



The Dutch Parliamentary Debate on European Defense and NATO in the Decade after the Maastricht Treaty

AN ANALYSIS OF THREE JUNCTURES



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Abstract

This thesis analyzes three important junctures in the political debate regarding the European defense policy in the decade after the Maastricht Treaty, which established the European Union. Throughout this period notions of European defense have shifted from a separate European defense identity to a European defense identity as part of NATO, and back. This thesis analyzes how the political debates in the Dutch House of Representatives shifted accordingly. In three chapters this thesis respectively deals with three junctures in this debate: 1. The initial construction of the post-Maastricht European defense identity, 2. The testing of European defense capacity during the war in Bosnia, and 3. The renewed debates about the European defense identity in the late 1990s. This thesis finds that throughout the 1990s, Europe has not been able to fully construct a European defense identity outside of NATO, which leaves challenges to fulfill these aspirations in the twenty-first century.

Keywords: European defense identity; NATO; CFSP; CSDP; ESDI; Treaty of Maastricht; Dayton Agreement; Brussels Summit; Saint-Malo; Cologne Council; Washington Summit; Helsinki Headline Goal; ERRF; Yugoslav Wars; Dutch parliamentary debate

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My interest for this topic was sparked by dr. Bloemendal's course 'Foundations of Transatlantic Relations'. After my BA American Studies, and three years of mainly focusing on the United States, it was very refreshing to look at European politics in a transatlantic framework. Safe to say, I chose the right MA for my passion and interests. Moreover, because of this course and my interest for European and Dutch politics, I chose to do an internship at political party D66 in the House of Representatives.

As a part of this internship, I learned how to use the minutes of parliamentary debates as a source to prepare upcoming debates. For this MA thesis I chose to consult the parliamentary debates in the decade after the Maastricht Treaty. Researching this topic was quite challenging at times, as it seemed like a puzzle for which I still had to uncover the pieces and then arrange them. There is so much written about European defense, but in every source, there remained a vagueness about Europe's goals and limits. Hopefully, I've completed this puzzle and have given a clear overview on the Dutch debate on the European defense identity in the 1990s.

Writing this second thesis in times of Covid-19 was as challenging as the first time. It felt like a bigger burden this time, as I had to divide my time between this thesis, my fulltime internship, having a social life, and all my Covid-induced fit girl aspirations. It was difficult to find my focus, but I made it! First of all, I want to thank my supervisor Prof.dr. Verheul for his enthusiasm, trust, reassuring meetings, and feedback. Secondly, I want to thank Denise Roodbeen for her peer feedback. My gratitude also goes out to Tariq Sewbaransingh, who encouraged me to make a better, more comprehensible planning, and helped me to make sense of the parliamentary minutes and its search engine. Lastly, I want to thank my roommates and friends for their moral support, our coffee breaks on the balcony, the evenings at Grip, and the Chidoz Wednesdays to take our minds of our theses.



1

“A stronger Europe is only possible when we assign more powers to it. – We need a serious debate about the role of Europe.”

- *Hans van Mierlo*²

¹ “Signature of the Treaty of Amsterdam on October 2, 1997 – Hans van Mierlo,” accessed May 16, 2021, https://multimedia.europarl.europa.eu/nl/signature-of-treaty-of-amsterdam-on-october-2-1997_19971002_Treaty005_p#ssh.

² Original quote: “Volgens Van Mierlo is een sterker Europa slechts mogelijk wanneer we er meer bevoegdheden aan toekennen. Dat maakt dat we over onze eigen ‘kleine’ soevereiniteit heen moeten stappen. Om dat te doen moet sprake zijn van een serieus debat over de rol van Europa.” Allard Altena, “Lessen uit het verleden: Van Mierlo vertelt..” *Idee* 203, no. 4 (2018): 45.

Introduction

The twentieth century was the Transatlantic Century according to American historian Mary Nolan.³ She has charted the rich transatlantic interactions in various fields, among which politics and diplomacy. Like Norwegian historian of transatlantic relations Geir Lundestad, she describes America's role in Europe as that of an empire by invitation.⁴ This empire, often called Pax Americana, was based on a few pillars. The military position of the United States in Europe was an important pillar. This empire and its military intervention however, were costly to uphold. When the Cold War ended, the United States reduced its military presence in Europe. One of the reasons for the withdrawal of troops was the financial burden of military presence in Europe.⁵ Another reason for the United States to reduce its military presence in Europe was its rooted tradition of non-entanglement.⁶

At the same time a more unified Europe developed a new ambition to position itself as a united power. With the Maastricht Treaty, Europe set the agenda for its ambitions in the coming century. As one of the three pillars of European integration, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) mapped a European defense strategy.⁷ However, with the construction of the CFSP, the question remained how this European defense strategy would act alongside that of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The transatlantic discussion about the European defense strategy and NATO has been interpreted by several scholars. American diplomat and foreign policy expert Philip H. Gordon and American research director of the European Council on Foreign Relations, Jeremy Shapiro, for instance, have mapped the transatlantic alliance in the years after the Cold War. According to Gordon and Shapiro the structure of NATO posed inequalities between the role of the United States and the role of Europe in the defense of the European continent. They argue that NATO, and thus partly the United States, had secured a role as the first and foremost force to guard democracy in Europe.⁸ This begs the question how the nations that signed the Maastricht Treaty saw the role of the CFSP alongside that of NATO.

According to German historian and political scientist Wilfried Loth, different countries had different ideas about what role the CFSP should play in European defense

³ Please note: All British spelling has been replaced with American spelling without specifically indicating these alterations.

⁴ Geir Lundestad, *The United States and Western Europe Since 1945: From Empire by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

⁵ Mary Nolan, *The Transatlantic Century: Europe and America 1890-2010* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 358.

⁶ Hubert Zimmerman, "The Improbable Permanence of a Commitment: America's Troop Presence in Europe during the Cold War," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 11, no. 1 (2009): 26.

⁷ Appendix 1 contains a list of all abbreviations used in this thesis.

⁸ Philip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, *Allies at War* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004).

missions. A striking example Loth analyzes is the weakness of Europe in the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁹ The war in Bosnia contributed to the struggle within the EU about the autonomy of European defense.¹⁰

The roots of the uncertain division of European defense between the EU and NATO lie in the early 1990s. Former French president François Mitterrand had envisioned an autonomous European armed force, without further need for NATO. Germany however, argued that NATO could be expanded while a European alternative was unavailable.¹¹ Lundestad offers a detailed account of the position of France and Germany as important discussants, but also as two opposites in European integration.¹² With France and Germany as designated key players in the debate, the question remained how the CFSP would relate to NATO, and how other countries positioned themselves in this debate.

Robert E. Hunter, an American foreign policy expert who served as United States Ambassador to NATO under Clinton, has looked at the complex process of the European Security and Defense Policy for RAND corporation. Hunter considers the relation between the CFSP and NATO to be intertwined. He argues that most U.S. analysts assumed that the EU was not likely to “take any military action of any major size” as such a challenge would also engage the United States and therefore the decision-making and action would shift to NATO.¹³ This research will analyze this position, and will conduct a small case study on the war in Bosnia to see what role the European Union and NATO had in this operation.

The academic debate about the role of the CFSP and the role of NATO is rooted in the 1990s, but has continued until today. Since the foundation of the EU, the construction of a defense identity has been a prominent subject. Lundestad and Nolan have broadly sketched the American military influence on Europe. They touch upon the division between CFSP and NATO, but concentrate on the positions of Germany and France in the late 20th century. This leaves a gap for a more detailed case study, to see how the debate on European defense has formed in another country that was part of the EU from the start: the Netherlands. This case study can be positioned within the wider context that Lundestad and Nolan offer, but will also be considered within the historical moment of the Yugoslav Wars that Loth and others have studied. This will serve as the academic framework within which the parliamentary debates on the subject of European defense in the Netherlands can be

⁹ Bosnia and Herzegovina is also known as Bosnia-Herzegovina or Bosnia for short. Throughout this thesis, ‘Bosnia’ will be used to refer to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

¹⁰ Wilfried Loth, *Building Europe: A Story of European Unification* (Berlin: Walter De Gruyter, 2015), 357.

¹¹ Loth, *Building Europe*, 357.

¹² Lundestad, *The United States and Western Europe*, 258.

¹³ Robert E. Hunter, *The European Security and Defense Policy NATO's Companion — or Competitor?* (Santa Monica (CA): RAND Corporation, 2002), 41.

placed.

Within Europe, the positions of France and Germany have dominated the debate regarding European defense. The position of the Netherlands has not been researched widely. The Netherlands has been very transatlantic oriented, but at the same time stood at the birth of the precursor of the EU. By analyzing how Dutch political parties positioned themselves in the debate concerning European defense, and how they perceived the relation of a European defense entity to NATO in the decade after the Maastricht Treaty, the roots of the current debate can be uncovered.

Research Question and Methodology

This thesis seeks to chart the Dutch parliamentary debate about European defense and NATO by answering the following questions: What is the position of Dutch political parties in the debate concerning European defense? What did they perceive as the preferred relation between a European defense identity and NATO in the decade after the Maastricht Treaty?

To answer these questions, this thesis will focus on three historical moments in the decade after the Treaty of Maastricht. Each chapter will start with an analysis of the academic discussion on the historical context of each juncture. This historical context will serve as a starting point of the discussion of the parliamentary debates.

The discussion of the parliamentary debate is based on the minutes of parliamentary debates in the Dutch House of Representatives. These minutes allow an analysis of the official standpoint of each political party on the different ongoing matters concerning European defense, the EU, and NATO.

Relevance

Only last February the EU has held a discussion on the future of European security and defense. Their conclusion was that Europe needs “commitment at the highest political level to make the EU a stronger security actor in a world of fast-changing threats.”¹⁴ It is interesting to take a step back to see how Dutch representative parties positioned themselves regarding European defense in the first decade in which the EU also wanted to strive towards being a strong security actor. A question that remains topical is how this ambition is compatible with the transatlantic system of collective security under NATO. Should the EU, for instance, develop its own armed forces, or should the EU armed forces develop into a compatible unit within NATO? These remain urgent questions that have been posed for the last three decades.

¹⁴ “Moving forward on European defence,” EEAS, published February 28, 2021, accessed May 6, 2021, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/93928/node/93928_bs.

Chapter 1 - Building Towards a European Defense Identity

“A European counterweight to the United States only exists in the dreams of nostalgic Frenchmen and in the nightmares of paranoid Americans.”¹⁵

This chapter will discuss the road to the Maastricht Treaty, the promises of Maastricht, and the search for a European defense identity within and outside NATO in the first five years of the 1990s. The chapter starts with a discussion of the Maastricht Treaty, clarifies the relations between the CFSP pillar of the Maastricht Treaty and the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO, and sketches the debate between Europeanist and Atlanticist countries on the construction of a European defense identity. This chapter, like the following chapters, will use the Netherlands as a case study. The final paragraph contains an analysis of the parliamentary debates of the Dutch House of Representatives around the foundation of the EU and NATO’s Brussels Summit. This chapter will aim to chart the position of Dutch political parties in the debate concerning European defense: what did they perceive as the preferred relation between a European defense identity and NATO at the eve of European unification?

1.1 Ambitions of Maastricht

When the Cold War was coming to an end and Germany was on the doorstep of reunification, French president François Mitterrand and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl initiated negotiations on unifying Western Europe into a political union during the European Council in April, 1990.¹⁶ Initially, Mitterrand and Kohl proposed these negotiations between West European governments to ensure Germany’s engagement with Europe, and to assure that German reunification would take place within a European framework. The political union that Kohl and Mitterrand envisioned would overarch the already existing European institutions. They proposed, for instance, to construct a common foreign and security policy, to increase the role of the European Parliament, and to strengthen the institutions.¹⁷

In his reflections on the process towards the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, Émile Noël, the French secretary-general of the Commission of the European Communities between 1967

¹⁵ Gordon and Shapiro, *Allies at War*, 220.

¹⁶ “Gemeinsame Botschaft von François Mitterrand und Helmut Kohl (Bonn, 18. April 1990),” CVCE, accessed May 28, 2021, https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/joint_message_from_francois_mitterrand_and_helmut_kohl_paris_18_april_1990-en-89369c53-5d93-4e56-8397-825ca92c86f5.html.

¹⁷ “Gemeinsame Botschaft Mitterrand und Kohl,” CVCE.

and 1987, explains that the goal of Kohl and Mitterrand, and later the Twelve,¹⁸ was to unite all relations between member states in one European Union by early 1993.¹⁹

This European unification effort, among other agreements, involved a defense policy. Previous attempts had been made to construct a European Defense Community (EDC) with a pan-European military defense force with the Treaty of Paris in 1954. However, this Treaty was never ratified.²⁰

The next extensive attempt to construct a coordinated form of European defense was the European Political Co-operation (EPC). The EPC was created in 1970 “to increase the weight of the EC in international affairs.”²¹ The EPC was not a policy itself, but rather a collaboration of the foreign ministers of different EC member states to coordinate defense efforts.

According to former European commission advisor and political analyst on EU and international affairs, Fraser Cameron, the Maastricht Treaty aimed to provide a stronger structure for European security when the EPC had reached its limits.²² Since France assumed that the presence of the United States in Europe would decrease after the Cold War ended, they saw the political unification of Europe as an opportunity to build a larger, more important geopolitical position in the world.²³ Therefore France primarily aimed “to strengthen common foreign and defense policy.”²⁴ The CFSP, which would include a common security and defense policy (CSDP), would become one of the pillars of the Treaty on European Union.

This pillar system was originally proposed by the Luxemburg Council presidency in April 1991. The purpose of the different pillars that would constitute the European Union was to prevent the European Commission from having too much power. The economic pillar, the European Community, would combine the three original organizations: the European Economic Community, the European Coal and Steel Community, and the European Atomic Energy Community.²⁵ The second pillar, the common foreign and security policy, aimed among others to “strengthen the security of the EU and its member countries” and to

¹⁸ ‘The Twelve’ are Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom.

¹⁹ Emile Noël, “Reflections on the Maastricht Treaty,” *Government and Opposition* 27, nr. 2 (1992): 148.

²⁰ Gordon and Shapiro, *Allies at War*, 24.

²¹ Fraser Cameron, *Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union: Past, Present, and Future* (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999), 17.

²² Cameron, *Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union*, 23.

²³ Loth, *Building Europe*, 314.

²⁴ Loth, *Building Europe*, 314.

²⁵ “Summary of the Treaty on European Union,” EUR-Lex, accessed April 18, 2021, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM:xy0026>.

“preserve peace and international security in line with United Nations principles.”²⁶ The third and final pillar entailed cooperation on justice and home affairs. This pillar aimed to provide safety by fighting organized crime and terrorism, established rules for the external borders of the European Union, and aimed to control illegal immigration by developing a common asylum policy.²⁷ Another key part of the Treaty was European citizenship.

Loth describes that Dutch Foreign Affairs Minister Hans van den Broek and Belgian Foreign Affairs Minister Mark Eyskens were hesitant and critical of the pillar structure proposed by the Luxemburg Council. They felt that the pillar structure might undermine the Community and the development towards a federal system and would rather see one single European Community.²⁸ The Luxemburg Council, however, argued that with this pillar structure the Commission would be “prevented from having access to the fields of foreign policy and domestic security”, and thus the pillars remained part of the second draft.²⁹

The Dutch effort to change the pillar structure came to the surface once more when the Dutch Council presidency presented another treaty draft late 1991. In the draft that was produced during the Dutch Council presidency, the pillars envisioned by Luxemburg were bound together under Community law. This draft was only endorsed by Belgium and did not find support of the other ten, however.

According to Loth the decision of these ten countries to vote against the Dutch treaty draft seemed “an affirmation of the choice for an autonomous European defense.”³⁰ This standpoint seems to be incompatible with the transatlantic focus of some countries. The United Kingdom, Denmark, and Portugal voted against the Dutch treaty draft – which according to Loth means that they chose for an autonomous European defense – but simultaneously seemed worried that securing a CFSP would have a negative result on the cooperation within NATO and the relationship with the United States. This raises the question how the different member states saw the relation between the CFSP and NATO. The next paragraph will seek to construct the historical context of this relation.

²⁶ “Summary of the Treaty on European Union,” EUR-Lex.

²⁷ “Summary of the Treaty on European Union,” EUR-Lex.

²⁸ Luuk van Middelaar, *De Passage naar Europa: Geschiedenis van een Begin* (Groningen: Historische Uitgeverij, 2009), 168.

²⁹ Loth, *Building Europe*, 316.

³⁰ Loth, *Building Europe*, 317.

1.2 The Common Foreign and Security Policy and the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization

As established in the Maastricht Treaty, the CFSP seeks to strengthen international security, to preserve peace, to ensure fundamental freedoms and human rights, and to promote international cooperation.³¹

While the Twelve were successful in reaching a significant agreement with the Maastricht Treaty, Preben Bonnén, research analyst at the Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy, argues that especially for the CFSP “the outcome of Maastricht fell well short of the challenges the EC were facing.”³² Cameron also mentions that fundamental differences came to light during the negotiations.³³ One of the main debates was the definition of ‘security policy’; questions arose how the envisioned CFSP related to NATO or to the Western European Union (WEU).

1.2.1 Looking Back: WEU and the Petersberg Tasks

To establish how the debate about European defense progressed after 1992, it is important to define the situation before the 1990s. The shaping of a European “security and defense architecture” started after World War II in the form of the Western Union (WU).

The WU was founded with the Brussels Treaty in 1948. It was a military alliance between the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, and the United Kingdom. In 1954, the amendment to the Brussels Treaty established the WEU as successor of the WU.³⁴ Besides the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, which was already part of the WU, the amendment to the Brussels Treaty “created a consultative parliamentary Assembly, an Agency for the Control of Armaments, and a Standing Armaments Committee.”³⁵ In the years after the Cold War the WEU was slowly incorporated in the EU. The Brussels Treaty - and thus the WEU - was finally terminated in 2010.

One of the most relevant agreements of the WEU, the Petersberg tasks, became fundamental to the CFSP. The Petersberg tasks were defined during the Petersberg Declaration of the Ministerial Council of the WEU in 1992. The declaration set out that members of the WEU would provide military units to the WEU or NATO for humanitarian

³¹ “Foreign and Security Policy,” Europa.eu, accessed May 12, 2021, https://europa.eu/european-union/topics/foreign-security-policy_en.

³² Preben Bonnén, “The Common European Security and Defence Policy and the US Defence and Security Dilemma,” *Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs* 2, no. 2 (2001): 67.

³³ Cameron, *Foreign and Security Policy*, 24.

³⁴ Gustav Lindstrom, “History and Development of the CSDP,” in *Handbook on CSDP: The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union* (Vienna: Armed Forces Printing Centre, 2021), 16.

³⁵ “The establishment of Western European Union (WEU),” CVCE, accessed May 14, 2021, <https://www.cvce.eu/en/education/unit-content/-/unit/803b2430-7d1c-4e7b-9101-47415702fc8e/6d9db05c-1e8c-487a-a6bc-ff25cf1681e0>.

and rescue tasks, crisis management and peacemaking, peace-keeping, and stabilization tasks.³⁶ These “conditions under which military units could be deployed” were later incorporated into the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997, which amended the Maastricht Treaty.³⁷

What is most important to notice is that territorial defense of the EU was not part of these Petersberg tasks, and thus does not lie with the WEU or – after the Treaty of Amsterdam – with the EU. Territorial defense of Europe was and still is a responsibility of NATO. The division of defense tasks, as established in the Petersberg tasks, uncovers a complex triangle between NATO, the WEU and EU in the 1990s, where Europe is not in charge of its own territorial defense. However, when the United States chose not to be involved, Europe had to act on its own. For these missions, Europe would be able to use the assets of NATO. This interdependent structure – and other agreements between a new, more united Europe and the United States about Europe’s place within the Alliance – will be further clarified in the next paragraph.

1.2.2 NATO and ESDI

NATO is an intergovernmental military alliance that was constructed by the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949. The Treaty was first signed by Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States.³⁸ This first peacetime military alliance was set up “to provide collective security against the Soviet Union.”³⁹ The Alliance initially cooperated on defense and security issues. One of the most well-known articles of the Treaty is Article 5: “an attack against one is considered an attack against all.”⁴⁰ In the 1990s, NATO expanded its tasks to collaboration with non-member states and other international organizations, and to crisis management. This expansion is particularly interesting for the construction of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI).

NATO’s Brussels Summit (1994) arranged the construction of the ESDI within the transatlantic alliance. The Brussels Summit Declaration stated that the “launching of the European Union [...] would strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance and allow it to

³⁶ “Petersberg Tasks,” EUR-Lex, accessed May 17, 2021, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/petersberg_tasks.html.

³⁷ “Shaping of a Common Security and Defence Policy,” EEAS Europa, published July 7, 2018, accessed May 17, 2021, https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp/5388/shaping-of-a-common-security-and-defence-policy-_en.

³⁸ “NATO Members,” NATO, accessed May 17, 2021, <https://www.nato.int/nato-welcome/index.html>.

³⁹ “North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 1949,” Office of the Historian, accessed May 17, 2021, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/nato>.

⁴⁰ “The North Atlantic Treaty,” NATO, accessed May 18, 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm.

make a more coherent contribution to the security of all the allies.”⁴¹ This meant that ESDI would facilitate Europe with the power to act on its own in issues on European territory. Within ESDI, Europe had the possibility to make use of NATO assets for WEU operations.⁴² The WEU would thus act as a connection between NATO and the EU. This connection was essential as not all EU members were also NATO signatories, nor the other way around. However, all members of the WEU were also part of NATO.⁴³ Bonnén clarifies the position of the WEU in both NATO and the EU and defines the WEU as “the body responsibly for carrying out decisions of the EU with defense implications, and also the vehicle for ESDI in NATO.”⁴⁴

Introducing ESDI as a part of the NATO framework had two outcomes. On the one hand, Europe procured more autonomy in WEU-led operations for which they could use NATO assets – even when the full Alliance was not included in these operations. On the other hand, the principle of “separable, but not separate” was introduced. Which, according to Bonnén allowed limited autonomy to European forces.⁴⁵ He attributes this limited autonomy to the fact that all WEU assets lie within NATO or within the defense structure of individual members. Bonnén concludes that therefore “most EU-member states came to the conclusion that achieving the desired political and strategic autonomy in defense must happen outside of the NATO framework.”⁴⁶ However, constructing a common security and defense policy (CSDP) as part of the EU instead of NATO leaves something to be desired.

1.3 CSDP and a European Defense Identity in the early 1990s

The CSDP is an integral part of the CFSP. While the CSDP was officially structured and established in the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, the defense policy was already slowly constructed in the late twentieth century. Building blocks of this defense policy were the establishment of the WEU, the Maastricht Treaty, the integration of the Petersberg tasks in the WEU and Amsterdam Treaty, Eurocorps, and ESDI within NATO.

Article J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty stated that “the common foreign and security

⁴¹ “The Brussels Treaty Declaration,” NATO, published January 11, 1994, accessed June 5, 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_24470.htm?mode=pressrelease.

⁴² Bonnén, “The Common European Security and Defence Policy and the US Defence and Security Dilemma,” 67.

⁴³ “ESDI: Separate but not Separable? NATO review, published July 1, 2001, accessed May 19, 2021, <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2000/07/01/esdi-separable-but-not-separate/index.html>.

⁴⁴ Bonnén, “The Common European Security and Defence Policy and the US Defence and Security Dilemma,” 69.

⁴⁵ Bonnén, “The Common European Security and Defence Policy and the US Defence and Security Dilemma,” 67.

⁴⁶ Bonnén, “The Common European Security and Defence Policy and the US Defence and Security Dilemma,” 68.

policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense.”⁴⁷ The reason that a common defense structure was described this indistinctly was that different member countries had various perceptions on the role of a common defense structure as part of the CFSP pillar.⁴⁸

Simon Duke, a former NATO fellow and professor at the European Institute of Public Administration in Maastricht, explains that there were differences between the member states. For many countries an “independent European defense capacity” had become essential. As example Noël touches upon French determination to promote “an independent [European defense identity].”⁴⁹ Germany was more inconclusive as to how they saw common defense; both siding with France and promoting European defense within NATO.

Bonnén points out the Nordic countries’ position in the debate on an independent form of European defense and the European pillar within NATO. He argues that Norway, Iceland, and Denmark – NATO members since the foundation – wanted to see European defense within NATO. Non-aligned countries Sweden and Finland however “fully [supported] the development of the [CSDP] by the EU.”⁵⁰

Duke argues that Europe was incapable of constructing a European defense identity, and considers the United States to be a central force in European security.⁵¹ He attributes the inability to construct a European defense identity to the reliance on “U.S. initiative, leadership and resources.”⁵² Gustav Lindstrom, the director of the EU Institute for Security Studies, seems to agree with former NATO-fellow Duke and identifies the unclear position of European defense and a common defense policy. He recognizes that the Maastricht Treaty included an ambitious but vague path to a European defense policy with J.4.1.⁵³ However, Lindstrom also argues that in the late 1990s “in the aftermath of the wars of secession in the Balkans [...] concrete provisions were introduced for a common European security and

⁴⁷ “Treaty on European Union,” Council of the European Communities – Commission of the European Communities, signed February 7, 1992, accessed June 6, 2021, https://europa.eu/european-union/sites/default/files/docs/body/treaty_on_european_union_en.pdf, 126.

⁴⁸ Loth, *Building Europe*, 357.

⁴⁹ Noël, “Reflections on the Maastricht Treaty,” 148.

⁵⁰ Bonnén, “The Common European Security and Defence Policy and the US Defence and Security Dilemma,” 69.

⁵¹ Simon Duke, “NATO and the CFSP: Help or Hindrance?” NATO, published June, 1997, accessed March 21, 2021, <https://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/95-97/duke.pdf>, 29.

⁵² Duke, “NATO and the CFSP,” 29.

⁵³ J.4.1. of the Maastricht Treaty: “the common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense.”

“Treaty on European Union,” 126.

defense policy endowed with tangible crisis management capabilities.”⁵⁴ Chapter 3 will go further into the European aspirations for CSDP in the second half of the 1990s.

1.3.1 Eurocorps

In 1991, Mitterrand and Kohl, in addition to promoting European unification, also discussed a form of European defense. After World War II, Germany and France had reconciled. The Elysée Treaty, signed in 1963, for instance, promoted the bond between France and Germany. This Treaty already included a defense clause, which stated that “all major decisions concerning security and defense policy were to be coordinated.”⁵⁵ The conversations between Kohl and Mitterrand in 1991 amplified this defense clause, and initiated a shared command in Strasbourg. This shared command, as established in May 1992, was named European Corps (Eurocorps) and was based on the French-German Brigade of 1987. France and Germany opened the headquarters to other members of the WEU, making Eurocorps a multinational entity.⁵⁶ Belgium, Spain, and Luxembourg joined Eurocorps between 1993 and 1996. Besides members, Eurocorps also contained associated nations, which were Greece, Italy, Poland, Romania, and Turkey.⁵⁷

This intergovernmental military corps currently consists of 1,000 troops at its headquarters. However, up to 60,000 soldiers can be deployed under the command of different organizations like the European Union, the WEU, NATO, or the United Nations. Florent Banfi, president of UEF Europe, explains that the availability of these troops depends on the command of the national states – as these soldiers are “detached by their national armies” on request of Eurocorps.⁵⁸ The structure of these additional troops will be further defined in paragraph 3.1.5.

As the mission of Eurocorps already indicates, Eurocorps is “a force for the European Union and NATO.”⁵⁹ The SACEUR agreement of January 1993, for instance, ensured that NATO could take over the command of Eurocorps when needed. In May 1993, Eurocorps was made available to the WEU to execute the Petersberg Tasks. This bilateral position thus means that both the EU and NATO could make use of Eurocorps: the WEU, and after the

⁵⁴ Lindstrom, “History and Development of the CSDP,” 17.

⁵⁵ Bernd Riegert, “In brief: What is actually in the Elysee Treaty?” DW, published January 22, 2013, accessed June 6, 2021, <https://www.dw.com/en/in-brief-what-is-actually-in-the-elysee-treaty/a-16520266>.

⁵⁶ “History,” Eurocorps, accessed June 6, 2021, <https://www.eurocorps.org/about-us/history/>.

⁵⁷ “Contributing Nations,” Eurocorps, accessed June 6, 2021, <https://www.eurocorps.org/about-us/contributing-nations/>.

⁵⁸ Florent Banfi, “Eurocorps: Future European Army or Missed Attempt?” The New Federalist, published July 13, 2008, accessed June 6, 2021, <https://www.thenewfederalist.eu/Eurocorps-future-European-army-or-missed-attempt?lang=fr>.

⁵⁹ “A Force for the EU and NATO,” Eurocorps, accessed July 6, 2021, <https://www.eurocorps.org/a-force-for-the-eu-nato/>.

Amsterdam Treaty the EU, in Petersberg missions, NATO in “warlike situations”.⁶⁰

The question still remains how Eurocorps conformed to the idea of European defense.⁶¹ This military dimension has raised the “most heated debates in both academic and policy circles.”⁶² France, for instance, saw Eurocorps as an embodiment of European defense. It seems, however, that while many nations supported Eurocorps they did not see it as a form of the European defense identity the French had envisioned – partly due to the size of available assets and its bilateral nature.

1.3.2 Transatlantic Cooperation and European Defense Aspirations: Complementary or Incompatible?

Duke argues that while the United States had earlier supported a more prominent place for western Europe within NATO, the process of setting up the CFSP pillar and the search for a common European defense identity was also interpreted “as potentially damaging to NATO and US leadership within it.”⁶³ To substantiate his argument, Duke refers to a memorandum of February 1991 in which US Under Secretary of State Reginald Bartholomew criticized a French-German initiative in which the WEU would be primarily a part of the European defense, rather than being in “NATO’s shadow.”⁶⁴

Another transatlantic oriented scholar, Stanley Sloan – expert on US-European relations and founding director of the Atlantic Community Initiative – also acknowledges American reticence. He refers to speeches that William Taft, the former US Ambassador to NATO, made. Taft said that the United States “supported a stronger ‘European pillar’ in the Alliance based on a revival of the Western European Union, but cautioned that the European pillar should not relax the central transatlantic bond, should not duplicate current cooperation in NATO, and should not leave out countries that were not members of the European Community.”⁶⁵

The search for a European defense identity outside of NATO caused the American administration to warn the EU to avoid “the three D’s: duplication, decoupling and discrimination.”⁶⁶ They worried that the EU would duplicate what was already done by NATO, and thus waste their resources or redirect their defense spending from NATO to European defense. This is linked to the to the second D: decoupling. The United States feared

⁶⁰ Duke, “NATO and the CFSP,” 26.

⁶¹ Duke, “NATO and the CFSP,” 26.

⁶² Anand Menon, “Empowering Paradise? The ESDP at Ten,” *International Affairs* 85, no. 2 (2009): 228.

⁶³ Duke, “NATO and the CFSP,” 25.

⁶⁴ Howard LaFranchi, “European Dialogue on Defense Hints at Smaller NATO Role,” *CS Monitor*, published October 10, 1991, accessed May 17, 2021, <https://www.csmonitor.com/1991/1010/10011.html>.

⁶⁵ Stanley R. Sloan, “The United States and European Defence,” *European Union Institute for Security Studies*, published April 1, 2000, accessed June 6, 2021, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep07051>, 6.

⁶⁶ Sloan, “The United States and European Defence,” 16.

that Europe would ‘gang up’ on them and that European defense efforts would no longer be coordinated through NATO, excluding (amongst others) the States. They also warned the EU for discriminating against “NATO allies who are not members of the European Union” like Turkey, Norway, Iceland, Hungary, and Poland – and of course the United States and Canada.⁶⁷

Nicole Gnesotto, professor of EU Studies and former director of the Institute for Security Studies of the Western European Union, worries about the three D’s for another reason. She questions the complementarity between the EU, NATO and WEU after Maastricht and calls this structure a course between “impossible impotence and an improbable omnipotence.”⁶⁸ Gnesotto’s question seems more plausible, as the start of the 1990s saw a copious effort to construct a united Europe, but also saw incoherence in establishing a European defense policy or identity.

The fear of the United States of a European counterweight seems to be somewhat irrelevant at the start of the 1990s. While Europe had obtained the possibility to act on its own for humanitarian and rescue tasks, crisis management and peacemaking, peace-keeping, and stabilization tasks, NATO was still in charge of territorial defense.⁶⁹ This also meant that the United States still had a large part to play in the security of Europe.

1.4 Preliminary Conclusion

The multitude of terms that are relevant for the debate on European defense already demonstrate the unclarity of the term ‘European defense’. The debate on what a European defense identity is and consists of, overarched the debate on CFSP and ESDI. In the years after the Maastricht Treaty, the EU has not been able to collectively set up this identity. This inconclusively seems to be attributed to the position on European defense of the different member states, the multitude of coinciding organizations, and the influence the United States exercised on Europe through NATO.

After 1992, a pivotal year in constructing European unity, the question remained how to define and form these ambitions with all these different forces at play. This debate was not only held on a European level, between Europeanist and Atlanticist countries, but also on a national level in different member states. To provide insight into the national considerations of the preferred form of European defense, the next paragraph will position the Dutch political

⁶⁷ Sloan, “The United States and European Defence,” 17.

⁶⁸ Nicole Gnesotto, “European Union after Minsk and Maastricht,” *International Affairs* 68, no. 2 (1992): 228.

⁶⁹ “Petersberg Tasks,” EUR-Lex.

debates within this context of European defense, European defense identity, NATO, and transatlantic defense ties in general.

1.5 Discussion of transatlantic and European defense in Dutch parliament⁷⁰

This paragraph discusses the debates of the Dutch parliament about the foundation of the Maastricht Treaty and NATO's Brussels summit. The debate is structured along the lines of parties that have a pro-transatlantic defense standpoint and parties that have a pro-European defense standpoint.

In the parliamentary debates before the Maastricht Treaty was signed, parties voiced their concerns and questions about the relationship between NATO, the WEU and the CFSP pillar. Almost all parties questioned this indistinctness.⁷¹ In some of the earlier debates, the standpoint of some parties was not that clear. Later, when the Maastricht Treaty was signed, parties were more explicit in their views on NATO and European defense.

1.5.1 Debate in the Netherlands: Pro-transatlantic Defense

In 1993, the debate about the budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was split in two; the first part of the agenda contained a debate on the adoption of the budget for foreign affairs – excluding NATO. The second part of the agenda contained a debate explicitly about the budget for NATO. Both debates however, seemed to have nothing to do with available funds or allocating money. The debate rather focused on how the different parties valued NATO or the bond within the EU, often specifically focusing on defense and security.

The Christian-democratic center-right party, CDA, was quite outspoken about collaboration within NATO. Member of Parliament (MP) Jan van Houwelingen assured in the debate on NATO in November, 1993, that the close alliance between the United States and Europe had been the fundament of Dutch defense policy.⁷² CDA saw this alliance as crucial for the future of European defense. However, Van Houwelingen clarified that holding on to NATO for defense “did not mean that Europe could not take a larger responsibility for its own defense.”⁷³ Therefore, CDA pleaded to further strengthen the CFSP-pillar. It is important to note that CDA saw this reinforcement of the CFSP as a way to strengthen the European pillar

⁷⁰ NB: The minutes of parliamentary debates of the Dutch House of Representatives will be referred to as prescribed in ‘De Leidraad,’ a Dutch method for citing juridical and parliamentary documents.

M.H. Bastiaans et al. *De Leidraad 2019* (Deventer: Wolter Kluwer, 2019), 67.

⁷¹ *Handelingen II*, 1990-91, nr. 49, p. 1-70.

⁷² *Handelingen II*, 1992-93, nr. 29, p. 2206.

⁷³ Original text: “Het vasthouden aan de NAVO als een belangrijk instrument voor het veiligheidsbeleid, betekent niet dat Europa geen grotere eigen verantwoordelijkheid moet nemen.”

Handelingen II, 1992-93, nr. 29, p. 2206.

in NATO.

The liberal-conservative VVD seemed to have similar views. MP Jan Dirk Blaauw argued that if the Netherlands and Europe deliberately considered the possibilities and undesirable aspects of the CFSP, the European Union as constructed in the Maastricht Treaty could have a substantial influence on “everything that has to do with defense.”⁷⁴ VVD spokesperson explicably argued that the CFSP could aid the cohesion of NATO.

The liberal-conservative VVD, then, similar to the Cristian-democratic CDA advocated that a European defense policy should be constructed within NATO. Additionally, both parties were very critical about burden sharing and felt that European countries should realize an appropriate financial contribution to NATO.

SGP – a conservative orthodox Calvinist party – was somewhat less outspoken about defense, but also saw the future of European defense within NATO. However, the party did argue that better cooperation in Europe would be a necessity, especially for humanitarian missions. MP Bas van der Vlies was quite critical about the CFSP during one of the debates, and argued that “the CFSP has not exactly made a great start.”⁷⁵ His CDA-colleague, MP Jaap de Hoop Scheffer – future Minister of Foreign Affairs and Secretary-General to NATO – takes it a step further and says that Europe can be distinguished by “its lack of leadership.”⁷⁶

While none of the parties above are explicitly opposed to a European defense identity, this conservative-Christian compound of VDD, CDA, and SGP saw the future of European defense in NATO. Leading in this was on the one hand the incompetence of European leadership and the unsure position of European defense in 1993, but also the trust in the transatlantic alliance with the United States.

1.5.2 Debate in the Netherlands: Pro-European Defense

The progressive parties, on the other hand, were largely in favor of European defense; specifically, as a structure separate from NATO. They all seemed to urge the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defense to encourage a European defense policy at the European Council as soon as possible. However, apart from their pro-European defense standpoint, these parties also saw that the state of European defense was still inadequate in the early 1990s.

⁷⁴ Original text: “Het in werking treden van het Verdrag van Maastricht heeft toch een wezenlijke invloed op het gehele veiligheidsgebeuren, of men dat nu leuk vindt of niet.”

Handelingen II, 1992-93, nr. 29, p. 2204.

⁷⁵ Original Dutch text: “Het gemeenschappelijk buitenlands en veiligheidsbeleid heeft intussen bepaald geen vliegende start gemaakt.”

Handelingen II, 1992-93, nr. 29, p. 2199.

⁷⁶ Original Dutch tekst: “Al eerder is gezegd dat het huidige Europa wordt gekenmerkt door gebrek aan leiderschap.”

Handelingen II, 1992-93, nr. 29, p. 2187.

The progressive parties seem to distinguish three components: 1. The aspirations for an independent European defense identity, 2. The role of the WEU, and 3. The shortcomings and questions that needed to be resolved to ensure European defense separate from NATO.

These three components can for instance be analyzed in the position of social-liberal party D66. MP Doeke Eisma acknowledged the defense aspirations of the late 1990s, and called the Maastricht Treaty a small step forward after a huge delay. In his plea, Eisma touched upon the disagreements that lurked beyond the future of the European Union. He was especially critical about a statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pieter Kooijmans (CDA), that a common defense policy within the European Union would be something for the next century.⁷⁷ D66 hoped that a common defense policy would be part of the short-term agenda.

D66 also expressed itself critically towards the government. The party wanted to know if the government would be willing to model the WEU as a comprehensive organization which would be prepared to act independently. Or if the government saw the WEU as an organization whose days were numbered. This quite critical position of D66 seems to indicate that the party saw a larger role for the WEU and the European Union in the defense of Europe aside from NATO.

It remained unclear how D66 felt about NATO itself. They seemingly remained quite positive concerning collaboration with the United States and also agreed with the fact that Eurocorps could be deployed under NATO in territorial defense situations. However, it was also quite clear that D66 saw a larger role for European defense and a European defense identity – sooner rather than later.

PvdA – the social-democratic labor party – seemed to have a comparable standpoint and also wanted to realize a common European defense policy in the near future. Maarten van Traa, the spokesperson for PvdA, emphasizes that PvdA has often pleaded for an independent role for Europe concerning European (territorial) defense.⁷⁸ He felt that the coalition parties focused too much on the United States. While PvdA was not against NATO or collaboration within NATO, the party felt that there was more to win within Europe itself.⁷⁹

GroenLinks – the progressive green party – seemed to position itself somewhat different than D66 and PvdA. While they were pro-European defense, like the other two progressive parties, GroenLinks also saw a larger role for the Netherlands within Europe.

⁷⁷ Original Dutch text: “Zo heeft de minister zich reeds laten ontvallen dat een gemeenschappelijk buitenlands beleid van de Unie vermoedelijk iets voor de volgende eeuw is. Bij mijn fractie leeft nog steeds de hoop dat dit op kortere termijn is te realiseren.”

Handelingen II, 1992-93, nr. 29, p. 2192.

⁷⁸ *Handelingen II*, 1992-93, nr. 29, p. 2195.

⁷⁹ *Handelingen II*, 1992-93, nr. 29, p. 2196.

They were quite critical about the powers the United Kingdom, France, and Germany had within Europe, and wanted the Netherlands to be more self-assured on the international stage. To achieve this, European collaboration would be paramount according to MP Bram Van Ojik.

GroenLinks also felt that NATO seemed to be running out of business. MP Leoni Sipkes argued that NATO created various new concepts, without making real choices.⁸⁰ Another issue for GroenLinks was that every decision would be to the advantage of the largest player; the United States. The party did not agree with this state of affairs and argued that it was therefore important to work towards a clearer, more independent European defense identity with a larger role for the Netherlands itself.

1.5.3 Debate in the Netherlands: Other Positions

The orthodox Protestant party GPV and the Reformatory Political Federation (RPF) were both very unclear about their positions concerning European defense or NATO. GPV argued that the Minister of Foreign Affairs seemed to perceive Dutch support for a European defense policy as a fact rather than a point of discussion – but he does not add a remark about how his party feels about this standpoint of the Minister. This is an interesting remark considering that D66 was critical on the same Minister for seeing European defense as something for the next century.⁸¹

RPF only asserted its concerns about the specific focus on the United States within foreign affairs, the party felt that the connectedness between the United States and Europe was becoming more distant. It is unclear if RPF felt that Europe should have put more effort into the bond with the United States through NATO because of this development, or should rather focus on European defense and European collaboration.

The scarcity of statements of this orthodox party and reformatory party might be a result of their focus on humanitarianism rather than defense. Another explanation is the fact that these parties held only a few seats in the House of Representatives, which did not allow them to be present at all debates as these might have overlapped with important debates on other subjects.

⁸⁰ Original Dutch text: “De NAVO weet zelf immers ook dat zij "out of business" dreigt te raken. Zij produceert het ene na het andere nieuwe concept, maar echte keuzen worden daarbij niet gemaakt.” *Handelingen II*, 1992-93, nr. 29, p. 2211.

⁸¹ Original Dutch text: “Zo heeft de minister zich reeds laten ontvallen dat een gemeenschappelijk buitenlands beleid van de Unie vermoedelijk iets voor de volgende eeuw is. Bij mijn fractie leeft nog steeds de hoop dat dit op kortere termijn is te realiseren.” *Handelingen II*, 1992-93, nr. 29, p. 2192.

1.6 Chapter Conclusion

The parliamentary debate is not as black and white that parties who were pro-NATO were simultaneously against a form of European defense. Yet, a clear divide can be pinpointed between the conservative-Christian parties who pleaded to sustain or enlarge Dutch or European participation within NATO, and saw NATO as the main and future defense structure – as opposed to the progressive parties who saw the future of European defense with the Union and would rather see a smaller role for NATO and especially the United States in European defense.

However, in both categories, the parties seemed to acknowledge both developments. Parties who saw a larger role for NATO in the future of European defense, wanted to enforce defense developments in Europe to strengthen ESDI within NATO. Parties who saw the future of European defense, among which also territorial defense, with the EU, also recognized that the shaping of a European defense policy and identity had not yet reached the potential they would have hoped.

Regarding both the historical context and the parliamentary debate, the main concern is that European defense was still too weak in the early 1990s. Even though the WEU had acquired a part of the defense structure, namely humanitarian and rescue tasks, crisis management and peacemaking, peace-keeping, and stabilization tasks, the most important task – territorial defense of Europe – still lay with NATO. Another impediment was Europe's deficient resources. While the WEU had a more autonomous position within ESDI, all WEU assets lay within NATO or within the defense structure of individual members. While France saw Eurocorps as large step to a European defense identity, the available assets were not extensive enough. A third obstacle was the different standpoints countries had in the debate about European defense and NATO. There was a divide between Europeanist countries, like France and Germany, and Atlanticist countries, like the Netherlands, United Kingdom, and Denmark. Additionally, as the debate in the Netherlands demonstrates, this same debate is held within each country. The Netherlands had both parties that were more transatlantic focused, and others who wanted to see a stronger Europe. Therefore, it is interesting to see if the focus within the debate on state level shifts accordingly to the debate on European level.

The next chapter will explore the first real challenge for European defense: the war in Bosnia. Additionally, the parliamentary debates will be discussed to see if the different parties change their point of view based on the approach of this conflict by both the EU and NATO.

Chapter 2 – Facing Adversity: Americans to the Rescue in Yugoslavia

“As it turned out, the Europeans proved incapable of handling the Yugoslav crisis without American leadership.”⁸²

This chapter will discuss the first real challenge of the newly constructed European Union: the conflict in Yugoslavia. However, due to the scope of this research, this chapter will not cover the entirety of the Yugoslav Wars, but will specifically focus on the conflict in Bosnia.⁸³ The chapter starts with a short overview of the new European ambition. It furthermore deals with the question if the EU was ready to face reality. It will then discuss how Europe handled the conflict diplomatically, and it will assess the role of the United States. This chapter gives an overview of the historical context of the challenges the EU faced, and the position the United States took. Additionally, the final paragraph contains a discussion of the parliamentary debates of the Dutch House of Representatives about the events in Bosnia, the initiated peace proposals, and the Dayton Agreement. This chapter will aim to analyze if the position of Dutch political parties changed about the role of European defense in relation to NATO, when both alliances were put to the test in a real crisis.

2.1 How to Deal with Reality?

“The hour of Europe, not the hour of the Americans,”⁸⁴ that is how Minister Jacques Poos of Luxembourg – and then President of the European Community – perceived the challenge of the only just starting Yugoslav crisis in 1991. According to Josip Glaurdić, professor of Political Science at the University of Luxembourg and researcher at the European Research Council, the European Community perceived the Yugoslav crisis as the first test for the new European Union, which would be established in the Maastricht Treaty in the near future.⁸⁵ Gordon and Shapiro also describe this European challenge to demonstrate its new, desired geopolitical position. They add, however, that the European belief that it was able “to play a more autonomous role” in foreign policy was a distorted picture.⁸⁶

The United States had left the task of settling the disputes in the Balkan region with Europe. Gordon and Shapiro explain that because of a shift in focus to Asia, the events in

⁸² Gordon and Shapiro, *Allies at War*, 33.

⁸³ Due to the limited scope of this research, this thesis does not entail an extensive historical review of the Yugoslav Wars and will mainly focus on the conflict in Bosnia Herzegovina.

⁸⁴ Gordon and Shapiro, *Allies at War*, 33.

⁸⁵ Josip Glaurdić, *The Hour of Europe: Western Powers and the Breakup of Yugoslavia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011), 2.

⁸⁶ Gordon and Shapiro, *Allies at War*, 33.

Yugoslavia initially did not draw American attention. Bill Clinton was critical of President George W. Bush' apathetic attitude towards the conflict during his presidential campaign. However, when Clinton succeeded Bush, he also encountered the hesitance of Congress, as people "did not want to take risks in the Balkans for humanitarian purposes."⁸⁷ The United States had been reducing its military presence in Europe after the Cold War had ended, and was shifting back to a somewhat more isolationist approach of non-entanglement.⁸⁸

This meant that Europe was on its own and had to consider how it would deal with the Yugoslav crises that was turning into multiple wars. Glaurdić argues that this responsibility was met with both fresh aspirations to exhibit a more united Europe, as with many urgent questions.⁸⁹ Europe had to consider how a peace-keeping and peace-making mission would respond to the displayed violence. Additionally, European leaders had to work together as a mediating power to initiate peace plans. The following sections will deal with these questions and will analyze to what extent the aspirations of a more united Europe have been achieved.

2.1.1 Has the European Ambition Failed?

Already during the negotiations of the Maastricht Treaty, the EC proved to be in disagreement about which direction to go. Glaurdić explains that most of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs were not going to recognize Croatia or Slovenia when these countries would declare their independence.⁹⁰ As they worried that, after Croatia and Slovenia, more 'dominoes' would fall and declare their independence as a state or autonomous region. The United Kingdom tried to speak for all members of the EC when enouncing European preference for a "single Yugoslav political entity."⁹¹ Germany, however, did not agree with the rest of the EC and even "urged Slovenia and Croatia to declare independence."⁹² This was a first brink in the attempted consentient position of the EC.

On August 25, 1991, Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence. The Slovenian and Croatian National Guard and armed forces (re)captured border control posts, initiating the Ten Days War in Slovenia. These armed forces of the newly declared states were seen as paramilitary organizations by the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA), which was mobilized by the Serbian government. The War of Independence in Croatia had already started a few months earlier, in March 1991. There, the YPA under Serbian command and other Serb forces

⁸⁷ Gordon and Shapiro, *Allies at War*, 32.

⁸⁸ Zimmerman, "The Improbable Permanence of a Commitment," 26.

⁸⁹ Glaurdić, *The Hour of Europe*, 174.

⁹⁰ Glaurdić, *The Hour of Europe*, 174.

⁹¹ Glaurdić, *The Hour of Europe*, 174.

⁹² Walter Goldstein, "Europe after Maastricht," *Foreign Affairs* 71, no. 5 (1992): 126.

were fighting the Croatian forces which supported the newly declared Croatian government.⁹³

Under the Dutch presidency, the EC had proposed to send an intervention force from the WEU to Croatia. However, the United Kingdom, Denmark and Portugal were opposed to interfering as EC.⁹⁴ At that time, the United Nations (UN) was not yet present in the region and only imposed an embargo to limit the forces in arms – which harmed the Croatians more than then Serbs.

The next ‘domino’ that was already tilting was Bosnia and Herzegovina. Tensions were building between the three ethnic groups Bosnia largely consisted of – Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs. In February 1992, the month that the Maastricht Treaty was signed, British politician and former foreign secretary Lord Peter Carrington and Portuguese ambassador José Cutileiro initiated the Carrington-Cutileiro peace plan to prevent war in Bosnia. This first effort of diplomatic leadership by the EU entailed a proposal to leave the full administration under the state of the current Republic, shared by all ethnic communities, but to transfer central government to the districts. These districts would all be divided under one of the three ethnic communities – Bosniak, Serbian or Croatian.⁹⁵

Carl Bildt, a Swedish politician and diplomat who was prime minister of Sweden at the time of the Balkan Wars, explains that while the three ethnic leaders initially had signed the plan, different perceptions made that “consensus collapsed.”⁹⁶ Lord Carrington believed that the United States had persuaded Bosnian leader Alija Izetbegović to abandon the negotiations. It is still unclear if this is the case, both Izetbegović and the United States have denied these claims by Carrington. The failure of the Carrington-Cutileiro plan meant that the first diplomatic effort of the EU – trying to safeguard Bosnia from war – was unsuccessful.

Bosnia held and past a referendum to acquire independence on February 29, 1992. This referendum was issued after the European Community had required it as a condition before it would recognize Bosnian independence. The Bosnian Serbs had opposed the referendum and had set up their own “autonomous areas”, whereas the Muslim Bosniaks and Croatian population of Bosnia and Herzegovina had voted in favor of an independent state.⁹⁷ According to Bildt, the war in Bosnia was made inevitable after the failed peace proposal and

⁹³ Carl Bildt, “Bosnia to War, to Dayton, and to its Slow Peace,” European Council of Foreign Relations, published January, 2021, accessed June 13, 2021. <https://ecfr.eu/wp-content/uploads/Bosnia-to-war-to-Dayton-and-to-its-slow-peace.pdf>, 5.

⁹⁴ Pierre Gerbet, “The vain attempts of the European Community to mediate in Yugoslavia,” CVCE, accessed June 6, 2021, https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2003/5/15/cf4477b6-87a5-4efb-982d-fb694beac969/publishable_en.pdf, 2.

⁹⁵ Glaurdić, *The Hour of Europe*,” 290.

⁹⁶ Bildt, “Bosnia to War, to Dayton, and to its Slow Peace,” 7.

⁹⁷ Bildt, “Bosnia to War, to Dayton, and to its Slow Peace,” 6.

due to the declaration of independence after the referendum was passed.⁹⁸ The Serbian population of Bosnia did not accept the outcome of the referendum. As a result, Serbian Bosniaks declared war.

In 1992, the YPA “formally discharged 80,000 ethnically Serbian troops who lived in Bosnia.”⁹⁹ These troops, which also kept possession of their heavy weaponry, formed the new Army of Republika Srpska¹⁰⁰ and fought the in 1992 newly established Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The escalation of the conflict in Bosnia brought uncertainty in the European Community. Walter Goldstein, professor of international relations at the University of New York at Albany, elucidates a rift between the three large powers - France, the United Kingdom, and Germany - in how to deal with this crisis. The United Kingdom and France both refused to move against Serbia. The UK, for instance, felt that NATO should intervene in the conflict, but France – who was not part of the NATO command structure – disagreed. This incoherency did not forecast an effortless course for the newly established CFSP. In the course of 1992, the EC proved and realized that they could not undertake the challenge of mediating peace in former Yugoslavia by themselves, consequently looking at the United Nations for help.

2.1.2. The International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia

The International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), a collaboration between the EC and the UN, was established at the end of August 1992.¹⁰¹ While Bildt mentions this as a matter of fact, Pierre Gerbet – former professor of political sciences and author of *The Construction of Europe* – is significantly more critical of this development. He says that the EC was “forced to appeal to the UN” as it could not function as one leading entity due to the diverging opinions of the members.¹⁰²

The ICFY implemented a framework for peace negotiations for former Yugoslavia. Bildt explains that while the Conference focused on the entirety of former Yugoslavia, most of its efforts concerned the war in Bosnia. After the failed attempt to prevent war in Bosnia with the Carrington-Cutileiro plan, the two representatives of the UN and EC, who were co-

⁹⁸ Bildt, “Bosnia to War, to Dayton, and to its Slow Peace,” 7.

⁹⁹ John Kifner, “Yugoslav Army Reported Fighting In Bosnia to Help Serbian Forces,” *New York Times*, published January 27, 1994, accessed June 11, 2021, <https://www.nytimes.com/1994/01/27/world/yugoslav-army-reported-fighting-in-bosnia-to-help-serbian-forces.html>.

¹⁰⁰ Republika Srpska was formed in 1992 at the onset of the Bosnian War as a state for Bosnian Serbs, it was not internationally recognized until the Dayton Agreement.

¹⁰¹ “International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY),” United Nations, accessed June 11, 2021, <https://search.archives.un.org/international-conference-on-former-yugoslavia-icfy>.

¹⁰² Gerbet, “The vain attempts of the European Community to mediate in Yugoslavia,” 3.

chairmen of the ICFY, tried to negotiate peace early 1993.

UN Special Envoy to the UN Secretary-General, Cyrus Vance, and EC representative Lord David Owen initiated their ‘Vance-Owen Peace Plan’ in January 1993. This plan, like the Carrington-Cutileiro peace plan sought to unite one Bosnia-Herzegovina, with designated provinces per ethnic group. The division entailed nine provinces, three for each ethnic group, and a tenth province – Sarajevo – under international rule.¹⁰³

The plan proved too complicated. While all parties involved had initially signed the plan, a referendum held in Republika Srpska ensued the Bosnian Serbs to later rejected the plan. Another matter that caused the plan to fail was that the Clinton administration did not endorse the plan as they worried that displaced persons would not be able to return to the ethnic region of their birth.¹⁰⁴ For Bildt, this was the main reason that the plan did not succeed. He argued that “with the US going off in a different direction, the efforts to settle the conflict [...] had virtually no chance.”¹⁰⁵ What is worth noting, is that Cyrus Vance was an American diplomat who had earlier served as Secretary of State under President Carter, and as Deputy Secretary of Defense under President Johnson. It is therefore striking that an American diplomat, who was a Democrat as well, was held back by his own Democratic president. As a result, Vance resigned. The Vance-Owen plan was declared “dead” on June 18, 1993 by Lord Owen.¹⁰⁶

After the failure of the second European initiated peace plan, the third quickly followed. Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs Thorvald Stoltenberg had succeeded Cyrus Vance as Special Envoy to the UN Secretary-General when Vance resigned in April, 1993. Together with Lord Owen, he proposed the Owen-Stoltenberg plan in August, 1993. Theo van der Poel, senior research associate at Clingendael, labels the plan as a containment strategy, which is “focused on the geographical containment of the conflict.”¹⁰⁷ The plan once more divided Bosnia-Herzegovina based on the three ethnic groups. However, this time instead of appointing different, smaller provinces, Bosnia was divided in three larger regions.¹⁰⁸ This third plan also failed to reach consensus: the Bosniaks rejected the plan.¹⁰⁹

Early 1994, the co-representative structure of the ICFY was replaced by a committee,

¹⁰³ “The Vance-Owen Plan,” The University of Edinburgh Peace Agreements Database, published February 5, 1993, accessed June 11, 2021, <https://www.peaceagreements.org/viewmasterdocument/606>.

¹⁰⁴ Bildt, “Bosnia to War, to Dayton, and to its Slow Peace,” 8.

¹⁰⁵ Bildt, “Bosnia to War, to Dayton, and to its Slow Peace,” 8.

¹⁰⁶ Gerbet, “The vain attempts of the European Community to mediate in Yugoslavia,” 3.

¹⁰⁷ Theo van der Poel, “Een schijnoplossing Plan Owen-Stoltenberg maakt geen eind aan oorlog,” Telegraaf, published August 5, 1993, accessed June 2021, <https://www.trouw.nl/nieuws/een-schijnoplossing-plan-owen-stoltenberg-maakt-geen-eind-aan-oorlog~b5ab9ef0/>.

¹⁰⁸ “The Owen-Stoltenberg Plan,” The University of Edinburgh Peace Agreements Database, published August 11, 1993, accessed June 11, 2021, <https://www.peaceagreements.org/viewmasterdocument/472>.

¹⁰⁹ Gerbet, “The vain attempts of the European Community to mediate in Yugoslavia,” 3.

“the so-called Contact Group.”¹¹⁰ The Contact Group was formed of representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Russia. Helen Leigh-Phippard, a researcher with a PhD in international relations, reviewed the workings of the Contact Group from its foundation until the Dayton Agreement. She argues that the Contact Group “took up where the [EU and the UN] had failed in bringing the warring parties to the negotiating table.”¹¹¹ However, the EU was also represented in the Contact Group. Additional to the representatives from the five aforementioned countries, Swedish politician and diplomat Carl Bildt joined the Contact Group as EU-mediator. Bildt represented the EU as a whole, but also sought to unite the European member states in the group.

While the United States had shown more willingness in intervening in the region – which was the reason that they were part of the Contact Group – the first proposal initially was unsuccessful. The Contact Group plan focused on a territorial map like the earlier proposals, this time with two regions, and added a series of constitutional principles. The Bosnian Serbs again rejected this effort.¹¹²

The Contact Group was heavily divided about how to continue. Leigh-Phippard explains that the United States wanted to lift the arms embargo on the Bosnian Muslims. Congress argued that this way “they might be better equipped in their fight against the Bosnian Serbs.”¹¹³ Germany partially agreed with the United States on the matter of lifting the embargo, but did not want to counteract its European partners. These partners, the United Kingdom and France, were against lifting the embargo as they were afraid that their UN-peacekeeping troops would be put at even more risk.¹¹⁴

The United Kingdom, France and Russia tried to resume the negotiations between the Contact Group and the parties at war in Bosnia, but according to Leigh-Phippard these efforts were “blocked either by the warring parties themselves or by the United States and Germany.”¹¹⁵ This meant that yet another peace plan, this time largely initiated by European countries, instead of the EC, had failed due to incompatible points of view of the member states and there was not yet a consensus on how to proceed.

Even though the Maastricht Treaty had been ratified by all member states in 1993, the events in 1994 proved troubling. Large European powers like France, the United Kingdom, and Germany had incompatible views on how to resolve the war in Bosnia diplomatically.

¹¹⁰ Bildt, “Bosnia to War, to Dayton, and to its Slow Peace,” 9.

¹¹¹ Helen Leigh-Phippard, “The Contact Group on (and in) Bosnia: An exercise in conflict mediation?” *International Journal* 53, no. 2 (1998): 306.

¹¹² Gerbet, “The vain attempts of the European Community to mediate in Yugoslavia,” 3.

¹¹³ Leigh-Phippard, “The Contact Group on (and in) Bosnia,” 308.

¹¹⁴ Leigh-Phippard, “The Contact Group on (and in) Bosnia,” 308.

¹¹⁵ Leigh-Phippard, “The Contact Group on (and in) Bosnia,” 309.

Some of these positions were also incompatible with the views Bildt shared as EU-representative. For a moment, it seemed like the conflict resolution had come to a complete standstill.

2.2 American Interference in the Balkan Region

During the same time as the many catapulted attempts to reopen negotiations, France and United Kingdom started to question “whether its presence made any sense in the absence of a coherent political strategy to end the war.”¹¹⁶ The fear of withdrawal of these parties who had the most troops on the ground, fueled the United States to be more proactive.

Leigh-Phippard claims that “the process [of peace negotiations] was reinvigorated only after the United States showed a unilateral commitment to conflict resolution.”¹¹⁷ While this might be true, it seems short-sighted to argue that just because the United States made more effort, negotiations continued again. However, the American diplomatic efforts were enforced by their military efforts, which increased the pressure for the warring parties.

Mid-1995, the United States took the lead. Instead of peacekeeping and providing humanitarian aid – which the EU had done with the WEU exercising the Petersberg Tasks – the Clinton administration urged its European allies to change the approach to more forceful action, by resorting to US interference through NATO. As a result, this demonstrated that EU needed the United States in their own backyard, as their own efforts proved inadequate.

The American diplomatic effort started with diplomatic missions to Bosnia. These missions were “loosely coordinated through the Contact Group”,¹¹⁸ which effectively meant that the United States initiated the missions and the Contact Group followed. The missions sought to revisit the earlier proposal of the Contact Group, specifically the division of the regions by recognizing Republika Srpska as a part of Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the time of these diplomatic missions, NATO conducted air strikes around Sarajevo, aimed at Bosnian Serbs, to push Serbian president Slobodan Milošević to accept a deal.

The negotiator appointed by Clinton was Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke. After individual negotiations with Balkan leaders, Holbrooke chaired a conference in Geneva on September 8. At this conference the representatives of the Contact Group and the Balkan leaders accepted the earlier plan of 1994 as the starting point for further negotiations. This, among other agreements, meant that Bosnia and Herzegovina would be split up in Republika Srpska and the Muslim-Croat Bosnia.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁶ Bildt, “Bosnia to War, to Dayton, and to its Slow Peace,” 10.

¹¹⁷ Leigh-Phippard, “The Contact Group on (and in) Bosnia,” 306.

¹¹⁸ Leigh-Phippard, “The Contact Group on (and in) Bosnia,” 309.

¹¹⁹ Leigh-Phippard, “The Contact Group on (and in) Bosnia,” 310.

EU-mediator Bildt explains that the key principles were set in the Geneva conference. In meetings in New York and Moscow, further agreements were made between the United States, the Contact Group and Balkan leaders, paving the way to Dayton.

2.2.1 The Dayton Agreement

The Dayton conference took place in the first three weeks of November 1995 at the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio. The Dayton conference was chaired by US Secretary of State Warren Christopher, with Richard Holbrooke as main negotiator. The other negotiators were EU-representative Carl Bildt and Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov.¹²⁰

There were around 200 officials present to support the negotiations, divided over the American, the Bosnian, Croat, Serbian, European and EU-delegations. All these officials were housed at the base.¹²¹ Talking to the press was not allowed as Holbrooke worried that this would result in opinion making about successes or concessions, which could influence the negotiations. American foreign policy advisor and Counselor of the United States Department of State, Derek Chollet states that instead, “the Americans alone would speak publicly for all delegations.”¹²² This already makes it quite clear who is in charge of this multilateral meeting.

The first ten days, the delegations negotiated for hours but there was no clear outcome. However, these days were needed to clear away from smaller issues. The ‘core issues’, like territorial questions, were barely discussed at the onset of the Dayton conference. These initial talks were conducted by both the Americans as the Contact Group’s EU-members. But when, in the second weekend, the negotiations about ‘the map’ started, “Holbrooke sidelined his European counterparts and took unilateral control of the negotiations.”¹²³

This sidelining entailed that the rest of the Contact Group members, as well as the EU-negotiator received a new point of contact and were excluded from some of the meetings and negotiations. Leigh-Phippard attributes this to the American belief that “Europeans were so consumed by technical details [...] that they would prefer to leave Dayton empty-handed.”¹²⁴

The sidelining inherently meant that European countries were partly excluded while the United States, which already had the lead, strengthened its position as the world leader who would resolve the crisis. Furthermore, because of this development, European powers and the EU itself did not resolve the conflict on European territory. The CFSP fell short of its military and diplomatic aspirations, and after initial hesitance the United States was there to

¹²⁰ Leigh-Phippard, “The Contact Group on (and in) Bosnia,” 309.

¹²¹ Derek Chollet, *The Road to the Dayton Accords* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), 134.

¹²² Chollet, *The Road to the Dayton Accords*, 133.

¹²³ Leigh-Phippard, “The Contact Group on (and in) Bosnia,” 311.

¹²⁴ Leigh-Phippard, “The Contact Group on (and in) Bosnia,” 311.

save the day.

After 21 days, a consensus had been reached. The ‘map issue’ had been resolved, and the State of Bosnia Herzegovina was formed out of two entities: the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska.¹²⁵ Both entities would be recognized by the international community and by the other entity. The Dayton Agreement was officially signed in Paris on December 14, 1995. Signatories were the leaders of Serbia, Bosnia, Croatia, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, and the representative of the European Union.¹²⁶

2.3 Preliminary Conclusion

Around the time the Maastricht Treaty was formed, the conflict in former Yugoslavia, and consequently in Bosnia, erupted. While the Maastricht Treaty is not ratified in the first years, the European Community did share the CFSP pillar as vision for the future. European leaders, especially the leaders of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, tried to meddle in the conflict in Bosnia. This first challenge of the newly constructed European Union would prove that this was the hour of Europe.¹²⁷ Unfortunately, it was not.

As it turned out, the Europeans proved incapable of handling the Yugoslav crisis without American leadership.”¹²⁸ However, it does not seem entirely fair to label this quote by Gordon and Shapiro as the truth without adding some nuance. When the Yugoslav crisis erupted, the Americans did not want anything to do with the area. They did not see the relevance. When the conflict worsened, the United States also saw that the international community had to step in. However, they initially only intervened through the UN.

It took quite some time for the United States to take the lead. When ‘the hour of America’ was ushered in, it became quite clear that the power was needed for its decisiveness and conflict resolution. All the European initiated peace plans had failed, as the member states could not come to an unanimously supported proposal that would also be supported by the United States and the ethnic leaders in Bosnia. Furthermore, Europe did not have the military capacity to pressure ethnic leaders into agreement without the United States clearly and actively on their side.

Glaudić is quite blunt by arguing that “to say that the EC/EU failed the Yugoslav test

¹²⁵ Bildt, “Bosnia to War, to Dayton, and to its Slow Peace,” 13.

¹²⁶ “Dayton Peace Agreement,” Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, published December 14, 1995, accessed June 11, 2021, <https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/e/0/126173.pdf>, 2.

¹²⁷ Gordon and Shapiro, *Allies at War*, 33.

¹²⁸ Gordon and Shapiro, *Allies at War*, 33.

would be a dramatic understatement.”¹²⁹ While a great deal can still be said about the attitude of the United States throughout the years of the crisis, it must be acknowledged that the EU was not up for the task. The failure was both visible in the inability to manage the conflict with boots on the ground, as in the diplomacy efforts and peace proposals that could not reach consensus.

2.4 Discussion of transatlantic and European defense in Dutch parliament¹³⁰

This paragraph contains a discussion of the parliamentary debates of the Dutch parliament around European efforts to resolve the conflict in Bosnia, American interference through NATO, and the Dayton Agreement. The debate is structured along the lines of parties that have a pro-transatlantic defense standpoint and parties that have a pro-European defense standpoint.

This division is made in every chapter as parties seem to strive for the future of the European defense identity in either within NATO or outside of NATO. However, concerning the debate about NATO and European defense regarding the conflict in Yugoslavia, this divide is rather difficult to make. There is a general disappointment in the efforts of NATO, and especially the reserved attitude of the United States, as well as how the EU has failed its aspirations. Parties speak less about the future of either form of defense, but rather discuss their discontentment about both transatlantic defense and European defense in the management of the Yugoslavia crisis. This paragraph seeks to chart the consequences for the military role of the EU; therefore, the conceptual bilateral divide is deliberately kept the same as in chapter one.

2.4.1 Debate in the Netherlands: Pro-transatlantic Defense

For VVD, ‘impotence’ was a key word in their contributions in different debates about the situation in Yugoslavia. It had become clear how difficult it was to intervene with a humanitarian mission. VVD felt that the EU was not equipped enough for conflict resolution and that this became once more evident in the approach and failure in Yugoslavia.¹³¹ VVD felt that formalizing a common defense polity would be increasingly difficult with the admittance of more member states. It had already become clear that the member states were not able to reach consensus in Yugoslavia. MP Frans Weisglas therefore asked the

¹²⁹ Glaurdić, *The Hour of Europe*, ” 2.

¹³⁰ NB: The minutes of parliamentary debates of the Dutch House of Representatives will be referred to as prescribed in ‘De Leidraad,’ a Dutch method for citing juridical and parliamentary documents. Bastiaans et al. *De Leidraad 2019*, 67.

¹³¹ *Handelingen II*, 1992-93, nr. 29, p. 2203.

government “if they agreed with the standpoint of VVD that the CSDP would be doomed to die silently if no major effort was conducted.”¹³²

VVD was generally upset about the American disinterest in the conflict in Yugoslavia in 1993 and early 1994, as European efforts proved inadequate. VVD did seem to regard NATO as the main defense structure for Europe and the Netherlands. Weisglas colleague MP Jan Dirk Blaauw said that he regretted that the Americans had a detached attitude towards the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1993. It seemed like VVD would rather return to the United States’ military presence and interest in Europe as during the Cold War. VVD seemed to feel that the construction of the CSDP might jeopardize European investment in NATO as they called the European members of NATO to remain invested in the alliance. They argued that a clear approach and profound involvement would prevent an isolationist America.¹³³

The conservative orthodox Calvinist party SGP was saddened by the situation in Yugoslavia and felt that the EU has failed in controlling the Balkan crisis. SGP wanted to look for a new approach and urged the government to find common ground in the integrated structures the Netherlands is part of, like the EU, UN and NATO.¹³⁴ Additionally, like the VVD, SGP also worried about the American attitude towards Europe.

CDA agreed with SGP and also firmly requested that the “European Union needed to speak with one face and one voice.”¹³⁵ MP Jaap de Hoop Scheffer assured that for CDA the future of European defense would lie within NATO and ESDI. Like VVD, CDA was also hesitant about new member states and wanted to assure that “any new member of the EU would be prepared to shape the European defense identity and actively shape a European foreign policy [to construct ESDI].”¹³⁶ In another debate, CDA reaffirmed its position about NATO by arguing that Europe should fulfill an active role in NATO as part of the new strategy for European defense.¹³⁷ While CDA wanted to invest in European defense, they were also increasingly worried about the capacity of the WEU to intervene in Bosnia. De Hoop Scheffer proclaimed that he could not be optimistic about either the WEU or NATO at

¹³² Original text: “Is de regering niet met ons van oordeel dat een gemeenschappelijk buitenlands en veiligheidsbeleid zonder ingrijpende operatie gedoemd is om aan een zachte dood ten onder te gaan?” *Handelingen II*, 1994-95, nr. 24, p. 1501.

¹³³ *Handelingen II*, 1992-93, nr. 29, p. 2203.

¹³⁴ Original text: “Als er één ding hard nodig is, dan is het wel om binnen de ons ter beschikking staande integrerende structuren de klokken gelijk te zetten en een gemeenschappelijke koers uit te zetten om de uitdagingen van vandaag en de komende tijd het hoofd te bieden.”

Handelingen II, 1992-93, nr. 29, p. 2199.

¹³⁵ Original text: “De Europese Unie moet daarbij wel met één stem, één mond blijven spreken.”

Handelingen II, 1994-95, nr. 34, p. 2347.

¹³⁶ Original text: “Als je toetreedt tot die Europese Unie dan moet je bereid zijn vorm te geven aan een Europees veiligheids- en defensie-identiteit en constructief en actief vorm te geven aan een Europees buitenlands beleid.” *Handelingen II*, 1994-95, nr. 32, p. 2198.

¹³⁷ *Handelingen II*, 1993-94, nr. 87, p. 5908.

this time, and like his colleagues at VDD was disappointed in the United States' disinterest.¹³⁸

This last remark of de Hoop Scheffer seems to summarize the position of the conservative-Christian parties in the debates concerning the Yugoslav Wars and the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These parties, which at the onset of the European Union saw European defense within NATO, still see NATO as the main force of European defense at this time. However, the parties were increasingly worried about American isolationism. VVD, CDA, and SGP hoped that by strengthening the European pillar within NATO, the United States would also become increasingly invested in NATO and European defense through NATO: by providing assets when the WEU would be able to perform its Petersberg Tasks, but on the other hand also providing adequate security for territorial affairs or when the efforts of the WEU are too limited.

2.4.2 Debate in the Netherlands: Pro-European Defense

The parties who were pro-European defense around the time the Maastricht Treaty was drafted, were also worried about the limited European participation in Yugoslavia. Additionally, they were also worried about the position of the United States.

PvdA was downright angry about both the limitations of European defense and the apathy of the United States within any collaboration, specifically the UN. They felt that after constructing all these aspirations for a European defense identity, Yugoslavia would be the image in people's mind instead of Maastricht. MP Maarten van Traa even argued that "Europe had lost the credibility to act without the United States."¹³⁹

Van Traa's PvdA colleague MP Jacques Wallage later argued that Europe needed to make new agreements about its defense strategy as Europe grew to new proportions with the accession of new member states. PvdA felt that these changes requested a renewed consensus.¹⁴⁰ While PvdA was not opposed to NATO, they did want to work towards a European defense identity outside of NATO after the Maastricht Treaty. However, in the debates regarding Yugoslavia, they did not repeat this stance this clearly. While they did aim to work towards a new consensus, like Wallage proposed, PvdA was not as outspoken about a constructing a European defense identity outside of NATO as they were earlier. This clearly had to do with the failure the EU experienced in Yugoslavia. However, the question remained if PvdA saw this as a call to expand, or a call to revise the CSDP.

¹³⁸ *Handelingen II*, 1994-95, nr. 32, p. 2199.

¹³⁹ Original text: "En Joegoslavië blijft mensen nu meer bij dan Maastricht, want in Joegoslavië verloor Europa de geloofwaardigheid om, als het moet ook zonder de Verenigde Staten en zonder de Sovjet-Unie, te kunnen en willen optreden."

Handelingen II, 1992-93, nr. 29, p. 2194.

¹⁴⁰ *Handelingen II*, 1993-94, nr. 87, p. 5908.

D66 seemed to know their answer to this question. MP Bob van den Bos argued that “a European foreign and security policy without defense capacity, was like a knight without a horse, or better said yet, a knight without a sword”, arguing that the EU should invest more in its defense capacities.¹⁴¹ D66 reassured the House that they had been, and remained, a supporter of military collaboration within the European Union.¹⁴²

The abovementioned progressive parties who had earlier pleaded for a more sophisticated European defense identity as part of the EU instead of NATO, seemed less outspoken about this divide in the heat of the war in Bosnia. Only D66 seemed to be outspoken about military collaboration, but they too did not specify how they saw the European position within NATO. PvdA mainly asked the government for clarification on how to act as a united Europe. However, both parties felt that the EU had fallen short on its aspirations, which was clear from the inability to act diplomatically. Additionally, the capacity of the WEU fell short considering the extent of the conflict. At that time, it seemed like the parties just wanted the conflict to end, if needed with help from the United States.

2.4.3 Debate in the Netherlands: Other Positions

There might be a blind spot, as some parties did not participate in the debates about defense. The House of Representatives in the 1989 – 1993 term was composed of nine parties, of which the top four had between 12 and 54 seats. In the 1994 – 1998 term the House was composed of twelve parties of which the top four had between 24 and 37 seats. This meant that the other five and eight parties, respectively, had between one and six seats. These parties had to choose in which debates they would participate in the absence of more members to send. This also meant that these parties are not or barely part of the parliamentary debate concerning European defense and transatlantic defense. This is for instance the case with GPV and RPF, who are only represented in one debate.

Protestant-Christian party GPV, for instance, only asked the government to clarify its position about a European defense structure. In a statement the government gave, it said that for the defense of Europe, NATO would play the most important role, and that the European defense and security policy should be formed as a part of NATO.¹⁴³ This is a similar standpoint to the conservative-Christian block. Like in earlier years, it is not clear where GPV stood in the debate about NATO and a separate European defense identity. GPV furthermore only indicated that it deemed the form of the European foreign and defense policy, or a

¹⁴¹ Original text: “Een Europees buitenlands en veiligheidsbeleid zonder defensiecapaciteit is als een ridder zonder paard, of beter gezegd, als een ridder zonder zwaard.”

Handelingen II, 1994-95, nr. 24, p. 1497.

¹⁴² *Handelingen II*, 1994-95, nr. 24, p. 1497.

¹⁴³ *Handelingen II*, 1993-94, nr. 87, p. 5923.

common defense identity, as very limited in 1994.¹⁴⁴

The same is true for the Reformatory Political Federation (RPF). They were shocked by the events in Bosnia and pronounced their disgust. It remains unclear if RPF wanted to invest more in a European defense identity to give Europe a better position in future conflict resolution, or if they wanted the United States to intervene.

2.5 Chapter Conclusion

Regarding both the historical context and the parliamentary debate it is clear that Europe could not successfully end the conflict in Bosnia without the help of the United States. This first test for the EU had failed. Europe's military capabilities proved too limited and its diplomatic approaches did not reach consensus. In the end, the apathic United States realized it had to intervene. With the United States in the lead, the different European and ethnic parties came to an accord with the Dayton Agreement.¹⁴⁵

Considering the parliamentary debate in the Dutch House of Representatives, both the conservative-Christian parties as the progressive parties were generally disappointed in the failed ambition of the EU and the reserved attitude of the United States. In the debates about defense in the heat of the war in Bosnia, parties discussed their disappointment in both transatlantic as European management of the conflict.

The events and approach of the conflict in Bosnia seemed to call for a serious recalibration of the European aspirations for a common European defense identity. Either within, or outside NATO. The following chapter will further examine the construction of a European Defense Identity and will analyze the position of NATO in the second half of the 1990s.

¹⁴⁴ *Handelingen II*, 1993-94, nr. 24, p. 1491.

¹⁴⁵ Significantly more can still be said about the Dayton Agreement and the way the United States handled the conflict in Bosnia and other conflicts in Yugoslavia. However, due to the scope of this research this analysis is not part of this thesis.

Chapter 3 – Recalibration of European Aspirations

*“We Europeans should not expect the US to have to play a part
in every disorder in our own back yard.”¹⁴⁶*

This chapter will discuss several EU agreements and NATO’s Washington Summit to establish how the European defense identity was formed after the EU had lost face in handling the conflict in Bosnia. In the late 1990s, the EU had to revisit the aspirations of Maastricht to be able to form a functioning European defense policy, both within and outside of NATO. Additionally, the final paragraph contains a discussion of parliamentary debates of the Dutch House of Representatives at the end of the 1990s concerning the preferred European defense policy and identity, either within or outside of NATO. This chapter will chart the challenges the EU faced to further construct its defense structures. It will also discuss the position of Dutch political parties in the debate concerning European defense. What did they perceive as the preferred relation between a European defense identity and NATO at the end of the 1990s and what were their ambitions for the European defense identity going into the twenty-first century?

3.1 How to Continue after Losing Face in Bosnia?

The war in Bosnia clearly showed that the EU was not ready to act on its own. Nolan summarizes the European effort by arguing that key players “disagreed on policy and that the EU lacked military power.”¹⁴⁷ Europe had realized that changes needed to be made if they wanted to become the geopolitical power they had envisioned to be in the Maastricht Treaty. Over the course of the second half of the 1990s, Europe revisited the agreements made in the Maastricht Treaty. Furthermore, the EU started a new dialogue about its defense capabilities and how the members wanted to work towards a European defense identity that would have the military strength to keep peace on the continent. This process started with the Treaty of Amsterdam.

3.1.1 The Treaty of Amsterdam

The Treaty of Amsterdam amended the Maastricht Treaty. This Treaty on the European Union of 1992 already included an article which established a revision of the Treaty in 1996.¹⁴⁸ In the Turin conference in March 1996, the EU drew up a draft treaty. This draft was

¹⁴⁶ Quote by Prime Minister of the United Kingdom Tony Blair, as mentioned in Peter van Ham, “Europe’s Common Defense Policy: Implications for the Transatlantic Relationship,” *Security Dialogue* 31, no. 2 (2000): 218.

¹⁴⁷ Nolan, *The Transatlantic Century*, 361.

¹⁴⁸ Article N as recorded in “Treaty on European Union,” 138.

adopted by the European Council in Amsterdam in June, 1997.¹⁴⁹ The Amsterdam Treaty was signed in October 1997 and entered into force on 1 May 1999.¹⁵⁰

Besides focusing on freedom, security and justice, and reforming the institutions to make the Union “more democratic and efficient in preparation for the enlargement to include Central and Eastern European countries” in the future, the revisions also focused on strengthening the CFSP.¹⁵¹ With the Treaty of Amsterdam the aforementioned Petersberg Tasks were integrated in the EU instead of the WEU.¹⁵² This meant that whereas first the WEU-members would provide military units for humanitarian and rescue tasks, crisis management and peacemaking, peace-keeping, and stabilization tasks, these tasks from then on were executed by EU-members.¹⁵³

However this form of defense was still rather limited. Former director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, François Heisbourg and his co-authors explained in a series of papers of the European Institute for Security Studies of the WEU, that while these tasks included military action, they did not include using military means “in the traditional sense of ensuring [...] the territorial integrity and the political independence of a state in the face of a military treat, nor did they cover collective defense.”¹⁵⁴ This meant that the territorial defense of Europe remained with NATO instead of the EU.

The Treaty of Amsterdam furthermore created the post of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. This post seems to meet Jaap de Hoop Scheffer’s request in the Dutch House of Representatives that the “European Union needed to speak with one face and one voice,” as the High Representative (HR/VP) manages the cohesion of the EU’s external action.¹⁵⁵ As established in the Treaty of Amsterdam, the HR/VP creates and conducts the common foreign and security policy, and specifically the common security and defense policy. Furthermore, the Representative is head of the European Defense Agency (EDA). In the Lisbon Treaty of 2009, the tasks of the HR/VP were expanded to chair of the Council of Foreign Affairs and vice-president of the European Commission.¹⁵⁶

Heisbourg et al. argue that the Treaty of Amsterdam seemed to be “exceedingly

¹⁴⁹ “The Treaty of Amsterdam,” CVCE, accessed June 14, 2021, <https://www.cvce.eu/en/education/unit-content/-/unit/02bb76df-d066-4c08-a58a-d4686a3e68ff/56e15a9a-7508-4a2b-9bbe-b5c3d2605ae4>.

¹⁵⁰ “Summary of the Treaty on European Union,” EUR-Lex.

¹⁵¹ “The Treaty of Amsterdam,” CVCE.

¹⁵² François Heisbourg et al., “European Defence: Making It Work,” *Chaillot Papers* 42, (2000): 2.

¹⁵³ “Petersberg Tasks,” EUR-Lex.

¹⁵⁴ Heisbourg et al., “European Defence,” 2.

¹⁵⁵ Original text: “De Europese Unie moet daarbij wel met één stem, één mond blijven spreken.”

Handelingen II, 1994-95, nr. 34, p. 2347.

¹⁵⁶ “Hoge Vertegenwoordiger van de Unie voor Buitenlandse Zaken en Veiligheidsbeleid,” EUR-Lex, accessed June 15, 2021, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/high_representative_cfsp.html.

modest.”¹⁵⁷ However, the Treaty language had the potential to enable functions that “the framers may not always have intended.”¹⁵⁸ The ‘functions’ that Heisbourg et al. refers to are agreements that have been made between the members in the meetings of the European Council in the last few years of the 1990s. Starting in 1998 with Saint-Malo.

3.1.2 Saint-Malo and the British U-turn

In 1997, when Tony Blair became prime minister of the United Kingdom, the British government took a new approach to their role in Europe. Peter van Ham, Senior Research Fellow at the Clingendael Institute, explains that the Labour administration of the United Kingdom wanted to enlarge their “commitment to defining a common European defense policy and capability” and also wanted to claim a more central role in Europe.¹⁵⁹ This more progressive point of view seems compatible with the progressive parties in Dutch parliament.

The informal European Council meeting in Pörschach, Austria, in October 1998, was a starting point for developing a “more effective military infrastructure” within the EU.¹⁶⁰ It was at this Council that the United Kingdom affirmed its ambitions to strengthen European defense. One of the reasons for this was the unacceptable and weak policy Europe had portrayed earlier in the conflict in Bosnia and at that time in Kosovo.

After Pörschach the Franco-British Saint-Malo Summit was held in December, 1998. Van Ham argues that this was the moment that “the debate on European defense gained in momentum.”¹⁶¹ Agreements made in the Saint-Malo declaration were both focused on European defense to strengthen the EU, as the “organic link between the EU and NATO.”¹⁶² This consequently meant that while the CSDP would be reinforced, this would “not undermine the transatlantic relationship.”¹⁶³ This does reopen the debate about the three D’s as earlier mentioned in chapter 1. France insisted that European resources and decision-making structures must be strengthened independently from NATO. This is a quite logical response as they were not part of the NATO command structure. The United Kingdom, however, wanted to be careful of sending a wrong message to their transatlantic ally, the United States. This debate was not settled at Saint-Malo and would continue in upcoming council meetings.

Heisbourg et al. describe from a pro-WEU point of view that Saint-Malo had a few

¹⁵⁷ Heisbourg et al., “European Defence,” 5.

¹⁵⁸ Heisbourg et al., “European Defence,” 5.

¹⁵⁹ Van Ham, “Europe’s Common Defense Policy,” 216.

¹⁶⁰ Van Ham, “Europe’s Common Defense Policy,” 216.

¹⁶¹ Van Ham, “Europe’s Common Defense Policy,” 216.

¹⁶² Van Ham, “Europe’s Common Defense Policy,” 217.

¹⁶³ Van Ham, “Europe’s Common Defense Policy,” 217.

implications.¹⁶⁴ For instance, the capacity for autonomous action was to be enlarged, as was the role of the EU in territorial defense. They argue that Europe had to strengthen its defense policy to be a stronger, more reliable force within NATO. This seems to suggest that the United Kingdom had successfully promoted its transatlantic interests. However, the role of a European defense identity as a part of or outside of NATO would be discussed in future Councils and Summits, like for instance NATO's Washington Summit.

3.1.3 The NATO Washington Summit: The Enhancement of ESDI

In 1999, the NATO members celebrated the 50th anniversary of the Alliance with the Washington Summit.¹⁶⁵ It was a moment to look back at the past decade, and to make plans for the next century. Members spoke about the conflict in Yugoslavia, but also about the future and strengthening of defense. Heisbourg et al. mentions that the “determination of both EU members and other European allies to make necessary steps to strengthen their defense capabilities” was applauded by the Alliance.¹⁶⁶ However, during the Washington Summit it was also made sure that the expanding of European defense would need to happen under the watchful eye NATO.

One of the topics on the agenda was the enhancement of ESDI within NATO. After the decisions taken at the NATO Summit in Brussels in 1994, Europe was facilitated with the power to act on its own in issues on European territory. The WEU had access to NATO assets for these operations.¹⁶⁷ The Alliance concluded at the Washington Summit in April 1999 that the European security pillar within NATO was now fully formed, which would “strengthen the transatlantic link and Alliance solidarity as a whole.”¹⁶⁸

Through ESDI, the United States always had some degree of control on the European-led operations. The reaffirming of ESDI seemed to curb autonomous European defense aspirations as envisioned by France. Expanding the European defense identity was tolerated, but only within NATO. This gave the European Union the “right to act, but not to decide autonomously” as any decision had to be discussed by NATO.¹⁶⁹ The Alliance would decide if “the matter should be pursued by NATO as a whole or left to the autonomous initiative of the EU, which could then envisage to take military action with the help of NATO.”¹⁷⁰

The result of this was that a European defense identity outside of NATO was evidently

¹⁶⁴ Heisbourg et al., “European Defence,” 7.

¹⁶⁵ “Washington Summit,” NATO, published April 23, 1999, accessed June 14, 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_27286.htm?selectedLocale=en.

¹⁶⁶ Heisbourg et al., “European Defence,” 7.

¹⁶⁷ Bonnén, “The Common European Security and Defence Policy and the US Defence and Security Dilemma,” 67.

¹⁶⁸ “Washington Summit,” NATO.

¹⁶⁹ Heisbourg et al., “European Defence,” 47.

¹⁷⁰ Heisbourg et al., “European Defence,” 47.

non-existent, as NATO was always be part of the decision process. This is an important situation to note, as not all EU-members are NATO-members as well. Some Europeanist countries would rather see Europe as powerful enough to regard involvement through NATO on the European continent as unnecessary.

3.1.4 Cologne: Securing a Common Defense Strategy

At the European Council at Cologne in June 1999, the EU-members signed ‘the Declaration on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defense.’¹⁷¹ This common defense strategy that was earlier discussed at Saint-Malo was converted by the German Presidency from a bilateral initiative by France and the United Kingdom, to a formal European Union process.¹⁷²

The Amsterdam Treaty had laid the basis for the operative development of the ESDP.¹⁷³ But at the Cologne Council, a common defense strategy was agreed. The Declaration officially transferred all WEU assets to the EU, and set up an EU Political and Security Committee (PSC).¹⁷⁴ Even though the WEU assets now belonged to the EU, the Petersberg Tasks were still only enforceable after approval of NATO. This limited the construction of a European defense identity outside of NATO.

The limited construction of the European defense identity was not the only problem. In Yugoslavia, the EU had experienced that their forces were very limited and could not engage in a way they had initially planned. The members tried to solve this problem in the Helsinki Summit.

3.1.5 Helsinki: The Road to a European Army?

Nolan explains that the EU had become “aware of its weakness” after the conflict in Yugoslavia.¹⁷⁵ When the CSDP was further structured with Saint-Malo and Cologne, the Helsinki Summit arranged that there were enough resources to intervene militarily. The establishment of the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) made that EU member states would make troops available at a notice of sixty days for at least one year.¹⁷⁶ The Force would entail a total of sixty thousand troops.¹⁷⁷ These forces “were self-sustaining with the necessary command and control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, and other combat support

¹⁷¹ “Annex III – European Council Declaration on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence,” European Parliament, accessed June 14, 2021, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/kol2_en.htm#an3.

¹⁷² Heisbourg et al., “European Defence,” 7.

¹⁷³ “EU Security and Defence Policy,” Euractiv, published January 6, 2005, accessed June 15, 2021, <https://www.euractiv.com/section/science-policymaking/linksdossier/eu-security-and-defence-policy-archived/>.

¹⁷⁴ Heisbourg et al., “European Defence,” 6.

¹⁷⁵ Nolan, *The Transatlantic Century*, 361.

¹⁷⁶ Heisbourg et al., “European Defence,” 7.

¹⁷⁷ Nolan, *The Transatlantic Century*, 361.

sources and additionally, as appropriate naval and air elements.”¹⁷⁸ This meant that Europe would establish its own command structure, instead of using the NATO command structure, to manage these troops.

While these forces initially might sound as a European army, due to the collaborative nature and the overarching command structure, the troops could only be deployed to carry out the Petersberg tasks. This meant that NATO remained in charge of the territorial defense of Europe. Furthermore, there is no permanent force, the members states would make troops available when called upon.

Nevertheless, International policy expert Peter van Ham sees the EU Helsinki Summit of December 1999 as a “decisive step towards the development of a new Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP)” as this defense capacity finally gave Europe a distinct military component.¹⁷⁹ Heisbourg also considered Helsinki as “a turning point.”¹⁸⁰ They both assign these claims to the fact that the upcoming meetings of the European Council from then on focused on implementation of a common European defense force, rather than the vague pledges to set up common defense.¹⁸¹

It seemed especially noteworthy that the ERF was part of a European command structure, rather than NATO’s command structure as this is a large step towards the CSDP led by Europe instead of as a part of NATO. It is therefore interesting to see how Dutch political parties approach the decisions made in Helsinki: has Europe started to construct a European army, or will NATO remain indispensable?

3.2 The European Defense Identity at the Start of the Twenty-First Century

While the abovementioned agreements and Summit clarify the position of European defense in the late 1990s, there are still issues that needed to be crystalized. The several agreements have shown that the EU tried to establish a European defense policy and identity. The form of this policy, however, mostly remained tied to NATO.

However, van Ham argues in 2000 that the Helsinki declaration might become a concern to the United States, as “in the future Europe may well be capable of taking autonomous military action without recourse to NATO and even without first asking the USA to get involved.”¹⁸² Nevertheless, at the end of the 1990s, the prospect of military operations

¹⁷⁸ Heisbourg et al., “European Defence,” 7.

¹⁷⁹ Van Ham, “Europe’s Common Defense Policy,” 215.

¹⁸⁰ Heisbourg et al., “European Defence,” 7.

¹⁸¹ Heisbourg et al., “European Defence,” 7.

¹⁸² Van Ham, “Europe’s Common Defense Policy,” 224.

led by the EU without interference of NATO seemed non-existent. While the ERRF could deploy 60.000 forces, more forces and a better integral command structure were needed to actually be able to execute military operations on a large scale. Questions for the next decade were for instance how the Union could facilitate these needs without duplicating “existing capabilities and institutional frameworks already existing within NATO,” and if member states would support the idea of a European defense identity outside of NATO.¹⁸³ Lastly, it would be important to discuss the territorial defense of Europe: was Europe ready to take on this responsibility, and more important, would the United States allow this shift?

Additionally, there were also other challenges for the twenty-first century. Heisbourg et al., who seem to encourage the European defense identity outside of NATO, for instance, see a lack of “operational capabilities” in the EU structure. These operational capabilities were available within NATO, but only because the United States provided these assets.¹⁸⁴ Additionally, Heisbourg et al. indicate that the “technological complexity of modern arsenals [were] widening the gap between the United States’ and [the EU’s capabilities].”¹⁸⁵ The European Union would have to invest more to ensure a similar level of defense capacity as the United States. A third concern for the first decade of the twenty-first century, as mentioned by Cristain Jordan, specialist in international cooperation, security and defense, is the dysfunctional relationship between the CSDP and NATO. Jordan feels that the relationship should be clarified and restructured as some countries, which are “members of both NATO and the EU, do not consider the relationship [...] problematic, but rather mutually supportive,” while others would rather form a European defense identity outside of NATO.¹⁸⁶

To become the geopolitical power the EU had aspired to be, these issues needed to be tackled in the new century. One of the most important issues that needed to be resolved seems the European capacity to take on its own territorial defense, and the question if the United States would agree with this. Some countries might have argued that there is no need for a substantial European defense force, as Europe still has the benefit to enjoy the protection of the United States through NATO, others, however, argued that the European command structure and the ERRF needed to be expanded into an actual European army. It is interesting to analyze these viewpoints on a national level in the Dutch parliamentary debate.

¹⁸³ Van Ham, “Europe’s Common Defense Policy,” 222.

¹⁸⁴ Heisbourg et al., “European Defence,” 46.

¹⁸⁵ Heisbourg et al., “European Defence,” 46.

¹⁸⁶ Cristian Jordan, “The Transatlantic Relation in Times of Multipolarity: European Security Implications,” *Connections* 13, no. 1 (2013): 32.

3.3 Preliminary Conclusion

The agreements that were made in the late 1990s within the EU seem to strive towards a European defense identity outside of NATO. However, NATO's Washington Summit seems to restrict these ambitions somewhat. Every time the EU calibrates its defense ambitions, NATO and specifically the United States seem to reel the Union back in.

While large steps have been made, the future of European defense outside of NATO was still undecided at the end of the 1990s. The European Union from then on spoke with 'one face and one voice' after appointment of the HR/VP. However, the implications of this function for the European defense identity were not that clear. The name already revealed the vagueness of the function. Another large step is the creation of the ERRF. However, when these troops cannot be employed via a functioning command structure with necessary military means, how much can these troops do?

Going into the twenty-first century, it was important for the EU to establish the "current and future limits" of its ambitions in the military and diplomatic sphere,¹⁸⁷ and to continue the debate about a European defense identity outside of NATO. The debate in the Netherlands might give an indication for future debates within the European Union.

3.4 Discussion of transatlantic and European defense in Dutch parliament¹⁸⁸

This paragraph contains a discussion the parliamentary debates of the Dutch House of Representatives at the end of the 1990s, around the time the aforementioned agreements were made, and the Washington Summit was held, to establish how Dutch parliament envisioned the European defense identity. The debate is structured in two conceptual categories: parties who have a pro-transatlantic defense standpoint and parties who have a pro-European defense standpoint.

3.4.1 Debate in the Netherlands: Pro-transatlantic Defense

The conservative-Christian parties, VVD, CDA, and SGP remained strong supporters of NATO throughout the 1990s. The Christian Democratic center-right party, CDA, for instance, argued that as the European defense identity was taking shape, an explicit division of tasks had to be agreed upon.¹⁸⁹ CDA perceived the European defense policy first and foremost as a part of NATO. Only if NATO did not want to be involved, Europe should be able to conduct

¹⁸⁷ Heisbourg et al., "European Defence," 2.

¹⁸⁸ NB: The minutes of parliamentary debates of the Dutch House of Representatives will be referred to as prescribed in 'De Leidraad,' a Dutch method for citing juridical and parliamentary documents. Bastiaans et al. *De Leidraad 2019*, 67.

¹⁸⁹ *Handelingen II*, 1998-99, nr. 86, p. 5035.

the Petersberg Tasks, among which peace-making, on its own.¹⁹⁰

The conservative-liberal VVD seemed to agree with CDA, arguing that they saw the enhancement of the European security and defense identity “only as acceptable if this European security and defense identity was a part of European collaboration within NATO.”¹⁹¹ VVD therefore argued that they regarded the outcome of the Cologne Council – in which the EU-members signed the ‘Declaration on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defense’ and the PSC was constructed – as quite troublesome. MP Enric Hessing argued, for instance, that the European council had always spoken about a European defense identity within NATO, but that suddenly at the Cologne Council, the European defense identity was discussed as an entity outside of NATO. He wanted a clarification from the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs whether this meant that this defense identity would entail executing the Petersberg Tasks, or if the council was pursuing a new strategy, disengaged from NATO.¹⁹² VVD once more indicates that they only wanted to see the development of a European defense identity within NATO.¹⁹³

SGP seemed to agree with everything the VDD had argued, but was even more vocal against the development of a European defense identity. SGP worried about the decisions made at Saint-Malo and reaffirmed that they were “absolutely against a separate European defense identity.”¹⁹⁴ They only support the CSDP as a part of NATO.

SGP was also very negative about the Helsinki Council. They did not support the autonomous capacity that would be able to operate outside of NATO. While they expected that the ERRF would remain a “paper tiger” for the time being, they do not support this course of action whatsoever.¹⁹⁵

GPV has shifted from an unclear stance towards the stance fellow Christian parties. GPV perceived the endeavor to construct a European defense identity somewhat more positive in the late 1990s. However, they do further clarify that they see this identity and the collaboration on a European level as necessity to ESDI within NATO. This however also means that GPV does not see the European defense identity as a source outside of NATO.¹⁹⁶

The abovementioned parties are quite clear that they do not see a European defense

¹⁹⁰ *Handelingen II*, 1998-99, nr. 86, p. 5035.

¹⁹¹ Original text: “Het is slechts acceptabel wanneer deze Europese veiligheids- en defensie-identiteit optreedt als Europese samenwerkingsvorm binnen de NAVO.”

Handelingen II, 1998-99, nr. 39, p. 2801.

¹⁹² *Handelingen II*, 1998-99, nr. 86, p. 5048.

¹⁹³ *Handelingen II*, 1998-99, nr. 86, p. 5036.

¹⁹⁴ Original text: “Mede in het licht van nieuwe initiatieven van Frankrijk en Duitsland zeg ik in dit debat graag dat mijn fractie absoluut tegen een eigen Europese defensie-identiteit is.”

Handelingen II, 1998-99, nr. 39, p. 2812.

¹⁹⁵ *Handelingen II*, 1999-00, nr. 36, p. 2809.

¹⁹⁶ *Handelingen II*, 1998-99, nr. 86, p. 5052.

identity outside of NATO. Some worry that the European defense identity will become a separate entity, and that the transatlantic bond will become strained. But the most important thing to the abovementioned parties is that the Netherlands and Europe will not lose the transatlantic tie to the United States.

3.4.2 Debate in the Netherlands: pro-European defense

In the debate in the late 1990s, almost all progressive parties speak about NATO as being a part of European defense. However, some parties also want to invest in a European defense identity outside of NATO, be it not as outspoken as they were in the early 1990s.

Social-liberal party D66, saw the declaration of Cologne as an important breakthrough. D66 regarded a larger European role in defense as a huge value. However, in the late 1990s D66 asserted that this independent role does not have to contradict the efforts of NATO or the United States.¹⁹⁷ The party's standpoint shifted from a European defense identity outside of NATO to a European defense identity outside and within NATO.¹⁹⁸ This is a divergent statement from earlier debates before the 1997, when D66 was one of the biggest supporters of the efforts to construct a European defense identity outside of NATO.

Labor party PvdA also has a slightly different approach to the European defense identity than a few years earlier. In the case of PvdA, the reason for this seems that they do not see a European defense identity outside of NATO as a possibility on a short term.¹⁹⁹ MP Frans Timmermans argued that within NATO, the European identity needed to be strengthened and enhanced.²⁰⁰ PvdA was also very positive about the Helsinki Council, and argued that the CSDP finally entailed a military dimension to support its aspirations.²⁰¹

Progressive green party GroenLinks felt that the CSDP only just started to take form. MP Paul Rosenmöller clarified GroenLinks' position by saying that they would like to see that the HR/VP would focus on improving the foreign policy of the EU. The reason for this is that they first wanted to see an established foreign policy, before the defense policy could be successfully conducted.²⁰²

While GroenLinks earlier claimed that Europe should work towards a defense identity outside of the current structures, the party assured in 1999 that it did not seek to duplicate parts of NATO, and that it did not want a self-sufficient European army. What GroenLinks

¹⁹⁷ *Handelingen II*, 1998-99, nr. 86, p. 5025.

¹⁹⁸ *Handelingen II*, 1998-99, nr. 39, p. 2806.

¹⁹⁹ *Handelingen II*, 1998-99, nr. 39, p. 2807.

²⁰⁰ *Handelingen II*, 1998-99, nr. 39, p. 2807.

²⁰¹ Original text: "Dit zal de geloofwaardigheid van het GBVB zeer ten goede komen, zal Europa de kans bieden, zijn verantwoordelijkheden ook daadwerkelijk te nemen."

Handelingen II, 1999-00, nr. 36, p. 2803

²⁰² *Handelingen II*, 1998-99, nr. 86, p. 5020.

did call for however, is “a shift in European defense, rather than reinforcement.”²⁰³ Meaning that Europe should be able to act on its own when needed, but should not try to be the sole defense capacity for Europe.

While the progressive parties are still quite positive towards a European defense identity outside of NATO, it seems that this identity was not yet as far formed to actually be able to be the sole force of European defense. The abovementioned parties therefore also reconsidered NATO as a large part of the European defense structure.

3.4.3 Debate in the Netherlands: Other Positions

There seems to be a difference from the first two junctures. In the early 1990s, some parties were very motivated to enhance European defense outside of the transatlantic sphere to see what the EU would be capable of. But after losing face in Yugoslavia and the cooperation within NATO, a shift occurred which made that the progressive parties were more reluctant to say that they envision a European defense identity specifically outside of NATO. Therefore, the two categories grew closer together: almost all parties mentioned that they saw NATO as a part of European defense, but not necessarily the other way around.

PvdA, D66, and GroenLinks remain categorized under pro-European defense even though they voiced support for NATO in the late 1990s. These progressive parties were more vocal about a European defense identity outside of NATO than the conservative-Christian parties – but also felt that an autonomous defense identity for Europe did not exist quite yet in the late 1990s.

3.5 Chapter Conclusion

Regarding both the historical context and the parliamentary debate, there seems to be a shift from the early aspirations of a European defense identity at the start of the 1990s, to the more realistic and gradual process of structuring this identity in the late 1990s through the various agreements.

Initially, Europe wanted to become this large geopolitical power with its own defense policy and identity, autonomous from NATO. However, after the events in Yugoslavia, Europe seemed to realize that it was were not quite there yet. The same situation applies to the Dutch political parties who were strongly in favor of a European defense identity outside of NATO at the time the Maastricht Treaty was established. However, this position decreased

²⁰³ Original text: “Het gaat ons meer om een verschuiving dan om een intensivering van middelen wat betreft de defensie in Europa.”
Handelingen II, 1998-99, nr. 86, p. 5020.

throughout the 1990s. While the EU agreements, like St. Malo, Cologne, and Helsinki, paved the road to a more autonomous form of European defense in the late 1990s, most pro-European parties in the Dutch House of Representatives felt that the defense identity was not yet structured sufficiently to be the sole force of European defense.

The pro-transatlantic parties however saw cooperation within NATO as key to the safety of the Netherlands and Europe. While they were somewhat hesitant about the course of the agreements made in the late 1990s, they perceived the strengthening of the European defense identity as an enforcement of ESDI and thus transatlantic collaboration within NATO.

Conclusion

This thesis aimed to chart the Dutch parliamentary debate about European defense and NATO by analyzing the position of Dutch political parties in the debate concerning European defense: What did they perceive as the preferred relation between a European defense identity and NATO in the decade after the Maastricht Treaty?

To answer this question, the decade was divided into three important junctures. In each chapter, the historical context of one of the junctures was discussed. Additionally, the analysis of the available scholarly resources is followed by a discussion of the parliamentary debates of the Dutch parliament.

Chapter one analyzed the debate about the aspirations for a European defense identity and NATO at the onset of the 1990s. In the years after the Maastricht Treaty, the EU has not been able to construct this identity outside of NATO. The United States remain in the lead within the defense of Europe. However, the ambitions to define a common security and defense policy remained on the European defense agenda. Additionally, shortly after the Maastricht Treaty there is a clear divide in the Dutch parliamentary debate between parties who plead to sustain or enlarge Dutch or European participation within NATO, which see NATO as the main and future defense structure – as opposed to parties who see this future with the Union and see a smaller role for NATO and especially the United States in European defense.

What is evident is that the European defense identity and the defense structure are still too weak in the early 90s. The conflict in Yugoslavia, as studied in chapter two, made this abundantly clear. “The hour of Europe” proved a farce. Europe did not have the means to intervene in the conflict in Bosnia. This failure was both visible in the inability to manage the conflict with boots on the ground, as in the diplomacy efforts and peace proposals that could not reach consensus. The debate in the Dutch parliament reflected the unease about the incompetent execution of European defense.

Moving towards the new century, a serious recalibration of the European aspirations for a common European defense identity was needed. Chapter three discusses the agreements that further constructed the CSDP, be it mainly as a part of NATO. Within the Dutch parliament, there seems to be a shift from the early aspirations of a European defense identity at the start of the 1990s, to the more realistic process of structuring this identity in the late 1990s. The common ground seems to be that the European defense identity and capacity are not yet structured in a manner that is sufficient enough to be the sole force of European defense, and therefore NATO is still the vehicle for the territorial defense of Europe, but also to aid in conflict resolution.

As mentioned earlier, the Netherlands has always been a loyal transatlantic ally, but is simultaneously European oriented. These two characteristics form the Dutch political identity, and are also visible in the parliamentary debates. The analysis of the three junctures clarifies that at the start of the 1990s, the progressive parties – like D66, GroenLinks, and PvdA – are very pro-European defense. They want the EU to secure its own defense, autonomously from NATO. Throughout the decade, their opinion slightly seemed to change. D66, GroenLinks, and PvdA still wanted to build a European defense identity with a fitting military capacity, but also acknowledged NATO as an important structure in the defense of Europe.

The parties who wanted to enlarge the CSDP as a part of NATO – most prominently conservative-Christian parties CDA, VVD, and SGP – do not alter their position and remain pro-transatlantic defense throughout the decade. After the Maastricht Treaty, these parties were quite critical about the ambitions and only supported the plans within the structure of NATO. At the end of the 1990s, they felt that NATO had proved itself as the main defense capacity in Europe. Their stance remained that any form of European defense should be tied to NATO. These parties supported the enlargement of Europe's military capabilities, but only to aid ESDI within NATO.

At the end of the twentieth century, Europe still had not invested enough in the European defense identity outside of NATO. The role of the HR/VP remained quite vague. Inherently, the HR/VP is the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Europe. The fact that this is not their title already shows that the framework of European integration remains inadequate. Additionally, the European Rapid Reaction Force may sound like an army, but it cannot be employed as one. Limiting Europe of providing its own territorial defense. To repeat the words of Koos van den Berg of SGP: at the end of the 1990s, the European defense identity remained a paper tiger.

Discussion and Suggestions for Further Research

This thesis sought to give an overview of European defense within and outside of NATO, and the corresponding debate in the Dutch House of Representatives. To do this, this thesis analyzed three important junctures. However, the choice for these junctures is inherently arbitrary. Other junctures could have very well been chosen to conduct this research. Additionally, the scope of this research was too limited to thoroughly analyze Europe's response to the conflict in Yugoslavia. Moreover, choices have been made as to which European agreements or NATO Summits to explore.

These limitations, however, also open doors for further research. This thesis focused on the Dutch parliamentary debate, but the same theoretical framework can be used to analyze the decisions the Dutch government has made. The framework can also be used to analyze the

public debate on European defense. Additionally, this research can also be conducted by analyzing the parliamentary debate in another EU-member state. Austria already has a similar research, in which the CFSP is addressed from an Austrian point of view.²⁰⁴

Furthermore, this thesis does not discuss the admittance of new members to NATO or the EU while this was also an important issue in the 1990s. The parliamentary debates can also be analyzed to chart how the different parties felt about admittance of new members to either NATO or the EU.

Lastly, additional research can also be conducted on the construction of the European defense identity. What is especially interesting at this time, in 2021, is that Dutch political parties speak out for or against a European army. It would be interesting to analyze how the European defense identity was further developed in the twenty-first century and what the exact nature of ‘a European Army’ would be for different parties in the House of Representatives.

²⁰⁴ Vladislava Gubalova, “The CFSP of the EU – The View from Austria,” Centre for Global Europe, published May 25, 2021, accessed June 18, 2021, <https://www.aies.at/publikationen/2021/cfsp.php>.

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Appendix 1: List of Abbreviations

CDA	Christen-Democratisch Appèl (Christian Democratic Appeal)
CESDP	Common European Security and Defense Policy
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSDP	Common Security and Defense Policy
D66	Democraten '66 (Democrats '66)
EC	European Commission
EDA	European Defense Agency
EDC	European Defense Community
EPC	European Political Co-operation
ERRF	European Rapid Reaction Force
ESDI	European Security and Defense Identity
EU	European Union
GPV	Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond (Reformed Political League)
HR/VP	The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
ICFY	The International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia
MP	Member of Parliament
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PSC	Political and Security Committee
PSP	Pacifistisch Socialistisch Partij (Pacifist Socialist Party)
PvdA	Partij van de Arbeid (Labor Party)
PvdD	Partij voor de Dieren (Party for the Animals)
RPF	Reformatorsche Politieke Federatie (Reformatory Political Federation)
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SGP	Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij (Reformed Political Party)
SP	Socialistische Partij (Socialist Party)
UN	United Nations
VVD	Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (People's Party for Freedom and Democracy)
WEU	Western European Union
WU	Western Union
YPA	Yugoslav People's Army

Appendix 2: Fraud and Plagiarism Statement

Undersigned

Maaïke Duenk, S1006577,

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declares that the submitted thesis is completely original and written exclusively by herself.

For all information and ideas derived from other sources, the undersigned made explicit and detailed references to the locations. The research data presented therein were collected by the undersigned herself in the manner described in the thesis.

Place and date:

Nijmegen, June 28, 2021

Signature:

