009, p.42). This form of national organization has successfully spread over the entire world (Habermas, 2001, p.62). Habermas (2001, p.65) argues though that since the end of the 1970s, this form of organization has come under increasing pressure from forces of globalization. The cross-border flows, together with the resulting economic integration and social transformation, have created a new world order with its own institutions and configurations of power that replaced the previous structures associated with the nation-state (Castles & Miller, 2009, p. 52). The nation-state now lies at the intersection of international regimes and organizations, which have been established to manage whole areas of transnational activity and collective policy problems (Held, 2002, p.306).

As a solution to the limitations of the nation-state, Habermas (in Pensky, 2003, p.133) proposes a ‘transformation of national identity into a cosmopolitan identity, a new transnational civil identity, that will be able to effect decisions transcending national self-interest’. In this context, several theories of post-national citizenship have emerged, wherein rights that used to belong solely to nationals are now extended to foreign populations, undermining the very basis of national citizenship (Soysal, 1994, in Faist & Gerdes, in Faist, Pitkänen, Gerdes & Reisenauer, 2010, p. 2). The first and foremost thesis seems to be that international norms and institutions exert pressure on nation states’ sovereignty toward granting individual rights to migrants (Faist & Gerdes, in Faist, Pitkänen, Gerdes & Reisenauer, 2010, p. 30). When underpinning their claims regarding citizenship transformation beyond the nation-state, post-national theorists often refer to the European level, since the most comprehensive legal enactment of a transnational status for migrants is encoded in European Communities law (Soysal, 1994, in Faist & Gerdes, in Faist, Pitkänen, Gerdes & Reisenauer, 2010, p. 31). The development towards European citizenship initially seems to be limiting the leeway of nation-states (Faist & Gerdes, in Faist, Pitkänen, Gerdes & Reisenauer, 2010, p. 31), but when analyzed critically though, these rights seem to be additional and not replaced by national citizenship (Weil, 2011, p.622).

The context of immigration, the supposed failures of multiculturalism and a renewed interest in national identity form one part of the backdrop of recent changes in the concept of citizenship in Western European nation-states (Van Houdt, Suvarierol & Schinkel, 2011, p. 408), where citizenship has become a central concept in policy and discourse on ‘immigrant integration’ (Schinkel & Van Houdt, 2010, p.697). Citizenship, because of its pivotal position between the individual and the collective level, emerged as one of the crucial elements of
population management. The political programmes of citizenship in the west of Europe manifest on the one hand, a neoliberalization of citizenship that involves an increased emphasis on the need to earn one’s citizenship and, on the other hand, an increased communitarization, or sacralization of the nation (Van Houdt et al., 2011, p.423), which is the perfect opposite of the cosmopolitan thought.

Although the pluralist perspective was dominant in the Netherlands in the 1980s, the Netherlands is now considered a frontrunner when it comes to communitarization or culturalization of citizenship (Van Houdt et al., 2011, p.418). Since the late 1990s, Dutch discourse on integration has increasingly centered on notions of culture, norms and values and proper definitions of Dutchness, but also on the defense of social identity, loyalty and commitment to the community and its values (Schinkel, 2007, in Van Houdt et al., 2011, p.418). In their research, Tonkens, Hurenkamp and Duyvendak (2009) showed that when the national identification of Dutch natives is strong and of a restorative character, it seems to exclude migrants, since a restorative notion of identity hardly relates to everyday events or experiences which migrants can join. Native Dutch seemed to consider the local level as far less emotionally meaningful though, creating room for migrants to develop and express feeling of identification there, which in fact they did. Tonkens et al. (2009, p.16) argue that their results show ‘a polarization in a painfully pure form’: when natives find refuge in a restorative emotive culturalization, migrants can either react by trying the constructivist approach at the local level or they take the more easy way of restorative emotional culturalization as well – but they can only do so by taking refuge in the culture and/or religion of their origin.

An empirical result of the restorative notion of identity can be found in the high number of transmigration of Somalis in the Netherlands. Since 2000 it is estimated that between 10.000 and 20.000 Somali immigrant have left the Netherlands for the UK (Moret and van Eck, 2006; van den Reek and Hussein, 2003, in van Liempt, 2011, p.570), right after having obtained Dutch citizenship (Van Liempt, 2011, p.580). An important reason for the Somali transmigration was the experience of the Netherlands as a country where you have to assimilate and where you are not allowed to enjoy your own culture (Reek and Hussein, 2003, in Van Heelsum, 2011, p.16). This high number of transmigration shows that the relationship between citizenship and belonging is not as straightforward as is often assumed and neglects the ways in which immigrants experience citizenship (Van Liempt, 2011, p.580).

In this research, this high number of transmigration serves as one of the reasons to explore how the Somali migrants in the Netherlands experience citizenship. Another reason is the integration of Somalis in the Dutch society, which is considered to be problematic by several authors (e.g. Klaver, Spoel & Stouten, 2010; MinBuZa, 2012). The literature has up till now mainly focused on Somali men though, while there seem to be problems among Somali women as well. According to Allas (2012), there is a substantial number of Somali women in the Netherlands who are not aware of the country they live in and who are not participating
in it. The possibility to initiate a new living in the Netherlands and to meet the requirements that are set by the Dutch government, is affected by the Somali history of war and chaos, since it leaves most of the Somalis traumatized when fleeing the country (Van Moors et al., 2009; Pels & De Gruijter, 2005; Kromhout & Van San, 2003, in Klaver et al., 2010, p. 24). Therefore, the warning of Penninx (2012) that policies that are defined solely by the receiving society have the inherent danger of representing demands of this society solely, resulting in unrealistic demands that often produce backlash, seems to be particularly relevant for the Somali migrant group.

Besides his argument that we should analyze migrant attitudes with regard to citizenship, Penninx (2008, p.16) also argues that the weakness of current European research is that it is fragmented. The national state has been an important level from the beginning and has dominated in research, but there is a growing body of research on the local level on the one hand, and on the supranational level on the other as well. The relations between these levels and the ways in which they influence each other, Penninx further argues, are yet to be explored. There seems to be a growing awareness among researchers that there is a need to overcome this fragmentation, and at the same time an expectation that this will greatly enhance our understanding of policies and policy making in the field (Penninx, 2008, p.17). These recommendations by Penninx could be considered as starting points of this research. In this case-study research, the attitude of Somali women with regard to citizenship was therefore explored, whereby the three levels that are put forward by Penninx were used as a theoretical framework.

In order to explore how supranational, national and local citizenship is experienced by Somali women who live in the Netherlands, five women that were considered to be key-figures were selected through purposive sampling. After and during a literature study, these Somali female key-figures were interviewed through the use of semi-structured interviews. Besides that, three relevant symposia were attended as well.

During the interviews, there seemed to be a common thread with regard to several subjects. With regard to the integration of Somali women in general, the interviewees emphasized the difference between first and second generation Somali women. First generation women seem to be the ‘isolated’ ones, while the second generation seems to be doing quite well. The main reason that is mentioned for the isolation of the first generation women is their mental occupation with the war, having less energy for other things.

Although almost all interviewees thought that the language requirements that are currently set for obtaining Dutch citizenship are initially a good thing, they did argue that a distinction should be made between people who are able to learn and those who are not. They further argued that there should be sympathy for war victims and that expectations should not be too high. The interviewees argued that requirements should not be enforced and that integration should be motivated in a more positive way, by emphasizing the benefits of it. According to them, especially the cultural requirements create hostility and
makes people feel insulted, since it comes across as a demand to let go of culture of origin, which makes migrants defend their own viewpoint or culture even more.

The Somali key-figures argued that Somalis experience the Netherlands as a bureaucratic country with a lot of rules and paperwork, where you can lose your way quickly. This bureaucratization provokes irritation and asks for assistance, since it is hard for Somalis to find out how it works. The current assistance should be easier, more open and less bureaucratic. Also, right from the start, Somali migrants are expected to master the Dutch language, only receiving information and letters in Dutch. Finding your way in the Netherlands would be easier if this information would be provided in English as well.

Some interviewees also experienced the political turnaround in the Netherlands, emphasizing that there was sympathy and tolerance in the beginning, while today there is not even recognition for war victims. Today, especially Islamic migrants have problems with feeling at home. According to the interviewees, Somali migrants want freedom and want to be accepted, or otherwise they want to leave the Netherlands. Their Dutch passport enables them to transmigrate within the EU and therefore many Somalis migrate to the UK, where they experience more freedom of religion and culture. Therefore, it is argued that the Netherlands could reduce the Somali transmigration by providing an environment wherein Somalis can feel at home.

Multicultural contact and festivities are considered to be valuable means to stimulate integration on both sides. Despite their critical attitude about the political developments of Dutch politics on the level of the nation, the Somali women actively initiate contact in their local environment and seemed to value this. One interviewee explicitly stated that despite the negative discussions about migrants that were going on in the media and politics at the level of the nation, migrants were being active in their own local environments and felt like a citizen there. Some women seemed to relate to their local environments in an emotional way as well, expressing feelings of pride and referring to their city as having a place ‘to be’.

Almost all of the interviewees mention that when a Somali couple starts living in the Netherlands, it frequently causes problems, resulting in fights and divorces. In Somalia, the husbands work and the wives do everything in the household, while the Netherlands has a different system. Somali women start to ask their husbands to help them in the household as well, which is difficult for them to accept. At the same time, Somali women want to do more than staying at home to cook and clean and want to live for themselves as well.

Despite the arguments that were made about politics and the like, all interviewees emphasized personal responsibility as well. These women all seemed to think that it was a good thing that language requirements were being made, because they consider language to be essential to participate in society. Emphasizing that you should not be afraid to make mistakes, as well as the need to be willing to learn yourself and to develop yourself in order to get respect from other people, these women seemed to value self-responsibility in order to develop.
The research among Somali female key-figures showed that their experience of EU citizenship seems to be limited to the opportunity it offers them to transmigrate, to the UK in particular. With regard to their experience of national citizenship, the interviewees indicated that they thought that the formal citizenship requirements, like learning the Dutch language, was a good thing in general, because it prevented Somali women from being isolated from society. With regard to cultural requirements though, they argued that this creates hostilities and that you cannot force somebody to feel something. These cultural requirements do relate to the wish to transmigrate to the UK, because in the UK more freedom with regard to culture and religion is experienced by Somalis. The Somali women that were interviewed in this research, all indicated that they valued having contact with people in their local environment. Besides the emphasized importance of these contacts in order to learn the language, some of them expressed feelings of emotional belonging as well, like feeling proud and having a place to be.
List of figures and tables

Figure 1  Visualization of research concepts  29
Figure 2  Contemporary Somalia  41
Figure 3  The political situation in Somalia on the 24th of March 2011  46
Figure 4  Somali refuge patterns  49
Figure 5  Level of education of Afghans, Iraqis, Iranians, Somalis and autochthones aged 15-65  51
Figure 6  Percentages of individuals aged 18-34 with a basic qualification by Ethnicity  52
Figure 7  Unemployment rate by ethnicity, gender, age, educational level and duration of stay in 2009  53
Figure 8  Development of Somali population in the Netherlands  55
Figure 9  Immigration, emigration and the migration balance for Somalis in the Netherlands 1995-2009  56
Table 1  Largest Somali population of recognized refugees  47
List of acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESF</td>
<td>European Social Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MS</td>
<td>Member State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MinBuZa</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCN</td>
<td>Third Country National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Table of contents

Preface I
Executive summary II-VI
List of figures and tables VII
List of acronyms VIII

1. **Introduction: nationalism in a post-national world** 1-9
   1.1 Societal relevance 4-6
   1.2 Scientific relevance 6-7
   1.3 Objective of the research 7-8
   1.4 Research question 8
   1.5 Structure of the thesis 9

2. **The evolution of citizenship during post-nationalism** 10-36
   2.1 The emergence of national citizenship 10-12
   2.2 Citizenship traditions 12-13
   2.3 Post-nationalism 13-16
   2.4 Post-national consciousness 16-18
   2.5 Post-national citizenship 18-19
   2.6 The paradox: nationalism in a post-national world 20-22
   2.7 Neo-liberal communitarianism in the Netherlands 22-23
   2.8 The assimilationist turn in the Netherlands 23-25
   2.9 Current developments in the Netherlands 26-27
   2.10 Culturalization of citizenship and polarization 27-29

3. **Methodology** 30-40
   3.1 Explanatory study 30-31
   3.2 Qualitative research 31-32
   3.3 Quantitative research 32
   3.4 Case study 32-33
   3.5 Literature study 33
   3.6 Purposive sampling 33-35
   3.7 Semi-structured interviews 35-36
   3.8 Participant observation 37
   3.9 Data analysis 37-38
   3.10 Methodology reflections 38-40

4. **Results: the holistic perspective** 41-50
   4.1 Brief history of Somalia 41-42
   4.1.1 After the Barre regime 42-43
   4.1.2 Somali Islam 43-44
   4.1.3 Somalia after 9/11 44-46
   4.1.4 Somali migration patterns 46-49
1. Introduction: nationalism in a post-national world

‘Nothing is more painfully characteristic of the pitfalls of modernization – and the ambiguities and tensions of globalization – than the fact that global problems and challenges frequently provoke renewed forms of nationalism as response...’

Habermas, 2001, p.xi-xii

The term ‘globalization’, or ‘the widening, intensifying, speeding up and growing impact of worldwide interconnectedness’ (Held, 2002, p.306), has become indispensable for a spectrum of current debates and seems to be a term destined to provoke ambiguous reactions. As Pensky (in Habermas, 2001, p.vii-viii) argues: ‘On the one hand, globalization evokes the image of proliferating interconnections and interrelationship, of better communication between the most far-flung regions of the world, challenging old prejudices and pointing toward a future where the cultural, geographical, and political sources of social conflicts have become antiques. On the other hand, it calls forth panic tinged images of global markets running out of control, of an unguided and uncontrollable acceleration of modernization processes, devastating the political infrastructures of nation-states and leaving them increasingly unable to manage their economies and the social and ecological crises they generate. On the one hand, globalization hints at the utopian vision of a once-hostile strangers coming into peaceable contact through globalized media of all kinds; on the other hand, it hints at the dystopian specter of forced cultural homogenization either by the decrees of a centralized administration or by market fiat’.

According to Habermas, the dynamic of globalization is reasonably clear in one respect though: it heralds the end of the global dominance of the nation-state as a model for political organization. ‘The globalization of markets and of economic processes generally, of modes of communication and commerce, or culture, and of risk, all increasingly deprive the classical nation-state of its formerly assured based of sovereign power, which it depended on to fulfill its classic functions’ (Habermas, 2001, p.xiii). Subsequently, the economic and cultural globalization, as well as the growing influence of multilateral policy regimes and international organizations, the transnational social movements and migrants’ transnational practices, all challenge and change the well-established institution of national citizenship. These cross-border realities pose fundamental challenges to traditional citizenship because it is based essentially on the assumption of a congruence of continuous residence in a given territory, a shared collective identity and participation in and subjection to a common jurisdiction (Faist & Gerdes, in Faist, Pitkänen, Gerdes & Reisenauer, 2010, p.21).

As a solution to the limitations of the nation-state, Habermas proposes a ‘transformation of national identity into a cosmopolitan identity, a new transnational civil identity, which will be able to effect decisions transcending national self-interest’ (Pensky, 2003, p.133). During this transformation, ‘existing ties between civil solidarity and the integration force of nationality should be surmounted and the postmodern conception of
private life-worlds should be replaced by a more abstract, cosmopolitan consciousness and a conception of life-worlds as overlapping’ (Pensky, 2003, p. 133). With regard to this transformation transcending the nation-state concept, several post- and transnational citizenship theories and concepts have emerged (Faist & Gerdes, in Faist, Pitkänen, Gerdes & Reisenauer, 2010, p.28). The most prominent concept of postnational citizenship starts with the empirical observation that in immigration states there is a dwindling influence of shared nationhood and national belonging on the definition of individual rights and membership boundaries. In this view, postnational citizenship confers upon every person the right and duty of participation in the authority structures and public life of a polity, regardless of their historical or cultural ties to that community (Soysal, 1994, in Faist & Gerdes, in Faist, Pitkänen, Gerdes & Reisenauer, 2010, p.29). The main postnational thesis seems to be that international norms and institutions, mostly related to that of the European Union, exert pressure on nation states’ sovereignty toward granting individual rights to migrants (Faist & Gerdes, in Faist, Pitkänen, Gerdes & Reisenauer, 2010, p.30), rights that used to belong solely to nationals (Soysal, 1994, in Faist & Gerdes, in Faist, Pitkänen, Gerdes & Reisenauer, 2010, p.29).

According to Pensky (2003, p.134), the conceptual dilemma that confronts Habermas’ post-national constellation and its echoes in the international realm though, is the sharp discontinuity between existing political wills and cultural self-identities situated in a historically given life-world, and a new, abstract, post-national consciousness. This discontinuity is shown by current citizenship policies in the west of Europe, wherein cultural assimilation and neo-liberalism tend to combine to a new governmental strategy, which results in the use of citizenship as a technique of in-and exclusion and a crucial instrument in the management of populations (Schinkel & Houdt, 2010, p.696). In order to use it as such an instrument, citizenship is being contractualized, sacralized and it needs to be earned. Those characteristics are increasingly ‘culturalized’, relating citizenship to national identity and national values in demonstrating ones’ progress towards citizenship (Houdt, Suvarierol & Schinkel, 2011, p.411-423), which is in itself the perfect contradictory to universalism. The Netherlands is considered to be a frontrunner when it comes to this culturalization of citizenship, centering its discourse on integration increasingly on notions of ‘Dutchness’ since the late 1990s (Houdt et al., 2011, p.411). Citizenship, according to the Integration note (Dutch National Government, p.12), ‘relies on active participation in all relevant aspects of society. Dutch language proficiency is an essential condition to be able to participate as an active citizen in Dutch society, as well as the need to feel like a citizen of the Dutch society, to identify with it, to feel responsible for it and to want to be a part of it’.

This active participation is considered unsuccessful among Somalis who live in the Netherlands, since they are lagging behind autochthones and the Afghan, Iraqi, Turkish and Moroccan migrant groups, with regard to education and employment (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011; Klaver, Poel & Stouten, 2010). Also, the majority of the Somalis do not feel at home in the Netherlands, due to the experience of cultural differences and a lack of
acceptance and recognition by the Dutch (Klaver et al., 2011, p.25). A narrowing definition of what it means to be Dutch was one of the reasons why one third of the Somalis decided to move to the UK right after having obtained Dutch citizenship, since the UK is experienced as a country where more space is created for cultural differences (Van Liempt, 2011, p.570). Van Liempt (2011, p.580) argues that this transmigration shows that the relationship between citizenship and belonging is not as straightforward as is often assumed and neglects the ways in which immigrants enact and experience citizenship. It also contradicts the assumption that legal rights and duties bind people to nation-states. Tonkens, Hurenkamp & Duyvendak (2009, p. 6) argue as well that the Dutch ‘restorative notion’ of national identity that centers on the ambition to re-establish national culture and identity through rather thick notions of citizenship excludes migrants, particularly because it is hardly related to everyday events or experiences which they could join. In their research they showed that migrants alternatively relate to the local level or take the more easy way of restorative culturalization as well, by taking refuge in the culture and/or religion of their origin.

Penninx (2012) also warns that policies that are defined politically by the receiving society have the inherent danger of representing demands of this society solely, rather than being based on agreements with immigrants themselves. Penninx further argues that the unrealistic demands that might be placed upon immigrants often produce backlash. This might be especially relevant for migrant groups like the Somalis, since their country of origin has a history of anarchy, war, famine, many deaths and subsequently huge flows of traumatized refugees. Several studies show the prevalence of psychological suffering and trauma among the Somali community in the Netherlands (Van Moors et al., 2009; Pels & De Gruijter, 2005; Kromhout & Van San, 2003, in Klaver et al., 2010, p. 24). The possibility to initiate a new living in the Netherlands suffers from experiences in their country of origin and their flight (Van Moors et al., 2009, in Klaver et al., 2010, p.24).

The preceding discussion shows that in order to understand the ‘problematic’ integration of Somalis in the Netherlands, the local, national as well as supranational level should be integrated in the analysis, as well as the history of the migrant group. Two quotes by Penninx could therefore be considered as starting points of this thesis.

‘One of the most obvious weaknesses of European research on migration and integration is that it is fragmented. A lack of integration of different levels at which phenomena are studied is one form of fragmentation that is regularly brought up. While the national state has been an important level from the beginning and has dominated in research, there is a growing body of research on the local level on the one hand, and on the international and supra-national level on the other’ (Penninx 2008, p.8), and ‘The relations between these levels and the way they influence each other are yet to be explored’ (Penninx, 2008, p.10).

¹ ‘The Dutch’ might indicate that ‘othering’ is not only done by the Dutch people, but by Somalis as well.
Besides this indication to re-orient migration and integration studies, Penninx (2008, p.13) suggests to ‘analyze migrant attitudes, ties and practices with regard to citizenship’ in general.

The content of this thesis could therefore be considered twofold as well, including a theoretical and an empirical part, which are of course related. The starting point of the theoretical part is the weakness of European research that is pointed out by Penninx. Many scholars still take the level of the nation as a starting point for citizenship and integration studies (e.g. Penninx 2008, Bachmann & Staerklé, 2003; Faist et al., 2010), while research shows that it becomes increasingly important to take into consideration the supranational (e.g. Faist et al., 2010; Penninx, 2008; Penninx, 2012) as well as the local level (e.g. Tonkens et al., 2009; Ludwinek, 2012). In the theoretical part the concept of citizenship at the supranational, national as well as local level, will be described. This description will show relations between the different levels. These three levels of analysis will also be integrated in the empirical part, of which the starting point is the suggestion to analyze migrate attitudes with regard to citizenship.

1.1 Societal relevance

Europe, which was traditionally the first continent of emigration, has become the first continent of immigration since the beginning of the 1980s (Chesnais, 1998, p.85). By 2000, 56 million immigrants lived in Europe, which is 7.7% of its total population (Penninx, 2012). Before the economic crisis in 2007, there were 18.5 million third country nationals (TCNs) living in the EU, which is 3.8% of the European population. Three years after the start of the crisis, this number increased to 20.2 million, or 4% of the total EU population. Research showed that the unemployment rate of TCNs aged 20-64 (20.7%) was significantly higher than that of the total EU population (10%). In 2008, research had already showed that 31% of the foreign-born persons aged 25-54 were assessed to be at risk of poverty or social exclusion. Therefore, during the 2012 ‘Unlocking the Potential of Migrants in Europe: From isolation to Multi-level Integration’ Symposium, the head of the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, stated as one of their main goals:

‘… to make migrants feel at home, to make them and their human potential become an integral and productive element, alongside the local population, towards their own well-being and the benefit of the economies they live in…’

In order to reach this goal, the EC is concentrating on the monitoring of EU’s demographic situation, including issues related to migration, social inclusion and integration of migrants firstly, on presenting main trends and assessing policy effectiveness, on supporting debate on demographic changes and migration policies and on promoting social innovation and social policy. The European Social Fund regulation therefore reflects EU’s intention to proceed faster and deeper with integration of migrants and minorities. The ESF is considered to be an important instrument to help member states to support migrants and minorities by
promoting equal opportunities, ensuring social inclusion, accepting diversity in workplace and combating discrimination (Sasu, 2012).

Intentions to ensure social inclusion, accept diversity and combat discrimination are in discontinuity with natives’ rising discontent about EU’s heterogeneity though. With regard to the Netherlands, the Dutch National Government (Integration Note, 2011, p.1) stated that ‘the different ethnic and cultural groups that became a part of the EU during the last decennia, did not mutually came together to form a new unity’. Instead, ‘cultural diversity led to division and to mutual disregard at best’. The Dutch National Government thereby states that ‘the severity of the integration problems shows that the model of a multicultural society is no solution to the dilemma of a pluriform society’. Although there is most certainly a particular degree of integration, concerns about that share of migrants that does not succeed in constructing an independent living prevails. According to the Integration Note (2011, p.2) there is a growing concern that integration on social-cultural grounds lags behind and that contradictions with Dutch natives will harden. Also, ‘research has shown time and time again that many Dutch consider the diversity that characterizes the Netherlands as a threat, instead of enrichment’.

The culturalization of citizenship, which was initiated in order to reduce the contradictions between native Dutch and migrants by emphasizing a common basis and recognizable fundament, is questionable with regard to several aspects. First of all, the research of Tonkens, Hurenkamp & Duyvendak (2009, p. 6) showed what they call ‘a polarization in painfully pure form’. Tonkens et al. argue that the restorative notion of national identity, that centers on the ambition to re-establish national culture and identity through rather thick notions of citizenship, excludes migrants, particularly because it is hardly related to everyday events or experiences which they could join. Tonkens et al. (2009, p.16) argue that migrants alternatively relate to the local level or they take the more easy way of restorative culturalization as well, by taking refuge in the culture and/or religion of their origin.

Secondly, the question is whether the requirements that need to be met fit the underprivileged migrants’ abilities. This is particularly relevant for Somali immigrants, since most of them had to process war and fleeing experience from the past, allowing them to have less energy for other issues. Also, Somalia knows a history of years of chaos and anarchy, while in the Netherlands they are facing a government, rules and administrative systems like Social Services, which they never knew. It is important to understand what this discrepancy does to the ability of Somali immigrants to become ‘Dutch citizens’ and to integrate into society, since Somalis in the Netherlands are lagging behind other migrant groups with regard to integration. Somalis still have the lowest education level in 2011, compared to Afghans, Iraqis, Iranians and autochthones (Klaver, Poel & Stouten, 2011, p.17). With its 33%, the degree of unemployment among Dutch Somalis is also relatively high compared to Afghans, Iraqis, Iranians and autochthones (Dagevos, 2011, in Klaver et al., 2011, p.27). Especially with regard to the integration of Somali women, concerns are being raised. In her
documentary, Allas (2012) showed several cases wherein children were taken away from their –single- mothers, who could no longer take care of them or who were accused of child abuse, according to Child welfare. According to Allas, these situations show that many Somali women do not know the country they live in and are not aware of the possible consequences of their actions with regard to the Dutch legislation.

Finally, the high number of Somalis leaving the Netherlands to live in the United Kingdom soon after having obtained Dutch citizenship shows that the relation between belonging and citizenship is not as straightforward as is often assumed (Van Liempt, 2011-1, p.569). Since 2000 it is estimated that between 10,000 and 20,000 Somali immigrants have left the Netherlands for the UK (Van Liempt, 2011, p.3388). Somalis tend to experience a great deal of religious freedom in the UK, compared to the Netherlands that calls for cultural assimilation, tough measures and neo-patriotism. Not being able to express their religious, ethnic or cultural identity in the public domain any more was one reason why Somalis decided to move from the Netherlands to the UK (Van Liempt, 2011, p.575). In this light, the Dutch integration policies, which are said to be implemented to stimulate participation and feeling of identification, seem to be counterproductive. It is therefore questionable whether the Dutch integration policies contribute in reaching the goal of making migrants feel at home and to make them and their human potential become an integral and productive element of the economies they live in, as was put forward by Sasu.

1.2 Scientific relevance
‘The welfare-state democracies and its democratic self-determination could only come about if the population of a state was transformed into a nation of citizens who take their political destiny in their own hands. The political mobilization of its subjects depended on a prior cultural integration of what is initially a number of people who have been thrown together with each other. This was fulfilled by the idea of a nation, with whose help the members of a state construct a new form of collective identity: the presumed commonality of descent, language and history generates a unity, even if only an imaginary one. Only this symbolic construction makes the modern state into a nation-state. The modern territorial state thus depends on the developments of a national consciousness to provide it with the cultural substrate for a civil solidarity...’
Habermas (2001, p.64)

Habermas (2001, p.65) argues that since the end of the 1970s, this form of nation-state institutionalization has come under increasing pressure from forces of globalization. Besides globalization’s rise of intergovernmental regulations, which are based on agreements between collective actors and which in any event cannot have the legitimating force of a politically constituted civil society, globalization affects the cultural substrate of civil solidarity that developed in the context of the nation-state as well (Habermas, 2001, p. 71). Held (2002, p.307) argues that the world is no longer composed of relatively discrete political communities; rather, it is a world of overlapping communities of fate, where the fates of
nations are significantly entwined. The woes of political oppression, civil war and poverty no longer remain local affairs, if only because the media see to it that the prosperity gaps between North and South, West and East are perceived worldwide. ‘And while this media coverage may not cause the flow of migration’, Habermas (2001, p. 73) further argues, ‘it certainly accelerates it’. The majority of OECD societies have witnessed a considerable change in the ethnic, religious and cultural compositions of their population through desired, tolerated or unsuccessfully restricted migration (idem). This pluralization of forms of life brought about by immigration renders the classical notion of a background consensus of cultural homogeneity problematic (Elveton, 2003, p.133).

The idea that societies are capable of democratic self-control has until now been realized only in this context of this nation-state (Habermas, 2001, p.60). According to Habermas (2001, p.61), it as a paradoxical situation: ‘we perceive the trends towards a postnational constellation as a list of political challenges only because we still describe them from the familiar perspective of the nation-state’ Also Penninx (2008, p.16) argues that:

‘While the national state has been an important level from the beginning and has dominated in research, there is a growing body of research on the local level on the one hand, and on the international and supra-national level on the other. The relations between these levels and the complex way in which they influence each other are yet to be explored’.

And subsequently Penninx (2008, p.17) argues that:

‘There is a growing awareness among researchers that there is a need to overcome this fragmentation, and at the same time an expectation that this will greatly enhance our understanding of policies and policy making in the field’.

Besides this indication to re-orient migration and integration studies, Penninx (2008, p.13), like Sasu (2012) & Van Liempt (2011, p.580), argues that in general, we should analyze migrant attitudes, ties and practices with regard to citizenship and that we should produce policy evaluations to support policy learning and revision while resisting immediate political needs and demands (Penninx, 2008, p.16).

1.3 Objective of the research
The current prevailing national research perspective in citizenship and integration studies does not seem to provide a holistic picture of what integration entails, especially during the globalization era. The high number of intra-EU transmigration of Somalis for instance shows that policies at the level of the nation relate with that of the post-national level, while research like the one of Tonkens et al. shows that it is related with local integration as well. Therefore, in order to understand the integration of Somali women who live in the Netherlands, it seems to be necessary to explore the national, post-national as well as local
level. Also, with regard to the warning of Penninx that was mentioned in the introduction, a throughout understanding of migrants’ current integration should include knowledge about their migration history and their attitude with regard to citizenship as well. Together, this provides a more holistic picture of integration.

To this research this means that citizenship attitudes of Somali women will be explored, whereby the post-national, national and local level will be included. Additionally, the Somali history will be related to aspects of Somali integration in the Netherlands.

The research objective therefore is to contribute to the knowledge on citizenship and integration studies in general, by introducing a framework that integrates the local, national and supranational level, and to contribute to the knowledge on migrant attitudes with regard to citizenship, with Somali women in the Netherlands in particular.

This objective will be fulfilled by studying literature on citizenship on the local, national and supranational level and by empirically exploring how Somali women in the Netherlands relate to the three different levels.

1.4 Research question

Below I present my main research question, which I will try to answer throughout the thesis, and its sub-questions, through which I will be able to answer the main question fully.

*How did the notion of citizenship change during post-nationalism and how is it experienced by Somali women who live in the Netherlands?*

The sub-questions I aspire to answer as a means of answering the main research question are the following:

1. How did the notion of citizenship change with regard to the supranational level?
2. How did the notion of citizenship change with regard to the national level?
3. What do these changes mean for integration on the local level?
4. How is post-national citizenship experienced by Somali women who live in the Netherlands?
5. How is national citizenship experienced by Somali women who live in the Netherlands?
6. How is local citizenship experienced by Somali women who live in the Netherlands?

To answer this research question with the help of the sub-questions it is important to understand the theories of citizenship with regard to the different levels. In this way, a link can be drawn between the post-national, national and local levels of citizenship. In the following chapter the theoretical assumptions with regard to these levels will be discussed.
1.5 Structure of the thesis

This writing contains a throughout description of the notions of citizenships with regard to the post-national, national and local level. This study is addressed to readers who are interested in the topic of citizenship and integration, in relation to globalization. The share of readers who want an overview of the changing definitions of citizenship on the post-national and national level and its relation to local integration, are advised to read chapter two. In this chapter, the national notions of citizenship will be related to the Somali migrant group as well.

Chapter three will provide the reader with a discussion on the methodological concepts used in this research in order to come to an analysis of the problem that is discussed in the previous paragraphs. Chapter four first includes a historical overview of Somalia and Somali migrations patterns, in order to provide the reader with an outline of the Somali migration background. The results of the interviews with Somali female key figures will be presented after that, followed by its explorative analysis, whereby the findings of the attended symposia will be included as well. Finally, a general conclusion will be formulated in order to answer the main research question that was stated in this research and recommendations with regard to future research will be made.
2. The evolution of citizenship during post-nationalism

In order to understand how national citizenship is challenged by globalization and subsequently how post-national citizenship has emerged, I will first recapitulate on the essential features of national citizenship, which is essentially tied to the borders and boundaries of nation-states (Faist & Gerdes, in Faist, Pitkänen, Gerdes & Reisenauer, 2010, p.21). Subsequently, I will recapitulate on two great citizenship traditions. As will appear later on in this thesis, these two citizenship traditions inspired the development of a common population management technique in the west of Europe, which evolved in reaction to globalization and international migration.

2.1 The emergence of national citizenship

A state, according to Seton-Watson (1977, in Castles & Miller, 2009, p.42), is ‘a legal and political organization, with the power to require obedience and loyalty from its citizens’. The state regulates political, economic and social relations in a bounded territory. Most modern nation-states are formally defined by a constitution and laws, according to which all power derives from the people (or nation). Nation is defined as ‘an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign’ (Anderson, 1983, in Castles & Miller, 2009, p.43). The implication is that an ethnic group that attains sovereignty over a bounded territory becomes a nation and establishes a nation-state. As Smith (1991, in Castles & Miller, 2009, p.42) puts it: ‘A nation-state can be defined as a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members’. Specific to the nation-state therefore, is the linking of national consciousness with the principle of democracy: every person classified as a member of the national community has an equal right to participate in the formulation of the political will. Being a citizen depends on membership in a certain national community, usually based on the dominant ethnic group of the territory concerned. Nationalist ideologies demand that ethnic groups, nation and state should be facets of the same community and have the same boundaries. In fact, such congruence has rarely been achieved and nationalism therefore is an ideology trying to achieve such a condition, rather than an actual state of affairs (Castles & Miller, 2009, p.43). This form of national organization that emerged from the American and French revolution has successfully spread over the entire world. Not all nation-states are democratic though, or constituted according to the principles of an association of self-governing free and equal citizens, but wherever democracies on the Western model have appeared, they have done so in the form of the nation-state (Habermas, 2001, p.62).

Since the power of modern nation-states all derives from the people, Castles & Miller (2009, p.43) argue, it is vital to define who belongs to the people. This membership is marked by the status of citizenship and its modern understanding therefore emerged with the
creation of an international system of states and was formalized and institutionalized along the lines of state formation. The state and citizenship became necessarily combined to form effective technologies of government. With the development of advanced administrative structures of the system of national governance, the state was able to mobilize citizenship as an aspect of nationalism (Bachmann & Staerklé, 2003, p.17). Nationalism consists of a collective claim to ‘nationhood’, which psychologically entails a claim of ‘groupness’, typically articulated in a definition and legitimization of the group and its boundaries based on historic, territorial, linguistic, religious, or cultural interdependence among its members. This nationalism comes along with a message of in-group distinctiveness and intergroup differentiation, as well as territorial claims (Azzi, 1998, 73, in Bachmann & Staerklé, 2003, p.18). Nationalism therefore involves a social construction process whereby the existing differences between members of different groups are endowed with psychological significance such that the categories become part of a collective cognitive ‘representation’ in which the group now appears to be a perceptual ‘unit’ differentiated from other units (Bachmann & Staerklé, 2003, p.18).

The concept of citizenship is composed of three elements or dimensions (Cohen, 1999; Kymlicka & Nordman, 2000; Carens, 2000, in Leydet, 2011, p.1). First, the legal status of citizenship entails the specifics of citizen recognition by the state and provides the formal basis for the rights and responsibilities of the individual in relation to the state (Sassen, 2002, in Bachmann & Staerklé, 2003, p.18). It defines the legal and institutional criteria that confer civil, political, and social rights to specified individuals and groups on the basis of their membership in a nation state. Citizenship therefore performs an allocative function within the politically constructed boundaries of the nation state in that it controls access to scarce resources and provides legitimacy to social hierarchies between different groups within the society. In the most general sense, the modern conception of citizenship has been based on the idea that membership in a society must rest upon a principle of formal equality (Delanty, 2000, p.14, in Bachmann & Staerklé, 2003, p.18).

Typically, modern citizenship rights derived from membership in a nation-state include civil, political and social rights. The civil dimension of citizenship rights includes the rights to property, individual freedom and legal protection. ‘The civil element is composed of the rights necessary for individual freedom – liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice.’ (Marshall, 1950, p.10, in Bachmann & Staerklé, 2003, p.19). Political rights refer to participation in the public arena and include citizen’s right to vote and participate in the political process. ‘By the political element I mean the right to participate in the exercise of political power, as a member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the members of such a body’ (Marshall, 1950, p.11, in Bachmann & Staerklé, 2003, p.19). Social rights, finally, included income and decent housing opportunities, as well as the right to health care and education for all citizens (Delanty, 2000, p.16, in Bachmann & Staerklé, 2003, p.19). The duties corresponding to citizens’ rights are the duty to serve in the armed
forces in order to protect state sovereignty against exterior threats, while the duty to pay
taxes, to acknowledge the rights and liberties of other citizens, and to accept democratically
legitimated decisions of majorities structure the internal sphere (Faist & Gerdes, in Faist,
Pitkänen, Gerdes & Reisenauer, 2010, p.23). The second dimension considers citizens
specifically as political agents, actively participating in society’s political institutions. The
third, ‘psychological dimension’ of citizenship refers to citizenship as membership in a
political community that furnishes a distinct source of identity. This identity dimension is the
least straightforward of the three and many things related to identity and social integration,
are included under this heading (Leydet, 2011. p.2).

2.2 Citizenship traditions
Bachmann & Staerklé (2003, p.20) argue that while the idea of citizenship may nowadays be
universal, its meaning is not. Definitions of what it entails to be a citizen vary significantly
across national contexts, since domestic laws about who is a citizen vary from state to state.
Western conceptions of citizenship have evolved from, and continue to be framed by the two
great citizenship traditions, namely the liberal and republican approaches to citizenship
(Bachmann & Staerklé, 2003, p.20). The liberal model’s origins are traceable to the Roman
Empire and early-modern reflections on Roman law. The Empire’s expansion resulted in
citizenship rights being extended to conquered people, profoundly transforming the
concept’s meaning. Citizenship meant being protected by the law rather than participating in
its formulation or execution. The focus here is obviously on the first dimension of
citizenship, since citizenship is primarily understood as a legal status rather than as a
political office. It now ‘denotes membership in a community of shared or common law,
which may or may not be identical with a territorial community’ (Pocock, 1995, in Leydet,
2011, p.3). The Roman experience shows that the legal dimension of citizenship is potentially
inclusive and indefinitely extensible (Leydet, 2011, p.3).

The liberal tradition, which developed from the 17th century onwards, understands
citizenship primarily as a legal status as well: political liberty is important as a means to
protecting individual freedoms from interference by other individuals or the authorities
themselves. But citizens exercise these freedoms primarily in the world of private
associations and attachments, rather than in the political domain (Leydet, 2011, p.3).
According to Bachmann & Staerklé (2003, p.20), the liberal theory is minimalist: it puts a
strong emphasis on the individual as an autonomous social actor, and consequently liberal
rights mostly reflect individual liberties. It purports that the role of the state is to protect the
freedom of its citizens, especially by protecting the right to property and by removing
obstacles to free exchange between individuals in the market place. The liberal conceptions
of citizenship uphold a more passive conception of citizenship, since they understand
citizenship rights mainly as liberties and do not imply collective responsibilities and
participation.
The Republican model’s sources can be found in the writings of authors like Aristotle and Rousseau and in distinct historical experiences: from Athenian democracy and Republican Rome to the Italian city-states and workers’ councils. Underpinning Aristotle’s characterization of the citizen as one capable of ruling and being ruled in turn, the key principle of the republican model is civic self-rule. ‘Citizens are, first and far most, those who share in the holding of office’ (Aristotle, 1275, in Leydet, 2011, p.3). ‘It is their co-authoring of the laws via the general will that makes citizens free and laws legitimate’ (Rousseau, in Leydet, 2011, p.3). Active participation in processes of deliberation and decision-making ensures that individuals are citizens, not subjects (Leydet, 2011, p.3). According to the republican conceptions of citizenship, citizenship must involve rights and practices of political participation to achieve the common good: they stress an active and more practice-oriented conception of citizenship (Dagger, 2002; Delanty 2000, in Bachmann & Staerklé, 2003, p. 21). Republican theories put emphasis on both individual and rights and collective responsibility. They articulate citizenship rights as mainly powers and claims, and emphasize the role of conflict and contestation in the expansion of such rights (Bachmann & Staerklé, 2003, p.21). In essence, the republican model emphasizes the second dimension of citizenship, that of political agency (Leydet, 2011, p.3).

These citizenship traditions have in turn been elaborated over time in a number of different approaches, including their communitarian variations (Delanty, 2000; Janoski & Gran, 2002, in Bachmann & Staerklé, 2003, p.21) that will be discussed later on. For now, it is interesting to note that communitarianism emphasizes the predominance of the community, society or nation over its members. A primary concern of communitarian citizenship therefore is a cohesive society organized around a common set of values which community members are expected to endorse. According to communitarianism, the good society is built through mutual support and group action rather than through atomistic choices and individual liberty (Janoski & Gran, 2002, in Bachmann & Staerklé, 2003, p.21). Obligations to society may often predominate over rights because their goal is to build a strong community based on common identity, mutuality, participation, and integration (Bachmann & Staerklé, 2003, p.21).

Today we are witnessing increasingly forces transcending the reach and borders of nation-states though, which challenge and change the well established institution of national citizenship (Faist & Gerdes, in Faist, Pitkänen, Gerdes & Reisenauer, 2010, p.21). I will discuss these forces and the post-national theories of citizenship that have evolved as a consequence in the following paragraphs.

2.3 Post-nationalism

Habermas (in Pensky, 2003, p.131) argues that since the nation-state is a contingent product of modern history its essential characteristics cannot be assumed to be timelessly prescriptive. Since the end of the 1970s (Habermas, 2001, p. 65), globalization has been revealing the vulnerability of the nation-state (Pensky, 2003, p.131). Globalization has
become the ‘big idea’ of our time and it is being defined in several ways. According to Held (2002, p.305) globalization can be best understood as a spatial phenomenon, lying on a continuum with ‘the local’ on one end and ‘the global’ at the other. It can be thought of as the widening, intensifying, speeding up and growing impact of worldwide interconnectedness:

‘The world is no longer composed of relatively ‘discrete civilizations’ or ‘discrete political communities’, rather, it is a world of ‘overlapping communities of fate’, where the fates of nations are significantly entwined’ (Held, 2002, p.307).

The key indicator of globalization is, according to Castles & Miller (2009, p.51), ‘a rapid increase in cross-border flows of all sorts, starting with finance and trade, but also including democracy and good governance, cultural and media products, environmental pollution and people’. International migration is an intrinsic part of globalization, it is driven by globalization and its forms and directions are changed by it (Castles & Miller, 2009, p. 54). Globalization helps create the new technologies that facilitate mobility: air travel has become far cheaper and more readily available, and the electronic media spread images of first-world prosperity to the most remote villages. Globalization also creates the cultural capital needed for mobility: electronic communications facilitate the dissemination of knowledge of migration routes and work opportunities. It also creates the necessary social capital: informal networks facilitate migration even when official policies try to prevent it, while the migration industry is one of the fastest-growing forms of international business (Duffield, 2001, in Castles & Miller, 2009, p.56).

It is unknown how many international migrants there are currently. The United Nations Population Division estimate for mid-year 2005 stood at nearly 191 million (UNDESA, in Castles & Miller, 2009, p.5). By 2007, this was nearly 200 million or approximately 3 percent of the world’s population of 6.5 billion people. While absolute numbers have doubled over the past quarter-century, the number of migrants as a percentage of the world’s population has remained fairly stable in recent years, between 2 and 3 percent (Castles & Miller, 2009, p. 5). The number of people born in another country than where they live, or international migrant stock, has grown from approximately 195 million in 2005 to approximately 213 million in 2010 (World Bank, 2012). Many of those who move are actually forced migrants, who have been forced to seek refuge elsewhere, because of political or ethnic violence or persecution, development projects or natural disasters. In 2006, there were about 10 million officially recognized refugees in the world (Castles & Miller, 2009, p. 7).

The key organizing structure for the global flows is the transnational network, which is to be found in multinational corporations, international organizations or transnational communities (Castells, 1996, in Castles & Miller, 2009, p. 51). The accumulation of links across the world’s major regions and across many domains of activity can be related to many
dimensions (Held, 2002, p.306), although it is often portrayed primarily as an economic process (Castles & Miller, 2009, p.52). In its most general sense, ‘globalization refers to the upsurge in direct investment and the liberalization and deregulation in cross-border flows of capital, technology and services, as well as the creation of a global production system- or a new global economy’ (Petras & Veltmayer, 2000, in Castles & Miller, 2009, p. 52). In themselves, these economic trends still do not imply any damage to the conditions for a functional and legitimate democratic process as such, but they did signal a danger for the nation-state as its institutional form (Habermas, 2001, p.67). The cross-border flows, together with the resulting economic integration and social transformation, have created a new world order with its own institutions and configurations of power that have replaced the previous structures associated with the nation-state, and that have created new conditions in peoples’ lives all over the world (Castles & Miller, 2009, p. 52). The nation-state now lies at the intersection of international regimes and organizations, which have been established to manage whole areas of transnational activity and collective policy problems (Held, 2002, p.306).

‘The sovereign state now lies at the intersection of a vast array of international regimes and organizations that have been established to manage whole areas of transnational activity and collective policy problems. The rapid growth of transnational issues and problems has spawned layers of governance both within and across political boundaries. This has resulted in the transformation of aspects of territorially based political decision making, the development of regional and global organizations and institutions, and the emergence of regional and global law’ (Held, 2002, p.306).

According to Habermas (2001, in Pensky, 2003, p.132), the specific challenges offered by globalization to the nation-state are fourfold. First, the fiscal pressures exerted by globalization, such as the increased mobility of capital, threaten the tax-based resources of the state. As a consequence, the administrative effectiveness of the modern state and its ability to divert funds inwardly to address the needs of its citizens are increasingly jeopardized. Second, the political and territorial sovereignty of the state is also threatened by globalization. The growing economic interdependence that signals globalization makes it increasingly unlikely for the modern state to act unilaterally in its historical role as an autonomous agent. Third, globalization also has consequences for the traditional view of collective identity. The pluralization of forms of life brought about by immigration renders the classical notion of a background consensus of cultural homogeneity problematic. Finally, globalization also threatens the ability of democratic nations to meet fully the challenge of social justice (Pensky, 2003, p.132). According to Held (2002, p.307-309), the changing relation between globalization and nation-states can be characterized in five ways. Like Habermas, he states that the idea of a self-determining national collectivity can no longer be located within the borders of a single nation-state. Many of the most fundamental economic,
social, cultural and environmental processes that determine the political outcome now lie beyond the reach of individual politics. Held also argues that it can no longer be presupposed that the locus of effective political power is in national governments, because national governments are now embedded in complex networks of political power at regional and global levels. Political power is shared and negotiated among diverse forces and agencies at many levels, from the local to the global. Third, the actual capacity of states to rule within the circumscribed territories is changing shape. He thereby adds fourthly that the nurturing and enhancement of the public good increasingly requires coordinated multilateral action and finally that the distinctions between domestic and foreign affairs, internal political issues and external questions are no longer clear cut.

2.4 Post-national consciousness

As a solution to the limitations of the nation-state that are described in the preceding chapter, Habermas (in Pensky, 2003, p.133) proposes a ‘transformation of national identity into a cosmopolitan identity, a new transnational civil identity, that will be able to effect decisions transcending national self-interest’. He thereby states that ‘the existing ties between civil solidarity and the integrating force of nationality must be surmounted: the post-modern and neo-liberal conception of private life-worlds as ‘discrete nomads’ must be replaced by a more abstract and cosmopolitan consciousness and a conception of life-worlds as overlapping’. This transnational political self-legislation will be more open to issues of social justice that are, in this way, understood globally. It will bring global (economic) forces under transnational self-legislative control, two tasks that can be accomplished only when the nation-state transcends its historical autonomy and acts and thinks with a new understanding of political liberty for the democratic self-steering of all of society. Habermas views the achievement of a cosmopolitan consciousness as a step along the same historical path that led from an earlier period emphasizing cultural homogeneity to the more abstract democratic ideal of a self-legislating policy (Pensky, 2003, p.133). Regarding this cosmopolitan consciousness, each political party bears the responsibility for recognizing the needs and values of others and deciding the political will of all with reference to the consequences for all. Within this context, ‘the abstract character of the new, post-national consciousness simply reflects the ethical necessity of transcending the primacy of our personal and cultural perspective in order to understand the position and interests of others’ (Habermas, in Pensky, 2003, p. 134).

‘When someone asked: ‘Does your fatherland mean nothing to you?’, Anaxagoras replied: ‘Hush! My fatherland is very important to me,’ as he pointed to the heavens’.
Brown (2006, p.18)

The Stoics were the first to refer to themselves as cosmopolitans though and they emphasized that we inhabit two worlds: a local community which is assigned by birth and
another wider community of human ideals, aspirations and argument. The basis of this wider community is formed by what is fundamental to everybody: the equal worth of reason and humanity in every person. Allegiance should be owed to the moral realm of all humanity, not to the groupings of nations, ethnicity and class. Problem-solving should therefore focus on what is common to all persons as citizens of the world. Therefore, collective problems can be better dealt with if approached from this perspective, rather than the point of view of sectional groupings. According to the Stoics, ‘human beings are first citizens of the world and only incidentally members of polities. In this respect, boundaries of polities are considered arbitrary and borders obscure the common circumstances of humankind. Borders have no moral worth, because moral worth cannot be specified by the yardstick of a single political community’ (Held, 2002, p.309).

In the eighteenth century, when the term ‘weltbürger’ became one of the key terms of the Enlightenment, Kant linked the idea of cosmopolitanism to a conception of ‘the public use of reason’. According to Kant, people aren’t always able to explore the nature and limits of existing rules, prejudices and beliefs, because they are locked in the roles of practices and organizations of civil society. As members of a cosmopolitan society, people can ‘enjoy a right to the free and unrestricted public use of their reason’ (Schmidt, in Held, 2002, 309), ‘by subjecting all beliefs, relations and practices to the test of whether or not they allow open-ended interaction, unforced agreement and impartial judgment’. The right to enter a dialogue without artificial constraint or ‘cosmopolitan right’, enables people to enjoy an exchange of ideas with the inhabitants of other countries and it must be accepted if people are to learn to tolerate each other and to coexist peacefully (Held, 2002, p.310).

According to Held (2002, p.311), the more recent conception of cosmopolitanism involves three key elements. First, the ultimate units of moral concerns are individual human beings, not states or any particular forms of human association. The principle of egalitarian individualism holds that humankind belongs to a single moral realm in which each person is regarded as equally worthy of respect and consideration, and is the basis for articulating the equal worth and liberty of all humans, wherever they were born or brought up. Second, the just mentioned status of equal worth should be acknowledged by everyone. This reciprocal recognition should be the basis on which each person constitutes their relations with others. To be satisfactory rooted in everyday life it is essential that all people enjoy an equality of status with respect to the basic decision-making institutions of their communities. If people are marginalized in this respect, they suffer because they can participate less in the processes and institutions that shape their lives and so their agency is impaired. The third element stresses that the first two elements, egalitarian individualism and reciprocal recognition, require that each person should enjoy the impartial treatment based on principles on which all could act. To test the generalizability of interests, reasoning from the point of view of others or ‘impartialist reasoning’, is needed, which includes an assessment of whether all points of view have been taken into consideration and whether all parties would accept the outcome as fair if the roles would be reversed (Held, 2002, p.311).
These principles of post-national consciousness and cosmopolitanism find echoes today in the international realm. According to Held (2002, p.313), ‘states have been initiators of, and have been pressed into, the creation of rights and duties, powers and constraints, and regimes and organizations which impinge on and react back upon them’. The theory of post- and transnational citizenship that have emerged as a consequence will be elaborated on in the following paragraph.

### 2.5 Post-national citizenship

According to Bachmann & Staerklé (2003, p.21), globalization and its reality of migration, the formation of supranational bodies as the EU, the movement of refugee populations and the codification of international human rights norms has challenged modern understanding of belonging and has contributed to rethinking the meaning of citizenship. Globalization in this way challenges the nation-state as the sole source of authority of citizenship and democracy and blurs the boundaries of citizenship rights and obligations and the forms of democracy associated with them, broadening the way citizenship is understood and debated. This new language of citizenship is a result of what has been termed the ‘rights revolution’ (Isin & Gran, 2002, p.2, in Bachman & Staerklé, 2008, p.21). Major social issues such as the status of immigrants, refugees and diasporic groups have recently been framed as citizenship concerns as well (Doise, 2002; Ignatieff, 2003, in Bachman & Staerklé, 2008, p.21). There are different theories and concepts that announce to transcend the nation-state citizenship concept, the most prominent being post- and transnational citizenship.

Under the heading of ‘transnational citizenship’, ‘that is announcing a transformation that is related to a changing understanding of nation rather than that of state’, Badar (1997, p.780, in Faist & Gerdes, in Faist, Pitkänen, Gerdes & Reisenauer, 2010, p. 28) proposes a far-reaching ‘disentanglement of democratic citizenship from ethnic languages, history and cultures’, which is considered necessary in order to live up to substantial individual equality and fair democracy. According to Badar, the established ‘color-blind’ institutional framework of liberal democratic states, which grant individual and formal rights irrespective of the identities of persons, is insufficient to fully accommodate ethnic and national minorities because these political cultures are biased in favour of the majority’s ethnicity and religion. Therefore, it argues, group-differentiated rights should be provided as an extension of formal citizenship.

According to Faist & Gerdes (in Faist, Pitkänen, Gerdes & Reisenauer, 2010, p. 2), the concept of post-national citizenship also seems to be predominantly concerned with the nationalist imperatives of nation-states. According to Soysal (1994, in Faist & Gerdes, in Faist, Pitkänen, Gerdes & Reisenauer, 2010, p. 2), ‘post-national citizenship confers upon every person the right and duty of participation in the authority structures and public life of a polity, regardless of their historical and cultural ties to that community’ and ‘rights that used to belong solely to nationals are now extended to foreign populations thereby undermining the very basis of national citizenship.’ ‘The transformation in question might be interpreted
as somewhat analogues to a transformation from ethno-cultural concept of nationhood, which is primarily based on common descent and cultural similarity, toward a civic understanding of political community, where access to membership is essentially derived from residence and the will of the individual persons to join the political community (Faist & Gerdes, in Faist, Pitkänen, Gerdes & Reisenauer, 2010, p. 29). According to the post-national model, this transformation could be explained by making an additional claim which transcends the territorial space of established nation-states, because the sources of this transformation are essentially located outside the nation-state. The first and foremost thesis seems to be that international norms and institutions exert pressure on nation states’ sovereignty toward granting individual rights to migrants (Faist & Gerdes, in Faist, Pitkänen, Gerdes & Reisenauer, 2010, p. 30).

When underpinning their claims regarding citizenship transformation beyond the nation-state, post-national theorists often refer to the European level. Soysal (1994, in Faist & Gerdes, in Faist, Pitkänen, Gerdes & Reisenauer, 2010, p. 31) contends that ‘the most comprehensive legal enactment of a transnational status for migrants is encoded in European Communities law’. The development towards ‘European citizenship’, with the growing importance of supranational legal bodies such as the European Court of Justice is deemed to be effectively limiting the leeway of nation-states. These norms and regulations on the scope of individual rights increasingly also influence matters of immigration and migrants’ rights. Benhabib (in Faist, Pitkänen, Gerdes & Reisenauer, 2010, p. 32) takes the European Union as the ‘primary example to illustrate the increasing influence of cosmopolitan norms, which in terms of human rights constrain the latitude of nation-states’ democratic sovereignty’. With regard to contemporary Europe, Benhabib (2004, in Faist, Pitkänen, Gerdes & Reisenauer, 2010, p. 32) speaks of a ‘disaggregation of citizenship, by which factual trends towards postnational solidarity would be discernable’: ‘The unitary model of citizenship, which combined continuous residency upon a given territory with a shared national identity, the enjoyment of political rights, and subjection to a common administrative jurisdiction, is coming apart. One can have one set of rights but not another: one can have political rights without being a national, as is the case for EU national: more commonly, though, one has social rights and benefits, by virtue of being a foreign worker, without either sharing in the same collective identity or having the privileges of political membership.’
2.6 The paradox: nationalism in a post-national world

The conceptual dilemma that confronts Habermas’ post-national constellation and its echoes in the international realm though, is ‘the sharp discontinuity between existing political wills and cultural self-identities situated in a historically given life-world, and a new, abstract, post-national consciousness’ (Pensky, 2003, p.134). According to Habermas (2001, p.61), under the pressure of de-nationalization, societies constituted as nation-states are ‘opening’ themselves up to an economically driven world society, but interestingly, there is the desirability of a renewed political closure of this global society. Schinkel & Van Houdt (2010, p. 697) also argue that alongside the denationalizing processes, citizenship is also subject to various renationalizing efforts. A renewed interest in ‘active citizenship’ becomes apparent that is strongly coupled to national culture, and to ‘norms and values’ deemed essential to the nation. The context of immigration, the supposed failures of multiculturalism and a renewed interest in national identity form one part of the backdrop of recent changes in the concept of citizenship in the Netherlands (Schinkel & Van Houdt, 2010, p. 697) and other Western European nation-states (Van Houdt, Suvarierol & Schinkel, 2011, p. 408), where it has become a central concept in policy and discourse on ‘immigrant integration’ (Schinkel & Van Houdt, 2010, p.697).

Weil (2011, p.622) argues that it is true that in the European Union immigration rules have been more and more Europeanized, sometimes by courts and in the name of treaties that are difficult for nation-states to abrogate, like for instance the European Convention of Human Rights. But, Weil further argues, Europeanization has been recently trumped by the re-nationalization of citizenship as well. Far from declining, nationalization has been reinforced in the recent treaties of Lisbon and Amsterdam. As article 20 (in Weil, 2011, p.622) stated:

‘Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship in the Union shall be additional to and not replaced by national citizenship’.

The European Constitutional Treaty will likely not be modified for some time and access to European citizenship will therefore remain within the sovereign realm of the member states (Weil, 2011, p.622).

With regard to the national sovereign realm of member states, Western European nation-states adapt to the challenges posed to them by globalization and immigration, by adjusting citizenship criteria for immigrants (Van Houdt et al., 2011, p.408). Citizenship, because of its pivotal position between the individual and the collective level, therefore emerges as one of the crucial elements of population management (Van Houdt et al., 2011,

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² It could be asked to whom this paradox belongs. It is the question whether this is something that is experienced as such by migrants or whether the phenomenon is too complex to be a part of the migrants’ daily lives.
Van Houdt et al. (2011, p.423) consider citizenship to be ‘a crucial technique in the national and international management of populations as formulated in the political programmes of nation-states’. The political programmes of citizenship in relation to immigration and integration in the UK, France and the Netherlands manifest, on the one hand, a ‘neoliberalization’ of citizenship that involves an increased emphasis on the need to earn one’s citizenship and, on the other hand, an increased ‘communitarization’, or in the words of Brubaker (1992, in Van Houdt et al., 2011, p.423) a ‘sacralization’ of the nation in response to immigration, which is of course the perfect opposite of the cosmopolitan thought.

Muhall & Swift (1996, in Schinkel & Van Houdt, 2010, in Van Houdt et al., 2011, p.410) even state that neo-liberalism and communitarianism are the main contemporary strategies of population management in Western Europe. In neoliberalism, the underlying moral image of the individual is one of the autonomous, free, rational and self-regulating citizen who disciplines his nature under the influence of the civilization processes she/he underwent. From a neoliberal strategy, citizens need to become active parties entering contracts between the state, society, markets and citizens (Rose, 1999, p.165, in Van Houdt et al., 2011, p.411). Citizens are called to assume responsibility in regulating themselves, their children and their neighborhoods (Houdt et al., 2011, p.411). According to Dean (1999, p.161, in Schinkel & van Houdt, 2010, p.699), another way of conceptualizing such a form of citizenship in neo-liberal discourse itself is by emphasizing ‘active citizenship’ as participation in various societal spheres.

As mentioned previously, the key issues of communitarianism are community, common values and the commitment of individuals to endorse and defend these values (Etzioni, 2007, p.359, in Van Houdt et al., 2011, p.411). A selective focus on ‘community’ is the way in which cultural assimilationism takes shape in the government of migrant and indigenous populations. Today this ‘governing through community’ (Rose, 1999, in Schinkel & Van Houdt, 2010, p.699) combines with a neo-liberal emphasis on the responsibilization of the individual, the ‘cooperation’ between citizens, state and civil society and a newly conceptualized contractual relationship between citizen and state, called ‘neo-liberal communitarianism’ (Schinkel & Van Houdt, 2010, p.699).

According to Van Houdt et al. (2011, p.412), the striking characteristic of the new citizenship regimes in Western Europe is that citizenship is presented as a form of contract between the prospective citizen and the state. According to this contract, the applicant accepts the responsibilities that need to be undertaken in order to acquire the citizenship in question. Even though it is out of the question for natives and therefore questionable whether it is tenable to require, the individual is only entitled to the status of citizenship together with all the benefits that come with it when all the responsibilities are fulfilled. Closely linked to this contractualization, is the sacralization of citizenship, which means ‘to separate the sacred from the profane by commanding respect for the sacred object due to its privileged status’ (Brubaker, 1992, p.147, in Van Houdt et al, 2011, p.416). It refers to the
criteria that need to be fulfilled which are specifically related to the membership of the nation-state in terms of cultural and moral criteria. These cultural criteria are in turn presented as a precursor to an autonomous functioning individual in society. In demonstrating one’s progress toward citizenship, there is an increased value attached to the national identity and to national values. According to Van Houdt et al. (2011, p.416), the cultural components serve multiple purposes: for testing knowledge of the country, for showing loyalty to the dominant values, and finally for creating an ideal image of the citizen and the contributions he is expected to make to the national community. These emphases point to the communitarian underpinning of earned citizenship. Van Houdt et al. (2011, p.417) argue that in the UK, France and the Netherlands, citizenship has increasingly transformed from a status to be obtained as a result of residence in a particular country to a process of manifesting that the potential citizen is worthy of the citizenship and all the rights and benefits that come with it. As such, the researchers state, ‘the process of earning citizenship is one in which the newcomer bears the responsibilities of citizenship and can only look forward to enjoying the full rights and benefits of citizenship when he succeeds in fulfilling the economic and cultural conditions of membership. Earned citizenship has thus both neoliberal and communitarian underpinnings’ (Van Houdt et al., 2011, p.419).

Although the pluralist perspective was dominant in the Netherlands in the 1980s (Fermin, 2009, p.19, in Schinkel & Van Houdt, 2010, p.701), the Netherlands is now considered a frontrunner when it comes to this culturalization and moralization of citizenship in relation to the sacralization of the community. Since the late 1990s, Dutch discourse on integration has increasingly centered on notions of culture, norms and values and proper definitions of ‘Dutchness’ and of ‘Dutch society’ but also on the defense of social identity and loyalty and commitment to the community and its values (Schinkel, 2007, in Van Houdt et al., 2011, p.418). In 2012, the Dutch government explicitly stated on their website that it wants to limit the ability of underprivileged migrants to come to the Netherlands.

2.7 Neo-liberal communitarianism in the Netherlands
In the 1980s a pluralist perspective was dominant in the Netherlands, wherein the demand to discard one’s original nationality in the process of naturalization was seen as needlessly complicating the process of naturalization. Only basic language skills were required for naturalization at this point (Fermin, 2009, p.19, in Schinkel & Van Houdt, 2010, p.701) and it was assumed that both a strong juridical position in Dutch society and a strong cultural position within minority communities would further socio-economic integration. Accordingly, the states assumed responsibility to support minority groups (Driouichi, 2007, p.20, in Schinkel & Van Houdt, 2010, p.701).

Due to situational factors such as high unemployment among the immigrants and cultural-political factors (Van Houdt et al., 2011, p.415), the 1994 Outline Integration Ethnic Minorities Policy Paper argued though that a new relation between the state and citizens was
needed: the state was stepping back and expected more autonomy and responsibility from citizens and local governments (Driouichi, 2007, p.24, in Schinkel & Van Houdt, 2010, p.701). Minority policy became integration policy at this point. While in the 1980s emancipation was the crucial concept, in the 1994 citizenship became explicitly formulated as the leading principle. Citizenship was considered as a reciprocal process involving rights and duties, an individualized status and the main responsibility of the ‘allochtones’ themselves. These two themes, citizenship and the ability to cope for one self in society, came to dominate future policies (Schinkel & Van Houdt, 2010, p.702). In the Integration Outline, the Dutch government also formulated the need for ‘civic integration contracts’. Together with the new policy path towards decentralization, responsibilization and individualization, it became the context wherein the technique of the contract emerged and regulated the rights and duties of the contracting parties (Van Houdt et al., 2011, p.415). In the same period the 1998 Civic Integration Newcomers Act was formulated, that obliged newcomers to follow a civic integration course, which focused on learning cognitive skills like language (Fermin, 2009, in Schinkel & Van Houdt, 2010, p.702). Besides the individualization and responsibilization with a main focus on socio-economic participation that occurred in the early nineties, Schinkel & Van Houdt (2010, p.702) argue that it is also possible to speak of a culturalization of citizenship in the 1990s. Since the 1990s, citizenship plays a crucial role in the debates concerning integration and culture.

2.8 The assimilationist turn in the Netherlands
From 2000 onwards policy and discourse in the Netherlands made an assimilationist turn, meaning that both the individualized and responsibilized strategy remained, except that now adaptation to cultural values and norms were prioritized (Schinkel & Van Houdt, 2010, p.702). In the period after 2000, it was argued that the problem of integration was closely related to the ongoing influx of new immigrants (Vermeulen, 2007, in Schinkel & Van Houdt, 2010, p.703). Therefore, the Alien Act 2000 was formulated, making it more difficult to gain asylum in the Netherlands. The 2002 Integration in Immigration Perspective Policy Paper emphasized individual responsibility and autonomy alongside Dutch norms and values (Schinkel & Van Houdt, 2010, p.703). In the context of policies of immigrant integration, this meant a shift in emphasis from formal citizenship to moral citizenship (Schinkel & Van Houdt, 2010, p.703). Since the late 1990s, double nationality became a problematized issue in politics but now also in the media (Fermin, 2009, in Van Houdt et al., 2011, p.418). Therefore, in 2003, the 1985 Bill on Dutch Citizenship was amended to include more restrictive and culturalized terms. As a consequence of this, a more extensive naturalization and/civic integration test together with the requirement to renounce the original nationality have been introduced (Van Houdt et al., 2011, p.419).
As was mentioned previously, in 2011, Van Houdt et al. (2011, p.418) argued that the Netherlands was a frontrunner when it comes to the culturalization and moralization of citizenship in relation to the sacralization of community. Dutch citizenship had increasingly become something to be earned while the criteria to earn Dutch citizenship have been extended. Since the late 1990s, Dutch discourse on integration has increasingly centered on notions of culture, norms and values and proper definitions of ‘Dutchness’ and of ‘Dutch society’ but also on the defense of social identity and loyalty and commitment to the community and its values (Schinkel, 2007, in Van Houdt et al., 2011, p.418). At the same time, plans to find out what ‘Dutchness’ actually means, were implemented (Schinkel & Van Houdt, 2010, p.702), which resulted in a ‘Dutch Historical Canon’ and the Dutch National History Museum where these elements were displayed. Also, in 2005 the minister of education asked schools to make explicit what they were going to do about ‘citizenship formation’ in their curricula (Schinkel & Van Houdt, 2010, p.703) and civic education became part of the obligatory Dutch school curriculum (Van Houdt et al., 2011, p.418). The culturalization of citizenship also became visible in the content of the civic integration contracts and the socio-psychological demands placed upon migrants. The influential 2004 policy document ‘Framework of Civic Integration’ formulated by a central-right coalition, reiterates a strong focus on norms and values and national identity (Van Houdt et al., 2011, p.418). It repeated the responsibility of immigrants themselves to fulfill their duty of civic integration (Schinkel & Van Houdt, 2010, p.704).

In 2006, the Civic Integration Abroad Act was passed. It stipulated that alien outsiders are to pass a civic integration course in their own country to get a residence permit for the Netherlands. If a person passes these tests, obligatory civic integration continues upon arrival in the Netherlands (Driouichi, 2007, in Schinkel & Van Houdt, 2010, p.705). Within three years a new exam has to be passed and failing to do so means a fine or a limitation on the duration of legal stay. Immigrants initially have to pay and search for the civic integration courses themselves (Driouichi, 2007, in Van Houdt et al., 2011, p.422). In this 2006 Civic Integration Abroad Act, a distinction is made between Western and non-Western ‘culture’ although this is operationalized in economic success (Spijkerboer, 2007, in Schinkel & Van Houdt, 2010, p.704). Here the operative image is that of the good citizen as a working citizen (Spijkerboer, 2007, in Schinkel & Van Houdt, 2010, p.705). The failure of immigrants to properly participate is explained culturally, which is presented as an individual responsibility and failure. Therefore, non-western immigrants have to ‘close the cultural gap’ (Schinkel, 2008; Spijkerboer, 2007, in Van Houdt et al., 2011, p.422).

While in the former system it was believed that a strong formal citizenship status was necessary for acquiring good or moral citizenship, in recent years this has been turned around: nowadays moral citizenship comes first and afterwards a formal status can be obtained after demonstrating good citizenship. ‘This is expected to be demonstrated by making the effort of following, paying for and passing civic integration tests, or requiring a sufficient level of knowledge of Dutch language, society, norms and values, and pledging
commitment to Dutch society by attending citizenship ceremonies (Schinkel, 2007, in Van Houdt et al., 2011, p.419).

The 2007 Civic Integration Act established new civic integration courses that now contained aspects of identification and emotional feelings of belonging. And while the previous civic integration course was based on an effort obligation, meaning that the immigrant had to put some effort in the course but the result was inconsequential, the new civic integration is based on a result obligation, which means the immigrant has to pass all tests (Schinkel 2010; Vermeulen, 2007, in Schinkel & Van Houdt, 2010, p.705). The content of the courses also changed: one has to earn Dutch citizenship by showing knowledge of Dutch norms and values and political institutions. As a consequence of the new path taken, earning citizenship in relation to contractualization and sacralization in the Netherlands therefore means more demands are placed on immigrants in the Netherlands, immigrants are made responsible for their own integration, more and several penalties are made possible and there is a strong emphasis on culture (Van Houdt et al., 2011, p.422).

In 2009, the Dutch Cabinet emphasizes in their Integration note (p.12) that citizenship ‘begins with the participation of every citizen: an independent life for themselves, through self-reliance and by the knowing and applying rules of Dutch society. Citizenship thus relies on active participation in all relevant aspects of society: the labor market, education, own neighborhood and environment, protecting and maintaining the democratic rule of law, by educating children to responsible citizens, by being involved in fellow citizens and respecting their rights. The proficiency of the Dutch language is an essential condition to be able to participate as an active citizen in Dutch society. A requirement for citizenship is also that the citizen needs to feel like a citizen to the Dutch society, identifies with it, feels responsible for it and wants to be a part of it’.

Schinkel & Van Houdt (2010, p. 702-703) argue that several concerns have contributed to this rise of assimilationism since 2000. First, the critique on the welfare state, given the overrepresentation of members of minority groups in social security benefits, focused particularly on such groups. Second, there was a more general western European move towards assimilationism, particularly vis-à-vis Muslim minorities. And third, popular and scientific concern about the representation of ‘allochtones’ in statistics of unemployment, crime and school drop-outs, incidents like 9/11, the rise of politician Fortuyn, and the murder of Theo van Gogh are relevant in understanding these changes in the Netherlands.

While this might be a relatively new phenomenon in the Netherlands, this is already quite common in other countries, as is shown by patriotism in the USA for instance. See for example the research of Weber (2013). It is therefore questionable whether our system will be heading in the same direction.
2.9 Current developments in the Netherlands

In their 2011 press release ‘The government believes that Dutch society and the values it is based on should be central to integration policy’, the Dutch National Government emphasized that ‘people who wish to live in the Netherlands are expected to contribute to social cohesion and demonstrate involvement and citizenship. The Dutch National Government thinks it is legitimate to impose requirements on immigrants because society places the same demands on its own citizens. With this change of course, the government is distancing itself from the relativism embedded in the model of the multicultural society.’

In their press release, the Dutch National Government further argues that the integration policy takes as its starting point a society which is changing, partly due to the influence of migrants, but is not interchangeable with any other. The government believes as well that ‘integration policy with a more mandatory character is needed to prevent fragmentation and segregation in society, which would ultimately result in no-one feeling at home in the Netherlands’. Integration, according to Mr. Donner, is not the responsibility of the public authorities but rather of those who decide to settle in the Netherlands. Every citizen is expected to contribute to Dutch society by taking responsibility for their subsistence, for their living environment and for society as a whole. For instance, immigrants are expected to learn the language and learn about Dutch society (Dutch National Government, 2011). Also, integration policies will no longer target specific migrant groups. Anti-social and criminal behavior will be combated without regard for ethnic origin. Mr. Donner assumes that ‘the general labour market, education and housing policies enable all citizens to build a life for themselves in accordance with their ability’. The press release sets out the following measures in the area of integration, engagement and citizenship: ‘the Civic Integration Act will be amended and made more rigorous, grants and measures for the integration of specific groups will be terminated and incorporated in general integration policy, a bill dealing with forced marriage under criminal law will be introduced, and prevention of forced marriage will be made a priority, bill will be introduced banning face coverings in public and a common agenda for modern citizenship will be drawn up in cooperation with municipalities, civil society organizations and citizens’.

In 2012, the Dutch government explicitly stated on their website that it wants to limit the ability of underprivileged migrants to come to the Netherlands. Migrants that want to stay in the Netherlands for a period longer than three months, have to meet several requirements. Migrants from outside the EU who want to stay in the Netherlands because of employment, education or family, need to apply for a temporary resident permit (MVV) in their home country. They are only eligible when they meet certain conditions. For instance, immigrants who come to the Netherlands because of family reunification need to have sufficient income and adequate knowledge of the Dutch language and country. They have to pass a basis examination in their home country as well to show that their knowledge is sufficient. Immigrants that want to study in the Netherlands need to be able to pay for it themselves too. Once a MVV is obtained, they are allowed to come to the Netherlands.
though, but once they are in the Netherlands, they have to apply for a residence permit for a fixed time, which is valid for one year. If the immigrant still meets the conditions a year later, the permit will be prolonged. After five years, the immigrant can apply for a residence permit for an indefinite time. When the reasons to apply for a MVV concern work, study or family, the fees -cost of processing the application- have to be paid for (Government of the Netherlands, 2012). To obtain a MVV, the migrant has to demonstrate that he is able to maintain in his own livelihood, own a valid identity document, be able to demonstrate that he has no criminal record and if the applicant previously resided in the Netherlands illegally or committed fraud, he is not permitted provision at all. In addition, the Dutch Cabinet wants to offer more chances to foreign talent, who are able to contribute to the Dutch economy, science or culture. For this group of ‘knowledge migrants’, regulations will be eased (idem).

2.10 Culturalization of citizenship and polarization

Despite the above described developments concerning citizenship and integration policies, according to the Dutch National Government (2009, p.1) ‘It appears time and time again that many Dutch do not experience ethnic and cultural diversity as enrichment, but as a threat. For almost twenty years, about half of the Dutch think that too many people of different nationalities are living in the Netherlands’. According to Tonkens, Hurenkamp and Duyvendak (2009, p. 4), especially the value gap between Muslim groups and the majority population is bigger in the Netherlands than in other countries. The majority-immigrant distance in value orientations is higher in the Netherlands than in Germany on such dimensions as community spirit, equality in gender roles, and sexuality. In their research, which I will summarize below, Tonkens et al. (2009) relate this polarization to the process of the culturalization of citizenship.

In their research, Tonkens et al. (2009, p.5) use the term ‘culturalization of citizenship’ to describe:

‘a process in which more meaning is attached to cultural participation (in terms of norms, values, practices and traditions), either as alternative or in addition to citizenship as rights and socio-economic participation’.

Tonkens et al. (2009, p.5-7) discern four forms of culturalization along two axes: functional versus emotive and restorative versus constructivist. The restorative culturalization centers on the ambition to re-establish national culture and identity through rather thick notions of citizenship. A functional restorative culturalization of citizenship is built on the idea that citizens have to adapt to certain core values and preferably confess their engagement to their ideals. It stresses the nation, resemblance and shared values between citizens rather than that of the city or neighborhood reciprocity, and practical cooperation on matters of common interest as entries to a shared identity. Most of the elements that ignite the ongoing and
heated debates in the Netherlands can be traced back to the restorative approach, particularly the emotive variant. It emphasizes the need for feelings of loyalty to the national state, demands feelings of loyalty and belonging from immigrants, and proof of such feelings (idem).

According to a constructivist culturalization, culture is not something that can be uncovered and conserved, and to which newcomers can only adapt. Rather, it is a dynamic concept and even though culture has traditions and a history, it is changing and its contents are essentially contested by various groups. It is made, rather than found, by democratic processes as well as in everyday exchanges between citizens. This approach concentrates on rethinking existing practices in light of their binding and dividing consequences. Emotive constructivist culturalization looks at experiences and feelings of citizens and the degree to which they are shared, and to what degree this sharing culminates in participation and institutions. It entails question like when and where citizens feel at home, and what signifies their idea of a collective identity, without prescribing the questions at forehand (idem).

Interestingly, with respect to emotive culturalization, Tonkens et al. (2009, p.11-15) found that national identification among native Dutch is strong and of a restorative character: it has to do with something already present, although it was hard for them to define what it really meant to be ‘Dutch’. According to the researchers, this restorative notion of national identity excludes migrants, particularly because it is hardly related to everyday events or experiences which they could join. ‘Not surprisingly’, according to the researchers, migrants did not claim to feel Dutch: they do not have the power to define it themselves, and the way it was defined by the native Dutch does not invite them to join in. The national scale in general was met with a shrug among migrants. Respondents with a migrant background would not come up spontaneously with strong emotions attached to the Netherlands and found it hard to connect events in their daily lives to it. However, Tonkens et al. also asked the participants about local identification that presented an almost reversed picture. To city identities like ‘Amsterdamer’, the native Dutch attached less meaning. Even when one still lives in the city where one is born, native Dutch see the local level as far less emotionally meaningful than the national level. Many native Dutch like the city where they live, but they present it more functional than emotional. The fact that the native born do not claim the city so much as theirs, may create room for migrants to develop and express feelings of identification there, what in fact they did. The emotional side to this local citizenship has often to do with family: one belong to the city because one’s family lives there, because one’s children are born there or sometimes because it was the first place where one was welcomed after having fled a country of origin.

Tonkens et al. (2009, p.16) argue that these results show a polarization in a ‘painfully pure form’: when natives find refugee in a restorative emotive culturalization, migrants can either react humble by trying the constructivist approach at the local level or they take the more easy way of restorative emotional culturalization as well – but they can only do so by taking refuge in the culture and/or religion of their origin.
An interesting empirical result of this culturalization of citizenship can be found in the high number of transmigration of Somalis in the Netherlands. One third of the Somalis moved to the UK soon after having obtained Dutch citizenship (Van Liempt, 2011, p.581). Research showed that an important reason for the Somalis to move to the UK was the experience of the Netherlands as a country where you have to assimilate and where you are not allowed to enjoy your own culture. Also, the Somalis that migrated to the UK indicated that they have experienced institutional and political exclusion in the Netherlands, something that citizenship is theoretically supposed to resolve (Van Liempt, 2011, p. 571-580).

So, the research of Tonkens et al. (2009) and the high number of Somali transmigration show that there seem to be relations between the experience of post-national, national and local citizenship. When restorative, culturalized notions of citizenship exclude migrants from identifying with the level of the nation, migrants either react by identifying on the level of the local or by taking refuge in their own culture or religion of origin. Moreover, the Somalis show that there seems to be a relation with post-national citizenship as well. The high number of transmigration also shows that the relationship between citizenship and belonging is not as straightforward as is often assumed and neglects the ways in which immigrants experience citizenship (Van Liempt, 2011, p.580). In this research, the above discussion serves as a reason to explore how citizenship is experienced by Somali migrants, with regard to the post-national, national and local level of citizenship. I will come back to this in the empirical part of this thesis. The relevant concepts and their relations can be visualized as follows:

![Figure 1 Visualization of research concepts](image-url)
3. Methodology

As is mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, the content of this thesis is twofold, with a theoretical and empirical part. The starting point of the preceding theoretical part was the weakness of European research that is pointed out by Penninx. Many scholars still take the level of the nation as a starting point for citizenship and integration studies (e.g. Penninx 2008, Bachmann & Staerklé, 2003; Faist et al., 2010), while research shows that it becomes increasingly important to take into consideration the supranational (e.g. Faist et al., 2010; Penninx, 2008; Penninx, 2012) as well as the local level (e.g. Tonkens et al., 2009; Ludwinek, 2012). The aim of the theoretical part was therefore to describe the concept of citizenship -in relation to integration- during the globalization era, at the supranational, national as well as local level. This description has shown relations between the different levels. The reader has now arrived at the empirical part of this thesis, wherein these three theoretical levels of analysis will be used as a research framework and wherein the migrant attitude with regard to citizenship is pivotal.

3.1 Explanatory study

Saunders et al. (2009, p.140) warn that ‘descriptive research should be thought of as a means to an end rather than an end in itself. This means that if your research project utilizes description it is likely to be a precursor to explanation’. Descriptive research is therefore often a forerunner to explanatory research, what in this thesis is the empirical part. The starting point of this empirical part is Penninx (2008, p.13) suggestion to

‘Analyze migrant attitudes, ties and practices with regard to citizenship’.

By using the three levels mentioned by Penninx as a framework, the citizenship attitude of Somali women who live in the Netherlands, together with the Somali migration history will be used to explain the high number of transmigration and the present state of Somali integration in the Dutch society.

Although this research is quantitative as well as qualitative, considering my aim to ‘understand how the people being studied understand and interpret their social reality’ (Bryman, 1988, 8, in Ritchie & Lewis, 2003, p.3) and the nature of my research questions, it is mainly qualitative. According to Miles & Huberman (1994 in Parker, 2004, in Miglić, 2011, p.58), ‘qualitative studies can provide answers to humanistic questions like ‘why’ and ‘how’ and enable a researcher to study a phenomenon in natural settings, with real people’. Qualitative research ‘goes beyond positivistic findings of a quantitative study and helps a researcher to study phenomena more deeply and to widen holistic and ‘contextually informed’ understanding of how and why things happen as they do’ (idem). In the next
paragraph I will elaborate on what qualitative research entails and what it means for the formulation of general laws, where after I will elaborate on quantitative data shortly.

3.2 Qualitative research

‘Predictive theories and universals cannot be found in the study of human affairs. Concrete, context-dependent knowledge is, therefore, more valuable than the vain search for predictive theories and universals’.
Flyvbjerg (2006, p.224)

According to Flick (2009, p.13) traditionally, social science has taken natural science and their exactness as a model, paying particular attention to developing quantitative and standardized methods. Guiding principles of research and planning research have been used to create research designs allowing the generalization of findings and the formulation of general laws. Bonß and Hartman (1985, p.21, in Flick, 2009, p.14) argue though that ‘… we can no longer unreflectively start from the notion of objectively true sentences. What remains is the possibility of statements which are related to subjects and situations… To formulate such subject- and situation-related statements, is a goal which can be attained with qualitative research’.

According to Flick (2009, p.12), the interest in qualitative research has grown much during the last few decades. He argues that ‘qualitative research is of specific relevance to the study of social relations, due to the fact of the pluralization of life worlds, which requires a new sensitivity to the empirical study of issues’. Advocates of postmodernism have argued that ‘the era of theories is over: locally, temporarily and situational limited narratives are now required’ (Flick, 2009, p.12). According to Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004, p.18, in Miglić, 2011, p.58), ‘time or context free generalizations are not only impossible, but also undesirable. Namely, ‘the researcher, or ‘the subjective knower’, is the only source of information and ‘reality’ cannot be value-free since human beings are subdued to subjectivity and can never be resistant to values and judgments’ (Miglić, 2011, p.58).

Qualitative research is therefore defined as a ‘situated activity that locates the observer in the world. It consists of a set of interpretative, material practices that makes the world visible. These practices turn the world into a series of representations including field notes, interviews, conversations, photographs, recordings and memos to the self. At this level, qualitative research involves an interpretative, naturalistic approach to the world. This means that qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or to interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them’ (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000, p.3, in Ritchie & Lewis, 2003, p.2). According to Ritchie & Lewis (2003, p.7), Wilhem Dilthey, who was a key contributor to the development of qualitative research, emphasized the importance of ‘understanding’ and of studying people’s ‘lived experiences’ which occur within a particular historical and social context. Max Weber, who was influenced by Dilthey, tried to build a bridge between Dilthey’s ‘interpretivist’ stand and
natural sciences’ positivism. Weber recognized the importance of the analysis of material conditions that was stressed by positivism, but pointed out the need for researchers to understand the meaning of social actions within the context of the material conditions in which people live (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003, p.7). ‘Weber argued that there is a difference in the purpose of understanding between the natural and social sciences. In the natural science, the purpose is to produce law-like propositions, whereas in the social science, the aim is to understand subjectively meaningful experiences’ (idem). So, ‘the interrelatedness of different aspects of different aspects of people’s lives is a very important focus of qualitative research and psychological, social, historical and cultural factors are all recognized as playing an important part in shaping people’s understanding of their world’. Ritchie & Lewis (2003, p.7) state that ‘qualitative research practice has reflected this aim in the use of methods which attempt to provide a holistic understanding of research participants’ views and actions in the context of their lives overall’.

Tashakkori and Teddlie (2003, in Saunders et al., 2009, p.153) argue that ‘one major advantage in using multiple of these qualitative research methods in the same research project, is that the different methods can be used for different purposes in a study’. Since my research knows a descriptive and explanatory purpose, multiple methods are needed. I chose to use a literature study, semi-structured interviews and participant observation. Besides the usefulness of the multiple methods in providing better opportunities to answer my research questions, they also ‘allow the researcher to better evaluate the extent to which research findings can be trusted’ (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003, in Saunders et al., 2009, p.153). Denzin & Lincoln (2005, p.5) note that this use of multiple methods, or triangulation, ‘reflects an attempt to secure an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon in question’, even though ‘reality can never be captured’. In the following paragraphs, I will elaborate on the various techniques that I will use.

3.3 Quantitative research
According to Saunders et al. (2009, p.414), virtually all research you undertake is likely to involve some numerical data or contains data that could usefully be quantified. Quantitative data refers to all such data and can be a product of all research strategies. Saunders et al. further argue that quantitative data can range from simple counts to more complex data and these data need to be analyzed and interpreted, in order to be useful. In this research, the quantitative data was the result of the literature study and it mainly had a descriptive purpose. In order to be useful, the quantitative data were related to qualitative data as well.

3.4 Case study
In social science, according to Flyvbjerg (1996, p.224), there does not and probably cannot exist predictive theory. Social science has not succeeded in producing general, context-independent theory and thus, has in the final instance nothing else to offer than concrete, context-dependent knowledge. In producing this knowledge, the case study is especially
well suited. Flyvbjerg (1996, p.223) emphasizes that the closeness of the case study to real-life situations and its multiple wealth of details are important for the development of a nuanced view of reality, including the view that human behavior cannot be meaningfully understood as simply the rule-governed acts found in much theory. Therefore, as opposed to the experimental research strategy, wherein research is undertaken within a highly controlled context (Saunders et al., 2009, p.146), a case study is ‘a strategy for doing research which involves an empirical investigation of a particular contemporary phenomenon within its real life context using multiple sources of evidence’ (Robson, 2002, p.178, in Saunders et al., 2009, p. 145). The importance of a context is also highlighted by Yin (2003, in Saunders et al., 2009, p.146), who adds that ‘within a case study, the boundaries between the phenomenon being studied and the context within which it is being studied are not clearly evident’. According to Morris and Wood (1991, in Saunders et al., 2009, p.146), ‘the case study is of particular interest if you wish to gain a rich understanding of the context of the research and the processes being enacted’. Saunders et al. (2009, p.146) add that ‘the case study strategy also has considerable ability to generate answers to ‘why?’ ‘how?’ and ‘what?’ questions and therefore the case study strategy is most often used in explanatory research. The data collection techniques employed may be various and are likely to be used in combination’.

3.5 Literature study
In order to ‘provide the foundation on which my research is built’ (Saunders et al., 2009, p.61) and to ‘develop a good understanding and insight into relevant previous research and the trends that have emerged’ (idem), I have conducted a literature study before and during my empirical research. Flick (2009, p.49) notes that instead of using the existing literature to derive hypothesis, as in quantitative research, in qualitative research literature is used to gain insights and information as context knowledge, which you use to see statements and observations in your research in their context. With the writing of my literature review, I was aiming to ‘link the different ideas that I have found in the literature to form a coherent and cohesive argument, which sets in context and justified my research’, as advised by Saunders et al. (2009, p.66). The literature that I have read consisted mainly out of articles from refereed academic journals and books. Attending the EU symposium ‘From isolation to multi-level integration’ seemed particularly inspiring for my literature study, guiding me to relevant authors and literature.

3.6 Purposive sampling
According to Saunders et al. (2009, p.210), ‘sampling techniques provide a range of methods that enable you to reduce the amount of data you need to collect by considering only data from a sub-group rather than all possible cases or elements’. Since the probability of each case being selected from the total population is not known in my research and since it is impossible to answer research questions that require me to make statistical inferences about the characteristics of the population, non-probability sampling would be applicable in my
research. Non-probability sampling provides a range of techniques to select samples based on subjective judgment. Despite the lack of statistical grounds, it would still enable me to generalize from non-probability samples to the population (Saunders et al., 2009, p.213).

Saunders et al. (2009, p.233) emphasize that for all non-probability techniques, the issue of sample size is ambiguous and there are no rules to follow: ‘rather the logical relationship between your sample selection technique and the purpose and focus of your research is important’. ‘Consequently, your sample size is dependent on your research question(s) and objectives – in particular, what you need to find out, what will be useful, what will have credibility and what can be done within your available recourses’ (Pattan, 2002, in Saunders et al., 2009, p.234). Saunders et al. (2009, p.234) add that ‘this is particularly so where you are intending to collect qualitative data using interviews’. Although Patton (2002, in Saunders et al., 2009, p.235) argues that the validity, understanding and insights that you will gain from your data will be more to do with your data collection and analysis skills than with the size of your sample, Saunders et al. (2009, p.235) add that ‘it is possible to offer guidance as to the sample size to ensure you have conducted sufficient interviews. Many research text books recommend continuing to collect qualitative data until data saturation is reached: in other words until the additional data collected provides few, if any, new insights’.

Since it enables me to use my own judgment in selecting cases that will enable me to answer my research questions best, I chose to use purposive sampling (Saunders et al., 2009, p.237). According to Neuman (2005, in Saunders et al., 2009, p.239), this form of sample is often used when working with very small samples such as in a case study research and when you wish to select cases that are particularly informative. Denscombe (2010, p.34) notes that purposive sampling operates on the principle that a researcher can get the best information through focusing on relatively small number of instances deliberately selected on the basis of their known attributes. However, ‘such samples cannot be considered to be statistically representative of the total population. The logic on which you base your strategy for selecting cases for a purposive sample should be dependent on your research questions and objectives’. Patton (2002, in Saunders et al., 2009, p.239) emphasizes the need to select information-rich cases in purpose sampling. According to Denscombe (2010, p.34), purposive sampling works where the researcher already knows something about the specific people and deliberately selects particular ones because they are seen as instances that are likely to produce the most valuable data.

The HIRDA internship provided me with the opportunity to select ‘information-rich cases’ of which I already knew ‘something’ and who were particularly informative according to my personal judgement. Information-rich means to me that the Somali women are actively involved in the Somali community, with Somali women in particular, and therefore have an aiding role in a Somali migrant organization and were additionally well aware of Dutch politics. Besides my internship, the symposia that I have attended at Araweelo and Interlokaal were also helpful. During the symposia, that attract especially Somali women who are
actively involved in the community in the first place, I approached women that seemed ‘information-rich’ to me, had a social talk and decided to invite them or not to participate in my research.

Eight Somali female key-figures were selected to participate in this research. Actually getting to speak to these women turned out to be quite troublesome sometimes though. I have experienced several times that when an appointment was made and when I called the women in question, she did not answer her phone and did not reply my call later on, even when I tried it several times. Eventually I decided to exclude them from my research. As a result, I have actually interviewed five women. Fortunately, they were willing to speak to me and provide me with a lot of information.

I have interviewed one woman at her workplace in the north of Netherlands, two women at the HIRD A office and two women by telephone. I will come back to this in the following paragraph and in the methodology reflections.

3.7 Semi-structured interviews

Interviewing ‘… is about listening. It is about paying attention. It is about being open to hear what people have to say. It is about being nonjudgmental. It is about creating a comfortable environment for people to share. It is about being careful and systematic with the things people tell you’ Longhurst (2010, in Clifford, French & Valentine, 2010, p.103)

According to Longhurst (2010, in Clifford et al., p.103) talking with people is an excellent way of gathering information. Semi-structured interviews thereby are about talking with people but in ways that are self-conscious, orderly and partially structured. According to Saunders et al. (2009, p.318), interviews can help to gather valid and reliable data that are relevant to your research questions and objectives and they vary in the degree to which they are structured and formalized (Saunders et al., p.320). ‘Standardized or structured interviews follow a predetermined list of questions, which are always asked in almost the same way and in the same order. At the other end of the continuum are unstructured forms of interviewing, wherein the conversation is actually directed by the informant rather than by the set of questions. In the middle of this continuum are semi-structured interviews, which have some degree of predetermined order but still ensures flexibility in the way issues are addressed by the informant’ (Longhurst, 2010, in Clifford et al., 2010, p.105).

In semi-structured interviews the researcher therefore will have a list of themes and questions to be covered, although these may vary from interview to interview. The order of question may be varied depending on the flow of the conversation and questions may be omitted or added in particular interviews (Saunders et al., 2009, p.320). Saunders et al. (2009, p.324) thereby argue that ‘semi-structured interviews provide you with the opportunity to probe answers, where you want your interviewees to explain, or build on, their responses. This is of course important when you will be concerned to understand the meanings that participants ascribe to various phenomena. Interviewees may use words or ideas in a particular way, and the opportunity to probe these meaning will add significance and depth
to the data you obtain’. Finally, semi-structured interviews may also lead the discussion into areas that you had not previously considered but which are significant for your understanding. The result should be that you are able to collect a rich and detailed set of data (Silverman, 2007, in Saunders et al., 2009, p.324).

The themes that I am aiming to discuss in my interviews are:

- The migration story of the interviewee
- Her perception of the integration of Somalis (Somali women in particular) in the Netherlands
- Her perception of national citizenship
- Her perception of local identification
- Her perception of post-national (EU) citizenship/transmigration to the UK

The semi-structured interviews that I will conduct will be mainly face to face, but also by telephone. According to Opdenakker (2006, p.3) face to face interviews takes its advantage of social cues, such as voice, intonation, body language etc. These cues can give the interviewer extra information that can be added to the verbal answer of the interviewee on a question. And ‘since there is no significant time delay between the question and the answer, the interviewer can directly react on what the other says or does. An advantage of this synchronous communication is that the answer of the interviewee is more spontaneous, without an extended reflection’ (Opdenakker, 2006, p.3). Face to face interviewing also has the advantage that the interviewer has the possibility to create a good interview ambiance. Finally, this interview method has as an advantage that termination of the interview is easy, since in the interaction enough clues can be provided that the end of the interview is coming, by for example turning of the tape recorder (Opdenakker, 2006, p.3).

Compared to face-to-face interviews, interviews by telephone have the major advantage of the extended access to participants, due to the asynchronous communication of place (Opdenakker, 2006, p.4). According to Saunders et al. (2009, p.349), ‘attempting to conduct non-standardized interviews by telephone may offer potential advantages with access, speed and lower cost. This method may allow you to make contact with participants with whom it would be impractical to conduct an interview on face-to-face basis because of the distance and prohibitive costs involved and time required’. I chose to conduct a share of my interviews by telephone, namely the ones following the symposia that I have attended, because of the practical side of it. Between the interviewees in question and me, there was a large distance between our residencies, so it saved me significant amounts of time and costs to speak to them by telephone.
3.8 Participant observation

Although it might be less important to this thesis than the literature study and semi-structured interviews, I did get the chance to observe as participant. The 6 months HIRDA internship provided me with the opportunity to participate in the activities of those who were interesting to my research: Somali women. As I have mentioned previously, besides this internship, I have attended two symposia that were organized by the Somali community, one at Amsterdam and another in Nijmegen. The first, which was partially led by Yasmine Allas, focused especially on the problems concerning the integration of Somali women. The second was concerned with the integration of Somalis in the Netherlands in general. Additionally, I have attended a symposium that was about the integration of third country nationals in the EU. The results of the attendance of these symposia can be found in appendices I till III.

According to Saunders et al. (2009, p.288), observation is a somewhat neglected aspect of research, although ‘it can be rewarding and enlightening to pursue and, what is more, add considerably to the richness of your research data’. Participant observation is qualitative and derives from the work of social anthropology early in the 20th century. According to Gill and Johnson (2002, p.144, in Saunders et al., 2009, p.290) ‘Participant observation is where the researcher attempts to participate fully in the lives and activities of subjects and thus becomes a member of their group, organization or community. This enables researchers to share their experiences by not merely observing what is happening but also feeling it’. Delbridge and Kirkpatrick (1994, in Saunders et al., 2009, p.290) state that it implies ‘immersion (by the researcher) in the research setting, with the objective of sharing in peoples’ lives while attempting to learn their symbolic world’. The type of data that will be generated through my participant observation will be mostly experimental, which are the data on my perceptions and feelings as I experience the process I am researching. According to Saunders et al. (2009, p.296), this may also include notes on how the researcher feels that his values have intervened, or changed, over the research process.

3.9 Data analysis

‘The more ambiguous and elastic our concepts’, according to Dey (1993, p.28, in Saunders et al., 2009, p.482), ‘the less possible it is to quantify our data in a meaningful way’. According to Robson (2002, in Saunders et al., 2009, p.482), ‘qualitative data are associated with such concepts and are characterized by the richness and fullness based on your opportunity to explore a subject in a real manner as is possible’. In addition, Dey (1993, in Saunders et al., 2009, p.482) and Robson (2002, in Saunders et al., 2009, p.482) notes that ‘a contrast can be drawn between the ‘thin’ abstraction or description that results from quantitative data collection and the ‘thick’ or ‘thorough’ abstraction or description associated with qualitative data’.
Since I will use existing theory to shape the approach that I will use to the qualitative research process and to aspects of data analysis, I am using a deductive approach (Yin, 2003, in Saunders et al., 2009, p.489). Yin (2003, in Saunders et al., 2009, p.489) suggests that ‘where you have made use of existing theory to formulate your research question and objectives’, which I did, ‘you may also use the theoretical propositions that helped you do this to as a means to devise a framework to help you to organize and direct your data analysis’. Doing this might have advantages, as it will link your research into the existing body of knowledge in the subject area, help you to get started and provide you with an analytical framework. ‘To devise a theoretical or descriptive framework you need to identify the main variables, components, themes and issues in your research project and the predicted or presumed relationship between them’ (Yin, 2003, in Saunders et al., 2009, p.490), which I will do through the theoretical part of my thesis.

According to Saunders et al. (2009, p.490), there is no standardized procedure for analyzing qualitative data. One of the three main processes they describe consists out of summarizing data, after you have written up notes, an interview or observation session. ‘This summary will compress long statements into briefer statements in which the main sense of what has been said or observed is rephrased in a few words’ (Kvale, 1996, in Saunders et al., 2009, p.491). In order to ‘become conversant with the principal themes that have emerged from the interview or observation and how you would like to explore these further in forthcoming data collection sessions’ (Saunders et al., 2009, p.493), I will summarize my notes and interviews. Summarizing, Saunders et al. (2009, p.492) argue further, may also enable the researcher to identify apparent relationships between themes that you wish to note down so that you can return to these to establish their validity.

3.10 Methodology reflections

‘The observer is the observed…’
Krishnamurti

With qualitative research in general, as I have mentioned in the first paragraph of this chapter, Denzin & Lincoln (2005, p.5) noted that a researcher attempts to create an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon in question, even though ‘objective reality can never be captured’ and ‘we know a thing only through its representations’. Likewise, I am not aiming to capture any kind of objective reality in this research. I am aware of the subjectivity of my research, which I tried to reduce by using multiple methods, which is described by Flick (2002, p.227, in Denzin & Lincoln 2009, p.5) as ‘not a tool or strategy of validation, but an alternative of validation’ and ‘the combination of multiple methodological practices, empirical materials, perspectives, and observers in a study is best understood then as a strategy that adds rigor, breath, complexity, richness and depth to an inquiry’.
With regard to single case studies, Flick (2009, p.134) notes that ‘concentration on one case often leads to problems of generalization’. He adds that this could be repaired by doing a series of case studies. Saunders et al. (2009, p.146) also argue that a rationale for using multiple cases focuses upon the need to establish whether the findings of the first case occur in other cases and, as a consequence, the need to generalize from these findings. Yin (2003, in Saunders et al., 2009, p.147) therefore argues that multiple case studies may be preferable to a single case study.

‘One can often generalize on the basis of a single case, and the case study may be central to scientific development via generalization as supplement or alternative to other methods. But formal generalization is overvalued as a source of scientific development, whereas “the force of example” is underestimated’

Flyvbjerg (2006, p.228)

Although many authors may advise otherwise, I chose to use a single case study, since the Somali migrant group is a unique case with regard to their high number of transmigration and their history of decades of anarchy. It therefore provides me with the opportunity to observe and analyze a phenomenon that few have considered before (Saunders et al., 2009, p.146). I hereby agree with Flyvbjerg (2006, p.227), who argues that formal generalization is only one of many ways by which people gain and accumulate knowledge. That knowledge cannot be formally generalized, as in single case studies, does not mean that it cannot enter into the collective process of knowledge accumulation in a given field or in a society. Therefore, a purely descriptive case study without any attempt to generalize can certainly be of value in this process.

Despite a list of themes to discuss during the interviews, the semi-structured interviews that I have conducted lack a true standardization, like most semi-structured interviews. This lack of standardization may lead to concerns about reliability, which is concerned with whether alternative researchers would reveal similar information (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008; Silverman, 2008, in Saunders et al., 2009, p.326). In the light of my previous notion that I am not trying to capture objective reality, I agree with Marshall and Rossman (1999, in Saunders et al., 2009, p.327) who note that ‘the findings derived from using non-standardized research methods are not necessarily intended to be repeatable since they reflect reality at the time they were collected, in a situation which may be subject to change’. In using non-standardized research methods, it is assumed that the circumstances to be explored are complex and dynamic. The flexibility that the researcher can use to explore the complexity of the topic makes non-standardized interviews particularly valuable. An attempt to ensure that non-standardized research could be replicated by other researchers would therefore not be realistic without undermining the strength of this type of research (Saunders et al., 2009, p.328).
As I have mentioned in previous paragraphs, a share of the semi-structured interviews that I have conducted were by telephone, which might jeopardize the establishing of trust and subsequently to issues of reduced reliability (Saunders et al., 2009, p.349). As mentioned previously though, I have met the women that I have interviewed by telephone at the symposia that I have attended, which means that I have already had face-to-face contact with them before I spoke to them by telephone. This provided me with the opportunity to establish trust in advance. Another advantage with regard to trust and credibility was the fact that I could introduce myself as an intern at HIRDA, which is a well-known and credited organization among Somalis in the Netherlands. Of course, as is mentioned by Opdenakker (2006, p.4) an important disadvantage of communication by telephone is the reduction of social cues, since the interviewer does not see the interviewee, so body language and the like cannot be used as a source of extra information. Despite this, social cues as voice and intonation as of course still available.

Although the ecological validity of participant observation is high because social phenomena are studied in their natural contexts, the greatest threat to the reliability of participant observation is observer bias (Saunders et al., 2009, p.297). Delbridge and Kirkpatrick (in Saunders et al., 2009, p. 297) note that ‘because we are part of the social world we are studying we cannot detach ourselves from it, or for that matter avoid relying on our common sense knowledge and life experiences when we try to interpret it’. Observer bias, according to Saunders et al. (2009, p.297), cannot be avoided, although it was something that I was trying to be aware of.
4. Results: the holistic perspective

In the context of the Dutch integration and participation policies, the integration of the Somalis in the Netherlands could be considered a ‘failure’, as integration is called in several policy articles by the Dutch government. Propositions like these tend to be based on a narrow definition of migration and integration though, focusing solely on the political notions of citizenship and integration statistics. In order to have a holistic perspective on the current integration statistics instead, the migration history and the migrant view on citizenship should be taken into account as well. For migrant groups like the Somalis, it is the history of their country of origin in particular that makes it harder to initiate a new life in the Netherlands, as the following sections will show.

4.1 Brief history of Somalia

Until the middle of the 17th century, Somalia was not recognized as an actual state. Various kin groups, who considered themselves Muslim, ruled the region, until the land was taken over by Europeans (Won Hong, in Miglić, 2012, p.41). During colonization, the European powers divided the territory where different Somali populations were living into five states. The French settled in northern Djibouti, the British merged the southwest with Kenya and founded British Somaliland in the north, the Italians called the area around the current capital Mogadishu Somalia and the western desert ‘the Ogaden’ became part of Ethiopia (MinBuZa, 2011, p.7). After nearly eighty years of colonial experience, Somalis started to express their collective anger against foreign rule, which resulted into organized resistance against their colonizers. The first leader that recruited an army and challenged the colonial presence in Somalia was Sayid Muhamed Abdile Hasan, who demanded that people act against the foreign powers that dominated their land. Although it was little successful, the struggle brought Somalis a step forward in establishing a sovereign state (Won Hong, 2009, p.116).

Achieving independence in Somalia took a long time though. Right after World War II, Somalia was placed under the protection of the United Nations. The UN believed that establishing a state in Somalia would require some time, since the Somali had no experience in self-governance, due to the extensive presence of colonizers in their country (Won Hong, 2009, p. 116). Finally, in July 1960 the British protectorate and Italian Somalia joined as the
Somali Republic (MinBuZa, 2012, p.7). The new republic developed a democratic parliament and the representatives from the two former colonies participated in the process of establishing a democratic government in Somalia. Somalis enjoyed their newly created democratic order and the freedoms that came with it. This period turned out to be brief though, since the government failed to sustain stable institutions (Won Hong, in Miglić, 2012, p.41).

After the first president was killed, General Siad Barre and his cohorts took military action and established a military dictatorship in 1969 (Won Hong, in Miglić, 2012, p.41). They undertook almost immediately attempts to regain the Somali lands on the Kenyan (1963) and Ethiopian (1964) borders. After de-colonization, the ‘pan-Somalia thought’ of ‘all Somalis in one country’ was very vivid. People thought that one country that shared the same language, religion and culture would have fewer problems than its multi-ethnic neighbors in Africa (MinBuZa, 2011, p.7). Therefore, Barre prohibited any reference to clans during his rule (Kleist, 2004, in Miglić, 2011), while at the same time he himself was manipulating clan affiliations and working in advantage of his clan and its members (Lewis, 1994, as cited in Kleist, 2004: 5; Griffiths, 2003: 4, in Miglić, 2012, p.41). Due to his ‘authoritarian socialistic rule’ (CIA, 2011, in Miglić, 2012, p.41) and oppression, numerous Somalis fled the country and sought asylum elsewhere. After the Northern Frontier District became a part of Kenya and inhabitants of French Somaliland decided for their own independent nation-state (Djibouti) (Kleist, 2004, p.5, in Miglić, p.41), Barre engaged in a war against Ethiopian Ogaden in 1977, being partly motivated by the idea of Greater Somalia (Hesse, 2010, p.247, in Miglić, 2012, p.41). Since the following devastating defeat of Somalia, Somali politics fell into a downward spiral of rebellion, repression, militarization and corruption (MinBuZa, 2011, p.7). When two decades of this regime passed, Barre’s rule broke down into the civil war with numerous clan militias fighting and trying to take control over Somalia (Won Hong, 2009, p.117, in Miglić, 2012, p.41).

4.1.1 After the Barre regime

After Barre’s downfall in 1991, a new situation developed. While in the rest of the country the consequent power vacuum let to the re-appearing of armed conflicts, which was accompanied with famine, in the North a unilateral independence was announced by the Republic Somaliland, followed by Puntland in 1998 (MinBuZa, 2011, p.7). The Americans attempted in 1992 to get control over the situation with the intervention force ‘Operation Restore Hope’. According to Lewis (2002, in Van Heelsum, 2011, p.5), the Americans did not take enough time to comprehend the complicated clan relationships and got stuck in contradictions between the warlords Aideed and Ali Mahdi. The operation was considered a total failure in terms of long-term effects, since constant turmoil continued to hurdle economic and social development of the country and creation of effective central government (Van Heelsum & Hessels 2005, p. 2, Kleist, 2004, p. 8, in Miglić, 2012, p.42). When dead bodies of American soldiers were dragged through the streets of Mogadishu by
the troops of Aideed, the US-troops left in 1995. In 1996 Aideed himself got killed in a battle between two Hawiya sub clans (the Habar Gidir and the Abgal). The situation reverted to the pattern of conflicts and lack of safety (Van Heelsum, 2011, p.5).


4.1.2 Somali Islam
One of the basic elements of Somali culture is the Islam. Already in the 7th century the first Muslim communities developed along the coast, conducting trade with the Middle East. Lewis (2002, in Van Heelsum, 2011, p.6) describes how most of the men in traditional nomadic society were ‘waranhel’ (spear carriers) and a minority was involved with religion, the ‘wadads’ or ‘sheiks’. Their task was to educate the youth, to perform weddings, to administrate justice and to give direction to religious life of the community. It is often said that Somalis are traditionally followers of a liberal version of Islam, namely the Sunni Sha’afi School. Although this is indeed true for the majority of Somalis, there have also been several other movements and leaders (sheiks) (MinBuZa, 2011, p.10). Samatar (1992, in Van Heelsum, 2011, p.6) describes two old main streams, the Qadiriya and the Ahmadiya brotherhoods. In the 19th century a new and more puritanical brotherhood developed within the Ahmadiya stream, called the Salihiya. It was led by a national hero - Sayyid Mohammad Abdille Hassan - who started a crusade against the Christian colonizers. Most Somalis adhere to the Qadiriya-stream, which promotes a moderate Islam wherein for instance smoking of tobacco is allowed and worshipping saints and their graves plays an important role. A minority is member of the Salihiya-stream though, which focuses on ‘pure’ religious practice and considers smoking and dancing as improper. Their leader got into contact in Mecca with Wahabi teachers. The Salihiya consider improper clothing or not joining the Friday prayer a reason to exclude someone (Van Heelsum, 2011, p.5).

According to Abdi Elmi (2010, in MinBuZa, p.10), the turnaround to a political involved Islam or ‘Islamism’ is a relatively new phenomenon, that evolved under influences from abroad (Abdi Elmi 2010, p.53, in MinBuZa, 2011, p.10). He thereby refers to the period of ‘Islamic Awakening’ in the Arabic world during the sixties, when some Islamic leaders called for resistance against Western imperialism and for tackling the underdevelopment of Islamic countries. That is how in Somalia, the Ikhwan-school developed, which is related to orthodox movements like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the Salafi School. New religious groups like Al-Shabab and Hizbul-Islam are though radical representatives of this
movement today. Al-Shabab’s interpretation of the Islam is considerably more extreme than the one of for instance the traditional Muslim brotherhood and the majority of the Somali population thinks that this interpretation does not fit their traditions (MinBuZa, 2011, p. 10). Despite lots of communication between Muslims from all countries trough the pilgrimage to Mecca, the high numbers of guest laborers and the trade contact with the Gulf States, religious movements are not simply copied. The movements in Somalia develop in their own ways, and clan membership and the membership of religious streams interact. A sheik would for instance usually find his followers within his own clan or in related clan groupings (Van Heelsum, 2011, p.6).

4.1.3 Somalia after 9/11

After the attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York of 9/11, a new phenomenon became apparent in Somali politics. A number of warlords started to cooperate with the American secret services and the Ethiopian government, to persecute individuals who were supposed to have connections with international terrorism and Al-Qaeda (Lewis 2002, in Van Heelsum, p.6). A bombing at a hotel in Mombasa in 2002 would indicate an African network of terror. According to Abdi Elmi (2010, p.61, in MinBuZa, 2011, p. 11), leaders of Islamic movements felt forced to revise their strategy because of the arrests that were experienced as random. They wondered whether Islamic movements should start fighting against Somali warlords from a jihad or Sharia perspective, since the warlords target certain Islamic movements in particular. In 2005, some Islamic leaders decided to pick up arms against those warlords. In this way, Islamic groupings started to gain direct political power since the beginning of 2006. The old system of Islamic courts, organized on sub-clan level, replaced the absent government in large parts of Mogadishu already for some time. Cooperation developed in the Union of Islamic Courts, and to the relief of the population, this new institution managed to control the fighting militias. With harsh punishments for both bigger and smaller offences, order was more or less restored. The courts were financially supported by the powerful businessmen of Mogadishu and after some time even the harbors and the port re-opened for the first time since 1995. For a short period normal life and trade was possible (Van Heelsum, 2011, p.6). The Union of Islamic Courts was managed by the moderate jurist Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, but two out of the eleven courts were seen as militant by the United States. One of them was managed by Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, who is on the US’ list of suspects of terror (MinBuZa, 2011, p.11).

The US was therefore not content with the situation. Incidents took place at the Southern coast, where US navy ships firing at ‘terrorist cells’ and ‘Al-Qaeda supporters’. In these raids citizens got killed and reports of prisoners who have been interrogated on US vessels appeared in the media. At the same time, the Ethiopian army was send to Mogadishu through an UN resolution to re-establish order. In December 2006 Mogadishu was conquered by the Ethiopian army and the remains of the Yusuf government troops and President Abdullahi Yusuf is reinstalled. The intention was to station a peace force of the
African Union in Mogadishu for six months, but the Ethiopian troops did not manage to withdraw that fast, hindered by incidents (Van Heelsum, 2011, p.6). The Ethiopian president Zenawi states in 2008 that he will not let the Ethiopian troops withdraw before the ‘jihadi’s’ are defeated. Meanwhile, hatred increased among Somalis about this foreign intervention, which they interpreted in terms of the growing contradictions in the world between Muslims and Christians. The supporters for Islamic movements were fueled by these ideas (MinBuZa, 2011, p.11). This political situation that emerged around 2006-2007 caused a humanitarian crisis and a serious peak in the refugee stream. The Red Cross spoke of the worst fighting in 15 years. In April 2007 a UN report showed that 320,000 people fled Mogadishu since February. Moreover, it was nearly impossible for food transports to reach the harbors because of worsening piracy in front of the coast. The withdrawal of Ethiopian troops is rounded off only in January 2009. At the same time the radical Islamic movement of youngsters Al-Shabab advances, after they have chased their rival – the Hizbulla Islam militia – towards the countryside, away from the Southern harbor town Baidoa (MinBuZa, 2010, in MinBuZa, 2011, p.12). In February 2010, Al Shabab concentrates its troops in South Mogadishu and prepares a large offensive on the capital (MinBuZa, 2010, Van Heelsum, 2011, p.7). In December 2010, the cooperation between Al-Shabab and Hizbulla Islam is announced (Van Heelsum, 2011, p.7).

Figure 3 (next page) depicts the Somali political situation on the 24th of March 2011. It shows how the green area ‘Harakut al-Shabaab Mujahideen’ is under control of two Islamic movements, whereby Al-Shabaab uses the name ‘Islamic Emirate of Somalia’. Al-Shabaab/Hizbul Islam strives for a supra national emirate (MinBuZa, 2010, in MinBuZa, 2011, p.12) and it controls most of South and Central Somalia, where it has established its own government, based on strict Sharia laws. People, who do not live according the rules of the Sharia run the risk of being abused, arrested and even killed (Human Rights Watch 2010, in MinBuZa, 2011, p.12). The blue area is controlled by the Temporary Federal Government (TFG). Puntland (grey) and Somaliland (yellow) are autonomous. Al Sunna Wahla Jama’a (ASWJ – blue) is an Islamic Sufi grouping that cooperates with the TFG (MinBuZa, 2011, p.12) and that re-conquered the town Matabaan in Central Somalia (Van Heelsum, 2011, p.7). After 12 years of transitional government, Somalia had its first elections since decades on the 10th of September, 2012. 135 clan elders, who represented a convoluted power-distribution model that compartmentalizes Somalis into four and half clans, have selected 225 members to the new parliament. The new MP in turn have elected a speaker in August and his deputies (African Argument, 2012), and subsequently a president in September (Guardian, 2012). Over 6 men have declared their candidacy for presidency, but only a few had a realistic chance to become the 8th president of the Somali Republic, since its independence (African Argument, 2012).

Although the United Nations viewed the development toward elections as a sign of improving security, the process has been tainted by allegations of bribery and corruption as well (Guardian, 2012). In view of the future with regard to Al-Shabaab, the new president...
Hassan Sheikh Muhamed said: ‘Al-Shabaab is not an ordinary militia like a clan militia. It is an ideology. You cannot fight an ideology only. That is what the government is doing. Military al-Shabaab is defeated; the areas they control are because nobody wants them, but still the ideology is there. We need a multi-faceted war against them.’ With regard to the development of safety in Mogadishu’s he said that ‘If you go through Mogadishu, you can see it is different from 18 months ago. But the question is: how sustainable is this? It is still very fragile’ (Guardian, 2012).

Figure 3 The political situation in Somalia on the 24th of March 2011


4.1.4 Somali migration patterns

Due to the repeated periods of internal war, thousands of Somali have fled their country, which makes them perhaps the most dispersed people in the world. This has led to a complicated settlement pattern including many countries and several continents (Van Heelsum, 2011, p.2). According to Van Heelsum (2011, p.8), most of the Somalis that were driven into exile due to the political instability and periods of violence first fled to neighbouring countries Kenya, Yemen and Ethiopia. In addition, hundreds of thousands of
Somali refugees are scattered across the globe, from North America and Europe to the Middle East and Australia (Gundel, 2002, p.266). In January 2010 the total number of refugees from Somalia was 673,309, and there were 1,550,000 internally displaced persons (UNHCR, in Van Heelsum, 2011, p.8) on a population of 9.3 million Somalis (UN, 2010, in Heelsum, 2011, p.8). Table 1 (next page) shows in which countries refugees are currently settled.

Table 1 Largest Somali population of recognized refugees according to UNHCR (end 2009, in Van Heelsum, 2011, p.8)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>5,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>11,198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>6,096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>58,980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>7,747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>310,280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>*11,068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>7,064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>9,718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>10,636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>8,172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>32,299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>7,112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>161,468</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* From the total number of 26,500 Somalis in the Netherlands, 11,068 persons have a recognized refugee status (UNHCR Yearbook 2009 (http://www.unhcr.org/4ce5327f9.html), in Van Heelsum, 2011, p.8).

The actual Somali refugee population in the countries that are mentioned is actually much higher though, since not every refugee obtains a recognized refugee status (Van Heelsum, 2011, p.8), elude documentation and reside in these countries illegally (Gundel, 2002, p.266). From those registered in Kenya (882,339), 331,570 are living in the refugee camps, 46,351 in cities, while from the majority (504,004) no residence is know (UNHCR 2009, in Van Heelsum, 2011, p.8). The refugee camps are not always a neutral and safe hideaway (Horst, 2004, 2006, in MinBuZa, 2011, p. 14). The dividing lines between clans and religious movements can also be found over there. In the eighties for instance, the members of Siad Barres Darod-clan were more welcomed than members of other clans. Attitudes of government also prone to lack neutrality, for instance the attitude of the Yemeni authorities
that hardened towards Somali refugees after Al-Shabab seemed to associate with Al-Qaeda (Van Heelsum, 2011, p. 10).

Van Heelsum (2011, p.10) argues that besides the dividing lines between clans and religious movements, the refugee camps are overcrowded, there is little to eat and it is nearly impossible to obtain extra income. Surprisingly, although a substantial number of the refugees fled Somalia because of the Islamic groupings, an increasing influence of Islamism is visible the Kenyan camps. Some terrorism experts consider the combination of a hopeless situation, with little prospect for a solution in Somalia itself, and little hope for the improvement of the standard of living in Kenya, as root causes for a potential development towards Islamic fundamentalism (Van Heelsum, 2011, p.10).

Some refugees decided to leave without papers to Nairobi after having stayed one or more years in the camps (Moret et al., 2006, in Van Heelsum, 2011, p.10), because in the slums of Nairobi it is easier to survive, because one can start a little business over there. In this way a sizable Somali community has developed in Nairobi, some of them have managed to get very rich – legally or illegally- (Van Heelsum, 2011, p.10). A minor part of the refugees –usually the better educated or wealthier ones- (Van Heelsum, 2011, p. 10) succeeds in fleeing the region and migrates to West-European countries, the Gulf States and the North of America (MinBuZa, 2011, p.14). Sometimes they succeed to bring money or gold along on their flight, while for others the financial support of family members in safer places is indispensable for the second part of the trip (Van Heelsum, 2011, p.10). For assistance one may need enormous sums of money and often people migrate on another person’s passport (Van Liempt, 2007, in MinBuZa, 2011, p. 14). Most refugees have no knowledge about the country of destination and most of the time the route is decided by the trafficker (MinBuZa, 2011, p.14).

As figure 8 shows, Europe, including the Netherlands, can be reached through almost every country in the region (MinBuZa, 2011, p.14). Escaping eastwards generally leads to a boat tour overseas to Yemen, and access to the Arab World: Saudi Arabia, the Arab Emirates and Egypt. From Egypt the route can continue to Greece or Italy. Through an escape route southward people can end up in Kenya and Tanzania by land, but also further by sea as far as Mozambique and South Africa. Large numbers of refugees stay in the camps in Kenya and northern Tanzania for years. When the refugee has any acquaintances in Ethiopia, they can pass the Kenyan- Ethiopian border and reach Addis Ababa by car, while some go on to Djibouti (Van Heelsum, 2011, p. 11).
After safety is guaranteed, the most important reason to stay somewhere is a possible legal status. Getting work and being able to bring the family together determines whether to stay or proceed to the next location. The UNHCR handbook 2009 (p.50, in Van Heelsum, 2011, p.11) adds a few issues of another nature that may stimulate people to move on, such as detention, illegal entrance, unfair asylum procedures, xenophobia and violation of human rights by the authorities of receiving countries. Though the UNHCR considers return usually as the best option, this is only considered realistic for Somaliland and for South Somalia as utterly unrealistic (Van Heelsum, 2011, p.11).

4.1.5 Somali migration to the Netherlands

According to Van Heelsum (2011), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2011), and Klaver, Poel and Stouten (2010), the influx of Somali refugees into the Netherlands is taking place since the late eighties and had peaks in two periods. The first was between 1992 and 1998 (Van Heelsum, 2011, p.12), when people fled mainly from the North of Somalia, because of the civil war, the fall of the Barre regime and increasing violence (Klaver et al., 2010, p. 7). The second was between 2008 and 2010 (Van Heelsum, 2011, p. 12), with a flow mainly coming from the South of Somalia (Klaver et al., 2010, p.7), especially Mogadishu (Van Heelsum, 2011, p.12). During the years in between there was a constant influx of asylum seekers, and those who received their refugee status had the right to bring their direct family members to the Netherlands (Van Heelsum, 2011, p.12). The first influx of Somalis in the Netherlands reached its highest point in 1995. During Barre’s rule people fled who belonged to clans that were supposed to be antagonistic to his rule, like Isaq and Majerteen. After Barre’s downfall, those who had involved themselves in his reign fled the country, like members of the Darod clan. The border war with Ethiopia caused another increase in refugee numbers. After 2007 there was a second peak, as a consequence of the political situation in the South. During this
period, there were hardly any northerners, because Somaliland is relatively safe (Van Heelsum, 2011, p.13).

According to Moret et al. (2006, in Miglić, 2011, p.56), the peaks were enabled partially by Dutch asylum policies. Until 1994, all asylum seekers were granted a ‘tolerated status’ in the Netherlands, which was formalized in a resident permit on humanitarian grounds. This policy changed in 1996 though, because of the improved conditions in northern Somalia that opened up the possibility to return to that area, depending on the clan and sub-clan affiliations. Due to these changes and the generally blur circumstances in Somalia, the procedure became more complex. Several restrictions were added to the asylum policy since then, intended particularly for the Somalis, ‘which amount to a complex scheme of persons entitled to an asylum policy’ (Moret et al., 2006, p.4, in Miglić, 2011, p.56). Since the Ministry of Foreign Affairs estimated the situation in Somalia as too dangerous, a ‘category-based protection policy’ (Wolf, 2011, p.6, in Miglić, 2011, p.56) was in place from 2006 until 2009, that granted asylum-seekers a residence permit. This category-based protection was abolished in 2009, though granting asylum is still possible on individual grounds (Wolf, 2011, p.7, in Miglić, 2011, p.56). In 2010 the asylum laws became even stricter and it has become more difficult for Somali’s to get a refugee status, but there is still an inflow of refugees into the Netherlands, though less than in 2009. Even when the direct fighting diminishes, there are still people who leave Somalia because of the rule of Islamist courts or to unite with family members who have already migrated earlier (Van Heelsum, 2011, p. 13).

### 4.2 Integration of Somalis in the Netherlands

In 2010, almost 27,000 Somalis were living in the Netherlands (Klaver et al., 2010, p. 8), of which 55 percent were men and 45 percent women (MinBuZa, 2011, p. 22). The Somali population consists of mainly young people: about two out of three Somalis are younger than 30 years. Over four out of ten are even younger than 20 years. Considering the relatively young age of the Somali population, it is not surprising that most of them are not married (Klaver et al., 2010, p.13). Slightly less than 20 percent of the men as well as women are married (MinBuZa, 2011, p. 22). The young age profile is caused by the relatively large share of young asylum seekers and the relatively high birth rate among Somalis in the Netherlands (Klaver et al., 2010, p.13). In 2010, the second generation constituted 27 percent of the total Somali population (MinBuZa, 2011, p.22). The second generation consists mainly out of very young children (younger than ten years) and only recently teenagers can be found among the second generation Somalis. This is not surprising, considering the fact that the first Somalis came to the Netherlands at the end of the eighties (Klaver et al., 2010, p.14).

Research shows that divorces are very common among Somalis who live in the Netherlands, with numbers estimated around the forty percent. Six percent of the Somali population aged 20 years and older is divorced, that is much higher than among other migrant groups. Among the Somali population, there are relatively high numbers of single
person households and single parent families. One fourth of the Somali that migrated to the Netherlands during the last ten years, live in a one parent family (VluchtelingenWerk IntegratieBarometer 2009, in Klaver et al., 2010, p.15). The explanation can be found in the civil war, wherein men joined militias or took a flight, which pulled apart families (Abdulhrman & Tuk, 2006, in Klaver et al., 2010, p.15). Many single mothers with children and youngsters without parents left to Europe (Klaver et al., 2010, p.15).

4.2.1 Education

Figure 5 Level of education of Afghans, Iraqis, Iranians, Somalis and autochthones aged 15-65

As figure 5 shows, Somalis by far have the lowest educational level compared to three other migrant groups and autochthones (MinBuZa, 2011, p.24), what contributes to their particularly vulnerable position (Van Heelsum, 2011, p.13). The majority of the Somalis (58 percent) fall in the category of ‘up to primary school’ (women 64 percent and men 54 percent), which actually means that they never had any education. For native Dutch this percentage is 7 percent, but Somalis also score significantly lower than for instance Afghans (34 percent). The Somali percentage of individuals with a college or university degree is with its 5 percent (men 4 percent and women 5 percent) also significantly lower than among native Dutch (28 percent), Afghans (26 percent), Iraqis (28 percent) and Iranians (41 percent) (MinBuZa, 2011, p.24).

Figure 6 (next page) shows the percentage of young adults aged 18-34, that have acquired a basic qualification that enables them to participate in the Dutch labor market. With its 23 percent, Somalis have the lowest percentage. This means that the educational level of three out of four young Somali adults is insufficient to be able to participate in the Dutch labor market (MinBuZa, 2011, p.26).
With regard to Somali children in primary education, ‘Cito toets’ results show that their scores fall behind compared to those of autochthon children. Research also shows that the share of drop-outs is higher among Somalis (31 percent), compared to Afghan (16 percent), Iraqi (19 percent), Turkish (21 percent) and Moroccan (17 percent) children (SPVA, 2003, in Klaver et al, 2010, p.19).

4.2.2 Labor market
The position of Somalis in the labor market is characterized by high unemployment and high welfare dependency. Related to this, many Somalis have an unfavorable income position (Klaver et al, 2010, p. 20). As figure 7 (next page) shows, in 2011, the unemployment rate of Somalis was higher than that of Iraqis, Iranians and Afghans (Dagevos, 2011, in MinBuZa, 2011, p.27). Where the native Dutch knew an unemployment rate of only 4 percent in 2009, this percentage was 33 percent for Somalis. When categorized in gender, the unemployment rate among Somali women (32 percent) is similar to that of Afghan women (32 percent) and lower than that of Iraqi women (42 percent) (MinBuZa, 2011, p.27).

As figure 7 also shows, the Somali unemployment rate decreases when Somali enjoy a higher level of education and as they live longer in the Netherlands. As the table shows, 47 percent of the Somalis who live less than four years in the Netherlands are unemployed. With duration of 15 years or more, this percentage dropped to 24 percent (Dagevos, 2011, in MinBuZa, 2011, p.28).
Besides the relatively high unemployment rate among Somali, they also show a significantly lower employment rate than Dutch natives (69 percent), Turks (54 percent) and Moroccans (59 percent). Under the SCP examined refugee groups, they have the lowest employment rate (29 percent), compared to Afghans (36 percent) and Iraqis (35 percent) (Dagevos, 2011, p.112, in MinBuZa, 2011, p.28). The conclusion about the low employment among Somalis is also reflected compared to Sudanese and Angolans, who participate more in the labor market (Clover & Van der Welle, 2009, in MinBuZa, 2011, p.28).

As mentioned previously, related to the low labor market participation, the welfare dependency is relatively high among Somali living in the Netherlands. No less than forty percent of the Somalis in the Netherlands receive a social welfare payment. The social welfare dependency is especially high among Somali women: almost half of the Somali women aged 15-64 receive payment (Klaver et al, 2010, p.21). The high level of unemployment, low level of employment and high welfare dependency induce a vulnerable income position. The average spendable income for Somalis was 13.000 euro in 2002, compared to 22.000 euro for autochthones. Over fifty percent of the Somalis knew low income, which means they had to live from 850 euro per month (Dagevos & Linden, 2005, in Klaver et al., 2010, p.23).
4.2.3 Socio-cultural integration

Like other Africans living in the Netherlands, Somalis feel rather distanced from the Dutch culture in general. This distance finds its origin in language, which is considered rather hard to learn. In 2005 (Van Heelsum, 2005, p.86), six out of ten Somalis living in the Netherlands believed that they did not master the Dutch language sufficiently. The cultural differences were of various natures, the Somalis in general for instance have different views on the relations between men and women. Also, they are used to more community spirit than Dutch natives, and so they tend to feel lonely rather quickly. Another difference concerns raising children. Dutch children tend to have more expensive clothing, celebrate their birthdays with a variety of gifts and show, according to Somali standards, little respect to adults (Van Heelsum, 2005, p.86-87).

According to Klaver et al. (2011, p.25), an important share of the Somalis in the Netherlands are not acquaintance with Dutch regulations and laws, habits, manners and existing facilities. The research of Van den Tillaart (2000, in Klaver et al., 2011, p.25) showed that only one third of the 112 interviewed Somalis is ‘at home’ in the Netherlands. Almost 50 percent indicated they felt at home ‘fairly’, while one quarter indicated that this was only partially so. In 2003, Van den Tillaart showed that 40 percent of the 100 Somalis that were interviewed by him, felt at home in the Netherlands in a lesser extent or not at all. The research of Van den Tillaart of 2000 (in Klaver et al., 2011, p.25), also showed that only 40 percent of the 112 Somalis felt well at home at the Netherlands, whereas this percentage seemed to be 45 percent in 2003 (Van den Tillaart, in Klaver et al., 2011, p.25). The most mentioned argument for not feeling at home appeared to be the experience of cultural differences and a lack of acceptance and recognition by the Dutch (Klaver et al., 2011, p.25). Longing back to the country of origin, the financial position and a lack of Dutch language proficiency appeared to make integration particularly difficult (Van den Tillaart et al., 2001, in Klaver et al., 2011. p.25).

4.2.4 Somali women living in the Netherlands

Spijkerboer (2007, p.46, in Van Houdt et al., 2011. p.422) states that, with regard to forced integration, specific emphasis is put on immigrant mothers in their role as child bearers and it is them who are specifically targeted in policies. The dynamic between the ‘meddlesomeness and patronizing Dutch social system’ (Van Heelsum, 2011, p. 16) and the integration of Somali women living in the Netherlands, is captured by the 2012 documentary ‘Nomads and pirates’ of Yasmine Allas. In her documentary, she shows that there are many problems among Somali families in the Netherlands. She spoke with several women who were accused of welfare fraud and/or of whom children were taken away from by the Dutch social service ‘Youth Care’. Some of them were also accused of abusing their children or were considered not being able to take proper care of them. According to Allas, this concerns hundreds of children.
Allas seems to agree with the notion of Klaver et al. (2010, p.25), that an important share of the Somalis in the Netherlands are not acquaintance with Dutch regulations and laws and that the integration of Somalis in the Netherlands is troublesome. She confirms that there is a high rate of unemployment and that there are many problems among Somali families. According to Allas, in Somalia it is accepted to beat children in order to discipline them, while many Somali women are not aware that in the Netherlands it is not. Subsequently, Somali women who do beat their children in the Netherlands are accused of child abuse, whereupon their children are taken away from them. Youth Care argues that they are aware of the ‘culture shock’, but that the reality is that they view the cases in question from a Dutch perspective, even though this perspective differs from the Somali one. An important share of Somali women living in the Netherlands, Allas (2012) therefore argues, is not aware of the new country they live in.

4.2.5 Somali transmigration
The number of Somalis in the Netherlands shows strong fluctuations in the last 15 years. Figure 8 shows the development of the total Somali population residing in the Netherlands from 1996 till 2010. Between 1996 and 2010 there is a strong increase from 20,000 to nearly 30,000, while between 2001 and 2007 there is a decrease back to less than 20,000. After that, the number has been increasing again (Van Liempt, 2011, p.13). Because of the abolition of the category-based protection policy, this increase did not carry on after 2010 (MinBuZa, 2011, p.17).

Figure 8 Development of Somali population in The Netherlands 1996-2010 (CBS Statline, 12-10-2010, in Van Heelsum, 2011, p.13)

Figure 9 (next page) shows that these fluctuations are caused by lower numbers of immigration between 2002 and 2006, in combination with higher numbers of emigration. The high numbers of emigration regards migration to other EU member states, with the UK in particular. In 2007, the immigration and emigration numbers are more or less equal, while in
2008 the number of immigration is higher than that of emigration again (MinBuZa, 2011, p.17).

Figure 9 Immigration, emigration and the migration balance for Somalis in the Netherlands 1995-2009 (CBS Statline, 12-10-2010, in Van Heelsum, 2011, p.14)

Since 2000 it is estimated that between 10.000 and 20.000 Somali immigrants have left the Netherlands for the UK (Moret and van Eck, 2006; van den Reek and Hussein, 2003, in van Liempt, 2011, p.570). Reasons for moving onwards can be divided into economic, social and political ones. For some Somalis the move to the UK was motivated by the expectation to find better jobs and career opportunities. For other the move was mainly driven by social reasons, they wanted to be close to family and friends. The differences in political climate between the Netherlands and the UK that triggered the decision to move were decreasing tolerance towards Muslims in the Netherlands and the perception of the UK as a country where more space is created for cultural differences (Van Liempt, 2011, Van den Reek & Hussein, 2003, in Van Liempt, 2011, p. 570). A narrowing definition of what it means to be Dutch was thus one of the reasons why Somalis living in the Netherlands decided to move to the UK (Van Liempt, 2011, p.570).

In 2011, Van Liempt (p. 571-580) conducted research among Dutch Somalis that migrated to the UK. She found that the experience of institutional and political exclusion, something that citizenship is theoretically supposed to resolve, was an important reason for Somali families to leave the Netherlands. Many faced discrimination and unemployment. They also felt that they were treated as not ‘Dutch’ enough, regardless of the Dutch passport they possessed. Van Liempt (2011, p.580) argues that besides the fact that one third of the Somali community in the Netherlands has left the country soon after having obtained Dutch citizenship shows that the relationship between citizenship and belonging is not as straightforward as is often assumed, it also neglects the ways in which immigrants enact and experience citizenship. It contradicts that legal rights and duties are supposed to bind people to nation-states. Also, the Somalis have experienced the political turnaround in the
Netherlands: the populist political party that started to dominate the Dutch political landscape, influencing public opinion and increasing anti-Muslim sentiments. For some Somalis that were interviewed by Van Liempt (2011, p.581), this situation triggered them to move to the UK as well.

In their research, Van Reek and Hussein (2003, in Van Heelsum, 2011, p.16) found similar motives for Somalis to move from the Netherlands to the UK. Their respondents were motivated by economic as well as social factors and unhappiness about the Netherlands too. With regard to the economic factors, the respondents indicated that the better educated ones move to the UK. Those who move know the English language, and think it will be easier to find a suitable job than in the Netherlands. Diplomas from the country of origin are sometimes recognized in the UK, but not in the Netherlands. Starting your own shop or business is easier, because there are fewer rules: ‘In the Netherlands is everything that you try to do difficult. There is always an official that tells you that what you want it is not possible’. With regard to the social pull factors, the respondents said to be motivated by the existence of the old UK colonial ties, and a community of mainly Isaq from Somaliland, that is well established in the UK. Other clan groups joined this community in the last 15 years, and concentrations of Somalis live in cities like Leicester and Birmingham. For them, a large community means social contacts, Somali shops and facilities, and also more social control, support and possibilities to educate your children in a Somali sphere and culture. Most emigrants had family members in the UK who helped them with their first steps.

The unhappiness about the Netherlands was indicated as an important push factor in the research of van Reek and Hussein (2003, in Van Heelsum, 2011, p.16) as well. Their respondents indicated that the Netherlands is experienced as a country where you have to assimilate and where you are not allowed to enjoy your own culture. The attitude of the Dutch towards immigrants and Muslims is also experienced as more and more negative. Additionally, they argue that the social system is based on meddlesomeness and patronizing, with advisory house visits and annoying rules. The UK on the other hand is seen as ‘really multicultural’, having respect for individual initiatives that suits better to the independent mindset of Somalis⁴.

⁴ Although the UK is experienced as a country where you are allowed to enjoy your own culture, research like the one of Van Liempt (2011) showed that there are also Somalis, especially Somali youngsters, who long to go back to the Netherlands once they are living in the UK.
4.2.6 Somali history in relation to aspects of integration

Related to this history, several studies show the prevalence of psychological suffering and trauma among the Somali community in the Netherlands (Van Moors et al., 2009; Pels & De Gruijter, 2005; Kromhout & Van San, 2003, in Klaver et al., 2010, p. 24). The possibility to initiate a new living in the Netherlands suffers from experiences in their country of origin, the flight and the period of asylum. The Somali European Forum states that traumatic experiences as a consequence from war and fleeing are a fact for all the individuals among the second flow of refugees. Almost without exception, it concerns traumatized war victims that grew up in broken families. There are also many individuals suffering from socio-psychological problems among the first flow of refugees though (Van Moors et al., 2009, in Klaver et al., 2010, p.24).

According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2011, p.34-35), the traumatized individuals among the Somali community are people who are processing their experiences from the past, having no energy left to occupy themselves with other things. In some cases, this leads to psychiatric disorders, confusion and aggression. There are also people who experience deep feelings of hatred because of relatives being killed. These feelings may focus on sub clans or militia, but it can also be focused on for instance the US, because of their involvement in Somalia between 1992 and 1995. A common consequence of the trauma and war experiences is extreme suspicion towards people in their environments. Some trauma victims see conspiracies everywhere, and do not believe in the good intentions of anyone. In addition to the processing of trauma, the long chaos and anarchy where people have lived in, lead them to prioritize safety for themselves and family members. The absence of murder and violence are the most important things, making the Dutch rules of administrative systems like Social Services and their children’s school less relevant, exaggerated and exhausting. Where many Dutch natives are already disturbed by overregulation, Somalis tend to experience this even stronger, as evidenced by the following quote: ‘Dutch people do not have real worries, they are worried about al sort of futilities’ (MinBuZa, 2011, p.35).

The research of Van Moors et al. (2009, in Klaver et al., 2010, p.24) also showed that Somalis are reluctant to receive mental healthcare. Because of this, many youngsters suffering from psychological problems do not get the help they need as well. Quite often, their parents or caretakers are suffering from psychological problems themselves, making it even harder to have a supportive role for the youngsters.

The lack of a supportive role is also mentioned as problem with regard to the high number of Somali drop-outs on primary school. Somali children tend to enjoy less support from their parents. Moors et al. (2009, in Klaver et al., 2010, p. 19) point out that Somali parents lack knowledge about Dutch educational systems and show little involvement in their children’s education. Pels and De Gruijter (2005, in Klaver et al., 2011, p. 19) also found that Somali women have difficulty with supporting their children with their education. Often there seems to be poor communication with teachers and schools, with an insufficient knowledge about the Dutch language as an underlying problem. Besides the language problem, Somali
women also indicated that they felt that their opinions were not always taken seriously by the teachers. With regard to education in general, the cause of the relatively low level of education of Somalis living in the Netherlands probably lies in the unstable political situation in Somali, through which educational systems were unmaintained and children in some regions and periods did not attend school at all. Although the population in the country of origin has on average been relatively poorly educated, this has drastically increased by twenty years of violence. The positive thing though is that 29 percent of the Somalis aged 15-64 do go to school once in the Netherlands, even among the higher age groups (Vogel, 2011, in MinBuZa, 2011, p.25).

With regard to the relatively high social welfare dependency of Somali women what was mentioned previously, Klaver et al. (2010, p.21) note that this high dependency is partially caused by the fact that many Somali women stand on their own with regard to raising their children and housekeeping, making them see little possibilities to enter the labor market (Klaver et al, 2010, p.21). As a consequence of the war, many families fell apart and lots of women have to raise their children on their own, in a whole new environment that imposes different requirements to upbringing (Allas, 2012). As was already discussed in chapter two, the most mentioned argument for not feeling at home, with respect to the socio-cultural integration, appeared to be the experience of cultural differences and a lack of acceptance and recognition by the Dutch (Klaver et al., 2011, p.25). In addition, longing back to the country of origin, the financial position and a lack of Dutch language proficiency appeared to make integration particularly difficult (Van den Tillaart et al., 2001, in Klaver et al., 2011. p.25).

4.3 The migrant view: the experience of citizenship by Somali women living in the Netherlands

Again, the preceding results show the importance of researching how citizenship policies are experienced by the migrant, in order to understand the current integration statistics. In the next section, I will therefore present the results of the interviews I have had with Somali female key figures in the Netherlands.

4.3.1 A., social worker in the north of the Netherlands

‘When you develop yourself, people will respect you… it also depends on yourself…’

The first interview was with A., who lives in the north of the Netherlands, where I have visited her at her work place. A. is a social worker, whereby she also guides Somali women with their entry and integration in the Netherlands. I know A. through an acquaintance of mine, who is her son. This was the first time I met her though.
A. was part of the first ‘influx’ of Somali refugees into the Netherlands between 1992 and 1998. She has fled on her own together with her three children. She tells about the sad times she has experienced in the asylum center, where she has lived for three months. After these months, she moved to a little village in Drenthe, where she still lives today. Fortunately, she was able to speak English during her first year in the Netherlands. She realized though that it was important to learn the Dutch language and so she did, even though it turned out to be a difficult task for her.

‘These mothers are occupied with the war in their heads and have less energy for other things... the only thing they want is safety for their children...’

After two years or so, she started to concern herself with Dutch politics and decided she wanted to study. She completed her social worker studies and started working at the organization where she still works today. A. seems to be a strong, resilient woman, who has experienced a lot during her life, but has made the best of it. She seems to believe in self-empowerment as she emphasizes the capability of women ‘who are able to develop anything ... When you develop yourself, people will respect you, it also depends on yourself...’ She continues to tell about the first generation Somali women, who she calls ‘invisible’. The first generation Somali women, according to her, ‘are doing nothing’ and do not have a social network. ‘The first generation Somali women do not want to do anything, they are not interested in what happens around them, and they are only concerned about their children’. According to her, this is why they are not very much developed and are only aware of the basic aspects of the Dutch society. Learning the language for example, is enough for them, as long as their children are able to develop further than that. Besides this, A. tells me that these women are satisfied. ‘They do not feel isolated and they are satisfied, also with their welfare payment’. The first generation Somali women are always at home and busy with their children, as they are frequently single mothers. ‘These mothers are occupied with the war in their heads and have less energy for other things... the only thing they want is safety for their children...’

A. tells that during her first years in the Netherlands, she searched for contact with Dutch people, what was easy in the village where she lives. She considers this to be an advantage of small villages, since in big cities there is less contact between different cultures and people are less concerned about it. A. emphasizes the necessity to speak the Dutch language, in order to be in contact with Dutch people in your environment. She tells about a Nigerian woman who lives close to her, who feels isolated and who feels like nobody wants to talk to her. A. emphasizes her own responsibility in this, as she tries to motivates her to initiate contact with others herself and to just speak up. She tries to motivate the Nigerian woman to not only bring her children to school, but also to initiate contact with other women on the playground. A. states that it is necessary to mingle with other cultures in order to learn the Dutch language.
‘When women come to the Netherlands together with their husbands, it always causes problems…’

A. tells that when women come to the Netherlands together with their husbands, it always causes problems. In Somalia, the husband always works while the women do everything in and around the house. In the Netherlands, there is another system. Women get welfare payment and demand their husband to do thing in the household as well, which is difficult for men to accept, because ‘many Somali men in the Netherlands use qat, eat all day and expect from their wives to keep them occupied’. When the women come by themselves, they experience fewer problems and they tend to develop better, because they feel very responsible in that case. They also have more time for their children. A. tells that many Somali married couples divorce due to constant fights, when they live together in the Netherlands.

‘Today there is no more recognition for the war victims, while in the beginning there was tolerance, interest and understanding…’

Besides her emphasis on own responsibility, A. also tells about the turnaround she has witnessed in Dutch politics. Twenty-one years ago, ‘everything was easy’, while during the last years, everything has become a lot more difficult. In the beginning, she considered the Netherlands to be ‘the best country’, while ‘today, migrants do not feel at home in the Netherlands’. A. argues that Dutch migration and integration policies have changed considerably and there is no more recognition for war victims, while in the beginning there was tolerance, interest and understanding. The expectations nowadays are too high for people who have just entered the Netherlands, while they have fled from a war. ‘After fleeing from a war, people just want to feel at home…’ Many Somali refugees end up on the street nowadays, without insurance and the permission to work. Islamic migrants feel that they are not free to experience their religion and culture as they want to and they do not feel at home because of it. In the Netherlands, many people just look at the media and believe everything they see and hear with regard to radicalism, while they are not sincerely interested in the matter. A. argues that a woman cannot wear a hijab without being stared at. She says that there are good and bad people everywhere and radicalism stands far from what the Islam implies. Every nation knows people who fight for power, especially during the last years. Radicalism is something new for Somali people and the people who make war are not really Somali. In the past, the Islam was never interpreted in the way it is now interpreted by some Somalis.

‘Somali migrants want freedom and want to be accepted, or otherwise they want to leave the Netherlands…’
A. tells that Somali migrants want freedom and want to be accepted, or otherwise they want to leave the Netherlands. That is, according to A., the reason why many Somalis transmigrate to the UK, where they tend to experience more freedom of religion and culture. In the UK, life is easier for migrants like the Somalis, the language is easier and it is easier to find a job or open up your own store. In the UK, there are many Somali enclaves, where Somalis feel at home among people with their own nationality. A. argues that this is not beneficial for the development and progress of migrants. A. really values multicultural contact and activities, this is why she initiates a lot of them together with neighbors and the acquaintances.

4.3.2 K., volunteer at Somali refugee organization at Amsterdam

‘Intermediaries are very important…’

I have met K. at the Araweelo symposium in Amsterdam. She caught my attention because of her opinion that she was not afraid to give when she got the chance. She seemed to me as an involved member of the Somali community and when I spoke to her in private, she confirmed my expectation.

In the year 2000, K. married a Somali man who already lived in the Netherlands, Amsterdam. They still live there today, together with their three children. In the beginning, she had a hard time adjusting in the Netherlands. Learning the Dutch language was a difficult task and during the Dutch language lessons, she did not understand a thing. All she heard was ‘quacking’. Fortunately, her husband who already lived in the Netherlands for ten years could help her a lot, which made a big difference according to her: ‘other women are less fortunate, I always had someone to help me’. Despite this help, she felt very lonely and sad sometimes. In 2002/2003, she used to cry every day and realized that her husband could not fill in all the gaps for her. She missed everything in Somalia and missed having activities in the Netherlands, like a job and a study. She even considered leaving her husband and going back to Somalia, because she did not want to live in the Netherlands any more.

‘I do not want to get up in the morning for cooking and cleaning only, I wanted to live…’

Her considerations to leave her husband and go back to Somalia, made her realize that she had to tackle her problems herself. She needed to accept her situation and needed to grow and learn on her own. She did not want to get up in the morning only for cooking and cleaning the house, instead she ‘wanted to live’. K. discussed these problems with her husband and asked him to take her along when he went to visit friends and the like. Today, K. has many Dutch friends and her best friends are Dutch too. ‘I told them I felt lonely, so together we went to swimming pools for women only and the like’. In the meantime, she has
finished higher education and works at a midwife clinic, because ‘my mother always taught me to help other people’. She is currently happy that she got over her problems.

‘Many Somali couples get into relationship problems when they start living in the Netherlands, since life is very different here…’

K. tells that many Somali couples get into relationship problems when they go live in the Netherlands, since life is very different there. Her own depression that she experienced while trying to adjust in the Netherlands makes her understand why so many Somali couples divorce when they start living in the Netherlands. K. thinks that having a relationship means growing together. As a woman, you cannot expect your husband to just know what you feel or think, without communicating about it. You need to tell him about your feelings and ask your husband to deal with it in another way. ‘Do not let one bad thing ruin everything’.

‘You need to know how to handle integration when you have just arrived at the Netherlands…’

With regard to integration, K. thinks that ‘you need to know how to handle it’. For the last six years, she therefore works as a volunteer for an organization that helps recently arrived Somali refugees adjusting in the Netherlands. She tells that Somali women, as the most important person of the family, have many problems with Youth Care and financial income. K. therefore organizes meetings to educate Somali women and operates as a contact person for them. K. believes that the Netherlands is very different from Somali: ‘the Netherlands is a busy country with a lot of paperwork, where you can lose your way quickly’. K. argues that when refugees just arrived at the Netherlands, they are expected to master the Dutch language right away. The letters and information they receive are for instance only in Dutch. ‘People do not understand the information they receive from the Dutch government, which is a pity’. K. herself did not understand all the paperwork she received from the Dutch government in the beginning of her stay in the Netherlands as well. Since the Dutch language is very important right away, K. organizes many projects to inform Somali refugees right after entering the Netherlands: ‘intermediaries are very important’.

‘Somali refugees just came out of war and experiences from war are very hard to let go of…’

K. argues that you cannot feel at home and integrate in the Netherlands, without mastering the Dutch language. K. argues though that Somali refugees are concerned with other things when entering the Netherlands: ‘they just came out of war and experiences from war are very hard to let go of’. Besides that, it is very frustrating to be waiting on a residence permit and not being allowed to work or study. K. thinks that the Somali people who did not flee right away were left behind in a ‘land of chaos’. Former Somali refugees tend to be higher educated than the people who have fled later on. The new refugees are poorly educated, but,
K. argues, you cannot expect that from people coming out of a country where there has not been a proper government and schooling system for 22 years now.

‘The people in Amsterdam are very sweet and kind…’

With regard to learning the Dutch language, K. argues that you should not be afraid to make mistakes. K. herself has asked her colleagues and friends to correct her when she makes mistakes. Sometimes they make fun of her when she does make a mistake, but K. does not care about it and laughs along. She also thinks that it is important to establish contact with people in your environment yourself. K. herself likes to be in contact with people in her surroundings and to chat on the street with people in Amsterdam, who are sweet and kind according to her. ‘Dutch people give back what you give them, which makes me proud and want to greet them’.

‘… it should not be too Somali, nor too Dutch, but somewhere in the middle…’

K. herself indicates that she currently feels Somali as well as Dutch. ‘You live her, but you also support people in your own country’. It is important to feel Dutch as well, K. argues: ‘you may hope you will return to Somalia one day, but it is impossible’. Integrating in the Netherlands is a difficult task according to K. and raising your children with two different cultures is also difficult: ‘it should not be too Somali, nor too Dutch, but somewhere in the middle’. She thereby emphasizes the need to be willing to learn yourself, as a mother with another origin as your child. She thereby gives the example of a school trip to the ‘Rijksmuseum’, where she noticed that her 5th grade child knew less about the Dutch history than a Dutch 3rd grade child, whereby she realized that her own origin prevented her from providing her children with enough information about the Netherlands. After that, she started to read a history book of her child and started to search for information on the internet, while motivating her children to do the same.

4.3.3 F., law student and volunteer at HIRDA

‘Integration should be made more attractive…’

I have met F. at HIRDA, where she works as a volunteer. Besides her activities at HIRDA, she is involved in other Somali diaspora activities as well. I came to know her as an intelligent young woman who is passionate about helping others and Somalis in particular. F. is one of the few Somali women that I have met who are not Muslim, she told me she is an atheist.
‘Many Somalis do not feel at home at the Netherlands… Holding on to your own values is more accepted in the UK…’

F. fled to the Netherlands at a young age, together with her parents, in 1993. She grew up at The Hague, where she is currently in law school. During the interview, F. tells that Somali migrants in the Netherlands tend to transmigrate to the UK, because they do not feel at home in the Netherlands and because of language difficulties. Somali know the English language already because of the former colony and in the UK there are many Somalis already, so Somalis in the Netherlands go there to be a part of the Somali population there.

‘I cannot explain what it means to be Dutch…’

F. says she herself feels like a world citizen, not European in particular. She also says she does not feel Dutch in particular, at least she is not aware of it. She does feel Dutch somehow, but does not know what it really entails and cannot explain it. F. thinks that many Somalis do not feel at home in the Netherlands, because there are not many Somalis in the Netherlands. Somalis tend to hold on to their own values, what is easier and more accepted in the UK. F. does speak Somali, although not very well. She has difficulties writing it, because her main priority was learning Dutch, since she lived in the Netherlands for almost all her life.

‘Somalis do not know what is expected of them when they enter the Netherlands…’

F. argues that the Netherlands could do something about transmigration, by letting Somalis feel more at home. Making migrants feel at home should be a priority in Dutch migration policies. She says that Somalis do not speak the language when they entry the Netherlands and when they do enter, they do not know exactly what is expected from them. Policies should also be concerned about getting Somalis involved, so that they are concerned with the Netherlands. If they are not involved and concerned, they tend to migrate to the UK, where family members live, what makes them more concerned about the UK already. According to F. this is a matter of feelings and emotions, which can be in just little things. She argues that one can feel at home rather easy, by for instance other people who do speak the same language, regardless whether you like them or not.

F. tells that when her parents came to the Netherlands, her father’s doctor’s specialization was not recognized by the government. At first her father was a doctor who performed excellent, while after entering the Netherlands it did not seem to matter anymore. He was jobless and received a welfare payment, but did search for a job, also to provide for his family back in Somalia and the UK. Their lives were chaotic in the beginning, because they had to start from bottom up. They did not feel at home, which made them wonder what they did in the Netherlands in the first place. F. tells that one of their biggest problems in the first years of their stay is a lack of clarity and therefore confusion, when they consulted
government agencies. They were sent from one place to another, when confronted with problems concerning their integration. They tried to make the best of it nevertheless.

‘… the requirement might pursue good intentions, but good intentions are not always beneficial… Instead of enforcement of requirements, the benefits of the requirements should be emphasized…’

When asked about the citizenship requirements, F. argues that ‘the requirement might pursue good intentions, but good intentions are not always beneficial’. All the requirements might aim to involve citizens in order to let them participate in the society, but it is enforced and related to negativity. F. argues that instead of the enforcement of requirements, the benefits of requirements, like learning the language, should be emphasized, in order to really motivate migrants. Integration should be made more tempting. The government should make clear why they want migrants to integrate and what the benefits for the migrant themselves are. She says that she considers integration policies that forces people to do something as ugly. Migrants, especially refugees come to the Netherlands with mixed feelings, their studies and work experience so far does not count and meanwhile they are attacked with all kinds of demands. More progress will be booked by using a more positive approach.

‘… despite these discussions, what you did see where migrants being active in their multicultural local environments… They did feel citizens there…’

In her environment she experiences that many Somalis want to maintain their own values and cultures, what she considers to be something good, because culture makes you who you are. Despite this, F. thinks that Somalis are open for new experiences and other cultures and that their identities are rather dynamic: ‘it mingle’. The current Dutch integration policies, does make migrants feel defensive. The fact that they feel attacked, makes them defend their viewpoint or own culture in itself. F. tells about how she felt about six years ago, when she experienced ‘pressure’ for migrants and when everybody seemed to have an opinion about migrants, regardless whether it was true or not: ‘people were finger pointing, without listening to each other’. F. further argues that especially in the media and national politics, there were many negative discussions going on. ‘Despite these discussions, what you did see where migrants being active in their multicultural local environments. They did feel citizens there. In The Hague, migrants, including Somalis, were very active in their local environments, establishing contact with their neighbors with all kinds of different backgrounds’. She also noticed that many of them were aware of Dutch politics.

‘Somali women tend to delimit the world by their home, while there is a whole world that could open up … When Somali women start living in another country their roles are prone to change…’
With regard to Somali women in particular, F. thinks that they do not show up in the
statistics very often, because they are more reserved. More attention is focused on Somali
men and boys, with regard to radicalization and the use of qat. Women do not get involved
with that kind of matters, they concentrate on the household. F. thinks that it is important for
Somali women to integrate, especially for their own development. When they do not
integrate, their development will stagnate. She tells that in Somalia, the women have an
important role in the house. In order to keep this role, Somali women should develop when
they start living in another country, because especially then their roles are prone to change.
With regard to Somali women, F. tells that her mother does work, but a significant share of
the Somali friends of her mother are at home mothers who receive welfare payment though.
Many Somali women, according to F. do not participate in the Dutch society: ‘Somali women
tend to delimit the world by their home, while there is a whole world that could open up’.
She thinks that it is a pity that Somali women get isolated and this should be prevented. She
does acknowledge the own responsibility of the Somali women, but also thinks that this
isolation is driven by fear, fear of a new job that is different from those in Somalia and fear of
an unknown environment.

‘Somali women should know what they are up to, for which government assistance should not be too
bureaucratic…’

Even though there are Somali women who do participate in the Dutch society, F. thinks that
many Somali women in the Netherlands do not feel at home there, since many Somali
women tend to be ‘locked’ in the Somali community. F. argues that when these women
would also participate in the society, they would probably feel more ‘Dutch’, because of the
familiarization with the Dutch society. F. emphasizes again that this participation should not
be enforced, but positively motivated instead. Also, Somali women should know what they
are up to, for which government assistance should not be too bureaucratic. This
bureaucratization provokes irritation: ‘if we could get more assistance in that field, in
another positive way, Somali women will probably search for more information themselves
… Being at home is not always fun, when you know that there is a whole world waiting
outside for you, you will probably feel at home sooner’. The assistance that is provided today
should be easier, more open and less bureaucratic.

‘When many Dutch natives are not familiar with matters as the Dutch history, why is it legitimate to
do require it from migrants…?’

F. questions whether cultural requirements are desirable. First of all, she thinks that curiosity
about the Netherlands, for example the history, will be aroused spontaneously by just living
in the Netherlands and secondly, it could come across as the demand to let go of the culture
of origin, which could be insulting. Also, F. argues that many Dutch natives are not familiar
with matters as the Dutch history, which makes her wonder whether it is legitimate to do require it from migrants.

4.3.4 AJ., student health project management and volunteer at HIRDA

AJ. was born in the Netherlands, but soon after her birth, she and her family transmigrated to the UK. After their stay in the UK, they moved to Kenya, after which they moved back to the Netherlands. Today, she is 18 and has only been her for 11 months and works as a volunteer for HIRDA.

‘Right now when I receive my study grant, I feel like: yeah I am a Dutch citizen…’

When she first arrived at the Netherlands, she thought that people were very welcoming. She was really focused and started looking for schools, volunteering and ways to learn the language right away. She went to the offices to register herself and did not have a problem at all. She is currently enrolled in language lessons and studies: public health project management in Zwolle. Because she was busy right from the start, she did not get the chance to really interact with people she did not know, besides at the office and school. Her school is mostly international, including other African and Dutch people.

She thinks that Dutch people are enthusiastic: ‘when you ask them a question, they answer it like them have known you for years’. She did not have any negative experiences so far. AJ. and her family already had European passports when she came back to the Netherlands. Therefore, for them there were no any other formal requirements like learning the language and civic integration test. Besides that, AJ. indicates that she is very motivated to learn the language: ‘when people hear that I am born in Amsterdam, while I do not speak the language, they are very surprised. Than I have to explain the story for 15 minutes and I do not want to end up in situations like that again’. She teaches herself and speaks to her Dutch fellow students in Dutch. She hopes to finish a master in Dutch in the Netherlands. She is also part of a student association, she likes to undertake many activities and learn from all of them, to increase her experience later. AJ. tells that she has been responsible all her life, because she is the eldest in the family. She had to look after her younger siblings and even in religious schools, she used to be a leader and the teacher’s assistant. AJ. is now living on her own since a couple of months. Although she does not have to pass civic integration test, she does experience problems with insurance and taxes sometimes. She is not afraid to ask for help though and goes to government agencies and asks friends and family for information.

‘In the Netherlands there are no English pamphlets to inform Somalis where to go, which makes it really hard for Somalis sometimes…’
In the Netherlands there are no English pamphlets to inform Somalis where to go, which makes it really hard for them sometimes. The language is very difficult in that sense sometimes, AJ. argues. AJ. says that she is very motivated to be involved in Dutch politics, because she lives her and needs to know what is around her.

‘Citizenship means that I have the same rights as the people who are the habitants of the same country I live in…’

AJ. does experience problems sometimes in defining herself as a Dutch citizen. It is really hard, because when she tells people she is from the Netherlands, they are like: ‘what?!’ She thinks she is a Somali Dutch citizen. Citizenship means to her that she has the same rights as the people who are the habitants of the same country she lives in. She has the same rights as a Dutch born: ‘I am a citizen in that way and I do not care what others think of it. I go to the office and show my Dutch passport, that is right, I am a Dutch citizen. When I go to Somalia or Kenya, they call me a white person, because I was born in the west and in the Netherlands, they call me African, so I am in between’. This makes her feel bad and makes it hard. At school, when a teacher recently selected ‘Dutch citizens’ for a project, she was not selected, because ‘she did not grow up here’, which she thinks is sad. AJ. feels excluded in Kenya, in Somali and in the Netherlands.

‘The UK did not mind whether you were a citizen or not, that was the best place I have been in my life…’

‘The UK was good, because we had so many international people … so many Somalis from different countries. The UK did not mind whether you were a citizen or not, that was the best place I have been in my life. In Somali, Kenya and the Netherlands you get excluded, because you did not grow up there. ..’ According to AJ., the UK accepts everybody for who you are, they do not care, as long as you do not break the law: ‘UK is the best’. AJ. does notice though that she thinks that the native people in the Netherlands are kinder than those in the UK. ‘When you live in the UK in neighborhoods with al lot of different cultures, like Pakistanis and the like, they do not care, but other native people, like Irish people, are more racist. When you live in a neighborhood with a certain kind of people, it is hard to live in those kinds of areas. But UK is working hard to mix people in order to improve it, so it is getting better’.

‘Zwolle is a great city, very nice people, there I feel a Dutch citizen…’

AJ. also makes this distinction for the Netherlands: ‘Zwolle is a great city, very nice people, there I feel a Dutch citizen, but in Amsterdam, I do not.. The more you have like international people around you, the more you feel like you have a place like ‘to be’ … right
now I live in the building with Spanish, French students who are going to be here for one semesters to study some courses. You have Turkish and Moroccan students who are born here who say to us that they are Dutch citizens, but when they are around other native Dutch locals, they say they are Turkish or Moroccan … It depends on the context … In Kenya, when they tell me I am a white person, I tell them that yes, I am a Dutch citizen … Also to stop bullying…’ My worst experience when I went to high school in Kenya was they thought that … normally the people in Africa they are violent … I have been to Somalia where people normally defend themselves or fight and girls were kind of bullying me, the senior ones, they started bullying me and they were like, yeah you white person! And I was like: I am African just like you … But if you try to bully me … I grew up in the UK with Irish people, they are real fighters and I was like: I am going to kick your ass if you do not stop bullying me!’ According to AJ., ‘even in African schools kids exclude themselves, like the kids from Finland make a group, the UK make a group, the ones from America make a group, because they cannot interact with people who grew up in Africa … it is really hard.. Sometimes you do not know the language because you integrate in another country and it gets hard to communicate with people, even from Somalia…” AJ. herself says she can express herself better now in English than in Somali and she speaks five languages and mixes them many times.

‘The Dutch government needs to change some policies, like improving the accessibility to information…’

With regard to integration AJ. thinks that the Dutch government needs to change some policies, like improving the accessibility to information. ‘They should make English pamphlets for people who come so they can understand it better’. AJ. thinks it is mostly the language that makes integration in the Netherlands harder: ‘in the UK it is better, because they already know English, so they can relate really fast’. Whenever AJ. herself wants to understand something from the news or newspaper, she needs Google Translate.

‘Integration should come from within the people, you should show them that being Dutch is really good and that you should be proud of that… But when it comes to forcing people, they will back out … It is the worst to force people, it will create hostilities, it will create hate … Motivate them by emphasizing the same rights they will have as Dutch citizens and all the benefits … Then people will feel they are Dutch, when they receive all the benefits …’

AJ. also argues that the Dutch government should organize more activities to bring people together, like ‘Africa day’. Dutch people like festivities too, she has found out. In order to mix people up, they need to increase festivals and games. ‘There are also places where people are excluded, like little villages where only Dutch people live … they have never seen a black person before … so they need to mix people up… Integration is on both sides …’.
'Hard requirements will discourage people’, AJ. argues, ‘it should come from within the people, you should not force people, you should show them that being Dutch is really good and that you should be proud of that… But when it comes to forcing people, they will back out … It is the worst to force people, it will create hostilities, it will create hate … Integration should not be forced … Motivate them by emphasizing the same rights they will have as Dutch citizens and all the benefits … Then people will feel they are Dutch, when they receive all the benefits … Right now when I receive my study grant, I feel like: yeah I am a Dutch citizen…’

4.3.5 FA., employee at HIRDA

FA. fled to the Netherlands in the nineties. She is very much involved in the Somali community in the Netherlands, working full-time for the Somali migrant organization HIRDA and attending many symposia.

According to FA., Somali women can be divided into two groups: the ‘younger generation’ and the ‘older one’. The younger generation is doing quite well, while the integration of the elder generation is troublesome. When the older generation entered the Netherlands, they were not guided well and they were not obliged to learn the language and culture.

‘When the first generation of Somali women came to live in the Netherlands, the environment was not helpful for them, it did not help them to look forward… These women were only thinking about their families, children and the war…’

According to FA., ‘integration means that you participate in the society… To be able to participate, you need an environment that allows you to participate… When the first generation of Somali women came to live in the Netherlands, the environment was not helpful for them, it did not help them to look forward… These women were only thinking about their families, children and the war… They come from an environment where they have experienced many terrifying things, making it hard to leave their children behind in daycare, because they were afraid that bad things would happen to them…’ FA. does emphasize though that these first generation women have ‘saved’ the second generation, by staying home for them and taking care of them, the second generation women were enabled to go to school and the like.

‘The language requirements are very good. It enables women to take internships and it prevents them from being isolated…’
FA. argues that the women who stayed home all day to take care of their children were not obliged to learn the language and the like. FA. thinks that the requirements like learning the Dutch language are a very good thing. ‘When you learn the language, you can go to the doctor by yourself, you get to know the society and its people and you do not somebody to translate anymore.’ But, FA. does argue that their needs to be a distinction for women who are not able to learn, especially for the elder women who never went to school because of the war and who have experienced many difficulties during their lives. ‘Besides this, the requirements are very good. It enables women to take internships and it prevents them from being isolated… Maybe if the requirements were set earlier, the older generation would have been better integrated as well…”

‘Being in an environment that gives you chances will result in feeling Dutch. The longer you live here, the more you get attached to the Dutch society…’

When asked about the cultural requirements that are set for citizenship, FA. argues that feelings will develop by themselves. ‘Being in an environment that gives you chances will result in feeling Dutch. The longer you live here, the more you get attached to the Dutch society… In the UK, the Somali children who transmigrated from the Netherlands really feel Dutch. They celebrate Dutch holidays, eat cheese and the like… This is because they have experienced a pleasant and warm time in the Netherlands…’ FA. argues that the longer you live here, the more pleasant it becomes and the more Dutch you will feel, these feelings will develop by itself. ‘You cannot oblige somebody to feel something, you have to experience and feel that for yourself…’

‘The administration in the Netherlands is annoying for many Somalis who live in the Netherlands. There are many Somalis who are not fully aware of the taxation system and for who it is hard to figure out how it works…’

With regard to European citizenship, FA. tells that ‘Somali people like to live together, which is easier in the UK, since the Netherlands has its dispersal policies… the Dutch culture is different from the Somali one, Somalis are homesick and like to see their own people…’ Also, FA. tells that the Dutch language is considered hard to learn by many Somalis, which is a lot easier in the UK, since many Somalis already speak English. She also says that Somalis like to teach their children a language that is helpful all over the world, while the Dutch language is only helpful in the Netherlands itself. FA. further argues that ‘the administration in the Netherlands is annoying for many Somalis who live in the Netherlands. There are many Somalis who are not fully aware of the taxation system and for who it is hard to figure out how it works’. Another reason for transmigration, according to FA., is that in the Netherlands it is hard to live from welfare payment. ‘Many Somalis in the Netherlands receive welfare payment, but they have to pay more than they receive. They have to pay
many bills, but of many they do not know why they have to be paid. For Somalis, this is easier in the UK...’ Also, Somalis are entrepreneurs according to FA. ‘Entrepreneurship is also easier in the UK. In order to be able to arrange everything with regard to taxes, the language is necessary, which is a barrier right away in the Netherlands. In the UK, there are more other Somali people that can help you to open a restaurant or hotel or the like...’ Furthermore, education is also easier in the UK. ‘In the Netherlands, children get an advice in the eighth grade about their educational future. The Somali parents are never happy about this advice, because they think that their children can do better than that...’ The educational systems are different in the UK and more in accordance with what Somali parents want for their children.

‘Integration is about being open to new experiences and learning new things. The people who already live in the Netherlands should also be open to learn new things, it should be two-sided...’

With regard to the current citizenship policies, FA. argues that the people who come to the Netherlands right now should get the chance to learn the language. ‘They have to pay by themselves to learn the Dutch language right now... Currently everything has to be paid for by themselves right from the start... Right from the start, Somalis should get the chance to participate in the Dutch society... For Somali women, there should be daycare for their children, so that they do not have to stay at home all day and can participate in society... Also, learning the Dutch language should continue to be obligated, but only for the people who are able to...’ Moreover, FA. argues that people should be accepted as they are, you should not expect them to feel the way you want them to feel. ‘Integration is about being open to new experiences and learning new things. The people who already live in the Netherlands should also be open to learn new things, it should be two-sided... The Somali migrants themselves need to change the image of them, since this image is negative with regard to radicalism, isolated women, large robes and bad integration... The second generation has the chance to improve this and to alter this image... Meanwhile, the society should not only communicate bad news about the Somali community in the Netherlands, since this does not motivate Somalis to improve and change...’

4.4 The experience of citizenship

The previous chapter has shown the different perspectives on post-national, national and local citizenship of Somali women who live in the Netherlands. In their different stories, there seems to be a common thread with regard to several subjects. In this chapter an explorative analysis will describe these common themes, whereby findings of the attended symposia will be included as well.
4.4.1 The difference between first and second generation Somali women

During the ‘Het is makkelijker om stadskleren te dragen dan om een stadsmens te worden’ symposium, Klaver argued that there is an accumulation of problems among the Somali migrant group in the Netherlands, making the integration in the Dutch society especially hard. These problems concern unprocessed traumas, cultural differences, the situation in the country of origin where there has been war and anarchy for decades already, distrust towards government agencies, low educational level of especially the latest group Somali asylum seekers, the poor social position and financial problems, the use of qat and insufficient knowledge of the Dutch language, the functioning of the Dutch society and core institutions like education and the labor market. According to Klaver, two groups of the Somali community need attention in particular, the single mothers and the youth. The single mothers have an essential role in raising their children, while they are often not capable in providing their children with appropriate support, due to their lack of knowledge on the Dutch language and society. For further information, the interested reader is referred to appendix I.

With regard to the integration of Somali women, half of the interviewees emphasize the difference between first and second generation Somali women. According to them, the first generation women seem to be the ‘invisible’ and ‘isolated’ one, who ‘are staying home all day’. The reason that is mentioned to stay at home is first of all, like argued by Klaver as well, their mental occupation with the war and the traumatic experiences they have witnessed, making them have less energy for other things. The interviewees argue that first generation Somali women seem to be less interested in what happens around them, and seem to be concerned about their children only. Since they are very often single mothers, they are responsible for their children on their own. According to the interviewees, first generation Somali women value development for their children, but are quickly satisfied with regard to their own development, making them only aware of the basic aspects of the Dutch society, like the language or not even that.

Another reason that is mentioned for the isolation of first generation Somali women is fear of a new environment, since the Netherlands and Somalia are very different countries. Also, according to the interviewees, Somali women are more reserved out of cultural background, concentrating on the household primarily. Moreover, when the older generation Somali women started living in the Netherlands, they were not guided well by the Dutch government and they were not obliged to learn the language and culture. If this would have been the case, the integration of first generation Somali women might have been better, according to one interviewee. On the other hand it is argued that the younger generation Somali women in the Netherlands, like F. and AJ. themselves, seem to be doing quite well.
4.4.2 Enforcement

Although almost all interviewees argue that the language requirements that are currently set for citizenship by the Dutch government are initially a good thing, they do have some critical notes about it. First of all, the interviewees make a distinction between the people/women who are able to learn the language and those who are not. Factors like age, education and traumatic experiences are mentioned as reasons for not being able to learn the language. The interviewees mention that there should be sympathy for war victims and expectations should not be too high.

Another argument that was mentioned with regard to citizenship requirements was that the requirements are enforced and therefore related to negativity. Hard requirements, the interviewees argue, discourage people. Almost all interviewees emphasized that integration should be motivated in another way, by emphasizing the benefits of it. By making clear why migrants should learn the language, emphasizing the benefits of being able to find your way in society and emphasizing the rights you will have as a Dutch citizen, more progress will be booked according to the interviewees. When Somali women know there is a whole world waiting outside for them, they will feel at home sooner. Integration should be motivated in this way, from within and should not be enforced. In this way, the already mixed feelings of refugees after fleeing from their home countries are more respected than by attacking them with all kinds of demands. Moreover, the interviewees argue, curiosity about the Netherlands will come by itself when you are living in it.

Three interviewees mentioned that these forced requirements, especially the cultural requirements, will create hostility. The requirement to feel Dutch could come across as a demand to let go of the culture of origin, which could be insulting. The current Dutch integration policies do make migrants feel defensive according to some interviewees. The fact that they feel attacked, makes them defend their viewpoint or own culture in itself. Therefore, integration should be two-sided; Somali migrants should be open to the Dutch culture and vice versa. The Somali key-figures further argue that people should be accepted as they are and providing them with an environment that gives them opportunities will eventually lead to attachment. Several interviewees mention that participation will eventually lead to feelings of identification.

During the ‘Unlocking the potential of migrants in Europe: from isolation to multi-level integration’, Penninx argues that the essence of policies is that they intend to steer processes in society: in our case the integration processes of immigrants. Explicit policies are part of a political process of normative nature in which first the topic of integration is formulated as problem, the problem is given a normative framing and concrete actions are designed and developed to reach a goal. Policies are defined politically by majorities of the receiving society. There is the inherent danger of being lop-sided, representing expectations and demands of this society rather than being based on negotiation and agreements with immigrants themselves. In contrast with the long-term nature of integration processes, the political process in democratic societies requires short term results, namely within the space
between elections. Like the interviewees, Penninx also argues that the unrealistic promises and demands that arise from this ‘democratic impatience’ often produce backlash. More difficult than democratic impatience however, are situations in which a political climate of anti-immigration and anti-immigrant sentiments – translated into political movements and a politicisation of immigration and integration – affects policymaking, reinforcing interest of the native majority and increasing demands of society.

According to Penninx, integration is ‘the process of becoming an accepted part of society’, while there is a two-way street of interaction between immigrants and the dominant society. There are three dimensions of becoming an accepted part of society: the legal/political dimension, the socio-economic dimension and the cultural/religious dimension, while the process of integration takes place at three levels simultaneously: the individual level, the organizational level of groups and the institutional level. An important question according to Penninx is what the society demands from their immigrants, since the outcome of integration is more determined by the institutional level than by the individual characteristics of the immigrant. For further information, the interested reader is referred to appendix I.

4.4.3 Intermediaries

Another theme that was mentioned frequently by the interviewees is the lack of assistance when Somali migrants enter the Netherlands. Compared to Somalia, the Netherlands is experienced as a bureaucratic country with a lot of rules and paperwork, where you can lose your way quickly. This bureaucratization provokes irritation and asks for assistance, since it is hard for Somalis to find out how it works. It was mentioned various times that the assistance should be easier, more open and less bureaucratic.

The interviewees also argue that clarity is needed, so that Somali women know what they are up to when they start living in the Netherlands and know what is expected of them. A barrier that is mentioned with regard to this clarity is language. Right from the start, Somali migrants are expected to master the Dutch language, only receiving information and letters in Dutch. The interviewees argue that finding your way in the Netherlands would be easier if this information would be provided for in English firstly and if information would be more accessible. According to the interviewees, integration would benefit from clarity provided for by government agencies themselves as well, since Somali migrants have experienced that they were sent from one place to another.

Klaver emphasized the need for information and intensive guidance during the first period of shelter of Somalis in the Netherlands as well. She also emphasized the need for proper language acquisition, the maintenance of guidance after the integration program and the use of Somali role models from the Somali community. Klaver argues again that Somalis have fled out of a torn apart country, while in the Netherlands everything goes fast and the expectations are high. It requires various competencies in order to be able to meet these
expectations, while having such a history. Again, the interested reader is referred to appendix III.

4.4.4 Political turnaround

In line with the research of Van Liempt (2011), three interviewees tell about the turnaround they have witnessed in Dutch politics. In the beginning there was tolerance, interest and understanding, while today there is no more recognition for war victims. In the nineties, the Netherlands was considered as a good country for refugees, while today migrants have problems with feeling at home.

According to the interviewees, especially Islamic migrants feel that they are not free to experience their religion and culture as they want to and they do not feel at home because of it. In the Netherlands, many people just look at the media and believe everything they see and hear, and start finger-pointing as well, while they are not sincerely interested in the matter. Two women for instance argue that nowadays a woman cannot wear a hijab without being stared at.

During his lecture, Penninx also argued that the Europe is ‘an unwilling immigration continent’, while many EU MSs often make explicit that they are no immigration countries on various arguments. Penninx hereby argues that there is a ‘paradox of free movement’: while there is free movement within the EU, there are restrictions for outsiders. These increasing restrictions mainly account for non EU, non-developed countries. Also, within the EU there are variable integration policies, from non-policies to enforced assimilation, while the integration argument is increasingly being used for selective migration. Again, the interested reader is referred to appendix I.

4.4.5 Transmigration to the UK

During the ‘Unlocking the potential of migrants in Europe: from isolation to multi-level integration’, Sasu argued that even though employment is an important challenge for the EU as a whole, there are still shortages of work force reported all across the EU, with significant regional varieties. Therefore, Sasu argued, the potential of intra-EU labor mobility is insufficiently tapped, also by migrants. Legal intra-EU migration can help to relieve labor market shortages in specific areas and should therefore be stimulated. The EU demand for migrant workers will actually increase, according to Sasu. To attract migrant workers, the EU works to reduce gaps in living standards between regions and people, promotes economic and social cohesion and focuses on labor mobility and labor migration. Sasu argued that the new EU policies on migration are based on solidarity and responsibility by substantive involvement of employment and social policies both at EU and member state levels, completing a meaningful admission regime for economic migrants and better valorizing the potential of migration from 3rd countries for satisfying labor market needs and promoting employment growth. The interested reader is referred to appendix I.
As was described previously, the Somali migrant group already has a high intra-EU mobility, from the Netherlands to the UK. Even though labor is mentioned as a reason to transmigrate, the main reason for Somalis to move from the Netherlands to the UK seems to be the desire for freedom and acceptance, according to the interviewees. Their Dutch passport enables them to transmigrate within the EU and many Somalis experience more freedom of religion and culture in the UK. As one interviewee mentions, the UK accepts everybody for who they are, as long as you not break the law, regardless whether you are a citizen or not. Therefore, it is argued that the Netherlands could reduce the Somali transmigration by providing an environment wherein Somalis can feel at home.

The language is also put forward as an important reason to migrate to the UK, since many Somalis already speak English and since the Dutch language is considered as a hard language to learn. Also, one interviewee mentioned that Somali parents prefer to teach their children a language that they can use all over the world, instead of only within Dutch borders. As was already mentioned previously, the Dutch administration is experienced as annoying by many Somalis who live in the Netherlands, who find it hard to figure out how it works. This is also experienced as easier in the UK, mainly because of the language. The language also makes it easier for Somalis to start their own business in the UK, compared to the Netherlands. The interviewees emphasize that Somalis are entrepreneurs and so this is experienced as an important benefit of the UK. In the UK, there are also more family and acquaintances that can help them setting up a business.

4.4.6 Local contact

With regard to the Somali enclaves in the UK, two interviewees mentioned that they think that this is not beneficial for the development and progress of migrants. Notably, all interviewees seem to value multicultural contact in order to stimulate integration on both sides. Three interviewees argued that multicultural festivities are a valuable means of bringing people together and that the Dutch government should stimulate this.

Despite their critical attitude about the political developments of Dutch politics on the level of the nation, almost all of the interviewees actively initiated (multicultural) contact in their local environment and seemed to enjoy and value this. One interviewee explicitly stated that despite the negative discussions about migrants that were going on in the media and politics at the level of the nation, migrants were being active in their own local environments and that they did feel citizen there. Some interviewees seemed to relate to their local environments in an emotional way as well, expressing that people in their local environments made them feel proud, make them feel like you have a place ‘to be’ and give them warm and welcome feelings.

During her lecture at the ‘Unlocking the potential of migrants in Europe: from isolation to multi-level integration’, Baglai also argued that we need to start thinking about diversity differently and that intercultural policies are needed. Diversity, Baglai argues, is the metaphor for fear of change. To manage diversity, Baglai therefore argues, we need a change
in mindset and cities are the actors of this change. We have to start thinking of diversity as an advantage. Diversity policies include guest-worker policy, assimilation policy, multicultural policy and no policy at all. Intercultural policy on the other hand, takes diversity as an advantage, since migrants enhance the city though complementary skills, access to markets and capitals, aspiration and entrepreneurship, cosmopolitan brand and mixing, which means creativity and innovation. Her intercultural cities methods includes among others access to information in English in French and international learning. The interested reader is again referred to appendix I.

4.4.7 Changing relationships between men and women

Almost all of the interviewees tell that when women start living in the Netherlands together with their husbands it frequently causes problems, leading to fights and divorces. Especially in another country than the country of origin, roles are prone to change. In Somalia, the husbands tend to works while the women do everything in and around the house, while in the Netherlands there is another system. Somali women start to ask their husbands to help in the household as well, which is difficult for them to accept. Somali women want to do more than staying home all day to cook and clean and want to live for themselves as well. One interviewee therefore argued that when women come to the Netherlands by themselves, they experience fewer problems and tend to develop better, having more time for their children as well.

The name of the organization Araweelo is inspired by a former queen Araweelo, who ruled the Somali people centuries ago. Men were afraid of her, they claimed and still claim today that she was a disturbed men-hater, but women see her differently. Araweelo wanted equal rights for men and women. She even organized a strike among women during the time she ruled. Araweelo argued that men should be more involved in the household and in raising the children (Araweelo, 2012). During the meeting at Araweelo, where the audience mainly consisted out of Somali women and staff of organizations that were involved in the integration of Somalis, the themes that were struggled for by Araweelo were discussed as well.

The main speaker, Yasmine Allas, argued that taboos needed to be broken in order to stimulate the integration of Somalis. Therefore, issues like birth control and the changing roles of men and women needed to be discussed. To me, Allas seemed to be comparable with Araweelo, in that sense that the opinions about her are divided. Allas argued that there are many men who do not like her, but overall she is ‘tolerated’ in the Somali community. Like Araweelo, she does seem to be liked by Somali women though. The other women who spoke during this meeting seemed to me like women who would have participated in the strike that was organized by Araweelo, mostly agreeing with her point of view. Together they spoke about the changing relationships between Somali men and women in the Netherlands and argued that men should also be involved in the household and in raising the children.
The few men that were also present during this meeting were slightly challenged, while they reacted a bit hesitant with laughter. The interested reader is referred to appendix II.

4.4.8 Self-empowerment

During an interview with NTR (2012), Allas was asked whether the problems with regard to integration among the Somali community are not inherent to the process of integration itself. In response, Allas argued that starting a new life in an unknown country means uprooting and confusion, but that Somalis are good at creating myths to explain away certain behavior. Allas also argues that Somalis play the victim role very well. Of course, they have fled the war, but they have fled to build a better life. The creativity to take action is lacking when Somali women are confronted with a problem according to her, and therefore she is trying to spread the message of self-resilience. While Allas holds the Dutch government responsible for a lack of sympathy for the history of Somalis, her criticism on the Somali community is that it is their responsibility to know in what country they live in and to know what the consequences of their actions could be. According to her, Somalis should be constantly confronted with the fact that they are living in the Netherlands, although they might not welcome this. Again, the interested reader is referred to appendix II.

Despite the arguments that were made by the interviewees about politics, it is notable that all the women that I have spoken to emphasized personal responsibility as well. These Somali women all seemed to think that it was a good thing that language requirements were being set, because they consider language to be essential to participate in society and to prevent isolation. Although learning the language and integration in the Dutch society is a difficult task, it was considered to be very important to the interviewees. Emphasizing that you should not be afraid to make mistakes, as well as the need to be willing to learn yourself and to develop yourself in order to get respect from other people, these women seemed to value individual responsibility in order to develop.
Conclusion

In this chapter, the final conclusions of the research will be discussed and it will provide an answer to the following main question:

*How did the notion of citizenship change during post-nationalism and how is it experienced by Somali women who live in the Netherlands?*

To be able to draw a conclusion on the main question, the theoretical part of post-nationalism and the evolution of citizenship with regard to the post-national, national and local level will be discussed first. Secondly, the descriptive and explorative analyses of the results of the interviews with the Somali female key-figures will be discussed, which demonstrates their experience of post-national, national and local citizenship.

**Post-nationalism**

As is described in chapter two, a nation-state can be defined as a named human population sharing a historic territory, a common culture and common legal rights and duties for all members. Being a citizen depends on membership of a certain national community and since the power of nation-states derives from the people, it is vital to define who belongs to these people. Citizenship is thereby composed of three elements. First, the legal status of citizenship entails the specifics of citizen recognition by the states and provides the formal basis for the rights and responsibilities of the individual in relation to the state. The second element considers citizens as political agents, who actively participate in society’s political institutions. The third, psychological dimension of citizenship refers to citizenship as membership in a political community that furnishes a distinct source of identity. Issues that relate to identity and social integration are related to this third dimension.

Chapter two also showed that the vulnerability of the above described form of national organization has been revealed by globalization. The cross-border flows, together with the resulting economic integration and social transformation, have created a new world order with its own institutions and configurations of power that have replaced the previous structures associated with the nation-state. The nation-state now lies at the intersection of international regimes and organizations, which have been established to manage whole areas of transnational activity and collective policy problems.

**Post-national citizenship**

Globalization and its reality of migration, the formation of supranational bodies, the movement of refugee populations and the codification of international human rights norms have challenged the way we think about belonging and have contributed to rethinking the meaning of citizenship as well. The subsequent concept of post-national citizenship seems to
be predominantly concerned with the nationalist imperatives of nation-states. As opposed to national citizenship, whereby being a citizen depends on membership of a certain national community, post-national citizenship confers upon every person the right and duty of participation in the authority structures and public life of a polity, regardless of their historical and cultural ties to that community. Rights that used to belong solely to nationals are now extended to foreign populations, thereby undermining the very basis of national citizenship. The first and foremost thesis seems to be that international norms and institutions exert pressure on nation states’ sovereignty toward granting individual rights to migrants. When underpinning their claims regarding citizenship transformation beyond the nation-state, post-national theorists often refer to the European level, since the most comprehensive legal enactment of a transnational status for migrants is encoded in European Communities law. The development towards European citizenship initially seems to be limiting the leeway of nation-states.

**National citizenship**

With regard to the changing notions of citizenship at the level of the nation, chapter two showed that globalization did not only result in the above described post-national thoughts though. Although the European Union immigration rules have been more and more Europeanized during post-nationalism, Europeanization has been trumped by the re-nationalization of citizenship as well. The allocation of rights regardless of cultural background at the level of the EU seems to be additional and not replaced by national citizenship. Further, the allocation of citizenship at the level of the nation is restricted by adjusting citizenship criteria for immigrants, with third-country nationals in particular. Citizenship, because of its pivotal position between the individual and the collective level, therefore emerges as one of the crucial elements of population management. The political programmes in the west of Europe manifest on the one hand a neoliberalization of citizenship that involves an increased emphasis on the need to earn one’s citizenship and on the other hand an increased communitarization, or sacralization of the nation in response to immigration, which is of course the perfect opposite of the cosmopolitan thought.

In chapter two it was also argued that although the pluralist perspective was dominant in the Netherlands in the 1980s, the Netherlands is now considered a frontrunner when it comes to the culturalization of citizenship. Since the late 1990s, Dutch discourse on integration has increasingly centered on notions of culture, norms and values and proper definitions of Dutchness but also on the defense of social identity, loyalty and commitment to the community and its values. While in the former system it was believed that a good formal citizenship status was necessary for acquiring good or moral citizenship, in recent years this has been turned around: nowadays moral citizenship comes first and afterwards a formal status can be obtained after demonstrating good citizenship.
Local citizenship

The culturalized requirements in turn affect how migrants relate to the local level. Chapter two showed that when migrants are excluded from identifying at the national level, they tend to express more feelings of identification at the local level or react by taking refuge in their own culture or religion of origin. Another empirical result of the culturalization of citizenship can be found in the high number of transmigration of Somalis to the UK, right after having obtained Dutch citizenship. Dutch citizenship provides them with the possibility to move freely within the EU, showing a relation with post-national citizenship as well. Although it is argued that the possibility of moving freely within the EU is insufficiently used and that it should be stimulated to relieve labor market shortages, the Somali migrant groups seems to be well aware of the possibilities Dutch citizenship offers them with regard to the intra-EU migration. Research showed that an important reason for the Somalis to move to the UK was the experience of the Netherlands as a country where you have to assimilate and where you are not allowed to enjoy your own culture.

As was argued in chapter two, the high number of transmigration shows that the relationship between citizenship and belonging is not as straightforward as is often assumed and neglects the ways in which immigrants experience citizenship. Therefore, in this research it served as a reason to explore how post-national, national and local citizenship is experienced by Somali migrants. Besides a literature study and the attendance of three relevant symposia, in this case study, Somali female key figures were selected through purposive sampling and subsequently interviewed through the use of semi-structured interviews.

The experience of national citizenship

To begin with the experience of national citizenship and its requirements, the interviewees seemed to make a distinction between functional and emotive requirements, as Tonkens, Hurenkamp and Duyvendak (2009) did as well. The language requirement was initially experienced as a good thing, since the Dutch language enables Somali women to participate in the society and prevents them from being isolated.

The cultural or emotive requirements were experienced quite different though. First of all, the interviewees argued that participation in the Dutch society will eventually lead to identification in itself. Therefore, it is important to provide Somali migrants with an environment that offers possibilities. They thereby seem to agree with the believe that a strong formal citizenship status is necessary for acquiring good or moral citizenship, instead of the other way around whereby moral citizenship comes first and afterwards a formal status can be obtained, as was argued by Schinkel and Van Houdt (2010) as well. Cultural requirements, the interviewees further argued, will create hostility. The current Dutch integration policies make migrants feel defensive according to the interviewees. Like Tonkens, Hurenkamp and Duyvendak, who argued that migrants who feel excluded from identifying at the national level because of the assimilationist policies react by taking refuge
in their own culture of origin, the interviewees argued that the fact that migrants feel attacked, makes them defend their viewpoint or own culture in itself even more.

In line with Penninx, who argued that policies that are defined political solely, representing demands of the society rather than being based on negotiations with the immigrants themselves, have the inherent danger of producing backlash, the interviewees argue that hard requirements discourage people. The current requirements are enforced and related to negativity. Integration, the interviewees further argue, should be motivated in another way, from within, by emphasizing the benefits of it. By making clear why migrants should learn the language, emphasizing the benefits of being able to find your way in society and emphasizing the rights you will have as a Dutch citizen, more progress will be booked according to the interviewees. In this way, the already mixed feelings of refugees after fleeing from their home countries are more respected than by attacking them with all kinds of demands. The Somali key-figures also argue that integration should be two-sided; Somali migrants should be open to the Dutch culture and vice versa, like Penninx, who emphasized that integration two-way street of interaction between immigrants and the dominant society as well.

An important point that was mentioned various times by the interviewees was the need for a distinction between people who are able to meet the requirements that are set by the Dutch government and those who are not. Age, lack of education and traumatic experiences are mentioned as reasons that reduce the possibility of learning the language. There should be sympathy for war victims and expectations should not be too high. Penninx also warned that we should be aware of unrealistic demands from immigrants. Paragraph 4.1 showed the Somali history of decades of anarchy and war, which leaves almost all Somalis traumatized when fleeing the country. This makes it especially hard for them to initiate a new life in the Netherlands, making the warning of Penninx especially relevant for them.

The experience of post-national citizenship
As was argued in chapter two, Sasu emphasized that even though employment is an important challenge for the EU as a whole, there are still shortages of work force reported all across the EU, with significant regional varieties. The potential of intra-EU labour mobility, Sasu further argues, is insufficiently tapped, also by migrants. Legal intra-EU migration can help to relieve labour market shortages in specific areas and should therefore be stimulated. While the EU natives need to be stimulated to migrate within the EU, the Somali migrant group already seems well aware of the possibilities Dutch citizenship offers them in this regard.

Chapter four showed that one third of the Somalis left the Netherlands to migrate to the UK, right after having obtained Dutch citizenship. This transmigration is stimulated by political, social and economic reasons, according to the research of Van Liempt (2011) and Van Reek and Hussein (2003). Politically, their experience of national citizenship seems to
play an important role in their transmigration, as chapter four showed that a narrowing definition of what it means to be Dutch was an important reason for Somalis to leave the Netherlands. Research showed that the Netherlands is experienced as a country where you have to assimilate and where you are not allowed to enjoy your own culture. The interviewees confirm that one of the main reasons for Somalis to move from the Netherlands to the UK seems to be the desire for freedom and acceptance, since many Somalis experience more freedom of religion and culture in the UK.

In line with the research of Van Reek and Hussein as well, economically, the interviewees also mentioned the language to be an important reason to migrate to the UK. Since many Somalis already speak English, it is easier to find a job in the UK. With regard to the social factors, Van Reek and Hussein already emphasized that a large community means social contacts, Somali shops and facilities, and also more social control, support and possibilities to educate your children in a Somali sphere and culture. Most emigrants had family members in the UK who helped them with their first steps. The interviewees also mentioned a large Somali community, enclaves, social contact and help from relatives and acquaintances as reasons for transmigration.

The experience of local citizenship

According to the theory of Tonkens, Hurenkamp and Duyvendak (2009), it would seem plausible that Somalis express feelings of identification with regard to the local level, since research has shown that Somalis tend to feel excluded at the level of the nation. The Somali key-figures did not state explicitly that they felt excluded from the Dutch society themselves, although they did expressed critique about Dutch integration politics. As was mentioned previously, the interviewees argued that the current integration politics makes migrants feel offended, since the policies could come across as a demand to let go of the own culture. Despite their critique, the interviewees actively initiate contact in their local environment and seemed to enjoy and value this. One interviewee explicitly stated that despite the negative discussions about migrants that were going on in the media and politics at the level of the nation, she experienced that migrants were being active in their own local environments and that they did feel citizen there. Some interviewees seemed to relate to their local environments in an emotional way as well, expressing that people in their local environments made them feel proud and made them feel like they had a place ‘to be’.

In summary, this research has shown that there seems to be a paradox in the evolution of citizenship during globalization, with regard to the post-national and national level. On the one hand, globalization has resulted in international norms and institutions that exert pressure on nation states’ sovereignty toward granting individual rights to migrants, which are disentangled from country of origin and religion. When underpinning claims with regard to post-national citizenship transformation, post-national theories often refer to the European...
level, since the most comprehensive legal enactments of transnational status for migrants is encoded in European Communities law.

The growing importance of these supranational bodies at first sight seem to be limiting the leeway of nation-states, but when analyzed critically though, these rights seem to be additional to and not replaced by national citizenship. With regard to the level of the nation, globalization’s international migration and the supposed failures of multiculturalism lead to changes in the concept of citizenship in Western European nation-states, where citizenship has become a central concept in integration policies. Their political programmes manifest on the one hand a neoliberalization of citizenship that involves an increased emphasis on the need to earn one’s citizenship and on the other hand an increased sacralization of the nation, which is the opposite of post-national thought. Especially in the Netherlands there seems to be a strong emphasis on culture, norms, values and definitions of what it means to be Dutch in the discourse on integration.

This research has also shown that as a consequence of the restorative notions of citizenship at the level of the nation, migrants tend to respond by identifying to the local level or by having restorative notions of culture themselves as well, by taking refuge in their own culture or religion of origin. Another empirical result of the assimilationist policies is the high number of transmigration of Somalis in the Netherlands. One of main reasons for Somalis to migrate to the UK was the experience of the Netherlands as a country where you are not allowed to enjoy your own culture. Although the possibility to move freely within the EU is insufficiently used by EU citizens, the Somali migrant group seems to be very aware of the possibilities Dutch citizenship offers them in this regard.

The research among Somali female key-figures showed that their experience of EU citizenship seems to be mostly functional, since their interest seems to be limited to the opportunity it offers them to transmigrate, to the UK in particular. The interviewees did not express feelings of emotional identification with the EU in particular. At the level of national citizenship, the Somali female key-figures that were interviewed during this research indicated that they thought that the formal citizenship requirements, like learning the Dutch language, was a good thing in general, because it prevented Somali women from being isolated from society. With regard to cultural requirements though, they argued that this creates hostilities and that you cannot force somebody to feel something. These cultural requirements do relate to the wish to transmigrate to the UK, because in the UK more freedom with regard to culture and religion is experienced by Somalis. The Somali women that were interviewed in this research, all indicated that they valued having contact with people in their local environment. Besides the emphasized importance of these contacts in order to learn the language, some of them expressed feelings of emotional belonging as well, like feeling proud and having a place to be.
Recommendations for further research

As was already mentioned in chapter four, some interesting developments took place in Somalia during the process of this research. After 12 years of transitional government, the first elections took place since decades. The United Nations view these developments as a sign of improving security, while the process has been tainted by allegations of bribery and corruption as well.

Most women that were interviewed during this research argued that it was impossible to go back to Somalia, even if you wish to. Somalia is considered to be unsafe because of Al-Shabab and the political situation. Even though the opinions about the past elections might differ, the elections and the possible future prospect on safety in Somalia could change the way Somali migrants feel about going back to Somalia, especially since Somalis in the Netherlands feel that their freedom to express their religion and culture is restricted. This might in turn change the way Somali migrants relate to the Netherlands or feel about transmigration to the UK. Further research might therefore contribute to the current body of knowledge on the Somali migrant group in the Netherlands.

Another recommendation for further research can be made with regard to the target group. In this research, Somali women that were considered to be key-figures were interviewed. The actual problems among Somali women that were described in chapter two can hardly be found among these key-figures though, since these key-figures are well aware of the society they live in and actively participate in it. In further research, the Somali women that are actually experiencing the main problems could be considered as the main target group, what could contribute to the current body of knowledge as well. Also, the first generation Somali women that were described by the interviewees in this research as ‘invisible’ and ‘isolated’, could be considered as the main target group in order to contribute to the current body of knowledge as well.

During this research, the interviewees argued that they and other Somali migrants experienced a lack of clarity about what was expected from them when they just entered the Netherlands. They also experienced that they were sent from one place to another by government agencies and argued that integration will benefit from offering important information in English as well. It was experienced as disadvantageous for integration that Somali migrants were expected to master the Dutch language right from the start. Further research could demonstrate that this might indeed be beneficial for integration, at least for the Somali migrant group and possibly for other migrant groups as well. Further research might also explore how this lack of clarity that is put forward by these interviewees, is experienced by other migrant groups. This could contribute to the body of knowledge on integration in the Netherlands.
Epilogue

As a psychologist, I have been interested in nationalism for quite some time. It is fascinating to see how people have the need to identify with some sort of group, in order to have self-confidence or feelings of pride. It is even more intriguing to see how this group identification can be used to mobilize people on a large scale. The process of globalization is especially interesting in this regard, because it results in the confrontation between people who differ from each other and the groups they belong to. Out of this personal interest, my interest in citizenship has originated, because I realized that citizenship requirements have to ability to function as a large-scale protection mechanism of ourselves.

While I was reading about citizenship studies, I realized that the Somali migrant group with their high number of transmigration and troublesome integration was a suitable group for conducting an empirical case study. I started my internship at HIRDA, which give me the opportunity to get familiar with the Somali migrant group and their migration history. I have organized several events for the Somali community and have met many Somali people, what was a nice experience. I have to admit that the actual conducting of the interviews progressed troublesome, while there were many appointments canceled and rescheduled (without even letting me know). This too, turned out to be a learning experience for me. The women who I did speak to though, really inspired me with their life vision and psychological strength.

The whole process really enriched my view on citizenship, integration and the human psyche and I am thankful for that.
Literature


Internet references


Lectures


Interviews


FA. (2013). Interviewed the 27th of June by telephone.
Appendix I Findings of attended symposium ‘Unlocking the potential of migrants in Europe: from isolation to multi-level integration’

The Silken Berlaymont Hotel, Brussels
Thursday 27th September 2012
10:00am – 4:00pm

The international Public Policy Exchange symposium that I attend provides a platform for key stakeholders to disseminate knowledge on the most sustainable and successful integration strategies, which involve both migrants and the host societies at a multi-sector level. During the symposium, complexities and comparative experiences from within the diverse regions of Europe were discussed (Public Policy Exchange, 2013).

The first lecture ‘Establishing a comprehensive and holistic European standard for integration of migrants’ was by Ionut Sasu, Policy officer, European Commission’s Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion. Since most EU Member States have experienced increased migration over the last decade with migration from third countries representing approximately 4% of the total EU population (20.1 million citizens) and since there are European cities and regions with over 20% of immigrants and 40% of persons with a migration background, Sasu argues that it is very important to stimulate integration in order to be able to use the potential of migrants. In 2008, the Labour Force Survey ad-hoc module on migrants in the EU showed that foreign-born persons aged 25-54 had over-qualification rates significantly higher than native-borns, higher unemployment rates than native-borns, were more likely to live in overcrowded dwellings and 31% of them were assessed to be at risk of poverty or social exclusion. And when they are unemployed or poor, they have less access to safety nets than EU natives. Therefore, Sasu argues, migrants are more affected by the economic crisis than EU natives and that although major progress with regard to social inclusion has been realized, much work still needs to be done.

Even though employment is an important challenge for the EU as a whole, there are still shortages of workforce reported all across the EU, with significant regional varieties. Therefore, Sasu argues, the potential of intra-EU labour mobility is insufficiently tapped, also by migrants. Legal intra-EU migration can help to relieve labour market shortages in specific areas and should therefore be stimulated. The EU demand for migrant workers will actually increase, according to Sasu. To attract migrant workers, the EU works to reduce gaps in living standards between regions and people, promotes economic and social cohesion and focuses on labour mobility and labour migration. The new EU policies on Migration are based on solidarity and responsibility by substantive involvement of employment and social policies both at EU and member state levels, completing a meaningful admission regime for economic migrants and better valorizing the potential of migration from 3rd countries for satisfying labour market needs and promoting employment growth.
The most important question according to Sasu is:

‘How can we prepare migrants to feel at home, to make them and their human potential become an integral and productive element, alongside the local population, toward their own well-being and the benefit of the economies they live in?’

In order to meet this challenge, the European Commission is concentrating on the monitoring of EU demographic situations, including issues linked to migration, social inclusion and integration of migrants; identifying challenges, opportunities and good practices for policy makers; presenting main trends and assessing policy effectiveness in regular analytical reports on demography; supporting debate, mutual learning and exchange of experiences on demographic changes and migration policies with group of government experts, NGOs, and all the key stakeholders in the area of employment and social policy and finally on promoting an evidence-based approach in social innovation and social policy.

The second lecture ‘Developing a two-way process: promoting integration at the local level’ was held by, inter alia, Rinus Penninx, Professor of Ethnic Studies, University of Amsterdam. Penninx first tells about the European context of immigration, or the context of ‘an unwilling immigration continent’. By 2000, 56 million immigrants lived in Europe, or 7,7% of its population, while there are no ‘nations of immigrants’ tag as in classical immigration countries. Many EU MSs often make explicit that they are no immigration countries, on various arguments. Penninx also argues that there is a ‘paradox of free movement’, free movement within the EU, while there are restrictions for outsiders. These increasing restrictions mainly account for non EU, non-developed countries. Also, within the EU there are variable integration policies, from non-policies to enforced assimilation, while the integration argument is increasingly being used for selective migration.

Secondly, there is the step of the operation definition of integration. According to Penninx, integration is ‘the process of becoming an accepted part of society’, while there is a two-way street of interaction between immigrants and the dominant society. There are three dimensions of becoming an accepted part of society: the legal/political dimension, the socio-economic dimension and the cultural/religious dimension, while the process of integration takes place at three levels simultaneously: the individual level, the organizational level of groups and the institutional level. The process takes place mainly at the local level though and since local contexts and characteristics of immigrants vary significantly, the form and outcome of the process varies. An important question according to Penninx is what the society demands from their immigrants, since the outcome of integration is more determined by the institutional level than by the individual characteristics of the immigrant.

Thirdly, Penninx refers to the nature of policies, the making of integration policies and implementation. The essence of policies, Penninx argues, is that they intend to steer processes in society: in our case the integration processes of immigrants. Explicit policies are part of a political process of normative nature in which first the topic of integration is
formulated as problem, the problem is given a normative framing and concrete actions are designed and developed to reach a goal. Policies are defined politically by majorities of the receiving society. There is the inherent danger of being lop-sided, representing expectations and demands of this society rather than being based on negotiation and agreements with immigrants themselves. In contrast with the long-term nature of integration processes, the political process in democratic societies requires short term results, namely within the space between elections. Unrealistic promises and demands that arise from this ‘democratic impatience’ often produce backlash. More difficult than democratic impatience however, Penninx further argues, are situations in which a political climate of anti-immigration and anti-immigrant sentiments – translated into political movements and a politicisation of immigration and integration – affects policymaking, reinforcing interest of the native majority and increasing demands of society. Immigrants identify themselves more with the local than the national, Penninx argues. Although potentially influenced by national rules, regulations and policies, their process of settlement is primarily local: neighborhood, schools, workplace, etc. The demanding integration policies at the level of the nation could increase tensions at the level of the local though.

Additionally, in her lecture ‘Promoting better integration: tackling misconceptions and discrimination towards immigrants’, Christina Baglai argues that we need to start thinking about diversity differently. Diversity, Baglai argues, is the metaphor for anxiety about change. To manage diversity, Baglai therefore argues, we need a change in mindset and cities are the actors of this change. We have to start thinking of diversity as an advantage. Diversity policies include guest-worker policy, assimilation policy, multicultural policy and no policy at all. Intercultural policy on the other hand, takes diversity as an advantage, since migrants enhance the city through complementary skills, access to markets and capitals, aspiration and entrepreneurship, cosmopolitan brand and mixing, which means creativity and innovation. The intercultural cities method includes diagnostics and profiling, learning and mentoring, strategy development and indicators and evaluation. Advantages of Intercultural cities are the large network, the access to information in English and French, the evaluation of progress, the outreach, on-the-spot visits and international learning.
Appendix II Findings of attended meeting at Araweelo

Araweelo, Amsterdam
Thursday 25th 2012
2:00 pm – 6:00 pm

The historical Araweelo was a queen, who ruled the Somali people centuries ago. Men were afraid of her, they claimed and still claim today that she was a disturbed men-hater, but women see her differently. Araweelo wanted equal rights for men and women. She even organized a strike among women during the time she ruled. Araweelo argued that men should be more involved in the household and in raising the children (Araweelo, 2012).

The audience mainly consisted out of Somali women and staff of organizations that were involved in the integration of Somalis. The main speaker, Yasmine Allas, spoke about the problems between the Somali women and government agencies like Youth Care and the integration of Somalis in the Netherlands in general. Allas seems to be comparable with Araweelo, in that sense that the opinions about her are divided. Allas argued that there are many men who do not like her, but overall she is ‘tolerated’ in the Somali community. Like Araweelo, she does seem to be liked by the Somali women though. The other women who spoke during this meeting seemed to me like women who would have participated in the strike that was organized by Araweelo, agreeing with her point of view. Together they spoke about the changing relationships between Somali men and women in the Netherlands and that men should also be involved in the household and in raising the children. The few men that were also present during this meeting were slightly challenged, while they reacted a bit hesitant with laughter.

Allas seems like a woman who is not afraid to express her opinion and to confront people with their own responsibility. During an interview with NTR (2012), Allas was asked whether problems like the ones Somali women experience with regard to Youth Care are not inherent to the process of integration. Allas thereby argued that starting a new life in an unknown country means uprooting and confusion, but that Somalis are good at creating myths to explain away certain behavior. Allas also tells that according to her, Somalis play the victim role very well. Of course, they have fled the war, but they have fled to build a better life. According to Allas, the creativity to take action is lacking when Somali women are confronted with a problem, and therefore she is trying to spread the message of self-resilience.

Her criticism on the Somali community is that it is their responsibility to know in what country they live in and to know what the consequences of their actions could be. According to her, they should be constantly confronted with the fact that they are living in the Netherlands, although they might not welcome this. On the other hand, even though the Somali women should be ‘punished’ for their actions, the price they pay is not proportional.
Sometimes the children come to live at the other side of the country, after being taken away from their mothers, having no contact with them at all.
Appendix III Findings of attended symposium ‘Het is makkelijker om stadskleren te dragen dan om een stadsmens te worden’

Het Inter-Lokaal, Nijmegen
Thursday 13th December 2012
1:00pm – 6:00pm

This ‘It is easier to wear city clothes than to become a city person’ symposium consisted out of three general lectures and three workshops, out of which you had to choose two to attend. The first lecture was about the Somali community in the Netherlands, by Jeanine Klaver, cluster manager Regioplan Beleidsonderzoek, while it was specified for the Somali community in Nijmegen during the second lecture. During her lecture, Klaver mentioned many statistics about the Somali community in the Netherlands that are already mentioned in the literature findings of this study. Therefore, I will narrow it down to the information that is of added value to my literature findings and of course target group.

Klaver emphasized that the Somali community in the Netherlands is characterized by a young age structure, no less than two-thirds is younger than 30 years. It does not only concern the second generation, during the last year many young Somali asylum seekers come to the Netherlands as well. The share of one parent families is considerably high, since divorces are common among Somalis. One out of four Somalis come out of a one parent family. The women are often on their own with regard to raising and taking care of the children. Klaver also confirms that the integration of Somalis in the Netherlands is troublesome with regard to various aspects. School attendance is low and school drop-outs are high among Somali youth, while there are relatively high unemployment rates among them as well. Especially among the people over 45 years old the unemployment rate is very low, while especially Somali men are overrepresented in criminal statistics.

Klaver argues that there is an accumulation of problems among the Somali migrant group in the Netherlands, making the integration in the Dutch society especially hard. These problems concern unprocessed traumas, cultural differences, the situation in the country of origin where there has been war and anarchy for decades already, distrust towards government agencies, low educational level of especially the latest group Somali asylum seekers, the poor social position and financial problems, the use of qat, insufficient knowledge of the Dutch language and the functioning of the Dutch society and core institutions like education and the labor market.

According to Klaver, two groups of the Somali community need attention in particular, the single mothers and the youth. The single mothers have an essential role in raising their children, while they are often not capable in providing their children with appropriate support, due to their lack of knowledge on the Dutch language and society. Because of the preventive effect it may have with regard to other family members, like
preventing school drop-out and committing criminal activities by youth, attention is needed for this group of women.

As improvement points for the Dutch government, Klaver emphasizes the need for information and intensive guidance during the first period of shelter in the Netherlands. She also emphasizes the need for proper language acquisition, the maintenance of guidance after the integration program and the use of Somali role models from the Somali community. Klaver argues again that Somalis have fled out of a torn apart country, while in the Netherlands everything goes fast and the expectations are high. It requires various competencies in order to be able to meet these expectations, while having such a history.

Although interesting, the workshops were less relevant for my thesis. For the second workshop I chose ‘empowerment met een broodje bal’, which focused solely on the empowerment of Somali men. What might be interesting to say is that during this workshop, I have witnessed the problems that Somali men are experiencing partly as a consequence of the changing or ended relationships with their wives. Not only Somali women, but also Somali men seem to be struggling with problems of isolation and changing expectations with regard to their roles in the household, initiating support groups that focus solely on them.