[Towards an independent Kosovo Security Force!?]

The promotion of local ownership in SSR activities in support of defence reform by KFOR towards a sustainable security sector in Kosovo
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A research to the promotion of local ownership in SSR activities in support of defence reform by KFOR towards a sustainable security sector in Kosovo

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Preface

This thesis is the result of the final research I have conducted on completion of the master programme Conflicts, Territories and Identities at the Radboud University in Nijmegen. For me as an officer of the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps it has been a privilege to be given the opportunity to do this master programme for which I am thankful. Defence reform in Kosovo is chosen as research topic with specific focus on the Kosovo Security Force. This topic is in my field of interest, because the Dutch defence forces are frequently used to train foreign defence forces.

My research interest for the Kosovo Security Force came after I had visited Kosovo once before and gained a lot of interesting impressions. With Dr. Siniša Vuković, I found a first supervisor who had a lot of knowledge on conflict management and had specific interest in Kosovo as well. In the orientation phase of my research we came up with KFOR’s role in the development of the Kosovo Security Force. I would like to thank Siniša for his contribution to my research, because we have been regularly in contact to critically discuss my research to finally bring the research process to a good end.

Part of the research was doing a research internship that was relevant to my research. At the Faculty of Military Sciences of the Netherlands Defence Academy I found the perfect place to do my research and I especially like to thank Drs. Sabine Mengelberg. While doing my internship, Sabine and I have closely worked together on the Kosovo student project in which we coordinated the education programme, our excursion to Kosovo and the visit of the Kosovo Security Force to the Netherlands Defence Academy. Sabine was also willing to act as my second supervisor, for which I am grateful.

Also special gratitude go to the people who participated and helped me with my research. This research would have been impossible without their willingness to cooperate with my interviews. In particular I would like to thank the members of the Kosovo Security Force for being so helpful at all times.

Last but not least, special thanks to my family for their support I have received this year!

Nijmegen, July 2013

Xavier Meulenbeek
Summary

Kosovo unilaterally declared independence in 2008 and after this declaration the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) was established among other things. Since then the KSF wants to become an independent defence force, but is still under supervision of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and is not yet allowed to get an increased mandate. From 1999 onwards, the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) has been leading a peace support operation in Kosovo and has not completely transferred authorities to local actors yet.

In (post-)conflict environments, external organisations and donors are often seen as essential in achieving sufficient levels of peace and stability through statebuilding programmes. One of these statebuilding initiatives is reforming the security sector and defence reform forms an important part of that. The general objective of Security Sector Reform (SSR) is to reform a dysfunctional security sector into a functional one ensuring security and justice which contributes to further statebuilding initiatives. In order for SSR programmes to be sustainable, it is critical to involve local actors in processes of reform as early as possible. The principle of local ownership has been viewed increasingly as a precondition for effective SSR.

The objective of this research is to provide insight into the relevance of promoting local ownership in SSR activities in support of defence reform in relation to an independent KSF in Kosovo and to make recommendations to facilitate KFOR’s decision-making processes in handing over responsibilities to the KSF by analysing the level of local ownership in KFOR’s defence reform activities in the period 2008 until 2013.

Defence reform initiatives should focus on creating sufficient levels of military power which should then be locally owned. Important defence reform activities that have been identified for this research are doctrine development and strategy, command structure, defence force formation and military education and training. Local ownership has to be promoted through the entire SSR process, which includes the initiation, planning, implementation and evaluation phase. A defence force that eventually is able to formulate strategies and translate this into doctrines, able to operate in a transparent command structure and has its own executive powers, is responsible for its formation by selecting personnel and equipment and responsible for training its forces, can be considered to be independent.

The KSF has been developing towards a more professional force since it was established and has received increased capabilities during the SSR process. However, the KSF has
the ambition to become a defence force or to at least have an increased mandate which it is not yet allowed to. Considering the promotion of local ownership in KFOR’s defence reform activities towards the KSF, it can be concluded that there has been promotion of local ownership by KFOR in the planning, implementation and evaluation phases in most of the defence reform activities. However, the promotion of local ownership in the initiation phase for each activity has been limited. This makes the KSF still a security force under supervision of KFOR and not yet an independent and sustainable KSF.

KFOR’s promotion of local ownership towards the KSF is affected by political and military aspects. The main reasons for the limited promotion of local ownership are political limitations, NATO restrictions, limited authority of Kosovo’s government, Serbia’s and Kosovo’s dialogue about normalising relations, the KSF’s continuing development as a young organisation and the limited budget of the Ministry of KSF making it dependent on external help. The main reasons for the significant promotion of local ownership are military and political impulses. Besides the political limitations, KFOR has been promoting local ownership in creating an independent security force and there is a lot of bilateral involvement of NATO members in supporting the KSF.

Promoting local ownership towards the KSF is complex, because of the political and military aspects that affect KFOR. Recommendations that can be made to proceed in transferring authorities by KFOR to the KSF are reviewing KSF’s mandate, declare the KSF to be fully operational capable (FOC) and decide how to continue and consider the accession of Kosovo to NATO through the Partnership for Peace programme. Considering these recommendations could allow KFOR to hand over responsibilities to the KSF.
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1 Introduction

On 17 February 2013 Kosovo celebrated its fifth year of independence after it unilaterally declared independence from Serbia in 2008. This fifth anniversary was celebrated with many flags of the Republic of Kosovo and a military parade of the Kosovo Security Force (KSF). This was the first time after the Kosovo War of 1998-1999 that these security forces presented themselves in such parade. The 2500 forces trained by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) want to become an independent defence force, however the KSF is still under NATO’s supervision and is still a security force (NOS, 2013). The KSF was set up as a lightly armed force and had primary responsibility for security tasks that were not appropriate for the police (Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo, 2008), but so far the KSF has not been allowed to get an increased mandate.

In (post-)conflict environments, external organisations and donors are often seen as essential in achieving sufficient levels of peace and stability through statebuilding programmes. One of these statebuilding initiatives in rebuilding countries emerging from conflict by external actors is rebuilding the domestic security sector. Security Sector Reform (SSR) has become more important in international security and development policies since it first emerged in the late 1990s. The general objective of SSR is to create or to change a dysfunctional security sector into a functional security sector ensuring security and justice, which is conducive to development, poverty reduction, good governance and the growth of democratic states and institutions based on the rule of law (Bryden & Hänggi, 2005; DCAF, 2012; GFN-SSR, 2007; OECD-DAC, 2007; United Nations, 2008). This model of security assistance is becoming more common in statebuilding policies and practices and is perceived as a precondition for stability and sustainable development in countries recovering from conflict (Sedra, 2010). SSR should be approached in a holistic manner (DCAF, 2012; GFN-SSR, 2007; Paris & Sisk, 2009; Schnabel & Ehrhart, 2005; Sedra, 2010; Watkins, 2010) meaning that security is an indivisible concept in which progress in one field should be complemented by progress in other fields by other security institutions (for example: defence, police, border management) in order to be successful (DCAF, 2012).

Defence reform plays a central role in SSR and therefore the military, which is often the most powerful security institution, can influence reform in other sectors as well, such as police and intelligence (OECD-DAC, 2007). External guided SSR in relation to defence reform has proven to be succesful, like in South Africa, Rwanda (Donais, 2009; Nathan, 2007; Snijders, 2010) and also in countries of former Yugoslavia like Croatia (Edmunds,
2007). However, external intervention in domestic matters of other states could create dependency on external assistance (Donais, 2008; Nathan, 2007; Narten, 2009a). The general objective of SSR, creating a sustainable security that supports the independency of states, is then not reached. Without a successful handover of authorities from external to local actors, statebuilding missions, including SSR programmes, would either become open-ended and extra-ordinarily costly, or the missions would come to a sudden end without generating sustainable local institutions (Narten, 2009a). In order for SSR programmes to be sustainable, it is critical to involve local actors in processes of reform or to give them the opportunity to take over the process of reform as early as possible (Teftedarija, 2008).

The principle of local ownership has been viewed increasingly as a precondition for effective development assistance and therefore local ownership has also emerged as part of SSR (Donais, 2008; DCAF, 2012; Narten, 2009a; OECD-DAC, 2007). Even though there are dilemmas in promoting local ownership that potentially endanger the entire statebuilding process, it is still important to mitigate these dilemmas and to promote the principle of local ownership (Narten, 2009a). The key dilemmas in promoting local ownership are the problem of external intrusiveness, local dependency and the “spoiler problem”, and statebuilding activities in Kosovo provide a good illustration of the impact of these three dilemmas (Narten, 2009a).

From 1999 until present, the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) has been leading a peace support operation in Kosovo in support of wider international efforts to build peace and stability in the area (NATO, 2013). After Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008, KFOR has been responsible for the supervision and support of the stand-up of the KSF, but NATO reaffirmed that KFOR would remain in Kosovo and that the process towards minimal presence would be conditions-based and not calendar-driven (NATO, 2013). Since creating a sustainable security sector is the general objective of SSR and since local ownership is essential for successful transformation of authorities, NATO should promote local ownership towards the KSF in its defence reform activities. As KFOR will reduce its presence and influence in the future, security and defence capabilities have to be guaranteed in Kosovo to maintain sustainable peace and stability (Geci, 2011). As the KSF’s tasks and missions include mostly humanitarian and civil protection operations, the KSF getting an increased mandate that includes full military duties would allow the KSF to take over KFOR’s responsibilities (Geci, 2011). Therefore it is interesting to analyse whether or not KFOR has been promoting local ownership towards the KSF in their defence reform activities.
1.1 Research objective and questions

The objective of this research is to provide insight into the relevance of promoting local ownership in SSR activities in support of defence reform in relation to an independent KSF in Kosovo and to make recommendations to facilitate KFOR’s decision-making processes in handing over responsibilities to the KSF by analysing the level of local ownership in KFOR’s defence reform activities in the period 2008 until 2013.

This research objective can be translated into the following main question: Has KFOR promoted local ownership in its defence reform activities from 2008 until 2013 in order to establish an independent KSF in Kosovo? To answer this main research question, the following sub questions are relevant.

1. How have the concepts of SSR and local ownership developed within statebuilding theories and what do these include?
2. Has KFOR promoted local ownership in its defence reform activities in order to create an independent KSF?
3. How can KFOR’s promotion of local ownership towards the KSF be explained?

1.2 Academic and societal relevance

This research is academically relevant, because SSR is a relatively new concept and is not yet properly defined in theoretical debates. SSR gained prominence as an essential component of any successful democratic transition in post-conflict countries and the extent to which SSR programmes are locally owned is increasingly viewed as important. Since the emergence of SSR, the concept has been under-theorised and employed by a variety of different actors in a number of different ways (Bryden & Hänggi, 2005; Edmunds, 2007; Sedra, 2010). Also the concept of local ownership is defined differently by different scholars and the extent to which local ownership has to be applied is debated within the local ownership discourse. Since the principle of local ownership has been viewed increasingly as a precondition for effective SSR (Donais, 2008; DCAF, 2012; Narten, 2009a; OECD-DAC, 2007), this research could contribute to the theoretical debate in defining the concept and the importance of local ownership in SSR. The confirmation of theories increases the base on which the theories of these concepts are build or criticising the theories should lead to putting more focus on theorising SSR programmes for both scholars and organisations involved in SSR.
The societal relevance of this research is fourfold. First, military organisations have often been involved in training defence forces around the world, like Afghanistan, South Africa and Rwanda. Also in future statebuilding programmes, SSR related activities will remain crucial (Sedra, 2010). Future military operations will include involvement in SSR programmes and organisations like NATO have prioritised assisting foreign security forces (Ivanov, 2012). Also the United States and the United Kingdom have published their own doctrines in “Security Force Assistance” (Department of Army, 2009) and “Partnering Indigenous Forces” (Development Concepts Doctrine Centre, 2011). SSR can therefore be considered as important for future military operations. As this research focuses on KFOR’s defence reform activities of a local security force, it scientifically analyses a military involvement that will be important in future military operations and will make recommendations to KFOR’s decision-making processes.

Secondly, many different international organisations play and have played a vital role in statebuilding processes in Kosovo and other Balkan countries. NATO is one of the organisations that guarantees Kosovo’s security. After the KFOR mission entered Kosovo in 1999 by an UN mandate to secure and stabilise the country, it is now one of the KFOR’s new tasks to train the KSF. The KSF is there to protect the people in Kosovo and to act in case of crisis and natural disasters. The creation of the KSF forms an important basis for Kosovo in becoming a stable country, and therefore the independence and sustainability of KSF is relevant.

Thirdly, studying SSR programmes in Kosovo provides insights that may be applicable to other cases as well and therefore lessons learned from Kosovo can be brought into practice in other and new SSR programmes. Studying KFOR’s promoting of local ownership towards the KSF in its defence reform activities is also important, because describing what factors contribute to an independent and sustainable KSF could lead to improvements of KFOR’s current defence reform activities.

Fourthly, today the international community has been involved since the Kosovo War in 1998 and it is likely that international organisations like KFOR will remain present for at least the short term. Until now, the final settlement of Kosovo’s status has not been resolved yet, but this year in April 2013 Kosovo and Serbia reached an agreement on normalising each other’s relations which could be a step in the right direction towards solving the ongoing disputes. If Kosovo and Serbia would further intensify each other’s relations, then this could affect KFOR’s promotion of local ownership towards the KSF in its defence reform activities.
1.3 Structure

In the second chapter the theoretical framework will be described which will create a basis for the analysis of the case study. The concepts of SSR and local ownership will be outlined, discussing both the significance and their relation in the practical application as well as their theoretical foundation. After a more general description these two concepts are specified to defence reform as part of SSR. The third chapter addresses the methodology of this research in which the research approach, used methods, the validity and reliability of the research are described. Then, in the fourth chapter general developments and statebuilding initiatives in Kosovo will be described since the Kosovo War ended that eventually led to the stand-up of the KSF. The fifth chapter specifically focuses on the KSF and its development over time, as well as KFOR’s involvement in this development and the promotion of local ownership in support of defence reform. After describing the level of local ownership by KFOR in different defence reform activities towards the KSF, the sixth chapter will elaborate more on KFOR’s promotion of local ownership. Finally, in the seventh chapter the conclusion is given in which the main question of this research is addressed and recommendations are given.
2 Theoretical framework

This research is about KFOR’s role in Security Sector Reform (SSR) activities since it has been leading the peace support operation in Kosovo, more particularly about the promotion of local ownership in defence reform activities by KFOR towards an independent and sustainable KSF. In this chapter the theoretical framework is described that will be used in the rest of this research. The first paragraph outlines the concept of SSR in general. Then, in the second paragraph the concept of SSR is linked to local ownership. After this general introduction, these two concepts are specified to defence reform as part of SSR in the third paragraph. In the fourth paragraph the link between this theoretical framework and to the rest of this research is described.

2.1 Security Sector Reform

SSR has developed as one of the subfields within statebuilding activities in post-conflict settings. External organisations and donors are often seen as essential in achieving sufficient levels of peace and stability by rebuilding the domestic security sector. The main objective of SSR is to create a stable domestic security sector by setting up security institutions. This paragraph first explains how SSR has emerged to a concept as it is today. Then, the concept of SSR will be defined based on the different literature. Finally, this paragraph elaborates more on the characteristics of SSR.

Origins of Security Sector Reform

Since the end of the Cold War, many international and regional organisations, governmental and non-governmental organisations have conducted many complex peacebuilding operations aimed at stabilising countries emerging from periods of internal conflict. It was former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali who introduced the concept of post-conflict peacebuilding as an important step in the sequence of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping (Schnabel & Ehrhart, 2005). Boutros-Ghali defined peacebuilding as “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict” (Boutros-Ghali, 1992, para. 21). Peacebuilding is a complex and multidimensional process of transitioning that requires a multifaceted and holistic approach, covering diplomatic, political, economic and social factors (Paris & Sisk, 2009; Schnabel & Ehrhart, 2005). In the late 1990s and early 2000s peacebuilding agencies began emphasising the construction of legitimate governmental institutions in post-conflict countries, what was later referred to as statebuilding (Paris & Sisk, 2009).
Statebuilding is a particular approach to peacebuilding, while SSR is again one of the subfields within statebuilding activities. The statebuilding approach emerged on the recognition that achieving security and development in countries emerging from war partly depends on capable, autonomous and legitimate governmental institutions (Paris & Sisk, 2009). The concept of security has been traditionally viewed in state-centric terms, focusing on the protection of states from military threats. After the Cold War, focus shifted towards people and their well-being. As a result, the notion of security also shifted towards human security (DCAF, 2012). The concept of SSR developed along with this new dominant human security agenda.

As a concept, SSR gained prominence initially in response to the challenge of making the security structures of post-communist Eastern Europe more effective, accountable and affordable as part of the broader transition to liberal democracy. Since then, SSR has come to be seen as an essential component of any successful democratic transition (Donais, 2009). However, SSR has been predominantly a donor-driven enterprise and has frequently been based on Westernised views and objectives that are imposed on their partner countries (Donais, 2009; Mobekk, 2010; DCAF, 2012). Donor-driven SSR programmes are unlikely to fully succeed in applying Western rules and standards to the local community without involving local actors. The process of SSR should therefore be a nationally owned process that is rooted in the particular needs and conditions of the country emerging from conflict (DCAF, 2012).

**Defining Security Sector Reform**

The concept of SSR is still relatively new and in the late 1990s the concept became common within statebuilding discourses. Even then it was under-theorised and employed by a variety of different actors in a number of different ways (Bryden & Hänggi, 2005; Edmunds, 2007; Sedra, 2010). However, starting point of SSR is to turn a dysfunctional security sector into a functional one and its objectives are directed at reducing security and democratic deficits (Bryden & Hänggi, 2005, p. 27). SSR has been defined both in policy documents and academic papers.

Different organisations involved in SSR activities have defined the concept of SSR differently. In the United Nations (UN) context, SSR is conceived as “a process of assessment, review and implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation led by national authorities that has as its goal the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the State and its peoples without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law” (United Nations, 2008, para. 17). Another commonly used SSR description comes from the OECD-DAC, which describes SSR as a process in
which a country seeks to "increase [its] ability to meet the range of security and justice challenges in a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of governance and the rule of law" (OECD-DAC, 2007, p. 21). Furthermore, the United Kingdom’s Policy Document on Security Sector Reform (2004) defines SSR as “a broad concept that covers a wide spectrum of disciplines, actors and activities. In its simplest form, SSR addresses security-related policy, legislation, structural and oversight issues, all set within recognised democratic norms and principles” (Department for International Development, Ministry of Defence and Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2004). Taken together, these definitions illustrate that SSR activities operate under the assumption that security and development are mutually reinforcing factors and that principles of justice, rule of law and governance are key reference point in SSR (DCAF, 2012).

Within the academic discourses SSR is defined different as well. According to Bryden and Hänggi (2005) SSR is meant to turn a dysfunctional security sector into a functional one, thereby reducing security deficits and democratic deficits. This double objective of developing an affordable, effective, and efficient security apparatus within a framework of democratic accountability constitutes the uncontested core of the SSR concept (Bryden & Hänggi, 2005, p. 27). Heiner Hänggi (2004) categorises SSR in three different context: developmental, post-authoritarian and post-conflict. Considering this research’ theme of SSR programmes in Kosovo, the post-conflict definition would be applicable. SSR in post-conflict context implies (re-)establishing security forces which are able to provide public security in an effective and efficient manner and in the framework of democratic, civilian control (Hänggi, 2004).

Even though there is not a single definition of SSR, it is generally acknowledged that SSR is: “A nationally-owned process aimed at ensuring that security and justice providers deliver effective and efficient (human) security and justice services that meet the people’s needs, and that security and justice providers are accountable to the state and its people, operating within a framework of good governance, rule of law and respect for human rights” (DCAF, 2012, p. 5). In the DCAF definition the characteristics of SSR have been identified that are derived from different definitions of different organisations and academic writers. All definitions comprise the enhancement of effective and accountable security, political character and the wide spectrum of activities. DCAF has brought different definitions together into one definition and has identified the characteristics that will be explained below.

The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) is an international foundation founded in 2000 on the initiative of government of Switzerland.
DCAF combines research with operational activities and is especially focused on SSR and defence reform and governance of the security sector. Its mission is to assist the international community in pursuing good governance and reform of the security sector. The centre provides advisory support and practical assistance programmes in countries that need to. The DCAF foundation comprises 61 member states from across the world and decisions are made in the Foundation’s Council (DCAF, 2013). As the DCAF is an important foundation in theorising the concept of SSR and putting it into practice, its definition will be used for this research, because it combines definitions of other prominent organisations involved in SSR and the DCAF is a prominent global organisation that uses definitions that are generally acknowledged. The DCAF’s definition will also be used because the organisation has a special interest in defence/armed forces reform, what relates to this research’ theme of KFOR’s promotion of local ownership in defence reform activities towards an independent and sustainable KSF.

**Characteristics of Security Sector Reform**

Building on DCAF’s definition described above, the following characteristics of SSR can be identified which will be elaborated on: SSR is dependent on local ownership, SSR objectives are increased effectiveness and increased accountability and SSR is a process with a political, holistic and technical dimension (DCAF, 2012, p. 7). These characteristics can be illustrated in the following figure:

![Security Sector Reform Diagram](image)

*Figure 1: The Approach, Objectives and Dimensions of SSR (DCAF, 2012)*
Local ownership

The principle of local ownership has been viewed increasingly as a precondition for effective SSR, also given the fact that the process of SSR should be nationally-owned (Donais, 2008; DCAF, 2012; OECD-DAC, 2007). Local ownership implies that the reform of security policies, institutions and activities in a given country must be designed, managed and implemented by local actors rather than external actors (Nathan, 2007, p. 4). Local ownership not only implies government ownership, but it implies a people-centred approach involving all relevant stakeholders. Taking local ownership into consideration in all aspects of SSR activities is crucial for the success of any SSR programme (DCAF, 2012). The next paragraph elaborates more on the local ownership approach in SSR as this is a central theme in this research.

Increased effectiveness and accountability

Effectiveness, the first core objective of SSR, is an important precondition in creating a stable security sector. It refers to improving the provision of security and justice services in order to enhance the overall well-being of the state and its people (DCAF, 2012; Donais, 2009; OECD-DAC, 2007; Sedra, 2010; United Nations, 2008). Increased effectiveness could be achieved through a wide range of activities including skills training for security and justice officials, provision of equipments and infrastructure, undertaking reforms to enhance the organisational and managerial capacity of security and justice institutions, as well as efforts to improve cooperation between security and justice providers (DCAF, 2012, p. 9; Sedra, 2010).

Accountability, the second core objective of SSR, implies that security and justice actors adhere to the rule of law and therefore transparency, oversight and civilian management of security institutions is needed. Democratic control over defence forces or other security institutions, meaning civilian oversight and management of the monopoly of violence, is a crucial condition for a stable and sustainable democracy (Hutton, 2010). Accountability deficits are among the key reasons why SSR programmes are unsuccessful in reaching their desired outcome. SSR programmes cannot be successful in the long term if proper accountability and governance structures are disregarded (DCAF, 2012). A democratic government being the only legitimate actor controlling security institutions allows to control security institutions through the democratic system that represents all citizens within the state. It also prevents security institutions to use their skills and capacity to oppress citizens (DCAF, 2012).
Political, holistic and technical dimensions

SSR is a complex process with three dimensions: it is politically sensitive, highly technical, it requires a holistic approach and understanding of the interconnected nature of security and justice institutions.

First, SSR programmes are highly sensitive and political undertakings, if only because it is about the monopoly on the use of force, power and sovereignty. Additionally, SSR implies decisions relating to the state’s architecture as well as societal values such as freedom, security and human rights (DCAF, 2012; OECD-DAC, 2007; Sedra, 2010). SSR processes should carefully identify stakeholders, minimise the effects of spoilers and ensure flexibility in the planning, design and implementation of SSR programmes (DCAF, 2012).

Second, SSR should be approached in a holistic manner (DCAF, 2012; GFN-SSR, 2007; Sedra, 2010; Watkins, 2010), that involves a multiplicity of stakeholders. Security is an indivisible concept in which progress in one field should be complemented by progress in other fields by other security institutions (for example: defence, police, border management) in order to be succesful. Adopting a holistic vision of SSR requires understanding the interconnected nature of the various components of the security and justice sector (DCAF, 2012).

The foundation of SSR is formed by the people and the various security and justice needs, especially those of the most vulnerable groups. Ideally, a state would attempt to meet these needs through the development of an overarching national SSR strategy. This national strategy encompassess a wide range of sectoral and institutional reform programmes (for example: defence reform, police reform, intelligence reform, etc.). Besides, it is important to consider a number of cross-cutting issues such as gender, human rights and financial management. In addition, there is a need to understand the links between SSR and other reform processess such as Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), Transitional Justice, Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) Control, mine action, elections, etc. Since these processes can affect and can be affected by onging SSR programmes (DCAF, 2012, p. 12).

The holistic nature of SSR does not imply that all activities have to be done simultaneously. Instead, it promotes planning the next specific activity in full awareness of the complex interdependencies that characterise SSR, fitting it within the broader SSR framework and regarding the activity as one step within the overall SSR process (DCAF,
Of this holistic approach, only defence reform activities will be considered in this research. The holistic dimension of SSR is illustrated in the following figure:

![Diagram of The Holistic Nature of SSR](image)

**Figure 2: The Holistic Nature of SSR (DCAF, 2012)**

The third dimension of SSR is its technical complexity. Given the political sensitivity associated with SSR programmes and their holistic nature, SSR programmes require a wide range of skills and the adoption of a multi-disciplinary approach (DCAF, 2012). Among the specific skills required are: thematic competence in specific reform areas (such as defence); organisational expertise (including personnel, budget, IT, logistics); integrity systems (internal discipline, external oversight, governance, gender, human rights); project management skills (including planning, reporting, coordination); political experience (diplomacy, political negotiation) (DCAF, 2012).

These specific skills, expertises and knowledge are required both at strategic/political and at the more practical operational/technical level. There needs to be an appropriate balance between all levels within SSR, ranging from SSR programming to practical types of operational expertise and experience. A proper combination of these skills will help develop coherent programmes that can deliver sustainable results (DCAF, 2012).

### 2.2 Local Ownership within Security Sector Reform

SSR is regarded as an essential component towards any successful democratic transition. SSR aims to ensure both the delivery of effective and efficient security and justice and the accountability of security and justice providers, and that this process of SSR is nationally-owned. The previous paragraph has described briefly the importance of local
ownership as an approach within SSR programmes. At one certain moment in time external support and help, which are important within SSR, needs to be reduced to eventually disappear. In this paragraph the importance of local ownership in SSR is first described and then the dilemmas of local ownership are outlined.

**Importance of Local Ownership**

As mentioned, the principle of local ownership has been viewed increasingly as a precondition for effective SSR (Donais, 2008; DCAF, 2012; OECD-DAC, 2007). Apart from some few exceptions, SSR has been predominantly a donor-driven and donor-defined enterprise (Donais, 2008; Donais, 2009; DCAF, 2012). As donors control both SSR funding and SSR agenda-setting, strong donor influence runs through much SSR programming and therefore SSR often appears to be an externally-driven process (Donais, 2009). Externally driven processes can produce resentment and resistance for external support (DCAF, 2012). However, SSR often takes place in contexts in which external support is required because of limited local capacity or resources (DCAF, 2012). So there needs to be a proper balance between external support to SSR programmes and the extent to which the reforming process is locally owned.

Local ownership has to be taken into consideration in all aspects of SSR-related activities, because it makes SSR sustainable and ensures that SSR-related activities respond to local needs (DCAF, 2012). Reforms that are not shaped and driven by national actors are unlikely to meet people’s needs and are therefore unlikely to be sustainable. The outcomes of SSR are inseparable from the processes of SSR (Donais, 2009). So success of any reform process within SSR is highly dependent on the level of local ownership.

The extent to which local ownership has to be applied is debated within the local ownership discourse and therefore there are different definitions of this concept. Laura Nathan (2007) argues that “the principle of local ownership means that the reform of security policies, institutions and activities in a given country must be designed, managed and implemented by local actors rather than external actors” (Nathan, 2007, p. 4). Nathan’s vision implies that SSR should be fully owned and operated by local actors, however this vision confronts some uncomfortable realities because external help and support remain important. The most obvious challenge is that there is little reason to believe that greater local ownership of SSR will lead to improved security (Donais, 2009). Therefore tensions emerge between the principles of good governance and local ownership.
Jens Narten (2009) is more aware of the lack of capacities of local actors and the importance of external actors in the first place. He defines local ownership as follows: “The process and final outcome of the gradual transfer to legitimate representatives of the local society, of assessment, planning and decision-making, the practical management and implementation, and the evaluation and control of all phases of statebuilding programmes up to the point when no further external assistance is needed” (Narten, 2009a, p. 254). Important to emphasise is the gradual transfer of ownership towards local actors and this definition is more aware of the tensions between good governance and local ownership. Also, this definition includes the notion that in order for SSR to be successful, local actors should be involved throughout the entire process of SSR to eventually become independent and sustainable. The phases in which local actors should be included are: initiation, planning, implementation and evaluation (Narten, 2009a; Donais, 2009, p. 118; United Nations, 2008). Narten’s formulation of local ownership will therefore be used in this research, because it allows this research to analyse to what extent KFOR has been promoting local ownership in different phases of its SSR activities.

Dilemmas of Local Ownership
As mentioned above, the principle of local ownership has been considered important for SSR programmes to succeed, even though there are some tensions and discussions in how to promote local ownership. Narten’s definition of local ownership will be used, but Narten is also aware of some dilemmas in promoting local ownership. The three key dilemmas in promoting local ownership are the problem of external intrusiveness, local dependency and the “spoiler problem” (Narten, 2009a, p. 255). External statebuilding programmes might face these dilemmas and when reforming a country’s security sector there needs to be a proper balance between external support and local ownership.

Figure 3: Dilemmas of Local Ownership
Need for external intrusiveness versus creating self-governance

The first dilemma relates to the extent to which external statebuilding is intrusive and promoting local ownership at the same time. SSR activities of external actors are regarded as intrusive if they do not allow input, consultation and control by local actors in different phases of the SSR activities (Narten, 2009a). External actors will therefore be regarded as less intrusive if any SSR measures are reached in consensus with legitimate local actors. This dilemma of intrusiveness is particularly common in post-conflict environments in which external intrusiveness is needed to fill a potential vacuum of domestic authority, especially in the absence of political consensus, capacities and resources (Nathan, 2007; Narten, 2009a). When external actors are needed in post-conflict situations, the dilemma of external intrusiveness versus creating self-governance is likely to occur because of the lack of local capacities.

When external actors have to exercise both authoritative functions and need to help local actors build up their self-governance capacities, the question remains what degree of intrusiveness is appropriate. In practice, actors involved in SSR activities face challenges in determining the appropriate degree (Narten, 2009a). If the transfer of authority occurs too early, local actors will be unable to take over responsibilities, which creates a certain local dependency on external support. Statebuilding activities in Kosovo might face this dilemma, because Kosovo has not been an independent state before the Kosovo War ended in 1999. Regarding KFOR’s promotion of local ownership in its defence reform activities, it needs to find a balance between intrusiveness and promotion of local ownership towards the KSF in the initiation, planning, implementation and evaluation phases of the reform process.

Extending local dependency by short versus long term commitments

The second dilemma of local dependency is related to the previous dilemma, namely to what extent external support is needed on the short and long term. On the one hand, external actors involved in SSR feel pressure from other international donors to conclude their mandate within short timeframes to allow operational capacities to deploy elsewhere, to keep military engagement abroad limited and to save a considerable amount of money (Narten, 2009a, p. 258). Considering SSR activities in Kosovo by NATO, NATO member states could possibly want the KFOR mission to end as soon as possible and therefore formulate a mandate with a short timeframe in order to hand over authorities towards the KSF quickly. On the other hand, creating a sustainable security sector needs thorough capacity building in many state structures with sufficient local skills, expertise, competences and a civil culture of democratic values (Narten, 2009a). This makes long term commitment by external actors necessary.
Both short and long term commitments could create and extend the local dependency from external support. Short term commitments could lead to a too short period of external help, resulting in transferring authorities too quickly. This could negatively affect the stability of the security sector, because the development towards sustainable local ownership has not yet been completed. Long term commitments could extend the local dependency because local actors have not been given the opportunity to fully take over responsibility. A proper assessment of the SSR developments by external actors is therefore crucial (Narten, 2009b). The NATO-led KFOR mission has been present in Kosovo since 1999 and this mission is NATO’s longest commitment ever. Therefore KFOR has to be aware of the fact that it is not being intrusive and is not extending the KSF’s dependency.

Identifying local partners versus empowering potential spoilers

The third and last dilemma is related to the difficulties that external actors have in identifying appropriate local partners. In war-torn countries it is difficult to appoint capable local partners. External actors need to identify cooperating partners within the local population, without whom local ownership of SSR processes could not be realised (Narten, 2009a, p. 261). If appropriate local partners are not found, then the appointed local actors might spoil the process of SSR.

There is a risk of appointing local partners among former warring parties who bear responsibility for the violence during the conflicts, because it would signal to the local population that violence during the conflict will pay off after the conflict. In some cases, choosing a partner involves a choice between effectiveness and legitimacy (Hansen, 2008). However, these actors often continue to enjoy strong support after the conflict, so there is a risk to sideline these actors. Another risk arises when choosing to appoint local partners along ethnic lines. Considering Kosovo it is especially important to include both ethnic Albanians and ethnic Serbians in SSR programmes, because this would create some mutual understanding towards ethnicities (Narten, 2009b). These two perspectives dominate the political discourse about identifying local partners as “spoilers” or “governance actors” (Schneckener, 2009).

These dilemmas might form a restraint in the complete promotion of local ownership by external actors, especially because the dilemmas are all related to each other and have the potential to reinforce each other. Therefore it is important to consider these dilemmas in formulating SSR objectives and important to consider the process of promoting local ownership.
2.3 Local Ownership within Defence Reform

The previous paragraphs have defined and described the general concepts of Security Sector Reform and local ownership. The main objective of SSR is to create a stable domestic security sector by setting up security institutions. SSR should be approached in a holistic manner in which different security institutions complement each other in creating a sustainable security sector. Defence reform plays a central role in SSR and therefore the military, which is often the most powerful security institution, can influence reform in other sectors as well. First, in this paragraph the transformation clusters in reforming defence forces are described. Then will be elaborated on defence forces and the components of military power. Third, the transformation clusters are combined with the components of military power in order to operationalise researchable variables which allow this research’ analysis to be done.

Reforming Defence Forces

Countries emerging from conflicts often need external help in reforming its defence forces. Defence forces need to be effective and accountable, which implies that these forces adhere to the rule of law and transparant oversight and civilian management of security institutions is needed. Democratic control of defence forces through a democratic system that represents all citizens within the state prevents defence forces to use their skills and capacity to oppress citizens. However, considering Kosovo or other neighbouring Balkan countries, history has been marked by a long history of conflict and violence and therefore this process of reform towards a sustainable defence force is complicated. Still, the objective is the creation of an independent defence force, which operates to standards that apply within the SSR agenda.

Considering defence forces, many reforms have to take place in several areas. Rocky Williams\(^1\) (2005) identified four transformation clusters in reforming defence forces, namely cultural transformation, human transformation, political transformation and organisational transformation (Williams, 2005, p. 48). The first cluster, cultural transformation, is about the transformation of the organisational culture within defence forces and the traditions upon which the organisation is predicated. Secondly, human transformation entails transforming the organisation’s composition regarding its racial, ethnical, regional and gender composition. It also includes human resource management. The third cluster of political transformation strives to ensure that the conduct and character of defence forces are conform the political features of democracy. For defence

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\(^1\) Dr. Rocky Williams was former head of the African Security Sector Transformation Programme at the Institute of Security Studies (ISS) in South-Africa. Before that, he has been working at the South-African Ministry of Defence as Director Operations ranked as Colonel.
forces this includes acknowledgement of civil supremacy and adherence to the principles and practices of accountability and transparency. Finally, organisational transformation includes transforming the organisation of the defence forces to enhance efficiency and effectiveness in future operations (Williams, 2005, p. 48).

**Defence Forces and the Components of Military Power**

When reforming security sectors as part of further statebuilding initiatives, it is required for defence forces to possess a sufficient level of military power. Generally, defence forces exist usually to realise foreign and domestic policies of their government and to defend the state’s security it represents from external and internal aggression (Nederlandse Grondwet, 2013; US Department of Defense, 2013). The use of defence forces is to achieve political objectives. The concept of military power, which consists of a conceptual, physical and moral component component, is a constantly changing concept that needs to adapt to new security threats (Canadian Forces Experimentation Centre, 2011; Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, 2010; Development Concepts Doctrine Centre, 2011; Koninklijke Landmacht, 2009; NATO Standardisation Agency, 2013; Rickard, 2010; Sloan, 2012).

The conceptual component comprises the doctrine; a set of widely accepted principles of operations and practice related procedures. Success in military operations derives from the correct interpretation and application of principles of operations. These principles stem from years of experience. The physical component concerns the operational capacity of personnel and equipment. Also the operational readiness is considerend to be important within the physical component and therefore the level of training of units is an essential part of this. At last the mental component consists of effective leadership, motivation and the management and organisation of responsible deployment (Development Concepts Doctrine Centre, 2011; Koninklijke Landmacht, 2009). Within defence forces a modified command structure needs to be formed to allow transparancy of activities and enables control by civilian oversight. Defence reform activities in Kosovo should focus on the components of military power, because these are considered crucial in the overall functioning of defence forces. The KSF needs to locally own these components in order to be independent and sustainable.
Operationalised variables
This research’ theme is about the promotion of local ownership by KFOR in support of defence reform activities towards the KSF. To answer the research questions of this thesis as fully as possible, the just mentioned transformation clusters can be combined with the components of military power to operationalise researchable variables. In order for the KSF to be independent and sustainable there needs to be a right balance in the three components of military power and these components should be locally owned. Therefore this research focuses on the promotion of local ownership by KFOR in activities related to these components. So Williams (2005) claims that in order for defence reforms to be succesfull, defence forces have to undergo four transformation clusters. Also, having a sufficient level of military power is necessary for defence forces to operate (Canadian Forces Experimentation Centre, 2011; Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, 2010; Development Concepts Doctrine Centre, 2011; Koninklijke Landmacht, 2009; NATO Standardisation Agency, 2013; Rickard, 2010; Sloan, 2012) and necessary in creating sustainable democracies and achieving political goals (DCDC, 2011;
Koninklijke Landmacht, 2009). By combining the transformation clusters and the components of military power, the following variables can be operationalised:

1. Doctrine development and strategy, organisational transformation;
2. Command structure, combination of political and organisational transformation;
3. Defence force formation, combination of cultural, human and organisational transformation;
4. Military education and training, organisational transformation.

**Figure 5: Operationalised Defence Reform variables**

**Doctrine development and strategy**

As mentioned, a military doctrine comprises a set of widely accepted principles of operations and practice related procedures. Military doctrines define the most effective way of using military assets based on practical experiences. For military operations to be successful, there has to be an understanding of the nature of circumstances in which
they are carried out. A military doctrine represents principles that are collectively and officially approved in deploying defence forces to realise the objectives determined in the strategic process (Ministry of Defence, 2005). The strategic process is about translating national interests into national objectives. Doctrines also have a function within defence forces in military education and training, which shows the relationship between the components of military power.

Regarding defence reforms, the formation of defence forces should be derived from the strategy and doctrine that would contribute to a sustainable security sector. A doctrine is not dogmatic, but is intended to advise and guide future operations and therefore it is especially important for newly set up defence forces. Without a guiding doctrine, principles of operations that are considered crucial for military operations, like unity of effort (Koninklijke Landmacht, 2009), would lead to differentiation within the same defence force. Doctrines also provide a certain level of transparency, because perspectives, strategies and modes of action of defences forces can be found here.

Since the KSF is a young organisation it does not have years of experience that can be translated into doctrines and strategies. Doctrines and strategies are however an important part of the military power, so then it is likely that external involvement of KFOR was high in the beginning to dictate the KSF’s doctrines and strategies. Over time KFOR should promote local ownership in this particular defence reform activity, so the KSF will be able to formulate its own doctrines and strategies from which it derive its mandate, mission statements, objectives.

**Command Structure**

Creating an independent and sustainable defence force that is both effective and accountable is one the objectives within SSR. This implies that defence forces adhere to the rule of law and so transparency, oversight and civilian management is needed. Democratic control over defence forces is crucial to stable and sustainable democracies (Hutton, 2010), and therefore a functioning command structure to which defence forces adhere is important. Ignoring these command structures or operating independently from civilian oversight, could lead to non-functioning or corrupt defence forces. By creating healthy relationship between defence forces and civil authorities skewed power relations can be prevented. Promoting local ownership concerning the command structure is important, because defence forces need to development good relationships with local authorities instead of developing relationships with external actors.
Before the Kosovo War, Kosovo has been a province of Serbia until it declared itself independent in 2008. Kosovo’s government was therefore inexperienced in controlling the KSF and neither was the newly established KSF used to be operating a democratic command structure and to be subordinate to civilian oversight. KFOR’s involvement in the KSF and the Ministry of the KSF was likely to be high in the beginning, because local actors did not have the experience. The promotion of local ownership by KFOR should therefore focus on the transfer of authorities to civilian oversight of the KSF and focus on training the KSF in operating in an operational command structure. Over time KFOR should also reduce its executive authorities over the KSF, so local institutions will become responsible for Kosovo’s security sector.

Defence Force Formation
As SSR programmes aim to ensure human security and justice that meet people’s needs, it is thus important to consider this in the formation of defence forces. A defence force that is accountable to the state and its people and operating within a framework of good governance, rule of law and respect for human rights is needed for creating a stable and sustainable security sector that is conducive to other statebuilding activities. In the formation of defence forces are therefore two important aspects, namely the representation of different ethnic groups and the local involvement in this formation process. Also, the control and purchase of equipments is an important part of defence force formations.

Post-conflict environments that have been torn apart by conflict and are struggling with its aftermath are filled with feelings of discontent and hatred for a long time. Relationships between different ethnic groups are then strained, which could affect stability within a country. Creating security institutions that can contribute to a stable security sector is then a challenge and so is the formation of a defence force that can count on the support of the population. To create support for defence forces among the entire population, proper representation of ethnic groups and the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants also plays a critical role in transitions from peace to war (Knight & Özerdem, 2004). Because of the importance of DDR within SSR activities (DCAF, 2012), Williams (2005) speaks of transformation instead of the formation of defence forces. There is a risk of appointing influential local partners among former warring parties who were involved during the conflicts but still control parts of the territory. Legitimising “undesirable” partners would signal to the local population that violence during the conflict will pay off, but there is also a risk to sideline these actors because of their strong support. In some cases, choosing a partner involves a choice between effectiveness and legitimacy (Hansen, 2008). For Kosovo, the
formation of the KSF should consist of both ethnic Albanian, Serbian and other minority groups. Also, DDR programmes are important while setting up a new KSF.

Also local involvement in the formation process is important and this involvement should be in line with the objectives of SSR programmes. As has been described, local actors should be involved throughout all phases of the defence reform process (Narten, 2009b) and the local execution of the recruiting process is thus important. External intrusiveness as one of the dilemmas of local ownership could lead to local dependency, while external support in the formation process might still be required. Former warring parties might be selective in recruiting new members of defence forces and exclude particular groups, but external advice and control should guide such processes successfully. Proper balance in both external and local involvement is needed.

The control and purchase of equipments that meet defence force’ requirements is another important aspect of defence force formation. The purchase of new equipments is also related to the changing security environment and to national strategies. So the physical component of military power is clearly linked to the conceptual component.

The promotion of local ownership by KFOR should focus on recruiting campaigns of the KSF and KSF’s management to control its equipments. Again it is likely that KFOR was highly involved in recruiting new members into the KSF, because the KSF was a young organisation and KFOR had to make sure it appointed the “desirable” partners within the KSF. After appointing the KSF’s management, KFOR should promote local ownership so the KSF is responsible for its own recruiting campaigns in which there is specific attention to ethnic and female representation. Also the control of the KSF’s equipment should be locally owned. As the KSF was likely to be dependent on KFOR considering doctrine development and strategy, the control of equipment by the KSF would then be very much related to strategies that have been dictated by KFOR. As the KSF would formulate its own doctrines and strategies, the control of the KSF’s equipment could be locally owned better.

**Military education and training**

Doctrines serve as a guideline for defence forces in conducting future operations and the operational readiness of defence forces is therefore strongly linked to its doctrine and strategy. Military education and training in practice is derived from doctrines and as doctrines and strategies change over time, defence forces have to adapt to that and train their personnel accordingly. In this research, the focus will be on the operational level of
military education and training of the KSF and not on the tactical level of tactics and standard operating procedures (SOPs).

Local ownership in military education and training can be promoted in different phases and at different levels. External actors could formulate education and training programmes in which local actors can only participate limitedly, while local actors could also formulate their programmes and train their forces independently. External trainers could be responsible for providing military trainings or local actors have the capacities to train their own people. The level of independence is bigger when local actors are closely involved in these processes. Again, some external guidance and advise might be required in order to prevent education and training processes from derailing.

The promotion of local ownership by KFOR towards the KSF in military education and training should aim at providing the KSF with capacities and expertise in training their forces. If this process would be locally owned then the KSF would be responsible for its own training programmes, would have its own trainers and could adapt to changing doctrines and strategies.

2.4 Promotion of Local Ownership within KFOR’s Defence Reform activities

So far the concepts of SSR and local ownership have been described to then link these to defence reform. The characteristics of SSR have been explained in which the promotion of local ownership is considered to be an important approach, but also faces some dilemmas while promoting this. Within defence reform activities, external support should focus on creating a sufficient level of military power. In this paragraph the relation is described between this theoretical framework and the rest of this research. Therefore this paragraph explains how KFOR’s promotion of local ownership within its defence reform activities towards the KSF is analysed.

Concerning the characteristics of SSR, KFOR has to promote local ownership in its defence reform activities in order to create an effective and accountable KSF. KFOR, and other organisations involved in SSR programmes, operate within a complex environment of political, holistic and technical dimensions. Independent defence forces rely on a sufficient level of military power and therefore this research has operationalised four defence reform activities which are derived from the defined SSR concept and the concept of military power. This research focuses on the KSF’s development in four defence activities that have been operationalised and the level of KSF’s local ownership in these four activities during the process of defence reform by KFOR.
In accordance to the importance of local ownership within SSR activities in support of defence reform, local actors should be included in the initiation, planning, implementation and evaluation phase (Narten, 2009a, p. 254; Donais, 2009, p. 118; United Nations, 2008) of those defence reforms. Only then the SSR objectives of effectiveness and accountability can be reached in creating an independent and sustainable KSF. This research analyses for each of the four individual defence reform activities what development the KSF has made since its establishment and how KFOR has promoted local ownership in each phase.

While analysing the formation of the KSF, the promotion of local ownership in the selection and composition of personnel and the selection of equipment is important to focus on. Then, regarding the command structure, it is important to consider the transparent relation with the KSF and Kosovo’s civil authorities and the change of KFOR’s external executive powers over the years. Also in the development of doctrine and strategy, the extent of the KSF’s involvement in the process of formulating own KSF doctrine and future strategies will be analysed. Last, the extent to which the KSF is involved in educating and training their own forces is analysed. These four SSR activities in support of KFOR’s defence reform towards an independent and sustainable KSF, can be combined with the four phases of local ownership and illustrated in the following figure:

![Figure 6: The four operationalised defence reform activities related to the different phases of local ownership influenced by local and external efforts towards an independent Kosovo Security Force](image-url)
This figure illustrates how the theoretical framework relates to this research. In general it is likely that if a defence force is being reformed and it eventually is locally responsible for the defence activities that have been operationalised, that this would lead to an independent defence force. When a sufficient level of military power is locally owned, then the defence reform activities by external actors can be considered successful. In defence reform processes both local and external influences determine the level of local ownership. A proper balance between local and external influence is required through all identified phases to create independence and sustainability and to prevent any dilemmas in promoting local ownership. When reforming defence forces, external actors might first have to assist local actors to then transfer authorities to local actors during the different phases of the process of defence reform. During the process of promoting local ownership, it is likely that the level of local influence increases over time. A defence force that eventually is able to formulate strategies and translate this into doctrines, able to operate in a transparent command structure and has its own executive powers, responsible for its formation by selecting personnel and equipment and responsible for training its forces, can be considered to be independent.

In this research, for each individual defence reform activity the level of local ownership in analysed for each phase. As local actors should be included in every phase, the local influence of the KSF and external influence of KFOR should be in balance in every phase in each reform activity. The larger the local influence in this process of local ownership, the more independent and sustainable the KSF will be. In its promotion of local ownership, KFOR might face the three dilemmas that might affect the KSF’s independence. The dilemmas are likely to occur, because it is common for post-conflict institutions to have limited capacities and resources which lead to long term commitment by external actors. Therefore the most desirable process would be that the promotion of local ownership by KFOR towards the KSF in each individual defence reform activity would be in balance, so any dilemmas in promoting local ownership would be reduced to a minimal level. Then this would lead to a successful defence reform in Kosovo and to an independent and sustainable KSF.

The relationship between the level of external influence by KFOR and the level of local influence by the KSF decide the level of local ownership. The different levels of local ownership range from full local execution to full external execution. In the following table these different levels of local ownership are operationalised.
Defence Reform Activity | Level of Local Ownership | Symbol
--- | --- | ---
Fully local execution | Very high | ++
External advice, local execution | High | +
Joint execution or execution with strong external pressure | Medium | +/-
Local influence, external execution | Low | -
Fully external execution | Very Low | --

Table 1: Operationalisation of the levels of local ownership

This research focuses on the level of local ownership for each individual phase for each individual defence reform activity. Relating the individual defence reform activities to the operationalised levels of local ownership for each phase provide overview of KFOR’s promotion of local ownership towards the KSF for each defence reform activity. The level of local ownership will be indicated by the symbols identified in the table above, ranging from fully local execution (very high) to fully external execution (very low). In the following table will be used for this research’ analyses to provide an overview of KFOR’s promotion of local ownership:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Defence Reform Activity</th>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Local Ownership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Doctrine development and strategy</strong></td>
<td>Initiation Planning Implementation Evaluation</td>
<td>Initiation Planning Implementation Evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Doctrine</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Strategy</td>
<td>Initiation Planning Implementation Evaluation</td>
<td>Initiation Planning Implementation Evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Command structure</strong></td>
<td>Initiation Planning Implementation Evaluation</td>
<td>Initiation Planning Implementation Evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Defence force formation</strong></td>
<td>Initiation Planning Implementation Evaluation</td>
<td>Initiation Planning Implementation Evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Personnel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Equipment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Military education and training</strong></td>
<td>Initiation Planning Implementation Evaluation</td>
<td>Initiation Planning Implementation Evaluation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Level of local ownership in different phases of KFOR’s defence reform activities
In this chapter the theoretical framework has been described that will be used for further analysis in the rest of this research. The importance of local ownership within SSR has been explained and in particular its promotion in defence reform activities, as this relates to this research’ theme. Finally in this chapter has been explained how the promotion of local ownership within KFOR’s defence reform activities will be analysed. Before the operationalised variables are being analysed for the KSF’s development since its establishment, this research’ methodology is described in the next chapter after which it is generally described how the Kosovo War has eventually led to the stand-up of the KSF.
3 Methodology

In the previous chapter the theoretical framework has been described in which the importance of local ownership within SSR has been explained and in particular its promotion in defence reform activities. This chapter addresses the methodology of this research in which the research approach, research methods, the validity and reliability of the research is described. This research is a qualitative research that will be mainly conducted by desk research, but additional interviews and observations will be conducted in support of the literature as well. In the first paragraph the research strategy is described, in which the conduct of this research is given. The second paragraph explains why the particular case and research methods are chosen. Then the third paragraph elaborates more on the literature that has been studied for this research, as well as the fourth and fifth paragraph that elaborate more on the interviews and observations of this research. This chapter ends with reflecting on this research’ validity and reliability.

3.1 Research strategy

This research model below presents the conduct of this research, which is extracted from the research objective and research questions.

![Research model](image)

Figure 7: Research model

In describing the relevance of local ownership in defence reform activities, scientific literature has to be analysed. As the literature is operationalised into researchable variables, the focus on local ownership in defence reform activities will be on doctrine development and strategy, command structure, defence reform formation and military education and training. Then this theoretical framework is used to analyse KFOR’s promotion of local ownership in defence reform activities towards the KSF from 2008
until 2013. The required information will be primarily acquired through literature, but also through interviews and observations.

Analysing how the relevance of local ownership in defence reform activities is described in theory and conducted in practice by KFOR, allows this research to conclude whether this resulted in an independent and sustainable KSF. Based on that analysis the relevance of local ownership in defence reforms can be indicated and recommendations can be made to facilitate KFOR’s decision-making processes in handing over responsibility to the KSF.

3.2 Case and method selection

In the introduction has been described what the academic and societal relevance of this research is. The answer to the main research question can partly be found through literature, but in order to get an increased understanding of local practices, interviews and observations were conducted. There were some limitations to the case and method selection that are worth mentioning.

For this research, there was a special interest in doing research on Kosovo and more particularly in the KSF’s development. Defence reforms are especially interesting because it provides new insights in how new defence forces are formed and how those forces will be independent and sustainable. Considering Kosovo, many statebuilding efforts have not been successful and neither have SSR efforts. For this research’ internship it was relevant to do an internship at the KFOR headquarter in Pristina. However, it was not allowed because this research was not commissioned by the Dutch Ministry of Defence. Also this research would be too critical to KFOR and there were also some safety regulations. Kosovo namely is still considered to be a military mission area. These restrictions limited possible research internships. However, an internship at the Faculty of Military Sciences at the Netherlands Defence Academy was both interesting and beneficial to the research.

An internship at the Faculty of Military Sciences, at the section International Security Studies, included a Kosovo excursion project concerning stability and reconstruction in post-conflict areas in which students of Military Sciences participated. The one-week excursion included tours and presentations to the KFOR Headquarter in Pristina, EULEX Special Police Department in Mitrovica, Kosovo Academy for Public Safety (KAPS), KSF base and academy combined with a battlefield tour and a visit to the Serbian enclave Goraždevac in which we visited a Serbian NGO and monastery.
Besides the one-week excursion, the opportunity was provided to stay for another week in which interviews could be conducted with different people from KFOR, KSF, Ministry of KSF, Kosovo Centre for Security Studies, American embassy and with the Military adviser of the Commander of the KSF. In the Netherlands the opportunity arose to interview Mister Pieter Feith, who was a senior diplomat and crisis management expert working for the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, EU and NATO. He ended his career as International Civilian Representative (ICO) in Kosovo. Also the KSF academy has visited the Netherlands Defence Academy for a student exchange for a week, in which student of the KSF academy learned more on the historical, political and military affairs of the Netherlands. These experiences during the internship gave many different impressions that were useful to this research.

Doing an internship at the Faculty of Military Sciences allowed access to do interviews, because many contacts were made with several interviewees. Being in the military also provided better access to KFOR, KSF and the Ministry of the KSF. This can considered as a great advantage to this research, because it allowed conducting interviews with people relevant for doing the analysis. The KSF was very helpful in assisting this research, because some contacts arranged some interviews with people that were considered to be useful and provided great help. The case and method selection were limited because of
some restrictions that were just mentioned, but this did not necessarily affect the outcome of the research because it provided great access at the same time.

### 3.3 Literature

Doing research on this topic needs clear understanding of what SSR activities in support of defence reform is and what position SSR has within the larger peacebuilding and statebuilding theoretical debates. Also having a good understanding of the relevance of local ownership within SSR activities is needed. The theoretical framework therefore approached articles from different scholars and organisations involved in SSR that were formed into one single framework. Having a clear understanding of this, the promotion of local ownership in KFOR’s defence reform towards the KSF activities can be analysed. Having a notion of the theoretical framework was crucial prior to doing fieldwork, because it allowed to selectively ask questions while interviewing and it allowed to interpret data better.

Furthermore, literature about Kosovo in general necessary for the rest of the research was consulted. Additional literature was needed on Kosovo’s history, the Kosovo War, Kosovo’s development since that war ended, NATO’s involvement as well as the international community’s involvement in Kosovo and KFOR’s role in Kosovo over time. Apart from scientific literature, newspaper articles, policy documents, international organisations’ websites were addressed to acquire general information on Kosovo. Most literature on Kosovo was written in English because of the international involvement in Kosovo and few Serbian or Albanian literature was found. Not understanding the language was not really a problem, because most relevant literature was published in English. Also Kosovo’s government publishes its laws and regulations in Serbian and Albanian as well in English.

Data related to the case will be collected by studying the defence reform activities by KFOR (doctrine and strategy, command structure, defence reform formation and military education and training). Official documents of KFOR, NATO, KSF and Kosovo’s government will be important sources of data and are openly accessible, but also previous research that has been done on the KSF by other researchers or policy institutes (“think tanks”). Having a military background made it possible to make some connections within KFOR and the KSF to get some additional documents. Relevant to this research were KFOR’s and KSF’s progress reports, in which specific objectives, evaluations and end states were given.
3.4 Interviews

The participants in this research consisted of people who were in some way involved with the development of the KSF or had studied this particular subject. Overall, eleven semi-structured interviews were conducted, each for approximately one hour. This method was relevant for this research’ case study, because doing in-depth interviews allowed opportunity to selectively gain information needed for this research. Semi-structured interviews do not include strict question lists, but are not done without any form of pattern. The interview formats addressed some general topics on statebuilding in Kosovo and more specifically on the promotion of local ownership in the operationalised defence reform variables. It depended on the interviewee what the most important topics were and what questions were relevant. In appendix A there is a general format of the interview and the list of interviewees. At every interview it was asked if the conversation with the interviewees could be taped and if their names could be cited in this research. Every interviewee agreed to cite their names in the research, while some had some difficulties taping the interview.

Prior to doing fieldwork in Kosovo it was carefully selected what people were relevant to interview and arrangements were made before going to Kosovo. While being in Kosovo contacts were made with other people who could be interviewed. The second week in Kosovo was scheduled with two to three interviews a day, so good use of the time was made. At KFOR, people who were involved in the development of the KSF were interviewed. At the KSF some high-ranking officer of the Land Forces Command (LFC) were interviewed because this was the division that commanded all other KSF battalions and operates directly under the Ministry of KSF. Within the KSF, another interview was conducted with someone of the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), since doctrine development and strategy and military education and training were one of the operationalised variables. At the Ministry of the KSF the heads of the sections for Plans, Programmes and Analysis and Euro-Atlantic Integration were interviewed. During the excursion arrangements for interviews were made after getting in contact with relevant people.

All interviews were conducted in English, which allowed the interviewer and interviewee to communicate in a language they were both confident in. The advantage was that there were few misunderstandings. However, two interviews were conducted with the help of interpreters because the interviewees were less confident in English. One interview at the LFC was translated by someone who spoke English fluently since he did a training in the
United Kingdom for one year. The other interview at the Ministry of the KSF was half done in English and half translated by a colleague working at the same office.

Working with translators is partly a disadvantage, because an interpreter could translate the native language in his own words that are different from what the interviewee intended to say. However, there was enough confidence that the conversation was correctly translated because both interviewees could understand English and could therefore correct the interpreters if needed.

One last remark about the interviews is that of the local people that were interviewed, all were ethnic Albanian. This is logical in a sense that the majority within the KSF and Ministry of KSF are ethnic Albanian and there are few minorities within the KSF, especially ethnic Serbians. Interviewing ethnic Serbian people would not necessarily provide different answers regarding the KSF’s development, but it could have provided different answers when talking about future scenarios of the KSF. Speaking to ethnic Albanian people was not a problem, but sometimes caution had to be kept in mind when addressing sensitive topics like ethnic representation within the KSF. Also staying objective all the time and not to be bias is important, since this was hard when being in close cooperation with the KSF.

3.5 Observations

Apart from conducting official interviews, many (informal) conversations were made with people that contained some interesting information. The two-weeks stay in Kosovo also allowed to make observations of everyday life. Making observations for a relatively short period of time did not allow to conduct “participant research” or to refer to the observations in this research, but the observations did relate to the expectations having beforehand and to this research’ conclusions.

For people living in Kosovo it is common to express their Albanian or Serbian ethnicities by flagging the national flags of Albania or Serbia. Also many things refer to the Kosovo War, because throughout Kosovo there are e.g. many KLA memorials, many places are called after the former KLA commander Adem Jashari or many destroyed houses that have not been repaired yet. The Kosovo War recently ended in 1999, which means that throughout Kosovo many generations have experienced the war in one way or another. Signs of nationalism prevail and it might take decades to completely harmonise all the different ethnicities in Kosovo. Considering the KSF, many of its members have served in the KLA during the war. Also their main base in Pristina is named after Adem Jashari.
This does not mean that the KLA has transformed into the KSF or is just a continuation of it, but it does indicate that the majority of the KSF members are ethnic Albanian that does not forget its past. It also clarifies some of the difficulties that ethnic Serbians face when joining the KSF.

After two weeks of observing the KSF, there are many signs that the KSF is becoming a professional organisation but is still in development. After visiting Kosovo as well as the KSF in 2011, there were clearly some signs of improvement. During the Netherlands Defence Academy’s visit this year, sometimes transport and escort was provided by KSF’s Force Police and their procedures were very professional and similar to other military police forces. Also KSF cadets that were met at the KSF academy have to perception to be an “army” soon and they were looking forward to participate in international peacekeeping operations. Former KLA members also appreciate young leaders that have not served the KLA, because young leaders are needed to further develop the KSF. If the KSF will indeed become a defence force will be seen in the future, but KSF members at least are willing to join a “Kosovo Defence Force”. Also many people within the KSF want to serve all the people in Kosovo, both Serbian and Albanian, but are aware of the political limitations and sensitivities. Of course the KSF as a young organisation is still developing and does not have many years of experience since it was established in 2009, but there are many signs that the KSF is continuously developing into a professional force.

3.6 Validity and reliability of the research

This research uses qualitative methods which fundamentally differ from quantitative research methods in a way that quantitative research provides specific and precise outcomes, while qualitative research provides more open outcomes (Verschuren, P.J.M.; Doorewaard, J.C.A.M., 2007). The goal of this research was to provide more insight into relevance of the concepts of SSR and local ownership and therefore qualitative research methods suited this research best.

Validity of a research refers the what extent conclusions are correct, well-founded and its outcomes correspond with the research questions. Reliability within a research indicates that if the research would be repeated, the same outcomes and results would be delivered. Within this research, the validity and reliability are guaranteed by conducting a triangulation of analysing literature, making observations and having interviews. This increases the research’ replicability. Observations are done in an objective manner to avoid that assumptions are made or the research would be bias.
Attempts to improve the research’ reliability were done by selection a diversity of interviewees, because these people provided various and different sources of information rather than narrow point of views.

After conducting interviews with different people from different organisations the notion arose that many interviewees shared the same point of views concerning KFOR’s promotion of local ownership towards the KSF or at least showed many similarities. Sometimes findings were verified with others in an informal manner while having conversations. These methods contributed to the research’ validity and reliability, which allowed to do a proper data analysis. As mentioned in the previous paragraph as well, interview findings also related to the observations made while being in Kosovo. One remark about the conducted interviews is that conducting more interviews for a longer period of time would form a more solid base to draw conclusions on.

After all interviews had been conducted, signs of repetition and inconsistencies within the data were searched for. Parts of the interviews were coded and the themes to describe in this thesis that were repeatedly mentioned in the interviews were selected. This does not mean that themes that were mentioned only a few times were less meaningful. All the data collected from the interviews was analysed having the theoretical framework in mind and all data was considered important.

Concerning the literature on KFOR’s role in Kosovo and its promotion of local ownership to the KSF, many literature is openly accessible while other information is KFOR or NATO restricted and therefore not accessible. For this research only accessible literature has been accessed that could affect the outcome of this research.

After the methodology of this research is described in which some strengths and weaknesses are described and limitations to the methodology are given, this research still provides insight into the relevance of promoting local ownership in SSR activities in support of defence reform in relation to an independent KSF in Kosovo. Because of the specific case study, one should be careful when generalising this research’ outcomes. The next chapter general developments and statebuilding initiatives in Kosovo will be described since the Kosovo War ended. The fifth chapter will then analyse the KSF and its development over time, as well as KFOR’s involvement in this development and the promotion of local ownership in support of defence reform.
4 Kosovo

In the second chapter the theoretical framework has been described that will be used for this research, in which the concepts of SSR and local ownership have been linked to defence reforms. Also this research’ methodology has been addressed in the previous chapter. In this chapter is generally described how the Kosovo War has eventually led to the stand-up of the Kosovo Security Force (KSF). In the first paragraph a brief conflict analysis is given in which a brief history of the conflict is described until the outbreak of the Kosovo War in 1999. Then in the second paragraph, statebuilding initiatives in Kosovo are outlined in general. After this, the fourth and final paragraph elaborates more on the NATO-led Kosovo Force, which is also related to the KSF.

4.1 Conflict analysis

On 17 February 2008, Kosovo declared the unilateral independence from Serbia, but until now Kosovo’s statehood has only received limited recognition (Beaumont, 2010). The declaration of independence therefore seems a provisional but not a final capstone in the relationship between Serbia and Kosovo, which is characterised by a long history of violent conflict.

Until the 20th century, the Balkan region was ruled by the Ottoman Empire, but after the Balkan Wars in 1912 and 1913 the region was freed from Ottoman rule. The decrease of Ottoman influence in the Balkans together with increased political nationalism (Baudet & Baets, 1999), gave opportunities for both Serbia and Albania to claim Kosovo. Both countries claimed authority over Kosovo based on some major historical events: for Serbia the Battle of Polje in 1389 (Baudet & Baets, 1999) and for Albania the League of Prizren signed in 1878 (Pahumi, 2007) was their right to claim authority over Kosovo. These events have had and still have major influence on the relationships between Albanians and Serbs (Zwol, 1999).

The two world wars have been of great influence on the Kosovo conflict as well. The First World War started in 1914 after the Austro-Hungarian invasion of Serbia, in which Serbia suffered heavy losses in fighting the Central Powers. After the creation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1918 when the war had ended, ethnic Albanians in Kosovo were suppressed by the Serbian authorities. The Albanian language was not allowed and ethnic Albanians were forced to emigrate out of Kosovo (Babuna, 2000). At the beginning of the Second World War, Serbia was defeated by the Nazis and Mussolini’s Italy and most of Kosovo
became part of a Fascist Italian Greater Albania (Judah, 2008). Many Serbians were murdered and expelled from Kosovo during that time. After the war, the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia was established in 1946 in which Kosovo was given a certain degree of autonomy as a province of Serbia (BBC, 2012).

In 1953, Josip Broz Tito became the first president of Yugoslavia. During his presidency he advocated for more decentralization in the Republic. In 1974 the Yugoslav Constitution was passed and among other things Kosovo received substantially increased autonomy (Doder, 1993). This gave ethnic Albanians more opportunities to for example educate their children in Albanian (Judah, 2008). Also, many Serbians left Kosovo because they felt abandoned by the Yugoslav authorities, while more ethnic Albanians came from other Balkan regions to start living in Kosovo allowing the Albanian majority to grow.

After Tito’s death in 1980, the Serbian communist leader Slobodan Milosevic used a period of unrest in his political campaign to reiterate Serbian nationalism. At Kosovo Polje, he addressed the Kosovo Serbians and assured their protection against Albanian oppression. After Milosevic became president of Serbia, Kosovo’s autonomy was ended and its provincial parliament’s powers were taken away (BBC, 2012). In reaction to that, Kosovo Albanians established a parallel “Kosovo Republic” led by Ibrahim Rugova that advocated a peaceful resistance against Belgrade (Hoon, 2000). During the 1990s, conflicts arose in neighbouring Balkan countries like Bosnia, Croatia and eventually Kosovo as well.

When the Kosovo War broke out in 1998, the shadow government was disbanded and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) started an armed resistance. The Belgrade government tried to get a grip on the situation and the region of Drecina was erased from KLA fighters. From that moment on, Kosovo was the scene of multiple massacres of civilians and systematic destruction of homes (Müller & Winter, 2013). By March 1999, more than 80 percent of the entire population of Kosovo – of which mostly ethnic Albanians – were displaced from their homes (Human Rights Watch, 2001; Müller & Winter, 2013).

In 1998, the United States initiated peace negotiations without any success. While the humanitarian catastrophe continued, the American diplomat Richard Holbrooke declared that diplomatic negotiations should be supported by military power (Müller & Winter, 2013). NATO eventually launched the air campaign Allied Force on the 23rd of March 1999 (Müller & Winter, 2013; NATO, 2006). After NATO’s air campaign, President
Milosevic agreed with the demands of the international community. The NATO-led peace support operation KFOR (Kosovo Force) entered Kosovo in support of wider international efforts to build peace and stability in the area (NATO, 2012). The resulting transition resulted in a protectorate authorised by UN Resolution 1244, in which many international actors are involved in different statebuilding processes. The resolution guaranteed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and reaffirmed the call for autonomy self-administration for Kosovo (UN Security Council, 1999).

### 4.2 Statebuilding in Kosovo

The Kosovo War ended after the UN Security Council passed the UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244 on 10 June 1999. The resolution demanded an immediate end of violence and repression in Kosovo by both the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the KLA. The UN was authorised to facilitate the political process to determine Kosovo’s future status (UN Security Council, 1999). UNSCR 1244 placed Kosovo under the interim administration of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and established a security presence of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR). The lack of consensus over Kosovo’s status at the international level severely complicated statebuilding activities of the international community in Kosovo (Kallaba & Ferati, 2012). Today, UNSCR 1244 still remains in force for over 14 years, unrevised due to the lack of consensus among the permanent member states of the UN Security Council. As UNSCR 1244 does not conclude Kosovo’s final status and as Kosovo’s declaration of independence eventually in 2008 was not in violation with the general principles of international law, this did allow statebuilding initiatives to take place in Kosovo (Feith, 2013; ICO, 2012; Just, 2013).

When the UNSCR 1244 was adopted, UNMIK was mandated to administer Kosovo until its final political status would be resolved. The resolution stipulated no duration for the mission (Bislimi, 2012). UNMIK’s mission was to help in ensuring conditions for a peaceful existence and a normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo and help advance towards regional stability in the western Balkan region (UN News Centre, 2012). The mandate of UNMIK was threefold: to establish a functioning interim civil administration; to promote the establishment of self-government and substantial autonomy; and to facilitate the political process to determine Kosovo’s future international status (Lemay-Hebert, 2009). Concerning UNMIK’s mission statement and mandate, there was a clear focus on human security in Kosovo.

UNMIK was initially organised into four major pillars. The first pillar was that of civil administration led by the UN, the second was that of humanitarian affairs headed by
UNHCR which was tasked with the coordination of humanitarian affairs and the return of refugees. The third was democratisation and institution building, a responsibility entrusted to the OSCE and the fourth comprised the reconstruction and economic development pillar led by the EU (Kallaba & Ferati, 2012; Narten, 2009b). A fifth pillar of security was provided by KFOR, but the NATO-led peace support operation was not subordinate to the UN (Bellamy, Williams, & Griffin, 2010) and therefore considered as a separate pillar. This fifth pillar is particularly important within this research and will be described in the next paragraph, also because this pillar can be linked to Security Sector Reform (SSR) which fits within statebuilding theories as has been described in the theoretical framework.

The head of UNMIK was the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), who acted as the legal head of the state as Kosovo had no national government. UNMIK involved local political leadership in its activities and the establishment of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) in Kosovo came after elections were organised – locally in 2000 and nationally in 2001 (Bislimi, 2012). Despite this promotion of local ownership, there was no separation of power within the international administration of Kosovo, because the executive, legislative and judicial authorities were allocated to the SRSG (Lemay-Hebert, 2009). Kosovo’s democratic system was therefore mainly determined by outside actors (Narten, 2009b). The SRSG’s decisions could not be challenged by the population of Kosovo, whose actions were not always transparent and could not be removed from power by the people in whose interest he exercised authority (Caplan, 2005). No matter what the PISG would decide, the SRSG could overrule it (Bislimi, 2012). Still, this de facto government had the task to convince the international and local communities of the legitimate character of UNMIK. However, in absence of clear improvements in living conditions for inhabitants and also given the fact that UNMIK was in charge of Kosovo, setbacks within the country were attributed to the UNMIK administration. As UNMIK was not an elected government, many people in Kosovo became critical, resulting in UNMIK not being able to convince the population of its legitimate rule over Kosovo (Lemay-Hebert, 2009).

Furthermore, in November 2005, Martti Ahtisaari was appointed as Special Envoy for the Kosovo status process, which was to determine whether Kosovo should remain a province of Serbia or should become independent. After a long process of negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina, Ahtisaari submitted to the UN Secretary General the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement (better known as the Ahtisaari Plan) in March 2007. The Ahtisaari Plan was intended to be a compromise that offered the Kosovo Albanians the prospect of independence, while giving the Kosovo Serbians
extensive rights and a high degree of local autonomy to Serbian municipalities within Kosovo (Bislimi, 2012; International Crisis Group, 2007). The Ahtisaari Plan envisioned a multiethnic, independent Kosovo under international supervision and it was expected that the UN Security Council would pass a new resolution superseding the UNSCR 1244 in support to implement the Plan (International Crisis Group, 2007). However, after many negotiations Serbia was unwilling to do any concessions or to come to a compromise on the Kosovo’s status issue (Feith, 2013; Geci, 2013). Therefore the Ahtisaari Plan was not signed by Serbia and the legal status of the plan could be questioned (King, 2013). Still the Ahtisaari Plan was introduced to the UN Security Council after which a strong divide between Western states on the one side and Russia and China on the other side ensued.

After twenty-five rounds of negotiating between Pristina and Belgrade and the Ahtisaari team, it became clear that Kosovo was to have supervised independence with an European perspective (ICO, 2012). After this process to agree or to compromise on Kosovo’s final status, in which it was unlikely that a new resolution would be adopted in support of Kosovo’s independence, Kosovo unilaterally declared itself independent on 17 February 2008. Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence made specific mention to the Ahtisaari Plan and accepted the obligations contained in the Plan (Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo, 2008). Kosovo declared itself independent unilaterally but in coordination with Western countries (Feith, 2013). The Ahtisaari Plan did not have the UN Security Council sanction, but provided an adequate political basis for statebuilding initiatives in Kosovo (ICO, 2012). Kosovo’s independence was recognised by many Western states, including the United States, United Kingdom and the Netherlands, but was not recognised by Serbia, Russia and China. As these countries have veto power within the UN Security Council, this would hamper further statebuilding initiatives (Vrajolli & Kallaba, 2012) or adoption of a new UNSC resolution. More important non-recognising states were the NATO and EU member states: Spain, Greece, Slovakia, Romania and neither did the EU member state Cyprus. For the KFOR mission, these non-recognising countries are its primary concern in statebuilding activities and to determine their engagement in the mission (King, 2013), because within NATO there is no consensus on Kosovo. Political recognition is therefore a big obstacle for NATO (King, 2013).

Without a new resolution of the UN Security Council, the existence of UNMIK continued, despite the fact that its role as interim government decreased after Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008. It was unclear who was in control in Kosovo after this declaration. According to UNSCR 1244, the SRSG of UNMIK was in control, but if Kosovo was independent, Kosovo’s elected government was in control while Kosovo was still
under supervision by the ICO (International Civilian Office) (ICO, 2012). After the declaration of independence a transitional period of 120 days followed in which UNMIK’s presence decreased, while the ICO’s and EU’s presence on the ground increased (ICO, 2012). Today, UNMIK’s role in Kosovo is almost non-existent (Geci, 2013). A new international presence was established in Kosovo in 2009: the EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX), which was to support Kosovo on its path to a greater European integration in the rule of law area (EULEX, 2008). EULEX works within the framework of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 and under the umbrella of UNMIK. The EULEX mission was invited by the Kosovo government (Geci, 2013) and was proposed in the Ahtisaari Plan (Ahtisaari, 2007). EULEX has a limited mandate that expires on 14 June 2014 but the European Council will evaluate whether the EULEX mission should be extended (EULEX, 2008; EULEX, 2012).

As all areas of domestic sovereignty were re-established by UNMIK from 1999 onwards, this generated a high level of external intrusiveness into local affairs. Even after the establishment of the PISG and Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence, external actors did not fully transfer authorities to local institutions in Kosovo or remained having executive powers over local authorities. EULEX and KFOR maintained external control over judiciary, police, and military affairs (Narten, 2009b). Even after ending Kosovo’s supervised independence on 10 September 2012, in which Kosovo finalised the implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan, still more needed to be done and help of the international community was needed (Feith, 2012; ICO, 2012). Therefore the international presence in Kosovo still remains high today.

4.3 NATO-led Kosovo Force

As mentioned, the UNSCR authorised a NATO-led peace support operation in 1999. NATO has been leading the Kosovo Force (KFOR) ever since it was authorised in support of wider international efforts to build peace and stability in the area (NATO, 2013). KFOR deployed into Kosovo on 12 June 1999 after the 78-day NATO air campaign Allied Force. This air campaign was launched in March 1999 to stop and reverse the humanitarian catastrophe. The KFOR mission derives from the UNSCR 1244 and the Military-Technical Agreement (MTA) between NATO and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that both date back from 1999 (Foreign Policy Club, 2011; NATO, 2012). KFOR operated under Chapter VII of the UN Charter that authorised the peace support operation. Initially KFOR was composed of some 50,000 troops from NATO member states, partner states and non-NATO states under unified command and control. Over the years, as the security environment improved, NATO has constantly been in the process of reducing its KFOR
troop presence in accordance with the political and security context in Kosovo to a current troop presence of 5000 today (Foreign Policy Club, 2011; KFOR, 2013). KFOR’s troop reduction, and therefore its exit strategy, is referred to as ‘Gates’, meaning the transition to Gate 1 consisted of a reduction to some 10,200 troops in February 2010 and a transition to Gate 2 consisting of some 5000 troops (NATO, 2013). The transition to Gate 3, towards a minimal presence, is conditions-based and not calendar driven (KFOR, 2013)

KFOR’s initial mandate was to: deter renewed hostility against Kosovo by Yugoslav and Serb forces; establish a secure environment and ensure public safety and order; demilitarise the KLA; support international humanitarian efforts; and coordinate with and support the international civil presence (NATO, 2012; UN Security Council, 1999). Special attention was to be paid to the protection of minorities, including patrols near minority enclaves, escorts for minority groups and protection of heritage sites like monasteries. Further KFOR’s initial tasks included assistance with the return of displaced people and refugees; de-mining; security and public order and border security (NATO, 2013). KFOR has law enforcement capabilities and it is important stress that KFOR is impartial, not neutral (Pograjc, 2013). KFOR implements its mandate to everyone and uses its law enforcement capabilities if needed, while being neutral would imply that KFOR would deliberating not be involved (Pograjc, 2013).

After Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008, NATO agreed to start implementing new tasks in Kosovo, like standing down the KPC (Kosovo Protection Corps), the establishment of the Kosovo Security Force and a civilian-led body to supervise this KSF. These tasks were implemented in close coordination with the relevant local and international authorities (NATO, 2013). However, NATO reaffirmed that KFOR shall remain in Kosovo on the basis of UNSCR 1244 and the North Atlantic Council (NAC) is to decide on troop reductions, but this process is conditions-based and not calendar-driven (NATO, 2013). KFOR’s new tasks were not tied to UNSCR 1244 but were implemented by the NAC which is NATO’s political decision-making body (King, 2013). The new tasks were mainly adopted from the Ahtisaari Plan that foresaw supervised independence for Kosovo. These tasks will be briefly described below, because these are related to the rest of this research.

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2 Within NATO’s KFOR mission caution is required using different terminology, because of political debates concerning Kosovo’s status. Terms like republic, government, ministry would imply recognition and therefore more neutral terms are used like institutions and civilian-led oversight (King, 2013). In this research the local terminology of Kosovo is being used without losing the neutral status of this research.
Stand-down of the KPC

After the Kosovo War and the demilitarisation of the KLA, the KPC was founded whose mandate was to provide disaster response service, perform SAR (Search and Rescue), provide a capacity for humanitarian assistance in isolated areas, assist de-mining and contribute to rebuilding communities and infrastructure (NATO, 2013). The KPC was conceived as a transitional post-conflict arrangement under the responsibility of UNMIK. The KPC consisted of 5000 troops of which 2000 were reserves, and even though the KLA was demilitarised, the KPC was seen as a continuation of the KLA while this could not be admitted (Clewlow, 2010a; International Crisis Group, 2000).

The KPC ceased its operational activities on 20 January 2009 and was formally dissolved on 14 June 2009. In parallel, the Kosovo Security Force was established to ensure that key capabilities were emergency situations. The KPC members that were not recruited into the KSF were resettled, reintegrated or retired with dignity by the UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) (King, 2013; NATO, 2012). Considering SSR in Kosovo, there is a clear link between the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) of the KPC and further developments within Kosovo’s security sector.

Stand-up of the KSF

KFOR was responsible for supervising and supporting the stand-up and training of a multi-ethnic, professional and civilian controlled KSF. The first recruitment campaign for the KSF started on 21 January 2009 and was focused to encourage all ethnic minorities in Kosovo to apply (NATO, 2013). There was no transformation of the KPC to the KSF but transition, as the KSF was considered as a new organisation (Clewlow, 2010b; Geci, 2013). The KSF would be a lightly armed force and would consist of no more than 2500 active and 800 reserve members. KSF’s primary responsibility is security tasks that are not appropriate for the police such as crisis response, explosive ordinance disposal and civil protection (Ahtisaari, 2007).

This professional, all-volunteer force was being trained according to NATO standards and was placed under democratic control. The mission of the KSF is to “support the Government of the Republic of Kosovo and to assist the civil authorities in responding to natural disasters and other emergencies” (Ministry of Kosovo Security Force, 2012, p. 5). The Initial Operational Capability was reached in September 2009 and NATO’s North Atlantic Council is still to decide on KSF’s Full Operational Capabilities (NATO, 2013). A review of KSF’s mandate cannot be conducted earlier than five years from the date the Ahtisaari Plan enters into force (Ahtisaari, 2007). At the appropriate moment, NATO will
decide on any future relationship with the KSF beyond FOC (NATO, 2013). The KSF’s mandate consists of three main capabilities as the following figure shows:

**Figure 9: KSF’s core, enabling, supporting capabilities (MCAD, 2010)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core Capabilities</th>
<th>Enabling Capabilities</th>
<th>Supporting Capabilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EOD</td>
<td>ENG</td>
<td>Force Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAR</td>
<td>CRLT</td>
<td>Rapid Reaction Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firefighting</td>
<td>LOG</td>
<td>Communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAZMAT</td>
<td>MED</td>
<td>Aviation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Civilian-led body to supervise the KSF**

NATO assisted in the establishment of a civilian-led organisation that exercises civilian control over the KSF. The primary responsibility of this task rests with the NATO Headquarters in Brussels and KFOR is tasked to support NATO Advisory Team that has been established in Pristina (Ahtisaari, 2007; NATO, 2012). After Kosovo’s declaration of independence, the Law on the KSF was adopted by the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo on 13 March 2008, which also stated the tasks of the Ministry of the KSF (Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo, 2008).

The mission of the Ministry of KSF (MKSF) is to “formulate, implement, evaluate and develop the policies and activities of the KSF within the framework of democratic governance and in accordance with Kosovo’s Constitution and laws of the Republic of Kosovo” (Ministry of Kosovo Security Force, 2012, p. 4).

In this chapter is described how statebuilding initiatives in Kosovo evolved after the Kosovo War ended, with specific focus on the NATO-led Kosovo Force. KFOR has been leading a peace support operation in Kosovo since 1999 and has implemented new tasks over the years, like the establishment of the KSF. The next chapter elaborates more on the KSF and its development over time, as well as KFOR’s involvement in this development.
5 Developments of the Kosovo Security Force

In the previous chapter, general developments and statebuilding initiatives in Kosovo have been described since the Kosovo War ended. The NATO-led Kosovo Force has been active since 1999 and has changed its mandate over time. One major task that KFOR is involved in nowadays is the development of the Kosovo Security Force. This chapter focuses on the KSF and its development over time, as well as KFOR’s involvement in this development and the promotion of local ownership in support of defence reform. In the following paragraphs the four SSR related activities stated in the theoretical framework are described separately and for each activity is analysed to what extent local ownership has been promoted. At the end of this chapter, the degree of local ownership per phase for each activity is listed in a table.

5.1 Doctrine development and strategy

After the KSF was established on 21 January 2009, the institutions of Kosovo together with MCAD and NAT defined future strategies from which the KSF could also derive its doctrines. This paragraph first focuses on the development of strategy and then focuses on doctrinal development.

KSF’s strategy

Any strategic process is about translating national interests into national objectives. The KSF’s strategy is defined in ‘The Law on the Kosovo Security Force’ (Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo, 2008), in which e.g. the missions and tasks and territorial areas of activity are described. As with Kosovo’s declaration of independence, the Law on the KSF of 2008 is also derived from the Ahtisaari Plan in which the establishment of the KSF was proposed. Comparing the Ahtisaari Plan and the Law on the KSF indicate that these two are very alike or at least show many similarities, therefore it is important to regard the local involvement in the process of the final settlement for Kosovo status.

In the Ahtisaari Plan, the KSF was expected to be a lightly armed force supporting efforts of the police and international missions in those areas that are not covered by other actors, which are related to disaster relief and civil protection tasks. The KSF was not allowed to have any law enforcement authority (Just, 2013). Also, the KSF was to consist of no more than 2500 active and 800 reserve members (Ahtisaari, 2007). Mr. Agim Çeku, who was then Prime Minister in the initiation phase, wanted to see a larger KSF then the proposed 2500 force (Clewlow, 2010b). However, Kosovo’s institutions finally
agreed to compromise to the proposals (Geci, 2013; King, 2013). The Ahtisaari Plan explicitly stated that Kosovo was to have a security force and not to have a defence force. Any changes in the KSF’s mandate would be determined by the International Military Presence (IMP), in coordination with the International Civilian Representative (ICR) (Ahtisaari, 2007; Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo, 2008). A full review of these limits would be conducted no earlier than five years from the date the Ahtisaari Plan and the Law on the KSF entered in force (Ahtisaari, 2007; Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo, 2008).

After the presentation of the Ahtisaari Plan in 2007 and Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008, NATO agreed to implement new tasks in Kosovo, like the establishment of the KSF. The KSF however, was not established to relieve KFOR because the four non-recognisers within NATO would not allow any defence reform programmes to happen in Kosovo (King, 2013) and also because KFOR still operates under UNSCR 1244 which still has to determine Kosovo’s future status. Political recognition within the NATO members and the UN Security Council remains a big obstacle for NATO. Given the fact that KFOR has been reducing its presence in Kosovo over the years, it might be unrealistic that Kosovo was not allowed to have a defence force (Qehaja, 2013). Therefore Kosovo needs to have increased security and defence capabilities (Geci, 2011) and there has to be a successor next to the Kosovo Police to gradually take over responsibilities of KFOR (Qehaja, 2013). Kosovo as an independent state can change laws regarding increased capabilities of the KSF through the parliament (Geci, 2013), but Kosovo will not take any steps that would conflict with NATO’s interest (Hoti, 2013). However, in addition to that, Kosovo’s independence is not recognised by all NATO members and NATO would revisit its relationship with the KSF if it was to make decisions outside NATO (King, 2013). These political debates have hampered the KSF in its strategic thinking from the beginning.

The development of the security sector in Kosovo did not consider the local context and therefore the proposal of Ahtisaari in 2007 was externally driven (Foreign Policy Club, 2011; Qehaja, 2013). Considering the MKSF and the KSF, many people would like to see the KSF increase its defensive capabilities (Geci, 2011; Qehaja & Vrajolli, 2012) or to see the KSF become a defence force that will partner with NATO countries or Euro-Atlantic structures (Uka, 2013). Political recognition of Kosovo would allow cooperation with NATO and would allow Kosovo to participate in NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme (Vrajolli & Kallaba, 2012). Neither did the Ahtisaari Plan consider the Kosovo Internal Security Sector Review (ISSR) initiated in 2005 by the SRSG for Kosovo and head of UNMIK Søren Jessen-Petersen (Qehaja, 2013). This ISSR already stated in 2006
that Kosovo would need to develop an indigenous security architecture in the future and
that this would include a Kosovo Defence Force (Welch, Kondi, Stinson, & Tangen Page,
2006). The strategy and mission statement of the KSF are therefore extracted from the
externally imposed Ahtisaari Plan, which imposes a limited mandate to the KSF.

The KSF’s mandate could be reviewed after five years the Law on the KSF enter in force,
which is in the year of 2013. One of the objectives of the Minister of the KSF, Mr. Agim
Çeku, is to review structure, mission and duties of the MKSF/KSF through the Strategic
Security Sector Review (SSSR) (Ministry of Kosovo Security Force, 2012). This S SSR has
been initiated by the government of Kosovo in March 2012 with help and assistance of
the U.S. Defence Institution Reform Initiative. The goal of the S SSR is to identify
Kosovo’s current security environment and potential security risks to determine which
security capabilities are required for the next five years. In June 2013 the S SSR is
expected to reach initial conclusions and based on its recommendations the required
security capabilities will be identified and developed (Ministry of Kosovo Security Force,
2013). In the process of S SSR there is a high level of local ownership, because Kosovo
has initiated this review process and is also in charge of this process. The U.S. Defence
Institution Reform Initiative is there only for help and assistance. The S SSR will make
proposals for Kosovo’s future security architecture, but as KFOR still has executive
powers over the KSF (Just, 2013; King, 2013), possible recommendations might not pass
political obstacles within NATO and then cannot be implemented (Thomas, 2013).

One other objective of the Minister of the KSF, is the approval of the Full Operational
Capabilities (FOC) from the North Atlantic Council (NAC) of NATO (Ministry of Kosovo
Security Force, 2012). After the KSF reached Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in 2009,
all KSF efforts have been put towards reaching FOC. Through a joint KFOR/KSF
assessment cycle, FOC criteria were developed and performance was evaluated to ensure
progress has been made (KFOR Command Info Section, 2011). By then, the Commander
of KFOR, Major General Erhard Drews, reported on the significant progress of KSF and
recommended to NATO to declare FOC for the KSF (KFOR Command Info Section, 2011).
There was discussion whether the KSF reached FOC in all its capabilities or only in its
Core Capabilities (Just, 2013; King, 2013), because there still were some shortfalls and
progresses to be made in the Enabling and Supporting Capabilities. NATO’s NAC is still to
decide on KSF’s FOC today, but there is no consensus within the NAC what FOC implies
(Geci, 2013; King, 2013). NATO needs to determine what comes after FOC, because the
criteria for further progression are unknown (Hoti, 2013; King, 2013). Due to this delay
in the declaration of FOC, the KSF and MKSF are being hold back in their development
and strategic thinking (Krelani, 2013).
After KFOR implemented its new tasks in 2008, NATO’s planning foresaw a self-sustainable KSF in which the institutions in Kosovo would be responsible. After the KSF reached IOC, the political declaration of FOC was expected in two to five years after IOC which was between September 2011 and no later than September 2014 (MCAD, 2010). In this FOC window, the KSF was to go through different criteria in order to reach FOC. If the North Atlantic Council would declare FOC in the future, then this would mean that KFOR’s job with standing up the KSF would be over including the engagement of MCAD and NAT (King, 2013).

Within the Ministry of KSF, the NATO Advisory Team (NAT) is there to mentor and to advise the MKSF oversight of the KSF (Hoti, 2013; Krelani, 2013). In contrast to KFOR’s MCAD, the NAT only has advisory power and the ministry has had executive powers from the beginning (Geci, 2013), so the level of local ownership was high from the beginning. Since the MKSF was established in 2009, it has been publishing annual reports in which activities and achievements of that particular year are described. Also the objectives of the Minister for that year are described (Ministry of Kosovo Security Force, 2012). Even though local ownership within MKSF was high from the beginning, the NAT was very much involved in defining yearly objectives of the MKSF. However, from 2010 onwards, the objectives were defined by the Minister of the KSF himself (Hoti, 2013).
KSF’s doctrinal development

Military doctrines define the most effective way of using military assets based on practical experiences. The KSF is a young organisation since it was established in 2009 and therefore does not have many years of experience that can be translated into doctrines (King, 2013). Neither is the KSF used to having documented widely accepted principles of operations and practice related procedures for this same reason of being a young organisation. Within the KSF, the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is responsible for the documentation of doctrine, regulations and SOPs (Standard Operating Procedures) and trainings.

When the KSF was established in 2009, it was based on (or at least related to) U.S. doctrine and was training and building its forces similar to the U.S. Army (King, 2013; Parady, 2013). In October 2010, KFOR reported to NATO headquarters that the KSF and MKSF still lacked required doctrine and critical regulations and that without the support of the TRADOC Mentor and Advisory Teams (MAT) the progress would be severely delayed (MCAD, 2010). There were legal shortcomings in the legislation on the KSF, like the Law on Humanitarian Demining and Law on Deployment Outside the Country had not been adopted which hampered the KSF in its operations (Përteshi, 2011). At that time there was also a disconnect between approved documents and the implementation and understanding of these at all levels (MCAD, 2010). For TRADOC the doctrinal development is also a hard process to manage, because the KSF is not sure what standards they should adopt (King, 2013). KFOR mentors try to meet international standards and because the KSF has little international experience, it cannot document such standards themselves. Also, it is hard to compare the international standard to Kosovo’s domestic standard to finally come to a KSF standard (King, 2013). One of the main tasks of TRADOC is to produce doctrines and handbooks, and many of these are translated from NATO document in order to meet the international standard according to the KSF mission statement (Muhaxheri, 2013).

These observations again indicate the KSF’s young character and the importance of KFOR’s involvement in doctrinal development. The promotion of local ownership in KSF’s doctrinal development has stayed limited, but as the KSF had little experience in this, the question remains whether KFOR could transfer responsibilities to the KSF in an early stage. Within TRADOC the cooperation with KFOR mentors and advisors is experienced as good, because it has helped the KSF to achieve its mission statements faster (Muhaxheri, 2013; Uka, 2013). Over the years, the MAT’s involvement has decreased as mentors and advisers operate on the background and try to take the advisory role as much as possible (Muhaxheri, 2013).
Something that did hamper the KSF in its doctrinal development is the great willingness of many different countries to help the KSF, so it becomes difficult what standard the KSF should follow (King, 2013). Different countries have different doctrines, regulations and SOPs, so there is not really a unity of effort among partnering countries. External support to the KSF is definitely important because of the KSF’s young character, but it also makes it a hard process for TRADOC to manage. If the process of doctrinal development would be locally owned completely, it would increase unity of effort within KSF.

As the KSF’s mandate was limited in allowing the KSF to be a security force with primary responsibilities in responding to natural disasters and natural hazards, it has reached a professional level in its core capabilities (Hoti, 2013; Krelani, 2013). Today, the KSF is trying to build a Centre of Excellence in the region for Search and Rescue (SAR) operations (Hoti, 2013; Ministry of Kosovo Security Force, 2012), which would offer expertise and experience to other countries. This initiative by the KSF indicates that their professional level of operations motivates them to document their principles of operations and practice related procedures into doctrines, so the KSF could form a Centre of Excellence.

\section*{5.2 Command structure}

As defence forces should adhere to the rule of law, transparency, oversight and civilian management is needed. A functioning command structure to which defence forces adhere is important to stable and sustainable democracies. Only after Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008, civilian and democratic control of the security sector was handed over to local institutions. Until 2011, Kosovo institutions made significant progress in establishing institutional and legal infrastructures (Qehaja & Vrajolli, 2012). Kosovo’s security sector consists of a variety of institutions and their powers are defined in Kosovo’s constitution and supported by laws and regulations. Two ministries in Kosovo cover the security sector, namely the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of the KSF. The government of Kosovo exercises transparent, democratic and civilian control over the KSF and is answerable to the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo (Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo, 2008).

According to Kosovo’s constitution and the Law on the KSF, the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo, President, Prime Minister and the Minister of the KSF comprise the chain of civilian oversight of the KSF (Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo, 2008). The President of Kosovo has an important role in the security sector since she is the commander-in-
chief of the KSF. She also appoints the commander of the KSF upon recommendation of the government (Qehaja & Vrajolli, 2012). The prime minister chairs the Kosovo Security Council, which has a deliberative and advisory role for issues related to Kosovo’s security sector and regional stability. The KSF operates under the control and administration of the MKSF. The organisation of Kosovo’s security sector is given below:

![Diagram of Kosovo’s Security Sector](image)

**Figure 8: Organisation of Kosovo’s Security Sector (Qehaja & Vrajolli, 2012)**

As the chain of command of civilian oversight of the KSF has described, it comprises several institutions in Kosovo. After Kosovo’s declaration of independence it was, however, under supervision of the International Civilian Office (ICO) and the International Military Presence (IMP) which was the NATO-led Kosovo Force (Ahtisaari, 2007). Even though, the government of Kosovo and particularly the Ministry of KSF have had executive powers from the beginning (Geci, 2013), Kosovo was under supervision until 2012. During that period the ICO, headed by the ICR, formally had executive authority over Kosovo (ICO, 2012). However, the ICR’s executive powers were used very rarely since it was his aim to promote local ownership (Feith, 2012).

KFOR nowadays still has executive authority over the KSF (Just, 2013; King, 2013), but as the KSF developed over time, authorities were handed over (King, 2013). Again, in a few occasions the executive powers of KFOR were used, but these were in political
sensitive issues like suspension of the relations with the KSF by KFOR after a military parade on occasion of the KLA anniversary in 2010 (Foreign Policy Club, 2011; Qehaja, 2013) and not allowing KLA veterans to parade in 2013 (Smallwood, 2013). KFOR then has to remind the KSF of its mandate (Just, 2013). At sensitive issues there is also a lot of bilateral involvement in which the senior leadership of Kosovo is advised how to act. In case that Kosovo’s civilian oversight of the security sector would decide something that might e.g. harm regional relations, then the Commander of KFOR and also embassies would mention their concern (King, 2013). Unilateral types of action therefore involve bilateral involvement through soft power diplomacy (Thomas, 2013). These examples show that KFOR still has full responsibility for all KSF actions and bilateral partners are involved and so the role of local ownership in decision-making processes in the KSF is sometimes limited (Foreign Policy Club, 2011).

The command structure of the civilian oversight has been described, but the command structure within the KSF is also important because this allows effective leadership, administration and proper management within the KSF. The KSF is organised into one division (Land Forces Command), which comprises of three brigades (Rapid Reaction Brigade (RRB), Operations Support Brigade (OSB) and TRADOC). This hierarchical structure is similar to other defence forces within NATO, but other countries outside NATO organise their defence forces in such manner as well (Vrajolli & Kallaba, 2012). The KSF’s command structure can be illustrated in the following figure:

![Figure 9: Command Structure of the KSF (MCAD, 2010)]
5.3 Defence force formation

The KSF was established on 21 January 2009 after the KPC ceased its operational activities on 20 January 2009. In the theoretical framework is described that the formation of defence forces includes personnel and equipment and therefore this paragraph focuses on these issues separately.

Personnel

After the KPC started to stand-down, the KSF was developed in parallel to ensure that key capabilities were available for emergency situations (NATO, 2013). The KPC did not transform into the KSF, because the KSF was expected to be a new organisation unconnected to the KPC (Clewlow, 2010b; Geci, 2013). Former-KPC members had to apply to become members of the KSF (Geci, 2013). On 21 January 2009, a recruitment campaign for the KSF was launched Kosovo-wide which was focussed on encouraging all ethnic minorities to apply (NATO, 2013). In the recruitment process has been a clear shift in local ownership over the years.

Before the recruitment campaign was launched, necessary selection criteria and for new KSF members had to be determined in accordance with the Law on the KSF and standards determined by NATO (Qehaja, Ferati, Kosumi, & Qehaja, 2008). The Law on the KSF (2008) stipulated the KSF to have a maximum of 2500 active members and a reserve component of 800 members, but this recruitment process was relatively slow. In 2010, only a total of 1963 personnel was selected of which 1399 were former KPC members (MCAD, 2010). Until 2012, around 2300 active members had been recruited, while the reserve component had not been entirely selected or trained (Përteshi, 2011; Ministry of Kosovo Security Force, 2012). Former KPC members were given advantage if they met the criteria. The KSF had to incorporate skilled KPC members since they acquired knowledge, experience and training over the years (Qehaja, Ferati, Kosumi, & Qehaja, 2008). The selection of former KPC members was quite challenging for the KSF, since not all members of the KPC could be part of the new KSF (Përteshi, 2011).

When KFOR decided to adopt its new tasks, a working group was developed which was chaired by the head of the KPC and KFOR to design the new KSF. The KPC was given the task to stand down the KPC (King, 2013). KFOR’s planning foresaw a gradual transfer of local ownership to the KSF. In 2009, the recruitment of active members was led by MCAD, while in 2010 it was led by the MKSF/KSF and mentored by MCAD and in 2012 it would only be evaluated by MCAD (MCAD, 2010).
As the KSF is a multi-ethnic force (Ahtisaari, 2007), it should consist of 10% ethnic minorities and 15% females, but this objective had been not realised until April 2013. It is especially hard to recruit ethnic minorities in the KSF, especially ethnic Serbians. However, the KSF started a special recruitment in 2013 for ethnic minorities, so the KSF would be a better representation of Kosovo (Uka, 2013). The KSF, which consists of a majority of ethnic Albanians, had special mobile recruiting teams to go to Serbian communities to inform local people about a possible career in the KSF (Geci, 2013; Uka, 2013). In total, 490 applications were received after these campaigns ended of which 63 applications were from ethnic Serbians. In appendix B there is an overview of the total applications from different ethnic minorities. If these applicants meet the selection criteria and pass the training, then the objective of having 10% of minorities in the KSF would be reached (Just, 2013). Unfortunately it is still hard for the KSF to recruit ethnic Serbians from the North of Kosovo, because people who had worked for government institutions were threatened by their communities or faced pressure and had therefore left those institutions (Geci, 2013; Qehaja, 2013; Uka, 2013).

This campaign to recruit minorities was an internally driven process and KFOR’s role was only advisory. KFOR has raised it as a priority and provided advice, but the KSF had the responsibility to resolve this issue (King, 2013). The KSF has not encountered any problems or abuses regarding ethnicity since it was established, but its history that dates back to the KLA times is not forgotten (Uka, 2013). The KSF has faced difficulties promoting the multi-cultural environment, because ethnic Albanians within the KSF keep honouring the KLA which clearly favours one particular ethnic group (Just, 2013; King; 2013; Smallwood, 2013). For this particular process it was good to promote local ownership, because the local population knows better how to address ethnic issues because of their better understanding of culture (King, 2013). KFOR has emphasised the importance of minority representation within the KSF and concerning local ownership it is more favourable to pull the KSF to do that than to push (King, 2013). The KSF has been willing to start a minority recruiting campaign to meet the required standards, because it at least allows the KSF to meet NATO standards for possible future NATO accession (Clewlow, 2010b). The KSF spends a lot of resources in meeting international standards and KFOR’s role in this is to stress the importance of it. However, KFOR has to be careful not to overemphasise the representation of ethnic minorities, because then other important issues like mismanagement of funds could be sidelined (Qehaja, 2013).

Equipment
So far the KSF has been constrained in terms of equipment, which according to the Law on the KSF should be lightly armed (Qehaja, Ferati, Kosumi, & Qehaja, 2008). The KSF is
only allowed to have equipment which is suitable for carrying out tasks according to its mission. However, KSF’s current funds are insufficient to purchase the weapons, vehicles and other equipment foreseen as necessary of the KSF mandate (Vrajolli & Kallaba, 2012). Therefore the KSF is very dependent on donations from NATO member states and other bilateral relations (Hoti, 2013; King, 2013; Qehaja, Ferati, Kosumi, & Qehaja, 2008; Smallwood, 2013; Thomas, 2013; Uka, 2013). Donations have been important to the KSF, but unfortunately different equipments donated by different countries are incompatible and cannot be standardised (Hoti, 2013; King, 2013). The KSF especially faces difficulties in maintenance of unstandardised equipment, because not everyone within KSF logistics is trained for different types of equipment and therefore some maintenance has to be done by private companies (Hoti, 2013; Muhaxheri, 2013).

The budget of the Ministry of KSF for the year of 2012 has been approximately €35 million and nearly half of that budget is spend on salaries (Ministry of Kosovo Security Force, 2012), which leaves limited amount of budget to spend on equipment. The KSF is reliant on NATO’s voluntary trust funds and in 2012 the KSF received approximately $2.2 million dollars as donations (Hoti, 2013). According to the KSF budget, the KSF prioritises the purchase of new equipment and this process is locally owned (Hoti, 2013; King, 2013; Uka, 2013). Because of the KSF’s limited budget, the KSF is only able to purchase new equipment in different phases over a period of 2-3 years. The problem of the KSF as a young organisation is that they lack strategic vision and depth, because they buy different military systems of different donors (King, 2013). The dilemma of this is that once KFOR promotes local ownership and let the KSF make their own decisions on spendings, KFOR has to step back and try to educate the KSF on the future impact of their decisions (King, 2013). An example of this is that the KSF has the ambition to have aviation capabilities while this is very expensive and while there is not enough money for other important things such as clothing (Smallwood, 2013). As Kosovo is currently reviewing its security sector to determine new security capabilities, the SSSR would possibly prioritise the purchase of new equipment realistically (Krelani, 2013; Thomas, 2013). Regarding local ownership, the KSF is in charge of maintenance and purchase of equipment, but donations and external advice remain crucial to the KSF.

5.4 Military education and training

The operational readiness of the KSF is reliant on its military education and training according to its mandate, strategy and doctrines. Since its establishment, the KSF has made significant progress in its operational capacities: reaching IOC in 2009 and the recommendation of MCAD to declare FOC in 2011. The Ministry of KSF also formulated in
its objectives for the year 2013 to further develop operational capabilities (Ministry of Kosovo Security Force, 2012), so clearly the operational readiness of the KSF has increased over the years by its trainings. In this SSR activity, there has been a significant progress of local ownership since the stand-up of the KSF in 2009.

After the KSF was established, it had to design trainings that varied from basic to advanced levels. The Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is both responsible for doctrinal development and carrying out trainings and educational programmes for the KSF. The level of training ranging from basic to advanced will be according to NATO standards, as it is the KSF’s goal to meet international standards and to cooperate and partner with NATO and Euro-Atlantic structures in the future (Ministry of Kosovo Security Force, 2012; Qehaja, Ferati, Kosumi, & Qehaja, 2008). KFOR’s role in training the KSF has been significant in the beginning, as the KSF was unfamiliar with international standards. KFOR has been promoting the principle of “training the trainers” towards the KSF (Herd, 2013), so the KSF would eventually have the capacity to train its own members. Within TRADOC, KFOR mentor and trainer teams have been responsible for the planning and execution of the KSF’s training.

KFOR has been responsible for KSF’s basic training in 2009, but this task has been handed over to the KSF. TRADOC still works closely with the training and monitoring teams of KFOR. It has been MCAD’s goal to hand over authorities as soon as the KSF has been able to provide its own trainings. MCAD would then only provide feedback, so it is a learning process for the KSF (King, 2013). TRADOC works independently and according to its capacities offers different trainings and does its own planning. The cooperation with MCAD and TRADOC has been in the right manner (Muhaxheri, 2013; Uka, 2013). However, different trainers from different countries have other tactics and SOPs, what makes it difficult to translate this into one KSF standard. Since the KSF has been responsible for its own training, it creates unity of effort in its military education and training (Uka, 2013). The more experienced training and monitoring teams of MCAD have been important to the development of the KSF, because these teams made it possible for the KSF to become professional (Muhaxheri, 2013; Uka, 2013). TRADOC consists of four schools/centres of training: Basic Training Centre, Specialist Training School, Collective Training Centre and the Centre for University Studies (CUS). Among other things, TRADOC realised a Basic NCO course (non-commissioned officer) and Senior NCO course in 2012 (Ministry of Kosovo Security Force, 2012). KFOR has been promoting local ownership in the KSF’s basic trainings and follow-up courses, but could not promote local ownership in internationalised standards (King, 2013). As KSF trainers will become more
experienced in the future and the KSF will be possible deployed in peacekeeping missions, the process of training internationalised standards is a matter of time.

So far the KSF trainings have been limited by its mandate, which comprises mainly the four core capabilities: EOD, fire fighting, HAZMAT and SAR. The limits of the KSF’s mandate have decreased since 2009 as extra capabilities have been transferred to the KSF at later stages, like demining (Hoti, 2013). The CUS, which is the academy where future officers are trained, has a basic infantry oriented training which involves among other things basic offensive operations (Berisha, 2013). As the KSF has no law enforcement capacities, it is not allowed to use force, but the KSF is allowed to be lightly armed. This is a challenge of local ownership, because the KSF wants to train increased capabilities but MCAD makes sure KSF actions do not violate their mandate (King, 2013). It is logical and allowed for the KSF to train basic offensive actions, because the KSF needs to train how to use their weapons as a lightly armed force (King, 2013).

The KSF has to train according to its mandate, which focuses on its four core capabilities. Depending on future tasks, TRADOC would train the KSF forces accordingly (Muhaxheri, 2013). The KSF’s limited mandate hampers the KSF in its exercises, because when the KSF would cordon an area after e.g. a natural hazard has occurred, it is not allowed to use force in case of emergency (Just 2013). The KSF is well trained in its core capabilities, because those are the only things the KSF has been allowed to train. The KSF’s SAR capacities are very well trained compared to other Balkan countries (Krelani, 2013). The proposal of the Commander of KFOR to declare FOC in 2011, was mainly based on the KSF’s core capabilities (Just, 2013). However, not all units within the KSF are at the same level of training. Within the Rapid Reaction Brigade (RRB), not every battalion within that brigade has reached FOC in terms of civil protection (Qehaja, 2013). Other shortfalls of the KSF in its military education and training is the lack of knowledge in maintenance, because of different types of incompatible equipments. Therefore the KSF is dependent external trainers or following maintenance trainings abroad (Muhaxheri, 2013). Another shortfall of KSF’s level of training is the preparation for deployment abroad (Qehaja, 2013). It is priority of the Ministry of the KSF to make the KSF deployable abroad (Ministry of Kosovo Security Force, 2012), so there is still some progress to be made.

Based on the objectives of the Ministry of KSF and COMKSF of maintaining KSF’s operational readiness at a high standard, the KSF has conducted a field training exercise at brigade level in April 2012. This exercise, “Eagle 1”, has been planned, organised and controlled by KSF’s Land Forces Command (Ministry of Kosovo Security Force, 2012). The goal of the exercise was to measure and evaluate the operational capacities of the units
from brigade to tactical level. The exercise has been conducted by the RRB in which the OSB provided support. This exercise is an example of local ownership throughout all the different phases of local ownership. Also in 2010, the northern regions of Albania were hit by major floods resulting in the evacuation of more than 5300 people. Albania requested Kosovo for assistance and the KSF provided help after it was authorised by the institutions of Kosovo. The help that was provided by the KSF contributed to the FOC recommendation in 2011 (King, 2013).

The KSF is also participating in military trainings abroad in accordance with its bilateral partners. KSF members attend different kinds of trainings and schools in different countries; like the Army Command and General Staff College, NCO courses, logistics courses, basic infantry trainings (Muhaxheri, 2013; King, 2013; Thomas, 2013). These international trainings are important for the KSF to train its members in international standards, to learn from other international defence forces and also because the KSF does not have this capacity (King, 2013; Smallwood, 2013). While the KSF is still attending trainings abroad, TRADOC hopes to provide such trainings in the future itself (Muhaxheri, 2013). A disadvantage of attending military trainings abroad is that KSF members are not always allowed to exercise such trainings in Kosovo, because of its limited mandate (Just, 2013). KFOR is aware and informed about trainings the KSF attends and the KSF is being transparent about it (Krelani, 2013; Ministry of Kosovo Security Force, 2012). Infantry related trainings, which are attended by the KSF, aim to train decision making and leadership skills (Krelani, 2013; Smallwood, 2013; Thomas, 2013). KFOR has agreed to bilateral partners that KSF trainings cannot violate the KSF mandate (King, 2013).

One difficulty of bilateral trainings is language issues. In April 2013, the KSF has send four ethnic Serbian cadets to the Macedonian academy, because the primary spoken language within the CUS is Albanian. These cadets were internally recruited and after they graduate, they will become officers within the KSF (Uka, 2013) but have to be able to speak Albanian (Berisha, 2013). Ethnic minorities are allowed to speak their own language within the KSF, as long as they are able to speak Albanian. Otherwise it would be hard to communicate in an organisation with an Albanian majority (Berisha, 2013). Another point of concern is the KSF having six cadets going to the Turkish academy for aviation training. This bilateral training was offered by Turkey and the KSF was willing to participate, because it has the ambition to have helicopters in the future (Uka, 2013). As these cadets will graduate this year, the KSF has trained helicopter pilots without having any aviation capacities.
5.5  Local ownership in KFOR’s defence reform activities

The previous paragraphs have described the development of the KSF in different SSR related activities and the degree of local ownership promoted by KFOR in support of defence reform towards the KSF. In this paragraph, the degree of local ownership per phase for each activity is listed in a table.

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Table 3: Level of local ownership in different phases of KFOR’s defence reform activities in support of the KSF

As the table above indicates, there clearly has been promotion of local ownership by KFOR in the planning, implementation and evaluation phases in most of the defence reform activities. However, the promotion of local ownership in the initiation phase for each activity has been limited.

First, concerning doctrine development and strategy, the Ahtisaari Plan and other political restraints (like UNSCR 1244) have clearly dictated some limitations for the KSF in the initiation phase in which local involvement was limited. Also the KSF as a young organisation did not have all the capacities from the beginning and therefore external
support was needed. In the other phases, there has been promotion of local ownership but only in the limited spectrum of KSF’s mandate.

Second, regarding the command structure of the MKSF and the KSF, there has been promotion of local ownership throughout the years. Kosovo’s security sector has a clear chain of command in which the KSF is subordinate to democratic oversight. However, until 2012, Kosovo has been under supervision of the ICO and KFOR still has executive powers over the KSF. So besides Kosovo’s organisation of the security sector, international organisations still have executive authority in Kosovo’s domestic security matters.

Third, during the formation of the KSF there has been a high level of local ownership. Especially considering KSF’s personnel, the KSF has been responsible for recruiting new members into the organisation and the KSF has been aware of its ethnic representation. Except for the initiation phase, in which KFOR executed recruiting campaigns, the role of KFOR has been limited in the other phases. The KSF is responsible for its equipment and this process has been locally owned as well. However, because of the limited budget of the KSF, it has been very dependent on external donations. Unfortunately, different types of equipment donated by different partners have shown to be incompatible. This has been a mistake in the planning process, but the KSF is now deliberately prioritising its new purchases.

Fourth, TRADOC has been responsible for doctrinal development and trainings for the KSF. However, in the beginning the KSF did not have to capacities to train its new members and was therefore dependent on external help. Over the years, as the KSF got increased training capacities, the KSF has been responsible for its own trainings process. Members of the KSF are also send abroad to do trainings in accordance with bilateral partners. Doing these trainings allows KSF members to increase mutual understanding of other international defence forces, but the KSF is not allowed to do all of these trainings in Kosovo because of its limited mandate. As the KSF will have increased trainings capacities in the future, the KSF will be able to do more of these trainings itself.

In this chapter the development of the KSF in different SSR related activities has been described since its establishment, as well as KFOR’s involvement in this development and the promotion of local ownership in support of defence reform. The next chapter will elaborate more on KFOR’s promotion of local ownership towards the KSF.
6 KFOR’s promotion of local ownership

In the previous chapter, the development of the KSF has been described since its establishment, as well as KFOR’s role in this development and the promotion of local ownership in support of defence reform activities. KFOR has been promoting local ownership towards the KSF, but KFOR also imposed some limitations that affected the KSF’s development. This chapter will elaborate more on KFOR’s promotion of local ownership. As the NATO-led Kosovo Force is a military mission which is authorised by the UN Security Council, KFOR’s mandate affected by both political and military aspects. The first paragraph will explain KFOR’s promotion of local ownership because of political constraints at the international and national level. Then the second paragraph will elaborate on the political impulses that helped KFOR in its promotion. The third paragraph describes the military constraints after which the fourth paragraph will explain the military impulses that affected KFOR’s mandate towards the KSF.

6.1 Political constraints affecting KFOR’s promotion of local ownership

The KFOR mission was authorised after the adoption of UNSCR 1244 in 1999 and today this resolution is still in force. After Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence in 2008, NATO reaffirmed that the KFOR mission would remain in Kosovo on the basis of UNSCR 1244, unless the UN Security Council would decide otherwise (NATO, 2013). After Kosovo declared itself independent, KFOR agreed to take on new tasks, like the establishment of the KSF. Also, as the security situation has improved, NATO has been gradually adjusting KFOR’s troop level towards a minimal presence. The pace and level of troop reduction is decided by the North Atlantic Council (NAC). This process is conditions-based and not calendar-driven (NATO, 2013). These statements indicate the political character of the KFOR mission. KFOR’s promotion of local ownership towards the KSF is both affected by political challenges at the international and national level.

International level

At the international political level three major constraints affect KFOR’s promotion of local ownership towards the KSF, namely the UNSCR 1244, the Ahtisaari Plan from which KFOR adopted its new tasks and the political recognition of Kosovo’s independence. These constraints have been affecting the KSF in its long-term planning and therefore have limited the KSF’s development.

First, the UNSCR 1244 authorised the KFOR mission in which the UN Security Council decided that the international military presence had some responsibilities (UN Security
Council, 1999). Some of these responsibilities have been achieved and are therefore no longer KFOR’s responsibility, like e.g. the demilitarisation of the KLA, but other tasks are still KFOR’s responsibility. Some of the objectives that have not been achieved or have not been (completely) transferred to local institutions, are the protection of heritage sites such as Serbian Orthodox monasteries, freedom of movement throughout all of Kosovo and border security (King, 2013). While some monasteries are now protected by the Kosovo Police, other monasteries are still protected by KFOR. Also the responsibility of some border crossing points has been transferred to local Kosovo institutions, while border crossing points at the Serbian border in the North of Kosovo are still manned by KFOR forces (NATO, 2013). As long as Serbian monasteries feel unsafe without KFOR protection and the security situation in the North remains critical, KFOR will not be able to transfer authorities to institutions like the Kosovo Police and the KSF (King, 2013). As the KFOR mission would only end with agreement of the UN Security Council members and while KFOR has not achieved or transferred all of its tasks yet, the UNSCR 1244 remains in force which authorises a KFOR presence that would not allow a complete transfer to local institutions.

Also, NATO reaffirmed after Kosovo’s declaration of independence that KFOR shall remain in Kosovo on the basis of UNSCR 1244, unless the UN Security Council decides otherwise (NATO, 2013). Two of the five permanent members of the Security Council do not recognise the independence of Kosovo, namely China and Russia. Because of this lack of consensus by the permanent members, it is unlikely that a new resolution will be adopted that would allow complete transfer of authorities to local institutions. Therefore KFOR has not been able to fully transfer authorities to the KSF and has not been able to promote complete local ownership towards the KSF in order to withdraw its forces from Kosovo (King, 2013). Also, UNSCR 1244 does not describe or mention the transfer of responsibilities of KFOR to the KSF, because the KSF was only established in 2009. As long as there is no adoption of a new resolution taking into consideration the improved security situation and the presence of local security institutions in Kosovo, the UNSCR 1244 does not allow the complete promotion of local ownership towards the KSF by KFOR.

The second aspect that hampers KFOR in the promotion of local ownership towards to KSF is the Ahtisaari Plan. KFOR adopted its new tasks after the Ahtisaari Plan was proposed in 2007. The UNSCR 1244 that dates back from 1999 did not mention a security force like the KSF, so KFOR’s new tasks were adopted outside UNSCR 1244. The security environment has changed after the adoption of Resolution 1244 (King, 2013), so after the Ahtisaari Plan was proposed the NAC decided that the KSF would be established
according to this proposal. The previous chapter has described the limitations of the Ahtisaari Plan towards the KSF and the level of local ownership has been limited in the initiation phases in most of the defence reform activities. KFOR’s new tasks were implemented in close consultation and coordination with the relevant international and local authorities (NATO, 2013). The promotion of local ownership by KFOR towards the KSF would therefore not contradict with the UNSCR 1244 and the Ahtisaari Plan, which clearly have imposed some constraints. It is questionable if the political limitations that were imposed in 1999 and 2007 are still realistic today and will prevail in the future, because the KSF would not be a threat to the region and the chances of potential conflicts in the Balkans are small (Qehaja, 2013).

The third political aspect at the international level that affects KFOR’s mandate towards the KSF is the political recognition of Kosovo’s independence. Besides the non-recognising permanent members of the UN Security Council, the non-recognising NATO members (also EU members) form a big obstacle to the KFOR mission (Just, 2013; King, 2013). The rejection of formal recognition of Kosovo makes the relationship between NATO and Kosovo highly complicated (Vrajolli & Kallaba, 2012), which clearly affects KFOR’s promotion of local ownership towards the KSF. The lack of consensus among the NATO member states makes it difficult to determine KFOR’s engagement with the KSF (King, 2013). One of the objectives of the Ministry of the KSF is to cooperate and partner with NATO and join NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme (Ministry of Kosovo Security Force, 2012; Vrajolli & Kallaba, 2012), but KFOR is not partnering with the KSF in e.g. joint exercises nor promoting cooperation (Just, 2013; Smallwood, 2013). As the KSF is a young organisation, partnering with NATO would possibly be beneficial for the KSF’s development. Integration of Kosovo in Euro-Atlantic structures, and more particularly cooperation of the KSF with NATO, could also contribute to a stable and secure environment (Foreign Policy Club, 2011).

The PfP is a programme aimed at creating trust between NATO and states of the former Soviet Union and Europe. The objectives of PfP are among other things the facilitation of transparency, ensuring democratic control of defence forces and the development of cooperative military relations (Herd, 2013). Besides the lack of political recognition, another possible reason for KFOR’s rejection of partnership with the KSF is that NATO does not want to import conflicts or instability into the alliance (Dunay, 2013). So as long as the dispute between Serbia and Kosovo continues, the KSF will not be able to join any NATO partnership. The PfP programme has been successful in helping countries for NATO membership; enhancing support for NATO-led operations; in drawing training programmes and expertise; in assisting countries to undertake reform efforts including
defence and security reform (Herd, 2013). NATO partnering with Kosovo or allowing Kosovo to join the PfP programme would allow a certain supervision and indirect control through its remaining presence over the KSF (Feith, 2013; Qehaja, 2013). Cooperation and partnership of the KSF with NATO could therefore also be beneficial to NATO. However, the lack of consensus within NATO dictates KFOR’s promotion of local ownership towards the KSF.

**National level**

Also at the national political level two major constraints affect KFOR’s mandate in promoting local ownership towards the KSF, namely developments of Kosovo’s government and the political dialogues between Serbia and Kosovo. These political aspects have constrained KFOR in promoting local ownership towards the KSF.

The first political constraint at the national level is Kosovo’s government having limited authority in Northern Kosovo and some Serbian enclaves in other parts of Kosovo. Kosovo’s government has no institutional presence in the North of Kosovo and the security situation there deteriorated in 2011 forcing KFOR to respond (Foreign Policy Club, 2011; NATO, 2013). This part of the country has presented a constant threat to the stability of this region. In this part of Kosovo there have been parallel Serbian security organisations (Feith, 2013; Foreign Policy Club, 2011; Qehaja, 2013) undermining authority of both Kosovo’s government and KFOR. Also other parts of Kosovo that are inhabited by Serbian majorities rather seek rapprochement with Serbia (Feith, 2013). Given the fact that tensions have run high sometimes in Northern Kosovo and affected Kosovo’s stability, KFOR’s presence is definitely crucial to ensure a safe and secure environment and the government’s authority is limited in the North (Qehaja, 2013; Vrajolli & Kallaba, 2012), this clearly affected KFOR’s mandate in promoting local ownership to the KSF. If there would be a natural disaster in the North, involvement of the KSF would be decided by the Ministry of the KSF and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Geci, 2013; Hoti, 2013) but KSF involvement would be unlikely and would create complex political situation (King, 2013; Qehaja, 2013). Also KFOR has the executive powers to decide if the KSF could be tasked for actions in the North (Muhaxheri, 2013).

Another constraint imposed by the government of Kosovo itself is the Law on the KSF. As the Law on the KSF is derived from the Ahtisaari Plan, this too clearly limits the KSF in its mandate and future developments (Krelani, 2013). The law states that the KSF shall be a lightly armed security force and a full review of these limits can be conducted no earlier than 5 years from the date the law enters in force (Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo, 2008). These limitations have also affected KFOR in its promotion of local ownership
towards the KSF. The revision of the KSF mandate is done by Kosovo’s SSSR initiated by the government, but whether recommendations can be implemented remains the question (Thomas, 2013).

Secondly, the EU-facilitated dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia about normalising each other’s relationships, which began in March 2011, also affected KFOR’s promotion of local ownership towards the KSF. Serbia does not recognise Kosovo’s independence and has been undermining statebuilding activities in Kosovo (Foreign Policy Club, 2011). Normalising relations and calming the situation in the North would facilitate KFOR to draw down its forces to eventually complete exit from Kosovo (King, 2013). The solution is therefore political rather than military. After 10 rounds of negotiations, Serbia’s Prime Minister Ivica Dačić and Kosovo’s Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi signed an agreement about normalising their relations on 19 April 2013 (European Union External Action, 2013). Earlier that month EU High Representative Catherine Ashton, who chaired the negotiation process, announced that negotiations had failed (Ashton, 2013). The agreement implied among other things that Serbian-majority areas in Kosovo would be giving a high degree of autonomy in economic development, health, education, urban and rural planning (BBC News, 2013). Also Serbia and Kosovo agreed not to block each other’s efforts to seek EU membership (BBC News, 2013; Feith, 2013). While Serbia agreed to sign the agreement, it has not recognised Kosovo’s independence and many Kosovo Serbian people did not share the Serbian government’s opinion on the agreement (BalkanInsight, 2013). The signing of the agreement is however a step in the right direction in normalising relations.

After the Agreement on Normalisation was signed, NATO announced that there would be new possibilities to the Euro-Atlantic integration of the Western Balkans (NATO, 2013). KFOR would support the implementation of this agreement according to its current mandate. It would be too early to conclude to what extent this would affect KFOR’s promotion of local ownership towards the KSF, but it does open new possibilities. The three main factors why KFOR could not continue to draw back its forces and could therefore not move to Gate 3, was because of the limited freedom of movement in the North, the Serbian monasteries not feeling safe without KFOR protection and the difficult negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo (King, 2013). If the implementation of the Agreement on Normalisation would be successful, this could possibly allow the two remaining factors to play a less significant role and would facilitate KFOR’s exit.
6.2 Political impulses affecting KFOR’s promotion of local ownership

As mentioned, there have been some political constraints affecting KFOR’s mandate, but there are also some political impulses that positively affected KFOR’s promotion of local ownership towards the KSF. After the Ahtisaari Plan was presented, NATO’s NAC agreed to adopt new tasks for KFOR in which a lot of resources were spend in creating the KSF and the Ministry of KSF. Also the bilateral involvement of individual NATO members played a significant to the development of the KSF.

First of all, it has been described that the Ahtisaari Plan dictated some limitations in establishing the KSF and a civilian-led organisation of the Kosovo Government. As the NAC agreed to adopt these new tasks in 2008, NATO established the NATO Advisory Team (NAT) and within KFOR the Military Civil Advisory Division (MCAD) was established. KFOR’s planning foresaw an independent and sustainable KSF in which government institutions of Kosovo would be responsible, as can be illustrated in this previous shown figure. Currently the KFOR mission is in the FOC window, but regarding this planning there clearly were political intentions to promote local ownership when the KSF was established.

Figure 13: KFOR’s planning towards an independent KSF (MCAD, 2010)
The responsibility of establishing the Ministry of KSF rested with the NATO headquarters in Brussels, but KFOR was tasked to support the NAT that had been established in Pristina (NATO, 2013). The NAT was tasked to mentor and to advise the Ministry of KSF in its oversight of the KSF. It was composed of uniformed and civilian personnel and had been deployed by NATO’s Defence Policy and Planning Division (Vrajolli & Kallaba, 2012). The NAT has been providing substantial advice in the establishment of the Ministry of KSF and therefore NATO agreed on creating an institution to democratically control the KSF. It might be remarkable for an organisation, in which some members states do not recognise Kosovo’s independence, to agree on NATO’s coexistence in supporting sovereign state institutions in Kosovo (Thomas, 2013; Vrajolli & Kallaba, 2012). Furthermore, KFOR established the MCAD whose mission was to train, mentor and advise the KSF in its development. This KFOR division has been promoting local ownership as much as possible, as has been described in the previous chapter.

Another political impulse comes from individual NATO members through bilateral relations with the KSF. KFOR agreed to bilateral states that any bilateral programmes with the KSF cannot violate the KSF mandate (King, 2013; Thomas, 2013). Any contribution of an individual NATO member is in coordination with KFOR for the purpose of helping to further develop the KSF and Ministry of KSF, which contributes to the new tasks of KFOR. Bilateral involvement does not immediately affect KFOR’s promotion of local ownership, but as it is in coordination with KFOR and it clearly helps the KSF, it is a significant political impulse that indirectly affects KFOR’s promotion of local ownership towards the KSF.

6.3 Military constraints affecting KFOR’s promotion of local ownership

The previous paragraphs have described the political aspects affecting KFOR’s promotion of local ownership, and since KFOR is an NATO-led international peacekeeping force, this paragraph elaborates on the military constraints. Concerning the military constraints for KFOR in its promotion of local ownership towards the KSF, these constraints can again be divided at an international and national level.

International level
The KFOR mission is affected by military constraints at the international level, because of the fact that NATO imposes some requirements before partnering with other countries and because of the fact that a “Kosovo Defence Force” would form a military threat to the Balkan region.
NATO imposes some restrictions to the KFOR mission that affect KFOR’s promotion of local ownership towards the KSF. As has been described earlier in this research, the KSF is not allowed to be a defence force and therefore KFOR cannot completely promote defence reform activities in Kosovo. In that sense is KFOR only allowed to do statebuilding in the limited spectrum of Kosovo having a security force (Just, 2013; King, 2013). Other NATO restrictions that involve the KSF are requirements needed to partner with NATO. One of the military requirements is the fair treatment of minority populations (NATO, 2013). KFOR has been imposing some requirements to the KSF in order to reach FOC, like the ethnic and female representation within the KSF. Another NATO requirement for (future) member states is spending a significant percentage of a country’s GDP (Gross Domestic Product) on defence, which is recommended to be at least two percent (Cottey, Edmunds, & Forster, 2002). Kosovo’s GDP in 2012 was estimated to be approximately €17,96 billion ($13,56 billion) (Central Intelligence Agency, 2013) and the Ministry of KSF’s approved budget in 2012 was €34,90 million (Ministry of Kosovo Security Force, 2012), which only gives a percentage of 0,25% of Kosovo’s GDP. These formal NATO requirements makes it hard for the Ministry of the KSF to realise its goal to join the PfP programme. KFOR is also imposing the NATO requirement of female and ethnic representation, which puts a lot of pressure on the KSF.

Another military constraint at the international level is the fact that a 'Kosovo Defence Force' would form a military threat to the Balkan region. At the times the UNSCR 1244 and Ahtisaari Plan were signed, it was required to demilitarise the KLA and it was desirable for security in the Balkan region to leave Kosovo without a defence force. Since the Yugoslav Wars ended, and in particular the Kosovo War, there has been sporadic violence in the Balkans and Kosovo (BBC News, 2013; Qehaja, 2013). The security environment has improved, with some exception of the North of Kosovo, in which the KSF could contribute to peace in the Balkan region (Krelani, 2013; Uka, 2013). KFOR’s presence and its role could therefore be primarily focused on the Northern part of Kosovo and in other parts of Kosovo security related issues could be the Kosovo Police’s and KSF’s responsibility (Vrajolli & Kallaba, 2012). The international approach towards Kosovo could be revised to further develop local ownership in the defence sector. This international approach, which prevails since 1999, still affects KFOR’s mandate towards the KSF.
National level

At the national level it is important to remark that KFOR is subordinate to the international political and military level. Two major military constraints affect KFOR’s promotion of local ownership at a national level, namely KFOR’s exit strategy and the continuing development of the KSF.

First of all concerning KFOR’s exit strategy, KFOR has been reducing its amount of troops from 50,000 to approximately 5000 today. In 2009, NATO defence ministers agreed to adjust KFOR’s presence to a deterrent presence, meaning; reducing the amount of troops when appropriate and according to the evolution of events (KFOR, 2013). In 2010, KFOR had successfully achieved Gate 1 in its transition to deterrent presence, reducing its amount of troops to some 10,200. The transition to Gate 2 was authorised by NAC in October 2010, which left KFOR with some 5000 troops in Kosovo. The future transition of KFOR to Gate 3, which is a minimal presence, is still unknown (KFOR, 2013). KFOR’s exit strategy is not related to the KSF’s development (King, 2013). The KSF e.g. could become FOC without KFOR moving to Gate 3 or KFOR could move to Gate 3 without the KSF becoming FOC. Because KFOR’s exit strategy is not related to the development of the KSF, the KSF cannot be seen as successor of KFOR and KFOR cannot promote complete local ownership towards the KSF as its successor.

A second military constraint that also affects KFOR’s promotion of local ownership is the development of the KSF. In the previous chapter has been described that the declaration of the KSF’s FOC is rather political and therefore has not been announced yet, but there are also some limitations within the development of the KSF that affect KFOR’s promotion of local ownership. The KSF’s development is facing four challenges. The main challenges of the KSF are mismanagement of funds, deficiencies of public procurement and potential corruption (Qehaja, 2013). From a capability point of view; not all units of the KSF reached FOC in terms of civil protection, because some battalions of the RRB are better prepared to respond to crises than others and neither has the KSF reached FOC in all its capabilities (Just, 2013; King, 2013; Qehaja, 2013). The KSF did not completely prepare its units for deployment abroad in peacekeeping operations. The ability to make a military contribution to NATO operations is also required for NATO partnership (NATO, 2013). So considering these challenges, the KSF is still in development and KFOR’s promotion of local ownership towards the KSF is affected by it.

These challenges, as well as other KSF shortfalls in its logistics and Human Resource Management (Just, 2013; Smallwood, 2013), could exclude the KSF from potential change of its mandate. The Ahtisaari Plan (2007) states that the KSF should not be a
burden to Kosovo’s budget and therefore it is unlikely for the KSF to get increased capacities. Kosovo does not have to budget to be completely independent in its defence expenditures and the KSF does not have the capacities yet to become independent (Feith, 2013), because the KSF is a young organisation still dependent on donations. If Kosovo could join the PfP programme and eventually become NATO member, than NATO would also guarantee Kosovo’s territorial sovereignty (Qehaja, 2013).

6.4 **Military impulses affecting KFOR’s promotion of local ownership**

Besides some constraints there are also some military impulses that positively affect KFOR’s promotion of local ownership towards the KSF. Generally the KSF experiences its cooperation with KFOR as good, because it helped the KSF to make progression fast (Geci, 2013; Hoti, 2013; Krelani, 2013; Uka, 2013). Many KSF members are attending bilateral trainings in coordination with KFOR (King, 2013). It is expected that in the future NATO military trainings will be open to members of the KSF as well (Thomas, 2013). As these bilateral military relations bring the KSF forward (Smallwood, 2013), it also helps KFOR in its role of developing the KSF which could also allow KFOR to promote local ownership quicker.

Another military impulse that could affect KFOR’s promotion of local ownership is Kosovo’s SSSR process. This review helps both Kosovo and the international community to realistically know what Kosovo’s security sector needs in the future (Geci, 2013; Hoti, 2013; Krelani, 2013; Uka, 2013). After this review has been presented, which is expected to be June/July 2013, it is not sure if the KSF would be able to increase its mandate, but it might help KFOR or NATO to revise its role in Kosovo and its role towards the KSF in promoting local ownership.

In this chapter has been elaborated on KFOR’s promotion of local ownership towards the KSF and in particular the political and military constraints and impulses that were decisive in promoting local ownership towards the KSF. Clearly the political involvement in the KFOR mission is significant which clearly affected KFOR’s mandate at the local and tactical level in Kosovo. The next chapter comprises the conclusion in which is being described if KFOR’s promotion of local ownership towards the KSF is according to the theory of promoting local ownership in defence reform activities.
7 Conclusion

In this research the promotion of local ownership by KFOR in its defence reform activities in order to create an independent and sustainable security Kosovo Security Force has been analysed. By analysing the level of local ownership in specific defence reform activities from 2008 until 2013, the development of the KSF towards an independent force could be explained. First, in this chapter the conclusion is described in which the answer to this research’ main question is given. Then, in the second paragraph recommendations are given to facilitate KFOR’s decision-making processes.

7.1 Conclusions

In the theoretical framework has been described what the importance of local ownership within SSR is and in particular in defence reform activities since this relates to this research’ theme. The characteristics of SSR have been outlined and in order for SSR programmes to be successful, the approach of local ownership needs to be considered, the objectives of increased effectiveness and accountability have to be realised within a complex environment of political, holistic and technical dimensions. Although this research is limited to KFOR’s promotion of local ownership within defence reform activities, all the characteristics of SSR can be seen in the development of the KSF, like the objective of accountability and the political sensitive environment KFOR operates in. In order to analyse KFOR’s promotion of local ownership in defence reform activities towards the KSF, the variables of doctrine development and strategy, command structure, defence force formation and military education and training have been operationalised.

In general the KSF has been developing towards becoming a more professional force since its establishment and the KSF has received increased capabilities during this process. However, the KSF has the ambition to become a defence force or to at least have an increased mandate which it is not yet allowed to. This makes the KSF still a security force under supervision of KFOR and not yet an independent defence force. In order for SSR programmes to be successful towards any successful democratic transition, external help and support need to be reduced over time to eventually disappear. Therefore the principle of local ownership has been viewed increasingly as a precondition for effective SSR. Local actors should be involved throughout the entire process of SSR to eventually become independent and sustainable. When considering Kosovo then the military authorities and capacities of KFOR forces should be gradually transferred to local institutions, but for the KSF this is not yet completely the case. Therefore the promotion
of local ownership in defence reform activities by KFOR is not fully according to theory and has therefore not contributed to an independent and sustainable security sector in Kosovo in which the external support would be minimal.

Regarding the promotion of local ownership in KFOR’s defence reform activities towards the KSF, it can be concluded that the promotion of local ownership in the initiation phase has been limited in all of the defence reform activities. In the other three phases of planning, implementation and evaluation has been significant promotion of local ownership by KFOR in most of the defence reform activities, but only in the limited spectrum of KSF’s mandate. KFOR’s promotion of local ownership towards the KSF is affected by political and military aspects. The main reasons for the limited promotion of local ownership are political limitations, NATO restrictions, limited authority of Kosovo’s government, Serbia’s and Kosovo’s dialogue about normalising relations, the KSF’s continuing development as a young organisation and the limited budget of the Ministry of KSF making it dependent on external help. The main reasons for the significant promotion of local ownership are military and political impulses. Besides the political limitations, KFOR has been promoting local ownership in creating an independent security force and there is a lot of bilateral involvement of NATO members in supporting the KSF.

At the international political level, the Ahtisaari Plan and the UNSCR 1244 clearly dictated some limitations to the KSF, and clearly affected KFOR’s promotion of local ownership in its defence reform activities. The lack of political recognition among NATO members about Kosovo’s independence also affected both the KFOR mission and the KSF’s development. At the national level, Kosovo’s limited authority in the North and its limited Law on the KSF and the political dialogues between Kosovo and Serbia have affected KFOR’s promotion of local ownership. However, despite the limitations of the Ahtisaari Plan and the UNSCR 1244, KFOR has promoted local ownership within its mandate. Also individual NATO members are contributing to the KFOR mission and helping the KSF through its bilateral relations.

At the international military level, NATO imposes some military restrictions that affect the KFOR mission. In order for the KSF to partner with NATO it needs to meet certain requirements that put a lot of pressure on the KSF. Because the KSF has difficulties meeting NATO requirements, it has affected KFOR’s promotion of local ownership towards the KSF. Another military constraint is that a future ‘Kosovo Defence Force’ would form a military threat to the Balkan region. At the national level, KFOR’s exit strategy not being related to the KSF’s development, has limited KFOR in handing over authority to the KSF.
Also, the KSF is still developing as a young organisation and therefore KFOR’s presence is still desirable and the promoting of local ownership towards the KSF has been limited by this.

As has been described in the theoretical framework, there are three key dilemmas in promoting local ownership which might be applicable in the process of KFOR’s promotion of local ownership towards the KSF. These dilemmas are the problem of external intrusiveness, local dependency and the “spoiler problem”.

First, KFOR has faced the dilemma of being externally intrusive and creating self-governance at the same time. KFOR has exercised authoritative functions since 1999, but also has helped local actors to build up their self-governance capacities like the KPC and later the KSF. SSR programmes can be regarded as intrusive if they do not involve local actors in different phases of the SSR activities and for Kosovo this has been especially the case in the initiation phases of SSR programmes. KFOR needed to fill the vacuum of domestic military authority in the post-conflict environment of Kosovo. Decisions of the international community regarding Kosovo’s security sector or the continuous KFOR presence in Kosovo since 1999 might be intrusive, which could have affected the development of Kosovo’s security sector and the KSF’s level of local ownership. The intrusiveness of KFOR is however regarded as limited, because KFOR has significantly contributed to Kosovo’s security sector and to KSF’s development. The dilemma that KFOR does face, is to decrease its external help and to further develop the KSF into an independent and sustainable force.

The second dilemma of local dependency by short or long term commitments is also applicable to KFOR. The KFOR mission in Kosovo is NATO’s second largest deployment in troops after the ISAF mission in Afghanistan and the mission with the longest duration. Partnering KFOR countries want to conclude KFOR’s mandate to allow operational capacities to deploy elsewhere, to keep military engagement abroad limited and to save a considerable amount of money in times of financial crisis and defence budget cuts. However, the UNSCR 1244 authorises the KFOR mission and the adoption of a new resolution on the short term is unlikely. Also, the lack of political recognition of Kosovo’s independence keeps NATO member states divided. Because KFOR faces these dilemmas, the KFOR mission has become a long term military commitment, which does not allow the KSF to take over complete responsibilities.

The third dilemma faced by KFOR is about identifying capable local partners instead of spoilers. Considering the KSF it consists of a majority of ethnic Albanian members of
which many have been KLA member. For KFOR it is important to include both ethnic Albanians and ethnic Serbians in the KSF to enhance mutual understanding, but to keep military experience as well. Both KFOR and Kosovo’s government face the problem that acceptance of Kosovo institutions is limited in Serbian dominated areas in Kosovo. In the promotion of local ownership KFOR therefore faces the dilemma of identifying KSF members that could contribute to a sustainable security sector.

7.2 Recommendations

The objective of this research is to provide insight into the relevance of promoting local ownership in SSR activities in support of defence reform in relation to an independent KSF in Kosovo. Recommendations can be made based on the conclusions above to facilitate KFOR’s decision-making processes in handing over responsibilities to the KSF. KFOR’s promotion of local ownership was affected by some military and political constraints that seriously limited KFOR in its defence reform activities towards the KSF. Only making recommendations to KFOR based on this research would be too narrow, so some recommendations that do not only involve KFOR are also given.

Review KSF’s mandate

The first recommendation that can be made after this research’ analysis, is to review the KSF’s mandate. The KSF’s mandate is limited to the KSF being a security force without having the perspective of having increased capabilities. Some political and military constraints could possibly no longer prevail, because the political and security situations in Kosovo have changed.

The Kosovo government has initiated a Strategic Security Sector Review (SSSR) to review its security sector and this review is likely to be presented this Summer 2013. Given the fact that KFOR has been reducing its presence in Kosovo over the years, it might be unrealistic that Kosovo is not allowed to have any defence force capabilities that could take over responsibilities of KFOR. A full review of Kosovo’s limitations would be conducted no earlier than five years from the date the Ahtisaari Plan and the Law on the KSF entered in force. The review would not automatically imply that Kosovo could implement any of its SSSR recommendations, but the review could allow the Kosovo government to realistically redesign its security sector. The SSSR could also make clear to the government that redesigning Kosovo’s security sector would create too much of a financial burden on Kosovo’s budget or that the KSF has not developed to a desirable level yet. When the SSSR is presented, the UN Security Council and NATO could review
the KSF’s mandate which could positively affect KFOR in further promoting local ownership towards the KSF.

Other reasons for reviewing the KSF’s mandate is the increased security environment in the Balkan region and the recent agreements on normalising relations between Serbia and Kosovo. An additional recommendation to the EU is to continue dialogues between Serbia and Kosovo to further intensify each other’s relations. If relations would continue to normalise and hopefully intensify in the near future, then another recommendation is to research the security environment in the Balkans. Kosovo was not allowed to have any defence force capabilities, but as the security situation has changed and relations continue to normalise then it might be realistic to review KSF’s mandate.

**Declaration of FOC**

After the Commander of KFOR proposed declaration of FOC in 2011, NATO’s NAC is still to decide on KSF’s FOC today. Within the NAC there is no consensus of what FOC implies and therefore NATO needs to determine what comes after FOC, because the criteria for further progression are unknown. Possibly the declaration of FOC would be too early, because the KSF has not reached FOC in all of its capabilities (core, enabling, supporting capabilities) or the level of training within units run too far apart because some units are better prepared to respond to crisis than others. The KSF also faces some challenges and still has some shortfalls that could delay the declaration of FOC. The recommendation to KFOR would be to continue promoting local ownership towards the KSF, so the KSF continues to develop itself. A recommendation to NATO would be to create consensus with the NAC on what FOC implies and decide what comes after FOC, because the delay in FOC declaration holds back the KSF’s development.

**NATO accession – Partnership for Peace**

A recommendation to NATO is to consider the accession of Kosovo in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme. If a political solution for the North of Kosovo will be found and relations between Kosovo and Serbia will continue to normalise, then this would allow KFOR to move from Gate 2 to Gate 3. If KFOR would continue to draw down its amount of troops and the KSF has reached FOC, NATO could still monitor the security situation in Kosovo and the KSF’s development through the PfP programme. The PfP programme would strengthen regional cooperation and cooperation with NATO. The PfP programme would facilitate transparency of the KSF, ensure democratic control by the Ministry of KSF and it would facilitate the development of cooperative military relations. Cooperation and partnership of the KSF with NATO could therefore also be beneficial to NATO.
After these recommendations it must be realised that it is hard to implement these, because of the political and military constraints that have been described. However, these recommendations involve the biggest obstacles in KFOR’s promoting of local ownership towards the KSF in its defence reform activities. Even though the concepts of SSR and local ownership are relatively new, it is generally accepted that reforming security sectors in post-conflict countries are important in successful democratic transitions. Also external support that has proven to be crucial needs to decrease to eventually disappear. Reforming Kosovo’s security sector would therefore also contribute to a successful democratic transition. The KFOR mission has definitely been important to Kosovo’s security since it started in 1999 and after the adoption of KFOR’s new tasks, it has been important in the KSF’s development by promoting local ownership. If the international community, and especially the UN, EU and NATO, wants to successfully reform the post-conflict environment in Kosovo, then these recommendations have to be taken into account.
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Appendix A: Interviews

List of interviewees

NATO Headquarters KFOR

- Mister Kyle King (United States), Civil Protection Advisor at the Military Civil Advisory Division (MCAD), 15 April 2013
- Colonel Reiner Just (Germany), MCAD FAO (Foreign Area Officer) Senior Force Chief Advisor, 15 April 2013
- Brigadier General Bojan Pograjc (Slovenia), Deputy Commander of KFOR (presentation and general discussion), 09 April 2013

Ministry of the Kosovo Security Force

- Mister Sinan Geci, Head of Section for Euro-Atlantic Integration, 16 April 2013
- Lieutenant-Colonel Haki Hoti, Head of Section for Plans, Programmes and Analysis, 16 April 2013
- Lieutenant Vegim Krelani, Liaison Officer at ODC (Office Defence Cooperation), 18 April 2013

Kosovo Security Force

- Colonel Bajram Uka, Chief of G1 (Personnel) Land Forces Command, 17 April 2013
- Captain Faton Muhaxheri, Chief of G8 (Finance) Training and Doctrine Command, 17 April 2013
- Lieutenant Kadri Berisha, Instructor of Centre for University Studies (TRADOC), 17 April 2013

Others

- Mister Pieter Feith, former International Civilian Representative (ICO) in Kosovo, 03 April 2013
- Mister Florian Qehaja (Kosovo), Executive Director of the Kosovo Centre for Security Studies
- Lieutenant-Colonel Will Smallwood (Great Britain), Adviser to the Commander of the KSF
- Lieutenant-Colonel Emily Thomas (United States), US Army Attaché at the US Embassy in Pristina
Interview protocol

Objective of the interviews
The objective of the interviews was to acquire additional information relevant to the analysis of this research. Especially information on the development of the Kosovo Security Force and KFOR’s promotion of local ownership was crucial for the analysis and many of this information was unavailable through literature. Interviewing different stakeholders and key players that possess important functions would provide the essential information to complete the research.

Procedure of the interview
The interviewees have been approached by asking whether they were willing to cooperate and participate in an interview. Appointments were made and the context of the research and objective of the interview was send by email or orally discussed. It was told that the interview would be used for my thesis research and that it would approximately take one hour. It was also asked if the interview could be recorded. The interview consisted of two main parts. Questions (and sub-questions) were dependent on what person would be interviewed:
  a. General information about KFOR/KSF at a more strategic/political level
  b. More specific information at the operational/technical level about the KSF’s development and KFOR’s promotion of local ownership

Interview

General information about KFOR/KSF at a more strategic level
1. KFOR operates under the mandate based on UNSCR 1244, which only allows the KSF to be a security force and NATO still is to decide about KSF’s FOC. To what extent does this allow any statebuilding initiatives in Kosovo and particularly how does this affect the (M)KSF?
   a. Ahtisaari Plan ends in June ‘13. Is MKSF looking forward to present its SSSR in order to move forward in statebuilding initiatives after this?
   b. Towards what endstate can (M)KSF work? Is this hold back by KFOR?
2. The mission of the KSF is to support the government of Kosovo and to respond to natural disasters and other emergencies. The MCAD and NAT are there to assist/advise the (M)KSF in that.
   a. How has KFOR’s involvement changed since 2009? Has there been a shift in time considering local ownership?
3. One of the MKSF objectives is making the KSF self-sustainable and further develop operational capabilities. Right now NATO is discussing whether the KSF is ready to become FOC. What does this imply and why is this transition so difficult?

4. As the KSF and MKSF aim to provide security to enhance the overall well-being of the state and its people, how does the situation in the North of Kosovo and the attitudes of Serbian minorities affect this aim?

5. The KSF was not established to relieve KFOR and the UNSCR 1244 which dates back from 1999, never mentioned a force like KSF. How will security be guaranteed in Kosovo with KFOR decreasing its amount of troops, but UNSCR 1244 still applicable?
   a. Is KFOR’s presence and UNSCR 1244 holding the KSF back?
   b. Does KFOR fully support local initiatives?

6. Currently Kosovo is working on a Strategic Security Sector Review for the future security environment and capabilities Kosovo will need. What will it imply concerning KSF?
   a. The MKSF & US Defence Institution Reform Initiative are in charge of this process. Was this process initiated by KFOR or Kosovo? Does KFOR support it?
   b. Is this review for international organisations to decide what happens next in Kosovo? (endstate, enddate, UNSCR 1244, armed force?)

**Progress MKSF/KSF in relation to KFOR’s promotion of local ownership**

1. What progress have the KSF and MKSF made since its establishment in 2009? To what extent has there been promotion of local ownership by KFOR over time?
   a. Doctrine development and strategy
   b. Command structure
   c. Formation of the KSF/ MKSF
   d. Military education and training
## Appendix B: Total overview of minority applications

### Tabela e Raportimeve Ditore/ Daily Report Table

<table>
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<th>Total received applications</th>
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|    | Gjithësejë ditore/ Total daily | 21 | 9 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 1 | 1 |
|    | Gjithësejë/ Total          | 245 | 63 | 1 | 68 | 4 | 40 | 45 | 11 | 2 | 1 | 490 |

**Legend:**
- **Serb (Srb)**: Meishty/Ale 
- **Bosnian**: Meishty/Ale 
- **Turkish (Turq)**: Meishty/Ale 
- **Roma**: Meishty/Ale 
- **Ashkali (Ashkali)**: Meishty/Ale 
- **Egyptian**: Meishty/Ale 
- **Gorani**: Meishty/Ale 
- **Others (Tjera)**: Meishty/Ale

**Datë: 04.04.2013**

**Vërejtje/ Remarks:**