The Green Line, Cyprus: a Space of Exception or an Exceptional Space?

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Master’s Thesis
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Master Specialization: Conflicts, Territories and Identities

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April, 2012 – January, 2013
Nicosia, Cyprus/Nijmegen, the Netherlands
To those who can dream there is no such place as far away. –
Unknown

Acknowledgements

With a laughing and a crying eye I finally make it to this point. However, the amazing research and writing process of this thesis would not have been possible without the support, assistance, and friendship of a lot of people, who I would like to thank at this point…

First and foremost to Henk, for your supervision and guidance throughout the entire time. To Kyriakos, I will forever be in debt for your hospitality, knowledge, and help both throughout my stay in Nicosia as well as after my return to the Netherlands.

I would like to express my gratitude to the Cyprus Center for European and International Affairs and Prof. Andreas Theophanous for giving me the opportunity to use the facilities of the University of Nicosia for my research. Also, to the entire staff for making my stay on Cyprus as unforgettable as it was. It was a pleasure to meet you all and I will make sure to visit again.

Many thanks to all interviewees. Without your time and extensive answers, this research would not have been possible. Your stories and experiences continue to inspire me today. To Salih and Nic for taking me into the buffer zone and showing me what it is to you.

Marianna, the memories of your wit, charm, and ‘Gemütlichkeit’ continue to make me smile.

To Katherina and Farah, Cyprus in general, and living in a basement would not have been the same without you.

Ans, Carine, and Ferdinand thank you for helping me edit this thesis!

And finally, to my family, Thomas, and Ans, for always being just a phone call/a plane ride away.

Hannah Odenthal

Nijmegen, January 11, 2012
Abstract

This study explores how the actors involved in the Cyprus Problem perceived the Green Line in 1963, 1974, 2004, and 2012. In addition, it addresses if, why, and how these perceptions changed over time. In contrast to the history of the Cyprus Problem, the actors’ notions and ideas concerning the division line between the Cypriot communities have not been discussed in academia until this point.

To summarize the findings of this study, it can be stated that the decades of conflict without a settlement have turned the Green Line from a cease-fire line between Greek and Turkish Cypriots into an entity that reaches beyond Agamben’s *space of exception*. Despite contradicting opinions between, as well as within the communities, concerning what the Green Line is, the perpetuation of the conflict has turned the exceptional status of the demarcation line into the rule. The demarcation line has been actively and continuously *wanted* (UK, US, Turkey), *created* (Turkey, TRNC passport control), and *maintained* (EU regulations, the UN, and the rejection of the Annan Plan) ever since its establishment.

This thesis suggests that (a) the establishment of a Truth Committee; and (b) the creation of a curriculum, which focusses on the reconciliation of the conflicting parties, could lead to more moderate ideas and perceptions of the younger generations. Implementing these suggestions could therefore be beneficial to the peace process on the island.

Keywords: *Cyprus Problem, Green Line, Perceptions and Ideas*
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<td>Enosis</td>
<td>Reunion of all Greek speaking people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOKA</td>
<td>Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOKA-B</td>
<td>Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston B (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GC</td>
<td>Greek Cypriots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBAs</td>
<td>Sovereign Base Areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taksim</td>
<td>Division of Cyprus between Greece and Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TC</td>
<td>Turkish Cypriots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TMT</td>
<td>Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı (Turkish Resistance Organization)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; the terms United Kingdom and Great Britain will be used interchangeably in this thesis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFICYP</td>
<td>United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus</td>
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Note: English spelling is used for names and geographical places.
Introduction

Cyprus, island of Aphrodite, the island of beauty and love, so the legend goes. But Cyprus has also been a place of conflict and animosity. Since 1974 it has been divided, one side being inhabited by Greeks and the other by Turks. Divided, the island is united by mutual fear and mistrust.

Yiannis Papadakis

Ever since the outburst of violence between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities in the late 1950s, it has become increasingly evident that the conflict was instigated to a large extent by external actors, and in the view of Greek Cypriots at least, the three Guarantor Powers: the United Kingdom, Turkey, and to a lesser extent Greece. Since then, the Cyprus Problem has been on the political agendas of Greece, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, the European Union, and the United Nations. Exposed to the clashing interests of these powerful international and multilateral actors, the struggle eventually led to an unofficial stalemate, which has been safeguarded by a buffer zone, the Green Line, that completely separated the parties until 2003. In April 2003, the opening of the Green Line in several points has led to an uneasy, non-violent coexistence between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities.

While the Greek and Turkish Cypriots have been locked into competitive approaches for decades, the presence of the buffer zone has become less and less exceptional; awaiting a solution has turned from disappointment and frustration into a constant state of being. The Green Line was first established after the eruption of inter-communal violence in 1963; British Major-General Peter Young used a green pencil to draw a line across a map of Nicosia, in order to divide the capital into a Greek and a Turkish sector. Even though the buffer zone has become part of the Cypriot everyday reality, its status is ambiguous and complicated, as even though the “piece of land [is, H.O.] placed outside the normal juridical order…it is nevertheless not simply an external space.” The complexity of the Green Line became evident when the entire island of Cyprus – with exception of the areas under British control – joined the European Union in 2004; EU laws and regulations were suspended in the territories in which “the Government of the Republic of Cyprus does not exercise effective

Yet, does this description apply to the buffer zone? Who is in effective control of the buffer zone?

This is just one of the countless examples of how the actors in the peace process ensure the continuous creation and maintenance of the Green Line and its complicated status. By reflecting and comparing the perceptions and policies of the parties, as well as their internal divisions, this study seeks to contribute to the understanding of what the Green Line has been throughout the past four decades and what the involved parties consider it to be today; does it in essence resemble an international recognized border or should it be considered to be a space of exception?

Research Goal – Objectives and Questions

The main research objective of this ontological research project is to explore what the Green Line on Cyprus is according to the actors, as well as to identify if, why, and how these perceptions changed over time. This objective will be reached by answering several research questions. The main questions of this thesis are:

- How did the actors involved in the Cyprus Problem perceive the Green Line in 1963, 1974, 2004, and 2012?
- If, why, and how did these perceptions change over time?

The demarcation line is visible on historical, as well as on contemporary maps, and has been defined as “the line between the areas under the effective control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus and those areas in which the Government of the Republic of Cyprus does not exercise effective control.” This study will show that the Green Line is much more than just the line that limits the influence and authority of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.

Several sub questions related to the research matter were formulated in order to explain and develop an understanding of what the Green Line was and is according to the involved parties. The questions focus on the establishment of the Green Line, its historical development and status, as well as on the actors’ perceptions of the Green Line throughout the

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4 Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the European Union is founded - Protocol No 10 on Cyprus, European Union, April 16, 2003. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:12003T/PRO/10:EN:NOT.

decades. A list of all the sub questions formulated for this research project can be found in Appendix A.

Thus, this thesis will seek to highlight the differentiating opinions between foreign actors, as well as within and between the Cypriot communities. Although the Green Line is not and has never been an internationally recognized border, its establishment and maintenance, have been significantly influenced by domestic and foreign actors. Despite this foreign influence, and in contrast to other violent conflicts around the world, neither domestic forces, nor the international community succeeded to persuade or coerce the conflicting parties to reach a settlement. How did the different parties involved in the Cyprus Problem place, order, and name the Green Line throughout the past decades?

❖ Social and Societal Relevance

Ever since the independence of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960, the Mediterranean island has played an important role on the stage of international politics. Throughout the Cold War, the Soviet Union, as well as the United States and the United Kingdom, sought to use Cyprus for their political gain. As the island was located on the border of influence between the East and the West, Cyprus became a stage of the political standoff between the Cold War super powers.

Although the Cold War is long over, the Cyprus Problem is not. As the Republic of Cyprus became part of the European Union in 2004, the division of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities does not only remain a scar on the island and its people, but also on the EU and thus on the Netherlands. It can therefore be argued that the Green Line is more than a demarcation line between the Cypriot communities; it has become a European problem.

In contrast to other studies, which often solely focus on the history of the Problem, this research project seeks to offer a better understanding of the differentiating and corresponding opinions on the Green Line, as well as of the changes and developments of these perceptions over time. I believe that a better understanding of these perceptions can be highly beneficial to those who are involved in the peacemaking process on Cyprus; the UN, the EU, the Cypriot communities and their governments, as well as many other foreign and domestic actors.

❖ Scientific Relevance

Hundreds or maybe even thousands of scholars all over the world consider the border to be a fascinating and challenging research topic. The academic relevance and growing importance of the field of border studies is illustrated by the widespread existence of research centers, such as the Nijmegen Centre for Border Research at Radboud University Nijmegen
(NCBR), the Netherlands, which was established in 1998. The website of the NCBR illustrates the importance of the field as follows: “borders have become maybe more important then [sic] ever before,” “[b]ecause of…[the, H.O.] tension between borders as ‘meeting places’ and borders as ‘cut-off lines.’”

Throughout the past century, countless books, journals, and articles have been written on the border. While colonial powers lost their territories and the borders of the European Union were shaped and soon began to disappear, border scholars formulated and dismissed new theories. What is the border? What defines these concepts? The Literature Review of this thesis will seek to answer these questions, by highlighting and discussing several relevant theories.

Despite the extensive academic interest in boundaries and borders, as well as in the Cyprus Problem and the division between the Cypriot communities, little to no academic interest has been paid to what this Green Line is according to the actors involved in the perpetuating conflict. Therefore, this thesis seeks to close this knowledge gap and explores whether the Green Line on Cyprus can be considered to be a space of exception or an exceptional space.

Structure of the Thesis

This introduction will conclude by outlining the structure of this study. The thesis consists of four chapters: Chapter I: Literature Review, Chapter II: Historical Background, Chapter III: Methodology, and Chapter IV: Results. The fifth and chapter of this thesis offers ‘Conclusions and Recommendations.’ Appendices are included at the end.

Chapter I: Literature Review

Chapter I aims to offer the theoretical framework for this thesis. The framework is based on a literature review of the relevant theories on the Cyprus Problem, the border and the Green Line that have been discussed in academia for the past decades. In addition, the terminology used in this study will be explained, analyzed, and applied to the Green Line on Cyprus. What is the border? What is the Green Line? How are these two terms conceptualized? What is the difference between the border and the Green Line? What is a space of exception?

Scholars, academics, and historians have extensively discussed the Cyprus Problem and the division of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. Even though the international

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community has pressured the involved parties to find a solution to the conflict, the Problem remains unsolved today.

Chapter II: Historical Background

The second chapter of this thesis outlines the historical background of the Cyprus Problem since the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960. A profound understanding of the issue is important for the discussion and analysis of the events and policies concerning the Green Line, from its establishment in 1963, to the Turkish invasion in 1974, the opening of the crossings in the 2003, the Annan Plan in 2004, up until today. Why was the Green Line established? Why did the Turkish invasion lead to the continuous separation of Cyprus? What was the Annan Plan? Why was it rejected? Did the Greek Cypriot community want the continuous division of the island?

Chapter III: Methodology

Chapter III describes the qualitative research approach of this study. The methodology used for this study is not included in the Introduction, as I believe it to be too elaborate. The methodology chapter discusses the research philosophy and paradigms, and elaborates on the research strategy, research type, data collection, limitations to the research, analysis, data reduction, data display, and writing. Which methods and paradigms were used? Why were these chosen over others? How was the research conducted?

Chapter IV: Results

The fourth chapter of this study presents the results from the interviews conducted during my stay on Cyprus from April to July 2012. The data collected during the interviews and the literature review will be analyzed based on the qualitative methods discussed in Chapter III. In addition, subjective findings and interpretations will be presented along with photographs taken on Cyprus in 2012. What were the findings of the data analysis? What were my own experiences and perceptions?

Chapter V: Conclusions and Recommendations

In the final section of this thesis, conclusions are drawn from the interviews, literature review, and my own interpretations. In addition, recommendations for further research are presented. Is it possible to bring the perceptions of people concerning the Green Line down to a single definition of what the demarcation line is? What can we learn from the results of this research project? Is the Green Line a space of exception or an exceptional space?
Conclusion

This chapter presented the research plan – with exception of the methodology – for this study. The following chapters will seek to identify what the Green Line on Cyprus is according to the actors involved in the conflict, as well as if, why, and how these perceptions changed over time. In addition to discussing the research objectives and main research questions, this chapter focused on the social and societal relevance, as well as on the scientific relevance of the proposed research. Finally, this chapter presented the structure of this thesis, which was designed to help me delve into the historic as well as current perceptions of the Green Line and thus reach the goals of my research project.
Chapter I: Literature Review

Introduction

As noted in the Introduction of this thesis, the theoretical framework for this study is based on a literature review. This review serves to organize the most important ideas and notions on the Cyprus Problem, the border, and the Green Line that have been discussed in academia during the past decades. What is the Cyprus Problem? What is the border? What is the Green Line? How are these terms conceptualized? What is a space of exception? The discussion of these terms and their different dynamics will lead to a better understanding of the Green Line, its complicated status, and the Cyprus Problem at large.

It has to be stressed that, even though numerous Green Lines have been established throughout the years, the existing literature on the phenomenon is surprisingly limited. Also, as an extensive amount of research has been conducted on the Cyprus Problem, it is essential to include only those works in this study, which will contribute to reaching its research aim.

The Cyprus Problem

The Cyprus Problem has been considered to be one of the most significant examples “for the encounter, over time and space, between civilizations.”\(^7\) The island, which, with an area of 9,251 square kilometers, is the third largest in the Mediterranean, has been the home to Greek and Turkish Cypriots for centuries, and has become a place where East meets West.\(^8\)

Due to its strategic location, the island’s rule had been vigorously contested for centuries, when, on March 10, 1925, Cyprus officially became a colony of the British Crown. Burdened by high taxes, Cypriots from all communities and backgrounds soon began to challenge British domination. While this resistance resulted in violent riots, which broke out in 1931, demands from Greek Cypriots for the island’s reunion with the Greek mainland were voiced and became louder. This cry for integration was not new; the enosis movement, which strived for the unification of all Greek speaking peoples, had been established under Ottoman rule.\(^9\)

The enosis movement reached a peak during the 1950s and early 1960s – this decade was marked by anti-colonial uprisings – and would continue to exist until the 1970s, when the

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events of 1974 transformed the political agenda. Prominent roles during these periods were played by two Greek Cypriot leaders. Whereas Ethnarch Archbishop Makarios III, who would become the first President of Cyprus, was the leader of the Greek Cypriots and had the overall responsibility, the then Lieutenant Colonel Georgios Grivas Digenis was in charge of the military. Digenis lead the Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston, also known as EOKA or the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters. This violent Greek Cypriot military group was established in 1953 and assumed actions against the British domination in 1955; EOKA sought the reunion with Greece, and not the establishment of an independent country.¹⁰

EOKA enjoyed a lot of support from the Greek Cypriot community, which consisted of approximately 78 percent of the entire Cypriot population.¹¹ Data of an unofficial referendum carried out by the Ethnarchy Council, the highest Greek Cypriot authority, on January 15, 1950 showed that 96 percent of the Greek Cypriots favored the unification with the mainland and thus backed EOKA’s goal.¹² As many as 800 Turkish Cypriots also voted in favor of enosis and one can therefore not necessarily argue that the division of the island began with the Greek Cypriots’ desire to be part of Greece.¹³

In response to the continuous drive towards enosis, Turkish Cypriots, strongly supported by Turkey, established the counter organization Türk Mukavemet Teşkilattı, also known as TMT or the Turkish Resistance Organization, in 1957. This organization, as well as the growing Turkish Cypriot nationalism, was encouraged by the British colonial authorities, who sought to undermine the Greek call for enosis.¹⁴ Great Britain stressed the polarization of the Cypriot communities through its divide and rule policy and actively sought the involvement of Turkey on the island, yet, it has to be noted that the Turkish Cypriot opposition to enosis was not new; the majority of the community had always opposed the island’s reunion with Greece.¹⁵ David Souter, currently Visiting Senior Fellow at the London School of Economics, wrote: “[i]t was not until the mid-1950s that they [the Turkish Cypriots, H.O.] began to doubt Britain’s will and capacity to maintain colonial rule, and to look for


¹¹ This number, derived from the 1960 census, is still used today, as it was the last census to include both Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

¹² Ker-Lindsay, 17.


alternative protection against the threat of Greek domination.” Consequently, when EOKA continued its campaign for *enosis*, the Turkish Cypriots, supported by their ‘motherland,’ pushed towards the division of Cyprus between Turkey and Greece (*taksim*), and the establishment of a confederation.\(^{17}\)

In order to prevent a conflict between the NATO allies Greece and Turkey, Great Britain set up negotiations, which would eventually lead to the *Zürich-London Agreement*. According to this treaty, which was signed by Turkey, Greece, Great Britain, as well as Greek and Turkish Cypriot representatives in February 1960, Cyprus was to become an independent bi-communal state with a balanced power structure.\(^{18}\) In addition, seeking to protect the “sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity” of the newly established Republic of Cyprus, three important treaties were signed.\(^{19}\) The *Treaty of Guarantee*, signed by Turkey, Greece, and Great Britain, gave the states “an explicit right to intervene if the political situation on the island was challenged internally or externally.”\(^{20}\) The *Treaty of Alliance* established that Greece and Turkey would keep a small military contingent on the island and the *Treaty of Establishment* allowed Great Britain to keep 99 square miles of land for military purposes.\(^{21}\)

Throughout the early years of the 1960s, the influence of foreign powers successfully prevented the young republic from taking roots. Although the island was officially no longer part of the British Empire, London vigorously sought to maintain influence on Cyprus in order to ensure that Makarios’ newly established government did not turn away from the Western Alliance and towards the Soviet Union. London’s efforts to preserve its control were strongly supported by the United States of America; a communist invasion of the strategically important island was to be avoided at all costs.\(^{22}\)

In addition to the foreign efforts to undermine the independent Cypriot nation, the implementation of the new institutions was soon undermined by a lack of Turkish and Greek

\(^{16}\) Souter, 659-660.
\(^{17}\) Ibid.
Cypriot support and commitment. Even though the Turkish Cypriots did not believe the Republic of Cyprus was going to last, they welcomed the treaties, as they prevented *enosis* and thus protected the Turkish Cypriot community against the dreaded dominance of the Greek Cypriots.\(^{23}\)

The Greek Cypriot community did not welcome the treaties signed to protect the island’s independence and had only accepted the proposal after pressure from Athens; the Greek authorities had been coerced by London and Washington.\(^{24}\) The Greek Cypriot community considered the island’s independence to be a fake, as the Agreements did not represent a fair distribution of power.\(^{25}\) Andreas Theophanous, Director of the Cyprus Center for European and International Affairs, summarized the Greek Cypriot protests against the constitution and the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus as follows:

> [a]mong other things, the constitution gave the Turkish Cypriots the power to veto over legislation on defense, security, foreign affairs, elections, municipalities and taxation and stipulated a seventy/thirty ratio of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the civil service and a sixty/forty ratio in the armed forces and the police, when the actual population ratio was roughly 82/18.\(^{26}\)

Consequence of the Greek Cypriot resistance and protests was that they perceived the new state as an intermediate step on the road to *enosis*.

The 1959 Constitution failed to establish a common Cypriot identity for Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Glafkos Clerides, who would serve as President of the Republic of Cyprus between 1993 and 2003, summarized the failure when he wrote:

> A lot of ink has been spilt by both the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots, and others, using parts of the Turkish and Greek secret documents to prove the guilt of one or the other side. The truth is very simple. There were forces on both sides that were generally dissatisfied with the compromise arrived at Zurich.\(^{27}\)

One of the Constitution’s critiques was Makarios III, President of the newly established Republic of Cyprus, who expressed his discontent on June 28, 1960. In an official statement he said:

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\(^{23}\) Ker-Lindsay, 28, 29, 30.


\(^{26}\) Theophanous, 27.

The Agreements do not form the goal. They are the present and not the future. The Greek Cypriot people will continue their cause and shape their future in accordance with their will. The Zürich and London Agreements have a number of positive elements but also negative ones, and the Greeks will work to take advantage of the positive elements and get rid of the negative ones.  

Throughout the following years, tensions between the communities continuously rose and escalated in 1963 after thirteen constitutional amendments, which would limit the power of the Turkish Cypriots, were proposed by the Greek Cypriot leaders; the amendments had been supported by Great Britain.  

London was aware of the resistance the proposals would create within the Turkish Cypriot community and wanted to underline the division between the communities.  

Like his predecessors, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, the British Prime Minister from 1963 to 1964, therefore encouraged the separation of the Cypriot communities; “he had been convinced that if the Greek Cypriots could not treat the Turkish Cypriots as human beings they were inviting the invasion and partition of the island.” Subsequently, Sir Arthur Clarke, the British High Commissioner to Cyprus, was actively involved in the drafting process of the constitutional amendments Makarios proposed in November 1963 and which led to the outburst of violence.  

In order to prevent further escalations of the conflict, the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was stationed on the island in March 1964. Despite the presence of the UN, the separation between Greek and Turkish Cypriots increased and ended the latter’s involvement in the island’s government. These events remain of importance today, as the Turkish Cypriot community blames the Greek Cypriots for triggering the conflict by “bringing down the post-independence constitutional order and forcing them out of the government.”  

Even though most Greek Cypriots realized by the late 1960s that enosis was no longer a probable goal, there were many who did not want to abandon the ideal. As a consequence, 

Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston B, also known as EOKA-B, an organization that strongly supported the unification with Greece, was formed. On July 15, 1974, the Greek military junta, which controlled the Cypriot army and EOKA-B, took control over the island.

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30 Ibid.  
32 Ibid.  
34 Michael, 24, 26-27.  
35 Ker-Lindsay, 18, 35.
in a coup d’état.\textsuperscript{36} In response to this military aggression and referring to the \textit{Treaty of Guarantee}, Turkey invaded Cyprus on July 20, 1974. Following severe armed combat with Greek and Cypriot forces, the Turkish army occupied the North of Cyprus; 37 percent of the island has been dominated by Turkey ever since.\textsuperscript{37}

Although the Greek Cypriots and the Greek junta have been blamed for triggering the Turkish invasion and thus for the division of the island, the international response to the events in 1974 showed that the Cyprus Problem was not just a conflict between two domestic, but between several international parties. Christopher Hitchens, author and journalist, stressed this notion in his book \textit{Hostage to History: Cyprus from the Ottomans to Kissinger}. In his work, Hitchens focused on the role of the US Government, personified by Henry Kissinger, US Secretary of State between 1973 and 1977, during this period. Hitchens wrote:

It was Kissinger who decided to let the coup against Makarios go ahead, Kissinger who tried to screen the Greek junta from the fatal consequences of that policy, Kissinger who engineered and led the switch to Turkey when both of these expedients failed, and Kissinger who persuaded the British government to renege on its treaty obligations.\textsuperscript{38}

Of course, Hitchens’ argument is vulnerable to attacks, as it puts too much responsibility onto the shoulders of one single politician. However, in 2007 released American and British government documents, known as the \textit{Family Jewels}, show that the United States did indeed consider the protection and union of NATO and the Western Alliance to be more important than the democracy of a single country.\textsuperscript{39}

The humanitarian consequences of the 1974 Turkish invasion were devastating and traumatic for the Cypriot communities. Brendan O’Leary, Director of the Penn Program in Ethnic Conflict at the University of Pennsylvania, wrote:

In the Turkish invasion and the partition of Cyprus, 6,000 Greek Cypriots were killed and 2,000 reported missing, and some 1,500 Turks and Turkish Cypriots killed. After the partition more than 10,000 Greek Cypriots were pressurized into leaving Northern Cyprus, on top of the 160,000 who had fled before the Turkish army.\textsuperscript{40}

Consequence of these events was the establishment of a buffer zone between the conflicting parties, which decreased the interaction between the communities to a minimum.


\textsuperscript{37} Michael, 32, 34-35, 37.

\textsuperscript{38} Christopher Hitchens, \textit{Hostage to History: Cyprus from the Ottomans to Kissinger} (London: Verso, 1997): 146.


Seeking the establishment of a sovereign state in northern Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriots drafted a constitution, established a government, and declared their autonomy on February 13, 1975. Almost nine years later, on November 15, 1983, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) officially declared its independence. Until today, the TRNC is only recognized by the Republic of Turkey; the division of the island and its peoples was solidified when the Greek Cypriot government imposed a political and economic embargo against the north and when the Annan Plan was rejected in 2004.\textsuperscript{41}

While the international community actively tried to establish a united Cyprus through means of a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation, the conflicting parties have been unable to reach a compromise. Throughout the peacemaking process, the Greek Cypriots have stressed the importance of a strong central government and insist that all refugees can return to the properties they were forced to abandon in 1974. As the Greek Cypriots want the Turkish settlers, who arrived on Cyprus since 1974, to leave, they refuse to accept proposals that do not include this aspect. In contrast to this view stands the demand of the Turkish Cypriots: they do not want the authority on the island to be vested in a strong central federal government. Fearing oppression by the significantly larger Greek Cypriot population, the Turkish Cypriots seek to preserve as much autonomy as possible and want the federal administration to govern “over two sovereign states in voluntary association.”\textsuperscript{42} In addition, the community resists all plans that stress the demilitarization of Cyprus.\textsuperscript{43} The opposing Cypriot views have been illustrated by the scholars Nicos Peristianis and John C. Mavris in \textit{Ideal and Compromise Positions of Greek- and Turkish Cypriots} (see Fig. 1.1).

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{ideal-compromise-positions.png}
\caption{“Ideal and Compromise Positions of Greek- and Turkish Cypriots.”\textsuperscript{44}}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{41} “Government: Cyprus.”; Michael, 42.
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid.
The figure shows that the conflicting parties’ official opinions differ greatly and that they are in direct contrast to each other.

- **Border, Bordering, and Othering**

As the notion that the Green Line is a *border* is considered to be highly controversial, it is essential to define the concept, which plays a central role throughout this thesis. First of all, it has to be stressed that there is no single, perfect answer to the question *what is a border?* as the *border* is a product of language discourses. Henk van Houtum, border scholar and head of the Nijmegen Centre for Border Research, described this notion as follows: “[t]he reality of a border…is created by the meaning that is attached to it.”

45 How is the border defined and (militarily) enforced by strategic powers? Is an individual’s interest defined by the strategic powers? Does an individual (partially) internalize this definition? What does the border mean to an individual?

In 1648, the *Treaty of Westphalia* “established the concept of equality among states based on the principle of mutually exclusive sovereignty over territories delineated by borders.”

46 This new system, Gabriel Popescu, Assistant Professor of Geography at the Department of Political Science of Indiana University, wrote, ensured outside (foreign) interference was no longer an issue, as the established borders were to prevent coinciding territorial claims.

47 The political order enabled the creation of independent European states after the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and was crowned during the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, “when the principle of national self-determination became the benchmark of the European political order.”

48 Despite the finding of a political definition for a territorial line, it took until the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that “the idea of the nation-state and a world geography defined by national boundaries had evolved to a position of conceptual dominance, as had principles of international relations built upon them.”

49 During the twentieth century, three specific periods that shaped the borders of the world can be indicated:

47 Ibid.
48 Ibid., 36.
• The end of World War I;
• The end of World War II and the decolonization of territories around the world;
• The end of the Cold War.  

Nation states “became naturalized as the ultimate political expression of the will of a people and the uncontested modern political form of the organization of territory,” as they were entrenched by governments.  

Part of the institutionalization process of borders was the establishment of border management agencies. The agencies, which function as “gatekeeper of the border,” protect the economy, the environment, and society at large; they protect nations against international terrorism, ensure the collection of taxes, and safeguard “public health and cultural heritage.” Examples of important border management institutions are national customs, military and police border guards, and health inspections.  

Although the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia defined the interconnectedness of “sovereignty, territory and the state,” it is important to indicate that this concept of territorial sovereignty does not apply everywhere in the world. In such exceptional cases, the areas in question have been defined as quasi territory, neutral territory, res communis, and global commons and it has become evident that “the nature of the ‘space’” is subordinated to “the meaning with which the international community has infused that space.”  

During the early years of the twenty-first century, the security and protection of the national border gained momentum. Although the openness of borders had become ever more important for international trade, the rise of nationalism, as well as the fear of terrorism and the other ensured that borders became secured and sometimes even impassable. This development clearly shows and underlines the internal contradiction – the openness and closure – of the national border.  

Although the Treaty of Westphalia had confined social relations within the nation state, it became evident that it was not easy to create nationalism among heterogeneous groups. As nearly all European countries were made up from different cultures and  

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50 Popescu, 43-44.
51 Ibid., 36.
53 Popescu, 37, 38.
55 Ibid., 10.
57 Ibid., 405.
58 Popescu, 34.
identities, feelings of national belonging and a common identity were often created. Without shared feelings of nationalism, the Westphalian system and the guarantee of a nation’s existence were to be undermined.  

Essential aspect in the creation of a common identity was played by the national border, which was “to produce and enforce a clear division between the ‘superiority’ of a nation’s domestic ‘us’ and the ‘inferiority’ of the foreign ‘them’.” Often, this process, known as othering, included the invention of symbols and myths, which define and characterize the normal. The imagined “existence and threat of an ‘other’” leads to the glorification of the self and the neglect of differences within the us, as well as to the demonization of the other. Frequently, othering is the source of self-victimization, as it is closely connected to efforts to protect one’s ideals and identity, regardless of the consequences.

Closely related to the theory of othering is the idea, proposed by Benedict Anderson, that nations are in fact “imagined communities.” Anderson wrote: “[nations are, H.O.] imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.” By believing that they are part of a certain community, individuals place, order, and name; they create their own and their group’s identity by differentiating themselves from another group.

Despite the political and institutionalized use of the concept border, scholars from different academic backgrounds use diverse and even contradicting definitions for the same term. Anthropologists, for example, consider a boundary to be “the socio-spatially constructed differences between cultures/categories.” They further argue that a border indicates a territorial demarcation line. This interpretation is in strong contrast to the definitions used by border scholars.

Whereas border scholars used to focus on the complex developments of territorial boundaries and separation lines between states, it became increasingly evident that borders are multidimensional in “spatial, thematic and disciplinary perspectives”; throughout the twentieth century, the importance of the territorial division lines diminished, due to the

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59 Popescu, 36, 37.
60 Ibid., 36.
61 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
process of globalization, which was enforced by powerful political and economic actors. Also, as “there were territorial and political borders before states,” the border is no longer only considered to be a state’s territorial demarcation, but seen “as a site at and through which socio-spatial differences are communicated.” Consequently, contemporary border scholars consider the border to be a verb (bordering) and focus on the “human practices that constitute and represent differences in space,” as well as on the border “as differentiators of socially constructed mindscapes and meaning.”

It has been repeatedly argued that the process of bordering is dominated by the values of the international community and that borders are social and societal constructs, which are created by the hands and in the minds of people. The political aspect of this phenomenon can be illustrated by the fact that, throughout the past decades, the United Nations and the European Union have shown that they regard the reunion of Cyprus and its communities to be the only acceptable outcome of the Cyprus Problem. Until today, the UN Security Council has passed 69 resolutions and the UN General Assembly passed 17 resolutions with regards to this conflict, and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is not officially recognized as a sovereign nation.

An important role in the continuous process of bordering around the world, and especially on Cyprus, has been played by the United Nations. According to its Charter, the organization aims “[t]o maintain international peace and security ... [t]o develop friendly relations among nations...[t]o achieve international co-operation...[and t]o be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.” Although the UN officially seeks to actively establish peace and justice in conflict situations through military interventions and mediation efforts, it has to be noted that all UN members, especially the permanent members, keep their own interests at heart.

Since many dynamics are able to influence the process of bordering, academia considers the border to be a “socially (re)produced phenomena,” rather than the territorial

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66 Ibid., 673.
67 Ibid.
boundaries of the nation state. According to Henk van Houtum and Anke Strüver, border scholars and authors of the article “Borders, Strangers, Doors and Bridges,” borders “differ crucially in their meanings, forms and contents of representations and interpretation from context to context.” Thus, a border can become a symbol as well as a sign of a certain thought or an idea, depending on the context, the setting, and the framework.

People (re)produce what a border stands for, what it represents, and what it embodies. Van Houtum underlined this argument when he wrote in his article “Remapping Borders,” that the border “is being interpreted chiefly as a line of security and protection, often coinciding with an inward-looking reproduction and canonization of the history and culture it is believed to contain.” Newman stressed this notion when he wrote: “[b]orders may signify the point or line of separation between distinct entities, separating one category from another, in some cases institutionalizing existing differences, while in other cases creating the difference where none existed previously.”

Nicos Peristianis and John C. Mavris, as well as other academics, argued that, while internal and external factors contributed to the conflict’s eruption, its endurance is closely tied to the fact that the Greek and Turkish Cypriots have been living next to each other, yet, partially separated for centuries. Since the beginning of the Ottoman rule in 1571 AD, the communities lived in different neighborhoods and were divided by religion, and later on, during the second British Occupation 1878 – 1959, by separate schools. Despite the fact that this segregation was not strict – there was a vivid interaction between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots and many people spoke both languages – it has been stated that this social partition as well as the passing of time have turned the Green Line “not so much…[into, H.O.] an obstacle to communication as…[into, H.O.] a symbol of a communication problem that goes far deeper than the physical barriers of sandbags and barbed wire.”

In contrast to this notion, other writers, such as Oztemir A. Ozkiour, talk about the challenges of growing up as a Turk Cypriot in Pafos in the 1930s and how the two communities lived together. Ozkiour wrote: “[a]s TC growing we had some prejudices against the GC steaming from our different education and history books…We saw that we are all the

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72 Ibid.
73 Van Houtum, “Remapping Borders,” 405.
same differing only by name and religion that were not critical factors.” Papadopoulos, whose father was murdered by Turkish extremists in 1957, made a similar point. He stressed that most Turkish Cypriots are in fact Christians, who converted to Islam, so as to pay fewer taxes and have a more peaceful life.

In line with these differentiating opinions concerning the history of cooperation between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, Van Houtum and Strüver argued that it does not matter whether the border with the other is nothing more but a “mental border.” To the contrary, they argue that a mental border also represents a reality, and is therefore “not less real in its effects and consequences.” To overcome the imagined border, “the socially constructed imagination of belonging to a certain place” have to be altered. Previously developed notions of belonging have to be redefined for the differentiation between *us* and *them*, the *other* and *stranger*, to disappear.

**Perceptions**

Richard West and Lynn H. Turner, authors of *Understanding Interpersonal Communication: Making Choices in Changing Times*, defined perception as “[t]he process of using our senses to understand and respond stimuli. According to West and Turner, the perception process occurs in four stages: attending and selecting, organizing, interpreting, and retrieving” (see Table 1.1). Throughout these four stages, which are vital in the sense making process, an individual’s personal lens and his or her self-understanding play an essential role, as “perceptions influence and affect all aspects of our self.” In other words: “perception and individual identity go hand in hand.”

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79 Van Houtum, Strüver, 142.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
84 Ibid., 46, 47.
85 Ibid., 47.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attending and selecting</td>
<td>First stage in the perception process. It involves sorting out stimuli. We choose to attend to some stimuli and ignore others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizing</td>
<td>Second stage in the perception process. It involves categorizing stimuli to make sense of them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpreting</td>
<td>Third stage in the perception process. It involves assigning meaning to stimuli.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retrieving</td>
<td>Fourth stage in the perception process. It involves information we have stored in our memories.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.1: Stages of the Perception Process

Research has revealed that the interconnectedness between an individual’s identity and his or her perception creates differentiating opinions, relationships, and experiences with the (same) border. K. Hetherington and R. Munro, authors of *Ideas of difference: Social spaces and the Labour of Division*, summarized this notion when they wrote:

> Turning a space into place, giving it meaning,…is the act of human intervention…Place is a contingent effect of the process of placing, ordering and naming that emerge from the actions of heterogeneous materials within a given network and the system of differences that are generated to stability to such a mobile process.

Thus, according to Hetherington and Munro, the perceptions of individuals and groups are essential for the imagined as well as the physical construction of nations and borders.

An individual’s perception of borders is strongly influenced the previously described process of othering. Individuals attend and select, organize, interpret, and retrieve information about the other and a nation’s identity is established by defining the differences between the us and the them. Depending on the outcome of the perception process, the perception of borders is created. Borders can i.e. function as tools of permanent exclusion, but can also be seen as protective entities or as a corridor that enables contact with the other.

Territories and entities have to be placed, ordered, and named before they obtain meaning; they have to be *bordered*. Bordering is a constant and never-ending process, since

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86 West and Turner, 48.
borders are created or challenged (by force) as views and perceptions change. David Newman, editor in chief of the journal *Geopolitics*, and Anssi Paasi, Professor at the Department of Geography at the University of Oulu, described the development in their article “Fences and neighbours in the postmodern world: boundary narratives in political geography” as follows:

For people living in border areas, boundaries are an essential part of the activities and discourses of daily life, which are not necessarily translated into the collective and historical meanings that manifest themselves in the more general sociospatial consciousness and its concrete manifestations, such as national literature, monuments, curricula, etc.\(^89\)

As perceptions and representations of nationality are subject to change – they are influenced by political, economic, and social developments – bordering and perceptions of *national identities* are bound to transform as well. The maintenance of the Green Line on Cyprus was and still is strongly impacted this “canonization of the history and culture,” as both Cypriot communities are said to “attribute the causes of suffering or experiences of injustice exclusively to the other.”\(^90\)

Although it has been argued the process of othering ensured that both Cypriot communities solely blame the other for what happened in the past, this generalized statement ignores the perceptions of individuals.\(^91\) A survey conducted by Cyprus2015, a bi-communal initiative that seeks “to contribute towards a sustainable settlement of the Cyprus Problem through objective research and respectful dialogue between all relevant societal and political stakeholders,” shows that not all Cypriots solely blame the other (see Table 1.2; 1.3; 1.4).\(^92\)

Table 1.2: “I recognise that both communities in Cyprus have made mistakes in the past.”\(^93\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>The Greek Cypriots answered:</th>
<th>The Turkish Cypriots answered:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2% Strongly disagree</td>
<td>14% Strongly disagree</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4% Somewhat disagree</td>
<td>12% Somewhat disagree</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7% Neither agree nor disagree</td>
<td>22% Neither agree nor disagree</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38% Somewhat agree</td>
<td>23% Somewhat agree</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49% Strongly agree</td>
<td>30% Strongly agree</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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\(^89\) Newman and Paasi, 198.
\(^91\) Ibid.
Table 1.3: “I try to look at the Cyprus problem, from the point of view of the” ‘other.’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Greek Cypriots answered:</th>
<th>The Turkish Cypriots answered:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8% Strongly disagree</td>
<td>16% Strongly disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8% Somewhat disagree</td>
<td>12% Somewhat disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20% Neither agree nor disagree</td>
<td>23% Neither agree nor disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36% Somewhat agree</td>
<td>22% Somewhat agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29% Strongly agree</td>
<td>28% Strongly agree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.4: “I do not waste my time listening to the arguments of the” ‘other.’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Greek Cypriots answered:</th>
<th>The Turkish Cypriots answered:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22% Strongly disagree</td>
<td>26% Strongly disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20% Somewhat disagree</td>
<td>16% Somewhat disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26% Neither agree nor disagree</td>
<td>22% Neither agree nor disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17% Somewhat agree</td>
<td>16% Somewhat agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15% Strongly agree</td>
<td>20% Strongly agree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Cyprus2015 research project shows that the division within the communities runs deep. Both communities are divided on their perception of and attitude towards the other and who to blame for events of the past. The perception of the individual is thus important.

It can be concluded that perceptions of borders are closely linked to an individual’s identity. Individuals’ perceptions are created through attending and selecting, organizing, interpreting, and retrieving. Consequently, they place, order, and name in order to establish their own, as well as their nation’s identity. Borders can therefore be perceived as effective tools to exclude the other, or as an entity that allows the other to enter.

❖ Green Lines

The Green Line on Cyprus, as it is known today, runs across the Mediterranean island, is approximately 180 kilometers long, and was established as a buffer zone between the cease-fire lines of the conflicting Cypriot communities. The area covers about three percent of the island’s surface and its width varies from several meters to just over seven kilometers (see Map 1.1). As no formal cease-fire agreement has ever been signed, the military status quo of the demarcation line is ensured by the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus. Any violation of the status quo could lead to the renewed eruption of violence and UNFICYP

94 “Investigating the Future.”
95 Ibid.
96 Hadjipavlou.: 350-351.; Sahin, 584.
continuously “maintains surveillance through a system of observation posts, and through air, vehicle and foot patrols.”

In April 2003, the Green Line on Cyprus was opened for traffic and trade as part of “a series of confidence-building measures.” For the first time since 1974, people were able to cross the demarcation line to the ‘other side’ at two checkpoints in the island’s capital Nicosia: Ledra Palance and Ayios Dometios. A third crossing, at Ledra Street, was opened in April 2008. Today, the UN buffer zone, as a whole, can be crossed at seven checkpoints.

As noted earlier in this chapter, the Green Line on Cypriots has been contested ever since the island was first (partially) divided in 1963. Yet, what is a Green Line and how does it differ from the border?

While the Collins English Dictionary defined the term Green Line as “a line of demarcation between two hostile communities,” The Dictionary of Human Geography stated that “[t]he most common use of the term denotes the Armistice line separating Israel and the Palestinian territories and the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The term is occasionally used

Map 1.1: The Green Line, Cyprus.

As noted earlier in this chapter, the Green Line on Cypriots has been contested ever since the island was first (partially) divided in 1963. Yet, what is a Green Line and how does it differ from the border?

While the Collins English Dictionary defined the term Green Line as “a line of demarcation between two hostile communities,” The Dictionary of Human Geography stated that “[t]he most common use of the term denotes the Armistice line separating Israel and the Palestinian territories and the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The term is occasionally used

99 “Nicosia.”
elsewhere, as in the *de facto* partition lines in Beirut (Lebanon) and Nicosia (Cyprus).”

Agreeing with this definition, David Newman, one of the few scholars who have extensively discussed the concept of the Green Line, stated in one of his works: “[w]hile the Green Line constitutes the default border [between Israel and the Palestinian Territories, H.O.], the specific course of the Green Line is not sacrosanct, nor is its international legal status clear.” Numerous of such non-existent boundaries with these ambiguous characteristics have been established throughout history; the best known examples include Kuwait (1913), Israel-Palestine (1948), Cyprus (1963), Ireland (1969), and Pakistan-India.

In order to reach an understanding of what the Green Line is, it is important to look at two different aspects of the demarcation line. Firstly, the context of its establishment and the direct as well as indirect role of foreign countries, especially the UK, will be discussed. Secondly, the constantly changing nature of the Green Line will be addressed.

Research for this study has shown that the establishment of Green Lines can be closely linked to the decline of Great Britain’s colonial power. At the beginning of the second half of the twentieth century, London saw its political and economic influence around the world fade. Consequently, many ethically questionable means and methods were implemented to ensure the continued British control in its former territories.

On Cyprus, as well as in other colonies, the British authorities implemented the *divide and rule* policy. This policy, which came into effect five years before the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, aimed to divide the Cypriot communities in order to undermine a united struggle for independence. Feelings of hatred and animosity between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots were actively encouraged. As the efforts to divide the communities succeeded, an armistice line between the conflicting Cypriot peoples, the Green Line, had to be established in 1963.

The Green Line on Cyprus is not the only demarcation line that started out as an armistice line, as the partition of the conflicting communities has been considered to be the most efficient manner to reestablish peaceful conditions. However, whether this approach is indeed effective to solve ethnic conflicts, such as the Cyprus Problem, has been a hotly discussed and disputed topic in academia for decades. Even though scholars and academics


103 Newman primarily focused on the division between Israel and the Palestinian Territories.


105 Michael, 23.; Packard, 4, 11, 16.
have argued that partition of conflicting parties can lead to a lasting peace – and they might be correct in some instances – history has also shown differently. The Green Line that separated Israel from the West Bank between 1948 and 1967, for example, did not lead to a lasting peace in the Middle East.\footnote{David Newman, “Introduction,” in Boundaries in Flux: The ‘Green Line’ Boundary Between Israel and the West Bank - Past, Present and Future (Durham: International Boundaries Research Unit, 1995): 1.}

Also, although scholars have argued that the 1974 partition of Cyprus was successful, as it ended the inter-communal violence, it has to be stressed that the international community does not consider the partition of the island to be an acceptable solution of the Cyprus Problem.\footnote{Carter Johnson, “Partitioning to Peace,” International Security 32, no. 4 (2008): 143.; Nicholas Sambanis, “Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War - An Empirical Critique of the Theoretical Literature,” World Politics 52 (2000): 141, 143.}

The status of Green Lines remains highly controversial, as the international community does not accept them as borders between sovereign nations. Although the demarcation lines may become internationally recognized borders in the future, they remain nothing more but an almost meaningless line on a map to the rest of the world until that point. Shimon Peres, incumbent President of Israel and Nobel Peace Prize laureate, once wrote:

> Future borders have always been and remain the thorniest aspect of the solution…The borders must, therefore, reflect population distributions as they exist today…every attempt to demarcate borders will inevitably, touch a nerve, whether for strategic, national or religious reasons…The sensitivity of both sides is so great that even a simple formula could become the recipe for renewed conflict…We need soft borders, not rigid, impermeable ones. Borders are not walls. We need not close ourselves off with a wall, which in any case would not strengthen the national sovereignty of either side.\footnote{Shimon Peres, The New Middle East (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1994): 170-171.}

In the past, many peace processes have shown that the future of borders and boundaries can indeed be a sensitive and complicated issue. As conflicting parties aim for their most optimal outcome during negotiations, they do often not share the same territorial agenda and will therefore reject proposals made by the other.

The complicated status of Green Lines is often underlined by their most essential characteristic: their constantly changing nature. Newman described this process for the Green Line between Palestine and Israel as follows: “the boundary has passed through a number of phases: from an imposed sealed boundary to one which has been removed but nevertheless retains certain boundary characteristics, to one which may be reimposed at a future date under the terms of a permanent territorial solutions.”\footnote{Newman, “Introduction,” 1.} Until a final settlement of a conflict is reached, Newman states, the Green Line’s “formal and functional definitions” will continuously undergo change in the future.\footnote{Ibid.}
It can thus be stated that Green Lines are not internationally recognized borders, but *de facto* partition lines between conflicting communities, which were established as either formal or informal armistice lines. The establishment of Green Lines and their continued existence are strongly influenced by foreign countries and the international community at large. As Green Lines are not officially recognized borders, they are subject to continuous change.

- Green Lines and Borders: Differences and Similarities

As previously discussed, borders and Green Lines are not the same. Although both entities were discussed in the previous sections, it is important to address and highlight the similarities and differences between borders and Green Lines.

While Green Lines and borders are types of territorial demarcation lines that are both visible on maps (see Map 1.1), the process during which the entities come into being differ greatly. As previously discussed, three periods of time during the twentieth century can be indicated during which borders were established; the end of World War I and the redrawing of the borders in Europe, the end of World War II and the decolonization of territories around the world, and the end of the Cold War and the establishment of independent countries in eastern Europe. In contrast, Green Lines are established as cease-fire lines, which separate conflicting communities.

Another significant difference between Green Lines and borders is that borders indicate the boundary of a nation’s sovereignty, territory and state, while Green Lines are not internationally recognized. Green Lines divide people, yet, due to the lack of international recognition and the fact that they are an armistice line, the perpetuating existence of Green Lines does not comply with the Westphalian system of political order. Consequently, the demarcation lines have a politically and legally unclear status.

Although Green Lines are not internationally recognized borders, it has been argued that some of them, such as the demarcation line between Israel and Palestine, have resemblances with borders, such as the one between the United States and Mexico. Like borders, Green Lines are crossed by people to work, shop, and travel, as well as by undocumented individuals.\(^{111}\) In addition to this shared ‘openness,’ the “image of the line as a border” is strengthened by another characteristic: the continuously growing number of American police officers at the border and the erection of roadblocks and (temporary) barriers.

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in Israel. It can therefore be argued that as Green Lines, like borders, are protected, they are socially (re)produced socio-spatial constructions.

A door, which acts “as the blocking and permitting” divide between two entities, effectively works as a metaphor to illustrate the complicated dynamics of Green Lines and borders. When they are closed, borders, as well as Green Lines, are able to exclude the outside world entirely, as they effectively limit and separate people. However, once opened, communities and individuals have the possibility to interact with one another.

While the border symbolizes the division between nations and people, the Green Line can also represent a thought or an idea. However, as an individual’s identity defines the perceptions of the border/Green Line, people have different opinions, relationships, and experiences with the same entity. For example, the Green Line can be a perceived border, which protects the freedom of a community against the threat of the other. On the other hand, the Green Line can also be seen as an illegal entity. Thus, the same entity is placed, named, and ordered differently by different individuals.

In conclusion, the following two tables show the theoretically existing differences and similarities between borders and Green Lines, which are often far more nuanced and contested in practice:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Borders</th>
<th>Green Lines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International Recognition</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial boundary of a</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nation state</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cease-fire Line</td>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unclear Legal Status</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.5: Green Lines and Borders: Differences

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113 Van Houtum, Strüver, 143.
Table 1.6: Green Lines and Borders: Similarities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Borders</th>
<th>Green Lines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Territorial Demarcation Lines</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-spatial constructions</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socially (Re)produced Phenomena</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divide People</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Line on a Map</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbol of a Thought or an Idea</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Giorgio Agamben’s *Space of Exception*

  As previously noted, the view that the Green Line on Cyprus is a border is highly sensitive and controversial. Consequently, this research project seeks to explore what the Green Line is according to the involved parties, by incorporating Giorgio Agamben’s *space of exception* theory. In contrast to many other scholars, Agamben does not link the concepts of the border and the space of exception, but approaches them as different entities. Therefore, the theory has been chosen for this study to investigate the exceptional status of the Green Line; could it be that the status of the Green Line is an exceptional state of an exception?

  Before moving on to the discussion of Agamben’s theory, it is important to note that the separation of the concepts border and space of exception is in strong contrast to the understanding that many scholars have of the border. Mark B. Salter, professor at the School of Political Studies, University of Ottawa, is one of the many academics who explicitly connected the two concepts. In his article “When the exception becomes the rule: borders, sovereignty, and citizenship” Salter wrote: “[t]he state border is a permanent state of exception that clearly demonstrates the importance of biopolitics to the smooth operation of sovereign power.”\(^{114}\) According to this view, the border and the space of exception are not only interconnected, but the same.

  Rather than considering the space of exception to be, or to be connected to the border, Giorgio Agamben’s theory focuses on the “physical manifestation of the suspension of the law” and “a space of exception integral to the constitution of the political order of

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\(^{114}\) Mark B. Salter, “When the exception becomes the rule: borders, sovereignty, and citizenship,” *Citizenship Studies* 12, no. 4 (Aug, 2008): 365.
modernity.”¹¹⁵ The origins of the word exception can be traced to the Latin word ex-capere (meaning: taken outside); this indicates that something is omitted because of its involvement, and thus “included through its own exclusion.”¹¹⁶

In his work, Agamben described the concentration camps, run by Nazi Germany during the Second World War, as the ultimate space of exception. He wrote:

The camp is the space that is opened when the state of exception begins to become the rule. In the camp, the state of exception, which was essentially a temporary suspension of the rule of law on the basis of a factual state of danger, is now given a permanent spatial arrangement, which as such nevertheless remains outside the normal order.¹¹⁷

In his work, Agamben stresses the paradoxical status of a ‘permanent’ space of exception. A space of exception is “not simply an external space.”¹¹⁸ To the contrary, it “is neither internal nor external to the juridical order, and the problem of defining it concerns precisely a threshold, or a zone of indifference, where inside and outside do not exclude each other but rather blur with one another.”¹¹⁹ Thus, according to Agamben’s theory, the paradox is essential for the space to be exceptional.

Thus, Agamben’s space of exception theory will be used in this theory, as he does not consider the border and the space of exception to be the same concepts. To the contrary, by defining the exceptional status of a space through its paradoxical status, the theory creates dynamics that will be helpful to find an answer to the question what the Green Line is according to the parties involved in the Cyprus Problem.

According to Agamben, a space of exception is not an external space, as it is actively wanted, created, and maintained.¹²⁰ In the context of the discussion about othering and bordering, the space of exception can be interpreted as a social and societal construct between the us and the them. People, communities, and (political) institutions want, create, and maintain this distance with their hands, in their minds, and through their policies, in order to protect the ‘normal.’

The Green Line on Cyprus was created on the location of the cease-fire line between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots in 1963-64 and was supposed to be temporary. However, as the division is enforced and internalized by both sides, as well as by the European Union and

¹¹⁶ Ibid.
¹¹⁹ Agamben, 96.; Humphreys, 679.
¹²⁰ Agamben, 96.
the United Nation, it has become part of the Cypriot reality and turned from an exception into the rule. It can thus be stated that it is *wanted* as well as continuously *maintained* since 1974. The rejection of the Annan Plan in 2004 strongly emphasized the *normality* of the island’s division and can therefore be interpreted as a moment in time when the Green Line on Cyprus was recreated.

**Conclusion**

The goal of this chapter was to present the literature relevant for this study. Firstly, important aspects of the Cyprus Problem were presented. Essential part in this debate about the division of the island was the importance of the international community, especially the US and the UK. As the foreign powers do not consider the partition of the island to be an acceptable solution to the conflict, it can be argued that the division was not successful, even though it marked the end of a violent era. The importance of the international community was also part of the discussion on current as well as older academic dialogues on *bordering* and *othering*. Essential part of this debate is the contemporary notion that the border is no longer only seen as a state limit. To the contrary, it is considered to be socially constructed and influenced by humans; borders are established as well as undermined by changing ideas and perceptions.

Definitions of the concept *Green Line* were presented along with a short overview of different Green Lines that exist(ed) around the world. In addition to addressing the Green Lines’ unclear and ambiguous international status, this chapter discussed the ongoing academic debate about whether partition is an effective means to end conflicts, such as on Cyprus.

Finally, Giorgio Agamben’s *space of exception* theory was introduced, as the notion that the Green Line is a border is highly controversial. Agamben’s theory stresses the paradoxical character of a *space of exception*, as he notes that the exceptional status of the area has become *normal*, without it being part of the usual and standard order.
Chapter II: Historical Background

Introduction

Without a profound understanding of the historical background of the Cyprus Problem and the Green Line, it is impossible to indicate and understand the actors’ perceptions of the demarcation line today. Consequently, this chapter aims to analyze the history of the Green Line and to critically review the involvement of foreign as well as domestic powers in its establishment and the continued and perpetuated division of the Cypriot people.

Describing the time from the establishment of the Green Line until today, this chapter is divided into four chronologically structured sections. The first part focuses on the events in 1963, which eventually led to the establishment of the Green Line. The following section discusses the Turkish invasion of the island in 1974, which was triggered by a coup d’état on President Makarios, as well as the consequences of these events on the future of the Republic of Cyprus and the relationship between the two communities. The third part of this chapter analyzes not only the Annan Plan, the outcome of the referendum, and the accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the European Union, but also looks into the opening of the Green Line in 2003. After analyzing the aftereffects and effects of the previously discussed happenings, the fourth section discusses the division of the Greek and Turkish communities today.

1963 and the Establishment of the Green Line

Even though Cyprus became an independent country on August 16, 1960, neither of the island’s Guarantor Powers, nor the United States of America actually supported the nation’s sovereignty. It can therefore be argued, that the Cyprus Problem has never nor will ever be just a struggle between the Cypriot communities. Rather, it has been a conflict between the interests of many parties. Driven by their political, economic, and military interests, powerful foreign forces sought to stress and underline the division between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities by fueling their nationalism, instead of leading them towards a peaceful coexistence.121

Since the 1950s, it has become increasingly evident that Great Britain has vigorously sought to maintain its own power status on the geopolitically important island. These aspirations became evident when Henry Hopkinson, Minister of State for the Colonies, stated in the House of Commons on July 28, 1954: “[t]here can be no question of any change of sovereignty in Cyprus” and, while referring to Cyprus, “there are certain territories in the Commonwealth which, owing to their particular circumstances, can never expect to be fully

121 Packard, 2, 5.
independent.” A second government source that illustrates the UK’s objectives is a memorandum written by Selwyn Lloyd, who served as British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs between 1955 and 1960, sent prior to the first conference between the United Kingdom, Turkish, and Greek representatives on the Cyprus issue in 1955. According to the memorandum, London sought to reach an agreement that:

(a) safeguards our basic political and strategic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus, and
(b) secures at least the acquiescence of the Greek and Turkish Governments, and is accordingly practical politics within Cyprus.

In addition, the memorandum defined Britain’s goals during the conference as follows: “our aim would be to bring the Greeks up against the Turkish refusal to accept Enosis and so condition them to accept a solution which would leave sovereignty in our hands until at least there was tripartite agreement to make a change.”

The United Kingdom made several proposals for Cyprus’ ‘internal self-government,’ as the colonial power resisted the total independence of the island. Also, London sought to prevent Greece from re-addressing the question of Cyprus’ independence at the United Nations; as Athens was aware that enosis would not be internationally supported, it had introduced the subject of Cyprus’ sovereignty to the United Nations Security Council in 1954. Even though the United States supported this application at first, it withdrew its support after pressure from London.

Throughout the Cold War, the United States of America had a significant influence on Cyprus, as the super power vigorously tried to prevent the spread of communism in the region. Also, as the Cyprus Problem repeatedly brought Ankara and Athens to the brink of war, the issue posed a severe threat to the security of NATO and the Western Alliance. As early as 1946, the US Sixth Fleet was stationed in the Mediterranean – it was moved to the eastern Mediterranean in 1947 – in order to underline America’s military support and protection to the NATO partners Greece and Turkey. Despite these efforts, however, Monteagle Sterns, US diplomat and former Ambassador to Ivory Coast and Greece, rightly

124 Ibid.
126 Michael, 22.; Packard, 15.
noted that “[t]he relations of the United States with Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus have not been smooth.”

Seeking to undermine the Cypriots’ call for independence and prevent a united Cypriot battle against the colonial authorities, the UK strongly favored the division of the Greek and Turkish communities, and therefore, sought Turkey’s involvement in the conflict. Even though Ankara had not been interested in getting mixed up in the Cyprus Problem at the beginning of the 1950s, London’s continuous political pressure made sure that the Turkish policy, which was eventually adopted towards Cyprus, was hostile and belligerent towards Greece, and stressed taksim – the partition of Cyprus.

By implementing the so-called divide and rule policy between 1955 and 1967, and subsequently enforcing nationalistic feelings and tendencies within the Turkish community, Britain ensured that the Turkish Cypriots associated themselves with their ‘motherland’ and considered the ‘other’, i.e. the Greek Cypriots, to be a threat. This process had already begun in 1949, when the British authorities replaced the term Muslims of Cyprus, which had been used to describe the minority until this point, with Turkish Cypriots. In addition, throughout the 1950s, the division of the two Cypriot communities was strategically implemented when the colonial authorities employed Turkish Cypriots as police officers as well as informants against the threat of EOKA and enosis.

An essential role in the process of dividing the communities was played by the intentional disinformation and misinformation of the public; the press, as well as political leaders from all parties involved, undermined any understandings for the cause and the views of the ‘other.’ Concrete evidence that Greek and Turkish Cypriots were able to live side by side in peace was systematically destroyed. Martin Packard, a staff member of General Peter Young, reported in his book Getting It Wrong: “I wrote a three hundred page report on the mediating process [between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, H.O.] for the CRO [Commonwealth Relations Office, H.O.] which was passed to the Foreign Office and then, they claim, ‘lost.’” Also, it has been repeatedly argued that the British government financed several Turkish newspapers, such as Hürriyet and Vatan, in order to gain control of the imagery and

128 Sterns, 3.  
130 Michael, 23.; Packard, 4, 11, 16.  
131 Bloody Truth, 208.  
133 Packard, 2-3, 7.
messages that were spread about Cyprus in Turkey. Consequently, beginning in 1955, the Turkish press focused extensively on the idea that the Turkish Cypriot minority was threatened to be exterminated by the Greek Cypriot majority.

As a result of London’s political pressure on Ankara, Turkey continuously sought to increase its influence on Cyprus and publically claimed that it wanted to protect the rights and the existence of the Turkish Cypriots. The notion that Ankara was solely interested in the wellbeing of the Turkish Cypriot community was undermined by its support for the Turkish Resistance Organization (TMT) – this will be discussed later in this chapter – and strongly criticized by the authors of Bloody Truth. They wrote: “[t]he claim that the Turks request geographical separation because they are afraid of the Greeks, is just excuses that were promoted after the events.” The authors also stressed that the Turkish Cypriots, who lived among the Greek population on the island, were safer than those who lived in segregated areas, as they could not be targeted by the Turkish propaganda.

The 1959 Constitution, as well as the Treaty of Establishment, the Treaty of Alliance, and the Treaty of Guarantee have been severely criticized over the years. Several aspects of the treaties violate the Charter of the United Nations, as the treaties were signed after the UN agreement was signed by Great Britain, Turkey, and Greece. The Charter explicitly states in Article 2, Paragraph 4 that: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” As Article 103 stresses that the UN Charter exceeds “any other international agreement,” any military action taken by a Guarantor Power on Cyprus can be considered to be a breach of the multilateral pact.

In addition to this violation of the UN Charter, it has been argued that the treaties undermine “the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus as a full member-state of the United Nations Organization.” Not only did the island’s Constitution provide the Turkish Cypriot minority with a powerful tool – the right to veto legislations – but

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134 Vryonis, 77.
136 Packard, 5, 16.; United Kingdom. Committee of Ministers. Cyprus.
137 Bloody Truth, 298.
138 Ibid.; Hannay, 4.
141 Ibid.
142 Leventis, 20.
the *London-Zürich Agreements* also gave the three Guarantor Powers extensive influence on Cyprus.\(^{143}\)

The maintenance of its control over Cyprus was exactly what London had anticipated when it signed the treaties; as Cyprus was located on the border of the influence spheres of the Cold War super powers, the United States as well as Great Britain feared that the island’s independence would trigger the spread of communism in the region and would thus undermine the security of the West.\(^ {144}\) Consequently, the treaties that formed the foundation of the Republic of Cyprus and which were to protect its sovereignty, also established and ensured the permanency of the British Sovereign Base Areas on the island, and thus London’s influence on Cyprus and the region. In addition to these SBAs, which cover a territory of over 99 square miles, Britain also safeguarded its right to administer “other military and surveillance installations throughout the island.”\(^ {145}\)

Following the signing of the *Treaty of Alliance* in 1960, a multilateral headquarters was established on Cyprus and Greece exercised its right to deploy a contingent of 950 officers; Turkey stationed 650 soldiers on the island. Ankara’s military influence, however, did not end here.\(^ {146}\) While Packard argued that the Turkish merely provided weapons to the secret paramilitary organization TMT,\(^ {147}\) the authors of *Bloody Truth* reported that the organization was established on Cyprus, yet, soon after its founding, taken over by Ankara.\(^ {148}\) This claim was affirmed by Raouf Denktash, one of the TMT’s founding members and a longtime leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, who stated during an interview with *The Times* on January 20, 1978: “I had set up the TMT with a few friends...Everybody thought that I was the leader, but I was not. I was political advisor. Immediately after forming it I handed it over...The leaders were former army officers from Turkey.”\(^ {149}\)

The Turkish Cypriot Resistance Organization was not the first one of its kind; in 1958, the Turkish Cypriot secret organization Volkan, which was later incorporated into the TMT, was established. Volkan was created to stress the division between the Cypriot communities, and, in doing so, it was supported by the British authorities; it was comprised mostly of men

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\(^{143}\) Packard, 21, 16.

\(^{144}\) Michael, 23.

\(^{145}\) Leventis, 6, 9, 10.


\(^{147}\) In contrast to EOKA the TMT had not been forced to dissolve after the independence of Cyprus.

\(^{148}\) Packard, 10; *Bloody Truth*, 230, 232, 234, 267.

“who formerly had served in the British army or in the British-trained Special Police.”

In order for the Turkish Cypriots to advocate the British and Turkish ideas and intentions – the partition of Cyprus – they had to be convinced that the Greek and Turkish communities were not able to live side by side.

Essential in this strive were the glorification of the ‘motherland’ and of TMT fighters in newspapers as well as on television; this portrayal was in strong contrast to the press’ negative depiction of the Greek Cypriots. Navaro-Yashin, Senior Lecturer at Newnham College, quoted a Turkish Cypriot lawyer, who described the status of TMT and its portrayal within the Turkish Cypriot community as follows: “The TMT was protecting the Turkish-Cypriots from attacks by EOKA, and the Turkish-Cypriots had to recognize this force that was protecting them.”

Although the Turkish Cypriot community was possibly influenced by the glorification of the ‘motherland’ and the TMT, the officially upheld reason for the Turkish involvement in Cyprus – the protection of the minority – was strongly criticized and opposed by several Turks and Turkish Cypriots alike; amongst most notably were Ibrahim Hasan Aziz and Dervis Ali Kavazoglou, members of the left wing AKEL party, Dr. Ihsan Ali, Turkish-Cypriot diplomat and advisor to Archbishop Makarios, and the lawyers Aihan Hikmet and Ahmet Muzaffer Gurkan. It was a well-known fact that criticizing the Turkish leadership or the TMT was dangerous and Yashin described the atmosphere among the Turkish community as follows:

In the most intimate encounters among close friends and family, people would recount stories of Turkish-Cypriots murdered by the TMT or speculate that their officially ‘martyred’ relatives had in fact been assassinated by the TMT and not, as officially claimed, by EOKA or by Greek-Cypriots. Numerous stories circulated in private quarters about TMT atrocities against Turkish-Cypriot individuals. Turkish-Cypriots would provide evidence for, and examples of, how Denktas and other members of the TMT plotted to sabotage Turkish-Cypriot heritage sites, such as mosques, blaming the Greek-Cypriots for the attacks to create the rationale or a counterattack by Turkey.

Many of those who resisted TMT or did not agree with the organization’s goal were silenced; while Hikmet and Gurkan were murdered on April 22, 1962, Kavazoglou, along with the Greek Cypriot pro-unionist Costas Mishaoulis, was assassinated on April 11, 1965.

150 Packard, 17.
151 Bloody Truth, 227-228, 325.
153 Ibid.
Neither domestic, nor foreign powers sought to end the division between the conflicting communities. To the contrary, the Greek Cypriots continued to support enosis and the right-wing government in Athens, which had set the goal to reunite all Greek speaking people, was very popular among the community. On the other hand, neither the military coup, which took place in Turkey in May 1960, nor the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus changed Ankara’s Cyprus policy.

While the fear and hatred towards the other continued to be fed, Turkey sustained its arms shipments and the TMT continued to exist. İsmail Tansu, coordinator of the Turkish Resistance Organization, wrote in his memoirs:

The creation of the common Turkish-Greek Republic in Cyprus did not pose an obstacle to our determination. No matter what policy over Cyprus was followed by the Republic of Cyprus, our unmoving objective was to save the island of Cyprus, which we turned into a Turkish motherland, raising our flag over it for 340 years. In the event that the circumstances did not favour something of the sort, at least to put the foundations for Turkish sovereignty over half of the island and secure the creation of a free and independent Turkish state on the land our Cypriot expatriates possessed.

As the TMT would not be able to reach its goals without the support of the Turkish Cypriots, evidence that the communities could not live together was purposefully created. Attacks on and murders of Turkish Cypriots as well as bombings of mosques and the Press Office of the Turkish Consul in Nicosia were initiated and blamed on the Greek Cypriots. Denktash affirmed this twenty-six years later, when he stated during an interview: “[l]ater on, a friend of mine, whose name must still be kept secret, was to confess to me that he had put this little bomb in their doorway in order to create an atmosphere of tension so that people would know that Turkish Cypriots mattered.”

London, Athens, and Nicosia had been aware of the Turkish arms shipments to Cyprus as well as the general preparations to invade the island; the Deniz, a Turkish ship carrying 500 rifles, 6,000 bombs, and 1,000,000 bullets, had been intercepted by the British as early as 1959. Despite the existence of this knowledge, the Greek and Cypriot governments decided to pursue “a policy of tolerance, hoping to overcome the problem without any escalation towards collision.” A review of British government documents showed that London decided in 1963 “not to intervene even if Turkey invaded.”

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155 Packard, 5, 17.
156 İsmail Tansu, In reality no one was asleep, a secret underground organization with State support -- TMT, (İ. Tansu, 2007), quoted in Bloody Truth, 275.
157 Bloody Truth, 233, 251.
158 Cyprus, Britain’s Grim Legacy.
159 Bloody Truth, 320, 242.
160 Ibid., 333, 339-340.
Drastic steps towards the separation of the two Cypriot communities were taken in 1963, when, following an evaluation of the political cooperation at the time, the Greek Cypriot leadership decided to gradually implement changes to the Constitution that would not only weaken the Turkish Cypriot part of the government but would ultimately lead to the reunion of the island with Greece.\textsuperscript{161} Even though Clerides claimed in his book that the plans of the Akritas Organization “were not aggressive, but defensive,” any Turkish protests or outbreaks of violence against the implementation of the Constitutional changes were to be ended by the Akritas paramilitary force; the officers of this force were trained by the Greek officers stationed in Cyprus.\textsuperscript{162}

While the Akritas organization and the idea of enosis gained support among the Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriot leadership, in cooperation with Ankara, was preparing a strategy for the breakdown of the Republic and the partition of the island.\textsuperscript{163} These plans became evident when, following the events of 1963, a document, titled “A cursory glance on the general policy of the Turkish community as regards the future of the Republic on the occasion of the completion of three years since the establishment of the Republic,” was found in a safe in Vice-President Fazil Kutchuk’s office. The record, which was signed by Denktash and Kutchuk on September 14, 1963, contained the planning of the division of the island and the establishment of a Turkish state on Cyprus.\textsuperscript{164}

The authors of the document accused the Greek Cypriot leadership for undermining the London-Zürich Agreements by “abolishing the constitution de facto” and “admitting…that the agreements were a springboard for future victories.”\textsuperscript{165} However, instead of proposing plans on how to change the Greek Cypriot policy, the document made clear that the elimination of the Constitution by the Greeks was to be encouraged; if the Greek Cypriots would publically revoke or try to change the Constitution, the Turkish Cypriot community would respond by establishing “a Cyprus Republic outside the Zurich Agreements in accordance with the axiom ‘when the obstacle is removed one reverts to the forbidden.’”\textsuperscript{166} The homogenization of this Turkish state was to be accomplished as follows:

\textsuperscript{162} \textit{Bloody Truth}, 323.; Clerides, vol. 1, 219.
\textsuperscript{163} Hannay, 5.
\textsuperscript{164} Clerides, vol. 1, 203.; Hannay, 5.
\textsuperscript{165} Clerides, vol. 1, 203, 206.
\textsuperscript{166} Ibid., 203.
There is no doubt that this move of the Turkish community will meet with reactions and counter-actions by the Greeks… When the struggle begins, the Turkish community, dispersed throughout the Island, should be forcibly concentrated in an area and be compelled to defend it. The selection of the area will depend on the strategic plan, which will be prepared by experts.  

Even though the Turkish-Turkish Cypriot plan to divide the island was not executed to its full extent, the TMT did succeed to create a population movement; after the outbreak of inter-communal violence in December 1963, which will be discussed at a later stage, Turkish Cypriots were instructed and forced to move to the north of the island, where they lived separated from the Greek Cypriot community. In the areas, which were strengthened and reinforced by Turkish Cypriot and Turkish fighters to protect the community against possible hostilities, a separate Turkish Cypriot administration was established; former Vice-President Fazil Kutchuk declared himself to be the head of a Turkish Cypriot administration.

There are no exact numbers of the Turkish Cypriot fighting elements, which were mainly trained by the Turkish officers stationed on the island; however, UNFICYP estimated them at 10,000 in September 1964. This number does not include the 1,700 Turkish Cypriot police officers or members of the Cyprus Army, who formed the foundation of the Turkish Cypriot force. According to a report of the UN Secretary-General, these fighting elements were supported by 300 to 600 soldiers from Turkey, as well as large numbers of “Turkish Cypriot armed civilians in the defence of certain areas of Turkish Cypriot population.”

Throughout the last months of 1963, the tensions between the two Cypriot communities continued to rise and both sides sent out armed patrols at night, fearing that the other would attack first; Clerides described the conditions as follows: “the information supplied by paid informers to both organisations was often either inaccurate or greatly exaggerated [and, H.O.] it contributed to erroneous assessments by each side of the intentions of the other regarding the launching of a major attack.” Consequently, the inter-communal tensions escalated and extensive violence broke out in Nicosia on the night of December 21, 1963. Between December 24 and 30, the fighting spread through other towns – such as Paphos, Famagusta, Larnaca, and Limassol – it became evident that the leadership on both

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167 Clerides, vol. 1, 205.
171 Clerides, vol. 1, 220-221.
sides was unable to control its units. Local commanders-in-chief ignored orders from Nicosia and operated according to their own plans and beliefs; this often resulted in violence.\footnote{Clerides, vol. 1, 223, 227-228.}

Following the inter-ethnic violence that erupted during Christmas 1963, the three Guarantor Powers demanded a cease-fire.\footnote{Leventis, 15.} In addition, the international community pressed for the stationing of a peacekeeping mission on the island, as Turkey threatened to intervene militarily if the violence would not end.\footnote{Murat Metin Hakki, The Cyprus Issue: A Documentary History, 1878-2006 (London: I.B.Tauris, 2007): 97.; Packard, 13.} On December 30, 1963, a cease-fire contract, known as the \textit{Green Line Agreement}, was signed and the old town of Nicosia was divided into a Turkish and a Greek sector.\footnote{Leventis, 15.} In addition, Major General Peter Young, the Commander of the British army units in the Sovereign Base Areas, was put in charge of a unit that sought to stabilize the situation on the island: the Joint Truce Force.\footnote{Clerides, vol. 1, 226, 228.; Ker-Lindsay, 36.} Packard described General Young’s task and work as follows: “Young put together a UK team which would work with Greek and Turkish counterparts to try to restore order. Their efforts were to be based on tripartite patrols, involving British, Greek and Turkish military personnel working together in harmony, a visible example to the island’s two mistrustful communities.”\footnote{Peter Murtagh, “Forward,” in Getting it Wrong: Fragments from a Cyprus Diary 1964 by Martin Packard (Milton Keynes: AuthorHouse, 2008): xix-xx.}

The critique on the \textit{Green Line Agreement} has been severe. The authors of \textit{Bloody Truth} described the establishment of the supposedly temporary division as follows: “[o]n 26 December 1963 a truce was declared, followed by the intervention of the English as peacemakers, who managed to impose the Green Line with the signature of Glafkos Clerides, as directed by Makarios.”\footnote{Bloody Truth, 325.} The book stresses the negative role that Great Britain played with regards to finding a solution at the early stages of the conflict: “the British intervention as ‘peacemakers’…cemented the de facto status of partition.”\footnote{Ibid., 294.} These descriptions illustrate the authors’ discontent with the establishment of the division line and the separation of the Cypriot communities. This negative assessment of the Britain peacekeeping mission in Cyprus might be justified, as, while Greek and Turkish Cypriots were engaged in bloody riots, London’s main concern was the preservation of its Sovereign Base Areas on the island. If the \textit{Zürich-London Agreements} would fall, Great Britain’s claim of these regions might end as well.\footnote{Ibid., 329.}
Shortly after the eruption of inter-communal violence in 1963, the United States, supported by Great Britain, attempted to ‘solve’ the tensions between the communities as well as between their ‘motherlands’ by proposing the Acheson Plan. The Plan, which was part of the Truman Doctrine and thus aimed to undermine the Soviet Union’s influence on the geopolitically important island, was extremely radical: it proposed the island’s de facto enosis, yet, with several compromises with Turkey; Turkey would gain the right to establish a military base on Cyprus and acquire the Greek island of Kastellorizo. Also, Britain was to keep its bases on the island. All versions of the Acheson Plan were eventually fundamentally rejected by all involved parties.¹⁸¹

When Makarios approached the Soviet Union and the Greek Cypriot community became increasingly apprehensive towards the British, London responded by seeking the intervention of NATO and – when this failed – of the United Nations; a United Nations Peacekeeping Force (UNFICYP) was established and a mediator was appointed shortly after the UN Council adopted Resolution 186 (1964) on March 4, 1964.¹⁸² The UN force consisted of Austrian, Canadian, Danish, Finnish, Irish, Swedish, and British soldiers.¹⁸³ In addition, a civilian police force comprised of Australian, Austrian, Danish, New Zealanders, and Swedish officers was stationed on the island. The mission of the peacekeepers was formulated as follows:

In the interests of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions. In carrying out its function the Force shall avoid any action designed to influence the political situation in Cyprus, except through contributing an improved climate’ in which political solutions may be sought.¹⁸⁴

In addition to establishing UNFICYP’s mandate and the designation of a UN mediator, Resolution 186 (1964) acknowledged Makarios’ administration as government of the Republic of Cyprus, even though it did no longer represent the Turkish Cypriots.¹⁸⁵ In contrast to the Greek Cypriots, who embraced these international developments, hate and dislike towards the international community as well as the Greek Cypriots were fueled within the Turkish Cypriots. These feelings were underlined when Nicosia used its status “in the various international organizations to outmaneuver the Turks and Turkish Cypriots and to

¹⁸⁴ Ibid., 3.
¹⁸⁵ Ker-Lindsay, 37-38.
build up defenses against the latter’s succession and attempts to achieve international recognition.”

Although UNFICYP was formed to stabilize the conflict between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, the Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus of September 10, 1964 shows that the communities were not inclined to accept the UN’s role on Cyprus. The report stated:

…the fighting elements on both sides are not always co-operative and often adopt hostile attitudes towards the members of UNFICYP whenever their presence impedes the achievement of their designs. In the performance of their duties members of UNFICYP have been threatened, abused and even fired on.

Hostilities against UN soldiers resulted in several casualties.

Despite the establishment of the UNFICYP and the return to relatively peaceful relations, the Greek Cypriot government nullified the Treaty of Alliance and established the National Guard in 1964. Great Britain, as well as Turkey, protested vehemently against the formation of the military force, which was led by Lieutenant Colonel Georgios Grivas Digenis and designed to protect the Greek Cypriot community against the ‘Turkish threat.’ Notwithstanding the protests, the National Guard came into being; military training and service became compulsory for all men between eighteen and fifty-years-old. Also, by August 1965, all men who graduated between 1959 and 1965 were drafted obligatory. When the National Guard was reinforced by circa 5,000 Greek soldiers, who had secretly been stationed on the island, this Greek Cypriot military force was an estimated 24,000 men strong.

Makarios and Kutchuk had the obligation to protect the Cypriot people and the country itself against domestic and foreign dangers. However, this section clearly showed that both leaders proved to be loyal to their own people, rather than to the unity of the nation. Clerides summarized this effectively when he wrote: “Unfortunately for Cyprus, their [Makarios and Kutchuk’s, H.O.] allegiance to their respective communities proved stronger than their allegiance to the State of Cyprus; they were still national leaders and not statesmen

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186 Hannay, 5.
188 Ibid., 10.
189 Packard, 17.
of a bi-communal state.”\textsuperscript{192} Thus, although Cyprus was officially a united and independent country, the island’s communities and their leaders were deeply divided.

It can be concluded that the establishment of the Green Line by Great Britain and the division of the two Cypriot communities was not only strongly supported by foreign powers – Turkey, Great Britain, and the United States – who sought to protect their own interest in the region, but also by the Turkish Cypriot leadership. While the Greek Cypriots (at times violently) sought to limit the power of the Turkish minority, Turkey supported the (at times violent) Turkish Cypriot struggle for equality or even independence; the Greek Cypriot leadership aimed for \textit{enosis} and proposed constitutional amendments that would politically restrict Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriot authorities prepared plans to divide the island between the communities.\textsuperscript{193} As the foreign powers supported the partition of the Cypriot people, they did not only strongly influence the future of the island, but would alter the relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots forever.

\textbullet 1974, a Coup d’État, and an Invasion

As previously noted in the Literature Review of this thesis, recently released American and British documents show that Washington considered the democracy of a single country to be of secondary priority to the protection of the West. Fearing a communist invasion in Greece, the CIA and American military, as well as high standing American politicians, actively sought to undermine the democratically elected government in Athens. Former Greek UN official Gerassimos Gigantes described a meeting between President Johnson and the Greek ambassador, during which the Johnson elaborated on the plans to overthrow the Greek government and to divide the island of Cyprus.\textsuperscript{194} When the ambassador declared the proposals to be unconstitutional, the President supposedly said:

‘Then listen to me, Mr. Ambassador,’ said the President of the United States, ‘fuck your Parliament and your Constitution. America is an elephant. Cyprus is a flea. If these two fleas continue itching the elephant, they may just get whacked by the elephant's trunk, whacked good. ...We pay a lot of good American dollars to the Greeks, Mr. Ambassador. If your Prime Minister gives me talk about Democracy, Parliament and Constitutions, he, his Parliament and his Constitution may not last very long.’\textsuperscript{195}

In order to keep the Greece within the western sphere of influence, the US supported the establishment of the Greek junta in 1967. Also, as Washington feared the friendly relations

\textsuperscript{192} Clerides, vol. 1, 211.
\textsuperscript{193} Ibid., 207, 210, 223.; Hannay, 5.; Sherman, 28.
\textsuperscript{194} Blum, 216.
\textsuperscript{195} Ibid.
between President Makarios and the USSR, the United States considered the partition of Cyprus to be a suitable solution to this issue.

In contrast to Makarios, who had given up the idea of *enosis* at the end of the 1960s, many Greek Cypriots did not abandon the wish for reunion with the ‘motherland.’\(^{196}\) Fighting for this goal, the terrorist organization EOKA-B, established in 1971 and led by Georgios Grivas Digenis, attacked the government of the Republic and repeatedly attempted to assassinate Makarios, who was regarded as a ‘crypto-communist’; EOKA-B was strongly supported by the Greek military regime.\(^{197}\) When Grivas died on January 27 1974, the Greek dictator Brigadier General Dimitrios Ioannidis was a strong supporter of *enosis* and became in control of the organization.\(^{198}\)

On July 15, 1974, Greek and Greek Cypriot military forces attacked the Presidential Palace and other strategic public offices in Nicosia. President Makarios managed to flee the country with the help of British forces; he first went to London and soon after to New York. Nicos Sampson, a former EOKA member and strong supporter of *enosis*, was established as the new president of the Republic of Cyprus. As his administration was reinforced by Athens, Ankara was sure that the reunion of the island with Greece was about to happen.\(^{199}\)

Although Great Britain had, as previously discussed, implemented policies that increased the division between the Cypriot communities, the authors of the *Bloody Truth* argue that London also played a significant role in the time running up to the events of 1974.\(^{200}\) According to the *Bloody Truth*, “British Intelligence Officers were involved in subversive activities on the island: They manufactured bombs, aiding Turks to bomb Turkish properties (to incriminate Greek Cypriots furthering Turkish objectives), espionage etc.”\(^{201}\) Yet, when Ankara called upon London for a united intervention on Cyprus after the coup, the British, to the dismay of the Turks, refused.\(^ {202}\)

As a consequence to London’s refusal, Ankara decided to act alone. On July 19, 1974, the final orders were given for Operation Atilla (Atilla Harekâtı) and in the early hours of July 20, 1974, Nicosia was bombed, while approximately 25,000 Turkish troops landed on the island’s northern shores. Ankara’s ‘peace operation’ was supported by an estimated 10,000-13,000 Turkish and Turkish Cypriots fighting elements, which had been secretly trained and

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\(^{196}\) Ker-Lindsay, 41.

\(^{197}\) Hannay, 3.; Michael 32.


\(^{199}\) Ker-Lindsay, 42-43.


\(^{201}\) *Bloody Truth*, 334.

\(^{202}\) Ker-Lindsay, 43.
stationed on the island in the previous years.\textsuperscript{203} Even though the Greek Cypriot National Guard sought to prevent the Turkish advance, the advancing armies managed “to establish a meager, but nevertheless secure, foothold on the island.”\textsuperscript{204}

Several internal reasons have been named to explain the swift advance of the Turkish armies. Firstly, President Makarios had strongly mistrusted the officers of the National Guard, as many of them supported the junta in Athens. Therefore, Nicosia had not spent money on military equipment, such as tanks, cars, weapons, and ammunition.\textsuperscript{205} This lack of suitable equipment prevented the National Guard from getting to their assigned stations. Secondly, the coup d’état demoralized and dispirited on the Greek Cypriot officers. Thirdly, soldiers who supported Makarios refused to serve under those who were responsible for the fall of the President.\textsuperscript{206}

In addition to these internal causes, several external reasons have been given to explain the fast advance of the Turkish troops. Firstly, the Greek junta was strongly in favor of enosis and staged the coup against President Makarios in order to reach this goal. Without this interference from Athens, Ankara’s invasion would not have been justified according to the Treaty of Guarantee. Another external factor that enabled the Turks to secure a foothold on the island was treachery on the part of a number of Greek officers serving in the National Guard. Most of these (high ranking) officers took orders from the junta in Greece, which, under pressure from Washington, commanded to let the Turkish Army invade and take part of the island.

Following the CIA’s release of 700 highly classified pages in 2007, known as the ‘Family Jewels,’ it has become clear Kissinger was behind the Turkish plans for the invasion and division of Cyprus.\textsuperscript{207} The journalists Larisa Alexandrovna and Muriel Kane wrote:

Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger pushed for the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus and allowed arms to be moved to Ankara for an attack on that island in reaction to a coup sponsored by the Greek junta, according to documents and intelligence officers with close knowledge of the event.\textsuperscript{208}

\textsuperscript{203} Clerides, vol. 4, 17.; Ker-Lindsay, 22, 43.; Michael, 32.
\textsuperscript{204} Ker-Lindsay, 43.
\textsuperscript{206} Clerides, vol. 4, 22.
\textsuperscript{207} Alexandrovna and Kane.
\textsuperscript{208} Ibid.
Thus, the US pressured Turkey to invade Cyprus in order to keep the island in its sphere of influence by undermining the good relations between Makarios and Moscow.

Even though Greece came to aid the Greek Cypriots, the relationship between the two allies was complicated, as it had been damaged by history, as well as by the recent events that took place. The Greek Cypriots blamed Athens for the Turkish invasion, as the Greek junta had violated the island’s sovereignty by overthrowing its democratically elected president. David Hannay, Britain’s special representative to Cyprus between 1996 and 2003, noted that following the events of 1974, “[a]ny suggestion that the Greek government was giving less than wholehearted support to the Greek Cypriots or was meddling in Greek Cypriot internal politics was therefore dynamite, both in Athens and in Nicosia.”

Ankara’s swift and violent response to the coup d’état showed the Greeks and Greek Cypriots that they did not have a chance against Turkey’s military power. While the distance between the Turkish and Cypriot shores could be covered by a Turkish plane within minutes, “Greek aircraft had only about 30 minutes’ endurance over the island before needing to refuel” “by the time they had made the long trip from Rhodes or Crete.” Consequently, the Greek Air Force, or any other type of Greek military, was not able to form a substantial resistance against the strength of the invading Turkish troops.

Hannay summarized Washington and London’s initial response to the Turkish invasion as follows: “During this military phase the outside powers, the US and the UK in particular, avoided intervening and did little more than wring their hands, calling for restraint on all sides.” It was not until after the first Turkish offensive, that the governments of Britain as well as the United States released statements, in which they found strong words to condemn the Greek junta for triggering the crisis and to criticize the Turkish invasion. This hypocritical response was contrary to previous British policies, as London had always supported the Turkish Cypriots and Ankara; the sudden change of direction created distrust against the British, as the UK had even supported the idea of the division of the island among the 35th parallel, in 1965. Yet, as Washington was concerned that a war between Greece and Turkey would destabilize the south-east flank of the Western Alliance – Moscow had strongly supported Makarios – the NATO allies vigorously sought to maintain their influence in the region.

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210 Ibid., 7.
211 Ibid., 6.
212 Ker-Lindsay, 44.
214 Clerides, vol. 4, 24.; Hannay, 3.
The lack of western military intervention after the coup underlined the Turkish Cypriot notion that only Ankara could be trusted to protect their interests. In addition, biases and preconceptions about the Greek Cypriots and Greeks were seemingly confirmed by the coup and they were, as Hannay pointed out, generally considered to be a “people who were determined at least to dominate Cyprus by force and at worst to expel all Turkish Cypriots from the island.”

The only immediate western response to the Turkish invasion came from the United Nations Security Council, which adopted Resolution 353 on the morning of July 20, 1974. In this document, the Security Council did not only express its concern about the state of affairs on Cyprus and the influence the eruption of violence might have on the entire region, but also stressed the need to reestablish the legal order of the Republic of Cyprus. Further essential aspects of the resolution are as follows:

The Security Council,

...  
1. Calls upon all States to respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus.
2. Calls upon all parties to the present fighting as a first step to cease all firing and requests all States to exercise the utmost restraint and to refrain from any action which might further aggravate the situation;
3. Demands an immediate end to foreign military intervention in the Republic of Cyprus that is in contravention of the provisions of paragraph 1 above;
4. Requests the withdrawal without delay from the Republic of Cyprus of foreign military personnel present otherwise than under the authority of international agreements...

In addition to Resolution 353, the Security Council adopted two more resolutions (Resolution 354 and 355) in response to the invasion; both condemned the assault and called upon the parties to end the hostilities.

It was not until the Greek junta fell on July 23, 1974, that the United States and Great Britain were able to step in as mediators between the conflicting parties. A general cease-fire came into effect on July 23 and negotiations between the conflicting parties began in Geneva on July 25, 1974. Despite the signed agreement, however, Turkish troops did not end their advancement over the island. At first, Ankara’s justification for the continuous progress of its troops was that the Turkish community was still in danger, as the constitutional order of

215 Hannay, 7.
216 Clerides, vol. 4, 18.
219 Ker-Lindsay, 44.
1960 had not been reestablished; Sampson, who had been established as President of the Republic by the Greek junta, had not yet resigned.\textsuperscript{220} It has to be noted, however, that once Sampson stepped down after the fall of the junta, the Turkish troops continued their advancement.

During the negotiations, it soon became evident that Ankara did not seek to return Cyprus to its previous constitutional status. Glafcos Ioannou Clerides, who was the President of the National Assembly at the time of the coup and who became the acting President of the Republic of Cyprus after Sampson’s resignation, later wrote: “I proposed to the Turkish side to proceed to fully implement the 1960 Constitution, an offer which the Turkish Government refused to consider.”\textsuperscript{221} Ankara argued that the Greek Cypriots had shown the unworkability of the Constitution, when they violated it by driving the Turkish Cypriots out of the government in 1963. According to Turkey, the Constitution had to be either altered or eliminated. In addition, Ankara asserted that the attacks on Turkish Cypriots by Greek Cypriots had shown that previous settlements and agreements did not protect the Turkish community sufficiently.\textsuperscript{222}

Rather than to returning to the Constitutional order of 1960, Turkey sought to establish an independent bi-communal state, which would be composed of two self-ruling zones; the Turkish area would consist of 34 percent of the island. When the Greek side rejected this proposal, the negotiations between the conflicting parties failed on August 14, 1974, and the Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit gave the order for operation ZAFER, a second invasion of Cyprus.\textsuperscript{223} Starting where the first assault had ended, the Turkish armies spread to the west and east and would soon control the north of the island; approximately 200,000 Greek Cypriots were forced to flee.\textsuperscript{224}

In response to the second Turkish invasion, the United Nations Security Council adopted four more resolutions between August 14 and August 16 (\textit{Resolution 357}, \textit{358}, \textit{359}, and \textit{360}) and another resolution (\textit{Resolution 361}) on August 30, 1974.\textsuperscript{225} Once more, the resolutions did not only express the Security Council’s concerns about the repeated eruption

\textsuperscript{220} Clerides, vol. 4, 25.; Michael, 33.
\textsuperscript{221} Clerides, vol. 4, 21.; Hannay, 13.
\textsuperscript{222} Clerides, vol. 4, 35.
\textsuperscript{223} Michael, 34-35.
\textsuperscript{224} Ever since the Greek Cypriots were forced to leave their homes and properties, the government of the Republic of Cyprus has made the property issue one of the center stones of a possible negotiated settlement. Any proposal that did not include the return or the recompense of the Greek Cypriots was therefore rejected. As time went on and no settlement was reached, Greek Cypriot individuals challenged the Turkish state before the European Court of Human Rights; the first case was won in 1998. - Hannay, 6-7.; Ker-Lindsay, 44.; Michael, 33, 35, 37.
of violence, but also demanded the cessation of hostilities and the resumption of the negotiations between the conflicting parties.\(^\text{226}\) Despite these UN decrees, however, the Turkish troops continued their advancement, until Ecevit declared a new cease-fire on August 16, 1974. In his declaration, the Turkish Prime Minister stated “that the ‘foundations have been laid for the new federal state of Cyprus.’”\(^\text{227}\) At this stage, the Turkish armies controlled 36 percent of the Republic of Cyprus.\(^\text{228}\)

It was decided that the armistice line would be guarded by the United Nations and their peacekeeping force UNFICYP. The 180 km long UN buffer zone, which was established in order to prevent the reoccurrence of fighting between the conflicting parties, was divided into three sectors. Great Britain, as part of the UN mission on Cyprus, gained supervision over Sector 2, which contains the country’s capital as well as the United Nations Protected Area, including Nicosia Airport.\(^\text{229}\)

Following the events of 1974, the two sides bargained under the supervision of the UN General-Secretary’s special representative. Frequently, the negotiations between the two sides ended in lock downs and confidence building measures were initiated by the United Nations in order to continue the peacemaking process.\(^\text{230}\) While the Greek Cypriots stressed the importance of “the [limitation of the, H.O] territorial percentage allocated to the Turkish Cypriot areas; the powers of the central government; the three freedoms of movement, settlement, and property; the model for a bicommmunal multi-regional federal republic; the withdrawal of Turkish troops; and the return of all refugees to their homelands,” the Turkish Cypriots, especially their leadership, wanted to maintain as much as possible of their newly gained independence.\(^\text{231}\)

The Turkish Cypriot leader Raouf Denktash did not only have a substantial influence on the Turkish Cypriot opinion towards the Greek Cypriots. To the contrary, Denktash’s personal power in Ankara was able to influence Turkey’s Cyprus policies, while the role of his community to actively influence the political future of their ‘country’ was and still is minimal. The extremely popular politician was a strong supporter of the island’s division and steered Ankara into this direction as well. Any Turkish attempts to settle the problem were vigorously opposed and successfully contested by Denktash.\(^\text{232}\) Hannay described Denktash as follows:

\(^\text{226}\) Ker-Lindsay, 44.
\(^\text{227}\) Bülent Ecevit in Michael, 35.
\(^\text{228}\) Ker-Lindsay, 44.
\(^\text{229}\) Leventis, 14.
\(^\text{230}\) Hannay, 7-8.
\(^\text{231}\) Michael, 45.
\(^\text{232}\) Hannay, 12.
Most those who had dealt with Denktash in the past had reached the conclusion that he simply did not particularly want a settlement of the Cyprus problem or at least not one short of a wholesale capitulation by the Greek Cypriots. I came to share this view. The basic case that he made for a completely new start, with genuine political equality for the Turkish Cypriots, was a compelling one. But the language he used to describe it and the proposals he put forward to bring it about were not even remotely negotiable, and his forthright condemnation and misrepresentation of proposals designed to achieve these objectives by less direct methods than he favoured suggested that he did not really believe in them to be attainable. Moreover the Greek Cypriot fear that his ultimate aim was secession and permanent partition of the island was no mere figment of their imagination.233

Denktash’s unwillingness to find a settlement were underlined in 1975, when he became one of the founding members of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC). According to the Turkish leadership, there had been two separate Cypriot administrations since 1964, which indicated that the Republic of Cyprus was not considered to represent the Turkish Cypriots. Consequently, the establishment of their own state was part of the initial goal “to establish a federation in partnership.”234

Part of this partnership was, according to the Turkish Cypriots, the population exchange between the Greek and Turkish side, which was agreed upon in the Third Vienna Agreement on August 2, 1975. They noted: “[t]he Turkish Cypriots at present in the South of the Island will be allowed, if they want to do so, to proceed North with their belongings under an organized programme and with the assistance of UNFICYP.”235 In addition, the Agreement established that the Greek Cypriots, who still resided in the north, could leave if they desired to do so, but would not be pressured to leave.236

According to the Turkish interpretation of the Agreement, the population exchange ended the territorial and thus the refugee dispute between the communities, as it practically established two mono-ethnic territories as well as “the present de facto situation as bizonality.”237 Following the regulated ethnic cleaning, which was over-seen by the United Nations Peacekeeping Force, “only a few Greek Cypriots and some Maronites, the former mainly living in villages in the Karpas Peninsula (the ‘pan-handle’) in the north-east, remained in the north and even fewer Turkish Cypriots remained in the south.”238

233 Hannay, 18–19.
234 Michael, 42, 43.
236 Ibid.
238 Hannay, 6.; Michael, 44.
The Turkish Cypriots, who moved to the north, and the Greek Cypriots, who moved to the south, were settled in and on abandoned properties, which had previously belonged to members of the other community. The Turkish Federated State of Cyprus ‘legalized’ this annexation of property in its Constitution of May 7, 1985, which stated:

All immovable properties, buildings and installations which were found abandoned on 13 February 1975 when the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus was proclaimed or which were considered by law as abandoned or ownerless after the above-mentioned date, or which should have been in the possession or control of the public even though their ownership had not yet been determined...and...situated within the boundaries of the TRNC on 15 November 1983, shall be the property of the TRNC notwithstanding the fact that they are not so registered in the books of the Land Registry Office; and the Land Registry Office shall be amended accordingly.

As the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus included this section in its Constitution, the Turkish Cypriot authorities considered the division of the island to be final; the Greek Cypriots were not expected or supposed to return to their former properties. This notion was stressed, when Ankara began to send settlers from Turkey’s poorer regions, such as Anatolia, to Cyprus and moved them into houses which had been formally owned by Greek Cypriots.

Until today, all existing figures on the number of Turkish settlers on Cyprus have been contested. It has even been reported that “members of the Turkish Cypriot negotiating team have acknowledged privately that they do not have accurate figures.” According to the 2006 TRNC General Population and Housing Census, 178,031 people lived on northern Cyprus at that point in time; 120,007 (67.41%) citizens had parents who were both born in Cyprus; 42,572 (23.91%) citizens had parents who were both born in Turkey. These numbers are not only contested because the census did not differentiate between Turkish Cypriots and settlers but between the peoples’ place of birth, but also because many reports like the following have appeared over time:

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239 Ker-Lindsay, 48.
Turkish Cypriots are leaving Cyprus in greater numbers than ever before, worn down by decades of economic mismanagement, corruption and international isolation. In their place, dark-skinned Turks from Anatolia and Kurds from south-eastern Turkey are moving in...Reliable figures for the numbers leaving northern Cyprus are not available, but everyone knows somebody who is about to leave...While emigration is a highly sensitive issue, politicians at both ends of the spectrum agree that there are now many more Turkish Cypriots living in north London than in northern Cyprus.244

Thus, as many Turkish Cypriots are leaving the island, and official census data is disputed, no one is sure how many Turkish settlers and Turkish Cypriots live in northern Cyprus. The Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly estimated it at 115,000 people in 2003.245 Some scholars have argued that the settlers constitute approximately 16 to 18 percent of the population in 2005, while others have argued that the number is much higher and around 50 percent.246 Regardless of which numbers are correct, the contradictions illustrate the influence of Turkey’s Cyprus policies as all would have a significant influence on the population demographics.

Although the Turkish invasion has been condemned by the international community and its legitimacy denied by Greece, the Athens Court of Appeals ruled (case number 2658/79) on March 21, 1979 that:

The Turkish intervention, which was carried out in accordance with the Zurich and London Accords, was legal. Turkey, as one of the Guarantor Powers, has the right to fulfill her obligations. The real culprits…are the Greek officers who engineered and staged a coup and prepared the conditions for this intervention.247

Despite this legal decision and the recognition of the invasion’s legality and lawfulness, Athens has never taken responsibility for the role the Greek junta played in 1974.

It can be concluded that the events of 1974, as well as the Third Vienna Agreement, solidified the division between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Whereas the conflicting parties had lived separated before, most Turkish Cypriots had lived in enclaves; both sides of the island became almost entirely ethnically ‘clean’ after August 2, 1975. While the UN

buffer zone had divided Cypriots between 1974 and 1975, it has come to divide Greek and Turkish Cypriots ever since.

2004, the Rejection of the Annan Plan, and Membership of the European Union

On November 15, 1983, Raouf Denktash declared the independence of the **Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus** (TRNC) and, by doing so, created a severe deadlock in the negotiations between the conflicting parties. The Constitution of the new ‘country,’ which somewhat resembled the Constitution of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus and of the Republic of Turkey, was ratified by 70.16 percent of the Turkish Cypriot voters on May 5, 1985. Despite the fact that the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus put effort into appearing like a state with democratically nominated and elected leaders, it has often been argued that it was solely Raouf Denktash, who communicated with Ankara as well as the Turkish military and who made all of the decisions concerning the Cyprus issue.

The TRNC’s declaration of independence was only possible due to political tabulations in Turkey. The civilian government, which was being established as a replacement of the military administration, was unlikely to have supported the political move, as it was considered to be strongly pro-Western. In addition, it has been noted that the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was founded on Denktash’s own desires and objectives, as he strongly rejected the reunification of the island and was consequently fond of the idea of being the creator and forefather of an independent Turkish Cypriot nation.

Just three days after the TRNC’s declaration of independence, the UN Security Council adopted **Resolution 541 (1983)**, in which the multilateral organization strongly condemned the declaration and called upon its members not to recognize the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The resolution reads:

The Security Council,

... Considering...that the attempt to create a ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ is invalid and will contribute to a worsening of the situation in Cyprus,

... Deplores the declaration of the Turkish Cypriot authorities of the purposed cession of part of the Republic of Cyprus...
On May 11, 1984, the UN Security Council underlined its previous denunciation of the declared independence of the TRNC in Resolution 550 (1984) and once more called upon the international community to not recognize the new ‘state.’ In addition, the Council requested Varosha, located on the east coast of the island, to be transferred to the United Nations and pronounced any population of the area, by people other than its original owners, to be illegal.252

The UN Security Council was not the only international organization that issued a statement to condemn the TRNC’s declaration of independence. On November 16, 1983, the European Communities declared that:

The ten Member States of the European Community are deeply concerned by the declaration purporting to establish a 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus' as an independent State. They reject this declaration, which is in disregard of successive resolutions of the United Nations. The Ten reiterate their unconditional support for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of the Republic of Cyprus. They continue to regard the Government of President Kyprianou as the sole legitimate Government of the Republic of Cyprus. They call upon all interested parties not to recognize this act, which creates a very serious situation in the area.253

Also, the Commonwealth Heads of Government issued a press release on November 29, 1983, in which they announced that:

[The] Heads of Government condemned the declaration by the Turkish Cypriot authorities issued on 15 November 1983 to create a secessionist state in northern Cyprus, in the area under foreign occupation. Fully endorsing Security Council Resolution 541, they denounced the declaration as legally invalid and reiterated the call for its non-recognition and immediate withdrawal. They further called upon all States not to facilitate or in any way assist the illegal secessionist entity. They regarded this illegal act as a challenge to the international community and demanded the implementation of the relevant UN Resolutions on Cyprus.254

Despite international pressure, the TRNC failed to adhere to most of the Security Council Resolutions passed since 1974. Consequently, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is only recognized by the Republic of Turkey.255 Direct result of the international non-recognition has been the economic and political isolation of the Turkish Cypriot people.

Despite the TRNC’s declaration of independence and increasing tensions on the island, negotiations between the conflicting parties were picked up in January 1984.


255 Hannay, 8.
Numerous rounds of proposals and negotiations, mediated and supported by the UN, followed each other, as the Greek and Turkish Cypriot representatives were not able to find a common ground. Consequently, no solution to the Cyprus Problem was found.

On July 4, 1990, the dynamics of the peace talks between the conflicting parties changed, as the Republic of Cyprus applied for membership of the European Economic Community (EEC), the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), and the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC); the relations between the Republic of Cyprus and the European Economic Community/European Union had progressed from an Association Agreement in 1972, to a Customs Union Protocol in 1987. As the Cold War had come to an end with the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 10, 1989, the European Union deliberated an extensive expansion of the union. On June 30, 1993, the Commission of the European Communities wrote in its Opinion on the Application by the Republic of Cyprus for Membership:

Cyprus’s geographical position, the deep-lying bonds which, for two thousand years, have located the island at the very fount of European culture and civilization, the intensity of the European influence apparent in the values shared by the people of Cyprus and in the conduct of the cultural, political, economic and social life of its citizens, the wealth of its contacts of every kind with the Community, all these confer on Cyprus, beyond all doubt, its European identity and character and confirm its vocation to belong to the Community.

In addition to addressing the economic and judicial standards of the Republic of Cyprus, the report noted that “the adoption of the acquis communautaire by Cyprus will pose no insurmountable problems.” In addition, the Commission expressed its belief that the accession process would help the conflicting parties to reach a settlement.

Ankara’s initial reaction to Cyprus’ application was fury. As Turkey had applied for European Economic Community membership in 1987, and had been pronounced eligible in 1989, Ankara feared that the accession of the Republic of Cyprus would further undermine these aspirations; Nicosia was sure to block Turkey’s accession to the Union, once it had become a member.

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257 Ker-Lindsay, 57.
259 Ibid.
The negotiations between the Cypriot parties, which took place between 1996 and 2003, stood in the light of Cyprus’ pending EU membership and have, due to their complexity, been described as “a kind of three-dimensional game of chess.”\textsuperscript{261} Turkey, as well as representatives of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, vigorously sought to prevent the Republic of Cyprus and the European Union to begin any consultations.\textsuperscript{262} Despite these efforts, however, while Turkey’s application for full membership of the European Union was denied for the second time in 1997, the first round of accession negotiations with the Republic of Cyprus was started on March 31, 1998.\textsuperscript{263}

Even though it has been argued that Greece purposely stayed out of Cyprus’ accession negotiations to the European Union, as history supposedly taught Nicosia and Athens to be careful with Greece’s interests in the island’s matters, a WikiLeaks cable, released in 2010, shows differently.\textsuperscript{264} While several European countries did not want to admit the divided island and tried to prevent its accession, the cable revealed that Athens threatened to prevent other counties from becoming EU members, if the Republic of Cyprus was not accepted; the EU’s former external relations commissioner, Chris Patten, stated on the matter: “some of the accession countries were foisted on the EU as part of a larger bargain.”\textsuperscript{265}

The negotiations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots were not only complicated by the EU question, but also by the relations between Greece and Turkey, as well as Denktash’s disinclination and indisposition to compromise.\textsuperscript{266} Hannay described Denktash stance as follows:

\begin{quote}
[A, H.O.] feature of Denktash’s handling of the Cyprus problem…was his fundamental unwillingness to negotiate at all with the UN or with those backing its efforts. There was never any question of his responding with some flexibility to private probing about where areas of common ground with the Greek Cypriots might exist…the only people he ever negotiated with were the Turks themselves…His objective was to enlist in advance the backing of the Turkish state for whatever position he was going to take in the negotiations and, once he had it, to camp on that position and refuse to budge. He thus validated the view of those who said it was only in Ankara that a solution to the Cyprus problem could be found.\textsuperscript{267}
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[261] Hannay, ix.
\item[262] Ker-Lindsay, 59.
\item[264] Hannay, 21.
\item[266] Michael, 169.
\item[267] Hannay, 19.
\end{footnotes}
Denktash was able to continue these policies, until the AKP (the Justice and Development Party) won the national Turkish elections on November 3, 2002. The new Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, soon declared that Turkey’s EU membership would be at the heart of his policies. Consequently, the end of the Cyprus Problem became an essential goal for Ankara.\textsuperscript{268}

The United Nations acknowledged the importance of Erdoğan’s appointment and the essential transformation in Ankara’s Cyprus policies, which came at a time of momentum for change; presidential elections were to take place in the Republic of Cyprus in February 2003, Denktash had just undergone open-heart surgery, and, in December 2003, a summit was to take place concerning the EU membership of Cyprus and the application of Turkey.\textsuperscript{269} As the time was considered to be ripe, General-Secretary Kofi Annan introduced the “Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem,” which was designed by the US, the UK, and the UN, as a final settlement of the Cyprus Problem; the document is commonly referred to as the Annan Plan.\textsuperscript{270}

When Denktash, after his recovery, continuously resisted the Annan Plan, the criticism within the Turkish Cypriot community grew; in December 2002 and January 2003, between 45,000 and 70,000 Turkish Cypriots gathered to make their voices heard in favor of the proposed Plan.\textsuperscript{271} In addition, following Ankara’s wish to become a full member of the European Union, the pressure on Denktash to solve the Cyprus Problem was amplified and Turkey and repeatedly sought to illustrate and underline its wish for a resolution. An important step in this process was the settlement of the \textit{Loizidou v. Turkey} case, a landmark lawsuit concerning the property ownership in northern Cyprus, on December 7, 2003.\textsuperscript{272}

As a result of the political pressure from Ankara and the domestic protests, Denktash’s power began to decrease significantly; his loss of control, authority, and popularity was illustrated by the victory of the pro-solution CTP party in the 2003 Turkish Cypriot parliamentary elections. Denktash’s defeat was finalized when Ankara, contrary to Denktash’s wishes, requested a new round of negotiations. Despite his defeat, Denktash remained main negotiator for the Turkish Cypriot community.\textsuperscript{273}

Seeking to redirect the international as well as domestic disapproval, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus established four Green Line crossing points between April 23, 268 Ker-Lindsay, 61.
269 Michael, 170.
270 Ker-Lindsay, 61-62.; Michael, 170, 173.; Theophanous, 159.
273 Ker-Lindsay, 63.; Michael, 171.
While Denktash was supposedly “trying to create a basis for peace,” by opening the buffer zone and bringing people together, the initial response from the Greek Cypriot authorities was less than positive. The opening of the crossings was considered to be “important,” but not to be “the solution to the problem, or even a significant step.” The Papadopoulos administration strongly believed that no Greek Cypriot would be willing to acknowledge the Turkish Cypriot leadership by crossing to the north.

Not only was this notion wrong, but the opening of the Green Line also undermined the view Denktash had supported for the past thirty-nine years: that “the two communities could not live together.” On the first day alone, approximately five thousand Greek Cypriots showed their passport and filled in the ‘visa’, which enabled them to cross the division that had separated the north and south of the island for almost thirty years; after just eighteen days, 325,000 people (238,000 Greek Cypriots and 88,000 Turkish Cypriots) had crossed the Green Line to visit their old houses and villages.

According to a poll, conducted by the Greek Cypriot newspaper Simerini, 36 percent of the questioned people considered the opening of the crossings to have a positive influence on the process of finding a solution for the Cyprus Problem; 26.3 percent considered the opening of the crossings to be ‘more or less positive.’

Soon after the renewed beginning of the peace talks, it became evident that neither side wanted or supported a settlement; the Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus stated that the negotiations between the conflicting parties “did not produce significant progress at the political level. However, positive results were achieved at the technical level by experts from the two sides assisted by United Nations experts.” As no agreement was reached after the introduction of a fourth proposal, the United Nations Secretary-General finalized the plan. On March 31, 2004, expressed Kofi Annan expressed

275 “After six days, Cyprus crossings up to 100,000.”
277 Ibid.
278 “After six days, Cyprus crossings up to 100,000.”
280 “Cyprus people power.”
his hope “for a reunited Cyprus to accede to the European Union on 1 May 2004.”  

He made unmistakably clear that he considered the Plan to be a “chance for peace in a United Cyprus Republic” and that failure, thus a no vote by either one of the communities was practically not an option.  

Annan said:

The process of negotiation is not a football match. It is not a question of keeping score of goals and own goals, of winners and losers. Rather, we have tried to accommodate the expressed concerns of both sides, so as to create a win-win situation.

... Let us be clear. The choice is not between this settlement plan and some other magical, mythical solution. In reality, the choice is between this settlement and no settlement.

The fifth and final version of the Annan Plan was supported by the majority of the international community, including Turkey, and was put to vote to the two Cypriot communities on April 24, 2004.  

The Annan Plan proposed the establishment of the bi-zonal, bi-communal federal United Republic of Cyprus. Based on the legislative structure of Switzerland, the new country would be comprised of a Greek and a Turkish Cypriot state with political equality. In contrast to Switzerland, however, the new country would be comprised of only two states. All Cypriot people would hold a single nationality, yet, two citizenships: that of the United Republic of Cyprus as well as of the state in which the individual lived.

With regards to the Green Line, the Annan Plan stated that UNFICYP would entrust the control over the buffer zone to the Greek Cypriot State in six phases. Over the course of three years and six months, the following territories would be handed over: 1. Varosha and Kokkina, Achna and Petra, 2. Loutros/Gallini and Tymvou, 3. south Famagusta, Kalopsida/Acheritou, Lysi/Kontea, 4. Avlona and Lymnitis/Soli, 5. Famagusta, Mia Milia, Gerolakkos, and Zodhia (see: Map 2.1). The final boundary between the two Cypriot Constituent States would be established in phase six (see Map 2.2). The UN buffer zone was thus to become part of the Greek Cypriot Constituent State.

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283 Annan, “Remarks at the closing of the Cyprus Talks.”
284 Ibid.
285 Ker-Lindsay, 67.
286 Ibid., 64, 65.; Michael, 173.
Map 2.1: Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem – Territorial Adjustments

Map 2.2: Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem – Map of the United Cyprus Republic and its Constituent States.

288 United Nations, *Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem.*
289 Ibid.
Despite the international support for the Annan Plan, Turkish as well as Turkish Cypriot nationalists, including Denktash, strongly criticized the plan.\textsuperscript{290} Regardless of these condemnations and attacks, however, the Annan Plan, and thus the reunification of the island, was supported by the Turkish Cypriot population with 64.91 percent of all votes on April 24, 2004.\textsuperscript{291}

The Plan was also strongly criticized by many Greek Cypriots, including President Papadopoulos, who publically denounced the Annan Plan in a television address on April 7, and called upon the Greek Cypriot community to reject it.\textsuperscript{292} According to Papadopoulos, the Plan did not represent all interests of the Greek Cypriot people and he stressed that it would be possible to make new and better plans in the future; he implied, that the Republic would have a stronger negotiating position after its accession to the European Union.\textsuperscript{293} Eventually, 75.83 percent of the Greek Cypriot voters rejected the Annan Plan in the referendum of April 24, 2004.\textsuperscript{294}

The nationalistic authors of the \textit{Bloody Truth} agreed with the rejection of the proposed settlement and accessed the Plan as follows:

The plan envisioned the deconstruction of the Republic of Cyprus for the sake of establishing a sui generis ‘Federal creation’ nowhere [sic] to be found in the rest of the world, which would consist of two so called ‘constituent state entities’. What was to be created was a Greek Cypriot entity and a Turkish Cypriot entity under the ultimate co-sovereignty of Turkey and Britain’s guardianship through its British bases on the island. Furthermore, the British bases would be legalized as sovereign British territory with their own air space and sea rights.\textsuperscript{295}

Although the authors of this text simplified and falsely represented the intended effects of the Annan Plan with regards to the “deconstruction of the Republic of Cyprus,” their point about the British bases is correct. If the Annan Plan had been accepted, the British Bases on Cyprus would have become sovereign territory, in exchange for half of the British owned territory.\textsuperscript{296}

The Annan Plan would have served to secure Great Britain’s position on the island. After the beginning of the so-called ‘War on Terror’ in October 2001, the importance of the SBAs on Cyprus strongly increased; following the American-British invasion of Iraq, the

\textsuperscript{291} Jan Asmussen, \textit{Cyprus After the Failure of the Annan Plan} (Flensburg: European Center for Minority Studies, 2004): 1.
\textsuperscript{294} Asmussen, 1.
\textsuperscript{295} \textit{Bloody Truth}, 299.; Leventis, 19.
\textsuperscript{296} Ibid.; Leventis, 11, 19.
island became “an indispensable supply post for the coalition forces in Iraq.” One of the bases, the RAF Akrotiri, which is located in the south of the island, is reported to be “the largest airbase outside the UK and the only fully-fledged in the Mediterranean.” The Table 2.1 illustrates the importance of Cyprus; the table shows the annual budget (between 1996 and 2004), which the United Kingdom spent in order to maintain the bases on Cyprus, Gibraltar, and the Falkland Islands.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Financial Year</th>
<th>Cyprus</th>
<th>Gibraltar</th>
<th>Falkland Islands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996-97</td>
<td>£170m</td>
<td>£63m</td>
<td>£81m</td>
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<td>£165m</td>
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<td>1998-99</td>
<td>£170m</td>
<td>£52m</td>
<td>£72m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-2000</td>
<td>£159m</td>
<td>£54m</td>
<td>£71m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-2001</td>
<td>£160m</td>
<td>£60m</td>
<td>£64m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003-2004</td>
<td>£178m</td>
<td>£61m</td>
<td>£69m</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.1: U.K. Expenditure on the Three Main Overseas Garrisons

In its restructuring and modernization plan Army 2020, the British Army announced that its forces will remain on Cyprus as well as the Falkland Island after the implementation of the plan.

If the Annan Plan had been accepted, the UK would have remained a key actor on the island in the future, as Greece is an insignificant Guarantor Power due to a lack of military capacity to protect the Greek Cypriots against the Turkish Cypriot minority. Thus, despite the Republic of Cyprus’ EU membership, it would have become dependent on London’s protection. Professor Theophanous described the British intentions as being “a historical revenge.”

Many explanations and combinations of these reasons have been given as an explanation for the no vote of the Greek Cypriot people; amongst them were the rejection of the continuation of Turkey’s status as a Guarantor Power, concerns about the implementation of the Plan, disagreement with the proposed terms concerning properties and the economy, and the vagueness concerning the Turkish settlers issue, and the rejection of a settlement in

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297 Leventis, 11.
298 Ibid., 12.
299 Ibid., 16.
300 Leventis, 16.
302 Theophanous, 159.
general.\(^\text{303}\) In addition, it has been argued that the government of the Republic of Cyprus did not stop or correct the spread of misinformation about the content of the Plan.\(^\text{304}\)

The result of the Greek Cypriot referendum was met with frustration and disbelief from the Turkish Cypriots and the international community. Following the referendum, Secretary-General Kofi Annan released a statement, in which he declared that “[a] unique and historic chance to resolve the Cyprus problem has been missed.”\(^\text{305}\) The European Commissioner for Enlargement, Günter Verheugen, expressed similar sentiments in an address to the European Parliament in Strasbourg. Verheugen stated:

> What…Mr. Papadopoulos said after the negotiations in Switzerland is a rejection of that notion. And I must draw the conclusion from his words that the government of the Republic of Cyprus opposes the international settlement, proposes the rejection of the international settlement and I will be very undiplomatic now in saying that I personally feel that I have been cheated by the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.\(^\text{306}\)

Notwithstanding the disappointment and condemnations the entire island of Cyprus joined the European Union one week after the referenda of the Annan Plan, on May 1, 2004. However, as the plan for a settlement had been rejected and the sides had not been reunited, Protocol 10 of the *Accession Treaty of the Republic of Cyprus to the European Union* became effective. This meant “the suspension of the application of the acquis in those areas of the Republic of Cyprus in which the Government of the Republic of Cyprus does not exercise effective control.”\(^\text{307}\) Despite this Protocol, the Cyprus conflict had turned into an inter-European problem, as issues of jurisdiction would soon arise.

Even though the majority of the international community wanted to end the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community after their *yes* vote, it became evident that this was legally not viable. As the TRNC was not an officially recognized country, “international rules and regulations concerning shipping and air traffic made it legally impossible to open Turkish Cypriot ports and airports to direct traffic.”\(^\text{308}\) Consequently, the Council of the European Union accepted *Council Regulation (EC) No 866/2004*, more commonly known as the *Green*

\(^{303}\) *Bloody Truth*, 299-300.; Ker-Lindsay, 68, 69, 70-71.

\(^{304}\) Ker-Lindsay, 69.


\(^{307}\) *Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the European Union is founded - Protocol No 10 on Cyprus.*

\(^{308}\) Ker-Lindsay, 72.
Line Regulation, in order to regulate the crossing of peoples and goods between the south and the north of the island.

In the Green Line Regulation, the Council of the European Union stated that the Green Line is not an external border of the European Union. The document stressed that:

1. the term ‘line’ means:
   (a) for the purpose of checks on persons…the line between the areas under the effective control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus and those areas in which the Government of the Republic of Cyprus does not exercise effective control;
   (b) for the purpose of checks on goods…the line between the areas in which the Government of the Republic of Cyprus does not exercise effective control and both those areas in which the Government of the Republic of Cyprus exercises effective control and the Eastern Sovereign Base Area of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland;…

The regulations and surveillance of the line were, according to the document, set at a minimum. However, as northern Cyprus was not under the control of the Republic of Cyprus, the European Union stressed that rules and institutions had to be established in order to regulate “the crossing of goods, services and persons.”

As the Green Line Regulations were implemented, ‘border’ management agencies were established under the responsibility of the Republic of Cyprus. The Green Line Regulations specified the role of these agencies as follows:

As the abovementioned areas are temporarily outside the customs and fiscal territory of the Community and outside the area of freedom, justice and security, the special rules should secure an equivalent standard of protection of the security of the EU with regard to illegal immigration and threats to public order, and of its economic interests as far as the movement of goods is concerned. Until sufficient information is available with regard to the state of animal health in the abovementioned areas, the movement of animals and animal products will be prohibited.

As no solution to the Cyprus Problem has been found until today, the Green Line Regulations and the established agencies are still in effect. Consequently, the paradoxical status of the Green Line is underline and function as gatekeepers of the Green Line.

Although it had been believed that the Turkish Cypriots’ yes vote would have a significant impact with regards to their isolation, this was shown to be incorrect; economically as well as politically, little changed for the community. While all Turkish Cypriots had become EU citizens and the European Union sought to support several projects in the north,
these efforts were complicated and often even obstructed and hindered by “legal questions over property ownership” and the notion that Turkey was essentially occupying a part of the European Union. Consequently, many Turkish Cypriots “became increasingly bitter,…believing that they had been deceived by the European Union.”

Despite repeated Greek Cypriot efforts to prevent the end of the Turkish Cypriot isolation, the EU adopted the Aid Regulation or Council Regulation No 389/2006, on February 27, 2006. The initiative was directed to positively influence the economic development of northern Cyprus and thus the peace process; in addition to the provision of €259 million for the benefit of the Turkish Cypriots, the EU established the DG Enlargement Task Force for the Turkish Cypriot Community in order to ensure the implementation of the Aid Regulation and the distribution of the financial support. The plan’s main objectives were specified by the EU as follows:

- to promote social and economic development of the Turkish Cypriot community, including restructuring, in particular concerning rural development, human resources development and regional development;
- to develop and restructure infrastructure, in particular in the areas of energy, transport, environment, telecommunications and water supply;
- to foster reconciliation, confidence-building measures and support to civil society;
- to bring the Turkish Cypriot community closer to the EU, through information on the EU as well as contacts between Turkish Cypriots and other EU citizens;
- to help the Turkish Cypriot community to prepare for the implementation of the acquis in case of a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem.

An EU initiative that has not been implemented because of the Republic of Cyprus’ continuous protests is the Direct Trade Regulation. The document, which was proposed in 2004, was supposed to allow and regulate trade with the north of the island under special circumstances. Until today, the Republic of Cyprus has been successfully prevented the adoption of the regulation. Consequently, the Turkish Cypriot community remains almost entirely isolated.

Although the West was not able to change its stance towards the TRNC, the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers accepted the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as a member state under the name ‘Cyprus Turkish State’ in June 2004; this was the name used in

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313 Ker-Lindsay, 72.; Theophanous, 23.
314 Ker-Lindsay, 72.
316 Ibid.
the Annan Plan.\textsuperscript{318} Throughout the years to come, the Organization of Islamic Conferences (OIC) maintained steps to end the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community; in 2006, the Parliamentary Union of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (PUOIC) followed the 2004 decision of the Conference of Foreign Ministers. Despite these significant steps, it has to be stressed that the OIC did not acknowledge northern Cyprus as an independent country; the TRNC’s sovereignty is recognized still only by Turkey.\textsuperscript{319}

It can be concluded that, despite repeated efforts, the Turkish Cypriots remain an isolated community on the island of Cyprus. Even though the Green Line was opened in 2003, the failure of the Annan Plan destroyed the hope for the end of the political and economic isolation of the north as well as for a solution of the Cyprus Problem. Consequently, the two Cypriot communities remain separated until today; they continue to be divided by the Green Line, a division line the European Union stressed not to be its border.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textbf{2012, Still No Solution, and the Cypriot European Presidency}
\end{itemize}

Following the rejection of the Annan Plan on April 24, 2004, the Greek Cypriot authorities repeatedly stated that they “would not be rushed into a new peace process.”\textsuperscript{320} Consequently, Nicosia rejected the use of timetables, as well as the involvement of international negotiators or mediators. It was believed that a settlement had to come from within the two Cypriot communities. As international pressure grew, however, President Papadopoulos was forced to enter into new talks with the Turkish Cypriot leadership in 2006.\textsuperscript{321}

When the two sides could not agree on formal aspects of the negotiations, such as the agenda, the talks came to an end once again and it was not until after the election of Dimitris Christofias, as the new President of the Republic of Cyprus in February 2008, that the dialogue between the parties was resumed. Following the establishment of technical committees and working groups, which were to address all unsolved issues, high-level meetings began in September 2008.\textsuperscript{322}

All parties had entered the negotiations with confidence, however, it soon became evident that progress was hard to achieve for two reasons. Firstly, the Greek Cypriot

\textsuperscript{320} Ker-Lindsay, 74.
\textsuperscript{321} Ibid., 75.
\textsuperscript{322} Ibid., 76.
authorities refused to use the Annan Plan as the basis for any settlement, all issues, which had been previously agreed upon, were once more undecided and the representatives had to begin from scratch. Secondly, following the 2010 Turkish Cypriot elections, the leadership in northern Cyprus changed from a pro-solution to nationalist. Consequently, now, by the end of December 2012, no solution to the Cyprus Problem has been found or looks likely in the near future. The process has reached a dead end and the UN has called for a recess, waiting for the results of the presidential elections in the Republic of Cyprus in February 2013.

**Conclusion**

This chapter focused on the establishment of the Green Line in 1963 and on three other years, which played an essential role in the partition of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. Throughout this chapter, it has become increasingly evident that foreign powers played a significant role in the island’s perpetuating division, as well as in the establishment and in the maintained existence of the Green Line. This chapter showed that when Cyprus became an independent nation in 1960, the island’s former colonial power, Great Britain, ensured the maintenance of its authority on parts of the island. London’s policies stressed the division between the parties and would lead to the establishment of the Green Line in 1963 and, following the Greek Cypriot initiated coup ‘d’etat and the Turkish retaliation invasion in 1974, to the still prevailing division of the island.

The Green Line on Cyprus was created on the location of the cease-fire line between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots in 1963-64 and was supposed to be temporary. However, as no solution to the Cyprus Problem was found for decades, hatred, frustration, and alienation continued to grow on both sides of the demarcation line. Also, as the division is enforced and internalized by both sides, as well as by the European Union and the United Nation, it has become party of the Cypriot reality and turned from an exception into the rule. It can thus be stated that it is wanted as well as continuously maintained since 1974. This process was illustrated and finalized by the Greek Cypriots’ rejection of the Annan Plan in 2004, which strongly emphasized the normality of the island’s division and can therefore be interpreted as a moment in time when the Green Line on Cyprus was recreated.

The international community, which had strongly supported the Annan Plan, had failed to respond adequately to the lack of support from politicians on either side, as well as to the strong negative sentiments in the south with regards to the proposed settlement. With the rejection of the Plan, the peace process on Cyprus became even more complicated than it had been before. The Turkish Cypriot community felt strongly rejected by their Greek

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Ker-Lindsay, 75, 76, 77.
counterparts and nationalistic tendencies increased. Consequently, no solution to the Cyprus Problem has been found until the end of December 2012.
Chapter III: Methodology

Introduction

As discussed in the Introduction of this thesis, this chapter presents the methodology of this study. “Research is an intensive and purposeful search for knowledge and understanding of social and physical phenomena.”\(^{324}\) To find solutions and answers to yet unsolved (academic) problems and “to add to the body of knowledge,” the researcher, in this case me, has to be aware of his/her own philosophical orientation, as well as of the type of study that is going to be carried out, as these decisions demarcate and classify the methodology, which will be used during the research process.\(^ {325}\)

At the heart of every research methodology is the literature review, which was presented in the first chapter of this thesis, as it does not only influence the course of a research project, but also presents a detailed and indispensable analysis of the current understanding of a subject.\(^ {326}\) The literature review presented and analyzed the theories and literature on the Cyprus Problem, as well as on the border, the Green Line, and the space of exception, which have been discussed in academia for the past decades.

As this study seeks to define the ontological meaning of the Green Line on Cyprus, by approaching the history of its development and the actors’ perceptions, i.e. the ‘minds’ of people, this chapter presents the research approach and interview questionnaire. These were designed and formulated in order to investigate the peoples’ views and bring about the motivations and reasons behind them. As views and opinions change over time, this research project did only focus on one moment in time, but discussed and analyzed the following years: 1963, 1974, 2004, and 2012. While the year 2012 was chosen in order to discover what the perceptions of the Green Line are today, the other years were chosen, as significant events with regards towards the Cyprus Problem took place; the establishment of the Green Line, the coup ‘d’état and the Turkish invasion, and the Annan Plan referendum.

Aiming to explore how the Green Line has been wanted, created, maintained, and normalized, this study investigated the case of the Cyprus Problem. In addition, the Green Line’s position within the European Union was addressed. The most essential players in the multidimensional peacemaking chess game on Cyprus are the two Cypriot communities and their motherlands, Great Britain, the United Nations, and the European Union. Throughout the


study, all actors and interviewees were considered to be data sources, as well as observation units.\footnote{Piet Verschuren and Hans Doorewaard, \textit{Designing a Research Project} (The Hague, Eleven International Publishing, 2010): 181.}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textbf{Research Philosophy and Paradigms}
\end{itemize}

In order to understand how research is designed, it is important to focus on the organization and structure of the methodology. Research methodology consists of research paradigms and philosophy, which are defined by the philosophical ideas of the researcher concerning “the world and the nature of knowledge.”\footnote{Jill Collis, Roger Hussey, \textit{Business Research: A Practical Guide for Undergraduate and Postgraduate Students} (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009), quoted in K.E. Georgiou, “Research Methodology Workshop - Research Methodology & Methods,” (lecture Presentation. Nicosia: Kingston University, 2011).} Due to the development of multiple schools concerning different paradigms, the most essential ideas and beliefs were divided on the basis of their relevance and usage into \textit{hard} and \textit{soft} paradigms.\footnote{K. Georgiou, “Cristical Success Factors for the Implementation of Enterprise Resource Planning,” (MBA diss, Kingston University, 2010): 31.}

Hard paradigm has been defined as \textit{positivist epistemology} and is “rooted in the physical sciences and is termed systematic or scientific approach.”\footnote{K.E. Georgiou.; Rajendar Kumar, \textit{Research Methodology: A Step by Step Guide to Beginners} (London: Sage Publications, 2011): 14.} This type of research, asserts to reflect \textit{reality} and thus objective \textit{facts}. Consequently, knowledge is approached “as a thing” that is derived solely from science.\footnote{James Joseph Scheurich, \textit{Research Method in the Postmodern} (London: RoutledgeFlamer, 1997): 29.; Patricia H. Hinchey, \textit{Finding Freedom in the Classroom: A Practical Introduction to Critical Theory} (New York: Peter Lang, 2010): 36, 37.} Also, “the terms ‘knowledge’ and ‘information’ [can be used, H.O.] interchangeably,” while “‘theory’ and ‘knowledge’” cannot; without scientific verification and the repeated demonstration “under experimental conditions.”\footnote{Hinchey, 37.}

In contrast to the hard paradigm stands the soft paradigm, or \textit{interpretive epistemology}, which “is known as the qualititative, ethnographic, ecological or naturalist approach.”\footnote{K.E. Georgiou.; Kumar, \textit{Research Methodology: A Step by Step Guide to Beginners}, 14.} Soft paradigm research does not seek to find facts but believes “that access to reality (either given or socially constructed) is only possible through social construction such as language, consciousness, or shared actions and meanings.”\footnote{Stefanie Leimeister, \textit{IT Outsourcing Governance: Client Types and Their Management Strategies} (Wiesbaden: Springer, 2010): 11.} Interpretative research is based on the hermeneutical and phenomenological theories and seeks to identify events and observable facts “through the meanings that people give to them and their context.”\footnote{Ibid.}

For this study, I decided to use an interpretative approach, as it enables the analysis of shared as well as contradictory opinions concerning the Green Line within, as well as between
the conflicting communities. In addition, the perceptions of non-Cypriot interviewees were used to compare the understanding of foreigners with the Cypriots.

- **Research Strategy – Phenomenology**
  ‘Phenomenology may be defined as the study of appearances as such. By an ‘appearance’ is meant any existent which impinges on consciousness, anything cognized, irrespective of any judgment as to whether it be ‘real’ or ‘illusory.’” Phenomenology “sees behavior as determined by the phenomena of experience rather than by external, objective and physically described reality.” Thus, instead of focusing on the observations of outsiders, this philosophical approach considers the experiences, perceptions, and understandings of those who are involved, to be ‘knowledge.’

Even though the Cyprus Problem and its many different aspects and characteristics have been part of the academic discussion for decades, there has been a lack of research concerning the Green Line and the perception on it of those involved in the conflict. As individuals have different understandings of reality and truth, views on the definition of the Green Line are bound to do the same. Consequently, the non-positivist research paradigm phenomenology was considered to be the most appropriate research strategy in order “to go beyond positivism” and to reach this study’s goal by findings the diverse and differentiating ‘truths’ to the following questions:

- What is the most feasible solution to the Cyprus Problem?
- What is the best solution to the Cyprus Problem?

These first two questions help us to understand the complicated relationship between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. Do they believe in a solution of the Cyprus Problem? Would the interviewees be willing to make concessions? Would the communities be able to live together? Do they consider living together to be possible?

- What is your opinion concerning the other?
- Do you feel threatened by the other?

These questions delve deeper into the interviewees’ understanding of the other and thus into the perception of borders. How do the interviewees define themselves? Who is the other? How do the interviewees define the other? What is their image of the other? Is the other considered to be a threat?

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337 Remenyi, et al., 95.
338 Ibid., 96, 97.; Sion, 10.
What is your opinion of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus?
It is essential to differentiate between the Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, as not all Turkish Cypriots consider the TRNC to be an independent state. Therefore, it is important to make the distinction between the people and the perceived state. Also, if the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is not a country, what is it and what does this imply for the Green Line? Also, does it matter to the interviewees that the TRNC is not internationally recognized? Does this ‘distinction’ change or influence the status of the Green Line?

What is the Green Line; is it a border?
This question is essential in order to get an understanding of how the Greek and Turkish Cypriots perceive the Green Line in 2012. What is the demarcation line to them? What does it divide? Who owns the land that divides the two communities? Can it be considered to be a border?

The responses of non-Cypriots to the following questions will be analyzed:

What is your understanding of the Cyprus Problem?
Is the Green Line underlined or undermined by EU bilateralism?
Should the EU end its financial support for northern Cyprus?
These three questions will serve to get an understanding of what the non-Cypriots’ opinion is concerning the Cyprus Problem. What do they believe to be the source of the Problem? Can it be solved? Who can solve it? What role should the EU play in this process?

What is your opinion of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus? / Is the Green Line a border; is it the border of the European Union?
What is the Green Line?
These questions are important in order to get an understanding of what the Green Line is. As these two questions will also be asked in the Turkish and Greek Cypriot interviews, the answers of the three ‘groups’ will be discussed and analyzed together.

Thus, the research paradigm phenomenology was chosen in order to get an ‘insider’ understanding of what the Green Line is according to the involved parties.340

Quantitative Research vs. Qualitative Research

Following the analysis of the research paradigms and philosophy, it was concluded that the qualitative method would lead to the most valuable answers for the proposed research. Qualitative research, as noted in Table 3.1, does not only lead to “real, rich, [and, H.O.] deep data,” but it also enables the conduction of research from “the ‘insider’ perspective.” As the focus of this study was on the ontological interpretation of what the Green Line is, the interpretations of different ‘insiders’ were thus essential for this project. By asking why and how in-depth results were achieved that ultimately led to the answer of the research objectives.

Table 3.1: Differences and Similarities of Qualitative and Quantitative Paradigms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Qualitative</th>
<th>Differences</th>
<th>Quantitative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Concerned with understanding behaviour from actor’s own frames of reference.</td>
<td>Seek the facts/causes of social phenomena</td>
<td>Naturalistic and uncontrolled observation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjective</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close to the data: the “insider” perspective</td>
<td>Removed from the data: the “outsider” perspective</td>
<td>Grounded, discovery-oriented, exploratory, expansionist, descriptive, inductive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process-oriented</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valid: real, rich, deep data</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Un-generalizable: single case studies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holistic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assume a dynamic reality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

343 Blaxter, et al., 65.
**Similarities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quantitative research can also be used to test a theory and Qualitative research can be used to test hypotheses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Qualitative research can include quantification and Quantitative research can collect non numeric data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The underlying philosophical positions are not necessarily as distinct as the stereotypes suggest</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite the fact that qualitative research has been repeatedly criticized for being exposed to the researcher’s subjectivity, the studies have long been used as “source of well-grounded, rich descriptions and explanations of processes in identifiable local contexts.”

Considering the fact that “[t]he objective of qualitative data analysis is to identify, examine, compare and interpret patterns and themes,” it provides a holistic overview of the research topic.

In order to enable a contrasting and holistic approach, the research process of this thesis was based on an explorative and explanatory approach. As this approach incorporates the complexity of the interpretations and deliberations of all involved actors, it was decided that the primary data was to be collected through interviews. By exposing the research objectives and hypotheses to the considerations of others, an essential qualitative and explorative process is created and enabled. The following table illustrates the advantages and disadvantages of several research methods:

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345 Hair, Jr., et al., 288.; Miles and Huberman, 6-11.
Table 3.2: Advantages and Disadvantages of the Research Methods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Methods</th>
<th>Advantages</th>
<th>Disadvantages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Questionnaires &amp; Checklists</td>
<td>Produces lots of data fairly easily and cheaply.</td>
<td>Large samples generally required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Crude versions of questionnaires</td>
<td>Can get generalised objective results.</td>
<td>Length and presentation are important.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>generally with yes/no answers)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Need some knowledge of questionnaire design so preparation is important.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Motivation of respondents in important.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviews</td>
<td>Flexible</td>
<td>Can be time consuming especially if going to transcribe.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Can cover in-depth, complex or sensitive issues more effectively than other</td>
<td>Expensive both in terms of cost and time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>methods.</td>
<td>Difficult to cover large number of people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus Groups (Group Interviews)</td>
<td>Context can be obtained therefore results less likely to be misleading.</td>
<td>Often difficult to analyse.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strong views ore certain people can influence results.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Research Type – The Case Study

“A case can be an individual…a group…an institution…a large-scale community.”

A case study examines one or more cases and has been defined “as an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context, when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident, and in which multiple sources of evidence are used.” Thus, in a case study, different kinds of information and data, which

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are found within the context of the case study, are collected and organized as to find answers to formulated research questions.\textsuperscript{351}

Defined as a case study, this thesis seeks “to provide \textit{a, H.O.} rich, multi-dimensional picture of the situation being studied” and “arise[s] out of a need to understand and explain complex phenomena.”\textsuperscript{352} As the case study enables the researcher to obtain information in different ways – secondary data, interviews – it was considered to be the right method to discuss the Green Line as an individual entity and detail, in the light and complexity of the Cyprus Problem.\textsuperscript{353}

Since this study can be placed into the field of border studies, “the emphasis [of this study, H.O] will not be on counting and calculating on the basis of the observation unity, but on comparing and interpreting these results.”\textsuperscript{354} The academic field of border studies incorporates “interdisciplinary, multidisciplinary, and perhaps even postdisciplinary approach.”\textsuperscript{355} Consequently, multiple developments and perspectives, such as historical, cultural, economic, and political aspects of the Cyprus Problem and the status of the Green Line, were linked and evaluated throughout the case study.

\textbullet\ Data Collection

The collection of data and evidence for this research project consisted of three parts: observation, literature review, and interviews.\textsuperscript{356} Throughout three months, field work was carried out in Nicosia, Cyprus. Living on Cyprus and experiencing the cultural differences between the communities, as well as the everyday reality of the conflict, contributed significantly to my own understanding of the issue at hand. The personal experiences and knowledge gained throughout the stay on Cyprus are included in the analysis chapter of thesis in order to illustrate my own perception of what the Green Line is today. In addition to this work on site, where a research internship at the Cyprus Center for European and International Affairs enabled and enriched the research, all kinds of documents were studied and interviews were conducted with locals, as well as UN representatives and a scholar. By combining these empirical, as well as non-empirical resources, and considering them to have the same value, a holistic approach was ensured.\textsuperscript{357}

\textsuperscript{351} Gillham, 1.
\textsuperscript{352} Remenyi, et al., 162, 166,
\textsuperscript{353} Ibid., 166, 167,
\textsuperscript{354} Verschuren and Doorewaard, 159-160, 179, 181.
\textsuperscript{355} Wilson and Hastings, 3.
\textsuperscript{356} Remenyi, et al., 75, 79.
\textsuperscript{357} Verschuren and Doorewaard, 159-160, 179, 181.
The first part of this case study consisted of passive observation, as well as active observation and the collection of secondary data on the Cyprus Problem. As an immense amount of research has been conducted on this subject in the past, this process added to the understanding of this research and thus uncovered “the established and generally accepted facts of the” the Green Line and the Cyprus Problem in general. The secondary data clearly showed that, until today, little research has been conducted on the Green Line.

Besides literature, desk research also incorporated secondary material, which was comparatively analyzed in order to secure the accuracy of the provided information. The secondary data in this thesis was evaluated and used to describe, as well as explain, events that took place in 1964, 1974, 2004, and 2012. As the data collected for this research was not derived from a single location, it can be stated that it came from external sources only; both literary surveys (“knowledge sources” produced by others) and secondary research (“data sources” produced by others) were examined and evaluated in order to gain as much knowledge as possible on the position of the Green Line and the perception of all actors involved.

The goal of the literary surveys and secondary research was to collect data on the European Union, the Greek or the Turkish Cypriots and their official (governmental) views on the Green Line. As the amount of data available in libraries and on the internet is vast, it was essential to start the research with search terms that limit the subject. Even though broad perspectives can be helpful, they have the potential to cause confusion and thus jeopardize the research. Although it is thus important to remain focused on the research questions and related subjects, the dilemma of which aspects to include or exclude in a research project can easily lead to (minor) missteps.

The primary field generated data for this case study was gathered by conducting focused semi-constructed interviews. Eight Greek Cypriots, seven Turkish Cypriots, two UN representatives, and one Fulbright Scholar were interviewed throughout this process. Interviews are a method, which is often used in phenomenology and non-positivist research, as they “constitute an effective means of collecting large amounts of evidence in one or across several research sites.” To ensure the correct and consistent presentation of the primary data, the collection of the information was designed and organized. During the planning phase of the data collection, a questionnaire (see: Appendix B) was created.

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358 Remenyi. et al., 73, 75.
359 Hair, Jr., et al., 129.; Verschuren and Doorewaard, 179.
360 Hair, Jr., et al., 118, 128.
361 Ibid., 120.
362 Remenyi. et al., 111.
Before delving further into the theory of the type of interviews used for this study, it is important to focus on the interviewees, who contributed to this research project. While most interviewees were introduced to me by Mr. Kyriakos E. Georgiou from the Cyprus Center for European and International Affairs, several were also suggested by interviewees or approached by e-mail or telephone after finding their names on official websites. With exception of representatives of the European Union, all those approached were willing and able to participate. It can therefore be stated that it was not hard or complicated to find suitable interviewees.

Throughout the interviews, members from both Cypriot communities, as well as the non-Cypriot interviewees, were willing to openly share their personal perceptions, experiences, and, if applicable, family histories. It has to be stressed that it became obvious that the Cyprus Problem remains an emotional and sensitive subject; close family members and relatives of interviewees died during the conflict and many of their families lost their home. Striking was also, that several interviewees explicitly asked to remain anonymous because of safety reasons; their families had been threatened in the past. Consequently, for the sake of the interviewees’ protection, their names and identity will not be enclosed in this thesis.

What does this seemingly contradictory anonymous openness indicate? Can it be seen as disapproval of the political system? Is it the ‘nameless’ condemnation of the division of Cyprus? Or is it rather fear of the ‘other’ or the criticism of the own community? Throughout my stay on Cyprus and following the interviews, I have come to believe that all of these motives and many more, are part of ‘the answer,’ as they are personal and thus different for everyone.

The focused semi-constructed interviews, which were conducted during my stay on Cyprus, aimed to get a holistic understanding of what the Green Line is according to the actors involved. The semi-structured interview method was chosen to collect qualitative data, as it “allows a respondent the time and scope to talk about their opinions on a particular subject.” Also, as this type of interview requires structure and preparation, all interviewees were asked the same questions; this enables the analysis of their answers. Through the use of open-ended questions such as what do you think the Green Line is...? and to which side do you think the Green Line belongs...? the interviewees were encouraged to give their own

363 Hair, Jr., et al., 290.
365 Remenyi, et al., 111.
opinion on the subject. In addition, open-ended questions about the interviewees’ personal experiences with the Green Line were asked in order to get a better understanding of the individual’s experiences.

In order to ensure the use of suitable questions, as well as terminology during the interviews, several face-to-face informal interviews (also known as in-depth interviews) were held prior to the eventual survey. In addition to guaranteeing the reliability of the interviews, this method also ensures that the data one is looking for will be found. This ‘pilot’ was held among staff members of the Cyprus Center for European and International Affairs at the University of Nicosia, Cyprus. The questionnaires that were used during the interviews can be found in Appendix B.

During the interviews, notes were taken guarantee the accurate collection of data. The notes were later transcribed and sent to the interviewees for feedback. Thirteen out of the eighteen interviewees replied with their comments, corrections, and alternations. As most interviewees wanted to remain anonymous, personal details, such as names, place, and position of employment were deleted during this phase. It also has to be noted that neither Cypriot community has one opinion on the matter; the interviews did therefore not result in a clear one-sided view but illustrate a diversity of opinions on both sides of the divide.

In order to identify the interviewees, they have been categorized in the following tables according to gender, age, education level, and current employment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Greek Cypriots</th>
<th>Turkish Cypriots</th>
<th>Non-Cypriots</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

366 “Focused (Semi-structured) interviews.”
368 Remenyi, et al., 111.
369 Verschuren and Doorewaard, 179.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Greek Cypriots</th>
<th>Turkish Cypriots</th>
<th>Non-Cypriots</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20-30 years-old</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-40 years-old</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-50 years-old</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-60 years-old</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-70 years-old</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Completed education</th>
<th>Greek Cypriots</th>
<th>Turkish Cypriots</th>
<th>Non-Cypriots</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Still a student</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor degree</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master degree</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PhD</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Current employment</th>
<th>Greek Cypriots</th>
<th>Turkish Cypriots</th>
<th>Non-Cypriots</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil servant</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Researcher/university</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It can be stated that the majority of the interviewees was male, between 30 and 60 years-old, completed a master’s degree or a PhD, and is currently employed at a university and/or as a researcher.
Limitations to the Research Approach

Despite the extensive planning of the research project, several limitations were met during the process.

Firstly, the original aim was to interview sixteen Turkish and Greek Cypriots, as well as scholars and members of the UN and EU delegations. However, the number of conducted interviews is lower than the one originally planned, as the amount of information would have been too vast for a master thesis; eventually eight interviews were conducted with Greek Cypriots, seven with Turkish Cypriots, two with UN representatives, and one scholar. Despite repeated e-mail contact with the EU delegation on Cyprus, no interviews were scheduled in the end.

Secondly, although data sources are usually known to a study’s reader, no information of the interviewees is provided in this thesis. Several interviewees explicitly asked to remain anonymous. These requests clearly show the sensitivity of this research’s topic, as well as the possible risk for those participating in this study.

Thirdly, even though it has been repeatedly argued that the case study is biased, it is hardly possible to obtain unbiased information and data. It is important to note the three main difficulties with regards to case studies and the interviews conducted for this study in particular:

- the difficulties encountered by individuals in their being able to recall events accurately;
- the difficulty individuals have in disclosing important feelings;
- the suspicion individuals have about revealing information that might reflect poorly on themselves or their superiors.370

Even though it is important to be aware of these complications, bias can be limited by the extensive review of data.371 Therefore, this is what this study aimed to do, by being as accurate as possible.

Analysis

It has been argued that the analysis of qualitative data entails three simultaneous and closely connected endeavors: “data reduction, data display and conclusion drawing/verification.”372 The connection and interaction between the three aspects of analysis were extensively discussed by Matthew B. Miles and A. M. Huberman in their book

Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded Sourcebook

and are illustrated by Fig. 3.1.

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370 Remenyi, et al., 69, 70.
371 Ibid., 70.
372 Miles and Huberman, 10.
Data Reduction

Throughout the entire period that data was collected for this study, decisions were made concerning which information and sources would be included or excluded; the extensive amount of data on the Cyprus Problem was thus continuously reduced. This process aimed to ensure the authentication and verification of the work.

Data Display

The data display has been defined as “an organized, compressed assembly of information that permits conclusion drawing and action.” During this process, which took place following the finalization of all interviews, the collected primary data was condensed and arranged in a chart. By ordering the data and continuously linking the interview answers with the secondary material, which was derived from the literature review, the data was tested and verified.

As noted above, the gathered data was compared to each other in order to establish an in-depth image of what the Green Line is to various involved actors. The secondary data was thus analyzed and compared in relation to the new data collected on Cyprus: the interviews. The information derived from secondary sources was thus used in order to triangulate and explain the results from the interviews.

The themes for the final analysis of the results of the interviews emerged from the interviews themselves and were not chosen beforehand. Also, the following questions were continuously asked and debated during the analysis and writing process:

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373 Miles and Huberman, 12.
374 Ibid., 11.
375 Hair, Jr., et al., 130, 298.
1. What themes and common patterns are emerging that relate to the research objectives?
2. How are these themes and patterns related to the focus of the research?
3. Are there examples of responses that are inconsistent with the typical patterns and themes?
4. Can these inconsistencies be explained or perhaps be used to expand or redirect the research?
5. Do the patterns or themes indicate additional data, perhaps in a new area, need to be collected?
   If yes, then proceed to collect those data.
6. Are the patterns and themes consistent with other research? If yes, continue to collect data as planned. If not, assess how this impacts the validity of the research.  

Conclusion Drawing and Authentication

This stage of the research project was concerned with the interpretation and explanation of the collected data. Even though the researcher draws temporary conclusions in his or her mind throughout the research project, it is often not possible to draw final conclusions until all data is collected. Regardless of when the conclusions of the research are drawn, it is essential that they are confirmed and verified. In addition to critically assessing my own work, several peer reviewers read and commented on this study in order to verify its contents.

Writing

As suggested by Verschuren and Doorewaard, the research trajectory and writing process of this thesis took place parallel to each other. Although the authors of Designing a Research Project argue “that conceptual writing must precede communicative writing,” as this will help structure thoughts and ideas, I have experienced that these two aspects of writing go hand in hand; without a clear layout and structured and grammatically correct sentences, my thoughts will become as chaotic and disorganized as the text. Throughout the research project the conceptual and communicative writing were therefore combined.

Conclusion

This chapter focused on outlining and discussing the research approach and interview questionnaire, which were designed in order to gain a better understanding of the interviewees’ perceptions of the Green Line. Following the literature review in the first chapter of this thesis and the discussion and examination of the research paradigm, it was concluded that the qualitative research approach and the non-positivist research paradigm

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376 Hair, Jr., et al., 291-292.; Remenyi, et al., 112, 113.
377 Hair, Jr., et al., 298.
378 Verschuren and Doorewaard, 145.
phenomenology were the most optimum methods to collect data for this study. While the qualitative approach ensured a holistic overview of the research subject, the paradigm enabled the collection, discussion, and analysis of data, peoples’ views and perceptions, which were essential for this research. In addition to discussing the instruments used during this study, which were observation, literature review, and interviews, this chapter focused on the limitations and possibilities of the presented research approach and the writing process of the final master’s thesis.
Chapter IV: Results

Introduction

The data that was collected during the focused semi-constructed interviews will be evaluated, compared, and contrasted in this chapter. It will focus on the discussion of the interviewees’ opinions concerning the following questions, which are directly linked to the main research question (also see: Introduction):

- What is the most feasible solution to the Cyprus Problem?
- What is the best solution to the Cyprus Problem?
- What is your opinion concerning the other?
- Do you feel threatened by the other?
- What is your opinion of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus?
- What is the Green Line; is it a border?

It is important to point out once more that an individual’s perception is interconnected to his or her identity.379

The non-Cypriots (a scholar and two UN representatives), who were interviewed for the purpose of this research, have been in Cyprus between nine months and ten years. The responses to the following questions will be analyzed:

- What is your understanding of the Cyprus Problem?
- Is the Green Line underlined or undermined by EU bilateralism?
- Should the EU end its financial support for northern Cyprus?
- What is your opinion of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus? / Is the Green Line a border; is it the border of the European Union?
- What is the Green Line?

Relevant literature, as well as my personal experiences, will be used in the empirical analysis to discuss the interviewees’ opinions. In addition, the differences and similarities between the findings of the interviews and the literature will be analyzed. This chapter will begin with a discussion of the interviews that were conducted with Greek and Turkish Cypriots, before continuing with the analysis of the answers of UN representatives and an American scholar.

379 West and Turner, 47.
What is the most feasible solution to the Cyprus Problem?

As noted in the Literature Review of this thesis, the scholars Nicos Peristianis and John C. Mavris used the following figure to illustrate the differentiating opinions concerning a possible solution to the Cyprus Problem:

![Fig. 4.1: “Ideal and Compromise Positions of Greek- and Turkish Cypriots.”](image)

The figure clearly shows that the official positions (GC: unitary state; TC: two states) are in direct contrast to each other.

Over the past decades, it has become increasingly evident that Greek and Turkish Cypriot politicians are not able to agree on a solution to the Cyprus Problem. Whereas the Greek Cypriots are only willing to accept a settlement based on either a federation with strong central powers, or a unitary state, the Turkish Cypriots prefer two independent states or a confederation. In their quest to bring the two conflicting parties together, foreign powers traditionally supported a federal solution, as this would be a compromise between the two extremes.\(^{381}\)

Greek Cypriot politicians have repeatedly argued that the peace process is undermined by Britain’s and the U.S.’ own agendas and their pro Turkish stance. Consequently, even though the word *federation* has been used throughout the negotiations and peacemaking process of the past decades, Greek and Turkish Cypriot elites have not given the same meanings to the term; that different interpretations are possible was also reflected within the interviews. While one interviewee defined a federation as “anything that is in between a unitary state and a confederation,” the Greek Cypriot definition lies usually closer to a *unitary state* and the Turkish Cypriot definition comes closer to a *confederation*.\(^{382}\)

Both, Turkish and Greek Cypriot interviewees, stressed that the only feasible solution to the Cyprus Problem would be a negotiated mutually accepted agreement, as “[i]t is

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380 Peristianis and Mavris, “Ideal and Compromise Positions of Greek- and Turkish Cypriots.”
382 TC Interviewee V.
impossible to satisfy both sides a 100 percent.” Interviewees from the communities agreed that if either one of the sides was to reject the settlement, it is bound to fail. However, even though the interviewees’ agreed on this notion, the solutions they envisioned differed.

Nine out fifteen Cypriot interviewees consider a federation to be the most feasible solution to the Cyprus Problem. However, although five out of seven Turkish Cypriots stated that a federation will be the most feasible solution; most of them address the personal trauma and shock experienced after the Greek Cypriot rejection of the Annan Plan and the failure of reuniting the island in 2004. It became evident during the interviews, that the initial disbelieve has turned into disillusionment and the belief that the Greek Cypriots did not only reject the Annan Plan, but a settlement in general.

The feelings the Turkish Cypriots expressed are in line with Amanda Akçakoca’s assessment of the situation following the referendum on April 24, 2004. In her work, Akçakoca, a Policy Analyst at the European Policy Centre, stressed the widespread disappointment after the failure of the Annan Plan. The Turkish as well as Turkish Cypriot leadership, with exception of Raouf Denktash’s Ulusal Birlik Partisi (UBP, National Unity Party) had supported the proposed settlement and the Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi (CTP, Republican Turkish Party). Also, the Chamber of Commerce had spent a significant amount of money, in order to support the evet (yes) campaigns, as it was believed that the Annan Plan would ensure the self-determination, autonomy, and political equality of the Turkish Cypriot community.

While the Turkish Cypriots stressed the benefits of the island’s reunion for their community, the Greek Cypriots were well aware that their no vote would not influence their country’s accession to the European Union. Thus, knowing their rejection would not have direct consequences, “[t]he majority of the Greek Cypriots approached the referendum not as the beginning of a new era of collaboration, peace, and prosperity, but rather as a rearguard defense to safeguard their sovereignty and identity.”

As early as November 2002, when the first draft of the Annan Plan was submitted, polls indicated that the majority of the Greek Cypriots did not support the proposal. An essential argument against the Annan Plan was that it did not protect the unity of the state, as

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383 TC Interviewee IV.
387 Michael, 182.
388 Theophanous, 77.
there was to be “no hierarchy between the laws of the constituent states and those of the central government.” This lack of hierarchy was believed to make a decision-making process in general nearly impossible. Another argument against the Annan Plan was that it would “in effect turn…the country into a protectorate,” as it reaffirmed the system of Guarantee Powers as well as the right of Greece and Turkey to station troops on the island. Consequently, the Republic of Cyprus “would be under the strong influence of Turkey and Britain.”

The Greek Cypriot interviewees, who believed that a federation is the only feasible solution to the Cyprus Problem, repeatedly stressed Turkey’s role in the peacemaking process. Ankara’s expansionism in the region was repeatedly mentioned as reason for the presence of Turkish troops in the north. The interviewees considered the withdrawal of these troops as well as the leaving of the settlers essential for any kind of solution, as “[t]he Cyprus problem is an issue of invasion and occupation.”

The notion that the Cyprus Problem is essentially about the Turkish invasion and the occupation of the northern part of the island was underlined by the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly in 2003. In Recommendation 1608 (2003), also known under the title Colonisation by Turkish settlers of the occupied part of Cyprus, the Parliamentary Assembly adopted the following:

> It is a well-established fact that the demographic structure of the island has been continuously modified since its de facto partition in 1974, as a result of the deliberate policies of the Turkish Cypriot administration and Turkey. Despite the lack of consensus on the exact figures, all parties concerned admit that Turkish nationals have since been systematically arriving in the northern part of the island. According to reliable estimates, their number currently totals 115 000.

> The Assembly is convinced that the presence of the settlers constitutes a process of hidden colonisation and an additional and important obstacle to a peaceful negotiated solution of the Cyprus problem.

The Parliamentary Assembly did not only acknowledge that Ankara has continuously been sending settlers to Cyprus – according to international law it is illegal to populate occupied territories – but also recognized the complications that are created by this colonization.

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389 Theophanous, 80.
390 Ibid., 78-79.
391 Ibid., 79.
392 GC Interviewee VII.
393 Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation 1608 (2003), Colonisation by Turkish settlers of the occupied part of Cyprus.
Consequently, the Parliamentary Assembly called upon Turkey to make its settlers return to the mainland in order for the peace process to continue fruitfully.  

During the interviews, Ankara’s aggression and unwillingness to settle the conflict was indicated by a quarter of the Greek Cypriots as the reason for the eventual internationally recognized division of the island and the establishment of separate Turkish and Greek Cypriot states. This notion is closely related to the fact that “collective remembering does not only relate to the past and the present…[but, H.O.] also plays an important role in setting the scene for the way a social group projects itself into the future.” As the relations between Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus are “tormented by memory,” the Greek Cypriot community embedded the issue in its collective being and thus projects it onto the future.

It has been repeatedly argued that the blame for the Cyprus conflict is to share among all internal and external actors. However, Hannes Lacher and Erol Kaymak noted in their article “Transforming Identities: Beyond the Politics of Non-Settlement in North Cyprus” that many Greek Cypriots tend to blame the division of the island on “international conspiracies driven by Turkish ‘expansionism’ and American schemes with Turkish and Greek Cypriots little more than pawns on the eastern Mediterranean/Middle Eastern chessboard.” The scholars stressed that this notion is not only seemingly self-forgiving, but that it also undermines and diminishes the Turkish Cypriot inclination to make concessions concerning community rights. In order to prevent this in the future, I would argue that the Greek Cypriot community has to acknowledge that its own actions in the 1960s and early 1970s played a significant role in the division of the island.

One Turkish Cypriot suggested that the island will remain divided in the future. In contrast to the Greek Cypriots, however, the interviewee did not only believe in Turkey’s absolute unwillingness to compromise and give up the north of the island, but stressed that there would be no solution at all. If this were to happen, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus will not be internationally recognized and the status quo and the division of the island will continue as it does today.

Even though the interviewee did not indicate any specific reasons for the lack of finding a solution, it has been repeatedly argued that the campaigns against the Annan Plan and the eventual Greek Cypriot rejection showed that the community and its leadership do not

\[394\] Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation 1608 (2003), Colonisation by Turkish settlers of the occupied part of Cyprus.
\[396\] Ibid.
\[398\] Ibid.
want to solve the problem. Kofi Annan wrote in his *Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus* of May 18, 2004:

[T]he sheer size of the .No. vote raises...fundamental questions. This is the first time that the Greek Cypriot public has been asked to vote on a bicomunal, bizonal federal solution of the Cyprus problem. Such a solution means not just two constituent states, but also political equality and the sharing of power. Yet the situation today is very different from that which existed in the 1970s, when the leaders of the two communities agreed to seek such a solution. The contrast between economic stagnation in the north and prosperity in the south is visible and palpable. A generation or more of Cypriots have no memory of life on a unified island. Most of the dispossessed in the south, by hard work and enterprise, have carved out a prosperous livelihood, as have many others who are not originally from the north. While they strongly state their wish to reunify, many see in a settlement very little gain, and quite a lot of inconvenience and risk.

The Greek and Greek Cypriot authorities vehemently protested Annan’s evaluation of the negotiation process and the failure of the Plan. George Koumoutsakos, spokesman of the Greek Foreign Ministry, said at a press conference that the report does “not always coincide with the views of the sides involved” and that the Greek Cypriot no vote “is interpreted as a desire for non-solution, but that is not the case.”

The notion that neither the Greek nor the Turkish Cypriot political elite wanted the Annan Plan to pass the referendum was underlined when it became known in 2004 that Tassos Papadopoulos, President of the Republic of Cyprus, had secretly met Turkish Cypriot politicians shortly before as well as after the referendum. As neither side supported the proposed Annan Plan and it was too late to postpone the referendum, they sought to coordinate their efforts for a no vote. Consequently, it was agreed during these meetings “that a ‘yes’ and a ‘no’ come out of the ballot box at the referendum.”

In strong contrast to the other fourteen interviewees’ answers was the answer of one Turkish Cypriot interviewee, who stated that he believed a confederation would be the only feasible solution, as it is the only one acceptable to the Turkish Cypriots. The interviewee noted that “a weak central government is at the core of any solution,” as the two parties have lived separated for too long and thus “do not have any memories of living together.” It has to be noted that the interviewee himself questioned whether such a settlement would be

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402 TC Interviewee I.
possible, as he noted that the Greek Cypriots would probably not agree to such a proposal; the Greek Cypriots “do not have the tendency to share power” and “would never accept a Turkish Cypriot president.”\(^\text{403}\) This assessment of the Cyprus conflict is in line with the opinion of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus authorities.

Although the Turkish Cypriot leadership supported the federation proposed in the Annan Plan, the authorities repeatedly stressed that a confederation will be the only feasible solution to the Cyprus Problem, as it “addresses the reality that there are two sovereign states on the island.”\(^\text{404}\) The establishment of a confederation on the island of Cyprus would enable the Turkish Cypriots to maintain their autonomy, while its two communities would be internationally represented as one entity.\(^\text{405}\) This notion is in strong contrast to the wishes of the Greek Cypriots, who seek to fest as much power as possible in a federal government.

It can thus be concluded that the answers to the question \textit{what is the most feasible solution to the Cyprus Problem?} do not only differ between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, but also within the communities. Whereas the majority of the Greek Cypriots believes the conflict can only be solved with the establishment of a federation, a quarter of the interviewees is certain that the problem will be solved with the division of the island. The Turkish Cypriot interviewees turn out to be even more divided on the subject. Just as the Greek Cypriot community, the majority of the Turkish Cypriots believes in the establishment of a federation. Yet, another believes in the division of the island, and one in the establishment of a confederation.

\begin{itemize}
  \item What is the best solution to the Cyprus Problem?
  
  As it is possible that individual’s perception of what is feasible and what he or she considers being the best differs, this section will focus on the question \textit{What is the best solution to the Cyprus Problem?}

  As previously discussed, foreign powers have played an important role on Cyprus throughout the past decades. Representatives of the international community have repeatedly acted as mediators between the communities and pushed the parties to find a solution. Although one Greek Cypriot stressed that any kind of foreign interference on Cyprus has to end before a solution can be found, a Greek and a Turkish Cypriot interviewee supported the internationally advocated view that the Cyprus Problem should be solved with the establishment of a federation.
\end{itemize}

\(^{403}\) TC Interviewee I.


\(^{405}\) Ibid.
While half of the Greek Cypriot interviewees agreed with their authorities’ opinion that a unitary state would be the best solution for the Cyprus Problem, only one Turkish Cypriot believed in the establishment of a confederation. Also, even though one Greek Cypriot agreed with the general notion of a confederation, the reasons for their answers differed greatly. While the Turkish Cypriot interviewee stressed that the Turkish Cypriots should maintain as much independence as possible, within one Cypriot state, the Greek Cypriot stated that it would be impossible to unite the two communities, due to the extensive differences.

As, despite countless proposals, a settlement to the Cyprus Problem has not been found, it has been repeatedly argued in academia that the acknowledgement of a possible two-state solution to the Cyprus Problem, which is strongly supported by Turkish Cypriot politicians, might be inevitable.\textsuperscript{406} This type of a solution was also supported by one Greek and one Turkish Cypriot interviewee; once more, their reasoning was extremely different. While the Greek Cypriot stressed that he does not want to live together with the Turkish Cypriots, the Turkish Cypriot interviewee supported the two-state solution, because he considered it to be better to “fight within our communities and not against the other.”\textsuperscript{407}

The majority of the Turkish Cypriot interviewees stated that they do not believe the conflict will be solved anytime soon. This reflects the community’s disillusionment after the failed reunification in 2004, which was discussed in the previous section. This pessimistic view has been underlined recently by the fact that official negotiations between the parties have been suspended until further notice, as the Republic of Cyprus took over the European Presidency on July 1, 2012. The talks will not be resumed before the end of the term.\textsuperscript{408}

The belief that the non-settlement has become a solution in itself was repeatedly mentioned by the Turkish Cypriot interviewees. Research conducted by Cyprus2015 showed that “a majority of Turkish Cypriots feel they can tolerate…[the status quo, H.O.] as a ‘necessary evil,’” while the “majority of the Greek Cypriots reject” it.\textsuperscript{409} A Turkish Cypriot interviewee stressed that, following the failure of the Annan Plan, he no longer believed in any kind of federal solution and another Turkish Cypriot underlined this notion when he said:

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item\textsuperscript{406} David Milne, “One State or Two? Political Realism on the Cyprus Question,” \textit{The Round Table} (2003): 156.
\item\textsuperscript{407} TC interviewee VII.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
People have learned to live with the conflict. There are not many people who are bothered by the conflict. The Greek Cypriots have control over the bi-communal state since 1964 and the Turkish Cypriots sit in Greek Cypriot houses since 1974. It seems like both sides learned to live with the conflict.  

The conflict has become part of the everyday reality of the Cypriot communities and it seems like a settlement becomes more unlikely the more time passes. A Turkish Cypriot noted that even though he would support any kind of working resolution, he did not believe in the reconsolidation of the conflicting parties. The interviewee said:

I do not believe in the reunification of Cyprus, as the people in Cyprus are not prepared to implement a federation. There will be a settlement at some point. It will be a piece of paper and what we have today will continue. The Greek Cypriots will not sign an agreement, because they know this; the current situation would be internationally acknowledged.

While the Turkish Cypriots’ overall disappointment for the lack of a solution became evident during the interviews, several interviewees stressed that making a difference between most feasible and best solution complicates the situation and potentially makes a settlement impossible. A Turkish Cypriot summarized this complex situation as follows:

If we go for what we wish, we cannot find a solution. The situation now has been continuing for a very long time. If we are not satisfied with what we have now, and want something better, we have to find a compromise...We should work on this. It will not be ideal. It will not satisfy either side 100%.

It can thus be noted, that there is no single answer to the question what would be the best solution to the Cyprus Problem? Not only do Greek and Turkish Cypriots disagree on the answer, but there is also, once more, no agreement within the communities. It can therefore be noted that there are no answers to the question that represent the opinion of the entire communities.

What is your opinion concerning the other?

An opinion supported by many Greek Cypriots, and which was repeated during the interviews, is that the Turkish Cypriots should stay on the island, as they belong there, whereas the (majority of the) Turkish settlers, who were also allowed to vote in the 2004 referendum, should leave. This argument has been repeatedly made and it was partially

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410 TC Interviewee V.
411 TC Interviewee II.
412 TC Interviewee IV.
underlined by the Annan Plan in 2004. In Article 3, Paragraph 5 of the Foundation Agreement, Kofi Annan proposed that:

…for a transitional period of 19 years or until Turkey’s accession to the European Union, whichever is earlier, Cyprus may limit the right of Greek nationals to reside in Cyprus if their number has reached 5% of the number of resident Cypriot citizens holding Greek Cypriot internal constituent state citizenship status, or the right of Turkish nationals to reside in Cyprus if their number has reached 5% of the number of resident Cypriot citizens holding Turkish Cypriot internal constituent state citizenship status.\(^\text{413}\)

It was eventually decided that, if the Turkish Cypriot authorities were to produce a list with the names of the 40,000 settlers who had become ‘TRNC citizens,’ the Greek Cypriots would refrain from sending them back to Turkey. However, as the list was never submitted – the number was eventually altered to 60,000 – and the Annan Plan was rejected, the number of Turkish (or Greek) nationals has not been limited. Consequently, the Turkish settlers have not, nor will, leave Cyprus anytime soon.\(^\text{414}\)

Although Turkey has a lot of political and economic influence on northern Cyprus, the view that Turks and Turkish Cypriots are ‘the same,’ which was expressed by a Greek Cypriot interviewee, has been rejected by scholars. As noted in ‘Chapter II: Historical Background’, the term *Turkish Cypriot* did not exist until 1949, when the British colonial powers substituted the previously used label *Muslims of Cyprus*.\(^\text{415}\) Also, Aigli Andrea Pittaka noted in her PhD dissertation titled “Cultures of Peace Enabled Zoom Along Cyprus” that many Christians converted to Islam during the first years of the Ottoman rule.\(^\text{416}\) This view was stressed by Floya Anthias and Ron Ayres, who wrote in their article “Ethnicity and class in Cyprus”: “conversions from Christianity to Islam appear to have been fairly common, since those who converted were treated as full Ottoman citizens, and thus were able to avoid the exorbitant and economic disadvantages they suffered.”\(^\text{417}\) Thus, rather than stating that Turks and Turkish Cypriots are alike or the same, it could be argued that most Turkish Cypriots are in fact converted Greek Cypriots.

Following the rejection of the Annan Plan by the Greek Cypriot community in April 2004, Günter Verheugen, European Commissioner for Enlargement, questioned the willingness of the Greek Cypriots to reach a settlement of the Cyprus Problem.\(^\text{418}\) The notion

\(^\text{413}\) United Nations, *Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem*.

\(^\text{414}\) Loizides.

\(^\text{415}\) *Bloody Truth*, 208.


\(^\text{418}\) Zitouniati.
that the Greek Cypriots do not actually want a solution was repeated by two Turkish Cypriot interviewees. Even though one of the two interviewees mentioned that he had neither good nor bad memories of living together with the Greek Cypriot community, both agreed that the Greek Cypriots seemed to not only be against the Annan Plan, but against the concept of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. As the bi-zonal bi-communal has been the discussed framework for a settlement for the past decades, this would mean that the Greek Cypriots reject a solution in general.

Even though one Greek Cypriot interviewee did not reject a settlement itself, he remarked that the Turkish Cypriots “did not suffer that much; [as, H.O.] the crimes that were committed were not an official Greek Cypriot policy.” Even though it is correct that the atrocities committed by the Greek Cypriots were not part of the official policy, the paramilitary Akritas organization, which aimed to suppress protests after the 1963 constitutional changes, was founded by the Greek Cypriot political elite.

In contrast to those who do not want the communities to live amongst each other stands the opinion of a Greek Cypriot, who wants “to live and cooperate with the Turkish Cypriots.” This positive and cooperative view was shared by a Turkish Cypriot, who stated that he does not consider ‘identity’ to be important, as all people are human beings and thus equal. Even though the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* stresses this notion in its first Article – “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights” – it has been argued that consequence of the isolation is that “[a]ll humans in the world are equal but this is not the case in Cyprus.”

Several interviewees noted that their grandparents told them about the peaceful coexistence of Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Research conducted by Cyprus2015 has shown that Greek Cypriot displaced persons are more likely to talk to their children and grandchildren about “life at their original home” than Turkish Cypriots. The researchers concluded that “[a]mong Greek Cypriots, memories of life at their original home are almost uniformly viewed as very positive, whereas among Turkish Cypriot different groups report positive, neutral or negative memories of life at their original home.”

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419 GC Interviewee VII.
420 GC Interviewee III.
422 “About Us.”
423 “Investigating the Future.”
The stories the interviewees’ grandparents had told illustrated that although there had been religious and cultural differences between the communities, Greek and Turkish Cypriots lived together in peace before the 1960s. This underlined the image drawn by by writers, such as Öztemir A. Ozkiour and Faidon Papadopoulos, who argued that despite prejudices, which derived from different education and history books, the people realized that they were all Cypriots.\footnote{Ozkiour, 31-32.; Papadopoulos.}

Although the memories of living together are generally considered to be positive, the prolonged division of the island has severely complicated the relations between the communities. The interviewees, who grew up with their grandparents’ stories of peaceful coexistence, found that the differences between the communities seem to have become to be too big to overcome and prevent the unification of the island today. In addition, one of the Greek Cypriot interviewees believed that both sides were getting used to the separation and people stopped to care. This opinion was shared by two other Turkish Cypriot interviewees, who underlined the lack of knowledge about the other and the danger this brings with it. One of them stated: “[e]veryone blames the other, without critically questioning the past or attempting to overcome it.”\footnote{TC Interviewee V.}

### Personal Observations

One interviewee repeatedly mentioned the effort Germans put into dealing with their nation’s actions after the Second World War. He stressed that throughout the past decades, Germans have ensured not to forget the horrors they, as a nation, brought onto others and themselves. Although the Cyprus Conflict can and should never be compared to World War II, I was struck when an interviewee used this instance to illustrate his point. I, being German myself, had always considered acknowledgement of my nation’s past to be part of my personal identity. After all, I believed and still believe in the German proverb “self-awareness is the first step towards amendment and thus towards change” (“Selbsterkenntnis ist der erste Schritt zur Besserung”).

Throughout my stay on Cyprus, I regularly came to witness how the conflict and a lack of reconciliation have shaped the lives and emotions of many young Greek Cypriots. Their hatred against Ankara and the Turks runs deep and prevents them from having discussions concerning the Cyprus Problem. Also, most of my Greek Cypriots friends have never and will never cross the Green Line until the conflict is resolved. The fact that I did cross, in order to conduct interviews as well as for sightseeing and traveling, was often
considered being treachery: I sat at their (GC) table and had their food, while simultaneously financing the enemy by shopping in their stores. Despite these protests, I continued living my life the way I saw fit. Although I was aware of the conflict and their objections, I did not believe that I was betraying my friends, when I reached out to the ‘other’ side.

The unwillingness to face the mistakes made in the past, as well as the existing and widening gap between the communities, is connected to othering. The process, which has been defined as “the discursive differentiation between us and them,” does not only underline the differences between the communities but also glorifies the us and rewrites history in a positive way.\(^\text{426}\) The differentiating memories and histories were illustrated by a Turkish Cypriot interviewee, who said: “[f]or Turkish Cypriots, the Cyprus Problem took place between 1963 and 1964. For Greek Cypriots the Cypriots problem began in 1974.”\(^\text{427}\)

As noted before, central aspect of othering is the application of negative stereotypes to the other and the glorification of the us. Yiannis Papadakis, Greek Cypriot and author of the book *Echoes from the Dead Zone: Across the Cyprus Divide*, described this process as follows:

We had grown up in Cyprus as the proudest of Greeks. As everyone knew, ancient Greeks were the original creators of civilization, the people who gave its light to the west. Ancient Greece and Rome, then Europe and the Enlightenment: that was the story of civilization…The other reason we were the truest Greeks, of course, was that we had suffered so much throughout history at the hands of the Turk. Our small island was centre stage for the eternal confrontation between the forces of good and evil, Greeks and Turks, civilization and barbarism…The fact that we lived in Cyprus, which according to contemporary borders was an independent state not part of Greece, was of no importance. Everyone knew that historically Cyprus had always been a Greek island.\(^\text{428}\)

The notion described by Papadakis was underlined by a Greek Cypriot interviewee, who described that, while growing up, the image of the ‘evil Turk,’ was engraved in her mind; her education had played a significant part in this development. It was not until she stayed abroad for years, that she realized “that not all Greek Cypriots are good and all Turks are evil.”\(^\text{429}\) Yiannis Papadakis described experiencing the same during a visit to Istanbul:


\(^{427}\) TC Interviewee V.

\(^{428}\) Papadakis, *Echoes from the Dead Zone: Across the Cyprus Divide*: 4.

\(^{429}\) GC Interviewee VI.
I had never been so fascinated by people. There was nothing extraordinary about them at all. That was the most extraordinary thing. That people in Turkey looked like… well, like people. There were people in Turkey, not just men, or warriors, all kinds of people. Sitting there I felt numbed by the force of that discovery.\textsuperscript{430}

The rational notion that a coin always has two sides and that the communities might be closer related to each other than they pretend to be was underlined by a Turkish Cypriot. He stated that he has positive memories of Greek Cypriots while growing up, even though his grandmothers had told him stories about the vicious Greek Cypriots. Also, he stressed that his own people had done wrongs as well; “people told me they killed us, but I know we also killed them – it was a war.”\textsuperscript{431}

It can be concluded, that, once more, the Greek and Turkish Cypriot community are internally divided. While there are those on both sides of the divide, who want to cooperate and live together with the other, others do not want the other to live among our people. In the middle are those, who, even though they would like a solution, do not believe in a settlement.

\begin{itemize}
\item Do you feel threatened by the other?
\end{itemize}

Since the 1975 ethnic cleansing, the north and the south of Cyprus have been almost entirely mono-ethnic; in 2001, only about 1000 Turkish Cypriots lived in the south of the island.\textsuperscript{432} The responses from the Greek and Turkish interviewees to the question whether they feel threatened by the other will be analyzed and discussed in this section.

Two Turkish Cypriot interviewees, who have been living in the south since long before the opening of the crossings in 2003, have been repeatedly threatened in the past – one by both Greek and Turkish Cypriots – because they chose to live and work in the south. Despite these threats, however, one interviewee stressed that he felt, in different ways, at home on both sides of the divide. He stated: “[i]f I felt threatened, I would think about going somewhere else. If you stay, it means the situation is bearable, normal or good.”\textsuperscript{433}

It has been argued that the (imagined) existence of a threat leads to the demonization of the other, however, it might be expected that the majority of the Greek Cypriot interviewees stressed that they felt insecure and threatened by Turkey and the presence of the Turkish troops on the island; one Greek Cypriot interviewee also considered the police force and government, which are associated with Ankara’s power, to be intimidating.\textsuperscript{434} The north

\textsuperscript{430} Papadakis, \textit{Echoes from the Dead Zone: Across the Cyprus Divide}: 9.
\textsuperscript{431} GC Interviewee VI.; TC Interviewee VII.
\textsuperscript{433} TC Interviewee IV.
\textsuperscript{434} Van Houtum, Strüver, 142.
of the island has been defined as “one of the most densely militarized areas in the world.”

The number of Turkish soldiers on Cyprus, equipped with the newest military weapons and gear, is estimated to be between 35,000 and 40,000. In 2006, which are the latest numbers available, the Turkish troops comprised of the following:

- The 39th Mechanized Infantry Division
- The 28th Mechanized Infantry Division
- The 14th Armoured Brigade
- The Mechanized Infantry Regiment of the Turkish Force in Cyprus
- The Special Forces Regiment
- The artillery regiment
- The naval component

While the Greek Cypriots experience the presence of the Turkish armies as a threat, two Turkish Cypriots interviewees expressed their belief that the troops protect the Turkish Cypriot community. It has to be noted, however, that only one of these interviewees said that he felt actually threatened by the Greek Cypriots.

A United Nations representative, who was interviewed for the purpose of this research, asserted that the situation on the island would escalate without the presence of the UN troops. This notion was affirmed in the Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus of May 31, 2011. Even though the Secretary-General reported that “the number of military violations committed by the National Guard and the Turkish forces [decreased, H.O.] in comparison with the previous reporting period,” he also noted that “[t]he increase in civilian activities was accompanied by an increase in incidents caused by civilians, including passive resistance and belligerence; contesting, and often disregarding.” In response to the Secretary-General’s Report, the Security Council urged “all sides to avoid any action which could lead to an increase in tension, undermine the progress achieved so far, or damage the goodwill on the island.”

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437 “Letter dated 21 February 2007 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General.”


argued that the fear that the situation would escalate in case of the withdrawal of UN troops is justified.

Even though Turkey and its troops are considered to be a threat, all Greek Cypriot interviewees stated that they do not feel threatened by the Turkish Cypriots. Thus, they differentiated between the Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish settlers. It has to be noted that a Greek Cypriot interviewee did note that although the Turkish Cypriots are not a threat, she considers them to be a ‘foreign body’ on the island.

Over the past years there have been several minor instances of inter-communal violence in Nicosia and its surrounding areas. Most of these incidents took place during or after sports games between Greek and Turkish (Cypriot) teams. An instance was after the basketball match between the Greek Cypriot team APOEL FC Nicosia and the Turkish team Pinar Karsiyaka on December 21, 2011; Greek Cypriot supporters attacked Turkish Cypriot fans and tried to get to Pinar Karsiyaka’s dressing room. As friends of a Turkish Cypriot interviewee have been involved in such violent incidents with Greek Cypriots, the interviewee stated that he felt insecure and vulnerable at times. Another Turkish Cypriot interviewee noted that he feels only threatened when the Greek Cypriots were aware that he is a Turk.

In strong contrast to the number of interviewees who feel (sometimes) threatened, is the number of Greek and Turkish Cypriots who do not feel threatened at all; this group consists of a small minority of the Cypriot interviewees. This underlines that the times in which Greek and Turkish Cypriots lived side by side are long gone. The mistrust between the two communities, which was created by (recent) historical events, runs deep.

To summarize this section’s findings in Yiannis Papadakis’ words: “the island is united by a mutual fear and mistrust.” Even though the Greek Cypriot interviewees do not feel threatened by the Turkish Cypriots, the majority considers Ankara and the presence of the Turkish troops to be intimidating and threatening. Whereas there are a few Turkish Cypriot interviewees who believe that the deployed Turkish armies protect their security, there remain those, including UN representatives, who believe that the withdrawal of UNFICYP would lead to renewed eruptions of violence.

What is your opinion of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus?

Three days after the TRNC’s declaration of independence on November 15, 1983, the United Nations Security Council infused the new ‘state’ with meaning by passing Resolution


441 Papadakis, Echoes from the Dead Zone: 1.
541 (1983). In the document, the Council expressed its concern regarding the declaration and proclaimed the founding of a Turkish Cypriot entity in northern Cyprus to be illegal. Since the TRNC did not withdraw its declaration and continuously asserted its statehood through flags (see Picture 4.1) and other nationalistic symbols, it violated not only Resolution 541 (1983) but has been isolated by the international community, with exception of Turkey, ever since.442

The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus can be seen as a violation of the Treaty of Westphalia, as the Republic of Cyprus’ unity of “sovereignty, territory and the state” is violated by the presence of the Turkish Cypriot ‘state.’443 As the Republic of Cyprus became a member of the European Union in 2004, the area covered by the TRNC is can be seen as occupied EU territory. Because of the Turkish presence, the Republic of Cyprus is not able to exercise effective control over its land.444

![Picture 4.1: A common sight in northern Cyprus: the two flags are always side by side](image)

The area covered by the TRNC is internationally considered to be part of the Republic of Cyprus, as the TRNC is not a country, i.e. does not exist. This notion was shared by the majority of the Greek Cypriot interviewees, as well as by two Turkish Cypriots, the Fulbright scholar, and the UN representatives, one of whom referred to Protocol 10 of the Treaty of

443 Stuart, 8, 9.
444 Stuart, 8, 9.
445 Odenthal, A common sight in northern Cyprus: the two flags are always side by side, 2012, photograph.
Accession of the Republic of Cyprus. In this document, the European Union, following the Republic’s accession, suspended the acquis communautaire “in those areas of the Republic of Cyprus in which the Government of the Republic of Cyprus does not exercise effective control.”

Despite the lack of international recognition, it has been argued that the Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence can be described as an attempt to underline already “existing differences in space and identity” on the island. According to a poll conducted by Cyprus2015, 92% of the Greek Cypriot community considers itself to have Greek cultural roots, whereas 88% of the Turkish Cypriots considers themselves to have Turkish cultural roots. Cyprus2015 concluded that:

For both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, the modal response is to self-identify as Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot, as opposed to more exclusive ethnic or national identities. Significantly, few Greek Cypriots consider themselves Greek only. A significant number of Greek Cypriots claim to be Cypriot only. By contrast, Turkish Cypriot responses clustered around Turkish Cypriot identity. Relatively few considered themselves Cypriot only.

These significant discrepancies in self-identification between the two Cypriot communities clearly illustrate that “[n]ational identity is not cut and dry.”

Despite the fact that the Turkish Cypriots interviewees are aware of the non-recognized status of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus – the majority does not consider the TRNC to be an independent nation either – there were only few who denounced the de facto state. In contrast, the establishment of the TRNC was repeatedly mentioned as the way the Turkish Cypriot community chose to reorganize their lives after they were no longer represented by the government of the Republic of Cyprus following the events of 1963-1964.

In addition, one Turkish Cypriot stressed that the TRNC secured the existence of the Turkish Cypriots against the threat from the south.

The Turkish Cypriots interviewees acknowledged the influence Turkey has on their ‘country’ and its existence. Turkey’s importance for the ‘protection’ of the Turkish Cypriot people was illustrated by a Cyprus2015 poll, which showed that the “Turkish Cypriots display

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446 Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the European Union is founded - Protocol No 10 on Cyprus.
447 Van Houtum and Van Naerssen.
449 Ibid.
450 Non-Cypriot Interviewee II.
a high level of trust towards the [Turkish, H.O.] Army." In contrast to this trust in the Turkish Army was “a moderate to high level of trust towards the [Turkish Cypriot, H.O.] Government, the Judiciary and the Police, a moderate level of trust towards the religious authorities, and a low level of trust towards the political parties.”

Due to the significant influence that Turkey has on the TRNC, it was argued by the vast majority of the Cypriot interviewees that northern Cyprus is not an independent country, but subordinate to Ankara. One of the interviewees expressed his dislike towards the fact that the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus does not only represent the Turkish Cypriots, but also Ankara. Several Greek Cypriots underlined and added to this notion by describing northern Cyprus as a Turkish – illegally established – entity.

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**Personal Observations**

When visiting the northern part of Nicosia, it is hard to ignore the Turkish influence. Not only are the signs and flags different, but also the food, the spices, and the sounds on the street: the Turkish language and the call of the muezzin are almost nowhere to be heard in the southern quarters of the country’s capital. In addition to these obviously differentiating cultural aspects, the economic discrepancies between the two sides of the divide are more than clear.

While the roads in the south of the island can (generally) be considered to be very good, many streets in the north (outside the cities) are still under construction. When my friends and I decided to drive up to the north easternmost point of Cyprus, Cape Apostolos Andreas (see Picture 4.2), there were many situations during which we were bouncing in our seats and most happy to be in a four-wheel drive. Do not get me wrong, I strongly believe the nature in northern Cyprus is more beautiful than in the south, as it is largely untouched by humans, but it is clear that the south is economically much stronger than the north.

Although the economic differences between the two sides of the divide are of course related to the non-recognized status of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, I came to have a hard time to personally recognize the north of Cyprus as an independent country. Two of the most telling moments, which stressed this notion, took place when I visited a ministry of the TRNC for one of my interviews. Once the obligatory passport and ‘visa’ check at the ‘border’ was completed, I soon came to realize that it was surprisingly complicated to find a taxi driver, who knew where to take me. Language, however, was not the problem at stake:

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451 “Investigating the Future.”
452 “Investigating the Future.”
453 For safety reasons of the interviewee, his name, title, as well as his employer will not be disclosed.
people simply did not know where the ministry is. Startled by this observation, I climbed into the taxi, which supposedly knew where to take me but ended up driving me to the wrong location.

In the end, I found the right building for the interview; yet, my surprise did not stop at this point. Although the building could have been grand and stately, the grass in its garden was almost knee high, the trees looked wild, and the paint on the walls was crumbling down. Once I had established that the main entrance was closed and the search of the actual entry to the building was completed, I found myself standing in front of a small, gloom backdoor. Due to a lack of doorman, I strayed through the building for ca. 15 minutes before I arrived at my destination. As I have visited and worked at several Dutch ministries, the circumstances, under which I reached my meeting point, made me strongly doubt whether the authorities of the TRNC can be considered to be a government.

454 Odenthal, Enormous flags on Cyprus’ north-easternmost point - Cape Apostolos Andreas in Greek, Cape Victory in Turkish, 2012, photograph.
The trauma the division between the Cypriot communities has caused was underlined by the failure of the Annan Plan in 2004. As a consequence to the increased disillusionment, a Turkish Cypriot interviewee noted that he increasingly came to accept the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as a state – which needs democratic reforms – as well as his home. Even though the interviewee had believed in a solution prior to April 2004, he no longer has faith in a federal solution, as a settlement has to come from within the conflicting communities. He considers a compromise acceptable for both sides to be unfeasible.

As the area covered by the Turkish Cypriot ‘state’ is internationally considered to be part of the Republic of Cyprus, the TRNC is not a country, i.e. does not exist, but territory of a European Union member state that is occupied by a foreign force. This notion was shared by the majority of the Greek Cypriot interviewees, as well as by two Turkish Cypriots, the Fulbright scholar, and the UN representatives, one of whom referred to Protocol 10 of the Treaty of Accession of the Republic of Cyprus. In this document, the European Union, following the Republic’s accession, suspended the acquis communautaire “in those areas of the Republic of Cyprus in which the Government of the Republic of Cyprus does not exercise effective control.”

It can be concluded that despite of the fact that the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is not an internationally recognized country, a view stressed by all Greek Cypriots and international interviewees; there are voices within the Turkish Cypriot community that consider it to be their home. Even though not all Turkish Cypriot interviewees agree with this notion, the analysis has shown, that disillusionment and the lack of a solution can turn believers of a united Cyprus into people who come to love what they have: the unrecognized Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which protects their interests and wellbeing.

What is the Green Line; is it a border?

David Newman once wrote: “the specific course of the Green Line is not sacrosanct, nor is its international legal status clear.” The question whether the Green Line is a border or not, is indeed considered to be highly controversial. Consequently, the Fulbright scholar, as well as several Greek and Turkish Cypriot interviewees, described the Green Line on Cyprus by using terms such as physical demarcation of space, division line, and demarcation line.
Adhering to these definitions, a Turkish Cypriot interviewee described the Green Line as “a line that separates two sides, waiting for a solution.”

### Personal Observations

Before I turn to the discussion and analysis of the interviews and literature, it is important to mention that my personal understanding of what the Green Line is was in large shaped by the fact that my home during my stay on Cyprus was on the demarcation line itself (see Picture 4.3 and Map 4.1). Every day, I saw the area that separates the two Cypriot communities. Every day, I saw the Greek Cypriot guards and their rifles, protecting the south from a Turkish attack. In addition to these experiences, my opinion was strongly influenced by my three visits into the demarcation line: in January 2012 during an excursion with Radboud University and during the time I conducted research for this study. The latter two visits, to the old Nicosia Airport and to the village of Variseia, will be described in this section.

![Picture 4.3: Left: Buffer zone. Right in the back: Student Hostel](image)

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457 TC Interviewee IV.

As noted in the Literature Review on this thesis, the Green Line has a constantly changing nature and it passed through several phases. While it was possible to cross the Green Line between 1963 and 1974, the demarcation line was sealed between 1974 and 2003. Barely anyone was able to cross to the other side. Although the cross points have been opened since 2003, the Green Line continues to exist until it “may be reimposed at a future date under the terms of a permanent territorial solutions.”

The Green Line does not have the legal status of a border, as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is not considered to be an existing country, but a violation of international law and an illegally established entity on land that belongs to the Republic of Cyprus. Consequently, the international community considers the northern shores of the island, rather than the Green Line, to be the border of the Republic of Cyprus and thus of the European Union. Whilst both UN representatives, as well as the majority of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot interviewees, rejected the belief that the Green Line is a border, a Turkish Cypriot underlined this by arguing that the division line cannot be a border, as it separates conflicting parties, not nations.

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As noted in the Literature Review on this thesis, the Green Line has a constantly changing nature and it passed through several phases. While it was possible to cross the Green Line between 1963 and 1974, the demarcation line was sealed between 1974 and 2003. Barely anyone was able to cross to the other side. Although the cross points have been opened since 2003 and the Green Line’s resemblance with a border increased significantly as people are able to cross from one side to the other, the buffer zone will continue to exist until it “may be reimposed at a future date under the terms of a permanent territorial solution.”

The differentiating opinions concerning the Green Line begin with its point of establishment; not all Cypriots share the same understanding of when the division between their communities began. This became evident when one Turkish Cypriot noted that the unofficial establishment of the Green Line took place in 1956. In contrast to this belief, however, research has shown that until Christmas 1963, Greek and Turkish Cypriots lived in relative peace among each other. However, following the events of 1963 and the subsequent signing of the Green Line Agreement on December 30, 1963 and the establishment of the cease-fire line, approximately 500 Greek Cypriots and 25,000 Turkish Cypriots were forced to leave their homes. While the conflict continued to escalate, the majority of the Turkish Cypriot community – often forced by their own people – moved into enclaves that consisted of three percent of the island’s surface; the transition of the population distribution between 1946, 1960, and 1973 is illustrated by Map 4.2.
Throughout the Cyprus Problem, the United Nations has played a significant role in the process of bordering. As early as March 1964, UNFICYP troops were deployed on Cyprus in order to maintain and ensure “international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting [between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities] and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions.”\textsuperscript{465} Despite the presence of international soldiers, the conflict continued to escalate and the Greek Cypriot authorities put “an economic embargo on the Turkish-Cypriot enclaves, which increasingly developed the capacity to manage their affairs and defend themselves with Turkish military assistance.”\textsuperscript{466}

\textsuperscript{464} Hadjilyra.
As a consequence to the developments in the 1960s, the Greek Cypriot community dominated 97 percent of the island, which meant that they hardly noticed the separation in their everyday life. By 1970, less than 10 percent of all villages were shared by Greek and Turkish Cypriots. It has therefore been argued that, even though the Green Line had existed in Nicosia since the events of 1963, it was not until the Turkish invasion in 1974 and the occupation of approximately 37 percent of the island that the division of the island became ‘real’ for the Greek Cypriot community.

A Turkish Cypriot interviewee stressed that the island’s division became part of the Turkish Cypriot experience and everyday reality in 1964. In line with his argument, the majority of the Turkish Cypriot interviewees pinpointed the establishment of the Green Line at 1963-64. Even though it might be correct that the Greek Cypriot community did not ‘notice’ the Green Line until after the division of the entire island – two Greek and two Turkish Cypriots as well as a Fulbright scholar believed it came into being in 1974 – half of the Greek Cypriot interviewees stated that the line was established in 1963-64. As two Greek Cypriots did not know when the Green Line was established, the division in knowledge concerning the point of establishment of the buffer zone is underlined.

Another point, on which the opinions differ significantly, is the question whether the existence of the Green Line is beneficial to the Cypriot people. A Greek Cypriot and a United Nations representative strongly believed that the buffer zone ensures the peace between the communities. A Turkish Cypriot interviewee added to this opinion that, because the Green Line provides security and prevents the eruption of violence, it can be considered to be a border. These notions have been strongly contested, as it has been repeatedly argued that the presence of the Green Line is a symbol of political failure and for the impotence of living together – as stressed by a Turkish Cypriot – and therefore, as a Greek Cypriot stated, an obstacle to peace itself.

The view that the division of the island as well as the ongoing and seemingly everlasting character conflict is a problem in itself was underlined by the Fulbright scholar. The scholar noted that “[t]he Green Line is the physical and psychological scar on the entire island” (see Picture 4.4). In line with this view was the statement of an interviewee who described the division line as a mental border, which cannot be crossed until the conflict is resolved.

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467 Fisher, 310.
468 Non-Cypriot Interviewee II.
While the Green Line was established as a cease-fire line, members from both communities noted that the persistence of the status quo has led to the establishment of a *de facto* border. Thus, the division line resembles a border, but “separates the *de facto* state [the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, H.O.] from the rest of the territory governed by the central authorities [the Republic of Cyprus, H.O.].”\(^{470}\) However, although the Green Line appears like a border to some extent, it is often times not “a site through which socio-spatial differences are communicated.”\(^{471}\) To the contrary, as the interaction and the communication in itself between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities is minimal, the Green Line can be considered to be the representation of “the socio-spatially constructed differences between cultures/categories.”\(^{472}\)

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\(^{469}\) Odenthal, *Stairway to...? – Stairs leading towards a hotel that was never built*, 2012, photograph.

\(^{470}\) Francis, 31.


\(^{472}\) Ibid., 672.
Even though a Greek Cypriot agreed with the view that the Green Line is a *de facto* border, he differentiated slightly and pointed out that, due to the extensive economic and military support from Turkey, the Green Line is in effect a border with Turkey. According to Ankara and the official Turkish Cypriot interpretation, the Green Line is a border between the independent Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and the Republic of Cyprus. In line with this view, a Turkish Cypriot interviewee stressed the TRNC’s sovereignty and noted that the Green Line “is a border, as it is the line where the jurisdiction of one state ends and the jurisdiction of another starts.”

An essential aspect of what the Green Line is is tied to the territorial ownership of the area. The ownership of the buffer zone has been challenged and disputed ever since the final cease-fire line came into being, although “[n]either of the two sides can exercise sovereignty within the Green Line.” This continuously contested status of the buffer zone and the differentiating opinions between as well as within the conflicting parties concerning the subject will now be discussed and illustrated by (the answers of) several Cypriots, as well as by a UN representative and the Fulbright scholar.

The first opinion issued during the interviews was that the Green Line is not part of a country, but that it belongs to Greek Cypriot individuals. Even though the buffer zone is used for farming, civil activities, and at times even housing, no documentation can be found that it belongs solely to the Greek Cypriot community. According to the UN, “UNFICYP facilitates civilian use of the buffer zone for peaceful purposes, such as agricultural work, maintenance of public utilities and communications, and the construction of commercial and residential buildings.” Thus, the area can be used by Turkish Cypriots.

The UNFICYP website clearly indicates that activities within the buffer zone are not allowed “without prior approval, except within specially designated Civil Use Areas.” UNFICYP differentiates between three different kinds of permits: for construction, for farming, and for short-term access into the buffer zone. While parts of the Green Line are thus privately used, other areas still contain minefields, can only be accessed by UNFICYP, or “are British Retained Areas, which have the same status as the SBAs.”

The second view is that, as the UN administers the buffer zone and UNFICYP and the UN Police (UNPOL) maintain the status quo between the conflicting communities, the Green

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473 TC Interviewee VI.
474 TC Interviewee V.
476 Ibid.
478 Non-Cypriot Interviewee III.
Line is owned by the United Nations. This idea was strongly contested by a UN representative, as well as a Greek and a Turkish Cypriot. They rightly argued that United Nations does not claim ownership of the area but ensures that the status quo of the Green Line is not violated by either side (see Picture 4.5). According to the UNFICYP website, “[t]he buffer zone exists to prevent renewed hostilities between the opposing forces in the Cyprus conflict.” A Turkish Cypriot noted that the UN administration and supervision of the territory will continue until a solution is found.

![UN sign, indicating where the Buffer Zone begins.](480)

Yet another opinion on the ownership of the Green Line, which was expressed by a Turkish Cypriot, is that it changed over time, but that it belongs to civil society today. Although it is correct that the boundaries of the buffer zone changed slightly over time, and several parts have become accessible for civilian use, most parts of its limits have remained the same since its establishment. Also, even though the civil societies on both sides of the divide have played a significant role during the peace process, the notion that the Green Line belongs to civil society was not supported by any other evidence found.

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479 “Buffer Zone Permits.”
480 Odenthal, *UN sign, indicating where the Buffer Zone begins*, 2012, photograph.
In contrast to any perceived ownership of the Green Line stands the belief, which was supported by three out of eight Greek Cypriot and four out of seven Turkish Cypriot interviewees, as well as by a Fulbright scholar, that the buffer zone is neutral territory. Words that were used to describe this status of the Green Line were abandoned by both sides, no-man’s-land, does not belong to anyone, people do not identify with it, and belongs to both sides or to none.

Closely related to the assumed neutrality of the area is the question whether **acquis communautaire** is suspended in the buffer zone. As the matter was never officially addressed by the European Union, the conflicting parties were able to create their own meanings and definitions. Although “[n]either of the two sides can exercise sovereignty within the Green Line,” there is no consensus on whether the **acquis communautaire** applies to the Green Line.\(^{481}\) If the acquis would not be suspended in the Green Line, this would imply that the area would not be neutral territory, but under the authorization of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus. The southern government considers the entire island, and thus also the Green Line, to be part of the Republic of Cyprus and thus to be under their effective control. Logically, this interpretation is also objected by the TRNC.

Could the Green Line be seen as the Agamben’s physical manifestation of the suspension of law? As noted before, Agamben’s “state of exception is neither internal nor external to the juridical order, and the problem of defining it concerns precisely a threshold, or a zone of indifference, where inside and outside do not exclude each other but rather blur with one another.”\(^{482}\) As the European Union did not define the areas which are under the effective control of the Republic of Cyprus and the conflicting parties do not agree on a definition, the Green Line was placed neither inside nor outside the judicial order. Rather, the buffer zone’s already complex status is blurred and complicated even more, while the exceptional status becomes the rule.

An entirely different approach towards what the Green Line is and who it belongs to, was shared by the two UN representatives, who described the buffer zone as a “**de facto** nature reserve” in which, due to the lack of human intervention, endangered species have the possibility to thrive\(^{483}\). This description, which indicates nature as the ‘owner’ of the buffer zone, is in line with information provided on the UNFICYP website, which notes that many

\(^{481}\) TC Interviewee V.
\(^{482}\) Humphreys, 679.
\(^{483}\) Non-Cypriot Interviewees I, III.
“areas are largely untouched by human activities.” The websites continue to describe those parts of the Green Line as follows:

Remnants of old villages, shops and other reminders of lives once lived are scattered throughout the zone. In old Nicosia, ‘new’ cars from the 1970s sit in an underground garage once owned by a car dealer. As Cyprus has experienced heady development, the buffer zone has remained a haven for flora and fauna, thriving on the near absence of hunters and most other human interference.

Dr. Anna Grichting, Assistant Professor at Qatar University and Board Member of Friends of Humanity, added to this description:

[T]his landscape has escaped the construction boom on both sides of the Green Line, meadows have recovered from the contamination with pesticides and artificial fertilizers, hillside forests have been preserved, and wildlife has been allowed to flourish.

These accounts of thriving flora and fauna are in strong contrast with the repeatedly made argument of the Green Line being an abandoned zone.

### Personal Observations

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<th>Personal Observations</th>
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<td>On June 22, 2012, I was able to enter the UN buffer zone and visit the old Nicosia Airport together with Nicolas Jarraud, UNDP Program Analyst, Sarah Borton, an American scholar, and Farah Thalji, an intern at UNDP. It felt surreal to be back at the airport, as, even though time seemingly stands still in the Green Line, it does not really do so. While we had been able to enter the old terminal in January, entering the building was strictly prohibited at this point, and all entrances were barred. Wind and weather are eroding the old airport, as none is allowed to maintain the buildings and nature is taking back what it once owned (see Picture 4.6).</td>
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485 Ibid.
Although my visit to the old Airport gave me an indication on how fast nature works, I was able to experience the thriving nature in the buffer zone first hand, when Dr. Salih Gücel, associate professor at Near East University, invited me on a trip to Variseia, an abandoned village located in the Green Line, near the town of Gailini. On June 12, 2012, the four of us – Salih, Nicolas Jarraud, Fiona Campbell, Earth Beat producer at Radio Netherlands Worldwide, and me – left Nicosia in the early morning. Throughout the day, Fiona was going to interview Salih and Nicolas on the buffer zone and a research project, in which the two researchers and their team had explored “what had happened to wildlife in this 180km long strip of land in the absence of man.” For several hours, we drove east, outside of the buffer zone, in a white UN four wheel truck, until we reached the Headquarters of Sector 1 and the Argentinian Contingent, at San Martin Camp, around noon (see Picture 4.7).

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The mountains around us appeared significantly higher and when we left San Martin Camp, we were escorted by two UN trucks – one upfront and one behind us – and eight UN soldiers. As our trucks kept climbing over dusty roads, we reached a blocked entrance to the buffer zone. A UN soldier removed the barbed wire roadblock and two others secured white UN flags on our trucks. These white flags are extremely important, as they show the watchful Greek and Turkish Cypriot soldiers that the trucks are inside the buffer zone with UN permission and do not violate the status quo; essentially, the flags prevent those inside the trucks from being shot at.

It felt surreal to walk around Variseia. The village has been uninhabited since 1974, when its inhabitants received a 24 hours’ notice to leave. Ever since, heat and moisture have eroded walls and ceilings of houses, and today, flowers grow in what once was someone’s bedroom. Signs of the lives people once led in the village are everywhere: a car; a shoe; a child’s drawing. Although the type of life for which these items are necessary is unlikely ever to return to Variseia, a different kind is thriving. BBC World Service described this phenomenon as follows: “There’s a village in the Mediterranean where animals such as the sheep-like Mouflon are never shooed out of the bar, herded out of a house, or prevented

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from having a rummage among the clothes, shoes and books that lay scattered among the rooms.\footnote{Duke.} In Variseia, nature has taken back in what it once owned (see Picture 4.8).

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Picture4.8.jpg}
\caption{We had kept a watchful eye throughout the entire day; however, it was not until we made our way back to the paved road outside the Green Line, that we finally spotted a mouflon (see Picture 4.9). Although these wild sheep, which are endemic to Cyprus, were once almost extinct, the species benefited from the absence of humans in the buffer zone, today, over 3000 roam through this uninhabited part of the island.\footnote{Sven Gunnar Simonsen, “Hares, birds and orchids: the casualties of peace in Cyprus,” The Independent, December 8, 2009, October 7, 2012. http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/nature/hares-birds-and-orchids-the-casualties-of-peace-in-cyprus-1836061.html.} As mouflons hide during the day, to avoid the heat, I was excited that we did manage to see one.}
\end{figure}
After discussing the Green Line with many different people and visiting the demarcation line myself, I came to the conclusion that the buffer zone is a controversial area in many different aspects. Officially, the demarcation line is part of the Republic of Cyprus and the European Union, as is the entire island (with exception of the territories that belong to the United Kingdom), and the area is administered to the United Nations. However, at the micro-level, each plot of land has an owner, who is a physical or legal person, organization or the Government.

During the interviews conducted for this research, it became clear that not only the point of its establishment is not agreed upon by all interviewees, but also the question whether it is a border and its territorial ownership. It can therefore be noted that the Green Line is a geographical space, which separates people with many different opinions and notions concerning the buffer zone, its status, and its function.

What is your understanding of the Cyprus Problem?

A UN representative stated that he believes that in essence, the Greek and Turkish Cypriots are not that different. As discussed earlier, this is historically speaking correct, as most Turkish Cypriots decent from to Islam converted Christians. In addition, it has to be

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stressed once more, that, as the term *Turkish Cypriots* was implemented by the British colonial powers, the decision to use this name was not made by the Cypriots themselves.\(^{495}\)

Besides addressing the fact that Greek and Turkish Cypriots are possibly not that different, the UN representative stressed that it is important to look at *why* the negotiations failed. The author Michális Stavrou Michael devoted an entire book to this complex question and argued that one of the reasons why no settlement has been found is that track one negotiations will not solve the Cyprus Problem, as this form of peace process does not involve the Cypriot people.\(^{496}\) This argument was underlined by the UN representative, who stressed that “all attempts suffered from democratic deficit in terms of inclusion of the wider public.”\(^{497}\) The Greek and Turkish Cypriot people do have the possibility to take part in the peace process as part of one of the many organizations on the island.

Following the rejection of the Annan Plan, it has been generally accepted that, in order to find a compromise and peace to prevail on Cyprus, the people on the street, as well as civil society, have to get a feeling of *ownership* for the proposed settlement. Consequently, the United Nations work continuously on bringing the parties together through bi-communal activities and events. It has become evident, however, that the process to make them understand why a reunion of the island and its people would be beneficial for both communities, has been slow.

The notion that a lack of contact between conflicting parties undermines the peace process is supported by Gordon W. Allport’s *contact theory* and Andrew M. Pettigrew’s *theory of change.*\(^{498}\) According to the theories, a lack of interaction between groups undermines the establishment of “emotional connections (*affective ties*) across the group divide.”\(^{499}\) Until today, peace advocates have failed “to create an environment in public opinion that…[made] it safe for political leaders to take risks for peace.”\(^{500}\) Consequently, false stereotypes about the other were never corrected.

While a UN representative questioned whether the term *conflict* is appropriate for an issue with a timespan as long as the Cyprus Problem’s, the interviewed Fulbright scholar the interviewed Fulbright scholar addressed the prevailing and ‘unmoving’ character of the dispute. Such conflicts, which have been defined as a *frozen conflict*, are considered to be

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\(^{495}\) Anthias and Ayres, 60.; *Bloody Truth*, 208.


\(^{497}\) Non-Cypriot Interviewee II.

\(^{498}\) Millar, “Track II and Third Party Diplomacy.”

\(^{499}\) Ibid.


situations “in which violent ethnopolitical conflict over secession has led to the establishment of a de facto regime that is not recognized by the international community nor the rump state from which the secession occurred.” The Fulbright scholar pointed out that, due to the seemingly never changing nature of the Cyprus Problem, it appeared time ‘stopped’ when violence erupted. Consequently, other essential, everyday issues are pushed off the political agendas.

Recently it has become evident, that the current political and economic issues of the Republic of Cyprus are forcing more pressing topics onto the current political agenda. For the first time since the Turkish invasion of 1974, presidential candidates are not able to solely focus on the Cyprus Problem, nationalism, and patriotism during the running up to the 2013 elections. The *CyprusMail* stressed this notion and wrote on August 19, 2012: “the Cyprus problem will be of no relevance or interest to voters, who will want to know how soaring unemployment will be tackled, how the rising cost of living will be checked, how the economy will be revived and how the state will be made solvent again.”

It can be stated that, according to the interviewees, one of the most significant reasons for the failure of the entire peace process on Cyprus was the lack of involvement of the Cypriot people. As neither Greek nor Turkish Cypriots felt ownership for the proposed settlements, they were not willing to embrace them. Consequently, the conflict froze and left the communities divided by geographical space and hatred. Due to this animosity and continuously stressed nationalism, pressing economic issues were generally ignored until today.

- Is the Green Line underlined or undermined by EU bilateralism?
- Should the EU end its financial support for northern Cyprus?

It has been repeatedly argued, also by an interviewed representative of the United Nations, that the European Union does not have much influence on Cyprus and thus on the conflict between the two communities. However, recent history has shown that Europe’s influence on the issue has increased substantially after the end of the Cold War. F. Stephen Larrabee, Distinguished Chair in European Security at the RAND Corporation, wrote: “[t]oday, the EU, not the US, holds most of the key cards in the Cyprus game,” as it “can

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deliver…a meaningful perspective on [Turkey’s, H.O.] EU membership.”

Thus, Larrabee argued, the European Union should “take the lead and develop a more coherent and innovative long-term strategy towards Turkey and Cyprus, one which recognizes the close link between the two issues.”

Instead of connecting these two issues, however, European policy makers, pressured by Greece, accepted the divided Cyprus as a member of the EU. Of course, it can be claimed that Turkey would have held Cyprus and the EU as hostages, if Greece had not put its weight behind the matter; however, by not making a solution a condition to EU accession, the interviewed Fulbright scholar argued, the peace process on the island was undermined. Although the accession negotiations gave the Turkish Cypriot community “an incentive to be more flexible,” Ankara hardened its position on the matter and took further measures to incorporate the TRNC into the Republic of Cyprus. In addition to establishing a financial and economic union between Turkey and the TRNC, Ankara began “to include Turkish Cypriots in Turkish delegations and missions abroad.”

When the Annan Plan was accepted by the Turkish Cypriots, the European Union sought to end the economic and political isolation of northern part of the island through several initiatives. It was believed that the economic as well as social development of the north would be advantageous for the peace process. The notion that economic (semi) equality would be beneficial to overcome the differences between the conflicting communities was supported by all three non-Cypriot interviewees. Consequently, the Aid Regulation, which offers financial support to the Turkish Cypriots, can be seen as a positive and stimulating initiative.

Thus, even though it has been argued that the European Union does not have a significant influence on the Cyprus Problem; it has become evident that the acceptance of the Republic of Cyprus as a member of the EU has deepened the gap between the two conflicting communities. Despite financial help from Brussels for northern Cyprus, Ankara continuously pulls the TRNC closer into its political and economic embrace, while the Republic of Cyprus seeks to underline the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots.

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504 Ibid., 27-28.
505 Ibid., 25, 26.
506 Ibid., 26.
Conclusion

This chapter focused on answering the main research questions by analyzing the data collected during the eighteen semi-structured interviews. An exploratory and descriptive research approach, based on the concepts and themes from the literature review, was used during the analysis of this case study. Thus, this analysis sought to answer the research questions through the objective opinions of the interviewees in combination with secondary literature.

Although it has been argued that the existing boundaries and division lines “are not necessarily translated into the collective and historical meanings that manifest themselves in the more general sociospatial consciousness and its concrete manifestations,” this chapter clearly showed that different perspectives of the Green Line and the division of Cyprus are vested in the collective memories and identities of the Cypriot communities. Opinions concerning the Green Line and the Cyprus Problem do not only differ between members of the two conflicting communities, but also within them. This chapter analyzed the differentiating views with regards to when the buffer zone was established, whether the existence of the Green Line is beneficial to the Cypriot people, and the ownership of the area.

Newman and Paasi, 198.
Chapter V: Conclusions and Recommendations

Introduction

This final chapter presents and analyzes the most important discoveries of this study and discusses what we can learn from the findings. Following a brief explanation of the study’s goal and the research objectives, the research methodology and design will be revisited shortly. Next, the research questions are answered by discussing and examining the findings of this study and linking them to the theories and notions presented in the literature review. Subsequently, several recommendations are made, which are followed by suggestions for further study. This thesis concludes with the limitations of this research and a summary of this chapter.

It is important to note that, even though extensive research has been conducted on the Cyprus Problem, there has been a limited research carried out on what the Green Line is based on the views of different people. A possible explanation for this nonexistence has not been found in any academic references; however, it might be related to premature assumptions and conclusions on behalf of researchers; while many people do not consider the Green Line to be a border, as it is not internationally recognized, most Turkish Cypriots believe in the independence of their country.

Despite the absence of data and information, it has to be stressed that more extensive research on peoples’ perceptions of the Green Line could turn out to be a positive contribution to the understanding of the ‘other’ and thus the peacemaking process on the island. This study has shown that many people do not have a fixed opinion on what the Green Line is.

Research goal and objectives

The goal of this ontological study was to identify how the actors involved in the Cyprus Problem perceived the Green Line in 1963, 1974, 2004, and 2012. In addition, the research sought to identify if, why, and how these perceptions changed over time. The aim was to acquire a better understanding of what the Green Line was and what it is today, according to those living with its presence every day.

Research methodology and design

In order to gain a better understanding of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot perceptions and views of the Green Line, this study was based on a quantitative research approach and the non-positivist research paradigm phenomenology. The holistic overview of the research subject was ensured by the quantitative approach, while the paradigm enabled the collection,
discussion, as well as the analysis of data, peoples’ views and perceptions. In addition to a literature review and my own observations, interviews were used in order to collect data.

Throughout the process, interviews were conducted with 18 individuals (8 Greek Cypriots, 7 Turkish Cypriots, 2 UN representatives, 1 American Fulbright Scholar). While the questionnaire for the Cypriots consisted of 20 questions, the questionnaire for the UN representatives and the scholar consisted of 12 questions; several questions on both questionnaires had sub questions.

Finder

This section will present the findings, which result from the analysis of the literature and the empirical data collected during the interviews. During the course of this research project, a deeper insight into the division of the Cypriot communities, the (changing historical) significance of the demarcation line, and influence of foreign powers in the conflict is achieved. What can we learn from the new insights?

The Green Line: 1963

The establishment of the Green Line and the division of the Cypriot communities was closely tied to the interests of foreign nations, mainly the United Kingdom and the United States. Great Britain vigorously sought to maintain its colonial influence on the island and it implemented its divide and rule policy between 1955 and 1967, which successfully alienated the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The United States, on the other hand, wanted to undermine President Makarios’ ties with the Soviet Union in order to prevent a communist invasion of the island. Consequently, as the partition of Cyprus and its communities was deemed to be the best solution, it was actively supported by the foreign powers.

When the Green Line was established as a buffer zone between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, it was, unlike today, not a vast area, but barriers around enclaves. As the 1963 Green Line consisted of passable British and UN roadblocks, rather than kilometers of empty land between communities, the question to whom the Green Line belonged, was not relevant.

The Green Line: 1974

Throughout the entire Cold War, Washington had a significant influence on the politics of countries in the Western World and thus on the maintenance of the Green Line. Although Athens never officially supported the division of the Mediterranean island, it was due to clear orders from Greece, to not fight the Turkish troops, that the 1974 invasion succeeded. Turkey, proclaiming to protect the interests of the Turkish Cypriots, had always
supported the division of the Cypriot communities. Therefore, the 1974 coup d’état was but a political justification for Ankara’s military intervention, as it enabled Turkey to create a political and cultural foothold on the island.

Following the events of 1974, the Green Line became an extended, approximately 180 kilometer long, nearly impenetrable buffer zone, which was to prevent a new eruption of violence between the communities. Although the area, which now covered about 3 percent of the island’s surface, was administered by the United Nations, the UN did not claim ownership of the land. The Green Line, like the entire island, was seen as part of the Republic of Cyprus, as the international community considered the Turkish occupation of the northern territories to be illegal. Thus, officially, the Green Line is not recognized as a border and, like the entire island, considered to be part of the Republic of Cyprus.

**Green Line: 2004**

Following the end of the Cold War, the separation of the Cypriot communities and the division of the island was no longer beneficial to foreign governments. However, this essential change of power dynamics and the strong international support for the 2004 Annan Plan were undermined by domestic authorities from both sides of the Green Line, who reached across the divide in order to ensure the failure of the proposal. The rejection of the Plan was therefore not just a mere Greek Cypriot no, but also the result of a Greek and Turkish Cypriot political strategy, designed by politicians, who preferred the continued existence of the Green Line and the separation of the communities.

In 2003, just a year before the Annan Plan referendum, the unrecognized authorities of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus opened several checkpoints along the Green Line. For the first time in decades, the division line, the line between us and them was no longer impassable. In addition, the resemblance between the Green Line and a border increased, as people were finally able to cross freely and interact with the other.

When the entire island of Cyprus became a member of the European Union, the Cyprus conflict became a European problem. As no solution was found in time and the EU had not made a solution a precondition to the island’s accession, the *acquis communautaire* was suspended “in those areas of the Republic of Cyprus in which the Government of the Republic of Cyprus does not exercise effective control.”

Although the entire island became part of the European Union, the suspension of the *acquis* enabled questions concerning which

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508 Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the European Union is founded - Protocol No 10 on Cyprus.
areas are considered to be under the effective control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.

As the European Union has never formulated an official answer to the question whether *acquis* is suspended in the buffer zone, the conflicting parties were able to apply their own meaning to the area. As no consensus was reached on the matter, the Green Line was placed inside, yet also outside the judicial order; it is now located on “a threshold, or a zone of indifference, where inside and outside do not exclude each other but rather blur with one another.” Consequently, it can be argued that the existence of the Green Line and its complex status was underlined in 2004. The exceptional status, which the buffer zone had had until this point, became the rule and the Green Line became the “physical manifestation of the suspension of the law.”

Green Line: 2012

Between the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus and today, the official status of the Green Line has not changed: it is a buffer zone, administered by the UN, between the Turkish Occupied Area and the areas controlled by the government of the Republic of Cyprus. As the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is not an internationally recognized country, the areas it covers, as well as the Green Line, are considered to be part of the Republic of Cyprus.

Despite these internationally recognized facts, however, this research has shown that some Greek and Turkish Cypriots have opinions that challenge the official view. Also, it has to be noted that there is no consensus among as well as between the communities with regards to what the Green Line is. The most essential findings of this study are summarized below:

Throughout this study it has become increasingly clear that borders are only partially created by the hands and in the minds of people: a border is what people believe it or want it to be. However, it is even more so what the international community wants it to be. Its presence and existence is given meaning by the interpretations of people, yet, also by international laws and regulations. The Cypriot people are caught in the history of the island and what the Green Line is to an interviewee depends to a large extend on the individual’s background; the personal context plays an essential role in the individual’s perception of Cyprus’ demarcation line. Consequently, the Green Line is many things: it is a nature reserve for nearly extinct flora and fauna; it is a cease-fire line and a buffer zone between conflicting communities; it is a mental border, which cannot be crossed by some until the conflict is

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509 Humphreys, 679.
510 Ramadan, 157.
resolved; it is a *de facto* border with Turkey, due of Ankara’s omnipresence in northern Cyprus; it is a *de facto* border with a *de facto* state; it is a division between *us* and *them*.

Although it differs greatly to individuals what the Green Line is, it has become clear that their notion, and thus the process of bordering, is strongly influenced by the values of the international community. The vast majority of the interviewees did *not* consider the Green Line to be a border. Essential role in this non-definition is played by the international community’s non-recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as an independent country.

In contrast to the internationally recognized idea concerning the ownership of the Green Line, stands the belief that the Green Line is not part of a country. While the Green Line, like the entire island, is officially seen as part of the Republic of Cyprus, the majority of the interviewees considers the buffer zone to be neutral territory. Until a solution to the Cyprus Problem is found, the area will be administered by the United Nations.

It has to be noted that it often does not matter whether a *border* or a *country* is *official* or merely *mental*; a term does not alter the reality. During the interviews with members of the Turkish Cypriot community it became clear that they are aware that the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is not internationally recognized. While several interviewees agreed or opposed this, it was also noted that the continuous frustrations and disappointments, which derive from the lack of progress in the peacemaking process, have led to the realization that the TRNC *is* the reality; the *abstract* country it has become the home they live in.

**Conclusion – The Green Line: a *Space of Exception* or an *Exceptional Space*?**

It can be concluded that the passing of time has turned the Green Line on Cyprus into an entity that goes beyond what Giorgio Agamben described as a *space of exception*. While Agamben’s theory focusses on the space’s sovereignty and contradictory status, this study showed that the Green Line on Cyprus is characterized by more than that. The buffer zone is a contested space, which has been maintained and allegedly claimed by different actors.

The Green Line is a complex geographical entity, which was at different points in time *wanted*, *created*, and *maintained* by members of the international community, as well as by the Greek and Turkish Cypriot authorities and the governments of their motherlands. Over the past decades, the Green Line, which was originally established as a temporary solution after the eruption of violence between the conflicting communities, has become indistinguishable from the ‘normal.’ Although the existence of the Green Line is no longer an exception, but the rule, since the divided island became a member of the European Union, and an integrated part
of the Cypriot reality, its presence does not comply with the Westphalian system of political order.

The Green Line on Cyprus is not and has never been a recognized border between two sovereign nation states. Firstly, the process of bordering is strongly dominated by the values of the international community, which created the Green Line, but never recognized the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as an independent nation; the only internationally acceptable outcome of the Cyprus Problem is the seemingly impossible reunion of Cyprus and its communities. Secondly, borders are social and societal constructs, which are partially created by the hands and in the minds of people; yet, this study has shown that only a minority of the Cypriot interviewees considers the Green Line to be a border. Like the international community, the majority defines it as the neutral territory between a non-existent state, a territory dependent on Ankara, and the Republic of Cyprus.

Despite the international non-recognition and the general consensus between the majorities of both communities concerning the nature of the Green Line, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus continues to exist. Over the past decades, the Turkish armies have occupied the northern 37 percent of the island, seeking to protect the people of a de facto state that considers the buffer zone to be its border. As a consequence of the occupation, issues of continuously challenged perceived and alleged sovereignty arise.

The 2004 rejection of the Annan Plan by the overwhelming Greek Cypriot OXI (no) increased the complexity of the Green Line’s status, as it reestablished the existence of the demarcation line and the perpetuation of the Turkish occupation. While the Republic of Cyprus continues to regard the entire island as its territory, the European Union maintained the existence of the buffer zone when it failed to define the exact areas in which the authorities of the Republic of Cyprus do not exercise active control, i.e. in which the acquis communitaire is suspended. Without a clarification as to which regions the acquis applies, the Green Line can be considered to have become Agamben’s “physical manifestation of the suspension of the law.”

The Green Line can indeed be perceived as an area where law is suspended. However, the rest of Agamben’s theory is not sufficient to explain the complexity of the demarcation line’s existence, as it does not include the disputed ownership of the area. Ever since the buffer zone came into being in 1964, the status quo of the area has been strongly contested and has therefore been guarded by UNFICYP. Without the presence of these UN soldiers, the situation on Cyprus is likely to escalate, as both parties claim the entire or partial sovereignty of the space that separates them.

511 Ramadan, 157.
Although the Green Line on Cyprus divides an entire island and its people, the beliefs in unity and division as well as perceptions of the *us* and the *them* are not as strictly divided. While negative sentiments and feelings towards the *other* were expressed by members of both communities, it has to be stressed that the Greek Cypriots consider Turkey to be the *other*, and its military presence on the island to be a threat. The Turkish Cypriots are generally included in the Cypriot *us*. The majority of the Turkish Cypriots does see the Greek Cypriots as the *other*, however, the southern neighbors are generally not considered to be a threat.

It can thus be concluded that while the Green Line on Cyprus was originally established as a temporary cease-fire line between conflicting communities, the passing of time and the failure of the still ongoing peacemaking process have turned the line into an entity beyond the *space of exception*. Ever since its establishment, the demarcation line has been a disputed space that has been continuously wanted, created, and maintained by domestic as well as foreign powers. As a result, the Green Line has come to lie at the heart of a reality in which it separates people with many different opinions and notions concerning its status, and its function. The contested division of Cyprus and its communities is no longer exceptional, but normal.

**What We Can Learn**

This research project has shown that the Green Line on Cyprus is a complex entity, which has divided the island of Cypriot and its people for decades. While Greek and Turkish Cypriots used to live among each other in the past, the lack of interaction and the continuous process of othering have led to a minimal level of identification with the other. Consequently, the peace process has become immensely complicated, as people, who once sought the reunion of the island, prefer to live apart today. Although the Green Line had become normal in 2004, its existence and the division of the island is preferred by some today.

This shows that dividing communities, especially over a long period of time, is not an effective method to ensure peaceful relations in a country. The Cypriot people do indeed no longer engage in hostilities and violence against the other. However, the island remains as divided as ever and the interaction between the communities is minimal.

A significant role in the process during which the Greek and Turkish communities grew apart was played by the international community. As foreign actors enforced their own interests, those who are responsible for today’s conundrum should be held accountable. The current UN effort is not enough. Great Britain and to a lesser extent the United States have to step up and take their historical responsibly. The mistakes and errors the foreign actors made in the past to ensure their powerful position in the world have to be undone in order to ensure
that peaceful relations can return on Cyprus. Yet, how to right the wrongs of the past? Perhaps giving up the final remains of colonialism, the SBAs and the UK’s status of Guarantor Power, would open new doors and lead to pathways?

Recommendations

The aim of this study was to indicate what the Green Line has been to people in the past, what it is today, and how these perceptions changed over time. In this part of the chapter, several recommendations, which are based on the conclusions offered in the previous section, will be presented.

Reconciliation and the Establishment of a Truth Committee

Archbishop Emeritus Desmond Mpilo Tutu once wrote:

Reconciliation…is a way to transform individuals, and the whole of society…Through reconciliation, we can see the fluidity of everything in the universe: how the past influences the present and the future; how punishment is just the flip side of redemption, …how we are all victims, perpetrators, bystanders, everyone part of the same family of humanity.512

Although these words seem wise, there is no general agreement amongst scholars on what is necessary to achieve reconciliation between, as well as within, conflicting parties and societies.513 Consequently, no one knows what reconciliation would mean to the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, how long the process would take, and whether it would be successful in the end.

Throughout the course of this research project it has become clear that the Cyprus Problem and the division of the island is a complicated and also painful subject to many of those who are involved. The distance between the communities is not just geographical and political, but also deeply vested in the hearts of the people. Consequently, the Cyprus Problem is far from being solved.

On Cyprus, “peace is very much more complicated than war.”514 This situation will not change and the peace making process will remain as deadlocked as it is today, as long as the Greek and Turkish Cypriots are not able to live side by side. Therefore, until a solution to the Cyprus Problem and the reconciliation between the communities is not wanted and

513 Ibid.
514 Ibid., 3.
considered to be *needed* by all involved parties and their political elite, changing the current political dynamics requires (too) much political courage.

The establishment of a Truth Committee, which was suggested to the candidates of the 2013 presidential elections of the Republic of Cyprus by the human rights lawyer Achilleas Demetriades, could have the potential to bring the two communities closer to each other. According to the *CyprusMail*, the proposed “commission would determine the circumstances of the disappearances of over 2,000 Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots who went missing in the sixties and in 1974.” Demetriades wrote to the candidates that “[a]fter expressing their remorse, people could give correct and essential information over burial sites and the circumstances of [missing persons’] deaths, and be entitled to amnesty from criminal [and civil] prosecution.” As not to undermine its work, the efforts of this Truth Committee would be entirely confidential.

Until the end of December 2012, no contender of the 2013 presidential elections has responded to Demetriades’ proposal. As the elections are yet to come, the people of the Republic of Cyprus have the possibility to pressure the presidential candidates to lead their country towards peace and take the road towards reconciliation. Every possibility towards reconciliation has to be taken and a Truth Committee would offer such a chance.

Education

Even though Cyprus is divided by a Green Line and its communities are largely divided by language (Greek vs. Turkish), religion (Orthodox vs. Muslim), and cultural background (Greek Cypriot vs. Turkish Cypriot), the communities want to live in peace on an island they both consider to be their home. In order to limit the current estrangement between the two Cypriot communities, which is the result of the political and communal division of the island, and as peace is the result of an individual’s behavior, “the socially constructed imagination of belonging to a certain place” has to be altered through raising awareness on the individual level. An essential role in the shaping of this awareness and a person’s ideas and ideals is played by education.

In order to ensure that future generations of Cypriots will be able to overcome the hatred between the communities, it is important to address the history of the island in schools by offering an unbiased and balanced view, without stressing the differences between the communities. Consequently, third track diplomacy, grassroots initiatives, focused on the

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516 Ibid.
517 Van Houtum, Strüver, 142.; Willemijn Verkoren, “The Road to Peace,” (Lecture, Nijmegen, January 10, 2010).
creation of a common Cypriot identity for Greek and Turkish Cypriot children could help to bridge the existing gap between the communities and their cultures.

Children are, in contrast to adults, easily influenced by the perceptions and ideas of their surroundings. In order to prevent the creation or increase of prejudices among children, unbiased knowledge about the ‘other’ is essential, as a lack of such awareness can lead to fear and hatred. By integrating aspects of the other culture, religion, and language into the existing curriculum, the children will become familiar with its existence and learn that the similarities between the communities are prominent and more important than the differences. Consequently, the generation that will be able to change the future of the island will be positively influenced.

It has to be noted that such educational reforms will most likely be resisted by parents, hardliners, and conservatives on both sides of the demarcation line. However, such opposition could be limited by domestic support from liberal and moderate politicians. Also, the establishment of a central, unified, and internationally supervised information desk could help to meet insecurities and answer questions after the implementation of educational policies.

Suggestions for Further Study

Further research might seek to find additional confirmation on what the Green Line is according to the involved actors if more people are interviewed. A distinction in gender and age, as well as education and professional background could provide deeper insights into the issue as it could show differentiating opinions between sexes as well as generations.

Limitations

Despite the fact that actions were taken in order to eliminate any bias or error in this study, it is important to point out an essential limitation to this study: only 18 people were interviewed. Due to this small number of interviewees as well as the fact that they were all part of the upper middleclass, the results of this study cannot be generalized to the entire Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities.

Summary

I strongly believe that this study successfully fulfilled the aims and objectives of this thesis. The findings of this study have clearly shown that there is no single definition of what the Green Line is. Contrary, the analysis of the collected data showed that perceptions and policies of international actors change over time, as they are interconnected to the political context of the time. In addition, between, as well as within the two Cypriot communities,
different yet also concurring understandings concerning what the Green Line is, who it belongs to, and what it represents can be found. Throughout this study, these opposing as well as compatible notions and perceptions were analysed and put into a historical perspective. In addition, recommendations for further research and possible policies were presented.

The analysis and the findings of this study show that an individual’s outlook on the Cyprus Problem and the Green Line is often strongly influenced by personal (family) experiences. Although this outcome is not very surprising, it clearly emphasizes the need for a holistic and integrated understanding of the Cyprus Problem, which eliminates hatred and false prejudices of the other. The development of (educational) programs could strengthen the peace process on the island and may possibly pave the road for a solution of the conflict in the future.

On a personal note, I would like to conclude by saying that the extensive research process, which aimed to gain a better understanding of what the Green Line is according to the parties involved in the conflict, gave me the excellent opportunity to further develop my academic skills (research, observation, and analysis). However, perhaps even more importantly, it also helped me to broaden my international horizon and to gain confidence for the future.


*Collins English Dictionary*, s.v. “Green Line.”


Hatay, Mete. “Beyond numbers (An inquiry into the political integration of the Turkish ‘settlers’ in Northern Cyprus).” Nicosia: PRIO, 2005.


August 8, 2012.


---. *Enormous flags on Cyprus’ north-easternmost point - Cape Apostolos Andreas in Greek, Cape Victory in Turkish*. 2012. Photograph.


---. *Stairway to…? – Stairs leading towards a hotel that was never built*. 2012. Photograph.


---. *UN sign, indicating where the Buffer Zone begins*. 2012. Photograph.


Appendix A: Research Questions

Main Research Questions:

❖ How did the actors involved in the Cyprus Problem perceive the Green Line in 1963, 1974, 2004, and 2012?
❖ If, why, and how did these perceptions change over time?

Sub questions:

❖ What is a border?
   ❖ Give examples of different types of borders around the world.
❖ How did the Green Line come into being?
❖ What was the Green Line in 1963…
   ❖ …according to Greek Cypriots?
   ❖ …according to Greece?
   ❖ Why/how was the Greek Cypriot community divided on this subject?
   ❖ …according to Turkish Cypriots?
   ❖ …according to Turkey?
   ❖ Why/how was the Turkish Cypriot community divided on this subject?
   ❖ …according to Great Britain?
   ❖ …according to the United Nations?

❖ What was the Green Line in 1974…
   ❖ …according to Greek Cypriots?
   ❖ …according to Greece?
   ❖ Why/how was the Greek Cypriot community divided on this subject?
   ❖ …according to Turkish Cypriots?
   ❖ …according to Turkey?
   ❖ Why/how was the Turkish Cypriot community divided on this subject?
   ❖ …according to Great Britain?
   ❖ …according to the United Nations?

❖ What was the Green Line in 2004…
   ❖ …according to Greek Cypriots?
   ❖ …according to Greece?
   ❖ Why/how was the Greek Cypriot community divided on this subject?
   ❖ …according to Turkish Cypriots?
...according to Turkey?
- Why/how was the Turkish Cypriot community divided on this subject?

...according to the European Union?
- ...according to Great Britain?
- Is the Green Line part of the European Union?
- Is the Green Line underlined or undermined by EU bilateralism?
- ...according to the United Nations?

What is the Green Line in 2012…
- ...according to Greek Cypriots?
- ...according to Greece?
- Why/how was the Greek Cypriot community divided on this subject?
- ...according to Turkish Cypriots?
- ...according to Turkey?
- Why/how was the Turkish Cypriot community divided on this subject?
- ...according to the European Union?
- ...according to Great Britain?
- Is the Green Line underlined or undermined by EU bilateralism?
- ...according to the United Nations?

In addition, the following questions will be addressed during this study:
- How, why, and when did the status of the line develop…
- ...according to Greek Cypriots?
- ...according to Greece?
- How did/does the internal division of the community with regards to this subject become evident?
- ...according to Turkish Cypriots?
- ...according to Turkey?
- How did/does the internal division of the community with regards to this subject become evident?
- ...according to the European Union?
- ...according to Great Britain?
- ...according to the United Nations?
- How do the involved parties enforce or refute the existence of the Green Line?
Appendix B: Questionnaires

Questionnaire Cypriots

- Male/Female
- How old are you?
- Where were you born?
- What is your nationality?
- What is the highest education you completed?
- Where are you currently employed? (job title)
- Where do you consider yourself to be on the political scale?
- What is a feasible solution to the Cyprus Problem?

![Diagram of political spectrum]

- What is the best / optimum solution to the Cyprus Problem?

![Diagram of political spectrum]

- Do you have family members or relatives who are refugees?
  - If yes: who?

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518 Peristianis and Mavris, “Ideal and Compromise Positions of Greek- and Turkish Cypriots.”
519 Ibid.
• Do you have any family members or relatives who died or went missing following the events of 1964 and/or 1974?
  o If yes: who?
• How does this influence your opinion of the situation?
• Do you have family members who live on the ‘other’ side today?
• Have you ever crossed the Green Line?
  o Why/why not?
  o If no: would you cross the Line if the problem was resolved?
• Do you feel threatened by the ‘other’ side?
  o Why/why not?
• What is your personal opinion of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus/Republic of Cyprus?
• When was the Green Line established?
• To which side do you think the Green Line belongs to?
  o Why?
• What is the Green Line?
• What is a border?
  o Do you consider the Green Line to be a border?
    ▪ Why/why not?

Questionnaire UN Representatives/Foreign Scholars
• How long have you been on Cyprus?
• What is your employment position?
• What is your personal opinion of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus?
• What is your understanding of the conflict between Greek and Turkish Cypriots?
• When was the Green Line established?
• Is the Green Line part of the European Union?
• Is the Green Line the border of the European Union?
  o If no: what is the border of the European Union?
• Is the Green Line underlined or undermined by EU bilateralism?
  o Should the EU end its financial support for northern Cyprus?
    ▪ Why/why not?
• Was it a mistake to accept the Republic of Cyprus as an EU member without the Cyprus Problem being solved?
  o Why/why not?
• To which side do you think the Green Line belongs?
  o Why?
• What is the Green Line?
• What is a border?
  o Does the UN consider the Green Line to be a border?
    ▪ Why/why not?
    ▪ Do you agree with this notion?
    ▪ Why/why not?