Citizenship, What...?

Contested internal borders in Estonia

Gert Gerritsen
Colophon

**Title**
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**Image title page**

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"When we went out there presenting their Estonian language textbooks, the teachers could not understand what we were talking about them," lamented one of the authors of the textbook. "How will these Russian teachers for students to teach in Estonian in Russian, if they do not understand Estonian? This is absurd!"

- Anonymous teacher (Original text translated from Estonian to English by Google Translate)
Finally, here it is: my Master thesis! It is the last task before my graduation in Human Geography. I completed this study with the master “Borders, Identities, and Governance in Europe”. At first I focused my master thesis on the economic opportunities of Russians in Estonia. Therefore, I conducted an internship at Enterprise Estonia, which gave me insight in the issues of Russians living in Estonia. I really enjoined my time over there, and I am Kristi Tiivas still very thankful for the opportunity to work in such an inspiring environment. After quite some time and struggles with my master thesis in the Netherlands again, my supervisor and I decided to start afresh with another subject: contested internal borders in Estonia. I hope this thesis has resulted in an inspiring journey along Estonian borderlands that opens up new ideas for border studies.

Working on this thesis took quite some time and effort (illustrated by the motto), and without the support of many open-minded people, I could not have made this new start. First of all, I would like to thank my girlfriend for her patience and endless encouragements in order to keep me going. Second, I wish to thank Jackie van de Walle for her advice, help, and, most important, her trust in me. Furthermore, the Centre for Academic Writing really helped me finding a productive way of formulating my thoughts into a well-written text, thanks to you all. From this position I also want to thank Engin Isin for his auxiliary e-mail conversations. And last but not least, I would like to thank my supervisor Olivier Kramsch, for his ideas, patience, and enthusiasm.

Enjoy reading,
Gert Gerritsen

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Executive Summary

In this ‘provocative’ geopolitical master thesis a deviating theoretical lens has been deployed to explore the openness of the border. It has sought to widen the scope of borders as they represent institutionalized representation of ‘us’ and ‘them’. Rather, this thesis has aimed at opening the border as a space of continual contestation. By using a Foucauldian lens this thesis has shown that the border is ‘more’ than the top-down ordering of space. Through all kinds of laws and duties enforced by supreme political power, Estonianness is internalized to its citizens leading to individuals that govern themselves (bio-power). Meanwhile, an unclear power structure creates all kinds of knowledge leading to a wide variety of discourses. This provides individuals, organizations, or populations with the bio-power to contest the supreme political power through all kinds of acts.

According to Isin’s guideline for ‘writing the act’ has been used as an analytical tool to explore the openness of the Estonian internal border. The Estonian political elites have implemented all kinds of policies to internalize Estonianness and reduce Russianness discourse. Four arenas have been subjected to these policies of which two are comprehensively discussed in this thesis: labeling and education. These arenas have entered the field since major reforms in education have destabilized Russian as language of instruction. Meanwhile, labeling has become a platform of contestation because of the labels ‘non-citizens’ and ‘aliens’ to describe the minority in Estonia.

Describing ‘when’ these struggles seem to have started, which is a rather symbolic moment in time, has been further discussed. The ‘Bronze Night’ as this moment of resurrection (of the struggle between Estonianness and Russianness) has been called, became the actualization of the virtual event that has been going on since Estonia became an independent state. The analysis of the ‘Bronze Night’ was mainly based on Kaiser’s re-assemblage of the event. This thesis shows what changes in geography, history, and changing power relations have set the stage for further contestation of the internal border. A border, which arguably is defined along the line of Estonianness at one side and Russianness along the other side, has become a space of continual struggles.

Is the internal border in Estonia such a simple representation of who is in and who is out? As this thesis has shown, it is anything but that simple. Based on news items, forums, videos and blogs, a series of ‘acts’ have been distinguished and described according to three central questions: Who?, What + How?, and Why? These acts have shown a multiplicity of discourses along several de-territorializing lines of flight. The data have also proved that there is no such thing as Russianness discourse, as there is also no Estonianness discourse.
(although state politics (Estonia and Russia) pretend there is such thing). In the arena of education has come forward that there are no two simplified representations of groups; one group that is pro language reforms and one group that is against these reforms.

All kinds of what this thesis has called ‘hybrid forms’, border-as-horizons, ‘spaces of contestation’ or ‘spaces of the whe(a)rea’, can be distinguished, while none of these discourses excludes the other. All kinds of internalized power relations seek to contest (put into effect through ‘acts’) the normalization procedures of the ruling Estonian elites. At the same time, the arena of labeling has become more than a space of contestation for the ‘non-citizen’. It has become an arena of contestation between all kinds of internalized discourses that somehow seek to question the normalization of the internally drawn border based on duties and rights, and thus the legal status. All kinds of power structures, creating a multiplicity of discourses, have entered this particular field, which leads to all kinds of labeling acts, not only by the non-citizens. This makes labeling not exclusively an activity for those who are ‘in’, but also who are ‘out’: the openness of the border.

Having made these observations, this thesis has shown that there is a political function in analyzing the openness of the border. Thus, rather than interpreting a border that demarcates citizenship, borders language, or delimits rights, borders are spaces that are open to a continual contestation between multiplicities of discourses. It offers a platform to become political, to act. Whether it is an act of citizenship seems at that point irrelevant. It is the governing of the self that is enabled through the openness of the borders; this is when people act.

Key concepts: Critical geopolitics; borders; governmentality; power; bio-power; education; labeling; Estonia; acts of citizenship; openness of borders; post-structuralism; Foucault
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1. Introduction

What is Estonia and who are its citizens? At first sight this seems a rather simple question. Thinking about the country how it is presented in brochures for tourism or how Estonians are stereotyped, an important identity feature is practically almost neglected. Of course, Estonian territory is covered for more than half with forest, it has a stunning coastline, and its capital Tallinn could serve as the decor of any fairytale. The country flaunts its traditions which date back to medieval times, when the country was ruled by the Danish and the Swedes. Estonian people feel very Nordic, and so is their unpronounceable language. They celebrate Janipäev (st. John’s Day) in the same tradition as the Finns and Swedes. Estonians are modest and introvert people, who are not used to express their personal emotions a lot. One specific issue though has left unmentioned in most tourist brochures. Before Estonia became independent in 1991, the country had been subjected to Soviet rule. Fifty years of occupation by Stalin and his successors in title, has left a major heritage for Estonian society.

When Estonia became independent in 1991 the government aimed at creating a homogeneous community that shares a common history and geography, because it was perceived as an important condition to become a stable autonomous state. This idea of belonging to a community based on a common identity which is shaped by the national borders is what Anderson (1991) called an ‘imagined community’. Several policies were implemented to achieve this goal, of which one was giving citizenship to those people who were born before or after Soviet occupation. And those who were not granted Estonian citizenship could apply for it by passing Estonian language tests. Those people who did not apply for Estonian citizenship or weren’t able to pass the language tests became occupied with Russian citizenship or no citizenship at all. According to the population census of 2011 Estonia has nearly 1.3 million permanent residents of which a little more than 900,000 are ethnic Estonian (S. Estonia, 2013). This means nearly 400,000 permanent residents have other ethnic backgrounds than Estonian. This group of non-Estonians are for the main part Russian speaking residents (first, second, and third generation), who came to Estonia as being part of Soviet Russification programs.

With this in mind, let’s return to the question as it has been posed in the first line: what is Estonia and who are its citizens? Answering this question is not simply differentiating Estonianness from the ‘other’: what is within the national border is Estonian, and what is outside is not-Estonian. No, ‘the production and reproduction of borders involves studying the symbolic meaning in various institutional practices that create ideas of territories and boundaries’ (Paasi in Smeekens, 2010, p. 11). Critical geopolitical scholars have argued that
Bordering is an ongoing process, which takes place at all scales and dimensions through narrativity (Newman & Paasi in Smeekens, 2010). The practices of the Estonian state are examples of such a narrative. It is propagating an all common history, present and future by which a sense of belonging is created, based on the Estonian language.

Bordering processes are not only the result of practices by the nation-state; it rather takes place within the nation-state between, and by, various groupings. The practices by the Estonian state seek to promote Estonian language, which is thus part of making a constitutive ‘us’ and creating a hostile ‘them’. Nevertheless, as far as this goes, it is also part of internal bordering; those who speak Estonian and those who do not speak Estonian. So these socially produced borders unite the spatial and the social, and erect it at the same time. As Foucault (1980) argued with his concept of governmentality, power relations are not only hierarchical, they can be found everywhere, even within the body. Thus, the taken-for-granted internalized narrative of the border can also be contested both from outside as well as from within.

Thus, what the Estonian state is doing is setting a norm for citizenship, which, in turn is built around the knowledge of the Estonian language. This means that, leaving the reasons beyond, a large proportion of the non-Estonian, Russian-speaking minority still has not adopted Estonian citizenship. At the same time having no Estonian citizenship involves having less or no rights within Estonian territory. Traditional border studies call this the banal claiming of ‘us’ and ‘them’. Thus this kind of bordering serves a clear political end, one that could be defined as creating a unique time-space in order to control its population. Non-Estonians are not allowed to join elections or may not fulfill functions as state officials.

Nevertheless, as recent history has learned us, normalization efforts exercised by the state can and will be contested from within. Here I am referring to the Bronze Night as an ‘act of citizenship’ whereby the initial plan for the removal of the Bronze Soldier was heavily protested by the Russian minority. They saw the statue as a symbol for a claim on rights and their presence. Meanwhile, the state initiated the plan because the statue was argued to be a symbol of Soviet suppression and banishing it would fit into Estonia’s nationalizing project. The ‘Bronze Night’ initiated a wider spread of discourse within the Russophone society, what Deleuze called counter-actualization.

It is exactly this point where this thesis wants to jump in and deviates from the beaten track. It is the active constitution of the people who are being politically ‘ordered’, ‘othered’, ‘excluded’ and ‘alienized’ that current bordering studies lack. It is the way people re-invent themselves, through all kinds of ‘acts of citizenship’, wherein they actively claim rights, despite they have no rights and how groupings contest normalization practices conveyed by
the nation state. Today, two arenas serve as a scene for this active contestation. Language reforms at Estonian schools, which prescribe that at least 60% of all lessons should be taught in Estonian is one of the arenas where contestation takes place. The other could be defined as the arena of labeling, where labels such as non-Estonian, non-citizens and aliens are disputed. You will be guided along these items in this Master thesis.

1.1 Research objective

The main objective of this Master thesis is to explore and to contribute to a new ‘contrapuntal’ research agenda for border studies through a critical geopolitical investigation of how the ‘Bronze Night’ has triggered the Russian speaking minority in Estonia to actively constitute themselves as citizens through acts of citizenship and by finding out how this is part of internal (re)bordering.

1.2 Research question(s)

In achieving the main objective of this study, the following central question is formulated:

How should citizenship based on language requirements be seen as a form of internal bordering and how are these borders contested through acts of citizenship within the arenas of education and labeling?

In order to give a structured answer to this central question, sub questions will be answered in different chapters. Chapter two seeks to give an overview of the theoretic framework. It will give a deeper understanding of bordering, governmentality, and ‘acts of citizenship’. First, this chapter will focus on the debate on borders by placing it in a wider context of geopolitics. Geopolitical research has shifted towards a postmodern lens over the last century, resulting in critical geopolitics. Borders are not just determined lines on a map, but the product of a set of cultural, economic, and political interactions. Michel Foucault's governmentality will serve as theoretic fundament for understanding the way borders still have a clear political function that is contested from the outside as well as from within. Those who have no rights, and thus those who are being bordered, will contest from within and are therefore claimants of rights (acts of citizenship). In order to discuss all these items, the following sub questions will be answered in chapter two:

2.1 What is the history of geopolitics?

2.2 How did critical geopolitics arise and what are its implications for studying borders?

2.3 What does Foucault’s governmentality mean?

2.4 How does governmentality shine light on border studies?
2.5 What is meant by rights and how can they be used to understand the political side of bordering?

After reading the theoretical framework, the third chapter will give a historical overview of Estonia. It will give a deeper understanding of why Estonia is an interesting case for border studies. This results in an answer to the following sub question:

3.1 What is the historical background of Estonia, and why is this country an interesting case for border studies?

Now one knows more about the historical background of Estonia and the ethnic tensions that occupy the country, chapter four and five will zoom in where these tensions take place. Chapter 5 will, in more detail describe the bronze night and how this moment of rupture has set the stage for ever ongoing conflict.

4.1 What legislation defines the arena of education?
4.2 What defines the arena of labeling?

5.1 What did happen during the Bronze night and how can the basic characteristic ‘when’ out of ‘acts of citizenship’ be interpreted?

The fifth and sixth chapter is where the empirical data will be discussed. It focuses on the ways and means how internally drawn borders are contested within the fields of education and labeling.

5.1 Who are the actors?
5.2 What and how do these actors seek to accomplish a certain aim?
5.3 Why was it an ‘act of citizenship’ and how is this a contestation of borders?

6.2 Who are the actors?
6.3 What and how do these actors seek to accomplish a certain aim?
6.4 Why is it an ‘act of citizenship’ and how is this a contestation of borders?

The seventh and final chapter will give an overall conclusion and answer to the central question, as posed in the beginning.
1.3 Scientific and societal relevance

1.3.1 Scientific relevance

For over the last decade or two, border studies is dominated by the idea that borders are institutionalized dividing lines separating ‘us’ from ‘them’. This thesis however, seeks to show that this is not the end of the story. Instead, it seeks to contribute to a debate whereby bordering is more than just creating a simplified distinction between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’. This theoretic discomfort with current border studies has led to a thesis that opens up borders as spaces of contestation, producing and reproducing discourses continuously; a debate that should not solely see borders as boxing sameness or difference, but as a space that continuously subjected to struggle.

1.3.2 Societal relevance

This research should not only be seen as a renovation of the political dimension of the current bordering literature, but it could also have major impact for society in what will be discussed forthcoming.

Although the motive for this thesis is rooted within theoretical discomfort with current border studies it might have societal impact as well. Against the backdrop of the actual events happening in Ukraine these days this thesis seems like forewarning. What currently is taking place on the Crimean peninsula and the Eastern regions of the country seems like a major thread that potentially is awaiting Estonia too. To put it most simply, Ukraine is split by two societies, those who wish to belong to Europe and another group who has sympathy towards Russia. Most of those who wish to look to the East, have Russian backgrounds and came as a result of the Russification program during Soviet time. This has left Ukraine with a somewhat similar demographic composition as Estonia. Currently there is some debate going on this topic that it could happen to Estonia as well. Both countries share a long history tied to their neighbor. What this thesis seeks to do is mapping who this minority is, where these struggles are located. By giving an overview what power relations are present, and how Estonianess is contested, gives the political elites insights how to overcome a similar situation as that what has happened in Ukraine.

1.4 Methodology

The next section consists of a series of methods used for conducting this research. It enables one to trace back steps that have led to this thesis, which, as a consequence have a positive effect on it reliability. According to Verschuren and Doorewaard (2007) three core decisions have to be made concerning the research strategy. These choices are made for:
(1) aiming at depth, or at width; (2) qualitative or quantitative; and (3) empirical versus desk research. The choice on each of the criteria depends on the assumptions, interests and purposes that are central in the research frame.

Qualitative research methods offer possibilities to uncover people’s thoughts, feelings and understanding that lead to a certain human behavior and the reasons that govern that behavior (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011). The term case study must be broadly understood here, since a case may refer to persons, social communities (e.g. families), organizations, and institutions (Flick, 2009). The main advantage of a case study is that it can study the subject in a very detailed and exact way, they are not restricted due to an intended comparability and one is able to fully use the potential of certain methods. A qualitative case study approach, therefore, will be a useful approach in finding an answer on the posed central question, since it seeks at uncovering the openness of the border as a space of multiple discourses. Using this method, the researcher is able to interconnect different aspects of the case, which brings a deeper understanding of the problem at stake.

A case study offers the researcher wider opportunities by not merely relying on one type of source or method. This is the possibility of triangulation, where one is able to simultaneously use a wide variety of data. By the use of different sources one is able to verify information (Denscombe, 2003). The amount of resources and time to conduct this research is rather restricted, thus the researcher is forced to carry out a small scale inquiry. In such kinds of situations the case study is a good method. Moreover, the case study will allow the researcher to use different research methods.

Desk research will be an important method for deriving information. First, in desk research several forms of literature will be studied. Scientific articles and books are studied to get a comprehensive overview of the current state of the art of border studies and it will help the researcher in creating substantiate theoretic critique. It will also describe the important theoretical insights and concepts that underpin this critique. Eventually, this results in an analytical framework to analyze the collected data.

1.4.1 Data collection

Desk research however, entails more than only literature research. It is also an approach for collecting data. According to the method of desk research, websites, newspapers, videos, and articles are used to find the most effective ways that clarify a certain phenomenon. Desk research in this sense literally will happen behind a desk where the researcher uses material
that is produced by others and that is within his reach, in terms of time, money, and qualities.
The researcher does not step into the field where he produces his own data material through
interviews or observation. He or she (the researcher) seeks to come to new insights through
critical reflection or based on his own theoretical insights (Verschuren & Doorewaard, 2007).

There are however, major limitations to this method of data collection of which the researcher
must be aware. The published data may not always be reliable and exactly as per the needs
of the research. The researcher has to make proper scrutiny before using published data.
This might lead to the situation that data needs modification before it can actually be used for
research purposes (Parvathy, 2013). In order to overcome these issues, sources from which
data will be extracted will not be chosen out of the blue. Per arena at least 10 articles,
interviews, blogs etc. will be discussed which are selected because:

- They present an overall picture, not all sources must be Estonian. Instead, to create a
  broader picture other sources should be used as well. This can be based on the
  ethnic background of the author, as well as where (geographically) the article is
  produced.
- The content of the articles matches the goal of this thesis. It should show how
  Estonianness and Russianness are opposing each other in the arenas of education
  and labeling.
- At last the articles should not be a static description of something. They should rather
  describe something that is being done by somebody.

The sources that will be used in this thesis derive mostly from Estonian newspapers. Via the
websites of these newspapers one will have access to a wide variety of articles that seem
relevant for this thesis. If not presented in English or Dutch, 'Google Translate' will be used to
understand the content of these articles. However, not in all cases this helps to understand
the content of the data, therefore language is another criterion that should be respected.
Other material besides Estonian newspapers seems relevant as well, since media are never
neutral and therefore always propagate a certain story. Newspapers/reports are particularly
interesting for this research since they always describe an event, something that has
happened or is still happening (Isin, 2014). Thereby it gives an overview who is involved in
this event, what and where it has happened and in many cases the reasons for this. Videos
which today are easily accessible through canals like YouTube should be seen here as in the
same light.

The sources that will be used are not limited to news items only. It will also encompass
critical reflections and comments on policy papers, newspapers, videos and blogs. These
opinions will also be derived from news websites, YouTube, and forums. The list below will
give an overview of which my data material consists of:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Source</th>
<th>Type of source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ERR - Estonian Public Broadcasting</td>
<td>Estonian Digital newspaper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postimees (in English)</td>
<td>Estonian Digital newspaper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia Today</td>
<td>Russian Online broadcasting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York Times</td>
<td>American Newspaper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Moscow Times</td>
<td>Russian Newspaper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local-Life</td>
<td>Website for Tourism/Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Diplomacy</td>
<td>Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YouTube</td>
<td>Public channel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.4.2 Data analysis

Having collected the data, an analysis will be conducted. According to Isin’s guideline for
‘writing the act’ the data will be presented an analyzed. Isin’s guideline is a methodological
tool for analyzing whether an ‘act’ is an act of citizenship. Well, the first step according to
Isin’s model is that one should read ‘about’. The researcher should interpret whether what he
reads ‘about’ are repertoires of action. If these acts are repertoires of action, the researcher
should start describing its basic characteristics: when, where who, what, how, and why
something should be considered done – a deed – as an act (Isin, 2012).

The first question refers to when, the most obvious starting point is to mark its date and, if it
might be of any help, its time. Since acts always involve events, it would be meaningful to
identify the date and time of that event. Describing the date and time of an event is more
than a factual quality. Temporality, to use a better word for date and time is a rather symbolic
figure. Everyone has its own symbolism to a particular date. Consider May 22, 2012 or May
22, 1796. Each date will not invoke the exact same meaning; perhaps some people will even
assign different meanings than intended. Nonetheless, one has to raise the question, ‘what
did happen then?’

The second question one needs to answer refers to the ‘where’ of an event. Marking its
location is another important aspect of describing an act. Location is not simple; it is not just
naming the place. The location is a set of various complexities like the (supra) states, cities,
streets, squares, and buildings. The ‘where’ of the event seeks to symbolically give the
address of the event.
Thirdly, one needs to answer the question who you want to put the emphasis on. Is this a group, a person, an NGO? This is not just naming the actor, but it also involves a critical reflection of the actor(s)’ background. Describing and discussing the articles that will be subjected to this thesis, will result in a ‘list’ of key actors that play a substantial role within the debate.

Furthermore one has to describe what has actually happened. To quote Isin (2012): ‘again, it is probably a complex series of events that unfolded on a given date, time, and location, it is a question of emphasis as to what you think the actors have accomplished and selectivity as to what you think was essential.’ This automatically results in a fifth question which helps to give a thicker description of how things unfolded.

This fifth and last question is probably the most debatable question of all: why did an act happen? Everyone gives its own meaning to an act, therefore there won’t be agreement why a certain act took place. This disagreement should not hinder someone of giving his account. After all, it are these accounts that become competing and contested descriptions of acts (Isin, 2012). The work however, does not end here; it only offers a framework for a start. Was it an act of citizenship? Was this an act of defiance? Was it an act of prejudice? Does it really matter? This thesis therefore, will give an account by coupling the theoretic framework to the question why. This will result in a systematic analysis of whether an act is an ‘act of citizenship’.
2. Theoretic Framework

In 1963 Minghi argued that borders, seen as political dividers, should be more recognized in a way that they separate people of different nationalities, identities, and iconographic make-up. This meant that border landscape studies had to move away from a fixation with a visible function towards a recital of the border (landscapes) as the product of a set of cultural, economic, and political interactions (House, cited in van Houtum, 1999). The change in scientific paradigm has shed a new light on borders in such a way that new theoretical concepts have entered other geographic disciplines. These new insights have integrated with fields such as economics, geography, and other social theories. This has led to a shift from a focus on borders as a visible, determined line on a map towards a discipline that has the narrative meaning of the border at its center. In other words, ‘demarcation of boundaries, the lines, now the field of boundaries and border studies has arguably shifted from boundary studies to border studies’ (van Houtum, 2005).

At first, this chapter will first further elaborate on the debate on borders by placing it in a wider context of geopolitics. The debate departs from a change in scientific paradigm within the field of geopolitics that has evolved over the last century. Geopolitical research has now shifted towards a postmodern lens, resulting in what we today call critical geopolitics. Thereafter this chapter continues by showing how the change in paradigm has influenced the field of border studies. This will result in a critique that border studies is more than the simplistic assertions of the border as a continuously constructed entity creating ‘us’ and ‘them’, or a tool for what in popular terms is called (b)ordering and othering. In so doing, Foucault’s concept of governmentality will serve as theoretic fundament for understanding the way borders still have a clear political function that is contested from outside as well as from within.

2.1 The history of Geopolitics

Geopolitics, as Ó tuathail, Dalby, and Routledge (2011) correctly point out has, like any other word, its own histories and geographies. Devised by Rudolph Kjellen, the term geopolitics was articulated at the beginning of the twentieth century as a useful concept to define the geographical base of the state. This was intimately linked to the belligerent dramas during that time. Natural endowment and resources were by many claimed as the most important power potential (Holdar, 1992). The term geopolitics was taken-up by Nazi Germany during the interwar period. This was propagated by former German general, Karl Haushofer. He founded a journal ‘Zeitschrift für Geopolitik’ to promote conservative nationalist thinking. At that time, veteran and aspirant politician Adolf Hitler was one of Haushofer's fellow pursuers.
When Hitler gained power and initiated wars and aggression towards Germany’s neighboring countries, ‘geopolitics’ entered the English language and was associated with expansionist Nazi foreign policy, or what Friedrich Ratzel early twentieth century named ‘Lebensraum’. The negative connotation of the word caused many geographers and commentators avoid writing about this topic. During the Cold War the word geopolitics gained interest again, partly due to U.S. National Security advisor Henry Kissinger. He used geopolitics to describe the global contest between the Soviet Union and the United States for power and strategic resources. It became a synonym for the ‘balance-of-power politics’ (Hepple, 1986).

Today, geopolitics is a rather popular phenomena and is enjoying wide circulation with its meaning defined by the particular context (Ó tuathail et al., 2011). “Irrespective of whether the word geopolitics is used or not, the conventional understanding today is that geopolitics is discourse about world politics with a particular emphasis on state competition and the geographical dimensions of power” (2011, p. 1). Thus, understanding geopolitics is a matter of understanding discourse. Discourse, introduced by French social theorist Michel Foucault, rejects modernistic claims that there is only one theoretical approach that explains all aspects of society. According to Foucault, discourse can best be summarized as ‘systems of thoughts composed of ideas, attitudes, courses of action, beliefs and practices that systematically construct the subjects and the worlds of which they speak’ (Lessa, 2006). Postmodernist theorists, like Foucault, were mainly interested in examining the variety of experience of individuals and groups, and emphasized differences over similarities and common experiences. The role of discourse should also be understood in wider social processes of legitimating and power, stressing the construction of actual truths, both in terms of sustaining and what power relations they carry with them (Foucault, 1980). Discourses are the representational practices by which cultures creatively constitute meaningful worlds (Ó tuathail et al., 2011).

The introduction of discourse within the field of geopolitics has resulted in what is popularly called critical geopolitics or twenty-first century geopolitics; a discipline within political geography that has developed since 1980 (Agnew & Mamadouh, 2008; Dalby, 1991; Dodds & Sidaway, 1994). Critical geopolitics should be considered as a move beyond political realism. In international relations, political realism should traditionally be seen as the classical school of thought that international relations are being characterized by struggle for power between different states (Morgenthau, cited in Ó tuathail et al., 2011, p. 6). It renounces state centrism and ‘cognitively miserly stories about how the interstate system work’ (2011, p. 7).
In contrast to political realism, critical geopolitics recognizes the way human beings know, categorize and give meaning to world politics as a multi-interpretative cultural exercise. The cultural context gives meaning and enables us to understand the processes that take place involves studying geopolitics as discourse. Critical geopolitics therefore, should not only perceived as an activity performed by elites but is embedded throughout a state-centered society at multiple sites. Three types of different discourses can be distinguished in critical geopolitics. To sum up: (1) Formal geopolitics refers to the advanced geopolitical theories and visions produced by intellectuals like strategic studies, bureaucratic reports, and political doctrines. (2) Practical geopolitics refers to the narratives propagated by politicians in the practice of foreign or domestic policy. Examples are political speeches, state actions, and diplomatic and legal practices. (3) Popular geopolitics, at last, refers to the discourses in political relations that gains significance in the, to a certain extent, banal culture of a state (Sparke, 2002). The last discourse focuses on culture expressed by mass media, state rituals and public opinion.

The fact that critical geopolitics is multiple, involves that studying it involves a complex practice. It is more than just the study of what Halberstam has called “great ideas of great man.” The distribution of power within states is also an important tool for creating or shaping geopolitical discourse. ‘Some (power relations) are produced by state institutions (…) and are central to the political life of the state, others are the product of civil society’ (Ó tuathail et al., 2011, p. 9). Any critical investigation should recognize the workings of power struggles within states in shaping geopolitical discourse. What is understood with power will be discussed in more detail in forthcoming sections.

Critical geopolitical theory is not fixed or homogeneous. What has been outlined in the previous part is just one of many discourses of how geopolitics could be interpreted and theorized. The fact that no strict definition can be given makes the concept applicable within a wide range of geographical and trans-disciplinary studies. Scholars within the field of history, security studies, and border studies have taken-up the broad headline of geopolitics, justified or not. The way it has been presented in this thesis is also adopted by a wide range of border scholars.

2.2 Critical geopolitics of borders

The shift in paradigm in geopolitics starting in 1960s upwards now, has had major implications for studying borders. During the 60s border studies were dominated by the demarcation of boundaries, the line on the map. Today, the field of boundary and border studies has arguably shifted from boundary studies to border studies (van Houtum, 2005). To put it differently, the focus on studying borders has moved away from analyzing the border as
an evolutionary process wherein territorialization of space is the focal point towards an approach that defines the border as ‘a site through which socio-spatial differences are communicated’ (2005, p. 672). As a result, border studies are now being characterized in a way that they are considered as the study of human practices that produce and represent differences in space and time.

Territorial borders continuously fixate and regulate mobility of flows and thereby construct or reproduce places in space. Within this line of thinking borders are not constructed top-down, they rather represent an implicit common discourse among the majority of the people involved. Bordering, to put it as a verb (van Houtum, Kramsch, & Zierhofer, 2005), is the ongoing practice of securing and governing of the ‘own’ economic welfare and identity. ‘At the limit all that counts is the constantly shifting borderline’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 367), rather than a stable, permanently situated object.

Bordering, however, is a paradoxical practice. To some extent bordering rejects as well erects othering (van Houtum & van Naerssen, 2002). Othering, for a full understanding, should be understood as that ‘it identifies those thought to be different from oneself or the mainstream, and it can reinforce and reproduce positions of domination and subordination’ (Johnson et al., 2004, p. 253). Othering, therefore, is often understood as the discursive differentiation between ‘us’ and ‘them’ seen through the lens of spatial bordering. Creating otherness, as Chaturvedi (2002) argues, takes place at the national scale and is reinforced through hegemonic, homogenizing discourses on national identity and nation security and exclusivist geopolitical imaginations. It is the border that demarcates property, making ‘ours’ here and ‘theirs’ there, while shielding it off against socio-spatially constructed and constituted ‘them’ (van Houtum, 2005, p. 676).

Let’s move back to the paradoxical issue of bordering. At one side the continual process of (re)bordering erase territorial ambiguity and ambivalent identities in order to shape a unique and cohesive order. On the other side bordering creates new, or reproduces latently existing differences in space in identity (van Houtum & van Naerssen, 2002). Again, bordering is part of a somewhat simplistic or banal claiming and producing a unity out of a variety of subcultures and/or different populations whereby some groups are included and others being marginalized or marked as aliens. Sometimes this goes as far that political elites start practices of elimination or complete exclusion.

Othering and bordering practices implicitly involve or provide an opportunity to objectify space, ordering. Eventually resulting in a categorization and classification with a label that states a spatial unit is ‘good’ or ‘bad’, ‘friendly’ or ‘unfriendly’, ‘rich’ or ‘poor’, and ‘strategic’ or ‘unstrategic’ (and many more classifications). Ordering offers opportunities to map spatial
differences in institutionalization, naming, identification, and performance. The most debated and contested example of such critical geopolitical discourse is how former U.S. president George W. Bush constructed an ‘Axis of Evil’ for which ‘Axis’ served as a metonym for fascism or Nazism, and ‘evil’ as a metonym for Satanic forces, implying an alliance of Iran, Iraq, and North Korea responsible for cruel deeds (Clarke, 2005; Heradstveit & Bonham, 2007). The making of these representations have in many cases a higher political or economical function.

Borders, however, in all their manifestations ‘are the outcome of relations of power, the proper political dimension of which would be determined by who and what has control over borders, towards what end, and to what degree we may perceive openings for resistance in struggles over the spatiality of borders’ (Balibar, echoed in Kramsch, 2012, p. 195). This opens up the discomfort that borders are not only spatial representations of ‘us’ and ‘them’. A small, but growing amount of border scholars seem to open the debate on borders by arguing that bordering does not stop in making distinctions between ‘us’ and ‘them’. They do not refuse this way for border thinking, but are arguing for a ‘political moment’ in border studies (Kramsch, personal communication, August 20, 2014).

In Kramsch (2012) article on ‘negotiating the spatial Turn in European Cross-Border Governance’ he works his way through this ‘political moment’ with his notion of borders-as-horizon. Rooted in post-colonial geography Kramsch (2012) uses Edward Said’s contrapuntal space for handling the purified practices of dividing ‘us’ and ‘them’. This contrapuntal space rejects the hierarchy of elements and reveals the ‘intertwined histories and geographies’ (2012, p. 202). This way it would be impossible to distinguish a pure ‘us’ and ‘them’. This lay the seeds for: ‘a spatialized cross-border comparative methodology without recourse to a teleological norm’ (Kramsch, 2012, p. 202). Resonating this call, this thesis will further elaborate on this “new” research agenda in border studies through a Foucauldian lens.

2.3 A Foucauldian critique

2.3.1 Power and bio-power

In order to clarify how borders should be understood as spaces of contestation, on needs to understand the workings of controlling of space and what is meant with power. Being in the possession of power means controlling the territorial unit, both in terms of discursive as well as in non-discursive practices. Foucault (1980) who aimed at linking modernity with power, defined power as a complex strategic situation in a given societal setting. Rather than a unity, power is multiple and sneaks in where one does not expect to encounter it. Power is
present in the most subtle mechanisms of social relationships: not only in the state, the classes or groups, but these relationships are also present within dominant opinions, the spectaculars, the games, the sports, the information, the private- and household relationships or even within movements of liberation (Lenearts). Power, according to Foucault is two folded. First, power does not only suppress and prohibit, but it also forms an incitement to speak and production of knowledge. Second, power is not a unit that is solid, nor is it a one way traffic between an entity that commands and their subjects

For Foucault (1980) power is not ‘the power’ as set of institutions and apparatuses that must secure the suppression of the citizens. He argues that the term power refers to multiple power structures that are immanent to the terrain in which it is exercised while carrying their own organizing principles. The game in which these power structures continuously conflict and are being fought over transforms, enhances, inverts the support that these power structures find with each other (something similar like a chain or a system). Or the other way around, the differences or the contradictions that lead to isolation. At last, the strategies in which they could realize their effects resulting in a general design or the institutional crystallization of state apparatuses, like law and social discourse.

Power therefore, should not only be found in a singular center of sovereignty, but in a fluid basis of power structures which are contested because of their inequality and continuously induce power structures which will be local and unstable. Power, in this sense, is everywhere; first because it incorporates everything, but also because it comes from everywhere. Power structures are not the result of a binary opposition between the rulers and those being ruled, they should rather be seen as the multiple power structures that result and operate in those production apparatuses like families, small groups, the institutions are the basis for deeply rooted and embodied distributions.

That according to Foucault power is everywhere also comes forward in his notion of ‘biopower’. In his lecture courses on Biopower entitled Security, Territory, Population Foucault originally defines biopower as: ‘a number of phenomena that seem to me to be significant, namely, the set of mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the human species became the object of a political strategy, of a general strategy of power, or, in other words, how starting from the 18th century, modern Western societies took on board the fundamental biological fact that human beings are a species’ (Foucault, 2007). This technology enables the control over entire populations. It is a way of managing people as a group. Biopower is thus an integral feature of the modern nation state (Foucault, 2007). All in all, it refers to power over life.
In Foucault’s *Discipline and Punish*, he invoked Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon, as a metaphor to describe modern disciplinary societies and their pervasive inclination to observe and normalize. The design consists of circular structure with an ‘inspection house’ at the center, from which the manager, or guard of the institution, like schools, asylums, or hospitals are able to watch the inmates, who are stationed around the perimeter. Bentham however, devoted much of his efforts developing a design for a Prison (Kramsch, 2012). The Panopticon is an ideal architectural figure of modern disciplinary power. According to Allmer (2012) ‘the Panopticon creates a consciousness of permanent visibility as a form of power, where no bars, chains and heavy locks are necessary for domination any more’.

The Panopticon offered a powerful and sophisticated internalized coercion, which was achieved through the constant observation of prisoners, each separated from each other, allowing no interaction or communication. Rather than using violent methods, the modern architectural design has led to the situation that inmates are effectively controlling themselves. Because the inmates do not know whether they are being watched, they continuously must act as if they are being watched at all time. This constant observation has led to a consciousness of constant surveillance that is being internalized. The internalization of power is what Foucault has argued to be biopower.

### 2.3.2 Introducing governmentality

Foucault’s understanding of power has helped to develop new understandings of the political economy. His understanding of political economy derives from La Mothe Le Vayer in which he argued there are three fundamental types of government, each relating to a specific science and discipline: the art of self-government, connected with morality, the art of properly governing a family, which belongs to economy; and finally the science of ruling the state, which concerns politics’ (Foucault, 1991, p. 91). Important to mention, notwithstanding this typology, is that the art of government is always characterized by essential continuity of one type with the other, and of a second type with a third. ‘The establishment of the art of government is introducing the economy into political science – that is to say, the correct manner of managing individuals, goods and wealth within the family and of making the family fortunes prosper – metaphorically, how to introduce this meticulous attention of the father towards his family into the management of the state’ (Foucault, 1991, p. 91).

It has widened our understanding of ‘governing’ in a way that it should also include forms of social control in for example schools, hospitals, or prisons, as well as the concept has encouraged us to think that embodied knowledge is also important. In Foucault’s lectures on ‘territory, security and population’ that started in 1977 – later he would name this ‘the history of governmentality’ – he introduced the concept of governmentality.
Rather than a conjugation of ‘governmente’ and ‘mentalité’ as some authors have argued, the naming of the concept is simply a French degeneration of ‘gouvernement’ into ‘gouvernementalité’ (Sennelart, 1995). Basically, governmentality endeavors to show how the modern sovereign state and the modern autonomous individual co-determine each other’s emergence (Sennelart, 1995). This definition, however, is rather simplified and the concept is much more complex. Foucault (1991, p. 102) means three things with governmentality:

1. ‘The ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has its target the population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security.’

2. ‘The tendency which, over a long period and throughout the West, has steadily led towards the pre-eminence over all other forms (sovereignty, discipline, etc.) of this type of power which may be termed government, resulting, on the one hand, in the formations of a whole series of specific governmental apparatuses, and, on the other, in the development of a whole complex of savoirs.’

3. ‘the process, of rather the result of the process, through which the state of justice of the Middle Ages, transformed into the administrative state during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, gradually becomes “govermentalized”.’

The first part of Foucault’s definition states that governmentality is all of the aspects that make up a government that has to its end the maintenance of well ordered and happy society. In so doing, governments need to establish ‘political economy’ in which economy refers to the old meaning, as setting up an economy at the level of the entire state. This means ‘exercising towards its inhabitants, and the wealth and behavior of each and all, a form of surveillance and control as attentive as that of the head of a family over his household and his goods’ (Foucault, 1991, p. 92). This first strand refers to governmentality as governing with specific ends, with specific resources to these ends, and particular practices that should lead to these ends.

In Foucault’s second partial definition of the concept he presents governmentality as the slow transition of Western governments which eventually took over authoritarian regimes in focusing on sovereignty and discipline in what we know today as democracies and their typical methods by which they tend to operate.

At last, the third part of the definition can be clarified as the evolution from the Medieval state, that traditionally maintained its territory and an ordered society within its territory through a simple series of practices imposing its laws upon its inhabitants, to the early
renaissance state which became more concerned with “disposing of things by using strategies and tactics to create a stable society “render a society governable” (Foucault, 1991).

Governmentality as the ‘conduct of conduct’ will eventually and gradually permeate the various institutional apparatuses of the state. According to Kramsch (2012, p. 196) space would become codified on a binary basis with respect to the perceived distance from a norm (what is perceived as normal). Kramsch (2012) exemplifies this in a way that the physically ‘sick’ would be physically separated from the ‘healthy’ in large hospitals where they would subjected to therapy. Students who don’t have a certain level of both intellectual and emotional maturity are sequestered at schools. The indigent are removed from public spaces and put in poor housing. The norms that are present regulates movement from one place to another ‘within a determinate hierarchy of Being’ (2012, p. 197), whereby each subject has its own political economy, sets of rules, and governing principles.

2.4 Border studies and governmentality

In Foucault’s work on governmentality he used genealogy as his central method. According to Dean (quoted in Walters, 2002, p. 562) ‘genealogy is the methodological problematization of the given, of the taken-for-granted.’ In achieving this, he aimed at: ‘the construction of intelligible trajectories of events, discourses, and practices with neither a determinative source nor an unfolding toward finality.’ For border studies this has shed a new light on present critical geopolitical thinking. Rather than thinking of borders only as socially constructed products separating ‘us’ and ‘them’ and dividing what’s good and what’s bad, governmentality has offered new widened scope. New features of the present border are able to be identified by finding their antecedents in strange and unexpected places (Walters, 2002).

Foucault’s logic and the role of borders can already be traced back in late 19th century when a consolidation of nation-state territoriality took place. For modernist states borders and boundaries were a paradigmatic tool enclosing a unified space. Nations strove for a homogeneous culture, politics and economy. This spatial practice was for a large part defined around the “norm” of national citizenship. In many cases, this demarcation practice happened decisively and aggressively from forms of citizenship lying on the ‘other’ side of the boundary which is represented by another nation-state (Kramsch, 2012). Maps as presented at schools, for instance, represent such normativity of the border. The contours (borders) of each country are filled in by one solid tone. Just a simple example shows the will of nation-states to reduce difference into sameness. According to Kramsch (2012, p. 197) ‘from this vantage point, an entire technical cosmos would be required – in the form of
passports, security checks and finger printing, among others – in order to regulate the passage from “yellow” to “purple”, from “orange” to “green”.

The normative aim of dominantly political elites to create a complete homogeneous society is in practice rather an exception than the rule. The nation, or national identity, however effective it has been in shaping modern states, is only one of the institutional forms for the community of citizens and it does not include all of its functions nor does it neutralize its contradictions (Balibar, 2012, p. 438). What Balibar aims at saying here is that citizenship as a normative political principle cannot exist without a community, whereas this community cannot be completely homogeneous. Therefore, the defined norm around citizenship cannot be the consensus of its members. Citizenship should rather be seen as reciprocity of rights and duties that binds together the co-citizens, under the condition that it is being implemented and obeyed (Aristotle, cited in Balibar, 2012, p. 439). According to Balibar (2012): ‘the necessity of the community is not identical with its absolute unity or homogeneity.’ Yet, the opposite is true, rights have to be contested, imposed against the resistance of vested power interests and existing superiorities. They must be ‘invented’ in the modality of a conquest, and the content of the duties, or the responsibilities, must be redefined periodically according to the logic of this agonistic relationship (Lefort, in Balibar, 2012, p. 439).

This is precisely what Foucault has argued to be governmentality. One side of Foucault’s medal refers to internalizing power of the state through normative defining what citizenship is. The other side of his medal refers to the way people actively reinvent themselves – through all kinds of practices and strategies of self-identification and activism – so as to claim rights despite they have no or less rights. It enables one to explore the active contestation of the border by those who are politically being ordered, othered, excluded, or alienated within a community.

2.5 Acts of citizenship

So, if citizenship is seen as the mutuality of rights and duties that binds together the co-citizens, which in turn must be invented, redefined, contested continuously, what kind of rights, one might ask themselves? We experience rights as we experience odors: persistently and in great variety. To sum up a few: a right to live, a right to choose; a right to vote, a right to work, to strike; a right to play football, to be a dissident, to drive a car, to have a house; the right to have equal treatment before the law, to feel proud on what one has achieved; a right to be, to launch a nuclear first strike, to follow your gut feeling, to be left
alone, to change gender or the right to turn on the light. Many of these rights are taken-for-granted and are institutionalized through various state apparatuses and therefore are perceived as normal.

At the same time however, Arendt (1951) argued that the plight of stateless people revealed the modern conception of human dignity to be a mere abstraction. In fact Arendt (in Schaap, 2011) argued that to live as a human outside of political community amounted to a deprived of existence in which humans as individuals were thrown back on the givenness of their natural condition. This observation made Arendt aware that there is one fundamental right and that is the right of belonging to a political community, the right of politics of the self. Conceptualizing rights as such that it enables us realizing other rights, including the right to claim rights (Gaventa, 2002) or as Isin and Wood (1999) and Arendt (1951) suggest, the 'right to have rights'.

Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that everyone has the right to a nationality and, to this end, has the right to be a citizen. Citizenship in modern democracies, implies having civil rights (Staeheli, 2010). Claiming citizenship, which is thus a claim on rights, is a continual struggle between moments of insurrection and moments of constitution aiming at rebalancing power relationships between social forces (Balibar, 2012). Claims on rights have an emancipatory effect and these claims occur in many different ways: from campaigns to temporal condensation and from violent or non-violent relationship of forces to party mobilization.

According to Isin (2008) citizenship is more than only a status held by individuals that empowers them to claim rights. He rather speaks about ‘acts of citizenship’ which sees citizenship as something that is open and fluid. This concept can be defined as ‘those acts, when, regardless of status and substance, subjects constitute themselves as citizens or, better still, as those to whom the right to have rights is due’ (Arendt, 1951; Balibar, 2004; Rancière, 2004). This new perspective enables us to move away from subjects towards a focus on acts that produce such subjects. It is a shift from the citizen to citizenship. Citizenship, in the end, is not only a legal status, but it should be seen as a practice of making citizens – social, political and symbolic (Isin, 2008, p. 17).

For groups or individuals to become active claimants they must embody certain practices. One example is the feminist and civil rights movements. Both developed over a rather short period of time and various resistance practices within the symbolic arenas as folklore, theatre, music to social and political networks. Furthermore, acts of citizenship can also be found among the Negro society in the United States. In Burns (1997) book named Daybreak
of Freedom is described how black people claimed that they could sit anywhere they wanted on the bus during the Montgomery Bus Boycott in 1955. Or the hunger strike staged by British suffragette Marion Wallace Dunlop in Holloway prison in 1909 in protest against being refused the status of political prisoner (Isin, 2008, p. 18). The appeal of thinking about acts of citizenship forces us to consider those openings where citizens break or destabilize the bonds of habitual activity or in Foucault’s words contesting normalized and internalized power structures, and in so doing, unleash a creative energy (White, 2008).

2.5.1 Theorizing acts of citizenship

Traditional citizenship scholars have mainly focused on citizenship as a status held by people and ways of thought and conduct that have been internalized over a long period of time. This is in the same line as traditional borders studies scholars have tend to see borders they represent institutionalized discourses in space and time separating ‘us’ from ‘them’. Therefore, Kramsch’ (2012) call for a ‘political moment’ in political geography could be picked up here nicely. Passionately conveyed by political scientist Engin Isin, a new body of work has recognized that citizenship is made infinitely more complex due to several reasons. First, while citizens may be contained within state boundaries that makes them subject to all kinds of rights and duties, their own nation states do not live in such ‘container’ (Isin, 2008). States are thus complex webs of rights and responsibilities since all states are interrelated to one another by multilateral agreements and treaties. Thereby, citizens and non-citizens such as migrants, immigrants, or aliens, have become increasingly mobile. This means that they, carrying their own webs of duties and rights, are to be entangled in other webs (2008, p. 16). Acts of citizenship or activist citizenship seeks to serve as an alternative framework in order to move away (although to some extent related to) from status and normalization (internalization). It resonates the call that bordering in terms of defining ‘us’ and ‘them’ does not end here, but that borders are subjected to a multiplicity of discourses that cannot be boxed or whatsoever.

This new figure, as Isin (2009, p. 368) calls it, seeks to find out ‘how the emergences of this figure is implicated of new ‘sites’, ‘scales’, and ‘acts’ through which ‘actors’ claim to transform themselves (and others) from subjects into citizens as claimants of rights’. According to Schattle (cited in Isin, 2009, p. 368) it helps to understand how these sites, scales, and acts produce new actors who enact political subjectivities and reshape oneself and others into citizens by distinct continuously changing and extending rights. This new vocabulary on citizenship helps interpreting the ways ‘the rights (civil, political, social, sexual, ecological, cultural), sites (bodies, courts, streets, media, networks, borders), scales (urban, regional, national, transnational, international), and acts (voting, volunteering, blogging, protesting,
resisting and organizing)’ (Isin, 2009, p. 368) through which subjects enact themselves as citizens.

If acts of citizenship are investigated, one has to look for deeds by which actors actively constitute themselves (and others) as subjects of rights. The concept of acts of citizenship is grounded on four considerations (Isin, 2008). First, one has to look at the actors which should not be conceived in advance as to their status. To recognize certain acts as acts of citizenship, one needs substantiation that those acts create subjects as citizens. ‘Time and again we see that subjects are not citizens who act as citizens: they constitute themselves as those with ‘the right to claim rights’ (Isin, 2009, p. 371). Second, new sites of contestation, belonging, identification, and struggling are created by those acts through which claims are articulated and claimants are produced. Streets, media, networks, but also borders have become such sites of contestation. Third, acts of citizenship go beyond territories which lead to overlaying scales of contestation, belonging, identification and struggling. Fourth and last, theorizing through acts, we should not only look what people say, but also and maybe more important what people do.

Theorizing acts, defined by Isin (2008, p. 24) as ‘an approach that focuses on an assemblage of acts, actions, and actors in a historically and geographically concrete situation, creating a scene or state of affairs’, has been part of larger body of work that seeks to investigate genealogies of citizenship as a generalized question of ‘otherness’ that includes strangers but more strikingly seeks to overcome the gap between ‘them’ who are out, the aliens?. ‘Through orientations (intentions, motives, purposes), strategies (reasons, maneuvers, programs), and technologies (tactics, techniques, methods) as forms of being political, beings enact solidaristic, agonistic, and alienating modes of being with each other’ (Isin, 2008, p. 37). It is in this way that ‘we’ become political. One establishes his- or herself as citizens, strangers, outsiders, and/or aliens rather than identities that are already there.

2.6 Locating the act

So, what are the localities in which the principle of citizenship is actively contested? What are the arenas where claims on rights through acts on citizenship take place? To uncover the geography on rights, Kaiser (2012) suggests an approach in which he has aimed for an in-the-act re-assemblage of events. In Foucault’s political analysis he defines events as moments when an existing regime of practices is reinvested, co-opted and redeployed by new social forces and governmental rationalities (Walters, 2006). Kaiser’s approach however, loans its principles from Deleuze and Guattari’s work on the philosophy of the
event. Herein Deleuze systematically distinguishes virtual and actual events. ‘The virtual event is a “set of singularities” occupying a field of potential with singularities defined as “turning points and points of inflection; bottlenecks, knots, foyers and centers; points of fusion, condensation and boiling; points of tears and joy, sickness and health, hope and anxiety, ‘sensitive points’ (Deleuze quoted in Kaiser, 2012, p. 1048).

Lim (2007, p. 107) gives an example of homophobic harassment on a city street. “The visceral dimension of trauma gathers in the body to be encountered again in new circumstances as a trigger to feeling and action. The event of harassment comes to resonate with certain situations that the person who suffers such harassment might find themselves in at a later date. Although impossible to predict in advance there are many aspects of the latter encounter that might resonate with the former: markers of place, the tone of voice of somebody shouting, an ordering of events, a small gesture, glare or facial expression. Such resonation enters the process of selection of how to affect and be affected by other bodies.”

Actual events happen performatively as individuals seek to solve the problems they experience in daily life. According to Deleuze (in Kaiser, 2012, p. 1048) the actualizations of events are spacings. “Event-spaces emerge as the forward-feeding potential of the event, a creative/destructive pulse escaping from regulatory and regularizing capture along a de-territorializing line of flight, event-spaces replace the orderliness of striated static spaces with more unruly, nomadic, smooth spaces in flux” (Deleuze & Guattari quoted in Kaiser, 2012, p. 1048). Mountz (in Kaiser, 2012, p. 1048) in her study of Canadian immigration agents and the ‘everyday discursive practices that socio spatially produce “the embodied nation-state”. She argues that the state does not exist outside of the people comprising it, in their everyday work, and social embeddedness in local relationships, which makes every encounter with the state and within static spaces potentially evental.

The continual struggle over language (or linguistic) rights is one source that could lead to potential events. Defining language rights however, seems to be an almost impossible exercise. According to Arzoz (2007, p. 4) the only valid generalization one can make about language legislation and linguistic rights is that ‘the practical meaning of language has not yet been established anywhere.’ Nevertheless, regulation of both human and state behavior through law always includes, explicit or implicit, a linguistic aspect. Language rights are thus always concerned with the rules that public institutions adopt with respect to language use in a variety of different domains.

Language rights are fore mostly at play for those whose legal status is of speakers of non-dominant languages or where there is no single dominant language. Of course, speakers of
the dominant language also have language rights, but their rights are well ‘guaranteed and
enforced by social rules and practices’, these rights are normalized. The ways in which
language protection is formulated offers little protection to minority languages (Kibbee, 2004).
The main reason for this is that the state cannot guarantee perfect linguistic neutrality, since
it has to make choices for a certain language (or more) in order to provide social services
and for ruling its linguistic behavior regarding its citizens, this inevitably will favor the
community (or communities) whose language(s) it has assumed (Arzoz, 2007).

The fact that some linguistic groups have more rights than other groups has made language
a source of continual contestation. This is in line with Balibar (2012, p. 438) argument that
there is always a conflictual element in the claim of rights: ‘there is no such thing as an
originary distribution of equaliberty and no such thing as voluntary surrendering of privileges
and positions of power’. Thereby this contest between ‘majority’ and ‘minority’ is always
uneven, which is reinforced by the political elites (May, 2011). The nationalist ideas that
underpin today nation-states, which are in turn, the bedrock of the political world order,
because they exercise political and legal jurisdiction over its citizens, and claiming external
rights to sovereignty and self-government in the present inter-state system, are the basis for
attitude towards minority languages (May, 2000).

Claiming language rights by minority speakers takes place at a wide variety of arenas. Acts
of citizenship, as Isin (2008) has called these claims, aim at a continual restructuring of
power relationships. As we speak, this is part of a wider (re)bordering process. In a broad
spectrum of institutionalized resources and services these processes can be found. The
dominant language group usually controls the crucial authority in the are(n)as of
administration, education and the economy, and favor those who are in command of that
language (May, 2005). Thus, differentiation based on language takes place in a variety of
arenas and institutions.

Work is one of the arenas where language is contested and being used as part of a wider
bordering process. Bourhis and Foucher (2010) have highlighted how officials in the Quebec
region in Canada have sought to protect the French language by law, which meant that
English-speakers were left with fewer opportunities. By 2006 there was a drop of English
speakers of almost 180,000 inhabitants. The law was credited for the fact that it raised the
status of the French in a predominantly English-speaking economy. Another example that
represents the continual struggle between languages is within the school system. Education
has historically played a significant role in establishing a homogeneous civic culture of the
nation-state. Durkheim (quoted in May, 2011, p. 176) exemplified for the case of France how
education was employed to promote a state-sanctioned language, at the expense of other varieties, as a central part of a modernizing nationalist project.
3. Historical Background

After a long period of being repressed by the Soviet Union, in 1991 Estonia re-established its statehood after a break of 51 years. Almost twenty-five years after Estonia signed its independence, the country is still struggling with the past. The border treaty, for instance, demarcating Estonia as it was during its first period of independence still hasn’t been ratified by the Russian Duma; a situation that is a major source of dispute between Estonia and its big neighbor. Far and fore mostly the biggest issue Estonia is still struggling with, is that there is no single view on one state idea that would bind all its people and regions together (Berg & Oras, 2000). This chapter therefore seeks to give an historical overview of Estonia’s recent past in order to understand why Estonia is such an interesting case for this thesis.

3.1 Estonia: a multicultural society

Before Estonia re-established its statehood in 1991, the country has been subjected to many different rulers. Estonia’s history of being ‘ruled’ brings us back to the 7th century when the Vikings settled themselves on the Estonian shores. During the Middle Ages, the soil what we today know as Estonia was amidst a continual fight over land between Swedish, Danish and Polish civilizations. After the Great Northern War Russia conquered the land in 1721. Until 1918, when Estonia became independent for the first time, Russia governed the provinces Estland (Northern part of present Estonia) and Ljfland (Southern part of present Estonia and Northern part of Latvia). On February 24 1918, the republic of Estonia was proclaimed. This was, however, only a decree on paper. (EstonianForeignMinistry & EnterpriseEstonia, 2014). After a two-year period of war, the real independence was signed with the peace of Tartu in 1920 in which the Soviet Union recognized Estonia as an official state (Alenius, 2012).

Estonia’s first period of independence only lasted 20 years. In August 1939, when Germany and the Soviet Union signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact in which the spheres of influence of both countries were negotiated, Estonia was invaded by Soviet troops in June 1940. The Soviet Union arrested in the first year of occupancy 8,000 people, including the political and military leadership of the country, whereof 2,200 were executed and most of the others were put in prison in the Soviet Union of which only few returned. On June 14, 1941 mass deportations took place in the three Baltic republics. 10,000 Estonian civilians were deported to Siberia and other remote corners of the Soviet Union (O’connor, 2003).
The pact between the Soviet Union and Germany proved untenable and Nazi troops invaded Estonia. Between 1941 and 1944 Estonia was under control of the Reichskommissariat Ostland. The occupation by Nazi Germany didn't bring any alleviation. Estonia didn't become independent and the small Jewish society was almost completely murdered. Only those who managed to flee to the Soviet Union survived. The German occupation had no long shelf life. In the autumn Estonia was again occupied by the Soviet Union. The battles had a high price. The border city of Narva, for instance, was almost completely vanished due to heavy bombings. 80,000 Estonians fled and were adopted by neighboring countries. The Soviet occupation ushered a new period wherein Estonia became the new Estonian Socialist Soviet Republic.

During the era of Soviet occupation a strict Russification politics was applied in Estonia and the other Soviet states. The Russification program has left the non-Russian minorities in Estonia and elsewhere in the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) with no possibilities to promote and maintain their ethnic culture and language. Instead, an all-Union anti ethnic Soviet culture and ideology, carried by the Russian language was promoted (Siiner, 2006). Part of this program was a massive influx of Russian speaking Slav groups from other parts of the USSR such as Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine, to Estonia (Berg & Oras, 2000). Furthermore, the Estonia’s Eastern border had been changed in favor of Russia whereby Estonia lost the regions around Ivangorod and Pechory.

3.2 The Estonian Republic

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 heralded a second period of independence. This, however, did not involve that Estonia could leave the past behind. The era of Soviet occupation has left a major social and geographical heritage on Estonia. The question of the precise territorial delimitations of the Estonian border with the Russian Federation has been a source of discord between both states, and a permanent point of irritation (Levinsson, 2006, p. 98). Until now the Tartu border treaty that delineates the border as it was during the first period of independence still hasn’t been ratified by the Russian Duma.

The current foundations for the Estonian state were laid during the period 1991 and 1994. The rights-of-centre political elite that came to power in the first years of independence declared the previous years of Soviet annexation as illegal and against the will of the native population (Berg & Oras, 2000). The political elites who were at power during that time chose for a restitutionist interpretation of independence in founding a constitution of community and renegotiating the state and citizenship boundaries. This included a claim on 2000 km²
territory that had been assaulted by Stalin during the Soviet occupation. The new constitution stated (cited in Berg & Oras, 2000, p. 606): ‘Estonia is an independent and sovereign democratic republic wherein the supreme power of the state is held by the people.’ In practice, the decisions about the constitutional order are to be determined only by those who are citizens of Estonia. At that time, some 500,000 settlers from different Soviet republics were excluded. Thus, not only geographically but also socially the Soviet period has left scars on Estonia’s demographic composition.

The changed make up of the Estonian community has laid a basis for potential ethnic conflict. The conflict: ‘evolved more and more into one between indigenous people and immigrants, citizens and non-citizens a national centre and separate periphery, Estonia and Russia’ (Berg & Oras, 2000, p. 609). The central government has had the power to govern the complete country including those places where Estonians are the minority. The nationalist policies that have been implemented targeted three areas: regional policy, ethnopolitics and cultural standardization. These geopolitical actions aimed at creating a unique nation-space and nation-time (Berg & Oras, 2000).

Estonians and non-Estonians have for a long time lived separate lives. There has been little interaction between both groups. At one side, Estonians have felt that the large Russian population is ‘alien’ and not a problem for them to deal with since many of them came as a result of the Soviet occupation. On the other, Russians in Estonia have tended to cluster communities wherein they have created their own institutions like schools wherein exclusively the Russian language is used (Saar, 2011). Integration of Russians was also hindered due to the fact that they never intended to immigrate. Moving borders caused them losing their privileged status and becoming ‘minorities of precious status, disputed membership, and uncertain identity in a host of incipient non Russian nation-state’ (Brubaker, 1995). Thereby they didn’t feel the urge to communicate with Estonians. This feeling, Berg and Oras (2000) argue, comes from the fact that during Soviet times contact between native Estonians and ‘influxed’ Russians was limited at the level of state officials.

Saar (2011) argues that Estonia is a nationalizing state, ‘an unrealized nation-state, a state destined to be a nation-state but not yet in fact a nation state.’ Berg and Oras (2000) entitle Estonia as it resembles more an ethnic state with a divided society than an integrated entity of a putative nation-state. The current Estonian state idea which emphasized a restorianist approach promotes in particular two government policies. One that focuses on language and the other focuses on education (Berg & Oras, 2000). The aim of these policies is to give a privileged status on the Estonian language as the official state language. This is part of a
broader spectrum that is being called: cultural standardization of people and regions. Nationalist standardization or normalization is rooted in banal (b)ordering and othering practices wherein a state defines itself in perspective with and against the other. What has going on in Estonia, Saar (2011) argues, was greatly based on othering Russians and the Soviet period.

Estonia’s othering practices can be concluded from its citizenship laws. Based on the citizenship law of 1938, Estonian citizenship was granted to those who were born in the first period of independence and their descendants. This was based on the principle of *jus sanguinis*, blood relationship. For the ‘other’ the knowledge of the Estonian is a perquisite to apply for citizenship. In 1934 98,8% percent of the total Estonian population held the status of being citizen. In 1992 when the law was enacted 500.000 (of a total population of 1.5 million) Soviet immigrants were left with undetermined citizenship. During this time the government has actively promoted the acquiring of Estonian citizenship through naturalization, thus reducing the number of persons with undetermined citizenship. According to EstonianForeignMinistry and EnterpriseEstonia (2014) in 2014 84,3% of Estonia’s population holds Estonian citizenship, 9,2% are citizens of other countries, and 6,5% are having undetermined citizenship.
4. Defining the arenas of contestation

What does undetermined citizenship or being a non-Estonian in Estonia mean in practice? First, being an undetermined citizen implies that you do not belong to a certain society. Since 1992 Estonia has issued all its citizens with official passports. For those citizens who did not obtain Russian or Estonian citizenship, the Estonian government began in 1996 to issue identity documents to persons of undetermined citizenship, the so-called ‘alien passport.’ Poleshchuk (2004) has argued that this was due to pressure of Western countries. This incentive was given to the people who came to Estonia during Soviet Occupation to promote the Russification program. The document serves as an official identification within Estonia and allows its holder to travel abroad but not with the same rights as Estonian citizens. There is a difference however, Estonian citizens are allowed to travel unlimited within the Schengen area, and people with undetermined citizenship may only travel outside Estonia visa-free for 90 days or less.

Furthermore, non-citizens, undetermined citizens or people with Russian citizenship cannot work as state and municipal officials. This lack of proficiency in the Estonian language amongst members of ethnic minorities limits access to the labor market, because such proficiency is required by law in all public-sector and some private-sector jobs (Lindemann in van Ham & Tammaru, 2011) This involves that non-citizens cannot be a teacher at school, a police officer, or a rector of a public funded applied higher institution (Poleshchuk, 2004). As a result, non-citizens are most often forced to work in blue collar skilled occupations.

The law also prohibits non-Estonians to join national elections, because the law stipulates that all voters shall be Estonian citizens. Automatically, all candidates for the parliament should also be Estonian citizens. For local elections all people who are older than 18 and permanently reside in the municipality have a right to vote; this also stands for non-citizens. These aliens however, have no right to stand as a candidate at elections. In some places in Estonia this excludes a large population (or even the majority) of the local population.
4.1 Education

What’s more, the school system is still segregated by language. During the Soviet period schools were largely separated by Estonian and Russian language. A number of factors, argued by van Ham and Tammaru (2011), are combined aimed at reducing the amount of language segregation. The most important factor, however, is that educational reforms are part of Estonia’s restoriantist approach. All Russian secondary schools in Estonia are obliged to become bilingual which has led to the fact that these schools now also partly teach in Estonian. Also university courses are mainly being taught in Estonian (or English). Thereby, ‘geographic and historical education in the school system produces and reproduces that socio-spatial consciousness, makes space incontestable and exclusive, and defines the friendly and hostile neighbors’ (Berg & Oras, 2000, p. 618). So, the chosen state language has become a condition to get access to services and resources such as education (May, 2005). Non-Estonians who in most cases do not speak Estonian are thus withheld education in their own language.

Language, as the most important norm for citizenship has, immediately when Estonia became an independent state, entered the arena of education. It has sought to normalize Estonian as official language of instruction. More and more reforms over the last decade have changed the educational landscape in Estonia whereby it was sought to minimize the influence of the Russian language. Education, as many authors have already recognized is a major source to spread knowledge (ideologies) over society (i.e. Thomas, 2005). In most democratic countries education is under control of the government, the arena which is called ‘education’ is thus defined by law. For a full understanding an overview of how Estonian language has been integrated in regulation will be given first, substantiated with statements made by political elites.

When this thesis speaks about education, it is mainly referring to the educational landscape. The latter embraces broader package of the school as a space where institutional practices take place. One side represents the content, the literature, the histories, and geographies. The other side meanwhile, refers to the form. What is the spoken language? Who are the teachers? What kind of school? etc. Both sides, as this thesis has discussed earlier are being used to propagate Estonian language. Before moving on to the regulations it is important to have some background what the educational system of Estonia looks like.

The Estonian educational system is very similar to other educational systems within the Westernized world. Between the age of 3 and 7 years, children are allowed to go to preschool where attendance is on a voluntary basis. Compulsory schooling starts at the age of 7
until the age of 17 (or until the conclusion of the 9-year basic education. Primary schooling is divided into a primary level (classes 1 - 4) and secondary level (5 – 9). Hereafter, students are able to attend upper secondary education which is of 3 years duration. And is also state funded. The state stipulates the curriculum that is compulsory for all schools; nevertheless, schools have the freedom to offer optional courses and subjects and extended teaching within the compulsory subjects. When students pass their examinations and receive a state certification as well as an institutional certificate they have the right to enter higher education (University or University of applied sciences) or vocational education or training.

The preschool Child Care Institutions Act (Chapter 1, paragraph 8) states: ‘learning and teaching at a preschool institution shall be conducted in Estonian. Learning and teaching at a preschool institution or preschool institution group may be conducted in another language on the basis of a decision of the local government council’. Thereby the included paragraph that is devoted to language also says that government council must ensure that all Estonian-speaking children have the opportunity to attend a preschool institution or preschool group. Furthermore, institutions where teaching is not conducted in Estonian shall not receive state subsidies, but is allocated to the local government (Riigi Teataja, 2013).

The Basic Schools and Upper Secondary school act state that on primary schools as well as on upper secondary schools the language of instruction is Estonian. Nevertheless, there are still schools where the language of instruction is not Estonian. For these schools it is compulsory to teach Estonian as of the first grade. It is argued by the law that it allows the graduates of the basic school to continue their studies in an Estonian-medium educational institution. Subsection 5 of paragraph 21 states: ‘A school will organize language and cultural teaching for students acquiring basic education whose native language is not the language of instruction or who communicate at home in a language different from the language of instruction, which is the native language of at least one parent, provided that no fewer than ten students with the same native language or with the same language of household communication request it’ (Riigi Teataja, 2014a). The government will however, establish conditions and procedures for language and culture teaching, thereby the ministry of Education and Research will organize the coordination and creation of opportunities for the language and culture teaching that is provided.

Not only language is important to internalize an all common Estonian discourse. Textbooks that are written in Estonian tell Estonian histories. Take the example of the ‘Bronze Soldier’ (will be discussed forthcoming); what meaning is given to it in history books? From an Estonian perspective one could argue that it was a symbol of Soviet occupation, meanwhile from a Russian perspective it is argued that they have liberated Estonia from Nazi Germany.
whereby the statue is symbolic for this liberation. Further, what geography does the state want to offer? An Estonian state which is the focal point of European integration or be it the residue of a once powerful Soviet era. Not to mention the literature, art, and, culture that should be propagated at schools. The content according to paragraph 20 of the Basic Schools and Upper Secondary schools act will be determined per grade and subject by the Ministry of Education and Research.

What has been discussed earlier this thesis; a certain level of language requirements is demanded for state officials. Teachers and staff on schools in general are therefore also subjected to these rules. Chapter 5 paragraph 23 of the language act state: ‘officials and employees of state agencies and of local government authorities, as well as employees of legal persons in public law and agencies thereof, members of legal persons in public law, notaries, bailiffs, sworn translators and the employees of their bureaus shall be able to understand and use Estonian at the level which is necessary to perform their service or employment duties’ (Riigi Teataja, 2014b). For teachers this level is established at the level of C11 (Riigi Teataja, 2014a). For higher education, teaching shall be in Estonian. The use of other languages shall be decided by the Minister of Education and Research.

In terms of Foucault, defining the ‘arena’ offers an overview on how the Estonian state seeks to normalize based on rules and obligations the Estonian language within education. The laws that have been presented show the way how the Estonian state seeks to utilize its hierarchical power to spread knowledge among the society. At the same time, all these laws are vulnerable to contestation and are questioned, and mostly the non-citizens seek to reshape and redraw new power structures. It is exactly this point why education has become a space of contestation and therefore will be subjected to this thesis.

4.2 Labeling

A second arena that uncovers this struggle is called labeling. This arena is much easier to describe, but more difficult to understand, since it does not take place within a given societal setting. The Estonian parliament adopted a law that is called the ‘alien’-act, in which they described the rights for ‘non-citizens’. It is not the content of this law that defines the arena; it is the naming of it. Labeling could be seen as how self-identity and behavior of individuals may be determined or influenced by the terms used to describe or classify them (Mead & Becker, 2011). Derived from ‘labeling theory’, the definition that has been presented here includes perfectly how labeling should be understood in the wider border literature. Labeling

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1 This is according to the Common European Framework which divides the knowledge into three broad categories (A, B, and C) that can in turn, divided into 6 levels (A1 & A2, B1 & B2, and C1 & C2)
is used by the Estonian state to order and classify people, based on their ability – or better their inability – to be political.

The institutionalization of labels is nothing special. The label ‘Latino’s’ or ‘Hispanics’ for instance is used in the United States for classifying people from Central and South America. Another example is how most ‘westernized’ governments are labeled: as ‘democratic’. These are perfect examples of discourses on what is good and what is bad are internalized within communities. Nonetheless, as this thesis is sought to work on, these institutionalization practices are continuously debated and contested through power structures that are not only hierarchical. By all kinds of acts, which in turn could that are the result of bio-power (‘the power to govern the self’) these classification practices by the state are contested, both from within as well as from outside.

Labels as ‘non-citizen’ or ‘alien’ carry the connotation as if those people are no humans. By the state they are being portrayed as ‘non-humans’, people who actually do not exist. Because of bio-power people are able to step out of the normalization of labeling them as such. Instead, through all kinds of self labeling or counter labeling of the ‘other’ labeling has become a space of contestation in Estonia. This contestation does not only take place by those who are politically ordered but also by external factors that put question marks on the activities of the ruling political elites in Estonia. As will be shown in the empirical chapters, not only persons are being classified through labels, also policies and countries are being labeled as well with various motivations.

In conclusion, this chapter has shown how the Estonian state is using all kinds of bordering strategies in order to achieve its ultimate goal: achieving political, economic and cultural stability, based on a strong Estonian identity. This entails that everything that is reminiscent to Soviet times and Russia is banally being b/ordered based on language and citizenship. This internal bordering as this thesis seeks to call it, has demonized a part of its own community. However, this is a continual struggle between social forces and to echo Balibar again: ‘there is no such thing as an originary distribution of equaliberty and no such thing as voluntary surrendering of privileges and positions of power.’ Bordering takes thus place within different arenas (labor, political participation, labeling and education) of which only two, due to the researcher’s limits have been discussed here. By defining the arena of labeling and education this chapter has given an answer to the question where acts of citizenship might take place.
In the next chapters this thesis will further analyze and describe the event. First, the next chapter will discuss the ‘Bronze Night’ as a moment of insurrection and a moment of constitution aiming at rebalancing power relationships between social forces. It will also further describe what, in terms of discourse is actually taking place within; how the internal border in Estonia is representation of simplified discourses of ‘us’ and ‘them’. At the same time describing the event it already shows the multiplicity of discourses that do counter these simple representations of bordering. The ‘Bronze Night’ is thus describing the virtual event as a symbolic moment in time that describes ‘the when’ of an ongoing and never ending ‘act’ and should serve as an entrance to the following empirical chapters.
5. The ‘Bronze Night’

These empirical chapters will depart from an analysis of the ‘Bronze night’. It is a symbolic time and has served as a catalyst for a magnified rift between ‘Russianness’ and ‘Estonianness’ discourse (discourses introduced by Robert Kaiser and Marja Saar to draw the internal border in Estonia). The Estonian government adopted a legislation that should ban all Soviet symbols like the hammer and sickle. The War Graves Protections act, which implied that the remains of soldiers should be respectfully interned in proper military cemeteries, gave ground to the removal of the Bronze Soldier statue located on Tõnismägi square in Tallinn’s city center. This gave rise to a major riot between Estonian police and the Russian speaking minority.

The virtual event, Kaiser (2012, p. 1051) argues, ‘has the reality of a problem to be solved.’ The problem should be described as how to eliminate members of the constitutive outside (the ‘other’) who live in one’s proclaimed homeland and how to reclaim the spaces that occupy for one’s group. As we have discussed in our theoretic framework, nation-states seek to identify themselves against the constitutive outside, mostly by doing this around the ‘norm’ of citizenship. The ‘Bronze Soldier’ was a key ‘site’ embodying the virtual event whereby Russia, Russians, Russianness or Soviet Occupation served as the constitutive outside for Estonia, Estonians, Estonianness or Independence (Saar, 2010). The Soldier represented a mental border demarcating Soviet time-space from post-Soviet time-space (Kaiser, 2012). Furthermore, the site became a key place for ethnic Russians have enact themselves contra the discriminatory practices of the nationalizing Estonian state.

5.1 April 26, 2007

The Bronze night, followed after the government decided to relocate the bronze soldier monument from Tõnismägi square towards Siselinna Cemetery which is located three kilometers outside the city center. It was part of Estonia’s nationalizing project to reduce the affective power of ethnic Russians of the site and was part of re-territorialization of the independent nation-state of Estonia. Although there is no fixed beginning of the event, as Deleuze and Guattari (1987) have argued for the virtual event, the actualization took place in the early hours on April 26, 2007. Why this date? In 2007 Estonia was almost 20 years an independent state and since its independence the country had propagated a restorianist approach. Thereby the statue was for the ethnic Estonians in Tallinn seen as an unwelcome
reminder of Soviet suppression. What was the difference with, to be exact, 16 years ago? Three important factors, interrelated as they are, can be distinguished why exactly this date.

‘With a soaring economy, booming tourist industry, and pioneering technological advances, Estonia has become one of the darlings of the EU since ascension in 2004, giving rise to an increased sense of pride within the small Baltic nation and a slight tendency toward nationalist indulgences - the dismantling of the Bronze Soldier being a perfect example. Backed by Europe, Estonia is feeling good enough about themselves to get brazen. They won't be bullied by Russia anymore, and unlike other former Soviet satellites, they won't cater to Moscow in the interest of the national economy. They've got some new friends and they're doing just fine financially, thank you.’ (Local-Life, 2014a)

What this quote seeks to point out is that the new nation-state Estonia for a long time had not been ready to exile Russia(n(s)(ness)) in such a demonstrative manner, because the stakes were too high. Russia had been, and still is keen and loyal with their fellow Russians that do not live within Russia's territory (Sakwa, 2008). An assault, as it perceived by ethnic Russians would form a high risk for the new Estonian state. Backed, or to put it better, as a member of supranational organizations like the EU and NATO, which Estonia both joined in 2004, the country can act as if it is no longer Russia's smaller brother. Instead, as the removal of the Bronze soldier has shown, it is willing to use aggressive methods to ban Russianness.

According to Kaiser (2012) the plans for removal also had a clear political character. Although public opinion surveys provided evidence that there was little or no concern among the Estonian population regarding the statue (Ehala in Kaiser, 2012, p. 1051). The survey, held in May 2006, (although not directly) was picked up by former prime minister and chairman of the Reform Party Andrus Ansip. He noticed that a plan for removal of the monument could be used as means of mobilizing support for himself. To quote Ansip's speech in 2007 (in Kaiser, 2012):

‘I see the solution to this problem in the relocation of the monument to the cemetery … It has become all the more clear that the monument cannot remain in its old place. The question rose: whose word has authority in Estonia? The word coming from the Kremlin or the word from Old Town? We cannot say to our people, that Estonia is after all only a union republic, and our word in this country is not worth a ‘brass farthing’.

The elections were held in March 2007 and Ansip’s Reform Party won 27 percent of the total votes. His mandate within the parliament (Riigikogu) rose from 19 to 31 seats. The
propagated anti-Russian discourse proved to be successful and together with right wing party Pro Patria – Res Publica they joined forces to become a majority in the parliament. Just before the new coalition was installed, two new laws passed Estonia’s parliament. The War Graves Protection act (on January 10, 2007) and the Law on the Removal of Forbidden Structures (February 15, 2007) offered legal protection for the parliament in their willingness to remove the statue.

Another reason why exactly April 26 was chosen as the date on which the removal of the statue was planned was due to the Tallinn authorities that hoped to get the job done before May 9, Victory Day. On this day the Russian minority in Estonia would gather around the statue to remember the Soviet Union’s victory over Nazi Germany. At that time, the Bronze Soldier is the rallying point for ‘brawling’ nationalists on both sides of the issue and the site of violence. At point when the statue was amidst full attention of the Russian minority, the removal had a provocative signal towards Russian speaking people. An anonymous person living in Estonia said:

“The government didn't give the date for monument movement, they didn't give people a chance to go and say goodbye to it. Instead they dragged the monument in the night time like something shameful. Smart government with two nationalities shouldn't do it that way. It was like a slap in to the all Russian-Estonian's faces” (A. f. Estonia, 2010)

5.2 Estonian borderland in the making

To put it most simply, the removal of the statue took place from downtown Tallinn, Estonia’s capital, to a military cemetery three kilometers outside Tallinn’s center. To be more precise, the statue initially was located at Tõnismägi square which was the center of Tõnismägi hill, where the remains of Soviet soldiers were buried. The riots that happened as a consequence of the parliaments plan to remove the statue therefore took place around Tõnismägi square.

*By Saturday, police had detained over 1000 people, most of whom were drunken Russian-speaking teenagers hell-bent on defending a memorial to fallen soldiers from a war they didn’t experience and likely know little about. Provoked by the sensationalist, censored and one-sided journalism coming out of the Kremlin, Russian nationalists from all over Estonia rallied to Tallinn, inciting the worst violence in the country since Soviet tanks attempted to crush the independence movement (ironic, no?)’* (Local-Life, 2014a)

Soon these protests diffused around the city. The Old Town full of gazing tourists, transformed into a battlefield. Over a millions Krones damage was made. News reports spread the news rapidly across the country, more peacefully than the riots in Tallinn; the protests were passed over to even the country’s remotest places.
5.3 Who are the Russians, Estonians, or political elites?

Who is the main actor of the event, on who do we emphasize? Many actors can be observed. Of course, we can distinguish the state officials who planned the removal of the statue, the work crews, and security forces who did the actual work of removing the statue, the protestants, and the riot police. Obviously, we have to see the event from the perspective of the protestants, but how do we define these protesters? Of course, as many scholars did, the protesters were mainly labeled as ‘the Russophone minority’, the non-citizens (i.e. Kaiser, 2012; Poleshchuk, 2009). Is this doing right to the actual actors?

Would a general label as ‘the Russophone minority’ justify classifying the actors as such? The question hasn’t been raised yet ever since and looking at the previous quote, made by an author of Local-Life (2014a) one could argue that the protesters represent not a real reflection of the minority. The mobs during the Bronze Night were predominantly (drunk) youngsters seeking for thrill. This is of course, to speak in Foucault's terms, all discourse and one has to look at the background of this quote, which was in the end written with touristic purposes. Meanwhile, from pro-Russian point of view the mobs represented the complete Russophone society. Metaphorically, I would like to argue that youngsters presented itself as a kind of army (both verbally as well as physically) carrying out Russianness discourse. Nevertheless, this leaves open the debate whether the acquittal of defenders of the Bronze Soldier are an expression of justice or a submission to Russia? (Denisenko, 2009). A Russian journalist argued²:

‘Presumably, the majority of ‘defenders’ of the Bronze Soldier did not care about the monument’s fate. Therefore its defense has easily turned into the acts of vandalism and looting in the centre of the city. Participants of ‘Night Watch’ could be accused for inability to control ‘the revolted crowd’, whereas the riot has leveled the ones who went to the monument with high aims and the ones who expected disorders or were influenced by the herd instinct.’ (Denisenko, 2009)

Here we see a mix-up of different discourses of what by many is argued to be a homogeneous group. It obviously is not. In the previous quote one is able to distinguish different interests for people who attended the riots. People who truly want to defend the statue because they have affinity with the statue should not be seen as those drunken youngsters who came to deliberately destruct of or damage to public or private property. A clear difference should be made between those who came with high hopes and grounded

² The journalist refers to ‘Night Watch’, in Russian Nochnoy Dozor which is a group of Russophone political activists living in Estonia. It was set up in the summer of 2006 with the originally plan to defend the Bronze Soldier.
goals, and those who came due to solidarity. So, it is not fair to say that Russianness is solely propagated by one homogeneous society, and the same can be said for Estonianness or the political elite.

5.4 Covering spaces of Russianness

What happened during the ‘Bronze night’ hasn’t come forward yet. For a full understanding we need to move back to early morning April 26, 2007 when workers arrived at Tõnismägi square. Government workers arrived at the square and started to set up camps whereby they fenced off the monument. Meanwhile, a tent was set up around the statue to examine the bodies that were buried beneath it. This would prevent the operation to disrupt by onlookers, but also it would dampen resonance and forestall resistance. The government that gave rise to this operation knew this was a site of Sovietness and Russianness and they were aware of the affective power of the site (Kaiser, 2012).

The opaque activity that took place within the new re-territorialized space had the opposite effect, as Kaiser (2012, p. 1052) argues: ‘because no one could see what was going on inside the tent, and equipment could be heard running, rumors and news of the monument’s dismemberment and of the desecration of the soldiers’ bodies spread throughout the city in the first wave of event transitivity. They were affective in creating performative gaps, fissures, and ruptures in the enactment of everyday life by part of Tallinn’s population, as an increasingly large and agitated number of residents left their schools, workplaces, and homes and arrived at Tõnismägi Square in order to demonstrate their opposition, to defend the bronze soldier, or to ask the monument for forgiveness for their inability to protect it.

At a certain point the number of protesters were at the point that it created affective energy and riots started to break out. This relates to the question how the protesters tried to defend their space of Russianness. As the crowd was still growing, skirmishes began to break out between the police and the protesters. After a call of the police officers the signal was given to remove the crowd from the square and the people retreated quickly. A split within the lines of the riot police led to the situation that the police had to retreat, forming the moment that violence erupted. The event rapidly extended towards other places. The police in Tallinn arrested more than 1000 protesters, 150 people got injured, and one person died.

5.5 2 histories, 2 geographies, ‘1001 discourses’

Why did it happen after all? Probably this is the most debatable point of all. Roughly two histories and geographies come across at this site. The author of Local-Life (2014a) puts his finger on the right spot:
‘Estonia’s ethnic Russian community, which comprises a significant third of the country's entire population, regards the monument as a symbol of Russia's sacrifice during World War II and a tribute to the Russian soldiers who died fighting Nazi Germany. At the crux of the matter are two contrasting interpretations of history: For Russia, the years 1941-45 call to mind the ‘Great Patriotic War’, wherein the Soviet Union defeated Germany for the good of all Europe (an act they feel they've received little thanks for). For Estonia, alongside Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, the Second World War began two years earlier in August 1939, when Stalin and Hitler divided Europe in half with the secret Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Ethnic Estonians view Russia's re-entry into Estonia in 1944 as an act of occupation - a regime change from one oppressive occupying force to another.’

The site has become where the discourses of Estonianness and Russianness clash. The Estonian parliament argues that the statue refers to 50 years of Soviet oppression. Within its restorarianist and nationalist approach sites that refer to that time need to be vanished, especially its affective power. On the other hand, native Russians in Estonia argue that the statue is a demonstration of their rights to live in Estonia.

The Bronze Night has become the actuality of the virtual event that has taken place since Estonia became an independent state. Here, this thesis will not subdue the Bronze Night as act of prejudice, or an act of citizenship. The act is only a clear outcome of the ongoing struggle between discourses on Estonianness and Russianness and hybrid forms that cannot be boxed into one or another. It should be seen in this sense as the ‘when’ of Isin’s guideline for establishing an act. It is a moment of rupture that unleashes, catalyzes, and creates new power structures. In what will follow is how the actual event has further sneaked in within Estonian society.
6. The arena of Education

In the previous chapter this thesis has sought to answer two questions for describing the act. In answering the question where people show de-territorializing lines of flight this thesis has described four arenas of which two will be central in this thesis. Since acts are ongoing this thesis has sought to describe a moment in time where new creative energy was given. In describing the where of the event one was already able to see that internal borders are not created on the basis of two opposing discourses: Estonianness versus Russianness. Although many authors have understood the internal border in this ‘banal’ fashion the coming chapters seeks to show that the border is continuously in the making, and is not simply a institutionalization between ‘us’ and ‘them’.

In order to show the openness of the border this chapter is structured according Isin’s guideline for writing the act. First, it will distinguish the most important actors. This will result in a list of the most important players that are being part of a wider education reform debate in Estonia. The analysis of the actors is not solely restricted to pure description in terms of naming. It rather should deeper investigate, what their (symbolic) positions are in society to understand their involvement into the debate of language reforms. Thereafter, this chapter seeks to describe what these actors do, and how they do it. In what ways do these actors step out of what is defined as normal within education? At last ‘the who’, what, and how of the act will be discussed from a broader bordering perspective.

6.1 Describing who?

The first part of this analysis will start with a closer look to the ‘who’ of the event. Which actors can be distinguished and what are their power relationships. This opens up the complexity of discourses on the current language reforms in education. It is not simply a group of people who act as if they are pro language reforms in education and a group who acts as if they are against. No, all kind of different actors can be distinguished who do not fit within a certain group.

6.1.1 Russian speaking students

One of the articles mentioned Russian-speaking students; the two worlds that these people represent contrast sharply, since ‘Russian-speaking groups’ propagate a different discourse as students do. The fact that the group is named as Russian-speaking students reveals its somewhat delicate and problematic position. In order to overcome this problem, the students have created an assembly of students uniting Russian-speaking schools, with as the General Secretary of the Assembly of Student Representatives, Andrei Minejev ("Russian-Speaking
Students Seek More Lessons in Estonian," 2014). Maria, an ethnic Russian mother of a teenage daughter, tells about the problems that her child faces. Although she (her daughter) has been born and raised in Estonia she might not go do university because she does not speak well enough Estonian to understand everything that is being told in class (International, 2006).

6.1.2 Schools: the teachers, the institutions, and other staff

Language reforms do not only have an effect on the students. Teachers, workers and school institutions in general are also subjected to the internalization of the Estonian language. A teacher like Olga Muravyova, who is an ethnic Russian biology and geography teacher at the Päe gymnasium in Tallinn, was/is amidst the struggle of the language reforms at Russian language schools (Levy, 2010a). The law obeys state officials (such as teachers) to have a certain degree of fluency of the Estonian language. If a teacher like Muravyova wants to keep her job, she must attend lessons to improve her language skills. These skills can, in turn, at any point and mostly unannounced be examined by the language inspectorate. A procedure that many of the teachers who were subjected to these exams have perceived as humiliating, embarrassing and unpleasant (Levy, 2010a).

What strikes most is that the Päe gymnasium is located in the city district of Lasnamäe. Having a closer look at this part of city reveals its specific demographic characteristic. With a total of nearly 120,000 inhabitants it is by far Tallinn’s biggest city district. Ethnic Russians represent nearly 60% of Lasnamäe permanent residents, only 30% percent of the inhabitants are ethnic Estonian (S. Estonia, 2013). Muravyova said that she has taught all her life in Russian since the most part of her students had Russian as their mother tongue. Further she said:

‘I am 57, an age when it is not easy to pick up a new language, let alone one as devilishly complex as Estonian’ (Levy, 2010a)

The same is true for Rosa Ivanova, 68, who spent a quarter-century as headmistress at a high school in the Eastern Estonia in which she served mostly Russian speaking students. The language exams she said is ‘one big humiliating procedure’ (Ivanova, 2010).

Natalya Shirokova an English teacher at the Päe gymnasium said that she was really anxious about the language exams before she took them, during it as well. It was stressful, emotionally speaking. She adds to this it is one of those teacher things. Horrible to make a mistake, to do something incorrect (Levy, 2010a). In honesty, why would someone who fulfills his or her job in a good way at a certain point because of his or her lack of the Estonian
language be banned for giving lessons at schools? It is this where this stress and anxiety comes from and it shows how the Estonian language is being internalized at/within/through schools.

This is also reinforced by the school’s director: Izabella Riitsaar, who is bilingual (2010a). Although Riitsaar is an ethnic Russian she is perfectly integrated in Estonian society. Partly directed by the fact that she married an Estonian guy (Geni, 2011). Besides her managerial qualities, it is this reason, one could argue, that she has become director of the Gymnasium. She ‘serves’ as a role model in what way the Estonian language policies should look like. The political in this story refers to the way of controlling the population at this school. So, her function in this sense is more than the physical controlling of the unit, rather she performs a symbolic function. To put it exaggeratedly, as being ethnic Russian, Estonian and successful at the same time, she is expected to have a lot of authority; an example for the students and someone who the people on this predominantly Russophone school are willing to listen to. She should be an example of how the ‘good citizen’ should behave: learning the Estonian language and obtaining citizenship.

6.1.3 NGO Russian School of Estonia, Young Estonia, Pushkin Institute

NGO Russian School of Estonia is one of the most active actors within the debate on language reforms in education. The aim of the organization is to defend the interests of Russian schools and appeal to compliance with national and international legislation (Vedler, 2012a). Immediately noticeable is the ambivalence in the naming of the NGO. The Russian school of Estonia has a somewhat provocative connotation. Making a short excursion towards the theoretic framework it is explicitly bordering the Russian schools within Estonian territory. It stresses the way this NGO seeks to step out the normalization policies that take place within the arena of education. The organization has the tendency to see the Russian minority as a homogeneous group, just as the Night Watch organization did, something we have seen earlier while describing the Bronze Night. In essence, what the organization is doing is to claim rights for the persistence of Russian schools in Estonia.

One of the main leaders of Nochnoy Dozor (Night watch), Maksim Reva, was elected in the board of the Russian school of Estonia. Together with Dmitri Linter he was accused and arrested for organizing mass riots during the Bronze Night (Vedler, 2012a). After seven months of imprisonment both persons were released on bail. The Estonian International Service described them as radical nationalists who promote Russian chauvinism (Kahar, 2010). Both figures were thus used by the government to personify the hostile ‘them’. Reva has started to play an important role in the active contestation of Russian minorities in Estonia. Another person that was elected as member of the board was the leader of the
Human Rights Center, Semyonov. According to an annual report of the Estonian secret police Semyonov is a person with classic loyalty to Kremlin. His activities, the report noted, are mostly coordinated with the wants of the financiers (Kahar, 2010).

NGO Russian School of Estonia is registered at Alisa Blinstova address in Tallinn, she was just as the other (5) members of the board elected during a meeting with about 140 participants. The organization moved from a rather calms space in terms of the issue, towards one of the hotspots of contestation. During this meeting Russian School of Estonia was taken over from the parents of Tartu city who formed the organization when they were protesting against the merger of two-Russian speaking high schools. Blintsova (38) is mother of two daughters of which both went to Russian-speaking elementary schools of which the older daughter had attended both Estonian and Russian-speaking kindergarten. Further Blinstova has a doctorate in political science and works as a lawyer (Vedler, 2012a). She says:

‘I can write well in Estonian. Speaking is harder, because during the Soviet times, when I went to school, Russians didn't need to learn or speak Estonian.’ (Vedler, 2012a)

The Pushkin Institute is another NGO with close ties to Russkiy Mir. Andrei Krasnolov, the chairman of the institute, however, says that the goals of both organizations, respectively the Pushkin Institute and Russian School of Estonia, are common. The Pushkin Institute however, offers a different approach. One in which students should not suffer, and a way in which they (the students) are not actively involved in their actions to maintain the Russian as language of instruction at Russian schools. An approach that takes place at a more diplomatic level (Vedler, 2012b).

6.1.4 Political actors

Nor as the Russian minority is a homogeneous group, nor is the political elite, just like in any other country. In chapter four, where the legal provisions for the current language reforms are established we have seen that the ruling political elites are wielding language reforms within education. Yana Toom, whose ethnical background is Russian, shows the heterogeneity of the politics (in terms of government). As member of the centre party she became elected for the European parliament in 2014. Before she took seat in the Estonian parliament, she actively defended the rights of minority groups in Estonia, especially the Russophone society (Kund, 2014; "Russian-Speaking Students Seek More Lessons in Estonian," 2014; "Toom Speaks on Change in Center Party, Integration and How She Might Vote on Russia," 2014).
Mikhail Stalnulin, who was the former chairman of the city council of Narva together with Mihkail Kõlvart (former vice-mayor of Tallinn) are key figures within the political sphere too. The three aforementioned key figures are related to the field of education since they fight for keeping the Russian language as the academic language at schools (Kund, 2014; Vedler, 2012a). It is no surprise therefore that exactly the city governments of Narva and Tallinn are amidst the debate of language reforms at schools. It is in these places that a large share of the population is not ethnic Estonian. It is also here that the local governments are ruled by the Center Party, which has, as some have argued, a major loyalty to minority groups. We should therefore, pay attention when speaking about 'the government'. It shows that state politics is not always resonated in other, lower level state institutions.

6.1.5 External factors

Russia plays an important role as well as it comes forward throughout the articles. But, to understand its power relationships Russia needs to have a face, who are the people that speak to and about Estonia, especially with reference to education. It is well known that Putin has great loyalty to his fellow Russians on the other side of the border. This becomes apparent that certain Russian people critically reflect on the language reforms within education. The Russian Ministry of Foreign affairs is one of the actors that come forward in the news articles, just as Foreign Ministry Commission for Human Rights, Constantin Dolgov (Strnad, 2013). It is argued that this is soft-power – the creation of Kremlin-friendly networks in the cultural, economic, political and energy sectors, and the use of public diplomacy and the media (Grigas, 2012).

6.1.6 Defenders of law

To ensure that the reforms in education are respected, the articles that have been questioned here show a wide diversity of institutions and positions that must ensure law enforcement. Of course, the president, Ministry and Minister of Education and science, the
court, the language inspectorate and inspectors (Ilmar Tomusk), the International Security Service. For the government education is one of the key areas to achieve integration. It is their main aim to lower the figure that 30 percent of the 1.3 million people speak Russian as a first language (Levy, 2010a).

6.1.7 Conclusion

In this paragraph this thesis has sought to highlight the actors that come forward from the articles. Within the arena of education a wide array of parties and actors are involved. What it has shown is that education as an arena should not only be perceived as the students or teachers. Education has become an arena for local as well as for state politics; education even has become an international affair. Relating this to the concept of governmentality, education uncovers the diverse power structures that control the population. State politics represent only one side of Foucault's medal. In education, language or the personification of it, the language inspectorate has become ‘the Panopticon’ for Estonianness. Estonian language is the ‘guard’ that should govern the population even when the inspectorate is not physically there. It is the internalization of the Estonian language that should control the self through ‘bio-power’.

Meanwhile all kinds of other actors can be observed that belong to what popularly is called civil society. Not to speak about external powers which seek to destabilize Estonia's domestic matters. This chapter has shown that other discourses are internalized as well as all kinds of (unclear) power structures seek to contest Estonianness.

6.2 Describing what and how?

Having described who the actors are, this paragraph will further debate what acts are performed and how these acts take place. According to the distinguished actors in the previous paragraph, this chapter will result in an overview of what and how these actors are doing to step out of this so-called normalization process.

6.2.1 Russian speaking students

In the previous chapter we already saw that Russian speaking students are one of the main actors in this arena. What did those students do? Well, these students sought for more lessons in Estonian by making a proposal to the Minister of Education and Parliament to institute a minimum number of lessons taught in Estonian in basic schools. Andrei Minejev added a suggestion that lessons in Estonian could be divided over several days of the week, starting with subjects that are helpful in everyday interactions, such as natural sciences and social education. Rather than expressing themselves as being Russian and fighting to
maintain Russian as the language of instruction the students that are central here are keen to cooperate in looking for solutions for the question: how to solve the language-problem in education? ("Russian-Speaking Students Seek More Lessons in Estonian," 2014).

Meanwhile other students are mobilized by NGO Russian School of Estonia through all kind of organized meetings rallies and calls to relevant international institutions, whilst also collecting signatures in support of Russian schools. The NGO, as the founders describe, is in itself a ‘retaliatory action’ of the Russian minority in order to raise public interest for the ‘Russian language’ issue. The council of this association based their claims in the law of the Republic of Estonia. They say:

‘It gives the right to education in their mother tongue, so the law prohibiting teaching in Russian is in conflict with the law about the primary schools and secondary schools.’ (Strnad, 2013)

Recalling article 37 of the Estonian constitution says: ‘the language of instruction in national minority educational institutions shall be chosen by the educational institution. The law governing schools says that the government must approve the use of languages that aren't Estonian.’

Together with the civil association ‘Young Estonia’ they officially warned the government and the Ministry of the Russian federation that the language reforms are against the law; at the same time expressing the concerns about the consequences. In 2011, Russian school of Estonia had collected over 13.000 signatures against the government’s plans to implement language reforms at schools that 60 percent of all subjects in Estonian high schools must be taught in Estonian. Dozens of demonstrations are held in a regular fashion, but the actions organized by the Russian school of Estonia show a more radical approach: they sent about 20 students to the government buildings in Tallinn. They did nothing, except from standing there with taped mouths (Vedler, 2012a).
The most widely supported project in terms of participants is called the ‘roadmap of the Russian school and Russian community in Estonia’. Organized by NGO Russian school of Estonia it is a forum that should result in a roadmap against education reforms. It gained its popularity due to the fact that it gave opportunity for all sympathizers, mainly Russophone students who live in Estonia, to join (Vedler, 2012a).

6.2.2 NGO Russian School of Estonia, Young Estonia, Pushkin Institute

Maksim Reva, one of the leading figures in the struggle for rights for the Russophone community moved to St. Petersburg. As member of the board of Russian School of Estonia he is pretty much involved in the education issue. He moved from Estonia to Russia; in his blog he writes his motivations. The sentence that summarizes his reasons for leaving Estonia is cited below:

‘I praise the Russians dignity that have started to rise the last decennium, Russia has more advanced than the depressive Baltic countries’ ("De avond van de wacht: activist Reva afgestapt van Estland," 2011)

Blintsova, one of the other members of the board of Russian school of Estonia who is a political scientist, is also one of the key figures in preserving education in Russian. She even plans to write her dissertation about the education of minority nations in European countries.
Further she says that NGO Russian School of Estonia has about 100 dues paying members, but teachers don’t join.

‘They (teachers) are afraid of being fired’ (Vedler, 2012a)

6.2.3 Schools: the teachers, the institutions, and other staff

As shown in the section where this thesis has described the actors that are at stake we saw that teachers, directors and other staff at schools are also subjected to the language reforms within education. Most of the teachers, as we saw earlier do what the law obeys them to do. In the case of the Tallinn Päe Gymnasium the situation is even somewhat paradoxical. The institute prides itself on grooming students who can recite Pushkin as well as any Muscovite, meanwhile it places a high value on the quality of its staff and instruction (Levy, 2010a). The contradictory side of this pride is the way the director of the institution actively promotes the teachers to learn the Estonian language. First because it is a perquisite to become and maintain a state official, but second Riitsaar believes that:

‘a person who lives in this country has to speak this country’s language, even though it can create all kinds of problems’ (Levy, 2010a)

As for Russophone state officials, they are being oppressed, brainwashed and internalized by the fact that they must learn the Estonian language. Banning, or being fired because lack of language skills is not just a threat, the government has the power to undertake action as the case of Rosa Ivanova shows. She studied, but every time she didn’t have enough points, it is a humiliating procedure. When the national government got notice of this it pressured the local government of Kothla-Järve to fire Ivanova. She accepted a 30 percentage pay cut and a demotion. Being victimized by the Estonian language policies she reacted:

‘If I were 20 years younger, I would leave at once. Believe me. I would leave for my Russia. My pension is the only thing keeping me here’. (Ivanova, 2010)

Although very rare and a rather risky affair, the Russian Lyceum in Tallinn discharges itself from what is perceived as the norm. For the courses of history and social studies, the institution offers its students material that has been compiled in Russia (“Tallinn Paying for only Additional Russian language classes,” 2014). In so doing, it is in a way thwarting the Estonian government. At this school Russian history is indoctrinated and Russian social rules are internalized. A state of affairs that the Estonian government seeks to prevent at all cost.
What they have learned from the Bronze Night for instance, is how different histories have created specific geographies.

6.2.4 Political actors

So, what makes politicians political actors, and how are they made? All kinds of speech acts, as well organized, tactical actions aim at destabilizing habitual bonds within the political sphere.

Based on their ethnic as well as political backgrounds Toom, Stalnuhin, and Kõlvart have shown major loyalty to the Russian minority in Estonia. Although they fulfill different functions within politics they actively protest the current language reforms in Estonia. In a TV-show “Russkiy Vopros” (the Russian question), broadcasted in April 2011, recently elected members of the parliament Yana Toom and Mihhail Stalnuhin called the fight against education reforms:

‘the war against government and opinion of society’ (Vedler, 2012a)

Rather than using a soft strategy, the terminology has a different and aggressive connotation. Especially when looking at the term war. War in itself has a violent character; it literally means their willingness to physically or verbally fight for the right to maintain teaching in Estonian. Making such statements in a Russophone TV-program is an appeal for action, but could also be seen as an action itself. The data unfortunately does not seem to offer enough evidence to prove whether there is a relationship between this statement and the ones that have been undertaken by Russian students and the Russian school of Estonia. What can be said nonetheless is that a certain statement functions to gain popularity among the Russophone electorate in Estonia. Propagating an alternative discourse, and creating a common hostile among the targeted groups.

Kõlvart’s involvement derives from his period as vice mayor of Tallinn. He gave up his elected position in the parliament to execute his function as vice mayor of Tallinn, because it would bring him closer to the arena of education, since this position controls much of the education reforms. During this tenure he said that the city is planning to sue the government or to change public schools into private schools. Because these schools are free to choose the language of instruction. Some cities tend to go even further as there is talk in the city council of Narva of establishing a private school that belongs to the city. What we see thus is that the governments of Narva and Tallinn differ from national policy goals. The Municipal Administration of Tallinn for instance, called for an amendment to the law on private schools. At the moment, if a state or local government acts as founder, owner or shareholder of a
private school, the same rules are applied to this school as for local schools and the educational language is Estonian. The insisted change will lead to the situation that local governments may choose the language of instruction. They also have earmarked €100,000 to give additional lessons in math and chemistry to high school students, these lessons however are only given in the Russian language. This project was run by the Russian Lyceum, which, as we have seen before, uses materials that have been compiled in Russia ("Tallinn Paying for only Additional Russian language classes," 2014).

By the national government it was seen as a scandal which has led to failed vote of no confidence against Kõlvart. The Reform Party and IRL backed Kõlvart in his operations. Illmar Tomusk, director of the language inspectorate says out of his function that he objects such policies made by the local government of Tallinn. He argued:

‘The most important problem in our whole language policy is the teachers in the Russian-medium schools.’ (Levy, 2010a)

Tallinn’s incentive for more lessons in Russian makes the problem highlighted by Tomusk even bigger. He therefore argues that one should be forced to learn Estonian instead of rewarded to maintain teaching in Russian. The language level of many teachers, Tomusk continues, is lower than what we expect from the students. He therefore defends its agency of language inspectors. He also repudiates critics about how the agency operates. He argues that the language inspectorate is caricatured by the Russian-speaking politicians in Estonia and their allies in Moscow:

‘There are some myths about our work, about how we discriminate. For a democratic society, it is quite common that public servants should know the state language. If a public official is in Russia, he must know the Russian language. If he is in Estonia, he must know Estonian. There is no discrimination.’ (Levy, 2010a)

Yana Toom is also one of the targets of the government. The international Security Service (ISS) made a statement on their website saying that Yana Toom has, in cooperation with the Human Rights Information Center, pressured Tallinn schools to file petitions to the city council of Tallinn. What ISS seeks to say is that they accuse Toom of urging schools to resist language reforms. Two things in particular are worth noticing, first that the statement was only written in the Estonian language. Second, that according to ISS Toom worked together with the Human Rights Information Center, of which Semyonov was the director, who, in turn is in the board of the Russian School of Estonia.
The Tallinn district court however, ordered ISS to rectify the statement on their website. Contrarily, a lower administrative court had previously ruled in the ISS’s favor. On 12 April the ISS notes on their website that they unlawfully made claims concerning Yana Toom. It was an inappropriate judgment and therefore unlawful. ‘The courts’ however, do not operate unequivocal. Local governments therefore complained about the ‘Estonianization’ in court, because in 2012 the government refused to support 15 high schools to continue running. This complaint was rejected immediately by ‘the courts’ itself. Tallinn’s court would justify its decision on the base of the European court, which recognizes ‘the right of the state to protect its national language in order to preserve national identity and development. Meanwhile in Estonia’s capital schools operate with classes in English and Finnish. The fate of Russian schools in Estonia is in the hands of Supreme Court.

6.2.5 Defenders of law

The Minister of Education Jaak Aviksoo continues about the subject of discrimination. He says that he would not be against schools that are supported by Russia, nor is he against schools that are supported by Finland and Germany, because such kinds of schools are also present in Estonia. He even opens opportunities for Russian schools in Estonia; he says:

‘In Estonia there is also an English College and German and Jewish gymnasiuims. I have nothing against the fact that such an agreement was signed and supported by the Russian Federation and that this school in particular would be really in depth with their teaching of the Russian language, literature, culture, economy.’

Nevertheless, he leaves aside the way matters must be taught. He does not speak about the language reforms that involve that at least 60 percent of all lessons must be taught in Estonian. Rather, he expresses what is possible within the law and is nothing out of the ordinary, Russian studies (or any kind of language, literature, culture and economy) can be found everywhere. Of course, he should react this way as a state official, but to some extent it will also be perceived by some as too diplomatic since it does not give reason to what is at stake for the Russian schools in Estonia (not to confuse with the NGO). Thus what he is doing is offering some kind of sham politics.

6.2.6 External factors

As we have seen in the previous section, the actors who meddle in the debate on educational reforms are not only coming from Estonia. We have seen that several authors, but also the Russian key individuals say something about the issue at stake. Russia’s
ministry of foreign affairs made a statement that criticized Estonia in connection with various Russian-language schools opting to teach in Estonian.

‘This decision is not only contrary to the international obligations of Estonia in the field of protection of national minorities, but also violates the provisions of the State Constitution, which indicates that the school chooses the language of the education.’

The Russian foreign Ministry Commissioner for Human Rights, Konstantin Dolgov, considers the decision of the Estonian government to start teaching in Estonian at Russian school as ‘another example illustrating the reluctance of Estonian authorities. He continues on a more aggressive tone, ‘Tallinn (the Estonian government) has been implementing a discriminatory policy of forced assimilation for a long time’.

6.2.7 Conclusion

In the first section, where this thesis sought to describe ‘the who’ that are present in the articles that concern educational reforms we distinguished all kinds of actors. What these actors did and how was discussed in this paragraph. What this paragraph has made especially clear is the intermingling of power relationship. To speak in Foucauldian terms: who governs who? This chapter has shown how Russian discourse through all kinds of activities is internalized within different groupings. Continuously producing discourses that offer individuals as well as organizations knowledge to contest what is perceived as normal. At the same time, the contestation is not simply the contestation between bipolar discourses. In contrast, knowledge as unleashed all kinds of hybrid discourses who are rather difficult to define.

Any naming to describe a group seems an unjustified activity. Within a distinguished group one has been able to distinguish different discourses, calling the Russophone society a homogeneous group seems no right to reality. The teachers that took lessons to learn Estonian, the students who made a proposal to the government for more lessons in Estonia, or the Pushkin institute have a positive, but different attitude towards the implemented reforms. This group seems to show a willingness to learn the Estonian language. Although within this group different backgrounds for learning the language can be observed, they share a common idea that not learning the Estonian language is a no go.

This contrasts sharply with NGO Russian School of Estonia or the Russian Lyceum in Tallinn, which positions themselves as they are not willing to give any of their language rights in education. Their ultimate goal is to maintain Russian as the language of instruction at Russian schools. The taped-mouth-protests or the using of study materials compiled in
Russia are ways to show that they do not want to be subjected to the reforms in education as the government has opted. Obviously, many other (hybrid) discourses could be distinguished since each groupings a milder and lighter ways of dealing with the language reforms. For this thesis however it is only relevant to show the bipolarity within the Russophone community.

The same multiplicity of discourse is also present in the political sphere, ‘the government’ and its institutions of course seek that the rules are being respected and that the implemented rules are within the law. The other side however, within the political sphere, a lot of resistance can be observed. This regards individuals, like Yana Toom, Mihhail Stalnuhin, or Mikhail Kõlvart, but also the city councils of Narva and Tallinn. These cities have high proportions of ethnic Russians and language reforms will hit these cities hardest, which, in turn, will be a potential source for insurrection. Thereby these cities have high concentrations of ethnic Russians who are allowed to join local elections. This has resulted in a composition of the city council and its parties that differs majorly from the national government.

The Estonian government is implementing an assimilation policy, whereby the Estonian language is seen as the key to form a unique identity. Estonia’s big brother Russia loathes this kind of politics. Through all kinds of soft power, they seek to internalize Russians on Estonian soil with Russian speech acts. Thereby they critically respond to this kind of politics.

6.3 Description why (border studies)?

In the previous paragraphs one has been able to see which actors on are involved within the arena of education. Thereafter this thesis has sought to describe in what way and how these actors act within the field of education. In this section the discourses that have been debated previously will in further detail be described and analyzed. Here, more links will be drawn between the data and the theoretic framework. The central question that is raised in this chapter is why do certain actors act as they do? The answers to this question should be found in a wider bordering scheme as this thesis is seeking to work out.

One author of an article has problematized public schools like the Põe Gymnasium and Russian Lyceum, where kids have long been taught in Russian and due to the language reforms, they have turned into linguistic battlegrounds (Levy, 2010a). Schools are places where people, be it teachers, students or other staff, meet. In Estonia these people have different ethnic backgrounds. According to Minghi, borders separate people of different nationalities and identities. In Estonia, language should be seen as one of the most visible aspects of one’s identity. The language reforms that seek to ban the Russian language are
thus a way of bordering the Russian language. Nevertheless, these reforms do not take place without any struggle and are continuously contested.

6.3.1 Russian speaking students

To start again with the Russian-speaking students who made a proposal for more lessons in Estonian. The active involvement of the students in thinking of solutions is rather the opposite side of what one would expect when speaking about how bordering takes place due to the new language reforms. Instead of being bordered, through their active constitution they are rather vanishing a border along de-territorializing lines of flight. The students argue that these reforms would help to prepare them better for the compulsory lessons taught in Estonian in Upper secondary schools, in order to make the transition easier. Minejev, the General Secretary of Student Representative literally says:

‘to ease the burden’ ("Russian-Speaking Students Seek More Lessons in Estonian," 2014)

The quote reveals the fact that the students experience a border that is based in language. Instead of fighting this top-down constructed border they seek for alternatives for overcoming the problem. This group of the Russophone minority therefore is rather positive about the language reforms at schools. Thus what the Russophone students are doing could be seen as an ‘act of citizenship’. They seek to claim rights by making this proposal by creating and through the institutionalization of new power structures, rather than opposing Russianness to Estonianness; they seek to define themselves somewhere in between. Rather than putting the emphasis on a figured world that could be defined as ‘Russian-speaking’, they rather see themselves as ‘students’. Seeing themselves as students, which are in turn people who wish to learn something, the created border based on language seems to have disappeared. It is a way of contesting the border in a more ‘positive’ way.

Meanwhile, other students that are subjected are internalized by other discourses. Voluntarily or not, they seem to propagate a view where the Russian language should be preserved in education. Through all kinds of underlying power structures (financers, NGO, Russian soft power) a Russianness discourse is being internalized within a particular group of the Russian-speaking students; institutionalizing the Russian language as their ‘Panopticon’, as their guard to orderly govern a society. In so doing the internal border based in laws is thus being contested.
6.3.2 Schools: the teachers, the institutions, and other staff

For the teachers however the situation is much more delicate. The vulnerable attitude of many teachers towards the language inspection and their fear for being fired if they won’t be able to pass the language exams makes this specific group fulfilling a different position in this wider bordering debate. One could that showing a willingness to learn the Estonian language as an act of citizenship par excellence, since it gives teachers the right to keep performing their duties. On the other side however, it is exactly what the Estonian policies have as their ultimate goal: bordering Russianness, with Russian language as the main target in order to control its population. An act can thus have various bordering results and makes it a contested space. At the same time, learning the language seems an opportunity to strengthen the border since Russian speaking teachers have the right to educate 40% of all matters in Russian. A way Russianness and the Russian language are able to survive.

At the same time, there are Russian speaking teachers who are willing but haven’t been able in succeeding their language exams. One of the examples is Rosa Ivanova, who studied but every time she didn’t have enough points. She was fired on the basis of her language skills. A clear border is being drawn between her and Estonia, since she says the only thing that keeps her in Estonia is her pension. Language or the personification of it: the language inspectorate has become ‘the Panopticon’ that seeks to control the population. It internalizes teachers and institutions the Estonian language and other forms of Estonianness in order to control its population. As for the case of the teachers, they are being subjected to their own bio-power since although the institution is not always there the belief exists as if they are continuously watched by the language inspectorate.

We have seen that the speech acts made by politicians Kõlvart and Stalnuhin also had a political goal in order to receive more votes during local elections. This has changed the cities of Tallinn and Narva into real borderlands where local governments contest the national governments. At the same time, Tallinn schools like the Päe gymnasium and Russian lyceum (who are receiving support from local governments) have become contested spaces, places where new borders are drawn and redrawn. Those places have become spaces of Russianness, spaces that expose the vulnerability of the internal border in Estonia. Although against the law, the Russian lyceum kept on providing their students learning materials that have been compiled in the Russian Federation. Why? The language reforms are perceived as an inclination of rights for Russian schools in Estonia. Stepping out of the normalization of the inclination of rights of minority groupings this thesis would argue is a clear ‘act of citizenship’.
6.3.3 NGO Russian School of Estonia, Young Estonia, Pushkin Institute

The foundation of NGO Russian School of Estonia in itself could be seen as an act of citizenship. They certainly counter the government's policies in a way that they, through all kind of manifestation, seek to maintain Russian as the language of instruction at Russian schools in Estonia. In the paragraph where this thesis has sought to describe ‘who’ the actors are we have seen that the Russian School of Estonia is led by all kind of prominent Russophone people. One has been able to observe that all kind of power relations have sneaked in within this organization, main figures have close relations with their neighboring country and Russianness discourse is therefore, the main motive from which this organization operates.

The NGO Russian School could be seen as an outgrowth of the Night Watch organization. It seeks to contest the language reforms at schools through demonstrations, petitions, but also statements and acts of the various members of the board. What they do however, is seeing the Russophone minority as a homogeneous group, which all has a common vision on reality. Here we see the crux of the story that it isn't at all, as we will. The NGO Russian School of Estonia seeks to create a banal distinction between Russians and Estonians, whereby ‘all’ Russians are against language reforms. The acts of citizenships by the (Russophone) people that have been discussed previously shine a totally different light on reality and all seek to show a different discourse on the language reforms in education; contesting the border in their own particular fashion: aggressive or peaceful; integration or segregation; antagonizing or cooperative.

6.3.4 Political actors

At the same time politicians are seeking to contest the internal border as well. The question that rises immediately is: can people who already have rights also perform an act of citizenship. Well, as the political trio Toom, Kõlvart, and Stalnuhin have shown, they can. An act of citizenship is here perceived as those speech acts or practices that seek to contest that what is perceived or assumed as if it is normal by law. Within the political sphere they have shown the appeal for a war on government and opinion of society is maybe the perfect example of how politics is letting people getting involved in their pursuance for minority rights. War, which in classical geopolitical terms means a fight for land; someone wants to have something from someone else. War here, must be understood as contesting the language reforms and thus contesting law, meanwhile war has as its aim controlling space, controlling the territorial unit.
6.3.5 External powers

Russian soft power has sneaked in into several layers of society. We have seen that NGO Young Estonia is supported by Russkiy Mir, a Russian financer. Meanwhile, one has been able to observe the loyalty of many members of the board towards the Kremlin. All kinds of methods are being used to internalize Russianness discourse within the Estonian community. Although, not an act of citizenship, it is a method to destabilize internal power relations in Estonia. Exercising soft power seeks to provide the actors at play the necessary resources to mobilize, which might result in acts of citizenship. Russian power, although at first point not visibly manifest, is everywhere within the Russophone society.

Nevertheless, Russian soft power has as its goal controlling/protecting the Russophone minority in Estonia. As said earlier, Russia has traditionally shown loyalty towards Russian minority groups across the border, but what seems overlooked here again is that the Russophone minority is not a homogeneous group, certainly not in the arena of education as this chapter has shown. Thus, the practices of the Russian officials have a clear effect on a wider bordering process, in particular the way they stigmatize the ‘Russian-Estonian’ in Estonian community. From a political point of view, soft power will first enforce the banal claiming of ‘us’ and ‘them’, at the same time the internal border is drawn and redrawn since soft power provides those members within the Russophone minority the necessary ‘resources’ within education to contest the internal border.

6.3.6 Conclusion

What we conclude for this chapter is that education has become a space of contestation. This contestation however, cannot be grouped or defined among a common discourse. Thus, the border, as we can speak of such, is created by Russianness and Estonianness discourse, is, as this chapter has shown an open space of contestation. The internal border is not simply a dividing line of the two mentioned discourses. By raising two simple questions one could see the openness of the bordering. Imagine after reading this chapter where would you put the border? Or how would you define Russianness or Estonianness. It is an impossible exercise and it shows how banal the claiming of ‘us’ and ‘them’ can be.
7. The arena of Labeling

In the previous chapter we have seen that how a language based border is contested in the arena of education. We have seen that power structures are internalized; meanwhile these are subjected to a continual struggle of rights. This has led to a multiplicity of discourses of how to look at the linguistic reforms in education. In this chapter, this thesis seeks to show more empirical data how the internal border in Estonia is contested in the arena of labeling. In chapter four, this thesis already draw the scene for labeling practices, but how must we understand labeling as a practice of contestation. To put it most simply, labeling is describing someone or something in one word or a short phrase ("Labeling," n.d.). Labels per se, do not always tell a full story; therefore it is also important to understand the context in which these labels are used. The way labels are used in broader story tells a lot about one’s attitude and discourse to a particular issue.

In this thesis labeling is the exercise of any actor to provoke a discussion, reject a particular label or reject a whole idea that ‘the being labeled' can't be described as such. This uncovers that labeling is not only a description on someone or something from outside but it have some intrinsic power too. Practically anyone could enter the field of labeling since labeling is done continuously. In this thesis those labels, no matter who, what + how, or why, are being presented that somehow seek to destabilize the state-created border that is ‘created' by labels the non-citizen, non-Estonian, or alien. Thus, labeling is an arena (much more difficult to frame than education) where the norm of citizenship is contested through all kinds of self-labeling, counter-labeling, or by labels made by external (f)actors. In this case, labeling can be done according to one’s identity, but also labels are being put on policies or policy makers, or even on a whole country.

Based on the articles that are subjected to this thesis, this chapter seeks to give the most important actors that are involved in the arena of labeling, the central question that will be raised here is very simple: who labels? Thereafter this chapter seeks to elaborate further on and in what way and how people label each other. In the last section of this chapter the question why will be raised, in the analysis of the question ‘why’ links will be drawn between the data and the theoretic framework.

7.1 Describing who?

Just as in the previous chapter, the question ‘who’ will be raised first. The goal is to give an overview of the empirical data on what kind of actors can be distinguished. Indeed, in the end every person places a certain label on the other. Here those actors will be discussed that
give reason to the continual contestation between Russian-speaking people and Estonian-speaking people that have started to grow after the ‘Bronze Night’. Instead of acts, in terms of doing something, here the main focus will be on the ‘speech acts’. Thereby, the description of ‘the who’ does not only tell who the persons are, but it also reveals what others tell about the actor at play. The actors that are crystallized from the data will be grouped according to their background and ‘place’ in the community.

7.1.1 ‘The man on the street’

In the articles Andrei Zavyalov is one of the people who have a grey passport. He is born in 1984 in Narva, his family relocated to Estonia during Soviet times. He was not automatically granted citizenship. Today, he carries a grey passport, which gives him trouble finding work. Timing is everything he says, if he had been born after Estonia became independent he became a citizen. He says to become a citizen he’ll have to pass language exams. He was never forced to learn Estonian, because during the time he went to school classes were mostly taught in Russian. He says however:

‘I never had much interest in doing the exams, because I am determined to leave Estonia’

(Zavyalov, 2010)

The same story is true for Oleg Bessedin (36) who is an ethnic Russian, he tells that he is just as Zavyalov and among 100,000 other ethnic Russian’s occupied with what he is calling an ‘aliens passport’. He says it is a reminder of a conflicted relationship within this country, and of the explosive ethnic tensions that endure across the former Soviet Union, nearly two decades after Communism’s fall (Levy, 2010b). Vladimir Dzhumkov, a stateless theater director says that they (ethnic Russians) are stuck in the middle, and both sides are taking advantage of us (Levy, 2010b).

Nat, who migrated from Estonia to Switzerland when she was 22, migrated because she did not see any future. She is clear about the way she sees Estonia. ‘The politicians are very stupid. The force of one country depends on the reunion of the population inside of the country. At the moment whoever wants to conquer Estonia can do it,’ she argues (Local-Life, 2014b). Her frustrations derive from the fact that her brother is still not granted Estonian citizenship, and still carries a grey passport.

In the same article of Local-Life (2014b) an anonymous person from Estonia says with an anger and sarcastic tone:
‘OOO if Russians don’t like Estonian rules or do not want to learn the language let them go back to Russia.’ (Local-Life, 2014b)

Having made this quote, the anonymous person draws a parallel between the negro-society in U.S. and argues that some people do not know what they are saying. ‘Now every black or how U call them now African Americans do not like something in the US, so why don’t you suggest them as well to get out of the country back to Africa!’ (Local-Life, 2014b). She argues that most of the ethnic Russians are born in Estonia and says it is their home.

Aleksandr Brokk is ethnic Russian, while he is proud of his language and heritage, all he needs to do is look across the river at the dilapidated Russian fortress city of Ivangoord to which side of the border he wants to live on? His family has lived for generations in Estonia and today he is running a tech park. He continues by saying ‘people come and go. When you cross into Ivangoord straight away you can see the atmosphere there. Who is going to want to join that?’ Aleksandr Pavlov is a 56 year old ethnic Russian who has lived in Narva since the 1970’s and is pretty much integrated according to his background. He is a volunteer at the Estonian Defense League, the Kaitseliit, a voluntary paramilitary that is subordinated to the Defense Ministry. Pavlov however, does not speak Estonian very well.

Vikulov, a local journalist, states in the same article that he is certain that a referendum would prove that Narva’s Russians are loyal to Tallinn. Rock musician Vladimir Cherdakov says that citizenship has too long been a bone of contention for ethnic Russians. The Russians of Narva, call the European Union and NATO their home, and while they may feel the emotional grievances with the Estonian government in Tallinn.

Imbi Paju is an Estonian-born writer and filmmaker living in Finland. In Estonia she is well known for the book she wrote with fellow Finnish writer Sofi Oksanen. The book consisted of a number of essays entitled fear was Behind Everything. How Estonia Lost its History and How to Get it Back. Today she talks a lot about her book at libraries in Russian communities. As we will see in the coming sections, she isn’t labeling or whatsoever. So, basically she does not belong in this chapter, on the other hand she does belong pretty much in this chapter, since no labeling is a way of contesting the border. What and how will be shown in the next paragraph.

7.1.2 The media

Sergei Sotnikov is a Russian Journalist working for a Russian radio channel, NPR. He writes about the tensions in Estonia that mainly take place in the country’s Eastern regions in and around Narva. Many of them carry a grey passport, which makes them not citizens of Estonia.
or anywhere. Although he is a journalist and he should be writing objective material, his Russian background clearly comes forward within the article. Thus, rather than describing him exclusively as a Russian journalist, he should also be considered as a Russian from Russia. It shows how Russian politics and its loyalty towards minorities in other countries are internalized by the Russian citizens. It is this reason, probably why a clear Russian lens has been used in describing the current matters.

Russia Today is one of the main critics about the minority policies in Estonia. For a full understanding, Russia Today is a Russian non-profit organization, but it is being financed by the federal budget of the Russian Federation, by the federal agency for Press and Communication of the Russian Federation. Russia Today has as its main goal to do coverage of all kinds of news items from a Russian perspective in order to give people the possibility to understand Russian values and the domestic situation. Thereby, they make documentary or make comments on everyday life in Russia and about the Russian history. The article that will be discussed here should be seen in the light of the second goal. They write about an Estonian prison that labels the inmates on the basis of language fluency. Citing a letter he had received from a prisoner, Director of the institute of the Estonian language, Urmas Sutrop says that the inmate perceived the circumstances as very humiliating and asked the Ministry of Justice if there is not a law that would prohibit such kind of policies.

7.1.3 Political actors

Within the arena of education Yana Toom was one of the most important actors, so is she in the field of labeling. Her ethnic background, as well as her function as politician makes her amidst of all kind of labeling issues. Her speech acts mainly focus on showing her political integrity. She defends her political practices by saying that everyone is Estonian, only some speak a different language. Fellow MEP-selected members did describe Toom as another Tatyana Zhdanok, The Russian left politician from Latvia who opposed Latvian independence back in the 1990's as a leader of the pro-Soviet Interfront movement, and who is still barred from running for national legislative office as a result (“Toom Speaks on Change in Center Party, Integration and How She Might Vote on Russia,” 2014).

7.1.4 External (f)actors

Labeling goes as far that it does not only label persons based on their place in society. Rather, placing labels does also take place on a country policy. Mainly external forces seem to put labels on Estonia’s minority policies. Mister President of the Russian Federation did
also make a statement on this specific topic. In a general statement directed towards Estonian and Latvian government he says that:

‘I will in the strongest terms enforce that the governments of Latvia and Estonia adhere to a series of recommendations from reputable international organizations, and many recommendations from authoritative international organizations related to a compliance with generally recognized rights of national minorities.’ (Strnad, 2013)

The statement made by the president reveals the loyalty of Russia towards ‘its’ minorities across the states’ border. Instead of using violent ways of intervening in Estonia and Russia, he is addressing the power of reputable NGO in making a clear message for the governments of Latvia and Estonia with regard to the rights of minority groups. High Commissioner for minority rights of Russian federation adds to this that deep ethnic division of the company has remained (Strnad, 2013). The condensing tone in which he uses the word ‘company’ shows his feeling towards the situation in Estonia and Latvia. It looks like he would say, the countries Latvia and Estonia, are just two out of many and it should show towards both countries what the power relations are between Russia and their ‘tiny brothers’.

This paragraph will further describe two ‘special’ external commentators of the minority debate in Estonia: Edward Lucas and James Graff. Lucas is a journalist who has lived in Moscow from 1998 to 2002 when he was bureau chief for the Economist. After this period in Moscow he became central and East European correspondent for the ‘independent and the BBC. Furthermore, he wrote a book ‘the New Cold War’ in which, according to Newsweek’ he built a very strong case for the prosecution of Vladimir Putin. In his article that has been subjected to this thesis, he writes a warning that one should not use the Kremlin’s loaded lexicon. Here he discusses how Putin and ‘his friends’ label its fellow Russians across the borders of the Russian Federation (Lucas, 2014).

James Graff is a musician who came to Estonia because of love. His girlfriend studies at Tartu University. In his blog on ‘why Estonia sucks’ he labels Estonia in all kinds of ways from a foreigner perspective. His blog should have an exaggerating effect. In this blog, he also makes important references to Estonia’s minority issue.

‘The main intent of the post (and hopefully of most of my activities) is to ease suffering in the world. I am really simply speaking from my heart and mind - the truth - (something that post-soviet, nationally trained Estonians don't do very well yet) from a simple perspective: In what ways does Estonia "suck"?’ (Graff, 2008)
7.1.5 Defenders of law

President Ilves, who grew up in New Jersey and went to college in the U.S. before returning to Estonia after Soviet times, steadfastly defends his country’s policies towards Russian ethnic minorities. Ilves calls the grey passport ‘a compassionate gesture’, giving ethnic Russians without citizenship the ability to travel abroad. He said:

‘Said the majority of ethnic Russians left stateless after Soviet rule have successfully obtained citizenship, are generally happy to live in a free democratic country.’ (Ilves, 2010)

He continues by arguing that there is a minority who feels a connection to Russia and its language, and has shown little or no interest in learning Estonian.

7.1.6 Conclusion

In the previous section this thesis has sought to highlight the most important actors that come across the subjected articles. The actors show again the multiplicity of discourses that are being produced. None of the actors have shown signs of speaking in terms of a specific common discourse. Rather we should see each and every actor as a unique person internalized by mixtures of discourses that cannot be grouped accordingly. Where one was able to see the arena of education as a field of contestation that is created by political elites (in terms of laws); the arena of labeling has already been created with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The arena cooled down, since the uproar in 2007 when Estonia’s minority issue was given new life. Most of the news articles that have been used to extract data for the arena of labeling do not date back before 2008. Although labeling practices have always continued, the ‘Bronze Night’ has awakened the naming and framing of minorities in Estonia.

This paragraph has also shown that labeling practices transcend the ‘non-citizen’. It is not simple those who have ‘no rights’ that seek to contest the internal border in Estonia. Already the first signs of internalized power structures are visible that also those ‘who have rights’ are determined to contest the internal border Estonia through all kinds of labels. What and how these labels look like will be discussed in coming chapter.

7.2 Description what and how?

In the previous paragraph we have shown who is at stake. Again, it is not just simply a matter of ethnic Russians against Estonians or whatsoever. Instead this thesis has chosen not to split up the actors in any sense. Splitting up the actors based on any characteristic would
frame the people into a certain box. Here we will further describe what and how labels are being used in order to place themselves within a certain discourse.

7.2.1 ‘The man on the street’

Sergei Zavylov describes himself as an *Estonian-Russian*, one out of roughly 100,000, labeling them as “*aliens*”. He continues by saying that he is a nobody in Estonia, ‘I am an alien with no citizenship’. He says that Estonians and ethnic Russians don't feel love toward each other. He says that he is being labeled by Estonians as an ‘*occupier*’ of their country (Zavyalov, 2010). Although he says he is a nobody, he clearly steps out of this position. He is using all kind of labels to describe himself. Oleg Bessedin says something similar he is *not Estonian, nor a citizen of anywhere else* as if they (*aliens*) are *refugees in their own homeland* (Levy, 2010b). The anonymous person refers back to the ‘Bronze Night’ and argues:

‘*Yes Estonians hate Russians and it is sad.*’ (Local-Life, 2014b)

The government didn’t give the date for monument movement, they didn't give people a chance to go and say goodbye to it. Instead they dragged the monument in the night like something shameful. In other words, the government is making up their own and particular history, and through this it is creating a common hostile to create their own specific geography.

‘*Estonia is always been under somebody, Dutch, Germans and so on, but no only thing they remember is bad Russians. Do you know that during Dutch and German governing Estonians were slave and they had no Estonian speaking schools! And During Russian time they had all this.*’ (Local-Life, 2014b)

At the same time he or she does not defend Russia in any sense, but it is time to shake hands, Russians and Estonians. The anonymous person seeks to propagate a different history in Estonia, by showing that Soviet time was not as worse as German or other occupiers. He or she is proud of the country as it is now and wants to move on; she sees a bright future for Estonia as a country. Imbi Paju, the Estonian writer and film maker tells her audience during her talks in libraries in Russian communities that mutual suffering should be inspiring the two communities to build something better. And she is really optimistic about the relations between Estonians and Russians: they can improve. Nevertheless, citing Paju, ‘*language is our identity*’ (Paju, 2010).
Nat from Switzerland seeks to agree on creating a new a profound history in Estonia, literally she says:

‘Russians living in their own community and Estonians are very hostile towards them; like those Russians personally participated in killing Estonians 60 years ago. And let me remind you, that at Stalin’s time not only Estonians were killed and been sent to Siberia but the other nationalities as well, among of them mostly were Russians. At that time it wasn’t about the Estonian nationality but about enemy status, politics and much more.’ (Local-Life, 2014b)

There are two ways in which this person seeks to label. From the perspective of the Estonians, Russians have been ‘chosen’ to be a common enemy. At the same time she labels Estonians and Russians as equal in a way that both have been victims of Stalin’s regime. In line with one has been able to observe previously she seeks to propagate a new common history. Nevertheless, she is quite critical towards the current policies regarding ethnic minorities in Estonia and she argues that a game is being played by the politicians in order to be elected by the nationalists (Local-Life, 2014b). It shows that she does not label the Estonians in general as nationalists, instead she says that the national government are nationalists, something that is expressed by the policies that are implemented.

Aleksandr Brokk calls himself an ‘Estonian patriot’ (Balmforth, 2014), and so does Aleksandr Pavlov. A label that is quite remarkable since both are ethnic Russians and live in Narva, a place where the lingua franca is Russian, Russian media is the main source of news, and orange/black St George ribbons symbolizing military victory adorn cars. Brokk’s opinion is not unusual in Narva, most people have become accustomed to their stable and predictable lives on the EU’s eastern frontier. Uglov, a successful businessman praises the lack of corruption, the security of property rights and the ease of doing business in Estonia (Balmforth, 2014). So the patriotic ideas that live in Narva do not derive from the ‘love’ for Estonian identity, rather it is rooted in economical stability and prosperity that makes them having a positive attitude towards Estonia.

‘There is a certain mistrust of residents of Narva and the northeast. There is an expectation that, one day, at some critical moment, local people will turn their back on Estonia and toward Russia and do exactly what they did in Crimea, that is, to vote to be in the Russian Federation I am certain a referendum here would provide precisely the opposite result.’ (Balmforth, 2014)

The quote made by Narva journalist Vikulov goes to the core of the sentiment in the Russian community. The ultimate aim of finally put to rest the tensions between Russians and Estonians that have festered since independence. Here, he makes a clear distinction.
between the Russians in Crimea and the Russians in Estonia. He seeks to avoid a common label for all Russians that seeks to live outside the borders of the Russian Federation. Instead he seeks to show in what way Russians are different in their attitude.

Aleksandra (22) who is at university to become a teacher at a primary school says she feels trapped between two worlds – not quite Russian, nor fully Estonian.

‘We are an island, cut off from the world. We don’t belong either to the Russians who live in Russia or to the Estonians here. We are a little community with its own order. Now I speak to some Russians from Russia and we have moments when we do not understand one another.’ (Balmforth, 2014)

7.2.2 The media

Russian journalist Sotnikov and newsstation Russia Today seem to offer a different reality. Sotnikov first, says that the region around Narva, near the Russian border is a source of tensions. He describes the places along this border he describes as working class cities and the people that live in these cities are part of what amount the underclass. In other words, one could interpret his words by saying that the regions of which he speaks about are mainly inhabited by Russophone people and therefore the Russophone society is the underclass of the Estonian community.

Russia Today go even further in their critical reflection on Estonian state’s labeling policies and make notice of a prison where labels are being used to classify inmates on the basis of language fluency. The prisoners now bear the letter A, B, or C on their clothes. Those who barely are able to communicate are labeled with A, B is reserved for those with average level of the Estonian language and fluent speakers are tagged with C. Inmates who cannot speak at all are not marked in any way. Labeling in this sense, is taken very literally. Even within a prison labels are being used to distinguish who belongs to who. Russia Today describes these practices as:

‘The practice is reminiscent of how Nazi Germany marked Jews, homosexuals and other categories of people in death camps.’

The practices that take place within the prison are compared to the practices of Nazi Germany during World War 2. It is a clear message that Russian media, and therefore Russia in general do not accept such labels as they are being put on prisoners. One of the inmates has been able to write a letter to the Director of the institute of the Estonian language in which he wrote that the kind of labeling on basis of language skills is very humiliating.
7.2.3 Political actors

Yana Toom has been called upon that her Center Party was becoming a ‘Russian party’, a comment both heard outside as well as inside the party. Well, she reacts on this statement by saying that 60 percent of the votes were from Estonians; 40 percent of non-Estonians. Instead of using the labels Estonian-Russians or Russians she rather uses the word non-Estonians in order to move away from the statement that the party of which she is a member has become a Russian party. This because not all non-Estonians are ethnic Russians. She says that such statements are created by the Estonian newspapers and television broadcasts. ‘The situation is not how it is painted by the Estonian media’. ("Toom Speaks on Change in Center Party, Integration and How She Might Vote on Russia," 2014). Toom, as a politician whose personal political goal is to create awareness for the minority groupings in Estonia, continues by labeling her party and positioning it within the political landscape. Overall, her party, she says, is a true Estonian party, only some members speak Russian. When she discusses the people within her party she distinguishes Estonians and Russians, instead of labels like Russian-speakers which she has been using earlier. All in all, the two realities that have been presented both by Toom and by the Estonian media ‘is a slippery path’:

‘I've always said that we are all Estonian, just that some of us are Russian speakers. [...]I see no reason that Edgar Savisaar should be replaced with me any time in the future. Kadri Simson and Jüri Ratas are undoubtedly our stars, have fervent beliefs, and they're Estonians on top of it. I don't think we have any Russians who are prepared to take over the party, and Stalnuhhin and I don't have that ambition.’ ("Toom Speaks on Change in Center Party, Integration and How She Might Vote on Russia," 2014)

As we saw earlier this thesis, Toom is also elected for the European Parliament she received 25,000 prefential votes from Estonian citizens. Because of her ethnic background and political goals, she is often labeled as a traitor. She clearly is not happy with the envy she encounters. Instead of labeling her as a politician who does not renounce her roots, she is clearly not happy how she is presented as a traitor by the Estonian media, because she has been chosen into the European Parliament on a fair basis. Although she is probably aware of the fact that Estonian media are being used for a bigger political game, she cannot understand why people would describe her as such.

‘But 25,000 of our voters are Estonian citizens [sic] and if we start labeling people for making the wrong choice, that if I’m a traitor then 25,000 people are also traitors, that isn’t normal

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3 Only Estonian citizens have the right to cast a vote in European elections.
for anyone to start her post at the European Parliament this way.’ (”Toom Speaks on Change in Center Party, Integration and How She Might Vote on Russia,” 2014)

7.2.4 External (f)actors

Vladimir Putin does not tolerate the existence of the disgraceful term of non-citizen. By law, as shown earlier, people who do not have Estonian or Russian citizenship are labeled as non-citizens or aliens. Although he focuses on the naming, he rather alludes the political status of these people.

‘How can we accept the fact that every sixth Latvian resident and every thirteenth citizen of Estonia is a “non-citizen”, deprived of basic political, electoral and socio-economic rights and the ability to freely use the Russian language?’ (Strnad, 2013)

High commissioner for minority rights of Russia adds to that nationalism and insensitive treatment are the labels to be put on the Estonian way of labeling its undefined citizens. Putin and the commissioner both argue that determined citizenship should not be dependent on the fact which language you speak or what roots your parents have; instead citizenship should be based on the fact where one is born; even if someone has been born during a period of perceived oppression. It is again showing loyalty towards fellow Russians that live across the border.

In his blog ‘why Estonia sucks’, based on his experiences American James Graff is putting all kinds of labels on Estonia to describe how he perceives the country. At first glance, this seems no contribution to this thesis, but in fact it is. James Graff is a non-Estonian as well, but in contrast to actors that have been discussed earlier: he has rights, is not an Estonian nor a Russian and most of all he dares to share his thoughts. Summing up some of his labels one immediately is able to notice his reluctance towards Estonia, he says Estonians are: Greedy selfish neocapitalists, nationalists, Neo-Nazis (reaction what a man on public TV said when he was asked what should be done about all the foreigners in Estonia? Shoot them! The man answered), arrogant, and xenophobic with a Post-Soviet mentality. The ethnic Russians in Estonia he labels them as alcoholics and they have no soul (Graff, 2008)

Graff is the first who is really questioning the language policies and the attitude of the policy makers towards minority languages. He labels the non-citizens as refugees and asks the question in what way the Estonian language as key part of Estonian identity will make the country prosper. He is speaking as the advocate of the devil and argues that Russian is a more valuable language.
‘Estonia is the only country that I know of that requires every citizen to speak one certain language - Estonian - even though over a third of the population speaks an entirely different (and in my opinion immensely more valuable, diverse, culturally rich, etc. language) - Russian - and this is why Estonia has the largest population of refugees anywhere in the world!! (Estonian is not only virtually utterly useless outside of Estonia - it is often times - a third of the time - utterly useless within Estonia!)’ (Graff, 2008)

Edward Lucas meanwhile discusses how many Westerners have picked up the terminology that is being used by the Kremlin. No one for instance should accept Russian-speaker as a political label. Lucas is a Russian-speaker himself, such as many others who deal with Russia on a professional basis. In some countries Russian is the state language, but it doesn't mean that those people have affiliation with the Kremlin or whatsoever. Native Russian speaker is almost as useless. The one language they learn first may not be the one they end up speaking at home, or at work, or most fluently. Mixed marriages may have several languages: one for the children, one for each set of grandparents, plus another one for the country they are living in (Lucas, 2014). At last, Lucas describes ethnic Russian, which is equally slippery:

‘Is this simply a question of a surname? Or prescribed by some modern version of the Nuremberg laws? Or is it a matter of choice and self-description? Clearly it is not an exclusive category. You can be “Russian”, but also “Jewish” – or something else. I have a friend who is proudly Russian and Jewish and also Estonian (fiercely) by political orientation. When you read the word “ethnic” try to mentally substitute “racial”, to remind yourself how prescriptive, rigid and offensive the term is.’ (Lucas, 2014)

7.2.5 Defenders of law

At the same time, main defender of the law, president of the Republic of Estonia Ilves defends all policies that have been made in order to create a new independent and stable state. As said earlier he thinks the grey passport is a compassionate gesture for those ethnic Russians without citizenship. Meanwhile, he steadfastly defends the language policies in his country:

‘Allowing Russian to exist as a secondary, official language would be letting the Soviet legacy live on. Well, right, you (Russia) occupied us, now you're going to make your language the state language? That's just too much, so many people who come here and want to be here have no difficulty with the language.’ (Ilves, 2010)
President Ilves defends the citizenship policies as for those who do not obtain for it and keep on speaking Russian they are the reminescence of Soviet time. Something, as we saw in earlier chapters, that the national Estonian government seeks to ban.

7.2.6 Conclusion

The labels that are being placed on the actors vary widely. Some place labels on a more personal matter. In so doing, some label whole groups and others seem to label a country or a certain policy. Each label tells us which discourse a certain person or actor has on reality. Again we see an intermingling of different discourses, wherein ‘the Russophone minority’ does not exist. In contrast, we see that within this specific group a variety of attitudes can be distinguished. External factors meanwhile also question the country’s policies regarding ethnic minorities, and therefore place a label on both the actors as well as on the country. All these labels do not resonate ‘the Estonian’. Instead, the labels that are deployed here show all kinds of de-territorializing lines of flight.

7.3 Describing why (border studies)?

According to Isin’s guideline the last question that should be raised is ‘why’ do people label as such. In the previous section(s) this thesis agreed on whom is labeling and what and how he or she labels. This paragraph seeks to analyze why people are using these labels. Since it is difficult to agree whether why an act of citizenship takes place the analysis will be done from a broader bordering perspective. Why do certain labels contest a border is the central question here. Putting a label on the ‘other’ tells a lot about what ‘us’ thinks about the ‘them’ and vice versa. At the same time, self-labeling can tell the same story. Labeling uncovers something else too. The labels show how discourses are produced and reproduced within a community and among a society.

All the discussed actors have certain common ways to describe themselves, as well as to describe the other. General labels like ethnic Russians, Russian-Estonians, or Russians are used to describe the minority that now represents one third of the total Estonian population. How general these labels are and how bandied these terms are used they reveal a lot about one’s identity. Therefore it is important to know who uses these labels and in what kind of context.
7.3.1 ‘The man on the street’

7.3.1.1 Self-labeling of the ‘non-citizen’

Take Zavyalov for instance, who described himself as an Estonian-Russian, speaking in border terms this label shows that he feels more compassion with Russia, meanwhile he does not forget where he was born. At the same time Zavyalov says Estonians hate Russians, which he finds sad. You immediately recognize the difference; he continuously draws and redraws the internal border in Estonia. Further he labels himself through the Estonian state internalized notion of an ‘alien’, as a nobody. Something that could be interpreted as if he recognizes no border at all, meanwhile he is completely bordered because of the lack of rights. Furthermore, he says that he is labeled by the government as an occupier of their country, which is part of creating a common enemy. Thus every label gives the border a different meaning. This does not mean that each label is an act of citizenship. It are those labels, which have as purpose to step out of the normalization of the Estonian government by treating the minority groups as non-citizens/non-Estonians. In the case of Zavyalov one could argue that that he labels himself as someone, he is a Russian, he is an Estonian-Russian, and, at the same time, he labels himself as he is labeled as an occupier of the country, which as this thesis have shown to highlight are clear ‘acts of citizenship’ and contesting the internal border in Estonia in its own provocative way by not resonating the particular label of the ‘non-citizen’.

Bessedin goes a bit further and labels himself and the non-citizens as refugees in their own homeland. According to the Geneva treaty a refugee is a person who is outside their home country because they have suffered (or feared) persecution on the account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or because they are a member of a persecuted social category of persons or because they are fleeing a war. Thus taken this concept literally, the group of which Bessedin is part of could be seen as a persecuted social category. Although persecution is not exactly the word that should be used here, the people at stake label themselves as being bordered by the Estonian government since they are given minimal rights. It also shows how non-citizens are internalized by their fragile position. They position themselves as if they don’t know better.

7.3.1.2 Writing a common history

The anonymous person questions why Russians are chosen as a common hostile. Although she/he claims that the Estonian officials are writing their own particular history for higher political purposes, she does not understand in what way Russians differ from the Dutch or Germans (one remark has to be made though: she does not know much about Estonian
history, because the Dutch have never been there). As a probably Russian man or woman she tries to actively give a different meaning to what happened in history. The Netherlands and Germany are friends of Estonia, why can’t Russia be one? The person critically analyzes how history is written and internalized, here she justly draws a parallel between the removal of the Bronze Soldier and how non-Estonians are treated in Estonia. Although this thesis does not seek to point out whether her claim is justified or not, she clearly steps out of the normalization procedures by labeling Russia as a country that is no different from Germany or the Netherlands. It could be argued thus that this is a clear act of citizenship. She is in her particular way questioning, through creating a new history and geography, a border that has been drawn between her, Estonia and Russia.

Nat from Switzerland also proposes a common history in which both Russians and Estonians have been subjected to Stalin’s cruelties. It is an act of citizenship since she wishes to say that Russians do not differ from Estonians, they both have suffered. It is not fair to punish us, and pushing ‘Russians’ into a corner because a guy 60 years ago sent all our families because of political goals to prison camps in Siberia. At the same time she is using labels like Russians and Estonians to show a banal distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ whereby she belongs to Russian side of this distinction. At the same time, she seeks to propagate a new and alternative history whereby ‘Russians’ and ‘Estonians’ are not different. At the same time she actively promotes an alternative vision of the internal border (act of citizenship); meanwhile looking at her language use and particular way of labeling the distinction between Russian and Estonians is pretty much internalized.

Meanwhile Paju, who is ethnic Estonian, also writes her own specific history for Estonia. And that mutual suffering should be inspiring for the two communities to build something better. Here the crux is already visible, she sees two separate communities in Estonia which she labels as Estonians and Russians. It is a way of labeling that is internalized within ethnic Estonians. The internalization of the Estonian discourse goes even further because Paju argues that ‘language is our identity’. She is drawing and redrawing the border between those who speak Estonian (Estonians) and those who speak Russian (Russians) and it is the banality that is indoctrinated within many Estonians.

7.3.1.3 True ‘Estonian patriots’

Brokk and Pavlov, being ethnic Russians, called themselves Estonian patriots, as a true act of citizenship. They do not forget their roots of which they are proud, but they recognize how good life is on the Eastern shore of the Narva river. Vikulov argues that this is the way how many Russians of Narva are thinking. Although Narva is a real Russian place where Russian identity can be found on each corner of the street, most people that live in this city feel love
towards Estonia. It shows how Narva is becoming a borderland where Russianness and Estonianness seem to go hand in hand. At the same time a new internal border is in the making, as well as a border is vanishing. Here the internal border is 'on the move', indicating that the border is contested.

7.3.1.4 The Russians of Narva

Zavyalov, Vikulov, Brokk Pavlov, and 22-year old student Aleksandra are all people who live in the city of Narva. They label themselves as Russians from Narva. Not truly Estonian, nor fully Russian. This comes forward in their wide variety of labels, some label themselves as true Estonians, others label themselves as Russian, meanwhile others are stuck somewhere in between. Narva has become a real borderland where a multiplicity of discourses are produced and reproduced where new power structures are created and recreated, sometimes against all odds. The labels they are using show a refusal to define themselves as being part of the non-citizen or non-Estonian. Instead they actively create a new labels that are 'somewhere in between', they seek to propagate alternative labels for defining their own particular identity.

7.3.2 The media

Sotnikov has labeled the inhabitants of Narva as the underclass of Estonian society. First of all he sees the community of Narva as a homogeneous entity, something that does not right to reality as we saw previously. This way of classifying is very common for Russian media to exaggerate the neglected position of the non-Estonians/non-citizens in Estonia. However, this clearly comes from a Russianness discourse that aims at infiltrating in Narvation community. Creating a picture of how bad they are being treated. Thus, Narva is not only a borderland where Russianness and Estonianness seek to contest; rather Narva is being used by Russian media to describe how Russians in Estonia are being bordered.

Labeling based on class even takes place within Estonian prisons as Russia Today. In this particular prison labels are being used to indicate the language skills of the inmates. Something the inmates have experienced as humiliating. The prison therefore is being 'panopticized' by the Estonian language. If you want to govern the self properly, to be good citizen, one should learn the Estonian language since you do not wish to belong to the underclass of a community. Nevertheless, an act of citizenship is observable by one of the inmates since he seeks to contest the labeling practices to which he is subjected. As a non-citizen he wrote a letter in which he asked if the practices are justified or not, contesting the internal drawn border.
At the same time Russia Today labels these kinds of policies as ‘Nazism’. With such hard terms they seek to internalize an anti-Estonian discourse. In labeling the discussed prison-policies in this particular way, the Russian media seeks to conquer Estionianness. Creating a picture of how hostile the language policies are in Estonia and their policies even internalizes the remotest spheres of society. In a place where people are supposed to be equal, borders are being made, and at the same time, being contested; both by critical reflection as well as through acts of citizenship.

7.3.3 Political actors

Yana Toom can best be described as the personification of the contested internal border in Estonia. Being Russian, being Estonian, being successful, being political (both in terms of governing the self as well as in terms of politics), being labeled as traitor, at the same time true Estonian. The discussed texts have shown that she is continuously labeling and being labeled. Sketching differences between Russians and Estonians, similarities between Russian-Estonians and Estonian and counter-labels to show how Estonian, as well as how Russian her political goals are. She opens up the complexity and multiplicity of the internal borders in Estonia. Her particular way of acting opens opportunities for more than one interpretation of Estionianness and Russianness. The acts she performs need courage and bravery and she seeks to contest Estionianness, meanwhile she also contests Russianness.

7.3.4 External (f)actors

The acts of the Russian officials should simply be seen in the light of indoctrinating Russianness on Estonia in order to destabilize the normalization practices of the Estonian government. In so doing, Russian politics, attacks the label of the non-citizen as if it a nationalistic game and insensitive treatment of the government. It is an internalization of a common hostile, something wherefore Russian media are also being used. As this thesis has sought to work out, the internal border in Estonia is an open space, not defined by any (opposing) discourses or whatsoever. Interpreting the border as an open space makes it also contestable from outside. Thus how Graff and Lucas (ref-)use labels to describe reality is a bordering practice in itself. They are contesting the internal border by means of describing their own reality. Implicitly, when they label, they continuously ask themselves: where’s the border? Graff for instance draws a border between Russians and Estonians. The multiplicity of labels he uses to describe Estonia(ns) in an exaggerating way shows how he thinks about the implemented policies. Estonia is putting too much emphasis on controlling its (Estonian) population on the basis of citizenship and language. On the other side, he describes the Russians as alcoholics with ‘no soul’. Here he makes a reference to
the Russian soul, something that is used in Russian literature to describe Russian spirituality. Interpreting Graff freely: he probably thinks that the Russians in Estonia seek to identify themselves with Russia, but are not Russian at all. So, Graff reveals a contested border within its labeling. He is labeling Estonia(n(nes)s) and Russia(n(nes)s) in all kinds of ways. Although he is not limited in rights, one could argue that he is that is practices are ‘acts of citizenship’. His provocative texts have an ambitious aim, that is to say ease suffering in the world. Graff’s speech acts (for which he uses labels) are thus a clear way of destabilizing the internal border in Estonia.

Lucas seeks to point out those internal bordering practices in Estonia and elsewhere in the former Soviet Union states have moved beyond the country’s boundaries. He argues that Russian language is normalized within Estonian/Western thought. He argues that the Kremlin has internalized taken-for-granted labels. It’s a sinister Kremlin discourse that these terms carry. People who are labeled or label themselves as Russian-speakers, ethnic Russians, or native Russian speakers have the tendency that they are grouped according a Russianness discourse. It is the simplicity of this banal claiming that can lead to absurdity. Lucas’ act is thus an act of what I would call ‘derogation’. His critical analysis shows that internal bordering is a contested matter.

7.3.5 Defenders of law

Ilves uses labels to make a clear thrust between discourses: Russianness vs. Estonianness. As we have seen earlier, the current policies in Estonia seek to ban everything that is reminiscent to Soviet times. He labels the Russian language as a symbol of Sovietism. As the ‘main-defender’ of the law he seeks to internalize, order and classify the Russian language as a common hostile.

7.3.6 Conclusion

First of all, labeling is a difficult arena to grasp. Labeling is not simply putting labels on the other. Labeling is an activity that surpasses the personal. Policies, persons, groups, places are labeled in order to classify something, by meaning of ordering. This makes the arena of labeling an arena of contestation, since these ordering practices are not teleological. What this and the previous chapter have sought to show is how all kinds of discourses seek to contest the ‘what is perceived as normal’. The labels that are being used by the discussed actors seek to step out of this normalization. The involved actors continuously constitute themselves against the other, creating a wide variety of discourses contesting the banally claimed distinction between Russianness and Estonianness.
8. Conclusions

In this thesis, a practically new field of border studies has been researched. It has sought to widen the scope of borders as if they are open, and are continuously contested both from within, as well as from outside. Instead of understanding borders and bordering as the ongoing process of banally separating ‘us’ and ‘them’, borders in this thesis are continuously drawn and redrawn, and are therefore contested spaces. Rooted in the post-structural concept of ‘governmentality’, which recognized that governing is more than the top-down ordering of things, and a critical geopolitical lens, this thesis has sought to show that borders are contested by all kind of acts of citizenship. This critique must be understood as those practices by any actor that seeks to step out of what is socially as well as by law accepted as normal. In so doing, new discourses are produced and taken-for-granted power relations have been questioned. In order to substantiate the discomfort with current studies Estonia borderland has been chosen as case for this thesis.

According to the post-structural tradition this thesis will not end up in ‘structure knowledge: ideas boiled down to their ‘essence’, bullet points, lists of ‘key ideas’, clear statements of what the issues are, fairly definite conclusions’ (Wylie, 2006, p. 298). Instead, the raised central question is open and vulnerable for critique and should be seen as an encouragement to debate the too long taken for granted assertions within current border studies. Linking empirics to the theory several conclusions can be drawn from this research. The most important one derives from the central question, which will be reiterated here: How should citizenship based on language requirements be seen as form of internal bordering and how are these borders contested through acts of citizenship within the arenas of education and labeling?

8.1 Contested borders

Engin Isin has developed a guideline for what he has called ‘acts of citizenship’. As a starting point, the Bronze Night (the removal and the following riots that happened as a consequence) has been described as a moment of ‘when’ the event of contested borders was re-awakened in Estonia. In describing this, one has been able to see how the ‘Bronze Night’ produced spaces of Russianness and Estonianness discourse. It has been a more symbolic moment in time that revitalized the ongoing struggle between Estonians and non-Estonians. Having described this moment of instability this thesis has sought, without making too much explicit reference to the Bronze Night, to describe how this moment has sneaked in within the arenas of education and labeling. Education has become an arena due to the government implemented language reforms at Estonian schools, meanwhile labeling became
an arena since the ‘Bronze Night’ showed the fragile positions of the non-citizen and the ‘ethnic Russian minority’ in general.

8.2 Contested arenas

Although completely different, the arena’s which have been called ‘education’ and ‘labeling’ have proven to be contested spaces. In the field of education one has been able to see, that the government has used education to limit the Russian language in everyday life. The laws that have been implemented into education had as its goal to enforce the Estonian language as the state language. Nothing special when speaking in bordering terms since the Estonian state seems to aim at creating a common ‘us’ and a hostile ‘them’. The government’s aim is to internalize Estonianness discourse at schools, and creating a border between those who speak Estonian and those who not speak Estonian. In terms of Foucault’s governmentality this is the hierarchical normalization of the Estonian language as perquisite to be able to politically, economically and culturally participate in Estonian community.

Nevertheless, this thesis has sought to go beyond the banal claiming of us and them. The language reforms as they are being called have led to major debate including all kinds of actors distracted from all layers of the Estonian community as well as the reforms received critique from external officials. Taking a closer look at the actors already unveils an important matter that the existing power relations in Estonia are anything but hierarchical and clear. According to Foucault, being in possession of power, means controlling the territorial unit. But, when these power structures are unclear, where does one’s power stop? And what about bio-power? Or, where should one draw the border? These are exactly the questions that come up having made the analysis. Since power is everywhere, controlling the unit is a difficult exercise. All kinds of acts of citizenship are the result of produced and reproduced discourses that seek to contest the often-for-taken granted border constructed by the state.

8.3 The ‘openness of borders’

The data that has been presented in this thesis has shown that ‘us’ and ‘them’ are unjustified terms. Within the arena of education there is no such thing as ‘the Russophone minority’. To be political, the question who governs who can’t be answered here. This thesis has shown for the arena of education that the political function of the borders should be questioned. In education within the so-called Russian minority, discourses differ per person, per group, per age, per function etc. The acts that have been discussed have shown a wide variety of Russianness and much more hybrid forms. The normalized border between Estonianness and Russianness, between Estonian language and the Russian language, between Estonian schools and Russian schools is contested continuously and in wide variety. Creating new
hybrid forms of Estonianness and Russianness discourse, this has made schools spaces of contested borders as ‘open borderlands’.

At the same time, bordering practices within the field of education go beyond the teachers, students or educational (related) institutions. Both state and local politicians and governmental institutions are contesting the internal border as well. They seek to dispute the internalization of Estonianness at schools. Even external factors seek to contest the internal border in Estonia, mainly through the use of so-called 'soft power'. Thus within education ‘us’ is continuously contested, meanwhile the ‘other’ is contesting and vice versa.

The same can be said for the arena of labeling. Governmental practices have sought to create an internal border ‘us’ and ‘them’ based on labeling person. Citizens are those who pretend to be a ‘good’ Estonian, specifically those who have a specific level of the Estonian language. Meanwhile non-citizens, non-Estonians or aliens are those who do not fit within this ‘Estonianness discourse’ from which the state government operates. As the chapter regarding labeling has shown, these labels are being contested by all kind of labeling of the self, labeling the other, or counter labeling. Labeling is not simply an activity that is being done purposely, but labeling has sneaked in everywhere; including this thesis.

Again by means of self-labeling we have seen a wide variety of labels among the minorities in Estonia. This counters the banal claiming of ‘us’ and ‘them’. Each person is producing its own discourses, institutionalizing and creating its own forms of Russianness and Estonianness. Some actors that have come forward in the description defined themselves as Russians, others defined themselves as Estonian and many more are in-between. Meanwhile, ‘top-down created labels’ are, just as in the arena of education, also contested within the field of politics. Ruling national parties label other parties as Russian, other politicians meanwhile, label the ruling elite as nationalists. What this shows is that even within the political sphere labels are being used to expose political vulnerability. Through the active constitution of politicians an internal border can be drawn and redrawn.

At last, this thesis has shown that acting is what matters. Being an actor who really acts requires courage, resolve and nerve. It is the most difficult thing in life, both to understand and to do. It let one enter the scene and the scene is no longer as it was. Whether an act is an act of citizenship is at that point not relevant anymore. Because when one acts, one comes political. You bring something new into being. It requires literally a leap into the unknown with the courage or doubt of one’s own convictions whatever the situation demands. To act is the core of politics, not only in the parliament but also, and maybe even more in important on the streets, schools and in everyday interaction.
8.4 Limitations

This thesis however, in its effort to show the openness of the border was limited in time and resources. And the argument could be more substantiated with a deeper investigation of how the internal border in Estonia could be ‘seen’ as ‘whe(a)rea’, an unknown, meaningful space. The secondary data that has been used for this thesis offered nice openings to see how the internal border is contested. However, the amount of resources is rather limited and as already discussed in the introduction, the data is not always one on one applicable to this research. Furthermore, this thesis was also limited due to methodological shortcomings. Isin’s guide has been a meaningful analytical tool for the act, but it is not a profound and well sophisticated framework for analysis. As this thesis sought not to frame any discourse or whatsoever, other tools, like discourse analysis was not of any use. A methodological framework should be created without recourse to teleological norm.

8.5 Last remarks

This thesis therefore is not a refusal of the ‘banal’ bordering literature. As it becomes apparent, also in this thesis, it is still valuable theoretic insight to understand the ways borders are produced and institutionalized through discourse. Nonetheless, this explorative thesis has shown that border studies should not complacently drown in this simplified notion of claiming of ‘us’ and ‘them’ and should therefore open a new scope to keep the debate lively and ongoing. This thesis has only sought to contribute to this debate, in attempting not to see the border as a line of difference, but as an open space that is produced and reproduced continuously and is subject to unidentifiable power structures that has sneak in within society.

This thesis should be placed in line with other post-structural, post-colonial and feminist theorists that seek for alternative ‘ways’ for analyzing the border. This thesis together with other geographers seeks to get (partly) rid of borders as such that it boxes people, space or discourses. Instead, alternative concepts such as, ‘borders-as-horizons’, borders as ‘spaces of contestation’ or borders as ‘spaces of the whe(a)rea’ should enter the field.

Further this thesis would recommend to do further research on how to conceptualize this ‘political moment’ within current border studies. This “new” body of work is still in a state of infancy and this thesis has sought to make this body a little more mature. At the same time, this thesis should also inspire political geographers to leave the beaten track. It is time for a new era in border studies.


Labeling. (n.d.).


## Appendix

### Appendix 1: Education – data analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Who (generalized)</th>
<th>What and how</th>
<th>Why</th>
<th>Observable power relations: internalizing discourses</th>
<th>Degree of contesting borders by discourses (+=contesting positive; +++,+++,...= contesting the border as ‘in-between’, hybrid; ++++=opposing discourses)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Russian speaking students</strong></td>
<td>Seek more lessons in Estonian.</td>
<td>To make the transition easier.</td>
<td>Russianness; Estonianness; something in between</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Made a proposal to institute a minimum number of lessons taught in Estonian at basic schools.</td>
<td>To ease the burden.</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rallies, calls, collecting signatures.</td>
<td>The laws of the Republic of Estonia include several articles that give the right to education in their mother tongue, so the law prohibiting teaching in Russian is in conflict with the law about the primary schools and secondary schools.</td>
<td>Russianness; NGO Russian school of Estonia; Young Estonia; Russian soft power</td>
<td>++++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Schools: the teachers, the institutions and other staff</strong></td>
<td>Has been teaching and social studies using materials compiled in the Russian Federation.</td>
<td>Because the Tallinn government earmarked €100,000 for additional classes in the Russian language.</td>
<td>Local governments; Russianness; soft power</td>
<td>++++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Russian Lyceum</strong></td>
<td>Laughing nervously recalling her last meeting with the language inspector.</td>
<td>57, an age when it is not easy to pick up a new language, let alone one as devilishly complex as Estonian; He wrote a report saying that I understood all the questions, that I answered all the questions, but that I made errors,”.</td>
<td>Estonianness</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Teachers who passed the examination</strong></td>
<td>Said it was unpleasant.</td>
<td>In all honestly, it was difficult,” said Natalya Shirokova, an English teacher. “I was anxious about it before I took it. And during it as well. It was stressful, emotionally speaking. I think that it was one of those teacher things. Horrible to make a mistake, to do something incorrect.”</td>
<td>Estonianness</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Director of Päe gymnasium, Izabella Riitsaar</strong></td>
<td>Believes that a person who lives in Estonia has to speak the country's language, even though it can create all kinds of problems</td>
<td>Estonianness; Russianness; something in between</td>
<td>++</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Päe gymnasium</strong></td>
<td>Prides itself on grooming students who can recite Pushkin as well as any Muscovite, and it places a high value on the quality of its staff and instruction.</td>
<td>Estonianness; Russianness; Inbetween</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rosa Ivanova, 68</strong></td>
<td>Spent a quarter-century as headmistress at a high school in eastern Estonia that served primarily Russian-speaking students “I studied,” she said. “But every time I didn't have enough points. It is a humiliating procedure.” “If I were 20 years younger, I would leave at once,” she said. “Believe me. I would leave for my Russia.”</td>
<td>Her pension is the only thing keeping her here. Ivanova accepted a 30 percent pay cut and a demotion.</td>
<td>Russianness; Estonianness</td>
<td>++++</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **NGO Russian School of Estonia, Young Estonia and Pushkin Institute**<br>NGO “Russian School of Estonia” | (Aim: to defend the interests of Russian schools and appeal to compliance with national and international legislation) organized various meetings, rallies and calls to relevant international institutions, whilst also collecting signatures in support of Russian schools. | A retaliatory action to raise public interest for the “Russian language” issue. | Russianness; Russian soft power; various Russian institutions | ++++

| **The civil association “Young Estonia” and “Russian School of Estonia”** | Officially warned the government and the Ministry of the Russian Federation. | | | +++

| **Maksim Reva, one of the Founding fathers of Nightwatch and member of the board of Russian school in Estonia** | Has moved from Estonia to Russia; Writes in his blog that Russia has more advanced than the more depressive Baltic countries. | He praises the Russia’s and Russians dignity that started to rise the last decennium. | Russianness, Russia soft power | ++++

| **Blintsova, one of the other members of the board of Russian school of Estonia who is a political scientist.** | Teachers don’t join NGO Russian School of Estonia. | They (teachers) are afraid of being fired. | Russianness; NGO Russian school of Estonia | +++

| **Semyonov, another member of the board was the leader of the Human Rights Center** | “According to an annual report of the Estonian secret police Semyonov is a person with classic loyalty to Kremlin.” | His activities, the report noted, are mostly coordinated with the wants of the financiers | Russianness; NGO Russian school of Estonia | ++++

| **The Pushkin Institute is an another NGO with close ties to Russkiy Mir. Andrei Krasnolov (the chairman of the institute)** | Argues that students should not suffer, a way in which they (the students) are not actively involved in their actions to maintain Russian as the language of instruction at Russian schools. | | Estonianness; Russianness; something in between | +++
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Political actors</strong></th>
<th><strong>Local governments in Tallinn and Narva (mainly Russian speaking cities)</strong></th>
<th>Complained against the &quot;Estonia-ization&quot; in court; called for an amendment to the law on private schools.</th>
<th>Russianness; NGO Russian School of Estonia; Center party; Estonianness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Municipal Administration of Tallinn</strong></td>
<td>Has earmarked 100,000 euros this year</td>
<td>To give additional lessons in math and chemistry to high school students, but only in Russian.</td>
<td>Russianness; NGO Russian School of Estonia; Center party; Estonianness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Yana Toom</strong></td>
<td>Children should learning Estonian at age three, but in actuality the language was not taught anywhere at that point. &quot;There are three well-functioning integration mechanisms in Estonia at the moment: sports, military and the Center Party&quot;.</td>
<td>I know that the situation is not how it is painted in the Estonian media.</td>
<td>Russianness, Estonianness, somewhere in between</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The politicians Yana Toom, Mihhail Stalnuhhin and Mihhail Kõlvart</strong></td>
<td>Were fighting for the keeping of Russian as academic language at schools declaring a war on government and society</td>
<td>The laws of the Republic of Estonia include several articles that give the right to education in their mother tongue, so the law prohibiting teaching in Russian is in conflict with the law about the primary schools and secondary schools.</td>
<td>Russianness, Estonianness, somewhere in between</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Russia</strong></td>
<td><strong>Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs</strong></td>
<td>Loyalty towards crossborder citizens</td>
<td>Russian supreme power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>The Russian Foreign Ministry Commissioner for Human Rights, Konstantin Dolgov</strong></td>
<td>Loyalty towards crossborder citizens</td>
<td>Russian supreme power</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Gortšakov Foundation** | Tries to involve several Riigikogu members, specifically the younger ones; there was an event organized. | Such attempts to approach youth organisations of political parties have been going on for years, however, and the goal is one – drawing future decision-makers into their circles early on; The favoured target group was young people, who are generally more susceptible to Russian propaganda. | Russian supreme power | ++++

| **Defenders of the law** |  |  |  |  
| **The ministry** | Maintains that schools have been given plenty of time to prepare for the transition, which was to be put into full effect the year 2011/2012. |  | Estonianness | +

| **Irene Käosaar, head of the ministry’s General Education Department** | There are actually very few Russian-language basic schools in Estonia that have no subjects taught in Estonian.; as the move regarding upper secondary education was initially met with protests and anger. |  | Estonianness | +

| **Education Department** | Also, there is currently little political will to impose compulsory lessons in Estonian in Russian-language schools. |  | Estonianness | +

| **The courts** | Rejected the complaint immediately. |  |  | +

| **The Ministry of Education and Science, the minister of education** | Said that it considers the application for the conservation of education in Russian as unjustified; said that he would not be against schools which are supported by Russia, as there exists schools in Estonia which are supported by Finland and Germany. Because in accordance with the law and with the Russian school itself, it planned for the transition of teaching from Russian to Estonian. |  | Estonianness | +

<p>| | | | | |
|  |  |  |  |  |</p>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Ilmar Tomusk, director general of the National Language Inspectorate</strong></th>
<th>Said “But the most important problem in our whole language policy is the teachers in the Russian-medium schools.”</th>
<th>“The language level of teachers is lower than what we demand from students.” If a public official is in Russia, he must know the Russian language. If he is in Estonia, he must know Estonian. There is no discrimination.”</th>
<th>Estonianness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Internal Security Service (ISS)</strong></td>
<td>Post the following statement in Estonian on its website: ‘Yana Toom has, in cooperation with the Human Rights Information Center, pressured Tallinn schools to file petitions to City Council.’</td>
<td>Estonianness</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 2: Labeling – data analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Who (generalized)</th>
<th>Who (specific)</th>
<th>What and how</th>
<th>Why</th>
<th>Observable power relations: internalizing discourses</th>
<th>Degree of contesting borders by discourses (+=contesting positive; ++,+++;+++= contesting the border as 'in-between', hybrid; ++++=opposing discourses)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'The man on the street'</td>
<td>Sergei Zavyalov:</td>
<td>&quot;I'm a nobody in this country.&quot;, said that in his life, timing was everything. If he'd been born after Estonia became independent, he'd be a citizen;</td>
<td>Never had much interest in learning the Estonian language and is determined to leave Estonia.</td>
<td>Russianness</td>
<td>++++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oleg Bessedin</td>
<td>Argues that he is among 100,000 other ethnic Russian's occupied with what he is calling 'aliens passport'.</td>
<td>He says it is a reminder of a conflicted relationship with in this country, and of the explosive ethnic tensions that endure across the former Soviet Union, nearly two decades after Communism's fall.</td>
<td>Russianness</td>
<td>++++</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vladimir Dzhumkov, a stateless theater director</td>
<td>Says that they (non-citizens) are stuck in the middle, and both sides are taking advantage of us.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Inbetween</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nat who migrated from Estonia to Switzerland</td>
<td>At the moment whoever wants to conquer Estonia can do it.</td>
<td>Because only a few people will truly defend the country.</td>
<td>Russianness</td>
<td>++++</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Like &quot; OOO if Russians don't like estonian rules or do not what to learn the language let them go back to Russia &quot;. Drawing a metaphor with the negro society in the U.S.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Russianness, Estonianness, somewhere inbetween</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>By all means I am not defending Russia , but it is time to let go. We should really shake hands Estonians and Russians.</td>
<td>She thinks that is the only way the country can prosper.</td>
<td>Russianness, Estonianness, somewhere inbetween</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Statement</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Kristina Kallas</td>
<td>Has been struck by the attitudes of many young ethnic Russians; The memories and reflections are handed down to the next generation who act as if they had the stature of their forebears; the second or third generation of Russians in Estonia you can see that they refuse to identify themselves or their ancestors as immigrants. Ethnic Russians in their 30s and 40s most disaffected, as if adrift between cultures.</td>
<td>Estonianness +</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aleksandr Brokk ethnic Russian himself</td>
<td>An &quot;Estonian patriot&quot;. And while he's proud of his language and heritage, all he needs to do is look across the river at the dilapidated Russian fortress city of Ivangorod to know which side of the border he wants to live.</td>
<td>Estonianness ++</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Russians like Narvian rock musician Vladimir Cherdakov</td>
<td>The citizenship issue has long been a bone of contention for ethnic Russians.</td>
<td>++++</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Russians of Narva</td>
<td>Call the European Union and NATO their home. And while they may feel the emotional tug of Moscow and certainly have their grievances with the Estonian government in Tallinn.</td>
<td>Somewhere in between ++</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Aleksandra (22) becoming a teacher

Feels trapped between two worlds – not quite Russian, nor fully Estonian.

We are an island, cut off from the world. We don't belong either to the Russians who live in Russia or to the Estonians here. We are a little community with its own order. Now I speak to some Russians from Russia and we have moments when we do not understand one another.

Somewhere in between

+++ Imbi Paju, Estonian writer and filmmaker

Often does talk about her book at libraries in Russian communities; tells her audience that mutual suffering should be inspiring the two communities to build something better.

Is optimistic that relations between Estonians and Russians can improve.

Somewhere in between

++

The media

Sotnikov

Tensions remain and are especially evident in the predominately Russian eastern edge of Estonia, near the Russian border, in working-class cities like Narva. Here, many people are part of what amounts to an underclass.

Roughly 100,000 Estonian Russians, many concentrated in this region, carry a special gray passport, which labels them "aliens" — legal, but not citizens of Estonia or anywhere.

Russianness, Russian media used to spread Russian soft Power

+++++

Russia Today

The practice is reminiscent of how Nazi Germany marked: Jews, homosexuals and other categories of people in death camps.

Inmates are reportedly labeled according to how fluent they are in the national language. Director of the Institute of the Estonian Language Urmas Sutrop: 'some Estonian inmates now bear the letters A, B or C on their clothes, representing the level of their language skills. Those barely able to communicate are labeled with "A", "B" is reserved for those with average level, while fluent speakers are tagged with "C". Inmates who cannot speak Estonian at all are not marked in any way.'

Russianness, Russian media used to spread Russian soft Power

+++++
### Political actors

**Yana Toom**  
Was another Tatyana Zhdanok, the Russian Left politician from Latvia who opposed Latvian independence back in the 1990s as a leader of the pro-Soviet Interfront movement, and who is still barred from running for national legislative office as a result. Tatyana Zhdanok was elected [MEP] as a representative of a Russian party, the Center Party is not a Russian party.

"But 25,000 of our voters are Estonian citizens [sic] and if we start labeling people for making the wrong choice, that if I'm a traitor then 25,000 people are also traitors, that isn't normal for anyone to start her post at the European Parliament this way."

**Tatyana Zhdanok**

### External factors

**President of RF Putin**  
Will in the strongest terms enforce that the governments of Latvia and Estonia adhere to a series of recommendations from reputable international organizations, and many recommendations from authoritative international organizations related to a compliance with generally recognized rights of national minorities. It is not possible to tolerate the existence of the disgraceful term of "non-citizen".

**High Commissioner for minority rights**  
Deep ethnic division of the company has remained. Unresolved disputes with RF burden the cooperation between countries; Nationalism and insensitive treatment are reasons.
| Lucas (British) | Nobody should accept the idea of “Russian-speaker” as a political label. I am a Russian-speaker, as are many (though sadly not all) foreigners who deal professionally with Russia; Native Russian-speaker or Ethnic Russian are equally slippery; pro-Kremlin minority which is why propagandists prefer to talk vaguely about large numbers of “Russian-speakers”. | Most people over 40 in the former Soviet empire speak at least some Russian; I have a friend who is proudly Russian and Jewish and also Estonian (fiercely) by political orientation | Nowhere in between, outsiders discourse |
| James Graff (American) | Greedy Selfish neocapitalists Nationalism, Neo-Nazism, Pride, arrogance, xenophobia, alcoholism; No Soul; Post Soviet mentality. | Anti-Estonian discourse | ++++ |