Alle Menschen werden Brüder?

An inquiry into two opposite arguments with regard to the relationship between sport and nationalism.
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Abstract

Is the kind of particular commitment created by inter-national sport morally acceptable or not? Two groups of scholars already investigated the relationship between sport and nationalism. Their conclusions clash, as the one argues that nationalism and sport are complementary, whereas the other group argues for the abolishment of inter-national sport. However, the subject of particular commitment with regard to inter-national should not be discussed in relation to nationalism, but in relation to patriotism. When looking at the arguments made by the two groups of scholars from this point of view, their arguments can actually be brought into accordance with one another.
1. Introduction

Sports and politics are intertwined. Ever since international sporting events started to emerge, politicians seized sport as a tool in order to create useful narratives. Lots of examples can be mentioned concerning national leaders trying to use sport in order to influence public opinion. When spinning the revolving door filled with examples, Adolf Hitler and Nelson Mandela step out as most famous examples.

Adolf Hitler attempted to use the Olympics of 1936 to show the superiority of his Reich to the world. He wanted to show the benevolent, modern and civilized revitalized Nazi Germany to the world through organizing the Olympics (Krantz, 2011). It was seen as the perfect propaganda tool to mask the evil sides of the regime. Furthermore, as Hitler wanted to show off the superiority of the Arian race, a sporting competition was the perfect opportunity to demonstrate this (Krantz, 2011). Hitler seemed to have succeeded with regard to this point, as the German Olympic team (which consisted completely of Arian athletes) finished first in the medal count. However, the 1936 Olympics are nowadays mainly remembered through the name of an Afro-American athlete: Jesse Owens. By winning four gold medals, Jesse Owens became Hitler’s biggest obstacle with regard to showing off the superiority of the Arian race. Especially, as he earned one of the gold medals by winning the 100 meter sprint, which is seen as the most prestigious athletic discipline. This did not help to create the narrative that Hitler wanted to tell the world, which was a hard task anyway. Already before the Olympics started some protest voices were heard in different countries on whether or not to participate. Although organizing the Olympics was meant as an attempt to influence public opinion, it could not prohibit people from still seeing the grave dangers of Nazi Germany. National sporting federations, however, took the stance of seeing sport and politics as two separate things. Whether or not to participate should not be decided by politics. Therefore, no real boycott was set up (Krantz, 2011). Consequence of this was that Nazi Germany, in some cases, did succeed in creating the narratives they wanted. For instance, the Dutch athlete Osendarf did join the SS after the Olympics. As the fastest white athlete of that Olympiad, he was so overwhelmed by the positive attention from the German side, that he started to sympathize with them (NOS, 2004). History showed that Nazi Germany was no good and therefore the 1936 Nazi Olympics can be seen as an example of using sports for harmful and bad purposes.

A much brighter example can be provided when looking at Nelson Mandela. A torn apart South Africa was still recovering from the wounds that were struck by the apartheid, when the national rugby team won the World Cup held in their own country. Rugby was seen as the white men’s sport and black South Africans always used to cheer for the opposition and booed the South
African team when playing (Bestall, 2010). The Springbok, which is the symbol and nickname of the South African rugby team, was also a symbol of the apartheids regime. As Mandela knew the power of sport as a unifier, he lobbied for organizing the World Cup in South Africa. This resulted in South Africa being the host of the Rugby World Cup 1995. In order to achieve unity, Mandela started to support the South African rugby team in public. When speaking to a crowd of black South Africans, Mandela put on a cap of the national team with the Springbok on it. At first, reactions were not that joyful and even a little booing could be heard. Mandela, prisoner for 18 years because of the apartheids regime, was now supporting one of the greatest symbols of this same apartheids regime: the Springboks. All of this meant that, although they never asked for it, the rugby players became more than sportsmen alone and started to be political actors as well (Bestall, 2010). Even though they were considered the underdogs, South Africa won the tournament. Mandela presented the trophy to the South African captain, Francois Pienaar, and by that time even black South Africans were cheering. The South African rugby team and Mandela caused some negative narratives to be destroyed and other, more positive, narratives to be created. Sport gave Mandela a great opportunity to unite people that were hostile and full of hatred towards each other. This example shows that the connection that exists between sport and politics can also be very positive.

So, the examples of Hitler and Mandela show that there can be good sides as well as bad sides concerning the relationship between sport and politics. However, both stories can be seen to have a common denominator. They both circle around the issue of creating narratives. Hitler and Mandela based their actions on the impact it would have on the stories that would be created. They both used the attraction of sport to change or influence people’s feelings inside as well as outside their countries. Hitler mainly focused on changing the opinions of people outside Germany. Foremost, he wanted them to acknowledge the physical superiority of the pure German, Arian, race. Mandela, in contrast, changed the leading narrative in South-Africa from within. Changing opinions and creating narratives like Hitler and Mandela did, leads us towards the issue of identity. The narratives created will determine towards which group people will feel related and therefore which group they see as important for their own identity. As a group identity is both based on how groups or persons perceive it themselves as well as on how it is perceived by people belonging to outside groups, both examples play a part in determining an identity. The created narratives influence thoughts concerning which features characterize the group and which people constitute the group. Hitler wanted to tell that the group consisting of real Germans should be Arians and that they are characterized by their physical superiority, while Mandela’s narrative existed of the idea that all South-Africans should be one group, regardless of their skin color and history.
The relationship between sport and politics, therefore, has to be seen as the relationship between sport and the creation of narratives and thereby identity. This takes place on all the different kind of levels on which sport is played. This paper, however, will only focus on one of these levels: sport played between nations. In general, sport between nations is the most popular type of sport. World Cups, in which athletes usually participate under the flag of their nation, are in almost any type of sport seen as the most prestigious tournaments. The same goes for the Olympics, which can be seen as the biggest sporting event of all. As sport at this level does get most of the attention, the impact of its narratives created will be the biggest. Especially Mandela showed how influential these narratives and thereby the rescheduling of identity can eventually be. Sport played between nations defines one part of what kind of identity will be created, as it does already define which people form the relevant group to which one belongs: the nation. The narratives created by sport played between nations will tell something about the characterization of the nations and the features that belong to the people who share the same nationality. These narratives created by international sport, therefore, create a national identity.

It is a small step from national identity to nationalism. Nationalism as a term, namely, incorporates the concept of a national identity. Nationalism is the more overlapping term that describes not only the attitude that people have when caring about their national identity, but also describes the actions that members of a nation are driven to undertake in order to fully enjoy their national sentiment (Miscevic, 2014). The creation of these action-driven sentiments may come from the creation of a national identity, but is not reducible to it. Therefore, in the end it is not only the national identity as such that will be created by inter-national sport, but more of a nationalistic sentiment that is better explained by reaching out to the term nationalism. So, in order to be more precise, this paper circles around the relationship of inter-national sport and nationalism.

Some scholars already investigated this relationship. They asked themselves what the moral credentials of inter-national sport should be and if this can be combined with the nationalistic sentiments and national identity. There are two different groups of scholars that can be distinguished with regard to this issue. The first group of scholars concludes that inter-national sport can rightfully exist. The philosophical ideas behind inter-national sport do not contradict with nationalism; instead, both terms can be seen as complementary to each other. Inter-national sport should be seen as a form of sincere internationalism and this will cause nationalism to drift away from its vulgar forms and reach its morally acceptable form without these vulgar elements. Therefore, they argue, inter-national sport and nationalism do not contradict, but are even complementary to one another. This group of scholars will be called ‘the complementarists’ from now on in this paper. The other group of scholars, in contrast, come to the conclusion that inter-national sport should be abolished as
combining nationalism and inter-national sport does not create the right effects that one should want to be created. Combining them will create morally unjust narratives. People would identify with others on behalf of features that may be deceptive. Inter-national sport, they argue, should therefore not be organized along nationalistic features and therefore not coincide with nationalism. As the combination should be seen as a bad combination, all inter-national sport should be abolished.

So, although both investigate the same relationship, they reach a radically different conclusion. Whereas one completely dismisses nationalism as a right thing to combine with sport, the other argues that nationalism and sport cannot only be brought together, but that both terms are complementary to each other. This would mean that the rightness of the one conclusion would mean the falseness of the other. Their conclusions cannot both be valid. Purpose of this paper therefore will be to look more closely at this difference. Where do their arguments split ways? What are the underlying assumptions regarding their different outcomes? By looking more closely at the arguments it may be identified where their difference can be found. When one argument may seem to make false assumptions or uses the wrong terms, their conclusion needs a different interpretation, which may mean that they do not clash as radically as they both sketch. The central question for this paper therefore will be:

To what extent can the two opposing arguments concerning the relationship between inter-national sport and nationalism be brought into accordance with one another?

In order to give an answer to this question, a step-by-step action plan has to be set up. First of all, in order to compare both groups of scholars, both arguments will be sketched in more detail. The complementarists will be discussed first. After that the argument of the other group of scholars, here represented by Gleaves and Llewellyn (2014), will be sketched. Finally these two arguments will be compared with one another. Focus will be on the two key terms of the investigated relationship: inter-national sport and nationalism. How do both arguments perceive and use these terms in their arguments and where do they differ with regard to this? After this has been established, the chapters to follow will be mentioned and explained in order to find the answer to the central question of this paper. But, first things first: the complementarists.

1.1  The complementarists: complementary

The complementarists are the first group that will be discussed. They argue that sport and nationalism are complementary to each other. This conclusion is reached following a triptych of
scholars. Hargreaves (1992), Morgan (1995) and Iowerth, Jones and Hardman (2010) successively investigated the relationship between sport and nationalism and used each other’s work in order to come to this final conclusion. In the end, their conclusion comes down to the following: the idea behind sport should be seen as a form of sincere internationalism instead of a form of cosmopolitanism, and nationalism should not be fostered in its vulgar forms (Morgan, 1995). There are a lot of interesting things in that sentence, but let us first focus on what is called the ‘idea behind sport’. In their argument they use a term called Olympism to capture the ideas behind sport played between nations. It is the most extensive philosophical theory that tries to capture the normative ideas about the coming into being of sport. Their investigation with regard to the relationship between inter-national sport and nationalism, therefore, is bent towards an investigation between Olympism and nationalism. As Olympism is brought into existence with regard to the foundation of the Olympic Games, it can be questioned if Olympism can be said to be the philosophical idea behind all inter-national sport, instead of just the Olympics. This will be answered further on. For now, it is important to see that the complementarists approach inter-national sport from the angle of the philosophical theory behind it and therefore from the angle of Olympism.

Changing inter-national sport into Olympism leads to the conclusion that, instead of inter-national sport, Olympism is a form of sincere internationalism and entails features that make the combination with nationalism morally acceptable, as it does not foster nationalism in its vulgar forms. This conclusion contains three propositions. The first two propositions can be distilled from Morgan’s work. The first proposition tells that Olympism is not a form of cosmopolitanism, but a form of internationalism which makes Olympism a powerful context for a reflective moral dialogue between nations and cultures (Iowerth et al., 2010: 82). The second proposition says that there is a version of nationalism that is morally applaudable, but that this will only be possible in combination with Olympism and its reflective moral dialogue (Iowerth et al., 2010: 82). Both these propositions will be held true by Morgan. His argumentation for this will pass review later on. The final and third proposition comes forth out of the contribution of Iowerth, Jones and Hardman. According to them, the moral dialogue between nations is crucial, but this dialogue has to meet certain requirements in order to be liberating and emancipator, namely that only authentic nationals should be given permission to compete for their country (Iowerth et al., 2010: 82). Although these three propositions are distilled from of Morgan and Iowerth, Jones and Hardman their work, the triptych will start with a man that revived the re-examination of the relationship between Olympism and nationalism. A man without whom Morgan and Iowerth, Jones and Hardman probably never had started to think about their propositions: Hargreaves.
Hargreaves (1992) kicks off the triptych, as he was one of the first to doubt the leading presumption of the time that Olympism and nationalism were conflicting. According to him, the terms themselves and the relationship between Olympism and nationalism were too much taken for granted. The terms were stuck in their usual context of opposites. In order to break out of this framework, Hargreaves offers a two step solution. First, Hargreaves argues, Olympism and nationalism should be seen as autonomous cultural forms (Hargreaves, 1992: 121). There is no given relationship between these terms. You can have one without the other. Both terms have a meaning apart from each other. Therefore, as both terms are autonomous, one should start by investigating both terms separately (Hargreaves, 1992: 121). The second step of the solution, according to Hargreaves, should be to eradicate normative theory from the process of investigating the relationship between the terms. Instead, empirical evidence should play an important role. According to Hargreaves, there are important causal influences that have an impact on the relation between Olympism and nationalism, which would be diminished by looking from a normative point of view. Like a good sociologist, Hargreaves eventually wants to focus on the empirical in order to find the real meaning of the two terms. This part of the solution, however, was not supported much by other scholars, but did inspire others to reexamine the issue at stake. One of them was Morgan (1995), who took over the baton and starts his paper with the ideas of Hargreaves in order to eventually come to his own view.

Morgan (1995) agrees with Hargreaves that the hostile relationship between the terms Olympism and nationalism are too much taken for granted. The idea that the particularistic aims and commitments of nationalism conflict with the universalist aims and commitments of Olympism is something that should be further and deeper examined (Morgan, 1995: 79). In order to do so, both terms should indeed be treated as autonomous cultural forms. However, Morgan disagrees with Hargreaves with regard to the eradication of the normative component. He argues that investigating the normative component is central in the process to break out of the taken for granted relationship of Olympism and nationalism. This relationship, namely, is normative by nature (Morgan, 1995: 80). Olympism itself already is a normative ideal. It is about how sport should be treated as a moral pedagogy and political engagement in order to reach certain goals. Eradicating the normative component out of the relationship therefore would only increase the misunderstanding of the relationship (Morgan, 1995: 80). The only real solution is to investigate this central normative component and this should be done by submitting the ideals of Olympism and nationalism to the scalpel of critical reflection (Morgan, 1995: 81). Therefore, Morgan pursues two lines of arguments. First, Olympism will be stripped down in order to find out what the exact credentials of the term are.
Second, the term nationalism will be closer examined as will its relation towards Olympism. This will also lead towards the formulation of the two propositions belonging to Morgan.

First then, in order to come to these propositions, Morgan focuses on Olympism and how we should see this term. The most important conclusion that Morgan comes up with is that Olympism should not be confused with cosmopolitanism (Morgan, 1995: 81). When looking closely at the Olympic ideal, Morgan argues, the goals it wants to reach do not coincide with cosmopolitanism. Instead, the Olympic ideal shows more similarities with something called sincere internationalism. Olympism, namely, dismisses the idea of fostering complete universalist aims and commitments. As cosmopolitanism is characterized by this craving for universalist aims and commitments, its fundamentals do not coincide with Olympism. Internationalism does not demand the people have universalist aims and commitments. Instead, it accepts that different communities exist and people will have some sense of a special relationship to their community. However, internationalism does not want this particular commitment to turn into some form of xenophobism. It wants to create understanding between these different communities with their own cultural background. Cultural differences between people are not neglected, but internationalism tries to create acceptance and acknowledgment between these differences, whereas cosmopolitanism tries to homogenize all people by pointing at their biggest common denominator: humanity. As Olympism is characterized by acknowledged different cultural groups coming together, it should be seen as based on sincere internationalist ideals, according to Morgan. This conclusion relates to the first proposition, which stated that Olympism is not a form of cosmopolitanism, but a form of internationalism. The proposition, however, extends this conclusion by saying that this makes Olympism a very powerful context for a reflective moral dialogue. With all the nations coming together through an event that focuses on acceptance and understanding, it makes it a perfect thing for each nation to reflect on their and other cultures, which also is the goal of internationalism.

In order to end up at the second proposition, Morgan starts by asking what seeing Olympism as sincere internationalism means for the relationship between Olympism and nationalism. According to Morgan, it opens up the possibility of getting out of their hostile relation. Crux to this is that internationalism is premised on nationalism, whereas cosmopolitanism is not (Morgan, 1995: 88). Internationalism, namely, does accept the existence of particular commitment. Therefore, nationalism and internationalism are not complete opposites. However, there are still some differences which make that internationalism may be premised on nationalism, but is in no way reducible to it. Whereas nationalism is characterized by the admiration for one’s own culture, internationalism is characterized by its open-mindedness with regard to other cultures. Internationalism, namely, wants to blend different strands of national life (Morgan, 1995: 88). By
organizing sport in accordance with internationalist ideals, it gives opportunity for an intercultural dialogue. All the different particular concepts of the ‘good life’ come together in the neutral concept of a sport event. This will create opportunity to reach a better understanding between cultures. Consequence of this will be that the nationalistic feelings that may live inside states will be weakened because of this coming together. The ethnocentrism that is felt by states will be softened when their acquaintance of other nations and their cultures will be enlarged (Morgan, 1995: 88). The danger of nationalism becoming detrimental will be neutralized. Nationalism, therefore, will not undo the ideas of Olympism. Instead, the internationalist ideal of Olympism makes that nationalism will still be present, but will evolve from hostile nationalism to nationalism which does not foster such vulgar forms (Morgan, 1995: 89). This argument relates to the second proposition. It shows that a morally acceptable version of nationalism is possible, but that the reflective moral dialogue from the first proposition is a prerequisite for this. Olympism and the creation of its context make it possible for nationalism to get out of its vulgar forms. Combining both propositions therefore means that the relationship between Olympism and nationalism can be seen as complementary to one another.

Elaborating on Morgan’s ideas, lowerth, Jones and Hardman (2010) take a look at eligibility rules. They argue that sport-related citizenship processes should be standardized and that it would be made more difficult for athletes to change citizenship (lowerth et al., 2010: 82). In order to let the Olympics create a reflective moral dialogue that is liberating and emancipator, and therefore coincide with the ideals of Olympism, athletes that compete in inter-national sporting competitions should be authentic reflective members of their nation (lowerth et al., 2010: 82). Being an authentic national does not necessarily mean that one has to be born in the nation one represents, but rather that one has to have a genuine attachment towards his country. The athlete can still feel some commitment towards the nation in which he was born, but this should not restrict him in understanding with and attaching to his new nation (lowerth et al., 2010: 101). This understanding and attaching should grow to such amounts that commitment should be evidenced even beyond the field of sport. When such a commitment can be demonstrated, then the athlete should be given permission to represent his new country. Purpose of only letting authentic nationals compete is to let sport keep its authentic narrative potential and not turn into inauthentic narratives (lowerth et al., 2010: 103). This argument is reflected in the third proposition, which stated that the moral dialogue from the first proposition needs to meet certain requirements in order to be liberating and emancipator. These requirements are sketched by the argument of lowerth, Jones and Hardman. Athletes competing and representing a country should be authentic nationals. Otherwise, the moral dialogue created by Olympism loses its real reflective meaning.
The triptych of scholars ends here. Together, their main argument is that Olympism and nationalism are not hostile towards each other, but can be complementary. Central to this line of argumentation is the idea that Olympism is based on internationalist ideals instead of cosmopolitan. Furthermore, nationalism can have different forms, which means that nationalism is not intrinsically aggressive and hostile, but can also exist without these vulgar forms. Olympism helps to achieve this kind of non aggressive nationalism. The frequently mentioned three propositions do comprise the complete argument resulting out of the triptych. So, recapitulating again: the first proposition says that Olympism should be seen as a form of internationalism and therefore is a great way to facilitate a reflective moral dialogue. Recalling the second proposition: a morally applaudable version of nationalism is possible, but will only be achieved in combination with Olympism and its reflective moral dialogue. Concluding with the third proposition: the reflective moral dialogue that is crucial with regard to the earlier propositions needs to meet a certain requirement in order to be valuable, namely that the athletes competing for and representing a country should be authentic nationals. Otherwise the complementariness of Olympism and nationalism will be undermined. If the national eligibility rules do ensure that after all, then it can rightfully be argued that Olympism and nationalism can be complementary.

1.2 Gleaves and Llewellyn: contradictory

The other group of scholars argues that nationalism should not play a primary role in sport (Gleaves & Llewellyn, 2014). In their paper, Gleaves and Llewellyn react to the complementarists by saying that their conclusion entails an assumption which is questionable. As their investigation focused on the appropriateness of nationalism and the proper role of the nation state, they neglected the more fundamental question if nationalism should have any place at all in sports (Gleaves & Llewellyn, 2014: 2). As thinking about sport is rooted in its internationalist form, they look solely at sport as an enterprise where nations compete against each other. Whether this should be the leading paradigm of sport is a question they do not touch upon. According to Gleaves and Llewellyn, this is probably because of their assumption that the benefits of nationality in sport outweigh the disadvantages that also still could come up (Gleaves & Llewellyn, 2014: 2). Therefore, the need to doubt the paradigm of inter-national sport is not present.

Gleaves and Llewellyn do see the need to take a better look at this paradigm. Philosophers may be able to defend the ideal of Olympism with regard to nationalism, but critics can rightfully argue by pointing at some practical examples that remain ethically disturbed (Gleaves & Llewellyn, 2014: 2). Gleaves and Llewellyn do not pick a side, but instead opt for a more thorough approach,
because neither the philosophical view nor the practical view can be seen as correct. Taking sport either at its best (as the philosophers do) or at its worst (as some critics do by pointing at practice) ignores the crucial assumptions that frame the whole debate (Gleaves & Llewellyn, 2014: 2). Instead of getting bogged down into a ‘tis–tisn’t argument, it would be better to focus on the paradigm in which sport is being evaluated. The underlying assumptions should be critically evaluated in order to say something about the role of sport with regard to nationalism. The key terms Gleaves and Llewellyn use in their argument should be properly defined in order to do this. Therefore, what they mean when talking about sport should be clarified first. Second, their definition of the nation should be discussed. After that, combining those two will point at why nationalism and inter-national sport are contradictory according to Gleaves and Llewellyn.

But first, the kind of sport that Gleaves and Llewellyn are talking about will be discussed. The particular kind of sport they are talking about is called inter-national elite sport. By inter-national sport they mean sporting competitions where individuals or teams represent their particular nation and compete against athletes representing other nations (Gleaves & Llewellyn, 2014: 3). Every World Cup, for example, is a form of inter-national sport. In team sports this means that when Spain will play Brazil, the squad of Spain should exist out of Spanish nationals and the Brazilian out of Brazilian nationals. With regard to individual sports, athletes are often required to qualify for such tournaments through national competitions and they are perceived as representatives of their country. This kind of sport is closely related to the subject of nationalism and national identity. Therefore, Gleaves and Llewellyn start with investigating this particular kind of sport in relationship to nationalism. Furthermore, focusing on this kind of inter-national sport automatically means that focus will be on elite-level sporting contests (Gleaves & Llewellyn, 2014: 4). The biggest and most popular of the inter-national sporting events like World Cups, Olympics and even Paralympics can be said to be elite sports. What characterizes elite sport is that it considers the values determining athletic superiority of paramount importance. Sport itself is an athletic competition whereas the winner can be called athletic superior. Events like the Highland Games or the Rollatorloop in Breda, although being sporting events and thereby searching for athletic superiority, do focus more on values like identification, harmony and culture. However, with regard to elite sports, the search for athletic superiority is the most important reason for organizing the event (Gleaves & Llewellyn, 2014: 4). Therefore, elite sport will be more serious and the athletes will be keener to perform. Criterion for inclusion will be talent, which makes that only the best athletes will be competing and the battle for winning will be much fiercer than when inclusion would be on the basis of identity. These features define the kind of sport Gleaves and Llewellyn talk about: inter-national elite sport.
The nation is another key term used by Gleaves and Llewellyn that needs some defining. In bringing forth their definition of the nation, Gleaves and Llewellyn reach out to Benedict Anderson. According to Anderson (2004), a nation should be seen as an imagined political community. Not everyone belonging to the same community will have contact with each other or will even know each other. Therefore, the community is imagined, as no one knows with whom exactly they form a community. Only through imagination people will get to know the others and can they acquire feelings of attachment and togetherness. That the community is an imagined one also means that it is a cultural artifact of a particular kind (Anderson, 2004: 48). It has come into existence, because people simply started to look at it in this particular way. This way of thinking and therefore the start of the existence of the nation can be said to be fostered by the industrial revolution (Gleaves and Llewellyn, 2014: 5). The industrial revolution and post-industrial revolution events made that, for instance, mass publishing of texts in vernacular took place, which made people more conscious of their identity (Anderson, 2004: 52). The idea of a nation and nationality thus has to be seen as a modern cultural invention, just like the idea of sport between nations is (Gleaves & Llewellyn, 2014: 5).

Along with nationalism, the idea of sport played between nations is also a modern cultural invention (Gleaves & Llewellyn, 2014: 5). Late nineteenth century inter-national sporting events started to emerge. In 1872 the first inter-national football match was held between Scotland and England and in 1896 the first modern Olympics were organized in Athens. This coincides with the post-industrial revolution period in which also the idea of a nation and nationality started to gain ground. That it does coincide is not a coincidence, according to Gleaves and Llewellyn. In explaining, they reach out to the anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1973) and his research with regard to how physical recreation does mirror social or cultural values (Gleaves and Llewellyn, 2014: 6). By analyzing the particular form that sport adopts, one will be able to analyze the values that a community feels very strongly about. Sport will be organized in such a way that it will create stories that the community wants it to create. Furthermore, this creation of stories is also the reason that people even play sport. People will derive a meaning about themselves and their community through sport (Gleaves & Llewellyn, 2014: 6). The stories created through sport will become meaningful narratives for them, whereas a meaningful narrative is a descriptive story that weaves factual events into an explanatory narrative (Gleaves & Llewellyn, 2014: 6). As sport is created by communities, it will be organized in the way that it will create narratives that the community wants to be told. Therefore, the dominant model for sport became the inter-national one. As the idea of a nation and nationality emerged at that time, sport would be organized in an inter-national way so the stories created would increase this feeling of belonging to the imagined community. It would give an identity to the
community which would make the imagined community even more real in the minds of people. Just as sport creates meaningful narratives for individuals, it also creates meaningful narratives for communities. Nations compete against each other as a way to tell stories about themselves as a group (Gleaves & Llewellyn, 2014: 7). The question however is if it is a good thing that sport should be organized in this way. Gleaves and Llewellyn do think that this is not the case and they come up with two reasons for it: inter-national elite sport brings ethical harms with it and inter-national elite sport harms lusory aspects of sport (Gleaves & Llewellyn, 2014: 7). Lusory aspects refer to the way the sport should be played. It refers to the psychological and cultural foundations on which a particular sport or sport in general is based (Rhodes, 2012). Lusory arguments often criticize one particular style of play as inferior to another (Gleaves and Llewellyn, 2014: 12).

Ethical harms take place, because inter-national sport creates inauthentic narratives (Gleaves & Llewellyn, 2014: 10). As communities are imagined communities, they thrive on narratives to tell them stories about their group and themselves in order to create an identity. The narratives that will be created by inter-national sport will be over generalized narratives predicated upon useful fictions (Gleaves & Llewellyn, 2014: 9). As people will also identify themselves with these inauthentic narratives created by their national teams and will feel that these narratives represent them, they will engage in self-deception. They will see themselves as people with certain characteristics which they may not posses. As for athletics, it is the rule rather than the exception that a Jamaican wins at the sprint disciplines. This creates the thought that all Jamaican are fast runners. However, there definitely will be Jamaicans who are way slower than an average European sprinter. Nevertheless, the idea of all Jamaicans being the fastest people in the world still is dominant. This means that the identities of Jamaicans are colored by this characteristic. This is an inauthentic narrative that will make that Jamaicans will be engaged in self-deception. Usain Bolt, James Blake, Sally-Ann Fraser and all other Jamaican sprinters do not reflect all Jamaicans, but will be seen as doing so. Eventually, these inauthentic narratives make that people their lives will be based on something false. This will prevent people from fulfilling the moral ideals of honesty and truth (Gleaves & Llewellyn, 2014: 10). Problems can become even bigger when these imagined narratives will be used to reaffirm unethical imbalances of power in the form of racial stereotypes or religious intolerance. Inauthentic narratives are ethically not right and therefore their creation through inter-national sport supports the argument that inter-national sport should be abolished.

Furthermore, there are two lusory arguments which show that inter-national sport should be abolished. The first argument concerning the lusory aspects states that inter-national sport surpasses the lusory narratives. The lusory narratives that should be created through sport are about athletic superiority and how talent and merit, instead of luck, determines outcomes (Gleaves & Llewellyn,
However, inter-national sport is organized in such a way that not automatically the best athletes compete with each other. Often, there is a limit on athletes representing the same country, which could mean that some athletes cannot compete because of their nationality whereas they would be able to compete if it would be for their achievements. The second argument deals with the aesthetic enjoyment of sport. Inter-national sport competitions will often create a ‘90-minutes nationalist’ of the spectator by adding partisan feelings to the competition. However, to watch sports as a purist, without any partisan feelings, would be better (Gleaves & Llewellyn, 2014: 14). When only watching to see excellent play a much deeper and richer appreciation of sport it’s aesthetic virtue will be reached, whereas watching as a partisan will bring emotional attachment in play with its emotional highs and lows.

However, one cannot dismiss all partisan feelings. There will always be some kind of attachment with regard to sport teams or athletes. Athletes will always be born in a particular place and it is only reasonable to think that people from this particular place feel affiliated and will support this athlete (Gleaves and Llewellyn, 2014: 16). This form of identification, however, does have different features than the one which relates to the creation of inauthentic narratives. For instance, this form of identification emerges out of an organic connection that people feel with their community. This is a much weaker version, whereas athletes can create a number of different narratives disconnected from nationality (for example, born in Africa, raised in Europe, trained in America). These narratives are not directly related to the eligibility of an athlete. As long as communities will not tend to think that the athlete’s success reflects the merits of the whole community as being their cultural representatives, the risk of creating inauthentic narratives is averted. Instead of inauthentic narratives, soft narratives are created (Gleaves & Llewellyn, 2014: 16). Herein athletes are no longer cultural representatives, but something weaker. The soft national narrative brings up some kind of moderate patriotism (Gleaves & Llewellyn, 2014: 17). People have a special concern for their country, but without the feelings of exclusion or aggression that comes up with some form of nationalism. Therefore, sport should be organized in a way that creates soft national narratives instead of inauthentic narratives, which would mean the abolishment of international sport, according to Gleaves and Llewellyn.

1.3 Bringing the debate in line

Although handling with the same issue, namely the relationship between sport and nationalism, both groups reach a radically different conclusion. Whereas the complementarists conclude that the relationship between sport (seen as Olympism) and nationalism should be seen as morally
permissible, the second group of scholars dismisses this thought by saying that inter-national elite sport should be abolished as the relationship creates insurmountable harms. That their conclusions differ can be ascribed to their difference in approach. Both groups seem to use alternate definitions with regard to sport and nationalism. Therefore, it can be said that they are talking at cross purposes. This could mean that their contradictory conclusions may not be as contradictory as they both like to believe.

As the central question to this paper is if the arguments preceding these contradicting conclusions can be brought into accordance with one another, the differences in approach have to become clear in order to examine what these differences mean for the arguments and conclusions. Core of the difference in approach lies with the two key terms used: sport and nationalism. As both papers investigate the relationship between these terms, the definitions used are crucial for one’s conclusion. Therefore, the use of the term sport and nationalism and their impact have to be discussed thoroughly.

First, both their ideas of how we should define sport will be compared. As seen, the complementarists used the term Olympism in order to define sport and the philosophical idea behind sport. Although they shortly state that this should be seen as the philosophical idea behind inter-national sport in general, they only put the term into practice in relation to the Olympic Games. The question, therefore, should be if the Olympic Games are just another sport event or if they are something special that has very different features which make that it would be wrong to equate it with the more general account of inter-national sport that has been used by the other group of scholars. Gleaves and Llewellyn focused on inter-national elite sport. The main difference between these two accounts is that, when talking about Olympism, emphasis is laid on the educational and cultural value of sport and how sport teaches people a certain worldview that has moral credentials. Talk about inter-national elite sport focuses on the physical aspects of sport and the role of sport to strive for athletic superiority. It sees sport really as a competition, whereas Olympism is more about bringing people together in order to learn from each other’s cultural differences. In order to find out if they these two terms can be brought into accordance with one another, the question has to be answered whether the philosophical idea of Olympism can be seen as the philosophical idea behind inter-national elite sport in general or if is it only applicable to the Olympic Games. Is the competitive element of inter-national elite sport compatible with the features that Olympism lays emphasis on or are they really alternative ways of looking at sport? Chapter two of this paper will eventually give an answer to this question. After sketching the origins and the definition of Olympism and giving a deeper investigation with regard to the term Olympism, an answer will be given to the question if, with regard to this term, the two schools of thought can be brought in line.
Second, their ideas with regard to nationalism need to be compared. What should be stressed with regard to the complementarists and their use of nationalism is that they focus on nationalism as a form of giving preference to particularistic aims and commitments. When one is called a nationalist, the actions one takes are based on giving preference to the wellbeing of one’s group members. The form of nationalism they start out with can be seen as pretty strict. However, they argued, by weakening these commitments and finding a more moderate form of giving preference to particularistic aims and commitments, the morally right version of nationalism will be reached. Gleaves and Llewellyn their most important point of view with regard to the nation and nationalism is that it should be seen as a cultural artifact. The nation is an imagined community, whereby nationalism is the commitment felt towards this imagined community. They focus on the creation of narratives that give meaning to the imagined community and the moral credentials of these narratives. According to them, these narratives created by nationalism are too strong and create self-deception. Instead, they opted for the creation of narratives by moderate patriotism.

Both their accounts of nationalism do have overlap, as the core of both versions of nationalism is feeling committed to a particular group with particular features. Interesting, however, is that they both start by investigating these particular commitments in the light of nationalism. As both their arguments conclude that a more moderate form is needed, instead of the strict form of nationalism, they both end up with different conclusions. While the complementarists still keep calling it a form of nationalism, Gleaves and Llewellyn shift from nationalism to patriotism. Chapter three will focus on this difference. It will further elaborate on this issue and the difference between nationalism and patriotism will be outlined. This outline will be used in order to find out to what extent moderate patriotism relates to nationalism without its vulgar forms. Can both their different conclusions with regard to the right type of particular commitment be brought into accordance with one another?

When these questions will be answered, the analysis of both terms will lead towards discussing the renewed relationship between them. This will take place in chapter four, where the two terms are brought together again. The conclusions of both groups of scholars will be reexamined with the knowledge gained from preceding chapters. Can these conclusions, how far apart they might have been from the beginning, said to say something alike?

Ultimately, chapter five will then bear the conclusion to the central question of this whole paper, namely, to what extent the groups of scholars their arguments can be brought into accordance with one another. Alongside with some remarks with regard to this paper and suggestions for further research, this paper will reach its final sentences there. However, as stated before, in order to reach this point we have to start out with the chapter concerning the idea behind sport: an inquiry into Olympism.
2. **The idea behind sport – An inquiry into Olympism**

As Usain Bolt improved the World Record on the 100 meter sprint at the 2008 Beijing Olympics, probably the last thing he thought about was philosophy. More likely, winning the gold medal alongside with praise from all around the world wandered around in his head. However, this does not mean that philosophy plays no part when it comes down to sport and especially not when it comes down to the modern Olympics. The Olympics, namely, would definitely not exist if it would not be for philosophy. Sport has been brought into being with a certain intention. Therefore, a search for the intention of the creation of sport will have to be started in order to say more about the idea behind sport.

As seen when discussing the two groups of scholars, they both have one’s own opinion with regard to the ideas behind sport. The complementarists focus on the term Olympism as being the idea behind sport. By focusing on Olympism, they focus on the Olympic Games. Olympism and the Olympic Games are strongly tied together. The revival of the Olympic Games by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) was based on the underlying ideas and values that Olympism entailed. The founder of Olympism as well as the founder of the IOC, Baron Pierre de Coubertin (1863-1937), based all his actions with regard to these topics on an internationalist ideal, according to the complementarists. Therefore, they conclude that the Olympics are organized in order to create an internationalist ideal. Gleaves and Llewellyn, however, lay emphasis on sport being a cultural artifact, whereby its features can be seen as reflecting the values that nations wanted to express, which they seem to think is nationalism. Therefore, they argue that inter-national sport became the leading paradigm for sport. In this way, sport would express the nationalistic feelings present in the nation states. According to them, the Olympics should also be seen in this light, which would mean that the Olympics are based on nationalist ideals.

In order to conclude which vision with regard to this issue has more merit, the alleged different origins of the Olympics and its underlying idea have to be discussed thoroughly. Therefore, the roots of Olympism will pass review, as well as the influence that De Coubertin has had on the term along with others. After that, Olympism will be discussed and a conclusion will be reached on how Olympism should be seen. As that would settle the question with regard to Olympism and the Olympics, further inquiry will have to determine to what extent this answer settles the question with regard to the idea behind all inter-national sport. Are the Olympic Games special in this regard or not? This question will evolve into an answer with regard to if the two groups of scholars and their definition of sport can be brought together. In order to end up succeeding, first Olympism and its roots will thus be discussed.
2.1 Roots of Olympism

The Olympics as a sporting event is not a modern invention. Roots of this tournament can be found in ancient Greece. Already in 776 B.C. the first Olympics were being held (Heber History, n.d.; Penn Museum, 1996; Schobel, 1996). Origins of this festival can be found in religion. As the term *olympien* refers to the ancient Greek gods on the mountain Olympus, these ancient Olympic Games were part of a cult to honor supreme god Zeus (Loland, 1995: 65). Other athletic events in different cities, for instance in Delphi and in Corinth, were being held in order to honor gods like Apollo and Poseidon. However, as the games in Olympia honored leading god Zeus it eventually became the most important festival of its sort (Schobel, 1996). It even became so important that every four years people from all around the Greek world gathered in mid-summer to compete in or watch the Games and to honor Zeus (Penn Museum, 1996).

As people from all around the Greek world would gather and some had to travel from very far, the Olympics Games were only being held every four years. It would not have been favorable for them to make this long trip every year. Furthermore, only organizing it once every four years would make sure that it would not coincide with the other local festivals that were still being held and the sporting calendar would be given its best form (Schobel, 1996). Reasons with regard to why the Olympic Games were always being held in mid-summer differ. It cannot be seen as something practical, as temperatures could rise towards such heights that watching and, even more, competing was not very comfortable. The most plausible reason tells that the Games at Olympia were born out of a lot of religious activity already there in that period, as Earth Mother Gaea would be worshipped in order to make sure that the growing of plants and fruit would go well (Penn Museum, 1996; Schobel, 1996). This ceremony, which has connections with the fruit harvest and therefore was being held in mid-summer, eventually evolved into the physical festival that became the ancient Olympic Games.

The religious roots of the ancient Greek Olympic Games can clearly be seen. For instance, a black ram would be slaughtered at the start of every Olympics. As the festival would continue, a lot of other offers would get sacrificed and a lot of worshipping would happen (Heber History, n.d.). Winners of the physical events were also seen as the athletes most pleasuring god and therefore were able to win (Penn Museum, 1996). At first, these physical events were only limited in number. Actually, for a long time, the only sport present at the Olympics was a running discipline equivalent to the modern day sprint (Heber History, n.d.; Penn Museum, 1996; Schobel, 1996). As time went by, a lot of events were being added. Eventually, the core events of the ancient Greek Olympics existed of this sprint, the double sprint, long distance running, boxing, penkration (which can be seen as a
mix of wrestling and boxing), a horse chariot race, a normal horse race and a pentathlon, which involved the long jump, javelin and discus throwing along with the already mentioned sprint and wrestling (Penn Museum, 1996; Schobel, 1996). At one point the hoplitodromos became part of the program. The hoplitodromos, which can be translated as ‘race of soldiers’ and, straightforwardly, entailed running races for people dressed up in their fighting armor (Penn Museum, 1996). This event emphasized one of the goals of the ancient Greeks with regard to sport and physical activity: athletic training had the main purpose of keeping the male citizens physically fit for war (Penn Museum, 1996).

War, therefore, is one of the main motives for adding physical events to the original religious festivities. Physical exercise was needed for military reasons (Schobel, 1996). The physical component of a human being was highly valued by the Greeks. It even can be seen as the educational ideal of that time (Schobel, 1996). A perfectly proportioned body gained a lot of status. Beauty of form was something that the ancient Greeks were trying to educate and propagate. Physical exercise could provide this, along with other highly rated values like cleanliness of character and morals (Schobel, 1996: 24). Furthermore, the Olympics made that the cultural unity of Greece was being fostered and peace was being promoted by bringing all the city-states together (Schobel, 1996: 22). Despite these benefits Emperor Theodosius eventually cut off the event in 393 (Olympic, 2015). According to him, the Olympics were pagan and had to be banned, which meant the end of the ancient Greek Olympics.

2.2 **Olympism: De Coubertin**

After a drought period for the Olympics it was in 1896 that the first modern Olympic Games were being held. This revival can for the biggest part be ascribed to Baron Pierre De Coubertin. He took the initiative to establish the IOC with the goal to organize new Olympic Games. Underlying idea of this foundation of the IOC and the revival of the Olympic Games was the idea De Coubertin called Olympism. De Coubertin’s ideas about Olympism are based on an eclectic approach (Chatziefstathiou & Henry, 2007: 27). This means that it is based on particular features from other ideas. When these features blend together, they form a new point of view on how things should be. De Coubertin originally based Olympism on its ancient Greek roots and on English ideas about education and upbringing. These ancient Greek roots, however, have to be conceived as something that is called Hellenism. Hellenism was a nineteenth-century European movement that had renewed interest in the ancient Greek period (Chatziefstathiou & Henry, 2007: 26). They saw the classical period as
valuable and sought to reinvent it. This reinterpretation of the ancient Greeks became a big source of inspiration for De Coubertin in defining Olympism.

Interest of De Coubertin with regard to the ancient Greeks was captured when archeological discoveries with regard to the old Olympic sites were done. Parts of archaic Olympia were found, whereby also the most sacred site and the centre of the Olympic cult (the altis) was found (Loland, 1995: 61). De Coubertin’s imagination was grasped by these findings and the stories about the cultic character of the Olympics that appeared in society on behalf of the Hellenistic interests. De Coubertin his interpretation of Hellenism laid emphasis on its threefold harmony (the ancient Greek values: body, mind and spirit) as something to cherish (Chatziefstathiou & Henry, 2007: 28). Full human self-realization would come much closer by pursuing these important classical values (Chatziefstathiou & Henry, 2007: 27-28). That was the goal that De Coubertin had in mind when trying to revive the Olympics. Most important of this is that it is not only about the body, as would be expected with regards to a sporting competition. The Hellenistic interpretation that De Coubertin enhanced was not only interested in athletic excellence, but also in aesthetics like art and beauty (Loland, 1995: 62).

The idea that other values alongside athletic excellence could be fostered by sports was something De Coubertin took from Hellenism and incorporated in his own theory of Olympism. Alongside with this, De Coubertin liked the idea of the binding force that the Olympics had in ancient Greece (De Coubertin, 1900: 802). The Olympic Games in ancient Greece had such an impact that for periods before and after the games a truce was declared (Loland, 1995: 62). This peaceful influence of the Olympics was something that De Coubertin saw as a great advantage. Instead of the Greek city states not going to war with each other because of the Olympics, this could count for the European nation states as well. Instead of being devoted to unite city-states, the Olympics should be devoted to unite nation states and therefore to foster international understanding and peace (Loland, 1995: 62).

Another building block for De Coubertin’s Olympism can be found when focusing on educational systems (De Coubertin, 1892). De Coubertin got inspired by the English ideas with relation to education and incorporated these ideas in his theory of Olympism. De Coubertin, namely, saw education as the solution to the problems of society (Loland, 1995: 55). According to him, great national questions can be reduced to educational questions, which means that educating the masses in the right way could lead to social harmony and therefore international peace (Loland, 1995). This striving for international peace was one of the most important features that French society urged for. French society, namely, was dismantled by their defeat in the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871) and
their previous instable governing forms (Loland, 1995: 51-52). Education was seen as the solution for this dismantling. If they would not raise their youth with the virtues fostered by physical education, France would lose future wars too (Chatziefstathiu & Henry, 2012: 74). This idea of adding physical education to the curriculum is something that De Coubertin took from English education.

According to De Coubertin, French education was unable to provide the youth with the necessary knowledge and skills to cope with the social and political challenges of the day (Loland, 1995: 52). In his search for improving French education, he started to deeply investigate the English educational system. By visiting English schools like Oxford and Cambridge and writing books about how their educational system could be implemented in France, De Coubertin became an expert on this topic. The thing he found most striking in English education and what was missing in France was the presence of physical vitality and the importance that the English prescribed to the training of the body (Loland, 1995: 55-56). French education totally neglected the values that physical education and sports brought with them. Sports were considered to be a killer for the study, instead of a useful assistant in reaching intellectual powers (Loland, 1995: 52). In England the training of the body was also seen as a moral educator, as a way to shape people’s character, as a social training for life (Loland, 1995: 56). The incorporation of sports into the curriculum would have positive effects by learning virtues that are required for sound, masculine, muscular Christian practice (Chatziefstathiu & Henry, 2012: 75). As England already showed, these features would strengthen society and make sure that war would not be lost as easily as the French did during the Franco-Prussian War (Chatziefstathiu & Henry, 2007: 38). At the end, the whole idea of De Coubertin was to solve the problems of the weak French society by adding physical education to the curriculum, which would make society strengthen up and would bring peace a step closer (De Coubertin, 1892).

The idea of adding sport to the curriculum in order to solve the problems of society can be perfectly combined with Hellenism and therefore the Olympic Games. Together, these two building blocks are central to De Coubertin’s Olympism. However, without the influence of the Peace Movement on De Coubertin’s thinking, Olympism would have been stuck in a patriotic framework. As De Coubertin tried to provide solution for the turbulent times that occurred to France and preventing France from losing any more wars, these are motives that can be seen as very patriotic (Loland, 1995: 58). However, De Coubertin changed this patriotic perspective into a more internationalist outlook. De Coubertin, namely, saw this change of perspective as something inevitable. Globalization, fostered by technological advances (new ways of communication) and a more and more integrated world economy, made it impossible to only keep focusing on one’s own nation (Chatziefstathiu & Henry, 2012: 85). Internationalism gained momentum and it was the Peace Movement of that time that inspired De Coubertin to translate his idea of peace for France into international peace (Loland,
A kind of patriotism should be fostered that did not lay emphasis on exclusion. Instead, a positive national sentiment should be fostered in which there would be room for tolerance towards other countries. Discrimination of other countries and the glorification of war are to be banned. Other countries should be accepted and welcomed instead.

2.3 Olympism: Carl Diem

Although nowadays De Coubertin is seen as the founding father of Olympism, he was not the only one involved in the development of the term. Carl Diem (1882-1962), who was already involved in the Olympic movement from around 1912, became one of the other leading figures in the discourse of Olympism (Chatziefstathiou & Henry, 2012: 145). Greatly influenced by De Coubertin, Diem eventually developed his own opinion about what Olympism should mean. Diem played an important role in the organization of the 1936 Berlin Olympics and the 1916 Berlin Olympics, which were eventually called off (Chatziefstathiou & Henry, 2012: 149 & 164). These Olympics tried to change the ideas that De Coubertin had implemented. However, Diem used the same sources of inspiration for his version of Olympism. His most important building blocks can also be said to be Hellenism and the educational system and how it should incorporate sport. That Diem did not create a definition of Olympism equal to De Coubertin is because his interpretation of these building blocks is very different. Core of the difference, roughly said, is that De Coubertin was a Frenchman, while Diem was a German. Consensus in both countries on how to understand Hellenism and how to incorporate sport in the school curriculum differed. Furthermore, where De Coubertin was able to shift from a patriotic framework towards an internationalist outlook, Diem was not. This also has to do with how things get a different interpretation, in this case the notion of particular commitment towards a community. De Coubertin, as a Frenchman and therefore a republican, started out from patriotism, while Diem saw nationalism as the basis for commitment. Difference between patriotism and nationalism will be discussed more thoroughly later on, but what already will be shown here is that Diems form of nationalism made it almost impossible to make the switch to internationalism.

First, the different interpretation of Hellenism that underlies the different outcome of what Olympism should mean will be discussed. Striving for beauty and perfection were seen by Diem as the core themes of Hellenism. These terms, namely, fitted perfectly into the framework of race and ethnicity that were greatly valuated in Germany at that time (Chatziefstathiou & Henry, 2012: 162). This view on Hellenism meant that the aesthetics of the body was highly important and, taken together with the ethno-nationalism present in Germany, that the German race was biological...
determined to be perfect and therefore most valuable. Sport should also be used to make the race even more perfect and international sport should be used to show their superiority to the world. Olympics should be held to give each country the opportunity to strengthen their national unity (Chatziefstathiou & Henry, 2012: 161).

Second, how different ideas about education lead to a different point of view with regard to Olympism will be shown. It comes forth out of the leading idea present in Germany about the educational value of sport, which they called Turnen (Chatziefstathiou & Henry, 2012: 151). According to this, sport should be used in order to strengthen the idea of a German national identity (Chatziefstathiou & Henry, 2012: 153). Not only the body and discipline would be linked by sport, but it would also be used to link military training and nationalism with each other. The idea was to train the youth in such a way that they would be able to defend their country. Therefore, sport was needed to train the body, but also needed to foster a sense that would lead to the people wanting to protect one’s country. This made that sport was seen as an instrument to awaken the consciousness of a collective identity. These references to a collective national identity have to be seen in the light of the Volkish ideology that was present at that time (Chatziefstathiou & Henry, 2012: 154).

Volkish ideology is based on xenophobic nationalism and mystical racism, by which they meant the preservation of the German racial identity (Chatziefstathiou & Henry, 2012: 154). These features find resonance in Diem’s writings. Several times he explicitly refers to the German national interest and how important it was for the country to perform well at the Olympics and how it would serve the national interest to organize the tournament. He saw sport as an excellent tool to unite Germany by bringing together people from all across the country. Playing sport in an inter-national manner would be a good thing, as it would show the world the greatness of the German athletes. It would give opportunity for showing the superiority of the German race. This focus on ethnicity is also an important feature of German nationalism. They emphasize nationhood as a shared culture, a shared language and a shared ethnicity (Chatziefstathiou & Henry, 2012: 151). People will eventually form a political enterprise together, because of these shared features. Citizenship, therefore, is something exclusive based on the ethnic identity of the ‘Volk’. This stands in sharp contrast with French notion of communal ties, which comes forth out of republican ideals (Chatziefstathiou & Henry, 2012: 150). A political community starts to exist when groups of people are willing to start one and are willing to work together, despite their individual backgrounds. Therefore, the French interpretation of identity allows more room for some internationalist notion than the stricter, ethnical notion of German nationhood and national identity. By seeing groups as something exclusive, based on ethnic features, groups will always see themselves as superior and will make it very hard to regard all cultures around the world as having value. The step to internationalism is not
that easily made from this point of view. Therefore, different interpretation of the same building blocks will end up in different outcomes. Question is what happened to these two different views in relation to the further development of the discourse of Olympism.

2.4 De Coubertin & Diem

When comparing the ideas of De Coubertin and Diem, they can be seen to start out with a fundamental difference with regard to the role of education and therefore why sport should be introduced in the educational curriculum. De Coubertin sees education as the solution to all societal problems, whereas the societal problem of France in that time was war. Diem, however, does not see education as the solution to every societal problem, but rather sees it as a tool to foster national identity. This fostering of national identity in combination with the physical training would make that wars would be won and the superiority of Germany would prevail. This should be seen as a purpose on itself for education, instead of a solution to all sorts of societal problems. This type of national identity also relates to another distinction between him and De Coubertin. As already mentioned, the German and French interpretation of identity and particular commitment differs in such a way that it eventually becomes the core of their different interpretation of Olympism.

Both react differently to the ever present tension between particular commitment and internationalism in relation to Olympism. Diem lets the balance tip more to the nationalist side, while De Coubertin eventually chooses internationalism as most important. De Coubertin’s emphasis did eventually lay on the particular community, but only until he got influenced by the international movements. As said, French idea of communal identity is also easier to combine with internationalism. Because this form of identity does not depend on ethnicity, language, or any other characteristics of that sort, there is more a tendency towards humanism and a shared common denominator between people than the Germans have. German emphasis on race and national unity does make it very hard to combine with internationalism. Therefore, Diem sought for ways to let the international environment create benefits for the nation, while De Coubertin his goal was to look for benefits for the international environment itself.

De Coubertin’s ideas became leading in the Olympism discourse. There are probably two major reasons for that. First, German interpretation of national identity and Hellenism were not that widely shared. As they especially focused on their own German unity it was not easy to persuade other nations to think in the same way, as the Germans only thought that German race was superior. Persuading other countries to think of their nation in the same way would not be in the interest of
Germany and therefore their point of view did not found any resonance. Second, the course of history did not help Diem either to spread his mental legacy with success, as the ideas about German superiority and German unity did eventually lead to World War II and all of its cruelties. So, the same ideas that formed Diem’s view on Olympism did also provoke one of the most brutal pages in history. It was also therefore that other nations did not feel very comfortable with Olympism as such. As this doctrine of Olympism was dismissed by this reasons, De Coubertin’s ideas got dominant. Therefore, scholars who wrote on Olympism always took De Coubertin and his interpretation as a starting point.

This difference between Olympism as seen by De Coubertin and Olympism as seen by Diem can be used in order to see the differences between the two groups of scholars. As seen earlier on, the complementarists see the Olympics as based on De Coubertin’s form of Olympism and therefore having internationalist ideals. Gleaves and Llewellyn, in contrast, see sport as a cultural artifact. Sport’s features will reflect the values that one wants it to reflect when it was founded. According to Gleaves and Llewellyn, this is nationalism. This coincides with the ideals Diem wanted to incorporate in and through sport. Therefore, debate about if sport should be seen as having internationalist or nationalist ideals between the complementarists and Gleaves and Llewellyn is equal to the question if De Coubertin’s or Diem’s ideas eventually became leading in the discourse of Olympism. As De Coubertin’s ideas became leading in the discourse it can be said that the complementarists are more accurate than Gleaves and Llewellyn.

To give more support for this, it is interesting to look at the claim of Gleaves and Llewellyn that sport should be seen as a cultural artifact. The divide between De Coubertin and Diem is a great piece of proof for this claim. According to Gleaves and Llewellyn, namely, sport will be given the form that the organizing nations want it to have in order to let it create the values and merits that they want. When looking at De Coubertin and Diem, their own countries their differences in ideology can be said to form the core of the different ways De Coubertin and Diem wanted to organize sport. Therefore, it is fair to say that there is truth in the idea that sport is a cultural artifact. The values that a country has a high opinion of do determine the way they want to organize sport. So with regard to sport being a cultural artifact, Gleaves and Llewellyn are right. However, this does not mean that they are right in declaring sport as being built on nationalism, at least when it comes down to the Olympics. Debate with regard to Olympism shows that De Coubertin’s internationalist sense won the battle for influence from Diem’s nationalistic sense. Sport should therefore not be equated with nationalism, but as being based on internationalist ideals. However, Gleaves and Llewellyn their idea of sport as a cultural artifact still does explain why sport is being played inter-national, as this is also the form through which international ideals can be achieved. Question that comes up, however, is if
Olympism nowadays still lives up to these expectations. How does Olympism get defined in modern times?

### 2.5 Olympism as a concept

Modern day Olympism can best be distilled out of today’s Olympic Charter (OC). In this charter the fundamental principles of Olympism are written down. These fundamental principles were first drawn up during an International Athletic Congress in 1894, of which De Coubertin took the initiative to organize it. In this meeting the constitution of the IOC was arranged and, accordingly, the OC was made (IOC, 2013: 10). Slightly evolving over time, the seven bullet points that nowadays are mentioned in the OC as the fundamental principles of Olympism find their origins in this Congress and therefore in De Coubertin’s thinking. The seven bullet points are these:

1. **Olympism is a philosophy of life, exalting and combining in a balanced whole the qualities of body, will and mind.** Blending sport with culture and education, Olympism seeks to create a way of life based on the joy of effort, the educational value of good example, social responsibility and respect for universal fundamental ethical principles.

2. **The goal of Olympism is to place sport at the service of the harmonious development of humankind, with a view to promoting a peaceful society concerned with the preservation of human dignity.**

3. **The Olympic Movement is the concerted, organized, universal and permanent action, carried out under the supreme authority of the IOC, of all individuals and entities who are inspired by the values of Olympism.** It covers the five continents. It reaches its peak with the bringing together of the world’s athletes at the great sports festival, the Olympic Games. Its symbol is five interlaced rings.

4. **The practice of sport is a human right.** Every individual must have the possibility of practicing sport, without discrimination of any kind and in the Olympic spirit, which requires mutual understanding with a spirit of friendship, solidarity and fair play.

5. **Recognizing that sport occurs within the framework of society, sports organizations within the Olympic Movement shall have the rights and obligations of autonomy, which include freely establishing and controlling the rules of sport, determining the structure and governance of their organizations, enjoying the right of elections free from any outside influence and the responsibility for ensuring that principles of good governance be applied.**

6. **Any form of discrimination with regard to country or a person on grounds of race, religion, politics, gender or otherwise is incompatible with belonging to the Olympic Movement.**
7. Belonging to the Olympic Movement requires compliance with the Olympic Charter and recognition by the IOC.

(IOC, 2013: 11-12)

Recapitulating, Olympism should be seen as a result of mixing Hellenism, English educational ideas and the internationalist perspective (Loland, 1995: 58). Especially the first two principles mentioned do relate to that linkage. The blending of sport with culture and education in order to create certain characteristics is exactly what the sources of inspiration meant. Also, striving for a peaceful society by placing sport at the service of the harmonious development of humankind does incorporate what was said when talking about internationalism under the concept of Olympism. De Coubertin saw the Olympics as a way to resolve international confrontations and to maintain world peace (Chatziefstathiou & Henry, 2012: 87). Sport has to be seen as virtuous, as creating noble and chivalrous characteristics and the creation of these virtues is positive for creating an environment where countries come together on a peaceful and courteous base (Chatziefstathiou & Henry, 2012: 87). The Olympic Games are the excellent neutral platform for this. The most important role De Coubertin had in mind for sport in the international environment was to create a neutral and peaceful enterprise where countries could come together and learn about other cultures. This would prevent countries from going to war with one another. This creation of peace comes back in the Olympic Charter. It says that the goal of the Olympic Movement is to act in accordance with the philosophy of Olympism and thereby to contribute to a peaceful and better world by educating youth through sport (IOC, 2013: 15). So, these points support the conclusion that Olympism nowadays still is in accordance with De Coubertin’s emphasis on internationalism.

However, in order to come to a rounded conclusion about the term, one should not completely depend on the bullet points from the OC. Some scholars, namely, argue that there are a lot of inconsistencies and unclear points in De Coubertin’s writings and Olympism nowadays defined by the IOC. According to them, lack of clarity exists and it is still thus question to debate what kind of phenomenom Olympism exactly is. Parry (2006) tried to make some clarifications in his paper, which eventually did found resonance in the discourse with regard to Olympism. He starts from the same point as De Coubertin did, by pointing at Olympism as being a philosophy. A social philosophy, to be precise, which emphasizes the role of sport in global culture, international understanding, peaceful coexistence, and social and moral education (Parry, 2006: 190). Parry, however, adds another point on how to look at the term Olympism characterized here. He has some problems by pointing at the Olympic Charter as the one and only fixed definition of Olympism. According to Parry, the principles of Olympism are not fixed as the Olympic Charter seems to suggest. This namely would imply that
Olympism is unchanging, while the meaning of Olympism does change over time and space. This can be seen best when looking at the difference between the ancient Greek Games and the modern Games. It is even inevitable to have differences over space and time, since a social philosophy (like Olympism is) cannot have a full meaning without depending on a specific social order or a particular set of social relationships (Parry, 2006: 190). Therefore, the term Olympism as described by De Coubertin cannot be the specific, fixed, definition of Olympism. But, this does not mean that Olympism is completely prey to relativism and that Olympism only generates different meanings (Parry, 2006: 191). In order to understand this, a distinction between concepts and conceptions will be explained.

Olympism has a concept as well as conceptions. Olympism as a concept covers all the different meanings of Olympism as a conception. The concept has a more general, thin, meaning. It is the coordinating term among which all the conceptions fall. The conceptions have a more specific, thick, meaning. The different conceptions of a term will interpret the more general concept of the term to give practical meaning to it. In a particular context, the conceptions will bring the general concept to real life (Parry, 2006: 191). Olympism as a concept has to be seen as the universal meaning of Olympism and Olympism as a conception as its specific relative meaning. The universal meaning of Olympism can only be understood (and thereby also created) by reflecting on existing communities with their norms and values. By looking at them, the universal meaning will become meaningful. So, in order to escape from relativism one has to look at the different conceptions of Olympism to identify the core values of the universal concept of Olympism. Only then the thin version of what Olympism is, can be given. Parry subtracts this concept of Olympism from the fundamental principles that are mentioned in the Olympic Charter. The core values of Olympism he eventually draws up are: respect for universal ethical principles, fair play, mutual understanding, antidiscrimination, education through sport and multiculturalism (Parry, 2006: 192).

McNamee (2006) almost draws the same conclusion. After analyzing different ways of looking at Olympism, he says that, although Olympism is a contested concept, that it is not contested in its essence (McNamee, 2006: 176). The core of all the different forms of Olympism is ever present. This is almost in accordance with looking at Olympism as a concept and searching for the more general definition. Sportsmanship/fair play, sports for all/mass participation, sport as education, cultural exchange and international understanding are the terms that all the competing conceptions of Olympism bear inside them, according to McNamee (McNamee, 2006: 176). Although giving it slightly different names, Parry and McNamee do agree on what defines the concept Olympism. These components they mention can also be found in the OC and therefore in the writings of De Coubertin.
Olympism nowadays therefore can be said to contain the following components. First component is fair play, or sportsmanship as McNamee also calls it. The OC does mention fair play, at their fourth point, in the context that every individual should have the possibility of practicing sport, which requires, among other things, fair play. Second component is about education. Parry’s education through sport and McNamee’s sport as education entails the same, as well as the first bullet point of the fundamental principles of Olympism, which talks about blending sport with culture and education. This leads to the third component, which entails culture and can be seen present in the OC by the previous sentence. It is also present in McNamee’s and Parry’s enumeration, respectively called cultural exchange and multiculturalism. Olympism should make cultures come together and give insight in each other’s way of life. At his turn, this must lead towards the fourth point: international/mutual understanding. This corresponds to the goal of Olympism as stated in the OC: the harmonious development of humankind and thereby promoting a peaceful society. Society should hereby be seen as the whole wide world, as De Coubertin’s Olympism is more based on internationalism than nationalism. Fifth component, then, is the idea that every person, despite all of his characteristics, should be able to participate. Antidiscrimination, as Parry calls it, but this can also be seen as sports for all, as McNamee converts it. Mass participation should be the aim and, just the OC states (in the fourth bullet point, but bullet point six completely deals with the issue), discrimination is therefore incompatible with the concept Olympism.

In contrast to McNamee, Parry does mention a sixth component. According to him, respect for universal ethical principles should be incorporated as well. These words are also mentioned in the OC, as something that Olympism seeks to create. However, this component already can be said to be incorporated in the concept of Olympism due to the previous components. Things like participation for all and thereby antidiscrimination are examples of these ethical principles. As Olympism as a concept has to be seen as the universal meaning and thereby principles of Olympism, all the components that talk about ethics can already be said to be about universal ethical principles. Therefore, referring to universal ethical principles as such, without specifying what is exactly meant, does have no added value. So, at the end, only five components form the concept of Olympism: fair play, role for education, make cultures meeting each other, create mutual peace and understanding in the worldwide society and antidiscrimination.

2.7 Olympism, internationalism & cosmopolitanism

Now it is established what Olympism entails, it would be interesting to focus on the term internationalism. According to earlier discussion, Olympism should be seen as based on
internationalist ideals. No remarks have been made about this statement, until now. When taking a
closer look at how they end up at internationalism, namely, one can raise some valid questions. The
complementarists, namely, end up at internationalism after dismissing cosmopolitanism. However,
this step is not as logical as the complementarists make it sound.

The complementarists see the discussion between internationalism and cosmopolitanism as
a discussion between particularism and universalism. According to the complementarists, Olympism
should be seen as a form of (sincere) internationalism and thereby particularism, instead of
cosmopolitanism and thereby universalism. As they think that complete universal commitment is not
possible, cosmopolitanism has to be dismissed. Instead, a particular view and the inevitability of
particular commitment has to be accepted. As pure cosmopolitanism requires complete universal
commitment it cannot be brought in accordance with particular commitment. Whereas particularism
is all about a special or particular love for something, cosmopolitanism starts from everyone being
equal and therefore not allowing people to have a special affection for some particular group.
However, dismissing universalism does not automatically mean one has to switch to the
particularism preached by internationalism. There is an alternative form of cosmopolitanism that
does accept some kind of particularism, namely moderate cosmopolitanism. Why do the
complementarists choose for internationalism instead of moderate cosmopolitanism? Although they
themselves do not give a clear answer on that, it is possible to interpret what their underlying
thoughts were. However, in order to end up at these underlying thoughts and an answer to the
question if it is possible to call Olympism a form of moderate cosmopolitanism, one best starts out
from discussing plain cosmopolitanism. Central to the whole switch to internationalism is the
argument that cosmopolitanism and therefore full universalism has to be dismissed. However,
should this really be the case?

Martha Nussbaum (1996) argues in her essay For Love of Country that it would be morally
right for people to feel universally committed towards the well-being of all human beings and
therefore propagates cosmopolitanism. Nussbaum her ideas for this are based on these of the Stoics.
They came up with the idea of the kosmou polites; the world citizen (Nussbaum, 1996: 7). Nussbaum
found it an interesting point of departure and eventually came to her own conclusion that ever
person’s allegiance should be to the worldwide community (Nussbaum, 1996: 4). Everyone should be
and see themselves as a world citizen. It all comes forth out of the similarities between every human
being and their equality. There is no justification for people belonging to one group or another. This
is all randomly determined and depends on luck or misfortune. No one deserves the love of a
particular community, because he just happens to be born in that community. Equally, it is not just
that some people will always be deprived of the love from some particular communities, because
one was just not born there. What is special with regard to Nussbaum is that she does not totally neglect the idea of feeling related to a community and giving priority to members of your community, it is just that she thinks that there is no justified base for having multiple, exclusive, communities. According to her, it is only justified to have one sort of community and that is the worldwide community to which everyone belongs (Nussbaum, 1996: 7). Humanity should be the base for forming a community and therefore every human being should belong to this community. This means that people can have a special affection for their particular community, but as there is only one community, it will always be a special affection to the world wide community. Priority should be given to fellow community members, which means that priority should be given to every human being.

Although this all sounds pretty solid, some remarks have to be made with regard to what it really means to feel first and foremost allegiance to the worldwide community. This, namely, does not mean that people should not have any local identifications at all. This is not even possible, even according to the cosmopolitan that Nussbaum is. To make this clear, Nussbaum sketches the image of a person surrounded by concentric circles (Nussbaum, 1996: 9). All these different concentric circles that surround someone consist of a group to which one feels related. The outmost circle has to be seen as humanity. The circle first off from the centre is someone’s immediate family. All the next circles consist out of other allegiances, like extended family members, acquaintances and compatriots. The closer someone’s personal relation to the group will be, the closer to the centre this circle will be. According to Nussbaum, that is how one should look at loyalty. This means that local identifications will always be present and cannot be completely eradicated. What can be done is that the more local allegiance circles can be made very small, so the outer circle can grow in volume and the distance between the centre and the outer circle can be reduced. Nussbaum argues that this has to happen (Nussbaum, 1996: 9). This, namely, would make that the circle of humanity should be given a lot of special attention and respect, which corresponds to the idea of equality and unfair group treatment. However, as the other circles cannot be completely removed, there will always be some affection with regard to these smaller groups. This is the best Nussbaum can get in arguing for full cosmopolitanism and making it possible to be one.

However, lots of criticism came down upon the cosmopolitans arguing for this universal commitment. Even Nussbaum herself changed with regard to the possibility of complete universal commitment and cosmopolitanism, as can be seen in her book *Political Emotions* (2013). Conclusion that it would be impossible to completely eradicate all particular commitments, as already seen when discussing her account with regard to the concentric circles, eventually convinced her to say that no one can become completely emotionally detached from his or her nearby communities. That
full universalism is not possible, is the main criticism that always comes down upon cosmopolitanism. It is this criticism that made the complementarists dismiss universalism and thereby cosmopolitanism as being the ideal of Olympism. Besides the argument that full universalism is not possible, another argument that can also be made is that cosmopolitanism and thereby dissolving all particular bonds would be morally dangerous.

First, the argument that shows that full and real universalism is not possible and would even not be useful will be given. Full and real universalism would, with regard to morality, mean adapting a ‘view from nowhere’ (Iowerth et al., 2010: 85). An account of the world should be made up out of complete objectivity. Therefore, impartiality is needed. Impartiality, namely, would dismiss interests and affections in order to reach the preferable moral rules (MacIntyre, 1984: 294). This would make that the moral rules that would be drawn up come out of the only characteristic that matters; humanity. The most basic principles of morality will be reached, because people will see themselves only as members of an egalitarian moral universe (Iowerth et al., 2010: 85). However, consensus is that this view from nowhere can never be achieved. Simply said, out of nothing one can never create something. Without anything to hold on to one can never climb a mountain and take a look at the view. A person will never reach complete objectivity, because he will always be aware of some of his particular characteristics. This cannot be switched off, just as the concentric circles cannot be eradicated. One may look at an issue from different angles, but without an angle one will see nothing. One can put different lenses on his camera, but when one does not want such a particular view and puts the cap on the lens one will see nothing. Furthermore, even in the hypothetical case that the view from nowhere would be possible, its usefulness can be contested. If people would be lifted from their particular cultures than they will not have the tools or language to meaningfully interact with other cultures. All the things that people need to make sense of themselves and others, like beliefs, values, rules and conventions, will be eliminated (Iowerth et al., 2010: 86). A view from nowhere and thereby full and real moral universalism is therefore neither possible nor useful, but the arguments also go for complete universal commitment.

Second, the argument that states that cosmopolitanism would be morally dangerous will be discussed. Cosmopolitanism can be said to be morally dangerous, because when all particular bonds will be dissolved all people would be deprived of a central dimension of their moral life (MacIntyre, 1984: 297). One can only be someone in relation to others. Without particular bonds, every single person will never get to know the narrative that will tell him who he is and where he comes from. As these narratives are normally embedded in the stories of some larger units, getting lose of these larger units will make all the narratives stand loose and therefore it will make them meaningless (MacIntyre, 1984: 297). Furthermore, individuals will not only be deprived of their own meaningful
narrative, it will also achieve that the narratives of other people will not be understood and will never make people share any common stakes. Getting insight into each other’s life’s will not succeed. Implication of this is that no one will know which moral rules one has to follow in order to act in a good way in accordance to everyone else. For example, I would never have the knowledge with regard to what I may owe to others or what others owe to me, as information about our interests in life will be lost and I will never know if my actions are prohibiting someone from reaching his goals. Therefore, which moral rules to follow would never be clear to me with the risk of not acting morally at all. Dissolving all particular bonds will mean that morality would never be clear and therefore it would become morally dangerous to dissolve these bonds (MacIntyre, 1984: 297).

Conclusion, therefore, is that universalism is neither possible, nor useful and not even morally permissible. So far, this is in line with the argumentation of the complementarists. After dismissing cosmopolitanism, the complementarists switch to internationalism, as this is an ideal that does not dismiss a particular view as being unjust, but still pleads for bringing people together and let them live harmoniously beside each other. However, question is why they switch to internationalism when there is also an alternative available that is called moderate cosmopolitanism. Moderate cosmopolitanism does also accept that real and full universalism would not be possible, but still does not lose itself in pledging for strict particular commitment. It also leaves enough room for the possibility of living harmoniously and peaceful in companion with others. Particular attachment cannot be dismissed, but one should not end up only helping people living in one’s community. Internationalism and moderate patriotism do sound the same in this regard, but there is a difference.

Cosmopolitanism and internationalism act on two different levels, which makes the switch made by the complementarists a strange one. Cosmopolitanism and all of its forms, namely, acts on the level of individuals. Feeling committed is not a group activity. It is about individuals feeling committed towards each other, which may cause the formation of a group, but this group is not the central actor with regard to commitment. Instead, internationalism acts on the level of groups. It is about the commitment or tolerance one group has towards another and how you look at and act towards other groups and nations. The existence and formation of groups is already taken for granted. The complementarists do not straightforwardly answer why they switch to internationalism, instead of staying on the same level and switch to moderate cosmopolitanism. The way internationalism is specified, or because of the lack of specification, makes that it does not differ from how moderate cosmopolitanism should be understood. They never talk about the level of commitment and if it should be seen as commitment between individuals or as commitment or tolerance between groups that should be created.
It seems to be the case that they implicitly assumed that the way the Olympics are organized it is played between groups and therefore they take the term internationalism. However, as it is played between groups, it does not have to be the case internationalism fits best. One can argue that the people forming a group during the Olympics do not feel committed to each other as a group. That they do not share the same features, but just happen to play sports under the same flag. The group is not the central actor, but the individuals in the group are. Then, one should better opt for moderate cosmopolitanism as the right term for addressing the type of commitment. When looking at the OC and the bullet points that form the principles of Olympism, it does not become clear if the goal is to form commitment and a harmonious coming together between groups or between individuals. Which term should be used, will therefore depend on the way the Olympics are organized, as that would be the conception of Olympism nowadays. Is there evidence that the purpose is the coming together of different groups or different individuals? As an answer of this question will be even more meaningful in relation to the debate between the use of nationalism and patriotism, it will be answered in the next chapter. For now, what should be understood is that the overarching concept of Olympism as declared by De Coubertin and written down in the OC could as well be based on internationalist ideals as well as on moderate cosmopolitan ideals. If this also counts for the underlying idea behind all inter-national elite sport is something that still needs to be answered. To what extent should this whole inquiry into Olympism count for inter-national elite sport as a whole?

2.8 Olympism extended

The knowledge about Olympism and how it should be understood is at this point only applicable to the Olympic Games. Question is still to what extent Olympism, and therefore the idea behind the Olympics, can be extended to be the idea behind all inter-national elite sport. According to Gleaves and Llewellyn, the Olympics and inter-national elite sport cannot be compared. The Olympics are about mass participation, while inter-national elite sport is about athletic superiority. Interestingly enough, difference between these two features have been discussed in the discourse of the term Olympism. One of De Coubertin's inconsistencies, namely, was his shifting interest between athletic superiority and mass participation. The attempt to link the Olympics and inter-national elite sport, therefore, will begin there.

Torres (2006) gives a great example of the tension in Olympism between mass participation and athletic superiority. The Olympic creed, namely, says that the important thing is not winning, but taking part. The Olympic motto, however, says: citius, altius, fortius (faster, higher, stronger) (Torres,
These two slogans seem to clash with one another, but do not have to be understood that way. The competitive element that the search for athletic superiority brings along is a necessary component for succeeding in the goals that come along with mass participation. The Olympics, Olympism and their search for virtuous behavior, which is sketched through the Olympic creed, could not succeed without the competitive element. The two Olympic slogans do match, instead of being contradictions. There are two arguments that support this claim.

First, without the competitive element the Olympics would not be as popular as they are now. Public attention would not be that big and therefore the creation of virtuous goals would not be that successful. It is only because the Olympics are seen as the highest sporting achievement an athlete can ever reach that it does attract that amount of viewers (Gleaves & Llewellyn, 2014: 4). If the Olympics would only be about plain participating instead of athletic performances, nobody, or at least few, would care about it. Second, results and participation are intertwined with one another and cannot be seen as two totally different things (Torres, 2006: 250). Results do not have to be seen as plain end results in a ranking, but as the end of a working process for which one has to exert oneself. Plain results, namely, do not necessarily correlate with excellence (Torres, 2006: 248). Records and medals do not give a proper image of the stories behind the athletes and their efforts. Moral values like discipline are not reflected in plain results, but can be found in the way that leads towards a particular result. The performance is more important than the result. However, without results there would be no route towards the results. It is therefore very difficult to distance results from performances. To make contestants always focusing on excellence and always trying to do their best, the test itself has to be cultivated (Torres, 2006: 251). The honor that athletes with great results get, gives them the incentive to strive for great performances. Great performances are not equal to good results, but it will definitely help to achieve them. Without the perspective of winning, the idea of performing well and therefore moral values like discipline will not be fostered enough. This shows that these seemingly incompatible aspects are not that incompatible when understood through a principled theory of competitive sport (Torres, 2006: 252).

This elaboration helps to link Olympism and inter-national elite sport. Because, the same goes for the distinction sketched between these two. Olympism being more about the promotion of virtuous behavior and inter-national elite sport being more about athletic superiority should not be seen that black and white. The Olympics do not totally neglect the search for athletic superiority, while inter-national elite sport does not neglect the promotion of virtuous behavior either. The main difference between the Olympics and a World Cup, with regard to these two goals, lies in the magnitude of the events. The Olympics are seen as the biggest and most important sporting event of the world. Some World Cups do come close and it is even arguable if, for instance, the FIFA World
Cup (football) is not a bigger event in relation to the public interest. However, it is clear that the
Olympics have the most athletes participating in a sporting event and the most athletes from
different countries. Therefore, the role of sport as a pacifier and as an opportunity for different
cultures to come together and get insight into each other, does have more impact with regard to
sport at the Olympics than inter-national elite sport. However, each at their own level, every type of
sport does have some impact with regard to this feature. As the Olympics are the best suited for this
purpose, it looks like the Olympics do emphasis it more than World Cups. However, their goals are
the same. Both the Olympics as inter-national elite sport bear inside them the search for athletic
superiority.

As seen, the search for athletic superiority is needed in order to successfully promote
virtuous behavior. They do not contradict, but are complementary. Therefore, it is nonsense to speak
of either promoting virtuous behavior or searching for athletic superiority, as it is also nonsense to
speak of the Olympics and inter-national elite sport as two totally different things. Their underlying
ideas are alike. Therefore, Olympism can be said to be the leading idea behind not only the Olympics,
but also inter-national elite sport. This means that the conclusion that the Olympics are a cultural
artifact based on internationalist or moderate cosmopolitan ideals can be extended. All inter-
national elite sport, including the Olympics, are a cultural artifact based on internationalist or
moderate cosmopolitan ideals.
3. Particular commitment: nationalism or patriotism?

As the previous chapter has brought the complementarists and Gleaves and Llewellyn in accordance with regard to the philosophical idea behind all inter-national sport, this chapter aims to achieve the same with regard to their use of the term nationalism. How do both group of scholars perceive this term and what are the consequences? The complementarists sketch nationalism as having particularistic aims and commitments (Morgan, 1995: 79). However, this characterization does not seem to differ that much from how patriotism is often described. Therefore, the first question that has to be addressed in this chapter should be what the conceptual difference between nationalism and patriotism entails, if there is any difference at all. This, namely, could have major implications with regard to how the arguments of both groups of scholars have to be perceived. Are the arguments really about nationalism or should they actually be understood in the light of patriotism? Answering this question may lead towards a different interpretation of the original arguments and therefore a lead towards different conclusions. After both arguments will be held to the test with regard to their conception of nationalism, they will be compared again. Can both arguments be brought in accordance after reanalyzing? In order to end up here, first, the differences and commonalities with regard to nationalism and patriotism will be discussed.

3.1 Nationalism, patriotism and their differences and commonalities

Having particularistic aims and commitments is the definition the complementarists come up with when sketching nationalism. However, nationalism has not exclusively all rights reserved on this characterization. Patriotism as well can be said to contain particularistic aims and commitments. If one should speak of nationalism or patriotism depends on the specific kind of particular attachment one talks about. It requires more nuance, which is often neglected. Therefore, nationalism and patriotism are two terms which often get mixed up and are used interchangeable by many authors (Primoratz, 2013). However, both terms evolved out of two distinct traditions of political thought (Primoratz, 2007: 129).

Patriotism is the term that popped up first in history. Its presence started to emerge in debates with regard to republicanism. Along with questions with regard to the bonds of community, patriotism came into being. This can even be traced back to the Roman Republic and the old Greek city-states (Poole, 2007). Commitment towards a political entity was central to the discussion, whereby patriotism has to be seen as the appropriate virtue to this conception of political life (Primoratz, 2007: 129-130). Nationalism only came into play in the late eighteenth century (Miller,
As already said when explaining the argument of Gleaves and Llewellyn, the idea of nationhood and national identity started to emerge just then, mainly because of industrialization. Both terms often get intermingled as they both relate to group commitment. However, differences can be found when looking more closely. In order to do so, first, the basic features of patriotism will be sketched. Second, the specific features of nationalism will pass review. After both terms have been introduced by these short sketches, they will be compared and their main differences can be pointed out.

First, therefore, patriotism will be given a closer look. This can be done best by looking at the leading definition of patriotism, written down by Stephen Nathanson (1993). According to him, patriotism is first and foremost about the loving of and having a special affection for one’s own country. Furthermore, patriotism entails a sense of personal identification with his or her country, a special concern for the well-being of his or her country and the willingness to sacrifice in order to promote the goods of one’s country (Nathanson, 1993: 38). Keyword in this enumeration is ‘country’. It all centers around feeling and having a special commitment to a country. A country has to be seen as a certain physical place where a certain political system is being executed (Miller, 2008: 531). A certain distinguishable community in which people cooperate in a political system can be said to form a country. The patriot feels committed to its country, which means committed to this political system in a certain geographical place. Therefore, the patriot is committed to the political community where he is part of. Which kind of people form this community does not matter that much. When people cooperate in the political community, they will all be given first allegiance on behalf of that characteristic (Viroli, 1995: 17). The bond between the people in a specific country is based on civic and political features.

Second, the specific features of nationalism that is useful for the distinction between patriotism will be discussed. For the nationalist, his loyalty is related to the nation, whereby the nation should be seen as a cultural homogenous group (Viroli, 1995: 1). People belonging to the same nation share, for instance, a language, an ethnicity and a religion, but it could also be seen in the light of some smaller things, like sharing a particular form of music or dance, a certain national cuisine or a particular style of literature or art (Miller, 2008: 532). All these features play a part in creating a national identity which will make people feel committed towards people sharing this nationality. Furthermore, loyalty to the nation brings a specific action plan in play. As the nation should be understood as a collective agent with its own aims and purposes, it also means that they should have self-determination through political self-rule (Miller, 2008: 532). They have their own specific purpose as a group, because they would be severely deprived when the only suitable option for achieving these purposes (a state of their own) would be denied. Therefore, nationality should
form the base of the political for the nationalist. Only then can the national identity be fully expressed. This national identity will create the feeling of belonging and loyalty, which also forms the link between the individual and the state (Primoratz, 2007: 144-145). By feeling committed to a certain nationality, one will automatically feel committed towards the political community that will be formed on the base of this nationality.

Now these short introductions have taken place, the main differences between patriotism and nationalism can be sketched. First of all, they differ with regard to the object of their love or loyalty. Patriotism has the country as object of commitment and love, while nationalism has the nation as its object (Primoratz, 2013). These two objects differ in their construction, as a country consists of a group of people belonging to the same political cooperation in a specific, demarcated, place on the map, while a nation consists of a group of people sharing some deep cultural values with each other. Therefore, patriotism can be said to be about the political and the civic, while the determining component of nationalism is the ethnical and the cultural (Viroli, 1995: 94). This means that the patriot’s allegiance is first towards the country and the individuals belonging to the political, whoever these people may be. The nationalist, in contrary, feels already deeply related towards other individuals as a predefined group, as long as they share the same cultural values and ethnicity. These features are pre-political and therefore already determined before communities are even formed. Ethnicity, for instance, cannot be changed over a lifetime and is already determined by birth. Therefore, for a big part, the group that a nation consists of is pre-political determined. It is only after becoming a group that they are looking for political self-rule and self-determination. In contrast, patriots only become a group after settling in a political community.

A special remark with regard to this distinction between patriotism and nationalism should be made about civic nationalism. It is this sub-form of nationalism, namely, that shares a lot of characteristics with the description of patriotism given here. It even shows so much similarities that one can argue both terms are actually the same. Civic nationalism is been called a form of nationalism as it came forth out of the discourse of nationalism. Hans Kohn (1945) first made the divide between Eastern nationalism and Western nationalism, which later evolved into ethnic nationalism and civic nationalism (Xenos, 1996: 214). Nationalism could differ in its type and form and therefore they touched upon these types of nationalism. However, when following the accounts of patriotism and nationalism just given, civic nationalism cannot be called a proper form of nationalism. Commitment is based on the political and the civic, which have been said to be signs of patriotism. In the light of this, civic nationalism is no different from patriotism. It is only named civic nationalism as it comes forth out of the discourse on nationalism. Patriotism was not taken into
account, whereas this should have been the case. Therefore, civic nationalism will not be taken into further consideration.

Although the distinction between nationalism and patriotism may look very clear now, in practice the two terms easily start to blur again. The problem, for instance, is that those groups that constitute a country are often the same groups that constitute a nation. When a nation has created its own state and achieved their self-determination and political self-rule, then it can be said to be a political community situated in a certain place as well. Thus, the country and the nation can consist of the same group of peoples. It is only when a country does not consist of a cultural and ethnical homogeneous group of people, or when a nation does not have their own political community in a certain place, that the distinction will become clearer again (Primoratz, 2013).

Another aspect that makes the sketched distinction less clear in practice concerns culture. Although the distinction puts the cultural aspect in the box of defining nationalism, this does not mean that culture plays no part at all with regard to patriotism. Patriotism is characterized by cooperating in a political community. However, it would be hard to fit in and cooperate in a community when all of your personal cultural background is at odds with most of the other people. Therefore, it would be hard for the patriot to feel committed to his compatriots when they all have totally different and clashing cultural backgrounds. It would not be a complete insuperable difficulty, and it would definitely demand more effort, but people will not always make this effort. Some cultural resemblance would therefore be handy to successfully cooperate in the political community. As cooperating in the political community is needed for the patriot in order to feel committed, it means in the end that it would be hard to feel committed to your compatriots when having totally clashing, cultural backgrounds. However, and that is central to the distinction between nationalism and patriotism, it is not needed to share the same culture in order to feel committed. It would definitely help, but patriotic loyalty will never be felt with regard to a shared culture. Culture is not the determining factor for the patriotic community, as it would be for the nationalist. This is the sharpest as the distinction can be sketched. With this in mind, it would be viable to go back to the complementarists and their argument and to see how their use of nationalism with regard to particular attachments has to be interpreted.

3.2 Nationalism according to the complementarists

The complementarists use the term nationalism to describe the feeling of a particular commitment and loyalty. However, as they do not define the precise object towards this commitment and loyalty
is felt, the feeling of particular commitment and loyalty could as well be called nationalism as patriotism. The complementarist choose for nationalism, but they do not seem to have taken into account the conceptual difference between patriotism and nationalism. They fail in discussing this conceptual difference and thereby fail to critically look at how these concepts play a role in relation to inter-national sport. Their choice for using the term nationalism is an implicit one. They seem to have chosen for nationalism as they assume that inter-national sport is being played between nations and is meant to be played this way. This would place the particular commitment and loyalty on the scale of nationalism, instead of patriotism. Although this assumption can be said to be understandable (why else call it inter-national?), it does not mean that it should be automatically accepted. Therefore, an elaboration will follow with regard to whether inter-national sport and its creation of particular aims and commitments should be seen in the light of nationalism or patriotism.

The central question in order to solve this issue is if inter-national sport has to be seen as a competition between nations or as a competition between countries. As the athletes competing are the representatives with whom people identify themselves with, it therefore matters on behalf of which characteristics these athletes are being able to compete. These characteristics, namely, determine what kind of identity will be created through sport and therefore if the particular aims and commitments created through sport should actually be called nationalism or patriotism. When looking at the current situation, one has to take a look at the eligibility rules for athletes. Athletes, namely, can only represent a community if they meet the eligibility rules. As with regard to inter-national sport, these eligibility rules are drawn up by the coordinating sport federations of each particular sport. These rules are too detailed to discuss thoroughly here, but in general they state that an athlete needs to have a passport corresponding with the country or nation one wants to play for. So, the question comes down to the issue if possessing a passport is a sign of belonging to a nation or to a country. The latter seems to be the case.

Acquiring a passport, namely, is most often based on living and cooperating in a particular place. There can be two reasons given for this statement. First, one can get a passport from the community where one is born. This is purely based on someone living in a particular place. Although, when speaking of nation states, chances are likely that the newly born passport possessors will have the same ethnicity and will probably be raised with the same deep cultural values like his or her fellow nationals, this does not form the base on which the passport is acquired. When someone with another ethnicity and deep cultural values will be born in this particular place he will be entitled to this passport too. Furthermore, when these newly born will grow older, chances are most likely that they will stay and will participate and cooperate in this particular community. Identity, therefore, is not acquired through ethnicity, but because of being born in a particular political community.
Second, this statement can be further supported by looking at the rules that concern people who want to acquire a passport of a community they are not born in. Although every community has its own rules with regard to this issue, in general the rules state that someone has to live in his new country for a couple of years before getting the opportunity to acquire a passport of this particular community. Often, this condition is connected with work. For, in some cases, one cannot just migrate and legally live in another country. One can only come to live somewhere when having a job over there (apart from ‘real’ refugees). These rules show that, in order to acquire a passport, working, living and therefore cooperating in the political community is the main factor. When looking more closely at the specific rules of one country, in this case the Netherlands, one can even see more features that relate to this conclusion.

In the Netherlands, the general rule is that one can apply for a Dutch passport when one has legally lived in the Netherlands for five or more years (IND, 2015: 6). In order to acquire this passport, one has to successfully complete a citizenship course in order to be naturalized. This course consists of a language exam, an exam with regard to ones knowledge of Dutch society and an exam with regard to orientation on the job market (DUO, 2015). Especially the exam with regard to the orientation on the job market pinpoints at the naturalizing procedure being a process towards making people able to cooperate in the political community. The aim is to prepare people as good as possible to really become a part of the community, instead of being stuck on the sidelines. Also the other two features of the citizenship course can be attributed to this. Being able to communicate, namely, is an essential part for cooperating. Furthermore, the exam with regard to ones knowledge of Dutch society has as main purpose to make one familiar with all the laws that are present in the country, which can also be said to be important in order to cooperate properly in the new political community. All of this supports the conclusion that acquiring a passport is based on living and cooperating in a particular place and a particular political community.

However one could also try to argue otherwise. This has to do with the point regarding learning the language of the community you want to live in. It could also be argued that this has to be seen as learning a deep cultural value that belongs to the nation. However, when remembering what earlier is argued with regard to culture in a country, this thought can easily be dismissed. In practice, namely, it would be plausible that a country will also consist of people with a more or less similar culture. When people in the community would have all quite different and clashing cultural backgrounds, cooperation would be quite hard to achieve and would therefore take away the defining feature for commitment. This is especially true for language. Communication is central to cooperation and it would at least be preferable that everybody will be able to understand each other. As all other things with regard to acquiring a passport are about cooperating in the
community, identity will be based on this feature and sharing a language should be seen in that light too. However, this contributes to the fact that the concept of the nation and the country blur again. Although here the argument made clear that the shared language itself is not the component towards one should and would feel loyal, it is a very fine line. It would be quite easy for the community to think that, as they all do share the same language, this is a determining factor for their community. Therefore, this issue will come back when talking about which practical consequences should be taken on behalf of the outcomes of the theoretical discussion that takes place here. What is important here is that acquiring a passport is based on features that are important for living, working and thus cooperating in the community.

Therefore, by organizing inter-national sport in a way that eligibility is about the possessing of a passport, it is organized in accordance with patriotism and not nationalism. The assumption made by the complementarists that inter-national sport is played between nations and athletes representing this nation should be dismissed. Patriotism instead of nationalism should be the term the complementarists had to use, according to their own method of approach. This has major implications for the argument they are trying to make. Their attempt to find out if nationalism and Olympism are compatible with one another has to become an attempt to find out if patriotism and Olympism are compatible. The conclusion with regard to this new question will be radically different than it is now. However, in order to end up at this conclusion, their argument should be rerun with this newly acquired knowledge. The question that needs an answer is if there can be a morally acceptable version of patriotism that can be combined with Olympism. This investigation will start by discussing the term robust patriotism, as this form of patriotism can be seen as the equivalent of the form of nationalism from which the complementarists started.

3.3 Robust patriotism

Now nationalism is being dismissed and patriotism has been favored as the term the complementarists should have used, their argument has to be translated from nationalism into patriotism. Therefore, the corresponding form of patriotism has to be found with regard to the type of nationalism that the complementarists start out from. Robust patriotism will turn out to be this corresponding form. This will first be explained. After that, what robust patriotism exactly entails will be discussed; what kind of allegiance does robust patriotism stand for? When this definition has been set out, the next step can be taken. It has to be found out if robust patriotism can be seen as morally acceptable. How does robust patriotism relate to morality? The corresponding form of
nationalism used by the complementarists cannot be said to be morally acceptable, but maybe changing the main term into patriotism changes something with regard to this conclusion.

First, the search for the corresponding form of patriotism has to be discussed. The complementarist described their starting form of nationalism not only as a form of having particular aims and commitments, but as a form of having pretty strict particular aims and commitments. Nationalism in its vulgar form, as the complementarists look at it, is about prioritizing one’s own community to such a degree that they will always see themselves as superior and therefore will never see value in other communities. Allegiance is very strict towards one’s own nation and there are not a lot of reasons which would make one act not serving the interests of his own nation. The corresponding form of patriotism has to possess this same strict allegiance, however as it as a form of patriotism this allegiance will be towards one’s country. Robust patriotism can be seen to be this corresponding form, as it sees patriotic commitment and allegiances in most cases as far more important than universal commitment. Extreme patriotism is another form of patriotism that is very strict, but is even so strict that it does not even bother to fit into the framework of morality (Primoratz, 2013). Therefore, extreme patriotism is of no use for this paper and will be dismissed. Robust patriotism is the corresponding form that will be investigated.

Second step, then, will have to be to find out what robust patriotism exactly entails. This is best sketched by Alasdair MacIntyre (1984). His essay *Is Patriotism a virtue?* is mainly cited when talking about robust patriotism. What MacIntyre tried to do in this essay was trying to prove that robust patriotism should be seen as a virtue and that there can be something like a morality of patriotism. According to MacIntyre, robust patriotism is not only a morally permissible stance, but should even be seen as the bedrock of morality (MacIntyre, 1984: 299). Before reaching this conclusion, MacIntyre starts out with a definition of robust patriotism. According to him, patriotism is a kind of loyalty to a particular country with only those possessing that particular citizenship can exhibit (MacIntyre, 1984: 287). The particularity of the relationship is essential with regard to defining patriotism (MacIntyre, 1984: 288). This particularity of patriotism means that it will not be possible for me to feel genuine patriotic commitment to Finland or the Cook Islands, for instance. It makes the difference between feeling committed towards some country and one’s own country. Patriotism entails the last. Which country becomes one’s particular country is being determined by a special feeling that will be fostered by working and cooperating in a certain political community. It all depends on someone’s social circumstances. Someone living and cooperating in Germany can never be a French patriot or vice versa. Because of the special relationship one feels by cooperating together, the place you live determines most which country will become your particular country. This
will create a kind of patriotic loyalty that can never be called up by a country of which one is not a citizen.

Another important feature regarding MacIntyre’s robust patriotism has something to do with a constraint he places on the strictness of the commitment one feels for his particular country. According to MacIntyre, robust patriotism should not be seen as a mindless loyalty (MacIntyre, 1984: 287). The status quo of power and government and the policies pursued by those exercising power and government are not exempted from the patriot’s criticism (MacIntyre: 1984: 295). One, namely, feels loyalty towards the project of a nation and not to the nation as an entity itself. This project has to be seen as being brought into existence when a morally distinctive community embodies a claim to political autonomy (MacIntyre, 1984: 295). It should be seen as the masterplan behind the country; the fundamental ideas that sketch the identity of a country which are brought into being when this claim for political autonomy is made by the community. As the robust patriot is committed towards a particular project, his commitment is towards the fundamental ideas that were created by the start of this particular country. Therefore, the robust patriot feels committed towards preserving or realizing this project in present times and future. One will feel responsible for this, because it’s someone’s particular country which has conferred a distinctive moral and political identity upon this individual (MacIntyre, 1984: 295). So, it is only the project of a particular country that is exempted from the robust patriot’s criticism instead of the country as a whole.

Third step in the process of reanalyzing the argument of the complementarists is to find out how robust patriotism relates to morality. Can robust patriotism be said to be morally acceptable? At first sight, the account of morality that is most prominent does seem to be in conflict with robust patriotism, as this account of morality requires rational judgment from all individuals (MacIntyre, 1984: 288). A rational individual cannot be a patriot in this regard, as being rational involves impersonal judgments, while a patriot has this particular commitment towards his country that makes it impossible to judge independently of one’s interests and affections. Therefore, one would say that robust patriotism is not morally acceptable. MacIntyre, however, argues otherwise. Robust patriotism and morality do relate to each other. First, because objectivity with regard to morality does not exist. Second, because objectivity with regard to morality should not even have any value and is ineffective.

First, MacIntyre starts by explaining that there are other ways to understand morality (MacIntyre, 1984: 290). He sketches an alternative account of morality, which says that where and from whom morality is learned is crucial for someone’s moral commitment (MacIntyre, 1984: 291). It dismisses the possibility of being able to judge impersonal on morality. Learning morality, namely,
should be understood as a social process. It being a social process means that it will always be a particular morality shared by a particular community that someone will get taught. The moral rules one will learn are therefore subjective and particular. Some communities may have more or less the same moral rules, but there will always be some distinctive features that make a community’s moral rules different from others. Morality as such, therefore, does not exist (MacIntyre, 1984: 291).

Second, even if a universal and objective morality would be accepted, only the particular would have any substantial value. People, namely, can only apprehend the rules of morality in the version in which they are incarnated (MacIntyre, 1984: 293). Central to this is that moral rules do not stand on their own, but refer to goods. Moral rules sketch what one is allowed to do, while the goods sketch what one should strive for in life. Moral rules determine which goods are justified and are therefore very interconnected. As the moral rules are learned through social process and therefore are particular, the goods one will strive for will be particular justified. To know what these good are, one has to act in the social life of this particular community. Without feeling loyal towards fellow citizens, one will not reach these goods one strives for. Therefore, as striving for one’s goods are the most important thing in life, eradicating the particular would deprive people from adding any value to their lives.

Furthermore, living and feeling attached to a particular community makes it more certain that one will live up to the rules of morality. Behaving moral is not a task easily fulfilled and temptations to abandon the path of morality are just around the corner. However, one would feel an incentive in being a moral agent, because the community he belongs to is constituted out of moral agents. Some form of group pressure will play a part. I can only be a moral agent, because we are moral agents (MacIntyre, 1985: 292). This pressure will work more effectively if people feel committed to their country than to the whole-wide world. Good example for that can be found when looking at the Tour de France. Often they ride a team time trial, which is seen as the hardest discipline in cycling (Info Nu, 2015; NRC, 2015). Riding together with their teammates, make them enhanced to do things they would not have done when just riding in a peloton with riders from all over the world from all teams. They will not drop as easily as in other occasions, they do not want to let their teammates down. Because of the social ties of a community or team, individuals will become not only capable of morality, but are also sustained in their morality and will be constituted as moral agents by the way in which other people regard them (MacIntyre, 1984: 292). Therefore, it would be inefficient dismissing teams or particular loyalty.

So, particular communities are necessary in order to apprehend the rules of morality, to know which goods are valuable and to keep every individual living up to these particular moral rules.
If people would be deprived of their particular community, they would be unable to flourish as a moral agent (MacIntyre, 1984: 293). Patriotism is therefore not only compatible with morality, but is even necessary in order to obtain and sustain morality. Therefore, MacIntyre comes to the conclusion that patriotism not only has to be seen as a virtue, but as a central virtue (MacIntyre, 1984: 292-293).

MacIntyre’s argument, however, is not immune to criticism. Especially liberals were not fond of MacIntyre’s robust patriotism and claimed that it would turn out to be a permanent source of moral danger. According to them, robust patriotism lays too much emphasis on the particular and therefore still is too irrational in order to be acceptable (MacIntyre: 1984, 295). The particular aspects of robust patriotism will make that still some fundamental beliefs and attitudes will never be critically examined, whereas this critical examination of beliefs and attitudes with regard to all aspects should be the norm (MacIntyre, 1984: 294). In some cases where one has to choose between the interests of the particular community or the interests of humankind as a whole, the robust patriot would even choose the interests of the particular community even if it would mean that humankind will be severely damaged. The robust patriot’s love for one’s country will make that one is blind for these grave dangers for humankind.

Although we have already seen that not everything is exempted from the robust patriot’s criticism, the question is if this is enough to parry the critique. The project of a country is exempted from criticism, but the project of a country will always be morally permissible. At the start of a project, namely, there was no special particular commitment present and critical and rational thinking would have prevented a morally unjust project from coming into being. Problems, however, can still occur. MacIntyre himself comes up with the example of Nazi-Germany to show this. At one point, namely, stopping the Nazis from their terrible deeds would mean the end of the country and thereby the end of the project of the country. Best for mankind would have been the overthrow of the regime from the outside, but as that would imply the destruction of Germany and its project, the robust patriot would not opt for that option (MacIntyre, 1984: 296). The robust patriot can never defend himself to full satisfaction with regard to this problem. Best they can do, is arguing that there eventually comes a point where a government may defect that far from the original project and mission of a country that their craving of keeping the project alive has to be abandoned. However, how long it takes before this understanding will start to grow and even if the opinion will ever be that this line will be crossed, can plausibly be doubted (MacIntyre, 1984: 297).

Therefore, liberal critique that robust patriotism still turns out to be a permanent source of moral danger cannot be rebutted with much success (MacIntyre, 1984: 299). The claim that robust
Patriotism is a central virtue with regard to morality has to be dismissed. Patriotism can be a virtue, but the kind of loyalty robust patriotism entails is still too strict to see it as morally acceptable. Although particularism has to be accepted, a form has to be found that can be said to be morally acceptable. The complementarists found theirs in nationalism without its vulgar forms. Corresponding form of patriotism can be said to be moderate patriotism and the question will be if this form of patriotism does stand the test of morality.

3.4 Moderate patriotism

After the complementarists dismiss their initial form of nationalism, they come up with an alternative: nationalism without its vulgar forms. It is their answer on a search for a form of particularism that is less strict than the preceding form, but still sees value and propagates the bonds of particular communities. The corresponding form of patriotism with regard to these features can be found in moderate patriotism. Moderate patriotism, as described by its biggest proponent Stephen Nathanson (1993), does accept particularism, but with more constraints than robust patriotism did. It is a form of patriotism in favor for a position that sees a possibility for being as impartial as is required by morality, but still would allow to have some particular attachments and special obligations. Moderate patriotism coincides with nationalism without its vulgar forms with regard to their position on this scale between the impartiality of morality and particular commitment. The particular commitment knows more constraints than it did when talking about robust patriotism. Question that needs to be answered is if these constraints can be said to be enough for moderate patriotism in order to be morally acceptable. In order to find this out, first, what moderate patriotism exactly entails and what makes it different from robust patriotism will be discussed. Second, how moderate patriotism links up to morality will pass in review. Third, some critique on moderate patriotism will be sketched alongside with Nathanson’s reply in order to end up at the conclusion that moderate patriotism can be seen as a morally acceptable version of patriotism.

First, what moderate patriotism exactly entails will be sketched on the basis of its differences with regard to robust patriotism. There are a couple of features that make moderate patriotism distinct. First, moderate patriotism is not unbridled (Primoratz, 2013). Morality will place constraints on the means a patriot can use in order to promote his country’s interests. Although MacIntyre’s robust patriotism already did place some moral constraints on actions, they did not go as far as moderate patriotism. The kind of morality that imposes constraints on the moderate patriots has more universal features than the morality that MacIntyre established. Second, moderate patriotism is not exclusive (Primoratz, 2013). Although the special concern for one’s own particular country and
compatriots still forms the base, in cases where this special concern clashes with the interests of other countries and their inhabitants the moderate patriot will not automatically choose for the interests of his own particular country. The moderate patriot will be much more willingly than the robust patriot to give preference to the interests of other countries and their inhabitants. Having a special concern for one’s own compatriots does not rule out some concern for people from other communities (Nathanson, 1993: 31). Third, the moderate patriot does not believe his own particular community being superior to others. The moderate patriot will not feel a desire to dominate over others and will therefore not automatically accept all of the country’s policies (Nathanson, 1993: 31).

All these features eventually are related to the degree of feeling committed to the particular. In contrast to robust patriotism, the constraints moderate patriotism lays on the particular commitment and loyalty are larger. The moderate patriot, therefore, is more inclined to take the interests of humanity as a whole earlier into account than the robust patriot. One will be more critical towards the loyalty and commitment one feels than the robust patriot. As long as universal morality would not forbid certain actions, then one can feel as committed and loyal as one can be. Therefore, the fiercest objection against robust patriotism does not count for moderate patriotism. Grave moral dangers will never happen, as this would incorporate actions that would violate the universal morality too such an extent that it would let the moderate patriot lose its loyalty and commitment for the particular with regard to that particular action. The three points from the paragraph before and this additional part eventually lead Nathanson to the following summarization of the features of moderate patriotism. First, the moderate patriot has a special affection for one’s country. Second, the moderate patriot has a desire that one’s country will prosper and flourish. Third, the moderate patriot has a special, but not an exclusive concern for one’s own country. Fourth, the moderate patriot supports a morally constrained pursuit of national goals. Fifth, the moderate patriot conditionally supports one’s own country’s policies (Nathanson, 1993: 34). These five points sum up what moderate patriotism entails.

Second, question is how moderate patriotism relates to morality. Can moderate patriotism be seen as a morally acceptable form? Therefore, one has to deal with the objection that morality does not coincide with patriotism, as it would require an impartiality that cannot be combined with a particular loyalty and commitment. MacIntyre tried to solve it by looking at morality as being a particular morality, however this led towards other problems. Nathanson tries to overcome the objection by looking at morality in another way. Morality, namely, can be split into two parts: positive and negative morality. This is the crux for still achieving an impartiality that is required by morality, but still leaving the possibility for the patriot to feel particularly loyal and committed without violating moral rules. It opens up the possibility for moderate patriotism to fit into the
framework of morality. Positive morality should be seen as the part of morality that specifies the goals that one has to achieve (Nathanson, 1993: 41). Negative morality is about placing constraints that determine which actions are morally prohibited (Nathanson, 1993: 42). The positive morality sets the goals of the game, while the negative morality sets the rules which one must follow when playing this game and trying to reach these goals. Analyzing morality on these different levels is what makes moderate patriotism distinct from robust patriotism. Whereas MacIntyre only looked at morality on one level, Nathanson and his two different levels of morality allow the patriot to be patriotic on one level, but also accepting universal loyalty and commitment as important on the other level. This is how Nathanson finds the middle ground between particular loyalty and universal loyalty.

A morally acceptable version of patriotism should fulfill two requirements. First, it has to bring a positive commitment to act on one’s country’s behalf in ways that one would not normally act for other countries. Second, it also has to bring a negative commitment to avoid acting in ways that fail to respect the common humanity we share with people of other countries (Nathanson, 1993: 37). As moderate patriotism was already sketched as supporting a morally constrained pursuit of national goals, one can easily see how it works. When looking at the negative part of morality, as already said, it is the part of morality that determines the constraints placed. These constraints are formed by the impartial view on morality from universal perspective, which means that things like killing, injuring and causing pain will be seen as forbidden actions. One person should never undertake such actions with regard to another person, no matter which particular community one belongs. There are certain exceptions in which it would not be unjust to kill someone else, for instance if a person is shooting his way through a school. However, when one kills solely because it would help him and his community to reach a certain goal it would be forbidden. The positive part of morality entails the commitment for the particular. This commitment creates special duties that can be morally acceptable as long as one does not break the rules of the negative morality. If these will not be broken there is no ground on which these special duties can be called unjust. As it would not be wrong for a parent to feel a special commitment and have a special duty with regard to his child, it would not be wrong for others to have a special duty with regard to someone or something. The goal that morality sets, then, is to feel specially committed towards a particular person or group, but it says nothing about the actions itself that are permissible for achieving and acting on behalf of this goal. All actions still have to fit within the constraints placed by the negative morality. Therefore, by splitting morality into two parts, one can see that moderate patriotism is a morally acceptable form.

Third, some critique on moderate patriotism will be discussed and refuted. Critique that foremost comes from MacIntyre and other more strict patriots. MacIntyre, namely, dismisses
moderate patriotism as it would be a sort of emasculated patriotism (MacIntyre, 1984: 298). The personal connectedness gets overlooked. Core of this problem lies in the difference between the subject of one’s commitment. Robust patriots feel committed towards the project of a country, while the moderate patriot is more committed towards the ideal of the country. Feeling committed towards the ideal of a country is not enough for MacIntyre to call it genuine patriotism. Commitment towards the project, namely, is feeling commitment towards much more determined features than commitment towards the ideal of a country. The project has to do with things like a shared history; things that are very determined. One can almost only feel genuine love for a country when one gets born there. Commitment towards the ideal of a country is more fluid. Everyone can feel committed towards this ideal, despite where one is born. One can also easily forfeit this commitment once the ideal does not fit his own ideals anymore, while this would not be possible with regard to the project, as the factors that contributed to the existence of the project will not change. As commitment towards the ideal would be too exchangeable for MacIntyre to be called a genuine form of patriotism, he disregards moderate patriotism as being genuine.

Nathanson, however, refutes this critique. According to him, particularity is just as present in moderate patriotism as it is in other forms of patriotism (Nathanson, 1989: 551). Loyalty of the moderate patriot is not just based on a universal value criteria, as MacIntyre argues (Nathanson, 1993: 55). The universal part of morality, namely, does not establish the loyalty towards a country. It only comes in play when reflecting on the loyalty that one has already established through his particular situation. It can ensure that one would not act on behalf of his loyalty anymore, but will never make that one starts to feel loyal to some country, because he starts to like the ideals of a country he has never ever heard of before. Therefore, the loyalty of the moderate patriot is in the beginning just as particular as the loyalty of the robust patriot. Based on emotional and historical ties one will create feelings of commitment towards one’s own country (Nathanson, 1993: 56). This feeling is just as irrational as the commitment that the robust patriot feels. One can only become committed to the ideal of a country if it is the ideal of one’s own country. Therefore, it is nonsense to say that feeling committed to an ideal means that one will rationally choose which country’s ideal fits someone best. Creating space for a universal part of morality does not mean that one will completely dismiss particular connectedness and therefore MacIntyre is wrong in his critique (Nathanson, 1993: 59).

Conclusion with regard to moderate patriotism, therefore, should be that it is a morally acceptable form of patriotism and a virtue. It can overcome the objections that arose with regard to robust patriotism by accepting a form of universal loyalty, but without losing its loyalty towards the particular. By analyzing morality on two different levels, one can perfectly give and take between
these particular attachments and the universal commitment that may be needed sometimes. With regard to the complementarists this means that their nationalism without its vulgar forms should be read as moderate patriotism without bringing up any problems with regard to it fitting into the framework of morality. If moderate patriotism could also be combined with the idea behind international sport is something that will be discussed in the next chapter. For now, it is important to see that when rewriting the argument of the complementarists, moderate patriotism should be the right term to use with regard to the relationship under investigation.

3.5 *Nationalism and moderate patriotism according to Gleaves and Llewellyn*

Whereas the complementarists their argument had to be rewritten and nationalism had to be changed into the right form of patriotism, question is if this has to happen to the argument of Gleaves and Llewellyn as well. What are the implications for their argument after sketching the difference between nationalism and patriotism? Contrary to the complementarists, Gleaves and Llewellyn their argument does not have to be completely changed and rewritten. Their argument already contains a conceptual divide between nationalism and patriotism, whereas even moderate patriotism gets mentioned in their text. The difference between feeling loyal to a nation or loyal to a country would mean a difference in the kind of narratives that get created by sport. Gleaves and Llewellyn work out the consequences of both types of narratives. Therefore, the conceptual difference between nationalism and patriotism already found its way into their argument. They do make the mistake of calling the way inter-national sport is organized nowadays as based on nationalism, just as the complementarists did. However, this wrong premise has no implications for their argument. It only makes that they investigate the narratives that get created by nationalism first, but does not mean that they make any conceptual mistake in doing so. As their argument is about how it should be in order to create the right narratives, instead of if the current situation creates the right narratives, their wrong premise does not harm their eventual conclusion.

Although the argument of Gleaves and Llewellyn does not have to be rewritten, it does need some addition. As they themselves only briefly mention moderate patriotism and the favorable type of narratives it would create, there is more to say. Therefore, the attempt being made here is to extent the argument in order to make the moderate patriotic narratives deal with the objections that come up with regard to the nationalistic narratives. These objections were based on ethical harms and lusory harms. First, the objections with regard to ethical harms will be related to moderate patriotism. Second, the lusory harms will undergo the same treatment. After that, conclusion will be drawn if their original conclusion has to be changed.
First, the objections with regard to ethical harms have to be overcome by moderate patriotism. Central to this line of argumentation is that narratives created by moderate patriotism will not make a cultural and ethnical representative of the athletes (Gleaves & Llewellyn, 2014). As, with regard to patriotism, culture and ethnicity are not the decisive factors for determining one's identity and feeling commitment, one will not blindly support an athlete because they share these features. This also prevents people to see the athlete’s successes as a reflection of himself and their shared ethnicity and cultural characteristics. Overgeneralization would not take place as the feeling of commitment towards an athlete is much more stronger when one belongs to the same nation than if one would belong to the same country. This overcomes the biggest objection with regard to the ethical harms. As narratives created by nationalism would create overgeneralizations and therefore self-deception, these narratives should be called inauthentic. This self-deception would not happen when the narratives are created along moderate patriotic lines. The patriot would find joy in the achievements of his compatriot, but he does not tend to think that this says anything about himself. The soft narrative comes forth out of the inevitable and organic connection that people feel with their community and is therefore authentic (Gleaves & Llewellyn, 2014: 16).

Second, moderate patriotism would dismiss some of the objections with regard to the lusory harms and aspects of sport. These objections were two-sided. First objection had to do with the eligibility rules. Sport should be about athletic superiority, but organizing sport along nationalistic lines would make that some very good athletes will not be able to compete, as often only a couple of athletes from one country are allowed. Moderate patriotism would open up the possibility for athletes to more easily switch from country. Once an athlete moves to another country, starts to identify with the political community and acquires a passport, one would be able to compete for his new country. There are already a lot of examples of athletes that compete for a different country. When watching table tennis, one will see a lot of athletes with Chinese origins competing for all different countries. It at least opens up the possibility to make the best athletes compete against each other. Second objection had to do with the aesthetic enjoyment that should predominate instead of partisan feelings. Also with regard to this point, moderate patriotism will not dismiss the complete objection, but at least takes away some of its concerns. As the commitment of the moderate patriot will always be subject to critical reflection, one’s commitment will at least stop once his or her particular team does not play fair. When someone’s particular team or athlete does not follow the rules of the game, his commitment will just as easily disappear. So, it would not be the case that one is just enjoying every beautiful playing team, as the lusory argument wants everyone to be, but it will at least never support unfair playing teams.
As already stated, the conclusion of Gleaves and Llewellyn will not change. According to them, moderate patriotism would create soft narratives that are not harmful and not deceptive and therefore are the morally right narratives. Inter-national sport should be organized along moderate patriotic lines. The division sketched in the beginning of this chapter does not have additional influence on their argument, as they already were aware of it. However, their argument had to be extended a little in order to give more ground to their conclusion favoring moderate patriotism. After doing this, one can rightfully argue that the narratives created by moderate patriotism are the morally right narratives.

3.6 Comparing both arguments again

Now both arguments have been reanalyzed with regard to their use of nationalism, one can answer the question if both arguments can be brought into accordance with one another. Before taking the conceptual difference between nationalism and patriotism into account, both arguments showed to be contradictory to each other. Whereas the complementarists argued that nationalism without its vulgar forms was a morally acceptable form of particular commitment, Gleaves and Llewellyn dismissed nationalism as morally acceptable and ended up with moderate patriotism as the right form of particular commitment.

However, after sketching the conceptual difference between nationalism and patriotism, the argument of the complementarists had to be adapted. As their reasoning for choosing nationalism as the form of particular commitment that had to be examined actually should have meant that they would look at patriotism, their complete argument had to be rewritten. In the end, their conclusion should have been that moderate patriotism is the morally acceptable form of particular commitment they were looking for. This newly acquired conclusion has some major implications for comparing both arguments with one another. All of a sudden both conclusions with regard to the morally acceptable form of particular commitment that should be used are equal. Both arguments now have their own reasons for seeing moderate patriotism as this morally acceptable form. Therefore, with regard to their use of particular commitment, their arguments can be brought into accordance with one another.
4   Reanalyzing the relationship

Both terms of the equation now have been analyzed separately. First, the idea behind inter-national sport had been illustrated to be equal to the definition of Olympism. Second, the particular commitment both arguments conclude to be morally acceptable should be moderate patriotism. Therefore, the use of both terms and their original difference can be brought into accordance with one another. However, in order to completely rerun the arguments, one has to check if the idea behind inter-national sport called Olympism is complementary or contradictory to moderate patriotism.

4.1   How moderate patriotism and Olympism can be combined

As inquiry learned that Olympism can be seen as a moderate cosmopolitan ideal as well as an internationalist ideal, first it needs to be determined which term should be used to combine with moderate patriotism. It all depends on which conception of Olympism has to be used. As the concept of Olympism only stated that it is about the harmonious coming together, the conception of Olympism will determine if the object of this coming together should be individuals (and therefore coincides with moderate cosmopolitanism) or groups (and therefore coincides with internationalism). As inquiry into the way sport is organized nowadays learned that it is organized along patriotic lines, the conception of Olympism should be seen as having moderate cosmopolitan ideals. Both, namely, have to be on the same level if one really wants to be able to achieve the ideals of Olympism. Therefore, Olympism should in this case be equated with moderate cosmopolitanism.

Thus, the question becomes if moderate cosmopolitanism can be combined with moderate patriotism. Eventually, the answer will be yes. As moderate patriotism does lay emphasis on particular aims and commitments, it also sees value in sometimes dismissing these particular commitments and instead let actions be determined by more universal aims and commitments. With moderate cosmopolitanism it is just the other way around. Emphasis is on universal aims and commitments towards all human beings, but as particular commitments cannot be dismissed, sometimes it is acceptable when these commitments are given priority. Therefore, both terms sometimes act on behalf of their particular commitments and sometimes on behalf of universal commitment. They will be able to settle on which action to undertake in a lot of cases. When thinking back at the two parts of morality one can see that, as long as the universal negative part of morality allows the actions that are needed in order to fulfill one’s special duties towards its compatriots, everything is fine.
However, there will be situations in which the two would clash. In these cases it depends on the concrete situation which part of morality should be given preference. At least, the claims made on behalf of both parts of morality need to be evaluated very carefully and it has to be investigated if the needs of the groups present in the conflict could be accommodated (Nathanson, 1993: 118). In principle, the rule would be that the claim which has the greatest moral weight should win. Even if this would mean the sacrifice of one’s own community, one has to choose for this option if the claims on behalf of the universal rights carry the greatest moral weight (Nathanson, 1993: 119). Only when these moral weights can be said to be equal, one is justified to choose for the claims of his own community. However, this does not mean that the universal rights are completely dismissed in these cases. When these moral weights between the universal and the particular are equal, it means that the universal rights that would be damaged when choosing for the one side are equal to the universal rights that would be damaged when choosing for the other. Then it would be justified to choose for one’s own country claims, because of the particular commitment that one feels. However, this should only be the case if the universal rights damaged would be equal or less. Therefore, moderate patriotism and moderate cosmopolitanism should also be able to be combined with regard to these more difficult cases.

Although sounding completely different, actually the base of this argument is the same as used by the complementarists to combine Olympism and nationalism. For that they used the argument that internationalism may be premised on nationalism, but is in no sense reducible to it (Morgan, 1995: 88). Actually, what makes moderate patriotism and moderate cosmopolitanism combine is the idea that moderate cosmopolitanism is premised on moderate patriotism in the sense that there is nothing beyond countries and the various kinds of political communities that make them up. Central to this is both their dismissal of complete universalism. Both terms find common ground with regard to the existence of different countries and thereby the existence of particular, political, communities. This premise is an important idea and will shape a lot of initiatives on which moderate patriotism and moderate cosmopolitanism will at least not differ (Nathanson, 2007). However, they are in no sense reducible to one another, as moderate patriotism feels at heart committed to a particular group, whereas moderate cosmopolitanism feels first and foremost committed to all human beings.

Extending this original argument from the complementarists a bit further also leads to interesting insights. Nationalism and Olympism, namely, could not only be combined with one another, but even could be seen as complementary. Combining internationalism and nationalism through the neutral concept of a sporting competition makes that the sense of nationalism that may be present will switch to a non-aggressive form that is morally permissible. Ethnocentrism, which is
the nationalistic base for the particular, cannot be dismissed, but internationalism helps to get beyond ethnocentrism in its distorting forms (Morgan, 1995: 88). It helps to soften the ethnocentrism by enlarging the scope of acquaintance with regard to other cultures. When looking at our terms and their relationship, one could see the same kind of mechanism takes place. Combining moderate cosmopolitanism with patriotism through sport will make that, by getting insight into other political communities and getting to know the other people that belong to these countries, the notion of human rights will be fostered. The stronger feelings of robust patriotism and their idea of being superior will be edged off. Sport will make that the feelings of patriotism will tend more to the moderate side. Therefore, combing moderate patriotism with the idea behind inter-national sport is not only possible, but the relationship can be seen as complementary.

4.2 (Practical) Consequences

At this point both the original argument of the complementarists as well as the argument of Gleaves and Llewellyn are almost completely rerun or extended. Almost, as the final contribution to the argument of the complementarists by lowerth, Hardman and Jones is about the practical consequences the theoretical discussion would have. The practical consequences they focus on have to do with the eligibility rules. According to them, in order to support the theoretical conclusions the eligibility rules have to make sure that only authentic nationals should be able to compete (lowerth, Jones and Hardman, 2010: 102). However, as the complementarists their theoretical conclusions have changed throughout this paper, this part of their theory needs to be looked at critically too. The practical consequences of the theoretical discussion have to be reanalyzed. What does the shift from nationalism to patriotism mean for the eligibility rules?

As inter-national sport should not be based on ethnicity and deep cultural values, but on being part of a political community and cooperation in it, the same goes for the eligibility rules. Eligibility nowadays is based on having a passport of a particular country and, as discussed, this should already be seen as a patriotic standpoint. Possessing a passport is a sign of belonging to a certain political community and is therefore the right way of organizing the eligibility of athletes with regard to the theoretical conclusions. However, this may be good enough from a theoretical point of view, but it brings with it some practical problems. Namely, in order to successfully cooperate in a political community, one should be able to communicate. As seen when discussing the rules of acquiring a passport, learning the language is often a prerequisite. Also, some cultural resemblance would also help and therefore existing political community do often not differ that much with regard to these points. Athletes possessing a passport and representing a country therefore also have a lot
of cultural resemblance. Although this is not the determining factor on which athletes get selected, chances are that people will start to identify with these cultural features. The athletes will start being cultural representatives again, which has its negative consequences. The most countries and nations do overlap and therefore states are most often nation states. Identification based on the morally wrong features awaits in ambush. There are two measures that can and have to be taken in order to reduce these chances.

First, education has to stress that people should feel committed to each other, because of their shared political community instead of shared deep cultural values or even ethnicity. As long as people will be taught how they should see themselves in relation to their other compatriots, the emergence of nationalistic feelings of commitment will at least be postponed. Nussbaum (1996) also came up with education as a solution to overcome practical problems in relation to commitment that people feel. She, however, argued for it in the light of people acquiring a cosmopolitan view, but some of her arguments can be used here. For instance, Nussbaum pleads for (cosmopolitan) education as being the best manner to teach people not to make arbitrary distinctions between people (Nussbaum, 1996). This is exactly what is needed in order to overcome our problem. Furthermore, by seeing education as being central in order to overcome problems, one gets back with De Coubertin again. Education is the solution to all societal problems, was what De Coubertin argued. Therefore, educating people the right way of looking at communal ties will help a lot.

Second, eligibility rules should be relaxed. In order to overcome the problem sketched, it would help if the group of athletes from a country is as diverse as possible. When this would be achieved, the chance for athletes falling back into their roles as cultural representatives would be reduced. Therefore, eligibility rules have to be changed, or rules for acquiring a passport for athletes specifically should be changed. Athletes, namely, do not have to be authentic nationals, as Lowerth, Jones and Hardman argued. As athletes should not be cultural representatives, it does not matter anymore if the athlete himself feels related towards the country he represents. Commitment of the public, namely, should be felt towards the concept of a sporting team or the concept of the country one represents and its history, instead of towards the athlete himself. Therefore, it does not matter if the athlete feels genuine related to the country he represents or not. For nationalism this was important as one had to be a cultural representative. Therefore, an outsider could only become an insider if he would really be committed to adapting a new culture and learning the language, which would not be able if one would not feel related. For patriotism this is different, as one should only be cooperating in the community to be an authentic citizen. One, therefore, does not have to feel genuinely related to the country. Competing for the country can already be seen as cooperating, which already makes him an authentic citizen as one should expect from an athlete to do his outmost
best. So, making it easier for athletes to compete for a country they were not originally born in would not generate any harm with regard to the authenticity of the athlete. If this would happen, sport between countries would become more like sport between more local communities, where more fluid eligibility rules exist. This non-international elite sport was also mentioned by Gleaves and Llewellyn as a good example of how sport should be organized in order to create the right feelings of commitment, without the possible bad side effects of more extreme forms of commitment. Therefore, this should happen in order to prevent the patriotic feelings to turn into nationalistic feelings.
5. Conclusion

Although starting out from two clashing conclusions with regard to the relationship between sport and nationalism, in the end both arguments can be brought completely in accordance with one another. After analyzing both groups of scholars their arguments extensively, conclusion can be drawn that moderate patriotic feelings should be the kind of particular commitment created by international sport. Both groups of scholars should actually agree on this matter. Although not concluding this themselves, reanalyzing the arguments and reinterpreting the arguments eventually lead to this conclusion. They therefore van be completely brought into accordance with one another and even help each other extending their original arguments by new insights gained from one another. The conclusion that both arguments can be brought into accordance with one another has been reached after comparing both arguments step by step.

First, both groups their different interpretation of sport had to be investigated. The complementarists defined international sport by looking at the term Olympism. This philosophical idea behind international sport foremost laid its emphasis on the coming together of different groups through sport and thereby creating acceptance between different groups. Gleaves and Llewellyn started out from inter-national elite sport and focused on the competitive element of sport. International elite sport is about athletic superiority. As Olympism and inter-national elite sport both focused on different elements, it seemed they both had to be perceived as two different points of view for looking at sport. However, after analyzing the exact credentials of Olympism, it could be shown that Olympism does not dismiss the element of athletic superiority. Both elements are ever present in inter-national elite sporting events. The magnitude of the event does determine which feature will get more attention and therefore how the ideas behind the event will be interpreted, but this does not mean one featured has to be dismissed completely. Therefore, Olympism and international elite sport actually can be said to have the same underlying ideas and can be brought into accordance with one another. Olympism, furthermore, should not simply be defined as having internationalist ideals, but could in certain conceptions also be understood as a form of moderate cosmopolitanism.

Second, both groups their conclusion with regard to the morally acceptable form of particular commitment did differ quiet a lot. According to the complementarists, nationalism without its vulgar forms would be an acceptable form of particular commitment. Gleaves and Llewellyn completely dismissed nationalism and instead opted for moderate patriotism in order to create the morally right narratives. Inquiry into the differences between nationalism and patriotism made clear the difference between a nation and a country. The complementarists seemed to have chosen
nationalism as the type of particular commitment to investigate, because of some implicit and false assumptions. Actually, as inter-national sport is organized as such that actually is about representing a country, they should have chosen for the term patriotism in their paper. Reanalyzing their argument by using patriotism instead of nationalism ended up at concluding that moderate patriotism is the morally acceptable form of particular commitment that they were looking for. Therefore, both arguments end up at reaching the same conclusion with regard to the right type of particular commitment: moderate patriotism.

By bringing the separate terms of the equation in accordance with one another, the biggest step already had been taken. However, further reanalyzing the original argument made by the complementarists led to some very interesting insights and helped to extent the argument Gleaves and Llewellyn made. First of all, it would be possible to keep organizing inter-national sporting events without creating the wrong kind of particular commitment. Olympism and moderate patriotism can be perfectly combined. Gleaves and Llewellyn dismissed the idea of combining inter-national sport with moderate patriotism, but they did not take into account inter-national sport nowadays already should not be seen as based on nationalistic features. Eligibility rules already make that what is called inter-national sport is based on patriotic features. However, one should stress eligibility rules even more in order to make it even more patriotic. An athlete does not have to be an authentic national anymore, which makes that stressing eligibility rules would not harm the authenticity of commitment felt.

The value of this paper lies foremost in the contribution of shifting the focus from nationalism to other forms of particular commitment. Gleaves and Llewellyn only mention moderate patriotism in relation to sport, but they do not build on this thought. Furthermore, they argue that the Olympics and World Cups should therefore be abolished and thereby neglect to see to what extent these types of tournaments still can be combined with moderate patriotism. Sport is already not an extensively investigated subject in the science of political theory. Therefore, this paper helps to gain some more knowledge and insights in this more or less virgin territory of philosophy.

However, when reading this paper a few remarks have to be taken into account. First, a lot of terms make their cameo in this paper and do not always get the attention they deserve. Civic nationalism, for instance, is only briefly mentioned and dismissed, but there are complete books written about this subject only. Choice is made to make a division between nationalism and patriotism as clear as possible, thereby completely dismissing nationalism as the term needed to evaluate the relationship between particularism and sport. As the two groups of scholars and their descriptions of particular commitment were being used as starting point, lots of other different
forms of nationalism and patriotism were never mentioned. This had to be done before one would drown in a debate without anything to hold on to.

That both existing arguments are used as guidance for this paper means that there are a lot of interesting roads that appeared along the way have not been taken. Purpose of this paper was to compare both clashing arguments. As it would not contribute to answering the central question of this paper, the more practical consequences have not been discussed extensively. This paper really focuses on theory and how everything can be theoretically brought into accordance. Therefore, a lot of interesting points are not mentioned. For instance, how one has to deal with countries that want to compete in international sport. Kosovo just recently became a member of the FIFA and the IOC, but this has led to some controversy. What should be the right way to act when it comes down to these dilemmas? Also, it would be interesting to look at the possibility of continental sport. Why is there no European football team yet? The Ryder Cup (a golf tournament), for instance, is a competition between a European team and an American team. How should this be interpreted and what are the moral credentials of this way of organizing sport? This paper should be seen as a starting point for these interesting questions.
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